Discourse on identity: conversations with ‘white’ South Africans

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Dissertation presented for the degree Doctor of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University

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March 2008
DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

27 February 2008
ABSTRACT

The uncertainty and insecurity generated by social transformation within local and global contexts foregrounds concerns with identity. South African society has a legacy of an entrenched racial order which previously privileged those classified ‘white’. The assumed normality in past practices of such an institutionalised system of racial privileging was challenged by a changing social, economic and political context. This dissertation examines the discourse of white middle-class South Africans on this changing context. The study draws on the discourse of Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking interviewees living in urban and rural communities. Their discourse reveals the extent to which these changes have affected the ways they talk about themselves and others. There is a literature suggesting the significance of race in shaping people’s identity has diminished within the post-apartheid context. This study considers the extent to which the evasion of race suggested in a literature on whiteness is apparent in the discourse on the transformation of the society. By considering this discourse a number of questions are raised on how interviewees conceive their communities and what implication this holds for future racial integration. What is meant by being South African is a related matter that receives attention. The study draws the conclusion that in spite of heightened racial sensitivity, race remains a key factor in the identities of interviewees.
OPSOMMING

Die onsekerheid en gebrek aan sekerheid wat deur sosiale transformasie in plaaslike en globale kontekste gegenereer word, stel gemoeidhede met identiteit op die voorgrond. Die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing het 'n nalatenskap van 'n verskansde rasse-orde wat voorheen dié wat 'wit' geklassifiseer is bevoorreg het. Die aannames van die normaliteit van praktysieke van so 'n geïnstitusionaliseerde stelsel van rasse-bevoordeling voorheen, is met die veranderende sosiale, ekonomiese en politieke konteks bevraagteken. Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die diskoers van wit middelklas Suid-Afrikaners oor die veranderende konteks. Die studie verken die diskoers in onderhoude van Afrikaans-sprekendes en Engels-sprekendes wat in stedelike en landelike gemeenskappe woon. Hulle diskoers openbaar die mate waartoe hierdie verandering die wyse waarop hul gesprekvoering oor hulself en ander beïnvloed het. Daar is 'n literatuur wat voorstel dat die betekenisvolheid van ras in die vorming van persone se identiteit in die postapartheid konteks afgeneem het. Hierdie studie oorweeg die mate waartoe die vermyding van ras wat in die literatuur oor witheid voorgestel word, ooglopend is in die diskoers oor die transformatie van die samelewing. Deur die diskoers in oënskou te neem word 'n aantal vrae oor hoe gesprekvoerders hul gemeenskappe bedink en wat die implikasie hiervan vir toekomstige rasse-integrasie is, geopper. Wat bedoel word met Suid-Afrikanerskap is 'n verbandhoudende saak wat aandag verg. Die studie kom tot die slotsom dat ras, ten spyte van 'n verhoogde sensitwiteit oor ras, 'n kernfaktor in die identiteit van gesprekvoerders bly.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the following persons and institutions for assisting in my research:

Professor Simon Bekker, my promoter who treated me as a mature student, allowing me time to read and explore the topic. He created a number of opportunities where I could present and discuss my research. He maintained an open-door policy and was always available responding promptly to my queries. His incisive and constructive advice and guidance was beneficial. I appreciated his willingness to meet me in Gauteng when he travelled to the province.

Janis Grobbelaar, who challenged my thinking on discourse, recommended key readings on the South African society and created a supportive environment at work that was conducive to research (including some necessary pressure for completion, eventually).

My colleagues in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria for the interest they displayed in my work. I would like to thank Kammila Naidoo and Khumisho Moguerane who at different stages shouldered a heavier burden of our shared teaching responsibilities.

Jan Pretorius for his willingness to read drafts of completed chapters and his encouraging and supportive feedback. Tina Uys for suggesting readings for my research when I started with the study and for resolving some queries around using the word processing program I had. Louwrens Pretorius and Gretchen du Plessis for the discussions on aspects of the research we had. I am also grateful for access to the Unisa library.

The panel of examiners for asking thought-provoking questions during the oral defence of this dissertation as well as for giving constructive feedback on the research.

Charmaine Raftesath, my sister, for reading parts of the dissertation, for assisting me with the graphics and answering any language queries I had. Marguerite Yates, my sister, for her encouragement and support.

Anneke Jansen, Louise Burton-Durham and Annette Griessel who assisted with transcription.

Anneke Nieuwoudt, my cousin, for fetching me at the airport and accommodating me during my consultations at Stellenbosch.

The key contact persons in the four communities I conducted fieldwork in who aided me in approaching potential interviewees. The interviewees themselves who voluntarily agreed to participate and freely gave of their time. Our conversation was frank and insightful. Since we agreed on maintaining anonymity I do not mention their names but remain indebted to their generosity.

My friends and family for their support, encouragement and interest in my progress.

My mother and father for their continued support and assistance with checking corrections to transcripts, cross references to interviewees in chapters and the list of sources. Unfortunately my father passed away during my research. I dedicate this dissertation to them both.

The fieldwork for this study was funded from my own resources.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB Afrikaner Broederbond [Afrikaner Brotherhood]
ACDP African Christian Democratic Party
ANC African National Congress
APK Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk [Afrikaans Protestant Church]
ATKV Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuur Vereniging [Afrikaans Language and Cultural Society]
AWB Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging [Afrikaner Resistance Movement]
B.Com Bachelor of Commerce
BEE Black Economic Empowerment
CBD Central Business District
CJMM City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CP Conservative Party
CTMM City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (Pretoria)
CVO [CPE] Christelike Volks-eie Onderrig [Christian Peoplehood’s-own Education]
DA Democratic Alliance
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acids
DP Democratic Party
DPhil Doctor of Philosophy
DRC Dutch Reformed Church
Eskom Electricity Supply Commission
GASH Good address small home
GNU Government of National Unity
HNP Herstigte Nationale Party [Refounded National Party]
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
ID Independent Democrats
IEC Independent Electoral Commission
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
Lotto National Lottery
MDM Mass Democratic Movement
NP National Party
NNP New National Party
NSMS National Security Management System
FF Freedom Front
FF+ Freedom Front Plus
KKNK Klein-Karoo Nasionale Kunstfees [Small Karoo National Arts Festival]
PAC Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
SABRA Suid-Afrikanse Buro vir Rasse-aangeleenthede [South African Bureau for Racial Affairs]
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations
SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TV Television
UDF United Democratic Front
UDM United Democratic Movement
UN United Nations
Unisa University of South Africa
UOVS Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat [University of the Orange Free State]
WASP White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
ZAR Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek [South African Republic (Boer Republic)]
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The context of the study

The tremendous and unexpected political tumult in the last decade of the twentieth century underlines that identities are not predetermined given. A collapse of the Soviet Union and repercussions in Eastern Europe resulted in social and political transformation of a number of societies. As totalitarian control receded, alternative ways of association within these territories politically and socially became possible. This resulted in an emergence of ethnic, regional and national attachments, consciousness and struggles. In Western Europe resistance to new patterns of immigration, emerged, often aligned to conservative nationalist politics and xenophobia. South Africa established an inclusive constitutional democracy organised around the notion of a civic nationalism. This followed the collapse of apartheid which was based on a strong ethno-nationalist framework and racial exclusion. The change in South Africa affected people in society differentially. There remains a strong propensity to see all issues in racial terms given the past legacy. Whether identities transcending the racial, linguistic and cultural divide within post-apartheid society will develop remains to be seen. Generally, profound economic changes have further resulted in globalisation and a commodification of culture contributing to the fluidity of identities (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley 1997; Bellier 2000).

Although changes like those mentioned above do not reflect a unique historical experience, they bring new values and forms of living within their contexts into existence. These recent events stimulated renewed academic and popular interest in questions of identity as well as the politics of difference and raised questions about both the tenacity and fluidity of identities. Ethnicity and nationalism overshadowed other possible modes of political organisation at the end of the century. According to Goldberg and Solomos (2001), the question of identity has been central to ethno-racial issues, historically and currently. A key question is: What are the options of ‘belonging’ in a society?
Debates on identity, in the context of change referred to above, attain a centrality within contemporary scholarship in disciplines across the social sciences and humanities. Currently the enormous resonance of the concept identity and consequent interest in it is reflected by the launch of new journals dedicated to identity studies and by identity being a key theme of numerous academic conferences at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. For instance Bekker (1999) lists five major conferences with respect to identity questions in post-apartheid South Africa held over a short time span before and after the 1994 election. This demonstrates the surge of interest in how collective identities are produced. Studying the notion identity, then, has appealed to social scientists when thinking about a changing social reality. At the end of the millennium the fragmentation of some societies and the dislocation and transition within other societies brought questions of belonging and solidarity to the centre of political debate and contestation. Driessen and Otto (2000:12) contend that

> [g]lobalising markets and media, the flow of people, ideas and values, ethnic revival and the redrawing of political frontiers, all contribute to identity questions ... at all levels of socio-political integration and differentiation. As a result identity has become a key term of public language and thought.

Focusing on identity has opened up new areas of scholarly debate and research agendas. Such questions have also assumed a central position in contemporary life and political debate.

1.2 Describing the study

This dissertation is a sociological exploration of the discourse on identity that emerges in conversations with ‘whites’\(^1\) on transformation of the South African society. My interest in the topic is the consequence of my own experience of living through the transition from a society based on apartheid to one based on the notion of inclusive

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\(^1\) I have placed ‘white’ in the title of this dissertation in denial quotation marks to indicate that this category is socially constructed rather than being primordially given. In this dissertation I only use denial quotation marks subsequently where I specifically want to re-emphasise this constructedness. There is a note on the use of racial terminology at the end of this chapter where conventions are discussed.
democracy. It is a society that has had to grapple with the legacy of the past and find ways of promoting greater equity and unity amongst its citizens.

South Africa, as a society, has undergone fundamental restructuring in the past decade and a half. This restructuring has been most evident in the political landscape. At the time of this transition, these changes were hailed a negotiated revolution. There was, in the context of this euphoria, talk about the ‘new South Africa’. This study considers how this ‘new South Africa’ has affected the lives of a segment of the society, which have been privileged in the past. The empirical research commenced almost ten years into the transition, and sought to determine middle-class white South Africans’ perceptions of change in their communities and society. In order to take stock, participants were asked to reflect on the past, present and future.

During the course of my studies I was often asked the question by colleagues and friends: Why study white South Africans? In answering this I have pointed out first, that generally, when it has come to the social sciences, by and large – for a considerable period – the ‘other’ has been studied as if they were racialised. This does not imply that whites have not been researched in the past. Where they have been researched they have been treated as the ‘norm’. The transformation of the society has put whiteness under the spotlight. Second, studying white people in South Africa has had the advantage that I have not had to face the barrier of language differences as I am conversant in both English and Afrikaans. Whereas I do not believe that this language barrier disqualifies researchers from studying other people with the help of an interpreter and research assistant, in a study orientated to the discourse of interviewees, proficiency in the language in order to engage participants and pick up nuances, is imperative.

Another question raised with regard to my research was: Why focus on the middle-class? First, a sizable white middle-class have benefited from the policy of apartheid in both material and status terms. As a result of past policies proportionately larger

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2 For the purpose of this study I define middle-class as constituted by gainfully employed people conducting non-manual labour, or alternatively owning their own businesses or farms, with adequate
numbers of people recognised in society as white South Africans have enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle than would have been the case otherwise. The working class are generally more vulnerable and is a category often researched. On a more pragmatic level, my own category inscriptions led me to gravitate to studying the middle-class. There is a literature on middle-class whites and why they acquiesced to the transformation of the society without providing resistance. I engage with this literature in subsequent chapters.

I was also asked by colleagues and friends why I chose the particular communities I studied. My choice of the communities in which I conducted my research was to a great degree determined by convenience – accessibility enabling repeat visits. I describe this in greater detail in chapter five. In selecting the communities I did endeavour to engage both English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers living in rural and urban areas.

I was challenged by some colleagues on my fixation with ‘discourse’. My interest in studying discourse emerged from trends within the field itself. I had previously conducted research on attitudes. The drawback of attitude research is that it tends to freeze people into cast positions rather than consider the fluidity evident in discourse. In this regard I found the debates around discourse and narratives in the literature more appealing. Drawing on my personal experience I noticed how acquaintances talked about society in conversations. The shifts in their discourse when compared to my vivid recollections of conversations before the transition caught my attention. I found their conversion to new positions and reinterpretation of their previously held positions striking.
I do not recall frequently being asked why I chose to study identity. This in itself probably signifies the pervasiveness and hence perceived legitimacy of studying the topic of identity in a society that is undergoing a transition.

This dissertation engages with the discourse on transition by middle-class white South Africans, placing it in a broader social and historical context. As a result of this transition institutions within society have changed. How these changes are received is a consideration of this research. It raises the question regarding the extent to which the loss of a monopoly on political power has shaped white middle-class interviewees’ sense of themselves, their community and positioning in society in relation to others.

The discussion in the dissertation is to a large extent my interpretation of the significance of these discourses and what they portend. A general objective, then, is to demonstrate how discourse on change is linked to a context and influences the identity possibilities and choices.

1.3 Outline of chapters

Chapter 2: *Theorising identity – an introduction* reviews the extensive literature on the notion identity. This chapter provides an overview of identity studies in the social sciences. It serves the purpose of unpacking identity conceptually and analytically. The social constructionist perspective underpinning my theoretical thinking on identity, discourse and race is also introduced.

Chapter 3: *Considering race – conceptual debates* introduces the debate around race and in particular the notion of whiteness and its association with privileging within societies. It frames one of the most common modes by which differences are drawn and understood, as a consequence of western modernity, with western identity emerging through the marginalisation and stereotyping of the other. The discourse around race takes on the form of descriptions and valuations of the attributes of the other, often viewed in a negative light. Therefore, whilst race presents itself as the embodiment of physical differences, it remains linked to the cultural and historical
context – the notion of white being an illustrative point. This link between race and culture is an association that is considered in the discourse of interviewees.

Chapter 4: *The South African socio-historical context* endeavours to provide a historical overview of the relationship between English- and Afrikaans speaking whites in the country as well as the events which led to the current social, economic and political transformation that is experienced in the country. It introduces background to a number of themes which emerged and were explored in interviews providing a context in which current discourse is situated.

Chapter 5: *Methodological considerations and research design* examines the epistemological and ontological assumptions guiding the research. Attention is paid to the notion of discourse as a social practice and how interviews can be read as texts in action. The operational decisions made with regard to the study are outlined. This includes a decision on the method to collect data, selection of sites and interviewees as well as ethical issues receive attention.

Chapter 6: *Interviewees’ discourse on their community and changes potentially affecting their everyday lives* considers how interviewees perceive the community in which they live and how it has changed. These conversations reflect with whom they identify as well as how they distinguish themselves from others.

Chapter 7: *Interviewees’ discourse on South African society – collective identities* considers collective identifications that are apparent from interviewees’ conversation on South Africa. It examines how they identify themselves collectively and situate themselves within the country.

Chapter 8: *Conclusion* reflects on what can be learned about identity from the discourse of interviewees on a transforming South African society.
1.4 Conventions followed in this study

A note on terminology: Racial terminology used in this study reflects everyday usage or common usage within the particular period. This does not imply acceptance of the categorisation the terminology refers to as a naturally given entity. For instance, black can be used more broadly than exclusively referring to blacks of African origin. African is also contested. I have therefore tended to use official designations like they appear in the census - black African, coloured, Indian and white. All these categories are socially constructed and historical products. Where interviewees or authors have used their own terminology, I have respected their usage.

I undertook to ensure the anonymity of interviewees and use pseudonyms instead of their original names where I refer to them. In this regard I have also ‘renamed’ the two smaller communities I worked in and avoided mentioning the suburb in the metropolitan area an interviewee resides in. I have furthermore tended to refer to their occupation in general terms and have not mentioned their employees or other data which would make them directly identifiable.

All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. The excerpts therefore reflect how interviewees have talked and are not edited to facilitate readability. In instances where I have translated the discourse from Afrikaans, the original excerpt appears, organised by chapter at the end of the dissertation.

Where I have referred to interviewees’ discourse in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, I have added the interview number after the name. If this is followed by an alphabetical letter it indicates the interviewee in a paired or group interview. Where an interviewee’s name is used more than once, following a discussion on an excerpt or on the same page I have not repeated the interviewee number. Where quotes from interviewees follow each other, I have added the names, at the end of each quote. The interviewees are listed by interviewee number and community in Tables 1.1 to 1.5 in appendix B. Some additional background on each interviewee is provided in these tables.
Chapter 2: Theorising identity – an introduction

2.1 Introduction

Identity is described by some scholars as an amorphous and ubiquitous concept. I establish a preliminary working definition in this chapter. Considering identity, lexicographers, etymologically, refer to the Latin root “idem”, meaning ‘the same’. In equations this logically implies ‘the same as itself’. It can refer to sameness in spite of time and circumstance – to essence and/or continuity. The concept identity therefore has several distinct connotations, with the possibility of debate and contestation. As a verb identification implies recognition and association and suggests a parallel process of disidentification (Burke 2003; Schwarz, Davidson, Seaton & Tebbit 1988).

Social scientists suggest that the term identity refers to various related phenomena. The self and consciousness are closely associated to identity. Taking on an identity implies distinguishing the self from others, both individually and collectively. This requires considering the interconnectedness between the personal and social. The personal, how we seem to be ourselves and the implied coherence and consciousness attributed to this, is the outcome of a social process. The social, in turn, refers to social relations – to how we operate within society.

The concept identity bridges thinking about the personal and social and this underpins its utility for many scholars. Identity implies setting boundaries and is therefore concerned with self-definition and the demarcation of groups. Questions of sameness and homogeneity as well as the relation to others have a long and varied history in human thought even though current terminology was not used to address these issues. In this regard the quest for recognition, association and protection continues to play a key role.

1 I have contributed to four publications individually, or jointly, on the concept identity, drawing on my readings and original notes for this chapter. The material in this chapter is reworked substantially and expands my own contribution to the publications (Bekker, Leilé & Puttergill 2003; Bekker, Leilé & Puttergill 2005; Puttergill 2001; Puttergill & Leilé 2006).
This process of recognition by the self and others is, in itself, not peculiar. Collective identity implies a possibility for solidarity which speaks to subjective we-feelings, sameness or similarity with others. It is furthermore associated with positioning in economic exchange and status suggesting social and political relations. Such differentiation generally appears secure and well established. However, when challenged, questions of identity arise, revealing that identities do not pre-exist their strategic invocations.

The rapid expansion in the use of the notion identity in academic discourse makes a comprehensive overview, summary or synthesis of the field of enquiry impossible. No discipline fully addresses all issues concerning identity. Studies take on different contours and raise specific topics, issues and questions – shaped by intellectual paradigms and contexts. Hence, Shotter (1993b:188) argues that “‘identity’ has become the watchword of the times”, given both the academic and public interest in it.

Philosophy and theology have an established tradition of dealing with questions of identity rooted in the metaphysical realm. Sociological and psychological literature on questions of identity date back to the late nineteenth century when these disciplines were established (Woodward 2002). The dislocation and transition experienced as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation brought questions of identity to the fore. A search in electronic databases for these disciplines reveals a substantial amount of literature generated on identity. The number of publications linked to the keyword identity reflects a growing interest. Closer inspection also reveals that the vast

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2 PsycInfo lists publications from 1887. Over this time span up to 2000, 27 149 publications in this database are linked to the keyword identity. Publications before 1960 constitute 1.9% (513) of all entries linked to identity in the database. The publications of the 1960s account for 2.8% (759), those of the 1970s for 10.6% (2 879), those of the 1980s for 25.1% (6 819) and those of the 1990s for 53.8% (14 601) of all entries linked to identity. The 1 578 entries published in 2000 constitute 5.8% of all entries linked to identity. Although the presentation of these figures does not provide a sophisticated analysis, some general conclusions can be drawn in spite of the possible incompleteness of earlier records and the selectiveness of databases. The figures suggest a steady growth in publications dealing with identity, with a takeoff from the 1970s, phenomenal growth in the 1980s and a peaking of interest occurring in the 1990s. If the trend reflected by the number of entries for 2000 is maintained for the decade, these figures suggest a stabilisation of interest in identity. A search of publications linked to identity in Sociological Abstracts, available electronically from 1986, lists 42 596 entries up to 2000. This confirms a high growth in publications on the 1980s and accelerated growth in the 1990s.

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majority of publications on identity within the social sciences initially remained within the disciplinary confines of social psychology and micro-sociology until the 1970s. Lewellen (2002) attributes the emergence of an interest in questions of identity within anthropology in the late 1970s to the impact of postmodernism focusing attention on subjective experience and discourse.

The concept identity has enabled scholars to ask new questions, sometimes in established fields of inquiry as well as reconceptualise established disciplinary concerns in terms of the notion of identity. Ultimately, the notion of identity takes on different connotations depending on the context within which it is used. Competing paradigms and perspectives define identity in their own terms of what is persuasively thinkable. Meyer (2001) suggests the way identity is used in different disciplines stretches it and ultimately then refers to incompatible phenomena.

The diversity and sheer mass of these contributions on identity reflects an enormous breadth and complexity. Given this scope and diversity, I have a more modest aim. I will consider some of the major debates around studying identity as well as some of the assumptions made about it and suggestions on how best to approach it in this study. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, the emergence of an interest in identity within contemporary social science is considered. Second, social constructionism is introduced. Third, the notion of identity is discussed conceptually. Hence, this chapter will clarify how identity is theorised in this particular study and then focus on the key issues it deals with.

2.2 Locating the interest in identity

Large scale changes and attempts to grapple with the issues they raise have led to a widespread interest in identity. Tracing back and identifying the roots of current ideas, always entails reconstruction of a lineage – which provides some legitimacy for the current research endeavour. However, there is a danger in such reconstruction that continuity in ideas are emphasised where it does not exist.
2.2.1 Theorising and the social context

The extent to which the renewed interest in identity is a result of theoretical trends such as the linguistic turn within disciplines and/or actual substantive changes in social reality is a recurring debate. Within this debate the notion of reality has been problematised. Referring to reality implies a relation to it reflected in consciousness, thought and language. Language is an ambient feature of our social environment. Thoughts and images about experiences are conveyed in interaction, and this discourse is seen as significantly shaping what is regarded as meaningful. Acknowledging these influences does not necessarily imply denying reality (Mills 1997; Stones 1996; Taylor 2004).

Theory enables social scientists to reflect on reality. As an abstract conceptual system theory shapes and filters the way reality is studied by enabling us to think about phenomena. Theory is not disengaged from the reality it engages, arising out of, and in relation to a historical and social context and processes of knowledge production. No theory provides an all-inclusive coverage. The relationship between theorising and the social context is not one-way. Sapsford and Dallos (1998) argue that theory continues to influence how we see ourselves and society.

Transition in society is a key concern of social scientists in the occident. The complex and bidirectional relationship between theory and reality is reflected in the debates around modernity. Each historical epoch is characterised by particular social and cultural forms impacting on consciousness. The transition, from the absolute certitude of traditional or feudal forms of social and economic organisation, culture and thought, to a greater degree of individualism is attributed to the Enlightenment, taken both as historical period and philosophical disposition, emerging in Europe from the seventeenth century. The notion of rationality played a key role in

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3 Historically it refers to Western Europe. Developed societies, reflecting similar ways of thinking, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are included currently. The occident or West refers to particular traditions of thought and practice within a historical trajectory rather than implying a singular entity (Woodward 2002).
facilitating the emergence of individual agency and with democracy as a political system necessitating the consideration of rights implied a greater degree of differentiation and choice. Notions of individual identity are historically and culturally specific (Dickens & Fontana 1994; Gecas & Burke 1995; Giddens 1991; Fay 1996).

The notion of an independent single self-contained individual, implying a conscious person reflecting a degree of consistency and unity over time, arose during modernity in the West. This led to what Hall (1992) calls the enlightenment subject. According to Hall, Western philosophy with its emphasis on reason consciousness and action played a key role in establishing such a notion of identity. Social science analyses have focused on the autonomous individual as a key variable to explain human agency, political participation and the quest for freedom (Crossley 2000; Giroux 1993; Sampson 1990).

These debates emerge from Western cultural and sociological self-examination because social scientists choose their objects of analysis from the vantage point of the culture and context they inhabit. The notion of an autonomous self, so prevalent in the West, does not apply to all societies. Sökefeld (1999) reminds us that the ‘self’ can be and is conceptualised differently.

At stake is how individuals are understood as social entities. Burkitt (1991) argues that social selves are always embedded within social relations. Viewed from this perspective then, the increasing individualisation reflects social relations and institutional practices within modernity, rather than an unchangeable essence of human beings.

In spite of reflexivity, longing for community remains a powerful force. Major socio-economic and political changes associated with modernity such as capitalism, industrialisation, secularisation, liberalism, democracy and mass education led to the institutionalisation of cultural norms and dissemination of a national ideology within a geographical area. Gilroy (1999:185) argues that the changing social conditions and ideas
promoted a new sense of the relationship between place, community and what we now call identity.

The Latin root of nation according to lexicographers is “natio”, meaning ‘birth’, whilst “ethnos” in Greek implies nation. Ethnic identification is often a consequence of state-formation. Within the context of European-wide state-creation as a form of political organisation and the accompanying citizenship, nineteenth century theorists viewed societies and collective identities through the lens of nationalist discourse (Billig 1995; Gellner 1983; Friedman 1994; Pieterse 1996; Urry 2000).

Nationalist ideas propagated a shared past and common future. This social belonging to a national collectivity determined civil, political and social rights/privilege drawing a distinction between insiders and outsiders. It facilitated the emergence of relationships, social solidarity and a political consciousness within the context of homogeneity, solidarity and continuity for a peoplehood implying emotional investment in a shared national identity (Greenwood 1994; Thomas 2001; Reicher & Hopkins 2001). According to Anderson (1983:7), nations appeared “to constitute a bounded, ‘natural’ entity” each having a claim to self-determination within a given territory.

The primordial sentiments expressed within nationalist discourse obfuscated the fairly recent emergence, fluidity and imagined rather than objective base of nations leading to the acceptance of societies as given and natural rather than constructed. A notion of societies as naturally uniform and distinct realms where people shared a common heritage and culture was established. In this regard language and religion often served as a basis for drawing boundaries. Ideas of race were deployed and developed in the context of the ideologies of nationalism, naturalising and normalising racial thinking. Consequently theorists projected ‘difference’ onto the excluded other when describing nationhood. Within nation-states and the territories they governed elites furthermore categorised the population, setting boundaries (Aronovitch 2000; Kertzer & Arel 2002; Miles 1993; Smedley 1999; Solomos & Back 1996a; Wallerstein 1991).
The categorisation arose as a result of the social relations of exclusion and exploitation whereby white Westerners established their dominance and social privilege over colonised peoples, in the context of expanding merchant capitalism from the fifteenth century. The identity of the West was defined by the colonial ‘other’. Identifying modernity’s essence required nineteenth century theorists to contrast it with the ‘other’ peripheral territories. Excluding indigenes contradicted the egalitarian and universal relations promised by the new ‘social contract’ of the Enlightenment contributing to a sense of superiority and a notion that they were bearers of civilisation amongst the colonisers (Appiah 1992; Banton 1996; Comaroff 2001; Miles 1989; Said 1994; Rattansi 1997). Taylor (2004:20) argues that the European colonial project was with great regularity and consistency imagined as a white supremacist project.

A particular version of history discursively presented as the self-evident complete reality underpins a particular way of imagining the nation and raises the question of whose interests are served. Evoking a common history entails reworking the past to create a sense of belonging in the present and denies the openness and changeability of such constructs by implying givenness (Friese & Wagner 1999; Parker 2002b; Woodward 2000).

A distinction can be made between an ethno-, civic- and hetero- nationalism. The racial and/or ethnic identities at the core of civic and social relations in ethno-nationalism are state sponsored rather than being foundational (primordial). For instance, the ethnic absolutism characteristic of apartheid South Africa led to the domination of an ‘other’ and bred chauvinism. In civic nationalism identity is based on citizens sharing equal rights providing a new basis for integration and potentially greater inclusiveness. Particular interests are served in resolving who comprises the nation and hence has access to resources. However, there is no guarantee that civic nationalism would be more open and tolerant. Hetero-nationalism recognises that there may be interplay between the ethno and civic ideal types in shaping the political community in certain contexts. It recognises ethno-national identity politics within a civically defined political community, thereby acknowledging diversity (Comaroff
The diversity within societies has drawn assumptions of homogeneity and uniformity into question. Nations are socially constructed, with multiple possibilities in the way national identity can be conceived and the commonality therefore imagined. This does not necessarily draw on the narrow assumption of ethnic origins. Other ideas can serve as the unifying ideological base. The constructions on which unity is built have material consequences. Credible symbols encourage allegiance to the ‘national project’, forging a commonality across differences and particularities. This unity is never fully achieved within the nation-state and the potential for competing interests and conflict remain (Fenton 1999; Garner 1997; Norval 2000; Palmberg 1999; Pieterse 1993). Chabal (1996) argues key issues are the ability of the postcolonial state in Africa to articulate an overarching identity, and the degree to which self-contained communities are possible. In this respect, commemoration is an institutionalised remembering that serves political purposes and forges collective identity. Shared identities ensure society is a meaningful social system.

With a growing awareness of globalisation, contemporary theorists have begun to recognise that they cannot assume that a coherent cultural context serves as the base for a stable collective identity. Old identities built around the nation and localities are increasingly fractured and/or challenged in the light of an intensified pattern of global interconnectedness. Yet such threats and insecurities have also led to a nationalist backlash in some instances. New conditions and environments for constructing identities are created by structural, institutional and cultural transformation aimed at fostering social integration. Hence sociologists have begun to appreciate the role played by contingency and uncertainty and argue that collective and individual representations are indeterminate and exceedingly preliminary in nature in a media-saturated world (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Davis 2000; Featherstone & Lash 1999; Johansson 2000).
2.2.2 Describing society and identity

Sociologists have been concerned since the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century about the implications of weakening traditional social bonds as industrialisation and the development of capitalism disrupted existing networks of kinship and community. In considering societal transformation they paid attention to the transition from ascription (implying fixed social roles) to achievement (implying greater fluidity) as well as to allegiance formed in newly emerging contexts, experiences of belonging and the extent of alienation. These concerns were not initially explicitly conceptualised as questions of identity (Calhoun 1995; Denzin 1989; Hunter 1986; Macdonald 1993)

Uncertainty and insecurity generated by social transformation foregrounds concerns about identity. Reflecting on the nature of change in societies in the twenty-first century, the declining influence of institutions and tradition, accelerated change, increasing reflexivity and fragmentation within societies suggest a new form of social organisation qualitatively transforming the material foundations of reality. The impact of globalisation and technological innovation as well as reflexivity are crucial issues that warrant attention when considering matters related to identity (Agger 1998; Gabriel 1989).

With globalisation and the emergence of the information society advances in communication technology have made it possible to encounter diverse events and thereby to experience multiple situations. The culture industry – mass media, mass marketing and mass consumption all play a significant role and impact on the form and content of identity. As social ties loosen and social relations become more fluid, individualism, narcissism, and an emphasis on the self increases. Heightened reflexivity facilitates the opportunity to choose between lifestyles opening up a space for the expression of particularities. Identity which usually appears to be fixed, coherent and stable becomes relatively open and differentiated in situations characterised by continuous change (Giddens 1991; Hetherington 1998; Ignatieff 1995; Mac an Ghaill 1999; Richards 1989). According to Smith (2000c), the political
economy approaches of the 1970s could not adequately deal with the transforming cultural landscape, in particular with the multiple forms of representation and cultural consumption.

Scholars argue that these changing circumstances heighten uncertainty resulting in an inward turn and preoccupation with the self. Callero (2003:63) points out that

the growth of personal agency comes with certain risks... [in particular] new experiences of ontological insecurity and self-anxiety.

With the inward turn the self becomes a reflexive project. A ‘culture of therapy’ addresses existential issues. There is a proliferation of lifestyle programmes, self-help books and marketed packaged products offering advice and solutions in the media. This self-awareness industry reflects a commodification of issues of identity. Consumption becomes a key dimension demonstrating the relationship between the changing nature of society and identity (Abu-Lughod 1999; Johansson 2000; Taylor 1989; Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen & Kurzweil 1984).

In some respects the freedom to choose, whilst socially significant, is an illusion because it still occurs within broader social constraints such as the availability of resources. Identity should be understood in terms of the interplay between the cultural and historical setting and the subjectivities which are formed within this. It would be a mistake to treat the public and private domains as dichotomous (Bell 1999; Oommen 1994; Wilmsen 1996).

The paradox of globalisation is that, whilst breaking down established identity boundaries, it often creates with the greater degree of self-direction and autonomy afforded the space for the emergence of local identities. The social and political movements that arise in contemporary society and mobilise around issues provide a base for identification, enable the expression of collective identity and raise an awareness of cultural diversity (Comaroff 1996; Keating 2001; Smart 1999; Tomasi 2001).
Some key changes associated with globalisation is the growth in significance of transnational corporations, the development of media and a sophisticated information technology. These changes underlie economic and cultural transformation as they result in the decoupling of industry and consumption from a national base, with the declining significance of the nation-state, as trade, capital and cultural ideas increasingly circulate worldwide (Castells 1997; Gabriel 1998; Urry 2000). The proliferation of terms such as consumerism and post-industrialism in the debate on how to describe contemporary societies, attempt to capture the economic and social changes observed as well as the accompanying cultural transformations.

Vandenberghe (1996) indicates that there is a considerable degree of ambiguity surrounding the notion of postmodernity, in particular whether it refers to epochal transition or is embedded in and co-exists with modernity. Seidman (1994a:4) argues many postmodernists wish to preserve the chief values of the Enlightenment, for example autonomy, individualism, tolerance, pluralism, and democracy, but insist that this requires a reconfiguring of knowledge and society.

The notion that globalisation is a recent phenomenon and social reality is characterised by a higher degree of ‘reflexivity’ is challenged. This process of describing contemporary society reveals a self-consciousness of an epoch considered to be different from the past. The question is raised whether the shifts described reflect theoretical trends rather than actual changes (Bradley 1996; Fenton 1999; Siebers 2000; Stevens & Wetherell 1996).

2.2.3 Politics and identity

Political change redefining exclusions opens up new possibilities in identity construction and social integration. Mamdani (2001) argues that political identity, rather than cultural identity, is crucial in the public sphere. He regards entitlement, and therefore questions of social justice as a key issue. Identities and interest are mutually implicative. Whilst interests may shape identities, identities also determine what is considered as interests. Social commentators observe a fragmentation of social interests in civil society (Castells 1996; Grossberg 1996a; Hetherington 1998).
The complexity and cross-cutting nature of social divisions, nevertheless, need to be acknowledged. How individual actors define themselves and the allegiances they form are crucial to the political identities that may emerge. Contests are opened up around expanding rights, the terms of societal membership and rules of participation. Recognition, in itself is a crucial aspect in establishing dignity. What is significant with identity politics is that recognition is demanded on the grounds where it has been denied previously. These identities arise from and change within the context of political struggle. Where the state is not able to respond simultaneously to all competing demands a crisis of legitimation potentially emerges. Devolution to regional and local government is an attempt to deal with such threats and re-legitimise the state. Politics of recognition and politics of resource distribution go hand in hand (Castells 1997; Goldberg & Solomos 2001; Kruks 1996; Maynard 2001; Taylor 1989).

Furthermore, there can be a tension between claims for individual and collective rights. Tisenkopfs (2001) argues that a sense of a collective identity is eroded by the growing quest for individual freedom. This growing quest to exercise choice, as well as the recognition that individual identity is not static, has been attributed to loosening social ties, increasing reflexivity and an inward turn towards subjectivity – the experience of being and feeling (Sarup 1993; Stevens 1996a; Thomas 1996; Wuthnow et al. 1984).

Identity has become a significant marker in contemporary political conflicts. The intense political conflicts over belonging often framed in ethnic, national and/or racial terms, reemphasise that, in spite of increased reflexivity, individuals are not automatically able to choose how they would like to live their lives. Gabriel (1998:40) argues that politics is

an important site for the mobilisation of racial fears and anxieties, invariably linked to economic discourses.

Collective identity implies a potential communal bond and some obligation thereby
positioning individuals in patterns of social organisation. The sense of belonging and stability that collective identity can offer is particularly attractive in contexts of rapid change where uncertainty can ignite nostalgia for old certainties. This is attractive because it provides a sense of positioning and obligation. However, the content and form of these collective identities and the interests linked to them are not fixed and may change during societal transformation (Ajayi 1993; Feinberg 1993; Friedman 2000; McAllister 1999; Pieterse 1993; Woodward 1997a).

Identity is central to questions of agency and politics. The construction of an identity can be viewed as a social and political process. An identity becomes salient when people think of themselves primarily in terms of it. This positions them within social relations. Once politicised, an identity serves as a base for mobilisation, organisation and activity in terms of the interests that can be attached to it. The purpose of mobilisation is to either maintain or otherwise change the current pattern of resource distribution. Institutional arrangements within society to an extent reflect the balance of power between interest groups. Although the pursuit of collective interests encourages awareness and identification, identities cannot be reduced only to interests (Hall 1997; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Jenkins 1997; Reicher & Hopkins 2001; Wimmer 2000).

Where the nation-state fails to project an overarching identity or to accommodate different interests, a group can enforce their vision of how society should be organised impacting on individuals’ daily lives. A system of ideas and beliefs plays a key role in justifying and naturalising these relationships, the socio-political order, interests and values (Dalal 2002).

2.2.4 Disciplinary boundaries and identity

A discipline shapes a substantive field in significant ways by prioritising particular questions and explanations. Generally, sociology and anthropology have primarily focused on aspects related to collective identity, psychology on individual identity and social psychology on the relationship between the individual self and collective
The focus of the disciplines are more nuanced and complex than a brief outline suggests. Gilroy (2000:109) notes

 [...]he theme of identification and the consequent relationship between sociology, psychology, and even psychoanalysis ... add layers of complexity to deliberations about how selves – and their identities – are formed through relationships of exteriority, conflict, and exclusion.

Within social psychology Hogg, Terry & White (1995) refer to two traditions – one influenced by psychology, the other by sociology. Psychologically orientated traditions emphasise the role of cognition (thought), and affect (emotion) as analytic processes. Identity implies attachment and therefore an emotional investment. Sociologically influenced traditions consider social structural aspects of interaction such as the framework of social institutions and power in their analyses (Bailey 2000; Parker 1989; Stevens 1998).

For psychodynamic theorists the self is the product of differentiation and identification. Through this process a sense of connectedness and separateness is generated. Psychodynamic theorising reveals the self-other dynamics of identity and in particular the emotional and unconscious dimension. They aim to transcend the experiential realm by moving beyond observable interaction. Psychodynamicists’ concern with interiority, as a distinct ontological domain, leads them to consider how the social world is represented within a psychic reality by taking the complex layering and interpenetration of the interiority and exteriority into account. In the process of burrowing beneath what is superficially apparent, they consider how the ‘other’ is in us. In this respect they argue that the ‘other’ is not only external, but also internal to the self, so that identity is split (Craib 1998; Fay 1996; Fuss 1995; Norval 2000; Richards 1989; Volger 2000).

Erikson (1971), focusing on the integration and development of a stable identity, is credited with popularising the concept identity. He emphasised the subjective sense of existence and sameness of individual identity implying a sense of continuity as well
as being. The notion of a psychosocial identity as the nexus between self-concept and social life acknowledges the meshing of the subjective and objective dimensions in the resolution of individual needs and social demands (Deaux 1992; Harré 1993; Hoare 1994; Manganyi 1991).

Hall (1992) argues that an interactionist reading of the work of Cooley, Mead, Blumer, Schütz, Strauss and Goffman lies at the base of what he terms the “sociological subject”. Such a reading emphasises recognition, consciousness and an experiential dimension. Mead’s distinction between “I” (subject) and “me” (object), mirrors a relationship between self and society, between individual action and social influence and how it is internalised. This other-directedness suggests reflexivity and interplay between how I present myself and an awareness of how others regard me, with neither one fully determining identity. There is a relationship between self-consciousness and a moral consciousness (Denzin 1995; Hodgkiss 2001; Jopling 2000; Solomos & Back 1996a).

Goffman (1971) demonstrates how people consciously portray themselves in everyday situations with his notion of impression management. Identity is anchored in the social process entailing self-awareness, self-evaluation and comparison. The social expectations of others play a crucial role in constructing an identity. Roles furthermore signify socially constructed relationships, implying interaction in accordance with expectations. Sociological accounts view the self as socially constituted, through interaction. Berger (1963:116,117) sums up the sociological stance arguing that

identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed. [He continues] …identity is not something ‘given’, but it is bestowed in acts of social recognition.

Identities then have to be negotiated and sustained. This implies intersubjectivity and agency (Atkinson & Housley 2003; Gecas & Burke 1995; Ibáñez 1997; McCall 2003; Parker 1990).

There is a strong preoccupation with the unity, closure, and durability of both
individual and collective identity in the theoretical approaches described above. Observations suggest identities may be more transient. The extent to which identities are regarded as stable possessing a fixed or essential quality is increasingly questioned. The sense of a unified self is regarded as a construction continually negotiated in narratives (Burkitt 1991; Sökefeld 1999; Solomos & Back 1996a; Woodward 2000).

Postmodern, poststructural and postcolonial theorising emphasise contingency, discourse and representation. Rejecting a foundational objective reality provides a new way to think about and understand identity, revealing its plurality, hybridity, multiplicity, fluidity and fragmentation. Hall (1992) has called this the postmodern subject, to distinguish this from previous conceptions of identity. Multi-vocality, within-group diversity and historically contingent competing interpretations of an identity are recognised. This highlights an openness and fluidity with identity being regarded as highly reflexive and constantly shifting (Featherstone 1991; Laclau 1993; Parker 1998; Rattansi & Westwood 1994; Richardson, Rogers & McCarrol 1998; Sidorkin 1999; Supriya 1999). Gabriel (1989) summarises this trend as analysing ‘routes’ instead of ‘roots’ as the notion of an essentialised identity is questioned.

Postmodernism relates to a theory of history, culture and society, whilst poststructuralim emphasises language and knowledging. Discourse is emphasised where these two theoretical approaches overlap. It shifts attention towards studying social meanings, how they are used and the social practices linked to them. Reality obtains meaning through representation, resulting in the study of everyday discourse (Augoustinos 1998; Benhabib 1992; Parker 1989; Sampson 1989; Sarbin & Kitsuse 1994; Vandenberge 1996).

Deconstruction reveals how meaning emerging from discourse rather than being located within the individual subject is organised serving particular purposes. This demonstrates how language and ideology constructs the subject, accomplishing it. Ideology is located within language. Many scholars regard deconstruction failing to move beyond representation counterproductive. They argue the materiality of the
social and historical context needs to be taken into account (Bradley 1996; May 2002; Nash 2001; Nicholson & Seidman 1995; Rattansi 1995; Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995). Maynard (2001:129) points out that

*The deconstruction of categories such as race and gender may make visible the contradictions, mystifications, silences and hidden possibilities of which they are made up. But this is not the same as destroying or transcending the categories themselves, which clearly still play significant roles in how the social world is organized on a global scale.*

The social is collapsed into the discursive, ignoring significant dimensions of material reality. They argue this deals with knowing rather than with being and that there are levels of reality which cannot be captured adequately by discourse (Agger 1998; Willig 1999).

A strong postmodernist notion of identity as being continually in flux detaches it from the institutional context within which it is embedded, resulting in a hyperrelativism. The question arises whether this emphasis on fragmentation, multiplicity and hybridity has not underestimated the persistence of singular identities. Comaroff (1996) notes that in spite of the variability and multiplicity of identities propagated by postmodern theorists, the politics of identity still points towards the resilience of totalising identities. The ever shifting reality leads people to seek some stability in seemingly stable values, which leads to the mobilisation of a defensive identity (Davis 2000; Sennett 2001).

The contribution of postcolonialism lies in its counter-discourse seeking to disrupt/unsettle the legitimating narrative of Western hegemony. These scholars argue that the construction and representation of colonised subjects as the ‘other’ results in their negation and invisibility. Their subordination is legitimated through ideology and they set out to establishing a reverse discourse, which resists such positioning (Ahluwalia 2001; Said 1994; Solomos & Back 1996a; Supriya 1999). Appiah (1992:56) argues

*Now that the objects of European imperialism have at last become the subjects of a discourse addressed both to each other and to the West, European languages and European disciplines have been “turned,” like*
double agents, from the projects of the metropole to the intellectual work of post colonial cultural life.

2.2.5 Concluding remarks

Personal or individual identity refers to unique experiences whilst collective identity implies shared characteristics. Identity is always particularistic. It expresses attachments and marks out boundaries providing a sense of location within the social world. Identity is acquired by being positioned in a particular way consciously and unconsciously. Although representations are shared and often a taken for granted they can be contested.

The boundaries of identity can be drawn on the basis of geographical units (national, regional or local), cultural attributes (ethnic group, religious affiliation), assumed biological difference (race, gender), socioeconomic position (class, occupation) and sexual orientation, all implying a classificatory system, which is negotiated and reflects an enactment of power.

The diversity and complexity in social life are reflected by these subject positions and the possible variations they imply, with conceptions of history and collective memory shaping the identities that are constructed. The range of issues substantively linked to identity covers a broad spectrum. A connectedness to others shapes both how sense is made of the world and what opportunities and constraints are faced. Hence the scope of the discourse on identity ranges from popular literature on individual self improvement to debate on contemporary political conflict.

The sheer volume and diversity of material suggests both individual and collective identity matter in contemporary life. Identity is used in a wide variety of ways and in different contexts to address the ways in which people relate themselves to each other and their social context. Identities are social constructions that are multiple, overlapping, intersecting and continually contested, implying a process that is unfinished rather than suggesting a static property of a purposeful, singular human being. Identities, as well as the significance attached to them, are always historically
Debates on postmodernism and globalisation emphasise the impact of changing conditions and how these have drawn into question the coherence and boundedness of identity. The growing importance of consumption and rise of identity politics have underlined the fluidity and fragmentation of identity. Issues of recognition and access to resources have also been prominent.

Both the changing context and trends within academic scholarship have put identity on the agenda within the social sciences. A key question, then, is how to conceptualise identity at the beginning of the new millennium.

2.3 Providing a theoretical framework

Theoretical debates play a crucial role in thinking about identity as well as criteria for assessing knowledge claims. A social constructionist approach represents a critical reflexive shift towards studying identity as socially mediated and historically situated (Agger 1991; Bryant 1990; Calhoun 1995; May 1996).

2.3.1 Introducing social constructionism

Michael (1996:4) argues that there is no “‘simple’ origin story” for social constructionism. It is a loosely knit network of ideas drawing upon symbolic interactionism, poststructuralism, postmodernism and discourse theory. A key idea of social constructionism is that our experience of social reality is immersed in social relations and practices and therefore socially and historically specific. Identity then is neither inherent nor essential (Danziger 1997; Sarbin & Kitsuse 1994; Stevens & Wetherell 1996; Wetherell & Maybin 1996).

According to Ibáñez (1997), social constructionism is underpinned by the emergence of three related ‘turns’, namely the constructionist, linguistic/interpretive, and anti-foundationalist in contemporary social sciences. The conceptualisation of social
reality as being constructed, leads to an emphasis on language and interpretation methodologically, and is underpinned by an ‘anti-foundationalist turn’ (epistemologically), a recognition that knowledge is always provisional and incomplete.

2.3.1.1 Constructionism

The notion that social reality and by implication identity are constructed, raise, a number of issues.

Social constructionists argue social reality becomes intelligible through its meaningfulness. Studying how individuals develop and sustain ways of relating to each other, reveals how they make sense of social reality. It is from interaction between social actors that meaning emerges as a relational-responsive kind of understanding. In dialogue, utterances constitute the situation and, in order to be meaningful, responses need to take into account the context spoken into. The meaningfulness of social reality is therefore constituted by the interpretive activities and cultural practices in interaction (Josselson 1995; Lee 1999; Sampson 1993; Smith 2000c;). Ibáñez (1997:30) argues that

[n]othing is social if it is not instituted within the sphere of shared meanings which belongs to a collective of human beings. This suggests that what is social is neither to be found in people, nor outside them, but is rather situated among people [emphasis in original text].

Shotter’s (1993b) notion of joint action recognises the public and social character of language. He suggests a moral order is established ensuring that social practices to a large extent are habitual and regular modes of action. This acknowledges the cultural environment and subjective experience, both which are historically located and variable. Meanings are negotiated and social action and culture are therefore a constitutive process of reality (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Hodgkiss 2001; Still 1998; Taylor 1989; Wetherell & Still 1998).

Social constructionism suggests that social arrangements are provisional. Although
meanings arise within a particular context, possibilities are limited because social actors are constrained by existing social relations. There is a mutually implicative relationship between structure and agency. For instance, an identity has to be plausible in the light of the social history in which it is embedded as well as the interaction which makes it intelligible. This plausibility depends on how the relationship between the individual and collective dimensions of identity is represented. There is a dynamic to this interdependence, in the sense that the social practices and social relations which constitute human beings and society is changed and transformed by action (Denzin 2000; Seidman 1994a; Shotter 1993a; Weigert, Teitge & Teitge 1986; Woodward 2002).

Collective identities are often presented in essentialist terms in discourse by referring to an underlying primordial base, ranging from biology to a claimed shared history. Primordial attachments arise from the belief that certain ties are crucial and therefore result subjectively in an overpowering sense of solidarity. Curt (1994:43-44) points out that

[t]he ‘social bond’ creates and maintains ‘the story’ just as much as ‘the story’ creates and maintains the ‘social bond’.

The foundations identified suggest an unchanging and therefore normal and natural division independent from social relations. Identity then becomes a possession (Smith 2000a; Werbner 1997b; Wilmsen 1996; Woodward 1997b). Gilroy (1997:307) argues that

[i]n these circumstances, identity ceases to be an ongoing process of self-making and social interaction. It becomes instead a thing – an entity or an object – to be possessed and displayed [emphasis in original text].

Paying attention to the construction of an identity reveals its contingency challenging essentialism. The illusionary nature of fixed identities becomes apparent by illustrating how identities change historically and are redefined politically. Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995:133) suggest identity

is a practical accomplishment, achieved and maintained through the detail of language use.
Identities are seen, in part, as discursive products, as an attempt to make sense of ourselves and others and therefore as being negotiated. Identity then is formed and transformed in the process of representation (Castells 1997; Norval 1996; Sapsford & Dallos 1998).

2.3.1.2 Language and interpretation

As a system of symbols, language adds a new dimension to experience because it enables the abstract and categorical representation of social reality serving as a precondition for setting out the intelligibility of the social order. Language is the primary medium through which human beings communicate and therefore crucial to their consciousness (Brown 1994; Shotter 1999). Burr (2002:65) argues that

[w]e cannot think about or reflect upon our experience ...until we are able to symbolically represent events to ourselves through language. And we cannot acquire language without engaging in social interaction.

The taken-for-granted character of language as a neutral transparent descriptive medium is questioned by social constructionists. They emphasise the linguistic and symbolic mediation of reality focusing on interaction, practices and processes, on what is accomplished through rhetoric. This shifts attention to how the subject emerges within the discourse rather than view it as a pre-existing object (Giddens 1991; LeCouteur & Augoustinos 2001; Sampson 1993; Stones 1996).

The key role played by language in establishing meaningfulness is reflected in the insistence by Schütz that scientific constructs must be grounded on lay constructs. Human beings acquire consciousness within the context of language and culture. The ways in which people refer to themselves in social interaction and conversation are determined by the modes of self-reference made possible by language and culture. Interaction plays a key role in the organisation of social life. Although discourse is constituted by the interactions of individuals, these interactions occur within the parameters of existing social relations, structures and cultural contexts. Discourse, as language put into practice, is a social form and intrinsically public. Two interrelated
levels of analysis are apparent – the interactional level at which meanings are negotiated in everyday social interaction and the socio-cultural level which structures everyday discourse (Atkinson & Housley 2003; Bryant 1990; Íñiguez 1997; Larrain 2000; May 1996). A mutual interdependence is suggested by Still (1998:93) arguing “there cannot be language without talk, or talk without language.”

Since we are enmeshed in a world of signifying practices it is not possible to think outside of the use of language. Physical things and actions take meaning and become objects of knowledge within the context of the use of language (discourse). Nevertheless, excessively privileging language is a matter of concern. This leads towards solipsism and a linguistic reductionism. Parker (2002c) concurs that an extreme post-structural maxim that ‘nothing is outside the text’ refers to epistemology, not ontology. Scholars have argued that much of social reality lies beyond the grasp of language (Burkitt 1999; Craib 1997; McIntosh 1995; Morley & Chen 1996). Exclusively focusing on signifying practices neglects the material dimension of social relationships. Taylor (2004:11) citing Austin points out

ordinary language is not the last word ...it is the first word [emphasis in the original text].

Human agency is embedded in social relations. Language alone does not constitute social reality. Discourse, the use of language, is a social activity and historically located. Reality saturated by social activity is grasped through language. Taking social activity into account counters solipsism and redresses a one sided view that language constructs reality (Greenwood 1994; Harré 1993; Roseberry 1996; Urry 2000). Cromby and Nightingale (1999:12) point out

[m]ateriality matters because it both creates possibilities for, and puts constraints upon, the social constructions by and through which we live our lives.

Relationships are established through discourse creating identifiable subject positions. The participants within a discourse make sense of their experiences and who they are, as well as what they can become. Although the participants within a discourse do not necessarily wield equal power, their identities emerge from this interaction. With
contested discourse there is an attempt to dominate and thereby fix the framing of identity in a particular way. In this respect new forms of social relations and even institutions emerge out of new forms of discourse (Gergen 1999; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Shotter 1993a; Shotter 1993b).

2.3.1.3 Anti-foundationalism

The debate on the status of our knowledge of social reality raises the philosophical dispute on realism and relativism (Gergen 1999; Mills 1997; Parker 1993; Terwee 1988). This dispute touches on many related issues which need to be thought through in understanding social reality.

Many anti-foundationalists do not deny that phenomena exist independently of discourse but emphasise that they are only known discursively. Discourse provides a way to organise experiences, which may be diverse, into meaningful episodes. Anti-foundationalists are sceptical about the apparent universality and stability of social categories. The sense of sameness, continuity and purpose in identity is achieved by a discourse connecting the past with the present and an anticipated future (Gergen 1990; Paranjpe 1993; Potter 1996; Richardson et al. 1998; Willig 1999).

Anti-foundationalists argue that criteria for knowing are always provisional and contestable. For instance, observation relies on interpretation and representation. The knowledge it generates is related to the positioning and interests of a knower. This implies a narrative rather than foundational knowledge. According to Curt (1994:10) they are

agnostic over a singular ‘true’ reality and replaces a search for singular ‘true’ reality with a study of narrative pluralities.

Truth claims, rather than being transcendental, depend on and are sustained by social processes. There are multiple constructed realities with no predetermined universal framework to determine what is true or false. A common understanding (what is regarded true) is socially negotiated, based on communal agreement, on normative
rules, and is regarded as contingent, open to examination and critique. In this respect anti-foundationalists do not claim an authoritative or privileged position, but rather acknowledge the historical and cultural particularity of their approach (Gergen 1993; Hoshmand 1999; Potter 1997; Potter, Wetherell, Gill & Edwards 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Smith 2000b).

Detractors argue the claim that all perspectives are relative and that there is no absolute certainty is itself a foundationalist claim. Knowledge is then seen as merely the product of the social conditions it arises from, and with no means of distinguishing between claims. This may result in a description of discourse and common sense understandings, undermining the notion of a critical social science transcending the obvious (Antonio & Kellner 1994; Hammersley 1998; Kramer 1997; Parker 2002d; Sayer 1992).

Extreme relativism permanently suspends adjudication. The possible slide into relativism with no final moral and/or political position is a key concern. Some adherents to an anti-foundational position deny defeatism is the outcome. They reject the charge of (moral) relativism levelled against them by realists and contend a situational ethics is possible. Anti-foundationalists argue their rejection of absolute criteria for knowledge claims and a questioning of the taken for granted appearance of phenomena provides space for criticism and political action. Unburdened by unreflexive foundationalist notions of knowledge and truth allow them to address issues of power (Callero 2003; Dickens & Fontana 1994; Potter 1996; Seidman 1994b; Wetherell & Still 1998).

There has consequently been an intense philosophical debate about whether context-free truth is possible and an attempt to rescue some notion of truth, veracity and relevance. Gergen (1999:231) argues that

> there is no position of relativism, that is a transcendent standpoint from which we can rule on the relative merits of various contenders without expunging any values [emphasis in the original text].

Not all social scientists arguing for a social constructionist position, which
acknowledges the key role played by discourse in constructing reality, accept an anti-foundationalist position. According to Parker (1993:46), whilst social constructionism breaks crude appeals to science as truth... [it is necessary] to think of ways to anchor these descriptions in the real.

The challenge is to steer between the Scylla of strong foundationalism implying universal knowledge and the Charybdis of radical relativism implying particularistic knowledge. Virtues of the one are vices of the other, with a number of debates raging across the epistemological divide (Cromby & Nightingale 1999; Greenwood 1994; Lee 1999; Parker 2002d; Stryker 1997).

2.3.2 Assessing social constructionism

Social determinism becomes a risk when the power of public discourse is overemphasised, resulting in the ‘death of the subject’. Hodgkiss (2001:209) argues

everyone is in permanent dialogue with everyone else: thinking becomes argumentation, motives – never of anyone’s making – become reason ... and memory becomes socially constructed collective remembering.

In assuming sociological omnipotence, the ‘social’ dimension itself remains underscrutinised, is reified and objectified (Burr 2002; Craib 1997; Michael 1996; Schmidt 2001).

Overemphasising constructionism paints a picture of continuous change and fluidity. However some phenomena are deeply embedded or solidified and hardly change. Individuals think of themselves as integrated, singular and continuous entities (Craib 1997; Crossley 2000).

Describing a process of construction does not explain it automatically. Showing how essentialist identities are constructed, for instance, does not necessarily grapple with the present-day political reasons why they continue to be invoked and often are deeply felt (Werbner 1997b).
The ‘totalising nature’ of social constructionism raises questions about the limits of discourse. The question then becomes one of whether a focus on intersubjective processes adequately captures reality. This potentially ignores the role of power and can lead to the reification of common-sense. Focusing exclusively on discourse, limits analysis to one dimension, ignoring how discourse is located in a material context of social relations (Alasuutari 1998; Bradley 1996; Harré 1995; Reason & Rowan 1981; Reicher 1997). Cromby and Nightingale (1999:13) argue that

[...]power appears in and operates through discourse...However, unless discourse is then situated in the material, embodied context that actually gives it meaning...such analyses will remain paradoxically incapable of fully addressing their own significance...

Studying the discourse on phenomena instead of the phenomena self, focuses on ‘how is known’ rather than ‘what is known’. It is not sufficient to document discourse. In this respect Hall (Grossberg 1996b:146) argues that

[...]hile the metaphor of language is the best way of rethinking many fundamental questions, there is a kind of slippage from acknowledging its utility and power to saying that, that is really the way it is.

Although we do not live outside language and discourse, it does not exhaust social reality.

Everyday conversation is not by itself transparent or obvious because reality extends beyond the grasp of the single human subject. Discourse is linked to specific historical and institutional contexts which need to be recognised. Institutionalised discourse reflects societal structures of meaning. Framing identity within this wider context and considering the practices which flow from it, counters reductionism. According to Billig (1991), the notion of ideology allows us to see how wider patterns of society and history are reflected in the representations made by individuals. It naturalises and reinforces particular interpretations of reality, which maintains the social relations of power. Identities, conceived within an ideological framework, are inherently political. By challenging ideology, new possibilities are created as the knowledge apparatus normalising practices are questioned. Viewed in this way the tension and relationship between discourse and material inequality is considered (Augoustinos 1998; Reicher
The language of construction minimises the role of power and inequality implying a multidirectional flow of influence and agency. This claim masks the power differentials in constructing identity. Identity construction does not occur in an ideal speech community where everyone is equally able to set the agenda and reposition themselves. The ability to exercise power sets the agenda by dictating how relationships between different social agents are to be constructed at a particular time (Calhoun 1995; Greenwood 1994; Larrain 2000; Willig 1999; Wilmsen 1996).

As a remedy to the concern Mac an Ghaill (1999) argues for the development of a framework that allows the exploration of changing representations whilst taking into account the accompanying material and symbolic systems and practices. What is crucial is that social constructions have real and often significant material consequences. Materiality and meaning, though different, cannot be separated. An inherent danger of a social constructionist approach is that it can focus so much on the construction of phenomena that it neglects the material dimensions and consequences of the phenomena (Burkitt 1999; Driessen & Otto 2000; Prinsloo & de la Rey 1999; Sökefeld 1999).

A more engaged critical approach to social constructionism is developed if structural and material constraints, as well as historically grounded social, political and cultural concerns, are considered. The link between everyday discourse and social structures demonstrates that possibilities for identity construction are not limitless and cannot be viewed independently of the historical and cultural context in which it emerges. Awareness that knowledge is a social product enables researchers to consider what is revealed and concealed in discourse (Agger 1998; Bhaskar 1993; Parker 1993; Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers 1997; Weigert & Gecas 1995).

Harré (1998a:18-19) warns against “slipping (sliding) into a wholesale relativism” regarding all knowledge claims as having equal standing positing and conceptualising reality what people claim it to be. Constructionists contend their position guards
against the silencing of oppositional perspectives. However, being unable to adjudicate between discourses opens the door to ‘anything goes’ potentially sliding into moral relativism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; McIntosh 1995; Parker 1998; Rattansi 1994).

Social construction need not to be at odds with some versions of scientific realism. It has undermined a naive realist position of an external reality. Critical realists, acknowledging the social and constructed nature of understanding, concede that social reality is never fully apprehended. However, they contend some positions offer more adequate explanations than others (Blaikie 2000; Denzin & Lincoln 1994a; Hammersley 1998; Parker 2002b; Reicher 1997). Sayer (1992) concurs that realists need not be threatened by the insight that one never can lay claim to an absolute truth because this does not imply that all knowledge is equally fallible.

Reality and its correct representation is only one of the standards of judgement available, rather than being the only one according to Sampson (1993). Potter, Edwards and Ashmore (2002:75) argue “that a relativist, anti-objectivist position treats facts as inseparable from judgements.” A pragmatic, socially informed moral analysis is possible without the need to rely on universal foundational values. Some anti-foundationalists concede that not all ‘realities’ are equally acceptable. Hence a relativist position does not necessarily imply moral and political quietism. By accepting that there is no privileged position from which to stake claims he argues critical relativists open up all discourse to scrutiny. In other words, anything does not go, nor is everything equally acceptable. The realist position offers no positive alternative to the critical relativist position when it comes to dealing with political and moral questions (Denzin 2001; Potter 1997; Seidman 1994b; Spears 1997; Wetherell & Still 1998). The Stainton Rogers’ (Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers 1997:81) conclude that

though we may think and debate in the transitive world of ‘relativism’, we have to act in the substantive world as though it ‘really is’ as we construe it, and as though its ethical demands upon us have foundational ‘truth’. In our actions we will always find ourselves working (and playing) in ‘practical realities’ [emphasis in the original text].
This call for pragmatism is intended to prevent nihilism.

An intransitive (ontological) sphere implying the independent existence of structures and mechanisms can be distinguished from a transitive (epistemological) sphere constituting the conceptual materials, shaped culturally and historically, through which reality is known (Greenwood 1994; Hughes & Sharrock 1997). Bhaskar (1989:57) argues for epistemic relativity

...which asserts that all beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge is transient... [and therefore historically located but against] judgmental relativism, which asserts that all beliefs are equally valid, in the sense that there can be no (rational) grounds for preferring one to another...

Danziger (1997) suggests that social constructionism is aligned to more critical approaches within the social sciences. A critical approach can be developed by revealing how social practices constitute phenomena, determining both how reality is perceived and what is considered possible. This demonstrates that the current state of affairs is socially constructed and therefore evitable, thereby countering essentialist notions of identity which presents it as given and natural. However, demonstrating the constructed nature of reality in discourse is not an end in itself and discourse cannot be uncoupled from a material context (Bhaskar 1993; Michael 1996).

2.3.3 Concluding remarks

The emergence of social constructionist approaches have challenged and unsettled orthodox positions within the social sciences. It suggests individual and collective identity is constructed in discourse with material consequences. The degree of commitment implied by an identity as well as the imagined fraternity attributed to it can vary historically. Being sensitive to human experience reveals the diversity of affiliations, belonging and therefore the fluidity of identity. Identity is rather a relationship and process than a possession. Hence, both discourse and social practices need to be taken into account.
2.4 Conceptualising identity

The popularity and malleability of identity is attributed to the plurality of meanings attached to it. MacClancy (1993:84) observes that “identity is a catch-all term of our times”. Identity is associated with the self, subjectivity, agency on the one hand and community, nation, culture and society on the other hand. Self-consciousness and collective awareness overlap with the personal and social dimensions of identity. Such flexibility contributes to the attractiveness of identity as a general framing device for a variety of data across disciplines. Gilroy (1997:304) contends

[the] the sheer variety of ideas condensed into the concept of identity, and the wide range of issues to which it can be made to refer, foster creative links between themes and perspectives that are not conventionally associated.

However, the conceptual slipperiness is seen by others as a drawback, arguing that by attempting to cover everything identity loses analytical utility. Billig (1995:60) suggests the “watchword should be watched because it frequently explains less than it appears to”. Conceptual clarity on identity is further muddled by everyday usage reflecting some vague superficial common sense ideas.

Identity is often conceptualised in terms of a number of opposing poles (Driessen & Otto 2000; Goldenberg 1992; Weigert et al. 1986).

2.4.1 Similarity and difference

An identity is not naturally given but socially constructed through representation. All identities, whether personal or collective, draw a distinction. Fuss (1995:2) points out, “identification is the detour through the other that defines the self”. The externalisation of an ‘other’ enabling a particular identity is not a passive process. The ‘other’ can question and challenge the identity being constructed. In social relationships individuals define themselves and others and in turn are also defined (Bennet 1998; Harré 1998a; Norval 1996; Wetherell & Maybin 1996).

A particular identity exists by contrast to another identity – the ‘other’. Hall
identities are “always constituted within, not outside representation”. The distinctions constructed discursively identify traceable origins providing a collective representation. Both difference and similarity are imagined and do not imply simple correspondence with an external reality or a predetermined essence (Hall 1996; Smith 2000c; Widdicombe & Wooffitt 1995; Woodward 1997b).

The recognition of ‘similarity’ and ‘difference’ as a result of comparison enables the marking of the boundary of one identity against another. This is a social process requiring a degree of agreement for classification to occur. Classification does not equal identification. It can be contested and is open to change and repositioning. Identities are relational and do not exist in a vacuum (Crossley 2000; Gilroy 2000; Hetherington 1998; Ignatieff 1995; Sampson 1993).

In collective identities there is a double motion of associating with similarity and disassociating with difference. Drawing a boundary delineates insiders from outsiders. Identity then does not only depend on a description of what it is, but more importantly on what it is not. In this sense an identity attains a unity and purpose through the expression of sameness and otherness. An understanding of what one is not provides a sense of assurance on what one is, and thereby strengthens a sense of belonging (Agger 1998; McDonald 1993; Rew & Campbell 1999; Shore 1993; Shotter 1993a).

Dencik (2001:196) citing Bourdieu argues that emphasising difference may yield a “profit of distinction”. There are strategic reasons to rally around perceived collective similarities and ignore individual dissimilarities. Ingroup similarity (commonality) within a category is emphasised and valued whilst outgroup difference (distinction) between categories is emphasised and devalued. Where a group is dominant this yields a dividend at least in terms of status, if not in terms of material rewards. The ‘other’ is seen in categorical rather than individual terms. The similarity serves as a base for an allegiance and solidarity enabling them to stake claims collectively in the public sphere. This process implies inclusion and exclusion. In this regard an identity becomes a sense of belonging and implies a moral dependence on and commitment to others (Greenstein 1993; Mc Allister 1999; Deschamps & Devos 1998; Driessen &
According to Shotter (1993a), there is a political economy of identity, in the sense that the opportunity to access resources and thereby construct identities is not equally spread within society. Those with power dictate the grounds and meaning of categorisation. Not all distinctions are valued equally. An attempt to fix and naturalise difference creates impervious boundaries, shapes social relations and keeps the other in place maintaining a particular state of affairs. Those whose constructed characteristics are valued positively occupy a privileged position. The dynamics around identity are historically and spatially grounded in social relations (Calhoun 1995; Frow 1998; Potter 1996; Troyer & Younts 1997; Wetherell 1996).

Put simply, similarity and difference implies a double contextualisation – material and symbolic. In this respect identity is embedded in both the social structure as a lived relationship and in individual consciousness. Jenkins (1997) points out that it may be imagined, but it is not imaginary. Both the material context and the symbolic frameworks are crucial to understand the identities that emerge (Macdonald 1993).

The recognition of difference serves as a basis for labelling and identification but does not by itself sufficiently explain why an identity is taken up and maintained. There is a danger of denying agency reducing consciousness and identity formation to the effect of discourse. Although identity is constituted by discourse, discourse can be contested as social relations are organised and reorganised. Acknowledging this allows space for intentionality and agency and prevents an ‘over-determined’ view of social relations (Sapsford and Dallos 1998). Sampson (1989:6) points out, citing Giddens, that

\[
\text{[t]he person is the mediated product of society and also, in acting, reproduces and transforms society.}
\]

Discourse and the social relations within which it emerges produce subject positions which reflect the specific historical, cultural and social location in which it is located. Difference is in itself neutral. It can be viewed positively as a source of diversity, or
negatively as a basis for exclusion and marginalisation (Ignatieff 1995; Woodward 1997b).

2.4.2 Conscious and unconscious

An investment is made in a particular identity unconsciously and consciously for both affective and strategic reasons. There is a strong need for a positive sense of the self, particularly in contexts of rapid change and uncertainty (Martin 1999; Smedley 1999). Harré (1993) notes a moral career establishes the public social reputation, achieved cooperatively.

On the conscious level, identity presumes reflexive awareness. An identity is aligned to a moral space and implies responsibility for actions. On an existential level there is a need for a positive self-identity – a sense of self-worth (esteem) and respect. Taylor (1989:41) argues there is an inseparable connection “between our sense of good and our sense of self”. This is reflected in narratives of identity providing the opportunity to reflect on lives and past actions. A narrator is acutely aware of presenting the self in a morally acceptable way. What is morally acceptable depends on the prevailing standards within the society at the particular point in time (Crossley 2000; Deschamps & Devos 1998; Michael 1996; Seale 2000; Woodward 2002). According to Greenwood (1994:109), identity projects are probably

best explicated in terms of sets of moral careers ... defined as the culturally available routes for the creation and maintenance (and destruction) of personal reputation and self-worth…

According to social identity theory, the process of favouring the in-group (those similar) is a conscious result of categorisation because collective identities have important self-evaluative consequences, provide a sense of security and enhance collective self-esteem when positively valued. There is in this respect a commitment to a positively projected self- and collective identity. On a collective level individuals seek to maintain the status of the group they associate with. In this regard identity narratives often legitimise the devaluation of the other who can be characterised as deviant, marginalising the outgroup, whilst simultaneously valorising the ingroup as
good and moral (Benson 2001; Brah 1992; Frow 1998; Hogg et al. 1995; Martin 1993; Sampson 1999). Werbner (1997a) argues that collective actors construct the meaning and underlying moral values of who they are relationally and socially.

Psychodynamic approaches make a useful contribution by paying close attention to the powerful unconscious emotional ties that are created at psychological and social level. Ignatieff (1995:17) refers to Freud’s conception of the “narcissism of minor differences” which turns trivial difference into a mirror, splitting the ‘other’ off. A related and useful concept here to explain some of the dynamics at collective level is that of projection. Psychodynamicists argue that negative qualities of the self/ingroup are projected onto the other/outgroup in this process. The scapegoating and undervaluation of the other can be a result of negative feelings being projected onto them. This solidifies boundaries and establishes powerful feelings of strangeness and hostility (Blok 2000; Britzman 1997; Dalal 2002; Manganyi 1991; Richards 1989; Volger 2000).

The dialectics of similarity and difference and internal and external processes underlie the formation of both individual and collective identities. It is therefore not surprising that Rattansi (1994) refers to self-regarding (us/insider) and other-regarding (them/outsider) discourse and practices.

2.4.3 Coherence and fragmentation, stability and fluidity, singularity and multiplicity

The dislocation experienced as a result of globalisation has contributed to a growing awareness of the impact of contingency on identity (Norval 1993; Venn 1999; Wilkinson 1997). Calhoun (1995:221) observes a

tension between identity – putatively singular, unitary, and integral – and identities – plural, crosscutting, and divided – [and argues that this] is inescapable at both individual and collective levels.

Biography assumes reflexive awareness implying temporal continuity and sameness within the constraints of the material and social situation. Curt (1994:74) comments
the experience of being a subject is itself ‘subject’ to a double tectonic – it is constructed within a construction. Identity narratives as public representations organise and interpret experience suggesting coherence and unity making relationships intelligible. This coherence enabling consciousness is a necessary fiction rather than a reflection of an essential core. The interplay between biography (privatised and individual) and history (implying consensus) are intertwined narratives which attend to changing circumstances and therefore are continually recast. Identity is discursively realised and imagined. It is historically specific and changeable (Hodgkiss 2001; Potter 1996; Sennett 2001; Werbner 1996). Gilroy (1997:303) points out that “the thresholds between sameness and difference are not fixed: they can be moved”.

Individuals manage their identity in their everyday lives in social relations. Goffman (1971) describes how the self is managed within social contexts and social relations suggesting that actions play a key role. The degree of fluidity suggests identity is emergent, entailing a process of becoming rather than being a property. It is never finalised or fixed (Taylor 1989; Woodward 2002). Le Pere and Lamprechts (1999:24) suggest that “[i]dentity is always en route rather than rooted”.

It becomes more appropriate to refer to discourse, meanings and memories which form the basis of identification within a given context. Memory, like meaningfulness, is constructed. Hence remembering does not simply provide access to the past as it was. Although identities are socially constructed and therefore contestable, inherently unstable and changeable, they are embedded in social relations that persist and evolve over time. The fluidity of identity does not imply that coherence is not attainable (Bell 1999; Castells 1997; Stevens 1996b; Tisenkopfs 2001; Venn 1999).

Bradley (1996:7) argues that social reality reveals two faces, “continuity within change; order within variability [and] fixity within fluidity.” There is both robustness, a stability enabling recognisability, and instability enabling change to identity. In this respect stability is continually reproduced and does not imply an absolute immutable essence but is rather an attempt at countering uncertainty (Norval 2000; Woodward
An infinite number of interconnections and relationships are possible within social reality. Hall (1992) plays on this fluidity with his notion of a postmodern subject. This raises the question of how people negotiate the multiple aspects of their selves. Any person can mobilise different collective identities in everyday life depending on the context. Given this complexity of everyday life, there is a plurality of contested arenas – each with its own identity possibilities and experiences implying multiple forms of belonging. This makes the idea of a single overarching identity that ‘fits’ these diverse experiences, tenuous (Burkitt 1991; Ignatieff 1995; Van Beek 2000; Werbner 1996; Wetherell & Maybin 1996). In this respect Agger (1998:53) contends that

people are seen as dispersed into a wide variety of subject positions from which they speak polyvocally about their experiences and meanings... and multiple subject positions.

Related to the notion of diversity, plurality or a multiplicity of identities is the notion that identity is incomplete and fragmented at both collective and individual level. Multiplicity can lead to overlapping and contradictory loyalties and obligations, hence fragmentation. The fiction of a collective identity being homogenous is a further complicating factor (McDonald 1993; Van Beek 2000).

Nevertheless, there is a quest for a degree of coherence, stability and singularity. In this respect Wetherell (1996:305) contends that

[w]hat is made, specifically, is coherence, intelligibility, and liveability of one’s social relations through time... According to this view, when people ‘make’ their identities they are attempting to develop positions which might relate to their current lives to what has gone before, rendering the past, the present and the future plausible and meaningful.

Out of the multiplicity, fluidity and fragmentation of subjectivity, singularity, stability and coherence is continually constructed.
According to Harré (1998a), the self is a (fictional) site from which the world is perceived and acted on. It is in this respect that we consider the ability of the self to actively manage identities in different contexts. The multiplicity of contexts experienced in modernity with a plurality of social identities and fracturing of experience encourages the emergence of a strong sense of individual or personal identity (a self) as a sense of location in terms of biography. Self-identity is reflexively realised by considering both subjectivity and agency. People usually see themselves as the same person in all their interactions, in spite of the different contexts they find themselves in and the different positions they consciously take in these (Castells, 1997; Greenwood 1994; Sökefeld 1999; Stevens & Wetherell 1996; Weigert et al. 1986). Thomas (1996:320) argues that

[it may be that the unitary self – our identity – is a defensive construction whose function is to provide a sense of continuity. [emphasis in original text]

Discourse, structurally rooted in a particular historical and social context, encourages individuals to see these communal ties as natural and inevitable, making sense of the present. Once these meanings are internalised by social actors, they become identities (Castells 1997; Craib 1998). In this regard Dencik (2001:216) argues that

individuals typically belong to several different social categories and thereby have access to a wide potential repertoire of latent identities. Each individual is unique with respect to which frameworks of belonging are combined to make up the person’s narrative identity. The individual is at the same time identical with several others and unique through his or her unique combination of identifications with possible others...

Identity implies both uniqueness in terms of personal lives and sameness in terms of collective membership. The subjective dimension refers to the individual’s awareness of identity, whereas the objective dimension refers to the structural relationships in which identity is embedded.

Identity is formed and sustained in this ongoing reflexive process. Stories are constitutive of the self. Narratives create what they reflect upon. In this respect they
are not neutral, draw on memory and pass judgement on the self. First order lived experience is revealed by second-order reflection. The retelling engages with our presentness in relation to what we have been (the past as presently understood) and what we are becoming (the anticipated future). The narrative is not simply a story, it is situated action with the purpose to create, sustain or alter a social relationship between the self, other and community. There is generally the need to present the self as a morally responsible agent and therefore to justify actions taken (Denzin 2001; Gergen 1993; Hermans & Kempen 1993; Martin 1993; Richardson 1990; Stevens 1996b). Watson (1996:261) citing Johnson (1983) indicates that

> individuals reconstruct their self-images and personal histories in the light of recent and current happenings and strive to keep them in “good repair”.

Shotter (1993b) argues that there are interlocking narratives and that a person is ultimately known by relationships to others. The narrative therefore, in part, depends on how the ‘author’ is situated within society, and this impacts on how experience is constructed. Since there is always more than one possible narrative, past events and experiences can be reinterpreted and rearranged in the light of the present and anticipated future. The past can therefore be remodelled in the present in the process through which an identity is created. This does not mean that the impact of the past on identity is denied, it supplies the ‘raw materials’ for an identity, but that in laying claim to a past, it is transformed and reconstructed. The construction of collective identity in opposition to an ‘other’ often relies on a search for a shared history through memory, myth and narrative and can actively invoke a powerful social reality (Reicher & Hopkins 2001; Spears 1997; Stevens 1996a; Woodward 1997b). Ibáñez (1997:31) points out that “the past acquires some of the characteristics of the actual future coming to pass.”

What should be apparent from this discussion is that the self as narrative emerges in interaction and therefore cannot be disentangled from social relations. Valentine (1998: paragraph 1.1) is of the opinion that

> there is a relative neglect of the way in which selves are collectively constructed against others [emphasis in original text].
Social relations themselves are structurally rooted and therefore constrain current actions. Whilst the self is a locus for understanding, it should be remembered that the self is first an awareness that is sustained through social relations. There can therefore be no autonomous self without the other and no self separate from the social or public domain. Narratives on the self are therefore about selves and others and embedded in social relations.

2.4.5 Contextually determined and situationally emergent

Although individual actors play a role in constructing their identities, this is always done within a social context. The cultural attributes and symbols available at a particular point that are given priority are used to construct an identity which provides meaning to actors and frames their experiences. The existing social relationships provide a framework within which identities can be expressed (Larrain 2000). Wetherell (1996:303) points out that

[t]he makings of past generations directly affect at a material level the kind of person one can be, and they enter into the narratives, internal voices and dialogues which constitute the subjectivity and consciousness of current generations.

Yet the process of identity formation is not a mere replication as societies also change (Gilroy 1997; Weigert et al. 1986). Benson (2001:4) contends

who you are is a function of where you are, of where you have been and of where you hope to arrive.

Identities are situational, depending on the context and relationships in which they are embedded. The social context, in particular social interaction, therefore, foregrounds a particular identity. Social relations are defined in terms of the cultural attributes that specify the primary identity. Such an identity then provides a sense of security. Asserting an identity is necessary, but not sufficient. The identity as it is projected has to be acknowledged by others (Bell 1999; Garner 1997; Jenkins 1997; Johanssen 2000; Rew & Campbell 1999; Spears 1997).
Insecurity as a result of change may lead individuals to seek comfort within the confines of a stable collective identity. Identity politics entails convincing people that a particular dimension is primary. Alienation and resentment at exclusion has, within the context of identity politics, resulted in the emergence of resistance identities. The question remains whether such identities would emerge in a post-apartheid South Africa. A rejection of the identity projected by the nation-state may lead a minority to seek refuge within the local community (Castells 1996; Castells 1997).

2.4.6 Concluding remarks

Identity is social, relational and multidimensional. There is a complex interplay between personal identity and collective identity. This complexity makes it difficult to fully grasp identity from one perspective or approach.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to provide a preliminary working definition of identity in order to provide a general orientation to this study. First, the interest in identity in contemporary social science was discussed. This growing interest in identity across disciplines within social science was attributed to historical processes within societies and theoretical developments in disciplines. The impact of the emergence of modern states on the conceptualisation of collective identity and the accompanying political processes were considered to illustrate the interplay between reality and theorising. Increasing individualisation, commodification and fragmentation of identity within the context of modernity and globalisation was considered. Second, the contribution of social constructionism as a theoretical approach focusing on interaction and modes of self-reference as a way in which the meaningfulness of everyday life is discursively constituted was considered. Third, the conceptual complexity of identity as relational was dealt with.

The debates within this chapter suggest that the process of identity formation is complex. There are many layers to identity. It can be personally appropriated and/or
socially bestowed. This suggests a positioning in social relations implying a link between the individual and collective dimensions of social life. An identity cannot be divorced from the context in which it is embedded and is closely connected to experience and subjectivity from which it obtains its meaning. Belonging implies reflecting on who we are and what our relationships to others entail.

An identity is neither fixed nor singular. It does not transcend space or time. One is then not merely positioned retrospectively by an identity. It is possible to position and reconstruct an identity (Hall 1996). In this respect Britzman (1997:31) comments that

identity is not the sum of singular and conscious acts but rather a social relationship caught up – even if it catches itself – in the detours of history, memory, and communities.

Viewed in this way identity suggests a process of becoming, fluidity and change.

Focusing on identity allows reflection on the interface between subjective experiences and the broader historical and cultural settings within which these are embedded. Whilst these subjective experiences are individual and private, their meaning is socially determined and public. The public and private are reciprocal, constituting dimensions implying both social and psychic investment. Hence identity formation is simultaneously sociohistorical and subjective (Mama 1995). The formation of collective identity is considered with regard to race in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Considering race – conceptual debates

3.1 Introduction

I have suggested in the preceding chapter that people experience multiple, and relatively fluid identifications in their lives. Race, gender, class, language, religion and sexuality all imply forms of social differentiation, fracturing experience. The forms of social differentiation that are salient depend on the context. A singular collective identification does not correspond to the totality of individual social experience in a complex and changing social reality. Identity is not a simple additive process either. Where one collective identity intersects with another one experience is transformed (Agger 1998; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller & Thomas 1995; Mason 1996a; Van Beek 2000; Weis, Proweller & Centrie 1997). According to McIntyre (1997:4), a matrix of interlocking relationships and positionalities “function to both conceal and illuminate our understandings of ourselves and others”.

In this chapter I discuss three distinct sections dealing with race. In section 3.2 I endeavour to provide a theoretical underpinning on race. In section 3.3 I deal with the construct ‘whiteness’ and how this contributes to the understanding of race. In section 3.4 I deal with how perceptions of race are surfaced in social discourse and how political changes and other factors impact on this discourse.

