


**Evaluating political accountability in water projects
with the aim of determining the impact of political
accountability on project sustainability.**

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch

Supervisor: Professor A. Gouws

March 2009

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: March 2009

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Abstract

The study investigated what the degree of political accountability is in water projects as practiced by project implementers. The evaluation was also aimed at determining the impact of political accountability on project sustainability. In order to evaluate the question, field research was conducted. Field research was of a quantitative nature, using a questionnaire. This involved (a) selecting two systems (project implementers, a municipality and a non-governmental organisation) where the systems' political accountability within water projects could be compared, and (b) interviewing community respondents from a set questionnaire in four villages. The main findings are that (i) the level of political accountability in water projects depends on the system implementing a water project, (ii) three elements of political accountability (responsibility, information, and inclusion) differ significantly between the two systems, and (iii) political accountability has a significant impact on project sustainability. It is recommended that project implementers take into consideration the identified three elements of political accountability in order to improve project sustainability.

Opsomming

Die volgende studie het die graad van verantwoordbaarheid in water projekte ondersoek. Die impak van politieke verantwoordbaarheid op projek volhoubaarheid is ook ondersoek. Veldnavorsing is gebruik om die navorsingsvraag te beantwoord. Navorsing was van 'n kwantitatiewe aard (vraelyste). Navorsing het (a) die selektering van twee stelsels (nie-regeringsorganisasie en munisipaliteit) waardeur die politieke verantwoording van elk van die stelsels vergelyk is, en (b) onderhoudvoering met gemeenskapsrespondente vanaf 'n vraelys in vier geselekteerde plattelandse dorpies, behels. Die hoofbevindinge is (i) die graad van politieke verantwoording in 'n water projek is afhanklik van die projek implementeerder, (ii) drie elemente van politieke verantwoordbaarheid verskil betekenisvol tussen die twee stelsels (projek implementeerders), en (iii) politieke verantwoordbaarheid het 'n betekenisvolle impak op projek volhoubaarheid. Daar word voorgestel dat projek implementeerders die posisie van die drie geïdentifiseerde elemente (verantwoordelikheid, inligting, en insluiting) binne elke stelsel in ag neem om sodoende projek volhoubaarheid te bevorder.

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Glossary

The following terms are used within the study and needs clarification:

Water project – a water provision project, at village level, which can provide water through in-house connections, standpipes every 200 metres, a borehole, and/or a water reservoir.

Project implementer – a governmental or non-governmental institution authorised to implement the abovementioned water projects.

Project beneficiary – a person within a village who is the target beneficiary of a water project.

Community – members of a village where a water project has been implemented; the community can therefore also be described as project beneficiaries.

Water committee – a committee, established by the community, closely involved with all matter dealing with water provision in the specific village.

Community meeting – a meeting that can be called by a project implementer, through the village chief, or by the chief in order to discuss matters (social, economic, political, or other) believed to have a direct bearing on the village.

Project sustainability – a water project that remains functioning for a long time after the project implementer has established the project.

Mopani district – the geographical location within which the two key water projects are located.

Standpipe – a watertap built either within a household yard or outside the yard, acting as a communal tap.

Political accountability - the essential elements of political accountability are *responsibility, information, inclusion, sanctioning, and credibility* (please see the literature study for a more detailed discussion).

*I lie down and sleep;
I wake again, because the Lord sustains me.*

Psalm 3:5

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1996 a new Constitution was introduced in South Africa. A new constitution was necessary to establish democracy and address past practices within the country. One effect the Constitution brought is changes in the structure and operation of local government (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518). This has taken place in order for local government to (a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) promote social and economic development; (d) promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (RSA 1996, section 152).

Although the Constitution highlights that government should be accountable it is difficult to know for certain whether this decision-maker is being accountable. One can hope that, in general, a decision-maker is accountable. But what are the requirements for accountability? Can a decision-maker meet only one requirement and still be regarded as accountable? Also, is there a difference between a government institution and a non-governmental organization with regards to the degree of political accountability practiced by each actor?

The following study evaluates what political accountability should, ideally, incorporate. This evaluation revealed that there are not many studies focused on detailed description of political accountability, and specifically, *measurement* of political accountability. It was also found that precise definition of what accountability entails is rarely provided in documents. Inadequate provision of a precise definition has two major outcomes. One result is that persons within a government institution or NGO have little guidance in how to *implement* accountability. The second result is that the public finds it difficult to evaluate whether the actions and behaviour of the government institution are accountable.

A water project in a community/village becomes an ideal method in which to evaluate whether a decision-maker on a local level acts in a manner that can be described as politically accountable. A water project at local level is, arguably, a smaller 'object' that can be influenced by citizens, compared to influencing a national 'object' like, for example, revising the electoral system. In a water project a process is followed which

can be observed by citizens going to benefit from such a project. Because the project follows a process, there is, probably, opportunity for citizens/community members to influence decision-making. Community members are, furthermore, in a position to evaluate how a project decision-maker/implementer establishes the water project. Laban's (2007) study considers accountability and rights in local water governance. His study indicates that both decision-makers as well as beneficiaries need to be accountable in local water governance in order for this resource to be utilised in a sustainable manner.

The ability to influence and evaluate decisions and behaviour of a decision-maker is essential in the practice of political accountability. It implies that (a) during a project, citizens are able to influence decision-makers via participatory measures and (b) during a project and after a project is completed, citizens are able to evaluate firstly, the project outcome and secondly, the participation of the decision-maker in the project.

Water projects, therefore, serve as a means of evaluating political accountability as practiced by government as well as non-governmental institutions involved in water provision. Approaching the evaluation of political accountability within the context of water provision has an added benefit for the study: it can be evaluated whether political accountability has an impact on the outcome of a project (or, the sustainability of a project). The research question that will be investigated is:

Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political accountability impact project sustainability?

In order to measure political accountability in water projects, four projects were selected in the northern region of South Africa. Similar to the rest of South Africa, the region is regarded as a low-rainfall area. Water access is therefore already of critical importance within the region. At the same time, it was obvious that water infrastructure within a village does not guarantee that water is provided to a community supposed to benefit from this infrastructure. From the research question it is evident that the study aims to determine whether political accountability in water projects would contribute to project sustainability, thereby ensuring water access to communities within a low-rainfall region.

Six chapters are presented for this study in order to address the research question. First, the introduction has highlighted that there are not many studies that provides evaluation of political accountability. The importance of the following study lies in its evaluation and measurement of political accountability in a real-life issue.

Second, the literature review focused on political accountability and what the concept entails. The literature considers (a) what other authors believe political accountability entails and (b) a section discussing which elements this study will employ in order to measure political accountability. In the literature study attention is also paid to a list of responsibilities as stated by two project implementers. This list of responsibilities serves as a valuable element within the questionnaire measuring political accountability in water projects.

Third, the context in which political accountability will be study is provided. This includes considering the water situation of the geographical area where the field research was undertaken; village demographics in which the selected water projects were established; and the importance attached to political accountability by two project implementers. This chapter also provides a more detailed rationale for the study.

Fourth, the methodology for the study is provided. In short, the methodology includes designing a questionnaire measuring political accountability in community-level water projects. Statistical methods utilised to analyse the data are also provided.

Thereafter the data analysis gathered through the field research is provided. In this chapter the findings of the data are presented. Data analyses include (a) presenting frequency graphs of selected variables believed to provide a reliable overview of the data (b) exploratory analysis of the data (c) discussing variables in the questionnaire in great detail (d), comparing the four water projects throughout the chapter and (e) presenting an overall analysis of the data which summarises key findings.

Lastly, chapter 6, the conclusion summarises the main findings of the study and discusses the contribution of this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Study

2. Literature Study

The chapter is divided into three sections. In this first section, other studies' contribution towards an understanding of political accountability is highlighted. A number of these studies do not address essential areas of political accountability and as such creates the space for a new study of accountability. The second section places political accountability within the context of democracy and good governance. This context is important when considering the concept within the South African environment. The last section is valuable since it provides an understanding of what political accountability should *ideally* focus on. In this section elements of political accountability are identified. These elements form the basis for the measurement of accountability in this study.

2.1 Unpacking the concept 'political accountability'

Political accountability is a concept that does not appear to have a “watertight” definition. Accountability acquires a variety of meanings depending on the actor using it as well as the context in which it is being used¹. It is essential to clarify the meaning ascribed to accountability in order to prevent confusion when linking this concept to water projects.

A general observation is that accountability takes place *through* another concept, such as stakeholder participation. It is not a concept that is visible on its own. Political accountability is, furthermore, usually discussed within the context of, for example, executive-legislative relationships, electorate-political representative relationships, or bureaucracy-elected official relationships (Allan 2001; Dunn 1999). As a result, discussions about political accountability reflect these contexts and rarely look at everyday accountability, as “exercised” in, for example, water projects.


In essence, political accountability implies that actor A gives account to actor B for its actions and decisions towards actor B. This involves that actor A provides explanation and justification for its decisions and actions.

There are different “directions” of political accountability within an accountability relationship. The different directions indicate who is/should be accountable to whom.

¹ For example, when accountability is used within the context of the financial world, it refers to accountability within the budgeting process of an institution and not necessarily to social accountability towards stakeholders.

These directions indicate an accountability relationship between different actors (see figure 1).

Figure 1 Directions of accountability



These directions are explained by Barker’s (2001:138) overview of different forms of accountability. Barker identifies:

- (a) Upwards accountability – accountability towards a controlling authority which I term *superiors*;
- (b) Downwards/explanatory accountability – a less formally based accountability that offers open explanation and a chance to raise questions and criticisms;
- (c) Outwards accountability – “whereby a public body or office-holder offers and receives mutual accountability to and from other relevant players in the public (and even the private) sector, to form a network of open, discursive relationships aimed at tackling public policy problems”; in short I refer to this as the relationship between the decision-maker and *colleagues* although these colleagues need not be from the same institution as the decision-maker;
- (d) Ex-ante accountability – “an elaborate planning enquiry into a proposed...project”; and
- (e) Ex-post accountability – “accountability and responsibility in policy choices...to help protect [against]...accidents or policy failures” (Barker 2001:138).

This overview indicates that political accountability is ensured through relationships between different actors. One can distinguish that accountability is a two-way process. There are certain measures that need to be practised by the project implementer. As will be later discussed, these measures include fulfilling specified responsibilities and fostering participation. At the same time, superiors, colleagues,

and stakeholders need to employ other measures in order to complete the accountability process. This includes using the sanctioning device.

The basic definition provided for political accountability is useful. However, once the concept needs to be measured, it becomes apparent that there needs to be *elements* which can be measured in order to determine whether actor A has acted accountably towards actor B. Political accountability, therefore, consists of a number of elements. These elements will be highlighted in this chapter.

In a number of laws as well as in documents referring to service delivery, mention is made of the need for an institution to be accountable to stakeholders. The reason stated usually refers to accountability being important for monitoring an institution's operations. The essential role of political accountability is therefore established in these documents. Despite the concept's perceived importance there is rarely, if at all, methods highlighted in which an institution's political accountability can be measured. Arguably, this can be resolved by considering what academics write about the concept and its measurement. Section 2.2 highlights a number of areas that writers believe the concept entails. However, as highlighted in the section, these areas do not necessarily provide an adequate description of political accountability. Measurement of the concept becomes challenging.

In order to use Barker's framework as well as determine measurement of the concept one needs to know what exactly political accountability entails. The following section considers how political accountability is promoted/ensured.

2.2 Selected studies' contribution towards understanding political accountability

A number of studies contributed to the focus of this study. All these studies agree on the necessity of accountability within democratic practice. This section highlights that studies about political accountability have focused on aspects of the concept. These studies do *not* necessarily highlight that accountability is ensured, only, when a number of aspects are pursued in *unity*.

The following section highlight that a number of studies on political accountability (a) see accountability as a sanctioning device, (b) focus on elections as sufficient to ensure political accountability, (c) focus on national-level comparisons instead of

evaluating the practice of accountability by organisations, (d) link outcomes of political accountability to a healthy political culture and not necessarily tangible outcomes for people, and (e) at times, evaluate accountability within a variety of contexts simultaneously, instead of focusing on one area and reaching detailed conclusions about political accountability in that one area.

2.2.1 Viewing accountability as a sanctioning device

Accountability is commonly viewed as a means of sanctioning one actor when it has not fulfilled certain obligations towards another actor (Fearon 1999:55,56; Dunn 1999; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-296; Dunn 1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:132-140; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; 232; Fearon 1999:55,56; Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4; Rubenstein 2007:616,617; Montesquieu 1989[1748]:xi,4 as amended by Dunn 1999a:336; Zhao 2007:64-73; Cloete 1996:20).

Accountability as a sanctioning device presents an opportunity to punish or penalise people who are acting contrary to what they are supposed. It is focused on the relationship between one actor towards another (specifically considering whether one actor acts in the interest of another), thereby ensuring accountability (Fearon 1999:55,56; Dunn 1999:297-300; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-282,294,295; Dunn 1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:133,137-140; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225,232; Fearon 1999:55,56; Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4; Rubenstein 2007:616,617; Montesquieu 1989[1748]:xi,4 as amended by Dunn 1999a:336; Zhao 2007:64-73). Cloete (1996:20) states that accountability should be more than answerability/giving an explanation. “Accountability should be enforced by purposeful control, punishment for wrongdoing, and compensation for the persons or parties prejudiced by the wrongdoing” (Cloete 1996:20).

In this way, accountability is seen as a legal device, used by one actor, to sanction (or *control*) the actions and behaviour of another actor. It is a device that is relevant in democracies as well as non-democracies².

In the “traditional” sense of using accountability as a sanctioning device, accountability means that the public can punish or penalise rulers when these rulers do not fulfil their

² This is because all forms of ruling have a system/hierarchy of authority that needs to be limited (through measures of accountability).

duties to the public. Zhao (2007:64-73), however, highlights that rulers can also use this mechanism in order to evaluate public performance and then reward or punish the public accordingly³. This study clearly highlights that when accountability is viewed, purely, as a sanctioning device, it can easily be limited to a mechanism of extreme control over another actor.

Crook and Manor (1998:298) highlight that “softer” sanctioning measures are sometimes more beneficial to ensure accountability. One such “soft” measure is the role that committee systems play. Committee systems are able to facilitate improved engagement and inclusion of the public in decision-making. Through these actions, committee systems serve as vehicles for *monitoring or sanctioning* government actions and decisions.

Accountability, certainly, needs to include sanctioning within its operation. However, studies viewing accountability’s most important role as being a sanctioning device sometimes neglect to consider whether this device will be effective in making an impact on the system of a country or institution.

2.2.2 Viewing elections as sufficient to ensure accountability

One of the end-objectives a number of authors argue is that accountability is a device to compel one actor to be *responsive* to the interests and needs of another actor (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4,5; Nelson 2007:79-97; Metagora 2007; Dunn 1999:131,299; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225).

A familiar mechanism believed to compel one actor to be responsive to the interests and needs of another, is elections (Bruch et al 2005 in Ashton 2007:86; Fearon 1999:56; Dunn 1999:298,299; Dunn 1999a:342,343; Stimson 1999:198; Barker 2001:132; Dunn 1999:298; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232; Crook and Manor 1998:233,290-299).

Despite a general belief that elections (as an accountability device) will compel a political actor to be responsive to the interests and needs of the public, Nelson

³ Zhao Shukai (2007) presents a study about Chinese township accountability. Chinese (rural) townships are required by government to fulfil certain targets, which include economic, social, and political targets. If these targets are not reached by a township/village the township is penalised.

(2007:80-83) argues that findings suggest that elections are *unlikely* to positively influence social sector outcomes, such as increased welfare spending or service delivery outcomes.

It should also be noted that although elections is viewed as a mechanism to ensure political accountability, a number of studies argue that, on its own, elections are insufficient to ensure accountability (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232,237,239; Fearon 1999:57,68,69; Stimson 1999:199; Crook and Manor 1998:294; Laver and Shepsle 1999:294; Dunn 1999:299).

Elections can only serve as an accountability mechanism during election times, which is periodic. It is not necessarily that public interests and needs are addressed once a party has been elected as government. Elections, furthermore, do not necessarily hold leaders accountable. Instead, fellow politicians may serve as a more likely means to hold leaders accountable (Stimson 1999:199; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232,237,239; Bruch et al in Ashton 2007:86). It is obvious that accountability needs to be ensured *between* elections as well.

2.2.3 Focusing on national-level comparisons

The *range* of accountability studies is another aspect that needs further attention. Mathur and Skelcher (2004:2,5) highlight that studies about democratic performance⁴ are, largely, focused on national-level comparisons of whole democratic systems (or formal constitutional structures). Little attention is given to the measurement of “the underlying discourses and associated practices that take place in and around the formal constitution⁵” (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:2).

Measuring the level of accountability in a whole democratic system is very beneficial to get an impression of where the particular country is heading within the context of governance. However, as Mathur and Skelcher (2004) highlight, the practices taking place “in and around the formal constitution” requires attention. In this sense, a study about accountability needs to include methods of measuring how democracy is practised at all levels in a country. These areas can be viewed as the political

⁴ Accountability forms part of the overall democratic performance within a country or organisation.

⁵ Colm, Allan 2001 (commentary about executive-legislative-judiciary relationships); Dunn 1999a; Barker 2001; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1999:134; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-285; Stimson 1999

“muscles” of a country. The constitution provides the structure (or skeleton); but it is the muscles’ functioning that makes the skeleton move in a certain way. If accountability is not completely ingrained at the “practising” level, it is unlikely that constitutional provisions will be able to ensure accountability on a national scale.

2.2.4 Accountability, a healthy political culture, and considering accountability in just one given area

Two studies that made a large impact on the focus of the study are the studies from Rubenstein (2007) and Laban (2007). Rubenstein (2007:616-632) highlights that it is difficult, at times, to ensure accountability in a world characterised by unequal relationships⁶. To compensate for this situation, the author suggests another type of accountability: surrogate accountability. Surrogate accountability describes a situation where less powerful actors can demand accountability from a more powerful actor via a “surrogate”. Rubenstein (2007) illustrates this by arguing that in the context of foreign aid, donors can act “as surrogates for aid recipients by sanctioning NGOs that fail to meet accepted standards of aid provision, but aid recipients cannot sanction donors”. Rubenstein’s reference to power-relationships makes the study valuable when considering the context in which accountability is practised on an everyday basis.

Similar to other studies, Rubenstein (2007:620,621) highlights benefits associated with ensuring accountability. These benefits are, however, not “concrete⁷”. In a sense, they can be considered as values necessary for a healthy political culture. This is of real value when focusing on the strength of democracy within a country. Still, the benefits highlighted by Rubenstein (2007) do not include tangible outcomes, such as improved service delivery or a healthy environment. The tangible benefits are what the following water project study is concerned with. Although my study agrees that accountability is valuable in fostering healthy democratic values; it is important to highlight that people want, and need, an outcome that is visible. People want to see an improvement in their living conditions, especially if those living conditions are of such a nature that it makes it difficult to survive.

⁶ If one actor has more power than another, it is difficult for the less powerful actor to demand accountability from the more powerful actor.

⁷ The benefits of accountability include “promoting rule following”; “promoting substantive or procedural norms”; “promoting civic virtues”.

Rubenstein's study also looks at accountability in a *variety of areas*, although these areas all share a similar theme of power-relationships and the impact thereof on accountability. In contrast to Rubenstein and the other studies, the following study is limited to evaluating accountability within one area, namely, water projects. This is believed to keep the study focused and to discover the importance of accountability in the sustainability of water projects. Through this, the value of political accountability can be evaluated in a single practical situation.

The second influential study is by Laban (2007:355-367) and considers accountability and rights in local water governance. The important element that Laban highlights is that both decision-makers as well as beneficiaries (of water projects) should be accountable. This is essential in order to ensure successful management of water resources (2007:355-358). Laban's study is important because it highlights that accountability should be practised by all actors, and not just by decision-makers.

2.3 Placing Political Accountability within the context of Democracy and Good Governance

It is generally agreed, on a national and international level, that South Africa is a democratic country. Reference made by a country about its believed democratic foundation is in most cases accompanied by outspokenness to a commitment to good governance. A study about political accountability requires using the concept within a specific political system. The political system context allows discussing political accountability in more detail than a general discussion would have provided. Because of the belief in South Africa's status as a democratic country, the following study places political accountability within the environment of *democracy* and *good governance*.

2.3.1 Political Accountability and Democracy

A number of authors confirm the importance of accountability within democracy⁸. Besides accountability, there are a number of elements that are associated with democracy. Some of these concepts include free and fair elections, a judiciary that is independent of the executive, a civilian government (the armed forces are not in control of government), the rule of law is upheld, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of

⁸ A number of authors emphasises the importance of accountability in democracy. These authors include Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., and Bernard, M. (in Dunn 1999a:329-344), Dunn (1999a) and Mathur and Skelcher (2004).


speech, and more. These characteristics remain in place when they are built into a system of accountability. For example, elections keep politicians accountable to voter needs and demands; an independent judiciary can keep the executive accountable for decisions it takes; by having a civilian government, the armed forces are kept accountable to serve citizens and not to rule over them by force; upholding the rule of law holds everyone accountable to act within the law; and lastly, civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, serves as an additional way to hold the government accountable for its actions or behaviour.

