The framing of the coverage of the Gaza withdrawal by Israeli forces in the
*Cape Times, Mail & Guardian* and *Sunday Times* from July 1, 2005 to
September 12, 2005

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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Philosophy (Journalism) at Stellenbosch University

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March 2007
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:  
Date:  

(Bryan Silke)  
March 2007
Acknowledgements

I hereby wish to thank first and foremost, my parents – Melville and Joan Silke, for their unwavering financial and emotional support of this project. With this backing, I was able to focus on the academic research without being side-tracked by logistical issues.

I would also like to sincerely thank the staff of the Stellenbosch University Journalism Department, especially Bevely Februarie and Professor Lizette Rabe for their constant encouragement and making the environment for conducting research so relaxed and motivating.

Finally, I would like to wholeheartedly thank my supervisor for this thesis, Professor Herman Wasserman – a pillar of wisdom. Doc, your superb critique and constructive advice is what motivated me to finish this thesis.
Abstract

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be classified as an isolated conflict. Today’s clashes were not triggered by a single event, but rather are as a result of thousands of years of violent and at times restrained disagreements about the rights of Jews, Muslims and other ethnic groups to the disputed land known collectively today as Israel and the Palestinian Territories. This study examines the media coverage of one event during the conflict, i.e. the withdrawal by Israeli settlers from the Gaza area. The study tracks coverage over ten weeks in the South African media context, specifically the Mail & Guardian, Cape Times and the Sunday Times – a media setting in itself highly diverse and compelling.

Using a qualitative framing analysis as the central methodology, the study focused on six core frames in analysing all articles/reports relating to the Gaza withdrawal. In addition, the editors of the respective newspapers were interviewed to complement the textual analysis. The methodological approach addressed how each story was packaged and presented, and then questioned why certain frames dominated and others did not.

The study found that conflict (a combination of violent and non-violent) was the dominant frame chosen. Consequences and Attribution of Responsibility were the next two most prominent frames. Both these frames were found to apportion blame to a particular side in presenting the news reports and when providing comment. Whilst all three newspapers argued that they practiced a balanced coverage, it was this perceived “balance” in using several different frames of presentation that neglected a key “historical” frame. This lack of historical context was one of the key results of the other frames being so dominant.
Die konflik tussen Israel en Palestina kan nie gesien word as 'n geïsoleerde konflik nie. Die huidige konflik is nie veroorsaak deur 'n enkele gebeurtenis nie, maar spruit uit die voortslepende geweld tussen Jode, Moslems en ander etniese groepe wat reeds duisende jare lank duur, as gevolg van betwiste aansprake op die grondgebied gesamentlik bekend as Israel en die Palestynse grondgebied. Dié studie ondersoek die mediadekking van een gebeurtenis in die konflik, naamlik die onttrekking van Israeli setlaars in die Gaza-gebied. Die studie volg mediadekking oor tien weke deur drie Suid-Afrikaanse publikasies, *Mail & Guardian, Cape Times en Sunday Times.*

Met behulp van kwalitatiewe raming-analise as die sentrale metodologie, konsentreer dié studie op ses rame in die analise van artikels, wat verband hou met die onttrekking uit die Gasastrook. Die navorsing word aangevul met onderhoude met die redakteurs van die koerante. Die metodologie is toegespits op die manier waarop die stories verpak en aangebied word, en bevraagteken waarom sekere raamwerke oorheers en ander van minder belang is.

Die studie bevind dat Konflik ('n samestelling van geweldadige en nie-geweldadige konflik) die oorheersende raam was waarbinne artikels in dié tydperk aangebied is. Die Gevolge- en Toeskrywing van Verantwoordelikheid-rame kom ná konflik die meeste voor. By albei raamwerke word bevind dat skuld aan die een of ander kant toegeskryf word in die aanbieding van nuusverslae en wanneer kommentaar gelewer word. Hoewel al drie koerante volhou dat hulle gebalanseerde dekking aanbied, word 'n belangrike “historiese” raam in dié aanbieding verontagsaam as gevolg van die gebruik van verskeie rame om balans te bewerkstellig. Die gebrek aan 'n historiese konteks is een van die vernaamste gevolge van die oorheersing van die ander rame.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Aim

The aim of the proposed study is to assess the framing of the coverage of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and subsequent evacuation of Jewish settlers in three South African newspapers over the period of 1 July – 14 September 2005\(^1\). I also intend to investigate what dominant frames emerged within the South African media, particularly the print media. This study seeks to establish what frames were used in interpreting the withdrawal, which was one, recent and pivotal event in an ongoing conflict.

The study’s point of departure is taken from Paula Slier\(^2\); writing in the October 2003 edition of the magazine *The Media*. Slier, one of very few South African news correspondents and freelance journalists based in Jerusalem, articulated my initial assumption that there has been a clear over-simplification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media. Slier questioned the responsibilities of journalists to portray a conflict foreign to the South African consumer of news. In the conclusion to her article, Slier implores that “perhaps today it is more important than ever that journalists explain diversities, so that news consumers don’t lapse into comfortable stereotypes, and self-justified racism” (Slier, 2003:27). She quotes Shenid Bhayroo of the Department of Communication at the University of Johannesburg, who confirms the SA media’s tendency to over-simplify.

Bhayroo argues further (Bhayroo, cited in Slier, 2003: 26):

Stories are either event-driven, such as a fire breaking out, or issue-related. As journalists, it’s our job to turn issues into events. We do this by simplifying. We present

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\(^1\) Whilst the actual evacuation of settlers and dismantling of settlements took place over the period from 15-24 August, I will be examining the newspapers from July 1 to September 12, 2005. The reason is to gain further context and with a ten week period, I allow coverage one month either side of the withdrawal to understand what frames emerged before and prior to the withdrawal.

\(^2\) Slier is one of the few full-time South African journalists covering the conflict from the region. She reports regularly for Radio 702, and freelances for magazines. Slier is both a news reporter and columnist. She is based in Jerusalem.
the minimum amount of information that will allow the issue to be understood. But we need to be careful because when we simplify, we run the risk of losing the essence of the subject we are covering. (Referring to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict) It’s not just an issue of Arab versus Jew or Islam versus Judaism. As journalists, though, this is how we present it.

I therefore aim to question whether this simplification is related to the local print media privileging a certain discourse, possibly religious or political, and without providing sufficient context, neglected other potential themes or discourses. As Slier asks, if not the journalist, who else can introduce subtle nuances to interpretations and add the human dimension to abstract concepts?” (Slier, 2003)

A secondary aim is to give a descriptive and analytic account of the historical events leading to the Gaza withdrawal and how these were represented in the SA print media. The aim of this study is thus to ascertain how key actors, events and situations were framed in this context of conflict. Through the examination of this example, preliminary insight might be obtained into broader issues of power relations playing out in the South African media, and how media can shape the social construction of reality as pertains to the conflict in the Middle East.

1.2 Background and Rationale

1.2.1 South African public interest in the conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a topic of strong interest for South African media since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 (Media Tenor, 2005). According to Kantor (1972) the previous Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967 also garnered media interest in this country. It is a manifest of an eventuality of a land dispute for over two millennia. A testament to the amount of interest the conflict generates amongst local audiences is the vast quantity of letters to the editor that follow a controversial comment or analysis (be it pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian). One such example occurred after the publishing of the Chris McGreal article entitled “Jo’burg and Jerusalem…worlds apart?” in the Mail & Guardian of March 2, 2006. The following week’s edition was flooded with letters expressing outrage and resentment at the content of the article. According to Haffajee (2006), it is clear
that readers with an interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict make up a considerable number of the readership/constituency.

The backlash of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian interest groups to perceived bias instances in the media have not been limited to the newspapers. Television documentaries and Radio talk programmes have aroused large-scale consternation amongst interest groups, with certain offensive comments having been taken to task – in some cases in the courts (Saks, 2006). There are several interest groups such as the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and the Muslim Judicial Council who release media statements if some issue of grave concern (severe mis-representation or inaccurate information about their constituency in the South African media). On the other side of the conflict, one advocacy group, the Media Review Network (MRN), exists solely to monitor the representation of Islam in the South Africa media – this is one such example of the attention that Middle Eastern matters receives domestically.

In its background motivation, the MRN states that “there are more than one million Muslims living in South Africa. In the past, and on a continuous basis, the mainstream media represent who we are and what we represent for the general South African public. Our views and opinions, our policy positions and strategic interests have always either been ignored or deliberately distorted. As Muslims, we need to have our opinions and insights heard on a daily basis as a matter of routine, rather than as exception” (www.mediareviewnet.com). The implication of this statement is that the local media favours non-Muslim interests in its coverage and the international reputation of Muslims is demonised locally. The MRN’s existence is clear testament to the interest that discourses about Palestinian issues hold in South Africa.

Australian journalist John Pilger’s controversial documentary entitled Palestine Is Still the Issue, created a furore of response from both the local Muslim and Jewish communities about the nature of its content, when it was aired on private broadcaster e-tv in late 2002.

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3 An example is the six-year long hate-speech claim filed by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies against Islamic community radio station, Radio786. (SA Jewish Report, June 2006)
4 The Media Review Network (MRN) is an advocacy group premised as a watchdog group of the abuse of Islamic interests in the media. According to its mission statement, the MRN exists “to dispel myths and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims and to foster bridges of understanding among the diverse people of our country
5 Some of the Media Review Network’s aims and objectives are the following: “to monitor, analyse and evaluate distortions, fabrications and double standards in the mass media”, “to counter the onslaught of Islam, it’s norms and values”, “to identify and nullify certain stereotypes rg: terrorists, fundamentalists, radicals, fanatics” (www.mediareviewnet.com)
Yehuda Kaye, former National Director of the South African National Jewish Board of Deputies, criticised the documentary because it failed to provide context. Kaye, in an interview with Slier, said the following:

There are always two sides to this very complex story. You can make a very compelling story if, as Pilger did, you look at it only from the Palestinian perspective and interview only Israelis with extreme left-wing points of view who don’t represent mainstream society. I don’t believe there is such a thing as objective journalism. But there can be an attempt to contextualise…a repeated lack of contextualisation over the years, as I believe had happened in this country’s press, is damaging.

Kaye also suggested that that he (and the constituency he represents) believes the conflict has been presented as “a kind of David and Goliath with Israel the aggressor and the Palestinians the underdog”. He adds that:

In the Middle East, there are nuances upon nuances. The conflict is land-related, political, social, and religious. This is the context in which the conflict takes place and yet all journalists do is take a snapshot. All they’ll cover in one story are the tanks rolling into the territories. None of the nuances come through. Journalists don’t check up on the facts, they generalise and they quote directly (Kaye, cited in Slier, 2003: 27).

Other groups disagreed with Kaye’s take on the Pilger documentary. Media Review Network researcher Suraya Dadoo welcomed the documentary while acknowledging it presented only the Palestinian viewpoint. According to Dadoo, the documentary was necessary for the South African media because “the other side (Israel) has been so dominant in the media. The Pilger documentary brought to the fore a lot of issues people weren’t aware of. It showed that the Palestinians were not only being brutalised, but also humiliated and de-humanised” (Dadoo, 2003).

This tension about the representation and/or perceived bias of Israeli and Palestinian interests in the South African media can be viewed against the backdrop of the research of the research company Media Tenor International. A recent Media Tenor (January-September 2003) report monitored the evening news of the national TV networks of five countries – the
United States, Germany, Britain, the Czech Republic and South Africa. Channels across several different news companies were analysed, including ABC, NBC, CBS (United States), BBC and ITV (Britain) and the SABC news (English, Afrikaans, Sotho, Xhosa) and e-tv news networks in South Africa.

According to the findings of the report, “there was a tendency of editors and reporters to understand the position and actions of the Palestinian Authority, at the expense of the State of Israel” (Media Tenor, 2003). The report also concluded that “international TV news media has continually presented Israel in a more negative light than that of Palestine”. One of the more controversial aspects of the Media Tenor report was the assertion that Palestinians receive a greater empathy rating of 22% as opposed to the Israeli rating of 16%. More specifically in the South African context, the report indicated that compared to other countries, “Israel’s negative image in South Africa is even more striking” (Media Tenor, 2003).

Media Tenor International’s 2005 report of the “Media Image of the Israel-Palestine Conflict” explored by way of a quantitative content analysis both volumes and ratings (positive versus negative) of the television news coverage in South African and Arab TV news. The Middle East, a region small compared with her Western neighbours, scored a total of 688 reports out of the approximately 30,000 reports. More reports on the Middle East appeared than the Oceania, South American, Central American regions and the Middle East accounted for only 400 less reports on Asia and 600 less than North America- two crucial world economic and political powerhouses. ((Media Tenor, 2005)

Arab television news had reports on the Middle East as the overwhelming dominant region, with 4725 reports out of mere total of approximately 10,000 reports. Middle East coverage totalled more than that of Europe, North America, Asia and Africa combined. (Media Tenor, 2005) Apart from being the dominant region for provision of news on Arab television, the Middle East, and specifically the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been heavily covered in the United Kingdom, another region with competing Jewish and Muslim interests.

The controversial report by the Loughborough University Communication Research Centre on the BBC’s reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided more impetus to the relevance of this study. According to the report, its purpose was to:

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7 The Loughborough report was published in April 2006. It covered the BBC’s reporting of the conflict spanning from 1 August 2005 to 31 January 2006.
Provide evidence in the form of a content analysis of the BBC’s reporting of what the BBC calls the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’. The report, commissioned by the BBC’s Board of Governors, is intended to aid the Independent Panel, appointed by the BBC’s Board of Governors, to come to a judgment concerning whether the BBC’s reporting of this subject is impartial. It is informed by our experience of news media content analysis in many fields, and is designed to provide accurate and robust data on the content of BBC and other media news coverage of this conflict in a defined period. The report is not Loughborough University Communications Research Centre’s assessment of whether we believe that the BBC’s reporting is impartial or not. The concept of impartiality is contested. It is a matter for debate whether impartial reporting is either desirable or possible. In this report we do not adopt a particular meaning of impartiality and then use it as a way of judging the BBC’s coverage. This is a matter for the Independent Panel should it decide to do so. (Loughborough report, 2006: 3)

One of the interesting conclusions drawn from the quantitative results was the seemingly disproportionate amount of time (in seconds) of coverage compared with the significant number of reports analysed. Obviously a television news clip is likely to be short due to time constraints, but according to the report, this is just part of a greater problem. The consistent pattern found across media in the extent of coverage suggests that reporting of the conflict is highly event driven or dependent and episodic. The two critical discourse moments (August and January) coincide with big events concerning the region (the Gaza withdrawal, Sharon’s ill health, Hamas’ election success). This suggests a reactive, rather than investigative, approach to news-gathering in the region (Loughborough Report, 2006: 15).

Apart from general results about the frequency of coverage in the British news, the Loughborough Report also analysed the actors mentioned in the coverage, the speaking time of the actors in news programmes, themes to emerge in the reporting, keywords used in the conflict, and more critically for this study – the reporting of the historical context in news programmes. The report showed that journalists made few references to historical events

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8 See Appendix B
9 Although the media of analysis and the context of the Loughborough Report and this study are different, the premise is essentially the same. Television news items and newspaper reports/features are similarly structured by combining the essential news elements with some context by way of headlines, pictures and footage.
when reporting contemporary developments. Apart from regular mentions of the Gaza withdrawals, very little other historical context was given:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Event</th>
<th>Percent of All Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sykes-Picot Agreement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balfour Declaration</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Mandate for Palestine</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron massacre (1929)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great uprising (1936-39)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Commission (1937)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lehi (Stern Gang) attacks (1940-49)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Protocol (1944)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition of Palestine (1947)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 War</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir Yassin Massacre</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakba</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qilba massacre (1953)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel invades Egypt (1956)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel withdraws from Sinai (1957)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding of PLO (1964)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Day War (1967)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avivim school bus massacre (1970)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich Massacre (1972)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Wrath of God (1972)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yom Kippur war (1973)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entebbe (1976)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp David (1978)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Sinai (1979)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel invades Lebanon (1982)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabra and Shatila</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intifada (1987)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding of Hamas (1988)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian declaration of independence (1988)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War 1, Scud attacks (1991)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo Peace Process/Accords (1993-95)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobel Peace Prize (Peres, Rabin, Arafat) (1994)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (1995)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp David 2 (2000)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Intifada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Defensive Sheild (2002)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasser Arafat dies (2004)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza pullout (2005).</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Loughborough Report, 2006: 45)
This lack of historical context by BBC journalists was highlighted as one of the key conclusions of the report. The Loughborough Report also argues that “some important themes were relatively overlooked in the coverage of the conflict, most notably in the recent period the annexation of the land in and around East Jerusalem” (Loughborough Report, 2006: 87). Other interesting conclusions were the apparent marginalisation of non-UK and US political (and non-political) actors as third-party commentators on the conflict, and that a disparity existed (in favour of the Israelis) in the appearance and talk-time of Israeli and Palestinian actors in the BBC coverage as well as that the news reported Israeli and Palestinian fatalities differently in that Israeli fatalities generally received greater coverage than Palestinian fatalities. (Loughborough Report, 2006: 86-87).

Another instance of a politico-judicial tension between competing Israeli and Palestinian lobbies was the recent culmination of an eight-year hate speech court battle between the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) and Islamic radio station Radio 786. On 12 May 2006 The Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) upheld SAJBD’s longstanding complaint against Radio 786 for anti-semitic broadcasting. The incident, which took place on 9 May 1998 and took the form of an interview programme with Dr Yaqub Zaki a Scottish academic, was deemed in the ICASA ruling to be in breach of Section 16 of the South African Constitution, which deals with the broadcasting of material that constitutes “advocacy of hatred” and “incitement to cause harm”. Radio 786 was found guilty of hate speech as defined under that cause. The broadcast station will now be subject to sanction as contemplated in Section 66 of the Independent Broadcasting Act. (Saks, 2006)

The BCCSA found that Zaki’s interview featured several instances of anti-Jewish conspiracy theorising and holocaust denial. It also argued for the plight of the Palestinians against the “racist Zionist entity”, and the South African Muslim population was urged to pledge their support for the Palestinians. This recent flare-up in Jewish-Muslim relations in the South African media gives credence to the necessity and importance of this study to analyse the framing of a conflict involving two heavyweight constituencies in local media establishments.

1.2.2 Background to the conflict: What is in dispute and why is there South African interest?
What constitutes the land of the State of Israel today and the Palestinian Territories has been under fierce dispute for at least 2,500 years. (Smith, 2004; Venter, 2003) Kantor (1972) argues that the Arab-Israeli conflict (from which stems the specific Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is a clash of divisive nationalisms in a setting which is dynamically linked to, and cannot be divorced from the conflict. This setting, within the Middle East, is on the one hand of significant strategic economic importance (with resources such as oil in the surrounding territories), and on the other hand, is a location of critical value to the three major monotheistic religions of the world – Judaism, Islam and Christianity.

A central tenet of the conflict, though often misrepresented and neglected, is the land question, more directly: who is entitled to operate, occupy and maintain religious and political control of the physical space known today as Israel and the Palestinian territories? This discourse is often competing against a militarist conflict discourse, which may be descriptively accurate but fails to include a historical context, which would highlight any potential problems in the framing of the coverage.

There are therefore many different aspects to the conflict and each is embedded in a different discourse. As indicated before, Israel and the Palestinian territories have sacred value as religious sites to Jews, Muslims and Christians. Another discourse could be the politics of Israel and the Middle East in general. What are the implications for the Israeli cabinet and Prime Minister in the wake of suicide bombings or army killings of Palestinian civilians, especially in the US-led global discourse of a ‘war on terror’? Is the conflict a function of internal Israeli policy – do right-wing or left-wing political groups control the direction of the conflict through geo-political policy-making?

A Palestinian political discourse may also be prevalent in local media as a way of helping audiences to understand the context – where did the conflict emanate from, what are the politicians in opposition about and what political decisions by the Palestinian Authority leadership will be made to ensure either a protraction or ending of the conflict. The election of Hamas in Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party’s ideological discrepancies with ruling

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10 The land question is inextricably linked to the notion of the nation-state as a political entity. Though this study is not the forum for an extended debate of this issue, it must be said that the land question pertains to physical space and the term “occupation”. The nation-state forms part of the debate as to whom should be responsible for law-making and political decision-making in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

11 One such example of an ideological discrepancy is the call for the destruction of Israel in Hamas’ charter. The Fatah movement, although wholly against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and Israel’s tight border security laws, recognizes the State of Israel’s right to exist. (http://www.mideastweb.org/hamashistory.htm)
Hamas and the security-policy measures taken during the conflict might constitute a discourse of Palestinian politics.

This is an example of how a single (albeit not isolated), ongoing conflict may be shaped by more than one discourse. Discourse analysis is different to a word-by-word analysis of texts. According to Williams, discourse analysis builds on other approaches to the media as it “deals with texts and with language in minute detail, but within a framework which is a larger unit of analysis that signs of texts, namely discourse” (Williams, 1992: 343). The method of analysis is mounted on three key assumptions: 1) that “texts are always produced, circulated and received within discourses”, 2) “meaning is assigned simultaneously within more than one discourse” and with logical inference 3) “meaning is produced within a group of some kind – a discursive community” such that any individual ideas or creations occur, but within the limits of an existing discourse to which they were exposed (Williams, 1992: 344).

One example to illustrate the above techniques is to explicate phrases and terminology that have become standardised through years of use. Williams’ example is the phrase “we live in the Southern hemisphere”. He argues that “we are talking within someone else’s text and discourse – the discourse of European conquest, and this suggests that many people are not aware of the context/discourse through which they speak (Williams, 1992: 344-345). A concluding point is that we define the manner of our texts and the creation of supposed “signs” through the guise of space and time in our speech, and therefore in our texts.

According to Kantor, the convergence “of conflicting claims to, and interests in the Holy Land has transformed what could otherwise be a local conflict into an international problem” (Kantor, 1972: 1). Religious sites in the disputed territory will have a foreign interest if many of the members of the religious faiths are located elsewhere in the Diaspora. Many millions of both Jews and Muslims are scattered around the world and thus maintain an interest in the progress of their brethren in the Middle East, especially if two or more groups are conflicting in claiming the rights of occupation to a single piece of land.

This is thus also manifested in South Africa, a diverse nation with both minority Jewish and Muslim communities. Apartheid South Africa and Israel have also been linked as arms traders since the birth of Israel in 1948. Chris McGreal (2006) points out that the relationship between these two states has been quite different at times. The early Apartheid governments, argues McGreal, were Nazi-sympathisers and disdained the thought of a Jewish State. South Africa were seldom aligned with Israel during Israel’s formative years, but
according to McGreal, began trading arms during the 1970s despite Israel’s acknowledged condemnation of Apartheid policy at United Nations general assemblies. Both states lived in a partial vacuum of isolation – both faced sanctions by certain countries, and this was one of the reasons why trade took place, the necessity of survival and a real-politico need for security and protection.

Within the context of the post-modern, technologically advanced age of the twenty-first century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and particularly the recent intifada which ignited in September 2000, has received a remarkable amount of coverage domestically. This is juxtaposed against conflicts that were clearly closer geographically to South Africa, such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994, as well as civil conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. For a more distanced conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian intifada has received a significant amount of coverage with its distant political proximity to South Africa.

The second intifada, it is generally accepted, began in September 2000 with “tyre burnings” protesting the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, a religious site holy to both Jews and Arabs (Gilboa, 2004). According to Smith (2004), Israeli police and soldiers met these protests with live ammunition, which in turn triggered an armed response from the Palestinians. The most pertinent issue in the conflict was the right of self-determination and security of both parties based on the question of land entitlement. Since 1967, Israel had been “occupiers” of the West Bank and Gaza strip territories, and the Palestinian population believed this to be a severe infringement of their right to self-rule, whilst Israelis argued the territories were legitimately won in war.

Bloodshed on both sides and little successful negotiation characterised the intifada years (generally acknowledged as between September 2000 and June 2003) prior to the consideration, and later action, by the Sharon government to disband Jewish settlements in Gaza. Violence would be met with counter-violence. Israeli government officials would repeatedly justify military incursions into Gaza city as preventative measures to protect Israeli citizens from suicide bombings. Palestinian extremist groups called repeatedly for a unilateral

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12 The concept of real-politik stems from the Realism theory of international relations. It prescribes that nation states, acting as singular entities will always act rationally, and choose the action in accordance with their own interests. Against the backdrop of scarcity of resources, interests may clash with possibly negative consequences. Realism argues survival and security are the primary interests of a nation state. For further reading, see Schrire (1992), Ohlsen (1974)

13 Israel as an occupier is one of the most vehemently debated issues in international politics. The discrepancy is based on the question of who determined the borders of Israel in a) 1948 and b) 1967, and whether they were legitimately and universally accepted. Much literature exists on the nature of Israel as an “occupier” of Palestinian territory. For a complete analysis refer to Charles D Smith’s Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (2004) or for an alternate view: Edward Said’s The Question of Palestine (1992).
withdrawal by Israeli forces from all Palestinian territory\footnote{Including Jerusalem, the West Bank and other towns that were formally declared part of independent Israel in May 1948.} otherwise the policy of suicide bombing would continue indefinitely as a defensive and protective mechanism against the Israeli army (Smith, 2003; Gilboa, 2002).

\textbf{1.2.3 The relevance of the study}

The following two issues are clear: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict commands massive worldwide interest (Media Tenor, 2003). An extensive literature exists (some examples) about the origins of the conflict and the implications for all the parties involved. The international community recognises the importance of resolution to this conflict, the United States-led Road Map for Peace is one such example of international intervention. South Africa’s government has even hosted delegations from both the Israeli government (2002; 2003; 2004) and the Palestinian Authority (2002; 2003) to assist in producing a peaceful resolution to the conflict (www.gov.za).

Secondly, the conflict commands regular interest in the South African press. One such example was the publication of the article entitled “The Road to Jerusalem” by South African journalist Yazeed Kamaldien in the Mail & Guardian (20 January, 2006). Kamaldien’s piece is listed as part of the “Comment” forum in the “Comment and Analysis” section of the newspaper and deals with the following crucial tenet of the conflict: Israeli border checkpoint security. According to the article, Kamaldien was “aghast at his treatment at an Israeli border post but finds it is an everyday occurrence for Palestinians who try to make the crossing” (Kamldien, 2006). His piece described at length the horrific experience of trying to enter Jerusalem from Ramallah, part of the Palestinian territories.

Kamaldien’s article including the two accompanying photographs, one showing Palestinian workers waiting for a bus at the Kalandia checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah, as well as a photograph of an Israeli soldier and Palestinian in dispute after the soldier prevents the Palestinian from crossing the same checkpoint. Both photographs are courtesy of Associated Press, neither taken by Kamaldien. The majority of the piece depicts the barrage of questions the journalist faced from the security officers, including a thorough interrogation and search for “security reasons”, according to Kamaldien’s interrogators. Obviously the Mail & Guardian believes the conflict warrants coverage in addition to the basic news elements.
Just the following week, another feature piece was published in the *Mail & Guardian* (27 January, 2006) by South African Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils entitled “The Myths of Zionism”. The article was written in Kasrils’ personal capacity and it commented on the present-conflict as well as the historical emergence of the Zionist ideology. It elicited such a dramatic public response both positive and negative that the *M&G* chose to publish six letters in response the following week. Reactions were published from Jews, Muslims and Christians, and certain readers expressed “dismay” and “discontent” at the content of the article, whereas others commended the *M&G* and Kasrils “for not buckling to organised pressure to suppress critical views on Zionism”. Clearly, this issue evoked passionate interest and was to feature more regularly in the newspaper’s “Comments and Analysis” section. Three weeks following Kasrils’ article, a response by the Israeli ambassador to South Africa, Ilan Baruch entitled “The Myths of Ronnie”, was published (17 February, 2006). His reply was characterised by engaging Kasrils on a factual battle over the emergence of the State of Israel and more crucially, the debate over the disputed territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The above two examples both argue that Israel are more responsible for the conflict and should be blamed. This “Attribution of Responsibility” frame resulted in swift responses by the opposing lobby’s spokespeople criticising the presentation of the articles. Clearly – the publications are aware (and the editors will later confirm this) of the pending retaliations, but believe that in the interests of giving space to both points of view, better coverage will ensue.

The conflict (of which the Gaza was one recent, pivotal event) is an important international issue. It is so significant in the context of international politics that world powers such as the United States, Russia and European Union have been heavily involved in trying to broker a permanent resolution. It also receives considerable coverage in South African newspapers and because of this dual-reason; it is relevant to question the framing of the coverage in the South African media context.

### 1.3 Problem Statement

The above examples leads to a number of questions related to the coverage of the conflict in the media. Was the isolated incident of the Gaza withdrawal (15-24 August, 2005),
for example presented as one within an inter-state conflict between Israel and Palestine\(^{15}\) where Gaza and the West Bank were central land issues needed to be resolved? More directly, how did individual newspapers frame hard news copy from their overseas correspondents? Media can frame events in a variety of ways – they can be framed by their consequences, they can choose a person or family’s account of the event thereby providing a human-interest frame or even cite the political implications for the key actors in the incident, and therefore use a political frame.\(^{16}\) Several contextual factors (South African as well as global/geopolitical) influence the choice of frame – examples include: editorial policy and pressure from lobbies.

The problem is therefore an investigative one. In view of the fact that the conflict could be framed in different ways, and the South African media’s position in a country where there are both Jewish and Palestinian interests, how did the media present the Gaza withdrawal?

1.4. Conceptualisations – definitions to fit the context of the study

Following the structure of Venter (2004), I agree that “certain concepts have to be defined to fit into the context of the study”. Venter suggests that “concepts take on different meanings depending on the type of study and the subject for it. There are a few concepts that arise regularly during the course of the study and need to be conceptualised in order for the study to make sense” (Venter, 2004: 12). I will now list these contentious concepts and provide a working definition for each:

1.4.1 Israel: Referred to in biblical texts as the “Eretz Yisrael” or \textit{land of Israel}. In Jewish scripture, Israel is known as the land promised to the Jewish people by G-d\(^{17}\). Geographically, it comprised all of what constitutes the modern State of Israel plus the ancient regions of Judea and Samaria (the controversial, modern-day West Bank and Gaza

\(^{15}\) Although Palestine does not have formal recognition as a “nation-state”, the conflict is essentially not one about Israel and all other Arab nations. At the risk of oversimplification, it is a conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people, some of who are not limited to residence in the “Palestinian territories”. For a stronger historical context, refer to chapter four of this thesis.

\(^{16}\) See Chapter three on framing theory for an in-depth discussion on how framing theory works.

\(^{17}\) Halacha (Jewish Law) dictates that the Jewish people may not spell out the name of the King of Kings in full, as it is a desecration of something inherently holy, such as a prayer book. This is the reason for the hyphen in G-d’s name. Another usable word is “Hashem”, directly translated as “The Name”, which may be used in an informal context. References to idols or pagans may be spelled as “god” or “gods” but the capital letter denoting the sacredness of the subject is omitted.
Strip). The collective territory has been ruled by Hebrew kings, the Roman Empire, Muslim rule and Turkish rule as the Ottoman Empire. It has been a focal negotiating point during both World Wars as a trade-off for serving the interests of either the Muslim or Jewish populations under the British Mandate. Contemporary Israel refers to the Jewish State declared on May 14, 1948. (Samuel, 1969; Duncan & Opatowski, 1998)

1.4.2 Israeli/Israelite: Ancient and contemporary definitions differ. The ancient term “Israelite” refers to the Hebrews who entered the land of Canaan after the exodus from Egypt, and after having established a covenant with G-d. Present-day terminology distinguishes between Jews and Israelis, the latter referring to all citizens of post-1948 Israel. The former comprises the descendants of biblical twelve tribes, who witnessed G-d’s revelation at Mount Sinai and subsequently received the “Torah” – the written law. Collectively, Israelis comprise Israeli-Jews, Israeli-Arabs, Israeli-Christians, Druze and news reports regularly make the distinction in their reports. (Samuel, 1969; Aharoni, 1962)

1.4.3 Palestinian/s: The term Palestinian is generally a reference to an Arab Muslim living in Israel or the disputed territories, believing in the right for an independent Palestine to exist. With the advent of the Westphalian nation-state system in 1648, Palestine was still used to describe a geographical region and therefore Palestinians were the Arabs who happened to inhabit the region. Palestine has never been thus a nation or a state by present-day understanding. (Said, 1992) According to Firoz Osman of the Media Review Network advocacy group, Palestinians are “people who can trace their roots, over many centuries to the land of Palestine” (Osman, 2006)

1.4.4 Conflict: According to Heywood (1997), conflict is defined as competition between two or more opposing forces, reflecting a diversity of opinions, preferences, needs and interests. There exist two branches of conflict: violent and non-violent, and the former refers to the context involving warfare, terrorism, militarism or any physical violence where the intent is to damage. Conflict differs from War in that conflict also refers to organised political violence that causes less than 1000 deaths per year. According to Holsti:

18 The Druze are an adherent of an esoteric monotheistic religious sect living in the relative security of the mountains of Syria and Lebanon, as well as urban and rural Israel who believes that Al-hakim was an incarnation of G-d. A Druze is permitted to conform outwardly to the faith of the unbelievers and separates state and religion as two entities, (Hence the presence of Druze soldiers in the Israeli army).
Conflict, leading to organised violence emerges from a particular combination of parties, incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and military actions. The parties to an international conflict are normally, but not necessarily, the governments of nation-states (obvious exceptions would include the various Palestinian guerrilla bands and the Secretary-General of the United Nations). Parties seek to achieve certain objectives, such as additional or more secure territory, security, control of valuable resources, access to markets, prestige, alliances, world revolution, the overthrow of an unfriendly government, and many other things. In efforts to achieve or defend these objectives, their demands, actions or both will run counter to the interests and objectives of other parties. (Holsti, 1992: 348-349)

1.4.5 Terrorism: The roots of the word terror refer to an entity being anxious or frightened. (Wilkenson, 1977) Although sources refer to some actors in conflict as “terrorists”, terror is not an identity but a method. Terrorism is a form of warfare in a situation of power asymmetry. A small amount of violence is used, but the intention is to generate a far greater political effect. According to ‘O Neill (1978: 13), terrorism refers to the use of covert and sporadic violent tactics such as murder, torture or bombing in order to achieve both short and long-term political aims.

Martha Crenshaw, a leading American scholar in security and conflict studies, describes terrorism as “a conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behaviour of multiple audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the many. Thus a lack of proportion between resources deployed and effects created, between the material powers of actors and the fear their actions generate, is typical.” (Crenshaw, 2002: 2) According to this definition, suicide bombings that kill few, but cause greater awareness of a dispute/conflict together with public lynchings and visual violence are considered acts of terrorism. “State terrorism” of Israel (Pilger, 2004, 2005; Fisk 2005) does not fit the above definition. Israel would classify the Palestinian threat at a national level rather than a group of individual guerrilla fighters. Hence terrorist/ism is a regularly contested word. Used in several contexts it has also become a term synonymous with the phrase “freedom fighter” – the implication being that the terrorist is the victim not the perpetrator in a liberation struggle.

Within the media context, terrorism is often simplified to extract the newsworthy values. Crenshaw argues that in modern times, “political conceptions are communicated and even
originated by the news media, an institution that serves not only as a channel for transmitting information but also as a magnifying glass” (Crenshaw, 2002: 3). Because terrorism is a political label, it is an organising concept that both describes the phenomena and offers a moral judgment.

1.4.6 Intifada: Refers to two periods during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (December 1987-1991 and September 2000-June 2003) characterised by violent Palestinian uprisings against Israeli rule. The Intifada was an unconventional form of warfare whereby short-term terrorist tactics of suicide bombings, public lynching and street violence would be met by Israeli incursions into West Bank and Gaza towns to apprehend the “terrorists” and prevent the advent of more terrorist activity against Israel. (Smith, 2004) According to Osman (2006), the literal translation of the term intifada means “shaking off”, and in the current context, it means to set free from the “Israeli oppression”.

1.4.7 Zionism: In summary, the contemporary version of the term Zionism refers to the ideology initiated by Theodore Herzl in the late nineteenth century which yearned for Jewish political and religious self-determination (Samuel, 1969). In the summer of 1897, the first Zionist Congress was held in Basle. The opening day’s conclusions began with the following statement from Herzl: “Zionism strives to create a home in Palestine for the Jewish people, which is secured by public law” (Herzl, 1897).

Some believe that Zionism was a reactionary movement to the mistreatment of Jews in Russia (Pogroms) and Western Europe (Spanish expulsion) necessitating a homeland where Jews could live under Jewish-run government. Biblical Zionism advocated the obligation for the Jewish people to settle in Israel, as promised by G-d in the covenant.

1.4.8 Framing: Framing is a theoretical approach within the broader media studies discipline of effects studies. According to Robert Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them salient in a communicative text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993). A single incident, for example a car crash or a

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19 As a French journalist in 1894, Herzl took an interest in the Alfred Dreyfus treason trial where he believed, and later proved, that Dreyfus was being pushed from the French military because he was Jewish. He believed Jews in the diaspora would face regular persecution unless they acquired their own “homeland”. He expanded this idea in his 1896 book The Jewish State (Samuel, 1969; Smith, 2004).

20 More details of this theory will be given in Chapter three.
lottery winning, could be presented as a story in several ways. The car crash could be framed as a story of conflict between two drivers, or as a human-interest story: how the injured party’s recovery is progressing or as a story of consequence: the possibility of a legal case. Winning the lottery could also be presented differently. Either as a story of morality: what the winner intends to do with his/her winnings, and if this is fair. Or a story of human-interest: what the winner’s occupation was prior to winning, and how this event will impact on his/her life.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

One of the initial theoretical assumptions of this study is that the media frame every story/event/subject in a particular way. According to Gamson, a frame is “a central organising idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue”. (Gamson, 1989) Two seminal scholars in the field of media framing include Gaye Tuchman and Robert Entman.

Entman defined framing further:

“to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them salient in a communicative text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52)

Kathleen Endres suggests that Entman emphasised that frames fulfilled several functions. They defined problems, diagnosed causes, made moral judgments and suggested remedies. (Endres, 2004: 8) Within the context of the Gaza pullout and subsequent evacuation of settlers, there were several possible frames. These may include the geo-political return of land by Israel to the Palestinians, or a socio-economic frame of the financial implications of a change of political leadership. The framework also addresses the framing of individuals and people, which leads to a larger frame of the conflict (or a specific event – the Gaza pullout) and possibly taking a stance or moral judgment.

Apart from the theoretical assumptions guiding this study, there are general assumptions about the media’s role in framing conflict. Claes H de Vreese argues a direct

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21 See chapter 2 on framing for a more detailed discussion of the brief theoretical framework.
relationship exists between framing conflict between two or more parties and commercial
success of television news (De Vreese, 2004). Several news scholars (Leiter, Harriss &
Johnson, 2003) cite conflict as a primary news value. One argument for their demand by
audiences is that conflicts tend to disrupt the status quo. But what about ongoing conflicts?
When does not being the status quo become the status quo? This line of thought questions
then whether commercial considerations and journalistic routines such as adherence to “news
values” influence framing. Two questions remain – firstly, how frames are chosen, and why
they are chosen?

Violent conflicts have tended to dominate front page news in the past at the expense
(until recently) of other conflicts: political, economic, social or scientific. (Leiter, Harriss &
Johnson, 2003: 31) However in the case of a single, unique conflict, such as the Israeli-Arab
conflict, there are many angles through which journalists can frame the conflict – either
religious, political, violence or socio-economic, and it is critical to question the dominant
discourses that emerge from choosing a particular frame.

De Beer (2004) proposes that another way to look at news is to identify different values
that constitute news. According to O’ Sullivan et al, these values are the “professional codes
used in the selection, construction and presentation of news stories in corporately produced
values appear entrenched in journalistic routines and also underlie journalism training. Many
journalism textbooks in South Africa, for example, cite crime, health issues and politics as
news values, whilst some have changed with time. According to Mencher, there are eight
values listed that American journalism students have found repetitive over the years:
timeliness, impact, prominence, proximity, conflict, the unusual, currency and necessity
(something discovered by a journalist that needs to be disclosed) (Mencher, 2003: 68-77).

A basic theoretical background on news is necessary to approach the concept of a
foreign conflict and its presentation in local media. Time, distance and proximity are all
variables taken into account when selecting overseas news items. De Beer (2004, 198)
explains:

Though time and distance variables play a significant role in what does and not
constitute news, and both values rank high on news values scales over time, closer
examination shows that distance and intensity might be more indicative of what
becomes news.
In order to come to some kind of typology of news values, De Beer combined the different loose standing news values cited in journalism textbooks in a so-called “Distance & Intensity Scale of News Values” model – the nearer the news event and the higher the intensity of the event, the bigger the news value would be:

**Distance Scale**

- Time (the closer to the event, the higher the news value)
- Proximity (ditto)
- Socio-psychological (ditto)

**Intensity Scale**

- Status quo (the higher the intensity of the impact of the news on the status quo, the bigger the news value)
- Magnitude (single/plural; for example, one important politician dying versus many people dying in an accident)
- Novelty (human interest, unusual event)

### 1.6 Research Methodology and Approach

This study will essentially will be driven by an analysis of texts - broadly termed a qualitative content analysis. Mouton (2001) says that contents not only refers to words, but also includes meanings, symbols, pictures and themes. The bulk of the research will be a framing analysis of the coverage of the Gaza withdrawal in three South African newspapers – the *Mail & Guardian, Cape Times* and the *Sunday Times*. Chapter two of this manuscript is dedicated to a full overview of the theoretical framework.

