Implementing Sustainable Human Settlements

by

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

In our rapidly urbanising world, the need for sustainable settlement planning, particularly for the poor in developing countries, is essential. In South Africa, apartheid spatial constructs segregated black population groups, denying them equal access to economic opportunities; housing; as well as basic and social services. After the first democratic elections in 1994, policy makers attempted to redress these inequalities. Though early housing policy aimed to provide secure tenure: permanent residential structures, and access to basic services for the poor, these policies failed to meet the objectives of the policy makers. In articulating that the state could not meet the needs of the homeless, and that housing for the poor should be delivered within a normalized market in order to attract private investment, these policies (which promoted private sector, contractor-driven development) only served to heighten inequalities previously entrenched by the apartheid regime.

In 2004, after measuring delivery failures, policy makers empowered the state to become an enabler of subsidised and low-income housing delivery, rather than leaving housing provision solely to the market. The new policy included the use of multiple finance and delivery mechanisms, multiple housing typologies, and clearly expressed the need for capacity development. It also espoused the need for citizens to become participants in sustainable settlement delivery. Despite this, policy implementation continues to be fragmented and mostly ineffectual.

Interviews, survey results and site visits reveal that there are some examples of integrated sustainable human settlements in the South African (SA) context. A few recent examples showcase better quality houses, a broader variety of housing options and typologies, better locations, functioning developmental relationships and the use of multiple financing mechanisms. Conversely, case studies and comparative analysis of developments reveal that most projects designated as Breaking New Ground (BNG) responsive by government officials (as defined in the study) fail to meet BNG policy objectives. This study argues that low-income housing provision continues to focus on the delivery of free-standing subsidy houses without providing a range of typologies and tenure options. It argues that basic and social-service provision is intermittent and, at times, non-existent. It argues that current
funding models for the development of sustainable human settlements in low-income communities are unable to meet basic needs within communities. It shows that skills scarcities within government prevent the acceleration of housing delivery and that participation strategies have failed to meet the policy objective of enabling citizens to become participants in sustainable settlement development.

In conclusion, it recommends that the current focus on and allocations of subsidies toward ownership models for shelter and housing delivery be re-examined. It suggests that support should be provided for lending institutions to extend finance to creditworthy, low- and middle-income families. Additionally, accredited capacity-building programmes should be developed and funded for local authorities, enabling local government to be the sole driver of local development. It argues that capacity should be built in community organisations to speed up delivery processes, and recommends that provincial government’s power and authority be incrementally devolved to local government as capacity is increased within local authorities.
OPSOMMING

Weens die snelle verstedeliking in Suid-Afrika het die behoefte aan beplanning van volhoubare nedersettings noodsaklik geword, veral vir armes in ontwikkelende lande. Tydens apartheid is gesegregeerde swart gemeenschappe gelyke toegang tot ekonomiese geleenthede, behuising, sowel as basiese en maatskaplike dienste onteem. Na 1994 het beleidmakers gepoog om hierdie ongelykhede reg te stel. Hoewel vroeë behuisingsbeleid daarop gemik was om permanente residensiële strukture wat toegang tot basiese dienste sou verseker, het hierdie beleid egter gefaal. Toe die staat nie sy doelwitte kon bereik nie, is daar besluit om private beleggings te lok. Hierdie privaatsektor gedrewe beleid, wat ontwikkeling binne 'n genormaliseerde mark sou bevorder, het egter slegs gedien om ongelykhede te verskerp. Dit is dan ook dieselfde ongelykhede wat voorheen in die apartheidse beleid verskans is.

In 2004, na besef is dat verskaffing misluk het, het beleidmakers die staat bemagtig om te verseker dat gesubsidieerde behuising vir lae-inkomste groepe verskaf word, eerder as om behuising slegs aan die private sektor oor te laat. Die nuwe beleid het ingesluit die gebruik van verskeie finansiële en leveringsmeganismes, meervoudige behuising-tipologieë, en het duidelik die behoefte aan kapasiteitsontwikkeling vergestaal. Dit het ook die behoefte onderstreep wat daar bestaan vir landsburgers om deel te neem aan die proses van lewering van volhoubare nedersettings. Ten spyte hiervan is min sukses behaal.

Hierdie studie voer aan dat daar 'n paar voorbeelde van geïntegreerde volhoubare menslike nedersettings in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks bestaan. Onlangse voorbeelde dui op huise van 'n beter gehalte, 'n groter verskeidenheid van behuisingsopsies en tipologieë, geskikter ruimtes, die funksionering van die ontwikkelingsverhoudings en die gebruik van verskeie finansieringsmeganismes. Aan die ander kant, alhoewel regeringsamptenare die meeste projekte aanvaar as synde dat hulle voldoen aan die vereistes van Breaking New Ground (BNG), voldoen hulle nie aan die vereistes van die BNG se beleid nie. Hierdie studie voer aan dat die voorsiening van lae-inkomste-behuising bly fokus op die lewering van subsidies vir vrystaande huise sonder dat 'n reeks tipologieë en ook opsies ten
opsigte van verblyfreg verskaf word. Basiese en maatskaplike diensvoorsiening is gebrekkig en soms totaal afwesig. Hierbenewens is die huidige finansiële modelle vir die ontwikkeling van volhoubare menslike nedersettings in lae-inkomste gemeenskappe nie in staat om in die basiese behoeftes van die gemeenskappe te voorsien nie. Dis duidelik dat 'n tekort aan vaardighede binne die regering verhoed dat die levering van behuising versnel en dat die strategieë vir deelname deur burgers aan die proses ook gefaal het. Ten slotte beveel hierdie studie aan dat die huidige stelsel vir die toekennings van subsidies vir die levering van skuiling en behuising weer nagegaan word. Ondersteuning moet gegee word aan instellings wat finansiering voorsien en dit behoort uitgebrei te word na lae- en middel-inkomste families wat kredietwaardig is. Kapasiteitsbou-programme behoort geskep te word vir plaaslike overhede wat dan alleen sal omsien na plaaslike ontwikkeling. Gemeenskapsorganisasies behoort ook bemagtig te word om leveringsprosesse te bespoedig. Die provinsiale regering se magte en gesag moet inkrementeel oorhandig word aan plaaslike regering soos kapasiteit binne plaaslike overhede self uitbrei.
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<td>BNG</td>
<td>Breaking New Ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Community Construction Management Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDW</td>
<td>Community Development Worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
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<td>DLGH</td>
<td>Department of Local Government and Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>Department of Housing</td>
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<td>DOHS</td>
<td>Department of Human Settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWAF</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHP</td>
<td>Emergency Housing Programme</td>
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<td>EMPS</td>
<td>Environmental Management Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Free State Development Corporation</td>
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<td>FS</td>
<td>Free State</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>A housing gap identified in the market for lower mid-income earners</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPDH</td>
<td>Gauteng Provincial Department of Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAD</td>
<td>Housing Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;LG</td>
<td>Housing and Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Implementation Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>ISUP</td>
<td>Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOSHC0</td>
<td>Johannesburg Social Housing Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFTEA</td>
<td>The Less Formal Township Establishment Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEIA</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MER</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting</td>
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<td>MFMA</td>
<td>Municipal Finance and Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCPG</td>
<td>Northern Cape Provincial Government</td>
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<td>National Department of Housing</td>
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<td>NDHS</td>
<td>National Department of Human Settlements</td>
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<td>NFSD</td>
<td>National Framework for Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHBRC</td>
<td>National Home Builders Registration Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMBM</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMPS</td>
<td>Operational Management Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVB</td>
<td>Olievenhoutbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFMA</td>
<td>Public Finance and Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>People’s Housing Process</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACN</td>
<td>South African Cities Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASSA</td>
<td>South African Social Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Strategic Design Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMME</td>
<td>Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTT</td>
<td>Technical Task Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UISP</td>
<td>Upgrading of Informal Human Settlements Program</td>
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<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHSP</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCSHSS</td>
<td>Western Cape Sustainable Human Settlement Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRC</td>
<td>Water Research Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zanemvula Development Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIBP</td>
<td>Zanemvula Interim Business Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZPIP</td>
<td>Zanemvula Project Implementation Plan</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Before the democratic elections in 1994, colonial and apartheid spatial planning solidified racial and socio-economic segregation in black and coloured settlements throughout SA. After the election, SA policies attempted to redress these spatial inequalities. The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:19), for example, called for the provision of secure tenure; permanent residential structures which would ensure privacy; and access to basic services for the poor and homeless. However, it also stipulated that the state could not meet the needs of the homeless, and that the fundamental pre-condition for attracting housing investment must be provided within a normalized market in order to attract private investment (RSA, 1994:19). This approach to housing delivery for the poor has been highly criticized over the years (Rust & Rubenstein, 1996; Tomlinson, 1998; Khan & Thring, 2003; Harrison et al., 2003; Bond, 2003). Early post-apartheid developments lacked appropriate infrastructure, basic services, clinics, schools, green spaces and other amenities that higher-income areas took for granted (Donaldson, 2001:6). These developments were also characterised by small, low-quality units, which were built on the periphery of towns and economic centres (Gilbert, 2000:27). Furthermore, though subsidies were provided for citizens earning less than R3,500 in 1994, there were few affordable housing options available for people earning between R3,500 and R6,000 per month. Credit for low-income families was also extremely limited (Rust, 2006:6, 8).

In 2004, after reviewing 10 years of post-apartheid housing performance, policy makers concluded that housing policies had failed to meet their objectives, and went back to the drawing board. In a move away from market-biased delivery regimes, the SA government launched Breaking New Ground (BNG) (DOH, 2004a) – an integrated sustainable human settlement policy which spotlights participative, multi-dimensional approaches which are meant to allow citizens to become local participants in sustainable human settlement development rather than simply recipients of free, government-subsidised houses. BNG enables the establishment of a range of tenure, finance and delivery mechanisms, and purportedly aims to
empower the poor to become economically active via participative, integrated planning and equity in home ownership.

1.2 Research problem

Though current housing policy continues to underpin the need for secure tenure, quality, appropriate housing and services for the poor – has the new policy discourse, and its concomitant programmatic responses for implementation enabled effective delivery of integrated, sustainable, human settlements in South Africa? (DOH, 2004a: 7-12). This is the key question within this study. Sub-questions include: Do current institutional arrangements within the three spheres of government enable or impede the delivery of sustainable settlements? Are the requisite skills available in government to deliver integrated, sustainable human settlements? Are there participation strategies in place which enable citizens to effectively become participants in human settlement development? Are current funding models able to meet the needs of no- and low-income individuals and families? The following sections will explain how these questions will be answered.

1.3 Scope

This study explores housing and settlement delivery in the context of subsidised and low-income housing for the urban poor in South Africa, and analyses performance against objectives enshrined in the South African policy environment. BNG espouses nine programmatic responses to integrated, sustainable settlement delivery and it is against these responses that South African performance will be measured (DOH, 2004a:7). These responses are: supporting the entire residential property market; shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements; utilising existing and new housing instruments; redefining institutional arrangements within government; institutional support and capacity-building; restructuring financial arrangements; utilising housing as a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy; improved information, communication and awareness building and establishing systems for monitoring and evaluation (DOH, 2004a: 7-27). This study also measures project
performance against locally defined goals and objectives which project teams deemed BNG responsive.

1.4 Research methodology

In order to establish whether South African performance meets housing policy objectives, a comparative analysis is undertaken. South African policy objectives are compared to and contrasted with South African performance in the housing and settlement sectors. The researcher shall undertake a broad overview in chapter one, followed by two case studies in chapter two. Case studies are examined in order to lend credibility to the argument that notwithstanding progress in achieving some BNG goals, most projects designated by government as BNG responsive fail to meet policy objectives. Comparative studies usefully focus on the similarities and differences of ‘objects’ or units of analysis (Mouton, 2001:51, 52). The units of analysis in this case are housing and settlement policies, and South African performance, as reflected in statistical data and measured in critical academic and professional reviews, government progress reports, personal observations, surveys, interviews and case studies. The exploration of case studies as empirical research is also selected as a suitable method for investigating the research problem. According to Mouton (2000:51-52) real-life objects, including physical objects, human actions and interventions can be measured empirically through active intervention in the real world. Yin (1994:13) states that case studies can be utilised to investigate ‘a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’. Eisenhardt (1989:532-550) states that case study research is commonly utilised to more thoroughly understand the dynamics of specific projects or real-life situations. The case studies or objects of analysis herein are implemented projects deemed BNG responsive by South African government officials. In this context, interviews, reports and experiences of officials, contractors linked to selected projects, and beneficiaries provide critical information with regard to the success or failure of these projects in meeting policy and project objectives.

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1 Officials were asked to measure whether settlements were responsive/compliant or non-responsive/non-compliant when measured against BNG’s programmatic responses. These responses will be explored in the section that follows.
Surveys asking officials and project teams to respond to whether or not government and designated projects are BNG compliant were also undertaken in 2009. These surveys, and site visits to selected projects, were undertaken in 2009 and in 2010. The results of this data were then compared to and contrasted with South African policy objectives. In these surveys municipal and provincial officials from around the country were asked if provinces and municipalities are successfully responding to BNG policy objectives. These officials were also asked to provide details about challenges impeding BNG compliance. Interviews with officials, engineers, planners, urban designers and contractors directly involved in the implementation of the selected projects were conducted, as were interviews with residents in the same projects. Information was gathered to ascertain whether the projects have met the South African policy criteria. Key and sub-questions were asked within the interviews and quantitative and qualitative data were collected. Quantitative data included the number of housing options, typologies and delivery mechanisms against targets and the level of basic and social services provided against targets. Qualitative data included responses to interview questions about whether implementers and community members felt project goals were communicated and achieved, and community needs were being met.

1.5 Potential risks of the research

This study forms part of a programme funded by the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS), and the researcher reports to NDHS on programme progress. Officials and contractors approached within this study were aware of the reporting process between the researcher and the NDHS. Interviewees may therefore have responded to questions in a manner calculated to please their superiors versus responding objectively. However, it was also made clear in the interview process that this research would explore challenges and failures – as well as successes – to facilitate critical learning and feedback to NDHS as well as helping to improve human settlement outcomes. It must be noted that each official reported from his/her own individual professional experience, and therefore no single official could provide a complete picture of the sustainable human settlement implementation process in any given municipality, province or project. It must also be noted that measurement
results of specified projects were compared with responses from implementers and community members in order to gauge authenticity. In order to minimise risks, an objective and critical approach was pursued, not only in selecting interview questions but also in selecting interviewees themselves. Officials and project team members who were critical of selected projects were deliberately included in interviews in order to provide a more balanced assessment. Interviews with, and survey responses from officials and development professionals were then correlated with site visit observations and community interviews in order to provide a more balanced analysis. Though the majority of interviewees and survey respondents provided their names and roles within the developments, some wished to remain anonymous.

1.6 Contributions of the research

Through site visits and interviews; surveys and workshops; national challenges, successes and trends were established. An extensive literature review was also conducted by the researcher to shed light on research questions. Research findings within this study will be disseminated to provincial and local government authorities to further assist them in their goal of implementing sustainable human settlements.

1.7 Structure of the research

The introduction provided a context followed by a definition of the research problem. The researcher further delineated the scope and the research method. In chapter one, the argument is presented for sustainable settlement development in an increasingly urbanised world. It provides definitions of sustainable settlements and cities. Chapter one also provides a brief history of the evolution of housing and settlement policy in order to determine whether implementation patterns have changed in recent history. Flowing from this, South Africa’s progress in delivering integrated, sustainable human settlements is measured by comparing and contrasting published statistics, government progress reviews, critical academic and professional literature, personal observations and interview results with the selected BNG policy objectives and with locally defined project objectives. In chapter two an
analysis of two case studies is presented. These case studies have been deemed ‘BNG responsive’ by provincial and local government officials. In the final chapter, research findings are consolidated, and core conclusions are presented.
Chapter 2: Sustainable cities and settlements?

