

**Liberation Movements in Southern Africa: The ANC
(South Africa) and ZANU (Zimbabwe) compared**

by

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Summary

Liberation movements came into being across the entire African continent as a political response to colonisation. However, Africa has in this field, as in so many others, been largely understudied, in comparison to revolutionary movements in South America and South East Asia. While many case studies on specific liberation movements exist, very few are comparative in nature. This study will do precisely that using the framework of Thomas H. Greene.

The resistance movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, consisted of several organisations, but the ones that emerged as the most powerful and significant in the two countries were the ANC and ZANU respectively. Although their situations were similar in many ways, there were other factors that necessarily led to two very different liberation struggles. This study looks closer at these factors, why they were so, and what this meant for the two movements. It focuses on the different characteristics of the movements, dividing these into leadership, support base, ideology, organisation, strategies and external support. All revolutionary movements rely on these factors to varying degrees, depending on the conditions they are operating under. The ANC and ZANU both had to fight under very difficult and different circumstances, with oppressive minority regimes severely restricting their actions. This meant that the non-violent protests that initially were a great influence for the leadership of both movements – especially with the successes of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa and India, inevitably had to give way to the more effective strategies of sabotage and armed struggle. Like other African resistance movements, nationalism was used as the main mobilising tool within the populations. In South Africa the struggle against apartheid was more complex and multidimensional than in Zimbabwe. Ultimately successful in their efforts, the ANC and ZANU both became the political parties that assumed power after liberation. This study does not extend to post-liberation problems.

Opsomming

Bevrydingsbewegings het oral in Afrika as 'n politieke respons teen kolonialisme tot stand gekom. Afrika het egter nie soveel vergelykende studies as bv Suid-Amerika of Suidoos-Asië opgelewer nie. Daar is geen groot skaarste aan spesifieke gevallestudies nie. Die leemtes is van 'n vergelykende aard. Dit is presies wat hierdie studie probeer doen en binne die raamwerk van Thomas H. Greene.

Daar was 'n hele aantal bevrydingsbewegings in Suid-Afrika en Zimbabwe – destyds Rhodesië, maar die magtigste en relevantste was onderskeidelik die ANC en ZANU. Alhoewel daar sekere ooreenkomste tussen hulle was, was die verskille soms groter en ook beduidend. Hierdie studie ondersoek die ooreenkomste en verskille van naderby. So word gefokus op die eienskappe, die leierskappe, die ondersteuningsbasisse, die ideologieë, organisasies, strategieë en eksterne steun. Alle bevrydingsbewegings kan hieraan ontleed word. Die stryd wat die ANC en ZANU aangeknoop het, was egter soms baie verskillend, en die minderheidsregering se response was ook soms baie verskillend. Dit beteken dat die aanvanklike nie-gewelddadige proteste wat beïnvloed was deur die suksesse van Mahatma Gandhi in Suid-Afrika en Indië uiteindelik plek gemaak het vir sabotasie en die gewapende stryd. Soos in ander gevalle in Afrika, was nasionalisme 'n belangrike vertrekpunt. In Suid-Afrika was die anti-apartheidstryd dikwels ook meer kompleks en multi-dimensioneel as in Zimbabwe.

Uiteindelik het beide die ANC en ZANU die regerende partye geword. Hierdie studie se afsnypunt is die instelling van meerderheidsregering, en handel nie met onafhanklikheidsproblematiek nie.

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ANC Timeline

- 1912: ANC founded as non-violent resistance movement, civil rights style
- 1948: The National Party came to power promoting a new programme of 'Apartheid' – separateness – to segregate white, black, Coloured, and Indian racial groups
- 1950: The Group Areas Act to divide South Africa into racial zones, residential and occupational
- 1951: Bantu Authorities Act introduced, to construct semi-independent reserves under cheap repressive administrations, removing tensions and problems from the towns near white areas. Rebellious Africans posed a less immediate threat, and were more legitimately denied political rights in white SA
- 1955: Kliptown, June – the ANC adopts the Freedom Charter
- 1960: 21 March: Sharpeville massacre
- 1961: *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) established - ANC's armed wing. Change of strategy, first acts of violence, targeting government facilities
- 1961-69: ANC into exile. Mandela arrested 1962. MK headquarters at Rivonia raided 1963. Mandela and other MK leaders sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 after convicted of sabotage
- 1969: 25 April – ANC Consultative Congress in Morogoro, Tanzania. Decision to open up ANC to all races, but non-blacks could still not sit on the NEC. Also adopted a new political strategy, a 'Revolutionary Programme'
- 1976: Soweto riots. The first child killed 16 June, triggers a wave of uprisings across the country. Many students join ANC in exile
- 1977: United Nations imposes mandatory arms embargo
- 1980-82: MK launch nine attacks, some of the most important on Sasol's oil refinery, SA Air Force headquarters, and Koeberg nuclear power station
- 1984: September – introduction of tricameral parliament, inviting Indians and coloureds, but still excluding blacks. In addition to a deep economic recession, townships erupt. Campaigns for foreign investment to withdraw from South Africa
- 1985: 16 June: Kabwe Conference in Zambia. Whites allowed in NEC – internal disputes. Adopt 'People's war' strategy. 21 July: government declares

- partial state of emergency, due to continued large-scale unrest. COSAS banned and COSATU formed November. Adopts Freedom Charter. Security Council urges General Assembly to impose trade sanctions.
- Mid-80s: PW Botha's policy of 'destabilisation'. ANC: 'ungovernability'
- 1986: 12 June: government declares national state of emergency
- 1988: February – UDF banned. US-USSR agreement to stop support to favoured allies in Third World. ANC: need to turn to international community for political and financial support.
- 1989: Mandela negotiations with apartheid government. Tambo and Botha suffer strokes. F.W. de Klerk takes over after Botha. ANC change towards strategy of accommodation.
- 1990: February: Unbanning of ANC and SACP. Mandela and others released. State of emergency lifted. Exiles allowed to return home.
- (Sources: Holland 1990; McKinley 1997; Pfister 2003; van Zyl Slabbert 1989)

ZANU Timeline

- 1896-7: African uprisings (Matabele and Mashona separate rebellions) to prevent white settlers taking their land – first *Chimurenga*. Africans defeated
- 1961: December ZAPU formed, replacing the National Democratic Party (NDP). Led by Joshua Nkomo.
- 1962: The Rhodesian Front formed, with stated objective of preventing black rule. September: ZAPU banned
- 1963: 8 August: faction of ZAPU forms ZANU, led by Ndabaningi Sithole. Nkomo forms People's Caretaker Council (PCC) to act for ZAPU, but continues to be known as ZAPU
- 1964: August – ZANU and PCC banned by new prime minister Ian Smith. ZANU central committee members were sentenced to ten years of detention.
- 1966: 28 April 7 ZANLA guerrillas died in battle with Rhodesian security forces at Sinoia. Marks beginning of second *Chimurenga*.
- 1969-72: ZANU strategy reassessed. Maoist influence. Training camps in Tanzania and cadres sent to China.

- 1972: 21 December – attack on Altena Farm, marks beginning of the protracted armed struggle.
- 1973: Smith closes and then reopens border to Zambia. Repressive legislation as response to guerrillas. Muzorewa of the Rhodesian African National Council (ANC) starts negotiations with Smith.
- 1974: 25 April - Coup d'état in Lisbon, Portugal. Independence for its colonies, Mozambique and Angola, in 1975 - great motivation for freedom fighters. Détente exercise drafted in Lusaka October. Sithole suspended by detained leaders November. December: Nhari rebellion within ZANU, Mugabe released by détente exercise.
- 1975: OAU withdraws recognition of ZANU and ZAPU – only support to ANC. March: Chitepo killed by bomb attached to his car. Mugabe leaves country. Détente exercise brings war to virtual standstill. ZANU leaders detained in Lusaka. ZANLA and ZIPRA joined in ZIPA, led by Rex Nhongo. Mgagao Declaration from prison, criticises Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo and Chikerema. Mugabe appointed new leader, but not officially.
- 1976: War resumes, within four months eastern border with Mozambique divided into three operational war zones: Hurricane, Thrasher, and Repulse. October: Mugabe and Moyo formed Patriotic Front - both ZANU and ZAPU. Start of Anglo-American-South African initiative for negotiations between Smith and nationalists.
- 1977: Growing number of refugees in neighbouring countries. War rapidly escalating towards peak in 1979. Rhodesian economy under much pressure. ZANU conference in Chimoio. Mugabe formally new ZANU president.
- 1978: 'The Year of the People'. ZANU strengthened, greater international recognition. OAU exclusive support to PF, no longer Muzorewa's ANC.
- 1979: 'The Year of the People's Storm'. April: Muzorewa won controversial election. Lancaster House and cease-fire agreement. New elections to be held under Commonwealth supervision.
- 1980: Mugabe wins elections – registered as ZANU-PF. Gets 57 of 100 seats. (Sources: Martin and Johnson 1981; Reed 1993; Meredith 2006)

List of abbreviations

ALN	Armée de Liberation Nationale
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ANC	African National Council (Rhodesia)
ARB	African Research Bulletin
ARMSCOR	South African Armament Corporation
APMC	Area Politico-Military Council
BBZ	Botswana-Zimbabwe military zone
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DARE	<i>Dare re Chimurenga</i>
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IPC	Internal Political Committee
MHQ	Military Headquarters
MK	<i>Umkhonto we Sizwe</i>
MMZ	Mozambique-Zimbabwe military zone
NAT	Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, and Security
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEC	National Executive Committee
NP	National Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PAFMECSA	Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa
PF	Patriotic Front
PMC	Politico-Military Council
PRC	People's Republic of China
RC	Revolutionary Council

RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RF	Rhodesian Front
RPMC	Regional Politico-Military Council
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANROC	South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
SASO	South African Students' Organisation
SOMAFCO	Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College
UANC	United African National Council (Rhodesia)
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZZ	Zambia-Zimbabwe military zone

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Introduction

“There is nothing in political life that is more breathtaking and more audacious than a revolutionary act that is inspired by a vision of perfect justice. Many will regard it as worthy of celebration, others as a lamentable defect of the human condition” (Greene 1984:4). The various instances of dominance and exploitation by groups of people over other groups are countless, epitomised by the ‘scramble for Africa’ at the end of the nineteenth century. This has not only rendered rebellions inevitable, but has indeed resulted in these being one of the most important - if not the most important – achievements for a substantial part of the world’s cultures. Although uprisings around the world have been of varying success, this study aims to look at two movements struggling towards liberation, which ultimately ended in victory. The two movements are the African National Congress (ANC) fighting against the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) fighting the white settler regime in Rhodesia.

1.2 Background and Problem Statement

It has been argued that war of independence or liberation is a type of rebellion as it is an uprising against established authority, and is characterised by the involvement of the international community (Barnard 1991:12). The argument further explains revolution as implying a greater transformation of the state than a war of independence, whereby the latter can be an early stage of revolution, from which a socio-economic transformation follows. Huntington (1968:266) argues that it is likely to occur in societies that have undergone fundamental social and economic change, but without the necessary political development to accompany this change. He explains revolutions as “the extreme case of the explosion of political participation” that, in order to be complete, necessitates the “institutionalisation of a new political order”. Theda Skocpol (1979:4) has defined social revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”. Both South Africa and Rhodesia underwent societal change in that power was transferred from one group of people to another. To what further extent the two societies were transformed

will not be discussed in this study, as this requires a closer look at the respective societies post-liberation. Thomas Greene (1984:15), on whose work this paper will be based, defines revolutionaries as those who “seek major alteration in the prevailing distribution of wealth, and power”, but their techniques, he explains, are not necessarily violent, but range from terrorism to general strikes.

The cases of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, or Rhodesia as it became known just as Northern Rhodesia gained independence and became Zambia in 1964, are in many ways similar. While most colonies in Africa gained independence around 1960 or soon thereafter, Rhodesia became a self-governing colony in 1923 and later declared itself independent in 1965. South Africa became a dominion in 1910, implying that it was an independent member of the British Commonwealth. Neither of the populations was any longer under direct control by the British, yet they were still dominated by a white minority. This has been termed a sort of ‘alien settlerism’, defined as “a system of colonialism under which an expatriate white community has set itself up as sole possessor of power and sovereignty regardless of the usual status of a numerically inferior group as a minority” (El-Ayouty 1975:27). This led to a situation where classic colonialism was combined with local aggression as a result of the vast imbalances in minority-majority relations. It is evident that the majority - the Africans - were still colonised peoples, and rather than liberating themselves from an overseas power, had to fight against a settler regime. Due to the comfortable situation that arose from the exploitation of human and natural resources – justified by the spirit of capitalism - the regimes were reluctant to give it up without a fight. However, it has been argued that the white population in South Africa had been there for such a long time – since 1652 – that by the middle of the twentieth century, they had few ties with Europe. As Nelson Mandela put it: “Unlike white people anywhere else in Africa, whites in South Africa belong here – this is their home... We want them to live here with us and to share power with us” (Meredith 1997:359). In this regard it was not a ‘settler society’ as such. Yet some members within this group had implemented a political system so oppressive, that it created a society exclusive of certain groups and favouring the whites. This led several opponents to reintroduce the term colonialism – with its very negative connotations – as such oppression was one of its clear traits. As the South African system was very similar to the Rhodesian one in this sense, there has not been made a distinction between the two.

In South Africa, apartheid was adopted as a political system in 1948, and was maintained by a range of laws and acts, which during that time were explained as “a labyrinth of legalisms which represent the most up-to-date forms of human slavery” (El-Ayouty 1975:28). While Rhodesia did not have such an institutionalised political system, a white Rhodesian official did admit that discriminations against black Zimbabweans in the 1930s were more severe than that in South Africa (Ranger 1969:310). In sum, both systems seriously limited the political rights and civil liberties of their respective black majorities.

Internationally, these settler societies were eventually to receive widespread condemnation from around the world, although the willingness of foreign governments to act against the two regimes was varying, and economic sanctions and boycotts were only partially followed (Minty 1988:260). Domestically, national liberation movements increasingly grew under the two regimes. They were usually banned, and either went underground to continue the struggle, or regrouped under a new name. Despite severely repressive countermeasures from the two governments, both the Zimbabweans and the South Africans ultimately succeeded in their struggle for majority rule. However, the strategies of the two main movements, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia, were very different, in part due to the circumstances in the respective countries.

The ANC was founded in 1912, and not only is it the oldest liberation movement in South Africa, it is also one of the oldest on the entire African continent. However, it was founded as a peaceful movement pursuing non-violent strategies. It was not until much later that it decided to take a more revolutionary approach, after realising that “fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more repressive legislation and fewer and fewer rights” (Mandela 2003:48). In November 1961 a separate armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) – ‘Spear of the Nation’ – was formed, led by Nelson Mandela. It waged an armed struggle against the apartheid regime until 1990, but failed to attract much support from the peasantry, especially as the ANC had little presence in the rural areas. While they did attempt to wage a guerrilla war under “exceptionally difficult circumstances”, this strategy largely

failed, and they were only successful in re-establishing a presence in the townships (Lodge 1987:2).

For a revolutionary movement to be successful, there is need for leaders who provide strong organisation and access to society's dominant institutions, or so-called regime access. The ability to mobilise the masses is crucial, facilitated by a uniting revolutionary ideology that legitimates the movement. External support is also necessary. The ANC was fairly successful in mobilising grassroots support in the townships, and organised a few strikes and work stay-aways. However, with most leaders either imprisoned or in exile, it was difficult for them to organise efficiently, and increasingly had to rely on the international community for penalising apartheid South Africa. After the renewed internal protest in 1984, one of their greatest successes was being seen as the representative of the majority of South Africans in most Western countries (Adam 1988:95).

ZANU, on the other hand, was a much younger movement, only established 8 August 1963, after breaking away from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). However, it was committed to an armed struggle right from the beginning. After the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union backed a group including the ANC and ZAPU, the so-called 'authentics', while ZANU had to increasingly look to the People's Republic of China for external support, as part of the 'non-authentics' group (Martin and Johnson 1981:15). The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of ZANU, had many of its cadres trained in China, and adopted Mao's tactic of three stages of protracted guerrilla warfare. One of the most important things they learned was the need for support within the population, for their material support, shelter, as well as maintaining the secrecy of their whereabouts towards the government. While ZANU's leaders and followers were almost exclusively Mashona speaking, they were from different tribes, but tribalism was more a problem within ZAPU than ZANU (Martin and Johnson 1981:87). Yet, there was a major split in the nationalist movement due to ethnicity, mainly between the Shona and the Ndebele, with the former generally backing ZANU, and the latter tending to support ZAPU. The Shona domination was later to have consequences for post-independence Zimbabwe.

In South Africa, the ANC worked closely together with the South African Communist Party (SACP) – with strong ties to the former Soviet Union, who taught them some essential techniques when it came to working underground after the organisation was banned in 1960, as the Communist Party had already been banned from 1950 (Ellis 1991:441). The two organisations later joined in an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) after it was formed in 1985, as the organised black working class was - as was generally the case - the leading element in the liberation struggle (McKinley 1997:70). When it came to membership, the ANC was fairly inclusive, but was seen as more a Xhosa party, as opposed to the Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The organisation eventually chose to opt for a non-racial ideology, and the Freedom Charter from 1955 clearly stated that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” (quoted in Holland 1990:97). But part of the leadership saw the need to become even more so, not only to attract as many as possible to join the fight against apartheid. This was also necessary in order for white SACP members to become part of the organisation, and later for the support – often financial - of sympathising white business leaders. However, it was only at the ANC’s Consultative National Conference held 25 April 1969 at Morogoro, Tanzania, also called the Morogoro Conference, that the decision was made to open up the ANC to all races. But non-blacks could still not sit on the National Executive Committee (NEC), and non-African SACP members such as Joe Slovo, Reg September, and Yusuf Dadoo – white, Coloured, and Indian, respectively - became members of the Revolutionary Council, which was under the NEC.

There were some Africanist elements within the movement that had long been opposed to the cooperation with white activists, believing that non-Africans could not identify sufficiently with their cause. “We have admitted that there are Europeans who are intellectual converts to the Africans’ cause but, because they benefit materially from the present set-up, they cannot completely identify themselves with that cause” (Robert Sobukwe quoted in Holland 1990:117). The Africanists broke away and formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) as early as 1959. They were to become an obstacle for the ANC in their struggle due to the rivalry that came about between the two movements. Especially when they were seeking international support on the African continent did the ANC face serious constraints, as the all-black principle of the PAC appealed more to African nationalists who were influenced by

the strong pan-Africanist wave sweeping the continent in the 1960s (Pfister 2003:54). While both the ANC and ZANU had to face often violent rivalry from other organisations, what was even more of a threat was “the enemy within” – the enemy spies and infiltrators who pretended to work for the liberation cause (Ntalaja 1979:16), as well as local “puppet chiefs” who cooperated with the governments, and gave the people in power an appearance of legality (El-Ayouty 1975:27).

The ANC were as mentioned closely allied to the Soviet Union, and also they sent many of their members abroad for military training. Mainly stationed in the USSR, they adopted the traditions of the urban proletariat in the Bolshevik revolution – i.e. the uprising in St. Petersburg in 1917-18. However, violence was far from being the only tactic employed. The ANC had as their ‘total strategy’ the aim for a National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which entailed a four-pronged strategy consisting of: protracted armed struggle; working towards the international isolation of the South African regime; mass mobilisation; as well as the so-called Mandela Plan, or M-Plan, which entailed organising the ANC into smaller groups or ‘cells’ that could encourage more grassroots participation in the struggle (van Zyl Slabbert 1989:78). However, the ANC’s protracted armed struggle never reached the status of guerrilla warfare, and MK attacks were limited to isolated acts of sabotage aimed at government property in mainly urban areas that was particularly representative of the apartheid regime. Of the most spectacular attacks were against Sasol’s oil refinery, SADF’s Voortrekkerhoogte headquarters, Koeberg nuclear power station in Cape Town, and the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria (McKinley 1997:53).

While ZANLA did increasingly pose a threat to the Rhodesian security forces, especially after the 1974 coup in Portugal that effectively multiplied the number of new recruits, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was far too superior for there to be any real possibility of the MK defeating white rule by protracted guerrilla warfare alone. This despite of the fact that the SADF were also fighting insurgents in Namibia, Angola, and even assisting the Rhodesian army against the Zimbabwean nationalists at the time. In ZANU’s case, the armed struggle was very dependent on support from the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), as well as the governments of Tanzania and Zambia. Provided with sanctuary across the border in Mozambique, and with widespread support in the Zimbabwean population, ZANLA

was able to wage a protracted rural guerrilla war on the Rhodesian government. The fighters were also motivated by their belief in heroic spirits of those who fought in the 1896 rebellion against the early settlers, also called the first *Chimurenga*, and were strongly influenced by spirit mediums who claimed to be possessed by these spirits (Ranger 1986:374). Politically, ZANU was considered the most radical of the Zimbabwean movements, and was repeatedly set back by factions of the nationalists who were prepared to settle for much less than full liberation from white rule (Meredith 2006:129-130).

Amilcar Cabral – the anti-colonial nationalist in Portuguese Guinea - has defined a national liberation struggle as “the rejection by a people of the negation of their historical process, the regaining of their historical personality, and their return to history through the destruction of imperialist domination” (quoted in Ntalaja 1979:14). However, it has been argued that despite decolonisation, most African countries were not genuinely liberated after finally gaining independence (Ntalaja 1979:14; Chimutengwende 1976:61). In reality, power was not transferred from the European colonialists to the African peoples, but to African petty bourgeois leaders who continued to exploit the indigenous populace. Indeed, the leaders of the two movements were often from a higher social class than the rest of the people they were representing. However, they waged their war under a banner of egalitarianism and socialism, yet were put in power in what had become a ‘de-racialised’ capitalist society – capitalism minus racism (McKinley 1997:87). It has in fact been argued that even capitalists called themselves socialists during the struggle, in order to get the attention of as large a part of the African population as possible (Chimutengwende 1976:61). Still, most anti-colonial revolutions in Africa were typically nationalist (Breytenbach 1989:71). This was not only a highly likely tendency but also an essentially useful one, as “an ideology that appeals to national identity is the most powerful symbolic means of mobilizing support” (Greene 1984:100).

Both the ANC and ZANU were influenced by socialists such as Marx, Lenin, Mao, Nguyen Giap and Che Guevara. Many colonised intellectuals found Marxism’s rejection of liberal capitalism particularly appealing, as this was seen to be the prime symbol of colonial exploitation. However, it was Leninism that was to have the

greater impact, due to its “analysis and explicit condemnation of imperialism, and because it provided a theory and organisational tool for revolution” (Macridis 1986:276). However, many were criticised for compromising their ideals on the way towards liberation.

Although the ANC had not been the most radical movement in South Africa, many felt that they became too moderate towards the end of the liberation process and lowered their standards disappointingly. Having once talked of the ‘transfer of power to the people’, the ANC had in the end given up on what had been one of their fundamental principles – the nationalisation of the country’s mines, banks and monopoly industries (McKinley 1997:108-109). The influence of Lenin and Mao were crucial for the organisation of the armed struggle and ultimately for independence, but neither of the countries adopted the ideologies after liberation. For a system such as the Soviet or Chinese to be implemented, there was an inherent need for a well-organised party and force. This was lacking in both countries, and the use of force would easily have split the population. Furthermore, the moral and religious aspects of the African liberation struggles were opposed to the more “materialist” and “atheistic” Marxism-Leninism (Macridis 1986:279). Other leaders in the struggles were convinced that a moderate and more diplomatic approach was the only way to win the battle, yet one can argue whether this would have been sufficient in the cases of South Africa and Rhodesia.

