Procession, Pilgrimage and Protest: A Historical Study of the Qadiriyya—Nasiriyya and Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Public Religiosity in Northern Nigeria, 1952—2021

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Declaration

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March 2023

Abstract

This dissertation explores the changing history, mode of organization and conduct of the *Maukibi* (procession) of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN) Sufi group and the *Muzahara* (procession and protest) and the *Tattaki* (pilgrimage) of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) Shia group. The former was introduced in 1952 and practiced within the confine of urban area of Kano state while the latter in 1981 and staged in varied spaces across northern Nigeria, particularly from 1996. Practiced differently, the *Tattaki*, unlike urban-based *Muzahara*, members trekked across state borders to Zaria via designated meeting points within the region. Analyzed in different historical contexts, these public religious rituals have since become defining practices of these two religious groups which, among multitude of religious groups in Nigeria, pattern their public religiosity. While the extant historical and anthropological studies on religious groups in Nigeria pay more attention to their evolution, transformation, sectarian fragmentation, and entangled relations among them, motivated by different socio-political and economic atmosphere, they hardly explore the phenomenon of public religiosity— *Maukibi*, *Muzahara* and *Tattaki* —of the QN and IMN.

The dissertation fills this historiographical gap by exploring the culture of veneration of saints as the underlying genesis of all these public practices and the way in which, in the long run, the practices are instrumentalized in the making and revitalizating of collective identities in the saturated northern Nigeria's religious landscape. By locating these practices within the broader scholarly conversations on nationalism, identity, politics, public order policing and violence, the dissertation posits that the practices constitute a new dimension of popular religiosity and represent the intricate nexus between religion, identity construction, commemoration and security in the region. With their distinctive features of appropriation of public spaces, massing of bodies, mass mobilization and transcendence, the dissertation demonstrates that different government(s) deployed various uneven regulatory measures to tame them. These regulatory measures ranged from confinement, postponement, restriction, repression and ban. While the application of these measures varies: the *Maukibi* was regulated by confinement, postponement and restriction; *Muzahara* by repression and ban, the latter measures resulted in the death of many of the IMN members over the last three decades and many more injured or incarcerated. Multitude of sources and methodologies have been used: primary and secondary sources, qualitative method, content analysis and observation.

Dedication

To my lovely late mother Hafsat Shehu Abdullahi and Dr. Chet's (my supervisor) father who passed away on the 10th September, 2021. May their souls rest in peace!

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List of Abbreviations

AC	Advisory Committee
AFM	Abuja Free Zakzaky Muzahara
AFMOC	Abuja Free Muzahara Organizing Committee
AI	Amnesty International
BBOG	Bring Back Our Girls
CDC	Constitution Drafting Committee
CF	Consultative Forum
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COC	Central Organizing Committee
CW	Cibiyar Wallafa
DOC	Document
DSS	Department of the State Security
FHC	Federal High Court
FMC	Federal Military Council
HRM	Human Rights Monitor
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HRCN	Human Rights Commission in Nigeria
IMN	Islamic Movement in Nigeria
IRC	Irregular Crowd
IVC	Islamic Vocational Course
INGENPOL	Inspector General of Police
JNI	Jamaat Nasril Islam
JCI	Judicial Commission of Inquiry
JTI	Jamaat Tajdidil Islam
LGA	Local Government Area
MSS	Muslim Student Society
MB	Muslim Brothers
MP	Meeting Point
MT	Muraqqa' Team
MT	Media Team
NA	Nigerian Army
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
QN	Qadiriyya – Nasiriyya

RC	Regular Crowd
RRE	Religious Regulation Edict
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squard
SI	Shuj'an al-Islam
SEC	Secretariat
SCSN	Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria
SIB	Security Investigation Bureau
TC	Tattaki Committee
TLC	Tattaki Logistics Committee
WABA	West Africa Bar Association
YMAN	Young Muslim Association of Nigeria

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

Map I: Showing the *Maukibi* routes (to and fro) within Kano city. In bold black color are the names of the quarters through which the procession routes (routed). They also represent the points at which the QN leaders stop over to offer prayers as shown using different symbols.

Source: Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano (2021)



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Source: Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano (2021)



Map III: Showing *Muzahara* marches within Zaria city. All the *Muzahara* within the city ended at Babban Dodo, a public square close to the Zaria emir's palace**.** Either way, the *Muzahara* would start from PZ and ended at Babban Dodo or from Gwargwaje and ended there.

Source: Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano (2021)



Map IV: Showing cross-state tattaki pilgrimage to Zaria of the IMN members from across different states in northern Nigeria. The map shows the meeting points based on groupings of members' locations within the region.

Source : Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano (2021)

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Rationale

The enactment, in different urban areas in northern Nigeria, of procession and pilgrimage to celebrate memories of saints, or ignite grief to mourn their martyrdom, is historically a defining feature of religious practice in Nigeria. Beyond the outward celebratory manifestations of these practices, they also serve as the sites of performative making and articulating of collective religious identities. The motive that underpins this collectiveness lies in reviving religious bonds, a display of group strength (in terms of size), 'performing' religious emotion and the re-enactment of the history of saintly 'birth' and of 'martyrdom', sacrifice and endurance. This dissertation traces how this has historically unfolded by foregrounding the public religiosity of two particular Islamic groups: the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN), a reformed sub-set of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood;[1] and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a Shia revivalist group. They symbolically represent two divergent doctrinal affiliations, Sufism and Shi'ism respectively, both of which compete for public space in northern Nigeria. Questions arise about religious identity and ownership and use of these spaces.

By Nigeria's Constitutional provisions,[2] all lands, and by extension public spaces, are legally owned and controlled by the government. The right to use public spaces for public processional marches and pilgrimage treks are, therefore, granted (or ought to be granted) by the government. They are subject to regulatory measures to ensure state and public interests of peace and security. Some theorists of mass protest describe this as 'public order policing'.[3] There is therefore a clear entanglement between religious and political entities in Nigeria, especially in times of political uncertainty or religious fanaticism.[4]

[1] 'Brotherhood' refers to an association or community of people linked by a common interest, religion or trade. Brotherhood in this dissertation is used in reference to the two major Sufi Brotherhoods namely the Qadiriyya Brotherhood and Tijjaniyya Brotherhood and their branches.
[2] As discussed in Chapter Four of this dissertation.
[3] As demonstrated in Chapter Five of this dissertation.
[4] Chapters Four and Five demonstrate the modes of these negotiations and entanglements.

The use of the space by these minority religious groups in these areas elicits reactions, often criticisms. These criticisms are largely motivated by doctrinal differences and public sentiment. However, spates of clashes between the processional crowd and the police (Nigeria Police Force, NPF) often occur in the course of regulatory governance (or rather 'public order policing') of the processional crowd of the IMN, and to a lesser degree, the QN. This could arguably be seen as 'state repression'. Thus, the tension that brews between the state, the religious leaders, the processional crowd, and the general public over the appropriation of public spaces defines procession and pilgrimage practices. This is another context of understanding the dynamics of the intersection of identity, performance, and conflict in northern Nigeria.

However, certain points need to be clarified. Firstly, ceremonial and mournful processional marches, and the politics that underpin them, receive scant historical examination in the extant historical, sociological and anthropological works in northern Nigeria. This includes works on religious and political culture, 'reformist movements' and the process for the (re)formation as well as fragmentation of identities across political and religious divides.[5] Secondly, these texts tend to bury the practices of the QN and IMN under the larger discourses surrounding the manifestation of religious practices in public spaces among the multitude of religious groupings in northern Nigeria, thereby neglecting their uniqueness. The above-mentioned studies leave unaddressed the significance of the QN and IMN's ceremonial and mournful processions as the driver for critical identity formation and revitalization,[6] as this dissertation argues.

Furthermore, because of the scant literature on the subject in northern Nigeria, this study draws on similar works on ceremonial processions and pilgrimages of Shi'ites and Sufis, mainly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.[7] These texts trace the evolution of the 'culture'

[5] Some of the foundational works on religious groups, religion and political culture, as well as reform movements, in northern Nigeria include J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (University of California, Press, 1973); I. A. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (PhD Diss., Cambridge University, 1975); O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003); R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston, Illinois: North Western University Press, 1997); Clarke I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State 1960 – 1983* (Grunewald.Kaiser: Munchen, 1984); R. B. Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: It's Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation" (PhD Diss. Bayreuth University, 2011); K. H. Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis: A Historical Study of Muslim Intra-faith Relations, 1978-2015" (PhD Diss., Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto, 2016).

[6] A term coined by Anwar in contrast to "reform", A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity: The *Ulama* in Kano 1937-1987" (M.A. Diss., University of Maiduguri, 1989).

[7] For example, A. Knut Jacobsen, *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008); R. Tiwari, *Space-Body-Ritual* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010; N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shia: Identity, Ritual and Sacred Space in the Eighth—Century Kufa*

of procession and pilgrimage in both Shi'i and Sufi traditions and demonstrate that the practice is rooted in the tradition of 'saints' veneration which each sect attempts to uphold. These works map out the context-specific territorial, spatial and ideological extent of the processions and pilgrimages but also reflect, as will be shown, similarities which transcend geo-political space. One important theme that recurs throughout these texts – and which this study expands on in the context of northern Nigeria – is the performance of identity; the definition of, and display in, public; foregrounding the agency of body and space beyond religious doctrine and state intervention.

Pertinent processions and pilgrimages are analysed. The QN organizes the *Maukibi*, the annual processional event, to celebrate the birthday cycle of Shaykh Abdulqadir al-Jilani (1078-1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood and the 11th century Sufi master of Bagdad. The IMN stages various processional marches (known as the *Muzahara*) with, quite arguably, overly religious and political underpinnings.[8] These marches have various intentions: to mourn and ignite grief of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (626-680), the grandson of the Prophet[9] and the third Shia Imam; to celebrate the birth of the Prophet along with other 'saints' during the moments of the *Ashura* and the *Maulid*;[10] or to perform the Quds Day to demonstrate solidary with 'persecuted' Palestinians. Added to that, a pilgrimage (the *Arbaeen* symbolic trek or the *Tattaki*) is organized to re-awaken the collective imagined 'redemptive suffering'[11] of Hussain and his 72 companions who were murdered along with him at Karbala in 680CE in present-day Iraq.[12] This dissertation will trace the historical trajectories of these public rituals, their changing modes of organization and execution as well as the changing religious motivations over time.

The focus of the research is limited to the urban areas of Kano, Katsina and Zaria. These are the sites where all the QN's ceremonial, and the IMN's ceremonial and mournful marches,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Z. Abdullah, "Sufis on Parade: The Performance of Black, African and Muslim Identities", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (2009), pp. 199-237; H. Dabashi, *Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest* (Harvard: The Belknap Press, 2011).

[8] As Chapter Three will demonstrate.

[9] Peace be Upon Him. Hereafter, all mention of His name will imply this religious invocation.

[10] These have differing meanings for both religious affiliations and will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter.

[11] M. Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Development Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978).

[12] The Karbala incident refers to the interception and killing of Hussain and his close associates by the Yazidi forces, the second caliph of the Umayyad Dynasty (Yazid I, 647 -711). This incident took place on the 10th October, 680 (10th Muharram 61 AH) at Karbala, a desert located near the Euphrates River in Southern Iraq. Hussain was said to have been killed along with 72 men, women and children. Hussain and his associates were denied access to water as a way to force them to pay homage to Yazid's rule, which they rejected as 'illegitimate'. This siege lasted for 10 days before Hussain and his followers were finally murdered. See M. Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Development Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978).

take place. These towns fall within the Northwest geo-political zone and constitute part of the core Muslim regions in northern Nigeria, with Kano having the largest Muslim population. These areas were the product of the Shehu Usman's Islamic revivalist movement of the 19th century that led to the establishment of the theocratic state of the Sokoto Caliphate. The entrenchment and growth of Islamic values and practices in these towns is owed to this development. While Sufi tradition in the towns (specifically the Qadiriyya) is as old as the establishment of Islam in this space, Shi'ism is believed to have been introduced by Lebanese traders during the colonial period. The Iranian brand of Shi'ism, and its inherent public spectacles, was introduced in 1980 following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Kano has been the headquarters of the QN since the 1930s. The IMN established its base in Zaria. Unlike the QN that organizes and stages its *Maukibi* processional ceremony exclusively within urban Kano, the IMN decentralizes its *Muzahara* by having them staged in various urban spaces of Kano, Zaria and Katsina.[13] This has far-reaching consequences on religious practice in public spaces.

The fact that the public religious rituals of both of the groups unfold within the same social context — northern Nigeria —, certain aspects of the practices call for mild comparison. Mild because the two groups are significantly different in terms of their history, traditions, ideological foundations, patterns of community and authority, orientation to authority and religious as well as political agenda. Both use public space of the same social context. The target population for mobilization by each is the same 'publics'[14] of northern Nigeria, eventhough the basis for the mobilization project rests on the public acceptability of the doctrine of the group in question— Sufism or Shi'ism. Although the *Maukibi* was started long before the birth of the IMN, certainly the ritual's stable cosistency could have had (in)direct influence over the staging of the *Muzahara*. The use of the *Maukibi*'s remote routes and alleyways of the core city of Kano by the *Muzahara* crowd, particulary in the last couple of years, points to the possible influence of one over the other. This does not, however, overrule or underestimate the connection of the practices with the normative Shi'i saints' public commemorations, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3. What cannot be established is whether the two groups could share the same set of participating crowd. What is certain is that the groups share the culture of 'saints' veneration and both of the groups' ceremonial and mournful

[13] See maps I, II & III for the estimate of the spatial extent of the QN's *Maukibi* procession within urban Kano and *Muzahara* of the IMN in Zaria and Katsina.

[14] I adopt the term 'publics' from the work of Anderson, Jon W., "New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam", *Social Research*, Vol. 70, No. 3, *Islam: The Public and Private Spheres* (2003), pp. 887-906. Anderson uses the term in the sense of what he calls 'new people' with newly reconfigured consciousness and outlook as a result of the impact of 'new media'. The people of northern Nigeria too are caught across various lines of ethno-religious and cultural consciousness.

procession, and pilgrimage are a performative compliment to the culture of 'saints' veneration. Therefore, the dissertation takes these public ceremonial and mournful marches as a phenomenon of public religiosity in the northern Nigerian landscape. Thus, each group is examined in this context based on the specific modes in which they perform their rituals, and the implications and significance thereof.

This dissertation contributes to the body of literature on social history by examining the public religiosity of the QN and IMN and the way in which these practices have been the sites for making and articulating identity in northern Nigeria since 1952. It also examines why the IMN marches became violent. However, part of the evolving rites of these two reformed groups is the use of public spaces to *perform* their beliefs into practice as a way of democratizing the groups' presence and for re-mobilization. This is done by taking their existence out of the confines of mosques or religious centres to the streets, alleyways, and other public arenas. While this practice 'sacralizes'[15] the public spaces, the territorial confines of the mosques or religious centres are expanded and, thus, become contested. Scholars argue that public processions and other forms of public rituality have used the concept of 'sacralized' space, denoting a transformation in the meaning of space from 'secular' to 'sacred'. Of the multitude of varying Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, the QN and IMN are the only groups who stage public processions and pilgrimage and the practices remain their defining identity in public. However, IMN public marches were 'banned' by the Nigerian government in 2015 following a 'clash' between the group and the Nigerian Army. This resulted in the processions and pilgrimages turning into the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* which were staged in the state capital of Nigeria, Abuja from 2015. This event will be examined in chapter 5 putting it in the context of freedom for public religiosity and the repressive reactions of the state against the waves of the 'Free Zakzaky' protests.

These public forms of religious practices, or public religiosity, thus form an important component in the formation and subsequent changes to the collective religious identity of these religious groups. Each has elicited different responses from the state(s) and members outside the religious movement on the one hand, and by the religious leaders of both movements, on the other, resulting in contesting reactions and counter-reactions. Historically, these reactions and counter-reactions have, over time, influenced the form of the public religious rituals. Since the processions, the pilgrimage, and the protest (3ps) do not take place in isolation, they are

[15] See for example, Jack David Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), p. 66; Chad E. Seales, "Parades and Processions: Protestant and Catholic Ritual Performances in a Nuevo New South Town", *Numen*, Vol. 55 (2008), pp. 44–67.

affected in some ways by the socio-political developments of the society within which they unfold.

1.2 Historiographical Debates

Socio-political and security discourses in northern Nigeria have, since the colonial period, largely been shaped by the interactions, contestations and conflicts between one or more Islamic sect or group, and the state. P.H.G. Scott testifies to these cleavages in his 1952 *Survey of Islam*. He reflects on the fierce struggles among these religious groups all vying for religious and political spheres of influence in the region.[17] Therefore, since independence in 1960, there has been what John Hunwick calls a 'symbiosis between religion and power' in Nigeria.[18] Ethno-religious divides in Nigeria continued after independence, despite attempts to form a political system under which the incompatible regions of the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south could live in harmony. Muhammad Sani Umar even argues that the deliberate omission of religious demography since the 1963 census is a "pointer to the centrality of religious demographics to Nigerian politics and the sensitivity around the question of which religious community constitutes a national majority".[19] In response, subsequent civilian and military political regimes formed a unique system of governance, from 'separatist regionalism' (1954-1960) to a parliamentary federal coalition government (1960 – 1965), to a unitary system (1966),[20] and finally to a fully-fledged federal state when the country was divided into 12 states. Religious conflict in Nigeria has, therefore, not only a long history but includes moments of conflict between members of the same religious affiliation or sect, between inhabitants of varying regions, and between religious protagonists and the state.

In this already volatile environment, allegations of corruption and nepotism after the 1964 general elections further factionalised state institutions, complicated relations between

[17] C.O. 554/1321, P. H. G. Scott, *A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria*, 1952 (Kaduna: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 1-7.
[18] J. Hunwick, "An African Case Study of Political Islam: Nigeria", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 524, (1992), pp. 143-155.
[19] M. S. Umar, "The Politics of Ethno-religious Balancing and the Struggle for Power in Nigeria", in J. G. Cooke and R. Downie (eds.), *Religious Authority and the State in Africa*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 70. See also P. B. Clarke & I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State 1960 – 1983* (Munchen: Grunewald Kaiser, 1984), p. 19.
[20] Nigeria operated with regional governments, with a weak centre from 1954 – 1966. A. M. Ahanotu, "Muslim and Christians in Nigeria: A Contemporary Political Discourse" in A. M. Ahanotu ed., *Religion, State and Society in Contemporary Africa: Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, Zaire and Mozambique* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1992), p. 12.

the regions and the centre, and compounded tension. This led to the 1966 coup in which all the northern leaders in the government were killed and the country was plunged into Civil War (1967-1970). The Biafran War was fought between the forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and those of the Biafra, a secessionist movement for the creation of an independent state. The movement was led by Major Chukwuemeka Ojukwu (d. 2011), an Igbo, one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria.[21] This visibly polarized Nigeria's society along ethnic, regional and religious lines.

The abrupt termination of the democratic dispensation of the First Republic, the Civil War (1967-1970), and the assassination of General Murtala Ramat Muhammad, Nigeria's military Head of State (1975-1976), paved the way for subsequent military takeovers. Since then, Nigeria had been tossed from one military regime to another, each with its own records of violations of fundamental human rights, political instability, and recurring ethno-religious violence.

Between 1979 and 1985, there were new trends of socio-economic instability. The oil boom of 1970-1980 led to a superficial and short-lived moment of prosperity. This was followed by economic crises, rising unemployment, and frustration on the part of the citizenry. The petro-dollars of the oil boom further enriched the affluent while the 'urban poor' suffered the repercussion of the neo-liberal economic policies of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Nigeria's Head of State (1985-1993).[22] This caused dramatic changes in the socio-economic landscape, particularly of northern Nigeria. It is here, and in this context, that the IMN grew as a movement.

According to Ousmane Ousman Kane, the proliferation of militant religious ideas and rapid urbanisation led to a dramatic 'fragmentation of authority' which challenged the socio-political dominance of not only Sufis but also the state.[23] The rise of the *Da'awa* (Islamic Propagation) Group led by Shaykh Amin al-Deen Abubakar (d. 2015) and the introduction of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, popularly known in local parlance as the *Izala*, transformed the religious landscape of the region.[24] With its

[21] See for example A. A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980); O. Obasanjo, *My Command* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1981); and F. Forsyth, *The Biafran Story*: *The Making of an African Legend* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1982).
[22] P. Lubeck, *Islam and Urban Labor: The Making of a Muslim Working Class in Northern Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[23] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 69.
[24] Both *Da'awa* and the *Izala* were Saudi-sponsored religious organizations. They were Wahhabi – oriented groups. Traditionally, their proselytization primarily targeted the Sufi groups who, at the time, still controlled the largest following of Muslims in the region.

mission of 'mediating social change' in the ever-changing socio-religious practices of Muslims,[25] the *Izala* castigated Sufi Brotherhoods as a heretical innovation. Furthermore, the IMN – an Iranian-backed movement – appeared at the Ahmadu Bello University, the largest university in northern Nigeria.

Using the platform of the Muslim Students Association (MSA) to build support, the IMN grew in popularity under its founder Shaykh el-Zakzaky. The ideas advocated by the *Da'awa*, the *Izala* and the IMN were appealing especially to western-educated youth. These emerging religious organisations became, according to John Hunwick, 'models for younger militant Muslims'.[26] Inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, these radicalised youths called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria, using the slogan "*Islama One*" (Islam only). One of the prominent features of Islam in post-independence Nigeria was the establishment of Muslim organisations and associations. Nonetheless, these bodies became the unifying platforms for the Muslims. According to P.B. Clarke (1987), the existing bond among the Islamic *ummah* became stronger than ever before.[27]

Amidst this fervent religious atmosphere, the *Maitatsine* riots broke out in Kano between 1980 and 1985. Muhammad Marwa, popularly known as *Maitatsine*, was a Cameroonian Qur'anic teacher who settled in Kano and led a millenarian movement proclaiming himself a prophet. He led bloody riots in Kano in 1980, in Maiduguri in 1982, in Yola in 1984 and in Gombe in 1985. The estimated death toll in Kano alone was about 6,000 people with many more injured and displaced.[28] Dramatic measures were taken by the federal government (1984-1985) to tame the activities of extremists in northern Nigeria. Part of this was a limitation imposed on the proliferation of mosques and the public *da'awa* (proselytization). The clamour for the re-implementation of *Sharia* law further complicated religious tensions.

The issue of *Sharia*,[29] a socio-legal system, resurfaced amidst power struggles between the state and religious actors. As noted above, Nigeria experienced a long period of military

[25] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria* … p. 3.
[26] J. Hunwick, "An African Case Study of Political Islam: Nigeria…" *op cit*
[27] P. B. Clarke & I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State*..., p. 72.
[28] P. B. Clarke & I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria*…, p. 107.
[29] It is important to note that *Sharia* is not a new phenomenon to the people of the north. *Sharia* was part and parcel of their history since the introduction of Islam in the 15th century. Although its application was weakened with syncretic practices, it was reformed by the 19th century Jihad revivalism. However, the British gradually restricted the application of *Sharia* through the introduction of the magisterial laws. It eventually became an issue when, after the independence, Muslims started to agitate for the re-introduction of *Sharia* in the Republican constitution. This project was not fully actualized until 1999. The *Sharia* debate in Nigeria has attracted much attention. See for example, R. B. Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of

rule. A return to democratic rule was therefore seen by Muslims in the north as an opportunity to press for the inclusion of *Sharia* in the newly drafted constitution. The agitation for *Sharia*, however, was a continuation of what had been underway since the Second Republic (1979-1983). Seen as the most contentious constitutional issue in the process of drafting a constitution, the main preoccupation of the *Sharia* debate during the time was the establishment of *Sharia* courts at federal and state levels, as recommended by the Constitutional Drafting Committee.[30] It is worth noting that despite intra-religious cleavages, there was general consensus among Muslims for the re-implementation of *Sharia* law. In 1999, the demand for the re-implementation of *Sharia* went beyond the establishment of the localised *Sharia* courts. Allen Christelow identifies four critical factors which inspired the perceived unanimity of the Muslim community for the *Sharia* project: the feeling of religious insecurity among the population; social inequality; recurrence of religious violence; and the absence of a well-structured state system.[31]

With the restoration of democratic governance, the survival of the northern elected elites depended on their cogent political will to negotiate the re-implementation of *Sharia*. The State Assemblies of the 19 northern states swiftly voted for the *Sharia* re-implementation in 1999.[32] This endorsement was more or less hollow as politicians were often accused of instrumentalising *Sharia* to garner support from the Muslim majority.[33] This, in part, explains the reason why *Sharia* was short-lived, as it ended in 2003. Yet it led to the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agencies, the *Sharia* Commissions, and the *Hisbah* Boards in Kano and Zamfara states. These bodies were saddled with different responsibilities such as fighting of corruption within the government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs); hearing public complaints of corruption-related cases; interpreting and administering *Sharia* legal provisions; enforcing *Sharia* compliance (using the *Hizbah* militias); and

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Sharia Re-implementation" (PhD Diss. Bayreuth University, 2011); M. U. Bunza, "Sharia in the History and Political Development of Nigeria" in J. O. Adekunle (ed.), *Religion in Politics*: *Secularism, and National Integration in Modern Nigeria,* (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2009), pp. 137 – 158; O. U. Kalu, "Safiyyah and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in Twenty-First-Century Nigeria", *African Affairs*, Vol. 102, No. 408 (2003), pp. 389 – 408; B. Kendhamer, "The Sharia Controversy in Northern Nigeria and the Politics of Islamic Law in New and Uncertain Democracies", *Comparative Politics,* Vol. 45, No. 3 (2013), pp. 291 – 311; D. O. Laitin, "The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1982), pp. 411 – 430; and M. Chun, "Legal Battles: Nigeria's Sharia Controversy", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2003), pp. 7 – 8.

[30] W. F. S. Miles, "Religious Pluralism in Northern Nigeria" in *N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels,* eds. *The History of Islam in Africa* …, p. 216.

[31] A. Christelow, "Persistence and Transformation in the Politics of Sharia in Nigeria, 1958 – 2002: In Search of an Explanatory Framework" cited in R. B. Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria…", p. 307.

[32] A. Christelow, "Persistence and Transformation…, p. 293.

[33] M. Chun, "Legal Battles: Nigeria's Sharia Controversy", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2003), p. 7.

adjudicating/mediating minor and customary social problems related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The *Sharia* debate also sparked new bouts of inter-religious violence in northern Nigeria.[34] It fuelled the schism between the dominant Muslims and the minority Christians, and subsequently led to the birth of the radical Islamist group, Boko Haram.[35] The radical form of the ideology of this group is far from systematic but rather sporadic and opportunistic. Their wanton violence, however, provides context under which religious insecurity was compounded in the region and further complicated the relations between the majority Muslims and the minority Pentecostal Christians, largely in the Middle Belt.[36]

However, the above set the context in which processions and pilgrimage were introduced in northern Nigeria. The religious and political significance of these practices lay in its capacity of collectivizing a substantial number of people in a community of followers. Steered by a centralized religious authority via hierarchy of command, the loyalty of this community is, largely, to that religious authority, with lukewarm recognition of the political state authority.[37] The size or demography of this community – processional crowd (PC) – varies across time, and is based on the form of the procession in question. Certainly, the growth in

[34] See: "Sharia and Islam in Nigerian Pentecostal Rhetoric, 1970 – 2003", in W. J. Kalu, N. Wariboko and T. Falola, eds. *The Collected Essays of Ogbu Uke Kalu, Vols. 3, Religions in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Social Ethics* (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 2010), pp. 87 – 105.

[35] The origin of the name 'Boko Haram' is contentious. The debate is framed around the group's anti-western education propaganda and modernity at large. It can be argued that the name 'Boko Haram' was coined by the Nigerian media profiling of the group and that framing has given it currency and popularity in both academic scholarship and public discourses. However, the group rejects this nickname because they consider themselves as the *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah Li al-Da'awa Wa al-Jihad* (A Society of the Sunni for the [Holy] Armed Struggles). According to Andrea Brigaglia, "for the southern Nigerian Christian press…as well as for the global Western media, the nickname Boko Haram magically captures all the stereotypes that have daily currency in Islamophobic discourses", A. Brigaglia, "Boko Haram: Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yufuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria", *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, Issue No. 11, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, p. 37. Boko Haram insurgency is one of the most widely studied themes in Nigerian history. For the recent authoritative works, see A. Brigaglia, "The Volatility of the Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram", *Diritto e questioni publiche* (2015), Palermo; M. P. de Montclos (ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014); A. Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018); and A. Kassim & M. Nwankpo, *The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2018).

[36] Middle Belt refers to the central Nigerian area but falls within the larger geographical region of northern Nigeria. The boundaries are fluid; it also refers to an extended community of Christians that cut across states like Plateau, Benue, Nassarawa, Niger, Abuja (FCT), Southern Kaduna, Taraba, and Adamawa. The Pentecostal Churches play a significant role in the minority Christian consciousness against the dominant Muslims of the region. See for example, S. Suleiman, "Exhuming Passion': Religion and the Emergence of the Middle Belt Struggle in Nigeria", *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, Issue No. 11, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, pp. 18 – 24.

[37] The debate of the state's 'legitimacy' in relation to the extent to which religious communities recognize it (the state) is discussed in chapters Four and Five of this dissertation.

the demographic size of the PC of all forms of processional rituals is proportional to the urban demographic increase.

How the *Maukibi* changed in a dramatic way within few decades of its introduction is part of the overarching aspects for examination in this dissertation. It calls to an examination that an event which was started with barely 20 participants in the urban city of Kano blossoms into a hundred of thousands of participants' processional event being attended from across Africa and other parts of the world. The event thus becomes the most spectacular of the 3ps in terms of crowds, territoriality and a religious spectacle in northern Nigeria. The phase at which the PC of the IMN has been expanding over the last two decades is worthy of note too. The PC of the IMN plays role not only in displaying the Shia identity but positioning it in the already tight and saturated Sunni-dominated religious sphere of Nigeria. This seems strategic as the Shia remains a significant minority since the formation of the IMN in 1980s, constituting only 12%.[38]

Public religiosity is observed to be one of the drivers for the recent transformation of the urban landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular.[39] The materiality of this transformation is seen and assessed, as Asonzeh Ukah argues, by the proliferation of prayer camps within the major cities of the country. Although Ukah's argument is within the context of the proliferation of the Pentecostal Christian prayer grounds in Lagos, the largest urban center in Nigeria, and perhaps other areas in Southern and Central Nigerian areas.[40] The case in northern Nigeria is different. Here, urban public ways rather than prayer grounds are being occupied by the 3ps. For the Pentecostal Christian evangelism, built structures sprang in the places mentioned but in the north the appropriation is temporary, usually conducted on specific dates and hours of the day. To this effect, Olufunke Adeboye asserts that "Casanova predicts the possibility of public religion instigating the debate that may ultimately facilitate the redrawing of the boundaries between the private and public spheres".[41] Public religiosity took a new dimension with the activities of the el-Zakzakists' movement.

[38] A. Mustapha & M. U. Bunza, "Contemporary Islamic Sects & Groups in Northern Nigeria", in A. M. Rauf ed. *Sects and Social Disorder: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria* (New York: Boydell & Brewer, Inc., 2014), p. 54.
[39] A. Ukah, "Redeeming Urban Space: The Ambivalence of Building a Pentecostal City in Lagos, Nigeria", in *Global Prayers: Contemporary Manifestations of Religious in the City*, J. Becher, K. Klingan, S. Lanz, and K. Wildner, eds. (Zurich: Lars Mller, 2014), p. 179.
[40] *Ibid*. See also O. Adeboye, "'A Church in a Cinema Hall'": Pentecostal Appropriation of Public Space in Nigeria", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 42 (2012), pp. 145 – 171.
[41] O. Adeboye, "A Church in a Cinema Hall…p. 148.

The group structures of the QN and IMN underline an important historical change in the development of Sufi brotherhood and Shia not only in northern Nigeria but in other parts of Africa. Sufism is a mystical form of Islam that emphasizes inward worship. Two independent, often conflicting, schools of thought have emerged. One school is Sufi-oriented, made up of Sufi scholars cum practitioners, and the other is non-Sufi, largely made up of 'Salafists'. The former regards the Sufi rituals of solitude, constant meditations, unworldly dispositions, austere, asceticism as a 'spiritual revolution' aimed at purifying the 'appetitive soul, corporeal self'. According to Malik (2018), Sufism involves constant discipline that leads to "permanent change of character and state, on both a personal and social plane".[42] 'Sufi' is thus the quality of being a practicing Sufism adherent.

Sufism in Nigeria is believed to have started with the introduction of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood to Kano by Shaykh Abdulkarim al-Maghil (d. 1505) in the 15th century.[43] Since then, the Qadiriyya Brotherhood expanded and developed multiple branches under respective Sufi leaders up to the 19th century Sokoto Jihad when they were consolidated by the leaders. This Brotherhood remained the only major Sufi group until the end of 19th century when the Tijjaniyya Brotherhood was introduced by Shaykh Umar al-Futi (d. 1864). Thereafter, these two Sufi groups have since competed with each other for influences and asserting identities.

When Sufism was embraced, there were only individual *marabouts* or Sufi masters with a handful of disciples under them. This trend was known to be in operation across North and West African sub-regions.[44] Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077-1166) was a 12th century Bagdad Sufi master, the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi Order and from whose name "Qadiriyya'" was derived.[45] He seemed the first to transform the (individual) Sufi culture into a group ritual and eventually acquired a prescribed status of an 'order' in principle and practice. This was claimed to have been done in order to arrest the 'moral' and 'spiritual' degeneration caused by the prevalence of civic strife, cupidity and socio-political instability that hit the Muslim community of the Middle East in the 7th century AD. Thus, the individual ascetic lifestyle was institutionalized (via formation of Sufi Brotherhoods) which became more

[42] See A. F. Ahmed, "The Qadiriyya and Its Impact in Nigeria" (PhD Diss., University of Ibadan, 1986), pp. 1- 44; H. A. Hanieh, *Sufism and Sufi Orders: God's Spiritual Paths, Adaptation and Renewal in the Context of Modernization* (Amman: Fruedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011), p.9; E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2010) and H. Malik, *The Grey Falcon: The Life and Teachings of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani* (Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 171-206.

[43] B. M. Barkindo "The Role of al-Maghili in the Reforms of Sarki Muhammadu Rumfa (1463-1499) of Kano: A Re-examination", in *Kano Studies*, NS, Volume 3, No 1, 1987/88, p. 85.

[44] N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels, "Introduction: Pattern of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims in Africa" in N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels eds. *The History of Islam in Africa* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 9.

[45] For life and works of al-Jilani, see H. Malik, *The Grey Falcon: The Life and Teachings of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani* (Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2018).

socially pronounced and publicly manifested from the 16th century onward. Designations associated with group collective rituals started to emerge. These included: the *ikhwan* (brothers), the *fuqara* (the poor), the *mureeduun* (disciples), the *aulaad* (the children, a master-disciple approach), the *ashaab* (companions, friends), and the *ahbaab* (the loved ones).[46] These designations, while they refer to a specific identity of disciples at a particular stage of spiritual development, all carry elements of communion and togetherness which are performed through the 3ps.

Sufism in Nigeria was practiced by individuals more or less in private. Sufi saints lived an isolated life without a notable affiliation to a particular designated brotherhood as it was the case in areas like Timbuktu, Harar and Cairo.[47] A notable shift occurred in the 18th century that moved the frontiers of the Sufi Brotherhoods from a 'decentralized and diffusive' system of ritual to a mass collective stream of people with a common identity.[48] Mention should be made here of Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729 - 1811), a charismatic Sufi icon who founded the Qadiriyya-Mukhtariyya (alias Kuntiyya) Brotherhood and had fragmented individuals and groups of the Kunta tribe and its environs united under his platform.[49] This trend continued across West Africa and the Sudan especially with the founding and spread of the *Sammaniyya* by Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim al-Samman (d. 1775)[50] and *Khatmiyya* by Sayyid Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani al-Khatmi (d. 1853).[51]

John Paden notes that "many of the works of Usman *bn* Fodio were addressed to 'companions of 'Abd al-Qadir,' and the Jihad followers of Usman were frequently called 'the community of Qadiriyya' (*jama'ar alkadirawa*)".[52] This is a reference to the 19th century development of the community – popularly known as the *Jama'a* – who constituted the locus of the *mujahiduun* (the Jihad army).[53] The epithet '*jama'ar qadirawa'* continued to be used for

[46] Sufism evolved with its epistemology. Its language is as mystical as its content. The language contains terms imbued with allegorical meanings which are, perhaps, understood only by those with adequate grasp of the Sufi sciences or acquired, through rigor of Sufi spiritual induction, its true 'reality'. A number of works have been written on Sufism. For some details, see these introductory works by E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2010) and W. Stoddart, *Outline of Sufism: The Essentials of Islamic Spirituality* (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2012).

[47] N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels, eds. *The History of Islam in Africa*…p. 9.

[48] Levitzion and Powels, p. 9.

[49] For more on Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti and his works, see A. A. Batran, "The Qadiriyya – Mukhtariyya Brotherhood in West Africa: The Concept of Tasawwuf in the Writings of Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729-1811)", *Transafrican Journal of History*, Vol. 4, No. 1/2 (1974), pp. 41 – 70.

[50] An extensive study has been conducted on the origin, development and genealogy of masters and disciples of the Sammaniyya Sufi Order in Sudan. See A. M. E. Abdel Rahman, "Middle Class and Sufism: Case Study of the Sammaniyya Order Branch of Shaikh Al-Bur'ai" (PhD Diss., University of Khartoum, 2008), especially Ch. 4.

[51] The Khatmiyya Sufi Order is in existence in Eritrea and Ethiopia. It also spread to Chad, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt and India.

[52] J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California Press, 1973), p. 68.

[53] The Shehu Usman bn Fodio Jihad or the Sokoto Jihad was the profound socio-political, economic and intellectual revolution in Hausa states led by the Shehu Usman bn Fodio (d. 1817), a Jihadi scholar. The Jihad resulted in the formation of the Sokoto Caliphate, the largest theocratic state in the history of West Africa. The

the Qadiriyya adherents up to the 1940s but that did not, however, abrogate the brotherhood structure which was the basic unit of the Sufi congregations. Similarly, the defining identity of the Shia during its formative years in 8th century Kufa was a group ritual. Visitations to the tombs of the Karbala 'martyrs' became their hallmark. Although the Shia operated during this period under intense state repression by the Sunni majority, the ritual was sometimes staged in clandestine mode.[54]

The impact of procession, pilgrimage and eventual protest in public spaces as an outward performance of ritual, rituality and religiosity are therefore essential components of this dissertation. 'Procession' could be looked at from two main points of view: literal and contextual. Literally, 'procession' constitutes the act of a group of people progressing or proceeding; moving along in an orderly manner. According to this definition, procession could be organized for three objectives: ceremonialization, mourning, or solemnization. Parade and cortège are synonymous to 'procession'.[55] According to Knut Jacobsen, "Processions are often cheerful religious occasions that bring people together to celebrate something. But not all processions are celebrations: some are occasions of sorrow such as funeral processions, some are displays of power and strength, and they can display hierarchy, competition and conflict".[56]

Contextually, and inferring from Jacobsen's definition, processions acquire meanings based on the context and the purpose for which they are staged. For example, a funeral procession symbolizes the deceased's transition into heaven. In this sense, procession should be considered neutral, deployed as instrument of public display or making public of both religious and non-religious events.

Caliphate comprised of a loose confederation of emirates, governed by emirs (also executed the Jihad in their respective localities), that recognize the authority of the Sultan, the head of the Caliphate. The Jihad influenced revolutionary movements in the areas of Futa Toro and Futa Jalo in Sene-Gambian region of West Africa where Ahmad Segu (also spelt Seku, d. 1897) and Alhajj Umar Tal (also known as Umar al-Futi, d. 1864) executed complimentary Jihads. For details on these Jihads movements, D. M. Last, *Sokoto Caliphate* (London: Longman, 1967); S. Abubakar, "The Established Caliphate: Sokoto, the Emirates and their Neighbors" in O. Ikime, ed. *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Nig. Plc, 1980); J. P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); H. A. S Johnson, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); A. Tahir, "The Writings of Shaykh Uthman b. Fudi: A Critical and Analytical Study" (PhD Diss., McGill University, 1989); D. Robinson, "'The Chronicle of the Succession': An Important Document for the Umarian State", *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1990), pp. 245 – 262; D. Robinson, "Revolutions in the Western Sudan", in N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels, eds. *The History of Islam in Africa* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), pp. 131 – 152.

[54] N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shia: Identity, Ritual and Sacred Space in Eight-Century Kufa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 231 – 248.

[55] Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Inc. (2019) https://www.merriam-webster.com (accessed February, 2020).

[56] K. A. Jacobsen, "Introduction: Religion on Display" in K. A. Jacobsen, ed., *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 1.

The term 'procession' is localised in different contexts by using the derived meaning attached to the term, its Arabic rendering, or a local language inference. For example, the mourning processions in Lebanon are known as *al-Mawakib al-Hussainiyya*.[57] For the QN, *al-Maukib* or *Maukibi* refers to the procession. The term '*al-Maukibi'* is used by Shaykh Nasiru Kabara, the founder of the QN, in his brochure on the event which is titled *al-Maukib al-Qadiriyya fi Shawari' al-Kanawiyya*.[58] *Waliyyai* ('saints' in Hausa) is used (largely within Kano) to refer to the *Maukibi* procession. Again, in Algerian Sufi pilgrimage of the Zidani Brotherhood, *Rekeb* (ride) is used to refer to procession.[59]

In this same tradition of localising the meaning and practice that the IMN gave names (in local parlance) to their forms of processions: the term *Muzahara*[60] is a generic concept that represents all the forms of processions that the group organizes. Derived from the Arabic word, *Muzahara* simply means 'public display' or 'protest'.[61] According to the IMN, *Muzaharats* are the "political activit[ies] of the movement and involve mass demonstrations against or for national or international issues that are of concern to the Muslims as well as in solidarity with oppressed section of the Muslim Ummah such as the Palestinians."[62] The activities include: the *Ashura*, the *Maulid*, the Quds Day processions. For distinction and to observe the 'sacred' days on their celebratory calendar, each event is referred to by its name. This dissertation considers procession an instrument of presence making, identity display, and as asserting both religious and political claims.

According to George Greenia (2014), pilgrimage involves 'travel', expression of faith and contestation of identity and offers "a powerful gesture of group spirituality" by which "a nation of the faithful and a faithful nation" is created.[63] Simon Coleman (2016) pushes the idea of 'travel' and contends that "pilgrimage involves leaving one's home to go on a journey to a distant and holy place, then returning home, often after having undergone a powerful spiritual experience".[64] In this dissertation, the meaning of pilgrimage is taken from the IMN's rendering of pilgrimage as the *Tattaki*, as explained under '*Arbaeen'*.

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[57] Transl.: processions [for mourning the murder] of Husayn
[58] Transl.: The Qadiriyya Procession in the Streets of Kano
[59] See S. Andezian, "The Role of Sufi Women in an Algerian Pilgrimage Ritual" in D. Westerland and E.E. Rosander, eds., *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997), pp. 193 – 215.
[60] Without '*ts*' for singular and with '*ts*' for plural
[61] This meaning is given by Ustaz Sunusi Abdulqadir, the leader of the IMN in Kano, during interview with him by the author at Dukawiya headquarters on 20 August, 2019.
[62] https://islamicmovement.org/ (Accessed May, 2021).
[63] G. Greenia, "What is Pilgrimage?", in Lesley D. Harman ed., *A Sociology of Religion: Embodiment, Identity, Transformation* (London: Ursus Press, 2014), pp. 8-27.
[64] S. Coleman, "Pilgrimage" in Robert. A. Sagel ed. *The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 386.

According to Pierre Lienard and Pascal Boyer (2002):

> Protest are messages directed to political adversaries, sympathizers, decision makers, and the wider public. Besides more conventional activities, such as voting and lobbying, they are important tools for various actors, most notably social movements, to attract attention, to appeal or threaten, to make claims heard and visible, and eventually to have an impact on politics and society.[65]

Protest is *Muzahara* and vice versa based on the IMN's conception of making 'claims heard and visible'. This dissertation examines the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* in the light of this definition and conceptualisation.

Definitions of the concept 'ritual' varies among anthropologists. The theory of ritual sums up its basic conception that 'ritual' "is a specific way of organizing the flow of action, characterized by stereotypy, […] performance […] and specific themes".[66] Processional performances of both the QN and IMN are routinely (annually) performed and thus fit into the descriptive components of the definition. More so when one considers the fact that 'rituals' are polythetic. 'Rituality' is the quality of being ritual.

'Religiosity' is, literally, the strong religious feeling or belief. Harvey Whitehouse has propounded the theory of 'modes of religiosity' which entails the performance of religious ceremonies that involve 'reciting of prayers and liturgical formulae'.[67] According to Barbara Holdcroft "religiosity is found to be synonymous with such terms as religiousness, orthodoxy, faith, belief, piousness, devotion, and holiness".[68] Processions are sites of performing religious 'devotion' and transforming 'belief' into practice.

What makes the 3ps a more distinctive mode of religiosity in this study is their urban-based location. Urban space is instrumental in the formation and growth of the 3ps over time. The notion of the 'religion of the urban poor' fits into the discourse of religion being a platform for the absorption of the urban people.[69] According to E. Gellner "[t]he city has its poor [and] what they require from religion is consolation or escape, […] excitement, an absorption in a religious condition […]"[70] From the 1950s to 1967, the *Maukibi* processional ceremony was the only Sufi space that effectively mobilized the fragments of the Qadiriyya adherents into a reformed QN community. The so-called 'urban poor' constituted the significant majority of

[65] Ruud Koopmans and Dieter Rutch, "Protest Event Analysis", *Methods of Social Movement Research*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2002), pp. 231-59.
[66] Pierre Lienard and Pascal Boyer, "Whence Collective Rituals? A Cultural Selection Model of Ritualized Behavior" *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 108, No. 4 (2006), pp. 814-827.
[67] H. Whitehouse, *Arguments and Icons: Divergent Modes of Religiosity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9.
[68] B. Holdcroft, "What is Religiosity?", *A Journal of Inquiry and Practice*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (2006), pp. 89-103.
[69] T. Asad, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam", *Qui Parle*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2009), p. 17.
[70] E. Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 48.

the *Maukibi* PC. While it is imperative to note that the PC is made up of both the poor and the rich, the latter distinguished themselves by contributing in cash or in kind towards the overall development of the QN in general and the *Maukibi* in particular. This is the case with the IMN. The rise of the Zakzakist's movement and the introduction of the Iranian model of Shia marked a departure from a seemingly 'secretive' Shia practices to a mass-oriented movement otherwise known as the IMN.

The concept of 'performance' has undergone terminological changes. The changes have been occasioned by difficulties in the contextualisation of the term in the fields in which it is used. Various meanings have thus been developed. 'Performance' first connotes 'accomplishment' or 'execution of a specified action', 'enactment of the script' and more recently 'activity of the agent or artist'.[71] This dissertation applies the last connotation. It takes the turn of the *Maukibi, Muzahara* and *Tattaki* performances of the QN and IMN as religious 'agents' and 'artists' playing critical roles in mediating their identity while casting the design of their respective organisations as the script. The modes of each of the group's rituals fit into Catherine Bell's (1998) categorization as follows: they are calendrical; occupy public space; occasioned by feasts which represent the political economy of the events and they are festivals in their own right.[72]

The phenomena of procession and pilgrimage evolved out of three interconnected discursive traditions: veneration, blessings, and remembrance.[73] These traditions mutate in succession; one leads to the next. They are essentially born out of idealization of the charismatic personalities of prophets and those who modelled their lifestyle after them. It seems to be a generic tradition in major belief systems – Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam – that the auras with which the prophet(s), their family members, and companions are faithfully venerated make them 'holy' and 'persons *extraordinaire*'. As such, they potentially risk being 'deified' by their ardent followers. Eventually, they are made the 'blessed' bodies – both in their lifetimes and after – worth seeking the *baraka* (blessings). Seeking the *baraka* eventually make not only those 'holy' men and the objects they used in their lifetimes 'sacred', but also the sites where they are interred as the destination for pilgrimage.

Devotees' recounting of the 'exceptional', or 'miraculous', life of a saint leads to the production of hagiography. This genre of literature remains an important biographic document

[71] Catherine Bell, "Performance", in Mark. C. Taylor ed. *Critical Terms for Religious Studies* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 205.
[72] Catherine Bell, "Performance" … p. 205.
[73] On discursive tradition, see Talal Asad, "Kareema Khoury Distinguished Lecture", Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, USA (April, 2015).

in many religious traditions. The desire to venerate and/or seek the *baraka* of the sacred men, sacred objects and the sacred sites (saintly burial grounds/saints' mausoleums) motivates *ziyara* (spiritual visits) that are conducted through either pilgrimages or processions.[74] The distance of the sites visited determines the mode by which the *ziyara* is staged – pilgrimage or procession. Beyond just the trek, pilgrimage and processional practices facilitate memory of the 'imagined communities' of holy men, holiness of places and close contact with the sacred.[75]

Traditions vary with regards to the conduct of pilgrimages and processions in commemoration, mourning or visits to the gravesites of saints based on societal and religious culture. Variations are also noted in their socio-spatial configuration, territoriality, distinctiveness in the ways in which symbols (flags, sticks, posters, portraits, paintings etc.) are deployed while on the move, and their changing purposes over time and space.[76] In the ancient cultures – for example China c. 171 C.E. – multiple depictions of chariot processions were discovered on the stone mound of the cemetery of the Eastern Han dynasty. While these depictions represent the Chinese funerary art, they follow the tradition of offering a symbolic honour to the deceased while leaving for 'the immortal lands'.[77] In ancient Rome, the practice of the 'melancholy procession' was established as the public event that displayed the passing away of a deceased to a final destination.[78] Although the practice was a part of the state's funerary rites, it was indicative of the deceased's reverence and 'symbolic significance'.[79] Robert Schneider's examination of 16th and 17th century France's processional rituals covers what he terms 'mortification on parade'.[80] This culture of self-inflicted suffering and hardship was rooted in the Christian tradition and practiced as public spectacle since the 13th century. While the culture was promoted by the Black Death, it was also banned by Pope Clement VI in 1349 to arrest its further spread. Yet, the ritual continued unabated, notably in places like

[74] Pilgrimages, local or international, are not only motivated by sacred visits. Rather, many historic battlefields, cultural artifacts, war hardware, archaeological discoveries etc that are preserved at museums or research centers also attract worldwide tourism. Brad West has conducted sociological research on tourism in a paper titled "Enchanting Pasts: The Role of International Civil Religious Pilgrimage in Reimagining National Collective Memory", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2008), pp. 258-270.

[75] I borrow and adapt from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London-New York: Verso, 1983).

[76] These points are articulated in the works of C. E. Seals, "Parades and Processions: Protestant and Catholic Ritual Performances in a Nuevo New South Town" *Numen*, vol. 55 (2008), pp. 44–67; N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shia: Identity, Ritual and Sacred Space in Eight-Century Kufa*…op cit & A. J. Knut, (ed.) *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008)

[77] J. Shi, "Rolling between Burial and Shrine: A Tale of Two Chariot Processions at Chulan Tomb 2 in Eastern Han China (171 C.E.)", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 135, No. 3 (2015), pp. 433-452.

[78] D. Favro and C. Johanson, "Death in Motion: Funeral Processions in Roman Forum", *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2010), pp. 12 – 37, p. 12.

[79] D. Favro and C. Johanson …, p. 12.

[80] R. A. Schneider, "Mortification on Parade: Penitential Processions in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century France", *Renaissance and Reformation*, New Series, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1986), pp. 123 – 146.

northern Italy and France, as a distinguishing element of religiosity even in times of Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Processional ceremonies are also staged to mark the commemoration of the Christian sacred days such as the Good Friday, Easter, last Sunday in April, First Sunday in June, July 14-16, July 27, and August 5.[81]

The way in which different religious traditions endorse the culture of procession and pilgrimage underlines the significance of the practices as sites for the performative articulation of the identity of the faith in question. Islam is no exception. While the funerary rite in Islam involves a procession that symbolizes the conveyance of the deceased to the cemetery, the culture also complimented the discursive formation of saint and sacredness of burial grounds. The sacredness is owed to the sacred bodies being interred therein. As noted earlier, the 'bodies' are being sacralised through veneration of different scales. Such veneration was first expressed as a form of 'display of devotion', evolved since the formative period of Islam. Christine D. L. Puente comments that:

> The practice of praying [praises] upon Muhammad seems to be linked with the Muslim evolution of the veneration for the Prophet's charismatic personality, and especially with the belief that Muslims need the Prophet's mediation between his community and God. The [prayer] is not only a eulogy but a request, and perhaps its actual meaning is so simple as to ask God for praying to Himself upon Muhammad, so that Muhammad can be aware of the believers' love and he will mediate for them on the Last Day.[82]

Expression of honour for the deceased is symbolically formalised as Muslims are encouraged to pay visits to the gravesites to offer prayers. Such visits, Andrew Rippin posits, "are generally used as occasions either to ask for favours of the deceased saint or to ask for forgiveness".[83] Rippin continues to say that "the power of the saint is believed to reside in his or her ability to intercede on behalf of the individual believer with God".[84] This assumed a more legitimate ground when *Hajj*, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, was made compulsory for physically and materially capable Muslims to perform. While the mausoleums of Prophet Muhammad and his companions interred at Medina are the target sites for the visits, the foundational space of the *Ka'aba* sanctuary – the black cube structure circumambulated by pilgrims – is believed to house many of the bodies of prophets and holy men. To further this point, Pnina Werbner argues that one of the logics of the *Hajj* ritual is to spatialize the

[81] J. Sciorra, "Religious Processions in Italian Williamsburg", *The Drama Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (1985), p. 68.
[82] C. D. L. Puente, "The Prayer Upon the Prophet Muhammad (*Tasliya*): A Manifestation of Islamic Religiosity", *Konninklijke*, Brill NV, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1999), p. 9. (emphasis added)
[83] A. Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (3rd Edition, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2005), p. 116.
[84] A. Rippin, *Muslims…*, p. 116.

memories of Prophet Abraham, his wife, Hagar (Hajir), and Ismael.[85] The significance of these historical nuances is to trace the root of the motivation behind the practices of processions and/or pilgrimage to celebrate or mourn saints.

However, the killing of Husayn at Karbala on 10 October 680 marked the birth of the Shia community whose identity was embodied and symbolized in the pilgrimages and processions.[86] These practices transcended commemoration: they signified dissidence and resistance against the Sunni's dynastic authority of the Umayyads (661-750 CE) and Abbasids (750-1258 CE). Historians and scholars of religion have made attempts to reconstruct the early Shia community and their distinct identity that was articulated via rituality. Drawing from scant classical Arabic literature of theology and historiography as well as extensive interpretation of artefacts such as "coins, tombstones, and archaeological inscriptions", Najam Haider (2011) reconstructs the 8th century Shia identity in Kufa, in present day Iraq.[87] Haider notes that the propensity of multiple streams of Shia to appropriate space for the "powerful public affirmation of sectarian identity" informed coalescing of ritual and space through the pilgrimage to the tomb of Ali, the fourth caliph, and al-Husayn.[88] This development resulted in the production of a new genre of Shia literature – the pilgrimage manual – that comprised of guidelines on the 'itineraries' and explicit prayers to be offered. This new genre of literature, especially the works of Shaykh al-Mufid and Ibn al-Mashhadi, played a role in mapping out sacred sites – tombs of saints and their locations – to which processions were destined. The most spectacular of these visits was the Kufans' processions to Ali's tomb in commemoration of *Ghadir Khum*[89] on the 10th of Zul Hajj, the 12th month of the lunar calendar.[90]

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[85] P. Werbner, "Langar: Pilgrimage, Sacred Exchange and Perpetual Sacrifice in a Sufi Saint's Lodge", in P. Werbner and H. Basu eds., *Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality and the Performance of Emotion in Sufi Cults* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 95-116.

[86] Contestations over succession to the Islamic caliphate after the death of Prophet Muhammad had eventually polarized the Muslim community into two main sectarian camps: Sunni and Shia. The Sunni favored the decision of the Council of Elders by which the most respected elder would be selected to become the head of the Islamic community. The Shia insisted that the successor must emerge from the bloodline of Prophet Muhammad, Ali (d. 661), the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law and their descendants. However, there are sub-divisions within the Shia sect, Ja'afari, Isma'ili and Twelver Shia groups being the major ones. For details, see V. Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York – London: W. W. Norton, 2006) and S. H. M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[87] N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shi'a: Identity, Ritual, and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kufah* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 245.

[88] N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shi'a…,* p. 255.

[89] *Ghadir Khumm*, also called *Eid al-Ghadeer*, is an event when Prophet Muhammad is believed to have announced that 'to whomsoever I am a master, Ali is also his master'. The Shia believe that this was automatic recommendation and endorsement by the Prophet of Ali as his successor and stands to be the most 'authentic tradition' that supports their claim that Ali and his offspring are the rightful successors of the Prophet.

[90] N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shi'a: Identity, Ritual, and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kufah* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 245.

Rachid Elbadri (2009) disagrees with the fact that the Shia rituals are synonymous with celebrations of the 'culture of death'.[91] In contrast, he argues that they represent a 'spiritual awakening' and solidification of Shia identity. In the formative period of Shia, Elbadri claims, procession was deployed as an instrument of visibility of a minority marginal identity. The practice became widely entrenched in the Shia tradition with the state approval under the Buyids (also known as Buwaihids, 945-1055 CE) and the Safavids (1501-1736 CE) rulers. The rulers of these regimes sought to elaborate the *Ashura* observances, including their gendered aspects, for consolidation of their political powers, leading to the formation of Shia states in the subsequent centuries.[92] The tradition of the *Ashura* procession on the 10th day of the first month of the lunar (Hijri) year, resonated with Twelver Shia group – one of the many sub-sets of mainstream Shia – up to the rise of modern nation-states of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. According to Arent J. Wensinck, the term originated from the Hebrew '*asor'*.[93] The day is given significance differently according to Sunni and Shi'i tradition. For the Sunni, *Ashura* day is venerated because it marks the day in which Prophet Moses (Musa) was saved along with the children of Israel from Pharaoh, across the Mediterranean Sea to the land of Israel. For the Shia, it is a day of sorrow and agony because it marks the Battle of Karbala (10 October 680) when Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet, was killed along his 72 companions. While the Sunnis commemorate the day by fast and feast,[94] the Shia re-enact the Karbala battle to spawn grief through lamentations and processions to mourn the murder of Hussain.[95].

The religious geography of the Shia ritual observances expanded into Southeast Asia around the 15th century. Hugh Skyhawk (2008) shows how the minority Indian Shia Muslims in pre-modern Deccan constructed grave replicas (*tabud ta'ziya*) that were moved in processions on the 10th of Muharram to observe collective mourning for al-Husayn. Historicising the practice, Skyhawk traces the institutionalisation of Shia Muharram

[91] R. Elbadri, "Shia Rituals: The Impact of Shia Rituals on Shia Socio-Political Character" (M. A. Diss., Naval Postgraduate School, California, 2009), p. 1.
[92] K. S. Aghaie, *The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2005), pp. 45 – 93.
[93] Arent Jan Wensinck, "Ashura", *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, (*Leiden and London, 1960), p. 705.
[94] Preparing a special feast on the day has been an old cultural practice among the *Hausawa* (Muslims) of northern Nigeria. By virtue of that, the month in Hausa is '*Watan Cika-Ciki*' (transl.: the month of eating to the brim). In the Hausa culture, as history shows, '*Cika-Ciki*' was conducted as an elaborate celebratory outfit that involved ceremonial feasting. However this practice is gradually waning while fasting is more or less embraced. See: Alhaji Rabiu, "Tsafi Ko Magani: Takaitaccen Nazarin Kan-Gida Da Nau'o'insa A Kasar Kwatarkwashi"['Magic or Medicine: A Brief Study of a Home-Based Deity and its Forms in Kwatarkwashi Land], (2014, unpublished).
[95] Works on the Shia public mourning have discussed the Ashura day as the starting point. For some details, see Mahmoud Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Development Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978); K. S. Aghaie, *The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2005).

observances from the times of Sultan Ahmad Shah Wali Bahmani (1422-1436).[96] The institutionalisation of Muharram mourning resulted in the spread of Shia doctrine and its steady fusion with indigenous traditional religious practices in Deccan. The transformative development of Muharram cults in Deccan and other locations in Southeast Asia was largely replicated after the practices being observed in Iraq and Iran, the birthplaces of the tradition. Notwithstanding, it is important to note here that there is one fundamental difference between the processional ceremonies of South Asia and those of the Middle East: mortification. The former's *modus operandi* were characterized by self-flagellation. This practice was later detested after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 because Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei rejected the practice. Measures were put in place such as the establishment of the Imamiyya Blood Transfusion Services (IBTS) and the Hussain Blood Bank (HBB) as centres where blood could be donated rather than spilling it on the street.[97] Although Sufi processional performances are devoid of self-flagellation, there are certain fundamental similarities between Sufism and Shi'ism in their evolution: modes of mysticism and the culture of veneration of saints. This is arguably the reason why the QN and IMN share some commonalities in the mode of performing religion in public.

Yitzhak Nakash (1993) argues that the Shi'i historiography is skewed to reflect the significance of the Imams in the constitution of authority. According to Nakash:" Shi'i historiography is scant […] containing relatively fewer and shorter historical works, comprised mainly of collections of traditions (particularly those attributed to the Imams), genealogical works, bibliographical works on the Imams, biographies of the *ulema*, and lamenting and memorial literature […]".[98]

Shia religiosity is premised on the strong attachment and unequivocal loyalty to the authority of the *Imams*. The Imams in Shi'i tradition are 'infallible' and enjoy afterlife veneration, much as the Sufi masters do, but there is no explicit ascription of infallibility status to Sufi masters. Nonetheless, both the Shi'i Imams and the Sufi masters are 'constructed' as *persons extraordinaire*, the embodiment of charisma, and sources of religious authority. These ascribed socio-spiritual statuses allowed them to organise a community of ardent followers around them and established the chain of transmissions along their lines of thought across

[96] H. V. Skyhawk, "Muharram Processions and the Ethicization of Hero Cult" in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 126 – 140.
[97] See S. T. Madsen and M. Hassan, "Moderating Muharram", in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 115 – 125.
[98] Y. Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura", *Die Welt Des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1993), p. 162.

successive generations over time. Eric Geoffroy (2010) argues that the Shi'i 'esoteric doctrines' changed dramatically when it assumed the state power under the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736).[99] Yet, it did not (and does not) erode the Shia-Sufi intimacy, as the chains of transmission (*silsila*) of all the Sufi Orders passed through Ali, the first Shia Imam, via his descendants.

The intimacy would be more glaring when we consider the intellectual and spiritual connections between the earliest set of the Shia Imams and the founding Sufi masters. For example, al-Hassan Basri (d. 728 A.D), Ma'ruf al-Karhi (d. 815), Bishir *bn* Hareth al-Hafi (d. 850), and Bayazid Bastami (d. 874), to mention a few, were reputed Sufi icons and known to be disciples of Imams Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765), Musa al-Kazim (d. 799) and Ali Rida (d. 819), the most revered Shia Imams.[100] This normative interaction went on and became established among the descendants and disciples of each camp since the 8th century. Geoffroy sums up the intersection of the two traditions in the following words: "Doctrinal and initiatory affinities between Sufism and Shi'ism are undeniable, especially the idea that the cycle of "initiatory sainthood" (*walaya*) is the successor to that of prophecy (*nubuwwa*), which guarantees the ever-living presence of an esoteric path in Islam".[101]

The venerated status of the Imams conferred on them by the majority of Muslims as the successors of the legacy of prophecy (*nubuwwa*) allowed them to remain the source of prophetic esotericism which is present in both Sufi and Shi'i spiritual discipline. The founders of the most popular Sufi brotherhoods, for example, Shaykh Abd' al-Qadir al-Jilani and Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, were claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad whose line of progeny goes back to Imam Hussain and Imam Hassan, the grandsons of the Prophet and the second and third Shia Imams. Moreover, scholars of Sufi persuasion played a role in enriching the Shi'i epistemology and gnosis. Muhyiddin *bn* al-Arabi (d. 1240), nicknamed 'the great Sufi master', was credited with fashioning the 'Shi'ite doctrine of *walaya'*. This was even attested to by Ayatoullah Khomeini, the revolutionary leader of Iran, in the 1980s.[102] In contrast, Sufi terminologies, like *qudb* (pole), *khirqa* (cloak), *mahdi* (the awaited one; the 'rightly guided'), had had their origin from Shia. The above points to the overt exchanges of influences that each group exerts over the other. This did not, however, guarantee harmonious co-existence between the two. There were moments of rivalries between them perhaps as they share some striking similarities.

Both Shia and Sufi practice *Maulid* (birthday) celebration, a more symbolically feasting way of remembering the Prophet and saints. Elaborate processions are conducted as part of the public celebration of the event. There is debate around the period when it was introduced (it is

[99] E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2010), p. 22.
[100] E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism* …, p. 23.
[101] E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism* …, p. 23.
[102] E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism* …, p. 24.

usually dated from 615 CE), and also the era when the ceremony became an elaborate state ceremony of the Fatimids (also known as the Ubaidis) dynasty at some point in the 6th century.[103] The *Maulid* ceremony organised by Muzaffar al-Din Kokburi[104] (also spelt Kaukabary) at Irbil in the 11th century was a turning point in the history of the ritual. He was claimed to be the first to organize *Maulid*.[105] The event changed the way the Prophet was remembered and celebrated in the subsequent centuries. Lavishly conspicuous feasts and banquets were prepared to welcome the guests from different walks of life within the Middle East. This monumental gesture was later to become the source of concern and criticism among religious polemicists who rejected the idea of *Maulid* as 'heretic innovation'. Nonetheless, differences are slight between the so-called 'medieval' and the 'modern' *Maulid* ceremony.[106] Both are 'domestic occasions', staged to invoke emotions towards the Prophet and represent 'sites of memory' where the latter is imagined and loved.[107]

While remembrance of the Prophet and saints underline the motivations for *Maulid,* pilgrimage and procession, the former's conduct is guided by some specific conventions: birth is celebrated rather than mourning the death. Thus, it is a calendrical ceremony accompanied by elaborate fanfare. It is traditionally made a night event in order for the space to be illuminated. This tradition of lightning follows the narrative in the anecdote of the birthday of the Prophet that says that "at the time of his birth, stars from the heaven have lowered down not only to illuminate the earth but to symbolize the dawn of a great event".[108] A particular genre of texts – biographic and hagiographic, as well as collections of rhymed poems – on the life of the Prophet are read at the event. The texts recount the life history of the Prophet and extoll his qualities which are being rendered as 'exemplary'.

