# The New War in Darfur: Ethnic Mobilization Within The Disintegrating State?

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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch

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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: 26 November 2009

Abstract

In the context of the present conflict in Darfur, and in the years preceding it, the distinction between so-called African and Arab tribes has come to the forefront, and the tribal identity of individuals has increased in significance. These distinctions were never as clear cut and definite as they are today. The 'Arab' and 'African' distinction that was always more of a passive characteristic in the past has now become the reason for standing on different sides of the political divide. What then are the main factors which contributed to this new violent distinction between Arab and African? How is it possible for people and communities who have a positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty and hate towards one another.

The thesis uses the New War framework to look at the current situation in Darfur. The most definitive version of this new framework is presented by scholars such as Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin van Creveld (1991) and Helfried Münkler (2005). The thesis then shows how the war in Darfur, exactly in line with the new war argument, has political goals with the political mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. Kaldor (2006) argues that the political goals in the new wars are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities, such as Arab or African. Defining identity politics as "movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (Kaldor, 2006: 80), it becomes apparent that Darfur has become subject to this these kind of new war politics. The study therefore questions the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an "ancient hatred" or "tribal warfare".

Chapters three and four illustrates how this new distinction between Arab and African should rather be seen as the cumulative effects of marginalization, competing economic interests and, more recently, from the political polarization which has engulfed the region. Most of the factors leading to the current Arab/African antagonism were traced to contemporary phenomena. The study also looks at factors such as loss of physical coercion on behalf of the state, loss of popular legitimacy and effective leadership, underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, and privatization of force. The study then concludes that politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects of these conditions then as the result of ethnic hatred.

Opsomming

In die konteks van die huidige konflik in Darfur, en die jare wat dit voorafgaan, het die verskille tussen sogenaamde 'Afrikaan' en 'Arabier' stamme na vore gekom. So ook het die stamverband van individue kenmerkend toegeneem. Hierdie onderskeid was nooit so noukeurig afgebaken en bepalend soos wat dit vandag is nie. Die 'Afrikaan' en 'Arabier' onderskeid wat in die verlede meer van 'n passiewe kenmerk was, het ontaard in die rede waarom beide kante hulself vandag in 'n politieke skeiding bevind. Wat dan is die hoof faktore wat bydra tot hierdie nuwe gewelddadige onderskeid tussen 'Afrikane' en 'Arabiere'? Hoe is dit moontlik vir mense en gemeenskappe met 'n positiewe geskiedenis van samewerking en verdraagsaamheid om skielik 'n toestand van soveel onmenslikheid en haat teenoor mekaar te ervaar?

Die tesis maak gebruik van die Nuwe oorlog denkrigting in 'n poging om die huidige oorlog in Darfur te beskryf. Die mees bepalende weergawe van hierdie denkrigting word voorsien deur akademici soos Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin Creveld (1991) en Helfried Münkler (2005). Die tesis fokus op hoe die oorlog in Darfur (in lyn met die Nuwe Oorlog denkrigting) politieke doelwitte aan die dag lê, met die gepaardgaande politieke mobilisering wat geskied op grond van identiteit. Kaldor (2006) argumenteer dat die politieke doelwitte in die nuwe oorloë berus op die aanspraak tot mag op grond van skynbare tradisionele identiteite of stamwese, soos 'Afrikaan' en 'Arabier'. As 'n mens identiteitspolitiek definieër as 'n beweging wat mobiliseer rondom etnisiteit, ras of geloof, met die doel om aanspraak te maak op staatsmag, dan blyk dit of die konflik in Darfur wel onderhewig is aan hierdie nuwe vorm van Nuwe Oorlog politiek. Die studie bevraagteken dus ook die gewilde aanname dat etniese oorloë ontstaan uit 'stamoorloë' of 'antieke vyandskap'.

Hoofstuk drie en vier verduidelik hoekom hierdie nuwe onderskeiding tussen 'Afrikaan' en 'Arabier' eerder beskou moet word as die kumulatiewe effek van marginalisasie, kompeterende ekonomiese belange en die politieke polarisasie wat die streek in twee skeur. Meeste van die faktore wat gelei het tot die etniese polarisasie van die streek word hier beskou as kontemporêre verskynsels. Die studie kyk ook na faktore soos: die verlies van populêre legitimiteit en effektiewe leierskap, onderontwikkeling, armoede, ongelykheid en

die privatisering van mag. Die studie sluit af met die gedagte dat identiteitspolitiek in Darfur beskou moet word as die uitkoms van individue, groepe of politieke leiers wat reageer op die bogenoemde omstandighede, eerder as die resultaat van 'antieke vyandskap' of aggresiewe 'stamoorloë'.

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Table of Content

Map of Sudan

Source: Sudan, No. 3707 Rev.7 May 2004, UN Cartographic Section

Chapter 1:   Introduction

1.1   Introduction

In 2005 the long process of reaching a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebels was finally ended after more than twenty years of protracted conflict in Sudan, this was marked by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the Western region of Darfur, however, violent conflict continues to rage and continues to draw the attention of the international community. United Nations officials estimate the amount of deaths due to non-violent causes to be more than 180,000 where others estimates places the total mortality since February 2003 near 400,000 (Reeves, 2005). Furthermore, it is estimated that more than 25-30 percent of the population of Darfur have been forcibly evicted from their homes and fields and that they have lost most or all of their assets, including the resources most essential for their survival, their livestock and crops.

Some observers, such as US officials, have gone as far as to refer to the government and paramilitary unit attacks on the population as genocide (The American Journal of International Law, 2005: 266). While UN officials exhibit more reservation in labeling the conflict, they nonetheless insist that the government of the Sudan and the state sponsored militias are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. These include killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. More so, these acts were also conducted on a wide spread and systematic basis so making it undisputed that they amount to crimes against humanity (UN, 2005: 3).

The Darfur region of Sudan has been afflicted with a certain degree of conflict for several decades preceding the current wave of fierce ethnic warfare which broke out in 2003. These historical conflicts have usually involved pastoralists from the North which include tribes like the Rizeigat, Mahariya,l Zaghawa and various other smaller tribes. These tribes traditionally migrate to the South of the region in search of water sources and grazing land for their cattle and camels in the dry season, which usually ranges between November and April. In the mid 1980s, however, large parts of Darfur was hit by successive droughts, especially afflicting the

Sahel region, and led to increasing desertification in Darfur. This had the effect of provoking land disputes between the Arab pastoralists and the agricultural communities. The disputes between these different communities usually started when the camel and cattle herding Arab Nomads started to invade the fields of the non-Arab farmers living in the central and Southern regions of Darfur in desperate search of water supplies and grazing land. Historically, however, such disputes have usually been resolved through negotiation between the different traditional leaders of both sides through a system of traditional tribal mediation (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

One of the early political warning signs to the current conflict in Darfur was when certain Arab tribes started to consider themselves as unequally represented in the Fur dominated local administration and in 1986 various of the Arab tribes formed what is known today as the "Arab Alliance" which had as its main goal the political and economical control of the region by Arabs. The non-Arab tribes, in turn, started to grow more and more distrustful of the local Arabs and the increasing tendency of the federal government to favour the Arabs. The rulers and elite from the government in the capital of Sudan in Khartoum were, and remains today, largely and historically comprised of Arabs from the Northern Nile Valley. This fear of Arab domination was only made much worse by the (then) Sadiq El Mahdi government (1986-1989) and its policy of Arming Arab Baggara militias from Darfur. These militias were known as "murahelleen" and they bear a striking resemblance to the Janjaweed militias which are operating in the current war in Darfur as government aided militias. These muraheleen were employed by the government as a counter-insurgency force against the Sudan's People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) during the long war against the South. The militias mainly focussed on looting, raiding, displacing, enslaving and punishing tribe members living in the SPLA territory (International Crisis Group, 2004: 1a).

Later in the 1980s, however, these disputes became much more bloodier, largely because of the introduction of light automatic weapons. By the late 1980s these violent incidents started to include non-Arab tribes as well such as the Zagawa pastoralists who attempted to claim land from the Fur tribes and its farmers. It was also during this period in which the armed banditry in the region started to become prominent, mostly as a result of many of the pastoralists loosing most or all of their animals as a result of the drought and desertification and in turn raided others to restock their herds. By 1990 these moderate clashes between the different tribes in Darfur had evolved into full-scale conflict between the Fur and Arab communities. This

conflict also started to take on a more political dimension in the sense that rather than attempting to defuse the tensions and attempt to settle the conflict, the government in Khartoum actually served to intensify the conflict by arming the Arab tribes and neglecting to address the underlying core issue of the conflict over resources. In the early stages this core underlying issue could still be identified as the "need for rule of law and socio-economic development in the region" (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

The current war in Darfur which officially broke out in 2003 therefore has deep historical roots and can be seen as "the latest configuration of a protracted problem" (Human Rights Watch, 2004). However, the current conflict is also drastically different to any of these previous conflicts in that it has developed along strict and serious racial and ethnic lines and it provides a serious risk of completely shattering the historical patterns of co-existence in the region of Darfur. Many of the different ethnic groups which have previously been neutral toward one another have now positioned themselves along the Arab/African divide, aligning and cooperating either with the rebel movements or the government and its allied militia (the janjaweed). It is also becoming harder and harder for neutral groups to position themselves outside of the conflict.

It is possible to argue that the emergence and use of the Janjaweed by the government in Khartoum marked the first instance of this new war in Darfur. The Janjaweed, literally meaning "evil spirit on horse back" has been an established militia faction since the early 1990s and had as their main adversaries the Fur tribes and their civilian support bases. In retaliation to the atrocities being committed against them, a Fur militia was also emerging, largely through extensive contact with the Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the South. The Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), which later became the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) was the most prominent of these and was partly armed by the former president Habre in Chad. By the late 1990s this form of self-defense units to protect farms and families had developed into something different altogether. The SLA had now evolved into an organized rebel group which was able to efficiently mobilize resources and support from local populations. In 2001, the Zeghawa tribes, whose villages had also been ransacked by the Arabs, joined the Fur against their old Arab allies and so further strengthened the SLA in Darfur (Kajee, 2006: 81).

Between 2001 and 2004 the SLA insurgencies had begun to drastically increase in frequency and in extent with the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) often attacking government garrisons in joint missions. In turn, the government, unused to this form of guerilla warfare conducted by the rebels groups, unleashed its air force to bomb the rebels from above. The watershed mark in the Darfur was when the SLA joined by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked a state air base in Darfur's provincial capital El Fasher on 25 April 2003. The rebels were successful in destroying government army equipment, ranging from bombers to helicopter gun ships and also managed to take prisoners, arms and vehicles (Kajee, 2006: 81).

In turn, Khartoum's reaction to this was to use the air force and the Janjaweed (which by that time had been trained and organized into effective paramilitary units) in what is known as a counter-insurgency strategy. The main conduct under this strategy was, and still is today, the bombing, burning and looting of villages, ensuring that the rebels are cut of from their civilian support base. In recent months, however, the atrocities committed by rebel groups have also increased and it has become increasingly difficult for aid workers and peacekeepers to distinguish between pro-government and rebel groups and to determine which of the two are responsible for the acts of violence. This blurring of different war parties is result of different actors adopting similar strategies in order to finance their war efforts and to simply keep themselves and their followers afloat (Kajee, 2006: 81).

1.2   Research Problem

Because of the effect that it has had on innocent civilians, the crisis in Darfur has perhaps attracted more media and scholarly attention in the last few years than any other conflict region in Africa since the Rwandan genocide. In some corners of the Western world the conflict has become intricately bound with campaigns and peace rallies organized by a diverse array of actors ranging from scholars to civil society to even celebrities, all making the headlines of large news and media networks across the globe. This may be good and well, yet it is also worth noting the common tendency of these news and media networks of oversimplifying the conflict in Darfur and in the greater Sudan. The hard fact is that civil unrest, such as the conflict playing out in Darfur, can hardly be framed as orderly and as one-dimensional" as is often done by the media (Kajee, 2006: 74).

So far the conflict in Darfur has commonly been framed as ethnic hatred or an ethnic cleansing of African by Arabs whereas the long war in Sudan has commonly been framed as the result of violent animosity between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South of the country. Although both of these deductions bear a certain mark of truth, they nonetheless neglect to account for various other actors and factors, both local, regional and international, which contribute to the root causes of the violent conflict (Kajee, 2006: 71).The most serious problem of this over-simplistic framing of the conflict in Darfur is the likelihood that this framework might be directly transferred or projected onto the peace process and would therefore have grave implications for the success of the peace negotiations. Although it might prove hard to establish, it is certainly possible that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) has often been branded as a failure partly because of an over-simplistic analysis of the actors and factors involved. (Kajee, 2006: 74).

The name Darfur is derived from the words "Dar"- meaning the land or the kingdom, and "Fur"- referring to one of the large tribes with the oldest standing historical roots in the region. In the literal sense Darfur means the Kingdom of the Fur people, yet what this literal definition conceals is the fact that Darfur is really the home of a much broader array of ethnic, cultural and linguistic communities and tribes. The province of Darfur, roughly the size of France, has, more or less, eight million inhabitance which consists of about eighty different tribes of which the most prominent include the Fur, Zeghawa, Tunjur, Berti, and Marsalit as well Arab groups such as the Rizeigat, Salamat and Bendi Halba (Kajee, 2006: 74)

As mentioned, in the contemporary context the main division among these various groups (or tribes) relate to their lifestyle, or rather, their livelihood, as opposed to their race. Two main divisions are commonly identified, namely: sedentary farmers and semi-nomadic pastoralists. Although this division can hardly be considered as clear cut, it can nonetheless be considered a division between Arab tribes (relying mostly on cattle and camel herding) and non-Arab tribes (relying mostly on agriculture) (Kajee, 2006: 75). It should be pointed out that all these tribes of Darfur share the same religion (Islam), and while some of the tribes do possess their own language, Arabic is generally spoken (International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005).

The "looseness" of this division, however, becomes apparent when one looks at the centuries of intermarriage between these groups, with the end result being that the notion of "Arab" and "African" remains exactly that: notional- something which perhaps has its roots in a contemporary context rather than in a primordial sentiment. Another example may also illustrate this point. Up until quite recently it was quite common for members of the Fur tribe to purchase and herd cattle and in the same process to "become Bagara" and to adopt the livelihood commonly associated with cattle-herding Arabs. Furthermore, even though most analysts regard the Fur people as the original or the first indigenous inhabitance of the region, the reality is that the Fur people themselves are the result of migration and assimilation starting from the fourteenth century. In the pre-colonial times it was very common for weaker tribes to assimilate and "become Fur" as a result of both conquest and religious and linguistic acculturization (Kajee, 2006: 75), (Cook, 2006: 123). The chapters to follow will elaborate extensively on how fixed these identities are in reality.

1.3   Research Question

To question to rise at this point is: how is it possible for people and communities who have a positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty and hate towards one another? Such were the scenes that played out in the civil wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia when friends and neighbors started to violently unleash their aggression onto one another. This is also the scene we are currently witnessing in Darfur. When the actors involved in these conflicts, whether victims or aggressors, are questioned about their experiences of the atrocities committed against them, or by them, the common response usually lies in a difference between "us" and "them" explanation. This "us" and "them" dichotomy, or "othering" (as it is often referred to), is usually expressed in terms of ethnicity and/or ethnic labeling. It is true that ethnic sentiments may inspire groups and communities to act in violent ways towards certain people whom they classify as "other". The problem, however, lies in detecting the "empirical basis of the sentiment" (Turton, 1997:78). The study therefore questions the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an "ancient hatred" or "tribal warfare".

Ethnic tensions and disputes have existed in Darfur for centuries, yet despite this the Darfuri's have managed to live in relative peace until recently. As shown in the introduction, in recent times these tensions have to a large extent been exacerbated by drought and famine. On top the

environmental considerations, one should also consider the possibility of political manipulation, both from the center in Khartoum and from neighboring states such as Libya, and how these actors may have played a role in shaping and exacerbating the conflict. The Khartoum government, as late as 2006, keeps insisting that the Darfur conflict is an inter-tribal one that has become much worst purely because of successive droughts and famine. This is clearly not all there is to the conflict when one looks at the way in which the government has bombed the villages of Darfur with official army aircrafts. Furthermore, the co-option of the Janjaweed into the regular army cannot be explained according an "ethnic hatred" or "tribal war" argument and therefore requires a study on Darfur to consider other factors not taken into account by the mainstream media. Recent UN reports found "credible information that the government of Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and vehicles. The Janjaweed/ armed militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled grenades…Their continued access to ammunition and weapons is evident in their ability to co-ordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in armed conflict with rebel groups" (United Nations, 2006: paragraph 76).

The study therefore draws a clear relationship between ethnicity and war. With this relationship, however, it is also important to question whether ethnic differences and ethnic conflicts is something that is given by nature or whether it is constructed and manipulated by politicians to achieve political and economical gains. In order to shed light on this particular relationship between ethnicity and war it would therefore be essential to point to the conditions and historical circumstances under which ethnicity is actually brought to consciousness. In tracing the historical and contextual origins of the idea of ethnicity scholars are often in disagreement as to whether ethnicity is simply a new term for describing something which has been present since the beginning of civilization, or whether ethnicity should be considered a "modern phenomenon". This disagreement runs parallel to the question of whether the conflict in Darfur should be seen as the result of ethnic hatred or whether it should be seen as having contemporary political causes, or both.

Gellner (1964: 149) provides a definition of ethnicity which is consistent with the idea that ethnicity is a universal phenomena, something inherent in every human, when he says that: "ethnicity is "the human need to belong, to identify and hence also to exclude". Such a definition, however, proves to be very vague and it is possible to argue that this "need" may

well be satisfied in a variety of other different ways which do not necessarily relate to ethnicity. Turton argues that it is precisely this vagueness of the idea of ethnicity that makes it a powerful tool for politicians to move individuals to collective action (Turton, 1997: 80). Therefore, Looking at "modern ethnicity", one has to see it as some form of a reaction to mainly "political and economical processes which [we] take to be characteristic of modernity" (Turton, 1997: 80). Chapter two will expand extensively on the different views which different scholars hold regarding ethnicity and the role it plays in the modern warfare context.

This criticism is close to the view which holds that ethnicity has been reconstructed for political purposes and corresponds closely to the instrumentalist conception of ethnicity, according to which nationalist movements "reinvent particular versions of history and memory to construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilization". Scholars such as Brown (2001: 4) would argue that what happened in Sudan may possibly be described as a diminishing capacity or perhaps even a form of disintegration of the state at the provincial level and perhaps also at the national level, forcing it to play the ethnic card in order to maintain control and legitimacy. Defining the state in the Weberian sense as the organization which "successfully upholds the monopoly of legitimate organized violence", it should be possible to trace, first the collapse of legitimacy in Darfur and, secondly, the collapse of the monopoly of organized violence, as this paper will attempt to verify in the chapter to follow (Kaldor, 2006).

In order for the study to shed light on the "ethnic hatred and/or tribal warfare" argument regarding ethnic conflict it would have to critically study the actors involved and the factors which drive their violent motives. Young (1985: 72) points to the important role that the unequal distribution of economic, educational and other benefits of modernization plays, this usually as the result of the favoring of some regions and groups and, in turn, the marginalization and neglect of other areas and groups. Another factor too consider here is the concentration of political power at the states' center which has as a direct result the provision of an arena where ethnic groups could become competing and often conflicting interest groups (Young, 1985: 75). This transformation of ethnic groups into interest groups is a factor worth emphasizing, for it is a factor that has greatly contributed to the profiting and exacerbation of ethnic tensions and conflict. What we see today in many conflict regions is a "transition from a non-competitive to a competitive form of ethnicity or political tribalism" (Lonsdale, 1994).

1.4   Purpose and significance of the study

So far the paper has been preoccupied with lying out the fundamental dimensions of the conflict of which the most important is the notion of identity and how identity in the Darfur conflict seems to parallel the notion of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness. As mentioned, the problem lies with detecting the empirical basis for this 'new' form of ethnic consciousness and ethnic "othering" and it is therefore important to question whether the ethnic hatred explanation amount to a sufficient explanation regarding the root causes of the conflict, or for most other 21st century conflicts for that matter. The study therefore questions the single logic or "ethnic hatred" explanation for war and aims to examine the conflict in Darfur based the idea that a single simplified answer such as ethnic hatred may not prove sufficient in discussing the root causes of civil war. In order to answer this question the study will consider the argument that the concept of ethnicity is a instrumental notion, a tool which may be easily wielded by desperate politicians eager to hold on to power and authority. The study will therefore attempt describe how certain individuals might manipulate different groups along ethnic lines and the effect this has on conflict in the region and the nation as a whole.

Such an inquiry will necessarily require the paper to firstly, analyze the various actors involved- their history, their origins, their motivation, their grievance, their opponents and their strategies. Secondly, the study will have to critically inquire into the functioning of the state, both locally, regionally and nationally, for it is within the context of the state, or rather the disintegration of the state that these actors operate. In line with the arguments presented by scholars such as de Waal (2007), Flint (2005) and Turton (2006), this study will explore the notion that all activity within the conflict in Darfur is derived, in some way or another, from political and or state disintegration and, therefore, inadequacy. What is meant by inadequacy in this context is the underdevelopment, the marginalization, and the brutalization which occur in Darfur on behalf of the ruling (and desperate) factions of the country, factors which have undoubtedly shaped and possibly caused the current war in Darfur. According to this view, most of the factors which led to the war in Darfur can be considered within the context of the state and the actors involved in its confines. Individuals and groups will be examined in terms of their relation to the state and one another.

