
by

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Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

March 2012
Declaration

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March 2012

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to provide a critical discussion of the contributions of the African Union towards the potential development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. Utilising Security Community Theory, and the framework for the study of security communities developed by Adler & Barnett (1998) it commences with an interrogation of the AU. This interrogation is arranged along the three tiers of the framework.

The first tier is the precipitating conditions, which cause states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. The second tier investigates the factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third, and final, tier identifies the necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change.

The study goes on and introduces three African case studies, which illustrate the contributions of the African Union towards the potential development of an African security community. The case studies are the African Union mission in Burundi, the African Union mission in Sudan, and the recent intervention of the African Union in the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. All three case studies were able to provide ample evidence to illustrate the AU’s contributions.

The study concludes with two major findings. Firstly, this study is able to illustrate that the AU has made significant contributions towards the development of peace and security in Africa. Secondly, that the AU has made significant contributions at all three tiers of the framework, and therefore major contributions to the potential development of an African security community. However, the AU is still in its embryonic phase, and any prediction concerning the existence, or potential existence of an African security community would be premature.

Even though there are ostensibly, positive developments in the area of continental peace and security this study is able to illustrate several remaining challenges to further contributions by the AU. The first is a lack of resources. The AU is heavily dependent on the contributions of its member states, and a number of members persistently fail to meet their contributions to the organization. A second challenge is the loosely defined relationship with the UN (and other external partners). It is crucial
that a constructive relationship be established, if not, differences might antagonise the two organisations and negatively affect any future contributions of the AU towards the development of an African security community. Finally, the role of core states, most notably regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria will remain important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of an African security community.
OPSOMMING

Hierdie tesis poog om n kritiese bespreking te bied van die bydra wat die Afrika Unie na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het sedert sy intrede in 2002. Deur gebruik te maak van Sekuriteits Gemeenskap Teorie, en die raamwerk vir die studie van sekuriteits gemeenskappe deur Adler & Barnett (1998) begin die studie met n direkte ondersoek van die AU. Hierdie ondersoek vind plaas volgens die drie vlakke van die raamwerk.

Die eerste vlak is die kondisies wat veroorsaak dat state hulself na mekaar orienteer, en n wil ontwikkel om hulle sake te koordineer. Die tweede vlak ondersoek die faktore vir die ontwikkeling van wedersydse vertroue en gesamentlike identiteit. Die derde, en finale, vlak identifiseer die nodige kondisies van afhanklike verwagtinge vir vreedsame verandering.

Die studie gaan voort met drie Afrika geval studies, wat die bydra van die AU na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap illustreer. Die geval studies sluit in die Afrika missie in Burundi, die Afrika missie in Sudan, en die onlangse intervensie deur die AU in die na-eleksie krisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Al drie geval studies verskaf wye getuienis wat die bydra van die AU illustreer.

Die studie sluit af met twee hoof bevindings. Eerstens, kon hierdie studie illustreer dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes na die ontwikkeling van vrede en sekuriteit in Afrika gemaak het. Tweedens, dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes op al drie vlakke van die raamwerk gemaak het, en daarom ook mondige bydraes tot die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het. Nogtans, is die AU self nog in n onvolwasse stadium, en enige voorspelling in verband met die bestaan, of oor die potensiele bestaan van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap is voortydig.

Al is daar opmerklike positiewe ontwikkelinge in die area van kontinentale vrede en sekuriteit, kan hierdie studie steeds verskeie uitdaginge identifiseer wat verdere bydraes deur die AU kan hinder. Die eerste uitdaging is n tekort aan bevondsing. Die AU is hoogs afhanklik op die bydrae van sy lidmaat state, maar n paar lede mis aanhoudend hulle bydrae tot die orginasasie. n Tweede uitdaging is die ongedefinieerde verhouding tussen die AU en die VN (en ander eksterne vennote). Dit is belangrik dat n konstruktiewe verhouding in werk gestel word, indien nie, kan
verskille die twee organisasies van mekaar dryf en enige toekomstige bydraes van
die AU na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits kompleks negatief
beinvloed. Laastens, sal die rol van kern state, mees aanmerklik streek leiers soos
Suid Afrika en Nigerie, belangrik bly om die sekuriteits kompleks te stabiliseer en
verdere ontwikkeling in die toekoms te bevorder.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Mr. Gerrie Swart for his continued guidance and assistance throughout the duration of this study. His knowledge was invaluable, and his professionalism is commendable.

Secondly, to my mother whom I love dearly, thank you for the sustained support and words of encouragement. This thesis marks the end of a five-year journey at Stellenbosch University, which without you, would not have been possible.

To all other friends and family, your support will be remembered. To the department of political science, thank you, the experience has been life changing.

Finally, I acknowledge the staff at the postgraduate and undergraduate loans and bursary offices of Stellenbosch University. Without the financial support of Stellenbosch University the dream of a tertiary qualification from an institution as fine as this one, would have remained unfulfilled.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AATPO</td>
<td>Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFREC</td>
<td>Convention of the African Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>Mission for the Support of Elections in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAU</td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the African Union</td>
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<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Central African Franc</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITF</td>
<td>Darfur Integrated Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Burundi Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>New Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td><em>Forces Nationales de Libération</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCFA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAES</td>
<td>African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDR</td>
<td>Rally of the Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection Support Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGoB</td>
<td>Transitional Government of Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations African Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union for National Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The new union is a re-emergence of the quest for African unity, a project dating back to the years before independence in the 20th century. Pan-Africanism was an expression of resistance against colonial occupation and it became synonymous with the common aspiration for peace and freedom. The Pan-African movement thus gave birth, initially, to the Organisation of African Unity and has once again been the cornerstone of the continent's political collective in the form of the African Union (Salim A. Salim, 2008).

Cawthra (2004: 26) describes the end of the Cold War as a fitting close to the 20th century, the end of the "modern period" that was ushered in 100 years ago. This period has been characterised by the process of globalization. "It is a world in which time and space has been compressed, and the density of political, economic, and cultural interactions has intensified as a result of technological innovations and the "information revolution". This, in turn, has led to the integration of many institutions (including states) into systems that have global dimensions.

During this period on 25 May 1963, 32 independent African states formed their "own" integrated institution in the form of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. The principal aim of the OAU was to free the African continent from colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination. A further 21 states joined gradually over the years, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member in 1994 (Naldi, 1999:1).

The most obvious security consequence of the end of the Cold War was the breakdown of the bipolar system, in which nations were broadly aligned with either Washington or Moscow. The situation thereafter, is however more complicated. It can be argued that economic power has become dispersed, with several leading powers and some challengers (most notably the US, China, and the EU), whilst the political and cultural power holders are not as easily pinpointed. The dominant
military position of the US goes unchallenged which now spends more on defence than the next eight or nine “powers” combined (Cawthra, 2004: 28).

As noted by the end of the Cold War, the world completely changed. Africa and the OAU, however, did not. Africa became increasingly marginalised and struggled to define its place and role in the new global system. The great powers increasingly declined to assume leading roles in promoting peace (most notably the debacles in Rwanda, Somalia, and Angola, with the Americans preferring to operate on their own or with regional organisations such as NATO) and development in the region (Cawthra, 2004: 28). It was therefore incumbent on Africa itself to consider a new political and economic order securing "African solutions for African problems".

By the time of its thirtieth anniversary, most analysts of the OAU concluded that the organization could not meet future demands without serious reform and reorganization. Experts agreed that the OAU Charter needed revision, most specifically with regard to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference (Packard & Rukare, 2002: 367).

During the latter half of the 1990’s African states took a series of decisions to overhaul the continental organization, endorsing new norms and adopting new rules to govern their interaction on matters of peace, security and development; and establish new institutions to enforce these norms. This transformation took a concrete turn when, on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, African Heads of State and Government declared their commitment to transform the OAU into a new organization, the African Union (AU). On 11 July 2000, at the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lomé, Togo, the legal-institutional framework for the new organization was adopted in the form of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU was launched in July 2002 in South Africa (Engel & Porto, 2010: 1-2).

1.2 Problem Statement

The formation of the AU in 2002 brought with it a completely new set of objectives and principles as set out in the Constitutive Act. African leaders optimistically committed themselves to a “new set of rules” according to which the continent would be governed in the future. This new set of rules placed a heavy importance on a
more integrated continent with increased co-operation between African states to foster continental peace and stability (Engel & Porto, 2010: 2-3).

Nearly a decade after its inception there has been mixed responses from academic scholars with regard to the performance of the AU; therefore, this research project proposes an interrogation of the contribution made by the Union. However, this interrogation will be limited to the contribution made by the AU concerning the development of an African Security Community.

Africa is not commonly accepted as a security community, but Franke (2008: 325) argues, “the continent currently displays all the essential characteristics of (at least) a loosely coupled security community”. Security Community Theory defines a security community, as well as explains the development of a security community. Thus, it can be hypothesized that if Africa were considered a security community, using Security Community Theory one would be able to illustrate how the AU has contributed to the development of an African security community since its inception in 2002.

For this interrogation, Security Community Theory as presented by Karl Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998) will be utilised. According to Deutsch (1957: 5) a security community, “is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way”. In 1998, Adler & Barnett offered a revival of the concept of security communities after decades of neglect and criticism. The revived concept “benefits from the best of Deutsch’s original conceptualization and corrects for its shortcomings by borrowing from four decades of substantial insights from sociological and international relations theory and various empirical studies that were informed by the concept of security communities” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 29).

It should be noted that this project will not elaborate on Franke’s (2008) argument about the existence of an African Security Community, but instead will probe the contributions made by the AU in the realm of peace and security that could potentially contribute towards the creation of a security community in the near future.

This interrogation will be limited to the continental level and cooperation amongst member states of the Union at this level, and will therefore not consider arguments
such as those presented by Laurie Nathan (2006: 276-277) in Domestic Instability and Security Communities. He believes that the relationship between security communities and domestic stability has been neglected in the revival of Deutsch and argues, that “domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community”. This project will not consider the national or domestic level.

1.3 Research Question

The research question for this study is as follows: How has the AU contributed towards the development of an African security community since its inception in 2002?

Furthermore, this research will have the following sub-questions:

1. How can Security Community Theory be utilized to interrogate the contribution of the AU?
2. Which contributions according to Security Community Theory have the AU made to continental security?
3. Can these contributions be illustrated with African case studies in which the AU was/is involved?

1.4 Purpose and Significance

The inception of the AU in 2002 coincided with a significant “shift” amongst African leaders regarding security issues on the continent. This shift involved a new security architecture, which included the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its organs the AU commission, the Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the African Standby Force (ASF). It also involved a shift in norms from the previous state centric approach to one revolving around human security (Powell, 2005).

The most significant advancement in this regard was the adoption of Article 4 (h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act which dictates “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity”. Much of this change was introduced in Article 3 (a) of the Constitutive Act which states that
to “achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa” especially within the area of continental peace and stability (AU, 2002a). Finally the shift also involved greater cooperation between the AU and the regional economic organizations “which it does not regard as competitors in a zero-sum game, but instead relies on them as essential building blocks and implementation agencies”… “this multi-layered approach to inter-African cooperation is most clearly enshrined in the continents emerging peace and security architecture” (Franke, 2008: 330).

As the AU contends, through the Constitutive Act, to promote continental security it seems appropriate (nearly a decade after its inception) to interrogate how the AU has potentially contributed towards the development of an African Security Community.

The academic application of Security Community Theory is in the main confined to Western scholarly work and therefore by applying it to the AU this project could possibly add to the literature in two ways. Firstly, as Smith (2006: 4) has noted “the different social, political, economic, cultural (including intellectual), historical, geographical and ideological contexts found in the global South, in comparison to the North, (thus) provides potentially fertile ground for innovative perspectives”. This project could consequently provide an “African” perspective.

Secondly, it will introduce an area of study that has received very little attention in the past. Security Community Theory has mainly been applied in Western cases e.g. the EU (see Waever in Adler & Barnett, 1998) and NATO (see Deutsch, 1957) and within the ASEAN region (see Acharya, 1998 & 2009; and Higgot & Nossal in Adler and Barnett, 1998).

As Ngoma (2003: 41) has noted “scholars such as Adler and Barnett have made important strides in the articulation of the security community paradigm and yet have failed to recognise its applicability to the African continent. Instead, they have focused on Europe, South-East Asia, South America, the Gulf region, Australia, and North America. Therefore, there is an analytical gap that needs to be filled with respect of work on the African continent in general,” and Franke (2008: 320) agrees, “serious discussions about the existence of a continental security community in Africa have hardly begun.”
When applied to Africa it has been limited to the regional levels such as ECOWAS and SADC (Ngoma, 2003; Hammerstad, 2005; Cawthra, 2008; Hentz, 2009). Presently only Franke’s (2008) work *Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multi-layered Security Communities* and Schoeman’s (2002) *Imagining a Community: The African Union as an Emerging Security Community* have attempted to do this and therefore will shed light on a fairly “unexplored” area.

1.5 Literature Review

This study departs theoretically from the work done on security communities by Karl Deutsch (1954, 1957, & 1967) and Adler & Barnett (1998). A “security community is generally defined as a group of states integrated to the point where people have dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Franke, 2008: 314). Richard van Wagenen initially introduced the concept in 1952, but the study by Deutsch et al. (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* popularized the concept. Deutsch (1957: 5) defines a security community as “one in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way”. Deutsch (1957: 5) believed that “if the entire world were an integrated security community, wars would automatically be eliminated.”

In 1998, Adler & Barnett offered a reconstructed architecture for the security community premised on the earlier work of Deutsch. They presented a framework, which “benefits from the best of Deutsch’s original conceptualization and corrects for its shortcomings by borrowing from four decades of substantial insights from sociological and international relations theory and various empirical studies that were informed by the concept of security communities”. Crucial for this study their work included “a framework for the study of security communities” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 29). This framework is analytically organised around three tiers.

The first tier consists of precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and co-ordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the structural elements of power and ideas, and the process elements of transactions, international organizations, and social learning. The dynamic, positive, and reciprocal relationship between these variables leads to the third tier: the development of trust and collective identity formation. The sequenced and causal
relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 30). This framework will be utilised in this study to interrogate the contribution of the AU to an African Security Community.


With the inception of the AU in 2002, there has been a significant shift in the approach of African leaders towards continental security. The “adoption of the Constitutive Act was a decisive step, showing that African states have not conveniently changed the name of their continental organization, but indeed giving it a radical new vision and mission, a set of clearly defined objectives and responsibilities” (Engel & Porto, 2010: 2).

The AU introduced a new security architecture, which as the title of the edited work by Engel & Porto (2010) explains, “promotes norms and institutionalized solutions.” Franke’s (2008) work is able to illustrate how the AU’s new architecture has evolved in line with the development of a security community as presented in Adler & Barnett’s (1998) theory on the subject.

The edited volume of Juma (2006) the Compendium of Key Documents Relating to Peace and Security in Africa demonstrates this evolution through the various treaties, protocols, and declarations that have been adopted by the member states of the AU. It commenced with the Constitutive Act in 2000/01 and was followed by NEPAD in 2001, the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council in 2002/03, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy in 2004, and the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact in 2005.
The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002/2003) was responsible for the introduction of the AU’s new security architecture by introducing the PSC with its organs the AU commission, the CEWS, the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund, and the ASF.

Another significant advancement since its inception was the signing of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) (2004). The framework of the CADSP establishes a common understanding of the concepts of defence, security, and common threat. Importantly the notion of security includes both traditional state centric security and human security. Franke (2008: 322) notes, “it is the AU’s underlying acceptance of the normative commitment to protect which distinguishes it from its feeble predecessor”. The “AU, like the Responsibility to Protect, clearly lay out provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of a member state through military force, if necessary” (Powell, 2005: 4).

Finally, the AU has continued to recognise the importance of the regional economic communities (REC’s). These regional communities were originally developed as centres for regional economic development, but insecurity served as a major impediment to this development. Therefore, these communities developed and currently possess security mechanisms. The AU retained the original organizational significance of these communities as set out in the Abuja treaty of 1991 and “Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the CADSP stress that the regional mechanisms will form the building blocks of the AU’s peace and security architecture” (Powell, 2005: 16). The importance of the REC’s is also visible in the regional arrangements of the CEWS and ASF.

To illustrate the contribution of the organisation to a continental security community the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the AU intervention in Côte d’Ivoire will be introduced as case studies.

The conflict in Burundi was driven by ethnic rivalries between the Hutu and Tutsi people. Even though the Burundian population consists of 85 percent Hutu, and only 15 percent Tutsi, the latter has controlled power positions in the country since independence in 1962. This has since led to several violent Hutu uprisings that were countered by Tutsi military oppression, which according to some, at times reached genocide levels (Svennson, 2008: 8).
When a multiparty system was introduced in 1991, some attempts were made to run the country democratically. However, the assassination of the first democratically elected president led to renewed violence. In 1996, Buyoya took power and governed the country with the help of the Tutsi military, but eventually introduced reforms that saw the inclusion of Hutu’s in government. At the same time, the first peace negotiations took place, but it was not until 2000 that the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement were signed. The agreement called for an international peacekeeping force to assist in peace building efforts in Burundi. In 2003, this call was heeded when the AU deployed the African mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Svennson, 2008: 11).

Extensive primary data on the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is available in both AU and UN documents and the mission has extensively been covered in academic books and journals (Murithi, 2008; Svennson, 2008; Franke, 2009; Rodt, 2011).

The Sudanese conflict “is anchored in longstanding struggles over resources (primarily land and water) between farming and nomadic communities” (Powell, 2005) which has been exacerbated since the droughts of mid-1980.

Some analysts add that more than thirty years of marginalisation from governments in Khartoum lies at the heart of the conflict. In 2001, these tensions and continued marginalisation prompted the mobilisation of two rebel groups the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Powell, 2005).

These groups have since systematically clashed with the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its backed Arab Militia groups (most notably the Janjaweed). Extensive primary data on the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is available in both AU and UN documents and the mission has extensively been covered in academic books and journals (Powell, 2005; Williams, 2006; de Waal, 2007; Adebajo, 2008; Moller, 2009).

