Building a Liberal Peace?
A critical analysis of South Africa’s Engagement in the DRC 2003-2008

by
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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Arts (International Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch

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March 2012
Declaration

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Date: March 2012
Abstract

In recent years there has been an increase in the amount of research critiquing international complex peacebuilding operations. Some of this critique is rooted in critical theory and argues how a universal replicated approach to peace and development, namely the liberal peacebuilding, possibly represents an impediment to peace itself. The liberal peacebuilding, which merges peacebuilding and statebuilding, is founded on a “Western” liberal agenda promoting political and economic liberalisation. The contemporary peacebuilding project is seen as given, with a specific unquestionable outcome, namely a liberal state. Furthermore, assumptions about the applicability of this approach, particularly in conflict areas in the South, are disputed.

As regional leading states are becoming more involved in peace processes and development in their backyards, this study aims to investigate the peacebuilding agenda of such actors. South Africa has marked itself as an important actor in peacemaking and increasingly as a significant peacebuilding partner on the continent, through multilateral as well as bilateral channels. By looking at South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 2003 to 2008, this study aims at establishing whether South Africa, as a regional actor, promotes a liberal peacebuilding. This study concludes by discussing how there is little evidence to suggest that South Africa’s strategy for peacebuilding in the DRC is differing from the liberal peacebuilding consensus. It seems evident that South Africa’s vision of African solutions to African problems and an African Renaissance is in fact guided by the liberal peacebuilding agenda and the underlying liberal norms.

Is it not the aim of this study to critique the intentions of peacebuilding. Rather, it is the assumptions about what kind of peace the liberal peacebuilding promotes that need further analysis. Through a critical theory approach this study goes beyond current assumptions about the liberal peacebuilding project and questions the foundation on which liberal peacebuilding is built. This study aims at challenging the ontology and epistemology of the current peacebuilding debate in its theoretical approach as well as its scope. The intention is to shed light on and establishing a basis for a better and more nuanced understanding of the nature of peacebuilding by including the strategy and practice of regional actors in its analysis.
Opsomming

In die onlangse verleden is dit waargeneem dat daar 'n verhoging was in die hoeveelheid navorsing wat kritiek lewer op operasies van internasionale komplekse vredesopbou. Sommige van hierdie kritiek is gewortel in kritiese teorie en redeneer oor hoe 'n universele gerepliseerde benadering tot vrede en ontwikkeling, naamlik liberale vredesopbou, moontlik 'n struikelblok tot vrede verteenwoordig. Liberale vredesopbou, wat vredesopbou paart met die bou van staat, is gegrond in 'n "Westerse" liberale agenda, wat politieke en ekonomiese liberalisering bevorder. Die kontemporêre vredesopbou projek word geag soos dit voor kom, met 'n spesifieke onbetwisbare uitkoms, naamlik 'n liberale staat. Verder word daar aannames oor die toepaslikheid van hierdie benadering betwis, veral in gebiede van konflik in die Suid.

Siende dat toonaangewend streeks-state meer betrokke raak in vredesontwikkeling in hul agterplase, stel hierdie studie ten doel om die vredesopbou agenda van sulke akteurs te ondersoek. Suid-Afrika het onlangs homself gemerk as 'n belangrike speler in vredesbou en al hoe meer as 'n beduidende vredesopbou vennoot op die vasteland, deur middel van multilaterale asook bilaterale kanale. Deur te kyk na die vredesbou rol van Suid-Afrika in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) vanaf 2003 tot 2008, is hierdie studie gerig om vas te stel of Suid-Afrika, as 'n plaaslike akteur, liberale vredesopbou bevorder. Hierdie studie sluit af deur te bespreek hoe min bewyse daar is wat voor stel dat Suid-Afrika se strategie vir vredesopbou in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo verskil van die liberale vredesopbou konsensus. Dit dui duidelijk daarop dat Suid-Afrika se visie aansienlike Afrika-oplossings vir Afrika-probleme en 'n Afrika-renaissance in werklikheid gelei word deur die liberale vredesopbou agenda asook die gepaartgaande onderliggende liberale norme.

Dit is nie die doel van hierdie studie om bedoelings van vredesopbou te kritieseer nie. Inteendeel, dit is die aannames oor die soort van vrede wat liberale vredesopbou bevorder wat verdere analise benodig. Deur middel van 'n kritiese teoriebenadering gaan hierdie studie verder as die huidige aannames oor die liberale vredesopbou projek en vra beduidende vrae oor die fondamente waarop liberale Vredesopbou gebou is. Hierdie studie stel ten doel om op die dieontologie en epistemologie van die huidige vredesopbou debat uit te daag in sy teoretiese-benadering, sowel as omvang. Die bedoeling is om gelykytydig lig te werp sowel as 'n basis vir beter en meer genuanseerde begrip te stig vir vredesopbou van die aard, deur insluiting van die strategie en praktyk van die streeks-akteurs in hierdie analise.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Mr. Gerrie Swart for his constructive guidance, encouragement and inspiration during the process of writing this thesis. His knowledge about and commitment to researching the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admirable.

I would like to thank my wonderful husband, my family and friends for their love and continuous support during this time. I am also grateful to all my good study friends – a big up for interesting discussions and buckets of inspiration during our studies.

A special thanks goes to Klaus Kotze who was so kind to take time from his busy schedule to translate the abstract into Afrikaans. Baie dankie! I also want to thank Anders N. Årsæthers og Gunvor Berli Årsæthers legat for supporting my research.


Il est plus facile de faire la guerre que la paix

It is far easier to make war than to make peace

Georges Clemenceau (1919)

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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BNC</td>
<td>South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the defence of the People of DRC</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Congolese Armed Forces (<em>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (<em>Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISPD</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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1 Introduction

Peacebuilding rose as a multifaceted and ambitious approach to peace and development in the 1990s. After realising the limited success of traditional peacekeeping and its impact on peace such as in Somalia there was a need to change the strategy; numbers showed that 50% of civil wars reoccurred within 5 years (Smith, 2004). More complex peacebuilding efforts were to create an environment conducive to peace through promoting democracy, good governance, a market economy and human security. The issue of development as such became a part of the conflict discourse and agenda (Duffield, 2001: 1).

Conflict and instability as a clear impediment for peace and development has gained extensive attention from international as well as regional actors in mediation, negotiation and peace operations in the last decade. After the end of the Cold War civil wars became a dominant part of the peace and development landscape on the African continent and have since had devastating results for many of Africa’s states and citizens. Prominent is the crisis in the Great Lakes region which has been referred to as Africa’s World War with an estimate of over five million deceased and millions displaced and the heart of its conflict located in the eastern DRC (Prunier, 2009).

In recent years there has been an increase in the critique of international peace operations. Some of this critique is rooted in critical theory and argues that a universal replicated approach to peace and development which builds on a liberal peace agenda promoting democratisation and marketisation in a top-down approach could in itself be an impediment for peace (Pugh, 2004: 39:41; Richmond and Franks, 2009). Pugh (2004:39, 41) argues that

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1 Peacekeeping is here defined as “the deployment of a lightly armed, multinational contingent of military personnel for nonenforcement purposes, such as the observation of a cease-fire” (Paris, 2004: 38). Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 6) argue how peace operations during the Cold War were aimed at containing and not resolving sources of conflict, as opposed to later complex peacebuilding operations.

2 Peacebuilding is here defined as “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a civil war” (Paris, 2004: 38). According to Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 7) peacebuilding includes a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs and areas such as security, development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening of governance of rule of law. Post-conflict reconstruction is part of the peacebuilding definition.

3 Peace operations are here defined as “any international peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding, or preventive diplomacy operations that include a multinational military force aimed at restoring or preserving peace” (Paris, 2004: 38).
such international efforts serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose\textsuperscript{4} built on the existing power relations in international politics and its liberal values, structures and ideology of good governance. The critique further states that the “liberal peace agenda” and the current project of liberal peacebuilding\textsuperscript{5} has inherent assumptions about peace and its applicability, particularly in non-Western societies (see for instance Taylor, 2007; Pugh 2004; Richmond 2008; Richmond and Franks 2009; Newman 2009). Richmond (2008:13) explains how the discourse on peace takes place within a context of “conflicting images of peace”. How we think about and conceptualise peace is decisive for theorising and making policy about peace. Challenging the current assumptions and intellectual limitations about what peace is, and how it should be made, by rethinking the conceptualisation of peace and questioning the basic assumptions of the liberal peace agenda are prerequisites for understanding contemporary peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008: 94).

Regional organisations and regional leading states have played an increasingly important role in peace efforts in unstable parts of the world (Sidiropoulos, 2007:11). Within the new international security paradigm, where regions such as South America and Africa are of relatively less international importance after the end of the bipolar world order and under the US so-called “war on terror”, a space for regional actors to define themselves as regional peace brokers and utilise regional responses to promote peace and security has opened up (Alden and Vieira, 2005; Gratius 2007; 2008). The role of these regional actors in peace processes, such as South Africa, Nigeria, India and Brazil, is increasingly receiving more attention within international relations (IR), as pivotal participants for creating peace and development in their neighbourhoods, and as emerging donors. Gratius (2008: 11) argues how “Brazil and South Africa are clearly stabilising powers which build integration agendas in their respective regions and take part in regional and international peace missions (...) both within and beyond their more immediate surroundings”.

Motivated by the increasing critique against the international community’s engagement in peace operations, this study aims at exploring the role of regional actors in peace and

\textsuperscript{4} Problem-solving theory is theory which accepts the current world order as given, accepting the assumptions of existing policy (Cox, 1981). This will be discussed below.

\textsuperscript{5} Complex peace operations and initiatives have led to a nexus of statebuilding and peacebuilding, the liberal peacebuilding. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 10) argue that complex and a broad range of peacebuilding activities and a core focus on building institutions based on market economies and democracy leads to the description of current peacebuilding as liberal peacebuilding. This will be elaborated on in chapter two.
development in order to acquire information about the engagement of such actors. This increased centrality makes this a timely area to explore. This study will focus on one such regional actor which has marked itself by its increasing central role for promoting peace and development in Africa, namely South Africa. Post-apartheid South Africa has marked itself as a strong regional actor particularly in mediation and peacemaking. The development of Africa as well as the need of finding African solutions to African problems is expressed as amongst South Africa’s main foreign policy priorities. As a promoter of an “African Renaissance” spearheaded by President Mbeki, South Africa has put considerable efforts and resources into building Africa’s institutional capacity, including the African Union and regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Lifting the continent out of its marginal global position has been a vital part of South Africa’s African agenda. South Africa has demonstrated its prominence on the continent and its commitment through various engagements in peace processes, which is argued to be premised on its own experience of a relatively peaceful transition to democracy through negotiation (De Coning, 2006).

South Africa has played a particularly significant role in the complex peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), leading the parties to a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003 and towards the first democratic election since independence, which took place in 2006. In addition to its central mediation role South Africa has also had a particularly prominent role in the peacebuilding process in the DRC (De Coning, 2006; Ajulu 2008). It is South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC which this study will explore further.

This study aims at going beyond a descriptive analysis of South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC. Through a critical theory lens this study will challenge and go behind the contemporary assumptions about peacebuilding and the actors involved. By addressing South Africa, as an African actor, and analysing what structures lies behind its peacebuilding engagement in the DRC this study will add to the theoretical and policy related debate of current peacebuilding. An inclusive framework including all actors in peacebuilding processes open up for new questions in the discourse on peace. This study aims at

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6 “South Africa” is conceptualised as the South African government in this study. See 1.4.
7 Peacemaking is defined in this study in accordance with Paris’ conceptualisation; “Peacemaking is the attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict, either by peaceful means such as mediation and negotiation, or, if necessary, by the authorization of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict [sic]”.
8 To be discussed in chapter three.
investigating whether such actors, with a starting point grounded more locally, has a different approach to peacebuilding than multilateral engagements. Through a post-positivist approach the research question is not aimed at measuring how effective South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives are, but rather to question what kind of peace is promoted.

This first chapter will serve as the motivation for conducting this particular study in terms of the theoretical approach and the related case study. Firstly, the research focus will be presented by looking at the aims and research question utilised for reaching these aims. Secondly, the motivation and significance of the study will be specified. Thirdly, the research design will be presented, elaborating on the technical elements of the project and its methodology. Fourthly, a chapter outline will be provided.

1.1 Research Aims and Research Question

Guided by the critique of liberal peacebuilding drawing mainly on the work of Duffield (2001), Pugh (2004), Richmond (2004; 2008), Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) and Richmond & Franks (2009) this study aims to:

(i) Discover and critically examine South Africa’s strategy and initiatives in the DRC peacebuilding process between 2003-2008
(ii) Critically examine if South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts, as a regional actor, are in line with the liberal peace agenda promoted by the international community

The purpose of this study is to pursue reaching these two aims by answering the following research question (hypothesis):

- Is South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC founded on the agenda of a liberal peace?

By analysing the different initiatives undertaken by South Africa in the DRC within the timeframe 2003-2008 this study attempts to answer if South Africa’s involvement in the DRC is promoting a liberal peacebuilding agenda. Through utilising critical theory this study aims at showing how South Africa's vision of African solutions to African problems and an African
Renaissance is in fact guided by liberal norms seen as universal. As such, South Africa to a lesser degree brings “African solutions” to the table in its effort to promote a long-term sustainable peace in the DRC.

1.2 Motivation and significance

1.2.1 Critical theory and peacebuilding

Studies informed by an alternative mapping and non-technical issues (...) have been relatively few and far between, overshadowed by policy-driven concerns (Pugh, 2004: 40).

The first area which this study aims at contributing to is the theoretical level. Theories of IR have been criticised for their narrow foundations with an empirical preoccupation reduced to the core of advanced industrialised states (Phillips, 2005; Duffield 2001). Thus, theoretical and conceptual frameworks have built on assumptions distinct for these often Western states. The question of whether such frameworks are applicable for other types of states needs further attention. Consequentially, the ontology, which is the categories of what is and what kind of relations exist, of mainstream IR creates analytical concerns as the world moves towards a multipolar system after the end of the Cold War. This creates a need for an incorporation of political relations and actors on a global scale. The increasing engagement of regional actors increases the distinct need for a different focus when looking at peacebuilding.

There are several perspectives of the concept of peace in IR theory. Idealism, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Marxism all have explanatory value in their conceptualisation of peace. This study, guided by a critical theory framework, does not aim to reject such “orthodox” theories. However, the methodology of these established theoretical frameworks do have inherent intellectual restrictions. Critical theory categorises these established theories as problem-solving and positivist in their methodology (Cox, 1981). Problem-solving and positivist theories are, from the view of critical theory, seen as theories which do not challenge the existing world system and the underlying environment in which power relations

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10 A deeper discussion of the concept “peace” will not be elaborated on in this study, due to space and time constraints. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of “peace” in IR, see Richmond (2008).
exist, and knowledge, in other words the way we understand the world, is produced (Cox, 1981). By accepting the assumptions and the foundation of existing policy such theories contribute to legitimating a system which is seen as unequal and where there is a lack of social justice and representation for marginalised actors (Richmond, 2008: 15).

Critical theory is not a new strand of thinking in IR, but originates from the Frankfurt School of critical social thought which took form from the 1920’s onwards (Richmond, 2008: 70). The idea of critical theory was presented as emancipatory in nature. By emancipatory it is meant at aiming at transformation of societies through reflection on power and knowledge aimed at social emancipation, as opposed to orthodox problem-solving positivist sciences. Critical theory has a post-positivist epistemology, which means a more meta-narrative method looking at how knowledge is produced and on what foundations this knowledge is built. Instead of concluding with universally applicable answers, a post-positivist approach to IR rather asks questions challenging the underlying foundation for the existing power relations in international politics.

The core of critical theory is based on Robert Cox’ (1981) famous saying that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose”. Knowledge is not objective and cannot be seen out of the context of the international structure, as opposed to positivist approaches. In other words, the argument is that all theories build on specific values and foundations, on which their epistemology of certain analyses is built and where knowledge is produced; they are subjective. Critical theory challenges the underlying structures of the environment in which actors act. Further, this approach has the potential to question and challenge these existing structures and the way we think about them and the institutions which dominate in the current international system.

Thinking critically about peace proposes a significant potential by questioning the dominating discourse of liberal peace and its underlying assumptions. More orthodox theories fail to critically question the fundament on which states and other actors engage in peace processes and peacebuilding. By questioning the empirical, conceptual and normative presuppositions inherent in the dominating discourse on peacebuilding, the underlying structures of the environment in which contemporary peacebuilding takes place will be identified. Such an approach has the potential of contributing to a more nuanced theorising on peacebuilding, the
actors and structures involved as well as increasing the understanding of peacebuilding in practice. According to Newman (2009: 50):

*The emergence of critical approaches to peacebuilding has provided a welcome opportunity to consider the significance of peacebuilding for international politics; or rather, to consider what peacebuilding tells us about the nature of international politics. This represents a real step beyond the problem-solving approaches that dominated the study of UN peace operations for decades.*

For this specific study, utilising critical theory advances the theoretical approach by questioning regional actors’ role in peacebuilding and the structures of the environment in which they operate and the peace they promote. This rationale proposes a significant explanatory value when theorising particularly about actors from the developing world, which has been argued to be continuously marginalised within global politics and in the international system. The increase of regional actor’s role in peacebuilding makes this study timely in contributing to a greater understanding of such peacebuilding efforts.

The motivation for using critical theory derives from whether a point of departure, namely a critical approach to peacebuilding, challenging the ontology and epistemology of IR could reveal new aspects of actors in peace processes. Thus, this study could possibly advance our understanding of a wider range of actors in peacebuilding processes and the peace that is promoted. Whilst a critical approach to peacebuilding remains disputed by scholars of IR, the approach remains valuable when attempting to go beyond assumptions about actors’ engagement in peace and development by identifying the foundations on which such engagements rest. However, a critical approach to peacebuilding has received criticisms for its meta-theorising nature as well as exaggerating the ability of peacebuilding actors to transform states and societies (Newman, 2009: 45). Another inherent weakness to a critical approach to peacebuilding that has been highlighted is viewing the contemporary peacebuilding project as a single hegemonic agenda of one specific interest (Newman, 2009: 46). Richmond (2008: 132) argues that “the common understanding of peace that is offered through critical theory is not therefore unproblematic, given its reliance on a specific and claimed universal set of human norms and discourse ethics, but these have brought much richer set of issues and dynamics to the debate”. Yet, it is not suggested here that actors such
as the United Nations (UN), World Bank, donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a common objective formed as a global conspiracy. Rather, critical theory is utilised to revisit the discourse of peace and create a greater awareness of peacebuilding in theory as well as in practice.

Other theoretical approaches within the critical theory tradition could, however be appropriate when analysing the increasing role of regional actors in peace processes and peacebuilding. Much has been written, and the literature is increasing, in the field of *regional power theory* (see for instance Flemes 2009, Nolte 2007, Schoeman 2003; 2007). The norms which shape the foreign policy of regional actors’ engagement in their respective regions have received specific attention. When looking at the existing theory on regional powers, a regional power is in general perceived as an important country in its region and additionally with some sort of influence on the global level. Nolte (2007: 6) explains that “the topic of regional powers refers to power hierarchies in the international system. The assessment of the power distribution depends on the vantage point and the preselected indicators”. Strong regional actors with increasing regional and international influence have also been analysed through the lens of *middle power theory*¹¹. Gratus (2008: 4) uses the term emerging powers for states such as South Africa, Brazil, India and China. She states how “an emerging power is, *per se*, a country which finds itself in a transformation process from one international position to a higher one: small power to medium power, medium to big, big to global”, related to the distribution of power in the international system. She argues how South Africa has the possibility to influence and stabilise its continent, much due to the lack of a dominating hegemon here.

In an increasingly globalised world where the power balance is shifting, another useful angle to this study might have been the utilisation of such theories. However, these theories are mainly related to the political economy position of such actors, and not towards analysing peace and development specifically¹². On the other hand, a critical theory approach to political economy could also shed light on regional powers’ engagement in peace processes.

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¹² However there are some literature and it is increasing. See Duffield (2001), Pugh (2004; 2005), Pugh, Cooper and Turner (2008) and Salih (2009) on the political economy of peacebuilding.
and peacebuilding. If refined to the respective matter such theories could potentially yield knowledge, particularly in a comparative perspective. However, in order to utilise only one theoretical approach in this study, namely the liberal peacebuilding, this theory has not been applied here and thus poses a strong potential for further research.

1.2.2 Linking theory and practice

Extensive research has been conducted concerning the UN’s role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. However, such studies have mainly focused on the policy level and been of a more technical nature, thereby lacking theoretical contextualisation. Moreover, such studies could be critiqued to be placed within the “peacebuilding consensus”, where the current approach to peacebuilding is seen as given and universal, which will be further discussed in chapter two (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 6). A critical approach to peacebuilding, with a post-positivist epistemology contributes to addressing the need in the study of IR to rethink and make globally applicable its theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundation in the area of peacebuilding.

Thus, the second area of significance for this study is the contribution of moving towards a more refined understanding of regional actors’ role in peacebuilding. In the absence of the above mentioned focus on the “South”, and actors in the South, there is a lack of empirical research on the topic. With reference to the specific case study here, the existing research on South Africa’s role in peace processes has mainly focused on South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, and mediation and peacemaking. Several analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa has been made. Previous studies have highlighted South Africa’s capacity as well as limitations in peace efforts in Africa, and argued for diverging explanations for South Africa’s broad engagement.

South Africa has since 1994 increasingly positioned itself as an active promoter of peace and development in Africa. Throughout the last 15 years South Africa has gradually increased its engagement in several African conflicts, prominently as the leading mediator in the peace

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process in Burundi, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan. Moreover, analyses of South African foreign policy have mostly focused on *cui bono* through South African foreign policy due to its strong political and economic role on the continent. There is a lack of exploring the underlying foundations of the principles guiding South Africa’s role in peace and development and its ambitious engagement particularly in the Great Lakes region. Even though South Africa’s role in mediation has been written about in length, few of these studies have provided in-depth information on South Africa’s strategy or role in peacebuilding.

Moreover, existing studies have also rarely been contextualised within a critical theory framework to peace/peacebuilding. Whilst a descriptive analysis of South Africa’s initiatives in the DRC peace process and peacebuilding would yield a degree of insight in the matter, an analysis built on a critical approach to peacebuilding could possibly advance the explanatory power and knowledge of regional actors’ efforts in peacebuilding. Yet as South Africa has marked itself as vital in peace and development through concerted engagement in African conflicts and the efforts to promote itself as an African peacemaker and peacebuilder, its peacebuilding efforts has not yet been analysed in-depth through a critical theory framework. This is the main motivation for this study.