The three newspapers were chosen for specific reasons. The *Cape Times*, as a popular English-language daily amongst the 7-10 LSM bracket, would generally provide lengthier analyses as dictated by the traditional broadsheet format. This together with it necessarily giving daily updates on developments in the conflict made it an essential choice. The *Mail &

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22 Please refer to chapter three for a complete account of the research methodology employed.
Guardian, too, was essential as it is a nationally-distributed newspaper. Although the circulation is rather low compared with other South African weeklies, their coverage of Middle-Eastern conflict is broad and always prevalent on the international news pages. The Sunday Times is simply South Africa’s largest newspaper and in selling 505,000 copies weekly, are able to supply a large audience with coverage of their choice. It will be interesting to therefore gauge how much coverage is in this paper in relation to that of the Mail & Guardian.

All three newspapers will be reviewed for articles relating to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Each article will then be analysed according to several standard factors (regardless of whether the article is a hard news report, feature, cartoon or opinion column): Firstly, a brief synopsis of the article’s content followed by an explanation of the context of the article based on the date of publication. A frame\textsuperscript{23} will be allocated to the article after which I will cite the key aspects of the article that have necessitated the choice of frame. These key aspects include the choice of language, themes to emerge, accompanying images and sources quoted. A brief comment on the choice of headline (a critical component of the framing procedure) will then follow.

The methodology is not without drawbacks. Mouton suggests that possible problems of …include little or no information or intention (including background) of the author. Furthermore, textual analysis can err in interpretive bias and the quality of text sources. (Mouton, 2001: 166-167)

To overcome these limitations, the findings of the framing analysis will be triangulated with in-depth interviews with the editors (political/news) responsible for the final framing decisions (selection of photographs, choice of headlines and kickers) of all three newspapers. This part of the research will fulfil several objectives. Ideally, the interviewees should articulate a stance with regard to the conflict: either a stance supporting either side, or a neutral position. These interviews could stimulate explanation as to the choice of frame and perhaps give account for the dominant frame.

Another objective of the in-depth interviews is to ascertain whether any pressure exists from either or both the Jewish and Muslim lobbies. Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 of this thesis have outlined the role these lobbies have played in the South African media, whether they have

\textsuperscript{23} The frames utilised for the purposes of this study are: conflict (violent and non-violent), human-interest, attribution of responsibility, consequences (economic or other), morality and other. Chapter two will expound on the presentation of each frame as well as examples of each.
been at loggerheads themselves, or whether one has been taking on a particular publication. This response, together with the focal point of how the copy for the stories is attained, will help answer the central question of how the conflict (particularly the Gaza withdrawal) is framed – as a product of all these factors, or as a product of none.

1.7 Outline of the remainder of thesis

The study will be based upon a theoretical grounding in framing theory, together with the application of the research methodology to the key units of analysis – the Mail & Guardian, Cape Times, and Sunday Times. Chapter two comprises a combined literature review and in-depth discussion of the theoretical framework and this study’s particular approach of framing theory. The literature review will be focused into three, separate sections. Firstly, a review of general works on the larger topic of media and conflict, from analysis of war reporting to specific scholarly case studies of event coverage. The second focused review will be of the literature pertaining particularly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in modern media. This will consider academic work related to the coverage of this particular conflict, especially the first and second intifada. Thirdly, this portion of the chapter will address previous research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media, together with literature on conflict reporting in general in the South African media.

Previous literature on framing theory and case studies will be outlined in the theoretical framework, also in chapter two. A brief historical background on the emergence of framing theory as it derived from the broader effects studies approach will act as an in-depth account of what is framing theory and why it is relevant as a form of content analysis today. The second chapter will conclude with discussions of the work of two seminal scholars in the field, Gaye Tuchman, and Robert Entman.

Chapter three will examine in detail, the research design and methodology associated with the study, including how the publications were selected, the research questions that were chosen and the method that will be used to address the research problem. An explanation of the triangulation of the research (including in-depth interviews with the key editors/decision-makers at the newspapers) will give a stronger basis for the relevance of the study. The chapter thoroughly explains the precise duties and structures of the examination, and then explains in detail (with examples) each frame which was utilised in the actual research.
Following the third chapter on methodology and research design, chapter four is a comprehensive historical overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict culminating in the 1967 six-day war when Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza and created the newer borders (changed significantly from the 1947 Partition) that have remained controversial ever since. Only after an evaluation of the events leading up to the “occupation” of the Palestinian territories, I believe, can one truly understand the land dispute that has caused the second Al-Aqsa intifada and more recently, the withdrawal from Gaza.

The penultimate chapter deals with the findings of the research, the implications of the frames used and any relevant conclusions drawn from the research. A shorter, final chapter is a summary of the results of the questionnaire distributed to South African journalists. It deals with their perceptions of the conflict and its representation in the South African media. The questionnaire interrogates the state of foreign news and the way it is placed in the local newspapers, the implications of solely taking wire copy for an international issue, and whether this acts as a hindrance to gaining a South African perspective on an international conflict.

1.8 Afterthought – the flare-up of the Israeli-Lebanon conflict: July-August 2006

Although many skirmishes, threats, and incidents of violence other than the conflict studied occurred in the Middle-East during the conceptualisation and research period of this study, few conflicts worldwide reached an escalation point such has been the level of the recent resumed conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah terrorist group based in Lebanon. As this study neared its completion, renewed tensions in the region flared during the first week of July 2006 when two Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah fighters crossing into Israel, and eight others were killed in the ensuing violence. Hagai M Segal, an Israeli commentator based in London, argues that “the timing of the raid, after months of calm in the border region, could not have been more deliberate” (Segal, 2006). Israel responded with an immense strategic operation aimed at the systematic dismantling of Hezbollah (and sovereign Lebanese) structure in an essentially protective/defensive operation according to the Israeli army (other commentators considered the Israeli offensive to be a pre-mediated attack on Hezbollah rather than a reactionary strike).

As it has been argued earlier in this chapter, the South African media reported widely on the violence, thereby regarding any Middle-East developments as the most crucial branch
of international news for local audiences (Weaver, 2006). One such example of the extent of the coverage is with the August 4 edition of the local Mail & Guardian.

1) Of the five full tabloid-size pages allotted to “International News”, four in their entirety reported developed in the Israeli-Lebanon crisis.

2) The “Comment & Analysis” section (consisting of seven pages) allocated two pages to the conflict – lengthy analyses by guest commentators together with many published letters to the editor.

3) One more full-length page in the “National News” section was published entitled “Israel should give up land” – an analysis of a recent survey of the opinions of South African Jews “highlighting growing willingness to compromise with Palestinians”.

The two preceding editions (the Mail & Guardian is a weekly newspaper) carried a similar amount of coverage spanning all the major news divisions as appeared above. Cape Times coverage has been equally considerable during this period. Daily reports from Reuters and Sapa-AFP coupled with regular commentaries from parties arguing from the perspective of both sides makes the coverage if anything, detailed, broad and encouraging of debate.

Apart from this medium, television and radio have also provided the necessary forum of informing the public of the hard-news developments, as well as a forum for more robust debate. Those without satellite television24 can hope for the conflict to be analysed in one of the two following investigative programmes: Special Assignment and 3rd Degree, but neither will focus on an international story with as much prominence as a local one. A recent investigative interview took place on Lerato Mbele’s show Public Interest, in early August where she interviewed Israeli ambassador to South Africa, Ilan Baruch.

Talk radio shows have also covered the Israel-Lebanon war heavily. The two main stations are Radio 702 (567 Capetalk in the Western Cape) and the state-operated SAfm. Both stations have reporters based in Israel/Lebanon and when an incident occurs, taped reports are submitted regularly. In the first week of August 2006, as the war was gaining momentum, 702’s Tim Modise and SAfm’s John Perlman dedicated several shows each to debate the

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24 South Africa’s local feed includes the British channels, BBC world, SKY television, and the United States’ CNN news which provide non-stop news coverage with regular special guests to share deeper insights. Another benefit is the impressive investigative talk show – Hardtalk, usually with host Tim Sebastian. Hardtalk hosted former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu during the first week of August. His appearance followed the events of 4 and 5 August where hundreds of Hezbollah rockets were fired into Haifa, killing 13 reservist soldiers and wounding approximately 50 civilians, and was preceded by an appearance by a member of the Lebanese government, arguing the plight of Lebanon
evolution of the conflict, and callers were invited to share their constructive opinions and offer possible solutions.

When a ceasefire was reached on August 14, news coverage almost immediately dwindled. Like the conflict reporting during the Gaza withdrawal, the reporting of the Lebanon crisis was prominent – the implication being that the entire Middle-East region is carefully monitored in the local press and that coverage of Israeli-Palestinian developments ought not to be treated as events in isolation, but rather as part of the larger Middle-East conflict discourse.

1.9 Summary of chapter

In this chapter I have outlined the motivation and rationale for this study – that a) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enjoys a massive public interest in the South African context and hence b) receives a disproportionately greater amount of coverage relative to other conflicts. The consequence of this was to analyse the coverage, and question how it was presented in relation to complaints by lobbies supportive of both sides. This, together with the aim to enquire whether there was a dominant frame or discourse in presentation forms the basis for what I wished to achieve by pursuing this subject.

Chapter 1 also included the necessary overview of the research methodologies employed, the theoretical framework, and a comprehensive list of contentious terms which needed lengthier definition before being used in this study to avoid misconception.
Chapter 2 Literature review

2.1 Previous Literature

There are three distinct branches of literature (including case studies) which constitute the research groundwork for this study. Firstly, there have been many journal articles, textbooks and academic collections published on the broad topic of media and conflict. The research topic of the media’s role in war and conflict expanded drastically during the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) where scholars have argued, the media were more involved in the reportage of a war situation than ever before in the media’s history. The role played by several key actors including CNN and teams of embedded journalists was explored in great detail by Carruthers (2000).

Dor (2003; 2004; 2005) has specialised in analysing the coverage of the second intifada within the Israeli media. His research for 2005 included an analysis of the “Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank”


One other area of media conflict research remains relevant to this study – the media and conflict in Africa, the context wherein the study is posited.

2.1.1 Literature on Israeli-Palestinian conflict news coverage (television and print news) in recent times

Within this overall framework, literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - specifically within a mass media context form a specific part. Here Gilboa (2002) and Shinar (2002) argue how journalists and media organisations have taken stances as mediators in recent years of the various Arab-Israeli conflicts. There have also been several valuable studies (Zandberg &
Neiger, 2004) regarding the framing of the events of the 2nd Intifada in Israeli media. Their overwhelming conclusions were of a failure to historically contextualise key incidents, and a noticeable change from a military to civil frame after 5 days of coverage in a local daily.

According to Zandberg & Neiger), the new “full civil discourse” became more introspective and analytical as coverage shifted from the plain descriptive. The conclusion that the reports failed to historically contextualise key events also has serious implications – both a possible resulting ignorance from the audience without the necessary background to understand the daily developments, and also limits the scope of the mainstream reader to gain a broader understanding of the evolution of present discourses in the media. Yes – connect this with the aim of your study

According to Zandberg & Neiger (2004), the coverage consisted of less hard news of the daily developments in the intifada, and featured lengthier analyses of the political and social implications of the intifada. This report is relevant to this study as it employs a similar framing analysis and makes for interesting comparison with the findings of the research into the South African context.

A similar study by Liebes & First (2002) suggested that the conflict discourse was dominated by symbolic incidents for the case of both sides, where two images competed for the status of “emblematic horror” of the 2nd intifada. The study of Liebes and First concluded that the “personalisation of the conflict” led the Israeli media discourse, both on television and in the newspapers. Relaying stories of grief-stricken parents of victims on both sides (though the Israeli media tended to give more attention to families that suffered losses on the Israeli side), the personalisation was based on several salient practices. Ie: 1) “TV’s ceremonial identification with the victims. 2) TV’s willing collaboration with provocateurs, 3) Seeing the suffering and hearing the voices of Palestinians (via their considerable participation in prime time TV talk shows and news coverage on Palestinian television where “there is no difference between mainstream and ideological channels”. (Liebes & First, 2002)

Another finding in the above study was that the media generally chose a united frame, that of Israel as the Goliathan conqueror. Editors, producers and journalists sought thereafter to follow this discourse thereby reinforcing their audiences’ preconceptions about the roles of the respective “sides” in the conflict. The discourse emerged of a helpless, disproportionately weaker Palestinian people living in horrendous conditions (overcrowding in the limited
Palestinian territories) battling against an Israeli superpower with unlimited fighting resources.

Although this study will not directly monitor the television news medium, a highly relevant study conducted by Greg Philo, Alison Gilmour, Maureen Gilmour, Susanna Rust, Etta Gaskell and Lucy West (2003) of the Glasgow University Media Group conclude that journalists were unaware of historical context, and critically, the TV news coverage “scores high on images of fighting, violence and drama but is low on explanation” (Philo et al, 2003: 133). This was after the Group analysed television news coverage of the intifada from its inception in September 2000 until the 16 October of the same year.

The authors also conducted in-depth interviews with journalists from the BBC, ITN and other news agencies who had reported on the conflict, then established a series of audience participation groups (including journalists, academics and members of the viewing public) to discuss the issues of representation and audience comprehension (Philo et al, 2003: 133-134). 12 audience groups comprising 85 people “with a cross-section of ages and backgrounds were asked a series of questions about the conflict and what they had seen on the television news.

A rather interesting addition to the research process was the distribution of a questionnaire (with identical questions posed in the audience groups) to a group of 300 younger people between the ages of 17 and 22. These participants were asked what words they thought of when hearing the words “Israeli/Palestinian conflict” – and whilst only two individuals remarked that they had listed accounts from relatives, it was critically 82 percent of the group that listed television news (and newspapers to a lesser extent) as their primary source (Philo et al, 2003: 133). The results were alarming. The following were direct typical answers:

- Conflict, hatred, religion
- Palestinian kids being shot by Israeli tanks and artillery
- War, murder, religious hatred
- Shootings, war, suicide bombers, poverty
- War, suicide bombers, Jewish people
- War, repression, suffering
- Guns, fighting, explosions, bloodshed
(Philo et al, 2003: 133).
Very few of the participants knew the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as anything other than a war zone, characterised by violence, bombings, murder and death. Religion and hatred were used several times together, but little idea from the participants (after their consumption of television news) about the discrepancies over land, context of Israel as “occupiers” or why the situation is considered a by some to be a war zone. The Glasgow University Media Group then analysed the television news coverage to identify the presentation of the conflict and whether dominant frames emerged.

The format of analysis was limited but precise, as 95 bulletins from 28 September until 16 October were transcribed and the number of lines of text which were devoted to different themes were counted\textsuperscript{25}. According to Philo et al., (2003):

In the over 3,000 lines of text in total, only 17 explained the history of the conflict. The key issue of water was barely mentioned. There was a very brief reference on BBC2 when a journalist listed major issues for peace negotiations and commented that “last but not least (there would need to be) an agreement of water right” (BBC2 Newsnight, 3 October 2001). In our audience groups many people expressed surprise, because they had not heard about it before (only 2 people of the 85 interviewed knew of the issue).

It was apparent that many people did not understand that the Palestinians were subject to a military occupation and did not know who was “occupying” the occupied territories. On TV news, journalists sometimes used the word “occupied” but did not explain that the Israelis were involved in a military occupation. For example, a BBC bulletin referred to “the settlers who have made their homes in occupied territory” (BBC1 18.00, 9 February 2001).

The concept of the “occupied territories” is of critical relevance to this study, as the Gaza withdrawal was essentially a unilateral pullout from land with a complete logistic overhaul of government structures, planning & development and the dramatic movement of landless Palestinian occupants inwards, with an equally dramatic movement outward of

\textsuperscript{25} An example of how themes were counted – how many described fighting/violence or peace negotiations or historical explanations of the conflict
Jewish former residents. The researchers found a general lack of awareness by interviewees about who constituted the “occupied” and why this was a source of conflict:

The reference to settlers is interesting because it speaks of “occupied territories”, without making it clear that it is the Israeli settlers who are the “occupiers”. It is perhaps not surprising then that many in the audience did not understand the nature of the “occupation”. In the sample of the 300 young people, 79 percent did not know that it was the Israelis who were occupying the territories. Only 9 percent knew that it was the Israelis and that the settlers were Israeli. There were actually more people (10 percent) who believed that the Palestinians were occupying the territories and that the settlers were Palestinian.

(Philo et al, 2003: 136)

2.1.2 Literature on conflict reporting and framing in the media

The reproduction and localising of global news was addressed in a study by Bill Rolston and Greg Mclaughlin of the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland (Rolston & McLaughlin, 2004). Their article analysed how the daily press in Northern Ireland reported the war in Iraq in 2003. This study bears semblance to this thesis topic for several reasons. Firstly, the press in Northern Ireland relied heavily on news agency copy, and secondly, the war was essentially between “The Coalition of the willing”26 and Iraq. Led by the United States, Northern Ireland were somewhat distanced from both sides in the same way that despite overt Jewish and Muslim communities in the country, South Africa was equally distanced politically and diplomatically from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Their findings were interesting. The daily newspapers in Belfast used mixed sentiment in framing their discourse. Belfast Telegraph chose a discourse of finding “local” heroes in the war (Rolston & McLaughlin, 196-197). But because of the historically dangerous political climate between Northern Ireland and Britain, some papers took a heavy anti-war stance; failing even to promote the causes of their own citizens’ involvement. This also acts as an

26 The “Coalition of the Willing” was a phrase coined by United States president George W Bush and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. It refers to the coalition of countries that did not support the UN inspection team’s findings in Iraq, and consequently supported a collective invasion. (source)
interesting contrast with South African coverage (this includes news reports taken from overseas news agencies, together with a comment and debate forum featuring local writers and their perspectives) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to see whether a local frame was used to perhaps localise the news. Because several journalists have chosen a discourse for the South African newspapers highlighting the similarities between modern, Zionist Israel and Apartheid South Africa\(^{27}\) it is important then to investigate whether they frame the implications of the Gaza withdrawal in terms of the political outcome of post-Apartheid South Africa.

The circulation figures of the three papers examined are very similar to those of the papers I will examine. *Belfast Telegraph* enjoys circulation of approximately 97,000; *Irish News* at around 50,000 and *News Letter* with a circulation of approximately 30,000 (Rolston & McLaughlin, 201). The fact that these titles share similar mid-level circulations with *Cape Times, Mail & Guardian*, (although the *Sunday Times* stands out with a circulation in excess of 500,000) together with the fact that two of the papers are not locally owned, make the dynamics of the study rather appropriate to the South African context.

Rolston and McLaughlin’s study bears semblance in locality to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the South African media. Perhaps the central premise and immediate concern of my study and the obvious similarity to the Rolston study is that the ways in which major international stories are reported locally. According to the authors “the war in Iraq is a global story that is unavoidable” (in the same way that because of the Jewish and Muslim interest locally, the demand for coverage of Middle East-related conflicts is important) (Rolston and McLaughlin, 2004: 192). Chapter six of this study will consist of in-depth interviews with editorial staff members of the newspapers examined. The key reason for this branch of research is to ascertain how and the papers set their non-local agenda. Similarly, with Rolston and McLaughlin’s research, they based their work upon the fact that in general, the local press in Northern Ireland appear to set their non-local agenda according to three criteria:

1. Stories that top the global news agenda – war, disaster or disease – and that can therefore be said to be unavoidable; for example local coverage of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 was exceptional for its breadth and depth (cf: McLaughlin and Baker, 2004).

\(^{27}\) See McGreal (2006), Pilger (2005) and Fisk (2005/6)
2. Stories which are global in origin but for which some local connection is sought to make them more familiar and newsworthy.

3. Stories and photo’s that act as space-fillers (often news agency copy) about places that have no immediate connection to Northern Ireland and that do not necessarily top the global news agenda.

(Rolston and McLaughlin, 2004: 192-193)

Foreign ownership clearly has an influence on what coverage a domestic newspaper can afford to present, as the *Mail & Guardian* takes almost all its copy from the parental *Guardian* group, the *Cape Times* takes primarily from *The Independent* group, whilst all three routinely purchase copy from the biggest agencies: Reuters, Associated Press and AFP.

Whilst literature on conflict in the media has recently seems to have been dominated by the coverage of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the field of journalism and mass communication, few of the studies undertaken have an appropriate theoretical grounding or research design to utilise for this study. Very few have employed the framing analysis, and most tend to be quantitative studies on the amount of coverage allocated within the news medium.

Allison Aiken’s (2003) thesis on a framing analysis of the *New York Times* and *Le Monde* newspapers following the attacks of September 11 is an exception. Aiken employs both a qualitative and quantitative content analysis in the descriptive section of her research, before questioning the implications of the chosen frames.

Unlike Aiken, who chose to examine two newspapers from different countries (*Le Monde* is a Parisian publication); my thesis will examine newspapers from within South Africa only. This is purely because of my objective to interrogate the South African context, and find out whether there were any differences in framing between newspapers from different stables and orientations, and why this might be the case. Despite this, Aiken’s thesis offers value from a perspective of research design as well as the choice to study an incident that took place on another one continent from the standpoint of a publication on another continent.

Despite the obvious incongruity between the isolated event of September 11 (though a significant aftermath provoked a shift towards the responsibility frame from the obvious
conflict frame) and the lengthier process of the Gaza withdrawal (the evacuation of Jewish settlements took nine days alone with Israeli troops only officially leaving the territory a week later), Aiken’s study is critically valuable because of the similarities in criteria she employed for her research. A final (but no less important) similarity is the targeting of elite publications to interrogate the frames. Like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the September 11 attacks were global events. According to Aiken (2003: 11)

The study remains balanced in the sense that the event being reported on was a global event having global consequences. Even though the attacks were in one country, the entire globe was affected economically, politically, emotionally, religiously and in countless other ways. The events continue to have a global impact today, one and a half years later.

This is probably the single most relevant reason for using literature on September 11 for my study. Several factors subsequent to the Gaza withdrawal have increased international participation in conflict resolution. The election of Hamas by the Palestinian population together with the election of Kadima in the Israeli elections have received major international media recognition. Just like September 11, the Gaza withdrawal has global consequences with both Jews and Muslims in the Diaspora vociferous in support of the interests of their people on the disputed territories. Because of the clear global interest that Middle-Eastern issues seem to have, I anticipate that the local media will frame issues within the conflict from a generic, simplified global context, rather than localising the issues and relating them to South Africa.

The study of the disinformation in coverage of the Kosovo War in the Flemish daily press by Els de Bens, Laurence Hauttekeete and Heidi Lagast (2002) appeals as a departure point for my thesis both in terms of research methodology as well as the theoretical framework employed and context of conflict. By initially asserting that the media are inseparable from their social, political and economic context and endorsing Altschull’s view that they are important agents of power, the writers acknowledge that it would be a mistake to assume that the media are neutral. (De Bens et al, 2002) However, and more critically, they argue that:
There is a world of difference between on the one hand the pursuit of neutrality or objectivity and on the other the indiscriminate reproduction of military information, the acceptance of disinformation and the presentation of blatantly black-and-white reports (De Bens et al, 2002: 241)

Their analysis of a perceived dominant NATO discourse during the Kosovo war followed a simple, yet effective methodology. The researchers examined three Flemish newspapers in Belgium searching main news stories, interviews, human interest articles and literary columns and simply searched for a NATO-led discourse, neutral or no-NATO discourse. In the Belgian context, it was concluded that the Dutch-speaking readers were fed a particular selection of discourses, heavily in favour of NATO in one newspaper, and more balanced in the others.

Whilst very few South African journalists are based in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, it will be important in this study to address whether the local newspapers examined choose wire copy which is supported from an Israeli military stance or a Palestinian perspective, or completely neutral. Although this study will not be a forum for a discussion of the greater political-economic structures of the newspapers, which may or may not dictate how they choose, and later frame stories from the Middle East, it will be interesting to note if any pattern emerges about how the newspapers develop their own respective stances or viewpoints in editorials, based on discourses emerging from their overseas copy.

Alicia Korn’s research (Korn, 2002) into the reporting of Palestinian casualties in the Israeli media could make for interesting comparison in the local South Africa press. She concludes that whilst Hebrew newspaper Haaretz reported accurately (consistency and reliability of numbers of deaths) the deaths of Palestinians, the discourse was such that the Palestinian casualties were framed as people killed in armed clashes, although the majority killed were actually unarmed civilians (Korn, 2002: 247).

Korn states (Korn, 2002: 247):

The newspaper accepted the dominant assumptions and definitions of reality, according to which the Israeli army was forced to react to the escalation in Palestinian violence,
but ignored the causal link between the Israeli reaction and the Palestinian behaviour. The wide use of the phrase ‘killed in clashes’ to describe Palestinian deaths, along with the emphasis placed on those events in which armed Palestinians were killed, legitimised the high number of civilian casualties and contributed to the construction of the uprising as an armed conflict justifiably oppressed by military means.

It will be interesting to see whether a similar discourse emerged in South African daily newspapers. Though my thesis will scrutinise the reports of the Gaza withdrawal more closely than those throughout the entire intifada, the renewed violence was directly part of the causal chain of events leading to the pullout by the Israeli armed forces.

I believe this form of study is useful for my research topic, though their study was conducted over a lengthy time-period and my study will examine no longer than ten weeks of content.

2.2.1 The Media’s Conflict Reporting in Africa

G.L Nassanga, head of the Department of Mass Communication at Makerere University, in his foreword of the 2006 book *Media in Situations of Conflict: Roles, Challenges and Responsibility*, outlines the reader about the troubled situation in post-independence Uganda. He argues that having endured a five year bush war (1981-1986), several guerrilla battles between resistance armies and fighters, and across-the-border fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998-2003) Uganda has essentially been at a constant state of war, and it is not only the politicians and military that can play a role in stopping this.

According to Nassanga, “the media is especially an important player as it is ever present during any conflict and its reportage could help ease the conflict or make it worse” (Nassanga, 2006). Nassanga’s department has since 1999 been trying to support the media in playing its role in constructively reporting conflict. Despite initiatives such as these, African conflicts remain perhaps the most dangerous in the world from which to report developments.

Adolf Mbaine, editor of the aforementioned book, echoes Nassanga’s sentiments in arguing that conflicts are devastating and too complicated to be left only to the combatants and a few peacemakers to resolve. Mbaine suggests that in Africa, stemming conflict should
require the contribution of everyone such as governments, civic and religious leaders, the military, community-based and civil society organisations, donors and critically, the mass media (Mbaine, 2006: xi). According to Mbaine, war reporting serves a function other than pure classical report-journalism, but can be used to inform warring parties and lead to resolution:

The media in particular has been brought into sharp focus recently as a key player in conflict whose role needs to be revisited. War necessarily makes news, as conflict is a time-tested news value. It has also been the view held by many that the level and orientation of coverage of a war by the mass media may easily escalate or reduce it. It has thus become imperative for the people, especially in Africa, to understand conflict and appreciate its role in covering it so that war reports are done consciously and effectively.

(Mbaine, 2006: xi)

Published in 2006, Media in Situations of Conflict: Roles, Challenges and Responsibility, was conceptualised around and centred on the conflict which plagued post-independence Uganda. Without giving an explicit account of the nature of the violent political conflict in Northern Uganda, Muto-Onop’Lajur argues that the situation was compounded by several conflicts: relationship conflict, resource or structural conflict, value conflict, interest conflict and the resulting violent conflict (Mutu-Ono p’Lajur, 2006: 73-77).

How then, he asks, should the media respond to public warring, or even choose to provide a forum for conflict resolution? According to Mutu-Ono p’Lajur: “in conflict situations, the media should ideally be a forum for bridging the gap between warring parties. It should provide a channel of communication through which the conflicting parties can dialogue so as to reach a consensus” (Mutu-Ono p’Lajur, 2006: 62). He also uses the argument that the media is a “voice for the voiceless” which should in theory give correct direction for the general good of the society – such that “it is wrong for media practitioners to promote and advance views which escalate, rather than de-escalate conflict” (Mutu-Ono p’Lajur, 2006: 62).
This call for civic journalism in the Ugandan conflict could well be asked of the media’s role in reporting the Israeli/Palestinian conflict – especially in the perceived “neutral” South African context. The essential argument is that in a tense and violent conflict, the media has a certain duty – to limit the apprehension/aggression of the citizenry through news reports, while at the same time staying true to the journalistic principle of impartial, fair reporting. What does this position hold for the local reporting of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? For the relevance of this study, it can be questioned whether the three newspapers analysed used more aggressive, conflict/religious frames (which unfortunately could have fuelled an escalation) or more, human-interest based frames, to not untruthfully, de-emphasise the violent aspect, but rather emphasise the socio-economic and political implications to perhaps educate rather than incite the audience.

Lugalambi argues that “in a functional society, the constructive management of conflict lies at the heart of the task of governance” (Lugalambi, 2006: 104). He then adds that “as far as Africa is concerned, what appears to confound many people is the nature of the conflicts raging on the continent” (Lugalambi, 2006: 104). Having said this, whether it is a conflict of ideology, conflict based on a dispute of land or even an ethnic-based conflict, the media does not need to approach the handling of the coverage of the conflicts any differently, as the implication for maintaining journalistic principles is essentially the same.

2.2.2 Previous literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media

Having scanned various local academic databases such as the Nexus research library as well as the Sabinet and Ebscohost databases, it appears that there has been very little communications research (including sub-fields of journalism, media studies, and cultural studies) on the events of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media. It seems therefore The above databases revealed that the conflict has been under-researched in comparison to the media research of the Rwandan conflict, Ugandan, DRC and post-September 11 related research.

In the more mainstream public media such as newspapers, media magazine The Media, television and radio, the conflict is debated regularly between guest commentators, public
letters to the editor and even the conflict’s representation in the South African media is occasionally debated (Slier, 2003; Sparks 2005, 2006; Fisk 2006). Another form of research is the media analysis concluded by the Media Tenor institute, where quantitative audits are completed on the depiction of issues in the media. Their most recent audit, the 2005 Media Content Analysis of the “Media Image of the Israel / Palestine conflict”, concluded that out of the 1537 news reports analysed, approximately 80% were without a clear positive or negative rating (Media Tenor, 2005).28

There is also a clear distinction made between the amount of coverage the region received over the period of the Gaza withdrawal as opposed to the rest of the year. According to the Media Tenor audit, media coverage of Israel (967 out of 1537) for the month of August doubled in most cases (and tripled in certain cases). This shows that the South African media a) recognises the critical international importance of the event for its audiences and b) understood that the event stood out as a unique period in an otherwise turbulent conflict.

The *Mail & Guardian*, despite having a smaller, niche readership (ABC Jun-Dec 2005 ) as opposed to the country’s largest selling newspaper, the *Sunday Times*, provides the largest forum for coverage of the conflict.

2.3 – Framing as a Theoretical Approach

2.3.1 Introduction to Mass Media Theory and Context

De Beer (1992:7) introduces the study of mass communication via four angles or channels. 1) “the different contexts of human communication”, 2) “the elements of mass communication in relation to interpersonal communication”, 3) “the forms, or media, as well as the trends and issues, of mass communication” and 4) “the functions of mass media in society.

Though each medium of communication (print, radio, television or personal) differs with degrees of relevance to human communication, there are several examples of distinct contexts which can best be linked to a framing effect. Intrapersonal or self-communication

28 See Appendix B
refers to one’s thought processes, whereas interpersonal communication refers to when two individuals communicate. De Beer refers to the latter as dyadic communication, but both allow for reflection of a message sent through a channel, although the response could be inward or outward response. A more significant context is mass communication – defined by De Beer as “when people (mass communicators) communicate through intermediate media (such as television or newspapers) to large, relatively heterogeneous and anonymous individuals or groups (mass communication audiences)” (De Beer, 1992: 7). This study focuses on the framing of a specific issue in the mass media (in this case newspapers). The theory of framing derived from an area of mass media study known as “effect studies”, within the broader paradigm of functionalism.

The term “effect” has a dubious reputation in media studies. It is often difficult and more likely improbable to assess a true “effect” that a media message has on the recipient of the message, especially within the context of mass communication, where responses are much more complex to gather and evaluate. For the purposes of this study, effects studies will not be discussed or expounded upon in detail. This is therefore a purely descriptive study analysing the use of certain frames within the context of mass communication. The rest of this chapter will deal with framing theory, it’s origin and underlying principle and an examination of specific frames that exist in conflict reporting, and an analysis of the implications thereof.

2.3.2 The Functionalism paradigm, and Effects Studies as the broader theoretical approach

Functionalism is a paradigmatic world view not limited to the discipline of communication sciences, journalism or media studies exclusively. Within a media context, functionalism holds that society is conceived as a “complex whole formed as a series of “parts”, each of which “functions” by contributing to the successful working of the whole”. (Couldry, 2004) The paradigm assumes that all the contributing forces work harmoniously to achieve an end goal of stability. One of the characteristics of versatility that the paradigm enjoys is the extended metaphor for “function” or “functioning”. In a biological sense, the functioning can refer to a natural organism such as the human body or a plant, whereas in a technological context, artificial “systems” such as a computer or physical machine (motor vehicle) could be used for the purposes of the approach. According to McQuail, the functional approach to mass
communication represents the media as essentially a self-correcting mechanism within certain parameters.

Although the approach has attracted many critical responses over the years for being short-sighted and unwilling to adapt to modern theory, De Beer argues that the functional approach still provides accurate insights into the workings of the modern media. He suggests that “over time the functional approach has shown that it is quite useful in explaining the process of mass communication within the context of a paradigm that postulates that society and its interfacing structures strive towards balance and not conflict” (De Beer, 1998: 13).

The most celebrated application of the functional approach to mass communications was Lasswell’s original communication model. The chain of communication, argued Lasswell, took the following form with key supplementary questions and implications: “Who says what, in which channel, to whom with what effect?” (Lasswell, 1948) Generally, there are many functions of the mass media. De Beer lists the traditional functions as potentially of surveillance, correlation & transmission and entertainment. (De Beer, 1998)

Hiebert et al. constructed two seminal models to attempt to explain the relevance of the functional approach to mass communication. In summary, the first model, it is assumed that societal forces create a “national media system” that is used to perform several functions in order to maintain shape and stability amongst society. Key functions include: news and information, event analysis and education, entertainment and art, sales and advertising, and publications relations. (Hiebert et al., 1985: 45-50)

Functionalism remains a heavily criticised paradigm of thought, declared by critics as short-sighted and unfeasible (Lukes, 1975). Couldry (2004) points out that “functionalism is so long dead in sociology and anthropology that it is embarrassing to find it alive and well in areas of media research” (Couldry, 2004: 123) He maintains that there is great difficulty in even conceiving of a society or culture as a “self-sufficient system”- and even more, that functionalism’s claim that societies and cultures function as working systems is not realistic.

2.3.3 Effects studies, and the standing of framing theory today

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Within the functionalist paradigm, framing emerges from the broader theoretical approach of effects studies. As McQuail simply put its: “the entire study of mass communication is based on the premise that the media have significant effects” (McQuail, 1994: 327). By listing the media’s perceived functions (see above); one can gain a more practical insight into the consequences (also effects). Advertising, education (of crime statistics) and providing public information (weather and politics) are the more tangible functions with which to measure effects.

Scheufele (1999) posits that because of several vague conceptualisations of framing as a media effects theory32, “the term framing has been used repeatedly to label similar but distinctly different approaches” (Scheufele, 1999: 103). Framing as a research and application theory mechanism, is embedded in the larger context of media effects research. The focus of this study is the framing and representation of an event, within a conflict context, and the presentation of the story is inextricably linked to media effects. Questions relating to public perception, interpretative bias and future coverage of the conflict will arise directly in relation to the interest is generates, hence a clearly symbiotic relationship between media and audience (this refers to lobbyists rather than neutral audiences).

Despite the drawbacks of the effects studies approach within mass communication theory33, it is still considered relevant and integral to research scholarship, so much so that the authoritative journal, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly dedicated their entire Spring 2004 edition to the topic “Media Framing – Five studies explore the nature and effects of media frames”. Daniel Riffe says in his editorial comment of the above edition that “at the risk of oversimplifying an important substantive concept, framing is a process implicit in storytelling”. He adds further:

In reporting a story, for example, journalists select aspects of an event or issue and organise or emphasise them in ways that may characterise the issue, suggest who or what is responsible for it, and perhaps even suggest solutions or changes. Requests by a marginalised group in society to be heard and served might, in one instance, be frames as the protest of a special interest group; as an alternative, of course, that

32 Scheufele cites Entman’s (1993) reference to framing as a scattered conceptualisation. He furthermore, alludes to Brosius and Eps (1995) argument that “framing is not a clearly explicated and generally applicable concept, but only a metaphor that cannot be directly translated into research questions” (Scheufele, 1999: 103)  
33 A timeless criticism remains the inability to measure effects of media. Apart from opinion polls, focus groups and perhaps advertising effects, the general effect of news is according to sceptics, difficult to measure.
group’s demands might be framed in terms of Civil Rights and equality. (Riffe, 2004: 2)

The application of framing theory is still regularly used today within communication studies. Proffitt and Fleming-Rife (2004) applied a framing analysis to examine the newspaper coverage of the court case – Brown v. The Board of Education, in itself, a broader study on the reflection of public school reform changes. More recently, Botha and De Beer (2005) completed a framing analysis of the coverage and portrayal of former President Nelson Mandela and current President Thabo Mbeki in the South African news.

2.4 History of framing theory

One can approach the concept of framing from more than perspective- that an event is represented in a particular way to highlight key facets and neglect others (salience), or that a frame just “offers a perspective and manages the viewer’s alignment in relation to the issue”. (Rhoads, 1997) It was originally developed by social psychologists as an analytic technique, but soon became more eminent as a means to “explain the roles of news media in defining and refining issues for the public” (Endres, 2004: 8).

Two of the pioneers in defining and shaping framing theory were Erving Goffman and Gaye Tuchman. Goffman built on the concepts of “selective attention, intimate involvement and non-contradiction” to outline the role of frames (Endres, 2004). There did however have to be a background to attributing these characteristics, and Goffman believed journalism and mass communication to be suitable “social frameworks” that help individuals understand events. His definition extends to classify framing as a way of establishment that will govern social event- most relating to the agenda-setting model within mass communication studies. (Goffman, 1974: 22)

Tuchman held a pragmatic stance suggesting directly that “mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events”. (Tuchman, 1978: xi) The implication is that whilst agenda-setting merely tells readers or viewers what to think about, frames, argue Aiken, go a step further and tell readers how, or in what terms, to think about the issue. (Aiken, 2003) A more critical assessment is that a frame offers a reader or viewer a specific way in which to look at a reality out of many possible
ways in which one could look at the same reality. Essentially, media (or journalists) become directly responsible for the contextualisation of news, where they attempt to take a perceived reality and represent it as close to the inclusive reality as possible.

It is appropriate to go one step further and label practically what a frame consists of. Though the following sub-section will outline and criticise Robert Entman’s conception of framing, I will base my definition on the three-part analysis of Kelton Rhoads:

2.5.1 Kelton Rhoads’ three–part frame analysis

As indicated above, Rhoads defines a frame as “a psychological device that offers a perspective and manipulates salience in order to influence subsequent judgment.” (Rhoads, 1997) I will now expound on the three key components of Rhoads definition, namely “to offer a perspective”, “manipulate salience” and “influence subsequent judgment”.

2.5.2 Frame functions: to offer a perspective

1) By offering a perspective, the frame “manages the viewer/reader’s alignment in relation to the issue. In the same way that a literal picture frame aims to flatter the artwork and tends to obscure a painting from an oblique view, so a psychological frame (not necessarily aesthetic or visual) tempts the observer to view the topic from a certain perspective. Rhoads cites an example by researchers Levin & Gaeth (1988) that after labelling ground beef as “75% lean” rather than “25% fat”, they were able to compel people to consider meat in terms of it’s positive health qualities.

2.5.3 Frame functions: Manipulating salience

2) By manipulating salience, a frame guides the viewer/reader to consider certain features and ignore others. This can be represented in either literary description or selective pictorial salience. Therefore a psychological frame encourages the observer to focus upon a specific feature of the subject within the frame, and implicitly disregard other features of the
same subject which lie outside of that particular frame. By referring to a subject as “intellectual”, “blue collar” or “an athlete” the emphasis is on one particular feature thus encouraging perception to be organised around this label.

2.5.4 Frame functions: Influencing subsequent judgment

3) The third component is part assumption – that a frame influences subsequent judgment. Take as an example the media coverage of the rape trial of former deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, in 2006. After the first two days of his testimony, newspaper and television reports framed their day’s coverage around the admittance by Zuma to choosing not to wear a condom when about to have sex with an HIV-positive woman, then relating this statement to previous statements made by the same person promoting abstinence or condom use when speaking as the chairman of the South African National AIDS Council.

The frame used here was morality and sex. Through the same testimony, different frames such as “public health”, “social development” or “violent crime” could have been used but were omitted in favour of the morality frame. The implication is clear. Zuma said one thing but did not act in accordance with this position. People following the case could now hold a judgment that Zuma is a) irresponsible and b) untrustworthy and c) unreliable as a representative of the people.