Violence erupted in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2010 when incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the results of the 28 November run-off elections that declared his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, as the victor. At least 50 people were killed in the initial post-election violence as supporters of both men acted out their frustrations. Fighting talk on all sides raised fears that the post-election deadlock would revive the civil war. Gbagbo loyalists, who included the military and the militia
organization Young Patriots, told huge crowds in an Abidjan square to gear up for fighting, saying: "We are ready to die." Ouattara supporters, aligned with militia concentrated in the north, spoke of waging "the last struggle" (Walt, 2010).

Ivorian election officials, as well as UN, US and EU officials, all stated that Ouattara had won the elections. They were swiftly supported by statements from the regional grouping ECOWAS and the AU. Rather than forcing opposition candidate Ouattara to accept a junior role in a Gbagbo government, as was done to Zimbabwe's Morgan Tsvangirai, the AU in a unilateral effort snubbed Gbagbo calling for him to step down (Watt, 2011).

After several mediation attempts by the AU it was the military power of the pro-Ouattara New Forces, the 9 000 strong UN mission in the country and French forces that ousted Gbagbo. Although the Côte d'Ivoire case is fairly contemporary extensive primary data on the AU's involvement is available in both AU, ECOWAS and UN documents and the intervention has extensively been covered in news sources such as BBC News (2010, 2011) and allAfrica.com (2010, 2011).

1.6 Research Methodology

Security Community Theory as presented by Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998) defines a security community, and is able to provide “a framework for the study of security communities” (Adler & Barnett 1998: 29). Adler & Barnett (1998: 49) explains, “the development of security communities can be broadly termed as social constructivist and path-dependent. The notion that security communities are socially constructed means that they have a history and, therefore exhibit an evolutionary pattern that follows the direction of “the arrow of time.” By adopting this approach one can trace back, starting with the “dependable expectations of peaceful change” to a period when they are merely imagined to exist, to the process that led to their development.”

Adler (1998: 199) has also introduced the concept of a “security community-building institution”. He argues that “collective identities, the stuff of which security communities are made of, do not always evolve spontaneously; rather, as in the case of the expansion eastward of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community, they are socially constructed by institutions”. Franke (2008: 324) notes that “like the
OSCE in Europe, the AU, fulfil at least six of the seven functions of a community building institution as specified by Adler.”

Using Security Community Theory as an analytical framework, this study proposes to interrogate the contribution the AU has made to the development of an African security community since 2002. This study will firstly comprehensively present Security Community Theory, by discussing the work of Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998). Thereafter it will utilize the analytical framework to evaluate the contribution of the AU towards the development of an African Security Community.

The AU will be categorically interrogated along the three tiers of development as presented by the framework to illustrate potential contributions by the Union at the various stages (tiers). This will also include a more specific interrogation of the contribution of the AU’s new security architecture, the AU as norm entrepreneur, and the continued relationship between the AU and the REC’s. Finally, a chapter with three case studies will be introduced to illustrate, using examples, the contributions the AU has made.

The first case study is the AMIB. This case study is selected, as it was the first operation wholly initiated, planned, and executed by the AU after its inception in 2002. The mission will therefore shed light on the AU’s willingness and ability to act with due regard to its newly established norms, values, institutions and security architecture. This case especially illustrates the AU’s ability in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peace building missions, an important facet on the road to establishing continental peace and security.

The second case study is the AMIS. This case study is selected as it warranted an intervention from the AU under the auspice of Article 4 (h), which can be considered as one of the most significant advancements of the AU’s Constitutive Act. The case study also illustrates the functionality of the new AU security architecture, including the possible correction of lessons learned from the AMIB case, and finally light on the relationship that exists between the AU and its regional partners.

The third case study is the AU intervention into Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2010. This case study is selected because it offers a contemporary example of an AU intervention. Even though the AU’s involvement did not result in a fully-fledged AU
mission, it still provides workable information that can be utilised to establish the
AU’s contribution to the development of an African Security Community. Notably this
case study provides a “reflection point” which could possibly shed light on the
willingness and the effective ability of the AU to get involved nine years after its
inception, thereby illustrating whether the initial enthusiasm shown by the AU to
achieve continental peace and security still exists.

Finally, this case study illustrates the importance of the relationship that exist
between the AU and the REC’s (in this case ECOWAS), and the relationship
between the AU and the International Community, and the possible repercussions of
these relationships for the development of an African Security Community.

This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises of both descriptive and exploratory
aspects. It is based upon an extensive review of related literature in the fields of
Security Community Theory, the “new” AU security architecture and the response by
the AU to the conflict in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS), and its involvement in Côte
d’Ivoire.

Both primary and secondary sources will be used, with an emphasis on including as
much primary text as possible. These will consist mainly of official AU and UN
documents, contributions from civil society and key persons in the field. Key persons
include recognized academics; senior AU and UN officials involved in Africa; and
African and Western diplomats.

Secondary sources will consist primarily of academic journal articles, publications,
books containing observations on, and evaluations of the above-mentioned topics,
produced by respected authors in their respective fields.

The unit of analysis in this study will be the AU, and specifically its contributions to a
continental security. The level of analysis is the AU at a continental level. In terms of
the time dimension, this study is cross sectional stretching from the inception of the
AU in 2002 until the present.
1.7 Chapter Outline

This study will consist of five individual and separate chapters. The first chapter will serve as an introduction. It will present the background, problem statement, purpose, and significance of the study, as well as the research design and methodology.

Chapter two will introduce the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter is vital as the theory serves as the foundation upon which the entire study is “built”. For this study, Security Community Theory will be utilised. The chapter will present several of the works of Karl Deutsch (1957) as well as a more contemporary version by Adler & Barnett (1998). Importantly, Adler & Barnett (1998: 29) provides “a framework for the study of security communities.”

Chapter three will interrogate and present the AU’s contribution to the formation of a continental security community. This evaluation will be conducted utilising the framework for the study of security communities as presented by Adler & Barnett (1998). This chapter will analyse the AU’s contribution through the three tiers around which the theory is organized. It will evaluate the AU’s new security architecture, the AU as a norm entrepreneur, as well as the relationship that exists between the AU and the REC’s.

Chapter four will extend the assessment into the case studies. An appraisal of key AU decisions and documents is not a sufficient assessment of the contribution of the AU to continental security. Therefore, this chapter will introduce AMIB, AMIS and the AU intervention into Côte d’Ivoire as case studies from which examples will be drawn to illustrate the union’s contribution.

The final chapter will serve as a conclusion and will bring all the previous chapters together to present key findings and recommendations.

1.8 Conclusion

The end of the Cold War resulted in many changes within the world system. One of these changes included a transition of the OAU, which was formed in 1963, to the AU in 2002. This transition did not simply remove the “O” from the OAU, but also included a “new” African security architecture, and a significant shift in approach from state centric to human security.
Nearly a decade after its inception, it seems appropriate to evaluate the contribution the AU has made since its inception in 2002. Specifically, this study proposes an interrogation of the contribution of the AU towards the development of an African Security Community. For this purpose, Security Community Theory as presented by Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998) will be utilised. Included in Adler & Barnett’s (1998: 29) work is “a framework for the study of security communities” which is arranged around three tiers.

The study will comprehensively present Security Community Theory, by discussing the work of Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998). Thereafter it will utilize the analytical framework to evaluate the contribution of the AU towards the development of an African Security Community. The AU will be categorically interrogated along the three tiers of development as presented by the framework to illustrate how the Union has contributed at the various stages (tiers).

Finally, the AMIB, AMIS and the AU intervention in Côte d’Ivoire will be introduced as case studies to illustrate, with practical examples, how the AU has contributed to the development of an African security community since its inception in 2002.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will present the theoretical framework against which the research in this project will be conducted. The chapter will commence with an overview of the development of regional security. Thereafter a conceptual analysis of the terms security and community will be provided followed by a description of the theory of constructivism and its function in regional security. This will be followed by Karl Deutsch’s theory of security communities and thereafter Adler & Barnett’s updated variant. Finally, the chapter will end with concluding remarks.

2.2 History of Regional Security

The first generation of regional integration studies in the 1950’s and 1960’s were immediately concerned with economics, but fundamentally were concerned with peace and security. They tended to see the nation state as the problem rather than the solution. The relevant theories were federalism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism (Hettne, 2008: 404).

Federalism is a political programme that is sceptical towards the nation state and envisions a new kind of state. Functionalism is an approach to peace building which raises the question on which political level various human needs (often defined in a rather technical way) best could be met. Usually the best way is to go beyond the nation state, but not necessarily going regional. Both federalism and functionalism wanted the state to go, but through different routes and by different means (Hettne, 2008: 404).

Neo-functionalism more explicitly discusses integration as a region-building process, and the positive implications as far as security is concerned are taken for granted. Neo-functionalism is essentially the theory of European region building authored by Ernst Haas in 1958. What was created in Europe was according to Karl Deutsch a “regional security community” (Hettne, 2008: 404).
Today it has become commonplace to distinguish between an older wave or generation of regionalism and a more recent, new “generation” of regionalism starting in the latter half of the 1980’s and now a prevalent phenomenon throughout the world (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000: 457).

This new wave must be understood in its historical context. It needs to be related to the structural transformation the world has recently experienced. This transformation includes a move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar structure, with a new division of power and new division of labour. It also involves the relative decline of the American hegemony; the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system; the growth of interdependence and globalisation; and a changed attitude towards neo-liberal economic development and political systems (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000: 457).

The studies in new regionalism considered new aspects, particularly those focused on conditions related to what was called globalization. In the more recent theorizing, security concerns are still relevant but these are often seen as causal factors forcing countries to cooperate, due to the risk of regionalization of conflict. By this is meant both the outward spread or spill-over of a local conflict into neighbouring countries and the inward impact from the region, in the form of more or less diplomatic interference, military intervention, and preferably, conflict resolution carried out by some kind of regional body (Hettne, 2008: 404).

Regionalism and security can be related in many different ways. One has to do with the choice of unit for investigation, e.g. a regional security complex defined by Barry Buzan as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991: 190).

In a second approach developed by Lake & Morgan (1997), regions are defined in terms of the mode of security management or “regional order”. Regional orders can shift from simple balance of power systems or concerns to more comprehensive communities or integrated polities. Alternatively, they define a “security complex” as “states affected by at least one trans-border but local security externality” (Lake & Morgan, 1997: 46).
A third approach is to do with the conflict management role of the organized region (if there is one) for internal regional security or regional order, and for the immediate environment of the region. “Conflict management with regard to immediate environment can refer to an acute conflict or aim at preventively transforming the situation, either by stabilization or by integration” (Hettne, 2008: 405).

Thus, groups of states can be characterised as security complexes, regional orders, or security communities (not limited to). Such groups commonly aim to develop various forms of collaborative or co-operative approaches to security. A “common security approach” suggests that states in a given regional formation share common security concerns, often of a multidimensional nature, and together can address their security needs more effectively than alone or in opposition to each other (Cawthra, 2004: 33).

2.3 Conceptual Analysis of Security

The term security is associated with many different meanings that refer to frameworks and dimensions, apply to individuals, issue areas, societal conventions, and changing historical conditions and circumstances. Thus, security as an individual or societal political value does not possess an independent meaning and is always related to a context and a specific individual or societal system and its realization (Brauch, 2008:27).

As a social science concept “security is ambiguous and elastic” in its meaning. Franke (2009: 8) notes, “the usage of the term security is thus inevitably fraught with conceptual difficulties”. This is particularly true in the African context, for no other part of the world has had so little control over its own security agenda”. In 1962 Wolfers (in Brauch, 2008: 28) pointed on the two sides of the security concept: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”.

Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those that, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future (Williams, 2008: 5). Security is a practise, a specific way to frame an issue. Security discourse is characterised by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat: if we do
not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant. By labelling this a security issue, the actor has claimed a right to handle it with extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 80).

The security concept has gradually widened since the 1980’s. For the constructivists, security is intersubjective referring to “what actors make of it” (Wendt, 1992). Thus, security depends on a normative core that cannot simply be taken for granted. Political constructions of security have real world effects, because they guide the actions of policymakers, thereby exerting constitutive effects on political order (Brauch, 2008: 28).

Security in an objective sense refers to specific security dangers e.g. to threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks to specific security dimensions (political, military, economic, societal environmental) and referent objectives (international, national, human) as well as sectors (social, energy, food, water) (Brauch, 2008: 28).

Studying the use of security is therefore informative for tracing security communities. If security is legitimised with the community as a referent object this assists in consolidating the community, and if it is done within the community it limits the risk of triggering political escalations within which the community might unravel. Many different actors can use the security move, but typically, there are relatively limited numbers of possible referent objects (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 80).

2.4 Conceptual Analysis of Community

The concept of community can be defined in both constructivist and rationalist terms. A constructivist definition would state that a community refers to a human collectivity that is constituted by shared norms and understandings among its members. Due to common values, identities, and goals, they feel solidarity with each other (Väyrynen, 2000: 114).

The rationalist approach builds the definition of community on the concept of interest. The members of a community try to control resources that are of value to them. As no member can usually obtain the control over all relevant resources, he engages in transactions with other members. The aim is to make sure that his access to resources improves or that the remaining resources are not used against him (Väyrynen, 2000: 114).
Adler & Barnett (1998: 31) shows that a community is defined by three characteristics. First, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. “Common meanings are the basis of community” and “intersubjective meaning” gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms. “If we treat identities and interests as always in process during interaction, then we can see how an evolution of cooperation might lead to an evolution of community” (Wendt, 1994: 390).

Secondly, “those in a community have many sided and direct relations; interaction occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 31).

Thirdly, “communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest derived from the knowledge of those with whom one is interacting, and altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 31).

These three defining qualities of a community can exist at the local, domestic, or the international level. There is no priori reason why they should be limited to the territorial state. There are ample historical reasons why these qualities are more likely to reside at the domestic level; obviously networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters have generally been limited to relatively short distances (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 32).

However, this is a contingent claim and allows for the possibility that these elements might emerge at the international level under the right conditions. Such conditions might already be present because technological developments and economic forces have radically transformed the international environment and made possible different forms of communication and identification previously unavailable, unimagined, and sometimes undesired. These new developments can in fact allow for the development of a sense of community among people who are not physically co-present (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 32).

By acknowledging, that communities develop around networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters that are not dependent on inhabiting the same geographic
space, we reconceptualise the very idea of regions. Scholars (e.g. Deutsch) have difficulty identifying precisely where one region ends and another begins; yet they tend to define regions based on geography because of the assumption that proximity generates common interests (see Deutsch, 1954) that derive from a common culture, economic circumstance, and security concerns. But individuals can organise and define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to space, suggesting something of an “imagined community”, or a “cognitive region” e.g. Australia is a member of the Western security community even though it resides thousands of miles from the “core” members (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 33).

2.5 Constructivism, Security and Regional Security

Constructivism, a term first elaborated by Nicholas Onuf in his groundbreaking book *World of Our Making* in 1989, is a broad theoretical approach to the study of International Relations (Mcdonald, 2008: 60). However, within little over a decade, it has risen to be one of the top three paradigms in the discipline (Franke, 2009: 22).

Despite attention to security issues, the extent to which constructivists have developed a theory of international security is limited (Mcdonald, 2008: 60). Franke (2009: 23) has identified “three common concerns that serve as a useful starting point”.

Firstly, constructivists argue that normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures. Secondly, constructivists of all stripes agree that ideational structures are important because they shape the identities and therefore interests of actors in world politics. Finally, a common concern that binds constructivists is the view that the relationship between agents and structures is mutually constitutive.

Karin Fierke (2007: 56) has argued, “to construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist”. This does not necessarily mean that there is no such thing as security or that security is devoid of meaning. “Security may be understood, for example as the preservation of a group’s core values. But such a broad definition of security tells us little about who the group itself is; what its core values are; where threats to those values may come from; and how the preservation or advancement of these values might be achieved”.

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For constructivists, answers to these questions are different in different contexts and develop through social interaction between actors. Moreover, it is the answers to these questions, articulated and negotiated in a particular social and historical context through social interaction, that bring security into being (Mcdonald, 2008: 61).

Other constructivists have focused on the possibility for the security dilemma to be ameliorated in different contexts. “This is apparent in literature exploring the possibilities for the emergence of security communities, namely a group of actors (usually states) for whom the use of force in resolving disputes between each other has become unthinkable over time” (Mcdonald, 2008: 67).

In summary, constructivists share a belief that security is a social construction, meaning different things in different contexts. Security is also seen as a site of negotiation and contestation, in which actors compete to define the identity and values of a particular group in such a way to provide a foundation for political action. Identity and norms are seen as central to the study of security, together providing the limits for feasible and legitimate political action. Finally, agents and structures are mutually constituted and, because the world is one of our own making, even structural change is always possible even if difficult (Mcdonald, 2008: 67).

### 2.6 Deutsch and Security Communities

“A security community is generally defined as a group of states integrated to the point where people have dependable expectations of peaceful change. Initially proposed by Richard van Wagenen in 1952, it was with the seminal 1957 study by Karl Deutsch and his associates that the concept received its first in-depth theoretical and empirical treatment” (Franke, 2008: 314).

Whilst at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Deutsch and several of his colleagues applied their skills to “study the possible ways in which men someday might abolish war”. The result of this study was *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957). The work did not focus on the new supranational institutions that had emerged in Europe, but rather examined historical cases to see if lessons could be applied to an area that included Western Europe, the USA, and Canada.
After comparison, they concluded that successful integration required a sense of community, a “we feeling” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 115).

According to Deutsch et al. (1957: 117) a “Security Community is a group of people which has become integrated. By Integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a, “long” time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. By Sense of Community, we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this one point: those common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”. By Peaceful Change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force”.

A security community, “therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).

Two varieties of security communities were observed. The first, an amalgamated security community means “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. “The US today is an example of the amalgamated type” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6). The US became a single governmental unit through the formal merger of several previously independent units, which today has one supreme decision making centre.

The pluralistic security community, “on the other hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units which form a security community without being merged” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6) and maintains two separate supreme decision making centres. However, the security community can only exist where the amalgamation occurs with integration.

Altogether nine essential conditions were found in an amalgamated security community and a further three possible conditions were noted (these are not mentioned here as these are not applicable to the AU case which is deemed to be a
pluralistic security community). Importantly “of the twelve conditions that appeared to be essential for the success of an amalgamated security community, only two or three were found to be very important for a pluralistic security community as well” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 134).