DuBois (2005), a driving force behind the first Pan African Congress held in London in 1900, predicted race would be a key concern of the twentieth century at its beginning. The prediction on the importance of racial matters continues to be applicable to the twenty-first century. Racial classification still has a profound impact on the structuring of modern societies and opportunities within them. The inclusion and exclusion race brings about in society is prominent in numerous conflicts across the world currently, making it a subject of public debate and academic scrutiny. Questions of race, ethnicity and nationalism are often linked to notions of biology, culture and language. Race and associated concepts denoting forms of belonging are regarded key sociological concerns in analysing the nature of social relations in
contemporary societies. The focus on race does not imply that no other significant social relations or bases for identity exist. Race is often prioritised over other potential bases of identity shaping relations as a result of the salience of a racial consciousness (Calhoun 1995; Essed 1996; Smith 2002; Solomos & Back 1996a; Stanfield 1993b; Woodward 2002).

Race is ubiquitous, a taken for granted, self-evident common feature of everyday life in racially saturated societies where race is regarded as primordial, and is deeply embedded in institutions and discourse. Racial distinction as a base of sameness and/or otherness is constantly reinforced and reproduced in these circumstances (Ayers 1997; Solomos & Back 1996b; Taylor 2004). Several scholars use denial quotation marks\(^1\) to remind readers that ‘race’ is socially constructed. They emphasise that it is problematic to essentialise or reify race as a given or fixed entity (Miles 1989; Miles 1993; Wetherell & Potter 1992). Goldberg (1993:80) points out that

\[
\text{[r]ace is not a static concept with a single sedimented meaning. Its power has consisted in its adaptive capacity to define population groups and, by extension, social agents as self and other at various historical moments. It has thus facilitated the fixing of characterisations of inclusion and exclusion, imparting social relations an apparent specificity otherwise lacking.}
\]

Debates around race raise enduring questions within both the social and political realms in societies. At issue are complex matters involving power differentials and political interests. Questions of identity remain central to discussions about race and aligned concepts within contemporary scholarship. Identity, difference and inequality within society have been dealt with in the preceding chapter. It is through the process of contestation that identities based on race gain social meaning (Grillo & Wildman 1995; Outlaw 2001; Stone 1995 Winant 1994). Gandy (1998) suggests race is salient in instances where negative outcomes are expected. According to Solomos (2001) race becomes a political resource

\[
\text{that can be used by both dominant and subordinate groups for the purpose of legitimizing and furthering their own social identities and interests.}
\]

\(^1\) Whilst I agree that race is socially constructed, I have decided against using denial quotations in the text as this tends to become cumbersome.
This chapter focuses on the conceptual debates surrounding race. Whilst I am mindful of the caveats that there is no singular collective identification – race has been contextually one of the primary divisions arising in the emerging South African society, as chapter four will demonstrate. The recent shift in power within society unsettled the position white South Africans enjoyed within the society. It is assumed that the white South Africans interviewed in this study will raise matters relating to race in their conversations on social change. Many scholars have viewed South African society as racially saturated, making race and aligned collective identities a key element of their analyses (Adam & Moodley 1986; Cell 1982; Giliomee & Schlemmer 1989; Schutte 1995; Steyn 1999).

This chapter endeavours to provide a theoretical underpinning on race. In section 3.2 debates within the social sciences on the nature and utility of using the concept race and associated terminology are considered. These debates provide a foundation for the recent interest in studies on whiteness. The context in which such studies have arisen as well as the contribution they make to understanding racialised identities is considered in section 3.3. In section 3.4 the way in which race may figure in discursive contexts is briefly considered.

3.2 Race

In this section I explore the development of thinking on race and associated concepts. I discuss the shifting meaning of race over time. First, the impact of the colonial context is explored and the accompanying pseudo-science of race is described. White superiority and the normalisation of racial thinking and racist articulation are discussed. This is achieved by considering the historical and social contexts and their impact on the meaning assigned to race. The meaning of race as a product of social construction and discourse is dealt with as well as contemporary scientific debates on race. Finally the section looks at movement away from the biological encoding of ‘otherness’ to the cultural encoding of ‘otherness’ and the more prominent role of ethnicity in assigning meaning to race. The impact of this is seen in current discourse
in which direct reference to race is socially unacceptable and race is alluded to in much more subtle ways.

3.2.1 Studying race within the social sciences and humanities

Disciplines such as sociology and anthropology have paid attention to questions of race and ethnicity within a context of collective identity. Recently questions of race and a range of related topics associated with it have expanded across disciplinary boundaries in contemporary social science and the humanities (Chapman, McDonald & Tonkin 1989; Goldberg & Solomos 2001; Solomos & Back 1996a).

There is a proliferation of theoretical approaches within this burgeoning body of scholarship. Evolutionary and sociobiological approaches, feminism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, psychodynamics and social constructionism have extended the questions asked about race and the way these matters are thought about. Numerous empirical studies on race and related concepts dealing with diverse historical and geographical contexts have added to the extensive literature on the topic. Within the context of these disciplinary developments it has become necessary to consider the broad range of theoretical trends around race and concepts associated with it (Alhuwalia 2001; Frye 2001; Manganyi 1991; Rattansi 1997; Stewart & Hurtado 1997; Van den Berghe 2001).

It is impossible to explore the range of positions and extensive debates on theorising race and the concepts aligned to it fully. The meaning of race and conceptual tools to analyse it are contested and extensively debated within the social sciences and humanities. The debate on the appropriateness and status of terminology raises key ontological and epistemological questions on the difficulties questions of race pose within the contexts of modernity and postmodernity. I will consider this briefly without becoming sidetracked in the abstract debate and terminological minefield around race and aligned concepts. One concern some scholars have expressed is that textual and cultural analysis has deflected attention away from the material and institutional domains (Dalal 2002; Gilroy 1999; Rattansi 1995; Solomos 2001).
Overemphasising the discursive domain reduces race to conscious understandings deflecting attention from social practices and the structural context in which they emerge. It is crucial to pay attention to the social interests mobilised, marked out, differentiated in this process of representation, distinguishing between an ‘us’ and ‘them’. A key question then is what social phenomena and social relations of difference are captured by the term (Gilroy 2000; Lopez 1995; Omi & Winant 1994; Stanfield 1993b).

3.2.2 The shifting meaning of race

In Spanish the use of ‘raza’ is linked to the era of European exploration commencing in the fourteenth century. Race has been used since the sixteenth century in English (Schwarz et al. 1988).

A number of scholars contend the emergence of nation-states, imperial expansion and colonisation during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries profoundly influenced the meaning attributed to race, culture and society. The emergence of nation-states has been discussed in the preceding chapter (see section 2.2.1). Within this context race initially was used to refer to subordinate sections within these metropolitan societies or to the character of competing states (Appiah 1992; Balibar 1991b; Miles 1989; Solomos & Back 1996a).

Kushnic (1998) refers to these forms of usage and the accompanying ‘internal colonisation’. Many of the stereotypes the English elite attributed to the working class and/or Irish were at a later stage attributed to both the Afrikaners and Africans within particular contexts of colonisation. Several studies have considered how marginalised immigrants to the United States such as the Irish ‘whitened’ themselves over time (Pieterse 1996).

Race figured prominently within the context of colonial domination where questions of commonality and difference arose against the backdrop of variation in physical
appearance. The frontier situation, conflict to control resources, coercive labour practices, and exploitation shaped relations during colonisation. It reflected the asymmetric relations of power between the occident and other regions. Stereotypical images of the other were shaped by relations in the colonial context and figured prominently within public discourse in the metropolitan societies as well (Miles 1993; Mills 1997; Rex 1983; Sampson 1993; Sartre 2001).

The notion of dividing humanity in discrete biologically based categories emerged in the mid-eighteenth century providing powerful determinist explanations rooted in the inevitable ‘natural order’ of things. Racial classification during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became rooted in a pseudo-scientific appeal to biological essentialism fixing difference. Discourse took on the form of descriptions and valuations of attributes. Behavioural characteristics such as temperament, qualities such as intellect and even issues of morality such as sexual appetite were erroneously attributed to these categories distinguished on the basis of visible somatic distinctions arbitrarily selected. These characteristics were assumed to be inbred and unalterable. Physiognomy was applied. The ‘other’ was negatively and stereotypically evaluated, imposing race on them. Notions of maintaining racial purity and guarding against miscegenation prevailed within this context (Feagin, Vera & Batur 2001; McDonald 1993; Woodward 1997a). Goldberg (1996), citing Fanon, indicates those raced as ‘other’ were overdetermined and reduced to one superficial dimension, implying a negation. Put differently, blacks (used in a more inclusive sense here) were regarded to be black in relation to whites.

Although race presented itself as the embodiment of physical difference, it remained linked to the cultural and historical context. The pseudo-science of race was based on spurious essentialist biological notions which fed beliefs on the superiority of the dominant group and the inferiority of marginalised groups. It is during this period that the political institutionalisation of racial inequality was justified scientifically, legitimating exclusion and discrimination. During the nineteenth century the notion of white superiority was generally accepted in a context of European political domination and transnational expansion and not questioned (Ashcroft 2001;
Boonzaier 1988; Dubow 1987; Stepan 1982; Wade 2002; Wieviorka 1995). Banton (1996:38), referring to this period, contends

the idiom of race reflected the power of whites to describe non-whites as biologically inferior.

Increasingly racial thinking and racist articulation was normalised and naturalised throughout modernity. With race taken for granted it was applied in the context of colonial expansion presenting relations as inevitable. Western modernity then dictated the most common modes by which differences were drawn and understood. A western identity emerged by marginalising and stereotyping the ‘other’ (Appiah 1992; Goldberg 2002; Fanon 1967a; Said 1994).

3.2.3 The legacy of a pseudo-science – notions of race in commonsense

The meaningfulness of skin colour is regarded self-evident in raced societies. Other visually observable clues such as facial features and hair are used in conjunction with skin colour to distinguish between people. These features serve as signifiers of commonality with regard to other underlying characteristics (Schmitt 1996).

In everyday discourse the meaning of race seems obvious and remains unquestioned as a result of the institutionalisation of racial categorisation in society and the accompanying internalisation of it during socialisation. Discourse drawing on biological and genetic claims imposes an essence. This fixes difference, placing race beyond historical processes and social action, normalising and naturalising the prevailing social order and interests (Barot 1996; Delgado 1995; Essed 1991; Grossberg 1996c; Kramer 1997). Omi and Winant (1994:60) contend

[r]ace becomes “common sense” – a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world. A vast web of racial projects mediated between the discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on the one hand and the institutional and organisational forms in which it is routinized and standardised on the other [hand].

Race is presented as foundational, representing a universal, immutable and inevitable distinction to which particular rights and privileges are attached by the dominant
group benefiting materially and/or symbolically from it. In the preceding chapter I have indicated how emphasising difference potentially yields a dividend. The valorisation of whiteness and denigration of blackness provided a racial tithe in the same way as men enjoy a patriarchal dividend in terms of their status (Augoustinos & Reynolds 2001; Blok 2000; Carling 1996; Kushnick 1998; Sampson 1999).

In spite of these commonsense notions of racial distinctions, the variability of these observable physical traits have allowed a number of people to ‘pass’ as belonging to another racial group on the basis of their appearance, contrary to their official classification. Such passing enables them to access more favourable social conditions and demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the classification. In a racially closed society such as apartheid-era South Africa, where belonging to a community and access to privileges depended on race, a number of reclassifications occurred annually (Gabriel 1998; Smith 2002; West 1988).

People act in accordance with commonsense beliefs resulting in a lived experience of race. Viewed in this way, the meaning of race is the product of social interaction. The notion race continues to retain social relevance in everyday life as a frame of reference for making sense of diversity and directing routine social interaction contrary to scientific evidence that race cannot biologically or genetically be fixed (see the discussion in the next section). It is therefore made ‘real’ without necessarily being ‘true’. In this regard the myth of race rooted biologically becomes central to people’s sense of themselves and others socially, implying interests around which people can organise. Since race directs daily practices, it has real consequences (Augoustinos 1998; Kramer 1997; Miles 1989; Maynard 2001).

3.2.4 Contemporary scientific debates on race

An established body of scientific evidence in genetics reveals the superficial nature of racial difference and its spuriousness. Current genetic understanding of human diversity suggests a single human ‘gene pool’ containing numerous alleles for each trait. Diversity is simply allelic differences (alternative forms of the same gene) and
allele frequencies amongst populations. The amount of genetic diversity existing within a population compared to the amount of genetic diversity between populations is then of importance when considering race. It is apparent that racial taxonomies based on somatic traits to determine types impose a false unity on categories. The variation between racial categories identified in this way is too minor to have taxonomic significance in a biological sense. The genetic variation within races remains larger than between them. Such taxonomies do not only fail to establish mutually exclusive types, they cannot even identify a single unique trait for each racial category (Gilroy 2000; Outlaw 2001; van den Berghe 2001).

Historicising racial identity reveals that it is socially constructed and the consequence of particular relations of power and social practices. The considerable change in meaning attributed to race from this period to the present problematises the transhistorical essentialism attached to race in everyday discourse. An awareness of these processes undermines the apparent autonomy and stability associated with a racial identity preventing reification. A more detailed analysis of colonial contexts, in spite of shared similarities, reveals diversity in the way racial matters have been dealt with. The key point they demonstrate is that ‘racing’ others has not exclusively depended on somatic traits. This implies that historical and social contexts shape the form race takes rather than viewing these ideas of otherness as either unique to the period or fixed in absolute terms (Wallerstein 1991).

The diverse ways in which phenotypical differences have been understood historically and situationally further demonstrates the indeterminancy and fluidity of racial categories and undermines the fixity associated with it. As Miles (1989:71) observes

> The fact that only certain physical characteristics are signified to define ‘races’ in specific circumstances indicates that we are not investigating a given, natural division of the world’s population, but the application of historically and culturally specific meanings to the totality of human physiological variation. This is made equally evident when we consider the historical record which demonstrates that populations now defined as ‘white’ have in the past been defined as distinct ‘races’. Thus, the use of the word ‘race’ to label the groups so distinguished by such features is an aspect of the social construction of reality: ‘races’ are socially imagined rather than biological realities.
Banton (1998) identifies a number of overlapping ways race has been expressed and valued historically. Conceptualising race as designation, linage, type, subspecies, status, class, bureaucratic-administrative category and social construct offers different explanations accounting for human diversity. An awareness of this variability counters presentism in analysis and usage.

This has led to an intense debate within social science on whether race can be used as an analytical construct (see section 3.2.1). The paradox lies between the fictitiousness of race and its enduring consequences. On the one hand where actors’ commonsense accounts are privileged epistemologically, there is the danger of potentially reifying race as a concrete objective phenomenon, thereby sustaining the ideological beliefs and legitimisation associated with it and undermining progressive politics. On the other hand regarding race as an illusion and dismissing it as merely epiphenomenal, potentially abandons an analysis of the form in which identity claims are made and difference demarcated discursively. Yet viewing race as socially constructed implies that a prevailing discourse of difference can be challenged and changed through social action (Mason 1996a; Roediger 1994; Solomos & Back 1996a).

In spite of current scientific evidence questioning the merit of linking certain attributes to appearance people still act in accordance with the assumptions they make regarding different racial groups (Frederickson 1997). For social scientists attention shifts to how race is socially constructed within as well as shape material conditions. Uncovering the constructedness of race does not explain it and demonstrating this is inadequate to counter its consequences. The debate around race is then not whether it is imaginary or really exists but rather what it accomplishes through the way it is manifested. Although race has no ‘reality’ beyond perception, the commonsense belief in its existence is a social fact resulting in socially significant practices as a result, becoming a force of its own. Racial categories then have more to do with politics and the distribution of resources than with science. Andersen (1999:8) contends

Racial formation is an ideological process, legitimized by the state, supported
by economic exploitation, and sustained through group social psychology.

Race consequently can only be understood within a social and historical context. It entails more than classification and the way in which race is used in society should be understood in relation to how society is structured. It is not the physical features, but the social significance attached to them that are crucial. Such categorisation reflects that relations of power are not a neutral process. Differences are accorded social significance and the accompanying opportunities and inequalities justified discursively (Bernasconi 2001a; Supriya 1999). People designated as belonging to a particular race then tend to share material and social experiences as a result of the classification and accompanying social relations. Chapman et al. (1989:2) argue that

> [a]cts of naming, and the classificatory, cognitive, and symbolic niceties surrounding these, are immediately implicated in the most trenchant material and political realities.

It is the ideological and discursive baggage that accompanies race as a description of human difference that is important to social scientists. A commonsense belief in the reality of race legitimises it as an object of study. Although race seems to have considerable explanatory power in everyday discourse, linked to notions of natural and inherited characteristics, it does not provide explanation in a scientific sense. Fuss (1995:14) argues

> [r]acial identity and racist practice alike are forged through bonds of identification

and that this is always embedded within politics.

### 3.2.5 Race and associated concepts

Bekker (1996) argues that racial consciousness becomes an important marker in the context of domination and stratification. Apartheid, as an ideology of racial difference, set out to obscure the relations of domination and exploitation whilst encouraging separatism. Sharp (1988a) charts the shifting discourse of domination in apartheid South Africa which attempted to legitimise the worldview of social reality held by the dominant group in society and maintain the ranking of social categories
within society against mounting resistance. He traces a shift in usage from race to ethnicity to technocratic terms, emphasising the continued underlying racial base which were camouflaged to some extent to counter rising resistance to the system. It should be apparent that it is not always possible to distinguish race from other concepts closely associated to it.

An identity becomes more salient where politics privilege or threaten it. The subjugated develop their discourse on race and ethnicity within a context of domination and exclusion. Redefining racial and/or ethnic categories as an oppositional identity on which solidarity can be built explains their retention by the subjugated (Gilroy 2000; Pieterse 1996; Wilmsen 1996). Smith (2002:40) cites Patricia de Lille who in reflecting on her own growing political awareness, said “I was obsessed with identity. I wanted something to give meaning to the way I saw myself”. She explains that in her case she opted for a broader Africanness rather than the narrow confines of a particular ethnic identity. There was, as we will see in the next chapter a period where black was used by the subjugated in a more inclusive sense.

Researching race and ethnicity often implies researching class as these categorisations are often stratified in society according to Bekker (1996). Class-based concerns are crucial in the way in which the racial groups perceive each other. This shapes both minority and majority identity, especially in the context of apartheid where a shared class experience formed a key part of minority experience (Anthias 1990; Greenstein 1993; Wilmsen 1996). Assessing South Africa, Manganyi (1991) contends race had a more profound impact on life experiences and social interaction than class.

Ethnicity assumes a bond between people, underpinned by a shared way of life, values, cultural practices, language, history and common destiny. Such a distinction always is made in relation to another group². Collective memories related to these matters potentially provide a social basis of enduring significance depending on the

² The next chapter considers how Afrikaansness was demarcated in relation to Englishness as well as to the myths underpinning the notion of a ‘volk’ (peoplehood). The extent to which some interviewees still remain attached to the ‘received wisdom’ of these beliefs is evident in their conversations, reported in chapters six and seven.
social and political conditions. Laying claim to a shared past implies rights in the present (Cashmore & Troyna 1990; Fenton 1999; Verkuyten, de Jongh & Masson 1995; Werbner 1997a). Banton (1983) compares the commonality, identification and inclusion positively associated with ethnicity to the difference, disassociation and exclusion negatively associated with race.

Shared ethnic origins imply relatedness. Although these origins are presented in absolute terms, they are socially imagined and constructed. The cultural differences, whether real or imagined, are often treated in dominant discourse as fixed. Balibar (1991a:22) argues that

\[ \textit{culture can also function like a nature}, \text{ and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin [emphasis in original text].} \]

When ethnicity becomes a basis of a social identity it implies an allegiance and social relationships, fulfilling a need of belonging and solidarity on a psychological level retaining continuity as a result of deep-seated investment in these differences, however minor they are in actual terms. Closer inspection has revealed the contingency of these identities (Ignatieff 1995; Jenkins 1997; Vail 1989; Van der Berghe 2001).

Recent conflicts have reminded scholars that ethnicity mobilised in a context of nationalism is no less innocuous than race. The extent to which racial and/or ethnic boundaries are fixed, impassable and exclusionary depends on the social, economic and political context. Either race or ethnicity or a combination can become socially salient, shaping both individual and collective identity. The beliefs associated with these distinctions become widely shared and invested (Barot 1996; Bradley 1996; Britzman 1997; Calhoun 1995; Rex 1986).

Wilmsen (1996) suggests ethnic politics arises within contexts of marginality. An ethno-nationalist conception of the South African society prevailed under apartheid where the dominant group defined the other. The purpose of ideology as ‘received
wisdom’ constructs a coherent view of the past, legitimising and maintaining prevailing practices. Such an official totalising system of categorisation then does not merely reflect a reality – it constitutes it (Sharp 1988b). Gilroy (2000:33) argues the role of culturalist notions in the consolidation and development of Apartheid in South Africa ought to be obvious.

Goodwin and Schiff (1995) contend, whilst in the past it was difficult for Afrikaners, in particular, to condemn apartheid, such condemnation now is common. As late as the transitional period within the South African society, when a new post-apartheid order was being negotiated, Hauptfleish (1990) working with essentialised notions of groups argues that preference and discrimination were natural responses to protect and ensure the survival of an ‘own’ group.

The intense debate within social science on the analytic status of race as an explanatory construct and its consequent validation applies to the use of ethnicity as well. The paradox lies between its fictitiousness and the existential and experiential reality it provides. Ethnic identifications then should not be regarded as merely epiphenomenal (Comaroff 1996; Norval 1996; Pieterse 1996).

3.2.6 Race, racism and the cultural turn

A discourse of race maintains the system and cannot be divorced from the political contests within the particular society. Discussing issues of race frequently requires considering racism, a persistent and complex problem in many societies. Attributing a negatively evaluated characteristic or behaviour of an individual to members of a social category or imagining that members of a social category inherently have negatively evaluated biologically determined characteristics implies racism. Miles (1989) argues for maintaining a distinction between intention and consequence. Racism is best viewed as an ideology in which race holds common sense credibility. Such an ideology, justifying differential treatment based on assumed superiority, emerges within particular social and historical circumstances maintaining the position of privilege through exclusion. A consequence of the ideology is the subsequent
practice of discrimination, although not all discrimination is the consequence of racism (Adam et al. 1997; Taylor 2004; Wellman 1993).

Miles in Cashmore (1988) suggests racism must be decoupled from an exclusive biological referent. He argues though black people have been the target of such beliefs there are other social and political modalities in which racism has emerged historically. Dalal (2002), whilst agreeing racism is not exclusively expressed by whites, argues it seems most pervasive in white dominated societies at this historical juncture, with blacks consequently bearing the greatest burden. Appiah (1992:14) points out that

\[
\text{[m]any people who express extrinsic racist beliefs – many white South Africans, for example – are beneficiaries of the social orders that deliver advantages to them in “virtue” of their race…}
\]

Dubow (1987) points out with reference to an earlier period, that the shamelessness of racist discourse is quite stark. Ndebele (1998) suggests expressing prejudice became routine. Hence, white people were expected to display their superiority in discourse. Steyn (1999) agrees, indicating that racism was a moral virtue at the height of apartheid.

The moral advantage associated with white domination and racist expression in South Africa became tarnished over time as a sustained international campaign against racial discrimination gained momentum. These pressures led to a number of reforms within the South African context aimed at softening apartheid whilst retaining power. Sharp (1988a) refers to the shifts in the public discourse within apartheid South Africa as the policy was increasingly condemned internationally. Presently, such overt expressions of racism are now frowned upon and considered taboo within the contemporary social and political context (Goldberg 2002; Rapley 2001).

Within a context of decolonisation the dominance of an occidental discourse on race has been challenged increasingly. Solomos and Back (1996a) argue against the background of these trends that the social relevance of race within contemporary...
societies is changing. Increasingly race is collapsed into a naturalised cultural difference within a context where the biological determinism underpinning it is discredited. This reconfiguration of the politics of representation suggests an increasing ambivalence and complexity in racialised identities, where otherness becomes recoded culturally rather than biologically. It raises a question about how race is linked to ethnicity which refers to cultural homogeneity as well as how race and ethnicity are interpreted in contemporary contexts. Consequently discourse on difference currently tends to be expressed in more neutral terms (Gabriel 1998).

There has been a turn towards studying identity and culture in the literature on race and racism recently. Crude racist language based on discredited notions of biological superiority and inferiority (the old vocabulary of racism) elicits public condemnation in a context where changing norms condemn overt expression of bigotry as taboo. There is consequently a wide-spread rejection of blatant forms of racism. The use of codes or euphemisms in discourse then aims to circumvent accusations of racism by referring to difference and incompatibility rather than superiority or inferiority (Balibar 1991b; Essed 1991; Feagin 2001; Gilroy 2000; Kinder & Sears 1981; Solomos & Back 1996a; Verkuyten 1998). According to Chapman et al. (1989:16),

‘Ethnic group’ is a collocation often used in covert synonymy for another term, ‘race’, which has been morally and politically disallowed in many areas.

These changes draw attention to how racism itself is defined in the public domain. There is a tendency to characterise racism as the expression of inappropriate and crude biological beliefs. Where such behaviour is seen in individual terms, racism is portrayed as isolated incidents of irrational prejudice. This simplifies and deflects the problem. Many scholars argue that the focus should be on the collective and organisational benefit of racism rather than presenting it as individual pathology. An awareness of this dimension then directs attention to the institutional transformation required to address the problem (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Fredrickson 1997; Goldberg 1993; Wellman 1993; Wildman & Davis 1995). Van Dijk (1993a:5) argues racism “involves the everyday, mundane, negative opinions, attitudes and ideologies.” This recognises that such beliefs are more subtle and pervasive within society.
Contemporary research suggests whites generally use benign non-discriminating terms when they refer to a racial ‘other’. More socially acceptable expressions of entrenched cultural difference is apparent in their discourse. Direct racist remarks, in contrast, is seen as being shameful. The apparent non-racial issues now expressed in a new coded mode enable them to avoid being challenged on racial matters. Cultural difference is presented as primordial and immutable. It is reified, masking a racial narrative. In contexts where cultural incompatibility is proclaimed, a new sort of coded (hidden) racism emerges, perpetuating the reproduction of racial inequality, whilst still naturalising social formations in terms of racial-cultural belonging thereby perpetuating stereotypes (Bradley 1996; Fenton 1999; Frankenberg 1993; Mac an Ghaill 1999; Verkuyten & ter Wal 2000). Balibar (1991a:21) suggests this trend results in a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of lifestyles and traditions; in short ...a differentialist racism [emphasis in original text].

3.2.7 Concluding remarks

In the preceding discussion I have suggested that the significance of race has to be understood historically and comparatively. In spite of the falsity of race, it has had a profound impact on modern societies. As notions of race have become increasingly challenged, some scholars argue that there has been a ‘turn towards culture’, with ethnicity playing a more prominent role. They argue it is more appropriate to talk about racism that arises in particular contexts than racism in monolithic terms (Goldberg 1993; Rattansi 1995).

Mason (1996a) is not convinced the so-called new-racism is a recent phenomenon and ascendant. He argues old racism with its biological reasoning remains widespread, albeit in a more sophisticated form. Some old forms of racism such as anti-semitism and islamophobia are culturally based, suggesting that there has always been a
conception of cultural and/or national character inherent in racism (Miles 1993).

3.3 Whiteness

A recent development within the field of race has been the growing attention to studying and theorising whiteness. This has reflected many of the concerns and debates within the broader field of race. Scholars contend studying whiteness contributes towards understanding race. The focus on whiteness, they argue, counters a preoccupation in the past within the social sciences on studying the racial other. The purpose of focusing on whiteness is to disrupt commonsense views by demonstrating that whiteness is neither absolute nor all-encompassing (Fredrickson 1997; Herndon 2003; Ware 2001). Johnson (1999:4) contends that studying whiteness particularises what first appears to be normal and universal – “being white, heterosexual, Christian, middle class, English speaking, able bodied”.

This interest in whiteness reflects changing circumstances. However, influential studies pre-dating contemporary ones can be identified. In Black Orpheus, Sartre (2001:115) refers to how the power held by whites to know, without being known, is being unsettled as they themselves become objects of study. He contends

> [h]ere are black men standing, looking at us, and I hope that you – like me – will feel the shock of being seen. For three thousand years, the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without being seen.

It is precisely the hegemonic position whites have occupied that enabled them to dictate terms. As their grip weakens they too become objects of study.

Americans of African descent, in particular, have studied whiteness for more than a century attempting to make it more visible from the margins. Smith (2002) mentions how the work of DuBois and Booker T Washington had a profound impact on South African blacks’ thinking. Solomos and Back (1996a) suggest that the shift in focus that studies in whiteness entails, by studying those who in the past by and large have remained unexamined, redresses an imbalance in research on race. This shift brings about that beneficiaries instead of victims of racialisation are studied. These studies
question the taken-for-granted position of whiteness. According to Bernasconi (2001b:294),

> [w]hat is new is that Blacks, who have always contested the meaning of Blackness imposed on them, have forced this contestation into the public realm. Whites cannot avoid hearing it and cannot avoid seeing how it implicates them. They now find their own identity being challenged by the meaning Blacks impose on them.

Recently, white scholars have begun to interrogate the benefits of power, privilege and cultural dominance associated with their whiteness. This unsettles the comfortable position whites have enjoyed within racial identity politics (Frankenberg 1993; Gabriel 1998; Giroux 1997; Gallagher 2000; McIntyre 1997; Phoenix 1997). McIntosh (1997:296) contends

> as my racial group was being made confident, comfortable and oblivious, other groups were likely being made unconfident, uncomfortable and alienated. Whiteness protected me from many kinds of hostility, distress, and violence ...such privilege simply confers dominance, gives permission to control because of one’s race... [emphasis in original text].

3.3.1 Describing whiteness

The suggestion in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 that race should be understood historically and comparatively also applies to whiteness. As the global ascendancy of the occident was established during modernity, a supra-national eurocentrism arose reflecting hegemonic whiteness. Liberal humanism promoting the idea of freedom, universality, rationality and progress fed notions of Western superiority and civilisation which in turn justified the domination of the West over other regions. This institutionalised a system of racial subordination within a context of colonial and imperial expansion. Capitalism sustained this white supremacy and cultural dominance, maintaining racial hierarchies and differential access to resources as well as the structural advantage associated with it (Balibar 1991b; Biko 2004; Frye 2001; Magubane 1999; Steyn 2001; Supriya 1999; Winant 1997). McIntyre (1997:89) argues that

uncritical acceptance of white power and privilege fosters the belief that white people are the keepers of/for democracy ...It’s a painful realization for white people to admit that our history is fraught with the destruction of other peoples in the name of democracy, freedom, and equal rights.
The majority status whites enjoyed historically enabled them to define the racial ‘other’. Race, as a representation of difference, is structured by relations of power. Definitional power, determining the terms and conditions of naming, is distributed unequally within society. Such naming nominates a site of identity into existence and is part of the process of identification (Ashcroft 2001; Goldberg 2002; Rattansi 1997). The representational power of whiteness, according to Ellsworth (1997:266), lies in its

[h]aving the last word, giving away the last word, forcing the last word, granting the last word.

All others in society are classified and ranked with regard to their relation to this whiteness, whilst the latter remain unmarked. Racialisation therefore is directed to a subjugated ‘other’. Whites see the ‘other’ as raced, objectifying them. The ‘other’ then becomes over-determined. As an identity, whiteness is relational, dependent on the definition of the ‘other’ as being ‘non-white’, rather than on an inherent characteristic. Investing in a representation of the ‘other’, of blackness, whiteness is established in relation to the other, implying an absence/negation. This relationship does not imply reciprocal recognition. They fail to see themselves as raced, remaining unmarked (Gallagher 2000; Harris 1995; Solomos 2001).

According to Pieterse (1996), ethnic identification among white Americans, who treat it in a volitional and superficial way with regard to themselves, has become commoditised and privatised. However, the ‘other’ are viewed in ethnic terms whilst the dominant group take on their universality. He regards this as a process of othering and argues that in these contexts a study of whiteness should inform an analysis of ethnicity.

Steyn (2001) reminds us that racialisation was always visible in South Africa. However, in spite of this ubiquitous racial awareness, whiteness enabled South African whites to think of themselves in universal and racially unmarked ways. It was the racial ‘other’ who bore the burden of being raced. While blackness stands in relation to whiteness, whiteness claims
the exalted position of transcendental signifier, “white” is never a “not-black”... [hence] the sign “white” exempts itself from a dialectical logic of negativity (Fuss 1995:143-144).

Frankenberg (1993) regards whiteness as an unmarked cultural category. It reflects the universal norm whilst the racial other is marked as difference. Those in positions of power validate and impose their definitions of the social situation. Exnomination, the power to remain unnamed – not raced in a context where race is regarded an issue – serves the purpose of maintaining whiteness as unseen and unproblematic, securing its privileged position and in general a middle-class status (Herndon 2003; Sampson 1993; Valentine 1998). Goldberg (1996:185) contends

[r]race extends visibility or invisibility to those it categorizes, and it may be used strategically to promote or deny recognition, social elevation, and status. Whites assume visibility in virtue, though often in denial, of their whiteness.

Whiteness develops into a taken-for-granted experience of privilege and normativity. Viewed in this way whiteness is linked to unfolding relations of domination produced historically, politically and socially. Frye (2001) argues being ‘whitely’, like ‘masculinity’, is an ingrained orientation and the consequence of a political process rather than a reflection of an attribute.

Whiteness denotes higher status and a collective sense of entitlement accompanying the dominant position occupied within societies. This ideology of superiority serves the self-interest of a dominant group within racialised capitalism at the expense of racial others both materially in terms of resources and psychologically in terms of status. The privileges have become so embedded that whites have come to expect and rely on them over time unaware of the advantaging they have enjoyed (Bonnett 1997; Fine, Powell, Weis & Wong 1997; Hardiman 1994; Leistyna 1999; Rattansi 1995). According to Solomos and Back (1996b:228),

[c]learly there is a need for a research agenda which looks at the way white subjectivities are racialised and how ‘whiteness’ is manifested in discourse, communication and culture.
3.3.2 The operation of whiteness

Flagg (1997:221) reflects on this racelessness indicating that

[w]hiteness once identified fades almost instantaneously from white consciousness into transparency.

Viewing race as having no bearing on their lives in the sense of marking themselves as it does a racial other, the notion of being mainstream, the norm, demonstrates the power of the dominant group. Whites as a dominant group present their reasoning as universal and absolute rather than particular. They function as the norm and their moral authority justifies the practices and social relationships they engage in. The universalised, naturalised and dehistoricised appearance of whiteness limits insight into its racialisation and the benefits that accrue as a result of this process (Goldenberg 1993). Referring to an example of whiteness, Solomos and Back (1996a:128) write that

English ethnicity, coded ‘white’, masks its own existence by being equated with the universal and the normal.

Whites generally lack awareness that institutional processes in the past benefited them as a category at the expense of others perpetuating the racial order. By failing to recognise or acknowledge the privileges associated with their whiteness, they reflect historical amnesia (Gabriel 1998; McIntyre 1997). According to Gilroy (2000:67), their

self-consciousness, as Fanon would have put it, [is] amputated at the point where the seductions of raciology emerged in popular and geopolitical forms.

Whites tend to view their current position within society as earned. They do not recognise how the institutional gains they enjoyed at the expense of others contribute to their success. This demonstrates indifference towards the structural context of racial inequality. Liberal pluralism, foregrounding notions of fairness, enables an emphasis on individualism which deflects attention from the socio-political context underpinning inequality (Augustinos 1998; Frye 2001; Leistyna 1999; Maynard 2001; van Ausdale and Feagin 2001). Feagin et al. (2001:216) argue that
Most whites wish to enjoy their privileges not by brute force but legitimately. One way that whites do this is to find something intrinsic in themselves to justify their array of racial privileges.

Instead of acknowledging the institutional privilege whites individualise matters attributing their positioning in society to their own effort, achievement and ability.

In spite of being masked, race remains ever present. In this regard whiteness is described as being politically overdetermined. Whilst whites are socially visible with regard to the positions and status they occupy as a result of their privileging, they are racially invisible. In contrast the social invisibility of the racialised other accompanies their racial visibility (Fine, Weis & Powell 1999; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Mahoney 1997; McIntyre 1997; Sampson 1999). Bernasconi (2001b:287) argues that

[...] those who are most invisible in the public realm, in the sense of being powerless, mute and deprived of human rights, are often most visible for those who disempower them, silence them, and exploit them.

The humanity of the racial other is then negated in this regard.

3.3.3 The plurality of whiteness

Several scholars warn against the danger of reifying and essentialising whiteness as a unitary, undifferentiated and absolute category, a monolithic identity, treating it as a fixed property. Closer scrutiny reveals variation in how whiteness, whilst drawing on a broader discourse, is exercised in particular localities and periods demonstrating its culturally constructed nature and fluidity. For instance, a segregationist approach in the United States emphasised racial purity. In contrast an assimilationist approach operated in Brazil with the idea of whitening (“emblanquecimento”). Even in the latter instance whiteness remains the ideal. Valorising whiteness has led people in these circumstances to classify themselves as being lighter than they are. Making whiteness the referential point contributes to a marginalisation (and even denial) of their blackness and the possibilities of mobilisation around it. The ideology therefore favours the elite and their privileged position (Abu-Lughod 1999; Greenstein 1993;
Mac an Ghaill 1999; Twine 1998; Wade 2002). Fanon (1967a) regards the desire to become white a consequence of an inferiority complex that can only be remedied by consciously embracing blackness, thereby ultimately enforcing recognition.

Changes in what is considered white reflect changing power relations as well as changes in perceptions of who should be eligible for membership. The uncoupling of whiteness, in some instances, from phenotype is illustrated by Fanon (1967a:44) indicating that in Martinique “[o]ne is white above a certain financial level.” In some contexts wealth has whitened people. This together with the examples mentioned in the preceding paragraph suggest whiteness is deployed strategically and its meaning is shaped historically by social and political struggles (Bernasconi 2001b; Feinberg 1993; Frankenberg 1993; Miles 1989; Nakayama & Krizek 1999; Solomos 2001). Woodward contends (2002:152)

> stories of white identities include those of white supremacy and colonial and racist discourses, as well as those of marginalisation and oppression of particular sections within the category white.

Regarding whiteness as monolithic potentially essentialises racism teleologically as an attribute. An awareness of variability of whiteness enables a more reflexive and nuanced understanding of white racial identity without reducing it simply to domination, privilege and racism (Bonnett 1997; Gallagher 2000; Taylor 2004). Miles (1993:87) also argues against reifying skin colour in accounts of racism as this tends to present racism as “a ‘white’ ideology which has only ‘black people, as its object.’”

Whilst the benefits associated with whiteness are not spread equally amongst everyone, all whites receive racially based rewards and privileges. It ensures fraternal loyalty. Generally, the white elite ensure other whites have better access to public amenities to forge a racial solidarity. As the class differential between whites and blacks decreases, social rewards such as deference become proportionately important in maintaining their position in the hierarchy. In this regard lower class whites are the

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For instance, as economic ties between South Africa and Japan strengthened, the Japanese were officially granted an honorary white status whilst the Chinese in comparison remained classified non-white for a considerable period.
stauncest supporters of an ideology of superiority, materially at the cost of cooperating with the other on the grounds of their class exploitation (Feagin 2001; Gallagher 2000; Hardiman 1994; Harris 1995; Herndon 2003; Rattansi 1994). Wander, Martin and Nakayama (1999) refer to Du Bois’s notion that a public and psychological wage is vital to white workers, in that whiteness ensured their access to both infrastructure and jobs and that this social advantage consequently produced and reproduced the whiteness.

3.3.4 Unsettling whiteness

Global change threatens the secure material privileges associated with whiteness as social, political and economic power is eroded, triggering ontological insecurity, increasing anxiety and contributing to a sense of crisis. The loss of a monopoly on power to shape the future unsettles the certainties whites have enjoyed. Whiteness becomes salient in circumstances where their position of privilege is threatened. This especially applies to situations where people assume others determine their opportunities. In such instances their awareness of their collective identity increases. In this regard whites have seen themselves as victims of these changes claiming reverse discrimination as entitlements they have enjoyed are questioned. As the position of privilege is challenged, vulnerability rises and whiteness is subjectively experienced as a handicap in spite of persisting racial inequality (Feagin et al. 2001; Gallagher 1997; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Mahoney 1997; Stewart & Hurtado 1997; Wellman 1993).

It should be apparent that the meaning of whiteness shifts within a post-apartheid context as social relations change. Steyn (2001) suggests the negotiated transition in South Africa marks whiteness as the privileges associated with it are reconsidered. She observes a deep-seated Afro-pessimism with regard to the future among her white South African respondents.

Instances where whites have reacted to the challenge to their privileged position casting themselves as the new victims of discrimination as tables are turned has been
term a ‘whitelash’. The perception that they are defined negatively within society and consequently discriminated against as a result of their racial characteristics (regardless of whether this actually is the case) implies an active identification with race. There is a reluctance to see their race as a fundamental determinant of white privilege and black poverty (Bradley 1996; Gabriel 1998; Wildman & Davis 1995; Winant 1994). The popular perception of disadvantage, in spite of evidence to counter it,

provides the cultural and political “glue” that holds together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics (Winant 1997:42).

This response reveals the extent to which whites understand their own positioning and collective interests. Ramphele (2001) argues official data on South Africa unequivocally reflect the legacy of privileging whites. This provides overwhelming evidence persisting white privilege. She contends whites’ advantaged position is apparent on every socioeconomic variable ranging from health to wealth measures. In a similar way data on unemployment, the labour market and occupational positions demonstrates that race still matters in South Africa and that whites as a category have benefited most from their location in the structure of racial advantage in a racially stratified society.

Institutionalising racial categorisation in South African contributed to racial consciousness, served white interests and promoted differential access to resources. It resulted in social-spatial segregation of institutions such as schools, hospitals, places of worship and other public facilities as well as neighbourhoods ensuring estrangement between groups. This legacy is perpetuated even where the most obvious discriminatory legislation is removed (Abu-Lughod 1999; Crenshaw et al. 1995). Ahluwalia (2001) points out with regard to transformation in South Africa that whilst the state (politics) has been deraacialised, civil society has not yet been deraicalised.

Policies to redress disparities pose a threat to the privileged position and entitlement of whites unsettling the social equilibrium. Bernasconi (2001a:6) raises a conundrum
racially saturated societies face, arguing that

[r]ace can be employed as an oppressive device, but once it has been embedded into the institutional structures of society, the concept of race is often needed to combat those structures.

According to Mamdami (2001), issues of social justice need to be addressed in South Africa to meet the aspirations of the majority and safeguard the rights of the minority. He contends this should not be regarded as a zero-sum game as it often is viewed. Steyn (2001) observes such a fear of losing everything amongst whites. Ramphele (2001:65) concludes

[t]here has also been a failure by a significant proportion of white South Africans to come to grips with the need to actively participate in the dismantling of the system of privilege based on racism and sexism. There are many white people who fail to see that the level of their privileges is in many ways directly related to the systematic deprivation of the majority of South Africans of the most basic needs and opportunities for normal human development. Vested interests in the privileges most white people have come to feel perfectly entitled to poses a major threat to genuine transformation to a more equitable society.

It is this inability to recognize their own privileging that demonstrates whiteness according to several authors. The way redress is approached and received determines whether a sense of a new South African identity emerges. What is needed is the consolidation of a common society with a shared vision. Alexander (2001:481) argues that

[w]hat this means in effect is that affirmative action should be viewed as a grand gesture accepted by those advantaged because of conquest, dispossession, racism, and exploitation, as an admittedly inadequate quid pro quo that does no more than demonstrate the willingness of the beneficiaries of the past policies to concede some reparations.

Affirmative action is a strategic measure to redress power imbalances and work towards equity. It requires the use of race as a socially significant category and serves as a point of departure for rethinking the rights and power associated with race. In implementing such a policy a claim is made for preferential treatment subject to qualifying conditions. However, grievances can surface when a sense that fairness has been breeched emerges.
Affirmative action threatens institutionalised privileges whites accept as natural. Researchers point out that the policy is often opposed as a form of reverse discrimination. This counterclaim highlights the unfair favouritism of affirmative action, violating the right to equal opportunity, penalising innocent victims for transgressions they did not commit. The increasing racial visibility of beneficiaries of affirmative action further leads to questions about whether the excluded other still need the redress as discrimination apparently no longer exists (Balibar 1991b; Bonilla-Silva & Forman 2000; Ross 1995; Winant 1997). According to Gandy (1998:244),

[t]he resentment that this belief [of disadvantaging] maintains has become a kind of ‘cultural and political “glue” that hold together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics [emphasis in original text].

In a sense fear of losing privilege and downward mobility ensures the unity of whiteness and ignoring the benefits that have accrued historically fans a belief of white victimhood (Roediger 1994; Weis et al. 1997).

Frankenberg (1993) pays close attention to the social geography of race. Withdrawing into self-defined protected private spheres, such as suburban enclaves is one of the responses to challenges in the public arena. A “white flight” from public to private services to a large extent implies maintaining spatial racialisation. Many whites with access to resources have the ability to exercise a choice. Living in segregated neighbourhoods avoids facing ‘race’ and possible contestation daily. The withdrawal can be physical and/or psychological. In this regard a lack of contact breeds indifference, a narrow self-interest emerges and loyalty to their group is maintained (Bernasconi 2001b; Feagin 1999; Goldberg 1996; Rattansi 1995). Taylor (2004:170) concludes

[a]s we know from the history of segregation and, for that matter, from the history of all sorts of intolerance and sociopolitical subordination, an appeal to privacy can mask quite unfortunate attitudes and conditions. ...So an appeal to privacy is in fact an appeal to entrenched attitudes and established practices – in this case, to the attitudes and practices of a racially segregated and stratified society.
Anti-racist strategies are countered in sophisticated ways. These anti-racist strategies themselves such as claim to non-racialism, are marshalled to protect their current privileged position by using neutral terminology arguing against the perpetuation of preference and for a non-discriminatory implementation of universal principles. The principles of equity, justice and fairness serve as defences against measures to provide some redress (Bonnett 1997; Giroux 1993; Goldenberg 2002). According to Wellman (1993:57), middle-class whites develop ways of explaining their opposition to change that do not explicitly contradict egalitarian ideals [emphasis in original text].

Appeals to multiculturalism and the notions of equality enable whites to defend their cultural purity, whilst claims to equality for all citizens enable them to lobby for colour-blindness and merit. Researchers have observed that they express a preference to drop all racial references and implement race-neutral policies within this changing context. At face value an ideology of looking beyond skin colour reaffirms universal values of fair play and equal opportunity, implying no special rights or privileges is attached to race (Gallaghar 1997; Rattansi 1994). Schmitt (1996) suggests proclaiming ‘colour-blindness’, reflects the rush to demonstrate tolerance.

Banton (1996) contends that colour-blind policies are ineffective because they do not take into consideration how popular racial beliefs guide everyday interaction and result in unequal treatment. It does not recognise oppression or racial injustice. This deflects attention from the socio-political context that maintains the dominant moral and social order. This racelessness fails to adequately deal with the past. Erasing race, given the past legacy is not possible. Referring to the South African situation, Adam and Moodley (1993) contend that nonracialism cannot imply colour-blindness. As a dominant mode of race thinking, colour-blindness allows the shift towards liberal individualism and the presentation of achievements as individual merit, perpetuating the status quo. In such an instance inequality is viewed a consequence of individual action (Frye 2002; Mac an Ghaill 1999; Solomos & Back 1996a; van Dijk 1993a).

Ultimately colour-blindness is regarded a way in which an effort is made to erase race
whilst retaining the privileges gained historically. According to Taylor (2004) colour-blindness supports racial hegemony by feigning superficial neutrality whilst rejecting race conscious policies, such as affirmative action, designed to ameliorate inequalities. Asante (2003:70) argues

[о]nly those who have the need to escape from their own histories have a need for such a raceless future.

The ideology of equality becomes a culturally sanctioned defence of whites’ privileged racial position legitimising and maintaining the status quo. It facilitates an invisibility of whiteness. The sudden conversion to colour-blindness is a consequence of changing conditions in which the privileging is challenged. The emphasis on equality and human rights is regarded ironic, given the strong opposition to such principles in the recent past (particularly in the South African context). Policies of redress implying institutional change in society which appear similar to practices whites benefited from in the past are opposed. This emphasis on racelessness is an attempt to go beyond racial history, without fully coming to terms with the inequality it brought about. It sets out to transform a racially marked social order into a racially erased one in which the past is placed beyond memory and rendered invisible (Goldberg 2002; Wander et al. 1999; Wellman 1993). Frankenberg (1993) described this colour-blindness as a double move to colour evasiveness and power evasiveness. According to Feagin et al. (2001:51), whites generally do not acknowledge their ascribed privileged position in society, preferring to claim achievement and merit.

3.3.5 Challenging whiteness

Making the politics of whiteness visible counters its hegemony whilst exposing the privilege and power underpinning social relationships. Once the cultural specificity and contingency of whiteness is exposed, it can be altered (Giroux 1993; Morley & Chen 1996; Werbner 1997a). Winant (1994:284) contends

[a]s previous assumptions erode, white identity loses its transparency, the easy elision with ‘racelessness’ that accompanies racial dominance. Today the matter of whiteness has become a matter of anxiety and concern.
Within this context white ‘race traitors’ have worked to hybridise or abolish whiteness. Their objective is to defuse the structures of privileging and oppression associated with whiteness, to work towards greater social justice and human dignity as well as to establish more open forms of identity. This ‘outing’ of whiteness, deconstructs it, exposing how it functions to maintain its privilege. They argue tracing and acknowledging how whiteness has operated is the first step towards imagining a new future (Gallaghar 2000; Gandy 1998; Gilroy 2000; Herndon 2003; Roediger 1994; Taylor 2004; Ware 2001).

3.3.6 Concluding remarks

The hegemony of whiteness arose within a context of colonialism and imperialism. Hence, whiteness is not contained within a society, but has been internationalised. This position has been sustained by global capitalism.

Reclaiming blackness in a positive light challenges whiteness. The affirmation of blackness can be liberating only in a context of transforming wider material and institutional forms of oppression (Biko 2004; Manganyi 1991; Smith 2002). It is argued that whites can liberate themselves from the constraints of their whiteness and the negative constructions associated with it by recognising their own imprisonment within the process of racialisation (Ahluwalia 2001; Balibar 1991a; Ramphele 2001).

3.4 Discourse and race

Several studies reveal the flexibility, ambivalence and even contradictions in talk on racial matters within societies. This demonstrates what racial categories, as social entitlements, accomplish rhetorically and ideologically. Discourse contains assumptions of the other and reflects ethical choices about relationships toward them. Categorisations are “contingently-shaped, strategic constructions” (LeCouteur and Augoustinos 2001:222).

Van Dijk (1993b) argues that ideologies are sustained discursively in everyday
interaction. Everyday discourse provides a starting point to study whiteness. Views about the racial other are intertwined with views of the racial self (Feagin et al. 2001; Mason 1996a; Nakayama and Krizek 1999). Mahoney (1997:331) argues that

the experience of lived whiteness is something continually constructed, reconstructed, and transformed for white people.

In the changing social and political landscape there is a shift towards a deracialised discourse as racism is morally rejected. Discursive strategies are often employed to evade race. Gabriel (1998:14) argues that

[one of the reasons why whiteness keeps itself so well hidden is because it works through other discourses.]

Projecting an image of themselves or their group as tolerant and non-racist contributes to a positive self-image protecting their moral reputation (Essed 1996; Verkuyten 1998).

Surveys reveal a decrease in the expression of overt prejudice and an increase in tolerance and greater acceptance amongst whites of the racial other. Related to this are claims of friendship with a racial other. In the context of moral and political change, euphemisms may be more common. Political correctness conceals the race consciousness in society (Bonilla-Silva & Forman 2000; Feagin et al. 2001; Valentine 1998; Wellman 1993).

According to Van Ausdale and Feagin (2001), research reveals adult whites hide feelings on racial matters, given the current public taboo against overtly expressing racist opinions. This leads to a denial of seriousness of entrenched prejudicial thoughts and discriminatory practices. They contend that solidarity between participants in the private sphere creates a social space which affords protection from censure where negative sentiments can be expressed more freely. Social conditions then shape and constrain the discourse. The reproduction of prejudice in this context of moral condemnation against it, requires disavowing statements like ‘I am not racist, but...’, demonstrating the need to justify any comment that may be construed as racist, or to inoculate against such a charge (Essed 1991; Rattansi 1995).
Wellman (1993) argues that white middle-class people with means at their disposal experience their own situation in individual terms and can afford to express tolerance. They have until recently been shielded from social arrangements where they have to confront the racial other directly. As they become more directly affected, their veneer of tolerance is put to the test and wears thin, especially where their materially advantaged position is potentially challenged. According to McIntyre (1997:45),

> what is so striking about whites talking to whites is the infinite number of ways we manage to ‘talk ourselves out of’ being responsible for racism.

This enables them to be exonerated from responsibility for perpetuating current racial inequality.

Within the context of structural change the attempt to define whiteness in a non-demonised fashion becomes a priority. Liberal humanism depoliticises identity, by stressing an essential human sameness. Not seeing racial difference, claiming colour-blindness and talking about equity in abstract terms provides opportunity to demonstrate they look beyond skin colour, and reject race consciousness (Taylor 2004). According to Goldberg (1993:1),

> liberalism plays a foundational part in this process of normalising and naturalising racial dynamics and racist exclusions. As modernity’s definitive doctrine of self and society, of morality and politics, liberalism serves to legitimate ideologically and to rationalise politico-economically prevailing sets of racialised conditions and racist exclusions.

Parker (1999), whilst critical of liberalism and humanism, cautions that it can enable progressive work.

Adding to the complexity of these debates, Miles (1993:83) points out a charge of racism has become a category of abuse, a means of declaring one’s political opponent as an immoral and unworthy person. A majority of people in western Europe seek to avoid being so labelled and they adjust their discourse and actions accordingly.
This has complicated matters because any challenge, questioning or critique can be turned into a charge of racism effectively vilifying, demonising, discrediting and silencing the adversary. Patricia de Lille has noted the censuring effect this may have (Smith 2002). In South Africa Husemeyer (1997) suggests such a tactic featured prominently in both the Makgoba-affair at the University of the Witwatersrand where the CV of the deputy-vice chancellor was questioned and the Pityana-Davis spat over appointments to the Human Rights Commission. Without commenting on the merits of these incidents, the polarising effects of such charges are apparent. They furthermore reveal how salient race remains.

3.5 Conclusion

From the discussion on race (Section 3.2), whiteness (Section 3.3) and discourse on race (Section 3.4) it is clear that race is not primordial. Rather, it is a construction. Race has had the effect of privileging so-called whites and negatively impacting on the lives of so-called blacks. In the process of racial classification and discourse becoming socially unacceptable, other sophisticated strategies have been employed to maintain white privilege. This is so even though racial privilege is not recognised or acknowledged by the beneficiaries of this privilege.

The meaning attributed to difference as well as the ideological underpinnings become apparent in discourse. The social relations and interaction as a result impact on material conditions. Within a transforming social and political context questions of inclusion and how difference is dealt with are renegotiated. The salience of race is demonstrated by the extent to which people define themselves and public issues in racial terms. How such changes shape everyday understandings of these concepts is one of the key concerns of this study. This study explores the extent to which racial matters come to the fore in the current political, economic and social context.

Current understanding of racial matters suggests that social and historical contexts shape the forms this collective identity takes as well as the significance attributed to it. In South Africa race was historically reified as a key organising category in society.
The legacy – a general awareness of a broad racial categorisation – is considered in the next chapter. The chapter considers how this broad racial categorisation emerged and unfolded historically.
Chapter 4: The South African socio-historical context

4.1 Introduction

Participants interviewed in this study were asked to reflect on societal changes located within the current socio-historical and material context. The objectives of this chapter are to examine the evolution of the ‘racial order’ in South Africa, consider the conflict and changing relations between white Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities in South Africa, chart the response of the apartheid state to growing internal and external pressure for reform and consider the response and positioning of white South Africans to a post-apartheid context.

The objectives direct attention to European settlement and its impact. Several general historical texts, which overlap to a great extent in the themes they cover, have shaped my synopsis of the unfolding process of settlement, contact and conflict described below (Davenport 1987; De Villiers 1990; Giliomee 2003; Jung 2000; L’Ange 2005; Schutte 1995; Sparks 1990).

I discuss these events in terms of the following broad periodisation – settler-colonialism (section 4.2), white dominion (section 4.3), Afrikaner hegemony (section 4.4) and a transitional period (section 4.5). The section on the period of settler-colonialism covers white settlement and territorial expansion in the region against the backdrop of British imperialism. The section on the period when a white dominion was being established reveals the consolidation of white power and interests in the Union of South Africa as well as the contest for influence within white politics. The section on the period of Afrikaner nationalist hegemony charts the implementation of Afrikaner nationalist ideals and the consequent ethnic privileging associated with this as well as the response to the growing internationalisation of resistance to official policy. The section on the period of transition to a post-apartheid South Africa considers the impact of three related changes on the position of whites within society. These changes are the negotiated settlement, destruction of white hegemony and shift of authority.
This chapter neither provides a complete historical overview fully engaging the heterogeneity and complexity within the society, nor pretends that history begins with European settlement. Doing justice to the complex relations between these and other communities, both which are neither homogenous nor static entities, is a challenging endeavour.

Although the past shapes the present and future, the past is open to an interpretation which cannot escape interests, priorities and concerns. The interpretation of events described in early writing on South Africa reflects the dominance of whites in the colonial period. In line with contemporary conceptual and theoretical notions of whiteness discussed in the preceding chapter, these histories attribute a key role to whites in shaping the society by focusing primarily on their settlement and conflict. In spite of more recent work contesting and revising claims made in earlier historical writings, these earlier writings remain significant as they shaped the understanding of the public. This influence of earlier writings would become evident from interviewee responses discussed in chapters six and seven. Earlier historical writing, as officially sanctioned versions of events, provide insight into how South Africa was projected as a ‘white man’s country’ and what justifications were offered for a racial order of minority rule (Lonsdale 1988; Saunders 1988; Worden 1995).

4.2 Settler-colonialism

I have indicated in the preceding chapter that European ideas of race and superiority were shaped by the context of colonial expansion. Cell (1982:3-4) contends racism had been imported into the minds and psyches of the earliest European settlers, who could hardly have escaped it. The association of blackness with all things evil, ugly, and satanic and of whiteness with all things pure, beautiful, and godly was fundamental to their psychology, to the way medieval and early-modern Europeans (especially northern Europeans) perceived and organized the world.

De Kiewiet (1941) and contributors to the collection on *The shaping of South African society, 1652-1840* edited by Elphick and Giliomee (1989) provide an overview of
this period of settler-colonialism and its emerging racial order.¹

4.2.1 Initial white settlement

European explorers had sporadic contact with the indigenous population of Southern Africa since the late fifteenth century when they circumnavigated the African continent for the first time. White settlement in South Africa commenced during this era of expanding merchant capitalism with the establishment of a permanent trading post to replenish supplies of passing vessels by the United East India Company in the Cape Peninsula in 1652. Five years later in an attempt to meet an increasing demand for supplies the Company released some employees from their contractual obligations, granting them land. This policy established a frontier of agrarian settlement between the freeburghers and the Khoikhoi. Slaves were imported from 1658, initially to work on Company grounds. Somatic preference, cultural chauvinism and religious belief all contributed to drawing a distinction between groups in a context of competition (Elphick & Malherbe 1989).

The settlement remained small given its purpose as a trading post. Social relations within the racially diverse context pragmatically reflected a degree of openness and economic co-operation initially. Settlers of Dutch, German and French stock communicated with Company officials in Dutch, who recognised people of European descent as a distinct group with specific privileges. In spite of their diverse social and economic backgrounds, white settlers gradually constituted a distinct group. Racial endogamy became possible as the number of women of European descent increased, reinforcing racial and class distinctions. Such endogamy was to a large extent maintained in the context of frontier expansion (Elphick & Giliomee 1989; Giliomee 1989b; Guelke 1989).

Seventeenth century settlers associated racial difference with cultural difference.

¹ ‘Racial order’ refers to differentiation in terms of colour and not to the initial British use of race, referring to relations with Dutch-speakers of European descent. In instances where the latter usage applies it will be indicated.
Effort was expended on maintaining religious links and guarding against any form of social levelling with slaves or servants. Christianity was racialised and slaves were not baptised. During this period slavery was enforced strictly. Within this context social distance was maintained and racial purity seen as a matter of cultural survival, necessary for maintaining dominance (Feagin 2001; Frederickson 1981; Thompson 2001). Miles (1989:16) points out that

Christianity became the prism through which all knowledge about the world was refracted, and as a result of which a literal Biblical explanation of the material world predominated.

Guelke (1989) notes that as the population increased more settlers turned to stock farming. The shortage of land and the system of loan farms gave rise to the emergence of trekboers. Although trekboers have been described as semi-nomadic pastoralists, historians suggest many retained some link to the market-economy. The social isolation, self-reliance and independence of trekboers increased as the frontier expanded. These Dutch-speaking settlers were cut off from European influences contributing to their gradual ‘Africanisation’. Concern was expressed that white civilisation would be diluted as a result. Religious observance was seen as a key denominator in preserving their European identity. The extent to which a rigid Calvinism dominated daily life as well as the strength of their puritan background is drawn into question by numerous documented instances where trekboer practices deviated from prescriptions. The distinct ‘group’ sharing a religion and language, practicing a large degree of racial endogamy did not at this stage develop a collective awareness (Du Toit 1983; Giliomee 1989a; Ross 1994).

Giliomee (2003) traces the first use of the term Afrikaner linked to white settlers to the early eighteenth century. He stresses the meaning of its use is open to interpretation and that other designations such as Christian, Dutchmen and Boer also were used. A myriad of identities were chosen within the context of a settler society.

4.2.2 British authority and control

After a brief first occupation between 1795 and 1803, the British incorporated the
Cape into its Empire in 1806. This strategic decision, following victory in the Napoleonic wars, enabled the British to control a key trading route and protect interests elsewhere. Initially they were less interested in colonising the territory and the settler population remained overwhelmingly Dutch-speaking. Reflecting back on events as they unfolded, an extension of British influence in the region triggered a ‘century of injustice’, in ‘Afrikaner’ terms (Giliomee 2003; Packenham 1991; Steyn 1987).

Britain was drawn into a process of colonisation by concern that adversaries may gain a strategic foothold on the coastline. A significant number of British settlers established themselves as farmers in the Eastern frontier region in 1820. Facing harsh conditions numerous skilled settlers abandoned their farms and drifted to towns. Subsequently an even larger British colonial settlement occurred in Natal, annexed for strategic reasons in 1843 from the pioneers who had founded a Republic there. This established one of Africa’s largest communities of English-speaking whites, staunchly British, maintaining their ties to the metropolitan society and dominant English-speaking communities elsewhere. It has been argued that these broader links then prevented the English from developing a distinct national identity and consciousness like the Afrikaner eventually did (De Kiewiet 1941; Macnab nd; Randall 2000; Slabbert & Welsh 1979).

Missionaries, with their humanitarian intentions, had a significant social and political impact, and were particularly despised. Enlightenment had brought about condemnation of slavery in Europe. Ordinances 49 and 50, passed in 1828, respectively allowed black Africans to enter the Cape colony as labourers and lifted restrictions on the movement of coloureds. A number of minimum conditions for employment were further set. Slavery was abolished in 1834. Much later, the emerging Afrikaner nationalist elite would repeatedly refer back to the threat humanism and liberalism with its associated individualism and rights held to their way of life. L’Ange (2005:36) suggests

Whereas the missionaries’ values had sprouted in the relative prosperity and liberalism associated with Britain’s rising technocracy, those of Boers had
been shaped by adaptation to a crueler, more primal environment in which life remorselessly fed on other life, and human relations and ideals were dictated by fundamental imperatives of survival.

Missionaries provided justification for colonisation and its civilising role, a key idea of nineteenth century colonial expansion. A liberal incorporative strategy gradually evolved under British rule within the Cape Colony allowing an assimilation of natives. This was viewed pragmatic and a more effective policy than coercion. Political aspirations and threats were diffused by incorporating those meeting franchise requirements set by the British (Du Toit 1983; Marx 1997; Miles 1989).

The precariousness of territorial claims in a region where settlers never demographically constituted a majority is apparent. For instance, the numerically small settler community in Natal, whilst wielding authority, felt vulnerable to the large black populations surrounding them. Successful closure of porous frontiers in a context of conquest eventually firmly established white domination and control over land, labour and trade. With regard to what was termed the ‘native question’, Ross (1994) argues notions of white supremacy underpinned inter-group contact, by the nineteenth century. This was strengthened by challenges to the established racial order. A clear distinction was drawn between tribal black and civilised white resulting in the maintenance of social difference (Elphick & Malherbe 1989; Lewsen 1988).

The arrival of British, regarding themselves as superior, had far reaching consequences for relations and the balance of power. In spite of being a minority numerically they occupied a dominant position in the nineteenth and early twentieth century adhering to a notion of their imperial mission (De Klerk 1976; Macnab nd; Paton 1981). Subsequently Victorian ideals fostered “British race patriotism” and fanned an ethnocentrism underpinned by an ‘imperialist superiority complex’. Rhodes chauvinistically believed “in the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’” (Davenport 1987:105). The Dutch were viewed inferior and these stereotypes were fostered in private English schooling, particularly in Natal with its strong sense of Pax Britannica, where a colonial jingoism developed (Marks & Trapido 1987; Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995). Wilmsen (1996) attributes the lack of an ethnic identification
among English-speaking white South Africans to the British dominance.

4.2.3 Burgher response

The departure by a number of burgher parties from the Colony in 1837 to the interior and their establishment of settlements beyond British jurisdiction was primarily triggered by economic factors. They raised objections to being treated differentially to English settlers, changes in the labour policy, the difficulty in obtaining more land, the cost of land, changes in local governance and frontier conflict. Historians have regarded their migration an extension of processes that had occurred for more than a century (Peires 1989). De Villiers (1990:124) comments:

They set out to recreate a traditional pattern that their African heritage had taught them was proper … They also preserved in the north elements of the way of life in the south, and those included having people of other races work for them.

De Kiewiet (1941) describes their action as more rebellious than revolutionary. The pioneers set out purposively to escape from the colonial yoke, but had no clear notion of setting up a single rival nation-state in the interior, based on linguistic and ethnic links. The upheaval caused by a regional conflict in the interior known as the “difaqane” (meaning ‘the crushing’ in Nguni-speaking languages) or “mfecane” (meaning ‘the great flight’ in Sotho-speaking languages) led to a temporary displacement. Consequently white pioneers encountered large tracts of sparsely populated or unsettled land to which they claimed ownership. Similar stories are also related by English farmers in the Midlands about their settlement as Steinberg (2002) indicates. This emptiness served the purpose of legitimising their right to govern areas they settled first. In historical writing, subsequently, this was exploited to suggest the myth of a simultaneous arrival of white and black African people within Southern Africa, respectively from the south and north serving the purpose of legitimising white claims to land and power. In some instances land ceded to white settlers was contested. The Boer republics were established through conquest, appropriating the land and denying black African people the right of ownership (Fredrickson 1997; Harrison 1987; James & Lever 2001; Saunders 1988; Worden 1995).
Most Dutch settlers remained in the Cape colony with an increasing number benefiting from an extension of schooling. The relationship between Dutch and English speakers was at this stage against the backdrop of imperialism referred to as a ‘racial’ question even though the Dutch were recognised as being of European descent entitling them to certain privileges. I referred to ‘race patriotism’ above and to the changing use of race in the preceding chapter. There were frequent references to the white races which are “two groups distinguished by language and sentiment and tradition”, rather than descent (Hoernlé 1945:34; Robertson & Trollip 1947).

Within this context the First Afrikaans Language Movement, a loose alignment, emerged among settlers of Dutch descent in 1875. This signalled a broader cultural awareness and resentment to the dominance of British cultural influence. They felt like second-class citizens in a British dominated Colony and set out to demand greater equality with regard to the use of Afrikaans in public life. Du Toit, leader of the movement, held a more exclusive notion with regard to who were ‘true’ Afrikaners and was supported by what Hofmeyr (1987) calls the ‘genteel poor’. Kuyperian neo-Calvinist ideas of religious sovereignty within distinct spheres provided a foundation for the Afrikaner Bond, established in 1880, and an impetus for the emergence of exclusivist white Afrikaner nationalism. The ascendancy of these ideas should be considered in a broader context rather than within its own logic. Hofmeyr, drawing support from propertied middle-class Dutch, developed a broader, more inclusive, notion of Afrikanership around commitment to South Africa. The clandestine manoeuvring by Rhodes, funding the Jameson Raid on the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) undermined Anglo-Afrikaner rapprochement and fanned jingoism (Du Toit 1985; Louw 2001; Kinghorn 1994; Steyn 1987).

2 I use Afrikanership to refer to the debate around who qualifies as one. This debate confirms Afrikanership is constructed rather than being primordial. The degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness in the positions taken by (Onze Jan) Hofmeyr and du Toit, played itself out between Botha, Smuts and Hertzog as well as Hertzog and Malan, subsequently. I use Afrikanerdom to refer to the nationalistic feelings surrounding being an Afrikaner.
4.2.4 The impact of the discovery of minerals

The discovery of minerals in the 1870s provided impetus for the emergence of capitalism and the socio-economic and political changes it wrought eventually contributed to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. The discovery attracted a large influx of white immigrants, aligned primarily to the British. Modernisation and industrialisation created new demands for labour and produce, bringing about a far-reaching social and economic transition within Southern Africa. Communities within the region were differentially incorporated into the economy further entrenching a racial order grounded in exploitation. More formalised segregation emerged, as a policy resulting in specific attempts to order populations spatially. De Kiewiet (1941) points out that in the diamond-fields mining companies found maintaining the difference between white and black labour advantageous, a distinction subsequently carried over to the goldfields. Marks and Trapido (1987:8) argue

[t]hat the segregationist solution emerged to solve the problems of industrialisation was in a sense made possible ideologically through the ideas of ‘scientific racism’, social Darwinism and eugenics.

In this context extensive systems of exploitation and exclusion were developed and implemented through administrative mechanisms. Practices implemented in nineteenth century Natal and the Boer republics were carried over to the twentieth century to secure white monopoly on formal political power and residential segregation (Davenport 1987; Frederickson 1997).

4.2.5 Imperial designs

The British saw themselves as the paramount power within Southern Africa, destined to govern others. They intervened to secure their interests and maintain their influence over the region as economic gravity shifted from south to north, annexing the diamond fields first and subsequently the ZAR in 1877 where the goldfields were situated. This led to what the Boers called the ‘eerste vryheidsoorlog’ (first war of liberation) fought to reclaim the independence of their territory in 1880-1881. A subsequent conflict for control in 1899-1902 was called the ‘tweede vryheidsoorlog’
(second war of liberation), Anglo-Boer war or South African war. With this conflict Britain felt compelled to demonstrate its will to exercise power, within the context of global rivalry, to protect its international reputation (L’Ange 2005; Miles 1993).

Among Afrikaners, both in the Cape colony and Boer republics, there were supporters of some form of co-operation with the British. The conflict ignited a sense of common purpose between factitious Afrikaner leadership within the two republics, and subsequently enabled them to forge links with Afrikaners within the colony. These events, spurred on by the strategic objective of maintaining control over the region, exacerbated the division between Boer and Briton (De Kiewiet 1941). According to Paton (1981), growing-up in English communities in South Africa British nationalist feeling was strongly imbedded. L’Ange (2005:142) observes

Most South Africans of British descent, mainly in the Cape and Natal, sided with Britain and many joined colonial units. Some, however, were strongly opposed to the war. Most of the Afrikaners in the Cape and Natal remained at least neutral if not openly loyal to the Crown...

More than a half million British soldiers were involved in the war. It was considered a war amongst whites. Some Afrikaners sided with the British and about a fifth of all fighting Afrikaners had joined them by the end of the war. The ‘joiners’ as they were known, were usually the ‘bywoners’ (white labour tenants), whilst landowners tended to be ‘bittereinders’ (die-hards). Recent work demonstrates that this South African war drew much wider participation from other groups than acknowledged initially (Harrison 1987; Sparks 1990; Swart 1998).

Pakenham (1991:556) writes that the war “cost more in blood and treasure and humiliation than all the preceding conquests in Africa”. About 30 000 farmsteads were destroyed to deprive the Boers of food. Their families were interned in concentration camps where almost 28 000 died. In total one sixth of the Boer population died. Their defeat and the subsequent humiliation inflicted by a policy of Anglicisation contributed further to Afrikaners’ sense of oppression in what they considered their own land (De Kiewiet 1941; Thompson 2001).
4.2.6 Concluding remarks

This was a period in which white settlers took control over a region through conflict and conquest. The complexity of political consciousness and community construction needs to be acknowledged with regard to white South Africans. British involvement in the region contributed to the diversity of the hegemonic group. The significance of racial difference in early white settlement cannot be separated from economic interest. Notions of superiority played a key role in justifying the overlap between race and class and the subordinate position of the racialised other. In other words the racial order of pre-industrial agrarian South Africa established patterns of privilege and domination which were refined within a system of segregation as the political and economic system developed.

4.3 Establishing a white dominion

Up to this point Afrikaans-speaking communities did not share similar experiences. A strong desire for independence prevailed within the former Boer republics in contrast with the Cape colony. Hence, a coherent Afrikanerdom could not be assumed. The conflict and policies implemented created conditions favourable for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. De Klerk (1976), Harrison (1987), Lewsen (1988), O’Meara (1983) and Steyn (1987) provide a useful overview of the period in which a white dominion was established, white domination was secured and Afrikaner nationalism arose.

4.3.1 The compromise and context of the Union

Diverse polities were consolidated by the British with the establishment of a Union of South Africa. Only white interests were represented at the National Convention. Attempts to change this failed. Excluding blacks set the stage for subsequent segregation. The debate on franchise almost shipwrecked the negotiations. As a compromise the status quo in each province prevailed, effectively approving the existing racial order. This set the tone for the persistent exclusion of other racial
groups from key political institutions. During this period three major issues dominated the political landscape: The relationship with Britain, reconciliation between whites, and policies towards non-whites. Generally there was no major difference between parties dominating Parliament on the policy towards ‘natives’ (De Kiewiet 1941; Lever 1978; Mandaza 1999; Slabbert & Welsh 1979).

The conflict between English and Afrikaners resulted in rivalry, mutual suspicion and a bifurcation of the white settlers. At Union white rural Afrikaans and urban English speaking communities lived almost segregated social lives. Destitution forced rural Afrikaners to towns in a migration dubbed the ‘second great trek’. Afrikaner proletarisation was a consequence of a number of factors like practices around inheriting land, a failure to adapt to commercial farming, low skill base, war and unforeseen natural calamities. Commercialisation also forced ‘bywoners’ off consolidated farms3. This migration altered the simple rural and urban divide that had existed previously. The division along cultural and linguistic lines threatened the Union. Milner hoped to establish an English-speaking society aligned and loyal to the British Empire. Most white immigrants assimilated into the English-speaking community which constituted a polymorphous group and did not acquire a distinct naming for them. Diverse as their roots were these English speakers occupied a more favourable position economically, but were over the course of time politically less influential. British imperialism facilitated an ethnic mobilisation and the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism (Macnab nd; Roberts & Trollip 1947; Swart 1998; Van Jaarsveld 1978).

Afrikaners speakers resisted Anglicisation. Although divided along regional lines with separate parties in the provinces across which they were dispersed, Afrikaners shared concerns of securing their economic welfare, obtaining recognition for Afrikaans as an official language and ensuring autonomy within the Commonwealth. A strong sense of historical injustice and bitterness polarised relations between whites. The

3 Potgieter (1957) working in the region I have conducted my research in compares three communities of white farmers primarily producing for their own consumption to those commercialising their concerns. He describes how these small farmers’ practices, lack of initiative and dependency on welfare impedes commercialisation.
petit bourgeoisie undertook to restore the sense of pride and justness of the Afrikaner cause in response to the suffering and defeat they had experienced. These issues were addressed in the Second Afrikaans Language Movement established in 1905 within literature, history and social sciences (Hofmeyr 1987; Jung 2000; Schutte 1995). Steyn (1987) cites the editor of Die Volksblad arguing that the Afrikaner’s struggle for survival was to prevent being engulfed by the tidal wave of English culture.

4.3.2 The debate on conciliation

Obtaining a majority in the first Union election in 1910 Botha opted for conciliation. This addressed two of the major political issues at Union. With Smuts he subscribed to the ideal of a united nation and broader white South Africanism. This policy was criticised by some Afrikaner leaders feeling they made all concessions. Hertzog believed the Afrikaner position had to be secured first before a relationship with the English could be considered. Language rights, economic security and the restoration of self-esteem were regarded key matters. Hertzog broke away advocating a South Africa first orientation as an alternative to an alignment with British imperialism. This implied a separate national identity and autonomy. His founding of the National Party (NP) in 1914 split the Afrikaners politically, drawing support from those advocating republicanism (Adam et al. 1997; Du Toit 1999; Roberts & Trollip 1947; Schlemmer 1987; Steyn 2002). O’Meara (1983) points out that Afrikaner parties represented multiple constituencies and had a somewhat fluid class basis. Over the next thirty odd years the political mobilisation of Afrikaners and their interests would be subjected to different and shifting expectations.

English speakers resisted the attempts by Afrikaners to enforce their language rights in the public sphere, still dominated by English. This resistance to bilingualism was particularly strong in Natal, where the Natal Devolution League agitated secession from the Union. The debate on national symbols, the flag and anthem, generally aroused and inflamed the passions of English and Afrikaans speakers, with only a minority of white liberal thinkers registering their opposition to policies around matters of race (Hoernlé 1945; Lewsen 1988; Steyn 1987).
Within the material contexts described above, cultural and ideological processes operated which were to have a significant impact over time. Before considering the final major political issue at Union – race, I describe the mobilisation within the Afrikaner community that shaped their relations to English speakers and Britain.

4.3.3 Collective imagining – writing Afrikaner history

The emergence of an ‘imagined community’ – the product of Afrikaner nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Although the pioneers established republics in the interior, they as well as the Dutch descendants in the Cape colony had no collective identification as a ‘volk’, in spite of sharing a language, religion and practicing endogamy. This identification of a ‘greater Afrikanership’ first emerged self-consciously among the intelligentsia and subsequently in the general population. Towards the end of the nineteenth century self-consciously fashioned historical writing aligned to the First Afrikaans Language Movement, established in 1875, set out to create positive images (and invent tradition) through idealised descriptions of the past for their emerging consciousness of a ‘volk’. Their historical accounts, influenced by Kuyperian neo-Calvinism, reflected a current concern to demonstrate continuity. This contributed to essentialised notions of identity providing an absolute truth. Key themes of this emerging national historical tradition were their special relationship to God, destiny as civilisers in Africa and subjugation by the British. It provided a narrative of a shared past and a predetermined common future. These themes were developed further by the Second Afrikaans Language Movement, established in 1905, as a more assertive nationalism arose, recognising that it conveyed what was ‘volksei’ (unique to the peoplehood) (Anderson 1983; Giliomee 1989b; Ross 1994; Thompson 2001; Van Jaarsveld 1978). Steyn (1987:i) cites the Afrikaner historian, Gustav Preller

Each generation revels in the hard-won rights and freedoms of the previous ...but in a person’s lifetime we have forgotten the price for which it all has been sold and paid for. [Translated – see endnote’]

Remembering, then, was seen as a necessary condition for the maintenance of a ‘volk’. These histories then nurtured notions of a shared heritage, experience, identity
and unity. It also provided the base for claims to the territory and self-determination (Schutte 1995).

The Great Trek by the pioneers (called Voortrekkers) was presented as a conscious attempt by a people to establish self-determination in uninhabited areas, implying a struggle against the meddling British imperialists, cast as villains. Religious and moral dimensions were accentuated in the interpretation of historical events in the writing of this period. Voortrekker experiences provided an ‘origin myth’. A belief that God scripted their destiny provided both purpose and justification for social action and domination. The myth played a key role in forging solidarity within the group and legitimised the institutional order Afrikaner nationalists established eventually (Du Toit 1983; Giliomee 2003; Grobbelaar 1998; Hochschild 1990; Pakenham 1991).

Drawing an analogy with Israel, comparing the Great Trek to the exodus to the Promised Land, highlighting suffering, the notion of predestination and divine intervention provides a particular interpretive frame for historical events. In his pre-revisionist writing Van Jaarsveld (1978:72) an eminent Afrikaner historian argued Afrikaners were in many respects an Old Testament ‘volk’ noting

If there is one idea that runs like a golden thread through the history of the Afrikaner, then it is that he, like Israel of the Old Testament is a chosen ‘volk’ – God’s ‘volk’, like Paul Kruger called them often... [Translated – see endnote2]

The Reformed (Gereformeerde) Church, in particular, had a strong republican orientation and promoted the Day of the Covenant, representing the myth of a heroic struggle in religious terms. An identifiable historical linage, charting the trajectory of a people through key events, guided by Christian principles, was described. Contemporary historians have not found reliable evidence to support the notion that pioneers considered themselves a uniquely chosen people, with a Covenant to God, a theme repeatedly returned to by nationalist politicians providing an absolutist base to Afrikaner identity (Du Toit 1985). According to Hochschild (1990:208-209),
For several decades after the Vow, everyone forgot about it. Nobody observed any solemn day of thanksgiving. …Nobody referred to the Vow at the consecration of the Church in Pietermaritzburg. …Gradually, half a century later, the struggles with the British leading up to the Boer War began to inflame Afrikaners’ sense of victimhood once again. Only then the Vow was resurrected as a great historical event….

These historical writings then should be read a cultural product within a particular context selectively reconstructing past events and erasing other events from an imagined national consciousness as Brink (1998) notes. It should be noted that besides Afrikaner nationalists, other white authors’ writing at this period also set out to project South Africa as the domain of whites. The invisibility of the racial other in these nineteenth century sources is striking. In Afrikaner writing contributions of non-Afrikaners usually in non-combatant roles aligned to them, were also often excluded. These writings, regardless their accuracy, provide insight into Afrikaner nationalist self-understanding. Within the civil religion of nationalism the notion of transgression implying a ‘fall from grace’ with retribution and eventual reconciliation of a people serves as a powerful regulatory system (Mills 1997; Saunders 1988; Schutte 1995; Swart 1998).

From the Old Testament in the bible, Deuteronomy 8, verses 11 to 20, was often cited during the twentieth century to remind the people of their obligation to honour the covenant and of the consequences if they did not. It suggested setbacks and suffering were willed by God as moral purification rather than being contingent and held the promise of a better future as an elect people if Afrikaners were faithful and obedient to the will of God. It was seen as providing a ritualistic assertion of solidarity (Du Toit 1983; Kinghorn 1994).

Grobbelaar (1991) argues that the myth should be regarded in terms of its functionality in supporting a hegemonic ideology. She adds the notion of a ‘volk’ primordially captures a sense of organic unity as its primary element. This was prominent and influential in the practice of politics with academic writing providing a pseudo-scientific essentialisation (Kuper 1988; Sharp 1981). It is not surprising then that Diedrichs, much later as political philosopher, wrote on nationalism as a passion,
a calling, and a way of life. The ‘volk’ then becomes the primary unit which provides meaning (De Klerk 1976). According to De Villiers (1990:307), Malan therefore did not regard the National Party as a party in a conventional sense, but rather as

An embodiment of a people’s aspirations, occupying a “central position in our national life”...

The influence of this writing is apparent in the subsequent idealisation of trekboers and Voortrekkers as independent, God-fearing, moral and racially homogenous forbears by authors. Scholars, influenced by this tradition, saw the emergence of Afrikaners as a distinct group by the eighteenth century, and in some instances even earlier, in a less problematic light and even connected ‘their traditional feeling about colour or racial differentiation’ to their Protestant religion (De Klerk 1976; Potgieter 1957). Reflecting this Christian National ideology, Hauptfleish (1990:58,176) wrote at the stage of political transition in his DPhil thesis on self-determination, arguing against liberal humanism which he contended denied peoples’ embeddedness in a nation willed by God and disregarded differences in religion and level of civilisation, that

The boundaries are drawn by God’s creation and nobody can escape from that. ...Already in an early stage after the permanent settlement in the Cape, the white population realised that unbridgeable differences exist between them and the non-white groups. On the one hand it was a difference between Christian and heathen and on the other hand a difference between civilised and uncivilised. [Translated – see endnote3]

It was not a major shift to extend the logic of a ‘volk’ and the associated ideology to the racial order, a matter I will return to later, after I have discussed the broad mobilisation of Afrikaners below.