2.6 Tuchman and framing as a function of the newsroom’s organisational structure

Prior to her landmark 1978 work entitled “Making News: A study in the construction of reality”, Gaye Tuchman worked as a sociologist with a particular interest in newsroom dynamics and how events are processed and framed from within this context.

Tuchman did not view the decision-making process of news selection as linear. Her seminal article of 1973 entitled “Making news by doing work: Routinizing the expected Unexpected” investigated the problem of how newsroom workers processed and imposed routines on non-specialised, unexpected events. She tackles the issue of how framing actually happens, and questions whether it is an eventuality on the part of the individual journalist, or the organisational structure of the newsroom. By focusing on the definition of news as
exceptional events that are in the public interest\textsuperscript{34} and need to be brought to the attention of the public, Tuchman narrowed down her research question essentially to the origin of the framing process- how organisations routinely process disruptive, exceptional events and critically, how newspeople reduce this disruptiveness.

One’s understanding opinion on the political economy of the newsroom is critical to the conception of news framing. Tuchman addressed the issue of framing as something inherent in bureaucratic structure rather than an issue of judgment or decision-making by an individual. By asking questions such as “How can organisations routinely process unexpected events?” And more explicitly; “How do newsmen routinise the processing of unexpected events?” (Tuchman, 1973: 111) By hypothesising that the methods used by newspeople to classify “events as news” reduced the variability of the organisation’s output (hence promoting routinisation), Tuchman argued that “news organisations routinised the process of seemingly unexpected events by typifying them along dimensions that reflect practical tasks associated with their work” (Tuchman, 1973: 117).

An interesting conclusion that Tuchman draws from her study was that “people categorise the objects of their work to control it”. (Tuchman, 1973: 112) This is a clear reference to the simplification of news events for the benefit of the newspeople, rather than the readers. Her research (which included participation and observation of two newsrooms for a significant period) concluded that newspeople don’t categorise events based on their subject matter, but rather that they interrogate the events according to the “way the events occur” and according to “the requirements of (their own) organisational structure”. (Tuchman: 116)

In her critique of Tuchman Pam Laucella (2000) expression caution at Tuchman’s conclusion that the aforementioned observations be accepted as how the industry manufacture news frames. According to Laucella, Tuchman overlooked the importance of the owners’ political and business interests and their influences on newsworkers, routines and content (Laucella, 2000).

Brian Carroll and Laucella both offer strong critique that Tuchman’s research did not cover sufficient bases for the conclusions to become generalisations. She covered the workings of only two newsrooms, although Carroll does argue for the credibility of the outcomes citing Tuchman’s eyewitness account (Carroll, 2000). Both also agree that

\textsuperscript{34} Whilst considerable debate in recent times in the South African media has emerged about the disposition of the “public interest” (for further information, see Tsedu, 2005), the debate will not be addressed in this thesis, as it is bears little immediate relevance to the study.
Tuchman’s study “may not prove falsifiable since it appears more difficult for researchers to access and directly participate in the newsroom and its work” (Laucella, 2000: 3). Despite the criticism, Tuchman’s work remains indispensable to the subject of framing and framing theory. She pioneered the idea not to observe a single incident or frame in isolation, but to thoroughly consider bureaucratic structure as to answer how and why a frame occurs.

The study of Tuchman’s to this study remains essential as it is necessary to understand if and how the makeup of a newsroom and the associated bureaucratic structures determine the choice and presentation of news. In the case of the three South African newspapers analysed in this study, all relied on a threefold procedure – the inflow of necessary wire copy, the selection of photographs to accompany the reports from other sources completely, and then final decisions rests with the respective news editors to present the ongoing events of the conflict as they see fit. Both Weaver (2006) and Haffajee (2006) have argued that organisational structure of their respective newsrooms dictates a shared responsibility amongst editorial staff, but that there is a problem when assigning responsibilities on such a sensitive subject (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and then having to overrule earlier staff decisions because of the choice of material chosen.

Following from Tuchman’s initial conclusions about newsroom decision-making, it remains relevant to this study to observe whether this “top-down” approach to news coverage existed in the South African newspapers. It seems that unlike in the case studies of Tuchman, it is difficult for the South African papers to favour a “bottom-up” approach to presenting the conflict as those in charge of choosing wire stories are not in fact the final decision-makers, and hence the choice of coverage relies almost entirely on what other people report – a potentially problematic journalistic exercise.

2.7 Entman’s conception of framing and its critiques

Robert Entman’s work built on the earlier theory and became a landmark work after the application to the mass media context. Entman’s (1993) primary argument is that frames involve selection and salience. He defined framing as follows (Entman, 1993: 52):
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them salient in a communicative text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

According to Entman, it is not just the communicators who subject the readers or viewers to framing judgments. He argues that frames exist in at least four locations in the communication process. Firstly, the communicators create frames (whether conscious of this or not) with implicit judgments. Consequently, footage or text has frames that are “emphasised or de-emphasised by the presence or absence of certain words, phrases, images or sources” (Aiken, 2003). The receivers then attribute their own value judgments or conclusions on the event which may or may not reflect the intention or frame of the communicator.

To understand how frames work in practice, we refer to Entman’s conceptions of selection and salience. Whilst selection is quite simply observable, Entman suggests that frames promote a particular bit of information’s salience, which he defines as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful or memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1993: 53). Increased salience, argues Entman, is also likely to increase the probability of the audience remembering the issue/event in that same way. It is also more effective to atone or link the frame to the pre-existing belief systems of the audience. Thus media workers can effectively research or survey audience opinions, then only incorporate a small or less obtrusive frame and generate the same effect.

Elaine Sieff (2000), however, finds Entman’s conception too simplistic and without sufficient justification. According to Sieff, Entman separates framing into two components of selection and salience. Selection is the portion of reality on which the framer wishes to focus. Salience is what stands out (vivid), a measure of importance. One must also question whether the circumstance under which framing occurs, something neglected by Entman. Entman concludes that public opinion may ultimately be the product of framing by elites and have little standing on its own. This appears to be pessimistic about the capabilities of the large, mainstream audience to dictate how events should be covered or framed.

Entman, however, believes audiences are less likely to respond to real changes rather than change of frame. But according to Sieff, “change, such as an economic downturn will
break people’s habitual patterns of political thinking and behaviour. It will also open them up to framing effects. But if the frames do not correspond to the new reality of the downturn, they are likely to remain ineffective” (Sieff, 2000). Eg: George Bush attempted without success to convince the public in 1992 that the economy was good, despite the reality of the downturn. Sieff’s argument seems credible. Individuals are not always immediately responsive to media frames – past experiences and beliefs must hold some weight if we assume the public to be a rational public. Kunda (1990) also argues that even when frames correspond to reality, individuals do not always respond to them, people are vested (emotionally) in past beliefs, therefore people more likely to accept consistent frames and reject inconsistent frames.

Another discrepancy exists between Entman and his critics regarding counter-framing. Entman mentions that potential counter-framing is “often absent” citing the case of survey questions as an example (Entman, 1993: 55). But Entman has also emphasised the power of “elite groups” in shaping frames, and here lies the irregularity. Should one elite group frame an issue, one would expect an opposing elite group to counter-frame that issue. Sieff, citing Zaller (1992), also suggests that if the frame and counter-frame are equally strong, then the overall effect is limited.

As mentioned in the first paragraph of this subsection, Entman’s conception of framing is centred on the powers of selection and salience. His definition of salience involves omitting some pieces of the picture to emphasise others. According to Entman, the exclusions are at least as important as the inclusions; they reinforce the inclusions by depriving the audience of the data they would need to forge an alternative interpretation of reality (Entman, 1993: 54). Kaplan in response argues that Entman’s conception is too generalised in comparison to the sociologists who derived the theory (Kaplan, 2000):

Selection could be seen as the emphasis on one interpretation of reality; salience, in Entman’s formulation, comes from emphasising the emphasis – through constant repetition, prominent placement, or association of the message with more deeply embedded cultural symbols and beliefs.

Entman rather ambitiously believes that the media have the power to stifle at will “any critique transcending the remedies inside the frame” (Entman, 1993: 55). According to
Kaplan, he focuses on the routines of reporters; excluding discussion on the media owners own status as political elites (with a vested interest in limiting the range and defining the very terms of public debate). We could therefore see the journalistic principle of objectivity as a frame in itself- one “designed to steer audiences clear of any social analyses or transcending critique that might trigger them into action” (Kaplan, 2000: 3).

Framing theory does not suggest that the message generated by the frame is purely a creation by the journalist to contextualise the news for the audience. The essentially unobservable frames help to organise the world for both journalists who report on it by enabling them to quickly and routinely process large amounts of information and also help to the audiences who rely on those reports, to understand the world. Gans (1979) offers a completely different perspective to the evolution of the media frame. According to Gans, making sense of the world by the selection of news stories, the shaping of its content, and the highlighting of important, novel, dramatic and distinctive information while deleting or under-emphasising the routine or expected is therefore inherent to the journalistic profession (Gans, 1979).

2.8 Summary of Chapter 2

This chapter gave an overview of the literature relating to. the three branches of literature examined for this study. The first branch, previous literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media, was extremely limited. No academic studies were found in any of the local research databases. The closest resembling studies were journal articles covering the United States invasion of Iraq – an entirely different context of Middle-Eastern conflict. Paula Slier’s article in *The Media* questioning the manner of coverage was one of the few discussion articles in local media that evaluated South African coverage of the conflict.

The next category of literature examined was previous academic studies on framing and conflict reporting in the media. Though a wealth of work was found, I chose papers that covered a similar context (though not necessarily an identical conflict) to where I was observing. For this reason, I analysed Rolston & McLaughlin’s (2004) article on how the Northern Irish press covered the War in Iraq in 2003. Another example covered was the study by De Bens, Hauttekeete & Lagast (2002) – a study in the disinformation in coverage of the
Kosovo war by the Flemish press. Both analyses were interesting and relevant to my study by focusing on coverage of a foreign conflict by a relatively uninvolved third party press – unlike other literature covered of for example: Aiken’s (2003) framing analysis of the post- 9/11 coverage in the *New York Times*. The latter was also critical, but within a different perspective.

Other literature reviewed was that of the prominence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in modern media, and it featured prominently in the South African context where television documentaries, radio shows and an interesting study by Media Tenor were scrutinised.

The rest of chapter 2 dealt with framing theory – a history thereof, the broader theoretical approach from where it emerged and a more detailed analysis of the work of two of the pioneers in the field, Gaye Tuchman and Robert Entman. The latter part of the chapter also included a review of the Kelton Rhoads’ three-part frame analysis. Here a detailed explanation is given on how to pick up nuances in the framing of articles, and how to implement these nuances in one’s own analysis.
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Research Methodology and Approach

This study will essentially be driven by an analysis of texts - broadly termed a qualitative content analysis. Mouton (2001) says that contents not only refers to words, but also includes meanings, symbols, pictures and themes. The methodology is not without drawbacks. Mouton suggests that possible problems include little or no information or intention (including background) of the author. Furthermore, textual analysis can err in interpretive bias and the quality of text sources. (Mouton, 2001: 166-167) Qualitative content analysis, argues Du Plooy (1997) is a more procedural form of research and “tends to be more critical in nature and can be used when we need to penetrate the deeper layers of a message such as in a semiological or narrative analysis”. According to Du Plooy, quantitative content analysis differs from qualitative in the way that it analyses more manifest messages, as opposed to the qualitative’s ability to evaluate latent messages (Du Plooy, 1997: 152).

Essentially, the difference extends to include the format of research. Both variants employ a method that focuses on the message, “which is reduced to a set of categories representative of the research problem” (Du Plooy, 1997: 152). As opposed to the qualitative’s reliant on the critical approach, quantitative analysis applies the “scientific method” more stringently, usually involving counting and numerating or tabulating to prove a hypothesis.

I will focus my analysis using the approach of framing analysis. Framing as a form of theoretical framework is covered extensively in chapter two – literature study and theoretical framework. Another important theoretical discipline considered when undertaking this study was approach known as discourse analysis. Mouton suggests that discourse analysis can be defined as the analysis “of language beyond the sentence” (Mouton, 2001: 167). It is also thematic methodology where the researcher will look for dominant themes (or discourses) throughout lengthy periods of text. As an analytical method, discourse analysis has value by focusing on larger contexts of discourse, and this analysis therefore, is high on “construct validity”. Norrick (2001) argues that it is quite possible that these two different methodologies can be relevantly used together gain stronger perspectives in a study.

The chosen methodology is relevant to the study both in terms of the subject material covered, and in terms of the way the research questions will be addressed. Because the
majority of the material to be analysed will be “hard” news reports, the structure and style of the reports are likely to be similar, but each piece needs to be evaluated according to the same standard guidelines. This can be achieved through the framing analysis (later discussed in this chapter) which analyses headlines, accompanying images, style and content within a strict framework – hence one needn’t change the scope of the methodology for each article, and the same structure of analysis can be adapted for longer, commentary-style narratives as well as cartoons and editorials.

With regard to the research questions, as they remain largely descriptive, the choice of methodology seems appropriate. One of the goals of the study is to simply evaluate and observe patterns in coverage presentation, not to create my own constructions based on a prior hypothesis. The framing methodology employed is more of an evaluative tool than anything else – one can ascertain if and how headlines differ – and crucially, how the dominant chosen frames neglect aspects of the conflict that other qualitative methodologies might not pick up.

3.2.1 Quantitative vs Qualitative methodologies

The merits and demerits of the above methodologies have been well documented in mass communication research with some of the early criticism emanating from Ralph Nafziger, Chilton R. Bush, Fay Day and Charles L. Allen (1949). Content analysis, one of the classical research approaches encompasses several qualities from both schools - the exploratory nature of thematic investigations and interpreting/understanding the results (qualitative), together with the measurement and counting of a research question, and tabulation thereof in purely numerical terms (quantitative). What both methodologies are investigating, in their respectively unique ways, is a message within a media text or as Danielson phrased it – “the actual symbol sequence that is being communicated” (Danielson, 1966: 180).

Though not directly observable, the message (or frame as with the case of this study) is a veiled presentation of news which ultimately forms a popular discourse35. Danielson argues that “it stands suspended in time and space between the source that created it and the destination that will ultimately receive it. It is the product of many forces, some plain and present, others obscure and remote” (Danielson, 1066: 180). An example related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be the reporting of the religious significance of Jerusalem in the aftermath of a recurrence of fighting between the Israeli army and Palestinian militant fighters

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35 Refer back to section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1 for a definition of discourse
in Gaza. The implicit theme of Arab versus Jew or Islam versus Judaism will become the provider of context in building the message as opposed to the contemporary land discrepancy which defines their conflict.

The actual measuring and interpretation of research results is only a consequence of the initial chosen methodology. Quantitative study means that research is geared to results expressed numerically – in frequency distributions, correlation coefficients, ratios and percentages or contingency tables. If one’s assumptions are accurate and correct, quantitative study can prove to be efficient because of the smaller margin for error in mathematical procedure, however the procedure is not without drawback, hence the choice of a qualitative content analysis (framing analysis) for the purposes of this study. Whilst quantitative study can highlight dominant themes or practices within a text, it fails to address the more analytical questions, such as how to understand thematic differences or why dominant frames emerged. This idea was questioned by early communication theorists Lasswell, Lerner and Pool as “reading on the lines” and not “reading between the lines” (Lasswell et al., 1952: 32).

Often a combination of the quantitative and qualitative to numerate and interpret data is useful, as will be the case with this study. The first half of the results of the research (Chapter 5) will be addressed with qualitative examples of the framing analysis – a systematic explanation of the accompanying quantitative graphs which will detail in numerical terms, the frequency in appearance of the six frames used. This method allows for greater depth of analysis, particularly with the addition of argument to supplement the “how” answers, and to address the “why” and “so what” questions.

Qualitative research must address the descriptive limitations of conceptualisation. Quantitative research in mass communication essentially provides a system of measurement so as to compare variables in answering hypotheses; however one of the principal goals of qualitative research is the generation of concepts that can form the building blocks of future theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Similarly, the argument of Bryman and Burgess (1994) that qualitative analysis can be viewed as a sort of a “long term” approach is a valid one because of the ability of conceptualisations to emerge from that form of study. According to Bryman and Burgess, initially, concepts are likely to be little more than extensions of codes; and at a later stage more abstract conceptualisation is likely to be possible. This added advantage, though not overlooked by quantitative researchers, can be misunderstood as an approach to research that may provide more questions than answers during the larger process of addressing a research problem.
3.2.2 Precise duties and subjects of examination

As the motivation for the following study has been indicated already (see Chapter 1 subsection 1.1), I will now indicate which media will be studied, and critically, how the results will be analysed and judged.

The primary goal of my chosen research methodology (framing analysis) is to identify how the media have packaged a certain event or subject using a broad frame, be it conflict, militaristic or as human interest, and then study the implications of the selective frame choice. My study will only be an examination of the coverage of the Gaza withdrawal in three local newspapers: Cape Times, Mail & Guardian and the Sunday Times.

There are several reasons for choosing firstly, this media form, and secondly, these particular publications. On the first account, newspapers, although subjected to space constraints, can be considered to still offer the greatest forum for news analysis and coverage apart from the internet and radio. This medium still allows authoritative and accessible debate on important global issues (Note: the Mail & Guardian’s Comment and Analysis section together with the Cape Time’s Forum section provide daily and weekly platforms for public debate), and remains a financially viable and competitive medium for delivering accurate news.

The three publications were chosen for a variety of reasons. The Sunday Times is the largest selling newspaper in the country and therefore has a larger potential influence to inform than other publications. The Mail & Guardian is generally regarded by media researchers as a quality paper (De Beer, 2005; Schreiner, 2005) with serious in-depth coverage for international issues. Although reflecting a fairly limited circulation, the Mail & Guardian is primarily an investigative weekly newspaper and it is dominated by lengthier comment and feature pages, as opposed to daily “hard” news.

The Cape Times, a localised Western Cape daily, is one of the country’s oldest and most respected publications. Under the previous editorship of Chris Whitfield (now assisting at the Cape Times’ sister paper the Cape Argus, the Cape Times grew in circulation after a

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36 Latest Auditor Bureau of Circulations (ABC) figures for Sunday Times published by Johnnic Communications at 505,400 with a readership of approximately 3,2 million. (July-Dec 2005)
37 Mail & Guardian’s latest circulation figures are listed as 40,200 with a readership of approximately 233,000.
lengthy slump in the dailies market. ³⁸ Like the Mail & Guardian (Previously the Weekly Mail), the Cape Times was known in the latter Apartheid years as an anti-government, anti-apartheid publication (Weaver, 2006). Today, it maintains a liberal ideology and reports on both local issues, national and international issues, and still maintains the lively forum section which is meant to encourage public debate.

### 3.2.3 Triangulation of Research with In-depth interviews

Apart from the framing analysis (See 3.3 in this chapter for the precise frames), the findings from this study will be complemented by several in-depth interviews with the editors and news editors of the three newspapers used in the framing analysis. The purpose of the interviews is to ascertain the structural process of building the frame- from the selection of the article either from an overseas wire service, local freelance copy or whether article selection differs from being subjected to time and deadline constraints or legal obligations to companies.

Key areas that will be interrogated include:

**Sources**- which is the newspaper’s most valuable source for coverage? Are their particular sources that draw responses from the audience? What role does the wire-copy play in helping the newspaper frame the story?

**Editorial Discretion** – Is the editorial team responsible for all headings, sidebars and choice of photographs for the packaging of the story? Is a particular frame pushed by editorial to either provoke response or promote a view?

**South African perspectives** – What does the journalist think are the primary reasons for South Africa not having enough print journalists in the Middle East? Do the South African print media serve the interests of any of the warring parties in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? Does the editor/editorial team believe that a South African perspective is necessary for local readers? Does the editor/editorial team believe the conflict receives enough (or too much) coverage in the SA print media?

³⁸ ABC figures attribute a 49, 500 circulation to the Cape Times, and an overall readership of approximately 316, 000.
Frames – Is there an effort by editors to select a specific frame that might not correlate to the tone of the story? Do the Palestinian and Jewish lobbies in the South African media have any effect on influencing the choice of frame? Are the editors inclined to personalise the conflict to key actors/decision-makers ie: Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and is the there an effort to steer clear of a religious frame for fear of offending religious groups?

Insights into how the different newsrooms value a foreign conflict, and choose to represent it will make for an interesting complement to the framing research. Perhaps a prescriptive guide as to how a foreign conflict should be covered/framed would offer another perspective from the descriptive results of this study.

As a qualitative research technique, Du Plooy (1997) argues that in-depth interviews provide significant detail that might otherwise be omitted. According to Du Plooy, “in-depth interviews provide more accurate responses on sensitive issues. The rapport between the interviewer and participant makes it easier to approach topics that might be taboo when using other research methods (e.g. survey research and experimental research” (Du Plooy, 1997: 114). Despite the considerable advantage of providing plenty detail by a particular subject, an in-depth interview could conceivably have a problem of generalisability because it is according to Du Plooy, done with a non-random sample. (Du Plooy, 1997: 114)

However, as Mouton (2001) illustrates, questionnaires are also problematic as a form of qualitative research.

According to Mouton, several techniques need to be used to obviate poor responses. “Sensitive or threatening questions may lead to non-response or refusal to participate” (Mouton, 2001: 103). Vague or ambiguous items need to be avoided because this could cause confusion and non-response. Questionnaires are most regularly employed to garner opinion, and form a generalised impression of an issue, this can prove fruitless is the generalisation appears inaccurate, and hence if this approach is coupled with a textual analysis, the results may become more credible.

3.2.4 Research Questions

The primary questions that will investigated in this study are how the three newspapers framed the build-up to the withdrawal from Gaza, together with the actual process which took
place over the course of 15-24 August 2005, and the framing of the consequence after Israeli troops left Gaza and the Palestinians were able to move and act freely. All the types of articles between 5.1.3.1 to 5.1.3.3 (including cartoons, a critical aspect of editorial stance and political positioning) to examine the following primary research questions:

RQ 1: Which frames were used to present the articles relating to the conflict?

RQ 2: Which frames dominated – across the three newspapers?
RQ3: What are the possible reasons for the domination of certain frames?

These above are the three main questions that will be addressed. Several key research questions emerge as sub-questions to the above. Firstly, what were different frames employed, and how do they differ (to be explained later in this chapter). Secondly, how did these frames differ both across newspapers, and also perhaps a shifting of the dominant frame as time went on, and the implications thereof?

A more critical aim of the triangulation is to understand and explain the choice of frames used during the time period studied. In-depth interviews allow an avenue to thoroughly engage with editors about their decision-making process/structure. Two key goals that Van Vuuren, Maree and De Beer (1998) argue should be kept in mind with this form of qualitative research, are to a) obtain information only that is relevant to the purposes of the study, and b) to achieve maximum reliability and validity of the data.

3.5 Types of Frames and Selection Criteria

In the previous chapter, I argued that framing was not only an inclusive process, but also one where neglect of an issue (exclusion) dictates the meaning of the frame. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) conducted an experiment with word usage in a survey and drew three interesting conclusions regarding the implementation of frames. They found that frames “determine whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act in regards to that problem”. By arguing that the frame used gives meaning to the event or issue being reported on, Kahneman and Tversky
found unequivocally that the exclusion of other ideas or frames was just as significant as the inclusion of ideas or frames.

Framing a particular subject, theme or individual may not follow an identical process. If you are choosing to analyse the presentation of physical characteristics or the representation of an event, it is unlikely that the same model can be applied. De Beer and Botha (2005) published an analysis of the news framing of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki as respective Presidents in the South African media. Aiken’s (2003) study however, was a framing analysis of the news coverage of the September 11 attacks in two newspapers. Let us briefly look at these two examples to see how the framing of an individual and an event differed in terms of….

News Framing of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki

The authors’ initial premise is that South Africa’s first two post-Apartheid Presidents are portrayed very differently in the SA media (Botha and De Beer, 2005: 37). According to their findings, Mandela was portrayed as a revered and charismatic “magic man” whereas Mbeki was portrayed by the local media as a rather cold and distant “mystery man”. To attain these conclusions, Botha and De Beer looked for characterisation in their framing analysis – a combination of direct and indirect factors that contributed to the framing of the individual (Botha and De Beer, 2005: 37-40).

The following model used by the authors (or referred to also as methods of characterisation) assessed the indirect factors associated with the subjects (Mandela and Mbeki) each time they appeared in the South African news. 1) Appearance – considerations included clothes, age, health, and references to skin, eyes and race. 2) Behaviour – “social, emotional, activities and actions”. 3) Speech – “What does the individual say, and how does the individual say it”. 4) Thoughts- this includes references by a journalist to the political thought, policies and attitudes, beliefs and values. 5) Effect on others – “What other people have to say about the individual”. According to Botha and De Beer, the advantage of using the characterisation attributes is that with slight adaptation, “it is applicable to all people,
public and private individuals alike. It is simple, user-friendly and gives a clear indication of
the character of the person (Botha and De Beer, 2005: 40).

Despite the advantageous simplicity with which framing “tools” can be developed and
used for study, the choice of methodology used in the above study leaves itself open to flaw
by the selection process of articles in the study. Whilst this disadvantage does not apply to the
study on the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (because every single article related to the conflict
was analysed), Botha and De Beer had to be selective over which articles they chose, and they
conclude that a major criticism against the way their study was constructed, was that “the
choice of examples from the media to underscore framing elements might have been rather ad
hoc” (Botha and De Beer, 2005: 48).

Aiken, in her study entitled “Framing Analysis of the New York Times and Le Monde
following the attacks of the September 11”, argues that the notion of a frame giving meaning
to an event has been turned into the five major media frames that dominate mass
communication research: conflict (violent and non-violent), human interest (civil), economic
consequences (including state and finance), morality (especially the contravention of any
ethical boundaries) and responsibility (including the attribution of blame and consequence).
The Aiken study was highly relevant to my own study because of Aiken’s frames, these will
be adapted for my study as they provided a competent method of analysis of the coverage of
9/11.

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) advise that “a reliable set of content analytic
indicators is necessary for studying developments in the news over time and similarities and
differences in the ways in which politics and other topics of national and international
importance are framed in the news in different countries”. (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000:
94) The correct conclusion that Aiken thus draws is that by simplifying frames into five
particular categories, it is easier for researchers to study the communication processes over
time in a comparable fashion. The division into five categories enables research within this
discipline to be more scientifically testable. An objective yardstick of measurement will
reduce margins of research error and allow for more assertions to be tested and retested.

This thesis will follow the structure of Aiken (as earlier discussed in the sub-chapter
on previous literature) in terms of frame analysis. I will now briefly outline the five frames of
Semetko and Valkenburg before the sketch of my research design.
3.5.1 Conflict (violent & non-violent) Frame

Conflict is essentially a recorded bout of disagreement between two or more parties. Although all five frames may be applied to similar events which may differ somewhat in terms of scale, the conflict frame finds application on a micro, mid-level or macro size scale. “The conflict frame emphasises conflict between individuals, groups or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest” (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000:95).

Religious, civil and physical disagreements all form within the conflict frame. This is to include crime and war in the violent-conflict frame. Militarist and army centred stories (not helped by the embedding of American journalists in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq) are also key to the representation in a conflict frame. Non-violent disagreements often are bound by the conflict frame as in the case of court cases and/or political debates, but in terms of the Gaza withdrawal by Israeli settlers (led by the Defence Forces) the conflict frame could possibly be applied to land disagreements, political jockeying or religious differences.

Example: 39 20 July, 2005. The Cape Times publishes a Reuters story on page 2 (World News section) entitled “Israeli troops in stand-off with defiant protestors”. Essentially a news report, it detailed right-wing Israelis (protesting the forthcoming withdrawal from Gaza settlements) having overcome the initial police barrier and then soldiers surrounding the protestors tents, restricting their movement into the Gush Gatif settlement bloc. The article is packaged as one of civil militarism: there are no religious or political references to the protestor/soldier stand-off. There is also reference to internal Palestinian conflict between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas militants. The overall context includes the following statement: “showdown loomed against a backdrop of resurgent Israeli-Palestinian violence and fresh clashes” which made the article more relevant to the vigorous nature of the pending withdrawal.

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39 The piece used in the example was published on 20 July, three weeks prior to the first evacuation of the settlements. Context: Gaza was now officially closed to non-residents in an attempt by the Israeli government to maintain stability in the region and minimize violence.
3.5.2 Human-interest Frame

The human-interest frame emphasises the human side of the story “in an effort to personalise the news in order to retain audience interest” (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 96). Such frames tend to embody either progress or regress in a situation of difficulty (though an example of the contrary could be a story on a lottery winner). It is not impossible for this frame to overlap with others including the conflict frame and the responsibility frame. Such an example could be the framing of a young child who survived a cross fire shoot-out between militias in a war zone. The child’s current circumstance could be framed through the greater conflict, the consequences (responsibility) or the human-interest frame.

Example: 21 July, 2005 (page 18) in the Mail & Guardian. The article by Chris McGreal of The Guardian Newspapers (UK) entitled “Last stand at Gaza” is effectively a feature report, with a hard news sidebar. Clearly framed as a human-interest story, it tells the narrative of the life of Julia Segal, an elderly Jewish resident of the Sanur settlement in the West Bank, and former inhabitant of Nazi-controlled Ukraine. Whilst the setting and climate around the 21 July is extremely hostile in the West Bank (The story is published eight days after an Islamic Jihad suicide bombing which kills five), the audience is taken into Segal’s home, where the author describes her artwork (of a right-wing nature) and the subject speaks candidly about her political views – a humanist perspective. It is interesting to note that this article featuring an elderly Israeli woman’s “voice of the conflict” is juxtaposed against a sidebar detailing clashes between Israeli police and protestors of the withdrawal. The article’s title lends itself to a conflict frame (aggressive altercations between protestors and police) and the kicker speaks of settlers’ defiance, despite the feature speaking mainly of the life of Julia Segal.40

3.5.3 Economic consequences (and general/other consequences) Frame

This is a simpler frame to contextualise and analyse. Whether we are analysing a singular event (ie: Gaza withdrawal or the death of Ariel Sharon) or an ongoing series of

40 It is insufficient to declare the story of Julia Segal indeed as an extended metaphor of the settler struggle because of the way the story is told.
events (ie: the Intifada) the economic consequences frame puts the issue in terms of the future economic consequences the event will have on groups and/or individuals. Though the Aiken study reflected only on an economic consequences frame, this study will differentiate between economic consequences and other consequences (eg: political or geo-political).

**Example:** A good example of the economic consequences frame occurred in the comment and analysis section of the *Mail & Guardian* dated 25 August, 2005. The article entitled simply “The day after…” was written by Daoud Kuttab, Director of the Institute of Modern Media, Al Quds University. In accordance with the title, the article discusses the economic and strategic consequences of the evacuation of the Jewish settlements from Gaza.

It outlines the key players involved in potential negotiations and speculates what is necessary for stability in the region to occur. Context: the analysis was published literally the day after the settlers had been evacuated from Gaza, although soldiers were to remain in the region for another week. The article questions whether the Palestinians will be able to use aid/existing resources effectively to build a modern, pluralistic state. The author also speculates whether the political rule will be one of Palestinian secularism or a religious region (statehood is not yet mentioned) governed by Shariah law. The economic consequences frame is used through the author previewing the economic challenges that lie ahead – possible unemployment because of a lack of market economy infrastructure could result in the flight of many employment seekers from the region.

### 3.5.4 Morality Frame

According to Semetko and Valkenburg, the morality frame “puts the event in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions”. (Semetko & Valkenburg, 96) It is more likely for the publication/programme to take a less impartial stance by using the morality frame to contextualise an event as it will inevitably frame the event within the boundaries of the publication’s own subjective values.

**Example:** Opinion piece entitled “Snipers with kids in their sights” by Chris McGreal (writing for *Guardian Newspapers*) published on page 16 in the *Mail & Guardian* on 7 July, 2005. This is a scathing report on the actions of the Israeli army as the kicker reads: “Palestinian civilians have been killed by the Israeli army with impunity”.

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The morality frame is generated by emotive descriptions of how the victims were murdered, then presenting the story with the stance that the Israeli soldiers killed innocent civilians on purpose and therefore the killing becomes an issue of morality. Another interesting aspect of the report is the moral judgment made by the author about the sentencing of guilty soldier – it is deemed too short in comparison with the sentences issued to objectors who refuse to serve in the army. By referring to a single source in the army which could have stifled the accuracy of the incident, and an opinionated headline, the article is framed as a breach of international ethics by the Israeli army.

Because the sources attribute the reasons of the killings to the victims being “weapons smugglers” it is significant to note that the author fails to acknowledge the moral implications of this, but apart from the attribution of responsibility directed towards the Israeli army, the morality frame is still dominant.

3.5.5 Attribution of Responsibility Frame

In summary, the attribution of responsibility frame tells the story in terms of who or what was responsible for the issue. Notwithstanding the tendency to speculate without justification, the responsibility frame can be employed to provoke future stories on the issue, and thus test whether intricate facets of the original responsibility frame were accurate.

Example: Editorial (page 20) by Ferial Haffajee of the Mail & Guardian of 25 August, 2005 is in example of a frame of consequences (exemplified by the title of the editorial: “Gaza: no guarantee”), but the editorial is framed more as attribution of responsibility. The crux of the Haffajee editorial recognises the Israeli withdrawal as a step in the right direction, but stresses that long-term peace and prosperity in the region is only viable with a complete pullout from the West Bank – hence the onus lies firmly with Israel.

The article personifies Ariel Sharon as the most integral part of the conflict resolution, citing him as the “architect” of the 1967 occupation and the 2005 withdrawal, therefore Sharon is the most important face/voice in determining the plight of both Israelis and Palestinians. The responsibility frame is typified by the acknowledgement of the pullout as a positive step, but then questions the viability of a Palestinian state without the West Bank – by implication further Israeli action is implicit to a two-state solution.
It also calls for an adherence to the US-led road map for peace, but the key statement which shapes the frame is in the final paragraph where the editorial states unequivocally that the responsibility lies with Israel: “Israel had no business settling on conquered lands”. The headline emphasises that the withdrawal does not guarantee either peace or extended conflict, that it is essentially a temporary measure

3.6 Research design, variable definitions and sources

Content analysis in the communication sciences is one form of methodology that observes the shape and context of a message by one decision-making party to another non-decision-making party. Therefore researchers set out to take a broad text, analyse the message and simplify it into several categories or groups. According to Weber, if the researcher is intent on making valid inferences from the text, “it is important for the classification procedure used to be reliable in terms of being consistent, but there is no one right way to do content analysis”. (Weber, 1985) While scholars of research methodology acknowledge successful ways to interrogate a research problem, the problem lies with the consequences, and according to Weber, the complicated part of content analysis comes after the research has been complete. It is the completed product that raises further questions: what are the implications of the research results? Are there competing interpretations?

This said, the methodology used in studies by Korn (2002) and Rolston & McLaughlin (2002) is a valuable comparative study for this study41. Korn examined coverage via proximity of headings, kickers and detailed news reports to the front and inside pages. This included the size and placement of pictures, and the nature of the visual aspects (photographs and large-fonted headlines) in formulating the frame. She also observed phraseology and the role it plays in shaping a discourse. This phraseology appears in several forms within the newspaper such as the editorial, news story, opinion piece etc.

It is necessary to make the distinction between forms of reporting, as an identical statement or frame utilised in two different contexts can have severely different implications. Obviously “hard news” requires less speculation and comment as opposed to a column. For the purposes of this study, each article will be analysed within the context of its placement in the newspaper, such that column “features” found in a “hard news” report and vice-versa will

41 Korn’s choice of newspaper for examination, Haaretz is a similar publication to Cape Times. Both are serious political broadsheets founded on the values of editorial integrity, accuracy and impartiality.
be questioned and interrogated for relevance. Part of this method is to query the framing of news as an account of events or as Tuchman (1978) suggested, or using editorial license for the construction of a reality.

3.6.1 Definitions

Combinations of sources including Harrigan (1993), Keiter, Harriss & Johnson (2003) were used to synergise the following concepts into singular definitions:

3.6.1.1 Editorial: “The unsigned, staff-written statement that runs on the editorial page, stating the newspaper’s official position on issues”. (Harrigan, 1993: 411). This segment of the publication is likely to comment on the most topical news issues, rather than a narrative which has been played out for a while. After declaring an initial stance, the newspaper will then offer journalists and the public to respond to the editorial, and then either defend or change their position.

3.6.1.2 Column: “A piece of writing that strongly shows the writer’s opinion or personal style.” (ibid, 408) The column, whether in a serious broadsheet or less serious tabloid, does not follow the objective, fact-based structure of a hard news report, but is a forum for the writer to build a lengthy subjective argument, satirise issues or engage in debate with either the editorial or article of a previous issue.

3.6.1.3 News story/report: An article of an unspecified length giving account of a recent event that has been designated by the editorial staff as newsworthy. By definition, the report is meant to observe events rather than offer comment. Even though the news report strives to be an impartial story containing facts and figures, it is inevitable for the journalist to pick and choose facts for the story, thereby creating a frame.

3.6.1.4 Frame: The way a reporter packages his or her research for the news report or column, and puts it into his or her own word is how a story is “framed”. The frame is therefore the parameters within which the story is set. According to Semetko and Valkenburg
(2000), there are five key frames that newspaper reporters use when writing stories: conflict, human-interest, economic consequences, responsibility and morality.

**Summary of Chapter**

Chapter 3 dealt with the aspects of the research methodologies employed for this study – both the qualitative frame analysis, together with the structure of the in-depth interviews. The chapter starts with an overview of the difference in structure and benefits of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies – especially how the limitations of being a single researcher would impact on the chosen methodology.

The rest of the chapter deals more intensively with the choice of demarcated newspapers used for this study – why the respective publications were chosen, and even more specifically, the different part of the publication to be analysed and definitions thereof. This included columns, editorials, cartoons and general news reports. The central theme of chapter 3 was undoubtedly the section discussing the research questions.

The final part of chapter 3 dealt with detailed examples of the types of frames employed for the study – conflict (violent and non-violent), Attribution of Responsibility, morality, human-interest, consequence and other. This latter segment was based on the earlier work of Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) and chapter 3 explains why I had chosen this model on which to base my research.
Chapter 4 Historical overview to the land discrepancy

4.1 How the ‘land question’ frame became central to cause and conflict

Israel and the Palestinian territories have been regions where authority over control of land has been disputed for centuries, with numerous wars fought by different religious groups over several periods of civilization. Whilst the three aforementioned monotheistic religions all claim a reverent spiritual connection to the land, religious conquest was never a primary motivation in the land disputes that have characterised the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict (as opposed to peaceful coexistence in the holy land), although contemporary media believe this religious frame of conquest to be a more accurate frame of the dispute.

Though this study is not meant to be a historical analysis of the Middle-East region, it is imperative to briefly outline the protagonists involved in the different forms of rule leading up to the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14 1948. This study should then observe how and when Israel took occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, and the subsequently disputed and controversial withdrawal from Gaza.

Through this direction, it is possible to gain insight into how and why critical incidents in a long, broader conflict were framed. By outlining the roles of key actors who held political control of the disputed territories, the goal to analyse how media have framed these actors becomes twofold - an assessment of the framing of the original controllers of the disputed territories followed by an analysis of how current events (most pertinently, the Gaza withdrawal) altered the framing of the warring parties.

4.2 Prelude to contemporary frames: the emergence of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Nation

It is rather difficult to argue that contemporary media can frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without the use, at some stage, of a religious frame. As Venter (2004) illustrates, the three central tenets of the conflict: struggle for land and other resources, differing spiritual ideology and self-governance, have never ceased in the conflict’s history. Though some scholars (Said, 1992) believe the question of Palestine’s self-actualisation and the emergence of the Zionist movement to claim right of control of the disputed territories should only be
examined within a discourse of modern history, I contend that we should include pre-modern and ancient recorded history as part of our departure point for conflict analysis. Only then, can we attribute all the existent media frames more accurately.

Whilst historians differ slightly about the nature and manner in which the Battle of Megiddo took place, it is generally regarded that this battle in approximately 1482 B.C. was the first fought over the territory, and was contested between the Egyptians and the Canaanites. According to historians Duncan and Opatowski, this battle was the first to be recorded in the region, with details found carved on the walls of the Temple of Amun at Thebes. (Duncan & Opatowski, 1998: 1)

Between this first recorded period and the establishment of the first nation state in 1948, the “occupied territories” have been governed by several different civilisations with rulers from all three major monotheistic religions. This has facilitated an easy conflict frame for the world media. Because the foremost characters of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict (and 3000 years prior) are clearly distinguishable by ethnicity as opposed to a civil war such as in Rwanda, the conflict frame centres on two sides - Jews and Muslims, who have been diametrically opposed in spiritual belief and political self-governance for the past 1400 years.

Two chronologies (www.mideastweb.org; Smith, 2003) agree that after the fall of the Kingdom of Israel following the death of Solomon, the son of David, the Northern and Southern provinces fell to Babylon where in approximately 539 B.C the land was conquered yet again. Both provinces then fell under Persian rule, but the conquering of the land by Alexander the Great left Israel under Egyptian rule. Between the period of 638 A.D and 1918 A.D Palestine was subject to Muslim rule – split further into two sub-periods of rule by Arab Muslims and then Turkish Muslims. The only unequivocal age of non-Muslim rule during these 1300 years, was the reign of the Christian Crusaders of Jerusalem between 1099 and 1244, when the Holy city was captured by Muslims under Mamlukes.