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one begins with an overview of global urbanisation patterns, which illustrates the need for sustainable settlement planning and development. Thereafter, definitions of sustainable settlements and post-apartheid policy objectives are explored. South African progress is then compared to and contrasted with selected policy objectives.

2.2 The need for sustainable settlements

In an increasingly urbanised world, the need for sustainable city and settlement development is becoming acute. According to the UN Habitat (2006:6), it is projected that by the early 21st century, the world’s urban population will equal its rural population. Between 2005 and 2030, the world’s urban population is projected to grow at almost twice the rate of the world’s total population, with international trends revealing that Asia and Africa will host the largest proportion of urban growth. By 2030, it is estimated that 80% of the world’s urban population will live in developing cities, with small cities (less than 500,000 people) and medium-sized cities (one to five million people) absorbing most of this urban growth (UN Habitat, 2006:6). According to UN Habitat (2006:12) 32% of the world’s urban population lives in slums, and 90% of slums are located in developing cities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 71.8% of the urban population lives in slums (UN Habitat, 2006:12). These statistics illustrate the urgent need for sustainable development practices, particularly in urban Asia and Africa.
2.3 Challenges in sustainable settlement delivery

Cities and urban settlements offer a concentration of goods and services like water and sanitation, garbage collection, electricity, roads, hospitals, schools, fire services, access to economic opportunities, and more. On the other hand, cities can also be environments where challenges are concentrated. The lack of water and sanitation services in poor areas can create environments rife with diseases like cholera, pneumonia and dysentery. Waste-water not properly removed and treated in cities and settlements can pollute groundwater and soil, causing further health and environmental risks. Lack of solid waste removal can create similar risks, and the lack of domestic energy services in poor areas often forces communities to cook with wood, paraffin and biomass which can cause respiratory infections and disease (WHO, 2004:138-140). The poor often build on waste sites, hillsides and next to industrial zones which often pose a danger to human health and well-being when, for instance, flooding and/or pollution occurs.

In South Africa, unravelling the complex challenges entrenched by apartheid spatial constructs, including the distance of townships from economic opportunities and necessary services, has proven to be a mammoth task. Complex roles and authority structures within and between national, provincial and local government spheres slow down the rate of housing and sustainable settlement delivery. Arguably, current government subsidies rarely cover the cost of quality residential structures that ensure safety and privacy. The lack of skilled and experienced capacity in local authorities also poses severe delivery challenges. These challenges will be explored further in the following sections. The next section examines definitions of sustainable cities and settlements, and explores whether these definitions are meaningful in the South African context.

2.4 Defining sustainable cities and settlements

In attempting to measure sustainable settlement delivery, it is important to define what a sustainable settlement is. The following widely accepted definitions of
sustainable cities are provided by Girardet (2004:419), Haughton (2004:65-73) and Sattherwaite (2004:6). According to Girardet, a sustainable city is:

…a city that works so that all its citizens are able to meet their own needs without endangering the well-being of the natural world or the living conditions of other people, now or in the future (Girardet, 2004:419).

Girardet (2004:417-418) suggests that the move toward sustainability in city planning should include balance sheets which can track inputs, outputs and throughputs with regard to city resources. This requires systematic collection of data, and sophisticated knowledge management systems to track this data over time. Assigning rights to society and the environment by way of regulations; legal, political and educational systems that encourage responsible production and consumption, as well as creating systems that make those who damage or degrade the environment responsible for their actions, can also help cities to move towards sustainability targets (Haughton, 2004:65-68).

Haughton (2004) uses a three-fold classification system to describe cities attempting to transit to sustainable patterns:

- Redesigning Cities: Those in which fossil fuel dependence has allowed planners to create urban sprawl, which explains the need for re-design. Bringing nature back into the city, planning for higher densities, and the reduction of waste and energy consumption are criteria used in redesigning cities;
- Self-Reliant Cities: Aim not to export pollution beyond their borders; they try to reduce consumption; minimise waste and move toward the use of renewable technologies. These cities are bio-regionally sensitive and encourage participatory politics and interspecies equity; and,
- Fair Share Cities: Create mechanisms for regulating environmental impacts. Environmental assets are traded in these cities, and there is an emphasis on reducing pollution, making waste streams more efficient and reducing energy
consumption. Those who pollute and degrade the environment are responsible for compensating society. Examples of these mechanisms include carbon trading schemes and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects (Haughton, 2004:68-73).

According to Sattherwaite (2004:6), sustainable cities are those in which production, consumption, waste management systems, built form and governance structures match sustainable development objectives. Swilling (2004:9-10) argues that sustainability will only be achieved in cities and settlements if the extraction and use of non-renewables do not exceed the earth’s ability to renew these resources; renewables are substituted for non-renewables; wastes are not dumped in excess of the planet’s ability to absorb them; local ecosystems and biodiversity are not destroyed, and human needs are met by reducing the consumption of the rich and increasing access to natural goods and services for the poor.

In the definitions listed above, natural resource use and environmental sustainability are foundational concepts. Most South African housing and policy documents include natural resource efficiency and environmental sustainability in their policy objectives. In practice, however, beyond the requirement that environmental impact assessments form part of the development planning process, few implementers include environmental sustainability or the sustainable use of resources in their development objectives. This is illustrated below and in chapter two.

Arguably, sustainable resource use and the systems required to implement and measure sustainable resource use strategies are more readily adopted by developed countries that have stable political-economic structures and technical capacity. In the South African context, the continuous process of post-apartheid government restructuring has created an environment of administrative instability, which arguably compromises a sustainable resource use approach in the short to mid-term. The next section will explore the evolution of housing and settlement policy objectives, and South African performance will be measured against these objectives.
2.5 The post-apartheid housing challenge

In order to determine whether current South African practice in sustainable settlement planning has evolved and adapted to changing economic and social drivers, it is necessary to explore its history. In 1994, the Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:5) estimated that by 1995, 68.7% of South Africa’s population would earn less than R1,500 per month; 11.8% would earn between R1,500 – R2,500 per month; 5.6% would earn between R2,500 and R3,500 per month and only 13.9% of the entire population would earn more than R3,500 per month. Though post-apartheid housing policy allocated subsidies for households earning less than R3,500 per month, Department of Housing research suggested that by 1995, these wage earners would account for 86.1% of the entire South African population, namely 36.85 million people (RSA, 1994: 5, 7 and own calculations). According to Callinicos (1996), by October 1995 only 10,600 state funded houses had been built.

Given these alarming statistics, and the requisite demand for housing and sustainable settlement opportunities for poor and low-income families in post-apartheid South Africa, have housing and settlement policies responded to the post-apartheid challenge? What objectives are purported within housing and settlement policies, and are policy goals being achieved?

2.6 Policy objectives and early post-apartheid housing performance

There is little question that the post-apartheid housing policy discourse emphasised the need to redress the inequalities of the past. For example: in 1994, the Housing White Paper called for the provision of secure tenure; quality residential structures which ensure privacy, equity in home ownership; access to economic activities for the poor; environmental sustainability; access to basic and social services; integrated, participative planning; consumer education; and maximum devolution of powers to provincial and local government (RSA, 1994:15-49).

The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:16) also ambitiously aimed to deliver participative, democratic and integrated settlements – within the shortest time frame
possible. Between 1994 and 2004, the Department of Housing (DOH) spent R24.22 billion on housing delivery; 1.5 million houses were constructed; and approximately six million poor South Africans were housed (DOH, 2004b:3). This is perhaps a world record in housing delivery. According to the DOH (2004b:3), the provision of shelter, basic connector services and secure tenure contributed significantly to poverty alleviation by securing an economic asset for the poor in the form of a residential house.

However, one of the main critiques of this policy era was its neo-liberal, market-driven response to housing delivery. The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:19) stipulated that the fundamental pre-condition for attracting housing investment must be provided within a normalized market in order to attract private investment. It also argued that the state could not meet the needs of the homeless. This approach has been heavily criticised over the years (Rust & Rubenstein, 1996; Tomlinson, 1998; Khan & Thring, 2003; Harrison et al., 2003). The unintended consequences of this delivery paradigm include inequitable allocations of finance between low- and higher-income families; the surfacing of a so-called housing finance gap in low-income families earning between R3,500 per month and R6,000 per month; a lower than expected rate of delivery; community disempowerment through lack of appropriate consultative processes; a reluctance on the part of developers to be involved in low-income housing delivery; and the inability of the National Housing Finance Corporation to increase access to credit and reduce interest rates for low-income families (Bond, 2003:47). According to Bond, (2003:47) the Housing White Paper’s market-centred approach resulted in the reproduction of apartheid-style ghettos, and intensified the equally menacing structure of class apartheid across the country.

Following the Housing White Paper, the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) (RSA, 1997), and the subsequent Urban Development Framework (UDF) (DOH, 1997), advocated a market-centred, full-cost recovery housing delivery model. This translated into a subsidised one room, 30 square metre house with a toilet (Rust, 2006:8). Rust (2006:8) explains that a ‘gap’ in affordable housing stock and in financial assistance for families earning between R3,500 and R6,000 per month who need affordable housing, was identified post-1994. This income group, and housing which is affordable for this income group, is referred to as the gap housing group or the gap housing market (Rust, 2006:8).
2006:8). Furthermore, the UDS identified private developers and construction companies to be the main drivers of housing delivery (Tomlinson, 2006:88). In an ‘incremental’ approach to delivery, these agents were allowed to apply for subsidies for low-income communities to procure land and provide basic houses. Bulk and link-infrastructural services were often only provided if funds were left over after land was purchased (Tomlinson, 2006:88). In some cases ‘serviced’ land equated to the provision of an erf, a foundation and an enclosed toilet (Tomlinson, 2006:91). Typically, the level of service provided in these communities was very poor. Communities that could not afford higher levels of service (e.g. graded roads, street lights [electricity], storm water reticulation, and onsite water and sanitation) were provided with communal taps, communal toilets and nothing more (Bond, 2003:50-51).

Though the UDF substantiated the need for urban densification and promoted a shift from ‘one household – one plot’ planning, in reality, low-density, single-household dwellings sprawled in settlements in and on the periphery of urban edges (Donaldson, 2001:6; DOH, 1997:31). Dewar (1998:370) agrees that early RDP settlements were largely low density, lacking in social amenities and commercial facilities. He also states that, ‘It is usually impossible to discern any social, economic or environmental concerns in the making of these schemes, which seem to have been ordered simply by question of engineering efficiency’.

Academics were not alone in their criticism of early post-1994 housing policy. Metropolitan councils also criticised the UDF, claiming it lacked integrated spatial plans for urban and urban-rural areas and that it failed to enable sustainable housing delivery. In 2001, the Department of Housing (now the Department of Human Settlements) formed a reference group to re-evaluate the Framework (Donaldson, 2001:6).

The Housing Act (Act 107 of 1997) reiterated the Housing White Paper’s goals by calling for the establishment of stable, sustainable homes; secure tenure; viable communities located in close proximity to economic opportunities, and the provision of basic and social services and amenities (RSA, 1997:3). However, in a marked shift from the Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994), the principles within the Act (Act
107 of 1997) established government as an enabler of shelter delivery, rather than leaving provision solely to the market. Though this new role was meant to enhance delivery, critics claim policy objectives were still not met.

According to Tomlinson, (2006:93) government’s primary aim in early housing policy was to provide security of tenure through home ownership and access to basic services through an incremental plan of delivering serviced sites with rudimentary structures. This was called ‘progressive’ and ‘incremental housing’. A ‘breadth over depth’ delivery response was justified by developers in order to provide as many low-income housing structures as possible (breadth), rather than building fewer structures of better quality (depth) (Tomlinson, 2006:96-97).

This ‘breadth over depth’ approach had many unintended consequences. Dangor (1998:359-361) states that the lack of appropriate infrastructure and service delivery within these early developments reproduced apartheid patterns of inequitable distribution. He also states that the ‘look and feel’ of these RDP houses was reminiscent of apartheid ‘matchbox’ houses delivered in previously segregated areas (Dangor, 1998: 359-361). Early RDP settlements lacked clinics, schools, social services and access to economic activities (Donaldson, 2001:6). In 2000, Gilbert (2000,27) echoed this sentiment, stating that the quality of the solutions being delivered had disappointed many in terms of both the size of the units and the quality of construction, and beneficiaries felt they were worse off in their new circumstances than previously.

Another important critique of early post-apartheid housing delivery is the impact housing policy had on the profile of housing units delivered. In 1994, it was estimated that 86% of South African households earned less than R3,500 per month, and there was an overwhelming need for subsidy support (Rust, 2006:6). For households earning slightly more than the R3,500 per month threshold, there were few, if any, affordable housing options available within their budget requirements (Rust, 2006:8). The availability of credit and end-user finance for low-income families was also extremely limited, and there was great reluctance on the part of lending agencies to extend credit to low-income earners (Rust, 2006:6).
In 2004, the DOH presented a 10-year progress report on the status of South African housing and human settlements to the United Nations (UN) Commission for Sustainable Development. This review concluded that integration in housing settlements had not been satisfactorily achieved due to misalignment of government funding streams and housing plans; the poor quality of low-income housing during this period and the location of low-income settlements on urban peripheries. Beneficiaries’ perception that their houses were not an asset, and the concomitant sale of houses at rates less the replacement value were also cited as reasons for failure to achieve set objectives (DOH, 2004b:4). Limited participation from financial institutions in financing low-income settlements; under-spending within housing departments; the slow rate of land transfer to municipalities for housing and the continued growth of informal settlements were also listed as barriers to the delivery of successful and sustainable housing settlements (DOH, 2004b:4).

Several other obstacles and constraints were also identified. These included the lack of necessary support and funding for local government to successfully build integrated sustainable human settlements; the misalignment of budget cycles and processes within national, provincial and local government spheres; a lack of capacity within local government to successfully implement their new developmental role in settlement planning and delivery; and a lack of clarity between land-use management tools as established in the Land Use Management Bill (2008) and integrated development plans (DOH, 2004b:6-7).

Many critics of early post-apartheid housing policy argue that the 1990s were characterised as an era of quantitative delivery and government failure to meet its own objectives as established within South African policy documents. The market-centred approach to housing delivery, which did not view housing as a single residential sector, generated a housing gap for families earning between R3,500 and R6,000 per month. Consultative processes with communities in this era were lacking; a lower-than-expected rate of delivery was apparent, and financial institutions failed to provide necessary services for low-income households. The quality of houses and level of service delivered to the poor were generally poor; social services and access to economic activities were lacking; and defective settlement planning invariably led to low-density, urban sprawl.
Following a 10-year progress review, the Department of Housing promulgated a new housing policy, *Breaking New Ground* (DOH, 2004a). BNG continued to underpin original policy objectives by stating that sustainable settlements should be safe, secure developments with reliable and affordable basic services, adequate housing, access to welfare, police, education and health services (DOH, 2004a:11-12). BNG states that settlements should be well-located, well-planned and close to economic opportunities. It calls for capacity-building programmes for government and communities, and states that implementers should take cognisance of the limits of natural resources (DOH, 2004a:7-27). Additionally, BNG acknowledges the failure of previous contractor-built, market-driven delivery regimes and the preoccupation with number chasing. It reflectively points towards participative, multi-dimensional approaches that allow people to become participants in sustainable human settlement development rather than simply recipients of a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) house (DOH, 2004a:11-12). BNG provides for a broader range of tenure options; finance options which allow for the purchase of land; and a choice of housing typologies, densities and delivery mechanisms (DOH, 2004a:8). BNG also calls for the accreditation of municipalities to enable them to manage a full range of housing delivery options (DOH, 2004a:23-25).

