


**PROSPECTS OF AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY:  
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY**

MR ATM CRICHTON

Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of  
Philosophy (Political Management) at Stellenbosch University



SUPERVISOR: PROF I TAYLOR

December 2009

## Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: 24 November 2009

## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability in light of the developing peace and security architecture of the relatively new continental body, the African Union (AU). The primary aim is to determine the nature and severity of those challenges that currently face the organization's ambition of realizing this Pan-African dream. This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises both descriptive and exploratory aspects.

The thesis begins by discussing the development of peacekeeping in conflict management. It establishes that peacekeeping emerged as an *ad hoc* response by the UN to address the growing issue of inter-state conflict during the Cold War, but has evolved into one of the primary tools used by the international community to manage complex crises. The advent of new security threats in the post-Cold War era, spurred on by the dynamic process of globalization, necessitated that peacekeeping adapt and is commonly perceived in contemporary discourse as a multidimensional practice. Central to this development was the shift in focus from international to human security and the recent development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

The study then goes on to explore the process that has ultimately led to the establishment of the AU's proposed peacekeeping capability, the African Standby Force (ASF). With a dramatic increase in incidences of violent conflict across the globe in the 1990s, the UN's limited resources were pushed to the limit, thus paving the way for regional organizations to play a more important role in ensuring international peace and security. The establishment of the AU in 2002 was meant to put to bed the inability of its forerunner, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had suffered from limited financial, logistical and structural competence, while its political and institutional authority was hampered by dissent and the qualified support of member states. However, as the African Union Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS), highlights, the AU's peacekeeping capacity is hamstrung by a lack of political will on the part of African leaders, weak institutional capacity, severe financial constraints as well as an overly militaristic approach that neglects the essential multidimensional nature of peacekeeping.

The study concludes with four key findings. First, given its structural shortcomings, the AU is unlikely to be able to implement the ambitious peacekeeping framework that it has laid out. Second, any hope of ever doing so is wholly dependent of continued support from the international community - although, this would undermine the notion of African ownership. Thirdly, despite these issues, the theory underlying the AU's peace and security architecture is of a relatively high quality and has the potential to make a significant contribution to peace in Africa. That being said, the most viable solution going forward would be to formally incorporate the ASF and related structures within the overarching network of the UN. Finally, the issue of political will was identified as the most significant challenge currently facing the establishment of an African peacekeeping capability, as Africa's elite are unwilling to see a strong continental body capable of interfering in their affairs.

## OPSOMMING

Die tesis ondersoek die vooruitsigte van 'n effektiewe Afrika vrede-bewaringsmag, binne die konteks van die huidige Afrika Unie (AU) se raamwerk vir vrede en sekuriteit. Die primêre navorsingsdoel is om vas te stel wat die AU se belangrikste uitdagings is, om die die strewe na Pan-Afrikanisme te bewerkstellig in die area van vrede-instandhouding op die kontinent.

Eerstens word 'n oorsig gegee oor die ontwikkeling van vrede-instandhouding binne die konteks van konflikbestuur. Die afleiding word gemaak dat vrede-instandhouding ontstaan het as 'n ad hoc proses binne die Verenigde Nasies ten einde inter-staat konflik tydens die Koue Oorlog, te besleg. Dit is later binne die internasionale gemeenskap aanvaar as die primêre strategie vir die oplossing en hantering van internasionale konflik. Na die einde van die Koue Oorlog, en tesame met die dinamiese proses van globalisering, het vrede-instandhouding egter verder ontwikkel en 'n multi-dimensionele proses geword. Hierdie ontwikkeling is hoofsaaklik gekenmerk deur 'n fokus wat wegbeweeg het van tradisionele soewereiniteits-sekuriteit na menslike sekuriteit. Dit het gepaardgegaan met die gelyktydige ontwikkeling van die Verantwoordelikheid om te Beskerm doktrine.

Die studie ondersoek verder die prosesse wat bygedra het tot die AU se voorgestelde vredesmag – die Afrika Bystandsmag (ASF). As gevolg van 'n toename in internasionale konflik tydens die 1990s is die Verenigde Nasies se vermoëns tot die uiterste beproef. Dit het die weg gebaan vir die opkoms van kontinentale en streeks-organisasies om 'n meer prominente rol te speel in internasionale vrede-instandhouding en sekuriteit. Die stigting van die AU in 2002, was veronderstel om die finansiële, logistieke en strukturele tekortkominge van sy voorganger, die Unie vir Afrika Eenheid (OAU) aan te spreek, aangesien laasgenoemde se politieke en institusionele hoedanigheid ondermyn is deur sy lidlande. Daar word bevind – met behulp van 'n gevallestudie analise van die AU se Sending na Soedan (AMIS) dat die AU se kapasiteit nie na wense is nie, as gevolg van die gebrek aan samewerking tussen leiers, finansiële tekortkominge en 'n neiging om militaristiese benadering te volg, ten koste van die multi-dimensionele aspek van vredes-instandhouding.

Die studie sluit af met vier bevindings. Eerstens is daar bevind dat as gevolg van die AU se strukturele tekortkominge dit onwaarskynlik is, dat die organisasie sy ambisieuse vredesraamwerk sal kan implimenteer. Tweedens, word daar bevind dat selfs al beskik die

AU oor die vermoëns die raamwerk te implimenteer, dit steeds die samewerking van die internasionale gemeenskap sou benodig, wat noodwendig die organisasie se gesag as kontinentale leier sal ondermyn. Ongeag van hierdie struikelblokke is daar egter ook bevind dat die AU se vredesinisiatiewe in Soedan wel meriete getoon het en dat dit wel die potensiaal het om die vrede- en sekuriteitsprobleme binne die Afrika konteks aan te spreek. Die toekomstige sukses hiervan is grootliks afhanklik van die AU se vermoëns en bereidwilligheid om die ASF en gepaardgaande inisiatiewe saam met die Verenigde Nasies aan te pak. Laastens is dit bevind dat die grootste struikelblok vir die ontwikkeling van 'n effektiewe Afrika vrede-instandhoudingskapasiteit die politieke wil van gesaghebbende Afrika leiers is om 'n sentrale beheerliggaam toe te laat om in te meng in die sake van soewereine Afrika-state.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Taylor, for his invaluable assistance throughout the duration of this study. His wealth of knowledge and expertise in the field of African security and conflict proved to be an inspiration. Despite far-flung commitments he was always on hand to offer guidance and support. Thank you.

I would also like to thank my parents. Without their hard work, love and many sacrifices over the years I would never have been able to come this far. This study is just as much a testament to their efforts as it is to mine.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Africa Action Plan
ACDS	African Chiefs of Defence Staff
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AU	African Union
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMU	Arab-Maghreb Union
APF	Africa Peace Facility
ASF	African Standby Force
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
BPST	British Peace Support Team
CADSP	Common African Defense and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CFA	Canada Fund for Africa
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMCA	Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
CMD	Conflict Management Division
COS	Chief of Staff
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade
EASBRIGCOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism



ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOBRIg	Economic Community of West African States Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FHQ	Forward Headquarters
FOMAC	<i>Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale</i>
FROLINAT	<i>Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad</i>
FUC	<i>Front Uni Pour la Changement</i>
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HRB	High Readiness Brigade
HSP	Heavy Support Package
HQ	Headquarters
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre
KPTC	Kenya Peacekeeping Training Centre
LSP	Light Support Package
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MP	Military Police
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NASBRIG	North African Standby Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAS	Organization of American States
OMIB	Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi

OMIC	Organization of African Unity Mission in the Comoros
ONUC	<i>Organisation des Unies au Congo</i>
OSCE	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKF	Peacekeeping Force
PLANELM	Planning Element
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Directorate
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RADF	<i>Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques</i>
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECAMP	<i>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines au Maintien de la Paix</i>
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern African Development Community Brigade
SFDA	Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SHIRBRIG	Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
SLA/M	Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer

UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
DECLARATION.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
OPSOMMING.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT.....	1
1.2 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	4
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	8
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY.....	8
<b>CHAPTER 2: THE PRIMACY OF PEACEKEEPING IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	11
2.2 PEACEKEEPING DEFINED.....	12
2.3 ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT.....	14
2.4 TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH.....	18
2.4.1 Human security.....	19
2.4.2 The responsibility to protect.....	22
2.5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING.....	26
2.6 CONCLUSION.....	32
<b>CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY.....</b>	<b>34</b>
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	34
3.2 THE DEVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.....	35
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CONTINENT: 1963 - 2002.....	39
3.3.1 The Organization of African Unity.....	40
3.3.2 Migration to the African Union.....	45
3.4 SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.....	46
3.4.1 The Common African Defence and Security Policy.....	47
3.4.2 The Peace and Security Council.....	50
3.4.3 The African Standby Force.....	53
3.5 PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.....	57
3.6 CONCLUSION.....	60

<b>CHAPTER 4: THE AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR.....</b>	<b>62</b>
4.1 INTRODUCTION.....	62
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT.....	64
4.3 THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN.....	68
4.3.1 AMIS I.....	68
4.3.2 AMIS II.....	72
4.4 LESSONS FROM THE SUDAN ENDEAVOUR.....	78
4.4.1 Lack of political will.....	79
4.4.2 Weak institutional capacity.....	81
4.4.3 Financial constraints.....	84
4.4.4 Limited scope.....	86
4.5 CONCLUSION.....	89
<b>CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>92</b>
5.1 SUMMARY.....	92
5.2 KEY FINDINGS.....	98
5.2.1 The declaration-reality gap.....	99
5.2.2 Striking a balance between African ownership and external funding.....	101
5.2.3 Potential in the long-term.....	103
5.2.4 Political will: the missing link.....	106
<b>LIST OF DIAGRAMS</b>	<b>109</b>
Figure 1: Number and type of conflicts and peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004	109
Figure 2: Linkages and grey areas in peace operations	109
Figure 3: Number of intra-state peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004	110
Figure 4: African Standby Force approved order of battle	110
Figure 5: The African Union’s peace and security architecture	111
Figure 6: African Regional Economic Communities	112
Figure 7: Map of Sudan and surrounding states	113
Figure 8: Map of Darfur, western Sudan	114
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>115</b>

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

The modern state system is relatively new to Africa and unfortunately enjoyed a rather short-lived honeymoon. Prior to 1950 only South Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt were recognized as independent political entities; the vast majority of states in the region having only achieved independence from their respective colonial powers after 1960 (ACPP, 2006:5). The overwhelming sense of optimism characteristic of this period soon vanished, however, as one conflict after another seemingly erupted across the continent. Indeed, conflict and political instability are problems that continue to plague Africa to this day. Over the last fifty years there have been more than seventy episodes of major armed conflict, many of which are either currently still in progress or have recently ended but are at risk of reigniting, with an estimated death toll well into the tens of millions (ACPP, 2006:41-44). Moreover, this figure says nothing of the countless millions more refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), roughly 37 million worldwide, whose lives have been irrevocably altered by war, or the devastating impact that such conflicts have on efforts to ensure the continent's long-term stability and prosperity (Annan, 2005:4).

Whilst this scenario is by no means unique to Africa, the sheer magnitude and intensity of the crisis facing the continent is unparalleled. Approximately one-quarter of Africa's fifty three states were engaged in some form of major armed conflict every year from the mid-1960s through to the late 1980s, peaking at a total of eighteen afflicted states in 1993 (ACPP, 2006:8); while it is estimated that more than half of all war-related deaths now occur in Africa (Annan, 1998:Para. 4). Meanwhile, two of the continent's most prolonged and bloody armed conflicts continue to rage in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan respectively. These crises are placing immense strain on the socio-economic and political institutions in the region and merely serve to destabilize an already precarious situation even further.

It is abundantly clear and has now become commonly accepted that there exists a pressing need to register further progress in efforts to address, manage and resolve the

issue of conflict in Africa (Clever & May, 1998:29). In recent times, however, the trend has been the devolution of this responsibility from the international community to Africa itself. As Juma (2006:1) points out, during the Cold War era “Africa assumed a central position in the geo-strategic interests and calculus of both the Western and Eastern blocs” and therefore received substantial attention and support from the superpowers. Yet, with the easing of East-West rivalry in the early 1990s, the continent seemed to lose its importance and slipped off the international radar to a large degree. This, coupled with the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), prompted powerful Western actors to rather abandon Africa to its own fate (Adebajo, 2008:131). As Ambassador Sam Ibok (cited in Powell, 2005:17) writes:

“The UN has a [self-proclaimed] global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In spite of this, genocide took place in Rwanda. It took place in Rwanda because Africans had to wait for more than six months for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. The same thing happened in Somalia, in the DRC, in Burundi, in Liberia, and in *Cote d’Ivoire*”.

This so-called “Africa fatigue” has both motivated and necessitated that the continent’s leaders step-up to the plate and devise African solutions to African problems (Malan, 1999a:1). During his term as Chairman of the African Union (AU) 2002/3 then South African President Thabo Mbeki urged member states to prioritize this issue, stating that “recent international events have confirmed the need for us Africans to do everything we can to rely on our own capacities to secure our continent’s *renaissance*” (cited in Neethling, 2006:94). To this end, the AU has developed and begun to implement the framework of a comprehensive continental peace and security architecture, described by commentators as “the most ambitious continental project Africa has ever seen within the areas of peace and security” (Bogland, Egnell & Larserström, 2008:12). At the heart of this strategy is a proposed African Standby Force (ASF), the modalities of which were agreed upon by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) at a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2003 (de Coning, 2005a:84). Essentially, it is envisaged that the ASF will

provide the AU with a multinational peacekeeping force capable of intervening in and bringing an end to serious conflicts around the continent.

That being said, this new initiative is by no means the first attempt at developing an all-African response in this regard. Early African leaders made some effort towards conflict resolution though on a rather limited scale. Indeed, the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration constituted a guiding principle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor to the AU, since its inception in 1963 (OAU, 1963:Art. 3.4). However, burdened by its own structural incompetence and undermined by the extremely hostile context into which it was born, the organization enjoyed little success and was unable to firmly dictate the course of Africa's development. Indeed, whatever the appeal of African solutions to African problems, neither the OAU nor individual African states or sub-regional organizations had the resources required to implement such solutions (Clapham, 1999:28). According to Akokpari (2008:372), "unable to locate itself at the centre of African politics for nearly 40 years ... the demise of the OAU became inevitable".

The fundamental question, then, is whether or not the AU is better placed than its predecessor to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, security and stability on the continent. The ASF concept undoubtedly represents a major step in the right direction. Reflecting on decades of UN peacekeeping experience, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000:Para. 3), otherwise known as the *Brahimi Report*, makes the important point that "no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force". That is to say, it is the practice of peacekeeping that creates the space within which political settlements can be reached and lasting peace can be built. Indeed, contemporary understandings of peacekeeping tend to perceive it as a multidimensional practice that incorporates a wide spectrum of conflict-related activities. Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004:5), for example, differentiate between five broad 'types' of peacekeeping operation that include tasks such as: monitoring ceasefires, implementing political settlements, providing humanitarian aid, enforcing the peace by military means, as well as assisting in the post-conflict reconstruction of affected communities. Seen from this perspective, peacekeeping operations form a critical component of the broader conflict management and resolution framework.



It is for this reason as well as the simple fact that the AU itself has decided to place so much emphasis on the development of its own peacekeeping capability *vis-à-vis* other potential conflict management mechanisms that the prospects of the ASF are so significant for the future of the continent in general. This is especially true given the extremely high incidence of violent conflict in Africa and the international community's unwillingness to engage the issue directly – i.e. putting boots on the ground. The research question for this thesis is therefore formulated as follows: in light of the many potential challenges facing the organization, what is the likelihood that the AU will be able to implement an effective African peacekeeping capability? Answering this question satisfactorily necessarily entails addressing three related points. First, can the AU give substance to what it has committed itself to in principle? Second, the AU's peace and security architecture is grounded on the notions of African leadership and ownership (Juma, 2006:47). Therefore, can this be a truly African endeavor free of dependence on the international community? Finally, can the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and prove successful in tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent?

To this end, the study will discuss three separate yet intimately related issues. First, what is the role of peacekeeping in conflict management? Indeed, understanding how and why the practice emerged, what it entails and how exactly it is practiced at present bear both contextual and analytical importance for a study aimed at critiquing the AU's peacekeeping capability. Second, how does the AU plan on implementing peacekeeping to tackle the scourge of conflict? Understanding how the organization's peace and security architecture is intended to function and why this is the case is a fundamental requirement. Finally, how have the organization's structures and strategy fared during an actual peacekeeping operation? Comparing actual performance against the envisioned standards is the clearest method of determining the nature and gravity of those challenges that face the AU's ambition of addressing conflict in Africa.

## **1.2 THE PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

According to the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (AU, 2003:Para. 3.11), the AU's

peacekeeping capability is to be implemented over the course of two phases: Phase 1 expired on 30 June 2005, while Phase 2 is due to be completed by 30 June 2010. This is an exceptionally ambitious timeframe given the complexity of the task at hand, a reality which is further exacerbated by the fact that, up until this point, Africa has never had a continental peacekeeping force or any other comparable conflict management structures. With the final deadline rapidly approaching, it is only logical that the question be asked as to whether or not the ASF will be fully operational as planned? Reporting on the progress made by 2008, Cilliers (2008:4) argues “it is unlikely that the AU will be able to meet more than the nominal targets in the two years that remain, without a change in the capacities that member states are prepared to devote to the ASF and much greater leadership and action”.

With the timeline steadily shifting to the right, what does the picture look like in the medium- to long-term? Whether or not the AU is able to meet its short-term targets is not the only concern here, as projects such as this one will inevitably face myriad problems that delay progress. Rather, taking a more pragmatic approach, the primary purpose of this study is to explore a number of key issues that will likely influence the operationalization of the ASF concept both now and in the future. Tentatively assuming that all the necessary arrangements will be finalized at some point, will Africa be in a position to prevent and address violent conflict with recourse to its very own multinational peacekeeping operations? If not, why is this so?

Neethling (2006:99-101) has identified a number of key challenges that the AU will likely have to overcome if it is to have any hope of succeeding in ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa. Firstly, peacekeeping is a costly undertaking and financial constraints pose a major concern. Even the relatively small observer missions deployed by the OAU in the 1990s were so expensive that they were wholly dependent upon donor funding (de Coning, 2005a:92). Secondly, the logistics involved in establishing and managing a rapid-deployment, multidimensional, and multinational peacekeeping capability are immense. As Cilliers (2008:4) argues, “as a general rule, the more multinational a force, the more difficult it is to train and operate. Multinational forces also take longer to deploy”. Finally, and very much related to the previous point, do African leaders have the political will and fortitude to translate political statements into reality and take action when necessary? The real

tragedy of what occurred in Rwanda is that it could have so easily been prevented had the international community or other African states truly been willing to do so. A further potential concern is the overwhelming emphasis placed on the military component of the ASF framework, potentially to the detriment of the police and civilian dimensions so crucial to multidimensional peacekeeping operations (de Coning, 2005a:86).

Amidst the ongoing process to bring the ASF into fruition events on the continent have continued apace, merely serving to highlight the importance of the work that is being done. In 2003, for example, major fighting broke out in Sudan's western region of Darfur and by May 2004 the number of "war-affected" civilians, the UN definition for those killed, raped, displaced, malnourished etc., reportedly stood at over 1 million. The international community's response to this crisis was muted and, given the growing call for the organization to take the lead in conflict-stricken areas under its auspices, the AU signaled its intention to establish the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Williams, 2006:175). Although this was not the first peacekeeping operation undertaken by the AU – the OAU/AU has been actively involved in Burundi since 1993 and these efforts were further enhanced with the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in February 2003 (Powell, 2005:34) – commentators argue that Darfur has become the single most important regional setting for AU peacekeepers in recent times and has brought to light a number of lessons that require careful analysis and study (Neethling, 2006:101).

This, then, is the primary point of departure in the study's attempt to determine the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability. As the saying goes, 'the devil is in the detail' and it is the assertion of this study that the clearest indication of what the future may possibly entail can best be obtained by scrutinizing the manner in which the theory has been put into practice in the present. Despite the fact that AMIS was deployed well in advance of the scheduled implementation deadline for the ASF, the analysis thereof can nonetheless provide valuable information looking forward. Indeed, the challenges faced by the AU in Darfur are likely to be generic and applicable elsewhere. As de Coning (2004, 26) argues:

“More research on the type of peacekeeping missions African institutions are likely to undertake will enable all stakeholders in the international peacekeeping system to position and adjust their own capacities accordingly. It will enable the AU, the various sub-regional organizations, the individual African countries, the UN and the various donor countries that have an interest in building African capacity in the peacekeeping field, to focus their policy development and capacity-building efforts on those modalities, mechanisms, equipment, training and preparations that will best enable Africa to undertake missions within its chosen framework and scope. This should result in a much more focused approach, which in a resource-weak continent like ours, will have a bigger impact and result ... in increasing the chances of success.”

This point is echoed by Bogland et al (2008:45), who assert that:

“One obvious study that will be of great interest is the illustration and evaluation of the peace-support missions that the AU has carried out and those that are ongoing. These studies also provide an increased understanding of the AU’s capacity development, as any shortcomings soon become obvious when the organization is forced out into the field.”

It is hoped, therefore, that this study will contribute in some way to the growing international debate surrounding peace and security on the continent and Africa’s ability to ensure its own future prosperity and development. Indeed, the findings from this research could help those in relevant government, military and bureaucratic positions of authority in their quest to establish an effective African peacekeeping capability. In addressing some of the major challenges that are likely to impede this process, as well as tentatively highlighting a possible way forward in this regard, the findings presented here may, at a minimum, be able to point to those areas that require further attention and conceptual development by those better placed to do so.

### **1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises both descriptive and exploratory aspects. It is based upon an extensive review of related literature in the fields of peace and security, peacekeeping and conflict management more broadly, conflict in Africa, as well as the situation in Darfur. Both primary and secondary sources have been utilised, although emphasis has undoubtedly been placed on incorporating primary texts. Indeed, the research question, whether or not the AU will be able to implement an effective African peacekeeping capability, necessarily entails adopting an organizational level approach. Therefore, key UN, OAU and AU documents as well as other official sources have been consulted where appropriate. Secondary sources consist primarily of academic journal articles, publications and books containing commentaries on and analyses of those topics introduced above, produced by respected authors in their respective fields. No questionnaires, interviews, focus groups or similar forms of fieldwork were conducted in order to support this research.

The notion that peacekeeping forms an integral part of wider conflict management and resolution strategies is the central analytical framework of this study. In terms of the research question, then, this argument is duly considered and further extended to the African context. The AU deployment in Darfur has been specifically chosen as a case-study as it is the organization's first large-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operation and an assessment thereof is arguably well-placed to shed light on those issues which are likely to influence the AU's capacity to engage in similar endeavours both in the short- and in the long-term. The unit of analysis is therefore the continental/regional peacekeeping capability, while the level of analysis is the AU as an organization. In terms of the time dimension, this study is very much cross-sectional. While the period of analysis stretches back to the formation of the OAU in 1963 and further looks ahead to what the future may hold for the AU's peacekeeping capability, the findings are written from the perspective of the present (2009).

### **1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY**

The remaining sections in this study are presented over the course of four chapters. As the title would suggest, Chapter 2 aims to highlight the primacy of peacekeeping as a

practice in conflict management strategies. To this end, the notion as it is understood in this study is first conceptualized. Thereafter, a brief introduction as to how and why peacekeeping emerged as well as its intended purpose is offered. Special attention is given to the pioneering role played by the UN in this regard. The chapter further attempts to explain how the evolving security context since the end of the Cold War era has precipitated an evolution in peacekeeping's role. Here, the notions of international security and non-interference are juxtaposed with human security and the emerging responsibility to protect doctrine. The chapter then concludes with a description of peacekeeping in its contemporary, multidimensional guise. The underlying purpose, then, is to contextualize the discussions that follow in Chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to addressing the AU's emerging peace and security architecture. Before this, however, the chapter begins by looking at the relatively recent trend of regional organizations and other similar actors taking on ever increasing responsibility in ensuring international peace and security *vis-à-vis* the UN. The development of African conflict management mechanisms and peacekeeping endeavours is then traced from the formation of the OAU in 1963 to the present. Thereafter, the salient features of the AU framework, including the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the ASF, are described. Finally, Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the role envisaged for the international community within this ambitious strategy to address African problems with African solutions.

In many respects, Chapter 4 represents the crux of the study. Having identified the central issues relevant to peacekeeping and laid-out the AU's proposed peace and security architecture in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, Chapter 4 aims to shed some light on the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability. To this end, the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur is assessed. The chapter therefore begins by providing a brief historical introduction to the conflict in that region. This is followed by a discussion of the AU mission, from AMIS I through to AMIS II and eventually the end of the operation's mandate in December 2007. Finally, the various issues that the AU experienced during the course of this operation, such as political will,

institutional capacity, financial constraints, and the organization's own limited scope, are all addressed.

Chapter 5 is an evaluation of the study. It presents a summary of what has been discussed within the previous chapters and then aims to highlight the key findings that were made. Most notably, reference is made to those challenges that are likely to constrain the AU's ability to successfully conduct large-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operations looking forward. The chapter seeks to answer the questions: can the AU give substance to what it has committed itself to in principle; can this be a truly African endeavor free of dependence on the international community; and, can the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and prove successful in tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent? The extreme significance of political will in this regard is also emphasized.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PRIMACY OF PEACEKEEPING IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

For better or worse, the notion of peacekeeping is inextricably linked in common perceptions with war, violent conflict and other similar crises. Central to such perceptions is the role played by the UN in this regard. As Bellamy et al (2004:45) argue, “although peacekeeping is an activity undertaken by many different actors, its history and development is intimately tied to the UN. Indeed, peacekeeping is often seen as being synonymous with UN operations”. The basic image of a contingent of soldiers donning the famous blue beret or distinctive blue helmet with the initials ‘UN’ emblazoned on the side as they dutifully keep watch in some or other conflict-ravaged territory is extremely well known. In reality, however, the notion of peacekeeping is far more complex. According to Bellamy et al (2004:4), “peacekeeping, in all its guises, reflects a desire to limit the scourge of war”. Yet, given the many differing conceptions regarding the nature and causes of violent conflict and variable levels of political will to address these issues, debate about what peacekeeping is for and what strategies should be employed continue to rage.