As mentioned, various other explanations exist regarding the origin of violent conflicts, of which the most prominent include the greed and/or grievance argument, ethnicity and the environmental scarcity argument. It is certainly possible to construct an explanation for the conflict in Darfur along these lines of argument, yet instead, the thesis will employ a more specific framework through which to explain the conflict. In this framework no particular actor or factor will form the primary unit of analysis, instead, various factors and actors will be considered and analyzed in the context of the state and ethnic conflict. As is apparent in the information provided above, Darfur has had a share of resource disputes which to some extent has shaped its present state of affairs and probably also its future direction, including the mingling of resource conflicts and ethnic conflict. The main question, however, is where resource conflicts end and where ethnic conflict begins. This question is of great importance because it will determine if and to what extent the Sudanese Government, the Janjaweed or the liberation movements are responsible for transforming minor resource conflicts into a new, modern warfare for political gains (Salih, 2005).

1.5   Theoretical Framework

When looking beyond Darfur at the contemporary international political arena (referring to the post-communist context in this paper), it becomes apparent that the greater majority of wars playing out take place within national borders as apposed wars between states. As Darfur clearly illustrates, one of the most alarming consequences of this reality has been the increase of the amount of refugees in different regions of the world. Statistics released on this subject reveal that the number of total refugees in the world have risen from 2 million in 1970 to well over 16 million in 1995. Included in these statistics are also more or less 21 million people which have been displaced within their own countries' (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1996: 131). According to Turton (1997) these internal wars are fought primarily with light weapons which a very easily available at very affordable prices and affects mainly the lives and livelihoods of civilians. Another characteristic of these wars are the fact that are generally waged not against a united enemy but rather, they are waged against neighbors, friends and relatives (Turton, 1997: 80).

Since the beginning of the 1990s many scholars have started to notice this changing nature of conflicts by comparing these conflict to conflict during the cold war era and to conflicts even prior to that. As mentioned, part of this changing nature of violent conflicts is the growth or

increase of civil wars or what some refer to as "low intensity wars" (Van Creveld, 1991) and what other refer to as intra-state armed conflict (Kaldor, 2006). These intra-state conflicts can be contrasted to the inter-state wars which were characteristic of the era preceding the demise of communism. Leender, (2007: 960) argues that these types of conflicts "warrants new analytical frameworks for the study of the motives and nature of combatants, the techniques and channels they use to sustain themselves and to acquire resources to confront their opponents and the implications of these practices for non-combatants, the notion of the state, and international efforts at conflict resolution".

Perhaps the most definitive version of this new framework is presented by scholars such as Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin van Creveld (1991) and Helfried Münkler (2005) who uses the concept of "new wars" which they place in opposition to conventional or "old wars" fought between states by armed forces in uniform and where violence continued to be "monopolized and applied by states according to certain rules, with their ability to exert territorial control at stake" (Leender, 2007: 976). Kaldor (2006) argues that new wars take place in the context of the disintegration of the state and that they are fought by networks of both state and non-state actors who direct their violence mostly against civilians. Furthermore, proponents of this new warfare framework also points to the fact that on the battlefield it is not a decisive victory that is pursued but, instead, the creation of new political identities (mostly ethnic or tribal identities) based on a "perpetual sense of fear and hatred" (Leender, 2007: 976). As a result, one of the key characteristics of the new wars is that they blur the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, between public and private actors, between political and criminal violence and between legitimate trade and illegal war-related modes of generating revenues (Kaldor, 2005: 493). This framework therefore seems highly suitable for this particular study on Darfur in that it relates to the key problems and questions raised so far.

The new war framework will help the study in explaining the conflict in Darfur whereby the main consideration will be if and how politicians use ethnicity as a tool in order to mobilize their followers in the context of the disintegration of the state and if and how they construct new political identities (mostly ethnic or tribal identities) based on a perpetual sense of fear and hatred. Such an analysis would require the paper to focus on the motives and nature of combatants, the techniques and channels they use to sustain themselves and to acquire resources to confront their opponents and the implications of these practices for non-combatants. The paper will also bring into question the notion of the state and its role in

inducing conflict, for as mentioned, it is within the context of the weak state (or the erosion of the autonomy of the state) in which the actors mentioned so far conduct their violence.

The war in Darfur and this paper's analysis of the war may therefore serve as a means for scholars to determine more accurately whether ethnic conflicts are a byproduct of the political structure of a country and its polity or whether it arises out of an ancient ethnic hatred context. In the case of Darfur there exists a stanch assembly of scholars who views the countries fundamental political problem as the "excessive power held by a disproportionately wealthy elite in Khartoum" which exploits and subjugates the countries the countries provinces (de Waal, 2007:3). According to this view, the conflict in Darfur should be seen as a result of the various ways in which the centre preys on and marginalizes the peripheries, with racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts being a result or a "secondary theme" to these dynamics.

This view would then also see the regions identity as being defined by means of a racial labeling preferred by a small minority situated in the centre (de Waal, 2007:3). If one applies this center-periphery paradigm in combination with another social reality of Sudan, that of persistent instability at the center of power, it becomes possible to question whether many of the crisis exhibited by Sudan, both current and historical, are not perhaps a direct result of the combination of these two realities. All the characteristics of the Darfur conflict such as the brutalization of society, the violent disputes over land, the opportunistic behavior of provincial political elites, the militarization of tribal administration, and the local ethnic or tribal conflicts may possibly be traced back to the impact of this political reality (de Waal, 2007:3). This idea serves as an example of some of the alternative explanation which exists regarding the root cause of the conflict and will be further explored in the chapters to follow, along with various other possible explanations or factors.

1.6   Research Objectives

The purpose of this study is to consider the argument that the war in Darfur (and most other 21st century conflicts for that matter) arose in the context of the disintegrating state and plays out in the form of violent ethnic animosity between different groups, this being the result of ethnic manipulation by powerful politician and elite losing their grip on state power and patronage. It is therefore appropriate to conduct the study within qualitative paradigm. What the qualitative approach will allow the paper is the ability to study a situation or a phenomena

such as the conflict in Darfur and to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons and motives for the attitudes, actions and behavior of individuals and groups. Via the qualitative approach the paper will therefore attempt to comprehend the issue and complexities that forms the root of the conflict in Darfur. More so, it will provide insight into the context within which different actors function, allowing the study to gain insights into the different perspectives which each of the different actors hold (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).

The nature of this study will be mainly descriptive. The descriptive method will allow the study to describe the situation in Darfur as well as to identify and highlight the primary characteristics of the conflict. This descriptive method will enable the thesis to determine who the main actors are, what the main factors are, what their relation to one another represents to the study and how the identified actors accomplish their goals and to what effect and extent. The study will also mainly rely on secondary sources of information via the analysis of existing literature, yet primary sources such as official diplomatic publications, field reports, and research papers published by humanitarian and relief organizations such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group will also be used throughout the study. The secondary sources which will be used include mainly academic journal articles, publications, books, and media reports (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).

1.7   Limitation and Delimitations

The study must also admit to some limitations and delimitations. The first limitation imposed upon the study is one related to time and space considerations. Due to the geographical distance and the financial constraint, the study will be unable to conduct extensive field work or detailed data analysis and therefore relies heavily on written records. Another limitation is presented by the fact that some literature is only available in Arabic and not in English, which is the language which this study will be conducted in.

In terms of delimitations, the content of this study will only focus on Darfur's political and/ethnic conflict since 1989 up until the 2007 deployment of the joint UN and AU forces in Darfur. The reason for the 1989 delimitation is that the new war framework which this study employs focuses exclusively on in intra-state conflicts occurring in the post-communist context, seeing that this is when the phenomena started to become documented. As for the 2007 delimitation, very little new and original data and literature have been published beyond

this joint AU and UN military deployment period. Although various historical factors and references will be mentioned, the primary focus will remain within the post-communist context. The focus on the study will also remain on the conflict in Darfur. Although some comparisons will be drawn between Darfur and other conflict regions such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the empirical analysis will focus mostly on Darfur and the greater state of Sudan.

1.8   Chapter Outline

Chapter 1, which serves as the introductory chapter, presents the subject and the primary focus of this study. In short, the thesis has three primary objectives which are all briefly raised in this chapter. Firstly, the paper seeks to describe the conflict in Darfur and to shed light on its origin and its root causes. Secondly, by describing the conflict the study will attempt to shed more understanding on the nature of ethnic warfare in general. The aim of the study is to determine whether the conflict in Darfur, and most other 21st century conflicts for that matter, is the result of "ethnic hatred" or whether there are contemporary political forces which better explain the conflict's ethnic character. Lastly, this chapter briefly outlines the new war framework which the study will employ. This framework provides a good lens through which to view most intra-state conflict and will assist the study in laying out the fundamental components of the Darfur conflict and so better enable the study to answer the research question.

Chapter 2 will serve as the theoretical chapter. In this chapter the paper will define and explain exactly what is meant under the new war framework. The work of various scholars will be considered here in an attempt to find a general outline of what the new wars entail. The most prominent of these scholars include Mary Kaldor (2006), Helfried Münkler (2007), and Martin van Creveld (1991). The new wars will be described in terms of their characteristics, their conduct, the actors involved in these wars, the context within which these wars occur and the effect which they have on participants and non-participants. The aim is to construct a clear framework with which the conflict in Darfur can be analyzed. The last section of chapter 2 will also elaborate on the discussion between the primordial views on ethnicity compared to the instrumentalist views on ethnicity. Here the paper will consider the views which different scholars hold regarding ethnic conflict and ethnic consciousness. The most prominent scholars under this discussion include Young (1985), Brown (2001), Gat (2006) Huntington (1996) and Conteh-Morgan (2004). Importantly, the paper will attempt to illustrate the compatibility

between the instrumentalist view on ethnicity and the new war framework. This chapter will therefore also serve as a literature review where the arguments of different opposing authors will be considered and compared. Different theoretical approaches will be considered in an attempt to find the most appropriate lens through which to view the conflict in Darfur.

Chapter 3 will provide, firstly, the background to the conflict in Darfur. An overview and chronological description of the conflict will be provided where the study will briefly focus on various historical stages of the development of the conflict. Although the study is delimited to the period after 1989, it cannot neglect to mention various historical factors which helped to shape the current situation in Darfur. Secondly, the chapter will also provide an overview of all the main actors involved in the conflict and the specific role which each of these actors fulfill in the war. The most important actors which will be discussed include the Sudanese government and its regular military force, two rebel groups (JEM and SLA), the Janjaweed, and certain international actors such as Chad, Libya, and China.

Chapter 4 will focus on the factors involved in the Darfur conflict. Having discussed the state as one of the important actors in the conflict in chapter 3, chapter 4 will elaborate further on the role of the state and the government as key factors in explaining the conflict and also in explaining how the government has played a great role in shaping the conflict along ethnic line. This, in turn, will shed light on the question of whether the conflict arose out of ethnic hatred as the primordialists would argue or whether the conflict should be seen in terms of the instrumentalist argument which claim that governments, intellectuals and elite are largely responsible for the violent ethnic mobilization occurring in many regions of the world. Some of the factors which will be discussed in this chapter includes the state in terms of its weak center, its over-dominant center and its persistent instability. Other factors which will be discussed, also within the context of the state, include factors such as under-development, marginalization, lack of service delivery in regions such as Darfur. This chapter will also study the militarization of ethnicity and critically look into the way in which ethnic mobilization occurred in Darfur, focusing on the main factors and actors lying behind ethnic mobilization in Darfur.

Chapter 5 (the conclusion) will summarize the findings which were made during the study. More so, this chapter will analyze to what extent the actors and the factors mentioned during this study contributed the causes of the conflict in Darfur. The aim of this chapter is to

conclusively establish whether the war in Darfur is a result of ethnic hatred or whether the answer to the research question lies in more recent political misconduct. Also, this chapter will also attempt to establish to what extent the conflict in Darfur constitutes a new war (as defined by Kaldor, van Vreveld, and Münkler). If the conflict indeed fits into the new war framework then it would be possible to draw various broad conclusions regarding the origins of the conflict, its conduct and possible suggestion regarding its future. In this chapter the research question will therefore be evaluated in terms of its validity and the study should be able to answer this research question raised in the introduction chapter. This would also allow the study to make suggestions regarding changes and/or alternative approaches in dealing with conflict such as Darfur.

Chapter 2:   Ethnic Conflict- Theoretical Perspectives

2.1   Two approaches to ethnic conflict: Primordialism and Instrumentalism

Ethnic identity is a feature of almost all modern wars to the extent that an enemy has to somehow be identified by a name or a title. So too, in order for international observers to make sense of a war, ethnic identity seem to provide the most comprehensible form of identification of different parties. Ellis (2003: 1) notes, however, that applying ethnic labels is not the same thing as saying that wars are caused by ethnicity. Put differently, ethnic labelling is often used as both a description and an explanation at the same time, this according to Ellis (2003: 2), often as a "substitute for a more thorough analysis". The big problem with this logic of labelling a war as "ethnic" or "rooted in ancient hatred" is that it may serve as a way for observers to distance themselves from the war in terms of intervention or what Ellis calls "an unwillingness to act". Similarly, when one claims that war should be viewed via a purely modern political lens, ignoring the ancient ethnic hostility argument, one may also possibly ignore a very important natural aspect of human aggression and of the nature of war itself. For the sake shedding some light on this disputed relationship between ethnicity and conflict, the section below will consider two different theoretical approaches when looking at the relationship between ethnicity and conflict.

2.1.1   Primordialism

Primordialism provides an explanation of ethnic identity which argues that there exists an ancient or primitive aspect of humanity which historically, or rather evolutionary, dictates human conduct. A primordialist would therefore argue that violent conflicts should be explained as a result of traditional cultural differences such as language, religion, and race. The phenomenon where people exhibit fierce identification with a certain ethnicity is an historical process which has its roots in human evolution, as opposed to being the result of modern political construct. Primordialists often explain the resurging wave of fierce ethnic and religious conflicts witnessed in the 21st century as the result the failure of modernizing ideologies and the failure of the modern state in various regions of the world and the resulting backlash of alternative ethnic groups who stand on the less prosperous end of modernity.

Although the idea of modernity and its glorious assumptions have come into question for some time already, most notably by post-modernists, and is therefore nothing new, primordialists nonetheless critically opposes the ideas modernizing ideology puts forth. Modernization is the idea that humanity and its governing structures have evolved beyond the 'uncivilized' and 'barbaric' form where elements such as religion and culture constitute a form of conflict, and that, instead, the human order have moved towards greater unity, freedom, and liberty. Cultural exclusivity and tradition is seen by modernizing theorists as inhibiting progress, and it is acknowledged only in the layer of humanity which the civilized world have already shed. Primordialists stand in direct opposition to modernists when they proclaim that cultural differences, meaning factors such as religion, language, race, and degree of civilization, are exactly the reason why modern political conflict remains such a prevailing reality.

Two of the most prominent primordialists today are Azar Gat with the book *War in Human Civilization (2006)* and Samuel Huntington with the famous article *The Clash of Civilizations (1996)*. Although both of these scholars are primordialists, they differ remarkably in their approach to conflict. Huntington firmly believes that factors such as race, kinship, religion, or broadly speaking, culture, should be seen as one of the key independent variables when looking at violent conflict, whether intra-state or inter-state. Put differently, he believes that the essential ingredient in conflict is cultural. The following quote by Huntington illustrates the basis upon which his ideas rest: "cultural similarities and differences between nations produce converging and diverging state interests that lead to nations forming alliances around cosmologies" (1996). Huntington's focus lies more at the national level, yet his argument may be equally valid for intra-state ethnic conflicts. There is no dispute that since the end of the Cold War the world has seen a remarkable increase in ethnic conflicts with identities becoming one of the main factors in these violent conflicts. Huntington's primordialist approach to ethnicity and ethnic conflict is similar to that of Keen (2000) when he argue that this great growth in these ethnic conflicts since the end of the cold war should be explained as the result of "ethnic, tribal, and national rivalries" being kept on hold by the hard regimes of the Cold War, and that with the end of these regimes, those hidden feelings were able to re-emerge (Keen, 2000: 20).

Huntington therefore has a rather rigid take on culture and civilization, arguing that existing cultural identities and forms of civilizations are extremely hard or impossible to bend or alter. They form the basic building block on which human societies are built and are unlikely to

change. In fact, Huntington predicts that the future wars of the 21st century will be almost exclusively based on cultural differences, wars between the "us" and "them", differences which have developed over the history in human civilization. If one were to look at the war in Darfur using Huntington's framework, one would take the African/Arab divide as one of the crucial independent variables in explaining the conflict (Huntington, 1993).

Most primordialists agree on one specific aspect of the ethnic phenomena: the fact that "ethnic communities are persistent, resilient, robust, and capable of eliciting deep loyalty, intense attachment and strong motivation, and, in consequence, are particularly resistant to change" (Horowitz 2001). Another notable primordialist scholar, Walker Connor, argues that this "resilience" of ethnic solidarity and the strength of ethnic belonging is an expression of a deep emotional feeling associated with ethnicity which has psychological roots in kinship bonds. Connor (1994) argues that "phenomena-logically speaking, ethnic feeling is a descent-orientated, quasi-kinship sense of belonging, incorporating a sense of shared blood". Connor therefore argues that the strength and persistence of ethnic communities remains so prevailing precisely because it is a socio-psychological fact that kinship and blood-ties tend to produce strong, intense and long lasting bonding. Along with this, kin-ties also generate a sense of ethnic opposition. Primordialists would make the argument that because of a belief in a common decent amongst an ethnic group, the bond between these members would therefore always divide humanity into a form of "us" and them". Connor, however, does not explain the origins and science behind these kinship and blood ties, he merely acknowledges them as important variables. Another author, Azar Gat, fills the gaps which Connor and Huntington leaves open.

Also a primordialist, Azar Gat, takes a different approach by looking at the root causes of violent conflict and aggression. In his study, however, he reveals a lot about ethnicity and the kinship and blood-tie phenomena. Gat begins his inquiry into the nature of human violence by asking the question: "did humans in their evolutionary natural environment and evolutionary way of life as hunter-gatherers fight? Was fighting an intrinsic aspect of their particular mode of adaptation, moulded by selective pressures for millions of years?" (2006: 5) Put differently, Gat questions whether man's evolutionary path has made warfare "natural to humans". The alternative to this hypothesis is: "did fighting come later, only after culture and the state really took off, and should therefore be seen as 'unnatural' to humans" (Gat, 2006: 5). Gat basically delves into the furthest and most historical realms of humanity and, in the process, sheds light

on classic question of whether ethnic conflict is natural to humans or whether it should rather be seen as modern construction.

Gat looks at what is known as "primitive hunter-gatherer societies" dating from the upper Palaeolithic Age (35-000 – 15-000) and attempts to establish whether fighting is truly intrinsic to the human mode of adaptation. As can be expected, data on the subject field is very illusive and therefore, he mostly relies on account held on Australia's Aboriginals and North-west American Indians, these hunter-gatherer societies all possessing a degree of isolation and lack of material possession making them suitable for the study of groups operating outside the realms of civilization. He argues that these tribes offer a good laboratory for the phenomena of fighting before agriculture and the state. After a thorough analysis he concludes that fighting was not a recent invention, associated with the emergence of sedentary settlement such as food storage, property and high population density but is, if fact, a phenomena which has been present long before the emergence culture or civilizational structures (Gat, 2006).

This conclusion that warfare is not a late cultural invention, firstly, marks a divorce between Gat and other primordialist scholars such as Huntington who base their central arguments on strictly cultural considerations. Secondly, it forces him to explain in what way warfare is innate in human nature. For this he turns to Darwinism. Darwin's evolutionary theory is centred on the idea that "organisms evolve blindly by natural selection, which takes place in their struggle for survival against environmental conditions and, because successful proliferation, also against each other for scarce resources" (Gat, 2006: 42). Applying Darwin's theory, Gat argues that violence and deadly aggression is innate in human nature, but only as "a skill, potential, propensity, or disposition". What this means is that genes are therefore more a general design plan, open to environmental influences, rather than "a ready made menu for action" (Gat, 2006: 41). This means that aggression is therefore both innate and optional in humans and that violent aggression levels actually fluctuate in response to certain conditions. The following quote by Gat sums up the above: "deadly aggression is a major evolution-shaped, innate potential that, given the right conditions, has always been easily triggered" (Gar, 2006: 41). Before turning to what these conditions are, a deeper look into Gat's views on kinship and blood-ties are required.

The basic idea which Gat takes from Darwinism is that one's genes are passed on to the next generation not only through one's own offspring but also through other close kin who share the

same genes (Hamilton, 1964). Siblings share on average 50% of their genes, the same percentage as parents and offspring. Half-siblings share, on average 25% of their genes, whereas cousins share 12.5% of their genes. This argument may be seen as the basis of the old idea that blood is thicker than water and also explains the idea of kinship and blood-ties, emphasized by Connor. Basically, one's close kin "constitute a reservoir of his or her own genes, and are, therefore, evolutionary worth caring for and defending against all others, even at the risk of the individuals own survival". This evolutionary rationale favors not individual survival but kin selection or "inclusive fitness" of the same genes in oneself and in one's kin (Gat, 2006: 44). In evolutionary terms, it is ultimately the survival and propagation of the genes that count.

Taking this argument further, the same logic which makes it evolutionary beneficial to sacrifice one's life in order to save more than two siblings or eight cousins, hold true, according to Gat, for 32 second cousins, 128 third cousins, or 512 fourth cousins. This is pretty much what a regional group is, in terms of size, and it is the main reason why members of the group will prefer the other members of the group to outsiders. Therefore, the clans of one regional group will normally support each other against other regional groups with whom their genetic kin relationships are far more remote than they are within their own region group. This argument also explains what Gat calls "the cases of altruistic self-sacrifice" to save one's people or a large number of them. One's kin are generally recognized by a combination of various attributes such physical features (phenotype) and cultural attributes such as language. Cultural identity became a strong predictor of kinship. This is why humans are therefore so inclined to side with people who share the same culture against foreigners (Gat, 2006: 136).