1.3 Purpose and Significance

“Revolution begins in the mind... Committed to building a new way of life, the revolutionary seeks to destroy the old way of life. Meaningful reform of existing society is considered impossible, and the revolutionary who is true to his or her convictions is intolerant of compromise... There is either justice or injustice, there is nothing halfway and nothing in-between” (Greene 1984:3). The purpose of this study is to compare the two liberation movements, the ANC and ZANU, by focusing on their characteristics. It will compare the leaders in the two movements, as well as their followers, looking at the importance of social class and ethnic backgrounds. It

will then assess the respective organisations, how they were built up and functioned, paying attention to the civilian and military wings, as well as the organisations in exile. As military wings focused on the armed struggle, revolutionary warfare in South Africa and Zimbabwe will be compared as well. The research will also focus on what impact ideology had on the movements, and how this developed towards liberation. Furthermore the different techniques that were used will be assessed, both those of a non-military nature as well as the more violent guerrilla warfare tactics. Finally, the role of external support will be studied, in particular that of providing training, sanctuary, as well as political and material support. “The comparative historian’s task ... lies not in revealing new data about particular aspects of the large time periods and diverse places surveyed in the comparative study, but rather in establishing the interest and *prima facie* validity of an overall argument about causal regularities across the various historical cases” (Skocpol 1979:xiv).

Liberation movements are largely understudied in relation to their immense importance around the world. A field even more overlooked is that of African resistance, which has often been viewed as negative and backward looking. Rather, “[r]esistance left its mark on the most important processes of the development of the African peoples; in the course of resistance tendencies to change developed more quickly” (Ranger 1969:303). This is the only study that compares South African and Zimbabwean liberation histories. By drawing conclusions from the findings in this study, this will hopefully contribute to the general debate in these fields.

1.4 Research Methodology

“[G]uerrillas arise in particular countries, appear at particular points in time, and are drawn disproportionately from particular social groups. Thus, in their origins, guerrilla movements demand a comparative sociological treatment to understand such variations” (Wickham-Crowley 1992:8). By comparing cases, the aim is to “draw the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory” (George and Bennett 2005:67), and thereby provide useful generic knowledge of that phenomenon. While the dominant form of comparative methods is controlled comparison, which entails studying two or more cases of a specific phenomenon similar in every respect but one, finding two such cases is usually extremely difficult.

Research is therefore often carried out without fulfilling this criterion, despite resulting in an imperfect comparison. Two main liberation movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe were chosen for comparison, as they not only resembled each other in many respects, but also differed in crucial ways. The methodology will therefore be descriptive and analytical.

The constant concern for the right approach, method and theory that is particularly evident in political science, indicates the difficulties in terms of creating clear-cut theories as opposed to that of the natural sciences (Greene 1984:11). In addition, one of the main problems of comparing only two cases, is that it is difficult to make any generalisations about liberation movements. Something that is true of the South African and the Zimbabwean cases hardly needs to be true of a third case. This comparison intends to draw conclusions about each of the two movements, and as such provide useful knowledge on the topic, without necessarily being conclusive about other cases. A further limitation is that the history of African movements seems to have been dominated by Western scholars, and it has been argued that these would have a better understanding of the ‘collaborators’ rather than that of the ‘resisters’ (Ranger 1969:304). Being yet another Western scholar, one is aware of this. So by keeping this in mind, and trying to keep an as objective as possible focus on the liberation movements themselves, this problem has been addressed. Finally, for this particular study, it is evident that the ANC, being an older movement, receiving more attention internationally, and fighting for a longer period of time, has received far more attention by scholars than ZANU has. While facilitating the search for resources about the ANC, it is also a limitation that must be addressed.

The units of analysis are liberation movements – not just the respective armed struggles, but other dimensions of the liberation movements as well. While it can be argued that the two were in fact revolutionary movements, and indeed will be referred to as such interchangeably, ‘revolutionary’ seems to emphasise a strong ideological influence. In these two cases, nationalism played a greater role than any other ideology, and the focus was on liberation rather than any other major societal change. However, the two are closely interlinked, as liberation can be interpreted as a form of revolution, which is always multidimensional.

As a comparative historical analysis, textual data – mainly secondary sources - will be analysed. It will be a descriptive and qualitative analysis, and there will be no interviews or questionnaires. The design of the study will be based on the work of Thomas H. Greene - on comparative revolutionary movements - published in 1984. His study is an exceptionally coherent and systematic analysis of six different revolutions, and he attempts to provide one or more theories of revolution by looking at the possible causes as well as characteristics of the revolutionary movements in the respective cases. As meaningful comparisons are difficult to make when differences between such movements become increasingly complex, I hope to systemise comparisons by adopting his analytical model, and focus on the multidimensional characteristics of these liberation movements. I have chosen to focus on the same six characteristics as Greene, namely leaders, followers, ideology, organisation, techniques and external support.

The focus of the study will be the more decisive years leading up to liberation. For the ANC this entails a focus on the period starting with the formation of its armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, up until the beginning of the 1990s. At this point in time, it became evident that majority rule was inevitable in the course of the Mandela-de Klerk negotiations, the armed struggle was suspended, and negotiations for a new order began. For ZANU, this period starts around in 1966 with the battle at Sinoia, and ends with the Lancaster House negotiations and the cease-fire agreement in late 1979.

Chapter 2 - Leaders

2.1 The ANC

Nelson Mandela, born Rolihlahla Mandela (Rolihlahla was known to mean 'troublemaker' in Xhosa), was a member of the 'left-hand house' of King Ngubencuka of the Thembu chieftaincy, and part of the Madiba clan, in the Xhosa speaking Eastern Cape region in South Africa. His father was the village headman, and Mandela was to inherit this role, despite being the youngest of four sons.

Mandela was treated as special, and it has been argued that this is one of the reasons that he developed "an extraordinary self-assurance that affected the way others acted to him" (Lodge 2006:40). However, circumstances led to his father being dismissed after a dispute, and Mandela and his mother and sisters went to live with kinsfolk in Qunu, where he was given a Methodist upbringing, started school and was given the English name Nelson. While he developed such attributes as a substantial capacity for empathy, assuming power easily, as well as charm, he could on occasions be very stubborn, even arrogant (Meredith 1997:70).

In 1939, he went to Fort Hare University College in the Eastern Cape aspiring to become a lawyer, but was expelled after participating in student protest. He then went to work in the mines in Johannesburg, but it was a short-lived experience, and he was soon after in Walter Sisulu's office seeking help to become a lawyer. Sisulu was like Mandela from the Transkei, and born out of wedlock, he was brought up by his mother's family. Walter dropped out of Standard V, went to work in the Johannesburg mines, before starting a small business, and later opening an estate agency. He had gained a reputation as somewhat of a community leader, always keen to help people out, and his office became a frequent meeting place, especially for people from the Transkei (Meredith 1997:32).

Sisulu saw Mandela "at once as a man with great qualities" (quoted in Lodge 2006: 20), and did pay the tuition fees so that Nelson could complete his bachelor's degree at the University of South Africa by correspondence in December 1942. Sisulu also helped Mandela get a job working for a lawyer called Lazar Sidelsky, through which he started attending Communist Party meetings and multiracial gatherings. What was

to become a very close and enduring relationship developed between the two, and Walter had a great deal of influence in Mandela's life. He also introduced Mandela to future friends such as Oliver Tambo and Anton Lembede, the first leader of the Youth League. Mandela also married Sisulu's cousin, Evelyn, with whom he had four children. However, the marriage would unfortunately end when Nelson met Winnie Madikizela.

Oliver Tambo was also a student at Fort Hare, and also received assistance from Sisulu after being expelled for protesting. Coming from a more modest background, Tambo was known to have an impressive intellect (Meredith 1997:22). He was also a good negotiator and had a strong personality, which was important when he had to go into exile and continue the work of the ANC after 1961. Tambo, like Mandela, managed to avoid being strongly associated with the revolutionary left or the radical Africanist right. Being far more quiet and reserved than Mandela, the two were said to have very complementary qualities, and set up a legal partnership together. Here they experienced the racial discrimination in South African society more severely than before, by representing Africans who had been victims of such. Mandela liked to cause a stir and the public galleries would fill up with cheering township residents whenever they heard he was appearing in court. However, his favourite occupation was political activity, and Tambo was the one doing most of the work at the office (Meredith 1997:104). They were also part of a group of young intellectuals, 'The Graduates', who met regularly to discuss politics, and in 1944 formed the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) together with Sisulu and others, under the leadership of Lembede. They represented a new spirit of African nationalism, more militant than the older generation, and were soon in leading positions of the ANC. Mandela was in the early days very influenced by Lembede's strong Africanist philosophy, and Sisulu was the first to admit the need for a more moderate ideology and a broader support base (Meredith 1997:68).

In 1948 the white National Party came to power and started introducing the new policies of apartheid. While Mandela saw this as deeply troubling, Tambo saw it from a different perspective: "now we will know exactly who our enemies are" (quoted in Lodge 2006:41). Chief Albert Luthuli was elected President General and Mandela Deputy President in 1952, and according to Fatima Meer (1990:56), the two

constituted “the most formidable top executive the ANC had ever known. Their oratory was breathtaking”. Chief Luthuli was never quite able to fully accept the violent alternative, and only very reluctantly gave in to Mandela’s persuasions regarding the foundation of an armed wing (Lodge 2006:90).

As the ANC had to go into exile, and most of its leaders were imprisoned, effective leadership became increasingly difficult. As well as being alienated from the rank and file and the conflict itself, the absence of successful strategies and action often led to major disputes among the exiled (Lodge 1983:296). Tambo had inherited a rather demoralised ANC: “Its strategy discredited, its leaders captured, its goals unmet, the Congress seemed on the brink of collapse in 1963” (Davis 1987:21). It was only after Morogoro in 1969 that the organisation appeared to be on the road to recovery. Despite the lack of funds, it has been claimed that Tambo, a “wizard as a fundraiser”, managed to raise more than 280 million pounds for the work against apartheid (Baai 2006:156).

The close alliance with the Communist Party was frowned upon by many – also in black politics, as several SACP members joined the *Umkhonto* leadership. Seen by some as a group of elitist intellectuals (Adam 1988:97; Meredith 1997:62), the SACP did, however, provide the ANC leadership with invaluable experience, in particular with regard to the planning of the military campaign during the seventies. SACP member Joe Slovo was the MK’s “most sophisticated military brain” (Ellis 1991:443), which the ANC could hardly afford to give up. In addition, SACP’s close relations with the Soviet bloc would lead to Soviet military assistance being far more valuable than Pan-African support throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Lodge 1983:298). Pan-Africanists led by Robert Sobukwe and Potlako Leballo broke away from the ANC in 1959, due to the close ties with white communists, amongst other reasons.

While not all of the ANC leadership were from as aristocratic a background as Mandela, they were largely from backgrounds that enabled education and political activism. This was not a typical trait of the deprived African population, and many regarded the ANC leaders as petty bourgeois (McKinley 1997:119). Their critics would argue that their main priority was the creation of a black middle class, rather

than the majority poor (Prevost 2006:169). “The ANC and SACP leaders are on the whole well educated, politically sophisticated, and in some cases, affluent, and they have been less vulnerable to some of the temptations and delusions of the often pretentious world of exile politics” (Lodge 1983:305). Most ANC leaders were also Xhosa, but this was no prerequisite to be an ANC member. Albert Luthuli was amongst those who were Zulu speaking. As the organisation matured, it as mentioned became more inclusive, and this was also reflected in the higher ranks.

Many ANC leaders were students at Fort Hare, where they were introduced to others with similar backgrounds and views. Not only were many highly intelligent, some, Mandela in particular, were very capable orators as well. Probably his most famous statement was that delivered during the Rivonia Trial in April 1964. Tom Lodge (2006:113) has described it as “certainly one of the most effective rhetorical texts delivered by a South African politician”:

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die (Mandela 2003:54).

While Mandela emerged to become one of the greatest moral authorities and an iconic figure, he was in fact not the sole leader of the ANC. He was the one the international community most associated with the South African struggle as he became the “world’s most famous political prisoner “ in the 1980s (Lodge 2006:191). Although he was the head of the military wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, he was only part of the leadership for a couple of years before he was imprisoned for over 27 years. Oliver Tambo took over as president after Chief Luthuli’s death in 1967, and only stepped down in 1991 when his health would not allow him to continue. That is the first time Mandela became President of the ANC. However, who could or could not become leaders was complicated by the banning of individuals and by imprisonment. On Robben Island Mandela was soon picked to speak on behalf of the other prisoners (Mandela 2003:95), and he was an important leader figure throughout the struggle. He was also the one President F.W. de Klerk would eventually negotiate with.

2.2 ZANU

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born on 21 February 1924, and was brought up in the Catholic mission Kutama, in the Sinoia district northwest of Salisbury. His father was a carpenter, and a studious young Mugabe was taught by Father Jerome O’Hea to become a secondary school teacher. The majority of Africans in Rhodesia at that time could not afford secondary education – only some six percent - so Mugabe continued to study (Martin and Johnson 1981:93). In 1949 he won a scholarship to Fort Hare in South Africa, and this was his first meeting with a politically engaged environment. While being introduced to Marxist ideas, Gandhi and his campaign of ‘passive resistance’ became the most important influence at that time. Mugabe went to teach in Lusaka, while taking more university degrees by correspondence, and later went on to Ghana. Being the first African colony to gain independence in 1957, Ghana made a great impact, as well as Kwame Nkrumah, the revolutionary leader that had challenged British rule (Meredith 2008:24). Mugabe also met his first wife here, Sally Heyfron, who shared his political engagement. On a visit back to Rhodesia, he was persuaded to stay and join the cause by his friend Leopold Takawira. Both of the Mugabes were to become active in the movement. On one occasion, when both were out of prison on bail and had to leave the country illegally on the request of Joshua Nkomo, Robert was imprisoned for four months on his return, while Sally received nine months for breaking bail (Martin and Johnson 1981:203).

After the breakaway from Nkomo’s ZAPU, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole became the first President of ZANU, with Takawira as Vice-President and Mugabe as Secretary-General. However, there was growing discontent with Sithole’s leadership, especially after what was interpreted as a denunciation of the armed struggle following his conviction in 1969 of incitement to murder the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Smith. “I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word, thought or deed... from any form of violence” (quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:145), he announced, and was seen as betraying those who fought and certainly those who died in the war. Following his conviction Sithole was put in the criminal section and was kept apart from the political detainees.

By the mid-1970s, Mugabe, Edgar Tekere, Maurice Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala and Moton Malianga, who were in the political section, became convinced that Sithole was no longer fully committed to the armed struggle (Ranger 1980:73; Martin and Johnson 1981:200). They decided to have a vote, and while some of the leaders abstained from voting as they saw it as unconstitutional and something to be decided together with the rest of the organisation, Tekere, Nkala and Nyagumbo voted in favour of suspending Sithole on 1 November 1974. Meanwhile, the Frontline presidents – Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Seretse Khama of Botswana - requested that the leader of ZANU be released from detention to go to Lusaka to negotiate a unified nationalist movement, so as to pave the way for a negotiated settlement with the Rhodesian government. The leaders decided to send Mugabe as acting leader of ZANU, accompanied by Malianga. This caused uproar by the presidents, as well as the other ZANU leaders who were present. The presidents were not familiar with the two, suspected a coup in the ZANU leadership, and sent them back. The detained leaders then agreed to send Sithole to Lusaka, but sent Nyagumbo along to make it clear to the African leaders that Sithole was there as a private individual, and not as the ZANU president. However, Josiah Tongogara, John Mataure and Mukudzei Mudzi of the war council *Dare re Chimurenga* (DARE), told Nyagumbo that they felt betrayed by the decision. President Machel said that if Sithole was not reinstated, he would arrest all the ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique. The leaders in detention had no choice but to suspend the suspension, and rather await a decision by congress (Martin and Johnson 1981:151). The occurrence led to quite some tension between the emerging new ZANU leader and the Frontline presidents.

The talks in Lusaka eventually led to the signing of Declaration of Unity by Sithole, Muzorewa, Nkomo and James Chikerema, the leader of Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), another faction that broke away from ZAPU, towards the end of 1974. It established the ANC of Rhodesia as an umbrella organisation for the nationalist movement. ZANU was sent home with a task of establishing a cease-fire. But according to Tekere, “our primary duty was to aid our people back home to get out and prepare to fight... and completely ignored this nonsense about a cease-fire” (quoted in Ranger 1980:78). There was obviously not much communication at this point, and counterproductively, leaders gave empty promises.

A few months later, after Herbert Chitepo was assassinated in March 1975, the ZANU leaders and personnel situated in Lusaka were arrested, and Tongogara was sent to Mpima prison in Kabwe. Here a document was eventually drafted declaring that the leaders at Mpima and all the guerrilla camps remained loyal to the detained leaders in Rhodesia, to the high command and to DARE, but that the commander-in-chief, Sithole, was confusing the situation and causing problems. It condemned the government of Zambia for creating hostilities, as well as Sithole, Muzorewa and Chikerema for being “completely hopeless and ineffective as leaders” (quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:200). It especially targeted Muzorewa, a Bishop and a moderate, who had started having talks with Ian Smith in the mid-seventies. The Mgagao Declaration, as it was called, became one of the most important documents in the liberation struggle, and was signed by 43 of the camp officers. It also referred to Mugabe as “outstanding”, which he demonstrated by “defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique” (quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:202), and the only person through whom ZANU would communicate with the ANC. December 1977 Mugabe was formally elected new president of ZANU, and he was hailed in ZANU’s own journal, *Zimbabwe News*, as “a genuine leader of unquestioned integrity, rare courage and total dedication” – which ZANU had “always deserved but lacked” (quoted in Ranger 1980:86).

Herbert Chitepo was the National Chairman of ZANU, and head of *Dare re Chimurenga*. He was also a student at Fort Hare, and after finishing his studies in London became Rhodesia’s first African barrister in 1954. He had the confidence of Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, and was instrumental in securing support for ZANU from Tanzania (Reed 1993:38; White 2003:3). He was tragically killed in Zambia by a bomb attached to his car 18 March 1975. The incident was to unleash a plethora of accusations and theories, and the Zambian high court charged Josiah Tongogara, Joseph Chimurenga and Sadat Kufamazuba with his murder. The three were innocent, but tortured and forced to sign statements, and it has been argued that the main objective of the prosecution was to clear Zambia’s name (Martin and Johnson 1981:190).

Josiah Tongogara was chief of the military high command, after being elected to the war council in 1973. He had moved to Zambia when he was denied further education in Rhodesia. He gave up his relatively comfortable life there to actively join the struggle. According to the recruits, he was more a comrade than a senior authority (Martin and Johnson 1981:84). Despite being imprisoned at the time, he was instrumental in the creation of Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), which united ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas and was to be led by ZANLA's Rex Nhongo. Tongogara was the leader that the rebels of the Nhari rebellion attempted to ambush and pressure into meeting their demands. But Tongogara was not easily intimidated, and as implied by Martin and Johnson (1981:164), it could seem that it was rather the rebels themselves - despite being the ones with the cocked guns – that were intimidated by Tongogara, and agreed to do as he said. At the Lancaster House negotiations he was recognised as the key figure in reaching an agreement, and was one of the first to realise that there was no need to continue the war – as the reasons for fighting had been eliminated. Sadly he died in a car crash on his way back from London when rushing to tell the news of the cease-fire agreement. He also died before three Special Branch members cleared his name by admitting that he had nothing to do with Chitepo's death (Martin and Johnson 1981:190).

Both Tongogara and Chitepo were strongly opposed to tribalism. ZANU members were predominantly Shona speaking, and in opposition to the Ndebele in ZAPU. While tribalism had become a problem in ZAPU by 1970, this never became a major issue for ZANU. Its members were from several different tribes – Mugabe and Rex Nhongo were both Zezuru, Tongogara was Karanga, Chitepo was Manyika, while Sithole was Ndaou. However, tribe was a source of tension, and would at times cause divisions (Breytenbach 1989:75).

Apart from ethnic divisions – mainly between Matabele and Mashona, there were class differences as well. The nationalist leaders were far more educated and well off than the typical Zimbabwean. John Saul (1979:111) challenges the image of ZANU founders as “being distinguished by their articulation ... of strategy of armed resistance to white minority rule far in advance of the conventional nationalist approach of Joshua Nkomo and his colleagues”. He rather agrees with the view that they were “educated, middle-class, rather elitist elements”. He further argues that

rather than revolutionary politics, it was intra-elite factionalism that characterised the nationalist exiles, employing the “use of any existing ethnic tensions to build their own constituencies” (1979:113), as well as being far removed from the guerrilla forces.

However, Terence Ranger (1980:80) argues that leaders such as Mugabe and Edgar Tekere were involuntarily “frozen out of Zimbabwean politics” for a while, such as when they were taken “out of the way” before a meeting between Muzorewa, Sithole and the Frontline presidents in Mozambique to discuss a combined ZANU/ZAPU army in 1975. Furthermore, he argues, this was while Mugabe and Tekere were in the midst of educating the cadres in Mozambique – implying that they were in touch with the fighters - which according to Tekere was “a hell of a task” (quoted in Ranger 1980:80). Yet Mugabe himself did admit in January 1976 that the leaders were somewhat detached from the guerrillas:

“We as leaders have not seen the struggle from the same angle that the military have seen it, and we have only just woken to the fact that we are not at one with the military. The time has come, therefore, for everyone like me who has in the past regarded himself as a political leader to take upon himself the task which our military has taken, and identify with the struggle by participating in it”.

(quoted in Ranger 1980:83)

So it seems clear that for much of the struggle, most leaders were in fact rather separated from the fighting guerrillas. While they constantly preached armed struggle and in that sense were committed to it, there were few – apart from such revolutionaries as Tongogara and Rex Nhongo, obviously – that actually spent much time in the battlefields and as such could relate to guerrilla warfare. While many have therefore argued that the ZANU leadership was a small elitist group (Saul 1979:111), it seems that this did not constitute a major problem for the majority of the followers, and they were content with Mugabe’s two months in the camps. Whether this was due to lack of alternatives or not, it seems credible that Mugabe’s embrace of armed struggle was highly appealing after the disappointments of Muzorewa and Sithole. In a radio broadcast from Mozambique in 1976, Mugabe had this to say about democratic elections:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.

(quoted in Meredith 2002:225)

2.3 Assessment

”... although it requires some careful amending..., one of the best documented ironies of revolutionary movements is that the social class of revolutionary leaders approximates that of political elites more closely than it does the social class of those the revolutionaries claim to lead toward greater social justice. The implication is obvious and dramatic: the great mass of those who would be liberated are unable to liberate themselves” (Greene 1984:60).

When comparing the ANC in South Africa and ZANU, it appears that these cases do help to verify Thomas Greene’s theory. This is particularly so when considering the fact that these leaders grew up in severely repressive environments, where the vast majority of Africans were deprived of not only material goods - sometimes even such to cover basic needs - but most certainly the chance to acquire a decent education. “In education, health, income, every aspect of life, blacks were barely at a subsistence level while whites had the highest standards in the world – and aimed to keep it that way” (Mandela 2003:53). The fact that the leaders of these movements were from far more fortunate backgrounds than average is especially obvious in the case of Herbert Chitepo, who became the first ever African Rhodesian to become a barrister. Robert Mugabe acquired a total of six university degrees, even though three of these were while in detention. In South Africa, both Mandela and Tambo managed to become lawyers under an exceptionally hostile apartheid government. While one can assume that their deprived African clients were not the greatest source of income, they still had the resources to lead a liberation movement on the side.