Indeed, there has been very little agreement regarding the desired role, if any, that peacekeeping should play. The concept cuts to the core of many issues which lie at the heart of our contemporary society and purportedly matter a great deal to the world’s major powers – peace and security; justice; state sovereignty and political independence; socio-economic development; and, human rights – and is therefore rather controversial. Writing on the state of peacekeeping in the early 1980s, Indarjit Rikhye (1984:1), a former Indian Army officer who played a central role in the very first UN peacekeeping operations, notes: “in spite of several attempts, the term ‘peacekeeping’ has still not been formally defined. This lack of clear definition provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes. But, there are corresponding disadvantages in that the term can be loosely used and vaguely understood”. More than twenty years on, this statement is as true today as it was then.



Perhaps the single most significant point when considering the development of peacekeeping, however, is the fact that it was ultimately born of necessity as an improvised response on the part of the international community to address conflict (UN, 1996:3). As Marten (2004:25) quite rightly points out, the concept of peacekeeping does not appear in the *Charter of the United Nations* and it was only in February 1965, after eight peacekeeping missions had already been deployed by the world body, that the term was finally formalized with the establishment of the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Rikhye, 1984:1). As the UN (2008:8) itself acknowledges, peacekeeping has for the longest time been conducted according to a largely unwritten body of principles informed by the experiences of the many thousands of individuals who have served on such operations throughout the world. Simply put, peacekeeping is a case-in-point of learning by doing.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide a descriptive insight into the development of the complex notion of peacekeeping. This will hopefully serve to contextualize as well as aid in the understanding of the technical and practical discussions that follow in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. With this in mind, the chapter begins by first conceptualizing peacekeeping itself. Thereafter, the significant role played by the UN in the modern development of peacekeeping is addressed. This is followed by a discussion of the contemporary shift in perceptions of security, with particular emphasis on human security and the emergence of the new international norm known as the responsibility to protect. The chapter then concludes by focusing on the role played by so-called multidimensional peacekeeping and how this differs from the first generation operations originally undertaken by the world body and other actors.

## **2.2 PEACEKEEPING DEFINED**

Peacekeeping is a notoriously difficult notion to conceptualize. This is due, in part, to the fact that the practice has evolved so significantly over the course of its six-decade history and has therefore been used as somewhat of a 'catch-all' or umbrella term for an exceptionally wide spectrum of activities. This reality is reflected in the abundance of definitions that is presented in the literature and the fact that the term has never been given a fixed and detailed meaning. The most common way of thinking

conceptually about peacekeeping is to identify it broadly in terms of its characteristics, functions and types (Quinn cited in Jett, 1999:14; Lewis cited in Jett, 1999:15). As has already been mentioned, this approach is epitomized by Bellamy et al (2004:5) who identify five different ‘types’ of peacekeeping operation, each conceptualized independently of one another. These are: traditional peacekeeping; managing transition; wider peacekeeping; peace enforcement; and, peace-support operations.

Other commentators have adopted a chronological approach. Francis, Faal, Kabia & Ramsbotham (2005:14), for example, seek to distinguish in broad terms between first and second generation peacekeeping conducted during and after the Cold War respectively. Richmond (2001:34) goes one step further and includes the recent development of so-called “third generation quasi-enforcement” operations to the mix. Moreover, Wiseman (cited in Francis et al, 2005:15) traces the development of the practice through five separate phases: the nascent phase, the assertive phase, the dormant phase, the resurgent phase, and the maintenance phase. In contrast, some have chosen to be far more specific in how they define the practice (Links, 2000:7; Goulding cited in Links, 2000:8; Mboma cited in Links, 2000:7). The International Peace Academy (cited in Rikhye, 1984:1), for example, defined peacekeeping as:

“the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace”.

Heldt & Wallensteen (2006:11), on the other hand, offer the following definition of peacekeeping:

“a third-party state intervention that involves the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state ... established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation ... between formerly, potentially, or presently warring parties”.

While these various approaches and definitions undoubtedly possess their own merits and shortcomings, a fuller discussion of this issue is simply beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the most appropriate definition for the current purpose is one that adequately encapsulates peacekeeping's many permutations. Indeed, the UN (2008:18) notes that "over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model ... to incorporate a complex model of many elements ... working together to lay the foundation for sustainable peace". This point is echoed by O'Niell & Rees (2005:6) who argue that, "categorization also creates the impression that operations had clear, specific objectives" when in reality mandates were, and are, fluid. As such, and following Diehl (cited in O'Niell & Rees, 2005:5), this study conceptualizes peacekeeping as: any international effort involving an operational component – i.e. putting boots on the ground – that aims to prevent or terminate any conflict or dispute.

Breaking with convention, this definition is intentionally broad and lacks reference to various phases in the development of peacekeeping. Rather, it identifies three key elements central to the practice of peacekeeping. Firstly, peacekeeping is conducted by international actors, thus differentiating it from domestic law enforcement or similar activities conducted by a government within its own borders. Secondly, it involves deploying troops or other individuals on the ground and is therefore altogether different than employing diplomacy in a peacemaking role. Finally, peacekeeping involves a wide array of activities, which may require military, police and civilian staff.

### **2.3 ORIGINS & EARLY DEVELOPMENT**

Established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the UN's principle aim is to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (UN, 1945:Art. 1.1). As the Preamble to the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), hereafter simply referred to as the *UN Charter*, rather more succinctly notes, the organization's founders were determined to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

which ... has brought untold sorrow to mankind". Bellamy et al (2004:70) argue, that "the catastrophic loss of life and physical devastation caused by the war, coupled with the invention of the atomic bomb, convinced international leaders that international organization was more necessary than ever". Reflecting this commitment to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security across the globe, the UN's overriding concern is that all disputes between states be settled by peaceful means. Indeed, Article 2.3 (UN, 1945), relating to the organization's underlying principles, states that, "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered".

More importantly, Chapter VI of the *UN Charter* (1945) makes provision for such matters to be settled through internal mechanisms. According to Article 34 (UN, 1945), the UN Security Council, the organ tasked with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security (UN, 1945:Art. 24.1), may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction; while both member and non-member states alike may bring any dispute or similar situation to the attention of the world body (UN, 1945:Art. 35). The Security Council is further empowered to call upon parties to settle their dispute by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement; or to recommend any other appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment with a view to the pacific settlement of the dispute (UN, 1945:Art. 33; Art. 36; Art. 37; Art. 38).

Although peaceful relations between states was and remains the UN's primary aim to this day, its founders had envisaged that the organization should nonetheless represent a strong and viable military force capable of combating any threat. According to MacQueen (2002:3), the intention at this stage was that the UN "would deploy military power as a forceful instrument in a global system of collective security", exercising direct control over international armed forces. Central to these plans was Chapter VII of the *UN Charter* (1945), pertaining to "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". As per Article 39 (UN, 1945), the Security Council is responsible for determining the existence of any such threat requiring collective security action as well as deciding what measures shall be taken in order to maintain or restore the peace. As MacQueen (2002:4) further notes, the enforcement options available to the UN follow an escalating scale. At one end of

the spectrum are non-military measures, such as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of all means of communication as well as the severance of diplomatic relations (UN, 1945:Art. 41); while, at the other end of the spectrum, Article 42 (UN, 1945) empowers the Security Council to restore international peace and security forcefully with recourse to the air, sea and land forces of member states.

The high ambition of a global collective security arrangement was, however, simply incompatible with the bipolarity that came to characterize international relations in the post-war years (MacQueen, 2002:4). Indeed, during the early days of the UN the Cold War between East and West prevented the Security Council from fully developing and employing its potential to enforce the peace. The major stumbling block in this regard was the use of the veto accorded to the five permanent members – China, France, the USSR, the UK and the USA (UN, 1945:Art. 23) – which blocked a number of such efforts and all but paralyzed the Security Council (Rikhye, 1984:3). As Rikhye (1984:3) notes, the *UN Charter* had envisaged that unanimity of purpose, namely the desire to avoid a reoccurrence of the extreme levels of violence and destruction witnessed during the two World Wars, would provide sufficient political will to empower the organization to keep and enforce the peace when necessary. Yet, this common goal soon succumbed to the pressure of competing ideological interests. With the world's two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, at opposite ends of this spectrum any hope of viable collective security was severely undermined. In such a divided international system virtually all crises were seen through the opposed ideological lenses of the two sides and neither consensus nor cooperation could be achieved (MacQueen, 2002:4).

Given this state of affairs the Security Council was forced to resort to other measures to promote and preserve the peace, such as the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, conciliation, mediation and the like (UN, 1996:4). Such measures could be considered classic Chapter VI-type initiatives; yet, used in isolation, these often proved wholly inadequate and the ability to project viable military strength remained crucial. By the early 1950s, however, it was clear that if the UN was to have any meaningful security role during the Cold War it would have to be in a form other than that of collective security enforcement as had originally been envisaged (MacQueen,

2002:5). As the organization's experience in Korea highlights, the situation had simply become untenable.<sup>1</sup>

It was in the aftermath of this fiasco that the notion of peacekeeping was born. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, a central figure in the development of the practice, famously described peacekeeping as characterizing Chapter VI ½ of the *UN Charter*. That is, lying somewhere between the peaceful techniques of Chapter VI, such as mediation and fact-finding, and the more robust methods of Chapter VII, including military intervention (Francis et al, 2005:9-10). As Francis et al (2005:15) rightly point out, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first force-level mission specifically characterized as a peacekeeping operation. Deployed in November 1956, UNEF was a military operation tasked with securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities after the British and French invasion of and Israeli attack on Egypt, as well as acting as a buffer between Egypt and Israel after the latter withdrew its armed forces from the territory of the former (UN, 1996:37).<sup>2</sup>

Significantly, the official view of the UN is that two earlier missions to the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent respectively should also be classed as peacekeeping operations – despite the fact that the concept had yet to be explicitly developed (UN, 1996:v). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was deployed to Palestine in June 1948 and consisted of unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs) dispatched by the Security Council in order to supervise the truce during the first Arab-Israeli War. A similar group – the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) – was deployed a few months later in January 1949 in order to supervise a cease-fire between the two countries following their conflict over the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir (O'Niell & Rees, 2005:23). Although

---

<sup>1</sup> The Korean War (1950 – 1953) was fought between North Korea and eventually China against a so-called UN collective security force that sought to actively defend South Korea from forced unification with the North. In reality, however, this so-called UN force was a Western coalition dominated and led by the United States. Its UN identity was only possible because the Soviet Union had been absent from a crucial Security Council meeting and could therefore not veto the action. The USSR's proposal that communist China, not a member of the UN at this time, be allowed to participate in the debate pertaining to Korea had earlier been rejected, thus prompting a walk-out by the Soviet delegation.

<sup>2</sup> The two European powers had invaded Egypt after it had nationalized the Suez Canal, previously owned by an Anglo-French company, in retaliation for the withdrawal of Western funding for the ambitious Aswan Dam irrigation project; while Israel had earlier been prompted to attack Egypt in order to provide a pretext for the Anglo-French intervention.

these two operations did not comprise peacekeeping forces as such, they were nonetheless based on methods of observation and interposition that were to become characteristic of the classic peacekeeping model that later emerged (MacQueen, 2002:5).

Peacekeeping, as represented by UNEF and already suggested by UNTSO and UNMOGIP before it, took a markedly different approach to addressing conflict than that of enforcement by means of collective military action. This model is based on three fundamental principles. Namely: the consent of the protagonists to a UN mission, political impartiality on the part of the UN forces, as well as the non-use of armed force except in self-defence (Francis et al, 2005:10). Moreover, such operations are further characterized by their multinational composition. UNEF, for instance, consisted of contingents from thirteen different countries (UN, 1996:42). Underlying this traditional model of peacekeeping is the premise that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations to occur (UN, 2003:1). Simply put, by facilitating an opportunity for the belligerents to cease fighting, peacekeeping allows for fresh avenues towards peace to be explored (UN, 1996:4). According to Bellamy et al (2004:5) such traditional peacekeeping does not propose or enforce particular political solutions; rather, such operations by and large serve as interpositional buffers between warring parties, acting in a confidence-building capacity as visible deterrents (Francis et al, 2005:14).

## **2.4 TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH**

Peacekeeping is ultimately a matter of security. As the discussion up to this point as well as the term itself would suggest, the principal aim of peacekeeping is simply that – to keep the peace. According to the UN *Human Development Report* (1994:1), however, “the world will never be secure from war if men and women have no security in their daily lives”. The distinction attempting to be drawn at this stage is between aim and method, between one’s goal and how one intends on achieving said goal. As such, the practice of peacekeeping can best be described as precautions or measures taken to provide security and thus ensure peace. Central to such efforts, then, is what is understood by the notion of security as well as the normative debate regarding how it can best be achieved. For current purposes, the most important point

to recognize is that the understanding of security has evolved from the longstanding state-centric model predominant during the two World Wars as well as the Cold War, to a far more holistic and people-centred approach.

Intimately linked to this debate is the issue of peace enforcement and the international community's 'right' to intervene in conflict situations. The form of intervention referred to here is that conducted for the 'right reasons' – specifically, for humanitarian purposes or in defence of human security more generally. So-called humanitarian intervention is one of the single most contentious issues in the debate regarding peacekeeping. Indeed, there have been many calls for such action over the last two decades and the practice has courted controversy both when it has happened (i.e. Kosovo and Somalia) as well as when it has failed to happen (i.e. Rwanda and Bosnia) (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.1). Disagreement continues to rage as to whether or not such a right exists, as well as how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority (ICISS, 2001:vii).

#### **2.4.1 Human security**

The conventional approach to security was based upon the notion of international security. While our world is characterized by a host of states that constitute the greater political order, this has not always been the case. The state system as we know it today is a relatively modern invention and it was largely only since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that the state itself became the predominant form of political organization in Europe, from where it continued to spread across the globe, culminating in the process of decolonization and state formation at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (van Creveld, 1991; 49 - 50). Essential to the state model's rise to prominence was the success of government – the administrative face of the state – in acquiring five monopolies. Namely: control over the instruments of violence and the legitimate use thereof; the sole right to tax citizens; the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens, as well as enlisting their support during times of war; the right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens; and, exclusive representation in the international community, thus binding society to international law (Bellamy et al., 2004; 22). With the rise of states as the single most important and powerful political entity a host of new issues emerged, such as the formal or legal status of states



themselves as well as the relationships that exist between them. As van Crevelde (1991; 49) notes, “states are artificial creations; corporate bodies that possess an independent legal existence separate from the people to whom they belong and whose organized life they claim to represent”.

International security, then, refers to the security of states as actors in their own right. It takes a predominantly militaristic outlook and is concerned with defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the state. Indeed, these very principles are enshrined in the *UN Charter*. Article 2.1 (UN, 1945), for example, proclaims that “the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members”; whilst Article 2.4 (UN, 1945) states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Reflecting these two principles, the *UN Charter* (1945:Art. 2.7) goes on to assert that no part thereof authorizes the UN to intervene in matters that essentially fall within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, nor shall member states be required to submit such matters to the organization for settlement.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the international community began to face a considerably different security environment. As has been widely recognized, the dynamic forces of globalization taking hold at the time served to highlight a number of pressing issues that had otherwise been neglected, calling the traditional focus on international security into serious doubt. Paraphrasing former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s groundbreaking report *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (1992:Para. 11; Para. 12; Para. 13), the rapid diffusion of technology; the development of advanced means of communication; the growth in global commerce and financial interdependence; as well as the decisions of states to yield sovereign prerogatives to regional and international political and economic associations all served to blur previously steadfast national boundaries. Moreover, the status and cohesion of the state was further challenged by fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty; an exponential growth in brutal ethnic, religious, socio-cultural and linguistic intra-state conflicts; as well as acts of terrorism; and, the proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Added to these concerns was a new found appreciation of the devastating effects to peace and

security of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to free trade, drug trafficking, the growing disparity between rich and poor, disease, environmental degradation, and famine.

It is here that the notion of human security *vis-à-vis* international security comes to the fore. Proponents of the former argue that the latter simply ignores the root causes of conflicts and also fails to take account of the security of individuals and non-military threats, which are the dominant form of insecurity especially in the developing world. The UN *Human Development Report* (1994:22) tackles this issue head-on and sets out in no uncertain terms what exactly the concept entails. First and foremost, it notes that the concept of security has for far too long been narrowly interpreted in terms of threats to a country's borders and the potential for conflicts between states; that the interests of nation-states were prioritized, whilst the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their everyday lives was forgotten.

Central to these most basic concerns are whether or not individuals and their families will have enough to eat; whether they will lose their jobs; whether their streets and neighborhoods will be safe from crime; whether they will be persecuted by a repressive state; whether they will become a victim of violence because of their gender; or whether their religion or ethnic origin will make them a target for discrimination. That being said, four important characteristics of human security can be identified (UN, 1994:22). First, it is a universal concern, in that the types of threats that it entails are common to all people in all parts of the world. Second, the components of human security are interdependent: when the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world it affects us all, as the likes of famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, economic recession and terrorism are not contained by national boundaries. Third, it is far easier to ensure human security through preventive action than through later intervention. And, finally, human security is a people-centered concept that prioritizes the wellbeing of individuals and communities.

The underlying hypothesis of this new understanding of security is neatly summarized by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000:17), who rather eloquently argues that more must be done to ensure the freedom of all people – freedom from fear as well as freedom from want. Therefore, while it may be true that peace is a necessary

precondition for effective development, it is also true that the absence of development severely threatens the long-term sustainability of peace. This point is echoed by the *Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000:Para. 28), which states that “history has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners ... while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work”. The argument being that human deprivation is the root cause of conflict and violence – particularly when disparities, whether real or perceived, exist between distinct communities. As such, it is argued that successfully meeting the objective of spreading peace around the globe requires the integration of the peace and development agendas (UN, 1994:iii).

That is not to say, however, that these are altogether new ideas.<sup>3</sup> Yet, once again, the ideological rivalry of the Cold War era and the associated antagonism between East and West meant that human security was obscured as national interest came to trump all other concerns (Alkire, 2003:38). As the *Human Development Report* (1994:22) echoes, “the superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle – fighting a Cold War all over the world [and] the developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives”. As such, it was only the rapidly changing security context that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War that forced fresh issues and ideas on to the international agenda.

#### **2.4.2 The responsibility to protect**

One of the most unsettling trends associated with contemporary conflict has been the dramatic increase in the vulnerability of civilians, whom are often deliberately targeted by combatants. Indeed, the number of human rights abuses related to such conflicts is almost unthinkable. In some instances the permanent displacement and/or extermination of civilian populations has been the primary objective of the conflict; whilst rape has deliberately and systematically been used as weapon of terror in order

---

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, the Preamble to the *UN Charter* (1945), which addresses the notions of human rights and socio-economic development; as well as, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UN, 1945).

to provoke exclusion. Moreover, regimes themselves have launched campaigns of terror on their own populations, in the name of ideology, racial, religious or ethnic hatred as well as simply for personal gain and plunder; whilst in other cases they have supported campaigns of terror aimed at the populations of other countries, resulting in massive destruction and loss of life (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.19). Thus, the question arises: when, if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action against another state for the purpose of protecting human security (ICISS, 2001:vii)? The point is simply that, no matter how noble or necessary the ends may be, does the international community have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state?

Central to this debate is Annan's report *We the Peoples*, more commonly referred to as the *UN Millennium Report*, in which he considers the desired role of the organization at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As he (2000:47) notes, although intervention necessarily comprises a wide continuum of responses ranging from diplomacy to military action, it is the prospect of the latter that has sparked untold controversy. It is argued that such coercive action would set a dangerous precedent and undermine one of the central tenets underpinning the world in which we live. The primary concern being that that just pretexts may be used as cover to disguise far more selfish motives and lead to gratuitous interference in the affairs of sovereign states.<sup>4</sup> In considering this dilemma, the former Secretary-General (Annan, 2000:48) posed the extremely difficult question that “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity”? He (Annan, 2000:48) further continues that, while “humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers ... surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity”?

It was in response to this challenge that the Canadian government, together with a group of major international foundations, announced at the UN General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention

---

<sup>4</sup> The recent US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are possible examples in this regard.

and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (ICISS, 2001: vii). Broadly speaking, the commission sought to “build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty ... to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action within the international system” (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.7). The eventual outcome of this process was a momentous report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, which has come to form the basis of the so-called R2P doctrine. As the title would suggest, the primary contribution the ICISS sought to make was to shift the terms of the debate, focusing on both the responsibilities as well as the rights of states.

The underlying argument presented in the report revolves around the rather difficult concept of state sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, sovereignty has traditionally been understood in Westphalian terms – as comprising the legal identity of a state in international law (ICISS, 2001:Para. 2.7). For many states, however, it is more than a simple functional principle of international relations. Rather, it is “recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own destiny” (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.32). However, the conditions in which the world now finds itself and the challenges that it therefore faces have changed dramatically since the Cold War era. This point is echoed by Annan (2000:11) who argues that, “our post-War institutions were built for an inter-*national* world, but we now live in a *global* world. Responding effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge for world leaders today”. (Original emphasis)

It is in this light that *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001:Para. 2.14) sought to re-characterize the notion of sovereignty, “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility”. As the report (ICISS, 2001: Para. 2.15) continues, thinking of the concept in this manner bears a threefold significance. Firstly, it implies that the state and its agents are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and the promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it implies that national political authorities are both responsible to their citizens internally as well as to the international community externally, via institutions such as the UN. And finally, state authorities are responsible for their actions and can be held accountable for both their acts of commission and omission. Following this logic, the R2P doctrine holds that

the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. This fact reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive contribution (ICISS, 2001:Para. 2.30).

It is further argued, however, that a residual responsibility also lies with the broader community of states. This argument is based on both moral and practical grounds and is underpinned by the notion of human security discussed above. As the report (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.28) notes, “there is a growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions”. Linked to this point is the recognition that “human security is indeed indivisible [and that] there is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring in ‘in a faraway country of which we know little’” (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.21). Rather, in a world as interdependent as ours, the existence of fragile and failed states as well as those, who through weakness or ill-will, harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain order by means of gross human rights violations, constitute a risk to people everywhere. It is therefore argued that, where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in question is either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of such crimes, the responsibility to act falls to the international community (ICISS, 2001:Para. 2.31).

Thus, it was proposed that the responsibility to protect entails three integral and essential components. Firstly, there exists a responsibility to prevent, by means of addressing both the root causes as well as the direct causes of internal conflicts and other man-made crises threatening populations. Secondly, there is a responsibility to react. This entails responding to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures such as sanctions, international criminal prosecution, as well as military force. Thirdly, the international community bears the responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military

intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation in order to address the original causes of the crisis and prevent a relapse (ICISS, 2001:xi).<sup>5</sup>

This stated willingness to embrace the concept of humanitarian intervention is reinforced by its inclusion in the recent *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* (UN, 2008), otherwise known as the *Capstone Doctrine*. Reminiscent of the collective security role originally envisaged for the world body at its inception, the notion of peace enforcement is referred to along side preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as an integral component of the broader framework of peace operations. It is conceptualized as “the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force” (UN, 2008:18), intended to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. According to the UN (2008:34), one should be careful not to confuse robust peacekeeping with peace enforcement.<sup>6</sup> In practice, however, such theoretical distinctions are often blurred in practice. As Furley & May (1998b:7) argue:

“There is always a danger that a peacekeeping mission will find itself converted into a peace enforcement operation ... Peace enforcement is a different kind of intervention, yet in Africa this type of ‘mission creep’ has been seen so often.”

## 2.5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING

As has already been observed, peacekeeping emerged as a pragmatic and somewhat *ad hoc* response by the UN to address the growing issue of inter-state conflict. In a

---

<sup>5</sup> The findings and recommendations of *The Responsibility to Protect* were those of the ICISS alone and are therefore not binding. However, the R2P doctrine ultimately formed an integral part of the larger UN reform package that was agreed upon at the 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly in 2005. For further information, see the Report of the High-Level Panel on *Threats, Challenges and Change* (UN, 2004:Para. 200; Para. 201) and the *2005 World Summit Outcome Document* (2005:Para. 138; Para. 139)

<sup>6</sup> Whilst the former is authorized to use force at the tactical level in order to deter forceful attempts at disrupting the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat and assist local authorities in maintaining law and order; the latter, does not require the consent of the main parties to the conflict and involves the use of force at the strategic level in order to bring about an end to hostilities.

time of intense confrontation, peacekeeping allowed the world body to take some form of action towards achieving its mandate of maintaining international peace and security – albeit with one hand tied behind its back. As the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (cited in UN, 2008:8), notes, over the last sixty years this rudimentary technique has evolved into one of the primary tools used by the international community to manage and resolve complex crises. Three key points relating to peacekeeping's contemporary role can be drawn from this statement. Firstly, peacekeeping as a practice has evolved from the traditional model already discussed; secondly, the focus of peacekeeping operations has broadened beyond inter-state conflict; and, finally, peacekeeping has grown from humble beginnings into a complex, global undertaking. As Johnstone, Tortolani and Gowan (2005:56) argue, the underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping have been thrown into question by a rapidly changing security environment and the practice has been significantly adapted over the years in order to meet the various challenges posed by a number of extremely different conflict situations. Indeed, peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has in many ways surpassed the traditional model of monitoring cease-fires and creating space. According to the UN (2003:1), it is now a multidimensional activity.

The turning point came with the abrupt end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (1992:Para. 2; Para. 8), otherwise known as the *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the adversarial decades of the Cold War had made the original promise of the UN almost impossible to fulfil. Yet, with the fall of the Iron Curtain the immense ideological barrier that had given rise to the extreme levels of distrust and hostility between East and West collapsed, presenting an unprecedented opportunity to once again commit to the principles of the *UN Charter* and work toward achieving its purpose. In many ways the first years after the end of the Cold War seemed to point towards a new role for the UN and the unprecedented accord within the Security Council provoked a quantum leap in peacekeeping operations (Francis et al, 2005:15). Between 1988 and 1992, for example, a total of 13 new operations were launched, as many as had been undertaken during the previous 40 years of the UN's existence (Francis et al, 2005:16). More importantly, however, this changing global context also



presented a number of new challenges to and insights regarding the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.