The making of religious identities through the medium of public religiosity is therefore critically analysed. There is growing body of research on religion in Africa, and in northern

[103] M. H. Katz, *The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad: Devotional Piety in Sunni Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 1. Jalaluddin Abd al-Rahman al-Suyudi supports this dating in his work *History of the Caliphs*, transl. into English by Abdassamad Clarke (Oriental Press, 1970).
[104] He was one of the army generals of Saladin and Sultan of Irbil. While serving Saladin during the Crusades, he was also loyal to both the Zengids and Ayyubids rulers of Syria and Egypt respectively.
[105] N. J. Kaptein, ed. *Muhammad's Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central Muslim Lands and Development in the Muslim West Until the 10th/16th Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993).
[106] M. H. Katz, *The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad*…p. 3.
[107] This phrase is drawn from J. Winter, "Sites of Memory", in S. Radstone & B. Schwarz eds. *History, Theory, Debate* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).
[108] Texts on the Prophet Muhammad's birthday are replete with this narrative. Katz and Kaptein have examined the content of some of the works. For example, works by Ibn Salama al-Quda'i (d. 1062 CE), Abu al-Hasan al-Bakri (d. c 1290s), Jalaluddin al-Suyudi (d. 1505) etc. However, of the biographical works on the life of the Prophet, the encyclopedic work *The Lives of Noble Figures* (*Siyar A'lam al-Nubala*) in 23 volumes by Shamsuddin al-Zahabi, is worth mentioning. Al-Zahabi has given graphic details of the narrative of luminous sky as well as other scenes that occurred at the time when the Prophet came to the world.

Nigeria in particular, that investigates both Islam and Christianity.[109] The significance of religion has been underlined as a 'vehicle' for intellectual and cultural exchanges between Africa and the wider world for centuries.[110] This is clear when considering the fact that the phenomenon of public religiosity (specifically the 3ps) was introduced from the Middle East. In the extant literature on religious identities and public religiosity, little attention is given to the changing nature of the modes of religiosity across historical ruptures in post-colonial northern Nigeria. This dissertation argues that the introduction of the ritual of procession in 1952 and the pilgrimage and 'religious' oriented-protest in the 1980s in the religious landscape of northern Nigeria is a new mode of religiosity whose performing site is public space rather than the conventional structures for worship, namely the mosques, *markaz* or *majlis*. They extend but sacralise and politicize public spaces through appropriation and display of 'saints' images and invoking their names. Moreover, these religious-cum-political rituals represent another dimension in the struggle for identity construction in the expansive religious and political spheres of Nigeria.

The history of the 3ps in northern Nigeria between 1967 and 2021 essentially explores the debates on changing identity (re)articulation that are embedded in nationalism, the evolution of the post-colonial Nigerian state, (re)formation of ethno-religious groups, the rise of 'new' religious movements, and engagement between the state and these groups. Some of

[109] See R. Marshall, *Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria* (Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 2009); A. Olufunke, "'A Church in a Cinema Hall': Pentecostal Appropriation of Public Space in Nigeria", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, No. 42, pp. 145 – 171; P. Lubeck, *Islam and Urban Labor: The Making of a Muslim Working Class in Northern Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003); P. B. Clarke & I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State 1960 – 1983* (Grunewald.Kaiser: Munchen, 1984); , R. B. Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: It's Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation" (PhD Diss. Bayreuth University, 2011); J. O. Adekunle, ed. *Religion in Politics*: *Secularism and National Integration in Modern Nigeria* (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2009); R. Pinxten and L. Dikomitis, eds. *When God Comes to Town: Religious Traditions in Urban Contexts* (New York: Berghahn Books , 2009); J. Olupona, K. *City of 201 Gods: Ile – Ife in Time, Space and the Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); U. Asonzeh, "God Unlimited: Economic Transformation of Contemporary Nigerian Pentecostalism", in *Economics of Religion: Anthropological Approaches* (Research in Economic Anthropology Series, vol. 31), L. Obadia and D. C. Woods, eds. (Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 2011); P. Gifford, ed. *Christianity and Africa's Democratization* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); K. H. Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis: A Historical Study of Muslim Intra-faith Relations, 1978-2015" (PhD Diss., Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto, 2016); I. A. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (PhD Diss., Cambridge University, 1975); R. Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston, Illinois: North Western University Press, 1997); J. A. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (Oxford University Press, 1962); D. Westerland, and E. E. Rosander, eds. *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997); D. Robinson, *Muslim Societies in African History: New Approaches to African History* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (University of California, Press, 1973) and many more.

[110] M. Saul, "Islam and West African Anthropology", *Africa Today*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2006), pp. 3-33.

these elements are articulated in Hayne's *Religion and Politics in Africa*.[111] Hayne's examination of the broad spectrum interactivity of socio-political identities from pre-colonial to colonial times provides a concrete foundation for developing a novel approach and understanding of the evolutionary processes as well as changing nature of religious identities through the lens of the 3ps.

Other scholars have added to this understanding. Lanshie (2014) argues that 'contestations' for influence and claims in political and religious spheres in Nigeria are not a 'recent' history.[112] It is part of the formation of Nigeria's federation. The contestations made these spheres vibrant sites where identities were deployed and reasserted. Expanding the debate, Tahir sees congregational identities as a "vanguard for reclamation and reassertion of people's power in northern Nigeria".[113] The continued attempts at defining identity and belonging have produced designations such as 'African Islam', 'Islam in Africa',[114] 'Protestant Islam',[115] and, recently, even 'extremism', 'fundamentalism' or contrastingly, 'moderate' and 'liberal'. One can also draw heavily on the literature on procession in Southeast Asia, for example, which is replete with instances of processional ceremonies being turn to spaces of sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia. Conflicts also break out between two or more communities in the course of mapping out territoriality for processional routes. The volatility of these processional spaces also compelled the state to ban them.[116] Historical scholarship on identity formation in post-colonial Nigeria is informed by and situated within these perspectives.[117]

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[111] J. Haynes, *Religion and Politics in Africa* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996). To compliment Hayne's work for specific context in Nigeria, See also J. S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958) and J. N. Paden, *Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

[112] N. E. Lanshie, "Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide: Exploring the Resurgence of Ethno-cultural Identity in Nigeria", *African Development*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153 – 212.

[113] T. H. Gwarzo, "Activities of Islamic Civic Associations in the Northwest of Nigeria: with Particular Reference to Kano State", *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2003), pp. 289 – 318.

[114] D. Westerland and E. E. Rosander, *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997).

[115] R. Loimeier, "Is There Something Like 'Protestant Islam'"? *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 45, Issue 2 (2005), pp. 216 – 254.

[116] See for example, K. A. Jacobsen (ed.), *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2008).

[117] R. Seeseman, *The Divine Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth Century Sufi Revival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); A. Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); R. Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation" (PhD Diss. Bayreuth University, 2011); A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity: The Ulama in Kano", (M.A Diss., University of Maiduguri, 1988); K. Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis: A Historical Study of Muslim Intra-faith Relations, 1978-2015" (PhD Diss., Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto, 2016) and I. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (PhD Diss., Cambridge University, 1975).

Ideological differences and state involvement have, and continue to, played out in the conflict and violence during religious processions (of the IMN to be specific) in northern Nigeria. Questions then arise as to what it is about the nature of these processions that sparks the catastrophe. Should one consider the physical spaces that are being occupied during the ceremonies or should one consider embedded symbolic meanings which are attached to each procession which happens to result in conflict at a particular site?

1.3 Points of Departure

The breakthrough study of the patterns, structures, and authorities of Islamic groups in post-colonial northern Nigeria was the work of John Paden. *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* is a detailed anthropological account of the 'political culture' of the Hausa and Fulani, the two major linguistic and cultural communities of the region. Paden stresses that "the relationship of religion to authority and community is fundamental" because loyalty to a faith community lies partly in the charisma of its leadership.[118] The core religious authority in the region was first derived from 'mysticism and brotherhood identity' which can be traced to the 15th century. It was a milestone in the consolidation of the latter authority that the 'companions of 'Abd al-Qadir' or 'the community of Qadiriyya' (*jama'ar kadirawa*) were frequently mentioned in the works of Usman *bn* Fodio, the 19th century Hausaland reformer.[119] One of the major contributions of Paden's work is his delineation of the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) classes – of Hausa and Fulani – and the *turuq* (Sufi brotherhoods), which led to the development of discreet but conflicting religious identities. He posits that "the spread of Tijjaniyya among non-Fulani *ulama* in Kano might be interpreted as a reaction against Fulani domination of the … religious sector".[120]

The patterns of religious authorities and communities identified earlier underwent a rigorous reform which led to the emergence of new subsets out of the larger Sufi organisations and realignment within the broader structures of authorities of the Hausa and Fulani classes of the *ulama*. The QN and the Tijjaniyya-Ibrahimiyyah (TI)[121] were the most vibrant of these new communities. The QN emerged out of 'traditional Qadiriyya' (TQ), a subset which Paden terms

[118] J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California Press, 1973) p. 11.
[119] J. Paden, *Religion…*, p. 68.
[120] J. Paden, *Religion…*, p. 69.
[121] Tijjaniyya-Ibrahimiyya (TI), like the QN, was a "reformed" community of the Tijjaniyya Brotherhood steered by a Senegalese cleric, Shaykh Ibrahim Nyass (1900-1970). For a detailed account on the TI, see R. Seeseman, *The Divine Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth Century Sufi Revival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

'reformed Qadiriyya', a more populist and 'transethnic' Sufi movement led by a 20th century Kano-based Islamic scholar, Shaykh Nasiru Kabara (1916-1996). One of the changes that Kabara instituted to get rid of the so-called 'traditional Qadiriyya' was his practical challenge to the TQ's exclusive pattern of community which *restricted* mass participation. According to Paden, the introduction of the *Maukibi* procession to commemorate the birthday of the Qadiriyya founder "serves as the only time in the year when men, women and children all participate in the same worship service".[122]

It is pertinent to note that the reformation and integration of the Qadiriyya Sufi community came at the time a fresh political agenda of the government of northern Nigeria. The Premier of northern Nigeria, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (1910-1966), the Sardauna of Sokoto,[123] had the plan of establishing a 'trans-brotherhood' organisation which would be premised on the objective of overriding loyalty of all and sundry within the same Muslim community. Criticism from the *Izala* group further heightened the religious contestations and necessitated reforms in earnest. The *Izala* group claimed that the Sufi brotherhoods could constitute an obstacle to the grand project of unification.[124] This claim was authoritatively represented in parts in the criticism of Shaykh Mahmud Gumi against the Sufi brotherhood. Although his strictures on the Qadiriyya were less severe compared to those on the Tijjaniyya, Gumi went to the extent of casting the Qadiriyya and the Tijjaniyya out of the mainstream Islamic circle. He claimed that:

> [The two brotherhoods] are […] separate religions distinct from each other and separate from Islam in belief. The Tijjaniyya does away with the greatness of Allah calling anything Allah. That is the oneness of God is done away with. The Qadiriyya claims that Allah descends on people […] so too the Ahamdiyya is a separate religion.[125]

While Paden's pioneering contribution is invaluable to this study, it underplays the centrality of the *Maukibi* procession as the most important of the Kabara's 'reform' project because its introduction marked a radical departure from the 'traditional Qadiriyya', an enclosed 'aristocratic' community, to the QN, a more mass-oriented movement. There are certain silences especially surrounding the *Maukibi* procession: its role in uniting the

[122] J. N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in* Kano…p. 159.
[123] For biography and socio-political projects of Sir Ahmadu Bello, see S. A. Amune, *Work and Worship: Selected Speeches of Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, 1986); Ahmadu Bello, *My life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) and J. N. Paden, *Ahamdu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986).
[124] P. B. Clarke & I. Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State*… p. 76.
[125] A. Gumi, *Musulunci da Abinda ke Rushe Shi* (Zaria: Ganuwa Publishers, 1981) cited in P. B. Clerk, *Ibid*, p. 77.

fragmented Qadiriyya sub-groups; the intention of revitalizing the spirit of brotherhood and group cohesion; the role it plays in transforming belief into practice and membership into belonging; the response of the state to the ceremony; and, the security implication of public space appropriation as well as urban spatiality of the ritual. Furthermore, the visible hierarchy of the procession and the gender disparities require further contemplation. The performance element too, is neglected.

Sound and song are clearly important factors in mobilisation and motivation of processional ceremonies. The degree and ways in which sound is performed in such activities differ considerably based on the tradition or cultural context. Sufi poetry of intercessions (*tawassul*), ecstasy (*shauq*), and panegyrics (*madh*)[126] on 'saints' are recited in the QN processional marches using the instruments of sound, namely *bandir*, *naubat* and *shanshar*,[127] as manifestations of the Sufi performance culture.

The IMN marches are motivated by the pace of 'revolutionary' songs and emotional lamentations. In both QN and IMN rituals, sound is thus fundamental because it ignites the passion of the participants while stimulating their vigour as the procession proceeds. The soundscape of processions, and the rhythmic lamentations and hymns of pilgrimage and protests, forms a part in the configuration of the 'sound of Africa' as theorised by Louis Meintjes and Steven Feld.[128] Introduced in the 1930s and popularized by QN in the 1950s, the use of *bandir* in the production of the Sufi religious soundscape in northern Nigeria sparked a debate on the 'Islamicity' of the mode of religiosity of QN. However, the *bandir* performance

[126] These set of songs and poetry genres are essential in invoking a sustained emotional charge while procession moves. The degree of this emotional arousal on the part of an individual Sufi is traditionally determined by the content of the poetry being recited. This also depends on the level of one's understanding of the messages/contents thereof, as the language of such poetry is usually a compressed classic, often archaic, one. In a nutshell, the emotional arousal is relative. However, this is difficult to be measured historically because it is ephemeral individualistic state of emotional ecstasy not collective. In other words, it is 'liminal'. What seems more feasible is the analysis of the individual persons who have been reputed with having such a spontaneity in the QN rituals and perhaps content-analysis of the verses believed to have more generative emotional currents. This will be contextualized more in this study. For more on emotion in rituals, see R. K. Wolf, "Embodiment and Ambivalence: Emotions in South Asian Muharram Drumming, *Yearbook Traditional Music*, Vol. 32 (2000), pp. 81 – 116 and F. Berthmore & M. Houseman, "Ritual and Emotions: Moving Relations, Patterned Effusion", *Religion and Society*, Vol. 1 (2010), pp. 57 – 75. For the concept of "liminality", see V. Turner, cf. "Liminality and Communitas", in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), pp. 94 – 113.

[127] The use of *bandir* in Sufi group ritual performance originally started by the Arusiyyah Sufi Order, established by the Libyan Sufi scholar, Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-Asmar al-Faitoory (1455-1575 CE). *Naubat* is a kettledrum, said to be used since the 16th century by drummers of the palaces of the Hindu kingdoms. The *shanshar* compliments the *naubat* beats sound. However, the QN adopted the use of *bandir* in its mosque-based weekly group ritual and it eventually became its defining hallmark and a potent mobilizing tool, especially for the youth. For more information on *naubat*, see R. Flora, "Styles of the Sahnai in Recent Decades: From Naubat to Gayakiang" *Year Book for Traditional Music*, Vol. 27 (1995), pp. 52 – 75.

[128] L. Meintjes, *Sound of Africa !: Making Music Zulu in a Sound African Studio* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003) and S. Feld, *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics and Song in Kaluli Expression* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2012).

as a Sufi ethnomusicological genre fits into a wider religio-cultural contestation over the issues of identity production and articulation in post-colonial northern Nigeria.

The narrative of 'reform' introduced by Paden was contested by the works of Auwal Anwar and Roman Loimeier. [129] While the themes of Loimeier's works were a substantive contribution to the field that Paden had opened, they point to the epistemological implication of the term 'reform'. Anwar favours the term 'revitalization' instead.[130] Ben Amara asks a pertinent question which supports this notion: "can we speak about reform in African Islam?"[131] The implication of 'reform', Loimeier argues, could imply innovations in the existing traditions. According to Loimeier, the term 'reform' is fluid; it is more descriptive than definitive. Having made the development of Islam synonymous with the rise of the Sufi Brotherhoods, Anwar underlines the period 1937-1970 as the time of "the challenge to the Qadiriyya and the Tijjaniyya Brotherhoods".[132] This was more prevalent from the 1950s when procession was introduced. The manner in which this unfolds over time has thus far remained unpacked.

Furthermore, both Paden and Loimeier describe the *Maukibi* procession, Islamic groupings and the discourse of reforms as fixed without recourse to the phenomena of continuity and change, at least in the last couple of decades. This is an obvious gap in the historiography of procession as well as the phenomenon of public religiosity in northern Nigeria, which this dissertation addresses.

The rise of 'liberal scholars', according to Anwar, challenged the monopoly that the 'traditional *ulama*' (majority Sufis) enjoyed. Additionally, the so-called liberal scholars (western educated ones) became an identifiable 'Other' in modern Nigeria because they had acquired western education. This class of so-called liberals supported the formation of Islamic organizations, such as the *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam*, JNI (A Society for the Support of Islam), *Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a Wa iqaamat al-Sunnah, Izala* (A Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition), and *Jama'at al-Tajdid al-Islam,* JTI (A Society for the Revival of Islam).[133] The JTI is a splinter group of the IMN. In this light, Peter Clark classifies

[129] A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity: The *Ulama* in Kano 1937-1987" (M.A. Diss., University of Maiduguri, 1989) & R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1997).
[130] A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity…p. 134.
[131] R. Ben Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation…, p. 125.
[132] R. Ben Amara, The Izala…, pp. 25 – 68.
[133] R. Ben Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation…, pp. 84 – 145.

reformers in contemporary Nigeria into the 'moderate and the fundamentalist'.[134] He categorizes the JNI, Muslim Student Society (MSS), Young Muslim Association of Nigeria (YMAN) and *Izala* as 'fundamentalist'. He acknowledges that, despite the fragmentation of Muslim identities, Islam "has since the 1960s become better organized […] at the national level".[135] Certainly, the fundamentalist tendency reflects in the IMN mode of public religiosity.

Using the Weberian Theory of analysis, Ibrahim Tahir conducted a sociological examination of the contestations between the four dominant but interconnected Muslim classes in northern Nigeria: the scholars, the Sufis, saints, and capitalists. [136] Tahir points out that the major shift in Muslim society with regards to the power relations and "the survival strategies of the ruling class" during the colonial times was largely influenced by economic factors. According to him, the patronage of the Muslim merchant class to the *ulema* "through direct grants" for projects such as construction of mosques and schools, tampered, in some ways, with the "Sufistic" lifestyle of the *ulema*.[137] Tahir argues that the role of the *ulema* in social and political changes is decisive. The introduction of public processions in religious landscape of Kano, according to Tahir, was connected to the Sufi "resistance against cultural infiltration through mass recruitment and mass education".[138] The new order was instituted to reassert the bond between the "*ulema* as teachers and the *ummah* [the people] as the community of disciples and worshippers".[139] He is, however, silent about how the bond, the community, and motivation are performed in public spaces. The gender debate is also largely neglected.

The two PhD theses with overarching scope are important material to this study: one by Yasir Anjola Quadri – "The Tijjaniyya in Nigeria: The Case Study of Tijjaniyya" – and the other by Asif Folarin Ahmed – "The Qadiriyya and Its Impacts in Nigeria". Both take as their scope the whole Nigeria by which the authors claim that the two Sufi movements – the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya – spread throughout the country. In detailed accounts, Quadri examines Sufi practices in West Africa, the rise of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, the genealogy of the Shaykh's successors, the introduction of the Tijjaniyya Order in Nigeria, its spread and consolidation. Like Quadri, Ahmad lays a background by conducting a general survey on

[134] P. B. Clark, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and Aims", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics (1988) 519 – 538, p. 520.
[135] *Ibid*.
[136] I. Tahir, "Scholars,Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904 – 1970: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (PhD Diss., Cambridge Unversity, 1975).
[137] I. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904 – 1970…", pp. 392 – 393.
[138] I. Tahir, Scholars…, p. 499.
[139] I. Tahir, Scholars…, p. 500.

Sufism as the basis for the introduction of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood in Africa. The work sets the genealogy of the Qadiriyya saints right from its founder, Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, to the 19th century Jihad leader, the Shehu Usman bn Fodio. Both works explore the structures of the rites of the Orders, their membership compositions, relationship with the state and society. Despite their elucidating accounts, both of the theses ignore the instrumentality of processional rituals in the formation of religious identities in the area of their research.

Recent additions to the historical and anthropological study of Islamic groups in northern Nigeria are the works of Ramzi Ben Amara,[140] Ousmane Kane,[141] Abdulra'uf Mustapha,[142] Alex Thurston,[143] and Kabiru Haruna Isa.[144] Kane and Ben Amara focus mainly on the *Izala* group. Their selection was informed by the group's radical orientation to the authority and community. According to Kane, the formalisation of the group in 1978 led to "fragmentation of authority" and the rise of Islamism. The preoccupation of this group, as their etymology implies, was to "mediate social change" in religious practices in post-colonial Nigerian society.[145] Paradoxically, condemnation of the beliefs and practices of other Muslims, especially Sufi rituals, is a recurring theme in proselytization of *Izala* scholars and followers. Kane believes that "proclaiming others as unbeliever (*takfir*) provided the *Izala* religious entrepreneurs and their sympathizers a religious justification for opposing the domination of the traditional order by which they felt oppressed".[146] While Ben Amara summarises Kane's examination of *Izala*, he situates the group within the re-implementation of the *Sharia* debate. Ben Amara conducts a general survey of the history of Islamic groups and concludes with the *Sharia* debate of 1999. He notes that the contribution of *Izala* in the re-implementation of the *Sharia* lay in their active campaigns as well as their acceptance to participate in its reorganisation at the invitation of Governor Ahmad Sani of Zamfara state, the first state in the north to 're-implement' *Sharia* legal provisions.[147] Ben Amara also notes that the IMN was one of the organisations that did not support the idea of the *Sharia* re-implementation. This points to intra-religious differences as well as oddities in the approaches of the IMN group.

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[140] R. Ben Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria…*op cit*
[141] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria…op cit*
[142] A. Mustapha, "Introduction: Interpreting Islam: Sufis, Salafists, Shi'ites and Islamists in Northern Nigeria", in A. Mustapha, ed. *Sects & Disorders…op cit*
[143] Alex Thurston has two books in this field: A. Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2016) and A. Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018). This study is more concerned with the first.
[144] K. H. Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis…*op cit*
[145] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria* …, p. 2.
[146] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria* …, p. 125.
[147] R. Ben Amara, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria …, p. 331.

Alex Thurston's *Salafism in Nigeria* is built on Kane and Ben Amara's works. Unlike Kane and Ben Amara, Thurston reflects on the transformation of *Izala* etymology and practices. He situates Nigeria's *Salafis* practices within the debate of the development of the Saudi-sponsored global *Salafism*. According to Thurston, Salafism is an "incarnat[ion of] the practices and beliefs of the earliest Muslims". The core principles of *Salafism*, Thurston argues, is "embodied in and transmitted through the canon, a communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation".[148] This text offended the Nigeria's *Salafis* as it explicitly points out that Boko Haram, the violent armed group in Nigeria, is the brainchild of the *Salafism*. Thurston claims that "the most infamous outgrowth of Nigerian *Salafism* is the violent movement *Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad* (*Salafis* for Proselytization and Jihad), better known by its Hausa nickname Boko Haram (Western Education is Forbidden by Islam)."[149] This statement caused a backlash by the Salafis.

Two further authors on Islamic groups in northern Nigeria require attention: Abdulra'uf Mustapha and Kabiru Haruna Isa. Isa's main theme is the historical study of the fragmentations, contestations, cleavages, inter- and intra-relations of these groups, the discourse provides an adequate foundation to understand the dynamics of interaction and the consequences thereof. According to Isa, competing interest and religious zeal in ownership and control of 'sacred spaces' (mosques and Islamic schools) characterized the intra-Muslim relations, especially after 1978 when *Izala* was formed. Intellectual debate and polemic over Islamic ritual practices between Sufis and Salafis was also a permanent feature of religious landscape of northern Nigeria. It is important to note that Isah's work differs with this dissertation in several ways. The scope for Isa's work covers the period from 1978 – 2015. This dissertation traces the development of the QN procession from 1952 when the *Maukibi* was introduced into the realm of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood and ends at 2021 when el-Zakzaky was released from prison. Isa's work is restricted to the Kano metropolis while this study extends beyond Kano to cover Zaria and Katsina metropolis, important sites for the groups under investigation. The thrust of Isa's work is the examination of intra-Muslim relations of a wide range of Islamic groups of differing persuations namely Sufism, Salafism, Shi'ism and Ahmadiyya. This relationship entails debates, disputes, contestation for ownership and control of mosques, worship centers, schools, inter-sect mobilization, conflicts and factionalization but has not grappled with the subject of the symbolism behind processions and pilgrimage,

[148] A. Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria …, pp. 1 – 27.
[149] A. Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria …, p. 193.

although he does mention the *Maukibi* in connection to the debates and disagreements over the mode of conduct and funding of the event.

Moreover, Mustapha and Isa trace the permutation of the IMN movement from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. According to Mustapha, "a key transmission belt was the Muslim Brotherhood, a group led by Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky".[150] Interestingly, all the works mentioned in the preceding paragraphs – Ben Amara, Kane, Thurston, Mustapha and Isa — have acknowledge that the rise of militant groups from the 1970s, including the IMN, can be traced to "individuation of belief, the economic crises of post-Civil War, corruption, authoritarianism of various military regimes – all contributed to the radicalization of Muslim students in the universities[…]".[151] But neither discuss the role of public religiosity of the QN and IMN, the central focus of this study.

1.4 Thesis Questions

This dissertation essentially asks the question, how have changing modes of processions and pilgrimages of the QN and IMN impacted on collective identity formation of these religious groups?

To examine this closely, this study asks: Why have religious processions been introduced into the QN and IMN religious rituals? What are the modes in which these processions and pilgrimage have been unfolded over time? How have spaces been negotiated between the state and the QN and IMN leaders over time? Why do the spaces of the IMN's *Muzahara* morph into spaces of violence?

1.5 Objectives

This dissertation attempts to trace the history of the *Maukibi* of the QN and the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki* of the IMN; assess the territoriality and spatial configurations of the public religiosity of the QN and IMN; investigate the extent to which the spaces of the *Muzahara* morph into spaces of violence; examine how public spaces are negotiated between the state and religious actors of the QN and IMN with regard to enactment of their public religiosity; analyse the

[150] A. Mustapha & M. U. Bunza, Contemporary Islamic Sect & Groups …, p. 71.
[151] A. Mustapha & M. U. Bunza, Contemporary Islamic Sect & Groups …

symbolic and concrete significance of public religiosity of the QN and IMN as drivers for mobilisation for more support and revitalisation of their collective identities.

1.6 Research Design and Method

This study employed a qualitative research design based on primary sources and private archives of the QN and IMN hitherto accessed. Access to the primary resources (archived documents) was granted to the author by the leadership of each group. The QN has maintained a secretariat since 1980 where all the primary documents on the activities of the group are kept. Of particular interest in the documentation are files on the *Maukibi*. These ranged from notes of meetings on the organisation of the event over time, lists of committees and their members, terms of reference of the committees, the activities carried out, notes on donations in cash and in kind, mode of arrangements of ranks, invitation booklets, and records of guests of honour that attended the events and their respective destinations (local and international guests). Important to state are correspondence between the QN leadership and the police commissioner, the state government, the state director of security for permission to conduct the *Maukibi* procession. Pamphlets produced (in Arabic and Hausa) by the QN leaders on the *Maukibi* are also documented. These pamphlets contained information on the earliest set of participants of the *Maukibi* procession and the precise number of participants a decade later as well as the mode of ranking/order of the procession from the 1950s to 1960s. This gave a concrete ground for making comparisons of what changed after the 1960s. Also, in the QN secretariat are rich repository of posters, banners, flags, stickers and other tokens meant for the *Maukibi* processional ceremony. There is also audio and video footage of the event.

For the IMN, information was obtained from the reports and commentaries on the movements (in words and graphics) that are published by *al-Mizan* and *The Pointer Express*, the two newspapers of the movement. The same is generated from the handful of booklets and pamphlets printed by the IMN centre for documentation (*Cibiyar Wallafa*, CW) on the activities of the movement in general and the *Muzahara* marches in particular. Of the print-outs of the CW are profiles in chronological order of the encounters since 1980s between the movement's *Muzahara* and the police as well as the number of casualties involved in each. By so doing, they developed a comprehensive list of *Shuhada* (deceased members at the processions) whose immediate family are claimed to be taken care of. Some of the pamphlets printed by the CW contained transcribed lectures of el-Zakzaky which he delivered at different occasions of the movement and interviews he granted over time. The print-outs of the CW are shared and

massively circulated among members via the social media platforms. An important source of data was also the collection of audio and video footage of the *Muzahara* marches which are obtained from the IMN centre at Rijiyar Lemo in Kano. Data was also obtained from the website of the movement as well as personal collections of some of members. Both repositories have been constructed by its adherents and as such, the author is cognizant of the inherent bias in both. These sources are employed in this study in an arguably uncritical manner in order to illuminate the ways in which the sanctioned religious narrative was employed to encourage religious adherence.

Substantial information was obtained during snow-ball interviews with leaders and followers of both the QN and IMN. Potential interviewees were first identified among members of each group, then contacted and audience and consent sought. The contacts were made via direct phone calls, writing letter requesting for audience or through a 'guide'. The place for the interviews were determined by the interviewees – personal residences or offices, as referenced to in footnotes. The body of information gathered during these interviews complimented the primary records obtained from the two groups and each was used to assess the veracity of the other. Some of the author's interviewees provided him with relevant primary materials from their own personal collections. All the interviews conducted were recorded, transcribed, analysed, and critically corroborated with other available data. The rigorous corroborations of one set of data with another — for example, cross-checking interviews with printed materials and vise versa —would help address potential bias.

State owned archival repositories further supplied important sources of data which counter-balanced the arguably one-sided sources of information procured from the organisational repositories and interviews. At the archive section of the Kano State Library, Murtala Muhammad Complex, Kano, newspapers – such as *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kobo*, a vernacular newspaper, and *New Nigeria* – were accessed. These newspapers contained reports on religious activities in northern Nigeria since the 1960s. Such newspapers are available at the Arewa House, Kaduna. Other archival research centers that contained relevant data include Kano State History & Culture Bureau (KSHCB) and Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research & Training (Mambayya House). These collections comprise records of religious groups in northern Nigeria, state policy documents on religious freedom, government gazettes, and commissioned reports. For later cases, especially developments from 1990s, the internet media archives are accessed. Important to mention is the State Investigation Bureau (SIB), Kano State Police Command, Bompai where security reports on the public religious activities of both of the QN and IMN have been obtained.

Ethnography – participant observation (advanced hang-out) – was also employed. This allowed the author to observe the practical displays of religious processions. It also helped understand the mode of conduct (how the processions unfold) of the most recent processions (especially the ones taking place in Kano, the concentration centre of the processions) in comparisons to the older ones. The observation further accorded the author the space to ascertain in reality points raised in interviews with regard to the mode of organization and execution of the rituals.

1.8 Structure and Chapter Outlines

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter One provides a general background of the dissertation. It uses a historiographical approach to trace the changing culture of procession from the 8th century Kufa across the Medieval Europe, Southeast Asia down to Africa to the contemporary northern Nigeria. The Chapter situates the discourse within the discursive notion of sainthood both in the Shia and Sufi religious traditions. The Chapter reviews literature on the socio-political dynamics of northern Nigeria, with the changing phenomenon of religious organisation as its thrust. 'Points of Departure' as an independent section in the chapter, points to the way in which this dissertation departs from the previous works done on themes around social movements in Nigeria, and hence foregrounds independent contributions in the field. It discusses the research design of the study, objectives, research questions and the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter Two: The New Mode of Public Religiosity in the Sufi Performances: The *Maukibi* Procession of the Qadiriyya – Nasiriyya, 1952 – 2017

This Chapter examines the history, motive, organisation, pattern, and territoriality of the *Maukibi*, an annual public religious procession of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN) in Kano. The development and transformation of the *Maukibi* within the timeframe are examined across historical phases in order to explore specific changes. The Chapter attempts to situate the performance of the *Maukibi* in public space within the context of "reform movement" in northern Nigeria and in the light of the unification project of the fragments or sub-sets of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood which culminated in the emergence of the QN or the Nasirist

Community. Examination of the social formation of the "charisma" of Shaykh[152] Nasiru Kabara, the spiritual leader of the QN, is discussed as a background. The main argument that the Chapter advances is that the the *Maukibi* was instrumental in the unification of the fragments of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood's sub-sets under the unified authority of the QN, especially under its leader Shaykh Nasiru Kabara, for whom the ritual provided a much broader collective space, outside the confines of Nigeria, to meet and worship.

Chapter Three: "Redemptive Suffering" and the Display of Collective Identity: The *Muzahara* Processions and the *Tattaki* Pilgrimage of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, 1979 – 2015

This Chapter examines the history, objectives, modes of organisation, and the display of collective identity of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria through the performances of the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki* of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. The Chapter situates, in historical perspective, the permutation of religious enthusiasm from 1979, the rise of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), and the introduction of public religious processions as the agency for articulating collective identity in public space. The provenance and the motives of the rituals – religious and secular[153] – of the *Ashura*, *Arbaeen*, Quds Day processions (referred to in the discourse of the IMN as the *Muzahara*) and pilgrimage (referred to as the *Tattaki*) and the processes of their localisation are discussed. The mode of organisation of the IMN's structure of community vis-à-vis the structure of authority in the rituals is explored. This highlights the workings of the structures in public religiosity of the movement which are reflected in both the *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki*.

Chapter Four: Nationalism, Security and State Control: Regulating the QN and the IMN Public Religiosity, 1967 – 2015

This Chapter builds on Chapters Two and Three to discuss the state's successive interventions to tame the public religiosity of the QN and IMN. This state's intervention is be analysed in phases as it unfolded under different political regimes: military and civilian. The dynamics of the state control in dealing with both of the groups' public religiosity is viewed within the prism of the state's attempt to tame religious activism and its ideational influences

[152] The word "Shaykh", is a title of respect given to an elderly or a learned person is used in the Sufi cult to call or refer to a leader of a Sufi community. Although the etymology of the word is Arabic, it is as much localised in different African contexts. It is thus spelled differently: Shaykh, Shaikh, Sheikh, Sheik, Cheikh (usually in Francophone usage). This dissertation will use Shaykh".

[153] For discussion on the difference between religious and secular rituals, see D. Intiri, "The Politics of National Celebration in Post-Revolutionary Iran" (M.A. Dissertation, Leiden University, 2015).

over the citizenry in a plural society like Nigeria. The Chapter contends that the incessant police repression of the IMN could arguably be part of the state regulatory measures to curb the transcendence of the group. The Chapter explores issues around the December 2015 Military crackdown on the IMN's headquater in Zaria, the biggest crackdown so far in the history of the movement, to lay a background to the staging of Abuja Free Zakzaky *Muzahara*. Perhaps, the state intervention is timely as the IMN aspires to create an "Islamic state". The Chapter highlights the question of religious nationalism and religious freedom in a broader discourse of the state legitimacy and the influence of religious leaders, essentially non-state actors.

Chapter Five: The Abuja 'Free Zazkaky' *Muzahara* and the Politics of Contestation for Public Space, 2015 – 2021

This Chapter focuses on the waves of 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* that have been staged since 2015 by members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. The Chapter explores pockets of such *Muzahara* that have been unfolded in other locations in northern Nigeria by identifying some patterns, modes as well as the state responses. While Chapter four examines the responses of governments on the public religious marches of both the QN and the IMN from 1967-2015, this Chapter limits itself to the discussion of the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* and how the government containes it within the period 2015-2021. While conducted primarily to press for the release of the group's spiritual leader from detention, the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* underpins the ongoing articulation of the movement's public identity and manifestation of religiosity. The legal entanglements between the IMN and the state and judiciary over the continued detention of Zakzaky along with other members of the group are highlighted. The Chapter surveys the politics of religion in Nigeria and discusses the fate of the IMN in the wake of the ban imposed on them and freedom of public religiosity in a plural Nigerian society. The Chapter summarises the responses of the international communities (namely Saudi Arabia, Iran and the USA) over the clash between the IMN and the Nigerian Army, or what some newspapers branded "the Zaria massacre". This is examined in the light of diplomatic skirmishes between Nigeria and Iran over the incident and the way in which those skirmishes compounded tension between the IMN as the 'victim' and the Nigerian state as the 'perpetrator'. The role of the media in shaping or accentuating religious politics and sectarian divides is discussed while making a general conclusion based on comparison between the QN and IMN public religiosity and the contribution of the dissertation.

Chapter Two

The New Mode of Public Religiosity in Sufi Performances: The *Maukibi* Procession of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya, 1952 – 2019

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the history, motives, organization, pattern and territoriality of the *Maukibi*, an annual public religious procession of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN) in Kano. The development and transformation of the *Maukibi* between 1952 and 2017 will be examined across historical phases in order to explore specific changes. The chapter attempts to situate the performance of the *Maukibi* in public spaces within the context of 'reform movements' in northern Nigeria. This performance will also be discussed in the light of the unification project of the fragments of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood (QB), which culminated in the emergence of the QN or the Nasirist Community. Central to this is the 'charisma' [1] of Nasiru Kabara, the spiritual leader of the QN.

While the formation and sustenance of religious identities are indispensable for the survival of religious groups, the practice of public processions by the QN is essentially motivated by the drive to form a distinct identity in the saturated religious space of northern Nigeria. In other words, public processions of the QN represent one wave in the struggle for religious identity in post-colonial northern Nigeria. This identity is performatively displayed in public spaces. This practice changes the significance and utility of the space itself by introducing a 'new mode' of public religiosity while triggering reactions from the state and the public. This new mode of public religiosity conveniently accommodates the movement's growing number of followers. The procession is thus instrumentalized over time to demonstrate the size, and ultimately the strength, of the QN. This overtly presents the QN as a critical stakeholder in Nigeria's religious sphere which competes with other religious establishments and the state for religio-political space. However, the *Maukibi* procession does not take place

[1] The concept of 'charisma' is premised on the notion of 'holiness' or exceptional qualities of certain individuals which attract people for them. Max Weber (1968) a sociologist who promoted the idea of 'social structure' views 'charisma' from the point of the relationship between the follower and the followed, with the former wielding considerable influence. For details on charisma, see Stephen Turner, "Charisma Reconsidered", *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003), pp. 5-26. This dissertation adopts this notion of charisma.

in a vacuum; it shapes as much it is shaped by the socio-political circumstances of the time and space within which it is carried out.

The 20th century development of Islam in northern Nigeria was occasioned by the rise of movements that aimed at bringing about the change of the *status quo* which have been termed 'reformist movements'.[2] As noted in Chapter One, the core objectives of these movements were, among other things, to purge Islam of 'heretic innovations', cultural elements (or better cultural imperialism) which were imported by the colonial regimes; the emancipation of women; or revive the 'dying' Sufi Brotherhoods. The timing of the reformist movement is crucial in understanding the specific problems that it targets to address. That is why Roman Loimeier identifies three 'differentiated' eras of reforms in sub-Saharan Africa: 'the pre-colonial', 'the colonial' and 'the post-colonial'.[3] Here, it is suggested that his 'post-colonial' does not adequately reflect factors which lead to change outside of politics. The discourse of reform has generated a multitude of meanings for the concept itself. John Paden (1973) identifies four different frames of 'usage' of the concept of reform in Kano: 'purification, modernization, westernization' and 'secularization'.[4] Auwal Anwar (1989) adds 'revitalization'[5] to the conceptual usage provided by Paden. Thus, arguably, Nasiru Kabara's project could be considered in this context as 'crystallization' of the Brotherhood.

Nasiru Kabara's internal crystallization of the QB defies all the conceptual usages that Paden identifies. Rather, Anwar's conceptualization is much closer to Nasiru Kabara's project of unification of the branches of the Qadiriyya that culminated in the emergence of the QN. The crystallization project was essentially motivated by the persistent decline of the Qadiriyya Sufi establishment, having hit by the forces of 'modernization', the influx of 'radical' Islamic philosophy of the *Izala* and Salafism, as well as the internal pattern of authority and community of the Order.[6] The project was approached through deployment of various means and strategies, as will be discussed. Before discussing the processes for the formation of the QN, the socio-intellectual formation of Shaykh Nasiru Kabara will first be examined based on a combination

[2] R. Loimeier, "Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33, Fasc. 3, Islamic Thought in 20th-Century Africa (2003), pp. 237-262.
[3] R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Africa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 3.
[4] J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California Press, 1973), p. 70.
[5] See A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity: The *Ulama* in Kano 1937-1987" (M.A. Diss., University of Maiduguri, 1989).
[6] This is discussed in detail in section 2.3 of this Chapter.

of scant biographical and hagiographical commentaries. These are in the form of articles,[7] vernacular (Hausa language) pamphlets,[8] and the introductory notes of some Arabic works.[9]

2.2 The Socio-Intellectual Life of Nasiru Kabara (1912-1996)

The examination of the socio-intellectual life of the Shaykh will highlight the context in which his thought was shaped and inspired him to stage a crystallization within the broader Qadiriyya Brotherhood, including the introduction of the *Maukibi* procession. Muhammad al-Nasiru al-Kabari was born in 1912[10] in Guringawa village in the present day Kumbotso local government area of Kano state.[11] His great-grandfather was believed to be al-Shaykh Umar, popularly known as Mallam Kabara,[12] whose genealogy of forefathers is linked to Kabara Farma Alu, the brother to Askia Muhammad Toure, the great Songhay Emperor (1493 - 1528) and also "one of the leaders of the revolt" against the latter.[13] The political significance of the connection of the Kabara family-line with the leadership of Songhay Empire elevated the Kabara's social status as 'elite scholars' in Timbuktu. [14] It is believed by adherents that, with the exception of only a few, most of Nasiru Kabara's ancestors came from the Sanhaja family group, who in turn can trace their ancestry to the Himyar Arabs.[15] Matabuli Shehu Kabara's

[7] J. O. Hunwick, "Obituaries", *Sudanic Africa*, 7 (1996), pp. 1-4 and R. Loimeier, "The Writings of Nasiru Kabara (Muhammad Al-Nasir Al-Kabari)", *Sudanic Africa*, 2 (1991), pp. 165-174.

[8] Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya Secreteriat (QN-SEC), DOCSEC/001: A. S. "Tudun Nufawa, *Hasken Allah Ba Ya Gushewa*: *Tarihin Sheikh Muhammad Nasiru Kabara*" (n. d.) (The Permanent Light: The Biography of Shaykh Muhammad Nasiru Kabara).

[9] M. S. Kabara, *Suwar Bayaniyyah Fi Shi'ir al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Nasir al-Kabari: Dirasah Balagiyyah Tahliliyyah Li-namazij Mukhtarah* (Assessment of the Rhetoric of Selected Themes in the Poems of Shaykh Nasiru Kabara) (Cairo: al-Quds Press, 2013) and "Introductory note" by Usman Zinnurain Kabara of *Ihsan al-Mannan Fi Ikhraaj Khabaya al-Quran Tafsir Wa Tarjamatu Ma'anil Quran al-Kareem Ila Lugati Hausa* [Translation of the Qur'an into Hausa Language, Vol. I] by Nasiru Kabara (Tarabulus: World Islamic Call Society, 2004), pp. 1 – 12.

[10] Nasiru Kabara's birthdate is disputed. In the absence of a record for the exact date, it is left open for debate. Hunwick offers 1916 but Loimeier assumes 1925. While the official website of *Gidan* Qadiriyya, Kabara, posted 1914 as Nasiru Kabara's birthdate (see www.scribd.com/mobile/doc/110485119?width=540) , Matabuli S. Kabara prefers 1912 as the date which Nasiru Kabara himself referred to in one of his poems (titled: *Sulalat al-Miftah min Manh al-Fattah* 'The Strain Key of the God Gift'. See: Hunwick, "Obituaries", p. 1; Loimeier, "The Writings of Nasiru Kabara", p. 165 and Kabara, *Suwar Bayaniyyah*, p. 50.

[11] Kumbotso is one of the 44 local governments of Kano state and spatially categorized as the "Kano Close-Settled Zone'" (a phrase invented by M.J. Mortimore, 1967). It is the adjacent settlement to the metropolitan urban area of the state.

[12] Shaykh Umar Kabara al-Sonkore, Mallam Kabara, was the progenitor of the Kabara family in Kano. For a brief biography of Mallam Umar Kabara see: QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: A. S. Tudun Nufawa, *Hasken Allah Ba Ya Gushewa*, pp. 1-2.

[13] Hunwick, "Obituaries", p. 1.

[14] J. O. Hunwick, *Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa'dis' Tarikh al-Sudan Down to 1613 and Other Contemporary Documents* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003), p. xxvi.

[15] M. Y. El-Firuz Abadi, *Al-Qamus al-Muhit* ('The Surrounding Ocean') (Beirut: Ar-Resalah Publishers, 1993), p. 251. There is debate over the ethno-linguistic and ancestral connection between the Sanhaja and the Himyar. The debate is animated by the fact that each of the two is seen as a separate ethno-linguistic group independent of the other. Sanhaja is Berber located in North Africa while Himyar is Yeminite Arab. Thus, contrary to what el-Firuz Abadi claims, as the debate proves, the Sanhaja is an Arabized Berber group formed through cross-cultural

work further claims that Nasiru Kabara's forefathers trace their ancestry to the Prophetic bloodline.[16] It is important to note that the discourse of the *Sharifian* ancestry (having a link with the Prophetic bloodline) features prominently in the formation of the legend of Sufi tradition in Kano and many other similar contexts elsewhere. 'Saints', in this tradition, are categorized according to their ancestry, and those believed to be of the *Sherifian* origin are considered most noble, and thus most venerated. Thus, the ascription of *Sherifian* ancestry to Nasiru Kabara is a way to extoll his personality. According to P. E. Starratt, this kind of discourse frames a narrative which stands out as the oral and legendary source of history in an African society like Kano.[17]

The history of the Kabara family in Kano began with Mallam Kabara who is believed to have migrated from Timbuktu in present-day Mali. The circumstances that motivated Mallam Kabara's migration and his settlement in Kano were given by Nasiru Kabara in his treatise on Mallam Kabara.[18] Nasiru Kabara extolled Mallam Kabara's Sufi ascetic lifestyle which he claims was 'miraculous'. Mallam Kabara was reputed to have explored sub-Saharan Africa, especially the shore of the River Niger, while on *siyaha* (travel for initiatory purpose).[19] This followed the training he received at Timbuktu from his teachers, namely Shaykh al-Mukhtar al-Kunti, Sayyid Muhammad al-Khalifa and Sayyid Ahmad al-Bakka'i.

According to legend, while on the spiritual journey, Mallam Kabara met with the Shehu Usman b. Fodio in Agadez, then the hub of scholarship and confluence of 'holy men' in 18th century sub-Saharan Africa. Both were in search of knowledge. This was at the time when the Shehu was conceiving the idea of a reform movement and was said to have sought the intervention of Mallam Kabara in the execution of the Jihad plan and design of the theocratic structure of the Sokoto caliphate.[20] Mallam Kabara responded to the Shehu's demand.[21] Upon

interactions over the time. Both are largely Muslim and speak Arabic either as their first or second language. The significance of this sketch is to put in context the traces of the Kabara lineage to the Himyar origin. See: Kabara, *Suwar Bayaniyyah Fi Shi'ir al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Nasir al-Kabari*, p. 46ff.

[16] Kabara, *Suwar Bayaniyyah*, p. 46.

[17] P. E. Starratt, "Oral History in Muslim Africa: Al-Maghili Legends in Kano" (PhD Diss., The University of Michigan, 1993).

[18] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: M. N. Kabara, "*Jala' al-Basar Fi Tarjamat Jaddina al-Shaykh Umar Kabar wa Man Haulah Min al-Sadat al-Kubar*" ('The Eye Opener for the Biography of Our Grandfather al-Shaykh Umar Kabar and His Associates', n.d.).

[19] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Jala' al-Basar*", p. 5. The anecdotes of *siyaha* of saints are popular in the Sufi narratives. The *siyaha* rite is considered a space within which one undergoes rigorous discipline of self-restraint, solitude and self-sanction of detachment from worldly indulgence and complete withdrawal from urban materialism. See: E. Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2010), pp. 162, 176 and A. Farid al-Din, *Muslim Saints and Mystics*, transl. A. J. Arberry (London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).

[20] QN-SEC-AUDCSEC/001: Audio lecture by Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara, one of Nasiru Kabara's sons, 2001.

[21] According to "*Jala' al-Basr*", Shehu Usman b. Fodio instructed Emir Sulaiman (1805-1819), the first post-Jihad emir, to "give a decent reception to Mallam Kabara and heed to his advice, for he is my lieutenant in Kano". On

his arrival in Kano, the then *Sarkin* Kano Muhammad Alwali (1781-1807), allocated a piece of land to him at Jarkasa quarters. These were later renamed the Kabara quarters in honor of Mallam Kabara. As a figure in one of the scholarly families in Timbuktu,[22] he established a school in about 1787 that was operated based on a classical method of Islamic learning. The school, commonly known in local parlance as *Makarantar Zaure* or *Madrasa*, was said to have excelled in teaching theology texts, a tradition that gave the school a distinguished scholarly status and a unique specialization for which not only the school but the household became known in northern Nigeria.

As Nasiru Kabara's father died when he was a child, Shaykh Ibrahim b. Ahmad, popularly known as Mallam Natsugune, took over his care. Mallam Natsugune was not a direct descendant of Mallam Kabara, but was linked to him through his grandfather Shaykh al-Maqarri Mallam Abd al-Rahman, known as Mallam Bako, one of the close associates of Mallam Kabara.[23] Thus, the close association of the Natsugune family with that of the Kabara And scholarly relations between the two over the years blended their ties and Mallam Natsugune became mentioned as one of the grandparents of Nasiru Kabara by virtue of this association.

Nasiru Kabara spent about 23 years under Mallam Natsugune's care.[24] Having trained him in the preliminary Sufi theories and practices, theology, the Science of Prophetic Traditions, Arabic grammar, syntax, morphology, astrology, and advanced legal jurisprudence as well as the Qur'an, he sent him off to various scholars for further specialization. Nasiru Kabara moved widely from one school to another within the city of Kano in search of knowledge. These schools were located at the residences of the respective teachers. According to Matabuli, Nasiru Kabara took with him at the time 30 different thematic books to five different schools within the school days (Saturdays to Wednesdays). The school of Shaykh Muhammad al-Thani (d. 1935), the deputy chief Imam of the Kano central mosque, was located at Daneji, some 100 meters from Kabara quarters. Here he studied Arabic grammar and theology. The school of al-Qadi Ibrahim b. Usman, the then Chief Justice of Kano (d. 1942), was located at Yakasai, 300 meters from his home. He studied wide range of disciplines such as Sufism, Arabic grammar, Qur'anic science, jurisprudence and theology. Al-Qadi Ibrahim

this instruction, the emir had Mallam Kabara relocated to Kabara, a quarter opposite to the emir's palace and given plots of land at Guringawa, Wadatallawa, Umarawa, Kukure, Rigafada and Dutse within the Kano emirate. Kabara, "*Jala' al-Basr*", pp. 18-19.

[22] Mallam Kabara is credited with the authorship of "*al-Kanz al-MudalsamI*" (The Flowing Treasure), a book that contains thousands of litanies and blessings upon the Prophet Muhammad. Still in manuscript form, it was in the custody of Mallam Aliyu al-Hawwas, one of the sons of Nasiru Kabara, until his death in 2017.

[23] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: M. N. Kabara, "*Jala' al-Basr*" p. 17.

[24] Kabara, "*Suwar Bayaniyyah*"p. 51.

was considered to be the most outstanding scholar whose teaching had profound impact on the intellectual formation of Nasiru Kabara. Nasiru Kabara spent seven years under his discipleship. The school of al-Hajj Mustapha (d. 1947), then Judge of Bichi, was at Kurawa, opposite the Kano emir's palace. At the school of Mallam Abd al-Kareem, known as Mallam Sabo, who resided at Chiromawa, he concentrated on the mastery of the Science of Prophetic traditions. At the school of the Imam al-Zawiya Mallam Inuwa (d. 1952), Nasiru Kabara learnt the science of legal jurisprudence.[25]

The above *Zaure* schools were said to have adequate reading and reference materials that were acquired through the trans-Saharan book trade, the activities of bibliophiles and copyists, and local purchases.[26] Although the quantum of the collections cannot be measured, they certainly contained classical literature of legal jurisprudence, prophetic traditions and Arabic grammar. The significance of attending different schools at the same time under various tutors shows diversity in the search and source of Kabara's knowledge and how important that knowledge was for building a base of followers.

By the 1950s, the culture of ambitious quest for knowledge that Nasiru Kabara had cultivated had distinguished him among his peers as a student with a 'distinctive' capacity. His quest for knowledge did not stop with local scholars in northern Nigeria. He also engaged visiting scholars – scholars on a journey for pilgrimage – as well as those who came to settle permanently in the region from other parts of the Muslim world, usually graduates of al-Azhar University in Cairo and other universities in the Arab World. Some of these scholars included: Shaykh Maulah Abd al-Rahman who came from Gao, Mali; Shaykh Mahmud al-Janzuri from Tripoli, Libya; Shaykh Muhammad b. al-Shurrah from whom he learned calligraphy; and Shaykh Sharif Muhammad b. Zain al-Abidin (alias Sharif Sami't). The knowledge he acquired from these scholars was partly through direct reading of the texts with them and partly by *ijaza* (permission, authorization).[27] The combination of scholarly experiences of his home-based teachers and those graduates of foreign universities meant that Nasiru Kabara became a product of two intellectual traditions. This shaped him for the later challenge of revitalization of the Qadiriyya. There are now over two hundred titles – both prose and poem in both Arabic and Hausa language – to his credit, an indication of his intellectual erudition. This could further be seen in the set of students he produced who were equally renown scholars in their own right

[25] Kabara, "*Suwar Bayaniyyah*", pp. 52-53.
[26] For detail on the trans-Saharan book trade and the activities of bibliophiles in Africa, see G. Krätli and G. Lydon, eds. *The Trans-Saharan Book Trade: Manuscript Culture, Arabic Literacy and Intellectual History in Muslim Africa* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011).
[27] Kabara, "*Suwar Bayaniyyah*", p. 54.

such as Shaykh Yusuf Abdullahi Makwarari (d. 1998), Mallam Bashir Shehin Halqa (d. 1989), Shaykh Hamisu Ayagi Dorawar Babuje (d. 2002), among others. This does not imply that Nasiru Kabara was the only scholar of his time in Kano. Indeed, there were scholars of Tijjaniyya Brotherhood persuasion like Shehu Maihula (d. 1987), Shaykh Tijjani Na 'Yanmota (d. 1992), Shaykh Sani Kafinga (d. 1988). Sani Kafinga was said to have studied *Nazm al-Kubra*[28], a sixth hundred lined verse text on theology, with Nasiru Kabara.

It should be noted that these hagiographic reflections portray only the positive achievements of Nasiru Kabara. This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive biography of this *personage* but is rather employed to elucidate the manner in which his academic prowess filters through to his followers via his own writing. It is this knowledge and broader connections which played a role in his ability to spark the crystalisation of a fragmented QB.

2.3 The Formation of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya Community and its Pattern of Authority

The formation of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya followed a trend in the Sufi cult of successive expansion of authorities from master to disciple. Local branches are often born out of the 'grand Sufi Orders'.[29] These so-called grand Sufi Orders expand their networks by having multiple representatives in local contexts, each under a respective Shaykh who retains the affiliation to the former and operates within the frame of its established principles. Because of its long history in the Muslim world, and in northern Nigeria in particular, as well as the multitude of branches it has developed over time and spaces, the Qadiriyya Brotherhood is regarded as the grand Sufi Order.

The Qadiriyya Brotherhood was the Sufi Order under whose ideals the Shehu Usman b. Fodio and his disciples carried out the 19th century Jihad which culminated in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. A report by P.H.G Scott of 1952 remarks that the Brotherhood "commanded complete acceptance" and *Amir al-Muminin* (Commander of the Faithfuls), the

[28] This text was authored by Shaykh Tahir Fairamma, a Bornoan (hailed from the defunct Borno empire) scholar who lived in the 17th century. There is evidence that Fairamma had other texts to his credit such as *Badi Bismillahi*. See, for example, A. U. Adamu, "The Significance of Ajami Manuscript Resources for the Development of New Knowledge in Nigeria", in Y. Y. Ibrahim *et. al. Arabic/Ajami Manuscripts: Resource for the Development of New Knowledge in Nigeria* (Proceedings of the National Conference on Exploring Nigeria's Arabic/Ajami Manuscripts, Kaduna: Arewa House, 2010), 199 – 236.

[29] E. el-Aswad, "Spiritual Genealogy: Sufism and Saintly Places in the Nile Delta", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2006), pp. 501- 518.

head of the Caliphate, remained the leader of the Brotherhood.[30] However, as noted in Chapter One, the introduction of the Tijjaniyya challenged that hegemonic dominance of the Qadiriyya. According to Scott's report, the Qadiriyya was "losing ground yearly to the Tijjaniyya".[31]

This development – the so-called losing ground – could be attributed to many factors. First, the visit of Shaykh Ibrahim Nyass (d. 1970) to Kano in 1937 changed the religious landscape of the Tijjaniyya Brotherhood, and the general Sufi sphere as well. Nyass democratized the Tijjaniyya into a mass Sufi movement motivated by a revivalist philosophy known as *faida* (flood) as claimed to have been predicted by Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijjani in the 19th century.[32] This dynamic expansion of the Tijjaniyya, otherwise known as the Tijjaniyya-Ibrahimiyya or 'Reformed Tijjaniyya' as John Paden calls it,[33] posed a challenge to the growth of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood.

Secondly, the rise of 'western-educated' elites, produced by the British policy of education and who acquired social space within the vacuum of decentralized religious authorities. The authoritative stake of the Sufi elites shrank as the western-educated elites also had a voice and, of course, a new perception as they could read (other sources of information) and write in a language different from the language of instruction of those religious scholars. The loyalty of an important segment of the society had thus been lost to the British. Dahiru Yahya (2010) alludes to this fact that "on the eve of independence, the influence of the *malamai* [religious scholars] was on the wane. They were replaced with *yan boko,* the new educated elites who passed out of middle schools and teacher training colleges".[34]

Thirdly, the rapid spread of 'radical'-cum-Salafi doctrine[35] which was a counter-force to the Sufi establishment and necessitated internal reform. More importantly, the internal

[30] P. H. G. Scott, *A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria* (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1952), p. 2.
[31] Scott, *A survey of Islam*, p. 3.
[32] Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani is claimed to have predicted that there would be among the disciples/adherents of his Brotherhood one who would bring about an unprecedented expansion of the Brotherhood. This man is *Sahib al-Faidha* (Bringer of the Flood). Shaykh Ibrahim Nyass is claimed to be the "bringer of the flood". See Rüdiger Seesemann, *The Divine Flood: Ibrāhīm Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[33] For detail on the visit of Ibrahim Nyass to Kano, his reform movement, and the formation of the Tijjaniyya-Ibrahimiyya (or "Reformed Tijjaniyya"), see: J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 105-146.
[34] D. Yahya, "Aristocracy as a Factor in Social Change in the First Millennium of Kano History", in U.A. Abdalla, and B.G. Bello, eds. *Kano Millennium: 1,000 Years in History* (Government House, Kano: Research & Documentation Directorate, 2010), p. 91.
[35] Although there was no *Izala*/Salafism as a doctrine or school of thought in Nigeria in the 1950s, 'radical' ideas that challenged the foundation of Sufi establishments were launched/preached by Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi as early as the 1950s. Gumi (d. 1992) was an Islamic scholar and Grand Khadi (Chief Judge) of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1962-1967. He was a close associate to Sir Ahmad Sardauna, the Premier of Northern Region, 1954-1966. Gumi's ideas had more or less influenced the rise of the *Izala* and Salafi doctrines or rather re-articulated them under the emerging platforms of the two groups. Kane's *Muslim Modernity* … and Ben Amara's

pattern of authority and community of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood – which was essentially aristocratic – called for a shift within the Brotherhood.

Again, the fragmentation of branches under the Brotherhood was a source of concern for Nasiru Kabara. According to Nasiru Kabara, there were as many as ninety-nine streams of the Qadiriyya in the world. Of the ninety-nine, there were five in Kano; namely: Ahl al-Bayt, Kuntiyya, Shinqidiyya, Usmaniyya, Sammaniyya, Shazzulliya, Arusiyya and Salamiyya[36]. A sketch has been provided in the previous chapter on the Sufi masters who founded these branches of the Qadiriyya and their locations. Thus, the major pre-occupation of Nasiru Kabara from the 1930s was the unification of these branches into a grand congregation of the Qadiriyya adherents which eventually gave birth to the QN.

To make the project of unification feasible, Nasiru Kabara first sought to establish direct Brotherhood links with the original source of authority. In 1937, he sought an *Ijaza* through correspondence with Abu al-Hassan al-Sammani, the leader of the Sammaniyya based in Mecca, to perform the rituals of the Order and serve as its *muqaddam* (designated representative) in Kano.[37] Al-Sammani granted the request for he was claimed to have been overwhelmed by the content of the letter that a young 'lad' at the age of about 25 could write. The permission granted eventually positioned Nasiru Kabara as the direct representative of the Brotherhood in his locality against the power struggle for such authority by local leaders of other branches in Kano. This earned Nasiru Kabara recognition among contemporary Sufi scholars. Consequently, Nasiru Kabara established his mosque with three foundational disciples of the QN, namely Bashiru Shehun Halqa, Abdulganiy Sulaiman Nabulisi, and Muhammadu Tukur (Baban Asibit). [38]

Nasiru Kabara, however, also participated in ritual sessions of the other branches mentioned above which put him in contact with many adherents who consequently developed an interest in learning from him, especially the sciences of Sufism, a field in which Nasiru Kabara is claimed to have been erudite. Many of these adherents were thus eventually integrated into the newly founded community of the QN. Yusuf Nabahani Baba Magashi estimated over

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"The Izala Movement in Nigeria …" have extensively discussed the development and transformation of the *Izala* philosophy. For Salafism, see A. Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For an autobiography of Gumi, see S. A. Gumi and I. A. Tsiga, *Where I Stand* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1992).

[36] M. N. Kabara, *al-Nafahat al-Nasiriyya* [The Breezes of Nasiru], (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1957), p. 12 cited in Paden, *Religion and Political Culture*p. p. 148. (see appendix 2.1 for a chart)

[37] R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1997), p. 53

[38] Nasiru Kabara stated this at one of the *Amfas* meditation session dated November, 1991.

50 disciples joined the community within the next few years and who, in turn, commissioned either mosques or *madrasa* (locally based elementary Islamic school) of their own with strong allegiance to Nasiru Kabara.[39] More activities in Nasiru Kabara's residence that gathered a sizeable number of disciples and other participants included the annual sessions of the *Tafsir* (exegetical analysis of the Qur'an during Ramadhan), textual analysis of the *Kitab al-Shifa'* (the Book of Cure), and *Babban Dare* (special religious nights, held five times in a year).

The establishment of sessions for group rituals of QN marked a departure from the old-fashioned pattern of Sufi Brotherhood rituality when many rites were performed individually. Collective rituals such as the *Babban Dare* (special night meditation), performances of *bandir* (broad-trimmed drum), reciting of the *Baghdadiyya wird* (the Bagdad litany), reading of the *Mi'ad* text (*Naf' al-Ibad bi Haqiqat al-Mi'ad* -The Benefit of People Concerning the True Covenant-, written by Shaykh al-Manzaly) were introduced and practiced by the QN. These forms of rites were adopted from other branches. The *bandir* performance was the Arusiyya-Salamiyya ritual while the *Mi'ad* text was read at the Qadiriyya-Manzaliyya sessional rituals. Influenced by the Sudanese-based Sammaniyya, Nasiru Kabara introduced *amfas* (inhaling and exhaling breaths) collective meditation. Thus, the rituals embedded in the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya represents the combination of all the rituals of the five mentioned sub-groups of the main Qadiriyya Brotherhood. This further portrays the primary objective of collectivity and mass participation. It is imperative to make it clear that the designation 'Nasiriyya' does not mean an introduction of an entirely new form of ritual as Paden's 'Reformed Qadiriyya' implies.[40]

For more fresh modes of articulating his newly established community, Nasiru Kabara travelled in 1952 to Bagdad to reconnect physically with the direct source of the Qadiriyya authority and have himself recognized. Around the same period, Nasiru Kabara also visited the Qadiriyya centers at Khartoum, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tehran and Amman.[41] During this time, Nasiru Kabara was claimed to have 'verified' the Qadiriyya Brotherhood rituals being observed in Kano with those in Baghdad and other places. By this, the rituals were 'authenticated', and the link was made stronger with the Kano base. Hence, the Bagdadiyya litany– another group ritual – was introduced which was performed twice every day in Kabara's residence and the mosques under the QN. While the reading of the *Mi'ad* text was not abandoned, the Bagdadiyya litany was recited much more easily as it is all about continuously

[39] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/003: A. S. Nabulisi, *Tsarabar Maulidin Qadiriyya A Kano Nigeria Na 63 A 1435=2014* (A Gift of the 63rd Qadiriyya Saint Day of 2014) (Kano: Manifold, 2014), p. 2.
[40] See Paden, *Religion and Political Culture*, pp. 147-152.
[41] Paden, *Religion and Political Culture*, p. 157.

uttering simpler words within a session, unlike the reading of a whole text with dense vocabularies.[42]

By 1954, the QN was growing exponentially, with many mosques under its control within the Kano metropolis.[43] This was the result of Nasiru Kabara's expansionist tour that reached out to outlying areas within Kano and the rest of Nigeria. Sharu Muhammad Fari, one of the tourists, recounted that "we toured even the Middlebelt or central Nigerian area, through the rugged hilly terrain, and in the course of that got a number of 'pagan' people there converted to Islam".[44] Towns within Nigeria where the QN had bases included Bichi, Dambatta, Dutse, Gaya, Kunya, Rano, Ringim, Getso, Rugu, Wudil (within Kano state), Nguru (Yobe state), Daura (Katsina state), Jama'are (Bauchi state), Lagos, Ibadan (Oyo state) among many other towns within Nigeria.[45] Further expansion of the QN authority was recorded in the 1950s and 1960s, the list of which will be presented below under the estimated number of participants of the *Maukibi*.

Regional networks were also explored by visiting countries like Libya, Togo, Benin, Mali, Niger, Ghana, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Algeria. The results of these trips were mobilization and establishing contacts with Islamic scholars and Sufi leaders who had attended some of the annual *Maukibi* ceremonies. The QN developed a 'trans-ethnic' and 'translocal' mode of collectiveness by expanding beyond the borders of Kano. A substantial following was attracted from the Yoroba land and the West, East and North African Sufi networks. For example, Loimeier found that Nasiru Kabara had a representative in Zanzibar, East Africa.[46] Paden sums up the fundamental characteristic of the QN community:

> In the twentieth century, partly under the influence of Reformed Tijjaniyya, the major portion of the Qadiriyya community in Kano also became reformed: a transethnic base of authority and community was developed; mass participation was encouraged; there was a shift away from strict allegiance to Sokoto religious authority and ties were established with Muslim groups throughout Africa and the Middle East; and there was a utilization and acceptance of modern technology.[47]

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[42] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, by the author, at his office in Bayero University Kano in November, 2019.