Democracy cannot be defined without making mention of accountability, unless every individual in such a political system has an exemplary moral character that will guide his/her actions and behaviour towards others. Accountability is, therefore, integrated into a system practising democracy: it strengthens the governance system for the benefit of the demos (the public).

Forming part of the foundation of democracy is the idea of ‘democratic anchorage’ (Sorensen and Torfing 2003 in Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4). Mathur and Skelcher (2004:4) argue that institutions of public governance should operate from this platform. Democratic anchorage links collectively determined goals to activity and performance within a governance network. The concept of democratic anchorage, itself, highlights the importance of legitimacy, consent and accountability within democracies (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:5). The implication is that accountability, as an element of democratic anchorage, guides activity, performance and goals within a governance network. Similarly, in a study focusing on water projects, the activity, performance and goals within the project are highlighted.

Figure 2 illustrates the above:

Figure 2 Democratic Anchorage



Without using the term *democratic anchorage*, Dunn (1999a) supports Mathur and Skelcher’s (2004) argument “that institutions of public governance should operate from

this platform". Dunn (1999a:329) argues that democracy supports the need for and correctness of public and collective action, providing *legitimacy* to politics.

At the same time, democracy accepts that there is a system of authority/hierarchy of authority, where "those who command are different from those who obey". This hierarchy presents potential hazards to the political system, which democratic states aim to curtail (Dunn 1999a:329). *Political accountability* is used to "control" these potential hazards (Dunn 1999a:332). Political accountability serves as a system of sanctions that highlights to all individuals that certain forms of behaviour are "especially unwelcome".

Furthermore, political accountability "assuages the bitterness of political defeat, and gives those who would otherwise have little motive to do so a reason for staying in the game" (Dunn 1999a:332). In effect, persons *consent* to the rule of a specific government.

In essence, institutions of public governance should operate from a platform, among other things, of accountability. This means *accountability* plays a large part in guiding activity, performance and goals of public governance institutions.

Political accountability is integrated even more within the context of democracy. Dunn (1999a) argues that

[d]emocratic accountability is best seen as a relation between the past acts of those who exercise public power and their future personal liabilities. Its core site is the degree to which rulers, in a democracy, are effectively compelled to describe what they are doing while they are ruling us, and to explain why they take this to be appropriate: to give us...reasons for their actions. So conceived, the relation of accountability holds fully where persons exercising public powers are

- (1) liable for their actions in exercising these powers,
- (2) predictably identifiable as agents in the exercise of these powers to those to whom they are liable,
- (3) effectively sanctionable for these acts once performed, and
- (4) knowably so sanctionable for them in advance... (Dunn 1999a:335,336)⁹.

The above highlights that even though it may become "political attractive", at times, to reduce the necessity for legitimacy, consent and accountability (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:5) "... what is necessary is that one power should be in a position to stop another: to bring it to halt" (Montesquieu 1989 [1748]: xi, 4, p155, Dunn 1999a:336 had amended the translation). . An actor may argue that "through a more focused and potentially private relationship with the principal" one can achieve the same democratic objectives as when

⁹ It is important, however, to recognize that the "formal apparatus of the modern constitutional representative constitutional democracy is far from ensuring accountability in any of these four senses" (Dunn 1999a:335,336).

it operated from a platform of democratic anchorage. However, political accountability is necessary, as Montesquieu highlights, in order bring one actor to a halt for the safety/welfare of others. Furthermore, as soon as an actor reduces the necessity for accountability (and legitimacy and consent), the means of linking activity and performance to collectively determined goals are weakened (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:5).

One of the most visible activities with which one associates political accountability is *government elections*. This is a means of bringing one actor to a halt and to highlight that there are boundaries to what rulers can do (Bruch et al 2005 in Ashton 2007:86; Fearon 1999:56; Dunn 1999:298,299; Dunn 1999a:342,343; Stimson 1999:198; Barker 2001:132; Dunn 1999:298; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232; Crook and Manor 1998:204;292-300). As mentioned, elections are not sufficient to ensure political accountability *between* elections (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:237; Fearon 1999:56,57,68,69; Ferejohn 1999:133,134; Stimson 1999:199; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232,238,239; Crook and Manor 1998:294; Laver and Shepsle 1999:294; Dunn 1999a:335; Dunn 1999:299). A definition about political accountability needs to include measuring the concept during election times as well as between elections.

In conclusion, political accountability is an essential concept within democratic thinking. It plays an important role in how the relationship between actors develops and turns out. It also acts as a tool to keep those that are in power within certain boundaries. In this way, political accountability acts as a form of guidance to those in power whilst protecting those who are subjected to this authority. Dunn (1999a:337) mentions that accountability can easily take on a purely symbolic status, in “the overwhelming deliberative complexity of contemporary politics” (Dunn 1999a:337). Although political accountability has a precarious position, it is a concept that is relevant to everyday political and social action. For this reason, the level of democracy practised within a country will only be as good as the importance each of its elements, of which political accountability is one, enjoys in practice.

2.3.2 Political Accountability and Good Governance

Accountability is clearly a fundamental element of democracy. 2.3.1 ended by highlighting that accountability is indicative of *how well* democracy is practised. The

importance that accountability enjoys is, in a large part, dependent on how much emphasis is placed on good governance (within a country, but also within an organisation). For this reason a short overview of how accountability forms part of good governance is important.

Heywood (2002:6) argues that governance refers to “the various ways through which social life is coordinated”. A government is only one of the institutions involved in coordinating social life in one country. Heywood highlights that “the development of new forms of public management, the growth of public-private partnerships, the increasing importance of policy networks, and the greater impact of both supranational and subnational organisations” reflect a “blurring of the state/society distinction” (Heywood 2002:6). Heywood (2002:6) also states that some associate governance with a reliance on consultation and bargaining instead of command and control mechanisms.

There has been a gradual move towards involving more actors in coordinating social life or providing essential services (Heywood 2006:6). The result is that these “new” actors and ways of providing services (partnerships) needs to be guided by a tentative “philosophy”. This is reflected in the concept of good governance. Generally, most government institutions and private organisations support democratic principles. Once these principles are being incorporated in the operation of these institutions and organisations it is reflected as good governance.

Ashton (2007:77) highlights that good governance includes the partnership between government, civil society and science. This partnership promotes responsible resource management, whereby accountability and transparency are fostered.

A good governance system depends on five key principles: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These five principles should be *explicit* in every decision-making process that affects the livelihoods of stakeholders (Ashton 2007:86). Such a system is very focused on engaging all stakeholders in every step of decision-making processes (Ashton 2007:85).

Governance incorporates three key components, namely:

- A guiding ‘philosophy’, or core set of agreed operating principles;

- The preferred 'process' that guides the way that people interact with each other and with institutions; and
- A desired set of 'products' or outcomes (Ashton 2007:86).

Accountability is one of the principles of governance. For this reason, I use the above framework as a structure in my study on political accountability. Political accountability as a philosophy has already been touched on in the previous section that considered accountability's place in democracy. Of more importance is the process that guides the way people interact with each other. Elements of this process includes focusing on:

- Meeting responsibilities/obligations
- Including people, and engaging with them
- Providing information
- Maintaining credibility
- Being able to sanction a decision-maker

These elements are discussed in the following section. After considering these elements that constitute the process (of how accountability is practised), the outcomes (or products) remain to be discussed. Within the context of water projects I would expect the outcome to mean that water is provided to the community, and that this provision takes place on a sustainable basis.

2.4 Deciding on five elements to use in measuring political accountability

Careful deliberation contributed to a decision to include five elements as encapsulating political accountability. These five elements are responsibility, information, inclusion, credibility, and sanctioning. Literature, confirming the importance of these elements, is provided in the following section considering the five elements.

2.4.1 Accountability and Responsibility

One way in which to determine the level of political accountability within an area or system is to evaluate whether the decision-maker has fulfilled its responsibilities. When considering Figure 1 (p6) depicting Barker's framework of the directions of accountability, this means evaluating the implementer's responsibilities in relation to its superiors, stakeholders, and colleagues.

Responsibility is linked to the measurement of accountability as follows:

Firstly, "...[o]ne person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction and reward A for [its] activities or performance in this capacity" (Fearon 1999:55).

Secondly, political accountability is concerned with the understanding of (a) what activities or performance an actor is accountable for (Fearon 1999:55,56), (b) what obligations are owed by one set of actors *to another* and finally *to the public* (Uhr 1992, 1993a in Dunn 1999:298), and (c) defining to whom an decision-maker is *answerable* (Caiden 1988:34,35 in Dunn 1999:298). Practising accountability through meeting certain responsibilities, in effect, means that actor A should 'give account' to actor B (Barker 2001:137-139; Dunn 1999:298).

Lastly, Cloete (1996:74) argues that "[a]ccountability relates to the acceptable or unacceptable exercise of powers and the performance of functions". Making use of the Constitution, Cloete (1996:18,19) continues by arguing "responsibility relates to making an institution or a functionary liable for the performance of specific functions. Accountability requires institutions and functionaries to explain the positive as well as the negative results obtained from the performance of the functions entrusted to them". This view is reflected by Lawton and Rose (1993:16-17 in Cloete 1996:19) who state that "[a]ccountability is the enforcement of responsibility".

Some of the responsibilities that an actor should meet in order to ensure accountability include:

- promoting openness (transparency) in the decision-making process (SADC 2008; Johnston:no date);
- providing descriptions, explanations and justifications for actions and behaviour (Dunn 1999:297-300; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-282,294,295; Dunn 1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:133,137-140; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225,232);
- accepting responsibility when decisions do not work out as planned as a result of actions or behaviour of actor A;
- accepting responsibility for unlawful actions;

- engaging in debate with stakeholders, superiors and colleagues about decisions (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517);
- providing evaluation of decisions which allows critics to learn how decisions or actions have turned out;
- provide sufficient definition of employees' duties in order for the definition to guide those employees' actions (Dunn 1999:300);
- providing a positive, honest and responsive reaction to enquiries, service requests and complaints (Barker 2001:134); and
- adhering to a set of common principles that define 'good governance' (Ashton 2005 in Ashton 2007:87).

From the above, an actor is also obligated to (a) have the *capacity* to take certain decisions (Dunn 1999:299; Crook and Manor 1998:233,291), (b) show full commitment to its duties (Ashton 2007:77), (c) possess certain moral characteristics necessary for good governance (Fearon 1999:59,67,68), and (d) act according to national and international legislation.

In a situation where the implementer do not possess the necessary skills, knowledge or expertise in order to fulfil its obligations, other actors need to be included, or partnerships formed (Kings 2007¹⁰). Especially in "countries whose governments *lack sufficient resources* to discharge their *responsibilities effectively*" these partnerships are essential (IUCN-ROSA 2001 in Ashton 2007:82).

2.4.2 Accountability means stakeholders are included

The inclusion and engagement with other actors describes the concept of participation within a specific context. Within this study, *participation* is used as an element of political accountability. Smith and Hanson (2003:1517) define the process in which "all groups participate in decision-making" on matters pertaining to service delivery, as 'procedural equity'. According to the authors, both procedural and distributive equity (who gets what and where in service delivery) are necessary components in "societies in transition". These two types of equity ensure "democratic accountability in service delivery..." (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517).

¹⁰Kings, J. 2007. Interview, Tzaneen.

The inclusion of actors is viewed as essential in response to “the growing demands from society for governments to be more accountable and transparent” (MacKay and Ashton in Ashton 2007:85).

It is taken that this inclusion means that

- actors’ existing expertise and experience is made use of in decision-making processes;
- a good relationship between actors is fostered and maintained;
- actors are included in every step of the decision-making process;
- actors’ opinion on relevant issues is sought during the decision-making process; and
- formal measures are in place that require and prescribe actor inclusion and engagement.

The inclusion and engagement with other actors (a) contribute to exacting responsibility¹¹ from politicians (Barker 2001:132), (b) influence how decision-makers act or behave (Barker 2001:132,138), (c) contribute to sustainable outcomes when all actors participate at all levels of managing a natural resource (Ashton 2007:85,94), (d) strengthen accountability when actors are included in every step of the decision-making process, and not only once the final decision is being made¹² (Kings 2007¹³), and (e) enhance the relationship between the decision-maker and other actors¹⁴ (Crook and Manor 1998:299).

Although public participation enhances the level of political accountability within an area or system, it is believed the degree to which decision-makers consult with stakeholders is dependent on “*the structures of accountability*” or *practising accountability at the institutional level* (Crook and Manor 1998:233). Crook and Manor’s (1998) study indicates that public participation is not sufficient, on its own, to ensure political

¹¹ The previous section established that ‘meeting responsibilities’ forms part of the concept of political accountability; therefore, inclusion and engagement with other actors enforces an element of accountability. It is also evident that this participation is closely linked to ensuring political accountability through being involved in the decision-making process of, for instance, a water project.

¹² Good governance’s dependence on five key principles, including accountability, argues that the principles should be clear in “every decision-making process that affects the livelihoods of stakeholders”.

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Establishing a relationship with another (for example, between stakeholders and the project implementer) makes it more likely that a project implementer will feel compelled to act in a more accountable manner than in a situation where no relationship has been formed.

accountability¹⁵. It is necessary that participation be linked to other elements (as all the other elements of accountability) in order to ensure political accountability.

2.4.3 Accountability and having information

The general impression gained from literature focused on accountability is that B should be able to determine what A is doing. Otherwise, how would B know A is accountable? Having access to information on A's actions or behaviour allows B to "observe" A's actions or behaviour. But, having access to information does not entirely solve B's search to determine A's actions. An added requirement is that B will be able to *use* this information to evaluate and determine A's actions.

Within the context of good governance accountability needs to be

- "visible",
- understandable, and
- accessible to affected stakeholders throughout the decision-making process.

This is only possible when stakeholders have access to information and are able to use this information.

Without access to, and the ability to use information, not one of the other elements of accountability would function optimally. For instance, in order to sanction (see 2.2.1) actor A (i) information is required on who should fulfil which obligations, (ii) information is essential in order to determine what A's responsibility is towards the stakeholders, (iii) it has to be clear in what way the decision-maker has *failed* in its responsibility towards stakeholders (Laver and Shepsle 1999:279; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:230¹⁶), and (iv) information is needed on how actor A should be sanctioned.

Within a system, stakeholders need access to information in order to evaluate (a) how decisions and actions are turning out (b) whether decisions and actions have turned out as planned. In this sense, it is taken that mechanisms of accountability include

¹⁵ This is because (a) a "supportive social and political context" is necessary for "accountability of bureaucrats and executive authorities both to elected representatives and to legal/administrative mechanisms" (Crook and Manor 1998:291); (b) in a case study of Ghana a "positive record of participation and consultation in Ghana did not prevent Ghanaian institutions from performing poorly" with regards accountability towards the public (Crook and Manor 1998:290); and (c) public participation at the local, or project, level will have little effect if political accountability is not promoted at the institutional level (Crook and Manor 1998:299).

¹⁶ In Cheibub and Przeworski's (1999:230) study, focused on voting, they highlight that it is important that voters should be able to determine whom they should sanction. Voters thus have a "clarity of responsibility".

- being able to identify the decision-makers;
- observing what decision-makers are doing;
- determining whether these actions fall within the decision-maker's responsibility;
- being able to interpret whether actions are in the public interest or not; and
- being provided with information when decisions are debated, taken and executed (Barker 2001:133,138-140; Dunn 1999a:334-343; Ashton 2007:77,87,88; Fearon 1999:67-130); and
- all actors should clearly *understand* their roles and responsibilities and be provided with definitions of these roles and responsibilities (Ashton et al 2005 in Ashton 2007:87; Ashton 2007:87,88; Dunn 1999:300).

2.4.4 Political accountability and credibility

Credibility means that what an institution promises to do is what it does in reality. In this sense, an organisation should have specific procedures and protocol that will be followed in order to guide actions. Through following these procedures and protocol all individuals in the organisation know what actions and behaviour are required of them. The result is that whatever was promised by the institution is delivered.

Furthermore, credibility means that stakeholders can *trust* in the institution to deliver on these promises. Without credibility, an institution may be hampered¹⁷ in fulfilling its responsibilities.

Institutional accountability *mechanisms* also need to enjoy credibility in order to be relevant ensuring political accountability (Laver and Shepsle 1999:281). This is because institutional mechanisms and the institutional discretion of actors allows (a) actors to evaluate how well a implementer met its responsibilities (b) sanction the decision-maker if necessary and (c) be in a position to bring a implementer to halt when it moves outside certain boundaries (Laver and Shepsle 1999:285). The credibility of these mechanisms is, furthermore, essential for the “health” of the accountability relationship between a decision-maker and its superiors, the stakeholders, and colleagues. The reason for this is that there needs to be a measure of belief in the institution and accountability

¹⁷ For instance, where an institution do not enjoy credibility in the eyes of the community where a water project is to be implemented, the community can show its disapproval of the institution by not participating in project discussion forums or through misuse of project infrastructure.

mechanisms, on the part of those three actors, in order for the mechanisms to be utilised and for it to be effective.

It is important to note that actors may view accountability mechanisms or an institution as credible even though the mechanisms do not provide benefits to everyone. For instance, actors may attach credibility to a mechanism for the only reason that a political party, with historical significance, has established the mechanism. As a result, credibility does not necessarily *lead* to real political accountability. However, in combination with the other elements, credibility strengthens political accountability.

2.4.5 Accountability as a sanctioning device

Accountability as a sanctioning device was discussed in the previous section. However, what remains to be highlighted is that political accountability can only be ensured when all its elements are pursued in unison. Every element supports the functioning of another element. In this way political accountability is fostered within a specific context or system.

2.5 Highlighting the importance of selected elements for the research study

Evaluating political accountability within water projects requires specific operationalisation of the concept. This operationalisation allows one to quantitatively measure political accountability. As such, it was decided to include at least five elements that are believed to be interwoven into a definition of political accountability.

Aspects highlighted by authors in 2.2 do not provide adequate means in which to evaluate political accountability. For example, an obvious point in case is that elections cannot be utilised in water projects to measure the concept. Neither will national level comparisons be useful, unless water projects are studied across the country.

When one utilise the five elements (or variables) identified in 2.4, the possibility of measuring political accountability in water projects become easier. Employing the element Responsibility allows one to focus on responsibilities that the project implementer states that it has towards project stakeholders/beneficiaries. Similarly, the elements of Inclusion and Information provide tangible means with which to evaluate how community members were included in the project and how much

information they received about the project. The element Credibility provides a way in which to determine whether community members perceived the project implementer as a credible actor, worth recommending to other villages. Lastly, the element Sanctioning was considered essential in determining whether community members utilised this accountability device in the respective water projects.

The selected elements are also easier to investigate at a water project level, where tangible outcomes (water provision) allow one to evaluate a decision-maker.

2.6 General points about political accountability

In ending this section, a few comments about accountability is useful. First, accountability is a retrospective tool. Only after actions have taken place and the consequences of these actions has been evaluated, can the actions of a decision-maker be evaluated (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225; Dunn 1999a:240; Laver and Shepsle 1999:295). This means that accountability mechanisms are “seen to work only when accountability has failed” (Laver and Shepsle 1999:295).

Second, accountability forms part of larger concepts. This was highlighted in the sections considering the role that accountability plays within *democracy* and *good governance*.

Third, accountability requires synergy between a number of elements (European Union 2001). This means that accountability is more likely to be ensured when meeting responsibilities, inclusion and engagement with stakeholders, access to information, credibility and sanctioning instruments, are pursued in unity instead of focusing on only one element.

Fourth, accountability can easily take on only a symbolic status. However, it is believed that political accountability plays a significant role in sustainable outcomes for public interests or needs. Studying this concept is, therefore, essential in order to find an adequate response to public needs.

In essence accountability is indicative of the health of democracy in a country or an institution. Political accountability guides actions, performance and goals within this country or institution. The concept is closely linked to categories within democratic

theory, which (a) focuses on how to safeguard the public from rulers and (b) how to effectively address public interests and demands. At the same time that accountability is important for the health of democracy within a country, the type of governance practised within that country influences the importance (or position) of accountability.

The chapter has indicated the elements of political accountability that will be used as measurement of the concept in the questionnaires. These elements include (a) responsibility (b) inclusion (c) information (d) sanctioning, and (e) credibility. Through measuring these elements within four projects, a means was established in order to evaluate the impact of political accountability on project sustainability.

2.7 Conclusion

The following study is believed to be necessary in order to gain a better understanding of political accountability as practised outside elections. The study considers a variety of elements when evaluating accountability in water projects, thereby considering accountability as more than just a sanctioning device or an ability to bring one actor a halt.

The focus of the study (water projects) highlights that accountability should also be evaluated at ground-level. Studying accountability on this level provides insight into (a) the value attached to the concept by decision-makers through the way they make decisions and act on those decisions, and (b) possible operational design limits of a particular decision-making institution to ensure accountability. Accountability, it is expected, also leads to tangible outcomes (sustainable water access) for people and not just to a healthy democracy.

