

# African leadership and the Role of the Presidency in African Conflicts: *A Case Study of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni*

By

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## **Declaration**

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## **Abstract**

As a wave of political uprisings swept across North Africa since January 2011, ridding the region of longstanding autocratic leaders, presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa were still imprisoning opposition leaders, deploying military and police to clamp down on protest, and promising their citizens change - all this in a bid to avoid being ousted by their own people.

Leadership has long been the main constraint on political and economic progress in Africa. This study analyses African leadership and especially the role of the presidency as a cause of conflict and instability in Africa.

The modern-day African president might no longer be the absolute autocrat from yesteryear, but he still rules with awesome power and vast state resources at his disposal. African leaders have assumed an imperial character; many regard themselves as largely above the law; accountable to no one and entitled to remain in power or to pass the sceptre to their offspring. Due to this rather imperial character, conflict has been inevitable in Africa.

As a theoretical basis the study proposes a framework for analysing leaders' behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict and instability domestically as well as regionally. Six relevant behavioural patterns are identified: political deprivation, patronage and clientelism, personalisation of power, use of the military, staying to office, underdevelopment and conflict.

Additionally, and as a case study, this framework is applied to Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni. Each of the six behavioural patterns are analysed and evaluated in relation to Museveni's rule of the past 25 years. Applying the framework demonstrates how Museveni contributed to conflict across the region in Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Museveni is found to be a power point man in the region and his imperial nature is likely to contribute to future instability and conflict in Uganda and the Great Lakes region.

The study also addresses the genesis of the imperial African leader and investigates why, despite waves of democratisation and the expulsion of a few autocratic rulers in Africa in the late 1990s, the imperial character still persist today. Constitutional limitations are found to be one of the

major reasons why absolute powers end up being vested in the hands of the president. Lack of proper separation of powers, and a culture conducive to suppressing the legislature and parliamentary role, provides additional reasons for this phenomenon.

Furthermore, both internationally and locally, the leadership deficit in Africa is drawing continuing attention and even funding. However, in order for Africa to make progress in eradicating poor and unaccountable leadership, local initiatives should be further encouraged. The African Union Peer Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance are discussed as two African initiatives; also the Mo Ibrahim Index and Prize are evaluated. Although all three these initiatives are admirable in theory, they have failed to deliver because real commitment to action is lacking in most African countries.

A speedy and conclusive solution to the problem seems unlikely because of the complex nature of humans and their environment. Thus, the aim of this study is to make a contribution to the scholarly body of work regarding the causes of African conflict, focusing on the African presidency as one cause of such conflict in Africa.

## Opsomming

Vanaf Januarie 2011 het 'n vlag politieke opstande Noord-Afrika getref waartydens weggedoen is met langdurige outokratiese leiers. In Afrika Suid van die Sahara het heersers egter steeds opposisieleiers opgesluit en militêre- en polisiemagte ontplooi om opstande die hoof te bied, terwyl vae beloftes aan die bevolking gemaak word oor moontlike veranderinge.

Swak Afrika-leierskap word dikwels beskou as 'n belangrike faktor wat politieke en ekonomiese vooruitgang op die vasteland strem. Hierdie studie analiseer leierskap in Afrika, veral die rol wat die president speel in die skepping van konflik en onstabiliteit.

Die hedendaagse Afrika-leier mag dalk nie meer voorkom as die absolutistiese outokraat van die verlede nie, maar hy regeer steeds met oorweldigende mag en ekstensiewe staats hulpbronne tot sy beskikking. Dit is duidelik dat die Afrika-leier dikwels 'n imperiale karakter aanneem en homself verhewe ag bo die wet. In welke geval hy dus geen verantwoording hoef te doen aan enige ander party nie. Die hoofdoelwit blyk dikwels te wees om beheer te behou. Die gevolgtrekking wat gemaak kan word, is dat die imperiale karakter van die Afrika-president tot konflik kan lei. Die teoretiese basis van hierdie studie bied 'n raamwerk om die leiers van Afrika se gedragpatrone te bestudeer wat aanleiding kon gee tot onstabiliteit asook interne-en-streekskonflik.

Ses gedragpatrone is geïdentifiseer om hierdie proefskrif te illustreer: politieke vervreemding; beskermheerskap en kliëntilisme; personalisering van mag; gebruik van militêre mag om aan bewind te bly; gebrek aan ontwikkeling en konflik.

In besonder word hierdie raamwerk toegepas op die president van Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, as 'n gevallestudie. Hierdeur word aangedui hoe Museveni bygedra het tot konflik, nie net in Uganda nie, maar inderwaarheid ook in Somalië, Sudan, Kenia en die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) tydens sy bewind van die afgelope 25 jaar.

Museveni word allerweë beskou as die “sterkman” in die streek en sy imperiale karakter sal heel waarskynlik ook in die toekoms bydra tot onstabiliteit en konflik in Uganda en die Groot-Merestreek.

Hierdie studie spreek ook die oorsprong van die imperiale Afrika-leier aan en ondersoek waarom, ten spyte van die sterk strewe na demokrasie en die omverwerping van outokratiese leiers in Afrika in die laat 1990s, die imperiale karakter van sodanige leiers steeds kan voortbestaan.

Konstitusionele beperkings word beskou as een van die hoofredes waarom totale mag in die hande van 'n president beland. Gebrek aan behoorlike verdeling van mag en 'n kultuur bevorderlik vir die onderdrukking van die wetgewende en parlementêre funksies, is bydraende redes vir hierdie verskynsel. Verder ontlok die tekortkominge van Afrikaleierskap plaaslik en internasionaal heelwat aandag en selfs befondsing. Die ideaal sou egter wees dat Afrika aangemoedig moet word om tot 'n groter hoogte plaaslike inisiatiewe te gebruik om swak en onbevoegde leierskap te verwerp. Die African Union Peer Review Mechanism en die African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance word gesien as twee nuttige Afrika-inisiatiewe. Ook die Mo Ibrahim Index and Prize word geëvalueer. Alhoewel al drie inisiatiewe in teorie goed blyk te wees, het dit misluk as gevolg daarvan dat 'n verbintenis tot aksie ontbreek in die meeste Afrika lande.

Waarskynlik is geen spoedige of permanente oplossing vir die konflik moontlik nie – grotendeels weens die kompleksiteit van mense en hulle omgewing. Dus is die doel van hierdie studie om 'n bydrae te maak tot akademiese navorsing betreffende die oorsake van konflik in Afrika en dan spesifiek hoe die institusionele aard van leierskap in Afrika fungeer as 'n bydraende oorsaak.

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## **CHAPTER ONE: Introduction**

### **1.1 Background**

The advanced democracies of our time learned a valuable lesson centuries ago; power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. History showed that a head of state may come into power with good intentions but the longer he stays in power the thinner the line becomes between serving the interest of the state and believing that the state should serve you as the leader. Therefore, since it is human nature to want to hold on to power once in power, advanced democracies ensured that power was ultimately vested in the people. Today's advanced democracies have mechanisms and checks and balances in place to remove the temptation to stay in power. This served people and their countries incredibly well, eliminating inter-and intra-state conflict.

Unfortunately, in developing democracies the notion that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely can still be seen in heads of states clinging to power to ensure that their states continue on serving them. This problem is especially evident in Africa where leaders enjoy unprecedented power and stay in office for decades. The longer leaders stay in office the more autocratic and dictatorial they become corruption becomes a way of rule. As a result thereof, public sector performance deteriorates, living standards drop, the rule of law is absent and intra- and inter-state conflict increases. The recent events in North Africa showcased just how detrimental heads of state refusing to give up power can be to a nation. It started in Tunisia where President Zineng-al Abidine Ben Ali, who vowed that never again will Tunisia be ruled by an ageing dictator, stayed in power for 23 years. His corrupt and suppressive rule was ended by mass riots in January 2011. Next in line was President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, whose 30 year reign ended in an embarrassing resignation after being ousted by his own people. President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire was also forced by the citizens of the country to resign power after rigging the 2010 elections in order to remain in power. Then there was Muammar Quadaffi, once hailed as the champion of the oppressed and admired by the developing world, recently brutally murdered by rebel soldiers in a battle to get rid of their president of 42 years. In all the above cases intra state violence, and in the case of Libya, war erupted due to leadership nuances.

Heads of state ruling for decades, abusing their power and creating not only intra-state conflict but inter-state conflict, is a saddening reality in most African countries. In West Africa, Paul Biya, the president of Cameroon, has been in power for 30 years, with endless scandals over corruption and abuse of power linked to his name. In Southern Africa, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is in his 31<sup>st</sup> year in office and in November 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the Zimbabwean economy as "completing its second year of appalling economic growth" (IMF, 2010) due to his tyrannical rule. That brings us to East Africa, and in particular Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni, once hailed as a beacon of hope in the region, is increasingly losing face in the international arena and at home. President Museveni has just been re-elected into his fourth term in office and, even before his swearing in, intra-state conflict has sporadically erupted across Uganda in protest against this once seemingly "big man".

It is against this background and the recent events in North Africa that African leadership, particularly the role of presidential leadership in African conflict will be examined, using Uganda's president Museveni as a case study.

## **1.2 The Aim of the Study**

The prevalence of inter-state and intra-state conflict in Africa has long prompted the question of how to find a lasting solution to such disagreements. Perhaps the best starting point in the search for an answer to this question is an understanding of the nature and causes of African conflicts. Therefore, this study aims to investigate leadership in Africa as a cause of conflict.

The study starts with the premise that African conflicts are essentially political in nature and have their origins in the organization of politics in the continent. Hence, politics are organized around institutions and, recognizing that there are several institutions in Africa, the aim of this study is to focus solely on the institution of the presidency. Also recognizing that there are vast arrays of factors that contribute to conflict on the continent, the presidency is picked as a case study to illustrate how this institution has contributed to conflict and instability in Africa. The office of the president is focused on because it is the most powerful, influential and also the most significant institution in African countries, around which national politics anchors.

Therefore, this thesis aims to illustrate how the presidency in Africa, as a political institution, is a source of conflict. In order to illustrate how presidential leadership (or the effective lack thereof) is a contributing factor relating to conflict, this study will present a framework for investigating the role of the presidency in causing conflict and instability both regionally and domestically. This framework will subsequently be applied to Uganda's Yoweri Museveni's of Uganda.

Ultimately, it is the aim of this study to make a significant contribution to conflict studies in Africa, by focusing on the most important aspect of politics- leadership. Good leadership has long evaded Africa and many scholarly works have been dedicated to the lack of good leadership and the causes of weak leadership, however very few studies have solely focused on the correlation between conflict and leadership, more specifically presidential leadership. With the recent events in North Africa, the strong connection between poor leadership, conflict and instability was once again highlighted and it is therefore of utmost importance to investigate the relationship between conflict and leadership in order to understand the persistence of conflict in the African continent.

### **1.3 Identification and Demarcation of the research problem**

The basic research question is the following: *What role does President Museveni play in inter-state and intra-state conflict in Uganda and the Great Lakes region?* The following three sub-questions underlie the basic research problem? *What is the nature and scope of the African presidential leadership and what factors contribute to leaders being a source of conflict in Africa? How is Museveni a source of conflict in the region and in Uganda? What are the attributes of the African presidency and African style leadership, specifically President Museveni, which has rendered conflict inevitable in Africa and in the Great lakes Region?*

Additionally the research question is demarcated conceptually, geographically and temporally. *Conceptual demarcation:* Although it is acknowledged that several political institutions and numerous other factors contribute to conflict in Africa, as previously indicated the study only focuses on the presidency as a political institution contributing to conflict in Africa. Thus, the conceptualization primarily focuses on the presidency, specifically the notion of presidential dominance. *Geographic Demarcation:* The geographic demarcation is confined to Sub-Saharan

Africa and more specifically the Great Lakes region. *Temporal demarcation:* The evaluation of the role of President Museveni in conflict in the Great Lakes region and Uganda involves the contemporary situation in the region and country. The historical colonial background of Africa is briefly examined, however in order to understand and explain the current situation, the study will mainly focus on events from late 1980's till present.

#### **1.4 Literature Review**

There is ample academic literature regarding the genesis and nature of the African presidency. Most of the literature focuses on the “path dependency” that has led to the persistence of presidential dominance in African states since independence. The main theoretical sources that serve as a point of departure and that provides insight into the persistent nature of presidential dominance are Kwasi Prempeh's *Presidential power in comparative perspective: the puzzling persistence of imperial presidency of post-authoritarian Africa* (2007) and Gary Rosen's *The time of the presidents* (2006). Both articles agree that despite the democratic waves that have led to great political liberation and freed the continent of autocratic leaders through constitutional reforms, the phenomenon of presidential dominance still persist. Furthermore, these articles define “imperial presidency” in post authoritarian Africa, elaborate on the nature of the dominant African president and the factors that contributed to the persistence of presidential dominance. These sources are supplemented by Oloka Onyango's “*New-Breed*” *leadership, conflict, and reconstruction in the Great Lakes region of Africa*, his body of work elaborates on the notion that the period from the mid-1980's generated a new breed of African leaders, although three decades later these rulers are looking more and more like the old breed. On the topic of theory, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg's *Personal rule: theory and practice in Africa* (1984) provide an insightful look at the theory of “personal rule” which has been an important facet of politics and is based on Machiavelli's *The Prince*. An additional source *Democratic ideology vs. Autocratic practice: Is Africa a victim of her past* by Kaniki considers the dominant political ideologies in African politics and the autocratic practices that the leaders apply to their rule.

A partial focus of this study is on the nature and character of African leadership. The key theoretical source that serves as a point of departure relating to African leadership is Eric

Masinde Aseka's *Transformational Leadership in East Africa: Politics, Ideology and Community*. Aseka's book discusses the question of political power and the role of leadership in East African communities. It sheds light on African leadership and argues that Africa lacks a sustainable leadership culture. Philip Kirk and Richard Bolden's article *African Leadership: Insights, Meanings, and Connotations* explains the renaissance of African leadership and offers insight into the post-modernist and social constructivist perspective on African leadership. Jo-Ansie van Wyk's article *Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers*, gives a well researched account of African political leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Worth noting is the academic work that argues from the "African culture" perspective on the subject of autocratic leadership in Africa. James Mchugh (2002) and Bo Nwabueza (1974) wrote that "the role of the 'strong leader' is consistent with a traditional perception of tribal leadership that is familiar to many people throughout the region of Africa. The "African culture" theory will largely be contested in this thesis.

The second body of literature relates to the presidency as a source of conflict in Africa. David Francis' book *Peace and Conflict* (2008) provides comprehensive background information on peace and conflict in Africa and specifically the Great Lakes region. Additionally, it provides insight into theories and definitions relating to conflict and the presidency as a source of conflict in Africa. The latter is supplemented by Godfrey Okoth and Bethwell Ogot's book *Conflict in contemporary Africa* (2000) that argues that a common factor to all intra and inter-state conflicts in Africa is that they are primary products of the centrifugal forces of political power. Such forces have their origins in the formation of a "defensive state" that survives on a personalized political power structure woven around the presidency. It is in this context that the African presidency takes centre stage in the causes of intra-and-inter- state conflict.

Regarding the case study, the internet provides extensive information on the contemporary situation in Uganda and the Great Lakes region. This information originates from multiple sources including multi-lateral institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations. These sources mostly provide the basic information required for the study for example statistical and background information. Data deriving from governmental organizations provide information relating to term limits for presidents in the Ugandan constitutions. Government

organizations also provide information regarding Uganda's foreign policy and peace accords as well as Uganda's involvement in conflicts in the region. Due to the possible bias nature of government sources, additional sources such as Africa Monitor: East Africa and United Nations reports also provide insight. Academic journals also present good background information and insight into Uganda's involvement in conflict in the Congo, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. Specifically William Reno's *War, debt and the role of pretending in Uganda's international relations* (2000) gives an excellent account of Museveni's involvement in the Great Lakes region and the factors that contribute to these conflicts.

Ted Dagne's *Uganda: Current conditions and the crisis in North Uganda* (2009) and Elliott Green's *Decentralization and conflict in Uganda* (2008) deliver insight into the current conditions in Uganda concerning Museveni's role in intra-state conflict. They both describe the role of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in North Uganda and Museveni's reluctance to deal with this crisis. Furthermore, since the elections in February 2011 sporadic violence has erupted throughout the country in protest against Museveni, newspaper articles is an invaluable source of information regarding the most recent developments.