4.3.4 Extra-parliamentary organisation of Afrikaners

The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) was established in 1918 by a petit bourgeoisie experiencing alienation from the English dominated cities. Harrison (1978:65) relates an experience one of the founders, Henning Klopper, described to him, where a superior said to him as trainee clerk “’Don’t be a fool man, speak white’, meaning
English.” Their strategy was to mobilise wider support to avoid Afrikaner interests being marginalised in the context of Anglicisation. This forced them into proximity with the dislocated poor and their plight. The acquiescence of the urban Afrikaner poor, as a constituency, had to be built and this required providing patronage besides ideological grounding. Welfare was the material inducement. The initial aim to foster Afrikaans culture and identity was soon supplanted by an aim to assume the role of watchdog and vanguard, steering the process to obtain political power by playing a coordinating and influential role in the background. This slow and contested process in which influence was consolidated over time profoundly shaped Afrikaner nationalism (Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Grobbelaar 1991; Jung 2000).

De Klerk (1976) argues that the Broederbond played a key organising role in building an alliance. Recognising language and culture as key dimensions expressing a ‘volk’, it established the ‘Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge’ (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations) to which over four hundred exclusively Afrikaner grass-roots organisations were affiliated. The success of Broederbond mobilisation is attributed to its control over Afrikaner cultural organisations and emphasis on ‘kultuurpolitic’ (cultural politics), which contributed to the emergence of a new consciousness. Conceived as a ‘volksbeweging’ (people’s movement), political, social and economic resources were mobilised gradually to advance opportunities for education, employment and commerce (Bekker & Grobbelaar 1987; Steyn 2002).

The commemoration of the battle of Blood River, within the context of the 1938 centenary celebrations, became a cultural event of great significance. The symbolic ‘tweede trek’ (second trek) provided inspiration and an emotional impetus for Afrikaner nationalism, instilling pride. The country was traversed by ox-wagons following nine routes. In total eight ox-wagon treks converged at the monument site in Pretoria and four others went to the battle-site at Blood River. Celebrations culminated in the laying of the cornerstone of the Voortrekker monument, attended by one hundred thousand people (Cillić 1990; Worden 1995). An imagined past was then concretised in a monument and re-enacted in the associated rituals of commemoration. According to De Kiewiet (1941), the event, presented in epic
proportions, became the focus of powerful patriotic sentiment. The public mood during the organisation of this event displayed an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, according to Paton (1981).

O’Meara (1983) argues that the organisation of Afrikaner workers and the promotion of Afrikaner business interests were key concerns. Hertzog’s son, Albert, played a key role in organising Afrikaner workers during the thirties and forties. This resulted in successfully establishing Christian National Unions. The number of Afrikaner businesses established increased more than threefold over the ten-year period after the ‘Ekonomiese Volkskongres’ (Economic People’s Congress) arranged by the Broederbond and Sanlam (a Cape-based, Afrikaans-owned insurer) in 1939. People’s savings were used to establish Afrikaner businesses and they were urged to support these ventures. Ownership of pro-Nationalist newspapers, the first established in 1915 in the Cape colony, would play a key role in disseminating their position. Davenport (1987:321) indicates that the initial modest goal of this organisation was extended to promote the “Afrikanerisation of South Africa in all its spheres”.

Although the Afrikaner-English schism was primary, questions of race also entered into nationalist debates. Sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and historians played a key role in providing academic support for the notion of immutable groups and apartheid ideology. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989) suggest this notion of the centrality of nations within God’s design played a fundamental role. Notions of race and ethnicity were internalised as essential elements of reality and experience and therefore subjectivity and identity. A significant number of Afrikaner academics with Broederbond ties contributed to the debate. For these Afrikaner intellectuals and ideologues, fulfilment occurred collectively through a community.

The sociologist Geoff Cronjé presented ‘scientific evidence’ to a special People’s Congress of Afrikaners in 1944 that miscegenation ‘irrefutably’ led to racial decline. In his work he unequivocally stated that each mixed marriage implied a loss for the white race (Cronjé 1947). More recently Hauptfleish (1990) has reiterated these views in the context of identity-preservation. He argues racial mixing is taboo within
Afrikaner Calvinism. Miscegenation runs against the natural order willed by God and is regarded an abomination and sin ("gruwel en sonde"). He emphasises the importance of self-determination in ensuring the survival of white Afrikanerdom in an increasingly hostile environment.

Afrikaner churches provided a biblical foundation for racial segregation, primarily citing passages from the Old Testament. At the ‘Volkskongres’ (People’s Congress) in 1947, The Dutch Reformed Church said that there were sufficient Scriptural grounds for such a policy.

Cronjé (1947) was a key apartheid ideologue arguing that racial separation was a sociological necessity, to prevent conflict and ensure white survival. In his writing he highlighted two powerful threats to the idea of separatism and the natural racial order, liberalism and communism, the latter posing the graver threat. Attempting to reconcile power and justice, he argued total separation was preferable to continued “baasskap” (bossism) or slow equalisation. His work proposed ideas such as ‘separate development’ subsequently a preferred term for apartheid.

Within Afrikaner communities an intricate network of economic and cultural organisations emerged to counter the dominant British institutions. The cross-cutting political, cultural and religious links they established penetrated deep into Afrikaner civil society. The Afrikaner nationalists set up a network of Afrikaner organisations, businesses, unions, schools, clubs, and churches to counter the dominance of British institutions and to provide a degree of cocooning for Afrikaners requiring their loyalty and adherence to authority (Bekker & Grobbelaar 1987; Hyslop 2000; Marks & Trapido 1987).

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4 To demonstrate God had willed diversity the story of the tower of Babel in Genesis 11 verses 6 and 9, and readings from Deuteronomy 32 verse 8 and Acts 17 verse 26 were often cited (De Klerk 1976; Graybill 2002; Kinghorn 1994; Nicol in Cronjé 1947). Groenewald in Cronjé (1947) writes God’s blessing rests on respecting his will and that the ordinances of creation are grounded in racial difference. Noah’s curse on Ham in Genesis 9 verses 21 to 26, and Genesis 10 verse 6 was used as justification for differential treatment (Giliomee 2003).
4.3.5 Race policies

During this period blacks attempted to persuade the government through dialogue and in sporadic protest, planned and spontaneous, as well as violent and peaceful, to repeal discriminatory legislation, address the poor socio-economic conditions they faced and follow a more inclusive path in politics without success. The South African Native National Congress (later renamed African National Congress [ANC]) was established in 1912. In the course of time it went through realignment to become a broader based movement and took a more militant stance. Very few whites supported the cause of blacks politically. Whites belonging to the Communist Party probably became the most extensively engaged in this regard. However white and black opposition to the racial policies was fragmented and there was mistrust as well at their real interest and involvement of whites (Davenport 1987; Lodge 1983; Meredith 2002).

Since Union segregationist policies ensuring political and economic hegemony and thereby the continuous dominance of whites enjoyed wide support from the electorate. The social controls embedded within the Natives Land Act (1913), adapted from the Canadian settler society, introduced the notion of reserves, and the Natives Urban Areas Act (1923) amended and consolidated several times subsequently, adapted from the Australian settler society, restricted access to urban areas controlling an influx of black African labourers. These measures regulating black African migration, settlement and employment served to meet demands of both commercial farming and mining, with regard to labour. The effect was to divide access to land unequally and control the movement of the indigenous population. In spite of its peculiarities South Africa reflected characteristics of white settler societies elsewhere in providing a justification for exercising domination over other groups and maintaining a privileged position (Cell 1982; Dubow 1987; James & Lever 2001; Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995; Worden 1995)

Poor sanitation was frequently used to declare areas a threat to public health and used as pretext for establishing segregated residential areas and amenities in urban areas in
the Union, as well as to establish greater control through regulation. The 1914 Tuberculosis Commission highlighted squalid living conditions and health risks posed by the lack of rudimentary infrastructure in Black settlements. Consequently the Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission and statutory Native Affairs Commission, set up under the Native Affairs Act of 1920, proposed measures to regulate black African migration settlement and employment (De Kiewiet 1941; Davenport 1987; Dubow 1987; Horrell 1978; Ticktin 1991).

An Afrikaner nationalist and white labour alliance gained control in 1924. Recognising the official status of Afrikaans\(^5\) in 1925, a second flag in 1926 and second anthem eventually in 1938, met Afrikaners’ existential and emotional needs. Numerous legislative arrangements introduced by the pact-government enforcing social exclusion and maintaining economic advantage for whites met instrumental needs. Some of these measures were amendments, strengthening legislation introduced by the previous government. The composition of the predominantly English-speaking civil service started to change gradually as more Afrikaners were purposively hired (Gilliomee & Schlemmer 1989; Roberts & Trollip 1947). De Villiers (1990:278) notes:

> You didn’t hear too many English-speakers kicking and screaming either – not about Hertzog’s native policies. They were worried mostly about the dumping of the Union Jack as the national flag...

De Kiewiet (1941:224) describes this alliance as “a white people’s front against the natives”. In the context of a ‘civilised labour policy’ white workers were protected from competition, given preferential access, higher wages and opportunity for mobility. Posel (1999:101) comments

> In particular, Roediger’s concept of the ‘wages of whiteness’ (drawn from du Bois) has some obvious and important resonances in the South African case in so far as white workers were beneficiaries of a series of racially constructed and discriminatory privileges.

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\(^5\) Dutch had been recognised as an official language together with English in the South Africa Act constituting the Union. Leaders had long ago recognised the status differential between formal Dutch and an emerging Afrikaans. Given the use of Afrikaans in everyday contexts, they agitated for its recognition in the public sphere.
Hertzog agreed to a call for a coalition with the United Party to address the serious social and economic issues brought about by the Depression and eventually to the formation of a fusion government. Having secured the position of Afrikaners he was amenable to co-operation between Afrikaans and English speakers loyal to South Africa. Malan disagreed, regarding it as a threat to Afrikanerdom. He adhered to a more overt expression of an ethnically exclusive Afrikaner nationalism opposed to English-speakers who were seen as being loyal to their British roots. As a result he formed the breakaway purified Nationalists and Colonel Stallard formed the Dominion Party in Natal, agitating for closer links to Britain (Harrison 1987; Roberts & Trollip 1947).

Worden (1995) argues that the notion of ‘black peril’ was entrenched in Hertzog’s speeches defending segregation by the late 1920s. Lewsen (1988:15-16) points out that

> The principle of a non-racial vote had become increasingly obnoxious to Afrikaners and English-speakers alike.

This climate ruled out an extension of franchise in other provinces. There was ambivalence within the National Party with regard to coloured people. The abolition of qualifications for white voters and extension of the franchise to white females in the 1930s diluted the impact of the coloured vote. Cape African’s were removed from the common role in 1936 although Smuts baulked at constitutional change initially (Slabbert & Welsh 1979).

Some Afrikaners warned against mistreating other racial groups referring to its consequences. In this regard, Steyn (1987:121) cites the following commentary in *Die Handhawer* 1934:

> Which culture are they going to support, English or Afrikaans? Is this not perhaps the location where the contest between the white cultures will be settled eventually? [Translated – see endnote4]

O’Meara (1983) points out that by 1932 the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), suspected in the northern provinces of being sympathetic towards equality for
coloureds, started supporting policies protecting the identities of peoples’ (‘volke’). The church in supporting Nationalist policy fully played an active role in promoting a number of initiatives and interventions to protect whites subsequently.

The influx of poor whites, many Afrikaners, to urban areas, furthermore introduced a new dynamic as these poor whites often lived in shanty towns alongside people from other races. Residential mixing between poor whites and other race groups triggered a moral panic among leaders adhering to middle-class sensibilities about lapsed whites. Such concerns were not unique to South Africa and were raised in other colonial contexts. Dubow (1997:75-76) points out

…‘poor whiteism’ was a perfect illustration of the inevitable tendency of civilisation to decline. …Miscegenation, particularly among the working classes, was seen to sap the fibre of white civilisation at its most vulnerable point.

Residential mixing implied equal-status interpersonal contact with a racial other. Miscegenation was considered degrading whiteness and emerged as a new threat besides Anglicisation in the context of economic depression and poor-whiteism. Official reports on the problem of poverty often contemplated issues of morality and respectability. The United Party government appointed a commission to deliberate on mixed marriages in 1938 as a result of lobbying by the DRC (Harrison 1987; Sparks 1990; Wade 2002). De Kiewiet (1941:222) points out that, conscious of the fact that they were numerically a minority “[t]he solidarity of white society and the integrity of its blood were supreme values.”

Lever (1978) points out that since Union a number of commissions of inquiry and church conferences paid attention to the poor white problem, addressing issues such as dependence on the state and lack of initiative, whilst black poverty was ignored and rather regarded a normal condition of native life. According to De Kiewiet (1941:220),

It was a condition different from the poverty suffered by whites. The mitigation of white poverty, therefore, had precedence over the mitigation of native poverty.
Authorities within the settler society recognised the problem of impoverishment and the white depopulation of rural areas (hence ‘blackening’). They set out to dispense privileges and material benefits in rural areas through policies such as providing assistance to white farmers and stabilising market prices. The farming community was seen as a bulwark of white Christian civilisation. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:9) point out that

white poverty was no longer seen as a class issue, but explicitly as a racial issue. ...it was considered a threat to white supremacy, requiring state intervention.

The government established the notion of civilised labour and job reservation, resulting in ‘labour aristocracies’, protecting the position of and better wages for white workers. There was compensation in terms of status in addition to the wage differential. Assumptions of white solidarity, then, displaced class divisions. Yet this welfare occurred within a context of containing and moralising the poor, whilst re-establishing a hierarchy (Adam 1971; Posel 1999; Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995).

For a significant number of Afrikaners the English remained their primary adversary and participation on the side of the allied forces in the Second World War was divisive resulting in a political realignment. After losing a motion for neutrality in parliament, Hertzog and his followers withdrew from the United Party. Outmanoeuvred by the ‘gesuiwerde’ (purified) Nationalists at the provincial congress in the Free State of the recently re-unified National Party, Hertzog found the cultural and linguistic equality proposed inadequate, sparking a ‘hereniging’ (reunification) crisis and resigned in principle (Cillé 1990; Roberts & Trollip 1947; Steyn 2002). According to De Villiers (1990:282):

He saw they wanted not a broader South Africanism but Afrikaner domination.

Roberts and Trollip (1947) indicates that Malan moved quickly to defuse the crisis and prevent a rift in Afrikanerdom and ‘volkseenheid’ (people’s unity) containing it to some ‘afskilfering’ (splittering). With a strong press behind him and organised party machine the purified-faction retained their position as the backbone of the
nationalists. However, besides dealing with and limiting the influence of the Hertzogites in the new Afrikaner Party, Malan, espousing constitutional republicanism, had to neutralise more serious threats from the populist ‘Handhawersbond’ (League of Defenders), ‘Nuwe Orde’ (New Orderites) and ‘Ossewa-Brandwag’ (Ox-wagon Watch Guard), each laying claim to representing Afrikaner ideals, in order to retain the gravity of the people’s leadership within a parliamentary setting and maintain allegiance to the party as home of a unified people.

The 1943 election, contested under difficult conditions, appeared to endorse the position of the United Party which increased its representation. The re-unified National Party increased its representation slightly. However, Roberts and Trollip (1947) suggests a closer scrutiny of the results suggest that the tide was turning for Malan. His adversaries within the domain of nationalist politics had been annihilated in the election. The success of Malan positioned himself to claim the mantle of nationalist Afrikanerdom.

4.3.6 Concluding remarks

The Union of South Africa provided an opportunity to gradually forge unity among Afrikaners. The notion of Afrikanership as well as relations with English speakers and Britain were contested issues. Against attempts to forge a greater South Africanness through conciliation, Afrikaner leaders fought to secure the position of Afrikaners first. Amongst them there were differences. The hard-line nationalists built an extensive social, cultural and economic network enabling them to increasingly capture grass-roots support for their vision. Afrikaners grasped at nationalism as a result of their insecurity, rather than as a consequence of their sense of superiority. An inward-looking Afrikaner nationalism developed viewing language, culture and race, as fundamental organising principles in society. The racial segregation established in a pre-capitalist context was strengthened during this period and enjoyed broad public support amongst whites.
4.4 Afrikaner nationalist hegemony

The electoral success of the National Party in 1948 marks the beginning of a period of Afrikaner nationalist hegemony within a context of rising African nationalism as the first black African states gained independence from their colonisers after the Second World War in the nineteen fifties. Adam (1971), Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989), Marx (1997) and Slabbert (2000) provide an overview of this turbulent period in which the exclusion of the racial other was intensified as segregation was institutionalised and strengthened through the policy of apartheid in an attempt to retain power and privilege for a white minority. The concerns that had featured in white politics since Union remained matters that received attention, videlicet the relationship with Britain, relationship between whites, and policies towards non-whites.

4.4.1 The 1948 election

In the preceding section I have pointed out that the Afrikaner nationalists mobilised a diverse constituency by emphasising a ‘volk’, reflecting on their shared historical persecution at the hands of the imperialist British, whose actions threatened their way of life and language. However, there was also a growing awareness of the threat a black African urban proletariat posed for their pursuit to economically advance their people. Hence, both Afrikaner identity and white interests were key electoral issues (Grobbelaar 1991).

In this context they campaigned for single-medium language schools, acknowledged rights of English speakers and downplayed their Republican ideal. Multi-racial labour unions were presented as posing a communist threat. Exploiting white fears – liberalism, equality and integration were denounced in favour of segregation, required to ensure survival of the white race. The United Party was attacked for so-called ambivalence on race relations. Exploiting comments by (klein Jan) Hofmeyr on representation for other race groups in parliament they raised the concerns of black peril, swamping and ‘gelykstelling’ (equalisation). This conjured up images of a
people under siege with their survival at stake, dangers which threatened Western civilisation and were repeatedly exploited in subsequent elections. Their election platform then was carefully calibrated to attract Afrikaner labour by promising to represent their interests for advancement and therefore to drive a wedge between them and other labourers (particularly of colour) and more moderate Afrikaners (by not antagonising relations with the English-speakers) besides the nationalist faithful (Kapp 1987; Lewsen 1988; Meredith 2005).

This strategy resulted in a surprise electoral victory with a realignment of many rural and some working-class constituencies behind them. Although they did not capture an outright majority in the popular vote, the Westminster system gave them a slim parliamentary majority together with their minority partners. A primary concern then for the Nationalists was to consolidate their support among Afrikaners and in this regard they continued with their broad based mobilisation within civil society. Subsequent election results during the 1950s and early 1960s attest to their success in uniting a majority of Afrikaners behind them. To achieve this they relied on the cross cutting network of organisations they had built up in civil society. The hold of the nationalists on Afrikanerdom was firm but not complete. Afrikaner dissidents were ostracised in their quest to shape and maintain ‘volkseenheid’ (people’s unity) within their nationalist ambit. These dissidents were hounded out and excluded from the cocooning but also isolating structures. The price paid was stifling critical reflection (De Villiers 1990; Meredith 2005; O’Meara 1983; Steyn 2002).

For instance the Voortrekker youth movement, established on Christian-Nationalist grounds in 1931 for Afrikaans-speaking youth, served as an alternative to the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides movements. The Voortrekker pledge reads ‘I will always and everywhere try to be a Voortrekker, to be obedient, to love my Country, my “Volk” (people) and above all the Lord’ [My own translation of: “Ek sal oral en altyd probeer om ‘n Voortrekker te wees, om gehoorsaam te wees, om my Land en my Volk en bo alles die Here lief te hê.”]. SABRA, the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs was established in 1948 with the objective to promote good race relations between people. In contrast the English dominated South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) had been established by liberals in 1929 to promote an improvement in race relations (Sparks 1990; www.sairr.org.za).

The poet DJ Opperman argued that instead of drawing others to them Afrikaners repulsed them, NP van Wyk Louw wrote a series of essays on the theme ‘survival in justice’, and the theologian, Keet, described apartheid as deserting Christian principles. Whilst they raised their criticism from within Afrikanerdom, it led to a rupture in some instances. A prominent example is the reaction to Beyers Naudé in response to the critique of apartheid contained in the Cottesloe resolutions, an inter-denominational questioning of its scriptural base, adopted after the Sharpeville-massacre in 1960. He was forced to resign his position as moderator of the Southern Transvaal synod of the Dutch Reformed
Scholars have disagreed on the role that apartheid played in the Nationalists’ electoral success in 1948. Apartheid had not yet been fully developed as a policy. Some argue voters voted against integration rather than for apartheid (Davenport 1987; Meredith 2005; Sparks 1990). The Afrikaner-English rivalry and quest to retain political control impacted on racial policies. For instance, the nationalists subsequently discouraged European immigration, fearing it would dilute the influence of their Afrikaner base. This course of action ran against a pure ‘racial logic’ of strengthening the number of whites in comparison to blacks. However, it secured the Afrikaner political dominance. Fear of losing political control also led to an estrangement from coloureds culturally closer to them, but who potentially were supporters of the United Party and therefore removed from the common voters roll in the Cape where they enjoyed franchise and could tip the balance of power. From the perspective of Afrikaner nationalists the 1948 election was seen as a victory over British imperial interests (Adam et al. 1997; Davenport 1987). De Klerk (1976:233) points out that

\[f\]or many, the hand of Providence was once more unmistakably in evidence – as it had been at Vegkop, Blood River and Majuba...\]

This affirmed the Afrikaner mythology that their history is characterised by losses and disasters, only to rebound strongly. He contends Malan, the first Prime Minister, had a simplistic view of apartheid, Strijdom an even a more banal notion linked to white bossism, and that it was Verwoerd in particular, that played a key role in the development of apartheid as policy.

4.4.2 Consolidation of power

The consequence of the victory was a cabinet constituted entirely by Afrikaners for the first time since union. This realised the Afrikaner nationalist dream to capture the Church and eventually defrocked. As a ‘volksverraaier’ (traitor of the people) a banning order was served on him, placing him under house arrest. Breyten Breytenbach was subsequently also regarded a traitor (Giliomee 1994; Sparks 1990; Steyn 2002; Villa-Vicencio 1995).

8 Vegkop refers to a battle in 1836 where a numerically strong Matabele force were repelled by a small number of Voortrekkers. Blood River refers to a decisive Voortrekker victory in 1838 against the
state and secure their future as a dominant minority. It gave them access to state patronage where the state bureaucracy and nationalised enterprises (para-statals) served as a key vehicle to ensure the advancement of Afrikaners to a middle-class status. The rapid expansion and changing ethnic composition of the civil service where Afrikaners were eventually disproportionately represented ensured greater loyalty. Associated with this Afrikanerisation, initially, was a stereotypical notion that new incumbents were incompetent and mediocre. In effect the state became the largest employer. Eventually one out of five whites was employed in the public service. The government also promoted Afrikaner interests in commerce and gains were also made in this sphere over time. By the end of the 1960s the difference in per capita income between the Afrikaners and English had narrowed from under half to about two-thirds. These gains were also reflected in better educational qualifications (Harrison 1987; Marks & Trapido 1987; Meredith 2005; Posel 1999; Van der Merwe et al. 1974).

According to De Klerk (1976), nationalists tried to protect and preserve Afrikaner identity culturally by shielding the community from English influences. The fear that English may overwhelm Afrikaans, thereby weakening traditional bonds was entrenched and had a profound impact on education policy. Whereas the United Party introduced dual-medium schools to foster a broader South Africanness, the nationalists reversed this programme. Single-medium instruction made ideological indoctrination easier and removed potential contaminating influences, securing Afrikaner identity and national pride. For example, the Rand Afrikaans University established, much later, in the ‘volksvreemde’ (alien to the people) Johannesburg countered the liberalism, humanism and communism prevalent at the University of the Witwatersrand. Christian National education was institutionalised. There was the idea of subtly Afrikanerising English-speaking pupils who were increasingly taught by Afrikaans speaking teachers. In Afrikaner schools the value of loyalty and

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powerful Zulu nation. Majuba refers to a decisive battle against the British in 1881 during the first war of liberation. In all three battles the Boers were outnumbered by their adversaries (Muller 1981).

9 According to Charney (1984) Afrikaner control over private industry increased from 10% in 1948 to 21% in 1975. The number of Afrikaners in professions doubled and white collar employment increased from 28% to 65% over this period.
obedience to leaders was instilled and a nationalist history occupied a particular position in reminding scholars about their place in society and core values. At a later stage concern was aired at scholars’ lack of enthusiasm for history as a subject. Within textbooks racial domination was normalised and stereotypes of a racial other perpetuated whilst the positive contributions of whites were emphasised. Encapsulating Afrikaners in separate institutions facilitated socialisation into the nationalist movement (Du Toit 1999; Louw 2001; Randal 2000). Van der Merwe et al. (1974) describe this as a ‘total’ approach orientated towards ensuring loyal Afrikanerdom.

The ambivalence towards the English-speakers declined, at least at official level, after the Republic was established in 1961. Although their commitment to Britain had declined steadily, the Republic deprived many white English-speakers of a symbolic link. Sparks (1990) contends he felt ‘emotionally stateless’. Assurances of a broader South Africanism were given as the threat to this long held Afrikaner ideal had been overcome and the ruling party realised the demographic limitations of its ethnic base. It shifted attention from an exclusive Afrikaner orientation towards a broader white solidarity. This strategy led to growing English support for the National party from the 1960s onwards as political and economic interests converged around maintaining power and privilege within a context of rising black political aspirations and demands, rising international condemnation and pressure, as well as an Afrikaner rift and conservative political backlash (Lever 1978; Marx 1997; Palmberg 1999; Thompson 2001; Van der Merwe 1974).

The broadcasting sector was firmly under government control and Afrikaner print-media almost exclusively pro-Nationalist. When content diverged from the government line, editors or producers were summoned to explain. A covert strategy of establishing a pro-government English daily paper to counter the more critical English-language press was exposed by the so-called Information Scandal which broke in the mid-1970s. The arrival of television, albeit under state control, had a profound effect by bringing visual images of black protest into the homes of whites. Censorship regulations kept a check on other media publications and constrained their
reporting. There were therefore very few alternative perspectives available to the population. In most instances the illusion of a white country was created. On the fringe there were publications with limited circulation which challenged government policy and reported more boldly (Louw 2001; Schoeman 1974; Steyn 2002).

4.4.3 Attending to the racial order

Afrikaner nationalism served as a vanguard in the battle against emerging black nationalism. De Klerk (1976) suggests Verwoerd had recognised a broader ‘white’ nation already in 1938. Afrikaners, considering themselves as pioneers laying the foundation of western civilisation in Africa, laid special claim to the state. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:94) contend that nationalists

set up Afrikaners as the core group on whom the privileges and security of the larger white group depended. It thus recruited all whites regardless of their party political affiliation, to uphold both the Afrikaner-controlled political order and the capitalist system.

Verwoerd became the prime architect and driving force of the policy of apartheid, sold to an electorate as the complete solution to the problems whites faced in Africa. Ironically they had to enforce the so-called self-evident groupings legislatively. The policy of apartheid was presented as preventing friction, casting society in terms of a socio-political ideal in securing racial and cultural diversity, and hence white survival. As the National Party consolidated its position a comprehensive framework of laws were enacted, in spite of opposition, to regulate relations between statutorily defined population groups. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, passed in 1949, and The Immorality Act, amended in 1950, protected ‘whites’ from racial mixing elevating unwritten practices to law. The Population Registration Act\textsuperscript{10} formalised racial ascription, reflecting the power to define the ‘other’ in order to control and regulate them. With the Group Areas Act\textsuperscript{11}, passed in 1950, it constituted key pillars of

\textsuperscript{10} James and Lever (2001) point out that the four main statutorily defined categories identified are diverse. The coloureds are the most diverse with ancestry traceable to either Asia or Africa and constitute a residual category. Indians arrived from various regions on the Indian subcontinent.

\textsuperscript{11} Settlement of black Africans had been affected by earlier legislation. In total over two million Africans were resettled in homeland territories from ‘white farming areas’ or as the result of township reallocation. Group areas which empowered the government to reserve areas for statutorily defined
apartheid, reinforcing the racial grid. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 and State Aided Institutions Act of 1957 enshrined entitlements for whites but did not require equal facilities for others. Legislation laid a foundation for complete residential and social segregation. Enforced strictly, the social, economic and political opportunities of people were affected. This established an institutionalised all-embracing notion of a racial order maintaining distance between those classified white and the racial other. The Department of Native Affairs as the vanguard of apartheid policy making had the fastest growing bureaucracy over this period (Davenport 1987; Horrell 1978; Posel 1999; West 1988). The sheer extent of state intervention is demonstrated by De Klerk (1976:236,241) who refers to a “torrent of legislation” noting that the administration managing the system of apartheid increased by forty-two percent between 1962 and 1967. He argues

[n]ever in history have so few legislated so programatically, thoroughly and religiously, in such a short time …with such a high sense of purpose, vocation and idealism.

These processes were not viewed as immoral or racist. Verwoerd drew on moral justifications developed by academics to soothe the Afrikaner conscience. As it evolved, euphemisms such as separate development were co-opted to mask the naked racism underpinning the policy. South Africa was viewed as the legitimate domain of whites. The presence of racial others in ‘white areas’ were defined as a problem requiring control. Maintaining strict separation countered social contact and assimilation which potentially threatened white economic and political power (Schlemmer 1987). Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:35) points out that

Drawing on Afrikaners’ own ethnic mobilisation, apartheid ideologues projected on to other groups similar ethnic and nationalist aspirations.

This became the prevailing state ideology, ordering the political accommodation of blacks along ethnic lines, within their own territories or institutions. However, Verwoerd baulked at the investment the Tomlinson commission suggested was
required to make such a policy viable. It furthermore intended to prevent the development of common interests. The fervour with which this policy was pursued demonstrated intolerance (Jung 2000; Yudelman 1984).

Apartheid, whilst benefiting Afrikaners, secured the interests of all whites. Reflecting on his visit to South Africa in the 1960s, Hochschild (1990) comments on how he was struck by how whites either denied or normalised their privileged position. He points out that when they were faced with the disparities, few sought actively to change it. Most whites enjoyed an undisturbed suburban lifestyle, where blacks provided the labour for menial jobs. Louw (2001) suggests that the policy was so successful, whites generally knew very little of the ‘other’. Amongst white South Africans racial categorisation was accepted and appeared to reflect in common sense a normal and given distinction within society. Le Roux (1986:186) notes

Although my parents were ardent nationalists, I do not remember being warned to stay away from the African compound or having any fear of Africans. If there was group friction, it was with the English.

English speakers felt politically sidelined whilst retaining control over the economy. Giliomee (2003:492) argues the difference was tactical rather than principled:

While there was very little difference between Afrikaners and English-speakers in their support for white supremacy, residential segregation and migrant labour … They found the crude expression of racism distasteful and resented being shut out from power.

Several scholars observe that English speakers were conservative and had a sense of cultural superiority (Adam 1971; Cell 1982; Paton 1981; Sparks 2003).

4.4.4 Challenges and realignments

As in previous periods blacks attempted to persuade the white rulers through dialogue and protest against discriminatory legislation, practices and poor socio-economic conditions. According to Davenport (1987), black Africans in rural areas resented controls being implemented and their resistance intensified during the 1950s. The Defiance Campaign launched in 1952 was the first mass mobilisation against
repressive legislation that occurred in this period. To maintain its firm grip, the government passed legislation such as The Suppression of Communism Act which defined communism broadly to include many forms of opposition. It used harsh security measures contained in legislation to counter resistance, neutralise challenges and ensure compliance. As the resistance grew additional measures to counter it were added and strengthened, enabling totalitarian control (Hochschild 1990; L’Ange 2005; Meredith 2005; Van Jaarsveld 1978). De Klerk (1976:335) contended

In the case of the Afrikaners, who only fully came to power in the post-Second World War world, it is not Anglo-Saxon South Africa – their old opponent – which comes into the picture, but those who remain alienated from the true body politic: a proletariat on the periphery.

The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 triggered a moral outcry both internally and internationally against state brutality and repression. Verwoerd, realising the threat posed by the Cottesloe resolutions (see footnote 7), summoned Afrikaner delegates from whom he demanded a retraction reminding them of their duty to their people. In an official response to these resolutions the Dutch Reformed Church branded individualistic humanism, the doctrine of equalisation and the thrust towards unity as threats to continued Christian civilisation in South Africa. A key contribution to this rebuttal was a series of articles by Dr AP Treurnicht, editor of the church’s weekly, *Die Kerkbode* (De Klerk 1976; Giliomee 2003; Steyn 2002).

Black resistance took a more confrontational form in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre transforming the political context of the period. A campaign of sabotage was launched by the military wings established. The stringent security measures forced leaders into exile. The conflict heightened white insecurity significantly at a time ‘uhuru’ was sweeping across Africa. It would eventually ignite a black consciousness and greater assertiveness locally. Most whites approved effective state repression of black resistance (Du Toit 1999; Schutte 1995; Southall 2001).

Several studies suggest a shifting dynamic within the dominant Afrikaner group as a class realignment occurred. Everyone did not benefit equally, undermining their collective sense of common interest and solidarity as embourgeoisement weakened
ethnic allegiance. Working class whites supported traditional principles to protect their more vulnerable position. De Klerk (1976) notes that middle-class urban Afrikaners entered the consumer society, with their politics mediated less by ethnicity and more by race and class interests. Security and prosperity became key concerns. Afrikaner capital also increasingly played a dominant role within the party. More affluent and educated than before, many of the barriers that were erected earlier were no longer needed as protection from competition. This placed a strain on the cross-class Afrikaner alliance. A significant number of Afrikaners started acting in terms of class rather than ethnic interests, creating conditions amenable for change (Adam & Moodley 1993; Charney 1984; Hyslop 2000; Lever 1978; Marks & Trapido 1987; Schlemmer 1997).

The first split in the ruling party during this period confirmed that the recent Afrikaner unity was not historically inevitable. Vorster succeeded in containing its impact by expelling leading ‘verkramptes’ (hardliners) from the party. Later the Broederbond secured the party’s grip on extra-parliamentary Afrikaner organisations in civil society. Pragmatic shifts in policy differences with regard to establishing diplomatic relations with friendly African states, fostering co-operation with English speakers, immigration, and allowing greater flexibility with regard to racial participation in international sport events precipitated the split. These policy shifts were seen as deviating from Verwoerdist principles and regarded a consequence of the undermining influence of liberalism which would encourage another round of concessions due to international pressure.12 The ‘verkramptes’ predicted integration in sport would lead to integration at work, followed by social integration and eventually racial assimilation. Liberalism was regarded dangerous because, in contrast to communism, it often arose in a ‘camouflaged’ form (Grobbelaar 1991; Louw 2001).

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12 Albert Hertzog, subsequently leader of the Refounded National Party (HNP), addressed parliament on 14 April 1969 on the importance of Afrikaner Calvinism for the survival of white civilisation during the build-up to the split. He contended liberalism, which he associated with the English, threatened nationalism with its abstract notion of human rights. In response Vorster, using imagery that appealed to the traditional populist base of the party, acknowledged Calvinist principles, reminded the house some English-speakers were also Calvinists, but concluded that it was not the prerequisite for co-operation with them (Schoeman 1974).
By the 1970s the effect of regional changes were felt with an escalation of political and economic pressure. Neighbouring colonies imploded, heightening a sense of internal and external threats. This drew the South African military into regional battles and dragged the country into Cold War politics as the phrase ‘total onslaught’ was coined. Assessing the situation on the subcontinent Rhodesians were encouraged to negotiate, a step decried by the HNP as selling-out white neighbours. These changes in neighbouring countries boosted the morale of black, coloured and Indian communities resulting in rejuvenated internal resistance to the state (Charney 1984; Meredith 2005; Sparks 2003). According to Slabbert and Welsh (1979), the options were between a politics of siege or politics of negotiation. Boot-Siertsema and Boot (1982) discuss interviews with a range of South Africans which provide insight in how they responded to events and key questions in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.

Yudelman (1984) argues the state faced a growing challenge as organised black labour regained initiative during the 1970s. Although the policy of apartheid had been effectively implemented, the ideology convinced the main beneficiaries only. Afrikaner churches were challenged over their biblical justification of policy. Contradictions between the policy ideals and reality became more apparent by the mid 1970s. Whilst the position of the black working class was reassessed, allies amongst the coloured and Indian minorities were being courted. Within these changing circumstances, Afrikaners increasingly questioned the efficacy of apartheid policy and success of the state’s social engineering. The Theron Commission on the position of coloureds raised questions about policy initiatives, whilst the Cillie Commission into the student uprisings portrayed apartheid policies as part of the problem, rather than the solution (Marx 1997). In a sobering assessment de Klerk (1976) warned that a small privileged minority could not maintain their security in the long run, that conflict with the majority would fan resistance and generate international sympathy resulting in their isolation and the threat of economic sanctions. Van Jaarsveld (1978:5) describes the situation in the late 1970s as

For the Afrikaner it can be summarised in one word, for various reasons: crisis. ...In the past the Afrikaner acted as if he was the only nationally
conscious ‘volk’ or nation which could legislate within the totality of South Africa for the rest of the population without consulting them about it. [Translated – see endnote5]

4.4.5 Reforming apartheid

Changes in discourse in an attempt to preserve white supremacy and deflect criticism had not succeeded. The need to adapt apartheid to changing circumstances was mooted. The moral condemnation of apartheid added to pressure on the government as it sought to reform the system. To convey the urgency of the situation to the electorate and mobilise them in the face of growing pressure brought about by internal militancy, economic stagnation, foreign condemnation and changing demographics, the ruling party invoked slogans like “adapt or die” and “apartheid is dead” (Giliomee 2003; Harrison 1987; Jung 2000).

Realignment occurred within the National Party as PW Botha, the Minister of Defence – a ‘verligte’ (enlightened implying reform minded), emerged as the new leader in a context of multiple crises and internal division. The new Prime Minister reorganised both party and governance structures leading to a centralisation of authority (Charney 1984; Sharp 1988b). Posel (1999:110) notes

By the late 1970s, after decades of being indulged by the National Party’s patronage, the rump of the civil service was simply too big and comfortably entrenched for Botha to have undertaken major bureaucratic reforms without running the risk of alienating a large segment of his electoral support among civil servants. However, his ‘rationalisation’ drive did create the opportunity to reconfigure power relations in the top echelons of the civil service...

This technocratic approach to reform extended governmental control. A National Security Management System (NSMS) managed a ‘total strategy’, combining repressive security measures and reformist measures. The slow unravelling of apartheid began with legalising black trade unions, relaxing of petty apartheid-measures, opening some public amenities and accelerating social spending (Worden 1995; Yudelman 1984).

Slabbert (2000) argues the government’s unilateral decision on what would be offered
and who would be included did not reflect a real spirit of negotiation politics. It reflected an assumption that whites could resolve political problems. Afrikaners were still wedded to the basic tenets of Afrikaner nationalism. A number of strategies were devised to retain power whilst providing an illusion of sharing it. The constitutional changes proposed attempted to co-opt coloured and Indian communities into the dominant white political system whilst excluding blacks. Segregation was still to be maintained with regard to residential areas, schools and hospitals, for instance. This was billed power sharing, but final control remained in white hands and the basic premise of segregation was retained. Limited concessions were made in the constitutional amendments for representation of urban blacks on separate local government structures at municipal level. Proposals to tighten influx control were eventually dropped. The homelands, which were intended to eventually gain independence, were meant to provide an outlet for any further political aspirations effectively denationalising them (Charney 1984; Harrison 1987; Hindson 1987; Neocosmos 2006; Thompson 2001). According to Boulle (1985), the institutional changes brought about by the tricameral system increased executive control and therefore implied greater centralisation. This reflected a reform/control paradox.

The constitutional reform of the late 1970s and 1980s elicited an intense battle amongst Afrikaners. The Afrikaner support for the National Party was eroded significantly in the 1981 election with almost a third voting for the ultra-right HNP, which still failed to win a seat in the Westminster system (Du Toit 1999). Grobbelaar (1991) argues that part of the rise in HNP support was a result of dissatisfaction at Botha’s leadership style and his reorganisation of the civil service.

Against the backdrop of constitutional proposals Boshoff (1982) emphasised the importance of recognising diversity and maintaining “volkere-eiesoortigheid” (the uniqueness of a peoplehood) in an HF Verwoerd-commemorative lecture. The reforms led to a major split of the National Party in 1982 triggering intense conflict within institutions of Afrikanerdom. The Conservative Party (CP) set out to become ‘the torchbearer’ of a reconstituted Afrikaner nationalism. The CP argued that key policy principles were betrayed and that the public were misled about what the real
consequences of the reform eventually would be – a compromise of white power. Power sharing, although limited, was seen as the start of a slippery slope to integration. Reactionary conservatively aligned groups were concerned that reforms would result in irreversible integration and assimilation. They started building a ‘Volksfront’ (People’s Front), a network of organisations to mobilise Afrikaner support in civil society and revitalise nationalism. Commemorative treks were organised in 1988 to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Blood River. Given the schism in Afrikanerdom, two rival treks were organised, known as the government and right-wing trek, both competing for Afrikaners’ allegiance, with the right-wing dominating these nostalgic celebrations (Charney 1984; Du Toit 1999; Grobbelaar 1998; Hochschild 1990; Schutte 1995). A split would occur at a later stage in the Dutch Reformed Church when the church publicly admitted that it erred in providing scriptural justification for apartheid.13

Two thirds of the white electorate supported the constitutional proposal for a tricameral parliament in a referendum in 1983.

In subsequent elections a rightward drift occurred as the National Party shed Afrikaner support, but the mobilisation of the ‘volk’ they hoped for had not materialised (De Villiers 1990; Harrison 1987). The Conservative Party was not exclusively an ethnic party and it managed to draw support from right-wing English-speakers. A significant rise in English support for the National Party in the unsettling times, which according to Jung (2000) had increased the salience of whiteness, kept the National Party in power.

Attempts to co-opt blacks to defuse the political situation were complex and doomed to failure. Voter turnouts in tri-cameral elections for the newly incorporated groups where black consciousness had been making inroads were below one fifth of the potential voters. The low polls in elections for Black Local Authorities underlined

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13 Over a period of time forty ministers and 30 000 members resigned from the DRC in protest at this ‘politicisation’ of the church. They established the ‘apolitical’ Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk in 1987 (Jung 2000; Sparks 2000).
their lack of legitimacy. This reflected both their alienation and black rejection of the reforms. The constitutional amendments did not meet rising expectations or alter relations fundamentally with the result of increasing pressure on numerous fronts to bring about change (Cillié 1990; Marks & Trapido 1987; Mashabela 1989).

These reforms failed to stem the spiral of resistance. It strengthened the politics of resistance. The emergence of a broad based coalition, the United Democratic Front (UDF), later the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) consolidated extra-parliamentary opposition. In urban black African areas resentment at their exclusion and the rejection of measures instituted at local level provoked resistance driven by a popular mass upsurge and resulted in a deepening crisis of legitimacy. This resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency with the National Security Management System playing a key role in co-ordinating strategy on the state side leading to cycles of fierce revolt and harsh repression. The politics of siege and coercion occurred as the legitimacy crises remained unresolved. Internal protest brought about a degree of insecurity and polarisation. The instability and cycle of violence and suppression led to the flight of capital. Consequently politics within South Africa were increasingly characterised by a siege mentality in the face of sustained opposition. Draconian measures to stem this resistance resulted in a stalemate at the end of the 1980s (Friedman 1986; Grobbelaar 1998; Marx 1997; Neocosmos 2006; Waldmeir 1997). Meredith (2005:432) comments that Botha’s iron-fisted reliance on state power to protect white supremacy left South Africa without a viable political strategy, only the prospect of more violence.

Slabbert (2000) writes that he resigned from parliament in a context where it was increasingly powerless, overridden by Botha’s autocratic leadership and security structures and a robust extra-parliamentary struggle.

The reform measures did not convince the international community. The implementation of sanctions by the international community following lobbying by anti-apartheid groupings and the liberation movement against an intransigent
government raised the cost of maintaining apartheid and affected white interest. Sanctions were damaging the economy and threatening white expectations of continued prosperity (Frederickson 1997).

According to Jung (2000:112), economic security trumped ethnic allegiance and that support depended on whether material interests were maintained. This would remain a key concern.

For White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans – those people who have been called Afrikaners in the past century – race and class, not ethnicity and language, were relevant markers of political identity in the 1980s.

The mounting cost of maintaining the system became apparent and convinced an increasing number of whites of the need to seek a political solution in spite of their fears. The choice Afrikaners faced was between purity and prosperity (L’Ange 2005; Louw 2001; Waldmeir 1997). Seekings (2003) and Tomlinson (1990) suggest a shift from race towards class as an organising principle within society occurred by the 1990s and that the interests of middle-class Afrikaners and English-speakers increasingly overlapped within the context of a growing crisis in legitimising the apartheid racial order. For instance, Lemon (1991:15) observes that by the 1990s

the government must have realized its own interest in making it easier for middle-class and upwardly mobile blacks, especially Africans, to move out of segregated townships.

4.4.6 Contemplating alternatives

It was apparent that attempts to reform apartheid had failed and were not acceptable to the majority. The government’s ‘grip’ over their constituency was weakening with a number of exploratory talks, mainly symbolic in nature, between the liberation movement in exile and businessmen, politicians, academics, students, all seeking a political resolution to the impasse. By the mid-1980s the Broederbond had started to suggest the unthinkable, that the survival of Afrikaners depended on accommodating blacks politically. Operatives within the government were also clandestinely pursuing contacts. These events signalled a growing mood for change, and readiness for a

Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki were working on a new strategy: encouraging an anti-apartheid alliance between white businessmen, Afrikaner intellectuals and black homeland leaders.

Waldmeir (1997) describes these meetings as a process of seducing opponents, winning their confidence, and thereby weakening the government. Slabbert (2000:103) comments on his own initial contacts with the ANC

With hindsight one realises how infinitely more accomplished they were as politicians; to what extent it was part of their daily existence to charm a wide variety of people from all over the world and make them a part of the struggle. In a certain sense we were novices and like putty in their hands.

With the ascendancy of FW De Klerk to party leadership, the party establishment regained control in governance structures. He did not have a strong relationship with the security-establishment, was not entirely sure of their loyalty and did not consult them on policy changes. The NSMS was dismantled and the National Security Council downgraded (Jung 2000; Slabbert 2006).

It was apparent at the beginning of his tenure that the security strategy had failed and a stalemate where neither side of the conflict could prevail had been reached. Facing a potential downward spiral economically the leadership opted for negotiating a settlement at an opportune time in their estimation. Within white politics inroads by the rightwing and some recent minor left-wing gains must have weighed on the decision to seize the moment and retain initiative. The end of the Cold War where the threat of ‘communism’ had dominated the ‘total onslaught’ ideology provided an opportune opening. The government calculated that these events weakened their adversaries. Exploratory talks with Nelson Mandela, which eventually totalled 47, as well as external leaders, convinced them it was preferable to negotiate with the old guard rather than with a more radical younger generation of emerging leaders. De Klerk expected to do well, believing he could manage and control the process. It was even imagined that disorganisation within the ANC would diminish its support and that a coalition with moderate black leaders would put them in a strong position to
preserve their power (Du Toit 1999; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Giliomee 2003; Meredith 2005; Sparks, 1990; Waldmeir 1997).

The assumption that the government could control the process and out-negotiate a weakened opposition was a serious miscalculation. Louw (2001) suggests in his assessment that years of isolation as a result of apartheid fostered ‘groupthink’. It left the government out of touch. They did not recognise that their idea of protecting group-rights was an anathema. Their isolation further inculcated prejudices leading to an underestimation of the capabilities of their adversaries. The government overestimated their abilities, as Schutte (1995:25) notes

"Whites assumed that they, as a politically and culturally cohesive group, were a powerful force whose know-how and sense of order guaranteed the relative stability of the country..."

Slabbert (2000) agrees that Afrikaners belonging to a closed community cut themselves off from critical analysis and consequently a more realistic assessment. Several scholars, reflecting on the transition raise the issue that Afrikaner leaders misjudged the situation being overconfident of their own power and underestimating their adversaries.

Once the announcement was made the process became unstoppable. Structural impediments limited the degree of racial integration even though key legislative pillars of segregation were repealed during the process of negotiation. Moves by the government to privatise semi-state companies and the broadcasting media elicited strong protest from the ANC (Schutte 1995).

The process of multi-party negotiation in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was a torturous process plagued by setbacks, deadlocks, and suspension, crises which the ANC exploited to their advantage. The ANC had more astute negotiators. As the balance of power shifted with the course of time the nationalists were outmanoeuvred and were forced to make concessions (L’Ange 2005; Slabbert 2006; Waldmeir 1997).
The announcement in Parliament on 2 February 1990 to lift the state of emergency, unban political organisations and begin to negotiate was dubbed ‘red Friday’ by the rightwing. This announcement took the general public by surprise. Rightwing leaders viewed the announcement a betrayal and emphasised that this liberal and humanist decision was made unilaterally and fraudulently without consulting white people whose rights it jeopardised, in particular their Christian value system (Grobbeelaar 1998). Hauptfleish (1990:314) describes this changing context in the following way:

The struggle in Afrikaner-ranks continues, indeed. From every conceivable locality the Afrikaner is presently being crushed, precisely because he wants to be Afrikaner and white. ...Everything own to him, his language, his religious convictions, his festive days and his cultural goods, that which fed his nationalism in the past, is questioned by the liberal world and even abhorred. [Translated – see endnote6]

The rightwing strategy was to question the legitimacy of the government. Mainstream white-rightwing parties attempted to draw wider support from the white electorate until the 1992 referendum, where over two-thirds of the white electorate supported negotiations. English-speakers generally voted in favour of negotiations whilst the Afrikaner vote was split almost evenly. With the limit of their support apparent rightwing parties focused on Afrikaners (Du Toit 1999; Jung 2000). Adam et al. (1997:57) contend:

To put it bluntly, the affluent Afrikaners sold out the poorer Afrikaners because they felt more confident about their ability to either survive in, or leave “the new South Africa”.

Giliomee (2003) argues that de Klerk made a strategic error by playing this ‘trump card’ too early in negotiations, undercutting his own ability to negotiate, before concrete proposals were agreed on. He may have neutralised his right-wing white opponents in the process, but had to deal with more salted opponents in negotiations who now could claim that he had his mandate.

In the referendum the white public had voted to share political power rather than transfer political power or implement majority rule. These undertakings then also contributed to growing support for the National Party amongst the white electorate.
The ANC interpreted the outcome of the referendum differently to what the nationalists did. If the referendum had not been held at this stage of the negotiations de Klerk may have been able to extract further concessions. He had campaigned for negotiations but against majority rule. During the referendum campaign guarantees against majoritarianism were promised (Adam & Moodley 1993; Slabbert 2006; Waldmeir 1997).

The National Party initially sought a way in which the minority white segment could attain access to power and influence. The party shifted towards greater inclusiveness, aligning itself to minorities. It proposed power sharing with guarantees preventing any group dominating another. The use of ‘minority’ and measures such as decentralisation, group representation and consensus seeking, veto rights, and a collective rotating presidency did not mask the intent of these strategies to protect whites. Their attempt to secure group rights to protect minorities failed, as these proposals were viewed as forms of neo-apartheid. The ANC formally ascribed to nonracialism, and an inclusive South Africanism (Adam et al. 1997; Steyn 2002; Sparks 1990). Ndebele (1998:24) contends with regard to continued lobbying around such rights that

They are unable to link failures of the past with the need for a new moral vision which includes others. ...Their demands, however valid they may be, represent the tragic failure of social conscience.

For some observers it became apparent that the government’s negotiation was floundering. There were sharp divisions within the leadership of the ruling party on what options were available. Principal negotiators had been replaced, and the new ones were more amenable to rhetoric of liberal democracy secured by individual human rights within a single political community (Giliomee 2003). Louw (2001), in his assessment, characterises the negotiation process under De Klerk as one of “total bluff”. He argues that all principles they argued for were discarded and their denials of what the eventual outcome of the process would be, became true. Breytenbach (in Slabbert 2000:16) argues that much of the centralisation of state power was retained in the negotiated settlement so that
We are now experiencing the same obtuseness and arrogance, and a similar overlap of ruling party and state, in the new order as when the National Party was in control.

Du Toit (1999) attributes the failure to the National Party’s misreading of the process. Viewing the process and contest in ideological terms they opted for a politics of values as a guide to their actions. They believed they could capture the middle-ground and moderate black vote and consequently neglected the rights of their traditional Afrikaner constituency. Cultural matters were consequently neglected. As they lost political initiative in the process, it eventually implied capitulation rather than a negotiation of assured participation and sharing of power in an alternative system.

The newly negotiated political dispensation resulted exactly in what a majority of the Afrikaners opposed during the twentieth century, a transfer of power. Slabbert (2000) concedes that the problem of cultural minorities was not addressed and this made Afrikaners who had enjoyed the advantage of power, vulnerable, leading to confusion, a lack of direction and even alienation.

Outmanoeuvred on key issues such as securing a general amnesty, the position of Afrikaans, structure and form of government, they were searching for an escape hatch by avoiding the symbolism of defeat. Ultimately De Klerk settled for much less than he had ever imagined, and a peaceful transition of power was managed. The nationalists had to settle for universal individual rights as a mechanism to protect interests in the context of universal suffrage in a unitary state (Adam & Moodley 1993; Giliomee 2003; Jung 2000; Sparks 1990).

The debate on participation amongst the right-wing Afrikaners was intense. Most decided to remain outside the process arguing that participation implied legitimising it. This deprived Afrikaners of having their interests represented fully. Some even mooted a ‘derde vryheidstryd’ (third liberation struggle). The Conservative Party eventually split in 1992 between pragmatists who had rethought their stance towards participation and hardliners who remained intransigent. Retired generals started to play an influential role in rightwing circles. Mandela worked hard through a series of
secret meetings to draw them into the process and defuse the threat of Afrikaner-rightwing counter-revolution. To bring the more pragmatic rightwing leaders aboard an undertaking was made to allow them to explore the matter of self-determination further after the transition in a Volkstaat (People’s State) Council. Poor discipline during the Boputhatswana incursion shortly before the elections amongst ultra-right paramilitary organisations participating served to convince General Constand Viljoen that participation would be the preferable option. The Freedom Front (FF) was established as a party under his leadership (Grobbelaar 1998; Louw 2001; Schutte 1995; Waldmeir 1997).

4.4.7 Concluding remarks

As the discussion above has demonstrated, Afrikaners did play a key role in establishing and maintaining apartheid once they had secured their position of dominance. Afrikaners were not the only beneficiaries. Apartheid evolved from a policy of segregation which English-speakers had condoned. Over the course of time political realignment occurred with an increasing number of English-speakers supporting the National Party as political conflict intensified. Yudelman (1984) suggests Afrikaner nationalist mythology enabled others to portray them as the villain, and in particular, to shift responsibility on to the past. In this regard Schutte (1995:15) contends English-speakers tended to

…problematize other groups, notably the Afrikaners and the Afrikaner-led government, rather than whites in general as causes and explanations of the country’s misery.

This enabled them to disavow agency and to disassociate themselves from the underpinning racist logic, whilst enjoying the benefits of white supremacy (Ndebele 1998; Stasiulus & Yuval-Davis (1995). During the period of Afrikaner political hegemony, the governing party took a calculated risk to enter into negotiations from a position of strength. The outcome was an end to an era where white politics had dominated the country as a result of the monopoly they held over institutional power.
4.5 Transition to a post-apartheid South Africa

Contemporary historians have commented on the propensity of settlers to identify with the land and turn into ‘natives’, thereby claiming sovereignty over an area. Adam (1971:10) concurs that as links weakened there was no overseas homelands for whites to return to and

[i]t is, therefore not the right of the white tribe to live in South Africa that is questionable, but its privileged political and economic status compared with the majority of the country’s population.

Whites lived their lives in a white world which was taken for granted. Until the end of the 1980s formal power was vested in a white electorate, who had repeatedly voted for the National Party. This suggests the apartheid racial order was accepted by a majority of the white electorate. The demise of apartheid transformed the ideological, social and political context in the country. Transition to an Africanising post-apartheid South Africa implied a change in relations as the significance of race altered and their influence diminished. The choices they faced such as participating fully in public life, withdrawal by isolating themselves in closed communities or emigration were debated in the public arena. In this changing context apartheid became an anachronism and embarrassment for many white South Africans. Adam et al. (1997), Du Toit (1999) and Jung (2000) provide a useful introduction to a period where whites began to reposition themselves as a minority in a multiracial society.

4.5.1 The meaning of a post-apartheid context

South Africa was no longer defined as exclusively a “white” country. Up to this point white people had lived in an isolated world. They engaged other people, who deviated from the norm of whiteness, on their terms. Race, previously portrayed as a problem related to others had to be confronted now. Whites became ‘raced’ themselves as whiteness lost its guaranteed social capital. With the loss of political power and diminished influence subsequent to transition being white has potentially become a liability. In a political sense being a black ‘African’ implies an entitlement.
One key issue which needed consideration within the changing political dispensation was what it meant to be South African in general and in particular the positioning of whites within this context (Adam & Moodley 1993; Singh 1997; Steyn 2001). Slabbert (2000) argues that freedom of association in a post-apartheid context potentially opens up new identity possibilities. Within the context of new modes of social interaction old identities can be revisited and transcended. The autobiographical description by Verwoerd (1996) of the journey he made from Afrikanerdom to the ‘new South Africa’ is an example.

Publications authored by South Africans dealing with the change and challenges in society proliferated during this period of transition contributing to the voluminous work written by social scientists, journalists and writers on the topic. Some of the works written by white authors were historical, biographical and/or autobiographical telling either redemptive and/or confessional tales fulfilling the function of self-absolution (Brink 1998; Nuttall 1988). Referring to some novels Ndebele (1998:24) contends

...there may be an informal truth and reconciliation process under way among the Afrikaners.

Amongst whites the transition brought about a degree of stock-taking. This is evident in the comments on change as well as resistance to it in the everyday conversations Krog (2003) relates. Schutte (1995) argues self-reflexive writing provides insight into forms of white consciousness and positioning in society. He observes a quest for historical meaning and self-presentation amongst authors of Afrikaans descent whereas those of English descent often tend to shift responsibility for the past onto Afrikaners.

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14 Examples of fiction dealing with adapting to a post-apartheid situation and anxieties in a transforming society are for example – Disgrace by JM Coetzee and People like ourselves by Pamela Jooste.
4.5.2 Positioning of Afrikaners

Slabbert (2000:82) acknowledges identities cannot merely be a matter of free choice. There is a degree of ascription, and he points out that Afrikaners may feel trapped by the way they are portrayed by those in power, which in turn may lead to a reactionary response. Although one cannot escape such social birthmarks and have to acknowledge the past, he argues that

> Afrikaners will have to apply themselves imaginatively to the task of establishing who they are in the new South Africa. In the process they will have to free themselves from a part of their history and work to create a new one.

Writing on the crisis in Afrikaner identity during this transitional period, De Klerk (2000) observes an exodus of Afrikaners emigrating elsewhere, an attempt by some to deny the existence of Afrikanership and reject it, the fantasy held by others to relive and revive the glorious past by resisting change, clinging to a timeless fixed-image of Afrikanerdom and finally a positive engagement with the changing context. He counsels against bearing grudges as a result of changing conditions, Afro-pessimism and a laager-mentality, encouraging an acceptance of the new political order as well as a co-operative rebuilding of society in a more inclusive sense. Such constructive participation by Afrikaners, he contends, requires fully acknowledging the past whilst insisting on equal justice in the present. In this regard de Klerk (2000:38) argues

> The old Afrikaner ‘volk’ – white, Christian-National, exclusive, with yesterday’s culture on the shoulders, historically burdened with apartheid and a stereotypical discourse – do not have a dynamic chance of survival. It will fade away in spite of cultural attempts to maintain it. [Translated – see endnote7]

Reacting in his reply to De Klerk’s politically correct counsel, Louw (2001:13,14) brands him as an ideologue who justified previous policies, was complicit by not fully reporting events in the newspaper he edited and now blames the general population, his trusting readers, for their withdrawal from public life. He contends

> I know you were the ‘enlightened’, intellectual face of apartheid. ...Now you have a new message for us: Become part of the majority, ‘son’. [Translated – see endnote8]
It is the seamless switch in allegiance, without acknowledging a pivotal role in the previous establishment that Louw (2001) finds galling. Amongst Afrikaner responses to change Du Toit (1999) identifies the “neo-behoudendes” (new-maintainers), leaders of the apartheid establishment, displaying what he calls a post-colonial settler mentality ‘singing to the tune of Caesar’, adapting their current discourse to the context of non-racial democracy. Desiring acceptance by the new power-brokers, these leaders follow an establishment line becoming ‘token’ representatives, manipulated by the new elite. They propagate joining the majority, discrediting any other option like minority politics by arguing that it harks back to the past. He agrees withdrawing is damaging in the long-term but advocates mobilisation to protect cultural interests which does not necessarily imply returning to an authoritarian past.

Louw (2001), like Du Toit (1999), accepts that whites in general and Afrikaners in particular have to live with the knowledge that they supported a system that had robbed others of their dignity. The Afrikaner establishment amnesia is reflected in the following example Goodwin and Schiff (1995:140) provide commenting that

[t]he most impressive retroactive conversion was the head of the Broederbond, Professor Piet de Lange, who said he opposed apartheid since 1950. It was a quiet, within-the-system kind of opposition. So subtle that critics might be pardoned for not finding his claim believable…

Louw’s open letter replying to de Klerk elicited a polemic on the positioning of the Afrikaner establishment. These debates on positioning are equally applicable to English-speakers.

4.5.3 Reconciliation politics

The fragmented nature of society raised questions about belonging, loyalty, citizenship and nation building. Reconciliation and the engendering of trust and confidence were key issues. The theme of the inauguration of President Mandela of ‘one nation many cultures’ reflected the notion of cultural pluralism, recognised diversity and a shared history whilst appeals were made for a common patriotism,
forging unity out of diversity. He was sensitive towards Afrikaner symbols, even with regard to changing names commemorating Afrikaner history (Chipkin 2007; Graybill 2002; Hadland & Rantao 1999; James & Lever 2001).

Grobbelaar (1998) suggests tradeoffs lie at the heart of the politics of negotiation. Mandela kept his promises and a ‘Volkstaat’ (People’s State) Council was convened. There was no agreement on a territory which could be developed along these lines in the ‘Volkstaat’ (People’s State) Council which reported in 1996. With state approval required by the South African Constitution such dreams were neutralised. Secessionist right wingers with their state-seeking nationalism held on to their dream of an ethnic homeland constituting a separate nation-state. Enthusiasm for radical partition was weak, limiting opportunity to retreat into an ethnic laager, with a majority opting for accommodation within South Africa (Adam et al. 1997; De Klerk 2000; Du Toit 1999; Hadland & Rantao 1999; Sparks 2003).

The negotiated transition brought about a number of changes. Building new institutions, developing unifying symbols and fostering shared values were key concerns. Examples of the outcomes of these processes are the establishment of a Constitutional Court, unified local government structures consolidating racially fragmented local authorities, a new (rainbow) flag, coat of arms with its motto in a ‘San-language’ and the joining together of ‘Nkosi Sikelel’i-Afrika’ and ‘Die Stem van Suid-Afrika’ in the spirit of national reconciliation. The debate around values is a key concern which remains an ongoing process (Seekings 2003; Singh 1997).

Reconciliation required coming to terms with the past, acknowledging the oppression, dispossession and discrimination that others experienced. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is an institution which was set up as a political compromise with narrow terms of reference to the immediate past. Since whites in South Africa were generally beneficiaries rather than perpetrators, it focused more on the extremes than the normalities and banalities of apartheid. In hearings where victims and perpetrators of human rights abuse could share their stories and seek forgiveness, testimony of past human rights abuses to some extent individualised the
past (Adam et al. 1997; Mandaza 1999; Meredith 2005; Slabbert 2000). James and Lever (2001) suggest that precisely as a result of the historical legacy most perpetrators were Afrikaans, leading to a mistaken perception of a witch-hunt.

Slabbert (2006) argues the apartheid establishment and security forces were not prepared to face the moral questions associated with the policy. He points out that the security forces that were at the coal-face of implementation were upset by politicians’ claims of being unaware about what had been done to keep the system viable. In general perpetrators who testified, tried to evade or shift responsibility, claiming they were foot soldiers. The refusal by leadership to acknowledge any complicity revealed an inability ‘to walk a road’ and face the past. De Klerk’s autobiography provided no trace of any accountability for the consequences of nationalist rule (L’Ange 2005; Slabbert 2000). Krog (1998) equates shame with being caught out, and guilt with an acceptance of responsibility for wrong doing. She feels shame rather than guilt surfaced in hearings.

The TRC was received negatively in the white community. The process was seen by some as retribution. This was also mirrored by the extent to which the commission proceedings were ignored by the white public.

4.5.4 Defining (South) Africanness

Mbeki’s ‘I am an African’ speech at the adoption of the constitution in 1996 ambiguously embraced both an inclusive and exclusive Africanism in its imagery depending on how it was read an interpreted. He suggested South Africans shared a common territory and colonial history (Chipkin 2007; Hadland & Rantao 1999; Mathebe 2001). Slabbert (2000:81-82) recognises nation-building is not an obvious process. He argues terms like African and African renaissance can be used exclusively and intolerantly.

It can either result in a process of exclusive intolerance, where the majority gives an ideological content to being black which excludes from the South African nation those which are not so defined. It could also involve a process
whereby society works towards attaining overarching and transcending values, to which most people in South Africa feel connected, despite their diversity and cultural differences. Which of the two processes becomes predominant will determine South Africa’s contribution to the so-called African renaissance or rebirth. But how minorities see themselves will also determine what kind of nation building takes place in South Africa.

What is viewed as African is open to contestation and by no means obvious. Prah (1999) speaking at a conference on African Renaissance, argues Africans’ origin, culture and history is rooted in the continent. He differentiates this from those who more recently have emigrated from elsewhere and still have external points of reference. These people, he argues, are citizens of African states and should enjoy all the rights and privileges associated with it. They, however, cannot claim Africanness in a historical or cultural sense but concedes that they may over time come to regard themselves as African, though they usually do not tend to do so.

African has tended to become conflated with black. Whether this implies a call for African solidarity at the cost of non-racialism has been debated. Leildé (2006:208) cites Mbembe, who argues that such views invest in race, which becomes “the foundation of morality and nationality”.

Breytenbach in his foreword to Slabbert (2000) argues that a shared heritage, prevailing above all other divisions has not yet been constructed, but requires an understanding of our shared history and injustices of the past. What people feel connected to, the extent of tolerant inclusivism, whether over-arching and transcending values can be generated, in spite of diversity, and how they imagine the nation, are key concerns requiring attention within the changing context (Adam et al. 1997). Singh (1997:122) poses the question:

If we do have the beginnings of a new state, what kind of nation is in the making in South Africa? The idea of the rainbow nation, a powerful symbol at the launch of the new dispensation, is becoming more ragged at the edges as we move beyond the rhetoric of reconstruction to building its substance.

Two years after his ‘I am an African’ speech in a debate on national reconciliation, in the National Assembly, Mbeki referred to the continuous presence of ‘two nations’ – one white and wealthy, and another black and poor. This raised fear of a racialised
populism. Whilst the divide between rich and poor in society is apparent, and whilst the majority of the poor unquestionably are black, this simplifying rhetoric smoothing over other divisions racialises the problem again (Mathebe 2001; Maré 2001). Related to the ‘two nations’ thesis was a growing criticism of the absence of white South Africans at commemorations on public holidays. Jung (2000) suggests that the political elite use discourse to mobilise constituents, which defines the substance of a particular identity, to some extent self-consciously and strategically.

The relationship between African and Western values is another key question associated with this debate. Africanness is seen as emerging in opposition to Europeanness (Leildé 2006). Du Toit (1999), accepting difference, posed the question whether these differing value-systems will clash and whether those who are excluded will be alienated. In this regard the value of ‘ubuntu’ has been valorised and romanticised as a generic African predisposition taking on ‘mythical’ dimensions (Adam et al. 1997; Slabbert 2006) whilst liberalism\textsuperscript{15}, associated with the English, has retained the stigma it had attracted under Afrikaner nationalism. Biko (2004) had warned against the danger white liberals posed to black emancipation and their solidarity. His mistrust resulted from the whiteness their actions exuded.

Ndebele (1998) relates a vignette of the typical English-speaking liberal to illustrate why they are disliked so intensely by blacks. Liberalism is equated to whiteness and their privileging by the emerging elite. The term liberal, remains pejorative and is used as an insult against blacks who are seen as aligning themselves to white interests. In the context of the transition white liberals are acrimoniously attacked for their perceived racism, self righteousness, and patronising stance (Husemeyer 1997).

\textit{4.5.5 Afrikaner responses to nation building}

According to Du Toit (1999), Afrikaners were once again confronted with the homogenising thrust of a nation building project at the end of the twentieth century,

\textsuperscript{15} This debate again underlines the social constructedness of these value systems and how they can essentialise and fix identities.
like at the beginning of it. This linked them to a “rainbow nation” in a centralised state with English as the dominant language. He contends, citing Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, that the process of Africanisation coupled to nation building implied transforming whites into Africans by requiring them to adopt new values.

Such a project of nation building is seen by more conservative commentators as a conscious attempt to undermine their group identity. Boshoff (cited in Goodwin and Schiff 1995:103-104), regards this ‘social revolution’ as threatening the continued existence of Afrikaners as they become integrated, arguing it’s not difficult to break down the borders between children and young people and make them used to mixing and putting the accent on living together rather than living apart. Sharing common goals and common values and trying to create a common society, an open society. Now, I don’t think it is wrong to be open towards other people, but if the Afrikaner nation is going to lose its identity, then, well, then the question is what is your future? Do you accept the disappearance of your people, or would you like to have good relations and Christian attitudes without being absorbed in mainstream Africanized society?

The sacrifices of previous generations for independence are futile as a result. For others like De Klerk (2000) nation building did not exclude the retention of an ethnic identity. He rejected a self-imposed isolation arguing that opening up to African influences did not imply negating European influences.

In Du Toit’s (1999) assessment cultural identity remains a primary loyalty. He argues that in spite of a low ebb in ethnic consciousness, it is unthinkable that Afrikaners would not agitate for greater political and cultural recognition in the future. Whether the immense popularity of the Afrikaans ‘De la Rey’ ballad at the beginning of 2007 reflects such a reawakening in the light of uncertainty has been debated. There remains a persistent criticism of whites’ attitude to nation building.

According to Grobbelaar (1998), matters such as increasing crime rates, radical affirmative action and redistributive policies, the declining status of Afrikaans as well as threats to their ‘eiesoortigheid’ (distinctively ownness) in areas such as education all can lead back to a renationalisation.
Analyses of elections suggest parties based on multi-ethnic or multi-racial membership do better than those based on ethnic membership primarily. According to Du Toit (1999), a growing realisation of the negotiation failures as well as the withdrawal from the GNU discredited the New National Party (NNP). The Democratic Party (DP), positioning itself as a robust opposition holding the government to account, gained considerable Afrikaner support as NNP and FF+ support declined in the subsequent election, but the racial census remained (Adam et al. 1997; Du Toit 1999; Maré 2001; Southall 2001). Giliomee (2003:661) points out that:

> In the South Africa of the early twenty-first century the Afrikaner-English intra-white tensions and language struggles seemed to be peripheral phenomena. The two communities had moved much closer together in their political views.

Slabbert (2000) observed potentially polarising anti-ANC hysteria among opposition parties. During the 1999 election the DP rejected any alliance with the ANC, whilst the ANC in turn expressed greater willingness to work with the NNP. An ill-fated short-lived DP-NNP alliance occurred, establishing the Democratic Alliance. The NNP withdrew in 2001 and aligned themselves with the ANC. The party voted to disband in 2005.

Adam and Moodley (1993) suggest that maintaining their position materially in post-apartheid South Africa mattered most to whites. Although being indispensable economically appeared to be an asset to some, general difference in prosperity could also be a source of envy and rejection as experiences elsewhere in Africa had demonstrated. This raised fears of and of a reversal in fortunes and privilege. Working class whites, in particular, were left in a more vulnerable position.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) successfully mobilised middle-class, non-African people. Maré (2001) points out the DA were labelled, first and foremost ‘white’,
which whilst not completely inaccurate, undermines non-racialism. This is interpreted as political realignment against the aspirations of the black majority. Its adversarial political style and focus on minority issues constrained attempts to draw significant support from black African voters. Block-voting by minorities for opposition parties is interpreted as being irreconcilable with a greater South Africanism.

4.5.7 Policy debates

Social inequality remains a concern in spite of the euphoria at the successful transition to democracy. The striking economic disparity between racial groups Mbeki has alluded to in speeches, a legacy of historically constituted relations of inequality, raises questions of social justice. Democratisation cannot succeed without meeting the crucial challenge of achieving a degree of equalisation by meeting majority aspirations. This places issues such as access to land\textsuperscript{16}, education and employment on the agenda. Events in Zimbabwe around land seizures, and possible land issues rearing its head in South Africa emphasise the urgency of addressing the needs of a frustrated majority who have not experienced economic emancipation yet remain a key challenge within the constraints imposed by neo-liberalism globally. Newly integrated administrative structures, such as local governments, face pressure to implement inclusive policies geared towards equity within the context of the broader constraints (Bekker & Leildé 2003; Mandaza 1999; Meredith 2005; Southall 2001).

The impact of policies to ensure greater equity is not surprising. After 1994, the composition of the civil service changed considerably. In transforming the civil service the proportion of whites employed in it dropped from 44 to 18 percent representation. The racial composition of public corporations’ staff was also transformed substantially (Giliomee 2003; Sparks 2003).

\textsuperscript{16} The intensity of this issue in the context of glaring disparities is portrayed by Steinberg’s (2002) investigation of a farm murder. The complex and conflict-ridden relationships between tenants and farmers become apparent. James & Lever (2001) add that the increase in such incidents is a matter of concern but that it is not fully clear whether they are racially based and/or justified. Data of incidents of
Mbeki set out to address economic and social disadvantage in his presidential term. With legislation to tackle many barriers to advancement with regard to matters such as property, residential settlement, social services and employment in place, implementation and delivery to achieve greater socio-economic equity became key words (Hadland & Rantao 1999; Mathebe 2001).

In response to Mbeki’s reference to two nations, Du Toit (1999) argues the distinction should not be interpreted in racial, but rather in class terms. Sparks (2003) agrees pointing out the poor-white phenomenon reared its head for the first time since the Depression and that the middle-class and wealthy are increasingly multi-racial. He concludes society has remained highly differentiated with few economic benefits trickling down to the poor almost a decade after the negotiated transition. Adam et al. (1997:1) argue post-apartheid South Africa has emulated a conventional consumer society with a conspicuous new black elite. Alexander (2001:484) contends

…the cohesion of the majority of the oppressed and their common interest in national liberation, which constituted the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, can be pressed into service of those who are now in a position to inherit or to accumulate power in all relevant social spheres.

To restore equity does not imply colour-blindness and key terms such as non-racialism require careful consideration. The challenge remains engaging progressively with issues of race (Adam & Moodley 1993; Singh 1997). Du Toit (1999:293-294) argues employment equity has made racial discrimination against whites compulsory. He contends the government interprets South Africa increasingly through a prism of black and white

Where notions like ‘African renaissance’ and ‘transformation’ had to provide a broad philosophical grounding for the ANC’s Africanist viewpoints, practice was especially affected by the slogan of ‘representivity’. Virtually the whole country with each imaginable branch of the political, economic and social spheres is subject to an overarching quota system according to which institutions have to reflect the composition of the country’s population, whether it is government departments, sport teams or the winners of beauty pageants. ...A person’s future, whether it is at the workplace or on the sports

violence against the farming community reported between 1997 and 2004 suggest an increase up to 2002 followed by a subsequent decline (Lehohla 2004a).
field can be decisively determined by this. ....This time however it is not the blacks who are disadvantaged but the whites [Translated – see endnote9].

Besides changing material conditions, institutions and practices, a reassessment of the country’s identity and heritage received attention. L’Ange concludes (2005:500)

Native whites now live – not always uncomfortable, it must be said – among the debris of their power, their polities displaced, their administrations disbanded, their cultures endangered, their privileges waning, their histories revised and their heroes sometimes reviled, their cities and streets in some cases renamed. Most of this they must accept as part of the process of indigenisation that is essential for them to have a viable future in Africa.

Whites’ interaction with other groups on a private and social level has been limited rather than common. Du Toit (1999), referring to a ruling by the Constitutional Court absolving the state from maintaining culturally-exclusive education for minorities, contends transformation alienates minorities. He argues the discourse of non-racialism denies the political relevance of race, providing a convenient shield behind which the new status quo can be perpetuated. A majority of Afrikaners possibly see themselves as victims of a new cultural inequality (in the absence of protecting group rights). In a context in which Afrikaans as language has been downgraded, and apartheid ideology has been discredited, they also feel culturally embattled.

English speaking South Africans do not feel the same degree of disempowerment, being more mobile and attached culturally to the global community of English speakers. The English do, like the Afrikaners, feel affected by escalating crime and affirmative action (Sparks 2003).

White emigration has been considerable. High levels of knowledge, skill and wealth contribute to mobility. This has impacted substantially on the proportionate size of the white population in the country (James & Lever 2001).

Jung (2000) agrees that race and ethnicity remain salient features of post-apartheid politics. She suggests this alignment occurs in a context where there is competition for access to resources. According to Slabbert (2000), a clear mobilisation around ‘black’ and ‘African’ has occurred not merely in a descriptive but also in an ideological sense.
He believes these notions have been appropriated and defined in an exclusive sense and that a ‘race card’ is increasingly played (Slabbert 2006). Maré (2001) provides several examples where the race card has been played. Sparks (2003) argues the notion of a rainbow nation is threatened when a charge of racism is used to label a white adversary as ‘racist’. This becomes a devastating weapon used to demolish their credibility.

The rise of racially exclusive forms of associations for professional ‘blacks’ in positions of power to promote their interests suggests uncomfortable relationships in institutions as well as pressure to adopt an increasing African orientation within them. The media and education, for instance have been affected by such demands. Race and racial issues and competition then remain a basis for mobilisation politically and a key issue in contemporary South Africa as well as a possible source of polarisation (Adam et al. 1997; Husemeyer 1997; Mathebe 2001).

4.5.8 Concluding remarks

Constructing an identity implies value choices of what one wants to be. A liberal-democracy is premised on a nation-state with overarching symbols of solidarity transcending particular loyalties. The emphasis on wider South Africanism is an attempt to neutralise nationalisms.

In spite of their complaints over escalating crime, bureaucratic inefficiency and falling standards, most whites seem to have reconciled themselves to the changing situation. In this context of changing relations many have withdrawn into a private world, focusing mainly on maintaining their material wealth (Schutte 1995). Recent events have demonstrated that the possible insurrection by ultra-rightists currently does not pose a threat, with the likelihood that it may become more remote.

4.6 Conclusion

Matters of race are fashioned within social and political environments. Within South
Africa politics were forged on the basis of institutionalised racism. In spite of specificity, there is some resemblance to other settler societies and general notions of whiteness. The demise of apartheid necessarily leads to a reconsideration of identity. Identity choices in private as well as public spheres are shaped by interests and needs. Schutte (1995:60) argues that

the way in which whites appropriate history is of crucial importance to their sense of justice and fairness.

It would be surprising if some of the ideas of the past do not remain in some residual form as a result of interaction and is reflected in everyday narratives.

The question remains around how divisions of the past are dealt with. Post-apartheid South Africa is not unmarked by the past and questions of race continue to dominate. It is apparent that social, cultural and economic integration has not yet been achieved. It is in this context that this research was undertaken. The methodology underpinning this study is considered in the next chapter.
Chapter 5: Methodological considerations and research design

5.1 Introduction

Discussing identity conceptually, I referred to the turn to language within the social sciences. Some of the key questions dealt with were the debate on the centrality of language in constructing meaning and the criticism of the notion that language simply reflects a pre-existing external reality. The notion of foundations is questioned in this regard. It raises the question of how identity, or more appropriately identities, can be explored substantively. The debate is underpinned by ontological and epistemological assumptions determining what questions are asked and how they are approached. Although this debate is abstract, I argued that identities are expressed and used during interaction. In this chapter I reflect back on these arguments and how they have informed the research decisions that structure the way this study is organised and conducted.

A social situation arises in and through interaction according to social constructionists. Berger (1963), referring to Weber, argues that expectations determining how people act towards each other emerge from interaction reflecting an agreed upon definition of the social situation. Shared social and cultural conventions are then both established in interaction and direct subsequent interaction. Social relationships are created and maintained in interaction (Alasuutari 1998; Burkitt 1991; Riessman 1993; Wetherell & Maybin 1996). According to ten Have (1990:8), “Sociological discoveries are ineluctably discoveries from within society.”

Our ‘being in the world’ is mediated through conversations. Everyday conversation reflects

a whole background of shared assumptions which are implicitly invoked and confirmed by each spoken sentence (Abercrombie 1986:24).

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1 Some of the material discussed in this chapter has been published in Puttergill (2001) and Puttergill and Leildé (2006). This material drew on my original notes on methodological questions in studying identity and has been reworked substantially and expanded in this chapter.
Conversations, structuring our experience, reveal their meaningfulness in the accounts provided. Meaningfulness is primarily constituted relationally within conversations and is fundamentally social. Qualitative research methods, enabling an ideographic approach, are particularly well positioned to pay attention to how people attribute meaning to their social worlds (Bauer, Gaskell & Allum 2000; Harré 1998a; Hoshmand 1999; Parker 2002c; Shotter 1993b; Smith, Harré & van Langenhove 1995).

Key questions addressed in this chapter are what the nature of discourse is, what procedures are followed in the generation of research material (data) and how the research material/data are approached. In this regard section 5.2 discusses the ‘turn to language’ in the social sciences. In section 5.3 reflection on ‘the relationship between knowing and being known’ considers the implication of this shift in social sciences with regard to interviewing, the primary method used in this study. The context of the research and central question is revisited in section 5.4. Questions around the ethics and politics of research are dealt with in section 5.5. In this section the way in which interviewees were approached and asked to participate is explained. The research design, in particular, the decision to rely on interviews, as well as site selection and sampling procedures are unpacked in section 5.6. Where necessary cross references are made to additional information contained in tables in appendices B and C. The interview schedule is in appendix A. In section 5.7 the way in which transcripts were analysed is explained.

5.2 The turn to language

In studying identity, individual and collective, I begin from the premise that people define themselves as similar to or different from others and in turn are also defined by others as being similar or different. Studying an identity implies taking the ‘other’, against which the identity is relationally demarcated, into consideration. Self-other representations are in part dependent upon ways of referring to the ‘self’ and ‘other’ which are culturally and socially accessible. This emphasises the significance of language, particularly discourse, in constructing meaningful social positions.
Discourse reveals how people represent themselves and others in talk. Smyth and Shacklock (1998:4) contend that “conversation begins in response to, not in a speaker’s singular assertion.”

Hall (1996) argues that a theory of discursive practice rather than one of a knowing subject is needed in addressing questions of identity, implying a shift from ‘type’ to process. These arguments suggest that the research material/data cannot be regarded as merely waiting ‘out there’ to be discovered, as already existing knowledge, independent of the interpretation of the researcher and researched. Briggs (1986) argues that some researchers erroneously take what is said as a reflection of what is ‘out there’. An emphasis on discourse then underlines the fluidity of identity.

Emphasising discursive practice suggests a questioning of the notion that people know, remember and tell in an unmediated fashion. Our experience of reality is not an unproblematic given. Remembering always entails interpreting what happened, and this meaning is not fixed in the past, it is situated in the present. There is no simple correspondence to an objective external reality as is assumed by traditional empiricist accounts. Language is not a neutral descriptive device mirroring a pre-existing, well-ordered reality. Communicated experience is constructed through representations. These representations are not predetermined direct descriptions of phenomena, they should rather be regarded as being constructed within a context and therefore always open to contestation (Atkinson & Housely 2003; Harré 1993; Parker 2002c; Shotter 1993a; Wooffitt 1993).

Emphasising the constructed nature of our knowledge does not necessarily imply that there is nothing beyond discourse – an extreme relativist position. It is our understanding of reality, not reality itself, which is determined by the social processes of constructing meaning (Denzin 2001; Ezzy 2002; Williams 1998). Schmidt (2001:146) warns against conflating epistemological constructivism, the inevitability of treating knowledge as socially constructed when viewing it from the standpoint of a second-order observation, with ontological constructivism, the view that the objects of that
knowledge are themselves socially constructed [emphasis in the original text].