However, it must be emphasised that in both countries, the leaders could not accomplish what they did on material resources alone. First of all, an impressive sense of will and ambition was evident among all the leaders, as well as a burning passion to achieve their goal, and the willingness to sacrifice certain aspects of life in

that struggle. Nelson Mandela later admitted that by dedicating his life to the struggle and his people, he was not able to fulfil his roles either as a husband nor as a father (Lodge 2006:16). The support of families and friends was also of substantial importance in enabling their activities. While Mandela was helped by his guardian, Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo, to pay for his education at Fort Hare, and later by Walter Sisulu for his further education (Meredith 1997:14), Mugabe was assisted by Father O’Hea in paying his tuition fees (Meredith 2002:21). Later, when the leaders eventually got married, their wives not only took care of their homes and raised their children, but were in most cases politically active themselves. While Fort Hare could be seen as an “elite black institution” (Meredith 2002:22), it also charged much lower fees than was usual in order to give students from poorer backgrounds a chance of gaining access. It was in fact the only one of its kind in the area, and a degree from Fort Hare was considered a “passport to success” (Meredith 1997:24).

Mandela was as mentioned highly gifted as an orator, and much of what he said made a great impression on his audience. But the government decided to implement censorship, and printing his speeches or statements became prohibited. Mugabe, on the other hand, was hardly trying to charm a nation, or the international community for that matter, with clever rhetoric. He apparently trusted that the legitimacy of their cause, combined with the power of the African population, was enough for an eventual victory. And in retrospect it seems he was entitled to some of that confidence. He was not known to have great political skills (Africa Research Bulletin 1978:4994), and has been described as “a cold, austere figure who rarely smiled and seemed bent on achieving revolution, whatever the cost” (Meredith 2008:7). But while Mandela was accused of turning accommodationist during negotiations, Mugabe was never one for compromise. The British found him difficult to deal with, and the Frontline presidents were infuriated by the stubbornness during the attempted negotiations. While Mugabe was known to be the most militant, the entire ZANU leadership was known to be very unrelenting. Herbert Chitepo had the confidence of Nyerere, but still managed to provoke the Tanzanian president into calling him a “black Napoleon”, while accusing the entire ZANU of being “married to disunity” (Martin and Johnson 1981:155). But Mugabe was also known as “quiet spoken and articulate” (Meredith 2008:2), and even described as “pleasant”, as well as “decent and humane” by a man held hostage by ZANLA (Martin and Johnson 1981:107).

In sum, the leaders of both organisations were obviously part of an African elite, and clearly more middle class, as opposed to the rest of the population. Thomas Greene has borrowed the definition of ‘intellectuals’ from Lerner, Pool and Schueller: those “who are predisposed – through temperament, family, education, occupation, etc. – to manipulate the symbolic, rather than the material environment” (1984:64). The leaders of both the ANC and ZANU were indeed intellectuals. According to Greene, leftist revolutionary leaders in underdeveloped societies are very likely to be intellectuals, especially as they are more likely to have experienced how other societies function, that are not oppressive in nature. While Mugabe was impressed by the achievements in Ghana, Mandela was brought up as a privileged boy in a rural society where racial groups were not an issue. However, their bourgeois backgrounds were not necessarily a negative characteristic. It appears to be not only a very common trait in leftist revolutionary movements, but arguably a requirement for success. Lenin claimed that the working class, if left on its own with no intervention by the upper classes, “its political vision would never pierce through the veil of trade union consciousness” (Greene 1984:60). Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara argued that a successful peasant revolution likewise depended on being led by the higher classes. As these were seen as the ideals for the respective movements, this merely acted to reinforce the legitimacy of the leaders. So, however thought-provoking it may be, these two cases are indeed two more that help verify Greene’s theory that the majority of those in need of liberation are dependent on others to liberate them.

Chapter 3 - Followers

3.1 The ANC

The leaders of the ANC from the 1960s and onwards, started out as followers. At the time they joined the movement, they were very typical as such. They were young males, and most of them had just acquired an education, or were in the course of doing so. Many also had trade union backgrounds. They all shared a passion for politics, and would get together for discussions, unified by their opposition to a severely discriminatory regime as well as being influenced by pan-Africanism, Ghana's president Kwame Nkrumah, and others who challenged colonialism in Africa. However, as the ANC developed, Walter Sisulu was the first to accept that in order to make an impact, there was an urgent need for support from a much broader section of the population. Despite Africans far outnumbering whites in South Africa, they were not a homogenous unified people. Containing a large number of different ethnicities further divided into subgroups, there was no common, shared allegiance. A significant proportion of the African population was also far removed from the centre of ANC activity, which was mainly in the Eastern Cape and Transvaal area.

According to Greene, revolutions are unlikely to succeed if they only gather support from a limited class base, such as either the working class, peasants or the middle class. He emphasises the need for a "critical mass of most or all of the major classes in the society" (1984:83), as well as establishing crosscutting alliances, whether across class, race, or any such boundaries. Although many whites, Coloureds and Indians wished to support the liberation struggle actively and join the ANC, they were not welcome in the early stages due to their skin-colour. But as Mandela and others took on Sisulu's view, this gradually changed, but only after the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955, and most notably with the Morogoro conference in 1969. At first, this was limited to Indians, Coloureds and whites with politically leftist convictions. Towards the latter stages of the struggle, as a result of both boycotts and the appeal of leaders such as Mandela, white business people - even capitalists - saw the need for a change of the system, and supported the cause. Indeed these businessmen served "the twofold purpose of splitting the enemy and adding power to the broad anti-apartheid forces" (Adam 1988:118). While inclusiveness was quite

possibly one of the reasons for success in the end, it also caused the alienation of the more Africanist elements in the struggle, such as PAC and the Black Consciousness movement, as well as preventing crucial support from parts of the African continent (Pfister 2003:54).

As the ANC was urban-led at the time, it failed to gain much support from the peasantry, as they had little, if any, presence in the rural areas. This had a lot to do with the regime's barriers, which effectively controlled the "flow of people and ideas between town and the countryside" (Lodge 1983:290). In 1960 more than 90% of Africans on the continent were peasants (Macridis 1986:314). Even though it is likely that the number was lower in South Africa, it is clear that they lacked backing from a large group of the population. At the time of the Rivonia Trial in the early sixties, ANC membership amounted to little more than one percent on the South African population (Meredith 1997:269). This is the reason why protracted guerrilla warfare, which is dependent on peasant support, was out of the question in South Africa, and the movement had to rely on acts of sabotage in the urban areas. However, they did attract substantial support in the townships as a result of the M-plan, or underground structures popularised by Mandela. The Soweto riots especially helped mobilise township youth, and the following student exodus provided *Umkhonto* with "a new army of highly motivated and well-educated ...saboteurs" (Lodge 1983:339). The average age of the MK guerrilla dropped in just one year from thirty-five to twenty-eight (Davis 1987:28). Apparently some 14,000 youths left the country, most of them joining the ANC. Many ended up in Mozambique, at that time the main operational centre for *Umkhonto*, and others went to camps in Angola. The more promising youth were sent to the Soviet Union or East Germany for training. However, during the township uprisings in the mid-1980s, the exiled leadership had little influence over the happenings.

The ANC did however gain support from a substantial part of the working class, and joined the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in the Congress alliance in the beginning of the 1960s, together with the Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress (Meredith 1997:203). Later, in 1985, the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF), which comprised of more than 700 affiliate organisations from all fields of interest and national groups

(Meli 1989:193), joined in an alliance with the successor of SACTU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU was at the time the largest trade union in South Africa, and together with UDF adopted the Freedom Charter in 1987 (Pfister 2003:57). But as Greene (1984:82) points out, “the revolutionary potential of workers declines as they are organized and integrated into the economic and political systems of their society”. In those instances where they in fact are mobilised to play an active role in a revolution, he argues, this will usually happen only after other factions of the population, such as students or peasants, have already started. In the case of South Africa, it was certainly the students and youth who played the more active part in the struggle. In 1980 the Soweto daily *The Post* began a ‘Release Mandela’ petition campaign for several months, as well as helping popularise the Freedom Charter. The non-racial Congress of South African Students (COSAS), among others, soon adopted it. The revival of political radicalism among Indians also served to place the ANC “at the political centre of gravity within black South African society” (Lodge 1983:341).

As with the leaders, the followers of the ANC tended to be Xhosa, but the ANC was not a Xhosa movement. However, on occasions such as during the ANC-Inkatha clashes, Xhosas were identified as ANC supporters, as opposed to Zulus, who were seen as Inkatha supporters - regardless of their actual allegiances. Inkatha members living in township hostels would at night attack Xhosa people assumed to be ANC supporters with spears and axes, and, as is largely believed, with the support of the police (Meredith 1997; Lodge 2006:174). “Many Zulu-speakers living near hostels were forced to align themselves with hostel dwellers as their only means of defence against revenge attacks by township residents” (Meredith 1997:426). In this way the government helped to reinforce ethnic divisions, as well as inciting ANC followers to use increased violence.

Interestingly, there were not such armed clashes between the ANC and PAC, whom it considered its main rival. PAC was considered to be more prone to violence than the ANC, but was also more radical, and therefore not a potential ally for the South African government. The leader of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, however, was perceived as the more moderate of the resistance leaders, and was therefore approached by the government for early-phase negotiations as well as more dubious

undertakings – when authorities realised they could exploit their shared rivalries with the ANC. The rivalry with PAC was therefore more for international support. But it has been argued that there was an ethnic division between the two organisations, in addition to an ideological one. While there was a clear tendency for Xhosas to support the ANC, PAC was usually supported by Sothos (Breytenbach 1989:75).

3.2 ZANU

Mugabe and the other leaders of ZANU were indeed the founders of the organisation, and were not followers in that sense. While most of the students and intellectuals joined the higher ranks, it has also been argued that in comparison with ZAPU, ZANU attracted more support from intellectuals (Meredith 1979:40). Their main task was to mobilise support for the second *Chimurenga*, especially in Mashonaland, and ZANU was more successful than the South Africans in gathering the support of the peasants. The return of land was a major grievance, and largely facilitated rural support. However, in the earlier stages of the struggle, they encountered some difficulties in recruiting a sufficient number of cadres. They then resorted to so-called ‘press-ganging’ – went into villages with force and said that the boys or young men had no choice but to join them (Martin and Johnson 1981:23). However, this was apparently also so for their rivals in ZAPU. In Zambia, the level of kidnapping went so far that the Zambian government arrested 56 members of ZANU and ZAPU, and deported them to Tanzania (Meredith 1979:70). People in the rural areas were therefore quite terrified of the guerrillas as their reputation spread. The Rhodesian government efficiently took advantage of this, in their propaganda campaign of labelling the guerrillas ‘bandits’. As ‘guerrilla’ gave a notion of heroic men fighting for their political beliefs, ‘bandit’ implied a thug or a thief, with no cause – or at best a highly discredited one. The security forces went further and called the insurgents *magandanga*, “wild people who live in the bush”, but also implying the possession of a tail, which added to a sense of animality (Ranger 1986:379). ZANLA fighters often turned around to show they had no tail when seeking support in rural areas.

But ZANU did not always have to resort to coercion, especially after the coup in Portugal in 1974, which would lead to the decolonisation in Mozambique and

Angola. By seeing their neighbours gaining the freedom they fought for so long, young Zimbabweans became motivated to join the struggle for their own freedom. However, people were still frightened when ZANLA guerrillas came into their villages, so they had to convince them that they were friendly and respectful before the population could be at ease with their presence. Indeed ZANLA had a set of rules of conduct, comprising of three main rules of discipline and nine points of attention. To prevent traitors, guerrilla behaviour was not always according to these rules. ZANU's publicity secretary Eddison Zvogbo explained: "In every guerrilla war there is a need to demonstrate power. When you do so depends on careful calculation, because too much repulses and you lose support, while too little demonstrates weakness and you also lose support" (quoted in Ranger 1986:382). But guerrillas often executed traitors or 'sell-outs', as well as suspected witches, in front of a whole village, frequently creating much fear and terror. Still, large parts of the peasant population continued to back the guerrillas, as they were convinced that liberation could only be attained through an armed struggle. However, it has been argued that there has been too much emphasis on socio-economic reasons for active peasant support, with claims that the rural population resented states, markets and people from other classes, and was therefore prepared to join the fight against the government. Norma Kriger has in her study on peasant support for ZANU, argued that the low status of unmarried boys and girls in peasant society played a larger role, and that by joining the guerrilla war they were challenging the authority of their elders (1992:239).

The ZANLA fighters were fairly well hidden by the peasants, by moving among them as if they were themselves peasants, so that the security forces could not distinguish who was a guerrilla from the ordinary population. This was a strategy firmly in line with Maoist thinking, which ZANU had learned by their main external supporters during the struggle. Unfortunately, however, this did imply a great deal of danger for the population, as the government forces killed many civilians when targeting guerrillas. While the villagers gave their passive support to ZANU by not reporting their presence and being uncooperative with government agencies, others gave more active support. Many living in rural areas acted as *mujibas*, a South African slang word for "young unemployed men who live by their wits" (Martin and Johnson 1981:73). They acted as the eyes and ears of the guerrillas, and were messengers as

well as intermediaries between the combatants and the local populations. The female *mujibas* were called *chimbwidios* (Cliffe 1979:128). Such contacts grew to become a substantial network, and provided the insurgents with important local information, as well as information about the security forces and their responses to ZANLA activity. According to ZANLA commanders, they numbered over 50,000 by the end of the war in 1979. However, some of these the government succeeded in turning around to work for them instead, as they could tempt them with awards of payment, while the guerrillas had to count on people to volunteer. Those collaborating with the government knew a lot about ZANLA, and it was easier for them to point out the guerrilla in a crowd. They were often eager to impress their 'masters', and "another person killed meant another stripe on their arms" (Father Vernon quoted in Ranger 1986:387).

Towards the end of the armed struggle, especially around 1978-79, it has been claimed that many guerrillas started to drink much more alcohol than previously. They became a liability to the liberation movement, and were endangering their own lives as well as the lives of the people in their areas. They were generally behaving very badly towards the peasants, demanding that they buy them drink and even raping their daughters. In fact, women were increasingly allowed to join ZANLA, and also they were sexually abused (Mashingaidze 2003:139). This gave increased justification to the government's 'bandit' label. However, during the Lancaster negotiations, the ZANLA soldiers again appeared disciplined as they marched to assembly points, after the cease-fire was established. In the 1980 elections, however, they began using intimidation to secure votes. While the other parties also took part in this, ZANU was apparently "the worst culprit by far" (Meredith 2008:10). Still, post-independence the people "realised their debt to the guerrillas for the 1980 victory", and thereby ZANLA had secured a "place as heroic men rather than as animal bandits" (Ranger 1986:390).

Terence Ranger has argued that by the time the second *Chimurenga* began, the peasants were very aware of what the white regime had done to them. He explains the nature of peasant consciousness by the 1970s, in that they were willing to fight the guerrilla war locally for the return of their lost land, and nationally hoped for a regime change to ensure the support of black farming as well as "high prices, good marketing

facilities, supplies of cheap fertilizer, and so on” (Ranger 1985:177). This certainly helped ZANU in their quest for support, and indeed they encouraged this consciousness and promised the land would be returned when they came to power. The deep commitment to land, Ranger further notes, made the peasant war in Zimbabwe very similar to the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (1985:183).

Spirits and the mediums through which they conveyed their messages, were of much significance to the peasants in the late sixties and seventies as they were a symbol of the peasantry’s fundamental right to the land (Ranger 1985:197). They were responsible for rain, good harvests, diseases and pests, and if the soil was not cultivated in a way favoured by the spirits – as the Europeans did not – they would punish the farmers. The guerrillas were also motivated by the spirit mediums, as many believed that they helped them in the struggle. The earlier ZANLA fighters had received much ideological training and therefore fully understood the legitimacy of their cause. However, when they first got in contact with the peasants, gaining support for their cause and even new recruits was facilitated by first going to the mediums, who not only gave guidance in launching the war, but also gave the guerrillas legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants (Ranger 1985:204). The government tried, and in a few cases succeeded, in co-opting mediums over to their side and against the nationalist guerrillas, but these largely lost credibility among the population.

3.3 Assessment

As Greene points out (1984:79), it is not easy to distinguish between leaders and followers in a revolutionary movement. Followers can gradually turn into leaders, and followers can give varying degrees of support – from the active supporter risking their life either by joining the guerrillas or even by hiding and ensuring the safety of the guerrillas, to the very passive - verging on apathy. But the typical follower is as mentioned young, male and unmarried, and often an intellectual or a student. “The students are the most coherent and effective revolutionaries within the intelligentsia” (Huntington 1968:290). However, they will often tend to become members of the higher ranks. Alone they cannot create revolutions. In urban-based movements, the unemployed or underemployed are likely to form a large part of the following –

especially if somewhat politically aware, although these would usually be limited to the rank-and-file. In rural-based revolutions, the active participation of the peasantry is depended upon.

While leftist revolutionary movements look for support among the lower social classes such as workers or the peasantry, the bourgeois movements look to the middle and upper classes (Greene 1984:80). In both the South African and the Zimbabwean case it would be almost impossible to then have a bourgeois movement, as there were so few, if any, Africans that could qualify as middle-class. Both movements were clearly part of the former category. The ANC saw the need to attract the urban-based workers, as this was where ANC activity was based. The urban-based poor were not targeted as supporters, as severe poverty prevents political activism (Greene 1984:81). The Zimbabweans had the circumstances that enabled rural guerrilla warfare, and appealed to the peasantry. After the first stages of the respective revolutions were achieved - i.e. majority rule was implemented - leftist goals were not pursued, despite the leftist appeals. The main disappointment among the population was the failure to distribute wealth satisfactorily. This could be seen as an implication of a failure to achieve a successful second phase of Huntington's "complete revolution", which involves "the creation and institutionalisation of a new political order" (1968:266).

Eric Wolf (1969:292) has argued that "it is not so much the growth of an industrial proletariat as such which produces revolutionary activity, as the development of an industrial workforce still closely geared to life in the villages". It is the nature of capitalism, he notes, that cuts people off "from their accustomed social matrix in order to transform them into actors, independent of prior social commitments to kin and neighbors" (1969:279). The situation for black South Africans was further exacerbated by the harsh apartheid laws. Not only did capitalism force them to move from rural areas into urban slums, legislation made sure that they lived in such areas with a very poor living standard, whether or not they wanted to. The apartheid regime effectively divided the country into white and black areas, reserving the best areas for themselves. This would undoubtedly cause much discontent and frustration, which facilitated mobilisation for the ANC.

The situation in Rhodesia was different. It also had discriminatory laws, but not the same institutionalised ‘separateness’ as South Africa. The size of the country was much smaller, as well as the population. The Zimbabweans had the advantage of facing an enemy whose population was sufficiently small for them to be able to pose a threat through protracted guerrilla warfare. With a black population of 5.5 million, there were only 250,000 whites. With a regular army of 3,500 men, many warned that the Rhodesian government would not survive a prolonged war, despite increasing compulsory enrolment (Martin and Johnson 1981:97).

“The apparent irony of proletarian revolt in pursuit of bourgeois goals suggests the complexity of interests that motivate revolutionary leaders and followers. It is plainly wrong to assume that leaders and followers hold the same opinions, attitudes and beliefs only because they are temporary allies in their assault on the bastions of power” (Greene 1984:82). This is necessarily true as leaders and followers are likely to be from very different classes of society. While the more immediate goal, being in both cases the end of white domination, was a common aim, the interests driving the different groups were bound to differ. Leaders were more concerned about political organisation and the social order, and the ANC and ZANU preached freedom, justice and equality. A revolutionary follower, on the other hand, was “more likely to think in terms of greater security and material well-being for himself” (Greene 1984:83). One can speculate whether the leaders of both movements had a sincere aim of implementing socialist goals, or if this was empty rhetoric to cover for the typical bourgeois revolutionary aim of extending equality to their own middle class only. Priorities could have changed on the way, or policies could have proven impossible to implement. In either case, both countries continued the capitalist tradition after the power-change.

As mentioned, Greene (1984:83) emphasises the “one obvious common denominator that cuts across all successful revolutionary movements”, namely mobilising a so-called ‘critical mass’ of the vast majority of classes in a society. If only pursuing a strategy intended to fulfil the narrow set of interests of one particular social class, any revolutionary movement is doomed to fail. Rather, a movement must create alliances cutting across the classes through a common cause. Both the South African and Zimbabwean movement avoided this trap. The ANC was with its policy of

inclusiveness, a multiracial and multi-class movement, with support ranging from township residents to white capitalists – so by definition what Greene is implying. ZANU, although being more a peasant-supported movement, were supported more according to region or ethnicity. As 70% of Zimbabweans were Mashona, this was a major advantage for ZANU. According to Tongogara, the Rhodesian forces were indeed “a major mobilizing force for the guerrillas” (Martin and Johnson 1981:89), as civilians who witnessed innocent people being bombed and killed, saw joining the ZANLA fighters as the safest alternative.

According to Greene’s theory, the typical follower was relatively young, male, unmarried and intellectual, which corresponds to the two cases to a certain degree. There were indeed many women activists, but they were usually somewhat restricted due to raising children and keeping a household, and in some cases reluctant due to sexual harassment. Yet Sally Mugabe and Winnie Mandela were indeed very active. Winnie had several children during the struggle, in which she spent much time in prison, solitary confinement and house arrest. However, there were many other equally courageous women, such as Walter Sisulu’s wife, Albertina. While ZANU mainly appealed to the peasantry and the land issue, many students in South Africa joined the organisation, although only significantly after the Soweto uprisings in 1976, and the uprisings in the mid-eighties. However, the ANC and ZANU were not typical leftist movements as such, and were pursuing national interests rather than those of a specific social class. It has indeed been argued that what is significant about African rural wars - which Rhodesia was a clear example of - “is that the self-perception of the participants has always been ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘class’” (Breytenbach 1981:15). While the ZANU/ZAPU divide in Rhodesia was clearly an ethnic one, the split between the ANC and PAC was more ideological – but ethnicity did play a role.

Chapter 4 - Ideology

4.1 The ANC

“The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism” (Mandela during the Rivonia Trial, quoted in Mandela 2003:50). The ANC aimed to present itself as a multiracial, multi-class movement, with the aim of freeing Africans from white domination, but also creating a non-racial society. However, in the early days, when the Youth League was rebelling against the inefficiency and moderation of the old guard of the ANC, the message was far more radical. Anton Lembede, who was the leader of the ANCYL, maintained the crucial need for African leadership and control, in what was regarded as “essentially a philosophy of racial exclusivity” (Meredith 1997:66). Mandela was indeed deeply influenced by Lembede, as well as being an anti-communist, and in the mid-40s Lembede, Sisulu, Mandela and Tambo tried to get the communists expelled from the ANC. However, it has been argued that Lembede’s “forceful personality” became an “obstacle to [the ANC’s] advancement” (Meredith 1997:69). But after his sudden death in 1947, his successor, Peter Mda, switched the focus of attention from ‘Africanism’ to ‘African nationalism’. Together with Sisulu’s appeal for a wider approach, the ANC leadership eventually adopted a more inclusive policy, and realised the many advantages of working together with the Communist Party towards their common goal – the removal of white supremacy (Mandela 2003:51). However, what became a close alliance with the SACP led many to believe that the ANC was in reality led by communists. Whether it was the ANC leaders that had communist leanings, or the SACP that was manipulating them and in effect making all the decisions, or even making the decisions with full approval from the ANC – they saw the communists, especially white communists, as having far too much influence.