Oloka-Onyango (1997), Ted Dagne (2009) and Aili Mari Trip (2002) all present a broad range of arguments regarding President Yoweri Museveni as a power point man in both Uganda and the Great Lakes region. These three sources respectively investigate the character that is Yoweri Museveni and his manner and style of rule. Anne Mugisha's "*Museveni's Machinations*" delivers an exceptional insight into Museveni's rule since 1986 and his role in the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

## **1.5 Methodology**

The descriptive method of research is used for this study. Descriptive method is mainly concerned with describing the nature or condition of a present situation. It is applied in order to investigate and explore the causes of a particular phenomenon. Descriptive studies provide a detailed highly accurate profile of people, events or situations. It also locates new data that contradicts past data and it clarifies a sequence of steps or stages. Additionally, a descriptive

study report on the background or context of a situation. In this study, the descriptive research method was employed to identify the role the presidency play in conflict in Africa, particularly the role Museveni of Uganda plays.

This is a qualitative study; the use of the qualitative method is advantageous as it is more open to change and refinement of research ideas as the study progresses. Furthermore, secondary data will be used for this study, as well as, newspaper articles and academic reviewed articles as a primary source of information. “In choosing media sources, the study prioritized those with a reputation of credibility, and sought to ensure diversity of geographical regions and of perspectives” (Cotula, Vemeulen, Leonard, Keeley; 2009: 19).

## **1.6 Outline of the Study**

This study makes use of a conventional approach. This study is thus divided into a theoretical framework, a main body, and an evaluation, including a conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter one, introduces the research topic and states the aim of the study. A general introduction and background of the topic is provided and a brief overview of the research methodology is given. A literature review is also included, focusing on literature on the genesis of the African presidency, conflict and literature on Uganda’s President Museveni.

Chapter two serves as the theoretical basis for the study at hand. In this chapter a proposed framework for investigating the role of the presidency in African conflict will be discussed, by identifying certain leadership behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict regionally and domestically. Furthermore, this chapter delivers background to the origin of the African presidency and discusses trademarks associated with the African imperial style leadership.

Chapter three serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it gives background to the colonial legacy and other factors that led to the path dependency of the African presidency. It also looks into the transition that occurred in Africa from post colonial autocracy to constitutional democracy and showcases how it was a transition without change. Secondly, this chapter examines the notion of the “new-breed” leadership and examine why the imperial style leadership still persist in African today.



The fourth chapter examines leadership in modern day Africa and provides a brief overview of initiatives that promote good leadership in Africa. Three initiatives will be discussed in detail namely, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, African Peer Review Mechanism and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

In chapter five the proposed index for evaluating the role of presidency in Africa conflict presented in chapter two is applied to Uganda and President Museveni. All six leadership behavioural patterns will be discussed in order to evaluate Museveni's role in causing conflict and instability locally and regionally. Furthermore, the leadership characteristics of President Museveni will be probed and conflict in the Great Lakes region will be discussed.

Chapter six provides a conclusion that sets out the main findings, and responses to the research question posed in the first chapter. Brief recommendations regarding the persistence of the imperial presidency in Africa is made, with special reference to constitutional reforms. A last evaluation is made regarding President Museveni in order to sufficiently answer the research questions.

## CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Introduction

The chapter that follows serves as the theoretical basis for the study at hand. This chapter will attempt to present a framework for investigating leaders' behavioural patterns that lead to conflict and instability. Furthermore, this framework will be applied to evaluate the role of the presidency as a source of instability and conflict in Uganda, the case study presented in chapter five. The first section of this chapter provides a brief discussion on the origins of the African Presidency, a theme that will be addressed in the subsequent chapter again. The next section looks at the trademarks of the African presidency as partially presented by Frederick Wanyama in the book *Conflict In Contemporary Africa*. These trademarks are general trademarks associated with the office of the presidency in modern day Africa. The framework, presented in the last section of this chapter, begins by identifying six leadership behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict and instability in a given country. Namely, political deprivation; patronage and clientelism; personalisation of power; use of the military; clinging to office and underdevelopment and conflict. Each behavioural pattern has consequences that result in conflict and conflict resolution outcomes observed in African countries. This proposed framework is a collaboration of several theories and well known themes that have been developed in the field of leadership. In particular, the sixth behavioural pattern makes use of Peter VonDoepp's framework for evaluating leadership behaviour and their behaviour contributing or undermining governance and development. The aim of this chapter is thus to paint a picture of leadership in Africa, particularly the presidency and hence deliver a framework for evaluating and discussing certain behaviours typical of the African presidency and how such behaviours contribute to conflict in a given country and region. In chapter four this framework will be employed to assess the leadership of President Museveni and the impact of his leadership on the stability in Uganda and the rest of East Africa.

## 2.2 The Origin of the African Presidency

Colonialism and the colonial masters set the tone for the type of African leadership we witness today. French, Portuguese and British colonialists introduced a paternal, centralized and authoritarian administrative system in those colonies they ruled. This system was largely adopted by these countries after independence, and marked the beginning of a centralized and authoritarian presidency. In previously colonized African states, the leaders after independence wished to also enjoy the privileges that came with authoritarian colonial administrative rule as seen being enjoyed by the colonialists, “they had seen the efficiency with which control of state institutions had enabled the colonial elite to convert the “national” economy into some kind of private estate” (Wanyama, 2000: 31). Therefore, the fragmented political structure was rejected by African leaders immediately after independence. After a brief stint with plural politics, African leaders across the continent argued that a fragmented structure would curtail national unity, would divide people along ethnic lines and it was not conducive to a traditional African lifestyle which is communal, hence united under one leader. Such arguments provided African leaders with enough reason to return to the authoritarian rule of the colonial period. One-party political systems developed as a result and constitutional arrangements that were in place at the eve of independence were undermined as leaders rushed to republicanism. From this time, the republican system of government established executive presidents in African countries with awesome power, and as a result dictators ruled sub-Saharan African states with relentless vigour after independence. Post independence leaders that enjoyed unlimited power included Nkrumah’s rule in Ghana, Siaka Steven in Sierra Leone, Guinea under Sékou Touré, Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny, Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda, and the most notorious autocratic ruler of the time was Mobuto Seso Seko of Zaire.

However, at the end of the 1980s a wave of democratisation swept through the continent due to popular protest and civic activism and led to unprecedented political liberalisation and constitutional reforms. In the process, “some of Africa’s longest-serving and most notorious autocrats have been brought down and many more forced by new constitutional rules to face the prospect of electoral defeat or foreseeable exit through presidential term limits” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007:3). Despite this democratic wave ridding Africa of autocratic leaders and

bringing about regime change, the phenomenon of “imperial presidency”, as Arthur Schlesinger calls it, still persisted throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The term “imperial presidency” refers to a presidency that is characterized by greater power than the constitution allows. President Nixon of the United States is one case study discussed by Schlesinger to demonstrate the notion of Imperial presidency. Nixon and his advisors became very arrogant in their rule giving way to several incidences of abuse of power, one such incident being the Watergate scandal where Nixon acted as if he was above the law and constitution of America. The separation of powers stipulated in the constitution was failing as it became clear that most of the power was situated in the office of the executive. Although this term was coined in order to describe President Nixon’s style of leadership, as democratisation spread across the African continent it became evident that most presidential power tended to assume this “imperial presidency” character. The term imperial presidency will be used throughout this thesis to explain the most dominating style of leadership in Africa. The most obvious African example of imperial style presidency is Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; he regards himself above the law in every aspect of his rule. He has disregard constitutional term limits, he has relentlessly oppressed the opposition and allowed, and motivated, illegal land occupation in Zimbabwe. However, the subsequent sections of this study will address the character of the imperial style leadership in Africa and demonstrate how this style of leadership has saturated the whole continent and it will discuss the consequences of having an imperial style leader.

In short, after colonialism, the most African countries developed a one-party system and steered away from a fragmented political system and consequently autocratic leaders ruled Africa. Despite waves of democratisation and other political developments throughout the 1990s, the absence of constitutional regulations and non-adherence to the constitutional regulations restricting the power of the president, resulted in the presidency developing into the most powerful institution in the land. The political game thus changed while the rules and players stayed the same and today imperial presidents with awesome power are ruling most African states and this type of leadership is having an immense impact on the continent.

### **2.3 Trademarks of an African Imperial president.**

As leadership developed over time and morphed into an imperial style, certain characteristics and common traits amongst these rulers became identifiable. Four typical trademarks usually associated with the African presidency and the awesome power they enjoy will briefly be discussed next.

The first trademark associated with the all-powerful African leader is the fact that he is supreme over all organs of government. In most African states a separation of powers exist within the statute law; however this separation is only seen at administrative level. With regards to the judiciary, the president has the power to create or abolish its office in many African states. The president appoints the judges and therefore it can be argued that the African judiciary lies in the presidents' hands. The legislature, on the other hand, experience a bit more independence since it is not directly established by the president. In other words, due to a lack of checks and balances and the ineffective separation of powers found in the African states, the president is the manager and chief decision maker over all organs of government and the judiciary. Furthermore, the president is the head of the party that sponsors the legislators during legislative elections and thus "the legislature ends up with several members who owe their allegiance not to the electorate, but to the president, such that the latter can always manipulate the legislature to dance to his whims" (Wanyama, 2000: 32). For example, in the 1997 Kenyan national election, the electoral commission constituting of members proposed by the opposition was accused of favouring the ruling party (Kenyan National Union) and the president. A similar situation was seen in the 1996 Zambian elections as well as the general elections in Cameroon in 1997 (Wanyama, 2000: 33).

The second trademark relates to the president being immune to the legal process for as long as he stays in power. Some countries' constitutions make provisions for upholding and protecting the dignity of the office rather than protecting the person. However, because the president in Africa has been personalised to a great extent it is difficult to separate the person from the office, hence the mentioned provisions is not applied in its proper context. "Consequently, the position has remained that the president cannot be sued nor can his decisions and pronouncements be challenged in a court of law" (Wanyama, 2000:32). For example, the president of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, simply declared his country a "Christian Nation" in 1992, despite the fact that

Zambia has been a secular state containing a religiously pluralistic society since its independence in 1964. The people of Zambia rejected Chiluba's announcement but failed to challenge his statement in a court of law and in 1996 Chiluba succeeded in adding a "Christian National clause" to the Zambian constitution (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003).

During the one party era there were no or little provisions in most African states limiting the tenure of office of the president. In fact, in countries like Malawi and Tunisia there were provisions conferring life tenure of the president. However, in current multi-party African states there are provisions limiting the tenure of office of the president. Nevertheless, the attitude of "the father of the nation" still persists and therefore the power of the president has not really been trimmed by the constitution. Kwame Nkrumah exemplifies this notion of "the father of the nation" best, he stated "I don't want to make too much of myself, but in a way this nation is my creation. If I should die there should be chaos" (Calderisi, 2007: 61). Furthermore, transferring power from one president to next have never been easy in Africa, sometime the process has been violent and other times laughable, for example Madagascar had two presidents for sometime in 2002 because the defeated president refused to step down after occupying the office for twenty years. Wanyama (2000:33) writes "In the absence of the necessary reforms, the African president has continued to use his enormous powers to ensure his continuity in office. Such powers have particularly been used to manipulate the electoral process by putting in place partisan electoral mechanisms and employing the coercive instruments of the state support of the president". This is the case in Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe has ruled for more than a quarter of a century, as is the case in Angola, Cameroon and Guinea, their presidents having ruled for over twenty years.

Another characteristic of the African presidency is the personalization of power. The African presidency is synonymous with personal rule. Personal rule can be described as the antithesis of institutional rule in that the exercise of political power is based not on institutions but on individuals (Wanyama, 2000:33). In other words, the president is permitted a high degree of discretion to exercise personal authority and power to satisfy self-interest rather than the formal grants of power. "This political system, that has penetrated the entire African landscape, is sustained by a patron-client relationship, the legislator and other local powerful political operatives act as intermediaries or brokers between patron (the president and other powerful political barons at the capital) and their clients (the voters at the local level), so that they are

patrons to one group and clients to another” (Wanyama, 2000: 33). Because of the uncertainty of this type of patron-client relationship, the African president (as the chief patron) experiences a high degree of paranoia, as he is the only and final source of redress, even for smaller problems.

In conclusion, although political regimes in Africa range from an Absolute monarchy (Swaziland), transitional governments (Somalia), governments of national unity (Sudan), one/no party state (Uganda 1986-2006), one party dominant governments (Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) to a multi-party democracy (Botswana), one aspect they have in common is leadership characterized by awesome power, and perhaps even absolute power (Van Wyk, 2008:13). There are numerous arguments and reasons for the power being vested in the presidency in Africa and this is the subject of discussion later on. However, regardless of the reason for this being the case, good leadership is a prerequisite for good governance, development and institution building, therefore it is crucial to investigate and identify certain behaviours of presidents that lead to the latter being neglected and consequently causing insecurity and conflict. Next, six leadership behavioural patterns are identified and discussed showcasing how the “imperial” character of the African presidency is contributing to insecurity and conflict across the continent.

## **2.4 Six leadership behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict**

### *2.4.1 Political Deprivation*

The first leadership behavioural pattern that contributes to incidents of conflict is political deprivation. What are emphasized here are actions leaders take in regards to political participation and inclusion of all groups in politics. Political deprivation occurs when the leader of a given country is preventing meaningful participation in the making of political decisions; political deprivation manifests itself through restrictions in the law or through repression. Political deprivation also includes: the rise of one-party states, governmental repression and criminalization of opposition, state terrorism, electoral malpractice and political coercion.

State terrorism in particular creates political violence, “institutional repression or more violent forms characterize 91 of 105 developing countries. The majority of populations in Third World

countries exist under regimes characterized by torture, execution, disappearance and brutal prison treatment of those suspected of opposing government” (Mogire, 2011: 130). Von der Maiden (2009:76) classifies state violence into four categories: First, attacks upon power contenders; efforts to instil unity or maintain order; suppressing those expressing opposition to the regime where such individuals or groups are not of immediate danger to those in power and do not employ violent tactics; and elimination of persons or groups considered “undesirable”. The main aim of state terrorism is to protect and defend the interest of those in power.

When a president makes use of political deprivation in order to stay in power and maintain his grip on his country, conflict is highly likely as people will eventually want to rid themselves of such leaders. Particularly, where opposition parties and supporters are being suppressed the incidents of conflict are to be expected. In effect Mogire (2011: 130) argues, “A constant and frequent use of repression indicates a lack in leadership legitimacy and political capacity. Political repression may keep the ruler in office for longer but violence will occur sooner or later as the people will try and rid themselves of their illegitimate ruler. Political deprivation and repression are likely to create a deep sense of injustice within a population which may generate intensive conflicts with heavy human cost”.

In short, African leaders have unleashed a reign of terror that has severely restricted political participation over the years. Suspected and even perceived political opponents have been executed or detained and human rights have been abused. People’s efforts to rid themselves of such tyrants have quite often resulted into intra-state conflict as was the case in Uganda, Somalia, Chad, Liberia, Central African Republic and former Zaire (Wanyama, 2000:30) as well as in Egypt and Libya. The former President of Mauritania Ould Taya’s regime was also characterized by severe oppression of the opposition, and exclusion of most groups from politics and this led to a failed coup attempt in 2003. More recently in 2010, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda arrested hundreds of opposition leaders prior to the 2010 national elections; many of the opposition were tortured and badly injured while in prison (Globalresearch, 2011). In March 2011, Meles Zenawi’s regime in Ethiopia rounded up and jailed over 200 members of eight opposition parties, Zenawi alleged to be rounding up opposition members in order to prevent any popular uprisings as was seen in North Africa (Ethiopian Review, 2011). Presidents frantically trying to oppress social uprisings across the African continent in a bid to avoid being ousted saw



seven African countries figure amongst the list of the world's worst human rights abusers (Freedom House, 2011).

#### 2.4.2 *Patronage and Clientelism*

The second behavioural pattern that leads to conflict is leaders' actions with respect to patronage and clientelism. Before elaborating on this behavioural pattern an individual explanation of clientelism and patrimonialism is in order:

The concept clientelism was first elaborated on by social anthropologists to describe the hierarchical social relations that have long marked the countryside in peasant societies. It was a means to describe "who gets what"; they hence found that clientelism, also known as the patron-client system, explained contemporary political systems of the Third World. Brinkhoff and Goldsmith wrote "clientelism refers to a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers. These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources (jobs, money) to dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation (votes, attendance, rallies). The patron has disproportionate power and thus enjoys wide leeway about how to distribute the assets under his control" (Brinkhoff and Goldsmith, 2002:2). In absolute cases of clientelism the government is referred to as kleptocracies, also known as rule by stealing. Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire also fall in this category. During his three decades in power Mobutu accumulated a personal fortune of about US\$5 Billion. Thus, leaders who were able to hang on to power after independence grew extremely rich by using their control over state resources to build vast networks of clients across the continent (Van Wyk, 2007:11).