The turn to hermeneutic and deconstructive traditions within continental European philosophy as well as the emphasis on ordinary language in the British analytic tradition played an influential role in shifting the focus to what language does and how meaning is constructed. Discourse is intricately linked to the construction of shared meaning that events or experiences hold for social actors and the production of knowledge. I have referred to the notion of joint action through which meaningfulness emerges in the context of interaction. In interpretative understanding grasping experience contributes to our knowledge. If discourse is then about knowledge, representation and meaning, all social practices have a discursive dimension. In turn discourse itself can be viewed as a social practice (Hughes & Sharrock 1997; Potter et al. 2002; Shotter 1993b).

This shift to the role played by language and discourse is apparent across disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, as well as in related fields such as linguistics and law. In many instances studying discourse becomes the central focus providing the data that is analysed. This focus on discourse then shifts attention from uncovering an external reality, or accessing internally constituted meanings, to how language is used in particular contexts (Dixon, Foster, Durrheim & Wilbraham 1994; Garner 1997; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Parker 1989).

Attempts to define discourse reveal the complexity and fluidity of the term. Having gained common currency and being fashionable, discourse is as polysemic as identity. Discourse is therefore bedevilled by the same problem as identity, becoming all things to all people. Thus, discourse is best considered within the disciplinary and theoretical context it is used. Within the social sciences, the notion is broader than that of a speech act, by emphasising the social and intersubjective dimensions of interaction (Calhoun 1995; van Dijk 1993b).

The world is not ready-made. Language, as a shared symbolic form – a social activity, plays a key role with discourse providing the medium through which meaning is
bestowed and can be accessed. Social constructionists emphasise the constitutive
dimension of language. Wetherell (2001:16) points out that

[w]ords are about the world but they also form the world as they represent it.
...[She continues that] what reality is, what the world is, only emerges
through human meaning-making.

Epistemologically, discursive practices accomplish reality as it is reflected on at a
particular point in time. It is through discourse that reality takes on its appearance of
stability, neutrality and objectivity. Put differently, experience becomes intelligible
through discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Parker 2002a; Shotter 1993a).

Burkitt (1991) emphasises that discourse is embedded within social relations. It is
connected to practical activity and a material reality. Studying discourse then reveals
historical, cultural and interactional dimensions of social life. Discourse takes on
multiple forms formally within institutions, within the media, as well as in everyday
conversation where sense is made of lives and changing milieus. Everyday
conversation reveals that opinions and thoughts are more variable, context-dependent
and inherently contradictory than what is usually acknowledged (Augoustinos &
Reynolds 2001; Bradley 1996; Gergen 1993; Lee 1999; Richardson 1990; Smith
2000b).

For the purpose of this study, discourse is considered from both a macro- and micro-
perspective. The former implies focusing on the institutional level, therefore on the
structural and ideological domain, hence on discursive resources. This broad approach
considers how discourse structures the subject matter under consideration. In contrast
a micro-perspective of discourse focuses on an interpersonal level, therefore on the
conversational and experiential domain, hence on discursive practices. Such an
approach therefore considers how participants use discourse. These two domains are
intertwined. On the one hand, discourse is situated in a historical, social, cultural and
political context were social processes and structures give rise to discourse. On the
other hand, the social practices and structure of interaction reflect the positioning of
the participants. The specific discursive practices remain located within broader
structural and cultural contexts (Billig 1991; Mills 1997; Potter & Wetherell 1998;
A macro-perspective, drawing on the work of critical theorists, considers how discourse is historically rooted in specific social relationships within society. Manganyi (1991) argues that the interplay between history and biography implied by the sociological imagination enables an understanding of the individual and society by disturbing silences. This counters naive subjectivism inherent in common-sense explanations by considering the broader symbolic universe or discursive horizon in which meanings are embedded. Institutionalised formal discourse reinforces and sustains power relations of a particular social and political order. This dominant discourse, functioning as a broad historical and cultural framework of meaning, embodies and articulates collective knowledge and ideology. Ideology serves a normalising function ensuring discourse and social practices aligned with it remain unquestioned and are regarded inevitable. As coherent systems of meaning, discourse shapes and legitimises social relations of power. Van Dijk (2000) argues that ideological belief systems provide a broader backdrop of which a specific discourse and accompanying social practices are expressions and enactments. By revealing the sociohistorical locatedness of discourse, categories become denaturalised and their givenness is questioned (Billig 1991; Crossley 2000; Denzin 2001; Lee 1999; Parker 2002b; Potter & Wetherell 1998). Parker (1989) argues that ideology is not merely a system of beliefs and should be understood as the effects of power relations in discourse. In this respect ideology renders invisible operations of power and the coercive functioning of meaning in specific contexts. Ideology therefore tends to suppress alternatives and present a dominant discourse as normal and natural.

Discourse, as a social resource, constructs objects and subjects as well as the positions taken during interaction. Such established discourse is reproduced when it is accepted and incorporated into dominant institutional and political structures through and by which power and influence are reproduced. An alternative discourse constitutes new subject positions (providing space for oppositional modes of representation) which challenge and resist the dominant discourse. Hence discourse positions people relationally to each other socially, politically and culturally. The notion of subject
positions arising from and within the discourse highlights the fluidity and fragmentation of identity (Bhavnani 1990; Denzin 1989; Parker 2002b; Parker 2002c; Rattansi 1994).

A micro-perspective considers how discourse emerges as a practical activity from the interactional work done in conversation. In analysing how things are talked of/argued about, the socially constitutive nature of language is displayed. Discourse is conceived as a social practice, oriented towards meeting specific ends. This requires paying attention to the metaphors used and how particular accounts are defended rhetorically. It emphasises the role agency plays in consciously establishing and defending a particular account. The accounts then represent a particular standpoint rather than an absolute truth in an objectivised sense (Edwards & Potter 1992; Gill 2000; Parker 2002b; Potter & Wetherell 1994; Watson 1996).

Analysing the fine detail of interaction determines what is accomplished by the conversation. The data is therefore studied and theorised in terms of what is constructed and how the participants within the conversation orientate themselves to each other and collaborate to achieve orderly and meaningful communication. Hence, rather than merely looking to the interview as a source of substantive content (uncovering a factual reality), the way in which identities are publicly occasioned and socially negotiated, in interaction, is considered. Wetherell (2001) points out that accounts that become widely shared, regardless of their ‘truth’, in absolute terms, become social realities which should be reckoned with.

Discourse can be read and understood in terms of both the social and interactional context in which it occurs. A discursive study of identity should contemplate both the macro- and micro-perspectives, acknowledging agency and structure. Considering the socio-cultural context in which the discourse is embedded guards against relativism whilst attention to interaction and agency guards against reification (Spears 1997). Potter et al. (2002:169) argue

a particular form of discourse may have consequences which have not been formulated or even understood by the speaker or writer and on any specific
occasion there may be powerful constraints on the discourse used. There is a clear tension between seeing people as active users, on the one hand, and seeing discourse as generating, enabling and constraining, on the other. Put simply, discourse analysis studies how people use discourse and how discourse use people.

Studying identity requires awareness of both the broader historical structural context within which discourse is located as well as attention to interaction. In this respect both ideology and rhetoric become important because it reveals how discourse names and ‘fixes’ what is deemed to be real in an unchanging timeless way. Discourse works to produce rather than merely reflect ‘objects’ to which it refers. Such discourse then reveals the constraints on and concerns of an individual or community (Harré 1998b; Hermans & Kempen 1993; LeCouteur & Augoustinos 2001; Wetherell & Maybin 1996; Widdicombe & Wooffitt 1995). With regard to identity Malson (2000:160) concludes that

subjectivities are, in important ways, discursively produced, and the discourses we deploy to make sense of our lives, and of ourselves and others, do not stand alone or operate autonomously.

A key question then is which methodology best captures the socially constructed nature of reality and identity. In this section I have referred to two broad perspectives on discourse. The first perspective emphasises a structural and material dimension. It considers discourse as constituting a subject position and pays attention to the impact of the institutional and ideological domain within a particular historical context. These ideas have influenced my interpretation of conversations with interviewees on the changing society. The second perspective makes a compelling argument for agency and for considering the local context within which discourse occurs. I have in my interpretation of interviews attempted to take cognisance of how conversation within the interview itself can be regarded as contingent and the outcome of a particular social situation. Attention to discursive detail of the interview, however, has been a secondary concern in this dissertation.

The turn to language implies a shift from the standpoint of an objective detached researcher collecting accounts of objects or things to an active participant embedded in the social context focusing on the meaning of practices. Shotter (1993b:21)
characterises this methodological change as

[t]he shift from third-person observation to second-person ‘prosthetics’: from metatheory to metamethodology.

In this respect there is also a reflexive turn towards what the researcher interpretatively contributes in an understanding of the situation studied.

5.3 The relationship between knowing and being known

Social constructionists argue everyday interaction is embedded in the life histories and social networks of participants. Since this sociohistorical matrix shapes their experience, their accounts are not interest-free or neutral but historically and socially embedded within a wider context of meanings (Marshall & Rossman 1995; May 1993; Potter 1996). With regard to collective identity Billig (2001:213) argues that remembering is a social activity, often linked to events that were not experienced directly, such as “a previous generation’s sacrifice”.

The assumption underpinning conventional interview-based research that subjects simply can report their experiences to the researcher is regarded as problematic by social constructionists. Such an orientation is more evident where questionnaires are used and uniform understanding and responses are presumed. It treats subjects as repositories of information and assumes that the information they provide enables an objective researcher to access their experiences directly.

In contrast, social constructionists recognise that the research situation differs from everyday situations. An interview is an activity with a particular purpose through which data is constructed rather than collected. The objectivist bias in conventional research leads researchers to ignore how accounts of past experiences are shaped by the current situation as well as the subjects’ own self-reflexivity. Social constructionists prefer to use the term participant as this foregrounds the participant’s agency. Accounts are context specific and modified as the situation changes. For social constructionists knowing is jointly achieved in interaction and therefore local
and contextual. There is a double hermeneutic in research as the researcher and researched are both reflexive in their actions. The researcher who intervenes in the research setting occupies a central position in the research and cannot claim ‘special’ objective status (Danziger 1997; Denzin 1989; Fine 1994; Hammersley 1998; Huyssen 2003; Lepper 2000).

Although the sentiment that the researcher cannot claim a ‘special’ status is commendable, it elicits a degree of tension in research, raising the question of whose ‘voice’ is heard eventually. Researchers, in general, often interpret data, and claim some authority in this regard. This issue has been a dilemma I have faced in this study. There is, generally speaking, a trade-off between a more limited research agenda that an emphasis on micro discourse entails and an attempt to move beyond the immediate setting. Such a shift to a broader agenda is not without risk. Whilst I refer extensively to interviewees own words in this study, I frame its meaning within a broader social and historical context. In this regard I draw on my interpretation of the significance of a localised discourse. Alvesson (2002:71) contends,

The meanings produced by the researcher to make sense of phenomena under investigation are but one aspect of the level of meaning.

A crucial point to bear in mind is that research participants do not report on their past experiences in an unmediated fashion. They are attentive to the accounts they provide, selectively revealing and/or concealing information in interviews. For instance, their understanding of current events and future developments plays a key role in their recalling of the significance and meaning of past events. Objects of knowledge cannot be viewed independently from the accounts given of them. These accounts then are public, linked to political and moral positions and reflect attempts to make sense of the past and give form to current experiences. Rather than being simply factual, such accounts are interpretive as participants re-author their own histories, reinterpreting experiences and their impact. A particular version of the past in service of the present is then recalled (Merrick 1999; Riessman 1993; Shotter 1993a; Silverman 1993).

Social constructionists argue that accounts generated in interviews, which they regard
an interactional context, are accomplished rather than simply descriptive. Research participants actively engage with the research process. They express and articulate positions and do not merely convey standard positions, or as Becker (1998:8) describes it, “the conventional world’s thoughts”. This engagement with their social worlds contributes to the complexity of studying reality. Such accounts then are attentive to the context in which they are generated and therefore always selective and partial (May 2002; McIntosh 1995; Mitchell 1993; Seidman 1998; Williams 1998).

In social constructionism there is a shift from focusing on content (what is said) to process (how it is said). Underlying this shift is the notion of meanings being jointly constructed in interactional contexts. Such a subjectivist epistemology is best served by an interpretative qualitative approach, which enables both reflexivity and flexibility and focuses on understanding the meaningfulness of a social context, to view lived experience as ways of knowing and understanding the world (Denzin & Lincoln 1994a; Emerson, Fretz & Shaw 1995; Maxwell 1998; Parker 2002a; Sarbin & Kitsuse 1994).

Alvesson (2002) is of the opinion that accessing the meanings participants attribute to events or phenomena is a central concern of research. He contends that when the cultural context is not adequately considered there is often ‘thinness’ in discourse analysis. Although accounts are situated and co-constructed, requiring an awareness of the context in which they emerge, the accounts draw on prior experience and refer to a situation beyond the interaction itself. Such accounts need to be viewed against the broader discourse within society. The accounts then are not only directed to the particular interaction in which they are generated, but engage with a potentially wider audience which eventually may read the research (Becker 1998; Parker & Shotter 1990; Rennie 1999; Vidich & Lylman 1994).

Denzin and Lincoln (1994a) argue both researchers and participants are historically and socially located. In this regard it is necessary to consider how this impacts on the form and content of accounts. Being reflexive implies probing the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and in particular, sensitivity to the
multiplicity of identities and the relationships associated with them. This has drawn the notion of a neutral observer and passive subject into question. It is an important matter to consider because it questions whether accounts are direct and accurate factual descriptions. The notion of respondent validation of analyses is questioned because it assumes a prior claim to truth and accuracy. Key criteria such as validity, generalisability and reliability are rethought and issues such as plausibility, credibility and trustworthiness emphasised (Fine 1994; McIntosh 1995; Merrick 1999; Oakley 1999; Rosenwald & Ochberg 1992).

By reflexively coming to grips with how research material/data are produced, rather than discovered, the researcher’s constructs, participants’ common sense constructs, and broader contextual influences are identified. This reveals both the limits of data generated through research and how data are socially constructed within, not apart from a context, raising the question of whose story is being told, why it is being told and how it is interpreted (Briggs 1986; Fine 1994; Richardson 1990; Ritchie 2003; Smyth & Shacklock 1998; Stones 1996). Reflexivity is not a panacea. Both May (2002) and Parker (1999) caution against a paralysing reflexivity resulting in inward-looking practices.

Research does not entail passive description, mirroring experiences. It is naïve to let the participants voices stand on their own. Such a stance assumes that participants always have full insight into their experiences and actions. Only presenting these voices may lead to an uncritical description of what is experienced as familiar. Denzin (2001:83) points out that

> In a certain sense, interpretative researchers hope to understand their subjects better than the subjects understand themselves, to see effects and power where subjects only see emotion and personal meaning.

Social scientists construct representations of social life, through engaging in a dialogue between ideas (theory) and evidence (research material/data). Such representations are then structured by the researcher because evidence is purposively collected. Although the participants have to be heard to get a grasp on social phenomena, the researcher frames their responses and plays a crucial role in focusing
the research. There is a danger though that the researcher may completely write over the voices of participants. The challenge then is to place the discourse in a context - historically and socially whilst retaining the integrity of the accounts (Agger 1998; Condor 1997; May 1993; Mayall, Hood & Oliver 1999; Ragin 1994). Whilst acknowledging the risk inherent in interpreting utterances, Alvesson (2002: 78) concedes,

It is indeed difficult not to privilege a particular line of interpretation.

Maxwell (1998) notes a trend towards acknowledging the presence of the researcher within qualitative research. All perspectives are positioned and the researcher’s personal history and identity provide a significant source of experience, knowledge and insight.

5.4 Restating the central research question/problem

Living through the political transition within South Africa from an apartheid state to an inclusive democracy, experiencing the changes within society personally and observing them professionally have influenced my interest in the topic and shaped how I have set about studying it.

I addressed constituent aspects of this research – the notions of identity and discourse – in general terms. The discussion of how they relate to each other provides a theoretical and conceptual backdrop for the study. Discourse on identity is embedded in social relations. The socio-historical description of the South African society provided in chapter four charts the broader context within which current discourse on identity is situated. Given the racially saturated nature of the South African society, I have paid attention to how race matters are dealt with conceptually and theoretically in chapter three.

Colonisation, segregation and apartheid ensured material and status benefits accrued to those classified white. In apartheid South Africa race significantly determined the
privileged position of whites in society. Hence, although the material rewards were not distributed equally, disproportionately more whites enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle than would have been the case under different circumstances. Currently a majority of white people define themselves as middle-class. Hyslop (2000) attributes the trend of identifying themselves as ‘middle-class’ to the declining attractiveness of defining themselves collectively in racial terms.

With the transformation of social institutions, notions of racialised inclusion and exclusion have shifted and material practices changed. Whites’ loss of a monopoly on political power undermined their position as a dominant group within the society. The societal transformation in South Africa implied changes within the political economy of race and hence in the social relations that sustained identities. Transformation at its most elementary level implied extending at least theoretically full citizenship rights to an excluded majority of the population. Against this backdrop, nation-building implies building new institutions and symbols that foster civic consent within society. Attempts to achieve greater equity in society, threaten the privileges whites have enjoyed historically. According to Outlaw (2001:61), in such changing circumstances race becomes

the primary vehicle for conceptualizing and organizing precisely around group differences, with the demand that social justice be applied to groups and that “justice” be measured by results, not just by opportunities [emphasis in original text].

An attempt to address inequality within society potentially results in feelings of vulnerability, marginalisation and exclusion amongst whites. The transformation of society raises the key questions about how whites, who were beneficiaries of the previous system, reposition themselves within this changing context, of how they relate to the past and view the future, what sense of belonging they experience and whether they associate with a broader South African identity.

Numerous studies consider how identities are reshaped, reclaimed and renegotiated in the context of changing moral enablement, privilege and entitlement as a result of
social, political and economic transformation in South Africa (Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Jung 2000; Pieterse 1993; Singh 1997; Steyn 1999). Norval (2000:220) argues that

[i]t is through the consolidation or dissolution of political frontiers that discursive formations in general, and social and political identities more specifically, are constructed or fragmented.

This consciousness of change raises the issue of which identities are appropriated, the extent to which a collective memory is revealed, what sense of community (solidarity) emerges and what values are claimed. Considering these issues uncovers the extent to which change is perceived as a threat or opportunity. In the first instance old forms of identification are maintained or reshaped and in the second instance new possibilities are taken up and invested in within the constraints imposed by the past and the present. This study considers the discourse on identity that emerges from middle-class white South Africans conversations on the transition to a post-apartheid South Africa.

Broader socio-historical changes put this particular topic on the agenda as a researchable problem. Concomitant with these changes, trends within academe also influenced my choice of a topic. Until recently the gaze of many white researchers dealing with racial matters were focused on a racial other. This focus has increasingly been challenged as the (previously) dominant became subjects of studies themselves (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Gallagher 2000; Twine 2000). I am not suggesting that ‘whites’ have not been studied previously. Where they have been studied, they have generally been studied as a dominant group, or as representing humanity, in general, therefore as a norm, as studies on whiteness discussed in chapter three suggest.

Within South Africa policies of redress potentially re-inscribe racial distinction. I assume that transformation keeps issues relating to race on the public agenda for ordinary citizens. Transformation is a topical theme, which interviewees should

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2 If one takes the point made in chapter three that whiteness affords a degree of invisibility to those privileged, it is significant to note that there is a paucity of studies dealing specifically with English speaking white South Africans. Their initial hegemonic position and orientation to Britain has been highlighted in chapter four. In contrast there is a considerable literature on the Afrikaner.
recognise as significant and be familiar with. Issues of transformation are often reflected on in daily discourse as a result of the change people face within society. I focus on the discursive practice of a subgroup of ordinary citizens (categorised as white) and how they negotiate identity. Michael (1996:9) indicates, it is at specific historically situated junctures that we see identities formulated, mediated and reproduced.

Identity is salient where comparisons are made. Studying perceptions on social change amongst white South Africans affords an opportunity to assess how they manage their positioning in society and their local communities. Allowing interviewees to provide accounts on their own positioning in society and how it is changing does not reify them as belonging to a particular category. It demonstrates the extent to which there is continuity in the identities whites articulate as well as how such identities may have changed, subtly or more fundamentally. Caution is required when considering the conversations, bearing in mind that although interviews are social situations of a particular kind they do not constitute the ‘real life’ situations interviewees are asked to comment on. Alvesson (2002:81) comments...

…utterances made in an interview regarding social practices might reflect some aspects of actual practices. But they might instead reflect morally binding conventions for how social members speak on these matters – how you as a competent member ought to describe actual practices…

He contends that interviewees both politically aware and motivated and that this should be kept in mind.

The discourse in conversations ultimately reflects self-representations, shaping how they want to be known, often projecting a positive image. For white South Africans, this raises the dilemma of managing their stake in the discredited past whilst safeguarding their position and gains within society. Biography and history are intertwined. Self-identity, is not an objective description, it is a plausible narrative, which the teller needs to keep going, from a standpoint/positioning in society. The discourse reflects the concerns and constraints (Giddens 1991; Riessman 1993; Rosenwald & Ochberg 1992).
Where such accounts refer to an ‘other’ against whom their identity is demarcated they establish their own and others’ identities. Categories used in describing and identifying others are culturally available resources and a key interest for qualitative researchers (Blaikie 2000; Ezzy 2002; McCracken 1988). In these conversations such references are of particular interest, with a positioning in terms of identity occurring not only with regard to the broader social and historical context but also within the context of the study itself in terms of the research. Recognising the impact of the interview as a social situation is matter a researcher should bear in mind.

Within the broader context, political transition has disrupted the hegemonic discourse under apartheid. The form current discourse around whiteness and the privilege associated with its hegemony historically takes are of interest. Discourse that was considered legitimate and normal in the past is now considered unacceptable. Challenging familiar and entrenched ways of thinking about the self and other brings about changes in social discourse and practices. Given these broader changes in society, research participants may be cautious of how they express themselves on matters. Transformation brings about a change in what normatively is deemed acceptable practice. Such influences function within the public domain, and may determine what discourse is regarded as permissible or impermissible leading to institutionalised ways of talking.

Discourse on identity, emerging from conversations with white South Africans on societal transformation, contextualises and historicises identity. It provides a particular substantive focus to this research and reveals the complexity of identity construction as well as the sense and degree of belonging people feel.

Studying the discourse of members of this previously influential social category does not imply that they are naturally a bounded group and a necessary unit of analysis. Being a white South Africans is a nominal category and there is the danger of treating this in an essentialist way as necessary unit analysis. As Gabriel (1998:5) points out
“[b]eing white’ is not a once-and-for-all categorisation for anyone”. Analysing discourse brings out the ambiguity and variability associated with such a categorisation.

The key question then is how to operationalise the study. Several interconnected issues are considered in determining the feasibility of the study in this respect, namely - ethical and political implications, ways of accessing conversations on social change, evaluating methods to collect and record discourse and deciding on strategies to analyse the research material/data generated by the research.

5.5 Contemplating ethical and political issues

Social research occurs within a context of existing relations of power in society at large as well as within research itself. This raises questions and dilemmas to which researchers need to be attuned such as whose interests may be served by conducting the research. The relationship between the researcher and the researched is also crucially important (Andersen 1993; Frankenberg 1993; Gray 2003; Street 1998). Stanfield (1993a; 1993b) argues that ethical issues are particularly pertinent when considering identity in race-centred societies as this is a politicised domain. The transformation of the South African society is both publicly and privately debated. It is against this backdrop that the research is conducted and practical, moral and political interest in its outcome is generated.

Research remains an intrusive activity. The benefits and costs of the research are key matters even where this is not completely predictable beforehand (Becker 2000; Cieurzo & Keitel 1999; Sieber 1998). In this study I as the researcher benefit by obtaining a qualification on successful completion. There are no direct material benefits for participants in this study. They are afforded an opportunity to air their views and gain some insight on the matter studied by reflecting on it. The cost of participating for the researched, encouraged to speak openly and frankly about their

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3 After completing their interview some participants commented on how talking about the change in the
experiences on a sensitive topic, in public, can potentially escalate. This applies to instances where contentious matters arise.

An ethically informed research project requires reflexively contemplating how the three coalescing aspects, informed consent, confidentiality and the public good are operationalised to ensure responsible social research. This generally requires managing both communication about the research and the risk it entails by ensuring informed consent, maintaining confidentiality and contributing to the public good (Berg 1995; Burgess 1984; Punch 1994; Weiss 1994).

I approached potential participants directly and asked them whether they were willing to participate in a study on their perception of change in the country. Introducing myself I informed them I was registered for a DPhil degree in sociology at the University of Stellenbosch. I mentioned all the universities where I had studied previously as well as the university where I was employed at the time of my fieldwork. Describing sociology, I explained that sociologists studied societies, that social change was a key area of interest in the discipline and added that South Africans were facing change.

Prospective participants were told I selected communities in two provinces, one predominantly urban and the other predominantly rural, and that I interviewed Afrikaans and English speakers in these communities on their experiences. I explained limiting the number of provinces and communities made the study manageable.

I ensured participants that confidentiality of individual, paired or group conversations would be maintained by using pseudonyms. This, I explained, prevented individuals participating from being identified directly. As an additional measure, I also undertook not to mention the name of the town or farming community in the Waterberg district council, or of the suburbs in the metropolitan areas where I country got them thinking about a range of issues.
conducted my fieldwork. I emphasised that I was interested in their views on change and that there were no right or wrong answers, that participation was voluntary, that they could decline to answer any question they felt uncomfortable about and that they had the right to withdraw from the research at any stage during the interview. Their permission to tape-record the interview was asked verbally. I explained the purpose of tape-recording was to ensure accuracy. Participants were told that transcripts of the tape-recorded interviews would be studied to identify and discuss issues which arose in the conversations, that this would be kept in a secure location, and that only my supervisor and I would have direct access to these full transcripts. Their participation and agreement to allow the tape-recording of interviews indicates consent.

The degree of openness in qualitative research and the phenomenon of reactivity hampered full disclosure. Denzin (1989) and Mitchell (1993) argue against a dogmatic absolutist application of ethical principles in a uniform way. Conveying the conceptual intricacies of identity and discourse beforehand to research participants was not regarded feasible. After careful consideration I decided to foreground the context, South Africa in transition, in negotiating access. Although this strategic decision raises the issue of deception in the sense that potential participants were not alerted to how identity work embedded in their discourse would be analysed, I contend that it is not possible to fully engage participants on the intricacies of these matters.

In this study, relying on transcripts of taped interviews as a primary source, confidentiality was guaranteed to ensure the privacy of individual participants (Lewis 2003; Mason 1996b). In introducing my research to potential participants, I explained the measures that would be implemented to secure data. I indicated that I label tapes

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4 Besides using pseudonyms to refer to the interviewees or their immediate area of residence, I left out company names (their employers) to protect their identity. In this regard I refer to a general occupational category. Where they refer to place names which are not directly related to them, I have left these unchanged. Transcripts were numbered and interviewees’ names were not attached to these original transcripts.
numerically, lock them in my filing cabinet, and that direct verbal identifiers such as names mentioned which may identify them are removed when transcribing. I undertook to refer to biographical detail using general rather than specific categories. Providing an example I indicated that I would refer to their employment category rather than a specific position in order to avoid the likelihood of identification (see appendix B). These measures were applied to ensure the anonymity of individual participants. An awareness of these measures to protect their identity may have eased any uncertainty or anxiety participants felt of being identified directly.

A study on a potentially sensitive topic dealing with matters charged with a great deal of emotion and affect in a divided society requires careful consideration of the ‘public good’. Although direct disruption to specific individual participants can be prevented by protecting their privacy, the limitations of such measures and potential risk have to be assessed. How to manage the stereotypical accounts Fine and Weis (1998:20) describe as “treacherous data” in a society where racial tensions potentially exist, poses a dilemma. Responsible research is conducted by framing findings in a comprehensive and thoughtful way, providing the necessary contextualisation, in order to prevent accidental and/or deliberate misinterpretation and abuse of the findings.

In my discussion I have primarily engaged with conceptual issues underpinning the research topic. How these principles are translated into a specific study is described below.

5.6 Research design: a strategy of inquiry

I suggested conversations on the transformation of the South African society are common in everyday discourse. This claim is rooted in my experience as a member of the society and is apparent in my personal interaction with others as well as in the mass media. I have observed such interaction firsthand as a white South African
male\(^5\). These conversations provide insight into how individuals reflect on their identity and orientate themselves to social change. This discourse engages daily experiences and reveals how the change is understood.

Accessing everyday unsolicited talk in many respects would be the ideal for a study of discourse on identity. However, recording such unsolicited talk accurately poses a number of challenges. Whether a researcher can obtain unproblematic and transparent access to everyday ‘talk’, as a researcher, remains questionable. The lifestyles of middle-class people and their mobility, furthermore complicates an ethnographically based study. Naturally occurring conversations are not necessarily less ‘staged’ and therefore more authentic than an interview. In such conversations the talk of persons may be motivated to achieve a particular purpose like they may be in an interview. Questionnaire based survey research, in turn, has been criticised extensively for determining a particular outcome by using preset questions and soliciting one-dimensional responses, treating respondents as passive dispensers of facts. An interview based study then appears to offer a compromise position in this regard, allowing a greater degree of flexibility and engagement with research participants. It is suggested that interviews are common in modern society. Persons are frequently interviewed in the media on their experiences or opinions (Bonilla-Silva & Foreman 2000; Burgess 1984; Fine & Weiss 1998; Gallagher 2000; McAllister 1999; Silverman 1985). As Hughes and Sharrock (1997) point out, methods are not self-validating.

Interviews were chosen for pragmatic reasons given the difficulties and drawbacks associated with the alternatives described above. In these conscious conversations on societal transformation care was taken to balance the requirements of directedness and openness. Broad themes were introduced in contrast to the narrow focus of structured interviews. Within the interviews I tried to facilitate a context in which participants felt able to speak freely and frankly in a conversational and hence more relaxed

\(^5\) I do not claim that I am outside of such discourse, as a researcher. Personally, I have reflected on my own positioning and prospects within a changing society. Approaching the topic as a researcher, however, does afford an opportunity of viewing the matter from a different perspective.
setting. I allowed participants latitude to spontaneously explore themes introduced and even digress from them.

Semi-structured in-depth interviews were the primary method generating data on participants’ experiences and opinions for this study. Although most interviews were conducted with individuals, paired or group interviews were conducted in instances where the participants formed a naturally occurring unit (partners, family, and friends) and expressed a preference to have relatives of friends with them. Wetherell and Potter (1992) followed a similar strategy of conducting individual, paired and group interviews in their discursive research. My sense in these instances was that the particular participants were more comfortable discussing the topic together with their relatives and friends.

Whereas individual interviews generate personal accounts, the paired and group interviews offer some access to interaction with other participants, besides the researcher. In these instances they often reflected on and drew comparisons with the comments made by other participants (Gaskell 2000; Lewis 2003; Macun & Posel 1998; Morgan 1997; Ritchie 2003; Stewart & Shamdasani 1998).

In preparation for interviewing as well as in reflecting on the data generated, I drew on my own observations of discourse occurring in natural settings (daily interaction), studied available documentation – in particular local newspapers, read literature by both English and Afrikaans speaking authors published during the transitional period engaging with the changes occurring within the society and listened to radio talk shows and phone-in programmes on both national and community-based stations. I am aware of the selectiveness of such secondary sources, particularly as they were not studied systematically and exhaustively. However, drawing on my experience as an insider within the society and paying attention to everyday contexts within which people communicate with each other provide an indication of how people publicly

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6 In my initial proposal I envisaged conducting between forty and sixty open-ended interviews as a primary method of data collection. As an additional secondary method of data collection I proposed six focus-group sessions which I eventually dropped due to the presence of paired and group interviews
and in some instances privately discuss issues of transformation. During my research I have remained attentive to opportunities where people talked in an unsolicited fashion about the matters I deal with in this study. Although I took note of discourse on change in these everyday contexts, the media and personal experience as secondary sources, are not integrated into my analysis, largely due to constraints in terms of the permissible length of the thesis. Being attentive to these secondary sources is beneficial. They have allowed me to reflect on credibility and representativeness, albeit not in a statistical sense, of my primary data as well as afforded an opportunity to reflect on the continuity and disjuncture between such interaction and interview talk. Both Maxwell (1998) and Weber and Carter (1998) argue that the insider-as-researcher position does have the advantage that the researcher, if conscious and sensitive, is able to draw on experiences when analysing and making sense of the data.

Shotter (1999) warns against simply falling into the mode of taking up an ‘overhearer’s perspective’, treating what is said as data and then simply selecting what is regarded as useful. Citing Alasuutari, ten Have (1999) argues interviews are part of the reality studied rather than being a means of obtaining statements about or reflections on reality. In-depth interviewing as an account-centred method focussing on interaction between researcher and researched generates discursive data on how claims made, provide meaning, coherence and structure to experience. This implies a shift from exclusively considering the content or substance interaction to an awareness of the process involved in interaction social constructionist approaches analyse. The context plays a role in how participants present themselves in the interviews. Situated understanding implies a relationship between the researcher, participant, data and the social world as the knower becomes part of what is known (Abell 1990; Fontana & Frey 1994; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998; Mason 1996b; Seidman 1998). Gray (2003:17) contends

[extended time spent with groups as participant observers would not necessarily be any more productive than listening to people in close

and also as a result of the amount of data the interview process generated.
conversational interviews.

Although interviews rely more on reporting than the actual observation of practices, they are guided conversations, reflecting on intentionality, which itself can be observed. Given the public nature of interviews it would be surprising if broader societal expectations do not influence the conversations. Research participants have their own preconceptions about what research is as well as what the objectives of the particular study are. These preconceptions affect the role they play during the research which may potentially influence the responses they offer. Expectations are socially generated and define what is regarded as relevant and what remains unsaid in the situation. The shared frames of reference generate discourse and reveal the functions it serves. In this respect interviews are often criticised for providing an ‘official’ account – what is publicly permissible. Multiple narratives are possible, depending on the context and location of the research participant. The accounts are constructed containing justifications to make them credible. This does not imply that a particular account is definitive (Cicourel 1964; Collins 1998; Denzin 2001; Weber & Carter 1998; Weiss 1994).

I referred to discourse on a moral self in chapter 2 and suggested how this may impact on how whites may represent themselves (see section 5.4). Retelling experience is not the experience itself and cannot escape interpretation. There is always a gap between the experience and relating it. Accounts are not merely a simple and complete reproduction of matters. Michael (1996:22) contends there is always the concern to appear as “good accountable persons whose actions are warrantable”. Hence, narratives are social, representing the narrator’s viewpoint, which can both reveal and conceal details of the event.

In spite of attempts to avoid the potentially contrived nature of interview talk, extrapolating from these contexts to others remains tenuous. The accounts generated in the interview cannot be treated naively in an uncritical and literal way as referring to an unchanging external reality. However, this does not imply that the discourse in the interview is totally cut off from that within everyday situations. People talk about
their social worlds and how they experience it. In this respect, Taylor and Bogdan (1984:83) conclude that

the skilful researcher can usually learn how informants view themselves and their world, sometimes obtain an accurate account of past events and current activities, and almost never predict how an informant will act in a new situation.

The possibility of recording the interview, although not without drawbacks, ensures a comprehensive record of the discussion and enables a researcher to be attentive to the discussion. Interviews are guided conversations. Conversations are as much about being in a relationship than a means of sharing information, and both these matters come to the fore in interviewing. Whilst the emphasis is still on listening, sharing does imply some reciprocity and therefore builds trust (Chase 1995; Emerson et al. 1995; Fielding 1993; Huberman & Miles 1994; Rubin & Rubin 1995; Stewart & Shamdasani 1998).

Sampling decisions demarcate the boundary of the study. Although the notion of sampleable units suggests discrete, distinguishable entities, Becker (1998) argues it is preferable to treat activities or processes as units of analysis rather than research participants. He argues this prevents reification because the activity or process, rather than the person is ‘typed’. Hence, research participants are not selected because they are for instance ‘typically’ white, rural or Afrikaner essentialising their identity and fixing their discourse. Following this suggestion, discourse becomes the focus of this study, with research participants being sampleable units that provide access to the units of analysis – their discourse (Bickman, Rog, & Hedrick 1998; Mama 1995; Ragin 1994; Silverman 2000; Williams 2000).

Choices have to be made about the location or site where the research will be conducted and subsequently who will be approached. These choices are guided by the focus of investigation. Such decisions are made pragmatically within the context of a relatively small sample as in-depth interviews generate a considerable volume of transcript. Several scholars suggest between fifteen and twenty-five in-depth interviews as the norm, with upper and lower limits between five and fifty (Bloor,
Conversations are fluid and the range of discourse is unknowable. Selection is based on the notion of diversity rather than representivity in a strict statistical sense. For this purpose a matrix of attributes which suggest different social locations and experiences and therefore variability guided the purposive selection of samplable units. The objective is to take variability into account without making claims on its distribution or implying that the attributes predetermine an identity. This then ensures that a range of experiences are covered, rather than all experiences and also without implying that experiences linked to a particular attribute are homogenous (Arber 1993; Bauer & Aarts 2000; Frankenberg 1993; Weiss 1994).

For this study, two urban and two rural sites were identified, to ensure diversity (see Maps 1 to 6 in appendix D). The urban sites were adjacent metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng (Map 2), whilst the rural sites were in Limpopo and previously fell within a large conservatively orientated rural constituency in the previous political dispensation⁷, currently a district council (Maps 5 and 6). According to the 2001 Census, Gauteng had the highest rate of urbanisation at ninety six percent, whilst Limpopo at ten percent had the lowest rate of urbanisation (Boraine 2006; Lehohla 2003). These sites were pragmatically selected for ease of access, with interviewees in three sites being within two hours drive from my home. One urban site and one rural site⁸ respectively served as a primary location were most interviews were conducted. The second urban site and second rural site served as a secondary location.

⁷ Waterberg was regarded the kernel of Afrikaner nationalism in the north. The constituency (although its borders were periodically redrawn through demarcation) remained in Nationalist hands until the party split establishing the Conservative Party in 1982. Hans Strijdom, later the second Prime Minister of the nationalistic reign, was the sole representative of the purified Nationalists from the north (Transvaal) for a period following the fusion between the National and South African parties. This constituency was also the seat of the leader of the Conservative Party, Andries Treurnicht.

⁸ For the purpose of this study, the town, established in the countryside is seen as reflecting a rural rather than urban character.
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CJMM) is an amalgamation of thirteen apartheid based local authorities. It developed from a mining camp established in 1886 to the economic hub of the country. From its establishment segregation was enforced, benefiting mining capital by reducing the social cost of labour. Population wise it is the largest municipality in the country. Generally the bulk of whites reside in middle-class suburbs established in the central and northern areas of the municipality, whereas the south-western and peripheral areas house the majority of the black population and the poor. Given this spatial distribution and my focus on middle-class whites, I worked in administrative regions C, B and E\(^9\) which are located in the north-western area of the city (see Map 3). The CJMM is the primary urban site of this study (Boraine 2004; Lehoela 2004a; Lemon 1991; Parnell & Pirie 1991). The descriptions of the city by Mabin (2001:183) aptly capture the current context.

Johannesburg is really a remarkable place from which to view the urban world. It is a ‘suburbanizing world city in an urbanizing poor country’. ...From its very high density but troubled inner city, through bourgeois suburbs of last century to symbols of extraordinary suburban (‘edge city’) investment.

The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) amalgamated fifteen apartheid based local authorities (see Map 4). A white township was proclaimed in 1855. It became the capital of the ZAR in 1860 and subsequently the administrative capital of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Whites residing in the predominantly white southern region (see Pretoria and Centurion on map 4 in appendix D), containing more affluent southern and eastern suburbs, were interviewed. The northern and central region houses a majority of the black population as a result of displaced urbanisation to previously homeland or trust areas. During apartheid black township development elsewhere was suspended for a period. The northern region contains almost 60% of the black population with another third residing on the flanks of the central region respectively in the east and west where two black townships Mamelodi and Attridgeville had absorbed black Africans, many who initially had

\(^9\) The Northern parts of regions C and B and the north western parts of E together constitute part of the north western quadrant of the city where I worked.
lived in more central locations in the city (Boraine 2004; Lehohla 2004a; Mashabela 1988; Olivier & Booysen 1983; Smit & Booysen 1982).

Waterberg District Council covers the largest area of the five regions\(^{10}\) in the Limpopo Province (see Map 5). Whereas the eastern part of this district is more densely populated, the western part is more sparsely populated. Voortrekkers settled in the area from the mid nineteenth century. It was the least populous district in the province according to 1996 census data. By the 2001 census its population had passed that of another district in the province, which experienced a decline in its population. In the province Waterberg district was more urbanised and had the largest number of whites proportionately (not in actual numbers). It was also the only region in Limpopo to experience net in-migration. One can assume that this in-migration gravitated towards the east of the district which is closer to Gauteng. I selected one of the towns in the eastern part of the district as the primary site, and a farming community in the less populous west as a secondary site (see Map 6). The layout of Edensvlakte (a pseudonym for the town), is affected by the spatial ordering brought about by segregationist policies and apartheid planning. A ‘location’ is separated from the formerly white commercial and residential areas by a buffer of transport arteries and light industry. With regard to the formerly white farming area, Wesveld (a pseudonym), the border of a homeland (Bantustan) lies south of it. Control over political, economic and cultural domains in Waterberg ensured that whites settled in prime locations and had access to developed infrastructure (Boraine 2006; Lehohla 2004b).

Selection of sampleable units occurred after gaining some familiarity with the sites. Nine key contact persons suggested potential participants to be interviewed. Introduced by these contact persons to potential participants, the rate of refusal to participate was low. A decision was made to speak to middle-class people, precisely because the bulk of white people occupy this location as a result of the privileging in

\(^{10}\) The Bohlabela District Council, straddling Limpopo and Mpumalanga was disestablished in March 2006 in accordance with the policy to align municipal and provincial boundaries. This reduced the administrative regions in the province from six to five.
the past dispensation. A matrix of attributes – age, language and sex, was kept in mind to obtain a general balance when approaching potential interviewees purposively across the primary and secondary sites. The specific demographics of the sites also had an impact (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7, as well as the accompanying notes in Appendix C). In the rural areas amongst the whites there were proportionately more elderly and Afrikaans speaking people. Selection within the primary urban site was skewed towards English speaking people, given the middle-class suburbs selected, as well as to ensure an adequate number of English speakers were interviewed, given the preponderance of Afrikaans speakers in the rural sites (see Table 1.7 in Appendix C).

It has been argued that the personal background of the researcher is brought into the research context. The researched are aware of the researcher, who cannot fully determine how s/he would be perceived. The particular beliefs and interests of the researched in turn affect how they are invested in the topic under consideration (Fine 1994; Shipman 1997).

Where a researcher is viewed as an outsider a degree of suspicion on the purpose of the research may arise. Whilst a stranger can be misled as a result of mistrust, Denzin (1989) contends being a stranger may be an advantage in some instances where the researched are more willing to discuss matters with a person they are unlikely to meet again, to defend their position and to convince him or her. An outsider has the advantage of looking at matters from a distance and can provide a new perspective. The researcher may also share a number of characteristics with the researched and be welcomed as an insider. On the one hand this may facilitate access on one level, but on the other hand it may also be limiting. For instance, they may take a number of things for granted. Outsiders and insiders generate different responses. The boundary between being an outsider and/or insider is fluid and complex. Hornsby-Smith (1993) points out gaining and maintaining access depends on the interpersonal skill of the researcher to forge a relationship with research participants. The relationship within an interview, then, is potentially fluid.
Accepting the participant is important to facilitate rapport. Research is intrusive and reactivity cannot be eliminated. In a society where race filters knowledge and structures social experience sharing the same racial categorisation, to some extent confers the status of an insider\textsuperscript{11} to the researcher. Sharing category membership implies possible shared experiences and empathy. Such ‘insiderness’ (in terms of category membership) attenuates the impact of race and enables the researcher to probe sensitive matters in conversations. As I have indicated research participants often assume the researcher shares their taken-for-granted views of reality (Andersen 1993; Burgess 1984; Essed 1991; May 1993; Sciarra 1999; Taylor & Bogdan 1984).

Acknowledging the positioning of a researcher within the context studied encourages reflexivity about how the category inscriptions attributed to the researcher such as race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, age, training and occupation both facilitate and constrain access. Such categorisations, whilst mutually comprehensible, cannot be reduced to singular and fixed experience and their impact cannot be determined beforehand and should neither be viewed in essentialist terms nor overestimated. There are limits to sameness (Collins 1998; Evans 2002; Fontana & Frey 1994; Sapsford 1998; Taylor & Bogdan 1984).

Several scholars have debated the complex and fluid relation between insider and outsider within research indicating that it is not a simple mechanistic process of matching key characteristics. Whilst sharing a category inscription does potentially facilitate access, this does not imply better understanding or more authentic data. The complexity of social identities implies that a researcher will simultaneously be an insider and an outsider. In a study focusing on the discourse of white South Africans sharing race does ease access to some extent, but such access is neither automatic nor complete. Being aware of the researcher and participant’s social positioning is useful (Gallagher 2000; Kram 1988; Lewis 2003; McIntyre 1997; Twine 2000).

A degree of self-disclosure then can facilitate access and participation encouraging

\textsuperscript{11} There is always the risk of overstating similarity, reducing it to one dimension and then fixing it. In reality this matter is much more complex. Identity, as suggested in chapter 2, is fluid.
openness, but overdoing this eventually can also be detrimental to the research (Berg 1995; Bhavnani 1990; Fine 1994; Weber & Carter 2003; Weiss 1994). According to Weber and Carter (1998), disclosure implies reciprocity, but not necessarily counterdisclosure. I therefore presented myself as interested in understanding how the research participants experience social change within South Africa and answered any questions they posed.

A small pilot study was conducted before embarking on the research by interviewing three individuals, conveniently selected, in an urban area – two female, one male. Two were English-speaking and one Afrikaans-speaking. The main purpose of this pilot study was to assess the interview schedule, to determine whether questions asked were comprehensible, to see what responses the questions elicited, and to test the functioning of equipment.

The themes covered in the interviews dealt with participants’ personal details, description of the community they lived in and South Africa in general, as well as their view on the changes occurring in the community and society. These themes indirectly revealed how interviewees understood and oriented themselves toward questions of race (see the interview schedule in appendix A). A great deal of flexibility was allowed in open-ended conversations, to enable participants to talk about their experiences and concerns.

Interviews were conducted at participants’ homes or workplace, between May 2003 and August 2004 (a full list of interviewees is provided for each site and the pilot interviews in Tables 1.1 to 1.5, see appendix B). Most interviews where conducted at interviewees’ own homes, a setting they were familiar and comfortable with. Four were conducted at a workplace (interviewees’ own businesses). Interviews were conducted in the language of choice indicated by the participants.

A total of 58 interviews were conducted with 95 interviewees. In total slightly more women than men were interviewed. With regard to the age range of interviewees the
rural sample under-represents young adults, slightly. In the urban sample there is an under-representation of young adults also and a corresponding over-representation of older adults. The characteristics of interviewees are unpacked in the notes following the tables in appendix C. As I have explained, the matrix used in selection served as a guide to ensure potential diversity of participants rather than to achieve representativeness in a statistical sense. Almost all interviews conducted in the Waterberg District Council in Limpopo were conducted in Afrikaans. Data reported in Table 1.6 (see appendix C) indicates that there are few English-speakers in the region. Slightly more than a third of the interviews conducted in Gauteng were conducted in Afrikaans. There is a bias towards English-speakers built into the sampling for the urban sample, primarily as a result of the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking rural sample. However data reported in Table 1.6 does confirm that the CJMM, which was the primary urban site, has more English-speakers.

Time was taken to talk to the participant before commencing with the interview. The purpose of this small talk was to put the interviewee at ease. It served the additional purpose to enable me to introduce myself and the research project as well as get a sense of the background of the participant. During small talk before the interview I was often asked some questions about my background, amongst other, the origin of my surname. Such discussions reminded me that interviewees were sizing me up and placing me within a broader context and social relations. How they placed me would impact on what they were prepared to share with me with regard to the topic under discussion. This obviously varied between interviewees and the impact of characteristics that could be ascribed to me, cannot be fully known. Comparing the conversation in the interviews to my personal experiences in other settings as well as the secondary documentary sources I read, I feel that a degree of openness was achieved. In this regard Adriaan, an interviewee, made the following comment.

That is why it is important for someone like you to do a study and reveal it publicly, where you talk to people in their privacy asking them, but how do you really feel about this? Because at the end of the day there is not, uh, anymore provision for them, they think actually everyone is liberal and thinks
Adriaan and Karen both contend that they have at times kept quiet in the liberal work context out of fear that their frank opinion would be branded racist and jeopardise their position.

Only one interview was shorter than an hour. A third of the interviews were an hour long, more than half between an hour and two hours in length. The remainder were longer than two hours in length.

Following the interview I made direct observation notes such as how I was received, whether the research participant expressed any opinion about being interviewed, what difficulties I experienced. The descriptive detail of these notes framed the context in which the interview was conducted and I reread these during my analysis of transcripts.

5.7 Working with data

A key analytic question is whether interviews give direct access to experience or actively construct them (a constitutive theory). With regard to the latter position narrative analysis displays “forms of telling about experience, not simply the content to which language refers” (Riessman 1993:2). Data then are not assessed in terms of ‘telling it like it is’ accurately mirroring an external reality but reflexively in terms of contextual rootedness preventing reification. Discourse-analytic methods do not transparently and unproblematically reveal the truth. Narratives in this sense describe experience and offer a representation or interpretation of reality (Bradbury & Sclater 2000; Malson 2000; Parker 2002e; Potter et al. 2002; Richardson 1990). Parker (2002c:145) contends

[d]iscourses do not simply describe the social world, but categorize it, they bring phenomena into sight.

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12 The convention when referring to an interviewee is, to note the interview number after the pseudonym. In a paired interview an A or B is used with the interview number.
It implies the process of making sense is in itself a social process and that this is crucial in mapping social realities.

Interviews were transcribed verbatim in the language they were conducted in, reflecting in a rudimentary fashion the flow and structure of conversations as they occurred. References potentially revealing the actual identity of participants were removed. These omissions are indicated. I included graphemes (mmm, uh) and in some instances paralingual (e.g. laughter) and extralingual (gestures) references. Transcription is a selective process and I did not time pauses or indicate overlaps between speakers. Detail such as intonation, inflection, stresses and loudness has been left out as this was not required for this study. The transcripts then simplified the actual recorded event, erasing some nonverbal and contextual data (Heath & Luff 1993; Smith 2000b; ten Have 1997; ten Have 1999; Wooffitt 1993).

Transcribing approximately a hundred hours of unstructured taped interviews and checking them to ensure accuracy was a labour intensive process. The transcripts generated a considerable amount of text-based data (three thousand four hundred and sixty one pages at one and a half spacing, with generous margins for notes). Transcribing is the first step in data analysis. To manage the amount of data coding categories organised it thematically. Drawing interpretations from the data and moving beyond simple description posed a number of challenges.

The transcripts can be subjected to multiple readings (interpretations). Deciding on what to analyse is itself an interpretative process and theoretically informed. Coding unstructured transcript data entails a process of data reduction, selection and condensation in anticipated ways as conceptual frameworks chosen determine the significance of data. Retaining the complexity of the social world remains a crucial ideal. Working through transcripts, being attentive to contrary evidence and alternative interpretations, ensures comprehensiveness preventing the error of selecting data that supports a particular claim. Analytic induction implies the ‘double fitting’ of ideas and evidence across a number of cases, establishing a dialectic

In my analysis I accessed transcripts and tape recordings of the interviews repeatedly to get a ‘feel’ of conversations and to familiarise myself with the data. Given the immense amount of material this was a challenge. I read transcripts in full, attentive to the interaction between me and the participant. This inductive strategy was not pre-determined to avoid premature closure. Reading and rereading the transcripts as well as listening and re-listening to tapes enabled me to identify and annotate recurrent themes in conversations as well as differences within a conversation (variability) and between different conversations. I was particularly interested in considering broader patterns of talking about community, society, change and identity that emerged.

Conversations refer to an already interpreted world by both the interviewee and interviewer. They are inference rich and choices have to be made. I have indicated earlier in this chapter that the fine detail of discourse, though important and valuable in rooting an analysis in the interview as a social situation itself is not the primary focus of this study.

I used first-order concepts to identify meaningful units of analysis during initial coding. It enabled me to focus on what became part of an analytic account, to identify central themes in accounts that illustrate the interconnectedness of themes. In this regard I attempt to retain sensitivity towards the original accounts whilst framing them in a broader context in order to develop a more general sociological

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13 All excerpts from transcripts dealing with a theme were grouped together. The excerpts selected were as inclusive as possible (rather including more than less) in order to provide a sense of the context of the conversation in which the theme emerged. Attached to this was an identifier to the interview and interviewee as well as brief notes. Formal constraints, such as the length of the dissertation permitted, resulted in shorter segments of excerpts selected being cited. The grouping together of these excerpts enabled the final selection for inclusion in the dissertation. In this regard care was taken to draw excerpts from all interviews, to reflect different positions.
understanding. The potential themes and issues that emerged are a consequence of this process. A review of existing academic work and theorisation on the topic of this study (see chapters 2 to 4) played a key role in generating questions and providing sensitising concepts with which I could reflect on discourses within conversations. This reflects the choices that are made between many possibilities during analysis.

I took care to work systematically through all transcripts. I paid attention to variability in accounts and contradictions. In selecting excerpts to illustrate accounts I considered the discourse across interviews. I was mindful to reflect this diversity and to avoid falling into the trap of excessively relying on a particular participant. The excerpts are selected for what they exemplify rather than merely a reflection of frequency. In translating the excerpts used from Afrikaans interviews I tried to capture the spirit of the conversation whilst translating it as directly as possible. The original excerpts are in endnotes organised by chapter, following the conclusion (Chapter 8).

The process of interpretation runs throughout the research process. I have indicated that my personal and professional interests influenced the choice of a topic. The conversations themselves reflect an already interpreted social domain. As I suggest at the end of section 5.6, I am aware that the interview is a social situation in itself and that my interviewee notes made directly after an interview served the purpose of enabling reflection on it. I have suggested that as a member of the society, personally experiencing the transition, I am located within the context I am studying. As interviewer, I asked questions which shaped the interaction within interviews. The asymmetric relationship between interviewer and interviewee is a matter that needs to be borne in mind. This requires reflection on my own involvement in the collection of the material used in the study and how I was perceived by interviewees implying that detachment is impossible.

As a member of society I am able to draw on my personal experience and knowledge.

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14 I do not suggest that this leads to bias, but it does shape how the research is conducted and how data are interpreted. Reflecting on these matters makes one aware of both the limitations inherent in the research as well as the possibilities associated with it.
Transcribing and coding are processes that draws on a theoretical stance allowing the volume of material to be condensed and presented in more digestible forms. In the final instance engaging with the material, I as researcher, drawing on my professional knowledge as well as personal experience (which can never be excluded, but needs to be recognised) develop an understanding of the context studied. It is this understanding which is conveyed in the analysis. The interpretation offered, then, is not the only interpretation possible. It does attempt to offer a defensible and convincing interpretation.

5.8 Conclusion

According to Reason and Rowan (1981), the debate on validity has centred on methods. Implicit are notions about “truth” and checking the data against ‘reality’. Discursive studies rather focus on the trustworthiness and credibility of interpretation. The plausibility and adequacy of an account becomes a key measure of validity and relies on demonstrating rigorous and thorough analysis. For qualitative researchers validity depends on the relationship between the researcher and the researched and the interpretative community generated in the research context. Hence, validation is not achieved by reference to an absolute standard, but by relying on canons, themselves contestable, within social science practice. In this regard it is a question of confidence rather than one of certainty (Guba & Lincoln 1994; Hammersley 1998; Marshall & Rossman 1995; Maxwell 1998; Merrick 1999; Silverman 1993).

Another key matter concerns the question of generalisability of this study. The study does not indicate how phenomena are distributed within the population in a statistical (enumerative) sense. An assertional rather than a probabilistic logic situates the phenomena contextually providing an indication of resonance with other contexts. The strategy of seeking variation in cases, as well as an attempt to consider disconfirming evidences, strengthens the confidence in analytic claims inductively enabling theoretical inference. With the small sample it is possibly more appropriate to consider the transferability of findings. This is known as moderatum generalisation.
and is an intuitive process whereby the findings can be compared to other contexts, providing a framework for reflection. Some researchers prefer to call this extrapolation. The generalisations made in the next two chapters, nevertheless aim to describe the broad contours of the topic and are suggestive, rather than being final or definitive (Bryant 1990; Mason 1996b; Silverman 2000; ten Have 1999; Wellman 1993; Williams 1998).
Chapter 6: Interviewees’ discourse on their community and changes potentially affecting their everyday lives

6.1 Introduction

This chapter considers how middle-class white\(^1\) interviewees talk about the communities they live in and how they respond to and reflect on the changes they have experienced locally. First, attention is paid to how interviewees identify and describe the community they reside in (section 6.2). Second, interviewees’ observations of the changes in their communities and society in general are considered (section 6.3).

In chapter four I discussed how white South Africans constituted the dominant group in formal political institutions of society. The Union of South Africa was a result of the partial inclusion of some groups and full exclusion of others. Racial consciousness was an important marker of social relationships and privileged access to resources resulted in a majority of white South Africans occupying middle-class positions. Whites defined vast areas of the country, including urban areas, as their domain. The spatial and social morphology of all the communities I studied were affected profoundly by these policies.

A couple involved in ministry in Johannesburg describe the harsh impact of implementing these exclusionary apartheid measures to shape the city as the domain of those classified white. Ian contends he said to officials

…look uh, this family you’re going to divide. Because in Kliptown they were white railway workers who had lived and married, a black woman and their children were living in the same house which they had been involved in. And

\(^1\) Although the category ‘white’ glosses over many differences and elicits scholarly debate about its analytical usefulness and the danger of reifying race, as discussed in chapter three, it is impossible to understand the present situation without taking past racialisation in society into consideration. The reason for focusing on middle-class whites is discussed in the preceding chapter.
this young man was saying, ‘because you’re white and because you’re
coloured you’ll have to split this family’. [30A]\(^2\)

This expanding system dictated to people who they were, who they could marry, what
work they could do and where they could live. Patricia de Lille indicates her father
was subjected to such official scrutiny to determine whether he could remain coloured
(Smith 2002). In our interview Arlene adds that this encompassing system of
regulation put some who could pass for being white or coloured in the position to
apply for reclassification, to improve their social position, a process officials strictly
controlled.

…so a lot of coloured people changed their names, their African names to
coloured names, so that they could [Ian: Go up in society], so that they play,
for what they called in the coloured community, so that they could play for
white. But it meant that your community that you had left, never could see
you again because if you were seen fraternising with them, you could be re-
classified backwards. And so, uh, it broke families widely apart. [30B]

The attempt to establish an exclusive white group led to proscriptions on
fraternisation across racial lines. Ian and Arlene contend that whites had a choice
whether to accept or reject their positioning in society. Very few whites sought multi-
racial contact or challenged the prevailing social injustices\(^3\). Those like them who put

\(^2\) The number in square brackets following the excerpts quoted in the chapter identifies the interviewee.
Where it is followed by an A or B, this indicates one of the participants in a paired interview.
Pseudonyms are used to ensure confidentiality. Tables 1.1 to 1.5 in appendix B contain background
information of interviewees.

\(^3\) Generally speaking Ian and Arlene through their sustained community involvement relate an extended
narrative of lobbying for an alternative system, challenging the prevailing racial order during the
apartheid era. They were involved on a personal and institutional level. As anti-apartheid activists in
communities they often had to adapt their strategies working towards liberation as apartheid constantly
evolved. Ian [30A], who met Biko through his community work, says there was a distinct
psychological shift amongst blacks from victimhood, where people had lamented their plight, to an
active challenge and engagement. This he contends had a profound impact on their own work, which
they no longer conducted simply from a liberal viewpoint. Within the Johannesburg sub-sample Danny
[20] a conscientious objector to military service and Emma [27] who developed an extensive friendship
network across the colour line are two others that appear to have been involved in resisting the course
of events in a more sustained sense. Others like Gloria [23] and Francis [P3] report involvement in
student protests at university as they became politically more aware, but they admit their involvement
at that stage was not sustained. One says “I was at the burning of the, eh, eh, eh flag, which is a fairly
well known event in South Africa’s history”. Regardless of the extent of reported involvement, and
individual assessment of its importance, these narratives do position these interviewees from their
perspective in a particular way with regard to the racial order in the past and society at present,
providing them with a degree of moral credibility (some social currency) to trade on, in the presently
changed context. Joyce’s [28B] remark that it is ‘hip to be radical’ at ‘varsity’ devalues the effort of
those who viewed themselves as siding with activists.
their children in an almost exclusively black multi-racial school, were pressurised by family arguing they were disadvantaging their own children. For most interviewees, on the other hand, racial divisions in society were, at the time, regarded as normal and natural.

The fluidity of race is apparent from the examples above. The marginalised status of some groups, classified white, is also recalled by several interviewees. Markus [31A] remembers Portuguese being called ‘salt kaffirs’. This underscores that whiteness had to be produced and reproduced.

Decades of strict residential segregation together with the development of separate institutions such as churches and schools resulted in isolation from other racial groups leaving whites, according to Schutte (1995), ill equipped for the transition ending white hegemony and unsettling the assumed normality of past practices as well as the privileges associated with it.

6.2 Identifying and describing their community

After introducing my research as a study of “perceptions of change in South Africa”, I asked interviewees to tell me about themselves and the area/community. I purposefully formulated my question without reference to a specific place because I was interested in seeing what boundaries the interviewees themselves drew. In instances where further clarification was sought, I tried to keep my reply vague, referring to the broader area or region.

Given the limitations in size, the composition and spatial location of the sample – described in chapter five – no claim of generalisability to the full range of ‘white’ experience in the communities studied is made. In spite of these limitations, the interviews generated an immense amount of data and provided an indication of how middle-class whites describe their communities and respond to the changes they face.
How interviewees living in Edensvlakte (see Table 1.1 in the appendix) identify and describe their community is considered first, then conversations of interviewees residing in Wesveld are considered (see Table 1.2 in the appendix) and in the final instance that of interviewees living in metropolitan municipalities (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in the appendix).

6.2.1 The discourse of interviewees living in Edensvlakte on their community

Interviewees living in Edensvlakte use the Afrikaans name of the town to refer to the formerly white section of the town and the African name to refer to the township and adjacent informal settlement where the majority of black Africans still reside. Talking about their community interviewees then refer to Edensvlakte. ‘Tshimo en tlé’[^4], the new official name of the town is only used when a reference is made to the adjacent township and informal settlement. From the conversations with interviewees it is clear that they identify primarily with the formerly white area, which they consider their community.

A number of themes emerged from interviewees’ description of their community. They talked about where people lived and in particular the persisting segregated patterns of settlement (section 6.2.1.1), the extent of conservatism within the community and their own positioning with regard to it (sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.5), why the community remains attractive for white people to settle in it (section 6.2.1.3) as well as the nature of social institutions serving and constituting the community (section 6.2.1.4).

6.2.1.1 Patterns of settlement in Edensvlakte

Residential desegregation has been limited, primarily occurring to some extent in an extension on the outskirts of town where an employer owns a number of properties rented out to personnel. According to Marius [15], who lives in this part of town, a number of people moved out of this area when the residential integration started. He

[^4]: Like Edensvlakte, Tshimo en tlé (meaning a beautiful garden) is a pseudonym.
contends, as long as his privacy is respected, the integration does not concern him. Yvette [13A] adds people do not have problems living next to black people because ‘respectable citizens’ move in next to them⁵. However, Hanneli [11] says that a number of people threatened to move if blacks start to settle in their residential area. Tiaan [5A] reports several donors to the old age home unequivocally stated they would suspend their financial support if a black person is admitted.

Herman [3A] indicates an estate agent admitted to him it would be commercial suicide to sell their small holding, on the market, to a black buyer. According to Sakkie, the new government initially proposed to establish black residential areas between farms. A neighbour offered the authorities land bordering theirs, for free, on condition that he would build the houses. This was attractive to labourers who had always felt slightly insecure on the farms where they stayed whilst the farmer allowed it. The ANC organiser drew up a list of farm workers interested. He contends

> Look and it was a nightmare. Because having a black neighbour is one thing, but to have a thousand or two black neighbours, then we realised it was over. It’s over. If they establish a town with five hundred houses on our boundary, with two, three thousand black people, then it is over, like with all other border areas. [Charles: Yes] That bad, so that our old black person came and said to me “Boss sell the cattle before the time. They are going to steal each one. Right, so that was one of, it was an impact we experienced intensely. [translated – see endnote¹] [6A]

He adds they realised their property would have no value and be unsellable. Weighing their options they had decided to abandon the farm as the risk was too high living next door to such as settlement, something he admits black people do not like to hear. But he contends, ‘as the Lord willed it’, they discovered the ground unsuitable for residential development. The perception of increased risk bordering a black settlement is not entirely unfounded as examples discussed in Steinberg (2002) and Krog (2003) suggest. The anecdote however confirms the threat of living adjacent to a black community and the economic consequence of declining property values. The retelling of the advice from a trusted black worker, further supports the claim and deflects any

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⁵ To substantiate her point of respectability, she relates an anecdote of neighbours in Pretoria North telling her domestic worker’s children that they should not move because they had many problems with the white tenants living there before.
criticism of Sakkie that he may be prejudicial in his analysis. Such a strategy of using a racial other to confirm a negative perception is repeated by other interviewees and serves the purpose of strengthening the claims they make. This observation does not imply that the ‘racial other’ did not discuss the matter with Sakkie. However, being able to refer to what his worker said strengthens his arguments.

6.2.1.2 The extent of conservatism in the community

Edensvlakte is described by interviewees as aging, Afrikaans, conservative, rural and by implication white. According to Gerrie [7], it is a ‘heavy boere town’. Fran [2] refers to its ‘old type Afrikaners, set in ways’ and Mervyn [17] to being situated behind the ‘Boerewors gordyn’ [Traditional Boer sausage curtain], a completely conservative town in an extremely conservative region. It is contrasted to more open, liberal and tolerant areas.

The interviewees contend the elderly remain steadfast in their beliefs and principles rooted in belonging to one of the Afrikaner Reform churches and sticking to their political party. They point out that the traditionalists feverously oppose prevailing changes considering the turn of events, a tragedy, believing whites should still rule. Some interviewees refer to a sustained opposition within the community to political change, deviating from core apartheid principles. For instance, Marie contends in this regard referring to the leader of the HNP (A party formed as a result of the split that occurred at the end of the 1960s. See the discussion on challenges and realignments in Afrikanerdom in chapter four) that

There was only one man that is now who predicted the political outcome correctly, and that was Jaap Marias [Charlene: Yes, his politics was the purest politics there were.] He said it in 1970 and everything happened like that... He remained steadfast [principled] to the end. [Translated – see endnote5] [4A]

6 According to several interviewees conservatism is embedded in the predominantly Afrikaans community. The popularity of Radio Pretoria, a conservative Afrikaans language community radio station, in the community is noted. Marie [4A] regards it an authoritative source countering government propaganda. Wilma [3B], in contrast, sees it as fanning feelings of being wronged in the conservative community through overly negative programming.
Daniel [47] also refers to ‘Dr Andries’s (the leader of the CP formed during a subsequent split from the Ruling Nationalists in 1982) warning that one cannot share power because you would lose control. Right-wing Afrikaner patriots in the community argued they saw the writing on the wall and their leaders warned the electorate that the concessions would eventually lead to granting blacks franchise. Yvette [13A] says her husband ‘fought the battle by pen’, writing to Ministers, highlighting inconsistencies in policies and the discrepancies between what they said and did. He was assured that his fears would not materialise, although they did eventually. The Digest they received from McAlvany, an ultra-conservative American supporting apartheid, also warned against the pending Communist threat.

With regard to the political transition, an intensely emotively charged period in the community, Kasper contends, reflecting disillusionment

Man, no, no, a guy did not, I did not think it would happen so easily that, that a, one, one Afrikaner could do that to us. FW de Klerk. That he could do that to us, do that to his own people. You are still ruling. You still have power at your disposal, and you negotiate so little for your own people. He’s a dog, man. He is a fucking dog, man. … We just had to fall in with these men and they kicked us around like they pleased. They are still doing it, now. There, there he sits with a randy Greek, and he does not worry. Huh. [Translated – see endnote3] [48]

Several interviewees raised the notion that their leaders had not kept their word and looked after their own personal interests (as Kasper’s reference to de Klerk’s personal relationships, suggests).

Jannie [10A] does not find it surprising that several of the ‘Boeremag’ (Boer Force – a white ultra-rightwing splinter group plotting to overthrow the state) are from the Waterberg district itself, given the ultra-right sentiments in the region. According to Ina, the beliefs of some right wingers have been influenced by

…that Seer Van Rensburg prophesy that the ‘Four-colours’ [old ZAR flag] would fly again. In the rural areas they believe firmly that, that matters in South Africa would change to such an extent that the whites would rule again. Uh. That strong sentiment is shared by Boers. [translated – see endnote4] [9]

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Petro [13B] claims Afrikaners have always desired strong leadership. Currently Ina [9] observes a degree of ‘political ambivalence’ amongst conservatives, a crisis as the leadership of the parties they have faithfully supported have either died or deserted them, and she believes this is why the ‘Boeremag’ may have an attraction for some of them. However, she believes that the absence of a clear leader verbalising the sentiments of the ‘old Boer things’ which the older people hold dear has reduced the cultivation of emotional incitement and the intense ‘awakening’ (“aanwakkering”) that occurred previously within the community.

According to Mervyn [17], the conservatism of the region is highlighted by the number of people originating from it held for treason in the ‘Boeremag’ trail. He argues many in the community pretend they are part of the new South Africa. Engela [16B], disassociating herself from ‘stoere boere’ (stalwart Boers), agrees tolerance and acceptance of change in the community lies at the surface level, rather than being deep-seated. Hanneli [11] contends extreme conservative positions are still held privately. According to Marius,

There is no way in hell (apologies for expressing it in this way) where a Boer, I am now talking of the old guard Boers, will have respect for him [a black person]. [translated see endnote5] [15]

According to Mervyn, traditional ties are strong, in-bred, confirmed by church and party even where the latter no longer exists officially, because what was good for their grandparents, is good for them. He contends he cannot fathom the ‘vierkleur’ (four-colours) lying so close to their hearts, to be prepared to fight for it zealously.

Several of the interviewees mentioned above, when describing the conservatism in the community, present themselves as more enlightened and supportive of the transition than is the norm in the community. Although they acknowledge that they personally did not foresee black majority rule in the country when initial reforms were instituted (see section 4.4.5), they argue that they had supported the initiatives instituted by the Nationalists. In this regard they contend that it had become apparent in the context of international condemnation as well as internal revolt that matters could not continue as they always had in the past.
Demonstrating an acceptance of change, Marius argues he personally came to the realisation that it is futile to swim against the stream of change and therefore altered his own prejudicial attitudes. Jack [16A] agrees whites have to change their mindset because there is no turning back to what had existed before. Elbie believes greater pragmatism is setting in. She contends

But I think the guys began to realise it, you know, it won’t bring you anywhere, because there isn’t a way in which a guy can function like that. My husband and I also differ on this matter. [translated – see endnote6] [14]

Some interviewees regard the ultra-right a declining force, an aberration. Marius [15], mocking the Boeremag, argues that not much would come from such talk. According to Jack, support for the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB – the paramilitary Afrikaner Resistance Movement) has waned.

And my experience, of the AWB as such here, is nil. There hasn’t really been a, a, there isn’t, okay, some of the guys talk, they talk, they talk a lot but their, their talk isn’t actually worth much, luckily. I don’t think there, there will actually come any action, like, you know. The one or two that were here, that were involved in incidents, I don’t know if you know about the incident in Botswana. …I remember they had a big thing here at the new AP “kerk” and things like that. Where they came past here in a big parade, consisting of two cars and two flags, you know that type of thing. [Engela:And a horse or two.] No, no the horse was in the other one where there where five guys in the parade. Here they’re all wishy washy little like things, you know. Big noise, but they, they actually didn’t mean anything. [16A]

Jack downplays the alleged conservatism of the area as well as the impact or threat of far right action – diminishing the support of the ultra-right, by parodying the AWB. The reference to Botswana is actually to the failed invasion of Boputhatswana in support of their rulers’ resistance to inclusion in South Africa and to participation in the first general election before the general election of 1994 in which AWB members from the community participated. Several interviewees expressed regret at the collapse of Boputhatswana. The incident probably increased awareness amongst right-wingers of the limits of their paramilitary power and the costs associated with such a route. Daniel [47] agrees that the ill discipline of some factions during the

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7 Boputhatswana was one of the homeland territories granted independence by the apartheid State.
Boputhatswana incursion (a reference to the AWB) was a turning point in their struggle. He contends that where they had the possibility of presenting a unified front, new leaders formed a new party overnight. He attributes this to their military background, saying that a strategist always has a backup plan (see section 4.4.6 in chapter four).

Sakkie [6A] argues that although many right-wingers believed that it would be possible to maintain the status quo and retain white control, pragmatists amongst them realised that it could not be maintained at any cost as traditionalists urged.

6.2.1.3 Reasons for settling in Edensvlakte

Many interviewees indicate that the Afrikaans character and conservatism of Edensvlakte are seen as positive selling points for settling in it. Lacking an industrial base employment opportunities are limited, leading to most white young people leaving after they have completed school to work elsewhere. The comparatively lower crime rate, tranquillity associated with the surrounding countryside and a convenient location, not too remote from larger urban areas, has contributed to the marketing of the town as a destination for retirees. In this regard a large security housing estate was built. Demographically the white population in Edensvlakte has an aging population structure (see Table 1.7 in appendix C and the notes on the communities and interviewees in the sample). According to Hendrik [8C], the more favourable demographic profile (a term he uses to refer to the ratio of whites to blacks) in the town, in a predominantly black province, attracted him to settle in it. Frederik [8A] agrees that one does not need to ‘scrum’ through a sea of blacks when shopping, as

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8 Petro [13B] reports the white municipality purposively discouraged the establishment of industry to restrict job opportunities and therefore the size of the black population, limiting ‘problems’, a strategy confirmed by Daniel [47] who served on the town council. He argues that they passed developments which benefited whites retaining the character of the town.

9 Although interviewees report burglaries and a few incidents of serious crime, such as homicide, that have affected the community, it is seen as a much lower risk area than cities. Measures such as burglar-proofing properties are taken, but generally the high perimeter fencing characteristic of suburbia in urban areas is absent.

10 In reality the ratio was never as favourable as Hendrik, who recalls it as an essentially white town, thinks it was. Census data from 1970 reveals that Edensvlakte had more black than white residents, although the difference in their numbers was smaller than many other areas and than it is currently.
you have to elsewhere in the province. Both settled in the gated residential housing estate initially marketed to retirees.

Some residents, interestingly enough, draw a distinction between the old town and the new development that has attracted a large number of affluent retirees from outside. Old-timers see these newcomers as ‘stand-offish’, bringing more urban-orientated values with them, diluting the traditional conservative character of the town and not fully integrating into the community. However, according to Daniel [47], he cannot say that they brought a more enlightened stance; but the conservative old-guard, like him, withdrew as the newcomers started playing a more prominent role. The newcomers in turn see themselves as reviving a dying town. There is a debate on the impact the residential estate has had on the character of the (white) town. Whereas some see it as altering the original character, others agree the influx of retired professionals injected new life into the town.

Another major attraction associated with the community is its gemeinschaft. Several anecdotes are provided by interviewees to contrast relations within the community to the gesellschaft prevalent in urban areas. Many interviewees contend that the relaxed atmosphere, friendliness¹¹, neighbourliness, support and intimacy in the community keeps them attached to it, in spite of opportunities to relocate elsewhere, in some instances. These benefits accrue once one is accepted within the community. Jannie [10A] indicates that they were first sussed out before being accepted fully. Several other interviewees referred to initial exclusion and a sense of parochialism before their eventual inclusion in community life.

6.2.1.4 Social institutions within the community

In describing the community, interviewees highlighted the churches and schools as key institutions around which community life was organised and in which it was rooted because they play such a fundamental role in instilling beliefs on which the

¹¹ I myself experienced the hospitality in both communities in the Waterberg District Council, I studied, during my fieldwork.
community life is grounded. The mainstream Afrikaans Reform churches, Afrikaans Protestant Church\textsuperscript{12}, Pentecostal churches and mainstream English language denominations all have congregations in town. These churches remain exclusively or predominantly white, with blacks attending their own churches in the township. Several interviewees, however, referred to the missionary work the white congregations support, and some of them personally are involved in. Annatjie [1] describes Edensvlakte as a close-knit community, involved in its churches and schools.

Although their influence has waned somewhat, mainstream Afrikaans Reform churches are still regarded as influential within the community and its cultural life. Several interviewees hinted at continued ‘kerkisme’ (churchism) in the community, though less intense than the past, with improving inter-denominational co-operation. In this regard, to demonstrate the hold of the Afrikaans Reform churches on other institutions within the community, Tiaan\textsuperscript{13} [5A] indicates that their pastor has not yet received an invitation to open the weekly assembly at school. Many interviewees, in spite of belonging to different denominations, regard the church as being the guardian of the ‘spiritual life’ in the Afrikaner community, and as a custodian of key norms. Whereas some like Gertruida [10C] and Anna [10D] emphasise the moral teaching of the Christian faith, others also refer to a ‘volkskerk’\textsuperscript{14} (people’s church). Daniel

\textsuperscript{12} According to Ina [9], church and politics have always overlapped closely within the community. She contends people attend the church which accommodates their political beliefs. To substantiate her claim she refers to the large APK congregation which many people in the community joined. Tiaan [5A], Lani [10B], Hanneli [11], Yvette [13A] Marius [15] and Mervyn [17] all refer to the presence of members of the ‘British-Israeli-sect’ in the community, distancing themselves from its extreme beliefs that blacks do not have souls. Their rejection of this ultra-conservatism, positions them as more moderate.

\textsuperscript{13} Tiaan, relating his personal experience, suggests his conversion to an Afrikaans Pentecostal church, at the time branded a sect by the Afrikaans Reform church establishment, limited subsequent promotion. At the time he obtained a transfer from the Cape Province to Transvaal. Although not entirely clear, it seemed to me that he decided to make a new start after this conversion, possibly due to pressure in the community at the time, where he was a principal of the school. According to his wife Ingrid [5B], he probably would not have been appointed if the school board had known about his religious affiliation beforehand. Tiaan contends he was prepared to make the sacrifice of exclusion from an inner circle for his beliefs. He retired as a departmental head in the school he moved to.

\textsuperscript{14} I unpacked the role of the church in the propagation of the ideology underpinning Afrikaner nationalism in chapter 4. The conversations demonstrate the extent to which these ideological positions are still held by a number of individuals, generally older (but not exclusively so). Of the four communities I worked in such positions were most vociferously expressed in Edensvlakte, to a lesser extent in Wesveld and more rarely in the urban communities.
provides such an example, emphasising the foundation provided by religion. He argues some remain attached to the teachings of the church avoiding corrupting influences\(^{15}\) like gambling (mentioning ‘the Lotto’, for instance). In this regard he contends

I think us, we as religious ones believe in the nucleus (core group). There is a nucleus that would remain healthy. … We learn from the Biblical times, from the ‘volk’ (peoplehood) of Israel. We as Afrikaner ‘volk’, we have to a great extent, we do not claim to be Israeli, but we have to a great extent associated ourselves with the ‘volk’. [Change cassette tape] …there’s a nucleus (core) in the ‘volk’ that will maintain their standards, who will remain “Boer Afrikaners”, but we will have many marginals who are on the fringes of the ‘volk’. … Your, your larger group who are less steadfast. …Now we say there is a nucleus. It will remain there. It will remain pure, because it is all hope we have, like with the ‘volk’ of Israel. There is a core group. The Lord always said there is a nucleus, and we believe so with the ‘volk’, also. The core, healthy, holding onto the principles of the Lord will remain. But then you have your marginal on the fringes, which unfortunately, it is so, will stray. [translated – see endnote}\(^7\)]\(^{47}\)

The religious analogy provided by Daniel above is more sophisticated and less literal than some others I encountered during my fieldwork in the community. However, the notion that God ordains ‘pure’ groups which should be maintained (‘remaining healthy’) by retaining boundaries (not mixing with others) remains the same in these analogies. Yvette relates her husband’s life ideal that South Africa, which he regarded as the Benjamin\(^{16}\) of nations, in his words, would

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\ldots\text{‘be a pure people who, who, who absolutely lived to the glory of their Creator. …[He said] But that ‘people’s-own’ feeling. I am grateful to the Lord, [for] my ‘Afrikanervolk’. I am grateful that I am not of the foremost economy, and I am neither this, nor that. But I am grateful that I have been placed here, because there’s a purpose with my life, and my aim is to be an honourable citizen of my country. Not to be dependent, to contribute towards the country’s progress and its, its maintenance and so forth’}.\] \([\text{translated – see endnote}\(^3\)]\) \([13A]\)

\(^{15}\) Marie [4A] contends her husband always said the Afrikaner core would ‘never bow down before Baal’. This of course implied being faithful to pure Verwoerdian principles in their instance. They were ‘patriots’ as another interviewee described them.

\(^{16}\) The religious imagery of Benjamin, an orphaned child and favoured son, suggests a people (‘volk’) spurned by the world but called by God. According to Schwarz et al. (1998:1774), Benjamin refers to “son of the right hand” and therefore implies good fortune. According to Yvette, who reports taking a more pragmatic rather than patriotic route currently than in the past, her husband eventually expressed doubt, in a rapidly changing context, over whether he had not emphasised politics at the expense of religion, shortly before his death.
The excerpt above captures some of the religious zeal of Afrikaner nationalism, which viewed South Africa first as Afrikaner, and second as white. A context of adversity has forced the Afrikaner closer again according to several interviewees. The church is seen playing a key role in maintaining the notion of Afrikanerdom, providing a sense of reassurance. Acknowledging political fragmentation\textsuperscript{17} in the community Antonie contends their salvation as a ‘volk’ lies in serving one God.

\begin{quote}
I think for us as believers, we must, must not become dejected. ..He is always in control of everything. …we do not know what His purpose is with the changes. Whether He, you know, maybe wants to wake us up, or whatever. You know, because look at Israel, He punished them many times when they followed the wrong path. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{9}] [12]
\end{quote}

It should be noted that several interviewees emphasised that they, as a Christian people, are law-abiding and that the current government has been willed onto them (the ‘volk’) for their sinfulness. They believe restoration of their rightful position (as rulers of their own territory) is possible once they return to the fold. In an assessment on what went wrong Antonie argues people lost interest in the past because it went so well with them. He shares a notion with Kasper \textsuperscript{48} that as urban Afrikaners became more materialistically orientated they turned their backs on Afrikanerdom and pursued their self interest. In this context, they contend many have become anglicised. Petro \textsuperscript{13B} agrees that urban Afrikaners, cocooned by their wealth, no longer orientate themselves to their community roots. According to Antonie and Kasper, the collective suffering as a ‘volk’ will bring Afrikaners closer and increase solidarity.

Against the background of widespread apostasy in the ‘volk’ indirectly suggested in conversations, Charlene \textsuperscript{4B} refers to the activities of the festival-committee in the community, led by a minister of one of the mainstream Afrikaans Reform churches

\textsuperscript{17} Sakkie \textsuperscript{6A} briefly refers to the deep political rifts that emerged in the community around constitutional reform and the future dispensation in the eighties, first, between supporters of a new dispensation reforming apartheid and opponents who favoured maintaining the status quo, and at the beginning of the nineties again, a split within the conservative camp between those ‘patriots’ who advocated resistance as ‘bittereinders’ (die-hards) and those ‘pragmatists’ who realised change was inevitable and required new strategies. Fran \textsuperscript{2}, Tiaan \textsuperscript{5A}, Jannie \textsuperscript{10A}, Hanneli \textsuperscript{11}, amongst others, refer to intense and acrimonious ‘broedertwis’ (fraternal quarrelling), name-calling and the consequent political splintering of Afrikanerdom which affected the community and eventually weakened the front presented by the ‘volk’. Frederik \textsuperscript{8A} equates this to roaming in the desert (lost – like Israel was).
she has joined. They arrange celebrations for key historical events of the ‘volk’, such as Van Riebeeck day, Kruger day and the Day of the Vow, in order to maintain the culture, and particularly target the youth. This is seen as investing in the ‘volk’ of the future. Antonie says with Van Riebeeck commemorations the committee wants to instil in the children awareness that it implies more than an arrival of a person.

