An Analysis of Right-Wing Extremism in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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DECLARATION

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Abstract

Western democracies have seen a surge in right-wing extremism (RWE) over the last decade. With notable examples being the United States, Australia, and large parts of Europe, this is an ideology growing in recruitment ability, legislative influence, and capacity for violence. South Africa (SA), with its oppressive Apartheid history, is not immune to this global development. Thus, conceptions and monitoring of RWE in SA primarily centre around Afrikaner nationalist groups. However, post-Apartheid SA has seen the emergence of additional forms of RWE outside the realm of Afrikaner nationalism. In particular, the operationalization of anti-foreigner groups within various waves of xenophobic violence since 2008, in addition to the July unrest of 2021, have demonstrated RWE elements.

Therefore, with its growing influence in Western democracies and clear capacity for social change and harm, it is imperative to understand which forms of RWE are manifesting in post-Apartheid SA and what is driving their recruitment. By employing a qualitative case-study research design, and using secondary desktop research and thematic analysis, this study addresses the question: why has RWE occurred in post-Apartheid SA and what can explain the various manifestations? Using the dense existing literature on RWE, an ideologically comprehensive, but theoretically flexible, framework was designed to identify and analyse right-wing extremist groupings, activity, characteristics, and determinants.

The employment of this framework in terms of the pre-1994 period in SA showed three main forms of RWE: Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism, and political vigilantism. Post-Apartheid SA displays a different range of groups, however, still existing within the three main forms seen pre-1994. Afrikaner extremism is still alive through a persistent subculture of Afrikaner nationalism built upon decades of history, culture and religious prophecy. Zulu nationalism has been adopted by some political groups, such as the Radical Economic Transformation faction within the African National Congress (ANC), which seeks to acquire control of the party through the mobilization capacity of the Zulu identity. Political vigilantism has evolved into a violent xenophobic subculture and formalized into anti-foreigner groups such as Operation Dudula, which seek to forcefully expel foreigners from SA.

This study finds the primary determinant of these various manifestations to be social change. White extremists long for Apartheid-era social structuring, and black extremists demand the post-Apartheid social and economic rewards they were promised with the inception of democracy in SA. This demand for social change is driven by the frustrations of economic hardship and political resentment caused by lackluster post-1994 macroeconomic policy, a militarized police force, lagging land reform, ineffective affirmative action and institutionalized corruption. Therefore, these groups have found success in recruiting support based on one or a combination of the discursive opportunities of social inequality, ethnic tensions, land, crime, and immigration. The use of these issues by right-wing extremist groups were found to share the same mainstream nature as other international forms of RWE, along with their focus on youth recruitment and online activity.

Opsomming

Westerse demokrasieë het gedurende die afgelope dekade 'n oplewing van regtervleuelse ekstremisme (RWE) beleef. Met noemenswaardige voorbeelde soos die Verenigde State van Amerika, Australië en groot dele van Europa, is dit 'n ideologie wat groei in werwingsvermoë, wetgewende invloed en kapasiteit vir geweld. Suid-Afrika (SA) met sy onderdukkende Apartheid-geskiedenis, is nie immuun teen hierdie globale ontwikkeling nie. Dus is opvattings van RWE in SA hoofsaaklik rondom Afrikaner-nasionalistiese groepe gesentreer. Post-Apartheid SA het egter die ontwikkeling van addisionele vorme van RWE buite die omvang van Afrikaner ekstremisme ervaar. Die formele operasionalisering van xenofobiese groepe in onlangse vlae van xenofobiese geweld, asook die Julie 2021 oproeringe, het die teenwoordigheid van regtervleuelse ekstrimistiese elemente ten toon gestel.

Derhalwe, met die groeiende invloed daarvan in ander Westerse demokrasieë en die duidelike kapasiteit vir sosiale verandering en skade, is dit noodsaaklik om te verstaan watter vorme van RWE in post-Apartheid SA buite die tradisionele omvang van Afrikaner nasionalisme manifesteer. Met behulp van 'n kwalitatiewe gevallestudie-navorsingsontwerp deur sekondêre navorsing en tematiese analise, beantwoord die navorser die volgende vraag deur hierdie navorsingstuk: waarom het RWE voorgekom in post-Apartheid Suid-Afrika en watter faktore kan die verskeie manifestasies daarvan verklaar? Met behulp van die digte bestaande literatuur oor RWE, is 'n ideologies-omvattende, maar teoreties-buigsame raamwerk ontwerp om regtervleuelse ekstremistiese groeperings, aktiwiteit, eienskappe en determinante te identifiseer.