The term patrimonialism was coined by Weber (1974) to describe situations where the administrative workers are appointed by and answerable to the "top leader", the president. These administrative staff have power over certain areas and have freedom to do as they please (these arrangements are usually informal and off the record). Patrimonial administration are similar to clientelistic politics, "for administration jobs are among the choicest plums a boss or patron can offer his protégés, such jobs are more valuable than equivalent posts in a state subject to the rule of law and that has carefully circumscribed job descriptions. Under a pure patrimonial system, a

government office is treated as a type of income-generating property, even if the sovereign can reclaim this property at will. Authority is thus decentralized, with incumbents typically free to decide exactly how to carry out their administrative responsibilities” (Brinkhoff and Goldsmith, 2002:6). The absolute power that the African president has usually goes together with the incidence of patronage. Patronage occurs because African presidents dominate the policy-making and implementation processes and adopt socio-economic policies that only benefit his clients.

Clientelism and patronage is indistinguishable from leadership in most African states, the reason for this is that liberation movements turned political parties are more likely to stay in power for decades (In Zimbabwe the Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has been in power since 1980. In Namibia, the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) since 1990, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa has been ruling ever since the end of Apartheid in 1994). As they stay in power, the harder it becomes to hold onto power, hence all of these ruling parties are associated with the need for power and thus the various forms of conflict, violence and/or corruption that accompany this relentless quest for power. Subsequently a system of clientelism or patronage develops where the leaders have the state and the private sector as their clients. Furthermore, states with imperial presidencies make use of an a social political process, in other words, the leader is largely indifferent to the interests, concerns, and problems of social strata beyond the political class, and his only objective is power. Therefore, although the state may employ certain socio-economic policies and national development plans, the state’s actual activities paint a different picture. Rather, the state and its leader are likely to be highly personal and riddled with patronage and corruption. Jackson and Rosberg argue that “the real norms that affect political and administrative action are not rooted in state institutions and organization but in friendship, kinship, factional alliance, ethnic fellowship. Political action in personal regimes is thus strongly affected by expediency and necessity. What an actor can do is more strongly affected by the resources at his disposal than by the office he occupies. What an actor must do is more strongly affected by particularistic norms, that is: obligation and attachment to friends, kin, factional allies, clansmen, ethnic fellows, than by state rules and regulations” (Rotberg and Jackson, 1984: 425).

As a result of patronage and clientelism, large parts of African populations are alienated from their political systems. These alienated groups are thus forced to resort to conflict in order to reverse the socio- economic and political trends in their respective countries, the result which has been internal conflicts. Uganda and Sudan illustrates this point as, since independence, all the successive regimes have, in one way or another, alienated some section of their countries from the economy and the political system, all leading to political upheavals and infighting. In Sudan the southern region has been excluded from the political system and the northern part of Uganda has been at war for decades due to political exclusion, patronage and clientelism (Wanyama, 2000:34).

#### *2.4.3 Personalisation of Power*

The third behavioural pattern associated with African leaders is that of personalisation of power. The third behavioural pattern links with the previous pattern in that patrimonialism and clientelism leads to the personalisation of power. The exercise of personal power has seen the president assume a high degree of paranoia. Frederick Wanyama (2000: 35) writes “as much as the patronage requirements may have forced presidents to attend to such minor issues, the said assumptions and presidential actions have all the same turned the presidency into the most privilege, prestigious and, hence, coveted office in the land”. Therefore the president guards his office jealously. Because the president is the chief patron he is considered to be the only and final source of redress, even for the smallest of problems. This responsibility has turned African leaders into complete paranoids because the patron-client relationship extends to the presidency and well as the channels through which presidential power is exercised. The uncertainty that accompanies the patron-client system generates a survival complex within the presidency and the entire power structure, which then translates into ‘backslapping’ behaviour among politicians towards the presidency (Wanyama, 2000: 35). Thabo Mbeki of South Africa is a prime example of this, as Thabo Mbeki’s time in office drew closer he became a complete paranoid. He accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), western governments and drug firms of conspiring against him, “Mbeki railed against white organisations specifically, saying they were seeking to hurt South Africa’s reputation” (Butcher, 2011). Furthermore, in 2001 he alleged that three well-known politicians-turned-businessmen were plotting to overthrow him, but no serious evidence

of anything remotely like a coup was revealed (The Economist, 2001). These incidents of paranoia drew attention to Mbeki's shortcomings and infighting within the African National Congress (ANC), and doubts were raised about the political stability within South Africa.

This notion of paranoia and jealousy that accompanies personalisation of power within the presidents office, somewhat explains why presidents in Africa have more often than not reacted harshly to critic towards them. Presidents silencing their critics in an inhumane way were witnessed in, *inter alia*, Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia. Such atrocities have, in the long run, proved to be potential "seeds" for the internal conflicts that have at times exploded into civil war (Wanyama, 2000: 23). Also this relentless struggle for power and the 'backslapping' that accompanies personalisation of power has led to infighting in the ruling party, ever so often this infighting spilled over into civilian life and caused conflict and instability. The most notorious example of personalisation of power that led to instability and conflict is Uganda under Idi Amin. Idi Amin became overly obsessed with his rule, organising and interfering in every political and economic aspect of the country. His jealousy and paranoia led Amin to kill an estimate of 500 000 people alleged to be against his rule, he expelled 35 000 Asians from Uganda in the space of three months as he was convinced they would finance and support a coup against his military regime (Keatley, 2003).

#### 2.4.4 Use of the military

Niccollo Machiavelli argues that the foundation of all states is good laws and good arms and good arms are necessary because it is the only guarantee that the citizens would obey the laws. Unfortunately, the military in Africa is often associated with disobeying the law and the military became part of the political problems that confronted newly independent African states. Dictators and their armies ruled all over Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, in fact only 12 sub-Saharan African states, up to 1990, never fell under army rule (Decalo, 1998: 344). Nonetheless, in the 1990s civilian rule became the norm in many African states because international norms changed in ways that shifted against army rule and coups (prior to the 1990s coups had been a familiar part of the political landscape of Africa). Yet this shift away from military rule towards civilian rule did not completely diminish the role of security forces in Africa (Tripp, 2003:30).

Also the military was central in both facilitating and preventing the transition to multiparty elections in Africa, in the early 1990s. If the military were to split from the state and side with the forces that was pro-democracy, democratisation had a better change, on the other hand if the military were to side with the ruling party the pro-democratic party faced repression.

As mentioned in the previous section, clientelism is the underlying basis upon which political support is built, and the most important source of that support is the security forces. In democracies the military and the police force are controlled by the elected officials, but in semi-authoritarian states military dominance is only thinly disguised as civilian rule. In other words, even though the military, in most semi-authoritarian states, no longer rule per se, power nevertheless rest with the security forces. These security forces' main aim is to protect those in power from internal threats to their rule by citizens. Aili Mari Tripp (2010:31) argues "Given the lack of democracy (in African states), the centrality of the security forces has, in practice, ironically led to the increased insecurity, as the state frequently defines its enemies broadly as people who do not agree with its policies or with those in power. This becomes yet another paradox of many semi-authoritarian regimes".

Another phenomenon going hand in hand with the president and his awesome power is to ethnicise the struggle for the desirable office of the presidency. Idi Amin's military was drawn from his own Kakwa tribe and, with their special language and accent, they were well placed to detect any opposition to Amin's regime and carry out his mass killings (Keatley, 2003). There have been many arguments placing ethnicity at the top of the list of causes of conflict in Africa because Africans are ethnically conscious to the extent that they view political activities in tribal terms (Wanyama, 2000:35). There are indications that leaders, particularly in the presidency, have appealed to their kinsmen for support in their own struggles through ensuring their armies are made up of mainly their kinsmen. It is such appeals that have aroused and emphasized ethnic consciousness. Thus, ethnicity became a tool frequently employed by leaders to keep the army loyal to their rule. Because the military in many African states are not ethnically neutral it affects its role in the socio-political development of a nation (Anugwom, 2001:101). Therefore, military leaders are less inclined to give up their institutional privileges if the president was their ethnic patron and was about to lose power, consequently conflict erupts in order to ensure their patron stays in power. Furthermore, the ethnic factor becomes important when people can see it as a

way to gain the upper hand in a struggle (Anugwom, 2001:101). In other words, ethnicity arises when the leaders decide to employ ethnic differences as weapons in pursuing competing interests. Ethnicity becomes an invaluable political and economic instrument for leaders as leaders can easily appeal to a certain interest group. In this way the leader uses ethnicity to seize power and stay in power through ensuring that the military stays loyal to the leader. The military on the other hand uses their privileged position to seize power and appropriate resources. “The military may also manipulate ethnicity, particularly in the officers’ cadre, to ensure that political-cum-military power rest solely with a particular ethnic group and thus marginalising other ethnic groups” (Anugwom, 2001:101). In Chad there are numerous rebel groups fighting for power however President Déby has been clinging to power with the support of the military. President Déby is from the Zaghawa tribe which represents only two percent of the population. This group however profits from presidential patronage and dominates all ranks in the armed forces. The Burundi case also illustrates this point where a click of Tutsi from Bururi province have, since independence, appealed to their kinsmen to assist them to cling onto the “imperial presidency” (Wanyama, 2000:35).

Nigeria in general serves as an example of how the military, employed by the leader, can create an immensely unstable environment and conflict in a country. Six years after independence the military seized power in Nigeria after which a civil war raged for years and the military finally gave up power only in 1979. However, in 1983, the military once again seized power through a military coup which rule lasted until 1999. The military is largely responsible for the current political, economic, social underdevelopment and conflict in Nigeria. Furthermore, the post independency military in Nigeria was ethnicized in the sense that ethnic or regional origin was made a core principle for recruitment. “It was government policy that the Nigerian army be composed as follows: Northern region 50 per cent, eastern Region 25 per cent, Western Region 25 per cent” (Anugwom, 2001:103). Thus the military in Nigeria became both politicised and extremely ethnicised, recruitment and promotion became election issues and captures the interest of political and ethnic leaders.

The leadership in Africa involves the military as an instrument in the political chess game thereby compromising their integrity and created them as a possible source of recruiting the political leadership. Many of the military institutions themselves are affected by corruption, ill

discipline, factionalism, ethnicity and other issues that compromised their professionalism. Also most militaries in Africa is lacking in manpower, training and resources, this translates to the military being ill disciplined and has hence failed at most peacekeeping missions (Tripp, 2010: 32). Due to this lack of discipline, military personnel across Africa have been accused of rape, pillage, torture, and other violations of human rights with presidents tending to look the other way in order to stay in favour with the military.

The military is a great source of insecurity in African states. Leaders need to have the military on their side in order to stay in power, in turn the military enjoys a great deal of privilege. In many cases the military will display brute force in order to protect their privileged position. On the other hand, the already sensitive issue of ethnicity is exploited to further ensure the loyalty of the army to the president. As ethnicity is seen as one of the main reasons for conflict in Africa this is potentially dire political tool used by presidents.

#### *2.4.5 Staying in office*

One of the most important changes in presidential rule in contemporary Africa is the instalment of presidential term limits in African constitutions. Prior to the 1990s African presidents had the luxury of determining their own tenure in office, however they usually then risked being forcefully removed through a coup d'état. Today, in many African states constitutional term limits to the presidential tenure is in place, and in 2005 presidential term limit provisions were contained in thirty-three African constitutions. (Kwasi Prempeh, 2007: 14). However, African leaders are known for their reluctance to leave office and one way they ensure to stay on is by amending the constitution. Thus, when constitutions have been amended “presidents for life” are again installed, “presidents for life has a bad reputation of eliminating of opposition, narrowing of the political field, establishing personal armies, often looting national wealth and using the constitution to consolidate personal power” (Van Wyk, 2007: 12). For example, Omar Bongo former president of Gabon came to power as the head of a one party state. In 1991 a multi-party system was introduced, however in 2003 presidential term limits in Gabon was abolished. The same scenario played out in Chad where president Déby won a third presidential term after pushing through a referendum to lift the constitutional two-term limit.

Table 1: Trajectory of regime change in 47 Sub-Saharan African countries (1989-2008).

<b>Countries</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2008</b>
Not free	33	15	15
Partly free	11	24	22
Free	3	8	10

*Source:* Ali- Mari Tripp (2010)

The recent events in North Africa are an excellent example showcasing how extreme cases of stayism leads to conflict and instability. The longer a leader stays in power the more corrupt he becomes, and the more entangled his web of clientelism and patronage becomes, eventually leading to either a coup d'état or severe protest by civilian population, both cases usually involving massive loss of life, followed by an immense time of instability and conflict.

#### *2.4.6 Underdevelopment and conflict*

The next presidential behavioural pattern that leads to conflict and insecurity is leaders' actions towards good governance and development. This section aims to argue that leader' actions resulting in underdevelopment leads to conflict, arguing from the premises that underdevelopment leads to conflict. In order to illustrate this point Peter VonDoepp's framework will be utilised to examine leadership behaviour in regards to development. Next a theory on how underdevelopment leads to conflict will be explained in order to illustrate how underdevelopment leads to conflict. Thus, if a leader engages in actions that undermine development it can lead to internal conflict as poverty (underdevelopment) gives way to conflict. Firstly, Peter VonDoepp's (2009) framework will be analysed followed by a discussion on how underdevelopment and poverty leads to conflict and instability.

Peter VonDoepp's framework for studying leadership attempts to sketch a research agenda to address the role of leadership in Africa's development and governance trajectory. His goal is to present a framework for studying leadership that incorporates considerations of both the structural circumstances under which leaders govern as well as their own agency in making the choices and undertaking the actions they do. Peter VonDoepp's framework begins by focusing



on leadership behaviour as the dependent variable. He focuses on the kinds of behaviours leaders might take on that will either positively or negatively affect development and governance outcomes. By incorporating Rotberg's (2009) governance index he arrives at five different types or dimensions of behaviour (VonDoepp, 2009: 1).

#### *2.4.6.1 Leadership actions leading to underdevelopment.*

The first is leaders' behaviour with respect to economic management. What he refers to here is the extent to which leaders incorporate economic policies that contribute to broad economic outcomes or leaders that take more irresponsible actions that undermine economic outcomes (VonDoepp, 2009: 5).

The second dimensions of behaviour deals with actions regarding the provisions of public goods. In this respect "the focus is on the extent to which government act to generate basic goods that are critical to development progress and citizens quality of life". For example broad provision of infrastructure, improving basic education nationwide or improving national security. Taking in consideration that many African governments have to make do with limited fiscal resources, the leaders still have a choice when selecting and distributing key resources. It all depends on the priorities of the leaders, for example sponsoring elites to study abroad or improving broad based educational goods (VonDoepp, 2009: 5).

The third dimension of behaviour is a leader's attitude towards corruption and public integrity. On the one hand VonDoepp (2009: 6) looks at the extent to which leaders are involved in corrupt activities and, in the case where leaders are involved in such activities, it can be argued that they are taking actions that are negatively impacting their countries' long term development goals. On the other hand he examines the extent to which anti-corruption rhetoric and programs exist, whether in name or reality.

The fourth dimension of behaviour involves action regarding the rule of law and the institutions supporting these actions. The rule of law is very important for development as it stabilizes and regulates economic and other relations within a state. Leaders take different roles when it comes to the rule of law; leaders' actions can either undermine the rule of law or they can adhere to and

enhance the rule of law (VonDoepp, 2009: 6). Thus, leaders undermining the rule of law decrease both developmental potential and political conditions in their countries.

Furthermore, leaders’ actions with respect to civic and political conditions in the country and in particular whether they are providing an environment supportive of individual liberties and civic engagement represent the fifth dimension of leadership behaviour. A leader that hinders public organization and free and open expression undermines a countries developmental potential (VonDoepp, 2009: 6).