In the existing literature South Africa’s ability and capability of creating peace in African countries is questioned, however noting that this short overview is far from exhaustive. The arguments are often split into the debate between promoting ideational and global norms, as a “partner”, or being driven by own material interest, as a “hegemon”16. Scholars such as Schoeman (2003: 360) and Kagwanja (2009: 29) presents accusations against South Africa as being too Western and not “African enough”, despite Mbeki’s rhetoric of “Africanism”, which breeds suspicion and distrust about South Africa’s *bona fides*. Kabemba (2006) and Flemes (2009) argue how capacity and effort of promoting international norms such as human rights and development of democracy, promoting a highly Westernised agenda, is limited due to suspicion of its motivations, again manifested in South Africa’s past. Kagwanja (2009) also highlights South Africa’s multilateral limitations. Neethling (2003) argues how altruism is one of the main reasons for South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping.

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16 For useful critical debates on the “Partner or Hegemon” debate related to South Africa’s role in the region, see for instance Habib and Landsberg (2003), Kabemba (2007), Kagwanja (2006), McGowan and Ahwireng-Spence Obeng (1998), Shoeman (2007) and Solomon (1997). Landsberg (2005) is less critical and argues that South Africa has played a partnership role in the region and the continent.
Schoeman (2003: 361), amongst others, argues that South Africa’s capacity to influence is overstated by its neighbours, and particularly by the West, who expect South Africa to act like a regional leader with hegemonic powers and capabilities. Alden and Soko (2005: 388) illustrate how South Africa’s role as a mediator in Zimbabwe has shown the shortcomings of its attempts at providing stability, and the inability to influence its neighbours, expressing South Africa’s “limits of hegemony”. Further, the emergence of critical literature from a political economy perspective should also be mentioned, which elaborates on South Africa’s imperialist or sub-imperialist power and intentions (see for instance Lee, Taylor and Williams, 2006; Taylor 2001; Williams 2000). Flemes (2009) builds on Pedersen’s (2002) theory of co-operative hegemony to argue that South Africa’s influence as a regional power is restrained by its historical legacy. Despite its capacity as a military and economic stronghold compared to its African neighbours the limitations of South Africa’s regional role are evident (see Kabemba, 2006; Ajulu 2008; Flemes 2009). Ajulu (2008) underlines how assumptions are made on South Africa’s potential for creating peace in its region.

Several scholars analyse South Africa’s national interest as material interest only – its economic interest. More critical scholars, such as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998), have previously argued that South Africa is concerned first and foremost with its own national security, not regional security. Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, (2001) and Taylor (2001) argues that South Africa’s *bona fides* in Africa is based on its strong economic position in the region, and its closeness with neo-liberalism and its capitalist macroeconomic policies, as well as suggesting that South Africa benefits from maintaining the status quo.

Despite South Africa’s commitment to economic, military and “diplomatic” engagements in the region, several authors argue that African states and actors proves uncommitted to South Africa’s foreign policy actions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Landberg and Hlophe, 1999; Taylor and Williams; 2001; Alden and Vieira, 2005; Kawanja, 2006). Lee, Taylor and Williams (2006) analyse South Africa’s increasing diplomacy and role as a bridge builder between the North and the South in multilateral channels and state that South Africa’s global position is of a neo-liberal approach, despite as Lee, Tyler and Van der Westhuizen (2001) argue, acting as reformist in multilateral forums. Lee, Taylor and Williams (2006: 183) argue further how South Africa’s peace support efforts
on the African continent are built on a neo-liberal foundation, thus questioning if these efforts are likely to promote long term sustainable peace. Williams, P. (2000) has written an interesting study guided by Critical Security Studies literature arguing how South Africa must search for a different development approach than the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan (GEAR) in order to deal with poverty, inequality and unemployment. Williams further highlights the contradiction of the neo-liberal economic policy and the incapability of dealing with such issues at home.

However, South Africa’s approach in the *White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions* (DFA, 1999) emphasises the normative foundations which represent its national interest. Kagwanja (2009) for instance, argues that the driving factors for South Africa’s involvement in conflict resolution and stabilisation are diverse, from aspirational, in other words the promotion of human rights and democracy, to more pragmatic concerns related to the instability and conflicts having effects for South Africa. According to Sidiropoulos (2007:1):

> Many argue that South Africa’s promotion of human rights and democracy in its external engagement is motivated by its principles. The country can be regarded as increasingly driven by realpolitik however. (...) Much of South Africa’s foreign policy is still driven by its values, though. (...) South Africa believes that attempting to counter the global system’s skewed nature must be a crucial element of its foreign policy. The country’s very active multilateralism can partially be explained by these factors.

Within IR theory, diverging analysis are proposed on South Africa’s role in peace and development in the region. From a realist perspective the peace initiatives in the resource rich DRC and particularly its involvement in peacebuilding will be explained as driven by South Africa’s own interest and benefit (Gueli, 2008). Explanations following a liberalist perspective argue for an idealist approach based on norms and values facilitated through multilateral cooperation and as such, South Africa’s engagements are based on the benefit for international peace and security. Critical analysts, such as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) and Taylor and Williams (2001) argue that South Africa is facilitating its own and
other capitalist forces to access and exploit the resources in the DRC, based on neo-liberal principles.

It is evident that academic contributions on South Africa’s foreign policy propose a contradictory and ambiguous picture on the role South Africa plays in relation to its region, the continent and in the global context, despite a somewhat consistency in its foreign policy when it comes to peace and development\(^\text{17}\). However, a complementary view of diverging factors also seems to be the general argument in previous research. These are interesting views to bring into this study. Moreover, this ties into the critique of South Africa as more Western than African, which also feeds into the motivation for this study for a deeper analysis of the foundations on which South Africa builds its peacebuilding engagements, conducted by looking specifically at its role in the DRC.

By focusing on peacebuilding through critical theory this study offers a refined understanding of one regional actor engaging as an agent in the nexus of peace and development in its neighbourhood. Daley’s (2007) study on the peace process in Burundi should be mentioned here. Daley argues that peace agreements are not a compromise for peace, but rather a stalemate between international, regional and local actors. Further, he claims that the Burundi peace process is a struggle between different visions of peace. Regional actors attempted to implement an alternative policy suited for the African context, as opposed to the international community and Western donors, however they had to accept the “imposition of the liberal peace” (Daley, 2007: 334).

The aim here is not to see South Africa as a solution, or obstacle, to the conflict, or to criticise the South African government’s extensive engagement in the search of peace in the DRC. By analysing South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement through a critical theory framework this study challenges assumptions about engagements in peace processes. Such assumptions have received little attention. This study thus supplements the existing research thereby refining the understanding of such engagements. Critical theory contributes to unveiling the structures that South Africa promotes in its peacebuilding initiatives, and moreover clarifying the environment in which these initiatives takes place.

\(^{17}\) It should be noticed that a minority of the academic literature on South Africa’s foreign policy has been contextualised within specific theoretical frameworks; some exceptions are Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen (2001), Taylor (2001), Taylor and Williams (2001; 2006) Vale and Taylor (1999) and Williams (2006).
1.2.3 The complex conflict in the DRC

The third level where this study will add significant analysis is of empirical and geographic relevance to the DRC and South Africa’s engagement there. The multiple crises in the Great Lakes region, including the DRC, have engaged extensive attention from regional and international actors in mediation, negotiation and peace operations in the last decade. Extensive research has been done both on the conflict in the DRC and the instability in the Great Lakes region, the peace process and the peacebuilding phase. The DRC is moreover a significantly important country for stability and development of the African continent, due to its vast area and borders to nine African countries, and its massive resources posing a great potential for Africa (Kabemba, 2006: 152). Despite the peace process “the Inter-Congolese Dialogue”, led by South Africa, the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, the holding of democratic elections in 2006 and the formation of a power-sharing government there has been little success in stabilising the country, particularly in the eastern parts. The largest UN mission in the world, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with close to 20,000 peacekeepers has had great challenges in fulfilling its mandate of mainly protecting civilians and creating stability in the war torn eastern Congo. However, despite its weakness, the UN mission has still played a significant role in the DRC, particularly with regards to the 2006 election.

Although there has been a significant increase of studies and policy briefs on the situation in the DRC, few academic literary works has focused on peacebuilding in the DRC. Most of the existing studies are also policy related and have been conducted outside a theoretical framework, except for recent studies such as Eriksen (2009) and Autesserre (2007; 2008; 2010). Eriksen utilises a critical theory framework discussing the liberal peace, and Autessere a “top-down peacebuilding” approach critiquing the international peacebuilding approach in the transitional phase from 2003-2006 for not including peacebuilding on the local level. Additionally, Swart (2010; 2011) has made recent contributions looking at the DRC post-peace accord identifying the gains and challenges for peace in the DRC and how the status quo of “no war, no peace” is perpetuated in the eastern DRC. Koko (2011) argues that there

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19 Turner (2007) has one chapter on the DRC post-conflict. Prunier (2009) has also dedicated one chapter of his book to the transition period.
will be no peace in the DRC as long as local conflict dynamics is not addressed properly and root causes are included in the peacebuilding process, including on a regional level. However, these studies’ main focus is to identify what has failed as a consequence of international peacebuilding. This study aims at contributing to existing studies by identifying whether South Africa, as a regional African actor, has a similar approach to peacebuilding as represented by current attempts by the international community.

South Africa has played a particularly dominant, committed and critical role in the complex mediation efforts and peace agreements in the Great Lakes region, namely in Burundi and the DRC (Kagwanja, 2006; Sidiropoulos, 2007; Ajulu, 2008: 272). South Africa has been an important actor in the mediation efforts and transitional process, through negotiating peace agreements that led to transitional governments (De Coning, 2006; Ajulu, 2008), as well playing a central role in post-conflict and reconstruction initiatives. In the DRC, South Africa’s role has seemingly changed from mediator into being more explicit a peacebuilding “partner” after the finalisation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2003 (Ajulu, 2008: 256).

Some focused research has, however, been conducted on South Africa’s role in the DRC peace process, although with the predominant focus and analysis on mediation and peacemaking and not on South Africa’s peacebuilding role (Gueli, 2008). It is also argued here that little attention has been given to a critical view on peacebuilding in general, which leaves a major gap in the study of African conflicts, peace processes and peacebuilding. This study will thus add to the existing literature by filling a gap through providing a critical analysis of South Africa’s initiatives in the post-conflict process in the DRC from 2003-2008. This need in IR will be addressed by rethinking and making globally applicable its theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundation, with a core focus on the African context.

1.3 Methodology and research design

The purpose of this study is to explore South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC through a critical theory approach. This study will be descriptive as it discovers South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives. Additionally, it will be of an exploratory nature, as it will explore South Africa’s peacebuilding role in depth through a critical theory lens. Importantly, this

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study will apply existing critical peacebuilding theory, draw conclusions and further show wider applicability and how it can influence existing theory with regards to actors in peacebuilding. The study is thus deductive as it aims at discussing and testing existing theory and concepts, in a sort of top down approach. This is opposed to inductive studies, where the data often leads to developing concepts (Yin, 2011: 93). Yin (2011: 94) highlights how deductive studies usually are qualitative. This study, based on the nature of the research question, will be of a qualitative nature. The study will analyse official government documents from existing primary and secondary sources, in addition to building on relevant secondary sources on the topic, such as academic articles and literature, and other relevant textual sources.

Due to the nature of the research question and the descriptive and exploratory research, a single case study design was chosen for this specific study. A case study adds to a theoretical and empirical field through analysing each empirical case separately usually in a qualitative manner. Consequently, such a design has the function to supplement more generalised or quantitative studies and importantly contribute with case specific theoretical and empirical explanatory value. It is important to note that findings of a case study are generally applicable to a certain context, due to the specificity of the theoretical approach merged with the case study. Therefore, one must be aware of drawing conclusions on single case studies to a certain extent is a generalisation (Yin, 2011: 98). Regardless, this study will contribute with data for a deeper understanding of South Africa’s engagement in peace processes and peacebuilding, with specific reference to its role in the DRC. Moreover, it potentially could have applicability to other regional actors and peacebuilding processes. It also advances the contemporary discourses on peacebuilding, and the role of different actors in such processes. This case study will be informed by theory, due to its deductive nature. Through a post-positivist approach the research question is not aimed at measuring how effective South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives are, but rather to question how we think about peace. This is decisive for theorising about and making policy for peacebuilding. Awareness about the methodology utilised when thinking about peace is fundamental for the understanding of peace, as a theoretical and empirical concept.

The data gathering is mainly of three different categories. First is the theoretical data regarding the liberal peacebuilding. Second is data related to South Africa’s peacebuilding
role in Africa, and third, data on South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC. This study, for the empirical parts, mainly uses South African government sources to explore South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC, and the structures which South Africa expresses as the foundation for its engagement. Several sources of information strengthens a case study approach, thus one must be aware that for this study, the expressed views and actions of South Africa’s role in peacebuilding is used as the foundation for the research. This is mainly due to the lack of other sources on the topic, which a larger research project could have utilised. However, using a single case study and a critical theory approach, the validity of this study is not meant to present an unquestionable hypothesis. Rather, it will be a contribution to increase the knowledge about peacebuilding in order to stimulate the theoretical and practical debate built on the accessible empirical evidence.

1.4 Delimitations/limitations

Due to time constraints, financial and practical constraints, the analysis of this study will limit itself in several aspects. Firstly, this study is restrained (delimited) to looking at the South African government’s engagement in the DRC peacebuilding. The level of analysis in this study is limited to focus on the relations between South Africa and the DRC on a state level. The choice of the state as an ontology for this study is made based on the prominent relationship between South Africa and the DRC on a state level. However, critical theory is used going beyond the orthodox state level focus in IR, as well as challenging the understanding of peace, and the actors involved. This is to some extent challenged here, as South Africa is not seen as one of the core states in the international system. Moreover, it is recognised that due to such delimitation, dynamics that would be highlighted by a different level of analysis, such as global, regional and local, certain weaknesses can arise. Also, South Africa is only one of the actors in the peace process in DRC. The involvement of the UN and other actors, except for where South Africa’s engagement through MONUC is relevant, will not be taken into account in this study.

Secondly, the access to public information has shown a limitation. Primary sources are limited to those publicly accessible, also meaning that some information will not be accessible. Secondary sources will be utilised in order to balance this constraint. However, there are limitations on how reliable and adequate information can be obtained. For this study,
the South African government has also been restrictive on the information sharing related to South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in general and towards the DRC. Using government as well as other sources might also pose a risk for using biased sources.

A third limitation, and delimitation, of this study is its scope. A broader or comparative analysis of South Africa’s engagement in peace processes on the continent would provide a more comprehensive study, from which more general conclusions could be drawn. Further, a study of all South African engagement, including private sector engagement, could shed light on the dynamics and contradictions of its presence. However, as proposed above, this study is limited to suggesting a framework for understanding the peacebuilding initiatives of South Africa’s government. Additionally, the contribution could be applicable to other regional actors in peacebuilding and leave possibilities for comparative analyses.

A fourth delimitation of this study is the time frame. It is delimited to 2003 till 2008; from the finalisation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue agreement to the end of Mbeki’s presidency. Between 1996 and 2003 South Africa was engaged as one of the main mediators in the conflict in the DRC. However, the time frame after the signing of the peace agreement in 2003 will be the core focus of this study. This is also delimited as a result of the prominent role President Mbeki has had in relations to the DRC peacebuilding process and in promoting African peace and development. President Mbeki was central in the DRC peace process from the time when he became president in June 1999, until he stepped down in September 2008. Further, it is behind the ambit of length and focus of this study to give a comprehensive overview of the 1997-2003 period. However, as part of the historical background, and to get a comprehensive backdrop for South Africa’s peacebuilding role, the peacemaking will be briefly assessed as a part of chapter three.

A fifth delimitation relates to the theoretical nature of the study. This study aims at analysing South Africa’s engagement in peacebuilding. As indicated above several other theoretical frameworks could be utilised here. However, as indicated above and as will be elaborated on in chapter two, the selection of a critical approach to peacebuilding could unveil a deeper understanding of South Africa’s peacebuilding role that more orthodox theories of IR would fail to provide.
1.5 Chapter outline

This first chapter has identified the context and motivation for the research to be conducted. The research question has been presented and will guide the further work of the study and to be answered in the final chapter. Further, the purpose and the significance have been clarified and the methodology has laid the frame for the study.

Chapter 2 Theorising peacebuilding

Chapter two will present the theoretical debates on peacebuilding. Current understandings of peace will be explained as a foundation for the further exploration of critical theory and the concept of peace and peacebuilding. This chapter will, through critical theory, present and discuss the assumptions about current liberal peacebuilding and present some of its inherent contradictions. This proposed framework will serve as the theoretical foundation for the further chapters.

Chapter 3 South Africa promoting peace in Africa

In accordance with the proposed theoretical framework in chapter two, chapter three will trace various dimensions of South Africa’s role in peace processes in general, with a specific relevance to Africa. This is done firstly by establishing how South Africa has positioned itself through statements and policy documents in order to show what role South Africa has pictured itself to have in peace and development in the region. Further, the study will identify the foundations for South Africa’s peacebuilding engagements.

Chapter 4 South Africa’s peacebuilding project in the DRC

Chapter four will provide an in depth analysis of South Africa’s initiatives in the DRC within the given time frame of the study, 2003-2008 guided by the theoretical framework to be suggested in chapter two. This chapter will argue how South Africa has changed from a peacemaker in the DRC to a peacebuilder engaging in a broad range of areas. Further, the chapter will investigate, based on chapter two and three, the foundations on which South Africa has built its peacebuilding engagement in the DRC.
Chapter 5 Building a liberal peace?

Finally, chapter five will bring together the analysis conducted and conclusions reached in the preceding chapters. Using a critical theory approach to peacebuilding, chapter three and four has led this study to the conclusion that South Africa is building a liberal peace in the DRC. This chapter will also highlight the most important contradictions in South Africa’s peacebuilding role. Further, this chapter will summarize the explanatory value of critical theory and how this approach advances the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. The chapter will conclude with policy recommendations and possible areas for further research.
2 Theorising peacebuilding

2.1 Introduction

This study is guided by an attempt at advancing the understanding of regional actors in peacebuilding, focusing on South Africa. Informed by the dominating debates on South Africa’s regional role, revisited in chapter one, this chapter will stimulate the theoretical thinking about peacebuilding. This will be conducted by using a critical approach mainly building on the works of Richmond (2008) and Richmond & Franks (2009), as well as Duffield (2001), Pugh (2004) and Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009).

This chapter will challenge the ontological and epistemological barriers of the current discourse of peacebuilding guided by a framework based on critical theory. Thinking critically about peace presents a potentially valuable avenue for attempting to question the dominating discourse of liberal peace and its underlying assumptions. Only by questioning the empirical, conceptual assumptions inherent in the dominating discourse on peacebuilding, the underlying structures of the environment in which contemporary peacebuilding takes place can be identified. Hence, this approach has the potential of contributing to a more nuanced theorising on peacebuilding and increasing the understanding of peacebuilding in practice, in a broader and critical perspective.

Firstly, this study will be contextualised within existing IR theory on peace and peacebuilding. Secondly, the origins of peacebuilding will be briefly presented as a backdrop for the further theoretical framework. Thirdly, the motivations for using critical theory in the discourse on peace will be presented. Fourthly, a presentation and discussion about the liberal peace and the critical approach to the liberal peacebuilding will be given.

2.2 Globalising actors in peacebuilding

As touched upon in the previous chapter IR has been criticised for its narrow foundations with an empirical preoccupation reduced to the core of advanced industrialised states. Theoretical and conceptual frameworks are as a consequence of such narrow foundations built on assumptions distinct for such states. Phillips (2005: 2) argues that “the ‘Third World’ has systematically and unjustifiably been excluded from the purview of mainstream IR”, as have
to a certain extent issues and discourses of peace. Arguably, the ontology of mainstream IR has to a certain extent been reduced to the major world powers (Phillips, 2005). This “mainstream intellectual hegemony” creates analytical concerns as the world moves towards a multipolar system after the end of the Cold War. Despite an increase in IR on emerging actors outside the west there is still a great need to incorporate such actors. Herein lays a challenge for orthodox theories of IR. Thus, there is a great need for incorporating political relations and actors on a global scale, which this study aims to address.

The emergence of regional actors as prominent in peace and development is an important motivation for this study. Peacebuilding could arguably often be related to UN peace operations, with military and political efforts. However, such international initiatives are only part of a much wider spectrum of activities and actors in peacebuilding. This study aims to contribute to address this need in the study of IR by rethinking and making globally applicable its theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundation, here with a theoretical and empirical focus on the African context. An inclusive analytical framework which examines regional actors’ engagement in peacebuilding will contribute to advancing the explanatory value of the topic. This approach will go beyond an “orthodox” focus in peacebuilding and the critique aimed at such international efforts. By focusing on regional actors in peacebuilding, in this case South Africa, this study challenges the ontology not only on major world powers, but also multilateral actors such as the UN. Further, the approach proposes a post-positivist methodology, as touched upon in chapter one. Therefore, this study has the potential to contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding of what kind of peace actors in the field, including those engaging in their own regions, promotes. Advancing this understanding will further lead to academic and policy clarifications and contributions.

2.3 The origins of peacebuilding

Peacebuilding consists of a massive and diverse field of study, policy and practice which shapes the thinking and practice of peacebuilding in different ways (Richmond, 2008: 3). Diverging definitions of peacebuilding exists between scholars, policy makers and those working in the field. As a result, the diverse interpretations and practices of peacebuilding could be described as diverging sets of beliefs rather than one coherent theory. Different
approaches to peacebuilding propose diverging understandings of its theoretical and the practical concept.

Before going into the critical theory view of peacebuilding a short review of the history of the term peacebuilding will be revisited. Johan Galtung, seen as one of the main intellectuals in peace studies, first introduced the term peacebuilding in 1975 in his article “Three approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding”. Galtung (1975: 297) proposed peacebuilding as the structure of peace based on a mechanism offering an alternative to war where “structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur”. According to Galtung’s understanding, peacebuilding in its basic form aims at creating a sustainable peace based on structural solutions addressing root causes of the specific conflict, by building on local capacities. Lederach (1997: 184) has argued for a broader understanding of peacebuilding towards a conflict transformation through a holistic and multi-faceted approach to broad social participation, “building relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes and structures”.

*Peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct* (Lederach, 1997: 84).

Peacebuilding is defined by Paris (2004: 38) as “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a civil war”. More concretely, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 7) state how peacebuilding includes a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs and areas such as security, development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening of governance of rule of law.

Paris (2004: 2) argues how challenges in the security arena after the end of the Cold War led to the UN becoming a leading organisation in post-conflict missions in the 1990s, when
peacebuilding in practice emerged as a broader approach to peace and development. These missions were to take the shape of peacebuilding operations where the UN, other leading governmental and non-governmental organisations would play a leading role. The shift towards more intra-state conflicts made humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians as one of the core tasks for these missions, together with establishing conditions for stable and long-lasting peace.

Despite the strong efforts, the limited success of traditional peacekeeping, mainly by the UN, created a need for a broader approach to making or keeping peace. Previous peacekeeping missions showed an insufficient impact in attempting to create peace in the changing nature of conflict as 50% of civil wars reoccurred within 5 years (Smith, 2004). This created an increased focus on addressing root causes of conflict as well as linking peace and development in order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace. The nexus of peace and development created a complex and rather specific peacebuilding focus including addressing root causes of conflict, including structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors.