Die toepassing van hierdie raamwerk op pre-1994 SA, het drie hoofvorme van RWE uitgelig: Afrikaner esktremisme, Zoeloe nasionalisme en politieke vigilantisme. Post-Apartheid SA vertoon 'n ander verskeidenheid van groepe, maar val egter steeds binne die drie hoofvorme bestaande voor 1994. Afrikaner ekstremisme is steeds teenwoordig deur 'n deurlopende subkultuur van Afrikaner nasionalisme, gebou op dekades van geskiedenis en godsdienstige profesie. Zoeloe nasionalisme is deur Jacob Zuma en sy Radikale Ekonomiese Transformasie-faksie, wat poog om politieke mag te wen deur die mobaliseringskapasiteit van die Zoeloe identiteit, aangeneem. Politieke vigilantisme het ontwikkel in 'n gewelddadige xenofobiese subkultuur en is geformaliseer tot anti-buitelandergroepe soos Operasie Dudula, wat poog om buitelanders gedwonge uit SA te verdryf. Daar is gevind dat hierdie groepe sukses behaal deur werwing te baseer op die kwessies van sosiale ongelykheid, etniese spanning, grond, misdaad en immigrasie.

Die hoofdeterminant van hierdie verskillende manifestasies is sosiale verandering, met wit ekstremiste wat smag na 'n Apartheid-era sosiale strukturering, en swart ekstremiste wat die post-Apartheid sosiale belonings eis wat hulle belowe is. Faktore soos mislukte makro-ekonomiese beleid, gemilitariseerde polisiëring, grondhervorming, regstellende aksie en korrupsie speel deurslaggewende rolle in die handhawing van ekonomiese swaarkry en politieke wrok wat hierdie begeertes na sosiale verandering dryf. Dit maak die wydverspreide antagonisme binne die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing en sy sosiale beloningstruktuur uiters volhardend en spreek tot verskeie ekstremistiese groepe gebaseer op talle sosio-ekonomiese foutlyne.

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Lastly, thank you to Dr. Elizabeth Smith for professionally editing this thesis and to Matthys Carstens for translating the abstract.

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List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
AVF	Afrikaner Volksfront
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging
BB	Broederbond
BDF	Bophuthatswana Defence Force
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BKA	Boere-Krisisaksie
BLF	Black First Land First
CCB	Civil Cooperation Bureau
COSAG	Concerned South African Group
CP	Conservative Party
HNP	Hersigte Nasionale Party
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
LEWC	Land Expropriation Without Compensation
MP	Member of Parliament
NDP	National Development Plan
NP	National Party
OB	Ossewa Brandwag
OD	Operation Dudula
PSAF	Put South Africans First
RET	Radical Economic Transformation
RWE	Right-wing Extremism
SA	South Africa
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SPU	Self-Protection Unit
TA	Thematic Analysis
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WWII	World War II

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale

6 January 2021 saw the invasion of the United States (US) Capitol building by large numbers of white supremacist and pro-Trump militants in an attempted insurrection. Described as one of the worst breaches of security in American history, five people died as President Trump encouraged the far-right movement which saw the American Congress violated and presented Vice-President Mike Pence with the very real prospect of being lynched (Smith, 2021; Borger, 2021). This act was not spontaneous, but rather the culmination of premeditated violence by members of several groups across the far-right spectrum such as QAnon, The Proud Boys, Boogaloo Bois, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters Movement (Mehra & Cook, 2021).

This event is reflective of a growing international trend, with the 2019 Global Terrorism Index recording a 320% increase in far-right terrorism over the past five years. Nineteen countries across North America, Western Europe and Oceania were affected (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). In 2018, the number of deaths and incidents resulting from political terrorism was higher than from any other form of terrorism for the first time since 2007. Despite far-left attacks occurring at a higher frequency, far-right attacks are overwhelmingly more violent with 30% of fatalities from terrorism having occurred due to far-right attacks since 2007 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022).