The most obvious and disconcerting trend at this time was the exponential growth in the number of intra-state conflicts. Although such conflicts have historically been more common than the inter-state variety, the difference between the two increased dramatically in the periods leading up to and directly following the end of the Cold War.<sup>7</sup> As was already mentioned in the introduction to this paper, in Africa alone a total of 18 states were afflicted by some form of major internal conflict in one year during this period (ACPP, 2006:8); while, worldwide, this figure is close to 50 states. According to the UN (2004:Para. 5), the rise of intra-state conflict as the single most significant form of warfare during this period was symptomatic of the crises of capacity and legitimacy that many states around the world came to experience as the political landscape that had characterized international relations for the best part of a century seemingly crumbled beneath them.

Whilst peacekeeping may have initially been developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict, the international community simply could not ignore the realities on the ground and was forced to take action. Indeed, peacekeeping has increasingly been used in intra-state conflicts and civil wars – the number of such operations rising from less than 10 in the late 1980s to a peak of more than 30 in little more than a decade.<sup>8</sup> As Johnstone et al (2005:57) argue, peacekeeping emerged from this period as the primary tool tasked with managing the chaos and confusion associated with the aftermath of the Cold War – most notably in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Significantly, this shift in the nature of conflict necessitated a breach of the previously sacred principles of state sovereignty and traditional consent-based peacekeeping, as the UN and other actors were forced to intervene in internal crises – crucially involving deployment within the borders of often outright hostile host states. Indeed,

---

<sup>7</sup> This fact is clearly highlighted by Figure 1 in the Appendix, based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which shows trends in inter- and intra-state conflicts as well as peacekeeping operations for the period 1948 – 2004.

<sup>8</sup> See Figure 1.

the *Agenda for Peace* (1992:Para. 20) ambitiously sought to redefine peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* with the consent of all the parties concerned” (emphasis added); whilst, faced with the choice of adopting a far more robust approach or going home, the international community increasingly began to choose the former (Johnstone et al, 2005:55). As the *Brahimi Report* (2000:Para. 20), points out, peacekeeping operations have to a greater extent tended to deploy where conflict has yet to cease and where at least some of the parties to the confrontation are not seriously committed to ending hostilities. Rather than deploying into post-conflict situations, peacekeepers have often had to create them.

Moreover, these conflict situations are often subject to significant cross-border effects by both state and non-state actors alike, whilst also precipitating such effects themselves. Political patrons in other states; international arms dealers; those who trade in illicit commodities such as so-called conflict diamonds; regional powers and other third parties that send their own armed forces into the fray; as well as neighbouring states that host refugees who are often systematically forced to flee their homes, simply exacerbate the extremely complex prospect posed by many contemporary conflicts (UN, 2000:Para. 18). According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000:9), “this is the world of globalization – a new context for and a new connectivity among economic actors and activities throughout the world”, in which threats to peace and security faced by the people of the world have become distinctly transnational in nature.

The development of these trends has further given rise to a greater appreciation on the part of the international community of those issues which ultimately lie at the heart of conflict, which cause people to go to war with one another as well as prolong the conflicts themselves. In the *Agenda for Peace* (1992:Para. 5), Boutros-Ghali argued that the sources of conflict are both pervasive and deep and that successfully meeting the challenges facing peace and security would require concerted effort on a number of fronts. Namely: enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; promoting sustainable economic and social development; alleviating human suffering; as well as, curtailing the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. Simply put, the changing strategic context highlighted the fact that a much broader and far more structured approach to conflict management than had previously existed under

the guise of the traditional peacekeeping model was required. According to Johnstone et al (2005:59), the *Agenda for Peace* reflected a sense that a comprehensive strategy was needed to guide peacekeepers in doing what they had previously been undertaking on an *ad hoc* basis.

As such, it was proposed that the aims of the UN in this regard should comprise the Four Ps<sup>9</sup>: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding – a formula which continues to form the basis of the organization’s approach to conflict management (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:Para. 15). According to this approach, prevention represents the first step in responding to a conflict situation, whilst peacebuilding represents the last – these two mechanisms being juxtaposed at opposite ends of the spectrum. Simply put, the UN’s primary aim is to prevent conflict from occurring by means of diplomacy; should this fail, the next step is to bring the hostile parties around the negotiating table and engineer peace; if some sort of agreement is successfully meted-out, a peacekeeping force comprised of military, police and civilian elements may be deployed in order to monitor and otherwise assist in the implementation thereof; and, lastly, the UN will assist in rebuilding the country once the situation has been stabilized, with a specific focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to prevent a relapse in the long-term (de Coning, 2008:6).<sup>10</sup>

Practice has shown, however, that the distinctions between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are in fact rather blurred and a number of linkages and so-called grey areas do exist.<sup>11</sup> Whilst peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of agreements achieved by peacemakers, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts as well as further peacebuilding activities. Indeed, the Five P’s rarely occur in a linear or sequential manner. Rather, they are mutually reinforcing and if used in isolation fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict (UN, 2008:20). As de Coning (2008:14) argues, “preventive diplomacy ... does not only occur in the phase before violent conflict

---

<sup>9</sup> The Four P’s concept is introduced by De Coning (2004).

<sup>10</sup> As was highlighted in the previous section, a fifth aspect, peace enforcement, has also been identified as constituting a vital part of this overarching framework of peace operations.

<sup>11</sup> As is illustrated by Figure 2, peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.

breaks out. In most cases tensions persist even after peace agreements have been entered into and there will be a need for a range of preventive measures far into the peace transition". Moreover, "many conflicts are not singular events. Instead they go through cyclical phases that see peace agreement after peace agreement relapse into conflict ... Peacebuilding may thus be 'post-conflict' in theory, but in reality it is also 'preventative' in that it is aimed at trying to prevent the re-occurrence of the conflict by addressing the root causes" (de Coning, 2008:15).

That being said, the second generation or multidimensional peacekeeping operations that evolved out of the end of the Cold War and which have continued to this day are generally deployed as one part of a much larger international effort to assist countries emerging out of conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace. As is noted in the *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:23), the primary functions of multidimensional peacekeeping within this broader context are to:

- (a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- (b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and
- (c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Indeed, over and above the primarily military tasks of monitoring and observing cease-fires characteristic of traditional peacekeeping, these multidimensional operations are frequently mandated to provide support to national law enforcement agencies; provide security at key government installations, ports and other vital infrastructure; establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance; as well as, providing direct protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (UN, 2008:23 - 24). Moreover, such operations are often tasked by the Security Council to play a leading role in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; mine clearance

action; security sector reform (SSR); the protection and promotion of human rights; electoral assistance; and supporting the restoration and extension of government authority (UN, 2008:26). Although the military component remains the backbone of the majority of peacekeeping operations to this day, the multidimensional nature of contemporary operations has necessitated the inclusion of administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and election observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers as well as experts in communications and public information, to mention but a few.

## **2.6 CONCLUSION**

This chapter sought to provide a descriptive insight into the complex notion of peacekeeping as well as address a number of related issues. It commenced by conceptualizing peacekeeping as: any international effort involving an operational component that aims to prevent or terminate any conflict or longstanding dispute. This was followed with a discussion of the origin of peacekeeping and the pioneering role played by the UN in this regard. It was emphasized that peacekeeping ultimately emerged as an *ad hoc* response to particular problems of peace and security facing the international community during the Cold War, which led to the establishment of the traditional or first generation peacekeeping model. Thereafter, the significance of security to the peacekeeping debate and how it is understood was introduced. More specifically, we highlighted the manner in which the shift in focus from international to so-called human security changed the way peacekeeping was envisaged by the international community. Related to this issue is the recent development of the R2P doctrine, which has further altered the terms of the peacekeeping debate and possibly pointed a return to the enforcement role originally envisaged for the international community. Finally, the development of and contemporary role played by today's so-called multidimensional peacekeeping operations, based on the five pillars of preventive action, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, was also discussed

The common thread running through all of these discussions, and arguably the single most important point one should take away from this chapter, is the manner in which

the post-Cold War security environment necessitated the profound shift in how peacekeeping is both conceptualized and put into practice. As has been shown, the ideological rivalry between East and West and the immense influence of the two superpowers during this period acted like a time machine and virtually froze international relations in their 1940s format. For the next four decades a host of issues, including the rise of international criminal networks, global climate change, internal conflict and mass poverty, went unattended. Thus, with the abrupt end of the Cold War, the international community was jolted back to reality and found a world far different and in a much worse state than they had realized.

The world was no longer simply black and white – ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’. As Annan (2000:11) acknowledges in the UN *Millennium Report*, it was previously taken for granted that “external aggression, an attack by one state against another, would constitute the most serious threat; but in recent decades far more people have been killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide fuelled by weapons widely available in the global arms bazaar. Technologies of mass destruction circulate in a netherworld of illicit markets, and terrorism casts shadows on stable rule. We have not yet adapted our institutions to this new reality”. As such, the international community was forced to re-evaluate the way in which it perceives threats to peace and security as well as their strategies for tackling such threats. The net result was the development of the Five P’s doctrine and the marriage of the developmental and peacekeeping agendas in today’s multidimensional peacekeeping model. Simply put, addressing a multidimensional problem requires a multidimensional approach.

## CHAPTER 3

### TOWARDS AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

On 9 July 2002 African leaders gathered in Durban, South Africa in order to lay the foundation of what then South African President Thabo Mbeki proclaimed will be the “African Century” (cited in Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba, 2008:1). Indeed, it was at this summit that the AU was inaugurated as the paramount continental organization, succeeding the OAU, which had been in existence since 1963. Whilst the transition from the OAU to the AU has been characterized by a proliferation of new ideas and initiatives in almost every sphere, arguably the most significant development to come out this process has been the new organization’s dramatic shift in approach to ensuring peace, security, and stability on the continent *vis-à-vis* its predecessor (Juma, 2006:45). Central to this new approach is an elaborate peace and security architecture that aims to provide the AU with both the legal framework and logistical and operational capacity to effectively respond to any conflict situation that may arise. In reference to the AU, de Coning (2005a:83) argues, “Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since regional cooperation started on the continent in 1963”.

It is important to note, however, that this new initiative is far from being the first attempt at establishing a continental conflict management capability. Rather, the notion of collective defence and security has long been at the heart of African politics and was one of the principal concerns that ultimately prompted African leaders to establish the OAU in 1963. According to Touray (2005:637), this organization “was looked upon to offer a platform on which African leaders could together settle inter-African disputes, promote common defence as well as economic and social programs”. Despite the best intentions and multiple attempts at addressing the scourge of conflict, the OAU simply proved incapable of guaranteeing peace and security on the continent. The sheer intensity and magnitude of the crises which plagued Africa transcended the organization’s limited financial, logistical and structural competence, while its political and institutional authority was hampered by dissent and the qualified support of member states (Wiseman, 1984:135).

Whether or not the AU is in actual fact better placed than its predecessor to ensure peace, security, and stability in Africa is of vital importance. Violent conflict remains the number one threat to Africa's future development and prosperity not least because of the direct consequences thereof, but also because of the innumerable negative knock-on effects associated with war. Indeed, these costs include not only "the visible and immediate – death, injury, destruction, displacement – but also the distant and indirect repercussion for families, communities, local and national institutions and economies, and neighboring countries. They are counted not only in damage inflicted but also in opportunities lost" (UN, 2001:6). In order for the AU to have any real hope of bringing about a significant change in Africa's prospects and improving the lives of its people, it will have to do what neither the OAU nor UN has thus far been able to achieve and implement an effective conflict resolution capability for the continent.

Before one can speak of implementation, however, the first step is necessarily creating a framework within which to operate. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to explore the development of the AU's comprehensive peace and security architecture as it has been envisaged by the continent's leaders. The chapter shall begin with a discussion of the manner in which regional organizations and the like have come to take on far greater responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in recent years, hopefully answering the question as to why it is so necessary for Africa to be able to look after itself so-to-speak. Thereafter, the history of peacekeeping initiatives on the continent, beginning with the OAU and ending with the migration to the AU, is addressed. This is followed by a discussion of the salient features of the AU's peace and security architecture, including: the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the ASF. The chapter then concludes by examining the role of the international community within this overarching framework.

### **3.2 THE DEVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY**

Although the UN is undoubtedly the single most significant actor in terms of peacekeeping operations, it is by no means the only actor. A number of multilateral and regional organizations have played a very important role in addressing major



conflicts throughout the world. The most infamous example in this regard is undoubtedly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) involvement in the Balkans during the mid-1990s (Bellamy et al, 2004:43).<sup>12</sup> Other bodies which have conducted significant peacekeeping operations over the years include, but are not limited to: the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Nicaragua; the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Albania, Moldova and the Ukraine; as well as, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, *Cote d'Ivoire* and Sierra Leone (OAS, 1991; OSCE, 2008; ECOWAS, 2005). Indeed, in what was originally designed as a hierarchical relationship, regional bodies and other actors have become increasingly visible partners with the UN in many areas of conflict management.

The modalities of cooperation between the UN and so-called regional arrangements are clearly spelled out in the *UN Charter*. Chapter VIII (UN, 1945:Art. 52.1) states: “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. It goes on to emphasize the obligation of regional organizations to seek peaceful settlement of conflicts before bringing such incidents to the attention of the Security Council (UN, 1945:Art. 52.2), apparently limiting such organizations to Chapter VI-type actions. Moreover, Article 53.1 (UN, 1945) empowers the Security Council, where appropriate, to “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority”. Thus, unless taken in self-defence as is provided for under Article 51 (UN, 1945), a military operation conducted by a regional organization requires an explicit Security Council mandate. This, then, would seem to preclude proactive peacekeeping independent of the UN.

---

<sup>12</sup> In Operations Deliberate Force (Bosnia 1995) and Allied Force (Kosovo 1999), NATO was instrumental in bringing an end to humanitarian suffering, ostensibly in support of UN Security Council resolutions; while, at the end of 1995, NATO took over management of the military component of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia outright, which later led to the NATO mission in Kosovo

According to McKenzie (2001:151), however, developments in the greater security environment since the end of the Cold War have necessitated an increased role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The increasing scale and dynamics of conflicts across the globe has prompted the UN to undertake a number of wide-ranging peacekeeping operations and this, in turn, has resulted in the world body being vastly overburdened as its resources are stretched to the limit (Francis et al, 2005:1). Indeed, as Bellamy et al (2004:44) argue, the increase in demand for the UN to be proactive in global conflict management since the mid-1990s has pushed the organization's inadequately funded bureaucracy and limited physical resources to the edge, thus prompting the organization to encourage increased involvement by regional bodies and other agencies. *The Agenda for Peace* (1992:Para. 64), for example, states that regional arrangements in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding; and, regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the UN could significantly lighten the burden of the Security Council in terms of maintaining international peace and security.

Burden-sharing, as opposed to the hierarchical structure originally envisioned by the *UN Charter*, may therefore be a more appropriate concept for understanding the contemporary pattern in UN-regional relations. Whilst, in absolute numbers, the incidence of both UN- and non-UN peacekeeping operations has risen sharply since the early 1990s; over the last decade or so, the difference between the number of operations carried out by the UN and other actors has diminished to the point of being negligible (Heldt & Wallensteen, 2006:14). Moreover, with the rise of intra-state conflict as the predominant form of warfare in the aftermath of the Cold War there has not only been dramatic growth in the number of intra-state peacekeeping operations, but also a discernable trend towards greater reliance on non-UN operations from the mid-1990s onwards.<sup>13</sup>

Heldt & Wallensteen (2006:18) argue that in instances of intra-state conflict states are more willing to engage their neighbours for assistance, while neighbouring states

---

<sup>13</sup> This trend is clearly highlighted in Figure 3.

themselves are also more willing to take action when trouble is brewing in their backyard. A number of arguments in support of this point have been made. First, regional organizations can sometimes provide greater legitimacy and sensitivity to the situation, borne of a greater working knowledge of the relevant local circumstances. Second, their geographic proximity allows regional actors to deploy and supply troops relatively quickly. Finally, regional intervention may be the only realistic option in conflicts where the UN has declined or is simply unable to intervene (Bellamy et al, 2004:214). As McKenzie (2001:152) recognizes, “regional norms of behaviour may be perceived as more legitimate than global ones. From the perspective of the United Nations, too, there could be many benefits to intensified cooperation with regional organizations: increased flexibility and efficiency, more thorough information, greater acceptance and legitimacy in conflict mediation, and reduced costs”.

There are, of course, a number of counter-arguments that one can level against regionalization in conflict management – a phenomenon Frank (2006:2) has termed “regioscepticism”. First, regional organizations are particularly susceptible to the pull of partisan national interests, especially those associated with a regional hegemon such as South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and arguably the United States in NATO. Their impartiality could thus be called into question. Second, compared to the UN whose infrastructure has been frequently tested, many regional organizations lack the experience of conducting peacekeeping operations and thus sometimes also the relevant provisions within their respective charters. Third, with the possible exceptions of the European Union (EU) and NATO, regional organizations tend to operate with relatively small bureaucracies and budgets and lack the administrative, logistical and command structures necessary to manage complex operations of the multidimensional type (Bellamy et al, 2004: 215).

Despite these legitimate concerns, the African experience would seem to point towards what McKenzie (2001:153) describes as a “new security regionalism”, in which regional organizations play an increasing role in maintaining peace and security in partnership with the UN. Indeed, Africa has not only been the single greatest recipient of UN operations, accounting for more than three-quarters of all authorized peacekeepers worldwide, but it is also in Africa where the world body has registered

its worst peacekeeping fiascos (Francis et al, 2005:96).<sup>14</sup> Speaking specifically of Africa, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1998:Para. 41) noted that the UN simply “lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all the problems that may arise” and should therefore provide support for, as well as strive to complement rather than supplant, regional and sub-regional initiatives.

### **3.3 DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CONTINENT: 1963 - 2002**

The road leading to the establishment of a significant peacekeeping capability under the auspices of the AU has followed an exceptionally long and torturous path – a path littered with good intentions, failed endeavors, and far too many lives lost while African leaders dithered when they should have taken action. Considering the rather short history of the state as a political model in Africa, the first major step towards regional cooperation and addressing the issues of peace and security on the continent, the formation of the Organization of African Unity, was taken exceptionally quickly. As Naldi (1999:1) notes, there were only four independent states in Africa in 1945 – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa – yet, Pan-African demands for political, economic and cultural self-determination in the wake of the Second World War became a flood that the colonial powers could not dam. Within less than twenty years a total of thirty-two states put pen to paper and brought the new continental organization into being.

Unfortunately, this was as much as African leaders appeared willing to commit to, as the unprecedented wave of optimism and cooperation which made such a remarkable feat possible seemed to dissipate shortly thereafter. According to van Walraven (1999:148), the OAU was a weak regime that merely “represented a consolidation of Africa’s political status quo”. Indeed, up until the establishment of the AU in 2002 very little had been achieved that promised to address the challenges of peace and security on the continent directly and that could potentially bring an end to conflict in Africa. Indicative of this point is the fact in the three decades 1963 – 1993, the

---

<sup>14</sup> Most notable among these: Somalia, the first UN operation to be withdrawn before fulfilling its mandate, where no political progress could be made due to a lack of commitment on the part of key Somali factions not interested in peace; and Rwanda, where close on 1 million people were brutally slaughtered in the course of the genocide that was perpetrated in full view of the international community.

African continent was ravaged by close on ninety military coups and other violent conflicts; whilst at least 10 million people lost their lives, five times as many were wounded and more than 20 million became refugees or were displaced from their homes (Legum, 1999:31-32).

### **3.3.1 The Organization of African Unity**

On 26 May 1963, thirty-two heads of state and government assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia signed the *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*, otherwise known as the *OAU Charter*. As Articles 2.1.c and 2.1.d (OAU, 1963) of said charter indicate, the organization was primarily committed to defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, as well as eradicating all forms of colonialism from the African continent. Whilst a number of other social and economic aims were also highlighted, state interest and security were overwhelmingly emphasized. Indeed, the guiding principles of the organization as identified in Article 3 (OAU, 1963) refer exclusively to such matters. These include: the sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; as well as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence. Yet, this is hardly surprising given the context in which the OAU was established.

The decolonization of Africa literally multiplied the number of sovereign states tenfold; yet, this was by no means a straightforward process and the peoples of a number of African states including South Africa, the former Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique were still caught-up in an often bloody fight for majority rule and self-determination. Addressing the delegation in Addis Ababa, President Ben Bella of Algeria (cited in Červenka, 1977:7) declared “this Charter will remain a dead letter ... unless we lend unconditional support to ... these peoples still under the colonialist yoke”. As a collection of independent African states, the OAU saw itself as possessing a moral obligation towards its fellow Africans and therefore as the vanguard in the fight against colonialism. This so-called “spirit of Addis Ababa” (Červenka, 1977:8) was thus enshrined in the OAU Charter.

What is more, upon achieving independence, the vast majority of African states did not reflect natural divisions<sup>15</sup> – an issue which was raised during the Addis Ababa conference (Naldi, 1999:1). After much heated debated, it was eventually agreed that the pre-existing borders should remain intact. As Malian President Modibo Keita (cited in Červenka, 1977:9) argued, “the colonial system divided Africa, but it permitted nations to be born. Present frontiers must be respected and the sovereignty of each state must be consecrated by a multilateral non-aggression pact”. The argument being, that without a commitment on the part of all member states to respect the equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to independent existence of all, Africa was likely to degenerate into utter chaos as a plethora of border conflicts over disputed territory and populations engulfed the continent.

The net effect of these factors was that the continental body prioritized state security over all other considerations and was therefore significantly constrained in terms of its own conflict management capability – a reality highlighted by the terms of the *OAU Charter*. Article 2.2.f (OAU, 1963), for example, merely states in broad and ambiguous terms that members shall coordinate and harmonize their defense and security policies. Moreover, the *OAU Charter* (1963:Article 3.4) adopted the principle of the “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration”; whilst, as has already been mentioned, interference in the internal affairs of member states was also expressly prohibited by Articles 3.2 and 3.5 (OAU, 1963). In terms of actual conflict resolution mechanisms, the *OAU Charter* proved equally disappointing. Provision was made for the establishment of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) (OAU, 1963:Article 7.4); yet, the basic underlying principle was that of consent and the entire process was restricted to third-party political assistance (Wiseman, 1984:125). Moreover, the protocol only allowed for involvement in inter-state conflicts and so became redundant very quickly (Francis, 2006:121). As Wiseman (1984:125) notes, “no provision was made or inferred about any imposition of political settlement by the use of military force, excepting Article 20”.

---

<sup>15</sup> Rather, African borders stem from the arbitrary partition of the continent agreed upon by colonial powers at the Conference of Berlin in 1885, the primary concern being that each European nation should receive their fair share of exploitable land, resources and people.

Article 20 (OAU,1963:Article 20.3), however, merely relates to the establishment of a specialized Defense Commission should the organization deem it necessary. No further details as to how or to what end this commission shall function are offered. Although the notion of a supranational African High Command was mooted – most notably by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah – the proposal fell short as the idea of an integrated continental army presupposed greater authority to be vested in the OAU than member states were willing to accede (Červenka, 1977:39).<sup>16</sup> Ultimately, the Defense Commission was established in order to devise a formula for coordinating and harmonizing the defense policies of member states as called for by Article 2 of the *OAU Charter* (Imobighe, 1980:241).

Significantly, not one dispute was ever handled by the organ specifically created for this purpose, the CMCA (van Walraven, 1999:274), as the organization had rather evolved a traditional African concept of mediation by respected elders and fellow heads of state on an *ad hoc* basis in order to diffuse conflicts (Červenka, 1977:67). In practice, the organization's conflict management strategy lacked substance as there was neither mention of nor scope for effective, coercive measures to ensure compliance on the part of member states, while the crucial role of peacekeeping seemed to have been entirely overlooked. As Wiseman (1984:126) reiterates, “the concept and practice of peacekeeping, dramatically employed by the United Nations in the Suez crisis of 1956, and ongoing in the Congo at the time the *OAU Charter* was formulated, were not at all entertained for adoption by the OAU”<sup>17</sup>.

That being said, the organization was not entirely inactive and was engaged in conflict resolution almost from its inception. Most notable amongst these efforts were: two failed attempts at resolving the 1963 Morocco-Algeria border dispute (Wiseman, 1984:128); Nigeria's successful opposition to OAU intervention during its civil war 1967-76, on the grounds that such an act would represent an unacceptable violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Červenka, 1977:97); and, the organization's

---

<sup>16</sup> Imobighe (1980) provides a detailed discussion of this issue.

<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, a number of African states had objected to UNEF as a form of neo-imperialism; whilst they were even more critical of the United Nations operation in the Congo, *Organisation des Unies au Congo* (ONUC). The latter was perceived to reflect Western interests in support of pro-Western Congolese factions and was unable to fulfill its mandate: to rid the country of foreign white mercenaries, maintain law and order and prevent the secession of a number of 'rebellious' provinces.

inability to resolve the conflict in Western Sahara, a dispute that deeply divided members and nearly precipitated the collapse of the continental body (Damis, 1984:273). Other noteworthy incidences include: the 1964 border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia; as well as the OAU attempt to intervene in the Congo after UN peacekeeping forces had pulled out in 1964 (Wiseman, 1984:128-129). The organization's most infamous endeavor, however, was undoubtedly during the 1977 Chad crisis. Although notable for the deployment of the first all-African peacekeeping force, the OAU operation was ultimately a disaster and failed to resolve the situation in that country (Pittman, 1984:297).

The Chad fiasco<sup>18</sup> and prior failings significantly diluted the organization's interest in collective security arrangements (van Walraven, 1999:343); yet, the importance of a regional capability in this regard simply could not be ignored. The upsurge of violent conflicts in Africa after the end of the Cold War led the OAU to reappraise its position, and this set in motion a process that ultimately culminated with the formation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) at the 1993 OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt (Francis et al, 2005:100; Naldi, 1999:31). Up until this point OAU efforts at addressing disputes between member states had been "remedial and reactive rather than preventive and proactive" and relied heavily on *ad hoc* arrangements in the absence of effective established structures (Naldi, 1999:31). It was hoped that this new mechanism would pave the way toward a more systematic conflict resolution strategy.<sup>19</sup> The principle functions of this mechanism were:

- (a) to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars; and
- (b) to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts should such conflicts arise. (OAU, 1993:Art. 15)

---

<sup>18</sup> The OAU operation did not keep the peace; it did not stabilize Chad, nor allow elections to be held as had been called for in numerous OAU resolutions. Rather, beset by financial constraints, limited operational know-how and a lack of political will, there was a gapping abyss between the OAU's resolutions on Chad and the organization's competencies on the ground. For a comprehensive account of this peacekeeping operation see Pittman (1984).