As a reaction to these needs the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali (1992) established the term post-conflict peace-building on the international agenda in 1992 in his report to the Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Here, the definition of peacebuilding is a project for (re)building nations after conflict and “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Importantly, this UN definition underscores that “post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development although also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace”. An Agenda for Peace further calls attention to the broad and complex approach of peacebuilding by observing peacebuilding, “in surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions” (Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1992).
Subsequently to “An Agenda for Peace”, several other UN documents addressed peacebuilding, further expanding this notion. In 2000 the definition of peacebuilding was refined to "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000: 3). It is noteworthy that project of peacebuilding here was underlined as a hybrid of politics and development (UN, 2000: 8). Further engaging with local parties and having a multidimensional engagement was highlighted. In 2006 the Peacebuilding Commission was established to support UN efforts of peacebuilding followed by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office (UN, s.a.). The Peacebuilding Commission’s role is to coordinate, marshal funds and to carry out “advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace” (UN, s.a.).

In the African context, the AU is responsible for peace and development on the continent. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is the socio-economic development programme of the AU, approved a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework in 2005. This framework was followed by the AU adoption of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy in 2006. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework is an African agenda, and a common platform for all actors for “post-conflict reconstruction” merging “the nexus of peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding” (NEPAD, 2005; iv). The framework defines peacebuilding as an “action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” and further “managing the transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace and development” (NEPAD, 2005: iii). The NEPAD policy will be discussed further in the following chapter when addressing South Africa’s peacebuilding strategy in Africa.

The conceptualisation of peacebuilding is representative for the ways of measuring and evaluating effectiveness (Newman, 2009: 27). More narrow and technicist definitions might more easily evaluate international peacebuilding projects as successful. On the other hand,

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21 The AU and NEPAD use of the term “post-conflict reconstruction” is here analysed as an equivalent to the term “peacebuilding” in accordance with the argument of a liberal peacebuilding in this study.

22 For a useful discussion on post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa, see Kotzé and Solomon (2008).
broader definitions could lead to more modest conclusions of the achievements of such projects. Reflected in the definitions above, the creation of new structures and environments for peace are seen as the core of peacebuilding, either in a post-conflict situation or during conflict. These structures are to be based on addressing root causes as well as local capacities in the country concerned. Peacebuilding is thus a much broader and ambitious activity than traditionally limited peacekeeping or peacemaking efforts, as long-term stability is the goal, either after or in some instances during conflict (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008: 2).

Peace operations represent a nexus where efforts for peace, security, development and state building meet – with the aim of creating a sustainable peace. There is a noticeable convergence of the notion of development and security, or peace. It is not just a policy concern; it has political and structural implications. This integration opens up for a lot of questions related to the agenda of peace, and what kind of peace is the aim of such comprehensive projects. These questions, seen as assumptions and contradictions in current peacebuilding projects, and how peacebuilding is politicised, will be discussed in depth below guided by critical theory.

2.4 Thinking critically about peace

Before venturing into an analysis of the term peacebuilding it is necessary to present the methodology and an explanatory potential of critical theory. This particular theory is utilized in this study, based on its potential to contribute to the current theoretical debates of peacebuilding towards a broader understanding of peace and peacebuilding. How we think about peace is decisive for theorizing about and making policy for peace processes and peacebuilding. Awareness about the methodology utilised when thinking about peace is fundamental for the understanding of peace, and peacebuilding, as a theoretical and empirical concept.

Richmond (2008: 122) argues how critical theory has opened up for a greater influence and richer debates in IR. With its origins rooted in the Frankfurt School of critical social thought in the 1920s, the core of critical theory has been its aim to transform societies through unveiling patterns of power and knowledge. Its post-positivist epistemology opens up for
seeing patterns of knowledge production, and how knowledge is produced. Critical theory asks questions which challenge international politics and its power relations, rather than claiming to find unquestionable answers which are universally applicable. Further, it unveils the norms on which the international system is built on.

Richmond (2008: 13) presents the discourse on peace as taking place within a context of “conflicting images of peace”. As mentioned in chapter one the established frameworks of Idealism, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Marxism all have conceptualisations of peace which has inherent theoretical value. However, the restrictions of these theories, particularly due to their problem-solving and positivist nature, have theoretical and practical limitations. Richmond (2008: 1) argues that the discourse on peace has been “concerned with a balance of power between states rather than the everyday life of people in post-conflict environments”.

The methodology of these established theoretical frameworks, here meant as the dominating schools of realism, liberalism and constructivism, fail to critically question the underlying structures of the environment in which states and other actors engage in peace processes. A critical approach to peace and peacebuilding has a unique potential of contributing to this gap in theorising about peacebuilding, providing a more nuanced understanding of the peacebuilding project. Richmond (2008: 17) bases his methodology on critical theory and in accordance with Cox’ (1981) argument of knowledge as subjective. Thus, peace is a subjective concept which understanding depends on different actors’ definition, method, ontological and epistemological approach, as well as the level of analysis, thus being subject to many different interpretations. All theories build on specific values and foundations as a result of their ontology and epistemological nature. The historical context in which peacebuilding takes place is vital for analyses of critical theory (Richmond, 2008: 124). This is an important backdrop for understanding the liberal peace, which is shaped in a liberal environment. Newman (2009: 50) and Richmond (2008: 12) argue how critical approaches to peacebuilding thus provide knowledge about international politics and further uncover relations of power and knowledge within the current international system.

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23 Problem-solving and positivist theories are, from the view of critical theory, seen as theories which do not challenge the existing world order and the underlying environment in which knowledge, the way we understand the world, is produced (Cox, 1981).

24 For a thorough discussion on the conceptualisation of peace in IR theory, see Richmond (2008).
Thinking critically about the subjective concept of peace, how it is theorised upon and what peace should be and bring about is an important element in the method of critical theory. Questioning given assumptions about peace could possibly unveil contradictions of the current peacebuilding project, and in this study including regional actor’s involvement in peace processes. Further, critical theory has the potential to identify the existing structures influencing the foreign policy behaviour of regional actors in peacebuilding. Further, it opens up for questioning and challenging these structures and the way we think about them, including the institutions which dominate the current international system and how they lay the frames for how we think about peace. Moreover, seeing through a critical lens and understanding peace as an emancipatory peace includes marginalised actors and discourses (Richmond, 2008: 15). These are some of the main potentials of explanatory power of critical theory that other theoretical approaches cannot offer. Richmond (2008: 131) explains:

“Critical theories offer a vision of an emancipatory, everyday and empathetic form of peace in the context of a post-conventional, post-Westphalian IR. This is a post-sovereign peace, though it extends aspects of idealist, liberal, structuralist and pluralistic debates (a common peace system and emancipation), to produce a powerful critique of the liberal peace and its underlying liberal-realist problem solving framework which rests on territorial sovereignty. It is driven by an intellectual question about what form emancipation would take in material and discursive terms, and how it can be achieved”.

Thus, critical theory has a strong potential for advancing the discourse and practice of peace and the complexity of peacebuilding, going beyond orthodox assumptions and questioning inherent contradictions within the current debates on the peacebuilding project. The aim of this study is not to utilise critical theory in order to criticise external actors who contribute with knowledge, capacity and resources to peace processes. Rather, the choice of critical theory is motivated by its potential to challenge the ontology and epistemology of approaches to IR and opening up for a broader and deeper discussion on peacebuilding.

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25 In this study the concepts of emancipatory peace and long-term and sustainable peace will be used interchangeably.
For this specific study, utilising critical theory advances the theoretical approach by questioning regional actors’ role in peacebuilding and the environment in which they operate and the peace they promote. This rationale proposes a significant explanatory power when theorising particularly about actors from the developing world, which has been argued to be continuously marginalised within global politics and in the international system. The increase of regional actors’ role in peacebuilding makes this study timely in contributing to a greater understanding of such peacebuilding efforts.

2.5 Liberal peacebuilding

2.5.1 The liberal peace thesis

“The nature of the international order is heavily contested in theoretical, methodological, ontological and epistemological terms, meaning that the consensus on the contemporary liberal peace represents an anomalous agreement rather than a broad-ranging consensus.”

(Richmond, 2008: 6).

The dominant debate about the concept of peace in contemporary theory - and practice - is the liberal peace, an understanding of peace with its foundation grounded in liberal thinking (Richmond, 2008). Immanuel Kant is seen as the father of liberal peace, where political and economic liberalisation is a prerequisite for creating an environment and structures for peace. Paris (2004: 6) argues that the idea that democratic and liberal states would be more peaceful underlies this debate. The promotion of a liberal democracy and a market economy would thus be a remedy for conflict as it is less likely that such states will go to war against each other (Paris, 2004: 22). The idea of democratic forms of governments as being more peaceful goes back to the Enlightenment and early liberal thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith26 (Paris, 2004: 41). However, the idea of a liberal peace has been transferred to a post-Cold War environment which is increasingly multipolar and where conflicts to a large extent are of an intrastate nature. Thus the idea of a liberal peace is viewed suitable also for preventing or curbing intrastate conflicts.

26 See Paris (2004: 41) for a thorough discussion on the liberal/democratic peace argument. The liberal peace could, according to Richmond (2008: 90), be perceived as “a normal condition of the interaction of liberal states”, a “democratic peace”.

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Duffield (2001: 11) explains:

The idea of liberal peace (...) combines and conflates ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, transformative measures. While this can include the provision of immediate relief and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and society sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy.

According to Richmond and Franks (2009: 4) the conceptual framework for the liberal peace “has emerged through a complex evolution within a very specific political, economic, social, conceptual and methodological environment, which has universal ambitions, nevertheless”. As such, peace is to be reached by building the foundation for state security and human security issues including democratisation, human rights, civil society, the rule of law and economic liberalisation, meaning free market reform and development (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 3). Building a liberal state implies that peace equals governance, and the institutions of this liberal state is essential for the construction of the liberal peace (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 6). Richmond and Franks (2009: 6) describes this as follows: “The liberal state provides the framework for the creation of peace at local, state and international levels through governmentalism and its relation to institution building. This has become the most common form of peace, applied by international actors through a methodological peacebuilding consensus in conflict zones”.

The complex peace operations emerging after the end of the Cold War, involving the UN, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, took the shape of ambitious projects attempting at creating peace through the construction of the liberal state (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 4). It is also evident in the UN definitions of peacebuilding that the liberal
peace is a consensus for peacebuilding, focusing on the building of environments and structures, or institutions, conducive for the emergence of a liberal state. The liberal peace, through a critical theory lens, is then seen as the current dominant, and given, discourse and epistemological approach to peace in IR theory\textsuperscript{27} (Richmond, 2008: 6; 13).

2.5.2 The critique of the liberal peace

As the idea of a liberal peace between liberal states is part of the framework for seeking peaceful solutions to contemporary conflicts, Duffield (2001: 11) argues that despite the end of the Cold War and a change from more interstate to intrastate conflicts, the shift from traditional peacekeeping to more complex peacebuilding clearly indicates how policy has changed – not necessarily the nature of conflicts\textsuperscript{28}. In traditional peacekeeping the aim of peacekeeping mission was to contain a peace and prevent the escalation of violence. However, in contemporary complex peacebuilding projects the aim is to build peace through building liberal states. Paris (2004: ix) argues that there has been one common strategy for all peacebuilding projects in post-conflict societies in the 1990s; immediate democratisation and marketisation. As such, the liberal peace is not a neutral response to specific needs and requirements, but rather a political project, to be discussed below, with political, theoretical and practical implications.

One could thus argue that the peacebuilding project today takes place as a “unspoken consensus” between international actors, the UN, international financial institutions and NGOs to construct a liberal peace “as a third generation response\textsuperscript{29} to post-Cold War conflicts, many of which revolved around collapsed or fragile state in the terminology of the day (meaning any non-liberal state that was subject to conflict)” (Richmond, 2008: 105). This form of liberal peace engagements has received criticism of having flawed preconceptions of the societies they engage in. It is not their intentions, but rather the theoretical assumption

\textsuperscript{27} For a more detailed review of the different strands of thinking within the liberal peace framework, see Richmond and Franks (2009:7).

\textsuperscript{28} It is still argued here that the nature of conflicts have somewhat changed post Cold War, and that interventions into conflict zones are significantly of a liberal peacebuilding nature, with the given aim of building liberal states. See for instance Kalyvas (2001) for an interesting debate on “old” and “new” civil wars.

\textsuperscript{29} Richmond (2008: 107) explains third generation approaches to peacebuilding as “closely connected with the liberal peace and its underlying liberal-realist framework, and underlying methodological and ontological assumptions. This replicates the Kantian derived democratic peace argument and its focus on democratisation, adding a focus on development and marketisation, and the rule of law and human rights”.
shaping such engagements, which poses contradictions in the liberal peace agenda (Liden, 2009:1). As Lidén (2009) argues, it is not what liberal peacebuilding promotes, but rather the discontinuity between the objective and the impact of liberal peacebuilding, what liberal peacebuilding does not address, with conceptual, empirical and practical consequences.

The liberal peace is a discourse and framework presenting a specific ontology and methodology, as this study argues. One of the main contradictions in how liberal thinking explains the liberal peace is that it is presented as universal built on a universal normative ideal of economic, political and social institutionalization of cooperation, regulation and governance and an idea of fulfilling human needs. Moreover, Richmond (2008: 9; 94; 96) there exists no alternative to the liberal peace in the current discourse – nor is it visible in practice. Richmond and Franks (2009: 188) explains how “liberal peacebuilding automatically assumes it carries the technical and normative legitimacy to bring peace – although this is a western, liberal, state-centric narrative of peace with all of its related ethical meta-narratives”. Embedded in the Western liberal paradigm the normative framework for peacebuilding is based on perceived universal values. An assumed acceptance of peace means a liberal peace building on political and economic liberalisation through democracy and a free-market economy. According to Richmond (2008: 127) this paradigm is linked to the Gramscian concept of hegemony of a “single dominant notion of peace”. As a consequence of this dominating discourse the conceptualisation of liberal peace has shaped most forms of engagement in peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction, what Richmond (2008: 105) describes the “peacebuilding consensus”.

The discourse, claiming to be a neutral, universal ideal and not concerning other possible approaches to peace, has inherent limitations for the potential of peacebuilding and the creation of sustainable peace. As a consequence, there is a lack of focus on peace, both concerning its conceptualisation and empirical dynamics. Peace, in the current discourse based on the understanding of the liberal peace, shapes the contemporary peacebuilding projects. The understanding of liberal peace then arguably has occurred within a Western context of liberal thinking building on liberal norms and values. In order to globalise the discourse and practice of peacebuilding it is necessary to open up for a critical discourse on peace opens up for clarifications on the environment and the structures that current peacebuilding promotes and shapes on the ground.
The superiority of the liberal state model as an environment for peace also implies a lack of connection with the local environment and complex conflict dynamics, despite the emancipatory change based on local structures that the liberal peace aims to create (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 190). “Liberalism offers a version of peace that is plausible within a liberal state and between liberal states, as well as a model to replace failed or non-liberal systems. As a result a far more complex version of peace has emerged, irrespective of strong realist opposition on ideological and theoretical grounds” (Richmond, 2008: 93). Richmond (2008: 95; 96) further states that the discourse and epistemological approach of the liberal peace “has led to a methodological approach which legitimates this transferral of peace – often with little regard for local context and the social, political and economic system of its recipients” and is unable to prevent poverty or address inequality in sustainable ways. This calls attention to methodological and empirical challenges with the liberal peace. Equality and social justice is not a key issue when dealing with peace theoretically or practically, rather the discourse of security and stability constructs the international discourse on peace (Richmond, 2008: 14). The high value of institutional democracy in liberal peace has received critique for ignoring issues such as identity and culture, and accepting neo-liberalism as “the only option” (Richmond, 2008: 90). Likewise, the civil aspect of liberal peace such as agency and rights has to a certain extent been anomalies in IR (Richmond, 2008: 94).

Building on these arguments, the dominant focus of the liberal peace in practice is to a significant degree reduced to security and state institutions. This is another aspect of the liberal peace which represents the inherent contradictions of its framework, and practice. The emancipatory claims of the liberal peace pose a great contradiction. Current liberal peacebuilding projects are theoretically grounded in a “new humanitarianism”, sensitive to local dynamics and potential, and careful not to create external dependency. This presents a paradox as Richmond and Franks (2009: 5) highlights; “Often, though, the priority is the international or regional dynamics of the liberal peace rather than its local quality”. Richmond and Franks (2009: 13) argue that the emancipatory “component” of the liberal peace legitimates the peacebuilding project in theory. However, they argue, forms of emancipation has not emerged in practice. There is a need for greater awareness of the subjective ontology of peace covered by the objective and universal peace that the dominating discourse presents (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 13). A restrained definition has inherent theoretical and
practical consequences. There is a discontinuity in the liberal peace between the objectives and the impact of peacebuilding, as Lidén (2009) also emphasises. This could represent an impediment to long-term sustainable and emancipatory peace.

Peace operations as such serve a narrow, problem-solving agenda which reinforce the existing power relations and knowledge relations in IR. The inherent values and structures sustain a particular form of global governance and norms and a particular ideology of good governance (Pugh, 2004: 39; 41; 53). The aim of creating such a peace with a predisposed intention should be questioned as well as the aim of liberal peace as taken for granted and as given, “dependent prior to and independently of the political process” (Eriksen, 2009: 16). Here, Richmond (2008: 131) states how critical theory “produces a powerful critique of the liberal peace and its underlying liberal-realist problem solving framework”. By questioning the ontological “subjective nature of peace [which] disguises ideology, hegemony, driving practices and marginalisation” which is a reflection of the liberal hegemony in the current world system, a deconstruction of the meta-narrative of power and knowledge takes places challenging the methodological approach to how knowledge about peace is assessed (Richmond, 2008: 5; 7). Critical theory thus proposes a more sophisticated conceptualisation of peacebuilding through its post-positivist methodology.

The critique of the liberal peace underlines the possibility and desirability of establishing a liberal-democratic state as “taken for granted”. These assumptions have implications for theory and politics when it comes to perceiving peace and the state to be built (Eriksen, 2009: 5). A critical theorisation of peace in IR views the dominant discourse of peace as a “liberal-realist methodology and ontology connected to positivist views of IR” (Richmond, 2008: 6; 13). This notion of peace includes law, civil society, democracy and trade, and arguably is a top down universally claimed notion of peace. Consequently, this understanding poses inherent flaws and problems particularly when theorising about peace on a universal scale (Richmond 2008: 13).

Problem-solving and positivist theories are, from the view of critical theory, seen as theories which do not challenge the existing world order and the underlying environment in which knowledge, the way we understand the world, is produced (Cox, 1981).
2.5.3 The nexus of peacebuilding and statebuilding

Moreover, and central here, is the emergence of complex peace operations that have led to an integration of peacebuilding and statebuilding (Richmond and Franks, 2009:1). Richmond and Franks (2009: 182) defines the statebuilding agenda as “focused on political, economic and security architecture, and determines its outcomes as a neoliberal, sovereign and territorial state”. Statebuilding contrast peacebuilding, the latter focusing on “the needs and rights of individuals, on sustainable communities and on the requirements for a self-sustaining polity of equitable representation without placing sovereignty, territory and the institutions of the state before that of the mundane needs of everyday life” (Richmond and Franks (2009: 182). The latter has been the foundation for the UN and international community’s interest in peace processes, peace operations, peacebuilding, human rights and development. However, this had led to a “compromise agenda between statebuilding and peacebuilding, now known as liberal peacebuilding. It now tends to veer towards statebuilding approaches, but uses peacebuilding a framework for its legitimation, resulting in the uncomfortable compromises of liberal peacebuilding” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182).

Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 10) argue that a broad range of peacebuilding activities and a core focus on building institutions based on market economies and democracy leads to the description of current peacebuilding as liberal peacebuilding. Further they argue (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 10), “the theoretical underpinning of liberal peacebuilding is the liberal peace: the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are” and the idea that

*liberal constituted states are more internally peaceful, prosperous and humane and even better environmental managers than non-democracies. Indeed, the international and domestic versions of liberal peace theory have recently blended into far-reaching claims about the manifold peace-producing benefits of democratization and marketization.*
Some aspects of contemporary statebuilding could pose challenges to promoting peace, at least not a sustainable and emancipatory peace building on local capacities. The statebuilding process is a long-term project, as is peacebuilding. However, statebuilding fails to build a social contract and viable solutions to sustainable peace (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 181; 190). The nature of the liberal peace and the focus is not on the citizens but rather on building a state. Rather, the result has been on politics as a zero-sum game as well as a weak democratic process. Richmond and Frank (2009: 186) uses a case study on Cambodia as an example: “The peacebuilding process merged into statebuilding, which in turn became a vehicle for elite competition, not to mention corruption, at the expense of civil society and local populations, all clearly within the gaze of international actors”. Examples of long-term liberal peacebuilding projects have moreover shown limited effect on institutions, developments and human security, due to embracing statebuilding elements. Richmond and Franks (2009: 181) state: “The elision of the two terms peacebuilding and statebuilding has legitimated statebuilding practices of a top-down, externally driven nature, whereupon their problems have actively discredited the broader agendas of peacebuilding at the expense of the local, its everyday context, the customary, and of hybridity”.

The liberal peacebuilding must also be placed within the context of the ontology of orthodox IR, namely the ontology of the state. Threats to international peace and security have to a certain extent been focused down to weak or failing states (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 10). Particularly post 9/11 underdevelopment and state failure has received a lot of attention as threats to international peace and security. The current peacebuilding project should be contextualised within this specific and limited paradigm of externally driven agendas for what supposedly creates peace and security, but rather ignores the fact that such top-down peace and statebuilding projects not necessarily has a legitimate potential for creating peace or a functioning state.

Several empirical experiences have emphasised how the “universal” understanding of peace, rule of law, democracy and economic liberalisation are not necessarily globally applicable, such as in the DRC, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan (Richmond, 2008: 1). Rather, the liberal peace represents the potential of an environment that could be far from leading

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31 There is a vast literature on weak or failing states, including several critiques of this view. See for instance Newman (2009b: 248) for a critical analysis of the discourse, or Hill (2005).
conflict ridden states towards a peaceful solution. As Richmond and Franks (2009: 12) state, “liberal peacebuilding processes have created very weak states that have been capable of providing limited security with international assistance, and institutions with similar international support”. Richmond (2008: 106) also describes the result of the liberal peacebuilding as “the shell of the liberal state” and Richmond and Franks (2009: 12) “quasi-liberal statehood” and a “virtual liberal peace”. It is not a hybrid between the liberal and the local, but rather a “virtual peace hybrid” (Richmond and Franks 2009: 191). Paris (2004: ix) argues how the strategy of immediate democratisation and marketisation which underlies contemporary peacebuilding can have damaging and destabilising effect and not necessarily be the answer to internal conflict. The practical consequences of the strategies and implementation of the current liberal peacebuilding efforts should therefore not be undermined. The response to such challenges in peacebuilding has rather been of technical nature, rather than questioning the liberal peace itself and going beyond inherent assumptions about the current peace agenda, which might pose inherent obstacles for sustainable peace.