These include i) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making, ii) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence and iii) mutual predictability of behaviour (Deutsch et al., 1957: 134).

Adler & Barnett (1998: 7) notes, “at the heart of Deutsch’s ‘pluralistic’ approach was the assumption that communication is the cement of social groups in general, and political communities in particular” (also see Political Community at the International Level, Deutsch, 1954 and The Integration of Political Communities, Jacob & Toscano (eds.), 1967).

Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together. The Deutschian model represents a process of integration based on a wide array of inter-societal transactions that are of mutual benefit to the people involved. The process is based on learning. Learning that such transactions provide benefits, that such benefits outweigh the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to continue such interactions and even expand them. As such, interactions occur and expand; the peoples involved become interdependent, and thus raise the costs of stopping such interactions (Starr, 1992: 210).

In addition, as interactions occur and increase, people develop greater responsiveness to one another, and develop the expectation that wants and needs will be responded to positively. At some point, this produces the ‘we-feeling’, trust and mutual consideration that Deutsch calls community. This is the process of integration at the heart of the social communication model developed by Deutsch and the most tangible outcome of this process is the security community (Starr, 1992: 211).

This transactional approach was the manner in which Deutsch and his associates measured the “sense of a community”. They quantified transaction flows, with particular emphasis on their volume. A relative growth in transaction flows between
states, in contrast to flows within that state, was believed to be a crucial test for
determining whether new “human communities” might be emerging.

In addition, the transactionalist perspective, which takes seriously the possibility of
community, offers an alternative understanding of international politics. Deutsch
hypothesized that many of the same processes that led to national integration and
nationalism in domestic politics might be equally relevant for international politics and
international community development. “This simple move was quite radical, placing
him at odds with how international relations theory generally evaluates the
international system”. Most international relations theories use material forces, the
language of power, and a very thin conception of society to understand interstate
outcomes. In contrast, the Deutschian perspective relies on shared knowledge,
ideational forces, and a dense normative environment (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 8).

2.7 Adler & Barnett and Security Communities

In their volume Security Communities Adler & Barnett (1998: 3) “thinks the
unthinkable: that communities exist at the international level, that security politics is
profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international
community might develop a pacific disposition. In staking out this position we
summon a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago: security
communities”. Deutsch observed a pluralistic security community whenever states
become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, which in turn
creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war, that is not
only a stable order, but in fact a stable peace.

By marrying security and community, states are revising the conventional meanings
of security and power. Some states are revising the concept of power to include the
ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behaviour
against an external threat and to attract new states with ideas that convey a sense of
national security and material progress. Thus as the meaning and purpose of power
begins to shift, so too does the meaning and purpose of security (Adler & Barnett,

Whereas once security meant military security, now states are identifying “new”
security issues that revolve around economic, environmental, and social welfare
concerns and have ceased to concern themselves with military threats from others within the community. “There is emerging a transnational community of *Deutschian* policy-makers, if you will, who is challenging the once nearly hegemonic position of realist inspired policy-makers and offering an alternative understanding of what is possible in global politics and a map to get there” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 4).

The concept of a community represents a direct challenge to the models of security politics that have dominated the discipline for the past several decades, and demands that we take seriously both sociological theorizing and the social character of global politics. “Simply put, the issue is not whether there is such a thing as an international community, but rather: when does it matter, where does it matter, and how does it matter? (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 5).

“Notwithstanding the tremendous admiration for Deutsch’s scholarly and political vision his conceptualization was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and conceptual difficulties”. Therefore Adler & Barnett (1998: 5) offer a resuscitation of his concept of security communities after decades of neglect and criticism which is intended both to draw attention to the concepts importance and to suggest refinements to it.

To overcome these shortcomings they propose a number modifications and additions to Deutsch’s original schema, which includes a broader definition of the term security, and a differentiation between loosely, and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities. It also includes the division of the evolution of a security community into three stylized phases and an increasing attention to the mutually constitutive relationship between members and the community and the socializing effect of international organizations (Franke, 2008: 315).

However, the constructivist reconceptualization goes much deeper than merely describing the three stages in the development of security communities. Now a security community has "shared identities, values, and meanings" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31). It is a "socially constructed," "imagined," or "cognitive" region, whose borders may or may not coincide with traditional geographical borders (Bellamy, 2004).
The term "imagined community," raised by Anderson (1983: 6), means that even though members of a community can hardly meet most of the other members, they still retain the mental image of their communion. A more traditional example of an imagined community is a nation-state, whose size generally prevents citizens from knowing each other in person. For this type of community, common identities and values are essential because ties between members cannot be based on face-to-face interactions (Tusicsny, 2007: 427).

Figure 1 illustrates the framework for the study of security communities, which is organised around three tiers:

**Figure 1. Framework for the Study of Security Communities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIER ONE</th>
<th>Precipitating Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in technology, demography, economic, the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of new interpretations of social reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIER TWO</td>
<td>Factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure: Power, Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process: Transactions, Organisations, Social learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIER THREE</td>
<td>Necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>=Dependable expectations of peaceful change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adler & Barnett (1998: 38)

2.7.1. Tier One

Because of exogenous or endogenous factors, states begin to orient themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. These factors include: technological developments, an external threat that causes states to form alliances,
the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of social reality, transformations in economic, demographic and migration patterns or changes in the natural environment (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 38).

There is no expectation that these initial encounters and acts of cooperation will produce trust or mutual identification, but because they are premised on the promise of more pleasant and more numerous interactions, they provide the necessary conditions for these very possibilities (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 38).

In this initial or nascent phase, governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community. Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges and encourage future exchanges (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).

Accordingly, one would expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges, something akin to search missions that are aimed at determining the possible levels and extent of cooperation that might be achieved. In order to deepen and extend their interactions, to foster cooperation, and to verify in the absence of trust, states will frequently establish third parties to observe whether states are honouring their contract and obligations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).

As noted, undoubtedly many possible trigger mechanisms initiate this initial search and the desire to create institutions or organizations to order and foster their relations. One is a mutual security threat. With a mutual security threat, states recognize or discover that they have joint interests that require collective action, and can mutually benefit from some modest coordination of security policies (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).

The resulting acts of security cooperation are likely to include greater specification of those actions that are and are not considered threatening, policies that are designed to overcome collective action problems associated with independent choice, and the development of security programs that are intended to serve their mutual interests. Yet states frequently develop close security ties to not only provide for collective defence against a common threat, but also to deepen the institutional and transnational linkages that bind these together, capitalize on particular visions of
better material progress, and to promote ideas about cooperative security (Adler & Barnet, 1998: 50).

The existence of or the desire to capitalize on the gains from trade can also encourage the development of international organizations and institutions. This is a standing argument of neoliberal institutionalism. However, here we anticipate that there will be a relationship between the establishment of international economic associations that are designed to encourage economic interchange, and the presence of international arrangements that are intended to produce order and security (Adler & Barnet, 1998: 51).

Cultural, political, social and ideological homogeneity can lead to greater interaction and association, and the development of new organizations and institutions. It may even create the desire, and the very expectation that it is possible, to develop a security community. People sharing cultural and social attributes across national borders frequently voice an interest in developing not simply a defensive strategic posture but rather an institutional form that is intended to give muscle to already existing expressions of mutual obligation. For example, Arab nationalism held that Arab states should deepen their security and political ties not only because of an external threat but also to nurture and develop a political community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 51).

In general, the trigger mechanisms for a security community are likely to have a material and normative bases. Other material and normative factors can include rapid shifts in the distribution of military power, cataclysmic events that cause changes in material structures, mindsets and sensibilities, new ways of thinking about organizing political life, and transnational, domestic or international processes that generate common interests. A security community “gets out of the gate” because of either push or pull factors that cause states to reconsider how to organize their relations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 52).

2.7.2 Tier Two

The defining feature of this tier is that states and their peoples have become involved in a series of social interactions that have begun to transform the environment in which they are embedded (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39). Also referred to as the
ascendant phase it is defined by the increasingly dense networks, new institutions and organizations that reflect tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat. It also includes cognitive structures that promote “seeing” and acting together, and therefore the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 53).

This tier is divided into the “structural” categories of power and knowledge and the “process” categories of transactions, international organizations and institutions, and social learning (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39).

2.7.2.1. Structure

Power and knowledge are the structural girders for the development of a security community. According to Deutsch “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39).

Power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community. Thus, those powerful states that belong to the core do not create security per se, rather, because of the positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 40).

Knowledge also constitutes part of the international structure, and in this instance, interest is in the cognitive structures (shared meanings and understandings). Specifically we are interested in those cognitive structures that facilitate practices that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity, and analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution. At the present moment if scholars of international politics are asked to identify one set of political ideas and meanings that are attached to a security community it is liberalism and democracy (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 40).
2.7.2.2 Process

The process categories involve transactions, international organizations and institutions, and social learning. A transaction can be defined as a “bounded communication between one actor and another. A transaction, therefore, admits various types of exchanges, including symbolic, economic, material, political and technological, and so on (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 41).

International organizations and institutions contribute directly and indirectly to the development of security communities. Following Oran Young (in Adler & Barnett, 1998), we distinguish between social institutions and formal organizations by defining social institutions as “social practises consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations among the occupants of these roles”, and organizations as “material entities possessing physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment and budgets” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 41).

Security and non-security organizations can contribute to the development of trust, at the most intuitive level; they facilitate and encourage transactions and trust by establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms. However, their trust-building properties extend beyond their monitoring capacities, for they also can encourage actors to discover their preferences, to reconceptualise who they are, and to re-imagine their social bonds (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 42).

Organizations are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even “teach” others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are. International organizations may be conducive to the formation of mutual trust and collective identities, because of their often underestimated capacity to “engineer” the very conditions e.g. Cultural homogeneity, a belief in a common fate, and norms of unilateral self-constraint, that assist in their development (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 42-43).

Also behind every innovative institution stand creative and farsighted political elites. Political elites that are connected to international organizations use them to promote new possibilities. As John Hall (in Adler & Barnett, 1998) argues “the creation of new
social identities by intellectuals, that is their capacity to link people across space so as to form a new community, is necessarily a rare historical phenomenon, but it is one the scholars of international relations need to take seriously” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 43).

While communication between peoples, learning processes, and the thickening of the social environment plays a crucial role in the evolution of political communities, these are but propensities until agents transform them into political reality through institutional and political power. This highlights the critical role of social learning, which can be described as “an active process or redefinition or reinterpretation of reality, that is what people consider real, possible and desirable, on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 43).

Social learning is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organizational settings, and core powers. During their transactions and social exchanges, people communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their normative expectations. Institutions promote the diffusion of meanings from country to country, may play an active role in the cultural and political selection of similar normative and epistemic understandings in different countries, and may help to transmit shared understanding from generation to generation (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 44).

Social learning may not be sufficient for the development of a security community unless this learning is connected to functional processes that are traceable to a general improvement in the state’s overall condition. This is why core powers are so important to the process. States that possess superior material power, international legitimacy, and have adopted norms and practises that are conducive to peaceful change tend to confer increased material and moral authority to the norms and practises they diffuse, and may also induce their political adoption and institutionalization (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45).

In sum, this phase is defined by an intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states that is likely to be produced and be a product of various international institutions and organizations. Although functional organizations might help to encourage mutual trust, we look for changes in the organization and production of
security for both the primary mechanism by which this trust is produced and for its evidence. We expect that a core state or a coalition of states remain important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of the security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 54-55).

2.7.3 Tier Three

The dynamic and positive relationships among the described variables are the wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity, which in turn are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45).

In this mature phase, a threshold has been crossed, trust and identity exists, it becomes increasingly difficult for the members of this “region” to think only in instrumental ways and prepare for war among each other (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55). Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on mutual identification. Because a minimal measure of mutual trust is needed for a collective identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to identity. Once some measure of trust develops, a collective identity is likely to reinforce and increase the depth of trust (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46).

When international relations theorists turn their attention to trust they generally elevate how anarchy makes trust highly elusive if not impossible”. This is one reason why states establish international organizations and other means to monitor the behaviour of others. The very existence of dependable expectations of change suggests that states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust, but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the others (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46).

Collective Identity in its simplest definition is the understanding of oneself in relationship to others. Identities are not only personal or psychological, but are social, as defined by actor’s interaction with and relationship to others. Therefore, all political identities are dependent on the actor’s interaction with others and placed within an institutional context. This relational perspective informs the view that
national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations and states (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 47).

In the loosely coupled security community states identify positively with one another and proclaim a similar "way of life". There are multiple and diverse mechanisms and patterns of interaction that reinforce and reproduce the security community; there is an informal governance system based on shared meanings and a collective identity; and while there remains conflicting interests, disagreements, and asymmetric bargaining, there is the expectation that states will practise self-constraint (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55).

Evidence of the emergence of a security community can be found in various indicators that reflect a high degree of trust; a shared identity and future; low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters; and the differentiation between those within from those outside the security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55).

These indicators could possibly include multilateralism, where the decision-making procedure, conflict resolution, and processes of conflict adjudication are likely to be more consensual than in other types of interstate relations. Unfortified borders, even though still present, border checks are undertaken to secure the state against threats other than an organized military invasion. Change in military planning which does not include those within the community as potential enemies during a military engagement and a common definition of the threat by the community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55-56).

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided the theoretical framework against which the research in this project will be conducted. It introduced an overview of the development of regional security, and conceptual analysis of the terms security and community. It also provided a description of the theory of constructivism and its function in regional security.

Deutsch (1958) initially introduced Security Community Theory but, as noted, his conceptualization was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and conceptual
difficulties and therefore a resuscitation of his concept of security communities was needed.

Adler & Barnett (1998) provides a revised version of Security Community Theory, which includes a “framework for the analysis of the development of security communities”. This framework was introduced and extensively discussed in this chapter utilizing their edited volume.
Chapter 3

Security Community Theory, the OAU and the AU

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will utilize Adler & Barnett’s (1998) Security Community Theory to interrogate the development of a security community in Africa at the continental level, and more specifically, how (if indeed) the AU has contributed to this process.

As Adler & Barnett (1998: 49) argues, “our understanding of the development of security communities can be broadly termed as social constructivist and path-dependent. The notion that security communities are socially constructed means that they have a history, and therefore exhibit an evolutionary pattern that follows the direction of “the arrow of time”. Thus, one can trace backwards the institutionalization of dependable expectations of peaceful change, from when they merely are imagined to exist to the process that led to their development.

This chapter will commence with a historical background on the formation of the OAU, its involvement in Africa, and its transformation into the AU. Thereafter a short introduction to the AU will be presented followed by a methodical interrogation of the development of a security community in Africa, and how (if indeed) the AU has contributed towards the development of an African Security Community. This methodical interrogation will follow the three tiers of the framework, starting at tier one. The chapter will end with concluding remarks.

3.2 From the OAU to the AU

The OAU was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent, they saw the danger posed by the division of language, culture and religion, by the economic inequalities, and by controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers. It quickly became apparent that a high degree of co-operation was necessary among the fledgling African states, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. It was for the purpose of cooperation that the OAU was established (Cervenka, 1977: ix).
3.2.1. Formation of the OAU

At the beginning of 1963, the African states were divided into three main political groups: the Casablanca group\textsuperscript{1}, the Monrovia group\textsuperscript{2}, and the Brazzaville twelve\textsuperscript{3}. There were several reasons for the division. One of them was the disagreement of the Casablanca states with the UN policy in the Congo (Zaire), a policy supported by the states of the Monrovia group as well as the Brazzaville group. Another was the support of the Casablanca states for the Algerian independence struggle, which was strongly opposed by the Brazzaville states. The relationship was further strained by the differing opinions on the recognition of Mauritania, a member of the Monrovia group, and support for Morocco against this recognition (Cervenka, 1977: 1).

The most significant difference was on the matter of African unity. The Casablanca group was convinced that political unity was a prerequisite for the subsequent integration of African economies, while the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups maintained that African unity should be approached through economic cooperation only. However, even though disagreements existed there was a similarity in the fundamental aims of the three groups. This was particular in those areas concerning decolonization, racial discrimination, maintenance of world peace, and the urgent need for economic cooperation between African states. Thus, despite the many divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all the independent African states, and each of the groups made frequent attempts to end the division (Cervenka, 1977: 1).

The signing of the Charter on 25 May 1963 establishing the OAU was quite an achievement considering the split into the three rival blocs. However, because of the deep divisions, the OAU represented a largely negative agreement, and consequently in the years following the signing of the Charter very little progress was made. Kwame Nkrumah’s call for continental unity was brushed aside and the

\textsuperscript{1} The Casablanca group compromised eight countries that first met in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in January 1961: the Algerian provisional government, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco.

\textsuperscript{2} The Monrovia group compromised 20 states, which attended a conference in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in May 1961. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Libya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia.

\textsuperscript{3} The Brazzaville Twelve compromised 12 French-speaking states that first met in Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire in October 1960: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.
African leaders settled for a superficial unity that brought together African states but not Africa's people. The OAU in no way affected the sovereignty of each independent state, and they were left free to pursue policies in which continental priorities were sacrificed to narrow national interests (Cervenka, 1977: ix). The operating philosophy of the OAU can best be described as “based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states” (Wiseman, 1984).

The purpose of the Organization is stated in Article II (1). It is (a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; (b) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Regardless of the order of the purpose, the fact remained that the principal aim of the OAU was to free the African continent from colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination (Naldi, 1999: 4).

Article II (2) lists some of the major areas for cooperation among the Member States and provides the OAU with its *reason d’être*: (a) political and diplomatic cooperation; (b) economic cooperation, including transport and communication; (c) educational and cultural cooperation; (d) health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation; (e) scientific and technical cooperation; and (f) cooperation in defence and security.

It is noticeable that political and military integration are hardly alluded to among the purpose of the OAU, although significant developments in these fields occurred. The African defence force, called for by Nkrumah, never materialized, but efforts such as OAU peace keeping became a major consideration as it sought to adopt local solutions to solve African conflicts. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution introduced in 1993 serves as a suitable example (Naldi, 1999: 5).