<sup>19</sup> Two main bodies were created under this new mechanism. Namely: the Central Organ and the Conflict Management Division, responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict at ground-level.



The MCPMR was nevertheless undermined by the organization's original mandate and the principles enshrined within the OAU Charter.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the concept of peacekeeping was once again notable in its absence. It was argued that "emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peacemaking and peacebuilding will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance" (OAU, 1993:Art. 15). In the event of conflicts degenerating to the extent that collective international intervention was required, the UN would be called upon for financial, logistical and military assistance (OAU, 1993:Art. 16).

Despite these constraints, the organization was undoubtedly more active following the establishment of the MCPMR. Although large-scale peace operations were out of the question, the mechanism did allow for the deployment of military observer missions and small operations of restricted scope and duration to stop or prevent hostilities as well as facilitate mediation efforts (OAU, 1993:Art. 15). The first mission of this kind was the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda 1992-1993.<sup>21</sup> A number of similar operations were deployed to a host of conflicts under the guise of this mechanism, most notably: the OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB) 1994 and the organization's mediation efforts in the Comoros (OMIC) 1997 (Francis et al, 2005:103).

The creation of this new mechanism was expected to boost the organization's conflict resolution capability, but other than perhaps creating order where once there was chaos the MCPMR brought about very little change in practical terms. Reflecting on the OAU's record Wiseman (1984:128) notes, "ventures in the practice of conflict resolution by [peaceful means were] many, the successes [were] relatively few. The ventures in peacekeeping [were] minimal, but without success". Even more worrisome was the reality that conflict in Africa was becoming an ever increasing problem, as the 1990s were arguably the most devastating decade the continent had

---

<sup>20</sup> Namely: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

<sup>21</sup> Comprised of contingents from the Congo, Tunisia, Senegal and Zimbabwe, NMOG totaled only some 130 soldiers and was mandated to supervise the implementation of a cease-fire and demilitarized zone between President Habyarimana's government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) prior to the genocide of 1994.

experienced since independence. Most notable were Somalia's complete disintegration into civil war in 1991; the continuation of Africa's so-called "first world war" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, involving six African states and myriad rebel groups; the outbreak of war in Sierra Leone; as well as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Callaghy, Kassimir & Latham, 2001a:3; Juma, 2006:17).

### **3.3.2 Migration to the African Union**

Van Walraven (1999:346) makes the important argument that, "while one cannot deny the OAU's realism in embarking on limited [operations], it also means that the organization [was] wholly unprepared for high intensity conflicts. Thus, other institutions [were] still needed to handle such crises". He goes on to cite the example of the Somali Civil War in the early 1990s, where, in the face of ever increasing violence, the OAU kept a painfully low-profile while calls for Western and/or UN intervention grew ever louder. In light of the organization's shortcomings in ensuring peace, stability and security on the continent, African leaders were more determined than ever to tackle this issue head-on.<sup>22</sup> As such, the heads of state and government assembled on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya for the fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU in order to discuss the way forward. As Juma (2006:17) notes, the lukewarm response of the international community to the calamities taking place on the continent created an impetus for action and emphasized the need to engage in a search for African solutions to African problems.

The eventual outcome of this process was the adoption the so-called *Sirte Declaration* (OAU, 1999), which paved the way toward the formation of the AU. The principal aim of these talks was to strengthen the OAU and make it more effective in dealing with the political, social and economic developments taking place within and outside

---

<sup>22</sup> The process of reforming the OAU began in earnest in the early 1990s, but gathered momentum under the guidance of Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, the former Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Upon assuming office in 1999, and guided by his precept of an 'African Renaissance', Mbeki foreswore the unilateralism characteristic of South Africa's past and looked to adopt a new multilateral strategy to addressing peace and security in Africa. Likewise, Obasanjo identified four core principles or 'calabashes' – security, stability, development, and cooperation – as prerequisites for Africa's future prosperity. The process that eventually led to the formation of the AU has been attributed to a temporary convergence of interests and ideas between these two nations, arguably the most powerful in Africa, as a result of their similar yet competing ambitions for continental leadership. For more on this subject see Tiekou (2004) and Kagwanja (2006).

the continent at the time (OAU, 1999:Para. 2). With this declaration, African leaders once again expressed their continued desire to establish a body capable of effectively addressing conflict on the continent; as Paragraph 6 (OAU, 1999) highlights, the delegates were “determined to eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitute a major impediment to the implementation of [Africa’s] development and integration agenda”. The challenge, however, was to move past the stale rhetoric which had been repeated *ad nasuem* and implement real change. Indeed, the selfsame commitments had been made with the establishment of the OAU in 1963 and the MCPMR in 1993. In the words of the *Sirte Declaration* (1999:Para. 6), African leaders were convinced that the “continental organization [needed] to be revitalized in order to be able to play a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of [Africa’s] peoples and responsive to the demands of the prevailing circumstances”.

Central to what Juma (2006:45) has described as this “New African Vision” was the eventual decision that the OAU would be succeeded by a new continental organization known as the African Union (OAU, 1999:Para. 8.i). Adopted at the 36<sup>th</sup> OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo on 11 July 2000, the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* was formally brought into force on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa and launched a new era for African multilateralism in the process (Juma, 2006:45). According to Akopari (2008:371), the transformation of the OAU to the AU spawned considerable euphoria and optimism, informed by the hope that the new continental organization would mitigate Africa’s seemingly intractable challenges and thus succeed where its predecessor had failed. One should bear in mind, however, that this selfsame atmosphere surrounded the establishment of the OAU in 1963, only to be tempered by the harsh reality of the task which lay before it. For the AU to have any real expectation of ensuring peace, security and stability on the continent it would need be more than just a case of “old wine in new bottles” (Melber, cited in Akokpari, 2008:373) and represent a sea change in how the scourge of conflict is addressed.

### **3.4 SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

In stark contrast to its predecessor, the AU is rather audacious and explicit in terms of its approach towards achieving the aims of peace, security, and stability on the

continent. According to Field (2004:19), when African leaders formed the AU they sought to put to bed the inability of its forerunner, the OAU, in order to deal with continental instabilities by adopting new approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. Indeed, the transition to the new continental organization represented an opportunity to rectify those issues that had dogged the OAU in the past. Namely: a limited mandate within which to operate, limited resources, irresolute conflict management structures and a distinct lack of political will. This point is reinforced by the terms of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* itself, hereafter referred to as the *Constitutive Act*. As the Preamble (AU, 2000) notes, successfully tackling the multifaceted challenges that confront the continent and its people in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world depends upon not only addressing the scourge of conflict, but also strengthening Africa's common institutions and providing them with both the necessary powers and resources so that they may actually discharge this mandate effectively.

#### **3.4.1 The Common African Defence and Security Policy**

Central to this new approach is the so-called Common African Defence and Security Policy. It is arguably the single most important continental regime on peace and security and, according to Touray (2005:636), “holds considerable promise for a continent that tragically accounts for the bulk of the world's war-induced deaths”. Adopted in February 2004 in accordance with Article 4.d of the *Constitutive Act* (2000), which calls for the “establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent”, the CADSP represents a common understanding among African states regarding the challenges which they face as well as how best to address said challenges. Most significantly, it is binding on all AU member states. As the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy* (2004a:Para. 4) notes, the CADSP is premised “on a common African perception of what is required to be done collectively by African states to ensure that Africa's common defence and security interests and goals, especially as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, are safeguarded”.

Reflecting due consideration for the principles and objectives of its predecessor as well as the notions enshrined in the *UN Charter*, the common interests and goals

referred to above include: defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states (AU, 2000:Art. 2.b); a commitment to the sovereign equality and interdependence among member states; respect for the borders existing on the achievement of independence; the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states; the prohibition of the use of force or threat thereof among member states; as well as non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another (AU, 2000:Art. 4). More importantly, however, the *Constitutive Act* (2000:Art. 4.j; Art. 4.h) further asserts the right of member states “to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”, as well as the organization’s right “to intervene in a member state ... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Following the February 2003 amendment to the *Constitutive Act*, “serious threats to legitimate order” has also been included as grounds for such intervention (AU, 2003:Art. 4.h).

Clearly, this is a revolutionary development in African conflict management strategy and represents a major departure from the state-centric approach of the OAU. As Powell (2005:11) quite rightly argues, “the norms underpinning the AU’s emerging peace and security regime resonate closely with elements of the protection framework found in *The Responsibility to Protect*” and represents a shift in focus on the part of the continental organization to the notion of human security. In the words of Ambassador Saïd Djinnit (cited in Powell, 2005:1), the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security:

“Africans cannot ... watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people”.

Any doubt in this regard is easily dispelled with reference to the CADSP itself, which is based on a major reinterpretation of the fundamental notions of defence, security and common threats. Defence is broadly defined to encompass both “the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity” as well as “the less traditional, non-

military aspects which relate to the protection of people's political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life" (AU, 2004a:Para. 5). Similarly, security is defined as a "multi-dimensional notion" that encompasses the act and the process of protecting individuals, families, communities and the state as well as all their associated interests. These include, human rights, the right to access to resources and the basic necessities of life, as well as the right to protection against environmental and ecological degradation, and the protection of the state from external aggression, to mention but a few (AU, 2004a:Para. 6). According to Touray (2005:642), "the notion of common threats is extrapolated from these broad definitions of defence and security and hinges firmly on the principle that the security of each African country is inextricably linked to the security of other African countries and the African continent as a whole". As such, common threats are perceived as those that confront all, some, or one of the countries or regions of the continent (AU, 2004a:Para. 7).

The types of threats envisaged by the CADSP are grouped under two broad categories: internal threats that emanate from within the continent as well as external threats, referring to those challenges that may arise from international sources. The former include, but are not limited to, inter- as well as intra-state conflicts; unstable post-conflict situations; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; transnational crime, such as human and drug trafficking; disease; and, poverty (AU, 2004a:Para. 8). The latter includes any external threat that may, either directly or indirectly, constrain individual and collective security, such as aggression towards an African state; international conflicts and crises; mercenarism; international terrorism; weapons of mass destruction; and, the adverse effects of globalization (AU, 2004a:Para. 9).

The underlying purpose of the CADSP, then, is to provide a platform from which prompt and effective collective action can be taken so as to address issues relating to peace and security and therefore enable the achievement of the AU's many political and socio-economic objectives (AU, 2004a:Para. 13). To this end, it is further recommended that the organization engage in activity in a number of conflict-related areas, most notably: peacebuilding and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction (AU, 2004a:Para. 10). As Touray (2005:636) argues, the CADSP "is neither a mere political declaration [without] binding authority, nor a

simple continental military and police outfit. It is essentially a strategy based on a set of principles, objectives and instruments that aims at promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent as well as at releasing energies and resources for development”. Simply put, the CADSP aims to address the scourge of conflict in Africa both directly and indirectly, through preventive measures as well as through rapid intervention in conflict zones. After tackling conflict situations, it is further expected that the CADSP will also facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives.

### **3.4.2 The Peace and Security Council**

The organ tasked with the primary responsibility of lending credence to and implementing the CADSP is the Peace and Security Council. Once again, this body was established in accordance with the *Constitutive Act* (AU, 2000:Art. 5.2) and is intended to serve as the “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” (AU, 2002:Art. 2.1). As Mlambo (2006:43) points out, the PSC is the successor to and replacement for the now defunct MCPMR of the OAU. Following from Article 2.2 of the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (AU, 2002) the PSC is mandated to “facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU, 2002:Art. 2.2). Within this rather broad mandate a number of more specific objectives are identified, namely:

- (a) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa;
- (b) to anticipate and prevent conflicts;
- (c) to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions where conflicts have occurred as well as promote and implement post-conflict reconstruction;
- (d) to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism; and
- (e) to promote and encourage democratic practices and protect human rights as part of efforts to prevent conflict (AU, 2002:Art. 3).

The council is composed of fifteen members, elected on the basis of equal rights and with due consideration for equitable regional representation.<sup>23</sup> Ten of the members are elected for a term of two years, whilst the remaining five are elected for a term of three years in order to ensure continuity and preserve institutional memory (AU, 2002:Art. 5)<sup>24</sup>. Unlike the UN Security Council, the PSC has no permanent members. Moreover, decisions of the PSC are guided by the principle of consensus and no state holds the power of veto. In cases where such agreement cannot be reached, decisions on procedural matters shall be carried by a simple majority while decisions on all other matters require a two-thirds majority (AU, 2002:Art. 8.13). In order to enable the council to carry out its mandate, the AU has extended the PSC extensive powers that far exceed those previously provided to any organ under the OAU (Touray, 2005:544). Indeed, Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba (2008:6) argue that the PSC's ability to sanction military and diplomatic intervention in the affairs of African countries marks "a radical departure from the OAU's four-decade-long obsession with non-intervention and non-interference". These powers include, amongst others, the authority:

- (a) to mount broad peace support missions, including peacekeeping, as well as lay down the general guidelines for the conduct thereof;
- (b) to recommend to the AU intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances as set forth in Article 4.h of the *Constitutive Act*, as well as approve the modalities for such intervention;
- (c) to institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state; and
- (d) to take appropriate action within its mandate in situations where the sovereignty of a member state is threatened by acts of aggression (AU, 2002:Art. 7).

---

<sup>23</sup> The continent is divided into five regional economic communities (RECs): SADC, ECOWAS, East Africa's Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU), representing North Africa. These are identified in Figure 6.

<sup>24</sup> The PSC is currently composed of: Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, elected for three years each; while DRC, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Togo are currently serving two-year terms.



The PSC shall further be supported in its work by four subsidiary bodies. These are, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, a Special Fund and an African Standby Force (AU, 2002:Art. 2).<sup>25</sup> The first three of these bodies are touched upon below. However, the proposed African Standby Force, represents the AU's most significant endeavor in terms of establishing an African peacekeeping capability. Quite simply, it is the organization's centerpiece project and is therefore discussed in more detail in the next subsection (Adebajo, 2008:133).

The Panel of the Wise is to be composed of five "highly respected" African personalities from various segments of society serving for three year periods.<sup>26</sup> It is further required that these individuals have distinguished themselves and made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent at some point in the past (AU, 2002:Art. 11.1; Art. 11.2). In the interest of fair regional representation, the five members are to be selected from Africa's the five RECs. Ultimately, the Panel of the Wise serves in a consultative capacity – advising the PSC on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability (AU, 2002:Art. 11.3). Similarly, there is to be a Military Staff Committee (MSC), comprised of senior military officers from each of the countries represented on the PSC, advising the council on military and other security requirements (AU, 2002:Art. 13.8).

In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, Article 12.1 (AU, 2002) of the protocol establishing the PSC calls for a Continental Early Warning System to be established. As Touray (2005:645) argues the effectiveness of the PSC "will ... depend very much on the capacity to collect, process and act on

---

<sup>25</sup> These various bodies are administered by the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). Briefly, the AU Commission is the executive/administrative branch or secretariat of the organization and the Commission chairman, his subordinate, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, and the latter's Peace and Security Directorate provide support to the PSC. The PSD is itself further comprised of the Conflict Management Division (CMD), responsible for developing policy and coordinating peacekeeping operations, and the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), responsible for the conduct of missions at ground-level. See Figure 5 for an outline of these structures and how they relate to one another. Bogland et al (2008) provide a detailed description thereof.

<sup>26</sup> The Panel of the Wise is currently chaired by former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella. The other members are: Elizabeth Pognon, the former President of Benin's Constitutional Court; Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, a former OAU Secretary-General; Miguel Trovadra, the former President of *São Tomé and Príncipe*; and, the former Chairman of the South African electoral commission, Ntombenhophe Brigalia Bam.

information”. This system is to be comprised of an observation and monitoring centre, otherwise known as the ‘Situation Room’, located at AU headquarters (HQ) in Addis Ababa and will be responsible for data collection and analysis, with similar units at the sub-regional level within the RECs linked directly to the Situation Room (AU, 2002:Art.12.2). The Early Warning System is to be based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators and the analysis thereof according to predictive models (Mwanasali, 2008:48). It is envisaged that the information that arises from this process will be used timeously to advise the PSC on the existence of potential threats to peace and security on the continent and, therefore, allow swift corrective action to be taken.

In considering the extremely ambitious peace and security architecture set forth by the AU, Kent & Malan (2003:77) make the very important point that, “the right to intervene must ... be paralleled with the capacity to do so”. It is in this vein that the so-called Peace Fund has been established. Governed by the relevant financial rules and regulations of the AU, this fund will ostensibly provide the financial resources necessary for the organization to undertake peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security (AU, 2002:Art. 21.1). The Peace Fund shall be made up of “financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union, including arrears of contributors, voluntary contributions from member states and from other sources ... including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities” (AU, 2002:Art. 21.2). In terms of operational deployment, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are expected to bear the cost of their participation for the first three months thereof and can expect to be reimbursed by the AU within six months (AU, 2002:Art. 21.6; Art. 21.7).

### **3.4.3 The African Standby Force**

Just as the Peace and Security Council is the body tasked with implementing the provisions of the CADSP, so the African Standby Force, and the military capability that it represents, is the arrangement within the AU designed to give force to the council’s decisions relating to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention as permitted by the *Constitutive Act* (AU, 2002:Art. 13.1). The proposed force is mandated to perform the following functions:

- (a) observation, monitoring and other types of peace support missions;
- (b) intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security;
- (c) preventive deployment in order to prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or resurgence of violent conflict;
- (d) peacebuilding, including post-conflict DDR; and
- (e) any other functions determined by the PSC (AU, 2002:Art. 13.3).

To this end, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, at their 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting on 14 May 2003 in Addis Ababa, adopted the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (AU, 2003).<sup>27</sup> It was recommended that the AU earmark a brigade-sized contribution of military personnel, as well as trained military and civilian observers, as a standby arrangement from each of the five African sub-regions.<sup>28</sup> These arrangements are to be supported by small full-time Planning Elements (PLANELMs) based in their respective regions (AU, 2003:Para. 3.12). Moreover, a sixth High Readiness Brigade (HRB) will be based at AU HQ (Neethling, 2005:11). The attached PLANELM is to be responsible for managing an Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control and information system infrastructure (Cilliers, 2008:2). It is envisaged that this structure would provide the organization with a combined capacity of 15000 – 20000 soldiers and 500 military observers. It was further recommended that the ASF include a centrally managed standby roster of at least 240 police officers, two company strength gendarmerie police units, as well as civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance and DDR (AU, 2003:Para. 3.13; Para. 3.14).<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Many of the modalities for the ASF as it exists today had already been discussed under the auspices of now defunct OAU. At the second meeting of the ACDS in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1997 an African Defence Force was agreed to in principle, while it was also agreed that the OAU should earmark a brigade-size contribution to standby arrangements from each of the continent's five sub-regions. However, these plans remained at the exploratory stage until the ASF was approved at the Durban summit in 2002.

<sup>28</sup> The five proposed regional standby brigades are: the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG); the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); the ECOWAS BRIGADE (ECOBRI); and, from Central Africa, the *Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale* (FOMAC).

<sup>29</sup> The proposed ASF model is presented in Figure 4.

As de Coning (2005a:84) notes, however, “the concept of a ‘force’ is perhaps misleading, because what is in fact proposed is a standby system, where components remain in their countries of origin, but are organized and trained in a coordinated fashion so that they would be ready to be deployed” on relevant operations. Indeed, the ASF design was developed on the basis of six likely mission scenarios, set along a spectrum ranging from small observer missions to classic peacekeeping operations and, finally, large-scale interventions in response to grave human rights violations or major conflicts. These scenarios are:

- (a) scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission;
- (b) scenario 2: an AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission;
- (c) scenario 3: a stand-alone AU/regional observer mission;
- (d) scenario 4: an AU/regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions;
- (e) scenario 5: an AU PKF for complex multidimensional peacekeeping with low-level spoilers; and
- (f) scenario 6: AU intervention, such as in the case of genocide, where the international community does not act promptly (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6).

One of the greatest lessons one can draw from the tragedy of Rwanda with respect to peacekeeping operations is the importance of timing (Touray, 2005:645). According to Kent & Malan (2003:73), within the current UN framework, it can take anywhere between three and six months from the time the Security Council decides to establish a peacekeeping mission until the organization is actually able to deploy and support such an operation. This is a totally unacceptable timeframe given the human suffering and loss of life that is likely to ensue while politicians and bureaucrats slowly work their way through the red tape. As such, the ASF aims to operate according to the following time schedule: simple operations, as characterized by scenarios 1 through 4, should be deployed within thirty days; complex operations such as scenario 5 should be fully deployed within ninety days, with the military component having been deployed in thirty days; whilst scenario 6-type intervention, due to the nature of the situation, requires that robust military force be deployed within fourteen days (AU, 2003:Para. 2.9).

It was further recommended that the ASF be developed in two phases. By the end of Phase 1, 30 June 2005, the AU should be able to deploy and manage scenarios 1 through 3, while the individual regions should have developed their standby brigade capacity. Recognizing that some regions may take more time than others to achieve this target, the ACDS recommended that, as a stopgap arrangement, potential lead nations should be ready to form so-called coalitions of the willing. Phase 2, which extends to 30 June 2010, should see the AU capable of sustaining a complex peacekeeping operation of the type envisaged in scenario 5. The regional bodies are tasked with continuing to develop or maintaining their own capacity for rapid deployment as appropriate (AU, 2003:Para. 3.11). With regards to scenario 6 intervention, the ACDS recognized that meeting the stringent fourteen day deployment target would require a capable lead nation that is prepared to assume control and therefore falls outside of the targets set for the ASF itself (AU, 2003:Para. 2.10). As Cilliers (2008:4) notes, “scenario 6 ... can only be performed by forces that are ready, assembled, fully equipped and exercised with transport available on immediate call and with logistic supplies pre-packed and ready for delivery by air” – a feat unachievable by a multinational force.

For the most part, significant progress has been made by both the AU and the sub-regions towards achieving the Phase 1 targets. As of 30 June 2005 both SADC and ECOWAS had established their HQs and PLANELMs, formalized overarching policy frameworks – a concept of operations, training doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOPs) – secured troop pledges from member states, and finalized their standby deployment arrangements (Mlambo, 2006:41). Although East Africa is lagging somewhat behind, progress has still been registered. The absence of a truly inclusive sub-regional organization has been the primary cause for delay.<sup>30</sup> However, troop pledges were secured and the policy framework for the creation of EASBRIG was adopted in February 2004 under the auspices of IGAD, while agreement was also reached on the establishment of the PLANELM and brigade HQ (Powell, 2005:16).

---

<sup>30</sup> In 2004 East Africa first mandated IGAD, consisting of only seven TCCs to coordinate EASBRIG. This, however, was staunchly opposed by states not party to the regional body. As a result, it was proposed that an independent EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism (EASBRIGCOM) assume control from IGAD. This mechanism was to be co-located with the PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya but a final agreement on this matter was only reached in 2007.

Progress in Central Africa, however, has been hard to come by. As Cilliers & Malan (2005:98) note, between July 2003 and December 2004, ECCAS held several meetings at the levels of experts, chiefs of defence staff and Ministers of the Peace and Security Council of ECCAS on developing a Central African standby brigade. Agreement was reached on the structure of the sub-regional HQ, the proposed strength and equipment requirements of the brigade, as well as a roadmap for the establishment of the PLANELM and the brigade itself. Indeed, the one sub-region which had truly failed to meet the Phase 1 deadline was North Africa. The AMU should arguably be taking the lead in this regard; however, the organization overlaps with the Community of Sahelian-Saharan states and some of its membership perceive the primary responsibility as contributing to ECOWAS rather than a North African standby arrangement. The continued tension regarding Western Sahara has also proved divisive.<sup>31</sup>

### **3.5 PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

In light of the organization's shortcomings, African leaders realized that partnering with other stakeholders would prove critical to ensuring the viability of the AU's proposed peace and security architecture. Indeed, the *Constitutive Act* (2000:Art. 3.e) encourages international cooperation, in cognisance of the principles enshrined in the *UN Charter* and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*; while Section V of the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy* (AU, 2004a) asserts that the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for ensuring international peace and security and that the AU should therefore coordinate and harmonize its activities in this regard with the world body within the context of Chapter VIII of the *UN Charter* (UN, 1945). This point is echoed by the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (2002:Art. 17.1), which goes on to state that "where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union's activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa".

---

<sup>31</sup> The political impasse regarding the status of that country, which began in earnest in the 1970s, has continued to this day and remains a highly divisive issue. Indeed, Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1984 because of this dispute and has remained outside of the AU to this very day. For more on this matter see Damis (1984) and the International Crisis Group (2007).

Indeed, the ACDS (AU, 2003:Para. 3.16) identified a number of areas where the ASF concept and the African peace and security architecture in general could be enhanced through direct co-operation with the world body. By employing on-call UN planning, liaison and advisory teams, the AU's strategic HQ capacity could be reinforced; while sharing in the UN's detailed requirements for military, police and civilian standby arrangements could significantly support the development of the AU's own mechanisms in this regard. Other recommendations included: that training within the ASF framework be consistent with UN doctrine and standards; on site training be achieved by seconding AU staff to the UN; as well as, entering into cooperative agreements with the world body in terms of logistics support. Such measures would further ensure interoperability between the two organizations and allow for operations to be easily handed over to or incorporated within a broader UN peace operation.

To this end, the UN has already provided considerable assistance to support the development of the AU's peace and security architecture. The Departments of Political Affairs (DPA) and Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), for example, assisted in establishing plans for the ASF and MSC; while, in February 2005, the DPKO set up a liaison assistance cell within the AU in part to assist with the organization's deployment to Darfur (Powell, 2005:24). Furthermore, the ASF concept is said to be loosely modelled on the UN's Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) headquartered near Copenhagen, Denmark. SHIRBRIG has offered to provide support to the AU, including: strategic planning, technical advice, matching troops with equipment from member states, as well as securing strategic air and sea-lift capabilities (Neethling, 2005:13).