Thus, according to VonDoepp (2009:8) each of these five dimensions of behaviours can be either conducive to development and good governance or against it. Table 2 below lays this out schematically:

	<b>Governance/Development</b> <b><u>Undermining</u></b>	<b>Governance/Development</b> <b><u>Neutral</u></b>	<b>Governance/Development</b> <b><u>Enabling</u></b>
<b>Economic Management</b>	Reckless fiscal policies/Budget deficit	Mixed fiscal record	Fiscal restrains enabling currency stability
<b>Public Goods Provisions</b>	-Decay of public goods -Narrow/particularistic provision of public goods in face of overall decay	Unbalanced or limited distribution of public goods	Broad based distribution of public goods
<b>Corruption/Public Integrity</b>	-Corrupt behaviour of political insiders\ -Undermining or marginalising anti-corruption institutions	-Mixed record pursuing corruption within the administration -Rhetorical and/or checkered support for anti-corruption institutions	-Efforts to punish political insiders for corrupt activities -Support for and non-interference of anti-corruption institutions.
<b>Rule of Law</b>	-Violating legal rules governing authority of office. -Interfering with and marginalising legal and judicial institutions	-Occasional stretching of legal authority -Mixed/occasional interference with judicial and legal institutions	-Respecting legal limits for authority -Respecting independence of legal and judicial institutions
<b>Civic/Political Conditions</b>	-Routine inhibiting of public organization, free and open expression, and political competition	-Occasional inhibiting of public organizations. Free and open expression, and political competition	-Respect for public organization, Free and open expression and political competition

The basis of VonDoepp's scheme is that individual leaders can be evaluated along each dimension, which in turn can facilitate effective comparison of leader behaviour. For the sake of arguing that a leader's behaviour regarding development can lead to conflict, first the relationship between underdevelopment and conflict needs to be examined. Thus, once a president's activities in respect to development and governance has been found to be undermining development, and taken that underdevelopment leads to instability and conflict, it can be argued that his actions (undermining development) is indirectly contributing to instability and conflict. The next section will showcase how underdevelopment and conflict is connected.

#### *2.4.6.2 How underdevelopment leads to conflict*

The United Nations Security Council usually deals with country specific issues of war and peace, for example, Sudan or the Middle East. However, on the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2011, the Council held a day long discussion on the root causes that fuel conflict in the world, namely poverty and underdevelopment. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the interdependence of peace, security and development and stated "Evidence abounds; nine of the 10 countries with the lowest Human Development Indicators have experienced conflict in the last 20 years. Countries facing stark inequality and weak institutions are at increased risk of conflict. Poorly distributed wealth and a lack of sufficient jobs, opportunities and freedoms, particularly for a large youth population, can also increase the risk of instability" (BBC, 2011).

Frances Steward (2002:342) argues that there are four economic hypotheses (related to social and economic underdevelopment) that can explain intra-state wars. These four economic hypotheses are based on factors related to group motivation, private motivation, failure of the social contract, and environmental degradation, all decisions affecting development taken by leaders. None of these hypotheses solely explains all conflicts; they do however identify factors likely to predispose group conflicts.

According to the group motivation hypotheses, resentment between groups caused by group differences due to inequalities, known as horizontal inequalities, is a major cause of conflict (Steward, 2002: 342). These group differences have several dimensions namely economic, political and social (see table 2 below). According to Steward there is consistent evidence of

sharp horizontal inequalities between groups in conflict, “Group inequalities in political access are invariably observed, hence the resort to violence rather than seeking to resolve differences through political negotiation”. The evidence also shows that where horizontal inequalities are substantial, persistent and increasing over time, violence is more likely to occur. For example, one study classified 233 politicised communal groups in 93 countries according to political, economic, and ecological differences and found that most groups suffering horizontal inequalities had taken some action to assert group interest, ranging from non-violent protest to rebellion (Steward, 2002:343).

Private motivation hypotheses, when there are few or no job opportunities in underdevelopment countries, the opportunities of enrichment through conflict, is attractive to young unemployed individuals. Young uneducated men in particular can gain employment as soldiers. This “greed hypotheses” has its base in rational choice economics (Steward, 2002: 342). Studies done in Sierra Leone, Sudan and Liberia showcase the notion that private motivation plays an important role in prolonging, if not causing conflict in some countries. It was also found that greater male education reduced the risk of war.

Failure of social contract. According to Frances Steward “Failure of the social contract derives from the view that stability is based on a hypothetical social contract between people and the government. People accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions” (Steward, 2002: 342). In other words when the state fails to ensure employment and an income due to economic stagnation or economic decline the social contract breaks down and violence can occur. Thus, high and rising levels of poverty and decline in state services would be expected to cause conflict (Steward, 2002: 342). Econometrics studies provided evidence that the incidence of conflict is higher among countries with low per capita incomes, low life expectancy, and economic growth.

Green war hypotheses, Environmental degradation can cause poverty and unemployment that can result in conflict. For example, rising population pressure and falling agricultural productivity may lead to land disputes. Growing scarcity of water may provoke conflict. The evidence regarding the green war hypotheses suggest that both environmental poverty and resources riches can be associated with conflict. Rwanda is a good example of environmental stress that lead to violence as people tried to find alternatives to a desperate situation. On the

other hand, Sierra Leone with resource riches gave strong motivation to particular groups to gain control over resources.

Table 3: Examples of horizontal inequalities:

<b>Categories of differentiation</b>	<b>Selected examples</b>
<b>Political Participation:</b> -participation in government	Burundi, Uganda
-membership of army and police	Burundi
<b>Economic Power:</b> <b>Assets:</b> -Land	
-Privately owned capital	South Africa, Burundi
-Government infrastructure	Burundi
-Aid	Sudan, Rwanda
-Natural resources	Liberia, Sierra Leone
<b>Employment and incomes:</b> -Incomes	South Africa
-Government employment	
-Private employment	Uganda
-Elite employment	South Africa
-Unemployment	South Africa
<b>Social Access and situation:</b> -Education	Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, Uganda
-Health services	Northern Uganda, Burundi
-Safe drinking water	Uganda
-Housing	
-Poverty	Uganda, South Africa

Once a president's activities in respect to development and governance has been found to be undermining development, and taken that underdevelopment leads to instability and conflict, as showcased above, it can be argued that his actions (undermining development) is indirectly contributing to instability and conflict.

## 2.5 Conclusion

It is a well known fact that Africa has long been burdened by kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates and “presidents for life” after the first three decades of independence. However, bad leadership spilled over into the next era after waves of democratisation in the late 1980’s. By far the most noticeable examples come from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe, all countries with massive natural resource wealth that has been run to the ground. It has become evident that there are certain leadership characteristics found in most presidencies across Africa, all characteristics associated with the imperial nature of the African president. In short, as the civil unrest erupted in northern Africa there was a sudden threat of similar unrest across the Western and Eastern parts of Africa. Governments were quick to act with a few minor adjustments to calm the tension, however this recent unrest showcased that leadership especially the role of the president can contribute to instability and conflict. Therefore, this chapter proposes six leadership behaviours (associated with the imperial presidency) that either directly or indirectly eventually translates into conflict and instability. It is the intension that these six leadership behaviour patterns serve as an index of sorts to be applied in the fourth chapter to investigate, using these six behavioural patterns, if Museveni of Uganda is engaging in these behavioural patterns, and hence contributing to the instability of the country.

## CHAPTER THREE: Path-Dependency of the African Imperial Presidency

### 3.1 Introduction

Leaders that came to power after colonialism shared power with no one, they ruled over their countries with immense vigour. Legislative initiatives were a presidential monopoly and the president controlled all the countries' funds with no or little parliamentary oversight. Most importantly, the tenure of the presidential office was open-ended, the president was able to stand for re-election as many times as he desired. Out of sixteen contested elections held in Africa from 1960-1980 only one president suffered defeat and consequently had to leave office (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 10). As a result of the supreme power of the presidency during this period, the presidents in Africa simply ignored electoral accountability and held onto power indefinitely or made themselves "presidents for life", as a result Africa experienced the most prolonged dictatorships in the world. These "big men" of Africa were amongst others Mobutu of Zaire, Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Moi of Kenya.

Towards the end of the 1980s Africa experienced significant changes, especially in the context of presidential rule. Across Africa one-party political systems and one-man rule gave way to multi-party democracies and what was known as a new breed of leadership. Political scholars worldwide were writing about the arrival of what looked like a new breed of leadership in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was believed that this apparent new breed of leaders had now forever banished the old-fashioned style of dictatorial government, corruption, economic mismanagement, and all other discriminatory methods employed by the previous era's leaders. This new group of leaders were youthful, dynamic, determined, no-nonsense, developmental minded and progressive. As a group they presented a stark contrast to the big man syndrome that had characterized much of the early postcolonial period. The new breed can loosely be described to include South Africa's Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, Ethiopian premier Menes Zenawi, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea who negotiated Eritrea's divorce from Ethiopia in 1993, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. And for a short lived period, the great compliment was also applied to Laurent Desire Kabila, the Rwandan/Ugandan supported rebel leader who ousted Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire,

but the guru and chief mentor of the group was Yoweri Museveni (Oloka-Onyango, 2005, 32). The new breed of leaders overcame significant challenges and managed to abolish authoritarianism, improved economic conditions, encouraged political participation and enhanced personal liberties.

These leaders held the hope and respect of their respective nations and international leaders, yet as the time passed these leaders began to resemble their predecessors. Oloka-Onyango writes (2005:47) “the optimism that greeted the arrival of the new breed has long since dissipated...the bitter fact is that the new breed is no longer new: many have been around for at least a decade, and some, like Museveni for even more”. The new breed leaders did submit themselves to electoral processes, but only in cases where their party had no or little threat of losing power. Also, with the longevity of their rule came the tendency of corruption, less accountability, and a situation conducive for the development of conflict. Moreover, the new breed came to power through violence and conflict, and violence and conflict remains very much a part of their strategy and they apply it through various means, overt and covert. As observed by Oloka-Onyango (2005, 47), “If we recall that this was one of the main grievances that African peoples had against the Old Breed of its leaders, then we have truly come full circle”. Thus, transition from one-party autocratic leadership to multi-party presidency happened, yet it was transition without change. Kwasi Prempeh argues “Africa’s presidents may have been term-limited, but the evidence suggests that they have not quite been tamed yet. Presidential rule in post-authoritarian Africa has no doubt become less fragrantly abusive and arbitrary, and the climate for personal liberty and rival political activity has improved appreciably in Africa’s democratizing states. However, recent political and constitutional reforms aside, power in the African state continues to reside disproportionately in the hands of one person: the president” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 18). In other word, the African president is still characterized by its imperial character; wielding awesome power, self perceived as above the law, and accountable to no-one.

Persistence of the imperial presidency in post authoritarian Africa is a puzzle seeing that many states made incredible changes towards democracy and constitutionalism since the 1990’s. This persistence of the strong presidents has had damaging consequences in regards to conflict, the rule of law, human rights and the weakening of the executive branch and continues to have as long as the presidency in African remains all-powerful. The question of why imperial presidency



persists in Africa is the subject of discussion in the next section. However, before the answer to the latter can be analysed, the path-dependency of the imperial presidency needs assessing, by first evaluating why after independence autocratic rulers came to rule Africa. Consequently, three theories namely African culture defence; internal rationales; and historical and comparative rationales will be looked at as possible reasons why the imperial presidency came to be. Lastly, the question of why imperial presidencies still persist today will be addressed.

### **3.2 Theories on the genesis of Imperial Presidency in Africa**

Many theories have been developed in hopes of shedding light on the ever persisting problems of the continent. Most of the theories tend to find their basis in colonialism and its legacy as the main reason for Africa's woes. The African cultural thesis has also been put forward as a possible explanation of why certain problems continue to plague Africa. The next section will briefly touch on three rationales, as presented by Kwasi- Prempeh (2007), for explaining particularly how the "imperial" style of leadership came to be in Africa.

#### *3.2.1 African culture defence*

Social anthropologists and political scientists have argued that "African traditions and culture" are to blame for post-colonial Africa's misery. For example they blame the problem of corruption in Africa on the so-called African tradition of "gift-giving" and reciprocity. Even the horrific civil wars of post-colonial Africa have been blamed on such cultural explanations as African tribalism. The African culture thesis has also been used by several African leaders to explain their authoritarian ideological and constitutional choices in the immediate period after colonialism. For example, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, strongly defended socialism as deeply-rooted in the communalistic and egalitarian ethos of traditional Africa (Kwasi Prempeh, 2007: 22). Kwasi Prempeh supposes three reasons why the African culture explanation of the imperial presidency in post-colonial Africa, is not plausible. Firstly, he argues that the mere definition of African culture is problematic, as it is assigned to the whole of Africa. "The immediate difficulty of a continent-wide notion of African culture is its empirical plausibility. Africa simply has too

many states and too many diverse cultures and cultural groups-with wide variation in indigenous political structure and organization...for talk of a monolithically African culture to make analytic or empirical sense in this instance” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 25). Secondly, the African culture defence focus mainly on indigenous pre-colonial institutions as setting the tone for post colonial state. However, this overlooks the critical colonial period and the impact of this period on Africa. The third reason he argues that the cultural thesis is disabling from a policy standpoint, because it encourages the marginalisation of Africa, “It furthers the quick invocation of the “hand of destiny” to explain a host of contemporary problems in Africa” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 25). That a continent’s culture contributes to its development and progress is plausible, however the African culture defence is too limited in scope to explain the genesis of imperial presidency in Africa. Furthermore in the case of Africa, it was more the loss of African culture under imperialism and with the advent of Christianity that contributed to the imperial style presidency. For the purpose of this essay the cultural excuse is refuted and more focus will be placed on additional theories and rationales.

### *3.2.2 Internal Rationales*

*The national integration rationale* holds that the end of colonialism grouped different ethnic groups together in newly formed nation states and, to make matters worse, colonial policy did not encourage a sense of national unity amongst these newly formed diverse populations. After colonialism it was the intention of the new leaders to form a strong sense of national unity, new leaders intended to shift loyalties away from kin-based conceptions of identity to the new artificial entity, the nation state. Leaders soon realised that they needed more than just unifying symbols like flags, anthems and national sport teams, the answer came in the form of the “heroic leader”. The leaders became a symbol on unification and took on a “father of the nation” persona. As Senegal’s President Leopold Senghor observed at the time, “The president personifies the Nation as did the Monarch of former times his peoples. The masses are not mistaken who speak of the ‘reign’ of Sekou Toure of Guinea and Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, in whom they see above all, the elected of God through the people” (Meredith, 2005: 34). This national integration rationale proved to be detrimental to the discourse of the African president as this notion of “heroic leader” that needs to unify the nation, spilled over into the

multi-party era. This was the rationale most commonly used by Africa's first post-colonial leaders to explain their centralized governments and their tendency to oppress the opposition.

*The development rationale* argues from an economical point of view. It is argued that on the eve of independence African states had massive deficits in all the critical areas such as health care, education, technology, communication, jobs, housing and internal markets. When post-independence leaders came to power their number one objective was to “transform the inherited colonial economy and uplift the social and economic condition of the newly liberated African populations” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 56). As Kwame Nkrumah stated “What other countries have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation” (Biney, 2008: 54). Consequently, development assumed the character of a national emergency, and this challenge was frequently expressed in terms of a “war”, thus “the development rationale and its associated metaphors naturally carried authoritarian implications”. This explained why for example Tanzania's new constitution omits “checks and balances”, Nyerere stated “...for we recognize that the system of checks and balances is an admirable way of applying brakes to social change. Our need is not for brakes...we need accelerators powerful enough to overcome the inertia bred of poverty, and the resistance which are inherited in our societies” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 56). In other words, development came to underwrite presidential autocracy in post-colonial Africa. Also the model of the development these leaders favoured was socialism, this socialistic model placed the African state in a central role and the power came to be vested in the leader of the highly centralized African state. Socialism thus furnished an additional justification for the one-party state and for authoritarian political leadership.

In short, after independence unnatural borders were constructed grouping several different ethnic groups together and, in a bid to unify the new “nation states”, leaders employed several unifying symbols however it was not enough and the “heroic leader” became the number one unifying factor in these new states. Furthermore, after colonialism most African states were in a state of despair with most countries lacking basic economic provisions. Transforming their inherited economies became the number one objective in newly independent African states, leaders approached this challenge with a sense of emergency and with this came authoritarian implications, and hence authoritarian leaders.