[43] The Kano metropolitan area is now 499km^2 with a population of 2,828,861 as of the 2006 population headcount. The landmass of the area saddles across eight local government areas: Municipal, Fagge, Dala, Gwale, Tarauni, Nasarawa, Ungogo and Kumbotso. For more on the general urban and geographical pattern of Kano, see, A. I. Tanko and S. B. Momale, eds. Geography of the Kano Region (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2013).

[44] This information was provided by Sharu Muhammad Fari, one of the tourists. In2019, the author interacted with a section of the Maukibi procession participants who came from Yelwan Shendem, Plateau state, one of the towns that Nasiru Kabara toured in the 1950s. They told me that they have been attending the event for over 40 years. It is an annual programme that they took over from their parents.

[45] See: Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change*, p. 58.

[46] See: R. Loimeier, "Translocal Networks of Saints and the Negotiation of Religious Disputes in Local Contexts", *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, 51, No. 135, (2006), pp. 17-32.

[47] Paden, *Religion and Political Culture*, p. 146.

2.3.1 The Structure of Authority of the Qadiriyya – Nasiriyya under Nasiru Kabara

Nasiru Kabara was the spiritual leader of the QN until his death in 1996. He was assisted by his vicegerents, a set of disciples who formed the earliest members of the QN, as mentioned earlier. They were conferred with different titles: *Shehun Halqa* (the monitor of the order and mood of meditation in circle/session), *Naqeeb* (assistant to the monitor), *Shawish* (the errand), *Anjasha* (who leads poem recitation), and *Darwish* (igniter of 'ecstasy').

The headquarters of the QN is the *Darul* Qadiriyya (the Headquarters of the Qadiriyya),[48] adjacent to the Kano emir's palace. Initiation into the Brotherhood is the sole responsibility of Nasiru Kabara unless otherwise delegated. The aggressive campaigns for a united community of the QN adherents led Nasiru Kabara to make a number of his disciples *muqaddamun* (singular *muqaddam*), an area delegate. These *muqaddamun* are deployed to lead or manage mosques in their respective locality but receive instructions from the central command. Each mosque consists of a *halqa* (circle), a symbolic representation of group worship. Members of each *halqa* are answerable to the *muqaddam* who deputizes on behalf of the central command. Membership size varies according to population density. Each *halqa* decides when rituals are to be performed, so there is a level of flexibility and local autonomy. This process involves the *muqaddam* and senior members of the *halqa*. Most rituals take place on Thursdays and Fridays when *madrasas* are usually on break.

Interaction with sister mosques occurs regularly. Visits are encouraged, and that is why the days for rituals vary from one mosque to another. However, for an activity at the *Darul* Qadiriyya, all members, particularly the *muqaddamun*, are expected to attend, especially the *zikirin Juma'a* (the Friday meditation) session. During this session, messages and information are passed to the *muqaddamun* which they are expected to relay to their members. More so, the session serves as the space for educating the followers about the basic tenets of Sufism and other fundamentals of the Islamic sciences. Thus, attendance is somewhat compulsory.

[48] The *Darul* Qadiriyya, also known as the *Gidan* Qadiriyya of Gidan Kabara, was founded by Nasiru Kabara as a residence and the national headquarters of the Qadiriyya where all the Order's ritual activities take place. It was also declared the rallying point for all QN followers within Kano, as well as the host residence for those of the other states, particularly during the *Maukibi*. The plot of the land was allocated to him by the then emir of Kano, Sir Muhammadu Sunusi I (1954-1963) who was also Nasiru Kabara's student. While the House remains the national headquarters of the QN, it serves as the residence for the newly selected leader of the QN, Shaykh Qaribullah, after the death of Nasiru Kabara. The house underwent expansion projects at different times since the 1970s, in order to accommodate the *murids* (disciples) from different walks of life. Further expansions included a library, a mosque (named *Baaz al-Ashhab*), a *dhikr* space (named *al-Siffa*), a space for reading the *Kitab al-Shifa* during the month of Ramadan, a family section, guests section and corner shops at the outer part of the house.

In the QN tradition, responsibilities or posts are passed onto disciples from one generation to the next. In other words, children are prepared to take over specific responsibilities from their fathers once they (fathers) grow incapacitated or dies. In the absence of a rightful heir, another committed disciple is recommended for the post. From the late 1980s, Nasiru Kabara started to decentralize the system and delegated responsibilities to his children. This complimented the system of an area delegation that has been in practice at the inception of the movement. This generational succession of responsibilities stands out as one of the enduring legacies of the QN in the Sufi religiosity of Kano and has kept the movement alive since the 1950s.[49] Despite the criticisms one can levy on this somewhat patrilineal structure, the centrality of Nasiru Kabara's role in uniting Brotherhoods is quite evident. So too is his role in creating a new form or public religiosity.

2.4 The *Maulid* and the *Maukibi* Procession

The *Maulid*, celebrating the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, is part of the religious and ceremonial culture of the Muslim community of northern Nigeria. There were two distinctive modes in which the *maulid* was performed in the region: the *Sallar Gani* and the *Takutaha*. Performing the *maulid* using one or both of the modes differs from one state to another, depending on the cultural and historical antecedents of each. Both of the modes have socio-political ramifications and are rooted in the history of the state and society of northern Nigeria. It is not clear when the *Sallar Gani* and the *Takutaha* were introduced. Although the two festivals were meant to commemorate the same event, each has a discrete history of evolution and spatial differentiation.

The *Sallar Gani*'s (Gani festival) provenance is traced to around the 17th century. The festival evolved as part of the elaborate rituals of the noble aristocrats in the polities of the now defunct northwestern Hausaland (namely Daura, Gumel, Hadejia, Korgom, Kance, Zinder, and Agadez). The mode in which it was performed and the nobility of the performers made the event elitist. According to Derk Lange (1995), "Gani is celebrated by a horse-riding procession performed by the nobles and the commoners of the kingdom during two days".[50] However, the islamicity of the *Gani* festival is contested. Doubt is cast on the initial motive of the ceremony, given the fact that its history preceded the 19th century Jihad which did away with many 'pagan'

[49] Interview with Mallam Abdulganiy Sulaiman Nabulisi, the QN secretary, by the author in December 2019 at the QN secretariat office.
[50] D. Lange, "The Pre-Islamic Dimension of Hausa History", *Saeculum*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1995), pp. 161 – 203, p. 166.

or un-Islamic cultures in the region. While it is held to be a common tradition in northern Nigeria, the *Gani* festival is synonymous with *Maulid.*

Lange connects the *Gani* festival performances with the pre-Islamic ritual of spirit fetishes which were associated with the Bayajidda legend.[51] Lange throws doubt that the *Gani* festival is originally rooted in the pre-Islamic rituals of the *Hausawa* Kingdoms. He draws attention to the role of the king in the ritual, performative turns and the sites being visited. The king here is portrayed as the successor of the Bayajidda's regalia, staffs and embodied his 'secrecy'. Lange further posits that the *Gani* festival is originally connected to the celebration of 'killing of the snake' of the legend of Bayajidda and related myth. However, Lange leaves questions unanswered as to how did pagan ritual become Islamic? Was it a coincidence that the pagan *Gani* was performed on the same date of the 12th Rabi' al-Awal, the date that marks the beginning of the *maulid* celebrations in most of the Muslim world? How has the cultural barrier been cemented between pagan *Gani* and *Maulid*, while the latter is not indigenous to Sub-Saharan Africa? Unless these questions are addressed, Lange's assertion would likely remain flawed. In a nutshell, the *Gani* festival will be held to remain synonymous with *Maulid* until these questions are settled.

The *Takutaha* ceremony is the second mode. Unlike the *Gani*, the *Takutaha* is populist-oriented festival and is conducted on the 19th of every third month of the lunar calendar. Different scholarly perspectives are given on the etymology and the structural formation of the term *Takutaha*. Each perspective points to a particular time in history when the term is spelt and thus its etymology is shaped. For example, S. Y. Hassan (1998) claims that the term was first spelt by the *maguzawa* (pagan) people to express a backlash to a culture – the *maulid* when embraced by Muslims – which was unknown to them. This development could be dated to the 16th century. Others perceive the term to be a nickname given to the Prophet as the celebrant as

[51] Bayajidda legend is one of the 'Hamitic Hypodissertation' that explains the origin of the Hausawa. The legend claims that a migrant prince from Bagdad who said to have been exiled from his home town after Queen Zidam, also known as Zigawa, had conquered the city. The prince then traveled across Africa with numerous warriors and arrived in Borno, one of the empires that flourished in sub-Saharan Africa. According to Dierk Lange, "the Bayajidda legend is probably the most important single source for Hausa history. It deals with the founding of Daura, traditionally the oldest city of Hausaland, and by extension also with the establishment of other Hausa states by foreign immigrants". See D. Lange, "The Bayajidda Legend and Hausa History", Edith Bruder and Tudor Parfitt ed. African Zion: Studies in Black Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), pp. 138-174. This notion of history falls within the Hamitic Hypodissertation. 'Hamitic Hypodissertation' is mythological narrative that explains the legend of origin of people of Africa. This narrative portrays Africans as 'inferior' and that their histories are made by the 'superior' external elements. According to Sanders, Hamitic Hypodissertation states that "…everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race". See E. R. Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypodissertation; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective", *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 1, 10, No. 4 (1969), pp. 521 – 532. See also A. Smith, "The Early States of the Central Sudan", in J. F. Ade Ajayi & M. Crowder eds., *History of West Africa*, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1971), p. 70.

well as the pleasantries being exchanged between one or more individuals while the *maulid* celebrations go on.[52]

Large numbers of people in Kano celebrate the *Takutaha* festival. Samuli Schielke's (2008) description of Cairo during the *Maulid* celebration captures the graphic image of the *Takutaha* day in urban Kano:

> Each […] makes his or her own *Maulid*, depending on where he or she goes and what he or she does. The choices are many: [Those who] participate in a *dhikr* (a collective rhythmic meditation to musical accompaniment) and reach a state of trance, sit with Sufi brethren […] hang around on the streets […] listen to the performance of a religious singer, eat for free, sit and watch the changing scenery […] beg, give alms, feel unified with God […] earn money by selling […] commodities, walk in or watch procession, praise the Prophet […]. [53]

This state of the ceremony being described changes over time with the change in urban demography and spatial distribution of the participants. The *Takutaha* narrative claims that the first ceremony was staged at Madabo and its neighbourhood in the1750s. Dramatic changes were later recorded in terms of the spread of the practice and the size of participation. Unlike the QN and IMN processions, the final destination of the *Takutaha* procession was Dutsen Dala, the famous Dala mountain that housed the legendary ancestors of the *Hausawa*, through the alleyways of the old city of Kano.

The normative reading sessions during the *Maulid* were conducted at Madabo which was complimented by the procession. The rhymed poem of Abu Zayd Abd' al-Rahman al-Fazazi (d. 1230) known as *Qasid al-Ishriniyyat fi Madh Saiyidna Muhammad* is recited. The next important scholarly house that contributed in the development of *Maulid* and entrenching the culture of veneration saints in public is the Kabara lineage. Although Kabar's mode of *Maulid* stuck to the established tradition, the *celebrant* differed from that of the *Sallar Gani* and *Takutaha*. Kabara rather celebrated the birth of Abdulqadir, the founder of the Qadiriyya, not the Prophet. This shift is part of the focus of this dissertation.

Prior to 1952, three-day sessional activities held at Magangara (later Kabara, Nasiru Kabara's residence) that marked the circle of Jilani's cemmorative birthday. These activities occurred on the 8th, 9th and 10th days of the fourth lunar calendar, *Rab' al-Thani*. They unfolded in the following way: an account of the birthday of al-Jilani is 'read'[54] during the first two days. On the 10thday, the *Halqat al-Kubra* (the grand session) is dedicated to evening meditation.

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[52] S. Y. Hassan, *Madabo Jami'ar Musulunci* (Kano: Triump Publishing Company, 1998) cited in T. S. Almajir, "Bikin Takutaha A. Qasar Kano: Tarihinsa da Matsayinsa" unpublished paper.

[53] S. Schielke, "Policing Ambiguity: Muslim Saints Day Festivals and the Moral Geography of Public Space in Egypt", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2008), pp. 539 – 552.

[54] I use the term "reading" here to capture the sense in which the *Maulid* theorists, such Ja'afar bn Hassan popularly known as al-Barzanji, used. He had a work titled *Iqd al-Jawhar fi Maulid al-Nabiy al-Azhar* (The Jewelled Necklace of the Resplendent Prophet's Birth). Al-Barzanji was a poet and Islamic Jurist.

Foreign guests are welcomed. Participants are reminded about the theory and practice of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood as founded and practiced by its original master.[55]

The hagiographic text read on the 8th and 9th was authored by Ja'afar b. Hassan b. al-Sayyid, popularly known as *al-Barzanji* (d. 1764) titled *al-Lajain al-Dani fi Maulid al-Jilani* (The Sweet Fruit for the Birthday of al-Jilani). It was chosen because it was said to be "universally accepted panegyrics" of the Islamic saints.[56] It was popularised as it was widely read at different neighbourhoods by his disciples and thus became a standard text for *Maulid* reading sessions. The notion and scope of remembrance was therefore expanded to include the Sufi saints. An abridged version, *Da'awah al-Ghauth Ila 'Allah* (Proselytization of the Pole [al-Jilani]), was written by Kabara in 1962 to supplant *al-Barzanji*. *Da'awah al-Ghauth* makes explicit reference to the sanctification of the Shaykh. The text was produced in a verse form for easy memorization. Nasiru Kabara claimed that he was 'inspired' to write the pamphlet after a prophetic dream. It foregrounds the importance of being an adherent of the Qadiriyya, outlines the terms of membership, and reiterates that sub-groups, such as the Qadiriyya-Manzaliyya, Qadiriyya-Usmaniyya-Fodiyya, Qadiriyya-Sammaniyya, belong to the main Qadiriyya Brotherhood.[57] It was, however, only after the inclusion of the *Maukibi* procession in 1952 that the significance of the three-day activities, became seminal principles for the religious adherents.

It was in 1952, after the closing session of the reading of the al-Jilani's *Maulid* that Nasiru Kabara led a procession of his disciples alone – this time not to Dutsen Dala for the *Takutaha* but to the cemetery of his ancestors. This marked a shift in the mode of the ritual and a more organised procession under one leadership began. The procession became a symbolic celebration of the *Maulid* of Abd al-Qadir and a force that bound followers under one Order.

Performed annually since 1952, the *Maukibi* (procession) which occurs on the on the 11th day of the lunar month, is arguably the second largest Sufi Muslim event in Nigeria, next to the birthday commemoration of Shaykh Ibrahim Nyass. The event was organized by Nasiru Kabara to commemorate the birthday of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1079-1166). The procession involves a walk of 13.1km within the urban center of the Kano metropolis by the

[55] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November 2019.
[56] Nasiru Kabara alludes to this see QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: M. N. Kabara, "*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya Fi al-Shawari' al-Kanawiyya Izharan Lil Ibtihaj Bi Wiladat Hadhrat al-Jilaniyya*" (Processions of the Qadiriyya on the Streets of Kano for Display of the Prestige of the Birth of al-Jilani), Manuscript, p. 4.
[57] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: M. N. Kabara, "*Da'awah al-Gauth Ila 'Allah*" (the Proselytization of the Pole [al-Jilani]), Qadiriyya Nasiriyya Secretariat (QNSC). The pamphlet was translated into Hausa language by Ibrahim Sani Abdulkadir (Mai Rawani) as *Hasken Haske*: *Fassarar Littafin Da'awatul Gausi Ilallahi*, 2012.

swarm of the QN adherents.[58] This procession is the only, and the most visible, annual QN event that brings together QN followers from across the country. Occasionally, there have been guests of Sufi persuasions from West Africa, North Africa and, sometimes, the Middle East. Thus, the size of the crowds of the *Maukibi* procession, its conspicuousness, the extent of territoriality, as well as its transethnic and translocal participation, outweigh, in a significant way, all the other processional events of the QN. Much time and resources are spent by both QN leadership and followers to ensure the success of the event.

The *Maukibi* procession impacted the religiosity of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood in many ways. It profoundly changed the pattern of community of the Brotherhood from an elitist to a populist movement, thereby transforming it into a mass movement. Participation in the rituality of the Brotherhood had thus been democratized. The tradition of initiation (a prerequisite to participation) was challenged so that it is no longer the exclusive preserve of any Sufi master. The women and children gained access into the movement as *bona fide* members. The access, especially, of female participants was decisive as it marked an important development in women's participation in the public collective religious ritual in northern Nigeria. This participation continued to be defined by Islamic rules of separation of the sexes. These developments are traced in the next section.

2.4.1 Development of the *Maukibi,* 1952-1970

According to oral testimonies and Nasiru Kabara's written accounts,[59] at dawn on 15 December 1952,[60] Shaykh Nasiru Kabara led a procession of his disciples and associates from Magangara quarters to Shahuci Judicial School.[61] This 5km roundtrip walk began shortly after the closure of the three-day sessions explained above. Although short, the procession walked via the city center, along the present-day Abdullahi Wase Road – the route that connects the Kano emir's palace and the Kurmi market, one of the oldest in the town. The procession conveyed a new mode of religiosity, as practiced for the first time in Qadiriyya, as the cortege loudly recited different Sufi poems in chorus in different tones.[62] The participants were

[58] See Map I for the processional routes.
[59] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November 2019, and QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya"*.
[60] This Gregorian date is a converted version of the Hijri one (11th of Rab' al-Thani 1372) that is given by Shaykh Nasiru Kabara in his booklet QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara,"*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya*" , p. 4.
[61] Nasiru Kabara was the principal of the school at the time. It is now School for Higher Islamic Studies, a.k.a Alia, and was founded in 1928.
[62] Nasiru Kabara compiled many of the poems recited (including his own) in both Arabic and Hausa into a *Diwan* (a collection of poems by a single author). The title of the *Diwan* is '*Diwan al-Haqa'iq'*.

hierarchically organized, one column followed another, with Nasiru Kabara leading the crowd barefoot. The poems being recited had the effect of drawing the attention of the people on the sideways of the route, which was a way to make the QN known beyond its immediate community of followers.

Fig. 2:1

A group photograph of Shaykh Nasiru Kabara and a section of his disciples at Shahuci Judicial School (now School for Higher Islamic Studies) in 1952. The people in this photograph are believed to be the first set of the *Maukibi* crowd.

Source: Compliments of Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, one of the author's interviewees.

There are contesting narratives as to what initially motivated the walk to Alia. One explanation, according to an informant, is after the closing prayer at the end of the spiritual session, photographs were to be taken.[63] The number of participants necessitated a bigger space to accommodate the large numbers. Nasiru Kabara suggested that those who were interested in the photograph should go to Alia. The source claims that this signified the genesis of the *Maukibi* procession. According to Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara, the walk was meant to be a mass entourage to a cemetery at Shuhuci,[64] where participants were expected to pray at the tomb of Nasiru Kabara's father, Mal. Muhammad al-Mukhtar.[65] Whichever narrative is accurate, each ideologically motivated procession, as Clark-Deces argues on his reflections on the Khumba Mela procession in India, "has a story line that is associated with the 'myth' enacted during the given festival or ritual".[66] In this instance, one could argue that the *Maukibi* procession evolved

[63] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November, 2019.
[64] The cemetery is claimed to predate Alia.
[65] Interview with Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara by the author at his office at Ma'ahad Schools, Gwale, Kano in December, 2019.
[66] I. Clark-Decès, "The Reinvention of Tamil Funeral Processions" in in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 16.

out of the tradition of saints' veneration and over time became an instrument for visibility and identity-making.

The visit to the cemetery was a symbolic demonstration of the mission of the ritual of inclusive commemoration of the acclaimed saints at 'home' and on the 'international' level. 'Saints at home', in this context, refers to those saints who lived in Kano (and who were probably unknown beyond this environment) and their gravesites located in the area. These saints are commemorated through physical contact with their burial sites because they are within reach. This is performed through, what Pnina Werbner terms, "contact with the sacred".[67] 'Saints at international level' refers to those whose reputation in the mysticism movement is globally recognized. Their stories are narrated or read, and are imagined and remembered by reading their hagiographies, interceding with their names, and invoking their sacred persons for *madad* (spiritual support or miraculous intervention).

Having observed the devotional prayers at the cemetery, the procession reportedly took an alternative route back home. The procession penetrated the deeper alleyways of the old city of Kano, beginning from Yola through Kwanar Gabari, Kwanar Goda down to Alfindiki. Makwarari followed Soron Dinki back to Magangara.[68] The bulk of the participants came from these quarters.[69] It could be argued that this was a grand gesture to accompany participants to their homes. There is little indication to suggest that this was planned and may have accidently unravelled as it did. Nevertheless, it was widely publicized and this set the tone for future developments. Lilian Portefaix (1993) reflects on the accidental nature of rituals. "The significance of religious rituals often reaches beyond their strict religious intentions. Specifically procession, performed in front of the public, is a most effective instrument of disseminating a message to the crowds".[70]

The procession to Alia and from the Yola axis took place in 1952 and in 1953. The procession in 1953 was important not only for the articulation of *Maukibi* ceremonial activities but also for the consolidation of the QN more generally by Nasiru Kabara. As highlighted earlier, Nasiru Kabara toured Bagdad and other centers of the Qadiriyya in the Middle East.

[67] A. A. A. Saheb, "A 'Festival of Flags': Hindu-Muslim Devotion and the Sacralising of Localism at the Shrine of Nagore-e-Sharif in Tamil Nadu", in Pnina Werbner and Helene Basu, eds. *Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality and the Performance of Emotion in Sufi Cults* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 65.
[68] See map I.
[69] Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, Interview, November 2019. In subsequent sections of this chapter, a list of the Maukibi organizing committee members will be given and the role of these quarters in terms of participation in the activities will be highlighted.
[70] L. Portefaix, "Ancient Ephesus: Processions as Media of Religious and Secular Propaganda", *Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis*, Vol. 15 (1993), pp. 195-210.

Part of the proceeds of this tour was that Nasiru Kabara's short stay in Bagdad allowed him to witness, and perhaps participate, in the commemorative procession for the birthday of al-Jilani, organized by the Shaykh descendants and successors. Although the manner in which it was staged was slightly different from the *Maukibi* procession in Kano,[71] Nasiru Kabara's own experiences had an impact on the *Maukibi* programme at home.[72]

By 1954, chages were introduced. The 'territoriality',[73] the mode of organization/arrangement of ranks, columns and hierarchy for the procession, the site being visited (also the ground where the enactment of the visit takes place) as well as the point of return had changed. New routes had now been marked that covered a 24 km distance (to and fro) walk. The *Maukibi* procession now moved in horizontal direction through the city center; the major alley ways that linked old quarters, markets, and major city mosques among other marked structures, within the walled city of Kano[74] (see map I). Kabara[75] was the departing site— the point where mosques *halqats* across the wide spectrum of the city converged to accompany the entourage of Nasiru Kabara to the *Maukibi* ground. But as *Maukibi* grew more complex with a wider participation beyond the realm of the QN, many (both the QN and non-QN members) eventually made their way directly to the site.

[71] The saint-day of al-Jilani is celebrated in almost the same way that the *Maukibi* is performed. They are all celebrated on the same day. They are all characterized by processions. In Bagdad, like in Kano, a procession moves in the morning hours of the day after the reading session of al-Jilani's biography. The cortège moves from the residence of the Shaykh, then passes through the connecting routes of the urban centre of Baghdad to the mausoleum of Abu Hanifa (d. 767 AD), known in Bagdad as al-Imam al-'Azam (the greatest leader), the founder of the Hanafi School of Thought. His mausoleum is said to be the most venerated site within Bagdad. Although there are other areas outside Baghdad, like Karbala and Najaf, which are also popularly respected sites. One fundamental difference between the procession in Bagdad and that in Kano was that the former has no return leg. Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, Interview, November 2019.

[72] Interview with Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara by the author at his office at Ma'ahad Schools, Gwale, Kano in December 2019.

[73] I adopt the term 'territoriality' in the sense of the way Pierre-Yves Trouille used it in his article "Mapping the Management of Threatening Gods and Social Conflict: A Territorial Approach to Processions in a South Indian Village (Tamil Nadu)", in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 45-62.

[74] Kano is a walled town. The "wall is a 14km radius earth structure". This formidable structure was meant to fortify the town against the impending external aggressions. The construction of the wall was started as late as 11th century and completed in the 14th century. The wall was, and is, one of the visible material remains of the city not only of Kano but many towns in northern Nigeria. They also represent a significant feature of civilization, urbanization, power, and territoriality. According to Moody, the wall "seems to have been prevalent throughout the whole Western Sudan for some thousand years". He adds that "there were forty walled cities within thirty miles radius of Kano, and no fewer than one hundred and seventy in the whole of the [Kano] province". See H.L.B Moody, "The Walls and Gates of Kano City: Historical and Documentary References", *The Journal of General Studies*, Vol. 4. No. 1 (1983), Division of General Studies, Bayero University Kano, p. 12.

[75] It is to note here the change of residence/the point of departure from Magangara to Kabara. The exact date when Nasiru Kabara moved to Kabara was not certain, but record shows that the land for the newly built residence was allocated by the emir of Kano Sir Muhammadu Sunusi I (1954-1963). Thus, Kabara has thence become the point of departure for the *Maukibi* procession.

Within the first decade of its introduction, the numbers of participants grew. A following of non-QN adherents began to participate in the procession. This reflected more the trans-doctrinal and trans-ethnic mode of the QN mobilization, and hence, participation. Estimates during the period 1952 to 1962 vary from one source to another. The first estimate is drawn from Nasiru Kabara's account of the 1962 *Maukibi*. According to him, the total number of the participants were 30,000 under the leadership of more than 200 *muqaddams*,[76] drawn from various localities across Nigeria. According to Nasiru Kabara, of the grand total, 20,000 were participants from the QN mosques within the Kano metropolis while 10,000 from outside. Of them, mention was made of the three major QN circles/mosques in order of priority and their *muqaddams* as follows: the Kabara mosque, the Tudun Nufawa mosque led by Shaykh Abubakar Ramadan, the Makwarari mosque under Shaykh Yusuf b. Abdullah, and the Bakin Ruwa mosque led by Shariff Muhammad al-Haddad. The latter comprised of participants from Kiru LGA of the state led by Shaykh Aliyu Sakarma, Tofa LGA led by Shaykh Ja'afar, Jama'are LGA under their *muqaddam* al-Hassan b. Yusuf, among others.[77] Meanwhile, *Kano A Yau* inflated the population of the 1962 *Maukibi* participants up to sixty thousand.[78]

According to *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kobo*, a Kaduna-based vernacular (Hausa) newspaper, the total headcount of all the participants of the 1965 *Maukibi* was 36,055. These figures agree with the estimate made by Nasiru Kabara three years earlier. Despite the fact that the report was the first of its kind, as the newspaper claims, it laid down the basis for a spatial estimation of the size of participation in the event where the figures were not accurate or contemplated. The figures given by the newspaper are broken down in **appendix II**. However, another source, *Kano A Yau*, inflated the population of the 1962 *Maukibi* participants up to sixty thousand.[79] Despite the fact that there was no record of the estimate of the *Maukibi* participants in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the size of participants likely decreased from 1967-1970 because of Nigeria's Civil War. The volatile atmosphere of the time forced many shifts, including a temporary movement of people across the regions – from south to north and vice versa. Thus, the situation hardly warranted the participation of the followers coming from the south-western states and the foreign guests. But the volume of participation from within the Kano metropolis remained intact.[80] The population figures in **Appendix II** should be taken as a parameter for measuring participation in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

[76] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya*", p. 6.
[77] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: N. Kabara, '*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya*…p. 6.
[78] *Kano A Yau*, Vol. 1, No. 6. September (1996), p. 6.
[79] *Kano A Yau*, Vol. 1, No. 6. September (1996), p. 6.
[80] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November, 2019.

Typically, in the early hours of the morning, the QN adherents, particularly those whose mosques were located within the urban area of Kano, flocked to Kabara to accompany the entourage of Nasiru Kabara to the *Maukibi* ground. As the numbers grew, many would make their way directly to the site. The procession of *halqats* led by their respective *muqaddams*, would fly their flags, singing different Sufi songs that aroused emotional connections and kept the procession invigorated with the *Bandir* beats. Sound and song are an important factor in the mobilization and motivation of processional ceremonies. As noted earlier, *bandir* performance was introduced into the QN by Nasiru Kabara and became a defining ritual of the group. The degree and way in which *bandir* is performed at the *Maukibi* procession differs from the performances at the mosques' weekly sessions. At the *Maukibi*, *bandir* is performed while walking and is accompanied by recitations of Sufi poems and hymns. It also serves a practical purpose as it provides a cue for large crowds to respond with a collective voice. *Naubat* and *shanshar*[81] serve a similar purpose. In many of the QN rituals, sound is fundamental because it nurtures spiritual connection of the community and instigates outward displays of spiritual passion. The soundscape of the *Maukibi* procession forms a part in the configuration of the "sound of Africa" as theorized by Louis Meintjes and Steven Feld.[82] Introduced in the 1930s and popularized by QN in the 1950s, the use of *bandir* in Sufi religious landscape of northern Nigeria sparked a debate on the 'Islamicity' of the mode of religiosity of the QN. The *bandir* performance as a Sufi ethnomusicological genre fits into a wider religio-cultural contestation over the issues of identity production and articulation in post-colonial northern Nigeria.

While preparing to depart, the *Shawish* (the errand disciples or the monitor-disciples) arrange the participants in columns and position them according to the order by which their mosques were placed in the hierarchy. In this case, mosques are grouped according to the status of their leadership. This is determined by their commitment to the leader as well as familial bonds. The earliest set of Nasiru Kabara's disciples and contemporaries were normally placed at the front of the procession. The *muqaddam* of Danbatta and that of Kiru, Mallam Abdullahi and Mallam Aliyu Sakarma respectively, lead the procession.[83] Abdullahi of Danbatta was

[81] *Bandir* is a trimmed wooden drum made of tanned goatskin. The use of *bandir* in Sufi group ritual performance was originally started by the Arusiyyah Sufi Order, established by the Libyan Sufi scholar, Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-Asmar al-Faitoory (1455-1575 CE). *Naubat* is a kettledrum, said to be used since the 16th century by drummers of the palaces of the Hindu kingdoms. The *shanshar* compliments the *naubat* beat sound. The QN adopted the use of *bandir* in its mosque-based weekly group ritual and it eventually became its defining hallmark and a potent mobilizing tool, especially for the youth. For information on *naubat*, see R. Flora, "Styles of the Sahnai in Recent Decades: From Naubat to Gayakiang", *Year Book for Traditional Music*, 27 (1995), pp. 52-75.

[82] L. Meintjes, *Sound of Africa!: Making Music Zulu in a Sound African Studio* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003) and S. Feld, *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics and Song in Kaluli Expression* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2012).

[83] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya*", p. 5.

believed to be the grandson of Shaykh Abdullahi Gwandu or Abdullahi Dan Fodio (d. 1828),[84] the brother and close associate of the Shehu Usmna bn Fodio, the 19th century founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. Mallam Yusuf Abdullahi Makwarari of Makwarar quarters, Baban Asibiti of Magashi quarters and Mallam Garba Tudun Nufawa were positioned at the back, while Nasiru Kabara was flanked in the middle. The order of placement therefore reflects the history and religious allegiance in the *Maukibi* processional ranking. In what Knut Jacobsen calls 'social hierarchies,[85] tension would arise between members, vying for better positions within the procession. Examining the Khumbha Mela procession of Southern India, the largest procession festival in the world, Lochtefeld notes that while "such festivals would have attracted ascetics as important religious occasions", they also serve "as opportunities to display status" and "seek patronage".[86] In this sense, the display of an elaborate organization style by different *halqa* groups displays their status of affluence and level of commitment in the movement.

One positive step was the greater visibility of women. Women, often elderly women, followed from behind under the leadership of the *Darwisha* Laraba from Marmara quarters, the pioneer woman *muqaddam*.[87] The participation of women in the *Maukibi* procession marked an important development in women's participation in public collective (religious) gatherings in northern Nigeria. It is important to note that *Darwisha* Laraba was the pioneer woman *muqaddam* who first led the women's team during the *Maukibi* procession in the 1950s. Later more women were involved who took over part of her responsibilities.[88] Nasiru Kabara noted the participation in the *Maukibi* procession of the "old women" and of female students of *Islamiyya* schools[89] from 1962.[90] The bulk of these students were deployed from *Ma'ahad al-Deen* Gwale, a primary *Islamiyya* school founded by Nasiru Kabara in 1956, and other students

[84] Abdullahi Dan Fodio was a blood brother to the Shehu Usman and one of the leaders of the 19th century Sokoto Jihad. Abdullahi was a renowned Islamic scholar who contributed substantially to the intellectual tradition of the Sokoto Caliphate. His works remained reference points in many later works on the intellectualism of the Caliphate, sources of legal jurisprudence, Arabic literary tradition and other socio-economic matters. For details on the intellectual life of Abdullahi Dan Fodio, see: Abdullahi Aliu Gwandu, "Abdullahi B. Gwandu as a Muslim Jurist" (PhD Diss., University of Durham, 1977).

[85] K. A. Jacobsen, "Introduction: Religion on Display", in K. A. Jacobsen, ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 9.

[86] J. G. Lochtefeld, "Getting in Line: The Kumbha Mela Festival Processions", in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 32.

[87] *Kano A Yau*, Vol. 1, No. 6. September (1996), p. 6.

[88] See appendix I for the list of some of the women.

[89] *Islamiyya* schools are schools that operate on a format that combines elements of the traditional curriculum and the Western model. Islamic and Arabic studies dominate the school's themes and perspectives. English is taught as a subsidiary subject. The schools usually use the local language of the community where the schools are located as their language of instruction for easy comprehension. Reports show that "two-thirds of the pupils are girls". See for example, "ESSPIN briefing note BN4.3, 'Islamiyya Qur'anic and Tsangaya Education", www.esspin.org/esspin-documentation/briefing-notes/note-8-Islamiyya-Quranic-and-TsangayaEducation (Accessed 23 February, 2020).

[90] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Mawakib al-Qadiriyya*", p. 4.

drawn from community-based *Islamiyya* schools (including the 'night' *Islamiyya* schools, or schools that operated during the evening hours from 6-9 pm. They were mostly administered by Nasiru Kabara's disciples. These disciples, in most cases, served as classroom teachers and the Head Teachers of the said schools. These students used the *Maukibi* space to perform the songs they were taught at the *Islamiyya*. Growth then of the procession can also be attributed to the number of students indoctrinated with QN principles. While they keep the people entertained, this performance became a distinguishing role with which they had been identified with and set the precedence for the later generation of *Islamiyya* schools pupils to emulate at the *Maukibi* fair. This tradition is maintained to date.

Other *halqas* members follow the procession. There is relative freedom in terms of mode of dress, number of participants, number of *bandir*, and gender distribution. The mode of organization has thus become more inclusive, yet still hierarchical based on religious allegiance. While each *halqa* adopts its own model, it is expected to operate under the instruction of their *Muqaddam* and *Shawish*.[91]

Despite the issues which arose between members, oral tradition suggests that Nasiru Kabara made his intention behind the establishment of the procession very clear. "Do not differentiate between public routes and the mosques. Invoke the names of God on the street as much as you do in the mosques".[92] There is a clear call for the sacralization of public space, which is one of the impacts processions make over their locality. In his study on procession of Mailam village of India, Pierre-Yves Trouillet has postulated the way in which "procession[s] sacralize the village locality" through negotiation with the 'goddess' and the 'evil forces' that pose danger to the community.[93] While it is not explicit that the invoking of the name of God during the moments of *Maukibi* is meant to fight 'evil forces', the QN believe that 'divine' blessings cover the territorial space trekked during the *Maukibi*. This space therefore has significant symbolic meaning.

[91] See appendix I for the names of the *Shawish* of Kabara from 1950s-1970s.
[92] Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Isa Makwarari, by the author at Makwarari quarters (Mallam Yusuf Makwarari's mosque) in November, 2019. This narrative resonates intermittently in all interviews I had with different QN members.
[93] P. Trouillet, "Mapping the Management of Threatening Gods and Social Conflict: A Territorial Approach to Processions in a South Indian Village (Tamil Nadu)", in K. A. Jacobsen ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 46.

2.4.2 Routes and Spatial Significance of the *Maukibi* Procession

As far as the routes being followed are concerned (as Map I shows), the cortège first departs Kabara and crosses what is now Abdullahi Wase Street into Soron Dinki ward via Makwarari to Kwanar Goda down to Koki quarters. It reaches Kofar Mazugal, one of the northern city gates, across Katsina road and finally ends at Maigiginya cemetery or Kanzul Mudalsam Friday Mosque. On the return leg, while leaving the Maigiginya cemetery, the procession moves across Katsina road into Koki quarters, taking a turn at Bakin Zuwo junction up to Kwanar Dala. Jakara was the next point before proceeding to Kwanar Goda, Alfindiki right back to Kabara.

As a spatially oriented event, the *Maukibi* processional route was strategically mapped to pay respect to those who made significant contributions to the social formation of Nasiru Kabara and/or those considered saintly. Nasiru Kabara, for example, used to pause at Soron Dinki quarters to pray for the Lagwanawa family at whose school he studied the Qur'an, and at Madatai quarters for the tomb of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Zaghaiti, the head of the Wangarawa (Dyula) scholarly missionary who were credited with the introduction of Islam to Kano in the 14th century. He then proceeded to pray for the *Wali* (saint) *Maikurna* at Kurna (of Makwarari quarters), the grandfather of Kundila, one of the legendary business tycoons of Kano. Prayer was offered at Gabari/'Yandoya quarters and Darma quarters to Shaykh Bilqasim and Wali Maifarar Kasa, respectively. The prayer to Mai Farar Kasa was read concurrently with recognizing the sanctity of *Sharifai*, the claimed descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. At a point in between Koki and Kofar Mazugal quarters, Nasiru Kabara prayed for the late Mallam Atmana and recognized other saints at Madabo quarters.[94] Moreover, flags and banners were installed at the crossroads and on the walls of houses to provide directions. Locating the saints and the people of importance to Kabara reinforced the continued expression of the culture of veneration of saints for which the *Maukibi* was primarily introduced.

Maigiginya cemetery – which had, since 1954, been the final destination for the *Maukibi* processions – is associated with saint mystification. The Maigiginya cemetery, located on Katsina Road, 5 km east of Aminu Kano International Airport, was said to have been founded by one Mallam Shuaibu *Maimayayin Ilimi* as late as the 1760s. The site was originally his homestead and when he died, he was buried there. A *Giginya* (Arecaceae) tree grows next to his tomb to which the cemetery owes its name. While oral accounts believe Mallam Shuaibu to be of 'saintly status' worth veneration, no account on him was found in the plethora of

[94] Interview with Alhaji Isa Abdullahi Makwarari by the author at Makwarari (Mallam Yusuf Makwarari's mosque) in November, 2019.

intellectual biographies of the Kano *Ulama'* and saints.[95] A passing remark on his biographical data was found in the pamphlet "*Jala' al-Basr*" by Nasiru Kabara in which mention was made that "he was a north African" and one of the associates of Mallam Kabara.[96] Because of the belief in his saintly charisma, many of Mallam Shuaibu's contemporaries aspired to have their graves dug next to him. In tandem with this aspiration for saintly charisma, Mallam Kabara was said to have left a will that he should be buried on that site.[97] Consequently, most of the QN Shaykhs, including Nasiru Kabara and others from the Kabara family have been buried there. Thus, the ostensive appropriation of the cemetery space by mostly the QN members seems to breed a popular assumption that the Maigiginya cemetery belongs to the Kabara family.

Ziyara (paying homage to the gravesite of Mallam Umar Kabara and Shaykh Ibrahim al-Kuwaye) is one of the rituals conducted at Maigiginya. The *ziyara* was expected to illicit feelings of devotional piety, emotional attachment, and veneration.[98] While these attributes are considered to be parts of the standing etiquette of *ziyara* of a saint in Sufi tradition, the state of mind paves the way and prepares one to receive the spiritual flow of the *baraka* and the '*praesentia* of the saint'.[99] Upon reaching the cemetery, the pageant was led towards the tomb of Mallam Kabara where "*reverentia*"[100] is displayed: Nasiru Kabara would lead the prayer at the tomb. The tomb is thus flanked from all directions. Selected disciples of Nasiru Kabara and other *muqaddamun* were arranged at the front then followed by other participants. The *shawish* might not be able to enforce strict principles of seniority as the crowd flocks in to position themselves at one point within the cemetery or the other. A eulogy and intercessory poem titled "*A Yaa Shehu Faruku Nazo Gareka*…" (Oh Shaykh! I am here for you …), is read collectively at the tomb. This poem, composed by Nasiru Kabara in Hausa language (using *Ajami* system of writing[101]), points to his determination to internalize the required feeling as well as to arouse

[95] See for example I. A. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (PhD Diss., Cambridge University, 1975); A. Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity: The Ulama in Kano", (M.A Diss., University of Maiduguri, 1989) and M. S. Umar, "Muslim Intellectual Responses to British Colonialism in Northern Nigeria, 1903-1945" (PhD Diss., Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1997).

[96] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/002: Kabara, "*Jala' al-Basar*", p. 17.

[97] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November 2019.

[98] L. Takim, "Charismatic Appeal or *Communitas*? Visitation to the Shrines of the Imam", *Journal of Ritual Studies*, 18, No. 2, (2004), pp. 106-120.

[99] Takim, "Charismatic Appeal or Communitas?", p. 109.

[100] According to Peter Brown (1982), *reverentia* (or reverence) means "a willingness to focus on invisible persons…in such a way as to commit the believer to define rhythms in his life (such as the observation of the holy days of the saints), or to direct his attention to specific sites and objects (the shrines and relics of the saints)". P. Brown, *The Cult of Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), p. 119.

[101] *Ajami* simply means writing the local language using Arabic script. This writing style stands as a "locally conventional literacy". It was extensively used in northern Nigeria as an official system of writing in courts of law, at schools, in transactions up to the 1930s before it was eventually supplanted by the English language. For some

the devotional piety which is required to be nursed and performed while visiting the saints' tombs. An analysis of the poem being recited will further highlight the intricate connection of the content of the poem, the Maigiginya cemetery, and the broader culture of saint veneration that the activities symbolize as a whole.

The poem (see **appendix X** for the text of the poem) contains fifty stanzas. It is included in the 'market edition'[102] of Nasiru Kabara's collection of Hausa poems in *Ajami.* The poem is thematically divided into four parts. The first part contains a sketch note on the descendants of Mallam Kabara while the second part discusses Timbuktu and its fame in terms of scholarship, trade, Sufism, and cosmopolitanism. The themes highlighted in first and second parts cover the first ten stanzas. Mallam Kabara's ancestral stock, his ascetic lifestyle, his contact with the Shehu Usman b. Fodio at Agadez, his subsequent migration to Kano and the events that transpired, as well as a few of his "miracles" are analyzed in the third part which runs from the 11th to the 30th stanzas. The last part of the poem dwells on the outline of names of the associates or disciples and children of Mallam Kabara. They are mentioned in the following order: Muhammad Nasamu, Shuaibu Maimayayin Ilimi (associate), Usman Zabi (secretary), Shehu Kayu, Shehu Maizaure, Shehu Maishirayi, Shehu Ibrahim, Mallam Ahmadu (grandson), Nana Mallama (daughter), Nasir al-Deen, Shehu Bature, Mallam Muhammadu (son), Dan Maiyaki, Shehu Abdullahi, and Mallama Bilkisu (granddaughter). All these figures were laid to rest at the cemetery. The significance of this order is to demonstrate the status of each figure in connection to the celebrant, Mallam Kabara.

The content of the poem, as analysed, represents an appeal to the charismatic intercession of the figures laid down there. More importantly, it frames Mallam Kabara as the saint who embodied divinely *baraka*, capable of dispensing what Goolam Vahed calls "a supernatural power of divine origin".[103] The performance of the *ziyara* was swift and a simple affair. No canopy or podium. Nasiru Kabara wanted his followers to follow a path of spiritual purification, devotion and piety through repetitious calling out of God's name and intercession by 'holy' men.

Despite the performance of the *bandir* along with songs which regenerates the feeling of entertainment, the Islamiyya girls' and women's participation, the social hierarchy in the

details on the *Ajami* system of writing, see F. M. Laughlin, "Ajami Writing Practices in Atlantic-Speaking Africa" in F. Lupke, ed. *The Atlantic Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[102] The phrase "market edition" was coined by John Hunwick in his article "Accessing the Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Africa" as cited in A. Brigaglia, "Central Sudanic Africa Script (Part I): The Popularization of the Kanawi Script", *Islamic Africa*, 2, No. 2 (2011), pp. 51-85.

[103] G. H. Vaheed, "A Sufi Saint's Day in South Africa: The Legend of Badsha Peer", *South African Historical Journal,* 49, No. 1 (2009), pp. 96-122.

mode of organization, the *Maukibi* event remained largely a Sufi-motivated rituality inspired by saints' veneration and guided by the appeal for *baraka*. Identity formation and rejuvenation of the QN are embedded in the exercise of the ritual. The ritual became more ceremonialized from 1980. This was seen in the introduction of festive-oriented programmes such as invitation cards, invitation letters for foreign guests, state officials, security personnel, politicians, businessmen, production of posters, using chariot, and formation of militia guards etc.

2.4.3 Development of the *Maukibi,* 1980 – 1996: Consolidation and Ceremonialization

1980 was important in the transformation of the *Maukibi* not only in the way it was organized and performed but also the archiving of official QN documentation. This is attributed to the re-organization of the secretariat after Mallam Abdulganiy Nabulisi succeeded Mallam Usman Gwale. Although Abdulganiy Nabulisi claims the *Maukibi* organization had started to 'modernise' since 1970 under the first secretary,[104] there are virtually no records for the decade 1970-1980 with the exception of a single pamphlet written by Nasiru Kabara.

There was a shift in the mode of organization, the cost and the performance of the ritual. The mode of conduct of the event now accommodated elements of "a fair with the ecstatic spirituality of Sufism".[105] This shift can be discerned by looking at the newly introduced programs which were characteristic of an elaborate religious festival. The terms 'ceremony' and 'festivity' reflect the shift from spiritual to ceremonial procession.

Part of the new vision to 'modernize' the *Maukibi* was to introduce a more elaborate programme of events. A forty-member Central Organizing Committee (COC) was formed. The members of the COC are all QN adherents drawn from across mosques within Kano metropolis:

[104] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/003: A. S. Nabulusi, "*Tsarabar Maulidin Qadiriyya A* Kano Nigeria Na 63 A 1435/2014", p. 3.
[105] S. Schielke, "Hegemonic Encounters: Criticism of Saints-Day Festivals and the Formation of Modern Islam in Late 19th and 20th Century Egypt", *Die Welt des Islams*, 47, No. 3/4, (2007), pp. 319-355.

Table 2.1

Pioneer members of the COC for the *Maukibi*

	Name	Status		Name	Status
1	Shaykh Nasiru Kabara	Chairman	21	Shawish Nuhu Dirimin Iya	M
2	Bashiru Kabara (Shehun Halqa)	M	22	Sani Abdullahi Tofa	M
3	Sulaiman Hausawa	M	23	Shehu Nuraini Kabara	M
4	Baba Magashi	M	24	Yunusa Na Dala	M
5	Abbasu Magashi	M	25	Mu'azzam Nasiru Kabara	M
6	Sani Sabon Sara	M	26	Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara	M
7	Abdulkadir Makwarari	M	27	Isa Abdullahi Makwarari	M
8	Amirul Madihina Koki	M	28	Shuaibu Mukhtar Mak	M
9	Bunya Makwarari	M	29	Sharu Bala Gabari	M
10	Hamidu Kabara	M	30	Sabo Danbatta	M
11	Shawish Inuwa Kabara	M	31	Yusuf Sulaiman Tofa	M
12	Sharif Auwalu Kabara	M	32	Salisu Mai Shayi	M
13	Yaroro Kabara	M	33	Lawan S. Ladanai	M
14	Salisu Muhammad Kabara	M	34	Ashiru Sudawa	M
15	Mahmuda Wafa Kabara	M	35	Hamisu Makwarari	M
16	Shawish Uba Magashi	M	36	Shuaibu R. Biyu	M
17	Ali Ibrahim Kabara	M	37	Hamza Sule Yelwa	M
18	Datti Magashi	M	38	Ali Ahmad C. Makama	M
19	Haruna Ahmadu Kabara	M	39	Usman Ishaq Gwale	Secretary

20	Shawish Gwadabe Kabara	M	40	Abdulganiy Nabulisi	Ass. Secretary

Source: QN-SEC-DOCSEC/003: A. S. Nabulusi, "*Tsarabar Maulidin Qadiriyya A* Kano Nigeria Na 63 A 1435/2014", pp. 8-9.

All recommendations of the COC had to be endorsed by Nasiru Kabara, the Chairman of the Committee. Membership into the COC and the sub-committees was determined by a self-demonstration of commitment by a disciple or by recommendation from the Advisory Committee (AC), made up of the most senior disciples. The AC had the following members: Yusuf Abdullahi Makwarari, Ibrahim Makwarari, Abbas Magashi (Baban Asibiti), Bashiru Kabara (Shehun Halqa), Sharif Bala, Isa Abdullahi Makwarari, Umaru Trader Bakin Zuwo, Shuaibu Mukhtar Makwarari, Shehu Kabara Nuraini and Sulaiman Hausawa.[106]The pre-*Maukibi* preparations were the primary task of the COC. They were expected to establish sub-committees for the decentralization of responsibilities; ensure effective peace and security and proper management of the crowd; organize a programme that would ensure that prayer (noon and middle) times would be adhered to; integrate the *muqaddams* of the QN into the mainstream authority of the movement; form youth societies which would produce the next generation of leaders; formalize the invitation list; make provisions for logistics for international participants; ensure adequate media coverage of the event; and ensure that the ground at the Maigiginya is secured, cleaned and organized for the event.

The COC met four to six times every year prior to the *Maukibi*. The above outlined issues, among others, dominated the agendas of the meetings and recurred yearly throughout the period 1980-1996. The sub-committees were formed based on specific assignments for decentralization of responsibility. Membership of the committees changed over time but not their duties. In 1989, twelve sub-committees were formed: Publicity, Guests reception & welfare, Logistics, Provision of chairs and carpet rugs, Food, Sanitation and cleanness, Production of invitation cards, Beautifying the *Gidan* Qadiriyya and the *Maukibi* ground, Sound system, Security, Processional routes, and Headcount of the participants.[107]

The processional routes did not change but the hierarchical order was changed and size of procession accompanying Nasiru Kabara increased. Abdullahi of Danbatta and Aliyu Sakarma of Kiru had not been re-positioned but were pushed a little ahead of Nasiru Kabara in order to co-opt the *Muraqqa'a*[108] team (Mt) who were formed in 1968. *Shuj'an al-Islam* (SI),

[106] Schielke, "Hegemonic Encounters", p. 52.
[107] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/004: 'The Report of the Maukibi of 1989'.
[108] *Muraqqa'a* literally means "patched robe". In the context of Sufi tradition, it implies a humble mode of dress which is characterized by an extremely simple, at times tattered, appearance. This meaning is deployed in the

"heroes of Islam", were also formed few years later. While the *Muraqqa'a* team (Mt) were drawn from the youth of the *halqas* of Kabara and the environs, the SI were a group of 'repentant' armed *Yandaba* (gangs) who wree said to have offered themselves to Nasiru Kabara to serve as voluntary 'security' men in the public activities of the QN.[109]

The formation of the SI was connected to urban violence in Kano during the 1970s and 1980s that caused mainly by the activities of the '*Yandaba* which led to civil unrest. As a religious leader, Nasiru Kabara intervened and was able to mediate between warring factions of the *Yandaba* gangs by inviting them to his residence to forge rapproachment. According to Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara, some of them were supposedly convinced to disarm and 'repent'. [110] Consequently, they were re-named '*Shuj'an al-Islam'* and were initiated into the QN and eventually became devout disciples of the movement.

From 1980 to 1996, the number of SI rose to 70 and both Mt and SI were claimed to have played an important role in checking for disorder and irregularities on the processional routes and the *Maukibi* ground.[111] This was necessary as the number of participants grew. The number of flag bearers, for example, further expanded the size of the entourage of Nasiru Kabara. Earlier, flag bearers were drawn from within the *halqa* of Kabara under the leadership of Bashiru Shehun Halqa. Each *halqat* was initially asked to send two flag bearers. In later developments, the permanent flag bearers were restricted to members from five *halqa* – Dambatta, Dawakin Kudu, Gano, Getso, and Karaye. This practice had been maintained over time, though, it seems, a number of *halqat* had penetrated the ranks and took over the job from the five designated *halqas* mentioned. As of 1990, there were 43 flag bearers, as **appendix III** shows. The addition of a further twenty groups of *halqa* indicated more shifts in the re-organization, especially of the Nasiru Kabara's entourage which formed the core of the *Maukibi* procession leadership.[112] It is important to note that the accompaniment of Nasiru Kabara's entourage to the *Maukibi* ground is voluntary.

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context of the *Maukibi* to refer to a team in the court of Nasiru Kabara who wear multiple strips of colored robe as the '*Yan muraqqa'a*.

[109] Interview with Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara by the author at his office in Ma'ahad al-Deen Primary School, Gwale in November 2019.

[110] Interview with Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara, November 2019.

[111]Interview with Mallam Qasiyuni Nasiru Kabara and interview with Mallam Abdulganiy Sulaiman Nabulis by the author at the QN secretariat in February 2020. For the 70 names of the "repentant thugs", see QN-SEC-DOCSEC/003: A. S. Nabulusi, "*Tsarabar Maulidin Qadiriyya A* Kano Nigeria Na 63 A 1435/2014", QNS-DS, pp. 7-8.

[112] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/004: "The Report of the Maukibi of 1989".

Similarly, a new form of transportation was secured for Nasiru Kabara. A car had now replaced a horse, as the Shaykh grew older.[113] This could also be a symbolic demonstration of prestigious religious performance which portrayed more the ceremonial mode of the event. Spectators along the processional routes complained that they could not make a personal connection with Kabara with this new mode of transportation. He was once again placed on a horse on the return journey of the procession. Tracey Heatherington (1999) frames the ceremonial practice of riding a horse in the processional performances in Central Sardinian as part of "the aroma of festival". She notes that "The horses are adorned with colorful, walked halters and bells, and the streets resound with hoofbeets and jingling as the two riders accelerate, climax and slow".[114] These shifts added to the ceremonial pomp of the *Maukibi* procession.

As the leader aged, new adaptations had to be made. In 1988, a pick-up was hired at the rate of one hundred naira (US$21 equivalent at the time). The truck's boot was converted to an open-chariot. This eventually made the appearance of Nasiru Kabara more public and substituted horse and the saloon car. For more space, and perhaps for prestige, a wheeled wooden bed (metaphorically called *Arsh Bilqees* or the "Throne of the Queen of Sheba") was locally manufactured to be drawn by the pick-up truck. It was elaborately decorated with a carpet, cushion chair, a mounted canopy, and a standing fan, while flags were installed on the sides.[115] Hence, the *Arsh Bilqees* had remained the preferred mode of transportation for the Shaykh, and his successor, to date.

[113] Interview with Mallam Abdulganiy Nabulisi by the author at the QN secretariat in January, 2020. Nabulisi told the author that the car (a green peugeot saloon) had been provided by Mallam Yusuf Makwarari in the 1970s and early 1980s. This gesture by Yusuf Makwarari demonstrates the latter's commitment and sacrifice to the QN development for which he had since been credited with among the community of disciples and friends of Nasiru Kabara.

[114] T. Heatherington, "Street Tactics: Catholic Ritual and the Senses of the Past in Central Sardinia", *Ethnology*, 38, No. 4 (1999), pp. 315-334.

[115] Riding chariots in processional ceremonies has been practiced in many parts of the world. See for example the works of R. Sengupta, "Communal Violence in India: Perspectives on Causative Factors", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40, No. 2 (2005), pp. 2046-2050; G. Vaheed, "Contesting Meanings and Authenticity: Indian Islam and Muharram 'Performances' in Durban, 2002", *Journal of Ritual Studies*, 19, No. 2 (2005), pp. 129-145; and P. J. Chelkowski, "From the Sun-Scorched Desert of Iran to the Beaches of Trinidad: Ta'ziyeh's Journey from Asia to Caribbean", *TDR*, 49, No. 4, (2005), pp. 156-169.

Figure 2.2 (A & B) Nasiru Kabara while riding on horseback and the *Arsh Bilqees* being flanked by *Shawish* saluting the spectators. The horseback image is the oldest, taken in the early 1970s. The chariot replaced a Peugeot saloon in the 1980s. **Source**: QN-SEC-DOCSEC/004.

2.4.3 The *Maukibi* Procession and Securing the Space

The *Shuj'an Islam* was deployed to secure space for the smooth passage of Nasiru Kabara's ensemble on the processional routes. Essentially, as highlighted above, the intervention of the SI in securing the *Maukibi* was to counter the tendency of the '*Yandaba* violence, whose activities were on the increase in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, there were a few cases of the '*Yandaba* inter-factional conflicts that had often disrupted the processional cortège at the crossroads.[116] The assaults left a few participants injured and many dispersed.[117] But the heightened need for security was also the result of a natural phenomenon in 'festivals' and 'rituals'. Lil Kong, for example, notes, that "because [processions] tend towards 'spectacular', the potential for conflict is heightened. As events which attract crowds", he adds, "the possibility of violence and aggression is real, as experience in many countries reminds us".[118] Hotspots earmarked by COC included Makwarari-Madatai, Gabari, 'Yan Mota,

[116] There are many works on *'Yadaba* or "urban gangs" in Kano. Some of the works situate the menace in the context of economic inequality and identity crises, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. For details, see Z. Yau, "The Youth, Economic Crisis and Identity Transformation: The Case of the Yandaba in Kano", in Attahiru Jega, ed. *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria* (Sweden & Kano: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and Centre for Research and Documentation, 2000); Baffa U. Aliyu, "Urban Gangs ('*Yan Daba*) and Security in Kano State: A Review of Trends and Challenges", Abdalla A. Adamu ed. Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: *Past, Present, and Future* (Proceedings on the National Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria Organized by the Kano State Emirate Council to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD, as the Emir of Kano October 1963- October 2003), pp. 326 – 338.

[117] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in November 2019.

[118] L. Kong, "Religious Procession: Urban Politics and Poetics", *The Finnish Society for the Study of Religion, Temenos*, 41, No. 2 (2005), pp. 225-249. See also K. A. Jacobsen, ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: : Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008); S. McDowell *et al*., "Spacing Commemorative-Related Violence in Northern Ireland: Assessing the Implications for a Society in Transition", *Space and Polity*, 19, No. 3 (2015), pp. 231-243; V. Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within*

Bakin-Zuwo junctions, the Koki (Friday congregational prayer) mosque, Mazugal gate, the Maigiginya (Friday congregational prayer) mosque, the groundnut ground (*Filin Gyada*), pilgrim camp junction, Dala-Dambazau-Jakara axis, Goda joint, Mandawari junction and the *Gidan* Qadiriyya.[119] As a result, an 'advanced team' was dispatched to survey whether or not these paths on the processional track would be safe for passage.[120] There was also a concern about the increased visibility of the 'security force' and what their presence might illicit amongst participants and spectators. A debate unfolded in 1980 between the COC and Nasiru Kabara over the feasibility of allowing both the SI and Mt to carry sticks, canes and swords on the *Maukibi* day. The adorning of these items was an essential element to identify those in charge of peace and security.[121]The debate and the action taken reveals the imperative of securing the *Maukibi* space even if such a presence might incite unease amongst participants.

Similarly, the uniform of SI and Mt defined their 'regiment': the SI wear a green smock ('*yar shara*) and buffalo plaid hunter (*habar kada*) cap, while Mt wear green-red-orange robe, *habar kada*, a bunch of beads round their necks, and the girding belt (*karraba*). While both SI and Mt appear in distinctive attire because of the task they serve, there is a symbolism behind both the color and the style of their garb.[122] According to the QN, the SI and Mt's uniform reflects that Sufi tradition which exemplifies the lifestyle of classical Sufi icons. The colors each represent a specific Sufi tradition. The green represents the Qadiriyya, the red represents the Rufaiyya Brotherhood (originally founded by Ahmad al-Rufai, d. 1183), while the black symbolizes the Dasuqiyya Brotherhood (originally founded by Ibrahim al-Dasuqi, d. 1296).[123] This further demonstrates the trans-brotherhood representation of the *Maukibi* processional event. It also clearly identifies those in charge of security but at the same time it adds to the colourful aroma of the ceremony.

Islam Will Shape the Future (New York-London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006); J. S. Blake, *Contentious Rituals: Parading the Nation in Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[119] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005: "Areas Need Intensive Security Measures on Maukibi-Day".

[120] Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Isa Makwarari, by the author at Makwarari (Mallam Yusuf Makwarari's mosque) in November 2019.

[121] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/004: 'The Report of the Maukibi of 1980'.

[122] See for example, Eyad Abuali, "Clothing and Investiture in Medieval Sufism", In L. Ridgeon ed. *Routledge Handbook on Sufism* (Routledge, 2020) pp. 316-329.

[123] For conception of color in Sufi tradition, see Idries Trevathan, "From Texts to Tiles: Sufi Colour Conceptualization in Safavid Persia", In C. N. Duckworth and A. E. Sassin eds. *Colour and Light in Ancient and Medieval Art* (Routledge, 2018), pp. 184-194.

Fig. 2.3: A recent photograph of a cross-section of the Mt

Source: QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005

A more formalized process of securing the *Maukibi* had begun with the involvement of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). It resonates in the narratives of the QN leadership that they had long recognized the significance of the NPF and engaged them particularly in playing a supportive role in securing the *Maukibi*. Unfortunately, no records of correspondence had been documented between the parties in the 1960s and 1970s.[124] There is, however, a letter written on 12 February, 1981 which was addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Kano Command. The letter was specific about the size of the police presence required, 20-60 police both mounted and otherwise. According to the letter, the police were meant to accompany the rally from the point of departure, Kabara, to the Maigiginya sanctuary, keeping with the procession and the crowd through the day.[125] The letter served different purposes: it informed the police of the enactment of the *Maukibi*, sought permission, and requested their intervention. The pattern of the letters to the NPF was maintained over the subsequent years (1981-1986) but these letters were silent on specifying the number of police required. From 1986, permission was also sought from the Security Division of the Government House (of Kano) and the Director of Security, National Security Organization (NSO). This points to the involvement of more formal security institutions and formalization of the organization of the event.

Generally, it appears that the interaction between the NPF and religious groups in northern Nigeria is determined by the orientation of the religious groups. Religious groups that had been deemed 'peaceful', such as the QN, received a positive reply from the police. The relation between the NPF and the QN could be considered fruitful in terms of the police approving their request, the deployment of police personnel, and their monitoring of the

[124] Interview with Mallam Abdulganiy Nabulisi by the author at the QN secretariat in January 2020.
[125] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005.

progression of the march. Although the NPF, as the records show, did not (and do not) always approve the number of the police personnel being requested, this is based on the availability of the police manpower.[126]

Studies on the nature of the police monitoring of processional marches vary from one context to another. For example, Pnina Werbner (1996) points out that the Sufi processional matches of what she calls 'the British Muslims' in London in the 1980s had the "English policemen" walk "in front of the procession and flanking it on either side… follow the march, redirecting the traffic and clearing the way ahead of the marchers".[127] The case with the *Maukibi* is different perhaps because of the overwhelming size of the crowd and the small size of the police team. However, on the occasions when the *Maukibi* was temporarily 'suspended' or when its spatiality was 'restricted' for 'security reasons', the executive order of the Governor (executive or military) to that effect is communicated to the QN.[128]

At the *Maukibi* ground, a sort of a networked operational tactic is developed between the SI, Mt, and the police on the one hand, and the vigilante group and the police on the other. In the event of a crime that requires arrest, the tactic is carried out by any of the four supporting/monitoring groups who then hand the 'criminal' to the police, who in turn take him to the police station for appropriate action. An informant portrays the pattern of the activities of miscreant elements at the *Maukibi* ground over time:

> Thugs sneak through the crowd to the *Maukibi* ground. They do situate themselves in the peripheral strips of the area, usually lurking in the nearby uncompleted buildings or mechanic garages. They engage in smoking weeds and other toxic substances. The active patrol of the vigilante groups— a community-based monitoring team— play a role in checking those unscrupulous activities of the thugs. A handful of them are often caught while indulging in illicit acts such as pick pocketing, intimidating the girls in attendance or threatening them using or unleashing sharpened implements to rob people of their valuables. The apprehension of the thug elements is part of the massive security patrol strategy that the combination of the services of the Vigilante group and the police do. When they are apprehended, they are being taken to the leadership of the available security body of the aforementioned for mild punishment ranging from flogging to temporary detention. For this reason, spots considered flashpoints are particularly earmarked for quick security action.[129]

The concerns around security appear to be quite normative and unrelated to religious affiliation. Security surveillance was restricted to navigating large crowds and ensuring the

[126] Discussion with police officers at the Security Investigation Bureau (SIB), Kano state police command. They preferred to remain anonymous.
[127] P. Werbner, "Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: *Ziikr* and the Sacralizing of Space among British Muslims", *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1996), pp. 309-338.
[128] This is an aspect of the theme of chapter four.
[129] The author's field observation, and Interview with Mallam Abdulganiy Nabulisi, by the author at the QN secretariat in January 2020.

safety of participants. It was also of concern should any high-profile delegates attend the ceremony.

2.4.4 Formalization of the Invitation

There was an open invitation to participate in the *Maukibi* irrespective of religious affiliation. But there were invitation cards that meant to recognize selected members of political, business, and religious elites. The invitation cards (IV) were also extended to foreign guests. Thus, invitation cards were printed from 1985 onwards. Records at the QN secretariat has shown that the first IV was designed in 1985 by Ibrahim Mu'azzam, the elder son of Nasiru Kabara, and printed copies were produced based on the design.[130] (A copy of the IV card is available, see **appendix IV**). The IV was partly handwritten in Arabic. The other part contained the transliteration and translation of the Arabic inscription into Hausa, using Roman script. The IV was simple, outlining only the four set of normative activities: reading the text on al-Jilani; the closure of the *Maulid* session; *Halqat al-Kubra*; and the *Maukibi* processional ceremony as the *grand finale*. It marks a stark contrast to the informality that had characterized the mode of invitation in the events prior to 1985, which had been based on dissemination of information either through a state-owned radio (Radio Kano AM/FM) or verbally at the *halqa* levels.