A number of other major international actors have and will continue to play a decisive role in shaping Africa's emerging peace and security architecture. Indeed, the G8 has offered to provide direct support in this regard and in 2002 adopted the Africa Action Plan (AAP), according to which the G8 agreed to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the capacity of African states and regional organizations to prevent and resolve violent conflict. The AAP further called upon G8 members to design a joint plan to develop the AU's capacity to deploy peace support operations (Powell, 2005:25). This plan of action was reinforced the following year at the Evian Summit in 2003, where the G8 announced a joint undertaking with African partners to

establish, equip and train one of the standby brigades identified in the ASF model by 2010 (Kent & Malan, 2003:78).

The EU has also played a significant role in assisting the AU in the development of its peace and security agenda. This support has been spearheaded by two key instruments: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the Africa Peace Facility (APF). The former was established in 2001 in order to facilitate the provision of aid. Unlike humanitarian aid, however, the RPM is meant to be a crises management tool and it is under this guise that aid totalling €25 million in 2002 and €30 million in 2003 was allocated to the operational activities of the AU's PSC and other capacity-building initiatives (Bach, 2008:362 - 363). The APF, on the other hand, was established in 2004 in response to requests made by African leaders and provided for €250 million over three years specifically in support of peace operations deployed by the AU or undertaken by regional organizations under its auspices (Powell, 2005:25).

Over and above those contributions made by other international and regional organizations, the AU has also developed a number of partnerships with individual countries. France, for example, has continued to support its *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines au Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP) program. First established in 1997, RECAMP provides African military personnel with training at French military academies and also provided for the creation of three equipment storage depots located in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti (Brady, Bihari, Lim, Scotland & Wu, 2005:178). Britain has undertaken both *ad hoc* and institutional approaches to help provide transport and logistical support to peace operations in Africa; however, it continues to focus resources on training – primarily through the deployment of its British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATTs) (Williams, 2004:47). Most notable is the continued assistance provided by the British Peace Support Team (BPST) in Nairobi which is assisting with planning, training and structure in the creation of the EASBRIG; as well as the funding provided to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KA IPTC) in Ghana (Brady et al, 2005:181).

A number of other states have also made similar significant contributions in this regard. This includes: the creation of a C\$500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA)



earmarked for capacity-building projects as well as to assist in funding the deployment of unarmed military observer missions (Powell, 2005:27); and, the United States' African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), designed to enhance military capacity within selected units of national armed forces, as well as major financial and transport-related contributions (Hentz, 2004:33). Moreover, Italy has also provided African peacekeepers with both logistical and transportation assistance as well as making financial contributions to the abovementioned Kofi Annan centre; while Germany has provided funding, transport and communications equipment in support of African peacekeeping initiatives (Brady et al, 2005:179).

### **3.6 CONCLUSION**

The primary purpose of this chapter was to discuss the AU's emerging peace and security architecture. This was done having first highlighted the extremely important role that regional organizations in general and the AU in particular are increasingly required to play in maintaining peace and security around the world. Indeed, it was argued that the UN is hard-pressed to adequately respond to all the demands placed on it and the world body has therefore prioritized the development of an African capability in this regard. In this light, the development of African conflict management and peacekeeping mechanisms was traced. The most significant point raised was that, throughout its forty-year history, the OAU proved largely unsuccessful in its attempts to secure peace, security and stability on the continent. Its own limited mandate, a lack of political will and ineffective institutions were among the chief factors that served to undermine the organization in this regard. In order to address the failings of the past and pave the way towards a better future, African leaders launched a new continental organization at the dawn of the new millennium. Central to these plans is an ambitious, continent-wide framework aimed specifically at providing the AU with an effective, multinational peacekeeping capability.

As these discussions have shown, the ASF concept and the peace and security architecture represent a dramatic conceptual and practical shift for African conflict management strategy. Chief among these is an apparent commitment to the R2P doctrine and a willingness to intervene in the affairs of member states. Moreover, the AU has chosen to prioritize direct, force-orientated action in contrast to the OAU's

preference for mediation and other peaceful means in addressing conflict. This latest initiative represents the most complex and considered approach the African continent has ever seen in the field of peace and security and is a far cry from the *ad hoc* arrangements of the past.

However, with the end of Phase 2 and the original deadline for completion of the ASF rapidly approaching, a number of important questions remain. Firstly, will the final targets be achieved as planned or at some stage shortly thereafter? Second, can these structures and the ASF model more broadly be implemented effectively? And, finally, what are the future prospects of the AU's peacekeeping capability – will the organization have the capacity to tackle the challenge of conflict through direct action? Indeed, although development in this regard continues apace and despite the invaluable assistance provided by the UN and the international community at large, as of 2008 only the Southern and West African brigades were on track to be deployed in the form of a scenario 5-type operation by mid-2010. Rather pessimistically, Cilliers & Malan (2005, 98) argue, these “dates have proven ambitious, and while substantive progress has been made in three of the five regions, will not be met”.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE AFRICAN UNION'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In transforming the old OAU into the AU, African leaders ostensibly sought to reinvigorate the quest to rid the continent of the scourge of violent conflict. As has already been discussed, a number of new initiatives and mechanisms were incorporated within the framework of the new continental organization to this very end. In the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force, the AU has both the mandate and the tools capable of making a significant impact in this regard. Indeed, in accepting the responsibility to protect as well as asserting the right of the organization to intervene in defence of populations at risk the *Constitutive Act* broke new ground in the field of peace and security. As Powell (2005:14) notes, it is “the first international treaty to identify a right to intervene in a state for humanitarian objectives in cases other than genocide. The AU’s revitalized peace and security commitments are intended to break with the OAU’s tradition of ‘non-interference’ to build a new culture of ‘non-indifference’”.

That being said, drafting policy documents and formalizing standby arrangements are by far the easiest aspects in establishing such a plan of action. The real test of the organization’s capacity for ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa is that of implementation. According to Adebajo (2008:136), “operationalizing the AU’s security mechanism will ... require a political will and commitment that its leaders have not always demonstrated in the past”. Moreover, the organization also faces a number of financial and capacity-related hurdles that are likely to impact upon its ability to conduct effective peacekeeping operations. Even the UN, an organization with vastly more experience and resources, has faced such challenges in its own attempts at addressing conflict through direct means. In an oft-repeated statement, the *Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000:viii) emphatically argued:

“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when

the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them ... Without renewed commitment on the part of member states, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical ... tasks member states assign to it”.

In order to better assess the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability, this chapter therefore adopts an operational approach. That is to say, it addresses the practicality of the AU’s proposed peace and security architecture by exploring those issues that have impacted upon the organization at ground level – during the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Although Burundi was the first operation conducted by the AU, the African Union Mission in Sudan was selected to be subjected to such analysis for a number of compelling reasons.

First and foremost, the magnitude of the conflict is virtually unprecedented. Indeed, one commentator has described Darfur as Africa’s very own Palestine (Collins, 2008:299); while the UN (cited in Powell, 2005:41) has gone so far as to label the crisis as “the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world”. Second, the level of human suffering and credible allegations of government complicity in this regard in particular highlight two important issues: the responsibility to protect and intervene for humanitarian purposes, as well as the deployment of a military operation in order to create conditions conducive to conflict resolution. Third, although similar in nature, AMIS was faced with a far more complicated and daunting task than the organization’s previous outing in Burundi.<sup>32</sup> The latter is one of the smallest states in Africa while Darfur is roughly comparable in size to France. Moreover, the deployment of AMIB was more or less supported by all parties concerned. The Government of Sudan (GoS), however, was staunchly opposed to any interference in its affairs by the international community and has actively frustrated all such efforts. Finally, the response to the conflict in Darfur has seen substantial interaction and cooperation between the international community, the AU and the UN and therefore

---

<sup>32</sup> AMIS is also the AU’s most recent operation. The current African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is still underway and as such does not represent a suitable case study. Methodologically speaking, one can only undertake a fair and accurate assessment of an operation once it has run its course and its mandate has expired.

provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between Africa and its partners in an actual peacekeeping environment.

As such, the chapter commences with a brief introduction to the current conflict, making sure to emphasize those aspects that have had a profound impact upon the AU's peacekeeping operation. Thereafter, an overview of the AU's response to the crisis is presented. This includes a discussion of the events leading up to the deployment of an African peacekeeping operation, the travails of AMIS I, its eventual expansion into AMIS II, and the end of the mission in 2007. The final part of the chapter provides a broad evaluation of the AU's successes and failures in Darfur. The aim in this regard being to highlight those fundamental challenges that are likely to significantly undermine the organization's prospects of representing a viable regional peacekeeping capability. Briefly, said challenges include a lack of political will; financial and other resource constraints; weak institutional capacity; as well as an overly limited scope in how such conflict situations are addressed.

## **4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT**

While it is commonly held that the Great Lakes region<sup>33</sup> is the most conflict-ravaged on the continent, the scale of the crises in Sudan and its borderlands is at least comparable if not worse than the conflicts in those states. As de Waal (2007a:1) points out, “the war in Darfur is the most recent manifestation of a pattern of extreme political violence that has afflicted the peripheries of the Sudanese state over many generations ... for twenty years it has afflicted most of the southern, eastern and western borderlands”. The harsh reality is that Sudan has been engulfed in some or other form of violent conflict, be it ethnic warfare, civil war, *coup d'état* or interstate war, for more than fifty years (ACPP, 2006:41). This point is as true of Darfur as it is of the country as a whole. According to Collins (2008:272) “few have understood that the disaster is not some spontaneous eruption ... but the latest episode in the forty-year tragic conflict for control of the great basin of Lake Chad”.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC.

<sup>34</sup> See Figures 7 and 8 for maps of Sudan and Darfur respectively.

Most popular commentaries tend to vastly oversimplify the Darfur conflict and have tended to portray it as a polarized struggle between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ – racial labels uncritically cut and pasted from the concurrent north-south conflict in southern Sudan (de Waal, 2007a:2). In reality, the war in Darfur is rooted in a number of interconnected and longstanding issues, while that of ethnic identity is merely a tenuous by-product of these struggles. First, following major drought and famine in the mid-1980s the exhaustion of cultivable land caused disputes between farmers and herders/nomads in the region to become more common and more violent. Second, there were few effective government services capable of easing the struggle for diminishing resources. In Williams (2006:174) words, “the spasmodic functioning of Darfur’s systems of law and order left the region without consistent mechanisms to resolve disputes peacefully”. Consequently, weapons flowed into Darfur as both sides sought to protect themselves and their assets because the government was simply incapable, while tensions were merely exacerbated as a harsh Islamist regime took power in Khartoum in 1989. (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:3).

Crucially, de Waal (2007a:3) further argues that “Sudan’s conflicts arise from the ruthless ways in which the centre preys on the peripheries, with racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts being secondary to these dynamics”. Simply put, the Darfur crisis is the most contemporary manifestation of Sudan’s post-independence history of centre-periphery tensions. The hyper-dominance enjoyed by Khartoum is arguably the single most important reality in the country. The capital and its surrounds consist of a middle-income enclave surrounded by provinces that are not only poor but are also suffering from development processes running in reverse. While the centre possesses immense private wealth, a class of skilled professionals and a political culture that has a strong liberal tradition, the peripheries are subject to processes of subjugation and exploitation (de Waal, 2007a:4). As was argued in Chapter 2, such a discrepancy between groups has been identified as one of the key causes of violent conflict.

However, the current phase of the conflict was triggered in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), previously the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), attacked government institutions in El Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state (Powell, 2005:41). At the time, the rebels’ demands included that the government bring an end to the political and socioeconomic marginalization of the region and,

most importantly, halt the activities of the livestock herders' militias known as *Janjawiid* (Toga, 2007:214). As Mohamed (2007:208) notes, "it has become clearly evident that the government had an undeclared alliance with the nomads, who happened to be Arabs". Perceiving the government as either unable or unwilling to protect their villages against raids by the nomads, the rebels accused the government of complicity and therefore declared it as the true enemy.

Later that year, a second insurgency organization, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), joined with the SLA/M to wage a military offensive against the GoS and the militia groups. The JEM was very different from the secular SLA/M and proved to be more of a rival than an ally in the struggle against Khartoum. Unlike the indigenous African origins of the latter, the former had its beginnings amongst the so-called 'riverized' Darfuris, a patronizing term used by traditionalists to describe those from Darfur living in Khartoum who had adopted many of the customs and characteristics of the Arabs – including Islam. Crucially, however, many had become increasingly embittered by marginalized treatment and discrimination toward them, despite their partial integration into the urban life of the centre (Collins, 2008:287).

In retaliation to further rebel attacks on el Fashir and Mellit, the second largest city in North Darfur, the GoS forces launched a major land and air assault (Toga, 2007:214). Thereafter, major fighting broke-out throughout Darfur and a number of easy victories for the highly mobile rebels dramatically revealed that the several thousand government troops stationed in the region were ill-prepared and inadequate to contain such a significant insurgency campaign (Collins, 2008:288). Recognizing the army's ineffectiveness, Khartoum hastily rearmed and unleashed the Arab *Janjawiid* militias in what de Waal (cited in Prunier, 2005:99) rather horrifyingly described as "counter-insurgency on the cheap". With military and political backing, the *Janjawiid* began intentionally targeting civilians from African tribes in reprisal for their perceived support of the rebels, but also to gain access to valuable land and water occupied by non-Arab farming communities (Powell, 2005:41). The typical pattern of attack has involved government aircraft bombing towns and villages followed by strafing from helicopter gunships. Ground assaults then ensue, often jointly between GoS troops and militia forces. The *Janjawiid* are then 'rewarded' with *carte blanche* to loot, rape,

plunder and kill indiscriminately in a manner reminiscent of medieval warfare (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:7).

Further complicating the crisis in Darfur is the oft over-looked regional dimensions of this conflict. Marchal (2007:173) argues that, “even though eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic (CAR) are increasingly the location of skirmishes, full-scale battles and abuses against the civilian population, Darfur’s war is still overwhelmingly seen as an internal Sudanese crisis”. Indeed, both Chad and Libya have historically been significant destabilizing factors in Darfur. Since 1965, Chad has been subject to one of the longest civil wars on the continent and Darfur has provided a natural hinterland for the rebel group Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT), which was established in Nyala, Sudan in 1966. Moreover, Khartoum itself also provided support to FROLINAT in its war against the Chad government. This situation was further exacerbated when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi developed a growing interest in the Chadian conflict. As early as 1969 FROLINAT was given rear bases in Libya and soon after Gaddafi revived an old border dispute by claiming the Aozou strip between the two states. Another dimension, little noted at the time, was Gaddafi’s racism. More than just a strident Pan-Arabist, the Libyan leader was an Arab cultural supremacist (Prunier, 2005:42-44). As O’Niell & Cassis (2005:3) point out, “not only guns were imported into Darfur, but also an increasingly racist ideology ... *Janjawiid* leaders are among those said to have been trained in Libya”.

This trend has continued over the years and merely served to further destabilize the region as a whole. Khartoum has been backing two Chadian rebel groups, the *Front Uni Pour la Changement* (FUC) and the *Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques* (RADF), both of which are vehemently opposed to President Idriss Déby whom the GoS originally helped bring to power in 1990 and are known to be operating in Darfur. Moreover, Chad’s armed forces have pursued these groups across the border and have been observed in Sudan; while Déby’s government has recruited fighters from among the Darfuri population as part of his own proxy war and also backed the SLA/M and JEM by providing shelter and other support within Chad. The crisis in Darfur has been further compounded by the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the fragile Central African Republic, as Chadian rebels based in Darfur often traverse



the CAR en route to attacking Chad's capital N'djamena; whilst Sudan is reportedly supporting the rebellion in the CAR in an attempt to further complicate the crisis and frustrate international efforts aimed at engineering peace in the region and Darfur in particular (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:3 - 4).

### **4.3 THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN**

For the world at large Darfur was and has remained the quintessential African crisis: distant, esoteric, extremely violent, rooted in complex ethnic and historical factors, and devoid of any identifiable practical interest for the rich nations. Once the international media got hold of the story, however, Darfur suddenly became a 'humanitarian crisis' and domestic populations in the developed world began to put pressure on their governments to take action (Prunier, 2005:124). As Collins (2008:291) points out, "the political response from the West was ambivalent. With its armed forces ensnared in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was unwilling to commit its few remaining troops to a difficult military mission in yet another Muslim country. Although both Britain and France had regularly been involved in peacekeeping missions in Africa, neither was inclined to plunge into isolated Darfur". Furthermore, the UN was faced with the dilemma of possibly having to recognize that genocide was occurring in Darfur and therefore obliging the organization to intervene, but without member states giving it the means to do so (Prunier, 2005:142). Consequently, the AU became peacekeeper and peacemaker by default, because no other actor would take on the challenge (Flint & de Waal, 2008:173).

#### **4.3.1 AMIS I**

The catalyst for AU involvement in Darfur was the signing of the *Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* (HCFA) in N'djamena on 8 April 2004. Agreed between the GoS, SLA/M, and JEM and negotiated by host Chadian leader President Déby, the HCFA (2004:Art. 1; Art. 6) represented an agreement in principle on the part of the parties to cease hostilities, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the region, combine their efforts to establish a global and definitive peace in Darfur, and committed the GoS to neutralize the *Janjawiid* militia. Provision was also made for the establishment of a ceasefire commission (CFC)

composed of two high ranking officials from each of the three parties, Chad, as well as the international community, mandated to operationalize the ceasefire mechanisms on the ground (HCFA, 2004:Art. 3). During this initial phase the AU was first drawn in as a witness to the negotiations, then as a co-mediator and, finally, it was tasked with bringing the proposed CFC to life (Flint & de Waal, 2008:173). To this end, the chairperson of the AU Commission, former President of Mali Alpha Omar Konaré, dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur from 7 – 16 May 2004 in order to assess the security situation on the ground and advise him on the establishment of the CFC (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:8).

Following the reconnaissance mission's recommendations, at its 10<sup>th</sup> meeting on May 25 2004 in Addis Ababa, the PSC authorized the chairperson of the AU Commission "to take all steps deemed necessary to ensure an effective monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, in particular through the deployment of an AU observer mission, with the required civilian component and, if necessary the protection element" (AU, 2004b:Art. A.6). To this end, the AU entered into a major agreement with the GoS and the other Sudanese parties to the conflict, which cleared the path for the smooth deployment of AMIS I. On 28 May 2004, in a meeting convened in Addis Ababa, the *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur* was signed. The AU was acknowledged as the lead international body in the region as well as the operational arm of the earlier N'djamena agreement and it was further agreed that AU Military Observers (MILOBs) and a small protection force drawn from AU TCCs would be deployed in order to monitor the HCFA in line with the earlier PSC decision of 25 May (AU, 2004c:Art. 2.4; Art. 2.6).

The first point worth noting in regard to AMIS I was its size. Initially, the AU observer mission was composed of the twelve members of the CFC and 132 MILOBs, 60 of which were from the AU member states, 36 from the three Sudanese parties, 18 from Chad and the rest provided by the international community (Toga, 2007:219). Moreover, the proposed protection force was limited to a maximum of 300 troops (AU, 2004c:Art. 2.6). Secondly, the AU mission was further limited to conducting a traditional peacekeeping-type role. As the *Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the*

*Darfur Area of the Sudan* (SOMA, 2004:Para. 5) notes, the mission was mandated to “coordinate investigations, verifications, monitoring compliance in accordance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and Implementation Modalities, and also report violations of the Agreement”. Moreover, the protection force was limited to protecting the MILOBs and not the civilian population (Prunier, 2005:144). As Collins (2008:292) argues, AMIS I simply “was not a peacekeeping force”.

On 2 June an advance mission composed of AU officials and six MILOBs from Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria and Senegal deployed to Sudan with a mandate of securing and establishing the mission HQ in el Fashir. AMIS I formally commenced its operations on 9 June with the arrival of a further three MILOBs from Kenya, Mozambique and Nigeria and a modest ceremony symbolized by the hoisting of the AU flag at its HQ (Toga, 2007:219). Characteristically, the MILOBs were deployed with only one Thuraya satellite phone to link them with the AU in Addis Ababa and nothing else – not even their own vehicles, so crucial for conducting patrols and displaying a presence on the ground. Although mission strength slowly built-up from this point, AMIS I was only fully operational by the end of July. Sector commanders were appointed and assigned to the six newly created sectors – el Fashir, Nyala, el Geneina, Kabkabiya, Tine, and Abeche in Chad – on 22 July and were deployed by 25 July. Due to a distinct lack of civilian administrative support, commanders were issued \$5000 each for essential logistical needs. Moreover, each sector was only allocated four vehicles – a Toyota Hilux pick-up and three Toyota Land Cruisers – and two Thuraya satellite phones. Once in the field, commanders rented civilian accommodation in order to establish sector HQs. Following a decision adopted at the AU Summit from 6 – 8 July (AU, 2004d:Para. 7) the first detachment of force protectors, consisting of an infantry battalion from Rwanda, had arrived in Darfur by the end of the month, followed shortly thereafter by an additional company from Nigeria – bringing the total number to 300 (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:8 - 9).

The problems that bedevilled the AU’s mission, which ultimately earned the scorn of both Darfuris and the international community, were foreshadowed in those early days. According to Flint & de Waal (2008:174), “the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed on 8 April was a fatally flawed document”. For one thing, it had no maps and professional military officers on both sides warned that a

ceasefire without maps was totally unworkable. Furthermore, the document itself existed in two versions. A typewritten text was originally signed by the belligerents on 8 April, but later that same day the GoS delegation approached the Chadian mediators and insisted that an extra sentence be added to Article 6 of the HCFA. On the instructions of the Chadian foreign minister the AU representative, Sam Ibok, hand-wrote the following addition: “the forces of the armed opposition should be assembled in clearly identified sites” – something that the two rebel groups never agreed to (Flint & de Waal, 2008:175). What is more, despite previous experience in Burundi, in the barely one month between the AU’s decision to deploy a presence on the ground and the arrival of the first personnel very little pre-deployment assessment and training was possible – a fact compounded by continuing human resource limitations and a lack of institutional capacity and expertise at the AU (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:9).

In spite of the enormous strain the establishment of AMIS I had already placed on the limited operational and logistical resources of the AU, the organization was at the time contemplating enhancing the mandate and size of the force in order to enhance its effectiveness on the ground. Indeed, in the light of continued attacks by the *Janjawiid* militia against the civilian population, as well as other human rights abuses and violations of the N’djamena ceasefire by all concerned, the PSC requested that the Chairperson of the AU Commission table a proposal to “transform the said mission into a fully-fledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite mandate and size, to ensure the effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement, with particular emphasis on the disarmament and neutralization of the *Janjawiid* militia, the protection of the civilian population and the facilitation of the delivery of the humanitarian assistance” (AU, 2004e:Para. 9).

Somewhat predictably, however, Khartoum fervently resisted the AU’s attempts at both deploying a larger force and enhancing the mandate of the operation. In its bid to undermine such efforts, the GoS actively solicited and received the political backing of sympathetic AU member states such as Egypt and Libya and also rallied a number of weaker African states behind its cause. Consequently, the PSC backed down from its campaign to enhance AMIS I into a robust Chapter VII-type peacekeeping operation (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:6). As O’Niell & Cassis (2005:13) argue, a

fundamental challenge to the AU mission has been the organization's position that "Khartoum's cooperation and consent are required ... The African Union, with its binding decisions through the PSC, could have 'coerced' Sudan to allow greater freedom of action for AMIS. Yet the AU chose not to try and therefore severely limited the scope of AMIS' activities". Indeed, it would seem that despite the rhetoric the AU prioritized respect for Sudan's sovereignty over the protection of the people of Darfur.

#### **4.3.2 AMIS II**

In the meantime, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate. By October 2004 all parties to the conflict were dragging their feet on the diplomatic front; while attacks on and killings of civilians and policemen by government-backed militia and rebel fighters increased, as did incidences of highway robbery and banditry (Adebajo, 2008:137). Indeed, despite the presence of AMIS I, GoS troops, the *Janjawiid* as well as the two rebel groups continued to violate the terms of the HCFA with impunity and it became patently clear that such a small and under-resourced operation simply could not carry-out its mandate effectively and proved incapable of deterring the belligerents. According to Flint & de Waal (2008:175), "the AU monitors, the weakest of all the parties on the ground by far, could only watch and complain".

On 20 October the PSC authorized an expansion of AMIS I that also included a more comprehensive mandate. However, this expanded operation was smaller than that which had earlier been proposed by the AU and did not include an explicit provision for the protection of civilians. Unsurprisingly, a triumphant regime in Khartoum welcomed this development (Kagwanja & Mutahi 2007:6). It was agreed that AMIS II would be comprised of 3,320 personnel, including a 2,341-strong military force, up to 815 civilian police, as well as the appropriate civilian component (AU, 2004f:Para. 7). The strengthened mission was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA; assist in a confidence-building capacity between the hostile parties; contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; as well as oversee the safe return of refugees and IDPs (AU, 2004f:Para. 4). Within the framework of this mandate AMIS II was tasked with, *inter alia*, performing the following two tasks:

- (a) protecting static and mobile humanitarian operations under *imminent threat* and in the *immediate vicinity, within capabilities*; and
- (b) protecting civilians whom it encounters under *imminent threat* and in the *immediate vicinity, within resources and capability*, it being understood that *the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS* (AU, 2004f:Para. 6). (emphasis added)

Despite the urgent operational requirements of this reinforcement, it took over six months for AMIS II to be deployed – hampered by a failure once again to devise a sound logistics plan; a lack of vehicles, oil, furniture, stationary and communications equipment; bureaucratic red tape at AU HQ; a lack of strategic intelligence and clarity regarding the use of force; a lack of linguistic and driving skills; as well as difficulties acquiring accommodation (Adebajo, 2008:137). These problems were further exacerbated by a power struggle between TCCs, especially Nigeria and Rwanda (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7). Consequently, in January 2005 the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was established by the AU with the specific purpose of streamlining the planning, force generation, procurement of logistics and administrative support, as well as liaise with AU HQ in Addis Ababa and international partners (AU, n.d.). By end April just less than 2,500 personnel had been deployed on the ground – a figure far short of the proposed force strength (Powell, 2005:44).