### 3.2.3 Historical and comparative rationales

*The colonial experience and its legacy:* Postcolonial rulers inherited the colonial style institutions, routines and practises as well as its means of governance. On the eve of independence African states were ushered into parliamentary style constitutionalism and democracy, they however had no local parliamentary or liberal traditions to back them as it was not fostered under colonialism. Probably the most consequential post-independence legacy states inherited was the power and position of the colonial governor within the colonial system. The colonial Governor represented a one man government: he was solely responsible for the colony's administration, his authority was autocratic in nature, he was not subjected to any checks and balances, there was no means for his subjects to remove him and no one could criticise or attack him without severe repercussions. Also, the legislative and executive council only played an advisory role and the colonial judge was merely part of the Governors' administration. Furthermore, many of the oppressive laws that would later provide the tools of repression for postcolonial rulers had their origin in legislation during the colonial period. Thus, the postcolonial state and its practices, including its tendency towards presidential authoritarianism, showed remarkable continuity with the colonial tradition and the extraordinary power of the Governor. "In one sense independence meant, for Africa's new ruler the right to use the same tools and methods of government which the colonial authorities had employed" (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 63).

*Prevailing comparative models of executive power* is based in the examples of other strong leaders across the globe at the eve of African independence. This argument holds that postcolonial African leaders were influenced and aided indirectly by the models of political governance and of executive power prevalent in the world's leading political systems during the period of decolonialisation. The heroic leaders received inspiration from Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General de Gaulle, Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, all leaders known for their dominance and nationalistic nature. At the time of independence their closest examples of strong leaders were Tito of Yugoslavia, Sukarno of Indonesia, Jawaharal Nehru from India and Gamel Nasser from Egypt (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 56). These rulers were all nationalist, anti-imperialistic, socialistic, and authoritarian. Nkrumah of Ghana, by his own account, counted Nehru, Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler among the leaders whose methods he

valued most. Furthermore Roosevelt's "New Deal" showcased to African leaders that social and economic transformation needed strong and decisive presidential leadership. On the other hand, General de Gaulle's Constitution of the Fifth French Republic that restored and reinforced the executive authority in France showcased the importance of a presidency with extraordinary powers. The influence of de Gaulle's Constitution on postcolonial African constitutionalism accordingly extended beyond Francophone Africa. Historical personalities, especially the examples of presidential supremacy in the influential states of the post-war world helped to normalize similar tendencies and choices by Africa's postcolonial leaders (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 56).

The above section laid out possible rationales for why the imperial presidency came to be in the first place. However, given the miserable records the initial independence leaders had the waves of democratisation and the new breed of leadership, why does presidential imperialism persist in contemporary Africa? This will be examined next.

### **3.3 Why Imperial presidencies still persist today?**

The most damaging and lasting effect of the rule by autocrats, during the first three decades of independence (1960-1990), was the effect on the quality of constitutionalism in Africa. Post-independence state did have constitutions, however these constitutions were constitutions of power (presidential power, that is), not of restraint. "In general provisions in Africa's post-independence constitutions concerning the formal organizations and distribution of political power, tended to reflect or follow rather than condition actual practice" (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 10). Kenyan legal scholar Okoth Ogendo (2005:15) coined the phrase "constitutions without constitutionalism" to describe the apparent paradox of a commitment on the part of Africa's post-colonial elites to the idea of a constitution, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a rejection of the classic notation of constitutionalism evident in the first three decades of African independence. The first aspect under examination is constitutional design in Africa as a reason why the imperial style presidency still persists in modern day Africa.

As mentioned previously, after the turbulent post-colonial period the late 1980's brought major political changes to Africa as autocratic rule of the earlier period gave way to democratic

imperatives. The notion of developmental dictatorships was replaced with developmental democracy. Previous dictators were removed from office and major constitutional reforms across sub-Saharan Africa were made to reflect this new shift in politics and governance in Africa, “all of these changes have made the period 1989 a “constitutional moment” of sorts for postcolonial Africa, the first such moment since the momentous independence decade of the 1960’s” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 72). Africa’s “new and improved” constitutions abolished one-party rule; it made provisions for protecting political parties from oppression; restored the oversight function of the legislatures; it replaced indefinite presidential tenure with term limits; it empowered the court to rule on the constitutionality of challenged executive or legislative acts; included the right to freedom of association, free speech and press freedom; also included several other human rights laws. Thus, formal constitutional rules are coming to matter much more than they ever used to in Africa, constitutional rules have no partially displaced violence as the primary source of constraints on presidential power (Posner and Young, 2007: 127). In Addition, some African states even included a fourth branch of government in their constitutions, these fourth branches were responsible for bringing credibility and political detachment to the performance of critical political institutions. So, with democratisation sweeping through the continent and with this remarkable document of liberty, how has presidential supremacy managed to survive in contemporary Africa?

Kwasi Prempeh (2007: 73) explains that, even though constitutions have an important impact on new democracies, it is still merely a document, “as a document constitutions are neither exhaustive nor fool proof regarding matters they regulate. Omissions and contradictions are frequently embedded in the text of the constitutions. All of these limitations associated with constitutions generally are true of Africa’s new and revised constitutions”. He further argues that contemporary constitutional design should be viewed within the context of the primary or immediate impulse that drove the recent transition. Differences come in where the constitution came about due to the relentless struggle of a group of moral actors that wanted an equal and just social environment. Whereas in Africa, the reasons for constitutional reforms were mixed, in many incidents opportunistic and the “moral” actors, in Africa’s case, were elites from the old regime. Also in cases where the authoritarian regime was strong enough at the time of transition, the idea of constitutional reform were often done with regime continuity in mind, as was the case in Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana. Thus, Africa’s current constitutions must be seen as reflecting

limited ambitions of genuine social and political change. Moreover, African leaders are unified in the idea of a unitary state model and most reject the notion of federalism and contemporary constitutional reforms reflect this sentiment behind a centralized and unitary state. In other words, the highly unitary and centralized state remains in place and therefore the presidential hegemony stayed in place. In short, one reason why the imperial presidency still persists can be ascribed to the lack of all-encompassing constitutions which prescribe genuine sovereign powers to a sub-national entity in African states (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 76).

However, modern African constitutions do not actively grant the president exclusive authority to act and govern as he pleases. Most African constitutions hold that the president must seek legislative approval in the form of an Act of Parliament for all their intended actions. In most contemporary African constitutions (words on paper), the constitution, appear to empower parliaments to check presidential power. “Constitutional design in Africa has typically adopted a passive or open ended approach. Whereby power and responsibility is granted jointly to the president and the legislature and the two are expected to work together. Typically the president is granted the power to initiate and parliament the power to approve” (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 81). So, if this is the case presidential imperialism then occur constitutionally only with the consent of the parliament. Thus, can it then be argued that the legislatures are to blame for the continued existence of the imperial presidency? According to Kwasi Prempeh the answer is yes. He argues that the reason lies in the extra constitutional resources and advantages over parliament that the African president has to his disposal. The sources of these presidential advantages will be identified next.

*Firstly*, what drives multiparty rivalry, above everything else, is to capture the office of the presidency. One tool employed by African multi parties is to support or advocate certain good governance reforms while running for office; however once they have won office they reject their own reforms. In Zambia for example, the opposition party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), promised to remove certain dictatorial clauses from the constitutions if they were to win, however once in power they defended the same constitution as being satisfactory. The intense competition between opposition parties is not necessarily in pursuit of the national interest but more to capture the power of the office, hence using the control of the office for patronage. The connection between rival parties are their mutual interest in looting and

patronage, thus Africa's parliamentary parties' objective is to stay in power in order to keep benefitting from it. Yet, the presidential party usually has parliamentary majority, they either ensure this alone or through forming voting coalitions with opposition members, the result being that parliament always stays true to the wishes of the president and the presidential party. In short, "the idea of a legislature as a check on executive power is not realistically attainable when the parliamentary majority sees itself, as many do in Africa's multiparty parliaments, simply as the legislative arm of the presidency (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 85). For example, the African Governance Report found that only a third of African legislatures are recognized as being free from manipulation of the executive in all major areas of legislation. More than half of the countries were under some form of control in all major areas of legislation. South Africa, Ghana and Namibia legislature are regarded as the most independent, while Kenya and Ethiopia ranked as the most subordinate (ODI, 2007).

The *second* reason for the skewed relationship between parliament and the presidency lies in their vastly different histories. Only two of Africa's 53 states (Botswana and Mauritius) have enjoyed a post-independence record of unbroken multi-party democracy. Much of the continent saw the emergence of presidential regimes and one party states after independence. In these environments critical scrutiny of the executive and representation of the electorate was scarce. Instead, the 'big man' ruled and the separation of powers and legislative involvement was sometimes largely symbolic (APPG, 2008). In other words, most parliaments only have experience from the single-party period and thus have little experience of independence. The presidency had an unbroken existence all throughout Africa's post-colonial history. Consequently "most of Africa's current legislatures lack a clear conception of their institutional prerogatives, and have little way of helpful models from their past to fall back on" (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 86). On the other hand, the presidency inherited a well-developed and bold conception of the nature and scope of its executive power. Therefore, the presidency in African has been accustomed, for years, to rule without any external restrictions while the legislature is not completely aware of and experienced in serving as check and disciplinary body to the executive. Neither institutions can nor will be able to change the pattern, and therefore the imperial presidency still persists.



*Thirdly*, most African constitutions place the power of the purse in the hands of the legislature as it must approve and authorise the executive's spending however, in reality, the real power lies with the president and his minister of finance. Also, most of Africa's constitutions hold that only the president can initiate, introduce or amend a bill raising taxes or imposing a charge on the national treasury. The purpose behind this is to discipline the legislature and curb legislators' presumed appetite for being fiscally irresponsible. The effect of such exclusion gives the president power over most funds which entrenches presidential supremacy. Consequently, the legislature's budget is also under presidential control and enables the president to manipulate and undermine the legislature's checking function through withholding resources from parliament. The current Tanzanian Speaker stated "Government can call the shots because it controls the purse strings. This makes a mockery of holding government to account", also the Malawian National Assembly stated "The assembly's inability to have a final say on its annual budget is a source of weakness and unpredictability" (APPG, 2008). According to studies undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (2007), "most parliaments in Africa have inadequate or non-existent accommodation, a lack of access to information, information technology and library facilities, a lack of parliamentary staff to assist in the administration of parliamentary affairs and, in particular, in carrying out the research which is needed for parliaments to hold the executive to account. Fundamentally, such challenges result from the fact that parliaments receive insufficient funding, and are dependent for this funding on the executive, which may not be keen to see a stronger legislature" (ODI, 2007). Furthermore, many African governments depend on external donors and multilateral financial institutions to meet budget requirements; this in itself has strengthened the hand of the president on financial issues. This is the case because the president and his finance ministers are usually the fundraisers at external donor events, hence external donors and multilateral financiers are excluding parliament completely (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 89). Developmental partners and donors, such as the IMF and the World Bank, accordingly share some responsibility for weak parliamentary performance. Where as civil society participation was encouraged, parliaments were initially excluded from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) and have not had the right to see or scrutinise the conditions attached to loans offered by the international financial institutions. This undermines domestic democratic accountability and risks further marginalising parliaments (ODI, 2007).

*Fourthly*, democracy was supposed to restrain presidential power in post authoritarian Africa, however the recent wave of democratisation have actually strengthened presidential power. This especially happened because general elections in Africa are essentially about control of the president's office. Furthermore, "presidential power in Africa is particularly strong in those situations where recent democratisation has been accompanied by regime change and by a discernible improvement in the climate for personal liberties and media freedom. In other words, by ridding Africa of the most notorious and observable features of its authoritarian baggage, recent democratisation has arguably strengthened, not weakened, the presidency" (Kwasi-Prempeh, 2007: 90), as people viewed these new leaders as saviours. As it was put to the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (2008) "in the Kenyan context, 'the president became the father of the nation and the parliament was his political household'" (APPG, 2008).

Remarkable constitutional moments happened in the late 1980's and early 1990's, however they merely reflected that of a unitary and centralised state. Even though these new constitutions did make provision for checks and balances and placed some power in the hands of parliament, due to extra constitutional advantage of the executive over parliament a power deficit still exist, they further empower the president. As set out above, these advantages comes from the patronage system found in African politics, parliament is merely an extension of the executive branch in the sense that parliamentary oppositions will side with the ruling party in order to benefit from patronage. Furthermore, because of the lack of experience in the multi-party system, parliaments are not mature enough to apply their given powers, the power of the purse rests with the executive and the president who is used to manipulate parliament. Lastly, because the president is associated with eradicating autocratic rule and bringing democracy to the nation it indirectly reinforces his imperial power as he is the saviour of the nation.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

In conclusion, after independence most African states suffered economic crises, diminishing living conditions, sharp inequalities, instability and conflict. This was mainly due to the failure and un-sustainability of the autocratic leaders across Africa at the end of the 1980's. This

section examined three possible rationales and theories why African Autocratic presidency came to be in the first three decades after independence. It was argued that it was purposefully and systematically constructed by nationalist leaders to attend to regime needs at the time, the implementation of this style of leadership was also conditioned and facilitated by certain historical and external factors. Today, modern African presidents enter into office with immense political resources and advantages at their disposal. Even though the constitution provides for power allocations to parliament, political dynamics in Africa are of such a nature that the parliament is merely another entity subordinate to the president's office. As currently designed, Africa's democratic constitutions do not effectively address or redress the inherent tendency toward imperial presidentialism. Constitutional design in Africa is one of omission rather than commission, because African constitutions are not affirmatively prohibiting or preventing imperial presidency, they are doing little to prevent this tendency.

## CHAPTER FOUR: Leadership today and initiatives to promote good leadership

### 4.1 Introduction

Robert Calderisi (2006: 58) in his book *The Trouble with Africa* writes “The simplest way to explain Africa’s problems is that it has never known good government”. Despite the fact that leadership contributes and causes conflict (as discussed in chapter two), leadership is also at the root of the most fundamental of problems in Africa (as discussed in chapter one). Many scholars have dedicated their attention to showcase the link between bad governance and vast arrays of problems and today there is a universal awareness on leadership and governance in particularly Africa. Consequently, structural programmes addressing governance issues have been imposed on African states since the early 1980s, however only at the end of the 1990s did African leaders themselves begin to publicly acknowledge the importance of good governance. “There was a recognition that what happens internally in states and how governments rule, regulate and relate to their citizens are vital for peace, development, growth and prosperity, and that Africans themselves needed their own and drive this process” (SAIIA, 2011:4). This notion generated many new institutions, including the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), amongst others.

Furthermore, developing means to measure what governments do, is not a new phenomenon, also benchmarking and preparing report cards on various kinds of performance is also well-established practice, there exist indices and ranking systems of all kinds to rate national governments, there are indices of happiness, global peace, integrity, economic freedom, political freedom corruption, child welfare and many more. Among projects that seek to measure governance is the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators which have the most complete coverage of countries. There is also Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report and the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report. However, these efforts are only suitable to measure certain aspects of governance (Rotberg, 2008: 120). By far the most extensive and comprehensive index is the Mo Ibrahim Index of African governance which will be discussed in

the following section together with its most recent findings. However, first under discussion is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, followed by the African Peer Review Mechanisms, as two African initiatives to improve leadership and governance.

#### **4.2 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance**

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is considered by some as the most authoritative expression of the commitment of the African Union and its member states to a set of shared values and aspiration objectives in governance, democracy and elections. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was adopted by the AU during the 8<sup>th</sup> ordinary session of the assembly of the heads of state and government convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 30<sup>th</sup> January 2007. This Charter “firmly and unequivocally serves to fulfil a determination to promote and strengthen good governance through the institutionalisation of transparency, accountability and participatory democracy” (AU, 2011). Furthermore, the Charter aims to establish a political culture of change through holding regular, free, fair and transparent elections. The Charter provides that elections should be conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies. Also the Charter provides a consolidated point of reference for all of the African Union efforts to enhance the overall state of democracy, elections and governance across Africa. However, in order for this Charter to serve as an instrument of the African Union it must be ratified by at least 15 member states. When a state ratifies the charter it provides a direct pledge to uphold democracy and governance, as it is laid out in the constitutive act of the African Union. This Charter is considered to be a positive example for other regions of the world. “The details embodied in the Charter create the most basic standards and principles for governance, democracy and elections in member states” (AUCharter, 2011). To date 38 of 53 African states signed the Charter, however only ten countries have acceded, these countries are: Zambia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, South Africa, Mauritania, Lesotho, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso (AUCharter, 2011).

It is unfortunate that four years down the line only 10 countries have signed and ratified the Charter as this clearly highlights the unwillingness and inability of some of the AU member states to meet the principles and standards set within the Charter. It is a well known fact that

most African states have not yet achieved many of the goals they have committed themselves to, thus one might question the usefulness and feasibility of adopting a document that raises governance bar even further. Nevertheless, the Charter is a positive move in the right direction “the Charter does reflect a better understanding of African realities and the need for political transformation” (Saungweme, 2007: 5).