BNG espouses seven specific objectives for housing delivery. The specific objectives are:

1. The acceleration of housing delivery as a key strategy for poverty alleviation;
2. The utilisation of housing provision as a major job creation strategy, enabling all citizens access to property and housing as an asset for wealth creation and empowerment;
3. Leveraging growth in the economy;
4. Promoting social cohesion;
5. Combating crime and improving the quality of life for the poor;
6. Supporting the functioning of the entire single-residential property market to reduce duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first economy residential property boom and the second economy slump; and,
7. Utilizing housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human settlements, in support of spatial restructuring (which requires a link to Strategic Design Frameworks and spatial planning) (DOH, 2004a:7).

BNG also establishes the means to achieve specified ends and provides instruments to be used in the process. These instruments, as mentioned before, include nine programmatic responses, which are meant to enable the achievement of BNG’s specific objectives. These responses are:

1. Redefining institutional arrangements within government;
2. Information, communication and awareness building;
3. The restructuring of financial arrangements;
4. Institutional support and capacity-building;
5. Shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements;
6. The use of existing and new housing instruments;
7. Support for the entire residential property market;
8. The utilisation of housing as a job creation and poverty-alleviation strategy;

To summarise, in recognising previous policy failures, policy makers enhanced previous policy objectives, allowing the state to become an enabler of housing delivery by way of programmatic responses within the new policy framework. It is against these programmatic responses that current South African housing and settlement performance is now analysed.

2.6.1 BNGs aims and objectives: assessing performance

As mentioned above, this research forms part of a programme funded by the National Department of Human Settlements. In the formative phases of this programme, surveys of provincial and local government housing officials in all nine provinces were performed and results were collated during February to August of 2009. Officials, planners, engineers and developers in all provinces were asked to state whether provinces, local authorities and developers were able to successfully
implement BNG’s programmatic responses. The same respondents were also asked to list core challenges which may inhibit the implementation of these responses.

In a parallel process, officials from each province were asked to nominate ‘BNG responsive’ projects in their respective provinces. Site visits to all of these projects were completed by December, 2010, and project deliverables were measured against the same BNG programmatic objectives. Nominated projects are listed in Figure 2.1 below.

### TABLE 2.1: Site Visits to Designated BNG Responsive Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Dates Visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape (WC)</td>
<td>Witsands</td>
<td>October 21, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>Olievenhoutbosch</td>
<td>December 1-3, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)</td>
<td>Mount Moriah</td>
<td>May 6, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape (EC)</td>
<td>Zanemvula</td>
<td>February 18-19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Klarinet</td>
<td>June 30, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State (FS)</td>
<td>Grassland</td>
<td>March 31, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Potgietersrus Extension 20</td>
<td>March 18, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest (NW)</td>
<td>No project designated</td>
<td>June 17, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape (NC)</td>
<td>Lerato Park</td>
<td>June 25, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During these site visits, officials were asked why they believed the nominated projects were responsive to BNG objectives. Personal observations were made by the researcher during these site visits. Community members were also interviewed in order to ascertain whether they agreed or disagreed with officials’ reports, and whether they felt their needs were being met. Project responses were categorised in terms of a 100% score. A ‘responsive’ score was given if an average of 66% or more of those interviewed provided testimony and evidence of the successful implementation of the BNG mechanism in question. A ‘somewhat responsive’ score was given if 33%-66% of interviewees provided testimony and evidence of the successful implementation of the mechanism in question; and a ‘non-responsive’ score was allocated if less than 33% of those interviewed provided testimony and evidence of the successful implementation of the BNG mechanism in question. In each project, justifications for each response are given. The section which follows
provides an analysis of these results, as well as critical reflection on government’s progress to date.

2.6.2 Redefining institutional arrangements within government

This instrument calls for clearly defined roles within the various spheres of government, and institutional reforms in the housing and settlement sectors. It calls for integration between national and provincial development planning authorities and integrated development planning at local government level. This instrument also enables local government to be the primary delivery agent for housing and settlement delivery through the use of integrated development plans (IDPs) and through municipal accreditation, which is meant to enable municipalities to manage a full range of housing interventions (DOH, 2004a:21-22).

In 2009, participation in the IDP process in South Africa was labelled by UN Habitat as ‘professional participation’, with government departments dominating the process (UN Habitat, 2009:63). Though IDPs remain sophisticated, with complex policy instruments that have great potential to enable coordinated local planning, the reality in many local authorities is one of institutional competition and conflict, lack of internal capacity to engage in IDP planning and implementation, patronage in tendering and in appointing consultants, and financial crisis (UN Habitat, 2009:63). Moreover, while the IDP process is meant to include community members and other stakeholders, in many towns and cities this has been limited to the presentation of IDP results on programmes and projects for public comment (UN Habitat, 2009:63).

Some progress has been made in capacitating municipalities through the accreditation process. By 2010, all six metropolitan centres and some local authorities had been assessed and accredited, bringing the total number of accredited local authorities to 27 (Sexwale, 2010). However, questions of equity and access come to the fore in the accreditation process. Christmas and De Visser (2009:114) argue that the onerous processes required to accredit municipalities excludes most local authorities. Many local authorities do not understand the requirements for accreditation, and furthermore have to bear the costs associated
with the accreditation process. Furthermore, accreditation of a municipality does not necessarily equate to a permanent transfer of authority. In accreditation contracts, cities are bound by contractual terms with provincial government, thus reducing them to implementers rather than drivers of local development (Christmas & De Visser, 2009:113).

In a further attempt to redefine institutional arrangements within government, the line function for providing sanitation throughout the country was shifted from the former Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to the Department of Human Settlements (DHS). Additionally, plans were made to transfer other line functions to the DHS in order to promote sustainable human settlement delivery (DHS, 2010:8). Significantly, the DHS also negotiated the signing of an agreement with the Department of Public Works (DPW). This agreement gave the DHS the first right of refusal in respect of any land the DPW was considering for disposal (Sexwale, 2010).

In responding to the question of whether government institutions have been effectively re-aligned (post-BNG), officials in all nine provinces stated that institutions have not been successfully re-aligned. For example, Hiliza (Gauteng survey response from Godfrey Hiliza, July, 2009) stated that the lack of integration between government spheres and departments, particularly regarding lengthy and cumbersome approval and procurement processes, has led to the failure of BNG implementation objectives. Leshoe (Northwest survey response, Phenyo Leshoe, July, 2009) noted that many municipalities in the Northwest do not participate in or take ownership of development processes. These development processes include maintenance of infrastructure and taking part in inspections. Mabaso (Northern Cape survey response, Ntokozo Mabaso, July, 2009) pointed out that in the Northern Cape it is difficult to ‘get’ other sector departments (like Health and Education) on board in housing delivery processes and Ndenze (Free State survey response, Loyiso Ndenze, July, 2009) stated that the lack of synergy in planning across the spheres of government, and laborious procurement processes are core challenges to successful implementation of this BNG objective.

When examining the institutional arrangements and frameworks within projects (deemed by the same officials as ‘BNG responsive’), somewhat different pictures
emerge. In Gauteng, it can be argued that the institutional frameworks established in the Olievenhoutbosh project (to be discussed shortly) led to the successful delivery of an integrated sustainable human settlement (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). In this project, Gauteng officials formulated a collaborative planning and delivery strategy which was driven by provincial and local government departments, community leaders, ABSA and the developer (Bigen Africa). These stakeholders negotiated the development process together, and adjusted BNG objectives to locally defined project objectives (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

It can be argued that in six provinces the institutional mechanisms and frameworks adopted by project teams were ‘somewhat responsive’ to the BNG directive. For example, in the Eastern Cape (Zanemvula), representatives from national, provincial and local government, the Housing Development Agency (HDA), and community leaders met regularly to negotiate the development process (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Community leaders were democratically elected from the various areas in Zanemvula, and these leaders took the information from stakeholder meetings back to their communities. However, there was only one community liaison officer delegated to this project (which hosts an estimated 14,000 people) (Interviews with Phakamile Ximiya and Ntomnizodwa Tangana on 19 February, 2009).

In the Free State (Grassland), intergovernmental and interdepartmental task teams were also established. Stakeholder teams from various national and provincial departments, and developers, designed and negotiated the development process together. However, the municipality rarely took part in these meetings (Interview with Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009).

In KwaZulu-Natal (Mount Moriah), government departments worked collaboratively together. Despite this, there were some community disputes over social and rental housing units (Interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009). Conversely, in the Western Cape (Witsands), community members and the developer negotiated the development process through collaborative stakeholder and training sessions, but
communications with government were strained (Interviews with Mothusi Guy and Patrick Hlwili on 25 May, 2009).

In the Northwest, officials were not able to identify a BNG responsive project (Interview with Phenya Leshoe on June 17, 2009). In the Northern Cape, the Lerato Park project came to a standstill because of a dispute between the Sol Plaatjie municipality and the project managers (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on 25 June, 2009). These two projects could therefore arguably be deemed ‘not responsive’.

This disconnect between official views and project realities may be attributed to the fact that the projects selected for review were deemed priority or best-practice projects, and thus the project-development processes were, in some cases, better resourced than the bulk of provincial projects that were not deemed ‘best practice’, and therefore not selected.

2.6.3 Information, communication and awareness building

This instrument calls for interdepartmental information sharing, communication and awareness building, particularly within communities (DOH, 2004a:21-22). Survey results and interviews with development professionals reveal that, when measuring this mechanism, a similar disconnect between views of officials and actual project results emerges. Though officials in five provinces stated that this mechanism is not effective\(^3\), three projects could be argued to be ‘BNG responsive’ (Olievenhoutbosch in Gauteng, Potgietersrus in Limpopo and Mount Moriah in KwaZulu-Natal). In these projects, interdepartmental and inter-disciplinary task teams were established and, in the case of Gauteng, because stakeholders often did not speak the same language, a ‘translator’ was hired to negotiate communications between government, the developer, the bank and community members (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Three projects were deemed ‘somewhat responsive’. In the

\(^3\) Survey responses from Cedric Nemadzhiili (Limpopo, July, 2009); Caren Somiah and Loyiso Ndenze (Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 2009); Phenyo Leshoe (Northwest, July, 2009); Miemie von Maltitz and Metse Mabeba (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Ralukake Ndinanyi (Northern Cape, July, 2009).
Eastern Cape, leaders were democratically elected to be representatives in community forums in the Zanemvula project. Local, provincial and Housing Development Agency (HDA) officials guided and participated in these forums as well. In this way, information about project progress was meant to be shared (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

In the Free State, interdepartmental and intergovernmental steering committees and community members worked together to perform a community-needs analysis. Project goals were locally defined, based on this analysis. However, local government rarely came to these meetings (Interview with Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009). In the Western Cape, leaders were also democratically elected to represent local areas within Witsands, and these leaders took part in stakeholder meetings wherein the design and roll-out process for Witsands was determined. However, the City of Cape Town rarely took part in these meetings, and was often deemed ‘obstreperous’ to the process (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). Three projects were deemed to be BNG ‘un-responsive’. In the Northern Cape, as previously mentioned, disputes between the project manager and the municipality brought the Lerato Park project to a halt (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on 25 June, 2009). In the Northwest, a BNG responsive project could not be identified (Interview with Leslie Moremedi on 17 June, 2009). In Mpumalanga, the lack of communication between the municipality and the Klarinet community resulted in strained relationships and ineffective delivery (Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on 30 June, 2009). Again, this misalignment between survey responses (which state that communication and collaboration were ineffective) and project measurements may be due to the selection of ‘best-practice’ projects, in which additional human and other resources were allocated.

2.6.4 Restructuring financial arrangements

This mechanism enables subsidy allocations for households earning less than R3,500 to continue in the new policy era. Additionally, it enables households earning between R3,501 and R7,000 to access savings and credit-linked subsidies (DOH, 2004a:23 – 24). It also enables social housing institutions to provide subsidised
rental accommodation. Provision is also made for the accreditation of municipalities within this instrument. Accreditation is meant to reduce administrative and transaction costs and to improve delivery.

Though subsidies continue to be provided, escalating prices increase the cost of delivering subsidised housing, while reducing the value of subsidies (DOH, 2007:18). Furthermore, inflation reduces developers’ profit margins, dis-incentivising trading in the subsidy market. In an attempt to provide affordable home ownership to the broader residential market, the state waived transfer costs on properties valued at less than R500,000 in 2007 (DOH, 2007:18-19). However, land scarcity and the cost of well-located land limit the number of housing opportunities that can be provided in close proximity to economic opportunities (DOH, 2007:18-19).

Survey results against this measurement reveal under-funding of BNG policy mandates (particularly at local government level), lack of coordination between provincial and local government budget cycles, lack of funding for bulk infrastructure, insufficient subsidy allocations; and that township and other cumbersome approval processes slow down delivery and increase costs. City of Cape Town officials state that well-located land is more often than not unaffordable for the city to purchase, and the City of Cape Town tends to hold onto land in the event that it might need to be sold to generate needed income (Interview with Barry Coetzee on 6 November, 2009). A provincial government official in the Free State suggested that transparency in local government spending and anti-corruption systems and strategies are essential to the sustainable delivery of services via local government (Interview with Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009).

On a project level, only Mount Moriah and Olievenhoutbosch have a ‘responsive’ result against this measurement. The Ethekwini municipality provided top-up funding for an improved level of service for residents in Mount Moriah. In this project, land retention, improved roads, steps leading from roads to houses on steep gradients, and all basic services were provided for in the city’s budgeting process (Interviews

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4 Survey responses from Walter Mophato and Cedric Nemadzhiili (Limpopo, July, 2009); Kabelo Koloi (Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 2009); Peter Mokobane (Northwest, July, 2009); Mierrie von Maltitz (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Hastings Nel, Ndinannyi Ralukake and Saligh Suliman (Northern Cape, July, 2009).
with Ben Sithole and Winston Oakes on 25 June, 2009). In Gauteng, ABSA provided funding for bonded units and for an improved level of service for the entire Olievenhoutbosh development in order to attract bonded investments (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

It can be argued that two projects were ‘somewhat responsive’. In the Eastern Cape, Zanemvula was named a national priority project. Additional resources were allocated to Zanemvula, which included human resources from the HDA, and additional funds for solar water heaters (above and beyond the provision of basic services). Densified rental housing and social services were also planned. However, these had not been delivered at the time of the interview due to financial constraints and uncoordinated budget cycles between province and local government (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). In the Western Cape, the developer (PEER Africa) provided additional funds for improved interventions in Witsands. These interventions included the use of overhangs, compact fluorescent lights (CFL), ceilings, insulation, and training in sustainable development. However, PEER is currently suing the City of Cape Town for non-payment (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). Five projects were deemed ‘non-responsive’ to this mechanism. These results echo the officials’ cry that funding and financial arrangements have not been sufficiently or effectively restructured in relation to BNG objectives.

Though a grant guarantee of R1 billion was approved for the gap housing market, and R12.4 billion for housing delivery was transferred to provinces in 2009 (Sexwale, 2010), there is little evidence that these allocations are trickling down to low-income communities. Furthermore, the housing backlog increased to nearly 2.1 million in 2010, which translated into 12 million citizens being without adequate shelter (Sexwale, 2010). According to Human Settlements Minister, Tokyo Sexwale, the housing backlog was being cleared at a rate of only ten percent per annum in 2010. Though the total budget for housing provision was R16.2 billion for the 2010/11 financial year, it was recognised that current budget projections would not meet the needs of poor South African citizens (Sexwale, 2010).