Despite this growing trend of right-wing extremism (RWE) in Western countries, South Africa (SA) is not seen as a hotspot. In fact, it ranks 73rd on the list of countries most impacted by terrorism, with an overall status of "very low risk" on the 2022 Global Terrorism Index. No South African attack is reflected on the list of top 18 deadliest terrorist incidents of 2021 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). However, the riots of July 2021 raise questions about South Africa's risk of terrorism, particularly of RWE.

Between 9 and 18 July 2021, SA was rocked by the worst wave of civil unrest seen since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Mobs of angry citizens clashed with police, ransacked local shops, and set ablaze shopping malls in KwaZulu-Natal and Johannesburg (Winning & Roelf, 2021). Termed an "absolute insurrection" by President Cyril Ramaphosa (Erasmus, 2022), the unrest was devastating, leaving 350 people dead, two million jobless and wiping R50 billion from the economy (Erasmus, 2022). Characterized as an "unequivocal failure of the country's police and intelligence services" (Koko, 2022), it seemed that the riots had initially been triggered by

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protests surrounding the arrest of former President Zuma on corruption charges (BBC, 2021), which in turn manifested in protests surrounding economic hardship and widening inequality which have occurred since the dawn of democracy in 1994 (Winning & Roelf, 2021).

However, despite this development holding some validity, in the days following the unrest, a more sinister factor started to develop. The State Security Agency of SA reported that they were investigating the "possible eruption of right-wing extremism" which had led to "racial tensions" in KwaZulu-Natal (Felix, 2021). This is due to the consequences of the riots evolving from a seemingly spontaneous uprising of the poor to a targeted attack on state infrastructure. The Mooi River Toll Plaza, a key economic link between Durban and Gauteng, was blocked using hijacked trucks and 25 torched vehicles. Simultaneously, key infrastructure including communication networks and water facilities, amongst other vital parts of the province's economy, were compromised. In addition, medical clinics, mosques, schools, and pharmacies also formed part of the planned attack (The Presidency, 2021). At the time, President Ramaphosa described the unrest as a "deliberate" effort to derail the South African economy (*Al Jazeera*, 2021).

With RWE being defined as: "an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism" (Carter, 2018:174), the July unrest of 2021 should be regarded as an act of RWE. The level of coordination witnessed indicates a clear political agenda and concerted effort to reject and overthrow the South African democracy and constitution. Its extreme-right characteristics are certainly not as blatant as was the case with the 2021 US Capitol insurrection, but a deeper analysis shows that it had been instigated by right-wing extremist elements which effectively enacted politically motivated violence through the weaponization of discontent along political and ethnic fault lines. The deadliest terror attack worldwide in 2021 was a suicide bombing in Afghanistan which killed 170 people (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). If the July Riots are regarded as a terror attack, its death count of 350 people would make it the deadliest terror attack in 2021 by more than double the number of fatalities.

1.2 Problem Statement and Research Question

Right-wing extremist literature and analysis has predominantly focused on the developed West. RWE has been seen to flourish in times of crisis (Mudde, 2019); therefore, current studies on RWE have mainly been attributed to rising levels of immigration which have caused an

"unanticipated international political transformation" in North America, Australia, and Western Europe (McAlexander, 2020). This has resulted in RWE undergoing a renovation and infiltrating mainstream political parties, becoming the subject of leading ideas in public debates and increasingly becoming popular ideological foundations for public policy. In the US, this can be seen with the mobilization of the far-right after the election of Barack Obama, and the far-right's empowerment due to the election of Donald Trump (Auger, 2020:90); as well as the increasing electoral success and protest action by right-wing groups in Europe and Australia (Caiani, della Porta & Wagemann, 2012).