The captions of the IV from 1985 to 1993 carried the inscription "*Mahrijaan al-Qadiriyya*" (the Festival of the Qadiriyya) or "*Maulidin Qadiriyya*" (the saint-day of the Qadiriyya). The phrases referred to the general activities that had taken place in commemoration of the birthday of al-Jilani, the processional ritual inclusive. This changed in 1994, when the term "*Maukibi*" (procession) replaced the earlier captions which encapsulated all the religious activities of the day. errands carried symbolic images of the *Ka'aba* (the black cubic structure of the Great Mosque at Mecca that is being circumblated by Muslim pilgrims), a hawk holding an envelope with its beak, *bandir*, flying flags fixed over two pillars crossed together, the main gate of the *Gidan* Qadiriyya, the mausoleum of al-Jilani and a painting depicting Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani standing behind a crouching lion (see **appendices V & VI**). These images had been appearing in alternating manner across the period under review. Photographs eventually supplanted these images. The IV booklet of 1991 was produced with the photograph of Nasiru Kabara while performing *bandir zikr* in one of the QN sessions. This arguably signifies the way in which the processional and ceremonial pomp overshadowed the

[130] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005.

significant traditional spiritual elements. It also attests to broader brotherly bonds being articulated on the invitations' as well as guests and 'official' (*Shawish* or errands) - tags.

From 1991 to 2017, production of the *Maukibi* IV booklet with a photograph on its cover became a defining feature for the ceremony. Along with Nasiru Kabara's photograph that was posted on the cover of the booklet, other invited guests' photographs appeared in subsequent pages arranged according to the status of honour ascribed to each. As the pattern appears, photographs of the invited guests, especially those with distinctive regional Sufi influence, were put next to Nasiru Kabara. For example, the IV booklet of 1993 carried the portrait of Shaykh Hassan b. Muhammad al-Fatih Qaribullah, the leader of the Sammaniyya Brotherhood in Sudan. Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayyib b. al-Fatih Qaribullah from Sudan and Shaykh Hazim Nayif Abu Gazalah from Jordan were given the positions of the "Great Scholars" in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Often, the honour was distinguished by giving titles to the guests such as the "Father of the Day", "Special Guest of Honour", "Guest Speaker". Dr. Ahmad Muhammad al-Sharif, the leader of the Islamic Call Society from Libya was honoured in 1996 as the "Special Guest of Honour". In 1999, Assayyid Muhammad b. Alawi al-Maliki from Saudi Arabia was honoured as the "Special Guest of Honour". The local guests also enjoyed similar receptions and honours especially as the government officials became more involved in the ceremony.[132]

The configuration of the 'sacred' images and photographs, especially of the regional Sufi leaders who are invariably considered 'saints', helped produce a sacred impression of the *Maukibi* itself. The branding of the *Maukibi* as *Waliyya* (saints) is evidence to that effect. The impact of the IV could be claimed to be seen in the increase of the annual participants. By 1985, 150,000 people took part in the festivities in stark contrast to 30,000 in 1963.[133]

2.5 Conclusion

Challenged with a scant archive, this chapter has attempted to trace the historical development of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya and the *Maukibi* procession from 1952. An intellectual biography of Nasiru Kabara, the founder and spiritual leader of the QN, as well as the processes for the formation of the QN, has had to rely on elements of interviews with some of the Nasiru Kabara's sons, QN adherents, and few pamphlets that they produced. These sources are clearly

[132] Analysis of the *Maukibi* IV from 1991. Samples of the IVs are available at the QN secretariat, see QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005.
[133] Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change*, p. 63.

one-sided. However, the intention here is to account based on somewhat hagiographic narrative the rise of Nasiru Kabara to prominence in Sufi landscape in northern Nigeria and his legacy that transformed the QN into a vibrant and growing religious community. All religions have relied on mythmaking in some ways. Kabara is an important figure. He was a learned man, who through his studies and travels, had forged a great network of allies. From familial and patrilineal networks in Kano, he managed to crystalize some form of unity amongst a divided group of communities of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood centred around the practice of venerating saints. Sainthood seems to be a fluid concept based on direction of a spiritual leader.

From this call to revitalize and reignite a life of piety, ancient texts and saints are venerated giving rise to the establishment of the *Maukibi* procession. This was an accidental birth of a phenomenon which would come to symbolize the ceremonial practices of the QN. It has played, however, an essential role in the public display of collective commemoration by the QN adherents. It is a performative articulation of their community-based identity, it shows their strength, of size, of national and international connections, of trans-ethnicity and trans-locality. Interestingly, it attracted the attention and following of non-QN members as the *Maukibi* space, in some ways, transcends the spiritual and exhibits ceremonial and social attributes. The participants eat, greet, chat, make friends, share pleasantries, explore the environment particularly guests from other states or countries. They are entertained with the *bandir* and the *Sha'irai*, Hausa poets, often performing a eulogy of the Prophet. These performances also attract large number of participants who do not belong to any Sufi group but rather enticed by the melody of the songs and sound.

The role of the *Maukibi* in performative articulation of collective identity of the QN could be viewed from the point of *functionalist* perspective. The way in which the event pulls together the fragments sub-sets of the Qadiriyya under one umbrella, reconnects them annually and creates cohesion that transcends the visible community of the participants in the ritual, reconnecting it to a past that belongs to the broader sacred history of Islam in Kano. It functions as a way to stress not only the presence of a specific group (the QN) in the public space of today's Kano, but also its claim of being the 'true' inheritor of a broader, trans-historical community of sacred ancestors. As the procession develops, there are attempts made to change hierarchical structures and foster wider inclusivity, especially the visibility of women. However, these shifts are centred around the figure of Kabara and remain rather informal. As numbers grow and in the face of new challenges such as civil unrest, in 1980, there is a clear turning point in which the structure of the QN, the legacy which needs to be passed down and the significance of the *Maukibi*, are redrafted. Kabara retains an arguably dictatorial moratorium

on COC decisions. He does however increases the participation of youths within the structure. They form the bulk of his security forces in the absence of any larger police presence at the *Maukibi*. Security concerns do not evolve around religious tension or state repression but rather crowd control and daily acts of criminality.

The significance of the traditional religious procession, however, is somewhat diluted by the need to glamorize and internationalise the procession to such an extent that the *Maukibi* was no longer the main attraction when invitations were sent out to guests in 1994. Little has changed since Nasiru Kabara died in 1996 and was succeeded by Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara, one of his sons. This is perhaps not a question about the decisions made by a specific individual but rather reflects the ways in which processions have to be modernized and adapted. The unstable context of Nigeria, which forms the discussion of Chapter 4, may also speak to the ways in which international religious bonds of brotherhood had become even more important within the 21st century. The processions of the IMN, in stark contrast to the QN, reflect some of these observations.

Chapter Three

"Redemptive Suffering" and the Display of Collective Identity: The *Muzahara* Processions and the *Tattaki* Pilgrimage of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, 1979 – 2014

> In the public space, the processions follow routes with strong symbolic markers and put into play the concepts of place, border, space and territory.[1]

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the history, objectives, modes of organization, and the display of collective identity of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria through the performances of the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki*. The chapter situates, in historical perspective, the permutations of religious enthusiasm from 1979, the rise of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), and the introduction of IMN public religious processions as the agency for articulating collective identity in public spaces. The provenance and the motives of the rituals – both religious and secular[2] – of the *Ashura*, *Arbaeen*, Quds Day processions (referred to in the discourse of the IMN as the *Muzahara*) and *Arbaeen* symbolic trek (referred to as the *Tattaki*), and the processes of their localization will be discussed.[3] The mode of organization of the IMN's structure of community, *vis-à-vis* the structure of authority in the rituals, will be explored. This will highlight the workings of the structures in the public religiosity of the movement which will be reflected in both the *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki*.

This chapter fits into the broader debates of the politics of identity construction and articulation in post-colonial northern Nigeria. The chapter is further situated in the context of competing religious nationalisms and citizens' rights to public space. The practice of *Muzahara*

[1] Knut A. Jacobsen, ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
[2] For a discussion on the differences between religious and secular rituals, see D. Intiri, "The Politics of National Celebration in Post-Revolutionary Iran" (M.A. Dissertation, Leiden University, 2015).
[3] See Maps II, III & IV for the *Muzahara* routes in Zaria, Katsina and those of the *Tattaki* in Kano and other states.

and *Tattaki*, as will be demonstrated, is intricately linked to the cult of saint veneration and its inherent 'memory' narrative. It also represents the growth of Shia rituals in northern Nigeria which challenges the Sunni dominated religious sphere. While celebrating specific moments by establishing an annual 'cycle of remembrance',[4] the stake of the contested religious rituals expands which is marked by the display of the group's collective identity.

While the focus of this chapter is to examine the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki* of the IMN, a brief account on the biography of el-Zakzaky, the founder of the movement, will lay the foundation. This will be followed by an examination of the structure of community and authority of the movement, which remains an effective tool for keeping in check the identities of its members while the processions are on the move. This will serve as a counter to the debates that are advanced by some studies that argue that the group lacks structure.[5]

3.2 The Making of Shaykh Ibrahim Yakub el-Zakzaky

Born in 1953, Shaykh Ibrahim Yaqub el-Zakzaky turned 68 in 2021. Popularly known and identified as el-Zakzaky (or Zakzaky), he was born and raised in Zaria, the capital city of Zazzau Emirate. Having acquired a foundational Islamic education,[6] el-Zakzaky's formal schooling began in 1969 when he enrolled at Zaria Provincial School. On completion in 1971, he proceeded to the School for Arabic Studies (S.A.S), Kano, where he obtained a Teacher Grade II certificate in 1975.[7] There, he studied both Arabic (Islamic) and English (secular) subjects which prepared him for admission to Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, to read BSc Economics. It was through the activities of the Muslim Students Society (MSS) at the university that el-Zakzaky's religious activism was formed, radicalized, and built a network of colleagues and followers who were to form the core of membership of his later movement.[8]

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[4] See P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2012), p. 132.
[5] M. S. Muhammad and M. M. Abdullahi, "The Spread of Shia and Its Activities in Nigeria", *Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, No. 1 (2019), pp. 28-41.
[6] A system was implemented since the pre-colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa that children acquire Islamic (particularly Qur'anic) education at a very early age before being initiated into other professions. Knowledge is a practical tradition embedded in the curricula of Islamic schools in northern Nigeria and other Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Until the introduction of colonial education, the system has been practiced for decades. For details, see Ousmane O. Kane, *Beyond Timbuktu*: *An Intellectual History of Muslim Africa* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2016) and Lious Brenner, *Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000).
[7] Teacher Grade II (TC II) is a system of education in Nigeria that gives teacher-training and a benchmark certificate for teaching at primary and post-primary schools. The School for Arabic Studies (S.A.S) was one of the selected stations where the programme was run. See O. E. Kayode *et al.*, "Teacher Education and Development in Nigeria: An Analysis of Reforms, Challenges and Prospects", *Education Journal* 4, No. 3 (2015), pp. 111-122.
[8] For el-Zakzaky's religious activism in MSS at ABU, see Mohammed D. Sulaiman, "Islamic Fundamentalism: The Shias in Katsina", in Ismail A. Tsiga and Abdalla U. Adamu eds., *Islam and the History of Learning in Katsina* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1997), pp. 57-72. For the general shift in education from "traditionalism" to

El-Zakzaky's life in the MSS had been remarkable. He rose to become the secretary of the Society and the National Vice President (Foreign Affairs). Founded in 1954, the MSS remained a "dormant organization in Nigeria's educational institutions" until the late 1970s,[9] when el-Zakzaky and his coterie are believed to have reactivated the Society through religious campaigns with a view for the establishment of an 'Islamic state'. El-Zakzaky described the campus space during the heyday of the MSS activities as "a point of robust discussions and intellectual exchanges among the fellow MSS". The themes of the discussions revolved around U.S. foreign relations with the Middle East, the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, the 'heroism' of the Afghan jihadists, and the situation in Iran that culminated in the 1979 Revolution.[10] According to el-Zakzaky, 'a strong sense of brotherhood' and belonging was nurtured that led many to stay in their campus hostel rooms even during the semester and sessional vacations.[11]

The inspiration they derived from the discourse around the fermenting climate of revolutionary movements and the engagement with the narratives and literature of revolutionary theorists and political ideologues such as Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), Abu al-A'la al-Maududi (d. 1979), Sa'id Hawwa (d. 1989) eventually radicalized the MSS. The themes of these scholars' texts are premised on the ideas of religious welfarism, revivalism, resistance to western domination and creation of an 'Islamic state'. Although the thrust of their arguments seem common – the creation of a state ruled by Sharia law – each scholar was a product of a specific cultural and geographic space where his influence was birthed: *al-Banna* and *Qutd* were born and raised in Egypt, al-Maududi in Pakistan, and Hawa in Syria. The revolutionary ideas of these scholars were imbibed through engagement with texts which are explicitly anti-state. [12] They were also made more widely accessible. For example, one of the books of Sa'id Hawa, *Jund Allah*: *Thaqafatan wa Akhlaqan* (God Forces: Civilization and Values) was read by way of translating the text into Hausa language at the study sessions of the movement.[13]

However, the spread of these anti-state radical ideas shaped the formation or the rise of 'new' religious identities in Nigeria, and the debates around them. Peter Clark has identified two main discrete identities among Nigeria's Muslims in connection to approach to religious

"fundamentalism" in northern Nigeria, see M. S. Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s", *Africa Today,* 48, No. 2 (2001), pp. 127-150.

[9] Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria", pp. 127-150.

[10] CW-IMN-AUD-001: El-Zakzaky, public lecture titled "*Zaman Jangwam*" (The Idleness), 1991.

[11] CW-IMN-AUD-001: El-Zakzaky, public lecture titled "*Zaman Jangwam*" (The Idleness), 1991.

[12] Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria". See also C. Casey, "'State of Emergency': Armed Youths and Mediations of Islam in Northern Nigeria", *Journal of International and Global Studies,* 5. No. 2 (2014), pp. 1-18.

[13] Interview with Mallam Nura Adam, the leader of the JTI in Kano, by the author at his residence in Galadanchi, Kano, on the 19th August, 2019.

reform in the 1970s: moderates and fundamentalists.[14] Although this stark categorization is problematic,[15] in Clark's categorization, the MSS, and by extension the Zakzakists, fell within category of the fundamentalists. According to Clark, "the fundamentalists are often much more vociferous than the former".[16] Violence was thus, in Clark's argument, associated more with fundamentalists in their approach for change. One of the key attitudes of fundamentalists, as Ogbu U. Kalu argues, is their criticism against secularism.[17]

During the power shift from military rule to democratic dispensation in Nigeria between 1975 and 1979, there was debate over the establishment of a federal Sharia court that would adjudicate Muslims' appeals based on the established Islamic legal system. This generated heated controversy between members – both Muslims and Christians – of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDA) and Constituent Assembly (CA). For inclusive representations and to arrest civil unrest, public opinions were sought as to the best system to be adopted. In response to the raging debate, three distinct camps emerged from the Ahmadu Bello University community each advocating adoption of a distinct system: pro-Communism; advocates of the secular system; and the MSS, who advocated for the adoption of the Sharia legal system. Campaigns were organized to sensitize the general public about the matter. [18]

The 1979 Iranian Revolution coincided with this fervent debate around national and religious sentiments. While it stimulated the enthusiasm of the MSS, it further proved to them the feasibility for the change of a government through protest. The 'Islamist' campaigns of the MSS did not sit well with the philosophy of the university and they curtailed the excesses of the Society. Consequently, university management had core MSS officials, including el-Zakzaky, arrested while writing their final (level 400) examinations. This arrest, the first in his life, set the precedence for his subsequent arrests. Although they were given a chance to make up the examinations after they were released, el-Zakzaky's degree certificate has been withheld

[14] P. Clark, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and Aims", *Third World Quarterly* 10. No. 2, Islam and Politics (1988), pp. 519-538.

[15] This categorization has created layers of identities among Muslims and are often divisive with the potential to pit one against another because of ideological difference. Beverley Milton-Edward mentions such labels that have been popularized by the media particularly after 9/11: "fanatical Muslims, religious Muslims, secular Muslims, nationalist Muslims, socialist Muslims, Muslim resistance fighters, Muslim statesmen and women, Muslim conservatives, Muslim reformers, Muslim fundamentalists, Muslim moderates, Muslim terrorists, Muslim radicals" etc. See B. Milton-Edwards, *Islam and Violence in the Modern Era* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 2.

[16] Clark, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria …, pp. 519-538.

[17] O. U. Kalu, "Safiyya and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in Twenty-First-Century Nigeria", *African Affairs* 102, No. 408 (2003), pp. 389-408.

[18] A 'Brief Account of the Biography of Shaykh Ibraheem Zakzaky' — CW-IMN-DOC-003—compiled by the IMN's Centre for Documentation claims that the role played by the MSS and el-Zakzaky in particular in the above underlined development laid the foundation for the formation of the IMN 'A Brief Account of the Biography of Shaikh Ibraheem Zakzaky' compiled by the IMN Centre for Documentation.

to date.[19] The essence here is to present el-Zakzaky's background as Muslim activist whose rise marked the emergence of the 'fundamentalist' movement in Nigeria, who sought to make their presence known in public through processions, pilgrimage and protests. Their rise was to create a counter identity among the competing identities in the religious sphere that had been dominated by the Sufi/Sunni group in northern Nigeria.

3.3 The Formation and Transformation of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN)

In the 1980s, el-Zakzaky's pro-Sharia movement and the campaign for the establishment of an 'Islamic State' expanded beyond the boundary of the MSS and the university campus. A new identity, which was largely a 'declared' one,[20] was necessary to reflect the shifting ground and expanding scope of the movement. One thing that defined the Zakzakists in post-university life was adoption of the name 'Muslim Brothers' (MB) and 'Muslim Sisters' (MS). The adoption of this nickname reflected their engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement from which the title was borrowed. MB and MS were the brand nicknames used to address one another in the university. The MB became popular among the public and a defining identity with which the Zakzakists were known. Yet, they were branded differently. While they address themselves as *Yanuwa* (brothers plu.) *Danuwa* (brother sing.) *Yaruwa* (sister fem. sing.), the public addressed them as "*Yan braza*" ('*Yan* means member and *braza* is a corrupted form of "brother").[21] The MB, and of course *Yanbraza*, remained the brand nickname that the Zakzakists identified with until 1996 when they assumed a fully-fledged Shia identity.

Describing the MB as 'Islamist' or 'radical' is common in scholarship on religious reforms.[22] What was debatable among scholars was putting the MB's theology in the context of Shi'ism in Nigeria in the 1970s. According to Mohammed D. Sulaiman, the MB took the Shi'i doctrine as a path or instrument that would drive the "return of the pristine values of

[19] A 'Brief Account of the Biography of Shaykh Ibraheem Zakzaky' …

[20] In his study of the transformation of identity among Muslim students in the United States in 2005, Lori Peek identifies three stages in the development of identity: "Ascribed" identity, "chosen" identity and "declared" identity. In the context of development of identity of the IMN, their identity after university was "declared" as will be seen in the declaration that followed in which the identity was made public and popularized. See L. Peek, "Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity", *Sociology of Religion* 66, No. 3 (2005), pp. 215-242.

[21] This naming by the public is implicitly offensive. It portrays them as people with 'extremist' religious orientation.

[22] See Clark, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria", Ousmane Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Post-Colonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 93, and Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek eds. *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7.

Islam", and usher in "a radical departure from Western values and systems" ultimately leading to the establishment of the Islamic state.[23] Similarly, Roman Loimeier argues that the MB considers the Iranian Revolution as a "model for the successful policy resistance by an oppressed Muslim people against an authoritarian regime".[24] Nevertheless, these scholars have carefully avoided ascribing Shi'ism to the MB at this point of their formation. One recurring theme in the discourse of the rise of militant religious ideas is that they are partly triggered by the socio-economic hardship that had allegedly been precipitated by the Bretton Wood liberal economic policies, pro-longed military rule, and endemic corruption.[25]

One of the major preoccupations of the MB at the time was to secure an isolated piece of land far from the 'chaotic' urban life, where a community of disciples could be nurtured who would lead the execution of the project of Islamic revivalism. According to el-Zakzaky, Panlladan[26] was chosen as the site. Immediately, members started to settle there, using the infrastructure of the School of Aviation, which was located within the site. This community was 'imagined' to be an homogeneous one,[27] exclusively for people whose collective outward identity – wearing skull caps, trousers above the ankle, and bearded face – would symbolically express the meaning and the symbolic representation of the movement to the public.[28] This attire, according to Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, is 'Islamist' in outlook.[29] Throughout the 1980s, this mode of dress gave the MB a distinct public outlook and affirmed their constructed Islamicity. This attire was abandoned in the 1990s for a more 'normalized' dress code.[30]

Up to 1984, insignificant number of members were realized, between 30 to 40 people. Programs were introduced that could keep the members united and their spirits high. The programs were borrowed from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. According to Mallam Nura Adam:

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[23] M. Sulaiman, "Islamic Fundamentalism: The Shi'a in Katsina", p. 65.
[24] Cited in Abubakar Z. Ibrahim, "The Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN): A Socio-Cultural Link between Nigeria and Iran", in I. A. Jawondo & V. Ojakorotu eds., *Africa and other Continents Since the 19th Century: A Festchrift in Honour of Professor Rashid Oladija Lasisi* (Cape Coast: University of Cape Coast Press, 2016), p. 278.
[25] See, for example, Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria.*
[26] Panlladan is located three kilometers away from ABU. It is bordered by the university from the west, Zabin Zaria from the north and Sabon Gari from the south.
[27] This is adopted from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London & New York: Verso, 2006).
[28] El-Zakzaky, "*Zaman Jangwam*" [The Idleness], public lecture delivered in 1991. *Harka Islamiyya* or *Harka* (in shortened form) is the common name given to the movement particularly among its members. The name resonates in the activities of the movement such public lectures, pieces written in the local language, "private conversation" and other instances of reference to the movement.
[29] Z. Ould A. Salem, "Islam in Mauritania between Political Expansion and Globalization: Elites, Institutions, Knowledge, and Networks" in Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek, eds., *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 36.
[30] Salem, "Islam in Mauritania", p. 36.

> '*Ijtima'* (conference) is one of the flat forms modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt's *modus operandi*. It serves as a space for a rigorous collective worship meant to inculcate in the followers the spirit of endurance, sense of togetherness, brotherhood, self-discipline and self-restrain. *Ijtima'* usually lasted for three days i.e Friday – Sunday. Other spaces meant to acquire discipline include '*Ribadi'* ('Islamic' monastry), '*Jaulah'* (campaign tour) and '*Laila al-Tarbiyya'*(induction nights).[31]

According to el-Zakzaky, the only activities that united members of the nascent community were these programmes.[32] But beyond that small community, el-Zakzaky's influence manifested among the Muslim youth. This was spread accordingly through the (individual) proselytization of the ABU graduates who had been inspired by him at the University, the *Jaulah* mentioned above, or the Vocational Trainings (VT) that the MSS continued to organize for secondary schools students.[33]

Within a short period, el-Zakzaky became the rallying point for a large number of youths in northern Nigeria. Scholars have debated what inspired the youths. Brian Larkin explains this development from the point of view of the charisma of el-Zakzaky.[34] According to Roman Loimeier, el-Zakzaky's "opposition to the series of military regimes" had earned him recognition. His dogged criticism to the regimes while supported by the 'Yan Izala, an oppositional group to el-Zakzaky's movement, made him popular amidst human rights violation by the military.[35] A similar assertion is made by Ousame Kane that the rise of Islamists movements in northern Nigeria was partly associated with economic hardship. So many unemployed youths fell fray to the recruiting machineries of those religious movements.[36] In line with Kane's argument, the 'Special Report' of the United States Institute for Peace, suggests that "poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and weak family structures contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization".[37] Nonetheless, religious enthusiasm and the urge for a 'new system' remained the major motivational factors for el-Zakzaky's appeal in northern Nigeria.[38]

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[31] Interview with Mallam Nura Adam, the leader of the JTI in Kano, by the author at his residence in Galadanchi, Kano, on the 19th August, 2019. See also Nura A. Galadanci, "Gwagwarmayar Kafa Shari'ar Musulunci a Nigeria: Nazari a Kan Kungiyar Jama'atut Tajdidil Islamy Da Koyarwarta [The Struggle for the Establishment of the Shariah in Nigeria: A Study on the Society for the Revival of Islam] (MS), p. 25.
[32] CW-IMN-AUD-001: El-Zakzaky's public lecture titled "*Zaman Jangwam*" (The Idleness), 1991.
[33] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February, 2020.
[34]B. Larkin, "Bandiri Music, Globalization and Urban Experience in Nigeria", *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 42, No. 168 (2002), pp. 739-762.
[35] R. Loimeier, "Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 33, No. 3, Islamic Thought in 20th-Century Africa (2003), pp. 237-262.
[36] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria*
[37] Freedom C. Onuoha, "Why do Youth Join Boko Haram", *Special Report*, United States Institute for Peace (2013) www.usip.org
[38] Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria", p. 139.

3.3.1 Migration and Integration, c. 1982 - 1991

To compete in Nigeria's saturated religious sphere, the Zaria community had to be expanded to carry many more members. Two recruitment strategies were emphasized: *Intiqaal* (migration) and *Da'awa* (proselytization). According to el-Zakzaky, *Intiqaal* was a change of a residence by a member of the MB from their original home to Zaria for easy access to the movement's programmes. Thus, ABU-MSS graduates who had allegiance to el-Zakzaky were encouraged to perform the *Intiqaal* to Zaria. As a result, there were waves of migration to Zaria from northern Nigeria not only of the ABU-MSS graduates but many other youths.[39] Migration is critical in theological discourses and has been noted to be an instrument of changing identity and a factor in the process of reintegration. According to Carmel U. Chriswick, 'religious considerations' influence the decision to migrate and, hence, the assumption of 'new' identity.[40] Here again, the migration was religiously inspired. The zeal and enthusiasm were sparked by the concept of *Baraa* (disavowal), the political doctrine that defines the rejection of loyalty to a constituted authority, which was introduced into public discourse by the MB's campaigns and gradually accepted.[41] To the northern Nigerian youths, the application of the concept transcended defying the state's authority to include abandoning personal, familial and material attachments. Oral sources claim that there were notable cases where a number of youths abandoned their families, jobs, occupations, other worldly possessions and absconded from schools for the movement.[42]

The migrants were integrated into the Zaria community through the programmes mentioned above. To discourage MB from being counterproductive, they were made to be self-reliant by practicing whatever occupational skills they had. While a few of the MBs made a full living in Zaria, others shuttled from one place to another. Yet, many demonstrated passion and commitment to the cause that el-Zakzaky called them for, stood by him. Others – their numbers ranged from 10 to 20 – had themselves arrested and incarcerated alongside with him.

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[39] Interview with Mallam Nura Adam and Mallam Abdullahi Muhammad by the author at his residence in Galadanchi, Kano, on the 19th August, 2019. El-Zakzaky highlighted the same point in "*Zaman Jangwam*" cited earlier.

[40] C. U. Chiswick, "Immigrants and Religion", Discussion Paper No. 8092 (2014), pp. 1-20. For discussion on 'religious diversity' in migration, the 'theology of migration' etc,, see Fabio Baggio, *Theology of Migration* (Phillippines: Quezon City, 2005).

[41] For details on the doctrine of "*al-Baraa*", see M. B. Ali, *The Roots of Religious Extremism: Understanding the Salafi Doctrine of Al-Wala' wal Bara'* (London: Imperial College Press, 2016).

[42] There were widespread stories in the late 1980s and early 1990s that a number of youths in northern Nigeria were "abandoning" their families, absconding from schools in order to join the Zakzakist's movement. Interview with Mallam Nura Adam, the leader of the JTI in Kano, by the author at his residence in Galadanchi, Kano, on the 19th August, 2019.

3.3.2 The Fragmentation and Split, 1994-2003

The visit of el-Zakzaky to Iran in 1980 and the meeting he had with Ayatollah Khomeini, the then supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, further exposed his alleged connection with the introduction of Shi'ism in Nigeria.[43] Alexander Thurston articulates this point further that after the Revolution, the Iranian embassy in Nigeria "sponsored Islamic politico-religious activities, including funding Islamic magazines and sending many Nigerians to Iran for training" which found an extremely receptive audience among Nigeria's students.[44] Through funding these charitable programmes, ground was laid for the importation of what Jacob Zenn described as 'Khomeinism',[45] the Iranian brand of Shi'ism.

El-Zakzaky had doggedly denied his connection with Iran and his spreading of Shi'ism in Nigeria at the time, the claim became the source of tension and eventually factionalized the group in 1994. The breakaway faction under Abubakar Mujahid was named *Jama'at Tajdid al-Islamy* (JTI), the Movement for Islamic Revivalism.[46] Abubakar Mujahid accused el-Zakzaky of an undemocratic style of leadership and of identifying with the Shia, which they considered heretic because it subverts the Sunni theology, mores and rituals. While the JTI embraced Sunnism, they opted to maintain the MB principles of self-discipline, such as the *aila al-tarbiyya* sessions mentioned earlier.[47] The *Rasul al-Azam* Foundation (RAAF), another breakaway faction formed earlier in 1992, rejected IMN 'radicalism' and its authority, while recognizing the legitimacy of Nigeria's state and its Constitution, they maintained Shi'ism as the source of their ideology and identity.[48]

There are some differences, however, between the IMN, JTI and RAAF that need to be highlighted. These differences lie in their orientation to the constituted authority. As noted above, RAAF recognizes Nigeria's state legitimacy and its constitution. RAAF opts to operate within the purview of Nigeria's bureaucratic setup and so it was formally registered with the

[43] See H. Onapajo, "State Repression and Religious Conflict: The Perils of the State Clampdown on the Shia Minority in Nigeria", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, No. 1 (2017), pp. 80-93 and https://themaydan.com/2017/05/shiism-anti-shiism-nigeria/ (accessed June 18, 2020.).

[44] A. Thurston, "Interactions Between Northern Nigeria and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century" (M.A. Diss., Georgetown University, 2009), p. 59. These Islamic magazines are *Echo of Islam* in English, *Mahjuba* in Arabic and *Sakon Musulunci* in Hausa.

[45] J. Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria", *CTC Sentinel* 6, No. 10 (2008), pp. 13-18.

[46] A. Adogame, "How God Became a Nigerian: Religious Impulse and Unfolding of a Nation", *Journal of Contemporary African* 28, No. 4 (2010), pp. 479-498. See also T. H. Gwarzo, "Islamic Civic Society Associations and the State: A Kano Case Study 1994 – 2004" (PhD Diss., Bayero University Kano, 2006), pp. 188 -201, for details on the leadership structure, membership, funding and other activities.

[47] Interview with Shaykh Yakubu Yahya, the leader of the IMN in Katsina, by the author at his residence in Katsina in June, 2020.

[48] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State, between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December, 2015 (2016), p. 36.

Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in 2003. Its founding members, Muhammad Nur Dass and Saleh Zaria, run the organization through the aid of the centre named Baqirul Ulum Theological Centre which they established in Kano. While it is difficult to notice the presence of RAAF in public spaces, the organization keeps a strong link with Iran through the *Ijaza* (written permission to discharge religious duties) from the Iranian top clergy.[49] Unlike RAAF, the JTI did not register with the CAC but maintains a somewhat fragile leadership structure with fragmented followers. The JTI, unlike RAAF and IMN, is no longer in possession or control of schools or religious centres where they could propagate and conduct their activities. Most of its members had either abandoned the movement or decamped to Salafism.[50] It has thus been in imminent state of disappearance since the 1994 fragmentation.[51] Other Shia splinter factions are the Dar al-saqalain Foundation, headed by Uszat Hamza Lawan Kaduna, and Haidar Islamic Foundation, headed by Dr. Hafiz Muhammad Sa'id Kano, whose orientations are similar with those of the RAAF.

Whatever the consequences of this conflict might be to factionalization, the incident redefined the MB movement. It acquired a new name – Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) – amidst stiff contestation between the competing factions, exclusion and domination. A student activism movement thus shifted to a mass movement organisation, accommodating members from different quarters of society. El-Zakzaky claims that the IMN is a movement not a formally registered organization, and a non-sectarian entity.[52] On the contrary, the IMN is regarded by both the other factional groups and the public as the largest Shi'ite organization in Nigeria.[53] A discussion of the pattern of authority and community of the IMN will be relevant.

3.3.3 The Structure of Authority and Community of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria

John N. Paden (1973) has used the concepts of 'authority' and 'community' in the context of Sufi movements in Kano.[54] In Paden's analysis, the concept of authority expresses the Sufi master-disciple chain of succession, the modes of initiation and the *Ijaza* (permission), while the 'community' represents the adherents. I employ these terms to describe the *Amirship*/*Wakiliship* and the assembly structures of the IMN but with a slight twist. This is in

[49] For details, see Kabiru Haruna Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis: A Historical Study of Muslim Intra-faith Relations, 1978-2015" (PhD Diss., Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto, 2016).
[50] For details on Salafism in Nigeria, see Alex Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2016).
[51] I observed and deduced this point from my interaction with Mallam Nura Adam, the current leader of the JTI.
[52] CW-IMN-DOC-003: "*Harkar Musulunci*" (Islamic Movement), a compilation of part of el-Zakzaky's public lectures and interviews, p. 49. See: Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria".
[53] Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria", p. 14.
[54] J. N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California, 1973), pp. 43-73.

response to the claim made by Maga Sule Muhammad and Muhammad Maigari Abdullahi that the IMN has "no organized or structured leadership, there is no organizational chart top-bottom".[55] By 'authority', I refer to the leadership structure of the IMN, taking into account that there are no rituals of initiation, *Ijaza* and the rigid chain of succession from master to disciple. By 'community', I refer to the adherents whose orientation to 'authority' differs with those of the Sufi movement.

The IMN developed the structures of authority and community for different purposes. Firstly, there are specialized organs within the structure and these have changed over time. The *Hurras* is a male militia guard, formed in about 1981. At the inception, *Hurras* meant to provide order for the *Muzahara* performances in the early 1980s. The scope of their function has been expanded to include providing protection to el-Zakzaky and other IMN leaders. They are in charge of patrol and control of traffic during street processions and demonstrations. It is widely suspected that the *Hurras* received para-military or even military training. They also perform in parades during public commemorative ceremonies of the group such as the *Maulid*, *Ashura*, Quds Day etc.

The Academic Forum is constituted of educated members of the Movement and coordinates intellectual activities such as lectures, seminars, workshops, conferences and Islamic Vocational courses. It also facilitates outreach to educational institutions. The *Shuhada'* Foundation was established to cater for the bereaved families of members who have lost their lives in the course of IMN activities, particularly the processions. Donation of 100 Naira (equivalent to US$0.36) per person to the Foundation is made compulsory for all members.[56] The Foundation collects and distributes charity to the surviving family of deceased members while it honors their memory through the annual commemoration of the deceased on the 17th of *Rajab*, the seventh month of the lunar calendar. The Foundation was inaugurated by el-Zakzaky on 1 January 1992, following the crackdown on the movement's *Muzahara* which led to the killing of one Shehu Abubakar Modomawa, considered as the 'first' *Shaheed* (martyr), as they are called, in the movement.

The Sisters Forum is led by Malama Zeenat, the wife of el-Zakzaky, and serves as the women's branch. It organizes educational services and commemorative lectures, and provides support services. The ISMA Medical Care Initiative includes various medical and healthcare professionals. They provide medical support during the processions and the pilgrimages of the IMN. The Business Forum assists IMN members to be self-reliant by providing soft loans in

[55] M. S. Muhammad and M. M. Abdullahi, "The Spread of Shia and Its Activities in Nigeria", *Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, No. 1 (2019), pp. 28-41.
[56] Sample of receipts are attached as appendix (see appendix 3/2).

the form of cash, machinery, or vehicles. It is rumoured that hundreds of motorcycles and tricycles have been distributed to members with the understanding that they pay back the capital over several months, or even years. The Communication Forum/Media Team serves as a public relations outfit. In addition, they publish educational and ideological material. For example, there is a media outfit that publishes newspapers, newsletters and pamphlets both in English and Hausa; such as *Al-Mizan*, *The Struggle*, *The Pointer*, *Gwagwarmaya* and the IMN website.[57]

Aside from these organs, there are assemblies that represent the spatial distribution of its members. Members are organized into hierarchically formed assemblies. Each assembly accommodates a sizeable number of members from a given geographical space. These assemblies serve as the mechanisms that identify IMN members, gather them for meetings, and foster and activate brotherhoods within a respective area. This is crucial to the survival of the IMN given the fact that they constitute only 15% of the total Muslim population of Nigeria.[58]

Historically established as a coterie of ABU graduates who were inspired by el-Zakzaky,[59] they were consolidated after the establishment of the IMN in 1994. El-Zakzaky is the *Imam*, the temporal and spiritual leader of the IMN. He is assisted by members of the *Majlis al-Shura* (The Consultative Forum, CF), his closest vicegerents and the most senior members of the group. The members of the CF are, in turn leaders of the IMN in their respective states. Zakzaky as *Imam* within the Shia doctrine of 'infallibility',[60] exercises unquestionable authoritative power.

All the other members are organized into four hierarchical intersecting assemblies as follows: the *Majlis* (assembly),[61] the *Halqa* (Circle), the *Daira* (Forum) and the *Mandiqa* (Zone). These assemblies are coordinated by the *Wakili* (a representative) for the *Majlis* and *Halqa*, and *Amir* (a leader) for the *Da'ira*. The titles for the coordinators vary from one town to another. Both the *Wakili* and *Amir* emerge as leaders by virtue of their education or having been unanimously endorsed by their fellow members, with the duo as the most senior. Their position is permanent unless certain transgressions are committed such as fraud, 'financial

[57] CW-IMN-DOC-003: "*Harkar Musulunci*" (Islamic Movement) … pp. 54-56 and Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry…p. 166. This has been corroborated in an interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, by the author at his office, Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano, 16 September 2019.
[58] A. Mustapha & M. U. Bunza, "Contemporary Islamic Sects & Groups in Northern Nigeria", in A. M. Rauf, ed., *Sects and Social Disorder: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria* (New York: Boydell & Brewer, Inc., 2014), p. 54.
[59] CW-IMN-DOC-003: "*Harkar Musulunci*" (Islamic Movement) … pp. 54 – 57.
[60] See M. Pierce, *Twelve Infallible Men: The Imams and the Making of Shi'ism* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2016).
[61] In some literature on Shi'i structure of community, *Majlis* are called "mourning service sessions". See R. M. Nejad, "Urban Margins, a Refuge for Muharram Processions in Bombay: Towards an Idea of Cultural Resilience", *Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle,* 5 (2015), pp. 325-346.

misappropriation' or if they are deposed in a factional fight. After the JTI fracture in 1994, for example, Aminu Gusau, Nura Adam, Muhammad Bakari, Aminu Ibrahim Daurawa,[62] and Ahmad Shuaibu had to be replaced.[63]

It is important to note that the spatial size of the assemblies do not conform to the delineated boundaries of the states and local government administrative areas. The *Daira*, for example, is the biggest and most populous assembly of the IMN in a state with *Halqa* and *Majlis* under it. Members are grouped according to their locations. All IMN members within the urban centre of a state within northern Nigeria are grouped into a *Daira*. The *Halqa* and *Mandiqa* follow the *Daira* in terms of the size, even though the *Mandiqa* are found in the outlying areas or the remote villages of the states. Here the *Majlis*, acts as a grassroots-level hubs for newly recruited or mobilized members.

There is clear organizational structure rooted in educating the masses and maintaining close bonds between the people and the command structure. This is considered one of the defining features of the IMN in the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry sums up the organizational structure and activities of the IMN therein as follows:

> The Local Branches (named Dawa'ir for the State and Halqah for LGA) refer to circles of disciples and followers guided by a local leader. These are strewn across the states of the federation but are more prevalent in the northern part of the country. All of them have absolute loyalty to Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky as their supreme leader. The States as well as the Local Governments Headquarters have the same approach to leadership as that of the centre, albeit having less resources. The activities at the local IMN branches are a combination of Shi"ite religious instructions, recruitment, physical and ideological training, out-reach to broader Muslim communities in each locality and Islamist political activism. The Shi"ite religious instruction is a weekly activity that takes place in local mosques, where the heads of the local branches offer lessons for members, including women. Seminars and workshops on particular topics are also organized occasionally and speakers are invited not only from the ranks, but also from outside of the Movement. A notable feature of local seminars and workshops is that at the end of the programme the spiritual leader of the Movement, Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky, comes and close[s] the programme with inspiring speech. This personal visit by the leader indicates an important organizational link between the local branches and the national headquarters as well as reinforcing members' loyalty to El-Zakzaky' s supreme leadership.[64]

Many of the assemblies took their names from the locality where they are based. This is the tradition in Zaria, the headquarters of the IMN. A similar culture is found in some other places in northern Nigeria. Others are given names of Shia Imams. For example, assemblies in Kano bear names such as al-Zahra *Halqa*, Imam Hassan *Halqa*, Imam Hussain *Halqa*, Imam

[62] It is not clear why Aminu Daurawa decamped. His decamping is claimed not to be motivated by the Shia crises because he left earlier than Nura Adam and Ahmad Shuaibu.
[63] Interview with Engr. Bala Abdullahi, Member the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at UDB Road, Kano in February 2020.
[64] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State, between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December, 2015 (2016), p. 128.

Ali Zain al-Abidin *Halqa*, Imam al-Hassan al-Rady *Halqa*, and Imam Baqir al-Sadr *Halqa*.[65] The significance of this naming is seen in the display of the names of Shia Imams in public spaces, a tenet of the Shia movement.

Although all the assemblies are steered by men, the "women's deepening involvement in the *Majlis* was part of a larger Shi'a pattern of religious nationalism and transnationalism".[66] Women participants in the proceedings of the *Majlis* are mostly in the presence of their husbands who, by virtue of being the head (in patriarchal cultures such as this), have their women mobilized/integrated into the movement. In other words, the involvement of women is regulated by prevailing patriarchal norms. They are but one unit within the family structure. Thus, the size of a given *Majlis* is relatively proportional to the size of the household of a given locality.

It is at the *Majlis* where the Karbala remembrance is read and this marks the mourning period, processions and symbolic treks.[67] These structures of authority and community are reflected in the conduct of all the public marches of the movement as lines are arranged according to area assemblies. Thus, the IMN claims that this helps to detect 'intruders'. Having discussed the organs and the structures of authority and community of the IMN, it is now necessary to examine the *Muzahara* (public marches) of the group according to historical phases in order to demonstrate change and transformation over time.

Fig. 3.1 The Structure of the Authority and Community of the IMN (author's fieldwork)



[65] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano on 15 February 2020.
[66] M. E. Hegland, "Flagellation and Fundamentalism: (Trans)Forming Meaning, Identity, and Gender Through Pakistani Women's Rituals of Mourning", *American Ethnologist* 25, No. 2 (1998), pp. 240-266.
[67] For similar practices and traditions elsewhere, see, D. D'Souza, "Gendered Ritual and the Shaping of Shi'ah Identity", in K. Pemberton & M. Nijhawan, eds., *Shared Idioms, Sacred Symbols and the Articulation of Identities in South Asia* (New York-London: 2009) and S. B. Abbas, "Sakineh, The Narrator of Karbala: An Ethnographic Description of a Women's Majles Ritual in Pakistan", in K. S. Aghaie, ed., *The Women of Karbala*: *Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam* (Texas: University of Texas, 2005).

3.4 *Muzahara* Processions: The Public Display of a Collective Identity, 1980-2019

In 1996 when the Muslim Brothers assumed the new name IMN, the nature of processions changed somewhat. There are thus two definable phases, which will be explored: 1980-1996 and 1996-2015.

3.4.1 Phase I, 1980 – 1996: The '*Ephemeral' Muzahara*

In the IMN narrative of public rituality, two discrete but interconnected terms are deployed to describe all the forms of symbolic resistance (against the government or public actions) as well as commemorative public processions: *Muzahara* and *Tattaki*. The *Muzahara* (demonstrations or public displays[68]) is used as a generic term to refer to all forms of processions that the group had been staging within the confines of urban centers of the major towns of northern Nigeria (namely Kano, Katsina and Kaduna states) in order to commemorate specific days – commonly known as the 'saint days' – across the lunar year.[69] These processions take on the name of the commemorative event. The Quds Day, the *Ashura*, and the *Maulid*. The *Tattaki* (a pilgrimage or a symbolic trek) connotes the inter-state long trek embarked upon on every 20th of Safar, the second month of the lunar calendar, to mark the legendary 40th day of the murder of Hussain who was killed on the 10th of Muharram, 61 AH (equivalent to 10 October, 680 CE). It is instructive to note that the grouping into the phases of the *Muzahara* processions of the IMN is informed by the mode and motive behind the performances. For example, most of the *Muzahara* processions of the first phase were 'reactive' while those of the second phase are 'Shia-oriented' days of observation/commemoration/mourning.

The mode of the *Muzahara* in the history of the IMN has evolved and changed over time, but less so with the *Tattaki*. The first *Muzahara* procession was organized in April 1980. The *Muzahara* was politically motivated; it was meant to celebrate the abortive strike of 'Operation Eagle Claw'. The United States had planned to rescue 52 diplomats and citizens

[68] While the terms "demonstrations" and "public displays" convey the meaning (both literal and technical) of the *Muzahara*, they also translate the discursive conception of the *Muzahara* in IMN discourse. Therefore, the *Muzahara* will be conceived and analyzed accordingly in the sense of demonstrations/public displays in the analysis that follows. Interview with Ustaz Muhammad Sunusi Abdulqadir, the IMN leader of Kano, by the author at Dukawiya quarters, Kano, on 23 September 2020.

[69] "Saint Day" commemoration has been examined by different scholars. "Saint Day" refers to a day in which venerated figures' birthdays are celebrated by their followers. The analysis of commemorative festivities resultant from observations made by sociologists and anthropologists fit into the discourse of memory or memory studies which is prevalent in the Sufi and Shi'i traditions. See, for example, P.V.D. Veer, "Playing or Praying: A Sufi Saint's Day in Surat", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 51, No. 3 (1992), pp. 545-564; M. J. Sallnow, "Communitas Reconsidered: The Sociology of Andean Pilgrimage", , *Man* 16, No. 2 (1981), pp. 163-182 and R. A. Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

who were held hostage for 444 days at the US Embassy in Iran.[70] The 'Iran Hostage Crisis', as it is known, depicted a well-orchestrated scheme of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line (MSFIL) against the US and so was inspirational to the MB's unfolding blueprint of revivalism. Certainly, while this *Muzahara* was a symbolic resistance to the overarching influence of the US in world politics, the success recorded and the inspiration derived from the MSFIL's resilience, perhaps, motivated the organization of a yet another *Muzahara* in the following month of that same year. This demonstration was staged following the 'Funtua Declaration' where el-Zakzaky openly declared Nigeria's constitutional democratic system as 'ungodly' and dissociated himself from it.[71] This Declaration took place at the Islamic Vocational Course (IVC) lecture titled "Loyalty and Disavowal: The Way Forward" that was organized for the students of the Government Girls Secondary School, Funtua, Katsina state.[72] The *Muzahara* was a performative actualization of the Declaration that marked a departure from passivity to open rebellion against the Nigerian secular state. 'Islam Only', as the placards held at the *Muzahara* displayed, signified a total rejection of any order other than an Islamic system of governance.[73]

Four years later, the 'Quds Day' commemoration *Muzahara* was organized for the first time in Nigeria on 6 July 1984.[74] Introduced on 7 August 1979, shortly after the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini proclaimed the 'International Quds Day' (also known as the Jerusalem Day) commemoration as an annual solidarity against the controversial 'usurper Israel'. He encouraged Muslims worldwide to declare annually every last Friday of the month of Ramadan as the Quds Day to demonstrate a collective solidarity for the oppressed Palestinian people.[75] While identifying more with Iranian religious activism, the ritual articulated a paradigm shift of the fight against broader 'injustice' against Muslims. The Quds Day commemorative

[70] CW-IMN-DOC-003: "*Harkar Musulunci*" (Islamic Movement) … p. 19. For details on the America-Iran standoff over the Iran Hostage Crisis, see G. Sick, *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1991).

[71] The Funtua Declaration was an open declaration made by el-Zakzaky in a lecture he delivered at the Islamic Vocational Course (IVC) that the MSS used to organize for the students of secondary schools. The IVC is one of the programmes that was introduced by the MSS and appropriated by the IMN. It is strategic to them because it offers the opportunity to engage youths at schools and is a potential ground for mobilization. According to Mallam Nura Adam, the current leader of the JTI in Kano, the declaration factionalized the MSS into two camps: the "moderate" and the "radicals". The latter camp constitutes the IMN members. Interview, 19 August 2019.

[72] The lecture was premised on the discourse of *al-Wala wal Bara* [loyalty and disavowal], the political doctrine that defines the extent of loyalty to a constituted authority as well as "love" and "hate" towards non-Muslims. These twin doctrines have had intellectual substance in both Salafi and Shi'a doctrines For details on the doctrine in Salafi discourse, see M. B. Ali, *The Root of Religious Extremism: Understanding the Salafi Doctrine of al-Wala' Wal Bara'* (London: Imperial College Press, 2016).

[73] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry…p. 94.

[74] "Collection of Important Days in the Islamic Movement Activities" compiled by the IMN Centre for Documentation.

[75] "Iran's Anti-Israel Ideology: Quds Day Report", https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/quds-day (accessed 5 August 2020).

procession has, since its inception, been conducted annually in solidarity with the Palestinian plight. The significance of this turn was that el-Zakzaky's MB had identified with the politics of the Middle East which became a window for support for them from Muslims in northern Nigeria.

However, the sources that account for these *Muzahara* are silent on their modes: size of the pageant, spatiality, time-taken, and gender representation. Both of the *Muzahara* underlined a symbolic sympathy, at least in ideology, with Iran, and promoted the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria. Certainly, a significant percentage of the crowds was drawn from the students of both the university and high schools, especially in the second *Muzahara,* which was conducted at the closing of the Islamic Vocation Course (IVC). Both of the *Muzahara* appeared to be a litmus test of the group's ability to make use of processions to increase membership. The Declaration and the radical 'anti-state' messages displayed on placards, banners, posters, and also inscribed on walls of people's houses, appealed to many Muslims, particularly the youth. The radical traits that these *Muzahara* represented were believed to be the source of tension between the state and the MB, which culminated in the arrest of el-Zakzaky the following year (1981) for 'sedition or inciting disaffection' against the Federal Government of Nigeria.[76]

The *Muzahara*, particularly due to youth participation,[77] became an emerging phenomenon, a symbol of resistance and instrument of articulation of identity by the MB in the major states of northern Nigeria, namely Kano, Katsina, Kaduna and Sokoto. This shift was evolving at the time when there was heightened tension over the police's suppression of students' demonstrations during which different scales of fatalities had been reported.[78] Reports show that students demonstrated for different reasons, ranging from the hike in university fees to unfair disciplinary procedures. The police retaliated in what was perceived to be a disproportionate spectacle of violence thus fuelling the clashes and resentment amongst the student body.

After el-Zakzaky' arrest, the revolutionary spirit of the MB waned. This is an indication of his own positionality as leader of the movement. By 1982, a group of el-Zakzaky's lieutenants formed themselves into a Council to fill the leadership vacuum. Selection into the Council was determined by one's outstanding and distinctive commitment towards the development of the movement over time; the qualities that qualify one to occupy a position within the circle of leadership of the group. Members of the Council were thus regarded as the most distinguished ones. The pioneer Council members were Ibrahim Akilu who headed the

[76] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry … p. 35.
[77] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry … p. 134.
[78] I. T. Sampson, "The Right to Demonstrate in a Democracy: An Evaluation of Public Order Policing in Nigeria" *African Human Rights Law Journal* (AHLJ) 10, No. 2 (2010), p. 432-456.

council, Hamza Lawan, and Muhammd Turi. Other members included Abubakar Mujahid, Adamu Tsoho, Aliyu Tukur-Tukur, Aminu Gusau, Hussaini Bauchi and Yakubu Yahya. These members represented their respective states.[79] These members were drawn from different state and thus each represented his respective state for which he became the leader.[80] Their primary concern was to free el-Zakzaky and they used the platform of the *Muzahara* processions to express their discontent.

From 1982, the Council introduced some form of order for the *Muzahara* processions. *Hurras*, the militia guards, were formed and deployed to monitor the conduct of the *Muzahara*. Meetings were held with the field instructors of the *Hurras* to determine the point of departure, routes, and the point of dispersal. While the first and second *Muzahara* (of April 1980 and May 1980) took place only in Zaria, with these developments the marches were extended into Kano, Kaduna and Katsina. Another interesting observation comes from Mallam Nura Adam, one of the participants of the first phase *Muzahara*. It is striking to note how he specifically states that the *Muzahara* is staged in 'earnest' only after the prayers had been concluded. As was seen in the second 'ceremonial' phase of the QN in the previous chapter, the centrality of religious text seems to be overshadowed. According to Nura Adam:

> *Muzahara* are conducted on Friday(s) immediately after the prayer. Friday mosques are thus made the meeting points. Members are instructed to pray at a particular mosque [the chosen meeting point]. A flag bearer is assigned who would be seated at a strategic point amidst the congregants within the premises (usually open space) of the mosque. He would stand up immediately after the prayer is over and shout '*Allahu akbar'* [God is great], then fly the flag in order to draw/mobilize members around him. Having convened members at the point, the cell leader of the MB would then address members, inspire and ginger them with words of motivation and encouragement. Having got charged, columns are formed and the *Muzahara* would be staged in earnest. While the routes would usually take through the central part of the city [for visibility], the *Muzahara* would end at two specific points: the markets or motor stations.[81]

[79] Interview with Mallam Nura Adam, the leader of the JTI, by the author at his residence in Galadanci, Kano on 19 August 2019. According to Nura Adam, Mallam Ibrahim Akilu was accused of being passive, radically minded members attempted to hijack the running of the movement. Hamza Lawan in connivance with Zeenat, the wife of Zakzaky, would give counter-instructions against the leader in effect of the governance of the movement. The formation of the pioneer Council took place at the residence of Aliyu Tukur-Tukur. Aliyu Tukur-Tukur played role in co-establishing *al-Mizan* newspaper that became the mouthpiece of the movement. As noted earlier, Abubakar Mujahid led a breakaway faction of the movement to form JTI. Muhammad Turi was to lead the Kano's base of the movement and he was killed in December, 2015 Zaria clash. Yakubu Yahya, Hussaini Bauchi and Aminu Gusau were to become leaders/el-Zakzaky's deputies in Katsina, Bauchi and Zamfara states respectively.

[80] Interview with Mallam Nura Adam, the leader of the JTI, by the author at his residence in Galadanci, Kano on the 19th August, 2019. According to Nura Adam, Mallam Ibrahim Akilu was accused of being passive, radically minded members attempted to hijack the running of the movement. Hamza Lawan in connivance with Zeenat, the wife of Zakzaky, would give counter-instructions against that of the leader in effect of the governance of the movement.

[81] These views are expressed by Ustaz Sunusi Abdulqadir and Mallam Nura Adam in interviews with them by the author at Dukawiya and Galadanchi quarters on 19 August and 23 September 2019 respectively.

Other critical elements that need to be underlined are the points of departure and dispersal. Friday Mosques had often been the meeting and departure points for the *Muzahara*. These Friday Mosques are mostly located adjacent to the emirs' palaces of the towns where the marches are held. Convergence or departure at/from the Mosque seems to offer political legitimacy and religious acceptability, as the Mosques represent the enduring legacy of Islam more generally, on the one hand, and revivalism of the Shehu Usman *bn* Fodio (d. 1819), on the other. Furthermore, they are potential sites for social mobilization.[82]

While Mosques were central points of meetings/departure, the *Muzahara* ended at the 'markets' and 'motor parks. According to the MB, markets and motor parks are crowded spaces where the *Muzahara* adherents could easily disperse and avoid police arrest.[83] One could add that these spaces were occupied by large numbers of people who could possibly be enticed into joining the cause. From 1996, the practice of dispersing at the markets or motor parks changed. Different video footage of the IMN *Muzahara* have shown the *Amirs* making closing statements at the end of the events at the points where the *Muzahara* end while the participants causally taking to the streets. The change in the mode of ending the *Muzahara* in 1996 reflected a shift of the IMN from the MB's outmoded *modus operandi*. The spate of fear for incessant arrests that characterized the MB's era had now been resisted as the IMN appeared more consolidated. According to an oral informant, the *Muzahara* usually would last between two- and three-hours duration.[84]

Throughout the 1980s, the activities of the MB had popularized the *Muzahara* and essentially became their defining identity and, arguably, a force that sustained its public presence. But part of the objectives of the practice was to root out blasphemy as well. In 1987 violence broke out in Kafancan, Kaduna state, which caused many lives and valuable properties to be lost.[85] This was instigated after an incident at the Federal College of Education, Kafancan. The MSS of this College invited el-Zakzaky to give talk at one of their programmes in response to which the Christian students too invited Reverend Abubakar Bako to give a counter talk. It was alleged that the Reverend Bako's 'unguarded utterances' against Islam triggered off a spontaneous *Muzahara* processions by the MSS condemning Bako's action as 'blasphemous'

[82] For the significance of the mosques, particularly Friday mosques, as sites for social mobilization see Kabiru Haruna Isa, "Religion and Society in Kano Metropolis: A Historical Study of Muslim Intra-faith Relations, 1978-2015" (PhD Diss., Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto, 2016).
[83] Interview with Nura Adam, the current leader of the JTI, by the author at Galadanchi on 19 August 2019
[84] Interview with Nura Adam, the current leader of the JTI, by the author at Galadanchi on 19 August 2019.
[85] There are works on the Kafancan violence. See, for example, R. T. Suberu, "Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria", IFRA-Nigeria https://books.openedition.org/ifra/761?lang=en (last accessed, 14 august, 2019); https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria0703/2.htm (accessed 14 August, 2019).

and unacceptable. Consequently, violence broke out which spread to Kaduna and Zaria, the immediate neighborhoods of the flashpoint of the violence with casualties on both the Muslims and Christians. The Kaduna state government set up a Tribunal under Justice Godwin Karibi-Whyte to investigate and prosecute the culprits. As a result, over 150 persons were brought to book, tried, and 75 of them were jailed. El-Zakzaky was also implicated for his attachment to the MSS in spite of the fact that he "had not even taken part in the riots" but "was sentenced to 4½ years of imprisonment".[86] Although the above *Muzahara* processions trigged a spate of violence, the same practice has been deployed as a tool to react against blasphemous invectives. Instances where *Muzahara* had been used as instrument of symbolic resistance against what considered to be blasphemous by the movement will be discussed below.

3.4.2 The *Muzahara* as Response to Blasphemy

The major shift in the activities of the MB in the 1990s was an attempt to identify itself as the 'protector' of the 'sacred persona of the Prophet' against the incidences of blasphemy that were circulating in the global media at the time. These incidences of blasphemous acts were becoming viral as the world was becoming more connected by the technological breakthrough in the media technology. George N. Claassen, Syairal F. Dalimunthe *et al.*, Jonathan Heawood, Jane Sasseen,[87] among others, have examined a variety of cases of blasphemy and violence. According to Dalimunthe *et al.*, the problem arises from the 'political mediatization of blasphemy news' which, as Claassen suggests, triggers 'anti-social behavior'. Meanwhile Heawood and Sasseen lend blame to the conflicts between 'freedom of religion and of expression' or 'clash of cultures'. However, reaction to blasphemy, whether violent or symbolic, as Andrew Rippin notes, is triggered by the notion that:

> […] attacking Muhammad is, of course, attacking the way of life of individual Muslims, for their way of life is understood to rest on the example of the founder of their religion. If something is felt by Muslims to be a denigration of one aspect of the life of Muhammad, then by implication such may be seen as an attack on the whole way of life of each and every Muslim, at least in its idealized conception.[88]

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[86] N. A. Galadanci, "Gwagwarmayar Kafa Shari'ar Musulunci a Nigeria: Nazari a Kan Kungiyar Jama'atut Tajdidil Islamy Da Koyarwarta [The Struggle for the Implementation of the Shariah: A Study on the Society for the Revival of Islam] (Manuscript), pp. 22-23; R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1997), p. 304.

[87] G. N. Claassen, "The Media and Society: Special Ethical Concerns on Blasphemy, Violence and Nudity", *Ecquid Novi*, No. 1 (1994), pp. 86-104; S. F. Dalimunthe, *et al*. "Political Mediatization of Blasphemy News", *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding*, No. 2 (2020), pp. 436-444; J. Heawood, "Taking Offence: Free Speech, Blasphemy and the Media", in Jonathan Heawood, ed., *Religion and the News* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 197-206; J. Sasseen, "A Clash of Cultures: Hate Speech, Taboos, Blasphemy, and the Role of News Media", A Report to the Centre for International Media Assistance (2013).

[88] A. Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London & New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 55.

Rooted in the history of religions,[89] the 'politics of blasphemy still proves troublesome' as Kwame Anthony Appiah describes it.[90] According to Appiah, "the concept of blasphemy has relatively little purchase on the contemporary European mind."[91] But this is not one sided. Court trials attest to transgressions on both sides. For example, the 2016 International Religious Freedom reported that:

> On 4th January, 2016, [a] Kano State Upper Sharia Court sentenced cleric Abdulaziz Dauda and nine followers to death for making blasphemous statements against the Prophet Muhammad; the case was under appeal...In [the same month] a Kano sharia court convicted a Tijaniyah Sufi Muslim cleric and five others of blasphemy, and sentenced them to death.[92]

Arguably, cases of blasphemy are not peculiar to Islam nor to Nigeria. [93] Other major regions in the world have encountered the same problem.[94] Notwithstanding, perhaps due to lack of an organized action to fight what considered to be blasphemous among Muslims in northern Nigeria, the gap offered the MB moments of revitalizing identity and reasserting themselves in Nigeria's religious sphere.Below are incidences of *Muzahara* processions against blasphemous acts within and outside Nigeria.

Firstly, in its edition of December 1990, the *Daily Times* newspaper made fun of the Prophet Muhammad and Jesus Christ in a cartoon.[95] Mallam Yakubu Yahya, the leader of the IMN in Katsina, led the *Muzahara* of hundreds of members and stormed the newspaper's office and burnt copies of that issue.[96] The *Muzahara* spawned a tense political entanglement between the MB and the military administration of Katsina state under Colonel John Yahaya Madaki

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[89] See, for example, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton & B. Lewis, *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2A (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 414; and K. A. Appiah, "Causes of Quarrel: What's Special about Religious Disputes" in T. Banchoff, ed., *Religious Pluralism, Globalization and World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 41.

[90] Appiah, "Causes of Quarrel", p. 41.

[91] K. A. Appiah, "Causes of Quarrel: What's Special about Religious Disputes…p. 43.

[92]Nigeria 2016 International Religious Freedom Report (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/&ved=2ahUKEwjkptm0zqH5AhUKXvEDHXZuDAAQFnoECA8QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3GMJIhFYb4KCjTqRX8Nf0u , accessed April 2020).

[93] This is the case with Sufi "mystical" theology which leads to utterances that may be considered blasphemous. See P. J. Ryan, "The Mystical Theology of Tijānī Sufism and Its Social Significance in West Africa", *Journal of Religion in Africa* 30, No. 2 (2000), pp. 208-224 and the introductory note of Appiah in "Causes of Quarrel" p. 41.

[94] For the genealogy of cases of blasphemy in different religions, see Leonard Williams Levy, *Blasphemy: Verbal Offense Against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie* (UNC Press Books, 1995).

[95] Founded in 1925, the *Daily Times* newspaper, headquartered in Lagos, was purchased by the government in 1975 having been rated as one of the most successful business outfits in Africa. It recorded a set back after the purchase by the government until 2004 when it was resold to a private investor.

[96] Interview with Mallam Yakubu Yahya, the IMN leader in Katsina state, by the author on 22 February 2020 at his residence in Katsina state. This lecture, as its introductory part explains, was organized annually and the time for the lecture coincided with the time of the incident. The lecture was, therefore, moved to Katsina and its content changed to reflect the unfolding saga.

(1989-1992). The matter took a religious-political dimension, particularly as the governor was a Christian. While Colonel Madaki threatened to 'execute' Mallam Yahya publicly for radicalizing the youth, el-Zakzaky rushed to Katsina and delivered a public lecture titled "*Jan Kunnen Madaki*" (Warning to Madaki).[97] It is difficult to ascertain whether the lecture preempted Colonel Madaki's envisioned 'punishment', but the death sentence was never passed. Nonetheless, the lecture had given Yahya's violent *Muzahara* a legitimacy and moral boost as it was premised on two interconnected themes: 'To rejoice with Mallam Yahya; and to warn Colonel Madaki'. Framed as a binary discourse between the 'God-favored one' and 'God-cursed one', the lecture portrayed Yahya as the former while Madaki was castigated as the 'imprecated'.[98]

In the early morning of 26 December 1994, a *Muzahara* was staged terminating at the Kano central mosque. This *Muzahara* was staged in reaction to the alleged blasphemy committed by Gideon Akaluka, a Christian Igbo migrant trader in Kano. Akaluka was accused of 'desecrating' the Qur'an, the sacred Muslim book, by using its pages as toilet paper. While Akaluka was arrested and detained at the Goron Dutse prison facility in Kano city, the MB (largely then JTI members[99]) had condemned the case as 'blasphemous' and, without giving the courts a chance to prove Akaluka guilty, staged a 'mysterious and highly insular' plan which led to the beheading of Akaluka while in prison.[100] His dismembered head was then paraded on the streets of Kano and displayed at the premises of the Kano central mosque before hundreds of Muslims. This incident is known as the 'Kano riot of 1995'.[101] Tension loomed

[97] CW-IMN-AUD-001: Public lecture delivered by el-Zakzaky in 1991 in Katsina titled "*Jan Kunnen* Madaki" ["Warning to Madaki"].
[98] CW-IMN-AUD-001: Public lecture delivered by el-Zakzaky in 1991 in Katsina titled "*Jan Kunnen* Madaki" ["Warning to Madaki"].
[99] The pattern and mode of this *Muzahara* was based on el-Zakzaky's MB, the organizers had largely come from the JTI faction under Abubakar Mujahid as discussed above, as el-Zakzaky's MB then had already disintegrated.
[100] The plan was said to have been conceived and executed by and within the circle of the top officials of the Kano cell MB/JTI without involving the national leadership and other members. They claimed to have divided themselves into different sub-groups charged with specific tasks: "how to enter the prison", "locating Gideon Akaluka's jail cell", "beheading Akaluka", and "taking the head out for safe keeping". These sub-groups worked independently, with little communication between them. *Jaish al-Islam* (the army of Islam), informal militia guards of the JTI (the sister to the *Hurras*), supported the process of executing the plan. The secretive mode of the operation, according to Mallam Nura Adam, proved problematic to the security investigation after they (those who were accused of beheading Akaluka) were arrested because the sub-group could only narrate what part they had planned and executed. Therefore, access to the "actual" information on the planning of the operation was scuttled by the group's cell-based activity. According to Nura Adam, Akaluka's head was thrown into a stagnant river. Interview with Nura Adam, the current leader of the JTI, by the author at Galadanchi on 19 August 2019.
[101] See, for example, C. Casey, "Suffering and the Identification of Enemies in Northern Nigeria", *Polar* 21, No. 1 (1997), p. 3; Conerly Casey, Osun Ekiti, Cross River and Imo Abia, "Mediated Hostility, Generation, and Victimhood in Northern Nigeria", *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines, CourseSmart eTextbook* (2015), p. 274. And Karl Maier, "Beheading Stirs Nigerian Tension", https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/beheading-stirs-nigerian-tension-1596448.html, (accessed 28 July, 2019); https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab7158.html; http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/1995-beheading-of-akaluka-group-to-drag-sanusi-to-national-conference/ (accessed 27 August, 2020).

large in the state and fear reigned. Karl Maier reported one of the Kano intelligentsia, Alh. Yusuf Maitama Sule, as stating that:

> We may end up with a revolution which is just not religious, but may be political, social and economic. Symptoms of revolt loom large on the horizon today. It is a group of disgruntled elements who are out to vent their anger who are joined by some irresponsible, undesirable waste products of humanity.[102]

The dismay expressed by the Danmasani represented the resentment of the political elites of the state over the activities of the el-Zakzaky's followers. El-Zakzaky was said to have distanced himself from this incident, alluding more to internal dissention within his led-movement [103] This was a major turn of events for the MB after the 1994 factionalization conflict. Yet, Ahmad Shuaibu, under whose leadership Akaluka was beheaded, remained as one of el-Zakzaky's lieutenants. This standoff around Akaluka's case reflected the factional cleavage of the two camps: the MB of el-Zakzaky's camp and Abubakar Mujahid's JTI faction.