In the hunter-gatherer regional group, shared culture was a distinctive mark of kinship, as well as a strong basis for social cooperation. Gat argues that this inter-relationship of kinship, social-cooperation and culture constitutes the evolutionary root of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, patriotism, and nationalism (Druckman, 1995), (Gat, 2006: 136). The idea behind this statement is that with the coming of agriculture, civilization and modernity, "as shared-culture communities expanded a thousand- and even million fold, the sentiments of kin solidarity expanded far beyond its original evolutionary setting and scope". Basically, an individual's people or nation (which is according to Gat merely an extension of the original genetic cultural regional group) can "evoke the greatest devotion, indeed, fraternity within a motherland or fatherland, no matter how genetically related its members actually are" (Gat, 2006: 136).

Individuals are therefore actually prepared to risk and sacrifice themselves, not only under coercion but also voluntarily, for these "large shared-culture, semi-, and sometimes pseudo-, or imagined kin groups" or what Connor (1994) calls: a descent-orientated, quasi-kinship sense of belonging, incorporating and a sense of shared blood.

As to the conditions required and the motivations for violent aggression and conflict, Gat argues that in the human state of nature, the human motivational complex consists of different mixtures of the certain scarcities for which people may resort to competition of which "both somatic and reproductive elements may be present with humans" (Gat, 2006: 56). Resource competition is a prime cause of aggression and deadly violence in nature. Food, water, and shelter are all important natural selection forces. The human tendency for maximizing reproduction was constantly checked by resource scarcity and competition. Another prime source of competition involves reproduction.   Among hunter-gatherers, reproductive opportunities were often a strong motive for warfare and often the main motive. The reason why women are such a strong motivational force is because reproductive opportunities are a very strong selective force, like resources. Violent conflict is therefore a means through which competition over reproductive opportunities is both expressed and resolved.

Gat takes this point further by arguing how "from the primary somatic and reproductive aims, other, proximate and derivative, 'second-level', aims arise". According to Gat, factors such as personal esteem, prestige, power and leadership positions may assist the individual who posses this recognition to reap somatic and reproductive advantages. The secondary factors are therefore also competed for and may take the form violent conflict. Another point which Gat makes, related to the above, is that competition and conflict often only breeds more competition and conflict. As mentioned, competition and conflict arise out of a basic state of scarcity, but then, because of the above mentioned second-level aims such and power, prestige and the resulting suspicion and insecurity which they create, competition and conflict starts to grow on itself and starts to take on a life of its own and often reaches a negative sum situation where defection seizes to become an option. War may therefore often take on a "self-perpetuating and mutually damaging" aspect where a type of prisoners' dilemma arises which may potentially mean net losses for both parties (Gat, 2006: 144).

In summary, primordialism assumes a type of "cultural realism" stance, suggesting a sort of pessimism in human nature that often takes a military form in terms of inter-group cooperation.

This is very similar to the way in which realists would argue or theorize on interstate behavior. This pessimism in human nature can be seen as the result of certain attributes of human nature which primordialist assume as given by nature and dictated by evolution, attributes such as ethnocentrism, xenophobia and racism. Also, similar to realists, security dilemmas and balances of power among culture groups are therefore as important for primordialists as they are for realists. In certain circumstances, "group solidarity reinforces military capability (or supersedes it when, as is often the case, military resources are meager), and the intensification of group identity is viewed as both necessary to group survival and threatening to other groups"- a classic security dilemma at the regional group level (Henderson, 1997: 657).

2.1.2 Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism is generally applied as a means to illustrate how politicians and elite actors may use ethnicity as an instrument to further their political and economical interests. The factors which primordialist consider to be the root causes of conflicts, factors such as religion, race and ethnicity, are not excepted by instrumentalists as the causes of conflicts. Factors such as race, religion, or broadly speaking, ethnicity, are instead used as a force with which to mobilize people, a means to gain support for and justify the conflict. On its own, ethnicity is not seen as the cause of conflict. Instead, instrumentalists argue that the true and underlying causes of most violent conflicts are the result of political and economic factors, with politicians often being the actors behind the scene. When looking at the true motives for war, instrumentalist would argue that factors such as power and wealth play a much greater determining role, as opposed to cultural differences.

As to the question of why people would be willing to support political entrepreneurs in the first place, it is often agreed that "individuals will consciously self-identify on the basis of ethnicity when ethnic membership to one or another group is perceived to be instrumental in accessing valued goods" (Hempel, 2006). Kaldor (2006) refers to this as "ethnic mobilization from below". It is argued that the coming together of shared interests and shared identities promotes group solidarity, and so, provides the organizational means necessary to mobilize ethnic groups in pursuit or defense of the valued goods, be it land, access to resources or any other desired goods. Material incentives may therefore play a large role in the decision to adhere to political rhetoric. Various scholars therefore believe that the process of ethnic mobilization by political

entrepreneurs occurs more easily under certain condition such as extreme poverty, inequality, landlessness, and lack of political representation. Within these condition, it become much easier for politicians to sweep up masses by giving expression to these grievances via ethnic, religious or cultural means and, simultaneously providing material incentives from joining.

Another argument also exists as to why individuals would consent to the ethnic or religious mobilization on behalf of political entrepreneurs. According to Hempel (2006), the "ethnic community" may also become increasingly relevant and important for individuals as they respond to resource shifts resulting from factors such as, for example, increased immigration, urbanization, unequal industrialization, and state expansion associated with modernization. The ethnic group then serves as an effective medium for accessing goods in these changing environments. Put differently, "ethnic groups may then become interest groups defined by ethnic boundaries" (Hempel, 2006: 2). The following quote by Weber (1996) provides a good summary of this argument: "ethnic membership does not constitute a group, it only facilitates group formation". This is why instrumentalists argue that ethnic identities in this mode of analysis does not reflect traditional bonds based on one's local place or kinship group but are, instead, build around wider distinctions based on language, race, religion, or region of origin, all of which provides a means for politicians to maintain a form cohesion when furthering their interests. As shown above, this is also made possible by providing the group members with access to valuable resources that they would not otherwise have been able to seize.

Unlike the primordialists, therefore, instrumentalists argue that inter-cultural conflict does not emerge from any natural division of groups, but rather, should be seen as the result of elite manipulation of ethnic or nationalist appeals in pursuit of their own interests. Cultural differences, therefore, does not necessitate conflict, rather, it only makes it easier for elites and politicians to move their societies close to hostility and rivalry. Cultural dissimilarity in itself should not be associated with interstate war. One of the reasons often stated for this is the fact that, for example, groups to which people actually belong are not always the ones to which they would like to belong or feel loyalty for or whose standards they adopt. It is often argued that people have multiple, often crisscrossing identities. Also, one may find members of a group who are disloyal to or alienated by their membership groups, and there are also those who aspire to groups to which they do not belong or who "accept the evaluative standards of an external group" (Henderson, 1997: 656).

Many scholars therefore oppose the ideas which primordialist puts forth which implicitly accepts the argument that cultural or ethnic differences are the root cause of ethnic conflicts. Opponents of this view also point to the fact that there often exists great commonalities across intercultural spaces and, also, that there are usually long histories of cross-cultural cooperation among many of the present day antagonists. One example which may illustrate this point is provided by Gagnon (1995: 334) when he says that in the former Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats hardly fought each other prior to this century. In fact, he adds that intermarriage rates were quite high even up to the 1980s. In addition to this, the former Yugoslavia never witnessed the religious wars that were experienced by Western and Central Europe. Examples such as these lead many scholars to conclude that conflict, such as the conflict among the Slavs, is neither ancient nor religiously based but rather primarily ideological and political (Henderson, 1997: 650).

Horowitz (1985) argues that "identities are not hard givens, but they are malleable". What he means by this is that a form of attachment must exist in order for it to be exploited for the rational benefit of elites. He goes further by arguing that "passion and interest work conditionally and that ethnicity matters because it "can combine an interest with an effective tie". Young (1993) takes of from this argument by insisting that the best way of looking at ethnic conflicts, or what he refers to as "the dialectics of cultural pluralism", is to combine the two approaches of instrumentalism and primordialism. According to Young, primordialism proves very helpful in completing instrumentalism in that it explains the strength of the personal and emotional sentiments through which interest is instrumentally pursued. In Young's words: "it helps make comprehensible the emotionally latent in ethnic conflict, its disposition to arouse deep-seated anxieties, fears, and insecurities, or to trigger a degree of aggressiveness not applicable in purely material interest terms" (Young, 1993: 23). Young, however, leans more towards instrumentalism when he says that the atrocities that have been committed in many of the wars in Africa, Eastern Europe and various other places, all in the name of ethnicity, should rather be seen as "profound failures of statecraft" rather than as "the inevitable consequence of primordial ethnic loyalties coming into conflict".

If one excepts this argument by Young it is important to realize that in order for a group of people's primordialist sentiment to be aroused and mobilized in the service of instrumentalist objectives, there must be some sort of a deep-rooted perception of, for example, injustice or discrimination in the collective psyche of the people. Why else would these sentiments surface

if not as a result of some sort of threatening condition imposed upon the group. Gurr (1998: 123) argues that "ethno-political activism is motivated by people's deep-seated grievances about their collective status in combination with the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as determined by group leaders and political entrepreneurs". What is meant by this quote is that in order for an ethnic group to be mobilized to the extent of taking up arms and violently confronting another group as was done in Darfur, there has to be a very strong sense of grievance which is experienced or shared by the majority of that group.

According to the Instrumentalists, one should therefore be careful to seek explanations for the so-called new wars in ethnicity or culture, no matter how ethnic or cultural they may be. Perhaps a more relevant way to examine causes is to look at the way power is organized, usually through a state. The Instrumentalists also argue that what the primordialist view fails to explain is why there where such long periods of coexistence of these different communities, or why these waves of ethnic consciousness take place at particular times. Instead, many scholars and analyst might argue that the current wave of ethnic consciousness has contemporary causes. These analysts would perhaps argue that the primordial view "amount to a kind of myopia, an excuse for inaction", both on the part of the governments involved and the international community (Kaldor, 2007).

In summary, instrumentalists suggest a greater degree of optimism in human nature (rooted in rationalism) that promotes cooperation (especially multi- cultural forms of democracy). If primordialist resembles a form of "cultural realism", then instrumentalism assumes a "cultural idealist" position (Henderson, 1997). What they suggest is that conflict does not simply emerge from group difference, but rather, it emerges from the absence of properly functioning institutions. In political terms, instrumentalists would promote forms of governance such as federalism, consociational democracy, and other institutional arrangements to restructure domestic conflict in much the same way that idealists promote international organizations, transnational organizations, transnational regimes, and liberal democracy as facilitators for peace for the global system. Although these two perspectives may seem to oppose one another, they are in fact not mutually exclusive, they may only represent "tendencies towards either acceptance or denial of the peaceful prospect of intercultural interaction" (Henderson, 1997).

In order to asses the instrumentalist approach, this paper will have to examine the direct and indirect effects of ethnic-based instrumentalism on ethnic identification and ethnic

mobilization. Furthermore, the focus should also be more specifically on ethnic-based access to economic and political resources because, as discussed above, this constitutes the driving force for ethnic mobilization according the instrumentalist view. In the chapters to follow this study will look into Sudanese state as a key factor in keeping peripheral areas such as Darfur classified as "closed district" which had the result of marginalizing the region and excluding them from the development processes of the country. Also, the government's use of the Janjaweed in its counter-insurgency strategy seems to have contributed to mobilizing one group in opposition of another. The state, however, only constitutes one aspect of this grievance. Colonialism and the politics of decolonization also greatly contributed to the current structure and therefore deserve attention. Furthermore, environmental factors such as drought and desertification helped create the ideal context within which this form of mobilization might occur. Therefore, even though the conflict may bare strong cultural dimensions, this study will consider the possibility that it might constitute an essentially political and economical one. Where this section was primarily preoccupied with the concept of ethnicity, the next section will look into the different perspectives which exist regarding war and how war and ethnicity interact.

2.2   The New War Framework

Since the beginning of the 1990s the types of conflicts which have made the headlines has drastically changed, both in terms of their composition and their conduct. One important aspect of these wars is that they have political goals with the political mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. The main strategy under this new form of warfare is population displacement and destabilization in an attempt to get rid of those whose identity is different and to provoke fear and hatred. This exclusive and identity driven form of politics also has unique economic roots. The various political and military actors plunder the assets of ordinary civilians and that of the remnants of the state while at the same time taking for themselves many of the resources provided by external assistance provided for the victims. These new conflicts bear a striking resemblance to organized violence, more than they resemble wars in the classical sense. Areas which have been particularly hit by this new type of organized violence are Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle-East. This is also exactly what the world is currently witnessing in Darfur. The violent relationship between the different actors in Darfur and the means through which they confront one another has become subject to debate amongst scholars in terms of the origins of the conflict and the resemblance it bears to other conflicts since the end of the cold

war. By contrasting these new wars to the classical inter-state war of the mid-17th century until the early 20th century, various new and distinctive characteristics come to surface.

The remainder of this chapter will seek to analyze these new and distinctive characteristics with the aim of providing a framework from which to look at the war in Darfur. Although the new wars have various dimension about them and may differ from case study to case study, all of them non the less share the same basic and determining features, features and/or characteristics which apply to most or all 21st century intra-state conflicts. Scholars such as Kaldor (2006) and Münkler (2007) refer to these conflicts as 'new wars". The new war framework provides a broader and more universal explanation for the sudden eruption of the war in Darfur. More so, it allows the study to compare and apply the findings to other violent 21st century conflicts, conflicts over which the international community have little control over so far.

Martin van Creveld (1991) developed an argument and model on the nature of warfare and provides a similar framework for the evaluation of these new wars (or what he terms non-conventional warfare or low-intensity conflicts). Van Creveld proposes a "nontrinitarian model" for the analysis of war and argues that the Clausewitz's model of a "trinitarian arrangement among the people, army and government is no longer valid" in the current era. The argument is made that the Clausewitz's model does not hold for all types of warfare. Put differently, his argument is therefore that the concept of war and its conventional application is no longer useful in the modern age. It fails to recognize various trend and characteristics of modern wars (van Creveld, 1991). Van Creveld therefore questions the basic premises of inter-state wars, which is "that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means" (Clausewitz, 1968).

Trends in warfare since 1945 are examined by van Creveld to illustrate that forces are currently at work that are not well explained by Clausewitz's strictly political framework. The essential requirements for the Clausewitzian model requires a social system which recognizes states as the main actors involved and the central force of any conflict. Then also, the forces within the state that must be managed and form a "trinity of people, army, and government". While still valid for conventional warfare, Clausewitz's 'trinitarian model' does not account for all types of warfare, specifically most forms of, what van Creveld calls, 'low intensity conflict' and the unconventional war common since 1945 (van Creveld, 1992).

Van Creveld distinguishes three principle characteristics of low-intensity conflict, all of which correspond to certain degree to the 'new warfare' argument of Mary Kaldor and certainly also the current conflict in Darfur. Firstly, these conflicts tend to "unfold in less developed parts of the world" whereas the small scale armed conflicts which do take place in the developed world are usually referred to as 'terrorism' or 'police work'. Secondly, these conflicts rarely involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is conducted between regular forces on the one side and guerrillas, terrorists and/civilians on the other side. Thirdly, most of these low-intensity conflicts do not rely on high-technology weaponry available to the developed world and to modern armed forces. The key element of low-intensity conflict is the fact that it has become the dominant instrument for bringing about political change (van Creveld, 1991).

A brief deconstruction is necessary in order to explain the concept of new wars as it will be used in this study. As Kaldor argues, the term war denotes the "political nature of this new type of violence". Because this paper is concerned with the political origins of conflict it excepts this conceptualization, yet it also recognizes the fact that one characteristic of the new wars is that the traditional and strict distinction between war; organized crime; and large scale violations of human rights has become blurred in many of the 21st century wars, with most conflicts usually containing various of all three of these concepts. Therefore, if one defines war as "violence between states or organized political groups for political motives"; organized crime as "violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes"; and violations of human rights as "violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals", it becomes quite apparent that any conflict which simultaneously contains all these elements requires a new analytical framework in order to study the origins and resolution of these conflicts. The new war framework which will be employed in this study is ideally suited for the conflict in Darfur, seeing that this war presents clear evidence that the actors involved and the means through which they conduct war does not fall into the Clausewitzs' or "old wars" framework for explaining violent conflicts. As illustrated by the information provided so far, the war in Darfur clearly contains traces of all three of the concept outlined above, therefore making the new war argument a suitable framework through which to study the conflict (Kaldor, 2006: 2).

In order to further explain what exactly is meant by the new wars is will prove helpful to differentiate the new wars from the old wars. Kaldor (2006) argues that the new wars "form

part of a process which is more or less a reversal of the process through which modern states evolved". Looking at the way the old wars were conducted one sees that it occurred in the context of politicians and rulers usually increasing taxation and national borrowing coupled with the recruitment of large national armies and police forces with a strong emphasis on national support, often via a heightened sense of nationalism. Because of this, a war could only be conducted via the state level and in turn, required a strong state in order to be able to conduct war. Kaldor says that "the growing destructiveness of war against other states was paralleled by a process of growing security at home" (Kaldor, 2006: 7). The new wars, on the other hand, should rather be seen in the reverse where instead of higher state income via taxation and lending, state income decreases as a result of a weak economy and poor financial policies and only gets worst with time as a result of high corruption, criminality, and inefficiency. As will be illustrated in the section to follow, the new wars occur instead in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state, or simply, the weak state.

2.3   Characteristics of the New Wars

2.3.1   Identity Politics

According to Kaldor (2006: 72), "the political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities [such as] nation, tribe, or religion". This claim by Kaldor therefore addresses the research question of this paper ethnic conflict. Kaldor does not except the notion that these politics of particularistic identities arise out of a primordial or traditionalist context. Rather, politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects marginalization, underdevelopment or loss of state power and legitimacy with identity politics merely being an easy means of mobilizing people behind a greater sentiment arising from these conditions. A strong sense of inequality, poverty, landlessness, and lack of adequate government services may drive individuals and groups to a state of extreme dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction usually occurs in relative terms, meaning that when one group (or region, as is the case in Darfur) suffers from chronic underdevelopment while another region within the same national border obtains a disproportionate share of government support, the effect may turn to violent opposition. Furthermore, if these differences in access to resources and services form along historical

ethnic lines (however ill-defined these lines may be) the likelihood that dissatisfaction will be raised (or mobilized) in ethnic, religious, or racial term increases.

Identity politics in this context can be defined as "movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (Kaldor, 2006: 80). In order to illustrate the nature of identity politics unique to the new wars it proves helpful to apply Kaldor's (2006: 7) contrast between the politics of identity and the politics of ideas. When looking at nationalist movement in Europe in the 17th century one sees a particular type of nationalism, concerned primarily with the freeing of individuals from the over-dominant rule of the Catholic Church. Again, in the 19th century Europe or in colonial Africa the type of nationalism which played out was in the context of state-building and/or democracy. In both these historical periods nationalism was used as a way to bind people together under the idea of a nation for the greater purpose of modernization. The type of ideational politics which were employed here were therefore forward-looking projects. In a similar vein, the current surge in environmentalism and cosmopolitism in global political arenas, especially in the developed and semi-developed regions of the world, also fall in line with the forward thinking ideas for the future (Kaldor, 2006: 80).

On the other hand, and in direct contrast to these forward looking projects, the identity politics being witnessed in the new wars are generally "fragmentative, backward-looking, and exclusive" (Kaldor, 2006: 81). What is meant by this is that the specific political grouping, like for example Muslim or Christian, or African and Arab, can generally be said to be based on a "reconstruction of a heroic past, the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and famous battles, won or lost" (Kaldor, 2006: 81). An important factor to consider is how this "nostalgia" is rekindled and mobilized into something political. The best way of achieving such a goal is through invoking insecurity amongst masses of people. By rekindling a sense of fear and/or hate for an historical enemy and by making certain people belief that they are being threatened by another group with a different label, one is able to add even more meaning to this constructed identity. This type of politics therefore greatly depends on a feared and hated sense of the "other" or the one labeled differently. It should therefore be clear why these types of political identities are backward-looking. Munkler (2007:57) says that this type of labeling leads to psychological discrimination and, at worst, to population expulsion and genocide.

The question to raise at this point is why certain groups and/or individuals resort to this kind of divided politics, often knowing what the consequences might be. It has already been mentioned that this type of identity politics occur in the context of the disintegration or the erosion of the autonomy of the state structures. Kaldor (2006) says that this is particularly the case when these states are authoritarian states or in centralized states. For example, the fall of communism in 1989 and the loss of popular legitimacy experienced in many post-colonial African countries to a large extent contributed to the climate of insecurity in which the new wars and their politics of identity seems to thrive. In answering the question raised above, two possible explanations exist where both of them might simultaneously contribute to the political division of groups along ethnic lines.

On the one hand, this type of identity politics may be fostered from above. In this case it can be seen a reaction by established political classes to "the growing impotence and declining legitimacy" they face within the structure of the state (Kaldor, 2006:82). This type of politics from above can be seen as a form of political mobilization, or rather, a survival tactic for politicians active in national politics either at the regional or at the national level. On the other hand, identity politics may also emerge from the bottom up, meaning that it emerges as a result of insecurity associated with underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and various other grievance related factors. This is directly related to the rise of what many refer to as the parallel economy in which "new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living spring up amongst the excluded sectors of society" (Münkler, 2007: 76). Exclusive identity formation from below serve as a means for these excluded groups to legitimize these new "shadowy forms of activity".