Against the background of this extremely slow build-up the security situation in Darfur became increasingly fluid. As Appiah-Mensah (2006:4) notes, the situation was characterized by: increasing infiltration of Chadian rebels into the AU Area of Responsibility (AOR); a dramatic escalation in the number of ceasefire violations; attacks upon, and hijacking of, non-governmental organization (NGO) vehicles; continued attacks on civilians and the burning of villages; collection of illegal tolls at makeshift checkpoints; and, most significantly, attacks on, and harassment of, AU personnel by the *Janjawiid* and breakaway factions of the rebel movements. Indeed, deliberate targeting of and firing at AU personnel added a new dimension to an already tumultuous security situation. As Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:7) note, “the AU had come to be viewed by protagonists in Darfur as a partisan player ... in an ironic

twist, the AU's protection force itself needed protection as it came under increasing attacks from the state-backed militias and rebels alike". In one of the first incidences an AMIS investigation team was attacked between Khor Abeche and Niteaga on 28 March 2005. The team leader was shot in the neck, while both the driver and civilian guide suffered similar injuries (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:11). Other reported incidents include: an attack on an AMIS patrol outside Harafa; the shooting of two Rwandese soldiers; the death of five Nigerian troops and two civilian support staff, as well as a further three troops who were seriously injured near Kourabishi; and, the abduction of an entire 18-strong AMIS patrol team, an American advisor and a rescue team of 20 in west Darfur (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7).

This is not to say, however, that the AU operation was completely impotent. In the face of these increasing challenges, from 10 – 22 March an AU-led Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) deployed to the region with a view to enhancing the operation's capacity. At the end of the visit, the assessment mission (AU, 2005:Para. 17) observed that, "AMIS is making a significant difference in those areas in which it is deployed". According to Fabrice Weissman, head of mission for *Médecins Sans Frontières* (cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:176) there were "some good African Union commanders [who] really made a difference locally – when they organized patrols to go with the women to collect firewood; when they would try to defuse conflicts between some rebel groups and some Arab militias; to organize a migration, for instance, of cattle along certain roads". For the most part, local people reported that AMIS patrolling did indeed reduce attacks on their camps. However, many of the operation's successes came down to dynamic leadership more concerned with results than rules. For example, General Festus Okwonko of Nigeria, AMIS' first force commander, breached protocol and pushed the limits of his mandate on a regular basis whenever he thought there was likely to be trouble and in order to protect civilians (Flint & de Waal, 2008:176).

The overwhelming reality, however, was that AMIS was weak and appallingly resourced and neither its leadership nor its capacities could sustain its early successes. Indeed, despite the sterling work being done at grassroots-level, the AU assessment mission also found that:

- (a) there remain large areas that are beyond the operations' reach on all but an occasional basis;
- (b) the assumption on which the operation was planned and the overall level of compliance with the HCFA have not been borne out;
- (c) notwithstanding the fact that AMIS II has nearly reached its authorized troop ceiling, it remains well short of being fully operationally effective; and
- (d) while there is no need to change the existing mandate, the tasks within this framework should be reprioritized, with greater emphasis on creating a secure environment (AU, 2005:Para. 17).

It was therefore recommended that AMIS II itself be further strengthened initially in two phases, with a possible follow-on operation to be decided upon in September 2005. The first phase aimed to increase the mission's strength to the existing authorized ceiling of 3,320 personnel as soon as possible. The second phase was to expand AMIS II to a total of 5,587 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and support staff. These recommendations were reviewed by the MSC; and the PSC, at its 28<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 28<sup>th</sup> April 2005, requested that the AU Commission increase the mission to its authorized strength by the end of May and further increase AMIS II to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and support staff by end September of that year (AU, 2005:Para. 18; Para. 19).

While this proposed doubling in force size was no doubt perceived by the AU itself as being indicative of the organization's commitment to resolving the situation in Darfur and reflected a major step in this regard, O'Hanlon & Singer (cited in Williams, 2006:176) make a significant point with regards to technical capability. That is, two rules of thumb are commonly used when calculating the necessary force size for civilian-protection operations. The first is based on the assumption that 2 – 10 troops are required for every 1,000 inhabitants within the crisis zone. The second method is based on the protection force being at least the size of the largest indigenous armed force. Therefore, given the approximately 6 million people living in Darfur as well as estimates that place GoS forces in the region at 40,000 - 45,000 and the *Janjawiid* militia at 10,000 – 20,000 strong, AMIS should have been comprised a minimum of 12,000 and potentially 45,000 troops (Williams, 2006:177).



Nonetheless, by July 2005 the AU operation had successfully commenced its second enhancement exercise, known as AMIS IIE, and by October 6,773 personnel of the projected 7,731 strength deployed in country (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7). The full complement of military personnel was expected to comprise three Nigerian battalions, three Rwandan battalions, one South African battalion, a South African engineer company, a South African Forward Headquarters (FHQ) reserve, a Senegalese battalion, a Kenyan military police (MP) detachment, and a Gambian FHQ company (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:4). As Appiah-Mensah (2006:4) goes on to argue, however, “contrary to expectations ... this significant increase in numbers [did] not necessarily translate proportionally to the operational efficiency and effectiveness on the ground, mainly because of the lack of appropriate equipment”. Arguably the most glaring shortcoming of the AU operation has been its total and utter dependence on the international community’s support. Indeed, although AMIS IIE should be commended for its rapid deployment, the same cannot be said of the arrangements for the logistics and funding so crucial to such an operation. The mission has had to operate with approximately half of its critical force enablers, such as vehicles and information and communication equipment, all of which is supplied by the AU’s international partners (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:5).

Throughout this period the AU and international community at large, most notably the United States and Britain, were actively engaged in diplomatic measures aimed at securing a political settlement to the crisis in Darfur. In late 2005, under the auspices of the AU mediation team, the seventh round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which had initially begun in July 2004 commenced in Abuja, Nigeria. Led by Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the OAU, the talks aimed to broker a comprehensive peace agreement between the GoS and the various rebel groups. By 5 May 2006 the so-called *Darfur Peace Agreement* (DPA) was signed (Nathan, 2007:245). However, only the government in Khartoum and one of the SLA/M factions, led by Minni Arkoy Minawi, put pen to paper; the JEM, Abdel Wahid al Nur, leader of the other SLA/M faction, and the newly formed Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) rejected the terms of the DPA (Adebajo, 2008:137). Three primary dynamics conspired to undermine this process: first, the belligerents themselves were unwilling to engage in negotiations and failed to forge agreements; the AU and its international partners were desperate for a quick accord and pursued a

counter-productive strategy of deadline diplomacy; and, consequently, the mediators were unable to embark upon effective arbitration (Nathan, 2006:3).

Unsurprisingly, the accord was soon rendered a dead letter and failed to bring about peace, and in certain respects heightened the conflict. Shortly after the Abuja agreement was signed violence, insecurity and forced displacements rose in Darfur – a result of both renewed *Janjawiid* and GoS attacks on the rebel groups, as well as fighting between the non-signatories and the newly formed government of national unity (GoNU) comprising Khartoum and the Minawi SLA/M faction (Fadul & Tanner, 2007:284). In the aftermath of the DPA, Khartoum condemned the non-signatories as terrorists and in August of that year successfully pressured the AU to expel these parties from the CFC (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:9). According to Flint & de Waal (2008:179), this move all but “destroyed what remained of the AU’s impartiality and with it the troops’ security and ease of movement”, as the organization was no longer perceived to be an honest broker.

Subsequently, attacks on AMIS personnel escalated, leaving more than 40 peacekeepers dead by the time their mandate ended on 31 December 2007. Indeed, by the beginning of 2006 the situation in the borderlands had continued to deteriorate as an increasing number of deserters from the Chadian army as well as rebels crossed into western Darfur, where they joined the ranks of Sudanese rebels and the *Janjawiid* operating as bandits preying on NGOs, all but brining a stop to humanitarian aid. This tragic set of circumstances produced an even more strident outcry from the international community to transform AMIS from essentially a monitoring operation into a robust UN peacekeeping force (Collins, 2008:295).<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Towards the end of 2005, the second Joint Assessment Mission, comprised of AU, UN, US and EU personnel, travelled to Darfur in order to determine the way forward. In light of the continued insecurity in the region at that time and AMIS’ manifest shortcomings, it was proposed that the AU hand over its operation in Darfur to the UN – reflecting calls that had begun as far back as 2004. Consequently, and after protracted negotiations between the AU, UN and GoS, on 31 July 2007 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1769, formally establishing the hybrid African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*. At full deployment, UNAMID, which was to be managed by the AU at ground level and backstopped financially and otherwise by the UN, would consist of 19,555 military personnel, 360 MILOBs and liaison officers, 3,772 civilian police, and appropriate support staff to begin deployment by October 2007 and assume authority from AMIS no later than 31 December. Crucially, UNAMID was to incorporate existing AMIS personnel as well as give preference to African TCCs for the provision of the remainder.

#### **4.4 LESSONS FROM THE SUDAN ENDEAVOUR**

In evaluating the AU's operation in Darfur it is important not to be bogged down by focussing on specific, performance-related issues. Whether or not AMIS was successful in achieving its mandate, for instance, is not the overriding concern in terms of the scope of this study. In the words of O'Niell & Cassis (2005:6), the AU "could not have chosen a more daunting conflict for such an operation. Darfur is as large as France, with few passable roads, rudimentary communications systems and feeble power and water resources ... This scenario would challenge the most seasoned, best trained and well-equipped peacekeepers", let alone those of a newly established organization. Nonetheless, appraisals of AMIS have in general been exceptionally critical. Appiah-Mensah (2005:7), the former special representative of the Chairman of the AU Commission and head of AMIS HQ in Khartoum, described the operation as "spineless and ineffective", while a western officer (cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:177) who liaised with AMIS for a number of years said the operation "was weak and appallingly resourced. It neither had the capacity to ask for what it needed nor the ability to manage what it had".

Rather, the manner in which this operation was conducted is significant in terms of its wider implications. That is to say, the process of moving from the declaratory stage to an operational domain is a poignant test of the AU's conflict management mechanisms and undoubtedly holds some clues as to how the organization is likely to conduct itself in this regard in the future. Indeed, a number of fundamental issues – a lack of political will, financial constraints, weak institutional capacity, and the limited scope of the operation – conspired to undermine AMIS' effectiveness. What remains to be determined, however, is whether or not these challenges are significant enough to warrant concern and whether or not they will have an adverse effect on any future AU peacekeeping operations given the ambitious ASF model that is currently under development. Neethling (2006:108), for one, speaks of a so-called "declaration-reality gap" and argues that the process is still "something in the realm of a paper, or a wishing phase, and could even become derailed or stalled".

#### 4.4.1 Lack of political will

Perhaps the most pertinent issue is that of political will and the distinct lack thereof shown by African leaders and the AU more specifically with regards to the crisis in Darfur. As has already been observed, the *Constitutive Act* (AU, 2000:Art. 4.h; AU, 2003:Art. 4.h) empowers the organization to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state in order to restore peace and security in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to legitimate order. If ever a case existed where this provision could be employed without hesitation, it is in Darfur. As Slim (2004:812) vociferously argues:

“The government of Sudan must take primary responsibility for what has happened and continues to happen in Darfur. It has both perpetrated atrocities and then blocked the humanitarian response ... Such obstruction and denial are typical of those seeking to mask orchestrated killing, terrorizing and forced displacement of civilians, and should have been recognized for what they were by powerful states much earlier”.

In reality, however, the international community was very slow to react and the response by the AU was less than forthcoming and extremely disappointing when it eventually materialized. Throughout the duration of the AU's involvement in this crisis, and despite the GoS' clear complicity in the human tragedy that has unfolded in Darfur, the organization has been at pains to respect the sovereignty of Sudan at the expense of those on the ground. The disjuncture between the proclaimed stance of 'non-indifference' and the R2P doctrine that ostensibly underpins the AU's peace and security architecture on the one hand and the organization's willingness to actually take action in this respect on the other hand is extremely evident (Williams, 2006:169). For instance, whether or not the conflict in Darfur, given its ethnic dynamic, constitutes genocide is one of the most contentious issues surrounding the current crisis. It is telling, however, that while former US President George W. Bush, former Secretary of State Colin Powell and Senator John Kerry all eventually concluded that genocide had occurred and the personal representative of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Sudan, Jan Egeland, referred to 'ethnic cleansing', the AU was unwilling to condemn the situation as such. Had it done so, this would

have necessitated a much stronger response on the part of the continental body than was actually witnessed (Collins, 2008:292; Prunier, 2005:157).

However, the most striking example of the AU's lack of political will in engaging the conflict in Darfur is evidenced by the extremely restrictive framework within which AMIS was forced to operate. Even in the expanded guise of AMIS II, the approximately 7000-strong operation was hard-pressed to make any significant impact – the mandate clearly confining troops to: investigating ceasefire violations; conducting regular patrols in order to build confidence and act as a visible deterrent; as well as, protect NGO and humanitarian agencies in order to facilitate the delivery of aid (AU, 2005:Para. 16). Indeed, Khartoum's key condition in permitting the deployment of the AU mission was that it would *not* be a robust peacekeeping force. The AU simply conceded far too much to the GoS in negotiating the modalities for the operation (Collins, 2008:298). As Grono (2006, 626) argues, “a critical limitation of the AU mission is its mandate. It is largely an observer mission. It does not have a mandate to go out and proactively protect civilians. In fact, it can only protect civilians when they are being attacked in its presence, and only then if it feels it has enough troops to intervene – and too often it does not”.

Despite these limitations, the international community still expected that AMIS would play a meaningful role in bringing about peace, stability and security in Darfur (Clough, n.d.:8). The second JAM report (cited in Appiah-Mensah, 2006:10) observed that the operation's mandate was adequate, but merely needed to be “interpreted flexibly and robustly in order to maintain the force credibility, and provide the necessary degree of protection to civilians”. Simply put, field commanders were asked to interpret the mandate in line with their capabilities and resources in order to compensate for the shortcomings of their political masters – a totally unacceptable state of affairs, as operational requirements should be matched to the conditions on the ground and not the other way round. Rather damningly, Prunier (2005:145 - 146) asserts that, “the AU had been scheduled for a ‘Mission Impossible’ type of situation. It was supposed to substitute itself to the coalition of the unwilling, to stop what it was only mandated to observe, to operate on a shoestring and to keep the pretence of serious international involvement ... Predictably all it achieved was a token presence”.

At the level of member states, substantial commitment to the operation has also been rather hard to come by, as the enthusiasm displayed when authorizing AMIS did not translate operationally. This point is echoed by Grono (2006:624), who notes that “it is in Darfur where the gap between formal recognition and implementation is at its greatest”. Indeed, troop contribution or a lack thereof has been one of the most persistent problems delaying deployment and ultimately undermining AMIS’ effectiveness, with only Nigeria and Rwanda initially contributing sizeable contingents and without whom it is unlikely that AMIS would ever have been able to achieve anything near its authorized force strength. As the International Crisis Group (2005a:8) notes, “African militaries are stretched thin, with approximately 18,600 personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations” and, given the often tenuous security situation most African states face at home, are hard-pressed and rather unenthusiastic about contributing to AU operations as well. Such a state of affairs is particularly concerning in the light of the organization’s attempts at establishing a continental peacekeeping force.

#### **4.4.2 Weak institutional capacity**

As both Neethling (2006:101) and Williams (2006:172) point out – and was observed in Chapter 3 – “the process of establishing the ASF is still very much in the declaratory and macro-political phase” and “was not even remotely operational during the early stages of the Darfur crisis”. Indeed, when the AU authorized the deployment of AMIS I in mid-2004 the organization had yet to celebrate its second anniversary and many aspects of its comprehensive peace and security architecture, such as the CADSP, were still in the process of being conceptualized let alone implemented. For Mtimkulu (2005:35), however, “when violent conflict erupts, it holds no sympathy for an institution still learning to walk the rough terrain of resolving conflicts relying on armed forces as a cardinal instrument of displaying resolve”. The point being that ‘we are not ready’ is a totally unacceptable excuse when people are dying and one is in a position to take action – no matter how small such action may be.

Nonetheless, AMIS has suffered from a number of significant capacity-related issues that do not bode well for the future of African peacekeeping operations. Before continuing in this vein it is worth recalling that, according to the AU’s own policy

framework, by the time AMIS I had been authorized the organization should have been more or less capable of managing a scenario 3-type stand-alone observer mission, while the RECs should have been close to finalizing their standby brigade arrangements (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6; Para. 3.11). In reality, however, there was a distinct lack of planning on the part of AMIS prior to the operation commencing (Bogland et al, 2008:40). For instance, the UN had to send an assistance cell to Addis Ababa to work with the AU in planning the military mission to Darfur as only *one* full-time professional staff member was dedicated to this task at AU HQ<sup>36</sup> (Adebajo, 2008:137); while, the AU's Early Warning System lacks skills and expertise in political analysis and, according to Mwanasali (2008:48), this unit "simply relays information provided by member states and the international media". Moreover, AMIS itself was comprised of a coalition of militarily powerful African states from across the continent rather than representing one of the five RECs.

Predictably, these shortcomings were reflected at operational level. As was mentioned earlier, AMIS I deployed with insufficient transportation, and communication equipment and no prearranged accommodation. In light of these arduous operational conditions and apparently as an afterthought, the AU eventually secured the services of Pacific Architectural Engineers, contracted through the US State Department, for the most basic logistical support, including: camp construction, the provision of food and water, as well as laundry services (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:9). Furthermore, office equipment, stationery, furniture and sufficient petroleum, oils and lubricants to support the operation were not supplied until late November 2004; while it is only thanks to the generous donations of international partners, such as the UK, Canada and Holland, that AMIS has had the vehicles and air support so crucial to the operation (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:16).<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> The PSOD, the unit within the AU responsible for the strategic and operational planning of peacekeeping missions, has a full-time staff of only 8 individuals. Compare this to the 630 staff within the UN DPKO, which is itself expected to increase by a further 295 as a result of the recent establishment of the Department of Field Support (DFS).

<sup>37</sup> Significant individual contributions to AMIS include: communications equipment provided by Germany; 3 helicopters and fuel from the Netherlands; 25 helicopters and 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Canada; office equipment, construction and maintenance services provided by the USA; as well as air transport from NATO and the EU.

Over and above the issue of securing troop contributions discussed in the previous subsection, AMIS has been plagued by a number of other force generation-related challenges. Firstly, the quality of the troops supplied by TCCs has been poor and undermined the effectiveness of the force. Indeed, Appiah-Mensah (2005:17) claimed that “few people carry out the job of monitoring, investigating and reporting, while the majority assume the role of operational ‘passengers’ ... and sector commanders have repeatedly expressed their frustration with the continuous influx ... of personnel who cannot communicate and write in the operational language ... [while] a good number of these ‘passengers’ have no driving skills whatsoever”. Secondly, before the formation of the DITF, things were done haphazardly and the information flow on personnel movements to and from the mission was virtually non-existent. This led to a situation in which there were neither AU reception parties to meet personnel arriving in the AOR nor sufficient resources to accommodate the new arrivals. Finally, in a bizarre bid to allow more Africans to benefit from the experience of this operation, a strict ban was put in place that forbade extended tours of duty. The unintended consequence being most of the pioneer principal commanders and key staff officers who made such an impact in the early stages of the operation were rotated and replaced (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:13). This problem is clearly highlighted by the successor to AMIS’ highly praised first force commander. Although enjoying the benefit of a far superior force, an international observer had this to say:

“He was horrific. He had a totally different perspective. We got cut off from the humanitarian convoys. He wouldn’t allow us to meet with the humanitarian organizations ... Under this new commander we weren’t permitted to share [security] information. But we did it anyway” (cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:178).

Training is another area where the AU’s limited capacity has once again been laid bare. Observers point to AMIS’ apparent inability to derive maximum benefit from the innumerable capacity-building programs that the AU’s international partners have brought to the mission. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of training and assistance packages for the troops in Darfur were put together by the international community themselves, with little or no input from the AU because it simply does not state its requirements or know exactly what it wants (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:13). A further



problem has been the under-utilisation of the various training centres that have been setup around the continent at enormous cost. These include the previously mentioned Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre in Accra, Ghana as well as the Kenya Peacekeeping Training Centre (KPTC) in Nairobi (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:17).

#### **4.4.3 Financial constraints**

Despite the deteriorating security situation in the region, a lack of political will and weak institutional capacity that conspired to undermine the effectiveness of AMIS at ground-level, the troops managed to achieve some remarkable successes (ICG, 2005b:4). As Williams (2006:178; 179) argues “these problems do not mean that AMIS personnel performed poorly as individuals”. Rather, “AMIS did protect the AU’s military observers ... in the areas where it established a presence, both the security and humanitarian situation improved”. That being said, the AU’s operation in Darfur would not have been even remotely feasible without substantial financial backing from the international donor community, including: the UN, EU, NATO, the United States, Japan and South Korea (Gomes, 2008:127). According to Neethling (2006:99), “it should be noted that one of the realities of peacekeeping experience in Africa relates to financial constraints. In the past years, the extent of African peacekeeping was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but rather by insufficient funding”.

At the time that the AU and the international community at large was proposing AMIS as a solution to the crisis in Darfur, the director of the AU’s Peace and Security Directorate (PSD), Sam Ibok, noted that the organization spent only \$1.6 million – less than \$31,000 per member state – a year on resolving conflicts throughout the entire continent (Williams, 2006:179). Indeed, in 2003 the organization’s entire proposed budget had been a meagre \$43 million, of which member states neglected to pay a staggering \$26 million. The following year the budget was revised upwards to \$158 million<sup>38</sup>, a sum far smaller than the estimated \$250 million required for AMIS

---

<sup>38</sup> \$68 million was to be financed by obligatory payments from member states and the remaining \$95 million was to come from so-called ‘voluntary contributions’. Given the poor track record of African states in paying their obligatory dues, such voluntary payments are almost certain to come from

I; while the expansion of the operation to AMIS II the following year was expected to cost over \$450 million for just twelve months (Neethling, 2006:103; Prunier, 2005:144; Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:9). In a report produced by the AU Commission in July 2005, it was revealed that only seven of the 53 member states had paid their basic contributions in full, thus leaving the organization with a budgetary shortfall of approximately \$35 million. What is more, a pledging conference for AMIS co-chaired by the AU and UN in late May 2005 only managed to raise promises, not actual donations, of \$291 million; thus presenting the operation in Darfur itself with a \$200 million shortfall (Williams, 2006:179).

Perhaps most concerning is the fact that when money is donated rather than equipment, the AU lacks the procurement capacity to spend these funds efficiently. This issue was acknowledged by the Chairman of the AU Commission (cited in Appiah-Mensah, 2006:5), who admitted that, “in the area of procurement the AU neither has the logistical infrastructure nor the experience to handle bulk and urgent purchases, worth millions of dollars, for such large operations”. In fact, donor funding has had to be returned on several occasions when the AU Commission has not had the staffing capacity to accept and administer these financial contributions (Bogland et al, 2008:42). Such concerns have also trickled-down to ground-level, where it is claimed that many of the AU’s soldiers have gone unpaid while on deployment as part of AMIS (Grono, 2006:626). It has been reported that South African soldiers serving in Darfur earned far less than their colleagues serving as UN ‘blue berets’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, a fact that has clear ramifications in terms of force morale. Also, in August 2005, the South African contingent was reportedly informed that their daily allowance would be cut from \$25 per day to a meagre \$1 per day – the UN’s measure of absolute poverty – in view of the AU’s extreme financial problems (Neethling, 2006:106).

The AU’s admitted inability to effectively and efficiently manage such large sums of money has itself exacerbated the financial constraints experienced by the organization during the deployment AMIS. While substantial financial support to AMIS had been

---

international donors. Indeed, the international community supports virtually all of the AU’s programs and the deployment of both AMIB and AMIS would not have been possible without funding from external actors.

forthcoming from the international community during its initial deployment, this enthusiasm waned drastically from mid-2006 as the operation dragged ahead and the organization's shortcomings became apparent (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:12). As O'Niell & Cassis (2005:37) assert in reference to the mission in Darfur, "there is no audit trail for expenses, no spreadsheets showing money coming in and how it is spent". Indeed, one senior UN official (cited in O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:37) described the AU's handling of finances as "money going into a black hole". This apparent lack of accountability and transparency prompted the donor community to push for the transition of AMIS to the UN, as they simply were not willing to support a further enhancement of the AU operation in the light of its limited effectiveness (ICG, 2006:16). Such a state of affairs has led observers to conclude that, from a financial perspective, the only viable peacekeeping operations in Africa are those supported by the UN (de Coning, 2004:23; Neethling, 2006:100). Indeed, one western official involved with AMIS made this observation:

"As a few, non-African countries paid for absolutely everything – from helicopters to food to knives and forks to sandbags, to vehicles, to wages, to beds – the AU preferred to blame these countries rather than take responsibility ... And money was involved. Lots of it. The majority of the mission was ... made up of determined, dedicated and capable people. But people who are unpaid, unfed, under-armed, unvisited ... with a meaningless mandate, being shot at, with no idea what is going on, are unlikely to make a difference in Darfur" (cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:177).

#### **4.4.4 Limited scope**

A further factor likely to impact upon the AU's future peacekeeping capability, evident during the Darfur operation, is AMIS' rather narrow scope. It has been argued in this study and by others that the overwhelming emphasis placed on the purely military aspects of the AU's peace and security architecture is short-sighted and belies, at best, a fundamental misunderstanding of peacekeeping's contemporary role and the multidimensional nature of security or, at worst, a conscious decision to ignore these realities (de Coning, 2005a:91). Neethling (2005:18), for example, argues

that “the multidimensional notion of security will require that peacekeeping forces not only be combat capable, but to undertake training on issues related to HIV/AIDS, gender issues, children’s rights, civil-military coordination, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law”. The reality clearly highlighted in Darfur, however, is that AU is very far implementing such a broad peacekeeping capability.