5 Interview with Jackie Masike on March 31, 2009; Interview with Walter Motapo on March 18, 2009; Interview with Vusi Bidi on June 17, 2009; Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on June 25, 2009; Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on June 30, 2009.
2.6.5 Institutional support and capacity-building

Capacity-building, particularly for municipalities, is seen as a cross-cutting theme for delivering sustainable human settlements in BNG. This includes organisational development, institutional support, and capacity-building for community members and officials through education and training (DOH, 2004a: 22-23). However, capacity constraints, particularly in local government, are clearly evident.

Researchers and government agencies alike recognise the skills shortages within local authorities (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; DBSA, 2009). Officials in five provinces identified skills and capacity shortages, particularly at local government level, as core challenges to effective service delivery. These skills gaps are particularly evident in the areas of engineering, project and financial management, town planning and community development. In addition, there is a need for skills development programmes for local and emerging contractors, as well as skills development and consumer education programmes for community members.\(^6\)

In the projects identified, only two projects in South Africa were deemed ‘responsive’ to this mechanism: Witsands in the Western Cape and Olievenhoutbosch in Gauteng. In both cases, local contractors were up-skilled and constructed the dwellings. Training in sustainable development and consumer education was also provided for community members in both projects (Interviews with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009; and with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Only two projects were arguably ‘somewhat responsive’ to this mechanism. In Zanemvula, a community liaison officer was hired by the HDA, and training in sustainable human settlement development was provided for two small community groups (Interviews with Jacko McCarthy & Phakamile Ximiya on 19 February, 2009). Some community training was also provided in Mount Moriah (Interview with Winston Oakes on 6 May, 2009).

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\(^6\) Survey responses from Kabelo Koloi (Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 2009); Phenyo Leshoe and Peter Mokobane (Northwest, July, 2009); Hanson Mazibuko and Thokozani Hlatshwayo and Gratitude Booyse (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Ntokozo Mabaso and Saligh Suliman (Northern Cape, July, 2009).
2009). Officials linked to the other five projects were unable to identify capacity-building programmes. This is in line with provincial survey responses.

2.6.6 Shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements

This programmatic instrument aims to enable implementers to move beyond the provision of subsidy houses in pursuit of the broader goal of building sustainable human settlements. Means to achieve this end include progressive informal settlement upgrading, the provision of medium-density housing solutions and the proposal that developers should integrate settlements by including 20% low-income housing opportunities within or adjacent to all new residential developments (DOH, 2004a:12). This mechanism also promotes the release of well-located private, para-statal and state-owned land to municipalities for housing developments (DOH, 2004a:13-14).

Though the principle of well-located settlements for the poor is a central feature of BNG, the high cost of land in inner-cities and the reluctance of local authorities to make central city land available for low-income housing developments continue to marginalise low-income earners (Cross, 2008:5).

Officials in Limpopo stated that bulk infrastructure was inadequate, and lengthy approval processes impeded the delivery of sustainable human settlements (Limpopo survey response, Walter Mothapo and Cedric Nemazdzhili, July, 2009). In the Eastern Cape, increasing housing backlogs, the lack of well-located land and shack re-invasion in informal settlement-upgrade projects were listed as impediments to sustainable settlement delivery (Eastern Cape survey response, Calvin Brummer, July, 2009). In the Northwest, delays in enrolment from the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) and the slow release of land were listed as problematic (Northwest Province survey response, Peter Mokobane, July, 2009). Gauteng and Northern Cape provincial and municipal officials also listed

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7 Interviews with Mohlago Masakela on March 18, 2009 (Limpopo); with Jackie Masike on March 31, 2009 (Free State); with Lesley Moremedi on June 17, 2009 (Northwest); with Saligh Suliman on June 25, 2009 (Northern Cape) and with Logan Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga).
challenges with land availability and land transfer (Gauteng survey response, Miemie von Maltitz and Northern Cape survey response, Hastings Nel, July, 2009). In the Free State, lengthy and laborious approval processes and zoning constraints were also seen to impede delivery (Free State survey response, Loyiso Ndenze, July, 2009).

In measuring selected ‘BNG responsive’, projects, three can arguably be deemed ‘responsive,’ (Olievenhoutbosch, Mount Moriah and Witsands); one ‘somewhat responsive’ (Potgietersrus), and five ‘not responsive’ in the shift from subsidy housing delivery to sustainable human settlement delivery. In Olievenhoutbosch and Witsands, banks provided finance for gap housing. Funding was also allocated for multiple-density options and rental accommodation (personal observations and interviews with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009; and with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). In Gauteng, a suitable location was also provided near economic centres (personal observations and interviews with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Durban’s Mount Moriah project provided medium-density bonded and rental housing options, and is well located near commercial and industrial nodes (personal observations and interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009). In Limpopo, though gap housing has been planned, single, free-standing units dominate the Potgietersrus development, and water and sanitation services have not been delivered. However, this development is close to economic activities (personal observations and interview with Walter Mothapo on 18 March, 2009).

In the Northwest, a BNG responsive project could not be identified (Interview with Phenya Leshoe on 17 June, 2009). In the Eastern Cape, Zanemvula is far from economic activities. Planned rental and social accommodation were not delivered against targets, and the same applies to social amenities (personal observations and interview with Jacko McCarthey on 19 February, 2009). In the Northern Cape, the Lerato Park National Priority Project is on hold (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on 25 June, 2009). In Mpumalanga, the Klarinet project has not yet delivered on its sustainable settlement objectives (Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on June 30, 2009). Finally, Grassland (another National Priority Project in the Free State) is far from economic centres; there are no rental or social housing options and no social
amenities (other than a community centre) (personal observations and interview with Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009).

2.6.7 Utilising existing and new housing instruments

In this programmatic response, the provision of subsidy housing continues to underpin delivery. However, these instruments are meant to be enhanced to address demand-side needs. Emphasis is placed on participative planning through ‘enhanced’ People’s Housing Process initiatives. The Enhanced People’s Housing Process (ePHP), which replaced the old PHP programme and which was adopted in July 2008, ostensibly allows for greater flexibility and choice while maintaining the central principles of people-centred development. The policy framework states that beneficiaries should actively participate in decision-making in the housing process and should make a contribution in such a way that:

a. Beneficiaries are empowered individually and collectively so that the community ultimately takes control of the housing process themselves. This includes identifying the land, planning the settlement, getting approvals and resources to begin the development, contracting out or building the houses and providing the services, living in and upgrading their homes and continually improving the community;

b. Various partnerships are created;

c. Social capital is retained and expanded upon as the process builds on existing livelihood strategies and creates all kinds of associated poverty alleviation opportunities for the community;

d. Housing is valued as an asset far beyond its monetary value for all the value added components it provides for individual household members and for the family as a whole;

e. Housing citizenship is built, with beneficiaries being aware of their housing rights and responsibilities;

f. Local economic development is promoted with money spent being kept in the community, thereby increasing the local multiplier effect;
g. Stable communities with a direct stake in the future of their neighbourhoods are fostered;

h. Houses are built that are better suited to the needs of individual households;

i. Women and the youth are more directly involved in the process, ensuring skills transfer;

j. Human settlements are built that are more sustainable because they are more inclusive and more responsive to the needs of the community and because communities have invested directly in the process (DHS, 2009:9-10).

Demand-side responses are also spotlighted via the provision of social and rental housing (DOH, 2004a:16). New instruments include support and funding for informal settlement upgrades through phased, in-situ upgrading (DOH, 2004a:17). This instrument aims to support social cohesion within communities, to minimise community disruption and to enhance participation (DOH, 2004a:17). The enhanced People’s Housing Process (PHP) instrument calls for the redefinition of ‘...the nature, focus and content of PHP in order to build greater consensus and understanding between all stakeholders of the focus and intention of PHP in order to address previous contradictions in the PHP delivery process’ (DOH, 2004a:17,18).

Another instrument that is purported within this BNG responsive mechanism facilitates the establishment of effectively managed social, medium-density housing. Social housing includes mixed-income opportunities in apartments, multi-level flats, cooperative group-housing units, communal and transitional housing developments. New funding instruments based on the needs of the project are also meant to be provided, and institutional capacity is meant to be scaled up through national social-housing accreditation institutions and establishment grants via the Social Housing Foundation (DOH, 2004a:18-20).

Though enhanced PHP aims to improve housing delivery, BNG does not specify how these processes will be effectively implemented and, as a result, questions arise as to the effectiveness of the various PHP models. Tomlinson questions whether this
new approach will match the scale of delivery achieved by previously contractor-driven responses (Tomlinson, 2006:99).

In an attempt to strengthen the social accord with civil society, and to increase the effectiveness of PHP processes, the National Department of Human Settlements signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Federation of the Urban Poor (Fedup) and Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in September, 2008 (DOH, 2009:51). Fedup and SDI were, and still are, arguably the largest network of civil activists in the housing/micro-savings sector in South Africa. In order to effect the MoU between government and Fedup/SDI, joint working groups were established in nine provinces. A consultation model was also established for other partnering agencies, in which a code of ethics, roles and responsibilities were delineated (DOH, 2008:52).

In May, 2008 PEER Africa was tasked to review the Federation’s progress and to provide critical feedback for the Federation. PEER found that the unrealistic expectations of Federation members increased the rate of delivery failure. For example, PEER concluded that project management and conflict-resolution skills, and the systems required to build self-help houses within the Federation were seriously lacking (Guy, 2009:10; Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). PEER explained that the overall Fedup PHP model lacked realistic project plans; dedicated and skilled PHP project managers with clearly defined tasks; clear and transparent budgets and formal contractual and reporting agreements (Guy, 2009:10,19).

In addition, Federation members and members of their Community Construction Management Teams (CCMTs) had unrealistic expectations regarding housing size and delivery. For example, PEER found that community members expected to build 56 square metre houses on the assumption that CCMT beneficiaries would make up the difference in cost between the subsidy allocation and the cost of a larger unit, without the requisite savings set aside for an improved product. PEER stated that this was a defective value proposition and a ‘departure of expectation from reality’ (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009).
PEER concluded that the current Fedup project model is too ambitious and is inherently high-risk. In this model, less-skilled, dispersed and often isolated community contractors are expected to ‘out-perform’ larger, more experienced contractors. In other words, community contractors were being called upon to produce larger units without concurrent budgets and project management systems in place (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). PEER’s final recommendation was that Fedup should agree on a short-, mid- and long-term plan of action in order to rectify delivery problems (Guy, 2009:22).

Though the South African chapter of SDI struggles with delivery, others within the SDI network are more successful. In Lilongwe (Malawi), 50 women from the Mtandire informal settlement in Lilongwe City formed a savings club in 2003. These women also married the concept of savings to housing delivery. Moreover, their savings club at present has over 15,000 members, and is now affiliated to SDI through the Malawi Homeless People’s Federation (MHPF) (Manda et al., 2011:4). By December 2010, Malawi Federation groups had successfully negotiated with government and acquired land for over 3,000 members in several urban centres (Manda et al., 2011:4). The main difference between the South African and Malawian approaches to mobilising savings for housing is the provision of training and capacity-building programmes for Malawian savers and builders, which has yielded positive results in Malawi (Manda et al., 2011:7).

Other challenges identified in PHP delivery in South Africa include resistance from housing authorities to work with organised civil society, lack of technical capacity in supporting the PHP process both on government and civic levels, and lack of integration and alignment in municipal and provincial planning and budget cycles (DOH: 2009:51). Lemanski (2008:399) argues that beneficiary participation in the housing process can be viewed as a poverty reduction mechanism. However, capacity must be built in communities in order to enable community members to collectively identify problems and consider solutions. Lemanski (2008:399) also argues that community incapacity hinders successful housing delivery and constrains the potential for poverty alleviation. In addition, he identifies the following factors for non-delivery in South Africa: internal divergent agendas; organisational
inexperience with managing community processes; external exploitation and controls; and structural constraints (Lemanski, 2008:399).

In addition to the promotion of an ‘enhanced’ People’s Housing Process, BNG also advocates upgrading informal settlements. Though BNG promoted this instrument in 2004, it was only in 2008 that a general consensus was built around in-situ upgrades of existing informal settlements that were well-located. Critical attention was also paid to building mixed-income settlements which could draw middle-income earners into the city’s tax pool, while cross-subsidising lower-income earners (Cross, 2008:6). The National Upgrading Support Programme was established to provide support to municipalities for in-situ upgrading. A project process guide is currently being compiled to assist developers, contractors and implementers working on in-situ upgrade projects, and this guide will also function as a project-management and monitoring tool for project managers (Topham, 2010). Though in-situ upgrades are being promoted, their implementation requires strong social compacts and extensive participative engagement. There are few officials trained in participatory strategies, and many are simply unwilling to engage in these intensive processes.  

Though the use of existing and new housing instruments is meant to enhance delivery and shift the housing sector away from single-dwelling subsidy developments, subsidy housing still dominates the low-income settlement delivery agenda. Very few best practice projects include in-situ upgrades, PHP, social/rental housing units, or densified units. It must be added that though officials and developers in the projects identified have delivered better quality units which do afford privacy, the only projects which have incorporated gap housing are Olievenhoutbosch in Gauteng and Witsands in the Western Cape (personal observations and interviews with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009; and with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Gap housing has been planned and budgeted for in Potgietersrus in Limpopo, but had not yet been delivered at the time of the author’s site visit (Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009). Rental and higher-

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8 This observation was made in three executive courses run at the Sustainability Institute in 2009 and in 2010 wherein the bulk of officials attending the courses suggested that community members should simply be happy with the housing and services that government provides, without complaint; that it is the government’s responsibility to make decisions for communities; and that participatory processes are messy and slow down already cumbersome delivery processes.
density units have been built in Olievenhoutbosch and Witsands, and training for community members was provided in both projects (personal observations and interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010 and interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). Higher-density options have been built in Mount Moriah (personal observations and interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009). Witsands is the only ‘best practice’ project identified which included PHP processes in its development model (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). Project teams linked to six selected provincial projects could not identify project-related strategies which responded to this BNG objective.9

2.6.8 Supporting the entire residential property market

This instrument aims to provide support not only for households that qualify for a uniform subsidy, but also for lower-middle income (or gap) households (earning between R3,500 and R7,000 per month) by collapsing subsidy bands in order to incentivise private sector investment. New subsidies and financial instruments linked to household savings and loans from financial institutions are meant to facilitate access to financial assistance for gap households, while overcoming the down-payment barrier experienced by this income group (DOH, 2004a:7-8). This instrument is meant to shift the delivery focus from a one household – one plot delivery format to a demand-responsive approach that includes the provision of funding for a variety of housing typologies, tenure options and delivery mechanisms for various income groups with differing needs (DOH, 2004a:8).

In response to the provision of various tenure options, DHS continues to provide subsidies for no- and low-income earners using a variety of subsidy and loan mechanisms. However, in the provision of subsidies and loans for low- to middle-income earners who do not fall within the subsidy band, questions arise as to the

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9 Interview with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009 (Eastern Cape); interview with Logan Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga); interview with Mamiki Maboya on March 31, 2009 (Free State); interview with Saligh Suliman on June 25, 2009 (Northern Cape); interview with Logan Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga) and interview with Mohlago Masekela on March 18, 2009 (Limpopo).
ability of these earners to access housing finance. For example, the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act (Act 53 of 2003), which led to the Financial Sector Charter\textsuperscript{10}, gave low-income earners the ability to access credit. This has led to excessive indebtedness in low-income households, particularly with regard to credit and shop cards, thereby undermining their ability to access housing finance (Rust, 2006:9).