What does Van Riebeeck Day mean? …there our, uh white race started. There our religion started. There our education started. Everything, everything started there. I mean we cannot allow that to go to ground [translated – see endnote10] [12]

For him the arrival of Van Riebeeck signifies the establishing of the ‘white’ race and by implication civilisation in Africa. In a broader project of ‘rebuilding’ the ‘volk’, the festival committee have gained access to schools where they tell children the significance of their shared heritage and history. It is hoped that all these initiatives would establish a sense of who and what they are as a people and why they are here in South Africa, restoring their national pride. Antonie adds that knowing where you come from directs where you will be going. These commemorative days, not the new official public holidays, are printed on their church calendar18. Charlene contends

A ‘volk’ must, must as it were in the past, we must have rallies together and we must feel we are a ‘volk’. What are we today? We are nothing. …we have nothing we can feel proud about [translated – see endnote11]. [4B]

This initiative has been launched against fears that the changing history curriculum would lead to ignorance among the youth about their ‘volksvaders’ (fathers of the people and nation)19. Yvette [13A] recalls how they always sang the fourth verse of the Call of South Africa, which calls on God to mercifully assist them in maintaining and building their inheritance20. Although replicating strategies of cultural

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18 Publishing ‘old’ public holidays reflects resistance to the project of nation building and the aim of establishing new days of commemoration, which several interviewees feel exclude them as whites and denies their own history and struggles.
19 Several interviewees suggested that the youth, particularly in the urban areas, no longer know about their past, leading to a ‘vervlakking’ (shallowing) of the ‘volk’ and undermining of its foundations. Reinvigorating commemorations is seen as instilling a sense of solidarity, building unity and strengthening the ‘volk’. During my fieldwork the regional newspaper reported on excursions arranged for youth to key Afrikaner historical sites where they discussed the people’s history passionately indicating according to the reporter that there is ‘a clear voice from the Waterberge’.
20 The official translation of this verse encapsulating a claim to the country and special relationship to God is: “In thy power, Almighty, trusting, did our fathers build of old; Strengthen then, O Lord, their
mobilisation used in the past no longer is officially condoned by the church, this key role in socialising the youth and guarding the Afrikaner heritage is still subscribed to by some members, a matter which can be revived as insecurities within the community increase.

The ideal of self-determination remains a valued objective, for some of the interviewees. Daniel [47] acknowledges that the attempts to establish areas that could become the foundations of a ‘Volkstaat’ have remained small-scale projects and did not reach the critical mass required.

The examples cited above, from the interviews, suggest that the ingrained ‘mythology’ of Afrikanerdom described in chapter four is still kept alive, at least, by an old guard in Edensvlakte. They, furthermore, in line with their beliefs and past practices of mobilisation, have actively set out to instil these beliefs in the youth. In general, religion seemed to play a central role in a significant number of interviewees’ lives, reflecting the religiosity, usually associated with rural Afrikaner communities.

6.2.1.5 Revisiting conservatism in Edensvlakte

The conservatism is also reflected at school level. In the community the Afrikaans schools remains to a large extent racially segregated with limited integration of other groups. Private schools, some following ‘Christelike Volks-eie Onderrig’ (Christian Peoplehood’s-own Education), abbreviated CVO, offer an alternative for parents regarding the predominantly white Afrikaans state schools as too liberal. During my fieldwork the regional newspaper carried an insert advertising such an independent school in the area and describing its principles. Several interviewees indicated that the white state schools in the community initially resisted participating in integrated sporting events for a long time, arranging parallel events for likeminded schools. The Afrikaner ‘volkseie’ (peoplehood’s-own) sporting events, arranged since the 1990s,
are reported in the regional newspaper and institutionalised, running parallel to other open events. Interviewees told me, where state schools participated subsequently in interracial events they requested non-participating scholars and general supporters to stay away as a precautionary measure to avoid any racial incidents.

I have pointed out that most interviewees in Edensvlakte acknowledged the conservative nature of the community and the leading role played by ‘patriots’ (conservative Afrikaners) in the church, school and municipality in the past. This was in part reflected in proportionately stronger support for the FF+ in local government elections in Edensvlakte than in some neighbouring towns of the District Council as a whole at the time the fieldwork was conducted, as well as by subsequent floor-crossing, after this period\textsuperscript{21}. In their response to the conservatism generally associated with the community interviewees positioned themselves in various ways. Whereas some interviewees embraced their traditional conservative viewpoints as an indication of their principled and resolute positions, others argued for a more pragmatic conservative stance that engages with the changing society and recognised that a return to past positions are not feasible. A large number of the interviewees distanced themselves from a conservative position suggesting that they have adapted to and accepted the current situation. Interviewees cannot be placed in watertight categories in this regard as their positions at times shifted during the interview.

Lapsing into her ‘patriotic’ conservative mould, Yvette sympathises with the ‘Boeremag’ (Boer Force) trialists. In an extended discussion, only partially quoted below, she describes the trialists as God-fearing patriots, juxtaposed against a ‘godless’ government.

\textsuperscript{21} The DA drew the bulk of the white support in the 2000 local government elections in both areas in the Waterberg I conducted fieldwork in, possibly due to some disorganisation amongst the rightwing parties (see Table 1.6 in appendix C). Whilst the DA outperformed the FF+ in both Edensvlakte and Wesveld in the 2004 National elections, the differential in the support the parties drew declined, particularly in Edensvlakte, compared to other municipal areas. By the 2006 Local government election the FF+ had substantially closed the gap between it and the DA in both areas. Although elections for different levels of government are compared, it does suggest resurgence in the area for support for an Afrikaner party on the right and possibly a degree of disillusionment with the middle ground occupied by the DA.
Yes, now it is unfortunate that they were caught before the time. As I have said these people have, for me, such open and guiltless faces, but they are treated as if they are the greatest criminals. Now you can understand. In that same hall, courtroom, or whatever, Mandela was considered a dangerous criminal, but they of course did encourage some criminal acts, whilst our people at this stage had not yet planned criminal acts. [translated – see endnote12] [13A]

The factual correctness of her claims is not at issue here. She paints a picture of guiltlessness. Equating the position of the trailists to Mandela’s struggle also provides a sense of legitimacy, for their cause. Yet, she says shifting back to a pragmatic position22, she has moved on and learned to adjust to the changing circumstances, which was not easy. In this regard she adds that she takes her inspiration from the biblical story of Daniel, who led a life where he co-operated with that government and made a positive impact, during his exile.

Those sympathetic to the conservative cause opting for a more pragmatic route, argue that not everyone in a community should be stereotypically tarnished by the actions of a radical minority. They contend the strength of ultra-rightist hardliners has waned as people have come to new insights. According to Sakkie,

But a small group of old people are extremely vengeful, radically. They cannot change, believing it was a big mistake, effectively giving all to the black. [translated – see endnote13] [6A]

In a discussion, with Jannie, Lani, Gertruida and Anna [10], they attribute the ‘Boeremag’ actions to irrational racial antipathy, fanned by policies such as affirmative action which feed the grudges people bear. Identifying such mitigating circumstances starts to shift the blame for such actions towards policies threatening the privilege and livelihood of whites, in their view.

Fran, rejecting publicised incidents of racial violence in the Province as well as ultra-right strategies to overthrow the government contends

22 She contends that this pragmatic conservative position has cut her off from fellow-patriots whom she spent years organising party events and socialising with. She no longer attends the meetings or the social events they organise. When they accidentally meet they no longer have things to say to each other. Her daughter Petro has been instrumental in encouraging her to accept the new situation.
…many of them didn’t move forward. You know, you know they’re still the AWB, the white wolf. Those are all still Boere-War Afrikaners fighting for that still. … I reckon if you do want to be a AWB, be, fine, just don’t go and do bad things. …You know, which, uhm, is harmful for us people that are trying to live in a society where we will be branded now because we all white. You know what I mean? [2]

This response reflects concern at being tainted by ultra-conservatism. More interviewees publicly projected a moderate position than embraced conservatism. These interviewees disassociated themselves from conservatism which was seen as harming the image of whites. Arguing that apartheid is a spent force and that right-wingers belief in a return of a white government creates false expectations, Tiaan [5A] indicates his political positioning and loyalty. As a loyal Nationalist (NP and subsequently NNP supporter), he contends, he (and his family) entered into ‘the new South Africa with FW’ [23]. Mervyn also stakes his position and acceptance of the change

No I will also not go with a crowd and go and wave the Four Colours for one or another thing. I am not interested. I will not even wave the old South African flag somewhere for one, or another, thing. I mean for what purpose, too? It does not make any sense to me. [translated – see endnote14] [17]

Acknowledging the conservatism within the community, situated in a region publicly known for its rightwing sentiment, allows the interviewees to position themselves as moderate and distance themselves from any stereotype associated with it. Bolstering his moderation, Marius [15] claims to have been called a ‘kafferboetie’ (derogatorily a negrophile) in the community because he treats blacks courteously [24].

Anecdotes related suggest people have been socialised in what is regarded appropriate in the community. Lani describes an incident of how she, when they arrived in the community almost a quarter of a century ago, was corrected at the school on the appropriate use of racial terminology, and Herman, arriving more recently, relates

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23 ‘FW’ refers to FW de Klerk, the leader of the NP who officially announced the unbanning of political movements and the beginning of negotiations. Presenting himself as an agent for change in the new South Africa Tiaan discusses his community work under the aged, indicating that he constantly reminds them what they should be thankful for (e.g. receiving state pensions from the ‘black’ government).

24 It should be noted, however, public disassociation from conservatism and a demonstration of an openness towards, as well as acceptance of, others does not preclude some interviewees from making harsh remarks about the racial ‘other’ at another stage of the interview.
another incident where he replied to a fellow congregant’s query about his intensive farming methods.

Listen here man [person addressed] … ‘there where you come from, you probably have black people, but here by us you only have kaffirs’ [derogatory]. And, [giggle] that’s, that is, that is typical [translated – see endnote 15] [Lani, 10B]

Then the one guy said, you surely mean maids [derogatory terminology in Afrikaans for maidservant]. Then I said, no man, there are no maids on my farm, I do not have maids and kaffirs [derogatory] on my farm. I have black men and black women who work for me. And that guy shunned me for a considerable period, but that day is past, you no longer hear it anymore. [translated – see endnote 16] [Herman, 3A]

Herman [3A] contends when he arrived in the mid 1990s he found the community insular, frozen in the 1960s with a strong anti-English sentiment. Ina [9] and Ingrid [5B] share similar experiences of how they found this foothold of Afrikaner nationalism when they arrived. Herman relates another incident where he was castigated for allowing a worker with a sick child to sit in front with him in the pickup when he took her to the clinic. These anecdotes illustrate the policing of racial boundaries, and attempts at socialising newcomers in appropriate ways of referring to the ‘other’ prevalent in the community at a particular point in time 25. Herman in his anecdote does suggest that a change has occurred and that the discourse of the past no longer is sanctioned publicly and therefore scarcer.

Both narrators from whom excerpts of conversations are quoted above express their shock at the crude racist socialisation that prevailed at the time of their arrival and draw a distinction between it and their more progressive stance. The anecdotes then fulfil another function besides relating factual information of events. It enables the narrators to distance themselves from a more extreme ultra-conservative position by displaying a more progressive position. Finally Herman notes, such blatant remarks are no longer commonly made in the changing public context. It is against this background, where most interviewees have staked their position with regard to the

25 Several other interviewees related anecdotes that demonstrated that their actions differed from what was regarded as the prevailing racial attitude in the community at the time. Whether this was so, is actually beside the point. What such anecdotes achieve is a demonstration of their own tolerance in contrast to common practices.
perceived conservatism of the community, which interviewees turned their attention to how things have changed within the community.

As the literature on social constructionism dealt with in chapter two and that on discourse dealt with in chapter five suggest, interviewees in Edensvlakte are attentive to how they would be perceived by an outside researcher. In this regard part of their efforts in their conversations were taken-up with dealing with the generally perceived conservatism of the area and their own positioning towards it. In chapter two the literature suggests that establishing a positively valued identity is crucial. In this regard, in a context where conservatism no longer is the norm in society, dissociating from it publicly bolsters their sense of a moral self. However, in instances where interviewees strongly identify with a traditional conservative position, their point of reference remains past principles, and not new norms within society, which they regard as being illegitimate. Adhering to past ideology then enables these interviewees to also claim a ‘moral self’.

6.2.2 The discourse of interviewees living in Wesveld on their community

Like Edensvlakte, Wesveld is also located in the Waterberg District in Limpopo Province. Since it was a secondary site, I will highlight both similarities as well as differences that emerged in the identification and description of their community. In contrast to Edensvlakte, patterns of residential settlement did not arise as a key issue. Whites remain the point of reference in describing this farming community. With black Africans receiving almost no mention, when identifying the community, their invisibility in the area is confirmed. This, however, may have been a consequence of how my research was interpreted, as I have indicated earlier, but I do think it is telling, in the sense that it again suggests separate spheres for whites and ‘others’.

The number of small farm shops in this remote area as well as the registration of voters for polling stations that cover the area confirms that blacks demographically outnumber whites. As a fairly close-knit farming area it is not affected to the same extent as towns, and cities, by desegregation. Such issues did not feature prominently
in conversations with Wesvelders. Land reform and issues around tenancy right is a more direct concern. There are no land claims in the immediate area.

In contrast to Edensvlakte where several interviewees commented on the Afrikaansness and conservatism of the community, only Gwen, who has lived in the community a considerable time and has found greater acceptance over time, does so directly. Gwen contends when she arrived there was still a sentiment against English as well as what she terms a ‘strong race attitude’. This has mellowed and support for the AWB, with the intense emotional incitement accompanying it, has also petered out. Some interviewees indicate that they did not support the reform measures, which eventually were implemented, arguing they misled. In this regard, Dieter [36] points out that the referendum sought a mandate to negotiate and that the agreement struck never was tested amongst the white electorate again as was promised (see the discussion in section 4.4.6).

Nancy [38B] talking about the commando in the area admits that it is perceived to be right-wing. At the outset she states that she has no sympathy for ultra-rightists who are making a mess of things.

The election results reported according to polling station by the Independent Electoral Commission for the National elections in 2004, tends to support Gwen’s observation that people in the community have become more moderate in their views. At two of the three polling stations where whites living in Wesveld could vote, the DA outpolled the FF+ by a considerable margin, with the contest between them closer in the third station. According to her the race attitude

26 There were interviewees in the community who clearly aligned themselves with a traditional conservative stance. The sample is small and this makes generalisation difficult. Like in Edensvlakte some interviewees indicated that they expected the change to majority rule and warned others who did not believe their predictions. For instance, Dieter [36] contends that he was not surprised as rising liberalism worldwide, which he attributes the change to, was apparent from the 1970s when the sport boycotts against the country started.

27 These results whilst indicative of a general trend should be treated with caution. The DA potentially could have drawn some support from other racial groupings, but even if it were the case, it is unlikely to have altered the differential between it and the FF+ significantly. Although the poll at all three stations was above the average, it is not clear what proportion of the white electorate did not vote, and this may have increased support for the FF+. In my interviews several right-wingers indicated that they
…has changed slightly, the more enlightened people in this community have become more tolerant towards the black labourers and stuff. I wouldn’t say more tolerant towards the government, but towards the people that are working for them. But I think they perhaps were like that right from the beginning anyway. [37]

Gwen’s last comment, hedges against criticism that she may be prejudicial to her Afrikaans neighbours’ racial stance.

Describing their community Dieter [36], Braam [38A], Hardus [39A] and Petrus [40A] all refer to the initial poverty in the area, presence of ‘bywoners’ (white peasants) squatting as well as uneconomical units as a result of patterns of inheritance28. They contend that over time successful farmers consolidated their ground, adapted their farming methods and diversified from cattle into crops and some into game, much later, establishing commercially run concerns. In the process the area depopulated and white farm schools closed. Homeland consolidation to the south also meant that several farmers in the community relocated elsewhere when their properties were purchased. There are, according to them, fortunately no land claims in the immediate vicinity. They also suggest that farming is tough, that conditions are not always favourable and that only the hardy and prudent survive29.

They suggest, more recently as the farming community has aged some have sold their properties and there has been an increase in week-end farmers (property usually bought by wealthy urbanites and stocked with game). Samuel [35A] sees such a trend as further weakening the farming community (assumed to be white). However, in several instances sons have returned to farming. According to Matilda [39B], they found farming an attractive option again as their career opportunities elsewhere became more limited. This then implies that many of the farms do not house a single

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28 Potgieter (1957) addresses the backwardness of impoverished white farmers and their practices in the region.
29 Similar comments on the difficult conditions commercial farmers face economically with rising input costs and politically with an unsympathetic government were also made by those farming in Edensvlakte.
family. Petrus [40A] referring to the Farmers’ Association enjoys seeing the community together ‘braaing’ at the Farmers Hall. Ben describes their relations, saying

…the guys, they talk the same language. We live enjoyably together. It is really, I must almost say … a deep group. You know they understand each other and get along well [translated – see endnote17]. [41]

Sandra [35B] points out that it is a close and friendly community with people knowing each other well, which she admits has its costs in privacy compared to urban areas, but this ‘gemeinschaft’ can also be regarded as an attraction. Nancy [38B], Matilda [39B] and Riana [40B] indicate they initially got together more frequently, but that the considerable distances and poor roads have cut down on their meetings. They still visit their relatives and those living closer often. Television is seen as having some impact in reducing the sociability that applied in the past.

Like in Edensvlakte, the school and churches are seen as forming the backbone of the community. Samuel [35A] regards the school as important because it brings the community together, with everyone working towards a common goal, because the churches each build a community of their own, which is a disadvantage according to him. Dieter [36] recognises that the character of both schools and churches are potentially threatened by governmental intervention and an influx of other racial groups and that this ultimately threatens their language.

The remoteness and isolation of the area is seen as contributing to the low level of crime in contrast to urban areas. There is an awareness of the danger of farm attacks. An adjacent province, North West, has a higher incidence of both farm attacks and murders than Limpopo, ranked fourth in both instances whilst Limpopo is respectively ranked sixth for attacks and seventh for murders. Significantly, Gauteng had the highest number of attacks and murders (Lehohla 2004a).

There is also mining, which ultimately is seen as posing a potential threat to their way of life. Mining implies an influx of labourers and less security as an expanded
settlement provides cover for outside criminals who can disappear into it. Sandra
explains this in the following way

You know, you wonder, why are we not targeted yet, attacks, there is one
logical explanation that enters your head, you are far from a ‘township’ or
large town where many people stay [translated – see endnote 18]. [35B]

This comment ‘racing’ perpetrators of crime is a recurring theme in all communities
studied.

6.2.3 The discourse of interviewees living in metropolitan municipalities on their
communities

Interviewees sampled in both metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng did not spend
much time in their conversations describing the community they lived in, specifically
because it seemed redundant to describe the community they lived in to an urban
insider. My familiarity with the area and hence community was taken for granted
since I had lived in Johannesburg during my undergraduate and initial postgraduate
studies and was working and living in Pretoria at the time the interviews were
conducted30. From the interviewee perspective my familiarity with the area did not
require them to unpack the nature of the community in detail, as had occurred in the
two settings in Limpopo – where I was seen as an outsider.

Generally Johannesburg was described as cosmopolitan, vibrant and to some extent
more English-orientated. In this regard Heleen, contrasting the city to the town in the
Waterberg District of Limpopo where she was born and grew up, comments
how it affects her

I was raised Afrikaans. In Johannesburg I almost never speak Afrikaans.
There are very few people in Johannesburg that know I am Afrikaans … It is

30 Reflecting on my own interviewee practice, subsequently, I did not probe interviewees more to
describe the community, precisely because it seemed an uncomfortable line of questioning, asking
them to describe what both they and I regarded obvious. Hence I focused more on their observations of
how this ‘known’ community was changing. I refer to Johannesburg (see Table 1.3 in appendix B) and
Pretoria (see Table 1.4 in appendix B), the terms interviewees used themselves instead of the official
names the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CJMM) or the City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM).
as if I have a ‘switch’ in my brain, which as I travel through the second
tollgate flips. Then I can no longer speak English. [translated see endnote19]
[24]

She comments that the opposite process occurs when she travels back from the
Waterberg to Johannesburg. In highlighting the specific characteristics of
Johannesburg, Danny aligning himself with it, comments that it differs from other
areas arguing that

There’s quite a big difference in the geographical pop., populations amongst
white people. Pretoria people are not the same as the Joburg people, they’re
not the same as the East Rand, West Rand uhm ... I’m not even talking about
the, Cape Town which are a foreign coun., country completely. ... when I
think about myself, I think you know I’m definitely a Joburg person, I’m
definitely a white, English speaking South African, uh I’m definitely on the,
the Left of the politics. [20]

As I indicated earlier, I was cautious not to mention an area in my initial open
question asking interviewees to describe the community. Johannesburg or other
variants of its name were not mentioned in four interviews in the CJMM sub-sample.
In these instances the focus was more on the immediate environment. Danny’s
description of the community depends like Heleen’s on drawing contrasts with other
areas. However, at the end, he goes further, identifying a number of overlapping
identifications that could describe him.

In contrast to the gemeinschaft interviewees describe in Edensvlakte and Wesveld, the
metropolitan areas are characterised by gesellschaft. Many interviewees indicate that
although they recognise their neighbours, they no longer know them by name
anymore, or where they do, they seldom visit each other like was custom in the past.
According to Danny,

I don’t think people down the road interact with their neighbours whether
they’re black, white or Martian. [20]

Most interviewees in CTMM mentioned Pretoria spontaneously and unprompted
when describing the community. None made a reference to Tshwane, in this specific
context. In instances where references to name changes surfaced subsequently in
interviews some observed that whereas the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking
Pretoria was subjected to a name change (still contested and not finalised), this did not apply to the predominantly English-speaking Johannesburg.

Some interviewees mentioned the predominantly Afrikaans character of the community, again suggesting a white point of reference when considering their community. After a brief description of their own background and the community the conversation soon moved to recent changes they observed.

**6.2.4 Concluding remarks**

In identifying and describing the communities they live in interviewees generally spoke from their local context, the suburb, white town or rural white community. Although this may have been a consequence of the way my question was formulated, I did find the response significant, particularly in the communities in Limpopo where racial distinctions were more pronounced. Another clear distinction that emerged was that interviewees in Limpopo generally tended to talk more extensively about their community, whilst those in the metropolitan areas focused more on telling me about themselves, initially. This distinction, as I have suggested, can be attributed to interviewees in the urban areas regarding me, living in Gauteng, as an urban insider knowledgeable about the environment, whilst those in the rural area of Limpopo saw me as more of an outsider, who may have a preconceived idea of the community, which needed to be addressed.

**6.3 Discourse on change in the community and society**

I have discussed how middle-class white interviewees talk about the communities they live in. My attention now turns to how interviewees respond to and reflect on the changes they have experienced in the community they live in as well as society in general. I first consider the themes that arose from conversations with interviewees in both the primary and secondary sites in the Waterberg District in Limpopo (section 6.3.1), and subsequently the themes that arose from conversations with interviewees
in both the primary and secondary sites in the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng (section 6.3.2).

6.3.1 Discourse on change: interviewees living in the Waterberg District

As I have indicated above, I discuss the two communities in the Waterberg District Council jointly. My discussion and examples draw extensively on Edensvlakte, the primary research setting. Where I draw on comments made by interviewees in Wesveld I indicate it.

In reflecting on how change affects their everyday lives interviewees raised a number of issues. They talked about how increasing numbers of rural black Africans were moving to towns (section 6.3.1.1), the impact of the consolidation of local government structures (section 6.3.1.2), declining public service delivery (section 6.3.1.3), the centralisation of authority and potential loss of control within their community (section 6.3.1.4), the extent to which relations between racial groups have changed within their community (section 6.3.1.5), the extent to which social institutions serving their community have changed, the threats these institutions face and the potential consequences such change will have on their community (section 6.3.1.6). The impact of the changing political context (section 6.3.1.7) as well as the impact of crime (section 6.3.1.8) was also raised.

According to interviewees in the Waterberg District Council area, the degree of change in their communities is probably less than in urban metropolitan areas. They attributed this to the rural (‘landelike’) nature of their communities. Interviewees in Edensvlakte describe change as gradual with a considerable degree of continuity with past practices. According to interviewees in Wesveld the rhythm of the farming community has not been disrupted substantially by the transition.

Jannie [10A], reflecting on change in Edensvlakte, observes that blacks no longer are restricted to the location. They now have a place in a community in which they previously were not welcome. Gertruida [10C] agrees that the dismantling of petty
apartheid in town restored their dignity. The greater visibility of black people in public life and the town itself (no longer the exclusive preserve of whites, where people of colour were simply labourers to serve their needs) did strike a large number of interviewees as one of the major changes locally. In contrast interviewees in Wesveld did not comment on the greater visibility of blacks. Being more isolated it is probable that the daily rhythm within this farming community has not changed significantly. As Schutte (1995) suggests with regard to rural areas life is marked by physical closeness but social distance.

6.3.1.1 Changing patterns of settlement

After the transition the demographic balance in Edensvlakte tipped in favour of blacks according to Daniel [47]. Whilst residential integration in the town remained limited, the size of the informal settlement on the outskirts of town increased considerably. Sakkie [6A] attributes the growth of informal settlements around towns to changing settlement patterns in rural areas. To illustrate this he indicates that whereas several black families lived on their farm in the 1930s (probably as sharecroppers), it dwindled to two families by the 1960s and none currently. I will return to this scaling back of settlement on farms later in the chapter. As a result of the changing settlement patterns, the size of informal settlements surrounding towns increased considerably after the transition in 1994. This was a consequence of either evictions from farms or otherwise an attempt to access better services and facilities. Legislation compelling municipalities to provide an alternative site for people evicted to settle on effectively made informal settlements permanent.

Wesveld in contrast is some distance from a town. Labourers consequently stay on farms. Hardus [39A] admits there has been a depopulation of blacks as farmers scaled back their labour requirements. In their case this was achieved when they switched

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31 I referred earlier to Petro’s [13B] claim, confirmed by Daniel, that the white council of the town followed a policy objective of containing the size of the black population of the town, during the apartheid era, in part, by limiting development and therefore employment opportunities and labour needs.
from labour intensive fresh produce to game farming. Since most of their labourers became redundant they left for towns.

The (white) depopulation of the area and shrinking farming community has been a concern for a considerable period. Samuel [35A] contends that whereas policies in the past were more farmer-friendly and designed to keep people on the farms, they currently get nothing. In fact, he suspects the government does more to get them off farms than to retain them there.

6.3.1.2 Local government consolidation

Incorporating the township, which had its own council, into a single municipality amalgamating adjacent local authorities, politically reshaped the local landscape. According to Petro, the relation between the races was poor in Edensvlakte at the stage of the transition.

They absolutely viewed the municipality as a white regime which said ‘woodenhead’ [pejorative] what are you looking for here? [translated – see endnote20] [13B]

Daniel [47] argues that as black participation in local government matters increased in Edensvlakte white participation decreased. Petro, who became involved in ward committees32, confirms this trend saying that whites generally boycotted the meetings of the ‘black’ municipality, which restructured the administration and took on a pro-poor developmental orientation33 in its policies.

Several interviewees in Edensvlakte referred to the sidelining and replacement of the white Town Clerk by a black Municipal Manager. Daniel, for instance, contends the

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32 According to her, she was seen in the white community as belonging to the ANC and working against whites as a result of her participation. In her opinion you can only access resources if you work inclusively. She contends whilst the notion of a developmental municipality, a concept she bought into as an entrepreneur, theoretically is an excellent idea its execution in practice has been disappointing.

33 According to Daniel, the council no longer supports white bodies, such as the sporting codes who now must find funding elsewhere. He disputes the current municipality’s claim that facilities were not developed for blacks. The problem, he contends, was that blacks did not maintain their facilities and therefore were denied further funding until they put their house in order.
appointed black municipal manager had no experience in local government. In general, new municipal appointees are regarded less qualified for the positions they have been appointed to.

Two interviewees from Wesveld, Dieter [36] and Gwen [37], who served on the Development Forum for the area which was dissolved when new local government structures were introduced, no longer participate in local government affairs.

A friend of Petrus [40A], who serves on the council, tells him that ‘they’ make stupid decisions, which are reversed once lobbied. In this regard he comments that it remains a pity that there are not more whites in parliament. To an extent this comment suggesting black incompetence and white expertise reflects ‘whiteness’ (a sense of superiority).

Nancy [38B], like several others in Wesveld, also argues affirmative action appointees lack the knowledge required for the positions they are appointed to. Kobus, euphemistically referring to black appointees as ‘new South Africans’, contends in agreement

Yes, no, they are, they are the men in control, or they guys who usually must make the decisions are now new South Africans. So the personnel has changed, yes. [translated – see endnote21] [38C].

In Edensvlakte, the consolidation of local government has created an impression that whites cross-subsidise the residents of other areas. In the gated residential estate, residents complain about the high rates and taxes they pay. The swift disconnection of services in the formerly white residential area when an account payment is made late compared to mounting arrears in the township without any action being taken is a bone of contention. Interviewees discuss black entitlement and white subsidisation of services extensively. Fran [2] argues whites pay more for utilities so that other groups get services free. Hendrik contends

...you realise that you in one way or another subsidise uh, the, the electricity and water consumption of ‘other coloured people’, and then and, and it’s a pity you cannot say of poor people. There are poor amongst them. I mean
there is poor amongst the whites also, but they are not treated in the same way as blacks. And it’s a pity because it affects us all, the fact that we now have to pay extra, now we cannot argue historical facts away, they didn’t have, but I am convinced that the people who can pay services, or who have a job, should pay for their services what others pay. And those who do not have, and now I do not necessarily want to refer back to our history, but it is not, for me, something strange that there, especially in Africa or a Third World country, is not electricity and water available for every household. [translated – see endnote22] [8C]

In this conversation Hendrik acknowledges blacks were deprived historically but suggests some currently benefit unfairly, whilst deserving poor whites are excluded. The admission of past deprivation, together with the claim that all poor should be treated equally, demonstrates his reasonableness. This then enables him to criticise current practices. Finally he concludes by drawing a comparison with Africa. The implication of Hendrik’s comparison is that these services are not universally available in Africa and therefore should not be made available automatically here. It also suggests, indirectly, that such services were introduced by Europeans. Mervyn contends

The whites must now also contribute their part. …We have to uplift and uplift and uplift these people a bit. But how many are you going to uplift if you look, in the rest of Africa? If you look in Uganda and any of those places, even in Zimbabwe, it is not being uplifted. There is not going to be any further upliftment now in Zimbabwe, because there is not anymore whites. As long as the whites then are here, they must now carry everything and do the upliftment and then thereafter they will take over, but that is just in passing, right. But for the rest of the place, Uganda, you have to go and see it there, as it was left. In those times some of the buildings, and your infrastructure and things also did not even receive a ‘coat’ of paint. [translated – see endnote33] [17]

While Mervyn does, in our conversation admit that there is some sense in measures to uplift, the gist of his comments conveys a sense that it is whites who take responsibility for development and who carry the burden. He marshals examples from elsewhere in Africa to demonstrate the role that whites have played in providing and sustaining infrastructure and how this has run down and collapsed once they were ‘worked out’34. This is a matter several interviewees refer to.

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34 Although the failure of leaders in Africa in providing better infrastructure for their citizens cannot be denied, the reasons for a collapse are more complex and varied than purely the withdrawal of white expertise. This simplistic explanation furthermore does not take into account the exploitative relationship that existed.
Charlene [4B] contends that Africa remains a ‘dark continent’. In her opinion whites are the saving grace of this country. Engela’s [16B] also contends that if South Africa, which still has a significant number of whites, cannot pull it off, one will have to write off the whole continent. The notion of black incompetence and white competence is a recurring theme.

In the conversations a distinction is made between the able white and incompetent black. Daniel sums up the notion that whites will pick up the pieces once everything has been run down in the following way

You, we travel on this wagon. They let all its wheels fall off and [we] then look what remains and pick it up. And that is more or less our stance at the moment. [translated – see endnote24] [47]

Embedded in this imagining of a decline and a white led recovery is the hope that whites would be influential again.

Jannie [10A] takes a slightly different stance on the familiar theme of white superiority and black inferiority. He argues whites have lived in a ‘fool’s paradise’. They had a small Europe here and thought that they could continue to maintain it like a First World country, at cost of others. Given the demographics this was not sustainable. For him it is necessary to realise that South Africa will become more like a Third World country in future. As an example he quotes missionary friends of them that always said to each other, when infrastructure failed, ‘TIA’ meaning ‘This is Africa’, the latter which he admits could not be said aloud. He contends whites have to realise that South Africa is a Third World country and things cannot be maintained at the same level as Europe.

Several interviewees associate the change with a decline in administrative capacity which has impacted on service delivery. Raising concerns about governance Elbie voices a concern similar to that of several other interviewees with regard to the transition in the public sector.
...in municipal services and the types of things where, uh, the blacks now are starting to occupy certain responsible posts and things which, which previously were uhm, filled uhm, by white people, uhm, that which what, makes me slightly concerned, is whether, whether the guys appointed in the posts, whether they have the knowledge, to be able to handle it, you know, what they have been appointed for. [translated – see endnote25] [14]

The notion of white experience and competence is played off against the unknown entities blacks constitute (this was a recurring theme in several contexts). There was a notion that these new employees were less experienced than the white workers they replaced and over-remunerated35, placing a strain on resources. Referring to the municipal administration Sakkie contends

They perform so poorly. And, and I do not say it because I am angry at them. It is just a reality and it is a consequence of their ‘lagging’. [translated – see endnote26] [6A]

To substantiate their claims of incompetence several interviewees relate anecdotes of poor service delivery and unprofessional behaviour at government departments. Kasper contends

Well he’s the boss now, right. He strums the guitar. He, he makes the laws and, uh is in control. I meen he, jeez, I mean I am still, I always say I will die in a fucking queue, because wherever you come you must queue and look at an official who, who [mimicked: nose picking]. [translated – see endnote27] [48]

There are parallels in public opinion on how the changing Africanising officialdom is currently perceived and the Afrikanerising civil service under apartheid was viewed (see Posel 1999).

6.3.1.3 Declining public service delivery

The deterioration of the level of service delivery in Edensvlakte is perceived a consequence of the change. Interviewees point out that the town appears more neglected than it was in the past to substantiate their perception of decline. Hendrik

35 The notion of self-enrichment is pervasive. The municipal manager, responsible for a larger area, had a generous remuneration package, which was reported in the newspapers. Both Fran [2] and Ina [9] refer to the conspicuous consumption of the new elite which they contend occurs at the expense of their own ‘people’.
[8C] complains about the lack of regulation of street traders, Annatjie [1] refers to the increase in litter, a matter Jack [16A] regards endemic to the ‘new South Africa’ (again used as a euphemism for race) and a source of immense frustration. Hanneli [11] attributes the increase in litter to the fact that blacks are less set on neatness. There is a degree of ‘othering’ in these responses, where blacks are seen responsible for degrading the environment as they increasingly enter into what was regarded previously a ‘white’ space.

Most interviewees concede that municipal services did not implode, as was predicted before the transition. They do report an increase in power cuts, compared to the ‘old South Africa’. This is attributed to less reliable maintenance by Eskom, rather than acknowledging the massive expansion in the service to those people excluded previously. Eskom pursued affirmative action aggressively during the period. The implication of the power cuts are that the decline in service is associated with the leaving of white staff, which were regarded as more experienced and competent, rather than a reduction in the number of staff employed as neo-liberal management principles were employed.

In Wesveld over the years services have been cut back and they have had to travel further to obtain them. All interviewees complain about the condition of the roads, stolen telephone lines and power failures (affecting irrigation). Several interviewees mention that white technicians have been replaced, suggesting like in Edensvlakte a decline in competence. In this regard Petrus contends

...and that I am sorry that I have to say it now like this, but I mean they have withdrawn the whites, its, they are now about hundred kilometers from here, there’s whites, and then you do not always get, when you phone and enquire, you do not always get prompt service. Previously you could phone the guy that was here and confirm that he will investigate immediately... [translated – see endnote28] [40A]

Hardus [39A], regards practices such as African time contributing towards the lack of infrastructural maintenance and low productivity. Samuel [35A] contends those services that have not been privatised are non-existent. Several anecdotes of poor service delivery are told, where governmental officials have failed to keep to their
arrangements such as processing identity document applications for workers, or arriving late at the polling station. Riana and Petrus contend

You know that total unreliability is something which personally galls me considerably. [Petrus: ...people are not used to it. Really it was never like it is nowadays. Heavens. Its a big issue.] I do not know if it is now African time which a person must learn to accept. But it is for me a very, very difficult thing if you cannot trust, that what has to be done, will be done. [translated – see endnote29] [40B]

Nancy [38B] suggests that the government no longer caters for whites and that they generally have to purchase their own services, such as private security, broadcasting that caters for their tastes and even education. Sandra and Gwen respectively contend

You know the three basic things a government must provide are health, education and protection for its citizens. We feel at this stage that no effort is made with any of these at the moment. [translated – see endnote30] [Sandra, 35B]

I mean we are going, in those areas we are going very much back into a third world country and we need to keep on building this country up. [Gwen, 37]

There is a general notion of an ‘African’ trajectory of decline where a self-serving elite looks after their own interests at any cost.

Charlene [4B] attributes the poor fiscal state of municipalities and other public services such as hospitals to the incompetence of new employees, as well as to the fact that services are rendered for free. Interviewees report blacks started using the clinic in town besides the township one. Some claim blacks receive better service from the town clinic run by white nursing staff. There is a suggestion that white healthcare professionals are better trained and more committed. Comments by Hanneli and Ina reflect this

When I started nursing ...black people just began infiltrating, like where black and white work together in the hospitals, right. And uhm, I realised that my knowledge …what I know, in comparison with what they knew, was not the same. I can give you many examples ...You do get some of the black people who are much better nurses, and sisters, than white people are because it is not a career for them, it is a ‘love’ ... [translated – see endnote31] [Hanneli, 11]
Of them do have medical funds and then they can be recipients of better service, and uhm, you know I realise that often they do not trust their own people. Their own people can be very rough with them. So they have, here by us still the idea that the whites provide better service than their own people. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{32}] [Ina, 9].

Whilst Hanneli implies white nurses are better trained, she hedges subsequently by suggesting that some black nurses may be more committed to their vocation. Admitting that some blacks are more committed to nursing than whites to an extent enables her to criticise their skill whilst avoiding being charged as being prejudicial. Ina uses the example of black people accessing private white healthcare to suggest the difference in standards, whilst avoiding being viewed prejudicial.

Commenting on the decline in public healthcare several indicate, like with teaching, that nursing no longer is seen as a vocation. This lack in interest, sagging discipline and low morale are seen as contributing to the decline in the quality of health care generally at state hospitals. There is general agreement in both communities that whereas the clinic service may have improved, there is a definite deterioration at public hospitals. Sandra mentions an incidence of poor treatment and incompetence at the state hospital, adding that ‘you don’t want to lie there, they will let you die’. Several ‘horror stories’ on the experience of poor care for state patients are retold to substantiate claims. In general blacks are blamed for the state of health care. Fran argues

Now you, your medical aid can’t provide you with what it did... I'm not saying that they [blacks] are not allowed to [join], I don't say it to deprive them, but I reckon that if you got three wives, surely you should contribute more. Not so? [2]

Fran casts her complaint that blacks are bankrupting medical aids in terms of a principle of fairness to demonstrate her ‘reasonableness’. The logic is that they use more resources since they have large families and therefore disadvantages other members. Her objection then can be presented in a way that does not question the right of blacks to belong to the medical aid whilst simultaneously scapegoating them for solvency issues. It becomes convenient to blame the racial other. Structural features such as medical inflation are not considered in her complaint. What makes
her complaint surprising is her lengthy discussion, subsequently in the interview, on approaching the medical aid to increase her own benefits for chronic medication, which is exhausted mid-year. This conversation reflects her entitlement which is not recognised.

6.3.1.4 Centralisation of authority

Marius, who during the interview presented himself as open to change, contends that as ‘they’ exercise their power they are forcing more things down whites’ throats. He asks

First schools, then hospitals and then this, then that. What’s next, what’s next?
[translated – see endnote33] [15]

Several interviewees raise concern at the increasing meddlesomeness of the government in both private and public matters which is often also regarded as a trait of socialism and/or communism. Some complain even sport is subjected to such governmental control. These interviewees treat the government intervention as if it is a new trend. They do not acknowledge that sport was politicised during apartheid (see the discussion in section 4.4.4).

Daniel describes the difficulty they had in obtaining a licence for Radio Pretoria, to broadcast locally. Mervyn sees broadcasting as another area targeted by the government to extend its influence, often attempting to get rid of more outspoken white presenters under the banner of realigning programming. They respectively contend

That which belonged to the Afrikaner must be reduced to nothing. That which belonged to the Christian must be reduced to nothing. You can realise it from the, from these community radio licences they grant. So immediately as it is an Afrikaner or Christian radio, a licence is not granted. All our Afrikaner’s [applications] have been rejected. Christian radios were also rejected. In other words he is systematically busy with his plan. [translated – see endnote34] [Daniel, 47]

36 Marius predicts rising tension. He suggests that if ‘they’ continue to force things, a backlash from whites will occur, which he adds he hopes will never happen. He describes it as a pressure cooker building up steam and invites me to revisit the tape recording (and his prediction) in five years time.
Okay, the education, the health, uhm, broadcasting services, all these types of things, and to forth, then I think they scratch on many places where it does not itch. Especially in the education, but also in broadcasting, and this is now just again all to prove, we want everything black, we want everything black, and there is not actually anymore place for the white people, and if you look at this whole thing on Africa, and now in Zimbabwe, and everywhere, I think it is just an eventual idea that they have and so forth, of the overwhelming majority, that Africa is not for the white people. [translated – see endnote 35] [Mervyn, 17]

The plan to which Daniel refers is the master plan of communism. This is juxtaposed to Afrikanerdorn and its Christianity. Mervyn raises the spectre of a Zimbabwe scenario which is seen as a real possible threat to the future by many interviewees. Several interviewees find the stance of the government to events north unsettling, contributing to fears about the security of property. Antonie comments

If things continue as they presently do, then a person is concerned, then you can almost see that the same thing would happen to us as what is happening with Zimbabwe, because look with what open arms he, he [Mugabe] was received with, with, with uh, with the funeral. And that makes a guy [quite] a bit, very, very, very worried. I do not know. Because things can change, it can change overnight. We cannot predict it now, but if it continues like it presently is going, our future is a bit dark. [translated – see endnote 36]. [12]

6.3.1.5 Changing race relations locally

Several interviewees admit that race relations in Edensvlakte were strained in the past. Yvette [13A] reflecting on race relations explained that they saw themselves as guardians of blacks, whom she paternalistically compared to teenagers. She argues the government was in the process of gradually weaning blacks, allocating more responsibilities to them, culminating in independence being granted to homelands from the mid 1970s. This was the aim of a policy of separate development. She feels external instigation exacerbated an impatience and rebelliousness in black communities. Defending the state policy, she argues this required maintaining firm control in the 1980s, because like with teenagers, allowing blacks to take over would result in ruin.
Gerrie [7] describes race relations in the community at the time of transition as ‘heavy’. According to Jannie [10A], greeting a black by hand was frowned upon before the transition. Sakkie [6A] indicates that conversing socially with blacks was taboo and would have been regarded as shameful.

Some interviewees report a change in the attitude of blacks at the transition. Employees initially made more vocal demands than previously as a result of heightened expectations\textsuperscript{37}. For Hanneli [11], using an analogy similar to the one Yvette provided, the transition for blacks was similar to the experiences of a child that suddenly gained freedom from the tutelage of parents with all prohibitions lifted. An example of blacks’ new assertiveness, mentioned by several interviewees, was that walking on the pavement in town they no longer yielded to you (a white) as they had done in the past.

Several interviewees concede that white people in the community, especially the aged, were extremely invidious (‘hatig’) towards blacks in the past. Most agree that the transition has been particularly difficult for the aged, who have had to adapt to an increasingly interracial context, ranging from the introduction of black nursing staff at the home for the aged to the type of entertainment\textsuperscript{38} offered by the service centre, sometimes resulting in some friction. Gwen added that politically things have

\textsuperscript{37} Yvette [13A] says she told her domestic worker at the transition they would continue their relationship as they did in the past. She describes her as being part of the family (in a paternalistic sense). Fran [2] relates several instances where workers became dissatisfied with their remuneration, and left. Tina [6B] contends their domestic worker is more grateful for what they do for her and less entitled than she was at the transition. When her domestic worker realised things would not change instantaneously reality sunk in and relationships normalised. Such changes in relationships at the transition were also noted by interviewees from the metropolitan areas. Adriaan [33B] shares the anecdote that his parents were initially challenged by their domestic worker about why they had separate crockery and cutlery for her. He adds that she has accepted this now, arguing that her crockery and cutlery is even better than what they use daily and that such differentiation is normal in a servant-employer relationship. Patsy [19] relates a story of where a worker at the hairdressing salon was fired after repeatedly making intimidating comments to clients about what would happen after the transition.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{38} The banality and pervasiveness of a segregationist ethos, as well as how it has changed, is demonstrated by anecdotes Tiaan [5A] relates. At an event several years back a white entertainer requested black kitchen staff to provide backing for one of his songs. Several conservatives objected afterwards. Currently there have been no complaints about – artists using black staff as ‘props’ for their acts, or the local crèche for performing with their black children, or against a black choir. He adds that each time he reminds the pensioners from the podium to be grateful that this ‘black government’ still pays them pensions.
quietened down considerably, in Wesveld. She maintains, people are less vocal, publicly, about what is occurring.

In assessing the change, some interviewees relate anecdotes suggesting continuity with past segregationist practices. Several suggested that they arrange their business on weekdays because the town becomes ‘pitch black’ on Saturday’s, especially at the end of a month. Commenting on what has not changed in the community Jannie [10A] notes white clients may be served first in some instances. Ester [18] agrees that blacks are treated differently, sometimes with more suspicion. Hanneli39 [11] provides several examples of persisting racism – like derogatory remarks about ‘kaffirs’ being made in the presence of blacks, not entering a store whilst blacks are in it, or viewing blacks suspiciously as potential thieves, all cases she dissociates herself from. In a group interview Gertruida [10C] relates an incident she observed in town where the proprietor of a coffee shop asked a black man who was sitting at an outside table chatting to passing black women, not ordering, to leave. She comments that such incidents may contribute to a feeling of being treated the same way as in the past and to bitterness.

In response to the example provided by Gertruida, Lani [10B] suggests a greater degree of moderation is settling in within the community. She argues that you can go to Wimpy where you will see the opposite, where there are both black and white people eating. Marius [15], in contrast to the examples of differential treatment provided above, claims he treats all customers equally.

According to Herman and Wilma [3AB], the limited interaction and aloofness between the races, characteristic of relations in the past, has thawed. Jack observes the following

…they are starting to change now. You, you can communicate with them more. In the in the earlier part [of the transition] they were very, very

39 The limit to the liberal viewpoint Hanneli projects in commenting disapprovingly on continued discriminatory behaviour by other whites in the community becomes apparent later in the interview where she expresses strong opposition to a set work at school on an interracial relationship between teenagers, comments on interracial worship and explains her position on socialising with blacks.
“hardegat” [stubborn] as such. I remember, they would walk you off the pavement type of thing. But now things, I find it different. They even stop and talk to you. You can have a conversation and so, if you feel that way. Okay, many of the people in this “dorp” [town] don’t do it, like you know. But, uh, I mean, if you do take the time then you can chat with them, they’re very capable. … I mean I take for myself, there’s a lot of black people that walk, I go in the “dorp” [town] here, we walk and we chat hallo “hoe gaan dit”? [how is it?] How are you or what have you and “soos jy weet” [as you know] we speak to, we speak to one another. “Jy” [You], speak to one, how’s it going, how’s it at home or how’s it at work and things like that. …[In Afrikaans, he adds] But previously you could not begin a conversation with them, because then you were a ‘nigger-lover’. You know that, that feeling is now starting to disappear. [translated – see endnote37] [16A]

Interviewees describe how currently a greater degree of spontaneous association and openness has emerged between racial groups. To substantiate their claims they offer similar examples of more relaxed, less strained, freer interaction, such as – talking to each other in a queue or sharing a joke. Sometimes they add that they have observed a person known in the past to be very right-wing or ultra-conservative engaging freely with blacks. These examples are offered to demonstrate greater tolerance as well as acceptance of the new situation. Several give examples of children playing together. In contrast to the claims of better and more relaxed race relations some interviewees argue that the local community remains racially divided. Ester observes

You will not merely, if you, you know, walking in the streets, or like that, see white and black children, walking together, walking together, or playing together, or like that . . .[The] few, few times that a person actually hears it, yes, you hear from people who have [a] daughter with a black friend, or like that, but it is still completely exceptional. You do not hear it a lot or see it a lot. [translated – see endnote38] [18]

The degree to which change has occurred and even is desirable is contested terrain. Kasper [48] stakes his position and preference for segregation in this regard (and also how it differs from urban areas)

40 It is frequently mentioned that children are less racially aware, more exposed to interracial contexts and more comfortable with interracial interaction than their parents. In this context it is said, then, that racial relations will improve with the next generation. However, in spite of these claims, there is evidence that peer pressure against associating with blacks is very strong. Lani [10B] mentions an incident where a girl was the only black pupil in the Afrikaans High School for more than a year and had no friends at break. She feels that isolation was cruel and adds that if she were a teacher in the school she would have given her a hug.
In the rural areas we still have, he’s in his place and I am in my place. I do not want to bother him. He must also not bother me. No, not here, maybe in the city, those, those, people, they do not ‘worry’ much. [translated – see endnote39]

Commenting on the blacks in the area Annatjie contends they remain unsophisticated, with many still using, in polite exchanges, the deferential terminology of ‘baas’ (boss) and ‘miesies’ (missus), she was accustomed to hear growing up. She adds (to her defence) that she no longer expects to be addressed in this way and concludes

I cannot say we really have the rebellious moody types here. We get along well. [translated see endnote40] [1]

According to Ester [18], local blacks in comparison to urban blacks are still ‘poorly developed’ as the result of limited opportunities. Tiaan [5A] uses the terminology of ‘agtergeblewenes’ (those left behind) and ‘opheffing’ (upliftment) to describe his involvement in a community project41. Engela [16B] concurs saying it is much easier at work to have conversations with blacks originally from urban areas.

The examples provided by interviewees suggest although people may have more exposure to other races, contact generally is between employer and labourer and seldom at an equal-status level. However, in spite of this unequal status there is some indication that the opportunity structure is changing.

According to Yvette [13A], when they opened their store in Edensvlakte, they were requested not to sell the business to Indian traders who at the stage had no premises in the central business district. There are now several black businesses alongside white businesses. Several interviewees argue that the transition brought about changes where more black people gained opportunities through better employment and therefore ‘came into their own’. Herman [3A] contends that many have risen to the new responsibilities placed on them, delivering good service. This change reveals

41 He acknowledges services in the township are rudimentary and is involved in establishing a satellite service centre for aged in the township. Although commendable, his involvement is a pragmatic response to changing conditions. Requirements set by the Department of Social Welfare forces the service centre for the aged in town to provide an integrated service if they want to access a state subsidy. In this regard they have extended services and established an integrated management structure, resisted by some, but a pragmatic option. He comments that these changes were inconceivable twenty years ago.
‘how much talent was locked up’ by past constraints according to Lani [10B]. Hanneli [11] contends that they now could ‘reach the level whites have achieved’.

According to interviewees they are increasingly served by black staff at the municipality, banks and post-office. Several contend white people, in general, have become more accustomed to being served by black workers. Initially a number of white customers were rude, but many now know these black workers by name. However, some interviewees claim the new appointees are rude to them. Marie relates her experience at the post-office counter, whilst Hendrik talks, in general terms, about the level of service provided.

He said to me, ‘Granny’, walk back till I call you. [translated – see endnote41] [Marie, 4A]

...and now I want to stick my neck out a bit, and I don’t want to draw politics into the whole thing again, but I have to say honestly where you have black staff, in general...the enthusiasm is also just not there. Their pride, uh in the business and work is absent and I want to attribute this all, uh, to a lack of discipline. [translated – see endnote42] [Hendrik, 8C]

By signalling ‘a reluctance to bring in politics in’ an awareness of the contentious nature of the issue is acknowledged before specifically criticising newly employed blacks who do not meet the (white) standards and work-ethic (discipline) of the past. In response Frederik [8A] relates an anecdote illustrating the incompetence of a newly employed black teller who repeatedly failed to count money being deposited correctly, whilst the white supervisor immediately counted it correctly.

6.3.1.6 Challenges to local social institutions

Even those who suggest greater tolerance in the community admit that at a social level it remains segregated. Lengthy discussions followed on the desirability of integration at church and school.

4Karen [33B] argues objecting to the white exclusivity of any organisation reflects the hypocrisy prevailing currently in the country with regard to race when organisations such as a ‘Black Lawyers Association’ is allowed.
Several interviewees in Edensvlakte confirm most denominations although officially no longer racially closed still function in a segregated fashion in the community. In Wesveld the notion of church integration across racial lines was seen as a threat to one of the pillars of the ‘volk’. Two reasons are given for continued segregation of churches – resistance to integration and personal preference. Marie comments

> Look I am not a racist. I have nothing against them, but they must not meddle with my culture. I will also leave them alone. [Charlene interjects to Marie and Bettie’s agreement: Yes and my religion …I do not want them in my church] [translated – see endnote43] [4A]

Jannie [10A] admits resistance to integration at church-level is strange as one logically would expect barriers to be broken down due to the shared faith. He contends that, although people of colour have occasionally attended their services, congregants clearly prefer segregated worship. It is in fact according to him one of the domains where people in the community strongly feel integration should be resisted. Interviewees relate several anecdotes on how people acted to the presence of racial others attending the church. This ranged from ignoring the visitors, to walking out. Assessing the current situation Yvette contends

> But I want to say there is now greater tolerance. Look no one will now protest or say something about it, if blacks attend a funeral in church, because they may according to law [translated – see endnote44]. [13A]

In defence Lani [10B] adds, with Anna [10D] in agreement, that the separation is natural. Lani refers to the United States of America which she argues has had integration for a longer period and still has churches based on racial divisions. She adds, she personally has no problem worshipping with others, and did before the transition, as racial differences fade away when people are ‘born again’. However, several people argue the styles of worshipping differ, with black Africans holding more expressive and lengthy services. Cultural and language differences then are also offered as reasons for segregated worshipping. According to Fran, this applies to

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43 Antonie [12] and Hanneli [11] argue that one attends churches where you can understand the message. In this regard she relates an anecdote where she told a black youth whom she was counselling about a fantastic series of sermons at Church. When he asked whether he could attend, she discouraged him by telling him that he would not receive a blessing if he did not understand Afrikaans well.
English churches in the community as well. There is a mutual preference to worship with your ‘own’. She contends

  Uhm. There’s a lot of black Christian people, but they’ve got very funny Christian beliefs. It is not quite exactly the same as ours. [2]

Sandra [35B] also refers to their practices of ancestor worship. Anna contends where blacks attend white churches, like Rhema (a large charismatic church) in Johannesburg, they adapt to the church’s way of worshipping.

Interviewees in both rural communities were concerned about the long-term impact that ‘volksvreemde’ influences (alien to the ‘people’) would have on their right to practice their religion. Petro says that a general perception within the community is that the ANC are heathen and communist, which runs counter to her own experience of participation in local government committees where meetings were opened with prayer.

  But we have attached religious things to our politics. So if I want to become ANC then I must, I, I, lose my religion [Yvette interjects: And your Afrikanership] because then I go communist. So that still becomes that communist fear thing is still placed on us somewhere. [translated – see endnote45] [13B]

Some interviewees feared that there was a plan to take their Christianity away from them, which they stated would not succeed. This was related to the influence of a disproportionate number of Indian’s in influential positions in cabinet\(^\text{44}\). Antonie [12] believes it is their intention to destroy Christianity. He claimed erroneously that Easter was going to be abolished as a public holiday. Several repeated this rumour. Bettie raises these concerns

  …I am just afraid that the new South Africa will, will, will be Muslim. …I think its, it’s a graver danger to us than our black people are. …And then our Christians will suffer. [Charlene interjects: ‘The Muslim and the Communism’ are the two danger points I see. The Muslim, even more, because he’s ‘fanatic’]. [translated – see endnote46] [4C]

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\(^\text{44}\) According to Anna [10D] the Muslims are making their demands, as payback for their contribution to the struggle.
Lani [10B] argues that prominent communists fill positions within the government and that the legislation reflects the centralisation and control characteristic of communism. Gertruida is concerned about the growing secularisation within the new South Africa and argues that policies show disdain to the Lord. Gertruida and Samuel respectively contend

You can’t out-vote the Lord. And vote the Lord out of your country and think that you will prosper, you will not prosper. You will reap what you are sowing. [Gertruida, 10C]

I believe, I believe if our religion is right and we, we start to get onto our knees again, the Afrikaner may again have a future in this country, because I believe we have been placed in exile, the day when we no longer opened parliament with scripture and prayer, and I am talking about Christian principles which in this country have gone to the dogs. [translated – see endnote47] [Samuel, 35A]

For Lani the legalisation of abortion is an example of anti-God policies. Accepting homosexuality is another. She contends that the imaginary gates of South Africa are opened ultimately ‘inviting in demonic influences’. A distinction is made between the government and ordinary black Christians who do not condone such policies but who do not have much influence at the moment.

Daniel is convinced that the government is systematically implementing their communist plan in stages. He raises the notion of apostasy (which is evident in more than a quarter of the interviews for Edensvlakte and also features in Wesveld interviews45), again. Antonie and Daniel respectively contend

It is like I say, I do not feel despondent about the future, because I believe in the Lord, I believe He will give us on His time salvation, but if things continue as they currently continue we do not have a future, because they are trying to destroy everything that has value for you… [translated – see endnote46]. [Antonie, 12]

But then we have to remember he is there, an authority is placed there by the Lord. The Lord has allowed that this government is put over us. He allowed it. Now I have to ask myself, why? Why had the Lord allowed this? Then we say it is because of the sins of my people, and my own sins, that the Lord allowed these things over us. We had strayed. And the Lord will undo this. He will

45 The notion of ‘apostasy’ also surfaced in interviews in Pretoria. Apostasy was only raised by Afrikaans-speaking interviewees.
reinstall us when we fully return to Him. …We realise that our plans have run out. And we, we believe that the Lord has brought this situation over us. The Lord’s allowing will, placed this yolk on us, and that we as, as, as Boer ‘Afrikanervolk’ [people] will have to humbly confess before the Lord. …So, the, uh, so if we reach a point where we repent and return to the Lord, to our ways, the old ways, then we believe the Lord will deliver them from the current situation. Because we do not have a plan. Our plans did not work. Our solution is, the Lord has to give us a plan again as, as to how we as Christian Afrikaner will live between such mixtures of peoples in this country, how you will live and where you will live. We do not now. [translated – see endnote⁴⁹]

Daniel, 47

In these extracts the argument that God placed the government there as a result of the lapses by the ‘volk’, is prominent. By returning to the fold, as Samuel also suggests above, the ‘volk’ will redeem them. Yvette [13A] refers to complacency as a result of material well being, adding that the Boer nation, have received the government they deserve as they had exchanged God for materialism, sport and other pleasures. For Kasper [48] it is the urban Afrikaner, in particular, who has been prodigal. In this context Daniel then reports that he recently attended a large Day of Atonement rally, one of contemplative prayer (“verootmoediging”). He adds that the ‘volk’ strayed, neglected their vow (see the discussion of the mythology around the battle of Blood River in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 of chapter four) and that religion retreated to the church where attendance also dwindled. Their salvation lies in rekindling the relationship with the Lord.

Talking about education there were general complaints that the profession has become less of a vocation and more a job. With regard to integration in education interviewees refer to mounting state pressure to deracialise public schools and for Afrikaans-language schools to become dual-medium. This policy was highly contentious in the community, almost a declaration of war for some, but eventually accepted. The racial composition of many English-medium schools changed considerably as a result of the policy. Switching to dual-medium instruction was resisted by the governing bodies of the Afrikaans schools⁴⁶. Kasper, a member of the governing body of an Afrikaans-language secondary school, contends

⁴⁶ Annatjie [1] refers to a black child speaking pure Afrikaans, neatly dressed, and behaved to demonstrate all is going well and there are no problems with integration. Petro [13B] relates how she urged parents of two children attending formerly white schools to brush up on their Afrikaans. It seems
…you can go and look at the schools that have many black children. The teacher no longer wants to [teach] anymore. He does not have that pride to, of past teachers. He just rattles things off, man. …These ‘curly-heads’ tires him. …My daughter also teaches, man. Uhm. She always said ‘Good Lord dad, but you’re a racist’, uh. She’s a greater racist than I. …It’s a local school, it is still going well, but as I say again, it does not have that many of the other people, the other-lingual, call it what you want. Uh. There is less. We try, but I mean, there are schools in our region, which are going very black. …No our school is fine. We are still managing well. [translated – see endnote50] [48]

Note the indirect implication that others drag standards down as their numbers increase, and how they by limiting numbers have managed to keep their school on track. Antonie [12] maintains that once blacks constitute the majority they would do as they like, and this is precisely why maintaining control over the school as a cultural institution of the ‘volk’ is regarded so important. Hendrik [8C] argues those who are disciplined and prepared to study in Afrikaans should be accommodated but that he is against forcing integration unnaturally and then lowering standards. According to Sakkie, the governing body erred in their strategy. They should have had open admission from the start, making the enforcement of strict discipline clear to parents of prospective scholars. He believes the community cannot stop the process and ultimately will be forced to provide tuition in English, adding

Now, that is now again one of the realities of our country, on the one hand you understand that these white adults want to protect the standard of educational facilities and maintain it at a high level, whilst on the other hand the government views such actions as a political divide, a skin-colour division currently, aimed at maintaining the privilege of the privileged. [translated – see endnote51] [6A]

as if the conditions of admissions are regarded as one of adapting to the ‘standards’ (norms) set by whites. Interviewees also reflect on the threat that the anglicisation of higher education poses. Gerald [38D] sees this as part of the changing set-up.

Sakkie [6A] relates an anecdote where he took a visiting evangelist to several black schools and how the lack of discipline at many schools became apparent. He attributes this failure in discipline to the use of youth during the struggle which undermined respect for authority. He contends that the government has subsequently failed to create a ‘culture of discipline’ in schools. The abolition of corporal punishment, due to the corrupting influence of humanism and lack of discipline was a recurring theme, mentioned by Frederik [8A], Hendrik [8C] and others. Several interviewees noted black parents’ complaints on the lack of discipline, some suggesting that this is now even evident amongst the white youth.
In Wesveld, Gwen⁴⁸ is not in favour of school integration. Given the different levels of development of pupils from different groups, she feels it would be disruptive and lead to a drop in standards. She contends

I really don’t. I think let, let them have their own schools. I agree pull up the standard of education but don’t force them into, into a white school where they are pulling down our levels, or our standard of education which we are seeing is, is happening around us here. So, so give everybody their own cultures and let everybody have their own schools and don’t force people to, to integrate. They will integrate if they are allowed to do it on their own time. Don’t force it [37]

Interviewees attribute the pressure to integrate to more committed teachers and better education in formerly white schools. Marita [8B] contends that if she were a black parent she would also agitate for her child to be admitted to a white school, given the poor conditions in black schools generally. She shares an anecdote of her own experience contrasting the commitment of white teachers to the lack of it among black teachers and adds that black parents have told her they want white teachers to educate their children. She adds, black learners concur. Frederik agrees relating an incident where black parents objected to a crèche employing a black teacher.

They wanted a white teacher for their children. So they know what the advantage of it is. [translated – see endnote⁵²] [8A]

Matilda [39B] believes that the foreign system⁴⁹ being implemented in education would reduce standards. Dieter [36] describes the curriculum changes as accommodating a collective rather than an individual. He believes it is geared towards improving basic skills rather than individual achievement and therefore regards new scholars as being disadvantaged. Other interviewees also believe that standards in tertiary education are declining and that the long-term impact would be negative.

There is an awareness of the key role schools can play as a socialising agent and also the impact that policy and curriculum changes may have. In this regard interviewees

⁴⁸ In contrast to her stance against integration, Gwen [37] justifies putting her ‘maid’s’ son in the white school because he had received so much stimulus in their home and was considerably more advanced than his peers in the black school. She defends her actions because he would not disrupt schooling. Her tolerance is consequently conditional to her standards being met. The justification she provides, furthermore, is telling about her stance towards blacks and their abilities.

⁴⁹ This is a reference to outcomes based education, contained in the phased implementation of curriculum 2005, introduced at the end of the 1990s.
referred to changes in prescribed texts for history and literature. Several interviewees contend that children should be aware of their collective ‘past’ as it provides them with a basis of who they are\(^{50}\). Bettie objects to the negation of whites’ contribution to building the country and the bias in prescribed texts.

The Struggle. That is all our children know, and how awful it was, and all those types of things. It’s nonsense. They leave that which was valuable out, which helped to build this land, and the whites did excellent work here. …They were also good towards the blacks, I won’t agree with everything, but they did many things and they did not get recognition for building-up this country. [translated – see endnote\(^{53}\)] [4C]

Petro [13B] adds that it was with shock that she discovered her sister’s children who grew up in the city did not know the meaning of the Day of the Vow. She adds, ambivalently, that one is no longer sure what to convey – what is acceptable, and what is not.

Hanneli\(^{51}\) comments extensively on the subversive influence of a voluntary set work for literature, her daughter showed her. A white guy embraces a black girl on the cover and the story according to her contains explicit detail of a relationship. She confiscated the book, commenting

It is more oriented towards, towards, towards, how a black and white may mix and those type of things and there is no longer things such as cultural differences and classes and castes, and those types of things, its gone, it is, it is no longer there, and even though I am not racist, uhm, because I really am not racist, uhm, it is not right that, that, different cultures mix with each other. I am really totally an opponent of that, I grant anyone what they deserve in life, period, there is no difference regarding that to me, but black with black and white with white. That is how it is supposed to be, hear. [translated – see endnote\(^{54}\)] [11]

\(^{50}\) Sandra [35B] relates how she belonged to the Voortrekker youth movement as a child and how they heartily sang the national anthem, ‘The Call of South Africa’.

\(^{51}\) To some extent Hanneli presents a different position here, than she does at the beginning of the interview. Whereas she earlier vociferously drew a line between herself and more conservative people, demonstrating a willingness to engage with blacks in public, in private she draws firm boundaries and is in favour of maintaining segregation. She is aware that her response may be regarded controversial and therefore prefaces her criticism with the denial of being racist. Interracial relationships are seen as being problematic because there are ‘cultural’ differences. Bringing ‘culture’ in softens the critique, which otherwise could have been regarded as simply based on race (and biological difference).
She took issue with exposing children to sexual relations. Allowing this literature at school demonstrates in her opinion unbounded freedom and the extent of moral decay. She contends the community should be ashamed. The normalising of interracial sex\(^{52}\) as acceptable aggravated the matter. She adds all scholars also read the work out of curiosity and is convinced that no Christian Peoplehood’s-own Education school would have allowed such a set work. This was seen as an effort to capture their children’s minds. In fact, several interviewees referred to similar corrupting influences in television programmes. Some interviewees even drew associations to communism, which they claimed had a notion of universal citizenry breaking down group boundaries. Daniel spells out the consequences of such a corrupting influence, referring to an incident where parents said nothing when their son took a coloured girl to the matric farewell and subsequently were unable to stop their wedding when they raised concerns about the consequences of such a relationship.

He cannot understand if you say to him, but the child born, what does that child look like? Uh. You do a terrible injustice to that child. Where does he fit in the society? So that, we say it is very selfish of the people not to draw their children’s attention to these things. [translated – see endnote\(^{55}\)] [47]

Hanneli [11], as well as others commend the secondary school for the way it has dealt with the issue of religious instruction\(^{53}\), under review by the education department at the stage of my fieldwork to bring it in line with the constitutional guidelines on religious freedom. This was a matter which received considerable attention as schools are regarded as a key institution where values are imparted to the youth and the initiative was seen as an attempt to influence children’s thoughts. Referring to communistic influences, Lani and Daniel respectively contend

…it’s as if they want to [influence] children’s thoughts [Gertruida interjects: It is, it’s communism] and that is now the other, yes they do not want, ‘they want the minds of our children’ and that is also a communist thing. ‘They

\(^{52}\) In chapter four (section 4.3.4) I indicated how at the 1944 People’s Congress Cronjé presented ‘scientific evidence’ on the deleterious effect of miscegenation on the continued existence of the white race and how Hauptfleish (1990) recently reiterated these views in the context of identity-preservation.

\(^{53}\) With an Indian minister of education at the time, Kader Asmal (assumed to be Muslim) as well as post-9/11, this review of religious instruction was seen as confirmation of the threat by Islam to Christianity, raised by several interviewees in the community. Interestingly enough Daniel [47] mentioned that Verwoerd advocated ministering the Gospel to black people and Frederik [8A] adds that religious instruction makes blacks more law-abiding and better citizens.
want the minds of our children’ and that is why certain ways of thinking is nurtured amongst children and, and, and you know that, that’s a very worrisome thing. [translated – see endnote56] [Lani, 10B]

…He must take everything away from you. He must, the Christian character which is in it. Our, our baptismal oath. That I will raise my child in fear of the Lord, and those things he must take away from me. [translated – see endnote57] Daniel, [47]

Several interviewees see the Christian character of education being attacked to undermine the people as part of their master plan to introduce communism. Tiaan objects

...you cannot force all the, uh, religions down the children’s throats, and, and, and we had from Jan van Riebeeck’s time religion as a subject at schools, and churches, many churches began schools and to make it now suddenly a general subject, I want to say that almost fits all faiths. That can work if they want to have it as a subject, but not as a personal confession, uh to replace your personal creed and confession of faith with a general one. It then should return to church and school for the, for the personal uh, [religious] instruction, with it then just becoming a general subject at school, although I do not completely agree with that [translated –see endnote58] [5A]

The new proposals then run counter to cultural practices that have been established for over three centuries, according to Tiaan. Contradicting earlier comments on acknowledging minorities, Jannie [10A] argues that the minority, especially such a small one, cannot hold Christians to ransom. The proposed change is of less concern to Engela who believes that the country in the past was religious in form rather than in practice. She feels in the current context people are more sincere about their beliefs, arguing that it is the duty of parents to instruct their children on religious matters. In this regard she contends

What about that poor Jew and Catholic and Pentecostal? So I don’t think that system was right. I believe religion and moral values must be taught at home. So, that’s why I’m not really worried about those changes in South Africa. [16B]

In her response, she reflects on how they at school always were exposed to ministers’ from mainstream Afrikaans Reform churches. In Wesveld, Samuel, unprompted, says that they are concerned by the government’s intention to remove Christianity from schools (a reference to the review on religious instruction). He contends
…maybe it is a good thing, because then, because then possibly people’s eyes would start to open and they would seek more alternatives and support alternatives, which we possibly need and realise that we no longer can depend on the government to educate our children but that we would have to start doing our own things… We support the, I can say, the CPE schooling principle, we support it completely [translated – see endnote59] [35A]

The government policy then is seen as a blessing in disguise as it, as an unintended consequence, will raise people’s awareness. This is necessary for remobilising the people along ‘volkseie’ (peoplehood’s-own) principles. In the absence of a Christian Peoplehood’s-own Education school locally, Sandra [35B] adds the closest rural school, still quite a distance, fortunately is an Afrikaans-medium school and not under pressure to amalgamate with the black one.

6.3.1.7 The impact of a changing political context

Progressively conditions for farming have become more challenging, a matter that all interviewees in Wesveld raise. Ben [41] suggests small farms, in particular, are squeezed. Interviewees acknowledge this was a gradual process that started under the previous government. Some contend farmers lost support from the government because they no longer voted for the National Party. In the current context there situation has been exacerbated because they are no longer seen as being potential voters (a constituency) for the current government. Gerald [38D] and Hardus [39A] indicate that the agricultural support provided has shifted to the ‘agtergeblewenes’ (laggards).

Land reform issues are a concern for farmers because they invest their resources in the farm. Hardus [39A] claims that land claims are lodged where there has been development. Although there are currently no claims in the area they farm in, there is always a possibility that laws can be amended, as events in Zimbabwe reflect. Several interviewees add that such events increase the insecurity they experience, especially since no African state has lodged an objection. They claim that commercial white farmers are not against land reform, in principle, if it is applied fairly and on a voluntary basis. Nancy [38B] contests, what she calls careless claims made in
parliament, blaming farmers for slowing the land reform process down. She argues that they provide no documentary evidence to back-up such claims. Several interviewees warn that should the same route to land reform be followed in South Africa, as has been instituted in Zimbabwe, it would imply famine. It remains a concern that the ruling elite may be tempted to implement such destructive policies to retain power.

Interviewees in Edensvlakte living on farms close to town commented on the changing macro-political context farmers faced. Sakkie and Kasper respectively contend

> It is our experience that the Boer is seen as the guy, given his history, which has to be ‘got at’ now. There must be a corrective. ‘All the years of disadvantaging of our black people have to be caught up’ now. …And the Boer is the man that disadvantaged them... [translated – see endnote60] [Sakkie, 6A]

> Somewhere someone is busy bedevilling you. …we do not trust the black government. …Look he has ‘bullshitted’ you extremely, and everything. You do not believe him again. …I see the black government, the black people, all the laws they pass, are to get the white man, white people. [translated – see endnote61] [Kasper, 48]

From a farming perspective, there is a belief that farmers, rather than the broader white community, shoulder the brunt of new measures introduced by the government. This raises suspicion around the motives of any measures that are introduced by the state⁵⁴. There is a notion amongst farmers that white urban people have no conception of the difficulties farmers face and hence are less sensitive to their plight. Some examples of such insensitivity are provided.

In Wesveld there is also a sense that legislation has been passed to get farmers, like farmers in Edensvlakte cited above. In this regard there is mistrust on the real purpose of several government initiatives. For example, the proposed introduction of land tax was a concern as it posed a double edged sword with regard to property valuation. It

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⁵⁴ The agricultural census and household surveys run by StatsSA caused some anxiety amongst interviewees in rural areas living on farms that they are being monitored, and raised suspicion around the ‘real’ purpose of such surveys.
was explained in the following way – on the one hand, if they as farmers value their land conservatively, it is potentially attractive for expropriation, whilst if it is valued highly, taxes initially set at a low base (to appear innocuous) can become burdensome if the rate of taxation is increased considerably. Petrus conveys what he read reported in a paper to substantiate the claim that farmers are targeted. He contends one of the legislators said after passing legislation applicable to improving service conditions of farm workers

...this, uh, minimum wage thing was a nice whip to beat the Boers with.
[translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{62}] [40A]

The notion of being ‘got at’, furthermore suggests white victimhood. It is within the context of the changing legislation and requirement around labour, such as the provision of housing, that farmers reassessed the value, utilisation and productivity of their labour.

Although Hardus [39A] and Matilda [39B] do not explicitly say their decision to switch from labour intensive produce to game was prompted by changing legislation setting minimum requirements for employees’ accommodation and remuneration, as well as securing tenant rights, reducing the control of the farmer over settlement on the property, their negative comments on these measures suggests it played a key role. They claim that farming produce had become less profitable after 1994, with deteriorating infrastructure (roads), rising costs, volatile markets and increasing demands made by labour.

Sakkie [6A] regards the policies around labour populist, to gain support, with negative consequences in the long-term as it ‘kills the goose that lays the golden eggs’. The implication he contends is that farming can eventually be smothered as it was in Zimbabwe. Several suggest that land reform may damage agriculture as black farmers lack the skill required. According to Kasper,

Ah, I do not know, I do not know why he is, why he does not want to, he cannot man. He cannot. The homelands of, of, of the past. This whole country is going to become a large homeland. Why not? There then happens nothing. Everything that happens is the whites that keep these things on the ‘go’, and
what it is about. I do not know, I can be wrong, right. I hope I am wrong, right. [translated – see endnote 6] [48]

As a result of the legislation introduced, labour has become a liability. Several suggest farmers mechanise and employ fewer workers in response to the changes that have been legislated. Interviewees relate several anecdotes on how farmers have reacted to the new legislation, cutting back on labour. Annatjie contends that policies to improve the material circumstances of rural workers have been counterproductive, resulting in more retrenchments. These redundancies contributed to the growth of informal settlements around towns, a concern for many living in Edensvlakte as they think it potentially can contribute to an increase in crime. Fran, living on a large small holding outside town, indicates how these considerations impacted on her employment and housing of workers. In this regard both Annatjie and Fran contend

It is good that they have instituted a minimum ‘wage’, I agree, because you cannot work for R300 a month, or ‘whatever’, but, uhm, I think they should have thought about it. Where are they going to accommodate these people? [translated – see endnote 64] [Annatjie, 1]

You see it’s, they go onto all the farms and see how much land the people have got. How many people are working for them, how many people are working for them. The conditions, in which they’re, live in because they have got to have running water, they’ve got to have, they’ve got to have a toilet. … So as I say, so that’s the position there and as I say this survey is, I think, to see how many people they can get to stay on farmers’ lands, you know I…So we can expect it. [Charles: What can you expect?] That they gonna repossess land to accommodate, uh, supposed to be black farmers …You know you sort of cut back in a sense that, uhm, you know like at one time with this, uhm, land claiming issue you didn’t mind how many people stayed on your property. Because it was legal you could have, you could allow them to stay there. Now you are absolutely down to the bare necessities because if they stay here longer than a certain period then they want to claim to stay… [Fran, 2]

What is significant of Annatjie’s comments is that she first supports the ‘spirit’ of the measure but questions the practicality of its implementation. She establishes reasonableness by her acknowledging that remuneration should cover living costs adequately. Many interviewees, whilst acknowledging that living conditions have to be improved for the majority, feel that the government has created unrealistic expectations through their electioneering promises
Fran’s discussion suggests collecting information, on who resides on the farm as well as recording their living conditions, raises suspicion amongst owners in a context of potential land claims as well as one where an increasing number of regulations are instituted. Besides the increasing direct cost of labour, these monitoring actions and the suspicion they elicit have probably contributed to the decline in the number of labourers living on farms. Preceding the discussion I have cited above, Fran describes how her domestic worker and her family moved to town (this move itself may have been to access better resources, such as housing and education). The whole issue of ‘rights’ to access land and a potential claim is deflected by her own biography. She indicates that she was born in a house owned by her father’s employer, but that this does not give her the right to claim ownership of it or insist on residency there. The events in the neighbouring state do raise her concern and increase her sense of vulnerability, in the sense that her asset may be under threat, as well as, in the sense that she lives alone. She argues that it is more difficult to sell her property now in the ‘new South Africa’ with the pending risks of ownership.

Fran adds that the ‘new South Africa’ has made her labour more expensive and that she has had to cut back as they push for more. Ina [9] argues that the farmers generally have looked well after their workers. She acknowledges that the measures around labour introduced by the government are intended to ensure a better position for their ‘own’ people. Although she concedes that some labourers may have suffered, that they were not well paid, she feels that they were better off on farms where they had housing, food and a salary.

In some instances the responses suggest that interviewees are at the moment less concerned about affordability and more about the fear of losing control over the process of employment and of what may happen in the future. This is not stated directly, but appears to underpin many concerns raised. Affordability, however, is given as the reason for downsizing labour.
6.3.1.8 The threat and consequences of crime

There is ambivalence in interviewees’ assessment of their security. On the one hand they concede that crime is low, whilst on the other hand they perceive themselves as potential targets and under threat.

Several interviewees in Wesveld compared the low crime rate locally to urban areas. They feel their remoteness adds to their security. Providing examples of how safe their area is, they describe how they do not lock cars and leave doors unlocked. Although they acknowledge a low crime rate\(^\text{55}\), security remains a primary concern in the community, with a sense that their situation has deteriorated considerably as white commercial farmers in the country, in particular, are vulnerable. According to Gerald [38D] and Ben [41], conditions are especially less favourable where properties border homelands, mining areas or urban areas where there are informal settlements. In these areas, they claim, farmers have to barricade themselves and face the frustration of continuous pilfering. In Wesveld, before 1994, living in a ‘designated area’ (close to the boarder with a neighbouring country), there was the possibility of a threat of a farm attack, but they then felt better protected than they currently are and knew who the ‘enemy’ were. Living in a designated area means that the security measures around the homestead are already in place. The government had subsidised fencing homesteads off. Dieter and Gerald respectively contend

\[\text{We have to lock ourselves almost in prisons, to be safe. It is much worse than before. ...but it is not at all robbery. It is completely in my opinion politics. If you see how these things are executed ...with military precision. [translated – see endnote\(^\text{65}\)] [Dieter, 36]}\]

\[\text{I have, I have expected, uh, that given the nature of our history, that the people will have to, I mean, like people are ...discriminate against us. As we discriminated against them. That I expected. I thought in the interest of South Africa I would never experience something like I experience now. [translated – see endnote\(^\text{66}\)] [Gerald, 38D]}\]

\(^{55}\) Referring to data on reported crimes Lehohla (2004b) argues that the incidence of murder and attempted murder had decreased between 1994 and 2002. Robbery, with aggravating circumstances, declined and subsequently increased albeit not to the 1994 level. Rape, burglary and theft (including stock theft) generally increased over the period in Limpopo. Only theft of vehicles reflected a decreasing trend. This provides a general indication of crime, in spite of the limitations of such official statistics.
Gerald’s response suggests that whites, in particular farmers, are paying for the transformation in terms of a crime wave targeted against them. The difference now, according to Dieter, is whereas the threat in the past was an external one and they had government support to repel it, it currently is internal without the necessary commitment from the government to address the problem. Several interviewees refer to the dismantling of commandos, the last remaining branch of the Civilian Force constituted by conscripts in rural areas who completed their national service, tasked with local security. The broader long-term consequences for self-protection are spelled out by Kobus who says that the last (white) military intake must now be in their thirties. He concludes

So within ten years, you know, the youngest guy that had training, the youngest white that had military training, will be forty years old. So we are going to, over twenty years from now, the white ‘volk’ in South Africa are going to, will no longer be able to provide resistance. And uh, …that is surely a countrywide problem… [translated – see endnote67] [38C].

He views this dismantling of the commandos as a process of disarming those whites still able to resist, although he adds that it never was the intention to use the commando against the government. Hardus [39A] refers to rumours that they intend recalling weapons issued, and tightening control over weapons which would make attacks easier. Riana [40B] is not concerned by the disbanding of the commando, as people can join the police reservists.

In their immediate environment in Wesveld, there have been some robberies and burglaries, with farm stores mostly targeted, but fortunately no murders. Samuel refers to a TV programme on which recently was claimed that farming in South Africa was one of the most dangerous occupations. He argues that this impacts on morale.

So it has a large, I think it has an influence on you, on your whole existence, because, you, you begin to limit [translated – see endnote68] [35A]

In Edensvlakte several interviewees mention that there has been an increase in farm attacks in the region. The first farm attack in the region I could locate in newspaper
clippings was reported six years before my fieldwork. None were reported in Wesveld for the corresponding period. Province wide the incidents remained at levels reached in 1998/1989. Limpopo was ranked sixth in the number of incidents of violence against members of the farming community and seventh in the number of murders committed in such incidents for the period 1997 to 2004. Gauteng had the highest number of such incidents and murders linked to the farming community (Lehohla 2004a). Ten cases of farm attacks were mentioned by interviewees. Generally, older people were targeted. Several attacks were extremely violent and brutal implying for interviewees that racial hatred and vengeance was a factor. The attacks were seen as straining race relations in an already conservative community, according to Frederik, and increasing farmers’ sense of vulnerability. He contends

It does not engender relationships. Not at all. And here is a right-wing element in [Edensvlakte] like you have never seen in your life and this is fuel on their fire. Fuel on the fire. [Charles:Yes] Those types of things. Man, they boil again. Each time as something like that occurs. Then they just want to murder. [translated – see endnote69] [8A]

The measures taken to protect property, particularly in farming areas of the community, are seen as imprisoning ordinary citizens whilst criminals walk around freely. Interviewees report an awareness of crime has had an impact on how they live their lives, like avoiding going out in the evenings. Several interviewees describe how they have adapted their lifestyles to the changing security threat they face which adds, for some, to immense emotional strain. Sandra [35B] adds one has to psychologically fortify yourself.