### **4.3 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)**

APRM was set up by the African Union as a voluntary governance self-monitoring system within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa (Nepad). In order to discuss the APRM, some reference needs to be made to Nepad. Nepad was adopted by the African Union at its inaugural summit in 2001. Nepad was to serve as the AU’s official strategic policy framework for accelerating economic co-operation and integration among African countries. The document outlining Nepad states, “Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards” (Chêne, 2009). Hence, in July 2002 at the Durban AU summit a document setting out the stages of peer review and the principles by which the APRM should operate was adopted.

APRM’s mandate is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards as contained in the 2002 Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments (SAIIA, 2011:7). The primary purpose of the APRM is to promote the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building (SAIIA, 2011:7). The principles of APRM are that every review exercise carried out under the authority of the Mechanism must be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation. These stipulations together constitute the core guiding principles of the Mechanism (SAIIA, 2011:7).

The APRM is open to all member states of the AU, thirty members of the AU have voluntarily acceded to the APRM. Thirteen countries had been peer reviewed and their reports made publicly available (UNECA, 2011). In other words, thirteen African presidents have been reviewed by their peers and opened themselves to self-imposed scrutiny in a commitment to improve governance systems, policies and developmental practices. There is clear evidence of the APRM's impact, "recent developments in reviewed countries have demonstrated the strengths of the mechanism as early warning system for potentially emerging issues" (Chêne, 2009). For example the APRM report for Kenya predicted the ethnic violence that broke out in 2007, and the APRM also anticipated the xenophobic outbreak in South Africa in 2008. Another strength of the APRM is the consequential Programmes of Action (POA) the review proposes to reviewed countries. Ghana reduced the size of their cabinet and passed a bill to protect whistle-blowers to promote access to information, also Rwanda reformed its business environment, as a consequence of the APRM report. Furthermore, the African Peer Review makes useful contributions to development as countries are more inclined to respect international commitments.

However, there are still some limitations and critique surrounding the APRM, for instance some non-acceding leaders have openly dismissed the APRM as a means for countries to please aid donors. This argument seems credible when you take in consideration that barely democratic states have joined the APRM program in hope for more donor aid, for example Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Senegal were among the first to accede, without a consideration of the consequences. One of the limits of the APRM is that it identifies flaws and weaknesses of political processes; hence many governments control the process through appointing allies in the various peer review institutions. Also countries have showcased a great reluctance to challenge the state sovereignty principle and criticise each other. One of the biggest challenges and major weakness of the mechanism is the lack of effective follow-up, as there are not enough resources and capacities to monitor the implementation reports of countries that already have been reviewed. In next section will evaluate the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Index developed by this foundation as well as the prize allocated to an African leader for good governance.

#### **4.4 Mo Ibrahim Foundation**

Mo Ibrahim is a Sudanese cell phone mogul that created the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, an incentive to transform poorly performing African leaders into good leaders. The main aim of the Foundation is to provide a framework and tools so that citizens and governments can assess their leader's and government's performance. Furthermore, the Foundation recognizes good leadership and helps find ways how leaders can build positive legacies. Also the Foundation wants to stimulate debate regarding leadership and governance in Africa and, in doing so, develop leadership in Africa. The Foundation works to achieve these goals through four major programme areas. Firstly, they award the Mo Ibrahim prize for achievement in African leadership to a leader each year. Secondly, they developed the Ibrahim Index for rating governance in Africa. Thirdly, they promote good governance through the Ibrahim discussion forum and fourthly the Foundation works to achieve their goals through capacity building programmes. Mo Ibrahim Index and prize will be discussed next.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance was created by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in accordance with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. The Ibrahim Index was first published in 2007 and is an annual assessment of African countries based on the quality of their leadership. When it was first published it rated 48 African states in Sub-Saharan Africa, today it includes most North African states and rates 53 African states annually. The Index rates African states according to fifty-seven variables that are divided into five categories of political goods. The first political good in the Index is Safety and Security which includes National security and public safety. The second political good is Rule of Law, transparency and corruption, and includes eight sub categories. Participation and Human Right is the third political good, among some of the sub categories there are, free and fair elections, press freedom, respect for civil rights and no gender discrimination. The fourth political good is Sustainable Economic Development and is assessed according to twelve sub categories. The last political good used by the Ibrahim Index is Human Development which encompasses the sub-categories of poverty, health and sanitation, and educational opportunity. The result of this massive measurement exercise produces overall rankings of governance attainment; however the purpose of the Index is not to rate, but to diagnose states. Thus the Index is a diagnostic tool for civil society, donors and



governments so that performance can be enhanced and the lives and outcomes of Africans be strengthened, the main aim of this Index is to improve African governance (Rotberg, 2009: 113).

In the 2011 the Index found that the standards of governance have declined significantly over the past five years, particularly in Madagascar, while governance has improved in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Index continued to rate Mauritius as Africa's best governed country and Somalia as the worst-governed country. The Index's 2011 findings illustrated that countries that pursue a balanced approach to all dimensions of governance achieve the most success. The Index found that the general trend in Africa is one of imbalance; many countries have however improved in both sustainable economic opportunity and human development, while the majority of the countries have regressed in safety and rule of law, participation and human rights. In general, the index raised concern at the stagnation, and in many cases the reversal, in the rule of law and citizen's rights, and warned that "if economic progress is not translated into better quality of life and respect for citizens' rights, we will witness more Tahrir Squares in Africa" (Allen, 2011).

The Mo Ibrahim Index was originally closely linked to the first prize awarded by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation for accomplished African leadership. In order to win the \$5 million prize leaders have to come from countries with a high ranking according to the Index, in other words they have to provide security, rule of law, relatively little corruption and good economic and political outcomes during their terms in office. In 2007, its first year, the prize money went to Joaquim Chissano, the former president of Mozambique, who led Mozambique from Marxism to democracy, from civil war to peace and from massive poverty to economic development. In 2008 the prize went to Festus Mogae, who served as Botswana's president from 1998 to 2008. According to the Index, Botswana was the best governed country in 2008. In addition, Nelson Mandela was named an Honorary Laureate by the foundation in 2007. However, in 2009 and 2010 the foundation did not award the prize to any leaders due to a lack of worthy candidates (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011). This year the \$ 5 million prize was awarded to President Pedro Verona Pires of Cape Verde. President Pires governed Cape Verde for 10 years and under his presidency Cape Verde became only the second African country to graduate from the United Nation's Least Developed category and has won international recognition for its record on human rights and good governance. Ahmed Salim, the Chair of the Prize Committee, stated "the Prize Committee has been greatly impressed by President Pedro Pires' vision in transforming Cape

Verde into a model of democracy, stability and increased prosperity” (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011).

There is no doubt that the Mo Ibrahim Prize is a laudable and inspiring effort to generate increased attention to the governance challenge in Africa. Even so, there have been numerous critiques regarding this prize and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. One such critique is on the notion that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s approach is primarily based on energizing civil society. However, it is argued that they presume there is a “strong, independent and vigour civil society organisations and leaders with strong supportive networks who will be able to utilize the Governance Index information to aggressively foster accountability in their countries. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The handful of genuinely independent and committed civil society organizations that focus on governance have very limited resources and are therefore weak and not very effective against powerful and ruthless elites” (African Leadership and Progress Brief, 2008). Many sceptics have also expressed the opinion that the prize is an embarrassment to Africans, seeing that their leaders are being ‘bribed’ to do what they are supposed to do - govern well. Furthermore, critiques argue that the prize places too much emphasis on one person, the president, rather than the more important focus on political elites and their cronies, public institutions, bureaucracies and citizens, thus they are further perpetuating the stereotypical ‘big man’ syndrome (African Leadership and Progress Brief, 2008). Critiques have also highlighted that for leaders, whose main motivation is power and wealth, \$ 5 million is ridiculous compared to the large amount they know they can steal without severe consequence (African Leadership and Progress Brief, 2008).

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

Today there are many initiatives within the continent and globally that have attempted to address the problems faced by African states. As discussed above, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, The African Peer Review Mechanism and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation are examples of some of the ideas that have been promoted by Africans and the donor community. There is no lack of funding regarding initiatives to enhance leadership in Africa. However, according to a report by the Parliamentary Development Unit (2009) submitted

to AusAID, “such initiatives often suffer from too distinct obstacles, the first of which is lack of capacity or political will with regards to implementation”. A further obstacle is governments’ commitment to international and national acts are mostly symbolic acts, without a real intention to abide by or actually implement these initiatives. For example, one might argue that the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is a symbolic act to improve African states’ appearance abroad. Nevertheless, the African continent is slowly but surely making progress in the right direction to address the leadership deficit in the continent. However, a real commitment to initiatives must be the next step.

## CHAPTER FIVE: Case study: Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni

### 5.1 Introduction

Uganda, a small land-locked country in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, gained its independence from Britain in 1962 where after it was engulfed in civil war and ethnic rivalry and suffered under the hands of two brutal dictators Milton Obote (1962-1971, 1980-1986) and Idi Amin (1971-1979) until the mid 1980's. By the time President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRM, also known as the Movement) took power in early 1986 the country's economy was in shambles with an inflation rate of over 240 percent. Once in power President Museveni brought relative political and economic stability to Uganda. After a long transitional period President Museveni was formally elected to a five year term in 1995 in direct presidential elections in what was then known (until 2005) as a "no-party" system. Museveni argued that multiparty politics could only be introduced once a no-party system had succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics. In 2000 a national referendum on multiparty politics was held and Museveni triumphed with 90.7 percent of Ugandans favouring a no-party system. In the 2001 elections President Museveni won 69 percent of the votes, while Kizza Besigye, Museveni's one time ally and personal physician, received 27 percent. In March 2003, President Museveni suggested lifting the ban on the multi-party system, and in May 2005 the Ugandan parliament voted to approve a referendum to instate a multi-party system (Dagne, 2009:2). Also during this time, Museveni and his supporters fought a constitutional battle to lift the two term limit for a president and in July 2005 the Ugandan parliament voted to remove the two term limit. Hence, in 2006, and in the first multi-party elections in 26 years, president Museveni won again with 59 percent of the votes while leading opposition Kizza Besigye won 37 percent of the votes. International election observers did not condemn the election results nor did they fully endorse the electoral process as the elections were marred by intimidation, counting irregularities, voter name deletion and show of force by the government.

President Museveni was re-elected to his 4<sup>th</sup> term in office in February 2011, his long time rival Dr. Besigye received only 25 percent of the votes. In addition Museveni's NRM party won 76 percent of the 384 parliamentary seats that were up for grabs, and if he is able to sway NRM

rebel Members of Parliament (MPs) Museveni will have an even bigger parliamentary majority and will be able to change the constitution again. Museveni won the 2011 elections with copious amount of money and smart tactics, all through the elections the regime's attitude remained defensive. According to the African Report (2011: 38) "Military and regular police roamed the streets both in the north and south of the country, geared up in anti-riot paraphernalia that had been imported just before the elections. For many Ugandans, it was a reminder of the bad old days: the three decades of military rule that seemed to have ended when Museveni shot his way into power in 1986 and promised to return peace and stability". The immense presence of the military was justified by the Al-Shabaab bombings last July, however the obvious reason was that autocratic leaders were falling one after the other in North Africa due to popular uprisings, Museveni was merely acting out of fear of a Tahrir Square type uprising in Kampala. In the months immediately following the elections violent outbreaks sporadically erupted all over the city, due to Museveni's treatment of the his opposition Dr Besigye, who questioned the election results and called foul play. Museveni reacted to these violent outbreaks with unnecessary and extreme aggression and violence, stating that he will literally "eat" anybody that stands in his way and dare to cause havoc in his country. All this drama unfolded even before Museveni's inauguration.

This chapter will evaluate Museveni's leadership style and investigate if he falls into the category of an imperial style leader as set out in Chapter two. Furthermore, the purposed leadership behavioural index discussed in chapter two will be applied to Museveni in order to investigate if he is contributing to conflict in the region and domestically, all in order to showcase how absolute power vested in the office of the president is detrimental to a country and its stability.

## **5.2 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni**

Many observers have compared Museveni to Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, but closer scrutiny places him farther down the line. Oloka-Onyango (2005:36) provides good insight into the man that is Museveni he writes "Museveni can be described as a conundrum of paradoxes: he is a dictator with some democratic tendencies, and a market reformed Marxist. Each of these

character traits vies for expression and supremacy”. Museveni actually shares characteristics with his most hated enemies, Milton Abote and Idi Amin. Like Idi Amin Museveni has an unflinching belief in the effectiveness of military action to solve virtually every problem and he also, like Amin, had a close friendship with Muammar Qaddafi. Regarding Obote the relationship is more complex, Obote is both a mentor and nemesis, and many of Museveni’s politics closely resemble that of Obote. Like Obote, Museveni believes in the supremacy of his political organization and his own ability to manoeuvre the political elites. Central to Museveni’s worldview is the primacy of security over all public goods. Defence spending has consequently grown to overshadow any other sector as a proportion of national expenditure; even attempts by international donors to limit Museveni’s military spending have been unsuccessful. Nonetheless, during Museveni’s 25 years in office he has introduced numerous reforms to the Ugandan body politic, the economy, civil society and the state operate. Such reforms have included affirmative action for women, access to primary education, and cognisance of the struggle against HIV/AIDS. These reforms were in stark contrast to the previous leaders in Uganda and led many to praise Museveni as a new breed leader. Praises for Museveni continued, despite the fact that domestically and within the Great Lakes Region an upsurge in armed conflict has coincided with the remarkable presence of this new leader. However, recently praises for Museveni have faded and internationally people are starting to question his intentions and leadership style. In the following section Museveni’s rule will be examined within the phenomenon of conflict and its expression within the region generally and in Uganda in particular, first an overview of conflict in Uganda.

### **5.3 Conflict in Uganda**

Uganda has experienced continuing internal and external conflict, internally at least 14 districts have experienced continuing strife, however by far the most pressing conflict internally is the on going war in Northern Uganda. A civil war involving the rebel faction, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), has ravaged Northern Uganda for over 20 years. Consequently, 90 percent of the northern Ugandan population has been displaced, and some estimate that 80% of the forces in the LRA are the abducted children from this area. The conflict began as an effort to overthrow Museveni’s regime; however the most victims in this conflict have been civilians and have

devastated the economy in the Northern Ugandan region. The government of Uganda has expanded civilian protection over the years and increased the budget for reconstruction; nonetheless, due to the NRM's inconsistent position and actions in dealing with the LRA, peace has evaded this region. America has recently sent 100 troops to assist Museveni in capturing the leader of the LRA Joseph Kony, which attempts has thus far been unsuccessful (The Guardian, 2011). Uganda also became heavily involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the 1990s where Museveni tried to destabilize the Laurent Kabila regime by backing a coalition of rebel forces. At first Museveni justified his involvement in the DRC, claiming they had to protect Ugandan borders from Allied Democratic Forces, he also claimed that Uganda wanted to stop the massacres in eastern Congo. Ugandan military officers became involved in plunder and quasi-legitimate trade businesses in the areas they occupied, Uganda was ultimately found guilty of humanitarian and human rights abuses in the DRC by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2005 (Onyongo, 2005: 32). Uganda is also involved in Somalia where approximately 18000 Ugandan troops have been stationed since 2007 in an effort to increase security and put a stop to violent conflict in Mogadishu. Some observers have argued that it is not pure coincidence that conflict and instability, in both the region and locally, have increased with the advent of Museveni's rule. The next section will apply the proposed behavioural index in order to illustrate how Museveni has contributed to conflict, and showcase how his behavioural patterns as an imperial style leader can potentially contribute to conflict in the near future, locally and regionally.

## **5.4 Leadership behavioural patterns**

### *5.4.1 Political deprivation*

The first leaders' behaviour that contributes to incidents of conflict is political deprivation. What are emphasized here are actions leaders take in regards to political participation and inclusion of all groups in politics. Political deprivation occurs when the leader of a given country is preventing meaningful participation in the making of political decisions, political deprivation manifests itself through restrictions in the law or through repression. Political deprivation also includes: governmental repression, criminalization of opposition, state terrorism, electoral

malpractice and political coercion. Museveni is guilty of political deprivation in numerous ways and these actions have led to incidences of conflict and instability in Uganda. Since Museveni came in power in 1986, human rights in Uganda have improved remarkably, the press in Uganda has become considerably liberalized, and papers openly criticized the government and free press flourished. However the longer Museveni stayed in office the less free freedom of speech became. In 2002 police stormed and raided the offices of the two major newspapers in Uganda, numerous journalists and media workers were charged with defamation, sedition, and treason. Moreover, radio stations have been targeted by the Museveni government, “under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, radio stations in Uganda can be closed down if they host exile political dissidents on their talk shows. Opposition Dr Besigye was mentioned specifically in relation to this ban” (Tripp, 2004:11). Museveni stated that this ban was necessary because most stations are focusing on criticizing the government and poisoning people’s minds. Thus, the media in Uganda that was once hailed as one of the freest in Africa can today no longer be regarded as free. The arbitrariness and unpredictability with which the government restricts media workers limits true freedom of press. The same is true for freedom of association, especially regarding political parties. In general government policies have not allowed sufficient political space for the development of political parties and have actively sought to destabilize them. Hence the prize of participation in political parties is too high, given that party leaders have had to live in fear of harassment, intimidation, and death. Furthermore security forces have continued to disperse and arrest various opposition party demonstrators on the grounds that they believe the demonstration will turn violent.