However, these were the days of the Cold War. The Western world in particular had a fear of communism almost verging on paranoia, exemplified by McCarthyism’s hunt for communists in the United States in the 1950s. It was indeed the US, as one of the world’s two superpowers, which had a substantial influence over large parts of the world, including many South Africans. The National Party shared this sentiment, and viewed communism as “the work of the devil” (Mandela 2003:304). The Suppression of Communism Act in fact targeted “any related form of [the Communist] doctrine”

seeking political, industrial, social or economic change through the disruption of order (quoted in Meredith 1997:86). General C.L. Viljoen, chief of the South African Defence Force, argued that rather than Africans fighting for the more legitimate cause of liberation, what South Africa was experiencing was the “Soviet Union’s support for terrorism under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation” as part of their struggle for “world domination” (1984:4). “Here it bears emphasising”, John Saul (1988:211) explains, “that for extended periods of time in South Africa racial hierarchisation and capitalist relations of production have been mutually reinforcing”. According to him, white capitalists had a vested interest in maintaining the system in order to legitimise exceptionally cheap labour in areas such as the mining sector. And justifying this by emphasising the need to contain communism gave far more legitimacy than simply refusing to give Africans any rights in order to protect white comfort. This, he writes, has often been referred to as ‘racial capitalism’.

On the other hand, communism was far from intimidating to the liberation movements. Indeed the Third International of 1920 clearly states that “all Communist Parties must give active support to the revolutionary movements of liberation” (quoted in Macridis 1986:276), and that it was in fact the “duty” of the Communist International. It could only seem natural that Marxism appealed to so many of the African liberation movements. “It rejected capitalism, which was taken to be synonymous with the capitalist exploitation of the colonial world, and it provided a vision of a new world of equality and prosperity” (Macridis 1986:276). Lenin called imperialism the highest stage of capitalism, and it was his writings that attracted the most attention in Southern Africa, especially as they served as a well-developed organisational tool for revolution.

“It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accepted communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression are a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals” (Mandela 2003:51).

While claiming he was not a communist, Mandela did not deny that the thought of a classless society appealed to him. However, this stemmed more from his fascination with early African societies, where land belonged to the whole tribe and peaceful democracy was the norm (James 2003:20). While admitting he was influenced by Marxist thought, he also claimed to be an admirer of the parliamentary system of the West, as well as somewhat of an anglophile.

According to Mandela, a few ANC members, “especially those MK soldiers who had been trained in socialist countries, believed that the ANC and the [Communist Party] were one and the same” (2003:144). In fact, Bruno Mtolo, who had been the regional leader of the Natal faction of MK, had lost faith in *Umkhonto* when he became convinced that the armed wing was an instrument of the Communist Party. He therefore decided to betray the ANC leaders and testify against them at the Rivonia Trial (Mandela 2003:37). In this sense, it is possible to see where the communist-fearing National Party was coming from when they demanded that the ANC break from the SACP before negotiations could begin. However, it is also highly probable that the government’s constant accusations played a large part in confusing and in several instances convincing different parties that the two were the same.

The Freedom Charter, Mandela maintained, was not a blueprint for socialism, but rather that of an African type of capitalism (Mandela 2003:50). In the initial Charter, it affirmed the equal status of all national groups, as well as a redistribution of land and public ownership of mines, banks, and monopoly industries. The transfer of power to the people implied power to all classes, rather than only to the working class. However, Mandela did call it a revolutionary document “precisely because the change it envisages cannot be won without breaking up the economic and political set-up of present South Africa” (Meredith 1997:139). But it was hardly a Communist Manifesto. According to John Saul (1988:224), it was a “popular-democratic” document, which could “be interpreted in an eminently petty bourgeois and reformist manner”. In fact, he writes, Mandela himself saw it as such.

Towards the end of the struggle, the ANC was reaching out to white capitalists. Some up-and-coming moderate ANC leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki, caused quite a bit of confusion. In denying that the ANC had ever been a socialist party, he went on to say

the national consciousness and national liberation were “deadly enemies of class consciousness and class emancipation” (Mbeki 1984:610). After previous attempts by the ANC leadership to present it as a class struggle rather than a black struggle, this reflected the lack of ideological clarity that to a certain degree plagued the ANC. However, this was mainly due to the fact that many failed to understand that a new type of socialism that was sweeping the continent, an African socialism, was different to the socialism of Marxist theory, as a stage before communism. Marxism rejects nationalism as it rather calls for internationalism – that the proletariat around the world unite, and ultimately create a classless society – implying no governing class. The African type of socialism, however, was far more moderate, with its demands for the abolishment of racial discrimination, and greater equality among the whole population economically, politically and socially. It was indeed very closely entwined with nationalism.

Many businessmen realised that a change of the political system was inevitable, and soon “nervous would-be-brokers (from the business community and elsewhere) [were] beating a path to the Lusaka headquarters” (Saul 1988:210, brackets in original). In September 1985, a group of businessmen led by the chairman of Anglo-American Gavin Relly, voiced their concerns to Oliver Tambo. They discussed reforming the system in a way that secured their businesses while abolishing racial discrimination – they were dependent on continued free enterprise (Meredith 1997:361). Soon lawyers and economists were drafting constitutional proposals based on the principles of the Freedom Charter. They did not include nationalising the mines, banks and monopoly industries, and rather prescribed a mixed economy (Holland 1990:213). John Saul, seemingly disappointed, saw this as the freeing of capital “by the popular movement to fight on a new terrain for a bourgeois-democratic, rather than a revolutionary democratic-cum-socialist, denouement of the liberation struggle”(1988:214).

“The ANC and SACP cannot be seen as two unlinked organisations which act independently of each other. They are united in a so-called revolutionary alliance for at least a *bourgeois* revolution, and as a result the boundaries between them are no longer clearly defined” (Koster 1986:ii). While the classification of the revolutionaries was indeed a contested area, the ideology of the ANC was even more

so. However, Heribert Adam has argued that “the ANC represents too amorphous and broad-based an alliance to be used as a front organisation for the SACP” (Adam 1988:119), and that the ANC were in fact “relatively moderate”. Instead, the close relationship between the two came about as both the organisations saw the need for an alliance. As the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) disbanded itself as a somewhat hasty response to the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, discussions over the need to unite the class and national struggles became intense. South Africa was in a particular situation where the permanently settled white population was able to exert “a more complete control of political and economic power than [was] possible in a typical colonial country” (Joe Matthews quoted in Everatt 1991:38). Lenin had supported temporary alliances between working class movements and national movements, where the latter were bourgeois and anti-imperial, in a broader anti-imperial struggle. South Africa had no well-developed African bourgeoisie or class-conscious African proletariat. Transvaal activists of the former CPSA decided to form their own organisation that was to become the SACP, and merged the class and national struggle by joining the ANC’s struggle. When the South African government demanded that the ANC break with the SACP in 1989 as a precondition for negotiations, Mandela replied: “which man of honour will ever desert a life-long friend at the insistence of a common opponent and still retain a measure of credibility among his people?” (quoted in Rantete and Giliomee 1992:519).

It is also worth noting that non-violence had been one of the most central aspects of ANC ideology for a long period of time, and although the military wing was launched in 1961, no MK activity was intended to harm civilians. The increase in casualties towards the mid-80s was more a result of individual action caused by frustration, and not according to MK guidelines. “It is not the communists who radicalise the townships, but the youth who radicalise the communists and the ANC” (Adam 1988:105). Indeed there was widespread recognition that the strongest revolutionary potential among black South Africans was among young urban students (Breytenbach 1981:19). However, it is disputed whether the ANC in fact did give consent – unofficially – to such violence, and therefore should have taken responsibility for it.

Joe Slovo, while writing that the Freedom Charter was not inconsistent with an advance towards socialism, specified that “the ANC does not and should not demand

a commitment to a socialist South Africa as a precondition for membership” (quoted in Saul 1988:221). It was a mass movement, he explained, implying a multi-class nature, and it was rather the role of the SACP to represent the working class. As this was at a time when the trade union movement was rather weak, the working class itself was concerned about the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie to control political movements. They did not merely want the revolution to entail black bosses replacing white bosses, but instead a restructuring of the exploitative capitalist system.

Chief Luthuli, who was president of the ANC between 1952 and 1967, wrote in 1959 about why a counter racialism had not occurred on behalf of the black population in response to the humiliating treatment of apartheid: “That it has not done so is no accident. It is because, deliberately and advisedly, African leadership for the past fifty years, with the inspiration of the African National Congress... has set itself steadfastly against racial vaingloriousness” (quoted in Meredith 1997:162). While parts of the African population did develop strong anti-white sentiments such as many pan-Africanist and Black Consciousness activists, the ANC managed to contain the ideology of the movement, and prevent it from reacting to such treatment in a way that would seem merely natural for human beings. While some undoubtedly felt anger and bitterness in response to the dehumanisation of apartheid, the ANC message remained one of racial harmony and togetherness. All hatred was directed at the apartheid ideology, and not towards the white population. The ability to do so after so many years of oppression, even in times of despair and seemingly hopelessness, is due to in part organisational skill and a strong ideology – whether or not its political direction was largely disputed. But Gary Prevost (2006:167) has argued that from its founding, the ANC has represented a very broad range of political interests, and therefore by definition been what constitutes a moderate movement. Between 1960 and 1990, he notes, the national and international context enabled the more radical elements to have a more profound impact on the ANC. But with the happenings in 1990, the revolutionary influence had to step down and give way to the moderate voice that had been there from the start.

4.2 ZANU

The situation in Zimbabwe was much the same as in South Africa, although much more straightforward. The ZANU leadership was also influenced by Marxist ideas. Some of the leaders had been students at Fort Hare and were introduced to such political thinking there. Others were undoubtedly influenced by the prevailing political sentiment on the continent in the 1960s – that of African nationalism with a socialist leaning and an idolisation of revolutionaries. However, after the Sino-Russian split, ZANU did not become part of the group supported by the Soviet Union, and increasingly turned to the People's Republic of China. This entailed a natural adoption of a Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare, quite different from the style of Lenin. However, certain similarities were inevitable, as both Mao and Lenin were acclaimed Marxists. But Mao's theories were more directed towards rural societies, and he aimed to create a new government based on peasant support with "guerrilla warfare as its defence and land to the tiller as its creed" (Pandya 1988:16).

Reading Mao turned out to have a very positive impact on ZANU. They adopted a more pronounced socialist ideology, and adopted Mao's three stages of protracted guerrilla warfare - which proved to be a crucial factor for their success. ZANU never had a Communist Party that it could get support from or be influenced by, nor that it had to keep reiterating its distance to in order to reassure parts of the population in Rhodesia. Instead, ZANU had other resistance movements that they were competing with, having the effect that ZANU – seen especially by white Rhodesians to be the most militant of them – increasingly criticised the moderation and lack of fighting will of the other movements, in order to reassert themselves as the more powerful movement. ZAPU more than others were frequently portrayed as incompetent fighters. "We knew ZAPU wasn't fighting, that ZAPU had no experience" (Tongogara quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:219). It has in fact been argued that after ZANU and ZAPU joined forces and established ZIPA in January 1976, ZANU was doing most of the fighting (Martin and Johnson 1981:223). According to Africa Research Bulletin (1976:4199), ZANU themselves "[knew] that they [had] the military edge". However, it has been argued that this was because ZAPU had already withdrawn from the alliance due to clashes between the two factions (Meredith 1979:246). Still, this only seemed to intensify the militancy of ZANU. It was reported

that ZAPU cadres withdrew from the ZANU-dominated ZIPA army as they were frightened of the Karanga hegemony in the army, and that they indeed feared for their lives. ZAPU sources claimed that around 100 of their fighters had been killed by ZANU during only three months in 1976 (ARB 1976:4199). So when Mugabe and Nkomo later that year decided to create a Patriotic Front (PF) between ZANU and ZAPU, which would enable them to attend the Geneva Conference with a united common stand, this was perceived as “at best, a fragile union of two political groups deeply divided on tribal, ideological and personality grounds” (ARB 1976:4198).

Muzorewa was also a favoured target for ZANU. After he had embarked on secret talks with Ian Smith in 1973, it became clear that he dropped the demand for ‘one man, one vote’, believing that an agreement would be reached. ZANU soon issued a statement from Lusaka, saying that by this they understood that the British Government was trying to create an African puppet regime in Rhodesia, and that “in Bishop Muzorewa they could not have found a better candidate” (ARB 1974:3112). ZANU were distrustful of the British Government’s involvement in the Rhodesian conflict, and in this regard decided to unite them with the enemy. They did therefore not object to “the racist Ian Smith” attending the Geneva Conference, as he would merely be part of the British delegation (ARB 1976:4198).

ZANU was also first and foremost nationalist, but had a more pronounced socialist leaning. A reason for this was undoubtedly because socialists got much more attention from Zimbabweans than those with other leanings (Chimutengwende 1976:61). The organisation in no way wished to gain support from more moderate groups in society or from capitalists. It did not have to tread carefully as not to alarm anti-communists, or western powers that feared the spread of socialist rule. In fact, for ZANU the support of their neighbours, in particular the Frontline states, was by far the most important, in order to ensure areas across their borders where they could have the rear bases that were so crucial for guerrilla warfare. And the leaders of these countries were indeed acclaimed socialists, and obviously in favour of ZANU’s socialist ideals (ARB 1978:4994). Furthermore they supported the armed struggle. When Muzorewa criticised the establishment of ZIPA, claiming that resuming the armed struggle was a major setback for the nationalist struggle, Nyerere replied:

“You people seem to think that power comes from the barrel of the mouth rather than the barrel of the gun” (quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:224).

Mugabe’s militant attitude may indeed be one of the reasons he was so unanimously voted the next leader of ZANU, after Sithole. Sithole himself had previously embraced the armed struggle in much the same way, but had increasingly begun to opt for negotiations instead. By 1977 he was one of the two nationalists who were considered likely to work with Ian Smith for an internal settlement, the other obviously being Bishop Muzorewa (ARB 1977:4512). Zvogbo praised Mugabe for having “been the most consistent of all the leading Nationalists for the solution of our problem through armed struggle” (quoted in Ranger 1980:82). Mugabe was indeed very unrelenting, and not really willing to compromise. The only reason an agreement was signed at Lancaster House in 1979 was due to the immense pressure of African authorities such as Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda.

John Saul has argued (1979:112) that “Zimbabwean exile politics, both inside and between the liberation movements, came to manifest many of the most negative features characteristic of petty-bourgeois politics in already independent, neo-colonial Africa”. He further claims that by 1974-75, ZANU was plagued by petty bourgeois political infighting between various Shona subgroups and personalities (1979:115). There was also much concern that Mugabe, being a Zezuru, would have great difficulties in trying to represent the Karanga-dominated ZIPA army (ARB 1976:4199). Despite such turbulence, up until the elections in 1980, Mugabe’s manifesto still denounced racism, tribalism and regionalism (Meredith 2008:10). However, soon after coming to power with AK-47s as election symbol, he saw the need to crush his opponents, and his “strategy henceforth was to have fearful consequences for Matabeleland” (Meredith 2008:62).

4.3 Assessment

The principal function of revolutionary ideology is to “facilitate the development of cross-cutting alliances between the active minorities of the society’s major classes” (Greene 1984:99). It serves to provide a common set of basic values that will be accepted by its followers, and further give legitimacy to the movement. This is

especially important where the movement has substantial levels of violence as one of its main techniques. “The certainty of revolutionaries in the legitimacy of their acts helps to inspire them with optimism for the future and self-sacrifice for the present” (Greene 1984:103). Furthermore, the ideology is also intended to weaken the legitimacy of the regime, and will generally be in stark opposition to everything the regime’s ideology promotes.

At the time of the two liberation struggles, the world was largely divided by the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two countries were not in a position to fight a conventional war against each other, as this was considered far too dangerous for the survival of humankind – due to the development of nuclear weapons. They had to resort to other alternatives, and on the African continent they embarked on fighting proxy wars. The two powers began to support and supply each side of an already existing conflict, and fought each other by such means. In southern Africa, colonialism had led to a situation where the rulers of colonised countries were of European origin, and hence led largely capitalist regimes. While the whites in South Africa were now considered African, they too led a capitalist system in the European tradition. The Bolshevik communists in the Soviet Union had already in 1920 committed the Communist International to support the revolutionary movements of liberation “in the colonies and in the backward countries” (quoted in Macridis 1986:277). While this was long before the Cold War came about, this only helped to justify their increased involvement in the 1960s and 1970s. This also ensured a general sentiment favouring the socialist ideology among the African resistance movements before the armed struggles really erupted around 1960. Few turned to the United States for support before the later stages of the struggle, when the need for international political support became crucial, in order to pressure the opposing regime to relent. Before any such event, the communist powers had free access to the oppressed liberation groups.

“Communist ideology is probably the most coherent and articulate belief system in the history of revolution” (Greene 1984:99). While Marxism influenced both the South African and Zimbabwean movements, these did not promote a communist ideology. “Communism as a set of political tactics and organization developed by Lenin was welcomed by many, but not as a way of life. Most of the African elites

viewed their struggle for liberation in moral and religious terms, and sometimes even in the liberal terms in which nationalism had been couched in Europe in the nineteenth century” (Macridis 1986:279). The ANC put forth their cause as a deeply moral wrong that was being done against Africans, and while ZANU did see it as such as well, they did not have the same urge to pronounce this. Mugabe only began to talk in moral terms after the 1980 elections, when the need to calm the Rhodesians and indeed the rest of the world that he was not a “Marxist ogre” became evident (Meredith 2008:13).

Most of both the ANC and ZANU leadership were very religious – predominantly Catholic or Methodist. As mentioned above, this went against Marx’s idea of a communist society, as religion was perceived as ‘the opium of the people’ – having the effect of pacifying the population. The ANC in comparison to ZANU clearly had a much more moderate ideology, despite its formal relations with a communist party. Towards the end of the struggle Mandela was increasingly criticised for adopting a policy of accommodation. ZANU, on the other hand, continued to have a notably militant and uncompromising approach, especially when considering Mugabe’s idealising of guns and violence. Furthermore, ZANU was more pronounced in their socialist ideology of redistribution. The ANC – whether or not certain leaders were in fact socialist – had more difficulty insisting on prior demands of redistribution, and could not go against their multi-class and often capitalist ideals. Robert Fatton Jr has argued that it is precisely because of this all-class common front, rather than mobilising the black proletariat or peasantry, that rendered the ANC a “fundamentally populist movement which has yet to go beyond the confines of petty-bourgeois radicalism” (1984:593)

But according to Greene (1984:100), “an ideology that appeals to national identity is the most powerful symbolic means of mobilizing revolutionary support. Nationalism alone has the greatest potential for cutting across all the society’s classes”. So, while influenced by Marxist revolutionaries, it was nationalism that had the greatest impact and was the label the movements themselves used. It clearly appealed to both South Africans and Zimbabweans, as national liberation was the primary concern of all classes, and the belief that it would solve their individual grievances prevailed across the populations. This, combined with the theories of Lenin and Mao, proved to be the

perfect recipe in the case of the ANC and ZANU. In line with Greene's argument, this facilitated the success of the ideologies of the two movements, by enabling crosscutting alliances within the respective populations. Indeed, they provided legitimacy for the movements, both at the national and international level. For ZANU, this legitimacy was crucial due to the movement's more violent tactics, and even survived despite atrocities towards the population. Belief in their cause and that without them genuine liberation would never be attained, ensured the movement's glory, whether or not this was deserved.

Chapter 5 - Organisation

5.1 The ANC

The ANC was an older organisation, pursuing non-violent resistance to white domination, and its organisation reflected the challenges of a particular period of time. Dr A.B. Zuma streamlined the ANC organisation by having a new constitution drawn up, and giving full equality to women members. He centralised authority and tried to create an effective branch structure. Throughout the 1950s they continued to have organisational difficulties due to lack of resources and increased bannings of its leaders (Lodge 1983:196). Yet, the Defiance Campaign against unjust laws in 1952, in which many Africans burned their passes against the pass laws, was fairly successful, as well as the three-day stay-at-home in 1961. However, they did not bring about any change, and organised armed struggle only started with the foundation of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* in late 1961. Being an underground movement and having the regime-imposed barriers controlling the movement of the population, the restrictions were obviously a major restraint on the ANC. In fact, Ted Gurr has argued that the government deliberately used resettlement of the black population as “an effort to reduce the scope of dissident organization and coercive control” (1970:284). When its leadership was arrested soon after its launch, the management of the organisation was further impeded. But the training of cadres was taking place, despite the difficulties of ensuring external military bases under the colonial administrations in neighbouring Rhodesia, Mozambique, Bechuanaland and Angola. Tanzania was fortunately not under colonial rule after 1961, and ANC headquarters moved to its capital, Dar es Salaam. However, the relative political inactivity in South Africa after the Rivonia Trial made recruitment to the ANC and MK increasingly difficult (Motumi 1994:1).

By 1968, internal morale was low within the MK rank-and-file, and a group of defectors sought asylum in Kenya, as this was before any neighbouring countries gained independence. They claimed there was widespread discontent in the camps in Tanzania, and accused the *Umkhonto* commanders of living extravagantly and causing ethnic divisions. Furthermore, they said that the first expedition into Rhodesia in collaboration with ZAPU in August 1967 was “a suicide mission to

eliminate dissenters” (Lodge 1983:300). According to other dissatisfied MK cadres, there was a general state of confusion, lack of direction and reluctance towards discussing revolutionary issues. The Third Consultative Conference at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969 was launched to address such problems as the discontent of exile life within the ranks of the ANC and MK, as well as the counterproductive period of political apathy in South Africa (Motumi 1994:1).

At the conference the leadership was recognised as one of the main problems, and Tambo announced that the entire executive had resigned, and that a new one would be elected. The “unhealthy tendencies” had led to a situation where the ANC was no longer “organisationally geared” towards undertaking a people’s war (Lodge 1983:300). Also, the communication links within the ANC’s internal organisation were in a bad state. A Revolutionary Council (RC) was established, with the responsibility of the direction of *Umkhonto*, the overall supervision of the armed struggle, and dealing with complaints and grievances amongst the rank-and-file. Oliver Tambo was officially elected President, after having been acting president since Chief Luthuli had been hit by a train and died in 1967 – something that was largely believed among ANC members to be a murder. With only 70 delegates attending the conference, the highly controversial constitutional change was made to invite non-Africans to join the ANC’s External Mission, including the RC. Thereafter, competent revolutionaries, such as Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo and Reginald September were amongst the leaders voted onto the council. A ‘Revolutionary Programme’ was also adopted, but contrary to its misleading name, it was more an elaboration of the Freedom Charter. ANC ideology remained clearly conservative and essentially nationalist, and its “specifications still remained compatible with the preservation of a form of welfare state capitalism in South Africa” (Lodge 1983:301).

There were still tensions in the ANC leadership, mainly due to the opposition to the new constitutional change. This led to the expulsion in October 1975 of eight Africanist members, known as the ‘Makiwane eight’, as they were led by Tennyson Makiwane (Ndebele 2002:139), and their main source of discontent was the influence of the ‘petty bourgeois’ SACP. This occurred simultaneously as the Black Consciousness (BC) movement was gaining significance under the leadership of Stephen Bantu Biko and his black student organisation, the South African Students’

Organisation (SASO). This showed an emerging opposition to the ANC's non-racialism within the black population. While the BC movement included Asians and Coloureds in their definition of 'black', the ANC tried to turn the race issue to a class issue, by referring to these people as a *class* of people "engaged in a struggle against the white ruling 'class'" (Tambo quoted in Ndebele 2002:141). Still, this shows the conflicting sentiment within the resistance movement at the time.

The situation in South Africa – dubbed 'colonialism of a special type' by activists in the emerging SACP in the beginning of the 1950s (Everatt 1991:19) - had many in the resistance movement recognise the need for what the Communist Party had called a 'two-stage revolution'. This entailed first the national liberation of the African people, followed by a transformation of the political and socio-economic structure, as a national-democratic stage of the revolution. However, during the mid-80s some more moderate figures within the ANC were increasingly trying to downplay the socialist influence and calling only for the first stage. This served to further obscure the objectives of the ANC, and some had to admit, "much of the confusion among our friends in the international community is probably attributable to the imprecise terms our movement's discourse is usually couched in" (Jordan quoted in Saul 1988:217).