There is a sense that farm attacks are increasing and the veracity of official statistics are questioned. A sense that the government is not really concerned coupled with the perception that they are doing little to address the problem heightens insecurity. As an example, Sandra [35B] cites Peter Mokaba’s funeral where blacks on the pavilion jumped up and chanted “Kill the Boer; Kill the farmer”, whilst Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and many other ministers present sat on the podium and did not stop them. She contests the official line that farm attacks are merely robbery, adding that
the cruelty associated with some attacks provides evidence that racial hatred plays a role. With regard to a recent farm attack reported in the media Gwen says

It's, it's absolutely frightening to think that people that are wanting to be equal to everybody else can commit such acts of savagery. And, and I do think there's a problem in this country with it being basically a third world country and trying to control the matters with first world laws. I don't think its working. [37]

This discourse generalises the actions of the perpetrators to blacks, implying that a distinct form of punishment should apply to them, that different systems apply to ‘first world whites’ and ‘third world blacks’. In this regard the difference between groups becomes essentialised.

Samuel [35A] and Dieter [36] agree farm attacks are primarily politically motivated with the intention to get rid of the ‘white farmers’. They argue such attacks require a degree of planning and imply outside involvement. A political agenda is seen as lying behind these incidences.

In general, whites are seen as victims and blacks as perpetrators. Race is not always mentioned directly when talking about crime, as the excerpt citing Gwen above illustrates. The use of first world and third world serve as euphemisms for white and black, with third world often used when referring to Africa and first world used when referring to developed countries. Suggesting the farm attacks are politically instigated further adds to the notion that one group has targeted the other group. Mervyn [17] and Kasper [48] erroneously contend that most often whites are the victims. Where others admit that crime might be high in other communities and that this has not been reported as prominently in the press, there is a perception that the current increase of crime in formerly white areas is a result of the problem spilling over. This then still ‘races’ crime, in the sense that ‘blacks’ are seen as perpetrators. Riana [40B] says it is unfortunately so that the burglars usually are black. Matilda’s [39B] brother was shot dead on his farm and a nephew in his house. Hardus contends

You do not hear of a murder on a farm where a white shot dead a black. There were a few isolated cases, but they were blown out of proportion, but daily, daily there are attacks [Matilda interjects: ‘tens’ (several)], not only on farms,
on the road, there are uh hijackings which occur [Matilda interjects: ‘robberies’ and …murder] …in broad daylight, people are attacked. [translated – see endnote 70] [39A]

Significantly, with regard to farm attacks, three interviewees – Fran [2], Elbie [14] and Marius [15] who specifically presented themselves as more enlightened members of the community in Edensvlakte said that they understood, but did not condone, the vengeance of attacks because blacks had been treated poorly by the farmers (Afrikaners, according to Fran) in the past. Most however, whilst acknowledging that some farmers may have treated workers poorly, contend that this was a small minority. Sandra [35B] contests the claims made by urban whites, English-speakers particularly, who falsely accuse farmers of treating their labourers poorly and who offer this as an explanation for attacks 56.

The increase in crime is associated with the lack of discipline within the country by several interviewees. In this regard Jannie contends

The crime can eventually be linked to, uh, you see before 1994 there was, in the ‘struggle’ the masses were precisely learned to be, uh, to act lawlessly, and this lawlessness has now become a pattern in their lives, and uh, it has, the government surely now finds it difficult to change that, because each one is, he does just what he wants to do. [translated – see endnote 71] [10A]

Jannie attributes the increase in crime to socialisation during the struggle, where blacks were pitted against the white authority. Although race is not mentioned, the reference to the struggles, and the masses, suggests a reference is made to blacks. This then ‘races’ crime again.

The police in Edensvlakte merged the white and black police stations. Bettie [4C] contends that most constables are now black and show little interest when one reports something. This claim was repeated by others. In general policing was regarded as ineffective, compared to the past or neighbouring countries like Botswana. They

56 As is apparent from the responses cited above the perception that farmers brought the attacks on themselves is not exclusively held by English-speakers. Within the Gauteng sub-sample two students Douglas [58B] and Michelle [58D] did offer this type of explanation as a reason for farm attacks. However, Una [32], an English-speaker in Johannesburg, in contrast, said that reading about such attacks generally increased resentment amongst whites.
contend this laxness allows criminals to act with impunity. The dismantling of commandos was furthermore seen as a setback to farm security. Sakkie contends

There is no way that the current government, how can I put it, will maintain such an arrangement which is so pro-white farmer, in its own structures. It could not remain like that. So we expected that a long time ago. [translated – see endnote72] [6A]

Sandra [35B] contends there is one exception – when Afrikaners like the ‘Boeremag’ (Boer Force) are involved. Matilda [39B] agrees they are treated harshly. Gerald relates the following anecdote. Whilst he had waited two years for the police to come and investigate a theft on his property, when his wife phoned them to report a dead black man they found on their property the police were there almost immediately. Two white officers told him that although serious black on black assaults occur the police does little about that, but when they suspect a white is involved they act immediately. He adds

…then the case changes. …as I said, you know, a guy has to expect these things. [translated – see endnote73] [38D]

The low rate of conviction, leniency in sentencing and pardoning of perpetrators, who recommit crimes, is criticised. It is argued that this discourages the police. Ben [41] suggests that there may be repeat offenders who want to get into prison where they are looked after receiving food and shelter. Gwen suggests tribal justice (again implying perpetrators are black) would be more appropriate to address the high incidence of crime and to bring it under control. She contends

Now we’re handing them first world countries punishments and stuff like that and it’s a, it’s a, it’s a, it’s a joke. …You go to jail, somebody looks after you. …they seem to have more rights than the people that are being murdered. And I think that if they were perhaps a little bit frightened of what the ramification was going to be, maybe they would be more respectful of laws in this country. … Those people should be hanged in public. I don’t care what anybody says. I don’t care what the churches say. I think if the, if the system was more barbaric to suite the barbarians, maybe it would, it would just put a little bit of a stop to what’s going on. [37]

Some like Charlene [4B] attributes the lenient treatment of perpetrators to liberal and humanist orientations, with human rights having gone ‘too far’. The leniency, according to Tina [6B], undermines law and order, putting the country on the wrong
trajectory. Interviewees mention restrictions on police using force and relate anecdotes of light sentencing and comfortable incarceration. Most interviewees were in favour of reinstating capital punishment as a deterrent for violent crimes. Petrus [40A] believes that this may only change once those at the top are affected directly. Sakkie argues

The death sentence is a Biblical measure and plays a crucial role. [translated – see endnote 74] [6A]

For many interviewees as discipline has weakened in society, moral standards have deteriorated, with whites increasingly taking ‘gaps’. With regard to law enforcement reference is made to bribery to avoid ticketing for traffic offences. The significance of several of these anecdotes is that the blame is shifted onto the corrupt black official, rather than the white briber.

Several interviewees attribute the failure of African states to maintain their infrastructure since independence to corruption. The notion that the new elite have benefited most was linked to this in interviews. Several interviewees suggest blacks are more corruptible. Fran, Marita, Hanneli and Daniel respectively argue

Look the thing is, I can’t say that the last, uh, government or the government before that were dead honest, but, they were nothing like this. The current one is. …actually in lots of ways the majority and I’m not saying all of them, were brought up to be, you know, dishonesty was the game. If you didn’t steal to get something then you went without. And it just became the way of life. [Fran, 2]

…but now I also have to tell you that it does not only occur amongst black people. There are many whites who start to argue ‘let us become like the new South Africa. Let us descend to their level’. I say it is wrong because it all has
to do with your character and moral standards. [translated – see endnote76] [Hanneli, 11]

...you must talk to the blacks and ask them, do you agree with this government, he then says to you – no, he does not agree with it. Then you say to [them], why do you not vote him out? Take him out. Then he says, but he cannot, because he who is now sitting there is busy lining his pockets, and if you now take him out, now their stance is, his pockets is almost full, leave him. [translated – see endnote77] [Daniel, 47]

Fran refers to her intimate insider knowledge to support her claims. I have omitted her lengthy descriptions of how the ‘girls’ working for her, ‘help themselves’ to some things. For her it is ‘inbred’. Greed is presented by several interviews as a natural characteristics displayed by black people.

Tina [6B] suggests blacks are generally selfish and that they just look after themselves. To substantiate this claim she says one can just look at how taxi-drivers exploit their own people, even if they are poor, for their own gain. The same characteristics then apply to rulers. Hendrik [8C] contrasts the wealth of Mugabe to the collapse and decline in infrastructure in Zimbabwe, indirectly implying corruption. Hardus [39A] raises the issue of governance. He contends ‘they’ (implying the black elite) line their own pockets as the media constantly reports cases of fraud and corruption. He adds as evidence that Mugabe possibly is one of the richest men in the world.

In her conversation Hanneli suggests that corruption rubs off on whites and that that is the ethos of the new South Africa (which is assumed to be black). Daniel and Marita in contrast in their conversations discursively use the alleged responses of blacks to confirm that the government is corrupt. By retelling the criticisms raised by blacks (the veracity is not an issue here) credibility is lent to their own arguments and any criticism of racial bias on their part deflected.

6.3.1.9 Concluding remarks

In discussing change in their communities interviewees in the Waterberg District suggest that as far as patterns of settlement are concerned they probably are less
affected than urban areas. To a large extent matters have continued as they were beforehand, with the exception that a greater number of blacks have moved from farms to adjacent towns, a process that has contributed to growing informal settlements. Some interviewees living in town raise their concern over the consequence this resettlement has, implying more unemployed persons living close to their doorsteps and therefore increasing the risk of crime.

Underlying issues interviewees in Edensvlakte and Wesveld raise on transformation with regard to governance and service delivery is a pervasive view of blacks unable to manage by themselves or maintain previous standards. This is attributed to a lack of opportunity, training and in some instances a belief that they are less able. The belief that whites need to uplift blacks is coupled to the view that they are ‘agtergeblewenes’ (laggards). The paternalistic notion of whites carrying the burden of having to uplift blacks in turn results in resentment due to the feeling that whites receive no benefit or recognition for their efforts. This is underscored by the notion of white experience and competence as opposed to black inexperience and incompetence and the assumption that without white expertise and input conditions in South Africa will degenerate to the levels characteristic of a third world country. Such notions ultimately reflect whiteness (see chapter three).

The discourse further highlights the fact that segregation is maintained at a social level. A notion of apostasy and the belief that churches should be culturally constituted results in a clear preference for continued segregation in worship. With regard to education there is a belief that there is a direct correlation between increased black enrolment and lowering of standards. An increase in black enrolments is furthermore seen as threatening the culturally imbued nature of educational institutions serving the community. A belief that tertiary education standards are decreasing also is pervasive. With regard to government policy there is a view that legislation is put in place to get white farmers, who primarily are Afrikaans-speaking and are blamed for the past policies in the country. The lack of support for farmers is given as evidence to support their view. A perception that crime is increasing and that
with the integration of the police service, policing is less effective and negatively biased towards whites also exists.

In general, most interviewees are keen to demonstrate that relations between white and black have improved significantly and declare their tolerance in this regard. This together with their rejection of the conservatism associated with the area positions them as being moderate and co-operative in the new South Africa and supports the presentation of a moral self, in a context where norms have changed.

6.3.2 Discourse on change: interviewees living in metropolitan municipalities

The announcement of negotiations with liberation movements came surprised several interviewees in both metropolitan areas\(^{57}\). Guy [28A] and Robert [53], who had completed their National Service just before the announcement was made, admitted it caught them offside as the ‘enemy’ they had combated no longer was one. Dirk [22] and Adriaan [33A] describe the transition as an intensely politically charged period where conservatives did not want whites to relinquish their position as they knew it would be almost impossible to regain power again\(^{58}\). They saw the NP as traitors. Regardless of their personal political position notions of switching sides, ‘giving away’ or being sold out were often raised by interviewees, reflecting a sense of the loss of power they experience in society. Patsy, who does not view herself as conservative, admits

\(^{57}\) Part of the analysis provided here has been published as chapter 8 in Bekker & Leilda (2006) authored by me (Puttergill 2006). This analysis has been expanded and reworked.

\(^{58}\) Adriaan [33A] defends the historical claim of Boer Afrikaners to independent republics, arguing they were based on ‘statehood rights’ on land justly obtained before the British annexation. He regards the Union a strategic blunder because it implied a greater territory to which ‘power hungry’ blacks now also laid a claim as a result of the economic integration between people and reliance on ‘alien’ labour and failing to institute ‘selfwerksaamheid’ (doing one’s own work). Whilst the possibility of regaining the freedom of statehood remains a yearning of the ‘volk’ he rates chances of achieving this slim under the current regime, in spite of the UN recognising a people’s right to self-determination. English-speakers like Douglas [58B] and Michelle [58D] find the ‘Volkstaat’ idea ‘ridiculous’ and associate it with ‘ultra-rightists’ like the ‘Boeremag’ [Boer Force]. According to Dirk, in spite of their efforts as conservatives to warn people of the consequences of policy changes, many people voted for their ‘party’ out of habit, on its historical record of looking after their interests and because they believed the assurances given to them. Markus [31A] agrees that Afrikaners were socialised into allowing their leaders to think for them, following them blindly.
And there’s still with me, which is probably the wrong feeling that we whites, gave it to them, if you know what I mean. [19]

Ian [30A] contends that whereas the South African government had outmanoeuvred SWAPO in the negotiations for Namibian independence they had not taken into consideration the immense experience blacks had built up internally as a result of unionisation.

A number of interviewees expressed their relief that the transition occurred relatively smoothly describing it as a miracle. They conceded that it was inevitable. Margaret [26] commends ‘Madiba’\(^59\) positive leadership. During a period they admit feeling a great degree of insecurity about what the future held in store for them. Several referred to how some people stockpiled basic commodities in anticipation of mayhem.

One interviewee, Catherine, who had described her feeling of guilt at white oppression and anti-Afrikaner sentiment, reveals her response to the first democratic election based on universal franchise, in 1994, and Markus his responses since then.

I was excited then and I stood in the queue and oh, but then I started going the other way, because I didn’t vote ANC. I think I voted … I voted Nat. I voted to keep whites to get whites some sort of protection against the crime, but it didn’t work. Prior, prior to that I had voted … previously the P something … [Catherine, 25]

And you stand together as, as a group of people they will listen to what you say. They are not going to say, ‘okay’ here are a few pale souls that are raising their voices. But everyone has the attitude, but what can I do? You know it is like bloody elections. I have, I think I have already voted for five, maybe six parties. I have no ‘allegiance’ to any of them, but if I think this guy sound the closest to me, I vote for them. My father and I once, right, had a massive fallout in front of his church elder, because he criticised. I said to him but you do not even vote. If you do not vote you do not have the right to criticise. [translated – see endnote\(^78\)] [Markus, 31A]

When it came to the final crunch Catherine switched her allegiance in the first election from the more liberal DP (which had roots in the Progressive Federal Party) to the New Nationalist Party. The electorate vote strategically for the party they feel

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\(^{59}\) Madiba is the clan name of Nelson Mandela, and an honorary title bestowed on elders in the clan.
would best protect their economic and security interests. Markus in turn voices the frustration raised by many that they have not yet found a political home in the new dispensation. Sandy [52] voices a similar frustration to that raised by Markus, saying that she currently is much less politically aware than in the past and that the floor crossing makes one wonder whether your vote counts. Whilst a number of interviewees emphasised the importance of establishing a strong opposition to keep the government in check, some regarded the combative style of the DA as counterproductive and appearing as if whites were protecting what they enjoyed in the past.

Commenting, in general, on change Danny argues there has been a heightened sensitivity around race in society and that people tend to attempt to avoid offending others. Guy also refers to an increasing emphasis on rights and the need to be tolerant. Jasper [34A] attributes the eventual change to a shift in thinking from the rights of the strongest (which reigned during the colonial era) to the rights of the majority. Danny and Guy respectively contend

…one of the big social changes that has happened within the white population is, uhm, the sort of sensitivity and, and political correctness of not, uhm, wanting to create an incident, so from being, trying to be over sensitive or at, at the best not doing anything intentionally? So, there’s, there’s like purge of all that behaviour that might have happened 20 years ago. [Danny, 20]

You’ve, you’ve got to walk such a fine line or else you’re fundamentalist this way or that way. You’ve, you’ve got to be careful. We’re going into a funny sort of society at the moment. [Guy, 28A]

Other examples are provided of an increasing awareness and sensitivity around race. Dirk [22] refers to being cautious in what he says publicly and consciously treating everyone equally. Markus [31A] says one cannot always speak your mind out of fear of offending or embarrassing others. Danny [20] and Guy [28A] argue that the voting process has made one wonder about the value of one’s vote.

Election results for the areas I conducted my research in are reported in appendix C, Table 1.6. This is discussed subsequently in the notes that follow the tables. These election results should be treated with caution as they are not disaggregated by race. In elections for the National Assembly in 2004, the DA support polled a distant second place behind the ANC. The DA drew more than a quarter of the vote in the CTMM, with proportionately more white voters than the CJMM, where it drew slightly less than a fifth of the support. The FF+ polled a third place in CTMM ahead of the NNP which had a sixth place. In the CJMM, the FF+ fared much worse. Support for both the NNP and FF+ were low in the CJMM. Based on the results it can be assumed that the DA was supported by a majority of white voters in both the metropolitan areas. The FF+ built a sound base of support in CTMM. NNP support had declined significantly in both metropolitan areas (see section 4.5.6).
that you will be labelled. Quinton [42A] talks about having to ‘protect your wickets’ as a white. Peter [46] believes after the transition it was seen as politically correct to be involved with other races, but feels that this is now wearing off.

Craig [49], like these other interviewees, suggests one is permanently on guard and careful about what you say or do. He says one could lose your job for a silly joke. In this regard he contends that the freedom of communication one enjoyed with black workers in the past no longer exists. To illustrate this Craig relates an anecdote of how he in the past would jest with a black co-worker but no longer is able to do so. In his example he relates how he had ascertained from a black co-worker what the word for ‘baboon’ in his language was and then would use that term jokingly when he saw him. Craig thought this displayed rapport and camaraderie. The example demonstrates that he at that stage was able to dictate terms of reference and in a position of dominance. His obliviousness to the offensiveness of his actions to the other person involved reflects whiteness (see the discussion in chapter three).

According to Joyce [28B], there has been a generational change. They have become more politically correct and their children are ‘flabbergasted’ if people use the ‘K-word’ (denoting a derogatory term for blacks). Ian [30A] suspects whites still lapse into the use of old terminology in private, something Markus [31A] confesses happens, but he adds in his defence that he suspects the blacks gossip about you in front of you without your knowledge, justifying the practice.

In the metropolitan areas, like in Edensvlakte and Wesveld, the need to avoid breaching taboos is also evident in the conversations with interviewees.

In reflecting on how change affects their everyday lives interviewees in both metropolitan areas raised a number of issues. They talked about the change they observed in their city, its impact and their concerns. The changing racial composition

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61 Such a changing context obviously affects the responses that will be expressed in an interview to questions on racial matters. An interview can be regarded as a public (rather than private) context. Due to such a conscious awareness about racial matters an indirect approach in which interviewees discuss change yields a considerable amount of conversation on racial matters indirectly.
of suburbs (sections 6.3.2.1 to 6.3.2.3), degeneration and regeneration of the central business district and the impact of development (section 6.3.2.4) were consequently described. Other key issues discussed were how social institutions and service delivery were changing (section 6.3.2.5) as well as the impact of crime on their lives (section 6.3.2.6).

Commenting on change in their immediate environment, interviewees were aware of the changing racial composition of suburbs in their city, how this impacted differentially on suburbs, in some instances changing their character, as well as the impact such changes had on the suburbs they live in and the increasing visibility of informal settlements.

A majority of interviewees allude to differences between their suburb and other areas in the city when they describe the changes they observe. The increasing visibility of people of other racial groups settling in the suburb they live in and the perceived threat of crime are recurring observations interviewees make when referring to change.\(^{62}\)

6.3.2.1 Change in inner-city suburbs

Higher density inner-city suburbs have been most significantly affected by the process of desegregation (Lemon 1991; Parnell & Pirie 1991; Seekings 2003). More than one third of the interviewees living in Johannesburg referred to the changing racial composition of suburbs close to the Central Business District during their description of how the city was changing. If descriptions are taken into account of how the

\(^{62}\) Nathan [44] contends that it is his perception that crime within the city is out of control. A detailed assessment of the extent and distribution of crime within these metropolitan municipalities is beyond the scope of this chapter. The level of crime in both metropolitan areas in Gauteng, comparatively, is high. The rapid increase in crime can be attributed, in part, to instability accompanying political and economic change. Official statistics on reported incidents suggests crime increased after 1994 and then stabilised. This trend was already apparent in the 1980s. Between 2000 and 2003 murder and attempted murder decreased. Robbery with aggravating increased. Burglary and theft generally increased over the period. Rape remained stable. Hijacking and theft of vehicles decreased. In 2001 Johannesburg had a lower incidence of residential burglary than Pretoria when expressed in relation to population size. Suburbs within the metropolitan areas have been affected differentially (Isserow 2001; Lehohla 2004a; Parnell and Pirie 1991).
Central Business District (CBD) has changed, the tally rises to more than half of the interviewees in Johannesburg. Sunnyside in Pretoria\(^{63}\) did not conjure up the images Hillbrow in Johannesburg did for interviewees living in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, who were clearly orientated towards their own suburbs. None of them raised the issue of a changing inner-city.

Many interviewees reminisced how when they were growing up the city centre, as a predominantly ‘white’ domain, was the focal point of social, cultural and commercial activity. The impact of the rapid changes to the CBD are captured by comments made by Danny, whose employer relocated their office from the city centre, Emma, who still frequents the centre, as well as Quinton and Peter, who currently conduct their business affairs in decentralised nodes.

…fifteen years ago, uhm, it was essentially a white commercial centre, uhm, banks, mining companies, uh legal profession, accounting profession. Anybody who was anybody was situated in town. …Uhm, so there’s been massive outflow, you know, and then the influx of black people into, into town and, and taking up that space and so its like two different forces almost business versus social, uhm, competing for space. [Danny, 20]

…I’m one of the few whiteys in town. …when I was a kid, I remember we would go window shopping in town. We would walk around window shopping. Uhm, now the shop windows look bloody ugly, you know, they’re not window-dressed in an artistic way, they’re window dressed in a mass market way – ‘buy this, cheap this’. Uhm, big signs, loud garish signs, you know of, that look like everything is perpetually on sale whereas before you’d have sale windows and Christmas windows and Easter windows and ‘back to school’ windows and now you just get sale windows. …who would have thought that Sandton would become an, a CBD? Who would have thought that the traffic congestion going from the suburbs into town would become so light that it was a pleasure to drive into town and now to drive out of town towards the north is a nightmare beyond anything that driving into town was. [Emma, 27]

It’s a lot similar to what happened in the middle of Braamfontein…. Where you conducted your shopping and banking there ten years ago, it is difficult, nearly not worthwhile to go there. [translated – see endnote\(^{63}\)] [Quinton, 42A]

Well, when we first came here, of course this was a predominantly white area, with a fairly active and booming business district. ...if I had to say one of the

\(^{63}\) I use Pretoria when I refer to what interviewees living in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality say about their community, since Pretoria was the point of reference for most interviewees when they described their community.
changes, well, it’s no longer a very, uh, busy business district, in fact it’s almost fallen apart, and, uh, all shopping centres and businesses have moved out of the central business area, so there’s, there’s the first major change. [Peter, 46]

All four these excerpts suggest white displacement from the city centre and a concomitant decline in the prosperity of the area. Danny describes the change as the outcome of competing forces, suggesting a struggle for space, now claimed by black people, as ‘white flight’ to gated business and commercial enclaves occurred within the context of property speculation. Emma describes how retail changed in the CBD as a result of the changing racial composition where it became as Francis [P3] also noted a shopping area for black people. Whereas the decentralisation of retail to suburban shopping malls began in the 1970s and was consolidated in the 1980s with the most recent development major ‘themed’ entertainment centres, decentralisation of businesses to office parks started a decade later and intensified in the 1990s. These trends shaped the cities and consumption within them in significant ways (Bremmer 2000; Mabin 2001). White people, generally, avoid these inner city areas which, as areas of decay and decline, are seen as no-go zones. Lena [42B] confirms that they seldom go to the city centre.

Francis, who worked in the CBD and initially lived in an inner-city suburb, suggests that as businesses were attracted north by aggressive marketing by Sandton more buildings in the CBD became available for occupancy by black tenants and that this had a knock on effect on surrounding areas. Lara describes the movement of blacks from peripheral areas toward the central suburbs. They respectively contend

…and once the businesses started moving out there, uh, because there were empty premi., premises, it, it started attracting, uh, tenants, to the areas that, that there were, unpopulated, and it became, uh, sort of more like a ghetto. And I must say it was specifically racially, so, so, the, the people, black people who couldn’t find homes, essentially started squatting, in buildings that weren’t populated, where people moved out of and it, it became, it became a shopping area, of, of the black population. And the more that happened, the more the white population moved out. I mean, I know it sounds terrible but, eh, that’s my perception [Francis, P3]

64 These exclusionary processes are not uniquely South African. Davis (1996) describes similar processes occurring in Los Angeles.
...there’s definitely been more of a movement, uhm, you know of the black population, sort of where they origin., they lived in town more towards, I think they still live there, but more towards, uhm, Yeoville, Bellevue and moving inwards. So yah, in terms of the ur., you know the dynamics of where people stay, there has been that change. [Lara, 29]

As the greying of the inner city, a process that started in the 1980s in some suburbs, gained momentum the phenomenon of tipping occurred as a result of ‘white flight’. Some working-class and middle-class inner-city suburbs resegregated becoming predominantly black and African. Associated with the changing racial composition of these suburbs was a perception that their class composition was also changing. Danny provides an example of the process of invasion and succession that occurred in some inner-city suburbs

...[in] both of those [Malvern and Bezuidenhoudt Valley], uhm, there were, there were massive changes there. For what was, when I first moved to the Joburg area, were very Portuguese areas, uhm, inhabited by people from Angola and, and, uh, Mozambique after the '75, '74 stuff, and, uh, those people, those people moved out and, uhm, and were replaced by lower economic group members of, yah, maybe they, they became more affluent and could afford to move out… [20]

The change in the racial composition of inner-city suburbs were often linked by interviewees to a decline in property values and ultimately deterioration in the infrastructure and poor service delivery. Inner-city suburbs were regarded more embattled, with dwindling numbers of white residents. Parnell and Pirie (1991) confirm that where lower-income whites could not successfully prevent significant numbers of other racial groups from settling in their residential areas they often succeeded in accessing housing elsewhere.

Una suggests high-density areas, with reasonable rental, located elsewhere in the city are vulnerable to changes inner-city suburbs experienced. In expressing concern regarding the knock-on effect the greying of an area in close proximity to her own residential area may have she is cautious, emphasising that she has no objectives against deracialisation, provided they can afford living in the area. Class, apparently replaces race.
…if people have got the money to buy in the area that’s fine I have got nothing against that. If you take a look at some of the areas down, down towards Cresta ten years ago it was mainly white areas. It has become a mini Hillbrow, now which I don’t agree with, because the crime like I have said has shot up there and basically, uhm, most of them use, most of the peop., black people used to stick to their townships, now they getting out their townships. Its not that I worry about that, but I do worry about uh, uh, crime going up. [32]

Una’s conversation is revealing. Blacks no longer ‘stick’ to the township. Formerly white areas where they have settled are hamstrung by crime. In an attempt to avoid a charge of racial bias, Una emphasises that she is not concerned about race, she is concerned about crime. The condition she then sets for accepting racial diversity within her own suburb, like Patsy [19] and Gloria [23], is one of maintaining the social class status. A change in the racial composition of a suburb, although not stated directly, potentially implies deterioration in the quality of life, as infrastructure and the level of services decline. In her conversation crime becomes racialised. She contends race is not her concern, crime is. However, an increase in crime is associated with a changing racial composition. Crime then becomes a euphemism for race, whilst deflecting charges that her concerns may be racially based.

In their conversations interviewees highlight several issues regarding the impact of changes in inner-city and high-density areas. A changing racial composition undermines property values and increases the risk of crime threatening the sense of stability and security in established residential areas bordering these areas. These claims indirectly suggest a racial causality to crime.

Gloria [23] and Emma both refer to suburbs centrally located that held or improved their value as they became more diverse.

Melville has become like this cosmopolitan area. Where it used to be a whole lot of sort of affirmative action housing for the Afrikaans population, its now become this little trendy kind of village and I think that a lot of places in the northern suburbs have become trendy little villages .. street life in the suburbs, but only around shops. [27]
Emma adds that this street life in suburbia contained around the shopping areas, reflecting again the protective laager Tomlinson (1990) refers to, differed from the street life she was accustomed to when growing up.

6.3.2.2 Change in own residential areas

In formerly white group areas the changing racial composition of middle-class suburbia has been less pronounced than high-density inner-city suburbs. The north-western suburbs of Johannesburg and the southern and eastern suburbs of Pretoria where I conducted my research are still predominantly white and have not yet changed significantly like inner-city areas have.

Interviewees generally recognised that the racial composition of their suburb was changing and that it no longer formally constituted an exclusively white area as it had been during the apartheid era. Stephen [P1] recognises the freedom to purchase property anywhere as one of the significant changes that has occurred. Craig suggests that the changes are a fait accompli to which residents adapt.

Well, changed in the respect of, uhm, yes, most places have, uhm, opened to, uh, your, your, your, uh, non-white races who’ve bought houses in the area which used to those years be strictly just white, uhm, but it’s, it’s really matter of either you accept the fact that they are part of our, uh, community, uh, they will be a part of our, uh, community, uh, no matter you do. Uh. You can’t fight that. Uh. Probably a lot due to our, uh, current government system, uh, but yah, I’d say change-wise that’s probably about the major thing that has happened. Yah, the, the basics behind our whole neighbourhood is, it’s not the same as it was when we bought here. Uhm. Really basically because we had to learn to change with the, the, uh, situation in the country, uhm, in that the whole matter of, of racism, uh, and segregation of races has been pushed aside to a certain extent. Albeit a lot of us would think at the moment that it has become a matter of reverse racism. But yes, we’ve had to learn to accept what has happening in the community. [49]

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65 See the discussion on the central research question (section 5.4) and the research design (section 5.6) of this study. In the introduction of this chapter I reaffirmed that since a significant proportion of whites are middle-class, they constitute the focus of this study. A numerically significant proportion of those people classified white in the city live in suburbia.
In his assessment of change in Pretoria, Dirk identifies the opening up of their residential area and an increase in crime as the two major changes that occurred. With regard to these matters he contends

> We, the neighbourhood self is not so badly, so targeted as other neighbourhoods, you know like Danville and those parts, because here’s a middle-class… In the east of Pretoria, so, you know, money is here quite a factor. I think that is why the impact has not been that strong, you know with the mixing of races and matters like that here. [translated – see endnote 80] [22]

Later in the interview Dirk claims that class has become more prominent and he also talks about cultural differences. The shifting emphasis to class and culture is indicative of race evasion reported in the literature.

Instances where interviewees thought the racial composition of their suburb had altered significantly reflected an overestimation of the presence of other racial groups as a result of the greater visibility newcomers had. Emma acknowledges that, whereas the change has been visible, her neighbourhood still remains substantially white in its composition.

> Well, in very recent times a lot of people of the Moslem faith have moved into the area and a mosque has been built and is being renovated, uh, added to, they’re enlarge and that, and, uh, from that point of view there’s been a big change in the occupancy of the houses. … I’d say still predominantly white, very, very predominantly white, with a big In., Indian population and a small black population and maybe a sprinkling of coloured people. …Well the crime that people lived within the townships has now come to the traditionally or historically white suburbs, uhm, so the whiteys who were protected by the Group Areas Act are now not protected from the darkies invading anymore. [27]

The awareness of a changing racial composition in suburbs and an accompanying increase in crime is apparent in Dirk and Emma’s conversations. Francis [P3] also, like Emma, suggests that crime has spilled over into formerly white suburbs from formerly ‘black locations’ (townships). These matters of changing racial composition and crime were recurring themes in both metropolitan areas.
Responses on the meaning and potential consequences of a changing racial composition of their own suburb can be divided in two strands of thought. Most interviewees emphasise a shared middle class position with black people moving into their suburb. They argue that as long as the class composition of the suburb is maintained, the impact of a changing racial composition on their way of life will be minimal. Some interviewees believe cultural difference potentially could be unsettling.

Gloria drawing a distinction between liberal urban and antiquated rural areas feels Johannesburg has coped well with the transition. She contrasts the racial mixing in Johannesburg to the prevalent segregation in small towns, concedes that people still live to a large extent in communities they had lived in previously, but argues that the upward mobility of blacks is bringing about some change in the composition of middle-class suburbs, albeit slowly, and is accepted. In her assessment:

It’s fairly static, not a lot of movement. Static. My next door neighbour has been here even longer than me. Maybe 20 years… I haven’t seen as much of a change, in the area in which we live. …except the house across the road which has been ‘to let’ …there’ve been black people living there, but not bothering anybody… they in fact, they didn’t even really integrate, either. We did invite them once to tea, the one lot ...So what the apartheid regime did wrong I think is that they did not develop the African middle-class. So now we’ve got masses of uneducated people whom we’re sitting with and causing a huge problem for us. And, and I think that …the difference between people is going to be class … and not race, because a black person and a white person who are of the same class are going to find it quite easy to mix, because they have lots of things in common. They mix in the gym or whatever, whatever whatever that class of people will do. People will not even see the race issue, but the class issue. But the class issue I think is hidden by race. The vast majority of black people are low-class… they’re not middle-class and have sort of middle-class values. And as more and more of them get into positions of power, go into better schools and become educated you’re going to have a slowly developing middle class, and, and then its going to be a class issue which will be the

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66 These strands of thought are not watertight and in certain instances flow into each other. Whereas the first strand emphasises class commonalities, the second emphasises cultural difference. At times interviewees can use different strands and sometimes even mix them.

67 Susanna [45] describes the community more ‘with-it’ than people in rural areas. She adds that they have realised that there is no point in hanging on to their prejudice and that one has to adapt to the changing circumstances. Charl [54] argues a lot has been achieved about which one can feel proud. For instance, it is no longer strange to see people of different racial groups eating together or even sharing the same toilet, something which a few years ago were considered shocking and shameful. Drawing such comparisons then demonstrates their own positioning and also distances them from more conservative viewpoints.
dividing line between people, rather than the race issue. It just is very unfortunate that the vast majority of black people are low-class. But now you can see the levelling of the class issue. If you go to any traffic light here in Joburg, and I am sure probably in Pretoria, you’ll see lots of whites, poor whites and they’re poor people. It’s just another thing, of the white thing. Like my friend, my one white friend, she said to me, “I don’t give to white beggars” So why? I also don’t. Because they had all the benefits of the past. They had a council house, they had welfare, they had all this and they had like all the opportunities and they blew it. They did. [23]

In her discussion only partially cited above Gloria repeatedly refers to ‘upward mobility’, the necessity of developing an ‘African middle-class’, having ‘things in common’, sharing ‘middle-class values’, and to the ‘levelling of the class issue’ to underline the importance of class in solving the racial problem. She concedes middle-class black people in their suburb have not yet really integrated, in part, to ‘carry-overs from the old apartheid regime’.

Gloria’s admission, that black residents keep their distance and have not really become integrated in her suburb, suggests that the impact of these changes have not been that extensive. In spite of her own experience, she argues a shared middle-class association will develop as common interests between middle-class white and black people emerge. To substantiate her claim she refers to the dress of African ‘girls’ being westernised. No one walks around with ‘doeks’ (head cloths) like they presumably would in rural areas, for instance. The influence then is clearly western, not traditional. Gloria in her conversation further acknowledges that a majority of blacks still are ‘low-class’ and therefore have not yet internalised middle-class values. She views their class status as unfortunate, a consequence of history, a matter that can

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68 Stephen [P3], demonstrating his openness like Gloria, invited new black neighbours to tea. They did not take up his invitation and he adds he will not ‘push himself’ onto anyone. These examples suggest that they are prepared to be friends with blacks. The limited contact across racial lines is attributed to few opportunities. According to Douglas [58B] it is natural for people to stick to their groups, just like animals do in nature. He adds that there are cultural and language barriers. Deon [58A] and Michelle [58D] agree that people tend to relate to those culturally similar to them, whom they understand better.

69 During the course of her interview the effortlessness of the integration she suggests is possible within the suburb stands in contrast to her description of a strained relationship at work with a black superior. Whereas she individualises her problems with her superior and to some extent links it to a notion that the supervisor is ‘riding an affirmative action bandwagon for own gain’, she romanticises the possibility of interracial class solidarity in the residential context. On the one hand the work situation suggests a loss of control, whilst the residential situation still reflects maintaining control, precisely because it is built around an assumption that the newcomers adapt to what she regards middle-class values. The upwardly mobile newcomers adapt to their established lifestyles, to their ways of doing things.
be redressed as their income improves and they access better education\textsuperscript{70} which presumably would socialise them into internalising the middle-class lifestyle of consumerism she describes – for instance, westernised clothes and gym-memberships. This acceptance of middle-class values and lifestyle choices, often equated to consumption, charts the route for blacks to gain greater acceptance and inclusion as their opportunities increase. By admitting that blacks current ‘low-class’ status is not of their own making and by welcoming the rise of middle-class blacks, Gloria, avoids criticism that she may be prejudicial in terms of race. It is not a race thing. It is rather about class (as long as the middle-class values they subscribe to are retained).

A majority of interviewees suggest shared class interests and values may transcend racial lines and become the primary division within society. Nathan and Mary respectively contend

\begin{quote}
Yah, I suppose I’m viewed as a white middle, a middle-class, a middle- to upper-class person, yah. And I’ll assume that most, most non-whites see me as that yah, uhm, I don’t, I think that those let me call it non-white people that I know and neighbours that I’ve got, and friends that we’ve got probably don’t necessarily class me as totally different. [Nathan, 44]

I think that when we first moved here, obviously it was predominantly white, there’s a lot more, uh, coloured people, black people, Indian people in the area. I still think its very much a middle-class area which it was when we first moved in, I don’t believe that having coloured people moving has changed the, the status of the area at all. [Mary, 50]
\end{quote}

Danny acknowledges, in a lengthy stretch of conversation, the immense material gap that still exists between blacks and whites in the country. He feels as affluence increases amongst blacks, integration is aided, that people will feel less discriminated against. He contends

\begin{quote}
…so social status, whatever you, however you want to put it …that might include a number of criteria, power, power of job, uhm, money you earn, the car you drive, the school you send your kids to, uhm, where you live, you know, that type of thing, can be summed up very quickly on that basis as well. So the first things South Africans ask one another …because we’re sizing them up and immediately on social status, and so if that merges for, for the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} The importance of improving blacks’ education was raised by several interviewees. Implicit in such statements are the assumption that it changes practices and raises standards of service delivery. Charl [54] is of the opinion that better education will also address issues of discipline.
different population groups, then there might not be quite as much, you know, race might not be exactly first in line, it’ll slip to second, and then the, the first question will be “what do you do?” [20]

Lara [29] refers to a significant ‘burgeoning black bourgeois middle-class’, as playing fields are slowly levelled as well as an ‘emerging white poor’. These conversations of Nathan, Mary and Danny suggest the possibility of class becoming a more acceptable, less contentious, basis for an exclusionary discourse and defence of privilege. In this regard ‘poor whites’ are dispensable as Gloria suggests above. In fact, viewed instrumentally, a poor white presence at lower rungs and black upward mobility serves a useful purpose, deracialising class difference and privilege contributing to a ‘levelling of the class issue’. There is a clear preference for differentiation by class to differentiation by race, with the former being viewed less problematic than the latter especially as upwardly mobile black people join the ranks of the middle-class. Mark [58C] and Adriaan [33A] suggest race is less crucial in a wealthy cosmopolitan environment (this observation does not necessarily imply approval).

Charl [54] argues the (white) middle-classes keep things on track. He suggests that the ‘bottom line’ people, which after clarification becomes apparent that this refers to the poor (although he avoids using race), need to be taught the ‘base’ things for progress to occur. He is of the opinion that what he calls a social-developmental level needs to be achieved. Prioritising his values as universal ones, others should subscribe to, suggests whiteness. The whole notion of educating and thereby civilising the ‘other’ has roots within the colonial past where it has been regarded as the ‘white man’s’ burden (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3).

Patsy regards education as the key to bring about change. She believes denying blacks a full education, as happened in the past in the country, was a big mistake. Margaret

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71 Markus [31A] too refers to an imaginary line in white suburbia in Johannesburg with whites living south of this looked down upon, even though he admits that they are not necessarily always materially worse off. He suggests that such class divisions will also become more pronounced as blacks move from the southern suburbs to the northern suburbs. Several others, like Olga [31B], Quinton [42A], Lena [42B], Edward [43] and Craig [49] mention the emergence of white beggars. On the one hand they find it disturbing, reflecting the increasingly unfavourable position whites in general face (a reminder of their vulnerability). Charl [54] predicts that one will see whites squatting soon. On the other hand, interviewees often refer to the laziness and unwillingness of such white beggars to do menial work offered to them because they do better on the street.
doubts whether the middle-class dream is sustainable. Patsy, Audrey and Margaret respectively argue

I would say my feeling is any differences that there are is lack of education, because not being educated they possibly have more, uhm, a raw, if that’s the word I’m looking for, uhm, well I don’t know Charles, it’s a bit of a difficult question. I would say that any differences there are, is based on education because if you, if you’re educated you have a wider field of thinking… [Patsy, 19]

Well, I feel that they [the government] should be quicker with education. Uh. You know there are a lot of, well do you mind if we talk about ‘black’? [Charles:Yah] I feel they should be quicker and give them a better education, because I mean, this is a rainbow nation, isn’t it? So the black and white have got to have the same sort of education, I feel. [Audrey, 21]

I would love everybody to have that, but practically speaking the, we don’t have the economy to sustain that. A lot of people don’t have the knowledge, the background or, or, or the working power to sustain it. Uhm. So you know a lot of people, you know without being derogatory, uh, the black people are very childlike in their beliefs… there’s certainly a lot more affluent black people which is great, uhm, but a lot less affluent white people. [Margaret, 26]

In all three the conversations cited above the level of education is seen as contributing to a difference between the groups. It is also regarded as a potential remedy. Some sensitivity is demonstrated around what could be regarded as reflecting negatively on the racial other. Patsy emphasises that education is the main difference and that some are still ‘raw’ (meaning unsophisticated). She expresses some doubt on her selection of the word ‘raw’. With regard to Audrey she first asks whether she could talk about the blacks, even though previous references suggested they were the topic of discussion. Her reference to the rainbow nation and the implied principle of equal access enables her to comment on their lack of (westernised) education without running the risk of being regarded by others as being racist. Margaret cautions that she does not intend to be derogatory when she refers to them being ‘childlike’.

Interviewees are concerned with maintaining their own class position as well as that of the neighbourhood. Hence Danny’s [20] choice of suburb is one that is ‘solidly middle-class’ where his investment in property would hold its value. Ian [30A] observes this concern of retaining the value of properties with regard to a proposed housing development and the response within the suburb.
Interviewees recognise the middle-class increasingly will be multiracial and that proportionately more middle-class people will be black. At the very least there is a desire for middle-class sameness within the suburb. A sameness that can be achieved by subscribing to shared middle-class values as Patsy suggests:

Oh, we have seen changes occurring ...a lot of, uhm, Indians and blacks buying the houses. Uh, they are of course probably, uhm, of our financial status, [Charles:Yah, yah] because if you look at the cars they drive and the, uh, the, the way they’re dressed and the way they speak and the way they, what they’re paying for the houses. ...But there’s no change, in that the area’s deteriorating, not at all, not at all. I would say the houses round here that look as though they need, uhm, renovating outside are very much more the, that belong to the white people. And, uhm, the funny thing is, Charles, the houses that have got the biggest locks on the gates are the Indians and the co., the black people, not the white people. Eh, eh, eh, because they obviously uh, uh, I personally think they don’t trust their own. [Charles:Yah] That’s my personal feeling, they don’t trust their own, and we’ve never been broken into, we had one attempt, but hence I mean, you see the way we live [Charles:Yah], but I feel perfectly safe. I’m not concerned that my, uhm, neighbour here is Indian and my neighbour diagonally across the road is black. I’m not concerned at all, and of course you see a lot of children here very nicely dressed in their school uniforms. [Charles:Yes] So there has been a change from that point of view. I can’t say from any other. ...And, uh, wherever you go the, the shopping centres, the, uhm, the schools, the, uh, especially the, uh, uh, recreational, uh, like the botanical gardens, there are many, many, uh, you know blacks, coloureds and Indians walking around there and my personal opinion is, that frankly, they are very, very well behaved. [Charles:Yah] That’s one of the things that, because, this is the circle I moved in, you know what I mean, I couldn’t tell you what it’s like in Turffontein because I have got no idea. [Patsy, 19]

In contrast to Gloria [23] who has rated the change in their suburb minimal, Patsy [19] suggests that the racial composition of their suburb has changed considerably. Regardless of the difference in their assessment of the extent of the change in the racial composition of their suburbs, which I have suggested may be exaggerated by the increased visibility of the racial other in a formerly white area, both are in agreement that maintaining the middle-class status of the suburb retains its character which buffets it against other changes.

Items of consumption – clothes, cars and homes – confirm a shared class position between newcomers of another racial group and established white residents. Hence
the increasingly multi-racial composition of the suburb does not threaten its class base. The potentially precarious class position of some whites is reflected in Patsy’s comment that it often is members of this category, rather than the upwardly mobile newcomers, whose homes may need renovation. Middle-class similarity is emphasised by comments that these newcomers are ‘very, very well behaved’ in the public areas they share with her middle-class ‘circle’. Comments like their ‘children [are] nicely dressed’ implies shared middle-class respectability. It is contrasted to the potential situation in a formerly white working-class area (Turffontein) on which she comments she cannot talk about with authority. The comment suggests that formerly working-class white areas may be more embattled. A similar comment is made with regard to Pretoria, by Dirk [22] in his reference to Danville, in an excerpt cited earlier in this chapter.

Most interviewees do not express concern about the changing racial composition of the suburb they live in, provided the class character of it is maintained and not affected negatively by the influx of newcomers. The responses in the preceding excerpts raise the question whether class becomes the primary articulation of social difference. Guy and Joyce contend

We’ve got black neighbours across the road, that doesn’t bug me at all. …Uhm. We, we actually don’t have an issue, it, it ends up being a, again like I was saying, a financial or educational status will eventually work together. That’s where I think the distinctions of separation are going to be, not racial or skin colour. [Guy, 28A]

Your financial separations will be in areas you live in and stuff like that but I’m still not so sure it will be in your choice of friends. There’s still racism here. Because I mean we don’t have black friends. …Shopping centres and things I’ve noticed a big change in that. They’ve changed from white to black, if, some of them more than others. I mean Westgate quite a bit, Northgate not so much [Joyce, 28B]

Although Joyce agrees with Guy that class is an important distinction in society, her response suggests race may be more pervasive than some admit. In his reply Guy retorts that it is true, that they ‘don’t really come across them yet’, implying that segregation remains so extensive that they have not yet had opportunity to befriend
blacks. Both suggest experiences of children at school are different where they are exposed to other groups.

I have referred to two strands of thought in interviewees’ responses to a changing racial composition of their own suburb. A majority of interviewees thought shared middle-class values ensure commonalities across racial boundaries. They contend that as long as the class composition of the suburb is maintained the impact of a changing racial composition would be minimal. Some interviewees were more cautious about what a changing racial composition of their suburb would entail. These interviewees referred to how ‘cultural’ differences potentially may have disruptive consequences. For instance, Heleen, Joyce and Lena respectively contend

Well we talked about, you know, uhm, things like, uh, housing, for instance. …like, for instance, I stay in this house, and, and say, a black family stays in that house and the two houses cost exactly the same, monthly rental and maintenance, those type of things. But there, here I and my family stay, and there he stays and two, three other families, you know, that doesn’t really make it fair in our eyes. …I think it is how we have been raised, of, uhm, I have my house and my privacy and, and it is how that is, you know …Yes, it is, you know … there isn’t a thing like a family stays in one room. [translated – see endnote$^{81}$] [Heleen, 24]

I think our upbringings are fairly different. Okay, I grew up on a, on a farm. So okay, I can’t account for a sort of, a, an upper class black family, but I mean I know the rural blacks and I mean, you think, you think differently. You act differently. In those days we were taught differently. I think a lot of that is still there. You know for us to actually act the same and think the same is going to take a long time. It’s gonna take generations for those separations and differences to work themselves through. I mean there’s, there’s a lot of basic fundamental differences, ancestor worship and stuff like that. Where, you know, it’s just something I don’t believe in and they do. And, so to an extent you’re still going to be separated [Joyce, 28B]

I think the culture is a, is a big difference because they still believe in ancestral spirits. That plays a big role in their lives and they are people who live close to each other. So they will not mind if they are now, for example, twenty living in a house. It does not bother them… and we are more, we like our privacy more. [translated – see endnote$^{82}$] [Lena, 42B]

In her conversation Heleen is recalling a conversation she had with her mother at the time of the transition on the threat of overcrowding to their suburb once black people legally could move into their formerly white suburb. The discussion reflects an assumption that black people typically engage in certain practices that differ from
those white people typically engage in. Black people are described as both being prepared to and often forced, given their lower class position, to share accommodation. Heleen concedes that whilst white people may start a commune, it is a-typical in comparison to the more common practice amongst black people of sharing accommodation. Joyce\textsuperscript{72} and Lena’s conversations on cultural differences reflect similar assumptions to those held by Heleen. This is then compared to what whites find acceptable. The notion of racially integrating suburbs raises the fear that white people may be overrun by black people with a deterioration of the living conditions in the suburb, since different standards and norms may apply. Markus raises similar concerns with regard to adhering to or changing municipal bylaws, suggesting different cultural practices may cause tension.

\textit{...and I do not have a problem if here, whatever other-colour guy comes and stays next to me, if he adheres to my norms and the norms of the environment. You know, if you go and look at the, at the “bylaws” or the, yes what is the Afrikaans, bylaws that are being changed now, that have changed, if there, next to me now is an other-colour guy, whose, whose culture dictates to him, he can slaughter an animal because they have a funeral, they may now slaughter in his backyard. Now I mean, can you think what drama, what, what impact that will have on me and my neighbours and also on children, to see how they slaughter an animal, cut off its throat, and let it bleed like this, and bleed like this, and bleed like this. So, I see that as a future problem, a possible problem.” [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{83}] [31A]}

The transition and consequent changing racial composition of suburbs hold the danger of disrupting the perceived homogeneity and accepted social practices within a suburb affected. In these instances the desire for sameness extends to shared cultural practices and hence a shared history. For these interviewees, cultural difference becomes problematic when it is seen as undermining their sense of social order. Concern is voiced about how the quality of life may be affected adversely. These foreign practices described, affect standards and impact on the character of the suburb. Some traditional cultural practices, stereotypically described as a disruptive spectacle

\textsuperscript{72} Her suggestion that she has intimate knowledge of how rural blacks are socialised, but cannot comment on more sophisticated upper-class blacks, presumably urban, deflects potential criticism that she is biased towards blacks. Comments on the difference in sophistication between rural and urban blacks were also made in Edensvlakte. Patsy [19], Margaret [26] and Charl [54] both suggest that blacks in urban areas are more sophisticated than those in rural areas where segregation still occurs. They contend that it is in the urban areas where one comes across educated blacks.
threatening their privacy and tranquillity in the suburb (presumably due to the collective and ritual nature), are labelled inappropriate for a suburb.

Several excerpts from conversations cited above deal with what is considered the ‘right kind of practices’ in formerly white suburbs. Acceptable neighbours would heed to these practices. Tolerance is qualified by stating that they should adhere to established norms to maintain standards. This suggests that besides material interest, a premium is attached on the sharing of values. Amending bylaws to allow traditional practices suggests a shift power and the possibility for blacks, as a result of political power locally, to dictate what is deemed appropriate or not. This sounds a warning signal. Peter, living in a less exclusive more racially diverse middle-class suburb argues

Well personally, they haven’t affected me at all. Uhm. I have, for instance, a black neighbour behind me, to the front of me and on one side of me and they are very quiet and, and, and … and we, we get on very well. I would be inclined to say we don’t become personal friends, simply because we are different in culture ...Um, I would be inclined to say that there has been a deterioration in the actual residential area, because, um, a lot of these folks don’t do the same type of gardening-cum-housing maintenance that we were used to in the past. In the past it would appear that people were quite proud to have a nice garden and a nice verge. Um, a lot of the people that live here now don’t look at the verge on the outside at all. Um, all the swimming pools around us are empty and dirty. Every one. Back, front and both sides. In fact, ours is the only swimming pool that you could swim in. So you can see there’s been a deterioration in the actual quality of the resident, residential area. [46]

After stating that his neighbours do not bother him, Peter continues to describe how their cultural practices differ from his, and the impact these different practices have on the suburb. He compares the present heterogeneity of the suburb to its past homogeneity and present practices with past practices. The norm in the suburb in the past was to maintain properties. Current practices by his black neighbours suggest neglect. The deterioration of the suburb is linked to the influx of ‘these folks’. Whilst Peter is cautious to emphasise that he gets on well with his new neighbours, he also indicates that cultural difference remains a barrier to the development of friendship. Therefore, cultural difference between races is seen as creating possible barriers and difficulties.
In these conversations cultural difference is reified and accepted as a fact. Referring to cultural difference takes over some functions played by the reference to race in the past. Peter deflects any charge of racial bias towards him by criticising all neighbours for not maintaining their swimming pools in the conversation above. However, they are treated differently. His white neighbour’s failure to maintain a swimming pool does not reflect on white peoples’ social practices. It is treated as an individual failure. In contrast the failure of his three black neighbours to maintain their swimming pools is taken as evidence of how they as a group differ from white people. Their actions are viewed in intergroup terms. Emphasising cultural difference deflects attention from race whilst maintaining a notion of difference which is fixed. There are numerous examples of these strategies in the conversations.

The remark by Peter, at the beginning of the excerpt above, that ‘they haven’t affected me at all’ is similar to Markus’s claim that he is not bothered by ‘other-colour’ neighbours living next door to him. Both responses highlight a strong desire to deal with race neutrally, to express tolerance even when cultural differences are described incompatible. The pattern then is one of declaring that the changing racial composition of the suburb is not a problem. This is, followed by a caveat, stressing the need to adhere to middle-class values, or municipal bylaws, or on the impact cultural differences may have. Since all these caveats indirectly refer to race, they mask racialised thinking and prejudice. Goldberg (1993) argues that a denial of racial prejudice often plays a prominent role in its reproduction.

The desire to express tolerance for diversity and avoid questions of race may be the result of changing socio-political contexts. References to race in the interviews conducted for this study are much less prominent than in the interviews conducted by Boot-Sietsema and Boot (1982) with white respondents during the 1970s and early 1980s. They report a strongly argued taken-for-granted viewpoint on a biologically rooted racial difference providing justification for racial segregation amongst many of

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73 Some of these interviews were conducted with whites living in the areas I conducted my fieldwork in.
their interviewees. I do not want to create the impression that such a discourse has completely vanished. There were instances where references to racial difference surfaced. This caused some embarrassment for interviewees aware that the viewpoints they expressed is contested and no longer is considered normal and natural in the society. Joyce’s following comment provides such an example.

So for me its very hard to distinguish what I perceive as a real difference and what is a taught difference, because I was taught a lot of differences, okay. [Charles: What differences were they?] …They’re, they’re definitely more stupid, you know, I mean physically, apparently its been proven that they have thicker skulls so they’ve got less brain space, you see. I mean, you know, these are things that I, I have been taught since I was tiny, so I can’t say what, what is real, what is real and what I was taught, you know, they’re definitely dirtier people. And they, you know there’s all these things that I was taught, I can’t distinguish, because I don’t have enough to do with them to form a friendship with somebody. With the kind of friendship I have with, with my white friends that I actually know what they think and feel. [28B]

Although Joyce refers to physical differences above, she initially argues that the socialisation of white and black people differs. This suggests cultural difference between these groups. In describing what she was taught in the past Joyce lapses into a highly contentious and offensive notion of biologically determined difference. The stereotypical images expressed by her are reinforced by selective observation. Schutte (1995) suggests the relationship between groups in rural areas is marked by physical closeness but socially distant asymmetric relationships. She recognises, in her defence, her racial isolation prevented her from ‘testing’ the validity of these stereotypes and myths. This raises the possibility of being wrong.

Although I have already reflected briefly on the matter it is necessary to reflect on what is meant by middle-class values. Gloria’s reference to ‘the dress of the, the girls, [being] very westernised’ as well as ‘none of us walking around with doeks and things like that’, as well as Patsy’s suggestion that ‘they are very, very well behaved’ suggests black people are accepted when they express values acceptable to the white middle-class. This takes for granted the idea of assimilating to a western

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74 It is important to bear in mind that Joyce is reflecting here on what she was taught in the past. This is not her current position. In an excerpt cited before the one above she describes groups as being socialised differently.
middle-class lifestyle, dictating the terms of such an association. It is reflected in the debate on by-laws raised by Markus [31A]. In spite of an avowed greater tolerance, the interviewees specify the grounds on which they are happy to associate with black people. These grounds require demonstrating values acceptable to the white middle-class. Black people, then, should adapt to the way of life and practices white people are accustomed to. It is possible, like Schutte (1995) points out, that the assumption that blacks should adapt to a white South African lifestyle, demonstrates the exercise of whiteness.

6.3.2.3 The increasing visibility of informal settlements

A quarter of the interviewees in the metropolitan areas, commenting on the changes they observed in Johannesburg or Pretoria, referred to the increasing number and growth of informal settlements on the outskirts of the cities. Housing provision in black townships did not keep pace with the natural increase of the urban black population. A serious shortage of housing existed in black townships by the 1980s. The lifting of restrictions such as influx control led to an increase in migration to cities. These factors together contributed to the growth of informal settlements (Mashabela 1988; Parnell & Pirie 1991). Patsy comments on the consequences of the relaxing of controls on settlement and the inability of authorities to meet the demand for housing.

…before the, uh the, freedom, uh, they were very restricted into areas they went into, whereas they’re not now, they can now do what they want to. Do you know here in the [*]75 Road, living in the sewers, were hundreds of them, they got them out last year some time. In, uhm, behind [*] [the nursery] there was a village living in those reeds, they’ve got no homes …the government as fast as they build their houses they, they can’t cope. [19]

For Patsy, the lifting of restrictions has led to an ‘invasion’. Margaret [26] and Markus [31A] refers to the difficulty of evicting people once they have erected a shack as well as to threat of ‘shack farming’ in the periphery. Poverty becomes more visible as more informal settlements are established, and in some instances, like the

75 Where ‘[*]’ is used it refers to an omission of a name, potentially identifying or pinpointing an interviewee.
example cited above, on vacant land near a middle-class suburb. Such settlements are seen as a consequence of the inability of local government to prevent the poor from settling on vacant land and as a problem that has to be dealt with. It suggests disorder and a loss of control, matters which increase the sense of vulnerability and insecurity of residents in established suburbs. The juxtaposition of poverty and affluence is unsettling to the middle classes. They petition the authorities to resolve the problem resulting in efforts to move or clean-up such areas, as is described in the excerpt above. Kowa [P3] argues that facilities within these settlements need to be improved. Guy notes the increasing visibility of encroaching informal settlements.

I don’t recall seeing squatter camps and that as a kid, the squatter camps. Well, I don’t ever remember seeing. I don’t know if it was just that we were so isolated but now its in your face. You see poverty far more around you as well. You know so you, to me its almost, its becoming not a racial divide but becoming a financial divide in the country. [28A]

Patsy [19] also comments on the growing visibility of informal settlements. Social distance no longer necessarily equates to spatial distance. Whilst the white middle-class are accommodating towards an emerging black middle-class moving into their suburbs, they are less tolerant of black poor settling in their midst. The ‘financial divide’ disqualifies members of informal settlements. The burden of moving is placed on the poor. They are seen as undesirable neighbours bringing a number of social problems potentially spoiling the quality of life in established more affluent neighbourhoods. Informal settlement, then, should be managed. Preferably these settlements should be situated out of sight. In voicing her concerns, Sandy noted that besides crime, her primary concern, the establishment of an informal settlement in close proximity to her residence, theoretically would be concern.

I suppose what could be a concern today although it doesn’t affect us directly here, is when there’s empty land and you get squatters moving in, that sort of thing, it will be an issue but for me personally here its not. [52]

The conversation in this excerpt and the one below demonstrates that exposure to informal settlements vary. Whilst the close proximity of informal settlements is not a direct concern facing her currently Sandy is aware that the establishment of an informal settlement near established suburbs does have an impact. Vacant land, within
this context, always poses a risk. Informal settlements are seen as a threat because they imply poverty, and poverty is linked to crime. These two concerns are not unrelated. As I pointed out earlier, the establishment of informal settlements are associated with the failure of authorities to regulate settlements and provide services. Some of these concerns are raised by Peter, living in close proximity to such a settlement.

There’s been some dramatic changes, just recently, over the last, uh, eight or nine years, that are very alarming though, and I’m inclined to put my money where my mouth is and say that the government has zero, zero control over the development of large squatter camps within the area. [Charles: Near here?] Very close. Just up the road. You know and these squatter camps are totally and utterly illegal in terms of municipal laws. They’re an absolute health hazard to everybody including themselves and they are a very, very eyesore to, to, to the community ...If one had to go back 20 years ago, it would never have been dreamt to be allow., allowed and now it’s just getting bigger and bigger and bigger. It’s got to the stage where I believe in my own mind that they have no opportunity of ever changing it. And of course it’s full of, of, of, uh, undesirable people. …[Charles: Undesirable? Why? Why would you say they are undesirable?] They’ve got no work, they’ve got no homes and they’ve got nothing and therefore they’ve got nothing to lose. You know when somebody has got nothing, they’ve got nothing to lose, then they will come and they will break in and rob and steal and do whatever they want. It’s been like that for hundreds of years, and now it’s just right on our doorsteps. [46]

The notion that authorities have ‘zero’ control, that the settlement is full of ‘undesirable people’ and that it is ‘on our doorstep’, underlines the sense of vulnerability. The conversation suggests that informal settlements are undesirable and the problem, rather than the inequality. Undesirability is linked to poverty and poverty to crime. Affluence, in contrast, is not considered problematic. The failure of authorities to exert control over informal settlements implies disorder, threatening the adjacent suburb in both a material and normative sense. The squalor, disease and crime associated with informal settlements are perceived as threats to health and safety. It raises concerns of decay. Informal settlements and vagrants are portrayed as a threat to these suburbs, raising the concern that existing education, transport and health facilities will be overburdened, affecting their quality of life.

The middle-class is less enthusiastic about low-income neighbours and uses its organisational capacity and political influence to oppose such housing developments
in close proximity to their residential areas. Parnell and Pirie (1991:144) refer to the strong opposition voiced to a proposed Norweto, in this instance a township closer to the northern suburbs. Considerably fewer objections are raised against “a ‘second Soweto’ 50 kilometres south of Johannesburg” in spite of dolomite at that site. Bremner (2000) and Seekings (2003) suggest that upwardly mobile blacks, having obtained a foothold in the property market, may side with their white middle-class neighbours in opposing settlements that may affect their property values. In his classic study of suburbia Gans (1996) indicate that first-time homeowners vigorously protect their property investment against loss of value. There are consequently strong pressures to preserve the class-base of residential areas.

Class position, to some extent then, provides a source of security and a base for their identity, defining where they belong in society. Associated with class position comes a set of entitlements and expectations which reinforces the apartheid geography of the city, pushing housing developments for the poor to the periphery in areas where they are currently located. The locational disadvantage imposed by apartheid persists, with housing for the urban poor provided in the periphery, as a consequence. This social exclusion and consequent segregation maintains the chasm between the poor and affluent, marginalising the urban poor and reducing the possibility of broad-scale integration (Bremner 2000; Seekings 2003).

Markus [31A] explores some concerns about the undesirability of informal settlements, referred to by Peter above, in a normative sense, relaying the matter back to cultural difference. He relates an anecdote a nurse told them about a grandfather in an informal settlement who contacted the clinic about birth control for his granddaughter

…it came out that the grandfather and the father rape, the, the daughter. Now I do not need to expand on that. If. You need only to read in the newspapers, and to look at how the people now, okay. It sounds again if a guy is picking the whole time on the other-colours. I know there’s of the white people also, that are paedophiles and all those type of things, but, dear god, it was never at such shocking levels as it is now, and then you don’t even need to talk about the Cape Flats, of all those numbers of children which are each time shot dead, innocently, and I mean that is coloureds, its not whites where it is about a
white issue for me at all. It is only for me about, about the broader society. Uhmm, Jeez, you know, if you, just these things, where are we going? ...Now how, how, you know, I do not know what you, but it, I only say how do you reconcile these societies... How do you reconcile our culture which has a strong European influence with a culture which has a strong African influence? Which dif., differs radically of each other. You know I did Anthropology I at Unisa. What I said earlier of these children that are raped, it is so. It is shocking, and ten to one, what [“]my wife[“] also said, it already occurred for too long. It is so. In the old days, in the Zulu’s days, the, of, of the captains, or whatever, give the king young girls to maintain the peace… So maybe it is not, maybe this now is only now in the public domain. It is actually an old tra., it is, contrarily it is their culture, but in our culture we cannot reconcile ourselves to say we may have sexual intercourse with a girl of 14, 15 years. Good that is now, that is now, but one extreme. [translated – see endnote84] [31A]

Markus’s conversation deals with moral deficiencies within informal settlements rather than with the material deficiencies of informal settlements76. Instead of emphasising genetic difference, cultural difference reflecting particular practices and values are emphasised. Uncivilised practices are contrasted with civilised practices. The depravity of practices described in the informal settlement erodes the worthiness of its residents (as neighbours).

However, a number of discursive moves underpin what can be regarded a highly contentious and stereotypical account, guarding against the charge of prejudice being levelled. Markus concedes there are some deviant white people. However, he does not suggest that their deviant behaviour is culturally sanctioned. With regard to other racial groups, the deviance is attributed to traditional or cultural practices. Ironically, there is evidence that significant numbers of women within white communities married at a young age, at the turn of the century. Russell (1997) suggests a high incidence of incest within white South African families77, a claim which is also contested.

76 As far as this study is concerned, the veracity of the incident described is not the key issue here. What is under consideration is what is achieved discursively by relating the anecdote. It should be noted that Markus emphasised cultural difference as potentially being an obstacle in integrated suburbs. In my discussion I indicated such a discourse on cultural difference takes over the task a notion of race, biologically rooted, fulfilled in the past. In this process culture is reified, providing an acceptable explanation for fixed differences, construed in some respects as being irreconcilable.

77 One of my interviewees in Edensvlakte, unsolicited, told me when she shared her background with me, she had been a victim of sexual abuse. She claimed that she often sensed it in other women, whom she then counselled.

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In providing an account of highly blameworthy behaviour Markus denies having an interest or agenda, indicating that this is not about a “white issue”. He finally calls on the persuasive power of academe to corroborate the claims made (his study of first year Anthropology) and provide reasons why such behaviour occurs. This serves a dual purpose simultaneously establishing the factualness of cultural difference whilst denying prejudice.

The discourse in the excerpt reflects rhetoric available in the public domain. It is permissible to refer to culture but not to race when describing differences. The discourse establishes incommensurate moral standards. It suggests that the ‘racial other’ have an unacceptable lifestyle when measured against white norms and practices. This lifestyle is constructed from anecdote rather than direct experience, or based on exceptional and sensational cases that are reported in the media. In this regard Markus’s anecdote reflects whiteness.

To conclude, the establishment of informal settlements in the vicinity of middle-class suburbs raises a number of concerns related to – a potential deterioration in health and sanitary conditions as a result of inadequate infrastructure, the stain on service delivery, increasing crime and the impact on property values. None of these concerns raised can be denied. In some instances besides references to the physical deterioration and decay such settlements bring about, the threat of moral decay is also implied.

6.3.2.4 Central Business District regeneration and development

One quarter of the interviewees commented on how they used to go to the central business district of Johannesburg which was the focal point of social, cultural and commercial activity. The efficient cleaning of the CBD, Emma [27] refers to, is a result of attempts to foster regeneration with the establishment of city improvement district initiatives. This partnership between local government and business has strengthened services in some areas, by installing extra measures such as surveillance
camera’s and providing additional resources to deal with incivility. It has led to a reduction in crime and made areas more attractive again as an Emma notes

But town was a huge mugging area, so there was a change from the safety of walking in the streets of town to becoming major mugging area to becoming again safe now, or relatively. [27]

As Jacobs (1996) points out people need to feel safe and secure on streets for a district to be successful. She argues that only a few incidents can undermine this sense of security in public places. In Johannesburg, Braamfontein has recently benefited from being designated a city improvement district. With large sums invested by multinationals such as Liberty and Sappi there has been a concerted effort to revitalise the area. The pattern of development and decline is complex as Mabin (2001:183) suggests.

Johannesburg is really a remarkable place from which to view the urban world. It is a ‘suburbanizing world city in an urbanizing poor country’. ...From its very high density but troubled inner city, through bourgeois suburbs of last century to symbols of extraordinary suburban (‘edge city’) investment.

The processes of decentralisation and urban sprawl have affected residential suburbs. Residential densification has affected more established suburbs in the north as developers cashed in on the GASH (‘good address, small home’) principle. Commenting on urban development Tomlinson (1990:101) refers to intensification pressures in established suburbia, and

…the ‘schizoid’ outlying suburbs that display a mixture of medium-density cluster or group housing and spacious neighbourhoods with managerial villas.

These areas have also been affected by the encroachment of office space and commercial activity along main routes as Danny [20] observes and strained service delivery as both Nathan [44] and Mary [50] note. In Pretoria Dirk [22], Robert [53] and Charl [54] all comment on the development of the south-eastern sector. Whilst William welcomes development as increasing property value, Markus regrets the urban sprawl as a result of uncontrolled development.

I think, uh, this specific spot where we are this, uhm, [*][suburb] there’s, there’s a tremendous amount of increased business activity going on here.
…so I, I’m very happy with that I think that is actually, uh, good news for the, for the community here. That will bring a lot of, uhm, it will obviously increase the value of property and things like that. So, uh, that’s the, the main changes I can see happening around us. [William, 51]

We are basically on the building-boundary, this ridge is the building-boundary of Johannesburg. It is tragic that a guy sees that, let us say our green heritage, which, which, which, the past aldermen, correctly or not, you know, left for the, for our descendants, there is, there’s just not a priority anymore. It is all about making money. [translated – see endnote85] [Markus, 31A]

He continues pointing out how small holdings become high density complexes of townhouses or clusters crowding out the green spaces in profit driven, unwelcome, developments. Several interviewees also commented on rapid growth of suburbia, as well as laissez-faire development fuelled by developer greed erecting secure complexes, for which there is an escalating middle-class demand.

Unifying fragmented local government structures increased the population, boundary and need for infrastructure in both cities considerably, without a corresponding increase in resources. It also required integration of administrative systems. Several interviewees contend that the newly appointed employees in the council lack the necessary knowledge and that this has affected service delivery.

In a context of political transition in which social inequality increased as a consequence of economic liberalisation, post-apartheid cities face increasing pressure to provide services to and house a growing impoverished population. Responding to this Gloria contends

…with such bad infrastructure and bad service provision in, in what we call ‘formerly disadvantaged places’ and you know and that I do understand that the rich or more affluent people have to, uh, what’s the word, kind of pay for services which other people are not paying for. There’s obviously a discrepancy, there are people and they simply cannot afford to pay for those things. Uhm. It’s a problem because I think the State has to recoup from, the people do have to learn that they have to pay for some things. This is not a socialist State. [23]

Dirk [22], Margaret [26] and Robert [53] all comment on the culture of non-payment and their cross-subsidisation of services provided to others, which they feel encourages entitlement without corresponding responsibility. Some feel more money
should be spent where it is generated. Others often criticise the government for wasting resources unnecessarily. Susanna [45], for instance, after praising Mandela for his accomplishments criticises the lavish amounts spend to celebrate his birthday. She asks how many houses could have been built instead. Similar criticisms are raised around expenditure on peace initiatives elsewhere in Africa or name changes, for instance.

By implementing policies geared towards equity and inclusion, economically and politically, local government shifted attention from servicing previously privileged white group areas to addressing needs of the urban poor, albeit within the constraints of powerful vested interests (Bekker & Leildé 2003; Seekings 2003).

6.3.2.5 Privatisation of service delivery and change in social institutions locally

Does interviewees’ emphasis on class instead of race imply a shift as Seekings (2003) suggests? Gloria [23]78, for instance, expressed little sympathy with ‘poor whites’, who ‘blew’ the ‘opportunities’ they had. She suggests ‘low-class’ blacks may improve their position as their opportunities increase, whilst a white and black middle-class would share interests and do things together. According to Hyslop (2000), whites were less prepared to defend apartheid from the 1990s. Hyslop (2000) and Seekings (2003) argue the urban white middle-class is prepared to share its residential areas and institutions with the black middle-class.

Maintaining their middle-class lifestyle was a key concern for most interviewees. All commented on the trend amongst middle-class people to consume privatised services, not always affordable to them, but generally regarded superior, albeit not exclusively so79. Areas mentioned were security, health care and education. According to Gans

78 Please refer back to the end of the lengthy excerpt citing Gloria’s views on how suburbs are changing in section 6.3.2.2 of this chapter.
79 Most interviewees had medical aid and expressed relief that they as private patients did not have to rely on state services. Some entrepreneurial individuals, having left formal employment with benefits like medical aid had cut back their healthcare provision to a hospital plan, for instance. Whereas some had children in private schools others felt that although this would be nice, it was too costly for them at
(1996), groups endeavour to ensure institutions that serve the community reflects their culture and maintains its status. Privatised services play a role in ensuring exclusivity and maintaining privileged access in a context of change. It also ensures a degree of autonomy and homogeneity. Sandy admits that white people had been privileged. She adds

Up to '94 I mean the white man actually had it all his way and we’ve actually, a lot of the problems perceived now is, I just want to say, we’ve been greedy, we don’t want to share what’s been available which is also maybe why we see health care and education and so on as not being what it used to be, but maybe that’s because it has to cover a much broader base now, and if we want it, we’re going to have to pay for it, if we want it like it used to be. ... I would say in many ways it’s our choice, that we want it a particular way, if that’s what you want, well, pay for it [52]

Access to financial means, then, are seen as securing quality of life in the context of consumerism. Class determines access to privatised services and institutions. Nathan contends

Being, yah, yah, being a middle-class, uhm, it, you know, own company person, I think that the health services and the, uh, education services in this country and the area don’t really affect me negatively because I, I, I have a, I have a privilege to use private organisations so I have a medical aid and I can use, uhm, you know private clinic and I can afford the private school, so I’m not really affected by and I don’t really have a first-hand experience of the education and the health provided by the, the government in the area. Uhm. Certainly there’s negative perceptions in terms of what’s in the media… [Nathan, 44]

Nathan confirms a recurring theme. If you have money you can buy better services and secure your privilege. Having the financial means, then, from the perspective of many interviewees enables them to exercise choice and to opt out of the public sphere to the private sphere. Associated with this are perceptions that the private sector provides a better service than the public sector, as well as a sense of control and privileging, evident in Nathan’s response. Michelle relates the following anecdote of her own experience

…our school we used to have, and then there was a government school, and it was a very, very black government school, all girls school as well, and two
black girls in our school were in the car with us the one day, and we just asked
them, you know, just out of choice, how come they didn’t go there, instead of,
and they went to [*], and they said no, its because their mom and dad wouldn’t
send them to an all black school. …but they wouldn’t send them there because
they say it’s corrupt and it’s an all black school and it’s just not right. [58D]

Michelle’s anecdote confirms the superiority of private education, which whilst open,
has less black pupils. Reporting on how fellow black scholars speak about their choice
of a school, the predominantly black public school can be criticised without her
seeming prejudicial. She does not elaborate on what is meant by it being corrupt.

With regard to a single education system, according to Ian, privatisation provides an
escape hatch for the middle-classes and the more affluent, who as Ian suggests, can
move on elsewhere if, and when, they find conditions too constraining for their own
lifestyles. Ian argues

…the escape route has been that whites can escape into private education and,
uh, private advantage and private values and so it becomes [inaudible] …if
that group of people take over the positions in the economy, they will, uh,
create the global escape that is available to them in the globalised economy
[Ian, 30A]

Emma confirms this observation of being able to escape arguing, given her privileged
education she is able to emigrate.

…if I don’t like what’s going on, I can leave. I have an option to leave, but
there’s, many more people who have no option to leave, and so those with the
option to leave, a lot of people are exercising it. [27]

She did not intend to emigrate but made the point that she could, and would, if
circumstances became unfavourable.

Ian [30A] believes integration is positive as it holds the possibility of friendships
being established across the racial divide. This is also a point Emma makes. However,
several interviewees point out that the integration has not been entirely unproblematic.
Mary refers to the difficulty in discipline English-medium state schools are
experiencing as a result of the change. This overlaps with the notion that they, the
blacks, are more ‘unruly’.
I think there’s, unfortunately since they, they seem to be bussing in a lot of black kids from all over and I think since that has happened it has led to a problem in the school, in that there’s a bit of, uh, trouble with gangs and, and I think that possibly the discipline has, uh, dropped. [50]

The ‘bussing in’ suggests that many outsiders of a lower socio-economic status attend school, which diminishes the community’s control over the institution. Peter [46] contends that the basis of successful education is discipline, which he believes is lacking. Social problems at school then are attributed to the newcomers.

Ian [30A] also refers to the increasing racial integration of the English medium schools, whilst the Afrikaans medium schools retain ‘their lilywhite complexion’, with a few additions. Adriaan registers his objection to the notion of an integrated school and also to how schools themselves have watered down their principles, betraying their undertaking in the past.

The schools were reasonably oriented to a ‘volk’ in the old dispensation, if I just think about the school anthem, you know that the children sang often had a very specific ‘volk’ and spiritual flavour. Must other nationalities sing that same school anthem? You know it galls me. [translated – see endnote86] [33A]

To demonstrate how patriotic beliefs no longer are maintained one of the examples Adriaan refers to is an amendment by the Voortrekker youth movement of its constitution81.

According to Dirk [22], initially people were vehemently against opening schools, but they have adapted since. With reference to her child’s own schooling, Susanna [45]

80 For Adriaan [33A] the betrayal of these schools and other Afrikaner cultural organisations, contrary to their pledge historically to defend the country, is captured in the lack of resistance to the changing system. Whilst not in agreement with the politics of Adrian, Danny [20] expresses surprise at the lack of resistance to change, adding that it is limited to the fringe ultra-right like the Boer Force.

81 Adriaan refers to Verwoerd’s three options. The first is, accepting liberalism and its implied assimilation, majority domination and disappearance. The second is, continually making concessions which leads down the same path as accepting liberalism, merely delaying the inevitable outcome. The third is, rejecting the advances of liberalism, recognising that people should first and foremost be allowed to express themselves in their ‘volk’. He contends that it is precisely this threat to the continued existence of the ‘volk’, posed by the ascendancy of these first two options, Verwoerd rejected. It is also these changes that fan people to respond like the ‘Boeremag’ (Boer Force).
points out that fortunately blacks prefer tuition in English and therefore are in a separate class\textsuperscript{82}.

For Lena [42B] one of the positives of living in an urban area, compared to a rural community, is the choice available on matters such as schooling. Guy and Joyce reflect on changes within education and how this affected their own choices with regard to the education of their children.

Look the big one [change] for me is the demographic change where I’ve picked up with our kids at school, with the Africans and the Indian kids integrating into the schools. I mean our kids go to a private school and even there, there’s already far more, you know, yah, seeing this, this sort of I would say almost the middle-class integration where the racial lines are starting to disappear. ...I think more money counts, you know, it doesn’t matter what your skin colour is, as long as you’ve got the bucks to pay for everything you’re okay. [Charles: Was, was there a reason why you put your children in a private school, uh, were you unhappy with the State schools, or was it?] , We, the, the main reason is, we, we when the kids were, that was just when this whole government you know started changing the school models as model C\textsuperscript{83} schools and all that type of thing and they were talking about 40, 50 kids in the class. [Guy, 28A]

Small class was a big issue as a choice and to be blunt, we could afford it. Why go for something cheaper if we could actually afford a private education? ... We changed our minds sort of half-way through to an extent because they started at [*] and then we got very involved with the church and that’s when we decided to go for a Christian education rather than just a private education, so we changed… But I wanted the, the value systems to be similar, you know. At [*][the first private school] [*][her daughter] was friends with the Moslems and I thought, you know, especially young, I’d like them to go walk the straight and narrow so that that was my opinion and he just went along with what I said. [Joyce, 28B]

\textsuperscript{82} She however also emphasises that she has no objection at their presence in the school and believes that this exposes her child to other cultures thereby deflecting criticism that she may be prejudicial. She adds that the impact has not been substantial in the sense that a black teacher or head has been appointed. In such instances, she contends one might begin to wonder what they are taught. She does express a desire that they are taught their history in a respectful way. Susanna argues that some documentaries on television cast the older Afrikaner generation in an unfair light, arguing that events need to be contextualised as they were reason for their actions. In contrast Sandy [52] sees changes to the curriculum in a positive light. She acknowledges that when she was at school they were not taught anything remotely African at all. Francis [P3] also recalls attending workshops arranged by SABRA to indoctrinate them with regard to policy, whilst still at school.

\textsuperscript{83} Model C schools are ‘state-aided’ schools that generate part of their income through school fees. Most previously white schools opted for this model which shifted control to the community and further through levying fees limited the number of black children in instances where these fees were high.
In Guy and Joyce’s discussion on the schooling of their children a number of points interviewees made in other contexts are reiterated. In general they see state education as deteriorating for white people whilst it improves for others. They do not overtly object to racial integration, as long as it occurs along class lines, and the particular values are those ‘WASP’ ones they are accustomed to. Integration therefore should occur on their terms, with newcomers adapting to what they regard as being appropriate. These requirements suggest whiteness. It is the other that must adapt, and where this does not occur their means allows them to escape elsewhere  as Ian observes happens. In the final instance, they feel vindicated by their choice in the light of the government’s policy on religious instruction in schools (see the discussion in section 6.3.1.6). Yet they are concerned that their school eventually may lose its right to decide on this matter. For Drien the matter of religious instruction raises a concern about the extent of Muslim influence on the government. She is concerned that Islam is extending its influence throughout Africa. With regard to intervention by the government, Robert raises the concern that the school governing body no longer can choose the teacher. He regards this as undermining the community.

Danny argues that if one realistically considers how education was in the past, drawing on his own experience, then the current situation is not bad at all. Emma agrees, commenting

The education system I think, conceptually, is a wonderful thing. I think the education system historically has been one of the worst. Uhm. Content-based

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84 Whereas Joyce expresses prejudice against a religious other, Guy contends it is less of an issue for him. They express concern in the interview at the ongoing encroachment of government control and regulation in different spheres. This concern is only raised in instances where the state’s position differs from theirs. Robert raises similar concerns at the centralisation of control nationally. However, such tendencies characterised Afrikaner Nationalist rule also.

85 Markus fails to see why Christians should make concessions to a Muslim minority. Nathan also criticises government policy on religious instruction, but adds that he cannot force his viewpoint on others. Whilst these interviewees, like those in Edensvlakte, are concerned about changes in religious instruction they generally do not all have the same stance on the purpose of religious instruction.

86 She is positive about the integration of education, regarding it more valuable than the formal content of the curriculum. Gloria, Heleen, Mary and Francis respectively agree pointing out that children are more at ease with each other than adults as a result of their exposure, making integration easier. Douglas, Mark and Michelle agree that the older generation find adapting to change more challenging and that race relations have improved between the younger generations.
teaching, rote learning, irrelevant material, uhm, illegitimate government promoting, uhm, propaganda, Christian National Education, there was very little Christian about it, and it was hardly national, because most of the nationals were excluded from it. So, I don’t think you can do much to make the education system worse than it was, uhm, I think outcomes based education is a very, very sound concept. There again the government departments and the service delivery is what screws it up. [27]

Gloria [23] and Quinton [42A] agree with Emma that the Gauteng Department of Education is poorly run 87.

Danny, Gloria and Emma argue the changing racial composition of the student corps at tertiary institutions 88 is the result of exponential growth. In the context of these changes Robert refers to how anglicisation of Afrikaans universities has changed their culture and traditions.

Although Danny acknowledges that they adapted their teaching, he disputes the general perception that standards have dropped 89. For some, the consequences are grave. Craig claims

I’m concerned that every thing is going backwards instead of forward. …The regressing, uh, downgrading basically because of the capabilities of the current people that are in charge and running the system because they’re not able to handle it properly. And why are, can’t they handle it properly? A matter of education again. So yes. It also points to our standards of education that are going down. …You find a lot of these guys don’t actually know what they are doing but they walk into a job and they got a B., BCom degree but the way they handle a situation or, or do the job one would swear that they bought the degree. Because the people that have been doing the job for years, they don’t

87 Francis [P3] like Gloria [23], Catherine [25], Emma [27] and Lara [29] are positive about policy innovation in the field of education and training. Francis refers to the difficulties caused by the fragmentation of responsibility across departments.