Since 1996 when el-Zakzaky's MB officially assumed the name Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), waves of *Muzahara* processions concentrated on reacting to the acts of blasphemy both locally and abroad.[104] Two major events that caused outbursts in Muslim majority counties worldwide merit mentioning with regards to the reactionary *Muzahara* processions of the IMN. On 30 September 2005, the Danish Newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published 12 editorial cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad. These same satirical cartoons were reprinted in France. What followed was the eruption of massive protests in different Muslim countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa, torching Danish and Norwegian flags.[105] A somewhat similar incident occurred in 2012 when *Innocence of Muslims*, a film made in the US was produced in which the Prophet was further reviled. The IMN joined the wider Muslim world in protests. The IMN organized more than ten different *Muzahara* to condemn *Innocence of Muslims*. As Jacob Zenn claims, mass participation in the *Muzahara* was a collective solidarity because many people had taken part who did not even belong to any religious camp.[106] The active reaction to the invective by the IMN had placed them in the context of the global Muslims outrage against the infamous 'blasphemy' that recurred over the last two decades —the Danish cartoon and *Innocence of Muslims* being the most famous in

[102] Maier "Beheading Stirs Nigerian Tension"
[103] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020.
[104] CW-IMN-AUD-003: Video footage of the IMN members at the *Muzahara* in Niger, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Katsina, states captioned '*Cinzarafin Annabi* (Denigrating the Image of the Prophet).
[105] BBC, "Nigerian MPs Burn Denmark's Flag", (2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4689314.stm (accessed 26 September 2020).
[106] Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria", pp. 11-18.

recent history. While this took the form of reactive protest, when needed, two further established and organized *Muzahara* took place every year.

3.4.3 Phase II, 1996 – 2017: The *Perennial Muzahara*

In this phase, I will examine the introduction and internalization of the rituals of the *Ashura* and the *Arba'een*, the two major Shi'i-oriented rituals, into the mainstream IMN public religiosity. The IMN introduced these rituals in 1996 when the organization assumed the name Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). This phase is significant because it marked a shift in the process of identity evolution from a group of radical "Muslim Brothers" to an Islamic Movement in Nigeria. The shift eventually defined the IMN as the largest Shi'a organization in Nigeria with the *Ashura Muzahara* and the *Arba'een Tattaki* becoming two major annual commemorative events.

3.4.3.1 The *Ashura Muzahara*

In the historiographical literature of Shi'ism,[107] the *Ashura*, the 10th of Muharram,[108] is mourned as the day of the murder of Hussain, the third Shia Imam. This incident polarized the early generation of the Muslim community between those who were pro-Prophetic lineage and those who were pro-institutionalization of the selection protocols to the seat of the caliphate based on consensus.

The tragedy of the murder and the 'redemptive sufferings' of the 'martyrs' has since then been mourned, remembered, and commemorated with grief, sorrow, and a shared sense of pain. The tradition of remembrance of the incident birthed a plethora of literature, narratives, discourses, and distinctive rituals. These narratives, discourses, and rituals led to the construction of a community distinguished mainly by public rituality that marked a shift 'from tribal mosque' rituality 'to sectarian space' defined by the staging of processions and pilgrimages to the gravesites of the Karbala 'martyrs'.[109] The construction of the Shi'i community led to the development of public religiosity in order to make their marginal identity

[107] Literature on Shi'ism and the protracted contestation for succession see V. Nasr, *Shia Revival: How Conflict within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006); M. Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism* (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton Publications, 1978); L. Deeb, *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); P. J. Stewart and A. Strathern, *Contesting Rituals: Islam and Practices of Identity-Making* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005); K. A. Jacobsen, ed., *South Asian Religious on Display: Religious processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008).

[108] Muharram is the first month of the lunar or Islamic year. It is regarded in Shi'i tradition as the month of mourning.

[109] N. Haider, *The Origins of the Shi'a: Identity, Ritual, and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kufa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 231-249.

seen and recognized. Scholars that study the origin of Shi'a have emphasized the attempt by the early Shi'a community to articulate their identity in public against the background of the predominant Sunni dynastic rule over many centuries. According to Najam Haider, the propensity of multiple streams of Shi'ism to appropriate spaces for "powerful public affirmation of sectarian identity" led to a coalescing of 'ritual and space' through the pilgrimage to tombs of Ali, the fourth caliph, and al-Husayn, the martyred. The most spectacular of these visits was the Kufans processions to Ali's tomb in commemoration of Ghadir Khum[110] on the 10th of Zul Hajj, the 12th month of lunar calendar.[111] This is what led Hamid Dabashi to frame Shia as a 'religion of protest'.[112]

What then the *Ashura* is all about? The meaning of the *Ashura* is fluid: it is a defining historical moment in the history of Islam, a narrative, a source of symbolic and collective identity of the Shi'a, and an 'imagined' and 'constructed' line that divides the pro-Hussain and anti-Hussain parties within Islam. It is a shift in the trend of history which Michael Fischer calls 'The Karbala paradigm'.[113]

Ashura is also associated with various traditional narratives that form part of the history of the Middle East such as the survival of the Noah's Ark, and God's parting of the Red Sea for the children of Israel being pursued by the Pharoah.[114] These historical elements have been reflected in the *Ashura* commemorative ceremonies through performing dramas. Scholars have differed over the exact forms of rituals being observed to commemorate the *Ashura*. Yitsak Nakash mentions three forms: (1) mourning recitations (2) representation of the battle (of Karbala) as a play and (3) mourning processions, excluding the visitation (*ziyarat*) to the gravesites of the Karbala martyrs and self-flagellation.[115] Florian Bernhardt adds two more practices: '*Noha'* and '*Matam'*. While these commemorative rituals have evolved over time,

[110] Ghadir Khumm, also called Eid al-Ghadeer, is an event when Prophet Muhammad is believed to have announced that "to whomsoever I am a master, Ali is also his master". The Shia believe this to be the "appointment" of Ali as the Prophet's successor.
[111] Haider, *The Origins of the Shi'a* p. 245.
[112] H. Dabashi, *Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest* (Harvard: The Belknap Press, 2011).
[113] M. J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. xiv.
[114] Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam* …p. 213.
[115] Y. Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of ʿĀshūrāʾ", *Die Welt des Islams* 33, No. 2 (1993), pp. 161-181 and F. Bernhardt, "Redefining the 'Ashura' Ritual in Iraq: The Islamist Movement and the Student Processions (*mawakib al-talaba*) during 1966-1968", *Anthropos* 110, No. 1 (2015), pp. 63-72. Other forms of symbolic mourning and re-enactment of the Ashura include *Nakhl Gardani*, *Alam*, *Rawda*, weeping, *noha*, *Matam*, etc.

they also are reformed and transformed in time and space.[116] The *ziyara*[117] began shortly after the battle of Karbala and set the stage for the rise and articulation of public rituality that defined the 'pro-Hussain" community's existence, despite being pushed to the margin by the ruling dynasty. Later, mourning recitations of the Karbala accounts and the ritual representation of the battle through performative play commonly known as the *Ta'ziyeh*[118] was introduced.

The IMN *Ashura* mourning processions combine all the aspects of the mourning performances mentioned, with the exception of self-flagellation which has not been seen in the practices.[119] The *Ashura Muzahara* of the IMN marked an internalization and institutionalization of Shi'a public religiosity in Nigeria. This development symbolized an avid recognition of the Shi'a as the ideological model for the IMN. Evidently, the IMN publications, for example, carry the statement that "Every day is *Ashura*, every land is Karbala". According to Mara Leichtman, this was the same slogan that Ayatollah Khomeini used to mobilize his followers during the Iranian Revolution.[120]

3.4.3.2 The Form and Pattern of the *Ashura Muzahara*

Introduced in 1998,[121] the *Ashura* annual commemorative processions fall within the context of the broader public performances that the IMN called the *Ashura Muzahara*. The *Ashura* mourning and commemorative rituals are specifically performed between the 10th of Muharram and the 20th of Safar (declaring the 40 days in between as the "mourning period", with the 10th of Muharram symbolically being the most "sorrowful"). These 40 days are

[116] Two dynasties, the Buyud (also known as the Buwaihids, 945-1055 CE) and the Safavid, played significant roles in the institutionalization of the *Ashura* rituals through state support and sponsorship. The rulers of these regimes exploited the public spectacle of *Ashura* ritual observance to consolidate their political power, leading to the formation of Shia states in the subsequent centuries. See K. S. Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2004).

[117] *Ziyarat* (spiritual visit) in this sense refers to a pilgrimage to the shrines of the Shia Imams. According to Liyakat Takim, the Shia Imam shrine is an "amalgamation of hereditary authority, *Baraka* [charisma], extraordinary powers, prayers, *communitas*, and a place for expressing socio-political grievances". L. Takim, "Charismatic Appeal or Communitas? Visitation to the Shrines of the Imams", *Journal of Ritual Studies*. 18, No. 2, (2004), pp. 106-120.

[118] There are many works on the *Ta'ziyeh* performative play. See for example, I. Anvar, "Peripheral Taʿziyeh: The Transformation of Taʿziyeh from Muharram Mourning Ritual to Secular and Comical Theatre Source", *TDR* 49, No. 4, (2005), pp. 61-67 and P. J. Chelkowski, "From the Sun-Scorched Desert of Iran to the Beaches of Trinidad: Taʿziyeh's Journey from Asia to the Caribbean", *TDR* 49, No. 4, (2005), pp. 156-169.

[119] El-Zakzaky discouraged his followers from the ritual of self-flagellation during the *Ashura Muzahara* which leads to spilling of blood. Instead, he urged them to be donating blood to hospitals. For this, el-Zakzaky was honored by the Voluntary Blood Donors Club of Nigeria (VBDCN). See I. H. Hassan, "An Introduction to Islamic Movements and Modes of Thought in Nigeria" PAS/ISITA Working Papers, No. 1 in L. Denzer and R. Shereikis, eds. (Illinois: Northwestern University, 2015), p. 26.

[120] M. A. Leichtman "Migration, War and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shiʿi Community in Senegal" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, No. 2 (2010), pp. 269-290.

[121] It seems that this was the first major activity introduced by el-Zakzaky shortly after he was released from prison.

mournfully sanctified.[122] Within the span of these days, all the IMN assemblies (the *Majlis*, *Daira* and *Mandiqa*) stage their own mourning programmes in their respective communities nationwide with different scales of commemoration. This portrays some degree of decentralization in the IMN's conduct of the rituals.

The mourning period begins at the congregation hall – *Hussainiyyah Baqiyyatullah*[123] – the IMN headquarters in Zaria, by el-Zakzaky (or his deputy) in the presence of thousands of IMN followers. It is often a grand ceremony which includes the 'hoisting of the flag' over the dome of the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah*. The red and green flags over the dome are substituted with black and red ones respectively. The black flag, according to tradition, represents the mourning mood, while the red one symbolizes tragedy. The hoisting of the flags is executed by six members of the *Hurras* corps. They form two columns of three, and march through the crowd towards the podium to the beat of kettledrums. The flags are then hoisted. The performance is cheered up by the teeming participants, especially the women, chanting in collective echoing voice '*Labbaika Ya* Hussain' ('We Answer Your Call, Oh Hussain'). This exercise is done while all the participants remain standing. All the flags hoisted are produced locally. In 2011, el-Zakzaky was allegedly gifted a piece of the red flag that was hoisted over the dome of Hussain's tomb in 2009.[124] On the one hand, this development was celebrated as an honour for el-Zakzaky, on the other, it demonstrates symbolically that he had attracted some form of recognition from the Shi'a clerics in Iraq. Furthermore, it places the IMN in the context of the global Shia community.

After the flag-hoisting ritual, reading sessions follow that are also conducted at the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* where the history of Karbala is retold. The history is deliberately rendered in such a way that could spawn grief by painting the tragic picture of the battle. Participants go through 'exhaustive emotional fluctuations' and weeping of varying degrees, depending on individual provocation. Beverley Milton-Edwards notes that the "ultimate result of Karbala was to provide the Shi'a with a martyr and Islam with a mediator between God and man".[125]

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[122] Observing these specific days for commemorative rituals follows the tradition that was instituted by the Shia intellectuals most especially Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765) and Ibn Qulawayh (d. 980) who urged followers to observe the mourning rituals on those specific dates. See Y. Nakash "The Visitation of the Shrines of the Imams and the Shi'i Mujtahids in the Early Twentieth Century", *Studia Islamica* 81 (1995), pp. 153-164.

[123] Congregation halls where the *Ashura* commemorative rituals take place in Shi'i majority communities across the world are named *Hussainiyya*, derived from the name Hussain.

[124] There is no counter-source from Iraq that confirms the story, but the claimed rug of the flag is displayed at the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* in video footage of the *Ashura* hoisting of flags ceremony at the headquarters in 2011. The video footage is available from the author; CW-IMN-VID-002.

[125] B. Milton-Edwards, *Islam and Violence in the Modern Era* (NY: Palgrave, 2006), p. 37.

It is also important to note in the *Ashura* mourning performances at the *Hussainiyya* are the activities of a group of IMN vernacular poets whose songs at the occasion add to the tempo of the emotional experience. These poets are members of the movement and their poems' themes are basically eulogies for the *Ahl Albait* (the family of the Prophet). Richard Wolf argues that it is the music that "generates the often subtle range of emotions".[126] The session lasts for a few hours. El-Zakzaky leads the reading while all the participants appear avid spectators.[127] The 'Grand procession',[128] is staged with processional *communitas* turn out from various parts of the country. The processional march snakes from the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* through strategic points; Kofar Doka and Tudun Wada within the alleyways of Zaria city and ends at Babban Dodo, the town's biggest square. Until the late 1990s, the *Ashura* commemorative rituals took place solely in Zaria but at the end of the decade, perhaps for wider spatial visibility, the commemoration had been decentralized by instructing the local assemblies to organize their own processions.[129]

Oral sources claim that at the levels of the *Majlis*, *Daira* and *Manqid*, the *Ashura* mourning activities (re)accentuate religious identity by strengthening ties between assemblies.[130] This is done by inter-exchange of the *Wakili*/*Amir* 'lecturers' who lead/deliver lectures at the *Ashura* reading sessions of one another. The dates for the programmes are flexible, with each assembly organizing their own *Muzahara* procession anytime within the mourning period. This flexibility allows different members of particular assemblies to take part in those of their fellow brotherhoods. While the themes of the lectures are premised on the traditionally constructed Shia Karbala narrative, discussions on the state of the movement are adapted to suit the context.[131] All the reading sessions take place at the assembly space making this a closed convention.[132] This explains that the group operates within the dominated Sunni environment as marginal identity. The *Muzahara* processions of the *Ashura* mourning is the final activity in the programme of the event.

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[126] R. K. Wolf, "Embodiment and Ambivalence: Emotion in South Asian Muharram Drumming", *Year Book for Traditional Music* 32, (2000), pp. 81-116.

[127] El-Zakzaky had been released from detention in 1998, two years after the introduction of the *Ashura* commemoration programmes.

[128] This is a "general" meeting which IMN members from different parts of the country participated in. It is the "grand" assembly for the *Ashura* commemoration. However, it is difficult to estimate the size of participants but the IMN claims that numerous members come from different parts of Nigeria.

[129] CW-IMN-AUD-OO2: Video footage of El-Zakzaky's lecture at the flag off of the *Ashura* commemoration at the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* in 1999.

[130] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020; Engr Muhammad Nalado, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February, 2020 and Dr. Maimuna Hassan, member Academic Forum, by the author at her office in Bayero University in November, 2019.

[131] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo.

[132] The IMN Ashura mourning activities at the assemblies are not public. The *Hurras*, and also other members, do deploy intensive monitoring observation to identify a non-member intruding into the circles.

Men and women (clad from head to toe) wearing black, symbolizing the mournful mood, waving red and black flags, displaying banners, posters and placards with varying symbolic messages, walk in numbers of several thousand from within the urban areas and the outskirt villages to the meeting points on the morning hours on the 10th of Muharram. This is restricted to IMN members only. In Kano and Katsina, the two strongholds of the movement, Friday mosques and the emir's palaces are often chosen as the departing points, as is the case with mode of the *Muzahara* processions before 1996. In Kano, for example, three major spots are the customary points for departure: the Fagge (or *Waje* Friday Mosque), the Kano central (or emir's) Mosque and *filin dalar gyada* (the groundnut pyramid square). While information on the meeting points, the time for the meeting, the processional order are communicated at the assemblies, information on the processional routes are often not disclosed until just before the point of departure.[133] Each of the three departing points connects to the central part of the Kano metropolitan city via its major routes like the Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) Way, the Murtala Mohammed Way to the Abdullahi Wase Road down to the Nassarawa Gate overhead bridge. The processions alternate between these routes to increase visibility. The parade territorializes the public space as it lays a temporal claim over the geographical area it passes while articulating the mixed messages of piety and radical disposition, a clear demonstration of the entanglement between the religious and political spheres.[134]

The mode of organization of the processional lines recognizes the hierarchy and social status within the organizational structure of the IMN. While the entire *Mandiqa* (the village-based assemblies) converge in the metropolitan areas, the assemblies with sizable population (the *Daira*, the urban based assembly) take the lead to form the frontlines. The *Daira* is the most senior assembly under the most senior representative, the *Amir*. The smaller assemblies (the *Halqa* and *Majlis*) follow in this order. Each processional rank consists of five people. This is supposedly organized in such fashion to ensure a seamless flow of the procession. As the IMN leader in Kano claims, this arrangement is made to control transcendence that could block the routes. In practice, however, the processions cause traffic jams and disrupts motorists and pedestrians. However, the *Hurras* are deployed to ensure that the procession remains orderly.

[133] This is an attempt to pre-empt any disruption to the processions, particularly when there are clashes between the IMN processional *communitas* and the police. Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020. Security challenges of the IMN processional marches or the *Muzahara* will be addressed in the next chapter.

[134] Knut A. Jacobsen, ed. *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008) contains detailed information on how processions territorialize space and lay claims on the geographical terrain within which they move in other contexts. There are many works on similar themes. See for example, Chad E. Seales, "Parades and Processions: Protestant and Catholic Ritual Performances in a Nuevo New South Town", *Numen* 55 (2008), pp. 44-67. (see map II for processional routes in Kano and appendix II for the pictures of the *Ashura Muzahara* processions).

Part of their function is also the identification and placement of members in their respective assemblies. This would include latecomers or those who stop for a break during the procession.[135]

There are differences between the 'ephemeral' (temporal) and 'perennial' (recurrent) *Muzahara* processions. The assembly structures, which are the more concrete spaces of mobilization, have been (re)strengthened with the introduction of the *Ashura Muzahara* processions. Members and resources are mobilized through these structures and made the starting points of the rituals, as noted earlier. There is a series of events which unfold. The reading sessions of the Karbala narrative to the performative display of the rituals in a public space as the grand finale. The placement in lines of members according to their respective assemblies during the processions constitutes another layer of identity within the broader context of the movement and rejuvenates the sense of belonging. Unlike in Phase I, there has been a significant increase in the participation of women and children in Phase II *Muzahara* processions. Although there is no available quantitative evidence that indicates this surge, a review of the assemblies' membership composition provides some insight. The assemblies' structure does not formally recognize gender boundaries. In other words, women play as active a role as their male counterparts in terms of participation, ownership, and belonging. Most of the women in any given assembly, however, are wives or daughters of male members. Thus, the immediate family members of male members, in most cases, become 'automatic' members of the assembly. Women's membership and belonging are formalized more through the monthly financial 'contribution' that the male member (as the head of the family) makes to the *Shuhada* Foundation. This is therefore not a gender equal space, despite increased visibility of women. It is observed that the growth of the male members' immediate families has been proportional to the mutation of the assemblies and the overall expansion of the IMN.

Of particular significance in women's participation is the role of the *Harisat* (female militia guards) in the activities of the group who, as their male counterparts do, keep women in line in the processional ranks. In Shemeem Burney Abbas's ethnographic account, the Pakistani Shi'a ritual assemblies are described as "communicative speech event where members of a speech community congregate and participate in an event based on common beliefs, values, and attitudes".[136] For Vernon Schubel, the assemblies help 'preserve' Shia identity by collating

[135] Interview with Ustaz Muhammad Sunusi Abdulqadir, the IMN leader of Kano, by the author at Dukawiya quarters, Kano, on 23 September 2020 and Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020.

[136] S. B. Abbas, "Sakineh, The Narrator of Karbala: An Ethnographic Description of a Women's Majles Ritual in Pakistan", in K. S. Aghaie, ed., *The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), p. 141

adherents into one community.[137] It appears that the IMN's model of assemblies reflects those of other regions in the world. What is particular in Pakistan, for example, as the works of Mary Hegland show,[138] is that the assemblies are women-dominated.

One notable shift that occurred from 2015 in the IMN *Muzahara* performances was the 'involvement' of Christians. Despite their religious incompatibility, Christians were invited to take part in the processions. It was reported that a delegation of Christians under the leadership of Pastor Yohanna Y. Buru participated in the *Ashura Muzahara* that took place in October 2015 within the Kaduna metropolis. In the delegation, there were top Christian clergy, including Reverend David Abaya, Pastor Joel Zego, Pastor Maxwell Sanda, Mr. Adun A. Adua and Pastor Muhammad Abdullahi. This was a bold attempt at reconciling religious discord. According to Pastor Yohanna:

> It is expedient and necessary for us to be with our Muslims in time of sorrow, just as we commemorate with them in times of joy. Moreover, the people killed were those Luminaries in Islam the Prophet Muhammad ordered the Muslim faithful to strictly adhere to. We therefore extend our sincere condolences to the entire Muslim Ummah on this day.[139]

This symbolic peace-offering was reciprocated. The *Independent* newspaper reported in 2017 that the IMN visited three different churches in Kaduna during the Christmas period to celebrate with Christians.[140] Dr. Shuaibu Musa, the leader of the IMN in Kaduna, claims that the visit was meant to promote 'diversity and tolerance' in one of the most religiously violent-prone states in Nigeria. This development is a re-orientation of a new pattern of relationship with Christians against the backdrop of a recurrence of Muslim-Christian conflict in northern Nigeria.[141] While this shift represents a trans-faith and trans-ethnic re-orientation of the

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[137] V. Schubel, "The Muharram Majlis: The Role of a Ritual in the Preservation of Shi'a Identity", *Muslim Families in North America* (Alberta: University of Alberta, 1991), pp. 118-31.

[138] M. E. Hegland, "The Power Paradox in Muslim Women's Majales: North-West Pakistani Mourning Rituals as Sites of Contestation Over Religious Politics, Ethnicity, and Gender", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1998), pp. 391-428 and M. E. Hegland, "Shi'a Women of Northwest Pakistan and Agency Through Practice: Ritual, Resistance, Resilience", *PoLAR* 18 (1995), p. 65.

139 "Muslims, Christians Participate in Ashura Procession in Kaduna, Nigeria", October 27, 2015, https://en.shafaqna.com/21766/muslims-christians-participate-in-ashura-procession-in-kaduna-nigeria/ (accessed March, 2020).

[140] "Shia Muslims Visit Nigerian Churches to Celebrate Christmas with the Christians", 28 December 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/muslims-nigeria-church-visit-christmas-celebrate-christians-islam-shiite-shia-kaduna-a8131686.html (accessed 16 June 2021).

[141] For Muslim-Christian conflicts in Nigeria, see for example, Abdul Raufu Mustapha and David Ehrhardt, eds., *Creed and Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations and Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria* (New York: James Currey, 2018); Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (New York: University of Rochester, 1998); Isaac Terwase Sampson, "Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causal Diagnoses and Strategic Recommendations to the State and Religious Communities", *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*,12, No. 1 (2012), pp. 103-134; Akinola Ejodame Olojo, "Muslims, Christians and Religious violence in Nigeria: Patterns and Mapping (2006-2014)", *IFRA-Nigeria working papers series*, No. 32 (2014); Jude Okafor, Vincent Okeke, and Ernest Aniche, "Power Struggle, Political Contest and Ethno-Religious Violence in Nigeria", *Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science (NAJOPS)* 3, No. 1 (2012), pp. 74-87.

movement, it demonstrates a move to a more moderate dealings with long-standing contentious issues in the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.

It is obvious that this emerging solidarity with Christians emanates from the ideological transformation of the IMN which manifests in the activities of the group in recent times. This change is seen in sharp contrast with El-Zakzaki's earlier stand expressed during the famous "Funtua Declaration" of 1980s and his recent position expressed in a lecture titled "Nigeria at 50" which he delivered at the 6th Annual Conference of the Resource Forum of the Movement, themed "The right perception of Islam" that took place at the Fudiyya Islamic Center Zaria from 29th Oct, 2010 to 31st Oct, 2010. [142] These inter-faith moments at strengthening religious divisions should also be read alongside the ritual of pilgrimage, the trek otherwise known in the IMN as the *Tattaki*.

3.5 The *Tattaki* Symbolic Trek, 2000-2015

The *Tattaki*, also known as the *Arbaeen* symbolic trek, is the symbolic inter-state trek (from Kano to Zaria) that the IMN organized annually on the 20th of Safar, the second month of the lunar calendar. Established in 2000, the activities were suspended by 2015 because of the security threats in the region as well as the State declaration that the IMN was an undesirable group.[143] The *Tattaki* is the last activity of all the mourning rituals of the forty-day-long period which began with the *Ashura*. To the IMN, this long endurance trek which covers over 150km, barefoot, is meant to allow participants to 'experience' the trial and tribulation of the remnants of the family members of Hussain and his associates – the 'Captives of Karbala' – who were forcibly dragged barefoot through the scotching desert of Iraq to Damascus, covering the approximate distance of 847km. It is therefore considered a whole-hearted sacrifice to what Mahmoud Ayoub called 'redemptive suffering' of the family of the Prophet.[144] This tradition echoes the worldwide Shi'a mourning pilgrimage to Hussain's sacred burial site in Iraq in which hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites participate. In 2016, the Iraqi state-run media claimed that over 22 million Shi'a pilgrims visited Karbala, casting it as the 'world's biggest pilgrimage'.[145]

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[142] http://www.islamicmovement.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=161 (accessed January, 2023).

[143] This is discussed in the next chapter.

[144] Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam*.

[145] https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/arbaeen-worlds-largest-annual-pilgrimage-millions-shia-muslims-gather-karbala-1531726; https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sayed-mahdi-almodarresi/arbaeen pilgrimage_b_6203756.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnLw&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMmomIIPoYvmM5-5Ec9T_DA6yJcv6LbKh8gpqsLLnsfgSJwg2ah0qi0Ck8pCnmXizP6L9miOinQeX2ASdbWfl_sHHuWHTbv_Eh4MJ3UdHLvaP7Z3_sMsGvIKxxBt7sHsDoyr-PIUj-LumL2Twe32_LWEzZvyYfwuOdgJ_2KlyZNs (accessed 29 September 2020).

3.5.1 The Mode of the IMN *Tattaki*

Five major designated meeting points (hereafter MPs) were earmarked where members from various towns converged, and then trekked. This was developed based on the spatial location and proximity of members to Zaria, the final destination. The first MP was located at Pambeguwa in Kaduna state. It connected members from Taraba, Gombe, Nasarawa, and the Plateau states. The trek to Zaria from this MP covered 85.2 km. The second meeting point is also in the Kaduna metropolis, connected members from Minna and Suleja in the Niger state; Abuja and Birnin Gwari in Kaduna, Ilorin and Kogi states respectively. This trek was 81.7 km. For the Funtua MP, members from Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi states converged and trekked 73.2 km. Katsina members moved from Malumfashi, the fourth MP, covered a distance of 91.7 km. Members from Maiduguri, Yobe and Jigawa states met at Kano, the fifth and the largest MP and trekked for a 160 km, the longest of the five.[146]

A few weeks before the pilgrimage, the *Tattaki* Committee (TC) is activated to conduct a survey to locate space for makeshift toilets, tents along the routes. Factors that are taken into consideration include the suitability of the locations/spaces (in terms of its proximity to the highway, feasibility for monitoring). This requires careful planning. The planning takes into account the public cricism on the activities of the group for hijacking the routes, leading to bottlenecks on the highway. Village authorities (either the village or district head) of the villages identified for the shelter were consulted to give permission for the use of open spaces, often uncultivated lands or farmlands, within their villages to set up the makeshifts. Requests were also made to public primary and secondary schools' head teachers, principals or the education secretaries of the local government concerned.[147] Schools' facilities would require less prpapration for the pilgrims unless bushy land spaces that would require clearing. However, permission was not always granted, especially if the group was perceived to be subversive.[148]

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[146] Interview with Engr. Muhammad Nalado, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office, Department of Civil Engineering, Bayero University Kano on 6 July 2020 and Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in August 2020. The calculation of the distance in kilometers and the reflection of the geopolitical zones is done by the author.

[147] My informants claim that the permission sought by the TC from the villages and schools' authorities establishes a good relationship with the pilgrims. Some of the village members supply the pilgrims with water or food as a show of hospitality. Notwithstanding, there were instances when the IMN requests are rejected. The requests for using the schools' buildings, for example, sometimes had to go through the Local Education Authority (LEA) which could lead to delays. The rejection of the requests follows the popular stigma against the minority Shi'a group by the majority Sunni. In such a situation, an open, often bushy, land is simply cleared, which, as far as the IMN is concerned, does not require formal permission.

[148] Interview with Brother Imam Kurna, TC Member, by the author via Whatsapp chats on 17 August 2020 and interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in July 2020. The tents are made of the leather sheets of sack, tampol, roofing sheets, rope, iron poles, curtains.

Once permission was granted to make use of open spaces, the TC would conceptually design and kit out with a market space, parking lots, tents, and toilets facilities. Each assembly (*Daira*, *Halqa*, *Mandiq* and *Majlis*) is then allocated a space. The size of the land being allocated is determined by the population of the assembly. The *Amir* of each state would communicate the details to the respective leaders of assemblies, who would in turn delegate to the *Tattaki* Logistics Committee (TLC) to mobilize resources, construct and furnish the makeshifts. The TLC of each assembly was tasked with preparing and transporting all the necessary goods (cooking utensils, mats, mattresses, water containers, for example) to the sites.[149]

However, dates and time for convergence and departing from the MPs varied, depending on the days to be spent along the way. The pilgrims at the Kano MP, the farthest to Zaria, for example, would spend six days and five nights while the Malumfashi MP spend four days and three nights.[150] Thus, the closer the MP to Zaria the less the days/nights being spent. The trek would kick start at the early morning hours but there were two intermissions for prayers and resting, one at noon and the other at the evening. While the latter resting time is shorter than the former, each assembly spends the resting hours according to peculiar needs of its members. The movement, as practiced in all other public processions, goes according to the assemblies' structure with defined columns for men and women while each is moved by the melodic rhythm of the accompanying songs and performative chants.

In the event a collective resting point is not secured, each assembly is at liberty to secure a resting point. They can also decide prayer time within the resting period as well as sleeping hours.[151] In 2013, about eight villages had been earmarked/selected for the Kano pilgrims resting points and shelters: Karfi/Kwanar Dawaki, Kura, Dorawar Sallau, Dakatsalle, Kwanar Dangora, Kunkumi, Ruma, and Zabi (see **map IV** for location of these villages).[152] Distance from one village to the next vary, depending on the tempo of the trek but does not exceed 25 kilometers.

The *Hurras* kept the trek moving, but also monitored security around the shelters, and the interactions between the pilgrims. One concern was unnecessary contact between men and

[149] By the tradition of the *Tattaki*, participants are not allowed to take their belongings with them, perhaps in order not to weigh them down while trekking.
[150] Discussion between the author and Mallam Sulaiman Gambo via phone call on the 26th July, 2020.
[151] It is allowed for members who are not energetic enough or for personal reasons to join/leave the trek along the way. Interview with Dr. Maimuna Hassan by the author at her office in Sociology Department, Bayero University Kano.
[152] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, Member the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in July, 2020.

women. This included contact between spouses. The mode of settling the pilgrims at the resting points posed some problems when the practice was at the nascent stage. Initially, in 2012, pilgrims were juxtaposed and collectively camped irrespective of the assembly they belonged. This resulted in difficulties in locating individual members within a given assembly when the need arises. This has changed three years after the introduction of the pilgrimage. Pilgrims are now camped according to their assemblies and re-arranged the following morning accordingly for another round of trek.

The activities of the ISMA medical team of the IMN are also worthy of note. Instances of fainting and breakdowns of pilgrims along the way were reported by *al-Mizan*.[153] Many of the 'minor' health problems were dealt with on site. The intersecting roles of the TC, TLC, *Hurras* Media Team (MT) and ISMA made the *Tattaki* feasible. With the support of these bodies, the camp space was transformed into a site for re-education' or, arguably, 're-radicalization' and 're-indoctrination'. Film documentaries on the Karbala incident, the mode of observing the *Ashura* mourning rituals, and el-Zakzaky's video lecture footage were shown using a movie projector. These various forms of education served the purpose of the practice.[154]

The performance of pilgrimage in Nigeria either to Mekkah (by Muslims) or Jerusalem (by Christians) is an important religious obligation and has even been sponsored by the government(s) at the federal and state levels.[155] Aside from these, there are places within the country that have been declared sacred, and by implication, have become pilgrimage sites. The graveyard of the Shehu Usman *bn* Fodio in Sokoto state has been visited by large contingents of Sufi Brotherhood adherents from across different states in northern Nigeria. Emeka E. Okonkwo and C. A. Nzeh have mentioned various spaces in forests, groves, water bodies in southeast and southwestern Nigeria that have been turned into shrines or temples for pilgrimage travels.[156] While sanctification and veneration are the underlying motivations of pilgrimage travels or treks in Nigeria, the IMN *Tattaki* is the only formal trek of its kind in the country.

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[153] *Al-Mizan, Juma'a 26 ga Jimada Ula*, 1433, p. 6.
[154] Interview with Brother Imam Kurna, TC Member, by the author via Whatsapp chats on 17 August 2020 and interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in July 2020.
[155] Winston Madume, "Government Sponsorship of Pilgrimage in Nigeria: The Implication to a Challenging Economy", *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science* (IJRISS) 3, No. 8 (2019), pp. 337-343. For politics of the governments' sponsorship of pilgrimage trips in Nigeria, see Kahar Wahab Sarumi, "Between Hajj and the Christian Pilgrimage: Parallels, Contrasts, and Implications for Nigeria", *International Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Society* 8, No. 2 (2018), pp. 1-11.
[156] See Emeka E. Okonkwo and C. A. Nzeh, "Faith-Based Activities and Their Tourism Potentials in Nigeria", *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences* 1 (2009), pp. 286-298 and Emeka E.Okonkwo and Afamefuna P. Eyisi, "Pilgrimage Circuit of Osun Osogbo Sacred Grove and Shrine, Osun State, Nigeria", *Journal of Tourism and Heritage Studies* 7, No. 2 (2018), pp. 13-28.

Placing pilgrimage in the context of the scholarship, there are various perspectives around the conceptual, contextual meanings of, as well as motivations for, pilgrimage. Pilgrimage study is a nascent field but interestingly a corpus of ethnographic, sociological, historical studies has been produced that goes beyond definitions that reduce the pilgrimage to 'sacred travel'. "What [then] counts as a 'pilgrimage'"? According to George Greenia (2014) pilgrimage involves travel, expression of faith, contestation of identity, and offers "a powerful gesture of group spirituality" by which "a nation of the faithful and a faithful nation" is created.[157] Simon Coleman, Deborah Puccio-Den, Huub de Jonge, Kama Maclean, and Justine Digance,[158] among others, have partly agreed with Greenia's argument. But Coleman's definition is more explicit - that "pilgrimage involves leaving one's home to go on a journey to a distant and holy place, then returning home, often after having undergone a powerful spiritual experience".[159] However, Collins-Kreiner notes a shift to a post-modern approach in the study of pilgrimage which differentiates between 'secular pilgrimage' and 'religious pilgrimage', the former being free from religious motivation while the latter is religious. [160] As the concept of pilgrimage is re-evaluated, it has been 're-invented, contested, reframed' based on the mode and motivation of the ritual.[161] Victor Turner's '*communitas'* depicts pilgrimage as a state of 'anti-state structure' or 'liminality'.[162]

The IMN's *Tattaki* does not fit neatly into the above definitions but certainly resonates across them. There are specific points from where the trek departs and the final destination is the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* in Zaria. While the *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah* is revered as the headquarters of the movement, it is hardly sanctified as holy as Mecca or Jerusalem, the two major pilgrimage sites of the world. There is no evidence to show, at least phenomenologically, the 'powerful spiritual experience' besides the sheer commitment to the cause that the trekking

[157]G. Greenia, "What is Pilgrimage?", in Lesley D. Harman, ed., *A Sociology of Religion: Embodiment, Identity, Transformation* (London: Ursus Press, 2014), pp. 8-27.
[158] See S. Coleman, "Pilgrimage" in Robert. A. Sagel, ed., *The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 386; D. Puccio-Den, "The Anti-Mafia Movement as Religion? The Pilgrimage to Falcone's Tree", *Shrines and Pilgrimage in the Modern World*, No 49 (2008); H. de Jonge, "Patriotism and Religion: Pilgrims to Soekarno's Grave", in Peter Jan Margry, ed., *Shrines and Pilgrimage in the Modern World: New Itineraries into the Sacred* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008); K. Maclean, "Pilgrimage and Power: The Kumbh Mela in Allahabad, 1765-1954", *Oxford Scholarship Online* (2008); J. Digance, "Pilgrimage at Contested Site", *Annals of Tourism Research* 30, No. 1 (2003), pp. 143-159.
[159] Coleman, "Pilgrimage".
[160] N. Collins-Kreiner, "Researching Pilgrimage: Continuity and Transformation", *Annals of Tourism Research* 37, No. 2 (2010), pp. 440-456.
[161] Peter Jan Margry, "Secular Pilgrimage: A Contradiction in Terms?", in Peter Jan Margry, ed., *Shrines and Pilgrimage in the Modern World: New Itineraries into the Sacred* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 13.
[162] See S. Coleman, "Do You Believe in Pilgrimage? Communitas, Contestation and Beyond." *Anthropological Theory* 2, No. 3 (2002), pp. 355-368.

communitas demonstrates by enduring the hardships involved.[163] In pilgrimage, as Coleman argues, trekking "is seen as more authentic than cycling and cycling more authentic than driving a car".[164] Coleman further underlines the centrality of barefoot trek in determining a pilgrimage rite. The IMN's *Tattaki* also falls within the category of 'religious pilgrimage', as Collins-Kreiner theorizes, as it is deeply motivated by the Shi'i tradition of saint veneration. Pilgrims make 'contact with the sacred' or undergo 'sacred exchange' to quote Pnina Werbner.[165] The suffering of Hussain is supposed to be 'imagined' and felt. Besides, there are instances to cite in African context that pilgrimages are performed for material gains. Benjamin F. Soares's "Prayer Economy", for example, notes that:

> In the late twentieth Century, Nioro du Sahel, an economically marginal town in thé West African state of Mali, has become an important régional pilgrimage center for Muslims. Each year, thousands of people, coming not only from Nioro's neighboring villages and towns but also from other parts of West Africa and beyond, travel to Nioro, to seek blessings, offer gifts, and pay homage to the town's most prominent religious leaders and their lineages.[166]

The *Tattaki* was a demonstration of symbolic resilience of a collective identity on the long trek. The expansion of the IMN into the West African region makes its identity more trans-national than local. Participants from West African countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Ghana took part in the *Tattaki* and staged their trek from the Kano MP.[167] The internationality of the IMN *Tattaki* is certainly a source of concern to the constituted authority in Nigeria. Discussions on the response of the state to all the IMN public *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki* are the themes of the next chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter has examined the birth and development of Islamic activism in northern Nigeria. The mutation of religious enthusiasm was traced from the university Muslim Students

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[163] The participants express enthusiasm and gladness at having participated in the pilgrimage as a way of performative demonstrations of the impassioned mourning for the departed souls of the "Karbala martyrs". These expressions are contained in video footage of interviews that the IMN Media Forum conducted while on the pilgrimages.

[164] S. Coleman, "Pilgrimage", p. 389.

[165] P. Werbner, "Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: *Zikr* and the Sacralizing of Space among British Muslims", *Cultural Anthropology* 11, No. 3 (1996), pp. 309-338. There is a plethora of work on saints veneration both in Sufi and Shi'i tradition. See for example, Pnina Werbner and Helene Basu, eds., *Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality and The Performance of Emotion In Sufi Cults* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Gary S. Gregg, *Culture and Identity in a Muslim Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jack David Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) Rüdiger Seesemann, "Three Ibrāhīms: Literary Production and the Remaking of the Tijāniyya Sufi Order in Twentieth-Century Sudanic Africa", *Die Welt des Islams,* 49, No. 3/4, (2009), pp. 299-333.

[166] B. F. Soares, "The Prayer Economy in a Malian Town" (L'économie de la prière dans une ville malienne)." *Cahiers d'Études africaines* (1996), pp. 739-753**.**

[167] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry…p. 147.

Society (MSS) activism to the Muslim Brothers (MB) which were largely inspired, and shaped to a large extent, by the philosophy of the Egyptian-birthed *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brothers) and re-activated by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The trend continued, kept mutating according to the socio-political conditions of Nigeria and the agenda of the movement until, in 1996, the activism transformed into a radically organized Shia group called Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). The evolution of the MB and its transformation into the IMN has been synonymous with the changing religious identity of its members (as well as changing identity of Muslims in northern Nigeria more generally), who had been using the agency of public space to articulate the identity at public religious processions and demonstrations (*Muzahara*) as well as the long-distance trek/pilgrimage (*Tattaki*).

The IMN was born out of protest. It is clear that many of the earlier ephemeral *Muzahara* were essentially protest marches. The lines between politics and religion, which were somewhat upheld by the QN, led to a political vision which wanted to entrench Islamic practices. This is not surprising as it is an inherent part of the philosophy. This was further imbedded with the war on blasphemy which may have indeed appealed to Muslims of other persuasions and also created a global connection for the IMN. This led to tension and violence between Muslims but also with other religious adherents and the Nigerian state. Surprisingly, attempts were made to heal the rift. The Perennial *Muzahara* of *Ashura* and *Arbaeen*, from 1996, somewhat served as a transitional phase in which Islamic politics was diluted by religious practice. The IMN public marches marked, from 1996, a wholesome public introduction or practice of Shi'a rituality in Nigeria's religious landscape. The co-existence between the Shia ideology and the Sunni, who are the majority, remains a source of tension in the intra-religious Islamic configuration of the region. This was a fight for survival. By 2000, the *Tattaki* pilgrimage was indeed a ceremony of true redemptive suffering even if the occasion also provided an opportunity for re-education and possible radicalization. But it marked the adopting of a truly religious and traditional practice, the pilgrimage. It is however, the wholehearted claiming of the public space and the ensuing violence which pegged the IMN in a precarious position for survival.

The amalgam of nostalgic feelings as offerings to the 'redemptive sufferings' of Hussain and his cohort on one hand and the cohesive performative display of the feelings via the *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki* on the other represent the fusion of phenomenology and functionalism, the two important frames that this dissertation weaves. The "organic solidarity" (Moore, p. 324) that the movement could be said to have achieved *functions* as a binding force over time in Nigeria's socio-political sphere. Again, phenomenologically, this brings us back to the argument put forward by Talal Asad, as alluded to in this dissertation, that the ethical

formation of persons is central to ritual practices. And this is what those public performances represent in part.

While all these public rituals are rooted historically in the discourse of memory and sainthood, they are sites of collective identity articulation, political demonstration of resistance, resilience and visibility in Nigeria's saturated religious sphere. But this visibility, unlike the QN, was still shrouded in a level of secrecy. Non-members were not welcome, except by invitation. Reaction towards all of the IMN ceremonies, despite the distinctions made in this chapter, later led to a blanket ban on their activities. The next chapter examines the conflict that emanates from this tension in relation to the handling of public religious processions by the state as well as the reaction of the public.

Chapter Four

Nationalism, Security and State Control: Regulating the QN and the IMN Public Religiosity, 1967 – 2015

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Two examined the *Maukibi*, the QN annual procession and the *Muzahara*, the IMN ephemeral and perennial processions in Chapter Three. This chapter discusses the state's successive interventions to tame the public religiosity of the QN and IMN. The state's intervention will be analyzed in phases as it unfolded under different political regimes, the military and civilian. The dynamics of state control in dealing with both of the groups' public religiosity is viewed within the prism of the state's attempt to tame religious activism and its ideational influences over the citizenry in a plural society like Nigeria. Perhaps, the state intervention is timely as the IMN aspires to create an 'Islamic state'. The chapter will highlight the question of religious nationalism and religious freedom in a broader discourse of state legitimacy and the influence of religious leaders, essentially non-state actors.

4.2 Constitution, Nationalism and Identity: A Background

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as amended) states that: "Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any […] other association for the protection of his interests".[1] It further states that: "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance".[2] The fundamental right of each Nigerian to assemble, to form association, to propagate, practice or observe their religion is theoretically guaranteed. One critical element in this submission that needs to be underlined is the explicit mention of 'public' as the arena of religious observance. Yet, the 'public' here is contested.

Jugen Habermas defined the public sphere as "a social space—distinct from the state, the economy, and the family—in which individuals could engage each other as private citizens

[1] Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, No. 24, LL47.
[2] Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, No. 24, LL46.

deliberating about the common good," and Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpens' rendering of this definition is helpful for the themes covered in this chapter. While Habermas' idea of public space is applicable to Nigeria, Ogoh Alubo believes that the pluralistic nature of the country's 'public' or 'publics',[4] with its level of ethno-religious contestation, is critical.

The constitution makes provisions for the pluralistic nature of Nigeria's society. Unfortunately, it is unclear on how the 'practice' or 'observance' of 'religion' is to be negotiated. However, the two major religions in Nigeria – Islam and Christianity – each have a manual that contains detailed descriptions of the mode of execution of their religious rites. Neither military nor civilian administrations appear to have consulted these texts when ruling on public religious processions, pilgrimage and protests. The state's approach is shaped, to some extent, by the question of nationalism. Atalia Omer and Jason A. Springs comment on this: "In what ways do national identities selectively […] make use of practices and understandings drawn from organized or historical religious traditions (rituals, symbols, myths, sacred spaces and times, etc.) to imagine, justify, and perpetuate themselves? Are such links always and necessarily destructive and exclusionary?"[5] Studies on Nigeria conclude that the rising influence of ethno-religious identities in many spheres of the country has undermined the formation of national identity. Situations arise where there is stiff contestation of space in which ethnicity and religion are manipulated for political and economic ends.[6]

While both the QN and IMN public marches are religiously ritualized practices and characterized by deployment or display of symbols in public spaces, they are not wholly destructive but rather have the potential to incite violence. One is not always able to identify the source of the violence. Rather, Johan Galtung's 'structural violence' theory helps to discern the associated violence with those religious practices. According to Mark Vorobe, "structural violence is violence that results in harm but is not caused by a clearly identifiable actor".[7] In cases where state regulatory measure leads to more religious violence, both the state and religious body needs to share responsibility. In most cases, the religious group suffers the consequence as the government, as is the case in Nigeria, resorts to "harassment,

[4] O. Alubo, "The Public Space in Nigeria: Politics of Power, Gender and Exclusion", *Africa Development,* 36, No.1 (2011), pp. 75–95.
[5] A. Omer and J. A. Springs, *Religious Nationalism: A Reference Book* (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC), p. xiv.
[6] See Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa and Andrew Emmanuel Okem, "Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Impact of Ethnicity and Religion on National Identity in Nigeria", *Peace Research,* 43, No. 2 (2011), pp. 98-125. Yusuf Bala Usman, a radical Nigerian historian, warned about the manipulative use of religion in Nigeria's political space which is virulent and detrimental to the effective political and economic development of the country. See: Yusufu Bala Usman, *The Manipulation of Religion, 1977-1987* (Lagos: Vanguard Printers and Publishers, 1987).
[7] M. Vorobej, "Structural Violence", *The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies,* 40, No. 2 (2008), pp. 84-98.

surveillance/spying, bans, arrests, torture, and mass killing by government agents and/or affiliates".[8]

The debate on 'religious nationalism' triggers the underlying question of duality in nationalism: nationalism to the state or to non-state institutions? The rise of faith-based communities in Nigeria leads to the problem of dual patriotism – partly for religious elite and for the state – or what Sun Yat-Sen calls 'a union of sovereign and subject'.[9] This kind of situation motivates some scholars to narrowly misinterpret religious nationalism as "uniquely volatile and anti-modern form of nationalism".[10] Here, a pragmatic conflict or 'contested construction' occurs between religion and modernism on one hand and religion and secularism on the other.

The practical co-existence of religion and secularism, on the one hand, and religion and modernism, on the other, within a political system, has sparked debate too. Scholarly perspectives and context-specific solutions have been offered. According to George Jacob Holyoake, secularism refers to "a variety of utilitarian social ethics and sought human improvement through reason, science and global organization".[11] Moving from the dominant narrative that secularism is the separation of religion and state, John Esposito argues that secularism is far more complex. According to him, secularism, in modern states, involves a purge of religion from the public sphere.[12] It is a "doctrine", he asserts, that was historically imposed by the colonial regimes on the political set up of the colonized, Nigeria inclusive, and so inherited. The degree of applicability of the secularization "as a sociological process" varies from one country to another, depending on socio-political dynamics.[13]

The complex co-existence of religion and a secular political sphere also gives rise to discourse about the entanglement of religion and 'modernity' in modern African. In what Clinton Bennett calls 'the crisis of modernity' argues that "Islam faced a fundamental challenge as it entered the modern world".[16] Inspite that Islamic practice predates the establishment of

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[8] C. Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 10 (2007), p. 2.
[9] S. Yat-Sen, "The National Entity of Japan and the Japanese Subject" in Elie Kedoure, ed., *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1970), p. 322.
[10] Omer and Springs, *Religious Nationalism*, p. xiii.
[11] G. J. Holyoake, *The Principles of Secularism* (London: Bookstore, 1871). Also cited in Wu Bingbing, "Secularism and Secularization in the Arab World", *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia),*1. No. 1 (2007), pp. 55-65.
[12] J. Esposito, "Islam and Secularism: Exploring the Place of Religion in Secular Society", *Religion and Secularism*, pp. 4-10.
[13] See for example, Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co., 2010); Ragini Sen, Wolfgang Wagner and Caroline Howarth, *Secularism and Religion in Multi-Faith Societies: The Case of India* (Switzland: Springer, 2014).
[16] C. Bennett, *Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates* (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 17.

modern states yet religious institutions found themselves under threat. Islam is thus engaged in dialectic interactions with systemic norms and values of the so-called 'modern world' that necessitate shifts. These shifts are reflected in the struggles by religious movements to live under 'secular' and 'modern' political systems which de-emphasize religion from the public sphere, or ban it all together.

Nigeria is not exceptional. According to Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, as quoted in Charles Keyes *et al.*, Asian countries have had to make similar negotiations:

> The process of creating modern nation states has […] entailed two rather contradictory stances towards religion. While the modernizing stance leads to a de-emphasis of ritual practices, the nation-building one leads to the promotion of selected practices and even the invention of new rites. Modernization emphasizes rational action; nation-building insists on a commitment of faith. The tension between these two stances as well as that between each of them and those of religious practices that derive their authority from other than the state, have contributed to the crisis of authority.[17]

It is in the context of this so-called 'crisis of authority' that the intersection of religion and modernity has been problematized and thus interpreted differently. For example, Armando Salvatore views it as "the mismatch between Islam and modernity",[18] while Samuli Schielke frames it as 'hegemonic encounter'.[19] More so, as the intersection of nationalism, modernism and religion breeds a 'crises of authority', so the process of articulating identities within the broader context of the nation-state further results in violence. Thus, the drive for nationalism and modernization, coupled with the propensity for an orderly and secured urban environment, underscores the motivation behind the regulation of public religiosity of the QN and IMN. This is executed through the imposition of 'restriction', 'suspension' and 'ban'. In other words, the attempt to tame public religiosity coincides with the state's political will to enforce social order as requisite for modernity. Jose Casanova (1994) points out that "there is…another sense in which the privatization of religion is intrinsically related to the emergence of the modern social order".[20]

In recent times, massive processions and protests have toppled states, and this has not gone unnoticed by fragile states. The revolution of 1979, for example, that toppled Reza

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[17] A. B. Shamsul, "Identity Construction, Nation Formation, and Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia", in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, eds., *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press, 1997), p. 207.

[18] A. Salvatore, "Tradition and Modernity within Islamic Civilization and the West", in M. K. Masud, A. Salvatore and M. van Bruinessen, eds., *Islam and Modernity*: *Key Issues and Debates* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 4.

[19] S. Schielke, "Hegemonic Encounters: Criticism of Saints-day Festivals and the Formation of Modern Islam in Late 19th and Early 20th-century Egypt", *Die Welt des Islams* 47, No. 3-4 (2007).

[20] J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 40.

Pahlavi's government in Iran and ushered in the Islamic Republic of Iran was engineered by orchestrated and sustained mass protests. This is currently being challenged by a wave of demonstrations across the country. This political change was decisive as it marked the spread of Iran's brand of Shi'ism in the Muslim world, including Nigeria. It could also be argued that this led to a fresh wave of religious 'fundamentalism'. The event sparked the historic rivalry and sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shia sects. In parts of the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia, with significant Shia minority, public religious processions have been turned to theatres of bloody violence. They articulate the sectarian divides and distinguish the proverbial 'other' through 'collective violence'.[21] This in turn determines the state's response.

This chapter analyses two different but interconnected contexts: the first examines the 'restriction' of the QN's *Maukibi* processions in Kano (under different Kano state administrations from 1967-2014) and the reason(s) that prompted each government (1967-2004) to impose these restrictions, as well as the processes and politics around the imposition of the regulations. The second context focuses on the 'ban' of the IMN's *Muzahara* processions. This was formally announced by the Kaduna state government on 6 October 2016, but has a longer history.

Historical and anthropological studies provide many synonyms under which the practice of procession is placed under state control. These include: 'suppression', 'regulation', 'ban', 'clos[ing] street', 'confine[ment]', 'prohibit[ion]', 'prevent[ion]', 'denounce[ment]', 'licens[ing]', 'management', 'moderation' etc.[22] The variations depend on the spatial restrictions imposed. For example, while cuts to the size of some processions had been imposed, others had to apply for a license before being executed, and many more operated under a much tighter state control. At times, the processions are 'suppressed' by means of coercion, as Azam Torab, Toft Madsen and Muhammad Hassan, and Reza Mas'udi have demonstrated in their studies of public religiosity in India and Southeast Asia.[23] In this study, the term 'restriction' in

[21] See for example, George J. Bryjak, "Collective violence in India", *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 13, No. 2 (1986), pp. 35-55; Deepak Mehta, "Collective Violence, Public Spaces, and the Unmaking of Men", *Men and Masculinities* 9, No. 2 (2006), pp. 204-225; Ashutosh Varshney, "Analyzing Collective Violence in Indonesia: An overview", *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8, No. 3 (2008), pp. 341-359; Marie-Eve Reny, "Forms of Collective Violence: Riots, Pogroms and Genocide in Modern India", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2007), pp. 393.

[22] See, for example, R. M. Nejad, " Urban Margins, a Refuge for Muharram Processions in Bombay: Towards an Idea of Cultural Resilience", *South Asia Chronicle* 5 (2015), pp. 325-346; A. Torab, *Performing Islam: Gender and Ritual in Iran* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), particularly chapter seven "Reversal and License", pp. 194-222; and K. A. Jacobsen, *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), particularly chapter three "Mapping the Management of Threatening Gods and Social Conflict: A Territorial Approach to Processions in a South Indian Village (Tamil Nadu)" by Pierre-Yves Trouillet and chapter eight "Moderating Muharram" by Stig Toft Madsen and Muhammad Hassan.

[23] A. Torab, *Performing Islam* …; K. Jacobsen, ed. *South Asian Religions on Display* … ; and R. M. Nejad, "Urban Margins"

the case of the QN seems apt and is inspired by a formal letter from the Commissioner of Police to Shaykh Nasiru Kabara on 9 December 1986.[24] The term 'ban' is drawn from the statement made by Mallam Nasiru el-Rufai, the Kaduna state governor (2015-Present), on 6 October 2016 in which he declared the IMN to be 'unlawful' because they were (perceived to be) a threat to peace and security.[25] However, the circumstances for, and the imposing of, the restrictions varied from one political regime to another. The consequence of this on the collective religious identity making of both groups will be foreground. Essentially Chapters Two and Three have investigated the significance of processions and pilgrimage to identity formation, here we reflect on how the implications of restrictions are on this process.

4.3 Negotiating Authority and Space: The QN and the Kano State Government(s), 1967- 2004

Nigeria gained its independence from Britain on 1 October 1960. The country was run as a federal system with a prime minister and ceremonial head of state. Ethnic and religious tensions were rife. The northern parts of the country feared that southerners would eventually become a stronger political entity, while the south complained of an overly powerful influence of the north. Subsequent civilian and military political regimes formed a unique system of governance, from a 'separatist regionalism' (1954-1960) to the 'confederates' (1967-1970).[26] Allegations of corruption and nepotism after the 1965 general elections further factionalized state institutions and these were largely based on religious differences. This led to the 1966 coup in which all the northern leaders in the government were killed and the country plunged into Civil War (1967 – 1970). The Civil War, also known as Biafran War, was fought between the forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and those of 'Biafra'. The movement was led by Major Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, an Igbo, one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria.[27] This visibly polarized Nigeria's society along ethnic, regional and religious lines.

The abrupt termination of the democratic dispensation of the First Republic, the Civil War, and the assassination of General Murtala Ramat Muhammad, Nigeria's military Head of

[24] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005: 'A letter with reference number SB.8270/KS/V.13/805'.
[25] This declaration was reported by many of Nigeria's national newspapers. See https://www.thecable.ng/el-rufai-we-banned-the-imn-not-the-shia-sect; and https://punchng.com/kaduna-bans-el-zakzakys-shiite-group-imn/ (accessed 16 November, 2020).
[26] A. M. Ahanotu, *Religion, State and Society: Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, Zaire and Mozambique* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1992), p. 12.
[27] See for example A. A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980); O. Obasanjo, *My Command* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1981); F. Forsyth, *The Biafran Story*: *The Making of an African Legend* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1982).

State (1975 - 1976) paved the way for military takeover. Since then, Nigeria has been tossed from one military rule to another, with attendant consequences of violation of fundamental human rights, political instability and recurring ethno-religious violence. Between 1979 and 1985, even more religious conflict ensued. The oil boom of 1970-1980 led to a superficial and short-lived moment of prosperity. This was followed by economic crises, rising unemployment and frustration on the part of the citizenry. The petro-dollars of the oil boom further enriched the affluent while the 'urban poor' suffered the repercussion of the neo-liberal economic policies of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Nigeria's Head of State (1985 - 1993).[28] This caused dramatic changes in the socio-economic landscape, particularly in northern Nigeria. It is here, and in this context, that the IMN grew as a movement.

According to Kane, it was in the context of a dramatic 'fragmentation of authority' that an influx of militant religious ideas proliferated and challenged not only other Islamic groups in northern Nigeria - the Sufis in particular - but also the state. [29] The section below discusses the regulatory practices of the QN *Maukibi* processions by successive Kano state administrations and the circumstances that shaped the regulations. This is discussed under separate phases and scopes of the administrations.

4.3.1 Phase I: 1967-1976

The recurrence of riots and disturbances in northern Nigeria and the Kano urban space made the Kano state administrations very sensitive to crowds of whatever form.[30] These disturbances – beginning with the infamous 'Kano Disturbances' of 1953 – required colonial intervention quite simply, as Gustav Le Bon puts it, because it had the potentiality of being counter-productive to peace.[31] Between 16-19 May 1953, political squabbles unraveled between the stalwarts of the Action Group (AG), the Yoroba dominated political party based in the south west of Nigeria and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the Hausa/Fulani dominated political party based in the north. Each of the two parties was struggling to mobilize support of the people as the race for independence was waged.

> At 8.30 in the morning, the *procession* [my emphasis] by the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) which was accompanied by a number of Native Administration Police to ensure against incident took place. It consisted of four kit-cars and a large number of cyclists and

[28] P. Lubeck, *Islam and Urban Labor: The Making of a Muslim Working Class in Northern Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[29] O. Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 69.
[30] According to Haruna Wakili, between 1953 and 1995 'about seven major riots took place in urban Kano' with different motives: religious, political and ethnic. See H. Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995: An Historical Perspective" (PhD Diss., Bayero University, Kano, 1997).
[31] See G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., [1986] 2002).

> pedestrians. The total number taking part, as distinct from the crowd that followed, is estimated as being about one thousand. A few members carried walking sticks and there is no evidence of any of the original gathering carrying offensive weapons such as swords, spears or bows […] The procession was quite orderly and peaceful except for the shouting of slogans such as 'We do not want the Yorobas here' (i.e the Action Group Delegation).[32]

The procession was politically motivated. It was symbolically deployed as an instrument of mass mobilization against the prevailing political influence of the AG at the time. Transcending the approved processional routes into the Sabon Gari area, the march became the immediate source of the outburst as the pageants were alleged to have "attacked" minority "southerners" in the area. There are two main conceptions of the Sabon Gari area: some perceive the Sabon Gari to be a system of residential organization that was created in order to "protect Islam and the culture of the predominantly Muslim population" from the Euro-Christian traders and missionaries, and internal migrants. Others consider that the Sabon Gari of Kano, and those of other parts of northern Nigeria, were established essentially based on the colonial policies of racialism and residential segregation.[33]

Soon after independence, the '*Araba*' (separatists) demonstrations led to a fresh wave of riots which broke out on 28 May 1966. The riot began when a group of students gathered to protest the 'Unification Decree' promulgated by the military head of state Major General Aguiyi Ironsi. Eventually, the allegedly 'peaceful demonstration' turned into a violent riot when a band of 'thugs' joined the crowd.[34] This riot was a symbolic expression of the growing anger against the Igbos who allegedly killed the key political leaders of the north in the bloody *coup d'état* of 15 January 1966 that terminated the First Republic. As a result, there was a mass exodus of Igbos from Kano. The population of the Sabon Gari area dropped drastically from 41,956 in 1966 to 2,129 in 1968.[35] This situation was one of the factors— the January 1966 coup and counter-coup, the failure of the Aburi Conference, secessionists' declaration of Biafra Republic —that lapsed the country into a 30-months Civil War.

Despite the disturbances, the *Maukibi* procession under the colonial authorities continued unabated.[36] The QN leadership, however, had to enter into conversation in the context

[32] Report on the Kano Disturbances 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th May, 1953 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1953), p. 7.
[33] For details on the Sabon Gari, see Ahmed Bako and M. T. Usman, "Colonialism and the Growth of the Sabon Gari System in the Early 20th Century Kano" in A. U. Adamu & B. B. Gwarzo, eds., *Kano Millennium: 1,000 Years in History* (Kano: Government House, Kano, 2010), p. 260-272.
[34] Haruna Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995", pp. 126-138.
[35] Alan I. Frishman, "The Spatial Growth and Residential Location Pattern of Kano, Nigeria" (PhD Diss., Northwestern University, 1977), p. 193.
[36] CO 551-1321 'Nigeria: Muslim Influences and Problems' [Colonial Report].

of growing civil unrest with the Audu Bako administration (1967-1976),[37] the first indigenous governor of Kano state. Audu Bako spoke with Shaykh Nasiru Kabara over the restriction – temporary suspension – of the *Maukibi* procession in light of the War situation. Audu Bako instructed the Kano state emirate council to intervene.[38] Audu Bako 'directed' that the Kano emirate council intervene to negotiate the suspension with Nasiru Kabara which he defied. The emirate council was recognized by the state as the custodian of cultural traditions and the institution that represented Islamic heritage. Historically, there existed good cooperation between the traditional leaders and Islamic scholars in Kano.[39] This cooperation worked more in terms of involving the Islamic scholars in legal matters, education, mediation etc. It appears that the emirate council intervention worked in favor of Nasiru Kabara as the state government allowed the *Maukibi* processional event to take place. It could be argued that the patrilineal relationship of Nasiru Kabara with the emirate council could have motivated its intervention.[40] Nasiru Kabara had, from 1954 to 1963, been a part of the policymaking and administration of the Native Authority (NA). In 1953, the emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953), appointed him a member of the Council of Advisers to the emirate. Although Nasiru Kabara was later relieved of that advisory position, the emir Muhammadu Sunsi (1954-1963), who succeeded Bayero, re-appointed him as a legal consultant to the Northern Muslim Court of Appeal.

Nasiru Kabara was adamant about the continuation of the *Maukibi* procession. In his words, "he would rather die than to submit to the futile instruction of the state". The argument made is that the procession would rather "invoke the intervention of God". Interestingly there

[37] Audo Bako (d. 1980) was a police and administrator. He rose to the position of the deputy head of the Native Authority police in the now defunct northern region. He was appointed military governor of Kano in May 1967. For details on the Audu Bako administration, see A. N. Shehu, "Kano State Under the Administration of Audu Bako 1967-1975" (M.A. Diss., BUK, 1997).

[38] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: Ibrahim A. Isa, *'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su*' [The Qadiriyya Procession: Its History, Prospects and Challenges] (2004), pp. 54-55. Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office at Bayero University Kano in November 2019.

[39] For details on the cooperation between the traditional leaders and Islamic scholars, see Asma'u G. Saeed, "Cooperation between Religious Leaders and Traditional Authority in Kano", in Abdallah Uba Adamu, ed., *Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: Past, Present, and Future* (Proceedings of the National Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria, Organized by the Kano State Emirate Council to commemorate the 40th anniversary of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD, as the Emir of Kano), pp. 187-196.