It is important to note that accountability is imperative within a democracy and also plays an essential role in the practice of good governance. This role allows accountability to link *goals* with *actions and performance* in almost any context.

The chapter provided an overview of the elements, believed, to be essential in order to ensure political accountability. This requires a decision-maker to meet certain responsibilities; include stakeholders; provide necessary information; maintain credibility

of accountability mechanisms as well as itself (the decision-maker); and ensure sanctioning devices can be used if necessary.

Chapter 3: Context and Rationale

3. Context and Rationale

Strides have been made in providing equal access to services within South Africa. Despite the improvement in service delivery, a number of households within the Mopani area still fetch water long distances from their homes. In most villages, communal standpipes are present. However, the presence of standpipes does not guarantee water access. The following study is interested in why there is little, or no water in villages even though water infrastructure (water project) is present. In order to investigate this question, it is essential to highlight the context in which the selected water projects have been established. The context includes (a) the water context in the Mopani district, (b) a short description of the Mopani district, and (c) the general impression about political accountability within the district. The section, therefore, evaluates the context in which the non-governmental organisation and the municipality need to pursue the elements of political accountability when implementing a water project.

3.1 The Water Context in the district

Through specifically focusing on the Mopani district, this section considers (a) water availability (b) water use (c) water capacity (d) service backlogs and (e) the impact of not having adequate water access within the selected villages. By considering these five areas, one is able to gain an understanding of the context within which project implementers are to establish water projects in a manner that is politically accountable.

3.1.1 Water availability in the district

South Africa is not a high rainfall country. Although the Mopani district falls within a higher rainfall area (in comparison to the rest of the country) lower lying areas are vulnerable to frequent droughts (FAO 2005; Mopani IDP 2007:34). Within the Mopani district there is “stiff competition between the different water users such as agriculture, mining and forestry. To this end water use for domestic purposes becomes critical” (Mopani IDP 2007:34,35). It is estimated that the agricultural sector uses around 70% of the available water in the district, leaving 30% for other water users (Mopani IDP 2007:34,35).

Water is sourced, mainly, from the Groot Letaba River catchment and its tributaries. It is argued that this can be supplemented by the use of increased borehole access (Mopani IDP 2007:34). However, increasing human settlement, farming activities and tourism between the Drakensberg escarpment and the Kruger National Park have placed pressure on the Letaba River. The demand on this water source is of such a nature that there is a real risk of water shortages from existing infrastructure.

Water availability from this source is clearly under pressure. Groundwater sources are also at risk within the district. In rural areas, a lack of water-borne sewerage systems increases the potential of providing polluted water through boreholes¹⁸ (Mopani IDP 2007:43).

In general, Mopani District is well provided with *bulk water*¹⁹ supply infrastructure. However, it is argued that there is inadequate *pipeline* infrastructure within some villages. The distance between villages, and between villages and existing water infrastructure, makes it challenging and expensive to provide water to these villages. Water shortage is not only linked to inadequate infrastructure and environmental conditions but also to vandalism of infrastructure, unwillingness to pay for water services, illegal connections of pipelines by communities, and extremely high water usage in areas where there is adequate water access (Mopani IDP 2007:32,35).

As highlighted in the previous paragraph, water availability is influenced by how well water sources are taken care of. Issues of pollution, deforestation and weak monitoring of urban and industrial water use indicate poor resource protection within South Africa (Sanparks 2007). Prominent environmental organisations also argue that South Africa is promoting an attitude of “get rich at all costs”²⁰. Furthermore, water management

¹⁸ In rural areas it is common to make use of “french drain” or pit latrine sewerage systems. When there is a high density french drains or pit latrines within an area, the potential to pollute groundwater is dramatically increased.

¹⁹ Bulk water is water that has not been treated, making it unsafe for human consumption.

²⁰ The South African government is currently pushing all government departments to meet the objectives that are found in “5 year plans” of the Asgisa strategy. The overall aim is to encourage socio-economic development in the country (RSA 2007; Robinson 2007). Such development has in a number of instances come at the expense of a “healthy biophysical environment”. A visible example is the extraction of minerals (Middelburg) that are exported or used to develop infrastructure in South Africa. Whilst minerals are certainly numerous and useful in encouraging development and providing jobs to many people, the manner that decisions are made and executed has resulted in a situation where the

schemes, such as bulk water schemes, are “often inappropriate” as they negatively influence biodiversity conservation, ecosystem protection and resource management (Yeld 2007).

On a national level, 8,2 million people do not have adequate access to water (Mabuza 2007b). At the same time, the national population has been steadily increasing²¹ within all the provinces (StatsSA 2007:7,9). Thus, water access has to be provided to 8,2 million people as well as to an additional number of people as the population increases. This growing population as well as a service backlog to 8,2 million people is placing pressure on an already scarce resource.

3.1.2 Water use in the district

Water use is mainly linked to household consumption and economic activities.

Water use at household level includes utilising the resource (a) for normal household activities, such as washing, cooking, and drinking, (b) within health care facilities, and (c) at educational facilities, such as pre-schools, primary and secondary schools.

Both the Tzaneen and Gyani area's economic activity is characterised by commercial and small-scale farming activities (Mopani IDP 2007:24,25,32; Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08). Water is, therefore, utilised to a large extent to support these farming activities. Small-scale farming activities are important in the context of rural villages where (a) villages are very far from formal towns for people to purchase produce and (b) a high rate of unemployment in the district makes it expensive to travel to towns for produce when such produce could be grown at home. At the same time, Limpopo has a large percentage of people who are only semi-skilled²², at best (StatsSA 2007:16,26-29; Mopani IDP 2007:25,32). Small-scale farming, thus, is a means of providing food whilst also providing a way to earn some form of income when there is a surplus produce. This kind of economic activity is very dependent on a reliable, and clean, water source.

formal town of Middelburg is provided with water that is of poor quality and unsafe to drink (without boiling and filtering it first).

²¹ Increase from 40,5 million in 1996, to 44,8 million in 2001 and to 48,5 million in 2007.

²² The population within the district is characterised by (a) a very large percentage of individuals between the age of 0-19 years (b) a small percentage of individuals attending any tertiary education institution and (c) a notable percentage gap between females with no education and males with no education.

3.1.3 Water capacity in the district

In the context of available water, the most likely source of water within rural areas comes from groundwater. However, groundwater has been extensively sourced in the district (Mopani WSDP 2002). At the same time, the lack of proper sanitation facilities in many of the district's rural areas pose a health hazard to communities through the contamination of available groundwater.

Government is not ignorant of the need to operate, maintain and upgrade water infrastructure. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAf) highlights that 60% of treatment plants (facilities that treat sewage) require urgent maintenance in order to prevent further outbreaks of disease, such as cholera (Mpofu 2008). The Mopani district has, within this context, made water services a priority within the area of service delivery in the district. This is evident through the Water Resource Infrastructure (WRI) charges²³ as well as the building of new bulk water supply systems (Opperman 2007:40). One such scheme is the building of the Nwamitwa Dam and the raising of the wall of the Tzaneen Dam to address the water shortage problem in the district (Mopani IDP 2007:35).

Although it is argued that the government is committed towards effective water management, there is a sense that resources are utilized without sufficiently considering decisions. For instance, it should be highlighted that bulk water supply has been shown to be adequate in the Mopani district (Mopani IDP 2007:32,35). Although the building of the Nwamitwa Dam and the raising of the wall of the Tzaneen Dam will contribute to agriculture and household users being separated in order for improved access to water, the real concern is with adequate (and functional) infrastructure at the household level. This infrastructure includes ensuring that purification schemes²⁴ are working in order to provide water to households.

Lastly, the Mopani District Municipality (MDM) and media reports indicate that the district, and South Africa as a whole, is finding it difficult to retain infrastructure, institutions, money and skills required for water resource management in the country. In this context,

²³ A means of cost-recovery in order to assist with maintenance and upgrading of existing water infrastructure as well as establishing new projects.

²⁴ Schemes treating bulk water in order to make water safe for household consumption.

there are a few, or no cost-recovery programmes in place for a number of (small) water projects in the district (Kilian 2008b²⁵; Mamarara 2008²⁶). These cost-recovery programmes are essential in order to finance new projects as well as for maintenance and upgrading of existing infrastructure. Adequate water capacity within the district is essential within the context of low water availability in the area. However, from the above it appears that the district's capacity to provide water to the public is presented with a number of challenges.

3.1.4 Service backlogs

According to the Community Survey, there has been an increase²⁷ in the percentage of households having access to water from piped water inside the dwelling (StatsSA 2007:52). Despite this increase, Limpopo is below the national average of households having access to piped water (StatsSA 2007:53).

In the Mopani District, around 67 percent of households have access to water (Mopani IDP 2007:37 Table 5). Despite this percentage, the MDM states that most of the settlements in the Mopani district do not have adequate access to potable drinking water and sanitary facilities (Mopani IDP 2007:110). The MDM admits “[t]he levels of services in these areas are either in terms of RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme²⁸) standards or below such standards. Further to that, some rural settlements do not have access to water at all. These communities fetch drinking water from wells, pits or rivers” (Mopani IDP 2007:110,111).

A situation also exists where, despite bulk water supply schemes, one area have access to water whilst another area is without access (Mopani IDP 2007:111; Kilian 2007²⁹). For instance, one village will have access to water through a water project whilst a village immediately next to the village with water, does not have water access.

Inadequate provision of water within the district is reflected on a national level by DWAF stating that a number of municipal waste-water treatment plants are operating below

²⁵ Kilian, A. 2008b. Telephone interview, Tzaneen.

²⁶ Mamarara, V. 2008. Interview, Tzaneen.

²⁷ 32,3 per cent in 2001 to 47,3 per cent in 2007

²⁸ A socio-economic policy framework designed in 1994 to address the unequal socio-economic context in South Africa as a result of apartheid policies. RDP standards are still in use even though the socio-economic policy was succeeded by first, GEAR and now, Asgisa (the last frameworks are considered more market-oriented than the RDP framework).

²⁹ Kilian, A. 2007. Interview, Tzaneen.

required standards (Mpofu 2008). Poor standards at these treatment plants have a direct bearing on drinking water quality served by the treatment plants. It is, therefore, suggested that South Africa, as a whole, is finding it challenging to provide adequate access of drinking water to the public.

3.1.5 The impact of not having adequate water supply

The impact of not having an adequate supply of water is serious. Firstly, water is essential for daily survival. This includes ensuring that a person stays hydrated on a daily basis. Secondly, as indicated, a large percentage of the population in the Limpopo province do not have specialised skills allowing them to take part in the formal economy. This results in a number of people relying on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods. Without water, livelihoods become directly threatened, leading to food shortages and lack of income. In 2005 it was estimated that about 14 million people (roughly a third of the total population) in South Africa were vulnerable to food shortages. The reason was not that too little food was produced but that there was a lack of suitable water infrastructure in the deep rural areas (Ashton 2007:90).

Within villages visited for this study, the severity of being without water was evident: on a number of days pre-schools are without water, leaving children vulnerable to dehydration; high school pupils have to stay away from school on days when the community receive water in order to collect water; inadequate water supply prevents people from growing their own food; and people with boreholes charge high amounts to other community members for water.

Water is not only necessary for household consumption and farming activities, it is also essential for health services. Inadequate water supply contributes to outbreaks of diseases, such as cholera. Without a reliable and clean water supply, health facilities are unable to provide necessary treatment to patients. These diseases are (without a clean and reliable water supply) never dealt with, contributing to reoccurring outbreaks.

The above is the three most “concrete” issues linked to water access. There is also an economic factor at play. According to Ashton (2007:90) water supply infrastructure development is linked with future economic growth. Once again, without a reliable and clean water source, small-scale agriculture can never progress to commercial farming,

thereby contributing to an area's economic growth. People are also less likely to settle in areas where there is not adequate water supply, in effect not providing a "consumer-base" to an area.

In conclusion, the MDM states that "[t]he success of local economic development is tied to providing basic and other types of infrastructure to the people. Adequate infrastructure underpins socio-economic development and determines a people's quality of life. The provision of adequate municipal infrastructure remains a challenge throughout the district" (Mopani IDP 2007:34).

3.2 Description of the Mopani District

The above section has highlighted the water situation within the Mopani district. A more complete description of the district requires providing a general overview of the district, the selected villages and the project implementers. Such an overview provides insight into the socio-economic development within the district. For purposes of clarity, two key projects were selected in the Mopani District. The two key projects are located in the Mopani District in the local municipalities of the Greater Tzaneen and the Greater Gyani.

3.2.1 Demographics

The Mopani district reflects a high number of villages/rural settlements. 82 percent of the population in the Greater Tzaneen area³⁰ and 89 percent in the Greater Gyani area³¹, lives in rural settlements (Mopani IDP 2007:19,20). The above indicates that (a) a large percentage of the district population resides in rural settlements, and (b) within the Tzaneen municipality, one ward has to represent around 13 000 people³²; in the Gyani area, one ward represents around 11 000 people³³. Public interest and needs are to be represented within the context that a ward committee consists of a ward councillor and, at most, ten members of the community.

In the context that the Mopani district consists of a number of rural settlements, there are also a number of indigent households³⁴. The Greater Tzaneen area has

³⁰ The Greater Tzaneen has a total population of 442 282. Of the total population, 362 453 are rural, 45 836 urban, and 33 993 farming

³¹ The Gyani area has a total population of 276 668. 247 585 are rural, 29 083 urban, and 0 farming

³² 442 282 divided by 34 wards in the Tzaneen area

³³ 276 668 divided by 25 wards in the Gyani area

³⁴ Households that are financially unable to pay for essential services and are subsidised by the government.

28 552 indigent households; and the Greater Gyani has 21 007 households registered as indigent (Mopani IDP 2007:37). The above information implies that a quarter³⁵ of the population in the Tzaneen area (and *more* than a quarter of the population in the Greater Gyani area) is unable to afford to pay for essential services.

Linked closely to the number of indigent households within the two municipal areas is a high level of unemployment in the district. In this regard the Gyani area has the highest level of unemployment³⁶ (Mopani IDP 2007:22). 60% of the unemployed persons in the district are women, where women also make up a large part of the population in the district (Mopani IDP 2007:20,22). This is due to men seeking work in provinces, such as Gauteng, with more employment opportunities than Limpopo.

Notwithstanding the socio-economic situation of a number of people within the district, there is also the reality that more than 50% of the adult population can be regarded as functionally illiterate³⁷ (Mopani IDP 2007:21). At the same time, more men have some form of schooling in comparison to women (StatsSA 2007:23-29).

The above elements indicate that water projects will, mainly, be established in rural areas in the district. Within these areas, it may be challenging to implement cost-recovery programmes (in order to fund maintenance of infrastructure) within the context that a large percentage of the population is classified as indigent households and that there is a high level of unemployment.

3.2.2 The selected villages/water projects

For this study the villages of Bellevue, Nwamitwa, Tours and Mamogolo were selected. Tsogang (the NGO) implemented the water projects in Bellevue and Mamogolo; Tzaneen municipality implemented the projects in Nwamitwa and Tours. Two key projects were selected: Bellevue and Nwamitwa. The other two projects are discussed in the findings but no demographic information is provided

³⁵ When you take into consideration that the average household in the Limpopo Province consists of four members.

³⁶ 36.9 per cent

³⁷ “[A]s much as 37.8% of the adult population (older than 20 years of age) has not received any form of schooling with a further 13.7% only having completed some form of primary education”.

for them. First, it was difficult to find any demographic information for Tours and Mamogolo. Second, the study is concerned with political accountability on the part of the project implementer and this could be evaluated without depending on demographic information of Tours and Mamogolo. However, a basic description of the water project in each village is provided. Take note that Bellevue and Mamogolo have NGO projects and Nwamitwa and Tours have Municipality projects.

Bellevue is a rural village near the town of Gyani, where Tsogang completed a water project in 2001 (Tsogang 2008). Bellevue has a population of about 2 757. Around 1 963 people have access to water above RDP level³⁸ (more than 25 litres a day) with the rest below the RDP level. 1 896 people do not have access to sanitation services above RDP level. The village source its water from a variety of water sources³⁹ (DWAf(a):no date). Inadequate sanitation services pose a potential threat to the community's health through possible contamination of their groundwater source.

Nwamitwa was randomly selected from ten other villages that are served by the Ritavi 1 water project. Nwamitwa is described as a rural village with a dense population of about 8 720. Around 5 397 people have access to water above the RDP level. Sanitation services for 5 571 people are below the RDP level. Similar to Bellevue, the Nwamitwa village makes use of a variety of water sources. As mentioned, Nwamitwa receives water from the Ritavi 1 project. This project forms part of the Letaba Regional Water Scheme. Although the Ritavi 1 project was implemented by the Tzaneen municipality, it is owned by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAf(b):no date). From the above, it appears that a large percentage of the population is without adequate access to water services. The inadequacy of sanitation services to the population poses a potential health risk.

On a national level, it is argued that 88% of all households have access to piped water (StatsSA 2007:8). However, the above information indicates that within Bellevue, around 71 percent, and in Nwamitwa, around 62 percent, of people has

³⁸ The national government has set a standard for the minimum amount of water that each person must have access to on a daily basis. This basic standard is set at 25 litres water each day per person.

³⁹ For example, through boreholes or through a spring

access to water (whether this is through boreholes, springs or from another source).

The last part of this section considers the water projects within the four villages. In **Bellevue**, standpipes are provided to the community every 200metres (or even less). This exceeds government recommendations. All standpipes are in working condition.

The project was designed for 80 households, with a maximum capacity of 100 households. However, reliable and clean access to water in this part of Bellevue has attracted a number of people since the project has been established in 2001. At the moment the project is providing water to more than 400 households (this is a 400 percent increase on the initial capacity of the project).

The community was trained to build and maintain the water infrastructure, e.g. the water reservoir, the standpipes, water lines connecting the standpipes with each other and with the water reservoir, etc. The community was also able to construct a drinking trough for their livestock in 2003.

Although the project was established in a very low rainfall area, it appears as if the project is capable of providing enough water to the community. However, the added pressure on this project (because it is functioning) is posing a potential threat.

After completing the water project in 2001, Tsogang has handed over responsibility for maintenance to the Greater Letaba Municipality.

Similar to Bellevue, **Mamogolo** is a rural settlement that, it appears, had no service delivery until the establishment of the water project by Tsogang (2004-2006). Although Mamogolo is situated close to the Olifantsriver, pumping water directly from the river is not safe. It is apparent that the river water is polluted. Each household has a standpipe inside their yard.

The water project serves around 53 households. The project has a 40-year horizon.

Although respondents stated that the project does not form part of water provision to the entire district, the project coordinator said that 14 villages are covered within the larger water provision project. Mamogolo is one of the first villages with a finished project (2006).

Members from the community were employed to assist with building the water infrastructure. These community members now have a valuable skill in knowing how to fix minor problems, such as fixing leaks.

Initially residents contributed to the purchase of diesoline (R5/household) for the pump. However, the Tubatsi municipality is now providing diesoline each month, free of charge. The amount of diesoline provided to the village is enough for Mamogolo to pump water for three days of the week. Water infrastructure is more than adequate for villagers to pump water more than these three days. However, villagers seem reluctant to start paying for diesel again and have chosen to only pump water with the diesel provided by the municipality.

The project has been handed over to the Greater Tubatsi Municipality after completion.

In 2004 the water project (standpipes) were established in **Nwamitwa**. This project forms part of the Ritavi 1 project. The Ritavi 1 project was established in order to provide water to ten villages. Within Nwamitwa, standpipes are located every 200 metres (or further) within the village. Similar to Bellevue and Mamogolo, no households are left out.

A number of the standpipes have been damaged at the hand of vandals. In other places, water leaks into the road. These water leakages are caused, in some instances, as a result of bulldozers doing maintenance work on the gravel roads within the village. It is unclear whether pipes were lain too shallow or whether continued bulldozing "erodes" the level of the gravel road, thereby exposing the water pipes to potential damage.

People were not trained during the project how to fix problems, such as changing washers, leakages or any other maintenance jobs. The community rely on the municipality to perform these tasks.

The project in **Tours** was established in 2003. From information gained, the project included standpipes for the upper part of Tours (older part of the village) but focused mainly on the building of the Tours dam, a purification plant and lines to lower-lying villages.

Only three standpipes are still functional resulting in some community members to collect water from a nearby river or making illegal connections to waterlines. Collecting water from the nearby river is contributing to diseases, such as cholera, in the village.

Community members were not trained in the project process in order to do minor maintenance on the project.

3.2.3 The project implementers

Two project implementers were selected. The one implementer is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) and the other is a local municipality; both are based in Tzaneen, Mopani district. Both implementers are actively involved in water and sanitation projects, especially within rural communities. The following section discusses the two project implementers. The section is also linked with 3.2.4 where a list of responsibilities as published by each project implementer is discussed. Within the Literature Study it was argued that *fulfilling responsibilities* is a necessary element of political accountability. As such, it is important what each project implementer states its duties are towards project stakeholders. The list of responsibilities are utilised in the questionnaire in order to measure political accountability.