### 3.2.2. Towards the AU

The Pan-Africanist ideals that led to the creation of the OAU in 1963 proceeded from the idea of the African states as strong and united against colonial subjugation and racism, and working together to improve the lives of African people. By its fifteenth
anniversary, however, the OAU was sailing on rough waters. The only remaining issue uniting the OAU was the factor that caused its birth: apartheid in South Africa. Otherwise, the OAU was weak and disunited by the dispute over Western Sahara (involving Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and France), the Shaba rebellions (the attempted invasions of Zaire), the invasion of Benin, and the Ogaden war against Somalia. Overall, the organization was seen to have failed to respond to serious intra-African conflicts or to act as a pan-African body against foreign intervention (Packer & Rukare, 2002: 366).

Although some significant positive changes in the African political landscape had occurred in the late 1970s (such as the fall of the regimes of Idi Amin, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, and Francisco Macias Nguema, and progress toward Zimbabwean independence and self-determination in Namibia), the OAU had little hand in them. It was hampered by the split between radical and conservative member states, combined with a worsening economic situation in most of them. Assessments around the time of its twentieth anniversary evinced an unsatisfactory record and pessimism about the future (Packer & Rukare, 2002: 366).

By 1988, which celebrated twenty-five years of OAU existence, hardly any analysis of the organization was made without suggestions for reform, particularly because the contemporary challenges faced by the continent were no longer the same as those of 1963. A primary function of the organization (eradicating colonialism and establishing the independence of African nations) had been virtually completed. Only the situation in South Africa remained a preoccupation (Packard & Rukare, 2002: 366).

As noted with the end of the Cold War, the world completely changed, but Africa and the OAU did not. Africa became increasingly marginalized and the great powers increasingly declined to assume leading roles in promoting peace. Thus during the latter half of the 1990’s African states took a series of decisions to overhaul the continental organization, which led to the launch of the AU in 2002 (Engel & Porto, 2010: 1).
3.2.3 Formation of the AU

The years from 1999 to 2002 saw a gradual transformation of the OAU into what is now the AU (Mwanasali, 2003). A process that is best understood as a fusion of three projects, namely a Libyan quest for Pan-African unity, a Nigerian project the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), and a South African project for an African Renaissance (Tieku, 2004).

“First, and apparently driving the transformation, was the grandiose and utterly unrealistic pan-African scheme of the Libyan dictator Gadaffi, who pursued the decision in 1999 to create a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national differences”. However, the flamboyant Libyan leader could not implement his plan without the support of Nigeria and South Africa, each of which had their own projects for which they wanted an all-African stamp of approval, in return for which they gave their support for the new union (Moller, 2009: 8).

The Nigeria idea of a CSSDCA came out of the so-called “Kampala Movement” (Deng and Zartman, 2002), and was envisioned as a counterpart of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSSDCA was based on a very broad concept of security, including human security, and acknowledged good governance as a pre-requisite of stable peace. As a means to realise these values, it envisaged “a collective continental architecture for promoting security and inter-African relations”, and recommended the signing of non-aggression pacts, a common defence policy for Africa, stand-by arrangement for peace support operations, police collaboration, the establishment of an early warning mechanism as well as a strengthening of confidence-building measures. Most of these recommendations were formally confirmed at the inaugural AU summit in Durban in 2002 (Moller, 2009: 8).

South Africa’s project was the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Based on the vision of an African Renaissance, it was first called the “New Africa Initiative”, dating back to the OAU summit in 1999. The main objectives were poverty eradication and sustainable development, but as a precondition for such development it also featured a “Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative” (Moller, 2009: 9).
A grand bargain had thus been struck between the “neo-Casablanca”, personified by the grandiose and populist Gadaffi, and the pragmatic “neo-Monrovians”, personified by Obasanjo and Mbeki: that is, three of the continent’s potential hegemons. This cleared the path for the launch of a new organisation. Following a hectic drafting process, 53 African Heads of State signed the Constitutive Act of the AU in July 2000 (Maluwa, 2003). This allowed for the solemn proclamation of the AU at an extraordinary Summit of the OAU in March 2001, and its solemn inauguration at a July 2002 summit in Durban (Cilliers, 2002).

Article 4 of the Constitutive Act sets out the principles according to which the AU shall function (Juma, 2006: 49-50):

a. Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;
b. Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;
c. Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;
d. Establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent;
e. Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly;
f. Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;
g. Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
h. The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision by the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war, genocides and crimes against humanity;
i. Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;
j. The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;
k. Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;
l. Promotion of gender equality;

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4 The 53 Heads of State does not include Morocco, which suspended its membership in 1984 over the issue of the Western Sahara (Packer & Rukare, 2002: 371).
5 In 2003 Article 4(h) was amended to include “as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council” (AU, 2003).
m. Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;

n. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;

o. Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;

p. Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.

Desmond Orjiako (in Mathews, 2008: 33) describes the AU as “a political, economic and social project aimed at creating a democratic space across Africa, promoting economic development, and for reflecting a common African identity”. The AU seeks to promote a more integrated and cooperative continent. Unlike its predecessor, it has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states in grave circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and is tasked with ensuring respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance (Mathews, 2008: 33).

3.3 The AU: Tier One

As noted, in the nascent phase governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community. Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges and encourage future exchanges. Accordingly, one would expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges, something akin to search missions that are aimed at determining the possible levels and extent of cooperation that might be achieved. In order to deepen and extend their interactions, to foster cooperation, and to verify in the absence of trust, states will frequently establish third parties to observe whether states are honouring their contract and obligations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).

Briefly presented here are examples of the nascent phase as it “developed” in other regions that today are considered as security communities. In addition, examples from SADC on which a substantial amount of scholarly work exists is included, and finally a representation of the possible development of a security community in Africa.
3.3.1 Examples from other Regions: EU and ASEAN

Western Europe is a security community and the EU is deemed the principal example of a security community. Contrary to most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of “desecuritization”, that is progressive demarginalization of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues (Weaver, 1998: 69).

The process of security community formation does not match the three-phase model presented in this study. However, the nascent phase (of the EU) is marked by institution building (e.g. NATO) and motivated by both mutual and common external security concerns (Weaver, 1998: 91). These include i) the Soviet Threat; ii) an internal political threat, the Communists; iii) the economy; iv) the German question; and v) a historical argument: Europe had to make a choice to change course from wars to integration (Weaver, 1998: 81-82).

In Southeast Asia, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not fought a war against each other since 1967. This has promulgated Amitav Acharya (1991, 1998, and 2009) to argue in favour of the existence of a security community within the region. Using the theory as presented by Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998), Acharya has been able to trace the development of this community. He explains that the founding of ASEAN immediately followed the end of Indonesia’s policy of “Confrontation” against newly independent Malaysia and Singapore, which had proved costly for Indonesia’s economic development and the region’s stability. Thus, preventing a repetition of such interstate confrontation and developing a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes were major considerations behind ASEAN’s formation (Acharya, 1998: 203).

ASEAN was also a product of shared threat perceptions. Yet, the threat was not necessarily external. The important factor behind the evolution of ASEAN regionalism was a common sense of vulnerability to the enemy within, particularly the threat of communist insurgency. This threat was magnified by the possibility of external backing from China and Vietnam. Singapore and Thailand viewed Vietnam
as a major security threat, while Indonesia and Malaysia saw China as most

This led to mutual cooperation against the trans-border movement of communist
guerrillas, including intelligence sharing, mutual extradition treaties, and joint border
patrols and counterinsurgency operations that served as an important basis for intra-

ASEAN’s origins were also influenced by the desire of its members to enhance
economic cooperation for mutual gain. Inspired by the integration project in Europe
ASEAN was conceived as a framework which would allow its members to preserve
their independence and advance their national interests, rather than promote supra-
nationalism. ASEAN opted against EU-style trade liberalization that could
compromise locally less advanced economies, in favour of improving its external
economic climate through collective bargaining with its major trading partners

However, the outlined political (responding to an external threat) and economic
imperatives, while important, were not sufficient to trigger the process of community
building in ASEAN (Acharya, 1998: 205). Without a constructivist understanding, it
would be difficult to explain the emergence of ASEAN. Community building involves
a certain convergence of values. In the case of ASEAN, anti-communism (but not
necessarily an adherence to liberal democracy), and a general preference for
capitalist economic development (albeit state controlled) over the socialist model,
served as important factors binding an otherwise diverse membership. Against this
backdrop (which was supported by the West) ASEAN regionalism developed as a
highly deliberate process of elite socialisation involving the creation of norms,
principles, and symbols aimed at the management of diversity and the development

3.3.2 African Example: SADC

In the early 1990’s, the Southern Africa region emerged from protracted conflicts
which were primarily connected to the Cold War and apartheid destabilization. The
first evidence of a community within Southern Africa started with the creation of the
Frontline States (FLS) in the early 1970’s and the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. The FLS was a loosely structured security coordination forum for post-colonial states in Southern Africa. The objectives, or *raison d’être*, was to achieve the region’s economic liberation from apartheid South African dominance (in response to a mutual threat), and to coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (economic incentive) (Hwang, 2007: 67). However, neither the FLS nor the SADCC put integration, either economic or political, on the agenda (Hammerstad, 2005: 72).

The SADCC is seen as an important development in regional cooperation. It existed parallel to, but separate, from the FLS. The SADCC consisted of nine black ruled states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and was later joined by Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe) and was chaired by Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana. The SADCC was set-up as a loose formation of states with a shared geography and a shared denominator, namely a programme of action to achieve closer economic and transport integration among its members to reduce their dependence on South Africa (Swart & Du Plessis, 2004: 28-29). Notably after 1990 these states together with South Africa would form the core of SADC.

The transition of the post-Cold War era during the 1990’s has had profound implications for the position of the Third World in global politics, which resulted from systemic changes in both the international and national levels. The replacement of the bipolar system for a US dominated unipolar system weakened the presence and superpower “rivalry” that dominated the continent before. In many cases, but not all, this created the space for political settlement and resolution of many perennial issues, allowing local security dynamics to develop their own course and to operate more based on domestic resources and issues, rather than a function of ideology based Cold War politics (Swart & Du Plessis, 2004: 14).

Following the end of the Cold War and the system of Apartheid in August 1992, at a Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, the Heads of State and Government signed the SADC Treaty and Declaration that effectively transformed the SADCC into SADC (Hammerstad, 2005: 72). The pressure of globalization, post-Apartheid euphoria and a growing feeling of disappointment and distrust drove a shift away from universalism, opting instead to look for regional solutions for political, economic and military problems in Southern Africa (Franke, 2008: 326).
Adler and Barnett (1998) explain that the nascent phase of the security community does not exhibit an explicit search for a security community per se but rather a desire to coordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions. The formation of the FLS and SADCC, and the later formation of SADC are evidence, and definitely include an important “other contributing factor” in the desire for a stable economic environment.

3.3.3 Precipitating Conditions in Africa

“At first glance, neither the concept of security communities nor any other of the concepts of security cooperation currently in the academic discourse seem applicable to Africa’s emerging security architecture” (Franke, 2008: 317). However, a “desire to co-ordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions” were visible early after the start of the decolonisation process in Africa. The first of these states to “break the shackles” of colonial rule was Ghana (1957) and its leader Kwame Nkrumah was an adamant follower of Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah in 1963 already called for a “United States of Africa”, a continental organisation with a common currency, one army and a central government. Even though Nkrumah played a pivotal role in the formation of the OAU, his call for a complete integration of Africa was rejected as expressed in the final arrangements of the OAU. However, it should still be viewed as an important contribution in the overall progress to the achievement of a “sense of community in Africa”. Nkrumah did not stand alone in his “vision” for a unified Africa, as Nyerere (1963: 1) explains, “there is one sense in which African unity already exists. There is a sentiment of “African-ness” a feeling of mutual involvement”.

The OAU was not the only regional organisation that existed, and since its formation in 1963 leading to the post-Cold War period in the 1990’s several regional arrangements developed. This illustrates the desire to coordinate actions and increase interaction and cooperation. Some of the most important and influential efforts include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1986, the East African Community (EAC) in 1967, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1981, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989 (Franke, 2009).
During this period, it can be argued that, it was the “internal threat” of colonialism, or rather the elimination thereof that acted as a precipitating condition for member states to be drawn to one another. This was epitomised by the Apartheid regime in South Africa, which was established in 1948 and served as the final “colonial stronghold” until 1990. Additionally, a realisation of the economic benefits of integration served as an important contributing factor e.g. IGAD, ECOWAS and the EAC.

However the OAU never achieved a “full” integration of the continent, ironically it was the organisation itself, though its promotion “of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states” that hindered closer cooperation, and by the 1990’s many shortcomings of the organisation had been exposed. Also in the 1990’s we saw the end of the Cold War, and the demise of Apartheid. The former rearranging the entire world system, from bi-polar to unipolar in favour of the US, and bringing an end to ideological conflicts in Africa, whilst the latter meant the “death” of colonialism in Africa, and the emancipation of the African people. As Swart & Du Plessis (2004) have noted, “the end of the Cold War meant that Africans no longer received the international attention they had enjoyed previously as Africa’s geopolitical and strategic importance dwindled, which included a decrease in financial and military support”.

The decade that followed could best be described as a “decade of awakening” (Franke, 2006: 12). The catastrophe in Mogadishu, which saw a withdrawal of the US from direct peacekeeping operations in Africa, the genocide in Rwanda where the international community failed to intervene, and the impact of globalization on African economies brought Africans to the realisation that it could no longer entrust its future to the international community. Henceforth, “African solutions had to be found to African problems”.

As Franke (2008: 319) explains “driven by a growing sense of urgency and a feeling of disappointment and distrust in the international community and its motives, capabilities, and willingness to get involved in African affairs, that the continent’s leaders realized that if they want to break the cycle of violence, poverty and underdevelopment they had to cooperate with each other and together take charge of the continent’s destiny”. What ensued has been described as the fifth wave of
Pan-Africanism characterized by a slow conceptual shift from regime security and its sacrosanct principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity to the broader notion of human security (Franke, 2008: 319). Africa has reached the nascent phase.

3.4 The AU: Tier Two

The ascendant phase sees the development of intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states that is said to result in the emergence of various international institutions and organisations. Dense ‘friendly’ networks that continue to develop, the development of structures that show increased military coordination and cooperation and/or a reduction of fear by members of the emerging community that other members represent a threat, characterise the phase (Ngoma, 2005: 48).

This phase is divided into two categories: structure and process.

3.4.1. Structure

The structural category consists of two parts. Power is central for understanding the development of security communities, and plays an important role in its development and maintenance. Deutsch (1957) argues, “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which most cases the integrative cases developed”.

Following the realisation that henceforth Africa will have to find “African solutions, to African problems” three states emerged as critical/power players in the ascendant phase. As presented earlier in this project, the call for greater African unity was spearheaded by three leaders, each with their own specific project, and arguably each with their own national interests at heart (Tieku, 2004).

President Mbeki from South Africa (the regional hegemon in the SADC) “nourished the hopes for an African Renaissance as first introduced in his famous “I am an African” speech to South Africa’s Constitutional Assembly in May 1996. Mbeki’s “vision” “provided a useful counterpoint to the Afro-Pessimism of the days” (Franke, 2008: 319).

President Obasanjo of Nigeria (the regional hegemon in ECOWAS) introduced a reform package, which was articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
on the CSSDCA. “In specific terms, the reforms provided benchmarks for judging the behaviour of African leaders in four issue areas: security, stability, development, and cooperation. These principles were meant to redefine security and sovereignty, and to demand certain standards of behaviour... from every government [in Africa] in the interest of common humanity” (Tieku, 2004: 256).

“Sensing that the two most powerful African leaders were teaming up to reform the OAU, President Gaddafi from Libya (considered a potential African hegemon, see Powell, 2009) intervened” (Tieku, 2004: 260). Gaddafi called for an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya from 6 to 9 September 1999. The Libyan leader wanted to use the platform of the summit to cement his full return to the geopolitics of black Africa, and to demonstrate his renewed commitment to the Pan-Africanism project. Surprisingly, Gaddafi presented to the 33 African leaders attending the Sirte summit his plan for a “United States of Africa”. This plan included the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single military force, and a common African currency (Tieku, 2004: 261).

A grand bargain was thus struck between the grandiose and populist Gadaffi, and the pragmatic Obasanjo and Mbeki: that is, three of the continent’s potential hegemons (Moller, 2009: 8). From this “power” bargain, we see the emergence of the AU as orchestrated mainly by these three states.

The second part of the structural category is knowledge. As Adler & Barnett (1998: 40) comments that “here we are interested in cognitive structures, that is shared meanings and understandings... (especially) those cognitive structures that facilitate practises that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity, and analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution”.

The formation of the AU in 2002 was a crucial and important step towards the development of an African security community. This development, as previously stated, was promulgated by the changing conditions (both at international, continental and local level) in Africa, and facilitated by the regional hegemons South Africa, Nigeria and potential hegemon Libya. The transition from the OAU to the AU included a new “set of rules” in the form of the Constitutive Act as set out in its objectives and principles. Thus, the Constitutive Act can be viewed as the single most important contributor to the creation of “new knowledge”, and the AU as a norm
entrepreneur, on the continent, and crucially by adopting this Act the 53 African states acknowledged and accepted this “new knowledge”.

When considering “those cognitive structures that facilitate practices that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity...” one should consider Article 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 3 (a) to achieve greater unity; 3 (b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; and 3 (f) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. Article 4 (d) the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent; 4 (e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States; 4 (f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States; 4 (m) respect for democratic principles; and 4 (q) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (Juma, 2006: 49-50).

Additionally, at the 2002 Durban summit “to enable the organization to carry out its new peace and security mandate, and provide operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction”, the AU adopted The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol) (Engel & Porto, 2010: 3).

However, this has only been the initial step towards the creation of knowledge as the AU has continued to act as a norm entrepreneur on the continent through the adoption of several agreements, protocols, treaties and conventions (see Powell, 2005; Williams, 2007; Vreÿ, 2008; Engel & Porto, 2010; AU, 2011a). One such an addition was the agreement on a Common African Defense Policy (CADSP) during the second extraordinary session in Sirte, February 2004. The CADSP, clearly, under section I (Definition and Scope) define the concept of defence, the concept of security, and define “common security threats” (Juma, 2006: 84-85). Engel & Porto (2010: 3) notes, “this policy, in addition to the PSC Protocol, forms the legal underpinning of the continent’s peace and security architecture”.