The colonised countries bordering South Africa made rear bases impossible, and an attempt was made to infiltrate from the sea in 1971, off the Transkei coast. However, they were arrested and imprisoned, and the building of the underground movement was again focused on. When the student riots broke out in 1976, the ANC was caught by surprise, and "not ready to exploit the events that followed" (Motumi 1994:2). However, it did lead to the growth of *Umkhonto*, and also resulted in a higher level of political consciousness amongst the cadres. This was even more the case after the Vaal uprisings in the mid-1980s.

Between 1976 and 1988, most MK training took place in Angola. Instructors were initially Cuban and Russian, but in 1978 MK instructors took over. General training took six months, and taught the use of firearms, mines, rocket launchers and communications systems. It included political education, map reading, physical training, first aid, intelligence work and disciplinary education. It was followed by specialisation courses. From 1986 cadres were sent to the Soviet Union for extensive

training in conventional warfare, and some went to East Germany and Yugoslavia for shorter periods. Cuba and Algeria also trained small groups of Special Forces. Towards the 1990s the eastern bloc situation led to relocation to Tanzania, Uganda, India, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Zambia (Motumi 1994:3-5). The ANC also built its own refugee educational centre in 1979, called Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFSCO), after the first MK soldier to be hanged by the South African government. It was located in Mazimbu, Tanzania, and took care of many of the younger children that fled South Africa in the late seventies and mid-eighties (Davis 1987:61-62).

While the government's ban severely restricted the means of communication within the movement, the M-Plan facilitated this to a great extent. Dividing the movement into underground cells in urban areas, just like Lenin's 'Soviets' in pre-communist Russia, the movement was divided into underground cells in urban areas and 'zones' or 'wards' in larger areas of townships. Now it was no longer necessary to call public meetings or issue statements that would most probably encourage repressive reactions from the authorities. Branch leaders were also required to organise political lectures to local supporters. However, these cells or zones required substantial work, and were therefore only implemented in a few places (Meredith 1997:111).

The organisational structures within the ANC and MK went through some changes following a conference held in Maputo in 1983. Previously, political and military affairs of the ANC had been separate within South Africa, and only met in the RC. Planning and operations in the regional command units were also separate. *Umkhonto* was politically accountable to the NEC, and the MK commander acted as accounting officer. At Maputo, they decided on joint planning, command and control of all operations of the armed struggle. The RC was replaced by the Politico-Military Council (PMC), which meant that the barrier between the political and the military was removed. The PMC was the executive arm of the NEC, and was charged with the overall strategic planning of internal ANC work, and implementing NEC decisions. An underground leadership structure was to be built, requiring better communication between internal and external wings, and leading to more operational freedom further down in the movement. And within the PMC, the Military Headquarters (MHQ) had considerable power in terms of control of MK cadres in the field. Still, pressure into

undertaking operations not sufficiently planned led to many arrests, injuries and even deaths of cadres in confrontation with South African forces (Motumi 1994:5).

Under the PMC were the MHQ, the Internal Political Committee (IPC), and Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, and Security (NAT). The MHQ was responsible for training, equipping, infiltrating and planning MK operations. The IPC was in charge of underground activity, propaganda distribution and mass mobilisation. NAT was working with intelligence and security issues. Further down were the Regional PMCs (RPMCs), that were situated outside South Africa, and then Area PMCs (APMCs), located in certain areas inside the country. The RPMCs were to have comprehensive knowledge of the units in their particular region, ensuring better control, command and communication with the units. APMCs were much smaller, and provided leadership at the local level, as well as intelligence. The working conditions were difficult, and the high levels of secrecy meant that recruits were generally not to meet its members. Outside the country, resistance work was increasingly hampered as Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984, whereby ANC and MK officials were expelled from Mozambique in exchange for discontinued South African support for RENAMO, who were fighting the FRELIMO government. On the West coast, the ANC had to withdraw from Angola as the South African government was negotiating terms for Namibian independence (Motumi 1994:10).

The exiled ANC, having been separated from South Africa since its banning in 1961, got easier access to the country, i.e. the main intended battle ground, with the victory of liberation movements over Portuguese colonialists in neighbouring countries after 1974. In addition, the ANC was able to raise its own profile due to its “considerable skill” in intuitively discovering the public mood and giving added concrete expression to popular sentiment (Saul 1988:216). Indeed the widely publicised Free Mandela-campaign during the 1980s - with emphasis on first ‘ungovernability’ followed by the transfer of ‘power to the people’ - and finally the success of promoting the Freedom Charter to again be one of the main demands of the resistance movement, were all clear indications that the ANC was reasserting its position amongst the various nationalist organisations. By 1988, the ANC had “re-established

itself as far and away the single most important force within the South African resistance movement” (Saul 1988:210).

5.2 ZANU

The Rhodesian government was on several occasions referred to as a rebel government, rebelling against the British Crown from whom Ian Smith had declared Rhodesia independent through the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 (Reed 1967; Pandya 1988:3). This was done in order to ensure white domination in Rhodesia, without Britain having any power to pressure them into accepting majority rule. ZANU had been formed in 1963, but already in April 1964 distanced itself from Nkomo’s non-violence, announcing it would wage the struggle “by any means” (quoted in Reed 1993:38). They held their first Congress in May 1964, where the movement adopted its constitution. The main objectives were to wage an armed struggle on the Rhodesian government, establish a democratic state based on a one man, one vote election, creating a government accountable to the people. A Central Committee was elected, and given the task of planning and executing a ‘national revolutionary struggle’ (Pandya 1988:4). ZANU soon started to send their cadres abroad to undergo extensive training. But with most of the Central Committee in detention following the banning in August 1964, organisation, as with the ANC, became difficult. 28 April 1966 the first skirmish with Rhodesian forces left all seven ZANLA combatants dead after the ‘Battle of Sinoia’. There was an evident need for a reassessment of strategy.

Many cadres had been sent to Nanking Military College in China since September 1963, and in January 1969 eight Chinese instructors were flown in to train cadres at Itumbi camp in southern Tanzania. Here the recruits received six months of basic training, followed by ten months of specialised training – including advanced sabotage (Martin and Johnson 1981:24). Training had become more institutionalised, and a far more central part of the guerrilla war. Although some guerrillas had been trained in Cuba and developed a different orientation and ideology, Mao’s three stages of guerrilla warfare were adopted. The first was a strategic defensive stage, the second a strategic offensive stage, and the last a stage of mobile warfare. ‘Mass

support' became the most important element in their struggle, as opposed to ZAPU's 'conventional weapons' (Pandya 1988:7). In line with Mao's first phase, emphasis was now on organisation, consolidation and preservation of external bases, and guerrillas were recruited, organised and trained in warfare and propaganda tactics. Consolidation meant establishing the sympathy and active support of the population. There was much emphasis on political education, and cadres were taught the National Grievances contained in *Mwenje One* (mwenje: Shona for 'light'), the early political manual of ZANU. The writings of Marx, Mao and Lenin were discussed, as well as capitalism, communism and colonialism. In the second phase, having secured bases in rural areas enabled the insurgents to start their offensive and maintain the tactical initiative. Eventually they would secure larger liberated zones, and in the third phase positional warfare would lead to the encircling and capture of urban centres. However, as a result of the method of 'press-ganging' for new recruits, desertions were very common. A large group of Zimbabweans living in Zambia were targeted, and told they were going to national service as Zimbabweans (Martin and Johnson 1981:23). ZANU indeed considered it their right to call on their fellow citizens for conscription in a time of war (Meredith 1979:70). Guerrilla coercion therefore resulted in some peasants adopting strategies to avoid active support to the guerrillas (Kriger 1992:238).

While most of the ZANU leaders were in detention, this obviously brought about some problems, such as the leadership crisis involving Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. Communication was more difficult, and while some leaders wanted to make executive decisions while detained, this led to uncertainty and discontent on the outside. The détente exercise led to the release of many of the leaders in late 1974, yet communication continued to be a challenge, as Robert Mugabe finally admitted in January 1976. Indeed, the Nhari rebellion in December 1974 was a sure indication that circumstances within ZANU were far from ideal. During the détente talks Thomas Nhari and two other ZANLA commanders were having secret talks with people from the Rhodesian government's Special Branch, military intelligence, and army officers. The Rhodesian forces were having some success in starving the guerrillas by creating so-called 'protected villages', and effectively depriving the fighters of the crucial peasant support in these areas, such as food, shelter and intelligence. But a more important underlying cause for the apparent discontent

within ZANLA was the explosion in recruits following the victories in the Portuguese colonies, combined with severe administrative deficiencies. They went from about 300 to 5,000 cadres in two years, without the ability to feed or equip them. In addition, the Rhodesian regime was taking advantage to the tensions within the movement, and allegedly, so were certain politicians in Lusaka seeking personal power and revenge for previous incidents (Martin and Johnson 1981:168). So Nhari and the rebels tried to threaten Tongogara into accepting their demands for a new high command, with Nhari as Chief of Defence. But as pointed out earlier, the rebels failed to achieve anything.

ZIPA had been formed in January 1976, uniting ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres in one army. The Frontline presidents had been pressing for unity between ZANU and ZAPU and were therefore very content, as they saw this as a precondition for a nationalist victory over white rule. Early October later that year, Mugabe and Jason Moyo of ZAPU began negotiations in Maputo, which resulted in the foundation of the Patriotic Front, an organisation bringing together the two liberation movements. Not only did this join ZANU and ZAPU in one negotiating team in all the conferences up until 1980 – starting with the Geneva conference later that year, but the Frontline presidents were again satisfied and Kaunda began releasing detained ZANU leaders on 17 October, including Tongogara.

External base camps were situated in Tanzania and Zambia, and after Mozambique's independence, also there. Not only ZANLA cadres stayed here, but also refugees who fled the difficult conditions in Rhodesia. Camp commanders, who were in charge of the camp's overall supervision, ran the camps. A political commissar was in charge of political training, and a security officer was responsible for the camp's security, ensuring there were no infiltrators. A logistics officer ensured sufficient food and supplies, as well as organising the various self-reliance projects that were to make the guerrillas less reliant on the population for food. A medical officer was in charge of medical services, as well as lessons in first aid and health care. An education officer organised schools for young children, who read textbooks published by ZANU's Maputo offices. There were also smaller transit camps, where guerrillas were issued with supplies closer to the combat field, or could have a rest after action. The even

smaller staging posts were the last stops before the Rhodesian border (Pandya 1988:48-49).

ZANLA had divided the areas they operated in into operational zones: early on these were called MMZ (north-east Mozambique-Zimbabwe zone), ZZ (Zimbabwe-Zambia zone) and BBZ (south-west towards Botswana), and were later changed to Tete, Manica and Gaza. These were divided into sectors, which often overlapped with Tribal Trust Lands such as Dande, Chiweshi, Mukumbura and Chimanda. They were again divided into detachments, which consisted of several smaller sections. Here ZANU recruited and mobilised the population. So-called liberated zones were created when ZANLA forces took control over these areas after security forces withdrew due to lack of manpower, or other high priority areas. According to ZANU, by August 1979 they regarded 95% of Rhodesia as being operational zones, and 32% as liberated zones (Pandya 1988:58). However, as Paresh Pandya notes in his study on ZANU (1988:9-10), one of his prime sources of information was *Zimbabwe News*, the official ZANU newsletter – which for obvious reasons did not take a very objective approach. The validity and reliability of some of the information was therefore questionable, he admits, yet “unfortunately the information cannot be verified in any other source of information”. This was a result of Rhodesian Security Forces destroying official documents just before the 1980 elections. Terence Ranger (1985:179), on the other hand, argues that no area was completely under guerrilla control, and Ranger’s authority on the topic further questions the reliability.

Inside Rhodesia, ZANU was present at several levels. At grass-roots level there were village committees, elected by the whole village, with a disciplinary committee ensuring party discipline. A step further up were branch committees, often covering a whole Tribal Trust Land. Above these were district committees, and finally provincial committees. All committees had a chairman, secretary, political commissar, police, treasurer, medical assistant, educational and cultural secretary, as well as a productions and construction advisor. Representatives of the provincial committees attended the biannual review conferences, where the members of DARE were elected. These were usually held in Zambia, but from 1977 they were moved to Mozambique. DARE had been formed in April 1969 at a review conference in Lusaka, which consisted of eight members. It was led by Herbert Chitepo, and not a single member

had any military experience. This included the Secretary of Defence, who automatically chaired the high command. However, in 1973 Tongogara was elected to this position, becoming the bridge between the political and military wings of ZANU, and led the high command throughout the war (Martin and Johnson 1981). At the 1977 conference, DARE was combined with the military high command, to form an enlarged Central Committee consisting of 33 members. Of these, 15 were on the Executive Committee or Heads of Departments – of Defence, Health, Political Commiserate, Education or Women’s Affairs. Robert Mugabe was also elected President of ZANU in 1977, automatically making him Commander-in-Chief of ZANLA (Pandya 1988:68).

ZANU was divided into a political and a military wing. The political was responsible for the mobilisation, socialisation and politicisation of the masses, and the military for waging the war. Both operated within Rhodesia. The Central Committee was divided into an internal and external wing, and the latter was not only in neighbouring countries, but also had branches around the world. The internal wing was to provide information, spread propaganda, prepare the population for the insurgency, and also for the coming elections in 1980 – i.e. make them understand that they had to vote for Mugabe. The external was more the decision-making wing, as the high command was externally based, and was to focus world attention on happenings in Rhodesia.

5.3 Assessment

”What is clear is that, by itself, spontaneity is incapable of effecting revolutionary change” (Greene 1984:111). Spontaneous outbursts of acts of violence are usually labelled ‘revolts’. While ‘revolt’ and ‘revolution’ can both be seen as species of rebellion, Greene argues that by definition, revolts fail while revolutions succeed. What revolts lack is first and foremost organisation, with which they would not be spontaneous. While Rhodesia did not experience a substantial amount of spontaneous revolts, South Africa did, usually as a result of the regime’s brutality towards the African population. The ANC however, were not responsible for the incidents, as these were mainly youth-led outbursts of frustration.

Greene further points out that organisation is likely to be strong wherever there exists a coherent ideology that effectively unites and mobilises the population under a joint cause. In addition he draws attention to the increased importance of organisation in such cases where the leadership lacks charismatic appeal, regime access is low, resistance remains strong and the struggle is protracted. Both the ANC and ZANU had ideologies that were effective, but - as with most typical leftist movements - fairly low regime access. The ANC had several charismatic leaders, but ZANU - with their more militant attitude - lacked this. Whether this was coincidental or a deliberate strategy to strengthen their militancy, is up for debate. It is clear, however, that both faced very strong resistance from the respective governments, and experienced relatively protracted struggles - although the South African movement did so to a far greater extent.

A 'strong' revolutionary organisation has "a minimum of factional conflict and a clearly established chain of command running from the top of the organization's hierarchy to the bottom" (Greene 1984:115). It must also be able to survive tactical military defeat and the loss of one or more of its leaders. Strength is further measured by the extent to which the movement institutionalises the recruitment and training of cadres, as well as ensuring their continued ideological commitment to the movement and its cause. In addition, channels of communication must be maintained to ensure feedback from the rank-and-file to the leadership. Good organisation also implies creating sub-organisations with clearly defined functions and tasks.

Both the ANC and ZANU had factional conflict between leaders and followers, and between political and military wings. While the Zimbabweans had almost continuous leadership problems, the problems within the ANC were not as much about individuals. They were more focused around the ideology and the policies of the movement. ZANU, with imprisoned leaders suspending another imprisoned leader, the chain of command was rather fuzzy at the top. Later, with the Rhodesian ANC becoming an umbrella organisation for the nationalist movement, very few cadres regarded Muzorewa, the compromise leader of the umbrella organisation, as their leader. Sithole continued to call himself the leader of ZANU (ARB 1978:5073), to which Mugabe replied: "He is a reverend herring, if you pardon the pun. He has left the party" (Meredith 1979:269). Mugabe was portrayed as the leader of both ZANU

and leader of the Patriotic Front, along with Nkomo. While the leadership was constantly contested, this led to divisions within the party, as it did within ZAPU. Attempts to forge unity between the several factions of the two movements complicated issues even further, leading to an increased mistrust of the politicians by the guerrillas throughout the 1970s (Martin and Johnson 1981:33). The situation was somewhat bettered when Tongogara was elected to the DARE in 1973, becoming a bridge between the political and military wings and granting the military far more recognition in the movement. It seems that within ZANLA, the chain of command was clearer. Nonetheless, the Mashona and the Matabele remained organised in different political and military wings, and any attempted unity between the two, such as the Patriotic Front, was never very successful. But despite both the ANC and ZANU having internal conflicts, it is reasonable to say that they had a fairly clear chain-of-command, especially after their respective reorganising.

While ZANU suffered several military defeats by the Rhodesian forces in that the Rhodesians were much more effective killing machines, the movement survived and was until the end of the war convinced that they could defeat the Rhodesians militarily. The ANC, on the other hand, were not even close to posing a threat to the military might of the apartheid regime. Both of the movements, however, withstood having not just one leader, but most of their leadership imprisoned. In line with Greene's argument, this was undoubtedly due to good organisation, a strong ideology made clear in their respective manifestos, and committed outside support – from the USSR in the case of the ANC, and the PRC in the case of ZANU.

Another important function of organisation is according to Greene, the development of 'countergovernment' or 'dual power'. This entails building the movement's own institutions that carry out governmental tasks such as collecting taxes from supporters and establishing international connections, and that intend to become the new institutions following the capture of power. The ANC and ZANU both had a military wing, or a "political army" (Motumi 1994:1), and a revolutionary council. While ZANU could rely on substantial support from neighbouring countries and especially that of FRELIMO, their main support, apart from that of China, was limited to the African continent. The ANC had to go further in order to ensure material and financial support, and providing funds to keep the struggle going was one of the main

tasks of the ANC in exile. While both movements built functioning organisations, they did not succeed in creating 'countergovernments'. Their channels of communication were at times not optimal, but were eventually improved with more efficient organisation.

After independence, both movements became the ruling parties in their respective countries. But as Greene (1984:118) has argued, when power is finally captured, original ideals will not necessarily be implemented, and it is not guaranteed that power will be consolidated. Furthermore, it is far from certain that the movement will achieve the socio-economic transformations that were initially aimed towards. Coming to power entails the need for structural change in the organisation of the movement, which can be problematic when having been supported by many people from different social classes. While ZANU came to power preaching socialism, this was not implemented. The ANC, on the other hand, had earlier called for the nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly industries. Yet what they ended up with, as Zimbabwe, was deracialised capitalism.

Some of the main functions of revolutionary organisation, Greene argues (1984:120), are effective command and communication between leaders and followers. In addition, it must recruit and coordinate the efforts of its cadres. This entails generating group loyalty and consent with regard to the movement's strategy. This is in order to make defections less likely. It must acquire logistical support for the various operations that are undertaken. It must also be flexible in order to adjust to new situations, such as the extension of the process and the taking over of power. While this describes the perfect organisation, the ANC and ZANU were obviously not perfect as such. Yet, and the fact that both survived and even achieved their goals under such difficult circumstances implies good organisation.

Chapter 6 - Techniques and Strategies

6.1 The ANC

The ANC was initially a non-violent movement, and kept their methods of protest peaceful in the early stages. The Programme of Action was adopted at the ANC conference in Bloemfontein in 1949, which was influenced by Gandhi's campaign of passive resistance, and at the time perceived as radical, despite being non-violent. Its strategy of rallies, strikes and boycotts failed to get much response from the government, and Nelson Mandela, Joe Slovo and Rusty Bernstein began drawing up the constitution of an armed wing at Lilliesleaf Farm in August 1961 (Meredith 1997:208). In June 1983 Oliver Tambo explained how the decision to change strategy came about: "It was our policy to be consciously, deliberately, non-violent and we persisted with this during the 1950s. There has never been a more violent regime in South Africa, but we stuck to our non-violence. But as the years went by, violence increased. We saw more armed police ... Then the tanks came. Women's demonstrations were put down with tanks" (quoted in Meli 1989:148). Still, he maintained, they continued to stick to non-violence – even after the Sharpeville incident in 1960. It was only in 1961, after the strike had been called protesting the formation of a republic in South Africa, that they understood the need for reassessment: "the army was mobilised on a scale not seen since the Second World War – against a peaceful strike. We knew that the army had left its barracks and that we had reached the end of the road of non-violence."

At Lilliesleaf plans were laid out for an armed struggle: a stage of guerrilla warfare intended to lead to a stage of equilibrium, would finally culminate in conventional warfare. 'Hit and run' tactics and 'armed propaganda' in the first stage were to be replaced by mobile warfare in the next. Finally, positional warfare, international isolation and external military assistance would force the South African government to give in to their demands (Hough 1986:10). But with the shift to a 'people's war' towards the 1980s, it became clear that rather than professional guerrillas, a political army consisting of 'the people' were to wage the war, supported by MK units carrying out the larger sabotage acts. The decision to engage in sabotage implied a strategy "guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided" (Lodge

1983:341), and targets of strategic or economic importance were intended to hurt the South African economy. The first acts of sabotage took place on 16 December 1961, chosen because of its symbolic significance as the date the Afrikaner Voortrekkers defeated the African warriors at Ncome River, later known as Blood River, in 1838. Bombs went off in Johannesburg, Durban and Port Elizabeth in December 1961. Leaflets were spread throughout the streets of big cities, containing the manifesto of *Umkhonto*. Part of it read: “The time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom” (quoted in Meli 1989:214). Yet, it was more a warning, saying further that it hoped to “bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before ... matters reach the desperate stage of civil war”. However, the impact of this and later initiatives remained modest, and it could hardly be called an armed struggle. Mass mobilisation remained sporadic, and there were no rear bases in neighbouring states. South Africa was not internationally isolated, and the lack of alternative structures further hindered the possibility of waging a guerrilla war.

One of the things Dr Percy Yutar, the state prosecutor during the Rivonia Trial, tried to have the accused MK leaders convicted for, was the planning of the more violent armed campaign called ‘Operation Mayibuye’. It was this case, which took place from the latter part of 1963 until mid-1964 that made Nelson Mandela famous. But the High Command did not adopt Operation Mayibuye as policy fearing the racial polarisation that could develop. While they had planned it, it was never *decided upon*, as Judge Quartus de Wet pointed out to Yutar. Nevertheless, most of the leadership was sentenced to life imprisonment in the early sixties, and the nationalist movement was largely destroyed. Stephen Davis explains that Pretoria’s “greatest weapon” was its intelligence network, and by police infiltration it took them only nineteen months to “completely ... crack” the organisation of *Umkhonto* (1987:18). Joe Slovo called the armed struggle “an heroic failure” (Meredith 1997:280), and the ANC entered more than a decade of lull. During this period the ANC decided to go underground with the Mandela Plan, also called the M-Plan, setting up alternative structures of which many township civics are examples.

At the Morogoro conference in 1969, a 'Revolutionary Programme' was adopted, also known as the 'Strategy and Tactics' document. However, not being very revolutionary in character, it did not lead to any real change of the situation. The ANC was still not achieving the results they had hoped for. After the 1976 student uprisings, many radicalised young South Africans left the country and joined the resistance movement. From 1977 the MK started to select targets with high propaganda value, "intending more to re-establish a political following among the black population and to raise its morale than to threaten the economy or white security" (Meredith 1997:348). This was the strategy of 'armed propaganda'. Some of the more ambitious acts of sabotage included the synthetic oil refinery at Sasolburg in June 1980, power stations in eastern Transvaal July 1981, and the Voortrekkerhoogte military base in August 1981. Police stations were a favourite target, especially those near townships, and they were attacked with grenades, rockets or bombs. The police and military had an obvious symbolic significance, as "official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression" (Fanon 1967:29).