The Tzaneen municipality is classified as a Service Provider⁴⁰. Municipalities are divided into three categories (A, B, and C) according to Constitutional provisions (RSA 1996, section 155(1)). The classification entails that a

⁴⁰ The municipality provides services, such as water and sanitation services, to people as decided by the Service Authority.

- “Category A municipality has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area;
- Category B municipality shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls; and
- Category C municipality has municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality” (RSA 1996, section 155(1)(a-b)).

A district municipality is classified as a category C authority whilst local municipalities are category B municipalities. Through the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998, section 84), the powers and functions of category B and C municipalities are divided between them. In Mopani, the District municipality retained the potable water provision function.

There is a distinction between a Service Provider and a Service Authority. A service provider can be any person(s) or institution(s) that provide a municipal service. A service authority has the power to regulate the provision of a municipal service by a service provider (RSA 2000, chapter 1). A municipality can, therefore, make use of any entity or person (government or non-government) in order to provide municipal services (RSA 2000, sections 76).

The Tzaneen municipality has a responsibility to act according to the district municipality’s business plan⁴¹ for a specific water project (Kilian 2007⁴²; Kilian 2008a⁴³; Mopani IDP 2007). As a service provider, the municipality is responsible to implement policy as formulated by the District municipality. It is expected that, as an “extension” of the Service Authority, the Service Provider will act in a manner that is accountable in the areas for which it has been made responsible. Oversight from the MDM should, also, contribute to the Tzaneen municipality acting accountable in its daily operations. This is

⁴¹ According to information from the Tzaneen municipality, the district business plan incorporates the following:

- Project identification
- Establishing the cost of the potential project
- Completing a project registration form (attach registration form)
- Drafting a feasibility report
- The registration form is accepted after the feasibility report is approved by DWAF
- A consultant is appointed through a tender process
- Reporting back on the project

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Kilian, A. 2008a. Interview, Tzaneen.

especially relevant in the context of the MDM highlighting the importance of accountability in its workings (Mopani IDP 2007:63-69;100,101).

Projects are, furthermore, dependent on the approval of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Mopani WSDP 2002). Through this measure, the relevance of proposed projects to an area is evaluated prior to implementation. This provides another measure with which to supervise the operation of the Tzaneen municipality.

Despite local government restructuring and increased attention to cost-recovery policies, municipalities have struggled in the delivery of services, especially to “historically disenfranchised communities” (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518). In the Mopani District, local municipalities are aware of the need to deliver basic services promptly (Mopani IDP 2007:66,67). However, it is argued that service delivery is influenced by poor communication within and amongst municipalities; disintegrated planning; poor collection of rates and taxes; not spending budgets fully; a shortage of staff in key positions; lack of capacity; and corruption and fraud within the public and private sector. At the same time, the MDM argues that there are insufficient water sources and bulk supply in the area; pollution of natural resources; and increased pressure on resources as a result of population growth. Accountability is hampered, according to the MDM, by a lack of stakeholder involvement strategy; poor co-ordination; lack of a revenue strategy; insufficient capacity to track the latest developments within sectors; inconsistent adherence to policies; lack of a succession plan; lack of a retention strategy; and the lack of a monitoring and evaluation system (Mopani IDP 2007:62-65, Table 14 and 15).

Despite the above concerns, the Tzaneen municipality has the authority to take action to effectively exercise powers assigned to it. The municipality is in a position where it can request funding from national government in order, for example, to build large water schemes. It is also connected to a national ‘system’ of other municipalities; each with a responsibility to deliver services to their communities. This means that the Tzaneen municipality forms part of a system, which should have a national impact on communities’ access to water.

Unlike the Tzaneen municipality, Tsogang is the decision-maker as well as the implementer of its water projects. Tsogang has fewer personnel available, in comparison

to the Tzaneen municipality, when implementing water projects. The NGO seriously promotes facilitating and encouraging training programmes within communities in order to assist the implementation of a water project. These training programmes include teaching community members to maintain water infrastructure. Tsogang operates in the provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga, focusing on rural communities. The organisation views accountability in water projects as a necessity as, the NGO argues, it influences the sustainability of water projects in communities (Tsogang 2008).

Because of the relatively small size of Tsogang, it is important that each and every project, which it implements, is successful. Without a 100 per cent success rate it is questionable whether Tsogang would be able to continue operating.

Both Tsogang as well as the Tzaneen municipality's ability to operate within areas are influenced by the level of influence that traditional authorities have within these areas. For example, in a number of areas traditional authorities influence the manner in which large parts of the land is made available to individuals for settlement. These authorities also influence the economic "direction" of this allocated land. Most of the land settlement and economic purposes decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. The result is that decisions, sometimes, do not take into consideration the impact it may have on the spatial pattern and the rendering of cost effective and efficient services to communities (Mopani IDP 2007:32). In the context of this, both project implementers are required to take this reality into consideration when planning and implementing water projects.

3.2.4 Objectives list or list of responsibilities

In order to measure the operation of the Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang, it was essential to determine an exact list of responsibilities that these two organisations state they should fulfil. Very specific lists of responsibilities for Tsogang and the Tzaneen municipality were accessed. The identified responsibilities of each project implementer are utilised in the questionnaire measuring Responsibility as an element of political accountability.

The Integrated Development Plan of Tzaneen municipality

It has been highlighted that the Tzaneen municipality is a Service Provider. This means that the Tzaneen municipality does not draft its own business plan but uses the business plan of the Service Authority. For this reason I decided to evaluate the institution's

relationship with project stakeholders on the basis of its (Integrated Development Plan) IDP. The Tzaneen IDP⁴⁴ guides its actions and decisions in manners pertaining to its responsibility towards the public residing in its area of jurisdiction (Tzaneen IDP Introduction 2007/08).

The Tzaneen municipality's IDP (Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08) includes reference to the following objectives:

- Sustainable service delivery (and sustainable services)
- Integrated service delivery
- Forming partnerships with other actors in order to deliver services
- Democratic and accountable governance
- Social and economic development
- Ensuring a safe and healthy environment
- Encouraging community involvement

The Tzaneen municipality has also adopted the values of Batho Pele⁴⁵. This means that the municipality says it supports consultation; a high service standard; accessibility to other actors; courtesy towards other actors; the availability and accessibility of information; openness and transformation; services at an affordable tariff; and, an entrepreneurial developmental culture (Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08).

The objectives reflect the municipality's determined responsibilities towards the people falling within its area of jurisdiction. Because of reference to Batho Pele within a number of government documents and visions, this study employed the values as part of the municipality's responsibilities towards the public.

The section dealing with good governance highlighted that *accountability* guides activities, goals and the performance of an actor. As such, these objectives and values provide a means of evaluating the level of political accountability as practised by the municipality⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ It should be noted that a *district* IDP is drafted after considering, and prioritising, all the needs from the different wards. It is imperative that an identified project falls within what has been identified in this IDP.

⁴⁵ These values are measured in the manager's Performance Plans.

⁴⁶ The objectives and values guide the municipality's activities, goals and performance.

The objectives list of Tsogang

Similar to the Tzaneen municipality, a number of Tsogang's determined responsibilities towards its stakeholders are also found within its defined role, principles (or values) and objectives list⁴⁷, as combined in the following paragraph.

Some of Tsogang's objectives are:

- Facilitating more equitable access to economic and social services;
- To support and assist innovative and appreciative approaches to improve the delivery of services at the local level;
- Delivering those services to ensure that they are appropriate, efficient, and sustainable;
- To ensure that integrated planning and development at the municipal and provincial levels;
- To support and assist training (of partners as well as beneficiaries) in the delivery of services and programmes;
- To strengthen and support the partnership between government and civil society in addressing the imbalances of the past; and
- Within development initiatives, to promote the cross-cutting issues of
 - Equity within projects,
 - Local economic development (LED),
 - Environmental protection,
 - Good governance (transparency, accountability and responsibility),
 - Capacity building, and
 - Service delivery to the poor in all Tsogang's programme activities.

Similar to the Tzaneen municipality, Tsogang uses the South African Constitution (RSA 1996) and a number of governmental policies⁴⁸ as its legal framework to guide its actions and behaviour in providing water and a healthy environment for rural and peri-urban communities in Limpopo and Mpumalanga.

⁴⁷ I modified the list to include only items that have a probability of being researched, without resorting to a nationwide survey (e.g. *assisting in eradicating poverty and assisting the government of South Africa to close the poverty gap*).

⁴⁸ In the case of Tsogang, it makes use of the Procurement Policy; Total Quality Assurance Policy; Affirmative Action Policy; Communication Strategy Policy; Dispute Resolution Policy; ESETA Learnership Policy; Gender Policy; Infectious Diseases Policy; and a Language Policy.

It is important to note that Tsogang's objectives list is a reflection of the Tzaneen municipality's IDP list of responsibilities. It was decided to utilise only the municipality's list of responsibilities in the measurement of political accountability as practised in the four projects. This is believed to allow better comparison between the two project implementers.

The Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang also provided a range of duties owed to the community. These duties guide the municipality's and Tsogang's actions and decisions. It is important to note that the responsibilities identified by these two implementers reflect all the elements of accountability as identified in the Literature Study. Furthermore, both implementers recognise that political accountability works when all its elements are pursued in unity.

3.3 The Accountability Context

The water context and the description of the district, villages and project implementers have highlighted the context in which accountability is practised. The next section encapsulates the accountability context within the district. It highlights the obligation of government towards the public with regards to service delivery. It also considers, in general, how the municipality (and also the non-governmental organisation) perceives accountability towards the public with regards to service delivery.

3.3.1 Constitutional responsibility

In essence, the Constitution (1996) was adopted in order to address the historic imbalances in South African society that resulted in a majority of people living without access to clean water and proper sanitation (Mopani IDP 2007:45).

The new Constitution highlights that *everyone* has the right to have access to sufficient food and water (RSA 1996, section 27(1)(b)). The state is obligated to realize this right to access through reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources (RSA 1996, section 27(2)).

At the same time, the Constitution highlights that everyone has the right to (a) an environment that is not harmful to their health; and (b) have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations. Reasonable legislative and other

measures must (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development (RSA 1996, section 24). A healthy environment, i.e. resources that are not polluted and which are used in a sustainable manner, is essential for continued water access.

The Constitution also prescribes certain measures to the government in order for this institution to fulfill its obligation to the public of ensuring access to water. This is encapsulated by section 155(6), which highlights that each provincial government must (a) provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the province; and (b) promote the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their functions and manage their own affairs (RSA 1996). The government, through provincial government, is thus obligated to ensure that local government *capacity* to provide access to water is strengthened whilst *monitoring* this level of government to ensure the fulfillment of its functions and duties (RSA 1996, section 155(6); Mopani IDP 2007:75, own emphasis).

As a result of the new Constitution there have been changes in the structure and operation of local government (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518). This has taken place in order for local government to (a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) promote social and economic development; (d) promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (RSA 1996, section 152). The local government is, therefore, empowered and obligated to fulfil the above duties for the benefit of the public.

The above has highlighted the constitutional duty of local government to provide access to water to the public. However, NGOs can also provide this service to the public. According to local government legislation, when local government does not have the capacity to ensure adequate service delivery it can (a) form partnerships with organisations that will then provide those services and (b) appoint organisations to provide essential services to the public. Although these organisations are appointed by local government to provide services to the public, these organisations are obligated to

operate according to national legislation, thereby ensuring these organisations operate accountably. Organisations, such as Tsogang, therefore commit themselves to operating within the constitutional principles when providing services to the public (RSA, section 2). At the same time, legislation dictates that the government is still obligated to oversee the operation of these organisations that provide basic services to communities.

In essence, government has a responsibility to provide access to water to communities according to the Constitution. This provision can take place through the government or via organisations monitored by government. At the same time, NGOs (as any other person within the Republic) are under obligation to uphold the principles of the Constitution. Therefore, any NGO providing services to the public is also required to be accountable within its operations.

3.3.2 Accountability in South Africa

Chapter 1 has highlighted that it is challenging to evaluate whether a decision-maker is politically accountable. Through the new Constitution, various pieces of legislation and policies have been introduced in order to guide government and public actions. A number of these documents make reference to accountability. This emphasis on accountability is intended to ensure accountability on the part of one actor towards another in the South African context.


However, as mentioned, precise definition of what accountability entails is rarely provided in documents. Inadequate provision of a precise definition has two major outcomes. One result is that persons within a government institution or NGO have little guidance in how to *implement* accountability. The second outcome is that the public finds it difficult to evaluate whether the actions and behaviour of the government institution are accountable.

Within the above context, accountability in South Africa needs to be practised. At the same time that there is a general lack of definition of the concept, the type of democracy practised within a country plays a role in the position of accountability within the system. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy. According to Cheibub and Przeworski (1999:223), parliamentary democracies are characterised by a legislature able to change

the executive⁴⁹. In a parliamentary system, voters elect representatives to the legislature, who, in turn, elect the executive. This makes the executive accountable to the legislature. The legislature is, thus, in a position to ensure accountability from the executive on behalf of the public.

This executive (who is accountable to the legislature/indirectly to the public) appoints persons to establish, in this case, water projects across the country. The appointed persons for each water project is, therefore, obligated to be accountable to the public⁵⁰ (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 Three-tier government representation



Although South Africa operates on the basis of parliamentary democracy, inadequate definition of the concept as well as other factors contributes to a situation where accountability is not enjoying the importance required for a healthy democracy. For instance, an article from the *Mail and Guardian* (Serjeant 2008) argues that “[f]oundational principles of accountability, transparency and the independent operation of institutions through which constitutional democracy is mediated, including the judiciary, are all under pressure”.

⁴⁹ If there is a large enough majority supporting such a change, the legislature can change the executive.

⁵⁰ It is clear that there is a “direct” line of accountability between the public, the legislature, and the executive. The executive appoints the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Dwaf) to oversee water projects within the country. Some projects, like dams, Dwaf establishes on its own. For other projects, Dwaf delegates the duty of establishing projects to provincial or local government. Evidently, there is not a “direct” line connecting Dwaf and the public; accountability is maintained through the executive-legislature-public line.

An illustration of this pressure on the foundational principles of democracy (and specifically accountability) highlight factors that impact accountability's position within the South African democracy. The example is the on-going water 'fight' between citizens of Phiri and the city of Johannesburg. In short, the issue highlighted here is that water meters were installed, without consultation and without the knowledge of Phiri residents. The city of Johannesburg was also accused of withholding information about the installation of these metres (Mabuza 2007b). Residents were, furthermore, left without water for almost eight months and had to walk to others areas to fetch water (Mokoatsane 2007). The illustration highlights a general failure to *fulfil an obligation* towards another actor, be it providing information or water access.

Another issue that has become evident in South Africa is the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) within the political arena. It is argued, "if a single party controls the entire government...then that party's ideal point is implemented as policy" (Laver and Shepsle 1999:286). The ANC's dominance on the political scene has the potential to result in this party's policies being implemented at the cost of other parties', and citizens', policy ideas. This is not conducive to accountability between political leaders and citizens⁵¹ (De Lange 2007).

As a result of the electoral system in South Africa, where voters elect political parties and do not vote for political leaders, the accountability relationship between the public and government decision-makers becomes distorted. Parties are elected on a proportional basis according to the national vote. In this Proportional Representative (PR) List system, political leaders compile the final lists of party candidates. As a result, members of parties tend to be more accountable to party leaders than to voters in order to be included on the lists. Members of the Parliament do not necessarily feel themselves accountable to constituencies since there are no constituencies in a PR List system.

3.3.3 The accountability context at the local level

From the previous section, accountability at the national level appears to be under pressure. Considering the importance each water project implementing institution⁵²

⁵¹ In an interview with Mr Jan de Lange, Tzaneen, it was emphasised that difference in opinion (between the ANC and opposition parties) does not enjoy serious discussion and it has resulted in a party-centric focus instead of maintaining close contact between the public and the government.

⁵² Within the following overview of the accountability context, take note that more information is available on the operation of the local government than Tsogang. As a result, local government is described

attaches to accountability within water projects contributes to an evaluation of the concept at the local level. In this way, it is believed the level of accountability as practised in an individual institution highlights the building blocks of national attachment to accountability.

It appeared that the two implementing institutions, the Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang, held slightly different views about accountability in water projects. In general, it is understood from documents and interviews with Tsogang personnel that accountability in a project is a necessity and not an option. For Tsogang, accountability influences the sense of ownership that communities attach to a project in their area. Through 'community ownership', Tsogang is convinced that communities are more likely, and willing, to "take care" of project infrastructure and operation. This is argued to lead to sustainable projects (Kings 2007⁵³; Mamarara 2007⁵⁴; Mamarara 2008⁵⁵). Tsogang, furthermore, does not have the 'security' of having a tax-base from which to source its projects. This, most likely, encourages the organisation to develop and implement methods and approaches that contribute to projects functioning effectively over a long period of time without having project beneficiaries depend on continued finance and maintenance support from Tsogang. Prudent financial management, i.e. financial accountability, as well as Tsogang's focus on community training in water project implementation build the perception that this NGO values accountability in its operation.

Despite donors' trust in Tsogang's operation (Irish Aid 2007), the Tsogang's operations have been considered wanting in a few areas. Webster (1998) highlights that questions about the accountability of Tsogang in water projects are related to perceived lack of impartiality⁵⁶ of the NGO in the project cycle. The author also indicated NGOs, such as Tsogang, need to include local government at every stage of the project cycle since this level of government is a valuable role-player at the local level. Tsogang has included in its list of objectives that partnerships with all levels of government are to be fostered.

more fully than the NGO. However, the study is concerned with how accountability is practised within water projects. Although the context plays a definite role in this operation, it is believed that the research question will be addressed despite less institutional information available about the selected NGO.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Mamarara, V. 2007. Interview, Gyani.

⁵⁵ Mamarara, V. 2008. Interview, Tzaneen.

⁵⁶ In this specific water project, Tsogang was seen as siding with one actor (Mafefe Water Committee) and this may have alienated other actors from the project cycle.

According to this, Tsogang is obligated to include local government within its operation. Neglecting to do this indicates a failure on the part of Tsogang to fulfil all its stated duties, i.e. acting in manner that is not accountable to all parties within the project cycle. However, since 1998 it is clear that the NGO has addressed the identified issue⁵⁷.

Similar to Tsogang, the Tzaneen municipality recognises that accountability is essential in delivering essential services to communities. The municipality states that a system of checks and balances should be in place in order to evaluate the content, causes and consequences of decisions for communities (Tzaneen Policies 2007). Despite the municipality's recognition of the importance of accountability in its daily operation, most of the municipal personnel involved in water projects were dismissed as a result of serious irregularities⁵⁸ (Kilian 2008b).

It is important to note that because the Tzaneen municipality falls under the supervision⁵⁹ of the MDM, the MDM's views regarding accountability have an impact on the Tzaneen municipality's practice of accountability within water projects. In this regard, the MDM's mission is (a) to provide integrated sustainable equitable services through democratic responsible and accountable governance, and (b) to promote the sustainable use of resources for economic growth to benefit the community (Mopani IDP 2007:59,69). The MDM has also approved and (partially) implemented a by-law that focuses on administrative and operational efficiency and monitoring of employee and organizational performance (Mopani IDP 2007:56,76,83,84). The above suggests that the MDM supports accountability within its own institution and, therefore, it is assumed that municipalities under its supervision would also follow this vision.

A difference between Tsogang and the local government is that Tsogang attaches an objective (equitable and sustainable service delivery) to the necessity for accountability in its operation. The Tzaneen municipality, on the other hand, neglects to adequately highlight this objective. Instead, "the *pace* at which services are delivered to the

⁵⁷ In an interview with the project coordinator (September 2008) it was evident that Tsogang worked closely with the district and local municipality in the area as well as with DWAF and environmental health offices.

⁵⁸ When I spoke to Mr Kilian in April 2008 he informed me that the staff of the water services department, except him and another colleague, were suspended pending an investigation into apparent irregularities with projects. When speaking to Mr Kilian again in August 2008 I was told that the suspended staff had all been dismissed.

⁵⁹ The MDM "employs" the Tzaneen municipality in order to provide certain services; at the same time, supervising and monitoring the operation of the Tzaneen municipality in the provision of these services.

community” is emphasised more than other objectives (Mopani IDP 2007:56, own emphasis). The MDM guides the activities and behaviour of the municipalities falling within its jurisdiction. In this sense, the emphasis placed on the pace of service delivery influences smaller municipalities to focus on this objective. This focus comes at a cost of focusing on *quality or effectiveness* of service delivery, thereby nullifying the purpose⁶⁰ of accountability within service delivery.

Another issue highlighted is that there is an impression that municipal “procedures are there to direct *administrators* [and also councillors] on good governance and accountability” and do not focus a lot of attention on accountability from contractors towards the public (Tzaneen Policies 2007, own emphasis; Mopani IDP 2007:69). It is important that all actors within an institution, as well as contractors appointed by the institution, should remain accountable towards the public.

In summary, both Tsogang as well as the Tzaneen municipality appear to value accountability within its operations, when considering written documents. The following section considers responsibilities, which the Tzaneen municipality finds challenging to implement. Considering the duties that are found difficult to fulfil presents the reader with an understanding of the context in which accountability should take place at the local level. Highlighting this is meant to make people aware of challenges and not to accuse an implementing institution for finding it difficult to fulfil those responsibilities.