4.3 Palestine under the British mandate

Between the years of 1920 and 1948, Palestine was governed under a British mandate, with the Allies having conquered the Middle-Eastern state after the Ottoman Empire joined World War One on the side of Germany (Smith, 2001). These years were less pivotal in the
allocation of territories to Arabs and Jews, but rather were dominated by calls from both parties for independence from colonial rule.

The ideal turning point for the Palestinian territories to assume the title as colonised lands or “land under occupation” was in the immediate aftermath of World War One.

Turkey, formerly the Ottoman Empire, originally entered the war on the side of Germany, who had just declared war on Russia on August 1 1914. Smith argues that the seeds of division (divide and rule tactic of political control) and hostile occupation were sewn with the British ratification of their existing occupation of Ottoman territory. In December of 1914, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate and annexed Cyprus (Smith, 2001: 56-7).

During the course of the war, British and French interests (as powerful allies) dictated the necessary arrangements for land negotiations. Arabian independence in the Middle East was a goal that had to be countered against growing pressure from a Zionist contingent for a national homeland for the Jews of the Diaspora, as (Smith, 2001: 65) explains:

The Sykes-Picot Agreement, officially ratified in May 1916, defined areas of direct and indirect British control in Arab lands and southeast Turkey. The British would occupy Iraq from Baghdad south to the Gulf; they would have indirect authority in a region designated as their exclusive sphere of influence that ran from the Egyptian border through eastern Palestine into northern and southern Iraq, thus protecting the Baghdad-Basra axis and establishing the linkage to the Mediterranean recommended by the de Bunsen committee. The French were allotted Lebanon and coastal Syria as their areas of direct control, along with south-eastern Turkey.

The media frame of occupation has its roots nearly half a century prior to the Israeli capture of Palestinian territory in the 1967 six-day-war. British invasion of Palestine, under the leadership of General Sir Edmund Allenby resulted in the capture of Jerusalem in December 1917. According to Venter, this was the pivotal moment alongside the Balfour Declaration, in changing political control of the Palestinian region. After the war ended, the Ottoman Empire had officially collapsed and Palestine being a subject province of the Empire, was assigned to British protection. Britain was thus to govern Palestine as a
temporary mandate for the League of Nations, where the mandate was supposed to encourage the development of self-governing institutions and then independence. (Venter, 2004: 22)

Between 1920, when the mandate was declared, and the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, the analogy of occupation was still prevalent.

As would later be accentuated with the withdrawal from Gaza, the two groups (Arabs and Jews) vying for independence, were irreconcilably divided by politics, religion, culture and socio-economic infrastructure. Both groups had different priorities, and as of 1920, it was the task of the British to govern these two entities.

The Zionist effort yearning for a Jewish State was bearing fruit under the British mandate. At the same time, as Smith argues, Palestinian calls for independence were coming unstuck, primarily because of the need for land to survive as a nation (Smith, 2001: 119-120):

To both Arabs and Jews, land was crucial to either the retention or attainment of their respective national existences. Palestinian Arab society – especially its Muslim component, which was 90 percent of the total – worked on the land. Although only a relatively small percentage of Jews in Palestine ever farmed, the Jews considered the possession of land essential to the foundation of the future Jewish state.

Despite all parties desire to reach a speedy resolution on the release of the mandate, the period between the start of the mandate until after the Second World War was marred by violent political uprisings by both Jewish and Arab groups, several British white papers and severe indecision on the form of governance. (www.mideastweb.org) This period was the precursor to the region’s future reputation as a land of instability, and conflict frames such as terrorism, two-way power struggles, unlawful occupation and ethnic differences became entrenched prior to the existence of the State of Israel.

Critical to the discourse of political land struggles was the emergence of Adolf Hitler as chancellor of Germany on January 20, 1933. Stein (1984), Wasserstein (1978) and Smith all argue that Germany’s Nuremburg Laws, bent on excluding Jewish participation in civilian life together with preventative measures from Jews marrying non-Jews were another catalyst amongst Zionist leaders for the declaration of a Jewish State. Though Palestine (and particularly Gaza and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) for the purpose of this study) was
inhabited by a Arab majority and Jewish and Christian minority in the immediate years preceding the proclamation of Israel by the United Nations, the term occupation was beginning to have a dual role in the framing of the overall discourse of the “conflict in Palestine”.

As stated above, the conflict in Palestine prior to 1948 featured a third, critical actor apart from the Palestinian and Jewish nationalists. Great Britain, who after inheriting the mandate after the settlement of the First World War, had been attempting to negotiate a transfer of power of governance between the two competing parties. The timeline of the conflict under the Mandate, as confirmed by historians Smith, Wasserstein and Stein (1984) was characterised by several British commissions of inquiry, followed by suggestive White Papers on how to transfer power.

The 1939 White Paper limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to 75 000 in total. It was rejected by both Arab and Jewish Parties (Smith, 2001) At the same time, it offered no significant solution to the establishment of an independent Palestine ruled by the Arab majority. Consequently, the outbreak of World War Two advanced a solution, though not an entirely popular resolution. Illegal terrorist actions taken by Jewish nationalist groups 42 put severe pressure on the British and the post-war United Nations organisation to act quicker.

After appointing a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to create a final resolution, the United Nations General Assembly voted for UN Partition Resolution 181 on November 29 1947. In summary, the resolution was to divide Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State; and Jerusalem was to be declared an international city. Subsequent approvals by both the United States and the USSR and the Jewish nationalist groups met with opposition by the Arab countries, refusing to accept the resolution. It is crucial to acknowledge this point as one of the foremost junctures for the establishment of the contemporary discourse of formalised occupation of Palestinian territory by Jewish/Zionist interests.

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42 This refers specifically to the explosion on the illegal Jewish immigrant ship Patria on November 25 1940. The ship, carrying European refugees, sank after the attempt to prevent transshipment of the refugees to Mauritius via an enforced leak, escalated into a full-scale flood. The second incident was the blowing up of the British headquarters at the Kind David Hotel, Jerusalem on July 22 1946, by the Irgun, an underground Jewish faction.
4.4 The New State, territorial turbulence up to 1967, and an official doctrine of occupation

Israel came into formal existence after a United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews of the Diaspora. The UN resolution GA 181, which was passed on November 29 1947 issued for the partition of Palestine into two, separate states- one Arab and one Jewish with Jerusalem to be declared an international city. The two superpowers of the era, the United States and the U.S.S.R both supported the partition whilst the Arab League rejected the proposal outright. (Smith, 2003: 190). Between December 1947 and the declaration of statehood by David ben Gurion on May 14, 1948, both Arab and Jewish nationalist groups were engaged in a guerrilla-style warfare, during which the control of several key cities and towns changed hands regularly.

Historian Charles Smith expands (Smith, 2003: 191-192):

The hostilities between the Arabs and Jews went through several stages. At first, Arab irregulars took the initiative, attacking Jewish settlements and convoys. Hagana (Jewish nationalist fighting unit) tactics, though they fluctuated, remained essentially defensive, protecting settlements and maintaining lines in communication. From April onward the Hagana took the offensive, establishing control over the area granted to the Jewish state and showing that the lack of coordination of the Arab forces severely impeded their ability to mount a serious resistance, as opposed to the previous more opportunistic forays. Within the major cities, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, a war of terror reigned that spilled over into the countryside involving the Hagana as well.

Two competing groups violently jostling for land characterised the turbulent period up to Ben Gurion’s famous address from Tel Aviv on 14 May, 1948. Israeli partition from Palestine set a precedent for the physical fight for land without a process of negotiation. It is precisely because this land discrepancy was contested violently that any future overhaul of rule would be framed as an occupation – literally because of a lack of legal transition. The land question continued to plague the progress of both partitioned states to peacefully coexist and critically, agree on their respective borders. On May 14 1948, when Ben Gurion declared the independence of the Jewish state and British forces had withdrawn from the land completely, Israel were in control of the cities of Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Tzefat (through a
combination of voluntary Arab flight and Guerrilla battles for control won by the Jewish Hagana group).

The final phase of Israeli-Palestinian conflict that needs to be outlined for the purposes of this study is the culmination of a third Israeli-Arab war on June 10, 1967. This was where Israel had gained noteworthy quantities of land in a brutally short and surprising war victory. As modern political commentators such as Sparks (2006) and McGreal (2006) agree, the most contentious issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the last sixty years, has undoubtedly been the finalisation of Israeli borders against the backdrop of three wars within the first twenty years of her existence.

Within minutes of declaring independence on 14 May, 1948, the Israeli army and air force were engaging in military combat against the respective forces of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On May 14, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian units had already entered Palestinian and Israeli territories. Clearly the dispute centred on the authority of the United Nations to partition the land, and thus the Arab lands believed Israel’s existence to be a falsely constructed seizure of Arab land – henceforth an occupation. This often termed “War of Independence” brought with it crippling repercussions for the Palestinian Arabs as Israel gained approximately fifty percent more territory than was originally allotted to it by the UN partition plan.

According to Smith, political security, semi-concrete armistice agreements and failure to peacefully co-exist broadened the conflict and solidified the Palestinian belief of unlawful Israeli occupation. This was especially contentious as a divide emerged within the collective of Palestinian-Arabs who were approached by Israelis to purchase land, some sold their properties for money, and some remained defiant. Thus without a unified policy, conflict would be inevitable (Smith, 2003: 217):

The conclusion of the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states introduced an era of no war-no peace; technically a state of belligerency still existed. Nor did Israel’s successful defence of its borders bring official recognition of the status quo either by Arab states or by much of the international community. A major stumbling block was the question of Palestinian Arab refugees. Western powers called

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43 As will be explained later, the post-war negotiations were marred by a lack of genuine Palestinian leadership; as no independent Palestinian governing body had emerged before the P.L.O was formed in June 1964. Again, Israel dealt with her Arab neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) in negotiating land settlements
44 The fourth war – the Yom Kippur war of 1973 will not be discussed during this chapter as it bears little relevance to the goal of outlining the eventuality of Israeli “occupation”.

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on Israel to permit at least a portion to return to their homes, but Israelis resisted this pressure or tied its acceptance to the conclusion of peace agreements with Arab governments. Some Arab leaders called for a return to the 1947 Partition Plan, the borders of which they had previously rejected. Israel, which had benefited from that stance by expanding its sovereignty into areas allotted to the Arabs, naturally opposed these claims as being invalid, given the changing circumstances that had resulted from the war of 1948.

The notion of Israel as occupiers of Palestinian-Arab land was confirmed and even swelled in the two decades following the 1948 war of independence. Political relations between Israel and its neighbours were mediocre at best, and consistent incidents of mostly border violence and insurgencies from Israel into Gaza put any hopes of permanent peace treaties between the warring states at bay. When in December 1949, King Abdullah of the newly independent nation Jordan, annexed Arab Palestine to Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza fell under Jordanian rule, again creating a discrepancy about Palestinians living under non-Palestinian rule.

1956’s Sinai Campaign involving Israel, Egypt, France and Great Britain heavily disrupted any political stability in the region. Although the two disputed territories of this study – the West Bank and the Gaza strip did not feature in this war (the Sinai campaign was fought entirely between Israel, France and Great Britain on the one hand, against Egypt over the closure of the Suez canal), the neighbouring Arab states sympathised with the Egyptian state. The cycle of conflict culminated with the third major war in the region within twenty years of Israel’s existence, where new territory would be gained, and the occupation discourse would become dominant.

4.5 The Six-Day War, its consequences and Israel as the occupier of Palestinian territory

Whilst scholars tend to disagree about who was directly responsible for the eruption of the Six-Day war, the pattern and consequence of the war is almost indisputable. According to Smith (2003), the months leading up to the Israeli pre-emptive air strike of June 5 were littered with security uncertainties amongst all parties in the region. Egyptian troops were

45 Edward Said (1992) argued that it was Zionist expansion driven, whilst Alan Dershowitz (2004) places the blame on Arab negligence and Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping
placed on standby at different times in May 1967, and on May 27 1967 President Nasser was forced to abort a planned attack on Israel after finding out that Israeli intelligence was aware of the pending attack (www.mideastweb.org; Lucas, 1975). It was within this context that Israel launched a blistering pre-emptive air strike on Egyptian airfields in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Israeli key defence and government decision-makers proceeded to push forward and enter Jordanian controlled West Bank and Gaza territory, as well as continued insurgencies into the Golan Heights controlled by Syria. Within six days, Egypt had surrendered, Israel was in control of the Golan, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza had been wrested from Jordanian hands. Critically, Israeli military presence remained in the Jordanian won areas (though the Sinai was returned to Egyptian control after negotiation) after the Khartoum Conference concluded that no peace or negotiations would take place with Israel. On November 22, 1967 perhaps the most significant UN resolution in Israel’s history was passed by the UN Security Council. Here resolution 242 called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories previously unoccupied by Israel and for the swift establishment of peace (Stein, 1984).

Apart from the massive physically damaging consequences together with further political mistrust and instability amongst the Middle-Eastern countries, the primary repercussion or change was the transition of Palestinian Arabs who were previously Jordanian citizens, now having to fall under Israeli rule. This was the biggest worldwide refugee crisis since ironically, the Holocaust. According to Rubenstein (1991:62)

The Six-Day war of 1967 added a new dimension to the problem of “repatriation”. Former residents of Jaffa, Sataf, Ramle and all the other villages, towns and cities left in 1948 were suddenly able to visit these places after nineteen years. The Israeli conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip- enabled the people of nowhere” to re-establish contact with their own place.

But according to Edward Said (1992), the Israeli annexation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip East Jerusalem into Israel, had no merit and only stifled an already growing Palestinian refugee problem (Said, 1992: 38):

46 Rubenstein’s book entitled “The People of Nowhere” is a direct reference to the indigenous Palestinians who lived under several different forms of rule over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without ever declaring self-rule as a nation state.
In the decade following the June 1967 war, Israel’s borders expanded enormously; a large portion of approximately one million Arabs was accumulated as a result. No one, least of all Israelis, could dodge this problem of this new Palestinian actuality… For over ten years now, Israel has been in military occupation of actual territories and people. It is true that the West Bank is designated as “Judea and Samaria”, but the people there will not be so easily dissolved, at least not yet. Therefore the new problem of Zionism-Liberalism is the problem of the occupation.

I have now outlined the key historical events which led to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip during the Six-Day war of June 1967. The literature remains ambiguous about who is entitled to what land, but it is clear that within the forty years since the war, both sides remain adamant that these territories were either justly (in the case of the Israelis) or unjustly (in the case of the Palestinians) acquired. The magnitude of the 2005 Israeli withdrawals from Gaza, though despite being unilateral, was historically immense.

4.6 Summary of Chapter

One of the central discourses that shapes the conflict in the South African media landscape is that of the conflict as being a land problem – an inherent claim by two parties to the same piece of land. The aim of chapter 4 was to put this assertion into context, by giving a brief overview of the political players involved in controlling the territory over approximately the last century. There were many limitations and pitfalls to addressing this aim, however I believe that a well-researched attempt was wholly necessary to proceeding with the framing analysis – whereby key concepts and historical references are alluded to in newspaper articles which many ignorant readers might not understand. This could be done only to a limited extent here, due to lack of space.

The bulk of chapter 4 chronicles the events leading up to the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 from the time of Palestine being under a British mandate – this after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, of which Palestine was a province. A key conclusion drawn was the importance of the six-day war of 1967 in Israel becoming known in contemporary media discourses as an “occupier” of Palestinian territory. The chapter is
concerned with detailing the conflict as a one centred on the “land question” rather than a religious battle between Jews and Muslims or a socio-economic problem in the region.
Chapter 5 – Summary of Findings, in-depth interviews and discussion

5.1 Summary of Findings

5.1.1 Summary of chapter and structure of results

The following chapter represents the descriptive results of the framing analysis, followed by a review of the in-depth interviews with the respective editors of the three newspapers analysed. Firstly, the chapter begins with a summary of what was actually covered in the ten-week period. This includes the pure quantitative results of how many articles were analysed, how they were divided, which newspapers carried how many articles and references to any editorials that were dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the period.

After the initial summary follows the detailed findings of qualitative content analysis – answering the first two research questions as outlined in chapter three:

RQ 1: Which frames were used to present the articles relating to the conflict?
RQ 2: Which frames dominated – a) across the three newspapers

The results are set up in a frame-by-frame arrangement, and are in no particular order. Each frame consists of an introductory paragraph whereby a summary of the findings of that particular frame is delivered, followed by approximately five examples of how the article was presented. Each example is structured in the following way: the date, publication, author and placement of the piece are mentioned. Then a short summary of the article’s contents which is followed by the context in which the piece was written. After the brief context, several key aspects of the report/opinion piece are listed and discussed after which a brief analysis of the headline and accompanying pictures or sidebars follows.

The second half of this chapter involves a discussion of the interviews with the editors of the newspapers analysed in this study. Ferial Haffajee (Mail & Guardian), Tony Weaver (Cape Times) and Mondli Makhanya (Sunday Times) address issues such as why there are insufficient print journalists from South Africa covering the conflict, the contentious issue of
wire copy and its lacking a local perspective, and whether they believe a particular frame is
dominant thereby emphasising or neglecting key aspects of the conflict.

5.1.2 What was covered?

This study has examined the coverage of the Gaza withdrawal (days specifically from 15-24
August, 2005), as well as a six-week period before the withdrawal and three-week period after
the withdrawal. The motivation for researching the latter two periods was to gain a necessary
context that the reading audience would have had, together with a broader insight into the
conflict in general which would explain who the newspapers framed as the key role-players
and after the interviews, perhaps why.

Fifteen articles were analysed in the Mail & Guardian within this period. Of the fifteen,
four appeared in the month of July, eight appeared in the month of August and three appeared
in the month of September. Articles were spread evenly between the sections termed
“international news”, Comment and Analysis columns (or opinion pieces), and lengthier
feature/in-depth analysis articles. Only one cartoon from the in-house cartoonist Zapiro
featuring the conflict was printed within the above time parameter. The six weeks of coverage
prior to the withdrawal were dominated by articles centred on the Israeli army, the conduct of
some soldiers, however the closer the time came to the physical pullout by Israeli forces, the
coverage shifted towards the instances of conflict between the soldiers and the settlers. More
discussion will follow.

The 25 August edition of the newspaper was heavily saturated with news coverage and
comment on the withdrawal. A total of six pieces were published relating to the conflict on
this day. It included one lengthy feature by Guardian correspondent Chris McGreal entitled
“Gaza: end of the dream” together with one short news item. Another feature published on the
same page (page 8) was written by Daoud Kuttab and was simply entitled “The day after…”
The following page features an article under the sectional heading “comment” by Daphna
Baram, an Israeli journalist based in London. Two more pieces centred on the withdrawal
were in the editorial section of the newspaper – a satirical cartoon by Zapiro, and a full
editorial by editor Ferial Haffajee.
In the three weeks immediately following the withdrawal, three articles were published by the Mail & Guardian (all three were taken directly from the Guardian newspapers group). September 1 featured an article by McGreal entitled “Gaza pullout boosts Sharon” – an article based on the political consequences of the withdrawal for the Israeli premier. A very short news report on 8 September was published entitled “A strong scent of racism”, which outlined an incident within the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The final article in the Mail & Guardian was a feature that appeared in the 15 September edition of the newspaper. Entitled “Israel’s revenge killings”, it detailed incidences of Israeli army officers being responsible for the deaths of Palestinian civilians in and around Gaza city.

Coverage in the weekly Sunday Times was rather limited in comparison to the Mail & Guardian and the Cape Times. Of the four articles published, one was an editorial (28 August) and all other three stories were taken from different wire services. The articles were taken from the New York Times news service, The Times (London) and the Times news service. All three pieces took some elements of the implications of the withdrawal and were packaged as such. The 3 July article entitled “Zionism in crisis over Israeli withdrawal” focused on the difference between religious and secular Zionism and expounded on the political implications for Zionists after the withdrawal.

Sunday Time’s second article of the conflict was published on 21 August and entitled “Gaza pullout is only the start”. It speculated more on the political consequences of the withdrawal for Israelis, Palestinians, the United States, Britain based on the actions of key players including Hamas, Mahmoud Abbas and George W Bush. There was a third angle/take on the withdrawal in the piece entitled “Gaza rejoices as hated bridge fall” that appeared in the World section of the 11 September edition of the newspaper. It gave the impression of a city moving forward after the removal of a divisive metal bridge, and gave context by stressing why the structure was initially erected what purpose it served and why it was removed.

The third publication reviewed, the daily Cape Times featured more shorter, news-based articles, but also went on to present longer analyses during and after the withdrawal. Of the forty articleed covering the conflict in the ten-week period, 9 appeared in July, 29 appeared in August and only two appeared in September up until the 15th of that month.

Cape Times’ coverage heavily featured on page 2 (international news page). 29 out of the 40 articles (72.5%) on the withdrawal were published on page 2 of the paper. Therefore
approximately one in every four articles (27.5%) appeared in the newspaper’s editorial and insight pages (including cartoons and columns). In terms of the news coverage, the Cape Times favoured Reuters, SAPA, and Associated Press as wire services, whilst a significant amount of copy was used from the mother-publication, The Independent.

Within four days in August, the newspaper dedicated two editorials to the Gaza withdrawal and broader implications of the conflict. The first editorial published on 15 August, and entitled “Hail Sharon” praised Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for making peace “at least possible” and argues on the opening days of the pullout that “without it (the withdrawal), there would be no hope”. This editorial was taken directly from The Independent in London. The second editorial, published on 18 August and entitled “A step into the future” gives an overview of the political analysis of the withdrawal within the larger context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Again, a position defending the actions of Sharon was taken suggesting that “Sharon’s motivations should not cloud the importance of the Gaza developments”. It suggests face-to-face negotiation between the leaders of the warring parties, and cites South African conflict resolution of the early 1990s as context to how compromise could be addressed. Many of the frames mentioned in chapter three were utilised by the Cape Times, however the two most dominant were the conflict frame and the human-interest frame.

5.1.3 Dominant Frames

The research has shown that although the final frame tallies for all three newspapers combined were relatively even, two of the three newspapers did have their own dominant frames during the duration of the period studied. The Conflict frame (as a whole) accounted for the greatest number of articles (19), however when split up into violent and non-violent conflict, the numbers (11 and 8 respectively) were more in line with the average. When treating the two forms of conflict separately as I have done in this study, the dominant frame becomes consequences with 16 articles.

The Attribution of Responsibility (13), Human-interest (11) and Conflict (violent – 11) frames followed, after which came Other and Conflict (non-violent) both with 8 articles. The Morality frame (5) was the least frequent of the frames used, and of those five, four of those articles appeared in the Mail & Guardian with only one appearing in the Cape Times.
Specific Newspapers

Mail & Guardian

Whilst consequences was the dominant frame overall in this newspaper, the Attribution of Responsibility frame (6) was utilised most frequently in the Mail & Guardian. All six of these placed the “blame” of the current circumstances with Israel as opposed to a more neutral position. At 30%, the Attribution of Responsibility Frame occurred with a 10% higher frequency than the next highest scoring frame. Consequences (4), Morality (4), Conflict (non-violent – 3), Human-interest (2) had similar frequencies of appearance. Interestingly, zero articles were framed as violent conflict and one article did not have a clear frame was therefore classified as “other”.

Cape Times

Although the Conflict (violent) frame was not used on a single occasion in Mail & Guardian coverage, it featured as the most prominent way of presenting/packaging a story in the Cape Times (11). A possible argument for this discrepancy is that as a daily newspaper, the Cape Times international news structure requires more updates and reports, and the majority of these articles detailed violent clashes between right-wing Jewish settlers and the Israeli army. The Mail & Guardian provides less direct reporting, preferring a broader analysis of the culmination of a week’s worth of events.

Consequences, the dominant frame across the board, was the second most frequent frame used (10). The Cape Times then presented 9 stories through the Human-interest frame. Attribution of Responsibility was only used to frame 5 articles (two of which placed the onus of conflict resolution on Israel as the party guilty of too many past indiscretions, and three attributed responsibility equally to both sides) and Non-Violent Conflict framed 4 articles. Only one, solitary article was framed according to issues of morality, whilst 7 articles could not be clearly categorised and were thus classified as “other”.

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Sunday Times

Of the four articles related to the conflict that appeared in the Sunday Times, two bared the characteristics of two frames. Both articles gave equal weight to both Consequences and Attribution of Responsibility. One report was framed as Non-Violent Conflict and the final article was presented as a Human-interest story.

5.2 Detail Results by Frame

5.2.1 Consequences

Consequences was observed as the most dominant frame used during the period of study (16). The results of the research show that during the actual withdrawal period (15-24 August), and the three weeks that followed, consequences only then began to emerge as the dominant frame. News reports tended to speculate about the immediate period following the withdrawal, raising questions regarding the physical logistics of the removal of Jewish burial sites from the area and the dismantling of Jewish synagogues, whereas the longer, feature articles speculated about broader issues which were not to be immediately resolved. These sorts of consequences included the future of the Palestinian political dispensation in the Gaza area, whether the withdrawal would advance the semi-defunct Road-Map to Peace, and whether the policy of “disengagement” (and smooth success of the operation) will impact on the forthcoming Israeli and Palestinian general elections.

Example 1 – 16 August, Cape Times, page 13 (feature)

This article by Ilan Fluss of the Israeli embassy in Pretoria appeared in the “insight” section of the Cape Times. It takes the form of a comment/analysis narrative addressing the aftermath of the “disengagement” on four fronts: security, economic development, diplomacy and international assistance.
**Context:** The first day of the official withdrawal goes according to plan, no incidents of violence. Fluss believes if it finishes without interruption then there are more pressing questions to address.

**Key Aspects of the Feature:**

- Opening paragraph provides historical context by referring to Israel “ending its 38-year military rule”, and then looks forward to the region’s future
- Fluss hopes that the move will create a less violent reality and create a peace agreement
- He classifies the aftermath of redeployment into four key areas: 1) security, 2) economic development of the region, 3) diplomacy and 4) international assistance
- Fluss suggests giving a role to the international community in the diplomatic process, and argues that the Palestinians must ensure economic development (core areas include an increase in employment, development of municipal infrastructures, and a smooth overhaul of local government)
- According to Fluss, both parties must facilitate the diplomatic process with the Road Map for Peace

**Headline:** “Israel hope Gaza pullout will herald a new era of peace in the Middle East” – the implication is that Israel has made the first move with a unilateral withdrawal, now a Palestinian response can gradually result in progress of international relations. Headline and frame of consequence and responsibility.

**Example 2 – 18 August, Cape Times, page 14 (editorial)**
The Cape Times dedicated the editorial on this day to the Gaza withdrawal and the regional implications. This editorial gives an overview of the political analysis of the withdrawal within the larger context of the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

**Context:** The conflict has barely ceased since the proclamation of the State of Israel (1948) and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza during the Six-day war (1967). The editorial places this event (withdrawal) as part of a longer process of peace-building.

**Key Aspects of Feature:**

- “Sharon’s motivations should not cloud the importance of the Gaza developments” says the editorial. Therefore the Cape Times argues that it is irrelevant why Sharon has made this move, and any possible hidden self-interest is of lesser importance than the actual withdrawal itself.
- The editorial cites the next responses by Israelis and Palestinians as pivotal to the future direction of the peace process. Editorial credits Sharon for his “boldness”.
- Attribution of responsibility to Mahmoud Abbas to assert his leadership over his constituency – to “ensure militants do not abuse the disengagement and thereby jeopardise political gains”
- The editorial cites the South African conflict resolution policy in the 1990s of compromise as an important example to follow, and it argues that this is the context within which the withdrawal should be viewed.

**Headline:** “A step into the future” – the headline points towards a frame of consequences despite the majority of the article apportioning roles to the Israeli and Palestinian leadership. * Frames also of Attribution of Responsibility

**Example 3 – 25 August, Mail & Guardian, page 20 (editorial)**
Published on the day following the official conclusion of the withdrawal from the Gaza and West Bank settlements. It recognises the Israeli withdrawal as a step into the right direction, but stresses that long-term peace and prosperity in region is only viable with a complete pullout from the West Bank to allow the Palestinian people their independent state.

Context: As above

Key Aspects of Feature:

• Introductory paragraph cites Ariel Sharon as the most important face/voice in the plight of the Israelis and Palestinians. E.g. Sharon as “architect” of 1967 occupation and of 2005 withdrawal

• Editorial asserts that Israeli pullback is a step in the right direction, but questions (paragraph 3) whether a Palestinian state is feasible if the do not have their own land (West Bank).

• The editorial calls the Israeli state’s adherence to the US-led Road Map, but does not contextualise that Palestinian land allocated in 1947 was absorbed by Egypt and Jordan – therefore the land question is not limited to Israeli and Palestinian involvement.

• Suggests that Israel is responsible for the borders of Palestine, and she must put Palestinian interests before hers. Difficult to expect this with two warring countries.

• Consequences: Gaza withdrawal has culled moderates and fuelled a victory for militants, therefore resulting in either an escalation of conflict “give militants heart” or immediate concessions.

• Final paragraph – responsibility/onus on Israel to take first step, states stance clearly: “Israel had no business settling on conquered lands”.

Headline: “Gaza: no guarantee” – emphasises the unknown of the future. The withdrawal was a temporary measure as it does not guarantee either peace or extended
conflict. Frame also of Attribution of Responsibility: The article cites all the conditional outcomes upon the Israelis. E.g.: If Israel does this, then…

Example 4 – 28 August, *Sunday Times*, page 20 (editorial)

The editorial is imploring both sides o forego their personal self-interest and return to the negotiating table. It credits Sharon for the withdrawal and condemns militancy as a resort to breaking the deadlock.

**Context:** Editorial has been written in the context of the withdrawal having been completed with minimal resistance. All the settlers houses have been destroyed with bulldozers and Palestinians have taken control of the territory.

**Key Aspects of Editorial:**

- It credits Ariel Sharon with taking a risk. It is interesting to observe that only Sharon in his personal capacity (not a mention of his cabinet or coalition partners).
- The editorial outlines a pattern of steps that needs to be considered before additional progress can be made. It suggests firstly, an immediate marginalization of extremists, followed by a prompt return to the negotiating table
- There is a reference to South Africa as a potential partner in conflict resolution

**Headline:** “Bulldozing a way to peace” – acknowledges that there is sometimes a negative required to achieve an overall positive. Frame of consequence, headline suggests the unilateral withdrawal will lead to peace. This is different to some analysts who predict the unilateralism to result in an escalation of violence. Frame suggests that the consequences are subject to two politicians, Sharon and Abbas to control the extremists.
A thorough analysis by Benjamin Pogrund (former deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail in Johannesburg) of the political and land consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians post-withdrawal. It cites the possible political decision-making options for both Sharon and Abbas. The introduction specifies an Attribution of Responsibility to Sharon for making the first move.

**Context:** According to Pogrund, “the engagement had broken the deadlock” and suggests the current situation is entirely different to previous negotiation eras – Palestinians have ownership of a portion of land, and Israelis face a stark divide now that previously faced the Palestinians, an indifference with leadership.

**Key Aspects of Feature:**

- Second paragraph – “It starts with Ariel Sharon”, he has received support for his coverage and statesmanship.
- Land consequences – tighter grip on the West Bank and/or Jerusalem? What if the separation barrier increases tension or decreases violence?
- Pogrund speculates on Sharon’s political future – result in condemnation of support? He argues that it has created a problem for the religious/Zionist faction: were they betrayed by Sharon? Will they continue to serve in the army?
- Pogrund argues that Sharon’s political future is the determining factor for the future in general – Binyamin Netanhayu’s Likud could join with the Labour Party, he argues that Kadima and Labour have set the new political agenda.
- Referring to Mahmoud Abbas, Pogrund suggests that he strives for unity, centred with smaller aggressive factions. Hamas will struggle for Jerusalem and Pogrund speculates that if Gaza becomes a base for terror, then the cycle of attack and response will continue
Headline: “Anything now possible in Israel” – suggests that further avenues have been opened for negotiation after the withdrawal that previously might not have been available. The headline asks the audience to look into the future and look forward to any possibilities.

Example 6 – 21 August, Sunday Times, page 14

A speculative piece directly taken from The Times in London, it outlines the implications of the Gaza withdrawal for Israelis, Palestinians, the United States and Britain.

Context: Article is published directly in the middle of the process of evacuating Israeli settlers. With the process scheduled to be completed within the week, this piece outlines the socio-political situation.

Key Aspects of Feature:

- It gives a crucial summary of the perspectives of both warring parties. The removal of settlers seems like the end of a process leaving the Israeli population “exhausted and divided”. But, for the Palestinians and the international community, it is seen as the first step in a chain of events. This is an interesting approach for gaining a multiple perspective.

- The newspaper offers a stance: when the last settler leaves Gaza, the onus is on the Palestinian Authority and Mahmoud Abbas to take the next positive step to ensure stability before more changes can occur.

- Article quotes the United States presidency and senior White House aide Condaleeza Rice – they affirm that “it cannot be Gaza only” – this adds to the consequence frame as it is essential to view the withdrawal in context of being part of a process rather than an isolated world event.

- Interesting angle pushing the frame is the speculation on the possibly dormant peace process, and how it will affect the Bush presidency.
Headline: “Gaza pullout is only the start” – clear reference to subsequent concessions to achieve further progress: consequence frame suggests withdrawal is part of a process and not an isolated incident.

5.2.2 Attribution of Responsibility

This frame regularly overlapped with the consequences frame. This occurred primarily because of the way journalists and guest commentators referred to the future for the region, whilst allocating tasks to either side at the same time. Columnists often debated and forecasted the future, but were sure to place their speculation in context. How did they do this? By suggesting either that Israel retreat from West Bank territories or allow more freedom of movement across borders. They would then argue that onus ought to be placed on the Palestinian leadership to reduce militancy and respect the security of Israel’s citizens. The five examples to follow will clarify this.

Thirteen articles in total were framed by either apportioning blame to a particular side for the conflict’s current circumstance, or by arguing for certain roles that the actors should play (key actors included Sharon, Abbas, United States) in the aftermath of the withdrawal—thereby assigning responsibility to act in a post-withdrawal context. Six of the 13 articles appeared in the Mail & Guardian, 2 featured in the Sunday Times and five in the Cape Times.

Example 1 – 25 August, Mail & Guardian, page 8

A feature/opinion piece by Guardian newspapers’ Chris McGreal. It is a critical reflection of the discontent expressed by some Israeli in the aftermath of the withdrawal. The article describes the anger and confusion by Israelis at the policy of unilateralism taken by the Ariel Sharon and the Knesset.
Context: McGreal writes during the penultimate days of the withdrawal. 8,000 Jews were evacuated from Gaza territory (together with four West Bank settlement blocs), protestors and civilians were also arrested for refusing to cooperate.

Key Aspects of Feature:

- Responsibility for the crisis belongs entirely with Sharon, argues McGreal. He suggests that the settlements were part of “Sharon’s vision” as minister of housing in the 1970s. Possibly construed as an anti-Sharon rhetoric.
- Reference to religious prophecy and living in the “messianic age” – dream metaphor used, but Israel is a democracy not a theocracy
- McGreal treats the withdrawal as a step towards resolving the demographic problem. “Israel will “lose the responsibility of over one million Arabs who threaten Israel’s desire to be Jewish and democratic”.
- Demographic problem (refugees) is the fault of Israel, argues McGreal. Uses quote that draws reference to Apartheid South Africa
- Settler vs politicians rhetoric: the feature quotes settlers, Olmert, Weisglass, Alpher, Dundak – internal conflict between “haves and have nots” – part of lengthier discourse.

Headline: “Gaza: end of the dream” – is the author’s (or sub-editor) reflection of post-withdrawal Israeli opinion. It refers to Israeli leaders not fulfilling their biblical prophecies: control over “entire ancient Israel”. Frame of Attribution of Responsibility to Israel for the settlers violence and a refusal to follow the Road Map lies with Ariel Sharon. In the text, McGreal makes a moral analogy – Israel “did the right thing”, and it would have been immoral not to withdraw, therefore the act was a moral necessity.

Example 2 – 22 August, Cape Times, page 11
The author Steven Gutkin is the Associated Press bureau chief in Jerusalem. His thesis is that the withdrawals were expected to have stalled and been less smooth. Therefore he argues that the progress is due to minimal Israeli/Palestinian violence in the region.

**Context:** Only three days are left in the military operation of the evacuation. Currently 19 out of the 25 settlements have already been evacuated, and two more West Bank settlements need to be cleared and four more Gaza settlements still need to be cleared.

**Key Aspects of Feature:**

- Gutkin lists key non-events of the past week weeks that were expected: no major attacks by Palestinian militants, no mass refusal by soldiers to carry out orders no use of heavy weapons by discontent settlers and no significant disruption of life in Israel
- 19-year-old soldier shot dead four Arabs on a bus, Jewish settlers killed four Palestinian labourers in the West Bank
- The author speculates a worst case scenario – a religious war based on the attack of the noble sanctuary (Temple Mount, Western Wall) in Jerusalem. He contends that both sides need to reduce the overall militaristic tension in the region.
- According to Gutkin, “effective cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian security forces” is helping to reduce militarist violence. Sharon’s advisor Assaf Shariw says army officers on both sides have been working very well together, therefore responsible for what has not happened (violence).

**Headline:** “Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza has been significant for what has not happened” – this summarises that the withdrawal has run effectively without serious incident (responsibility). The entire article is written in military terms sourcing authorities from both sides rather than a narrative of an event.
Political, satirical cartoon by award-winning cartoonist/journalist Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro). The cartoon portrays Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in full military garb, asleep and completely oblivious to the plight of the Palestinians in the cartoon (extended metaphor).

**Context:** Sharon, a former top military general ordered (with the support of his cabinet and parliament) a unilateral withdrawal by Israeli military forces from the Gaza strip (and partially from the West Bank). The evacuation included the dismantling of Jewish settlements erected after the 1967 six-day-war. The cartoon was drawn on 18 August and withdrawal had not yet been complete.
**Key Aspects of Cartoon:**

- Sharon (in a tank), departing from Palestinian territory, gives the Palestinian civilians a rude salute (note the cartoon does not feature Palestinian militants)
- The two fingers of the salute are labeled “Gaza” and “West Bank”, in the cartoon the finger labeled “Gaza” is removed or shot off from Sharon’s hand, the Palestinian man then tells him on to “suspend” celebrations because the West Bank remains in Israeli hands, therefore an incomplete freedom.
- Sharon’s shut-eyed image advocates his disregards for the Palestinians in his unilateral approach, the implication therefore that Sharon does not believe the Palestinians to be a credible negotiating partner.

**Headline:** None, although the frame is a personalisation of the conflict – it does fit the frame of Attribution of Responsibility for the portrayal of Sharon as all-powerful against the weak Palestinians.

**Example 4 – 21 July, Cape Times, page 2 (Sapa-AP, AFP)**

This news report details the construction of a protective barrier/separation barrier of 80 kilometres wide and eight metres high around Jerusalem. The report is not directly related to the settlers, or Gaza withdrawal.

**Context:** There are still three weeks before the actual withdrawal is to take place. The report does provide context to the barrier’s construction in a bullet point subsequent to the article – it cites two counts of Israeli and Palestinian casualties to help articulate the reason for the barrier: bloodshed.

**Key Aspects of Report:**
• The introduction speculates that the barrier will end the possibility of east-Jerusalem becoming the capital of a Palestinian state – Israeli unilateralism therefore limits a dialogue of negotiation

• There is a discrepancy between the amounts of Arabs that will be cut off by the barrier. One estimate specifies 50,000 whilst another source says at least 100,000

• According to the article, the route strays from municipal borders and “slices” through Arab neighbourhoods. It separates homes from work for Palestinians, but surrounds Israeli areas

**Headline:** “Israeli barrier slices through Palestinian dream” – definitely sways the frame. The headline could have read “…protective barrier seeks to restore peace” Essentially, the article advances that this plan is more Israeli expansionist rather than security driven, still a frame of Israeli responsibility.

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**Example 5 – 24 August, Cape Times, page 10**

**Second Opinion (editorial) – The Independent**

An interesting, speculative editorial taken directly from the UK’s Independent Group. It questions the future of the peace process – particularly, who needs to act, and what needs to be done (Attribution of Responsibility).

**Context:** The article was published on the day of the scheduled completion of the withdrawal. Questions of who needs to act and how, are premised in the context of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral decision the previous year to make a compromise by pulling out troops and dismantling settlements in Gaza, but he does admit that all of the West Bank cannot be ceased.

**Key Aspects of Editorial:**
According to the editors of *The Independent*, the whole territory must be transferred to Palestinian control before further concessions are to be discussed.

They speculate whether the withdrawal will be the first stage in a wider withdrawal programme or is this the most territory Sharon is prepared to cede?

They question that if Palstinia militants show their strength because of Israel’s failure to cede the West Bank, then Mahmoud Abbas’ authority will be undercut and the best chance for peace will be squandered.

**Headline:** “What happens next?” – It’s a simple question of the consequences and actions of the key parties after the disengagement. The headline clearly asks of the future, and the editorial predicts that if Sharon continues to expand settlement blocs on the West Bank, then questions of the Israelis faith and commitment will arise, and this will renew the strength and motivation of the militants.