Despite facing circumstances different to those found in developed western nations, SA is not unfamiliar with crisis. SA experiences consistent rounds of nationwide rolling electricity blackouts, the largest youth unemployment rate in the world, local government failures and inadequate infrastructure, little economic growth, and furthermore, is one of the most unequal countries in the world (World Bank, 2022). This provides ample room for predatory ideologues to take advantage of the lack of any meaningful political alternatives and to recruit desperate and vulnerable people looking for solutions into their extremist belief systems. Therefore, SA is seeing a variety of right-wing extremist manifestations such as the predatory forms of Zulu Nationalism seen in the July Riots of 2021, the formalization of xenophobic violence in the form of Operation Dudula, (an isiZulu term meaning "push back" or "fight back"), and persistent forms of Afrikaner extremism such as the Crusaders terrorist group looking to violently overthrow the government.

These patterns of violence emerging from these groups demand a deeper insight into the manifestations of RWE in SA. With only very little published analyses existing on post-Apartheid Afrikaner extremism, RWE in SA is largely understudied, despite displaying a strong potential for violence. Therefore, to aid the theoretical understanding of efforts to counter violent extremism, this study aims to address the gaps in the literature by answering the research question: Why has right-wing extremism occurred in post-Apartheid South Africa and what can explain the various manifestations?

Therefore, this study will address two primary objectives:

1. What are the various forms of RWE within SA?
2. Why have these different forms of RWE emerged in SA?

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1.3 Theoretical Framework

It is important to understand that RWE consists of multiple factors that form part of a common ideological core (Ignazi, 2006). This core is centred around two traits: (i) a rejection of the democratic state and its institutions, values, and procedures (anti-democracy) and (ii) the rejection of the fundamental principle of human equality (anti-constitutionalism) (Carter, 2005). Therefore, this study is based on Carter's (2018:174) later extension of this work which offers a minimal definition of RWE as: "an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism". It will be bolstered by the characteristics of RWE listed by Carter (2018) which are: *the strong state, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, anti-democracy,* and *populism and anti-establishment rhetoric.* Groups do not need to exhibit all five characteristics to be judged as right-wing extremist. They will be judged according to their proximity to the ideological core and definition, in addition to the number and intensity of the characteristics they assert.

Social movement theory will be implemented to isolate the specific actions that will be observed. Limited by length restraints, this study does not have the capacity to implement the full framework of social movement theory listed by Borum (2011). Therefore, it will only focus on the *discursive opportunities* used by groups to convey their extremist messaging (Kriesi, Koopmnans & Duyvendak, 1995) and how these contribute to the specific groups' broader worldview, or *frame alignment* (Caiani *et al.*, 2012). Contemporary right-wing extremist groups will be categorized according to political parties, social movement organizations and sub-cultures (Mudde, 2019). Lastly, Piazza's (2017) determinant structure of economic hardship, political resentment and social change will be applied to SA to see if it holds validity in helping to understand why right-wing extremist ideologies are manifesting in different capacities.

1.4 Research Design and Methodology

This study will employ a qualitative research strategy and case-study design to accomplish the objectives. Due to the subjective and multifaceted nature of the information studied, a qualitative design is deemed most suitable. Secondary data gathered through desktop research will be used as the primary method of acquiring evidence. Data will be gathered dating from the year 1994 (which is defined as SA's post-Apartheid timeline) and will be organized according to the specific groups seen asserting right-wing extremist ideologies.

Data will be analyzed thematically, and this thematic analysis will be guided by the theoretical framework mentioned above. This will allow the study to effectively identify the main groupings of RWE and to analyze any similarities and theoretical overlaps. Following from the issues identified, Piazza's (2017) framework will be applied to determine the primary causes of right-wing extremist groups. This will allow the study to answer the stated research objectives extensively and comprehensively through the study, and in this manner, effectively contribute to the gaps in knowledge currently present within South African extremist literature.

1.5 Ethical Considerations

Even within secondary desktop research, ethical considerations are still a priority within social science research. This study is being conducted at Stellenbosch University and therefore must fall within the regulations set out within the institution's *Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University* (2009). The Stellenbosch University Research and Ethics Committee for Social Behavioural and Education Research granted permission for the researcher to conduct interviews with journalists and professionals within the field of RWE in SA. However, due to time constraints, these interviews were not undertaken. Consequently, secondary data that was available within the public domain was used for the analysis of RWE in SA. Nonetheless, the highest standards of integrity and honesty were maintained in terms of the interpretation of data and conclusions drawn throughout the study.