National and local elections have been held on regular basis and until 2001 elections in Uganda were considered relatively free and fair (according to international and local observers). However grave concerns were raised about intimidation of military and police forces during elections, vote rigging and irregularities when counting votes in the last three elections. Museveni furthermore appoints the electoral commission, a power that has contributed to the uneven electoral playing field. During the 2001 elections Museveni used unusually violent means to oppress the opposition, he detained Dr Besigye and several of his supporters “after the 2001 election the opposition party leader Besigye complained that about 4000 of his supporters have been arrested, and that an army-sponsored paramilitary group has killed some and tortured others” (Tripp, 2004: 10). Dr Besigye had to go in exile after the election and even though



Museveni said that Besigye was free to return he accused him of being a terrorist and publically stated that he will capture and kill all terrorists. Again after the 2011 elections Dr Besigye was arrested several times and brutally detained by military forces for allegedly organizing violent protests, Dr Besigye's brutal detention was caught on camera and broadcasted on several international networks, consequently Kampala erupted in a two day brutal battle between Besigye supporters and Museveni forces. By far the most obvious form of political deprivation used by Museveni is oppression of political opposition. After being in exile for four years Dr. Besigye returned to run in 2006 elections, he was however charged with treason, illegal possession of firearms, and rape soon after returning. The government also accused him of being linked to the Lord's Resistance Army.

State terrorism is also evident in Uganda, there have been reports of subjective detentions and torture in safe houses. Some of the torture of political opponents took place in regular prisons. The Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC) found that people had been arrested and dumped in prisons without being charged, some prisoners had wounds indicative of torture. Also, in areas of rebel conflict, government soldiers sometimes torture treason suspects, the aim being to make ordinary people afraid of being considered anti-governmental (Tripp, 2004:17).

Museveni's goal of staying in power surpasses concerns for freedom of speech, freedom of association, political freedom, and even human rights. In order to create a system that allowed one person to be in power for more then two decades, the possibilities for the development of a truly competitive electoral system and real opposition have been limited. In shrinking the political space Museveni had to expand its boundaries in a way that would suppress harmless civil society advocacy and press freedom. Museveni is playing a dangerous political game as already this year people revolted in masses against his treatment of the opposition, interrupting business as riots raged for days. International observers have warned that educated young university students are slowly becoming less passive and no amount of teargas or rubber bullets will keep them quite for much longer.

#### *5.4.2 Patronage and Clientelism*

The third behavioural pattern that leads to conflict is leaders' actions with respect to patronage and clientelism. As a result of patronage and clientelism, large parts of African populations are alienated from their political systems. These alienated groups are thus forced to resort to conflict in order to reverse the socio-economic and political trends in their respective countries, the result which has been internal conflicts. Since Museveni came to power his Movement has used both patronage and clientelism to establish itself, "the relationship among the NRM, the government, and the grassroots is established primarily through mechanisms that are non-coercive which basically have to do with patronage" (Tripp, 2010: 33). Museveni patronage networks have over the years been characterized by co-optation, creation of new districts, tight control of the military, and elevation of family members to key political and military posts, amongst others. Next each of these dimensions of patronage and clientelism will be discussed.

Co-optation in Uganda happens through recruitment of elites from universalities and those in the opposition as well as outspoken female activists. For example, vocal university professors who were co-opted into government include the current prime minister Apollo Nsibambi. Co-optation has led to the creation and maintenance of patron networks, "ensuring that all decisions taken by government institutions are sanctioned by the president, entrenched of cronyism and virtually creation of a bloated state and local government, Museveni has used the benefits of this reform to buy patronage" (Mutabazi, 2010: 14).

The decentralization policy in Uganda was basically a manifestation of political patronage. Through creating new districts and local government, Museveni sought to build a patronage network that would serve him well. A variety of mechanisms were used to expand the network: firstly, control of district-level appointments. The creation of new districts expanded political administrative jobs from a total number of 6036 in 1991 to 12948 in 2006, all these new jobs having merely expanded the patronage network. Secondly, the use of central government funds, about 90 percent of the local government budget comes from central government and, as Uganda moved from having thirty-three districts in 1990 to ninety-seven by 2009, more opportunities exist for patronage. Thirdly, by the use of a tender board responsible for awarding contracts. The use of tenders for political patronage was one key reason people sought public office, tenders are supposed to go to the best possible candidate for the job, in reality, it is given to family members, friends or proxy companies. In the past years Ugandan pharmaceutical companies, construction

companies, and taxi park managers have been implicated in tender corruption along with their local government patrons. Museveni's decentralization program was hailed as a model for the rest of Africa, however with closer scrutiny the motivation behind Museveni's decentralization seems to be the broadening of his patron-client network. Ali-Mari Tripp (2010: 30) writes "the imperative of keeping Museveni and the Movement in power came to overshadow other objectives of participatory democracy as they had been articulated via the establishment of a hierarchy of local councils, from the village up to the district level...gradually all these levels where transformed into a patronage machine that linked the localities to the centre and proved especially useful during election time".

According to Transparency International (2010), Uganda ranked 127<sup>th</sup> out of 178 countries surveyed and in Sub-Saharan Africa it ranked 27<sup>th</sup> out of 47 countries, making it one of the most corrupt countries in the world. A typical example of blatant corruption is when the NRM MPs were bribed to campaign against the freeing of parties in the 2000 and 2005 referendum. A more vivid example of NRM bribery tactics was the manipulation of the democratic process involved the amendment of the 1995 constitution to lift presidential term limits. In this case 223 out of 333 MP's were each given five million shillings to support the amendment of article 269 (Muhumuza, 2000: 37). However, Museveni declared the year 1996 the year of fighting poverty and corruption, he created several new institutions and commission to address this problem, however corruption increased exponentially since these policies and offices were initiated (Tripp, 2010: 32). The reason being that the laws creating these institutions were drafted in such a way that made it a lame duck, instead of these institutions being independent and reporting to parliament, they report to the president and their head was appointed by the president. "Rather than promote democratization, these institutions have been systematically manipulated to promote vested political interest of Museveni and subsequently entrench him in power (Muhumuza, 2000:42). There is no doubt that the persistence of corruption in Uganda is a strong reason for growing discontent among Ugandans as demonstrated by decline in support for the government and increases popular protests (Mutabazi, 2010:6).

Political patronage can lead to small scale but serious conflicts as one camp accuses the other of some malicious action as each camp tends to use tricks to gain political advantage, leading to continuous instability in decision making. The creation of districts in Uganda has carved out

ethnic populations, the consequence being a re-enforcement of social networks pervading particular populations. Some of the divisions in districts have divided ethnic groups, in one case an ethnic group was split in four and more districts, with the consequence of psychological separation of people and in some cases conflict. Thus, Museveni's decentralization efforts were hailed as an example for the rest of Africa, but it soon became clear that it was merely a means to enhance his patronage system of support; his decentralization has increased local-level conflict in Uganda. "Museveni's ongoing efforts to create new districts have intensified, rather than diminished, local ethnic conflicts as the creation of districts has altered the majority/minority status of local ethnic groups and thereby intensified inter-ethnic competition in such districts as Bulissa, Kibaale and Tororo" (Green, 2008: 17).

The above raises a dangerous issue of leadership as centralizing the power in the office of the president through patronage and clientelism were trades associated with Mubarak of Egypt and Muamar Quadaffi of Libya. Van Wyk (2007:13) refers to these leaders as neo-patrimonial leaders featuring 'presidentialism', she does not identify Museveni as a presidentialist leader, however he is certainly aspiring through his corrupt government to be counted amongst these leaders. Although patronage and clientelism has not directly caused instability and violence on a large scale in Uganda, it is however slowly crippling the already stagnant democratization process in Uganda. As was proved in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it is not the elites receiving a slice of the national cake who lead movements of change, it comes from those who are marginalized by patronage and clientelism.

### 5.4.3 *Personalization of Power*

The third behavioural pattern associated with African leaders is that of personalization of power. The third behavioural pattern links with the previous pattern in that patrimonialism and clientelism leads to the personalization of power. Many authors have strongly argued that personalization of power and the state was Museveni's long-term objective from the bush war days. Personalization of power has taken the following forms: authoritarianism, strong control of the army and control and management of almost all key decision making organs of the state, and presentation of self as out-of-the-ordinary person.

Mutabazi (2010:10) writes "Twenty-five years on, he continues to be president, commander in chief, chairman of the Movement, and presides over all organs and committees of the army, even when he has officially retired". Museveni has build the army of Uganda into a fearsome force and the army remains his chief weapon of controlling power and the personalization of the state. Museveni uses the army internally to suppress conflicts, run government and all affairs of the state, he also uses the army to interfere in the politics of neighbouring countries. In order to use the army in such a way he has insured that the army stays loyal to him by making sure they are well funded and is made up of his kinsmen from his tribe. Furthermore, he has insured this loyalty by promoting his son to the rank of lieutenant colonel, Museveni has not allowed anybody in the army to supersede or outshine his son. Museveni's personalization of power through the use of the military has led to insecurity and conflict in the region and in Uganda. Uganda's involvement in the DRC especially showcased how Museveni's militarism was tinged with a high degree of arrogance and disdain for the DRC government and its allies.

It is also difficult for anyone in a party to remain in power for extended periods without others feeling that there should be an alteration in leadership, talent and vision. Therefore Museveni has protected his office jealousy, he has sacked any minister who raised opposition his rule. Museveni has also been outspoken about his attention of crushing anyone that stands in his way, he as increasingly used abusive and violent language in his speeches, to entrench a sense of fear amongst his delegates. Museveni's paranoia is best showcased through his military spending, he has invested in fighter jets and even a submarine, and he has increasingly mentioned that he will not step down without a war. Moreover, it has been mentioned that because Museveni has made himself guilty of excessive corruption and have suppressed opposition he fears leaving office and

must protect himself from prosecution or other forms of retribution, he does this through continuing to use violence and patronage in order to remain in power.

#### *5.4.4 Use of the military*

Although Uganda is not considered a military regime as the military does not exert overt control of the state, power nevertheless rest with the security forces. Uganda under Museveni has built a formidable military machine, one that has infringed itself onto nearly all aspects of national social and political life. Museveni's love and belief in the military is clearly demonstrated by his position as lieutenant general of the army and also his use of the military in dealing with political and economic affairs, for example elections, taxation and smuggling, this centrality of the security forces has in practice actually led to increased insecurity (Oloka-Onyango, 2005:38). The next section will briefly discuss the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF), the Presidential Guard Brigade and the ethnic dimension in the Ugandan military.

The number of UPDF soldiers today is estimated to be between 50 000 and 70 000, between 1986 and 2007 the government has spent twenty-six times more on defence than on agriculture, the mainstay of the country's economy. Military expenditure reached a high of US \$ 197 million in 2005. Military leadership in Uganda is the most important elite grouping, Museveni having spent much of his energy trying to gain support for both his government and himself within the military. He does this through cultivating loyal, nonpolitical military leaders, overlooking corruption in the military and trying to head off any splits. "The military leaders are placated through various forms of patronage and promotions, the strengthening of ethnic ties within UPDF command structures, and paramilitary formations" (Tripp, 2010: 72). Furthermore, Tripp writes that placating the military comes at a high price, but it is the one elite constituency that cannot be ignored so long as power is maintained through patronage and violence. UPDF's protracted involvement in the DRC and Somalia have resulted in violent conflicts, destabilization, massive loss of lives, rape, displacement, capturing of child soldiers, and other horrors of war.

The Israeli-trained Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB) has between 12000 and 14000 soldiers, and serves as Museveni's private army, or Praetorian Guard. This brigade is heavily equipped

and earns much higher salaries than regular soldiers. The PGB is also dominated by Museveni's own ethnic group and clan to cultivate loyalty. The opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), has stated "we are mindful of the grave consequences this country and especially some particular communities have suffered as a result of regimes maintaining sectarian and ethnic armies". Museveni uses this army as he wishes, they have been implemented in several scandals of abuse of civilians and torture of people expected of treason. The PGB is a feared entity in Uganda and Museveni has employed these forces during elections to intimidate voters and spread fear (Tripp, 2010: 45).

Right from the start Museveni appointed people from the western part of Uganda in leadership positions in the national security apparatus and by 2010 there were no longer any non-westerners in the core group of commanders in the UDF. Furthermore most of Museveni's closest associates since 2005 have been top military leaders, all from the west, including his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who was promoted in 2008 to the rank of lieutenant colonel and commander in charge of Special Forces. Museveni's half brother is also a general in the UDF. The western imprint is also seen in the fact that all five generals that make up the High Command of the army are from Museveni's tribe. After Museveni employed the five generals from the west, a group of lawyers petitioned the Constitutional Court to declare the appointments unconstitutional, as the constitution stipulates that the UDF must have a national character. The army responded claiming that the personnel were promoted because they were the best trained and most ideal officers in the country. Thus, Uganda military commanders and state elites make ethnicity instrumental by constructing their armed forces in a way that reinforce and revitalize ethnic identification.

According to Oloka-Onyango (2005: 40) many of the conflicts in and around Uganda are traceable to a combination of Museveni's reliance on militaristic methods and aggressive attitude towards achieving integration in the region. In 1990 Museveni backed the Rwandese Patriotic Front's invasion in Rwanda, he also backed rebel forces in Kenya against President Daniel Arap Moi. The result of these interferences was border wars with Kenya. When there was conflict in South Sudan, Uganda's support for the southerners in Sudan brought with it considerable negative consequences, as Sudan decided to back the LRA in Northern Uganda, hence this heightened the conflict within Uganda (Dagne, 2009). Also Uganda's involvement in the DRC

and Somalia were results of Museveni's obsession with the military. Therefore Museveni's heavy reliance on the military and militaristic means to achieve integration has led to the Great Lakes Region being one of the most conflict ridden areas in the world. Furthermore, Museveni's interethnic mapping of the military and charges of ethnic promotion can be ignored, disputed, and suppressed for some time, but eventually the objective of inclusive governance comes into conflict with the imperatives of remaining in power and such a conflict can have grave consequences for Uganda.

#### *5.4.5 Staying in office*

At the beginning of 2003, Uganda was gripped by two very important announcements, first was the intention of the government to allow political parties to organize and compete. Second Museveni recommended lifting the constitutional provision that stipulates that a president can stand for elections for only two terms. In Zambia, Malawi and Zanzibar the leaders proposed an amendment that would allow a third term, however Museveni recommended that term limits be removed altogether. According to Museveni the reason for removing the limit is "to allow the people to decide the number of times a person may serve as president by their support or rejection at the polls in consonance with Article 1 of the constitution, which provides that all power belongs to the people". In other words it would enable an incumbent who keeps winning elections to stay in power for life (Mugisha, 2004: 140).

Twenty-eight years ago Africa celebrated the arrival of Robert Mugabe, he mesmerized the continent and the world with his numerous degrees, polished diction and calls for reconciliation. It was only later in an act of desperate self-preservation when he began to expropriate white farmers' land that the international community, and Africa, realized the dictator they had in their backyard. In Uganda some might argue that Museveni is a Mugabe in the making - he has been president for 25 years and his policies have gradually become more desperate and oppressive.



Even though Uganda is not as rich as Zimbabwe or as strategic, the world would do well to note that the same traits that Mugabe has demonstrated in later life are all present in Museveni.

Stayism has not directly contributed or caused conflict in Uganda, however it is indirectly at the root of most of Uganda's insecurities. The longer Museveni stayed in power the more desperate his attempts at hanging on to power became giving rise to oppression, corruption and militarism. By changing the constitution in 2005 and removing presidential term limits Museveni undermined the rule of law and the fundamental basis for democracy. There is already a talk of further alterations to the constitution to lift the presidential age limit to 80 years, in order for Museveni to stay another term or two.