3.3.4 Responsibilities that are presenting a challenge

Specific constitutional duties and responsibilities are assigned to local government, as evident from 3.3.1.

The Tzaneen municipality⁶¹ has highlighted that a number of these stipulated duties still need to be addressed within the institution. Five sections highlight these duties.

The municipality is concerned about its duty to

(a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities. From municipal documents it becomes evident that the institution is concerned about a skilled

⁶⁰ Sustainable service delivery as an outcome of political accountability (see literature study).

⁶¹ Some of the responsibilities, which pose a challenge, is highlighted by MDM but is also echoed through communication with the Tzaneen municipality (but not necessarily in publications of the Tzaneen municipality).

and knowledgeable workforce; public participation in municipal processes⁶²; monitoring project implementation; developing and improving institutional systems, processes and procedures focused on good governance; and ensuring effectiveness and efficiency within the municipality, within the budget process as well as service delivery. Only through addressing these concerns can good governance be achieved (Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08; Mopani IDP 2007:59,66,76,78). The institution argues that, within ensuring policy goals, roles should be clear; definitions of terms and words should ensure that goals are understandable; the procedure in implementing goals should be clear; and that persons should be aware that contravention of the policy (guiding goal-attainment) might lead to penalties or other reasonable action (Tzaneen Policies 2007; Mopani IDP 2007:65).

(b) provide services to communities in a sustainable manner. The MDM states that access to sustainable quality and affordable services in the district should be improved. The MDM shows concern that the institution's planning should take future demand into consideration; infrastructure investment and services should also be fostered; municipal assets should be maintained and upgraded; and sound engineering principles should be employed in the design and implementation of water services in the district (Mopani IDP 2007:36,78). In the sense that the MDM is the coordinating institution in the district, it is believed that any concern the MDM has about the district is a reflection of the situation at the local municipal level.

(c) promote social and economic development (Mopani IDP 2007:36,66)

(d) promote environmentally sound practices in order to advance a safe and healthy environment (Mopani IDP 2007:36,66), and

(e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. An announcement in a Tzaneen newspaper highlights the idea of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) within the province in order to ensure improved service delivery (Letaba Herald 2008). The Tzaneen municipality and the MDM has argued that service delivery should be improved through partnerships with community based organisations and NGO's (Tzaneen Policies 2007; Mopani IDP 2007:75). The

⁶² Determining community needs and ensuring enough information is available in order to guide planning, prioritization and implementation of service delivery (IDP Mopani 2007:60,65)

MDM shows concern that there is a need to develop a culture that fosters active public participation in the IDP process (Mopani IDP 2007:76⁶³). Appropriate communication mechanisms should also be established, ensuring community capacity building for community participation to take place. The community should also be able to provide input for the IDP through a proper consultation process. This is believed will ensure effective and sustainable relations⁶⁴ between the community and government (Mopani IDP 2007:76; Tzaneen Policies 2007; Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08).

Meeting the above responsibilities (which the Tzaneen municipality and the MDM struggle to meet) is expected from local government according to section 152 of the Constitution (RSA 1996). The above indicates (specifically the duties to ensure accountability and to provide sustainable and equitable service delivery) that the Tzaneen municipality is finding it challenging to fulfil its constitutional obligations. Within the context of the Tzaneen municipality and the MDM identifying that a number of key duties of the local municipality are challenging to meet, water projects are to be implemented.

3.4 Rationale

Given the above context, it is evident that water provision is still a tangible issue within the Mopani district. At the same time, there are continued demands for service delivery on a national scale. These demands range from basic water access, such as standpipes, to public demands for affordable water access (Mabuza 2007a; Mabuza 2007b; Mpofo 2008).

Despite South Africa being classified as a democracy, thereby geared to serve the needs and interests of the demos (the public), the issue of adequate water access remains. This is in contrast to the Constitution (RSA 1996) highlighting basic human rights and the manner in which the country should operate.

Democracy is, in essence, a way of governing for the benefit of the public. This benefit must include having mechanisms in place, which should prevent issues, such as demands for service delivery, from ever escalating into potential crisis-points.

⁶³ This can be linked directly with a need for increased participation in the affairs of the Tzaneen municipality since the MDM's IDP consists of the IDP's of all the municipalities within its district.

⁶⁴ The importance of public participation in the formulation and implementation of the IDP of municipalities is considered vital. This participation is one of the objectives of the Constitution and is "one of the cornerstones of the White Paper on Local Government" (Tzaneen Policies 2007).

One such mechanism is political accountability. Since South Africa is a democracy, it should follow that political accountability should enjoy relative importance in the daily operation of government.

The lack of precise definition of accountability forms one part of the rationale for the decided study. Through the literature overview the study determines what political accountability means. The next question is then: how do you measure political accountability? One way is to measure the concept by considering a real-life issue. In this case it was apparent that a large percentage of households in the Limpopo Province, especially rural areas, do not have access to a clean and reliable water source. Access to such a clean and reliable water source is being addressed through a number of water projects in the province.

The focus on water provision projects highlights the second reason for the study. Although water projects are being established in a number of areas, quite a few of these projects are not functional in the longterm. Considerable cost goes into the establishment of a water provision project. Taking this cost-calculation into consideration one would expect that every effort will be made to ensure that projects remain functional over a long period of time. Why is this not the case? A number of reasons can be suggested for this failure. The study aims to evaluate whether the level of political accountability within a project impacts project sustainability. Determining whether political accountability has an impact on project sustainability or not, provides a means of identifying or eliminating elements believed to influence project sustainability.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4. Methodology

4.1 Research Question

The Introduction has highlighted that, from laws and documents dealing with service delivery, it is not clear what the requirements are for accountability. It was asked whether a decision-maker needs to only meet one requirement in order to be regarded as accountable. Also, is there a difference between a government institution and a non-governmental organization with regards to the degree of political accountability practiced by each actor?

The following study is interested in exploring political accountability as practised in every day activities that impact the public's socio-economic well-being. This includes exploring political accountability within water project implementation. Evaluating political accountability within the setting of water projects needs to include linking the evaluation with a tangible outcome. As stated in chapter 3, a number of villages in the Mopani District do not have access to water despite water infrastructure being present. Evaluating political accountability within water projects is, therefore, linked to determining whether improved political accountability within a water project may result in water projects functioning for an extended period of time. As such, the research question asks

Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political accountability impact project sustainability?

In this regard, the hypotheses tested were:

- H_0 There is no link between political accountability within a water project and water sustainability;
- H_1 Political accountability within a water project has an impact on water sustainability.

4.2 Nature of Research

The study wants to find out whether there is any accountability in water projects and whether accountability (if there is any) leads to project sustainability. Therefore, the study focuses on exploring the impact of one factor, political accountability, on project

sustainability. This is accomplished through quantitative methodology. The questionnaire measured the political accountability of two project implementers (municipality and a non-governmental organisation) within four water projects (two projects were selected from each implementer). The study is descriptive in the sense that it provides an overview of the water situation and demographic indicators within the Mopani district. Through the exploration of the role of political accountability on project sustainability, the study also aims to provide a probable explanation for the degree of sustainability found in some water projects.

4.3 Data Collection

Literature on political accountability was compiled in order to determine what the concept should, ideally, incorporate. Through the literature study five elements were identified that defines political accountability. These elements are (a) meeting specified responsibilities, (b) providing information, (c) include stakeholders/beneficiaries in decisions, (d) sanctioning, and (e) credibility.

Another qualitative method used was the utilisation of information gained through a number of semi-structured interviews. These semi-structured interviews consisted of meeting respondents from Tsogang, the Tzaneen municipality and the Tzaneen Business Chamber and discussing (a) water provision in the district, (b) budget management in order to fund water projects, and (c) operating practice in establishing water projects.

As mentioned, data was collected, primarily, through a quantitative approach. In order to evaluate political accountability in water projects at the village level, the following method was used:

(a) Two implementing institutions were selected that implement projects in seemingly different ways⁶⁵. The selected implementers were the Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang, a non-governmental organization (NGO). Within each institution, one person closely involved with water projects (who also works within higher management level within the selected institution) was interviewed from a set questionnaire.

Responses from the implementer were employed in order to verify responses from the

⁶⁵ I decided that within an evaluation of political accountability within water projects it would be useful to compare two actors that are, usually, considered not to operate in a similar manner.

selected villages. For example, when respondents in a village stated the date when a project was finished, the implementer's response should confirm those responses. Responses from the two implementers were, as such, utilised in order to confirm responses from project beneficiaries.

(b) Four villages were selected on the basis of the type of water provision by the selected implementers to the community. The minimum requirement for selecting a project was the establishment of standpipes every 200metres within the village. As such, the villages of Bellevue, Nwamitwa, Mamogolo and Tours were chosen through random selection. The villages of Bellevue (NGO project) and Nwamitwa (Tzaneen municipality project) were taken as the two key projects. Within each village, respondents were selected, where each respondent was interviewed from a set questionnaire (see section 4.3.1).

(c) Data gained through the questionnaire allowed an evaluation of the research question. This was accomplished in three parts (i) within each village/project an evaluation was done to determine the level of political accountability within this village/project, (ii) in every village the sustainability of the project was determined (is the project still functioning effectively), and lastly, (iii) the level of political accountability in each village was compared to the sustainability of the water project in each village. This last comparison allowed conclusions to be drawn relating to whether political accountability has an impact on project sustainability.

4.3.1 Selecting the community respondents

In each village, every effort was made to interview either (a) members of the water committee or (b) members of the community who regularly attended community meetings related to the water project in the village. Such interviews ensured that the respondent would be in a position to provide insight for a large percentage of the aspects addressed within the questionnaire.

Randomly selected respondents were also subject to meeting an equal-gender representation. However, it was generally found that respondents' consist of an overrepresentation of women compared to men (Table 1) and in the older age class (Table 2). As mentioned in chapter 3, it is believed that men find employment in

provinces with more employment opportunities, thereby resulting in an overrepresentation of women. Furthermore, respondents were required to have attended community meetings related to the water project or form part of the water committee of the village in order to be interviewed. This resulted in an older age group being interviewed.

Table 1 Gender distribution for the respondents in each village.

Village	Male	Female	Total
Bellevue	3	7	10
Mamogolo	6	5	11
Nwamitwa	4	6	10
Tours	3	5	8

Table 2 Number of respondents, in each village, for six age groups.

Village	18-19	20-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41+	Total respondents
Bellevue	0	0	4	3	2	1	10
Mamogolo	0	0	3	3	1	4	11
Nwamitwa	0	0	2	3	5	0	10
Tours	0	0	1	2	3	2	8

Community respondents were interviewed from a set questionnaire. An introduction of the researcher, by a person selected by the project implementer, to community members was essential for data collection on the chosen water projects. Data collected through the assistance of community members (or beneficiaries) provided most of the data needed to evaluate political accountability within each selected water project.

4.3.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire used to interview beneficiaries, as well as the project implementers, is mostly similar and measure exactly the same elements. However, a few questions were added to the questionnaire designed for the project implementer (Appendix B) and other questions added to the beneficiary questionnaire (Appendix A). Adding extra questions allowed a more in-depth picture of political accountability as experienced/perceived by the two groups - implementers/beneficiaries.

The questionnaire also included a few open-ended questions. It was considered necessary to include open-ended questions because (a) a few questions required the respondent to provide motivation for a selected answer and (b) in one section of the questionnaire, project related information was required in order to evaluate a specific element⁶⁶ of political accountability.

Face-to-face interviews were done with both the implementers as well as the project beneficiaries. When doing the first interview, opportunity was allowed for the respondent to expand on or explain responses. This was found to be very time-consuming and tiring for both the respondent as well as the interviewer. Despite the “down-side” of a long interview, this allowed the interviewer to focus on specific elements within the selected projects and how these elements (as encapsulated in the questionnaire) influenced project sustainability.

In order to compensate for the time it took to interview one respondent, it was decided to include research assistants to help with interviews. The selected persons were able to speak the first-language of respondents. This served as a valuable way in which to gain the trust of respondents as well as to ensure more reliable responses (less likelihood of misunderstanding between the interviewer and the interviewee).

The content of the questionnaire considered five elements (criteria) of political accountability as identified within the literature study:

- Responsibility
- Information
- Inclusion
- Sanctioning
- Credibility

The first element considered accountability as fulfilling certain obligations towards another actor. The obligations employed to measure whether the individual project implementers fulfilled those duties involved using the list of duties as described in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP⁶⁷) of the Tzaneen municipality as well as a list of duties of Tsogang. It was found that, overall, Tsogang listed similar duties to the municipality’s

⁶⁶ Sanctioning

⁶⁷ Every municipality is required by law to formulate an IDP. The IDP is a framework that (a) identifies priorities within the municipality’s jurisdiction and (b) formulates strategies to effectively address priority areas. All municipal actions and decisions are to be guided by the municipality’s IDP.

IDP, and even more. In the end, I used the municipality IDP list for both implementers in order to be able to compare the two implementers' fulfilment of certain responsibilities. In addition, I employed aspects of *meeting responsibilities* as identified in the literature study.

All the other elements (access to information; inclusion of beneficiaries; ability to sanction the project implementer; and the credibility of the project implementer) were measured according to characteristics of political accountability as highlighted in the literature study.

After interviewing both implementer and beneficiaries of each village, the separate responses from the implementer and the beneficiaries were then compared. This comparison was done in order to verify facts, such as when a project was finished. Thereafter, each village's responses, with regards the elements of political accountability, were evaluated. This analysis, combined with a general impression of each village on the day of the interviews, contributed to a notion of the level of political accountability within each water project as practised by the project implementer. The level of political accountability within the four projects was then compared to each other. Comparing the four projects/villages allows one to (a) determine in which village the degree of political accountability was relatively high and (b) reach an answer about whether political accountability has an impact on project sustainability.

4.3.3 Research scope and constraints

Evaluating political accountability was limited to one municipal district in the Limpopo Province, in which only two key water projects were selected. One of the 'verifying' projects (*Tours*) is also within the Mopani District Municipality (MDM). Mamogolo, however, is situated in the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality, Mpumalanga.

A study considering water projects within a relatively small area is useful for a few reasons. Service delivery is a concern for every person, whether you have access to services or whether you are still waiting for it. It is therefore a visible, and practical, manner in which to determine the level of political accountability as practised by service providers. Secondly, it is an easier way (than looking at the concept on the national level) to highlight to the public what political accountability needs to incorporate and what it should *not* be. In a small way it thus serves an educational purpose. Lastly, the study is

focused on determining whether political accountability has an impact on project sustainability. The study, therefore, serves a practical purpose in aiming to improve water provision.

The timeframe of the study considers one project finished in 2001 and the last project finished January 2007. The evaluation of political accountability is, as such, focused on the time from 2001 onwards and do not consider water projects established prior to this time. It should be noted that in 2001 local government underwent major restructuring⁶⁸ to its operation and functions, having an impact on water project implementation.

4.4 Statistical methods

The SPSS version 16 was used to analyse the data. Statistical methods were utilized⁶⁹, making use of:

(a) Exploratory data analysis:

- Stem-and-Leaf analysis – visual presentation of the data distribution;
- Frequency diagrams - illustrating the distribution patterns; and
- Cross-tabulations were used to look at the relationships between two variables.

(b) Testing differences:

- Chi-Square analysis to test for significant differences between villages; and
- Mann-Whitney Test: Testing whether significant differences were detected according to the Chi-Square analysis. The Mann-Whitney Test was employed in identifying the village.

⁶⁸ For instance, district municipalities were established with the objective of coordinating local municipalities within their jurisdiction. As such, a local municipality was, prior to 2001, responsible for every step of, for example, establishing a water project. Post-2001, the district municipality delegate certain project-steps to local municipalities and other steps to private organisations.

⁶⁹ Discovering Statistics by A. Field (2000) for selecting which methods to employ for analyses.

Chapter 5: Findings

5. Findings

Political accountability of an implementer was evaluated according to the degree in which the implementer met the identified criteria measuring accountability. In this study it was taken that an implementer is required to meet the criteria of responsibility, information, inclusion, sanctioning and credibility in order to be perceived as politically accountable.

An implementer's actions were evaluated by focusing on each element but also, through determining an overall level of accountability (by taking all five elements together and determining the level of political accountability on the part of the implementer). In essence, the research question was evaluated by determining whether a project/village that shows a high degree of political accountability also shows that the water project is still functioning effectively (project sustainability).

The overall political accountability and the overall sustainability of a project were also determined for each village. This provides a valuable overview of the analysis. Measurement of political accountability involved comparing the four villages/projects with each other. It must be stressed that each village was linked to a specific water supply institution, e.g. NGO or municipality. Although the main aim was to determine the degree of political accountability, an additional component was also tested – Is there a significant difference in accountability between the two water supply institutions?

It was difficult to find a large number of respondents who fulfilled the requirement of either having attended community meetings related to water or being part of the water committee within the village. As a result, data analyses depended on a small sample size. This makes it difficult to generalize findings but the results are important to give us some understanding of accountability in water projects.

5.1 Measurement of the five elements of political accountability

The questionnaire (see Appendix A) is divided into five sections. Each section measures an element of political accountability, as elected for this study. Question 1-24 measures the responsibilities of each project implementer, as stated by each institution

in their 'list of responsibilities'. The degree in which a project implementer is believed to have fulfilled the stated responsibilities was used as a measure of this criterion.

It is important to note that the variable responsibility consists of dimensions that are evaluated on a more detailed basis in two other sections, Inclusion and Information. Referring back to the literature study, it was argued that *accountability means that an actor fulfills specified responsibilities towards another actor*. A project implementer is, therefore, obliged to fulfill the stated obligations. Although these variables were measured in Q1-24 (see heading: Responsibility and Accountability), it was decided to analyse the dimensions within responsibility that are also considered for the variables inclusion and information in those two sections. This means that Q9-14 and Q17&18 are measured in the sections dealing with inclusion and information.

As a result of discussing Q9-14 and Q17&18 in the other sections, three dimensions remained in the section Responsibility. The variables in these dimensions include: sustainability of delivered services (Q1-8,19-24), good governance (Q15), and a question asking respondents directly whether they believed the implementer had been accountable in the project (Q16).

Sustainability of delivered services looked at service delivery obligations of the project implementer. For example, 'is water provided to the community', 'how many days/week is water provided to the community', 'how long has the project been functioning', and more. Variables related to sustainability were analysed in order to employ findings related to sustainability as a means of evaluating project sustainability. This served as a method to evaluate whether a project's political accountability is linked to the sustainability of the project.

Two questions remain in this section, Q15 (good governance) and Q16 (accountability). Q15 measured respondents' perception of whether the project had been implemented through good governance. Q15 and Q16 (accountability) were used as indicators to determine whether respondents believe the implementer had been accountable in the project. Q16's responses were employed to compare the overall questionnaire findings (of political accountability) with what respondents directly stated about accountability in the project (see heading:Overall Analysis). The remaining elements (Inclusion,


Information, Sanctioning, and Credibility) were discussed as they are found within the Questionnaire (Appendix A).

5.2 Exploratory analysis

The responses between the villages on the Overall Political Accountability (OPA) are presented in Figure 4. The general impression is a major difference between the village regarding the responses, with Bellevue and Mamagolo indicating a more positive trend toward OPA whereas the other two villages responded negatively.


The plot indicates⁷⁰ that the project implementer was the most accountable in Bellevue; followed by Mamogolo (both NGO projects). There is a significant difference between the level of political accountability as perceived in Bellevue compared to the degree of political accountability in Nwamitwa and Tours (municipal projects). However, Tours is an outlier. Figure 4 indicates Tours' position in relation to the other three villages. This position is influenced by an overall negative perception of Tours about the project implementer's political accountability during the project as well as unhappiness about the project outcome.

Figure 4 Stem-and-Leaf analysis on the overall response toward political accountability (numbers on the left of the graph represent the measurement scale employed within the questionnaire; closer to '1' indicates a higher degree of political accountability).



⁷⁰ The thick black line presents the average; with the two "arms" indicating the range of responses.

Figure 5 Stem-and-Leaf analysis on the overall response toward sustainability



Comparing figure 4 and figure 5, one can determine that projects indicating more sustainability are also the projects that reflect a high level of political accountability on the part of the project implementer (Bellevue and Mamogolo).

The responses from the various villages is markedly skewed – and do not fit a normal distribution pattern. The implication is that normal parametric statistical test would not be appropriate for testing hypothesis.

5.3 Measurement of the criteria for political accountability

Measurement involved (a) separately evaluating each criterion of political accountability and (b) evaluating the overall political accountability found within each project.

5.3.1 The relationship between responsibility and accountability

The chi square test indicates that within the section measuring the correlation between responsibility and accountability, there exists a relationship between the measurement scale and the specific village. Most of the variables in this section show that there is a

relationship between the measurement scale and village (as a variable). The exceptions are question nine⁷¹, question fifteen⁷², and question eighteen⁷³.