One example where these forms of identity politics have been most apparent has been the Former Yugoslavia where identity politics where fueled both from below and from above. With the collapse of Communism in 1989 the country spun into a disarray with politician desperately trying to maintain their grip on the weak new state form while, at the same time, new forms of economic (and criminal) activity emerged from the bottom as desperate people on the margins of society struggled to maintain their livelihood. Nationalism was the means through which the actors from below and from above legitimized their conduct. Nationalism (or rather, certain officially recognized nationalities) therefore became the primary and legitimate means through which actors could pursue political, economical and social objectives. What made this even worse was the fact that in the Former Yugoslavia these

'different nationalities' were constitutionally enshrined, therefore entrenching the animosity which developed between the different groups.

In the African continent one is able to observe similar tendencies of identity politics as those witnessed in Eastern Europe. Many scholars blame the sudden surge of ethnic uprisings and ethnic and nationalists oppositions as the result of the "fragility of the post-colonial administrative structures" (Kaldor, 2006: 84). Various states such as Sudan, Nigeria, Zaire, and Rwanda struggle with problem such as poverty, inequality, under-development, the failure of development projects, rapid urbanization, and the breakup of traditional rural communities. Furthermore, many of these countries have also felt the pinch of structural adjustment policies under the International Monetary Fund and other International Organizations which include policies such as deregularization, market liberalization, and stabilization. Many of these countries were also aligned to the bi-polar world structure prior to the collapse of communism, siding either with the Soviet Union or NATO. When this structure broke down in 1989 many of these countries lost their international identity in terms of alignment. Any one or any combination of these factors may possibly explain why many African politicians, both those ruling and those aspiring for leadership, and individual groups started to play the ethnic card via identity politics. This was therefore done for various possible reasons including: "to justify authoritarian policies, to create scapegoats, and to mobilize support around fear and insecurity" (Kaldor, 2996:17).

A typical phenomena of the weak states in which the new wars play out involves bands of young men which Kaldor (2006: 87) calls the new adventurers who make a living through violence or through threats of violence. These young men are particularly skilled in obtaining surplus weapons via the black market or through lootings and raids. Their strength and their surprising capabilities are usually dependent on certain particularistic networks, relating mostly to ethnicity, race or religion. They also often seek respectability through particularistic claims. Their business may include hostage-taking or the taking of prisoners in exchange for food, money or weapons. They also often take the form of nationalist militia groups consisting of unemployed youths, all of which "feed on the remnants of the disintegrating state and on the frustrations and resentments of the poor and the unemployed" (Kaldor, 2006: 17).

The phenomena describes above may become particularly problematic when politicians, elites or intellectuals ally with these militias or "new adventurers" on the margins of society. What

these politicians or elites do is mobilize the excluded, the abandoned, the landless, the insecure or the impoverished, all for the purpose of capturing support and so sustaining power. Chapter 4 will critically consider the government's use of the Janjaweed against the rebel movements and civilians in line with this argument. The logic which can be deducted from this point so far is that in a state with a high degree of insecurity the chances are that the society will be polarized, meaning that there will most likely be less space for any other alternative integrative political values. This is especially the case in during war times when the alliances between politician and militias or gangs become much more solid as a result of shared complicity in war crimes and a "mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war economy". The Rwanda genocide example illustrates this point very well. When looking at the way in which the Hutus attempted to retain their grip on power in the face of democratization and international pressure de Waal & Omaar (1994: 35) notes that "the extremists aim was for the entire Hutu population to participate in the killings. That way, the blood of genocide would stain everybody. There could be no going back".

2.3.2   Privatization of Force

Jeffrey Herbst (1996: 121) provides additional insight into the nature of the type of state in which the new wars occur when he says that many, or even most, African states never actually complied with the notion of the state sovereignty in the modern sense. What he means by this is that African states never actually exhibited "unquestioned physical control over the defined territory" and also that they also never had a successful "administrative presence throughout the country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state". His argument is therefore very similar to that of Kaldor (2006) and Münkler (2007) in that all of them recognizes that the failing states in Africa and, to a certain extent in South-East Asia and Eastern Europe, all have as an important characteristic the "loss of control over and fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion" (Herbst, 1996: 122). This loss of physical coercion can be seen as the start of a disintegrative cycle holding various negative implications for the state and its people. First of all, this loss of coercion and the "loss of popular allegiance" (Herbst, 1996: 122) make it extremely hard for the state to collect taxes and therefore seriously reduces the states available surplus and therefore its ability to maintain control. In this context of tax evasion various new actors emerge who take over the role of the state and its role of protection. This phenomena only further reduces the states capacity to maintain control and, according to Herbst (1996: 121) "encourages the fragmentation of

military units". This is the context in which the new wars operate: the weakening of states followed by the privatization of violence.

An important characteristic of the new wars, directly related to the above, therefore has to do with the way in which they are conducted, or, put differently, has to do with the mode of warfare. This development in terms of this new form of conduct of war may be termed the "de-statization" or privatization of military forces. This form of privatization is perhaps best explained by referring to the growing prevalence of para-state and private players which have been featuring more and more in intra-state conflicts. The actors fighting in these wars therefore form part of a wide variety of fighting units which include both public and private, state and non-state, or a mixture of these. These actors may include regular armed forces, mercenaries, child soldiers, private military firms, para-military soldiers, and militias. It is also often the case that these actors are driven by the commercialization of military force. An important note to make here is that land may also be considered as a commercial item or a commodity, therefore land may be as an important incentive for private actors pursuing a military strategy. The following chapters will clearly illustrate how the struggle for land and the value which land holds for many Darfurians contributed to the motives of the different warring parties (Münkler, 2007:17).

An important type of fighting unit, especially for this study, is the pare-military units. Para-military units are basically autonomous groups of armed men who are generally centered around an individual leader, often a strong warlord. It is most often the case that these units are created and partly maintained by governments, this being a way for a government to remove itself from the implications of violence and the full cost of violence. A good example where this type of government sponsored paramilitary groups played an important role was in Bosnia with the Arkan's tigers. Also, in Rwanda in 1994 the government started to recruit unemployed young men and help them form into an organized militia group which was linked directly to the ruling party at that stage. These men, although constituting a private fighting unit, where financed by the government and partly trained by the government army. Also, in Kosovo there was a famous para-military group called Frenki's Boys which were directly linked to the notorious leader Milosevic. These para-military units are most often recruited from actors ranging from redundant soldiers and/or young men who face unemployment and are desperately trying to sustain a living. One characteristic of these units is the fact that they very

seldom where uniforms which make it very hard for international observers to distinguish them from ordinary civilians (Kaldor, 2006: 103).

As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to draw a direct relation between this form of military privatization and the states' loss of its legitimate monopoly of military force. This is illustrated by the fact that when states do feature in these wars, it usually only does so with the assistance of para-state units of bands of armed gangs often only in the conflict with the aim of financial or commercial gain. Economic motivations therefore feature strongly in the considerations of these para-military units. Usually these commercial incentives come in the form of the belonging s from the houses of those that they drove out and murdered, or simply taking over the land and its livestock. This form of violence has also become much easier largely because of the fact that the conduct of war has become much less expensive with light weapons being easily available at low prices without requiring any extensive training for their use. Furthermore, these warlords and local militias are usually not equipped to conduct warfare and because the states within which they operate are faced with limited surplus and funding, they usually have to find ways of financing their war efforts on their own. Therefore, the use of violence against civilians often becomes their only resort and means through which to support their conduct (Münkler, 2007: 17).

Another way in which these paramilitary units support themselves is through the "shadow globalization" phenomena. Many scholars refer to this phenomena when they note how many conflict regions are linked to the world economy and are so more able to draw from it the resources necessary for the continuation of the conflict. In its strict sense, "shadow globalization" refers to, for example, "émigré communities that support either or both warring parties by means of money transfers, business transactions, the recruitment of volunteers and/or the reception of wounded or exhausted soldiers" (Münkler, 2007:10). It is possible to argue that the strong presence of refugee camps in neighboring countries to Sudan, usually under UN protection, plays a large role in fulfilling the same role as the shadow globalization phenomena. In this context, the refugee camp should not only be seen as a humanitarian station, but also as a possible supply center and reserve force where humanitarian aid from foreign countries and international organizations is to some extent converted into resources for the continuation of the war. As is obvious, this only serves in prolong the conflict.

In this context, violence becomes privatized largely because of "growing organized crime and the emergence of para-military groups", this in the face of politician and elite loosing their grip on control and legitimate power, unable to raise armies and police forces strong enough to maintain a monopoly on violence within the country. One of the most important, and often over-looked, characteristics of the strong modern state is its ability to "separate the use of force from commercial activity" and its ability to establish this separation into a norm. This achievement is solely possible because of the states' (using the Webberian definition) de facto monopoly on war. This contrast to the old forms of state power and aggression presents a grim image of the weak 21st century state. Possibly the worst effect of this form of conflict is the fact that it becomes harder and harder to distinguish between, for example, the rebel and the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, or between a soldier and a criminal.

2.3.3   Patterns of Violence

The new wars typically lack that which was characteristic of the inter-state wars from the mid-17th to the early 20th century: "[a] decisive battle" which, in the Clausewitz sense, was the "real center of gravity of the war" (Clausewitz, 1968). These old wars were relatively short with both sides usually seeking to resolve their dispute through a decisive battle that would ideally lead to a subsequent peace settlement. Furthermore, war was both declared and conducted in accordance both certain rules and norms. Münkler (2007: 10) says that these wars "had a precise definition in time, beginning with the declaration of war and ending with the peace settlement". The new wars, on the other hand and the actors involved in them adopt a type of strategy called "strategic defensive" in which they use military force primarily as a means of "self preservation", without looking for a military way of resolving the war (Münkler, 2007: 30). The logic which follows from this is that when both sides of the conflict conduct employ this strategy, coupled with enough internal and/or external funding and support, the war can theoretically last forever.

Another development and key characteristic of the new wars, related to the above, has to do with the alignment of military forces. Münkler, (2007:3) argues that "[there is] a greater asymmetry of military force, so that the adversaries are as a rule not evenly matched". What this means is that there no longer exist strict war fronts (in the classical sense) with two parties or groups trying to ware one another out on a battlefield. Physical and direct conflict between adversaries is usually at a minimum and major battles, such as those which were characteristic

of the First and Second World War, no longer exist. Instead, as pointed out earlier, apposing forces often spare one another and turn their violence and/or aggression against civilians. An important implication of this form of asymmetrical warfare is that it endorses a certain type of conduct which would normally have been considered a "subordinate military strategy" (Münkler, 2007: 30). This type of conflict bares a striking resemblance to guerilla warfare. Revolutionary warfare as it was practiced by leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara also used these guerilla tactics with the aim of finding a way around "large-scale concentrations of conventional forces and that were almost counter to conventional strategic theory". One of the basic objectives of this type of strategy is the control of territory through gaining support of the local population rather than through capturing territory from enemy forces. A territory is also controlled via political mans as opposed to actually capturing territory from enemy forces. The implications which this strategy holds for civilians is therefore extremely grave.

Another strategy called counter-insurgency also plays a determining role in the new wars. This type of strategy was designed in order to counter the guerilla type of warfare mentioned above. Counter-insurgency is commonly used via conventional military forces. The strategy here has been the destruction of the environment in which the rebels operate. This strategy basically "poisons the sea for the fish" (Kaldor, 2006: 103). The most common techniques used under this strategy include forcible resettlement or area destruction. The main idea under this strategy is to get rid of all possible opponents. Basically, the new warfare seeks to create an unfavorable environment for all those people that it cannot control. Normally one would seek to establish an alliance with people or groups on one's own side via the distribution of benefits. In the new war context, however, there are very little to offer to one's followers as a result of poverty and/or under-development. The strategy of these counter-insurgency forces therefore depends to a large extend on the mobilization of fear and insecurity and also the evoking a sense of fear and hatred towards those which are labeled as "different". It becomes apparent therefore why the use of population displacement is so readily employed and the importance which the actors involved attach to involving as many people as possible in these crimes so as to ensure a sense of shared complicity.

It is important to note what is meant under population displacement seeing that it forms an important aspect of the new wars and the devastating effect which it has on ordinary civilians. Firstly it may involve the systematic murder of anyone who is labeled differently. This was

exactly what happened during the Rwanda genocide with the Tutsi population being killed on a systematic basis. Secondly, it may involve ethnic cleansing or forcible population expulsion and thirdly, it may involve the rendering of an area as uninhabitable. This last strategy is perhaps the most commonly used and may involve acts such as the use of land mines or through the use of bombs and missiles aimed at civilian targets such as homes and hospitals. It may also be done via economic means such as forced famines and by depriving people of their livelihood. The chapters to follow will illustrate how this was achieved in Darfur and how people where literally forced to die of hunger or forced to migrate.

An important factor to consider is that all of these techniques fall within the definition of genocide contained in the 1948 Geneva Convention. The quite below from article 2 prove this claim: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole o in part, a national, racial, or religious group as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring the children of the group to another group" (Horowits). Base on the information provided so far it seems clear that most of the techniques employed by the new wars implicate them into what is generally understood to be genocide.

The new wars therefore endorse a kind of conduct which in the old war framework would have been considered as illegitimate and totally undesirable. This statement can be supported by looking at the statistics published in the last few years. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, more than 85 percent of the casualties of war in the old wars were official military forces whereas more than 80 percent of the casualties in the new wars from the 1990s onwards where civilians (Smith, 1997: 1). The effect of population displacement can also be proved by looking at the statistics available on refugees and displaced persons. Statistics published by UNHCR place the total amount of refugees in 1975 at 2.4 million. The number of refugees in 1985 where 10.5 million. This figure rose even further when in 1995 it stood at 14.4 million. These figures where also used by Mary Kaldor (2006) in her development of the new war framework. The figure above apply only to global refugees crossing international borders and doesn't include figures for internally displaced persons. If one look at the figures for internally displaced persons one sees that it increased from 22 million in 1980 to 38 million in 1995 and declining again to 32 million in 2004 (US Committee on Refugees).

2.3.4   Victims of the new wars

The obvious explanation for these statistics lie in the fact that there has been a drastic decline in the number of inter-state war and a drastic increase in the number in intra-state conflicts. This explanation, however, is still not sufficient enough and instead, this study takes a step further by noting that within the new war framework force and aggression is primarily directed not by opposing armed forces against one another, but instead, is directed mainly against the civilian population with the aim of driving them from certain areas, often thorough a strategy similar to ethnic cleansing or population expulsion, or to force these people to supply and harbor certain armed groups on a regular basis. Münkler (2007:14) notes how, in the latter example, "the boundaries between working life and the use of force becomes blurred". War, therefore becomes a way of life and the actors involved in the war makes a living from the war, some even obtain a considerable amount of wealth through the war, especially if natural resources are involved. This explains why many of the fighting units have a vested interest in continuation of the war. Furthermore, the way to achieving this interest is no longer the classical large battle, but instead, the massacre (Sofsky, 2003: 162).

What the information provided so far brings into question for the study is whether it makes sense to adopt a concept of war knowing that the concept can no longer account for all of the so far mentioned developments and their implications. As states loose their grip on the their monopoly of legitimate violence, so to does the concept of war looses it "well-defined contours", with the result being that military force and organized crime become almost indistinguishable from one another. It therefore becomes harder and harder for analysts to differentiate between criminal actors with political claims and regular armies, or armed followers of actors such as warlords, that finance and support their illegal operations through theft, plunder and trade in illegal goods. It becomes quite apparent therefore that the concept of war should be brought into reconsideration and re-evaluation.

This study raises the problem that unless more attention is given to these new patterns of violence and crime at the sub-state level, and, if analyst continue to apply the traditional model of inter-state war logic, they stands the risk of ignoring a very important and highly destructive part of 21st century political reality (Münkler, 2007). The study will therefore apply this new war framework in its analysis of the conflict in Darfur and will seek to determine the causes of

the conflict via this framework. Also, this framework will greatly assist the study in determining whether the conflict has ancient ethnic root causes or whether it has contemporary political causes. The new war argument clearly states that ethnic conflicts are indeed a modern phenomena and should be seen in the context of modernization. The remainder of the paper will consider this statement and attempt to establish whether this is in fact the case in the current conflict in Darfur.

Chapter 3   Overview of Darfur and the Conflict

3.1   Identity in Darfur

3.1.1   Ethnic Demographics

In order to commence a discourse on identity in Darfur, it is important to briefly mention something about the ecological and demographic nature of Darfur because identity in Darfur has often been discussed in direct relation to the ecological zone which different people choose to reside in. It is often the case that the home land which people choose depends greatly on which ecological zone is considered most suited to that groups' economic activity. The region of Darfur can be divided into more or less three important ecological zones, each of which harbors specific groups involved in specific types of economic activity (Fadul, 1006: 33). In the North of the region one finds the desert areas where rainfall is typically at a minimum and grazing zones limited during the dry seasons. This area typically attracts the people involved in pastoralist activity (usually cattle and camel herding). The second important zone is the south which typically consists of savanna terrain which enjoys much more rainfall than the arid northern parts. This area is also typically occupied by pastoralists involved in cattle and camel herding. The third zone lies in the central areas where the soil is much richer because of plenty-full rainfall. This area is perfectly suited for agricultural activity and is therefore generally occupied by sedentary farmers and cultivators. Mohamed & Badri (1994) estimate that more or less 15 percent of the regions inhabitance are pastoral nomads, whereas 75 percent of the people are sedentary farmers.

Having now mentioned the different ecological divisions within Darfur it is also important to note how each of these ecological zones are said to harbor specific ethnic group. The ethnic groups which have commonly been described "African" or "non-Arab" include tribes such as the Tama, the Fur, the Daju, the Masalit, and the Senyar. Theses tribes are said to generally share a common characteristic (unrelated to their actual skin color or their religion) which is the fact that they all reside in the central areas of Darfur and practice a sedentary or agricultural form of living.   The tribes which have commonly been described as "Arab" include the Reizegat, the Beni, the Ta'aisha, the Beni Helba, and the Habbaniya. Like the "African" tribes, the "Arab" tribes also said to share as common demographic characteristic which is that they

are involved in nomadic pastoralist lifestyles and that most of them live in the dry southern and northern areas of Darfur. It is certainly possible to argue that in Darfur ethnic groups tent to identify with either one of the two traditional subsistence patterns, yet it is not so certain whether this livelihood can be directly correlated with a primordial identity (Haaland, 1972: 11).

So far the section has outlined the main division among these various groups (or tribes) noting that this division seems to relate to their lifestyle, or rather, their livelihood, as opposed to their race (Kajee, 2006: 75). These divisions between sedentary African and nomadic or pastoralist Arabs may prove helpful for those seeking to comprehend the conflict in Darfur in a simplistic manner. The reality, however, is that these groups and the divisions amongst them a far less linier than the picture sketched above. The "looseness" of this division becomes apparent when one looks at the centuries of intermarriage between these groups, the frequency of (up until quite recent) cultural assimilation, and the often willful changes from one mode of economic subsistence to the other with the end result being that the notion of "Arab" and "African" remains exactly that: notional- something which perhaps has its roots in a contemporary context (Kajee, 2006: 75), (Cook, 2006: 123). The section below will attempt to shed further light on this statement.

3.1.2   Mixed identities

It is possible to make a strong argument that the strict ethnic differences which we see today in Darfur, namely those between sedentary "African" farmers and semi-nomadic "Arab" pastoralists, have not existed for centuries and can, instead, be viewed as a contemporary phenomena, something which was ideologically constructed, as de Waal (2005: 181) would argue. By looking at the way in which, up until quite recently, it was quite common for members of the Fur tribe to purchase and herd cattle and in the same process to "become Bagara" and to adopt the livelihood commonly associated with cattle-herding Arabs, one sees that identities are not as fixed as commonly assumed. Furthermore, even though most analysts regard the Fur people as the original or the first indigenous inhabitance of the region, the reality is that the Fur people themselves are the result of migration and assimilation starting from the fourteenth century. In the pre-colonial times it was very common for weaker tribes to

assimilate and "become Fur" as a result of both conquest and religious and linguistic acculturization (Kajee, 2006: 76).

One of the common arguments made regarding the conflict has been that the war has strong racial characteristics involving 'Arabs' who are trying to eliminate 'Africans'. This claim can also be questioned by noting how both the terms 'Arab' and 'African' have several meanings in Sudan. Turton (1997: 90) notes how there have been documented at least three meanings of Arab. Locally, the term Arab can be seen as a pejorative reference to the lifestyle of the nomad as uncivilized; regionally, the term refers to someone whose primary language was Arabic. In this sense, a group could become Arab over time. This process, known as Arabisation, was not an anomaly in the region in that there has been similarities in other regions as well, such as Amharisation in Ethiopia and Swahilisation on the East African coast. The third meaning of Arab was "privileged and exclusive", belonging the riverine political aristocracy who had ruled Sudan since independence, and who "equated Arabisation with the spread of civilisation and being Arab with descent" Turton, 1997: 90).

Some scholars such as de Waal (2005: 181) have pointed to the fact that almost up until 1989 the distinction between "African" and "Arab" was almost entirely unused by local population and that people placed very little emphasis between differences between the two "races". Furthermore, de Waal (2005) also notes how it was in fact very common for one group to consciously decide to move to another group, usually for commercial reasons, and so, to literally change his "ethnicity". This was the case in some of the Gimir tribes who have been active over the last two centuries in assimilating into the Arab communities and in the process becoming more Arab and revealing more Arab characteristics than African. Another example of assimilation was through the process of Arabisation where people not belonging to the Arab communities where steadily being "Arabized through a process implemented by successive governments" (Deng, 1995: 66). Various of the northern Arab communities enjoy a disproportional affluence, providing an incentive for non-Arab groups to assimilate. These groups then basically adopt Islam as their religion and Arabic as their language and in the process raise their social standing and recognition (Deng, 1995: 66).