#### *5.4.6 Underdevelopment and Conflict*

Uganda has fertile soils, regular rainfall and sizable deposits of copper and cobalt and oil was lately discovered. By far Uganda's largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78 percent of the workforce and account for about 90 percent of Uganda's export earnings and 23 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Uganda is Africa's largest coffee producer and also exports cotton, tea and on a small scale maize. Industry constitutes 20.4 percent of Uganda's GDP. The main industries include processing of coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco, edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling (Dagne, 2009). The next presidential behavioural pattern that leads to conflict and insecurity is leaders' actions towards good governance and hence development. This section aims to argue that leader' actions resulting in underdevelopment leads to conflict, arguing from the premises that underdevelopment leads to conflict

The first is leaders' behaviour with respect to economic management. What he refers to here is the extent to which leaders incorporate economic policies that contribute to broad economic outcomes or leaders that take more irresponsible actions that undermines economic outcomes. According to Mutabazi (2010:5), by the late 1990's Uganda's economic performance was among the most successful in the world due to Museveni's economic reforms. Museveni implemented a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) amongst other economic reforms and collectively all these

new policies were called the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). Because of ERP reforms the economy which experienced negative growth in the early 1980s began to recover after Museveni took power. One of the most outstanding outcomes of Museveni's economic reforms was macroeconomic stability. Despite the world economic crises and increased oil prices Uganda continued to post positive economic growth rates, as a result poverty levels reduced from 56 percent in 1992 to 44 percent in 1997 and further to 35 percent in 2000. It can be argued that since Museveni came to power he took economic actions that contributed to broad economic outcomes through his ERP policies.

The second dimension of behaviour deals with actions regarding the provision of public goods. In this respect "the focus is on the extent to which government act to generate basic goods that are critical to development progress and citizens quality of life" (VonDoepp, 2008:5). For example broad provision of infrastructure, improving basic education nationwide, improving national security or health. Uganda has made significant improvements in social sectors like education and health. With Museveni's introduction of the Universal Education Program, enrolment in primary schools rose to 82 percent and secondary school enrolment increased with 25 percent. This resulted in improvement of adult literacy rates from 69 percent in 2005/2006 to 73 percent in 2009 (Mutabazi, 2010:6). Health care improved slightly from 1995-2006. However, according to economists "growth stimulation and increased access to basic social rights such as security, housing nutrition, and health care have to be developed in parallel with and complimentary to pro-poor growth strategy. Unfortunately this has not happened in Uganda and, thus, the result has no doubt contributed to discontent in the country" (Mutabazi, 2010:6). Therefore there are many households which remain in chronic poverty and a substantial number that moved back into poverty, most of these household are from the war ridden Northern Uganda. Furthermore, cuts in spending in education led to increased class sizes and student-teacher ratios, and consequently a general drop in the standard of education. Also, as mentioned earlier, high expenditure on security and public administration fit well with Museveni's bid to remain in power through building patronage networks, hence provisions of public goods have suffered. Nonetheless some authors argue that "the benefits of the ERP have virtually served to entrench Museveni in power as it is what he uses to maintain this wide patron network. Important state-society mediating institutions have not developed, no wonder despite the

impressive economic growth indicators, service like health and infrastructure like roads are in a very deplorable condition and declining” (Mutabazi, 2010:6).

The third dimension of behaviour is a leader’s actions towards corruption and public integrity. On the one hand VonDoepp looks at the extent to which leaders are involved in corrupt activities, and in the case where leaders are involved in such activities it can be argued that they are taking actions that are negatively impacting their country’s long term development goals. On the other hand he examines the extent to which anti-corruption rhetoric and programs exist in name or reality. As mentioned in the previous section, Uganda has been ranked amongst the most corrupt countries in the world. Every sphere of Ugandan life is saturated with corruption by the government, business, the army, and even families. Yet, Museveni’s government has had the greatest number of institutions for fighting corruption; however corruption persists on a large scale. Many scholarly works on corruption in Uganda points the finger to Museveni’s and his lack of political will to deal with corruption. Furthermore, corruption has been part of the economic and political reform process it has for instance been noted that the privatization of government agencies in the 1990’s was marred by practices such as insider dealing, influence peddling and conflict of interest and proceeds from privatization were used to build patronage networks for regime consolidation. As stated by VonDoepp there is evidence that corruption has tremendous negative consequences on countries’ development as it leads diversion of resources meant for service delivery, increase rent-seeking and other predatory behaviour.

The fourth dimension of behaviour involves action regarding the rule of law and the institutions supporting these actions. The rule of law is very important for development, it stabilizes and regulates economic and other relations within a state. Leaders take different roles when it comes to the rule of law, in other words leaders’ actions can either undermine the rule of law or they can adhere to and enhance the rule of law. Thus, leaders undermining the rule of law decrease both development potential and political conditions in their countries. From the outset Museveni’s regime has taken an anti-institutional stance which was extended to the judiciary, police and parliament all institutions that up holds the rule of law. On several occasions Museveni has shunned, criticized, ridiculed and publicly undermined the parliament, police, and judiciary. “This has resulted in totally cowed institutions, willing to do his bidding as he wishes. For Instance, according to him (Museveni) the judiciary cannot decide the future of the country,

but rather the people” (Mutabazi, 2010:12). Thus, when a few judges ruled against Museveni in an election petition challenging the 2001 elections, and ruled that the 2000 referendum was unconstitutional, he simply ignored their ruling. As an imperial ruler Museveni perceives himself as above the law and has showcased this through his dealings with institutions supposed to uphold the rule of law. This has undermined development in the country and undermined political conditions as investors are reluctant to invest in a country where the rule of law is not being respected by the leaders.

Furthermore, leaders’ actions with respect to civic and political conditions in the country and in particular whether they are providing an environment supportive of individual liberties and civic engagement represent the fifth dimension of leadership behaviour. A leader that hinders public organization and free and open expression undermines a countries development potential. Earlier sections in this thesis have addressed this topic extensively, even though Museveni incorporated the multi-party system in 2005 he has not allowed any political space for opposition, he suppresses his political opposition viciously as individual liberties are trampled on routinely by the Museveni government. Freedom of association is limited and freedom of expression is becoming increasingly restricted.

According to VonDoepp’s index regarding economic management, Museveni is enabling development through government action as he adopted several economic reforms that have served Uganda’s economy particularly good. Regarding leaders action in respect to public good provisions, Museveni actions have a neutral effect on development, as there is an unbalanced or limited distribution of public goods. Corruption and public integrity, Museveni’s actions are undermining development in that there are corrupt behaviours of political insiders and he is undermining and marginalizing anti-corruption institutions. Museveni’s actions in regards to the rule of law is also undermining development as he is violating legal rules governing authority of office he is marginalizing legal and judicial institutions in Uganda. Lastly Museveni’s actions regarding civic and political conditions are undermining development as he is routinely inhibiting public organization, free and open expression and political competition.

Chapter two examined how underdevelopment leads to conflict and using Tunisia as an example one can showcase how Museveni’s actions in undermining development can easily lead to conflict and immense instability. Tunisia, like Uganda, enjoyed high rates of economic growth

under Ben Ali. Secondly, it had undergone rapid urbanization; Kampala hosts a large urban population and the majority of Ugandans moved to urban areas in hopes of finding a job. Thirdly, Ben Ali, like Museveni, invested heavily in education from primary to post graduate level. Fifty percent of Tunisians aged 20-45 have finished university and 92 percent have gone through school. Lastly, Tunisia has been highly penetrated by mobile phone and internet usage, in Uganda the mobile phone has penetrated every village and 2.5 million people use the internet. The above mentioned achievements in Tunisia are the achievement that nourished the social forces that brought Ben Ali down. In other words, the rate of economic growth was outpaced by the rate of output of graduates from tertiary institutions. However, about 64 percent of graduates with Masters' Degrees cannot find jobs. Unemployment amongst the Tunisian youth was 30 percent. "Highly educated youth with access to the internet and mobile phone but without jobs is a time-bomb" (Mwenda, 2011:9). Uganda is producing 400 000 graduates from tertiary institutions every year, however only 20 000 are getting jobs in the public sector. As Uganda is unlikely to create more than 150 000 jobs every year the country may have more than a million unemployed graduates over the next five years. "These unemployed graduates are not going to sit around and watch the kinds of institutionalized corruption, incompetence and nepotism that we see in Uganda, they will begin to question the existing political order" (Mwenda, 2011: 9). Therefore Museveni, like Ben Ali, is nourishing the social forces that can potentially bring him down, as economic growth in Uganda has led to increased education, urbanization and increased access to communication technologies. Furthermore, the mismatched between expectations and opportunities breeds social frustration, and can lead to large scale conflict and social uprisings.

Recently an oil exploration company has discovered as much as 2.5 billion barrels of oil in Uganda's Lake Albert district. This oil is enough to change everything in Uganda as the oil is estimated to generate \$ 2 billion a year for the next 20 years. Since the discovery of the oil hopes in Uganda is high that the oil will dramatically boost the country's economy and provide much needed jobs (McConnell, 2011). However, there are concerns that the oil money will be squandered, stolen or siphoned into private bank accounts rather than invested in the roads, schools and infrastructure. Already some suspicious oil dealings have been highlighted in the Ugandan news. The discovery of oil in Uganda can lead to high-stakes conflict over control of the oil money. Museveni will face grave consequences if the oil money seizes to reach the unemployed poor youth.

## 5.5 Conclusion

The preceding section have highlighted the imperial character of Museveni, as a leader that is supreme over all organs of state, immune to the legal process, portraying himself as the “father of the nation”, and hence have personalized power to a incredible degree. By applying the proposed index developed in chapter two, this chapter has showcased how Museveni has contributed to conflict and instability in Uganda and the region and highlighted the potential of his behaviour to contribute to further conflict and instability. Museveni is politically depriving a large section of the population from politics by suppressing political opposition and limiting individual freedom. Through an intrinsically woven patronage system he has held onto power for 25 years. His personalization of power has taken the following forms: authoritarianism, strong control of the army and control and management of almost all key decision making organs of the state, and presentation of self as out-of-the-ordinary person. He has ethicized the military to ensure the continuation of the military’s support, however by doing this he has increased the potential for ethnic conflict. Furthermore, due to underdevelopment and an ever increasing poor population, the country might experience mass uprisings in the future as seen in North Africa if the newly found oil money does not reach the poor Museveni will face immense challenges of civil disobedience. Museveni is clearly following the same path as Ben Ali, Mubarak and Quadaffi, and Museveni needs to realize that, regardless of the size of his military apparatus, even the most powerful of regimes can be brought down. Resistance and reaction to poor governance can come from anywhere and can come especially from those who are the weakest or the most marginalized and that the terrorism of hunger can be more fatal than the terrorism of so-called terrorists (Oloka-Onyanga, 2011).

## **CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion**

There is no general theory of conflict that is able to explain all conflict situations. This is because every conflict possesses its own historical character and its own set of reasons. There are domestic sources of conflict such as ideology, personality, internal power struggles, and the mistreatment of ethnic minorities. External factors include decolonization, territorial disputes, external interference and refugee problems, both sets of problems are closely related. Another set of causes of conflict in Africa are human and non-human, which are closely related. For that reason this thesis does not claim to have the last word on conflict or the various types and forms of conflict. Therefore, the major goal of this thesis was to illustrate that a major contributing factor to conflict in Africa stems from the centralized and dominating nature of the office of the presidency in Africa. It has been argued that the presidency, due to a variety of reasons, has enormous powers to the extent that it has become extremely centralized, abusive and personalized and also the most powerful institution on the continent. It was argued that the colonialism and the colonial masters set the stage for the three decades of the autocratic rule after independency. In the late 1990s a wave of democratization washed out most autocratic rulers and their authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless the phenomenon of the imperial style presidency still persists in these newly found democratic states in sub-Sahara Africa. Imperial style presidents in Africa have certain trademarks, they are supreme over all organs of state, they are immune to the legal process, they perceive themselves as the “father of the nation”, and personalization of power are found in all countries ruled by imperial presidents.

This thesis presented a framework for analyzing the correlation between imperial style presidency and conflict. Consequently six behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict were indentified, namely: political deprivation, patronage and clientelism, personalization of power, use of the military, staying in office, and underdevelopment and conflict. Each of these behavioural patterns are trades inherently found in the imperial presidency in Africa and contribute to conflict either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, in order to understand the persistency of the powerful presidency, three theories on the genesis of the imperial style presidency was analyzed. It was found that due to constitutional limits and flawed design the imperial presidency still persist today, because constitutional design does not effectively address or redress the inherent tendencies toward imperial presidentialism in Africa. In their current form

African constitutions adopt a “neutral” approach to the problem of presidential dominance, African constitutions formally allocate powers between the president and the legislature, however in practice the checks and balances are absent, thus “contemporary constitutional policy not only ignores the persistence of structural rigidities from the past, but also fails to take into account the realities of normal politics in Africa, especially the vastly superior political resources of the president” (Kwasi Prempeh, 2008:121).

In order to curb the imperial tendencies of the African president it is suggested that African political institutions should be liberalized, political participation should be encouraged, and the powers of the president be trimmed down. To do this, the president should be brought within the domains of the law so that his duties, functions and authority are clearly defined by the law (Wanyama, 2000: 41). The tenure of the office of the president should be limited by the constitution and the constitutions should limit presidential ministerial appointments by putting numerical caps on the size of the presidents’ ministerial contingents. Presidential patronage opportunities outside the executive should be similarly limited by the constitution. Furthermore, positions such as those of chief justice, auditor-general, anticorruption chief and the electoral commissioner, must be constrained by an express constitutional requirement that stipulates that such nominations must receive a majority vote in the legislature (Kwasi Prempeh, 2008:121). It is in this context that ongoing constitutional reforms in African countries must be encouraged, supported and implemented. Constitutional reform should also be accompanied by the reconstitution of the national political power structure in such a way that it can accommodate all voices (Wanyama, 2000: 41). The only way to achieve these goals is to ensure that the current democratization process in African countries does not lose form, as any deviation from this process will see African countries sink in endless conflicts as witnessed by the resurgence of military coups and protest in North Africa. Furthermore, as Kwasi Prempeh (2008: 122) writes, “African politics must move beyond the fixation with ‘strong’ leadership and focus instead on building credible and strong effective institutions at both the national and local levels”. African history has proved that solely relying on self-proclaimed reformers and trusting the heroic leadership is a recipe for disaster, “concentrating power in the hands of a single individual in the name of development- is not only short-sighted, it often disappoints. If anything, an imperial presidency magnifies the cost of having an incompetent or bad leader at the helm” (Kwasi Prempeh, 2008:121).



The Great Lakes region in particular has experienced and continues to experience conflict in the form of ethnic clashes, civil wars and guerrilla activities that have overthrown governments in power, caused millions of people to be displaced, and an influx of refugees have halted development and caused further ethnic tensions. Consequently, Godfrey Okoth (2000: 13) argues that this has disrupted the socio-political harmony in this region and substituted it with antagonism and power struggle and hence had a snowballing effect of creating instability, poverty, crime and underdevelopment in this region. Therefore, Uganda, under Museveni, was used to illustrate how an imperial leader can contribute to conflict not only internally but also externally and thereby affect a whole region. Uganda was used as a case study because president Museveni is one of the longest ruling leaders in this region and was initially hailed as a “new-breed” leader that was to change the face of leadership not only in the region but across Africa. As he stayed on in office he has slowly turned in to the imperial style leader, giving way to corruption, oppression and hence conflict. Conflict caused by this style of leadership has caused great insecurity not only in Uganda but across the region in DRC, Somalia, Kenya and South Sudan.

To quote Dr. Williams Kumuyi (2006:21), “Leaders! Their dearth has imposed painful limitations on our collective existence...leadership determines success. It is a critical variable in development calculus, and its dearth is the sole restrictive force that has barred Africa and its people from moving forward and upward”. In other words, tomorrow belongs to Africa, Africa has the resources the brain and the muscle, however there is an obstacle; unless we have the right leaders doing the right thing and making the right decisions Africans may never emerge from the cocoon of misery and conflict. There can be no permanent or conclusive solution to conflict because of the complex nature of humans and their environment, there should therefore be continuous scholarly research into the causes, nature, levels, variety and incidence of conflict and its management in Africa. It was thus the aim of this thesis to make a contribution to the scholarly body of work regarding the causes of African conflict, focusing on the African presidency as a cause of conflict in Africa.

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