Newman (2009: 30) argues that linking the peacebuilding project to statebuilding poses sensitive normative and ethical questions; “if peacebuilding is state-building, which (or whose) vision of the state is being used? In practice, the assumption has been for institutions that resemble the Western secular notion of the “state” – based upon liberal values – which is not something that is unquestionably accepted in all contexts as legitimate or appropriate”. Paris (2004) and Richmond and Frank (2009: 190) go further to argue that either more time is required for the liberal peace project – or it might be “terminally unsuited to non-liberal, non-western and non-developed environments”. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 12) argues that “the tenets of liberal peacebuilding – liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market values, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized secular state – are not necessarily universal (or universally applicable) values. Moreover, the liberal peace and its neo-liberal economic dimensions, which have displaced older liberal ideas about welfare, are not necessarily appropriate for conflicted or divided societies. Indeed, democracy and the market are arguably adversarial or even conflictual forces – taken for granted in stable Western non democracies but not necessarily suitable for volatile societies that do not enjoy stable institutions”.
2.5.4 Peacebuilding as a political project

Richmond (2008), Duffield (2001: 11), Pugh (2003), Paris (2004) and Newman (2009) argue that the liberal peacebuilding is a political project. The idea of earlier “traditional peacekeeping operations” as neutral where the outcome of the transition from conflict to peace was not the concern, and seen as apolitical, is challenged by the development of complex peace operations, in particular peace building (Pugh, 2003: 110; Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 12). Complex peace operations and peacebuilding bring out ethical, normative and particularly political elements to a much larger extent than traditional peacekeeping operations. The political objective of peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War has been to build liberal states through the promotion of democracy, human rights and free markets (Paris, 2004).

The argument of a contemporary peacebuilding as politicised is grounded in its focus on restructuring society and state from the ground, building on a liberal understanding of peace. The free market is a political project, not an economic as such (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008: 4). A particular world order is perpetuated through given truths about what building peace should consist of. The extensive control and guidance by external actors construct a liberal regime which illustrates an external construction of peace (Richmond, 2008: 106). A critical approach to the liberal peace claims that such approaches to peace are western-driven external processes driven by political agendas and embedded in the UN system and peace operations. Interestingly, Lidén (2009: 3) argues that scholars, in contrast to Kant’s idea of liberalism, see current peace operations as coming from the outside, in the form of top-down governance based on western norms. Richmond (2008: 106) further argues that the discourse on peacebuilding highlights governance and top-down thinking about peace, not bottom-up “as originally envisaged” in the Kantian sense. The attempts for reform of liberal-democratic free market frameworks, human rights and the rule of law in peacebuilding illustrate this argument. Newman (2009: 42) also argues how “the reality of peacebuilding is that it is essentially political: in terms of local political culture and the balance of power amongst elites, and in terms of international politics relation to the interests of powerful states whose

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32 Newman (2009: 37) defines a top-down approach as “a realist exercise aimed at achieving security and stability, based upon negotiations with local power holders”, underlining the focus on cooperation of elites. A bottom-up approach is defined as giving attention to “the sources of conflict and facilitating accommodation between previously conflicting communities” in a more community-oriented approach.
support is essential for the success of peacebuilding”. Thus, peacebuilding is not only political in a top-down external manner, but also locally.

Pugh (2003: 11) claims that “peace operations contribute to an ideology of world order that reflects and legitimizes neoliberal values, state-centrism and the economic structure of the international system”. Thus, peace operations are a significant part of the universal liberal peace and importantly the maintenance of a particular order of world politics (Duffield, 2001). Pugh (2004) argues that by applying critical theory to peace operations it is revealed that such peace processes serve a narrow and problem-solving purpose perpetuating the dysfunctional aspects in the world order and the privileges of rich and powerful states. The replication of normative and ideological assumptions enables dominant states to manage the system in their own image. Peace operations and humanitarian missions are weighed down with values in reproducing, or attempting to reproduce, the state system and liberal norms of domestic governance (Pugh, 2004: 54). These attempts are linked to the liberal peace where interveners’ peace operation personnel, NGOs and donors focus on democratisation, human rights, development and economic reform (Richmond, 2008: 105). Establishing values of a market economy and political liberalisation clearly represents global liberal governance (Pugh, 2004: 41). The understanding of the liberal peace is thus reflected as governance. This approach underlines the liberal objectives, which are fundamental for the understanding of liberal peace, however such objectives might not be suitable to those outside “the developed world” (Richmond, 2008: 13; 96). The peacebuilding project is thus part of a global governance, top-down and elite-led official process.

Again, we see the inherent fundamental contradictions in current peacebuilding which aims at building a specific kind of peace; the liberal peace, implying democracy, privatisation and a market driven economy, built on neo-liberal values and practices (Taylor, 2007). The liberal state based on democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights, good governance, market economy through establishment of “a government of national unity, capacity building, training of officials, financial support and human resources” illustrates an idea of a universally applicable state which assumptions are often not compatible with the situation in conflict areas (Eriksen, 2009: 15). As Taylor (2007) argues, assumptions about the African state and its potential for a liberal peace are flawed, possibly posing an impediment for a long-term sustainable peace. Taylor goes further in his argument linking the attempts at
liberal peace within Africa, highlighting the inherent and profound contradiction of the two. He (2009: 562) explains how “the empirical state in most of Africa does not conform to Western conceptions of the Weberian state, something which is a given within the liberal peace. (...) Equally problematic, however, is the fact that enforcing the basic liberal democratic rights in Africa would mean reviewing and replacing practically every government in Africa”. Moreover, the state is given a dominant role in the construction of the liberal peace, controlling society and economic development (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008: 2). This has inherent contradictions as peacebuilding and statebuilding goes hand in hand, often ignoring issues such as social justice and an emancipatory and long-term sustainable peace.

2.5.5 Linking theory and practice

The current dominating approach to peace, the liberal peace, has also been called an “underdevelopment of the concept of peace” (Richmond, 2008). This underdevelopment, in addition to the academic debates, creates a demand for connecting research and policy. The existing critiques of the concept of peacebuilding, and the alternatives proposed, have had relatively little theoretical influence, however importantly very little policy influence (Richmond, 2008: 15). By introducing the theoretical findings to policy making and peace processes a potential for more sustainable peace opens up, by including actors and ignored assumptions or contradictions that orthodox understandings of peace do not include.

Since the 1990s international peace missions focusing on peacebuilding have increased significantly. Peace operations, mediation and negotiation, development and humanitarian relief, and reform to meet international standards in the security sector, corruption, environment, border control, human rights and rule of law are largely based on the liberal peace embodied in the UN system and the post-Cold War international society (Richmond, 2008: 14; 107). However, such international engagements have shown limited when it comes to creating long-term sustainable peace as discussed above (Richmond, 2008: 107). Extremely ambitious and normatively sensitive such projects have experienced great problems on the ground, such as in Somalia and Cambodia in the early 1990s and later on in the DRC. The
Inherent contradictions of liberal peacebuilding have put forward the argument of liberal peacebuilding as a flawed approach to state building, social justice and sustainable peace.

A clear deficiency evolves when linking peace operations to theories of knowledge in order to inform the debates in IR related to world politics. Moreover, there is a lack of critique on how the liberal peace influences policy (Pugh, 2003). As explained above, conceptual and practical development of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding have been in the spotlight since the early peace operations in the 1990s and been discussed widely within a problem-solving, technicist contextualisation (Pugh, 2004: 39; 47). However, linking peace operations to theories of knowledge requires moving beyond practical operations issues and relating peace operations to the larger context of world politics (Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2003: 104). Theories and knowledge open up for interpretations of world politics, as Pugh (2003: 105) explains, “epistemological theories are like gatekeepers (…) restricting the scope of thinking about international relations” influencing ideas of what is legitimate or illegitimate in the agenda of world politics. Critical theory, as shown in this chapter, has the potential to increase the critical focus and discourse on the epistemology of current peacebuilding, in theory and practice. Such investigations open up for questioning the existing peacebuilding agenda, and the institutions and structures which dominate the current international system. There is a great need to advance the search for alternatives to ensure stable, long-lasting and emancipatory peace.

2.5.6 Alternatives to the liberal peace?

There is an evident need for a more reflective international role in peacebuilding. Richmond and Franks (2009) and Autesserre (2010) call for a modification of current peacebuilding projects and alternative approaches to peace. The liberal peace evidently has contradictions inherent in its top-down approach and might not be suitable for complex conflict zones outside the western world, as several empirical experiences illustrate.

On the other hand, the inherent weaknesses of the liberal peacebuilding do not necessarily imply that the liberal peace is a failed project as a whole which should be abandoned. As Richmond and Franks (2009: 15) argue, “some aspects of the liberal peace may well be
universal (the desire for self-government, self-determination, democratic participation, forms of human rights, a rule of law and prosperity) but such claims mask much dissensus about their detail, contextuality and the mechanism of governance, control and power that put them in place for others”. Eriksen (2009: 663) argues how “even if one accepts this model as normatively valid, the prospects of succeeding in creating such a state will be undermined if the nature of the state that is to be built is taken as given, prior to any dialogue between the external state-builders and those whose state is to be built”. This top down approach has undermined the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding project (Richmond and Franks; 2009: 182). Thus, there is a need to “see it [the liberal peace] as a part of an interwoven tapestry in which there are many patterns of peace, all of which share – if they are successful – high levels of local, regional and international legitimacy amongst citizens” (Richmond and Franks 2009:15). To reflect on the liberal state itself, and its potential, is necessary to avoid what caused war in the first place.

A top down approach, shaped as a political project guided by the liberal peace agenda, has created states and institutions which are more or less “empty shells of states” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 190). Moreover, the argument here is not to reject that empty shells of states are better than conflict. However, these constructions have little potential for social transformation into a peaceful, just and sustainable society. There is a need to discuss and consider how current practices of peacebuilding mainly focuses on statebuilding and does not legitimise peace for the citizens involved (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 191). The ontological question rises of the liberal peace as transferable into non-western and non-liberal policy or if the peace that is built is a virtual peace where causes of conflict are left unresolved in a lasting socioeconomic crisis and fragile security situation (Richmond and Franks 2009: 13). A local contextualisation of the liberal peace has shown almost absent in practice (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 190). Deep rooted causes of conflict and complex conflict dynamics, often beyond state borders, are not addressed. Building a state and conducting elections does not, in itself, bear emancipatory fruits. Democratic processes are rather of a weak nature and politics takes place as a zero sum game, often hand in hand with pervasive corruption. It is not meant to disregard democracy, rather to see how democracy in divided societies can lead to destabilisation and stronger sectarianism (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 12). These issues illustrate the internal inconsistencies and incoherencies in the liberal peace project (Richmond and Franks 2009: 15).
There is a great need to rethinking the relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding. This opens up for questions of the potential for sustainable peace that the liberal peace proposes. The restriction of the concept and methodology of the liberal peacebuilding is unclear on how practical and local forms of emancipation would look like is unclear, which underlines the subjective ontology of peace in theory and practice. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 14) argue that more hybrid forms of peacebuilding should be explored. Richmond and Franks (2009: 183) argue for the need to search for a more hybrid form of peacebuilding and statebuilding “that can develop international approaches and consensus for peace, while also developing and assisting the localised dynamics for peace”. Whether the liberal peace is not compatible in non-western societies or whether there is a need for a long-term process developing case specific hybrids is an important question for further research. However, the critical approach to the liberal peace is clear on one issue; if the liberal peace is to become more successful it must be based on “political agency for individuals rather than institutions” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 183). The potential for a more sustainable peace based on local dynamics, potential and emancipatory elements must include all peacebuilding actors also on a local level.

The role of regional actors might propose a potential for a much more reflective international role in peacebuilding. These emerging international actors show clear leadership in their regions and have capacities and resources to engage and participate. Such actors could have better premises for analysing complex conflict situations and the local dynamics implied. Moreover, there might be a potential for regional actors to promote the local and to focus on a long term engagement where root causes and local dynamics are embraced to a larger extent. An inclusive framework which includes all actors in peacebuilding opens up for new questions for the discourse on peace. Such actors, with a starting point grounded more locally, could have a potential for thinking alternatively about peacebuilding.

2.6 Conclusions

Traditional actors in peace operations and peacebuilding, such as the UN, have received extensive critique for the approaches to complex peacebuilding projects after the end of the Cold War. There is an urgent need to rethink the methodological, ontological and
epistemological underpinnings of the liberal peacebuilding – in theory and in practice. This chapter has placed the current peacebuilding debates within a globalised critical theory framework aiming at making the discourse and practice of peacebuilding global. Further, the origins of peacebuilding have been presented as a backdrop for the further analysis within the post-positivist methodology of critical theory. A restricted understanding of peace through a restrained methodological and epistemological approach creates the need for opening up the discussion about the current peacebuilding project. Critical theory goes beyond assumptions about what kind of peace is promoted and unveils the uncritical given aim of creating a liberal state. The environment in which the current peacebuilding project takes place, namely a liberal environment, leads us to the inherent assumptions and contradictions of the extensive efforts for creating peace in conflict areas around the world. The explanatory value of critical theory thus contributes with revealing these weaknesses and unveiling how the contemporary peacebuilding project might not in its current form be applicable to non-western conflict areas, challenging the current ontology of orthodox theories of IR. The power relations and how knowledge about peace is produced mirrors how the liberal peace is seen as the only solution to current intractable conflicts. These findings illustrate the great need for policymakers and analysts to reflect upon the liberal peacebuilding project aiming at developing more conducive approaches for long-term sustainable peace.

Empirical examples will add to the discourse on the liberal peacebuilding giving a more nuanced understanding of the current peacebuilding projects. Applying theory to empirical examples will underline the ontological, epistemological and normative aspects of these discourses “in an attempt to open up the conceptualisations and imaginings of peace as a serious research agenda” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 2). The case study examined here will empirically ground the liberal peace framework. The two following chapters will examine the ideological foundations and environment which shapes the current peacebuilding project, and further to identify the structures promoted in such an approach by looking at South Africa’s peacebuilding approach, in the DRC.
3 South Africa promoting peace in Africa

3.1 Introduction

South Africa has since 1994 increasingly positioned itself as an active promoter of peace and development in Africa. South Africa has transformed from what could be described as a negative force in the region during apartheid, to a partner vocal about its support for the prosperity of the continent. Throughout the last 15 years South Africa has gradually increased its engagement in several African conflicts. As the leading mediator in the peace processes in Burundi, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan, South Africa has marked its significant role. South Africa has also contributed with peacekeeping forces and military observers to the UN and the AU peacekeeping missions such as in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan and Nepal and gradually taken on multifaceted peacebuilding initiatives, such as in the DRC. Evidently, during the Mbeki presidency South Africa has become deeply involved in Africa’s peace and development agenda (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 3).

Within a post-Cold War environment foreign policy challenges have shifted from traditional peacekeeping towards more complex and ambitious peace missions. Parallel, South Africa’s policy towards the continent and beyond has changed. South Africa has made great effort in negotiation and peacekeeping, however the greatest challenges often arise after peacekeepers have left and peace agreements are signed. Empirical evidence show how groups often take up arms during or shortly after peace negotiations, particularly prominent in African conflicts. One prominent example is in the eastern DRC where the FDLR have persisted with their operations and the conflict has raged on despite the peace process. This has created a need for more complex peacebuilding operations, which has taken on the form of complex liberal peacebuilding projects, as discussed in the previous chapter.

South Africa has, as an advocate of “the African Renaissance”, put considerable efforts and resources into building Africa’s institutional capacity and architecture for peace and development (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 4). The AU and regional organisations such as SADC have been particularly important. Lifting the continent out of its marginal global position has been
Even though South Africa’s role in mediation has been written about in length, few of these studies have provided in-depth information on South Africa’s strategy or role in peacebuilding, as elaborated on in chapter one. These studies have also rarely been contextualised within a critical theory framework or specifically addressed peacebuilding. This chapter will, guided by the theoretical framework from chapter 2, proceed to look at how South Africa has positioned itself in policy and practice towards peace and development on the continent. Identifying the foundations on which South Africa operates reveals the environment in which South Africa engages. The foundations for South Africa’s peacemaking engagement and more specifically its peacebuilding agenda will be clarified in this chapter.

This chapter will proceed by firstly looking at South Africa’s change into an African peacemaker and its motives for becoming an agent of peace, as a background for the further analysis. Secondly, how South Africa positions itself in its peace and development agenda, with a specific focus on peacebuilding, will receive extensive attention. Finally, the chapter will draw conclusions about South Africa’s peacebuilding approach based on these findings.

3.2 South Africa as an agent of African peace

3.2.1 From apartheid state to African peacemaker

There was a great shift in South Africa’s foreign policy as a result of the transition from apartheid to democracy under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela. Geldenhuys (1984) presented South Africa as a pariah state under apartheid, and described its foreign policy as “diplomacy of isolation”. There is a general consensus in the literature that South Africa has gone from being a destructive and destabilising force in the Southern African region under apartheid, to portraying itself as a peacemaker and development partner after the

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33 Despite South Africa’s significant engagement in international forums, particularly attempting to raise the South on the agenda and out of its marginalised positions, as well as increasing South-South cooperation, it is Africa which is the focus in this study, guided by the focus of South Africa as a regional actor.

As Mandela became the first democratically elected president of South Africa in 1994 there was an urgent need for domestic change, transition and reconciliation. Reintegration of South Africa after decades of isolation, both globally, on the continent and in the region could only happen through re-establishing a comprehensive foreign policy based on international law and norms, and democracy (Landsberg, s.a; Mandela, 1993; Nathan, 2005). Mills (1994) argues how South Africa’s foreign policy characterised by a hard-line interventionist destabilising role and “emergency” foreign policy in Southern Africa and beyond fundamentally changed focus towards common regional solidarity, democracy and development during the mid-1990s. This shift was particularly important in changing its image from an enemy and destabilising force to a partner promoting peace and security in the region, however also finding a new place in international politics.

These ideological tenets, focusing particularly on democracy and international law and norms, are presented in much of the literature as the base of South Africa’s foreign policy characteristics in the Mandela era, described by Landsberg (s.a.) as a “principle-driven foreign policy”. The resurgence of Africa became a vital part of South Africa’s foreign policy, reflecting a continental solidarity built on a strategy for finding own identity and strength after colonisation and exploitation. South African foreign policy under the Mbeki government from 1999 onwards is seen as more or less a continuation of Mandela’s legacy (Landsberg, s.a.; Nathan, 2005). However, when the Mbeki government took over, the foreign policy became more macro policy oriented, pragmatic-driven and more focused on regional partnerships and development, the African Renaissance, multilateralism, constructive engagement in conflicts and non-confrontational “quiet diplomacy”34 (Landsberg, s.a.; Nathan, 2005). Multilateralism has been central in South Africa’s African agenda oriented foreign policy and has guided many of its interventions in African conflicts (Kagwanja, 2006: 53)

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34 The “quiet diplomacy” can be explained as a non-confrontational approach, where South Africa aims at avoiding controversy and criticism from the region and the continent. It could be seen as President Mbeki’s attempts to avoid the controversy over earlier issues, such as the intervention of Lesotho in 1998 as well as Mandela’s fallout with the continents’ leaders after criticising the Nigerian government in the Ken Saro-Wiva case in 1995.
South Africa’s “identity” as a peacemaking nation, where peace and stability are pre-
requisites for Africa’s development, particularly due to Africa’s marginal position in the
global economy, manifested itself through a broader continental and global agenda with
engagements in channels such as SADC, the AU and the UN in particular, as well as
Importantly, the investment in diplomacy has been a strategy to increase its regional and
global importance, illustrated by its willingness to promote democracy and peaceful
resolutions to conflict through building an African security architecture and participating in
other multilateral mechanisms making an explicit link between development, governance,
peace and security and growth” (Ajulu, 2008: 254). Scholars such as Ajulu (2008), Kagwanja
(2006), Landsberg and Hlophe (1999), Sidiropoulos (2007: 7), Southall (2006b) and Taylor
and Williams (2001) argue how South African foreign policy has, particularly under Mbeki,
been guided by the South African inspired concept of African Renaissance, where democracy,
peace and stability, and economic growth are the core principles of an African upswing as
how “the Pan-African Ideology of the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) ‘liberation
diplomats’, led by Mbeki and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, dominated the
Presidency and the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 2008, when Mbeki resigned
from office”.

These core principles arguably contribute to legitimising South Africa as an important actor
both on the continent and in the international context (Kagwanja, 2006). Further they are
arguably based on own historical experience of a peaceful transition and democracy. South
Africa has met high expectations from the international community to become an engaged
“agent of peace” through its own model of transition through negotiation (Ajulu, 2008: 256;
Sidiropoulos, 2007:1, 8; Southall, 2006b: 2). South Africa’s engagement in peace processes
has been described as “peace diplomacy” through soft power, mediation and negotiated
settlements (Southall, 2006b; Ajulu, 2008). South Africa has modelled its “peace diplomacy
framework” on its own relatively peaceful political transition and has become a facilitator of
national peace settlements. Thus, South Africa’s role has been proposed as pivotal for
Southern Africa’s stability and economic development, with South Africa’s negotiated
transition at home as a model for ending conflict (Curtis, 2007; Sidiropoulos, 2007:1). South
Africa has clearly demonstrated a foreign policy based on multilateral engagement rather than
confrontation and inspired by own experience built its “peace agenda” partly on its own transition, where avoidance of military intervention, inclusion, and a transitional government has been important pillars.

Post-Apartheid South Africa’s involvement in promoting peace and security on the African continent was initiated by Mandela’s engagement in brokering a peace deal in Angola in 1994 (Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg, 2007: 29). Together with Botswana and Zimbabwe, the Mandela government engaged in preventative diplomacy encouraging elections in Lesotho in 1994, and became involved in the OAU-mandated negotiations in the institutional crisis in the Comoros in 1998 (Schoeman, 2003: 362). Diplomatic engagements in peace processes, multilateral as well as bilateral, have taken place in Burundi, Zimbabwe, the Comoros, Lesotho, Sudan, Liberia, Angola and Cote d’Ivoire, and are strong empirical evidence of South Africa’s involvement since 1994 (Landsberg, s.a.). In Burundi and the DRC South Africa has shown a particular resistance to military intervention, despite the military participation of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola in the DRC (Nathan, 2005:365). However, South Africa has gone beyond negotiation and facilitation and participated in peacekeeping operations, contributing with peacekeepers in the DRC and Burundi (Schoeman, 2003: 362; Schoeman, 2007: 98). Also, it should be noticed that as South Africa emerged as a peacekeeping actor in the mid-1990s its approach was based on a more militaristic orientation (Williams, R., 2000). The intervention in Lesotho in 1998 where the Mandela administration together with Botswana went into Lesotho with a military intervention to restore democratic rule illustrate a harder approach for promoting democratic values and human rights (Nathan, 2005: 370; Schraeder, 2001: 233).35

South Africa has gradually positioned itself as an emerging and leading actor in promoting peace and development on the African continent and beyond. South Africa has increasingly played a central role by attempting to contribute to conflict resolution, peace and development on the continent through mediation, negotiation of peace agreements, and increasingly engaging in complex peacebuilding efforts. It is clear that South Africa’s engagements are built on ideological foundations such as democracy and human rights and through linking peace efforts with the general development of conflict areas and Africa as a whole. In policy

35 As a SADC operation, South Africa’s use of force in Operation Boleas in Lesotho has been described as “Apartheid-like behavior” and moreover bred suspicion about South Africa’s real intentions (Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, 2003: 388; Schoeman, 2003: 361).
and practice South Africa has demonstrated that Africa and African development lies at the core of its foreign policy strategy on peace and development, as will be elaborated on below.