[40] Nasiru Kabara served, more or less, as the "private" teacher to three consecutive emirs of Kano: Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953), Muhammadu Sunusi I (1954-1963), and Ado Bayero (1963-2014), as well as some members of their immediate families. This relation goes back to the 19th century when the grandfather of Nasiru Kabara, Shaykh Umar Kabara, migrated to Kano from Timbuktu and contributed to the formation of the theocratic state of Kano after the Sokoto Jihad among other Jihad leaders who became emirate officials. Hence, the relationship was developed with the emirate officials or the emirs seeking scholarly intervention of Kabara scholars in legal and other intellectual matters. See the background information of chapter two in this dissertation and Ahmad Muhammad Kani, "The Place of Kano in the Intellectual History of Bilad Al-Sudan", in A. U. Adamu and B. B. Gwarzo, eds., *Kano Millennium: 1,000 Years in History* (Kano: Research & Documentation Directorate, 2010), pp. 19-36.

was no reaction from the state in terms of police or military intervention, probably because of the relatively passive nature of the QN procession, as exhibited in Chapter 2. But this rejection of state decree also bolstered the religious charisma of Nasiru Kabara and the perceived efficacy of the procession amongst adherents. They believe that the intercessional prayers of the Shaykh had brought the War to an end.[41]

4.3.2 Phase II: 1977 – 1991

The pattern of negotiating authority and space between the QN and the successive Kano state governments has taken precedence from Audu Bako's administration. But the mode of the engagements shifted, depending on the circumstances. For example, by 1977, Nasiru Kabara had established an expansive network of contacts across different regions in Africa and the Middle East, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. Nasiru Kabara had travelled to Iraq in 1952. There, he met with Saif al-Deen *bn* 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the grandson of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. Since then, he had been on visits, at different intervals, to different locations like Jordan where he met with Hazim Abu Ghazala (d. 2013),[42] Sudan with Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Dayyib al-Sudani, the leaders of the Sammaniyya Brotherhood in Sudan and Libya with Imran Hussein through whose influence he had audience with Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi, the Libyan leader (d. 2011).[43] Part of Nasiru Kabara's network in East Africa, as described by Roman Loimeier, included Sayyid Umar Abdallah in Zanzibar, who not only had contact with Nasiru Kabara but appeared on the list of his *muqaddamun* (representatives) in the region.[44] Both John Paden and Roman Loimeier consider this Sufi networking as a re-enactment of the *silsila* (chains of spiritual authority) from the original sources of authoritative conferment.[45] They, however, underestimate the implications of these foreign contacts which led to some restrictions on the *Maukibi* procession.

Diplomatic relations with the leadership of the Sufi establishments of these countries meant a repositioning of the QN within the global Sufi network. More so, the most critical

[41] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office at Bayero University Kano in November 2019. QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: Ibrahim A. Isa, *'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su'*. The latter document is in support of Matabuli's information.

[42] Abu Ghazala is originally Palestinian but later in his life went on exile to Jordan where he became the Imam, mufti, and head of the Jam-e-yatu Darul Qur'an institution. A Shazali Brotherhood Shaykh, Abu Ghazala studied journalism and Islamic sciences at the University of Damascus.

[43] His contact with the Libyan leader was rewarding because the latter had financially supported the publishing of Nasiru Kabara's Qur'an translation into Hausa language.

[44] R. Loimeier, "Translocal Networks of Saints and the Negotiation of Religious Disputes in Local Contexts", *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 51, No. 135, (2006), pp. 17-32.

[45] J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (California: University of California Press, 1973); and R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1997).

aspect of this networking was the fact that the Diplomatic offices of these countries had been used in the 1970s and 1980s to invite either those Sufi leaders or the Diplomats themselves to the *Maukibi* processional event who, invariably, represented their respective countries.[46] Nasiru Kabara's direct engagement with the embassies appeared to have infringed on the sphere of the exclusive powers of the Federal government.[47]

From 1981, the imposition of restrictions on the *Maukibi* procession had shifted from negotiation to the deployment of the state police. More so, the negotiation venue was moved from the emirate palace to police headquarters. This security measure was re-articulated against the background of the 'rampage' that occurred in July 1981 which led to the loss of lives, and property worth hundreds of millions of Naira.[48] The QN leadership was expected to apply for permission from the Commissioner of Police (CP) ahead of staging the procession.

The *Maukibi* correspondence shows that the QN had to either inform state officials about the details of the procession or request permission, through a formal letter, from the serving governor, the police and other security apparatuses such as the National Security Organization (NSO), the Permanent Secretary, Security Division of the "Government House" (or the office of the governor), as well as other dignitaries within and outside the government. Permission was dependent on the intelligence 'situational report' of the processional routes, the spatial stretches of the cortège, the size of the participants, the caliber or 'identities' of the invited guests (foreign and local), the mode of the reading sessions, as well as the essence of the lectures to be delivered at the *Maukibi* ground, among other things.[49] The available archival records at the QN secretariat indicate that the first formal 'letter for permission' addressed to the Commissioner of Police was written on 12 February 1981 (see appendix 4.2 for the letter), a week before the *Maukibi* ceremony. This was more a request for police backup:

[46] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office at Bayero University Kano in November 2019. Matabuli is of the view that Nasiru Kabara used Diplomatic offices as a channel of communication because of the lack of modern means like email. There are documents at the QN secretariat which the author is in possession of which comprise of invitation letters/cards to diplomats over the years, their photographs, and covering letters for visa applications in respect of the foreign invited guests.

[47] See C. N. Okeke, "Nigerian Foreign Policy Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979)", *Suffolk Transnational Law Journal*, 5, No. 2 (1981), pp. 201-212.

[48] The principal cause of the "rampage" was believed to be a violent reaction of the masses against the "continued disrespect" of the Kano emirate by the Peoples' Redemption Party's (PRP) government led by Abubakar Rimi (1981-1984), the first civilian regime in Kano. For details, see H. Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995" pp. 85-105 and "Justice Fernandez Commission of Inquiry Report into the July 10th 1981 Rampage in Kano" (Kano, November, 1981).

[49] The intelligence reports and the correspondence between the QN and the police have, from 1981, been consistently indicating this trend. For example, the Police Annual Reports with reference numbers CB.4101/CIB/KS/6 – January, 1985 and CB.4101/E/KS/11 – January, 1986 (the files are in possession of the police headquarters, Kano command) are clear examples in point.

> As usual, we need some police escorts as follows: 1-20 horse rider police; 2-60 policemen. These escorts will accompany the rally on Tuesday 17th February, 1981 from Kabara quarters down to Maigiginya grave yards along Katsina road, which will [goes] through Koki quarters for the safety of the rallies.[50]

Responses from the police were positive but with stringent protocols for approving the designated processional routes. If there was a danger of clashes, the QN leadership was summoned to sign an undertaking with the police that they would ensure safe ceremonial marches.[51] Responsibility was therefore placed on the QN. This is an indication that there was no concern that the organisation itself would instigate violence. The QN leadership was also willing to agree to these terms because their march was religious more than political in objective.[52] As discussed in chapter two, aside the police escorts, two set of militia guards — *Shuj'an* al-Islam and *Muraqqa'* — were formed to support the police operations.[53]

Unfortunately, ethno-religious violence broke out in the area on 30 October 1982. This incidence was considered the first contemporary wide scale clash between Muslims and Christians in the history of Kano. This unfolded in a much broader underlying socio-economic crisis which left inhabitants frustrated and resentful. Much misplaced anger sparked clashes over a recently built 'mega Church' close to the Waje Friday Mosque,[54] upsetting Muslims living in the Fagge area. This more permanent appropriation of the 'public space' resulted in retaliation. By 1984, quite understandably, the military governor of Kano, AVM Hamza Abdullahi (1984-1985), suspended the *Maukibi* ceremony on the eve of the event.[55] The *al-Ihsan*, the *Maukibi* Central Organizing Committee, swiftly consulted with some of the Kano intelligentsia (comprised of both businessmen and traditional title-holders).[56] The QN sent a "high-profile" delegation of prominent Islamic scholars and business elites to the Office of the Deputy Governor, Alhaji Abba Abdullahi Danbatta.[57] The intervention led to the rescinding of

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[50] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005: 'Correspondence between the police and the QN leadership'

[51] Interview with Dr. Matabuli Shehu Kabara by the author at his office at Bayero University Kano in November 2019.

[52] Although the *Shuj'an* al-Islam were first formed in the early 1970s, the formation of the *Muraqqa'* in 1980 re-inforced the *Shuj'an* al-Islam, QN-SEC-DOCSEC/006: 'Minutes of the Meetings of the Maukibi of the Year 1980'.

[53] Although the Shuj'an al-Islam were first formed since the early 1970s, the formation of the Muraqqa' folks in the 1980 re-inforced the *Shuj'an* al-Islam. As the minutes of meeting of the Maukibi which was held on the 7th March, 1980 has shown, the idea for the formation of the Muraqqa' was given by one Ashiru Sudawa and was implemented on that year's event. QN-SEC-DOCSEC/006: 'Minutes of the Meetings of the Maukibi of the Year 1980'.

[54] The violence caused serious cleavages between Muslims, the host community, and Christians, largely migrants. See Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995", pp. 197-204; and Thaddeus Byimui Umaru, "Toward Christian-Muslim Dialogue and Peace Building Activities in Northern Nigeria: Theological Reflection", (PhD Diss., University of Glasgow, 2013).

[55] *New Nigeria*18, No. 6, 1985.FIX

[56] They were Sani Buhari Daura, Tijjani Hashim, Isa Abdullahi.

[57] Ibrahim A. Isa, 'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su' mentioned Alhaji Aminu Dantata, Mallam Isyaka Rabiu, and Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa. These personalities represent a

the 'suspension' of the entire event to 'confinement' of the *Maukibi* to the premises of the *Gidan* Qadiriyya, the QN headquarters.[58] The procession and symbols associated with the procession, such as the playing of the *bandir* (broad-trimmed drum), were prohibited. The suspension of the latter practice speaks to the power attributed to sound as an instrument of religious calling and could activate liminal mood that could spark disorderly actions on the part of the processional participants. The event took place under tight police surveillance at the *Gidan* Qadiriyya premises.[59] It cannot be concluded that the sequence of events constituted an attempt to regulate religious processions. The state had a duty to protect its citizens. What is apparent is the way in which negotiations unfolded to allow some acknowledgement of QN rituals but within reasonable limits.

The political, ethno-religious disturbances and the state's attempts at crowd control continued to determine the scale of the government's responsiveness to crowds. Another wave of ethno-religious disturbance erupted in October 1991 during the administration of Colonel Idris Garba (1989-1992). The disturbance was ignited by the crusading mission of Rev. Reinhard Bonnke, a German evangelist, "who was to preside over a Christian healing and faith revival session in Kano city".[60] Bonnke's exaggerated high-powered spiritual healings were considered by Muslims as a potentially blasphemous invective. Muslim scholars – namely Nasiru Kabara, Abdulkarim Dayyabu of the Izala and Abubakar Na Abba of the Tijjaniyya – made an appeal to the government to cease the planned event.[61] The violence that Bonnke's affair ignited prompted the government to cancel the event. The *Maukibi* was suspended in that year but the order was relaxed to 'confinement', as was the case in 1982, following the intervention of a 'delegation' sent by the QN. What is clear during this period is the egalitarian manner in which both Christian and Muslim events had to be regulated by the state to ensure broader state security. There is, however, a clear indication that the social and political connections of the QN, allowed for lengthier and more sensitive handling of the QN procession in contrast to the Bonkke affair.

combination of business class, Islamic scholars and bureaucrats in Kano. They seem to be friends of the QN and confident in matters that involved dealing with the government.

[58] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/006: 'Maukibi Correspondences Files (letter from the police with reference number SB.8270/KS/V.13/805)'.

[59] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: Ibrahim A. Isa, 'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su'. The Gidan Qadiriyya has been discussed in chapter two.

[60] Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995", p. 204.

[61] Wakili, "The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893-1995", p. 206.

4.3.3 Phase III: 1992 – 2004

Much changed within this period. Firstly, there was transition from military rule to civilian administration. The Third Republic was formed between 1992 and 1993. Secondly, the federal government involved in the restrictions processes on religious assemblies. This would alter the way in which they had to be performed. Thus, the mode and scope of the restrictions had changed to some extent. Thirdly, Nasiru Kabara died in 1996 and was succeeded by his son Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara. While he continued the *Maukibi* legacy, he strategically involved politicians at state and federal level into the activities of the *Maukibi* ceremony, thus ensuring easier negotiations and, perhaps support, to host the annual event.

The Third Republic saw the election into office of Kabiru Ibrahim Gaya as the civilian governor of Kano state. Contrary to the expectation of the QN leadership, the *Maukibi* was prohibited due to the sanctions implemented by the Federal Military Council (FMC). Gaya, along with two civilian governors, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (1999-2003) and Ibrahim Shekarau (2003-2011), had too implemented the moratorium in Kano. Each administration had imposed one form of restriction or another on the *Maukibi* ceremony. Unlike during the administration of Gaya, there were spills of ethno-religious violence into Kano that could be considered reprisals during the Kwankwaso and Shekarau administrations respectively. This was largely dependent on civil unrest. It was reported in July, 1999 that there was a Yoroba-Hausa inter-ethnic conflict in Sagamu, a Hausa community in a dominated Yoroba town of Lagos state which led to the killings of the people "suspected of being northerners".[62] Similar events occurred in Yelwan Shendem, Plateau state in June 2002, and February and May 2004.[63] This led to many reprisals in Kano.

However, the scope of the powers of imposing the restrictions had, during the eras of Gaya and Shekarau, been expanded to involve the consent of the federal government. This did not, however, abrogate the powers of executive governors as conferred on them by section 12(2b) of Nigeria's Constitution as "Chief Security Officers" of their respective states. The involvement of the federal government in the process of imposing the restrictions during Shekarau's was warranted by the gravity of the violence. The violence was occurring in the state with significant Christian population (Plateau state) which is largely seen as the epicenter

[62] https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria0203/nigeriaopc0203-03.htm; https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be7c12.html (accessed 26 December, 2020). See also Oladipo O. Olubomehin, "Ethnic and Communal Clashes in Nigeria: The Case of the Sagamu 1999 Hausa-Yoruba Conflict", *African Research Review* 6, No. 3 (2012), pp. 135-149; Semiu Bello and Oso Lai, "Newspaper Reportage of the 1999 Hausa-Yoruba Inter-ethnic Conflict in Sagamu, Nigeria", *Babcock Journal of Mass Communication*, (2018), pp. 1-16.

[63] "The Conflict in Yelwa", https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/nigeria0505/4.htm (accessed March 2021).

of the Christianity of the Central Nigerian area or the Middle Belt. The "indigene-settler" dichotomy that resonated with the politics of the state sharply polarized the so-called indigenous communities of the Jos Plateau who are mainly Christians and the alleged 'migrants' who are significantly Muslims. The violence escalated to such an extent that on 18 May 2004, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Plateau state.[64]

Despite the civil unrest, it was through the negotiating skills of the QN leadership that they somehow managed to stage the *Maukibi* yearly, but not necessarily the procession. This was not an elaborate display of state control over religious practices but rather an attempt to curb further civil unrest. Table 4.1 provides an overview of when deviations occurred and why.

Although Gaya had allowed the *Maukibi* processional march to take place,[65] both Gaya and Shekaru had to be invited to Abuja to 'sign' an undertaking with the Department of the State Security that there would be 'peace' in their state. Shekaru had forbidden the processional march but had allowed the event to take place within the premises of *Gidan* Qadiriyya, as had been done in 1991. For the first time in the history of regulatory governance of the *Maukibi* procession, armed military forces were stationed close to the *Gidan* Qadiriyya in the morning hours of the *Maukibi* day. While the state was recovering from the aftermath of the Yelwan Shendem-triggered violence, the stationing of the army at the point signaled that the *Maukibi* procession was perceived to be a threat to the already fragile security situation. The deployment of the army signified the direct involvement of the federal government in the matter.

In 1999, the Kano emirate council re-negotiated the authority and space between the government and QN. Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara, Nasiru Kabara's successor, was invited, for the first time, to the emirate council over the *Maukibi* procession to meet with emirate officials: the *Waziri* Shehu Gidado, the *Wambai* Abbas Sunusi, the *Madaki* Abdullahi Sarki and the *Wali* Mahe Bashir Wali. As noted earlier, this negotiation was prompted by what was perceived as "a national calamity".[66] It was reported that the governor 'ordered' the 'postponement' of the *Maukibi* ceremony until the situation became normalized.[67] The QN seemed intransigent.

[64] For details on the identity politics that ignited the violence, see Terhemba Norm Ambe-Uva, "Identity Politics and the Jos Crisis: Evidence, Lessons and Challenge of Good Governance", *African Journal of History and Culture* 2. No. 3 (2010), pp. 42-52.

[65] It was claimed that Kabiru Gaya had allowed the *Maukibi* procession to take place because of the intervention of two high ranking administrative officials in his administration, namely Surajo Gaya, the Director Special Duties, and Abubakar Ibrahim Matawalle, the Secretary of the Pilgrims Board. It was not clear, however, why Gaya attempted to suspend the *Maukibi* because there was no civil or religious disturbance as was the case with the previous administrations that could have warranted a prohibition of the ritual. In the absence of clear evidence from Gaya's administration to that effect, this study postulates that the approach was motivated by the traditional specter of sensitivity to the crowd that had been played out in the previous administrations.

[66] *National Concord*, Thursday, 22 July 1999, p.1.

[67] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: Ibrahim. A. Isa, 'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su', p. 58.

Mukhtar Kwaru, one of the Kwankwanso's advisers, met with Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara privately to reiterate the governor's position.[68]

Meanwhile, police reports had shown that the QN under Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara had also applied to the police for permission and escorts.[69] From the 2000s, following an improvement in the mode of monitoring the march, the 'assistance' extended to the Nigeria Civil Defense Corps, the Kano State Hisbah Board and the Vigilante Group.[70] This expanded the scope of the police monitoring. One general tradition that needs to be pointed out is that the QN made aconcerted effort to send "letters of appreciation" to the governor and those who contributed to the practicalities of the event.

Table 4.1 Summary of the modes of regulations imposed on the *Maukibi* processions by the Kano state government(s) between 1967 and 2004

Regime/Administration	**Mode of Negotiations**	**Type of Regulation**	**Reason (s)**	**Remarks**
Audu Bako (1967-76) — Military	Personal talk with the governor and meeting with the Kano state emirate council officials	Monitoring	The 'Kano disturbance' of 1953 and the Civil War (1967-70)	The *Maukibi* procession was conducted
AVM Hamza Abdullahi (1984-1985)— Military	Instruction communicated	Restriction with procession, *bandir* performance and music forbidden	Ethno-religious violence broke out on 30th October 1982	The *Maukibi* was held without procession
Idris Garba (1989-1992)— Military	Instruction communicated	Confinement. The spatial spread of the march limited	Ethno-religious violence triggered by Reinhardh Bonnke visit to Kano	The *Maukibi* was held at *Gidan* Qadiriyya at Kabara, the QN headquarters but no limit put on participants
Kabiru Ibrahim Gaya (1992-1993) —Civilian	Signed undertaking for peace in Abuja	Suspended		Suspension relaxed and the *Maukibi* was held
Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso	Negotiation through the	Postponement	Reprisal violence	The *Maukibi* was conducted

[68] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/001: Ibrahim. A. Isa, 'Maukibin Qadiriyya: Tarihinsa, Nasororinsa Da Matsalolin Da Ya Gamu Da Su', p. 58.
[69] Formal letters for permission to the Police Commissioner and the Director State Security are available both with the QN Secretariat and the Kano police headquarters (SIB) section.
[70] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/006: 'Maukibi Correspondences Files.'

(1999-2003)—Civilian	Kano emirate council		reactive to the Shagamu crises	
Ibrahim Shekarau (2003-2007 & 2007-2011)	Signed undertaking for peace in Abuja	Confinement. The spatial spread of the march limited	Reprisal violence reactive to Yelwan Shendem crises	The *Maukibi* was conducted at the *Gidan* Qadiriyya, QN headquarters but no limit put on participants

Source: Author's Fieldwork

It is evident that an array of political administrations executed an equal array of regulatory measures through the Kano state administration. This had to be negotiated by the QN leadership who had, over the years, refined their skills in diplomacy. The processions themselves have changed, for example, they had to become more militarized and policed, not out of choice but because of necessity. Yet the state always engaged with the group. This did little to dissuade participation in the *Maukibi*. It has also changed with the times. Not only does it boost local economic trade, but concerns about the environmental impact have surfaced. The extent of its appeal, is made clear by the QN leadership in 2018:

> The *Maukibi* has grown exponentially attracting millions of celebrants and visitors from Nigeria and beyond annually. Besides the spiritual and social connotations, the Qadiriyya Maukibi also impacts positively on the economy of Kano in many ways. The annual commemoration remains colorfully unique and has been internationally recognized amongst the world's notable pilgrimage events. Courtesy of the Qadiriyya Maukibi, Kano city is ranked 13th out of 32 most important pilgrims destination in the world, contributing about 2% of the estimated global 155 million annual pilgrims […] The Qadiriyya Sufi movement in Nigeria has been collaborating with eminent environmental protection organizations to make the Maukibi celebration green and also transform Kano as a modern Islamic green pilgrimage city.[71]

4.4 Contestation for Power, Suppression and Repression: The IMN and the State

From its formative stages, to being transformed into a Shi'a organization with a working structure, the IMN, it could be argued, has exhibited a tendency of blatant disregard for Nigeria's Constitution. This is not surprising, as Chapter 3 has shown, it grew out of political opposition. However, flagrant disregard for both state and the principles of state, have, equally unsurprisingly, led to it being declared an undesirable group.

Outward displays of defiance occurred at the sites of the *Muzahara* in the 1980s, where copies of the Nigerian Constitution were burnt, while carrying banners inscribed "down with

[71] QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005, p. 12.

the Nigerian Constitution".[72] Admittedly, they have always made their intentions clear: "to protest the secularity of the Nigerian state, voicing strong support for the then ongoing Iranian Islamic revolution".[73] Persistent castigation of Nigeria's authorities as 'unjust' and 'oppressive' became recurrent themes in the public addresses of the IMN leader, el-Zakzaky. For example, in his address delivered on 5 April 1980, el-Zakzaky claimed that "Not [only] that the rulers of this country […] take injustice and oppression as their motto, the whole system is built on the basis of injustice and oppression".[74] This anti-state rhetoric became the basis upon which the radical trait of the movement was formed and set the tone for what it came to be. But this appealed to the youth confronted with the daily struggles of state instability and socio-economic deprivations. El-Zakzaky inspired them to act, much like the preaching's of Black Consciousness activists such as Steve Biko and Franz Fanon:

> And certainly it is not that we have just failed to use our hands and mouths to confront this looming injustice and oppression. But we, ourselves give them the go ahead to oppress us, we voted for this unjust government with our own hands, and we are the ones supporting the government with our tongues. We have definitely offered them the chance to oppress us, we give them the chance to do away with the laws of Allah.[75]

The radical traits and activism that the newly el-Zakzaky-led group exhibited became a new addition to political Islam in Nigeria's religious landscape. Earlier in 1979, the Iranian Revolution offered the movement a model of religious activism and appreciated the potency of mass public demonstrations that eventually ousted the Shah's regime from power. As discussed in Chapter 3, taking a model from Iran, the IMN's mass *Muzahara* had, since the 1980s, persistently been sites for the display of images, posters, inscriptions that conveyed varying messages which were largely radical. The image of Ayatoullah Khomeini along with the slogan 'Islam Only' on banners for example, symbolically demonstrated the open support of Iran's revolutionary cause. It sent a signal to the constituted authorities of the blowing wind of a fervent religious enthusiasm, for which the Nigerian government had long accused el-Zakzaky of 'being sponsored by Iran'.[76]

'Free el-Zakzaky' *Muzahara*, were also organized whenever el-Zakzaky was arrested. The sequence of events was determined by the circumstance. For example, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the anti-blasphemy *Muzahara* and the Quds Day *Muzahara* were used as

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[72] Official Report, Section 23 as published in *New Nigeria*, 18 December 1981.
[73] M. S. Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s", *Africa Today* 48, No. 2 (2001), pp. 127-150.
[74] Transcribed version of the Funtua Declaration lecture delivered by el-Zakzaky on 5^{t} April 1980.
[75] Transcribed version of the Funtua Declaration lecture delivered by el-Zakzaky on 5^{t} April 1980.
[76] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/349275-nigerian-govt-accuses-el-zakzaky-of-planning-iranian-type-revolution-in-nigeria.html (accessed 29 September 2020).

sites for showering a 'curse' on Israel and the 'West' as the principal instigators or 'sponsors' of the blasphemy.[77]

The two major revolutionary ideologies adopted over time further defined the movement: Mahdism and Fodism. Mahdism, as Thomas Hodgkin puts it, hinges on "the idea of history as involving a continual conflict between oppressor and oppressed, and leading by a process considered as historically necessary to the ultimate victory of the oppressed".[78] Mahdism, or Mahdist tradition as some historians would suggest, is deeply associated with the debate on eschatology (the end of time) which translates into a violent movement that posed the most dogged resistance against the imposition of colonial rule in northern Nigeria.[79] Coupled with the above-mentioned perspectives, the 'Mahdi' (the anticipated one) is also 'constructed' in the Shia tradition as the 'hidden' Imam whose appearance at the 'end of time' would 'end oppression' and make the world a 'just' place.[80] The underlying issue in all of the three perspectives is the struggle between the neatly divided 'oppressors' and the 'oppressed' which the IMN claims to uphold. Fodism on the other hand refers to the 19th century revivalist movement by the Shehu Usman *bn* Fodio (d. 1819). To reflect the Fodism in more concrete ways, all the IMN schools (primary and post-primary) are being named Fodiyya.

With this background on the mode of the utilization of public space by the IMN, a stage is set for potential friction. This lies in the movement's 'audacious (mis)appropriation' of public space, according to the state. A police report in 2016 makes this point:

> Kano has been a free zone for the sect's activities whereby a [Shiate] member in Kano seems to be above the law. The sect organizes lectures, takes over the public roads on processions at will and in the habit of disobeying laws and order of the land. [Shi'ate] movement in Kano doesn't respect any constituted authority, and therefore have been operating illegally.[81]

Despite the state's charges, the IMN, understandably, denies and rejects this claim as 'baseless'.[82] This reasoning is largely based on the planned provisions of its activities rather

[77] CW-IMN-002: 'Video footages of anti-blasphemy *Muzahara* of the IMN'.
[78] T. Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in African Setting" cited in P. B. Clarke, "Islamic Millenarianism in West Africa: A 'Revolutionary' Ideology?", *Religious Studies* 16, No. 3 (1980), pp. 317-339.
[79] Works on Mahdism as resistance movement in colonial northern Nigeria abound. See, for example, Morley Robert Ernest, "The Mallam Sa1 id Conspiracy: British Reactions to Mahdism in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria" (M.A. Diss., University of Birmingham, 1973); Paul E. Lovejoy and Jan S. Hogendorn, "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6", *The Journal of African History* 31, No. 2 (1990), pp. 217-244; and Robert A. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906", *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* No. 2 (1972), pp. 193-214.
[80] Jan-Olaf Bleichfeldt, *Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985).
[81] Police Situation Report – SJ 4161/SIB/KS/SECINT/VOL. T 1166 (25 February 2016).
[82] Contrary to the police report as quoted, the IMN claims that at the instance of forming processional columns, each line is made by not more than five persons in order not to block public roads. Interview with Ustaz

than the consequences of its marches. The IMN is invited to negotiate the terms of the marches but they rarely abide by the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon. For this reason, the IMN public marches were, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, scrutinized, monitored and reported. There is plethora of reports with differing headings such as "Situation Report", "Threat Assessment", "Intelligence Report", "Planned Quds Day Procession" etc. The private and public activities of the IMN had been documented and reports filed partly under the custody of the Security Investigation Bureau (SIB) of the Kano state police command. Some of these reports have attributed the thickness of the IMN *Muzahara* to the 'poverty' and 'lack of education' of the youths being 'recruited' and 'indoctrinated'.[83] As a protest movement, they appeal in large part to the underclass.

Similarly, the intermittent arrest of el-Zakzaky, along with many of his lieutenants, was another of the government's intervention startegies to regulate the IMN's public presence. The arrests of IMN members intensified, particularly during the military regime of Sani Abacha (1993-1998).[84] These arrests came in the wake of tightened restrictions imposed on public religious activities following the passing of the Religious Regulation Edit in 1984, amended in 1987, and further reviewed in 1996.[85] These laws were enacted by the Kano state government to regulate religious conflicts. That of 1984 was established a few years after the Maitatsine violence. The subsequent changes were implemented to curtail further religious unrest. However, rather than curtailing the public presence of the IMN, the arrests triggered more waves of public visages of the movement, and anger among the group, pushing them to become more radical. For example, IMN members would troop out to welcome el-Zakzaky back home whenever he was released from prison. His prison sentences ranged from a few days to many years. The frequency of the incarceration is also a reflection of the intensity of his supposed subversion.

Muhammad Sunusi Abdulqadir, the IMN leader of Kano, by the author at Dukawiya quarters, Kano, on 23 September 2020.

[83] Police Situation Report – SJ:4161/KNS/SIB/SECINT/VOL.15/132 (4 October 2016). The SIB still engages the IMN by "inviting" IMN members ahead of their planned public *Muzahara* to "negotiate" possible "change/review" in the plans in order to avoid a situation that may lead to "conflict". While the IMN honours the invitation, they act "contrary" to what would be resolved at the meeting. Discussion with ASP Muhammad Salahuddeen and Aliyu Abubakar, SIB staff, in September 2020.

[84] For example, "Free Zakzaky Campaign Organization" lists 232 IMN members under detention since 1996. In a sort of overly manipulative way of attracting the sympathy of the public, the IMN deploys the children of the arrested members to streets to demand their parents' release. *Al-Mizan*, No. 1228, *Jimada Sani*, 1437.

[85] See Brian Larkin, "Public Preaching, Public Sound and the Control of Space in Northern Nigeria", Working Draft of a Paper Discussed at the Workshop "Religion and the Mastery of Public Space in Nigeria" (2021), p. 2.

Table 4.2: El-Zakzaky's Prison Terms

Regimes/Governments	Prison Location	Year	Time Spent
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo	Zaria Central Prison	1979	Weeks
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo	Central Prison, Sokoto	1981	Months
Shehu Usman Shagari	The Interrogation Centre of National Security Organization, Enugu	1981 – 1984	Four years
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari	Kiri – Kiri Maximum Security, Lagos	1984	Months
Gen. Ibrahim B. Babangida	Port Harcourt	1987 – 1989	Two years
Gen. Ibrahim B. Babangida	Dodon Barrack	1992	Days
Gen. Sani Abacha	Port Harcourt & Kaduna	1996 – 1998	Three years
Muhammadu Buhari	Abuja	2015 – 2021	Six years

Those 'martyrs' who died in custody were commemorated in newly established commemorative ceremonies, the *Shuhada*.[89] Equally, commemorative events such as the birthdays of the Prophet Muhammad, his family members, and other Shi'a icons have been converted to spaces for demonstrations - celebration, mourning and protest at the same time. Protests demanding for the release of those arrested tended to overshadow celebration and mourning. The tempo of these public visages had been sustained by decentralized activities of the movement at the levels of the *Majalis*, *Manadiq* and *Dawair*,[90] and as a consequence, more unruly. 'The great sacrifice',[91] as they consider these public scowls to be, further determined ones defining commitment and loyalty and, therefore, the collective 'respect' of the movement. While political conviction is entrenched within religious practice, the significance of the celebration and mourning of 'saints' in ceremonial practice, reduced in intensity.

[89] "Thousands of detainees have died in Nigerian military custody amid crackdown on Islamists", *The Washington Post*, 19 October 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thousands-of-detainees-have-died-in-nigerian-military-custody-amid-crackdown-on-islamists/2013/10/19/f7b8fa7a-3835-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html (accessed December 2020).
[90] For details on these bodies, see the previous chapter.
[91] *Pointer Express*, Vol. 3, No. 241, 13 November 2015.

4.4.1 Suppression of the IMN's *Muzahara*: Turning Procession from the Space of Mourning to Space of Violence, 1996-2015

The series of arrests of el-Zakzaky and his disciples by the military regimes of Ibrahim Babangida (1984-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998) have dimmed to some extent the public spectacle of the IMN, particularly at the level of leadership. As the security reports show, "the Shiite sect went underground in states like Kano, Kaduna, Katsina and Sokoto".[92] However, the reasons why the IMN had to become clandestine may not solely lie with state intervention. Incidences of clashes between the IMN and other Islamic groups played a role in the re-strategizing of the IMN's activities. There were, for example, reports of clashes between the IMN and followers of the Tijjaniyya Sufi Brotherhood in Kaduna state in January 2011, and with the 'Yan Izala youths in Sokoto in October 2013.[93] While these clashes were not triggered by IMN public marches, they do symbolize the tension and sectarian hostilities in the religious landscape of northern Nigeria which added to the governments' propensity to suppress the IMN's public religiosity or perhaps disguise the suppression for these reasons. As discussed in chapter three, two critical moments of *Muzahara* against blasphemy need to be mentioned: one which led to the ransacking of the office of the *Daily Times* newspaper in 1990 and the other which resulted in the beheading of Gideon Akaluka of Igbo extraction in 1994.

The first major crackdown on the IMN public *Muzahara* came in September 1996. El-Zakzaky was arrested on 12 September 1996. His alleged innocence and state entrapment is outlined in an IMN document:

> A team of police under the command of Mukhtar Ibrahim, the then deputy Commissioner of Police of Kaduna state. Ibrahim was said to have presented to el-Zakzaky a court warrant that gave them mandate to "search" his house on allegation that he (el-Zakzaky) "amassed arms". According to IMN, el-Zakzaky was, after the search, asked to go with the team of the police to "acknowledge" that "he was not in possession of arms" following which he was detained. Three staff — Mallam Abubakar Al-Mizan, Alhaji Abdulhamid Danlami and Mallam Shitu — of the *al-Mizan*, a weekly newspaper of IMN, were arrested along el-Zakzaky.[94]

The claim is that he was falsely lured and incarcerated.[95] Nevertheless, this arrest led to the police clamp-down of the twin *Muzahara* of 13 and 18 September. Although organized at

[92] Police Report – SB. 4089/SIB/KS/SECINT/VOL. T/51.
[93] See A. E. Olojo, "Muslims, Christians and Religious Violence in Nigeria: Patterns and Mapping, June 2006 - May 2014", IFRA-Nigeria Working Paper Series (2014), pp. 25-26.
[94] CW-IMN-DOC-003: "*Harkar Musulunci*" (Islamic Movement), a compilation of part of el-Zakzaky's public lectures and interviews), p.24.
[95] The allegation that IMN has been in possession of weapons has been echoed over and over again in the ensuing entanglement between the group and the government. While this allegation has not been proved beyond doubt, a cache of arms has been "discovered" in a warehouse in Kano belonging to Lebanese nationals who have been

different locations (the first in Zaria and the second in Kaduna metropolis) to attract wider support, the motive was to publicly display a collective sign of grief over the arrest. Tagged as 'Free Zakzaky', a crowd of IMN members converged at the Sabon Garin Zaria Friday mosque and staged a march under the leadership of Mallam Muhammad Turi through Kofar Doka via PZ down to Kofar Doka where they were subsequently blocked by the police.[96] Clashes led to many casualties. The second *Muzahara* was also convened within Kaduna metropolis and routed from the Maiduguri Road central mosque through the city center. The police who were blocking the demonstrators and dispersing them, were reported to have fired tear gas and live amunition, resulting in even more casualties. There were conflicting reports on the causalities. According to the IMN, 15 members died,[97] while some local and international media reports put the figure at 39.[98] This discrepancy may well point to the ways in which the media wish to draw more attention to the activities of the IMN. It could also reflect that the IMN wished to minimize the extent of the casualties. This is less likely as these members would then be hailed 'martyrs' of the cause. Nevertheless, there were causalities and destruction of property worth millions of Naira.[99]

The 'Free Zakzaky' demonstrations added to the boiling political atmosphere of the time, given the fact that they came in the wake of pro-democracy activists' campaigns for the removal of the military from power. However, between 1999 and 2013, there were no reported incidences of police-IMN clashes.[100] Although ethno-religious violence recurred in northern Nigeria during the period under consideration,[101] transition to democratic dispensation and its tentative maturation was the major pre-occupation of the Nigerian elites throughout the decade. The new dispensation, upheld the constitutional rights of public religiosity and identity making.

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connected to the Hezbollah trans-national networking and Shia movement as well. See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22722948 (accessed December 2020).

[96] The *Muzahara* was planned to terminate at Babban Dodo. Although the IMN claims that despite the police "shooting", the *Muzahara* had to reach to the point because of the size of the crowd. While there is no counter-source from the police, it remains to be contemplated given the panic that might have trailed the shooting. The source adds that the dead bodies were carried along to the terminal point where funeral prayers were observed. In a document signed by Muhammad Turi who led the *Muzahara*, 15 members were enlisted as in Fig. 4.3.

[97] "Muhimman Raneku 400 a Tarihin Harkar Musulunci" ("400 Important Days in the History of Islamic Movement") – a catalogue of historic days compiled in a pamphlet by the IMN Centre for Documentation (forthcoming).

[98] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-f9f1cd17-2c50-442e-88fc-e2deb46dbde1 and https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/nigeria.html (accessed December 2020).

[99] *The Witness*, No. 1, April-June 1998 and No. 2, July-September 1998.

[100] See H. Abdu, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Northern Nigeria: Issues in Informer Repression" (Nigerian Defense Academy, no date).

[101] See H. Abdu, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Northern Nigeria: Issues in Informer Repression" (Nigerian Defense Academy, no date).

From 1995 to 2020, the IMN listed 67 members killed while on the Ashura *Muzahara*. These are aside from fatalities reported at the other *Muzahara* marches, namely the Quds Day, the *Arbaeen* symbolic trek or *Tattaki*, *Maulid* or saintly birthdays' commemorative marches, the anti-blasphemy, and the ephemeral 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara*. The incidences of deaths occurred at different reported clashes of the IMN with either the police (after 2013), 'mobs' or 'hoodlums' – no doubt in reference to civilians opposed to IMN ideologies.[102]

The radical Boko Haram[103] suicide-bombing at the IMN *Ashura Muzahara* in November 2014, for example, claimed the lives of over 70 members. Here the density of adherents provided an opportunity for a radical sect to reconceptualise the day of mourning. Reported 'mob' attacks on the IMN *Muzahara* particularly in Sokoto, Kano and Funtua in 2013 and 2016, respectively, stood out in the series of reported incidences of violence at the *Muzahara* processions.[104] This portrays a critical dimension in the ensuing hostilities between the majority Sunni and minority Shi'a, as well as the ways in which public space is further contested during sectarian violence.[105] The mode of the violence changed from 'clash' to 'hoodlum-attacks' by the "Yan Izala youths", as example.[106] The usual reporting of the police—IMN clash was underplayed in favour of mob or sectarian suppression of the IMN *Muzahara* marches. The involvement of mob or hoodlums, however, was fueled by the proscription of the IMN's public marches in particular, and as an organization in general,

[102] The IMN are critical of the way in which they are portrayed in the media. The term "clash" is mostly used. According to IMN, "a clash is when there are two groups of people who are equally armed, fighting among themselves. *Punch*, 31 January 2021 "We Fear FG Wants El-Zakzaky Die in Prison" https://punchng.com/we-fear-fg-wants-el-zakzaky-to-die-in-prison-prof-danladi-imn-member/ (accessed February 2021).

[103] The origins of the name 'Boko Haram' is contentious. The debate is framed around the group's anti-western education propaganda and modernity at large. It can be argued that the name 'Boko Haram' was coined by the Nigerian media profiling of the group and that framing has given it currency and popularity in both academic scholarship and public discourses. However, the group rejects this nickname because they consider themselves as the *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah Li al-Da'awa Wa al-Jihad* (A Society of the Sunni for the [Holy] Armed Struggles). According to Andrea Brigaglia, "for the southern Nigerian Christian press…as well as for the global Western media, the nickname Boko Haram magically captures all the stereotypes that have daily currency in Islamophobic discourses", A. Brigaglia, "Boko Haram: Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yufuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria", *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, Issue No. 11, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, p. 37. Boko Haram insurgency is one of the most widely studied themes in Nigerian history. For the recent authoritative works, see A. Brigaglia, "The Volatility of the Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram", *Diritto e questioni publiche* (2015), Palermo; M. P. de Montclos (ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014); A. Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018); and A. Kassim & M. Nwankpo, *The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2018).

[104] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212640-anti-shiite-violence-spreads-kano-sokoto-katsina-8-killed.html (accessed November 2020).

[105] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212640-anti-shiite-violence-spreads-kano-sokoto-katsina-8-killed.html (accessed November 2020).

[106] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212640-anti-shiite-violence-spreads-kano-sokoto-katsina-8-killed.html (accessed November, 2020).

thereby 'excommunicating' its members.[107] In addition, the Sunni considered some of the views held by the IMN on some of the wives and companions of the Prophet Muhammad, as blasphemous.

Some of the alleged practices of the IMN that triggered the mob attacks have been underlined in the findings/recommendations of The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA). The Commission was established and inaugurated by the governor of Kaduna state, powers vested on him by the provisions of Section 2 (1) of the Commission of Inquiry Law, Cap 34, Laws of Kaduna State, 1991. The commission reported various transgressions:

> a. Construction of physical structures without recourse to the laws of the state;
> b. Blocking of public ways by *Muzahara* processions and the "aggravation and inconvenience that such processions and demonstrations have been creating for other people";
> c. Blocking of access into Zakzaky's residential quarters. Mention is particularly made of blocking of the Governor Lamaran Yero's (Kaduna state governor 2007-2010) entourage from accessing Gyallesu, the residential quarters of el-Zakzaky;
> d. Security failures to contain the reported cases of alleged disrespect to laws by IMN;
> e. Video footage and audio clips alleging that IMN had established "para-military" and "security" outfits and perform para-military parade ceremonies which are inspected by their leaders "reminiscent of a state"; and
> f. Appropriation of public infrastructures such as public schools along their path during their *Tattaki*.[108]

The most notable transgressions are the obstruction of public spaces, the para-military style of its security forces and the appropriation of public structures during the *Tattaki*. The mob violence against the IMN public marches spread to Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Jos where more than 20 members were reportedly killed in October 2016 during the *Ashura Muzahara*. The scope of violence previously restricted to the IMN – police clashes, extended to clashes between the IMN and mobs or hoodlums on the properties of the IMN, such as school buildings and houses. This necessitated the "deployment of more security personnel" to restore order ahead of, or during, the IMN *Muzahara* marches.[109] "Troops" would be stationed at the IMN *Markaz* (centres) or along strategic routes leading to bottlenecks.[110] This required better planning with the state police. According to the SIB of the Kano state police command, the

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[107] "Anti-Shiite Violence Spreads to Kano, Sokoto, Katsina; 8 Killed", October 12, 2016, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212640-anti-shiite-violence-spreads-kano-sokoto-katsina-8-killed.html (accessed March, 2021).

[108] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State, between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December, 2015 (2016), p. 73 – 82. The Judicial Commission's report was developed based on the exhibits, files of memos received and "eye witnesses" accounts from different quarters of Nigerian society over the activities of the IMN.

[109] https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20161013/281487865866297 (accessed December 2020).

[110] https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20161013/281487865866297 (accessed December 2020).

IMN would engage in dialogue and routes would be mutually agreed upon.[111] However, these would not be adhered to resulting in more chaos, bottlenecks and obstruction of traffic. An IMN source claims that the planned routes of *Muzahara* is kept confidential within the circle of leaders in order to avert any planned disruptions by either the state or sectarian mobs.[112] While better security was needed, there was little trust in the state system. This is understandable in the context of the events of 2015.

4.4.2 The December 2015 "Clash" between the Nigerian Army and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria: Towards the Abuja "Free Zakzaky" *Muzahara*

On 12 December 2015, a group of IMN members gathered outside of the IMN headquarters *Hussainiya Baqiyatullah* blocking the Sokoto road. They refused to make way for the Chief of Army convoy, preferring to taunt and jeer instead. They were supposedly armed with knives, batons and machetes. The army reported that the convoy was attacked and that the mob wanted to assassinate the chief, Lt. Gen. Tukur Burutai. They opened fire, supposedly in self-defence. The IMN members, in contrast, say that they had congregated for a religious ceremony. The previous year, 30 members were killed by the army, including three sons of Zakzaky, and so they refused to let the convoy pass. But to their surprise, the army opened fire again, killing many. A soldier was also reported killed in the skirmish. Soldiers were deployed to other sites and a further 100 IMN supporters were killed. Between the 12th and 15th of December 2015, the Nigerian army killed over 350 IMN members - men, women and children – in Zaria. Estimates suggest that even more were killed. A Kaduna state official confirmed that 347 bodies were buried in a mass graveside in the Mando area near Kaduna on the night of the 14th.[113]

The Nigerian army has a long history of human rights violations especially in its dealings with 'undesirable' groups such as Boko Haram. In 2015 President Muhammadu Buhari, agreed that a full-scale investigation of events take place. In 2016, Amnesty International released its report. Witnesses testified that the injured were burned alive. While many spoke out against this state brutality, some Sunni adherents justified the brutality by rather speaking out about the public chaos created by IMN members. Some recorded footage of the

[111] Author's discussions with some of the staff of the State Investigation Bureau, Kano State Police Command. They preferred their names to be anonymous.
[112] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member of the IMN Academic Forum, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020.
[113] "Nigeria: Unearthing the truth: Unlawful killings and mass cover-up in Zaria", 22 April 2016, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/3883/2016/en/ (accessed 10 October 2022)

events on their cellphones. The army erased any evidence of the clash. This included razing Zakzaky's compound to the ground. The IMN headquarters in Sokoto had already been destroyed by the military in 2007 and subsequently rebuilt in Zaria. Amongst hundreds arrested, an injured Zakzaky and his wife were also detained.[114]

Media reports (from within and outside Nigeria) between Saturday 12 December and Monday 14 December 2015, detail the clash which occurred between the Nigerian army (NA) and members of the IMN. The incident was widely reported. The NA, to begin with, expressed their own version in a press conference and a memo submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the incident. At the conference held on 15 December, Adeniyi Oyebade, the General Officer Commanding I Mechanized Division, Kaduna state, stated that:

> He (Chief of Army Staff) was coming in from Dutse because that same week we held the COAS conference in Dutse in Jigawa state. He got to Zaria at about 14:30 hours (2.30pm) and the advance security team had cleared the road up to and including the city centre. There was no problem. The same security team made a U-turn to now bring in the COAS' convoy which is our normal security routine whenever we are escorting our boss. But … Shi'ite sect … blocked the Sokoto road … [and that] two … officers … came down … appealing to these hoodlums to please clear the road…All entreaties, appeals to the Shi'ite sect members … refused to budge. It got to the point that they started throwing dangerous missiles, stones, machete and all kinds of traditional or crude weapons … at the COAS convoy. It was at that point that it dawned on the security forces … that this was … premeditated and of course … we must secure … the COAS. As if that was not enough, as he [COAS] was moving through, they were mobilizing in their hundreds… And again, within the rule of engagement, we had to use the force available to bring it down.[115]

In his testimony, he makes use of certain terms such as 'hoodlums', 'mob', 'Shiite sect' or 'crude weapons' as a way of securing sympathy and categorizing Muslims along sectarian lines. He 'frames the enemy', to use Silvo Lenart and Harry R. Targ's phrase,[116] which cunningly justifies the so-called 'rule of engagement'. According to the memo that the NA submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (JCI), and further supported by witness testimony of Col. A. K. Ibrahim, "Cordon and Search" (C&S) operations under his command during the crackdown on the IMN headquarters was necessary. The IMN headquarters, the residences of el-Zakzaky at Gyallesu and Darul Rahma, and the IMN's burial ground were besieged and demolished. El-Zakzaky and his wife, along with many other members of the IMN, were arrested.[117] The JCI report states that "the NA memo contained details of the C&S

[114] "Nigeria: Unearthing the truth: Unlawful killings and mass cover-up in Zaria" , 22 April 2016, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/3883/2016/en/ (accessed 10 October 2022)
[115] "How We Engaged Shi'ite Members, Arrested El-Zakzaky, Wife – Nigerian Army", *Premium Times*, December 15, 2015, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/195200-how-we-engaged-shiite-members-arrested-el-zakzaky-wife-nigerian-army.html (accessed January 2021).
[116] Silvo Lenart and Harry R. Targ, "Framing the Enemy: New York Times Coverage of Cuba in the 1980s", *Peace & Change* 17, No. 3 (1992), pp. 341-362.
[117] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State, between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December, 2015 (2016), p. 70.

operations, but fell short of giving the number of casualties on the side of the IMN".[118] While the NA's press statement was defensive, the IMN crowds were seen on video footage being persuaded by senior military officers in the entourage to make way.

For the IMN, the NA's repressive use of force was considered a premeditated plan to wipe out the movement, which they memorialize as the 'Zaria massacre' or 'genocide'.[119] Some of the accounts to this effect claim that the army were heard saying that "we have finished with Shia and the Zakzaky. No more Shia in Nigeria".[120] According to the IMN, it was not a coincidence that the military's 'passing out parade' ceremony fell on the date that the group celebrates the 'hoisting of flag' – marking the beginning of the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. As the news of the presence of the army around the *Hussainiyya* spread, panic and uncertainty mounted. Members on their way to the *Hussainiyya* who could be reached were said to have been told to proceed to Gyallesu perhaps to reinforce el-Zakzaky's *Hurras* that were guarding against a 'possible strike' by the army.

The media reports on the events take a moderate position between the reductionist perpetrator narrative of the NA and the victim narrative of the IMN.[121] These are the underlying modes of recounting of narrative between perpetrator and victim in violent situations, like the NA/IMN clash. According to Alletta Brenner "a victim/perpetrator framework […] presupposes perpetrator agency and empowerment, victim passivity and disempowerment […] which is always serious, flows only from the perpetrator to victim".[122] These theoretical phrases

[118] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, p. 70.

[119] The narrative of the "Zaria Massacre" or "genocide" (used interchangeably) has been adopted and popularized by the print media; *al-Mizan* and *Pointer Express*, the two newspapers of the movement and social media platforms (Whatsapp groups, Facebook groups & pages, Twitter handles), as well as the IMN official website (www.islamicmovement.org) in reference to the 12-14 December 2015 Nigerian Army clash with the group. See for example, "The Genocide of Members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria", *Pointer Express*, Friday 28th Rabiul Auwal, 1437 (9 June 2016). The term "massacre", has featured in the IMN's description of the July 2014 clash between the group and the NA during the Quds Day procession where many participants were killed, including three of el-Zakzaky's biological children. Building on the same narrative, some national dailies – like the *Premium Times* of 21 December 2015 – have followed the same trend by using the term "massacre". A recent publication (2019) by Mizani Publications appears with the same theme "*Kisan Kiyashin Zaria: Daga Ganau Ba Jiyau Ba*" [The Zaria Genocide: An Eyewitness Account]. The book is in one volume with 498 pages and compiles various accounts of the surviving victims of the clash which *al-Mizan* newspaper published within a year (2015-2016) of the incident. The National Human Rights Commission lays the same claim that the NA's crackdown was a "massacre", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/16/nigerian-army-killings-of-shia-muslims-to-be-investigated (accessed January, 2021). Because of the emotive nature and political implication of the terms, the United Nations highlights as to "when to refer to a situation as 'genocide'"? The UN notes that the definitions of the terms are fluid. They are only established after "detailed examination" of the "relevant legislation" which neither the Judicial Commission of Inquiry nor the Court has been able to prove. See: "Guidance Note 1", The United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protest, UN.

[120] *Pointer Express*, Friday 28th Rabi'ul Auwal, 1437 (9 June 2016), p. 8.

[121] For a discussion of the "perpetrator narrative" and "victim narrative" binary, see Roy F. Baumeister, Arlene Stillwell and Sara R. Wotman, "Victim and Perpetrator Accounts of Interpersonal Conflict: Autobiographical Narratives About Anger", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, No. 5 (1990), pp. 994 – 1005.

[122] A. Brenner, "Resisting Simple Dichotomies: Critiquing Narratives of Victims, Perpetrators, and Harm in Feminist Theories of Rape", *Harv. JL & Gender* 36 (2013), p. 503.

capture the NA and IMN's positionality with regard to the incident. The NA are the perpetrators who have access to power, offensive mechanisms, and control of the media and, thus, have an edge over the IMN who are the victims and are, thus, 'disempowered'. However, the history of IMN repression and the struggle history of the organization allows these individuals to have a strong and empowered voice during the formal investigations.

The intervention of human rights organizations – Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, National Human Rights Commission – has profoundly influenced the way in which the incident was subsequently framed and reported. Joachim J. Savelsberg argues that "journalists often rely on NGOs as one crucial source of information".[123] These human rights organizations established the relative gravity of the incident and the way in which it has been reconstructed thereafter. The result of the investigation by these human rights organizations estimated the death toll between 340 to 350 people, including one soldier. These figures were derived from information retrieved from the hospital where the corpses were dumped and the headcounts of the corpses that were buried at a mass grave in Mondo, Kaduna state. The Secretary of the Kaduna state government admitted on the 11th April, 2016 that "they had secretly buried the bodies of 347 people in a mass grave two days after the massacre".[124] Later information further supported the veracity of the investigative position of the human rights groups and marked a counter narrative to the unfolding media narrative over the incident.

A five-man committee was also established by the National Human Rights Commission to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the incident following the submission of complaints from both the NA and the IMN.[125] Pressured by these human rights groups, an independent and impartial commission of inquiry was established. Two commissions of inquiry were set up, one by Nigeria's Senate and the other by the Kaduna state government.[126] Perhaps, the idea for separate commissions of inquiry was to establish a more balanced account from

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[123] Joachim J. Savelsberg, *Representing Mass Violence: Conflicting Responses to Human Rights Violations in Darfur* (California: University of California, 2015), e-book 9780520963085.

[124] Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Human Rights Violations by the Military Continue in the Absence of Accountability for Crimes Under International Law Written Statement to the 32nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council (13 June – 1 July, 2016)".

[125] "Zaria Massacre: Human Rights Commission Inaugurates 5 – Man Probe Panel", December 21, 2015, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/195531-zaria-massacre-army-chief-petitions-human-rights-body-wants-attempt-on-his-life-probed.html (accessed January, 2021). Series of petitions and counter-petitions have been received by the Commission. *Al-Mizan* has reported that 160 petitions were sent by the IMN members from across various locations in Nigeria (*al-Mizan, Juma'a 18 ga Jimada Ula*, 1437 [27 February, 2016]). According to Mallam Abubkar Abulrahman Yola, the representative of the IMN in Adamawa state and the head of the IMN Council on Education and Trainings, the petitioners were invited by the Commission in order for them (the petitioners) to "defend" the claims they made as far as the incident was concerned. Yola said that during the meeting a "rich" document was further presented by the IMN to the Commission that contained a catalogue of the clashes between the group and the Nigeria's security forces over the last couple of years.

[126] "Nigerian Army Killings of Shia Muslims to be Investigated", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/16/nigerian-army-killings-of-shia-muslims-to-be-investigated (February, 2021).

two entities, one could check the veracity of the other. However, the commission of inquiry directed by the Senate never materialized, probably because the federal state did not want to be implicated in the atrocity. The Kaduna state government, in contrast, established the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (JCI). This was shunned by the IMN, probably because of the deep distrust they had of the state. This distrust was not alleviated but further entrenched when the Kaduna State governor already indicted the IMN during a pre-inquiry session.[127] In this context, the Commission received a letter dated 11 February 2016 from the lead counsel of el-Zakzaky refusing to participate.[128] The IMN rather considered the JCI a 'kangaroo court'.[129]

While there was clear evidence of state brutality, the Commission also received scathing testimony from the Zaria community and environs, as well as the majority of the Sunni-oriented organizations, condemning the activities of the IMN. They explicitly condemned the group's contempt for public order during its public rituals. The incident therefore exposes the power relations and contestation for space in the religious sphere between the majority Sunni and the minority Shi'a in Nigeria, on the one hand, and the Nigerian state, on the other. Few among the Sunni elites spoke out against the atrocities. The anti-Shi'a sentiment, nurtured in the Salafi-Sunni conflict discourse over a long period of time, was reignited.[130] In the context of these sectarian divides, the Sultan of Sokoto, who occupies the seat of Amir al-Muminin, and the then emir of Kano, Muhammadu Sunusi II – both Sunni elites in northern Nigeria – condemned the attack and urged the government to prosecute the perpetrators. The emir of Kano (until March 2020), criticized the IMN for "blocking of roads and insulting the companions of Prophet Mohammed" but blamed the Army for applying excessive force against them. Anti-Shi'a voices advocated for the outright 'ban' of the IMN.[131] Mob attacks on the IMN and other 'anti-Shia violence' broke out in Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, and Sokoto.[132]

Larger umbrella Muslims organizations in Nigeria further muddied the situation. For example, a meeting which was held by the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) under its leader Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmad resolved that, "[…] the federal government [should] ban

[127] "Nigerian Shiites Reject State Inquiry Into Deadly Clash", https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-shiites-reject-state-inquiry-deadly-clash (February 2021) and *al-Mizan, Juma'a 18 ga Jimada Ula*, 1437 (27 February 2016).
[128] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, p. 11.
[129] "Buhari Regime Must Free Oppressed El- Zakzaky and His Wife Now", December 17, 2020, https://en.abna24.com/news/buhari-regime-must-free-oppressed-el-zakzaky-and-his-wife-now_1096596.html (accessed April 2020).
[130] For a discussion on the growing anti-Shia movement in Nigeria, see Alexander Thurston, "Shi'ism and Anti-Shi'ism in Nigeria", https://themaydan.com/2017/05/shiism-anti-shiism-nigeria/ (accessed November 2020).
[131] See, for example, "Ban El-Zakzaky's Sect – Zaria Residents Beg FG", http://www.nigerianmonitor.com/ban-el-zakzakys-sect-zaria-residents-beg-fg/ (accessed February 2021).
[132] "Anti-Shia Violence Spreads to Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, 8 Killed", https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212640-anti-shiite-violence-spreads-kano-sokoto-katsina-8-killed.html. (accessed February, 2020).

Shi'a Islam from the wide spectrum of the existing global Islamic sects that have been recognized the worldover, and was explicitly protected along with all other religious sects under the Nigerian Constitution".[133] They further urged that el-Zakzaky and those arrested should not be released. The government was ureged to remove anybody found with connections or sympathy to the IMN movement from the security formations, civil service, schools, and so forth.

The 'Zaria massacre' occurred during a volatile period of state insecurity. State repression, it could be argued, is sometimes necessitated to prevent a potential threat such as an IMN Shi'ite uprising after the Boko Haram attack. Historically, the State attitude towards the IMN, shifts as the movement transtions from a political protest movement to an identifiable religious community, sharing a space in Nigeria's multireligious universe. But the reaction towards the 'Zaria massacre' could also be interpreted in terms of a much larger geopolitical sectarian divide between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

The IMN gained momentum during the Iranian revolution of 1979. As a political protest movement they established themselves as a religious movement in Nigeria. During the 'Zaria massacre', a similar revolution was unfolding in Syria. By 2011, the revolution in Syria against similar state atrocities, led to protracted alteractions between President Assad's regime and anti-government rebel forces. The former is backed by Russia and Iran while the latter by the USA, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, amongst others. These allegiances are sectarian based. Similarly, the 2014 Yemeni war involved the Shi'ite Houthi insurgents against the Sunni state. These volatile sectarian squabbles that rock the Muslim communities in the Middle East permeate to other parts of the world, as conflicting ideologies are massively funded and propagated via human and media agencies. This further muddies the politics of religion and increased inter and intra-Muslims contestation and further calls for the state regulatory measures. It therefore cannot be argued that the Nigerian state nor the sectarian violence that culminated after the Zaria massacre is a reflection of sectarianism in Nigeria but could possibly reflect the broader threat of political insurrection between state and sectarian based insurgency between sh'ia and sunnis unfolding during the 2015 period.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter explores the modes and patterns of regulating the public religiosity of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN) and Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) by different political

[133] https://dailytrust.com/shia-muslim-group-condemns-calls-for-banning-of-shiites "Shi"a Muslim Group Condemns Calls for Banning of Shiites" (accessed February, 2020).

regimes – both civilian and military – in Nigeria. The religious resurgence and the rise of 'new religious movements' have radicalized the religious landscape of northern Nigeria. This development turns it into a site where identities are collectively made, displayed, articulated, and performed over the years. While the QN commemorates the birth of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir, the founding Sufi master of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood, by staging an annual commemorative procession called the *Maukibi*, the IMN principally mourns the tragic martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the third Shia Imam. Since the 1950s, a number of religiously and politically oriented public processions and demonstrations are organized to that effect which becomes the defining feature of the two groups. In other words, annual commemorative and mournful processional marches are the hallmarks of both the QN and IMN.

The state's view of the 'crowd' and its potentiality of endangering public peace, particularly as religious and political crowds have become potential triggers for rampaging riots and violence in the recent history of Nigeria, projects the two groups' processional crowds in the light of mass mobilization against the interests of the state. This is more apparent when the processional crowd is situated at the intersection of the contestation between religion, modernity, federalism, regionalism, nationalism and even internationalism. The state's responsibility is to regulate the spatial presence, as well as the transcendence of the groups' ceremonial and mournful processions. As the motive of the marches, spatiality, territoriality, modes of organization, and patterns differ, so do the modes of reactions elicited from the regulatory governance. The adoption of regulatory sanctions of public religiosity both of the QN and IMN – from restriction, confinement, suspension, postponement to arrest, and outright ban or proscription[134] – goes beyond the notion of what Marian Burchardt calls "urban religious diversity assemblage";[135] - but the state's intervention to assert full control and tame the use or abuse of public space by religious actors.

The difference in the mode of regulatory sanctions between the QN and IMN is rooted in the orientation of each group. The QN public marches are less politically and 'revolutionary' oriented. Therefore, these marches elicited 'soft' state's regulations which included offers for negotiation, postponement, confinement or suspension. The measures, as the findings suggest, were implemeneted in order to avoid conflict in the context of ethno-religious disturbances prevalent in the region, even if their processions would not elicit the same resentment from

[134] "Arrest" and "ban" are mentioned among actions that define state repression against a community of people. See C. Davenport, "Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government Against the Republic of New Africa", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, No. 1, 2005, pp. 120–140.
[135] M. Burchardt, "Religion in Urban Assemblages: Space, Law and Power", *Religion, State and Society* 47, No. 4-5: Governing Religious Diversity in Cities: Critical Perspectives, pp. 374-389.

observers. Because it is politically oriented, as it deploys Iran's model of revolutionary demonstrations otherwise known as *Muzahara*, particularly its anti-state public pronouncement/displays in banners, walls, posters and performance, the IMN's processions have been suppressed over time and eventually 'proscribed'. This is because irrespective of the intention, the ceremonies turn towards expressions of political opposition, in the context of similar upheavels in the Middle East. The impact of the state's coercive repression on the IMN marches may be far-reaching. Some scholars have projected that the state's action may produce a new radical sect like Boko Haram; fuel the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian violence, and pave the way for a 'proxy' war with Nigeria being backed by countries like Saudi Arabia.[136] The concerns raised by the sectarian violence in Yemen and Syria attest to the possibilities.

The struggle between the state and religious actors for control over public space in Nigeria's federal setting poses the questions as to who owns the public space or to what extent the public space is public? While the Nigeria's Constitution guarantees the rights of association and assembly, those rights are not the exclusive preserve of individual citizens or groups. It must serve the 'national interest' and national security.

Nasiru Kabara and Ibrahim Yakubu el-Zakzaky, the leaders of the QN and IMN, have established reputations and networks that transcend Nigeria's political boundaries. Kabara used the avenue of his processional ceremonies to invite guests from across Africa's sub-regions and the Arab World, while el-Zakazky's connection with Iran feeds the allegations that he is propagating Iran's brand of Islam (Shi'ism) and he is materially supported by Iran.[137] Radio Iran and Iranian Press TV, for example, support a wider circulation of el-Zakzaky's teaching sessions.[138] Thus, the duo's activities have been scritinised by the state. In the case of the IMN, the impact of el-Zakzaky's 'publicness' requires further scrutnity in the next chapter.

There have been clear differences in the mode of regulatory sanctions over public religiosity of the QN and IMN between the military and civilian regimes. Paradoxically, the civilian regimes are harsher in terms of imposing the regulations. There were instances when the civilian regimes in Kano state gave out instruction to 'suspend' the *Maukibi* procession without recourse to 'negotiation' as was common practice under military dictatorship. It was

[136] See for example, H. Onapajo, "State Repression and Religious Conflict: The Perils of the State Clampdown on the Shi'a Minority in Nigeria", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 37, No. 1 (2017), pp. 80-93.
[137] The *Witness* 1 No. 2, July-September 1998, p. 9.
[138] *Jirgin Tsira* 3, August 2012, p. 13.

also under a civilian administration that the IMN was banned in 2015. This led to a series of protests which took the IMNs *Muzahara* not only to a new geopolitical place but also to a global and virtual space.

While the QN's *Maukibi* commemorative procession still enjoys the state legitimacy and 'soft' regulatory sanction of seeking 'permission' before staging, those of the IMN remain lawfully 'banned'. This does not dissuade the IMN and naturally leads to further state crackdown. The dynamics of identity-making using public processions and the regulatory governance of public religiosity, fits into the general discourse of religious diversity, religious and political frictions, nationalism and the state-religion co-existence.

Chapter Five

The Abuja 'Free Zazkaky' *Muzahara* and the Politics of Contestation for Public Space, 2015 – 2021

5.1 Introduction

Building on the previous chapters, this chapter focuses on the waves of 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* that have been staged since 2015 by members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in Abuja, Nigeria's capital.[1] This was sparked by the 'Zaria clash' between the Nigerian Army and the IMN between 12-14 December, 2015. The chapter explores pockets of such *Muzahara* that unfolded in other locations in northern Nigeria by identifying some patterns and the state responses. The international attention given to these protests mark a shift of performative local spaces to the global arena through conventional and social media.

Conducted primarily to press for the release of the group's spiritual leader from detention, the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* (AFM) underpins the ongoing articulation of the movement's public identity and manifestation of religiosity. The legal entanglements between the IMN and the state over the continued detention of el-Zakzaky, along with other members of the group, are highlighted. It should be noted that el-Zakzaky and his colleagues were acquitted of all charges on 28 July 2021. However, there is a distinction to be made between instances of state overzealousness, human rights abuses and illegal detention of accused perpetrators, for which it is held accountable by its own judiciary; and the broader perceived state security threat by the actions of the IMN.