Project responsiveness to this mechanism suggests that five nominated ‘best practice’ projects are ‘non-responsive’, as they only provide free-standing subsidised housing units (personal observations during site visits). Mount Moriah in Durban is somewhat responsive, as some densified options were made available (Interview with Winston Oakes on 6 May, 2009). In Limpopo, the Potgietersrus project is also ‘somewhat responsive’ (Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009). Once again Witsands and Olivenhoutbosch are the only two projects that can arguably be deemed ‘responsive’ (personal observations and interviews with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010 and with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009).

2.6.9 Utilising housing as a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy

BNG aims to promote job creation through the use of labour-intensive construction methods and through investment in socio-economic and technological infrastructure. On-site materials production is encouraged and capacity-building programmes for black economic empowerment in the construction sector are also mandated (DOH, 2004a:25).

Officials surveyed listed several criteria for job creation strategies in poor communities. Walter Mothapo (Interview with Walter Mothapo on 18 March, 2009) viewed location as a core part of the job creation agenda. Others included the use of local labour (Interviews with Mothusi Guy & Patrick Hlwili on 25 May, 2009). One

\textsuperscript{10} In 2002, National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) committed itself to the development of a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) charter. The Financial Sector Charter is a transformation charter in terms of the BEE Act (Act 53 of 2003). It aims to transform the financial sector through the provision of accessible financial services to black South Africans.
provincial official (in the Free State) felt that the development of a local community centre which provided a number of jobs for local community members was responsive to this mechanism (interview with Caren Somiah on 31 March, 2009). However, only Witsands in the Western Cape incorporated an exhaustive job-creation strategy through training, small-business development, linkages to economic activities within and outside the local geographic area and a business model that required three income-generating projects to run concurrently in case one or two failed to generate income (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). It is therefore understandable that this project was deemed ‘responsive’ to this policy directive.

Four other projects were deemed ‘somewhat responsive’. As mentioned above, the Grassland project team in the Free State included a community centre in its project planning model. This centre provided jobs for crèche workers. It also provided space and support for sewing and beading projects, which generate income through sales of school uniforms to local schools and beadwork sales through a local craft market. The location of this project, next to a middle-income community, also enabled some local residents to find employment as domestic help in the neighbouring community (Interview with Adelina Dibeco on 31 March, 2009). Mount Moriah and Olievenhoutbosch included the use of local labour, and both projects are located close to commercial and economic activities (Interviews with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009 and Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Limpopo’s Potgietersrus project is also well-located, with easy access to social services and economic activities (personal observations during site visits). Though location is a key factor in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo, job creation strategies were not established per se, and it must again be noted that these selected projects are not representative of all projects within the provinces. The Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Northwest and Northern Cape projects were deemed ‘non-responsive’ to this mechanism, as none of these project teams utilised instruments to create jobs.††

†† Interviews with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009 (Eastern Cape); with V. Mtsweni on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga); with Peter Mokobane on June 17, 2009 (Northwest) and with Lennie Barnes on June 25, 2009 (Northern Cape).
2.6.10 Establishing monitoring and evaluation systems

This instrument aims to improve data collection, information management systems, performance measurement, and monitoring and evaluation within the housing sector. New systems are meant to track and store more accurate information, particularly regarding subsidy housing (DOH, 2004a: 27). Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) systems aim to enable the three spheres of government to report on their performance in respect of the implementation of BNG against a set of measurable indicators. The monitoring system was enhanced to monitor provincial housing departments in meeting targets set in the various provincial business plans. The monitoring process is also meant to verify and validate the value of products delivered under conditional grants (DOH, 2009:7-8).

Though the Municipal Finance and Management Act (MFMA) (Act 56 of 2003) requires strict reporting from municipal finance officials on expenditures, only three projects visited had monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) systems in place to measure project performance against BNG objectives and locally determined project goals. For example, PEER Africa (Witsands) measured economic performance against the number of job creation/business-development strategies in the pipeline (within the community) at any given time; PEER Africa measured the number of community members trained in sustainable settlement development design (with a particular focus on energy efficiency); the number of people trained to build houses and the number of community members working on locally constructed housing projects (Interview with Patrick Hlwili on 25 May, 2009). BIGEN Africa (Olievenhoutbosch) measured project progress by the variety of housing typologies and delivery mechanisms utilised (gap, densified options, rental stock); the location of the settlement near to economic activities and the number of small contractors used within the development project (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). In Mount Moriah, the city measured progress against improved levels of service, the provision of a variety of housing typologies and options (rental and densified options) and the number of trained community members. Limpopo, on the other hand, was deemed ‘somewhat responsive’. Though officials and Standard Bank verbalised that they had agreed in principle to adopt ecological design criteria in the design process (north orientation, the use of overhangs and solar water...
heating) and to include gap housing and training in the development process, these criteria had not been reduced to an MER system against which to measure progress (Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009).

Though monitoring and evaluation is a foundational principle of BNG, the Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment (MEIA) Policy and Implementation Framework was only established in the housing sector in 2009. This system requires all three spheres of government to report on BNG performance against measurable indicators, and requires provinces and municipalities to measure progress, success and failure against targets set in provincial and local government business plans (DOH, 2009:7). At the time of this study, the MEIA system was not yet in place.

2.7 Conclusion

It seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganised. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organising, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization (Charlton Ogburn, Jr. 1957).

According to Menguele et al. (2008:179) though BNG presents a developmental vision, questions arise as to whether the state has the technical, managerial and administrative capacity to deliver on its ambitious vision. Moreover, many of the critical programmatic responses advanced in BNG were not finalised when it was promulgated in 2004. For example, in 2004, a plan of action to integrate government departments and interests in sustainable settlement delivery was lacking and still is (Menguele et al., 2008:195). This will be explored in the sections to come. In 2004, developers and banks responded to state incentives in the subsidy market on a voluntary basis, and they continue to do so. Up until 2009, a robust monitoring and evaluation system was lacking (DOH, 2009:7). By 2010, only 27 municipalities countrywide were accredited (Sexwale, 2010). According to Pieterse and Van Donk
vertical and horizontal integration in delivering sustainable human settlements was still severely challenged years after BNG was promulgated.

On a broader level, post-apartheid public sector restructuring continues to leave chaos in its wake. For example, in 1993 the City of Cape Town was governed by 61 municipalities and managed by 17 separate administrations. Thereafter, Cape Town established seven local government authorities from the former 61 municipalities in order to strive for more autonomy. The Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998) outlined new systems of metropolitan government leading to the establishment of the Cape Town Unicity – a single-tiered form of metropolitan government. This so-called “Unicity” structure secured a single metropolitan tax base in an attempt to address development disparities. This process of municipal restructuring and its impact on service provision has been well documented (Khosa, 2000; Parnell & Pieterse, 2002; Jaglin, 2004). Formerly segregated white local authorities (WLAs) and black local authorities (BLAs) were amalgamated in an attempt to ensure greater equity between rich and poor communities, and to help standardize service delivery. This restructuring process has taken its toll. Institutional memory loss and capacity gaps are evident throughout the country (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; DBSA, 2009). Capacity-building programmes are not keeping up with the vast need (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; DBSA, 2009). Moreover, participation strategies between government and communities in establishing integrated sustainable human settlements are near non-existent (this is explored below).

This highly complex process of transforming and de-racialising political governance was also underpinned by the ‘new public management’ approach to institutional reform and the decentralization of some national government functions to local government level. Privatization, service delivery on a cost-recovery basis and the implementation of performance management systems were also part of the process of institutional reform (Wilkinson, 2004; Parnell & Pieterse, 2002). By 2008,
municipal services in Cape Town were still delivered either directly by or through sub-contractors via the City of Cape Town.\textsuperscript{12}

Like most other South African cities, even a cursory glance at Cape Town and its sprawling informal settlements suggests development patterns have not changed much in the last 15 years. At the time of this study, planning and zoning regulations had not been updated to reflect a more democratic approach and RDP and low-income housing developments are still burgeoning on the urban peripheries. Significantly, there have been no changes to the way in which housing, energy, water, sanitation, solid waste and other services are delivered and distributed (Cullinan, 2006:3).

Continuing with the Cape Town example, one can understand Bond’s argument that a new form of class apartheid has emerged (Bond, 2003). According to Swilling (2006:33-34), there were nearly 800,000 households in Cape Town in 2006, with a rapidly expanding population of around 3.5 million people, 30\% of whom were unemployed. More than 50\% of Cape Town’s population was classified as poor in 2006, and it was estimated that 16\% of the richest households occupied some 40\% of the total surface area (Swilling, 2006:33-34). The legacy of land control and unequal land ownership continues to hinder low-income housing delivery, while protecting private property rights of the wealthy and elites (Thomas, 2010:7). In summary, systematic institutional fragmentation and the lack of skilled capacity to deliver against policy goals have served to increase development inequalities rather than alleviating them.

Though BNG promotes access to housing and services for all, these services are dependent on fiscal resources. A constant theme within government administrations has been the need to address the service backlogs in the poorer areas of cities. However, this has major implications for capital and operating expenditures in city service-delivery sectors (particularly energy, waste, water, sanitation and housing)

\textsuperscript{12} This conclusion was drawn after various workshops were held with City officials in 2008. These workshops formed part of a United Nations Development Programme - funded baseline analysis of services and financial streams in the City of Cape Town.
which, together, account for the bulk of city expenditure.¹³ For example, in 2007, there was a general consensus that the rollout of basic services to meet the needs of the poor could no longer be at the expense of essential maintenance and refurbishment of existing city-wide infrastructures.¹⁴

In the next chapter, two South African best practice case studies, as designated by provincial and local government officials, are measured against the same BNG policy objectives discussed previously. Additionally, ‘locally’ defined objectives set out by the implementing agents themselves are explored.

¹³ This information was gleaned in a workshop run by Aneel Radhakrishna with City of Cape Town finance officers and the researcher on 8 October, 2007.
¹⁴ Ibid
Chapter 3: Case Studies

3.1 Introduction

In December 2008, the then National Department of Housing (NDOH) and the Sustainability Institute (SI) signed a Memorandum of Agreement detailing a collaborative three year capacity-building programme. This programme aimed to assist the NDOH with operationalising BNG. The researcher of this study is also the programme coordinator for the NDOH programme, and thus had access to all case-study information as detailed below.

Deliverables in Phase One included surveys of provincial and local government housing and human settlement officials, as well as site visits to national “Priority Projects” and government-designated BNG responsive projects. The purpose of these visits was to gain a better understanding of project processes, current stages of development, successes and challenges related to BNG implementation, and to ascertain capacity needs at provincial and local government level with regard to integrated settlement planning and delivery. As explored in the previous chapter, information was gained from provincial and local government officials in each province, as well as from contractors assigned to the respective projects.\textsuperscript{15} Chapter two provides an in-depth analysis of two case studies, namely Olievenhoutbosch in Gauteng and Zanemvula in the Eastern Cape. Each case study concludes with an analysis of policy and project achievements measured against policy and locally defined project goals.

3.2 Case study 1: Tshwane - Olievenhoutbosch

In July 2009, Olievenhoutbosch (OVB) was nominated by the City of Tshwane as the best practice BNG case study for Gauteng. In July 2009 and December 2009,\textsuperscript{15} Questions posed included: Are these projects deemed BNG responsive? Why? What were the challenges and constraints in delivering against BNG targets? Were additional objectives set by the project teams, and were these objectives met? What were the lessons learnt?
interviews and a site visit were arranged by the Tshwane Department of Housing. Another site visit occurred in December 2010. Community members were interviewed, as were provincial and local government officials and the director of the consulting engineering firm (Bigen Africa).

3.2.1 Overview

In response to the Financial Sector Charter and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) - signed between the Banking Association of South Africa and the National Minister of Housing in 2004 – ABSA utilised an existing property in their portfolio to build Olievenhoutbosch. The City of Tshwane (COT) deems this project ‘best practice’; firstly, because it aims to respond to the BNG instruments of redefining institutional arrangements within government; integration of racial and socio-economic groups and the provision of a variety of housing typologies and finance mechanisms. Secondly, it includes social services and amenities (a sports ground, community facilities, a library, a shopping complex, taxi ranks) in addition to providing houses and basic services. Thirdly, it provides access to economic opportunities and employment through Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) job creation initiatives, and capacity-building through accredited skills training programmes (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). These responses are in line with the BNG instruments as defined in chapter one.

3.2.2 Area challenges prior to development

When interviewed about conditions in Choba (one of OVBs informal settlements) prior to development, respondents described the conditions as ‘very bad’ (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). For example: there were no toilets in Choba, so residents used the bush to relieve themselves (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010). It was difficult to access water in the settlement. There was no electricity; paraffin stoves were used for cooking; many suffered from hunger and there was very little space between shacks (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010). People migrated to these camps for various reasons.
The reasons cited included: unemployment and the concomitant need to live closer to economic opportunities; many could not afford to pay rent for existing accommodation so they moved to the informal settlements, and family arguments caused some to leave their family home and migrate to the informal settlements. Most were unable to purchase their own house and some were on waiting lists for RDP housing (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).

Camp 1 (another informal settlement in OVB) conditions were also described as ‘inhumane’. People used the long drop toilet system; sanitation provision was inadequate and many people fell victim to dysentery and other diseases (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). In Camp 2, one resident described the shacks as hot and leaky (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). The bucket toilet system was ineffectively used and it was reported that residents sometimes found human excrement on their doorstep (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). Rats ate food left out of sealed containers (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). Overcrowding, and a general lack of privacy between parents and children rendered living conditions difficult (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010).

One resident, Paulina Mohale, stated the following:

I used to live in a shack in Camp 2, before we were moved into our houses. Living in a shack wasn’t good at all. We struggled with water leaking through the roof during the rainy season, and in summer the shacks really got very hot. The community toilets did not flush; we had to use the bucket system and it was not impressive at all. There was no privacy because the toilets were public. Everyone used the toilets. Drunken people who would leave the place in a terrible state also used the toilets. We had to clean up their mess. Camp 2 wasn’t healthy at all because the water that people used for bathing was disposed of in the streets; the very same streets that everybody had to walk on. Previously we lived in Kayalami with my mother (on a plot), before we moved to Olieven (Olievenhoutbosch). My mother realized that shacks were being built in Olieven so she decided to buy a shack. Then I moved with her.
It took a while for our RDP house to be built. It must have taken a period of five to six years (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010).

Officials allocating houses stated that these informal settlements were generally not conducive to human habitation. The lack of adequate water and sanitation created environments conducive to cholera outbreaks, and adverse conditions in the settlements affected people’s dignity (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). However, despite these negatives, some residents reported that living under such difficult conditions made them survivors, tougher and with a greater ability to cope with life’s challenges (Interview with Margaret Mohale on 3 December, 2010).

3.2.3 Institutional arrangements

Stakeholders in the developmental process included the City of Tshwane (as developer with ABSA); various national and provincial government departments (including the Department of Public Works, the Department of Energy, the local utility services departments, the Department of Social Development) and Bigen Africa – a consulting engineering firm (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). ABSA Devco was the ‘turnkey contractor’; and the informal dwellers in Choba and Camp 1 and 2 were the target market for the development. Interestingly, residents in these three informal settlements represented a variety of income groups, which included people who qualified for a housing subsidy; people who earned too much to qualify; and people who were renting informal accommodation and wished to continue renting in a formal environment (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).

Another interesting feature in OVB was that development professionals reportedly did not sit in their offices designing the development from afar. They visited the site and the community members on a regular basis (Interview with Thokozani

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16 ‘Turnkey’ is a term commonly used in the construction sector, and is used to describe a home built on the developer-financed land. A ‘turnkey home’ is a home with a complete structure and finished interior, with everything ready for the occupant or homeowner to move in.
Hlatshwayo on 2 December, 2010). This was evident in the interviews, in which many community members knew the names of the officials working on the project.