Between 1977 and 1982, *Umkhonto* attacks were concentrated on the disruption of railway communications, industrial installations, and attacks on government buildings belonging to the regional Administration Boards responsible for African township administration. This change of tactics may have been due to Oliver Tambo's visit to Vietnam in 1978. Furthermore, there were assassinations and attacks on African security policemen, community councillors, suspected police informants, and former ANC members who had betrayed the organisation – such as those who acted as state witnesses during political trials. According to Mike Hough, this is what the strategy of 'ungovernability' entailed (1986:13). There were also incidents of clashes between the ANC and paramilitary police or army units. Attacks on police stations were often followed by pamphlet bombs in city centres (Meli 1989:191). Compared to 1961, the post-Soweto era had given *Umkhonto* several supporting countries offering resources, at least 8,000 well-trained guerrillas compared to 300 poorly trained ones, a network of cells to support operations, a functioning intelligence system, as well as Soviet arms and rockets replacing homemade bombs. Acts of sabotage were moving away from being mere warnings towards representing actual warfare, and labour strikes, township rebellion and armed attacks were to bring about the goals of the ANC (Davis 1987:117). In 1980, as Zimbabwe became independent, the ANC burned the

apartheid regime's flag and hoisted its own. The Freedom Charter was revived, and the 'Free Mandela' campaign launched. *Sechaba*, one of the ANC's newsletters, hailed Mandela as the leader of the South African liberation movement in their July issue (quoted in Meli 1989:192). The government, however, retaliated by attacking ANC bases in neighbouring states such as Matola, Mozambique, in 1981, and Maseru, Lesotho, in 1982.

In 1981 there was a major shift, at least in rhetoric. Oliver Tambo announced that the ANC would in future attack 'officials of Apartheid' – which according to Tom Lodge, the MK "had never had any inhibitions about doing" (1983:341). Tambo further warned that combat situations might arise in which civilians could be caught in the crossfire. However, wanting to avoid any panic, this was not reported in South Africa. The level of intensity continued to increase, and in 1982 bombs exploded in Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town, and in 1983 a car bomb outside a military building in Pretoria killed sixteen while injuring over 200. This was the most serious act of sabotage to ever occur in South Africa. The apartheid government responded, and by "military might and economic coercion" (Meredith 1997:348) managed to force its neighbours, mainly Mozambique, to expel the ANC. This was the beginning of the so-called destabilisation era, which amongst other things intended to choke African trade routes. They went across the border and attacked bridges, railways, schools, clinics and road transport. Joe Slovo and his wife, Ruth First, had moved to Maputo in 1977 as part of the MK command structure. In 1982, a parcel bomb that was sent to Eduardo Mondlane University in the Mozambican capital killed Ruth. Mozambique did eventually capitulate, signed the Nkomati Accord, and in 1984 expelled 800 ANC members. The South African liberation movement was now forced to operate from Lusaka.

A rent and services boycott in the Vaal Triangle triggered the Vaal uprisings in September 1984. The ANC's strategy of 'people's war', aiming to involve the whole population in the fight against apartheid, was well under way. It also called for the isolation of anyone working for the government, or the 'system', such as officials serving in local authorities (Motumi 1994:2). In November 1984 there was a successful mass stay-away from work in the Transvaal - "the industrial heartland of South Africa" (Meli 1989:195). The role of workers and trade unions became crucial

in the struggle, as they could potentially bring “the economy to a halt” (Hough 1986:11). According to Francis Meli – but contrary to the view of Thabo Mbeki - the ANC saw class struggle as complementary to the national liberation struggle, and *not* in competition with it (1989:183). With working-class problems having a central role in the struggle, he argued, it was necessary that the working class led the liberation struggle.

At the Kabwe conference in 1985 - after the founding of the UDF in 1983 and the Nkomati Accord in 1984, a decision was made to intensify the ‘people’s war’, which emphasised ‘ungovernability’, rather than attacking major installations. Some newspapers reported that a resolution had been passed authorising the MK to strike at ‘soft targets’ (Lodge 1986:5; Hough 1986:13). While attacks became less ambitious than previously, there were in the first half of 1986 twice as many guerrilla attacks or clashes with policemen, than in the preceding six months (Lodge 1986:5). Tambo also announced that there would be no cessation of the armed struggle, but opened up to the possibility of negotiations with the South African government if they were to be about immediate change to majority rule (Hough 1986:12).

Andrew Zondo, who was sentenced to death for the Amanzimtoti limpet mine explosion that killed five passers by in a shopping centre in 1985, was an example of those who carried out “attacks in the ANC’s name but contrary to ANC guidelines” (Davis quoted in Cock 1989:10). Assumably acting out of frustration and despair over the wrongs of the government, these unfortunately brought the ANC into disrepute by giving the impression it was done as an ANC act. Oliver Tambo had indeed signed a protocol on the Geneva Convention, binding the ANC to avoid civilian targets, which was believed to be the first time a guerrilla group did such a thing (Cock 1989:3). However, it can be argued that there were certain benefits for the ANC of such incidents - by putting pressure on the South African government, bringing the world’s attention to their struggle, or by contributing to creating an environment of fear. After the Amanzimtoti bomb Tambo did not quite condemn the act. He said he would “of course not” support ANC members if they wanted to plant a bomb in a supermarket, but understood that some might choose to do so due to the situation, despite facing punishment (quoted in Davis 1987:120).

A bomb exploded on Hyde Park Corner, Johannesburg, in August 1988, in one of the richest shopping areas in South Africa. While the labelling of ANC/MK members was a highly contested and value laden issue, targeting typically civilian areas gave the struggle a more ‘terrorist’ than ‘freedom fighter’ perspective – undoubtedly a satisfying factor for the government who wished to promote this view. Edward Said defined terrorism as “acts of intimidation, injuring unarmed, presumably innocent, civilians” (quoted in Cock 1989:3). However, South Africa was increasingly in a state of war, although it was seen more as “low-level civil war” or “low intensity conflict” (Cock 1989:4). And when two parties in a conflict are so very unevenly equipped, it is a typical trait in such situations that the lesser equipped must choose targets that hit hard and create fear at a low cost – such as a wealthy shopping district. On the other hand, the government was responsible for far more killing and atrocities than the ANC/MK. Mandela explained that the ANC considered “the armed struggle a legitimate form of self-defence against a morally repugnant system of government which will not allow even peaceful forms of protest” (quoted in Meredith 1997:389).

The ‘total strategy’ of the ANC was eventually adopted, called the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). It was a four-pronged strategy – waging an armed struggle, calling for international isolation of the apartheid regime, mass mobilisation, and the M-plan, also called underground and alternative structures (van Zyl Slabbert 1989:78). This was a response to the state’s ‘total national strategy’, implemented by the structures provided by the National Security Management System (NSMS). The government themselves felt they had to defend themselves from a ‘total onslaught’, and felt they could legitimately increase “military involvement in all spheres of decision-making” (Cock 1989:4). The State Security Council eventually replaced the cabinet as the most influential decision-making body, and police presence in the townships became a source of tension as school children were not allowed outside during school hours and had to have police escort to the toilet. The government embarked on a military build-up resulting in South Africa becoming the world’s fifth largest arms producer – as they were having difficulties getting hold of arms due to international boycotts – and annual defence budget estimates ranging from 8.2 (Minty 1988:239) to 15 billion Rand in 1989 (Cock 1989:5).

For both Pretoria and the ANC, espionage was a very important tactic, and the war between the two was “waged primarily as a shadowy contest for the intelligence high ground” (Davis 1987:138). Preventing the enemy from gaining any information was crucial, especially for the ANC’s ability to launch surprise attacks. Intimidation and assassination were tactics used to scare any potential informants from collaborating with the apartheid regime, as well as the gruesome practice of necklacing – although these techniques were officially unauthorised by the ANC leadership. They were in fact getting so concerned over the increasingly critical situation, that in March 1989 Mandela wrote to President Botha requesting a meeting to negotiate a settlement. At grass-roots level, the strategy had become so brutal – again, it is unknown how much, if any, of this was done by ANC members – that it pushed the leaders in the opposite direction, towards a strategy of accommodation. What is clear is that they had no control over what happened in the townships, and had to try to prevent further bloodshed. However, on the day of his release from Victor Verster prison 11 February 1990, Mandela maintained that the armed struggle would continue until conditions were right for negotiations for majority rule to start – meaning the lifting of the state of emergency and releasing all political prisoners. Frederik Willem de Klerk took over after Botha’s stroke forced him to resign, and talks started out on a good note. However, with the allegations of police assistance to Inkatha during the township wars starting in July 1990 – later referred to as Inkathagate - attitudes became increasingly hostile (Meredith 1997:433). Still, negotiations were eventually successful. Despite receiving much criticism for lowering the demands for a settlement, Mandela became South Africa’s first democratically elected president in the April 1994 elections.

The ANC’s strategy changed throughout the struggle, and this has been illustrated by Willie J. Breytenbach (1989b:10) in the table below, based on a diagramme in Van Zyl Slabbert (1989:79). The four-pillar strategy in the first column correlates with ANC strategy at the time of the Kabwe conference and the announcement of a state of emergency in South Africa in 1985. The second column reflects ANC thinking during the late eighties, just before the surprise unbanning of the ANC in February 1990. The third column correlates with ANC thinking after successful negotiations for an interim constitution in 1993 under which the first elections took place in 1994.

1985	Late-80s	1993-94
1. Mass mobilisation	1. The international isolation of SA	1. Negotiations (new pillar)
2. Alternative structures: the M-Plan	2. Mass mobilisation through the UDF & COSATU	2. Conditional isolation of SA (eg, arms boycott)
3. The armed struggle	3. Alternative structures	3. Strengthening alternative structures in the ANC, UDF, COSATU & SACP
4. The international isolation of SA	4. The armed struggle	4. Mass mobilisation linked to alternative structures
		5. The armed struggle temporarily suspended

6.2 ZANU

As the Smith regime introduced hospital charges for Africans in 1964, and further increased these in following years, many started to suspect that by making hospitals unavailable the regime was trying to reduce the number of African babies. Having one of the highest growth rates in the world, the African population therefore increasingly saw this growth as a weapon to be used against the regime, and ZANU called for more babies to be made (Maxey 1972:15). But the need for a more radical approach was soon imminent with the complacent and uncompromising attitude of the Rhodesian government.

In the early years after ZANU's creation in 1963, the leadership was impatient to get the armed struggle under way, and cadres were hastily thrown into battle for supposed short-term political gain – made apparent with the defeat at Sinoia on 28 April 1966. However, while all seven combatants died in the battle, it gave ZANLA much publicity, as well as having a substantial psychological and political significance as the first armed confrontation with the white settlers and the beginning of the armed struggle – of the second *Chimurenga*. The first *Chimurenga* took place in 1897, when the Shona rose up against the first settlers. This was of great significance for ZANU, as they were taking up the struggle where their forefathers left it.

ZANU began a serious reassessment of strategy, and in January 1969 eight Chinese instructors were flown into ZANLA's training camp at Itumbi, Tanzania. The strategy was to change as they turned to the Maoist approach of gaining rural popular support of the people before launching a protracted armed struggle (Martin and Johnson 1981:12). Sinoia marked the beginning of the first phase, in which Mao's theories emphasised the necessity to mobilise, politicise and organise the masses, and it would last up until December 1972. According to Maoist theory, it was also of great importance that the country in which the guerrillas were to operate was "rough and inaccessible", and thereby provided hiding places for the cadres, while making it difficult for government forces to move around (Pandya 1988:18). The many mountains and rivers in eastern Zimbabwe and north-western Mozambique in addition to thick forest was what made infiltration from Tete ideal. Still, as Mao pointed out, the land had to be agriculturally viable, so that the guerrillas could cultivate food. He also recommended types of clothing, and stressed the importance of medicines and medical equipment. He urged that guerrillas should be lightly armed with simple equipment – which served to justify the low quality Chinese arms - and that it was important to distribute propaganda (Pandya 1988:21). The Chinese instructors taught reconnaissance and sabotage in addition to political education, as well as using weapons such as bazookas and anti-aircraft guns (Martin and Johnson 1981:24).

Initially, the Zambezi valley was intended as a point of infiltration. But the valley was too hot, the Zambezi River was a natural barrier, and there were hardly any people inhabiting the Rhodesian side of the border to support, feed, and give shelter to the insurgents. Rhodesian forces were in fact aware of their presence there, and had sent troops into the area. The ZANLA guerrillas built a house and stayed with a man on the Zambian side of the river, but it later turned out that he had been recruited as a spy by Rhodesian security forces (Martin and Johnson 1981:25). Their fortunes only turned after 1974, when they were allowed to use the Tete province in Mozambique for infiltration. The government forces still believed that the insurgents were intending to go through the Zambezi valley, and Ian Smith closed the border to Zambia. Upon realising his mistake, Smith reopened the border – but President Kaunda was intent to keep it closed on his side.

Between 1969 and 1972, ZANU developed a strategy for guerrilla warfare in the northeast of Rhodesia, established political cells throughout the area, and politicised and mobilised the inhabitants. The first attack was on Altena Farm 21 December 1972, and the telephone lines were cut and the road was mined before some shots were fired towards the farm. It was the first attack on a European farm since 1966, and one of the children on the farm received minor injuries. A member of the security force was also killed when the vehicle he was in hit a mine on the way to the farm after the attack. Following this first incident, attacks multiplied as ZANLA was now in the second phase – that of guerrilla warfare. Several white Rhodesians were kidnapped, yet not assassinated. The DARE decided to target government institutions and officials representing these. This included the Department of Internal Affairs and its officials, as this department was in charge of the administration of the African population. Furthermore, military and police outposts and convoys were targeted; strategic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railway and power lines; white farms and farm stores; and tribal chiefs and headmen. ZANLA's main methods of attack were surprise attacks, acts of sabotage, ambush, and using landmines. Surprise attacks were of particular importance, as striking targets that suited themselves not only gave them time to carefully plan the operation, but also forced the government forces to be on the defensive – not knowing when or where the next attack would occur - while ZANLA were on the offensive. Farms were generally targeted if they were known to treat their labourers poorly, and many of these became deserted. Several farms owned by South African or British multinational corporations were not targeted, and many speculated whether this was due to mutual agreements between ZANU and these businesses (Pandya 1988:166).

Missionaries were of great importance in many African societies, but not only because many Africans – including Robert Mugabe, were Catholic. The missionaries often stood for much of the education in these societies as well as providing medical services - making them important parts of rural communities. Although the missionaries were not permitted to officially support the guerrillas, they assisted them with crucial food, clothing, money, medicine and shelter. While this meant that missions were not targeted, on one occasion this strategy was not followed. On 23 June 1978 ZANLA fighters attacked Elim Pentecostal Mission. Three men, five women and four children were hacked, bayoneted and beaten to death. "I believe this

sort of thing goes on all the time”, Bishop Muzorewa commented, “except it seems to be more news if it is white people” (quoted in ARB 1978:4897). Unfortunately, lacking documentation makes it difficult to verify this. However, while ZANU officially refused to claim responsibility for the attack, a diary belonging to a deceased ZANLA cadre was found which contained evidence of the contrary (Pandya 1988:166). But the operation undoubtedly succeeded in adding to the fear in the white population, and quite possibly led to some leaving their farms or even the country.

“The imagery of dispossession, of loss, of landlessness, of longing for the ‘lost lands’ to be restored was a constant pulse in the literature, the oral tradition and the rhetoric of the nationalist movements” (Lan 1985:121). The fact that the settlers had removed the peasants from the most fertile lands, for which at least the Shona had a strong sense of intimacy, served to increase their willingness to join armed resistance. In addition to this was the enforced abolishment of established agricultural traditions in order to satisfy the economic demands of capitalism – the system despised by so many African peasants. With only three percent of the most fertile white-owned land being used productively, David Lan has argued that this was a deliberate attempt to prevent the black population from being able to support itself to a satisfactory degree (1985:122). The frustration that grew from this worked in ZANU’s favour, and they followed the advice of the elders that said they must go through the spirit mediums before approaching the peasants. Lan has studied what he calls a specific form of resistance: the cooperation between the guerrillas and the religious leaders in the Dande area – the mediums of the *mhondoro* spirits. They are the spirits of the chiefs of the past, and known as “the bringers of the rain” (Lan 1985:xviii). *Mhondoro* means ‘lion’, indicating that the chiefs’ spirits would first enter the body of a lion.

The guerrillas first got in contact with mediums in early 1972, and were told that if they followed the rituals the mediums imposed, they would be safe and successful in their struggle. Still, Lan asserts (1985:209), few - if any, guerrillas relied exclusively on “magical precautions” to ensure their safety. One of the most influential was the spirit medium of Nehanda, who was carried to the Chifombo guerrilla camp on the Mozambique border, to give inspiration and advice to the cadres (Martin and Johnson 1981:50). The mediums made acceptance of the guerrillas “easier, quicker, more binding and more profound” for the peasantry (Lan 1985:165). The mediums had

taken over the position once held by chiefs, as the main political authority in rural areas. But the chiefs were increasingly seen as state-controlled, and guerrillas - to assert their authority – on several occasions assassinated chiefs and loyal headmen. But probably the most controversial technique used was ‘witch finding’ – finding people believed to be treacherous and acting against peasant interests, and punishing them (Lan 1985:167-170). A ‘witch’ was the negative of the concept mhondoro, who used their ‘magic’ in a bad way, such as in favour of the government. ‘Witch finding’ was used not only to instil fear but also to gather support. So, while using Maoist tactics as the main guideline for their strategy, ZANU in addition found the spirit mediums to be highly useful, not only for legitimacy but also for advice and instructions in their struggle. The spirits also gave names to war sectors in the northeast, such as Nehanda and Chaminuka (Martin and Johnson 1981:110). Yet, it has been argued that guerrillas used the different zones of popular religion very pragmatically. According to whether an area was under traditional or Christian influence, ZANU would use holy men to act as peasant leaders as well as agents giving guerrillas political legitimacy. To secure the widest possible legitimacy, widespread “conflicting peasant agendas, based on ethnicity, social stratification, gender and generation, acted as the motor of change for guerrilla strategy” (Maxwell 1993:363). However, as opposed to Muzorewa, Sithole and Nkomo, Mugabe was the only nationalist leader that was not seen carrying or waving a stick given by spirit mediums. “For his part, Mugabe successfully waved *Das Kapital*, a myth never understood by the peasants or spirit mediums, although they gathered that this was what the white man feared most, especially when backed by bazookas and AK 47s” (Sithole 1987:701).

Between 1974 and August 1979, 304 officials working for the Department of Internal Affairs were killed. Of these, only 25 were white, which shows the importance of killing ‘collaborators’ (Pandya 1988:168). These attacks acted to boost morale not only in the black rural areas, but also within ZANU and ZANLA, especially as they showed that the regime was unable to protect its employees. Attacking police and military outposts served much in the same way – showing their inefficiency and lack of control in rural areas, as did attacks on protected villages, and ambushes on civilian travellers, commercial transport, police or military convoys. Destruction of government property, as well as transport and communication systems, was also a

much-used tactic. RPG-7 rockets were often used in attacks, and in some instances mortars, AK47 machine guns, grenades or explosives – and most commonly landmines.

It is widely believed that ZANU, and possibly also government forces, inflated numbers of enemy killings to boost morale of their own fighters, instil fear and maybe get an upper hand over the enemy. But ZANU killed mostly Africans working for the authorities, or suspected of doing so. These killings often took place during a *pungwe* – a politicisation meeting held at night. While death was the most common penalty, amputations of hands, legs, fingers, toes, lips, tongues and ears were also used as punishments. As this was always carried out in public, fear in the rural areas effectively led to very few people willing to associate themselves with the authorities. Attacks in urban areas were quite rare, but the one with the greatest impact was the attack on Rhodesia's largest oil depot in Salisbury 11 December 1978, resulting in a five day long fire destroying millions of dollars worth of fuel, in the midst of the oil embargo (Pandya 1988:74).

Eventually even the Rhodesians had to admit that ZANU had “learnt the true art of guerrilla warfare, namely, to move amongst the people like a fish in the water” (Rhodesian military report quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:146). Still, Mao's third phase of guerrilla warfare, that of conventional mobile war, never materialised in Rhodesia. The Lancaster House agreement was reached before the struggle had a chance to get to that level – whether or not ZANU in fact had the ability to wage a war against the Rhodesian forces.

While there were several instances of brutal behaviour by ZANLA cadres towards the population in the rural areas, the Rhodesian forces were ruthless in their hunt for guerrillas. In 1977 they attacked the ZANLA headquarters at Chimoio and two camps at Tembwe- all in Mozambique – killing over a thousand people. A substantial part of these were civilians (Martin and Johnson 1981:288).

6.3 Assessment

Thomas Greene defines violence as “those actions by individuals or groups that endanger the physical security of people or property” (1984:129). The threat and use of violence, he argues, are among the clearest indicators of a movement’s revolutionary intent. It can be employed as a tactic before and/or after seizing power, and be necessary in most or all stages of the struggle. The intensity and character of the violence differs according to circumstances, depending on the degree of popular and external support for a movement, its regime access, the strength of organisation as well as the strength of the opposition it faces. It also varies according to how much political and socio-economic change is needed to fulfil the demands of the revolutionaries. The ANC only adopted armed struggle as a strategy – although not officially – 49 years after it was formed. Between 1912 and 1961, they insisted on sticking to strictly non-violent techniques. For ZANU this only took a few months. While the ANC tried to only target property, fatalities did occur. These instances were often a case of individuals acting on their own terms, and against ANC directives.

ZANU, on the other hand was never committed to non-violence. Shortly after it was formed it decided to launch an armed struggle, and it applied Maoist revolutionary strategies from the beginning. Leading an armed struggle from the beginning, they saw the inevitability of casualties, but still tried to avoid killing civilians, especially amongst its Mashona support base. Indeed, they were dependent on the support of the population, and harming them would be counterproductive. They had a strict code of conduct and were highly disciplined. However, in several instances and increasingly so towards the end of the struggle, the discipline was absent as some guerrillas were drifting into banditry (Ranger 1986:389).

Greene distinguishes between three types of violent techniques: terror, guerrilla warfare and coup d’état. The first two are typical where regime access is low, and have clear revolutionary intent. Guerrilla warfare necessitates good revolutionary organisation and popular support. A coup can occur under many different political circumstances, and is not necessarily a revolutionary process. A strategy of terror makes use of techniques such as assassination, kidnapping, or bombing. This is

intended to have a psychologically destabilising impact, cause fear and frustration, and create a “climate of collapse” (Hough 1986:4). The aim is to show the population that their movement is strong and the state is weak. But it only works as a mobilising tool in the first stages of revolution, and only if the revolutionary movement has the sympathy of the general population. If terror is the only technique used throughout the struggle, it will only serve to alienate the population and strengthen the government – in other words, be very counterproductive. However, terror is most likely to be an efficient mobilising technique in underdeveloped societies dominated by foreign actors, where the population is unorganised and not represented in decision-making. Not knowing where terrorists will strike next is very frustrating for government forces, and is hoped to provoke irrational and brutal behaviour, serving to discredit the government. If they begin to arrest, ban, censor, and further oppress the revolutionaries, this is intended to “confirm the accuracy of revolutionary appeals, thus justifying more intense opposition in the future” (Gurr 1970:354). The ANC mainly used bombing as a tactic in this category, while ZANU used all three: bombing, kidnapping and assassination.