Within this section, responsibility was further divided into measuring the implementer's responsibility with regards to (a) service delivery (or *sustainability* of delivered services) (b) inclusion, (c) governance, (d) accountability, and (e) information. Within this section sustainability of delivered services, accountability and governance will be discussed. Questions related to inclusion and information will be discussed within their specific sections. Take note that according to the list of responsibilities from each implementer, as highlighted in the literature study, both actors indicated that these responsibilities should be met in their operations.

Within the context of sustainability of delivered services responsibility, the implementer was evaluated according to (a) providing water to the community, (b) providing water to all members of the community, (c) providing water 24hours/7 days a week, (d) building water infrastructure that is of a high quality, (e) the project has provided water for many years, (f) the implementer ensured that water is safe for people to use, (g) the implementer did not harm the environment through the project, and (h) the implementer provides water at an affordable tariff. Questions 19-24 are also focused on the sustainability of service delivery. Three questions within this group of questions are believed to be important. These are Q22, Q23 and Q24. The questions are focused on (a) the length of time that respondents have been receiving water since the project was finished, (b) the number of days respondents have access to water each week, and (c) respondents' perception of how well the project implementer met its responsibility to the community of providing water.

Findings indicate that Mamogolo and Bellevue show a very high level of agreement that water is provided to the community. Combining the two agreement options (*strongly agree* and *agree*), Mamogolo and Bellevue indicates 100 per cent agreement. Nwamitwa indicates 60 per cent agreement and 40 per cent disagreement with the statement. Tours revealed the lowest score with only 12.5 per cent of

⁷¹ Determining whether the project forms part of water provision to the entire district.

⁷² Determining whether the project was established through good governance.

⁷³ Determining whether the implementer was open in its actions and decisions.

respondents agreeing that water is provided to the community and 87.5 per cent disagreeing with the statement. These findings are illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Q1: Water is provided to the community: H_0 (water provision) rejected, $X^2=19.4$, $df=8$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.




Figure 7. Q2: Is water provision equal: H_0 (water provision is equal) rejected, $X^2=39.9$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.





Figure 6 indicates water provision to the community. The *equality* of provision was also evaluated (Figure 7). In Bellevue 90% of respondents agreed that all members of the community have equal access to water. Mamagolo indicated 100% agreement. Nwamitwa showed more than 50% agreement. Tours *disagreed* almost 90% that water is provided equally. Tours' response is linked to the previous question. It is also

linked to information from respondents that there are only three working standpipes within the village. These standpipes are not “distributed” equally within the village.

An important part of service delivery is Q3, which asks respondents whether they have water 24hours/7 days per week. Bellevue indicated 90 percent *strongly agree* with the statement and Nwamitwa indicated 10 percent agreement. Mamogolo and Tours indicated 100 per cent disagreement with the statement (figure 8).

Figure 8. Q3: Water is provided to the community 24h/7d per week: H_0 (water provision 24h/7d) rejected, $X^2=30.3$, $df=8$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.




The findings related to Mamogolo need further explanation. Although Mamogolo respondents indicated that water is not provided to the community on a daily basis, this is not as a result of the implementer. Water can be pumped, and used, on a daily basis. However, this requires diesoline. At the moment the community receives free diesoline on a monthly basis from the local municipality. The amount of diesoline received is only enough for the community to pump water three days a week. In order to pump water every day, the community will have to purchase diesoline using its own resources.

From the data it appears that 100 percent of Bellevue respondents believe that water infrastructure is of high standards; Mamogolo indicates 90.9 percent agreement;

Nwamitwa indicates 80 percent agreement; and Tours indicates 37.5 percent agreement (figure 9).

Figure 9. Q4: Water infrastructure appears to be of high standards. H_0 (water infrastructure is equal) rejected, $X^2=18.5$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.



Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated 100 percent agreement that water has been provided for many years. This is despite Mamogolo’s water project only being finished in 2006. Nwamitwa indicated 60 percent agreement with the statement. Tours showed 37.5 percent agreement that water has been provided for many years. Bellevue is the oldest project selected (2001), followed by Tours (2003), Nwamitwa (2004) and Mamogolo (2006). This question is linked to two other questions within this section: for how long did the community receive water once the project was finished (Q22) and for how long does the community have access to water each week (Q23).

Both Bellevue and Nwamitwa indicated 90 per cent agreement that water is safe to drink; Mamogolo respondents show 100 per cent agreement. Tours showed 50 per cent agreement.

Respondents from all the selected villages showed a minimum of 80 percent agreement that the implementer ensured the environment was not harmed during the establishment of the project. Despite these positive findings, I do not believe that responses should be used as a reliable indicator that the implementer protected the

environment in its operations. Only one respondent, of a total of 39, mentioned knowledge that an environmental impact study should be conducted prior to any project being started. Unfortunately, respondents were not requested to provide a definition of what they consider environmental protection to incorporate. I believe respondents' knowledge and perception of environmental protection needs to be investigated since this is closely linked to how well a water source will be protected by a community. Water source sustainability is the responsibility of a project implementer as well as a community.

Q8 considers respondent perceptions of whether water is provided at an affordable tariff. In this regard Bellevue, Mamogolo and Nwamitwa all indicate 100 per cent agreement with the statement. Respondents highlighted that water is provided free of charge to the community (when water *is* provided). Tours showed 50 per cent agreement and 50 per cent disagreement. Once again, further explanation is required. Respondents who disagreed with the statement argued that there is no water, thus, water is not provided at an affordable tariff. On the other hand, respondents who agreed with the statement stated that the little water that is received (three standpipes are still functional) is free of charge.

As mentioned, question 19-24 measured further aspects related to the sustainability of delivered services. Three questions were highlighted as important to the study: Q22, Q23 and Q24. Cross-tabulations are provided to indicate the difference between the four villages related to these questions.

Table 3 Length of water reception

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q22 Since receiving water, how long after did you continue to receive water?	1 - 12 Months	3	0	2	0	5
	1 - 2 Years	0	11	0	0	11
	2 - 3 Years	0	0	3	0	3
	Longer than 4 Years	7	0	5	1	13
	Total	10	11	10	1	32

Considering Q22 (table 3) it should be remembered that the project was finished in Bellevue (2001), Mamogolo (2006), Nwamitwa (2004) and in Tours (2003). As such, Mamogolo's indication that the community has received water between 1 and 2 years is an accurate description of the project. Seven respondents in Bellevue indicate that the project has been functional for more than four years (in reality it means the project has been functioning for seven years). The three respondents who stated the project has been functioning 1-12 months cannot be explained except to assume that the respondents did not understand the question. Nwamitwa's project should have fallen into the category 'longer than four years'. However, half of the respondents stated that the project has been functioning for less than three years. The other half stated that the project has been functioning longer than four years. In Tours, only one respondent indicated at Q19 that water is received. This respondent stated that the project in Tours have been functioning for longer than four years. However, taking into account that the rest of this respondent group indicated that they do not receive water (Q1 and Q19), this one respondent's answers cannot be utilised as indicative of the project. Q22 needs to be evaluated in combination with Q23.

Table 4 Water provision per week

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q23 How long do you have access to water each week?	Less than 2 days a week	2	0	10	1	13
	2 - 4 Days	0	11	0	0	11
	7 Days a week	8	0	0	0	8
	Total	10	11	10	1	32

Q23 (table 4) indicates that Bellevue is the only village with water access each day of the week. Mamogolo has water access 2-4 days each week (refer to discussion at Q3 for reason for this access). All the respondents in Nwamitwa indicated they have less than 2 days water access in a week. Tours indicated in Q1 and Q19 that they do not receive water.

Q24 (table 5) asked all respondents whether they believe the implementer met its responsibility to the community in providing water. Eight respondents in Bellevue indicated the implementer met its responsibility fully; one respondent indicated the

implementer met most of its responsibility; one respondent provided a 'don't know' response. All the respondents in Mamogolo believe the implementer met its responsibility fully to the community. Seven respondents in Nwamitwa believe the implementer met part of its responsibility or did not meet it at all. Four respondents in Tours indicated the implementer met part of its responsibility; four respondents believe the implementer did not meet its responsibility at all.

Table 5 Implementer responsibility


		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q24 How well did implementer meet their responsibility?	Met if fully	8	11	2	0	21
	Met most of it	1	0	1	0	2
	Met part of it	0	0	6	4	10
	Did not meet it at all	0	0	1	4	5
	Don't Know	1	0	0	0	1
	Total	10	11	10	8	39

The question evaluating whether the implementer ensured the project was established through good governance does not show that there is a relationship between the measurement scale and village.

An interesting question added to the questionnaire is Q16 (figure 10). This question asks respondents whether they agree or disagree that the implementer was accountable in the water project. It was not emphasised to respondents that the questionnaire measured political accountability on the part of the project implementer. The interest in this question relates to conscious respondent responses (Q16) and what the entire questionnaire highlights about political accountability. In this question respondents were directly asked whether the implementer was accountability. Ideally, responses to this question should correlate with the entire questionnaire's content (seeing that the entire document measures political accountability).

In this regard, both Bellevue and Mamogolo indicate 100 per cent agreement that the project implementer was accountable in the project. Nwamitwa shows 60 per cent agreement and Tours 50 per cent agreement with the statement. See figure 7.

Figure 10. Q16: Was the implementer accountable in the project. H_0 (Accountability equal) rejected, $X^2=28.9$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.



Q16 is further examined in the Overall Analysis in order to highlight whether there is a difference between respondents' "conscious" answer of whether the implementer was accountable and what is revealed through the entire questionnaire's measurement of accountability in a specific village.

5.3.2 The relationship between information and accountability

Within this section respondents could indicate agreement or disagreement with statements. There were also questions that considered the amount of information made available to the community; how this information was made available to the community; and what impact the amount of information had on how the project turned out.

Firstly, the questions that required agreement or disagreement are discussed. These questions were divided into four parts: infrastructure, people, project results and maintenance tariffs. Each of these parts aimed to determine whether information was made available to the community regarding the selected parts. In Bellevue and Mamogolo respondents indicated 100 per cent agreement that information was made available to them regarding infrastructure (Q25, Q26). This included information about the type of water provision (standpipe or yard tap). Nwamitwa showed 95 per cent agreement and Tours 62.5 per cent agreement.

Information about people involved determined whether the community knew who the implementer persons were who worked on the project (Q28); if the community know who the liaison person is between the community and the implementer (Q29); and whether someone from the implementer can be contacted if there is a serious maintenance problem (Q30). With Q28, Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated 100 percent agreement that they knew who the implementer persons were who worked on the project. Nwamitwa showed 80 percent agreement and Tours 50 percent agreement.

At Q29 (liaison/contact person) Bellevue indicated 90 percent agreement. Mamogolo, Nwamitwa and Tours showed 100 percent agreement. This indicates that both the municipality and the NGO (a) made a lot of use of the liaison person during the project, and/or (b) that the liaison person performed his/her duties very well.

With regards to project results, Bellevue showed 100 percent agreement that the implementer made information available about how the project turned out (Q27). Mamogolo indicated 90.9 percent agreement and Nwamitwa 70 per cent. Tours disagreed fully (100 percent) that information was made available to the community about how the project turned out.

50 percent of respondents in Bellevue indicated that the implementer communicated to the community whether they will have to pay water tariffs in order to fund maintenance of the water project (Q31). Mamogolo showed 100 percent agreement. Nwamitwa indicated 30 percent agreement and Tours 42.7 percent.

The information-accountability section also considered whether the community believed they had received enough information relating to the water project (Q33). In this regard, table 6 indicates the percentage figures that the four villages indicated regarding the amount of information they believed the community received.

Table 6. Amount of information made available

	More than Enough (%)	Enough (%)	Some (%)	Not enough (%)
Bellevue	20	50	0	30
Mamogolo	54.5	36.4	9.1	0
Nwamitwa	10	20	50	20
Tours	0	0	62.5	37.5

The findings of table 6 need to be taken into consideration when interpreting the findings of Q35. Q35 asked respondents whether they believed that the amount of information they had received had made an impact on how the project had turned out. Put another way, the question aims to determine if enough information to respondents is positively linked to whether the project is successful. Findings are summarized in table 7.

Table 7. Impact of the information

	Big impact (%)	Some impact (%)	Small impact (%)	No impact (%)
Bellevue	40	30	0	30
Mamogolo	100	0	0	0
Nwamitwa	40	20	40	0
Tours	25	0	50	25

Respondents from each village indicated the following methods, summarised in table 8, employed by the project implementer to make information available to the community.

Table 8. Information methods

	Community Meeting (%)	Pamphlets (%)	News- Paper (%)	Contact Person (%)	Discus- Sions (%)	Reports (%)	House Visit (%)	Other (Chief) (%)
Bellevue	100.0	20.0	10.0	50.0	40.0	40.0	10.0	40.0
Mamogolo	90.9	27.3	0	90.9	90.9	54.5	0	100.0
Nwamitwa	90.0	50.0	20.0	80.0	90.0	60.0	10.0	90.0
Tours	75.0	0	0	62.5	87.5	25.0	0	50.0
Average	89.0	24.0	30.0	71.0	77.0	45.0	20.0	70.0

Table 8 indicates that, on average, community meetings, the contact person, discussion forums, project reports and approaching the chief, are utilised as key methods to make information available to the community.

Q35 (table 9) measured the impact the amount of information made available to a respondent had on how the project turned out.

Table 9 Impact of the amount of information

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q35 Impact amount of information made available to respondent had on how project "turned out"	Big impact	4	11	4	2	21
	Some impact	3	0	2	0	5
	Small impact	0	0	4	4	8
	No impact	3	0	0	2	5
	Total	10	11	10	8	39

In Bellevue, respondents who stated that the amount of information had made a *big* impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons:

- Information helps the community and the implementer to work well together;
- Information assists problems with the project to be resolved;
- Information is important in order to protect the water source and also to maintain the water infrastructure; and
- Information from the water committee is important in order to successfully link up with the local municipality (has taken over the project) when a problem needs to be resolved.

All the respondents who stated that information had a big impact on how the project turned out had also stated that they believed they had received *enough* information about the project.

Bellevue respondents who stated that information had *some* impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons for this response:

- Information is important for community members to be trained in matters related to the water project (this includes bookkeeping, maintenance and problem solving training);
- Information is important for support for the implementer; and
- Information regarding the project is essential since it is the community who will, ultimately, make use of the water source.

These Bellevue respondents, furthermore, stated that they had either received *more than enough* information or *enough* information. There was one outlier who stated that *not enough* information was made available about the water project.

30 percent of Bellevue respondents stated that the amount of information had no impact on how the project turned out. The sole reason these respondents gave for this response is:

- Water access is free.

These respondents stated that *not enough* information was made available to them. Only one respondent stated that *more than enough* information was made available to the community about the project. As such, the response that “water access is free” can, tentatively, be ascribed to (a) respondents not seeing a connection between the amount of information and how the project turned out, or (b) respondents believing that it is every person’s right to have free water access and that the amount of information is not linked to this since this right needs to be fulfilled one way or another.

In Mamogolo, respondents (N=11) who stated that the amount of information had made a *big* impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons:

- It is believed that the amount of information received from the implementer resulted in service delivery (water provision) to the community (9 respondents out of 11, 81.8%);
- Information helps in resolving problems, eg to ensure that a section of the village was not left out of the project; and
- Information contributes to ensuring that water is provided equally, i.e. no households are left out.

Six of the respondents stated that they believed they had received *more than enough* information about the water project. Four respondents stated they believed they had

received *enough* information; one respondent stated that he/she had received *some* information.

In Nwamitwa, respondents (N=4) stated that the amount of information had made a *big* impact on how the project turned, providing the following reasons for the response:

- The community supports the municipality/implementer when a lot of information is provided;
- Information contributes to the community developing an understanding of the project and sympathy for the project implementer when things do not turn out as planned/stated; and
- If a member of the community does not understand something related to the project, he/she can get information regarding this.

These respondents either stated that he/she had received enough information, some information, or not enough information.

Respondents (N=2) who stated that information had *some* impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons for this response:

- Information had contributed to water points being moved closer so that households have easier access to water;
- Information had some impact because sometimes the implementer gave information that did not realise, e.g. the implementer said people would have water once a week but in reality some people receive water only once a month; and
- If correct information had been given “no one would’ve agreed to the project” as it was established.

The above respondents stated that he/she either received *enough* information or *some* information.

Some respondents (N=4) stated that the amount of information made available had a small impact on how the project turned out. The reasons provided for this response is as follows:

- People had access to water for only one month;
- When people do have access to water, it is “maybe twice a week”;
- Distances between standpipes are very far;

- The project infrastructure is not being taken care of; and
- Some residents have approached the councilor about the state of the project, but the councilor had (at that stage) not come back to the community.

Three of the above respondents stated that they believed they had received only some information; one respondent stated that he/she had received more than enough information.

In Tours, two respondents (out of 8) stated that the amount of information made available to the community had a big impact on how the project turned out. It must be highlighted, first, that both the respondents stated they believed they had received *some* information. The reasons given for the response that information had a big impact on how the project turned out, are:

- If the municipality had utilised community knowledge about where the old water lines were laid, this line system could have been incorporated into the new water project; and
- More than enough information, it is believed, would have ensured that the community receives water after the project was finished.

Four respondents stated that they believed the amount of information received had a *small* impact on how the project turned out. The reason for this response is mainly:

- That the community does not have adequate access to water even after the project was established.

These respondents also stated that they believed they had received *some* information or *not enough* information.

Two respondents stated that they believed that the amount of information had *no* impact on how the project turned out. The reason given is:

- That there is still not adequate access to water in the village.

The respondents stated that they received *some* information or *not enough* information.

5.3.3 The relationship between inclusion and accountability


Within the section related to the inclusion and engagement of the community by the implementer, respondents were provided with a definition about being included in the

project. Respondents were asked to keep this definition in mind when answering the three questions within the section. The definition read as follows:

“Inclusion in the project process means the implementer kept continuous contact with you in order to make sure it took your needs and interests into consideration”.

According to this definition, respondents were asked to what degree they felt included in the project process. Bellevue indicated that 70 percent of respondents felt included *throughout the project*; 20 percent felt included *for most of the project*, and 10 percent *did not feel included*. Mamagalo felt 81.8 percent included throughout the project with an 18.2 percent of feeling included for most of the project. Nwamitwa respondents indicated that 30 percent of respondents felt included in the project; 40 percent felt included *sometimes*; and 30 percent did not feel included. Tours indicated that 25 percent felt included sometimes; 75 percent of respondents did not feel included. These percentages are illustrated in figure 11.

Figure 11. Q37: Level of inclusion in the project process H_0 (Inclusion is equal) rejected, $\chi^2=30.6$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.



Respondents were also asked to highlight how often they were able to contribute their ideas about the project (Figure 12). This question served as a means of evaluating whether the implementer allowed opportunity for respondents to participate in the project process, thereby substantiating respondents’ belief of inclusion.


In Bellevue, 50 percent of responses indicated that respondents could contribute their ideas *at any time* during the project. 40 percent indicated that they could contribute their ideas *most of the time* during the project. 10 percent stated that they did were not able to contribute their ideas.

Mamagalo indicated 45.5 percent agreement that ideas could be given at any time in the project; 54.5 percent showed that they could contribute their ideas most of the time.

30 percent of Nwamitwa respondents believe they could contribute their ideas at any time; 10 percent believe they could give ideas most of the time; 40 percent believe they could contribute ideas sometimes; and 20 percent felt they were never able to give their ideas about the project.

Tours indicated that 62.5 percent of respondents believed that they could sometimes give their ideas about the project; 37.5 percent felt they were never able to give their ideas.

Figure 12. Q38: Community contribution in ideas. H_0 (Contribution is equal between villages) rejected, $X^2=26.7$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.



Respondents were asked what items were utilised by the implementer to include the community in the project (table 10 p86). It is of interest to note that the municipal projects indicate higher values (considering the average figures) for six of the ten

items. The items relating to the contact person, project reports, feedback forms and ensuring illiterate community members are included, scored lower values than the NGO score (but not remarkably so).

Table 10 Methods to include the community

	Bellevue	Mamogolo	NGO	Nwamitwa	Tours	Municipality
	(%)	(%)	Average	(%)	(%)	Average
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Discussions	50.0	81.8	65.9	80.0	87.5	83.8
Community Meeting	100.0	90.9	95.5	100.0	100.0	100.0
Contact Person	70.0	100.0	85.0	80.0	75.0	77.5
Project reports	60.0	90.9	75.5	70.0	50.0	60.0
Feedback Forms	50.0	36.3	43.2	60.0	25.0	42.5
Translator	60.0	100.0	80.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Include illiterate	60.0	100.0	80.0	80.0	75.0	77.5
Equal inclusion	60.0	100.0	80.0	100.0	87.5	93.8
Vote	50.0	45.5	47.8	70.0	75.0	72.5
Veto	30.0	45.5	37.8	90.0	75.0	82.5

Q9-14 also measured the manner in which the project implementer included others in the project, be this because (a) it will lead to improved expertise in order to establish a project or (b) the implementer believes it should include the community in the project. The analysis focused on how the community was included in the project. For this reason, Q11, Q12 and Q13 are highlighted.

Q11 measured respondents' perception of being involved in the project process. Perceptions reveal that all four villages believe they were involved (table 11).