The aim of this chapter is to contextualize the contestation between the state and the IMN around the question of 'state repression' of public religious demonstrations, human rights violations, and the fight against injustice. In this context, the clash between the state and the IMN is viewed as an encounter between the 'secular' and the 'sacred', with the state framed as repressive and the IMN as the repressed. At the same time, the broader movement of the IMN is perceived to perpetuate state, and arguably global, insecurity. This intricate performance between upholding human rights and obliterating 'terrorism' forms the basis of this chapter. The state coersive instruments is challenged by weaponized dogged protest. Michael Goodhart has provide a scholarly framework that can help understand this interwoven legal, political, and

[1] Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), consists of two geographical entities: Metropolitan Abuja and the Abuja Hinterland. The total landmass of the hinterland is 7, 315 km^2 while the Metro area is 275 km^2. The Abuja Metro is one of the six local government areas of the FCT. The Abuja Metro is administrated by the Federal Capital Territory Administration and the rest of the local governments are administrated by the democratically elected local government councils. For details, see https://www.abuja-ng.com/federal-capital-territory.html (accessed February 2021).

socio-religious toil. Goodhart argues that "human rights are political demands —specifically, demands for emancipation, for an end to domination and oppression. As such they are highly partisan or ideological in nature— a fact which […] is central to understanding the politics of contestation that frequently accompanies human rights […]."[2]

5.2 The Legal Entanglement: IMN and the State

Following the arrest of el-Zakzaky and the release of the Amnesty International report which scrutinized the questionable methods of the Army, petitions written by the IMN to the National Human Rights Council and other security organizations emphasized the killings of their members in previous clashes, including three of el-Zakzaky's biological children. While part of the recommendations of the JCI implicated both the IMN and the National Army, the IMN had already initiated a litigation process to release Zakzaky using the famous legal activist Femi Falana, Senior Advocate of Nigeria, and Festus Okoye, Esq.[3] Femi Falana, ex-President of the West Africa Bar Association (WABA), is a SAN and constitutional lawyer in Nigeria. Festus Okoye, Esq, is a lawyer and the Executive Director of Human Rights Monitor (HRM). Both are human rights activists and Falana is the lead counsel of the IMN. Other members of the legal counsel team included Maxwell Kyon, Sola Egbeyinka, Samuel Ogala, Deji Morakinyo, Wisdom Elum, T. E. Olawanle, and Marshal Abubakar Falana.[4] The involvement of these legal activists followed the visit of the delegates of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) who arrived in Zaria on a fact-finding mission to determine what 'actually' happened between the IMN and the NA. The testimony of el-Zakzaky's daughter's —Suhaila Ibrahim — and eyewitness accounts formed the bulk of documents submitted to the Federal High Court (FHC).[5]

On 2 December 2016, having heard the case, the Court, under the ruling of Justice Gabriel Kolowale, ordered the release of el-Zakzaky and IMN members from the custody of the Department of State Security (DSS) and recommended 50 million Naira be paid in damages.[6] However, on 7 October 2016, the Kaduna state government filed fresh charges in the

[2] G. Michael, "Human Rights and the Politics of Contestation." *Human Rights at the Crossroads* (2013), pp. 31-44.
[3] *Al-Mizan*, Juma'a 18 Jimada Ula, 1437 (27 February 2016).
[4] The details of the eyewitness accounts gathered were filed in a document titled "In the matter of an application by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky for the enforcement of his fundamental rights to life, personal liberty, freedom of movement, dignity of the human person and right to private and family life" – Suit No: FHC/O231/06/2016.
[5] The details of the eyewitness accounts gathered was filed in a document titled "In the matter of an application by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky for the enforcement of his fundamental rights to life, personal liberty, freedom of movement, dignity of the human person and right to private and family life" – Suit No: FHC/O231/06/2016.
[6] "Court Orders Shiites Leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky's Release", 2 December 2016, https://www.channelstv.com/2016/12/02/court-orders-shiites-leader-el-zakzakys-release/; "Court Orders Release

state High Court against the group which blocked the 'release'. The Court "issued an order declaring the Shiite Islamic Movement in Nigeria, IMN, an unlawful society".[7] The order noted that since the clash, the IMN "has overtly continued with unlawful processions, obstruction of public highways, unauthorized occupation of public facilities […] without regard to the rights of other citizens and the public peace […]".[8] Since then, a series of court trials ensued. This development prompted many states in the north, particularly where the IMN's public manifestation took place, to ban the group. The IMN remained banned (at least in theory) and el-Zakzaky remained incarcerated until 2021. This move not only reflects the sectarian squabbles between the majority Sunni and minority Shi'ite groups in Nigeria but also reflects the ways in which the state decided to crackdown on the movement because of the encroachments in public places on a much grander scale than previous protests. This failed to deter the movement. They resorted to collective resistance through protest, against the continued detention of el-Zakzaky. As a result, the Kaduna state government filed new charges in the state High Court against the group on 15 May 2018. The charges included 'unlawful assembly', and 'disruption of public peace', amongst others.[9]

Various authors have postulated about protest movements in other parts of Africa. Drawing on the works of Stephen Ellis, Ineke Van Kessel, J. A. Du Pisani *et al.*, H. S. Simelane,[10] S. Olzak and J. L. Olivier,[11] D. Seddon, L. Zeilig, and M. Dawson,[12] the protests of the Abuja Free Zakzaky *Muzahara* (AFM) share similar characteristics. The AFMs differ from riots, campaign rallies, 'consumer boycotts', petitions, post-election violence and revolts, to name a few.[13] These collective reactions are situated in the broader theoretical framework of

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of El-Zakzaky, Wife, Awards N50m Damages", 3 December 2016, https://punchng.com/court-orders-release-el-zakzaky-wife-awards-n50m-damages/ (accessed February 2021).

[7] "Kaduna Bans Nigeria's Foremost Shiite Groups, IMN", 7 October 2016, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/212288-kaduna-bans-nigerias-foremost-shiite-group-imn.html (accessed February 2021).

[8] "Kaduna Bans Nigeria's Foremost Shiite Group, IMN", 7 October 2016", https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/212288-kaduna-bans-nigerias-foremost-shiite-group-imn.html (accessed April 2021).

[9] "Kaduna Files Fresh 18-Count Charges Against Zakzaky, Wife, Others", April 26, 2018, https://dailytrust.com/kaduna-files-fresh-18-count-charges-against-zakzaky-wife-others (accessed February 2021).

[10] J. A. Du Pisani, M. Broodryk and P. W. Coetzer, "Protest Marches in South Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies 28, No. 4 (1990), pp. 573-602; and H. S. Simelane, "Fiscal Crisis, Social Protest and State Violence in Swaziland, 2009-2012", *Journal for Contemporary History*, 41, No. 2 (2016), pp. 208-228.

[11] S. Olzak and J. L. Olivier, "Racial Conflict and Protest in South Africa and the United States", *European Sociological Review*, 14, No. 3 (1998), pp. 255-278.

[12] D. Seddon and L. Zeilig, "Class & Protest in Africa: New Waves", *Review of African Political Economy*, 32, No. 103, (2005), pp. 9-27; Leo Zeilig, *Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London & New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007) and L. Zeilig and M. Dawson, "Introduction: Student Activism, Structural Adjustment and the Democratic Transition in Africa", *JHEA/RESA*, 6, No. 2&3 (2008), pp. 1-31.

[13] For some details on the reasons why rallies turn to violent riots, see Brandon Ives and Jacob S. Lewis, "From Rallies to Riots: Why Some Protests Become Violent" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Peace Science Society, Vol.

'social movements' and collective action. The AFMs resonate with the conceptualization posited by Matt Clement that they are "crowds of people assembling, marching, demonstrating […] and occupying spaces, such as public squares, main streets and workplace".[14]

Over time, as exhibited in Chapter 3, the protests of the IMN foreground certain grievances. This included a struggle for social justice against perceived oppression; the fight for the plight of the minority; to outwardly express anti-government sentiment; and importantly, to free Zakzaky during his periods of detention. Mahmoud M. Ayoub notes that sacrifice in defense of one's faith is a marker of one's 'commitment to a religious ideology'. In Nigeria, the IMN claims that the AFM is defined by the struggle for 'social justice'. This has been the cornerstone of the outward expression of IMN religiosity. It led to state and sectarian resistance and oppression. What unfolds, however, is a convergence at the state capital, symbolically targeting the very heart of the state.

Centralizing the *Muzahara* at Abuja signified an expansion of the territoriality, spectacle, and visibility of the *Muzahara* to provoke government reaction.[15] Taking Abuja as the "boundary of dissent", to echo Bruce D'Arcus's phrase, this represented a direct challenge to state power. Such boldness, D'Arcus argues, "involves situated and politically charged representations of identity and geographic space".[16] This necessitated a more concerted response from the government. With the increased frequency of 'mob' clashes with the IMN, the massification of the 'Free Zakzaky' protest further represents the broader motives for international recognition, legitimacy, and sympathy for the movement. From January 2016, the Abuja Metro gradually turned into the epicenter of the IMN's public marches, in part because the IMN headquarters in Zaria had been demolished in the 2015 military crackdown.

64. No. 5 (2020), pp. 958-986. For the history of riots and protests since the pre-Industrial times, see Matt Clement, *A History of Riots, Protest and the Law: The Sound of Crowd* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[14] M. Clement, *A History of Riots, Protest and the Law* … p. 4.

[15] The public visibility of the IMN protests also demonstrates the material presence of the movement in the capital city. For materiality of identity, see Marian Burchardt and Mariske Westendorp, "The Im-materiality of Urban Religion: Towards an Ethnography of Urban Religious Aspirations", *Culture and Religion* 19, No. 2 (2018), pp. 160-176.

[16] B. D'Arcus, *Boundaries of Dissent: Protest and State Power in the Media* Age (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), p. 6.

5.3 The Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* (AFM): Mode and Pattern

The AFMs started on 4 January 2016, three weeks after the 12-14th December 2015 NA crackdown. It was conceived by IMN members in Abuja.[17] Many *Dai'ra* (*Majlis*, *Mandiq* and *Halqa* inclusive) assemblies of different states of northern Nigeria supported the initiative.[18] *Dai'ra*, like those of Gombe and Katsina states, rented houses in the low-cost suburbs of Abuja, such as Kubwa, Karu, and Gwagwalada. Along with the *Markaz* and *Fodiyya* schools facilities of the Abuja's *Da'ira*, accommodation was secured to house *Da'ira* members from other states.[19] By September of the same year, seven different *Da'ira* from seven different states each had a house rented and hosted sizeable numbers of male members dedicated to the AFMs. Female members were housed separately in family homes.

There was no universal plan for organizing the protests. According to Rucht, "organizing mass protest is its own right. This enterprise, as a rule, requires material resources, experience, know-how, talent, endurance, and, above all, time. The importance of organization and resources in mobilizing large groups of people is not new to social movement scholars".[20] Rucht's argument is premised on Erving Goffman who introduced the twin concepts of 'frontstage' and 'backstage' that are largely deployed in theater studies but prove useful here.[21] Andrew W. Martin's exploration of the authority of social movements emphasizes the fact that the shape of the protest is determined by a 'small leadership cadre' who monopolize what it takes to stage a protest.[22] In the case of the AFMs, the authority to finance, to organize, and to lead lies in the organization committee (AFMOC) and the *Amirs* of the *Daira*. Dieter Rucht elaborates on the concept of the 'backstage' which involves issues such as organizational style, the right of assembly, law enforcement systems, pre-protest meetings, and performative cultures.

Members willingly offered themselves to a cause 'worth sacrificing' for.[23] By conservative estimates, the total number deployed for AFMs in Abuja ranged from 500 to 700

[17] There was a presence of the IMN following in Abuja conducting their activities in *Markaz* and *Fodiyya* schools, the two major centers of the group. See N. I. Medugu, "Muslims of the Federal Capital Territory: A Survey", *NRN Background Paper*, No. 5 (2012), p. 5.
[18] Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.
[19] See chapter three of this dissertation for details on the IMN's organizational structure.
[20] D. Rucht, "Exploring the Backstage: Preparation and Implementation of Mass Protest in Germany", *American Behavioral Scientist*, 61, No. 13 (2017), pp. 1678-1702.
[21] Rucht, "Exploring the Backstage".
[22] A. W. Martin, "Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest: The Case of Union Organizing in the United States, 1990-2001", *Social Forces* 85, No. 3 (2007), pp. 1414-1435.
[23] IMN members declared that they were willing to die for the cause. Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.

in 2016 and early 2017.[24] This increased over the next three years. The *Washington Post* reported on 23 July 2019 that 3,000 IMN members gathered in the capital Abuja.[25] If the *Washington Post*'s estimate is accurate then the size of the AFM crowd had quadrupled by the time of the report. While this suggests expansive mobilization from the level of assemblies at different states, it further highlights the heavy presence of the IMN in the Abuja Metro during the protests of the AFMs. No doubt they were also able to attract other members from Abuja.

The AFM crowds can be divided into 'regular' and 'irregular' crowds.[26] The former (regular crowd, RC), refers to the section of the AFM participants who 'settled permanently' in Abuja. They sought jobs or practiced handcrafts, enrolled in school and began a 'new life'. This move was financially supported by the respective states' *Da'ira,* who paid for transport to, and accommodation in, Abuja.[27] As an organization, they were in a financial position to do so as part of collective support for the cause. This opportunity allowed members to find employment, open small businesses and for some to further their education. This was an attractive prospect for those youth of the underclass.[28] According to the AFM register, the RC constituted 70% of the total crowd.

For the 'irregular' crowd (IRC), two categories emerge: students of secondary and post-secondary institutions who made themselves available during the school vacation;[29] and the set of assemblies' leaders who form the front row during the AFM.[30] The significance of this categorization is to reflect the hierarchical organisation of the AFM crowd. The transitory nature of the IRC is important against the backdrop of residence (permanent and temporary) of the IMN in Abuja for the AFM. Both 'regular' and 'irregular' members are best described as a

[24] Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.
[25] "Why Shiite Muslim Protesters and Nigeria's Security Forces Keep Clashes", 23 July 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/journalist-police-officer-protesters-die-as-shiite-muslim-group-clashes-with-police-in-nigerias-capital/2019/07/23/e0b2e08e-ad4b-11e9-9411-a608f9d0c2d3_story.html (accessed February 2021).
[26] My perspective of the "crowd" is in line with Robert J. Holton's "The Crowd in History: Some Problems of Theory and Method", *Social History* 3, No. 2 (1978), pp. 219-233. According to Holton, the crowd serves a "social purpose" and is deployed as a means of "the collective sentiments" (pp. 222-223).
[27] Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.
[28] The actual number who obtained diplomas is not clear, making it difficult to give precise comparable statistics.
[29] Variations in the schools' calendars allowed for a constant supply of student activists.
[30] The last category appears in the video footage of the AFM. The youth form the ranks and the bearers of flags, banners and songs/slogans chanters. The content of the video footage has been verified with Abdullahi Muhammad during his interview with the author.

'protest society' as theorized by Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter – they were all in pursuit of a common goal.[31]

The participation of students in the AFMs is an indication of the potentiality of student activism in IMN struggles which is rooted in the history of the movement since the 1980s.[32] As noted earlier, students form a critical force in the rise of social movements. This involvement has the power, as Mahmud Mamdani points out, of "forcing an opening up even if they lacked an alternative strategy. Its possibilities depended far more on the character of forces that student action succeeded in mobilizing than its own internal energies".[33]

The media reports on the AFMs are not explicit about the specific hours when the protests were held. However, it is clear that the AFMs were conducted periodically. According to Abdullahi Muhammd, there were two main periodic cycles during which they took place: in the morning (usually 10-11 am) and the evening (4-5 pm). The morning AFMs often targeted the federal government offices around the Federal Government Secretariat Complex which is located in the Central Business District of Abuja. The location is strategic as it connects to the 'Three Arms Zone', which is home to the Presidential Villa, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the National Aboretum, the Millennium Park, the National Children's Park, the National Mosque and the National Christian Centre. While occupying the Federal Government Secretariat Complex, the IMN claims that some of their members among the federal government workers joined the morning AFMs.[34] While this claim is difficult to substantiate, Mallam Nura, a staff member of the National Universities Commission (NUC) was one of the AFM participants arrested by the police on 26 July 2018.[35] This, in a way, suggests that there was a presence of IMN members and supporters within the federal government civil service structures.

The points (for convergence or dispersal) and the routes for both the morning and the evening AFMs fluctuated. This depended on the target destination. Points at the intersection of strategic places within the Abuja Metro were taken as meeting/dispersal points. For example, on 22 July 2019, the *Premium Times* reported that the AFM began at Nitel junction and headed

[31] Donatella della Porta, and Herbert Reiter, "Introduction: The Policing of Protest in Western Democracies", in D. della Porta, and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1998), pp. 1-32.
[32] Studies have underlined the critical role of students in spearheading demonstrations that resulted in the democratizations in different countries in Africa. See, for example, Zeilig and Dawson, "Introduction". For more on the role of student activism in the emergence of the IMN, see chapter three of this dissertation.
[33] Mamdani quoted in Zeilig and Dawson, "Introduction", p. 18.
[34] Interview with Muhammad Nalado by the author in his office at Bayero University Kano on 16 November 2019.
[35] Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.

to the Federal Secretariat Complex.[36] The significance of changing the routes and spatial extent of the AFM was to increase visibility but also preempt possible interception by state forces. The armed forces wanted to restrict their activities to avoid unnecessary clashes and disruptions. This was not always the case. On 8 July 2019, for example, the police managed to disperse the AFM crowd as they attempted to break into the National Assembly Complex. Unfortunately, two AFM participants were killed and two policemen injured. During another stage of AFM on 22 July 2019, the violence escalated. Triggered by the incessant police repression, the AFM crowd allegedly set fire to "government vehicles including those owned by the Emergency Management Agency".[37] To contain the situation, the police "directed that protests in Abuja be limited [to] the Unity Fountain, near Transcorp Hilton hotel".[38] Such a confinement order was perhaps issued because this time the AFM threatened to break into the National Assembly.

The evening AFMs targeted the marketplaces, commercial spaces and crowded routes. Essentially, the government was targeted with morning cycles of the AFM while community support was mobilized in the evening. Consistent protests would also attract media attention and coverage of the events. This resembled the events of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as noted by Karen Rasler.[39] However, making protest consistent with periodic cycles goes along with time zones, and to some extent, as morning and evening are two major moments for most of the daytime activities in Nigeria. The making of protests period-specific offers specific advantages to the movement. In the light of this, Brian Larkin argues that "urban space is an imeersive, mediated, feedback environment".[41]

However, the persistent protests led to increasing resentment among non-IMN citizens. The AFMs created traffic jams in the busy Central District Area and environs. They held pedestrians and motorists alike in long traffic jam, compelling them to be spectators, particularly during the evening AFM. Movement within the Abuja metropolitan streets was

[36] "Again, Shiites Protest Turns Violent in Abuja", 22 July 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/342269-just-in-again-shiites-protest-turns-violent-in-abuja.html (accessed 25 February 2021); "Police, Shiites Members Clash in Abuja", 16 April 2018, https://www.channelstv.com/2018/04/16/breaking-police-shiite-members-clash-in-abuja/ (accessed 25 February 2021); "DCP, 12 Others Dead as Shiites Protest in Abuja", 23 July 23 2019, https://thenationonlineng.net/dcp-12-others-dead-as-shiites-protest-in-abuja/ (accessed 25 February 2021).

[37] "Again, Shiites Protest Turns Violent in Abuja", 22 July 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/342269-just-in-again-shiites-protest-turns-violent-in-abuja.html (accessed 25 February, 2021).

[38] "Again, Shiites Protest Turns Violent in Abuja", 22 July 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/342269-just-in-again-shiites-protest-turns-violent-in-abuja.html (accessed 25 February, 2021).

[39] K. Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution", *American Sociological Review,* 61, No. 1 (1996), pp. 132-152.

[41] B. Larkin, "Public Preaching, Public Sound and the Control of Space in Northern Nigeria", unpublished draft working paper for "Religion and the Mastery of Public Space in Nigeria", a workshop organized by Columbia University, USA (February, 2021).

difficult and chaotic. As the police cordoned off areas, ordinary citizens were subjected to security checks. This is more prevalent in the marketplaces during the evening hours. In the process of dispersing the AFM crowds, the police created pandemonium as they shot into the air and fired tear gas canisters indiscriminately. Non-IMN members became war-weary.[42] Unfortunately, they too became victims of the police repression. For example, Alex Ogbu, a passer-by, was killed by a stray police bullet on 21 January, 2020.[43]

While many blamed the IMN for the chaos, some media reports were sympathetic to the cause. Eye-witness accounts as reported by *Premium Times* on 30 October 2018, show varying levels of sympathy:

Eyewitness I:

> There were women who I suspect cannot be up to 20 years old carrying their children on their back, barefooted, wearing black and carrying placards marching for the release of their leader". Johnson continued that "the protest started around 3 [or 4-5] despite soldiers shooting, some of the protesters kept advancing in a column towards the soldiers, with some of them carrying their injured colleagues … All those small children, they have mind! With the shooting you could see them advancing towards the soldiers. With the heavy sound of gunshots, the sect members would carry any of their injured colleagues, the ones that died they put on bikes and you would see the legs of the victims scratching the ground.

Eye-witness II:

> I stay around Mararaba and that was where they were coming from. They caused a lot of (traffic) hold up and disturbed movement of people and businesses. As they got here (Nyanya Market), we started hearing gunshots from afar. It was now like there was a stampede among them, the way some were running and some advancing. And we that we are here, we started packing our things. Before you know it, we started hearing more gunshots and people started running. It was later we heard that the military first asked them to go back, that they were not allowed into the city. But they insisted that they must go into the town and the clash got more intense. One of the sect leaders came out with his chest opened, some said who he was with a charm, challenging the soldiers. That was when the soldiers started shooting. With the shooting, some were going back while some were moving forward, chanting that they would not agree. Before the clash, there was a military post just under the bridge with about four Hilux jeeps. When I was coming, I saw military police there and some police officers there too and it was later that the army now came. We did not stay long before we all packed and we moved out around 6pm to our homes. We heard that the group said they would still come and repeat the protest. So whoever is their sponsor, the government should find them out.

Eye-witness III:

> Before I don't like commenting on their issue … but the day I saw them at Nicon Junction in Abuja trying to take an armoured tank from policemen who were spraying hot water. They were trekking without shoes, with women not up to 15 years, marching from Area I to Secretariat (in the Central Business District) just because they said they are protesting!

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[42] "Gunshots in Abuja as Police Disperse Protesting Shi'ites", 18 October 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/358283-updatedgunshots-in-abuja-as-police-disperse-protesting-shiites.html; "Pandemonium as Police Fire Tear-gas to Disperse Shiite Protesters in Abuja", 8 January 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/police-fire-tear-gas-disperse-shiite-protesters-abuja/ (accessed April 2020).

[43] *Nigeria Security Situation: Country of Origin Information Report* (2021), p. 156.

The residents of Abuja are clearly overwhelmed with what they have witnessed. These testimonies suggest some form of admiration to the commitment, endurance, sacrifice, and courage on the part of the AFM crowd. The participation of young women and children in the AFM also triggers sympathy for the protesters. This admiration is further reported in the *Vanguard* report of 18 July, 2019 that: "The Shiites have enjoyed a lot of public sympathy and goodwill […] because of the largely peaceful and orderly manner in which they have pursued their quest for the release of Sheikh El-Zakzaky for nearly four years".

The IMN vis-à-vis AFM were attempting to convince people of their 'noble' objectives. The AFMs sites were used to showcase critical national problems while also advertising the movement. They relied heavily on the distribution of pamphlets. These briefly outlined the development of the movement and offered a critique of the Nigerian state, foregrounding all the governments' failures and abuses of power. It also provided some social critique. For example, the pamphlets between August and December 2018 provided scathing reports on cases of human kidnapping for ransom, rampant in the northern parts of the country.[44] The pamphlets would also contain excerpts from el-Zakzaky's lectures. He was portrayed as a social justice crusader who could provide a better solution for Nigeria's problems. In addition, it positioned the IMN within a global network. The US-Iran political conflict was not only an indictment of the 'west' but also aligned the movement to a greater Shi'a brotherhood.[45] These connections, as dicussed in Chapter 4, had both positive and negative consequences.

5.4 The Frequency of the AFMs

The frequency and intensity of the AFMs depended on circumstances associated with the situation of el-Zakzaky's detention and the aftermaths of the AFMs. For example, reports

[44] There are works on human kidnapping in Nigeria. See for example, Ibrahim Bello and Jamilu Ibrahim Mukhtar, "An analysis of the Causes and Consequences of Kidnapping in Nigeria", *African Research Review*, 11, No. 4 (2017), pp. 134-143; and Okoli A. Chukwuma and Fakumo T. Agada, "Kidnapping and National Security in Nigeria", *Research on Humanities and Social sciences,* 4, No. 6 (2014), pp. 137-146.

[45] For example, the case of Marzieh Hashemi, American-born Iranian journalist and television presenter. It was reported that Hashemi was arrested by the US police because she "wore" a headscarf. The story was framed to portray Hashemi as a victim of US police oppression. But the reason why Hashemi was arrested was far from the hijab phobia. She was "being held as a material witness for a federal investigation" as court documents showed. The family of Hashimi stated on 21 January 2019 that "communities all over, were outraged by the unjust imprisonment and harsh interrogations of Marzieh Hashimi. There was also a trending hashtag: #FreeMarziehHashimi. Hashimi was held for 10 days before being released. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/23/marzieh-hashemi-iran-us-arrest-journalist (accessed April 2021). Information featuring the Marzieh Hashimi case in the pamphlets during the AFM was obtained from an interview with Engr. Bala Abdullahi, member of the IMN Media Forum, by the author at UDB Road, Kano on 18 August 2020.

and even rumours about the ill-health of el-Zakzaky while in police custody often spurred protest. On 11 January 2018, for example, the *Guardian* reported that el-Zakzaky had suffered a stroke.[46] Reports were also circulated that el-Zakzaky was suffering from glaucoma. The *Vanguard*, also printed an article that el-Zakzaky "may die in detention".[47] This information sparked a surge in the AFMs, particularly in 2018 and 2019 (see Figure 5.1 below), calling for immediate access to medical treatment. Amidst massification of the AFMs not only in Abuja, but in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina and other northern states, the Kaduna High Court granted him "bail on health grounds" to visit Mandeta Hospital in India.[48]

Fig. 5.1 Frequency of the AFMs, 2016-2020



Source: Author's Fieldwork

El-Zakzaky's own 'suffering' in prison was juxtaposed with the redemptive suffering espoused by the movement. Posters, placards and banners with el-Zakzaky's image inscribed with 'Free Zakzaky' were brandished at other religious events such as the Quds Day, *Ashura*, *Arbaeen*, and *Maulid*. While el-Zakzaky's images remind the participants of his condition, they also re-activated their loyalty and commitment towards his greater cause.[49]

As the intensity of AFMs increased, so too did police intervention. Injuries and deaths slowed down AFMs in 2020. The police would confiscate the cadavers and those injured would

[46] "El-Zakzaky Suffers Stroke as Health Deteriorates", 11 January 2018, https://guardian.ng/lead-story/el-zakzaky-suffers-stroke-as-health-deteriorates/; "Daughter: Sheikh Zakzaky's Health Conditions Deteriorating in Prison", 13 October 2020, https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/891740/daughter-sheikh-zakzaky-s-health-conditions-deterioring-in-prison (accessed February 2021).
[47] "Zakzaky May Die in Detention – Shiites", 11 January 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/zakzaky-may-die-detention-shiites/ (accessed February 2020).
[48] "Court Grants El-Zakzaky, Wife Medical Bail", 5 August 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/344865-breaking-court-grants-el-zakzaky-wife-medical-leave-to-indian-hospital.html (accessed February 2020).
[49] Authors' fieldwork observation at Tudun Wada, Rimin Kebe, Kano in February 2021.

receive medical attention under police surveillance. Efforts made to recover the dead bodies or get the injured released for 'proper' medical care proved futile. This had a psychological impact on the AFM crowds.[50] Much like the debacle of 2015, there is little consensus about the numbers of causalities. The police are evasive. Through press statements, one can get a sense of the under-estimated number of causalities or arrests. On 16 April 2018, for example, the *Premium Times* reported that the Federal Capital Territory Police Command said that "115 members of Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) were taken into custody following Monday's protests in Abuja".[51] These figures were contested by the IMN, claiming that "over 200" members were arrested. Either way, this arrest operation was the biggest since the start of the AFMs. The injured could also not evade capture. The AFM organizing committee (AFMOC) claims that in July 2018, the police 'broke-into' the Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital and whisked away the injured AFM participants.[52]

This was a financially draining state of affairs. Legal practitioners had to be hired (or deployed the services of members with legal expertise) and medical bills had to be paid. Much of the burden was supported with the funds of the *Shuhada*' Foundation. The psychological and financial burdens impeded the process of mobilization and could be considered another form of state repression typologies.[53] On the other hand, one could also argue that in a 'state of emergency', there is little option but to end the clashes. The position of the state in relation to the actions of the IMN requires further discussion.

[50] The author listened to the interviews with the injured AFM participants who were kept under police custody before being admitted at the hospitals. Stories around similar issues popped up in the author's interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020. In Nigeria, there are reported cases of abuse by the police of detainees or inmates. Many studies have discussed these problems. For details, see for example, Igbo Emmanuel UM, "The Use and Abuse of Police Powers and Extrajudicial Killings in Nigeria", *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS* 10, No. 1 (2017), p. 83; Aborisade Richard and Similade Fortune Oni, "'Crimes of the Crime Fighters': Nigerian Police Officers' Sexual and Physical Abuses Against Female Arrestees", *Women & Criminal Justice* 30, No. 4 (2020), pp. 243-263. Essentially, it is the long-time police brutality in Nigeria that sparked the recent #EndSARS protests.

[51] "Why We Arrest 115 Shiites Protesters in Abuja— Police", 16 April 2018, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/265154-why-we-arrested-115-shiite-protesters-in-abuja-police.html (accessed April 2020).

[52] Interview with Mallam Sulaiman Gambo, member AFMCOM, by the author at his office in Bayero University Kano in February 2020 and interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020.

[53] Jennifer Earl argues that any action by the authorities to mar the process of mobilization is considered to be a potential state repression. See J. Earl, "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression", *Sociological Theory*, 21, No. 1. (2003), pp. 44-68.

5.5 Contestations for Public Space, Policing of Protests and Violence during the AFMs

Policing the AFM transports the ongoing state suppression of dissidence (religious and otherwise) and the imposition of 'order' into the contested and regulated space of the Abuja Metro. The protests were against human rights abuses by the state but also symbolized the encounter between 'the secular' and 'the sacred', to adopt from William Safran.[54] The fulcrum of Safran's edited collection is the entanglement between religion and politics in the 'West' and some adjacent political entities. They are framed as forces whose collision endangers discontent. Invariably, the IMN's AFM is staged under the banner of religion but criticizes Nigeria's government for manipulation of justice against them. Alex Thurston argues that the "informal relationship" between political leaders and religious elites breeds three main "vulnerabilities" in regulating religiosity: (a) the religious elite's 'credibility' is compromised; (b) religious leaders grow unnecessarily powerful; and (c) authorities deploy 'coercive' means, the repercussions of which, often worsen 'security conditions'.[55] While there is no such 'informal relationship' with the IMN, this chapter adds to the 'vulnerabilities'. The state profiling of the group— like branding it 'terrorist' and 'proscribed'— leads to more repressive policing. Thus, the contestation, the policing, and the associated violence fit into the discourse of public order policing.

Public order policing has been defined by Willem De Lint as "the use of police authority and capacity to establish a legitimate equilibrium between governmental and societal collective and individual rights and interests in a mass demonstration of grievance".[56] Stephen Reicher *et al.* ignore the claim of 'legitimate equilibrium' and stress the imperative of enforcing 'public order' because of "the unpredictability of [the crowd to] erupt into violence".[57] Moreover, Chris Greer and Eugene McLaughlin infer that public order policing is the counterforce to the situations that could lead to 'riot'.[58] The main supposition of these scholars is the fact that the discourse around the public order or protest policing involves the state being repressive in policing and the volatility of the protest crowd being violent. There are, however, exceptional moments when protests take place peacefully. In both of the situations, policing protest, as De

[54] See William Safran, ed. *The Secular and the Sacred: Nation, Religion and Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
[55] A. Thurston, "Nigeria: Between Formal and Informal Religious Regulation", in Haim Malka ed. *Faith in the Balance: Regulating Religious Affairs in Africa* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), pp. 62-63.
[56] W. De Lint, "Public Order Policing: A Tough Act to Follow?", *International Journal of the Sociology of Law,* 33, No. 4 (2005), pp. 179-199.
[57] S. Reicher, *et al.*, "An Integrated Approach to Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing", *Policing,* 27, No. 4 (2004), pp. 558-572.
[58] C. Greer and Eu McLaughlin, "We Predict a Riot? Public Order Policing, New Media Environments and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist", *Brit. J. Criminol* (2010), pp. 1041-1059.

Lint argues, is an exercise at the crossroad where the obligation of the state and the rights of the citizens intersect. This chapter contends that the mode of public order policing in Nigeria is repressive in some cases and tolerant in others.

The pattern of policing, the nature of the crowds, and their objectives could largely determine the result of the engagement. As noted in the previous chapter, there was heightened state intervention to curb the excess of public spectacles of the IMN from the 1990s when the movement transformed into a full-blown body of the Shi'a Muslim minority. Very few changes took place in the methods of policing the IMN *Muzahara* since the 1990s.

Nigeria's Constitution guarantees the rights for assembly and associations. Outward manifestations of religiosity are permitted subject to some restrictions. The Nigeria Police Force is conferred with authority to assess the security implications of assemblies and associations by the "Police Act" of 1978 under the provision of the "public safety and public order".[59] Civil society (both religious and otherwise) is expected to seek permission before holding any assembly. While the IMN defy this customary security protocol, the police reports indicate that there have been preemptive detective assessments by the police of the IMN's 'subterranean move' on the eve of every public march.[60] Intelligence information is gathered either through informants or espionage.[61] To forestall any risky situations, all the police states' commands are instructed to "emplace proactive action to preempt and mitigate any protest that could snowball into violent skirmishes".[62] The so-called 'subterranean move' has been reported in different tone such as a "clandestine planned protest", "expected turn out", and "a massification". The planned dates for the AFMs in different states, including Abuja, have also been noted.[63] This is not unusual. Pamela E. Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa and Kelley D. Strawn, state that "sociologists considered protest to be an undemocratic intrusion into politics".[64] Thus, there have been endless police blocks of the AFMs' routes by deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons. The massification of the AFMs elicited drastic state tervention, so much so that the police have used 'live ammunition' to crackdown on the crowd. The *Washington Post* reported

[59] Nigeria Police Act (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2020 (HB. 685).
[60] CB: 4089/IGP.SEC/ABJ/VOL.56/763.
[61] The police do not disclose such information and in the event of an "informant" their identities are also made anonymous. Police officers (their identities remain anonymous) at the Security Investigative Bureau (SIB), Kano Command, informed the author that they carry out preemptive intelligence gathering on the activities of all religious groups. According to them, this allows them take preemptive measures, which include deploying police officers at the sites where the activities are planned to take place and instructing the religious elites involved to suspend their plans in the event of impending security problems.
[62] CB: 4089/IGP.SEC/ABJ/VOL.56/763.
[63] CB: 4089/KNS/SIB/SECINT/VOL.2/31.
[64] P. E. Oliver, J. Cadena-Roa and K. D. Strawn, "Emerging Trends in the Study of Protest and Social Movements", *Research in Political Sociology* 12 (2003) pp. 213-244.

in February 2019 that as of late October 2018, 45 IMN members had died in Abuja "Free Zakzaky" protests and "more than another 100 wounded after Nigerian security forces used automatic weapons to disperse the crowds".[65] The dispersal and killing of the AFM crowds is occasioned by mass arrests, many of who died in police custody. While a state is charged to ensure public safety, Nigeria has quite rightly been criticized for its human rights abuses. Yet it has attempted to engage with the IMN.

The repressive reaction of the security forces to the public presence of the IMN could be viewed in the context of the country's continued fight against Millenarian groups a couple of decades before,[66] and the more recent insurgent group Boko Haram. The branding of the IMNs public marches in the court order as 'terrorist activities' not only villainized them at home but profiled them in the context of the global fight against terrorism. With the attendant consequences of the AFMs that muddle IMN's relationship with the government and further define contestations over public space, existential threats for extremists' movements have been complicated. The statement made by el-Zakzaky earlier in September 2015 that Boko Haram insurgency is a hoax, a failed plot hatched by Nigeria's spy agencies, could further implicate the IMN. According to him, "Boko Haram doesn't exist and it can merely be seen in the media and we just see some aimless attacks and blasts against people in the markets, mosques, churches and streets."[67]

These protests, as mentioned in the previous chapter, also unfold within a global context of Islamic sectarian violence. Hakeem Onapajo, Solomon T. Anjide and Okoli Chukwuma are of the opinion that violence is a result of state crackdown on the Shi'a.[68] While Anjide and Chukwuma reduce the AFMs to an 'uprising' that begs for state repressive intervention, both works underline the government's use of force as trigger for potential conflict in Nigeria. Murtala Ibrahim is of the opinion that the violence is the product of the encounter between the

[65] "Why is Nigeria Cracking Down on Peaceful Religious Protest", 4 February 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/04/why-is-nigeria-cracking-down-on-peaceful-religious-protests/ (accessed March 2021).

[66] The most notorious Millenarian group in post-colonial northern Nigeria was the Maitatsine sect. They were renowned for 'heretical views'. These include that Muslims "could pray facing any direction" rather than facing the direction of the Kaabah at Meccah. For further details, see Paul M. Lubeck, "Islamic Protest Under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine Explained", *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 55, No. 4, Popular Islam (1985), pp. 369-389; Abdul Raufu Mustapha, ed., *Sects and Social Disorders: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria* (NY: James Curray, 2014). For studies on Millenarian movements outside Africa, see Garry W. Trompf, ed., *Cargo Cults and Millenarian Movements: Transoceanic Comparisons of New Religious Movements* (Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 1990).

[67] "Nigeria: Islamic Movement Leader Describes Boko Haram as Failed Plot of Spy Agencies", *Asia News Minor*, September 11 (2015).

[68] H. Onapajo, "State Repression and Religious Conflict: The Peril of the State Clampdown on the Shi'a Minority in Nigeria", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 37, No. 1 (2017), pp. 80-93; S. T. Anjide and O. Chukwuma, "New Trajectory of Islamic Extremism in Northern Nigeria: A Threat-Import Analysis of Shiite's Uprising", *International Journal of African and Asian Studies,* 32 (2017), pp. 41-51.

'secular' (state) and the 'sacred' (IMN).[69] Markus Balkenhol *et al.* asks, "how, in various places across the world, do religious emotions and national sentiment become entangled?"[70] While these interesting notions provide insight into understanding the relationship between the state and 'social movements', they largely ignore the centrality of policing mode or style as the cause of violence.

A number of studies on protests (and by extension social movements) have noted that public order policing, and the role of the state in the policing exercise, differ from one country to another.[71] A dichotomy has been drawn between the so-called 'established' and the 'young' democracies, postulating that each deploys a style consistent with its own internal dynamics. One should really be asking what constitutes democracy and how should this be negotiated in a postcolonial framework. Although there are instances where in established democracies abuses are reported, these seem more prevalent in young democracies. Joanna Gilmore notes of a brutal way in which the police responded to demonstrations in England. He describes the policing style as "authoritarian style of protest policing".[72] There are a number of cases of violence resulting from the repressive styles of policing of protests in Africa.[73] In Nigeria – a relatively young democracy – the history of policing protests and demonstrations has been violent, a by-product of British colonial administration.

The mode or style of policing (whether violent or negotiating) changes over time with the upsurge in protest movements and improvements or changes in the economic and political systems. New 'policing tactics' evolve,[74] leading to what Pamela E. Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa and Kelley D. Strawn term 'dynamic interactions' between regimes and movements. The case with the AFMs is quite different. In the absence of real dialogue, police repression triggers fresh waves of marches despite killings and mass arrests. It further provokes 'micromobilization' for mass participation motivated by a penchant for 'martyrdom'.[75]

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[69] M. Ibrahim, "Spatial Piety: Shia Religious Processions and the Politics of Contestation of Public Space in Northern Nigeria", in Markus Balkenhol, Ernst v. d. Hemel and Irene Stengs, eds., *The Secular Sacred: Emotions of Belonging and the Perils of Nation and Religion* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 89-106.

[70] M. Balkenhol *et al.*, "Introduction: Emotional Entanglements of Sacrality and Secularity – Engaging the Paradox", in Balkenhol, v. d. Hemel and Stengs, eds., *The Secular Sacred*, p. 1.

[71] See for example Della Porta and Reiter, eds. *Policing Protest*; and Willem de Lint, "Public Order Policing in Canada: An Analysis of Operations in Recent High Stakes Events" (2004).

[72] Joanna Gilmore, "Policing Protest: An Authoritarian Consensus", Center for Crime and Justice Studies, No. 82 (2010), pp. 21-23.

[73] See for example Simelane, "Fiscal Crisis, Social Protest and State Violence in Swaziland, 2009-2012"; and Du Pisani, Broodryk and Coetzer, "Protest Marches in South Africa".

[74] See Mattias Wahlström, "The Making of Protest and Protest Policing: Negotiation, Knowledge, Space, and Narrative (PhD Diss., University of Gothenburg, 2011).

[75] According to Doug McAdam, Micromobilization "can be defined as that small group setting in which processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce mobilization for collective action … perhaps the most obvious example is that of the preexistent political group … unions …

The situation turned more outrageous following the killing of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Usman Umaru, and a member of the National Youth Service Corps, Precious Owolabi, during one of the clashes that took place on 22 July 2019 and sparked outrage.[76] This incident marked a shift in the response of the government to the AFMs. On 25 July 2019, a day after the funerary rite of Owolabi, the federal government secured a court order and declared the IMN 'banned'. According to the order, the government "outlawed the criminality of the group which has engaged in terrorist activities, including attacking soldiers, killing policemen and a youth corps member, destroying public property, consistently defying State authority.[77]

The President of Nigeria Muhammad Buhari (2015-present) called the AFMs 'violent' while addressing the nation and, stated that: "I want to reassure residents of Abuja in particular and the country in general to go about their lawful activities without fear. The leadership of our security and law enforcement agencies are taking action to safeguard the nation against such mindless attacks".[78] The President's speech underlines the call made that the IMN take up arms during the AFMs and compounded the unstable public security that the AFMs were creating in Abuja. The state was expected to secure the safety of all its citizens. In the security force's discourse, and indeed that of the state, the claim that the IMN is in possession of arms was amplified.[79] While the JCI has not been able to confirm this claim, it remains one of the reasons that prompted the ban order and at the same time it justified the highly criticized, and dubious methods by which, they were being suppressed. The move was rejected by the IMN but also other religious leaders. The Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, for example, Cardinal John Onaiyekan, was reported to have "criticized the government's action of banning the IMN as a threat to religious freedom for all believers".[80] Here the freedom of religious practice overshadowed the extent of violence unfolding in Abuja.

churches". See D. McAdam, "Micrmobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism", *International Social Movement Research* I, pp. 125 – 154.

[76] "DCP, Reporter, Two Shiites Killed, Sect Protests in Canada, India", 23 July 2019, https://punchng.com/dcp-reporter-two-shiites-killed-sect-protest-grounds-abuja/ (accessed February 2021). Conflicting accounts emerged as to the cause of their deaths. According to the police, the killing was carried out by the IMN using a gun seized from police. The IMN, on their part, claim that the victims were killed by a police shooting spree. This kind of blame narrative characterizes media reports, press statements, press releases of the two parties over the continued clashes between them particularly from 2015.

[77] "Nigeria: Court Bans Shia Group", 30 July 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-court-bans-shia-group (accessed February 2021).

[78] "Why Shiite Muslim Protesters and Nigeria's Security Forces Keep Clashes", 23 July 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/journalist-police-officer-protesters-die-as-shiite-muslim-group-clashes-with-police-in-nigerias-capital/2019/07/23/e0b2e08e-ad4b-11e9-9411-a608f9d0c2d3_story.html (accessed February 2021).

[79] D'Arcus, *Boundaries of Dissent*, p. 6.

[80] "2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria", https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/ (accessed February 2021).

This IMN-State policing dilemma also filtered into the media. For example, the National Assembly had to go into lockdown on 22 July 2019 when the AFM crowd broke into the premises.[81] This particular incident attracted conflicting media reports; more so than any other incident since the start of the protests because the IMN was now symbolically 'attacking' the legislature, the second arm of government. The IMN version of events stands in stark contrast to other media reports. In *Sahara Reporters*, the crowd is depicted as peaceful, exercising their democratic right:

> Members of the Islamic group had gone to peacefully protest the continued detention of their leader, Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakyzaky, but were tear-gassed by policemen. The placard-wielding protesters, in their hundreds, arrived the main gate of the National Assembly Complex singing anti -government songs and calling on the government to obey a court ruling directing the Federal Government to release their leader. Sheikh El-Zakyzaky has been in the custody of the Department of State Security Services (DSS) for over a year … But the plea was ignored, with the protesters heading towards the main gate of the National Assembly Complex while chanting: "Free Zakzaky".[82]

The *BBC* report was much more elusive, probably as they waited to corroborate testimony: "There have been violent clashes outside Nigeria's National Assembly between police and Shia protesters". The *Punch* is more scathing of IMN activity:

> Shi'ites attack National Assembly, shoot policemen, force reps to adjourn [...] One of our correspondents learnt that the Shiite members overpowered the policemen at the gate of the National Assembly, collected one of their guns and shot the two security operatives. They entered the main entrance popularly known as MOPOL gate and vandalized the gate house. They also burnt three vehicles and destroyed many others. The sect unleashed terror on security operatives when tear-gas canisters were thrown to disperse them.[83]

According to Yahaya Muhammad, the AFM spokesperson, the AFM crowd was at the National Assembly complex to protest the continued detention of el-Zakzaky "when military officers attacked them". They confirmed the killing of "two protesters" as they entered the premises, while two police officers were injured as they were hit by stones thrown by the AFM. The significance of presenting these conflicting narratives is to underline the role of the media in framing the so-called 'clash' between the IMN and the police in the process of policing. One is however reminded of Chris Greer and Eugene McLaughlin on the role of media reports in framing protest events:

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[81] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/11/nigerias-shia-muslims-continue-protest-over-el-zakzaky-detention (accessed April 2020).

[82] "Police Break Up Shiites' Protest At National Assembly Complex", 25 January 2017, http://saharareporters.com/2017/01/25/police-break-shiites%E2%80%99-protest-national-assembly-complex (accessed April 2020).

[83] "Nigerian parliament: Violent Clashes at Shia Protest", July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48926416; "Shi'ites Attack National Assembly, Shoot policemen, Force Reps to Adjourn", July 2019, https://punchng.com/shiites-attack-nassembly-shoot-policemen-force-reps-to-adjourn/ (accessed April 2020).

> Protests may descend into full scale riots, be policed in a heavy-handed, paramilitarized manner or pass peacefully and without incident. Yet, decades of research have demonstrated that there is no necessary correlation between events happening on the ground and the subsequent reporting of those 'events as news'.[84]

Either the media is stuck in the crises of (mis)representation or it helps the state profiling of the IMN as a 'terrorist' group. It did, however, open up a global conversation. In reaction, the US and the UK governments, on 22 July 2019, issued a warning to their nationals to stay away from the flashpoints until further notice.[85] According to the Ministry of Commerce, the disruptions of the movement and incessant clashes had brought down the volume of investments and international tourism to Nigeria. International tourists were scared especially when US, Israeli and French flags were burnt because of their complicit support for 'blasphemy' against Islam.[86]

The *Washington Post* reported in February 2019 that as of late October 2018, 45 IMN members had died in Abuja "Free Zakzaky" protests and "more than another 100 wounded after Nigerian security forces used automatic weapons to disperse the crowds".[87] While launching a crackdown on the IMN's protest in a repressive style across the country, the group was also proscribed as a 'terrorist' organization as earlier noted. This action elicited reactions from the international community that caused a rift in the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Iran, on the one hand, and strengthened that between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, on the other.

5.6 The Involvement of the International Community and the Politics of Religion in Nigeria

There were pockets of 'Free Zakzaky' protests that were staged in solidarity with the IMN in different countries with Shia minority groups, like Pakistan, India, Canada, Indonesia, Ireland, UK, Australia, and Malaysia. These protests were occasioned and fueled by 'substantial social media' campaigns.[88] Capturing the scenes, the Islamic Human Rights Commission

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[84] C. Greer and Eu McLaughlin, "We Predict a Riot? Public Order Policing, New Media Environments and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist", *Brit. J. Criminol*, (2010), pp. 1041-1059.

[85] "Demonstration Alert – US Embassy, Abuja", https://ng.usembassy.gov/demonstration-alert-u-s-embassy-abuja-nigeria-2/ (accessed February 2021).

[86] Interview with Abdullahi Muhammad, one of the leaders of the AFM, by the author, in Gwagwalada Abuja, on 26 September 2020..

[87] "Why is Nigeria Cracking Down on Peaceful Religious Protest", 4 February 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/04/why-is-nigeria-cracking-down-on-peaceful-religious-protests/ (accessed March 2021).

[88] Jawad Falak, "Zakzaky & the IMN: The Rise of a New Nigerian Schism", Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/zakzaky-imn-rise-new-nigerian-schism/ (accessed March 2021).

reported that "the world is demanding 'Free Zakzaky'".[89] That the police and the army repressive response towards the IMN took place in Sunni dominated spaces can still "have a powerful effect on onlookers", as Dominic Bryan suggests in his analysis of the 'Orange Parades'.[90]

In Nigeria's case, the spread of such sights of police assaults on social media attracted some level of sympathy from the people. "Outraged Nigerians", as *Aljazeera* framed the sympathizers, "took to social media to condemn 'trigger-happy troops' and 'extrajudicial killings'".[91] Immediately after the incident (the 'Zaria clash'), Iran summoned Nigeria's ambassador to Tehran to protest the killings of what appeared to be her extended trans-national community.[92] This diplomatic reaction was followed by a phone call in which the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, drew the attention of Nigeria's President, Muhmmadu Buhari, to the point that "minor disputes must not be allowed to turn into deep differences".[93] While expressing concerns over the injured, Rouhani later demanded that el-Zakzaky be handed over to Iran for medical treatment.[94] Could the "Zaria massacre" be an "opening" for Iran's decisive penetration into Nigeria as John Campbell[95] postulates? Given the assertiveness of Iran's intervention, one is pressed to contemplate. Notwithstanding, it is known that the 1979 Iranian Revolution consolidated Shi'ism, making it a powerful religious counter-ideology to the Sunni hegemonic domination in the Middle East. The struggle to balance power between the two competing doctrinal forces has had "a far more immediate and powerful impact on the politics in the greater Middle East".[96] The urge to spread the Shi'i doctrine beyond the borders of the Middle East, and by implication, compete in the global sphere of political alliances, necessitated the use of different agencies.

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[89] "The World is Demanding 'Free Zakzaky'", 25 July 2019, https://www.ihrc.org.uk/news/comment/23302-the-world-is-demanding-free-zakzaky/ (accessed March 2021).
[90] Dominic Bryan, "You Can March – Can Others?", in *Orange Parades*: *The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 78.
[91] "Nigeria Accused of Killing Hundreds of Shia Muslims", 16 December 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/16/nigeria-accused-of-killing-hundreds-of-shia-muslims (accessed March 2021).
[92] "Iran Summons Nigerian Envoy After Shia Clashes", 15 December 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/15/iran-summons-nigerian-envoy-after-shia-clashes/ (accessed March 2021).
[93] "Army/Shiite Clash: Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani Calls Buhari", 16 December 2015, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/armyshiite-clash-iranian-president-hassan-rouhani-calls-buhari/ (accessed March 2021).
[94] "Send El-Zakzaky to Us for Treatment, Iran Tells Nigeria", 25 July 2019, https://punchng.com/send-el-zakzaky-to-us-for-treatment-iran-tells-nigeria/ (accessed March 2021).
[95] John Campbell is the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Campbell served as a US Department of State Foreign Service Officer. He served twice in Nigeria as a political counselor and Ambassador from 1988-1990 and 2004-2007 respectively.
[96] Vali Nasr, "Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq", *The Washington Quarterly* 27, No. 3 (2004), pp. 7-24.

As noted in previous chapters, some of these agencies included importation and distribution of newspapers and magazines, namely *Echo of Islam* (English), *Mahjuba* (Arabic) and *Sakon Musulunci* (Hausa); the latter targeted the Hausa Muslims in northern Nigeria. Alongside print media, there are organs of the Cultural Relations Organization, based in Tehran, that facilitate and fund religious-cultural programmes in Nigeria.[97] In terms of political strategy, Iran became a member of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), a political avenue she uses to engage with the 'Third World'.[98] As Ahmadinejad bragged in 2008 at the United Nations General Assembly, Iran has "no limits to the expansion of ties with African countries".[99] Iranian influence as a regional power in Africa is played out through these agencies.

The apparent indifference of Nigeria's president that the clash between the IMN and NA was simply 'military affairs', the visit to Nigeria by John Kerry, the US Secretary of the State, and the reaction of Saudi Arabia, built layers of allegations and conspiracy narratives around the incident. Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, said in an interview with the *Time Magazine* on 29 March 2018 that they had curtailed the "attempt to overthrow the government by Al-Zakzaky [*sic.*] in Nigeria". *Time Magazine* points out that it is part of the modernizing mission of MBS to use "his ascendency to introduce modest liberalization and sharply escalate a wide-ranging proxy war with Iran across the region".[100] MBS's blunt confession in addition to Kerry's visits to Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, compounded the suspicion of the IMN that the crackdown against them was also a coordinated attack that involved national and international actors against what they perceived as a 'Shi'a revival'.

President Muhammadu Buhari was allegedly 'rewarded' for his patronage when he was given access into the inner space of the Ka'aba to offer prayers while performing *Hajj* in 2016.[101] The gesture was heavily criticized by the IMN.[102] Ibrahim Musa, the head of the Media Team of the IMN claimed that:

> It is not possible under every logical reasoning to exonerate President Muhammad Buhari from the genocide perpetrated by the Nigerian Army under his command as Commander-in-Chief, where over 1,000 unarmed members of the movement including men, women and children were killed on 12th – 14th of December, 2015. The government has declared illegally

[97] See for example Metin Atmaca, "African Shia and Iran's Cultural Diplomacy among Muslim Communities", *Journal of Iranian Studies*, No. 4 (2013), pp. 43 – 61.
[98] Atmaca, "African Shia and Iran's Cultural Diplomacy among Muslim Communities".
[99] Catherine Baffour, "Will Ahmadinejad's African Legacy Last?", 24 June 2013, https://www.legit.ng/38090.html (accessed March 2021).
[100] "Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Talks to *TIME* about the Middle East, Saudi Arabia's Plans and President Trump", 5 April 2018, https://time.com/5228006/mohammed-bin-salman-interview-transcript-full/ (accessed March 2021).
[101] "Buhari Visits Ka'aba Chambers", 27 February 2016, https://guardian.ng/news/buhari-visits-kaaba-chambers/ (accessed March 2021).
[102] The author follows several Whatsapp groups, Facebook pages and Twitter handles run by the IMN's media teams.

> burying 347 members of the movement in a mass grave at Mando Village in Kaduna after the mass murder, in violation of Geneva Convention, and every known law in the country.[103]

This entangled political power play between Iran and Saudi Arabia masked under religion manifested in Nigeria as a sectarian animosity between the Shi'a (IMN) and Sunni (Salafis). Hakeem Onapajo interprets the situation as an 'international proxy war',[104] taking the analogy from MBS. According to Jacob Zenn, this toil represents the presence of the Iranian-backed cells of "Nigeria's Shia community [that] may be part of Iran's networks and the possibility of them striking US and Israeli interests".[105] It is no coincidence that el-Zakzaky's lectures are full of condemnation of US foreign policies and Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Some scholars have expressed concerns that the continued Iranian support of the Shi'a and the support of Saudi Arabia for the Wahhabi-Sunni brand of Islam could mutate into 'full-blown terrorism' if mishandled.[106] This concern is reinforced by the rise of Boko Haram whose ideological root is traced to the global Salafi-Jihadi movements which stemmed from Saudi Arabia.[107] Essentially, Iran and Saudi Arabia have, since the 1980s, been influencing the way religion is preached, taught, performed, and conceptualised in Nigeria. The rise of radical religious thought is connected to this development and has had great bearing on religious intolerance and disturbances in the country. The role of the media in disseminating such narratives cannot go unnoticed.

5.7 Media, Religion and Public Space

Studies on the intersection of the media and religion have noted that the relationship between the two results in the "reproduction of spiritual realities and collectivities" through "regular use of communication" or "interactivity".[108] According to Paul A. Soukup, 'public

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[103] Press statement signed by Ibrahim Musa, IMN Media Forum, July 2019.
[104] Onapajo, "State Repression and Religious Conflict", pp. 80-93. Haruna Wakili, a Professor of History at the Department of History, Bayero University, holds the same view.
[105] J. Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria", *CTC Sentinel* 6, No. 10 (2008), pp. 13-18.
[106] See Zenn, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria" and Gabriel O. Adeniji and Peter E. Egieland, "The Shiite Uprising in Nigeria and Implications for Nigeria's Relations with Iran: The Role of the Media", *Ife Social Sciences Review*, 28, No. 1 (2020), pp. 105-119.
[107] There are many works on the global Salafi Jihadi movements. See, for example, Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and John A. Turner, *Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order* (USA: Palgrave, 2014).
[108] See Pauline Hope Cheong, "The vitality of New Media and Religion: Communicative Perspectives, Practices, and Changing Authority in spiritual Organization", N*ew Media & Society*, 19, No. 1 (2017), pp. 25-33; Kyong Cho, "New Media and Religion: Observations on Research", *Communication Research Trends*, 30, No. 1 (2011), pp. 4-22.

religion' is one of the main themes in the discourse surrounding "Religion in the Mass Media".[109]

Developments that followed 9/11 and the significant role that the media played in the articulation of the language of 'war on terror' have profoundly influenced the way religion is reported globally. When the US declared the global 'war on terror', the stage was set by President Bush by branding Iraq and North Korea as the 'Axis of Evil' in January 2002, for allegedly sponsoring terrorism or for being in possession of weapons of mass destructions. This produced or accentuated the narrative of 'terrorism' which eventually became a frame for analyzing Muslim movements in both media and scholarship. Iraq and Afghanistan were eventually invaded, supported by massive campaigns by the Western media using politically loaded stereotypes such as 'fanaticism', 'extremism', 'fundamentalism', 'Islamism' to describe anti-US sentiments as well as Muslim movements that fought (still fight) US occupations. The stereotypes, and their associated narratives, used to denigrate those movements had been popularized by the media. They eventually become the frames and lenses in scholarship (largely Western) through which Islam is viewed, researched, written, and reported. This trend gained currency worldwide and Islam has, erroneaoulsy, become synonymous with those stereotypes.

Nigeria is no exception. Those stereotypes inundate both media and scholarship in the country, particularly with the rise of the insurgent group Boko Haram. With the wanton violence of Boko Haram, other Muslim religious organizations and movements like the IMN in northern Nigeria have become subjects of suspicion more than ever. The existing rift between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria widened as a result. Muslim organizations and movements in the country are 'suspected' to harbor and articulate the agenda of 'Islamizing' Nigeria. There is tendency of likening them to Boko Haram.[110] The implication of this development is that a line is scarcely drawn between violent and non-violent movements in northern Nigeria.

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[109] P. A. Soukup, "Media and Religion", *Communication Research Trends*, 21, No. 2 (2002), pp. 3-37.

[110] Controversies and debates around the "Islamization" agenda have been raging in Nigeria and have manifested at different moments in Nigeria's political developments. Nigeria's Christians allege that the Muslims "softly" and "subtly" deploy mechanisms to woe or "conquer" members of other faiths into Islam, thereby "Islamizing" the country. During the exercise of drafting the Constitutions of 1963 and 1979, for example, particularly the establishment of the federal Sharia Court in the latter, this sentiment surfaced and undermined the successful execution of what the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) had envisaged for the country. "Islamization" controversies became more pronounced when, in 1999, Zamfara state was declared a "Sharia state" and other major states in northern Nigeria followed suit. For examples of such narratives in scholarship, see Chukwuemeka Eze Malachy, "Boko Haram Insurgency: A Northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization in Nigeria, 2007-2013", *Global Journal of Human Social Science*, 13. No. 5 (2013), pp. 1-18; Christian O. Ele, "Islamization of Nigeria: Implications for Sustainable Peace", *International Journal of Social Sciences and English Literature*, 2 (2018), pp. 13-19. There is also a body of literature that explores "Islamization" and Sharia debates in northern Nigeria more generally since the 1960s. For details, see Philip Ostien, *Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Source Book* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007).

While the IMN claims to fight 'injustice', it portrays itself as a trans-religious movement as it recently, as noted in chapter three, appears to have been inviting Christians into its public marches. This, however, is a new development in the IMN and it is too early to effect any significant change in the popular perception of Christians by the Muslim movements. The situation may also have been worsened as the federal government has declared the IMN a 'terrorist' group. This declaration reinforces the underlying suspicion of Christians. It implicitly provides a strong foundation that places the IMN in the same context as Boko Haram despite the wide disparity in their operations.[111]

Given the impending danger of this underlying situation, the government stepped in to regulate religious broadcast. According to Asonzeh Ukah:

> The volatile religious atmosphere in the country, the abuse of religious speech in the past, the excessive politicization of religion, and the constant use of the mass media to heighten religious tensions in Nigeria have necessitated the institutionalisation of a policy of "prior restraint" on evangelising communities in relation to religious broadcasting.[112]

Violence unfortunately sells newspapers. For example, only *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kobo*, a vernacular (Hausa language) newspaper, the *Weekly Trust* (in passing), and the *Triumph* newspapers covered the *Maukibi* processional ceremony. The *Maukibi* is thus ignored in the mainstream newspapers, because it is deemed not newsworthy, despite its national and regional network. But instances of violence – the clash between the police and the IMN while on the *Muzahara* marches; mass arrests of the *Muzahara* participants, and mob attacks on the *Muzahara*; and intra-Muslim conflicts – attract wider coverage in the print media, particularly from 2014 when the government crackdown on the IMN intensified. Perhaps, this is the problem with the media that Knut Jacobsen has long noted that, "[it] was noted several decades ago that studies of popular religious assembly were usually tackled only when they involve some violent and spectacular disturbance [...] rather than in terms of their public ritual and ceremonial as such."[113]

Another faultline that shapes religion in both media and scholarship is the sectarian affiliation and intra-Muslim contestation. Each of the two competing sectarian doctrines (the Sunni and the Shi'a) struggle to either maintain their dominance or assert their presence in the

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[111] See Ukah, "Banishing Miracles", pp. 39-60; Aliyu O. Musa and Neil Ferguson, "Enemy Framing and the Politics of Reporting Religious Conflicts in the Nigerian Press", *Media, War & Conflict,* 6, No. 1 (2013), pp. 7-20.

[112] Ukah, "Banishing Miracles"

[113] K. A. Jacobsen, "Introduction", in K. A. Jacobsen ed., *South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 6.

religious landscape of northern Nigeria. Different means and methods are geared towards achieving this. The Sunnis for their part engage the Shi'a in theological debates, criticism and, often, condemnation of their practices. The debate between Shaykh Jaafar Mahmud Adam/Abba Koki who represented the Sunni and Shaykh Auwal Tal'udi/Saleh Zaria who represented the Shia is a perfect example of the Sunni-Shia theological or intellectual public engagement.[114] Their points in the debate were re-articulated on the radio stations, television channels and their pulpits. Electronic audio and video file lectures were disseminated using electronic gadgets such as CDs, memory cards, and hard drives; particularly with the development of the 'new' media or social media. Many of these lectures are translated into the form of pamphlets and booklets which appear in Hausa, English and Arabic languages. The significance of this project is not to counter but to forestall the spread of the Shi'a ideology.[115]

Meanwhile, the Shi'a (IMN) have advertised and propagated their ideology and activities using print newspapers: *al-Mizan* and *Pointer Express*, the weekly Hausa and English papers, as well as a website. Although the IMN has no independent TV station, some of the Iranian funded TV channels like Press TV cover their programmes. In this entangled contestation, the Sunnis, by dominating the media space, reach out to a wider audience thereby establishing themselves as the dominant religious authority in northern Nigeria.[116]

The profiling of one group against the other within these sectarian terms, that are arguably offensive in intra-Muslim conflicts, compounds the identity categorization and makes Nigeria's unity more volatile. Names such as '*Yan Shia* (the Shiites), '*Yan Izala* (JIBWIS), '*Yan Wahabiyya* (the Wahabbists), '*Yan Salafiyya* (the Salafists), '*Yan Haqiqa* (the Heretics), '*Yan Bid'a* (the Innovators), '*Yan Gargajiya* (the Traditionalists), '*Yan Darika* (the Sufis), '*Yan Maja* ('Merger Scholars'),[117] and so forth, are deployed to frame 'the Other'. The

[114] This debate was recorded by Usmaniyya Photos and Video Film Production, Nasarawa, Kaduna. The debate was titled "Muqabala Tsakanin Sunnah da Shi'ah" [Debate between Sunni and Shia]. The video footage is available on Youtube, https://www.google.com/search?q=muqabala+tsakanin+sunnah+da+shi%27ah&rlz=1C1JZAP_enZA838ZA838&oq=muqabala+tsakanin+sunnah+da+shi%27ah&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160l2.33294j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (accessed April 2021).

[115] Kabiru Haruna Isa has covered some of the mechanisms that the Sunnis deployed to stop the spread of the Shia in northern Nigeria. See K. H. Isa, "Sunni Literary Responses to the Spread of Shia Ideology in Northern Nigeria", *Studies in African Languages and Cultures*, 52 (2018), pp. 113 – 130.

[116] For more on the role of media in establishing religious authority, see Jeffrey H. Mahan, "Religion and Media", *Religion Compass*, No. 1 (2012), pp. 14-25.

[117] "Merger Scholars" refers to the "coalition" of the Kano Islamic scholars that mobilized against the alleged blasphemous utterances by Shaykh Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara on the *persona* of the Prophet and his companions. The coalition was formed irrespective of the scholars' doctrinal differences and sought the intervention of the Kano state government to have Abduljabbar apprehended for court trial and his mosques and schools closed. The name "merger" has been popularized by Abduljabbar himself in his schools' sessions and among his disciples. This saga deserves an independent study for it brings interesting dynamics that Islamic scholars formed a coalition despite their ideological cleavages to fight a "common threat".

Wahhabists/Salafists (otherwise referred to '*Ahl al-Sunnah*) frame the Sufis as '*Yan Bid'a* or '*Yan Gargajiya* while, in contradistinction, the Sufis name them '*Yan Izala*. The Wahhabists/Salafists are seen fundamentally by the Sufis as anti-'traditional' Islam, while theirs is claimed to be the truly 'authentic'. The '*Yan Shia* narrative, and anti-Shia sentiment that grows out of it, reduces the Shi'ites to being more or less 'apostates' or 'unbelievers' in the Salafists' proselytization. While each of the names refers to a particular group, each carries sectarian and negative connotations that exclude one group from the mainstream Muslim collective. Unfortunately, these names are instrumentalized in public preaching sessions to tell the public who is practicing the 'purest' form of Islam. The media cover this development along these fault lines and the public' perceptions on religion are also largely formed in the same way.