1.6 Outline of the Study

With the background and rationale detailed, and the research question with subsequent objectives listed, the outline of the study will be presented to illustrate how these goals will be accomplished in a methodical and logical manner. Chapter 2 will comprise the literature review, detailing the body of work within which this study takes place. It will specifically focus on defining RWE and its surrounding characteristics, exploring the details of contemporary RWE seen around the globe and showing which literature on RWE is currently present within SA.

Chapter 3 comprises a detailed explanation of the research design and methodology, outlining which attitudes will be present for the analysis of data, the characteristics of thematic analysis and the limitations of this study. Chapter 4 reflects the study's engagement with the history of RWE in SA. This will detail the emergence and evolution of the various types of RWE seen in

SA prior to 1994 and will lay the appropriate contextual foundation for the analysis of contemporary groupings. This will bolster analysis by providing important historical developments and contextual cues which contribute to the rise of contemporary right-wing extremist movements.

Chapter 5 will detail the groupings of post-Apartheid RWE and the issues which drive their formation. This chapter will present an answer to the first research objective: a detailing of the *variance* aspect of the research question. This will be followed by Chapter 6 in which Piazza's (2017) framework will be applied for determining the causes of right-wing extremist violence. This will answer the second research objective, detailing the *why* aspect of the research question.

Lastly, Chapter 7, will discuss the findings of the study and restate the significance and importance of this research. This chapter will reflect on the groups identified and their primary determinants. In addition, the limitations of this study and avenues for possible research will be discussed, with the aim of continuing the development of extremist literature in SA.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The available literature on right-wing extremism (RWE) is extremely comprehensive and covers a wide range of definitions, contexts, and applications. Therefore, a specific and contextually appropriate theoretical framework, based on extremist literature, must be constructed to answer the question: why has RWE occurred in post-Apartheid South Africa and what can explain the various manifestations? This literature review draws on the extensive range of literature on RWE to enable the study to construct a framework which can be applied to South Africa (SA) and accurately address the specified research objectives.

First, the concept of RWE will be explained through its identity as a distinct ideology, its operational definition, and relevant characteristics. Secondly, the manifestation of RWE will be outlined through an explanation of the process of radicalization, its advancement through social movement theory and the causes of radicalization. Next, a global picture of contemporary RWE will be outlined through an explanation of the distinct characteristics, the types of groups that manifest, and notable examples. Lastly, a summary of the existing literature on South African RWE will be given. This literature review will identify the theoretical links and appropriateness of the theoretical framework through an explanation of the various concepts and characteristics involved in identifying contemporary RWE within a specific environment.

2.2 What is Right-Wing Extremism?

2.2.1 A Distinctive Ideology

A clear and commonly agreed-upon definition of the extreme-right within the literature is still intensely debated as there are many grounds for contention. Therefore, this study shall focus on the distinct grounds of similarity. Firstly, there is consensus around RWE primarily describing a definitive ideology. It is important to understand that the term *extreme-right* consists of multiple factors with a common ideological core (Ignazi, 2006).

In his analysis of European right-wing parties, Mudde (1995) found that within social and scientific discourse, RWE has significant bearing on five specific characteristics: *nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy*, and *the strong state*. However, there is most certainly disagreement around the defining characteristics of RWE. For example, Husbands (1981)

proposed that 'racial exclusion' is the central common denominator found in Western European RWE. More recently, Eatwell (2000) proposed that nationalism is the defining feature of the extreme-right. There is a definite list of ideological features which authors reference; however, disagreement around which are the most appropriate, is still rife.

Contrary to the listing of characteristics above, many authors prefer a theoretical approach. Popular within the German debate of RWE are the general theories of extremism which categorize the extreme-right as simply another variant of general (or genuine) extremism. In this way it is framed as simply opposition to the constitution, and therefore the antithesis to liberal, constitutional democracy (Backes & Jesse, 1996). This is due to the rise and reign of Nazism which produced speculations that Germany, and specifically Germans, held a particular vulnerability towards the appeal of RWE (Roberts, 1994).