Another example, related to the above, involves groups from one side of the divide moving to groups on the other side of the divide based on an evaluation of ones present circumstances. If, for example, an individual perceives it commercially viable, he might switch his livelihood

from a sedentary to a pastoralist form of living. This has often been the case for members of the Fur or Tunjur tribes who, depending on their economic circumstances, would often "change their identity" and in the same process "become Arab" (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 4). Another area where commercial considerations play a role is in the various market places in Darfur where merchants would learn as many dialects in order to switch from one identity to the other, depending on the client. Lastly, it is also fairly common for people in Darfur to practice both economic activities associated with both the Arab nomads and the African farmers. It is a very common sight to see farmers in the central areas of the region to keep livestock such as cattle and camels as it is also common for nomads to cultivate a small piece of land (de Waal, 2005: 52). On top of this, it is also quite common for Darfurians to completely change their economic activity to another, and in doing so, change tribes. From the information provided so far it is therefore clear that when looking at identity formation, political and economic considerations often seem to play an important role, together with cultural considerations.

A recent report by the UN Commission (2005) focused on similar factors in arguing that the Arab and African identities are not as fixed as the general media makes it out to be and that identity in Darfur should rather be seen in political terms. The report found that many Arabs in Darfur are actually opposed to the Janjaweed and that some Arabs are in fact fighting with the rebels including tribes such as the Misseriya and Rizeigat. Also, many non-Arab groups are supporting the government of Sudan by serving in its national army. The UN commission also supports the idea that political factors play a much larger role than cultural or primordial considerations in the African and Arab divide. It advances this view by noting how "Arab" and "African" have become political identities as opposed to cultural identities and says that "those tribes in Darfur who support rebels have increasingly come to be identified as 'African' and those supporting the government as 'Arab'" (UN, 2005). A very good example which illustrates this point is the Gimmer tribe which are a pro-government African tribe that is seen by the other African tribes opposed to the government as having been Arabized.

Barth (1994:12) make an appropriate claim when he asserts that "processes of boundary maintenance quickly showed interactional, historical, economical and political: they are highly situational, not primordial". The quite above by Barth is unique in that it strongly favors the argument that identity and identity formation in Darfur is not based on primordial sentiments alone, but should instead be considered in the light of more recent events. The process of identity formation of Darfurians along the strict divide of Africans and Arabs should therefore

be seen as the "culmination of a sequence of factors, of political, economic, ecological, and sociological nature which, as a result, ended up pitting one community against another" (du Toit, 2006: 114). The remainder of this chapter will look at various other historical factors which have had an influence on the conflict in Darfur and how these factors may have shaped identity formation in the region.

3.2   Structural Origins of the Conflict

In order to understand the current conflict in Darfur it is vital to also understand the origins of the conflict. It is possible to date the origins of the conflict as far back as the 17th century. During this period, dating from the 17th century up to the current war in Darfur, various factors have acted as crucial elements in the evolution of the current crisis. By looking at factors such as the evolution of trade routes, tribal territories, systems of administrations, land rights, and relations between Darfur and the central government of Sudan, starting with the period of the Fur Sultanate to the present day, one is able to identify various national and local processes that have contributed to the current status quo. Some of these which will be discussed below include the origins of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central government, starting in the 19th century. Also, one may look within the regional context and note how various regional conflicts surrounding Darfur has contributed to the development of ethnic armed militias, and also contributed to the increase of available number of arms. Some of these conflicts include the north-south conflict in Sudan, the conflicts within Chad, and the conflicts between Chad and Libya. Lastly, one may also look at the tactic way in which ethnic identities have historically been manipulated in Darfur by the government and political parties, including the mobilization of armed militias and political mobilization based on religious and ethnic identity (such as Mahdism and later also Islamization and Arabism) (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 13).

One may also note how various historical process have effected the local dimension in Darfur. The marginalization and neglect of Darfur (which will be illustrated during this chapter and the next) has especially contributed to the current conflict in various ways, some of which include: failing institutions including the native Administration, and the judicial systems and policing which seems to have historically favored certain groups. Also, failing development projects, including the education system, health care, transport and veterinary and other services, which have effected different ethnic groups to varying degrees. The origins of the economic and

political marginalization of Darfur can be traced back to the 19th century. Before this period, the Kingdom of Darfur was at least as powerful and important as its neighbors. The section below will illustrate how the Turkish empire strengthened the central Nile riverain groups at the expense of the peripheral regions. This pattern was then continued during the condominium rule, and throughout the post-independence. These local factors may be combined with various other processes such as competition for, and pressure on, natural resources within Darfur due to a long history of drought and famine (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 26).

All of these processes, in one way or another, may have contributed to the current dimension of the conflict in Darfur. This section will discuss some of these processes only in an historical context, whereas the next chapter will critically examine all the contemporary manifestations of these processes. By briefly summarizing the history of Darfur the study will be able to better, and more systematically, determine which factors contributed to the current conflict in Darfur. The study is delimited by focusing only on certain key historical staged starting with the Fur Sultanate, followed by the Turco-Egyptian rule, the Mahadiya, Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule and the post-independence rule. The Fur Sultanate laid the foundations for the current patterns of tribal territories, systems of administration, land rights and trade networks, which all evolved further under subsequent administrations (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 26), (O'Fahey, 2006: 23).

3.3   History of Darfur

3.3.1   The Fur Sultanate

The Fur Sultanate was established in 1650. Before this period the history of the Kingdom remains very unclear and illusive. The Sultanate moved into the central area of modern day Darfur. These areas were the riches and also the most sought after in terms of soil quality and the availability of water. The Sultanate expanded its size and influence through means of incorporation (incorporation via voluntary and violent non-voluntary means). Over the years the Fur Sultanate expanded its boundaries to areas as far as to the Nile River in the East. This extensive conquering had as a result the expansion of trade and commerce during the 18th century. With its strategic proximity to the White Nile and West Africa, the region was able to attract many immigrants which, in turn, were encouraged by the Sultanate in that the

immigrants ensured a sufficient supply of manpower. These immigrants mostly included scholars, holy men and merchants as well as some poorer worker class immigrants. These immigrants were also granted land and administrational positions by the Sultanate as part of the Sultanate's attempt to get people to settle. Thus, a process of cultural assimilation was set in motion via the incorporation of different groups from different territories (O'Fahey, 2006: 27).

During this period, tribes were generally distributed throughout the region on the basis of ecology and livelihood, as apposed to race or religion. Camel-based nomadism was generally practiced in the arid Northern areas whereas agriculture was generally practiced in the central rainland areas and cattle-based nomadism was practiced in the southern savanna areas. An interesting point worth noting is the fact that the current ethnic distribution of Darfur has not changed much from this basic outline, although there has been movements of particular groups. Another important factor in the expansion and internal consolidation of the Fur Sultanate was trade. Various important and lucrative trade routes were developed and many Arab traveling merchants (Jallaba) first came to Darfur because of these important trade routes. These trans-Saharan and regional trade routes were well connected with local trade networks and these networks had a profound political, economic and cultural impact on the Sultanate and its development as a state. Since that time, trade has been an integral part of the people in Darfur and their livelihood. Local trade, especially after the annexation period of 1916, provided an important forum through which the different ethnic groups interacted (O'Fahey, 2006: 27).

Under the Fur Sultanate a specific type of administration system came into existence referred to by many as the "three tier system" ((Prunier, 2006: 36). What this entailed was that people were ruled largely through their own chiefs. This system was based upon four provinces, each divided into a number of district chiefdoms (or shartaya, ruled by shartay). These shartay were the Sultan's representatives and was primarily responsible for taxation and general administration. The shartayas was further divided into various local chiefdoms (called dimlijiyya). The third layer of the system was the village sheikh. These were responsible for the direct administration of land, the settlement of small disputes, and tax collection (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 14).

3.3.2   The Turco-Egyptian rule (1874-1883)

The Sultanate maintained its independence until it was overthrown in 1874 by the Ottoman empire, which had invaded and occupied the northern part of Sudan as early as 1821. This period of occupation was marked by a series of revolts by the Fur and also by the Baggara (cattle-herding) tribesmen in the South of the region. Under the Ottoman rule both Arab and European traders exploited the lucrative slave trade with southern Sudan, often with the support of the Turco-Egyptian officials. The Baggara were part of this commercial enterprise, moving south to trade slaves with the small scale traveling merchants. This was the beginning of the north-south divide in

Sudan. The Southerners became heavily exploited for commercial gains by Europeans and northern Sudanese merchants. This shift also reduced the significance of Darfur trade links, making it the beginning of it's marginalization by the center (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 15).

3.3.3   The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955)

There exists a wide range of economic, political and environmental factors and explanations during this period which have led to the high levels of structural inequality between the center in Khartoum and the periphery (areas such as Darfur). These inequalities have fueled the conflict in Darfur in various and important ways. In 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian army re-conquered Khartoum from the Ottoman Empire, yet perhaps a greater historical point was 1916 when the British officially annexed the region to Sudan. As with many other countries under the British colonial rule, economic development in Sudan was geared towards serving the interests of the colonial economy. Production of cotton was one of the main interests of British rule, in order to supply the flourishing textile industry in Great Britain (Prunier, 2006: 57). This reinforced the routes previously established between Darfur and the Nile region in Sudan under the Fur Sultanate. This primary focus on cotton trade did very little to improve the conditions of the millions of small-scale farmers outside the scheme. Furthermore, it also meant that all development efforts were purely concentrated in an area which is known as the "three k's"- Kosti, Kassala and Khartoum. This area covered the Nile Valley to the north of Khartoum, the Blue Nile and White Nile areas, central Kordofan and the southern parts of the Kassala province. These areas, in turn, also benefited most from the spread of education and health

services (O'Fahey, 2006: 28). Today, these areas remain the most wealthiest and influential and continue to assert their authority over the peripheral areas.

Darfur's late inclusion into the British-Sudan, combined with its geographical remoteness from the center in Khartoum and other trading zones, together with the condominium government's unwillingness to provide services beyond "care and maintenance" (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 13) had as a result the fact that the region remained a loosely integrated periphery with hardly any stakes in the political center (Rolandsen, 2007: 151). The British system of indirect rule offered very little room for the development of a modern economy or of an educated elite in Darfur and it was very rare for Darfrians to participate in the multiparty system of government in Khartoum. Reports reveal that by 1955, out of around 1170 schemes that had been implemented, none was in Darfur. In 1947, Darfur had no provincial judge, education officer or provincial agriculturalist (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 13).

The Fur, the original inhabitants and rulers of Darfur during the Sultan period, became subordinate to the central government and came under rulership of the British administers and traders from the Nile Valley who combined skills and personal networks to become wealthy and influential (Ibrahim, 1984). Furthermore, minimum training or education was provided to the people of the region to enable them to manage their own affairs after independence. Also, the Arab inhabitance of Khartoum and the Blue Nile region had always received the greater part of British investment and when they eventually came to power, they merely continued the pattern of both economic and political marginalization of the rest of the country. So began a system of outside economic and political dominance from Khartoum that is still in place today (Cook and Mironko, 2006: 130)

The British rule and its administrative policy over Sudan had therefore greatly contributed to the marginalization of the pastoralists in Darfur. Under the tribal administration, most tribes were given their own homeland to be administered under local chiefs. The problem was that nomads were not given land because they were considered to be always on the move and therefore not in need of land allocation (de Waal, 2004: 6). Furthermore, the system of passage rights and livestock migration corridors was not very well formalized. Both nomads and semi-nomads were in most cases dependent on grazing their cattle during the dry season in areas that had been reserved for the homelands of various settled farming tribes.

3.3.4   Post Independence

Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956 and had a provisional constitution under the Arab-led Khartoum government. By this stage the first civil war between the North and the South had already been in process for more than a year (1955-1972) (Cook and Mironko, 2006: 130). Even prior to the independence of Sudan there had already been strong antagonism between the conquered elite in Darfur and the national elite in Khartoum. Some authors have referred to this as the "internal colonization" of Sudan (Harir, 1994: 155) and argue that it had begun in the last years of the condominium period and was then simply extended after independence. The way this "internal colonialism" functioned was basically through granting educated administrators from the Nile Valley the rights to take over positions which were previously held by the British. "The rulers, decision-makers, judges and not least, the jailors were riverain Sudanese whom the Darfurians generally regarded as alien to the region" (Harir, 1994: 159). The Khartoum elites therefore exhibited an absolute form of power over the people over which they ruled, a type of power involving distain and exploitation.

It is clear that although the policies of the British rule left Darfur in a disadvantaged position, they non the less left the Sudanese government in 1956 with valuable flow of income. This, one may argue, may have provided a good basis from which a post-independence government could have launched development programs to address the inherent disparities in Darfur and other marginalized regions, if it wanted to at least. However, instead of this, the national administration intensified the same processes that had been set in motion before 1956. For example, the expansion of irrigation pump schemes proceeded at an even higher rate after independence and of the 2280 schemes that had been implemented by the mid-1960s, again none was in Darfur. This is of course not surprising when one considers that the governments between 1956 and 1969 were dominated by social groups that had a natural interest in maintaining the economic and social framework from which they benefited. Therefore, very little was done to get rid of the pattern of society and economy created or maintained by colonial rule (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 17).

During the colonial period, the British authorities adopted a deliberate policy of enhancing the business interests of certain influential families from the central Nile Valley area, with the objective of minimizing resistance to their rule. This was done through preferential allocation of productive assets (mostly land), business contacts and bank loans (usually converted into

grants). The groups which benefited from this arrangement include religious leaders, tribal leaders and merchants. The reason why these groups came to be the main beneficiaries is largely due to the historical domination of religious life in northern society by Muslim Sufi religious orders and to the colonial state's policy of indirect rule. Authority and political influence therefore rested in the hands of these social groupings. This, in turn, aggravated disparities in development that already existed within the Northern part of Sudan (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 17).

The colonial administration also implemented an educational policy with a probable view to strengthening the social groupings whose support it required. Inequality in the region was therefore evident in the limited availability of educational opportunities. Entry to schools were therefore strictly controlled and limited to the sons of tribal chiefs and wealthy merchants. The following quote by a British governor at that time illustrates this point: "we have been able to limit education to the sons of chiefs and native administration personal and can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the education tree for many years to come". After independence, religious leaders and merchants came to hold great influence in political, social, and economic life throughout Sudan. They dominated the first parliament and senate, the legislative body and the central council. It was only in the late 1960s when the Darfuri people started to obtain a higher education and where an intellectual elite started to emerge. It was also during this period when the first resistance networks started to develop in opposition to the dominance of the riverain Sudanese (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 18).

3.3.5   The demise of Native Administration

As mentioned before, the British authorities abolished the Fur Sultanate, yet it retained many of its institutions under its native administration policy. This form of indirect rule was designed to leave populations free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, subject to British guidance. Basically, this model incorporated traditional tribal and village leaders into the structure of government. The role which the native administration played included: the management of tribal and local community affairs, maintaining security, allocate land for agriculture and grazing (under the hakura system), settle conflicts over land tenure, collect taxes and other levies, and chair tribal/sub-tribal local courts (judiyya). Traditional tribal

leaders therefore had executive, financial, and legislative powers and constituted an integral part of the system (Mohamed, 2006: 69).

This system was more problematic than it seemed, however, and became a seriously contentious issue over time. One argument was that this form of administration created an unproductive relationship between the educated Sudanese and the tribal leaders. The main tension between these two factions involved the Sudanese elite claiming that the tribal leaders resembled "tools of the colonial regime". The tribal leaders, on the other hand, viewed the educated elite as a potential threat that might undermine their own power and prestige. In 1971 the Local Government Act was passed, which divided Darfur into regional, district and area councils. This system of local administration therefore replaced the Native Administration and in the same process abolished the jurisdiction and administrative authority of the tribal leaders. A system of "multiple administrative units" was created under a single political party, the Sudanese Socialist Union under the rule of Jafar al Numayri , and basically "created a bureaucracy controlled by insensitive officials from the Nile". This naturally sparked serious anger on the part of the traditional authorities. Various scholars and local Darfuri's insist that this change was the most important factor in triggering the conflicts on a wider scale in Darfur in that it meant that "a locality belonging to one tribe could now be controlled by another" (Mohamed, 2006: 71).

This shift in administration can be seen as a modernizing act and falls in line with the contemporary idea of state structuring. For this study, the main problem with this shift lies in fact that the tribal leaders continued to be acknowledged as heads of their group, and the tribe now became a political base that aimed to promote its members to senior positions in local councils, as well as to regional and national positions. There came to be greater polarization along ethnic lines throughout government as representatives worked for the interests of their own tribe. This process has been described as "vertical ethical expansion" and has implications not only at the local level, but also at the regional and national level. The biggest problem with this was that the old order (dating back to the Fur Sultanate) was replaced by a new order which did not function. This process had various implication of which the most important were the increase of conflicts over land (including tribal territories and access for other groups) and conflicts over local governance, or local power struggles. The biggest problem was that these

problems were now increasingly being expressed and addressed in ethnic terms (Mohamed, 2006: 73).

As the section above illustrate, Darfur's wars may have roots that can be traced to the colonial past. This does not, however, mean that they are necessarily caused by colonization. In fact, the transition from militarized forms of politics into war, typical of so many countries in Africa since the end of the Cold War, seems to rather be due to contemporary crises, including the "implosion of some states", "short-sighted political leadership", the consequences of "hasty and ill-conceived programs of structural adjustment and privatization, and sometimes enforced democratization". These have led political elites to seek new forms of political mobilization in which violence figures less as a means of combating the enemy than as a way of mobilizing support. Economic decline and aspirations to social advancement in a situation where political groups are growing desperate in the context of a weak and limited state may contribute to a situation where people feel they can justify hatred between rival groups, often defined on ethnic lines, or what Mohamed (2006: 76) calls a "pseudo-traditional fundamentalism".

3.4   Drought and desertification

Another important dimension of the conflict in Darfur goes back to the mid 1980s when a series of prolonged drought periods and encroaching desertification started to place pressure on water and grazing resources. Although Darfur has been hit by droughts overt various periods of time in history, the years 1984 and 1985 proved to be hardest yet in terms of the implications which it held for the region as a whole (Sulliman, 1993). This drought and desertification forced nomadic herder to steer their cattle and camel closer and closer to the fields of the sedentary farmers and in the same process placed greater pressure on the already limited resources available. An important fact to note therefore is that besides the famine which became much more severe as a result of the drought periods, competition for resources also became more fierce during this period. According to de Waal (2005:112), it is possible to establish a clear link between this struggle for scarce resources caused by the drought and the rising levels of conflict which followed this period. Various other scholars and institutions agree with this claim, including the United Nations which claim that there exist strong evidence that "the hardship caused to pastoralist societies by desertification is one of the underlying causes of the current war in Darfur" (UNEP, 2007: 58). At the same time, however,

the United Nations also acknowledge that environmental factors such as drought and desertification "generally contributing factors only, not the sole cause of the tension". The same UN report also acknowledges the role played by factors such as "political, religious, ethnic, tribal, and clan division, economic factors, land tenure deficiencies and historical feuds". (UNEP, 2007: 77).

3.4.1   The environment as a cause of conflict?

Various scholars have attributed violent conflict to the effect of environmental factor and considerations. The most prominent of these is Homer-Dixon (1999: 13) who claims that factors such as drought, scarcity of resources and desertification may lead to violence, especially in a place where there is a high dependence on natural resources and/or agricultural activities. He therefore makes a direct link between environmental change and the incidence of war. Goldstone (2002: 24) also argues that a situation which is particularly conductive to conflict is when certain groups of a population or region move or migrate into areas already occupied by other groups in response to environmental pressure. In such a situation the likelihood of conflict increases significantly. This argument is very similar to that held by Homer-Dixon and also bares some resemblance to the current conflict in Darfur where certain groups were physically forced to migrate to areas populated by different groups in search of water and grazing which lead to more tension in an area already under severe pressure.

It therefore seems clear that environmental factors did indeed play an important role in the conflict. However, it is also possible to adopt a more neo-classical stance when looking at environmental factors in the conflict. By this is meant that a societies' "capacity for adaptation can overcome these issues" and a properly functioning state should be able to absorb these problems and assist its people in time of drought and famine. Put differently, the hardship experienced in times of drought and famine and the grievance which might follow should be directed against the state and not necessarily against different groups from the same region. It is therefore not merely factors such as drought and resource scarcity that provoke the conflict in Darfur, but also the "shortage of methods available to the society in dealing with these problems". If the people of Darfur had access to technology, equipment and infrastructure in general, they would surely have been able to overcome the effects of environmental issues.

A logical criticism against the environmental explanation for conflict is that it fails to explain what factors are more important in causing wars, factors more related to politics and the economy. This claim may be supported by the admittance by Homer-Dixon that environmental factors such as the scarcity of natural resources alone is unlikely to lead to war, it merely "assists in creating a scenario of social stresses within countries, helping to stimulate sub-national insurgencies, ethnic clashes and urban unrest" (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 12). One may make the argument that with sufficient technology, development and funding the society of Darfur can have the ability and the capacity to overcome matters such as resource scarcity and famine. The study will therefore acknowledge the environment as a secondary role player in the conflict in Darfur, yet it will consider the social, political and economical factors as primary sources for the current conflict. The next section of this chapter will look at the different actors involved in the current war and how their actions can be seen partly as a response to some of the historical factors mention above, and partly as a response to political factors mentioned in the next chapter.