### 5.2.3 Human-interest

The significant use of this frame resulted was one of the greater surprises of this study’s findings. Nine of the twelve examples of human-interest were found in the coverage of the *Cape Times*. These articles tended to employ a humanist angle – showing the plight of the innocent people on both sides, the physical toll of the withdrawal on those forced to leave their homes or the joy of those gaining new homes, in presenting the withdrawal as an event.

Human-interest frames were heavily discarded in favour of either conflict (where a combined nineteen articles were framed through either violent or non-violent conflict), consequences or attribution of responsibility. Most of the examples of human-interest found in this study were stories where the journalist has followed families or individuals (see example 1 – Julia Segal, example 4 – Liron Zeidman) through their daily lives, and questioned how and why the withdrawal has impacted on their lives. Only two of the twenty *Mail & Guardian* articles analysed were framed as human-interest stories. In
percentage terms, just 5% of the reports and commentaries of the withdrawal focused on the way civilian life had directly been affected. This does not include indirect reference such as the destruction of bridges or the blowing up of synagogues which would have had a common effect on the population of the area. Whilst Mail & Guardian editor Ferial Haffajee argues that her editorial policy excludes framing from any decision-making (a purely academic construct according to Haffajee), she failed to explain if any chosen frames might decrease an audience incitement or hostility to the conflict.

A key advantage of a human-interest framed story over another one bearing a single quote from a civilian party, is that through a brief background into the person’s circumstance, a better insight and context can be gained into the plight and stance (it is irrelevant how aggressively left-wing or right-wing the views of the subject are) of the person around whom the story is based –see example 1: Julia Segal. Example 2 follows the International Crisis Group to gain an NGO perspective as to what they have found in Gaza and the West Bank Examples 3 and 4 give overviews of the fighting, but discuss the injury or death suffered by a particular individual/family. This better informs the audience of the conflict’s consequence on ground level, as opposed to just mentioning x amount of casualties in which case the humanist angle is possibly lost.

Example 1 – 21 July, Mail & Guardian, page 18

A feature news story combined with a side bar block (factual report) of hard news. The former is dominated by interviews, quoting sources etc. The article is centred on the life of Julia Segal, a Holocaust survivor now living in a settlement in Gaza. Her story becomes one example of how the conflict has impacted on a settled life.

Context: The article was published eight days after an Islamic Jihad suicide bombing which killed five people. It was written three weeks prior to the Israeli evacuation/withdrawal from Gaza settlements.
Key Aspects of Feature:

- The author (Chris McGreal) draws on the subject’s (artist Julia Segal) work to explain the background and character of the subject.
- Article draws reference to “Zionist tour groups” visiting the Sanur settlement – therefore citing Sanur as a key component/example of the conflict. McGreal cites a comparison to Masada, to extend the metaphor of Gaza as a place of siege.
- Segal is portrayed as a “hardliner” (via references to her artwork) within a greater conflict (hence the title of the conflict). Quoting her extensively as an Israeli voice of the conflict invokes a humanist frame, although incomplete.
- McGreal quotes another “hardliner” Yossi Dagan who lambastes Ariel Sharon – “he turned the victory into total political defeat”. Even though opinion polls at the time of publishing the article showed an overwhelming Israeli support for Sharon’s withdrawal, the author quotes extensively from the minority.

Headline: “Last stand at Gaza” – reference to the remaining settlers in the Gaza area who are still optimistic about not leaving, and will avoid moving. The frame is clearly of human-interest because the of the narrative of the life of Julia Segal who escaped Nazi Germany to find a new home in the Sanur settlement on the West Bank.

Sidebar: A short news report accompanying the life of Julia Segal feature. It appears within a conflict frame- Israeli settlers and Israeli police dominant. Terms used include: enraged, forcibly removed, clashing, hauled protestors vehicles, five people arrested during the fracas.

Example 2 – 3 August, Cape Times, page 2

According to a report released by the International Crisis Group, Israel’s security barrier is meant to protect the West Bank from attacks, therefore a security measure to protect Jerusalem. The argument is that it could drive the Palestinians to violence.
Context: The controversial barrier/wall has been part of the Israeli security plan since 2003/04, but within the new context of the Gaza withdrawal, it shows a move to secure Jerusalem as Israeli territory.

Key Aspects of report:

- The report believes settlement expansion around the city will “anger Palestinians who have generally avoided armed conflict”
- It refers to land as a political-war consequence. Final paragraph – refers to East Jerusalem as captured in 1967, but not recognized internationally, therefore still a source of further potential conflict.

Headline: “Israel moves to close in Jerusalem, risks armed conflict” – combined with the article’s key thesis, is a prediction that should the barrier continue to be built, it would undermine chance of peace. The human-interest frame was because the article extensively quoted the interest group (International crisis Group), and articulated the effect the barrier will have on the population.

Example 3 – 4 August, Cape Times, page 2

A news report from overseas wire agency Reuters detailing an apparent misdirection of an Islamic Jihad rocket, one Palestinian boy killed and nine wounded. The rocket was aimed at an Israeli town.

Context: This report published two weeks prior to the pullout from Gaza. Israel has already threatened a large-scale offensive if militants open fire during the withdrawal process.
Key Aspects of report:

- The proposition is a conditional suspension of attacks: because of the Palestinian death, Islamic Jihad will be halting rocket attacks.
- Blame is attributed to the militants – the February ceasefire deal faltered badly with a resurgence of rocket and mortar attacks by militant groups, and a suicide bombing by Islamic Jihad.
- Third last paragraph – Islamic Jihad declared order of restraint applied only to rockets, not “other forms of resistance”.

Headline: “Militants halt rocket attacks after Palestinian boy killed” – the article does not attribute the killing to Palestinians themselves, but does give a reason for the halt of rockets. The boy’s death is presented as human-interest. The piece is highly descriptive of the death and it focuses on the family of the child that lost his life. The deceased’s sister-in-law describes the event, humanist but also places the attribution of responsibility on the militants for blundering with the ceasefire.

Example 4: 16 August, Cape Times, page 1 (front page, lead article)

This report was the first front page article analysed in any of the newspapers during the time covered. It was written by Amy Tiebel, credited to SAPA-AP, and is a full review of the first day of the Gaza withdrawal. It gives a detailed report of passive Israeli settlers and discusses the clashes between more resistant settlers and soldiers.

Context: In the final days preceding the withdrawal, letters were delivered to residents of the disputed settlements from the government demanding their exit from the settlements. The letter specifies that each family to adhere to the evacuation will receive financial compensation and a lack of adherence will result in a forced removal. This is the culmination of government plans that were initiated in the cabinet approval of 20 February, 2005.
**Key Aspects of feature:**

- Interesting report style: thousands of soldiers delivered eviction notices in six settlements, the report continues that if some don’t comply, they would be forcibly removed and lose one third of the compensation (economic consequences)
- The report speaks of an aggressive confrontation between settlers and General Dan Harel – the man trying to calm the proceedings
- Human-interest angle: Liron Zeidman pleaded with soldiers “not to take her from her home”. Brigadier General Zuckerman “I am not your enemy, you are a part of us”

**Headline:** “Gaza exodus begins” – an obvious reference to the biblical exodus; it does not use the conflict angle and does not contribute to the frame see in the pictures.

The frame is one of clear human-interest. Two supporting pictures are of a) comradeship (soldier comforting a settler), b) a settler holding his head in his hands at the entrance to the Neve Dekalim settlement. Despite references to Hamas supporters proclaiming “blood of martyrs had led to liberation”, the overall citation is of tearful settlers and sobbing soldiers. There is also a prevalent conflict angle – detailed descriptions of the stiff resistance in Gush Katif, troops blocked by burning tyres and paint thrown at policemen.

**Example 5: 17 August, Cape Times, page 2**

This Reuters report is a short account of the feelings of Palestinian refugees about moving into the Gaza and the West Bank.
Context: The refugees interviewed are currently living in the Baqaa refugee camp in Jordan. They relocated from Israel/Palestine when independence was declared and their children grew up in Jordan, hence the dual-loyalty.

Key Aspects of report:

- Key quote in the context of the article: “.feel there is hope that the Palestinian people will be free”, Hilmi Aquel, a Jordanian refugee
- Chants of “today Gaza, tomorrow Jerusalem” – suggest a stunted jubilation, that the “struggle” will continue – a much longer conflict than the frame suggests
- The referral to “former Palestinians” living in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Failure to explain how, why and when they left and whether is was on their own accord or if they were implicitly forced out? This is a crucial determinant of their refugee status

Headline: “Palestinians dream of returning to a free country” - The article paints a positive, optimistic future for “Palestinian refugees” living in neighbouring Arab countries – there is a clear oversimplification of the conflict (when did they leave…), and the headline acknowledges them as genuine Palestinians.

Framed as a human-interest story because of several interviews with refugees themselves. This is a humanist perspective from poor, the plight of being a refugee, rather than genuine citizenship.

5.2.4 Morality

Morality was found to be the least used frame in this study collectively, across all three newspapers. The Cape Times only presented a single article out of a total of 46 analysed, through the morality frame – this can be explained in one of two ways, that because the
large majority of stories are shorter, hard-news reports, the articles consist simply of the reportage of latest factual developments, such that insufficient time and space exists for a morality frame to be developed. Another reason is that this was a possible conscious decision by the editorial to present the conflict in a particular way, although all three editors argue that this is not the case, and framing does not enter their consideration when presenting a story. 47 More in detail discussions on the responses from the editors are to follow later in this chapter.

Perhaps the best illustration of the morality frame occurs in example 4: here Chris McGreal of the Guardian group produces a story which bears the characteristics of both a news report and an opinion piece. The author passes a moral judgment on the twenty-month sentence handed down to an Israeli soldier for the reckless killing of Palestinian civilians. A more striking demonstration of this frame is the choice of heading for the piece – “Israel’s revenge killings” – with a kicker saying that soldiers will disclose of the “culture of impunity”. Example 1 describes an incident where the Israeli Ministry of Defense ruled not to brand an Israeli officer “a terrorist” after he was found guilty of shooting four Arab-Israelis. The headline of “A strong scent of racism” succinctly shows how Israeli-Arab relations are framed in the Mail & Guardian, the abuse or adherence to a moral code.

The Sunday Times produced such a tiny sample size (6 articles) that there was too little if any inference to draw from their lack of articles presented in the frame of morality.

Example 1 – 8 September, Mail & Guardian, page 16

A short news report by Guardian correspondent Chris McGreal detailing a ruling by the Israeli Ministry of Defence not to brand an Israeli officer a “terrorist” after he was found guilty of shooting four Arab-Israelis.

47 Mail & Guardian editor Ferial Haffajee says that conflict and withdrawal was more of an issue of human rights rather than religion. She also specifies that quality and balanced reporting are the prerequisites to choosing a story, so four human-interest stories may be accounted for from this reasoning.
**Context:** The report was filed one week prior to the address by Ariel Sharon to the United Nations calling for peace and recognising Palestinian rights. The incident discussed, took place on 4 August – ten days prior to the beginning of the withdrawal.

**Key Aspects of Feature:**

- This article is presented as a summation of a defence ministry ruling
- McGreal stresses that compensation to the slain victim’s family was different from that of an Israeli killed by a Palestinian terrorist.
- The implication is a moral one of paying different compensation to Jews or to Arabs – racism.

**Headline:** “Strong scent of racism” – frames the conflict as an issue of racial discrimination, and therefore morality. The headline used is a direct quote from an Arab-Israeli member of parliament, and emphasises the theme of the story about labelling similar actions by Israelis and Palestinians living in Israel, differently. Rather than a headline about compensation or the definition of terrorism, the word *racism* is used.

**Example 2 – 18 August, Cape Times, page 2**

This Reuters piece took an entirely novel approach to the coverage of the withdrawal: it outlines the contrasting livelihoods of daily strife in Gaza with the influx of tourists into the “summer beach season in Tel Aviv”. In the story, lawyer Dedi Cohen is heavily quoted from a third person perspective and the article explores the dominant discourses in the Israeli media.
Context: As of 18 August, the evacuation/disengagement is nearly finished with approximately one week left of soldiers enforcing the removal of settlers.

Key Aspects of Feature:

- The article contextualises the Israeli media’s role in presenting the withdrawal, suggesting that it used as a unifying factor to divided groups in society (morality). (Mass circulation daily Maariv’s slogan read, “We’ll get through this together”)
- Refers to coverage as “media saturated forced evacuation”. It quotes from the editorial of Yehidot Achronot – “encouraging of settlers, they sweated for the land” etc.
- According to lawyer, Dedi Cohen, “it’s as if we live in different worlds, we living lives as usual, people in Gaza see themselves as fighting for their lives”.

Headline: “As settlers scuffled in Gaza, it was another day on the beach in Tel-Aviv” – this reflects the two different lives of two types of Israeli citizens, the affluent and the poor. According to Cohen: “I think this withdrawal was inevitable, the only sane thing to do.

The withdrawal is framed as a function of religious morality – the article argues that ultranationalists call the pullout a betrayal of Jewish claims on biblical land and a reward for Palestinian violence.

Example 3 – 15 September, Mail & Guardian, page 25

This feature report by Conal Urquhart (originally published in the Guardian) is an analysis of the morality of the killings by Israeli army officers of Palestinian civilians in and around Gaza city.
Context: The article was written one week after the publication of an article insisting how dignified, humane, and understanding the Israeli army was in removing screaming settlers. This article highlights the “culture of impunity” in the Israeli army.

Key Aspects of report:

- The article opens with a lengthy description of the killings, a description of ruthlessness which sets the tone for the rest of the article.
- Very small line in the piece: “…although those speaking out are a tiny proportion” – this is critical and should be explored further. Statistics should be attributed given for how many serving officers have given testimonies to really gauge the impunity
- The rules of engagement seem a very important issue which receives little attention. “Wide scope for interpretation by officers” – this might be better clarified before quoting “revenge killings”.
- Balance – gives numbers of Palestinians casualties and deaths, without listing the number of Israeli casualties (though it must be added that the article relates specifically relates to Palestinian deaths)
- The article does not question the reasons for the indiscriminate killings. Was it to avenge Israeli casualties?

Headline: “Israel’s revenge killings” – with a kicker saying that soldiers will disclose of the “culture of impunity”. The article is presented as an insider’s account of army business. Salience – the description of the killings, quotes from soldiers, and comment from Israeli pressure groups. Selection – interesting incidents occurred in 2002, 2003. The piece however, was published in the aftermath of the successful withdrawal. It is centred on the immorality of the killings.
This article is a hybrid between a news report and an opinion piece, bearing the characteristics of both. Taken directly from Chris McGreal of Guardian newspapers, it is highly critical of the Israeli army. It contends that “Palestinian civilians have been killed by the Israeli army with impunity”.

Context: There is still an approximate five week period before the actual evacuations are due to begin. The article appears in the same edition as a report of an Israeli soldier being jailed for defying orders.

Key Aspects of Feature:

- Various emotive, aggressive descriptions of how and where Palestinians were murdered
- The article cites several incidents of civilian casualties; the issue is of Israeli military brutality and lack of morality. Colonel Pinchas Zuaretz is the army source quoted/questioned. Lack of second, differing opinion.
- A moral judgment is passed: the 20 month sentence handed down to the guilty soldier is considered too short compared with sentence received by the “objectors” refusing to serve in the army
- Argues that current volatile situation is owed to Israeli hostility (Attribution of Responsibility) suggesting that the “Gaza climate amounts to a form of terror against the population”.
- The final paragraph makes a significant accusation against the Israeli army. McGreal disputes the charge in the penultimate paragraph that the teenagers killed were weapons smugglers, calling the Israeli story “a fabrication” and that the teenagers were kicking a ball.

Headline: “Snipers with kids in their sights” Headline makes an opinionated charge against the army: that Israeli soldiers kill innocent civilians and children on purpose.
Using the Human Right Watch (HRW) organisation as a source, the frame of morality is affirmed.

### 5.2.5 Conflict (non-violent)

Non-violent conflict falls, together with violent conflict under the overall umbrella concept of “conflict”. It is a term which can encapsulate minor verbal arguments (non-violent), legal battles or discrepancies (non-violent), differences of opinion (non-violent) together with physical violence (violent), motor or transport accidents (violent), and acts of war (violent).

This conflict spawned several large-scale non-violent battles. Firstly, newspaper coverage was dominated by instances of argument between Israelis: right-wing demonstrators against the withdrawal, right-wing settlers refusing eviction, Army officers carrying out government instruction, left-wing “peaceniks” encouraging the withdrawal etc. Many of the stories covered events related to settlers versus Army conflict that didn’t degenerate into a proper physical confrontation. One such example of the former is example 5 – a news report detailing how settler officials (or representatives) refused to distribute letters detailing the evacuation process to the residents of the settlements on behalf of Israeli General Dan Harel.

Other non-violent instances of conflict include example 1 – the only article detailing a Palestinian political discourse at length. It discusses the political conflict between Fatah and Hamas both vying for political supremacy amongst the Palestinian voting constituency in the hope that they can become the key decision-makers. The headline – “Gaza settler officials decline to handout evacuation letter” reflects this discrepancy, and that although mild, is a conflict nonetheless.
Example 1 – 5 July, Cape Times page 2

Reuters news report detailing an internal non-violent political conflict in Palestinian politics. The key point was the assertion by Hamas that they were not prepared to engage with Fatah in a unity government, as it is considered a ploy to postpone Palestinian elections.

Context: The article was published one week before a suicide bombing in a Netanya mall. There is no formal control of Gaza, but speculation about post-Israeli controlled Gaza.

Key Aspects of Report:

- This is the only piece of Palestinian political discourse out of all three newspapers examined. It looks at who is currently in power, and who will have power in the future.
- It cites the ultimate goal of peace and stability in the region, arguing that cooperation between Fatah and Hamas is crucial

Headline: “No unity government as Hamas rejects” – is accurate in that Hamas, is a key player and decision-maker, through selection of sources, the article is framed in a way that Palestinian politics is critical in the greater success of the withdrawal. The frame is of a non-violent conflict – largely Palestinian and speculates the consequences for the region: who will control Gaza once the Israelis have handed over power?
A news report detailing how protestors overcame the initial police barrier and then soldiers surrounded the protestors’ tents, thereby restricting the movement into the Gush Katif settlement bloc.

**Context:** Gaza has officially been closed to non-residents. The aim is to prevent soldier/protestor violence that could occur should the protestors seek to storm the settlements. The soldiers are fighting on two fronts: against Palestinian gunmen who violated the ceasefire and fired mortars into the settlements, and against the right-wing protestors who oppose Sharon’s disengagement.

**Key Aspects of report:**

- Context is provided: “Showdown loomed against a backdrop of resurgent Israeli-Palestinian violence and fresh clashes…”
- Referral to opinion polls and Washington (presidency): who regard the pullout as “a possible step towards reviving talks on stalled road map”.
- The penultimate paragraph refers to violence between Palestinian police and Hamas militants. Therefore a frame of political authority VS military factions

**Headline:** “Israeli troops in standoff with defiant protestors” – the article is packaged (headline, copy and placement) as a story of conflict. No religious or political angle, but one of militarist preparation. The overall frame is one of internal Israeli conflict, though the article also focuses on Palestinian/Israeli fighting.
Example 3 – 28 July, Mail & Guardian, page 27 (Guardian newspapers)

Hard news report explaining two, recent setbacks for the settlers/protestors wishing to reverse the unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli forces and settlers from Gaza territory.

**Context:** The Gaza strip is already closed to Israeli citizens other than residents. It is now two weeks prior to the disengagement and evacuation.

**Key Aspects of report:**

- The report takes a stance in support of the settlers (citing two problems: 1) that the protestors were kept in a pen, therefore unethical by Israeli army, and 2) the parliamentary vote to reverse Sharon’s decision failed)
- Several sources cited maintain violence/conflict as out of bounds, yet the article is framed as one of conflict
- Two police sources used and only one protestor source used
- Article stipulates that the disengagement plan received 69 more votes in the Knesset (out of 120 seats), they also quote that “most Israelis support the disengagement according to opinion polls”, hence the ironic criticism of the Israeli army

**Headline:** “Double blow for settlers in Gaza protest” – fair, accurate. The headline is a clear representation of what the article expresses. The overall frame is of a civil, non-violent conflict between Israeli forces and settlers

Example 4 – 25 August, Mail & Guardian, page 9

**Comment:** by Israeli journalist Daphna Baram based in London
This piece forms part of the opinion pages of the *Mail & Guardian*. Baram’s piece speculates about Israeli options post-withdrawal, and she gives critical comment on the potential reasons for Gaza withdrawal.

**Context:** Published the day after the settlers had been evacuated from Gaza. Soldiers are to remain in the area for one more week.

**Key Aspects of feature:**

- Baram speaks of Jews being able to govern Jews, whether this is a liberal, nationalist or racist rationalization
- Her key argument of how demography is the critical issue is that the withdrawal “cuts of 1.3 million Palestinians from Israel’s responsibility, thus improving the demographic balance between Israelis and Palestinians in territories under Israeli control
- The political discourse is of Israeli leaders only. She writes within the frame of Israeli politics only – Israel has a choice of action, right, centrist or centre-left. No views from Palestinian makers
- The penultimate paragraph: new questions need to be addressed after the disengagement. “Redefining political goals” - future plans

**Headline:** “The demography question” – Demography: who actually lives in the region, what is their background, ethnicity? It is politicising the withdrawal and discusses the governance of the people who previously lived under Israeli occupation (1) and the former settlers, now seeking land in “pre-1967” Israel (2). The frame, a politicisation of the withdrawal cites reasons for and implications of the withdrawal, hence also a reflection of responsibility.

The report does refer to Israeli political policy as racist, using terminology such as “ethnic cleansing”, but demography as a keyword reflects on the issues of citizenship and a territorial majority – and the conflict within those parameters.
This is a news report describing how settler representatives (officials) refused to distribute letters detailing the evacuation process to the residents.

**Context:** Article was published five days before the evacuation of the settlements was due to begin. General Dan Harel has already suggested that those who leave on their own account will be compensated, but after August 17th, Israeli forces will forcibly evacuate the settlers.

**Key Aspects of report:**

- Settlers refused to distribute letters signed by Dan Harel, the General overseeing the evacuation
- Haida, (the settlers’ spokesperson) said the following: “We threw the letters back to the officer”.

**Headline:** “Gaza settlers officials decline to handout evacuation letter” The headline is accurate, but not exaggerated. It emphasises the withdrawal as an “Israeli” issue, therefore a civil, non-violent conflict. The frame is actualised by reporting a non-violent conflict between the soldiers delivering the letters, and the settler officials/representatives who declared they would not be intimidated into leaving.
5.2.6 Conflict (violent)

As mentioned above in the description of non-violent conflict, the conflict reported in the period of this study was primarily of two kinds. Firstly, inter-state conflict\textsuperscript{48} between Israel and Palestine – which generally preceded the withdrawal, and followed the withdrawal (these were instances of suicide bombings, or gun battles between the Israeli army and Palestinian gunmen, and also the odd incident of indiscriminate killing by either side). The second kind of violent conflict featured, was the at times brutal interaction between right-wing Israeli demonstrators refusing to leave the Israeli settlements, and the Israeli army who had to remove settlers at any cost.

Examples 1 and 3 detail instances of inter-state conflict that were reported on during the period of study. The first article is, and does not pretend to be otherwise, a report of more cases of Israeli targeted assassinations of Palestinian militants – argued by the Israelis to be in response to numerous mortar bombs into Israeli territory. Ariel Sharon is interestingly quoted as saying that attacks against Israel will not impact on his decision to carry out the disengagement plan, again an emphasis on the unilateral decision-making process. Example 3 was published three weeks prior to the commencement of the disengagement plan. It speculates whether the already fragile truce will be abandoned after a Palestinian gunman killed an Israeli couple.

All of the other examples cited, refer to the latter type of conflict, when instances of confrontation between settlers and soldiers turned violent. Example 2 cites the edict signed by Ariel Sharon officially closing the Gaza and West Bank settlements to non-residents. This is a preventative measure against potential clashes between the army and civilians. Example 6 describes how protestors were forcibly removed from Gaza synagogues in one of many instances of violent clashes.

Together, the conflict-framed articles (11 violent, 8 non-violent) accounted for 19 out of a total of 72 pieces analysed. Therefore, just over 25 percent (or 1 in every 4 articles) of all articles had a conflict frame. It is interesting to note that all 11 violent conflict articles were from the Cape Times with neither the Mail & Guardian nor Sunday Times.

\textsuperscript{48} This use of inter-state is contentious however I don’t know of another way to describe the conflict. Although the aggression is usually between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and a “terrorist” / “freedom fighting” group such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad or the Al-Aqsa-Martyrs Brigade, it is difficult to label the conflict “inter-state” because the Israeli army seldom, if ever, fights against a Palestinian national army.
using the frame for a single article. This is probably due to the Cape Times having produced exponentially more “hard news” stories than the other publications, and hence in covering the latest developments of clashes, would have had no alternative to present the latest news as it was – an incident of violent conflict.

Example 1 – 18 July, Cape Times (Sapa-AFP), page 2

The article details ongoing clashes between Palestinians firing mortars into settlements together with responses from the Israeli army and snipers.

Context: Israel have admitted to re-introducing “targeted assassinations” as a policy to protect settlements from terrorism and bombing. Twelve Palestinians and six Israelis have been killed in the last five days.

Key Aspects of report:

- The article provides context for consequence by suggesting that the United States’ Secretary of State Condi Rice will visit the region to negotiate a possible truce
- Ariel Sharon asserts that attacks against Israelis will not impact on the decision to withdraw; he emphasises the unilateral approach to conflict, with no Palestinian intervention (positive or negative) after the disengagement plan

Headline: “Israeli troops in Gaza kill 8th Hamas militant” – The numerical association is not expounded on in article. It does not explain in long a time the eight were killed, and whether or not it was one incident. There is no how or why or when reference to the other seven victims, and therefore clearly a frame manufactured by the Cape Times or Sapa-AFP.
The article is built essentially through a military frame as an inter-state violent conflict. The article cites Hamas and the Palestinian Authority as military enemies of Israel, and also considers them as key partners in peace. Hamas and the PA are believed by Israel to be in control of the militants.

Example 2 – 14 July, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2

A Reuters report of the increased security on the border of the Jewish settlements to prevent right-wingers from protesting and inciting further intra-Jewish conflict.

Context: While opinion polls (3 July) suggest a heavy Israeli majority are in favour of the pullout, there still exists a dissenting group who support the position of the settlers. But, the article also highlights the clashes between the army and Palestinian policemen as well as between the suicide bombers and civilians.

Key Aspects of report:

- The article is split into two halves. The first section deals with the Israeli military response to a suicide bombing. This took the form of an offensive into Tulkarm where a policeman was shot
- The second half deals with the internal conflict between the army and the settlers. Sharon has signed an edict closing the settlements to non-residents to prevent violent clashes
- Israeli radio reported that five soldiers disobeyed their commander, and thirty were disciplined for refusing to remove settlers

Headline: “Gaza strip settlements sealed to prevent influx of protestors” - Cape Times has framed the situation less violently than they could have. This article describes aggressive Arab-Israeli violence, but it is framed as a mildly aggressive incident. Frame: key incidents mentioned include the suicide bombing, the death of a policeman,
marching protestors and disciplining soldiers, therefore conflict. There is also a salience of political and non-religious issues.

Example 3 – 25 July, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2

A report detailing the upsurge in violence (an incident where a Palestinian gunman killed an Israeli couple) less than three weeks prior to the pullout, and a description of the tension in occupied territories following Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Israel.

Context: Gaza remains officially closed to non-residents. A truce that had been initiated by Washington and agreed upon by Sharon and Abbas, was violated by the incident described in the article.

Key Aspects of Report:

- The story is contextualised in the introductory paragraph by saying that ambush occurred after Rice “ended her mission”
- Consequences are immediately established in paragraph two as Sharon promises a “tough response” to the shooting. It lists the retaliatory strike: Israel killed two gunmen.
- Islamic Jihad spokesperson is quoted as saying they are committed to calm, but conflict will resume in response to “Zionist violations”
- Washington has reacted through a statement by the US State Department spokesperson, Sean McCormack

Headline: “Truce teeters as gunmen kill Israeli couple” - The paper frames the article in the past by not indicating a follow-up strikes. However, it does admit order: conditional that the truce is teetering, because “gunmen killed an Israeli couple”.
Published on the day the evacuation operation has begun, this article is featuring both the Israeli army and defiant settler plans for the days in the build up to the forced evacuation in Gush Katif. The army has fully prepared for the threats and disruption to pullout was spurred by the influx of 4000 protesting nationalists into the settlement bloc.

**Context:** The Israeli evacuation of Gaza settlements commenced on this day. Last week saw large-scale protests in and around Gush Katif, the Palestinian Authority have put police on standby to prevent any gunmen from disrupting the disengagement.

**Key Aspects of feature:**

- Jewish settlers decided to lock the entry gates of their enclaves to soldiers
- The article quotes radical Jewish group “National Home” – which called on the settlers to fight back against soldiers, imploring confrontation
- Final four paragraphs referred to potential religious altercations in the wake of the withdrawal; therefore extra security has been deployed at the Western Wall in Jerusalem.

**Headline and Kicker:** “Israeli police block Gaza access” - The article is clearly framing the withdrawal as a civil conflict between the radical right and everyone else. Palestine versus Israel over land and religion has not featured. This conflict (settler versus army) is in danger of escalating. According to Moshe Karadi, the National Police Commissioner, the police services are on the “highest alert”.

Although the accompanying picture appears to fit more into a human-interest frame, once combined with the content, kicker (“Radical Jews vow resistance”) and heading, the article emphasises confrontation between police and non-residents of Gaza.

Example 5 – 17 August, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2
On day two of the disengagement, soldiers are facing stronger resistance than before in the Gush Katif settlement bloc. This report explains in security terms what is going on in the Gaza strip – clashes between violent settlers and soldiers losing patience.

**Context:** As above

**Key Aspects of report:**

- Scuffled erupted as protestors burned rubbish
- Quote from Eival Giladi, the government’s strategic coordinator of the withdrawal: “the only way is out” – whilst confronting yelling and crying settlers. Slight contradiction: frame – story is presented as one of violent conflict, but soldiers are still consoling certain settlers
- Hardliners have remained steadfast: “we are going to hold on to our houses as tight as we can”, Chaim Gross (settler representative)
- The final three paragraphs refer to the political and economic consequences for settlers, and not the Palestinians. Sharon vows to launch an attack if Palestinians commit violence after the evacuation. $150,000 - $400,000 compensation per family, but the families stand to lose up to a third of the income if they fail to co-operate.

**Headline:** “Israel gets tough with settlers” – standard headline. Kicker (“security forces in show of force”) is true, generally accurate and denotes progress. The frame is one of violent conflict between aggressive settler protestors and soldiers obeying national orders. The headline, kicker and picture all frame the withdrawal as a civil Israeli battle.

**Example 6 – 19 August, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2**
The first half of the article is a clear synopsis of the previous day’s settler/soldier conflict where settlers were forcibly removed from synagogues in the Neve Dekalim settlement. The second half tells of Israeli-Palestinian violence, and speculates whether the remainder of the withdrawal process will be peaceful or violent.

Context:

Key Aspects of report:

- Israeli troops “stormed” a synagogue and “dragged out screaming settlers”. Protestors linked arms and chanted “Jews don’t expel Jews” – a serious confrontation between Israelis
- Palestinian anger “stoked” when a Jewish settler shot four Palestinians dead in the West Bank, in an apparent bid to sabotage the withdrawal
- The final paragraph gives the first indication of disputed issues other than land; Palestinians want control of Gaza’s borders and airspace, whilst Israel are reluctant to hand over this authority citing security reasons

Headline: “Troops evict settlers from synagogue in Gaza strip” – not an aggressive stance by the paper. The accompanying picture of religious men in prayer is more of human-interest. Although the article says early on that the soldiers were unarmed, troops “dragged” protestors away, so this together with the upsurge of Israeli-Palestinian violence emphasises a violent conflict frame. (Religious references)

5.2.7 Other (articles that do not fit a regular frame)

Of the 72 articles analysed in this study, only eight did not fit one of the regular frames as defined by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000). Of these eight, seven appeared in the Cape Times while the Mail & Guardian only produced a single piece that didn’t fit one
of the established frames. Example 1 is a feature/op-ed piece from the Cape Times – it takes the form of a political overview of the conflict, ensuring to place the withdrawal in a historical context. It also features key references to the South African audience (surprisingly the only piece analysed during this period that was related specifically to the South African context), distinguishing the withdrawals from similar operations in Apartheid-South Africa.

The second cited example was unique in the sense that it was the only article of the 72 which featured developments with Israeli politics. This piece reports the resignation of Finance Minister and former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu from the Israeli cabinet. The article then describes the subsequent economic effects of Netanyahu’s resignation, again a rather unique characteristic. One other unique story that didn’t fit a specified frame was example 4 – a report detailing how 250 non-Jewish Gazans were given a security cordon and allowed to enter Israel. This story had no link to previous themes and was not to feature again in further coverage – a truly unique and isolated incident.

Example 1 – 18 August, Cape Times, page 15 (insight pages)

This is an excellently presented article which placed the withdrawal in a significant historical context. It refers to the acquisition of the land in 1967, the compromise of the Oslo Accords, and the proposal of disengagement as an event within the intifada.

Context: The context of this article is articulated by the editorial on the preceding page. The audience is obviously in need of historical context, Finkelstein’s article therefore explains the evolution of the dispute until disengagement, and the editorial gives the possible consequences.

Key Aspects of feature:
There is a key reference for South African audience – not to draw a parallel between District Six, Sophiatown and Gaza, because democracy, compensation etc is the differential

Finkelstein explains how the withdrawal is viewed through the eyes of many parties: poll show Israelis support disengagement, but outlines the views of the various groups who resist the plan on various grounds

He gives the Palestinian Authority’s position: Abbas “pragmatic” as he has persuaded many of the militias to put a moratorium on attacks – but this was partially effective only

**Headline:** “The road to disengagement day in Gaza has been a long one” – fair and non-opinionated, this lends to a possible historical frame. The entire article is a historical and political overview and does not fit one of the more established frames. It is more of a narrative rather than speculative comment. The final paragraph asks critical questions, but does not outline the potential answers.

**Example 2 – 8 August, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2 (lead story)**

This piece is a political story stating the resignation of Finance Minister and former Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. According to Netanyahu, a “unilateral withdrawal without anything in return is not the way”. He adds that he “cannot be a part of this irresponsible move”.

**Context:** Netanyahu is a political rival of Premier Ariel Sharon, and he opposes the disengagement. With the first evacuations beginning in a week, cabinet gave its final approval, hence the resignation by Netanyahu.

**Key Aspects of report:**
Netanyahu believes the disengagement not only compromises Israel’s borders, but also security consequences by posing a danger for the wholeness of Jerusalem (land issue)

The economic indexes have been affected by Netanyahu’s resignation – down an overall three percent. Netanyahu was a credible figure in the cabinet as he lifted Israel out of recession

Article was abridged to include a short news report on the shooting of an Israeli man and his son in a car near Ateret.

**Headline and Kicker:** “Netanyahu resigns on approval of pullout” – this is presented as an aggressive domestic move within Israeli politics. The quote emphasises the severity. This political move by Netanyahu was done either to gain support amongst the rightwing sect of the Israeli population before the 2006 election, or because the withdrawal is genuinely against his political ideals. The story (and withdrawal) is presented through a political frame.

**Example 3 – 22 July, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2**

News report detailing the army’s plans to dynamite the synagogues and religious schools in Gaza for fear of them being desecrated by Palestinians.

**Context:** The pullout means a complete withdrawal by settlers, security forces, and an end to Jewish civilian life in Gaza. The removal of synagogues therefore tops the list of operation priorities of the Israeli army.

**Key Aspects of report:**

- The importance of the consultation with army Rabbis to contextualise a halachic (Jewish law) decision
Headline: “Israel plans to blow up all synagogues in Gaza” – this is a direct, strong headline. The phrase “blow up” incites more aggression than “remove” or “dismantle”. A religious frame is used to essentially present a political story (…part of Sharon’s disengagement plan…) but cited as part of a greater religious conflict: “many Israelis feared the synagogues would be desecrated by the Palestinians if left intact”

Example 4 – 30 August, Cape Times (Sapa-AP), page 2

This report is a story of 250 Gazans (not Jewish) that were given an Israeli security cordon and were allowed to move into Israel with compensation similar to the 8500 Jewish settlers.

Context: Israel’s original intention was to raise the village prior to handing control over to the Palestinian Authority; but the villagers felt insecure at the prospects and believed they would face persecution by the incoming Palestinian leadership.

Key Aspects of report:

- This operation is still considered part of the security portion of the withdrawal from the Gaza strip
- Residents argued that Israel had left them with a dangerous reputation because the village was once used as a transit point for Palestinian collaborators.

Headline: “Gaza villagers branded collaborators over move into Israel” – this is an unclear description of the subjects (the villagers). Other than a possible social consequence of the pullout, there is no dominant frame.

Example 5 – 23 August, Cape Times (Reuters), page 2
A news report briefing the audience of typical day-to-day events in the withdrawal. Today’s report is of an easy evacuation of the Netzarim settlement unopposed and without protest.

**Context:** The evacuations have been happening for eight days already. Only two more settlements need in the West Bank to be evacuated, the process is drawing to a close.

**Key Aspects of report:**

- Insults were hurled at the army officers and tears were shed by the settlers, but no signs of protests were found in other parts of the procedure
- Religious angle brought in – removal of the menorah from synagogue, comparison to the Archbishop of Titus in Rome, where the Romans removed the menorah from Jerusalem
- Limited perspective from the Palestinians offered. A short quote from a farmer, therefore essentially framed as an Israeli issue

**Headline:** “Israel clears last settlement” – bland, accurate and no insinuation. The kicker adds a human element to the report. No clear frame has emerged – the article is structured as a regular news narrative with a slight historical context. Perhaps human-interest: soldiers and settlers pray together, kicker gives emotion and human perspective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Mail &amp; Guardian</th>
<th>Sunday Times</th>
<th>Cape Times</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (violent)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (non-violent)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human-interest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of responsibility</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1 - Frame frequency in the respective newspapers**

* The number of articles tallied included 14 articles which were counted twice because they fitted two frames. E.g. A Cape Times article that was framed equally by the consequences and by the attribution of responsibility. If you exclude the duplicates, then the original tallies should be 38 Cape Times articles analysed, 16 Mail & Guardian articles analysed and 4 Sunday Times articles analysed.
Framing Analysis of articles related to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict
1 July - 15 September 2005

Different frames used

Mail & Guardian
Sunday Times
Cape Times
Total
Newspapers used in this study
5.3 Editors on the framing of the conflict

The following sub-section of chapter 5 fulfills the second criterion of methodology as described in the introductory chapter. One of the aims of the following discussions of interviews was to ascertain from the editors any possible reasons for an overly dominant frame – whether frames are chosen by coincidence or whether there is a strategic decision-making aspect to presenting an article on the conflict.

The interviews were telephonic and took place within the context of my having already completed the framing analysis. The editors were presented with the results in advance to allow them to provide an argument before I put questions to them.

5.3.1 *Mail & Guardian* – Ferial Haffajee (editor)

**Date and place of interview:** 10 August 2006, telephonic

Ferial Haffajee has an extensive investigative journalism background in both print and broadcast media, where she was a radio producer and television reporter. For the last ten years, however, she has served the *Mail & Guardian* in the capacity of Media Editor, Economics Writer and Deputy Editor before being promoted to Editor in February, 2004. She also previously worked at the *Financial Mail* in the position of Senior Editor and then Managing Editor. She is a previous winner of the Sanlam financial journalism awards; was named as one of 10 Shoprite/Checkers women of the year in 2004 and was also named the winner of The Media magazine’s MTN Women in Media award for 2006. (Haffajee, Curriculum Vitae: 2006)

The purpose of the interviews with the editors of the newspapers was to question whether there was purpose or structure behind the findings of the qualitative research – the frames. It was imperative to ascertain whether there was a conscious decision-making process behind the choice of sources, choice of headlines and accompanying pictures and general story/report presentation. According to Haffajee, framing is never a consideration in her editorial process. Haffajee states unequivocally that she “never cites for sensation” and that “frames are an academic construct” that do not make their way into her decision-making. According to Haffajee, her primary concern is towards her readers, and her paper’s coverage is reflected in that. “Our readers are very interested in the Middle East and we feed that interest” (Haffajee, 2006). She argues that her chief concerns to achieve the objective of satisfying her readers, are to get excellent writing and reporting into the paper and to make
sure it is balanced. When asked whether she personally perceives the conflict through a particular frame, Haffajee said that she believed the conflict centred on a land dispute but had evolved into an issue of morality in the way Israel responded to issues of conflict-resolution. However, she stated that the paper does not choose a frame when a story comes through off the wire.

Apart from the local commentators, members of the public and scholars that are regular contributors to the *Comment and Analysis* when the conflict flares-up, the entire (not majority, but all) share of the *Mail & Guardian* reports (eye-witness) are taken from the parent newspaper, Britain’s *The Guardian*. According to Haffajee, it is *The Guardian* for “hard news” and then independently sources opinion articles. She denies that her publication uses wire copy and regards *The Guardian* as “scrupulously fair” as a source (Haffajee, 2006). Explaining the massive (and I argue disproportionate) amount of coverage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives in her newspaper (and the South African media in general), Haffajee believes that because of its historical and religious significance, the region attracts quantities of attention in direct contrast to its size.