88 Gloria [23] and Lena [42B] describe a situation of ‘tipping’ at the institutions they teach at. According to Gloria, relating her experience, as the balance shifted to a black majority, they drew fewer and fewer white students. This occurred at a time when various privatised postgraduate institutions were being established in the Johannesburg region, which she contends drew a number of potential students away from them. Joyce, who was completing a course at the institution, confirmed Gloria’s observations. She said that she did not attend classes that were predominantly black.

89 Gloria [23] feels they currently have ill equipped students, many of whom are diligent. Dirk [22], Margaret [26], Drien [34B] and Peter [46] all tell anecdotes to suggest a dropping of standards to ease access. The consequence is that standards in formerly white education have been lowered. Robert [53] describes a bridging programme and traineeships they instituted at work because graduates from certain institutions lacked the necessary skills.
necessarily have the degree, and know what is going on have to now tell this person how to do the job [49]

Craig’s claim that certain categories of people are less well trained for their positions and that it affects service delivery is a recurring theme across most interviews. What he like others do when discussing this matter is to generally avoid reference directly to race. In contrast, Sandy [52] is more positive about progress made with education and the long term consequences.

With regard to education the general orientation in the metropolitan areas is one of accommodation towards integration, as long as community norms are maintained. There is some concern that the state may dictate and control the processes as well as evidence that private education is a resort, for those with means at their disposal, to ensure that control is maintained. With regard to the racial composition of institutions, tipping is apparent beyond a certain threshold.

In general interviewees discussed religious matters where they arose less in terms of community and more in terms of personal beliefs in the Johannesburg sub-sample. Both, Guy [28A] and Nathan [44], acknowledge that integration in their respective churches is limited. Patsy [19], Joyce [28B], Drien [34B], Mary [50] and William [51] all acknowledge the churches they attend, although open, are predominantly white. All these interviewees voiced no objection to racial integration of their respective churches. They see the current membership reflecting people living in the community.

In the Pretoria sub-sample Dirk [22], Susanna [45], Robert [53] and Charl [54] describe the church connected to the community. However, they do not report the active involvement sought in Edensvlakte. In these instances no reference is made about integration. Adriaan, unprompted, objects to the politicising of the church and other institutions within the community which have changed their teachings (principles).

90 The views of accommodation expressed may be the consequence of the limited pressure being felt within the institution at the current moment and the ideal of displaying tolerance.
I think of institutions like Churches that proclaimed certain paved ways and suddenly changed from those paved ways. That’s something that galls me most ...I think, I, I personally have a type of a “Boetman” feeling. Uh. That there has been fraud. ...It lets a person not only doubt the Church, but I think maybe even more so the Lord. ...but if a church institution begins to change together with a political institution, uh, principles, you know then it lets me raise my eyebrows. [translated – see endnote87] [33A]

Adriaan’s stance is more in line with ultra-conservatives91. In chapter four, I discussed the disillusionment with the Afrikaner leadership92, who in the post-apartheid context changed their tune to change too, raised by the journalist Chris Louw93. He wrote a book detailing his objection to their counsel, with the title “Boetman”.

Most interviewees commented that service delivery of the local government had declined, albeit not dramatically. The main complaint related to issues of billing. Heleen [24], Olga [31B], Quinton [42A], Peter [46] and Craig [49] attribute these difficulties to newly appointed inexperienced (black) staff.

With regard to healthcare interviewees in Johannesburg and Pretoria generally draw a distinction between private and public facilities. Most have access to private health care and are grateful for that, with income determining the type of access. Several anecdotes of how services have deteriorated are shared. In general interviewees acknowledge that whilst whites must become accustomed to less, others receive better service than previously. According to Margaret and Emma

I mean the hospitals are, were overall, I would say first class, they’re not first class any more, that’s very sad. … I know in the hospitals I mean nothing is sacred there. There’s theft at all levels… [Margaret, 26]

91 Both Adriaan and Karen [33B] express understanding for the position of the ‘Boeremag’ (Boer Force) in taking up arms because they believe interests of individuals are protected within a ‘volk’. He argues that the mistake made in the past was to force a liberal into a conservative lifestyle. The pendulum has now swung the opposite way. This leads to a feeling of oppression evident in land expropriation, farm murder, anglicisation of education and their church changing its course declaring patriotism of a ‘volk’ evil, and no longer biblically justifiable.

92 Some interviewees in Edensvlakte, Wesveld and the metropolitan areas expressed their disappointment in leaders. This was referred to in sections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.2 and 6.3.2.

93 Louw’s main contention is against the sanctimonious council of self-appointed leaders, who do not fully acknowledge their stake in the past and now take it on themselves to prescribe to the general Afrikaner public how they should act.
The shift from publicly provided to privatised consumer-orientated health-care and education is particularly reflected in the security domain. Several interviewees feel that the state is failing to meet its obligations to citizens. Privileged access is maintained by purchasing privately managed services rather than using public services. Although a process of privatisation of security is not uniquely South African, the deployment of police in townships in the 1980s to deal with the volatile political climate as well as the more equitable redeployment of public resources after the political transition served as a catalyst for unprecedented growth in privatised security services. Interviewees in metropolitan areas, like those in the countryside, felt the police were inefficient, under-equipped or overwhelmed. They further argue that police officers were further poorly remunerated and hamstrung by liberal regulations that allow perpetrators too many freedoms. There was a sense that the criminal justice system had failed, partly due to a lack of co-ordination and as a result of lenient sentences that offered no deterrent. A general complaint is that minor infringements are pursued whilst more serious ones are ignored. Several share anecdotes of disorganisation at either police stations or magistrate courts. Jasper [34A] is of the opinion that the current liberal sentencing regime is inappropriate to people who live a ‘basic cultural lifestyle’. Catherine makes a similar point when she argues that the State has failed providing protection.

...they just get away with it, that’s the end, they’re gone. Uhm. In terms of kangaroo courts, I think they work and I think that, uhm, that, that we should have them but ...whites don’t know how to do it so I mean we don’t know how to organise ...You know they can do it to their own people in their own community because the whole community is watching, whereas with us we, we’re just, just disjointed, and its not one of ours that’s doing it usually. I’m

94 Several acknowledge that the police were in the past deployed under apartheid to enforce laws which undermined their legitimacy in the black community and deflected attention from crime. Others feel inept people are appointed.

95 Unprompted, nine interviewees in the metropolitan area called for the reinstatement of the death penalty. Jasper [34A], Quinton [42A] and Craig [49] all attribute the rise in crime to the abolition of capital punishment. They believe, like others, reactivating it will reduce violent crime significantly. Susanna [45] argues that incidents of violent crime contribute to a feeling of rebelliousness.
not saying whites don’t do crime, but blacks do crime …and we don’t have that cultural, uh, approach. Like its home-grown in the township to be able to stuff someone up on the corner by a group of people if they do wrong, but we’re not that way in., inclined so, we can’t have kangaroo courts. But they work, that’s the only way. So now all the crime comes here. [25]

The arguments offered by Catherine above are not unrelated to Gwen’s [37] position on tribal justice, discussed earlier in this chapter. Patsy [19] and Dirk [22] also refer to ‘peoples courts’ and instances of ‘necklacing’ of perpetrators of serious crime as ways in which black Africans sort things out. In the absence of vigilantism some think may be a solution, security is generally privatised. According to Berg (2004) service in a private security industry run by competitive for-profit companies is consumer-orientated rather than community orientated. This trend is driven by a perception of high risk resulting in a significant commitment of resources to safeguard and protect property. The rapid change heightened the sense of vulnerability and uncertainty middle-class white people felt. I have already pointed out that there was an increase in the incidence of crime in Gauteng in this period and will revisit this in the next section of the chapter (Davis 1996; Isserow 2001; Parnell & Pirie 1991).

Several interviewees referred to the general decline in morals and accompanying fraud and corruption reported in the media to which blacks were seen more prone. There are notions of the gravy train and nepotism. Some believed that better education will contribute towards eradicating the problem. This stance can be seen as reflecting ethnocentrism and an assumed superiority. Mary and Douglas respectively contend

I think obviously the white person has, his culture has taught him different values and long-term planning, whereas I think black people are still learning that. I think their, their culture has taught them to look after today and their long-term planning is maybe not so not so good. And they tend to look after themselves. Uhm. But that’s, uh, I see that as the biggest problem amongst probably the government officials, and all the rest of it, with all the corruption, I think that comes from their, their culture what they have been learnt you know grab what they can. Uh. I can only hope that with education and with, uh, the, the authorities trying to root out anything like that we can overcome it. [Mary, 50]

96 ‘Necklacing’ is a form of punishment which arose during the internal resistance to apartheid where informers (or those siding with the system) were killed by placing a tyre around their necks and setting it alight.
They think it is a Kingdom that is the problem, eh, eh. The govern., the president doesn’t know that he’s serving the people, he thinks now he’s king of the people, the people are working for him, that’s, that’s how I see it, that is why such nepotism is nepotism, and corruption and, because they don’t[ interruption] …like a kingdom basically, exactly and that’s like the mentality, that’s, we’re saying we’re more westernised like, they’ll, they’ll come up and I don’t know, they’ll, they’ll see corruption and all the rest and they’ll stand against it [Douglas, 58B]

These conversations display whiteness. Mary and Douglas suggests a cultural deficit that has to be overcome. It is white values and education that eventually would prevent the scourge of corruption. Dirk [22] attributes the rising corruption and lawlessness to declining ‘standards’, which for him is evident throughout Africa.

6.3.2.6 The threat and consequences of crime

All interviewees mentioned crime as a key concern and major factor influencing their lives. Most interviewees reported themselves falling victim to incidents of petty theft or burglary and usually expressed relief that they personally were not exposed to more serious incidents. Often interviewees knew about close relatives, family, friends, colleagues or neighbours who experienced more traumatic incidents of violent crime97. This contributed to their sense of living in a period of pervasive crime98.

Emma and Nathan respectively describe the situation

There are all the concerns about the crime, I mean every time I come home without anything happening to me or my car or my possessions, and, uh, I’m grateful because every day, today as well, we were sitting in an appointment and one of the people came into the appointment to say that one of their clients had just been hi-jacked … as that happened another woman came in to collect some stuff that she had ordered the week before and apologised for not having

97 In contrast to interviewees the Limpopo, those in Gauteng less frequently mentioned farm attacks, in spite of a higher incidence reported in the province (Lehohla 2004a). Generally Afrikaans-speakers brought it up and their assessment was similar to the majority view in the rural areas. Markus [31A] and Deon [58A] mention the high incidence of these attacks. Adriaan [33A] refers to the initiative by the Transvaal Agricultural Union with permission from the local government to plant 1 500 crosses next to an off ramp on the N1 highway in Centurion to commemorate farm attacks which were removed by a government contractor overnight. This he contends demonstrates that the issue is not a concern to the government, a matter Dirk [22] agrees with.

98 A key concern highlighted by Kowa [P3] and many others is the excessive and unnecessary violence accompanying some crime incidents, which she attributes to racial hatred. There is generally an agreement among interviewees on such an assessment. The withholding of crime statistics by the police is taken by many as confirmation that crime is out of control and that the government consequently suppresses reports on it to downplay its seriousness and defuse criticism of their handling of the crisis.
fetched it the week before, but that her car had been hi-jacked and so she couldn’t come … And I know that my sister emigrated because she was just too afraid to stay in the country with small kids. She lived behind a gate that was perpetually locked… I mean if, it’s a free for all, for the criminals it’s a free for all, for anybody. [Emma, 27]

I, I don’t feel, uhm. I don’t feel secure. Let’s, let’s put it this way, let me rephrase that. I, uh, I think, I think my family lives in a constant, uhm, state of apprehension, but its become a way of life so its not a negative apprehension. … If you speak to expats who leave your country and go elsewhere they claim to live in total security free areas. I dunno how true that, its, uhm, but I suppose then what we, what I live in is an, is an accepted apprehension, you know, I’m over cautious. [Nathan, 44]

Several interviewees raised similar concerns to those highlighted by Emma and Nathan. Interviewees relate anecdotes of how conversations at social events often turn to sharing stories about crime and how the media in their routine reporting of such events have become blunted, like most people. As a result of their own experiences or a growing awareness of increasing crime, interviewees describe how they have progressively upgraded security at their own properties over the course of years, contrasting the present situation to a carefree past. These conversations demonstrates ‘fear’ of crime and the increasingly sophisticated security measures to manage the perceived risk have become part of life. Several interviewees mention the closed gate syndrome Emma refers to, arguing that as the barricades went up neighbours became estranged. Like Emma’s sister, Nathan who lives in a gated security complex argues children no longer can go out into the streets on their own unsupervised, an observation shared by Quinton [42A] and Mary [50].

A fear of crime is not totally unfounded. My conversation with Catherine is dominated by the impact crime has had on her life course. In replying to my request to tell me about herself she describes how after being burgled several years ago she sold her property and then moved elsewhere. She describes the profound impact her subsequent hijacking, which occurred a year before our interview, had on her. It completely eroded her quality of life.

I’m totally shattered, I’m totally scared, continuously, uhm, I’m filled with hatred and anxiety and pain and I’m longing for my car back… I feel as if they’ve ripped my heart out and, uhm, I’m destroyed basically even though you might say to me “Yah, but someone else was attacked” I mean everyone
Craig [49] also describes his bitterness at being swindled selling his PC, saying that it broke his trust and filled him with hatred to them. He, like Catherine, venting his anger as a result of the negative experience, says he has become racist as a result.

In general, the perception of risk may be overstated, in a context of the commodification of security services. The sophistication of protective measures generally is linked to the level of affluence rather than the level of actual crime in the area (Davis 1996). Like elsewhere, efforts to address crime have taken a more formally organised, privatised and commercialised route in the metropolitan areas.

To secure their property in the context of their assessment of the risk and the means at their disposal, interviewees have fortified their homes, residential complexes or even parts of their neighbourhood by erecting high perimeter fencing, electrifying fences and gates, using razor wire, installing close-circuit cameras, alarms, boom gates and establishing residents’ associations to co-ordinate initiatives to create a protected private domain insulated from external dangers and threats. Patsy’s reference to the elaborate security measures of her black neighbours legitimises her own. Audrey, who describes the number of burglaries they have experienced in the complex, in spite of security measures, as well as Gloria, Mary and William, who refer to community initiatives in their respective neighbourhoods, comment on measures taken.
Charles ...you’re not safe anywhere, as far as I’m concerned. No. ...We’ve got a gate, we’ve got all this wire here, I call it Fort Knox. ...It doesn’t matter how, uh, many walls you build, how many wires you put round houses, it’s still not safe. [Audrey, 21]

Look I suppose changes have been things like a heightened awareness of crime, lots of, uh, there’s been talk, in, in this area, in fact there, there was a whole campaign to put up a boom, sets of booms, uh, they went around soliciting money from people, there’ve been, uh, the [*] Action Group. ... it, was blocked. And then the laws changed and as you know now you can’t, you have to reapply if you want road closures. ... There was one attempt, uh, the fences were taken down within 48 hours, uh, I think by, by the Council, yah. ...Some of it I think comes from fear ...being affluent I suppose and many have never been victims of crime and so they kind of jump to conclusions, they say ...like all black people are criminals, uh, and so. Yah there are those people who in Johannesburg hide behind these huge high walls and live in, in complexes, but I think that a lot of it has to do with security concerns rather than racism. [Gloria, 23]

I would say that I am rather satisfied, uh, we’ve got [*] Residents’ Association that’s recently been started and it seems to be fairly good participation. ...crime in this area increased dramatically because areas around us started Residents’ Associations and that led to a decrease in crime in their area and it all moved into our area. ... We have policing, people that, uh, patrol around the area and boards and that kind of thing up and that does seem to have helped. [Mary, 50]

When you hear about things, and I get the, the weekly or the daily e-mails from the, the Neighbourhood Watch that’s in contact with the police. [William, 51]

Gloria says that she was less in favour of closing the neighbourhood proposed by the Action Group because she felt it is was an ‘undemocratic’ and exclusionary step. Most interviewees, when discussing crime, generally avoid racialising perpetrators, although the ‘they’ used often suggests a reference to a racial other.

With regard to petty crime, several complain about a slackening of municipal byelaws which allows beggars and street-vendors at busy intersections (seem by some as a security risk). They also complain about the increase in loiterers or casual workers seeking piece-jobs and vagrants. An association between crime and poverty, and poverty and race, tends to racialise perpetrators as I have pointed out earlier. Several blame immigrants like Zimbabweans arguing they have nothing to lose. The weak
enforcement\textsuperscript{99} of bylaws regulating these matters is seen as increasing incivility in certain areas, heightening the risk of crime, especially petty theft.

There are moments in interviews where the race of perpetrators is admitted directly or indirectly. For instance Patsy [19]\textsuperscript{100}, refers to black neighbours having ‘the biggest locks’ because they ‘don’t trust their own’. Gloria [23] attributes hiding behind ‘huge high walls’, which by her own admission excludes blacks, to security concerns rather than racism. Catherine [25] argues for implementing ‘kangaroo courts’. In an excerpt of our conversation cited earlier in this chapter she contends ‘its not one of ours that’s doing it usually’. She backtracks slightly when she adds that she is not claiming whites do not commit crime, but the thrust of her argument is that they are the majority of the perpetrators and direct it specifically to whites. This racialisation of perpetrators of crime does raise the question of whether there are other reasons besides the often cited threat to their security for closing off areas. Guy, and Kowa respectively contend with regard to crime that

\begin{quote}
You know, okay, there’s still the crime and I can guarantee you even when they burgled you and that, you didn’t say ‘naughty white man’, you said ‘I’m going to get that, the, the black guy down there’… [Guy, 28A]
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Well it must be about how people hate others. You cannot just kill another person if you do not hate them and it may be how they were treated, but I never treated black people like that. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{88}] [Kowa, P3]
\end{quote}

The consequence of protective measures and constant surveillance regulating access is withdrawal to a privatised realm of a self-contained environment isolated from the wider society. Fortification provides a solution to the perceived threat creating areas where an affluent lifestyle can be lived in privacy without having to confront inequalities in society. Within gated communities, homogeneously stratified, children can roam around and ride their bicycles in streets. Within this context residents can organise their lives around their home and family. This voluntary self-exclusion

\textsuperscript{99} For many interviewees weak enforcement of bylaws implies a loss of control contributing to incivility and increasing their insecurity.

\textsuperscript{100} Please refer back to the end of the lengthy excerpt in which Patsy talks about changes to the neighbourhood cited in section 6.3.2.2.
reinforces a division between the public and private domains. Dirk in Pretoria contends in this regard

Ah, you know, actually a ‘peoples state’ is nothing other than, money is basicaly, that’s the discriminating factor. If you have enough money to...fence around you, around, around your neighbourhood, ‘security village’, it is a ‘peoples state’ on its own. [translated – see endnote89] [22]

Taken with his earlier comment that the east of Pretoria has limited integration, this suggests the possibility of maintaining a white enclave101. Spatial patterns of settlement are both the consequence of and a determinant of social relationships. Opportunities for communication across racial barriers remain limited as a result of continuing patterns of segregation. Ian [30A] criticises gated communities for withdrawing rather than engaging with their immediate environment. In answering a question on his concerns when he thinks about his community Robert comments

What is the community? …It is, there is not, there is no longer a community. …because a person does not feel part of a community. First as a result of. First safety, people have built walls around themselves. So you have now, you,where is your community? The complex you live in? Or is it the greater area? Or is it the ‘shopping centre’? [translated – see endnote90] [53]

Many interviewees reported spending more leisure time at home, going out in the evenings less frequently, in part, due to their fear of crime. When they went out for entertainment, generally, it was to a shopping mall or themed entertainment complex which had security measures in place. This confirms Tomlinson’s (1990:5) observation that “most whites live and work ‘inside the laager’ which means that they seldom feel endangered”.

In his classic study of suburbia, Gans (1996) notes that they provide what the residents seek. Current residential and commercial patterns perpetuate the insularity entrenched under apartheid, although as pointed out earlier, there is a willingness to share these amenities with others who may be upwardly mobile. In general, interviewees repeatedly professed no problem with a changing racial composition of

101 Dirk earlier declares himself not a supporter of the ‘Volkstaat’ (People’s State) idea, implying that he will remain living in the metropolitan area. However, he does not see why the government cannot accommodate this striving for expressing cultural diversity, like they do in Europe.
their suburb. Financial means ensure the right kind of people, who share their material interests, gain access. Prescriptions about who are permitted to live in these areas and who have to be kept out are clear.

Davis (1996) commenting on the ‘privatisation’ of public space in Los Angeles, through enclosure and fortification, argues that the new class divisions to some extent mirror old race divisions. In South Africa race and class also continue to overlap to a large extent, revealing the limits to processes of desegregation. In spite of this professed tolerance, and implied shared middle class status, Gloria [23] admits ‘they didn’t even really integrate’, suggesting that race still may play a key differentiating role. Several others acknowledge that they have limited contact with people from other racial groups.

6.3.2.7 Concluding remarks

The discourse of interviewees in the metropolitan municipalities suggested the transition has had a far greater impact in these areas than in the rural areas. In commenting on the changes these interviewees generally demonstrated a greater degree of awareness and sensitivity to racial matters than the rural interviewees did. Their heightened consciousness around referring to blacks in society and vigilance not to cause offence demonstrates a greater degree of sophistication when dealing with racial matters. These interviewees nevertheless revealed discomfort around no longer being able to dictate the terms of reference in their discussions with blacks. As with the more rural areas interviewees also suggested blacks differ from whites. When potentially offensive remarks were made these were often prefaced by comments to hedge against the potential charge of bias. In commenting on change emphasis shifts to talk about class and culture rather than race, compared to discourse evident in earlier periods (Boot-Siertsema & Boot 1982). I have argued that this enables them to evade speaking about race. The presence of middle-class blacks is tolerated as long as they adhere to white middle-class behavioural norms. Poorer blacks are seen as being more tribal and less westernised. As a result they engage in practices that differ from what whites regard as normal.
Some of the issues raised around the changing racial composition of formerly white areas pertain specifically to informal settlements, which were also addressed in the more rural areas. For some, the inhabitants of informal settlements are perceived to have moral deficiencies that are culturally sanctioned resulting in unacceptable practices. The living areas are also overcrowded. Interviewees believed informal settlements led to an increase in crime and devalued their properties. Another issue addressed was the impact of racial integration of suburbs. There was a belief that this potentially would devalue properties if its middle-class character was not carefully guarded.

Underlying the issues interviewees in Johannesburg and Pretoria raise on transformation with regard to governance and service delivery is a pervasive view of blacks unable to manage by themselves or maintain previous standards, albeit this being done in a more subtle way. This again is attributed to a lack of opportunity, training and in some instances a belief that they are less able. It is underscored by the notion of white experience and competence as opposed to black inexperience and incompetence. Such notions ultimately reflect whiteness (see chapter three).

There is a trend towards privatisation which is seen as providing the exclusivity that is desired. A perception exists that the state has failed to provide and that material affluence will provide security, health, education and the required amenities. There is amongst the interviewees a concern and vulnerability around maintaining their economic security. In this regard, commenting on government policy, they are generally less in favour of affirmative action and BEE. Most interviewees described affirmative action and BEE as ‘engaging with the politics of the past’ or as reflecting reverse discrimination, highlighting the vulnerability they felt as a result of these changes. Consequently, they tend to argue for colour blind policies and non-racial policies based on the notion of meritocracy.
Like in the rural areas there is a preference for socialising within their racial group. In general, most interviewees argue that relations between white and black have improved significantly and declare their tolerance in this regard.

6.4 Conclusion

In section 6.2.4 I provided some concluding remarks on how interviewees living in these different communities describe the community they reside in. In Section 6.3.1.9 concluding remarks are provided on the changes interviewees living in the Waterberg district identify. In section 6.3.1.7 concluding remarks are provided on the changes interviewees living in the metropolitan municipalities identify.

The settlement patterns in all these communities are changing and there is some indication of more racial diversity in schools, residential areas and malls, especially in the metropolitan areas. However, in spite of the growing mobility implying that race and class are no longer coterminous, and a professed tolerance for diversity, boundaries to a large extent prevail, since the rising middle-class blacks at this stage are still numerically constrained posing no threat to a fundamental change in the previously middle-class white group areas. This increasing diversity then thinly disguises continued racial exclusion of the majority.

Commenting on the transition interviewees generally refer to their minority status as the balance of power has shifted within society. They admit that this has required some adaptation in public life but indicate that it has not yet impacted significantly on their private lives. Some suggest whites have withdrawn from the public sphere.

This chapter considered the theme of how the changing environment is experienced. In the next chapter interviewees’ conception of South Africa and group affiliations will be considered.
Chapter 7: Interviewees’ discourse on the South African society – collective identities

7.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the collective identifications that emerged in the conversations with middle-class whites in both the urban and rural communities against the backdrop of the changing socio-political context in the country. Whereas the previous chapter considered the discourse on how change affected the communities this chapter considers the discourse on the society. Consequently, I organise this discourse thematically to prevent unnecessary repetition.

Although the post-apartheid state has re-inscribed race and ethnicity on the one hand by acknowledging diversity and on the other hand to address past inequality in society there has been an attempt to instil an inclusive national identity. This national identity is organised around constitutional values, new symbols and even the circulation of metaphors like the rainbow nation.

With collective identification in mind, interviewees were asked to describe the South African society. One prompt was to ask them how they would introduce themselves to foreigners (see appendix A). Elbie argues that a South African is someone who grew up in the country and who is attached to it, regardless, contending

I mean, it’s, it’s my country of birth and it’s …a beautiful country and it has a lot of potential. [translated – see endnote] [14]

Besides frequently referring to the natural beauty of the country or its abundant resources most interviewees noted the diversity of people, which many believed were

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1 I worked through all the interview transcripts to identify the themes discussed in this chapter. I have endeavoured to include the voices of interviewees from all communities researched. In deciding whom to select I followed a strategy of including the voices of as many interviewees possible. Where interviewees were not cited directly the gist of their arguments are paraphrased or summarised.

2 Two key questions with regard to collective identities that need to be considered are first, whether the measures designed to foster greater equity within society leads to a sense of being marginalised or excluded and second, to what extent interviewees buy into the new values, symbols and metaphors.
more extensive than that of other countries. The multiple collective self-identifications which emerged in their conversations were gender (often mentioned in the context of policies such as affirmative action), religious affiliation, class, race, ethnicity and language (linked to culture), geographical location (in the sense of belonging to a farming community or being urban) as well as the distinction of belonging to the first world (aligned to western influences) and the third world (aligned to African influences).

Many of these identifications often overlapped. In comparing the affluent Dairnfern to the adjacent Diepsloot, Markus [31A], like Dirk [22], Lara [29], Nathan [44] and Robert [53], for instance, drew a distinction between the wealthy first world with strong European (western) influences and the impoverished third world with strong African influences. Markus asks rhetorically how such opposites could be reconciled.

Dirk [22] sees the third world as a threat to first world standards. He is careful to emphasise that such a distinction is not purely a matter of colour but rather relates to lifestyle. In this regard he provides examples of ‘anderkleuriges’ (‘other coloured’ people) who are westernised and live in a first world milieu. His discussion clearly reflects a notion of whiteness by associating western and white values and practices with what is regarded as advanced and first world. It implies that the racial ‘other’ has to adapt and that whites dictate the standards and norms. In this respect Dirk who describes himself as a ‘nuwerwetse’ (new fashioned) Afrikaner who recognises cultural difference and is definitely not racist. He substantiates these claims, demonstrating his inclusiveness, by claiming that he knows and is friendly with

…coloured people [broadly defined] who are considerably first world orientated, you know. In other words they dissociate themselves to a large degree from their own ‘volk’ [peoplehood], which probably also suggests he’s a higher class than the others. [translated – see endnote’] [22]

Dirk in his conversation reconfirms that the racial ‘other’ has to adapt to white western standards, which is regarded superior. In doing this they improve their status but at the cost of disengaging them from their African roots. Margaret [26] observes that some blacks are culturally more comfortable with whites. Douglas [58B] provides
examples. He says black guys who have been brought up more westernised have a majority of white friends adding

Then they call, the other black okes [slang – guys], can call them a coconut, eh, eh, eh, black on the outside, white on the inside [58B].

Tina [6B] also relates an anecdote of a black man who attended a white school and eventually married a white girl. She contends that the cultural gap can be bridged, but that one should bear in mind that he was in a minority in the setup. The unsaid implication of her comment is that instances where blacks are the majority, the converse may happen, with whites being dragged down to a lower level rather than blacks being pulled up to a higher level. This becomes apparent in an extended discussion between Tina [6B] and Sakkie [6A]. Una [32] suggests that the different cultures (read races) are on different levels, saying that it will be extremely difficult for her to converse with her ‘maid’ (domestic worker) socially. For Una the difference is cultural and she expresses no desire to mix. She contends

 Uh, well I personally, I think its like I just said, it’s very difficult to try and be on the same level as, as a person from a different culture. I can’t accept that culture, I can’t relate to that culture. I find, uhm, with them as well that its difficult for them too. They are also very, very racialistic towards the white people and I just find it that, like for example, it will be very difficult for me to, to have, uh, uh, say my maid or something at the, uh, at, you know, the same table. I can’t relate to her. I do feel a lot of them are, are from a, uh, uh, yah, I don’t know, a slightly lower form of, of, uh, you know lower background unfortunately due to circumstances but it will get right. It will eventually get right. [32]

By suggesting that they also prefer to avoid mixing and that the levels will change in the course of time, Una, attempts to deflect possible criticism against her for being biased.

In spite of the diversity and different identifications an overwhelming majority described themselves South African and defended their rights in this regard. Robert suggests

…we are actually many South Africa’s in one, if you go overseas you’ll say you are from South Africa. [translated – see endnote3] [53]
Talking about the South African society most interviewees claim, and vigorously defend, their South Africanness (section 7.2). They also tend to identify themselves as white and discuss the implication of this for their opportunities as well as how it impacts on their relationship to others (section 7.3). In spite of drawbacks many interviewees valued their whiteness positively. They regarded whites as providing leadership, hence as the norm, studies on whiteness suggest is common (see chapter three). Most Afrikaans-speaking interviewees expressed an opinion about Afrikanership and their positioning within it (section 7.4). Both English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers discussed white English-speaking South Africans, and this reflected the changing relationship between these two groups (section 7.5). In describing the South African society references were made to the racial ‘other’ (section 7.6) as well as how society potentially is changing (section 7.7).

A key concern in the debate on the change in society was the respective weight western and African influences may hold in future. This debate raises a number of issues around how Africa is viewed, often highlighting notions of whiteness.

7.2 Claiming South Africanness

Like Sandy cited below most interviewees refer to their birthright, proudly claiming their South Africanness. Having grown up in the country not knowing any other country, they identify it as the country they will die in. They suggest being rooted in the country. Some acknowledge that they are not able to escape elsewhere. For both Hanneli [11] and Stephen [P1] South Africanness implies loyalty to the country, regardless of race. Many add that it is not necessary to refer to race when identifying their South Africanness, suggesting that they would not like to draw attention to their race. Fran, Gerrie, Emma, Peter, Sandy and Kowa respectively contend

I am a South African person, I belong as much as anybody else does. [Fran, 2]

3 In this regard Jannie [10A] takes issue with the ‘Minister of Sport’ calling a predominantly white team European. He argues you are South African in spite of your race. Recent events in Zimbabwe added to the insecurity several interviewees felt. This contributed to their defence of an equal right to citizenship.
I always say I am South African, myself. I did grow up Afrikaans, but also grew up in English. So, I cannot say, ‘okay’, but I am, I am Afrikaans, I am a Boertjie [diminutive form of Boer], I am not born like that. I will also not say that I am ‘solid[ly]’ English. [translated – see endnote4] [Gerrie, 7]

It’s the fact that I’m born here and second generation South African …I’m very, very definitely an African child. It’s the fact that, or not the fact, the opinion, my opinion that there’s far more going for this country in all of the chaos. At least thank God we’re, we’re in chaos, we’re not catatonic, I think that the West is moving towards catatonia and I think there’s an energy here, there’s a, yah, there’s something that’s going to work here, there’s definitely an energy of moving forward, where the West, I think, is in decline. [Emma, 27]

I very proudly introduce myself as South African. I’ve just recently spent six weeks in the USA and, uh, we, we, we’re very, uh, happy to say we’re from South Africa and we are South Africans and we’re right behind the South African flag. …I just call myself a South African. I don’t have to call myself a white South African. …“Because you’re white and because you were arrogant before, we’re in charge now, if you don’t like what we’re doing bugger off back to England. Go home.” And I say, “But this is where I was born. This is where I, I don’t know England. I was born in South Africa. This is where, my place of birth. I’m an African. I was born in Durban so I’m a Zulu African. I happen to be a white Zulu African, but I’m certainly not an Englishman, because I have no bloody clue about anything in London.” So there’s no point in somebody here saying to me, ‘Go home if you don’t like it’, because this is home. …Today, what I’m saying to these people that are in charge, is, ‘Listen, I’ve worked my entire life here. I’ve contributed to the tax of this entire country. I’ve built up this country. You’ve used your labour; I’ve used my skills and my labour. Between the two of us we’ve built South Africa into an economic giant in South Africa in, in … on the con., continent’. [Peter, 46]

I’m a South African totally South African, I mean I don’t have a passport anywhere else or anything like that. I. Born and bred here, I’m very, very mixed English, Afrikaans and all the rest of it, so I’m a South African. [Sandy, 52]

There is one thing I disagree about. Its some of them think this is only their country. It is not only their country, it is my country. I was born here, and my ancestors came to live in this country a long time ago. I had no other choices, nine …generations, and we have no other country. [translated – see endnote6] [Kowa, P2]

Gerrie and Sandy suggest their mixed English and Afrikaans heritage makes them uniquely South African. Many Afrikaans-speaking interviewees like Kowa, referring to her lineage, emphasise their claim to the country. They also argue that South Africa is the home of the Afrikaner and that they would lose their culture and language
should they go elsewhere. Peter attributes the past white arrogance, he refers to, to the Afrikaner policy of apartheid⁴.

Both Emma and Peter claim to be African⁵. Claiming Africanness within the context of their conversations affirm and legitimate citizenship. However, the meaning they attribute to such identification differs, particularly if their comments elsewhere in their respective interviews are taken into consideration.

Africanness implies, for Emma like Ian [30A], an embracing of the racial ‘other’ and their values to some extent or openness towards them⁶. In contrast Peter initially argues that it is not necessary to add the adjective ‘white’⁷ to describe his South Africanness. Debating a possible challenge to his claim to South Africanness

⁴ Such disassociation occurs regularly and enables interviewees to shift blame for the past on others and maintain their sense of a moral self. Audrey [21], for instance, pleads ignorance with regard to apartheid emphasising how she, having grown up in Rhodesia (which had segregationist policies), always treated them (the racial ‘other’) well. In response to blame being apportioned, many Afrikaans-speaking interviewees, like English-speaking interviewees, have denied personal responsibility for the policy of apartheid in their conversations. Some Afrikaans-speakers suggest that the imperial and colonial English are as guilty, if not more. Some English-speakers themselves have admitted that blame could not be placed exclusively on the Afrikaner. Jasper [34A], for instance, argues the Afrikaner has become less arrogant and insular than when they first arrived in the country, whilst the English remain smug retaining their sense of superiority.

⁵ For many interviewees African remains associated with black. They tend to call themselves South African, rather than African. Markus [31A] points out that this association of African with black was held in the past whilst South African was associated with white. Una [32] still strongly adheres to such a distinction. Nancy [38B] observes that there is a completely different understanding when you say you are from Africa. For Riana [40B] she is an Afrikaner first before she is a member of the rainbow nation. She will therefore not yet describe herself as an ‘Afrikaan’ (African Afrikaner).

⁶ This does not imply that either Emma or Ian denies their English heritage, or that they are white. Both concede that others in society still view them in that way. However, they contend that this heritage does not exclude them from exploring other cultures more broadly.

⁷ Jack [16A] and Engela [16B] contend they are South African first. They agree with Peter, Ester [18] and William [51] that adding an adjective before South African is unnecessary. It is unnecessary to refer to their Afrikanership when they identify to themselves as South African. Identifying themselves as South African emphasises belonging to the country, rather than to a subgroup, at national level. These responses reflect a reaction to awareness that whites and Afrikaners are tarnished by their history. Rightwing stereotypes in particular are associated with Afrikaners, a matter dealt with by many interviewees in Edensvlakte through disassociation. Mary [50] expresses such a stereotype, acknowledging that her mother becomes irate when she refers to racism remaining amongst Afrikaners. In this regard she refers to the ultra-right AWB and Oranjezicht (meaning the ‘volkstaat’ [people’s state] town Orania) as trying to hold onto the past. Drien [34B] argues that the English do appear to be more ‘slick’ than the Afrikaner, and Jasper [34A] adds that they personally do not like it when the English reveal their bias towards Afrikaners by criticising and blaming them. Hendrik [8C] also contests so-called English liberalism by arguing they are even more racist than Afrikaners.
subsequently, he calls himself a white Zulu African primarily to locate himself in the country. In spite of this reference, he still draws a distinction between himself and the racial ‘other’. Whilst they have contributed their labour, he (as a white) has contributed both his skill and labour. Listing his contribution and achievements further solidifies his claim to citizenship.

Markus [31A], like Peter, contests the notion that whites are immigrants in the country. He argues neither can claim true indigeneity and both are equally entitled to the land by referring to the historical myth that black Africans arrived from the North as Europeans arrived from the South. Delinking South Africanness from race counters potential claims to racial exclusivity with regard to citizenship. Several interviewees emphasise their rootedness in the country. Wilma, referring to her own children’s experience, and Mervyn, to his personal experience, respectively contend

…they cannot imagine going to live in Europe and not to see sunshine. See we are already deeply bred into Africa. [translated – see endnote6] [Wilma, 3B]

And uh, you know if you walk on the ground then you feel it’s Africa’s ground. If you walk overseas on that ground then it feels foreign under your feet. There is no connection, and those type of things, right. That is what it is about. It is South Africa; that is the country, it is my country, and I am accustomed to it. [translated – see endnote7] [Mervyn, 17]

Their rootedness in Africa, as Jannie [10A] contends, ensures a special bond with the country. Charl [54], is also eager to emphasise co-operation and argues he makes his contribution as South African, not as a white South African. To make a contribution as a South African, in his opinion, reflects adapting to the current situation as well as to display mutual respect and greater tolerance towards each other. Claiming a South Africanness then seems to send a clear signal that they belong to the country as much as others do and that they are therefore entitled to equal rights.

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8 Zulu African is used to locate himself geographically. This does not imply a cultural engagement. Peter was one of the interviewees who emphasised the cultural differences between whites and blacks when discussing how residential areas have changed and what the impact of such changes were. The shift in his discourse from where he discusses the changes in his community and disassociates himself as a white from blacks to a situation where he in the context of citizenship claims Africanness (an association), indicates how discourses are used differently in various contexts.
Heleen [24], Lena [42B], Craig [49] and William [51] all contend that more extreme elements on both sides use divisive slogans such as ‘Kill the Boer, kill the farmer’ or ‘Pretoria belongs to the Boer Force’. They disassociate themselves from these practices arguing that South Africans have to learn to tolerate and accommodate others.

In reflecting on what a South African identity entails, most interviewees concede that such a common identity has not yet been established. Many remain ambivalent towards such an overarching identity as their primary identity. In this regard Sakkie [6A] concedes that it would be an ideal but argues that cultural differences remain prominent. According to Herman, Guy and Joyce

Look a South Africanness must still develop. I am not sure that a South Africanness has yet developed. Look there, you know, groupings remain strong, you know, but how many years have we tried to get the Afrikaans and English together? [translated – see endnote8] [Herman, 3A]

We don’t have a national sort of identity as one group in my opinion. There’s no – ‘I’m a South African and I can identify with any other person from South Africa whatever skin colour’, that you could pick them out. You don’t have that unity of people. [Guy, 28A]

Okay from the, from like totally an uneducated point of view, you can say well the Americans all celebrate Thanksgiving, and the Americans all love football and the Americans all love baseball, you know. There’s, there’s like a group identity. You can’t say that here, we don’t all love rugby because more than half of us love soccer… [Joyce, 28B]

Many interviewees use the argument that whites have not managed to forge unity between them, some even refer to the divisions within Afrikanerdom itself, to substantiate why they believe forging a common national identity would be difficult. In their conversation Guy and Joyce suggest that there are not yet any binding traditions or interests that cross the racial barrier around which a common identity can be constituted.

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9 Matilda [39B], with irony, contends that the idea of a rainbow nation ‘is a beautiful idea’. Hardus [39A] adds ‘paradise’, before they set out to argue against its feasibility on grounds of cultural difference and incompatibility. They contend one cannot ‘throw the whole caboodle together’.
Joyce [28B] mentions the unifying potential of sport as providing some common ground for people to rally behind but adds that teams haven’t being doing that well and that such expressions of unity remains superficial. Sakkie [6A] admits there are moments when the possibility of such a shared identity emerges, with cricket being probably the closest catalyst, rugby still being predominantly a white sport and soccer predominantly a black sport. Guy [28A] agrees saying that different groups celebrate in different ways after the victory.

Antonie is more pessimistic about unity. He emphasises the different cultural backgrounds of racial groups and contends they differ as wide as the firmament from each other (‘verskil hemelsbreed’). With such differences, he argues, one nation emerging is inconceivable10. He contends

I do not want to mix with strangers or mix with other-coloured people. Because what, what do you then have ev., eventually? A nation which does not even know where he comes from. Who does not mind where he comes from. And what language will you talk? Now you have to reach a compromise to satisfy both again. There our language is buggered. [translated – see endnote’] [12]

The fear of being overwhelmed culturally by the majority is expressed above. Yvette [13A] asks why it is necessary that cultures have to be mixed together ‘to such an extent that there is no identity’. Hanneli [11] agrees that mixing leads to confusion. There is very clearly, although not exclusively, a preference between the Afrikaans-speakers to guarantee the survival of their cultural practices. However English-speakers like Fran [2], Joyce [28A], Una [32] and Gwen [37], amongst others highlight cultural difference.

Joyce is not in favour of a ‘homogenous mush-mash’ (sic), where everyone looks the same and dresses the same. Guy suggesting a trend towards individualisation agrees, referring to his wife who has other colours in her hair contending

10 Antonie [12], who regards himself as a patriot and Boer Afrikaner, refers here to an ethno-nationalism. Other interviewees who accept a civic nationalism are more accommodating and emphasise their South Africanness. In this regard Gerald [38D] contends that South Africa can become a nation but never will be a ‘volk’.
Guy mentions the usual divisions (official categories and subgroupings) within society. He thinks real unity will only be achieved by later generations as they have grown up together. The promise of the youth forging greater unity is a recurring theme in many interviews. Guy referring to divisions between the Afrikaner and English adds that we bluff ourselves if we think there will ever be complete unity.

Sakkie [6A] is of the opinion that divisions would remain and feels that attempts at establishing unity amongst such diversity are bound to fail. It would be more appropriate to accept the diversity and to agree on co-operation he contends.

7.3 The meaning of being white

Unprompted, most interviewees identified themselves, or the community they live in as white. They are careful to emphasise that recognising this difference does not imply they are racist. Many recognise being white as an obvious distinction within society and one where opportunities have diminished. Where an identification of being white was not explicitly made, it was implicit in the conversation. With regard to them being white, Kobus, Mary and Robert argue respectively

A guy doesn’t want to be anything else, so then you do not notice it. So no, I don’t think it bothers. [translated – see endnote10] [Kobus, 38C]

I think here in South Africa and I’m wary, I don’t want to stand out as being, oh I think I’m white. Oh well I mean I am white, but I don’t feel its necessary to make that statement unless someone actually asked me. You know, uhm, they would see straight away that, no, I’m white unless it was like over the phone or correspondence or something. …Uhm. Yah, I think that as I say, to be white does mean to, to realise that we are now in the minority, that, uhm, we’re going to have to build up something for ourselves, we’re going to have, perhaps, uhm, you know specially with your children realise that, uhm, they could find it difficult looking for work in certain situations so that’s, yah,
that’s what I see, at this point, but I still see that as a white person, I’m still very privileged. [Mary, 50]

I am not an Afrikaans South African. Because you see, what does association mean? I do not need to announce myself. When you are somewhere people see you are white. So then you know, you’re a white South African. [translated – see endnote11] [Robert, 53]

Kobus cannot imagine anything else than being white. For Robert, his attributes are obvious, have a context and imply both descent and a heritage. These things need not to be verbalised. He adds that if he introduces himself to someone over the internet in a chatroom he does not say he is South African because the association is that Africa is black and colour has a cultural connotation. In these instances he would identify himself as white or as an Afrikaner. More recently as a result of the changes, he is a minority, and in this context it has become more important to view himself as white because his race does have an impact on the opportunities available to him (and other whites in a similar position).

Many interviewees remark that they are a minority now. It is precisely in instances where this is apparent that they are most aware of being white. Several acknowledge their past privileging as white but indicate that they do not expect better treatment currently. They in fact expect to be disadvantaged, in spite of disapproving of such discrimination. Mary [50] expresses the desire, like many others, that colour eventually will mean little in public and that everyone will be treated equally. Catherine contends in this regard

Yah, uhm, because we’ve moved from a white male dominated society to, well a an Afrikaner political, uhm, stronghold to black, so our ministers and that are black and our politica., politics is black. And then our, uhm, jobs with affirmative action are now also black, you know so. White males feel like I’m at the bottom of the ladder, and that’s, that’s now well-known. Uhm. And, and now so if you do, if you’re not black it’s difficult, economically. [Catherine, 25]

There is consequently an acknowledgement among interviewees that their situation has changed. Most interviewees emphasise that being white does not imply that they
are better than others. For many it implies difference on a cultural level. Patsy expressing tolerance and equity states that although she is white, her colour does not give her any rights over others, and that she is happy to accept everyone. According to her

I, I know I’m white, let’s put it that way. I do think of myself as white, but I don’t consider myself to be better than the black man next door. That I don’t do. I never have. … I got no, uh, I know I’m white but I don’t consider myself superior to anybody, never ever. I used to, I used to think because I was white I was superior to anything that was another colour, but that has, that changed. Over the years. [19]

Patsy tones down her initial claim that she never has regarded herself superior to a racial ‘other’. Her admission increases the credibility of her claim. In a long confessional anecdote Patsy describes how her attitude around race shifted from a conservative position of supporting ‘segregation and servitude’ to accommodation. Visiting a neighbouring country for gambling, she fell ill. Only a black doctor was available. She adds his professionalism and competence led to her Damascus—experience and conversion eventually recognising the humanity in all people. Now she realises what a privileged life she has lived. Patsy contends it will be better if all are viewed merely as South African.

There were a number of interviewees who did not apologise for being white, who stated that they had no problem with their own skin colour. According to them the racial other, often inexplicably, seem sensitive about it. Kobus’s [38C] claim that he ‘doesn’t want to be anything else’ and Lena’s [42B] comment that her skin colour does not bother her, but does apparently bother others, are examples. Daniel contends

Colour is a thing that the Lord made. So if I say I do not want to mix with your colour, then I do not believe that I am committing a sin. I want to remain

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12 Claiming that they do not regard themselves as better does not preclude them from expressing a preference to socialise with people of their own colour, elsewhere in their interviews. Audrey [21] provides such an example, emphasising that she does not regard herself as being superior, yet explicitly stating that she prefers to associate with people who are similar to her. Heleen [24] defends such feelings arguing that people are more comfortable with what they are accustomed to and that this does not necessarily imply racism.

13 Now anglicised she acknowledges her own Afrikaner roots and blames the right-wing Afrikaner for setting the worst example and sullying race relations. Heleen [24] also disassociates herself from a conservative Afrikaner association, emphasising her bilingualism.
my own. I want to remain white. I do not want to become yellow, right. I want to remain white. ...Because you are that. The Lord made you and you must be that. [translated – see endnote12] [47]

Ina [9] is proud of being white and does not want to be anything else. Hardus [39A] states that he is grateful that he is unlike them, in spite of claiming that he does not think he is better than them, a discursive move aimed to protect him against the charge of bias. Gwen contends that there are distinct cultural differences that need to be recognised and allowed. In spite of her preference for white people socially, she adds that she does not associate with all white people. She is also keen to demonstrate that she has accepted black people, mentioning that she has entertained those she has done business with.

Yes, what a question, Yes, I do. I am white and I’m proud to be a white person and, uhm, I do prefer the company of some white people, not all of them. Some white people are horrendous. But I must admit that to become, if, if you had to tell me, now there’s no colour and I must go and interact with my farm workers and go and join them around the “pap” [porridge] pot. I’m gonna say to you, woah, I’m white. I don’t enjoy that. I don’t, I don’t want to drink sour beer. Uhm. That’s their culture. It’s not my culture. ....And we should be allowed to say I’m black and I’m proud of it and I’m white and I’m proud of it. Not, uh, I’m white and I must tread carefully because I’m a threatened species in South Africa. It’s not right. [37]

Susanna [45] is also proud of what whites and Afrikaners have achieved. She argues, like Daniel, that being white is how God created them and that culture is the main difference. For Bettie [4C] being white is a privilege and entails setting an example for the racial ‘other’. There is even a notion amongst some of the interviewees that blacks want to be white. Wilma, Mervyn and Jasper contend

I think that they feel, uh, inferior to the white and ‘they would like to be’. ...Because look he wants to be, he wants to be white. [translated – see endnote13] [Wilma, 3B]

And then they look down on those in their own ‘society’ and own group who are still in the non-white [black] school. ...So, but what I then mean by white is then only again an issue of, of the standard of education which they achieve, as ‘opposed to’ that of the other, because that is the same thing now. And uh, in your white community at one stage it was said that you are behaving like a ‘kaffir’. So its probably the same. ...Let us call, let us not now not call it white. Let us call it now then that they are more, uhm, literate [translated – see endnote14] [Mervyn, 17].
I think especially the black people would like to have the white man’s [sic] culture or enjoy more of it… [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{15}] [Jasper, 34A]

Mervyn suggests being exposed to ‘white schooling’ drives a wedge between the scholars who benefit and the black community. He argues a better standard of education in white schools may lead black scholars to regard themselves as superior to their fellow blacks who do not have these benefits. This reflects whiteness. It is backed by the derogatory reference to how poor behaviour within white communities was equated to acting like a ‘kaffir’. The implication is that the scholars, now beneficiaries of education in white schools, may also differentiate themselves from the black community. He does eventually reveal some sensitivity when he shies away from calling it white. Marita [8B] agrees that blacks regard white education as superior. Underpinning the notion that ‘white is better’ is the association of it with the first world, education and advancement. I will return to the assumed superiority of whiteness and explore such notions in greater detail later in this chapter where I discuss how interviewees see the society changing.

Interviewees generally concede that whites tend to be divided and point to old rivalries between the two main groupings the Afrikaner and the English\textsuperscript{14}. Tiaan [5A] argues each person belongs to a culture and that the cultures differ from one another. Hence the English culture differs from the Afrikaans culture. That is why he believes in democracy, in not forcing yourself on others, in allowing each group to freely express themselves culturally not at the cost of others. Ingrid and Craig contend

\begin{quote}
I agree [with Tiaan’s plea for respecting cultural difference]. Then they on their, uh, terrain and we have on our terrain, because they, there’s so many cultures, the, ah, I would say, the way of eating or drinking, or they like their, uh, way of living. We like our way of living, but I mean we are not resentful (malicious) towards each other. We grant it to them. Look, for example, we
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Several interviewees, like Fran [2], Joyce [28B] and Markus [31A] recall conflicts of their youth along these ethnic lines. Both Fran and Joyce relate how they as English-speakers were on the receiving end and were discriminated against at the dual-medium schools they attended and were in the minority. Markus relates growing up seeing ‘souties’ ['salty’s’ – a derogatory term for English, derived from ‘sout piel’ indicating a ‘salt phallus’ as they stood with one foot in Africa and the other in England, implying the phallus dangled in the ocean] whom they battled frequently as their main adversaries. He also recalls them targeting a Portuguese lady’s wall with ‘kleilat’ [clay-stick – a boy’s game of targeting objects with clay missiles] and calling them ‘salt kaffirs’ (The ‘salt’ is a reference to their foreignness). The derogatory term, as I have suggested in chapter six indicates that not all whites were regarded equal. Whiteness as the literature discussed in chapter three suggests is differentiated.
are not like the Jews, we are not for example like the French, or the, or the Germans, or even in England, when we were in England, and we were in Switzerland. And those people all have their, their culture. Each one has your own culture. And just like that, they have their culture and we have our culture. And that is like that. [translated – see endnote16] [Ingrid, 5B]

The white people in our nation is not just one race (sic), its two or three different races. Uh. You have the Afrikaans speaking people who have their morals their standards their way of living and that is how they were brought up. And you have English people who have their way of, of communication, their morals and standards and their way that they were brought up. And it is not the same. There’s no way it’s the same. [Craig, 49]

Following Tiaan’s plea for respecting cultural diversity, Ingrid immediately extends it to highlighting their difference to blacks, arguing for separation and tolerance. By emphasising the cultural difference between white people in Europe, Ingrid deflects any criticism that she may be racially biased. She therefore discursively normalises cultural distinctiveness and difference. Craig also emphasises the cultural difference between whites but elsewhere in his interview he collapses these differences talking about how whites are pitted against blacks in the society.

In comparing groups, Susanna [45] regards the English as more liberal. Margaret [26] agrees the English and Afrikaner often differ and therefore suggest that unity across racial boundaries would be even more difficult. Many interviewees concede that the Afrikaner and English have, given their current circumstances and their position in society, grown closer together. For Dieter [36] they together constitute the white nation, whilst he still tends to divide blacks according to ethnicity. He argues

For me it is about, what is a nation? A nation is, I am a white South African. English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking, it does not matter, it’s a nation. The Tswana-group is a nation for me. The Zulu's are a nation, but all together are not a nation. It can never be a nation. [translated – see endnote17] [36]

In practice, interviewees are more accommodating to other whites than to other racial groups. Unprompted, Marius, who presents himself as open and accommodating towards the racial ‘other’ throughout his interview, argues that he does not want to ‘crossbreed’, adding each should keep their own culture but that he has no problem with peaceful co-existence. He contends
I do not want us to crossbreed. We must not have a mixture by marrying white with black and black with white and my culture and his culture and all such things. …For me it is just wrong. Because God created you. He is also a human being and I am a human being, but I believe that you should keep to your own culture. He has his culture. He has his colour. He has his lifestyle. Let us call it that. Let us forget about colour. I hate to talk about colour. He has his lifestyle. I have my lifestyle. I am not going to force myself onto him. Because that is what they do. They are now forcing themselves onto us.

[translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{18}] [15]

The notion of crossbreeding conjures up an image of animal husbandry. Many interviewees used examples from nature suggesting that such mixing was not natural. Marius acknowledges their humanness. This acknowledgement together with his emphasis that God created difference justifying distinctiveness serves to deflect any criticism of racial bias. He displays race evasiveness arguing that he does not like to make this cultural (lifestyle) issue a colour issue. Culture clearly becomes a euphemism for race in spite of all the denials accompanying it.

7.4 The meaning of being an Afrikaner

Most interviewees who were Afrikaans-speaking identified themselves as Afrikaans. Although they generally emphasised the key role played by language, culture and institutions in shaping and maintaining the Afrikaner identity, they acknowledged that the Afrikaner is not unified and that there are in fact competing notions of Afrikanerdom. Several refer to church and political divisions as indicators of the continuing divisions amongst Afrikaners. This has been addressed to a large extent in the discussion of the communities of Edensvlakte and Wesveld, as spelled out in the previous chapter.

With regard to the Afrikaners, Sakkie [6A] broadly distinguishes between the patriot Afrikaners, middle-of-the road Afrikaners who value their culture and the marginal (nominal) Afrikaners who basically use the language to communicate in. This is a distinction Daniel [47] also makes\textsuperscript{15}. Nominal Afrikaners, are primarily urban based

\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Sakkie [6A] regards the middle-of-the road Afrikaners who are politically engaged but still true to the Afrikaner cause as the core of Afrikanerdom, Daniel [47] see the Boer Afrikaners who have
and tend to assimilate according to Hardus [39A]. For Daniel ‘the men of the previous government’ (the Nationalists) went overboard completely and set the country on a path towards assimilation. He contends they should be regarded nominal Afrikaners.

Samuel [35A] refers to the displacement Afrikaners have felt, saying he no longer knows whether they should call themselves Afrikaner, Sandra [35B] interjects or ‘Afrikaan’16. His admission is significant as it suggests an awareness of having a tainted or marked identity. According to Hendrik Afrikaners were demonised after the political transition and their contribution to the development of the country was not recognised fully.

I would like to align myself with my own people, in other words, with Afrikaners. You know I am now not one of the Afrikaanses17. …I am of the ordinary Afrikaner who wants to see the sun of the dear [Heavenly] Father shine upon everyone, but whose own, and this is not a narrow-minded route what I want to walk [Charles:Yes], but, but my own route with my own people and I grant the other groups everything. Just as much as I ask nothing more for us. That we are able to [participate fully], and I also do not look for a homeland. [translated – see endnote19] [8C]

Hendrik clearly defines Afrikaners as white. He argues for allowing ‘normal cultural activity’ whilst respecting that of others. Dieter [36] contends he has always supported parallel development. He prefers this term to apartheid, because it grants others what he wants himself, to be able to express themselves in their own language and religion.

In spite of his voiced insecurity and ambivalence Samuel expresses hope that his people would unify again. According to Samuel, the reason for them losing their foothold is that people no longer recognised the value of their culture. Being linked to apartheid, the Afrikaner was denigrated by those in power. As proof he adds that all groups, barring the Afrikaner, were depicted in the Cricket World Cup opening disengaged from formal participation as the faithful core of Afrikanerdom. He holds those leaders that sold the Afrikaners out with contempt (see section 6.2.1.2).

16 ‘Afrikaan’ implies an Afrikaner African. The Afrikaans title of Slabbert (2000) published in the preceding year was “Afrikaner Afrikaan” (see the discussion in chapter four). As Nancy [38B] has argued identifying yourself African does imply a different understanding. Riana [40B] also disassociates herself from being an ‘Afrikaan’.

17 ‘Afrikaanses’ is used to indicate a more racially inclusive notion of Afrikaans-speakers and often associated also with coloureds.
ceremony. He attributes the state of affairs to apostasy, saying things went downhill as soon as the country stopped opening Parliament with scripture and prayer. He says by reviving their cultural practices things could be turned around. Samuel emphasises the importance of creating a sense of their ownness (‘eie’) of which one can be proud as a base for solidarity and cohesiveness. Dieter [36], like several other interviewees, refers to a revival of Afrikaner traditions. Marie, Ina, Samuel and Hardus respectively contend

Therefore God created. He created boundaries for different nations. The different ‘volkere’ [peoples]. Why must we now mongrelise with another ‘volk’? [translated – see endnote20] [Marie, 4A]

I think we cannot cross the boundaries because the Father determined that with Babel. …I think each guy want’s to live ethnically, in his own area, or in his community. Uhm. Guys who speak the same language as you, who have the same religion. Uhm. Skin colour does make a difference in our country. If we want to know it or not. They do not want to marry over colour boundaries or live together. Each guy wants to be in a community where he feels comfortable, Guys who speak the same as you. Language is very important for me. So I think each guy just wants to be where his people are. [translated – see endnote21] [Ina, 9]

[Referring to reviving the ‘volk’ he says:] That’s what I believe in my heart, and am, and I believe if that comes right the other will come right. That’s why, I place my hope on my belief and on Christ and I believe that [if] that comes right all the other things, the other will come right again and we will be relieved from the mess we are in, I see it as a mess, other people may see it as a future [translated – see endnote22]. [Samuel, 35A]

I grant any other person, to also live and think the way he thinks. He has a place under the sun. I accept it. That the differences, the differences, the different ‘volke’, different languages is a creation of God. He made it like that. Why will He, why will He make different groups? He could have made everyone similar. For each group there is a ‘place’. [translated – see endnote23] [Hardus, 39A]

This notion that God willed racial and cultural group boundaries which should be respected, and that you are therefore born into and would die in a group, is a recurring theme (see sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). For Samuel churches remain at the heart of Afrikanerdom and have a central cultural role to play. He conveys the point Antonie [12] also makes that language, culture and religion are intertwined and that full expression of Afrikanerdom requires faith also. Ina [9] argues it is within this context that one experiences belonging to the group. Petro [13B] like Hardus [39A] believes
that there is a purpose in being an Afrikaner and that the Lord made each group different. Several interviewees raise the concern that both churches and schools are under attack to immobilise Afrikaners\textsuperscript{18}. Yvette [13A] also refers to how the Israelites were instructed to remain pure. Antonie, Kasper and Kobus respectively contend

\begin{quote}
But I am not going to sacrifice my language and my culture in my life, and my religion, never, never, never, never. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{24}] [Antonie, 12]
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
You, you go, you go to a school, school which is Afrikaans. You go to a church that has Afrikaans speaking people, who look like you, who are white because you, you think the same and do the same. Now what now, then you are an Afrikaner. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{25}] [Kasper, 48]
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
I, I suspect the, the, the traditions and the, and the, what do they call it, of the Afrikaner will, will not, will not just, will not just be influenced severely by anyone else’s ways and fads [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{26}] [Kobus, 38C]
\end{quote}

Hardus [39A] reiterates the position that groups have been divinely ordained, each with their purpose, a position Ben [41] accepts. Dieter [36] also views church, school and language as constituting the pillars of Afrikanerdom and ensuring a vibrant and distinct culture is maintained. Daniel [47] whilst identifying himself as a Boer Afrikaner, leaves room for an inclusion of those whites who associate with the key tenets of their ‘volk’\textsuperscript{19}. Charlene [4B] though English shows a strong commitment and involvement in Afrikaner-activities in Edensvlakte. Kasper contends in this regard

\begin{quote}
So, we are a, we are a group, and then well, other Afrikaner and white people who feels like you, falls in with you. If he doesn’t want to, he has those things [the ‘other’ to associate with]. We are now, we are a ‘volk’. Huh. We are, we are not the same as those people. Huh. If they, let us leave it now, who is now right and who is wrong. We are not the same, period. He is black and I am white. There is already a massive difference. But that is the smallest difference. Then those other things come. [translated – see endnote\textsuperscript{27}] [48]
\end{quote}

For Kasper the Afrikaner is clearly white, is open to association with other whites, and differs fundamentally from blacks, where the colour signifies the smallest difference.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item I have referred in chapter six to Daniel’s [47] belief that attacking the religious base is part of the communist master plan of the government. See the interviewees concerns about communism raised in sections 6.2.1.2, 6.3.1.4 and 6.3.1.6.
\item This is a reiteration of the policy of the Conservative Party to which he belonged and whom he served as an elected councillor in Edensvlakte. The policy directives of the Conservative Party are briefly discussed in chapter four.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
There is a general agreement that the profile of Afrikaans has been lowered in public. Dieter insists on being served in Afrikaans and regards this as a deciding factor with regard to which he conducts his business, deciding who to deal with. He complains that English is being pushed down their throats. According to him, people initially thought he was backward but now realise that it is a key principle to uphold these rights. Nancy [38B] adds that it galls her when people are not able to speak Afrikaans in public institutions that have to provide a service to the community. Matilda [39B] relates an anecdote where a male nurse at the clinic requested her to speak English as his Afrikaans was rusted. She agreed to but then requested that he improves his Afrikaans for when they meet again. She contends

I said, you are in the privileged position that you at least can be proficiently trilingual. [translated – see endnote29] [39B]

Matilda’s response is indicative of who is expected to adapt and in this sense still reflects whiteness. Hardus [39A] agrees with Dieter that the tide has turned and refers to the thriving Afrikaans Art Festivals like the KKNK and Aardklop [the sound of the earth] as well as the vibrant music scene. Petrus [40A] refers to their difficulty in getting official forms in Afrikaans. Several anecdotes are told about the difficulty in engaging with governmental departments in Afrikaans. In contrast to a more hardline approach Charl [54] is more pragmatic accommodating other people as he cannot speak their languages. Frederik also argues for being more pragmatic. He contends

No one is listening to us, that is why when our guys get up in the parliament to deliver an address, how well or how poor, the guys sit and eat chips because he talks Afrikaans. He knows they can, they do not understand Afrikaans. He can speak English as well as he speaks Afrikaans, and they achieve nothing by that. The guys laugh at them behind their backs. [translated– see endnote29]

Kobus [38C] believes that, although Afrikaans may be under siege in the public sphere, this does not apply to its use in the private sphere. There is agreement that Afrikaans will continue to be used. Yvette [13A] refers to the work of the ATKV (Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuur Vereniging, Afrikaans Language and Cultural Society)
in broadening the appeal of the language across groups, adding that they have become more liberal. She supports this initiative.

Adriaan [33A] identifies himself as part of the Boer ‘volk’, in contrast to the more liberal Cape Afrikaner, on grounds of descent, who as Voortrekkers sought independent statehood. He says one classifies people immediately, almost unconsciously, first in ‘volk’, then in party and church. Although this distinction has faded somewhat, there is still a core who desire freedom and nationhood. One is also a white and lastly a South African. He argues not all ‘Boere Afrikaners’ are militant. In this regard, Hardus [39A] concedes that it is unlikely that a ‘white government’ will rule again in the foreseeable future.

Dirk [22], in spite of declaring himself a new fashioned Afrikaner who is more open and liberal in his association with others at the beginning of our interview, highlights the cultural barriers that exist between white and black subsequently in the interview. The barriers he identifies are similar to those Markus [31A] referred to in his discussion of how black squatters differ from white middle-class suburbanites (see chapter six). Referring to blacks’ alleged promiscuity Dirk backtracks on his declared ‘new Afrikaner’ identity and openness, reifying racial difference. Acceptance of the racial ‘other’ occurs when they adhere to his white western middle-class suburban values, therefore meeting his terms. In highlighting cultural difference he contends, raising a number of stereotypes

You know that’s why some of the Afrikaners cannot accept the black culture because they have different views on, ‘and even’ about, you know how many people one can have [sexual] intercourse with. That is, there is a difference, you know. It is actually seen as pagan according to Afrikaners. ...How can you say you are a new South African and associate yourself, you know, with all those things also? [translated – see endnote30] [22]

Not all Afrikaners agree with the standpoint taken by patriotic right-wingers on their identity. In this regard some contend that the patriots emphasise their Afrikanerdom to the detriment of religion. Christianity, according to Jannie [10A] and Lani [10B], is not in service of ethnicity. Sakkie [6A] adds, for patriots, everything is subservient to their Afrikanerdom. On reflection Yvette [13A] admits when she was a patriot their
politics was their religion. Her husband eventually came to the realisation before his death that they may have out politics before religion. Her daughter Petro comments that politics and religion is closely intertwined within Afrikanerdom. Others like Annetjie [1], whilst valuing their cultural practices, takes care in emphasising that this does not detach them from the broader society. She contends

But no, that, uhm, that does not separate me from someone. If you understand what I mean. It does not separate me from any other nation in South Africa, because I am just like them, part of South Africa. [translated – see endnote 31]

[1]  
Significantly Annetjie still uses the notion of nation to refer to other groups within the society. Although belonging to a distinct group in a diverse society, she is cautious not to relinquish her claim to South African citizenship.

7.5 The meaning of being English

In Edensvlakte Fran identifies herself as a South African. She shares her experience of living in an Afrikaans community where she was seen as the English woman. When she lived in the city she was “basically an Englishman” in that milieu. She traces her lineage back to the first English settlers and adds that this was reflected in her upbringing. In relating her experiences with Afrikaans speakers, she suggests that she had to in the past defend her South Africanness

And, uh, he started off about something or another, so I said [to him], I said you are speaking to the wrong English South African. I said because you know my family have been here so long. I said that I might be more of a South African than what you are. … but it was just, you know, that time that I let him just know that he mustn’t think just because I’m English speaking that I am anything other than a South African. And that is where I do have a problem. And that’s, I can’t move overseas because I am South African and I shall remain here. [2]

Fran emphasises that people should not think she is less of a South African since she is English-speaking. She defines her Englishness in relation to the Afrikaner and the struggles which had raged between them, historically. This played out at school level when she was growing up where they had to find another school. When the
government changed, the dual-medium school became a single-medium one\(^{20}\). She contends that the English were less politically minded and also more refined than the Afrikaner. Her anecdotes reflect the changing power relations and its consequences, she states in this regard

I’ve heard because I was too young that a lot of that type of thing was done to the Afrikaans person by the English when they were a Union\(^{21}\). Then when we became a Republic they kicked us and now the blacks are in, they are kicking with two feet, and so you can imagine. You know the English, there were uh less English than Afrikaans and, now there will be hell of a lot less English and Afrikaans to the racial black. [2]

Like many other interviewees Fran raises a concern over how they will be treated in the changing context.

For Hendrik \([8C]\) the English with their sense of superiority think they are a rung higher than others, and, in the context of the transition, they have blamed the past on the Afrikaner, but from his observation of politics, he says that if you ever wanted to see racism in your life, you have to look at the English farmers in Zululand. In this regard Ian contends commenting on his fellow English-speaking South Africans reciting a verse he learned as a child to illustrate his point about English-speakers

‘The English, the English is, are best. Can’t care tuppence for the rest’. And so they felt superior to the Afrikaner as the Afrikaner felt superior to the African. And that was a holding pattern they still possess till this day. [30A]

In Wesveld Gwen identifies herself as English speaking and almost as an outsider in the community. Her children are called ‘souties’ [salty’s], but she contends not in the negative sense it has been used in the past. She presents herself as more flexible, reflecting greater egalitarianism and tolerance, than is custom within a more traditional Afrikaner community. In this regard she contends

I’ve a very different way of thinking to the, the more, traditional Afrikaans speaking person. So I do surprise them every now and then with a couple of things that I say or do… … I mix with everybody from most walks of life. But

\(^{20}\) In chapter four I have discussed how the education policy under the National Party differed from the route charted by the United Party before them.

\(^{21}\) Milner’s policy of the anglicisation of schooling after the war is discussed in chapter four.
there aren’t many that do that. So if you put, if I see myself, where do see myself socially? I’m a rainbow person.[37]

Emphasising a distinction between English and Afrikaans cultures normalises differences between groups and deflects a charge of racism which she is sensitive towards. Gwen repeatedly claims she has no problem with race. Yet she still believes that groups should be allowed to retain their cultures and is consequently not in favour of school integration.

Nancy [38B] refers to her parents’ negative perception of the English as a result of their colonisation and the war. Hardus [39A] and Matilda [39B] both argue there are historical reasons not to like the English. According to Riana [40B], the strong anti-English sentiment in the community has only recently receded as both faced the threat posed by a growing African ascendancy. It is in this context that they forged better relationships.

There is some debate around the status of the English speakers. Michelle [58D] comments that whilst they associate with whites, there is no ‘real’ white culture. Douglas [58B] replies that it is ‘sort-of British-Colonial’. Robert [53] draws a distinction between English South Africans’ lack of a unique identity and the innovative contributions of the Afrikaner. In this regard he refers to culinary, sport and cultural contributions arguing that the Afrikaner has had a greater impact in all spheres, even where they took over something like rugby[22].

7.6 Describing ‘the other’

Commenting on South African society and its diversity the past racial categorisation of the society is repeatedly mentioned in interviews to refer to the distinct groupings and their positioning within society. In general, the fortunes of whites are seen to have diminished whilst that of blacks has improved. Indians are seen to be well positioned

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[22] Several of the banal contributions he identifies – ‘boerewors’ (boer sausage), ‘koeksisters’ (a sweet delicacy), ‘jukskei’ (a game throwing a pin to a peg practiced as Boer sport) and ‘boeremusiek’ (Boer music) draw on practices brought by other groups or adapted from other contexts. Several interviewees refer to ‘volkspele’ (folk dancing) as a uniquely Afrikaner cultural activity.
to benefit from changes whilst the coloureds are often mentioned as an in-between group that was too dark-skinned in the past and now are too light-skinned. General stereotypes of the groups therefore circulate. This immense diversity within society is then seen as working against a South African identity. Robert [53], for instance, argues that the country lacks a dominant culture, language or identity.

Interviewees emphasise that these main groups are divided along religious and ethnic lines. Braam [38A] and Hardus [39A] contend that blacks will always remain divided. In this regard Patsy claims South Africa has many nationalities that do not get along. She refers to friction between the Xhosa and Zulu (who is seen as IFP aligned) as an example. Emphasising the strained black on black\textsuperscript{23} relations as more serious than white and black relations to some extent diverts attention from race. This ‘tribal animosity’ is the largest threat to unity.

\[
\ldots\text{ the in-fighting amongst them is amazing, not amazing, its, its, its, its frightening, and you, you seem to get the impression as far as they’re concerned life is cheap. What I’ve also noticed now is that there are societies that, uh, they’re doing this necklacing, in other words that they get sick and tired of somebody who is raping or if they can get their hands on them, they will kill them.}\ [19]
\]

In commenting on their diversity, Patsy further contrasts their harshness indirectly compared to whites in general. Blacks are presented as settling conflicts and disputes with force. The harsh punishment dispensed, almost suggests images of a more primal treatment. This taps into a discourse similar to that of the ‘kangaroo courts’ Catherine [25] mentions, or ‘tribal justice’, Gwen [37] refers to.

Some contend the ordinary black African wants to retain their ethic association. Jannie [10A] notes that a Zulu is a Zulu and a Sotho is a Sotho. For him ‘own peoplehood’ (“eievolkigheid”) will never disappear in South Africa it will always be there. Hanneli believes traditions and cultures should be maintained. According to her

\textsuperscript{23} The notion that blacks were divided was a recurring theme. Bettie [4C] recalls how they used to live in different suburbs in the urban areas. Such ethnic zoning was policy rather than preference (Smit & Booysen 1982). Interviewees such as Engela [16B] contend whereas they were united against white rule, they have a natural animosity between each other. Kasper [48] refers to their internal conflicts before whites arrived.
A black person does not want that their people must marry with a white person. The white people do not want them to marry a black person. Now the lot who does it get excluded. Automatically. Whether they want it or not, it happens. … Its, I mean a sheep and a goat do not mix. You will not see that a sheep goes and mixes up a goat’s things. A sheep will not breed with a goat. Those types of things you know. So keep your cultural differences. What is good for a black, is not necessarily good for a white. As far as culture is concerned, with regard to those traditions. So, I don’t know, that is how I feel. 

[translated – see endnote32] [11]

Indicating that black people also prefer to stick to their own kind, Hanneli inoculates herself against a charge of bias. The use of the example of how species mate within their own kind is a recurring theme and further naturalises and fixes boundaries. This is juxtaposed to the official policy approving racial mixing24 and Hanneli [11] expresses concern that it would lead to a generation which has no firm roots in a particular culture or language.

Gertruida [10C] relates two anecdotes to demonstrate the naturalness of the boundaries and the complications crossing them generates. Yvette [13A] suggests they prefer their own schools and churches. According to Jannie [10A], these people prefer their own groups. Contrasting the rural and urban contexts, Jannie contends it is in urban areas where such boundaries may be broken and you get an untethered group like Sowetans. Sandra [35B] describes Gauteng as a melting pot.

Other interviewees refer to the pervasive and undermining influence of the mass media. For Petro [13B] the American media has a potential homogenising influence on blacks, ‘flattening’ their cultural associations. Danny [20] believes within the global context it is impossible to stop American influences. Guy [28A] is of the opinion that blacks are losing their identity, that they are Americanising, ‘but not taking the good stuff’ like their work ethic. He further contends that morals were broken down by the migrant system, damaging their culture.

24 Whereas Charlene [4B] and Lani [10B] disapprove of the racial mixing displayed on local television programmes, Emma [27] praises the breaking down of such boundaries.
7.7 How society may be changing

Reflecting on how society may be changing, most interviewees felt western influences, which they tended to associate with whites, would have the greatest impact. Gloria, Heleen and Mary argue

I think amongst the young people, uhm, they often equate speaking good English, uhm, with sort of aspirational stuff then. You know, they like model C schools, as white, is better. They do seem to think of white as being better and, and then they aspire to speaking better English and dressing like white people and blending. You know its, its yah, I think there’s certainly a, a certain I don’t think there’s that much of a black pride. I don’t think. I think they still have bought into the notion [that white is better] [Gloria, 23]

We all want to ride nice cars. It is not an issue of, uhm, Zulu people still dressing in their Zulu clothes and such types, keeping by that type of, uhm, traditions and such stuff. They want to, we all want to look like, like the people in America look. [translated – see endnote33] [Heleen, 24]

Well, you know, I do see that a lot of the, uh, sort of higher up black people in the high society or whatever are actually trying to hold on to their Africanism in that they are trying to hold on to traditional dress. I mean look at Dr Mandela with his prints, African print shirts and whatever, so they are trying to hold on to some of that. But quite frankly I think its becoming more westernised because they're all driving Mercedez, they all have lovely houses in Sandton, they go overseas… [Mary, 50]

All three seem to suggest that middle-class suburban life with its amenities is western. Africa, indirectly, is linked to tradition. It ultimately becomes something that can be consumed – like clothes, food or accessories. Margaret [26] and Sandy [52] see society as pretty westernised but recognise some Africanisation in music and art may be beneficial. Sandy refers to Madiba shirts, or the possibility of Christmas with an African theme. She feels that we have ignored a whole culture and that we can potentially enrich ourselves by learning more. In this regard Emma contends

I think we’ll have westernised black and white people saying “eish” instead of saying “jissis, God jong” [Jeez, God boy], because we also learnt to say that, you know like English speaking people got pulled into the way A., Afrikaans speaking people spoke, because it was an Afrikaner led country. …It’s like going into the next thing. We now, we listen to African music, you want to see my music collection, it used to be very Euro-centric it’s now very Afro-centric …teenagers are saying “eish” and the Africanisms, the indigenous Africanisms are spreading into the previously Euro-centric people. Uhm. Things like drumming. How many whiteys are in drumming circles, its
amazing and what are they drumming? African rhythms. Uhm What else? You look at the TV sitcoms, South African sitcoms, the ones about younger people ...SOS, amazingly integrated stuff. That is how, that is how I think we’re going to be. Look at a drama series like this Backstage, very integrated and if I look again to the West, the TV leads them into the reality that they live, but it also has to take a reality that’s already out there and popularise it [27]

The hybridity that Emma suggests is emerging still tends to centre on consumption and may suggest a degree of superficiality. However, not everyone is pleased by these displays of mixing in the media. I have pointed out how Charlene [4B], Lani [10B] and Olga [31B], for instance, disapprove of interracial relationships portrayed in the media.

Jasper [34A], Drien [34B], Nathan [44] and Deon [58A] confirm the association between what is regarded western, technological development and education. In this regard training is seen as an assurance that things would become more western within society. Douglas contends that the young black guys are going to make a difference in the country due to their education

The outlook is more like, I, I don’t know how to say, they getting more westernised, in inverted comma, or whatever, you know that. [58B]

He adds that one can look at any other African country. Whites develop it and when they leave things degenerate. Douglas attributes this in part to the fact that they want to take over the country and then ‘rule it like a communist state’. He claims it’s such a mentality that westernisation breaks. Dirk [22] expects more Africanisation and hence a decline in infrastructure. Craig [49] like Douglas refers to the decline that occurs when black Africans take control of the country. The conceptualisation of western then reflects a sense of superiority and reflects whiteness. Sakkie raises the following question on the sustainability of westernisation arguing that it has occurred in instances where blacks have been the minority. In this regard he contends

25 SOS is a locally produced sitcom on e-TV.
26 In section 2.2.2 the role of the mass media, consumption and the commodification of identities are discussed within the context of globalisation.
27 Hardus [39B] also contends that westernisation had a civilising influence reducing inter-tribal conflict. Debating with Michelle [58D], Douglas adds that westernisation helped them to stop ‘running around and eating each other’. Reflecting on the comment he adds that it sounds racist.
But you as sociologist will realise we talk a lot about, we must, to put it cruelly now. We easily say, it is easy to take the ‘kaffir’ out of the bush, but it is difficult to take the bush out of the ‘kaffir’. We cannot extract the bush from him, if we do not expose him to circumstances where there is no bush. So this culture or this shift cannot occur without exposure. [translated – see endnote34]

He does not see complete westernisation happening because they constitute an overwhelming majority. The assumption that the ‘white’ way is more civilised and superior is implicit in his remarks, again demonstrating the pervasiveness of whiteness.

There are some interviewees, like Drien [34B], who wonder whether black Africans fully adapt to western cultural influences and who think that their exposure to it may lead to maladjustment. William suggests that other races experience tension as a result of their exposure to western influences. He contends

The people I work with and the people I see actually try their best to be westernised. Uhm. They try and pull themselves out of, out of their own culture to, to, to, to act very western, uhm, and I think they’re, they try, they’re actually very uncomfortable in the situation they’re trying to force themselves into, uhm. So I, I think eventually the country will become more and more westernised… But I think its going to take a long time because they also have their cultural backgrounds they have their own ways and religions and beliefs and things and its probably causing a lot of inner conflict in the people. So, uh, it, its difficult to say, I think, I don’t, I think they, they, they would act westernised and, and that but, uh, I don’t think its really where they want to be. I don’t think its where, they want to feel comfortable, yet they have to keep the pose. [51]

Some suggest, excesses within western cultures can be corrupting or damaging. Markus [31A] refers to a black colleague’s comment that the permissiveness on television has corrupted traditional African values. Nathan [44] believes that a Judeo-Christian frame of thinking (which is seen as being western) cannot be imposed on other cultures.

In contrast Arlene28 [30B] sees tackling the white western male-dominated value system as crucial for transformation. She contends both women and Africans are more

28 Given her and her husband Ian’s sustained commitment to transforming society (see 6.1), they engage with current debates around what the identity possibilities in a post-apartheid setting may be.
relationship orientated, co-operative rather than competitive. For her this implies a new vision for society. Unprompted she contends

…in the African Renaissance, when we’re talking about that, we’re talking about whose value systems are going to be paramount in this society, in the future. And I think that we need to find challenges – how do we find the blend? … that’s why I say South Africa for me is so exciting, because if you’re in America and you’re a black person you just have to go with this white male dominated WASP Anglo-Saxon way of doing things. In Africa we have the real opportunity to be able to have the best of both that white Anglo-Saxon WASP tradition and the African ubuntu communal culture. And I think it’s so exciting. [30B]

Ian [30A] agrees there are value changes. He comments that during apartheid the ‘reformation’ ruled, and that the notion of renaissance captures the creativity and flux of the current period. He was brought up to see ‘white standards’ as the only standards and received all privileges reserved for whites. This is no longer a position he holds. His involvement in anti-apartheid struggles, at community level, exposed him to other people and taught him many lessons.

With regard to change, echoing sentiments also expressed by Emma on the benefits of diversity, Francis contends

If you can get it right in Africa, we’ve got far, far greater opportunity to be far more creative because there is far greater diversity, we don’t live it out thinking in the same way, and, and we also, I think Africa is more emotionally intelligent than a lot of other, definitely, uh, far more than Europe and probably more than America as well. [P3]

On a more pessimistic note, Robert [53] regards the idea of an African Renaissance a good intention but lacking in basics on how to bring it to fruition. He can further not really define what an African Renaissance would entail. In contrast, Dieter [36] argues that the purpose of the African Renaissance is to make the country more African and that is not white.

Robert, generally, is not in favour of Africanising the country and suggests that it is necessary to consider what it implies. He argues that if Africanisation implies

The public debates around Africanisation and the African Renaissance are discussed in sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.7.
‘African time’, it will lead to unproductiveness. If it refers to language policy it is counter-productive because an international language is required for success. However, if Africanisation means wearing African printed shirts, he contends, its fine because fashion changes. These comments again devalue what is regarded African, and what Africa can contribute in comparison to what is regarded as western contributions.