Within the US debate, RWE is centred around the longing for a (not necessarily imagined) past state. RWE seeks to restore a perceived "golden age" from the past which can include times where white men had more power, a particular religion was more dominant, or government had less control over daily factors of life (Murphy, 2009). This is supported by Kerodal, Freilich and Chermak (2016) who argue that American RWE is centred around anti-globalism, survivalism, conspiratorialism, nationalism, and the worship of political and personal sovereignty. Therefore, in reaction to perceptions of negative change, fundamental features of the current political system must be reverted to include violence, in order to classify these groups as extremist (Jackson, 2019). This is similar to the Australian understanding of RWE as an ideology which is economically capitalist, anti-democracy and equal, enforces the notion of the white identity under threat, and romanticizes a return to a nostalgic and imagined past (Campion, 2019b).

In the United Kingdom (UK), debates centre around the parochial nature of the definition as the: "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs" (Zedner, 2021). This prompts contention around the phrases "fundamental British values", "democracy", and "rule of law" with failure to include violence (Lowe, 2017). This has created concern over the definition's use to focus exclusively on Islamic extremism, whereas anti-immigrant rhetoric and anti-Muslim hate crimes within British society are growing (Thompson, 2021).

Another popular theory developed by Heitmeyer (1993) is that of *disintegration*. This theory argues that the combination of the individualization of modern life and the penetrating logic of capitalism in every sphere of existence leads to an insecurity that makes the promises of the extreme-right incredibly appealing. Lastly, convincing comparative literature exists around how the extreme-right deals with political parties and voting behaviour. Betz (1994) defines extreme-right-wing populism as support for three things: critique of the welfare state, refusal to integrate marginal groups into society and populist rhetoric. On the other hand, Kitschelt and McGann (1997) argue that RWE operates within an economy of supply and demand within the political sphere. They argue that extreme-right parties succeed in attracting voters and building a supporter base through a 'winning formula' of market liberalism and authoritarian governance.

What is worth noting is that some scholars have noted a distinctive political style, behaviour, organization, strategy and demographically-aligned electoral base as central pillars of RWE (Betz, 1994). Right-wing parties were found to be more homogenous than the political alternatives left of them, with a clear and distinctive ideological policy profile (Ennser, 2012). However, these must be considered as secondary or additional tenets to the concept rather than a defining feature, since all the above-mentioned concepts are based on extreme-right ideology. As Backes (2001) explains, the organizational or strategic traits that manifest from RWE are not sufficiently comprehensive to consider the entire multifaceted scope of the concept we describe as RWE, and to act effectively as a common denominator. Organizational structures are effective when describing the phenomenon of RWE and its manifestations within society, but are totally inappropriate for definitional purposes (Translation by Carter, 2005:14-15). These organizational traits are informed by a distinctive political ideology (Betz & Johnson, 2004).

For the purposes of this study, RWE will be regarded as an ideology rooted in the theoretical concepts of social change, as this emerges as the consistent theme throughout most analyses of the extreme-right. Hence, Minkenberg (2000) advances modernization theory which proposes our contemporary society as one characterized by the expansion of individual autonomy (such as role flexibility and status mobility) along with segmentation and increasing social sub-system autonomy. As a means of retaliation to social differentiation, one must introduce a nationally defined community. To combat individualization, one must reintroduce traditional and community roles. Therefore, one can describe RWE as an ideology rooted in the myth of

a homogenous nation complemented by a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism. This is directed against the principles of universalism and individualism, and their manifestations into liberal and pluralistic democracies (Minkenberg, 2000).

Similarly, Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1989) describe the right as a variety of responses to the left. These responses can be grouped into five distinct categories: *the reactionary right, the moderate right, the radical right, the extreme-right,* and the *new right*. Ignazi (2006) builds on this, describing the variety of right-wing ideological definitions as a consequence of changing historical contexts and problems. The specific ideological tenet/s of RWE are dependent upon the issues of the time. Even when differentiating between the varieties of the right, there is still a shared ideology amongst right-wing groups (Carter, 2018).