3.2.2 South Africa’s reason d’être for engaging in peace missions

South Africa’s *White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions* (hereafter “the White Paper”) is the core document for South Africa’s strategy for engaging in international peace missions. The aim of the White Paper is (DFA, 1999: 5) “to describe the nature of contemporary peace missions and to provide clear and concise inter-departmental policy guidelines on South African participation in such missions”. The White Paper, developed in the late 1990s, can be seen as a normative framework for South Africa’s strategic principles, policy as well as practice in its efforts in promoting peace and development, with particular reference to Africa. Hence, this document is central also for the analysis of South Africa’s role in peacebuilding as it clarifies the ideological foundations in which South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts rest.

The White Paper is a good illustration of how South Africa reviewed its own role in peace and development after its few experiences in peace missions in the mid 1990’s. It resulted in a normative framework based on certain strategic main focuses reflecting South Africa’s commitment to a broader peacebuilding agenda. The White Paper process illustrates the demilitarising of South Africa’s approach to peacekeeping and further how it was “the core policy response to the widespread expectations that South Africa had to contribute to the prevention and resolutions of these [African] conflicts” (ACCORD 2007; Williams, R. 2000). The White Paper agenda is clearly based on normative values such as human rights, democracy and social and economic development. This normative approach illustrates how South Africa moves from acting as a peacekeeper mainly through military means towards a peacebuilder in broader complex peace missions, building on partnership and cooperation. Going beyond peacekeeping, focusing on long-term engagement and addressing root causes

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36 In 2005 the South African Department of Defence stated that an update on the White Paper will take place, due to the need for an update. However, to this date it has not been possible to receive any information from the Department of Defence or DIRCO on a possible reviewed White Paper. On the other hand, DIRCO presented a White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy in May 2011, *Building a Better World: The diplomacy of Ubuntu*, where “economic diplomacy” interestingly is one of the focus areas.

37 For a review of the process of constructing the White Paper, see Williams (2000).
in a peacebuilding approach gradually became the new niche for South Africa in its engagement with the continent and an extension of its peacemaking and mediation efforts.

Three elements are highlighted here as leading accounts for South Africa’s prominent efforts for African peace and development: (i) Its own experience of transition from apartheid state to a promising democracy; (ii) expectations for its contribution in the area of peace and development and; (iii) its strong base of resources compared to its fellow African countries. South Africa highlights in its White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) that its efforts in peace and development in Africa and beyond are inspired by its own transition from apartheid to democracy. The South African experience in conflict resolution through negotiation and its own relatively peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy has arguably a potential for inspiring other countries experiencing intractable conflicts.

As a previously relatively negative force in the region during apartheid, during which the African National Congress (ANC) and others benefited from external support during the liberation struggle, it has been argued that South Africa has a “moral obligation” towards its African neighbours and for prosperity of the continent. As South Africa expresses in its White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19):

> South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.

In addition to South Africa’s own experience, South Africa’s increasing role in world politics as it emerges as an actor on the international stage has produced expectations for South Africa’s engagement and potential. After South Africa changed from apartheid to democracy the international community’s perception of South Africa has fundamentally changed. South Africa has been perceived with new eyes, as having a new role “as a responsible and
respected member of the international community”, as a driver of democracy, human rights and good governance.

Further, South Africa’s own experience gives it a potential for influencing and guiding other African countries in their endeavours for conflict resolution and development. The White Paper (DFA, 1999: 4) highlights how such expectations have put pressure on South Africa to play a leading role in a variety of international, regional and sub-regional forums and that the country increasingly is an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international conflicts. South Africa has been an active promoter of the AU and NEPAD, to be discussed below. Particularly during the Mbeki presidency South Africa has played a strong role in representing and promoting Africa, and the voice of the “South”, in international forums such as the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). These three elements thus remains standing suggesting how post-apartheid South Africa had to adopt to a new reality where expectations for its international role and adaptation to the existing international system were parallel to the expectations for the utilisation of own experience and resources in Africa.

3.2.3 South Africa’s neo-liberal experience

It is not the intention in this study to explore South Africa’s economic policy at home or the expansion of South African corporate companies in Africa. However, the rapid growing role of South African businesses and parastatals cannot be ignored when looking at South Africa’s peacebuilding role on the continent through a critical theory lens. The growing role and penetration of South African corporate businesses in Africa, which often has a close proximity to the South African state, takes place parallel to South Africa’s prominent efforts to create peace. Kagwanja (2006: 30) argues how “South Africa’s preventive diplomacy became inextricably linked to the ANC’s post-apartheid neo-liberal internationalism”. After the end of apartheid the ANC developed South Africa’s economic policy from an initial developmental to a neo-liberal strategy through GEAR (Taylor, 2001). As Taylor (2001),
Kagwanja (2009: 20) also links the neo-liberal tendencies of South Africa’s foreign policy to its own post-apartheid adoption of a neo-liberal economic policy GEAR\textsuperscript{38}:

\textit{Economic calculations have driven the ANC since it ascended to power in 1994. Pretoria’s elite has worked to transform the African continent, on neo-liberal lines, into a destination for South African exports and a fertile ground for investment. This mirrors the ANC’s own ideological reorientation from its traditional populist and quasi-socialist ideas towards neo-liberal strategies for reversing the negative impact of apartheid and making South Africa an important trading nation. Its market-friendly economic blueprint, GEAR, adopted in 1996, also inspired the design of Africa’s recovery programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Partly as a result of these initiatives, South African companies have doubled their investment in the rest of Africa since 1994.}

Despite the significant shift in South Africa’s foreign policy from destabilising to a partner, South Africa still is the economic stronghold in the region after the transition to democratic rule. Landsberg (s.a.: 26) states how “in just one decade since the establishment of democracy, South Africa has become pivotal to the flow of capital goods and people on the continent” and according to the 2004 World Investment Report how South Africa’s trade increased 328 percent from 1993 to 2003. The legacy of South Africa’s past and structural position as a relatively developed country compared to its neighbours arguably has some roots in the structural echoes of colonialism and apartheid, and is vital when analysing South Africa’s role in the region.

South Africa’s historical role in the region combined with the rapid economic growth and expansion post-1994, have raised questions about whether South Africa’s engagements are continuations of the exploitation and domination seen in the past, or whether South Africa has transformed into a strong participant that takes responsibility for its neighbours in the region, especially in the promotion of security and development. The penetration of South Africa’s corporate businesses and parastatals in the region, South Africa’s dominance in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), in addition to the country shaping the regional political

\textsuperscript{38} However, as Kagwanja (2006: 31) rightly argues, the neo-liberal shift in the ANC was not unilateral, and also created internal cleavages in the party, which also endured into the Mbeki presidency and beyond.
economy through its domination in SADC clearly illustrates South Africa’s strong role in Africa as well as its dependency on Africa for own trade and economic growth.

On the other hand, South Africa can play a leading role for Africa’s development due to its privileged position in areas such as standby arrangements and civilian and military resources (DFA, 1999: 21). South Africa’s economic, military and human resources are significantly larger than in most of the other African countries. This adds to the expectations for South Africa’s possible impact and its expertise with other African countries with fewer resources for such efforts. Landsberg (s.a.: 28) argues how South Africa, due to its African Agenda and its goals for African development should sensitise its private sector to play developmental roles, and not relate to the continent in the ways many multinational companies do.

Due to South Africa’s economic involvement in conflict areas, such as the DRC, criticism has been made for conducting commercial activities in troubled parts of Africa, which could contribute to the fuelling and sustaining of civil wars. Scholars such as Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen (2001) and Taylor (2001) argue that South Africa benefits economically from countries in conflict, as well enjoying increased business opportunities if these countries obtain some kind of peaceful environment and during peacebuilding/post-conflict reconstruction particularly through its increasing complex peacebuilding engagements. Schraeder (2001: 233) argues that “a willingness to adopt the liberal economic model of free trade and investment has also gathered strength in the post-Cold War era, and has been especially invoked by the more technocratically minded Mbeki Administration (...) Towards this end, the South African government’s close cooperation with South African businesses has yielded enormous success in penetrating the Southern African market, as well as other regions of the African continent and the world in general”. The White Paper (DFA, 1999: 20) also highlights how South Africa’s political and economic development depends on Africa, an argument made by Mandela in 1993 as well (Mandela, 1993).

However, the task at hand here is not to make an evaluation of why South Africa engages in peacebuilding, but rather to look at how South Africa engages in peacebuilding. Utilising critical theory, South Africa’s own liberal structure, illustrated by its pro-market Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy from 1996 is likely to shape its engagement and promotion of liberalisation of Africa through liberalisation and good governance. This
chapter now turns to looking at if these indications are applicable to South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts.

3.3 South Africa’s agenda for peacebuilding

3.3.1 The foundations for South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement

In the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 6) it is stated how peacekeeping missions have changed into complex peace operations: “In less than a decade, United Nations peace operations have evolved rapidly and in an ad hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multidimensional interventions where the military component is but one of many participants within an involved peace process”. South Africa’s own philosophy of participation in peace missions, described in its White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) is concentrated down to two main areas, namely (i) the support for international conflict management and resolution and (ii) peace missions and national interest. In its strategy South Africa firstly highlights how its support to international conflict management and resolution focuses on addressing deep-root causes driving a conflict. As a basis for this focus, it is criticised how “resources and energies of the international community, regions, sub-regions and the national state are mobilised mainly around the symptoms of conflict particularly when these reach the proportions of genocide or civil war” (DFA, 1999: 19). Further the White Paper emphasises how “when addressing such crises, it is important to realise that they will recur if the underlying causes of the crisis are allowed to persist” (DFA, 1999: 19). As such, a vital part of South Africa’s strategic approach to complex conflicts is that the crisis as well as the causes must be addressed in a sustained and systematic manner. This is in accordance with the liberal peacebuilding discussed in chapter two.

The White Paper has a strong peacebuilding focus. Another aspect of South Africa’s support to international conflict management and resolution is that peace missions are long-term endeavours,

which include a significant investment in peace building, and not merely as short-term engagements. Peace building involves the inculcation of respect for human
rights and political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the capacity of state and civil institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity. These measures are the most effective means of preventing crises, and are therefore as much pre-crisis as post-crisis priorities. In all cases, peace missions should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and experiences, rather than the imposition of foreign modes of conflict management and governance (DFA, 1999: 19).

Further, a third element, governance, is highlighted in South Africa’s philosophy for support for conflict resolution and international peace missions. Here, the importance of free and fair elections is highlighted, however with emphasis on the necessity of good governance going beyond transitional elections (DFA, 1999: 19):

*The greatest need for capacity building in conflict arenas is, indeed, in the realm of governance. While the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the transition to the post-conflict state, this state has little chance to prosper unless emphasis is also placed on the essentials of efficient and effective governance, namely: adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries; effective police services and criminal justice systems; professional civil services with an ethos of democratic governance; and the reorientation of the state and its personnel away from partisan interests towards developmental goals.*

The second area highlighted in South Africa’s philosophy for participation in peace missions is how support for peace missions must be in line with South Africa’s national interest. South Africa’s own philosophy builds on how its own experience has informed strong national interest and experience in conflict resolution in complex and intractable conflict. The values enshrined in South Africa’s constitution include “the encouragement of global peace and stability and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. South Africa’s national interest, reflected in its foreign policy, is based on commitment to the principles of promotion of human rights and democracy, justice and international law, international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, the interest of Africa in world affairs and to economic development through regional and international co-operation (DFA, 1999: 20). South Africa is also vocal
about its commitment to human rights, democracy and good governance and loyal to international organisations’ approaches to conflict resolution. It is clear that South Africa’s strategy and philosophy for participating in peace missions and conflict resolution has a recognisable normative fundament linked to political and economic liberalisation. Moreover, there is a trust in the UN and the underlying foundations for international approaches to peace operations and peacebuilding, visible at least in South Africa’s multilateral participation.

Related to governance and capacity building, an in addition to acknowledging that holding elections alone is not the key to long-lasting peace, the White Paper highlights how “at the national level, democratisation has brought South Africa a greater degree of political and social stability, and has substantially improved the prospects of deepening and consolidation peace, security and stability within the Southern African region” (DFA, 1999: 6). When discussing the broadening concept of security, particularly in the post Cold War era, it is stated that the broadened understanding of security “has also led to widespread acknowledgement of the fact that appropriate response to ongoing political, economic and social instability must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development”.

Further, “South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood” and support to conflict resolution and peace missions as a “prerequisite for international respectability” (DFA, 1999: 20). In general, “South Africa will therefore participate in such missions where there is a clear need for our national contribution and where there is a legitimate and realistic international mandate for executing the mission” (DFA, 1999: 34). “In principle, the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to our national interest and the type of demand that exist (…)” (DFA, 1999: 3). Also, the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 30) highlights how “the foundation of South African policy on peace missions is one of national contributions to international efforts, whether these are at the level of the UN, the OAU, or SADC”, underlining how South Africa’s national interest always is a motive for its participation. Furthermore, South Africa’s policy has a significant focus on the African continent, where African peace and development is high on the agenda. In the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 29) regional co-operation, particularly with the AU and SADC, to be discussed
below, as well as other regional economic communities, are essential for South Africa’s capacity for participating in international peace missions.

3.3.2 South Africa’s definition of peacebuilding

The definition of peacebuilding conceptualised in the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 8) is as follows:

'Peace building’ may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in the aftermath of a conflict. ‘Peace building’ includes activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of interaction among former enemies in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. In essence, ‘peace building’ is mainly a diplomatic/developmental process. Although the military might be requested to support this process, ‘peace building’ does not constitute a military operation in the true sense of the word.

South Africa has committed itself to a “broader peacebuilding agenda” and has, through the White Paper, a general emphasis on peacebuilding as vitally important for South Africa’s efforts in peace missions and crucial for conflict resolution. South Africa’s philosophy as outlined in the White Paper has a core emphasis on addressing root causes of conflict and promoting long-term peacebuilding, as argued above, expressed as: “South Africa would obviously prefer to contribute to those initiatives that aim to address the underlying causes of conflict and not simply its short-term containment” (DFA, 1999: 21).

As part of a long-term approach to conflict paying particular attention to root causes, South African policy underlines the shift from peacekeeping to more multifunctional complex peace missions and how “with the change of function, scope and size (...) the distinction between political, military and humanitarian tasks in the pursuit of peace has become blurred” (DFA, 1999: 9). Consequentially such missions are carried out in support of political objectives. The White Paper underscores how “contemporary peace missions are fundamentally political initiatives, despite the complex admixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and means. South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of the political and strategic
environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing South African participation in such efforts” (DFA, 1999: 4). Here we can return to chapter two and see the link to the explanation of peacebuilding as a political project with a specific agenda, based on a liberal foundation. Peacebuilding is a constitutional key component of South Africa’s White Paper and central to the government’s involvement in peace missions, and moreover normative in its orientation as well as strategy (Williams, R., 2000: 90).

3.3.3 African solutions for building African peace?

Post-apartheid South Africa has increasingly focused its foreign policy on Africa and shown a dedication to supporting conflict resolution in unstable areas on the continent. During the Mandela-era, South Africa’s foreign policy was arguably more of a unilateral kind, with a focus on human rights and the promotion of democracy to the continent, also critiquing undemocratic leaders and breaches of human rights (Kagwanja, 2009: 5). However, as Kagwanja (2006) argues, despite South Africa’s strength economically and militarily, its capacity of promoting human rights and democratic development has been limited by suspicions of its agenda, critiqued for being “too Western”. When Mbeki became head of state in 1999, South African foreign policy turned its focus increasingly towards multilateralism and the promotion of common African development. Developing Africa as a continent was to happen through an African Renaissance, to be discussed below, guided by commitment to liberal economies, foreign investment and the prosperity of the African continent. Emphasising South Africa as being a part of the African continent is central in the foreign policy, as opposed to pre-1994.

According to The Department of Foreign Affairs’ 2005-2008 Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 19) “The South African Government firmly believes that the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbours in Southern Africa”. The Strategic Plan outlines how South Africa’s engagement with Africa rests on three pillars: (i) Strengthen Africa’s multilateral institutions; (ii) Supporting Africa’s socio-economic development programme NEPAD and SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISPD) and; (iii) strengthening bilateral relations political and socio-economic relations for effective structures for dialogue and co-operation. Further, “the Department’s goals for the
Continent are therefore the resolution of conflict and the building of a framework within which socio-economic development can take place. The entry points for achieving these goals are provided by the SADC, the AU and NEPAD”.

Priority one in the South African Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 is “consolidation of the African Agenda” (DFA, 2005c: 68). The objective is to “promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts and encourage post-conflict reconstruction and development” with the aim of achieving “Success in implementation of current peace processes”. Further, critical issues within this aim formulated in the Strategic Plan is: “the deployment of military personnel and equipment to mandated AU and UN peacekeeping missions”; “the role of South Africa as Convenor of the Sudan Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee of the AU”; “consolidation of the peace processes in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Somalia and Sudan” and; to “use the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund to support post-conflict reconstruction and development and to generate trilateral co-operation projects”.

South Africa has been promoting this multilateralism through engagements in organisations such as the AU and SADC, however also extensively through bilateral cooperation. Strengthening bilateral relations is one of the objectives under “consolidating of the African Agenda” through “facilitating institutional capacity building as part of post-war reconstruction and development in Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Somalia and the Sudan” (DFA, 2005c: 71). Landsberg (s.a.: 20) argues how “no other state in the continent has played such a pivotal role in post-conflict peace-building and development as did South Africa over the past six years in particular”. South Africa’s strategy has advanced the proposition that there can be no successful peacebuilding without socioeconomic, political and economic development, and there can be no such development without peacebuilding.

3.3.4 Building a stronger AU for African solutions to African problems

South Africa has had a central role in strengthening the AU during the Mbeki presidency, as the AU was founded in 2002. It was based on setting up institutions in order to find African solutions to African problems in a more efficient manner than the previous Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As a significant contributor to the AU’s annual budget, and as the chair
of the AU’s committee on post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan, South Africa has further marked its commitment to strengthen the AU (Landsberg, s.a.). South Africa has moreover committed to supporting the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the Panel of the Wise (DFA, 2005c: 21). President Mbeki has also been heavily involved in the new African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. South Africa has contributed with significant troop to the SADC and the AU. In November 2008 South Africa ranked fifth of African countries contributing troops to the UN and fourteenth in the world with 1994 police and military troops (UN, 2011)\(^39\).

Further, South Africa took on an active role in developing the capacity of the AU and also promoting norms and standards of governance to fellow African leaders (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 4). For example, South Africa was one of the inaugural members of the AU’s political mandate which is operationalised through the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflict (DFA, 2005c: 20). South Africa is also one of the main financial contributors to many of the PSC’s initiatives; for example AU’s first peace keeping operation, the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB), and the African Standby Force, where South Africa has been an active driver for a continental military force to operationalise the PSC (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 6). “The PSC was created to, inter alia, promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities and to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence (...). In view of this, peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian action and disaster management constitute core activities of the PSC” (AU, 2006: 3). These extensive initiatives are illustrative of South Africa’s deep commitment to peace and development on the African continent.

3.3.5 The NEPAD vision

South Africa was a central actor as one of five initiating countries establishing NEPAD, launched in 2001. NEPAD is AU’s strategy and vision for Africa’s socio-economic development and the modernisation of African states and regions (Landsberg, s.a.: 10). NEPAD is therefore an essential development programme as a part of the AUs strategy for moving towards a peaceful and developing Africa. President Mbeki had a significant role in

\(^{39}\) The November 2010 the UN statistics show that South Africa has contributed with 2173 troops to the UN, ranking fourteenth in the world and seventh of the African countries (UN, 2011).
forming NEPAD as a part of the effort to lift Africa out of its marginal position in international politics and the international economy. As Hughes (2004: 80) states; “as a document of macro political economy in which the South African president played a significant part in its conceptualisation, NEPAD may be regarded as the defining document of the Mbeki Presidency”. Accountability and good governance as well as economic development are seen as the core elements of NEPAD, as well as calling on African leaders to fight corruption. The African Peer Review Mechanism, launched in February 2004, is to promote good governance in African countries and steer the continent towards prosperity and is hosted by South Africa. The Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 22) describes NEPAD as:

*A continental instrument to advance people-centred development, based on democratic values and principles. It commits African governments to good governance and to detailed programmes of action within specific time frames. It ensures an integrated approach to development needs on the Continent and at the same time works to redefine the relationship of the Continent with the international community, particularly the developed world and multilateral institutions.*

The principles of NEPAD are to be put into practice through the five main elements of NEPAD’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD) which are security, humanitarian assistance, political governance and transition, socioeconomic reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation and, gender (AU, 2006). Further, the PCRD is a common platform for peacebuilding merging “the nexus of peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding” (NEPAD, 2005: iv).

South Africa through its contribution to NEPAD has made a development plan for Africa which is directly linking economic development with peace and security (Landsberg, s.a.: 11). South Africa has also promoted NEPAD in the G8, the UN, IBSA and G77. Hughes (2004: 79) argues how “NEPAD is quintessentially a visionary idea in documentary form”. While setting concrete targets for the achievement of the UN MDGs, it is propelled by a vision of a

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40 See Hughes (2004) from page 73 onwards and Melber (2002; 2004) for a thorough review of South Africa’s role in creating and promoting NEPAD.
transformed African continent and a reconfigured pattern of African-global trade and investment relations. The ideological premise for NEPAD is squarely located within the concept of an ‘African Renaissance’. The notion of renaissance suggests not just a rebirth, but a rediscovery, embracing and promotion of African precolonial values, culture, identity and pride”.

However, scholars such as Landsberg and Hlophe (1999) and Landsberg (s.a.) argue that NEPAD is a South-African inspired concept and project and African ownership, which is vital for the success of the programme, has proven a challenge. Landsberg (s.a.: 4) also highlights how South Africa’s African agenda, which has been put forward as a challenge to neo-liberalism is critiqued for being too Western, not African enough and as neo-imperialist. Thus, many African observers and even some governments have been critical of the NEPAD programme (Landsberg, 2008: 12).