Table 11 Community involvement by locality (village)

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q11 Community was involved in project process	Strongly Agree	8	11	8	1	28
	Agree	2	0	2	5	9
	Disagree	0	0	0	1	1
	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	1	1
	Total	10	11	10	8	39

Q12 asked whether the community believed they were consulted about the project (table 12). Findings reveal that Bellevue, Mamagolo and Nwamitwa believe they were consulted. Tours indicate that four respondents believe they were consulted, whilst the other disagree with this.

Table 12 Community consultation by locality (village)

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q12 Community was consulted about project	Strongly Agree	10	11	7	1	29
	Agree	0	0	0	3	3
	Disagree	0	0	1	2	3
	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	2	2
	Don't Know	0	0	1	0	1
Total	10	11	9	8	38	

Q13 aimed to find out whether the community was able to approach the implementer with comments/ideas/concerns about the project (table 13). Bellevue, Mamagolo and Nwamitwa agreed with the statement. Tours, once again, indicated that four respondents agreed with the statement, whilst the other four disagreed.

Table 13 Implementer accessibility to community

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q13 Implementer was accessible to community for any comments/ideas/concerns	Strongly Agree	10	11	6	0	27
	Agree	0	0	1	4	5
	Disagree	0	0	2	3	5
	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	1	1
	Don't Know	0	0	1	0	1
	Total	10	11	10	8	39

5.3.4 The relationship between sanctioning and accountability

This section was considered, prior to any surveys, to be very important in determining the level of accountability as practiced by each implementer. The section was detailed in its evaluation of sanctioning within a water project. Respondents were, firstly, asked whether there had been a very serious problem within the project where the community wished to halt the project until the issue was resolved.

A respondent would, on responding 'yes', be asked what the problem had been. The section then continued to include questions related to whether (a) the project was brought to a halt in order to solve this issue, (b) it was the community, the implementer, the contractor, DWAF, or another actor who stopped the project, (c) the project was brought to a halt immediately, (d) the issue was resolved before the project was finished, (e) there were people from the implementer's side who did not believe it was necessary to halt the project, and (f) reasons for not wanting to halt the project were related to, for example, economic motivation.

Even when a respondent did not believe there ever was a very serious issue to be resolved, every respondent was asked to evaluate whether he/she believed it would be easy to bring a project to a halt. This question aimed to measure whether a sanctioning mechanism was present within a project process, even if this mechanism did not need to be utilized.

Despite the expectation that respondents would "spill the beans" in this section, it was enlightening that a very low number of respondents believed that there had ever been a very serious problem in the project process which needed to be resolved.

In Bellevue, Mamogolo and Tours, two respondents from each village indicated that there was a serious problem during the project where the community wished to halt the project until the issue was resolved. It was decided, as a result of the low number of respondents indicating a wish to halt the project, that confident analysis of this section would be difficult. As such, only tentative findings are stated.

In Bellevue the problem identified related to (a) the payment of workers and (b) to workers being unable to dig a trench in a very rocky area. Similar, in Mamogolo the serious problem identified related to the payment of workers at the beginning of the project. In Tours, on the other hand, the problem related to (a) the contractor not asking permission from the chief to start construction and (b) the contractor not testing the lines to verify that water actually flowed.

Certainly, the identified problems are all serious. However, in both Bellevue and Mamogolo the problems were resolved before the project was finished. In Tours, it appears as if the issue of the contractor not taking into consideration that respect have to be shown to the chief by asking permission for construction was also resolved. In Tours, however, the issue of not testing the lines does not seem to have been resolved (with only three standpipes functioning in the village despite lower-lying villages having adequate access to water). Tours appears, thus, not to have been able to sanction the project implementer (or the contractor). This is, to emphasise, only a tentative conclusion about the situation in Tours.

5.3.5 The relationship between credibility and accountability

This section evaluated the credibility of the implementer as perceived by respondents. This element aims to determine whether respondents would recommend an implementer to another community in order to establish a water project; and also, *why* they would recommend a project implementer to another community.

Respondents in Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated that all respondents would recommend the project implementer to another community (table 14). In Nwamitwa seven respondents stated they would recommend the project implementer. In Tours,

five of the eight respondents indicated they would **not** recommend the project implementer to another community.

Table 14 Recommendation of project implementer to other communities (N)

	Yes	No	Total number of respondents
Bellevue	10	0	10
Mamogolo	11	0	11
Nwamitwa	7	3	10
Tours	3	5	8

Ideally, if respondents stated that they would recommend a project implementer, the motivation would be that the community receives water because of the project. However, the study included other items to determine whether items, besides water access, have a higher “regard” within a village.

Four set motivational responses were provided to respondents. These responses included recommending the implementer because:

- (a) the implementer consists of people who are important people;
 - (b) the community has water since the project was completed;
 - (c) the implementer can provide jobs to the community while the project is completed;
- and
- (d) the implementer has good morals characteristics.

These four responses incorporated reference to power, service delivery (actual outcome), economic opportunity, and moral values. An option was also given to respondents to provide an alternative response (“other”) if the respondent did not agree with one of the four set responses. Take note that respondents were allowed to choose only one option. This is believed to ensure that a respondent would choose the most “important” option to him/her.


From Table 15 it is apparent that a majority of Bellevue respondents would recommend the project implementer because they now have water access. This is a response linking directly with why respondents would recommend a *water project* implementer. In Mamogolo, five respondents indicated they would recommend the

implementer because of water access (this is a 45% response compared to a 70% response from Bellevue).

Table 15 Reason for recommendation of project implementer

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q51 Why would you recommend implementer?	Implementers are important people	1	0	1	0	2
	Have had water every day since project finished	7	3	0	0	10
	Implementer can provide jobs to community for duration of project	2	4	4	2	12
	Implementer has good moral characteristics	0	1	1	0	2
	Other	0	3	1	1	5
	Total	10	11	7	3	31

Figure 13 Visual representation of Table 15 (N)



Only two respondents from Bellevue stated that they would recommend the project implementer because the project could provide employment to community members. The other three villages, however, indicated that a large majority of respondents would recommend the implementer because of possible employment during a project.

Respondents were allowed to provide a reason of their own choosing about why they would recommend a project implementer. In Mamogolo, one respondent indicated that he/she would recommend the implementer because the implementer (later) established a sanitation project in the village. The respondent in Nwamitwa indicated that he/she would recommend the implementer because he/she would like other people to have water, even if it is only once a week. The respondent in Tours stated that he/she would recommend the implementer to another community because this might result in the implementer utilising a new idea in that village that results in people having access to water on a continued basis. This new idea could then be initiated in Tours, resulting in the village having adequate water access.

After responses were evaluated relating to the above two questions, respondents were asked to provide agreement or disagreement with actions and decisions of the implementer in the project process. These questions included 12 references to the “character” of the implementer during the project.

Six questions were employed to evaluate positive characteristics of the implementer. The other six remaining questions were used to confirm the responses of the first six questions. For example, Q53 asked respondents whether the implementer appeared to be working hard to finish the project. Q53’s “testing” question was Q59. Q59 asked respondents whether people from the implementer would, for example, arrive late for work on the project a number of times or would take very long lunch breaks. For example, if a respondent agreed with Q53, then the same respondent would have to provide a “disagree” response at Q59 in order for the implementer-characteristic to be seen as reliable.


Six questions aimed to determine whether the implementer (a) showed interest in the community’s needs, (b) appeared to be working hard to finish the project, (c) showed knowledge in how to establish the project, (d) appeared to make the project a priority

in its operation, (e) thought ahead about possible consequences for each decision and/or action, and (f) consulted other experts in order to successfully establish the project.

These questions measured belief in the implementer’s competency, commitment, and sense of providing the best possible service through contemplating possible consequences of decisions and making use of input from other experts in the field of water provision.


In this regard, Bellevue and Mamogolo showed 100 percent agreement that the implementer showed interest in the community’s needs (Figure 14). Nwamitwa indicated 90 percent agreement with the statement; whilst Tours showed only 12.5 percent agreement.

Figure 14. Q52. Implementer showed interest in the community needs. H_0 (Showed interest is equal) rejected, $X^2=29.3$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.




Bellevue and Mamogolo, furthermore, indicated 100 percent agreement that the implementer had appeared to be working hard to finish the project. Nwamitwa also indicated a very high score, with 90 percent agreement. Tours showed 75 percent disagreement with the statement (figure 15).

Figure 15. Q53. Implementer appeared to working hard to finish the project. H_0 (Hard working is equal) rejected, $X^2=29.3$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level.



Bellevue and Mamogolo indicate 100 percent believe that the implementer showed knowledge in how to establish a project (Figure 16). Nwamitwa showed 70 percent agreement and Tours 14.3 percent agreement. A number of Tours respondents made mention of their belief that the contractor never tested the water lines to see whether water was flowing. This belief may have played a large role in determining Tours' response on whether the implementer showed knowledge in how to establish a project.

Figure 16. Q54. Implementer showed knowledge to establish the project. H_0 (Knowledge) rejected, $X^2=19.4$, $df=8$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.



Bellevue, Mamogolo and Nwamitwa all indicated between 70 to 100% agreement that the implementer appeared to make the project a priority in its operation (Figure 17). Tours indicated 25.5 percent agreement with the statement.

Figure 17. Q55. Implementer showed priority in the project. H_0 (Priority is equal) rejected, $X^2=18.0$, $df=8$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.





Figure 18. Q56. Implementer took consequences into consideration. H_0 (Consequences is equal) rejected, $X^2=21.4$, $df=9$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.




Bellevue indicated 90 percent agreement that the implementer considered possible consequences for each decision and/or action (Figure 18); Mamogolo showed 100

percent agreement; Nwamitwa 50 percent agreement; and Tours 57.1 percent agreement.

Bellevue indicated 100 percent agreement that the implementer consulted other experts in order to successfully establish the project (Figure 19). Mamogolo indicated 27.3 percent agreement. A number of respondents were of the opinion that Tsogang (NGO) was the expert and, therefore, did not need to consult with other experts. Nwamitwa indicated 88.9 percent agreement with the statement and Tours indicated 50 percent agreement.

Figure 19. Q57. Implementer consulted other experts on the project. H_0 (Consultation is equal) rejected, $X^2=18.0$, $df=8$. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level.



5.4 Overall analysis of data

Non-parametric methods were utilised in order to present an overall analysis of the data. Tests revealed that between the two systems (NGO and Municipality) there are significant differences for the questions relating to Information, Inclusion, Sustainability (Q1-8, Q19-24), and Overall Accountability (Q1-64) (**Table 16**). Q70 (Political Accountability) measured accountability of an implementer without taking into consideration Q1-8 and Q19-24, which measures the implementer's responsibility. The Mean Rank indicates that for Inclusion, Information, Sustainability and Overall Accountability, the NGO system performed much better than the Municipality system.

Table 16. Comparison between NGO and the Municipality (Mann-Whitney Test)

	Q80 System	N	Mean Rank	Mann-Whitney U
Q70 Political Account	NGO	21	11.10	2 ***1)
	Municipality	18	30.39	
	Total	39		
Q71 Overall Account	NGO	21	11.52	11 ***
	Municipality	18	29.89	
	Total	39		
Q73 Sustainability	NGO	21	12.14	24***
	Municipality	18	29.17	
	Total	39		
Q74 Inclusion	NGO	21	13.71	57 ***
	Municipality	18	27.33	
	Total	39		
Q76 Accountability	NGO	21	15.90	103 **2)
	Municipality	18	24.78	
	Total	39		
Q78 Credibility	NGO	21	17.14	129
	Municipality	18	23.33	
	Total	39		
Q79 Sanctioning	NGO	21	20.71	174
	Municipality	18	19.17	
	Total	39		
Q77 Information	NGO	21	14.36	70.5 ***
	Municipality	18	26.58	
	Total	39		

1) Significant on 99% level. 2) Significant on 95% level

Analyses within a system (NGO Bellevue compared to NGO Mamogolo; Municipality Nwamitwa compared to Municipality Tours) were also done. Findings reveal that for the NGO system there are no significant differences between the perceptions of Bellevue and Mamogolo. However, the Mean Rank indicates that

Bellevue provides the best Overall Accountability between the projects. Bellevue's Mean Rank also shows that for Sustainability, Inclusion, and Credibility it is much lower than Mamogolo's. This means that on Sustainability, Inclusion, and Credibility, Bellevue performed also better than Mamogolo. Mamogolo's Mean Rank indicates that the village believes that it received the most information compared to the other villages.

Table 17 Comparison between Bellevue and Mamogolo (NGO system)

Ranks				
	Village of Respondent	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
Q71 Overall Account	Bellevue	10	7.85	78.50
	Mamagolo	11	13.86	152.50
	Total	21		
Q73 Sustainability	Bellevue	10	10.15	101.50
	Mamagolo	11	11.77	129.50
	Total	21		
Q74 Inclusion	Bellevue	10	9.20	92.00
	Mamagolo	11	12.64	139.00
	Total	21		
Q77 Information	Bellevue	10	14.30	143.00
	Mamagolo	11	8.00	88.00
	Total	21		
Q78 Credibility	Bellevue	10	8.30	83.00
	Mamagolo	11	13.45	148.00
	Total	21		
Q79 Sanctioning	Bellevue	10	11.10	111.00
	Mamagolo	11	10.91	120.00
	Total	21		

Comparing Nwamitwa and Tours, it was found that the two Municipality villages differed significantly on Overall Accountability, Sustainability, and Credibility. Nwamitwa's Mean Rank indicates that this village's perception regarding the identified elements is lower

than Tours'. This makes Nwamitwa the 'more accountable' project of the two Municipality projects.

Table 18 Comparison between Nwamitwa and Tours (municipality)

Ranks				
	Village of Respondent	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
Q71 Overall Account	Nwamitwa	10	6.00	60.00
	Tours	8	13.88	111.00
	Total	18		
Q73 Sustainability	Nwamitwa	10	6.70	67.00
	Tours	8	13.00	104.00
	Total	18		
Q74 Inclusion	Nwamitwa	10	7.70	77.00
	Tours	8	11.75	94.00
	Total	18		
Q77 Information	Nwamitwa	10	7.30	73.00
	Tours	8	12.25	98.00
	Total	18		
Q78 Credibility	Nwamitwa	10	6.35	63.50
	Tours	8	13.44	107.50
	Total	18		
Q79 Sanctioning	Nwamitwa	10	8.50	85.00
	Tours	8	10.75	86.00
	Total	18		

5.5 Overall Finding


The above analyses contributed to an overall finding. It has been stated in the Overall Analysis that (a) there is a significant difference between the two systems' (NGO and Municipality) political accountability within their respective projects, (b) although not significant, Bellevue (NGO project) appears to be more Sustainable, Inclusive, Credible, and Overall Accountable within the project than Mamogolo (or the other projects for that matter), and (c) Nwamitwa (Municipality project) indicates better performance, compared to Tours, in Sustainability, Credibility, and Overall Accountability.

It can, therefore, be stated that the two NGO villages' responses on the entire questionnaire indicates that the NGO system (or project implementer) acted in a politically accountable manner within the project. In comparison, the Municipality villages' responses indicate that the system (or project implementer) acted in a less politically accountable manner within the project. Take note that Bellevue, Mamagolo and Nwamitwa all indicated significantly that they believed the project implementer had been accountable in the project (see table 17 as well as figure 20). Tours has been an outlier in most of the findings. This indicates a very negative perception of the project implementer by this group of respondents.

Table 19 Implementer was accountable in project (Q16)

		Village of Respondent				
		Bellevue (N)	Mamagolo (N)	Nwamitwa (N)	Tours (N)	Total (N)
Q16 Implementer was accountable in project	Strongly Agree	7	10	6	1	24
	Agree	3	0	0	3	6
	Disagree	0	0	4	3	7
	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	1	1
	Don't Know	0	1	0	0	1
	Total	10	11	10	8	39

Figure 20. Visual representation of Table 19



The Overall Analyses, therefore, provides a confirmation of the Exploratory Analysis depicted in the Tree-and-Leaf graphs. When taking into consideration the Tree-and-Leaf graph depicting the Overall Sustainability of each project, it is illustrated that in the case where a village indicates a high level of project sustainability, that village's overall findings on political accountability is directly related. Thus, the research question **'Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political accountability impact project sustainability?'** is answered by arguing that (a) there is a difference between the two systems (involved in water project implementation) with regards to political accountability. The NGO project implementer indicates a higher level of political accountability in a project in contrast to the Municipality project implementer and (b) political accountability impacts project sustainability.

From the above a recommendation is made that both systems re-evaluate the position that Inclusion, Information, and Overall Accountability have within their operations, thereby improving project sustainability.

In summary, analyses indicate there is a significant difference between the NGO and municipality projects with regards to the degree of political accountability practiced.

The NGO projects indicate that for the variables responsibility (specifically questions focused on sustainability), information, inclusion, and overall accountability, the NGO project implementer appeared to be more accountable. This is not to say that the municipality projects do not show relatively high scores on these variables. It is believed the difference between the two systems (NGO and municipality) is significantly revealed when considering the reasons *why* information is provided and *how* the community is included.

The NGO projects also indicate a higher degree of sustainability. These projects provide water either every day or, at least, 2-4 days each week. This is in contrast to the municipality projects where respondents indicated that water access is less than 2 days each week. Naturally, when a project implementer has not fulfilled its duty to provide a stated responsibility (providing water) it is indicating a lower degree of accountability than would be the case otherwise.

It was interesting, and perhaps encouraging, that findings revealed that communities believe there was never a serious problem during a project where the community wanted to halt the project until this issue was resolved. However, this mechanism of accountability should remain within any measurement of the concept. This ensures that the option is also available to a community to halt a project when a serious issue arises.

All the projects (with the exception of Tours) showed relatively high belief that the project implementer can be viewed as credible. It should be noted that credibility, on its own, does not ensure a desired project outcome (sustainability). This can only come through pursuing all the elements of political accountability.

In essence, it is stated again that (a) there is a difference between the two systems (involved in water project implementation) with regards to political accountability. The NGO project implementer indicates a higher level of political accountability in a project in contrast to the municipality project implementer and (b) political accountability impacts project sustainability.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

6. Conclusion

Chapter 1 (Introduction) argued that citizens have a need to believe they can influence and evaluate the decisions and behaviour of decision-makers. This need to influence and evaluate decision-makers' actions was linked to water projects in the presented study. In this line, citizens want to be able to (a) influence decision-makers during a project via participatory measures, and (b) evaluate first, the project outcome and second, the manner in which a implementer has acted during the project.

In the study, five selected elements were utilised in order to measure political accountability within water projects. These elements allow citizens to influence (element: inclusion) and evaluate decision-makers and the project outcome (elements: responsibility, inclusion, information, sanctioning, and credibility).

Citizens' need to influence and evaluate project implementers presented an overall finding of political accountability within water projects. The research question asked (a) how political accountable are project implementers in water projects, and (b) what is the impact of political accountability on project sustainability? Findings revealed that for the elements Inclusion, Information, Sustainability (or responsibility to delivery sustainable services), and Overall Accountability, there is a significant difference between the two systems (NGO and Municipality). The NGO projects indicate a much higher Overall Accountability within the projects. Overall Accountability indicates a higher value within the NGO projects as a result of a significant difference between the two systems on the elements Inclusion, Information, and Sustainability (responsibility to provide sustainable services). Furthermore, even though the municipal projects indicated relative strong agreement with Inclusion and Information questions, the NGO projects showed much stronger agreement.

Especially on the Information and Sustainability elements the following needs to be highlighted:

- Q35 and Q36 asked respondents whether they believed the amount of information they received had made an impact on how the project turned out and to motivate their answer. It is noteworthy that NGO project respondents (a)

agreed with the statement, and (b) believed information is essential in order to solve problems and allow the project implementer and community members to work together effectively. In contrast, the municipality project respondents linked the importance of information to encouraging support and sympathy for the project implementer. This is a significant finding in the sense that NGO project respondents' relationship with the project implementer was/is of such a nature that it is (a) an equal partnership between the community and the project implementer in establishing the project, and (b) respondents realise that during a project problems will, most probably, appear which are solved through *information* and a *relationship* with the project implementer;

- There is a remarkable difference between responses on Sustainability between the two systems (NGO and Municipality). NGO project respondents indicated strong agreement that water is provided to the community even after the project has been finished for more than seven years (Bellevue). Bellevue also indicated that water is available each day of the week, despite the project providing water to a lot more households than it was designed for. Mamogolo has water access 2-4 days per week. This is the result of the community not able or willing to purchase more diesoline once the municipal-provided diesoline is finished. The NGO project respondents, furthermore, indicated they believed the project implementer met its responsibility to the community fully or, at least, most of it. The above findings are in contrast to the Municipality project respondents.

Figure 1 and 2, Chapter 5, provide appropriate illustration that the level of political accountability practiced within a water project is directly related to a project's sustainability.

Thus, it can be stated that

- political accountability within a water project is dependent on the implementing institution;
- the NGO project implementer shows a higher level of political accountability within its project implementation; and
- political accountability impacts project sustainability.

Therefore, H_0 (There is no link between political accountability within a water project and water sustainability) is rejected.