In 2007, the AU made another major contribution as “norm entrepreneur” with the introduction of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (AU, 2007a). The charter is “inspired by the objectives and principles obtained in the
Constitutive Act”... “particularly those which emphasize the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights”. The objectives under Article 2 of the Charter include: 1) Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of democracy... 3) Promote the holding of free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority... 4) prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional changes of government (AU, 2007a).

Article 11 dictates, “the State Parties undertake to develop the necessary legislative and policy frameworks to establish and strengthen a culture of democracy and peace. Importantly, the Charter includes under Art.23-26 the prescribed actions to be taken by the AU and member states should any member contravene the arrangements set out in this charter (AU, 2007a).

3.4.2 Process

The process categories involve transactions, international organizations and institutions, and social learning. Transactions can be defined as a “bounded communication between one actor and another” and “admits various types of exchanges, including: symbolic, economic, material, political and technological (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 41).

Transactional interactions between African states existed prior to the establishment of AU, but were hindered by the internal divisions amongst member states. The AU, in contrast, has committed itself to promote cooperation. This is set out in Article 3 (c) accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent; 3 (e) encourage international cooperation; 3 (j) promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels, as well as the integration of African economies; 3 (k) promote cooperation in all fields of human activity; and 3 (l) co-ordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities (REC’s).

Furthermore this commitment is promoted through the various AU organs e.g. The Pan-African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the Financial Institutions. Also since 2002, the AU has held various summits, the most recent 17th Summit for Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development from 23 June to 1 July 2011 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (AU, 2011b). These arrangements
have not remained dormant, but have made considerable contributions to cooperation on the continent.

Such contributions include the establishment of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO), which “fosters contact, and regular flow of information and communication between African countries in trade matters and assist in the harmonization of the commercial policies of African countries in order to promote intra-African trade” (AU, 2010a). The Bamako convention “which controls the trans-boundary movement of hazardous wastes in Africa” and the Convention of the African Energy Commission (AFREC) to cooperate in “the area of energy among Member States, particularly through the joint development of energy resources and identification and promotion of regional and/or sub-regional projects” (AU, 2006).

Several other conventions, charters and statutes are currently under review, which would enhance cooperation in the fields of maritime transport, civil aviation, and the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons (AU, 2011a).

The second category under process is international organizations and institutions. Following the work in this study, it can convincingly be illustrated that the AU is the principal contributor. The introduction of the Constitutive Act, the adoption of the PSC protocol, and the addition of the CADSP serves as the most prominent examples, but previously there have been no elaboration on the objectives and principles of these arrangements.

The two most important objectives of the PSC Protocol that relates to the development of a security community, is given under Article 3 and 4. Under Article 3 (a) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment; and 3 (e) develop a common defense policy for the Union. The most important principles under Article 4 are (a) the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, and (d) interdependence between the socioeconomic development and the security of peoples and States.

Sturman & Hayatou (in Engel & Porto, 2010: 146) “consider that the PSC has been central to the reforms of the OAU into the AU, changing both procedures and norms. The PSC can recommend interventions with or without the consent of the member
state in which conflict takes place and approve the modalities for such interventions. Furthermore, it may recommend sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government”.

Article 11 of the PSC Protocol introduces the Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise “shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent”. They shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States, and be representative of the various regions. The Panel shall advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues related to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (Juma, 2006: 72).

Article 12 of the PSC protocol introduces the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) that shall facilitate “the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”.

Article 13 of the PSC protocol introduces the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF will enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act. The ASF shall be composed of multidisciplinary standby contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin, and would be ready for rapid deployment (Juma, 2006: 73).

The adoption of the CADSP is premised on a common African perception of what is required to be done collectively by African States to ensure that Africa’s common defence and security interests and goals are safeguarded in the face of common threats to the continent as a whole (Juma, 2006: 84).

As noticed earlier it includes conceptualizations for the terms defence and security. According to the policy defence shall “encompass both the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use... as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of peoples political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life” (Juma, 2006: 85).

Similarly, security encompasses “both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military from external threats... as well as
the non-military notion that is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict (Juma, 2006: 85).

Another significant institution, which has evolved with the AU, is President Thabo Mbeki’s brainchild, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. NEPAD was adopted in October 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria, and the framework document points to security, democracy and good political, economic and corporate governance as the conditions for sustainable development (Juma, 2006: 56).

As a socioeconomic programme of the AU, NEPAD’s primary objective is to eradicate poverty in Africa through the establishment of stable peace and security conditions, and promote sustainable economic growth and development, which will enhance Africa’s participation in global political and economic affairs (AU, 2004a).

NEPAD is designed to address the current challenges facing the African continent. Programmes, which have been developed, include the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, which aims to assist the launching of a “green revolution” in Africa, based on a belief in the key role of agriculture in development; and the NEPAD Science and Technology programme, which includes an emphasis on research in areas such as water science and energy. Other programmes include the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund by the Public Investment Corporation of South Africa, which finances high priority cross-border infrastructure projects and capacity building for continental institutions that works with the African Capacity Building Foundation, the Southern Africa Trust, UNECA, the African Development Bank, and other development partners (NEPAD, 2011).

In 2003, NEPAD launched the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to monitor and assess compliance of African governments with the norms of governance and human rights articulated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The intention of the APRM is to promote peace and security through mutual trust. African leaders and governments are also held accountable through governance, which promotes transparency and good governance as ingredients of peace and stability, according to the objectives of the CADSP (Thobane, 2007: 51).

The final category under process is social learning. “Social learning plays a critical role in the emergence of security communities, and is facilitated by transactions that
typically occur in organizational settings” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 44). The AU, through its numerous organs, summits, and regional arrangements are able to facilitate social exchanges through which people communicate to each other their perceptions of reality and self-understanding. As a result the understanding and perceptions can be altered, and collective shared normative values are formed which inevitably leads to collective identity formation (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 44).

The institutions of the AU also disseminate information e.g. Norms and values to the various regions and countries on the continent which in turn can choose to accept and adopt these norms. This aids in the transmission of a shared understanding from generation to generation. Most notably the AU’s stand on good governance based on democratic principles and the legal transition of power, which is guarded by the AU’s right to intervene under Article 4 (h).

The AU is able to connect this learning to a functional process that promises a general improvement on the current conditions in Africa. Crucially regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria support this process, by adopting the norms and practices of the AU, and promoting it across the continent. This commitment of regional powers, whom themselves have adopted and practise these norms and values in their countries, legitimises the process and its meaning resulting in the attraction of smaller States which aspire to uphold similar norms and values.

“In general, social learning explains why transactions and institutional actions can encourage the development of mutual trust and collective identity. By promoting the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action, and regional boundaries, social learning encourages political actors to see others as trustworthy. And it also leads to people to identify with those who were once on the other side of cognitive ideas” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45).

3.5 The AU: Tier Three

Franke (2008: 322) argues, “it appears (from the above) that the evolutionary pattern of inter-African cooperation indeed corresponds to the approximate growth path of a security community as outlined by Adler & Barnett”. The foundations for an African security community were laid when the “trigger mechanism” induced closer cooperation (tier one)... shared meanings and understandings continued to evolve
over the following decade, and these foundations were strengthened and cooperation deepened (tier two). What remains is the verification of the actual emergence of a security community in Africa (tier three).

Adler and Barnett define the ‘mature’ phase as one where regional actors “share an identity” and a belief that peaceful change is inevitable, consequently paving the way for the existence of a security community which is typified in two versions: loosely coupled and tightly coupled security communities. The loosely coupled security community (as discussed in this study) is characterised by mutual respect and acknowledgement by the states that they lead the same way of life (Ngoma, 2005: 49).

The states are seen as having “an informal governance system” which is premised on “shared meanings and collective identity” regardless of having interests which are at odds with one another (Ngoma, 2005: 50). The AU and its organs in Africa provide the framework for such “an informal governance system”. Evidence of the emergence of a security community can be found in various indicators that reflect this high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and the differentiation between those within from those outside the security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55).

The mature phase is divided into two categories: collective identity and mutual trust.

3.5.1. Collective Identity

A collective identity for the African continent is not a novel idea. Kwame Nkrumah in as early as 1963 called for a collective identity through the development of a “United States of Africa” with a singular Union Government. But, for Africa it was only with the pressures of the post-Cold War environment combined with a new found support of Pan-Africanist ideology which promoted the emergence of a shared developmentalist project and a common (security) culture (Franke, 2008: 323).

The AU and its organs embody this project, which was formed in 2002. As Desmond Orjiako and Mathews (2008: 33) describes the AU is “a political, economic and social project aimed at creating a democratic space across Africa, promoting economic
development, and for reflecting a common African identity. It seeks to promote a more integrated and cooperative continent”.

This African identity formation process is enshrined in the articles of AU’s Constitutive Act, the NEPAD Framework, the AU PSC, and the CADSP. These articles facilitate this process of identity formation through, for example, the provision of common African position on a range of issues such as debt relief, access to Western markets, and a permanent African seat in the UN security council.

Most notably, in the Accra declaration, “the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, meeting at our 9th Ordinary Session in Accra, Ghana, from 1 to 3 July 2007 agree to accelerate the economic and political integration of the African continent, including the formation of a Union Government for Africa with the ultimate objective of creating the United States of Africa” (AU, 2007b).

To this extent the AU is “to rationalize and strengthen the Regional Economic Communities, and harmonize their activities, in conformity with our earlier decision, so as to lead to the creation of an African Common Market, through the stages set in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), with a reviewed and shorter timeframe to be agreed upon in order to accelerate the economic and, where possible, political integration” (AU, 2007b).

Even though there obviously remain substantial differences in political and economic values among the continent’s states, the resultant increase in transnational exchanges, policy coordination, and common institutions helped to reinforce a shared identity, form compatible core values, and deduce collective purposes (Franke, 2008: 323).

In order to encourage an increasing conformity in political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes and standards (which forms part of the identity formation process) Africa’s states have, as discussed, also agreed on the establishment of the APRM, as part of NEPAD (Franke, 2008: 324).

Arguably, the most explicit example of an African identity is the number of joint AU peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union. Regardless of the success or failure of these missions, their part and importance in this process need to be mentioned. The missions include the AU mission in Burundi
(AMIB) in 2003 which was the “first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members” (Franke, 2009: 115). The “AU’s heads of state and government was enthusiastic about the revival of continental cooperation and eager to put an end to the long running crisis” (Franke, 2009: 116). This mission consisted of 3 335 personnel with military contingents from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228), as well as an observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (Franke, 2009: 117).

Another mission is the AMIS in 2004, which by 2005 consisted of 6 170 military personnel and 1 560 civilian police members from Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya and Gambia, with smaller contribution from several other African nations (Moller, 2009: 14). The AU also conducted three peace support missions (AMISEC, MAES, and Operation Democracy) in the Comoros from the 2006 to 2008. Again, these missions involved several thousands of AU military and civilian personnel supplied by several AU member states (Franke, 2009: 123-127).

The AMISOM, which was officially launched in 2007, is the only AU mission that is still ongoing (In 2008 the AMIS was replaced by a hybrid AU-UN mission, UNAMID). By December 2007, AMISOM’s numbers had reached 3 400 personnel with the majority of contributions made by Uganda, and a minor contribution from Burundi (Franke, 2009: 127-130).

3.5.2 Mutual Trust

International Relations theorists regard the formation of international organisations and structures for monitoring states as premised on the generalisation that “anarchy makes trust highly elusive if not impossible”. They contend that the security community thesis, implying the “existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change”, is a negation of the dominant international relations dogma and a calculated undertaking that “states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the other” (Ngoma, 2005: 59).

However, Adler and Barnett regard trust as “believing despite uncertainty” and argue that there is a close relationship between trust and collective identity in that “there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification” (Ngoma, 2005: 59).
They introduce NATO as an example. Other nuclear powers do not feel threatened by each other’s nuclear weapons, even when France withdrew from the NATO integrated command and insisted on maintaining an independent nuclear force. Other NATO allies did not view this as a military threat against physical survival, yet they are threatened when states such as Iran and Iraq possess nuclear capabilities (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46).

Again, the AU can be viewed as the principal promoter of trust through the articles of the Constitutive Act, the PSC, and CADSP. This is evident in the Constitutive Act of the African Union Article 3 (a) achieve greater unity and solidarity..., (c) accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent, (j) ...integration of African economies, and (k) promote co-operation in all fields (Juma, 2006, 49).

The PSC is a relatively new international institution with a remit dedicated to promoting peace, security and stability on the African continent. It is “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts that should be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. The PSC has fifteen members elected by the AU Executive Council that the entire Union trusts for decision-making. Also in contrast to the UNSC the PSC members are elected according to the principle of “equitable regional representation and rotation” with no permanent members. All members have equal rights, there is no veto power, and the preferred method of decision-making is by consensus. By March 2009, the PSC had held over 180 meetings, issued over 100 communiqué’s, imposed sanctions against regimes in several African states (including Togo, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar), and authorised peace operations in Sudan, the Comoros (three times) and Somalia (Williams, 2009: 603-609).

The CADSP is a common understanding between African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges. Its underlying notions are a common understanding of the concepts of defence, security and common threats. Touray (2005: 643) explains, “the objectives of the CADSP are essential to respond to both internal and external threats effectively. In particular, they are to enhance defence cooperation between and among African states, eliminate suspicion and rivalry between them, enhance
the collective defence and strategic ability as well as military preparedness of member states of the Union..., and encourage the conclusion and ratification of nonaggression pacts between and among AU member states”.

Further, the level of mutual trust that exists amongst AU members is evident in the CEWS, the ASF and the various joint military exercises that have been held. These are all instances where military strategic and confidential information are shared amongst member states, which can be considered sensitive to national security.

The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled based on open source information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis for PSC decisions, particularly for the possible deployment of the ASF. It consists of two components: (1) an observation and monitoring Centre (The Situation Room) at the AU headquarters; and (2) parallel observation and monitoring units at the sub-regional level, which are supposed to link up to the Situation Room (Wulf & Debiel, 2009: 14). Franke (2009: 206) note, “in general, it seems fair to say that the operationalization of the CEWS and its regional component mechanisms is a promising sign of intensifying inter-African cooperation”.

The AU established the ASF to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (Cilliers & Pottgieter, 2010: 111). Conceptually, the ASF is based on three levels, the continental level (AU), the regional level (REC’s), and the national level (member states) (Franke, 2009: 158).

Franke (2009: 176-177) argues that “the establishment of the regional brigades and their continental coordination mechanism necessitates an extraordinary high level of interstate cooperation”... and “in order to ensure that the various national contingents follow standardized operating procedures, states not only have to raise the level of interaction between their military decision-makers and institutionalize some sort of working relationship, but also collaborate in extremely sensitive areas such as Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence and Surveillance systems”. This symbiotic relationship reduces the risk of competition between the continental, regional, and national levels of inter-African security cooperation.
3.6 Conclusion

This chapter utilized the framework for the analysis of the development of security communities to evaluate the contribution of the AU to the development of an African security community. From the discussion in this chapter it becomes apparent that the AU, despite heavy critique and pessimism, has indeed made significant contributions.

The precipitating conditions for the development of an African security community can be explained as: the failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, the end of the Cold War and the new arrangement of the post-Cold War international system, a general disinterest from the West in the post-Cold War period with regards to African security affairs, the political and economic benefits of “acting” as one, and the realization by African leaders that in the future “African problems” will have to be met with “African solutions”. It can be argued that the AU was a direct consequence of the precipitating conditions, and an expression of the intent and purpose of the African leaders.

The AU’s role becomes especially significant in tier two. It facilitated both the categories of the ascendant phase: structure and process. The regional hegemons South Africa and Nigeria, as well as potential hegemon Libya, was able to deliver their grandeur visions for Africa through the AU. It also served as a site where knowledge could be disseminated and in itself as a norm entrepreneur. In the process category it facilitated, and even accelerated transactions between states; acted as an organization and introduced new organizations and institutions; and again served as a site for social learning among the various member states.

Finally, the dynamic and positive relationships among the variables are the wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity. This African identity formation process is enshrined in the articles of AU’s Constitutive Act, the NEPAD Framework, the AU PSC, and the CADSP. It can be argued that these articles facilitate this process of identity formation. In addition, the Accra declaration is significant evidence of the continued pursuit of a singular African identity, and the most explicit example of the existence of an African identity is the number of joint AU peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union.
These peacekeeping missions, which involve intensive military cooperation and the sharing of sensitive information, are also evidence of the level of mutual trust that exists among the member states of the AU. Again, this points to the AU as a principal promoter of trust. The promotion of trust by the AU is also evident in the articles of the Constitutive Act, the PSC and CADSP. For example, the CADSP is a common understanding between African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges and includes a common understanding of the concepts of defence, security and common threats. Another example is the ASF, which because of its composition necessitates an extraordinary high level of interstate cooperation, and collaboration in extremely sensitive areas such as Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance systems.

In chapter 4, “theory will be put into practise” by introducing three case studies from Africa in which the contributions of the AU towards the development of an African security community is illustrated.
Chapter 4

The AU: Theory into Practise

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will extend the discussion of this research project beyond the theory by introducing and evaluating three case studies in which the AU has thus far been involved. An appraisal of key AU decisions and documents, as was done in previous chapters, is not a sufficient assessment of the contribution of the AU to continental security, and therefore these case studies aim to provide examples and illustrate the AU's involvement.

The first case study is the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB was the AU's first deployment of military forces after its inception in 2002. At this point, the AU was eager to get involved, but inexperienced, and this led to several mistakes. However, many regard the AMIB as a success. The second case study is the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS followed shortly upon the completion of AMIB, and the AU was as before eager to prove its willingness to get involved. However, not learning from AMIB several key “beginners” mistakes were repeated, especially in mission planning, which meant that the mission could never properly get off the ground. AMIS was heavily criticised for its performance, and was eventually replaced by an AU/UN hybrid mission UNAMID. The third case study is the recent post-election political crisis Côte d'Ivoire. President Gbagbo refused to transfer the presidency to president-elect Mr. Ouattara after losing a second round run-off election on 28 November 2010. This led to swift condemnation from ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and other international actors. After several mediation attempts by African heads of state and a threat of military intervention from Nigeria under the banner of ECOWAS failed, Gbagbo was arrested and removed from power by a French and UN military intervention.