A key stakeholder, Bigen Africa, described their role as ‘facilitating development activism’ (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). They reportedly ‘translated’ the different ‘languages’ of the various stakeholders in the development process in order to achieve improved communication and enhanced delivery. They stated that the developers did not know how to talk finance; the banks did not know how to talk development; government at times did not know how to talk development or finance; and no-one seemed to know how to talk to the community members (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Development activism was defined as the process of bridging language and ideological gaps between ‘knowns’ and ‘unknowns’ for the benefit of professional role players and community members (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

Bigen Africa also assisted with legal planning, researching and negotiating appropriate institutional modalities, and advising government and the private sector on the way forward (Interview with Anton Boschoff on December 2, 2010). Their aim was to craft a development process for the stakeholders involved, and to deliver a final product for the City of Tshwane that was operationally sound, easy to manage and financially viable (Interviews with Anton Boschoff & Mala Harrilal on December 2, 2010).

3.2.4 Financing the development

Prior to 2004, the City of Tshwane relied on subsidy allocations from national and provincial government for low-income housing provision, which reportedly prevented the city from delivering integrated, sustainable human settlements (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). In order to improve housing delivery post-BNG, the city wrote a policy which resolved to provide additional top-up funding for improved quality of services for low-income housing developments. They also resolved to work in partnership with ABSA (Interviews with Anton Boschoff & Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).
The Olievenhoutbosch funding model allocated financial responsibilities and risks to those best equipped to deal with them. For example, government was equipped to handle institutional risks, which were in the region of 80 – 90% of the overall development risk. This was significant for the private sector, which was then willing to accept 10 – 20% of the development risk (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

As mentioned previously, all three spheres of government played a role in defining the design and implementation of OVB. The National Department of Housing (NDOH) played a custodial role in the development process. The NDOH made sure financial policies were in place to attract private sector investment and the required grant funding was passed on to the city as the developer (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). In the case of OVB, the city had the advantage of a top-up policy for additional services, which reassured the private sector that sufficient funding would be in place to deliver a quality product. ABSA also contributed to a higher level of service for OVB in order to attract bonded investors (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

Financial responsibilities were allocated to different government spheres, and to ABSA. The lifecycle of the project was also taken into account, with funding allocated to various stages of the lifecycle. These stages included: project identification, project definition and development, project implementation, operation and maintenance. Government and ABSA Devco were responsible for capital costs, and local government as well as end users were responsible for operational and maintenance costs (Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).

Subsidy houses were funded by government and bonded houses were funded by ABSA Devco. Due to economies of scale, the bonded houses received benefits through the use of bulk services supplied for the subsidised units. ABSA Devco provided necessary bridging finance for government where required and carried its own market risk on all bonded units in the township. ABSA also provided bridging finance for the development due to the fact that the city budget cycle began in July and national and provincial governments’ budget cycles began in April, which
resulted in budgetary and allocative inefficiencies. Government re-paid ABSA on commercial terms (Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).

Subsidies from national and provincial government (including municipal infrastructure grant funding) were blended with city finances and covered costs for roads, water provision, sewer reticulation, storm-water drainage and top structures. The city’s infrastructure standards were 5% higher than other municipalities. However, Tshwane’s unique top-up policy made additional funding available for a higher level of service in the beginning phase of the project (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Financial modelling purportedly revealed that the additional up-front costs would save the city money in future (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Funding was also provided for social facilitation, beneficiary administration and consumer education before and after construction. However, it must be noted that only 2% of the development budget was allocated to these processes (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). It must also be noted that the Tshwane’s Housing Department does not have a fund for maintenance. Once the project was completed, the Department of Public Works maintained it. According to Bigen Africa, the higher quality of housing products and services delivered would reduce the amount of maintenance required in future (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Subsidy-housing beneficiaries were given one year to come back to the municipality to present any infrastructure problems (Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).

3.2.5 Tshwane’s ‘sustainable development’ process

In Olievenhoutbosch, the city aimed to deliver an integrated, sustainable settlement by following the BNG objectives of providing a variety of housing typologies for mixed income and mixed racial groups; hiring and training emerging contractors; planning for and providing social amenities and making use of public and private partnerships. Additionally, Tshwane provided an improved level of infrastructure and utilised enhanced financial mechanisms to eradicate three informal settlements.
The City of Tshwane attempted to mitigate negative environmental impacts through the use of ecological design techniques. The project team designed north-facing houses, placed larger windows on the north side of buildings, utilised overhangs, ceilings, appropriate ventilation, and recycled and local building materials. The team also viewed the hiring and training of local and emerging contractors as a sustainable intervention. They also included the use of alternate forms of electricity like solar street lights and solar water heaters (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010). The Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF provided training programmes on the greening aspects of development. DWAF donated fruit trees and taught residents how to take care of them. Project-greening activities included planting trees along the roads and creating natural drainage areas as well as flood-attenuation ponds. In this respect, “plant a tree” days were announced, and many residents began planting their own trees and grass at home (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Amenities were located close to the residents, and spatial planning included local and easy-to-access schools, shopping centres, taxi ranks and informal trading centres (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).

The process of integrated development also aimed to include the integration of communities in OVB. It was emphasised that learning should not come from government officials but that residents should learn from each other. Residents of various racial and socio-economic backgrounds live together in Olievenhoutbosch, thus breaking with the previous dispensation’s segregation of racial groups.

Olievenhoutbosch also aimed to be financially sustainable for residents and council. Residents had a sense of ownership and an investment to protect. The council benefited from rates income which, in turn, made services and funds available for poorly remunerated families and individuals. Olievenhoutbosch was designed to attract investors to create a quality development with local employment opportunities; a ‘place to live, work and play’. Project officials and contractors hoped that this integrated model of development would prevent Olievenhoutbosch from regressing into a future slum (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).
3.2.6 Housing options and typologies

According to the City of Tshwane, Olievenhoutbosch catered for subsidy housing, institutional rental housing (rental units and rent-to-buy units) and gap housing for those who qualified for bonds (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010). The process of allocating units was meant to be racially neutral, though income driven. Fully subsidised housing was provided for the poorest of the poor, bonded units were built for all racial groups who qualified, and social (rental) housing was provided for those who had access to money for monthly rental payments (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010).

Land ownership changed through the life cycle of the project. Originally owned by ABSA, the subsidised and bonded units were then handed over to beneficiaries, either through government or an investor. Subsidised and bonded houses were essentially freehold. Institutional rental housing, on the other hand, was owned by the Social Housing Foundation, which then made units available on a lease or rent-to-buy basis (Interviews with Anton Boschoff and Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).

Subsidised units were constructed for those who qualified for a housing subsidy and earned less than R3,500 a month. Subsidised units included free-standing houses of 36 square metres; semi-detached houses of between 38 and 40 square metres (see Figure 3.1) and walk-ups. Institutional rental housing units (in blocks of flats) were meant to house families earning between R3,501 and R7,500 a month. There were major challenges with the management of and income received in the rental housing sector. Thus this initiative did not prove very successful (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010). Bonded houses were designed for those earning R7,500 a month and more (see Figure 3.2), and were designed according to approved bond criteria and applicants’ specifications (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).
3.2.6.1 Identification of housing beneficiaries

The City of Tshwane identifies subsidy housing beneficiaries for greenfield developments from their database, which dates back to 1996. Theoretically, those who have been on the list for the longest period of time are eligible for housing opportunities first. The city numbers shacks and these numbers are then given to the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing for subsidy approval. Criteria which city officials take into account in the beneficiary selection process include household income levels, number of people in the household, number of financial dependents, and whether the applicant previously owned a house (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010).

In Tshwane, a number of factors determine house allocations. Elderly people who find it difficult to live in walk-ups are allocated ground level units, while double-story units are allocated to needy youth. Family size is also a determining factor. For example, Tshwane is reluctant to put a large family in a semi-detached house which cannot be expanded, and will thus allocate a free-standing house that can be expanded. According to Komane (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010) a certain amount of discretion is required from housing practitioners in housing allocation.

According to the city, the biggest challenge with beneficiary identification in OVB was political. Olievenhoutbosch fell within the City of Tshwane but bordered on Johannesburg’s metropolitan boundaries. This made it difficult to establish who should be included as beneficiaries. Once the politics were settled and there was a mandate from the political party to progress, ward committees began to contribute. It was then a matter of relocating the selected community members. Olievenhoutbosch had a large population and there was a shortage of stands. Though the City of Tshwane made attempts to densify the development (as reflected as in Figure 3.3), there were still community members who did not receive houses.
3.2.7 Economic development

Olievenhoutbosch residents intimated that business and economic opportunities had improved for them since moving into the development. Paulina Mohale stated: “I even run my own business now and God has allowed it to grow. I’ve found a full-time income in Olieven. Before moving here I didn’t even run a business” (Interview with Paulina Mohale 3 December, 2010). Mohale is currently expanding her garage so she can grow her catering business and hire staff to assist her (Interview with Paulina Mohale 3 December, 2010). After moving to OVB, Gary Moodley said that he was inspired to study again. He later qualified as an electrician, and bought a business selling electricity to community members (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). Other residents own spaza shops, hair salons, clothing stores and provide various other necessary services to residents (personal observation and interview with Mala Harrilal on 3 December, 2010).

3.2.8 Racial and socio-economic integration

Residents interviewed were Indian and African, and came from different parts of the country. Some reported that their own stereotypes regarding other races had been challenged as they spent time together in Olieven (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). It was reported that first-hand knowledge of other cultures helped
residents develop empathy toward one another, and there was an easing of racial tension over time (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010).

Moodley (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010) experienced an easing of racial tension with white people, who came to OVB to help their employees with their homes and also reported that his own stereotypes of white people had been challenged through this experience. He stated that many residents gained first-hand knowledge of other cultures through their own personal experiences – not via hearsay – and the experience was ranked as a positive, ‘nation-building’ exercise.

Community members also reported that mixing different income groups led to improved relationships between them. Poor community members learned to ‘think bigger’, and wealthier community members gained a better understanding of the circumstances of the poor (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010).

According to Margaret Molefe:

Olieven has changed. I’m saying this because we now see each other as one regardless of our different languages or skin colour. There’s nobody who can say this one belongs to that side and this one to the other. We are united and building each other. Life has changed because I’ve seen white people enter this neighbourhood in their cars. They even enter into these houses to see what they can do to help. Most peoples’ bosses do come here to fix their houses. Things have really changed because white people accept and welcome us when we meet. It’s peaceful. People from Olieven love and accept other people; they don’t discriminate against each other. I believe this is a good housing project because there’s no gap between social classes. We were all given houses. They didn’t say this one is rich; she will therefore get the house. We were all given houses without discrimination (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010).
3.2.9 Community responses

When interviewing community members in OVB, the general consensus was that government was recognised as playing a positive role in the development (Interviews with Paulina Mohale, Margaret Molefe & Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). However, concern was expressed about how slow the process was (Mohale, 2010). The need for replicability was also expressed by community members. ABSA and Bigen Africa were recognised as major role players and were also generally perceived in a positive light (Interviews with Paulina Mohale, Margaret Molefe & Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010).

Subsidy home owners interviewed were delighted to have indoor toilets and water, gardens and electricity (Interviews with Paulina Mohale & Margaret Molefe on December 3, 2010). They expressed gratitude to God, the government and ABSA (Interview with Paulina Mohale on December 3, 2010). There was also a desire to see others enjoy these amenities (Interview with Paulina Mohale on December 3, 2010).

Margaret Molefe stated that:

I was over the moon with excitement when I was given the key to the house which I currently live in. I couldn’t believe that I had finally been given a house. I still can’t believe that I have a house of my own. I’m so excited to be living in this house. My life has completely changed because I don’t have to worry myself about water coming into my house when it rains. I now have a toilet inside the house, I have water and I now have a garden where I’m able to plant vegetables. I even have electricity. I have good neighbours and we are treating each other well even though there are a few that are not so good. Good people surround me; we try to build each other.

I feel alive and accepted here. People who live in the nicer houses come to me to discuss certain issues. I feel accepted in this community. We were united while we were still living in shacks but we were not as close as we are now. The people within our community have embraced unity; we are now a team. We are comfortable with each other. We all greet one another. That’s
how we grew to know each other; we now call each other as neighbours. We even know each other’s physical addresses. We’ve been able to live together and we build each other (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010).

A few negative comments were noted, namely that houses and kitchens were described as small and an extra space would have been ‘nice’ (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 2 December, 2010). However, one resident with a two-room house had already begun improving it by building backyard rooms and a small business (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010).

3.2.10 Monitoring and evaluation

In OVB, monitoring and evaluation systems were established by Bigen Africa, and outputs were measured against original targets. Measurable indicators included the establishment of a working, institutional and financial model and the delivery of 5,000 mixed-income, mixed-density housing opportunities. Indicators also included the provision of an improved level of basic and social services, the provision of training and the delivery of consumer-education programmes for community members. Timeframes for delivery were reportedly measured and adhered to (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).

3.3 Conclusion

The main objective of officials and professionals in Olievenhoutbosch was to move beyond the provision of subsidy housing for the poor, and to deliver well-located, racially and socio-economically mixed communities with social amenities. This is responsive to the BNG directives of shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements; the use of existing and new housing instruments and support for the entire residential property market. Tshwane officials and other professionals expressed the desire to replicate the project methodology elsewhere, so more people could benefit (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).
It can be said that OVB is also responsive to the BNG instrument of redefining institutional arrangements within government. The level of commitment from various role-players was unique, and enabled the project to finish within deadlines, and against targets. These role-players included Bigen Africa, the City of Tshwane, ABSA, provincial and national government departments (including the Department of Public Works), and community members. Though Public Works provided some jobs during the construction of the project, these jobs were fixed term. However, the location of the development enabled community members easier access to economic opportunities. Knock-on effects within the development included enabling residents to start and run their own businesses.

When measuring the mechanism of information, communication and awareness building, the professional communication model in OVB was well documented. Officials and project leaders met regularly, defined project goals and monitored these goals regularly. Though community demographics were taken into account and community members taken through a consumer-education course, there was little evidence that community leaders were able to provide meaningful input in the design phases of the development. The fact that only 2% of the project budget was allocated to social and participatory development reflects the acute lack of participation of communities in settlement planning.

Creative finance streams which mitigated risks between the various investors enabled the project to deliver an above-average level of service as well as improved quality housing options. Thus it can be argued that the restructuring of financial arrangements worked well in this development. Monitoring and evaluation tools were used which measured completed project activities against initial targets and goals.

Housing and settlement practitioners should take cognisance of the methodologies employed in this development, notwithstanding diverse contextual challenges. For example, the greenfields nature of this project enabled the provision of a multiplicity of social services and housing typologies. However, not all developments are greenfields. Though the City of Tshwane (in partnership with ABSA) was able to provide additional funding for a higher level of services, not all municipalities have
the fiscal resources to accomplish this. Smaller municipalities with lower rates and tariff income do not have the luxury of extending a top-up finance policy, or of providing additional services. Additionally, project teams attempting to use an integrated approach could budget for and include the use of a development ‘translator’ to act as a go-between for improved communication between stakeholders. The financial risk-sharing model employed in this development is also interesting, and other practitioners can learn from this. This model may also be replicable in local authorities with the initial capital to invest.