5.8 Freedom of Public Religiosity, Restriction and Ban

The Constitution of Nigeria theoretically guarantees freedom of religion as a fundamental human right. This constitutional provision is based on the fact that religion in Nigeria is pervasive; it is visible in almost all socio-political spheres.[118] It is even termed the "world's second most religious country".[119] Whether this can be substantiated or not, it is probably in reference to the manifestations of religion in public spaces, often assessed by the proliferation of physical structures of mosques and churches all over the country. The pervasiveness of religion in Nigeria has attracted regulations that undermine or restrict, to some extent, the excess use of that Constitutional provision. Thus, enjoying freedom of religion depends on the extent of restrictions that the government could impose in the wake of potential problems. Some of these regulations have been discussed in the previous chapters but one important issue that needs to be underlined here is that the regulatory practices of the government(s) are not neutral. Religious voices and practices that seem 'dissenting' are 'silenced' in the name of regulation while those who "legitimate their [state] policies" are approved.[120]

The state regulatory practices in Nigeria have changed over time based on the changing religious orientation of the people. Sufi Brotherhoods were the earliest religious establishments in northern Nigeria that the colonial administration had dealings with. The P.H.G Scott report of 1952 was silent on any regulatory policies that governed religious activities. Rather, the

[118] Thurston, "Nigeria", p. 62.
[119] "Nigeria is the World's Second Most Religious Country", 11 December 2016, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/nigeria-worlds-second-religious-country/ (accessed March 2021).
[120] See the Haim Malka's analysis of a sort of general trend in regulatory practices of religions in Africa, "Introduction", in *Faith in the Balance: Regulating Religious Affairs in Africa*, Haim Malka, ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), p.1.

report was appreciative of certain qualities of the Sufi Brotherhoods that underlined cordiality with the colonial state. As noted in chapter two, according to the report:

> The Kadiriyya and Tijani sects are both entirely respectable sects headed respectively by the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Kano… The Kadiriyya … commanded complete acceptance through the twin empires founded by Usuman and his brother Abdullahi.[121]

Haim Malka argues that the Sufi Brotherhoods "were often seen as useful allies by colonial powers".[122] The praises contained in the report might be deceptive, intended to co-opt the Sufi figures into the colonial holding for 'smooth' administration while silencing potential dissenting voices. The apolitical status of the Sufi groups has not changed in post-colonial Nigeria and the relationship has continued. This is seen, for example, in the support (in cash and in kind) of the state officials (both at the federal and state levels) to the Sufi events like the *Maukibi* processional ceremony of the QN and the annual *Maulid* celebration of the *Tijjaniyya*. A relationship also existed between the military regimes with these Sufi figures in Nigeria. This is demonstrated in the visit of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) to Nasiru Kabara's private residence in 1994. However, such a relationship is more pronounced under democratic dispensation. This interaction is reciprocal.[123] It increasingly politicized the religion and underlined the basis for a mutual relationship between the state and religion in which the latter is allowed to flourish. Perhaps, this interaction is forced to take place because of the power of religion, as Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler argue, to "bolster or undermine" political legitimacy.[124]

From the 1970s, the rise of 'new' radical religious thoughts and movements – Muslim Students Society (MSS), the *Da'awah* Group of Nigeria, the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (the *Izala*), Muslim Brothers (MB), millenarian movement (the *Maitatsine* group)[125] – informed new developments in the regulatory governance of religious activities. The modes of proselytization of these radical movements were aggressive and further redefined Islam in public spaces. Following the *Maitatsine*

[121] P. H. G Scott, *A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria in 1952* (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1953), p. 2.
[122] Malka, "Introduction", p. 3.
[123] For example, Haruna Wakili's research on the role of religious leaders in the 2007 general elections in Nigeria notes that the *Ulama* (Islamic scholars) participated in the electioneering processes and this marked a shift in the participation of religious leaders in the democratic process. See H. Wakili, "Islam and the Political Arena in Nigeria: the Ulama and the 2007 Elections", Institute for the Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA), Working Paper Series No. 09-004 (2009), pp. 1-15.
[124] J. Fox and S. Sandler, "Quantifying Religion: Toward Building More Effective Ways of Measuring Religious Influence on State-Level Behavior", *Journal of Church and State*, 45, No. 3 (2003), pp. 559-588.
[125] The MSS and MB were discussed in chapter three as the foundational cells to the formation of the IMN while the *Da'awah* Group of Nigeria, the *Izala* and the *Maitatsine* group were discussed in chapter one.

disturbance, the Religious Regulation Edit (RRE) came into effect which regulated public preaching and proliferation of mosques. The RRE became the blueprint for the subsequent re-articulation of restrictions on freedom of public religion in both 1987 and 1996. Traditional leaders (the emirs and their subordinates) were involved to perform ceremonial function of screening the *Imams* (who lead the prayers). As noted in chapter four, the Kano emirate council mediated regulation of the conduct of the *Maukibi* procession between the Kano state government and the QN. The RRE was enacted by the military regimes and as it appears that it waned with the restoration of democratic rule in 1999. Contrary to Jonathan Fox and Ephraim Tabory's theorization that "state regulation of religion has a negative impact on religious participation",[126] in northern Nigeria the opposite is the case. Since 1999, for example, there has been an intensification of contestations for the ownership and control of the mosques (both for the Friday and five daily prayers) among different religious groups. While these intra-contestations have led to the proliferation of the mosques, they have also compounded tension and often led to violence between and among Islamic groups.[127]

The government responds to voices reacting against restrictions, ban or proscription. There are examples to draw from where the government either softens the restriction or clarifies the ban in the event of backlash. In chapter four, I have discussed the intervention of the Kano emirate and a group of elites in two different occasions with the Kano state government in favor of the conduct of the *Maukibi* procession. The interventions led to the softening of the restrictions and the *Maukibi* was permitted to be held with conditions. When the ban was imposed on the IMN on 7 October 2016, there emerged different interpretations and concerns of the exercise. Femi Falana and a host of other high-profile lawyers condemned the ban as illegal and unconstitutional.[128] According to Jibrin Ibrahim, a Professor of Political Science and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Democracy and Development:

> The most important issue, however, is that banning the organization would be understood by its members as banning their constitutional right to practice their religion. This is the basis of my plea that rather than proscribing the organization, we should follow the rule of law and hold its members accountable for infractions against the law that they commit.[129]

[126] J. Fox and E. Tabory, "Contemporary Evidence Regarding the Impact of State Regulation of Religion on Religious Participation and Belief", *Sociology of Religion* 69, No. 3 (2008), pp. 245-271.
[127] Kabiru Haruna Isa (2016) has extensively covered such contestations for the ownership and control of the mosques within the Kano metropolis from 1978.
[128] "Proscription of Shiite IMN Illegal, Unconstitutional – Lawyers", 28 July 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/343476-proscription-of-shiite-imn-illegal-unconstitutional-lawyers.html (accessed April 2021).
[129] "Proscribing the Islamic Movement in Nigeria: A Plea for Second Thoughts", 10 October 2016, https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2016/10/10/proscribing-islamic-movement-nigeria-plea-second-thoughts-jibrin-ibrahim/ (accessed March 2021).

Ibrahim's plea speaks in the same tone in which the IMN interprets the ban. His concern certainly sympathizes with the group and it has provoked a clarification of the ban from the government. According to Garba Shehu, the Senior Special Assistant to the President:

> Contrary to the claim by IMN that it had been banned from practicing its religion, President Buhari's administration has not banned Shiites from observing their five daily prayers and going to Mecca to perform the Holy pilgrimage. Their position is blatantly false and deceptive.[130]

With the ban, the government enforces a rather conventional way of observing religion while implying that it abhors its 'disruptive' outward manifestation. This could fall under what Rosalind Hackett calls 'legitimate restrictions'.[131] Yet, it is not categorical in Garba Shehu's statement whether the ban could be lifted if the group abandons public marches for more 'private' religiosity.

Even when the outward manifestation of religion is restricted, the question still arises as to whose religiosity is subjected to restriction given the plural and diverse nature of religious affiliations in Nigeria. As such, the government may be accused of imbalance in its regulatory exercise. The intervention of the government in the regulatory governance is manifold: as "umpire and player, regulator and participant […] for loyalties".[132] As Jeremy Gunn claims, this problem is "one of the most complicated and poorly understood areas of international human rights".[133]

Despite the ban, the IMN's public marches have continued but with a significant reduction in the size of the crowd. The incessant police repressions of the movement – the most recent clashes at the AFMs –could be another way to enforce the ban as the group appears intransigent. The ban also became a source of concern for members of other faiths over the fate of their religions.[134]

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[130] "Presidency Clarifies Position on IMN", 28 July 2019, https://www.channelstv.com/2019/07/28/presidency-clarifies-position-on-imn/ (accessed April 2021).
[131] Rosalind I.J. Hackett, "Regulating Religious Freedom in Africa", *Emory Law International Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2011), pp. 853-879.
[132] Asonzeh Ukah, "Banishing Miracles: Politics and Policies of Religious Broadcasting in Nigeria", *Religion, Media and Politics in Africa*, 6 No. 1 (2011), pp. 39-60.
[133] J. Gunn, Report of Working Session 2: Restrictions on the Activities of Religious and Belief Communities: What is Permissible in Law and Practice? cited in Hackett, "Regulating Religious Freedom in Africa".
[134] "Nigeria 2019 International Religious Freedom Report", p. 1. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/NIGERIA-2019-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. (accessed April 2021).

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the mode and processes of the protests organized by the IMN at Abuja, the Nigeria's capital, otherwise called the 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara*; the AFMs. The previous chapter laid a background to the AFMs by examining the crackdown launched by the Nigerian Army (NA) on the movement's headquarters, *Hussainiyya Baqiyyatullah*, el-Zakzaky's residence in Gyallesu and *Dar al-Rahma* in Zaria between 12-14 December 2015 during which over three hundred IMN members were reportedly killed. El-Zakzaky and his wife, Zeenatu, were arrested and many IMN members sustained gunshot wounds. The incident made headlines in both Nigeria's and the international media. It became a source of concern for Human Rights organizations worldwide.

The conflicting reports and narratives from the media and the parties involved – the NA and the IMN – over the incident made it complicated to discern. It appeared complicated as there was no investigative intervention either by the Nigerian or foreign media to tease out the 'true' picture of the incident. A relatively fair document was later produced by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry that was set up by Kaduna state government to investigate the incident. The document attempted to bring together the conflicting narratives and accounts and made recommendations that indicted both the NA and the IMN. The non-actualization of the ruling of the Federal High Court (FHC) in favor of el-Zakzaky and the counter-ruling of the Kaduna High Court against him have prolonged el-Zakzaky's detention in custody and have instigated waves of protests to demand el-Zakzaky's release.

The feeling of victimization, exclusion and injustice took the IMN to the streets of Abuja to demand the unconditional release of their leader and fellow members. The struggle for social justice, by and large, through regular protests defines the AFMs as a 'social movement' which is deeply embedded in identity making, and re-making for a different purpose. The AFMs have brought about some shifts in the IMN's public religiosity. The major feature of the IMN's religiosity (the *Muzahara* processions) has now been introduced to, and popularized in, Abuja metro for the first time since the evolution of the movement in the 1980s.

Following the demolition of the movement's headquarters in the incident, a *quasi* 'protest society' was established in Abuja which served as the 'national' meeting point and the major point for mobilization for the AFMs participation. Members from across the country trooped into Abuja, constituting both 'Regular' and 'Irregular' Crowds. The *Dai'ra*, state-level assemblies of the IMN, supported the AFMs' logistics and other organizational requirements.

Despite repeated claims by the IMN that AFMs are peaceful, reports have shown that the marches have been disruptive to the traffic flow of Abuja metro; holding pedestrian and motorists stranded, particularly in the Abuja Central Business District, the hotspot of the marches. Violent clashes with the police have also been reported. The violence that occasioned the AFMs raises concerns for peaceful co-existence of the various ethno-religious communities living in Abuja, as well as foreign nationals. The situation became more fragile as the country was fighting the insurgent Boko Haram and banditry in the northeastern and northwestern part of the country respectively. It is important to note, while the incessant repressive policing of the group's public religious processions over the last three decades has caused them frustration, despair, the feelings of victimization and exclusion, there has been no substantial evidence that the group takes up arms against the state. The JCI had not substantially established the allegations that the IMN is in possession of weapons in the security reports and statements. What is obvious is that they hurled stones at the police, while the police in turn fire tear gas, hot water or live ammunition into the crowd. Reporting on events in the media has however played a significant role on how the IMN and the State are framed both locally and internationally as victim/perpetrator. This complex performance is investigated.

While the AFMs and other public marches of the IMN remain a source for mobilization, making and remaking of collective identity, they further announce the presence of the Iranian-supported Shi'i movement in Nigeria. The growth of Shia through the activities of the IMN brews further tension as competition with the Sunni majority for influence in the religious sphere becomes complicated. Similarly, the growth of Shia represents, by implication, the spread of the influence of Iran in Nigeria which is inimical to the religious interest of Saudi Arabia, the main supporter of the Sunni/Salafi theology in the country. On the other hand, the repressive style of policing of the AFMs is predicted by many scholars and public commentators as having the potential of creating 'another' Boko Haram, particularly as it is presumed that el-Zakzaky could die in detention (this was predicted before his release). Thus, the growth of Shia movement and the entanglement between the AFMs and the Nigerian security forces is a critical source of concern for any reasonable government.

The AFMs, it could be argued, have achieved the objective for which they were introduced and executed: release of el-Zakzaky and the promotion of Shi'ism. This was achieved through their performances as a protest group at inception to religious performances which infused protest into religious traditional ceremonies of mourning within the Shi'a tradition. What we witnessed in AFM is a return to their protest modes of practicing religiosity which has essentially hailed them as heroes in some circles and villains in others

General Conclusion

Three intersecting concepts – procession, pilgrimage, protest (the 3ps) – are practiced by only two religious groups in northern Nigeria, the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya (QN), a reformed Qadiriyya and Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a Shia revivalist movement. This performance forms a central tenet of their public religiosity. This study examined how this was defined, patterned and unfolded between 1952 and 2021. While this dissertation treated each concept-cum-practice based on each group's tradition, conceptual meaning (attached to the practice), and mode of execution, the dissertation posits that the practices are far from being the same as far as the religious agenda of each group is concerned. Neither was the reaction towards these commemorative marches. In fact, the reaction by the state or non-members, opened up questions around human rights issues in Nigeria, regulation of religious freedom, Nigeria being turned a site of inter and intra-religious contestations among groups on the one hand or even 'proxy wars' on the other. The site of this display moved spatially between different localities in Nigeria but also filtered into social media and cyberspace in recent times, thereby increasing both visibility of religious sectarianism but also resistance towards it by state and global partners. The complexity of these religious performances has hitherto been restricted to literature on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which unfortunately lumps the historical evolution, meanings and practices of the rituals under one rubric.

A very thin line exists that demarcates the Sufi (QN) and Shi'i (IMN) traditions in terms of 'saint' veneration, as chapter 1 highlights. Each of the group's performances formed part of the religious mission to increase public visibility but each defined its movement and projected it in a unique manner in Nigeria's religious and political spheres. Therefore, the context within which the traditions of the QN and IMN unfolded, as well their peculiarities, were also significant. To better understand these dynamics, three main questions were asked: Why were the 3ps introduced? What were the modes in which they unfolded over time? How were public spaces negotiated and regulated? In essence this study evaluates the consequences of these shifts.

The tradition that gave birth to the rituals of procession and pilgrimage in both Shi'ism and Sufism was rooted in the culture of 'saint' veneration. This means that virtually all the public performances of the groups were meant primarily to either celebrate saintly birth or mourn iconic death (otherwise termed the 'culture of death'). Thus, there were as many 'saint' days to commemorate as there were different saints venerated by each group.

These rituals did not take place in isolation. Because of the volatile political climate led by a series of regimes of military and civilian leaders in Nigeria, religious leaders were compelled to negotiate with political figures on how the QN's ceremonial procession unfolded but less so with the demonstrations or protests and pilgrimages of the IMN, but which the latter defies. These were permitted as per the regulations of the constitution so long as they did not lead to state insecurity and violence. This posed a serious cause for concern as inter and intra ethno-religious violence periodically entered the political landscape of the country, and so religious spaces.

The mode of regulating the public religiosity of these movements raises the question as to the extent the Nigeria's state is skeptical about the growing crowd of the movements. This is more critical as the works on religious nationalism argue that all nationalism is religious in that old ideas of community and individual are repackaged in the nation state form. This means that the secular is not neutral, but often codifies different religious norms. The 'ethical' men and women with supposedly disciplined disposition reignite that religious nationalism in the claimed secular Nigeria's setting. This stands out to be counterproductive to the underlying project of building a united Nigeria beyond ethno-religious cleavages. For example, it is essentially conceived that the QN's processional performnaces are exclusively sites of sustained *zikr* meditation that produces a momentary spiritual rejuvenation and purification. Whereas the IMN encourages self-discipline, resilience and perseverance in anticipation for challenging moments resulting from their encounter with the state. This had been the trend since the birth of the movement from 1980s, as demonstrated in Chapter 3.

The motivation for holding a procession, pilgrimage or protest changed over time and this was reflected in the organization, development and execution of these marches. They often shifted from exclusive ceremonial spaces to sites of performing politics, demonstrations of socio-political grievances, trans-national solidarity with social movements, and the fight for social justice. The Quds Day in support of the Palestinian struggles and 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* marches of the IMN are a few examples. The AFMs, for instance, were staged to fight for constitutional rights of the IMN members and the continued detention of el-Zakzaky. In the context of northern Nigeria, the 3ps symbolize different things to different stakeholders: the state and civil society (largely across the Sunni/Shi'a divide).

From the reading of the reactions of the state and the civil society, as presented in chapter four, the QN's processions had been ceremonial, peaceful and executed within the ambit of the states' regulatory measures. In contrast, the IMN's protests (simply rendered here as *Muzahara*) were a demonstration of resistance and intransigence, used to defy the regulatory

provisions (of the police) and thus characterized by frequent police interventions. Reactions outside the ideological realms of the QN and IMN consider the 3ps as public nuisance and sites of violence and contrary to the urban religious configurations.

There was significant differences between the QN and the IMN in terms of what the participants uttered at the sites of the marches. While the QN engaged in collective *zikr* meditation, each *halqa* could choose how this would unfold. Collectively they engaged in reciting of the poems of their 'saints' while invoking the memories of the 'saints'. The IMN *Muzahara* and *Tattaki*'s collective voices invoked Hussain's name ('*Labbaika Ya* Hussain') with the flying of flags, uttering statements and songs that carried political connotations as well.

Going by their provenance, the public religious processions of the QN and the pilgrimage of the IMN represented trans-national religious and cultural connections between the Middle East and Nigeria. For example, the introduction of the *Maukibi* procession was inspired by a somewhat similar practice staged in Bagdad, Iraq, the birthplace of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood, to commemorate the birth of Shaykh Abdulqadir al-Jilani, the 11th century Sufi master of the town. The new mode of commemorating the death of Imam Hussain, the 3rd Shia Imam, as well as the *Maulid* (birthday celebrations) of different Shi'a icons through the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki,* represented the transposition of the Shia-oriented rituals, particularly the Khomeini brand of Shi'ism, into the religious landscape of northern Nigeria.

Prior to this development, the Muslim Brothers' (MB) public marches, the cell foundation of the IMN, were demonstrations motivated by the urge to enforce an Islamic system of governance. There was a paucity of evidence to prove that the MB had subscribed to the Iranian Shi'a theology. The Iranian brand of Shi'ism and its inherent outward manifestations through the *Ashura*, *Maulid*, Quds Day *Muzahara* and the *Arbaeen Tattaki* began with the formation of the IMN in 1996. Since then, more radical and politically motivated 3ps were staged at varying times. Thus, Iraq and Iran remained the original source of inspiration and authority for the two groups.

It is important to stress the overt difference, as detailed in Chapter 3, between the pre-1994 phase of the IMN when it was still called MB (and had not yet adopted a Shi'a identity), and the post-1994 era. There existed a little gap of two years i.e 1994 – 1996, when the MB assumed the name IMN. The fracture between the two eras was a very dramatic one, for it marked a shift/change in ideology, membership composition, leadership structure, and more importantly, the modes and motivations for the public religiosity. The factionalization of the movement that led to the emergence of a splinter group JTI was occasioned by conflict of ideology where the JTI opted to merge with pre-existing Sunni groups whereas the IMN

adopted the Iranian brand of Shi'ism. The adoption of Shi'ism, from what appeared, was the immediate factor that caused the rift.

Similarly, an examination of the trajectory in the successive transformations of El-Zazkaky's movement points out that it began as a political protest. What emerges quite clearly is that the *Muzahara* of the MB through the 1980s/1990s were essentially political protests. At that time, the MB was essentially an Islamic political protest movement that appealed to the Sunni youth of the country and that embodied Islamic protest against the military governments that ruled the country. From the mid-1990s, when the IMN becomes a Shi'ite movement, its processions become visibly more "religious" and less "political" (except for the Quds Day *muzaharat* that focused on Palestine rather than on internal politics - it being gradually framed as a threat to the political order of the country). The public events of the IMN become overtly political again only after the 2015 'massacre', when the religious processions are banned, the leader is jailed, and the "Free Zazkaky" campaign begins. This trajectory (political protest —religious procession — political protest) set the picture of the movement's transformation from 1980s to date.

Outlined according to phases of each group's development and the transformation of public marches, the chapters discussed specific themes. Chapter 1 provides a background to the study. It offers a literature review of the works on northern Nigeria and from other parts of the world on the themes of the study. Three main points emerge out of the literature: firstly, in northern Nigeria, the 3ps were examined as parts of the QN and the IMN complimentary religious rituals rather than as critical sites of identity making and drivers for revitalizing the public presence of the groups. Secondly, in contexts outside northern Nigeria, processions and pilgrimages were defined by the purposes for which they were staged. Thus, they were organized for spiritual visits, immortalizing of the dead, birthday ceremonies, solemnizations, military parades, and displays of power. This is more complex in Nigeria. Thirdly, in Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, the culture of procession and pilgrimage evolved out of the tradition of the 'veneration of saints' and became an outstanding ritual in the 'making' of saints, by, for example, martyrdom.

Chapter 2 focusses on the development of the QN *Maukibi* procession as the 'new mode of public religiosity' of the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya. The chapter argues that the *Maukibi* annual ceremonial march was a shift in the mode in which the saints of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood were commemorated in Kano before 1952. Scholarly attention is paid to the ritual as a critical driver to the processes of saint making and the '(re)formation' or cystalization of the Brotherhood in the public religious sphere of Kano and northern Nigeria. The chapter is divided

into historical phases to underline the change over time of the *Maukibi,* particularly its metamorphosis into a 'ceremonialized' Sufi event with expansive regional, religious, and political connections with which the 'reformed' or crystalized Brotherhood (the QN) increased visibility and religio-political networks. The chapter notes that the *Maukibi*'s engagement with regional Sufi networks and the sizeable participation it had been attracting led to scrutiny by the political administrations of Kano. Hence it became more regulated and policed but in the context of broader social upheavals. The *Maukibi* marches, however, were never banned. The chapter concludes that the significance of the *Maukibi* was largely in the unification of the fragments of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood's sub-sets under the unified authority of the QN, especially under its leader Shaykh Nasiru Kabara, for whom the ritual provided a much broader collective space, outside the confines of Nigeria, to meet and worship. One should not underestimate the political wrangling that the space provided.

The evolution and transformation of the IMN from Muslim university students' activism to the rise of the Muslim Brothers is discussed in chapter 3. The chapter critically advances the narrative of the influences of the 19th century Jihad of Shehu Usman bn Fodio, the Egyptian *Ikhwan,* and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on the development of the movement. The crux of the chapter is the examination of the growth and nuances of the movement's *Muzahara* marches since 1980, and its changing religious and political motivations. This is reflected in historical phases, taking into account the context and circumstances that triggered the *Muzahara*.

Two main forms of the *Muzahara* were identified: The ephemeral *Muzahara* (the transient and reactive *Muzahara* to specific circumstances such as the *Muzahara* against 'blasphemy') and the perennial *Muzahara* (the recurring annual *Muzahara* for the *Ashura, Arbaeen* symbolic trek or *Tattaki*, *Maulid,* and Quds Day). While the provenance of the *Ashura* and *Arbaeen* symbolic trek are traced to the activities of the earliest Shi'a community of 8th century Kufa, Iraq, the other marches were largely Iranian-oriented Shi'a rituals. The chapter posits that the frequency of these *Muzahara* and their spatial coverage in the northern Nigerian landscape worked to keep the IMN rejuvenated, publicly visible and able to increase its membership over time. The visibility of the IMN through the *Muzahara* marches is paid less attention. Instead, more attention is given to the way in which the movement contributed to 'political Islam' in Nigeria and sectarian cleavages.

Chapter 4 explores the changing regulatory governance on the QN *Maukibi* and the IMN *Muzahara* by various civilian and military regimes. The Nigerian Constitution theoretically guarantees the right to 'assemble' and 'observe' religion, yet public religiosity is regulated. The chapter notes that the regulatory measures deployed to order the groups' marches were uneven

and this was largely due to the way the leadership of both the QN and IMN engaged with the state administrators. While the QN sought permission with the authority before staging the *Maukibi*, the IMN defied it. It was a movement which, after all, was born out of protest towards any 'secular' state. Submission and defiance were, in this context, critical for the state support, or lack thereof. Analyzing police reports and 'executive orders', five different forms of regulatory measures were deduced: restriction, confinement, suspension, postponement, and ban. The first two regulatory provisions tamed the pattern of the spatial and territorial coverage of the *Maukibi* from the moment they were enforced, while the last two eventually 'outlawed' the IMN *Muzahara*. The way in which the state responded to the group was eventually deemed a crime against humanity.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the examination of the Abuja 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* (AFM). The differences between the *Muzahara* discussed in chapter 3 and the AFM were mainly the spatial location where they unfolded, the motivation, the modes and the logistics as well as the increased levels of violence occasioned by the incessant clashes between the police and the protestors. This unfolds in the context of growing Sunni and Shi'ite sectarian contestation in Nigeria. The AFM shifted their marches to the heart of the 'secular' state, Abuja. 'Regular' and 'irregular' crowds were recruited from the assemblies of the group in locations across northern Nigeria. Putting the AFM in the context of scholarly debate on the motivations for protests in Africa, it stood out. Works on protests in Africa underlined concerns such as democratization, struggles against apartheid, decolonization, gender inclusion as the primary motivations. Locating the AFM in Abuja and the frequency with which it had been staged proved to be a test of the state's power which eventually triggered waves of state repressive policing of the crowd. Many of the AFM participants were killed in the process or injured, and many more apprehended.

From the 'Zaria clash' to the repressive crackdown on the IMN's AFM, the tension between the Nigerian government and the IMN moved to the diplomatic space. The Iranian government frowned at Nigeria's response over the matter while the Saudi government was alleged to have saluted Nigeria for the crackdown on Shi'a followers. Thus, the Sunni-Shi'a rivalry featured prominently over the matter as it caused suspicion and layers of conspiracy narratives as to who the real culprits behind the clashes were.

The fact that the public religious rituals of both of the groups unfold within the same social context — northern Nigeria —, certain aspects of the practices call for mild comparison. Mild because the two groups are significantly different in terms of their history, traditions, ideological foundations, patterns of community and authority, orientation to authority and

religious as well as political agenda. Both use public space of the same social context. The target population for mobilization by each is the same 'publics'[1] of northern Nigeria, eventhough the basis for the mobilization project rests on the public acceptability of the doctrine of the group in question— Sufism or Shi'ism. Although the *Maukibi* was started long before the birth of the IMN, certainly the ritual's stable cosistency could have had (in)direct influence over the staging of the *Muzahara*. The use of the *Maukibi*'s remote routes and alleyways of the core city of Kano by the *Muzahara* crowd, particulary in the last couple of years, points to the possible influence of one over the other. This does not, however, rule out or underestimate the connection of the practices with the normative Shi'i saints' public commemorations, as discussed in details in Chapter 3. What cannot be established is the fact that whether the two groups shares the same set of participating crowds. What is certain is that the groups share the culture of 'saints' veneration and both of the groups' ceremonial and mournful procession, and pilgrimage are a performative compliment to the culture of 'saints' veneration. Therefore, the dissertation takes these public ceremonial and mournful marches as a phenomenon of public religiosity in the northern Nigerian landscape. Thus, each group is examined in this context based on the specific modes in which they perform their rituals, and the implications and significance thereof.

This study shows that there are more complex processes involved in the organization and staging of the 3ps than merely displaying crowds in line on the streets or other public spaces. The organization of the 3ps informs one about internal systems of division of responsibilities in each group. Committees and sub-committees are formed which determine the roadmap, the cost of the events, territoriality, the probable implications, and the placement of people in the processional lines based on their designated status in the groups. The organizational structure of each group is displayed at the 3ps sites, which reflects the order of hierarchy, gender, and class.

There are dissimilarities to note between the QN and IMN's processional events. The *Maukibi*, unlike *Muzahara* marches, involves both processional march and a ceremonial programme of the event where the invited guests are seated and speeches are delivered. At the podium, dignitaries such as the governor of the state or his representative, state commissioners, members of parliament, traditional and religious leaders, and other members of community

[1] I adopt the term 'publics' from the work of Anderson, Jon W., "New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam", *Social Research*, Vol. 70, No. 3, *Islam: The Public and Private Spheres* (2003), pp. 887-906. Anderson uses the term in the sense of what he calls 'new people' with newly reconfigured consciousness and outlook as a result of the impact of 'new media'. The people of northern Nigeria too are caught across various lines of ethno-religious and cultural consciousness.

intelligentsia, are strategically placed. This tradition of inviting guests to the *Maukibi* was established in 1985, and, in part, marked the transformation of the event into something more ceremonial than just a Sufi event for spiritual meditation. Chapter 2 has articulated this.

Inviting guests *vis-à-vis* participation stood out in the QN practices as a way of identifying friends of the movement among government officials and other elites. This is not the case with the IMN *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki*. The IMN does not prioritize ceremonialization of their marches. This underlines the fact that the group operates far from the involvement of the state and community leadership. This further makes the *Maukibi* both elitist and populist, while the *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki* are exclusively populist marches. Perhaps, it may be added, the IMN does not often recognize constituted authority except the almost saint like status of its leader, el-Zakzaky, or his assumed 'infallibility' as is the case with other Shi'a Imams.

The IMN marches are less regional and much less international in terms of physical participation. In other words, no participants from abroad are known to have attended the *Muzahara*. Because of decentralization of the *Muzahara* marches as noted, very little is incurred as far as the cost of transportation is concerned. But, for the *Tattaki*, official participation is recorded from Niger and Chad before 2015. The JCI attests to this when it notes the expansion of the movement beyond Nigeria's border. It is also making reference to the religious ideological connections beyond physical space.

There is a difference in spatial location, as well as the territorial stretches between the two groups' marches. The *Maukibi* ground (Maiadua cemetary) is the endpoint or point of return of the QN procession. This has not changed since the procession began in 1952. By comparison, there is no definite endpoint or point of return for the IMN *Muzahara*; these change to avoid a possible police clampdown. For this reason, information on the routes to follow and endpoints is not disclosed until at the point of departure.

In terms of the 'political economy' of the 3ps, the QN and the IMN's processional programmes are funded differently. As the archival records of the QN *Maukibi* show, the funds are internally generated through donations (in cash and in kind) from its followers. *Nafaha* (donations) are raised at mosques and delivered to the QN leadership through the *Muqaddams* (mosque delegates/leaders) and then topped up by the 'wealthy' disciples of the group. These so-called wealthy disciples are mentioned and appreciated publicly at the end of the *Maukibi* programmes. By this practice, the wealthy disciples feel honored enough to be 'rewarded' and given patronage for the gesture. One cannot completely rule out external funding of the group.

There were moments of financial interventions of the Kano state government(s), and perhaps, its officials, to the *Maukibi* event.

A similar tradition exists among the IMN that donations are raised from members for the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki* but, unlike in the QN, each circle (*majlis*, *mandiq* and *halqa*) generates its funds for its independent programmes. That is to say, the fund raising for the execution of the *Muzahara* programmes are decentralized and each *Majlis* is allowed to utilize its contributions for the event. There is no evidence that the funds raised for the *Shuhada* Foundation (see chapter 3) are spent on the organization and execution of the *Muzahara* and *Tattaki*.

That Iran funds the progammes of the IMN is contentious. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry's (JCI) recommendations and findings on the alleged financial intervention into the IMN by Iran have claimed that there is "alleged foreign indoctrination, political and financial support […] that have accompanied the development of the organization".[2] IMN sources emphasize the flowing financial contributions by members as the main source of funds for the movement's programmes. What is obvious is that Iran had been financially supporting Nigerian students to study in Qum and other Iranian religious institutions.

The financial implications involved in the execution of the programmes for and around the conduct of the *Maukibi* processional ceremony, the *Muzahara*, and the *Tattaki* pilgrimage constitutes what can be called 'the economy of procession'. As noted earlier, the contributions of members (in cash and in kind) of both of the groups are critical for the survival of the movement. Obviously, expenses incurred in the international travels of the guests attending the *Maukibi* from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and other African countries, the logistics involved, and the local transport fares of participants within Nigeria are an important component of this 'economy'. The production of *Muraqqa'* garments (distinctive robes with color strips worn at the *Maukibi*, see Fig. 2.3), and flags requires huge purchase of materials, costs of design and sewing. Extra-long beads are also purchased that are worn around the neck by the *Muraqqa'* team. For the QN adherents, the *Maukibi* is a significant annual ceremony that is prepared long ahead of time with huge financial budgets and commitments. Each *halqa*, aside from the donations that it raises, budgets for the purchase of materials for the production of clothes, the production of *bandir* drums, and feasts for the day. A number of participants from

[2] Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State, between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December, 2015 (2016), p. 51.

the southwestern (Yoroba) part of Nigeria come along with goods (mostly books) to transact at the site of the *Maukibi*. There are material benefits which should be further explored.

For the whole 3ps, a sort of 'mobile market' is developed where the participants buy water, drinks, fried nuts, snack and other light or fast foods. The opportunity to participate in mobile marketing during the different events is open to interested persons regardless of group membership. There are no restrictions on operating the mobile market or as to what food items should or shoud not be sold. This mobile market makes more profits during the *Tattaki* as the trek lasts longer and there is thus a higher demand than the *Maukibi* and the *Muzahara*, which last for the day only. This aspect has not been covered in much detail and this would certainly make for an interesting further study. Processions and pilgrimages not only require financial support but also generate income in the spaces through which they travel.

The 'economy of procession' also fits into the discourse of the political economy of religion. Different interpretations have been deployed to explain specific religious practices using the frame of political economy. It is in this context, for example, that Benjamin Soares examined the gifts exchanges between the Sufi Shaykhs and their disciples in return for prayers in Nioro town of Mali, a practice he theorized as 'prayer economy'.[3]

The study has shown that the 3ps do not take place in isolation as highlighted earlier. They take place on the space which is shared by other members of society. They take place within the sphere charged with complex doctrinal pluralism and diversity. Freedom of religion and of expression allows these diverse religious sentiments to interact with the practices of the 3ps. There are flowing criticisms as the practices may or may not be in tandem to the peoples' perceived urban religious configurations. The critical responses came from two fronts: the state and the public. The state intervention has been to tame the feeling of entitlement of religious actors over the public space which increasingly religionize the space and spatialize religion. In the process of enforcing public order in a 'secular' state, the interest of the state clash with those of religious actors who religionize public spaces which the state considers inimical to the 'modern' urban space construction. As discussed in chapter 4, the state deployed both a repressive style and soft measures in engaging with the matter. Since the 1970s and 1980s in Kano, there has been public criticism of the *Maukibi* procession. One such example is the anti-*Maukibi* song that reads: "Hausa: *Sun Bi Ta Jakara Za Su Jahannama Kar Mutumin Banza Ya Rakasu* (They march through Jakara to hell. None should follow them!). It is not certain

[3] B. F. Soares, "The Prayer Economy in a Malian Town', (L'économie de la prière dans une ville malienne)", *Cahiers d'Études africaines* (1996), pp. 739-753; B. F. Soares, *Islam and the Prayer Economy: History and Authority in a Malian Town* (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

whether the song was crafted by the *Tijjaniyya* adherents, the only rival group to the QN at that moment, but it was popular among the youth and eventually disappeared. From the 1990s, the criticism largely came from the Salafists. For example, they criticized the *Maukibi* processions that, by visiting the gravesite of the QN 'saints', the principal objective of the procession, they *worship* the graves. The public criticized the *Maukibi* procession for disturbing noise which the drumbeats of the participants produce while holding the motorists and pedestrians in disruptive traffic jam. But these criticisms, with regard the IMN, translate into anti-Shia sentiments. It is often assumed that their *Muzahara* were designed to attract attention and create chaos as a way of protesting the secular state and the existence of 'blasphemers'. This culminated in violence otherwise reported as 'mobs' from 2016 which resulted in the death of many of the participants of *Muzahara* marches in Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, and Sokoto.

The impact of the 3ps in the institutionalization of public religious (Islamic) culture is enduring in Nigeria's religious sphere. In this regard, the *Maukibi* procession should be reckoned with. Having unified the sub-sets of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood — Arusiyya, Manzaliyya, Shazzulliyya, Usmaniyya and Sammaniyya — to form the QN, the most important ritual that cemented the Sufi bond among these sub-groups and pulled together their hitherto discrete rituals was the *Maukibi*. This study moves beyond the perspectives of Paden (1973), Tahir (1975), Anwar (1989), and Loimeier (1997) who reduce the *Maukibi* as just one aspect among many of the QN's transformative initiatives. This study rather argues that the *Maukibi* is the driver to the reform project of Shaykh Nasiru Kabara and it is the structure that has kept the QN alive for over half a century. It is the *Maukibi* procession that gave birth to the *Ziyarar Waliyya* ('saints' visit) procession, the Nasiriyya procession, and the *Khatma* procession, and has also influenced the re-organization in the *Takutaha* procession.[4]

While there is no direct connection between the *Maukibi* and the IMN *Muzahara*, there are traces of some influences. From 2016, the IMN used to march through the routes that the *Maukibi* procession followed within the urban city of Kano. This is strategic for mobilization

[4] The *Ziyarar Waliyyai* ('saints' visit) procession was introduced in the 1970s by Shaykh Nasiru Kabara. The visit was meant to locate the gravesites of the 'saints' within the urban Kano and pay them 'spiritual homage' for blessings. The visit was also prompted by the concern to avert the degeneration of the material grave spaces of the 'saints' into what Crawford (1995) calls "the narrative of loss". It also meant to compliment what the *Maukibi* procession does not cover as far as locating the 'saints' is concern. The other two processional rituals, the Nasiriyya and the Khatma, were introduced by biological children of the Shaykh, Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara, who has been the Shaykh's successor since 1996, and Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara. While the former succeeds the leadership of the QN, the latter operates a school independent of the former. Under his school, named Ashab al-Kahf wa al-Raqeem, Abduljabbar introduced the Khatma procession which, as he claims, serves as the closing processional ceremonies to all *Maulid* celebrations in Kano. As at 2020, the *Khatma* procession is estimated to have attracted more than two million people.

as the routes traverse the epicenter of the town and its commercial hub. It underlines a shift in the stage of the *Muzahara* performances from the urban periphery to the center.

The acceptability of the 3ps as religious practices by a substantial number of Muslims in northern Nigeria and, hence, their convergence around religious leaders (Nasiru Kabara and Ibrahim el-Zakzaky) is important to underline. Scholars have different explanations as to the reasons why people organize themselves around a religious figure. Earnest Gellner and Cruise O'Brien have emphasized the 'charisma' that makes religious figures exceptional, and site of attraction based on certain distinctive personal and spiritual qualities.[5] In Shi'a philosophy, the charisma lies in the 'infallibility' of a leader or an Imam.

Other scholars have perceived this development from the point of view of socio-economic circumstances that pressed people to search for a better life. During the constitutional conferences that ushered Nigeria to independence, there were struggles by civil society groups in Nigeria to organize themselves in the form of political parties and community-based organizations at the regional level. While these organizations sought to position themselves in the nascent democratic representations and alliances, religious organizations have also provided an alternative sphere that sought to enforce moral order in the struggles. 'Kano nationalism', as it is referred to, for example, re-affirmed the rise of regional nationalism and thus Kano became the hub of northern religious and political activities. These developments have had an impact directly or indirectly to the expansion of the QN and, hence the *Maukibi* procession. But is important to note that, as Louis Brenner argues:

> […] adherence to a tariqa was by definition voluntary … Sufi disciples were not recruited by force. Recognition of this fundamental difference in orientation is helpful in analyzing and understanding the complex permutations of the Muslim political discourse as it evolved through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[6]

The mobilization of people around religious groups like the IMN (or the now defunct MB/MSS as it was then) in the 1970s and 1980s was partly the result of neo-liberal economic policies of the IMF that brought about economic instability and hardship. The dwindling economic condition, mass retrenchment, and price hikes that occasioned the IMF's conditions made the social life of the average person wretched. It is claimed that the IMN, especially in the 1990s when the IMN gradually matured, adopted social welfare packages and empowerment programmes for their members which lured many more. The financial and

[5] E. Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); D. B. Cruise O'Brien and C. Coulon, Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1989).
[6] L. Brenner, *Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society* (UK: C. Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 29-34.

material support provided by the *Shuhada'* Foundation to the families of deceased members was, and has been, instrumental in keeping and remobilizing members.

Of all the motivating factors that keep and mobilize followers into these movements, this study emphasizes conviction as the key. Conviction plays out when a 'Free Zakzaky' protesters face a police tanker and gun, with 'primitive weapons'. Conviction motivates the repeated turn out of *Muzahara* marches despite persistent police repression. It is the conviction that nurtures belief in the IMN that "whosoever dies in the struggle, dies as a martyr" whose reward is the garden of paradise.

While QN processions maintained a strong connection to the religious objectives which led to the establishment of these practices, the original intention was quite consistent but its form became much more ceremonial by the late 1980s. In contrast, the IMN was born out of protest and eventually subsumed religious symbols in its perennial *Muzahara* and the *Tattaki*. Protest against the 'illegal' detention of its leader, eventually led to all forms of processions becoming sites of protest and eventually violent protest. This study therefore unpacks some of the obvious and symbolic shifts in ceremonial practices amongst the QN and IMN which were instrumental in the changing formation of the religious identity of the collective. These patterns were constructed around central figures who reached 'saintly' status in the eyes of the adherents. It has also attempted to show that some form of protest has always existed even in more religious processions and pilgrimages. Resistance to these groups and the ways in which they are conceptualized as either perpetrator or victim, oscillates over time and space and therefore demonstrates that these are not simply ceremonial but symbolic of the intersections of local and global politics, religious affiliation and ethnicity in northern Nigeria.

The above dynamics underpin in significant ways the politics of/in religious processions and pilgrimages of the groups under study. The performative display of these practices represent the interplay between religion, power and contest. Concrete representation is expressed, and presence advertised. These perhaps dim the chances of other religious persuasions to be publicly recognized. It is rather deliberate as the practices symbolically represent expression of resistance against the dominant cultural, political and religious forces. Certainly, this ceates tension with other religious groups and the state, and inevitably calls for the state-imposed regulations. A plethora of works on religion have demonstrated how politics is played out in religion, ranging from tepid, but at times, violent constestaions for the ownership and control of mosques, 'programmed' mode of proselytization, narratives of 'Othering', sectarian branding, politically motivated factions, violence, extremesim, and terrorism. This study departs from these stripe-torn lines to focus on the politics of religious processions.

Three essentialized elements —religion, space and procession — intersect and make the processional practices of the two groups sites of compulsive politics, adding to the intra-doctrinal contests. Eseentially, politics in religious processions emanate from the interaction of religious practices with secular system, with the latter imposing regulation on the former. This brings us back to the discourse of the engagement of the modern and secular regimes with religious establishment, living with one another, as fleshed out in Chapter 4. More striking is the fact that the politics that religious processions harbor, transcends the normative intra and inter-sectarian contest and represents the material display of a particular religious spectacle, thereby breeding the feelings of being excluded by other groups who prefer a more private mode of religiosity.

This study has demonstrated that processions and pilgrimage are far from being simply ceremonial or mournful practices but are sites of performative construction of identity, presence-making, spiritual awakening, group cohesion, and contestation for space in the saturated religious landscape of northern Nigeria. To a lesser extent, the IMN used the *Muzahara* to press for the release of el-Zakzaky and other members as chapters three and five have shown. A critical look at the 3ps revealed that they essentially transformed belief into practice and membership into belonging. Participation in the rituals required sacrifice and resilience amongst its members. By taking rituals that were privately conducted in the mosques or *majlis*/*halqas* into public spaces, the territoriality of the mosques/*majlis*/*halqas* were expanded while the public space was sacralized as much as it had been done with the centres of worship.

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Dr. Muhammad Nalado, 52, Member IMN Academic.
Mallama Maimuna B. Hassan, 46, Member IMN Women Forum.
Ustaz Yakubu Yahya Katsina, 63, Leader or Amir IMN Katsina State.
Mallam Nura Adam, 54, ex-IMN Member and Current Leader of JTI, Kano.
Mallam Aminu Rabiu Tudun Wada, 57, IMN Member.
Mallam Abdullahi Kurna, 61, IMN Member and Audio/Video Vendor.
Ibrahim Yahya Kurna, 36, IMN Member.
Brother Imam Kurna, 45, Member IMN and Tattaki Committee
Abdullahi Muhammad Gwagwalada, 38, Member IMN and Abuja Free Zakzaky Muzahara Organizing Committee
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Appendix I

Fig. 2.1: List of the *Shawish* (monitor—disciples) who monitored the orderly progression of *Maukibi* in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

S/N	Names	Gender	Remarks
1	Bashir Kabara	M	
2	Sulaiman Hausawa	M	
3	Baban Asibiti Magashi	M	
4	Uba Magashi	M	
5	Sani Ladan Kano	M	
6	Inunu Kabara	M	
7	Inuwa Kwaru Maikyau	M	
8	Kyauta Satatima	M	
9	Abbas Magashi	M	
10	Laraba Marmara	F	
11	Tafada Kabara	F	
12	Amina Dan Disina	F	
13	Azumi Kabara	F	
14	Asma'u Gwale	F	
15	Tamalam Kabara	F	
16	Usey Madatai	F	
17	Fati Beyerabiya	F	She is of Yoroba decent, the major ethic group in south western Nigeria
18	Hafsatu Maituta Gurin Gawa	F	She held flags at *Maukibi* procession. She hailed from the village where Nasiru Kabara was born
19	Khadijatu Rantan	F	She moved to Kabara from her village in the present Bebeji local government area of Kano state

Source: Abdulqaniy Sulaiman Nabulusi, "*Tsarabar Maulidin Qadiriyya A* Kano Nigeria Na 63 A 1435/2014", (pamphlet), p. 3

Appendix II

Showing population of the *Maukibi* participants and their locality in 1965

S/N	Locality	Local Govt. Area	State	Population Per Towns/*Halqa* *	*Muqaddamun*
1.	Tofa	Dawakin Tofa	Kano	2,226	Mal. Ja'afar Tofa
2.	Kiru	Kiru	Kano	1,325	Mal. Aliyu Sakarma
3.	Yako	Madobi	Kano	07	Mal. Muhammad Yako
4.	Shanono	Shanono	Kano	03	Mal. Abubakar Shanono
5.	Dugabau		Kano	38	Ma. Aliyu Muhammad
6.	Minjibir	Minjibir	Kano	60	Mal. Aliyu Usman
7.	Wase	Wase	Plateau	08	Mal. Datti Alhaji
8.	Gano	Dawakin Kudu	Kano	14	Mal. Halilu Gano
9.	Gano	Dawakin Kudu	Kano	22	Mal. Sule Gano
10	Jama'are	Jama'are	Bauchi	32	Mal. Liman Hassan
11	Shira	Shira	Bauchi	07	Mal. Abubakar Shira
12	Getso	Gwarzo	Kano	58	Mal. Ibrahim Getso
13	Nguru	Nguru	Borno	05	Mal. Shariff Muhammad
14	Karaye	Gwarzo	Kano	100	Mal. Hambali Karaye
15	Karaye	Gwarzo	Kano	50	Mal. Yakubu Karaye
16	Karaye	Gwarzo	Kano	50	Mal. Bature Karaye
17	Sumaila	Sumaila	Kano	15	Ma. Haruna Sumaila
18	Dibi		Kano	31	Mal. Hussaini Dibi
19	Gwarzo	Gwarzo	Kano	31	Mal. Halilu Gwarzo
20	Gwarzo	Gwarzo	Kano	36	Mal. Hussaini Gwarzo
21	Zarewa	Rogo	Kano	100	Mal. Bello Rogo
22	Karaye	Karaye	Kano	52	Mal. Atiku Karaye
23	Rogo	Rogo	Kano	01	Mal. Sambo Rogo
24	Yako	Madobi	Kano	14	Mal. Aliyu Yako
25	Unguwar Maza	Kumbotso	Kano	15	Mal. Aliyu U/Maza
26	Darbo		Kano	07	Mal. Garba Darbo
27	Tarauni	Tarauni	Kano	10	Mal. Bature Taraunu
28	Dagurba		Kano	01	Limamin Tagurba
29	Kura	Kura	Kano	01	Mal. Hamza Tura
30	Guringawa	Kumbotso	Kano	75	Mal. Iguda Turingawa
31	Ringim	Ringim	Kano	23	Mal. Abdulhamid Tingim
32	Tamburawa	Kumbotso	Kano	100	Mal. Salihu Tamburawa
33	Taura	Taura	Kano	40	Mal. Haruna Taura
34	Burkum		Kano	08	Mal. Shuaibu Burkum
35	Takai	Sumaila	Kano	23	Mal. Musa Takai
36	Gyaranya	Municipal	Kano	15	Mal. Usman Gyaranya
37	Funtua	Funtua	Katsina	03	Mal. Isa Funtua
38	Karaye	Karaye	Kano	435	Mal. Umar Karaye
39	Tsangaya	Albasu	Kano	08	Mal. Alhaji Tsangaya
40	Yakasai	Municipal	Kano	266	Mal. Yunusa Yakasai
41	Tudun Wada	Kaduna	Kaduna	19	Mal. Muhammadu Maitakama
42	Dambatta	Dambatta	Kano	150	Mal. Abdullahi Gwandu
43	Bajoga	Gombe	Gombe	23	Mal. Baba Santali
44	Karaye	Karaye	Kano	15	Mal. Zubairu Dederi
45	Mallam Madori	Mallam Madori	Kano	11	Mal. Yusuf Mallam Modori
46	dingin		Kano	15	Mal. Saadu Dingin
47	Damusawa		Kano	11	Mal. Zubairu Damusawa
48	Sitti			13	Mal. Shuaibu Sitti
49	Zangon Agalawa		Kano	20	Mal. Ilyasu Zangon Agalawa

50	Ja'en	Municipal	Kano	07	Mal. Halilu Ja'en
51	Taura	Ringim	Kano	25	Mal. Adamu Maigida
52	'Yan Dutse		Kano	15	Mal. Alhaji Yakubu
53	Dawakin Kaltin		Kano	25	Mal. Sulaiman Muhammad
54	Nguru	Nguru	Borno	05	Mal. Safiyanu Nguru
55	Potiskum	Potiskum	Borno	11	Mal. Isa Potiskum
56	Jibiya	Jibiya	Kano	25	Mal. Isma'il Jibiya
57	Jos	Jos	Plateau	25	Mal. Na Adamu
58	Rimin Gado	Rimin Gado	Kano	15	Mal. Huzaifatu Isma'il
59	Sarauniya		Kano	14	Mal. Halilu Sarauniya
60	Moda		Kano	13	Limamin Moda
61	Dangora	Bebeji	Kano	09	Mal. Muhammad Dangora
62	Dangora	Bebeji	Kano	01	Mal. Isa Dangora
63	Dangora	Bebeji	Kano	07	Mal. Yunusa Dangora
64	Dakata	Fagge	Kano	01	Mal. Idi Dakata
65	Gurubjawa		Katsina	70	Mal. Halilu Gurubjawa
66	Tudun Wada	Zaria	Kaduna	08	Mal. Abdullahi Labbo
67	Cikaji	Zaria	Kaduna	03	Mal. Muhammadu Maitafsiri
68	Garko	Garko	Kano	10	Mal. Musa Garko
69	Kadawa	Kano	Kano	29	Mal. Ahmad Kaidawa
70	Lambu	Dawakin Tofa	Kano	55	Mal. Ahmad Lambu
71	Daura	Daura	Katsina	01	Mal. Abdullahi Daura
72	Daura	Daura	Katsina	01	Mal. Dannene Daura
73	Kamarawa		Katsina	01	Mal. Sulaiman Kamarawa
74	Rangaza		Kano	01	Mal. Ahmad Rangas
75	Kiru	Kiru	Kano	33	Mal. Aliyu Sakarma
76	Tofa	Dawakin Tofa	Kano	14	Mal. Ahmad Tofa
77	Kusfa	Zaria	Kaduna	03	Mal. Salimu Junaidu
78	Dorawar Babuje	Barkin Ladi	Plateau	35	Mal. Hamisu Ayagi
79	Jos	Jos	Plateau	20	Mal. Mu'azu Jos
80	Mangu	Barkin Ladi	Plateau	06	Mal. Musa Mangu
81	Yelwa	Municipal	Kano	10	Mal. Shu'aibu Yelwa
82	Mangu	Barkin Ladi	Plateau	04	Mal. Muhammadu Mangu

Source: *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*, 24 September (1965), p. 6.

Appendix III

List of Flag Bearers as at 1990

S/N	Name	*Halqa*/Village	S/N	Name	*Halqa*/Village
1	Darwish Maigida	Kabara	24	Abdulwahab Guringawa	Guringawa
2	Sule Yusuf	Kunya	25	Abdulmudallab Guringawa	Guringawa
3	Abubakar Zakari	Kabara	26	Habibu Guringawa	Guringawa
4	Yahya Unguwa Uku	Unguwa Uku	27	Hudu Guringawa	Guringawa
5	Sarkin Ladanai	Kabara	28	Haruna Nadotsa	Dambatta
6	Alani Kabara	Kabara	29	Yahya Marke	Karaye
7	Nabayaro Hausawa	Hausawa	30	Ali Marke	Guringawa
8	Gwadabe Hausawa	Hausawa	31	Idi Marke	Guringawa
9	Abubakar Tofa	Tofa	32	Mahmuda Marke	Guringawa
10	Ayuba Kunya	Kunya	33	Yahya Yau	Guringawa
11	Uba Kabarawa	Kabarawa	34	Rabi'u Shuaibu	Getso
12	Saidu Bayerabe	Kabara	35	Abdulkadir Adamu	Dawakin Kudu
13	Sa'adu Bayerabe	Kabara	36	Ibrahim Ishaq	Dawakin Kudu
14	Hussaini Kaura	Kabara	37	Nata'ala Jazuli	Dambatta
15	Abdulkadir Nasarkin Gida	Kabara	38	Abbas Muhammad	Kabara
16	Danladi Tofa	Tofa	39	Danjummai Harka	Karaye
17	Usman Bayerabe	Kabara	40	Kabiru Muhammad	Karaye
18	Fatahallo Kabara	Kabara	41	Jazuli Liman	Guringawa
19	Imam Kabara	Kabara	42	Shuaibu Auwalu	Guringawa
20	Auwalu Karaye	Karaye	43	Mukhtari Auwalu	Getso
21	Munmiro Getso	Getso			
22	Baita Kabara	Kabara			
23	Yusif Bala	Guringawa			

Source: QN-SEC-DOCSEC/005: 'The Report of the Maukibi of 1990, QN-SC'.

Appendix IV

The first invitation card for the *Maukibi* event, 1985 and 1986



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

« مهرجان القادرية »

(1) يوم الأربعاء :- انشاء الله قراءة المولد مع الساعة الثانية ليلا الى العاشرة ثم حلقة الكبرى

(2) يوم الخميس :- .....

(3) يوم الجمعة :- مقابلة الأضياف والحلقة الكبرى

(4) يوم السبت :- يتحرك الموكب من دار القادر الى رحاب السكتوري الإحدى عشر لزيارة الشيخ المركز في الساعة الثانية صباحا الى الساعة الحادية عشر الزيارة في الحلقة الكبرى ثم دعاء الختام في الساعة الثانية عشر والى قبالة عشر مساء

فضيلة الشيخ الناصر كبر كانو

Maharijanil Kadiriyya a 1985

(1) *Ranar Laraba:–* *Idan Allah ya yarda za'a karanta Maulidi da karfe 8.00 na dare zuwa karfe 10.00 nadare, sanan Zikirin amfasu.*

(2) *Ranar Alhamis:–* *Za'ayi [illegible]atun Mauludin Kadiriyya.*

(3) *Ranar Juma'a:–* *Za'a [illegible] Zikiri da kuma ganawa da baki.*

(4) *Ranar Asabar:–* *Mauk[illegible]zai fita daga Gidan Kadiriyya zuwa Rihabu san kwari izuw[illegible]hugaba mai girma Shehu Malam Kabara da karfe 8.00 [illegible]afe zuwa karfe 11.00 na safe za'a yi ziyara sanan hal[illegible]kubura su karanta Addua'r rufewa. sanan karfe daya zuv[illegible]ta biyu na yamma a dawo gida.*

Alhaji Shehu Nasiru Kabara



MAULIDIN KADIRIYYA

Shugaban Darikar Kadiriyya Nigeriya da Afrika ta Yamma
SHEIKH ALHAJI MUHAMMAD NASIR MUH. KABARA
Sarkin Yakin Shehu Usman Dan Fodio

Nofarincikin gayyatar.....
Aduar Kammala Bikin Mauludin Ranar Asabar 13/12/86, karfe Goma Shadaya na Rana 11. 00 am. Wuri Maigirinya Hanyar Katsina Road.

(A zo da wannan kati)

R. S. V. P.
628268
623523

Appendix V

Samples of front pages of the invitation cards of the *Maukibi* event from 1986 to 1992



Samples of the invitation cards of the *Maukibi* event from 1993 - 1999









Photograph of Nasiru Kabara (**Fig. A**) performing *bandir zikr* and the mausoleum of al-Jilani in Bagdad (**Fig. B**) with inscription '*Maukibin* Qadiriyya *Na* 48 *A Kano Najeriya* 1420 A.H. 1999 A.D.'

Appendix VI

Sample of tags for official

Note: The 'official' tags in **Fig. A & B** were given to the 'officials', usually members of the *Maukibi* Central Organizing Committee and sub-committees. The tags were used as an identity to help manage the crowd.

Appendix VII

The *Tattaki* Crowd at the Front Page of Pointer Express and Some of the Philosophy Motivating it



Appendix VIII

The Images of the Ashura Marches: Fig (A) The *Hurras* holding red flags. Fig. (B) the women participants holding 'free zakzaky' leaflets. Fig (C) women participants being flanked by male members

Appendix IX

Images showing the police while dispersing/arresting the 'Free Zakzaky' *Muzahara* crowd

Appendix X

The Text of '*Ayaa Shehu Faruuku Na Zo Gareka* …' Verse

وَقَالَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ

دَسُونَنْ مُهَيْمِنْ زَنْ قَارَوَقَبْ بَيَانِ نَكَاكَنُمْ مَالَمْ كَبَرْ
نِينِىْ مُحَمَّدُ نَاصِرُ طَاغَ مُحَمَّدُ مُخْتَارُ جِيكَنْ كَبَرْ
مُحَمَّدُ مُخْتَارُ طَانِىْ غَمَالَنْ مُحَمَّدُ نَاصِرُ جِيكَنْ كَبَرْ
مُحَمَّدُ نَاصِرُ طَانِىْ غَمَالَنْ مُحَمَّدُ مَيْزَوْرِىْ طَاغَ كَبَرْ
مُنَا عُودِىْ أَللَّهْ دَيَاتَيْمَكِيمْ دَ بَبَّنْ وَلِينْسَ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
قَسَسَ مَتَاسَسَّ تَنْبُوتُ أَمَّا غَرِنْ دَ كَحَيْفَشْ بِرْنَنْ كَبَرْ
غَرِىْ بِىْ أَتَنْبُوتُ غَابَا غَكَوْرَا أَتُنْبُوتُ شِيبِىْ أَكِىْ ثِىْ كَبَرْ
غَرِينِىْ سَتَبِّىْ غَرِنْ مَالَمِينِىْ غَرِنْسَ مَهَيْفَرْسَ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
بَتُنْ نَسَبَرْسَ كَثِىْ غَرِينِىْ إِيَايَنْسَ عَنْ لَارَبَاوَنْ كَبَرْ
أَتُنْ يَى كَرَاتْنَسَا غُنْ مَالَمِنْسَ أَتُنْ تَرْبِيَهْ نَسَ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
دَيَرْدَرْ مُهَيْمِنْ يَابَرْ قَسَرْسُوا تُنْبُوتُ بِرْنَنْ غَرِنْسُ كَبَرْ
غَبَنْ هِجَرْ شَيْخْ يَارُوا غَرِمْ ثِكِنْ أَدَكَاوَا أَكُنُوا كَبَرْ
كَافِنْ يَذُومَنْ يَا شِغَ جِجِى يَا يَاوَثِىْ حَوْسَ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
يَنَابِنْ قَيُوبِىْ يَنَا تَعِبَادَا ثِكِنْ سَرْفِقِىْ شَيْخْ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
مُجَدِّدِ عُثْمَانْ بِىْ يَكِرَا شِى سَبُودَ يَتَبِّشْ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ

يَتِىٰ دَ سُلَيْمَانُ فَـــارُوقُ حَقًّا مَسُويِمُّنِى شَيْخُ مَـــالَـــنْ كَبَرْ
كَبِيشِ كُسُوشِى كُسَنْ تَوْشِ عُنْكُ يَبَرْأَ دَكَاوَا يَـــكُـــومُـوا كَبَرْ
دَسُونَنْ عَرِنْسُ أَكِـــىٰ لَقَبِنْسَ سُونَنْ حَقِيقَرْسَ مَـــالَـــنْ عُمَرْ
غَبَـــاكِـــنْ مُجَنَّبِىٰ مُكَسَنْشِى ثِكِنْ كَشَفِنْسَ غَـسُـونَـــنْ كَبَرْ
مُجَدِّدِ عُثْمَانُ يَـــىٰ مَى بُشَارَا إِدَنْ يَيْعِيَالِى دَ مَـــنِـــيَـــنْ كَبَرْ
يَسَوْكَرْ دَ حَوَاءُ دُومِـــنْ بِشَارَا تَسَوْكَرْ دَ مَيْزَوْرِىٰ زُونْ كَـــبَـــرْ
دَإِدْنِنْ مَجَدَّد يَا فَـــارَ وَعَظِى أَبِرْنِنْ كَنُوا شَيْخُ مَـــالَـــنْ كَبَرْ
يَكَنْ تَاكَ مَاءُ يَكَنْ حَـــوْ حَوَآءُ يَكَنْ غَ صِرَاطَ وَلِـــيِـــنْ كَـــبَـــرْ
يَمِيقَ حَنُنْسَ يَكَرْبُوا غُـــرَاسَا أَمَكَّهْ يَيْبُوَا مُـــتَـــانَـــنْ كَبَرْ
يَكَنْ نُونَ كَعْبَهْ يَكَنْ ظَيْدَ حَدَرِى يَـــكَـــنْ شَـــادَ زَاكِنْ وَلِينْ كَبَرْ
يَكَنْ دُوبَ لَوْحُ يَكَنْ غَـــمَ أَيْكِى دَ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ وَلِـــيِـــنْ كَـــبَـــرْ
أُبَنْ قَادِرِيَّهْ أُبَنْ مَـــــالِكِيَّهْ أُبَـــنْ أَشْعَرِيَّهْ أُبَـــنْ بَنْ كَبَرْ
مُكُومَا غَمَنْيَنْ دَ سُنْ بِكِىٰ وَيْـــشِ سَيِلِى دَ أَلْبَرْكَنْ مَيْـــكَـــبَـــرْ
مُحَمَّدُ نَاسَامُ نِـــىٰ شُـــوغَبَنْسَ بَبَّنْ مَـــسُـــوِيِـــنِـــى غَمَالَنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ مَيْمَيَانِمُّ مَـــالَـــنْ شُعَيْبُ بَبَّنْ صَحَابِنْسَ مَـــالَـــنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ صَاحِبِنْسَ عُثْمَانُ زَابِى أَبُوكِنْ أَسِيرِنْسَ مَـــالَـــنْ كَبَرْ

أَكُوىٰ شَيْخ كَايَوْ أَكُوىٰ مَيْشِرَابِى — أَكُوىٰ شَيْخُ مَيْزُورِىٰ طَنْ مَيْكَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ زَاهِدِى شَيخُ إِبْرَاهِمُّ — دَ أُبَنْسَ أَحْمَدُ جِيكَنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ مَالُمَهْ مَيْفَسَرْتَ سُوِيطِى — أُوابْثِىٰ غَأَحْمَدُ بَرْ مَيْكَبَرْ
ثِكِنْ دَوْسِينْسَ أَكُوىٰ طَنْسَ مَالَنْ — مُحَمَّدُ بَبَّنْ خَلِيفَرْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ حَجِّ نَاصِرُ بَبَّنْ وَلِيِّى — أَكُوىٰ وَلِينْسَ صَحَابِنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ طَانَمَيَّاقِ جِيكَانَرَابِى — كَرَنْ قَادِرِيَّهْ بَرَادَنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ شَيْخُ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ غُرْزُنْ طَرِيقَهْ — أُبَنْ حَجِ يُوسِفُ غُرْزُنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ تَلَّفِى نَسَ بُلْقِيسُ جِيكَا — عَحَيْدَرَا بَبَنْ مَسُوبِنْ كَبَرْ
أَكُوىٰ مَالُمَىٰ مَاسُ أَيْكِى دَعِلْمِى — ثِكِنْ دَوْسِينْ شَيْخُ مَالَنْ كَبَرْ
أَبُوكِ إِدَنْ كَابُكَاثِى بَيَانِى — كَدَوْرِىٰ كَدُوبَ جَلَاءُ الْبَصَرْ
ثِكِى زَاكَ سَامُ ثِكَّنْ بَيَانِى — نَشَيْخَ دَمَنْيَنْ صَحَبَّنْ كَبَرْ
أَيَا شَيْخُ فَارُوقُ نَادُو غَرِىٰ كَ — كَثِىٰ مَرَايَنَكَ يَا مَيْكَبَرْ
أَيَا صَاحِبِينْسَ نَادُوا غَرِىٰ كَ — كُدُوبِ مَرَايَنَكَ مَنْيَنْ كَبَرْ
مُهَيْمِنُ دُومِنَكَ دَنْ جِنْ قَنَّكَ — كَنَيْمَكِ بَاوَنَكَ دَنْ مَنْ كَبَرْ
إِنَا بِنْ صَلَاتِى إِنَا بِنَ سَلَامِى — بِسَا شُوغَبَنْ دُكَ خَيْرِ الْبَشَرْ
دَءَآلِ دَ صَحْبِ دَ مَاسُ بِيَرْسُو — إِنَاغَمَ وَاقَا ثِكِنْ طَشْ عَقَرْ