Despite negative press that the *Mail & Guardian* has received form both local Muslim (re: the Mohammed cartoon saga) and Jewish (following the Chris McGreal article comparing Israel with Apartheid South Africa) readers, Ferial Haffajee firmly believes that the SA media does not serve the interests of either of the warring parties in the conflict. Referring to whether she believes a South African perspective is necessary for local readers, Haffajee argues that her readers are globalists “who do not always require a local angle to be interested in a topic” (Haffajee, 2006). She also believes local Muslim and Jewish to be “very out of touch with some of the most advanced debates and progressive positions”. The implication here is that overseas copy from an “objective” (meaning non-Jewish or non-Muslim) source produces better informed copy than South Africanising the content to suit the profiles of the local *Mail & Guardian* readers.

One of the most keenly contested debates in South African Zionist circles and local pro-Palestinian Muslim groups is the question of bias – both parties vociferously arguing that their side is the victim of intentional or unintentional bias and distortions in the media. Both factions regularly provide “proof” of their claims in letters to the editor (Bagrajim, 2006; Krengel, 2006; Osman, 2006 and Saks, 2006), and one of the biggest targets is no doubt, Haffajee’s newspaper. Responding to these claims, Haffajee protests that there is no “one media response” as to whether the SA print media have emphasised or neglected key aspects
of the conflict. Her paper has proclaimed their stance on occasion in the editorial – believing in a two-state solution provided Israel halts all provocative incursions into Palestinian territory with her military might. This stance is clear, however Haffajee asserts that the newspaper’s stance in no way affects how the conflict is covered. She believes that if they “follow the ethical imperatives of balances and giving voices to opinions you may not agree with, they do their duty” (Haffajee, 2006).

On Editorialising:

South Africa’s Mail & Guardian, whilst heavily reliant on foreign copy to cover the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, remains independent in the key editorial decision-making areas. This allows near complete control when choosing how to present a single individual or event, or even a lengthier process, such as the withdrawal by Israeli forces from Gaza. According to Haffajee, her editorial team is responsible for all headings, sidebars (denoting useful additional information) and accompanying pictures to contextualise the report/comment. One interesting example of the newspaper’s editorial discretion was the choice of headline for the 11 August article which appeared on the opening page of the “International” section. It is entitled “Sharon jails child protestors”.

The article referred to an incident where the Israeli supreme court (the judiciary in Israel is known as independent of government) has held three female teenagers in a women’s’ prison until their trial which was to take place in several weeks. Only four paragraphs into the article does the author Chris McGreal specify what the arrest was for – people have been detained for blocking roads, incitement and assaulting police and troops. Other possible alternatives to the headline could have been “Protestors jailed for assaulting police” or “Supreme court orders detainment of protestors” rather than the obviously misleading and inaccurate “Sharon jails child protestors”.

Haffajee, who admitted that her editorial staff were wholly responsible for the editing and presentation of all articles (including transforming the Guardian copy, as was in this case, into an article), refused to comment on how the decisions were made to cite Ariel Sharon as the primary protagonist in this story when he was clearly only indirectly involved. On Sharon, Haffajee disagreed that he was outright the most often referred to and quoted character during the withdrawal (which the research has proven he was) and argued that he did not carry the
burden of the dominant discourse. Haffajee maintains that “he (Sharon) was a larger than life figure, so he got a lot of press” but not significantly more than other Palestinian actors.

Haffajee’s responses to my questions were broader than I would have liked. She persisted with her line of reasoning that framing in the newsroom exists independently of any outside business pressure, lobbyists or preference for either party in the conflict. In refusing to acknowledge that there was a dominant way in which the Mail & Guardian chose to shape the conflict for its readers, Haffajee lent credence to my argument that by not “pushing” a particular stance and in a desperate attempt to vary the frames of the stories, her paper unfortunately missed out on using a historical frame to shape the context of the current situation.

5.3.2 Cape Times – Tony Weaver (news editor and deputy editor)

Date and time of interview: 11 August 2006, telephonic

Tony Weaver currently is employed at the Cape Times in the dual position of news editor and deputy editor where his roles include news editing, leader articles and writing opinion pieces. He has previously worked as a freelance journalist and in the turbulent 1980s as an investigative reporter at the Cape Times. He currently writes a weekly column “Man Friday” with according to him, very little restriction on what he may say. He has previously worked as a photojournalist both in broadcast and print media. Between 1981 and 1987, Weaver worked as a political and war correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail, Sunday Times and Cape Times.

Weaver argues that because of primarily cost-related issues, “almost all South African media rely on the international agencies to cover not just the Middle East, but also most of the rest of the world” (Weaver, 2006). His newspaper has a different policy approach to other print organisations because of the ownership structure of the Cape Times. According to Weaver, because the newspaper is owned by the Irish Independent Group they are allied to the Los Angeles Times, Daily Telegraph Washington Post and London Independent.

Does Weaver argue that this is necessarily a problem because South African writers are being maligned as potential correspondents and therefore the South African perspective and context for local readers does not exist? No, he is full of praise for the international news agencies – Reuters in particular. According to Weaver, “wire copy, especially from Reuters is
generally dispassionate and even-handed, avoiding ideological bias. We decide which agency copy to use on a story by story basis, and will often combine stories from two or more agencies to give a bigger picture” (Weaver, 2006). He also argues that providing a South African perspective does help make a story more accessible to Cape Times readers, and they try to assert a local perspective where possible.

There appears to be a slight contradiction in the view of the editors that a South African perspective is necessary to contextualise reports for local readers, however at the same time local readers ought to be satisfied with copy obtained from journalists working in other contexts. Weaver argues that because coverage by foreign (non-South African) correspondents is inevitable on most major stories, and because the agencies provide excellent service, local readers should be satisfied with the coverage according to those constraints.

In contrast to the statements by Mail & Guardian editor, Ferial Haffajee that she is not aware of the frames of her articles, and that the choice thereof is not even a consideration, Weaver acknowledges that because his paper is produced daily, their coverage is driven by the needs of “hard news” ie: the breaking story (resulting possibly in the violent conflict frame). Weaver appears conscious of frames – he concedes that his team tries to fit in human-interest stories when there is space, but the constraints of choosing fast-breaking stories dictate and hence there is seldom space for the human-interest angle.

Contrary to Haffajee’s failure to acknowledge the exceptional coverage garnered by Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, Weaver takes a more pragmatic stance. He argues that at the time of the withdrawal, “Sharon represented the Israeli government and military and hence he is quoted at the symbol of the country, as it were, in the same way that the foreign media quote Thabo Mbeki as representing South Africa” (Weaver, 2006). By stipulating as part of the same answer that the Cape Times makes a point of providing space on the Opinion and Debate pages for opposing voices in the conflict, the implication is that the news pages carry the voices of the key decision-makers and it is of no consequence who dominates the coverage because in the interests of reporting the news, it is the newsmakers who are turned to for quotes.

Like his editorial counterparts at the Mail & Guardian and Sunday Times, Weaver strongly believes that his paper’s foremost priorities are providing balance in the reports of the coverage of the Middle East (by providing forum for the voices of both sides). The other top priority of Cape Times coverage is to provide quality journalism for their readers. Again,
this lends credence to the argument that in their haste to provide balance in coverage by presenting via different frames, the newspapers have neglected key factors such as a historical context\(^{49}\), which could ironically prove of educational benefit to the readership rather than straightforward “inverted pyramid” styled news reports.

Weaver hid no secrets in his thoughts of the conflict. Because of his paper’s need to provide daily updates of the happenings in Gaza, Weaver acknowledged that “conflict” was going to dominate their coverage. He argued that a relatively large amount of lengthy articles appeared in the paper’s Insight section as compared with other foreign conflicts.

Weaver agreed with the frames that his paper had chosen and felt that because his paper did not have the leeway in choice that other publications had, the \textit{Cape Times} chose frames during the editorialising process rather than having pre-decided on a “best” way to present the developments.

\textbf{5.3.3 Sunday Times – Mondli Makhanya (editor)}

\textit{Date and place of interview: 17 August, telephonic}

The \textit{Sunday Times} is South Africa’s largest selling newspaper of any kind, selling approximately 505,400 copies daily. Its calculated readership is estimated at 3,239,000 and is arguably the country’s most influential newspaper (Koenderman, 2005: 16). Makhanya started his career in journalism at the \textit{Weekly Mail} in 1990 where he was the Cape bureau chief and business writer. Just prior to returning to the \textit{Sunday Times}, Makhanya enjoyed a brief period as editor of the \textit{Mail & Guardian} (formerly the \textit{Weekly Mail}). He has also been a political writer and Deputy News Editor of \textit{The Star} as well as Associate Editor of the \textit{Sunday World}.

In comparison to the other weekly analysed in this study, the \textit{Sunday Times} contributed a paltry four (two of which were dual-framed) articles related to the conflict during the entire ten-week period compared with the sixteen that appeared over the same time in the \textit{Mail & Guardian}. Makhanya argues that although the Middle East conflict is both popular and relevant to South African audiences, it does not feature as significantly in the \textit{Sunday Times} because it has to compete with “a surfeit of good South African stories” (Makhanya, 2006) – which his editorial vision believes is more important to his readership. According to

\(^{49}\) Whilst an attempt to provide balance would seem not to hinder context – this form of balance I found was for articles to routinely “blame” or apportion responsibility to a side in the story. This form of balance is more likely to incite, I believe than balance in the form of a historical frame.
Makhanya however, the story of the conflict is one that “touches a chord” with South African readers and local editors to recognise this. Like Tony Weaver, Makhanya believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been on the front pages of most newspapers a lot more than other foreign stories.

**On budgets, wire copy and a South African perspective:**

According to Makhanya, the only reason for South African not having enough print journalists in the Middle East is the monetary reason. Despite his newspaper having admittedly a substantially better budget than most, the Sunday Times could not afford to send someone to cover the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Interestingly enough, a representative of the paper was sent with the “Gift of the Givers” humanitarian delegation, from which coverage was done from there.

Makhanya cites the Times of London, with whom the Sunday Times have a syndication arrangement for foreign news as their most valuable source of news during the conflict. Apart from the UK-based wire services, the New York Times wire service provides the most often sourced copy for stories relating to the United States and other parts of the world. Makhanya is full of praise for the British news agencies coverage of the conflict, but still argues that caution is required when choosing wire copy:

The British quality papers are generally impartial and have handled the conflict with professionalism. But they too have a progressive stance on the Middle East situation. We definitely use our own discretion and choose from the syndication feed what we want to use and what we don’t want to use (Makhanya, 2006).

How then does this impact on the local reader? If the Sunday Times only sources international copy from the United States and Great Britain, but still chooses to frame the news (incidents such as the withdrawal) within the conflict themselves (according to Makhanya, all choices of headings, sidebars and accompanying pictures used to contextualise are done themselves), is the readership not getting an indirect version of what is taking place? Not so, says Makhanya – he does not believe that whilst a local perspective is useful, it is essential for his audience (Makhanya, 2006):
We cannot be so patronising and myopic as to think that you have to spoon-feed readers. Our readers are interested in what is going on beyond their borders and will recognise a big story. But we always try to get a local angle on a foreign story because it brings it closer to the reader. For instance, this week we featured South Africans working in United Nations aid organisations in Lebanon. It increases reader interest. People love reading about themselves, their neighbours and their countrymen.

Because the *Sunday Times* published only four articles related to the conflict within the ten-week period, it was difficult to gauge whether key characters stood out as carrying the burden of the dominant discourse in the way that Ariel Sharon featured in the *Mail & Guardian*. According to Makhanya, because he was the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon was the main protagonist in the conflict, but Makhanya contradictorily believes that Sharon did not carry the burden of dominant discourse (Makhanya, 2006). He also agreed with the Media Tenor finding that Sharon had been portrayed quite negatively in the SA media because of the role he played in the conflict.

**5.4 Summary of Chapter**

In chapter 5 I set out to give a complete account of the findings of the framing analysis, together with a full sub-section devoted to the interviews with the editors of the respective newspapers examined. One of the conclusions drawn in chapter 5, was the prominence of the consequences and attribution of responsibility frames in the general findings. There was not a large discrepancy between the prominence of these frames and other frames, however another interesting observation was the lack of a single article in the *Mail & Guardian* framed as a violent conflict.

Tony Weaver, Ferial Haffajee and Mondli Makhanya all argued that picking a “frame” for a story was not part of their editorial decision-making process, but that stories were presented according to the ethical imperatives of balances and giving voices to opinions you may not agree with. This, said Haffajee especially, was one of the duties of the newspaper. Another key finding was the general lack of articles framed in the religious context – something a section of the general public (letter writers to the editor of the *Mail & Guardian*) believed to have been more prominent.
Chapter 6 – Arguments, implications and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter of the study, final arguments are drawn and related back to the research questions and problem statement. Section 6.2 explores how, by focusing on the results of the qualitative framing analysis, the dominant and negligible frames can explain how in trying to provide balance in presentation, the newspapers clearly lack historical context that could benefit the audience. The newspapers admittedly employ similar sources of wire copy to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and therefore the results of the 2006 Loughborough Report into the British television coverage of the conflict are relevant.

The rest of the chapter includes a detailed conclusion and short reference to the implications that the results of the study will have on future research, following which recommendations are made regarding the opportunities for future framing study, with particular reference to the a possible comparative study with the Israeli-Lebanon crisis of July-August, 2006.

6.2 Argument: A lack of historical context

Loughborough University’s Communications Research Centre’s (UK) April 2006 report into the BBC’s reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict found unequivocally that historical context was barely visible in the reports that were packaged from news that emanated from the Middle East. It was thus something I looked out for when analysing the dominant frames as stipulated in my research questions of this study. By looking at the dominant frames, it is clear to identify the opposite – those that were far from dominant and whether a historical frame of presentation was one that was lacking. The report elaborates (Loughborough Report, 2006: 44):

One common criticism of UK national news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that it concentrates very much on the ‘here and now’ of the conflict and fails to convey to audiences an historical understanding of how and why the conflict has developed. Such an understanding, it is often claimed, is indispensable in order for audiences to make sense of current events. In order to assess the extent to which BBC
journalists provide historical context in their reports we counted the occurrence of references in news programmes to important historical events in the conflict. These are listed in table 19. The percentages indicate the relative frequency with which each event was referred to in news items. Journalists made few references to historical events when reporting contemporary developments.

The final sentence above is indicative of not just a problem with British coverage, but South African coverage as well. All the editors that were interviewed for this study declared that providing balance and equal voices to both parties of the conflict was their primary concern. My argument is this: In a critical attempt to provide balance by presenting the stories in many different frames, the papers neglected key facts such as historical context (a “historical” frame) and thus ironically did not provide a balance of coverage, as the balance would have been strongest had their been references to historical events in reporting contemporary developments.

All three newspapers claimed that they received many complaints from both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian lobbyists about a strong bias purported in their newspaper. They also seemed incredulous at these accusations because of their supposed balance that they provided, however they are missing the point. In two of the frames, Attribution of Responsibility and Morality, blame is apportioned to a particular side and hence tensions flare up in subsequent editions of the paper. I have shown that the Attribution of Responsibility frame (one of the two dominant frames) neglects key historical issues by focusing on the responsibility associated with extremely recent events.

Having analysed ten weeks of all reports, commentaries and analyses in the three local newspapers, and interviewed the editors of the newspapers, I believe that all three publications failed to provide sufficient context in their coverage. This conclusion was also based on the answers to my three research questions where the dominant frames of conflict and consequences revealed largely descriptive accounts of the events of the withdrawal without definitively explaining how the situation arose, hence a clear simplification.

The one idea that stands central to my initial undertaking of this study was that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is extraordinarily prominent in the South African media – especially the newspaper press. This has been verified on several accounts. Over a ten-week period, the conflict featured 46 articles in the Cape Times alone – an average of just less than

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50 See Appendix E
one piece per day (The Cape Times is a daily newspaper for the week-days). According to Tony Weaver, the news editor and deputy editor, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “along with the war in Iraq, it is far and away the most widely covered international story in the SA print media and in the Cape Times in particular” (Weaver, 2006). Mondli Makanhya, editor of the Sunday Times, argued that in dominating the world pages so regularly, the conflict has been on the front pages of most newspapers a great deal more than other foreign stories. Both editors have agreed that giving context to a story is crucial, especially when considering the sensitivity the conflict brings to local Muslim and Jewish readers.

Many sources argue that the coverage favours a certain slant in presentation. Chapter 1 showed the views of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and South African Zionist Federation, scathing in their criticism of the coverage as “biased” in favour of the Palestinians by spending a far greater majority of the time defending the Palestinians’ “courses of actions” and representing the Palestinians as victims in an “Apartheid-like struggle”. Another criticism was that the SA print media’s coverage was divisive between the local Jewish and Muslim lobbies, and caused friction between the respective communities.

In addressing the latter question, my research has found that the attribution of responsibility frame (where via strong headlines, graphic footage and opinionated copy results in apportioning blame) and not the morality and human-interest frames accounted for the majority of the articles. Morality, the most obvious frame with which to present a report through an ideological stance, accounted for only 6.9% of all articles. This lends credence to the argument of Weaver, whose publication presented only one report out of 46 through this frame. Ferial Haffajee’s Mail & Guardian, the newspaper most often accused by local supporters of Israel as being anti-Semitic” and “anti-Israel” (Krengel, 2006) framed a marginal four articles (or 20%) as an issue of morality (and hence take a forthright stance).

All the newspapers examined denied a particular slant to their coverage, but the argument came from pressure groups on both sides. The Media Review Network’s (MRN) stance was outlined in chapter 1. They also perceived a mis-representation of the Palestinian case in the SA print media and questioned the same Mail & Guardian as being discriminatory in their presentation of the conflict and the chief characters thereof.

According to the findings of the research, all three newspapers varied their frames with great regularity. Contrary to the preconceptions on both sides of a one-dimensional approach to the coverage, approximately half of all Mail & Guardian articles analysed were longer, comment pieces. Another critical finding was the lack of a single article in the M&G framed
as a violent conflict. This result therefore disputes the claims that the newspaper incites factionary aggression amongst the local Muslim and Jewish communities. According to the editor, Ferial Haffajee, if this occurs, it is independent of the newspaper’s reporting. She states that the *Mail & Guardian* are pro-rights, anti-human rights abuses, pro-multilateralism. According to Haffajee, this makes their positioning very different to the standard treatment of Israel and Palestine which is far closer to the US position with regard to the region (Haffajee, 2006). Essentially, she chooses to report what is happening, most often the results of violent exchanges and how people have been affected (hence wide spread between human-interest, morality, responsibility and consequences). Had 80% of the articles examined been presented through the attribution of responsibility frame (merely shifting blame onto both sides), then the arguments of the lobbyists could have had merit, however this has proven not to be the case.

My argument is based on both what the results of the frame analysis have shown, as well as implicitly what they have not shown – by identifying the dominant frames, we can also identify what has been missing in the coverage, and by stating how and why the editors respectively choose to present the coverage as is, explain that the lack of historical context and oversimplification is a clear result of their editorial choices made.

6.3 Do the dominant frames provide sufficient context? If not, what are they lacking?

Context is often difficult to package into a “hard-news” report. To explain how a situation arose, the role of actors/characters in a conflict and the place that the reported incident has had in the overall evolution of the conflict is more of an ideal than a practical reality, but certain frames do necessitate a greater provision of context than others.

One such example of providing context to a distanced audience is to make a comparison with a similar incident or pattern of incidents which took place in the region that the newspaper is being printed. In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media, one highly controversial analogy used on occasion is the analogy between Apartheid South Africa and the treatment metered out to Palestinians by the Israeli government (discrimination of Palestinians living in Israel) – examples include: hostile checkpoints where searches are mandatory, less money spent on Palestinian social services compared with Israelis (education, water facilities) etc. These issues are disputed regularly in the SA print
media, however this is irrelevant. Shenid Bhayroo of the Department of Communication Studies, University of Johannesburg suggests that the Apartheid comparison is possibly valid but not necessarily what the public requires. According to Bhayroo, “it’s fine to make the comparison as long as we don’t oversimplify the issue. We need to always bring stories down to how they affect us as ordinary human beings. I’m much more interested in what a lecturer like me is experiencing in the Mideast and their take on the conflict – the human-interest view – than what the officials are saying. In this way we introduce context to our stories” (Bhayroo, 2003).

Yehuda Kaye, former national director of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, argues that context, in a different form, was lacking in previous coverage and specifically cites the contentious John Pilger documentary of 2003 to support his view. Kaye’s argument is not based on the information presented in the coverage, but critically, the information he believes is lacking from coverage. This leads to another finding of this study – that the dominant frames over the ten-week period examined, were less problematic in how they presented the withdrawal, but were more seriously flawed in what they lacked. These factors are: the lack of application of a historical context for less familiar readers, and an alarming tendency to oversimplify.

The conflict-framed articles (including both violent and non-violent conflict) usually followed a similar pattern of presentation. If the report featured an incident of fighting, the story invariably detailed the action or gave a standard chronological account of the incidents of the day, with a short concluding paragraph explaining how this will impact on the region’s future. Several articles did not feature even this concluding paragraph and simply detailed either the confrontations between Jewish settlers refusing to leave their homes and Israeli Army officers attempting to remove them, or reactionary violence between Palestinian militants (suicide-bombings, mortar attacks) and the Israeli Army (tracking and killing of militants, occupation of a volatile area to reduce instability). In journalistic terms, most stories answered the basic 5 W’s (What? Where? When? Why? Who?) and H (How?) without addressing arguably the most important facet of a conflict-centred report, the So What question. Very few managed to correctly articulate what the settlers were holding on to, how they got into that position of land-ownership in the first place, or where and how they are intended to live following the withdrawal.

Cape Times news editor Tony Weaver logically argues that because his newspaper is a daily, the majority of the reports (the insight section of the newspaper did provide many
lengthier reviews and analyses) were shorter and essentially brief accounts of the previous day’s incidents. Because this newspaper was the only one to use the violent-conflict frame (11 examples) it does not appear that the editorial staff were unaware of the shortcomings and limitations of this method of reporting – the clear implication of a lack of historical context. The consequences frame was the most utilised form of contextualising the withdrawal and its positioning in the greater conflict. This frame uniformly committed the same mistakes in presenting the coverage – 1) intimating the audience with the regional political and social ramifications of the withdrawal, without crucially making the readership aware of a greater historical framework within which the withdrawal occurred. 2) The frame almost always features single characters or power-groups (the influential factions) in the narrative without explaining consequences for the majority whose voices do not receive coverage (the implication here is that presenting the opinions and statements of those in power will provide the subsequent discourses of the constituencies represented by those in power).

Another finding of the research was that the only source of historical background to lengthy analyses (during the period studied) occurred in the opening paragraphs of the editorials51 – a clear forum for advocating a stance, not necessarily the place to give a historical overview. Again, in the lengthier pieces that did attempt to deconstruct the development of the withdrawal and its subsequent implications, it was found that context was briefly articulated at the outset before delving into the argument, rather than the historical context forming part of the extended narrative of the piece.

This section of the study has attempted to demonstrate that by studying what the dominant frames were, I was able to assess what frames were missing, and whether the implications were positive or at all damaging. One such frame lacking was what we could term the “historical frame”. Using maps, photographs of characters central to the roots of the conflict (in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such examples could include: Theodore Herzl the founder of contemporary Zionism, the Mufti of Jerusalem in the medieval years or one of modern Israel’s political leaders such as Chaim Weizmann or David Ben-Gurion) or a historical narrative to educate those readers not familiar with the political history of Israel/Palestine. Of the 72 articles analysed in this study, just a single piece took the historical angle to present the withdrawal – an 18 August piece by Noel Finkelstein which appeared in the Cape Times. Finkelstein’s piece referred to the acquisition of the land in 1967, the

51 Five editorials focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (and withdrawal) appeared in the ten-week period studied. Two in the Mail & Guardian, one in Sunday Times and two in the Cape Times.
compromise of the Oslo Accords, followed by the proposal of disengagement as an event within the intifada.

6.4 Conclusion

6.4.1 Overall summary

The first inspiration for tackling this study occurred in the latter months of 2005 – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had featured prominently in the South African media during and after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August. As a South African-born Jew with dual loyalties to South Africa as my nation of birth and Israel as the controversial Jewish State, the idea of the conflict’s representation in the local media seemed a highly pertinent and interesting issue to investigate. I was also of the opinion (without engaging in prior research) that the conflict had been over-simplified in the news and opinion pages of local newspapers - such that readers who had no prior knowledge of historical Middle-East affairs were being short-changed with the way the coverage was being presented to them (ie: just highlighting the factionary violence and details of the resulting deaths rather than explaining the socio-economic implications of the citizens of the region – an area seldom covered).

Chapter 1 of this study, a part introductory chapter, discussed the aim, motivation, background and rationale of the study. Included here is the relevance of the proposed research – more directly, why it is of public interest and the prominence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South African media. I attempted to show through several examples, that a) the issue receives massive coverage locally, and b) both sides of the conflict (pro-Jewish interest groups and pro-Palestinian lobbies) claim the coverage is flawed, and that there was a general unhappiness in the way that the coverage worked against them. This lead to the problem statement, questioning how the conflict was framed and interestingly, how the editors of the newspapers choose to present the coverage (either through policy as admitted by the editor, or indirectly through the results of the framing analysis).

The problem statement illustrated that this apparent discrepancy between editorial and lobbyists existed – and my research questions built on how and why this discrepancy appeared in the frame analysis. The rest of chapter 1 dealt with the explanation of key concepts that would feature prominently in the study, followed by basic summaries of the theoretical framework and research methodologies to be employed. A late addition to the
chapter was an afterthought comment on the mid-year flare-up of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, which began to dominate the international news headlines in July. It also evidenced how significant the conflict remained in what is seemingly a distanced (South African) context.

The goal of chapter 2 was to provide a comprehensive literature review and thorough theoretical framework. Literature studies require the balance between being all-encompassing and concise enough to not dominate the research to follow it. For this reason I divided the literature study into three, distinct sections: 1) Previous literature on conflict reporting in Africa, 2) Previous literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the world media (including the subsections covering the conflict’s coverage in the South African media, and literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s hard news coverage and 3) Literature on conflict reporting and framing theory in the media.

Following the literature review is a broad review of framing theory – firstly the context of the theory within the broader effects studies approach within the overall mass communication research realm, and the theory’s indelible link to functionalism theory. This chapter also examined the history of framing theory from the early pioneers such as Goffman and Tuchman, along to the contemporary theorists such as Entman. The chapter then singles out the Kelton Rhoads’ three-part frame analysis and discusses how the theory actually works in practise, and what its functions are. I then delve deeper into the writing of Tuchman – focusing on her landmark work on framing as a function of the organisation/business structure, and Entman’s emphasis of selection and salience as being critical to framing theory. By building on their argument and the subsequent critiques thereof, the chapter closes on a solid foundation.

The purpose of chapter 4 was to provide a brief historical overview of the conflict to highlight how the contemporary debates around the conflict emerged. Beginning with a description of how the ancient land of Israel was inhabited, the chapter questioned how the land frame materialised as a central cause of the conflict, and how it surfaced in contemporary discourse about the region.

Chapter 4 also tracked the political evolution of Israel-Palestine from the extended middle-ages rule (Palestine as a Province) under the Ottoman Empire, through to the period under the British Mandate just prior to the formation of the State of Israel (partitioned alongside an independent Palestinian State) in May 1948. It was critical to clarify the intricacies of this new Middle-Eastern democracy before delving into the practical research of
how the nation was represented in the South African media. Part of this key transition was the label of Israel as a colonial state which was illegally occupying Palestinian territory – tensions between Israel and her neighbours were played out in the form of four large-scale wars, three of which are outlined in chapter four of this study. The reason for the historical detail ending after the 1967 war is because the final map and border changes (excluding the obvious withdrawal upon which this study is based) took place during this period- where Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and were either legitimised in certain circles or castigated as “occupiers” and “colonizers”.

Chapter 5 outlines the findings of the archive research and gives detailed examples of how certain articles were framed. The chapter addresses the first two of the research questions by citing in tabular and graphical form, the quantitative results of the study to complement the lengthier qualitative results which appear subsequently in the chapter. A frame-by-frame analysis constitutes the greater part of the qualitative results – approximately five articles per frame analysed are produced in this chapter, following which a publication-by-publication analysis highlighted the differences in frames used and the dominant frames across all three newspapers are cited.

The second half of chapter 5 featured summaries of the in-depth interviews with the editors of the periodicals analysed. Each paper’s policy on choice of wire copy, political stances and frames was interrogated. Another aim of the interviews was to hold the editorial stances backdropped against the qualitative analysis – the results showed that there were numerous factors including pressures on editorial to vary their coverage, which created the vacuum of a lack of historical context in the coverage. This discrepancy is argued at greater length in chapter 6 where together with the implications of the study and possible future research (such as a framing analysis of the coverage of the Israeli-Lebanese crisis in July-August 2006).

Concluding arguments are posed in the final chapter, where evidence is collected from the qualitative framing analysis, previous literature and the interviews with the editors. I argued that my research found that the Attribution of Responsibility, Morality and Human-interest frames did not account for the majority of the articles – in fact all three newspapers varied their frames with great regularity. However, in the effort to vary the presentation of their articles (as admitted by the editors), the blatant lack of historical context and oversimplification of the conflict was a clear result of their editorial choices. The rest of the chapter outlines the dominant frames (thereby answering the second research question) and I
argue how the dominant frames do not provide sufficient context – that in the haste of providing shorter, hard news reports (and this was also found in the in-depth analyses), key references to previous historical events, leaders and political positions were omitted.

6.4.2 Conclusion of research findings and arguments

The goal of this study was not to examine and respond to the arguments by lobbyists of bias or lack of balance in the SA print media’s coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study had two simple objectives – a descriptive frame analysis of how three local newspapers presented the conflict, as a way of articulating whether there existed a dominant frame which translated into a more visible discourse. A secondary objective was to triangulate the research with in-depth interviews involving the editors of the newspapers to try and gauge if the local editorial team was entirely responsible for the choice and presentation of the articles – thereby answering the research questions of why the dominant frames emerged, and crucially what was lacking in the presentation of the coverage.

I have argued that each frame fulfils a particular task/responsibility for the article. Attribution of Responsibility, for example, apportions blame to either a single side or both parties in the conflict. A Morality frame judges the actual news event, and by considering it right or wrong, will reflect on the incident within moral terms. Conflict pits more than one party in conflict against each other. The narrative will reflect on the differences and competing ideologies/characteristics of the respective parties in the description and reporting of events. It seems therefore, that when a particular frame is used to present a story, it is difficult and unlikely to provide historical context to the text without it perhaps having a disruptive influence on the structure and content of the story. The other conceivable option is to frame the entire article within a historical context, but the results (1 article out of 72) have proven that this is an unpopular option, and editors argue that they can “build in” portions of context into lengthier analyses. However, this has also proven not to have happened and only passing references to past characters, negotiations and preceding conflicts featured in a handful of the reports from a ten-week period.

Although similar analyses in local newspapers had been completed by the Media Tenor group, they were generally quantitative studies which only provided statistics without interrogating how the results actually emerged, or even what the public’s perception of the
results were (ie: focus groups etc). One thing that has been proven several times in this study is that the conflict evokes massive public interest in South Africa – not just when an incident occurs every few months, but for many years and probably for many years in the future. For this reason alone, I believe the present study was just the first of many possible studies chronicling events in the conflict and their portrayal in the South African media up to thirty years in prior to the Gaza withdrawal, and any future escalations.

The political instability of the region, including the recent war in Lebanon has again proven that the conflict is not a made up of solitary events, but is a continuous variable, with the dimensions, key actors, threats and boundaries always changing. This study, like the Gaza withdrawal, should hopefully not find itself as a solitary body of academic media research, but hopefully a single piece of research within a growing group of mass communication literature based on similar aims in evaluating the conflict.

6.4.3 Future Research – relevance, opportunities and recommendations

One of the pivotal reasons for the undertaking of this study was the habitual appearance of non-media organisations commenting on the perceived bias, distortions and general criticism of the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The organisations (pressure groups in support of both sides) argued how local media favoured the “other side” and used media terms such as “frame” and “discourse” liberally without evidencing their particular arguments. A consultation with researchers from Media Tenor confirmed my initial assumption that the conflict receives a disproportionately large amount of coverage in relation to other international conflicts. With the inconsistent interest from the lobbyists, and with the dearth of academic study in the field, I suggested that research into the presentation of the coverage was required.

As indicated briefly in the final section of chapter 1 (1.8 – afterthought), a massive escalation occurred whilst I was completing the archive research for this study, this time between Israel and the Lebanon-based Islamic militant group Hezbollah. This conflict was based less around territorial grievances (only several days after Israel’s retaliatory strikes had begun, did Hezbollah mention that they were also fighting to liberate the controversial farms in northern Israel which the argued belonged to the people of Lebanon) as much as it was based around a greater political objection – the unlawful existence of Israel. Israel’s chief
argument was that Hezbollah, a Syrian and Iranian funded organisation acted as aggressors in the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers, and hence they disrupted future political stability in the region.

The South African newspapers covered this in as much detail as they had any previous Middle-Eastern conflict – huge front-page spreads, many opinion pages dedicated to arguments legitimising each sides actions and graphic pictures accompanying the reports. I believe there is surfeit of potential research on Middle-East related conflicts, using both the frame analysis together with other research methodologies.

Whilst the grouping of the media frames into five distinct frames proved successful in this study, the “doubling-up” of certain articles fitting more than one frame suggests that in future frame analyses on similar subjects, additional frames should be. This is not to say that the present five frames were inaccurate for the material studies, but several articles had framed the conflict as a function of political or security policy – this is itself a possible future frame.

As was found in the Aiken September 11 study, a significant number of articles were near entire descriptions of the previous day’s events – such that the daily papers (in this case the *Cape Times*) chose to provide a “play-by-play” coverage of the withdrawal. The prominence of these types of story could necessitate a new frame called “report” which could add value to future analyses.

There is the opportunity to further interrogate and refine the research findings of the present study if more financial and technical resources were dedicated to the study. One of the limitations encountered by the researcher was the choice of the five frames. Obviously some bared the characteristics of more than one frame, in which case further analysis was required. On other occasions certain articles did not fit one of the frames, however this limitation could easily be obviated by choosing different frames when carrying out a similar analysis.
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CT, 2005/08/18: 15 – Finkelstein, N. 2005. The road to disengagement day in Gaza has been a long one. Cape Times. 18 August. P15
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8 September. P16

15 September. P25


3 July. P15.

P14

28 August. P20


11 September. P15
Chapter 9 Appendices

9.1 Timeline of Palestinian Israeli History and the Israel-Arab Conflict

Concise Overview of Recent Israeli-Palestinian History
(Source: www.mideastweb.org)

Nov 2, 1917
British issued the Balfour Declaration, viewed by Jews and Arabs as promising a “National Home” for the Jews in Palestine.

1936-1939
Arab Revolt led by Haj Amin Al-Husseini. Over 5,000 Arabs were killed according to some sources, mostly by British. Several hundred Jews were killed by Arabs. Husseini fled to Iraq and then to Nazi Germany.

May 15, 1948
Israel War of Independence (1948 War). Declaration of Israel as the Jewish State; British leave Palestine; Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia declared war on Israel. Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian invasion began.

April 3, 1949
Armistice - Israel and Arab states agree to armistice. Israel gained about 50% more territory than was originally allotted to it by the UN Partition Plan.

Oct. 29, 1956
Suez Campaign. In retaliation for a series of escalating border raids as well as the closure of the straits of Tiran and Suez canal to Israeli shipping, and to prevent Egyptian use of newly acquired Soviet arms in a war, Israel invades the Sinai peninsula and occupies it for several months, with French and British collaboration.

May, 1964
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) founded with the aim of destroying Israel. The Palestinian National Charter (1968) officially called for liquidation of Israel.

May, 1967
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closes the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and dismisses UN peacekeeping force. Negotiations with US to reopen the Straits of Tiran fail.

June 5-10, 1967
6-day war. Israel destroys the Egyptian air force on the ground, conquers and occupies Sinai and Gaza, then conquers the West Bank from Jordan, and Golan Heights from Syria. UN resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal, establishment of peace.

Oct. 6, 1973
Yom Kippur War (October War). In a surprise attack on the Jewish day of atonement, Egypt retook the Suez canal and a narrow zone on the other side. Syria reconquered the Golan Heights. Following massive US and Soviet resupplying of the sides, Israel succeeded in pushing back the Syrians and threatening Damascus. In Sinai, the IDF crossed the Suez Canal and cut off the Egyptian Third Army.

March 26, 1979
Peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel.

June 7, 1981
Israel destroys Iraqi nuclear reactor in daring raid.

Oct. 6, 1981
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is assassinated while on the reviewing stand of a victory parade.

June 6, 1982
Massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon to fight PLO.
Sept. 13, 1993  
**Oslo Declaration of Principles** - Israel and PLO agree to mutual recognition.

Sept 28, 1995  
**Oslo Interim Agreement** signed. Palestinian Authority to be established.

Nov. 4, 1995  
Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin assassinated by right-wing Israeli fanatic Yigal Amir. Rabin is replaced by Shimon Peres

June, 1996  
Right-Wing Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu elected Prime Minister in Israel, replacing Shimon Peres.

Sept. 1996  
"Al-Aksa tunnel riots - Arab sources spread the false rumor that a gate opened in an underground tunnel tourist attraction by the Israeli government, endangered the foundations of the Al-Aqsa mosque. This caused several days of rioting and numerous casualties.

Jan 18, 1997  
Israel and Palestinians reach agreement on Israeli redeployment in the West-Bank city of Hebron

Oct. 1998  
**Wye River Plantation talks** result in an agreement for Israeli redeployment and release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to correct its violations of the Oslo accords including excess police force, illegal arms and incitement in public media and education.

May 17, 1999  
Israel elects Labor party leader and Former General Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in a landslide. Barak promises rapid progress toward peace.

March, 2000  
Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations fail when Hafez Assad rejects an Israeli offer relayed by US President Clinton in Geneva.

Sept. 28, 2000  
Palestinians initiated riots after Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, which is also the location of the Haram as Sharif holy to Muslims.

Sept. 11, 2001  
Terror attacks on World Trade Center in NYC and the Pentagon carried out by fanatic Islamic Al-Qaida group headed by Osama Bin Laden initiate US war on terror. Israel and Palestinians agree to a cease fire, but it is not implemented.

Feb 6, 2001  
Right-wing Likud leader Ariel Sharon elected Prime Minister in Israel replacing Ehud Barak and promising "peace and security."

March-April 2002  
Israel conducts operation Defensive Wall in the West Bank, following a large number of Palestinian suicide attacks on civilian targets. Saudi peace initiative adopted at Beirut summit.

Jan 28, 2003  
Elections in Israel give wide margin (40 seats) to right wing Likud party, returning PM Ariel Sharon for another term.

March 19, 2003  
US begins invasion of Iraq by a strike against a building where Saddam Hussein and other leaders are meeting. Baghdad falls, April 9.

July 9, 2004  
International court of Justice (ICJ) rules that the Israeli security barrier violates international law and must be torn down.
Nov 11, 2004  Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat dies.

Jan 9, 2005  Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian National Authority.

Jan 10, 2005  Ariel Sharon forms unity government with Labor and United Torah Judaism parties in Israel.

April 2005  Ariel Sharon visits US President George Bush at his Texas ranch. Syrian Army leaves Lebanon, officially ending Syrian occupation.

May 26, 2005  Mahmud Abbas visits US President George Bush at the White House, an important symbolic gesture signaling US backing for Abbas and Palestinian aspirations. Israel releases 400 Palestinian prisoners including some with blood on their hands. Britain confirms "low level" negotiations with Hamas.

June, 2005  Violence flares in Gaza. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visits Palestinian and Israeli leaders to ensure coordination of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas meet in Jerusalem June 21. Sharon announces that Palestinians have promised to coordinate regarding Gaza withdrawal. PM Abbas postpones Palestinian legislative elections in order to change the election law, amidst growing concern that Hamas will trounce Abbas's Fatah party in the elections. Lebanese elections give a decisive majority to the opposition to Syria, led by Saad Hariri, son of slain leader Rafiq Hariri.

Aug. 15, 2005  Disengagement - Israeli evacuation of Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements began on August 15 and was completed August 24.

See detailed timeline below

Detailed Timeline

1300? BCE  Migration and conquest of Canaan by the Philistines and Israeliite tribes. Map of Canaan.

1000? BCE  Jewish conquest of Jerusalem; reign of David (maps); After the death of David's son, Solomon, the kingdom split into two: Israel in the north, Judea in Jerusalem and the south (maps). Brief History of Early Palestine in maps.

721 BCE  Fall of Israel (Northern Kingdom) to Assyria

586 BCE  Fall of Judea (Southern Kingdom) to Babylon and destruction of the first temple

About 539 BCE  Fall of Babylon. Jews allowed to return to Judea. Tradition has it that Ezra and Nehemia led this return, and later rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, but the walls were apparently not built until 100 years later.

About 519 BCE  Rebuilding of the Second Temple under Persian rule.

331 BCE  Alexander the Great conquers Persia. The land was subject to Egyptian rule after his death, followed by Seleucid Syrian rule.
313 BCE  Ptolemy of Egypt rules Jerusalem and Judea.