Each case study will provide a short historical background of the circumstances, the actions taken by the AU in response to the circumstances, the results from the AU’s intervention and involvement, and the contribution made by the AU concerning greater continental security. The chapter will close with Table 1, which provides a
summation of the contribution of the AU to the development of an African Security Community.

4.2 The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

Burundi has since independence, experienced repeated clashes between Hutu and Tutsi groups. Despite the fact that the country is made up of an 85 percent Hutu majority, the Tutsi minority of around 15 percent has enjoyed disproportionate levels of power since the country’s independence in 1962 (Svensson, 2008: 8). For example, the government and Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) were Tutsi dominated. The uneven power distribution, often exploited by the Tutsi leadership, has been responsible for a series of Hutu uprisings (Rodt, 2011: 6).

When a multiparty system was introduced in 1992, some attempts were made to run the country democratically. However, the assassination of the first democratically elected president, the Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, led to renewed violence. After Melchior’s successor, Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana were killed when their plane was shot down over Kigali, the Great Lakes region were thrown into turmoil. In Burundi an estimated 300 000 people, most of them civilian, were killed. Across the border, an estimated 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in the Rwandan genocide (Svensson, 2008: 8-9).

Regional efforts to restore peace in Burundi began when former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere convened meetings between the Hutu FRODEBU and Tutsi UPRONA in 1996. As these initial efforts failed, Nyerere proposed a summit in Arusha for the regional Heads of State to discuss the situation in Burundi. Tanzania and Uganda sought to persuade Burundi to accept a regional peacekeeping force, but the Burundi army resisted (Rodt, 2011: 7).

After attempts to reach an internal settlement failed, Burundi agreed to join a second round of talks in Arusha. The Presidents of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania all took part in these negotiations. When Nyerere died in 1999, former South African President Nelson Mandela took over as chief negotiator. This marked the beginning of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process (Rodt, 2011: 8)
The Arusha Agreement made provision for an international peacekeeping force in Burundi. The October 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) stressed that the truce should be verified and controlled by a peacekeeping mission, either mandated by the UN or undertaken by the AU. The ceasefire agreement signed in December 2002 confirmed that the AU should conduct such an operation (Rodt, 2011: 9).

The 2003 AU peace operation in Burundi, also known as AMIB, was the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members. It represented a milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peace building (Murithi, 2008: 75).

4.2.1 Reaction by the AU

The AMIB was the AU’s first deployment of military forces. The Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, approved the mission in 2003. AMIB was mandated for one year and deployed from April 2003 to May 2004. It was an integrated mission comprising military contingents from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa as well as observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (Rodt, 2011: 9).

South Africa was the lead nation, deployed first. This was achieved quickly since the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was already in Burundi (Svensson, 2008: 13). Mozambique initially committed one company of 228 persons to the mission. Ethiopia promised to provide one battalion and two additional companies, 858 persons in total. South Africa agreed to send one battalion, two additional companies and other elements, a total of 1 600 soldiers. Once fully deployed, the mission numbered 3 335 people (Rodt, 2011: 9).

South Africa appointed Force Commander Major General Binda and Ethiopia assigned Deputy Force Commander Brigadier General Azele. Head of Mission Ambassador Mamadou Bah was also the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (Rodt, 2011: 9).

The mandate clearly articulated the desired end-state of the mission: AMIB will have fulfilled its mandate after it has facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire
agreements, and the defence and security situation in Burundi is stable and well managed by newly created national defence and security structures.

AMIB’s four main objectives were to: (a) supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; (b) to support disarmament and demobilization initiatives and advise on the reintegration of combatants; (c) to create favourable conditions for the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and (d) to contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi (Svensson, 2008: 11).

4.2.2 Impact of the AU Intervention

AMIB has been described as “one of the AU’s biggest success stories” (Boshoff, Vreÿ and Rautenbach, 2010: 69) and a number of senior military personnel, observers and analysts share this perception (Rodt, 2011: 11). AMIB had the task of establishing conditions that would allow a UN peace operation to enter the country. (The UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict.) AMIB’s crucial role in this case was to create conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in the country (Murithi, 2008: 75).

By the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside Bujumbura where armed resistance, in the form of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), remained a problem. In the absence of the AU Mission Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict (Murithi, 2008: 75).

AMIB managed to stabilize Burundi to such an extent that the UN thought it possible to take over AMIB’s responsibilities one year on. The fact that the UN was reluctant to deploy a peacekeeping mission in the first place illustrates the precarious security situation in Burundi at the time of the AU deployment. The peace process and ceasefire agreements were fragile and not all parties to the conflict had consented to the presence of peacekeepers. There was a real chance that the country could return to full-scale violent conflict. Nonetheless, the AU intervened and AMIB successfully managed the violent aspect of the conflict (Rodt, 2011: 11-12).

On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi. On 1 June 2004 Kofi Annan, then UN secretary-
general, appointed a special representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head the mission. The former AMIB troops were incorporated into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB) (Murithi, 2008: 76).

4.2.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security

The interest of this research project is in the contribution of the AU towards the development of a security community and therefore the evidence from this case study should support this. The evaluation can conclude that the AU did contribute to the processes in Tier Two or the Ascendant phase. The phase is defined by: increasingly dense networks; organizations that reflect greater military coordination and cooperation; cognitive structures that promote “seeing” and acting together, therefore the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 53). The evidence also supports contributions of the AU to Tier Three or the mature phase. These include the institutionalization of expectations in both domestic and supranational settings, and a shared identity amongst members e.g. acting under the banner of the AU.

AMIB achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent conflict and secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, the UN deployment and future political progress and economic development in Burundi (Rodt, 2011: 14). Agoagye estimates that around 95% of Burundi was relatively stable when AMIB ended its mission (in Svensson, 2008: 15).

AMIB, the AU’s first military deployment since its inception in 2002, points to the commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems facing the continent. This task was undertaken even though the AU as a new continental organization had no previous experience. “AMIB is a sign of ambition from the AU members to deploy a mission when the UN is not able to, or does not want to become involved, in this case because there was no comprehensive peace agreement signed” (Svensson, 2008: 15).

The mandate of the mission was not backed by the use of force, but instead the rules of engagement were based on self-defence and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. This emphasizes the AU’s commitment to find
peaceful solutions to African problems. “It constituted a clear mandate in accordance with UN principles and standards, international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough mandate for the AU troops to complete their mission to the extent that its resources allowed” (Rodt, 2011: 17).

It also showed a commitment from various African states to become involved and assist. These include the troop contributing countries: South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique; and observer contributions from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. South Africa willingly assumed the responsibility of lead nation and contributed the necessary resources “to get the job done”. “It prepared for the AU mission, diplomatically and militarily. It provided essential resources such as funding, troops, equipment and logistics and made arrangements for procurement, maintenance, training and service of equipment” (Svensson, 2008: 17).

The AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with the UN mission ONUB in 2004. The former AU troops were rehatted and initially were the only UN peacekeepers when the UN force generation process was delayed.

4.3 The AU in Sudan (AMIS)

“For many, this operation represented the biggest test case of the AU’s new peacekeeping ambitions, not only because of its sheer size but also because of the complexities of the conflict it was meant to solve” (Franke, 2009: 118). The root causes of the conflict extends back to the 17th century when Arab incursions led to the establishment of a sultanate amongst the indigenous Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people of the region, and therefore defies easy analysis (Murithi, 2008: 76).

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has seen more war than peace. Civil war raged from 1955 to 1972, and again from 1983 to 2005. These wars are generally described as a struggle over resources and power between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). They are also characterised as being waged by a predominantly Arab and Muslim North and a largely African and Christian South (Ekengard, 2006: 11).

The most recent episode of the conflict began in February 2003, with the social and economic marginalisation of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum, which laid the foundations for rebellion (Murithi, 2008: 76). The main infrastructure for armed
resistance was tribal, but the largest segments Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit rarely
coordinated. Rivalry between the two Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) leaders, Abdel
Wahid al Nur and Minni Minawi became intense and bitter, and differences between
these two and the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khalil
Ibrahim, were significant. These divergences prevented the Darfur resistance from
forming a united political front (De Waal, 2005: 1040) The government retaliated
with a combination of its own military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today
known as the infamous Janjaweed (Murithi, 2008: 76).

The Janjaweed is from a segment of Darfur’s camel-herding Arab tribes, and Arab
immigrants from Chad, who had their own territorial ambitions in Darfur. The Sudan
government made a deal with the Arab groups whereby they were allowed to pursue
their own agenda with impunity, in return for suppressing the rebellion. Other
Darfurian Arabs initially remained outside the conflict, though some joined the
counterinsurgency in 2003 and others were drawn in the following year as the rebels
took the war to the east and south of Darfur (De Waal, 2005: 1040).

By early 2004, the escalating violence had already left tens of thousands dead and
millions displaced from their homes. As the government of Sudan (GoS) under Omar
al-Bashir at the time did not consent to a UN peace operation on its territory, it was
left to African actors to play the leading role. Just as the mission in Burundi was
winding down, the AU began to face the possibility of having to launch another
operation. This became a reality when the GoS, the SLM/A and the JEM signed the
so-called N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 8 April 2004;
and the subsequent Addis Ababa Ceasefire Agreement (signed on 28 May 2004)
called on the AU to monitor its implementation (Franke, 2009: 119).

4.3.1 Reaction by the AU

The Inter-Sudanese talks on Darfur, as the continued negotiations were officially
called, were initiated in late March 2004. After initial GoS obstruction, the personal
involvement of AU chairperson Alpha Konaré facilitated the HCFA.

The parties agreed to (a) cease hostilities; (b) establish a Joint Commission (JC) and
a Ceasefire Commission (CFC), which would be responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the HCFA; (c) release prisoners of war; (d) facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance; and (e) create a team of military observers, with an attached protection force, to monitor the ceasefire. This force was named the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Ekengard, 2006:14).

Following the signing of the HCFA in April, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the African Union authorized the deployment of AMIS (Ekengard, 2006: 17). Early in June, the AU deployed (later known as AMIS I) 80 observers and a small protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops to monitor, verify, investigate and report transgressions of the ceasefire agreement. The latter broke down as soon as the AU observers had arrived (Franke, 2009: 119). A major cause of the problems, which AMIS faced during its initial deployment, was deficient planning. This point is repeatedly mentioned by analysts as a major shortcoming of AMIS I. During a 2007 evaluation seminar, a former AMIS official said “AMIS was never planned: it just happened” (Ekengard, 2006: 18).

The AU realized early on that AMIS did not have the resources to fulfil its tasks. A concrete suggestion for improvement was delivered in the report of the CFC Chairman to the PSC on 20 October 2004. This suggestion was to guide the composition of an expanded operation, known as AMIS II (Ekengard, 2006: 19). The PSC finally agreed to increase the number of AMIS personnel to 3 320 including a civilian police component of 815. Even though the AMIS II deployment was larger, it continued to face many obstacles and failed to enact any effective change as the situation in Darfur continued to worsen. The logistical position improved somewhat in January 2005 when the AU established the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), and received logistical support from the US firm Pacific Architectural Engineers (Franke, 2009: 119).

Based on the recommendation of an AU led assessment mission, the PSC authorized a further increase in the strength of AMIS to 6 170 military personnel and 1 560 civilian personnel in April 2005. Known as AMIS IIE, the enhanced force was to “encourage improved compliance with the HCFA and create a secure environment for the IDP’s in and around the camps as well as for humanitarian relief services”. However, as with AMIS II an increase in the number of troops on the ground failed to translate into an improvement in the conditions on the ground. By January 2006, a report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission had to conclude that there had
been an escalation in the number of ceasefire violations since August 2005 and that
the security situation had further deteriorated with attacks on AMIS becoming more
frequent (Franke, 2009: 120). In total 59 soldiers died while serving in the AMIS
(Ekengard, 2006: 24).

The same report also asked the members of the PSC to consider possible
alternatives to AMIS IIE given the increasing difficulties in securing sufficient funding
for the operation. Realizing the dire situation of AMIS, the PSC used its 45th
meeting on 12 January 2006 to express its support for a transition from AMIS to a UN
operation (Franke, 2009: 120).

4.3.2 Impact of the AU Intervention

After three and a half years in the Darfur region, there was still no viable peace to be
found. It is evident that the combined efforts to create peace have failed and the
efforts of AMIS have not been sufficient, and unlike AMIB did not achieve any
considerable success. Franke (2009: 121) notes that the “critics are right that the
troops on the ground cannot be blamed for these failures. Rather, the problems were
caused by a combination of structural conditions like a severe lack of financial,
military, and institutional resources and a dangerous defiance of well-established
peacekeeping principles like the need for diligent planning, a workable political
settlement, and a clear mandate”.

Beginning with planning the ad hoc nature of AMIS and its rapid evolution from a
simple observer mission to a full-blown peacekeeping operation led to what
peacekeeping professionals were quick to label as “beginner’s mistakes”. Every
single phase of AMIS (I, II & IIE) was put together in a rush and as a result there was
little time for proper planning “AMIS was never planned, it just happened”. Together
with a notable absence of strategic guidance, this lack of planning caused
widespread problems ranging from the implementation of inefficient structures to the
absence of a clear division of labour between mission components. While the quality
of planning did improve somewhat with the creation of the DITF and the addition of
international experts, AMIS was never able to shed its quintessentially reactive
character and assume initiative (Franke: 2009: 121).
As AMIS was not based on a viable political settlement, the AU forced its troops to engage in “wider peacekeeping tasks” in the midst of a live war-zone. As noted by Williams (in Ekengard, 2006: 30), “there was no room in the mandate for AMIS to take on the underlying political causes of the conflict in Darfur, the marginalization of Darfur as a region or the politically induced ethnic tensions”. Literally caught in the crossfire of constantly shifting factions, AMIS soon began to suffer its first casualties as it was increasingly seen (and treated) as just another participant in the war rather than as the neutral facilitator of peace it should have been according to standard peacekeeping doctrine (Franke, 2009: 122).

The insufficiency of the mandate given to AMIS is one of the most frequent criticisms raised against the mission. As the legal basis for military actions, the mandate is a natural benchmark against which to judge a peace operation. In the brief period from the deployment of AMIS I until the reinforcements authorized as AMIS II started arriving, there seems to have existed two main problems with the mandate. First, while the mission was to monitor a ceasefire, the parties did not respect the ceasefire, and therefore no ceasefire existed to monitor. Second, the resources available to AMIS were far from enough to fulfil the very limited mandate entrusted to the mission (Ekengard, 2006: 25).

With the introduction of AMIS II, the PSC also introduced a new mandate. Whereas AMIS I had a straightforward mandate, the AMIS II mandate was a lengthy list filled with reservations (Ekengard, 2006: 26). The constantly changing nature and imprecise formulation of its mandates led to substantial confusion within AMIS. So dismal was the situation that after another expansion of the AMIS mandate that even the AU Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, had to admit that the new AMIS mandate “was not clearly understood by commanders at all levels” (Franke, 2009: 122).

Like AMIB before it, AMIS was under funded from the very start. The shortfalls in funding went hand in hand with a lack of critical force enablers such as vehicles, strategic transportation and communication equipment. Given the sheer size of Darfur and the absence of a road network and other infrastructure, the lack of sufficient air assets proved particularly detrimental to the missions overall effectiveness. Overall, the AU was unable to secure the type of long-term funding that would have allowed it to address these critical shortfalls, leaving Chairman

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Konaré to conclude, “the AMIS experience has demonstrated the difficulty to mount large peace support operations for a long period of time without reliable sources of funding (Franke, 2009: 123).

Franke (2009: 123) concludes that, concerning results, that “during its three and a half years in the field, AMIS demonstrated the growing willingness of the AU to get involved in the continent’s conflicts; however, it proved unable to bring peace to Darfur”.

4.3.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security

The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. “A member state was actively directing murder and displacement against parts of its own population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation against the will of the state in question. At that time, the AU was still in the process of designing its fundamental architecture for conflict management. When evaluating AMIS, this perspective should be kept in mind” (Ekengard, 2006: 47).

The concern of this research project is with the contribution of the AU towards a security community and therefore the evidence from this case study should support this. The evaluation of this case can conclude that the AU did indeed contribute at both the ascendant and the mature phase.

Even though the AMIB had just been completed, the AU again did not refrain from getting involved in yet another African conflict. The chairperson of the AU Alpha Konaré facilitated the ceasefire agreement personally, “Alpha Konaré blazed the diplomatic trail to Darfur” (Adebajo, 2008: 136), and the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the AU was quick to authorize the deployment of AMIS. The AU commission “made the crisis in Darfur a central priority, as it poses the first major challenge to the recently established PSC”, and Konaré commented that “the AU is duty bound to play a leading role in resolving [the] crisis” (Powell, 2005: 42).

Similar to the AMIB several African states were willing and in the position (Powell, 2005: 44) to become involved with major contributions from: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya; and other contributions from: Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Zambia, Lesotho, Uganda, Madagascar, Burundi, Cameroon, Mauritius. Even with the transition from AU (AMIS) to a hybrid
AU/UN (UNAMID) mission the majority of troops (89%), civilian police (66%), and military observers (82%) were comprised of African personnel (Moller, 2009: 14). Even though “the PSC might have been grateful to hand over some of the logistical and financial burden of the mission to the UN, the African Member States are expected to retain a degree of political leadership over the current mission” (Sturman & Hayatou, 2010: 70).

A significant contribution of the AU in the AMIS case is its reason for intervening. As suggested by Ekengard (2006) “the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation in Sudan” as it believed the GoS were committing acts of genocide.

By admitting the existence of these acts, the AU would be obligated to intervene under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act which gives “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Juma, 2006: 50). Article 4 (h) is one of the major norm shifts the AU has introduced and promoted since its inception in 2002.

However, the AU failed to acknowledge acts of genocide or grave circumstances in Darfur (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 84), or in other regions of Sudan. Instead, it noted that “even though the humanitarian situation in Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined as genocide” ..., but it did reiterate “its serious concern over the prevailing situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, particularly the humanitarian crisis and the continued reports of human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians committed by the Janjaweed” (AU, 2004b).