One of the key remaining challenges facing the operationalization of an African peacekeeping capability is the need to equally develop the civilian support and police dimensions of the ASF concept so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU framework (de Coning, 2006:41). Indeed, AMIS suffered from an extremely slow build-up of civilian staff and was an entirely military operation for months. Civilian police (CIVPOL) only began to arrive in very small numbers in early 2005 and, as one UN official familiar with AMIS stated, “the AU had no clue on police issues. They said there was no major role for police and they never even would have considered a police component if the UN had not recommended it”. Even once the CIVPOL units eventually arrived in theatre they faced a logistical nightmare. Not only did they have nowhere to go when they arrived in Darfur, but the first 250 police had only four cars between them and there was only one police officer at AU HQ responsible for every aspect of police deployment, recruiting, contracts, transport, lodging, communications and equipment (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:18; 40).

Over and above the force-orientated aspects of the operation, AMIS ostensibly also comprised political and humanitarian affairs sections, was required to operate alongside a substantial international humanitarian effort, and was meant to have a civilian-led management structure (de Coning, 2005b:15). According to O’Niell & Cassis (2005:41), however, “while civilians [were] in charge of this mission, this [was] not apparent from either the mission’s structure or its ethos” and Vogt (2005:26) goes as far as to criticise the extremely evident “civilian capability gap”. Firstly, despite the scale of the humanitarian crisis, there were no civilian-military coordination officers or a strong civilian component with expertise in humanitarian assistance and human rights within AMIS. Indeed, only three such experts were eventually deployed to the capitals of Darfur’s three states in late 2005. The mission’s leadership apparently did not perceive NGOs and their work as a critical component

or colleague in Darfur and thus these organizations found it exceptionally difficult to liaise with the AU on issues of concern. Secondly, the operation suffered from a lack of political advisors to assist senior military officers in developing effective relationships with the GoS and other belligerents. Thirdly, AMIS had only two public information officers in country – in el Fasher and Kahrtoum – with sector commanders lacking guidance on political and public information strategies. Finally, despite extremely high incidences of sexual and gender-based violence and the intentional use of rape as a weapon, no gender experts were included within AMIS’ structures (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:38, 40, 41).

Such a state of affairs should come as no surprise. As Fanta (2009:13) points out, “the ASF has no capacity for peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction. Even during an operation it is envisioned that it would eventually hand over to UN ... stabilisation or country teams”.<sup>39</sup> The *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (AU, 2003) goes to great length to set out the precise structure of the AU’s military response capacity, yet mention of the civilian and humanitarian aspects is limited to a few broad sentences. Although multidimensional peacekeeping is identified as one of the key tasks to be undertaken by the AU, the policy framework argues that “the UN is the most experienced organization” in terms of the non-military components of multidimensional operations (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6.e; 2.7). The implication being that the world body would likely be called upon to provide these services to an AU-led operation. Indeed, Paragraph 3.14 (AU, 2003) merely states that “the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component”; while it is further suggested that these capabilities could be procured through partnerships with other organizations that have relevant expertise, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the World Bank.

---

<sup>39</sup> As was discussed in Chapter 2, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction is the vital final cog in the broader conflict management framework. Peacebuilding necessarily represents peacekeepers’ exit strategy. As such, it would seem that the AU’s is to hand over responsibility to the UN. The problem, however, is that there is currently no formal structural relationship or clear approach to burden-sharing between the AU and UN. The consequences of this can be seen in Somalia, where the UN has remained steadfast in rejecting calls to deploy a peacekeeping force to relieve the embattled AU mission.

## 4.5 CONCLUSION

The significance of AMIS and the subsequent implications for the future prospects of African peacekeeping more broadly cannot be overemphasized. As Ndinga-Muvumba (2008:177) rather succinctly argues, “the AU’s peace operation in Darfur ... is the test case for the continent’s new security architecture” – a point echoed by Prunier (2005:144), who notes that “since the old OAU had decided to shed its skin and be reborn as the African Union, it had known that it would be by its competence in conflict management that the world, from its member states to the broader international community, would judge it”. Indeed, although the previous mission in Burundi had been the first of its kind undertaken by the AU, Darfur presented a far sterner challenge for the organization while also allowing it time to possibly build on the lessons learned during the deployment of AMIB. Yet, according to Adebajo (2008:138), “in trying to prove to the world that it had become a transformed organization, the AU may have bitten off more than it could chew”.

As such, this chapter sought to provide a critical analysis of the AU’s operation in Darfur and in so doing highlight the fundamental challenges that are likely to undermine the organization’s ambitious peacekeeping aspirations. The chapter therefore began with a brief discussion of the basic elements of the people and history of the region; the most significant finding in this regard being the extremely complex nature of the conflict. Indeed, the current crisis is merely the latest phase in Darfur’s long history of resource-and development-related inter-ethnic rivalries, fuelled by regional politics, in which the government itself is unquestionably complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity (Sharamo, 2006:51). If ever there was a situation requiring a robust, multidimensional peacekeeping operation in the contemporary mould, Darfur is it.<sup>40</sup> However, the AU’s response in this regard left something to be desired.

Despite an extremely strong peace and security architecture and the fact that the atrocities in Darfur coincided with the 10-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide,

---

<sup>40</sup> Indeed, on 31 August 2006 the UN Security Council invoked the R2P principle for the first time ever in its country-specific resolution concerning Darfur and the R2P has continued to be cited by the UN in relation to Darfur.

AMIS was cruelly exposed. Firstly, African leaders showed a distinct lack of political will. Due to a fear of negative reactions from key member states the AU never effectively dealt with the GoS and allowed the Sudanese to dictate the terms and size of the operation (Sharamo, 2006:53). Secondly, the organization's weak institutional capacity severely undermined whatever good the troops may have achieved at ground-level. For example, insufficient pre-mission planning as well as command and control shortcomings resulted in unclear SOPs and Rules of Engagement (ROE). If soldiers do not understand something as basic as the right to return fire in self-defence, then they have been failed fundamentally (O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:36). Many Darfuris came to pity the AMIS troops, asking, "what soldiers cannot even defend themselves" (cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:179). Over and above these operation-level challenges, AMIS also faced organization-level issues. Not only was the AU completely incapable of funding the operation, but it was also unable to manage the overwhelming donations that poured in from the international community at the outset (O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:36). Finally, as Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:5) point out, "Darfur's overarching impact on Africa's security system has been a trend of giving much weight to the military capabilities to the utter neglect of the capacity for non-military options" so crucial to successfully addressing such a crisis.

Even though the overarching strategy may have been poorly conceived, the AU undoubtedly enjoyed a number of successes at the tactical level. These include, *inter alia*: preventive deployments deterring attacks on civilians; mediation and conflict resolution between local leaders; flexible patrolling, answering as many requests as possible; as well as an overwhelming sense of motivation shown by AU troops to the task at hand (O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:24 - 25). Jan Pronk (cited in Sharamo, 2006:51), the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Sudan, reported in mid-2005 that "the AU force has helped to establish more stability. They have done an admirable job, highly professional, with much dedication". Concurring, Susan Rice (cited in Sharamo, 2006:52), a former US diplomat, commended the role played by the organization: "where it has deployed, the AU has performed heroically and greatly increased the security for civilians". Indeed, the AMIS' shortcomings were related to politics and capacity rather than to its conduct within the AOR.

However, the operation ultimately proved unsuccessful in bringing about a more stable and secure environment within Darfur in general; while, despite the best efforts of those troops deployed on the ground, the extreme levels of violence seemed to continue unabated. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (cited in Williams, 2006:179) claimed at the time that “the decrease in attacks [on civilians] may ... be a function of a reduced number of targets”. Or, as the head of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Andrew Natsios (cited in Williams, 2006:179), put it: “the major reason for that, frankly, is there are not many villages left to burn and destroy”. Indeed, a number of commentators are of the opinion that the decision to transfer AMIS to UNAMID and subsume the operation under a UN umbrella was long over due (Adebajo, 2008:139; Gomes, 2008:127). Reflecting international opinion at the time, Murithi (2008:77) has argued “the AU’s *monitoring mission* [left] much to be desired and a more robust peacekeeping force [was] required to effectively dissuade the silent genocide ... taking place in Darfur” (emphasis added).



## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

### 5.1 SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to explore the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability by means of assessing the various challenges that have impeded the AU's efforts towards establishing such a continental capacity. This purpose was formulated against the backdrop of violent conflict and political instability that has plagued Africa since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century and which has come to be viewed in common discourse as synonymous with the continent. Indeed, determining whether or not Africa is likely to succeed in establishing its own self-sufficient and successful continental peacekeeping force is important for three key reasons.

Firstly, as has already been mentioned, conflict arguably poses the most significant threat to Africa's future prosperity. One must consider not only the direct consequences thereof – the visible and immediate death, injury, destruction, and displacement – but also the innumerable negative knock-on effects associated with war – the distant and indirect repercussion for families, communities, local and national institutions and economies, and neighboring countries. Secondly, although the international community continues to offer financial and *matériel* support, enthusiasm to intervene in and take direct action on the continent suffered a major blow after the peacekeeping debacles in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. The resultant Africa fatigue has meant that the continent has been more or less left to its own devices, thus necessitating that the continent's leaders devise African solutions to African problems. Finally, given that the AU itself has chosen to prioritize peacekeeping as its primary conflict management tool within the overarching peace and security architecture – as indicated by the overwhelming emphasis placed on the development of the ASF concept – the importance of the organization's peacekeeping capacity cannot be overstated. Simply put, the AU has chosen to place all its eggs in one basket and should this endeavour fail the consequences for peace, security and stability in Africa are likely to be disastrous.

The research question for this thesis was therefore formulated as follows: in light of the many potential challenges facing the organization, what is the likelihood that the AU will be able to implement an effective African peacekeeping capability? In seeking to address this issue, however, it was first necessary to discuss three separate yet intimately related questions. First, what is the role of peacekeeping in conflict management? Indeed, understanding how and why the practice emerged, what it entails and how exactly it is practiced at present bear both contextual and analytical importance for a study aimed at critiquing the AU's peacekeeping capability. Second, how does the AU plan on implementing peacekeeping to tackle the scourge of conflict? Understanding how the organization's peace and security architecture is intended to function and why this is the case is a fundamental requirement. Finally, how have the organization's structures and strategy fared during an actual peacekeeping operation? Comparing actual performance against the envisioned standards is the clearest method of determining the nature and gravity of those challenges that face the AU's ambition of addressing conflict in Africa.

As such, the study commenced by first conceptualizing what is understood by the term peacekeeping. The problem in attempting such a feat, however, is that commentators are hard-pressed to agree upon a single, clearly defined definition and the plethora thereof presented within the literature merely reflects the fact that peacekeeping has been used as somewhat of an umbrella term for an exceptionally wide spectrum of activities. Nonetheless, peacekeeping was conceptualized in this study as: any international effort involving an operational component – i.e. putting boots on the ground – that aims to prevent or terminate any conflict or dispute. Again, this definition is intentionally broad as it seeks to incorporate the variety of tasks that contemporary peacekeepers are required to undertake, while also reflecting the reality that peacekeeping necessarily entails deploying troops and other individuals in-country so-to-speak and therefore differs from internal law enforcement and similar activities undertaken by governments.

Having determined what is understood by the term, the origin and development of peacekeeping were then discussed. It was shown that the practice ultimately emerged as an *ad hoc* response to particular problems of peace and security facing the international community during the Cold War, which led to the establishment of the

traditional or first generation peacekeeping model under the auspices of the UN. Indeed, peace enforcement, supported by other peaceful alternatives, had initially been envisioned as the means by which the international community would resolve conflicts in the post-war era. However, the rivalry between East and West during this period soon undermined the ambition of a global security arrangement and necessitated that an alternative approach be developed. As a somewhat awkward compromise between peaceful and force-orientated methods, peacekeeping provided the international community with a relatively successful conflict management tool – as epitomized by the first three operations UNTSO, UNMOGIP and UNEF – capable of diffusing hostilities and avoiding direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

It was further argued that peacekeeping is ultimately a matter of security, as the practice can best be described as precautions or measures taken to provide security and thus ensure peace. Central to such efforts is one's understanding of the notion of security as well as the normative debate regarding how this can best be achieved. As the Cold War wound down and the dynamic processes of globalization began to accelerate during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nature of the security threat facing states and their citizens also underwent a transformation. It was previously taken for granted that external aggression, an attack by one state against another, would constitute the most serious threat. In recent decades, however, far more people have been killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide; while technologies of mass destruction circulate in a netherworld of illicit markets, and terrorism casts shadows on stable rule. As such, the notion of security was forced to evolve from the longstanding model dominant during the Cold War, which perceived the state as the appropriate subject of security concerns, to a far more holistic concept that prioritized the, predominantly non-military, security concerns of individuals and communities.

Reflecting this shift in focus, at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the question arose: when, if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action against another state for the purpose of protecting human security? In response to this challenge, the ICISS developed the R2P doctrine. Briefly, the R2P redefines state sovereignty from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility. The

implication being: firstly, the state and its agents are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and the promotion of their welfare; secondly, national political authorities are both responsible to their citizens internally as well as to the international community externally; and finally, state authorities are responsible for their actions and can be held accountable for both their acts of commission and omission. It was further argued that, although primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens is vested in the state, the international community bears a residual responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild should the state fail in this regard.

The net effect of the changing security threats, human security, the R2P doctrine and other associated developments in the aftermath of the Cold War has been the expansion of peacekeeping into a multidimensional activity and one of the primary tools used by the international community to manage and resolve complex crises. Indeed, whilst peacekeeping may have initially been developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict, the international community simply could not ignore the realities on the ground and was forced to take action. Central to this new approach are the so-called Five P's: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Significantly, it was further highlighted that the distinctions between these tasks are in fact rather blurred and a number of linkages and so-called grey areas do exist. While peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of agreements achieved by peacemakers, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts as well as further peacebuilding activities. Indeed, the Five P's rarely occur in a linear or sequential manner. Rather, they are mutually reinforcing and if used in isolation fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict.

The study then turned towards addressing the long and rather torturous development of an African peacekeeping capability. One of the hallmarks of the post-Cold War era has been the devolution of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security from the UN to a host of regional and other similar actors. Indeed, the sheer number of conflicts and calls for UN assistance that emerged since the 1990s have stretched the organization's resources to the limits and seen the likes of NATO and ECOWAS taking a leading role in conflict management. While the world body is

tasked with the primary responsibility in this regard, the kind of burden-sharing that has become characteristics of contemporary peacekeeping is in fact provided for with the *UN Charter* and, given the organization's limitations, has further been encouraged by the UN itself.

It is in this light that AU came to being in 2002. Significantly, however, the new continental organization is not the first all-African attempt at addressing the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent. In the post-colonial era, Pan-Africanism and decolonization played a critical role in bringing states together and culminated in the formation of the OAU in 1963. With the continent seemingly ravaged by one conflict after another, early African leaders took some action towards addressing this issue under the auspices of the new body. Although a number of conflict management mechanisms – most notably the Defence Commission, CMCA and MCPMR – were established, the organization proved unsuccessful in this regard. Critically, the OAU was undermined by the organization's limited financial, logistical and structural competence, while its political and institutional authority was hampered by dissent, the restrictive terms of its own charter and the qualified support of member states.

Recognizing these shortcomings and the ever-increasing need for viable conflict management structures on the continent – as well as spurred on by the political ambitions of Mbeki and Obasanjo – the OAU was ultimately revitalized in the form of the AU. With the formation of the new organization, African leaders sought to put to bed the inability of its forerunner, in order to deal with continental instabilities by adopting new approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. Central to this new African vision was the AU's groundbreaking *Constitutive Act*, which adopted a distinctly human security-orientated approach and even went as far as to assert the right of the organization to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of member states pursuant to acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to legitimate order. Moreover, in the AU the continent now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since regional cooperation started on the continent in 1963. Indeed, the CADSP, PSC, ASF and other related components – on paper at least – represent a significant conflict management and

peacekeeping capacity capable of making a significant contribution to peace, security and stability in Africa.

The CADSP is an umbrella concept envisioned to promote a common understanding among African states regarding their numerous defence and security challenges. It further establishes a strategy based on a set of principles, norms, objectives and mechanisms aimed at harmonizing the continent's collective responses to these challenges and eventually eradicating the scourge of violent conflict from Africa. This goal is to be achieved through the PSC, the decision-making organ responsible for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, and is to be assisted by a Panel of the Wise, Military Staff Committee, Continental Early Warning System, and Peace Fund. In essence, the PSC is authorized to undertake a variety of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding operations to be carried out by the ASF.

The ASF is ultimately an intricate standby system that attempts to employ and coordinate the peacekeeping capabilities of Africa's five sub-regions. Briefly, each region is to earmark a brigade-sized contribution of military personnel, as well as trained military and civilian observers, supported by small full-time PLANELMs. Supplemented by a sixth High Readiness Brigade based in Addis Ababa, it is envisaged that this structure would provide the organization with a combined capacity of 15000 – 20000 soldiers and 500 military observers. It was further recommended that the ASF include a centrally managed standby roster of at least 240 police officers, two company strength gendarmerie police units, as well as civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance and DDR. However, it was further highlighted that apart from SADC and ECOWAS progress in developing the ASF model has been extremely slow and, despite significant support from the international community, it is almost certain that the scheduled 30 June 2010 deadline for the finalization thereof will be missed.

It was further argued that drafting policy documents and formalizing standby arrangements are by far the easiest aspects in establishing such a plan of action. The real test of the organization's capacity for ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa is that of implementation. Therefore, in order to better assess the prospects of

an effective African peacekeeping capability, the study further evaluated how the AU's peacekeeping structures have performed at ground level during the deployment of an actual peacekeeping operation.

The conflict in Darfur and subsequent AU mission was selected as a case study for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the magnitude of the conflict is virtually unprecedented and is often labelled the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world. Second, the level of human suffering and credible allegations of government complicity in this regard in particular highlight two important issues: the responsibility to protect and intervene for humanitarian purposes, as well as the deployment of a military operation in order to create conditions conducive to conflict resolution. Third, AMIS was faced with a far more complicated and daunting task than the organization's previous outing in Burundi and is the most recently completed AU operation. Finally, the response to the conflict in Darfur has seen substantial interaction and cooperation between the international community, the AU and the UN and therefore provided a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between Africa and its partners in an actual peacekeeping environment.

The purpose in this regard was to determine the practicality of the AU's proposed peace and security architecture by exploring what, if any, challenges have impeded the organization's deployment of AMIS. The study found that the AU operation in Darfur has faced a number of pressing issues that not only undermined its own performance, but are also likely to have a significant impact upon any future operations. Most notable among these are: a lack of political will shown by African leaders; the organization's extreme financial constraints; weak institutional capacity in core management, operational and administrative areas; and the limited scope of the AU's peace and security architecture – as highlighted by the overwhelming emphasis placed on the military components of the ASF concept.

## **5.2 KEY FINDINGS**

Given the research question – in light of the many potential challenges facing the organization, what is the likelihood that the AU will be able to implement an effective

African peacekeeping capability – the introduction to this study posited that three related points would need to be addressed. Firstly, can the AU give substance to what it has committed itself to in principle? Secondly, the AU’s peace and security architecture is grounded on the notions of African leadership and ownership. Therefore, can this be a truly African endeavor free of dependence on the international community? Finally, in light of the answers to the first two questions, can the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and provide the organization with a truly effective peacekeeping capacity capable of successfully tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent? These three issues represent the key findings of this study and are discussed below. Significantly, the findings up to this point have further highlighted the importance of political will – and the lack thereof – with regards to Africa’s peacekeeping prospects and as such will also be addressed.

### **5.2.1 The declaration reality-gap**

The AU, having only been established in 2002, is a relatively young organization and its peacekeeping mechanisms are still in the process of being developed. The question thus arises as to whether or not the organization will be able to successfully implement the extremely ambitious peace and security architecture that is called for within its *Constitutive Act* and the CADSP. The unfortunate reality is that the actual implementing structures within the AU framework do not match up to the theory. As this study has shown, one of the AU’s major shortcomings to date has been that of weak institutional capacity and the organization needs time to develop these structures before its peacekeeping missions are to have any realistic hope of success – a fact that has severely undermined the operational effectiveness of the organization’s mission in Darfur.

According to the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6), by the time that the deployment of AMIS had been authorized by the AU, the organization should have been more or less capable of managing a scenario 3-type stand-alone AU/regional observer mission, which is ultimately what the operation amounted to. Moreover, the individual sub-regions should have been extremely close to finalizing their standby arrangements. Arguably one of the greatest strengths of the AU’s proposed peace and



security architecture is its multilayered, decentralized method of security cooperation that builds upon the core competencies and relative experience of the sub-regions - particularly SADC and ECOWAS.

In reality, however, the ASF was not even remotely operational during the early stages of Darfur as three of the five proposed regional brigades which constitute the ASF model missed their Phase 1 targets, whilst it is virtually certain that the 30 June 2010 deadline for the implementation of the ASF will not be met (Williams, 2006:172). What is more, despite the emphasis placed upon the development and empowerment of these sub-regional structures – they form the mainstay of the AU's peace and security architecture – the overwhelming bulk of AMIS' strength was provided by a loose coalition of TCCs from three different regions of the continent operating under the auspices of the AU. Namely: Nigeria belonging to ECOWAS; Rwanda, a member of East Africa's EASBRIG; and, South Africa from SADC. Finally, as has already been discussed, the operation itself was characterized by a host of administrative and logistical deficiencies.

This point is most clearly highlighted by the fact that the advance party of MILOBs arrived in Darfur with only one satellite telephone and had no vehicles of their own; while sector commanders were required to rent civilian accommodation for their troops as the AU had not made any arrangements in this regard. Indeed, there are no ready structures within the AU for strategic and operational command and control, the result being an ad hoc organization that does not have the capacity to command missions effectively (Bogland et al, 2008:40).

The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this sub-section, then, is yes. The AU will undoubtedly proceed in this vein and should eventually succeed in establishing the various components of the peace and security architecture that it has committed itself to – although only ostensibly. Indeed, this study has shown that the AU is severely understaffed and under-funded; while those structures that are in place, such as the Early Warning System, do not function as they should. It would seem that, in reality, the AU is an extremely weak organization and will likely experience great difficulty in integrating Africa's myriad conflict management structures in a logical and efficient manner at the continental level. Such a scenario clearly does not bode

well for the organization's peacekeeping capability nor peace, security and stability in Africa in general. As the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security (cited in (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:5) argues in reference to the organization's experience in Darfur, "the AU was being asked to provide shelter when its house had no roof".

### **5.2.2 Striking a balance between African ownership and external funding**

In light of these glaring shortcomings it is abundantly clear that more attention and resources need to be dedicated to the development of the AU's structures if it is to have any hope of becoming a truly competent organization capable of effectively managing conflict in Africa. As Bogland et al (2008:42) echo, "lack of economic and material resources is one of the biggest problems that all peace and security initiatives contend with on the African continent". Such support, however, has not been very forthcoming from within the organization itself and so the AU has had to look elsewhere. As was shown in Chapter 3, partnering with more experienced and better managed and resourced international actors – the UN, NATO, EU and individual states – forms part and parcel of the AU's plan of action in this regard.<sup>41</sup>

This state of affairs highlights two important points that pertain directly to the notion of African ownership and 'African solutions to African problems' that was identified as a key driving force behind the AU and its desire to play a meaningful role in addressing the scourge of conflict on the continent. Firstly, the study found that the AU operation in Darfur was wholly dependent upon the support of external donors, a fact which also applies to the operationalization of the ASF and related structures with the organization's peace and security architecture. In terms of the organization's legitimacy and credibility on the continent, however, it is vital that external funding is not accompanied by undue influence on decision-making processes or leadership. In the words of Thobane (2007:109), "theoretically, as long as the AU cannot fund its own peace missions independently, it will never be in a position to determine the course of its missions". The likelihood of developing an effective *African* peacekeeping capability simply cannot be realized if the AU is wholly dependent

---

<sup>41</sup> The most recent figures available estimate the AU's peace and security budget at \$62 million (out of a total institutional budget of \$160 million). In contrast, the EU budget in 2007 was a staggering €129 billion.

upon the international community. Yet, given the dire economic conditions on the continent and the fact that member states have been less than forthcoming in terms of paying their compulsory contributions, the AU's ability to cover its own costs in the short- to medium-term is highly unlikely.

The second point worth noting is that continued international support for the AU is not necessarily a given. Indeed, despite the significant financial, *matériel* and other assistance provided by these partners in terms of both developing the organization's institutional capacity and supporting peacekeeping operations directly, the AU remains a relatively weak body and has proved rather unsuccessful in the field. It has already been mentioned that one senior UN official (cited in O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:37) described the AU's handling of finances as "money going into a black hole" and this lack of accountability and transparency not only prompted the donor community to push for the transition of AMIS to the UN, but is also likely to deter unqualified support for the AU looking ahead. Given the organization's utter dependence on the international community, the withdrawal of such assistance would no doubt severely undermine the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability. As de Waal (2007c:379) notes in reference to the mission in Darfur:

"The morale of the AMIS troops suffered as soon as the UN handover proposal was floated ... Even before the AU had approved the transition [to UNAMID] in March 2006 ... AMIS funds began to dry up ... Instead of the AU PSC discussing how to improve AMIS' mandate and operations, it was asked to discuss its demise. Rather than being expanded and made more effective, the mission began to wither".

Can the AU's peacekeeping capability therefore be truly African owned? In light of the above the answer is, unfortunately, more than likely no. The key consideration, then, is striking an effective balance between African leadership on the one hand and external funding on the other – a relationship based upon cooperation and mutual benefit rather than dependence and a negative hierarchical structure. Although the UN may assume *primary* responsibility for the maintenance of *international* peace and security, the AU necessarily assumes a secondary responsibility in this regard while also bearing the responsibility to augment the UN's capabilities within Africa itself

(Thobane, 2007:63). Indeed, the AU is undoubtedly the appropriate mechanism through which Africa's challenges, most notably in the area of peace and security, can be addressed. As such, the international community should not write-off the organization, but rather they should continue to encourage and support it as has been the case to date.