3.5   The Actors

3.5.1   The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

The Sudan Liberation army was known up to 2003 as the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) and is one of the Darfuri rebel groups and also a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). This group can generally be associated with the Fur and Massaleit tribes and the Wagi clan of the Zaghawa tribe and it was also the largest rebel group up until 2006. Although recent developments have seen the SLM/A split into smaller ethnic factions, in its inception stage the group had a fur chairman- Abdel Wahid, and a Zaghawa chief of staff- Abdalla Abaker. Both Abdel Wahid and Abdalla Abaker believed that the enemy was the government, not the Arabs, and both these leaders claim to have enjoyed good relations with their Arab neighbors (Flint, 2007: 145). It is often said that the ability of the SLM/A to address the causes and grievance of such a diverse array of tribal groups constituted one of their greatest strengths and achievements. The local support for the movement was truly remarkable and it is partly because of this show of support that the government started to feel threatened and resorted to the strategy of mobilizing the Janjaweed, which will be discussed in the next section.

In the initial stages of its existence, most members of the rebel group wanted to fight the Awlad Zeid Arab Nomads with whom they had had continuous clashes since the early 1980s-not the government in Khartoum. It soon became clear that the government was in fact involved in supporting and facilitating the Arab Attacks on their villages. The breaking point was when Awlad Zeid Arabs killed more than seventy Zaghaw at Bir Taweel in the Kornoi area, one of the most important water sources for both Zaghawa and Arabs. After the clash, the national army deployed in the area and kept the Zaghawa away from the wells. This finally convinced most Zaghawa that fighting the Arabs would not resolve their problems. Influential Zaghawa in Libya and Khartoum also agreed there was a need to form an organized resistance group to confront the government (Flint, 2007: 145). This is an important fact in that it illustrates that the cause of the rebels were not against the Arabs, but rather, a fight on behalf of people who feel themselves neglected and marginalized by the central government. The rebels therefore does not cite "ethnic differences" as one of their motivations for the conflict, instead, they cite grievance- "originating from a central government policy of power concentration and marginalization towards Darfur" as their main motivation for taking up arms (Flint & de Waal, 2005). This claim will be analyzed in terms of its accuracy and validity in the chapters to follow.

The SLA also released a manifesto which was drafted in Southern Sudan in January 2003 by the SLA delegation from Darfur and senior SPLA officials. This manifesto, according to Flint (2007: 161) clearly reflected John Gerang's (former leader of the SPLA) vision of a "New Sudan". What this manifesto entails is: "a secular, decentralized state with the right of self-determination as a basis for viable unity", and calls for "the restructuring of power and an equal and equitable distribution of both power and wealth in all their dimensions". Of great importance is the inclusive nature of this manifesto in that it claims that "the Arab tribes and groups are an integral and indivisible component of Darfur social fabric who have been equally marginalized and deprived of their rights to development and genuine political participation" (Flint & de Waal, 2005). The more common and stated aim was to liberate non-Arabs from domination and to press for greater power and wealth-sharing for the impoverished region of Darfur (Cook, Mironko, 2006: 128). Its early political demand included socio-economic development in the region, wealth sharing and greater representation in the central government for Darfuris.

In the beginning of 2003 limited shipments of military supplies were provided by Eritrea and the SPLA, yet most of the weapons and almost all of the vehicles used by the rebels were seized in attacks on police and army posts in Darfur. Support in the form of arms provision and manpower was also provided via links with Chad and Libya and the SPLA. The Chadian Zaghawa who dominated Chad's army and presidential guard supplied much of the equipment needed for the rebellion, and also, Zaghawa who had positions in the Libyan army or in local administration in Southern Libya were also very generous in their support (Feinstein, 2005). Furthermore, Diaspora Darfurians along with Fur and Zaghawa business communities also provided significant support.

In 2003 there was a raid on Golo and other attacks in North Darfur in February and March 2003. These attacks signaled a "marked escalation of the conflict" (Flint, 2007: 152). The watershed mark in Darfur, however, came on 25 April in al Fashir air base in a combined SLA and JEM attack on the air base in which five military planes and two helicopters gunships were destroyed on the ground and an air force general was taken captive. This marked a massive blow to the government of Sudan and even long afterwards generals remained uncertain of how to deal with this type of military strategy. The SLA's mobile forces "ran rings around conventional army units that were totally unused to this style of warfare" (Flint, 2007: 152). By the end of that year it was estimated that the SLA had more than six to seven thousand men behind it whereas the JEM has about a thousand men behind it. In response to these attacks, the government of Sudan began its massive and indiscriminate program of arming the Popular Defense Forces and Janjaweed in Darfur, this will be critically discussed in the section to follow on the Janjaweed.

In 2006 the SLA split into two factions over a dispute of whether they should sign the DPA. This split occurred along tribal lines, with the Fur faction (the smaller force of the two, but with the largest support base) led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed Nour on the one side and the Zeghawa faction (with a larger share of both fighters and weapons) led by Minni Manawi on the other side. The Minawi faction is now referred to as the SLA/MM and Minawi is the senior presidential assistant and head of the provincial authority in Darfur State. Various smaller units have also formed as the conflict has increased in intensity. It is often argued that the economic incentive of war has inspired the great many new rebel groups to emerge. Another problem, related to this factor, is the lack of control generated by the "all-consuming nature of the

leadership dispute" which, as Flint and de Waal argue, has led to the emergence of "rogue commanders answerable to none but themselves" (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 71).

The SLA leaders had great difficulty in enforcing discipline in that the movement divided and then sub-divided. Commanders with opposing views always had the option of deserting to another faction, or setting up his own. This lack of cohesion among the rebel group members has lead to an array of other problem including the emergence of actors resembling warlords who begin imposing taxes on the local populations and attempting to assert their authority over certain areas. One example of this involves the "loose" Zaghawa forces under the leadership of strong, yet independent, leaders who imposed taxes of local Fur populations and who asserted their authority via violent means into the local Fur inhabitance (Flint, 2007: 154). Various other accounts exist which show the rebels also being responsible for various acts of violence. In the beginning of the conflict this violence was being directed mostly at government targets, yet as the conflict become more and more manipulated along ethnic lines, so too did the attacks of the rebel movements start to resemble the tactics of the Janjaweed with regular attacks against civilians and humanitarian organizations and their property.

3.5.2   The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) first became public in February 2003. It announced itself soon after the first rebel attacks on Golo and the first use of the name "Sudan Liberation Army". The group, however, did not begin to organize militarily for another year. In June 2002, delegations were sent to talk to the Masalit and Zaghawa, including Abdalla Abaker and Minni Minawi, and early in 2003 JEM announced a first attack on a government position near Kabkabiya where it managed to steal vehicles and weapons. From the start the JEM had access to better sources of external support than the SLA. Because many of JEM's leaders held positions in government, they had access to funds and time to move them out of the country before beginning military operations in 2003. There also exist persistent reports that the JEM was supported financially by Ali all Haj, Popular Congress Party deputy to Hassan al Turabi, the Architect of Sudan's Islamist revolution. Very little hard proof exists for this claim however. Due to its suspected links with Turabi, JEM has often been labeled as "nothing more than the military wing of Turabi's Popular Congress Party in the wake of his political defeat by

President Bashir in 1999-2000" (Flint, 2007: 151). More of these governmental connections will be discussed in the next chapter on the government of Sudan.

In reality, the group's existence can be traced back to the mid-1990s when many Darfurians were already dissatisfied with Sudan's Islamist leaders and certain regime insiders formed a secret committee from the six states of Sudan to collect information about political and economic marginalization. It is often claimed that the outcome of this committee resulted in the underground publication of the black book, though this link has never actually been established. What is established is that the justice and Equality Movement based its agenda on this manifesto- the "black book", published in 2000- which essentially seeks to prove the "disparities in the distribution of power and wealth", by noting that Darfur and its populations, as well as some populations of other regions, have been "consistently marginalized and not included in influential positions in the central government in Khartoum" (International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005).

This book was released in 2000 and another edition was released in 2002 and describes how differences in access to power since 1956 have resulted in large differentials in development. Its popularity and the extent of its distribution amongst the dissatisfied sections of Darfur has been overwhelming. English translations of the Black Book are now also available on the website of the JEM. One may interpret the JEM's close affiliation with the Black Book as a sign that the political and economical marginalization of Darfur is widely recognized by local populations and rebels as a root cause of the conflict. According to Flint (2007:150) the black book provides a detailed account of "where political and economical power in Sudan lies and has lain ever since independence- in the hands of a small elite from three tribes who live along the Nile north of Khartoum: the Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyiin, and Danagla.

The JEM was definitely more ideologically driven than the SLA. The politics which they embraced were more coordinated and sophisticated than those of the SLA, this partly because its leaders had acquired more experience while serving under the NIF. Its focus was also more on a national level as opposed to being exclusively local. It basically called for a restructuring of the entire nation, with a return to Sudan six provinces (South, Darfur, Kordofan, East, North, and Central) and a presidency rotating among them. Its official manifesto demanded a federal and democratic system of governance, "based on political pluralism, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of powers" (Flint, 2007: 163).

3.5.3   The Janjaweed

The aim of this section is to analyze the origins and the composition of the armed militias in Darfur, better known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed is a pro-government armed group which consists of more than six categories of like-minded actors including: the Peace Forces, the Nomad Protection Forces, the Popular Defense Force, the Um Bakha Irregular Forces, and Um Kwak Attacker Forces. Excluded from this list are the National Army and the official police force which is not directly related to the Janjaweed but who does work closely with them via military intelligence, arms provision and indirect cooperation. Up until 2003 these groups were only loosely integrated, yet the transformation of these groups into a regularized form known as the Janjaweed occurred in 2003, along with the intensification of the rebellion in Darfur and the government's response to the rebellion. It was shortly after the SLA attack on El Fashir that the Sudan Armed Forces began a major recruitment operation for the Popular Defense Forces. Basically, the government's response to the rebellion was to organize the entire native administration system as one of military command, creating militia units up to the level of brigade" (Haggar, 2007: 129). Some of the native administration leaders who have mobilized their tribes in political and military support for the government include chiefs from the Habbaniya, Misiriya, Hawtiya, and the Tarjam. (Haggar, 2007: 129).

Before proceeding with the study it is important to mention something about the label "Janjaweed", a label which is surprisingly misleading and ambiguous. The term is used differently in different parts of Sudan and Darfur, depending on ones tribal affiliation and political standpoint. What the term generally denotes is additional armed forces or, put differently, the militias mobilized by the government to address the counter-insurgency and whose methods and violence of human rights are infamous (Feinstein, 2005: 39). The media and the international community has often held a misleading assumption regarding the Janjaweed when they held that the "Janjaweed=Arabs=perpetrators of human rights violations" (Feinstein, 2005: 39). Among pro-government groups, the term Janjaweed is used to describe bandit gangs whose activities are frowned upon and who are considered to be criminals and outlaws, not under the authority or control of any tribe. The additional armed forces, on the other hand, are men mobilized by their tribes to receive military training, who paid, and who come under the indirect control of the government. It is apparent, however, that these groups

have participated alongside the regular armed forces in causing gross violations of human rights.

When the war in Darfur officially started, many of the Janjaweed bandit gangs returned to their own ethnic groups in order to join the additional armed forces recruited by the government. Once they were recruited, many of them subsequently resumed their illegal banditry and criminal activities. Furthermore, the governments call for additional armed forces extended as far as West Africa, and thus a large proportion of those who have joined up are from outside the region and so placed even more pressure on the region and its limited resources. Apart from these two categories of bandits and additional armed forces, there are also armed Arab groups that provide protection (for a price) to villages such as Fur villages in Wadi Bari and Tama and Gimir villages around the area of Kebkabiya, and to lorries traveling on the trade routes from El Fasher to the border with Kordofan. As mentioned, various other categories of the Janjaweed also exist yet due to space and time considerations the study will not include them here (Feinstein, 2005: 39). It therefore seems that the purpose of the Janjaweed has a clear link with livelihood in terms of membership of the military and opportunities to loot, occupy land or operate protection rackets, all of which constitute a source of income in a very marginalized region with a very depressed economy. This livelihood linkages form part of the rapidly emerging war economy in Darfur, something which have now extended beyond the Janjaweed to include rebel groups as well. The incentive for war has become more appealing as the war has progressed since 2003 with many actors able to profit out of its structure (Feinstein, 2005: 39).

Various international bodies such as the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) and Human Rights Watch (2005) provide evidence of the government's assistance to the Janjaweed. Flint and de Waal (2005: 64) notes how there exists clear evidence of how the government equipped and trained" the Janjaweed. All the various divisions of the Janjaweed mention before also have well established links between themselves. All of these divisions, including the Popular Defense force, the Nomadic Protection Force and the Peace Force receive payments from the government and the tribal leader are often included in these payments by assisting in the recruitment process of the militias. The tribal leaders are often paid in terms of grant or gifts or even the promise of development projects such as schools and hospitals in their villages. The following quote illustrate this point: "in July 2003 the state called on tribal leaders for help. We called on our people to join the Popular Defense Force.

They responded by joining, and started taking orders from the government as part of the state military apparatus" (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005: 28).

Arguing in favor of economic incentives for joining the Janjaweed, Human Rights Watch (2004) claim that during the beginning of the conflict people didn't join the Janjaweed based on an "ethnic hatred" consideration, but instead based on survival and economic considerations. Flint and de Waal (2005: 114) also supports this view when they point to the way that "most Darfurians grew poorer, [while] Janjaweed commanders and security officers profited from a new economy of loot, extortion and plunder, growing rich on the misery of others". There seems to exist strong indications of opportunistic behavior among the members of the Janjaweed and their decision to join the armed movement. This form of opportunistic behavior perhaps better explain the violence between different groups, better than primordial notions of ethnic hatred. A big problem is the fact that most of these government sponsored militias also act independently as a means of obtaining profits, this also achieved via robbery and looting.

Another important point to mention is the fact that the process in which the government recruited the militia members also greatly contributed to fixing the Arab and African divide in Darfur. The recruitment process was done largely on a tribal basis with the government recruiting exclusively from the Arab tribes. Furthermore, these Arab tribes were also usually the ones who were hardest hit by drought and impoverishment. Flint and de Waal (2005) also points that many of these Arab tribes also never had rights to land and as a result were therefore easily convinced to join the militias forces and to fight for the government's cause. Poverty and landlessness are powerful driving forces and the government of Sudan seems have been aware of this fact when it recruited the Arab tribes. This was how the government was able to sell their cause to the Arab tribes as being their cause. Human Rights Watch (2004: 15) says that the government offered the impoverished Arab tribes an incentive which they couldn't refuse, "the chance of looting African villages and the opportunity to acquire with total impunity the land of communities that some have envied for centuries".

The International Crisis Group (2006: 8) notes how this selective form of recruitment was made even more ethnically exclusive in that the government refused volunteers that didn't belong to Arab tribes. Before the war in Darfur, most of the national army soldiers were members of African tribes. When the war started, these soldiers lost their positions and had to

seek other forms of employment, thus further aggravating their grievance. Furthermore, in order to receive more fighters on their side, the government made use of extensive propaganda campaigns in order to convince people of their "Arab origins". Flint and de Waal (2005: 103) sites an example from the Jebel Misseriya tribe who have generally been identified as African before the war started. When the war broke out the government attempted to coerce this tribe into joining the militia forces. This was achieved primarily by convincing them of their apparent Arabic ancestry, "linking members of this tribe to their distant relatives in other areas of Darfur and Sudan". This seems to be very much in line with Brown's (2001: 4) argument that powerful politicians or elites may "reinvent particular versions of history and memory to construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilization".

The most unfortunate aspect of the government's strategy of mobilizing supporters based on exclusive ethnic identities is the effect which it has on ordinary civilians. The International Commission of Inquiry (2005: 64) and other international bodies all observed similar tactics employed by the Janjaweed and their unofficial government allies. The tactics employed by the Janjaweed are greatly strengthened by means of military intelligence sharing with the government, through arms provision by the government army and neighboring countries such as Libya and Chad, and through direct technical and military support from the government. A standard attack on a civilian village would usually involve heavy air raids and bombardment with government helicopters. This is usually followed by members of the Janjaweed, generally operating on horseback or camels, who then resume looting and burning the villages, killing or expelling the inhabitance and claiming the land and its livestock for themselves. Recently the Janjaweed has upgraded their modus operandi via jeeps, rocket launchers, and semi-automatic weapons, mostly sponsored by the government. Since the war started in 2003 it is estimated that Janjaweed have been responsible for the forced displacement of more than 2 million Darfurian people and more than 400 000 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The information provided here seems to indicate that the violence currently being witnessed in Darfur isn't merely the result of Arab and African hatred, but rather, the calculated actions of the government of Sudan via its use of the Arab groups. This seems to be what is causing the real division in Darfur.

Looking at the recruitment process based on notions of ethnicity such as "Arab" and the selection of individuals and groups based on their willingness to fight against a clearly demarked ethnic other, "Africans", it seems very likely that the government of Sudan

deliberately induced the fierce ethnic division present in Darfur today, division which before the war where much more passive. It would seem that what the government achieved via its counter-insurgency strategy was to weaken the rebel movements, yet at the same time, dividing the Darfurians and creating a conflict along strict ethnic lines. The following quote by Mueller (200: 2) illustrates what has so far been discussed: "the violence seems to have been the result of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities".

The composition and the conduct of the Janjaweed therefore bares very little resemblance to nationalist movements present in the "old wars" with all members of a group standing behind a common ideological cause. Instead, the violence one sees in Darfur today is more the result of propaganda campaigns by a small minority of people, as opposed to a whole ethnic group fighting against another, united by an ideological cause. What the government of Sudan was able to achieve was to "[deflect] the discontent of the one ethnic group by turning their frustrations against another ethnic group" (Keen, 2000). So far, it seems that the conflicts are more the result of the use of these groups rather than it being the outcome of feelings of primordial ethnic hatred sentiments. The government and its role in causing the conflict will be discussed in chapter 4, for this study regards the government more as a factor in the conflict than as an actor.

Chapter 4:   The Factors contributing to the conflict

Taking another look at the ethnic hatred explanation for conflict, the main question that this study raises in response to this explanation is why these different ethnic groups have been able to coexist and live peacefully together for such a long time prior to the current era. So far the paper has also questioned the common tendency of the media and government officials to label the conflict as a tribal one or as a consequence of ecological degradation and the consequent resource scarcity resulting from this. These elements have, no doubt, contributed to the current tension in Darfur and both of these factors are, to a certain extent, part of the conflict. Disputes are inevitable whenever different communities share the same natural resources. Whether and how they are transformed into violent conflict depends, according to de Waal (2007: 31) upon the means of peripheral governance adopted.

This chapter seeks to analyze the conflict in Darfur within the context of the political and economic realm, wherein the government situated in Khartoum plays an essential role. The government of Sudan's strategy toward Darfur and its rebel movements has often been referred to as a "scorched-earth policy". The idea under this strategy is to eradicate the insurgency movement by not just attacking the rebels, but also the civilian population on which the rebels often depend for their supplies, shelter, and as a general support and recruitment base. The physical effect of this strategy has been devastating with the loss of countless innocent lives and the forced expulsion of millions from their homeland.

Worse than the physical effect of this scorched earth strategy, has been the division amongst the ethnic groups in Darfur which the government has sown. The previous chapter illustrated how the government's use of the Janjaweed as a counter-insurgency force can be seen as a divide and conquer strategy which had the result of pitting Arabs tribes against African tribes and so giving the conflict a distinct ethnic character. By exclusively mobilizing and arming dissatisfied and impoverished Arab tribes against African tribes, the government of Sudan exploited the tensions which were already present in Darfur. This strategy, in the end, led to the gradual militarization of the different tribes in the entire region of Darfur and only served to further alienate the African groups from the government. The militia and their tendency for savage type of behavior will be explained in this thesis beyond merely noting that they are apart of the war. Instead, the argument will be made that the tribal militias are more than a

cheap toll of counterinsurgency but that they should be seen as a key strategy of the central government of governing the peripheries.

The chapter to follow will describe the factors which played a role in causing the current war in Darfur. Looking beyond the "ancient ethnic hatred" or purely ecological explanations, the study will look for the causes of the conflict in areas such as the over-dominant political center in Khartoum, the weak state structure, the regional neglect and marginalization of the peripheral areas. This chapter will attempt to draw a link between these factors and the militarization of ethnicity in Darfur. This chapter will also attempt to draw a link between these factors and the privatization of military force and the type of conduct which goes with the privatization and ethnicization of force.

4.1   The over-dominant center

The government of Sudan (GOS) is based in the capital Khartoum. Currently the government is dominated by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), which was previously known as the National Islamic Front (NIF), and is generally understood to be an Islamist regime with a policy of "full Islamisation" for the whole of Sudan (Cook, Mironko, 2006: 128). The current president of Sudan is Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and came to power in 1989 via a military coup. In the north, the traditional political parties are, among others, the Umma Party (which has split into the Umma Party, Umma Party Reform and Renewal, and Federal Umma Party), the Sudan Communist Party, The National Islamic Front and the Democratic Unionist Party. The Umma Party represents the mainstream opposition, which together with the Unionist Parties constitute the largest parties in the north. Although all of these northern parties have different political agendas and ideologies, they all strongly advocate the unity of Sudan and exhibit a dedicated commitment and refusal to a move to federal government and power sharing arrangements (Sherif & Ibrahim, 2006: 46).