Interviewees respond with mixed feelings to the possibility of greater African influence in society. For some like Una [32] it is not something they can associate themselves with. She stereotypically refers to the ‘dancing, screaming and singing’ of black Africans and says she prefers more civilised and restrained ways of expression. Peter also says

I, I would guess, personally, they’re going to become Africanised. … Well Africa’s got its unique way of doing things. Haven’t they? They toyi-toyi29, they have big, big sing-ons and dance-ons and they, they wear very Africanised clothing. I mean if you take the Zulu race in, in, in, in KwaZulu Natal. I mean they’re still very happy to, to run around in leopard skins in, in the year 2003. [46]

From these conversations what is regarded black African is represented as primitive, traditional and often contrasted to the refined western tastes. Ina thinks only a small number of whites would be swayed to Africanise. She says

You know they, they will tend towards that direction and you will get your people who would do it, yes and with them, put on skins and dance together around the fire and things but I think the majority will not do it. I do not think so. [translated – see endnote35] [9]

Joyce says that she will not be happy taking on an African identity. In response Guy says he is African and she too. Rejecting this, she responds (displaying whiteness)

Never been African. [Guy: You are] No, I’m not, I have never run around the bush in a loin cloth and never will … I’m not African, my descent is not there at all, I don’t even have that DNA in me, I mean I’m not African why would I want to be African? [Guy: But I think there’s a lot of that, that is good and we mustn’t no, not force it, but we must not dispose of it, just for western identity. Because, we’re not even westerners anymore]. [28B]

29 Toyi-toyi refers to a protest dance enacted during mass marches.
Guy’s reference to no longer being westernised, suggests a rootedness in Africa and tolerance towards others. This coalesces with his notion that he is South African and has the right to be here as a citizen, even though he does feel that a South Africanness has not yet emerged.

The negative stereotype of Africa was common in many interviewees’ responses. However, some did see value in retaining African traditions and practices. Amongst these interviewees there were two strands of thought. The one group believed that maintaining these cultural practices were important for black people themselves and also emphasised their difference to whites. Some viewed African traditions primarily in consumerist terms, but a minority believed that whites could benefit by engaging with black traditions.

7.8 Conclusion

The notion of a rainbow nation receives a mixed reception. For patriots the notion of a rainbow nation implies mixing, something they do not condone. Dieter [36] talks about getting one brown stripe (when all colours are mixed together) and Kasper [48] says that you get a ‘shitty’ colour if you mix all the colours of the rainbow together.

Some interviewees like the notion of a rainbow nation. Tiaan [5A] sees the rainbow nation as implying greater co-operation as he has indicated in their community where they have established a satellite centre for the black aged. Dirk [22] likes the notion that all belong regardless of their differences. He admits that this notion suggests a

30 Unprompted Craig [49] says there are many similarities with how other African countries started at dependence and where they are now. The decline of Zimbabwe is often suggested substantiating negative claims of what happens under African rule. In this regard Robert [46] suggests that South Africa provides the last opportunity to show the world they can do things properly.

31 Several relate anecdotes that indicate a degree of disassociation from new symbols. Marie [4A] for instance relates a tale where their tour guide initially used ‘Bafana-Bafana’ (the name of the soccer team) to call their group travelling overseas together. They quickly stopped him and told him to call ‘Vrystaat’ (Free State). Charlene [4B] relates another incident where their tour group undertook to perform the national anthem and they sang all four verses of ‘The Call of South Africa’. Asked by others whether their anthem was not ‘Nkosi Mandela’ (sic) they replied, no they had sung their anthem. Sandra [35B] also refuses to learn the new anthem.
superficial unity, but such a unity on the surface level where people co-operate publicly but privately live their own life suits him.

A number of interviewees feel that the rainbow has not yet really emerged. Danny [20] does not believe that it ever was a rainbow nation, in spite of Mandela’s attempts to unite the people. Guy [28A] agrees that such unity is not achieved with a flick of a switch, that it will be a gradual process. Markus [31A] contends that the rainbow nation implies inclusiveness but that colour is still generally seen. In this respect Audrey comments

Right now we are, there is no rainbow nation at the moment not for us. We are being, we are being oppressed, our colour is being oppressed at the moment. [21]

Ian, critical of rainbowism, believes the changes whites have made are superficial. He contends

They have a superficial change and the sort of rainbow nation …but a rainbow doesn’t have black in its composition and, uhm, therefore they accept the rainbow quite well, because it doesn’t juggle with their, uh, perception that they are still privileged. [30A]

South African society, then, considering the collective narratives of middle-class whites remains a fragmented society. In spite of attempts to foster a national identity, most only superficially acknowledge it. Black and white differences remain reified.

This chapter does not provide a generalisable overview on the perceptions of people in the communities studied. It displays the variability in discourse within these communities, demonstrating how people talk about the change and its impact on them. Whereas the two rural communities studied was predominantly Afrikaans there is a variety of positionings taken up within them, just like there is a variety of positionings within urban communities. There are overlaps in the discourses that emerge in the urban and rural communities as well as between the Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers. Besides this variability, between groups, there is variability and there are even contradictions that arise in a single interview. I have pointed out some examples where this has occurred to underpin the fluidity of discourse.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

South Africa is one of the societies that experienced social and political transformation at the end of the twentieth century. This transformation raised questions of belonging and solidarity amongst its diverse citizenry. The commodification of culture within the context of globalisation during this period added to the fluidity of identities.

Numerous studies have focussed on questions of identity within the South African context, drawing on diverse disciplines within the humanities and social sciences, during this current period of transition. These studies have relied on divergent methodologies ranging from ethnography to surveys. Besides academic labour, there have been literary works as well as commentaries (including biographical and autobiographical work) in the public domain addressing these issues. This broad range of publications adds to an understanding of questions of identity in a changing context.

This study aims to add to the broader field of knowledge on transition within South Africa, mindful of its own limitations. Conducted almost a decade in the transition, this research is historically located. It focuses on how interviewees belonging to a social category, which has been privileged historically within the society, experience the transition from apartheid to a non-racial democracy. The category is middle-class whites1.

In chapter five I have argued that interviews, considered pragmatically, are an appropriate methodology to study the discourse on change amongst middle-class whites. I suggest that the material generated in the interview is not ‘naturally occurring talk’ within everyday contexts. Being an interviewee-based study, then, is one of the limitations that have to be kept in mind when considering the results reported. Interviews invite talking ‘about’. However, interviewees themselves can be

1 The reason for studying middle-class whites is unpacked in chapter 5. To restate the argument briefly, the middle-class constitutes the largest subcategory of whites as a result of systematic privileging.
considered a social situation, and it is attention to this micro-discourse that provides an indication and illustration of ways of talking in the public domain.

This study then, focuses on the discursive practice of a subgroup of ordinary citizens (categorised as white middle-class) and how they negotiate identity, within a context. Interviews allow a degree of flexibility. In this research, the conversations were open-ended in order to allow the interviewees to express their thoughts.

The amount of data generated in interviews is considerable, as I point out in chapter five. This then leads to another limitation qualitative studies face – generalisability. As a result of the amount of material interviewees generate, the sample is limited.

This study focusing on middle-class whites cannot generalise to the entire domain of white experience within the South African context. This research furthermore studies experiences within specific communities. The interview, though a social situation in itself, does not reflect the full range of everyday discourse. In this regard findings can only be provisional, drawing heavily on the interpretation of the researcher.

With the democratisation of South African society the position whites as a social category historically enjoyed is challenged. The majority government face the challenge of building civic consent within a divided society. Consequently, they need to develop new institutions and symbols.

Talking about transformation is topical. It is an issue interviewees recognise as significant and are familiar with. Matters of transformation are often raised in daily discourse as a result of the processes of social change people face within society. In describing the social change they observe interviewees contemplate the impact of changing global and local contexts and raise a number of concerns regarding it. There is a link between personal experiences and public issues in these discourses.

The conversations on societal transformation in this study provide a vehicle to examine discourse on identity. This strategy provides access to the articulation
between societal change, their personal experience of it, as well as to how they represent it. Attention is paid to how they refer to themselves and to others. They provide access to how affiliations are constructed and maintained, revealing the relationship between the ‘self’ and ‘other’. Such accounts are not merely passive verbal representations of pre-existing identities. The degree of debate and contestation within a single category such as Afrikanership attests to the constructed nature of such identities and how they are both historically located and renegotiated within a changing context (see chapter 7).

Under normal conditions identity is taken for granted. It becomes an issue when threatened. The primary question underpinning this study is: To what extent do white interviewees in the communities studied still react in terms of a racialised identity, and if this is so, how is it reconstituted? This relates to the question of whether normative and structural changes within society have resulted in more flexible identities. The responses show whether change is perceived as a threat or an opportunity. Related to the responses is a parallel question on whether measures to address equity re-inscribe race in society.

One of the assumptions I made is that transformation keeps issues relating to race on the public agenda, for ordinary citizens, especially given South African society’s history of racial engineering. ‘Whites’ formed a key constituency historically, and attempts at redress and achieving greater social justice in society threaten their status and privilege. The changes in society potentially pose a crisis with regard to how whites represent themselves. Societal transformation implies a changing political economy of race. This changing context impacts on the social relations which sustain the identities. According to Michael (1996) identities are constructed within specific contexts.

Since the hegemony of whiteness is challenged by the societal change which has occurred, the way in which interviewees deal with racial matters is of particular interest. In interviewing care was taken to avoid raising race initially. Questions of race were introduced at the end of the interview (see appendix A). Hence, the
emergence of direct and indirect references to race in discourses on transformation reflects the pre-eminence of it in the South African context.

The dislocation brought about by transformation in society yields new possibilities in articulating identity (although the options or alternatives arguably are limited historically within a social context). On a general level, it appears that past forms of identification remain influential. This is in part because these identifications are so strongly ingrained within the social fabric that they are difficult to escape completely.

Attending to micro-discourse, interviewee narratives are ultimately self-representations, shaping how they want to be known, and therefore are an attempt to project a positive image. This addresses the issue of the extent to which there is continuity and change in collective imagining. Several examples of the avoidance of race, what Frankenberg (1993) terms race evasiveness and denial of racism before criticising a racial other in interviewee discourse are provided in chapters six and seven.

By talking about transformation and how it affects them, the interviewees provide accounts of how they see themselves being situated in the changing societal context. Such accounts often refer to an ‘other’ against whom their identity is demarcated and therefore establish the interviewees’ identities as well as the identities of others. The discourses evident on the communities in chapter six and the country in chapter seven illustrate a range of positionings with regard to identity as well as how identity is constructed relationally. Hence, some interviewees in Edensvlakte dissociate themselves from traditional notions of Afrikanerdorn and related stereotypes associated with that. In both Edensvlakte and Wesveld a majority of interviewees were keen to demonstrate their moderation and acceptance of societal change. In a similar fashion some English-speakers blame past policies on Afrikaners. By blaming the Afrikaners they then attribute blame for the past policy of privileging whilst absolving themselves from any complicity.
This study then demonstrates how change is perceived and represented. It considers what the change means to interviewees. However, these ‘meanings’ are not isolated – there are shared repertoires (recurring themes and ways of expressing them) that emerge, which develop in interaction with others.

It is these broader patterns of collective sense-making and understanding that the analysis considers. It is apparent that the categories referred to in this process are culturally available resources to describe, identify or refer to others. The references to their and others’ identity are of particular interest in these conversations. A positioning in terms of identity occurs with regard to the broader social and historical context. Institutional practices and social structures consequently impinge on identities.

Hyslop (2000) argues that white people in South Africa increasingly identified themselves as ‘middle-class’ as the appeal of defining themselves collectively in racial terms waned. Studies suggest that the shifting dynamics of class within the politically dominant group during the apartheid era created structural conditions amenable to change and an orientation towards consumption (Seekings 2003; Tomlinson 1990). I have discussed these notions in chapter four.

In spite of the argument that class had replaced race as a primary identity in the changing circumstances, class based concerns remain central to the way in which the racial groups perceive each other. This is evident from the interview discourse presented in chapter six. What such a ‘middle-class’ identification means, as well as the extent to which the middle-class is deracialised, is addressed in chapter six. Evidence from interviewees in both Johannesburg and Pretoria is provided to support the argument that class remains deeply infused with whiteness even though the racial nature of it is masked.

In this dissertation, I have, to a large extent, focused on the representational dimension of discourse, providing a description of how changes are perceived, quoting extensively from interviewee responses.
As I have suggested, the interview is a specific discursive situation and the transcripts reflect the pragmatics of this conversational context. In chapters five, six and seven I have alluded to this briefly. May (2002) corroborates the view that the questions asked to some extent structure the responses obtained. This then is one of the limitations of interviewee-based studies that need to be borne in mind when considering the results.

There is a distinct possibility that interviewees report what they think the researcher expects, or what is socially acceptable. We have to accept that the discourses recorded in this study are not merely simple descriptions of reality. In chapter five I have suggested that this is not in itself problematic as such misrepresentations also occur in every-day discourse.

The assumption that the representations reflect actual practices is linked to naively considering interviewees as describing actual behaviour. The interviewee-talk is not the actual behaviour (except in the sense that the interview itself is a social situation). Put differently, it does not provide access to behaviour elsewhere. Another limitation of this research is that actual behaviour is not accessed (except in the limited sense of the interview, viewed as a social situation, suggested above).

The evidence generated in the study then needs to be treated with caution. For example, several interviewees suggest a level of integration which is not reflected in actual practice or casual observation of the setting. However, it should be remembered that people often alter their behaviour when they are aware that they are being observed by a researcher.

The naive assumption that interviewees are simple repositories of information and that interaction is a neutral medium of communication through which facts are conveyed that mirror reality has been discredited in the social sciences. Becker (1998:8) argues, research subjects are “not simply unknowing carriers of the conventional world’s thoughts”, serving merely as a source of information.
By considering what discourses accomplish, its constitutive function is revealed. In my analysis in chapters six and seven I have been attentive to this matter. Discursive practices present a version of reality which is not merely a reflection of what exists out there but an interpretation thereof. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that the discourses are not just reports describing an external world in a dispassionate way, but, that as rhetoric they aim to convince the reader/hearer of a particular position. Discourse is a product of social interaction and in this respect the product of social exchange (Calhoun 1995).

Viewing discourse in this way then underlines an important matter. The interviewees are not simply rehearsing already existing discourse. They do have a degree of agency in how they represent themselves and justify their position. This draws on their own reflexivity and contributes to the immense variability within discourse (in spite of broad discursive resources being mobilised).

The methods of self-accounting evident in the interview context, as well as the themes raised during it, have a broader resonance and suggest a generality outside. In the interviews, interviewees are engaged in constructing a variety of identity positions such as situating themselves as both reasonable human beings with good reputations, as well as co-operative and willing research subjects. This requires attentiveness to multiple positionings, and to fluidity.

Hall (1996) argues that what is needed in addressing questions of identity is a theory of discursive practice rather than one of a knowing subject. The participants interviewed in this study are aware of and attentive to the accounts they present. It should be apparent that accounts cannot simply be treated as reflections directly describing events. Identity then encompasses a sense of who we were, are and will be. The socio-historical context impacts on both the current sense of identity and on interpretations of the past and current events. An expectation of what will occur in the future is also influential.
Identities determine peoples’ positioning and relationships in the social world. They open up questions of a sense of belonging, a sense of community, the salience of locality, as well as the extent to which there is a personal, historical attachment, a rootedness to the locality. Although the excerpts cited in the study are reflections voiced by different people, and contain a variety of discursive and rhetorical moves, each involves a particular representation of a self that is defended. In discussing some of the excerpts, I have pointed out how interviewees take care in their representations to deflect any criticism of bias, especially where a potentially racially sensitive topic is discussed. One example I provided is the lengthy excerpt of a discussion about cultural differences in sexual mores in chapter six. In this discussion practices in ‘black’ informal settlements are described and indirectly contrasted to practices in white settlements. I return to this example in chapter seven to illustrate how the discourse accomplishes drawing a distinction between racial groups as well as evaluate them.

Changing social relations, due to the political transition, lead to changing discourses and practices. The results of this study, to some extent, reveal how interviewees respond to the political, economic and social dimensions of post-apartheid urban transformation. A brief comparison of discourses on the South African society in this study with those recorded by Boot-Siertsema and Boot (1982) in the 1970s and early 1980s demonstrate the contingent nature of taken for granted viewpoints within society. The results of this study can further be compared to the work of Schutte (1995) conducted in white communities during the period leading up to the transition, as well as that of Steyn (1999) conducted shortly after the political transition.

What is most striking, particularly when interviews conducted by Boot-Siertsema and Boot (1982) are considered, is the discrepancies between what people, in general, said in the past and how they recall it in the present. This suggests memory is not merely retrieved, but recalled bearing the current context and concerns in mind. This is reflected by the joke, that it is difficult to find a ‘white’ person who supported apartheid in South Africa today. I pointed out in chapter six that interviewees have acknowledged a trend towards political correctness. Danny [20] observes that many
have purged any support they had for the National Party from their memory, some claiming they never supported apartheid. He adds “Where the hell are they now? The Lord knows.” Similar observations are made by several scholars (see chapter four).

This study then demonstrates the salience of white subjectivities. However, comparing current discourses with past discourses illustrates how ‘whiteness’ operates differentially across time and space. It reveals how discourse has been altered within an Africanising context, to adapt to changing circumstances, with past events being reinterpreted in the present with an eye on the future. The responses provide insight into how lives are rethought and remade in a post-apartheid context. Where a majority of white people expressed overt racism in the past, only a minority do today. The pervasiveness of race consciousness is demonstrated both directly and indirectly. Prejudice has been transformed into subtle expression. Whilst the thrust of their comments suggest a decline of a suburb is linked to the racial ‘other’, or crime is linked to such an ‘other’, interviewees are quick to qualify their comments to protect themselves against a charge of racism. The caution around issues of race demonstrates their reflexivity, their awareness of a social taboo in the changing context and the need to present themselves in a positive light.

A number of interviewees went to great lengths to emphasise the contact they had with people of other races, to demonstrate their tolerance, even though such contact remained limited. They expressed a willingness to socialise, often attributing the lack of such social contact to the homogenous nature of their community. In this respect emphasising class became an attractive alternative as it deflects attention from race. Interviewees were clearly concerned with maintaining the class position they had attained, and policies aimed at racial redress created an amount of anxiety. Hence there is strong support for a notion of colour-blindness. The shift in attention from race, to class, is attractive to these interviewees because it deflects attention from categorisations of the past and their concomitant privileging. There were a number of interviewees however who expressed no desire for social contact, and emphasised clear maintenance of social boundaries. They justified this by fixing the racial other as culturally different, as having different lifestyles due to tradition.
It is apparent that race has remained a socially meaningful category in everyday discourse. Goldberg (1993:8) argues that

past kinds of racist expression need not exhaust the sorts of exclusions capable of being expressed in the name of race. ...The possibility of new racism – a more subtle and silently sophisticated racism, a racism that dare not mention its name, is assumed away as it orders social formations anew.

How the interviewees position themselves, how they reproduce ‘race’ discursively plays a key role in constituting subjectivity, and contributes to the construction of racial identity. In general, they continue to position themselves as white in relation to conventional notions of an ‘other’.

Assessing the ‘typicality’ of the views expressed by the interviewees remains difficult. In spite of diverse backgrounds, reflecting multiple positions in society, there is repetition in broad issues interviewees raise in response to non-directive questions about the social changes they observe. At a structural level, given past policies, interviewees benefited materially. Such divisions are still marked by a segregated way of life in society. They suggest shared interests in maintaining a foothold of privilege. The privileged position whites enjoyed is more ‘precarious’ with the dismantling of racial hegemony which in the past left their whiteness unmarked as the ‘norm’. The concerns they voice, cast light on their experience of living in and adapting to a changing context. These accounts of and concerns about change held by middle-class white residents in more affluent areas reveal insecurities.

The rural communities and Pretoria subsamples were predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, whereas the Johannesburg subsample was predominantly English-speaking. I have often been asked what my conclusions or the findings of my research are with regard to the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking white communities. The expectation raised by such a question is that firm generalisations on the differences between the communities I have studied will be provided. In answering I sense a disappointment, as I tend to emphasise the variability and fluidity of discourse within the communities I studied.
The notion that Afrikaans-speaking rural communities are more conservative is anticipated in the responses of interviewees in these communities who go to great lengths to dissociate themselves from such a stereotype. These instances provide an example of the reflexivity of interviewees and how they within a particular interactional context resist a predetermined characterisation being imposed on them.

As I pointed out in the dissertation, my aim is to gain insight and understanding in how identities are constructed and maintained. In this regard I have emphasised the interviewees’ need to present a moral self. In instances where interviewees take a more hardline approach with regard to their racial distinctiveness the morality of their identity lies in their absolute belief in the ideology underpinning their identity choice. This study has not drawn a representative sample from the communities. I have selected interviewees bearing diversity rather than representivity in mind. In spite of these caveats I venture a few general observations.

There is no doubt in my mind that the conversations on transformation provide a number of examples of ‘identity work’. In general terms there is a claim to a South African birthright by interviewees. They do not necessarily support the new symbols but see themselves as South Africans, and in the changing context recognise the rights of others. Although this recognition of the rights of others to be South African, may seem obvious, it is a significant shift from stances held in the past and a recognition of a changing context. This is a positive development.

Specific identities are also salient and sustained within interviews. The change has emphasised the variability of Afrikaner identity discussed in chapter seven. One example is that provided by interviewees in Edensvlakte, Wesveld and Pretoria who display a strong identification with a traditional Afrikaner identity. These Boer Afrikaners, as some like to present themselves, represent a discourse which draws on the myths of an Afrikaner identity they were socialised into. I discussed the historical unfolding of such an Afrikaner identity and the ideology underpinning it in chapter four. Their discourse on Afrikanerdom demonstrates how embedded systems of
meaning and concepts provide a coherent way of representing the world. Their
conversations further demonstrate that this is an active identity choice and that they
remain engaged in inculcating such beliefs in the youth (the success they achieve is
not a matter that was addressed or ascertained during the research). Aligned to such a
position then is a reactive response rejecting the current socio-political context.
However, it is also apparent that there are Afrikaners who have taken a more
pragmatic stance towards change within society. Amongst these interviewees there
remains an affinity to racial, religious and class affiliations but at the same time a
stated willingness to accommodate the change. There is some defensive positioning
around their current privileged situation.

The English-speakers, who do not form a homogenous group either, generally have
come across as more sensitive towards racial matters. However, in spite of not
analysing this extensively in the dissertation, lapses in the discourse of tolerance by
some English-speakers can be regarded as stereotypical as the position generally
associated with Afrikaans-speakers.

A notion of whiteness is evident in the discourse of both English-speakers and
Afrikaans-speakers when they tend to dictate what should be regarded as acceptable
middle-class values. Where racial differences are discussed there seems to be a shift
from race to culture, confirming the general pattern of race evasiveness associated
with whiteness discussed in chapter three.

In the final instance, what are the possibilities for a non-racial future? On the positive
side a majority of the interviewees, at least in private express a degree of tolerance.
Although this expressed tolerance reflects a display of socially acceptable behaviour,
it is progress.

Interviewees do tend to feel racially marked by policy which increases their sense of
vulnerability. These policies are also experienced as being exclusive. Within their
social lives they lead and prefer to associate with others of the same race. There are a
few interviewees who voiced progressive responses to societal change or seek new
identity alternatives. The extent to which such possibilities can be realised is however not entirely within their hands.

The aim of this study has been to consider the identifications of white middle-class South Africans within a changing societal context. The notion of whiteness in the literature serves as a sensitising concept on how race may continue to play a key role in the post-apartheid context. Engaging with the discourse on transition the research aims to provide insight into how interviewees reflect on their identity choices.

In spite of a great degree of individual variation interviewees’ discourse tends to reveal a considerable degree of continuity and association with identities that have been established in the past, albeit modified to meet the demands of the current changing context. In this regard a shift towards emphasising class as a basis of differentiation or an emphasis on culture, which as studies on whiteness suggest conveniently masks race, has been demonstrated.

There is no singular identity. In this regard a majority of the interviewees still see themselves in terms such as South African, white, English-speaking, Afrikaans-speaking.

I would conclude by emphasising that I have drawn on my own understanding of the literature and research context in analysing the data. There is no single or final interpretation. I have attempted to provide a comprehensive account of how the interviewees represent themselves and others in conversations of change in the society at a particular point in time.
Chapter endnotes

Chapter four

1 Iedere geslag verlustig hom in die duurgekogte regte en vryhede van die vorige ...maar binne ’n mens se leeftyd het ons die prys vergeet, waarvoor dit alles verkoop en betaal word (Steyn 1987:i).

2 As daar een opvatting is wat soos ’n goue draad deur die geskiedenis van die Afrikaner loop, dan is dit dat hy soos Israel van die Ou Testament ’n uitverkore Volk is - God’s Volk, soos Paul Kruger hom dikwels genoem het (Van Jaarsveld 1978:72).

3 Dié begrensing is deur God se skeppingsorde getrek en niemand kan daaruit ontvlug nie. ...Reeds in ’n vroeë stadium na die volksplanting aan die Kaap, het die blanke bevolking tot die besef gekom dat daar tussen hulle en die nie-blanke groepe onoorbrugbare verskille berstaan. Eenersyds was dit ’n verskil tussen Christen en heiden en andersyds ’n verskil tussen beskaaf en onbeskaaf (Hauptfleish 1990:58,176).


5 Vir die Afrikaner kan dit om verskeie redes in een woord saamgevat word: krisis. ...In die verlede het die Afrikaner opgetree asof hy die enigste nasionalistiese volk of nasie is wat binne die totaliteit van die Suid-Afrikanse bevolking vir die regtighede van die mens pixel saam. ...Reeds in ’n vroeë stadium na die volksplanting aan die Kaap, het die blanke bevolking tot die besef gekom dat daar tussen hulle en die nie-blanke groepe onoorbrugbare verskille berstaan. Eenersyds was dit ’n verskil tussen Christen en heiden en andersyds ’n verskil tussen beskaaf en onbeskaaf (Hauptfleish 1990:314).

Chapter five

1 Dit is waarom dit belangrik is vir iemand soos jy om die studie te doen en die lig te laat sien daar buite waar jy met mense in hulle, in privaat, te gesels en vra, maar hoe voel jy rêrig hieroor? Want op die ou einde van die dag word daar nie, uh, meer voorsiening gemaak, of hulle, hulle dink eintlik almal is liberaal en dink soos hulle dink [Adriaan, 33A].

Chapter six

1 Kyk, en dit was nag gewees. Want om ’n swart buurman te hê is een ding, maar om ’n duisend of twee swart bure te hê. Toe’t ons besef dis ver by. Dis ver by. As hulle op ons grees ’n dorp vestig met vyf honderd huise in die orde van twee, drie duisend swartmense dan is dit verby soos met alle ander grensplekke. [Charles:Ja] So erg, so dat ons ou swart mens vir my kom sê het Oubaas verkoop die beeste voor die tyd. Hulle gaan elke bees steel. Goed, so dit was een van, dit was nou ’n impak wat ons intens beleef het [Sakkie, 6A].
Daar was net een man, dis nou wat politiek reg voorspel het, en dit was Jaap Marais. [Charlene: Ja, sy politiek was die suiweste politiek wat daar was.] Hy’t dit in 1970 gesê en dit het alles net so gekom. … Hy was standvastig tot op die end. [Marie, 4A]

3 Jong nee, nee ’n ou het nie, ek het dit nie geglo dit sal so maklik gebeur nie en lat lat ’n een een Afrikaner dit aan ons kon doen. F W de Klerk. Dat hy dit aan ons, aan sy eie mense kan doen. Dat hy so min vir jou beding vir jou mense so min. Hy’s ’n hond man. Hy’s ’n fokker hond man. … Ons moes maar net inmal by hierdie manne. En hierdie manne het ons rondgeskop net soos hulle wil. Hulle doen dit nou nog. Daar, daar sit hy nou met ’n jagse Griek hy “worry” nie. Huh. [Kasper, 48]

4 …daai Siener Van Rensburg, en hy’t gesê die vierkleur sal weer wapper en op die platteland glo hulle sterk aan daai ding, dat dinge in Suid-Afrika gaan weer so verander, dat die blankes weer sal regere. Uh. Dit is ’n sterk gevoel wat onder die boere nog is [Ina, 9]

5 Daar’s “no way in hell”, ekskus dat ek dit so uitdruk, waar ’n boer, ek praat nou van die ou garde boer, respek vir hom sal hê nie [Marius, 15].

6 Maar ek dink die ouens begin besef dit, jy weet, dit gaan jou niks bring nie, want daar’s nie ’n manier wat ’n ou so kan funksioneer nie. Ek en my man verskil natuurlik oor hierdie siening ook [Elbie, 14].

7 Ek dink ons, ons as Gelowige glo aan die kerngroep. Daar’s ’n kerngroep wat gesond gaan bly. … Ons leer dit uit die Bybelsdae uit, uit die volk Israel uit. Ons as, as Afrikanervolk het ons baie, ons sê nie ons is Israeli nie, maar ons het ons baie vereenselwig met die volk [Change cassette tape] …daaar’s ’n kern in die volk wat sy, wat sy standaarde gaan handhaaf. Hy gaan die, ek gaan boere Afrikaner bly, maar ek gaan ’n klomp randeiers hé in die volk. …Jou, jou groot groep mense is, is minder, minder vas. …Nou sê ons die kerngroep is daar. Hy sal daar bly. Hy sal suiwier bly want dit is al hoop wat ons het soos met die volk Israel. Daar’t ’n kerngroep, het die Here altyd gesê, daar’s ’n kerngroep en die kern sal daar bly en so glo ons, in ons volk ók. Die kern, gesond, wat vashou aan die beginsels van die Here sal daar bly. Maar dan sit jy met jou randeiers hy met jou ongelukkig, dis so, in jou volk is, hulle wat sal afbeweeg [Daniel, 47]

8 ’n Maul wat saamtruk hê en ons moet voel ons is ’n volk. Wat is ons vandag? Ons is niks nie. Ons is niks wat ons op kan trots wees nie [Charlene, 4B].

9 Hy’s al die tyd in beheer van alles. …Ons weet nie wat is Sy doel met die verandering nie. Of Hy, jy weet, ons dalk wil wakker maak of wat nie. Weet, want kyk Israel het Hy baie keer gestraf as hulle verkeerd loop [Antonie, 12].

10 Wat beteken Van Riebeekdag? …daaar ons, uh, blanke ras begin. Daar’t ons Godsdiens begin. Daar’t ons onderrig begin. Alles, alles het daar begin. Ek meen, ons kan dit nou laat tot niet gaan nie [Antonie, 12].

11 ’n Volk moet, moet, moet soos lankal was, ons moet saamtrek hê en ons moet voel ons is ’n volk. Wat is ons vandag? Ons is niks nie. …Ons het niks wat ons op kan trots wees nie [Charlene, 4B].

12 Nou ja, nou sê dit ongelukkig dat hul voor die tyd gevang. Soos ek sê die die mense het vir my sulke oop en onskuldig dit hulle, maar hulle word behandeld asof hulle die grootste kriminele is. Nou kan jy verstaan. In daai selfde saal, hofsaal of wat ookal is Mandela ook as ’n vreeslike krimineel beskou, maar hulle het natuurlik kriminele dade bietjie aangemoedig, terwyl ons mense op die oomblik nie kriminele dade beoog [Yvette, 10A].

13 Maar ’n groepie ou mense is ontsettend hatig. Radikaal. Kan nie verander nie, glo dit was ’n groot fout gewees, as te ware vir die zwarte te gee [Sakkie, 6A].

14 Nee, ek sal ók nie gaan nie, met ’n klomp en nou so aan en die vierkleur gaan waai vir een of ander iets wat. Ek stel nie daarin belang nie. Ek sal ook nie eers as ’n ou Suid-Afrikaanse vlagiewers gaan waai vir een of ander iets nie. Ek meen vir wat om welke doel, om? Dit maak nie vir my sin uit nie [Mervyn, 17].

15 Hoor hier jong … ‘daaar waar julle vandaan kom het julle seker swartmense maar hier by ons het jy net kaffers’. En, ehie, dis, dit is, dit is tipies [Lani, 10B]

16 Toe sê die een ou, jy bedoel seker meide. Toe sê ek, nee man, daar is nie meide op my plaas nie, ek het nie meide en kaffers op my plaas nie. Ek het swart mans en swart vrouens wat vir my werk. En, daai ou het my ’n hele ruk die koue skouer gegee, maar daai dag is verby, kyk of dit nou nie meer nie [Herman, 3A].
die ouens hulle praat dieselfde taal. Ons lewe lekker saam. Dit is regtig, ek moet amper sê ‘n diep groep. Jy weet hulle verstaan maar hoe ek kom by die eerste logiese ding wat in jou kop opkom, is ver van ‘n “township” of ‘n groot dorp waar daar al ’n klomp mense bly. [Sandra, 35B]

Jy weet jy wonder hoekom is ons nog nie geteiken nie, aanvalle nie, dit is maar die eerste logiese ding wat in jou kop opkom, is ver van ‘n “township” of ‘n groot dorp waar daar al ’n klomp mense bly. [Sandra, 35B]

ek is Afrikaans grootgemaak. In Johannesburg praat ek omtrent nooit Afrikaans nie. Daar’s baie min mense in Johannesburg wat weet dat ek Afrikaans is. Dis of ek ‘n ‘switch’ in my brein het, wat as ek deur die tweede tolhek gaan, dan is dit verby. Dan kan ek nie meer Engels praat nie [Heleen, 24].

Hulle het absoluut hierdie munisipaliteit as ‘n blanke regime gesien wat absoluut sê... houtkop wat soek jy hier? [Petro, 13B]

Ja-nee, nee hulle is hulle is die manne in beheer, of die ouens wat gewoonlik die besluite moet neem is nou nuwe Suid-Afrikaners. In Johannesburg praat ek omtrent nooit Afrikaans nie. Daar’s baie min mense in Johannesburg wat weet dat ek Afrikaans is. Dis of ek ‘n ‘switch’ in my brein het, wat as ek deur die tweede tolhek gaan, dan is dit verby. Dan kan ek nie meer Engels praat nie [Heleen, 24].

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Ben, 41]. Jy weet hulle verstaan mekaar en kom baie goed oor die weg. [Ben, 41].

Jy weet jy wonder hoekom is ons nog nie geteiken nie, aanvalle nie, dit is maar die eerste logiese ding wat in jou kop opkom, is ver van ‘n “township” of ‘n groot dorp waar daar al ’n klomp mense bly. [Sandra, 35B]

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mense wat baie beter verpleërs is, en euters is, as wat witmense is, want dit is, dit is nie ’n beroep nie. Dis ’n liefde … [Hanneli, 11]

32 Van hulle het mediese fondse en dan dan kan hulle aan beter dienste onderwerp word en, uhm, weet jy ek kom agter hulle vertrou nie baie keer hulle eie mense nie. Hulle eie mense is met hulle baie kru. … So hulle het, hier by ons maar nog die idee dat die blankes, kan vir hulle beter dienste lever as hulle eie mense [Ina, 9]

33 Eers skole, dan hospitale, en dan dit en dan wat. Wat’s volgende, wat’s volgende? [Marius, 15]

34 Dit wat aan die Afrikaner behoort het moet tot niks laat val nie. Dit wat aan ’n Christen behoort moet tot niks verval nie. Jy kan dit agterkom uit hulle, uit hierdie gemeenskapsradio lisensies wat hulle toedien. Só, op die oomblik wat dit ’n Afrikaner is of ’n Christen radio is, kry nie ’n lisensie nie [Daniel, 47].

35 Okay, die onderwys, die gesondheid, uhm, uitsaaidienste, al hierdie tipe, publieke tipe goeters, en so aan, dan dink ek hulle krap baie op plekke waar dit nie jeuk nie. Vernaam in die onderwys. En ook in die uitsaaiwese en dit is nou maar net alles om weer om te bewys ons wil alles swart hê ons wil alles swart hê en daar is nie eintlik plek meer vir die witmense nie, en as jy kyk na hierdie hele ding op Afrika en nou in Zimbabwe en orals dink ek maar net dit is ’n uiteindelike gedagte wat hulle het en so aan van die oorgrote meerderheid dat Afrika is nie vir die witmens nie [Mervyn, 17]

36 As as dinge aangaan soos dit nou aangaan, dan is ’n mens bekommend, dan kan jy amper sien dat dieselfde ding met ons gaan gebeur as wat met Zimbabwe gebeur, want kyk met watter ope arms is hy hy ontvang hier met met met, uh, met die begrafnis. En dit maak ’n ou of bietjie baie baie bekommerd. Ek weet nie. Want, dinge kan verander, hy kan oornag verander. Ons kan dit nou nie voorspel nie, maar as dit aangaan, soos dit nou aangaan is ons toekoms maar bietjie donker [Antonie, 12]

37 ...Maar vroeër kon jy nie met hulle ’n gesels aanknooi, want dan is jy ’n kafferboetie. Jy weet, daai, daai gevoel begin verdwy nie [Jack, 16A].

38 Jy sal nie sommer as jy jy weet, in die strate loop of so, blanke en en swart kinders sien saamloop saamloop of saamspel of so nie. …Enkele, enkele kere wat ’n mens dit wel hoor, ja, hoor jy van mense wat, dogtjertjie het ’n zwart maatjie of so, maar dit is nog heel uitsonderlik. Jy hoor dit nie baie of pla nie. Hy moet my ook nie pla nie. Nee wat nie hier nie, miskien in die stad, daai, daai mense hulle “worry” nie baie nie [Kasper, 48].

40 Ek kan nie sê ons het rêrig die oproerige nukkerige tipe mense hier by ons nie. ’n Mens kon goed oor die weg en ook kom baie goed klaar [Annatjie, 1]

41 Hy sê vir my, Magog loop terug totdat ek jou roep [Marie, 4A].

42 ...en nou wil ek, my nek ’n bietjie uitsteek, en ek wil nie politiek weer by die ding betrek nie, maar ek moet eerlik sê waar jy swart personeel het, oor die algemeen …die, uh, entoesiasme is ook net nie daar nie. Die trots in hulle, uh, besigheid en werk is net nie daar nie en ek wil dit alles alles, uh, toekryaf ’n gebrek aan dissipline [Hendrik, 8C]

43 Kyk ek is nie ’n rassis nie. Ek het niks teen hulle nie maar hulle moenie met my kultuur inmeng nie. Ek sal hulle ook laat staan [Charlene interjects to Marie and Bettie’s agreement: Ja en my Godsdiens ...Ek soek hulle nie in my kerk nie]. [Marie, 4A]

44 ...maar ek wil tog nou sê daar’s ’n baie groter verdraagzaamheid. Kyk, niemand gaan nou in ’n kerk as daar swartes instap by ’n begrafnis nie protesteer, of iets daaroor sê want hulle mag in volgens wet [Yvette, 13B]

45 Maar ons het aan ons politiek, Godsdienstige goed gekonnekteer. So as ek ’n ANC wil word, dan moet ek my, dan en verloor ek my Godsdiens [Yvette interjects: En jou Afrikanerskap] want dan gaan ek kommunisie. So dit word nog daai kommunistiese vrees ding is nog iewers op ons gesit [Petro, 13A].

46 ...ek is net bevrees die nuwe Suid-Afrika gaan, gaan, gaan Moslem wees. …Ek dink hy’s, hy’s vir ons baie groter gevaar as ons swart mense. ....En dan gaan ons Christene swaar kry [Charlene interjects: “The Muslim and the Communism”. Is die twee gevaar punte wat ek sien. Die Moslem nog meer want hy’s “fanatic”] [Bettie, 4C]

47 Ek glo, ek glo as ons Godsdiens reg is en ons ons begin weer weer op ons knieë kom, sal die Afrikaner weer dalk ’n toekoms in hierdie land hê, want ek glo ons is in ballingskap geplaas omdat die dag toe ons nie meer die parlement geopen het met skriflesing en gebed nie, en ek praat van Christelike beginsels wat in hierdie land is in sy kanon in [Samuel, 35A]
355 Dis soos ek sê, ek voel ek is nie wanhopig oor die toekoms nie, omdat ek glo die Here, glo ek Hy sal ons op Sy tyd redding gee, maar as die dinge aanloop soos dit nou aanloop het ons nie ‘n toekoms nie, want hulle probeer alles afbreek en alles tot niemand wat vir jou waarder het... [Antonie, 12]

356 Maar dan moet ons onthou hy is daar, ‘n overheids is deur die Here daargestel. Die Here het toelaat dat hierdie regering oor ons gekom het. Hy’s dit toelaat. Nou moet ek vir myself afvra, hoekom? Hoekom het die Here dit toelaat? Dan sê ons in die die dis weens die sonde van my volk en my eie sondes het die Here hierdie goed oor ons toelaat. Ons het afgedwaal. En die Here sal dit tot niemand. Hy sal ons weer herstel wanneer ons tot volle tot Hom teruggestig. Ons besef ons planne het op geraak. En ons, ons glo dat die Here het hierdie saak oor ons gebring. Die Here se toelatende wil dat die hierdie juk op ons lê. En ons is daar en die sonde van ons volk en ons eie sondes... Só, die, uh, so as ons op ‘n punt kom en ons bekeer ons tot die Here ons terugkeer na ons weê toe na die ou weê toe dan glo ons dat die Here ons uit hierdie ding sal verlos. Want ons het nie ‘n plan nie. Ons planne het nie gewerk nie. Ons oplossing is die Here moet vir ons weer ‘n plan gee hoe gaan ons as ons as Christen Afrikaner hier in hierdie land onder so ‘n gemengde volke hoe gaan jy woon, hoe gaan jy woon en waar gaan jy bly. [Daniel, 47]

357 jy kan maar gaan kyk na waar skole wat baie swart kinders in. Die onderwyser wil nie. Hy’s nie meer daai trots om, van lankal se onderwysers nie. Ag, hy rammel net sy goed af, man. ...Hierdie krulkoppies maak hom moeg. Uhm. Daar’s minder. Ons probeer hom, maar ek meen hier is skole in ons omgewing waar dit baie swart gaan. Nee, ons skooltjie is nog “oraait”. Ons gaan nog baie goed aan [Kasper, 48].

358 “The Struggle”. Dis al wat ons kinders van weet, en hoe erg was ons, en al die tipe van goed. Dis twak. Hulle laat dit wat kosbaar was, wat hierdie land gehelp bou het, en die blankes het baie goeie werk hier gedoen. Hulle was goed teenoor die swartes ook, ek sal nie met alles saamstem nie, maar ons moet van jou wegvat. Hy moet alles van jou wegvat. Hy moet die Christelike karakter wat daar in is. Ons hees vir die persoonlike, uh, ons is dit nie reg dat dat verskillende kulture met mekaar meng nie. Ek is regtig teenstander daarteen, ek gun enige iemand wat hy in lewe toekom, klaar, daar is nie vir my ‘n verskil wat dit aanbetref nie, maar swart by swart, wit by wit. Dit is hoe dit hoort, né [Hanneli, 11].

359 Hy kan nie verstaan as jy vir hom sê maar die kind wat gebore word hoe lyk daai kind? Uh. Dit is asof hulle die kinder se gedagtes [Gertruida interjects: Dit is, dis kommunisme] dit is nou die ander ja hulle wil “they want the minds of our children”, en dis ook ‘n kommunistiiese ding daai. “They want the minds of our children”, en dis waarom daar, daar ‘n sekere denkgrytings by die kinders gekweek moet word en en jy weet dit dis ‘n baie kommerwekkende ding [Lani, 10B].

360 Hy moet alles van jou wegvat. Hy moet die die Christelike karakter wat daar in is. Ons ons ons doopbelofte. Dat ek my kind sal opvoed in die vrese van die Here en daai goed moet hy van my af wegvat [Daniel, 47].

361 ...miskien is dit ‘n goeie ding want dan gaan dalk van die mense se oë begin oopgaan en dalk meer alternatiewe begin soek en alternatiewe ondersteun wat ons dalk nodig het en besef maar ons kan nie...
meer langer op die regering staatmaak om ons kinders op te voed nie, maar dat ons moet ons eie dinge begin doen… Ons ondersteun die as ek nou maar sê die CVO skoolbeginsel, ons ondersteun dit heetemaal [Samuel, 35A].

60 Dit ons ervaring dat die boer word gesien as die ou, weens sy geskiedenis, wat nou bygekom moet word. Daar moet nou regstelling wees, ‘Al die jare se benadeling van ons swart mense moet nou ingehaal word’… En dat die boer is die man wat hulle benadeel het…[Sakkie, 6A].

61 Ons moet onsself in tronke omtrent toesluit om veilig te wees. Nee, dit moet ons baie seer verder. Maar dit is glad nie rooi nie. Dit is absoluut wat my aanbeterf die politiek. As jy sien hoe die goed uitgeoër word …en met militêre akkuraatheid [Dieter, 36]

62 Dit ons ervaring dat die boer word gesien as die ou, weens sy geskiedenis, wat nou bygekom moet word. Daar moet nou regstelling wees, ‘Al die jare se benadeling van ons swart mense moet nou ingehaal word’… En dat die boer is die man wat hulle benadeel het…[Sakkie, 6A].

63 Dit is goed dat hulle minimum “wage” ingestel het, ek stem saam, want jy kan nie werk vir R300 ‘n maand of “whatever” nie, maar, uh, ek dink hulle moes daarvoor ook gedink het. Daar gaan hulle hierdie mense akkommodeer [Annatjie,1].

64 Ons moet onsself in tronke omtrent toesluit om veilig te wees. Nee, dit moet ons baie seer verder. Maar dit is glad nie rooi nie. Dit is absoluut wat my aanbeterf die politiek. As jy sien hoe die goed uitgeoër word …en met militêre akkuraatheid [Dieter, 36]

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op hulle vlak’ en ek sê dit is verkeerd, want dit het alles te doen met jou karakter en jou morele standaarde. [Hanneli, 11]

77...jy moet met die swartes praat en vra om steun van hulle. Dit het alles te doen met jou karakter en jou morele standaarde. [Daniel, 47].

78 En jy staan as 'n groep mense saam, gaan hulle luister na wat jy sê. Hulle gaan nie sê, maar "okay", hell hier is maar 'n paar bleksiele wat nou hulle stem moet maak nie. Maar almal het hierdie houding van maar wat kan ek doen? Weet jy dit soos blerbies verkiegings. Ek het ek ink ek het al vir vry partye gaan stem, dalk al vir ses gaan stem. Ek het 'allegiance' met nie een van hulle nie, maar as ek ink hierdie ou klink vir my nou die naaste aan wat ek, vir hulle gaan stem het. Ek en my pa het voor sy ouderling eenkeer nê, 'n helse uitval gehad oor hulle kritiseer. Toe sê ek maar jy gaan stem nie eers nie. As jy nie stem nie, het jy nie 'n reg tot kritiek [Markus, 31A].

79 Dis baie selfde as wat in die middel van Braamfontein gebeur… Waar jy tien jaar terug jou “shopping” daar en jou banksake gaan doen, is dit moeilik, amper nie die moeite was nie. Dit is hoe ons grotjiesmaak is, van, uhm, ek het my huis en my privaatheid en dit is hoekom dit is, jy weet …daar se so 'n ding so 'n familie bly in een kamer nie [Heleen, 24].

80 Ek dink die kultuur is 'n groot verskil want hulle glo nog aan voorvadergeeste. Dit speel 'n groot rol in hulle lewe. En hulle is mense wat naby aan mekaar lewe. So hulle sal nou nie omgee as hulle nou twintig in huis nog so bly nie. Dit pla hulle nie... en ons is meer, ons hou meer van ons privaatheid. [Lena, 42B].

81 Wel, ons het gesels oor, jy weet oor, uhm, goed soos, uh, byvoorbeeld behuising. …soos, in byvoorbeeld ek bly in hierdie huis, en, en sê nou maar 'n swart famili bly in daai huis die twee huise kos presies dieselfde, maandeliks huur en "maintenance", daai tipe van goed. Maar daar, hier bly en ek my gesin en daar bly by en twee, drie ander gesin, jy weet, wat dit nie rëng regverdig gemaak het in ons oë nie. …ek dink dit is hoe ons grotjiesmaak is, van, uhm, ek het my huis en my privaatheid en dit is hoekom dit is, jy weet …daar se so 'n ding so 'n familie bly in een kamer nie [Heleen, 24].

82 Ek dink die kultuur is 'n groot verskil want hulle glo nog aan voorvadergeeste. Dit speel 'n groot rol in hulle lewe en hulle bly in hierdie huis en daar bly ek en my gesin en daar bly by en twee, drie ander gesin, jy weet, wat dit nie rëng regverdig gemaak het in ons oë nie. …ek dink dit is hoe ons grotjiesmaak is, van, uhm, ek het my huis en my privaatheid en dit is hoekom dit is, jy weet …daar se so 'n ding so 'n familie bly in een kamer nie [Heleen, 24].

83 …en ek het nie 'n probleem as hier, watter anderskleurige langs my kom bly, as hy my normes en die omgewing se normes gaan aanhang, nie. Jy weet as jy gaan kyk op die, op die “by-laws” of die ja, wat is die Afrikaans, byvette wat verander word nou, wat verander is, as hier langsmy se normes en die Anderskleurige ou, wat se, wat se kultuur vir hom sê maar hy kan nou 'n bees slag omdat hulle begraafsak het, mag hulle nou in sy agterplaas slags. Nou, ek meen kan jy jink watse drama, watse wate invloed gaan dit op my hé en op my breek hé en ook op kinders om te seent hoe slag hulle 'n bees se keel af en hulle moet dooii en hy moet so bloei en so bloei en so bloei. So, dit sien ek as toekomstige probleem, 'n moontlike probleem. [Markus, 31A]

84 …toe kom dit uit die oupa en die pa verkrag die, die dogter. Nou ek hoef nie verder daarop in te gaan nie. As. Jy hoef maar net in die koerante te lees en te kyk hoe, hoe, hoe die mense nou, okay. Weer eens dit klink of 'n ou net heeltjy piek op die ander dinkers. Ek weet daars van die witmense ook wat nuie gedrag in daai tipe van goed is, maar, vader ons, dit was nooit sulke sirkwekkende aantrekings soos nou nie, en dan hoef jy nie eers van die Cape Flats te praat, van daai hoeveelheid kinders wat elke keer onskuldig doodgeskiet word nie en ek meen dis kleurlinge, dis nie witte nie waar dit vir my gaan oor 'n wit nie. Dit gaan net vir my oor, oor die breë samelewing. Uhm. Jis, jy weet, as jy net hierdie goed, waar gaan ons op pad? ...Nou hoe, hoe jy weet, ek weet nie wat jy, maar dit, ek sê net dat hoe versoen jy hierdie samelewing. ... Hoe versoen jy ons kultuur wat 'n sterk invloed Europese invloed het met 'n kultuur wat 'n sterk Afrika invloed het? Wat radikaal van mekaar ver., verskil. Jy weet ek het die Antropologie I op Unisa gehad. Wat ek vroeg was dit van hierdie kinders wat verkrag word, dit is so. Dit is sirkwekkend en tien teen een wat [my vrou] ook gesê het, vind dit te lank al plaas. Dit is so. In die ou dae, in die Zulu se dae, het die van van die kapteris of wat ookal vir die koning jong meisies gegee as om, om die vrede te handhaaf... So dalk is dit nie, dalk is hierdie maar net dit kom nou op die lappe. Dis eintlik 'n ou tra, dit is, eensteed deel is hulle kultuur, maar ons kultuur kan ons nie ons versoen om te sê maar ons kan al geslags omgang met 'n meisie van 14, 15 jaar hé nie. Goed, dis nou maar dis nou maar een uiterste [Markus, 31A].

85 Ons is basies op die bouldyn hier, hierdie kop is die bouldyn van Johannesburg. Uhm. Wat tragedies as 'n ou sien dat, kom ons sê maar die groen erfenis wat wat wat die ou stadswaders, reg of verkeerd,
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Chapter seven

1 Ek meen, dis, dis my geboorteland en dis ...'n mooi land en dit het baie potensiaal [Elbie, 14].
2 ...gekleurde mense wat heel eerstewêreld geneig is, jy weet. Met ander woorde hulle distansieer hulle ook met 'n groot persentasie van hulle eie volk, wat eintlik maar seker ook kan sê hy’s 'n hoër klas as die ander [Dirk, 22].
3 ... ons is eintlik klomp Suid-Afrikas in een, as jy oorsee is dan sal jy sê jy’s van Suid-Afrika [Robert,53].
4 Ek sê altyd ek is Suid-Afrikaans self. Ek het Afrikaans grootgeword maar in Engels ook grootgeword. Só, ek kan nie se, “okay”, maar ek is, ek is Afrikaans, ek is 'n Boertjie, ek so gebore nie. Ek sal ook nie sê ek is “solid” Engels nie [Gerrie, 7].
5 Daar is een ding wat ek nie mee saamstem, is party van hulle dink dit is hulle land alleen. Dit is nie alleen hulle land nie, dit is my land. Ek is hier gebore, en my voorouers het baie lank gelede, hier in die land kom woon. Ek het geen ander keuse gehad nie, nege …geslagte, en ons het geen ander land nie.
6 ...hulle kan hulle nie voorstel om in Europa te gaan bly en nie sonskyn te sien nie. Sien ons is al so diep ingeteel in Afrika [Wilma, 3B]
7 En, uh, jy weet as jy so op die grond loop dan voel jy dit is Afrika se grond. As jy daar [oorsee] loop so op daai grond dan voel dit vreemd onder jou voete. Daar's nie 'n konneksie nie. En die tipe dinge, só. Dit is waaroor dit gaan. Dit is Suid-Afrika, dis die land, dis my land, ek is bekend daarmee [Mervyn, 17].
8 Kyk, 'n Suid-Afrikanerskap moet nog ontwikkel. Ek is nie seker dat daar al 'n Suid-Afrikanerskap ontwikkel het nie. Kyk daar, jy weet, groeperinge bly sterk jy weet, maar hoeveel jare het ons probeer om die Afrikaans en Engels bymekaar te kry? [Herman, 3A].
10 'n Ou wil mos nou nie iets anders wees nie, dan kom jy dit mos nie agter nie. Só, nee wat, ek dink dit nie pla nie [Kobus, 38C].
11 Ek is nie Afrikaanse-Suid-Afrikaner nie. Want jy sien, wat beteken assosiasie? Ek hoef nie myself te verkondig nie. Wanneer jy êrens is dan sien mense jy’s wit. Só, dan weet jy, jy’s ‘n wit Suid-Afrikaner [Robert, 53].
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12 Kleur is ’n ding wat die Here gemaak het. Só, as ek sê ek wil nie met jou kleur meng nie, dan glo ek nie ek doen sonde nie. Ek wil my eie bly. Ek wil wit bly. Ek wil nie geel word nie, né. Ek wil wit bly. … Want jy is dit, het die Here jou gemaak en dit moet jy wees [Daniel, 47].

13 Ek dink dat hulle voel hulle voel, uh, minderwaardig teenoor die blanke en “they would like to be”. …Want kyk hy wil maar hy wil maar blank wees [Wilma, 3B].

14 En dan kyk hulle in hul eie “society” en hulle eie groep, kyk hulle neer op die wat nog daar rond is in die nie-blanke skool. …Só, maar wat ek dan met wit bedoel, is dan maar net weer ’n kwessie van, van die standaard van opvoeding wat hulle bereike, as “opposed to” van die ander, want dis dieselfde ding nou. En, uh, in jou wit gemeenskap is dit op ’n tyd gesê jy gedra jou soos ’n kaffer. Só, dis maar seker dieselfde …Kom ons noem, kom ons noem dit nou nie wit nie. Kom ons noem dit dan nou hulle is meer, uh, geleterd [Mervyn, 17].

15 Ek dink veral swart mense wil graag die witte man se kultuur hê of daarvan mee geniet… [Jasper, 34A]

16 Ek stem saam. Dan hulle op hulle, uh, terrein en ons het ons terrein, want hulle, daar’s soveel kulture, die ag wat, ek sou sê die manier van eet of drink of hulle hoe van hulle, uh, manier van lewe. Ons hou van ons manier van lewe, maar ek meen ons is nie hatig teenoor mekaar nie. Ons gun dit vir hulle. Kyk byvoorbeeld, ons is nie soos die Jode nie, ons is nie soos byvoorbeeld die Franse, of die, of die Duitser nie, of selfs in Engeland, toe ons in Engeland was, en ons was in Switzerland. En daai mense het almal hulle, hulle kultuur. Elkeen het maar jou eie kultuur. En net so, het hulle, hulle kultuur en ons het ons kultuur. En dit is nou maar so [Ingrid, 5B].

17 Vir my gaan dit om wat is ’n nasie. ’n Nasie is, ek is ’n blanke Suid-Afrikaner. Engelssprekend of Afrikaanssprekend of Afrikaanssprekend, maak nie saak nie, dis ’n nasie. Die Tswanaagroep is vir my ’n nasie. Die Zulus is ’n nasie, maar almal saam is nie ’n nasie nie. Kan nooit ’n nasie wees nie [Dieter, 36]


19 Daaroor het God geskep. Hy’t grense geskep vir verskillende nasies. Vir verskillende volkere. Hoekom moet ons nou verbaster met ’n ander volk? [Marie, 4A].

20 Ek sou my graag skaar by my eie mense, met ander woorde by Afrikaners. Ja weet ek is nou nie een van die Afrikaanses nie. …Ek is van die doodgewone Afrikaner wat die liewe Vader se son oor almal wil laat sien skyn, maar wat my eie en dis nie ’n eng pad wat ek wil loop nie. [Charles:Ja] maar my eie pad met my eie mense wil loop en ek gun die ander groeperingealles. Net soveel as wat ek niks meer vra vir ons nie. Dat ons in staat is en ek soek ook nie ’n tuisland nie [Frederik, 8A].

21 Ek dink saam. Dan hulle op hulle, uh, terrein en ons het ons terrein, want hulle, daar’s soveel kulture, die ag wat, ek sou sê die manier van eet of drink of hulle hoe van hulle, uh, manier van lewe. Ons hou van ons manier van lewe, maar ek meen ons is nie hatig teenoor mekaar nie. Ons gun dit vir hulle. Kyk byvoorbeeld, ons is nie soos die Jode nie, ons is nie soos byvoorbeeld die Franse, of die, of die Duitser nie, of selfs in Engeland, toe ons in Engeland was, en ons was in Switzerland. En daai mense het almal hulle, hulle kultuur. Elkeen het maar jou eie kultuur. En net so, het hulle, hulle kultuur en ons het ons kultuur. En dit is nou maar so [Ingrid, 5B].

22 Dis wat ek in my hart glo en is ek glo as dit regkom sal die ander regkom. Dis hoekom ek plaas my hoop op my geloof en op Christus en ek glo dit sal regkom sal die ander dinge, die ander weer regkom, dan sal ons weer uitkom uit die gemors waar ons is, ek sien dit as eenemors, ander mense kan dit as eenemors sien [Samuel, 35A].

23 Dis wat ek in my hart glo en is ek glo as dit regkom sal die ander regkom. Dis hoekom ek plaas my hoop op my geloof en op Christus en ek glo dit sal regkom sal die ander dinge, die ander weer regkom, dan sal ons weer uitkom uit die gemors waar ons is, ek sien dit as eenemors, ander mense kan dit as eenemors sien [Samuel, 35A].

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Wat jy, want julle julle dink dieselfde julle doen dieselfde. Nou wat nou, dan’s jy mos nou ‘n Afrikaner [Kasper, 48].

26 Ek, ek het ‘n vermoede die, die, die tradisies en die, en die wat noem hulle dit, van die van die Afrikaner, sal, sal nie, sal nie sommer, sal nie sommer erg beïnvloed word deur enige iemand anders se maniertjies en giertjies nie [Kobus 38C].

27 Só, ons is ‘n, ons is ‘n groep en dan wel, ander Afrikaner en witmense wat soos jy voel, val by jou in. As hy nie wil nie, hy’t mos daai goed. Ons is nou, ons is mos ‘n volk. Huh. Ons is ons is nie dieselfde as die mense nie. Huh of hulle, kom ons los dit nou wie’s nou reg en wie’s nou verkeerd. Ons is nie dieselle nie, klaar. Hy’s swart en ek is wit. Daar’s al klaar ‘n moerse verskil. Maar dit is die kleinste verskillietjie. Dan kom daai ander goed in [Kasper, 48].

28 Ek sê julle is in die bevoorregte posisie dat julle tenminste goed drietalig kan wees [Matilda, 39B].

29 Niemand luister na ons nie, daaroor wat hulle as ons ouens op die in die parlementshuis daar gaan staan en ‘n toespraak lever hoe goed of hoe goed dit swak dit is die ouens sit en chips eet want hy praat Afrikaans. Hy weet hulle kan, hulle verstaan nie Afrikaans nie. Hy kan net so goed in Engels praat as wat hy sou Afrikaans gepraat het en hulle bereik niks daardeur nie. Die ouens, agteraf lag hulle vir hulle [Frederik, 8A].

30 Ek sê julle is in die bevoorregte posisie dat julle tenminste goed drietalig kan wees [Matilda, 39B].

31 Maar nee, dit, uhm, dit skei my nie van iemand nie. As jy verstaan wat ek bedoel. Dit skei my van geen ander nasie in Suid-Afrika nie, want ek is net soos hulle, deel van Suid-Afrika [Annatjie, 1].


33 Ons almal wil mooi karre ry. Dis nie ‘n kwessie van, uhm, Zulu mense, nog trek hulle Zuludrag aan en sulke tipe, hou by daai tipe van, uhm, tradisies en so goed nie. Hulle wil, ons wil almal lyk soos, soos wat die mense in Amerika lyk [Heleen, 24].

34 Maar jy as sosioloog sal besef ons praat baie oor ons moet, om dit nou kru te stel. Ons, sê maklik, dis baie naklik om die kaffer uit die bos te haal, maar dit is baie moeilik om die bos uit die kaffer uit te haal. Ons kan nie die bos uit hom nie uit haal nie. As ons hom nie bootstel aan omstandighede waar daar nie ‘n bos is nie. So hierdie kultuur of hierdie skuif kan nie plaasvind sonder blootstelling nie [Sakkie, 6A].

35 Jy weet hulle wil hulle wil in daai rigting neig en jy sal jou mense kry wat dit doen ja en saam met hulle sal velle aantrek en saam met hulle sal dans om die vuur en goed maar ek dink nie die groter meerderheid sal dit doen nie. Ek dink nie so nie [Ina, 9].
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Appendix A: Interview schedule

1. Introduction

I am Charles Puttergill. I am registered for a DPhil at the University of Stellenbosch. I have studied at the Rand Afrikaans University, the University of South Africa and the University of the Witwatersrand. I lecture in the Department of Sociology at the University of South Africa. Sociology, as a discipline, focuses on the study of society – in particular on social change. My research for this degree is on “perceptions of change in South Africa”. For this study I interview English and Afrikaans speaking people, in urban and rural areas, on their experiences, perceptions and expectations of change in South Africa. I would like to talk to you about your experiences and thoughts about change occurring in this community and the country.

2 Procedure

The interviews I conduct for this study are treated confidentially. Confidentiality is ensured by using pseudonyms when referring to participants and changing place names where it is regarded necessary.

Participation in this study is voluntary. Are you prepared to talk to me?

I have one further request. Because this study considers opinions, it is crucial to record them as accurately as possible. For this purpose I would like to tape-record our conversation. The tape-recorded conversation will be transcribed verbatim by me (and when necessary by an assistant under my supervision). No one else besides me and my supervisor will have access to the taped conversations. Pseudonyms are given during transcription. The tape recordings of conversations are kept in a locked steel cabinet in my study. During my analysis of the typed transcripts I may relisten to some conversations (a primary source). May I tape this conversation?

During the conversation, I may jot down a note, now and then. You are also welcome to ask me questions during our discussion if you require clarification.

3. Introductory questions [Self and community].

3.1 To start, for some background, tell me a bit about yourself and this area/community.
3.2 What changes have you observed here over the past decade?
3.3 Are you satisfied with the way things are currently (a) generally for yourself; (b) in the community?
3.4 Do you have any concerns with regard to the current situation (a) generally; (b) in the community?
3.5 What is your opinion of the future?
4. Thinking about South Africa

4.1 How would you describe the South African society?
4.2 How do you introduce yourself to foreigners?
4.3 Do you think of yourself as belonging to any group within society?
4.4 Do other people identify you as belonging to particular groups?
4.5 Is there an emerging South Africanism (and what influences it)?
4.6 Do you ever think of yourself as white?

5 Conclusion

5.1 Are there any important things we have not discussed in our conversation which you would like to talk about?
5.2 Do you have any questions to ask me?

Thank you for your willingness to participate. I appreciate it.
## Appendix B: List of interviewees and their biographical characteristics

Table 1.1 Limpopo Province, Waterberg District Council (Primary site – Edensvlakte (Town))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview no &amp; name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lang</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Annatjie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Businesswoman</td>
<td>Born in another town in a rural area, she spent almost her entire life in this town (more than 20 years), only leaving for a short period for post-matric education and some work experience in a city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Fran</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Financial officer</td>
<td>She moved to community when her husband (who was much older) retired. He had relatives farming in the vicinity. She worked in town and has lived on a small holding approximately 18 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A Herman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>His father was a missionary. He was in academe, retiring about 8 years ago to a small holding, and started intensive farming with vegetables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B Wilma</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Librarian</td>
<td>Grew up elsewhere in colonial Africa before returning, against the background of looming independence, 8 years in community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A Marie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>When her husband retired they moved to the district, first to a small farm, it was his wish to return to where he grew up, she now lives in town, back in the community for 20 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B Charlene</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Office manager</td>
<td>She is a Rhodesian, emigrated to the reef in South Africa after Mugabe took over, retired early in a changing work context here, and chose to move here because some family had settled in the town, lives here for 10 years. Her favourite subjects are history and politics, she has been drawn to Afrikanerdom in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4C Bettie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Retired from the city 15 years ago in the town, daughter married a farmer in district and they had holidayed in the area before and liked it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A Tiaan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>80s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>A distant relative of a Nationalist politician prominent in the 60s and 70s. Spent youth on family farm which was in an English dominated area although they were Afrikaans, trained as teacher, signed up for the War, took a transfer to the</td>
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Transvaal later where he spent 37 years in the district, the last 17 in this town.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5B</td>
<td>Ingrid</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6A</td>
<td>Sakkie</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6B</td>
<td>Tina</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gerrie</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Ae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8A</td>
<td>Frederik</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8B</td>
<td>Marieta</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8C</td>
<td>Hendrik</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Ina</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10A</td>
<td>Jannie</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>10B</td>
<td>Lani</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>10C</td>
<td>Gertruida</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10D</td>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Executive secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hanneli</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Businesswoman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Antonie</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13A</td>
<td>Yvette</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Estate Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B</td>
<td>Petro</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Elbie</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Beautician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Marius</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16A</td>
<td>Jack</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Security official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16B</td>
<td>Engela</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Administrative official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mervyn</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ester</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Health care professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Kasper</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.2 Limpopo Province, Waterberg District Council (Secondary site – Wesveld (Farm))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lang</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Was born in the district, lived on the farm his whole life, attended university for training. Has known community for 30 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>Worked in the district the past seven years, met her husband.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>Lived on the farm his whole life, except for high school training and diploma in agricultural studies. Sons farm with him. Served on the development forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Businesswoman</td>
<td>Has had an association with the community for 21 years since she married her husband who was born and raised in the area. During this period they moved in and out, but have settled here and lived here the past 17 years. She served on the development forum for the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>He has been here 62 years and has always farmed. They bought the farm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>She grew up in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>Except for his army stint he has farmed here his whole life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38D</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Agricultural advisor</td>
<td>He has retired now but worked in this area providing advice. Living on the property his grandfather purchased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>He has owned the farm for 52 years, resigned his research post thirty two years to come and farm, they scaled back the past ten years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Came with her husband thirty two years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>His grandfather came to this area, his sons are now farming, and that is the fourth generation. He has spent his whole life on the farm. He started farming fifty five years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>She has lived 44 years on the farm, since they were married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Farm manager</td>
<td>He grew up in a rural area and has managed farms in several areas. He has spent the last three and a half years in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Lang</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Financial officer</td>
<td>Born in a rural area, distant relative of a Boer General. Studied in city, met husband at university. They were transferred to various places, but retired to Johannesburg were their children and other family lives. Has live 11 years in suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Lived in an adjacent town on the Witwatersrand. Studied in the city and lived in it since, for over two decades. Spent two decades in the city. Did a brief stint with a multinational company overseas, bought the property when he returned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>80s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Born in Rhodesia and spent most of her adult life there. Moved to Malawi at independence, and settled in the city 14 years ago, when her husband retired from his contract employment. Her son lives and works in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Has lived in the city her whole life, the last 13 years in the particular house and before in an adjacent suburb for 12 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Ae</td>
<td>Receptionist</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Has lived in city for 5 years, 2 years in the current flat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Has lived in Johannesburg since undergraduate studies. Sold her first property after being burgled and rented others until purchasing this property two years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Has lived her whole life in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>Lived in an adjacent town on the Witwatersrand. Studied in the city and lived in it since. Lived in a adjacent suburb for 12 years and to the current property 2 years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Grew up on a farm. Spent the last sixteen years in the city. Has lived 2 years in this property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Has lived in Johannesburg for 24 years, since undergraduate studies. In current property for 7 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Religious ministry</td>
<td>Grew up in the city. Studied elsewhere after matriculation. Has lived the past 38 years on the property. Extensively involved in ministry in the city for over four years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>30B Arlene</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>Ea</td>
<td>Religious ministry</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Has lived the past 38 years on the property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>31A Markus</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Moved to city when he was in primary school. Has lived 30 years in city, 14 in the suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>31B Olga</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Financial officer</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Moved to city when she was in primary school. Has lived 28 years in city, 9 in the suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>32 Una</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Hairdresser</td>
<td>Grew up in a city on the coast. Moved to Pretoria, but settled in Johannesburg 10 years ago in this suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>34A Jasper</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>Dae</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Immigrated to South Africa 29 years ago and settled in the suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>34B Drien</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Dae</td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>Immigrated to South Africa 29 years ago and settled in the suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>42A Quinton</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Studied in city. Transferred to town and eventually back to city. 10 years in suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>42B Lena</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Grew up on a farm. Settled in city on a transfer 10 years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>44 Nathan</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Health care professional</td>
<td>Grew up in city, studied for profession elsewhere. Established his practice in the northern suburbs. Has lived in the suburb for almost six years, recently moved into this particular security complex (in the same suburb).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>46 Peter</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Born in South Africa, immigrated to Rhodesia as child and trained there. Was headhunted and returned to South Africa 30 years ago. Has lived in the suburb since.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>49 Craig</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Born in the city. Father was transferred back when he started high school. He has lived in the city since then.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>50 Mary</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Businesswoman</td>
<td>Grew up in adjacent city. Has lived in the suburb for 22 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>51 William</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Ae</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Born, studied and worked in the city. Transferred to the coast for seven years, but returned. Has lived in the suburb for seven years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>52 Sandy</strong></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Studied elsewhere and then settled in the city. Has lived in the suburb for 24 years, moved to a security complex in the same suburb recently.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.4 Gauteng Province, City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM, Secondary site)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lang</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
<td>Has lived his whole life in the city and suburb. Commutes to work in Johannesburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Ge</td>
<td>Health care professional</td>
<td>Recently moved from a rural town to a small holding. Has lived here 2 years. Lived and worked in Johannesburg before that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Born and grew up in a mid-sized regional town. Lived in an adjacent suburb from when he was in primary school. Has travelled for work but city has been his base for two decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Grew up in a small town in the rural area. Based in the city since undergraduate studies. Has lived in the suburb for 2 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>80s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Born on a farm in South Africa, but spent the bulk of his adult life in Rhodesia. Returned in 1980 and has lived 24 years in the suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Health care professional</td>
<td>Has lived whole life in city, except for a short period when her husband was posted elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Born and grew up in a small town in a rural area. Has spent 21 years in this province, the last 17 years the city has been his base and he has lived in the current suburb for 7 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Financial official</td>
<td>Born and grew up in a small town in a rural area. Based in the city since undergraduate studies. Has lived in the suburb for 3 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Grew up in adjacent city. Lives in the city since undergraduate studies have commenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Born and grew up in a mid-sized regional town. Lives in the city since undergraduate studies have commenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Has lived his whole life in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58D</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Grew up in adjacent city. Lives in the city since undergraduate studies have commenced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.5 Gauteng Province, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (Pilot interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lang</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Born in a small town, moved around a lot during his youth, moved to the city and lived in it for 25 years. Was transferred elsewhere but returned. Moved to the current property 2 years ago after living 15 years in an adjacent suburb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>70s</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Grew up on a farm. Moved to city and spent a total of 43 years in it. Moved to smaller property 2 years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Ae</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Born, studied and worked in city. Rented in the inner-city, bought a property in a suburb, lived there 10 years then moved to an adjacent suburb where they have lived for 3 years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on abbreviations used in Tables 1.1 to 1.5:

Sex

- M = Male
- F = Female

Language

A = Afrikaans-speaking
B = English-speaking
Ae = Bilingual (Afrikaans first language, English second language)
Ea = Bilingual (English first language, Afrikaans second language)
Ge = Bilingual (German first language, English second language)
Dae = Trilingual (Dutch first language, Afrikaans and English second language)
## Appendix C: Data on the communities studied and the sample of interviewees

### Table 1.6 Comparative data on the communities studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CJMM</th>
<th>CTMM</th>
<th>Waterberg DC</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>36,5%</td>
<td>17,3%</td>
<td>11,6%</td>
<td>19,7%</td>
<td>11,8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion white</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28,26%</td>
<td>8,65%</td>
<td>19,9%</td>
<td>2,39%</td>
<td>9,58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>8,09%</td>
<td>21,29%</td>
<td>8,53%</td>
<td>14,4%</td>
<td>2,3%</td>
<td>13,3% (3rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>19,45%</td>
<td>6,54%</td>
<td>0,95%</td>
<td>12,5%</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>8,2% (6th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 1st</strong></td>
<td>ANC  (69,02%)</td>
<td>ANC (60,636%)</td>
<td>ANC (84,54%)</td>
<td>ANC (68,74%)</td>
<td>ANC (89,18%)</td>
<td>ANC (69,69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 2nd</strong></td>
<td>DA (19,21%)</td>
<td>DA (27,798%)</td>
<td>DA (7,45%)</td>
<td>DA (20,33%)</td>
<td>DA (3,59%)</td>
<td>DA (12,37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 3rd</strong></td>
<td>IFP  (3,89%)</td>
<td>FF+ (2,96%)</td>
<td>FF+ (2,01%)</td>
<td>IFP (2,64%)</td>
<td>UDM (1,72%)</td>
<td>IFP (6,97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 4th</strong></td>
<td>ID   (2,51%)</td>
<td>ACDP (2,81%)</td>
<td>UDM (1,73%)</td>
<td>ID (1,73%)</td>
<td>ACDP (1,26%)</td>
<td>UDM (2,28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 5th</strong></td>
<td>UDM (1,03%)</td>
<td>ID (1,93%)</td>
<td>ACDP (0,98%)</td>
<td>ACDP (1,61%)</td>
<td>PAC (0,94%)</td>
<td>ID (1,7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election (other)</strong></td>
<td>NNP (0,78%)</td>
<td>NNP (0,88%)</td>
<td>PAC (0,85%)</td>
<td>FF+ (1,2%)</td>
<td>FF+ (0,6%)</td>
<td>NNP (1,65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FF+</strong></td>
<td>(0,42%)</td>
<td>PAC (0,62%)</td>
<td>NNP (0,48%)</td>
<td>NNP (0,74%)</td>
<td>NNP (0,46%)</td>
<td>FF+ (0,89%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lehohla 2004a; Lehohla 2004b; Lehohla 2003; www.elections.org.za

### Table 1.7 Sample summary: Age, sex and language by site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Edensvlakte</th>
<th>Wesveld</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>CJMM</th>
<th>CTMM</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-39</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>8 (17,8%)</td>
<td>8 (28,5%)</td>
<td>9 (75%)</td>
<td>17 (42,5%)</td>
<td>25 (29,4%)</td>
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<td>Middle-aged</td>
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<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>10 (31%)</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>13 (28,9%)</td>
<td>12 (44%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>14 (35%)</td>
<td>27 (31,8%)</td>
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<td>Older adults</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>17 (53%)</td>
<td>7 (54%)</td>
<td>24 (53,3%)</td>
<td>8 (28,5%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>9 (22,5%)</td>
<td>33 (38,8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Edensvlakte</td>
<td>Wesveld</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>CJMM</td>
<td>CTMM</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>13 (41%)</td>
<td>8 (62%)</td>
<td>21 (47%)</td>
<td>11 (39%)</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>19 (47.5%)</td>
<td>40 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>19 (59%)</td>
<td>5 (38%)</td>
<td>24 (53%)</td>
<td>17 (61%)</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
<td>21 (52.5%)</td>
<td>45 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>25 (78%)</td>
<td>12 (92%)</td>
<td>37 (82%)</td>
<td>5 (18%)</td>
<td>6 (50%)</td>
<td>11 (27.5%)</td>
<td>48 (56.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>3 (9.5%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>17 (61%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>22 (55%)</td>
<td>26 (30.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>7 (17.5%)</td>
<td>11 (13%)</td>
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Table 1.8 Sample summary: Primary occupation

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Limpopo (Edensvlakte)</th>
<th>Limpopo (Wesveld)</th>
<th>Gauteng (CJMM)</th>
<th>Gauteng (CTMM)</th>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Health</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<td>Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consulting</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House wife</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering/Technical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal services</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
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</table>
Notes on the communities and interviewees in the sample

Interviews were conducted between April 2003 and August 2004 (see Tables 1.1 to 1.5).

One quarter of those interviewed in Edensvlakte (8) have lived less than five years in the town or the surrounding district. Most interviewees have some family connection with the town, district or province. A majority of those interviewees who have lived a longer period in the town settled in town as a result of some family connections with the area. Interviewees in the farming community, Wesveld, have an established association with it. Only one has lived less than five years in the community. Another interviewee married a farmer and has been resident for seven years. This then suggests the interviewees in the sample in Limpopo have close links to the communities studied.

In the sample for the Johannesburg metropolitan municipality although a quarter (7) of the interviewees have lived less than five years in their current suburb, 24 (85%) have lived more than a decade in the city. Although there may be a degree of internal mobility within the city, most interviewees had a long established association with the city. With regard to the sample for the Tshwane metropolitan municipality, excluding the students interviewed, half (4) have lived less than five years in the suburb they currently stay in. Only two of these have lived less than a decade in the city. Amongst the students one has lived his whole life in the metropolitan area, and two others are from adjacent metropolitan areas. With regard to the Gauteng sample the conclusion can be drawn that the interviewees are generally familiar with the city they live in, having spent a considerable time in it.

Three of the 27 rural interviews (45 people) were conducted in English. In two other interviews some English was used. Eight interviewees in the Edensvlakte sample were conducted with interviewees who lived outside the town (13 people) on either small holdings (5 interviews – 9 people) or farms (3 interviews – 4 people). The small holdings and farms were close to the town. Amongst these interviewees, 6 (4 interviews) were considering moving to town, if they could secure a buyer for their property. The remaining 12 interviews were conducted with people living in the town (19 people). Of the Wesveld sample (one interviewee lived in town and the remaining twelve (six interviews) on farms. Ten of the 31 urban interviews were conducted in Afrikaans. In total 34 Afrikaans and 24 English interviews were conducted. The demographic data for these communities are reported in Table 1.6. This generally confirms with regard to language that the whites living in Limpopo and the Waterberg District Council (in particular) are predominantly Afrikaans-speaking. In Gauteng Johannesburg is predominantly English-speaking, whilst Pretoria is predominantly Afrikaans-speaking.

The data on demographic characteristics of the community is based on 2001 census data. Note the data on both Afrikaans and English includes people of colour speaking these languages. The impact is greater in Gauteng, as Limpopo has few coloureds or Indians. According to the interactive data facility in StatsOnline 57.1% of whites in Gauteng speak Afrikaans most frequently at home, whilst 41% speak English most
frequently. The corresponding figures for Limpopo are – 87.1% Afrikaans and 11.6% English.

Results of the elections for 2004 for the National Assembly are reported in table 1.6. The proportionate share of the vote the ANC received in the election for the National Assembly in the Waterberg District Council is lower than the provincial average reported, but higher than that obtained in Gauteng. Using the data available on the IEC webpage, the FF+ obtained a higher ranking in Edensvlakte than its provincial average. In this town it polled approximately half the number of votes cast for the DA in the 2004 election. The NNP received an insignificant number of votes. In the municipality Wesveld falls under results for the ANC are similar to Edensvlakte. As a result of the demographics of the area the DA and FF+ again proportionately do better than the provincial average, with the latter polling about a quarter of the votes the former received. Looking at the results for the three polling stations used in Wesveld, a trend closer to the CTMM is noticeable, with the exception that the FF+ does achieve a better proportionate share of the vote, but still lags behind the DA. Support for the NNP is negligible. Considering data available on the 2006 Local Government elections it is apparent that the FF+ has made considerable gains, suggesting a swing back to the right, amongst white voters. I have not reported specific percentages here, to avoid making the areas directly traceable, an undertaking I made to the interviewees and explained in chapter 5.

In Edensvlakte slightly more than three quarters of the white population were above 19 years of age. This was slightly less than three quarters for Wesveld. Calculating the proportionate size of the age groups above 19 according to the 2001 Census, using interactive data from Statistics South Africa provided a similar distribution of interviewees to the one achieved above (Statistics South Africa StatsOnline – Interactive Data, http://interactive.statssa.gov.za/superweb). In this regard 20.8% of the population were young adults, 26.3% middle-aged and 52.9% older adults, for the wards of Edensvlakte I worked in, which comprised the area associated traditionally with the town. This compares well with the breakdown of the sample for these categories reported in Table 1.7.

For the Wesveld 32% of the population were young adults, 42.7% middle-aged and 25.3% older adults according to the Interactive Data on StatsOnline. With regard to interviewees my sample here consequently under-represents the distribution of younger age categories and over-represents older adults in Wesveld (see Table 1.7). This bias of the small sample in Wesveld is accentuated by older people tending to sit in on interviews, inflating their numbers. As I pointed out in my methodology, I allowed people to participate in interviews if they expressed the desire to participate.

In Johannesburg metropolitan municipality young adults constitute 43% of adults over 19 years of age, the middle-aged 37% and older adults 20% according to the Interactive Data on StatsOnline. Compared to the sample for Johannesburg in Table 1.7, there is then an under-representation of young adults and a slight overrepresentation of the other two age categories in the subsample.

In the Tshwane metropolitan municipality young adults constitute 47% of adults over 19 years of age, the middle-aged 35.2% and older adults 17.8% according to the Interactive Data on StatsOnline. The over-representation of young adults in this sub-
sample was a conscious choice given the under-representation of the same category in the Johannesburg sub-sample.

I have reported on the distribution across age groups to provide a sense of the extent to which my sample corresponds to the population in the areas studies, in general. However, it should be noted that I did not set out to achieve an exact correspondence. I was more interested in ensuring that there was a spread of interviewees across age categories.

In Edensvlakte 18 interviewees were retired/pensioners (56%). Some had retired earlier, and some were involved in self-employed activities to supplement income. In Wesveld (31%) had semi-retired with the men were still involved with farming. Some of the women had been teachers. [Total rural retired – 49%] In Johannesburg 8 (28%) were retired/pensioners, some supplementing their income with self-employment, and some having retired earlier. In Tshwane 1 (8%) had retired. [Total urban retired, 22.5%; total overall – 36%]

With regard to their employment the following can be noted. Self-employed – Limpopo town 11 (34%) of which two had retired (6%); some had taken packages, or were retrenched, from previous employment to start their own businesses currently – 9 (28% ). 5 are salaried employees (16%) In the farm subset all involved in agriculture [8 – 61%], most self-employed. Of the younger had trained for other professions which they still utilise. Johannesburg – 10 (36%) self employed, two had been retrenched; salaried – 10 (36%); Tshwane (-) self employed; salaried – 7 (58%); students (33%). Total rural pensioned 22 - (49%), currently self-employed- 16 (36%), salaried – 6 (13%). Total urban pensioned – 9 (22.5%), currently self-employed – 10 (25%), salaried -17 (42.5%), students 4 (10%). Total pensioned – 31 - (36%), currently self-employed 26 (31%), salaried 23 (28%), students 4 – (5%). A number of the retirees were still economically active. The occupations of interviewees are reported in table 1.8.
Appendix D: Maps

Map 1 – South Africa

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org
Map 2 – Location of CJMM and CTMM in Gauteng Province, South Africa

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org
Map 3 – City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Administration Regions

http://www.joburg.org.za/unicity/index_regions.stm
Map 4 – Consolidation of local authorities constituting the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (Pretoria)

www.tshwane.gov.za/residents.cfm
Map 5 – Location of Waterberg District Municipality in South Africa

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org
Map 6 – District Municipalities in Limpopo

http://www.limpopoled.com/images/limpopo_municipalities_map.jpg