### **5.2.3 Potential in the long-term**

Having concluded that the AU is currently not well positioned to provide an effective peacekeeping capability on the continent and that any hope of the organization ever doing so is wholly dependent upon continued support from the international community, the AU is nonetheless capable of playing a meaningful role in ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa in the long-term. It is important to note, however, that attempting to both develop one's capacity to deploy peacekeeping operations and actually deploying such operations simultaneously is rather problematic. As LtCol Percy Hansson (cited in Ekengard, 2008:41) points out, "in some instances resources were diverted from the development of the regional brigades to AMIS, and later to UNAMID. This is evident in the case of EASBRIG ... from which command and control resources were diverted".<sup>42</sup> It is vital, therefore, that the AU adopt a pragmatic approach and commit itself to bringing the ASF and related structures fully online before agreeing to any further operations. Should the AU be faced with yet another conflict and take the premature decision to intervene, this would surely strike a death blow to the organization's stuttering peace and security architecture which is already overburdened by ongoing commitments in Darfur and Somalia.

However, as Bogland et al (2008:38) argue, "the institutional framework, as well as the doctrines and concepts for AU-led peace support operations are in place and are of a relatively high quality". Thus, should the organization manage to literally get its house in order, the AU's proposed structures represent an extremely strong platform from which to pursue the goals of peace and security on the continent. Firstly, the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* is groundbreaking in that it is the first

---

<sup>42</sup> LtCol Hansson is the Swedish military *attaché* at AU HQ in Addis Ababa.

international treaty to assert the right of a regional organization to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Secondly, the CADSP and ASF concept have the potential to contribute to the promotion of continent-wide security cooperation in at least two ways. For one thing, the CADSP represents a common goal for member states, a political framework for peace and security, which increases the opportunity for channelling resources, initiatives and programs in a common direction. What is more, the ASF's decentralized structure emphasizes the responsibility of the sub-regional organizations – thus retaining interest and promoting capacity development at the level of RECs – while the AU contributes the strategic framework, continental legitimacy and important conceptual and institutional link with international actors (Bogland et al, 2008:38). Indeed, it can be argued that the AU's peace and security architecture is a natural and practical solution to the challenge of establishing integration and cooperation over such a large and heterogeneous continent as Africa.

A further point worth mentioning is that, in the case of AMIS at least, AU troops have tended to make a significant positive contribution towards ensuring peace and security at ground-level. As has already been mentioned, such successes include: preventive deployments deterring attacks on civilians; mediation and conflict resolution between local leaders; flexible patrolling, answering as many requests as possible; as well as an overwhelming sense of motivation shown by AU troops to the task at hand (O'Niell & Cassis, 2005:24 - 25). As Ekengard (2008:41) notes, despite the extremely evident lack of civilian capacity within the ASF, commentators have “generally given credit to AMIS' work at the tactical level and below”. Indeed, in October 2006 a host of senior military and police officers, currently or formerly serving with AMIS, gathered at a seminar arranged by the International Peace Academy. Reflecting on what the experience in Darfur meant for the continued development of the AU's peace and security architecture, the participants concluded that weaknesses at the higher levels of AMIS and AU hierarchy were the most serious shortcomings constraining further progress (Ekengard, 2008:40 - 41).

Thus, in response to the question can the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and provide the organization with a truly effective peacekeeping capacity capable of successfully tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent, the answer would be yes. However, in light of the above findings the most likely and viable

scenario is sure to diverge rather significantly from the highly ambitious framework originally envisioned by the AU. Indeed, it would seem that large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations sustained over a prolonged period of time will remain beyond the AU's limited financial and institutional capabilities. On the basis of the Darfur experience, Neethling (2006:108) has suggested that it would be advisable for the AU to rather plan for the successful deployment of military observer missions and short-term stabilization operations consistent with scenarios 1 through 4 of the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*.

By prioritizing the development of a robust, rapid-reaction force, the AU could potentially deploy its troops in order to monitor and stabilize the situation on the ground for a limited period of time prior to the arrival of a more comprehensive UN operation. As has been discussed elsewhere, the UN is ultimately the only institution capable of co-ordinating the various multidimensional components needed to form as well as sustain a complex peacekeeping operation and peacebuilding system. However, in order for such a partnership to prove feasible, the AU must first formalize its relationship with the UN and adopt an integrated approach with regards to burden-sharing (Thobane, 2007:110). Key issues in this regard would include whether or not the UN should place its assets at the disposal of the AU and sub-regional bodies and vice versa; reaching agreement as to what partners such as the EU and NATO or any other bilateral donors could provide; as well as establishing clear lines of communication and command and control from the regional to global level. The alternative, as evidenced by the case of Somalia, would be nothing less than disastrous.

This, then, is where the significance of the current AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur comes to the fore. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the hybrid operation concept in general and the strengths and weakness of UNAMID in particular is beyond the scope of this study.<sup>43</sup> Suffice it to say that UNAMID represents an evolution in the relationship between the two organizations and hints at a possible alternative to the current AU framework. As such, further research on this developing partnership

---

<sup>43</sup> For an introduction to this concept and the technical aspects of UNAMID, see Aboagye (2007).

should be conducted as a matter of urgency. This point is echoed by Bogland et al (2008:45) who argue that, “future studies need to put the AU in a wider political perspective. At a global level, this should include relations with the EU, the UN and the great powers ... where are the boundary-defining factors and where should support thereby be prioritized”? For one thing, it is important to interrogate what this new development represents. As Murithi (2009:16) warns, “the AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a form of hybrid paternalism” where AU troops and personnel do the basic and dangerous work on the ground while guided by the all-wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of UN advisors.

#### **5.2.4 Political will: the missing link**

In reality, talk of an African peacekeeping capability – be it African owned or simply part of a broader, integrated global conflict management network – will remain nothing more than a Pan-African ideal unless the continent’s leaders undergo a dramatic change in attitude with regards to the AU and its role in Africa. The underlying issue which has undermined the organization’s effectiveness thus far has been the lack of political will displayed African elites. It can be argued that weak institutional capacity, financial constraints and a lack of progress in implementing the various elements of AU’s peace and security architecture are merely symptoms of this more fundamental challenge. Indeed, if only the major oil producing states in Africa took just 10 US cents a barrel the sum would cover the whole African Union budget in less than a month (Evans, 2004).<sup>44</sup>

As an organization that is very much the sum of its parts, African states will first have to pull together in order to imbue the AU with the necessary strength to live up to the weight of expectation and assume its envisioned role on the continent. This point is echoed by Bogland et al (2008:44) who argue that:

“like all international organizations, the AU suffers from the great breadth of national and regional interests ... the political support of the member states is required in each individual case and, in particular, contributions in

---

<sup>44</sup> Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria.

the form of troops, *matériel* and diplomacy. The AU will never be more effective than the sum of its members' will. A triangular are of tension has, thereby, arisen between the AU's ambitions, the organization's resources and capacity and the member states' political interests and will".

Unfortunately, this is somewhat of a 'catch 22' scenario as the AU's development and potential is largely dependent upon its ability to exude confidence and command respect both in Africa and internationally. It is therefore crucial that the AU make the latest wave of Pan-Africanism, which led to the establishment of the organization in 2002, tangible in a credible form and thereby act as a catalyst for further continental integration. This ability rests on member states' perception of the AU's capacity *vis-à-vis* the membership cost, which, in the end, will either generate political will and drive or an implementation and credibility crisis where financial, personnel and *matériel* contributions quickly disappear (Bogland et al, 2008:41). Indeed, until the AU is capable of presenting a strong and unified front, member states will remain unwilling to forsake their own selfish national interests and invest their faith and resources in the organization. This point is driven home by the Botswana Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the AU, Zibane Natkhwana (cited in Thobane, 2007:92), who asserted that, "Botswana will only send troops to assist or quell conflicts in war torn areas if under the auspices of the UN".

However, in the absence of both Mbeki and Obasanjo, it would seem that the dynamic leadership, drive and out-and-out rivalry which gave impetus to the AU in its early days is now gone. As Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:5) point out, "a fundamental re-configuration of power in the AU in the first half of 2004 cleared the way for Africa's intervention in Darfur. In March 2004, South Africa and Nigeria, the two principle prompters of the new-look AU, were elected to the PSC on a three-year term ... With Africa's two most powerful nations at the helm of its power, the AU was emboldened to take a larger role in Darfur". Indeed, given his dubious reputation, it remains uncertain whether or not Libya's Gaddafi, the newly elected Chairperson of the AU, and his vision of a United States of Africa will prove to be a strong directing force within the organization looking ahead.



It is more likely that the AU will remain fractured, perceived as little more than a token organization in the eyes of African leaders, who themselves are unwilling to promote a strong continental body capable of meddling in their affairs and undermining their interests. Rather cynically, it could be argued that the AU is nothing more than a trade union for the protection of African elites. In the case of the Darfur crisis, for example, Prunier (2005:125) notes that, the AU went as far as to coach the Khartoum government on how to “handle the whites”. The resultant effect of such a scenario on the AU’s capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations is clear enough not to require a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say, while the political rhetoric will continue, very little is likely to change at the organizational and operational level. Indeed, AMIS is likely to be as good as it gets in terms of an African peacekeeping capability for the foreseeable future – a fact supported by the debacle that is AMISOM.

## APPENDIX

Figure 1: Number and type of conflicts and peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004




Figure 2: Linkages and grey areas in peace operations




Figure 3: Number of intra-state peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004




Figure 4: African Standby Force approved order of battle




Figure 5: The African Union's peace and security architecture




Figure 6: African Regional Economic Communities




Figure 7: Map of Sudan and surrounding states



Figure 8: Map of Darfur, western Sudan



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aboagye, F. 2007. The Hybrid Operation for Darfur: a Critical Review of the Mechanism. *ISS Paper* 149.

Adebajo, A. 2008. The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. 2006. Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946 – 2004: a Macro-Comparative Perspective. [Online]. Available at: [www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/africa-conflictpp-stats-report.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/africa-conflictpp-stats-report.pdf). Last Accessed: 24/11/2008.

African Union. n.d. The African Unions Mission in the Sudan. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.amis-sudan.org>. Last Accessed: 14/07/2009.

African Union. 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive\\_Act\\_en.htm](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm). Last Accessed: 10/04/2009.

African Union. 2002. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol\\_peace%20and%20security.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf). Last Accessed: 15/04/2009.

African Union. 2003. Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm>. Last Accessed: 10/04/2009.



African Union. 2003. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1). EXP/ASF-MSC/2 (1), 14 May 2003. [Online]. Available at:

<http://www.saferfrica.org/DocumentsCentre/NEPAD/ASF/Index.php>. Last Accessed: 15/04/2009.

African Union. 2004a. Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/News\\_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.AF%20Def%20Sec.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.AF%20Def%20Sec.pdf). Last Accessed: 15/04/2009.

African Union. 2004b. Communiqué of the Solemn Launching of the Tenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. PSC/AHG/Comm. (X), 25 May 2004. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.amis-sudan.org/PSCCommunique/2004%200511%20communique%2010th.pdf>. Last Accessed: 28/06/2009.

African Union. 2004c. Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/cfc/agreement.pdf>. Last Accessed: 03/07/2009.

African Union. 2004d. Decision on Darfur. AU/Dec. 54 (III), 8 July 2004. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.africa-union.org/AU%20summit%202004/Assm/Assembly%20Decisions%20-Final.pdf>. Last Accessed: 05/07/2009.

African Union. 2004e. Communiqué of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. PSC/PR/Comm. (XIII), 27 July 2004. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/comm13.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/comm13.pdf). Last Accessed: 05/07/2009.

African Union. 2004f. Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII), 20 October 2004. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/News\\_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu%C3%A9%20\\_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf). Last Accessed: 5/07/2009.

African Union. 2005. An Opportunity For Partnership For Peace: Overview of the AU's Efforts to Address the Conflict in the Darfur Region of the Sudan. CONF/PLG/2(I), 26 May 2005. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.issafrika.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/pledgeoverview.pdf>. Last Accessed: 5/07/2009.

African Union. 2006a. Communiqué of the 46<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. PSC/MIN/Comm. (XLVI), 10 March 2006. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.issafrika.org/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2006/46com.pdf](http://www.issafrika.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2006/46com.pdf). Last Accessed: 07/07/2009.

African Union. 2006b. Communiqué of the 51<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. PSC/MIN/Comm. (LI), 15 May 2006. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Press\\_Releases\\_5/COMMUNIQUE\\_OF\\_THE\\_51ST\\_MEETING\\_OF\\_THE\\_PEACE\\_AND\\_SEC\\_150\\_printer.shtml](http://www.sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Press_Releases_5/COMMUNIQUE_OF_THE_51ST_MEETING_OF_THE_PEACE_AND_SEC_150_printer.shtml). Last Accessed: 07/07/2009.

Akokpari, J. 2008. Conclusion: Building a Unified Africa. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). 2008. *The African Union and its Institutions*. Johannesburg: Fanele.

Alkire, S. 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper2.pdf>. Last Accessed: 24/11/2008.

Annan, K. 1998. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Report of the Secretary-General. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html>. Last Accessed: 04/05/2009.

Annan, K. 2000. We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. UN Millenium Report. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

Annan, K. 2005. In Larger Freedom. Report of the Secretary-General. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>. Last Accessed: 07/04/2009.

Appiah-Mensah, S. 2005. AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur: Challenges and Constraints. *African Security Review*, 14(3): 7 – 21.

Appiah-Mensah, S. 2006. The African Union Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas. *African Security Review*, 15(1): 2 – 19.

Bach, D. 2008. The AU and the EU. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. & Griffin. 2004. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brady, C., Bihari, L.A., Lim, A., Scotland, J. & Wu, G. 2005. Peace Support Operations. *G8 Research Group: Final Compliance Report*, 22 May. [Online]. Available at: <http://assembly.weu.int>. Last Accessed: 12/04/2009.

Bogland, K., Egnell, R. & Lagerström, M. 2008. The African Union – A Study Focusing on Conflict Management. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.foa.se/upload/projects/Africa/foir2475.pdf>. Last Accessed: 10/12/2008.

Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>. Last Accessed: 10/12/2008.

Červenka, Z. 1977. *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. London: Julian Friedmann Publishers.

Cilliers, J. 2008. *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*. *ISS Paper* 160.

Cilliers, J. & Malan, M. 2005. *Progress With the African Standby Force*. *ISS Paper* 98.

Callaghy, T.M., Kassimir, R. & Latham, R. 2001a. Introduction: Transboundary Formations, Intervention, Order and Authority. In *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power*, Callaghy, T.M., Kassimir, R. & Latham, R. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Callaghy, T.M., Kassimir, R. & Latham, R. (eds.). 2001b. *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clapham, C. 1999. The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Africa. In *Whither Peacekeeping in Africa*, Malan, M. (ed.). *ISS Monograph Series* 36.

Cleaver, G. & May, R. 1998. African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping. In *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Furley, O. & May, R. (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Clough, M. n.d. Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect? Human Rights Watch. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=42>. Last Accessed: 10/04/2009.

Collins, R.O. 2008. *A History of Modern Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Damis, J. 1984. The OAU and Western Sahara. In *The OAU After Twenty Years*, El-Ayouty, Y. & Zartman, I.W. (eds.). New York: Praeger.

Darfur Peace Agreement. 2006. [Online]. Available at:  
<http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf>. Last Accessed:  
10/07/2009.

De Coning, C. 2004. Refining the African Standby Force Concept. *Conflict Trends*, (2): 20 – 26.

De Coning, C. 2005a. A Peacekeeping Stand-by System for SADC: Implementing the African Stand-by Force Framework in Southern Africa. In *People, States and Regions: Building a Collaborative Security Regime in Southern Africa*, Hammerstad, A. (ed.). Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs.

De Coning, C. 2005b. The Civilian Dimensions of the African Standby Force System. *Conflict Trends*, (4): 10 – 16.

De Coning, C. 2006. The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa. In *Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future*, Ojanen, H. (ed.). Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

De Coning, C. 2008. Moving Beyond the 4Ps – An Integrated Conflict Management System for the African Union. *Security in Practice*, 12(735).

De Waal, A. 2007a. Sudan: the Turbulent State. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

De Waal, A. (ed.). 2007b. *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*. Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

De Waal, A. 2007c. Darfur's Elusive Peace. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Economic Community of West African States. 2005. Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990 – 2004. Report of the ECOWAS Workshop. [Online]. Available at: <http://secint50.un.org/unowa/reports/ecowas110205.pdf>. Last Accessed: 12/04/2009.

Ekengard, A. 2008. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/foir2559.pdf>. Last Accessed: 10/07/2009.

El-Ayouty, Y. & Zartman, I.W. (eds.). 1984. The OAU After Twenty Years. New York: Praeger.

Evans, L. 2004. African Union Representative Explains New Continentwide Organization. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.international.ucla.edu/africa/article.asp?parentid=16508>. Last Accessed: 10/07/2009.

Fanner, A.J. & Tanner, V. 2007. Darfur after Abuja: a View From the Ground. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Fanta, E. 2009. The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security. [Online]. Available at: <http://erd.eui.eu/media/fanta.pdf>. Last Accessed: 15/07/2009.

Field, S. (ed.). 2004. Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Flint, J. & de Waal, A. 2008. Darfur: a New History of a Long War. New York: Zed Books.

Francis, D.J. 2006. Uniting Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

- Francis, D.J., Faal, M., Kabia, J. & Ramsbotham, A. 2005. *Dangers of Co-Deployment: UN Co-Operative Peacekeeping in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
- Franke, B.F. 2006. In *Defence of Regional Peace Operations in Africa*. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a185.pdf>. Last Accessed: 15/07/2009.
- Furley, O. & May, R. (eds.). 1998a. *Peacekeeping in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Furley O. & May, R. 1998b. Introduction. In *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Furley, O. & May, R. (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Gomes, S. 2008. The Peacemaking Role of the OAU and the AU: a Comparative Analysis. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.
- Grono, N. 2006. Briefing – Darfur: the International Community’s Failure to Protect. *African Affairs*, 105(421): 621 – 631.
- Hammersatd, A. (ed.). 2005. *People, States and Regions: Building a Collaborative Security Regime in Southern Africa*. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Heldt, B. & Wallenstein, P. 2006. *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948 – 2000*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.pcr.uu.se/pcr\\_doc/Wallenstein\\_pub/PKOs\\_1948-2004\\_II.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/pcr_doc/Wallenstein_pub/PKOs_1948-2004_II.pdf). Last Accessed: 04/06/2009.
- Hentz, J.J. 2004. The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. In *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*, Taylor, I. & Williams, P.D. (eds.). London: Routledge.

Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur. 2004. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur.pdf>. Last Accessed: 03/07/2009.

International Crisis Group. 2005a. The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps. *Africa Briefing* 28. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3547>. Last Accessed: 09/07/2009.

International Crisis Group. 2005b. The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination. *Africa Report* 99. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766>. Last Accessed: 09/07/2009.

International Crisis Group. 2006. To Save Darfur. *Africa Report* 105. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4027>. Last Accessed: 09/07/2009.

International Crisis Group. 2007. Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse. *Middle East/North Africa Report* 66. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5236>. Last Accessed: 07/08/2009.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Imobighe, T.A. 1980. An African High Command: the Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Defense. *African Affairs*, 79(315): 241 - 254.

Jett, D.C. 1999. *Why Peacekeeping Fails*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Johnstone, I., Tortolani, B.C. & Gowan, R. 2005. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Unfinished Business. *Die Friedens-Warte Journal of International Peace and Organization*, 3 – 4: 55 – 72.

Juma, M.K. (ed.). 2006. *Compendium of Key Documents Relating to Peace and Security in Africa*. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press.



Kagwanja, P. 2006. Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of Africa's Multilateral Capacity for Peacekeeping. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24(2): 159 – 184.

Kagwanja, P. & Mutahi, P. 2007. Protection of Civilians in African Peace Missions: The Case of the African Union Mission in Sudan, Darfur. *ISS Paper* 139.

Kent, V. & Malan, M. 2003. The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects. *African Security Review*, 12(3):71 – 81.

Legum, C. 1999. *Africa Since Independence*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Links, S.B. 2000. *Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement? A Proposed Model for Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University Press.

MacQueen, N. 2002. *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. Great Britain: Pearson Education.

Malan, M. 1999a. Leaner and Meaner? The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa. *African Security Review*, 8 (4).

Malan, M. (ed.). 1999b. *Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? ISS Monograph Series* 36.

Marchal, R. 2007. The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crisis in Darfur. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Marten, K.Z. 2004. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McKenzie, M.M. 2001. The UN and Regional Organizations. In *The United Nations and Human Security*, Newman, E. & Richmond, O.P. (eds.). New York: Palgrave

Mlambo, N. 2006. Evolution of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Standby Force, up to 2006. *Africa Insight*, 36(3 & 4): 41 – 56.

Mohamed, A, A. 2007. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Mtimkulu, B. 2005. The African Union and Peace Support Operations. *Conflict Trends*, 4: 34 – 36.

Murithi, T. 2008. The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Review*, 17(1): 70 – 82.

Murithi, T. & Ndinga-Muvumba, A. 2008. Introduction: Building an African Union for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Murithi, T. 2009. The African Union's Foray Into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, 14: 1 - 19.

Mwanasali, M. 2008. From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: the Emerging Doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa. In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Naldi, G.J. 1999. The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of its Role. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. London: Mansell Publishing.

Nathan, L. 2006. No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement. Crisis States Working Papers Series 2(5).

Nathan, L. 2007. The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Ndinga-Muvumba, A. 2008. Accelerating the Response: an Evolving African HIV/AIDS Policy? In *The African Union and its Institutions*, Akokpari, J., Ndinga-Muvumba, A. & Murithi, T. (eds.). Johannesburg: Fanele.

Neethling, T. 2005. Realizing the African Standby Force as a Pan-African Ideal: Progress, Prospects and Challenges. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 8(1): 1 – 25.

Neethling, T. 2006. Working Towards an African Peacekeeping Capability: Key Issues, Challenges and Dilemmas in Darfur. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 34(2): 93 – 111.

Newman, E. & Richmond. O.P. 2001. The United Nations and Human Security. New York: Palgrave.

Ojanen, H. (ed.). 2006. Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

O’Niell, W.G. & Cassis, V. 2005. Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

O’Niell, J.T. & Rees, N. 2005. United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. Abingdon: Routledge.

Organization of African Unity. 1963. Charter of the Organization of African Unity. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africanunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/OAU\\_Charter\\_1963.pdf](http://www.africanunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf). Last Accessed: 10/04/2009.

Organization of African Unity. 1993. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. AHG/Decl. 3 (XXIX), 30 June 1993.

[Online]. Available at: <http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/13/2-3/174.pdf>. Last Accessed: 15/04/2009.

Organization of African Unity. 1997. OAU Report of the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management. 22 – 25 October.

Organization of African Unity. 1999. Sirte Declaration. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1, 9 September 1999. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/Docs\\_AUGovernment/decisions/Sirte\\_Declaration\\_1999.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/Docs_AUGovernment/decisions/Sirte_Declaration_1999.pdf). Last Accessed: 12/04/2009.

Organization of American States. 1991. Background Notes: OAS. [Online]. Available at: <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/igos/oas9109.html>. Last Accessed: 12/04/2009.

Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. 2008. Survey of OSCE Field Operations. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.osce.org/item/3242.html>. Last Accessed: 12/04/2009.

Pittman, D. 1984. The OAU and Chad. In *The OAU After Twenty Years*, El-Ayouty, Y. & Zartman, I.W. (eds.). New York: Praeger.

Powell, K. 2005. The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect. *ISS Monograph* 119.

Prunier, G. 2005. *Darfur: the Ambiguous Genocide*. London: Hurst & Company.

Richmond, O.P. 2001. The Limits of UN Multidimensional Peace Operations. In *The United Nations and Human Security*, Newman, E. & Richmond, O.P. (eds.). New York: Palgrave.

Rikhye, I.J. 1984. *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Sharamo, R. 2006. The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan. *Conflict Trends*, (4): 50 – 55.

Slim, H. 2004. Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the International Response. *International Affairs*, 80(5): 811 – 828.

Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Region of the Sudan. 2004. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.amis-sudan.org/Agreements/SOMA\\_Darfur.pdf](http://www.amis-sudan.org/Agreements/SOMA_Darfur.pdf). Last Accessed: 03/07/3009.

Taylor, I. & Williams, P.D. (eds.). 2004. *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*. London: Routledge.

Thobane, B.N. 2007. Migration from the OAU to the AU: Exploring the Quest for a More Effective African Peacekeeping Capability. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University Press.

Tieku, T.K. 2004. Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests and Major Actors in the Creation of the AU. *African Affairs*, 103:249 – 267.

Toga, D. 2007. The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks. In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, De Waal, A. (ed.). Harvard: Global Equity Initiative.

Touray, O.A. 2005. The Common African Defence and Security Policy. *African Affairs*, 104 (417): 635 – 656.

United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>. Last Accessed: 06/05/2009.

United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. Last Accessed: 07/12/2008.

United Nations. 1994. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

United Nations. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operation/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operation/). Last Accessed: 18/11/2008.

United Nations. 2001. Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General. A/55/985 – S/2001/574, 7 June 2001. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conflprev-07jun.htm>. Last Accessed: 18/11/2008.

United Nations. 2003. Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org>. Last Accessed: 10/04/2009.

United Nations. 2004. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

United Nations. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005. [Online]. Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021752.pdf>. Last Accessed: 17/12/2008.

United Nations. 2006a. Resolution 1679. S/RES/1679, 16 May 2006. [Online]. Available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=34924>. Last Accessed: 06/07/2009.

United Nations. 2006b. Resolution 1706. S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/downloads/VNSRResolution1706.pdf>. Last Accessed: 06/07/2009.

United Nations. 2007a. The United Nations and Darfur: Factsheet. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.amis-sudan>. Last Accessed: 08/07/2009.

United Nations. 2007b. Resolution 1769. S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/downloads/070731-VNResolutionSudan.pdf>. Last Accessed: 06/07/2009.

United Nations. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines. [Online]. Available at: [http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf). Last Accessed: 27/05/2009.

Van Creveld, M. 1991. *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press.

Van Walraven, K. 1999. *Dreams of Power: the Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963 – 1993*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Vogt, a. 2005. Towards a Comprehensive Self-Sufficient African Peace Operation Capacity: Fact or Fiction? *Conflict Trends*, (4): 24 – 29.

Williams, P.D. 2004. Britain and Africa After the Cold War: Beyond Damage Limitation? In *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*, Taylor, I. & Williams, P.D. (eds.). London: Routledge.

Williams, P.D. 2006. Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2): 168 – 183.

Wiseman, H. 1984. The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. In *The OAU After Twenty Years*, El-Ayouty, Y. & Zartman, I.W. (eds.). New York: Praeger.