The NEPAD programme has been criticised extensively by scholars such as Bond (2002) and Taylor and Nel (2002) for building on neo-liberal policies and not working close enough with civil society. Taylor and Nel (2002) argue how such an approach legitimises current international politics and its power relations and illustrates how maintaining rather than rethinking the current trading system in South Africa and in Africa is an impediment for peace and development in itself. Murithi (2005) has an interesting argument that the AU must develop an agenda more focused on the welfare of the people, and that development and governance strategies must change their focus accordingly. He further argues that home grown economic and development strategies must be made, mainly due to the lack of consultation with African civil society during the development of the NEPAD programme.

South Africa has been one of the leading countries in the SADC. SADC is according to the Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 20) one of the key implementing agents of the NEPAD programme, and “the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional integration and development within all priority development sectors”. Moreover, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, is a central vehicle for South Africa in conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution. SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISPD) is particularly important instrument to operationalise the strategies on development in the region. South Africa underlines that “The RISDP has been developed in
line with NEPAD and is the regional expression of the NEPAD priorities and objectives, which will ensure that the SADC’s development agenda works in tandem with the AU” (DFA, 2005c: 20). South Africa has, through SADC, been central in peacemaking both in the crisis in Zimbabwe as well as in the DRC.

However, contradictions in South Africa’s foreign policy are evident here. Being generally a promoter of human rights and development in its strategies and policies, South Africa has not been vocal on these issues in Zimbabwe. Here, President Mbeki has been vocal about the need for Zimbabwe to find own solutions to own problems. This could possibly be a counterargument for South Africa’s western influenced liberal strategies. South Africa is attempting to find more home-grown solutions applicable to the African context. On the other hand, scholars such as Alden and Soko (2005) argue how the Zimbabwe case illustrates the limitations of South Africa’s influence, and moreover the hesitation of critiquing a leadership under the subscription to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Furthermore, the split and power rivalry between SADC countries such as in the case of the DRC, where South Africa attempted to bring all parties to the table whilst Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola sent troops to support President Laurent Kabila, illustrates the two poles in SADC which has made the SADC ability to punch weight in promoting peace and stability smaller (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 6). However, and important here, South Africa’s commitment to the promotion of NEPAD illustrates South Africa’s strategy of linking peace and development towards the continent within a framework which seems to build on liberal structures.

3.3.6 Promoting an African Renaissance

The promotion of NEPAD is closely linked with the ideology of the African Renaissance. The African Renaissance is, according to the government of South Africa “an economic and social development agenda for Africa” (DFA, 2004a). It promotes social and political democratisation, economic regeneration and the improvement of Africa’s geopolitical world affairs and an important foundation for the ANC (ANC, 1997).

The African Renaissance has been described as Mbeki’s effort to identify South Africa with the rest of the continent, a vital part of the post-apartheid foreign policy (Kagwanja 2006: 39).
Mbeki (Government of South Africa, 1996), then Deputy President of the ANC, spoke about peace and prosperity in Africa in his famous speech *I am an African* in 1996 and how “Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes”. Moreover, Mbeki (DFA, 1998) in his speech *The African Renaissance Statement* called upon fellow African leaders and fellow Africans to join forces against corruption, exploitation and abuse of state power: “The African Renaissance demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a permanent vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this rapacious stratum with its social morality according to which everything in society must be organised materially to benefit the few”. Moreover, in Mbeki’s (1999) article “On the African Renaissance”, he states that corrupt and inefficient economic systems of governance must be defeated. Kagwanja (2009: 6) highlights how “a salient ideological feature of the African Renaissance is the mantra of ‘African solutions to African problems’, now driving Africa’s peace and security agenda and architecture”. The idea is how the issues of inequality, poverty and corruption require African solutions. Still, in 2011 Mbeki still underlined how “it is time for Africans to stop looking for solutions elsewhere. Our challenges are African challenges, they should be addressed with African solutions that come from within us” (Koopman, 2011).

As such, the African Renaissance represents a *vision* for the continent to maintain systems of good democratic governance and promotes negotiated transitions towards a system based on democracy and rule of law drawing on the history and culture of Africa (DFA 2004a). In the DFA’s 2003-2005 Strategic Plan (DFA, 2003: 28) two of the main objectives are; “to work towards the realisation of the African Renaissance through the promotion of the objectives of the African Union and NEPAD”; and “to promote and enhance international peace and security”, more specifically to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and post-conflict reconstruction and development with specific reference to Africa. In 2001 the African Renaissance fund was established with the purpose of enhancing international co-operation with and on the African Continent and to confirm South Africa's commitment to Africa focusing on co-operation between South Africa and other, particularly African countries (DFA, 2004a). The fund is aimed for the areas of; promotion of democracy and good governance; the prevention and resolution of conflict; socio-economic development and integration; humanitarian assistance, and; human resource development (DFA, 2004a).
According to Landsberg and Hlophe (1999: 1) “the African Renaissance can be described as both a foreign policy culture and an emerging foreign policy doctrine. (…) It combines a philosophy – a view of Africa – with a set of foreign policy goals and domestic styles and politics entrenched in a set of political, social and economic relations”. Bongmba (2004) argues that Mbeki’s African Renaissance is a call for liberalisation of African states and their economies as a response to African conflict and crisis. Taylor and Williams (2001) describe the African Renaissance as more than a wish list for African development. They state (2001: 267) that “the call for a Renaissance requires commitment to some of the main tenets of liberal democracy, the neo-liberal approach to politics and economic management promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the crisis in Africa”. This is illustrated by statements such as when President Mbeki expressed with relevance to the African Renaissance that “it is also pleasing to see the emergence of the African businesses, which in partnership with global players can bring African solutions to African problems”, highlighting the liberalisation of economies and trade as central for the African Renaissance (Government of South Africa, 1999).

It is evident that Mbeki links democratisation and the practice of democratic ideals to the economic revitalisation of the continent. Taylor and Williams, in their insightful discussion, point out that Mbeki links his idea of renaissance to “global power structures that its proponents can claim with credibility that the values it represents have become self-evident”. (Taylor and Williams, 2001: 268). Kagwanja (2006: 40) claims that “just as Nepad is perceived as GEAR writ large for the continent, ‘African Renaissance’ is suspected to be a thinly veiled attempt to realise South Africa’s ambition for continental leadership”. Ajulu (2001) argues how the African Renaissance is a constructive way for Africa to find its place in the global market, a question which is more prominent in the age of globalisation.

Ajulu (2008: 253) argues that South Africa has become deeply involved in African affairs, in peacebuilding as well as in economic development. Thus, South Africa’s engagement has been shaped by the ideas of a liberal peace, as illustrated by South Africa’s peacebuilding approach and the nexus of peace and development. The link between peace and development, and its inherent contradictions, in the context of the liberal peace is evident. Ajulu (2008: 254) argues how South Africa “seeks to advance development and economic growth across Africa, based on the understanding that this cannot happen in the absence of peace and security. To
this end, its foreign policy makes an explicit link between development, governance, peace and security and growth. Under Thabo Mbeki’s leadership, some of these ideals found expression in the concept of an African Renaissance. The Renaissance vision expresses the desire to maintain systems of good governance and to promote negotiated transitions to democracy and rule of law”. The above analysis calls attention to this view and supports the argument on South Africa’s proximity to the liberal peacebuilding agenda.

### 3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has looked at how South Africa has positioned itself in policy and practice with regards to peace on the African continent. Analysing the contradictions in South Africa’s role in peace and development one goes beyond “moral judgements” analysing the underlying foundations for these engagements. The chapter has illustrated, through the framework of critical theory, that South Africa’s strategy to peace and development is promoting an environment where the liberal state is seen as the key to Africa’s prosperity, with a core focus on promoting liberal institutions. Further, this chapter has argued that the normative principles which underlie NEPAD policy and a philosophy of the African Renaissance shape the framework for South Africa’s focus on development in Africa. These strategic approaches make up South Africa’s position towards peace and development and moreover their nexus, namely peacebuilding. As such, it is suggested here that the liberal peace shapes the ideas of South Africa’s engagement in peacebuilding, which in turn can have inherent contradictions for the sustainability of the peace that is promoted.

Little is evident on how South Africa pictures its own “African solutions to African problems”. However, it should be underlined that the rhetoric of an African Renaissance and finding solutions suitable for African conflicts and obstacles for development in the African peace and development architecture is present, and as such arguably is an attempt at finding new ways of promoting Africa’s prosperity. This also applies to South Africa’s attempts at influencing the international system through its engagement in international forums. South Africa has also, despite accusations of being too Western and neo-imperialist, abstained from criticising its fellow African states for human rights breaches and weak democratic processes, even though such acts is contrary to what South Africa has promoted in the AU and through NEPAD. Moreover, South Africa highlights how peacebuilding and peace missions are
political projects, and how it is essential to focus on root causes. However, in its strategy South Africa has a strong reference to international mechanisms and own national interest in the engagements. Revisiting chapter two these are two of the main contradictions in the liberal peacebuilding; stating a focus on local issues and root causes in strategies, however not implementing this in practice.

On the other hand, the above analysis suggests that there are strong indications that South Africa’s approach to peace, development and thus the peacebuilding agenda is based on a shared set of ideologies, assumptions, definitions, paradigms and procedures as Western actors, the UN and international NGOs share, based on the promotion of a liberal peace, a liberal state and a liberal peacebuilding. These shared assumptions where the liberal peace is seen as the aim of peace operations underline that the liberal peacebuilding project is seen as given. These projects are supposed to have a specific outcome, namely the liberal state. Thus, a justification of specific policies and practices founded on specific liberal norms makes it possible for South Africa to promote a specific kind of peace, to give support to a peace constructed by international organisations and seen as the universal peace. Consequently, South Africa is promoting a peace that is built on the idea of building liberal states in the search for peace and development, despite its promotion of an African agenda.

Critical theory shows how this methodological approach legitimates a transferral of this particular peace. Further, this can be linked to South Africa’s national interest – an interest for international and own security, and prosperity in its neighbourhood for further economic development. South Africa’s transition to a liberal state unveils the contradiction that its own transitional process has to a small degree led to emancipation and real social change. Peace and subsequently development are seen as a result of a liberal peacebuilding, in a problem-solving approach, perpetuating the inequality in the current international system. This is despite the fact that South Africa in its strategy shows a clear awareness of the political nature that peace missions and peacebuilding are – however without questioning the underlying structures promoted by a specific environment. This suggested finding will further be applied to South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC 2003-2008 in the following chapter.
South Africa’s peacebuilding project in the DRC

4.1 Introduction

South Africa has been a key player in the peacemaking in the DRC since its first mediation efforts by President Mandela in 1997. Through multilateral and bilateral engagements including several bilateral commissions, South Africa has been committed to finding peaceful solutions to the conflict as well as political and economic development in the DRC. South Africa facilitated talks between the government and armed groups until a peace agreement was signed in 2002. The following Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was led and mediated by South Africa with President Mbeki in the forefront. Showing a notable commitment to mediation and post-conflict reconstruction cooperation in the DRC, various South African ministries and institutions have been involved in peacemaking and since 2003 increasingly in peacebuilding (De Coning, 2006: 1; Khadiagala, 2009: 67).

Several interpretations of South Africa’s role in the DRC have already been undertaken. What emerged from these studies has highlighted South Africa’s capacity as well as limitations for creating change in the DRC. However, such studies have mostly focused on South Africa’s general foreign policy or peacemaking processes, and not peacebuilding. However, the recent contribution from Swart (2011) is significant as it includes the DRC post-peace accord timeframe analysing gains and challenges for sustainable peace. As touched upon in chapter 1, there have also been few attempts at contextualising South Africa’s engagement within a critical theory framework of peacebuilding.

This chapter will draw upon the frameworks in chapter two and three and through the tool of critical theory make a careful analysis of South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC. Chapter two established the critique of the liberal peacebuilding and its inherent contradictions. Chapter three has established that South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding in

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41 See for instance Ajulu (2008); Curtis (2007); De Coning (2006); Dlomo (2010); Johnson (2009), Kabemba (2006; 2007); Kagwanja (2009); and Khadiagala (2009).

42 However, Ajulu (2008), Autesserre (2010), Eriksen (2009) and Kagwanja (2009) have provided more critical studies.

43 This chapter will not provide an exhaustive presentation of the diverse initiatives South Africa has engaged in the DRC between 2003 and 2008, however utilise many of these initiatives to illustrate South Africa’s broad engagement and support the argument of liberal peacebuilding.
general is closely linked with international initiatives related to the liberal peacebuilding. The indications for South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding as shared with the “peacebuilding consensus” are strong.

This chapter will illustrate how South Africa since the comprehensive peace agreement in 2002 has shifted from a peacemaker through its negotiation efforts to a significant partner in peacebuilding in the DRC through a committed and multifaceted engagement. South Africa has throughout the last decade engaged, multilaterally and bilaterally, in a broad range of peacebuilding activities in the DRC utilising considerable efforts and resources. Areas such as democracy building, security sector reform, institutional reform and economic development have been central. President Mbeki’s African agenda, which links security and development and where conflict resolution is seen as the prerequisite for economic development, has shown evident in the DRC (Khadiagala, 2009: 67). How South Africa has positioned itself in policy and practice towards peacebuilding in the DRC will be analysed. By contextualising accessible data such as official policy documents and secondary sources this chapter will investigate how South Africa has focused its policy and practice and not evaluate its initiatives per se. Guided by a critical theory lens this chapter aims at establishing to what extent South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC is founded on the idea of liberal peacebuilding. Firstly, this chapter will make a brief return to South Africa’s first peacemaking efforts in the DRC from 1997-2003 as a background for the further analysis. Secondly, South Africa’s peacebuilding agenda in the DRC will be analysed in depth, including looking at political and economical liberalisation as the core of this agenda.

4.2 South Africa as a peacemaker in the DRC

“Since the beginning of the conflict in the DRC in August 1998, South Africa has played an active role in attempting to bring peace to this vast country and the Great Lakes region of central Africa”, according to South Africa’s Yearbook 2003/2004 (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318). As South Africa changed from an apartheid state to an African partner in the early 1990s the Great Lakes region experienced great instability. Post-colonial issues of

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44 This study will, as previously emphasised, not try to establish why South Africa chose its specific approaches to peacebuilding in the DRC or contribute with analysis about its successes and failures. For a thorough overview of South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC as well as an analysis of the impact of South Africa’s input into the peacebuilding process in the DRC, see Dlomo (2010).
nation- and statebuilding, resource vulnerability and the lack of functioning regional institutions for economic integration and conflict resolution shaped the critical dynamics of the region (Khadiagala, 2009: 68). Moreover, genocide in Rwanda in 1994 created enormous challenges for the security dynamics in the eastern Congo. Radical shifts in the domestic politics in the DRC and the lack of regional leadership added to the conflict picture. The international community’s engagement in the region at this time was also in decline, much influenced by what had happened in Rwanda (Khadiagala, 2009: 68). This created room for South Africa, as a new partner in conflict resolution, to step up to fill a significant role right in the centre of the Great Lakes region.

President Mandela and thereafter President Mbeki became personally involved in the mediation efforts in the DRC, in addition to senior government ministers (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 8). However, already in 1997 South Africa made its first efforts as a peacemaker in the DRC. Then President Mandela attempted to broker a peace deal between President Mobuto Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila. South Africa, with its strategy of dialogue and negotiation, opposed other SADC participants such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, who provided military support to the regime in Kinshasa in opposition to rebel movements supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Southall, 2006b:13). Already then South Africa marked itself, in contrast to many of its SADC neighbours, as a promoter of dialogue and non-military solutions to the conflict in the DRC. Moreover, South Africa was a driver of including the DRC into SADC, due to its instability and the possible negative effect for the whole SADC region (Khadiagala, 2009: 70).

President Mbeki became central for South Africa’s involvement in the DRC. In the Renaissance statement President Mbeki (DFA, 1998) claimed how “the Democratic Republic of Congo is sliding back into a conflict of arms from which its people had hoped they had escaped forever”. SADC, despite its member states’ disagreements towards the DRC, sought a ceasefire in the DRC through the Lusaka process with support from Western countries and

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46 For a thorough analysis of the role of preventative diplomacy with a focus on the international community’s efforts to resolve the conflict in the DRC 1998-2004, see Swart (2008). Swart focuses mainly on the negotiation phase of the conflict in the DRC and argues that preventative diplomacy has not successfully been applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, foremost due to the lack of structural prevention and that the broader strategy of conflict prevention is not connected to measures and action that addresses the deeper or structural causes of conflict.
the UN, which culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999\(^47\) (Khadiagala, 2009: 70). Ajulu (2008: 260) argues how Mbeki added a new approach to South Africa’s foreign policy and particularly to the peacemaking efforts in the DRC by his hands on approach. President Mbeki, together with President Chiluba of Zambia, made a second endeavour at peacemaking attempting to include rebel movements to sign the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement before the first deployment of UN troops, MONUC, in 1999 (Curtis 2007: 253). South Africa had a central role in negotiating and drafting the agreement which included a ceasefire and the deployment of an international UN peacekeeping force (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318). President Mbeki announced South Africa’s commitment to a peaceful DRC, and a peaceful Africa, through committing to contributing with troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. MONUC was established following the UN Security Council Resolution 1279 in November 1999 (Khadiagala, 2009: 71). Evidently, South Africa had already taken a leading role in the DRC peace process\(^48\).

South Africa was later to emerge as a principal broker between conflicting interests during the peace negotiations, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD)\(^49\). These political negotiations between the Congolese government, the opposition and the armed groups were central to the peace process and to the transition in the DRC (Southall, 2006b: 13). As a host for the ICD in Sun City in 2002, South Africa helped to negotiate the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the DRC in 2003 and an agreement between President Kabila and President Kagame of Rwanda, illustrating South Africa’s regional approach to the conflict. Swart (2008: 208) argues how South Africa was a significant partaker during the Sun City negotiations which resulted in an agreement between the belligerent parts. The agreement is described by South Africa itself as “a ground-breaking peace agreement brokered by South Africa” signed by the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318). The agreement paved way for the withdrawal and disarming of Rwandan troops from the DRC, and the repatriation of the Interahamwe, the Hutu organisation responsible for the Rwandan genocide, and the Rwandan former army (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318). The final plenary session of the ICD took place at Sun City in April 2003 under South Africa’s mediation and supervision. Here, the *Global and Inclusive agreement on the*

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\(^{47}\) For a critical assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, see Solomon and Swart (2004).

\(^{48}\) For a thorough review of the peace process in the DRC, see Rogier (2004)

\(^{49}\) See ISS (s.a.).
transition in the DRC was signed, consisting of power sharing between the main Congolese parties during the transition and a transitional constitution, with Mr Joseph Kabila as head of state for a two year transitional period (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318).

Further deepening its leading role, South Africa became the guarantor of the transition process. South Africa has played a twofold role in the DRC peacemaking process, firstly as the chair of the AU, and secondly as a UN member state, which has given legitimacy as a facilitator (Search for Common Ground, 2003). In these capacities South Africa was assigned the role of Third Party. The Third Party Verification Mechanism was meant to monitor and verify the implementation of the Global and Inclusive Agreement. As a guarantor, South Africa continued its strong support to the further deepening of peace and promotion of development in the DRC. As stated by the DFA (2006a), “South Africa places much emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC having facilitated the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC on 17 December 2002. The signing of this agreement, for the first time, paved the way for peace and stability in the DRC”. From inclusive negotiations and political solutions through a focus on transitional government and elections, South Africa’s role for stability in the DRC changed towards promoting and being a partner in a comprehensive peacebuilding process.

However, as Kabemba (2006: 156) notices, the Sun City negotiations did not challenge the leadership of the DRC, focusing on agreements between the main belligerents. As such, the lack of accountability and a new political class perpetuated the vicious circle of the characteristics of the Congolese state, namely corruption, personalisation of power, and ethnicity. This is an important backdrop when revisiting the critique of the liberal peacebuilding, where local conflict dynamics and search for an emancipatory peace often are ignored issues. This study will now turn to analysing the principles shaping South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC, followed by empirical evidence supporting the arguments that these principles are guided by the liberal peacebuilding agenda.
4.3 South Africa’s peacebuilding agenda

4.3.1 The principles for building peace in the DRC

In accordance with the argument of this study how South Africa has positioned its strategy towards the DRC in its official documents, strategies and statements could unveil fundamental elements guiding South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC. Only by conducting such an analysis will it be possible to argue if South Africa is building a liberal peace in the DRC.

South Africa has no official formal policy or strategy for its engagements in the DRC. However, South Africa, as addressed in the previous chapter, has exclaimed its strategic foundations on international peace missions in the White Paper (DFA, 1999) and through its commitment to the AU and NEPAD, inspired by the idea of an African Renaissance. These strategic frameworks are vital when analysing South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC as they spell out the principles in which South Africa bases its peacebuilding engagement, which again are applicable to the DRC. Further, the South African Yearbooks are important sources of information for reviewing the foreign policy agenda of South Africa with regards to the DRC.

Peace and stability in the DRC is clearly stated as one of South Africa’s main priorities in its foreign policy towards Africa. The prosperity of Africa, and of the DRC, is repeatedly mentioned in its strategies and official statements. According to the South Africa Yearbook 2004/2005 (Government of South Africa, 2005:295) “South Africa’s diplomatic relations with central Africa have been dominated by attempts to bring peace to the DRC and Burundi, thereby ensuring greater stability in the whole of the central African region”. Landsberg (2004: 169) and Ajulu (2008: 261) argue that South Africa’s number one priority in the region is peace in the DRC. South Africa’s strong commitment towards the DRC is reflected through three levels: its contribution to the UN peacekeeping force MONUC and its mediation efforts and military engagement through SADC; placing peace and development concerning the DRC on the international agenda and; its extensive bilateral engagement.
As discussed in chapter 3 South Africa’s White Paper (DFA, 1999) lays out the strategy behind South Africa’s engagement in peace missions, moving into the area of peacebuilding. The White Paper states that South Africa’s strategy for involvement in peace missions firstly has a strong focus on peacebuilding efforts. A strong peacebuilding focus entails a long-term approach. Revisiting the definition of peacebuilding in the White Paper (1999: 8), “’Peace building’ may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in the aftermath of a conflict. ‘Peace building’ includes activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of interaction among former enemies in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. In essence, ‘peace building’ is mainly a diplomatic/developmental process. Although the military might be requested to support this process, ‘peace building’ does not constitute a military operation in the true sense of the word.”

The White Paper highlights the imperative to focus on root causes of a conflict, not just the symptoms. Further, peacebuilding is to be based on local capacities, experience and knowledge. The White Paper highlights how building a state and developing an economy, as well as conducting elections and building democracy are significant elements for South Africa’s strategy for participating in peace missions. The link to international and agreed upon mechanisms for achieving peace and how, primarily, South Africa’s national interest must be in accordance with these international mechanisms for South Africa to engage are also prominent.