Even though the situation did not, according to the AU, warrant intervention under Article 4 (h) the AU continued to seek a resolution and to this extent authorized AMIS, which would later become AMIS II, AMIS IIE and eventually UNAMID. This illustrates the AU’s continued support to uphold peace and stability, and even authorised an intervention in the affairs of a Member State to broker peace and provide humanitarian assistance. “This sense of responsibility and activism on the part of the AU represents a clear shift from the OAU’s de facto policy of “non-intervention” to the AU’s commitment to “non-indifference” (Powell, 2005: 42).
Although this was the second peace operation to be undertaken by the AU, it seems few lessons were learned from peacekeeping experiences in Burundi. It is unfortunate that the AU did not learn from AMIB on how to deploy faster and more effectively, acquire adequate funding, better coordination between units and between the military and political units of the mission, better coordination from the AU headquarters, better information sharing and better civil-military relations” (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 87).

4.4 The AU in Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, ruled from independence in 1960 until his death in 1993. Henri Konan Bédié, assumed power and won a fraudulent election in 1995. General Robert Guéï seized power in 1999 and declared himself the winner of an October 2000 presidential election after initial results showed that he was losing to opposition politician Laurent Gbagbo. A popular uprising soon toppled Guéï, and Gbagbo, who was eventually declared the winner, refused to call new polls. The post-election violence cost hundreds of civilian lives and deepened the divisions between north and south as well as between Muslims and Christians (Freedom House, 2011).

Civil war erupted in September 2002 when around 700 soldiers mounted a coup attempt, and government forces killed Guéï under unclear circumstances on the first day of fighting. Rebel forces quickly took control of the north and called for Gbagbo to step down. Other rebels in the west echoed this call. By December 2002, the rebel factions had united to form the New Forces (FN), led by Guillaume Soro (Freedom House, 2011).

Gbagbo’s government and the FN signed a French-brokered ceasefire in 2003, but it soon broke down. In 2004, following the deaths of nine French peacekeepers in a government bombing campaign against the FN, France destroyed the Ivorian air force, and with the backing of the AU, persuaded the UNSC to impose a strict arms embargo on the country. In April 2005, South African president Thabo Mbeki brokered a new peace accord that set general elections for the end of that year. Because the requisite disarmament and poll preparations were not completed in time, the AU postponed the elections, extended Gbagbo’s term, and appointed an interim prime minister, economist Charles Konan Banny (Freedom House, 2011).
Similar delays prevented elections from taking place in 2006. With the expiration of Gbagbo’s extended mandate in October, the UNSC passed a resolution transferring all political and military power to the prime minister until the next elections. Gbagbo refused to accept the move and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops (Freedom House, 2011).

In March 2007, Gbagbo and Soro met in Burkina Faso and signed an entirely new peace deal, the Ouagadougou Political Accord (APO), according to which Soro was appointed interim prime minister until elections could be held. Gbagbo soon visited the north for the first time since 2002, and the “confidence zone” separating the two parts of the country was officially dismantled (Freedom House, 2011).

Despite the more peaceful climate, the elections envisioned in the APO were postponed five times over the next three years. In February 2010, Gbagbo unilaterally suspended voter registration and dissolved the government and the electoral commission, accusing the commission of partisanship. This brought thousands of people, particularly in the north and from Abidjan, to the streets in protest. A new head of the electoral commission and a new cabinet had been appointed by April, and in September the registration process yielded an official voter list of 5.8 million people, including 500 000 new voters (Freedom House, 2011).

The first round of the presidential election, held on 31 October, was deemed relatively free and fair by domestic and international observers. Gbagbo led with 38 percent of the vote, and Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) party placed second with 32 percent. Bédié of the PDCI-RDA, who came in third with 25 percent, threw his support behind Ouattara ahead of the 28 November runoff election (Freedom House, 2011).

The day of the runoff was relatively peaceful, and the UN and EU observers generally approved of the polling, but violence increased considerably during the period before the results were officially announced. On 2 December, the electoral commission, backed by the UN, formally announced that Ouattara had won with 54 percent of the vote (Freedom House, 2011).

The Constitutional Council, which was made up of Gbagbo loyalists, quickly annulled the results from largely pro-Ouattara northern districts, alleging widespread fraud. It
then announced that Gbagbo had won with 51 percent. The government closed the country’s borders and banned all broadcasts of international news, as the international community formed a united front in pressing Gbagbo to concede to Ouattara. By 4 December, both Gbagbo and Ouattara had been sworn in as president in separate, conflicting ceremonies. The standoff remained unresolved at year’s end, with escalating violence between the two sides causing dozens of deaths (Freedom House, 2011).

4.4.1 Reaction by the AU

International responses to the post-election violence in Ivory Coast were very swift and significant. The “unanimity with which president Gbagbo was condemned, isolated, and sanctioned by the international community makes his case very different from recent situations in Africa. The response carried the strong message that instability in Africa and its resultant consequences can no longer be tolerated”. What makes the international pressure especially heavy for Gbagbo is the fact that his own peers in Africa also turned against him (Fowale, 2010).

Africa’s first response to the political crisis was an Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, which was held on 7 December 2010 in Abuja, under the Chairmanship of Dr Goodluck Jonathan, President of Nigeria (ECOWAS, 2010a).

During their deliberations, the Authority reviewed the political and security situation arising from the declaration of the results of the second round of the Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire. They were also briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire. After a thorough review of the situation, the Authority expressed “deep concern over the threats posed to the success of the peace process leading to a lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis” (ECOWAS, 2010a).

Reaffirming their commitment to the relevant provisions and principles of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the Heads of State and Government “condemned in strong terms, the attempt to go against the will of the Ivorian people as freely expressed on 28 November 2010”. In order to protect the legitimacy of the electoral process, the Summit “endorsed the results declared by the
IEC and certified by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Côte d'Ivoire in accordance with Resolution 1765 of the UNSC, dated 16 July 2007”. In this regard, the Heads of State and Government “recognized Mr. Alassane Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire” (ECOWAS, 2010a).

The Summit called on Mr. Laurent Gbagbo to abide by the results of the second round of Presidential elections as certified by UNOCI, and to yield power immediately, in the best interest of the Ivorian People. The Summit decided to apply the provisions of Article 45 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance relating to the imposition of sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire, including the suspension from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies until further notice (ECOWAS, 2010a).

As part of the AU’s initial response, former South African President Thabo Mbeki was requested to intervene. Mbeki arrived in the Ivorian city of Abidjan on 5 December “entrusted by the AU to find a legitimate and peaceful solution to the crisis”. Mbeki held crisis talks with Côte d’Ivoire’s incumbent president Gbagbo and president elect Mr. Ouattara in an attempt to mediate the political crisis. Mbeki commented, "it is important not to have violence, not to return to war, to find a peaceful solution" Mbeki’s mediation attempts received mixed responses, but ultimately failed to find any solution (BBC, 2010).

Mbeki’s mediation attempt was followed by several more attempts under the direction of the AU and was headed on different occasions by different African heads of state. The continued mediation efforts “indicates our [the AU] determination to explore all the options making it possible to resolve in a peaceful and consensual manner the crisis that threatens the survival, even the existence, of Ivory Coast’. The AU explained that this “issue was linked to regional stability and the preservation of the democratic characteristics of our continent” (BBC, 2010). Diplomatic efforts between November 2010 and early March 2011 were not on their own sufficient to persuade Gbagbo to relinquish power, but they undoubtedly diminished his political authority both inside and outside the country (Watt, 2011: 1).

The international community strongly backed the legitimacy of Mr. Ouattara’s victory, with the UN and the EU unconditionally supporting the AU and ECOWAS, and recognizing him as the duly elected leader of Côte d'Ivoire. On 20 December 2010,
the UNSC at its 6458 meeting adopted Resolution 1962 (2010). The resolution condemned “in the strongest possible terms the attempts to usurp the will of the people and undermine the integrity of the electoral process and any progress in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire”. In addition, it welcomed “the decisions of the ECOWAS Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Côte d’Ivoire held in Abuja on 7 December 2010 and the decisions of the 252nd meeting of the AU PSC”. Finally the UNSC urged “all the Ivorian parties and stakeholders to respect the will of the people and the outcome of the election in view of ECOWAS and AU’s recognition of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire” (UN, 2010).

The PSC of the AU, at its 252nd meeting, held on 9 December 2010, endorsed the final communiqué on Côte d’Ivoire of the ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria on 7 December 2010. The AU recognized the results proclaimed by the IEC, as certified by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, pursuant to Resolution 1765 (2007) of the UNSC of 16 July 2007, and Mr. Alassane Ouattara as the President-Elect of Côte d’Ivoire (AU, 2010b).

Also on the basis of relevant AU instruments, the “AU suspended the participation of Côte d’Ivoire in all AU activities, until such a time the democratically-elected President effectively assumes State power”. In addition they “strongly urged Mr. Laurent Gbagbo to respect the results of the election and to facilitate, without delay, the transfer of power to the President-Elect, in the best interest of Côte d’Ivoire, the region and Africa as a whole” (AU, 2010b).

The initial ECOWAS response was followed by a second Extraordinary Session, which was held on Friday, 24 December 2010 in Abuja. At this session the members present “expressed deep concern over the fast deteriorating political and security environment in Côte d’Ivoire characterized by escalating violence, the use of mercenaries to perpetrate atrocities, loss of life, and the heightening of ethnic tensions, as well as the threat of civil war, with its negative consequences on regional peace and security”. They also “expressed deep concern over the unacceptably high number of lives lost since 7 December 2010 and warned all those

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6 In similar cases the AU has condemned unconstitutional changes of government in Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005), and Guinea (2008), and subsequently suspended the countries from its activities (Franke, 2009: 220).
responsible that they will face an international trial for human rights violations at the earliest opportunity” (ECOWAS, 2010b).

The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the travel ban, freeze on financial assets and all other forms of targeted sanctions imposed by regional institutions and the international community on the outgoing President and his associates, and would support any future additional measures that may be taken in this direction (ECOWAS, 2010b).

The ECOWAS authority “also regrets the fact that the message sent by the ECOWAS Chairman on behalf of the Authority on 17 December 2010 has not been heeded by Mr. Gbagbo. In this season of peace, the Summit decided to make an ultimate gesture to Mr. Gbagbo by urging him to make a peaceful exit. In this regard, the Authority decided to dispatch a special high-level delegation to Côte d’Ivoire” (ECOWAS, 2010b).

In the event that Mr. Gbagbo fails to heed this immutable demand of ECOWAS, “the Community would be left with no alternative but to take other measures, including the use of legitimate force, to achieve the goals of the Ivorian people. Against the background of the parlous security situation, the Heads of State and Government instructed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to convene without delay a meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff in order to plan future actions, including the provision of security along the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border, in the event that their message is not heeded” (ECOWAS, 2010b).

In January 2011, Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia stated that, with the support of ECOWAS and the AU, that Nigeria would “request UN backing for military intervention in Ivory Coast to prevent it slipping into a civil war that could destabilise the West African region. Ajumogobia continued, "it is clear that Gbagbo is determined to defy and treat the entire international community with absolute disdain... He cannot, he must not be allowed to prevail..." and "Gbagbo must be made to understand that there is a very real prospect of overwhelming military capability bearing down on him and his cohorts". (allAfrica, 2011).

Ajumogobia said, “force did not necessarily mean an incursion into the former French colony, legitimate force can include, for example, a naval blockade to enforce
sanctions which might be imposed against Gbagbo. We cannot leave Ouattara to enforce the legitimate and internationally recognised mandate given to him by the people of Côte d'Ivoire. That would be to sanction civil war, against the very ethos of the UN. (allAfrica, 2011).

4.4.2 Impact of the AU Intervention

On 11 April 2011, following military operations conducted by forces loyal to President Alassane Ouattara, UNOCI and French Licorne troops, Mr. Gbagbo was arrested and placed in the custody of President Ouattara’s Government (UN, 2011). Gbagbo’s capture spurred a rapid decrease in the scale of combat and associated casualties and human rights abuses, but sporadic fighting continued in subsequent weeks, primarily in a few areas of Abidjan (Cook, 2011: 8).

On 21 April, the PSC of the AU reinstated Côte d’Ivoire’s membership in the organization, which had been suspended due to the Gbagbo government’s failure to heed the internationally recognized electoral outcome or comply with AU decisions regarding efforts to resolve the crisis (Cook, 2011: 5).

On 28 April, in a move aimed at bolstering the stability and the consolidation of peace in Côte d’Ivoire, the UNSC enacted Resolution 1980. The resolution urged that disarmament efforts be prioritised and reaffirmed UNOCI’s role in collecting and interdicting illicit arms, called for regional security coordination efforts, and stressed that it would closely monitor efforts to violate the sanctions it had imposed (Cook, 2011: 5).

On 6 May, Mr. Alassane Ouattara was sworn in as President of Côte d’Ivoire. He took the oath of office at a ceremony at the presidential palace in Abidjan a day after the Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council ratified the results of a presidential election showing that Mr. Ouattara won, reversing its December 2010 decision to reject them (UN, 2011).

“Since taking office, President Ouattara has, on many occasions, reaffirmed his determination to successfully carry out the much needed reconciliation process to consolidate the achievements recorded and enable Côte d’Ivoire to open a new chapter in its history. Noteworthy, is the planned establishment of a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is in line with the proposals of the AU High
Level Panel, as endorsed by the PSC (AU, 2011c). A second major emphasis, he said, would be the collection and destruction of arms, primarily through voluntary relinquishment but under the threat of criminal prosecution or coercive means, if necessary (Cook, 2011: 6).

The AU, in close cooperation with ECOWAS, has continued to support the peace consolidation process in Côte d'Ivoire. “To this end, consultations are underway with ECOWAS to agree on the modalities of a joint action by both organizations in support of the efforts of the Ivorian authorities” (AU, 2011c).

4.4.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security

The interest of this study is in the contribution of the AU towards the development of a security community and therefore the evidence from this case study should support this. The evaluation can conclude that the AU, in this case study, contributed to the promotion of continental security in both the nascent and mature phase.

To this extent, the intervention of ECOWAS was premised on the grounds of the “ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” (ECOWAS, 2010a) which is consistent with Article 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Most notably, Article 3 (g) “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”, and Article 4 (m) “respect of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Juma, 2006: 50).

This again points to the willingness of Member States to become involved, and their commitment to upholding the “new” norms that have been introduced with the transition from the OAU to AU. In this case, the “new” norm would refer to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance that was adopted by the AU in 2007. Article 2 of the Charter stipulates the objectives of the Charter to include 1) Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights; 3) Promote the holding of regular free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of governments; and 4) Prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development (AU, 2007a).
Condemnation of the events in Côte d'Ivoire was not exclusive to ECOWAS, but was swiftly followed by a similar response from the AU (Art. 23 (4) & Art. 25 of the AU's Charter on Democracy, Election, and Governance) which condemned the actions of Gbagbo, and declared Mr. Ouattara as the legitimate leader. The response from both the AU and ECOWAS was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d'Ivoire from both the organizations. Both organizations also imposed sanctions, and supported similar sanctions imposed by the international community.

As Chitiyo (2011) has noted “it is true that ultimately it was the military power of the pro-Ouattara forces, UNOCI and French forces that ousted Mr Gbagbo. However, ECOWAS sanctions had already eroded Mr Gbagbo’s power. Ivory Coast’s use of the CFA franc, which it shares with seven other West African countries, and its participation in the regional central bank, made Mr Gbagbo highly vulnerable when the region handed over control of the Ivorian currency to his rival. It became increasingly difficult for Mr Gbagbo to pay the civil service and his soldiers”.

Nigeria, after the refusal of Gbagbo to acknowledge the request of ECOWAS and the AU, threatened the use of “legitimate” force. This would never have materialised, as the UN already had a presence in Côte d’Ivoire, and not all UNSC members UNSC responded favourably to this request (most notably Russia). Regardless of the outcome of the threat of the use of force, it illustrates Nigeria’s commitment to upholding the norms and principles of both ECOWAS and the AU, especially within its sphere of “authority”.

As noted by Chitiyo (2011) “from the outset, and to their credit, ECOWAS and the AU recognised Mr. Ouattara as the winner of the elections and insisted that Mr Gbagbo step down or face legitimate force”. Importantly, Nigeria never opted to act outside the perimeters of the AU, which might have been the case in the years prior to the AU. Nigeria also first exhausted other solutions in the form of several mediation attempts by different African Heads of State on different occasions, before considering the use of legitimate force.

The hard line position taken by the AU and ECOWAS against the illegal takeover has to be seen to back its pledge to support democratic transitions of power. Ivory Coast is a step change in Africa’s support for electoral democracy and democratic transitions. Over the past decade, the tradition has been for power-sharing
governments to resolve post-electoral disputes, as in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Kenya (Chitiyo, 2011).

Power sharing is an important way of resolving military conflict, but it does not always resolve political conflict. Ivory Coast may mark a shift away from the power-sharing default setting, and back to the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the national leader and forming a government of their choice, either inclusive or single party government. It is too early to pass a definitive judgement, but arguably Africa's commitment to a democratic transition in Ivory Coast means that, for now at least, the continent passed the democracy test in that country (Chitiyo, 2011).