170 BCE  Antiochus Epiphanes rules Judea.

166 BCE  Revolt of Judah Maccabee against Syrian Hellenic dynasty; Simon. 164 - Liberation of Jerusalem. Judah is named Friend of the Roman Senate and People; Rule of the Maccabees: 166 - Judah 160 -Jonathan 143

About 61 BCE  Roman conquest of Jerusalem by Pompei. Land is divided into various provinces (maps).

40 BCE  Reign of Herod the Great; Herod conquered Jerusalem in 37 BCE. Herod began an extensive restoration of the temple about 20 BC

4 BCE  Probable year of birth of Jesus. Jesus was crucified between 31 and 33 AD.

66-73 AD  First Jewish revolt. Fall of the Jewish Second Temple to Romans in 70 AD.

133-135  Second Jewish revolt under Bar Kochba crushed. Judea renamed Palestina. Jews are banned from Jerusalem by Hadrianus Caesar.

313  Roman Emperor Constantine legalizes Christianity

614  Persians conquer Judea and Jerusalem.

622  Hijra of Mohammed. Islam is founded.

628  Emperor Heraclius defeats Sassanid Persians, reconquers Jerusalem.

About 638  Arab conquest of Jerusalem. (slightly earlier or later according to different sources). Caliph Omar provides the Christians of Jerusalem with the Covenant of Umarguaranteeing their protection. Land divided into the Jund of filastin, in the south (capital in Al-Lod and later in Ramlah), and the Jund of Urdunn in the north, with capital in Tiberias (Tabariyeh).

641  Arab conquest of Egypt.

705  Dome of the Rock (Omar) mosque is completed by Caliph Abd’ al Malik ibn Marwan who rules from Jerusalem.

715  The Al-Aqsa Mosque is completed by the Caliph Walid.

717  Caliph Suleiman builds Ramlah

750  Rise of the Abbasids in Baghdad, full of the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus.

969  Fatimid conquest. Churches and synagogues of Jerusalem destroyed.

1071  Battle of Manzikert. The Byzantine emperor Romanus IV Diogenes is defeated by the Seljuk Turks, opening Asia Minor to Turkish invasion. Seljuks devastate Jerusalem.

1099  Crusaders conquer Jerusalem, slaughter most Jewish and Moslem inhabitants, expel Jews.
1187 Salah-ed-din (Saladin) reconquers Jerusalem

1229 Jerusalem briefly held by Crusaders.


1260 Battle of Ayn Jalut (Nazereth) - Holagu (Mongols) defeated.

1291 Crusaders defeated at Acre and evicted from Palestine.

1453 Constantinople falls to Ottoman Sultan Mehmed.

1517 Ottoman Turkish conquest of Palestine.

1537-41 Muslim walls built around Jerusalem by Suleiman the Magnificent.

1799 Napoleon conquers Jaffa but retreats before Acco (Acre); 1799 - Napoleon's Proclamation of a Jewish State was stillborn, and his declaration of equal rights for Jews was repealed in part in 1806.

1831 Egyptian Conquest of Palestine area by Mehmed Ali of Egypt, who rebelled against the Ottomans. He was forced to withdraw in 1840 under pressure by European allies.

1834 Jerusalem families including the Abu Ghosh clan revolt against Egyptian rule. The rebellion is eventually crushed.

1839 Tanzimat - reorganization program- is proclaimed in the Ottoman empire.

1840 Blood libel (accusation that Jews kill Christian children to use their blood for Passover Matzoth) against Damascus Jewry

1843 First Zionist writings of Rabbi Alcalay and of Rabbi Kalischer, Emuna Yeshara.

1844 First census in Jerusalem shows 7120 Jews, 5760 Muslims, 3390 Christians.

1856 Ottoman reforms (Tanzimat) - including requirement to register ownership of land and pay taxes on it.

1860 First Jewish settlement (Mishkenot Sha'ananim) outside Jerusalem walls.

1878 First Zionist Settlement - Petah Tikwa.

1892 Railroad from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

1897 First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland.

1906 Beginnings of Zionist socialist movements. First Congress of Poalei Tziyon in Poltava, under the leadership of Ber Borochov.

July 3 1908 The Young Turks revolt breaks out in the Ottoman empire, and is eventually led by Enver Pasha; Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II is forced to restore the constitution of 1876, entailing the creation of a new parliament, and indirect representative elections. 'Abd al-Hamid is then deposed (27Apr 09), and his brother Mehmet
V installed. Policies for the ‘Turkification’ of the Ottoman territories promulgated through 1909, resulting in the creation of societies promoting pan-Arab ideas.

1908 First Arabic newspaper in Haifa, *al-Karmil*, popularizes opposition to selling land to Zionists.

1909 Foundation of Tel Aviv by Zionists (Called Ahuzat Bayit) near Jaffa; foundation of first Kibbutz - Degania.

1911 *Filastin*, large Arabic newspaper, launched in Jaffa.

June 15, 1914 Anglo French agreement on Baghdad railroad and Mesopotamia

Aug 1914 Start of WW I

Nov 1914 Allies at war with Turkey

Dec 17 British protectorate in Egypt; Prince Husein Kemal becomes Khedive.

April 25, 1915 Anglo-French landing at Gallipoli

July 1915 Husayn-McMahon Correspondence - Britain promises independence for Arabia.

Jan 6-8 1916 Allies evacuate Gallipoli

Apr 29, 1916 British surrender to Turks at Kut, in Mesopotamia

May 1916 *Sykes-Picot Agreement* divides up Fertile Crescent between France & Britain into zones of influence, recognizing Arab independence in part of the land.

Jun 1916 Husayn of Arabia proclaims revolt against the Turks urged on by British promises of independence and with support of T.E. Lawrence for military operations. In October or November he was proclaimed king of Saudi Arabia, but the British supported Saud, who had been in control of Riyadh since 1902, and who made a pact with the British in 1915.

Jan 1, 1917 Britain, France and Italy recognize Husayn as king of the Hejaz.

Nov 2, 1917 British issued the *Balfour Declaration*, viewed by Jews and Arabs as promising a “National Home” for the Jews in Palestine.


Apr, 1918 Zionist commission arrives in Palestine.

June, 1918 Emir Feisal and Dr. Weizmann meet near Aqaba

Oct, 1918 British and Arabs occupy Damascus, French occupy Beirut and Alexandretta

Nov 1918 First Muslim-Christian association formed in Jaffa to oppose the creation of a Jewish homeland. Another was formed in Jerusalem soon after. Armistice between Allies and Germany, Nov 11.
Jan. 1919  First Palestinian Congress advocated incorporation of Palestine into greater Syria.


March 1919  Widespread national revolt begins in Egypt against British rule after nationalist leaders were arrested and Zaghloul Pasha was exiled. The Wafd party is created.

May 19, 1919  Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) lands at Samsun in Turkey and begins organizing nationalist forces to oppose the sultanate & the Allied occupation.

May 23, 1919  Kurdish revolt against the British, led by Shaykh Mahmud Berzendji of Sulaymaniyya, who proclaims an independent Kurdistan. The revolt continued until 1931.

July 1919  General Syrian Congress (which included prominent Palestinians, Transjordanians, Lebanese & Syrians) held in Damascus, supporting the independence of an undivided Syria, and opposed to Zionism. Britain cedes authority over Syria to France after the congress finishes; Gen. Henri Gourand becomes High Commissioner.

July 19, 1919  In Turkey, Ataturk creates a provisional government based in Ankara.

Aug. 28, 1919  Henry King and Charles Crane, the US members of the International Commission of Inquiry, sent primarily on the initiative of President Wilson, present their report based on their visit to the region in June-July, against creation of a Jewish National home in Palestine.

Feb.- Mar., 1920  Jewish settlements of Tel Hai and Metullah in N. Palestine attacked (Feb. 20). Josef Trumpeldor killed in second attack at Tel Hai (March 1).

March, 1920  Faysal elected and crowned king of Greater Syria at 2nd General Syrian Congress in Damascus; assembly proclaims independence from France of Greater Syria; rejects Balfour Declaration and Sykes-Picot agreement. Allies occupy Constantinople.

April, 1920  Musa Kazim al-Husayni, mayor of Jerusalem, is replaced by Raghib al-Nashashibi; clan rivalry grows.

April, 1920  "Nebi Musa" Arab riots led by Haj Amin El Husseini and Aref El Aref in Hebron and Jerusalem. Forty Six Jews Killed.


June 1920  Haganah, Jewish Self Defense, organized by Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, Eliahu Golumb and others.

July 1920  Herbert Samuel named High Commissioner of Palestine. King Faisal recognizes French Mandate. French forces under Gourand retake Damascus by force with British support. Britain arrests Palestinian notables who had supported Faisal.

Dec., 1920  Histadrut, the General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel (Histadrut Haklalit Shel Haovdim Halvriyim Be'eretz Yisrael), was formed. Remained exclusively Jewish until 1960s, when it officially dropped ‘Hebrew’ from its name (1966).

May 1921  Arab riots in Jaffa against Jewish population.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1921</td>
<td>Haj Amin El Husseini appointed Grand Mufti by British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, though Husseini had been convicted of organizing riots in 1920 and had been sentenced to ten years in jail</td>
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<td>Jan 1922</td>
<td>Haj Amin El Husseini appointed President of the Supreme Muslim Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1922</td>
<td>British grant independence to Egypt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 3, 1922</td>
<td>The Churchill (&quot;Command&quot;) White Paper notes that the Balfour declaration only promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and reserves East Palestine for Transjordan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 24, 1922</td>
<td><strong>British Mandate for Palestine:</strong> Official establishment of Transjordan as a separate state; Britain, in military control of Syria, allows French forces led by Gourand to retake Damascus by force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1, 1922</td>
<td>Mustapha Kemal Proclaims Turkish Republic</td>
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<td>May 25, 1923</td>
<td>Proclamation of Transjordanian Independence under Emir Abdullah</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 29, 1923</td>
<td>Palestine Constitution suspended by British after Arabs refuse to participate in the government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 24, 1923</td>
<td>Lausanne Peace Treaty signed by Greece, Turkey and the Allies</td>
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<td>Sept 29, 1923</td>
<td>Palestine Mandate officially comes into force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 19, 1924</td>
<td>Shah Ahmed deposed in Persia; Reza Khan Appointed Regent</td>
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<td>Nov 20, 1924</td>
<td>Egyptian troops withdrawn from Sudan under British ultimatum, after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Official inauguration of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 20, 1925</td>
<td>Druze uprising in Syria, continues until June, 1927.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 12, 1925</td>
<td>Syrian uprising against the French Mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 8, 1926</td>
<td>Ibn Saud becomes king of the Hejaz, now called Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 23, 1926</td>
<td>France proclaims Republic of Lebanon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 20, 1927</td>
<td>Britain recognizes Saudi independence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 14, 1927</td>
<td>Britain recognizes Iraqi independence (subject to treaty provisions) and continuing mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 20, 1928</td>
<td>Britain recognizes Transjordanian independence (subject to treaty provisions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5, 1928</td>
<td>Sir John Chancellor becomes High Commissioner in Palestine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 19, 1928</td>
<td>King Fuad dissolves Egyptian parliament, suspend freedom of the press.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August, 1929</td>
<td>Arab Riots and Massacres in Hebron, Jerusalem, Safed, Haifa, Motza and elsewhere. The Jews had set up a dividing screen at the Wailing Wall in Yom Kippur of 1928 to separate men and women worshippers,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prompting rumors that the Jews wanted to build a synagogue at wall, which were spread deliberately by Haj Amin El-Husseini. Amid heightening tensions, a demonstration by Jews in 1929 and Arab incitement ignited violence and rioting again Jews. Thousands of Jews fled the ancient Jewish quarter in Jerusalem. The Hebron Jewish community was evacuated after 64-67 were killed in riots.

Oct. 21, 1929 Egyptian Constitution restored.

1930 The Hope-Simpson Report recommends cessation of Jewish immigration.

Oct 21, 1930 British Passfield White Paper proposes to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine.

1931 After questions in commons and League condemnation, Ramsay MacDonald writes to Haim Weizmann Rescinding the Passfield White Paper; IZL (Irgun or Etzel - The Ir gum Tzvai Leumi) formed by Jabotinsky and others who leave the Haganah.

Oct. 3, 1932 British Mandate over Iraq terminated.

Jul-Aug. 1933 Massacre of Assyrian Christians in Iraq.

Sept. 8, 1933 King Feisal of Iraq dies, succeeded by his son Ghazi.

May-June 1934 War between Saudi Arabia an Yemen.

Nov. 2, 1934 Syrian Parliament suspended indefinitely

Nov. 30, 1934 Egyptian Constitution of 1930 suspended


April, 1936 Farouk succeeds Fuad I as King of Egypt; Arab Higher Committee formed in Palestine.

1936-1939 Arab Revolt led or coopted by the Al-Husseini family and Fawzi al-Kaukji and financed by Axis powers. Over 5,000 Arabs were killed according to some sources; most were killed by other Arabs and by British. Orde Wingate forms “night squads” for Jewish self-defense. Several hundred Jews were killed by Arabs. Husseini fled to Iraq and then to Nazi Germany.

Aug. 26, 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty ends military occupation of Egypt except in the Suez Canal zone.

Oct, 29, 1936 General Sidqi Bakr seizes power in Iraq.

1937-1938 Peel and Woodhead commissions recommend partitioning Palestine into a small Jewish state and a large Arab one.


Oct. 1, 1937 British declare Higher Committee in Palestine an illegal body.

Oct. 16, 1937 Haj Amin El-Husseini Mufti of Jerusalem escapes to Syria and thence to Iraq.

Jan.-Mar. 1939 Round-table conference on Palestine in London, with Arab countries, Zionists and Palestinian
May 17, 1939  
**1939 White Paper** limits Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 in total, restricts Jewish land purchases, envisions an Arab Palestinian state. Jews found the Mossad to arrange for illegal immigration.

Sept. 3, 1939  
Britain and France declare war on Germany

Nov 25, 1940  
The Jewish illegal immigrant ship *Patria* (also called *Patra*) carrying refugees from Europe, detained in Haifa by the British, is blown up by the Jewish underground Hagana to prevent transshipment of the refugees to Mauritius. The explosion was supposed to cause a small leak. Instead, the ship sank and 252 people died.

Apr. 1, 1941  
Agitation by exiled Palestinian Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini leads to coup. Pro-Axis Government under Rashid Ali in Iraq.

May - June, 1941  
British reoccupy Habbanieh and Baghdad, Rashid Ali and pro-Axis leaders flee to Teheran and Berlin; After the revolt is suppressed, a pogrom against the Jews (Farhoud) takes place in Baghdad, while British troops stand by and refuse to intervene. Click for details of Iraq Axis coup, Mufti, British Intervention and the Farhud

June, 1941  
Free French and Australians occupy Syria and Lebanon; Britain and France guarantee Syrian independence.

Feb. 1942  
British force the appointment of Nahas Pasha, a British ally, as Egyptian PM. 

Feb. 24, 1942  
The Jewish illegal immigrant ship *Struma*, forced to sail north from Turkey, is torpedoed by a Soviet submarine (either collaborating with British or because the ship was mistaken for German shipping) and sunk with the loss of 428 men, 269 women and 70 children.

Oct. 1942  
Battle of El Alamein. British under General Montgomery defeat Rommel's Afrika Korps and end the Nazi threat on Egypt.

May 9, 1942  
**Biltmore Program** - Zionist leaders, headed by Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, convene at the Biltmore Hotel in New York and set their postwar program (known as the Biltmore Program). The program recommended an end to the British Mandate and demand Jewish control over immigration to Palestine with the aim of founding a Jewish "Commonwealth."

Oct 7, 1944  
**Arab leaders meet in Alexandria** to discuss postwar plans for independence and ways to prevent implementation of Jewish control over Palestine.

Nov 6, 1944  
Members of the Jewish Lehi underground Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet Zuri assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo. Moyne, a known anti-Zionist, was Minister of State for the Middle East and in charge of carrying out the terms of the 1939 White paper - preventing Jewish immigration to Palestine by force.

Mar, 1945  
All Arab states declare war on Germany and Japan.

March 22, 1945  
League of Arab States set up (Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, with Musa ‘Alami as Arab States’ chosen representative of the Palestinians) with British approval to shift welfare responsibility onto local population and to ensure continuing Arab support. The goals of the league were as stated in the **Alexandria Protocol**, of which it was an outgrowth. Arab League charter proclaims goal of achieving closer aims between Arab States and declares that Palestine is a member of the League in a special annex.
May-June, 1945  Crisis in Syria and Lebanon. British ultimatum to French causes French to withdraw their forces.

Aug., 1945  US President Truman asks British to admit 110,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

Sept., 1945  British limit Jewish immigration into Palestine to 1,500 a month.

Nov. 1945  Anglo American Committee of Inquiry for Palestine appointed.

Mar., 1946  British-Tranjordanian treaty; British recognize Emir Abdullah as King of Transjordan.

Apr. 1946  Report of Anglo American Committee of Inquiry published. Recommend admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.

June., 1946  Haj Amin El Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem, escapes from detention in France aided by French collaborators. Husseini was to have been deported to Germany and tried for war crimes after spending the war working for the Nazis in Germany.

July 22, 1946  Irgun Jewish underground blows up British HQ in King David Hotel, Jerusalem, killing 91 persons.

Aug., 1946  British start deporting illegal Jewish immigrants to detention camps in Cyprus.

Sept., 1946  Palestine round-table conference opens in London.

Dec. 1946  Nokrashy Pasha, new Egyptian PM, repudiates Anglo-Egyptian treaty.

Feb. 1947  Britain refers Palestine issue to the UN.

May, 1947  UN General Assembly appoints UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

July 18, 1947  British rammed the Jewish illegal immigrant ship Exodus (formerly "President Warfield") on the high seas. They towed it to Haifa where it was the subject of extensive publicity, generating public sympathy for the Zionist cause. The passengers were eventually disembarked in Hamburg. The incident set world and particularly US opinion against the British, and caused the British to intern illegal immigrants thereafter in Cyprus, rather than attempting to return them to Europe.

Sept 1, 1947  UNSCOP issues its report, calling for partition of Palestine.

Nov. 29, 1947  UN Partition Resolution (GA 181) - Palestine was to be divided into a Jewish State and an Arab State; Jerusalem was to be internationalized. The resolution is supported by both the US and USSR. Arab countries and Arab league refuse to recognize the resolution.

Dec. 1, 1947  Arab riots in Jerusalem. Beginning of Arab blockade of Jerusalem. The period to May 1948 was characterized by numerous skirmishes, road ambushes, riots, bombings and massacres, whether organized by one of the other sides or spontaneous. The Haifa riots and massacres were typical.

January 1948  Arab Salvation Army (also called Arab Liberation Army - ALA) are admitted to Palestine by the British, following a promise not to attack Jewish settlements. Their leader, Fauzi Al-Kaukji may have entered Palestine only in March. Jewish Agency concludes arms deal with Czechoslovakia, but most arms do not arrive until June 1948, after the British have left. The UN, including the US, had placed an arms embargo on Palestine. This did not apply to Arab countries including Transjordan. As independent states, they were allowed to acquire arms. The Jordan Legion received a steady supply of arms from Britain through the Suez Canal, at least until May 1948, including a large number of 25 pounder cannon at the beginning of
1948. Hagana agents purchased 20 Auster light aircraft in Britain, sold for scrap, rebuilt them and brought them to Palestine for use of the Haganah. Haganah later rebuilt Spitfires left by the mandate for scrap as well, but did not have real fighter and bomber aircraft until May 1948 or, when Czech Messerschmidtys and B-17s purchased clandestinely were brought into the country.

January 16, 1948
Jewish convoy to Gush Etzion intercepted

Feb. 1948
Anti-British riots in Baghdad against new British-Iraq treaty bring down pro-British government.

Mar. 1948
Provisional Jewish government formed in Tel-Aviv. Convoy to Gush Etzion ambushed in Nebi Daniel. Arabs begin to flee Haifa.

April 6-8, 1948
Arab blockade of Jerusalem is broken temporarily by operation Nachshon. Death of Abd-El-Qader Al-Husseini at Kastel - The foremost Palestinian military leader is shot by a Jewish sentry when he wanders into Jewish held Kastel in the Jerusalem corridor thinking it is in Arab hands.

April 9, 1948
Deir Yassin Massacre - Jewish dissident underground groups - Irgun and Lehi kill over 100 Palestinian civilians in the Jerusalem village of Deir Yassin.

April 13, 1948
Haddassah Convoy Massacre - In retaliation for Deir Yassin, Arabs killed Jewish medical personnel and sick persons on their way to Hadassah hospital.

April 13-20, 1948
Operation Har’el launched by Hagannah at conclusion of Operation Nachshon, does not succeed in opening the road to Jerusalem.

April 1948
Arab flight from Haifa continues; Arab flight from Jaffa.

April 22-31, 1948
Operation Misparayim launched by Hagannah to assume control of Haifa after British withdrawal and attacks by Arab forces and Irgun.

May 12, 1948
Haganah captures Tsfat (Safed). Arab population flees the city before it is captured.

May 13, 1948
Jaffa surrenders to Haganah.

May 13, 1948
Kfar Etzion Massacre - In retaliation for Deir Yassin Massacre, Arabs killed about 128 Jewish defenders at Kfar Etzion, after they had surrendered.

May 14, 1948
Remaining kibbutzim of Gush Etzion surrender. British High Commissioner Cunningham leaves Palestine. State of Israel declared on Friday May 14, in advance of the Sabbath. recognized immediately by USA and on May 17 by USSR.

May 15, 1948

May 17, 1948
Haganah captures Acco (Acre). Most of the Arab population flees the city before it is captured.

May 18, 1948
Syrian army captures Massada and Merom Hagolan.

May 28, 1948
Jewish quarter of the old city of Jerusalem falls to the Jordan Legion. The inhabitants were protected from the wrath of a lynch mob by the Legion under Abdullah Tell, and noncombatants were expelled to West Jerusalem. About 300 Haganah defenders were taken prisoner and sent to Jordan. The entire quarter
including 58 of the 59 synagogues was demolished by the Arab mob despite efforts of the Legion.

June 11, 1948
First truce begins, lasting until 8 July.

June 23, 1948
Irgun’s Altalena ship brings weapons and 940 immigrants to Palestine. The arms shipment was a violation of UN embargo, but Israel government agreed to it, provided the Irgun handed over the weapons to IDF and formed a unified force. Irgun Commander Menahem Begin refused to hand over weapons and Irgun insisted on keeping a portion of the arms for its own use as a separate force. Palmach units of IDF under Yigal Allon attempted to capture weapons by force, killing 14 Irgun men. Yitzhak Rabin, in command of shore batteries in Tel-Aviv, was ordered to fire upon and sink the Altalena after it attempted a landing there. According to some reports, factions of the Irgun (Etzel) were planning a coup with the arms.

June 28, 1948
Count Folke Bernadotte’s first peace plan - Jerusalem to be Arab.

July 8, 1948
Egyptian army breaks truce, due to end July 9. Attacks from neighborhood of Majdal (Ashdod). Israeli counterattack at Faluja was unsuccessful. This phase of the war is known as "the ten days," and included Mivtza Dani - the Israeli conquest of Lydda (Lod) and Ramla, breaking the Arab siege of Jerusalem, and creating thousands of refugees, as well as advances in the north. During this time Israel had acquired three B-17s and some Dakotas. One of the B-17s succeeded in dropping some bombs on Cairo on its way to delivery in Israel, others bombed Damascus and Rafa.

July 10, 1948
Arab League announced the establishment of a temporary Palestinian civilian administration over Arab held-areas of Palestine, but it was never implemented.

July 12, 1948
Egyptians attack Kibbutz Negba with armor and massive troop concentrations. Israelis suffer 5 dead, 16 wounded, Egyptian casualties 200-300 dead and wounded.

July 19, 1948
Second truce in Palestine.

Sept 17, 1948
Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, a UN mediator, was assassinated in Jerusalem, and Lehi members were suspected. The Israel government outlawed the organization's branch in Jerusalem and shut down its publication, Hamivra. The leaders of Lehi, Natan Yellin-Mor and Mattityahu Shmuelevitz, were sentenced to long jail terms by a military court, but were released in a general amnesty. Bernadotte, who had been instrumental in saving about 21,000 Jews in WW II, was proposing to "relieve" Israel of the Negev and force return of the Palestinian refugees. The latter proposal was adopted in UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

Sept 22, 1948
Palestinian States - AHC communiqué announces the establishment of the Government of All Palestine (APG; Hukumat 'Umum Filastin); Declaration of Independence proclaimed by Hajj Amin to Palestine National Council in Gaza (30Sept-1Oct) on 1Oct, with Hajj Amin as President of the PNC, Ahmad Hilmi 'Abd al-Baqi as PM, Jamal al-Husayni as Foreign Minister, in the Mandate territory of Palestine, with the flag of the 1916 Arab Revolt. Jerusalem as capital, Gaza as seat of government. Recognized and sponsored by Egypt and Arab League, who sought to forestall 'Abdullah’s plan to annex West Bank; strongly opposed by Jordan, who organized a much larger rival Palestinian Congress in Amman on 30Sept to support Jordan’s policy in Palestine. APG issued Palestinian passports; but with Egyptian disillusionment, HQ transferred to Cairo in Oct, Hajj Amin was confined to Cairo and is & actions curtailed; many leading members left to work for Amman. Ahmad Hilmi continued to represent Palestine in the League until his death in September 63.

Oct. 15, 1948
Second truce ends; Israeli offensive breaks Egyptian siege of Israeli settlements in the Negev (operation Yoav). Beersheva is taken. In the north, operation Hiram defeats the Arab Liberation army. IDF massacres in Eilabun, Saliba, Safsaf, Jish, Hule, Majd el-Krum, B’na, Dier el assad and Arab al-Mawassa.

Dec. 11, 1948
UN Resolution 194 called for cessation of hostilities, return of refugees who wish to live in peace. The
resolution reflected UN and US anger over the assassination of Count Bernadotte.

Dec. 1948
Israelis advance into Egypt; Nokrashy Pasha, Egyptian PM, assassinated.

Dec. 19, 1948-Jan 7, 49
Israeli Operation Horev conquers Gaza and enters Sinai. Intervention by British and US forces Israel to withdraw. Israel shot down several British reconnaissance planes, apparently unarmed (four Spitfires and one Tempest) January 7, 1949.

March 7-10, 1949
Operation Uvda - IDF captures southern Negev including Eilat with no resistance.

Feb-Jun, 1949
Israel and Arab states agree to armistice in separate agreements. Israel-Egypt (Israel-Lebanon Israel-Jordan Israel-Syria) Israel gained about 50% more territory than was originally allotted to it by the UN Partition Plan. The war created about 780,000 Palestinian refugees who fled or were evicted from Jewish held areas. Gaza fell under the jurisdiction of Egypt. The West Bank of the Jordan was occupied by Jordan and later annexed, consistent with secret agreements with the Jewish leadership made before the outbreak of hostilities.

April 27 – Sept 1949
Lausanne conference - Abortive Israel Arab Truce Negotiations. Minor achievements - working recognition of Israel by Arab States who attended the conference, and acceptance of UN Resolutions by both sides. However no substantive agreements were reached.

July 20, 1949
King Farouk of Egypt and PM Za’im of Syria agree on a common front against Iraq.

Aug. 1949
Syrian coup d'etat - PM Za’im executed; Colonel Hinnawi in power.

Dec. 1949
Syrian coup d'etat - Colonel Hinnawi executed; Colonel Shishakly in power.

Jan. 1950
Wafd party win Egyptian elections; Nahas Pasha PM

Apr. 1950
De Jure British recognition to Israel and Greater Jordan (including West Bank).

May 1950
Tripartite Declaration of USA, Britain and France - Middle East security and stability are a common interest.

May 2, 1951
Mossadegh, PM of Iran, nationalizes oil industry.

July, 1951
Assassination of Jordan’s King Abdulla because of rumored plans for peace with Israel. His grandson Hussein was crowned in his place following the brief reign of Tallal.

July 23, 1952
The Free Officers (al-dubbat al-ahrar) movement in Egypt - aware of royal plans to remove dissidents from the army - launch a near-bloodless military coup (only 2 fatalities). Officers were nominally led Gen. Muhammad Najib (who was not involved in the coup’s planning), though were organized by his deputy Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. King Faruq forced to abdicate (26 Jul) and is exiled. A new governing authority, the Revolutionary Command Council, is established (27 Jul), and chaired by Nasser with 8 other members (11 from early 1953). Initially, a civilian administration is set up under ‘Ali Mahir, but he opposed RCC plans for land redistribution (Sept 52), with compulsory purchase by the state, and so was dismissed and replaced with direct RCC control. Constitution is suspended (Dec 52), Parliament disbanded, parties banned (Jan 53, for a projected three year period of military rule), monarchy formally abolished, a republic declared & Najib is installed as President, with Nasser as deputy PM (June 1953) Land reform ensures that the power of large landowners and royal family was broken. Press brought under State control, esp. influential Al-Ahram (later nationalized in 1960). At Nasser’s urging, the nationalism of Egypt’s previous government - especially its opposition to Israel and Sudan - is toned down; and Najib indicates that Egypt would
participate in US/UK regional defense arrangements (10 Nov), coupled with a request for economic & military aid.

Aug 11, 1952 King Talal of Jordan abdicates in favor of Hussein, aged 17.

Sept 7, 1952 Najib becomes PM of Egypt.

Jan 16, 1953 Plot against Najib in Egypt; Rashid Mehanna arrested, political parties dissolved; Najib proclaims 3 year transition period without elections,

Jan 18, 1953 Beginning of anti-Zionist stance in USSR. Moscow accuses “Zionist agents” of murdering Zhdanov and attempting to murder other Soviet leaders.

June 18, 1952 Egypt proclaimed a Republic with Najib as President.

July 12, 1953 Shishakly becomes President of Syria.

Sept, 7, 1954 Ben-Gurion resigns as Israeli PM, succeeded by Moshe Sharett.

Oct 19, 1954 Anglo-Egyptian evacuation agreement signed (troops guarding canal to leave).

Nov 15, 1954 Najib dismissed as President of Egypt, after Revolutionary Command Council - alienated by his public prominence - had attempted unsuccessfully to engineer his resignation (Feb), had orchestrated pro-RCC demonstrations (25-29Mar) & had installed his main opponent, Nasser, as PM in Apr. Najib is placed under house arrest, Nasser takes over as President.

Jan 27, 1955 Military court in Cairo sentences 2 members of Israeli spy ring to death. They are executed Jan 27.

Feb 18, 1955 Pinhas Lavon resigns as Israel defense minister and is replaced by David Ben-Gurion.

Oct 19, 1955 Continuous incidents between Egypt and Israel/Syria, primarily in Gaza DMZ. Operation Black Arrow (Hetz Shahor) launched by Israel in Feb 1955, following Egyptian incursions, killed 38 Egyptians, resulted in a major embarrassment for Egypt and caused Nasser to rethink his strategy with Israel.
Feb. 24, 1955 Baghdad Pact - Pact of Mutual Cooperation Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact). British/US attempt to minimize Soviet incursions and protect friendly regimes. Israel feels isolated and lacking Western protection.

Sept 27, 1955 Egyptian-Czech arms deal. Secret clause requires Egypt to get financing of Aswan dam from USSR.

Nov. 2, 1955 Ben-Gurion replaces Sharett as Israeli PM.

Dec 11, 1955 Israel launched an attack on Syria following firing on a police patrol boat possibly sent as a deliberate provocation. (Operation Olive Leaves), condemned in SCR111, 19 Jan 56.

April 5, 1956 Increased tension between Israel & Egypt-Syria. IDF claimed 180 attacks on Israel from Gaza in past four months. Three Israelis killed April 4 when Egyptians opened fire on an Israeli patrol. Israel responded, and an artillery duel culminated in an Israeli artillery barrage at center of Gaza City (4-5 Apr) that killed 59, wounds about 100, mostly civilians. Egypt responded with increased commando raids, sending hundreds of fedayeen across the border in separate raids and killing 12 Israelis. Temporarily calmed through offices of UNS-G.

June 1956 Sharett resigns as Israeli FM (dies 1965); Golda Meir takes over; Last British troops leave Suez Canal base on June 13.

July 26, 1956 The US withdraws funding from the Aswan dam, USSR steps in. In response, Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company (26 Jul), to opposition of British (lease due to terminate in 1968). Is unanimously supported in this by the Arab League (Aug), though Iraqi leaders secretly call on the British to topple Nasser; imposition of martial law in Iraq. Britain, France and USA announce financial retaliation.


Sept 10, 1956 Egypt rejects 18 nation proposals for Suez Canal.


Sept. 23, 1956 Britain and France refer Suez dispute to UN Security Council.

Oct. 29, 1956 Suez Campaign. In retaliation for a series of escalating border raids as well as the closure of the straits of Tiran and Suez canal to Israeli shipping, and to prevent Egyptian use of newly acquired Soviet arms in a war, Israel invades the Sinai peninsula and occupies it for several months, with French and British collaboration. French and British were interested in reversing the nationalization of the canal. Israel withdraws after a UN peace keeping force is placed in Sinai, and US guarantees right of passage for Israeli shipping through the straits of Tiran. Suez Canal reopened March 23, 1957.

1957 Fateh founded (informally) with the aim of destroying Israel. Formal establishment about 1964.

1957 (?) Construction of Israel nuclear breeder reactor using French technology begins in Dimona some time in the latter part of the 1950s. The French later tried to stop the program, but backed down when Israeli FM Peres said Israel would make the deal public.

Feb 1, 1958 Egypt and Syria announce merger into United Arab Republic, on Syrian communist initiative in an attempt to outbid Ba'thist call for a federal union, taken up by Syrian Ba'th FM Salah al-Din Bitar, a Syrian military delegation had flown to Egypt for unity talks (11 Jan). Nasser, unexpectedly agrees to immediate unity. Approved by legislatures on 5 Feb, and parallel plebiscites on 21 Feb (which also approve Nasser as President). Armies placed under Egypt command; Syrian political parties dissolved (Mar); Syrian
"province" is headed by the left Ba'thists under Akram Hurani. Large land redistribution schemes in both Syria & Iraq, on model of Egypt 1952. Egypt receives its first economic loan from USSR ($126 million) to promote national industries.

July 14, 1958 Revolution in Iraq ousts and murders British clients, King Feisal II and PM Nuri As-Said. Kassim becomes takes power.

July 15, 1958 US Marines land in Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun.

July 17, 1958 British paratroops land in Jordan to support Jordanian gov't following Iraqi coup.

Oct. 23, 1958 Soviet loan to Egypt to finance Aswan Dam.

Nov 18, 1959 Israel abandons earlier Jordan river diversion scheme, begins work on the National Water Carrier Project, to divert the waters of the River Jordan from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev, taking its share of Jordan water in accordance with Johnston plan.

1959(?) Yasser Arafat, Khalil al Wazir and others found the Palestine Liberation Committee, soon renamed "Fatah" (Conquest). The organization was to be modeled on the Algerian FLN.

1960 Israeli Agents capture Nazi warcriminal Adolf Eichmann in Argentina and abduct him to Israel. Eichmann had order the deaths of millions of Jews as well as Romany people and other minorities.

1961 Eichmann trial is televised and seen around the world. Eichmann was executed in June, 1962.

June 25, 1961 With Soviet support, Kassim declares Kuwait is part of Iraq.

Sept. 29, 1961 Syria secedes from union with Egypt.


Nov. 5, 1962 Saudi Arabia severs relations with Egypt.

Feb 8, 1963 Baathist coup against Kassim in Iraq; Kassim executed on television and approximately 10,000 alleged communist supporters killed.

March 8, 1963 Baathist coup against President Qudsi in Syria.

March 14, 1963 Egypt, Syria and Iraq open abortive unity talks in Cairo.

24 June, 1963 Ben-Gurion resigns as Israeli PM, because of his frustration at being unable to get justice in the Lavon Affair.

Nov. 18, 1963 Abdul-Salem Aref takes power in Iraq, expels Baathist government members and breaks military union with Syria.

Jan 13-17 1964 First Arab summit at Cairo (the Egyptians count this as the third Arab Summit) (ie. heads of State, instigated by Nasser), prompted by Israel’s R.Jordan diversion scheme and Palestinian agitation against it. Arabs declare their intentions of stopping the Israeli diversion scheme, which is in accordance with the Johnson plan, and decided on establishment of the PLO. A Unified Arab Command under Egyptian supervision was created. This summit and the one that followed in September caused considerable alarm
in Israel, and is cited by Avi Shlaim (The Iron Wall) as the actual beginning of the 6 day war.

May, 1964

PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) founded with the aim of destroying Israel. The Palestinian National Charter (1968) officially called for liquidation of Israel. PLO was founded by Egypt to divert Palestinian energies from the nascent Fatah movement of Yasser Arafat, which had become anti-Nasserist.

Sept 13, 1964

Second Arab Summit at Alexandria decides on diversion of the headwaters of the Jordan as well as strengthening regional Arab armies. Arabs declare the aim of destroying Israel. Israel addressed two notes to the UN Security Council, concerning the alarming nature of the summit resolutions to destroy Israel.

Sept, 18, 1965

Third Arab Summit at Casablanca. Conference draws up staged plan for combating Israel, first building up armed forces of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon over 2.5-3 yrs & refraining from war with Israel; then proceeding to war.

April 13, 1965

Iraq President Aref killed in helicopter crash - possibly sabotage, and is succeeded by his brother, Abdul Rahman Aref.

Nov 13, 1966

Samu’ raid: Israeli troops kill 15 Jordanian soldiers and 3 civilians, & dynamite 125 houses, in an attack on the frontier village of Samu’ near Hebron; in response to the death of 3 Israeli soldiers by a road mine. Israel is censured by SCR228 (25 Nov 66), but no military response from Amman. This leads to recriminations in the Israeli government, which had intended a smaller scale raid, and Palestinian anger & clashes with Jordanian security forces throughout West Bank, especially in Nablus where the army had to intervene. The PLO gains support.

May, 1967

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closes the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and dismisses UN peacekeeping force. Negotiations with US to reopen the Straits of Tiran fail.

May 27, 1967

Nasser cancels a planned Egyptian attack on Israel, after it became obvious that the Israelis knew about the plan.

May 30, 1967

Jordan signs a defense pact with Egypt, allows Egyptian command of Jordan Legion.

Jun 2, 1967

Moshe Dayan joins Israeli cabinet as Minister of Defense. Unity gov't formed.

June 5-10, 1967

6-day war. Following a long period of tension, Israel attacks - destroys the Egyptian air force on the ground, conquers and occupies Sinai and Gaza, then conquers the West Bank from Jordan, and Golan Heights from Syria. UN resolution 242 (November 1967) called for Israeli withdrawal, establishment of peace.

Aug-Sept 1967

Khartoum Conference - Arab summit says no to peace or negotiations with Israel.

Sept 4, 1967

50 Egyptian officers arrested, including Commander in Chief Amer, on charges of plotting against Nasser. Amer later reported to have committed suicide

Nov 22, 1967

UN Security Council resolution 242 (November 1967) called for Israeli withdrawal, establishment of peace

Oct 21, 1967

Egyptian missile ship sinks the Israeli destroyer Eilath. Israel retaliates by heavy artillery bombardment of Suez refinery complex.

Nov 5, 1967

Pres. Sallal of Yemen Overthrown.
Nov. 30, 1967  People's Republic of Southern Yemen formed; last British troops leave Aden.


March 21, 1968  Battle of Karameh - Jordanian and Palestinian forces inflicted a partial defeat on Israeli troops staging a massive retaliatory raid on a Jordanian town that had served as a staging area for guerrilla attacks and a base for PLO/Fatah guerillas. The Fatah declared a great victory and retreated into the hills. The anniversary of Karameh is still celebrated as a victory by Palestinians.

Jun 1968  Escalation along the Suez Canal. Egyptians violated the cease fire repeatedly along the Suez canal. Nasser stated as strategy that Egypt can suffer numerous casualties because of manpower reserves, while Israel cannot.


21-30 Nov, 1968  Student riots in Egypt;

Dec 1968  PFLP attack on El Al plane in Athens. One Israeli killed; Israel responds on Dec 28 with helicopter raid on Beirut International Airport. Commandos destroy 13 Arab planes and damage airport. SCR262 of 31Dec unanimously censures Israel,

Jan 6, 1969  French ban on arms supplies made public by Israel

Jan 27, 1969  Iraqis hang 14 (9 Jews) as Israeli spies.

Feb 1-4, 1969  Fifth Palestine National Council (PNC) in Cairo. Fatah gains formal control with Yasser Arafat declared chair of Executive Committee. PNC statement sets goal of a "secular democratic state" society for Muslims, Christians & Jews.

Feb 18, 1969  PFLP attack El Al plane in Zurich; strong international condemnation.

Feb 20, 1969  PFLP bomb attacks on a Jerusalem supermarket

Feb 24, 1969  Israeli airstrike against 2 al-Fatah camps near Damascus; large no of casualties. Fatah moves to strengthen its position in Jordan; PFLP becomes more explicit in its call for the overthrow of King Hussein, seen as a Western puppet.

Feb 1969  Internal struggles in Syrian Ba'th party: Hafez al-Assad, defense minister, takes full control over military in Syria; civilian institutions left under the control of President Atasi. Former stressed pan-Arab cooperation, especially with Egypt; latter rejected cooperation with the conservative regimes, & controlled the Sa'iqa fida'i organization.