In line with the new warfare framework, this thesis argues that the "hyper-dominance" of Khartoum over Darfur and other peripheral areas forms one of the most important realities in Sudan and in the war in Darfur today (de Waal, 2007: 4). The capital of Khartoum and its close surroundings consists of a more or less middle-income closed society which is surrounded by provinces such as Darfur that are not only poor but are also suffering from development

processes basically running in reverse. It is possible to construct a sharp contrast between the centre and the periphery by highlighting how the center possesses immense private wealth, a class of skilled professionals, and a political culture that has a strong liberal tradition. In contrast, the periphery exhibit not only overall poverty but are also subjected to processes of subjugation and exploitation. The Black Book which was published in 2000 by members of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) employs a similar kind of critique of central power in Sudan (de Waal, 2007:4).

The Black Book: Imbalances of Power and Wealth in Sudan, which is officially available on the web-page of the JEM, supports most of the claims made above. The validity of the Black Book has also been verified and approved by scholars such as Cobham (2005) who compares the content of the Black Book with official economic, social, and political data released by large international organizations such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. According to the Black Book (2000), prior to its first publication in 2000, there were 24.7 hospital beds per 100,000 people in Darfur and 151 per 100,000 people in the northern region. Since 1957, all of the prime ministers and presidents in Sudan were from a northern community, this being shocking in that the northern area constitutes no more than 5 percent of the total population of Sudan. Also in terms of medical care, it was found that there were 1.9 available doctors in Darfur per 100,000 people, whilst in the north there were 13.4 doctors available per 100,000 people. In terms of primary school enrolment, 31 percent of Darfurian children attend, whilst in the north, 88 percent of children attend. These examples go on and on and include equally stark contrasts in most other development fields, including the general lack of transport, infrastructure and agricultural development projects.

Like many other developing countries therefore, Darfur is marked by extreme inequality. National economic statistics indicate that about half the nation's income and assets rests in the capital of Khartoum, which contains less than 20 percent of the population. This figure rose from 8 percent in 1980, indicating a rapid urbanization rate. Also, about three-quarters of the countries health professionals are located in the capital. The surrounding area qualifies as a "least developed country" in which the majority of people live in absolute poverty. Flint (2005) mentions two versions of this "center-periphery" argument where the first argues that there exists a "deliberate and consistent conspiracy by an administrative, military, and commercial establishment to exploit the provinces". According to this view, the war in Darfur can be seen as a continuation of historical processes of asset stripping and proletarianization of the rural

populations. This process had begun in the 19th century and had continued up to current date. This view corresponds closely with the view held by many that war is only continuation of primary accumulation including land seizure using military organizations (Flint, 2005; de Waal, 2005; Wallerstein, 1984). By looking at the different actors discussed in chapter 3, it becomes apparent that primary accumulation does indeed play a large role in the conflict with both militia forces and rebels often operating with the sole incentive of looting and land seizure. Furthermore, the government's assistance to the Janjaweed only serves to regularize this form of conduct, therefore making it an entrenched feature of Sudan, especially since the war started. The sections to follow will elaborate on this view by illustrating how the elite faction in the North of the country deliberately seek to keep areas such as Darfur in a state of conflict and how they benefit from the violent ethnic divisions in the region.

The second argues that the extreme center-periphery inequalities exhibited in Sudan are a result of the logical and natural outcome of specific historical imbalances of power and wealth in the country, inequalities inherited from previous colonial powers and conquerors. It differs from the first view in that it holds that no "conspiracies" exist but rather that the operations of merchant capital have had the greatest determining influence. Various authors such a Shanon (1974) and Wallerstein (1984) have argued in favor of this form of historical determinism which argues that those who have already accumulated capital will continue to do so, at the expense of those who have only their labor to sell, often lacking even recognized title to their own land. (Flint, de Waal, 2005; Wallerstein, 1984, Shannon, 1974). As mentioned in chapter 3, Darfur has a long history of inequality and regional marginalization starting with the Fur Sultanate and extending right through to the post-independence era. It is uncertain therefore to what extent the marginalization in Darfur is the result of deliberate and consistent conspiracy by an administrative, military, and commercial establishments to exploit the provinces or whether it is the result of the logical and natural outcome of specific historical imbalances of power and wealth in the country, inequalities inherited from previous colonial powers and conquerors. The following section will look more closely at the current actors within the government of Sudan and attempt to shed more light on the problem raised above.

Perhaps more important than determining exactly where Darfur's marginalization originated is the realization that this over-dominance displayed by the national capital of Sudan has various and far reaching implications for the conflict in Darfur, both socially, economically and politically. The values which prevail in Khartoum, whether socially, politically, or

economically, have come to form the standard by which the rest of the country is obliged to adhere to. For example, all the leading educational and cultural institutions and all the countries electronic and print media are situated in the capital. Therefore, only the capital has the infrastructure to establish and support a modern functional political party, or at least more so than the periphery (de Waal, 2007:10).

As mentioned before, the details of Sudan's national inequalities are clearly documented in the JEM's Black Book, with the book openly criticizing the marginalization of the counties' peripheral areas. For example, the book also raises the topic of agricultural policy and by using the concept of *I'mar Alarad,* or land development, it argues that such policies should be entrusted to the governing authorities of the country. According to Jooma (2006: 16), the importance of this challenge to authority highlights the fallacy of situating the conflict within an absolute racial paradigm of Arab versus African interests. By moving beyond this dichotomy one is able to see that the centralization of political power by Khartoum has various implications on local conditions in Darfur, conditions which led to the polarization of communities base on ethnicity. The weak capacity of regional authorities to deal with practical realities has also been a major contributing factor in the uprising, this will be discussed below.

4.2   The weak center

Another main factor which this study considers involves the realization that the political history of Sudan exhibits an almost "inherent inability of any one elite faction to establish unchallenged and legitimate political dominance over the state". Some authors, such as de Waal (2007), note how the center possesses sufficient economic, social, cultural, and political infrastructure so that it can support not only one but multiple elite groups. In the post-independence context where these various contending groups competed for power, none were ever able to dominate the others, leading to chronic political instability. Sudan, like many African countries, is a country which has shifted, time after time, between civilian and military rule with the parliamentary coalitions which did exist being extremely frail. Even under the presidency of Jaafar Nimeiri, which displayed a remarkable longevity in his rule, personal continuity at the top state level usually masked the many internal problems which the state faced. Also, since the coup in 1989 under President Bashir, Sudan has been ruled under the hand of military men in power which have masked the multiple competing power centers in Khartoum and the "frequent reconfigurations within the ruling group" (de Waal, 2007: 5).

The lack of internal political cohesion in Khartoum has not completely disrupted all functional elements within the state structure. The elites in Sudan have always been able to maintain the basic socio-cultural and economic dominance in the country and also the collective control over the countries' political and economic institutions. What it hasn't been unable to assure, however, is a leadership efficiently strong to achieve peace and sustain a consistent set of economic and governance strategies. This instability is best illustrated and materialized in the countries' peripheries and it has made it extremely hard to build or to maintain a stable mechanism of provincial governance. The provincial elites have therefore been unable establish the political infrastructure necessary to enable a means of challenging the dominance of the center. Furthermore, the provincial elites have also been unable to establish stable clientelistic relations with the center, which is in a perpetual state of fluctuation (de Waal, 2007: 5).

Another result of this persistent and perpetual lack of central cohesion has been that the center has also been unable to pursue any long term political strategies whereas politicians and governments institutions have become highly skilled at maintaining and addressing short-term crisis management. Normal state functions which would, in normal conditions, all have a medium to long term focus and execution, have become instead focused on the short run and crisis management level. Some of these functions include economic policy, foreign relations, administrative reform, and most important for this study, counter-insurgency. Furthermore, different parts of the government and ruling party might also be conducting different and often competing policies at the same time. The final result has been "the greater freedom given to politicians and elites eager to adopt low-cost, ad hoc approaches to managing security". Worth noting here is the security officers who are in charge of the "militia strategy of fostering tribal irregulars" (de Waal, 2007: 5). It might seem accurate here to refer to the government's use of the Janjaweed against the rebels as a form of "counter-insurgency on the cheap", a term which will be used throughout the remainder of the study (de Waal, 2004).

Since Bashir's coup in 1989 there has been a notable degree of continuity among the individuals at the height of state power, especially the security officials close to the president. This continuity at the top, however, is masked by the reality of multiple power centers in Khartoum. My scholars have argued that the most important form of politics to the regime since the earliest days of the Islamist government has been the internal politics for power such

as between the security apparatus and the civilian cadres, and among leading individuals and the government. The actions by the most powerful men in the government are very often driven by the need to "outmaneuver a rival within the ruling circle" (de Waal, 2007: 14). One must recognize how difficult it is for rivals to organize to take power in a system with multiple power centers. The NCP's hold on power can therefore largely be seen to stem from its power of patronage. The elites in Khartoum are united by a common interest in holding onto state power and they are all make sure that their internal disagreements do not in any way jeopardize their collective hold on power (symbolized by the presidency of Bashir). Flint (2005) makes an appropriate statement when she exclaims how it would be unlikely for the governing elite to achieve anything more than "to sit atop a paralyzed state system, making money, dispensing patronage, and managing their recurrent crises".

A big problem and vulnerability for the government of Sudan is military affairs. The central elites' dominance of the economy has definitely not meant that it has been able to establish "effective state institutions that exercise effective coercion across all Sudanese territory" (de Waal, 2007: 36). The basic consequence of this reality has been that the ruling elites are always fearful that a rebellion, such as presented by JEM and the SLA, could run out of control. Those statesmen who are responsible for the security of the regime have, for this reason, been granted immense power and impunity and are able to employ whatever means necessary in order to counter the resistance. The extent of impunity which have been extended to the government forces and their Janjaweed allies has been startling and, considering the consequences this strategy has had on the regions ethnic relations, has been most alarming. Kaldor (2006) would argue that the government's lack of legitimate monopoly of violence in the country has resulted in the ruling classes adopting other strategies in order to counter any form of insurgency. Due to a lack in sufficient financial resources, adequate military budgets, and sufficient man power, the government of Sudan therefore found that mobilizing the tribal militias was the only option which would not disrupt its current (and highly beneficial for most) status quo.

Another important factor has to do with the government's denial of any relations, involvement or support for the Janjaweed. By claiming that it is not involved, the government is therefore able shed any responsibility for the atrocities which have been committed by the militias. Another important fact, directly related to the above, is that the government of Sudan has persistently labeled the conflict in Darfur as "merely a tribal conflict" or a "tribal war". It has

forcefully denied any notions of the war constituting genocide or having its causes in political and economic factors. The following quote by vice-president Ali Osman, documented by International Crisis Group (2006: 9), proves this claim: "we are dealing with a typical situation which is very common in Africa". Such a claim quite clearly denies any government involvement. Furthermore, the government's actual use of the Janjaweed served to create the conditions in which the conflict did take on ethnic overtones, and so made it much easier for the government and also the international community to label the conflict as purely ethnic or tribal.

4.3 Center versus periphery Bargaining

The over-dominant center in Sudan, coupled with the unstable political center, has as a result a very particular type of center-periphery political bargaining which, in turn, helps to explain the pattern and persistence of violence in Darfur. The central elite faction needs the provincial elites for two primary reasons: votes and militia. Although the provinces are economically somewhat insignificant they nonetheless command the largest electorate, and when elections are held, their votes are needed to deliver a ruling majority. Because no central elite party can expect to generate support on account of its record on welfare or development, they rather votes through sectarian and ethnic allegiances. In parallel to this, the low-cost means of policing the peripheries and growing counterinsurgency is through tribal militia. To pursue either of these strategies, the intermediary of a loyal or dependable provincial leader is required. It is also the central government who controls the appointment of native administrators and it can therefore easily play on the rivalries between traditional and radical provincial elites (de Waal, 2007: 25).

Authors such as Flint (2008) have identified two strategies followed by provincial politicians of which the most common is to attach oneself to part of the central elite, cutting a deal in which votes and militia are delivered in return for a place in the administration and/or commercial opportunities. In the career of a provincial politician it is common to see him attaching himself to a succession of elite blocks , looking for the best deal. Darfurians, for example, have bounced from the Umma Party to the army to the Islamist and even the to the Unionist bloc, and the SPLM, all in different sequences. This strategy has the inevitable result that the provincial elite members fail to organize a common platform and that they become corrupt and politically discredited (Flint, 2008). The second strategy is to seek the sponsorship

of another government. An example of this would be the SPLM backed by countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, and the US. The Darfurian rebels, for example, have been backed and financially supported by Chad, Libya, and Eritrea and also the SPLA. This strategy has the disadvantage that it severely compromises the autonomy of the client provincial leaders, for example, the Darfur rebels' freedom of political maneuver is circumscribed by Chad (Flint, 2008).

The above clearly illustrates the form of political bargaining occurring between the center and the periphery. De Waal (2007) describes this pattern as the "circulation of provincial elite members" or as a "divide and rule strategy by the government". Flint (2008) describes this pattern as "opportunistic political-survival strategies by fragmented and dependent rural elite leaders". This form of bargaining also has a definite resemblance to the neo-patrimonial form of state conduct unique to so many African countries and also seems to be quite consistent with the idea that African states "instrumentalize disorder" (Schatzberg, 2001). Some authors also refer to this form of statehood in Sudan as the "turbulent state hypothesis" and it can certainly be used in this thesis to demonstrate important characteristics regarding the origin and the nature of ethnic and identity politics and also the nature of conflict over natural resources and why the war is fought in such a brute manner (de Waal, 2007: 24).

4.4   Ethnically Biased Administration

The government of Sudan has also consciously used other means to induced community divisions in order to counter any opposition to its hegemonic rule. One way in which this was achieved was through altering the local political configuration of Darfur to suit Khartoum's interests rather than those of the local population. In 1994, Darfur was divided into three states: North, South and West Darfur. By separating the region into three different administrative units, the government also very tactically made the Fur tribe a minority in each of these units, where previously it had been the majority in the region. The government basically split the land of the Fur and therefore greatly reduced their power and influence. Furthermore, the new local positions which were opened up by the forging of the three new states were all filled by members of the Arab tribes. This political maneuver was part of a national process in 1994 that divided the 9 states of Sudan into 26 regions in addition to the creation of 72 provinces from the original 18 provinces. According to International Crisis Group (2004), this "slicing up of

authority, rather than devolving authority to the grassroots as was claimed, stretched the states' meager resources thinly over a much inflated public sector that was unable to deliver basic social services". By dividing the region in this manner and stripping one tribe of its authority while granting another that same authority, the government of Sudan also blatantly contributed to raising the community divisions (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 58).

Also, the introduction of the Land Act by President Nimieri in 1970 greatly contributed to the current status of farmers and nomads in Darfur today. What the Land Act entailed was that all unregistered land, whether this land was being occupied or not, would from that stipulated date become government property. This act was truly unfortunate for many farmers and nomads in the peripheral regions in that most of their land were unregistered, and therefore, suddenly belonged to the government. The significance of this act was that access and rights to land suddenly had to be pursued through political channels and concept of ownership became much more prominent and problematic. According to Johnson (2003: 130), "land became a commodity with potential high value, which prioritized access for the country's elite". Johnson further notes how "the unregistered Land Act abolished customary rights of land use and access to land and set the formation for the central state's leasing of land for large-scale farming schemes".

Another important point, directly related to the above, involves the government support for the initiation of mechanized agriculture. This initiative, as part of the Land Act, was greatly beneficial to the rich and elite farmers who were able to greatly profit from the economies of scale which mechanized farming enables. This scheme, however, proved to be extremely disruptfull to the small farmer who practiced subsistence agriculture and also for the nomads in Darfur. Duffield (1990: 5) estimates that "the land use by 8000 richer farmers was equivalent to the same area that had to be shared by 2.5 million poorer traditional farmers. This unjust division of land had to a large extent contributed to raising the level grievance in Darfur and also further contributed to conflicts between different tribes over access to natural resources. These problems were also coupled with the increasing ecological degrading of the region and so served to create a context within which people could easily be mobilized by powerful actors promising commercial gain and access to resources. Flint & de Waal (2005: 9) note how this situation was severely aggravated by the fact that some Arab tribes had never had rights to land and that "to this day, many Abbala Arabs explain their involvement in the current conflict in terms of this 250-year-old search for land granted to the Baggara but denied to them".

Although ecological explanations for the conflict fall out of the scope of this study, it is till important to realize how increasing desertification of Darfur coincided with both the reduction of arable land and rainfall, and "the emasculation of administrative structures to mediate sedentary and nomadic people of Darfur" (Jooma, 2006: 16). Although this point has been mentioned, it is worth noting how the abolishment of the native administration system in 1971 by President Jaffer Nimieri led to a situation where there was no longer any credible authority in place to intervene in the complex and growing socio-economic crisis in Darfur, leaving the path open to the militarization of groups to defend their interests. The tribal administration system was responsible for maintaining tribal relations, allocating of land for agriculture or grazing purposes and administering local courts as centers of conflict resolution. The system therefore served as a good mediating force between the different communities. When the government abolished this system, it directly provoked the already fragile relations in the region in a deconstructive way.

4.5   Politicized identities

A key aspect of this study is determining what exactly changed in Darfur in terms of the divisions in ethnicity which became so apparent since the early 1990s. Scholars such as Barth (1994: 12) says that in order to understand this change one must realize that " the mobilization of ethnic groups into collective action is effected by leaders who pursue a political enterprise, and is not a direct expression of the groups' cultural ideology, or the popular will". It is therefore important to note how the state and the elite actors functioning within its disarray construct identities and how they have manipulated ethnicity and peoples perception of ethnicity in order to achieve their goals. In this sense, the main objective of the Sudanese government is to "maintain power at all costs" (Prendergast, 2005). The current war in Darfur, since its inception, represents a greater risk to the government and elites in Khartoum than the war with the South ever did. This is because the rebel movements symbolizes a break within the Muslim community, and it seems that the government was willing to use whatever means necessary to win the battle, even if it meant firing up an ethnic conflict in the region. When the government consciously decided to arm Arab tribes against African tribes, it inherently manipulated the ethnic fabric in Darfur to suit its own will. This task was made all the more easier due to grievance experienced by the marginalized Arab tribes and their eagerness for commercial gain, whether it be stolen land, stolen livestock, or government remittance.

Furthermore, the government, by using this strategy, succeeded in "localizing and redirecting grievances so that it is no longer the target" (International Crisis Group, 2006: 4).

The rebellion in Darfur also represented a greater threat to Khartoum in that the government feared that the rebellion might spread to other marginalized and disaffected regions of the country. Various other provinces, especially those in the north close to the border with Egypt, also expressed similar grievances and made similar demands for regional development and government attention. It is likely that the government feared that the rebellion in Darfur would set an example for other regions and spark an even greater uprising, one that the weak government would surely be unable to control. In order to prevent the spiraling of the rebellion into a full-on national crisis, as apposed to an exclusively regional one, the government felt that it had to deal swiftly with the situation (Ibrahim, 2004: 13). The solution which it sought to the problem also had to be one which did not include a power sharing arrangement between the government and the regional actors (as this would have shattered the favorable status quo of the central elite), nor could it be a solution demanding high military costs, as the governments available resources were already thinly stretched by the war with the south and a struggling economy. The most favorable option for the government was therefore the use of the Janjaweed in smothering the rebellion. The implications which this course of action held for the region and its inhabitance were not of great concern for the government. Of greater concern was holding on to power.

Another factor which might also have played a crucial role in the conflict has to do with what Brown (2001: 17) calls "elite power struggles" and how these struggles have a direct baring on conflict situations. His argument is basically that conflicts such as Darfur can often be seen as the direct outcome of the actions of domestic elites who are able to stir violence based on their own personal power struggles. One example which illustrates this argument involves Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, who has generally been considered the architect of modern Islamism in Sudan and had been a major political actor in Sudan since the 1960s as a member of the Islamic Charter Front, an organization that took its inspiration from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and which first proposed the drafting of an Islamic constitution for Sudan. In its beginning stages the Islamic Charter Front consisted mostly of riverine Arabs and Darfurians.

The Darfurians have long been known for their devotedness to Islam and they saw "the association with Turabi as the convergence of issues of identity with an opportunity to make

gains on the national political front". Realizing this, Turabi sought to unify the Darfurians against the monopolization of state politics by the two Sufi order families, the Khatmiya and Ansar, in a way that would "isolate their economically powerful elites and provide him with a constituency" (Jooma, 2006: 5). Put differently, the Darfurians basically saw the Islamist movement as a "route to forging links to the centre and enfranchisement" while Turabi saw Islam as a means of building a constituency in Darfur (Feinstein, 2005).

Since then, Turabi has also been greatly involved in the shaping of various regimes in Sudan, including that of the Nimeiri, Mahdi and the current NIF regime and has acted as a mentor to President Omar Al-Bashir. Turabi, according to International Crisis Group (2006: 6), has made an incredible mark upon Sudan's ideological landscape. His ideas, however, became quite threatening for the stability of the new political elite, particularly because they related to the power-sharing or federal system of government in Sudan (ideas very similar to the manifesto of the two rebel movements). Such a system would not only undermine the power of the centralized ruling clique, but it would also compromise their economic interests as beneficiaries of large state-funded agricultural and industrial schemes. The Islamist movement therefore has a great effect on the social political situation in Sudan and Darfur.

In 2000, a dispute over the question of federal devolution led to Parliament being dissolved by President Bashir, and in the following year Turabi and some of his followers were charged and arrested under the claim that they were undermining the state. Since his release in 2005, Turabi has become a strong critique of the current regime. Because of his strong ideological influence on Darfurians, his discontent with Khartoum has been associated with the simultaneous rise of the JEM. Jooma (2006: 5) argues that the conflict in Darfur presents a case study for what many observers see as the "battle for the soul of political Islam in Sudan". Many analysts argue that Turabi might have managed to manipulate the masses in Darfur against the government for his own purpose to return to power. De Almeida (2007: 31) argues that Turabi, who had full knowledge of the situation and the sentiments in Darfur, appears to have used these grievances in order to mobilize his people and regain his position of power. This argument is very much in line with that made by Brown (2001: 17) when he says that "[the] decision and actions of domestic elite often determine whether political disputes veer towards war or peace". The government's use of the Janjaweed to divide the people in Darfur, in turn, may then also be seen as both a means to weaken the insurgency movement and also as a convenient means keep Turabi out of national politics.