Table 1. Contribution of the AU to the Development of an African Security Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier One</th>
<th>Precipitating Conditions</th>
<th>AMIB, AMIS, and the AU in Côte d'Ivoire</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in technology, demography, economics, the environment</td>
<td>The “development of security communities can be termed as social constructivist. The notion that security communities are socially constructed means that they have a history, and therefore exhibit an evolutionary pattern”. Thus, the case studies could not contribute to the precipitating conditions, as they had to follow it. However, two conditions are relevant to the AU. The failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, and it can be argued that the AU was a direct consequence of the precipitating conditions, and an expression of the intent and purpose of the African leaders.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of new interpretations of social reality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>External threats</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier Two</th>
<th>1. Structure: Power and Knowledge</th>
<th>AMIB</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states</td>
<td>The AU’s first military deployment since its inception in 2002, points to the commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems facing the continent. This includes the institutionalization of expectations in both domestic and supranational settings, a shared identity amongst members e.g. Acting under the banner of the AU, and the extensive and intensive patterns that have developed since the inception of the AU in 2002 e.g. Without these patterns a coordinated effort of this scale</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Changes in the organization and production of security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A core state or coalition remains important for stabilizing and encouraging further development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harder for states and their people to imagine settling differences through violence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alter how they organize their security and define the threat</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AMIB</strong></td>
<td>would have been impossible. The intervention was committed to finding a peaceful solution to the situation in Burundi, as prescribed by Security Community Theory the use of violence is unimaginable. South Africa willingly assumed the responsibility of lead nation and contributed the necessary resources “to get the job done”, which as a core state is important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of a security community.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AMIS</strong></td>
<td>The AU did again not hesitate to get involved and made the situation in Darfur a priority. In addition, the mission was undertaken under the collective identity and decision making of the AU. There was a coordinated effort from several African states, which is evidence of the existence of extensive and intensive patterns between them. The reason for the AU intervention can be traced to Article 4 (h), which even though not proclaimed, did not prevent the organisation to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state. This is evidence that the AU is not only a norm “entrepreneur”, but also a promoter of its newly established norms. In addition the military effort of the AU in Sudan is evidence of a change and the organization of security in Africa under the AU e.g. The PSC and the ASF initiative.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AU in Côte d’Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>The intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the principles of the AU's Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance that promote free and fair elections, and rejects unconstitutional changes of government. This illustrates the AU's commitment to act, in unison and without compromise, on its established norms. Also to promote these norms among member states. In this case, the regional grouping ECOWAS, under the leadership of Nigeria, played a critical role in mediation efforts. Pointing, as prescribed in Security Community Theory, to the role-played by core states to facilitate and promote norms, and thereby legitimizing these norms and attracting other members. The lead role played by Nigeria and the support it received from the AU, points to the intensive networks that exist between the bodies, the changing and organization of security on the continent, and especially the trust that has developed between them e.g. Nigeria and other ECOWAS members, and trust between ECOWAS members and other AU member states. Finally, the involvement of the International Community e.g. France and the UN point to two distinctly different realities. A recognition by the AU that it cannot resolve Africa’s problems on its own and would therefore in future depend on the assistance of the International Community, or the International Community undermining the efforts of the AU to resolve its</td>
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The former could in future play an important role in the development of an African Security Community, whilst the latter could complicate the formation of such a community.

| Tier Three | -Multilateralism  
-Changes in military planning  
-Common definition of the threat  
-Discourse and language of the community |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB, AMIS, and the AU in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>In all three cases all decision making, conflict resolution and conflict mediation were done via the AU (e.g. multilaterally as prescribed by Security Community Theory) and are more consensual than other state relations. In AMIB (91st Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution), AMIS (HCFA &amp; AU PSC 17th Meeting), and Côte d’Ivoire (Extraordinary Session of the ECOWAS &amp; AU PSC 252nd Meeting). “This type of architecture reflects the high degree of trust present in the relationship and that common interests are handled through common and consensual mechanisms”. The evidence from the case studies supports the Tier 3 outcome that none of the military planning includes “worst case” scenarios against any member state. “Even though there might be some concern about the degree of cooperation and contribution to a joint military campaign, those within the community are not counted as potential enemies”. In all the cases, there was a clear and concise recognition of the threat, as well as common agreement on the threat. Finally, “the state’s normative discourse and actions reflect community standards”. The case studies are the AU’s actions, which from the evidence in this study reflect the community standards. Finally, the associated discourse also reflects community standards e.g. Intervention in Burundi for peace building purposes, the condemnation of the situation in Sudan, and the call for Gbagbo to step down and respect the democratic will of the people in Côte d’Ivoire.</td>
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### 4.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to present evidence from case studies in Africa that support the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 2 and 3 of this research project. In chapter two, a detailed presentation was made of Security Community Theory, which included a framework for the analysis of the development of security communities. In chapter three, this framework was utilised to determine where
possible contributions were made by the AU towards the development of a security community in Africa.

This chapter included three African case studies. The first of these is AMIB. AMIB achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent conflict and secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, and the UN deployment. The AMIB points to the commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems facing the continent, especially when the UN is unable to do so. Its mandate was in accordance with UN principles and standards, international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough mandate for the AU troops to complete their mission to the extent that its resources allowed without a resort to unnecessary violence. It also illustrated a commitment from various African states to become involved and assist with South Africa willingly assuming the responsibility of lead nation and contributing the necessary resources “to get the job done”. Finally, the AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with ONUB in 2004.

The second case study is the AMIS. The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. A member state was actively directing murder and displacement against parts of its own population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation against the will of the state in question. Even though the AMIB had just been completed, the AU again did not refrain from getting involved in yet another conflict. The chairperson of the AU “Alpha Konaré blazed the diplomatic trail to Darfur”, and the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the AU was quick to authorize the deployment of AMIS. Similar to the AMIB several African states were willing and in the position to become involved with major and minor contributions from several African states. Even though the situation did not, according to the AU, warrant intervention under Article 4 (h) the AU continued to seek a resolution and to this extent authorized AMIS, which would later become AMIS II, AMIS IIE and eventually UNAMID. This illustrates the AU’s continued support to uphold peace and stability, as it authorized an intervention in the affairs of a Member State to broker peace and provide humanitarian assistance. However, it should be noted that the AMIS achieved limited success. It seems few lessons were
learned from the peacekeeping experiences in Burundi as similar mistakes were made in Darfur (Sudan), and in the end could not find a lasting solution.

The third case study is the AU reaction to the post-election crisis in Côte D’Ivoire. The intervention of the ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the grounds of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This illustrates the commitment to, and respect for, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. In addition, the intervention again points to the willingness of member states to become involved, and their commitment to upholding the “new” norms of the AU. The response from both the AU and ECOWAS was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from both the organisations, which shows that leaders on the continent no longer simply talk, but are willing to “walk the walk”. Nigeria went as far as threatening Gbagbo with the use of “legitimate” force. As noted by Chitiyo (2011) credit should be given to the ECOWAS and AU for their blanket response to the situation, their unwillingness to compromise, and their willingness to resort to “legitimate force” if needed. Most notably Côte d’Ivoire might mark a shift away from the power-sharing default setting, and back to the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the national leader.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Summary

The purpose of this study has been to interrogate the contributions of the AU to the potential development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. To facilitate the study, the following research question was formulated: **How has the AU contributed towards the development of an African security community since its inception in 2002?** The central research question is supported by three sub-questions.

In Chapter 2 the first sub-question: **How can Security Community Theory be utilized to interrogate the contribution of the AU?** is discussed. The discussion includes a history of regional security, a conceptual analysis of security, a conceptual analysis of community, the theory of constructivism and its relation to regional security, Deutsch’s (1957) theory of security communities, and Adler & Barnett’s (1998) theory of security communities. To interrogate the contribution of the AU to the development of an African security community Adler & Barnett’s (1998: 38) Framework for the study of Security Communities (Figure 1) is introduced.

The framework is organised around three tiers. The first tier consists of precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and co-ordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the structural elements of power and ideas, and the process elements of transactions, international organizations and social learning. The dynamic, positive and reciprocal relationship between these variables leads to the third tier: the development of trust and collective identity formation. The sequenced and causal relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998:30).

In Chapter 3 the second sub-question: **Which contributions according to Security Community Theory have the AU made to continental security?** is discussed. Here the transition from the OAU to the AU is presented, and the AU’s contributions
to continental security, peace, and stability were categorically interrogated along the three tiers of the Framework.

The precipitating conditions (Tier One) for the development of an African security community can be explained as: the failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, the end of the Cold War and the new arrangement of the post-Cold war international system, a general disinterest from the West in the post-Cold War period with regards to African security affairs, the political and economic benefits of “acting” as one, and the realization by African leaders that in the future “African problems” will have to be met with “African solutions”. It can be argued that the AU was a direct consequence of the precipitating conditions, and an expression of the intent and purpose of the African leaders.

The AU’s role becomes especially significant in Tier Two. It facilitated both the categories of the ascendant phase: structure and process. The regional hegemons South Africa and Nigeria, as well as potential hegemon Libya, was able to deliver their grandeur visions for Africa through the AU. It also served as a site where knowledge could be disseminated and in itself as a norm entrepreneur. In the process category it facilitated, and even accelerated transactions between states; acted as an organization and introduced new organizations and institutions; and again served as a site for social learning among the various member states.

Finally, the dynamic and positive relationships among the variables are the wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity. This African identity formation process is enshrined in the articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the NEPAD Framework, the AU PSC, and the CADSP. It can be argued that these articles facilitate this process of identity formation. In addition, the Accra declaration is significant evidence of the continued pursuit of a singular African identity, and the most explicit example of the existence of African identity is the number of joint AU peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union.

These peacekeeping missions, which involve intensive military cooperation and the sharing of sensitive information, are also evidence of the level of mutual trust that exists among the member states of the AU. Again, this points to the AU as a principal promoter of trust. The promotion of trust by the AU is also evident in the articles of the Constitutive Act, the PSC and CADSP. For example, the CADSP is a
common understanding between African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges and includes a common understanding of the concepts of defence, security, and common threats. Another example is the ASF, which because of its composition necessitates an extraordinary high level of interstate cooperation, and collaboration in extremely sensitive areas such as Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance systems.

In Chapter 4 the third sub-question: **Can these contributions be illustrated with an African case study(s) in which the AU was/is involved?** is discussed. As case studies the AMIB, the AMIS, and the intervention of the AU in Côte d'Ivoire are included. These case studies are included for their important and relevant contributions to the potential development of an African Security Community.

AMIB achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent conflict and secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, and the UN deployment. The AMIB points to the commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems facing the continent, especially when the UN is unable to do so. Its mandate was in accordance with UN principles and standards, international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough mandate for the AU troops to complete their mission to the extent that its resources allowed. It also illustrated a commitment from various African states to become involved and assist with South Africa willingly assuming the responsibility of lead nation and contributing the necessary resources “to get the job done”. Finally, the AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with ONUB in 2004.

The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. A member state was actively directing murder and displacement of parts of its own population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation against the will of the state in question. Even though the AMIB had just been completed, the AU again did not refrain from getting involved in yet another conflict. The chairperson of the AU “Alpha Konaré blazed the diplomatic trail to Darfur”, and the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the AU was quick to authorize
the deployment of AMIS. Similar to the AMIB several African states were willing and in the position to become involved with major and minor contributions from several African states. Even though the situation did not, according to the AU, warrant intervention under Article 4 (h) the AU continued to seek a resolution and to this extent authorized AMIS, which would later become AMIS II, AMIS IIIE and eventually UNAMID. This illustrates the AU’s continued support to uphold peace and stability, as it authorized an intervention in the affairs of a Member State to broker peace and provide humanitarian assistance. However, it should be noted that the AMIS achieved limited success. It seems few lessons were learned from the peacekeeping experiences in Burundi as similar mistakes were made in Darfur (Sudan), and in the end could not find a lasting solution.

The final case study was the AU reaction to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The intervention of the ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the grounds of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This illustrates the commitment to, and respect for, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. In addition, the intervention again points to the willingness of Member States to become involved, and their commitment to upholding the “new” norms of the AU. The response from both the AU and ECOWAS was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from both the organizations, which shows that leaders on the continent no longer simply talk, but are willing to “walk the walk”. Nigeria even went as far as threatening Gbagbo with the use of “legitimate” force. As noted by Chitiyo (2011) credit should be given to the ECOWAS and AU for their blanket response to the situation, their unwillingness to compromise, and their willingness to resort to “legitimate force” if needed. Most notably Côte d’Ivoire might mark a shift away from the power-sharing default setting, and back to the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the national leader.

5.2 Key Findings

Franke (2008: 333) calls “for a less cynical view of inter-African security cooperation. Despite the tensions and rivalries that have characterized Africa’s institutional landscape thus far have cast a penumbra of doubt over the ability of the continent to establish a viable peace and security architecture, the past decade has seen several
important developments”. Similarly, this study is able to illustrate, concerning the important developments in the area of peace and security in Africa that significant contributions have been made by the AU since its inception since 2002.

Franke (2008: 325) concludes, “It seems as if the continent currently displays all the essential characteristics of (at least) a loosely coupled security community”. To declare the existence of an African security community would be premature, and is not within the scope of this study, however currently there are striking similarities between the theory and the existing developments in Africa under the AU. When compared against Security Community Theory it can be concluded that the AU has made significant contributions at all three tiers of the theory, and therefore major contributions to the potential development of an African security community (see Chapter 3 & 4).

As mentioned, to proclaim the existence of an African security community is premature, however insufficient time has passed to refute the argument, and therefore the potential development of such a community. Only nine years have passed since the inception of the AU in 2002, and when compared to the EU, which is considered the model example of a security community, is not enough. The beginnings of the EU can be traced to September 1946 when Winston Churchill in a speech called for a “kind of United States of Europe”. The foundation for the integration of the Union was laid in 1952 “when the leaders of six war weary European nations signed the Treaty of Paris and created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Venter & Neuland, 2004: 56). Nearly 60 years on the “process” is still not complete.

As noted by Engel & Porto (2010: 143) “common to all authors is the recognition that the political, institutional and normative processes that underpin the transformation of the OAU into the AU have the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development with potentially significant consequences”... “yet, permeating these pages is also acknowledgement that in creating the African Peace and Security Architecture, the AU is treading in new, unchartered waters for which there are no templates, no proven recipes, no off-the-shelf roadmaps”. Utilizing Security Community Theory this study is able to identify possible contributions by the AU to the development of a
potential African Security Community, but is also able to identify several (possible) key challenges that might hinder, in future, the contributions by the AU to the development of such a community.

The first and most commonly acknowledged challenge to the AU is a lack of resources. “One of the most notable characteristics of contemporary inter-African security cooperation is the crucial importance of external and material support (Franke, 2009: 239). A “substantial number of states continues not to meet their contributions to the organization, increasing its dependency on external aid, raising the issue of sustainability and ownership. Since January 2006, 75 percent of the entire AU budget has been paid by only five countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa” (Williams 2009: 619). In addition, “the escalation of conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Central of Africa, coupled with election-related disputes and violence, has substantially increased the demands on the organization” (Engel & Porto, 2010: 153). This challenge was evident in both the AMIB and AMIS.

A second challenge is “the loosely defined relationship with the UN, which may challenge the effectiveness of collaboration between the two bodies” (Söderbaum & Hettne, 2010: 22). Tension is evident from the case in Côte d’Ivoire where continued failure of an AU intervention led to decisive action from the UN and France. This action, even though effective, impeded on the territorial authority of the AU, and could potentially antagonize future relations. However, this need not be the case as the UN Charter under Chapter 8 Art. 52-54, the AU Constitutive Act Article 3 (e), and the AU PSC Protocol Article 4 provides for a positive relationship to exist.

As Söderbaum & Hettne (2010: 22) has noted “the challenge is to construct arrangements in which the two logics complement one another”. Such a relationship would be crucial for the development of an African security community as it could potentially guarantee crucial funding, and logistical assistance that would assist the AU during its embryonic phase. Also in recent times, “the UN has suffered a decline in power and authority and therefore needs support from regional bodies. A combined multi-regional strategy provides the most feasible solution for the future” (Söderbaum & Hettne, 2010: 30).

A final finding of this study is the role that core states will perform in the AU. As prescribed by Security Community Theory “we expect that a core state or a coalition
of core states remains important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 54). It is therefore essential that influential and capable states (e.g. South Africa in AMIB and Nigeria in ECOWAS) play a leading role in the performance of the AU. “A community formed around a group of strong power creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community”. Also core states don’t only have the capability to motivate the weaker states to become a part of the collective, but even at times to coerce others to maintain a collective stance” (Ngoma, 2005: 54).

In addition, these core states could potentially provide strategic leadership which as noted by Makinda & Okumu (2008: 71) “is crucial for the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between African states and peoples”. The term strategic leadership, in this context, means the capacity to provide clear vision, inspiration, and effective strategies for mobilizing human, financial, scientific, and social resources. Strategic leadership “should help to identify the resources on which policies should focus, secure markets for Africa’s goods, construct structures that empower the people, and initiate productive linkages between internal agents, regional actors, and the global community (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 72).

5.3 Conclusion

This study interrogated the potential contributions of the AU towards the development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. To achieve this Security Community Theory by Adler & Barnett (1998) and Deutsch (1957) was utilised. More specifically the framework for the analysis of the development of security communities, as presented by Adler & Barnett (1998: 38) was used.

Utilizing the theory, this study is able to illustrate that the AU has made significant contributions towards the development of peace and security in Africa. In particular, it can be concluded that the AU has made significant contributions at all three tiers of the framework, and therefore major contributions to the potential development of an African security community. However, the AU is still in its embryonic phase, and any prediction concerning the existence, or future existence of an African security community would be premature.
Even though there are ostensibly, positive developments in the area of continental peace and security many challenges remain, as this study is able to illustrate. The first is a lack of resources. The AU is heavily dependent on the contributions of its member states, and as a number of members persistently fail to meet their contributions to the organization, they compromise both the sustainability and ownership of the AU in areas of peace and security on the continent. This was evident in AMIB and AMIS. As the AU become increasingly dependent on external aid, external donors become expectant of greater involvement and influence in the affairs of the AU, albeit directly or indirectly.

This leads to a second challenge that this study is able to identify “the loosely defined relationship with the UN” and other external partners. It is crucial that a constructive relationship be established as provided for in the UN Charter under Chapter 8 Article 52-54, the AU Constitutive Act Article 3 (e), and the AU PSC Protocol Article 4. If not, differences as was evident in Côte d’Ivoire might antagonise the two organisations and negatively affect any future contributions of the AU towards the development of an African security community. However, a clearly defined and mutually respectful relationship will provide the necessary assistance and resources to “carry” the AU through its embryonic phase, and support the development of an African security community in the future.

The role of core states, most notably regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria will remain important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of an African security community. As long as these states continue to subscribe to the “new” norms and values of the AU, they will legitimise the process and attract other smaller states to similar behaviour. Core states also create the expectation that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community, and have the capability to motivate and if necessary to coerce others to maintain a collective stance. Finally, as noted by Makinda & Okumu (2008: 71) core states can offer strategic leadership, which will be “crucial for the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between African states and peoples”.


Reference List