According to official statements with reference to the DRC, “The South African facilitators have been committed to framing peacebuilding and democracy as an inclusive and progressive (yet incremental) process” (Search for Common Ground, 2003). This process has been based upon basic values such as (i) increased accountability and transparency (ii) developing policies and practices and (iii) creating an inclusive, centralised government with a main focus on the peacebuilding process on development of democratic institutions, including democratic elections (Search for Common Ground, 2003). These above principles are all clearly linked to the liberal peacebuilding, particularly visible by reference to building a state and developing an economy, linked to international and agreed mechanisms for achieving peace.
4.3.2 South Africa as a peacebuilder in the DRC

Peace and stability in the DRC is high on South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, and a mutual partnership shapes the statements on this relation. President Mbeki has stated (DFA 2007c) that “there are a number of similarities between South Africa and the DRC. Our countries consist of societies in transition from turbulent histories. The DRC is at a critical crossroads, similar to that we reached following the historic April 1994 elections, which marked the demise of apartheid and the installation of a democratically elected government. We believe, however, that transitional challenges such as those faced by our two countries are not insurmountable”. Further, Mbeki (DFA, 2007c) underlines how “off course, we are talking of a partnership between South Africa and the DRC - not of South Africa coming to the DRC without the support of the government of the DRC - we must work as a partnership”, underlining the mutually beneficial relations which underlies South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement. Here, we can link back to chapter two and the UN description of peacebuilding, where “concrete cooperative projects which links to or more countries in a mutual beneficial undertaking that cannot only contribute to economic and social development although also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (Boutros Ghali, 1992).

South Africa argues in the case of the DRC that the efforts of the international community should be a priority for South Africa in the DRC peace process (Search for Common Ground, 2003). Here, the joint efforts of South Africa and the UN under the UN Chapter VII mandate in the international military peacekeeping efforts have the goals of training a new Congolese security force, demobilise militias and belligerents and integrate combatants into the national force or civil society (Search for Common Ground, 2003). Further, South Africa in its Strategic Plan 2005-2008 (DFA, 2005c) welcomes the cooperation between the AU and the EU on peace keeping in the DRC, as well as cooperation in Burundi and Sudan. “In this area the major challenge is that available financial resources are inadequate relative to the needs. Hence South Africa will continue to engage the EU at a bilateral level and in multilateral forums on Africa’s efforts to bring peace and stability in the continent” (DFA, 2005c: 49).

It seems evident that South Africa supports the international approach and mechanisms set up to ensure peace and development in the DRC, mainly the international UN mission. Johnson (2009) argues how South Africa, as a power house in Africa, firstly promotes its national
interests within security and economics, through its participation to MONUC. The proximity of South Africa’s own interest, and in a wider perspective the African Renaissance, is evident due to the intimate economic relations with the DRC, and how South Africa in the White Paper highlights its own important role with regards to economic and political development on the continent. Furthermore, South Africa’s efforts through MONUC contribute to strengthen South Africa’s international recognition, as well as on the continent and furthermore South Africa’s “moral responsibility” is essential for its vast contribution to the UN mission (Johnson, 2009). In 2007 the DFA (Government of South Africa, 2007a) stated that “given the magnitude of the task, it is clear that the reconstruction process in the DRC will continue to require international support. In this regard, South Africa is supporting the DRC by sharing its experience of engaging the international community and international financial institutions in the processes of reconstruction, development and nation building”.

The regional dimensions are also prominent in South Africa’s strategy as well as practice towards the DRC. South Africa’s strategy towards the DRC is dominated by the fact that “South Africa’s assistance to the DRC is informed by its vision of an ‘African Renaissance’ of peace, stability and security, and sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic development on the African continent. According to Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of Provincial and Local Government 1999-2008 and an official South African facilitator in the DRC peacebuilding, the regional dimension of the DRC conflict is an important factor for South Africa’s dominating role in facilitating the DRC peace process (Search for Common Ground, 2003). “South Africa’s national interests are integrally linked to developing peace and improving the quality of life for all Africans. Therefore, it has been this desire to encourage regional stability and African solidarity that inspired South Africa to assume the role of a regional player in southern Africa and in the Great Lakes peace processes” (Search for Common Ground, 2003). Guided by South Africa’s own experience of the struggle against apartheid and the challenges of democratisation, as discussed in chapter three, South Africa has gained considerable understanding which could be used to promote peace processes in an African setting (Search for Common Ground, 2003). President Mbeki at the signing of the agreement between the government and rebel groups 29 June 2003 to end the war and create a government of unity, as a chair of the AU, said that “the rebuilding of the DRC will go a long way to ensuring the stability of the SADC region which will inevitably contribute to the strength of the African Union and the success of NEPAD” (DFA, 2003). Further, at the Joint
session of the transitional DRC parliament (Government of South Africa, 2004a), Mbeki again confirmed how the engagement in the DRC is linked to African development, the AU and NEPAD:

_We are convinced also that this experience of the reconstruction of the DRC must become an integral part that informs the strengthening of the African Union. What we will do with regard to the future of the Congo will tell the real story about whether we are serious about the objectives we have stated in the Constitutive Act, which resulted in the establishment of the African Union. These are big challenges that we face. They relate also to the New Partnership for Africa’s development. The continent took a common decision that we must ourselves decide what is wrong with our countries and what is wrong with our societies._

Moreover, the DFA (Government of South Africa, 2007a) stated prior to the state visit of President Kabila in 2007 how “the DRC remains one of the foreign policy pillars of South Africa's engagement on the African continent. South Africa's assistance to the DRC is informed by its vision of an ‘African Renaissance’ of peace, stability and security and sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic development for the African continent. Accordingly, South Africa is committed to a strategy for post conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC that is aligned with that of the African Union and Nepad. Hence, its assistance to the DRC is broadly based on 3 key areas, which are: the security sector reform (SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development”.

Revisiting the argument that the liberal peace is linking peace and development, governance and growth, it becomes evident that this link to a great degree has been expressed through the concept of the African Renaissance during the Mbeki Presidency. As such one could argue that the DRC becomes a “test case” for the peace and prosperity of the African continent. One could further argue how this represents a top-down view, seeing the DRC as a piece in a larger puzzle, where liberal structures are supposed to bring peace and development. It is however clear that South Africa is searching for developmental solutions suitable for the African countries and Africa as a whole. Nevertheless, these findings suggest how such solutions are founded on liberal structures, reflected in the international approach to
peacebuilding as well as through the AU, SADC by focusing on NEPAD and an African Renaissance.

Revisiting chapter two, Pugh (2004) and Richmond (2008) underline the liberal objectives of the current peacebuilding agenda. The normative framework for peacebuilding is based on what is perceived as universal values. The assumed acceptance of peace as the liberal peace, which includes a liberal environment meaning political and economic liberalisation through democracy and free-market economy, has inherent contradictions and limitations. As a consequence of its liberal ontology and epistemology, the liberal peace equals, or promotes, the reform of governance, building on liberal structures (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 4).

Peacebuilding in itself is a political project, as South Africa itself describes. The White Paper (DFA, 1999: 4) expresses how “contemporary peace missions are fundamentally political initiatives, despite the complex admixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and means. South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of the political and strategic environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing South African participation in such efforts”. This point to the fact that such a political and strategic environment, which contains the idea of a liberal peace, is more or less accepted by South Africa, at least in the case of the DRC and its multilateral engagement. This study now turns to looking at the bilateral engagement South Africa has with the DRC.

4.3.3 The South Africa-DRC Bi-national Commission

After signing the comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, DRC was in principle seen and treated as a post-conflict state by the international community. Autesserre (2010: 66) argues how donors changed their focus from security issues to economic and political matters despite the continuation of violence and instability, particularly in the eastern DRC. Further, Autesserre (210: 68) underpins how the dominating interpretation of the DRC as a post-conflict state led to a certain ignorance of conflicts related to land, mineral resources, traditional power and taxes. This is a noteworthy backdrop for analysing South Africa’s engagement which also to a large extent turned to political and economic matters after 2003.
Multiple agreements between South Africa and the DRC were signed during the first years after the peace agreement. According to the South African Yearbook 2004/2005 (Government of South Africa, 2005: 296) South African officials visited the DRC in December 2003 and January 2004 to “identify possible areas of co-operation to assist the DRC with its post-conflict reconstruction and development”. President Mbeki visited the DRC in January 2004 during the signing of a General Cooperation Agreement (GCA) meant to promote political, economic and social cooperation between the two countries (DIRCO, 2009). From 2004 onwards there was an annual summit in the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC) hosted by Mbeki and Kabila in Pretoria and Kinshasa, respectively. The Congolese Minister of Planning, Mr Thambwe Mwama visited South Africa for the South Africa-DRC Joint Ministerial Meeting in Pretoria in March 2004. The BNC was officially launched in Kinshasa in August 2004 to serve as a mechanism to strengthen, regulate and consolidate political and economic relations between the two countries (Government of South Africa, 2005: 296). At the first extraordinary session in August 2004, President Mbeki was accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and Industry, Public Service and Administration, Finance and Deputy Minister of Minerals and Energy as well as senior government officials (DFA, 2004b). At this session the two Independent Electoral Commissions also met to discuss the first Congolese election since independence, planned for 2005.

The BNC has been central in South Africa’s engagement in peacebuilding in the DRC. The GCA laid the foundations for the establishment of the BNC. The BNC, according to statements by the South African government (DIRCO 2009) became a forum for exchange and dialogue focusing on post-conflict reconstruction and development, whilst the GCA has resulted in numerous bilateral projects within a broad area of cooperation. The BNC will “create a mechanism through which the two governments can regulate political co-operation whilst simultaneously serving as a platform for the two governments to identify and implement joint co-operation projects” (Government of South Africa, 2004b). According to the Yearbook 2008/2009 (Government of South Africa, 2009: 252) “The BNC, which has been in existence between South Africa and the DRC since 2004, provides a legal and administrative framework to manage and implement a number of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in that country. In the implementation of projects in the DRC remains the substance of the BNC’s work, focusing on the development of the DRC”.

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Moreover, the BNC has “the overall objective of working for the renewal of Africa and creating a better world” (DFA, 2005b).

The BNC’s broad approach to peacebuilding in many sectors illustrates South Africa’s engagement. The BNC consists of four sectoral commissions established to review the progress in implementation of the commitments between South Africa and the DRC. The four commissions are (i) Politics and Governance; (ii) Defence and Security; (iii) Humanitarian and Social Affairs; and (iv) Finance, Economy and Infrastructure (DFA, 2005b). The Politics and Governance Commission led by DIRCO and its counterpart was administered by the Ministries and Departments of Public Service and Administration and has been responsible for Public Service Reform such as assistance in public service census, anti-corruption, establishment of a National Institute of Public Administration and rehabilitation projects (Dlomo, 2010: 46). Further, the Humanitarian and Social Affairs commission has dealt with all projects related to social development and the commission on Finance, Economy and Infrastructure with relevant issues (Dlomo, 2010: 47). Home Affairs has also been involved in the DRC on immigration and population issues (DFA, 2005a). The departments of Defence, the South African Police Service and the Independent Electoral Commission have also all been engaged with their counterparts in the DRC under the coordination of the DFA.

Between 2004 and 2005 32 agreements and memorandums were signed (Dlomo 2010: 45). During the first session of the BNC a Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation was signed, as well as one on Public Administration and an agreement for the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment. The second session of the BNC took place in Pretoria in April 2005. Here, issues such as political and diplomatic consultation, good governance and public administration, defence and security, economy, finance and infrastructures as well as further increased cooperation were discussed (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 316). South Africa has also been supporting the national reconciliation process in the DRC (DFA, 2007b). R25 million from the African Renaissance Fund was transferred from South Africa to the DRC by mid-2005 assisting the DRC with its reconstruction and development (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 317). This extensive engagement illustrates South Africa’s efforts to build a Congolese state, through liberalisation of politics and economy, capacity building and governance.
4.3.4 Political liberalisation as part of peacebuilding

In 2008, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (DFA, 2008), at the opening of the 5th BNC Ministerial Session, said:

*The RSA/DRC BNC is a framework for the formalisation of agreements in areas of critical co-operation for the mutual benefit of our respective countries. The BNC’s activities encompassed areas of election support, security sector reform (SSR) covering integration of the armed forces and the reform of the Congolese Police (PNC), as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and development process (PCRD). Critical milestones, reported in the Fourth Session of the BNC, have been covered in respect of election support and SSR. Beyond the 2006 historic presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, focus is increasingly on the PCRD process.*

One year later, DIRCO (2009) stated that “the overriding content of South Africa’s current bilateral relations with the DRC is aimed at assisting the country to develop capacity to effectively manage its programmes within the framework of its own Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) programme.” Facilitating institutional capacity building as a part of promoting development is emphasised as a part of peacebuilding in the DRC, as well as Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and the Sudan (DFA, 2005c: 71). Democracy, including elections, has been one of South Africa’s core engagements in the DRC. According to South Africa’s Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 “The maintenance of peace and stability and assistance with post conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC remains a priority for South Africa” and further consolidation of the peace process in the DRC as well as consolidation of democracy in the DRC are expressed as main priorities (DFA 2005c: 10; 68). This consolidation is to be carried out through achieving full agreement by all conflicting parties and implementing these peace agreements and further through supporting the DRC elections (DFA, 2005c: 69). South Africa has been vocal on how the constitution is seen as a basis for the democratic elections that would take place in July 2006, however somewhat delayed (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 317). South Africa, together with the facilitator, former President of Botswana Ketumile Masire, has been a vital actor in “assisting the people of the DRC to find a common solution to the political challenges that have faced
the country for decades” through their role in promoting the new constitution (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286).

In accordance with the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria in 2002, it was envisaged that the DRC transitional process would culminate in the holding of elections in the latter half of 2005. To this end, the South African Government adopted a framework to facilitate electoral assistance to the DRC, primarily based on strengthening institutional capacity (DFA, 2005c: 71). On 19 April 2004, President Joseph Kabila released the Road Map consisting of a calendar of different steps of the transitional process, including the finalisation of a draft constitution which would culminate in the organisation of free and fair elections in September 2005. On 8 May 2004, it was announced that all the components of the DRC’s transitional government had reached agreement on the provincial governors and deputy-governors. (Government of South Africa, 2005: 296). President Mbeki travelled to the DRC again in May 2005 for participating at the adoption of the DRC’s new constitution. Three months before the democratic elections, in March 2006, the third session of the BNC took place in Kinshasa, where the elections, social development, decentralisation and education where amongst the agreements signed (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 285). These high level visits are illustrative of South Africa’s deep commitment to the promotion of democracy in the DRC.

South Africa has, in addition to the high level partnership, provided significant support to the DRC for the election process. A Memorandum of Understanding signed 10 February 2005 ensured the cooperation between the South African and the Congolese electoral commissions, facilitation of co-operation and assistance to the electoral process. It ensured South Africa’s contribution with logistics such as ballot printing and distribution throughout the country. South Africa also assisted with ICT support in the monitoring and counting process of the election, recruitment and training of staff and conflict resolution within the framework in which the elections would take place (Government of South Africa, 2006a; Buanews 2007). Additionally, a South African observer mission of 108 South Africans were deployed to observe during the general and presidential elections in July 2006 as well as for the second round of the presidential election in October 2006 which was won by President Kabila (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). The mission concluded that the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner. Following, in September 2006, President Mbeki held
bilateral discussions with President Kabila in Kinshasa. These were the first democratic elections in 45 years since the country gained independence from Belgium in June 1960, described as *historic* by South Africa (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). After the elections President Mbeki congratulated the Congolese people and underlined how the election is "re-affirming their desire for a peaceful future in a stable and democratic state by holding successful Presidential and Parliamentary elections" and furthermore how “we [South Africa] stand ready to welcome them into the family of progressive and democratic states” (DFA, 2006b).

Also, the DFA continued its comprehensive capacity-building project for the DRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation throughout 2007 and a Public Service census in Kinshasa was completed with further data capture in the Bandundu and Bas-Congo provinces (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). South Africa also engaged in an anticorruption project for DRC public officials. During his visit to South Africa in 2007, President Kabila rewarded President Mbeki and South Africa for their extensive engagement in the peace process and transitional phase. Kabila expressed how “the government of South Africa invested so much to a solution to a crisis that affected my country for so long” (Buanews, 2007). Kabila again visited Pretoria for the fifth BNC Summit in April 2008 (Government of South Africa, 2009: 252).

However, as Ajulu (2008: 266) argues, the power-sharing model for the transition in the DRC has been criticised. It was effective in bringing the warring parties together for the transitional government and period. However, politics in the DRC quickly returned to a winner-takes-it-all approach, and a fracture party politics, not a model for ensuring wider participation and democratic values. Further, issues of nationality, one of the core issues in the conflict in the eastern DRC was not properly addressed when drawing up the Constitution (Ajulu, 2008: 268). The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006) highlights in its 2006 report how corruption problems and governance challenges are treated as technical issues by donors, indicating that an approach aimed at the fundamentally changing the landscape of Congolese politics is needed. However, the ICG’s 2009 report on peacebuilding in the DRC suggests a more structured security sector reform, justice system reform, governance reform, reconciliation as well as a regional focus, which in itself also has a certain technical focus.
Security sector reform is closely linked to the framework of democratic governance. This is an area which has been significant in the peacebuilding cooperation between South Africa and the DRC. Already in 2000 the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) was deployed to the DRC to participate in reconstruction of infrastructure and train Congolese troops. In March 2006, South Africa extended its existing deployment of SANDF members to a total of 124 (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). These forces where to support the integration and military training of the armed forces of the DRC, including registration of demobilised troops and upgrading military centers. The Defence and Security Commission within the BNC has led the cooperation for military reform, including training of the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), through the ministries and Departments of Defence. The Department of Justice has dealt with justice reform such as integration of the National Congress for the defence of the People of DRC (CNDP) into FARDC, mainly from 2007 onwards. In 2004 a defence cooperation agreement and Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration Process of the Armed Forces was signed, which later led to an agreement on Practical Assistance to the Government of the DRC (BuaNews, 2009). Furthermore, the Police and Secret Services have cooperated on security sector reform. According to the South African Yearbook (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 316) “the South African Police Service (SAPS) has worked closely with the Congolese police forces to ensure security and to assist with the integration of armed forces in the DRC. In addition, South Africa, Britain and the Netherlands formed a partnership to assist the Congolese Government with the integration of their army”. The South African Police Service was also engaged in training DRC police before the election in 2006 and was deployed in “high risk areas” during the elections (Dlomo 2010: 58). In 2005 1216 SAPS peacekeeping personnel were deployed as a part of MONUC.

South Africa’s contribution to MONUC also increased from around 100 in 2001 to 1409 troops in 2006 (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286; Khadiagala, 2009: 72). In 2008 the SANDF trained former DRC armed forces, the Rapid Reaction Battalion, who became members of the DRC Defence Force with the aim of providing security and stability particularly after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission (BuaNews 2009). However, security sector reform has proved a great challenge in the DRC. In the east ill-disciplined and ill-equipped security forces have represented a threat to the civilians (Ajulu, 2008: 267. These forces have also been involved in severe sexual violence50.

50 For a useful analysis of conflict related sexual violence by soldiers in the DRC, see Baaz and Stern (2009).
Revisiting Taylor’s (2007) argument it is an inherent contradiction to attempt to create a liberal peace in an African nation, due to the nature of its politics and governance. Moreover, one of the main contradictions in the liberal peacebuilding is namely how this approach results in a weak democratic process and a zero-sum political game (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 186). Despite South Africa’s support for the Congolese democratic elections, the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) highlights how a post-conflict state will have issues of prospering if elections are not supplemented with a higher agenda of effective governance. This has evidently proven difficult in the DRC, despite the concerted efforts of the international community, including South Africa’s extensive support.

4.3.5 Economic liberalisation as part of peacebuilding


The DRC has made remarkable progress and presents real opportunities for intraregional economic co-operation, foreign direct investment (FDI) and sustained growth and development. However, cycles of conflict have severely undermined both African and foreign-investor confidence, further weakened indigenous economic development, and increased dependence on foreign loans and assistance. South Africa is fully committed to continued engagement with the DRC, and to assisting the new democratically elected government with its consolidation of democracy, in line with its foreign policy objectives. South Africa has also committed to providing ongoing assistance to the new Government to reform the DRC’s economy, and is supporting measures to encourage a predictable and stable economic environment to unlock investment and trade opportunities between the two countries.

As a significant part of South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement, there has been a large commitment to assisting the DRC in its economic development and reconstruction. Already in 2002, Vodacom, the leading cellular network in South Africa, was launched in the DRC. At the launch where President Mbeki was present, he stated “In many ways, this strengthens the good relations between South Africa and the Congo. This launch will certainly assist in the
reconstruction of the national economy of the DRC and, in this way, must also be seen as a part and parcel of the process of the socio-economic recovery of the African continent” (Government of South Africa, 2002). In connection with the launch Mbeki expressed that “by taking this important step, you have made a significant contribution to the realisation of the dream of an African Renaissance and the implementation of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)” (Government of South Africa, 2002).

According to Mbeki (2007c) “we [DRC and South Africa] have a duty, among other things, to strengthen our economic relations by enhancing co-operation among our business people and increase trade and investment between our countries, as well as ensuring effective implementation of current and future New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) projects, as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) programmes. We must work together to improve people-to-people contacts, including through cultural, scientific and educational exchange programmes as well as encouraging two-way tourism”.

The role of the private sector and companies are seen as vital for Africa’s development. Areas such as telecommunication could thus be a catalyst for further integration of Africa into the global economy. In addition to support in the area of telecommunication, South Africa has assisted the DRC in institutional building for trade and industry, infrastructure development including major projects such as the Bas-Congo Corridor/Spatial Development Initiative, the Zambia Copper belt, the Inga Dam, telecommunications, technical assistance and expertise for electricity development and transport including airways.

South Africa and the DRC signed an agreement on investments, a Memorandum of Understanding on trade and industry as well as a working group for ministers responsible for trade and industry, minerals, energy and transport in 2005 (DFA, 2005a). Here, the RSA-DRC Business Forum was launched. Cooperation and capacity building on customs and tax administration authorities, energy, mining, transport and agriculture was also discussed. As the fourth South Africa-DRC BNC was held in Kinshasa in August 2007 it was the first summit after the elections in 2006 and with the new democratically elected government, led by President Kabila, in place. Two months earlier President Kabila had visited President Mbeki in South Africa for bilateral talks (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). Here Mbeki and Kabila reviewed the agreements in areas such as transport, telecommunications, mining and energy, infrastructural development, hydrocarbons, tourism and administration.
and public services (Buanews, 2007). Agreements in the areas of health and infrastructure were signed, and South Africa also committed to finance construction of a new Airport terminal at N’Djili airport, Kinshasa and a deep sea port at Banana (Buanews, 2007).