In closing, though the improved quality of units may reduce long-term maintenance costs, the fact that no budget has been allocated for maintenance, particularly for subsidy housing, is problematic, and indicative of a nation-wide trend that should be re-examined. It should be noted that after visiting more than a dozen ‘best practice’ nominated projects (some of which have not been detailed in this study), this case study stands out as the closest example of an integrated sustainable settlement. Olievenhoutbosch was chosen because there are many positive lessons that can be learned from it. However, it is not a true reflection of the status of most of the other projects identified. The next case study, Zanemvula, is more reflective of the dysfunctions evident in human settlement planning and delivery in South Africa.

3.4 Case study 2: Port Elizabeth - Zanemvula

In choosing particular case studies to showcase in this study, various criteria were used. Projects which were initially developed pre-BNG were not selected for in-depth analysis, as it became difficult to differentiate which policy objectives were followed in what timeframes (pre-BNG and/or post-BNG). Projects which were deemed wholly ‘non-responsive’ were also not selected. Only Olievenhoutbosch and Witsands were deemed ‘responsive,’ and the remainder of the projects were ‘somewhat responsive’. Zanemvula falls within the ‘somewhat responsive’ category. Given the fact that this project has been deemed a National Priority Project with support from national, provincial and local authorities and the HDA, it is interesting to see how this project performs and under-performs. On February 18th and 19th, and
again on November 4th, 2009, the author travelled to Zanemvula and met with the project team. An overview of this National Priority Project follows.

3.4.1 Overview

The Zanemvula Project is an informal settlement upgrade and a purportedly BNG responsive human settlement project in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). It is meant to be a cooperative project between the three spheres of government, and stems from a visit by former National Minister of Housing, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu. In October 2006, the Zanemvula Interim Business Plan (ZIBP) was approved by the NMBM and signed by council. In 2007, Thubelisha (now the HDA) was appointed Project Manager for Zanemvula, with the goal being to support and strengthen the implementation delivery capacity of the NMBM. The project follows the NNBM sustainable community planning methodology (NMBM, 2007a).

The project aims to adhere to the BNG principles of integration, of redefining institutional arrangements within and between government departments and of communication and awareness building (NMBM, 2006:3-52). It also aims to utilise collaborative funding and financing mechanisms (NMBM, 2006:42-44). It attempts to improve institutional support via partnerships with Thubelisha and the HDA. It also attempts to enhance sustainable settlement delivery and support for the entire residential housing market through the provision of a variety of housing typologies and tenure options (NMBM, 2006:14-17). The project aims to promote job creation and poverty alleviation through training, monitoring and reporting (NMBM, 2006:34 – 36).

The ZIBP states that Zanemvula aims to be:

An integrated and sustainable community living in environments that have access to economic opportunities, a variety of affordable and secure housing and tenure options, reliable and affordable basic services, educational, entertainment and cultural activities, as well as health, welfare and police services (NMBM, 2006:3).
Zanemvula involves the relocation of families from the Chatty River flood plain (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5), to serviced sites in Chatty and Joe Slovo West. It also involves the servicing of greenfield reception areas; the de-densification and improvement of source areas of Soweto-on-Sea and Veeplaas; the rectification of storm-damaged, defective housing and the upgrading of certain informal settlement areas within the project boundaries (NMBM, 2006:3). Thus the project entails informal settlement upgrading as well as greenfield development. In this project, informal settlement upgrading entails the establishment of Temporary Relocation Areas (TRAs) for families that must be moved out of flood plain areas in the Greater Soweto-on-Sea area; de-densification and house rectifications.

This project aimed to construct 14,401 houses between 2006 and 2008 (NMBM, 2006:6). The NMBM had already provided some subsidised housing opportunities at the time of the site visit (see Figure 3.6). Houses are 40 square metres in size, with 2 private bedrooms, a bathroom with shower/bath and sink, tiled roof, ceilings, hardwood
frames and doors, electricity, waterborne sewerage, electricity, metered water and 1,263 houses have solar-water heating units (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009 and with Steyn van der Merwe on 4 November, 2009). The Zanemvula Project Implementation Plan aims to provide for mixed-housing opportunities in terms of types and densities, the use of various housing instruments, funding opportunities and tenure options. Roads and stormwater were also designed to full standard (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). However, the initial targets for this project have not been met. This will be explored further below.

3.4.2 Institutional arrangements

According to the ZPIP, the institutional arrangements were initially structured as follows (NMBM, 2007b:17):

(i) A Project Steering Committee with representatives from the HDA, the three spheres of government, wards councillors, ward committee members, and government sector departments. This committee meets monthly;
(ii) A Zanemvula Implementation Agreement which specifies roles and responsibilities for all role players;
(iii) A Technical Task Team which also meets monthly;
(iv) A Development Forum which consists of ward councillors and ward committee members, community leaders and technical representatives. This forum serves as the main platform for community participation in the development planning processes;
(v) The NMBM Special Programmes Unit which holds the institutional responsibility for the project at municipal level;
(vi) Thubelisha (now the HDA) was appointed as the Implementing Agent and Project Manager under the terms of a formal Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) (signed in 2007).

In Zanemvula, monthly meetings are held in local wards, and both the councillors and the ward committee members reportedly participate in project steering and
development forum meetings (Interview with Alfred Booi on 5 November, 2009). In these meetings issues arising in both the greenfield developments and the reception areas are tabled (Interview with Alfred Booi on 5 November, 2009). In Soweto-on-Sea, major re-planning is necessary as much of Soweto-on-Sea sits on a flood plain. Councillors and officials have reportedly been effective in bringing community needs to forum meetings and in communicating to their respective communities what has been discussed within the meetings. Monthly progress reports are also presented within project steering committee meetings (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Progress report results are then distributed to constituents via ward councillors and ward committee representatives (Interview with Pumla Dwane on 5 November, 2009).

Though the steering committees seem committed and meet regularly, provincial government departments (such as health, safety and security, education) have little involvement in the project. The private sector was approached to support the development of bonded housing units, but to date the private sector has not provided support for the development (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Other role players meant to provide support were the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) and the communications department within the National Department of Housing. Though the NHBRC was meant to evaluate the status of the project, to take part in regular progress meetings, monitor home builders, and provide training, their input has been disappointing (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009; NMBM, 2006:35-37). The NHBRC did not deliver on their promise to provide builders with training and similarly the communication department reportedly did little to drive the project. Of the long list of interventions contained in the over eight pages of the implementation plan, none were implemented. According to McCarthy (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009) the only time the project team had any contact with the National Department was during a handover by the Minister of Housing, and even then the department’s input was negligible.
3.4.3 Financing the development

Zanemvula currently utilises subsidy allocations from National Treasury and provincial government to deliver subsidy housing. The ZIBP promotes the development of a variety of housing typologies and tenure options, and suggests that banks will be invited to tender on mixed-housing options (NMBM, 2006:26). However, to date no financial provision has been made for the financing of these options, either from the public or private sectors (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Though the ZIBP suggests that the Departments of Health, Safety and Security, Social Development and Education will provide funding for social services, to date no social services have been provided, and these departments claim that they have no funding available for Zanemvula (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Though a policing forum is also in place, the Chatty area is at the moment serviced by the Bethelsdorp Police Station which is some distance from where most residents reside. This is because funding has not been allocated to build a police station nearby (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that residents report high rates of crime and a lack of trust in existing policing services (Interview with Noluthando Makanda on 5 November, 2009).

On a positive note, the NMBM has set aside funding to build a sport field in Chatty, and the province has approved R14,450,603 to build a multipurpose community centre in Soweto-on-Sea. The Department of Education is providing some subsidies to transport children to schools in adjacent areas, but the reality is that long travel distances frequently prevent these children from taking the bus and going to school (Interview with Pumla Dwane on 5 November, 2009). McCarthy points out quite rightly: ‘I can probably get donor funding from someone to build a school, but if the Department of Education does not engage with the project, I will have no teachers to staff the school’ (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

The lack of funding and of collaborative planning with provincial departments (which are the custodians of education, health, and other social services), are reflective of many other projects around the country. In the case of Zanemvula, the lack of cooperation in financing this development compromises the integrity of the principles
enshrined in the NMBM Sustainable Community Planning documents (which informed the planning of both Joe Slovo West and Chatty 5, 12 and 13). Although general plans have been laid out to make provision for bonded and rental accommodation, for schools, clinics, police stations and necessary social services within a 2km radius of every resident, the reality is that these sites are undeveloped, and in essence only provide space for squatters moving in (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Additionally, the private sector is not interested in investing in under-resourced areas where the residents are mostly poor and unemployed. In the case of Zanemvula, the banks have taken particular issue with the lack of tarred roads, and this has inhibited investment (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Though the project was meant to receive a priority project budget of R1 billion over three years, none of this money materialised.

Settlement delivery is also impeded by a dispute between Thubelisha and the HDA. When the handover of Thubelisha to the HDA occurred, Thubelisha refused to transfer the existing project budget to the HDA. This budget had been allocated to contractors to build houses. This led to only 10 houses being built per month, as opposed to the planned 300 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

3.4.4 Other ‘sustainable development’ interventions

Though alternate and sustainable development technologies did not feature in the original planning documents for Zanemvula, an attempt was made by the project team to include the use of alternative building materials and solar water heaters in the development. The following sections explore attempted ‘sustainable development’ interventions within Zanemvula.
3.4.4.1 Alternative building materials

The ZIBP does not mention the use of alternative or sustainable technological interventions. However, McCarthy advised that an ‘alternative’ structure consisting of polystyrene and wire was erected with provincial government approval. This structure was meant to showcase alternative building materials. However, it was erected in the flood plain, and after it was built inclement weather and flooding caused damage to the structure, rendering it un-useable as a show house. The use of alternative, ‘sustainable’ construction materials and technologies on the flood plain caused residents to demand brick and mortar houses (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

3.4.4.2 Solar water heating

In 2009 Steyn van der Merwe, an official in the NMBM Department of Electricity and Energy, secured funding for a solar water heater pilot in Zanemvula. Interestingly, van der Merwe made provision in his budget for social surveys and for ongoing social evaluations of this pilot’s impact on the community. The aim of these surveys was to measure and assess the social impact of solar water heating in low-income communities, and to assist the municipality in assessing ongoing maintenance requirements. Van der Merwe’s pilot led to the installation of 1,263 solar water heating systems, which were funded by the Electricity and Energy Directorate (Interview with Steyn Van der Merwe on 4 November, 2009).

3.4.5 Housing typologies and options

Of the projected 2,287 houses that should have been completed in Chatty 3 and 4 in 2008/9, none have been erected. Of the projected 328 houses planned for Chatty 5, none have been erected. According to the project team, the lack of skilled contractors and the sharp increase in costs of building materials have impeded delivery (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). In Chatty 12, 13 and
15, 1,000 free-standing subsidy houses (of the projected 4,228) have been completed; 228 are nearly complete and the remaining 3,000 are meant to be completed by the end of 2011 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Construction of the proposed 4,000 houses in Joe Slovo West will only commence in 2010/2011. This contrasts sharply with the initial projections that made provision for 800 houses to be erected in 2008/2009 and the remainder in 2010 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

In the planning phases, 323 rental units were planned for Vista and Chatty 12 (NMBM, 2006:17). McCarthy confirmed that no rental accommodation has been constructed to date. Furthermore, the HDA conducted a study to quantify the affordability of rental housing (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). It can be argued that rental stock appeals to renters because of its desirable location, i.e. close proximity to job opportunities, amenities and public transport. Given the fact that Zanemvula is located far from economic opportunities and amenities, and the cost of transport to economic centres is high, this begs the question whether rental accommodation is appropriate in Zanemvula.

3.4.5.1 Informal settlement upgrades

With reference to Zanemvula’s progress against initial targets established in the ZIBP, households designated to be transferred to temporary relocation areas were not transferred (NMBM, 2006:17). The municipality claimed that it was too expensive to provide temporary structures; thus it supported the transfer of shacks to ‘serviced sites’. In reality, the services were far away and at times inaccessible to relocated shacks (Interview with Noluthando Makanda on 5 November, 2009). Raw sewerage continues to flow in the relocation areas, which has detrimental health and environmental implications, particularly given the fact that much of the project is located in and around natural wetlands, which act as receptacles for and conduits of water-borne disease (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009). Both the informal settlement upgrading and the house-rectification programme are dependent on the municipality finalising the township plans in these areas, which to date still await finalisation. The planning process has been complicated by the high
level of encroachments that necessitated continuous re-planning. Due to extensive re-planning processes, construction of only the first 865 houses is on schedule. The bulk of the construction was pushed out to 2012 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).

3.4.5.2 House rectifications

In turn, the development of the greenfield areas and house-rectification processes (also laid out in the NMBM planning documents) are impeded by inaccurate budget calculations and by the uneven quality of work done by contractors. According to McCarthy, in 2002 the NMBM began to demand larger houses (40 square metre) which would afford residents more privacy. However, subsidy allocations were calculated using a 28 square metre cost measure. Unsurprisingly, contractors who tendered on contracts prior to 2002 using the 28 square metre subsidy calculations, could not complete the houses according to the new specifications. Thus many houses inherited by the project team were labelled ‘sub-standard’ and required rectification. Moreover, the original projections for house rectifications were increased from 460 to 2,025 and these are reportedly on schedule (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).

According to Ngwekazi, house rectifications should occur once the original builder has been prosecuted. However, most of the contractors in question were emerging contractors who could not afford to pay the additional costs associated with building larger houses. Most of these contractors are now untraceable (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009). Ngwekazi, a female builder in charge of the rectification programme, also advised that the process is hampered by contractors who begin building, but only return intermittently or stop coming to the site altogether (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009). Additionally, the cumbersome co-ordination of project approvals, procurement and contractual appointments pushed project dates beyond deadlines. The knock-on effect was that fixed-cost budget allocations were not in line with inflation or cost increases (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).
A further problem in Zanemvula is that when flood plain residents move into formal, subsidised housing, new squatters quickly move in to take their place, thinking that government will come to their aid if they live in these hazardous conditions. Actions to prevent re-invasion have not been successful (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).

3.4.6 Economic development

Zanemvula is far from economic nodes and there are currently no strategies in place for local economic development.

3.4.7 Monitoring and evaluation

The evaluation plan identified by the Zanemvula project team consisted of measuring the number of units delivered, within allocated budgets and timeframes, then comparing these results with initial targets. The same system was used to measure house rectifications and in-situ upgrade processes. The Zanemvula team was unable to identify a monitoring system which tracked project processes over time.

3.5 Conclusion

To a certain extent, the Zanemvula project addresses the need for cooperative planning and improved institutional design through the establishment of steering committee and a development forum. These could potentially serve as reasonably effective mechanisms for communicating project needs between community members and government, and vice versa. However, national and provincial government agencies have not adequately participated in these collaborative processes.

The ZIBP ambitiously aims to acquire funding from several partners, per the BNG requirement. In reality, however, the DOH, the NHBRC, and provincial government
departments which should provide necessary funding and capacity for multiple housing options, training and social services are failing to provide necessary financial assistance. These bodies also fail, for that matter, to engage in any form of collaboration. Though institutional support is provided in the establishment of committees and forums, and though the NMBM has provided both financial support and additional technical capacity, this has not been enough to successfully implement a project of this size against BNG and ZIBP targets and objectives.

The ZIBP lists several design and implementation processes which would, ideally, take the project from a dormitory housing development to a sustainable human settlement. However, none of these plans have been implemented. The project consists of free-standing subsidised houses. Though these houses appear to be of very good quality, there are no other tenure options or housing typologies available in Zanemvula, and the housing needs of the communities are not being provided for. Though participation does occur through the various committees, there are in excess of 14,000 people to be housed in this project, and the HDA has hired one social-development facilitator to serve the entire community.