4.6   State financing and Privatization of force

A problem for the government and central elites of Sudan and for the research question of this thesis is how the state manages to finance its military activity and the patronage system which it has in place, this in the face of the growing financial crisis in the country largely due to rising foreign debt. It has largely been established that Sudan's, and most developing countries for that matter, domestic revenue collection system is largely inefficient and the country is also typically able to capture only a small percentage of the payments from expatriate workers. Sudan's national budget has been in decline since 1978, shrinking below $900 million per annum in 1990.
Of this amount more or less $400 million per year were spent on the army and security. In 1999, this figure had dropped even further to $240 million per year.

The discovery of oil revenues in late 1999 allowed Sudan to dramatically escape from its liquidity crisis. Since it began exporting oil its national budget has risen from $900 million to over $11 billion. In turn, this has allowed substantial increases in the official spending on the army. The new funds have not, however, resolved the underlying problems of the Sudanese state. The prospect of oil revenues only sharpened the rivalry between the state and the parties over who should control regime finances. For president Bashir to keep all the different elite factions within the ruling coalition happy means he must allow them to control a substantial amount of the oil revenue streams. Furthermore, oil revenues are still insufficient to cure the states' dept problem. Sudan's current gross external dept remains at well over $26 billion making oil revenues largely insufficient. Put simply, the country's available finances are not enough to finance a war. For this reason governments in the past have pursued different strategies in order to finance the war (de Waal, 2007:18).

One such strategy was to seek external finance such as during the financial crisis period (1978-1985) under Nimeiri's rule in which the government exploited its position as a Cold War ally of Washington to obtain concessions from the US treasury and the IMF. Another has been to find alternative sources of foreign money such as, for example, during the war in Sudan when Nimeiri campaigned for the option of oil companies directly financing militia and mercenaries in their areas of operation. Another example would be when Sadiq el Mahdi traveled to Arab countries to seek both government and private contributions for the armed forces' mobilization

to recapture the Kurmuk area of the Blue Nile, which had fallen to the SPLA. Most significant in this category of state finance is probably the efforts made by the Islamists from 1990 onwards to open their doors to Arabic and Islam non-state organizations. Usama bin Laden was one of the many who assisted in Sudan's refinancing. A wide range of other Islamic philanthropic organizations, Islamic banks, and private companies provided extensive support to military training, weapons purchase and manufacture, infrastructural development, and military operations. What this means is that Sudan was therefore able to sustain a major military mobilization for years despite a stagnant or shrinking official military budget (de Waal, 2007:19).

Another, third, approach to the finance of war in Sudan has been privatization. What is meant under privatization is "fighting the war in a cheap and self-financing manner" using militias and support from local business interest. This factor has had profound implications for the nature of war and has also had important consequences for the cohesion of the state. This strategy of using militias have been called "counter-insurgency on the cheap" and has resulted in massive and continuous violations of human rights in Darfur and other regions of the Sudan (de Waal, 2004). Furthermore, this form of privatization has also locked the central government of Khartoum's war strategy into the agenda's of other groups such as local armed groups and also armed factions coming from outside Sudan.

This financing of joint operations by the militia and army has created a situation in which militia leaders, merchants, and military officials worked together to profit from the war. This profiting is primarily achieved by raiding cattle, selling timber, smuggling ivory, and by making extra large returns from the inflated price of grains and other essential products in the towns. This situation reached its pinnacle in 2005 when the Janjawiid of Western Darfur emerged as a parallel military authority able to challenge the army and hold the government hostage to its agendas (de Waal, 2004). Looking at the cost of war, both in terms of military expenditure and in terms of revenues that were missed out on, it makes sense that the government should feel compelled to seek peace. Instead, however, because of the privatization of the war finance the war has been made much harder to resolve. By arming militias, the dynamics conflict is left outside the control of central government.

4.7 Regional Factors: Chad and Libya

Although somewhat on the periphery of this study, it might prove helpful to briefly mention something about the greater regional dynamic of the conflict. This factor will only be discussed in terms of the arms and manpower provision by neighboring states, and the role played by foreign Arab ideologies and how it played a role in leading to the current war in Darfur. Darfur shares a long border with Chad. Chad is also the traditional homeland of the Zaghawa clan who also constitute a large proportion of the Darfuri population. The president of Chad, Idriss Derby, is also an ethnic Zaghawa. In Chad, however, the Zaghawa are a minority. The tribes living on either side of the Chad-Darfur border are therefore closely related by ethnicity, culture and intermarriage. This make both of these regions a natural refuge for its neighbor in times of conflict and strife. More so, it also makes both of these territories a perfect staging ground for insurrection against the neighbor's rulers. Since the early 1960, an especially during the 1990 over-through of the Habri regime by now president Derby, Darfur has been the launching pad for insurgency, civil war and regime change in Chad. In April 2006, Chadian rebels groups attempted to capture the capital of Chad prior to the national elections. The government of Chad afterwards alleged that captured rebels has Sudanese identification an that Sudan had supported the attacks, a claim which Khartoum denies. Furthermore, reports by Human Rights Watch strongly suggests the existence of military and intelligence links between Chad rebels, Janjaweed and Sudan army forces in Darfur and Astern Chad (Kajee, 2006:78). De Waal (2004) deems Darfur's bordering with Chad as "a geographical misfortune". This close relationship between the two countries and its various groups have greatly fueled the conflict in Darfur in terms of arms provision and military recruitment for both the rebels and the Janjaweed.

The "thirty years war" in Africa between Libya and Chad which lasted from 1960 to 1989 has also affected Darfur in various ways. Libyan and Chadian opposition groups, and the government of Sudan all used Darfur as a training ground and an recruitment area from which to attack Chad. The presence of these fighters along with the proliferation of small arms, and also the need to settle refugees intensified conflicts over the already scarce natural resources, in particular land and water. This conflict between Chad and Libya was especially damaging during the 1980s when Chadian tribes sought refuge in Darfur amongst similar tribal members (Harir, 1994: 163). At the same time Libya was also recruiting soldiers from other parts of the

Sahelian belt which were all trained and armed in Darfur to form autonomous attack squads (called "Islamic Legions") with the aim of causing chaos in Chad (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 23).

President Gaddafi of Libya also generated an Arabist propaganda which encouraged nomadic tribe people to identify themselves as Arabs while regarding farmers as "Zurga" (black). This form of "Arab propaganda" certainly contributed to changes in the nomadic tribes' view of themselves and their surroundings and also their history (Rolandsen, 2007: 155). This propaganda encouraged them to see themselves as belonging to the histrorical tradition of Islam and the Arab expansion into Africa, which justified the rule of Arabs over black Africans (and not vice versa). These views and propaganda where all presented and promoted in what was called the "Green Book" and by the "Arab Gathering" (Flint and de Waal, 2005). It is very possible to argue that this form of Libyan propaganda contributed to making the pastoralists much more assertive vis-à-vis the agriculturalists and to provoking their rebellion against a "perceived subordination to the Fur and farming tribes" (Rolandsen, 2007:157).

Under his grand vision of Arab a pan-Arab Union, Muammar Gaddafi has often used Darfur to support Islamist Chadian uprisings and in this the process exacerbating ethnic tensions in the region as well as bringing about resentment amongst Darfuris for both Libyans and Chadians. On the other hand, anti-Libyan regimes in Sudan have used Darfur to subvert Gaddafi's plans. The following example should illustrate how Darfur has been used as a political weapon in consecutive regimes in Sudan and how this have impacted and exacerbated the tensions in the region. In 1976 Libya had a grand strategy to attack Khartoum, a strategy which failed. Sudan's president Numeiri later supported a politician in Chad called Hissan Habre and his bid for power in Chad, primarily because Habre was anti-Gaddafi and so Darfur became a rear base for Habre's troops.

After Numeiri was outset by the military coup in 1985, Sadiq al-Mahdi under the Umma Party basically "sold" Darfur to Libya as a base for attacking the US-supported Habre regime in Chad in exchange for financial and military support during the 1986 elections and also during the subsequent civil war with Southern Sudan. This practice of "selling" Darfur as a military base in exchange for Libyan aid continued even long after the NIF came into control 1989. Throughout this period, the Libyans showed a definite preference for the Darfuri Arabs, providing them with arms and contributing to further ethnicization in the region. The growing

commonness of automatic weapons in Darfur certainly contributed to the current force within the region and its society (Kajee, 2006:78). Libya also provided humanitarian aid to Darfur in the mid 1980's famine, often much more efficiently than the American were able to do. Libya used this excuse to move troops into Darfur and then to arm the local Arab tribes. Various news reports have suggested that Darfur had basically become a de facto province of Libya, with Libyan currency in use and Libyan guns everywhere.

Chapter 5:   Conclusion

5.1   Overview of the main findings

In the context of the present conflict in Darfur, and in the years preceding it, the distinction between so-called African and Arab tribes has come to the forefront, and the tribal identity of individuals has increased in significance. As shown in chapter three, these distinctions were never as clear cut and definite as they are today. The 'Arab' and 'African' distinction that was always more of a passive distinction in the past has now become the reason for standing on different sides of the political divide. The perception of one's self and of others plays a key role in this context (International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005). What then are the main factors which contributed to this new violent distinction between Arab and African?

Chapter three and four illustrated how this distinction stems, to a large extent, from the "cumulative effects of marginalization, competing economic interests" and, more recently, from the "political polarization which has engulfed the region". Although the thesis also showed that there is a long history behind the current conflict starting in seventeenth century, most of the factors leading to the current Arab/African antagonism was traced to contemporary factors such as, firstly, the marginalization and neglect of Darfur by the central government since the nineteenth century. This contributed to the failing political institutions so prominent in Sudan today, including the judicial system, policing and the military, which historically and recently appear to have favored certain groups over others. Also under the category of marginalization and neglect are factors such as failing development, including healthcare, education, transport and agricultural projects, which have all affected different ethnic groups to a different extent.

A second factor highlighted by the thesis was the tactical manipulation of ethnic identities within Darfur by the government of Sudan and by political parties. This included the mobilization of armed militias (or Janjaweed) and political mobilization based on religious and ethnic identity such as Islamisation, Arabism and the Arab Gathering initiative by regional actors such as Libya. What the government achieved in its counter-insurgency strategy via the Arab militia was to weaken the rebel movements, yet at the same time, dividing the Darfurians and creating a conflict along strict ethnic lines. Also included under this category was the

government of Sudan's relative weakness with regards to its political center, combined with a simultaneous over-dominance of the centre, which resulted in a very specific kind of center vs. periphery and ethnic-based political maneuvering.

A third factor contributing to the Arab/African divide involves wider regional conflicts, which have contributed to the development and use of ethnically distinct armed militias, and also to the increased number of firearms owned by Darfurians. These conflicts include the North-South civil war, as well as the long-running conflicts within Chad and between Chad and Libya, which have affected the relationship between these countries and Sudan and also the internal ethnic composition within Sudan. By using the new war framework in the study, the thesis was able shed more light on exactly how and to what effect this process of ethnic division was created and sustained.

5.2 Relevance of the New War Framework

The preceding chapters have shown how the complex identities in Darfur have been radically over-simplified in recent times and how a polarized 'Arab versus African' dichotomy has been created. The ideological construction of these polarized identities has gone hand-in-hand with the militarization of Darfur, first through the spread of small arms, then through the organization of militia, and finally through full-scale war. The thesis has shown how the war in Darfur, exactly in line with the new war argument, has political goals with the political mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. Kaldor (2006) would agree that the political goals in Darfur are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities such as Arab or African. Defining identity politics as "movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (Kaldor, 2006: 80), it is quite apparent that Darfur has become subject to this these kind of new war politics.

As the thesis has show, identity politics in Darfur have been fostered from above as a reaction by the established political classes to the growing impotence and declining legitimacy they face within the structure of the state. Within the context of the serious loss of physical coercion on behalf of the state, coupled with the loss of popular legitimacy and effective leadership, identity politics has become a survival tactic for politicians active in national politics either at the regional or at the national level. Identity politics has also been fostered from below in the sense that it emerged as a result of insecurity associated with underdevelopment, poverty,

inequality and various other grievance related factors. In the light of these conditions, it becomes easier for disenchanted people to mobilize along ethnic line, especially in the absence of government support. One of the biggest problems in the new wars, and especially in Darfur, is the fact that certain politicians, elites or intellectuals ally with one or other of these 'ethnic groups' on the margins of society. What these politicians or elites do is mobilize the excluded, the abandoned, the landless, the insecure or the impoverished, all for the purpose of capturing support and so sustaining power. The Government of Sudan and its use of the Arab Janjaweed against the rebel movements and civilians fall in direct line with this argument.

Another aspect of the new wars which corresponds to the current war in Darfur is the privatization of force. The thesis has noted how the state of Sudan has begun to lose control over and seen the fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion. What this means is that the state moves into a position where it can no longer maintain control over its territory. It is at this point where one sees the fragmentation of military units. In the case of Darfur and this thesis, this was exemplified by looking at the growing prevalence of para-state and private players which have been featuring more and more in the conflict since the beginning of the 1990s. As in the case of new wars, Darfur has also seen the emergence of a wide variety of fighting units which include both public and private, state and non-state, and a mixture of these. Since the beginning of 2006 the Janjaweed has also begun to operate as a completely separate entity able to confront and present aggressive demands to the government.

In Darfur one may therefore point to a direct relation between this form of military privatization and the states' loss of its legitimate monopoly of military force. This is illustrated by the fact that when the state does feature in the war, it usually only does so with the assistance of para-state units (or the Janjaweed), these para-state actors often only being in the conflict with the aim of financial or commercial gain. Economic motivations therefore feature strongly in the considerations of these militias, as with most new wars. Up until now commercial incentives has come in the form of the belongings from the houses of those that they drove out and murdered, or simply taking over the land and its livestock. Another new war characteristic of the war in Darfur is that it has becomes harder and harder to distinguish between the rebel and the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, or between a soldier and a criminal. Because of the economic incentives for joining the war, Darfur has seen the emergence broad array of different actors (often indistinguishable from one another) with many of them conducting warfare purely as a means to a earning a living. More and more rebel

groups have also started to emerge to the point where conflict resolution efforts are starting to take strain in their attempts to identify and include all the parties involved.

The combination of fear and violence was a particularly potent combination for forging these simplified and polarized identities, and these labels are likely to persist as long as the war continues. The U.S. government's determination that the atrocities in Darfur amount to 'genocide' and the popular use of the terms 'Arab' and 'African' by journalists, aid agencies and diplomats, have further entrenched this polarization, to the degree that community leaders for whom the term 'African' would have been alien even a decade ago, now readily identify themselves as such when dealing with international monitors.

It seems therefore, that the current war in Darfur can definitely be classified as a new war in that it corresponds to most or all of the key characteristics of the new war phenomena as lain out by scholars such as Kaldor, Munkler, and van Creveld. Also, this framework greatly assisted the thesis in answering the research question of whether the conflict has ancient ethnic root causes or whether it has contemporary political causes. The new war argument clearly states that ethnic conflicts are indeed a modern phenomenon and should be seen in the context of modernization. Together with the data presented up to this point regarding the contemporary origins of the Darfur conflict, the new war framework therefore also greatly assists the thesis in reflecting on the research question presented in chapter one. In the first chapter the study questioned the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an "ancient hatred" or "tribal warfare". How is it possible for people and communities who have a positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty and hate towards one another.

5.3   Modern New War or tribal war?

The mainstream media channels have often framed African and other developing regions' conflicts in terms of deterioration to an earlier stage of development. Looking at some of the media depictions on the current war in Darfur, one detects a certain style of documenting which delve more into the "Heart of Darkness" (referring to the book by Joseph Conrad covering the early colonial atrocities in the Congo) than into bringing forth news which outline the threat which this war might hold for international peace and security. Accompanied by this

portrayal of African conflict is the ever present claim that these wars are essentially between what used to be called tribes, and are today more correctly referred to as ethnic groups. Also implied in this use of the term ethnic group is that they are violent by nature.

The problem with this, as have been mentioned before, is that very little further explanation is then required as to why the war is taking place and who the main antagonists are. According to this critique, the ethnic explanation is only another way of saying that these wars are caused by the nature of certain cultures that have "fundamentally been unable or unwilling to modernize". The popular media view therefore often corresponds with the primordialist view which holds that there exists an ancient or primitive aspect of humanity which historically and evolutionary dictates human conduct. Like the mainstream media, some primordialists also frame African conflict in terms of deterioration to an earlier stage of development, rejecting modernization and often explaining these wars as the result of the failure of modernizing ideologies. The phenomenon where people exhibit fierce identification with a certain ethnicity is considered an historical process which has its roots in human evolution, as opposed to being the result of modern political construct.

The Khartoum government also keeps insisting that the Darfur conflict is an inter-tribal one that has become much worst purely because of successive droughts and famine. The thesis has shown that this is not all there is too the conflict, especially when one looks at the way in which the government has bombed the villages of Darfur with official army aircrafts. Furthermore, the co-option of the Janjaweed into the regular army cannot be explained according an "ethnic hatred" or "tribal war" argument and therefore requires one to consider other factors not taken into account by the mainstream media and the Sudanese government reports.

Recent UN reports found "credible information that the government of Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and vehicles. The Janjaweed/ armed militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled grenades…Their continued access to ammunition and weapons is evident in their ability to co-ordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in armed conflict with rebel groups" (United Nations, 2006: paragraph 76).

This convenient view presented by the Sudanese government has an unfortunate consequence in that it diverts the necessary attention away from the basic, yet important, question already raised by this thesis: how is it that a society or a group of people who have been living together in relative harmony for generation after generation in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual context become capable of such extreme hatred, abuse and ethnocentrism. As indicated in the preceding chapters, part of the answer too this question lies in the historical development of ethnic identities, specifically from the colonial period and onwards. A second explanation for this question lie in the specific techniques, strategies and methods which politicians and the elite employs in order to turn the already manipulated form and sense of ethnicity into a resource for advancing personal agendas (Turton, 1997; 83).

There seems to exist a very strong link between the government of Sudan's actions, motives and composition and the idea held by the new war framework and instrumentalists that "ethno-political activism   is motivated by people's deep-seated grievances about their collective status in combination with the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as determined by group leaders and political entrepreneurs" (Gurr 1998: 123). What is meant by this quote is that in order for an ethnic group to be mobilized to the extent of taking up arms and violently confronting another group as was done in Darfur, there has to be a very strong sense of grievance which is experienced or shared by the majority of that group and which have been induced by politicians and powerful elite pre-occupied with serving their own interests. The thesis have presented a clear case of how peripheral areas in Sudan suffers at the hand of the central government and how the conflict which eventually broke out in Darfur can be seen as the direct result of governmental doings and manoeuvring.

The Sudanese state therefore seems to be a key factor in keeping peripheral areas such as Darfur classified as "closed district" which had the result of marginalizing the region and excluding them from the development processes of the country. Also, the government's use of the Janjaweed in its counter-insurgency strategy seems to have contributed to mobilizing one group in opposition of another. The state, however, only constitutes one aspect of this grievance. Colonialism and the politics of decolonization also greatly contributed to the current structure and therefore deserve analytical recognition. Furthermore, ecological factors such as drought and desertification also helped create the ideal context within which this form of mobilization might occur. Therefore, even though the conflict may bare strong ancient ethnic

dimensions, it is possible to argue that it remains essentially a new and modern political and economical conflict.

5.4   Concluding Remarks

Judging by the facts presented throughout the thesis, it seems in order to claim that it is largely political developments that are driving the rapidly growing distinction between 'Arab' and 'African'. Furthermore, the Thesis has shown how 'Arab' and 'African' seem to have become political identities. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that those tribes in Darfur who support the rebels have increasingly come to be identified as 'African', whereas those tribes supporting the government are identified as the 'Arabs'. The emergence of fierce ethnic consciousness and violence in Darfur, which constructed itself on the basis of certain traditional social divisions can therefore be understood in terms of the struggle, on the part of the increasingly desperate elites of Sudan, to control the remnants of the state. Kaldor (2006) might perhaps argue that the emergence of such strong ethnic cleavages (or what she would call nationalism) paralleled the slow disintegration of the state's power over Darfur.

This thesis therefore brings into question the notion that these politics of particularistic identities arise out of an ancient hatred or tribal warfare context. Rather, politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects marginalization, underdevelopment or loss of state power and legitimacy with identity politics merely being an easy means of mobilizing people behind a greater sentiment arising from these conditions. The following quote might support the view presented above: "if the Sudanese government has not resorted to mobilizing ethnic/racial divisions by recruiting the Janjaweed militias, the conflict could have stood exclusively as one between a marginalized region struggling to regain some from of equal treatment" (Tar, 2005: 143).

These politicians and elite actors therefore found it very useful to play the ethnic card because it allowed them to legitimize their control at a time when their power and authority might have been slipping from them (Brown, 2001:19). By using ancient sentiments it can become possible drive the masses and by manipulating these sentiments it becomes possible to divide groups that used to be unified (de Almeida, 2007: 15). What the government of Sudan was able to achieve was to "[deflect] the discontent of the one ethnic group by turning their frustrations against another ethnic group" (Keen, 2000). Therefore, the idea that these types of conflicts

arise out of ancient ethnic hatred should be brought into questioned. Some might even argue that this idea could be considered as unethical in that it "[makes it] easier for the international community to stand aside while millions of people have been killed or made homeless" (Turton, 1997: 81).

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