Mar 11 1969  Golda Meir becomes Prime Minister in Israel after death of Levi Eshkol.

Aug 29, 1969  Group commanded by Layla Khalid hijacks TWA plane flying to Tel Aviv.

March 1969  Hostilities along the Suez canal between Israel and Egypt escalate as Soviets supply SAM-2 radar and pilots, US supplies Israel with Phantom jets and Hawk missiles.

April, 23, 1969  War of attrition between Israel and Egypt - Nasser formally declares that he is no longer bound by the terms of the armistice. Constant artillery and air duels around the Suez canal, as well as IAF bombardment
of Egyptian targets. US agreed with Israeli reports that Nasser was violating the cease fire agreement and preparing for another war.

Sept 1, 1969
Army coup in Libya deposes King Idris; Col Muammar Ghaddafi takes power and proclaims republic.

Sept 9, 1969
Major Israeli raid on Egypt.

Oct 22, 1969
Palestinian guerillas clash with Lebanese security forces. An agreement between al-Fatah and the Lebanese was concluded on Nov. 3.

Nov 26, 1969
Clash between Saudi Arabian and South Yemen troops at al-Wadeiah.

Dec 9, 1969
US Secretary of State William Rogers outlines US proposals for an Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement (Rogers Plan), which are rejected by both sides.

Dec 21-23
Fifth Arab summit in Rabat ends in disagreement.

July 1970
War of attrition terminated by a cease fire, July 1970, following pressure from USA and USSR on both sides.

Sept 1970
"Black September"- King Hussein of Jordan moves against the increasingly menacing power of the PLO. Palestinian guerrillas flee Jordan and take up residence in Lebanon.

Sept 6, 1970
PFLP hijack Swissair, BOAC, PanAm and TWA flights and divert them to Jordan. 310 passengers are held hostage and released after governments agree to release Palestinian prisoners. In the wake of the hijackings Lufthansa reportedly paid protection money to guerilla movements, and France purchased immunity for Air France by agreeing to maintain an anti-Israel policy.

Sept 28 1970
Nasser dies of cardiac arrest after negotiating Jordan-Palestinian truce; Anwar al-Sadat comes to power in Egypt.

May 30, 1972
PFLP and Japanese Red Army attack at Lod Airport killed 27.

Sept 5, 1972
Black September movement massacres Israeli Olympic team in Munich, triggering a systematic manhunt by Israelis for the assassins.

Oct 6, 1973
Yom Kippur War (October War). In a surprise attack on the Jewish day of atonement, Egypt retook the Suez canal and a narrow zone on the other side. Syria reconquered the Golan Heights. Following massive US and Soviet resupplying of the sides, Israel succeeded in pushing back the Syrians and threatening Damascus. In Sinai, the IDF crossed the Suez Canal and cut off the Egyptian Third Army. Israeli casualties were unacceptably high however, and both Syria and Egypt celebrate the anniversary of the war as a victory.

Oct 22, 1973
UN Security Council Resolution 338 called for cease fire and negotiations for peace. Following the cease fire, Israel withdrew from part of Sinai in stages, beginning with relief of the Egyptian third army, and likewise withdrew from a small part of the Golan heights.

Dec 21-29 1973
Middle East Peace Conference convened in Geneva, with Jordan, Egypt, SU, US & Israel attending (Syria refused). First objective is the disengagement of forces.

Jan 18 1974
Egypt-Israel Separation of Forces Agreement (Sinai I), opposed by Syria. UN Emergency Force takes up positions in the buffer zones established in Sinai; fully deployed by Mar. 3.
April 10, 1974  Golda Meir resigns as PM of Israel following popular protest over the Yom Kippur War. Yitzhak Rabin, former Chief of Staff of IDF and ambassador to US takes her place.

April 11 1974  Kiriat Shmona Massacre - PFLP-GC takes dozens of teenagers hostage in Qiryat Shmona, Israel, to demand the release of prisoners. IDF storms the building, but terrorists kill 19. Israeli reprisal raids on Southern Lebanon condemned by UN Security Council in SCR347 on April 24.

May 15, 1974  Ma'alot Massacre - PLO (PDFLP) gunmen took over a school in the northern Israeli village of Ma'alot, demand release of prisoners, killing 25 and wounding many others.

May 31, 1974  Syria-Israel disengagement agreement over the Golan, with Syria accepting SCR 338 (& thus 242) as a basis for peace, & Israel partially withdrawing to establish a demilitarized zone, with UN Disengagement Observer Force separating parties. Israel withdrew from Quneitra on 26 June, but Syria did not rebuild or repopulate the town.

June 1974  Twelfth Palestine National Council resolves that "the PLO will struggle by every means ... to liberate Palestinian land & establish the people's national, independent and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated." Israelis interpret this as staged liberation of Palestine. However, this was also widely portrayed later as meaning that a State in part of Palestine was acceptable to the PLO, eventually causing PFLP (George Habash) to leave the PLO on Sept. 26, forming the "refusal front." PFLP rejoined the PLO in 1980.

Oct 29, 1974  Rabat Summit - Arab League summit in Rabat declares that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This makes it more difficult for Israel to conclude a peace treaty with Jordan on the basis of return of the West Bank. Hussein declares that he is no longer empowered to act for the Palestinians, prevents possibility of negotiation with local Palestinians.

Nov 13, 1974  Yasser Arafat speaks at UN General Assembly debate on Palestine, on invitation of Oct 14 (GAR3210; vote: 105-4), with his pistol showing. UNGA recognizes Palestinians' right to sovereignty (GAR3236) and grants PLO observer status (GAR3237; 22Nov).

November 1975  UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 equates Zionism with racism. Harold H. Saunders tells house subcommittee that the Palestinian problem is in many ways the heart of the conflict, and that the US must seek partners who will recognize the relevant UN resolutions and engage them in dialog for peace.

May 31, 1976  Syria is invited into Lebanon by Maronite Christians.

June-July 1976  Palestinians hijacked an Air-France Air bus to Entebbe in Uganda. IDF commando units landed in Uganda, storm the plane and free most of the hostages.

Aug 13, 1976  Lebanese militias massacre over 2000 Palestinians in the Tel Al-Zaatar refugee camp, apparently with participation of Syrian troops. According to journalist Robert Fisk, the attack began when Yasser Arafat asked that the camps be considered a non-combat zone, and then ordered Fatah gunmen to open fire on Christian militia. Palestinians retaliated with a massacre of Christians in Damour.

June 20, 1977  Likud party and Begin government took office in Israel. Israeli settlement of the West Bank and Gaza was intensified following the rise of the Likud to power.

Nov. 20, 1977  Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem, spoke in Israeli Knesset (Parliament).

Mar. 15, 1978  Israel invaded Lebanon (operation Litani) after the PLO hijacked a bus on the main Tel-Aviv to Haifa
highway. UN resolution 425 of March 19, 1978 called for withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israel did not fulfill the terms of Resolution 425 until May 2000.

Sept. 17, 1978 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli PM Menachem Begin, meeting at Camp David under the auspices of US President Jimmy Carter, sign framework agreements for peace in the Middle East and peace between Egypt and Israel.

March 26, 1979 Peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel.

June 7, 1981 Israel destroys Iraqi nuclear reactor in daring raid.

Oct. 6, 1981 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is assassinated while on the reviewing stand of a victory parade.

April 29, 1982 Israel completes return of Sinai to Egypt under the peace agreement, including Yamit settlement.

June 3, 1982 Attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London apparently by Abu Nidal faction, backed by Iraq. Large scale bombings by Israel in Lebanon especially on W.Beirut (4Jun). PLO send First rockets at towns in N Israel since Jul 81.

June 6, 1982 Massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon to fight PLO. UN Security Council Resolution 509 demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith, but Israel advances rapidly to Beirut, surrounding the capital by 13 Jun. Israeli cabinet is split on the sudden expansion of the war, beyond the 40 KM limit originally declared by Sharon.


Summer, 1982 Foundation of the Lebanese Shi’ite Hizbulla Islamist terror group.


Aug 23, 1982 Bashir Jemayeel made President of Lebanon.

Sept. 14, 1982 Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayeel assassinated, by explosion of a bomb operated by Habib Tanious Shartouni, apparently an agent of Syrian intelligence. Amin Gemayeel, his brother was elected instead, Sept 21.

Sept. 15, 1982 Israeli invasion of West Beirut

Sept. 16-17, 1982 Lebanese Christian Phalange units under Elie Hobeika, allowed by Israeli forces to enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla, massacre between 400 and 800 Palestinian civilians. Israel Gen. Yaron and others overheard incriminating conversations between Phalange officers but no action was taken by Israel to stop the massacre.

24 Sept, 1982 Peace Now movement holds record demonstration in Israel (~300,000), demanding end to war, commission of inquiry for Sabra and Shatilla

Nov 11, 1982 Israeli military headquarters in Tyre destroyed in an explosion, killing 75 Israelis and 16 of their prisoners.

Feb 8, 1983 Israeli Kahan commission found Ariel Sharon and others indirectly responsible for allowing the massacre in Sabra and Shatilla.
April 18, 1983  Hizbulla suicide bomber destroyed the American Embassy in Beirut, killing over 60 people.

May 17, 1983  Israel and Lebanon conclude an abortive non-belligerency agreement.

Sept.3, 1983  Israel began partial withdrawal from Lebanon.


Sept. 20, 1984  Hizbulla suicide bomber destroyed the rebuilt American Embassy in Beirut, killing 25.

June 1985  Israel unity government, headed by Shimon Peres, orders withdrawal from most of conquered Lebanese territory.

Nov. 1985  Jonathan Pollard arrested by US authorities for spying for Israel. He was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment.

Dec 8, 1987  First Intifadeh - Stone-throwing Palestinian teens led by local groups took on the Israeli occupation, attacking Israeli soldiers relentlessly. The triggering incident may have been the death of four Palestinian workers in a road accident with an Israeli vehicle.


Nov. 15, 1988  Palestine National Council of the PLO declare a Palestinian state in absentia - See Palestinian Declaration of Independence

May 14, 1989  Israeli Peace Plan of May 14, 1989, calls for a negotiating process with the Palestinians very similar to the one actually implemented by the Oslo accords.

Nov. 1989  The Taif Accords, 1989 - were concluded to settle the Lebanese civil war and legitimize the Syrian occupation.

August 1990  Iraq invades and conquers Kuwait.


May 20, 1991  Syrian-Lebanese Cooperation Agreement is signed.


June 23, 1992  Labor party leader and former General Yitzhak Rabin, elected Prime Minister of Israel

April 16, 1993  First Hamas suicide attack at Mehola Junction in the West Bank. A car bomb blew up outside a small restaurant. The suicide bomber and one Israeli were killed.

Sept. 13, 1993  Oslo Declaration of Principles - Israel and PLO agree to mutual recognition, Yasser Arafat and PLO will be allowed to return to Gaza. PLO and Palestinian leadership renounce violence and use of terrorism, and agree to revise the PLO charter to remove chapters referring to destruction of Israel. Over the next, years, Israel withdraws from a small area (Area A) that is given to Palestinian sovereignty, a larger area (Area B) is given to Palestinian civil control only, while a third area of the West Bank and Gaza strip remains under
total Israeli control. Israel does not dismantle any settlements, and the number of settlers and new settlements increases considerably.

Feb 25, 1994  Settler Baruch Goldstein opens fire on Muslims praying in the Tomb of Abraham mosque in Hebron, killing 30. This massacre formed the excuse for numerous terrorist acts by Hamas and other groups. Following the bombing, the Israel government placed restrictions on Hebron's Arab population and closed the Tomb to visitors for an extended period. Goldstein's grave became a shrine for right-wing settlers. The shrine was dismantled by the Israeli government in 2000.

April, 1994  Hamas carries out suicide bombings in Israeli towns of Afula (April 6) and Hadera (April 13), killing 13, wounding 80.

May 1994  Yasser Arafat arrives in Gaza.

Oct 19, 1994  Hamas suicide bombing on a Tel Aviv bus kills 22, wounds 40.

July 24, 1994  Hamas suicide bomber blows up a Dan bus in Tel Aviv.


May, 1995  Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations seem close to conclusion.

Sept 28, 1995  Oslo Interim Agreement signed.

Nov. 4, 1995  Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin assassinated by right-wing Israeli fanatic Yigal Amir.

Jan 5, 1996  Israeli security service assassinates Palestinian terrorist Yihye Ayash, "The Engineer," responsible for the death of over 60 Israelis. Ayash was lionized by Palestinians as a martyr and the PNA named a square after him in Jericho.

Feb. 25, 1996  Hamas suicide bomber blows up a No. 18 bus near Jerusalem's central bus station, killing 26 people and wounding 48 others. Less than an hour later, a second Hamas suicide bomb explodes at a soldiers’ hitchhiking station near Ashkelon, killing one and injuring 31 others. The two attacks are said to be in retaliation for the slaying in Gaza of Yehiya Ayash.

March 3, 1996  A Hamas suicide bomber blows up a bus on Jerusalem's Jaffa Road, killing 19 people and leaving at least 9 wounded. The attack takes place on the same No. 18 bus line and almost at the same time as the previous week's attack.

March 4, 1996  Dizengoff Center Bombing - A suicide bomb is detonated in Tel Aviv's Dizengoff Center, killing 13, including children, and wounding at least 130 on the eve of Purim (anniversary of Goldstein massacre). Hamas claims responsibility.

June, 1996  Right-Wing Likud leader Benjamin Nethanyahu elected Prime Minister in Israel, replacing Shimon Peres.

Sept, 1996  "Al-Aksa tunnel riots - Arab sources spread the false rumor that a gate opened in an underground tunnel tourist attraction by the Israeli government, endangered the foundations of the Al-Aqsa mosque. This caused several days of rioting and numerous casualties.
Jan 18, 1997  Israel and Palestinians reach agreement on Israeli redeployment in the West-Bank city of Hebron

March 21, 1997  Cafe Apropos Bombing - A Hamas suicide bomber detonates an explosion at the Cafe Apropos in central Tel Aviv, killing 3 Israelis and wounding 47 others.

July 30, 1997  Two suicide bombers strike in the Mahane Yehuda open-air market in Jerusalem, claiming at least 12 victims and wounding at least 150 others. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim responsibility.

Sept, 1997  Israeli agents bungled an attempt to kill Hamas terrorist leader Khalid Mashaal in Jordan (Sept 26). To placate Jordanian public opinion, Israel subsequently released Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from jail.

Oct. 1998  Wye River Plantation talks result in an agreement for Israeli redeployment and release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to correct its violations of the Oslo accords including excess police force, illegal arms and incitement in public media and education.

May 17, 1999  Israel elects Labor party leader and Former General Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in a landslide. Barak promises rapid progress toward peace.


March, 2000  Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations fail when Hafez Assad rejects an Israeli offer relayed by US President Clinton in Geneva.

May 2000  Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to international border is completed after many years of harassment by Hizbollah guerillas. UN declares Israel is compliant with Resolution 425, but the Hizbollah continues to harass Israeli positions, kidnapping three Israeli soldiers later in the summer.

June 10, 2000  Hafez Assad, President of Syria, dies. He is quickly replaced by his son, Bashar.

July, 2000  Israeli PM Barak, US President Clinton and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat meet at Camp David in a failed attempt to hammer out a final settlement.

Sept. 28, 2000  Palestinians initiated riots after Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, which is also the location of the Haram as Sharif, holy to Muslims. Violence was apparently encouraged by Fatah Tanzim, as admitted by Marwan Barghouti. Violence escalated rapidly from rock throwing to machine gun and mortar fire, suicide bombings and lethal road ambushes, including some incidents instigated by settlers against Palestinians. Israelis killed 15 Israeli Arabs in riots in September/October 2000, and over 3,000 Palestinians in retaliatory raids thereafter. Palestinians kill over 1,000 Israelis. Violence continued for several years and finally abated following the death of Yasser Arafat.

Oct. 17, 2000  Sharm El Sheik Conference hosted by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt ends in promises to end violence, results in formation of the Mitchell commission.

Oct 21-22, 2000  Extraordinary Arab League Summit hosted by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt commends and praises the Intifada, backs hard line positions of Palestinians.

Dec, 2000  Talks begun in Washington DC and continued at Taba to January 2001 in different venues, end inconclusively.

Feb 6, 2001  Right-wing Likud leader Ariel Sharon elected Prime Minister in Israel replacing Ehud Barak and promising "peace and security."
March 27-28, 2001  Thirteenth Arab League summit in Beirut calls for renewal of Arab League Boycott against Israel.

April, 2001  Mitchell commission recommendations for restoration of peace, return to the negotiating table.

June 1, 2001  Dolphinarium Discotheque in Tel Aviv hit by suicide bomb, killing 20, including many teenagers. Islamic Jihad and Palestine Hizbulla both claim the bombing.

August 9, 2001  Sbarro pizzeria suicide bombing in Jerusalem by Islamic Jihad movement kills 15, wounds 130.

Aug 27, 2001  Israel assassinates Abu Ali Mustafa, Secretary General of the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)

Sept. 11, 2001  Terror attacks on World Trade Center in NYC and the Pentagon carried out by fanatic Islamic Al-Qaeda group headed by Osama Bin Laden. Initiates US war on terror. Israel and Palestinians agree to cease fire, but it is not implemented.

Oct., 17, 2001  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine assassinates Israeli tourism minister Rehav'am Ze'evi, known for extreme right-wing views, in retaliation for killing of Abu Ali Mustafa. After Palestine National Authority refuses to take effective action, Israeli troops enter Palestinian areas in the West Bank

Jan 3, 2002  Israel captures Karine-A carrying a boatload of illegal arms bound for Palestinian Authority as US envoy Anthony Zinni arrives to try to mediate a settlement.

March 2002  Midst mounting violence, Saudi Prince Abdullah announces a peace plan, according to which Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories in return for Arab recognition.

March-April 2002  In retaliation for a series of suicide bombings, Israel mounts operation "Defensive Wall" in the West Bank, arrests Palestinian leaders and particularly Marwan Barghouti, imprisoning PNA Chairman Arafat in the "Mukata" compound in Ramalah and besieges militants in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. During the operation, about 50 people, including at least some civilians, were killed in the Jenin refugee camp, prompting charges of a massacre by Palestinians. A proposed UN investigation of the alleged massacres is abandoned after Israel refuses to cooperate. From objective reports, it appears that about 22 noncombatant civilians were killed in Jenin, either wrongfully and intentionally by Israeli troops, or when bulldozers crushed houses in the belief they were empty, or when booby-trapped houses exploded and fell in on their occupants.

May 2002  End of sieges in Mukata; Church of Nativity. Militants in church of nativity exiled abroad. Wanted men in Mukata jailed in Jericho. Head of PFLP allegedly coordinated a suicide attack from his cell in Jericho.

May 30, 2002  PNA Chairman Arafat, under pressure for reform, signs the 2002: PNA Basic Law that was passed several years ago by the PLC.

June 24, 2002  Controversial speech by US President Bush calls for Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian state, but insists the PNA must first be reformed and current leaders replaced. Israel moves to reoccupy the entire West Bank, with the exception of Jericho.

July 23 2002  Israel assassinates Saleh Shehadeh, head of Hamas Izzeldin-El Kassam armed brigades responsible for numerous terror attacks.

Aug 16(?), 2002  Sabri Banna (Abu Nidal), head of the Fatah Revolutionary Council is rumored dead by assassination or suicide in Baghdad (Death is later confirmed - apparently assassinated by Iraqi secret police).
Oct, 2002  Libya withdraws from Arab League.

Nov 3, 2002  Israel government unstable as resignations of Labor party ministers become official.

Jan, 2003  Cairo conference of Palestinian groups, first in 20 years. Conference fails to agree on cease fire offer to Israel. Islamist movements say PLO no longer represents the Palestinian people.

Jan 5, 2003  Double suicide bombing in Tel Aviv kills 23, prompting increased action of IDF against Hamas.

Jan 28, 2003  Elections in Israel give wide margin (40 seats) to right wing Likud party, returning PM Ariel Sharon for another term.

Feb, 2003  Israel initiates a series of incursions in the Gaza strip and Nablus with numerous civilian casualties beginning at the end of February.

Mar 5, 2003  Hamas suicide bombing of Haifa bus kills 17. Qassam rocket fire from Gaza on Sderot brings Israeli reoccupation of parts of Gaza around Jebalya refugee camp.

March 6, 2003  Qassam rocket fire from Gaza on Sderot brings Israeli reoccupation of parts of Gaza around Jebalya refugee camp.

March 7, 2003  UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix reports to UN on Iraqi disarmament progress.

March 10, 2003  Central Council of the PLO meets in Ramalla and approves Chairman Arafat's proposal to nominate a Prime Minister. His nominee, Abu Mazen is also approved. The Council also condemns violence against all civilians. The appointment of a PM is due to Israeli and US pressure to reform the PNA and provide leadership other than Arafat, who is considered untrustworthy.

March 19, 2003  US begins invasion of Iraq by a strike against a building where Saddam Hussein and other leaders are meeting.

April 9, 2003  Fall of Baghdad.

April 24, 2003  Bowing to international pressure, Yasser Arafat allows the nomination of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as new Palestinian PM. The Quartet (US, Britain, Russia and Spain) hope that he will institute reforms. Israeli government backs Abu-Mazen, promises concessions.

April 29, 2003  Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) appointed Palestinian PM & vows reform, but Arafat maneuvers to retain control. Violence continues. US released updated road map on April 30.

June 4, 2003  Aqaba Summit - Abu Mazen and Ariel Sharon vow to stop violence, end occupation according to the road map. Hamas and Islamic Jihad vow to continue violence. Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad joined in killing four Israeli soldiers in Gaza (June 8) despite the call to end violence from Fatah leaders.

June 10-11, 2003  Failed Israeli assassination attempt on Hamas leader Ahmed Rantissi (June 10) and Hamas suicide attack that kills 15 in Jerusalem (June 11) jeopardize the future of the road map.

Aug 20, 2003  Hamas suicide bombing in a Jerusalem bus claims 21 lives

August 21, 2003  Israel, vowing that all Hamas leaders were now targets, assassinates Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab. Others killed in widespread operations in the West bank; Arafat moves to replace Abbas appointee...
Mohamed Dahlan as security chief in Gaza and to weaken Abbas.

Sept 6, 2003 Mahmud Abbas resigns; Failed Israeli assassination attempt on Hamas "spiritual leader" Ahmed Yassin, who is aged and crippled.

Sept 8, 2003 Yasser Arafat and Fatah/PLO name Ahmed Queia ("Abu Ala") as PM to replace Mahmud Abbas.

Sept 10, 2003 Twin suicide bombings kill 15 in Israel; Israel moves against against buildings surrounding Yasser Arafat's Mukata compound on the following day. US official Condoleeza Rice insists that the Road Map is "still on the table."

Oct 4, 2003 Palestinian Islamic Jihad Suicide bomber kills 20 in Arab-Jewish owned Haifa restaurant.

Oct 5, 2003 Israeli jets strike a camp in Syria allegedly used for training Palestinian terrorists. The strike gets US approval.

Oct 9, 2003 Palestinian PM designate Ahmed Qurei submits his resignation to Chairman Yasser Arafat because of differences of opinion regarding the mandate and composition of his government's cabinet. Increasing rumors of Arafat's illness attributed variously to cardiac problems or stomach cancer.

Nov 12, 2003 Palestinian PM Ahmed Qurei forms a government after a long period of negotiations, pledging to end terror and chaos in the Palestine Authority

Nov 19, 2003 UN Security Council passes resolution 1515 in support of the roadmap for peace.

Nov 24, 2003 Israeli PM Sharon announces Disengagement Plan for unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces if the roadmap fails to produce an end to terrorism.

Dec 2003 Geneva Accord peace plan of Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo officially launched in Geneva (it was leaked at the beginning of November). December 8 - UN General Assembly meets in Emergency Session to adopt Resolution ES-10/14 asking the International Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the Israeli security barrier.

Feb 24, 2004 International Court of Justice begins hearings on the legality of the Israeli security barrier, Israel and Palestinians use the hearings as a platform for demonstrations about terror and the occupation.

March 22, 2004 IDF assassinates Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin.

April 14, 2004 Israeli PM Sharon meets with US President George Bush, gets letter supporting disengagement plan

April 17, 2004 IDF assassinates Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantissi.

May 2004 Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan turned down in Likud party vote May 2; After 6 Israeli soldiers are killed when their APC is blown up in Gaza, Israel launches operation Rainbow to stop infiltration of arms across the Egypt-Gaza border in Rafah and to widen the Philadelphi patrol road. Demolition of houses and killing of over 40 Palestinians including noncombatants evokes world protest; plans to widen the corridor by demolishing houses meet legal snags and international protest; Fatah-Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti found guilty on 5 counts of murder; Arab summit in Tunis meets after postponement; Sharon proposes new disengagement plan.

July 9, 2004 International court of Justice (ICJ) rules that the Israeli security barrier barrier violates international law and must be torn down. UN GA later votes to order Israel to dismantle the barrier. Israel announces that it
will ignore the ruling, but makes changes in the barrier route according to the rulings of the Israeli High Court.

July 12-19, 2004

UN Envoy Terje Roede Larsen slammed by Palestinian leaders for issuing a report that claims there is chaos in the Palestinian areas. Fighting between Fatah factions breaks out in Gaza, amidst kidnappings of Palestinians and foreigners.

Aug 31, 2004

16 Israelis were killed in a suicide attack on a Beersheba bus. This was the first successful attack in many months. Another attack in the French Hill section of Jerusalem on September 22 killed one. During this period Israeli troops continued to operate in the West bank and Gaza, catching would-be terrorists, but also inflicting many casualties among civilians.

Sept 26, 2004

Hamas leader Izz El-Deen Al-Sheikh Khalil is assassinated by a car bomb in Damascus by Mossad agents. Hamas spokesmen announce they will consider attacking Israeli targets outside Israel. Under pressure from US, Syria forced many leaders of terrorist groups to leave Damascus.

Sept 29, 2004

Qassam rockets launched from Gaza kill two children in the Israeli town of Sderoth. Israel launches operation "Days of Repentance," occupying a large area in northern Gaza, demolishing houses and killing over 80 Palestinians by October 7.

Oct 7, 2004

Multiple suicide attacks in the Sinai desert against Egyptian tourist areas frequented by Israelis including the Taba Hilton hotel and Ras al-Shaitan (Ras Satan). About 27 persons killed, mostly Israelis. Initial reports attributed the attack variously to Al Qaida and to Palestinian groups, though Palestinian groups claimed no involvement.

Oct 25-26, 2004

Israel Knesset approves disengagement plan calling for withdrawal from Gaza with the support of Labor and Yahad leftist parties. Ruling rightist Likud members and NRP demand a referendum.

Nov 11, 2004

Yasser Arafat dies. Abu Mazen and Abu Ala share his powers. Abu Mazen is selected as the Fatah candidate for head of the PNA and will have little serious opposition after Marwan Barghouthi, who had announced his candidacy, drops out of the race in December.

Dec. 5, 2004

Egypt releases Azzam Azzam, Israeli Druze jailed in Egypt for 8 years on espionage charges.

Dec 12, 2004

An explosion destroys an Israeli Joint Verification Team (JVT) terminal near the Egyptian-Gaza border, within Israel. Five Israeli soldiers killed. The explosion was carried out by tunneling from the Gaza side and planting a huge explosive charge. Hamas and the Fatah Eagles take responsibility. The attack was not condemned by the PNA.

Dec 14, 2004

Egypt, US and Israel sign a three way trade agreement that allows Egypt to establish Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) with a small share (about 11%) of Israeli participation, with the output of those ventures exported to the US free of tariffs.

Jan 9, 2005

Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian National Authority.

Jan 10, 2005

Ariel Sharon forms unity government with Labor and United Torah Judaism parties in Israel.

Feb 8, 2005

Sharm El Sheikh Summit Conference - Israeli PM Ariel Sharon, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah II of Jordan meet in Sharm El Sheikh. Abbas and Sharon announce an end to the violence. Israel will release over 900 Palestinian prisoners and withdraw from Palestinian cities. Jordan and Egypt will return ambassadors to Israel. The Intifada is deemed to be over.

Feb 14, 2005

Assassination of Rafik Hariri, former PM and architect of Lebanese reconstruction. Hariri resigned in
protest over continued Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs and occupation of Lebanon. (Commentary
More More)

Feb 20, 2005 Israeli cabinet approves plan for implementing disengagement.

Feb 25, 2005 Suicide bombing by Islamic Jihad kills 5 in Tel Aviv. Israel freezes planned handover of Palestinian towns.

Mar 1, 2005 London Conference hosted by Great Britain aims at organizing Palestinian security forces and getting financial backing for the Palestinian Authority.

Mar 16 Cairo Conference - Palestinian militant groups agree to a tahediyeh - a lull in the fighting. Hamas and Islamic Jihad will join the PLO. Hamas will participate in May elections for the Palestine Legislative Council. Israel withdrew from Jericho and a week later it withdrew from Jericho.

May 26, 2005 Mahmoud Abbas received in White House by President George Bush and is promised an additional $50 million in aid. Bush declares US support for a settlement based on 1949 armistice borders. Israel releases about 400 prisoners and promises to withdraw from Palestinian cities in the West Bank. Commentary.

June 20, 2005 Would-be suicide bomber Wafa Bis arrested at Gaza checkpoint on her way to carry out a suicide attack against an Israeli hospital. Commentary.

June 21, 2005 Following visit of Condoleezza Rice, summit meeting between Abbas and Sharon ends in failure.

June 30, 2005 Gaza settlers initiate violent clashes, take over an Arab house and attempt to lynch a Palestinian youth, Hilal Majaida near Muasi. Shimshon Sitrin, Avinoam Krispin are arrested. IDF raids Maoz Yam hotel in Gaza where about 100 right-wing disengagement activists have gathered, and evicts them.

July 13, 2005 Islamic Jihad suicide bomber kills 5 civilians in Netanya mall. (Commentary). IDF reoccupies Tulkarm. Hamas responds with massive rocket fire on Israeli settlements and inside Israel, killing one. Israel responds with massive manhunt against Hamas members in Hebron area and in Gaza, renewing the policy of assassinating terror leaders, claiming they are only killing those who are about to carry out terror attacks. PNA attack Hamas in Gaza, Hamas counterattacks. Civilians are killed in the cross fire.

Gaza Closed - Israel closes the Gaza strip to Israeli citizens other than residents. This follows extensive settler violence and is intended to thwart a mass march organized by the Yesha (settler's) councils intended to thwart the disengagement.

Aug. 15, 2005 Israeli evacuation of Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements began on August 15 and was completed August 24.

Sept. 1' 2005 Last Israeli soldiers leave Gaza. Settlements handed over to Palestinians Sept. 12. Israel also evacuates four settlements in northern West Bank without incident. Palestinians loot and destroy greenhouses that were bought for them by Jewish philanthropists.

Sept. 15, 2005 Israeli PM Ariel Sharon addresses the United Nations, calls for peace, recognizes Palestinian rights, reasserts Israeli right to united Jerusalem, determination to fight terror

Sept. 15, 2005 Israeli Supreme court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, rules that the security fence is not contrary to international law. Text of Israeli High Court Ruling Regarding the Legality of the Security Fence

Sept. 23, 2005 After Palestinian authority bans parades with weapons in Gaza, but before the ban goes into effect, the last such parade held by Hamas ends in an accidental explosion that kills about 20 people. Hamas fires about 40 rockets on Sderot, in Israel. Israel responds with massive campaign of arrests in West Bank and
targeted killings in Gaza; Hamas pledges to respect cease fire.

Sept. 26, 2005  Ariel Sharon wins crucial vote in Likud central committee, narrowly edging out opponents of disengagement who wanted early primaries in order to oust him.


Nov. 2005  Amir Peretz elected leader of the Israel Labor party, pulls Labor out of the coalition, precipitating early elections. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon, facing internal opposition in the Likud over disengagement, quits the Likud to form a new party, Kadima. Rafah border is opened for Palestinians in Gaza for passage to and from Egypt. Israel promises to implement Gaza - West Bank safe passage, but does not do so, as Palestinians fire Kassam rockets into Sderot and then into the outskirts of Ashqelon.

Jan 4, 2006  On January 4, Ariel Sharon suffered a massive stroke, leaving the leadership of Israel and the new Kadima party in the hands of  Ehud Olmert.

Jan 26, 2006  On January 26, the radical Islamist Hamas movement won an upset victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections, threatening to end about 40 years of Fateh-PLO leadership of the Palestinians and to completely ruin hopes for peace with Israel. Hamas spokesmen sent mixed signals, but vowed never to recognize Israel and never to give up their claim to all of Palestine. Donor countries suspend direct aid to the Hamas until they are willing to recognize Israel and participate in peace process. Subsequently, a mechanism is agreed upon to pay salaries to PNA employees and give emergency humanitarian aid, but it is not implemented. Hamas smuggles in cash through the Rafah crossing with the connivance of European monitors in order to pay salaries.

March, 2006  Over 40 Qassam rockets fall on Sderot in March, this number increases in the next months. IDF responds with shelling of launching sites and IAF raids to kill leaders of Popular Resistance Committees, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Fatah Al-Aqsa brigades involved in the attacks.

March 28  Ehud Olmert elected PM of Israel, heading Kadima party coalition

May 11, 2006  Palestinian Prisoners’ in Israeli jails issue document of national unity calling for a state in West Bank and Gaza Strip and right of return for Palestinian refugees. Hamas government rejects the document and Hamas prisoners who signed it repudiate it. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that he will hold a referendum on approval of the document if the factions cannot agree. On June 28 a revised prisoners’ document is issued, supposedly agreed to by Hamas and Fatah. However not all factions agree and Abbas decides to hold a referendum.

June, 2006  Israeli targeted killings in Gaza and West Bank continue, while Hamas fires about 90 Qassam rockets into Sderot and other Western Negev communities. Seven Palestinian civilians having a picnic at a Gaza beach are killed by an explosion attributed by Palestinians and HRW to an IDF shell. IDF denies that it was shelling the beach at the time, and points out that shrapnel recovered from the victims does not come from IDF shells.

June 25  Following announcement of a "truce" agreement by the PNA, Hamas kidnap Israeli soldier from Israeli army outpost inside Israel, and kill two others. They demand release of Palestinian prisoners. Israel refuses to negotiate, demands release of soldier. Israel

June 27  Hamas, Fatah sign Palestinian Prisoners’ Document, supposedly cementing national unity. Israel begins operation Summer Rains, invades Gaza strip to recover kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit and stop Qassam rocket fire.

July 12  Hezbollah terrorists cross the blue line border with Lebanon, attack an Israeli patrol, killing 3 and capturing
2 soldiers. Additional soldier dies the following day and several are killed when a tank hits a mine, pursuing the captors. At the same time, Hezbollah began a series of rocket attacks on northern Israel. In subsequent days, Israel carried out massive but selective bombing and artillery shelling of Lebanon, hitting rocket stores, Hezbollah headquarters in Dahya quarter of Beirut (see Beirut Map) and al-Manara television in Beirut, and killing over two hundred persons, many civilians. Hezbollah responds with several hundred rocket attacks on Haifa, Tiberias, Safed and other towns deep in northern Israel, killing 13 civilians to July 18 (See Map of Hezbollah Rocket Attacks), and a Hezbollah Iranian supplied C-802 missile hits an Israeli missile cruiser off the cost of Beirut, killing 4. Hezbollah rocket also sinks at least one foreign neutral ship and damages an Egyptian one. G-8 meeting calls for cessation of violence, return of Israeli soldier and disarmament of Hezbollah in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and UN Security Council Resolution 1680.
9.2 Sample of questions posed to editors for in-depth interview (  

1) What do you think are the primary reasons for South Africa not having enough print journalists in the Middle East? (Apart from the obvious monetary implications) 

2) Does the SA print media serve the interests of any of the warring parties in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? 

3) What is your most valuable source of news in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? 

4) Do you find the copy received from the wire unequivocally impartial to both sides? Is wire copy attained contractually, or can you use your own discretion when choosing articles? 

5) Do you believe the conflict receives enough coverage in the SA print media? 

6) Is your editorial team responsible for all headings, sidebars and accompanying pictures to contextualise the report/story/comment? 

7) Do you believe that a South African perspective is necessary for local readers? Should the consumer be satisfied with overseas news copy? 

8) The escalation of the conflict since September 2000 has featured many characters. Throughout the 2nd intifada and Gaza withdrawal, Ariel Sharon is the actor most quoted and referred to. Why does he carry the burden of the dominant discourse? 

9) Do you and your editorial staff believe the conflict to have been purely a “land-based” conflict, or does it form part of a greater religious conflict?
10) Do you choose to present an article through a particular “frame”? Has there been a dominant frame to choose ie: human-interest to perhaps generate less antagonistic responses or presenting an issue as a violent conflict to perhaps sell more papers and thereby attract many more controversial writers and even letters to the editor?

11) Do you believe the SA print coverage emphasised or neglected key aspects of the conflict? Are there any serious implications thereof?
### 9.3 Loughborough Table: References to Historical events in Israeli/ Palestinian BBC News Coverage (August 1 2005-January 31 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Event</th>
<th>Percent of All Items</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sykes-Picot Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balfour Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Mandate for Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hebron massacre (1929)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great uprising (1936-39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peal Commission (1937)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lehi (Stern Gang) attacks (1940-49)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Protocol (1944)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holocaust</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition of Palestine (1947)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948 War</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir Yassin Massacre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qibya massacre (1953)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel invades Egypt (1956)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel withdraws from Sinai (1957)</td>
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<td>Founding of PLO (1964)</td>
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<td>Six Day War (1967)</td>
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<td>Avivim school bus massacre (1970)</td>
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<td>Munich Massacre (1972)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Wrath of God (1972)</td>
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<td>Yom Kippur war (1973)</td>
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<td>Entebbe (1976)</td>
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<td>Camp David (1978)</td>
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<td>Return of Sinai (1979)</td>
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<td>Israel invades Lebanon (1982)</td>
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<td>Sabra and Shatila</td>
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<td>Intifada (1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Founding of Hamas (1988)</td>
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<td>Palestinian declaration of Independence (1988)</td>
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<td>Gulf War 1, Scud attacks (1991)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oslo Peace Process/Accords (1993-95)</td>
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<td>Nobel Peace Prize (Peres, Rabin, Arafat) (1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp David 2 (2000)</td>
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<td>Al-Aqsa Intifada</td>
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<td>Operation Defensive Sheild (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yasser Arafat dies (2004)</td>
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<td>Gaza pullout (2005)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media Content Analysis
2005
Media Image of the Israel / Palestine conflict -
Middle East coverage behind Asia in SA TV News
Different regions in South African and Arab TV News: 2005

SA TV News:
- Africa: 24,534 reports
- Europe: 1988 reports
- North America: 1275 reports
- Asia: 1019 reports
- Middle East: 688 reports
- Oceania: 642 reports
- South America: 182 reports
- Central America: 157 reports
- Other: 366 reports

Number of reports:

Arab TV News:
- Middle East: 4725 reports
- Europe: 1718 reports
- Africa: 1147 reports
- Asia: 832 reports
- North America: 804 reports
- South America: 181 reports
- Central America: 45 reports
- Oceania: 29 reports
- Other: 860 reports

Coverage on South Africa (22,804 reports)
Different volumes, similar ratings
Middle East coverage in **SA opinion-leading newspapers: 2005**

- **Dailies**
  - 5160 reports

- **Weeklies**
  - 592 reports

Basis: 5752 Reports on Middle Eastern countries
Ratings remains consistent
SA media coverage of Israel and Palestine: 2005

Israel vs. Palestine volume (2005)

- Total: 1537
- Israel: 967
- Palestine: 570

Israel vs. Palestine rating (2005)

- Total: 967 Negative, 570 Positive

Basis: 967 reports on Israel and 570 reports on Palestine
Withdrawal from Gaza Strip draws media attention
SA media coverage of Israel and Palestine: 1/1/2005 – 31/12/2005

Israel (2005)

Palestine (2005)

Disengagement

Basis: 967 reports on Israel and 570 reports on Palestine
The Citizen newspaper leads the coverage
SA newspapers reporting on Israel and Palestine

Number of reports

- **Citizen**: 416 reports
- **The Star**: 209 reports
- **Pretoria News**: 207 reports
- **Business Day**: 187 reports
- **Sowetan**: 100 reports
- **Beeld**: 63 reports
- **M & G**: 39 reports
- **Sunday Independent**: 22 reports
- **Sunday Times**: 15 reports
- **Rapport**: 12 reports

Basis: 1299 newspaper articles on Israel / Palestine
Media Set

South African Media

¾ Dailies: BUSINESS DAY, BUSINESS REPORT, BEELD, CITIZEN, PRETORIA NEWS, SOWETAN, THE STAR, SAKE BEELD

¾ TV news: SABC AFRIKAANS, SABC ENGLISH, SABC SOTHO, SABC ZULU/XHOSA, E NEWS

¾ Weeklies: CITY PRESS, FINWEEK, FINANCIAL MAIL, MAIL & GUARDIAN, RAPPORT, SUNDAY INDEPENDENT, SUNDAY TIMES, BUSINESS TIMES, SUNDAY SUN, SUNDAY WORLD, SAKE RAPPORT, SATURDAY STAR