The bilateral economic relations between South Africa and the DRC have made the latter evolve as one of South Africa’s main trading partners in the region, according to the DFA (DFA 2005b; Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). When Mbeki visited Kinshasa in 2004 the Business Unity of South Africa signed a Cooperation Agreement with the DRC’s Federation of entrepreneurial Chambers and the RSA-DRC business forum was launched (DFA 2005b). It is noteworthy how the economic relationship between South Africa and the DRC has evolved. In 1998 South African exports to the DRC were 1 048 465 000, whilst in 2004 the number had increased to ZAR 1 387 566 000 (DFA, 2005b). In contrast, South African import from the DRC in 1998 was ZAR 25 042 000 and ZAR 1 343 217 000 in 2004. In 2008 exports from South Africa to the DRC were at ZAR 8 274 448 000 and imports from the DRC to South Africa at ZAR 49 977 000 (DIRCO, 2010). South Africa (DFA, 2005b) notes in 2005 that “The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have already begun working on economic reforms and assistance programmes, and certain confidence indicators make a compelling business case for investment and growth in the DRC”. Further, Minister Mandisi Mpahlwa expressed at the South Africa-DRC Business Forum in 2007 how “the South African business community has a very critical role to play in collaborating with the South African and DRC government to implement its bilateral economic strategy of achieving mutual economic growth and development with the continent through outward investment facilitation, infrastructure development and trade liberalisation” (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007).

As discussed in chapter three South Africa’s own neo-liberal adoption post-apartheid raises questions due to its increasingly economic expansion into Africa, including in conflict areas. Despite the multiple challenges facing the DRC, Kabemba (2006; 2007: 549) argues that South Africa aims at creating “an environment favourable for corporate investment” based partly on own national interest, however “while seeking to ensure that this is not achieved at any potential costs to human rights, peace and security”. South Africa’s involvement has received criticisms for paving way for South African business interests, and being a part of Mbeki’s broader agenda of African Renaissance and NEPAD’s conflict resolution hand in
hand with good governance, democracy and economic growth (Kabemba, 2006: 152). Kagwanja (2006: 47; 2009: 23) describes the greatest lesson from the DRC as “the need to reconcile economic interests in a conflict zone with the imperatives of peacemaking”, underlining that despite the critique of South Africa’s commercial and trade interest, South Africa’s involvement and commitment transcends this and has a higher aim of stabilising the DRC through capacity and institution building. There is a great need for South Africa to rethink and clarify this role, in relation to its peacebuilding initiatives, as it is evident that South Africa is promoting an economic liberalisation in the DRC.

4.4 African solutions based on a liberal agenda?

An increasing part of the literature as well as empirical evidence underline how the limitations and contradictions of South Africa’s foreign policy in the DRC and other multilateral initiatives must be recognised. Scholars such as Curtis (2007) and Ajulu (2008) argue that despite South Africa’s committed engagement in the DRC the limitations of South Africa’s “export of peace” must be emphasised. It is essential to recognise the complex challenges for a transition in the DRC, as post-conflict violence and tensions still act as an impediment for a stable Great Lakes region. Kagwanja (2006: 49) elaborates on issues such as “fundamental impediments facing the UN mission, namely inefficiency, inadequate resources and a limited mandate” make South Africa’s contributions to the UN less effective. Critical analysts from a political economy perspective, such as Kabemba (2006: 154), explain the perpetuating conflict by looking at the external exploitation of the resources in the DRC which has taken place through colonialism and the post-colonial era. Such dynamics arguably have continued and are currently shaped as exploitative relationships of neo-colonial networks and patterns. On the other hand internal problems are impediments for the creation of a stable and legitimate state. The political economy of conflict, weak leadership, the lack of state control over the eastern parts of the country and problems of reintegrating rebel groups into the dysfunctional army pose perpetuating challenges to the peace process (Kabemba, 2006: 155). Moreover, root causes such as the question of citizenship, land distribution and the regional aspect of the Great Lakes conflict, in a context of continuous exploitation by external and internal forces, are challenges to sustainable peace (Kabemba, 2006; Autesserre 2010).
The potential for peaceful solutions by building a Congolese state through liberalisation of politics and economics in a noticeable top-down approach could be questioned, due to inherent contradictions within this liberal peacebuilding approach. Despite significant efforts in the DRC by the international community, including the UN peace mission, great challenges remain on the ground. The government has limited control of its territory outside Kinshasa, particularly prominent in the eastern parts of the country. There is a chronic lack of service delivery, and state institutions are weak and to some extent even dysfunctional. Corruption is widespread and political participation is far from satisfactory. The human rights situation is grave, and the humanitarian situation particularly in the east is far from the idea of an emancipatory peace. Kabemba (2006: 169) concludes how “the attainment of peace and stability in the DRC would owe much to the role that South Africa has played during the recent negotiations. Even if this has been guided by a mix of Mbeki’s continental ambitions and the interest of South African capital in gaining secure and certain access to the riches of the DRC, the experience of democracy that South Africa has brought to the peace process may well prove to be invaluable to the long-term future of the DRC”. On the other hand, as South Africa itself highlights in its White Paper, elections in itself is no insurance for a peaceful prospering future.

The remaining existing, and immense, challenges in the DRC, raise concern for the peacebuilding efforts taking place, and whether these create an environment conducive for long-lasting and emancipatory peace. Spence (2004) suggests that South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding in the DRC is linked to a liberal and rational environment that necessarily does not suit all conflict environments, a view which is supported here. Linking the situation in the DRC back to the debate in the earlier chapters, Eriksen (2009) argues that the liberal peace agenda, in particular the attempt of state building, in the DRC has failed. “What is never questioned is the aim of creating a liberal state. Instead, this aim is treated as given, determined prior to and independent of the political process” (Eriksen, 2009: 16). The policies of western states are based on flawed ideas of creating a liberal state in the DRC. In accordance with the liberal peacebuilding critique Eriksen argues that external engagements have exacerbated the state weakness of the DRC, and further undermine the possibilities for building a liberal state as wanted by the donors (Eriksen, 2009: 17). Taylor (2007) goes further to argue how the liberal state is not applicable to the African context. Importantly, the root causes of the conflict in the DRC, namely the issues of citizenship and access to land,
and the social questions facing the country receives to a lesser degree focus on the ground, and on the local level. This coincides with Richmond (2008), Richmond and Franks (2009) and Autesserre’s (2010) arguments that the local dynamics of peacebuilding is not sufficiently addressed in the top-down focussed liberal peacebuilding. The regional nature of the conflict further complicates the potential for change and creates a desire for searching solutions way beyond building a liberal state with its core seat in Kinshasa – which has little impact in large parts of the vast DRC.

However, through a critical debate on the meaning of peace and the current liberal peacebuilding agenda, there is potential for the advancement of the discourse on current peacebuilding. Here, the emerging regional actors, such as South Africa, could represent a strong voice in searching for alternatives, in discourse and in practice. South Africa’s committed engagement in the DRC, and the close relations between the two governments could pose a potential for an alternative approach towards more sustainable peace. On the other hand, South Africa’s own neo-liberal adoption, despite its attempts of acting reformist in some international forums, could pose an obstacle for such debates, which would challenge the contemporary and more or less accepted liberal peacebuilding project.

4.5 Conclusion

There is no question about South Africa’s good intentions for supporting the DRC towards a more peaceful and stable future, despite accusations of neo-colonial intentions and national interest. As this chapter has illustrated, South Africa’s engagement with the DRC has evidently changed from being a peacemaker to becoming a significant peacebuilding partner. South Africa’s efforts in the DRC has been extensive and included a wide range of sectors, illustrating South Africa’s push to help the DRC build a state through capacity and institution building. Through concerted efforts South Africa has become a significant partner in peacebuilding for the DRC in the transition period after the conflict and beyond. Progress in areas such as elections, humanitarian assistance and a relatively peaceful transition phase are not meant to be underestimated.

However, the aim of this chapter was to investigate whether South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC is built on the understanding of the current liberal peacebuilding
project through a critical theory approach. Critical theory emphasise the contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding framework and practice. Merging the peacebuilding and statebuilding project poses great challenges when searching for a solution for long-term sustainable peace.

There are few evidences that South Africa is promoting a peace which is different from the liberal peace. The nexus of peace and development is overshadowed by the aim of building a Congolese liberal state. Throughout this chapter it has become evident that South Africa to a large extent has built its engagement in the DRC on the structures of liberalism, executed in an environment where the liberal state is a goal of its peacebuilding activities. Peace itself becomes secondary and compromised to the construction of a liberal state. It would be expected for South Africa to support the international mechanisms such as UN peace operations to some extent. However these findings are also evident in South Africa’s bilateral engagement in the DRC. Despite the rhetoric of finding African solutions to African problems and searching for an African Renaissance also through a successful development of the DRC, the peacebuilding approach in the DRC is evidently taking place in a liberal environment, in accordance with the liberal peacebuilding agenda promoted by the international community. Instead of searching for applicable solutions to African conflicts such as in the DRC, the aim becomes lifting Africa into the existing liberal political and economic arena of IR.
5 Building a liberal peace?

5.1 Introduction

Post-apartheid South Africa, as one of the leading political and economic powers in Africa, has received great expectations for playing a significant role in developing a peaceful and prosperous Africa. South Africa has also received a lot of recognition for its attempts at creating or strengthening institutions for Africa’s development, such as the AU, NEPAD and SADC. Its efforts in peacemaking as well as peacebuilding illustrate the deep commitment to lifting its continent out of poverty and conflict. On the other hand, as Shillinger (2009), Southall (2006) and others highlight, there is a question mark behind describing South Africa as “Africa’s peacemaker”. Through scholarly and empirical critiques of South Africa’s bona fides in its backyard, it becomes clear how South Africa’s engagement on the continent is disputed, complex and multifaceted.

By drawing on critical theory this study has raised a number of questions and issues about South Africa’s peacebuilding role in Africa, by specifically looking at its engagement in the DRC from 2003 to 2008. However, this study was not motivated by critiquing South Africa’s extensive efforts in peacebuilding. It was motivated by the critique of the current liberal peacebuilding project which takes place in troubled areas of the world. The framework and practice of the liberal peacebuilding, through a combination of statebuilding and peacebuilding, have inherent contradictions, which might represent obstacles for long-term sustainable peace. Critical theory challenges the contemporary liberal peacebuilding project, with the aim of opening up the discussion of peacebuilding, in theory and practice.

This study aimed at establishing whether South Africa, as a regional actor, promotes a liberal peacebuilding, or whether the idea of African solutions to African problems represents a different roadmap to peace. This study has critically challenged the theoretical foundations of South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement, through identifying assumptions about the applicability of the current liberal peacebuilding project and unveiling its inherent contradictions. There are few findings indicating that South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding is diverging from the “liberal peacebuilding consensus”, despite its attempt at building a peace, security and development architecture suitable to the African context.
This chapter will bring together the analysis and some of the core findings from the four preceding chapters. It will highlight the most important contradictions in South Africa’s peacebuilding role guided by critical theory, as this study has established that South Africa is seemingly promoting a liberal peace approach to its peacebuilding endeavours in the DRC. The explanatory value of critical theory and the significance this method brings to the table will be revisited. Further, this chapter will summarise the contributions that this study has provided to the field of IR and particularly regarding peacebuilding. The chapter will also contribute with some policy recommendations and suggest directions for further research.

5.2 Summary of findings

Chapter one sets the context and motivation for this study, focusing on the critique against the current peacebuilding project as well as the emergence of non-traditional actors in peacebuilding. South Africa has marked itself as an important actor in promoting peace and development in Africa, through negotiation and peacemaking and increasingly as a partner in complex peace operations and peacebuilding. South Africa’s engagement in the DRC has been particularly prominent, due to its extensive cooperation in numerous sectors beyond the peace agreement and transitional phase. This first chapter highlighted how the literature on South Africa’s role as an agent of peace is extensive. However, such studies are often descriptive in nature and largely concern the era before the peace agreement in the DRC, or the period up to the 2006 elections. Moreover, few of these studies have been placed within a critical theory framework on a theoretical level. Critical theory has an explanatory value that more orthodox theories cannot provide as it has a post-positivist methodology which challenges the current ontology and epistemology in IR. By globalising IR and including actors such as regional actors, critical theory opens up for a movement towards an inclusive approach to peacebuilding, incorporating new actors and elements such as emancipation. This chapter has clarified the significance that this study, through critical theory, and using the case study of South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC, contributes to, in theory as well as in practice.

Chapter two provided the theoretical debate on contemporary peacebuilding. It presented diverse definitions of peacebuilding and identifies how most of these approaches refers to
peacebuilding as providing structures and a certain environment for peace. The contemporary understanding of peacebuilding in orthodox theories is that peace is to be built on structures such as democracy, rule of law, political and economic liberalisation within a clear liberal environment – namely the liberal peacebuilding. However, by utilising critical theory and its method, the critique against the liberal peacebuilding project and its limitations opens up for many questions. Challenging the methodological and epistemological limitations of the contemporary peacebuilding project it becomes clear how it is built on Western assumptions and liberal understandings of what peace is and how peace is to be achieved. Moreover, this chapter has discussed the inherent contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding, and how contemporary understandings of peacebuilding itself could be an impediment for sustainable peace. The political objective of peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War has been to build liberal states (Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005). Additionally, the chapter has touched upon the current debate on alternatives to the liberal peacebuilding. There is a great need for further advancement of the reflections and practice of current peacebuilding approaches.

In chapter three the theoretical framework from chapter two was utilised in order to search for the foundations which guides South Africa’s engagement in peacebuilding on the African continent. The chapter explored South Africa’s strategy for peacebuilding and found that there are few evidences, both in its own strategy and statements as well as in its strong support of the NEPAD strategy and the African Renaissance, suggesting that South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding is different from the current peacebuilding consensus. South Africa, despite being vocal about African solutions to African problems, has to a strong degree adopted the liberal peacebuilding agenda.

Chapter four has applied the theoretical foundations, and built on findings from chapter three, to the case study of South Africa’s peacebuilding role in the DRC 2003-2008. Through a careful analysis the chapter focused on South African policy and practice in its peacebuilding engagements in the DRC. In line with chapter three, there is little evidence to support that South Africa has an approach which diverges from the international community’s liberal peacebuilding approach. South Africa, despite President Mbeki being particularly vocal on promoting African solutions to African problems, and despite using its own experience in other conflict areas, is seemingly not showing a significant potential to challenge contemporary assumptions about the liberal peacebuilding. South Africa is strongly
supporting international initiatives through multilateral channels such as the UN mission, as could be expected. However, there are also strong indications on how South Africa, through its bilateral engagement, is closely engaged in creating a state based on liberal institutions. South Africa’s initiatives in the areas of democratisation, rule of law and economic liberalisation to a great extent supports the liberal peacebuilding project. These are liberal structures shaped in a liberal environment.

Despite the rhetoric on African solutions to African problems and the African Renaissance South Africa’s approach in the DRC shows liberal in nature, which again has inherent contradictions which might be an impediment for long-term sustainable peace also in the DRC. As the conflict in the DRC is still ongoing in the eastern parts of the country, close to a decade after the peace agreement and five years after the first democratic election since independence, this is a strong indicator that the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed in an effective manner. Security sector reform in the country is not effective or successful, and the government in Kinshasa still has limited control of its territory outside the capital. Thus, South Africa’s approach to peacebuilding in the DRC is arguably a problem-solving approach which has contributed with limited change and not necessarily laid the foundations for a sustainable and emancipatory peace.

5.3 A potential for an alternative peacebuilding?

This study has opened up for further discussions about the contemporary peacebuilding project, its foundations and its potential for long-term sustainable peace. Many critical questions have been raised. A post-positivist method and critical theory challenges theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundations of IR and not all the questions raised have been meant to be answered. Critical theory does not aim to conclude with set answers that are globally applicable. Rather, the questions asked are meant to challenge the basis of the existing power relations in world politics and discourse. Challenging the ontology and epistemology of IR, and here the contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding framework and its

51 However, it should also be noticed that this is a study using a single case study, which to some extent result in actual generalisations of South Africa’s peacebuilding role. Also, South Africa is only one of many actors engaging in peacebuilding in the DRC, so the aim here is not to hold South Africa responsible for the situation in the DRC.
practice, contributes to advancing the analysis of contemporary understandings and practice of peacebuilding - however without presenting conclusive truths or ideal and universal solutions. As part of critical theory, these questions illustrate how all these issues deserve more attention in the search for a peaceful and prosperous world for all its citizens.

It has been highlighted through this study that it is not the intentions of peacebuilding which needs critique. Rather, it is the assumptions about what kind of peace that is to be built that needs further analysis, in theory and practice. The conceptual framework for the liberal peace has emerged through a complex evolution with a particular conceptualisation and methodological environment for understanding peace, namely a liberal environment, or historical context. The liberal peace, which is to arise through building a liberal state founded on liberal institutions, has shown limited success in different conflict areas of the world. The assumptions of the universal applicability of such states are often not compatible with the situation in conflict areas (Eriksen, 2009: 15). Also, building a liberal state overshadows the initial aim of such operations, namely finding long-term sustainable peace. One of the uncomfortable compromises of liberal peacebuilding is using peacebuilding to legitimate statebuilding (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182). The DRC is one obvious case. Clarification of the environment in which peacebuilding takes place, currently a liberal environment, unveils what peacebuilding actually promotes and the effects it has on the ground. By opening up for a critical discourse on peacebuilding a potential for a true globalisation of the discourse and practice of peacebuilding arises. The discontinuity between the objective of peacebuilding and its actual impact should thus be discussed further. A more thorough engagement with critical theory would be beneficial for future theorising about and even more importantly, for the practice of peacebuilding.

One of the core contributions from the critical theory tradition is identifying possibilities for change, in this study to search for an emancipatory peace. A problem-solving approach in itself will not provide the kind of change that would lead to an emancipatory sustainable peace. However, it has not been the aim of this study to reject the current peacebuilding projects in conflict areas and the extensive efforts of the international community, NGOs, donors and regional actors. The hypothesis in this study, namely if South Africa is building a liberal peace in the DRC, is rather meant as a contribution to advancing the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. As touched upon particularly in chapter two there is a need to work towards a more hybrid form of peacebuilding. The inherent contradictions in the current
peacebuilding project must be the lessons learnt for searching for alternative approaches. Moreover, connecting theory and practice will be absolutely necessary in the search for more sustainable and locally grounded approaches. This poses a critical need for further research, also by looking at the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s role.

The liberal peacebuilding, namely the merging of peacebuilding and statebuilding, legitimises contemporary peacebuilding practices which are top-down and externally driven (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 181). This top-down approach has undermined the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding project. The gaps between finding peace and building states must be re-addressed. The search for a hybrid form of peacebuilding and statebuilding “that can develop international approaches and consensus for peace, while also developing and assisting the localised dynamics for peace” is necessary (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 183). In this process localised dynamics and emancipation must be placed higher on the practical agenda. There is an urgent need to focus on political agency for individuals, rather than institutions as the main priority. It is peace that needs to be the main focus, not the creation of the structures for a liberal state. Reflections on the liberal state itself and its questionable applicability, particularly to troubled areas in the world, are necessary in order to avoid what caused war in the first place.

It should be noticed that because the liberal peace is seen as the only solution to contemporary conflict and the empirical evidence of its shortcomings, there is a great need to evaluate the liberal peacebuilding approach, and the potential such an approach has for sustainable long-lasting peace (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 185). This study does not aim at giving an answer to a specific alternative peacebuilding. It would be up to analysts and policy makers to come up with plausible alternatives to the current liberal peacebuilding project. There will be no easy answers or quick fixes to intractable conflicts. However such situations underline the need to address the inherent contradictions of current peacebuilding. One must look at the enormous resources put into current peacebuilding projects and analyse these in relation to the results on the ground, or lack thereof. This is where critical theory has a great potential for a modification and alternation of current peacebuilding approaches, particularly when addressing the wide agenda of peacebuilding, and the higher aim of creating long-lasting sustainable, an emancipatory, peace. There is a huge potential for more critical reflection as well as more critical practical politics by policy makers, donors, the UN, the AU, SADC, NGOs as well as regional actors, such as South Africa.
5.4 The role of regional actors

Beyond challenging contemporary understandings of peacebuilding this study has provided another aspect to the debate, namely the role of regional actors in peacebuilding. The critical theory motivation is whether such approaches can challenge the ontology and epistemology of the current peacebuilding discourse and reveal new aspects of actors in peacebuilding. Could leading regional actors potentially represent an alternative approach to peacebuilding, as they might have a better starting point for understanding the complex conflicts in their own regions, or as they might represent views from the South as opposed to the liberal orthodoxy?

South Africa has shown a vast commitment to peace and development in Africa after the end of apartheid as this study has illustrated. South Africa has been a vital actor in many peacemaking processes and beyond and has shown muscle as an agent of peace despite fighting its own struggles at home. The emergence of regional actors in peacebuilding could potentially contribute with more critical views challenging contemporary peacebuilding and further unveiling alternatives for peacebuilding. South Africa through its White Paper underlines several of the weaknesses of the liberal peacebuilding approach, such as a lack of building on local capacities and the lack of addressing root causes.

On the other hand it does not seem as such elements have received significant attention in South Africa’s peacebuilding approach on the ground. Despite such mediation efforts, the contradictions in South Africa’s peacebuilding approach, such as the unclear strategy and outcome of the nexus of economic interests and political priorities in conflict areas, is also recognisable in existing literature on South Africa’s foreign policy role in general, as addressed in chapter one. Kagwanja (2009: 31) points to how “South Africa should revisit its multilateral policy to see whether it is the best vehicle for its African policy”. South Africa’s increasing economic engagement in the DRC, also post-Mbeki, is a topic which deserves further critical analysis. Recent indications of the close relations between current South African President Zuma and the DRC government make it timely to look deeper into the foundations for South Africa’s relations with the DRC. For example, close relatives to President Zuma, who are deeply embedded in business, have allegedly received deals on access to oil exploration in the DRC. Such contradictions in South Africa’s relations to the DRC, and other countries particularly in conflict areas, is an issue for academics, and policy
makers to look at, and foremost an issue for the South African government to clarify. Landsberg (s.a.: 28) argues how South Africa should sensitise its private sector to play a developmental role in its region, and not follow the exploitative means of many multinational companies. However, the question then remains to exactly what kind of developmental role South Africa wishes to have and moreover, which outcomes of its peacebuilding endeavours are the most imperative.

The potential of such actors deserves further focus both in theory as well as in practice, not just in the more orthodox area of the global economy as seen increasingly in the later years, but also in the area of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Developing and refining existing frameworks and typologies of regional power theory needs further attention, particularly with regards to frameworks suitable for analysing regional actors in their efforts for peace and development in their neighbourhoods. By looking at regional actors in peace efforts, particularly in a comparative view, which could also be done across continents, one could possibly yield valuable knowledge of understanding such actors’ engagements. Here, the utilisation of critical theory ensures going beyond assumptions about peacebuilding and incorporating the foundations underlying such engagements. Here the potential for possibly identifying sources of change for a long-lasting sustainable, emancipatory, peace arises. A multiple case study design could also advance findings of such studies and add to the large and debated field of regional powers – and to the theory and practice of peacebuilding. Importantly, studies from the South pose a great potential to move the discourse, and policy, ahead. Revisiting Taylor’s (2007) argument, there is a great question mark behind what peacebuilding framework would be suitable for the African context. African scholars and policy makers would be best fit to answer such questions.
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52 The former Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was re-named by President Zuma to Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in May 2009. In the referencing in this study the abbreviation DFA is used for the sources from before May 2009 and the abbreviation DIRCO for post-May 2009.


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