The selection of five elements measuring political accountability allows the measurement to be utilised in other projects. These projects need not be related to water provision. The study thereby contributes to (a) measuring an essential principle of democracy and (b) confirming that political accountability is essential if project implementers aim to provide sustainable project outcomes. The study therefore contributes to (a) South African literature measuring political accountability through the identification of elements that are essential for projects to be described as accountable, (b) understanding the importance of inclusion, information, and responsibility in order to improve project sustainability, and (c) a measurement tool in order to determine the degree of political accountability found in a project. As far as is known, this is the first study to measure political accountability in water projects.

Recommendations

- Project implementers need to re-evaluate the relationship they foster with community members/project beneficiaries. This is accomplished through improved inclusion of project beneficiaries and providing reliable and regular information to project beneficiaries. A closer relationship between the community and the project implementer provides (a) trust between the two parties, (b) decisions to be implemented promptly and effectively, (c) issues to be resolved during the project, and (d) continued support of the project implementer even after the project is finished.
- Project implementers need to realise the importance of community training (ability to perform minor maintenance on project) during projects as a mechanism to (a) improve the inclusion of the community in a project, and (b) ensure that minor problems, such as leaking taps or lines, can be fixed promptly without the community having to rely on the project implementer to resolve such issues.
- The five elements of political accountability need to enjoy equal importance within a project. One or two elements cannot be pursued at the expense of the other elements.

- Lastly, whenever a project implementer employs an outside expert to assist with water provision, it is imperative that this third party also establishes a strong relationship with the community. What is evident is that a closer relationship between actors allows the resolution of issues promptly and effectively, thereby ensuring that a project can continue to be implemented.

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Appendix A

COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE

A. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mark as many items as you believe the implementer ensured

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q1. Water is provided to the community	1	2	9	3	4
Q2. Water provision is provided equally to all people within the community	1	2	9	3	4
Q3. Water is provided 24hours/7days a week	1	2	9	3	4
Q4. Water infrastructure looks to be according to engineering recommendations	1	2	9	3	4
Q5. The project has provided water for many years	1	2	9	3	4
Q6. The implementer ensured the water is safe for people to drink and use	1	2	9	3	4
Q7. The implementer ensured the environment was not harmed when the project was established	1	2	9	3	4
Q8. The implementer provides water at an affordable tariff	1	2	9	3	4
Q9. The project forms part of water provision to the entire district	1	2	9	3	4
Q10. The implementer used partners in order to establish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q11. The community was involved in the project process	1	2	9	3	4
Q12. The community was consulted about the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q13. The implementer was accessible to the community for any comments/ideas/concerns during and after the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q14. The implementer was open to new ideas in order to successfully establish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q15. The implementer ensured the project was established through good governance	1	2	9	3	4

Q16. The implementer was accountable in the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q17. The implementer provided information about the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q18. The implementer exhibited openness about its actions, behaviour and decisions in the project	1	2	9	3	4

	YES	NO
Q19. Did you receive water?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q20. IF NO, go to Q24.		
Q20. Did you start getting water on the promised date that the project said you would have access?	1	0

	DID NOT WAIT	1 - 3 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	3 - 6 MONTHS	LONGER
Q21. How long did you wait for water access?	1	2	9	3	4

	1 - 12 MONTHS	1 - 2 YEARS	DON'T KNOW	2 - 3 YEARS	LONGER (Specify)
Q22. Since starting to receive water, for how long after this did you continue to receive water?	1	2	9	3	4

	LESS THAN 2 DAYS A WEEK	2 - 4 DAYS A WEEK	DON'T KNOW	4 - 6 DAYS A WEEK	7 DAYS PER WEEK
Q23. For how long do you have access to water each week?	1	2	9	3	4

	MET IT FULLY	MET MOST OF IT	DON'T KNOW	MET PART OF IT	DID NOT MEET IT AT ALL
Q24. How well do you think the implementer met its responsibility to you?	1	2	9	3	4

B. INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mark the type of information that was made available to you by the implementer about the water project.

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q25. Information about the type (standpipes/in-house/borehole/other) of water provision	1	2	9	3	4
Q26. Information about how this water provision will take place	1	2	9	3	4
Q27. Information about how the project "turned out"	1	2	9	3	4
Q28. Information about the implementer persons involved in the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q29. You know who the person is who keeps communication open between the community and the implementer with regards to this project (contact person/CLO)	1	2	9	3	4
Q30. If there is a maintenance problem with a number of households' water provision, you can contact someone from the implementer in order to solve the problem	1	2	9	3	4
Q31. The implementer communicated to you whether you will need to pay water tariffs in order for maintenance in this water project	1	2	9	3	4
Q32. Other	1	2	9	3	4

	MORE THAN ENOUGH	ENOUGH	DON'T KNOW	SOME	NOT ENOUGH
Q33. Thinking in general, rate the amount of information made available to you about the water project	1	2	9	3	4

Q34. Please mark the methods used by the implementer to make the information available to you	
Community meeting	1
Pamphlets	2
Notices in local newspaper	3
Announcements made by the contact person/CLO	4

Discussion meetings with the implementer	5
Project reports	6
People from the implementer going from door-to-door to talk about the project	7
Other (e.g. chief)	8
None	9

	BIG IMPACT	SOME IMPACT	DON'T KNOW	SMALL IMPACT	NO IMPACT
Q35. What impact did the amount of information made available to you have on how the water project "turned out"?	1	2	9	3	4

Q36. Why do you say this?

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C. INCLUSION, ENGAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Let us say that being *included* in the project process means the implementer kept continuous contact with you in order to make sure it took your needs and interests into consideration. Keeping this definition of being *included* in mind, please answer the following questions.

	THROUGHOUT PROJECT	FOR MOST OF PROJECT	DON'T KNOW	PART OF PROJECT	NOT INCLUDED
Q37. To what degree did you feel you were included in the project process?	1	2	9	3	4

	AT ANY TIME	MOST OF THE TIME	DON'T KNOW	SOMETIMES	NEVER
Q38. How often were you able to contribute your ideas about the project?	1	2	9	3	4

Q39. Please mark the items used by the implementer in the project process	
Discussion forums	1
Community meetings	2
Contact person(s)	3
Project reports (information about how the project is progressing)	4
Feedback forms (the implementer asking you how you perceive the project's	5

development)	
Translator	6
The implementer made an effort to assist illiterate people so that they too could be part of what was happening in the project	7
Everyone in the community was able to be part of the process (for example, both men and women were included in community meetings)	8
The community could vote about suggestions made about the project	9
The community could <i>reject</i> suggestions to show disagreement with suggestions	10

D. SANCTIONING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	YES	NO
Q40. In your community's water project, was there at any time a serious problem with the project where your community wished to halt the project until the problem was resolved?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q41. IF NO, go to Q49.		

Q41. What was the problem?

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	YES	NO
Q42. Was the project brought to a stop in order to solve the problem?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q43. IF NO, go to Q45.		

Q43. Who stopped the project?	
The community	1
The implementer	2
The engineering contractor	3
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry	4
Other (please specify)	5

	IMMEDIATELY	1 – 3 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	3 – 6 MONTHS	LONGER (Specify)
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Q44. How long after the problem was "voiced" was the project stopped?	1	2	9	3	4
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	YES	NO
Q45. Was the problem resolved before the project was finished?	1	0
Q46. Were their people from the implementer's side who did not think it was necessary to halt the project?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q47. IF NO, go to Q49.		

Q47. What positions did these people hold within the implanter structure?	
Contractor	1
Politicians	2
Administrations officials	3
People who were hired to, for example, dig trenches for the pipes	4
Other (please specify)	5

Q48. What were the reasons for not wanting to halt the project?	
Halting the project would mean losing money	1
It was thought the issue was not important	2
The project was already behind schedule	3
It was said the issue could be resolved while the project continued	4
Other (please specify)	5

	VERY EASY	RELATIVELY EASY	DON'T KNOW	NOT THAT EASY	DIFFICULT
Q49. How easy, would you say is it to bring a project to a halt in order to resolve an issue?	1	2	9	3	4

E. CREDIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	YES	NO
Q50. Would you recommend this project implementer to another community?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q51. IF NO, go to Q52.		

Q51. Why would you recommend the implementer (choose one answer)	
The implementer consists of people who are important people	1
We have water every day since the project finished	2
The implementer can provide jobs to the community while the project is established	3

The implementer has good moral characteristics	4
Other (please specify)	5

Please mark the characteristics the implementer displayed during the project process

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q52. Showed interest in your needs	1	2	9	3	4
Q53. Appeared to be working hard to finish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q54. Showed knowledge in how to establish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q55. Appeared to make the project a priority in its operation	1	2	9	3	4
Q56. Thought ahead about possible consequences for each decision and/or action	1	2	9	3	4
Q57. Consulted other experts in order to successfully establish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q58. The implementer became annoyed when the community communicated its needs to the implementer	1	2	9	3	4
Q59. People from the implementer would, for example, arrive late for work on the project a number of times or would take very long lunch breaks	1	2	9	3	4
Q60. Work on the project sometimes needed to be done again because, for example, the wrong size pipes were laid and needed to be replaced	1	2	9	3	4
Q61. The implementer would, sometimes, not do any work on the project for weeks	1	2	9	3	4
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q62. It looked at times as if the implementer did not consider the effect of some of its decisions on the community or the environment	1	2	9	3	4
Q63. The implementer did not appreciate input from other people who has good	1	2	9	3	4

knowledge about establishing water projects					
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	COMPLETELY	SOMEWHAT	DON'T KNOW	A LITTLE	NOT AT ALL
Q64. How much did you believe the implementer would fulfil its promise to you of providing water to the community every day?	1	2	9	3	4

DEMOGRAPHICS

Q65. Gender of respondent	Male	1
	Female	2

Q66. Ethnic group of respondent	Black African	1
	White	2
	Coloured	3
	Indian	4

Q67. Age group of respondent	18 – 19	1
	20 – 25	2
	26 – 30	3
	31 – 35	4
	36 – 40	5
	41+	6

Q68. Language of respondent			
English	1	Tswana	7
Afrikaans	2	Tsonga / Shangaan	8
Zulu	3	Venda	9
Xhosa	4	Swazi	10
North Sotho Pedi	5	Ndebele	11
South Setho / Sesotho	6	Other (specify)	12

Appendix B

IMPLEMENTER QUESTIONNAIRE

F. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Q1. What type of water provision was your institution responsible for?	
In-house water provision	1
Standpipe every 200 metres	2
Borehole	3
Water reservoir	4
Other (please specify)	5

	YES	NO
Q2. Has the above-mentioned provision taken place?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q3. IF NO, go to 4.		

	1 – 12 MONTHS	1 – 2 YEARS	DON'T KNOW	2 – 3 YEARS	LONGER (Specify)
Q3. How long has the water provision taken place?	1	2	9	3	4

Mark the items your institution ensured in the project

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q4. Providing water to the community	1	2	9	3	4
Q5. Providing water on an equal basis to all members within the community	1	2	9	3	4
Q6. Providing water 24h/7days a week	1	2	9	3	4
Q7. Establishing water infrastructure that is in accordance with engineering recommendations	1	2	9	3	4
Q8. Providing water for many years	1	2	9	3	4
Q9. Ensuring the water is safe for people to drink and use	1	2	9	3	4
Q10. The environment was not harmed with the project being established	1	2	9	3	4
Q11. Water is provided at an affordable tariff	1	2	9	3	4
Q12. The project forms part of water provision to the entire district	1	2	9	3	4
Q13. Your institution used partners in order to establish the project	1	2	9	3	4

Q14. The community was involved in the project process	1	2	9	3	4
Q15. The community was consulted about the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q16. Your institution was accessible to the community for any comments/ideas/concerns during and after the project	1	2	9	3	4
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q17. Your institution welcomed new ideas in order to successfully established the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q18. Your institution ensured the project was established through good governance	1	2	9	3	4
Q19. Your institution was accountable in the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q20. Your institution provided information about the project to the community	1	2	9	3	4
Q21. Your institution exhibited openness about its actions, behaviour and decisions in the project	1	2	9	3	4

	YES	NO
Q22. Did the community start getting water on the date promised to them?	1	0

	DID NOT WAIT	1 -3 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	3 - 6 MONTHS	LONGER
Q23. How long did the community have to wait for water access after the project was established?	1	2	9	3	4

	1 - 12 MONTHS	1 - 2 YEARS	DON'T KNOW	2 - 3 YEARS	LONGER (Specify)
Q24. Since starting to receive water, for how long after did the community continue to receive water?	1	2	9	3	4

	LESS THAN 2 DAYS A WEEK	2 – 4 DAYS A WEEK	DON'T KNOW	4 – 6 DAYS A WEEK	7 DAYS PER WEEK
Q25. For how long does the community have access to water each week?	1	2	9	3	4

	MET IT FULLY	MET MOST OF IT	DON'T KNOW	MET PART OF IT	DID NOT MEET IT AT ALL
Q26. How well do you think your institution met its responsibility to the community?	1	2	9	3	4

G. INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mark the type of information that was made available to you by your institution about the water project (you can mark as many as you are sure of).

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
Q27. Information about the type (standpipes/in-house/other) of water provision	1	2	9	3	4
Q28. Information about how this water provision will take place	1	2	9	3	4
Q29. Information about how the project "turned out"	1	2	9	3	4
Q30. Information about the persons from your institution involved in the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q31. You know who the person is who keeps communication open between the community and your institution with regards to this project (contact person)	1	2	9	3	4
Q32. If there is a maintenance problem with a number of households' water provision, the community can contact someone from your institution in order to solve the problem	1	2	9	3	4
Q33. Your institution communicated to The community whether they will need to pay water tariffs in	1	2	9	3	4

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
order for maintenance in this water project					
Q34. Other	1	2	9	3	4

Q35. Please indicate the amount of information made available to the community about the water project	Information about all aspects of the project was made available	1
	Enough information was made available to the community	2
	Don't Know	3
	Information which the community needed to know was withheld; which may, for example impact the security of the institution	4
	Only information that we felt the community wanted to know was made available	5

Q36. Please mark the methods used by make the information about the project available to the community

Community meeting	1
Pamphlets	2
Notices in local newspaper	3
Announcements made by the contact person	4
Discussion forums with the implementer	5
Project reports	6
People from the implementer going from door-to-door to talk about the project	7
Other (please specify)	8
None	9

	BIG IMPACT	SOME IMPACT	DON'T KNOW	SMALL IMPACT	NO IMPACT
Q37. What impact did the amount of information made available to the community have on how the water project "turned out"?	1	2	9	3	4

Q38. Why do you say this?

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H. INCLUSION, ENGAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	VERY	MOSTL	DON'T	SOMEWHAT	NOT AT ALL
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	USEFUL	Y USEFUL	KNOW	USEFUL	USEFUL
Q39. Indicate how useful the suggestions the community communicated to you were	1	2	9	3	4

Q40. Please mark the ways in which you/your institution kept contact with the community	
Discussion forums	1
Community meetings	2
Contact person(s)	3
Project reports (information about how the project is progressing)	4
Feedback forms (the institution asking you how you perceive the project's development)	5
Translator	6
Your institution made an effort to assist illiterate people so that they too could be part of what was happening in the project	7
Everyone in the community was able to be part of the process (for example, both men and women were included in community meetings)	8
The community could vote about suggestions made about the project	9
The community could <i>veto or reject</i> suggestions to show disagreement with suggestions	10

Q41. Looking at Q40s answer(s), please indicate the number of times this method was used	1 – 3 TIMES	4 – 6 TIMES	DON'T KNOW	MORE THEN 6 TIMES	NEVER
Discussion forums	1	2	9	3	4
Community meetings	1	2	9	3	4
Contact person(s)	1	2	9	3	4
Project reports (information about how the project is progressing)	1	2	9	3	4
Feedback forms (the institution asking you how you perceive the project's development)	1	2	9	3	4
Translator	1	2	9	3	4
Your institution made an effort to assist illiterate people so that they too could be part of what was happening in the project	1	2	9	3	4
Everyone in the community was able to be part of the process (for example, both men and women were included in community meetings)	1	2	9	3	4
The community could vote about suggestions made about the project	1	2	9	3	4

Q41. Looking at Q40s answer(s), please indicate the number of times this method was used	1 – 3 TIMES	4 – 6 TIMES	DON'T KNOW	MORE THEN 6 TIMES	NEVER
The community could <i>veto</i> or <i>reject</i> suggestions to show disagreement with suggestions	1	2	9	3	4

	1 – 6 MONTHS	6 – 12 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	12 – 18 MONTHS	MORE THAN 18 MONTHS
Q42. How long did it take to complete the project?	1	2	9	3	4

	AT ANY TIME	MOST OF THE TIME	DON'T KNOW	SOMETIMES	NEVER
Q43. When was the community able to contribute their ideas about the project?	1	2	9	3	4

Let us say that being *included* in the project process means your institution kept continuous contact with the community in order to make sure it took their needs and interests into consideration. Keeping this definition of being *included* in mind, please answer the following question.

	THROUGHOUT PROJECT	FOR MOST OF PROJECT	DON'T KNOW	PART OF PROJECT	NOT INCLUDED
Q44. To what degree did you feel the community were included in the project process?	1	2	9	3	4

I. SANCTIONING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	YES	NO
Q45. Was there ever in the project process a time when the community wanted the project to be stopped because they believed there was a serious issue to be resolved before continuing?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q46. IF NO, go to Q51.		

Q46. What was the issue about?

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	YES	NO
Q47. Was the project stopped for a time?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q48. IF NO, go to Q51.		

Q48. Who stopped the project?	
The community	1
The implementer	2
The engineering contractor	3
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry	4
Other (please specify)	5

	IMMEDIATELY	1 – 3 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	3 – 6 MONTHS	LONGER (Specify)
Q49. How long after the issue was "voiced" was the project stopped?	1	2	9	3	4

	YES	NO
Q50. Was the issue resolved so that the project could continue?	1	0

	VERY EASY	RELATIVELY EASY	DON'T KNOW	NOT THAT EASY	DIFFICULT
Q51. How easy, would you say it is to bring a project to a halt in order to resolve an issue?	1	2	9	3	4

	YES	NO
Q52. The community does not always have all the necessary facts. Do you believe that you might just as well have continued with the project while resolving the issue at the same time?	1	0

Q53. A project does not necessarily need to be stopped because:	
Halting the project would mean losing money	1
The issue, most of the time, is not important	2
The project gets behind schedule	3
The issue can be resolved while the project continues	4
Other (please specify)	5

	YES	NO
Q54. Did anyone lose their job because implementation (for example, water pipers were laid too shallow) was not up to standard?	1	0

J. CREDIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	YES	NO
Q55. Do you still have contact with the community where the project was implemented?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q56. IF NO, go to Q61.		

Q56. Through whom is this contact maintained?

	YES	NO
Q57. Has this person(s) contacted you about something related to the project after its completion?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q58. IF NO, go to Q61.		

Q58. What was it about?

	YES	NO
Q59. Were you able to assist this person(s)?	1	0
IF YES, go to Q61. IF NO, go to Q60.		

Q60. Why could you/your institution not assist this person(s)?	
The institution is not responsible for the issue the person contacted us about	1
There is not enough resources available to respond to the issue the person contacted us about (specify what resource is not available: money, people or skills)	2
The institution is currently busy with other projects and do not have the time to spare to look into this issue at present but will do so in the future	3
It is beneficial for the community to resolve this issue themselves so they will be able to look after the project	4

	1 – 3 MONTHS	3 – 6 MONTHS	DON'T KNOW	6 – 12 MONTHS	LONGER (Specify)
Q61. How long have you been involved in establishing projects of this size?	1	2	9	3	4

Please mark the characteristics the your institution embodies during a project

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
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Q62. Show interest in the beneficiaries needs	1	2	9	3	4
Q63. Work hard to finish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q64. Possess knowledge in how to establish the project	1	2	9	3	4
Q65. Make the project a priority in the Institution's operations	1	2	9	3	4
Q66. Think ahead about possible consequences for each decision and/ or action	1	2	9	3	4
Q67. Consult other experts in order to successfully establish the project	1	2	9	3	4

	COMPLETELY	SOMEWHAT	DON'T KNOW	A LITTLE	NOT AT ALL
Q68. How much do you believe that your institution fulfilled its promise of providing water to the community every day?	1	2	9	3	4

DEMOGRAPHICS

Q69. Gender of respondent	Male	1
	Female	2

Q70. Ethnic group of respondent	Black African	1
	White	2
	Coloured	3
	Indian	4

Q71. Age group of respondent	18 – 19	1
	20 – 25	2
	26 – 30	3
	31 – 35	4
	36 – 40	5
	41+	6

Q72. Level of Education of respondent	Primary school	1
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	High school (Grade 10)	2
	Matric	3
	Diploma (specify)	4
	Tertiary (specify)	5
	Other (specify)	6

Q73. Language of respondent			
English	1	Tswana	7
Afrikaans	2	Tsonga / Shangaan	8
Zulu	3	Venda	9
Xhosa	4	Swazi	10
North Sotho Pedi	5	Ndebele	11
South Setho / Sesotho	6	Other (specify)	12

Q74. Position within the implementing institution? (Optional)