Zanemvula is approximately a 30-minute drive from the nearest economic hub. Transportation to shops and jobs is available via taxis for those who can afford them. The impact of transportation costs on this poor community severely reduces the disposable income of community members (Interview with Noluthando Makanda on November 5, 2009). The unemployment rate in Zanemvula is high, and there is no identifiable support for micro-enterprises and informal employment (Interview with Alfred Booi on November 5, 2009). The only visible commercial activities are spaza shops and shebeens (personal observations during site visits).

Shacks are also located in extremely hazardous conditions. Though the NMBM and the HDA do make concerted efforts to relocate these shacks and to build quality houses, there are no effective measures in place to prevent re-invasion. Solid waste is apparently collected intermittently in the formal areas, but rarely in the informal areas. Ngwekazi advised that she has never seen a garbage truck in the entire development (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009). Wastewater is treated in subsidised houses but informal households do not have proper access to
sanitation. Water is reticulated to all subsidised households in Zanemvula but is only available in informal areas via communal taps (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).

On a positive note, subsidy home owners seem pleased with their houses, which are visibly well-constructed from brick and mortar; with aprons, fascia boards and ceilings (Interviews with Alfred Booi, Pumla Dwane and Noluthando Makanda on 5 November, 2009). The families that received solar water heaters are exceptionally happy, and it has made an enormous difference to the quality of their lives (Interviews with Alfred Booi, Pumla Dwane and Noluthando Makanda on 5 November, 2009).

Particularly distressing to the researcher, however, was the state of the houses needing rectification, and Ngwekazi’s ongoing battle to ensure that contractors return to the site to honour their contracts by completing their building projects. In some cases, contractors would lay the slabs because that was the most lucrative part of the contract, collect payment and then abscond (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).

In closing, the short-sightedness of government’s practice of delivering dormitory houses without tying in funding for required social infrastructure (including access to affordable public transport systems) is clearly spotlighted in this development. Subsidy houses are all free standing and shacks reappear on sites that have been designated for social infrastructure. The planning department of the NMBM ensured that the general plans made adequate provision for the spread of amenities as required in terms of BNG and within the principles established by the NMBM sustainable community unit. Unfortunately, the lack of collaboration between government departments, the inability of provincial agents to tie in funding with local government planning and the private sector’s unresponsiveness to assisting the poor have made this National Priority Project a showcase of bad practice in South Africa.
Chapter 4: Research Findings and Core Lessons

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the main findings and conclusions of the research are consolidated. Core challenges are re-visited, suggestions on possible interventions which may promote more effective and more sustainable settlement delivery are proffered, as are concluding remarks.

In concluding this study, the researcher would like to return to a few comments and statements which surfaced while exploring the Zanemvula project, which resonated in many other parts of the country. In the Zanemvula Project Implementation Plan the vision of the Project is recorded as:

An integrated and sustainable community living in environments that have access to economic opportunities, a variety of affordable and secure housing and tenure options, reliable and affordable basic services, educational, entertainment and cultural activities as well as to health, welfare and police services. It is recorded that all parties recognise this vision (NMBM, 2007b:3).

On 15 August 2008, former Minister of Housing Lindiwe Sisulu came to Zanemvula to hand over houses. She stated:

I am glad that we are finally making headway in the Zanemvula Housing Project and I am glad that the people who will be housed in Zanemvula are finally benefiting after such a long wait. It is worth mentioning, especially for the benefit of the new MEC, that the people of this area have been the most cooperative and supportive of government initiatives I have come across. They have embraced the Zanemvula Housing Project and made it their own (Sisulu, 2008).
On 19 February 2009, a community member who wished to remain anonymous stated the following:

The government said they would give us houses. We used to have hope that we would be able to find work, send our kids to school, and walk to a clinic. We still have nothing. No house, no school, no clinic. We have lost our hope.

In her book, Fiona Ross suggests that though informal settlements and townships across South Africa differ in many respects, but “What residents do have in common, for the most part, is that they are poor, and utterly exposed to the rawness of life” (Ross, 2007:7).

In this exposé of life in ‘the bush,’ which is to say a shack settlement on the outskirts of Cape Town, Ross’s story of living in an informal settlement could be the story of thousands – perhaps even millions – across South Africa. The daily life in informal settlements and townships is unpredictable. Many residents are unemployed or under-employed, often living in areas without water, sanitation, waste removal or permanent housing. Separated by the apartheid government, and arguably abandoned by the post-apartheid state, they attempt to eke out a living with what meagre portions they can collect on a day-to-day basis. In the attempt to provide housing and services, it is this picture that is lost. This is the picture that needs to be reviewed by government and the private sector.

4.2 Collaboration, integration and fragmentation

With few exceptions, government spheres and institutions continue to be fragmented and dysfunctional, unable to collaborate, and unable to clearly define roles and lines of authority. Of all government spheres, local government is arguably uniquely positioned to manage and implement developmental solutions for their constituents (Christmas & De Visser, 2009). Alas, administrative changes and the amalgamation of local government systems and structures have been contributing factors to the inability of South African local authorities to play a meaningful role. Local authorities are exceptionally strained and in need of skilled human capacity (Lawless, 2007;
National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; DBSA, 2009). Couple this with inherited service-delivery backlogs from previous administrations (Christmas & De Visser, 2009), and local government has indeed a monumental task ahead.

It is clear to the researcher that though the IDP processes are meant to integrate city development and enhance social participation, most municipalities visited seem to lack the capacity to effectively implement their IDP. Participation in IDP processes is often limited to the presentation of IDP project and programme results for public comment, after it has been written (UN Habitat, 2009:63).

4.3 Fiscal constraints

The core challenge that has faced local authorities since 1994 has been how to find fiscally viable ways to expand services into poorer areas while maintaining and operating income-generating services for the city as a whole. The tension between equity and cost recovery continues to bedevil service delivery praxis in cities and provinces. Energy, water, sanitation and waste departments aspire to achieve cost recovery, whilst attempting to provide services for the poor. Equitable share allocations, and in rare cases top-up funding derived from rates, tariffs and land sales are not enough to provide services for an ever-burgeoning population (Interview with Barry Coetzee on November 6, 2009). Furthermore, it is one thing to extend infrastructure using capital budgets and transfers. It is a completely different matter to make sure that operating budgets are expanded accordingly to maintain and repair this infrastructure into the future. Provision should be made in capital budgets for refurbishment and upgrade, particularly for bulk infrastructure. It is my belief that as long as capital-expenditure budgets are used to extend basic services to the poor (as they should) without investing in refurbishing existing infrastructure, pressures on operating budgets to maintain collapsing infrastructure will relentlessly continue with, inevitably, diminishing returns. Then there is the requirement of trying to house the ever-increasing number of poor migrating to urban areas.

Though the South African government has arguably supplied more houses to its constituents than any other nation, housing provision is not aligned with other local
government line departments like water, sanitation, energy, electricity or waste (GCIS, 2010:308). This is largely due to the complicated manner in which housing is delivered. Instead of local government departments having full authority to deliver housing and basic services, convoluted systems and financial flows from national to provincial and local government slow down and often halt delivery altogether. This is not to say that provinces do not have a role to play in the development of sustainable settlements. It is important to have oversight bodies that can provide support and encourage accountability in all areas of service delivery. However, these roles should be allocated in a manner that enables effective delivery rather than hindering it.

Arguably, a step in the direction toward delivering integrated settlements would be the alignment of provincial and local government budget cycles. Another suggestion would be to re-define or to streamline overlapping provincial and local government functions that sow confusion and undermine effective delivery. If, for example, provincial government maintained its role as the provider of social services, whilst handing over the authority of housing delivery to local government in an incremental (and incrementally hands-off) manner, while concurrently building capacity within local government, the delivery of sustainable settlements could potentially move in the right direction. Provincial officials in the housing function could also be allocated positions in local government, where their experience might be invaluable.

On a fiscal level, limited state resources and the limited interest of private sector financiers in low-income developments continues to underpin subsidy-only housing settlement delivery. Private sector incentives and protection should be explored for financial institutions, beyond expecting them to invest in the low-income sector because of some moral obligation.

According to Hoek-Smit (2009), the ‘real’ cost of a subsidy house is near R135,000. This is far beyond the current state subsidy allocation to provinces. It can be argued that there is a dominance of ownership-driven responses in South Africa, which has fixed government’s attention (on the delivery of bonded housing options). Rental accommodation and subsidised rental accommodation are under-developed. Given the fact that less than 100,000 subsidies of R2.5 million have been allocated to rental
housing and given the need for backyard shacks and other forms of rental accommodation in South Africa, social housing models which provide affordable housing types for various income groups should be further explored and funded (Hoek-Smit, 2009).

4.4 Re-building capacity

Though capacity constraints continue to bedevil local authorities, the IDP mechanism is arguably still one of the most advanced and sophisticated methods for planning cities and distributing services and resources. Through accredited capacity-building programmes, local authorities can come to grips with the intention of integrated development planning, and learn to work with communities in the development of future social-spatial and economic nodes and strategies.

It could also be suggested that training in advocacy, lobbying, managing community processes and community finance for civil society organisations (like the Federation of the Urban Poor and Shack Dwellers International) may serve to build stronger partnerships with government and to create higher success rates in housing delivery. Moreover, the presence of informed communities and well-organised civil society organisations may enable long term, sustainable community participation to occur. Mechanisms for previously and currently marginalized groups could be established for these communities to have a voice in participatory planning processes.

4.5 Shifting to sustainable human settlements?

Though the Department of Human Settlements has delivered upwards of 1,3 million houses between 2004 and the end of March, 2009 (providing shelter for 7,5 million people) the Department has not achieved its overall objective of implementing integrated, sustainable human settlements in South Africa (GCIS, 2010:308). The principle of well-located settlements with access to services and economic activities for the poor is a central feature of sustainable human settlement development within
BNG. However, the lack of available, affordable inner-city land for low-income housing continues to marginalise the poor.

Other challenges identified include the need to address the harrowing effects of peripheralisation which include distance to place of employment and low levels of community integration. Planning and zoning restrictions can also be problematic, particularly in dense shack settlements where shacks are built extremely close to one another. Subsidy housing in its current form is also unnecessarily expensive. All of these challenges inhibit the progress toward sustainable human settlement delivery.

4.6 The non-use of existing and new housing instruments

In reviewing recent progress against BNGs objectives, it is clear that not much has changed from the previous policy dispensation. Though subsidy bands have been collapsed and new subsidy allocations are theoretically available, free-standing subsidy housing continues to dominate the delivery agenda. PHP processes are not working; civil society is not able to assist in reducing backlogs and communities are not capacitated to apply concerted pressure on government to change their praxis.

According to the UN Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements (UN Habitat, 2009:94), in order to ensure that citizen participation in urban planning is meaningful, a number of minimum conditions must be in place. These include political structures which allow and encourage active citizen participation; the establishment of a legal framework for local planning; the need for policies which specify that participatory processes must be allowed to influence planning and decision-making; and the establishment of mechanisms for socially marginalised groups to have a voice.

In order for these processes to be effective, the ‘need for speed’ mode of delivery must be challenged. UN Habitat (UN Habitat, 2009:164) states that governments need to acknowledge that programmes that focus only on the delivery of quantities of peripheral, low-density housing are doomed to fail. Housing delivery must be combined with community development, capacity-building, job creation,
empowerment, and the provision of services. If these mechanisms are employed, participatory housing delivery frameworks will be better equipped to influence the physical and spatial characteristics of cities.

The UN Habitat (UN Habitat, 2009:105) report also states that participatory processes have the potential to achieve the following positive outcomes:

- Joint identification of needs and priorities can lead to improved coordination of efforts and acceptance of outcomes amongst stakeholders even given resource restrictions;

- Local needs and priorities can be identified through processes involving wide stakeholder consultation. This is particularly important in assisting previously marginalised communities to vocalise and champion their needs and priorities.

4.7 Are we supporting the entire residential property market?

In response to the BNG directive to provide various tenure options, DHS continues to provide subsidies for no- and low-income earners using a variety of subsidy and loan mechanisms. However, the dominant feature in housing delivery continues to be the roll out of single, free-standing subsidy units. As previously mentioned, comparatively few developments include social/rental housing units, or densified options, and banks continue to view gap housing as high risk.

In proposing possible remedies to this pervasive problem, Hoek-Smit (2009) argues that finance should be extended to credit-worthy low- and middle-income families who have been traditionally excluded from the credit market. Coupled to this, government could subsidise insurance for low-income bonds, which would cover bond repayments if the borrower were to lose a job, become ill or be unable to pay for a period of time (Hoek-Smit, 2009). Government could also subsidise the transaction costs that banks incur, which low- and middle-income earners may not
be able to afford. This would enable these income earners to enter the bond market (Hoek-Smit, 2009). Another suggestion might be to offer fixed-rate premiums to low- and middle-income earners, who are less able to absorb shocks in the economy.

4.8 Is housing a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy?

Officials across the country view job-creation strategies and poverty alleviation strategies in different ways. Some view them in terms of locating settlements as close to jobs and economic hubs as fiscally and spatially possible. Others promote the establishment of local community centres which can create jobs and generate income. A few link housing delivery to job creation through EPWP programmes and the upliftment and support of local emerging contractors.

Sadly, these are proposed in a national economic policy context which has failed to significantly reduce unemployment, or increase income levels of poor and working class households. To make matters worse, if low-level wages do not keep up with inflation, municipal investments in the extension of basic services to the poor will not be recovered. In other words, if South Africa’s economic growth path depends on cheap labour, municipalities’ access to households that can pay rates for services will be undermined. Alternatively, this can also result in burgeoning, un-serviced informal settlements.

4.9 The need to establish and enforce monitoring and evaluation systems

The challenges related to the monitoring and evaluation of settlements and settlement delivery are as worrying as fiscal and human resource incapacity. Though the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA, 2003) requires strict reporting against financial indicators, most municipalities surveyed and visited do not have relevant or extensive monitoring and evaluation programmes in place to measure against policy targets. In fact, the researcher found that, when asked about monitoring and evaluation systems, most project teams responded that they simply measure against the number of units delivered within a particular budget and timeframe. Though
monitoring and evaluation is a foundational principle in BNG, the Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment (MEIA) Policy and Implementation Framework was only established in 2009 in the housing sector. Thus prior to 2009 there were few measures in place to hold provinces and municipalities accountable to established goals and directives. This is a critical area which must be addressed if transparency and accountability are to be achieved in settlement delivery.

In closing, extensive interviews with role-players, including individuals, the private sector and government departments arguably lead to the conclusion that very little progress has been made since 2004 with regard to the delivery of sustainable human settlements. The 10-year review highlighted the lack of necessary support and funding for local government to successfully execute what was required of them. It is evident that support and funding are still lacking. The misalignment of budget cycles and processes within national, provincial and local government spheres continues to undermine delivery in projects around the country. The lack of capacity within local government to successfully implement their new developmental role in settlement planning and delivery is also still evident.

Though Olievenhoutbosch can arguably be deemed a best practice project, and though lessons can be learned from this project, it is an isolated example. Olievenhoutbosch’s institutional arrangements, financing mechanisms, participatory strategies and other project processes are not reflective of project processes and procedures around the country. Zanemvula, on the other hand, is more reflective of the disconnect between policy and practice, and of dysfunctional state systems and responses. Though Zanemvula is a National Priority Project, it still fails to meet the needs of communities, the aims of BNG and the adopted objectives in the NMBM sustainable communities documents. Other projects reflected, to varying degrees, fragmented, uncoordinated and unsuccessful attempts to deliver sustainable BNG settlements. If we are making the same mistakes in this second decade of our democracy, we should go back to the drawing board.
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