Guerrilla warfare is intended to demoralise and wear out the enemy by sustained surprise attacks, rather than direct confrontation. Therefore, it is important to engage in a strategy that will give quick and effective results. Successful rural guerrilla warfare is furthermore dependent on the population’s willingness to provide support in terms of food, shelter, recruits, information and secrecy of guerrilla presence. Che Guevara’s mistake was that he believed that he could skip the time-consuming process of mobilising the population, that guerrillas preaching liberation was enough to engage them in the war (Greene 1984:134). The ANC attempted to engage in guerrilla warfare, but the necessary circumstances were not there for this to be put into practice. In fact, the ANC hardly ever waged an armed struggle. The ANC leadership did pay lip service to the idea of revolutionary warfare around the time of Kabwe. But by the time the ANC was unbanned in 1990, other strategies such as the isolation of South Africa and mass mobilisation inside the country, were of greater significance. ZANU, on the other hand, was able to wage a fairly successful rural guerrilla war, following Mao’s three-stage strategy.

Greene (1984:140) argues that “urban-based revolutionaries deserve more the label of ‘terrorist’ than ‘guerrilla’”. This is due to the fact that their mobility is severely limited, and that they therefore tend to rely on acts of terror, which acts more as an annoyance towards the regime rather than a revolutionary threat. While people were killed in the South African liberation struggle, the official strategy of the ANC was that of sabotage. ZANU on the other hand, wished to depict themselves as dangerous killing machines, and rather exaggerated the numbers of enemies they killed. Within the guerrilla armies, neither movement treated their recruits exemplary at all times. While much discontent was exposed within ZANU after the Nhari rebellion, a mutiny erupted at an ANC camp in Angola early 1984, which “shook the ANC to its foundations” (Ellis 1994:280). The recruits were frustrated due to routine beatings in detention centres. In both cases the rebel leaders were executed.

It can be disputed how much violence is necessary for a successful revolution. But Ted Gurr (1970:4) and Samuel P. Huntington (1968:264) both assert the need for violence during revolutions. Jack Spence talks of the “profound and necessary relationship between violent means and the political ends”, and concludes that revolutionary war “is ultimately Clausewitzian in conception” (1981:23). Frantz Fanon argues that a revolution “can only triumph if we use all means to turn the scale, including, of course, that of violence” (1967:28). There is clearly widespread consent concerning its need. Violence is necessary, but levels vary. In both South Africa and Rhodesia opposing governments were so militarily superior that it would seem necessary that levels of intensity were high. This was so in some cases, but in others revolutionary acts were ignored. In South Africa, there were factors present that eventually made high levels of intensity unnecessary, including the end of the Cold War, the ungovernability of the townships, the sports boycotts, and an emerging political will to negotiate.

“Decisiveness, discipline, weaponry, secure underground networks, military competence: none of these was a trademark of the sabotage phase in black opposition politics”, Stephen Davis says of the situation in South Africa (1987:14). As every state on the southern African subcontinent was occupied by a colonial power at least in the early stages - nor were rear bases or infiltration routes. Still, he points out, the ANC decided to launch an armed struggle in 1961, the first bomb going off shortly

after Chief Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December that year. South Africa had few heavily wooded areas suitable for guerrilla bases. They had to operate in urban areas, where the black population was subject to “vast array of controls which had already effectively crippled political action” (Meredith 1997:203). “The urban guerrilla lacks the space and the time, the two main factors favouring the rural guerrilla” (Spence 1981:30). As long as the government is willing to accept a certain level of violence there is little that the urban guerrilla can do to bring about a revolution, Jack Spence argues. Maoist theory was difficult to apply to South Africa due to the conditions. Not only because it was a modern industrial state as opposed to one corrupt and in decline, but also because Pretoria was the metropolis. “There is no possibility of a weakening of the will 6 000 miles away” (Spence 1981:33).

Chapter 7 - External Support

7.1 The ANC

The most important external supporter of the ANC was the Soviet Union. This was facilitated by the cooperation with the SACP. Many MK cadres were sent to Moscow or further south to Odessa for military training, and a substantial part of MK arms and ANC funds were supplied by the USSR or Eastern bloc. After being banned in 1960, the ANC was forced into exile, and established 43 Exile Missions, mainly in Africa and Europe (Pfister 2003:52). Having such a powerful and stable external ally, the ANC was “able to steer clear of dependent relationships in African countries which [had] hosted it” (Lodge 1983:304). Apart from training and hardware, Soviet support did not appear to have a marked influence on ANC strategy.

In February 1962 Mandela went abroad and attended the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA, later PAFMECSA – after southern Africa was included) conference in Addis Ababa, and was soon accompanied by Oliver Tambo, who had been to Oslo with Chief Albert Luthuli for the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony. They hoped to establish connections with African states, boost the ANC’s reputation and gather financial and military support. The four following months were used to travel via many African countries meeting heads of state. They were promised financial support from newly independent Nigeria, Morocco, and Africa’s oldest independent nations Liberia and Ethiopia. Mandela stayed at the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) headquarters in Algeria learning of the Algerian liberation war, which lasted from 1954 to 1962, and later went to Ethiopia for six months to undergo full military training, as preparation for MK leadership.

At the same time Arthur Goldreich, SACP and MK member, went to Eastern Europe seeking support, and for the next twenty years Soviet assistance was to be far more valuable than African assistance (Lodge 1983:298). On the African continent, the ANC had to compete with the PAC for support, especially in states with a strong pan-Africanist influence – such as Ghana. “In consequence, the ANC became disillusioned with the community of African states, forcing it to turn elsewhere for

substantial assistance” (Pfister 2003:69). The ANC’s London office was first transformed into the movement’s exile capital, and the ANC and members of the British Labour Party got involved in the establishment of the anti-apartheid movement. But in 1963 headquarters were moved - via Tanzania - to Lusaka, Zambia, while the PAC headquarters moved to the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam (Pfister 2003:55; Davis 1987:22). The ANC eventually established four MK camps in Tanzania. One of the largest was at Mazimbu, where their Freedom College, SOMAFCO, was situated, on a 3,400 acre abandoned plantation that the Tanzanian government had donated to the ANC (Davis 1987:61).

In 1963, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was formed, and its Liberation Committee took over most of the work PAFMECSA had done. This Committee was based in Dar es Salaam, which was now a centre for all African liberation activity. South African liberation movements did not receive much financial assistance from the OAU, making diplomatic support all the more important. In May 1970, the ANC was thrown out of Tanzania when Oliver Tambo refused to testify against the Committee’s chairman Oscar Kambona, after an alleged attempted coup against President Nyerere. Subsequently, Nyerere chose to support the PAC. ANC headquarters were therefore moved from Tanzania to Lusaka in Zambia (Pfister 2003:56).

Prior to 1975, the Portuguese colonies Mozambique and Angola, along with South West Africa and Rhodesia, were a sort of buffer zone for the South African government. They were not surrounded by any hostile governments, but rather by colonial administrations that for obvious reasons prevented the ANC from launching a guerrilla war from their territory. The ANC therefore had to look further afar for sanctuary – to Tanzania and later Zambia, making an armed struggle largely impossible. The ANC was part of an alliance with the MPLA and FRELIMO, who both came to power after independence in 1975 in Angola and Mozambique, respectively. MK training camps were now allowed in both countries, and while circumstances were still not ideal for an armed struggle, this eased some problems of exile for the ANC leadership. The Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique in 1984 was therefore a major setback for the ANC, as they could no longer infiltrate guerrillas, arms or communications into South Africa. Maputo had by

that time become a key operational centre for *Umkhonto*, in addition to Mozambique being the only real hope for a possibility of launching a guerrilla war. The Non-Aggression Treaty between Swaziland and South Africa in 1982 meant that ANC activity in Swaziland was seriously impaired as well. Indications of ANC activity in Lesotho led to increased South African security along the Lesotho border, badly affecting Lesotho's economy and contributing to the subsequent overthrow of their government. The ANC had to be flown out of the country, and attempted to establish alternative infiltration routes through Botswana and Zimbabwe. Neither of the two governments allowed ANC military action towards South Africa from their territory – officially – as South Africa only allowed ANC political presence in neighbouring countries, and not military presence. The surrounding countries were too economically dependent on South Africa to not follow such instructions. The South African government had effectively reintroduced the buffer zone and again pushed the ANC far away from the frontier.

Still, increased infiltration from Botswana led to the South African government's launching of several attacks in Gaborone (Hough 1986:17). And in late-1986 SADF did report evidence of MK guerrillas crossing the border from Zimbabwe. The Mugabe government did not condemn this. "It's very easy to cross from Zimbabwe to South Africa, and if they do, fine", said Eddison Zvogbo, then minister of legal and parliamentary affairs. "We're not paid by South Africa to be their policemen" (quoted in Davis 1987:47). But the largest ANC/MK external bases remained those in Angola and Tanzania. In Zambia, the ANC base on Chongella farm received a US\$500,000 grant from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to produce food for MK cadres. SOMAFCO in Tanzania was aided by East Germany, Denmark, Zambia and Tanzania, who provided training for the young students and cadres.

A distinction must be made between external support for the ANC itself, and support in the way of isolating the South African government. The ANC was by itself too insignificant to be able to harm such a well-developed and powerful regime. Instead, it was necessary to appeal to the international community and South Africa's trading partners to join in the campaign to isolate South Africa. In addition to giving diplomatic support - by condemning the government, it was important that they halt any intended loans, or even start recalling debt. In the initial stages the international

community largely ignored the apartheid issue, and had no intention of interfering with South Africa's 'internal affairs'. Multinational companies were happy to invest in profitable mining and industry, and major Western powers prioritised the apartheid government's anti-communist appeal rather than moral concern of apartheid. The main governments to give financial grants were those in Norway, Holland and especially Sweden, and this was only to be used for non-military purposes (Lodge 1983:304). Furthermore, Austria, the UNHCR, the Soviet Union, India, and Oxfam also gave substantial contributions (Davis 1987:73). In addition, several political parties, trade unions, student groups and church organisations offered assistance. In 1963 and 1964, the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions prohibiting states to supply arms or technology to produce arms. Not all countries chose to follow these resolutions, and in 1968, French newspaper *Le Monde* reported that France had become the principal arms supplier to South Africa (Minty 1988:260). The same year the South African Armament Corporation (ARMSCOR) was established. Later, in 1977, the Security Council adopted Resolution 418, imposing a mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria, after previous attempts had been vetoed several times by Britain, France and the US.

In 1969, the General Assembly recognised both the ANC and the PAC as authentic representatives of the South African population. But it was important for the ANC to be seen as the *main* representative, in order to have more fighting power in the event of a political confrontation with the South African government. The ANC was granted observer status in the United Nations from 1974, and the South African government's membership was suspended. This was an important signal to the rest of the world as such an acknowledged and influential organisation - the main authority in international affairs - granted the ANC recognition while denying the South African government this opportunity. However, it has been argued that having such authority, it should have done more for African liberation movements. "The UN condemned colonialism and apartheid but it did not appeal to African nationalism to radically alter the oppressive conditions of the African people" (Baai 2006:163). The UN has often been criticised for being ineffective and open to manipulation by the five permanent members through their veto powers in the Security Council, and lacking an enforcement mandate. However, it does have a highly influential voice, and the argument is that it should have spoken louder in this situation. Nevertheless,

by the mid-eighties, the South African government did contribute to the recognition of the ANC as a main representative of the resistance movement – by making the ANC its main enemy (Adam 1988:95). Together with the efforts of the exiled ANC, the organisation was soon recognised as the sole representative of the South African liberation movement.

While the close relationship with the SACP ensured the crucial Soviet backing, it at the same time alienated the support of most Western countries, such as the United States and Britain. Rather than perceiving anti-colonial struggles as a result of socio-economic grievances by African peoples, they saw these uprisings as Soviet-instigated threats to Western interests (Magumbane 1982:8). The CIA saw the need to keep an eye on communist-supported liberation movements in southern Africa, and collaborated with the South African government by exchanging intelligence information. But after incidents such as the Soweto riots in 1976 and the controversial death of black consciousness leader Steve Biko in 1977, several prominent US and British banks terminated their business. From late 1984, the anti-apartheid movement in the US began growing significantly for the first time. In 1986, the US Congress – overriding President Ronald Reagan’s veto, joined the group of countries supporting the isolation of South Africa (Prevost 2006:165). This meant that any new US investments in or bank loans to South Africa were prohibited. Importing uranium, steel, coal, textiles or agricultural products from South Africa was also banned, and air traffic between the two countries was restricted. Other countries adopted similar sanctions. Still, it has been argued that the economic impact of these was “unlikely to be great, although the political significance [was] considerable” (Becker 1987:147). Securing new international loans became almost impossible after the township uprisings, combined with falling prices on mineral exports and expensive petroleum imports. However, it has been claimed that much of the US disinvestments were due to capitalist considerations and not the moral aspect, as the political situation and instability made investment risky.

The sports ban was effective in that it grabbed the media’s attention and created a spectacle. Starting in the late fifties, it was especially countries of the old British Empire, such as Britain, Ireland, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, Australia, much of Africa and the Anglophone Caribbean – that shared the same sports interests

as South Africa, and were in a position to cause a major stir every time an all-white South African sports team such as the Springboks came to their country for a game – in the cases where a host had been paid enough money to break the ban. Such events were an exceptionally powerful stage for political advocacy, in addition to being one of the most important arenas for national representation – and boosting nationalist sentiment. White South Africans, who were often able to bask in the glory of their talented sportsmen, were now being denied the “opportunities to compensate for the smallness of their population, their geographical marginality, and their political ostracism” (Nixon 1992:73). The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) won a major triumph when South Africa was expelled from the 1964 Olympics, and in 1970 excluded from the Olympic movement. Dr. Danie Craven, the president of the South African rugby board, despaired: “We can’t go abroad without causing chaos. It’s not pleasant to feel as if we’re suffering from a disease” (quoted in Nixon 1992:82). Not until the ANC called for a lifting of the ban in 1991, was South Africa once more slowly accepted into international sports.

International media was immensely helpful in gaining support for the anti-apartheid movement, especially with such incidents as the Trojan Horse affair in Athlone, outside Cape Town, in October 1985. Eleven days into a state of emergency, armed policemen hid in the back of a railway truck and drove down Thornton Road, trying to tempt young children into throwing rocks at the truck. Not provoking a response after a first attempt, they drove through a second time – this time with more success. Kids were throwing stones, and the police jumped out and started firing – killing four, including a 12-year old activist, and an innocent bystander. Unknown to them, however, an international television crew was secretly filming, and the footage added to the many shocking images of apartheid brutality (Holland 1990:216).

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, aiming to change the Soviet Union’s internal policies and foreign relations, with his policies of ‘glasnost’ (openness) and ‘perestroika’ (economic restructuring). He met with Ronald Reagan, and the two agreed to discontinue military interventions and support to allies in the third world. This had serious implications for the ANC as they relied on the USSR as their main weapons supplier. However, it would make it easier in South Africa for government leaders to compromise in a negotiation situation – as they would no longer have to be

concerned that the ANC had such powerful socialist allies with a plan to take over the world (Prevost 2006:166). Although de Klerk initially planned to reform apartheid just enough to allow South Africa's return to the international community, he soon recognised the need to involve the ANC in negotiations for far greater reform. After his speech in February 1990, the armed struggle was eventually suspended and then abandoned when an agreement was reached in 1993. It has been argued that South Africa was "the only country that negotiated itself out of domination into democracy without any outside assistance and/or interference" (Van Zyl Slabbert quoted in James 2003:4). However, during the negotiations, diplomatic support from the African continent was crucial for the outcome of the talks (Pfister 2003:64).

7.2 ZANU

While the ANC's superpower backing came from the Soviet Union, ZANU's came from the People's Republic of China. Cadres were sent there for training starting in 1963. Although the arms provided by Beijing were neither plentiful nor of great quality, the Chinese did provide the ideological fuel for ZANU's revolutionary ambition, as well as the theoretical framework that was so crucial in their armed struggle. Still, the inadequacy of the Chinese weapons did pose a problem, and much discontent amongst ZANLA cadres arose as a result of the guerrillas that joined after the tribal tensions arose in ZAPU. Many had been trained in the Soviet Union using sophisticated Russian arms, and their frustration over bad equipment was allegedly one of the reasons for the Nhari rebellion (White 2003:20).

However, the main external support in terms of giving sanctuary came from Mozambique and Tanzania. Mozambique allowed the all-important rear bases in Tete, as well as offering significant military and technical support from FRELIMO. Together with the UNHCR, the government of Mozambique administered refugee camps, which also housed ZANLA guerrillas, and by the end of the war these camps had approximately 185,000 Zimbabweans staying there (Pandya 1988:194). Tanzania allowed ZANU to set up their main training camp at Itumbi. Zambia did not support ZANU as such, but permitted that ZANU's main external headquarters were located in its capital, Lusaka, up until the controversial death of Herbert Chitepo in 1975. The

assassination of the popular leader led to many accusations and the Zambian high court charged ZANU with the murder, arguably just to clear its own name (Martin and Johnson 1981:190). ZANU was thrown out and headquarters were relocated to Chimoia in Mozambique.

The UN supplied diplomatic support, and already in 1966 the Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia. But again, due to the UN mandate, this did not evoke any response from the Rhodesian government in terms of changing policies. However, the sanctions did affect the Rhodesian economy to a certain extent, as its neighbours - being members of the OAU – had a duty to help the Zimbabwean guerrillas and implement UN sanctions. The Lusaka Manifesto of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) clearly states: “On the objectives of liberation as thus defined we can neither surrender nor compromise”. The OAU preferred non-violent resolutions, but “while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of southern Africa, we have no choice but to give the peoples of those territories all support” (quoted in Chimutengwende 1976:65). Mozambique closed its seaports to Rhodesian goods, and South Africa’s ports and railways were unable to handle them all.

From 1975, after ZANLA guerrillas and refugees began to enter Mozambique, the UNHCR started assisting them with food, clothing, medical equipment, blankets, and self-reliance projects. They were soon followed by other agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from 1977. The Norwegian government provided cash grants from 1974, while the Finnish government gave financial assistance from 1978. The World Council of Churches also gave economic aid (Pandya 1988:195-201).

According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson (1981:24), in the late sixties and throughout the war, President Kaunda had much closer ties with ZAPU than with ZANU. But support from Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere grew out of personal ties with ZANU. PAFMECSA decided in 1963 that ZAPU would be their major aid recipient, as did the OAU when it took over. Early ZANU support mainly came from Ghana and Tanzania, and Zambia “little more than

tolerated” housing ZANU’s offices (Reed 1993:37). The Tanzanian and Ghanaian leaders chose ZANU rather than ZAPU as they disliked Nkomo and preferred ZANU’s more confrontational approach. While the Sino-Soviet split facilitated more support for ZANU, not having access to any eastern bloc support remained an obstacle. This was increasingly of concern as tensions grew between ZANU and the leaders of Tanzania and Mozambique with the beginning of negotiations in the mid-1970s.

In November 1969 ZANU and the top military commanders of FRELIMO had two secret meetings in Lusaka. This was significant as FRELIMO was part of the ‘authentic’ supported by Moscow, while ZANU was part of the ‘non-authentic’ – who got their support from Beijing. Still, FRELIMO eventually decided to back them after ZAPU failed to respond to FRELIMO’s suggestion that they collaborate on the battlefield: “our natural ally refused to fight with weapons in their hands. They violated all principles” (FRELIMO official quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:16). While maintaining their partnership with ZAPU, Samora Machel and FRELIMO were willing to help ZANLA with the liberation of Zimbabwe and allowed infiltration through Tete – but did still not support ZANU as a political party.

In 1978, Mugabe went abroad to gain international support. He visited Ethiopia, Syria, Pakistan, China, North Korea and Vietnam. At the following OAU summit in Gabon, he succeeded in getting the Frontline states and the OAU to grant exclusive recognition to the Patriotic Front, rather than Muzorewa’s ANC. At an OAU meeting in Sudan he represented southern African liberation movements, and on the following trip to Cuba, Fidel Castro agreed to send military advisors to ZANLA in Tanzania. They would train the guerrillas to use sophisticated Soviet arms coming from Ethiopia. Africa Research Bulletin also reported that 300 Cubans had begun the training of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique 1977-78, which had previously been taught by Chinese instructors (1978:4721). By late-1978 ZANU had indeed managed to gain support from Soviet-backed countries, as well as Italy, Scandinavian countries, and the World Council of Churches (Reed 1993:47).

After the Portuguese coup in 1974 the situation on the subcontinent changed. South Africa was no longer buffered from black Africa, and Prime Minister John Vorster

now saw Ian Smith as more a potential liability rather than a useful partner. Kaunda shared his concern that a war would destabilise the region, and Vorster pressured Smith to release the detainees and partake in negotiations for a peaceful resolution. The Frontline presidents also took part in the negotiations, as well as representatives for the nationalist organisations, John Vorster, and eventually also the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But getting the two parties to agree was no easy task, and the first attempts failed. It was all complicated by several factors. Most important was probably the issue of who was ZANU's leader. In addition, making the ANC of Zimbabwe an umbrella organisation for the nationalist movement was never really accepted by ZANU – and especially Mugabe and Tekere went straight back to continue the armed struggle. Smith himself was "very slippery", and often implied that he would give in to demands, without having any intention of actually doing so (Kaunda quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:157). This inevitably frustrated the rest of the participants. Following the death of Chitepo and the subsequent accusations against and arrests of ZANU members, they lost almost all the international support they had managed to gain (Reed 1993:44). After guerrillas confirmed their recognition of Mugabe as their leader, he joined Nkomo in the establishment of the Patriotic Front, which was finally recognised by the Frontline presidents as the only legitimate liberation movement (Meredith 1979:292).

While the OAU and the UN both supported the Zimbabwean resistance movement, ZANU, like the ANC in South Africa, had to assert itself as the main representative in order to be successful in an eventual competition for power with the government. Initially, it was ZAPU that received such recognition. William Cyrus Reed argues that liberation movements must contest the sovereignty of its opponent by generating political, military, moral, and other types of international support (1993:35). Having then established itself as an international actor it is more ready to compete for and even assume power. In addition, getting recognition from outside actors usually implies that these actors will not support the opposing government. Smith's government initially got external military support from the South African regime – the greatest military power on the subcontinent. This was obviously a major disadvantage for ZANU, as the Rhodesian force was already far superior to the guerrillas.

Tanzania and Mozambique did support ZANU, but they were also in a position to force ZANU to participate in negotiations in 1975-76 and in the meetings leading to the Lancaster House agreement in 1979. The final agreement that was reached was not what the PF had intended, but the Frontline states were satisfied, and threatened to withdraw their support and end the liberation struggle if it was not signed. Due to the historical circumstances, Britain clearly had an obligation to assist in the conflict situation. Britain passed the Southern Rhodesian (Interim) Constitutional Order 1979, which restored Rhodesia's colonial status, and Lord Soames as the new governor general, until elections would be held in 1980 (Reed 1993:53). They participated in negotiations, and hosted the Lancaster House conference. Once an agreement was reached, however, they wished to avoid too much involvement in the conflict, and announced that besides some assistance in the transition, they would have nothing to do with the administration of Rhodesia. It would seem that this satisfied Mugabe. At the Lancaster House negotiations, he told British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington: "It is we who have liberated Rhodesia – you are simply intervening now to take advantage of our victory" (quoted in Meredith 2008:8). But after he had come to power, and it was time for the British to go home, he failed to convince the Europeans to stay longer and continue to help with the transition, despite his unexpected efforts.

John Saul, however, argues (1979:109) that Kissinger's involvement was motivated by other concerns than that of moral injustice: "Left to run its course, the Zimbabwean struggle would produce not merely 'independence', but a social revolution. Where, then, was Kissinger's opportunity?" The Secretary of State, it is claimed, saw Mugabe and those leaders supporting him as petty-bourgeois elitists who could help prevent the "genuine militants" in ZIPA from putting a socialist government in power. Whether Saul was right or not, Mugabe never introduced an equitable socialist system, but instead readily received the bulk of foreign assistance from the US post-independence.

7.3 Assessment

South Africa and Rhodesia were in a special situation regarding colonial status. South Africa was technically independent after becoming a British dominion in 1910.

Rhodesia had been declared independent by Ian Smith in 1965 with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, so that he was free to run the country how he pleased without interference from Britain or any other actors. This set a very bad example for future power holders, but Smith could now pursue his intention to prevent majority rule: “I don’t believe in majority rule, black majority rule, ever in Rhodesia, not in a thousand years” (quoted in Meredith 2006:323). However, the African populations in both countries still felt very much like colonised peoples. But their situation was profoundly complicated as the principle of sovereignty and the UN Charter prohibited outside actors, including the UN, from intervening in matters that were “essentially within the jurisdiction” of a state (UN Charter Ch 1, Art 2). International sanctions was one way of ‘punishing’ them, and another was openly condemning their policies. A third way was by supporting their opponents.

There are several ways of offering support to revolutionary movements. One option is giving financial aid or material support such as food, supplies, or medical equipment. The ANC was more successful in gathering economic funds from foreign governments and organisations; ZANU was more efficient in collecting material support from the Mashona population and friendly neighbours, which also offered infiltration routes. This was obviously due to their particular situations and Mashona support groups. Soviet bloc-derived aid was for the ANC more helpful than any other source, while ZANU was less fortunate with its patron. The PRC was not the rich superpower that the USSR was, and Chinese support for African liberation movements remained “meagre and unreliable” (Lodge 1983:304).

Offering accommodation and sanctuary is another crucial type of support for revolutionaries, especially in the early and middle stages of guerrilla warfare (Greene 1984:151). This can either be in remote areas within their own country or in neighbouring countries from where the guerrillas can mount attacks. This also implies the necessity of being able to collect material support from these areas. This was necessary for both movements as they were banned by their respective governments. For ZANU it was important to have rear bases near their border, as they were in a position to wage a guerrilla war against the Rhodesian forces. The ANC of South Africa, on the other hand, needed a base from where they could continue operating. However, being far from the conflict zone did have a negative effect on the

movement, and further prevented the possibility of an armed struggle. One obvious consequence was that logistics became increasingly complex. But if a country offered technical support, such as allowing a radio station to broadcast from within its borders, this could relieve some of pains of exile. The ANC set up Radio Freedom in Lusaka, as a way of mobilisation as well as being able to keep in contact with the movement back home. ZANU was able to use the studio of Radio Mozambique in Maputo to broadcast their Voice of Zimbabwe.

External support for revolutionary movements is likely to generate external support for the government being challenged. Although South Africa and Rhodesia were internationally condemned, the issue of communist support for the movements posed a problem for the Western world, especially as it became clear that these would quite probably come to power. During the years of the Cold War, this was a significant consideration. “The political, social, economic, and foreign policy changes promised by the revolutionaries or implicit in their ideology provoke greater international concern, and foreign states are more likely to register their support for either the revolutionaries or the government in power” (Greene 1984:155). This again leads to higher levels of violence, as well as making it more difficult for the contesting parties to compromise at a negotiating table with international backers. Counterrevolutionary propaganda may claim that instead of internal forces pushing for change, they are dealing with foreign invaders. But in the cases where the existing regime does not manage to gather external support, it is usually just a matter of time before a strong revolutionary movement will succeed in removing it from power, Greene further argues (1984:152). The governments in South Africa and Rhodesia clearly did not succeed in gathering sufficient support – rather the contrary. While not having widespread backing from the start, this just continued to decrease throughout the struggles, and culminated in widespread condemnation.

The ANC had adopted a four-point strategy where one of these was the international isolation of South Africa. They appealed to sympathisers around the world to boycott the South African government, and uphold the sanctions against interaction with the government. This was increasingly successful, as South Africa was excluded from sports events, international bodies, and was refused loans. This was much due to the work at headquarters in Lusaka from the mid-eighties. The main people involved

after 1985 were Thabo Mbeki, who ran the ANC's publicity office in Lusaka; John Nkadimeng, who ran the political department; Johnny Makatini, who was in charge of the international affairs department; and Thomas Nkobi, who chaired the treasury department (Davis 1987:52). This international support in fact turned out to be far more important for the ANC than the armed struggle, and probably more important than the M-Plan or even mass mobilisation: "at certain points in their history the support of foreign powers and international organisations was more crucial to the survival of South African political movements than the existence of active membership within the country" (Lodge 1983:295). The strategy was a very sophisticated one as such, and more so than any strategy of ZANU's. For ZANU, however, external support was not more important than the armed struggle. The main reason ZANU needed international support, was for sanctuary in neighbouring countries, which also gave food, shelter and arms. Mugabe knew how crucial this was, and showed his gratitude after he came to power:

"In providing their countries as the necessary rear to our war fronts, the Frontline States have in the process borne the brunt of the enemy's vindictive raids resulting in heavy loss of civilian life and the destruction of economic and civic installations in Mozambique, Zambia, Angola and Botswana" (quoted in Pandya 1988:194).

"The leadership's task, then, is to maximize in fact the advantages accruing from external support while minimizing in word the movement's dependency on it, or else the revolutionaries may find that they themselves have been captured by foreign interests that were essential to revolutionary success" (Greene 1984:156). For the ANC, this problem was eliminated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, one could argue that not having been an issue during the struggle, it is unlikely that it would be after it was over. ZANU did not get substantial amounts of support, and was therefore not that dependent on it. Peasant and Mashona support was far more crucial. In fact, after independence, it was the United States that became the largest single donor of Zimbabwe, and not Russia or China (Reed 1993:54).

The ANC and ZANU were in two different groups of liberation movements, and as such did not support each other. The ANC was in the group that naturally supported ZAPU, while ZANU was in the other group together with the PAC. However, all African liberation movements clearly shared a sense of solidarity due to their very

common fates, and were therefore not opposed to each other. Rivalry was only a problem within the respective states, when two movements were competing for recognition.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

8.1 Key findings

The African continent, along with Asia, North and South America, and Oceania, had a rather dubious first encounter with the European tradition of exploration, which often entailed ensuing exploitation of the population. European rule was usually imposed on the indigenous peoples, which for obvious reasons bred considerable opposition. Inevitably, African nationalist movements developed, and fostered what would become some admirable individuals that would eventually free their people from oppression – with, of course, the help of a crucial support base, good organisation, a uniting ideology, suitable strategies, and outside support. The pioneers set a good example for other communities, and amongst the latecomers were the African populations in South Africa and Rhodesia. With a ruling class independent from their European ancestors, the struggle became a drawn out process that would depend on increasingly great efforts and motivation to overcome colonial rule.

In this historical comparative study, the ANC and ZANU have been compared in order to find specific similarities between the two, and to point out in what ways they differ. Using this typical method of comparison, one can draw possible explanations from each case, and add to the general knowledge on liberation movements to a certain extent. Thomas Greene's study of revolutionary movements has facilitated this, by providing an analytical model that simplifies such comparisons. However, the shortage of sources on the Zimbabwean movement has been a limitation, and there is still a need for further studies on African liberation movements. The main findings are listed below.

The success of a revolutionary movement depends on several factors, and strong leadership is one of these. Several have argued that leaders from both the ANC and ZANU could be categorised as petty bourgeois (Fatton 1984:593; McKinley 1997:119; Prevost 2006:167; Saul 1979:111), indicating that they were conventional and conservative - rather than the radical Marxists they were otherwise depicted as. While 'bourgeois' gives European connotations, 'class' is a universal phenomenon. "The population of every large society is differentiated according to status, wealth, and power, and the great majority of any given population may be thought of as the

broad base of a steep pyramid” (Greene 1984:59). In both South Africa and Rhodesia, there were two or arguably more populations. The white or European population was clearly separated from the rest, whether the ‘rest’ was the African population – or the black, coloured and Indian populations. In this context, subdivisions are irrelevant, and the ‘African population’ is most useful. Nevertheless, the majority of both leaderships were part of the much smaller narrowing part of the pyramid – being much more fortunate than the rest of the deprived population - and by definition ranging between lower and upper middle class. There were not really any middle or upper middle class Africans to speak of, and the leaders were labelled ‘lower middle class’ – or petty bourgeois. The behaviour, attitudes and personalities of the leaders, however, differed significantly. While most were highly intelligent, the situation in each country necessitated a certain way of being. In Rhodesia, this led to leaders being more aggressive, militant and uncompromising. In South Africa, on the other hand, the leadership saw the need to gain the moral high ground, and had to contain aggression and appeal more to the humanitarian aspect of the struggle. While trying to uphold an uncompromising attitude, this had to be sacrificed when negotiations got under way in the 1990s. Robert Mugabe felt he had been forced into signing the Lancaster House agreement, robbed of the opportunity of victory on the battlefield - and wanted to denounce the proceedings at the United Nations in New York (Meredith 2008:8). Mandela voluntarily signed an agreement, but was accused of giving up too many principles. However, with no outside help taking part in negotiations, de Klerk was still forced to compromise and accept majority rule. Early on 18 November 1993, and interim constitution was approved, ending 341 years of minority rule – following the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. “What had been achieved ... was remarkable” (Meredith 1997:497).

The leadership of the ANC saw the need to attract the support of workers and create an alliance with trade unions. Being an urban-based movement, it was crucial that the workers carried the revolution, as they in fact were what constituted the “masses” in urban areas. The large numbers of very poor township residents were not considered. “Extreme poverty breeds apathy and social withdrawal, not political activism” (Greene 1984:81). However, it was the students who were the most active as a revolutionary force, especially as the movement grew in size and intensity in the mid-eighties. In fact, according to Tom Lodge (1983:296), the ANC could not have waged

a rural guerrilla war if they wanted to. South Africa lacked a so-called 'middle peasantry' that a rural revolution was dependent on. Instead, the population was concentrated and effectively controlled in reserves, "where, for the most part, people live on the edge of starvation, dependent on migrant earnings". Rhodesia, on the other hand, did possess such a class, and ZANU was able to embark on such an armed struggle. Their "masses" were the rural population, amongst whom they did succeed in attracting a substantial support base.

All African liberation movements used nationalism as a main uniting ideology, as they were colonised peoples and this was clearly the most efficient mobilising tool. They called themselves nationalists, and wished to abolish foreign rule. They were in opposition to the European settlers and the European system of exploitation that was imposed upon them. This system was capitalism, and it therefore became natural for Africans to turn towards its opposite in search for a coherent counter ideology. They naturally embraced socialism, but fitted it to suit the African liberation context by linking it to African identity and the need for self-dominion. Both the ANC and ZANU preached such an ideology, as it was almost a prerequisite for recognition amongst the African peoples. The ANC, however, had to downplay the socialist tendency, as their close relationship with the Communist Party was even further alienating the government, and more crucially – potential supporters caught in the Cold War propaganda machine that shunned anything politically to the left of capitalism. Not only was this amongst South Africans, but also international actors – which were arguably of even greater importance. Instead, the non-racial aspect was emphasised, appealing at the same time to the group of people sceptical to the socialist influence. Still, this resulted in ideology being an issue of constant controversy for the ANC. This ideology was contained in the ANC 'bible' – the Freedom Charter – which has largely been recognised as a moderate document. Even after going into exile, it has been argued that "the ANC's ideological position remained noticeably conservative (and realistic)" (Lodge 1983:301, brackets in original).

ZANU on the contrary found it very useful to pronounce their commitment to socialism with extra vigour. They had the support they needed in the population – and when it was not enough, they had no constraints against using coercion to enrol more

cadres. Internationally, they were most dependent on the support of regional African leaders, who were all very much in favour of socialism. In their case, ideology helped them gain support. While they did have their political manual, *Mwenje One*, this received less attention than the South African Freedom Charter, probably because ZANU increasingly began using Mao's writings as revolutionary guidelines.

The ANC arguably had a greater task of defeating the South African government than that of ZANU, and their struggle was also prolonged over a period lasting more than three quarters of a century. This gave them more time to develop a well-functioning organisation. But facing many restrictions, such as having most of its leadership imprisoned, and being in exile, meant that this demanded substantial effort, and did not materialise before the 1980s. The South African government then realised they had to reform the system, and involve the ANC in any negotiations discussing such change. What stands out as the most formidable effort of the ANC's organisation, was how the anger of ANC activists – which can only have been present, was so effectively contained. Yet violence did erupt in the townships, and the period towards 1994 was heavily burdened with massacres and brutality. Mandela had to increase his efforts to calm them: “Do you want me to remain your leader? Well, as long as I am your leader, I will tell you, always, when you are wrong” (quoted in Meredith 1997:495).

ZANU, on the other hand, with an arguably easier opponent, managed to defeat the Rhodesians in only sixteen years – from late 1963 to late 1979. And in this period, most of their leaders were in detention from 1964 to 1974. Despite this, they also managed to develop an effective countergovernment. The Rhodesian government and the other participants in the negotiations saw the need to invite ZANU to negotiations, but ZANU was never the sole representative of the resistance movement in the same way South Africa's ANC was. Still, they got the overwhelming majority in the 1980 elections, and had an organisational structure ready to assume power. The most remarkable aspect of ZANU's organisation, in comparison to the South African ANC, is how quickly it was built. However, they did have Mao's guidelines that they followed closely.

The choice of strategy was a very important aspect for the ANC, as the many different campaigns they embarked upon were effortlessly crushed by the apartheid government. The initial pursuit of non-violence was a highly admirable but ineffective effort. The turn to armed struggle in 1961 showed that the movement was willing to give up principles in response to the government's aggression, but the level of intensity never got to, and could not get to, a stage that would evoke a response. Only the final four-pronged strategy was as such that it gained a certain amount of success. Of the four, the armed struggle was still not escalating much. The M-plan was, like the 'people's war', a strategic way of involving the people at grass-roots level, and effectively linked the townships together. Mass mobilisation was increasingly successful, with the revival of the ANC as the most important force in South Africa's resistance movement. The international isolation of South Africa was what was felt the most by the government, especially as the economy was becoming somewhat strained. Business people began to put pressure on the authorities as apartheid was having a negative effect on their enterprises. International media also did its part by reporting on such incidents as the Trojan Horse incident, or images such as the young boy running in despair, carrying an even younger victim – both covered in blood, in the midst of the Soweto uprisings. The picture was to become one of the world's most famous political images, alongside the Vietnamese images of the girl running from a napalm attack, and the guerrilla being shot in the head at close range.

ZANU was fighting a more conventional guerrilla war, as the conditions allowed it. They had Mao's guidelines to follow, and only slightly adjusted them according to their situation. The main difference was that ZANU took religion more into consideration - whether the population was of Catholic persuasion, or followers of the traditional beliefs. They used the missionaries or the traditional spirit mediums to gain legitimacy from the people, which was crucial for the preparatory or first stage of mass mobilisation. Without it they could not successfully go on to the next stage, that of guerrilla warfare. Although they liked to exaggerate their success, they did in fact manage to wage a guerrilla war to a greater extent than their South African counterparts. But they never reached Mao's third stage of conventional mobile war, and resented having to sign an agreement instead of defeating the Rhodesians on the battlefield - however questionable that prospect was.

The external support the ANC received in trying to isolate the government was one of their greater successes. All types of support were important, but diplomatic support was possibly more effective than others. Yet, while this was of great importance, one can argue whether it was crucial for their success. ZANU, on the other hand, depended on the support of neighbouring countries in order to enable an armed struggle. In this sense, material support was of greater significance, such as sanctuary, food, arms and shelter.

The ANC and ZANU were two very different movements in two more similar situations. One of the great differences was their position in the political arena. The ANC was by far the more moderate of the South African resistance organisations. The faction that broke away in 1959 to become its main rival, PAC, did so because they were opposed to the ANC's lack of Africanist principles. The PAC developed a more aggressive and militant attitude, and while appealing to pan-Africanists across the continent, had constant leadership problems and, according to John Saul (1988:215), a "pronounced tendency to self-destruct". While the ANC and PAC did attempt cooperation, this was never successful. However, it was between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party that most fatal clashes occurred, but this has largely been attributed to government involvement.

ZANU, by contrast, was clearly the most militant of the Zimbabwean nationalist movements. ZANU was itself the faction to break away from ZAPU, much due to Nkomo's passiveness and reluctance to get the armed struggle under way. ZANU idolised militancy and guns, and increasingly condemned moderate and non-violent strategies. They exaggerated the number of enemies they assassinated, to boost morale and instil fear. While they had more success than the South African ANC in collaborating with a rival movement, the ZANU-ZAPU partnership in ZIPA in early 1976 and the Patriotic Front later that year eventually failed due to ZANU's domination in both instances. The main reasons for this difference were the circumstances in the respective countries – and possibly most of all, the nature of the opposing government.

Ian Smith was a very peculiar character. He was astonishingly ignorant of the Zimbabweans and their situation, and was completely oblivious to the discontent amongst them. A few hours after the attack on Altena Farm, he was still not aware of the incident as information was delayed due to severed telephone lines. He was defending his statement that what he considered it his right to call *our* Africans - implying some sense of ownership - were “the happiest Africans in the world”, as no one had yet shown him “where there are Africans who are happier – or, for that matter, better off – than in Rhodesia” (quoted in Martin and Johnson 1981:1). Furthermore, he completely lacked a sense of self-criticism, as well as the ability to show some tact towards the black population on whose land the settlers had chosen to impose themselves. In a broadcast to the nation 18 January 1973, not long after ZANU had launched their offensive, he tried to explain the success of ZANU’s mobilisation. He claimed they had “found a few witchdoctors of doubtful character and of little substance”, bribed them to their side so that they could help ZANU convince local tribesmen into supporting them. “I am sure that I do not have to inform you how easy it is to mislead these simple gullible people who still believe in witchcraft and the throwing of bones” (quoted in Lan 1985:157). This type of attitude undoubtedly bred an immense anger amongst the Zimbabweans. “Mugabe’s brooding frustration and indignation ... would later develop into a naked hatred of all things British” (Verkaik 2008:8). In his last television broadcast as prime minister, Smith clearly saw no reason to try to ease the situation: “there was no message of goodwill for the new government; no appeal for national unity; no expression of hope that the bitterness shown by a divided nation should be buried” (Meredith 1979:17). Instead he complained that black majority rule had come too soon.

This is not to imply that the South African regime could not be criticised for their treatment of the African population. Still, they were less blunt and complacent, at least publicly. Most presidents at some point talked of need for change, whether or not they meant it in the way the nationalist movement had hoped. President Botha went into office warning of change in the political landscape: “We are moving in a changing world... We must adapt, otherwise we shall die” (quoted in Meredith 1997:345). However, what he really had in mind was the introduction of a tricameral parliament, giving Indians and Coloureds responsibility for ‘their own’ affairs. Political power still remained with the whites, while the blacks continued to have

none. When de Klerk took over in 1989, the government and its forces were still in remarkable shape to defend the apartheid system: “it faced no serious threat; sanctions were a costly rather than a damaging imposition” (Meredith 1997:395). He did not see apartheid as morally wrong, but rather as an honourable attempt to separate the white and black populations. Yet, he saw the need for change, and 2 February 1990 he went against his cabinet’s advice and surprised the nation when he announced the unbanning of the ANC, the MK, the SACP and the PAC. Restrictions would be abolished and prisoners released, he continued, while asserting the necessity of “peace and reconciliation” (quoted in Meredith 1997:401).

While both the ANC and ZANU fought and won wars of liberation or independence, and brought about major social and political change, they did not fundamentally alter the economic system – from the Western capitalist system to a more equitable socialist one – as they claimed they would in their initial revolutionary appeals. It would seem that business interests pressured the ANC into accepting that the economic system would not change to a great extent. The South Africans had waited long enough, and needed a negotiated settlement. ZANU, on the other hand, had gathered peasant support by promising to give them their land back if they won the battle. Instead, many ZANLA comrades took over farms, who knew little about farming, and drove the ‘breadbasket of Africa’ into ruin. Therefore, one can argue that the two societies did not experience a full political, economic and social transformation. They did, however, obtain liberation, majority rule, and a new ruling elite.

Frantz Fanon has argued that “decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (1967:27). And it can certainly be argued that both the South African and Zimbabwean cases were cases of decolonisation. However, they had very different levels of violence. This was also very apparent during the elections marking both the victories. Intimidation was widespread in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in 1980. ZANU – now ZANU-PF, ZAPU, and Muzorewa’s United ANC (UANC), were all found guilty of using intimidation, although ZANU-PF far more than others. Nkomo elaborated: “The word *intimidation* is mild. People are being terrorised. It is *terror*. There is fear in people’s eyes” (quoted in Meredith 2002:10). It seems that the violence and

militancy that shaped the liberation struggle, became entrenched in society as a heroic means to an end. Guns were increasingly idolised to the extent that Robert Mugabe could utter these words and still win such an overwhelming majority in the elections: “The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – *its guarantor*” (quoted in Meredith 2002:225, italics added). And clearly, the 1980 elections only served as a precedent for the succeeding elections – violence had become legitimised by those in power.

In South Africa, the year 1994 began with violence reaching unprecedented heights. However, as the four-day election commenced, South Africa experienced a much-needed calm: “The fever of violence suddenly abated. Even the killing fields of KwaZulu-Natal fell silent” (Meredith 1997:516). Old rivals joined each other in the long queues, exchanging complaints about the wait, and finally exercised the right denied to Africans for so long. The patience and determination of the voters was considerable, and the sense of restored dignity contagious. There were a few disturbances, such as the Afrikaner extremist bombing of Johannesburg International airport, which killed twenty-one civilians and injured almost 200 more. Yet, they could not stop the election from being a great success.

8.2 Further key factors and possible implications

It is difficult to speculate exactly why things happened as they did, but taking as many factors as possible into consideration facilitates this. Some such factors could be:

- The white population in South Africa had been there for such a long time that this was no new source of frustration – in Rhodesia the white population had been there little over sixty years, since the late 1890s
- The Rhodesians admitted having even harsher repressive laws than the South Africans in the 1930s, breeding much resentment in a short period of time
- As many urban blacks were moved into reserves, mass mobilisation for urban-based ANC was difficult – had to appeal to as broad a base possible, which made them favourable post-liberation. However, as with ZANU, becoming the sole possessor of power would inevitably pose a major problem.

- The difference of personalities between ANC and ZANU leaders was crucial – having to convince people of their cause on moral and humanitarian grounds made the ANC more humble and ‘thought through’ as a movement
- ZANU blamed Britain and colonialism, both of which would continue to exist elsewhere after 1980, and could always be used as scapegoats for future problems. ANC blamed apartheid, with which they could bury their hatchets in 1994.

Overall, the greatest difference was that ZANU had the opportunity to fight a rural guerrilla war, while this was impossible for the ANC. The South Africans therefore had to find alternative strategies, and could not as easily apply existing recipes for successful warfare. This was due to many factors, and had several consequences – most importantly that the struggle became more complex, more drawn out, and at times seemingly hopeless.

The greatest similarity was their respective opponents – a repressive regime that had implemented a system removing most civil liberties from the majority of both populations. This resulted in further similar situations for the two movements, such as the bannings that led to most of the two leaderships spent most of the struggle behind prison walls.

While both the ANC and ZANU defeated their opponents, the contexts in which they came to power differed considerably. While they have struggled with their respective problems after coming to power, Zimbabwe has clearly had far greater issues to deal with. One can speculate why this is so, but it is clear that while a higher level of ruthlessness pervaded in Zimbabwe, South Africa sought a higher level of self-discipline and self-containment. This would inevitably have an effect on the movement once in power. But, again borrowing a last quote that Thomas Greene himself found useful (1984:82), the Algerian rebel organiser in Gillo Pontecorvo’s film *The Battle of Algiers* warns of the coming problems:

“To begin a revolution is very difficult. To sustain it is even more difficult. To win it is almost impossible. But once you have won, then your troubles really begin”.

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