However, when searching for essentialist interpretations of the extreme-right's 'rightness', scholars often turn to the writings of Bobbio (1996) to make that distinction. *Left* and *right* can be distinguished by their attitudes towards (in)equality. The left is fundamentally more egalitarian, thus emphasising an ideology based on reducing social inequalities and reducing the pains of natural ones. The right takes the opposite approach, positioning itself as anti-egalitarian, believing that inequalities are a natural component of reality and cannot be eradicated. Therefore, it is not the state's responsibility to reduce inequalities within society. This focus on attitudes towards equality is helpful, as the traditional focus on economic issue differences reflects mixed positions and generally occupies secondary concerns amongst groups.

2.2.2 A Workable Definition

Carter (2005) defines RWE based on two traits: a fundamental rejection of the democratic state and its values, institutions, and procedures (anti-democracy), and the rejection of the fundamental principle of human equality (anti-constitutionalism). Backes (2007) agrees, stating that political extremism can be categorized according to a group's idea of civil equality which in turn constitutes the ethical foundation of the present constitutional state and the regulations governing civil liberty. Friedrich (1950) elaborates that the building of the modern constitutional state is based on the merging of democracy and constitutionalism. These two dimensions can be combined into the four typical ideal forms as seen in Figure 1 outlined by Backes (2007).

Figure 1: (Anti-)Democracy and (Anti-)Constitutionalism Combined

Carter (2005) explains that what defines a group as *extreme-right* is not its relative position on the left-right political spectrum, but rather its fundamental rejection of democratic (right-wing) and constitutional (extremism) order. Right-wing extremists prefer the ideology of nationalism, seeking to harmonize the cultural and political units of their country in order to advance a monocultural and uniform relationship between the nation and the state. This quest for the return of individual values has resulted in the RWE ideology exhibiting a core of anti-establishment, xenophobic and ethno-nationalist populism (Rydgren, 2018). In addition to nationalism, a second ideological characteristic of RWE is authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005). Groups with the RWE frames of anti-egalitarianism and anti-democracy often display acts of aggressive behaviour towards political opponents and ethnos, religious and gender minorities (Caiani, Della Porta & Wagemann, 2012).

Therefore, with these factors considered, Carter (2018:174) advances a minimal definition for RWE that this study will subscribe to: "an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism". This definition is judged adequate as it is sufficiently comprehensive to reflect essential features, but also practical enough to apply within different contexts. It is not verbose yet contains enough utility for one to categorize longstanding members of the extreme-right, new arrivals, or possible future additions accurately.

Two links arising from this definition are worth mentioning. Firstly, there is a distinctive link between nationalism and anti-democracy. Right-wing extremists believe their community is

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fundamentally in danger; therefore, the only way to save it is through anti-democratic means and the subsequent submission of individual desires to the needs of the community (Carter, 2018). Similarly, there is a link between authoritarianism and nationalism. In order to respect and protect the concept of the community as an organic entity that has criteria which validate membership, a hierarchy of respect, order, and discipline (essentially submission) must be instilled (Carter, 2018). Therefore, any groups not subscribing to the characteristics of the community must be treated with hostility and aggression (Mudde, 2007). It is an authoritarianism that is anti-democratic in nature (Carter, 2018:175), and does not always, but certainly can, lead to violence (Mudde, 2007).

2.2.3 Identifiable Characteristics

It is important to note that the following characteristics stem predominantly from literature covering far-right political parties. However, Minkenberg (2003) builds on his previous work by showing that the political parties, social movements, smaller groups, and socio-cultural fringes of the extreme-right all form part of an ideological core. All these factors can be seen as parts of an interconnected and interrelated system generating collective action in line with the core ideology. The definitions of the following characteristics are attributed to the work done by Carter (2018) who selected and examined 15 definitions put forward by authoritative scholars and have been influential in previous works. In addition, although most of them stem from studies relating to Western European political parties, some works do focus on demographics abroad such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

2.2.3.1 The Strong State

Heinisch (2003) argues that within the contemporary forms of the extreme-right, there is a characteristic that demands the state to be authoritarian in nature. This manifests in rhetoric and policy centred around law and order which is primarily aimed at protecting the state. Common targets regarded as enemies of the state are immigrants, asylum seekers, criminals, political opponents, and critics. This argument is complemented by Mudde's (1995) definition which describes the strong state as: "a collective noun for sub-features that have to do with a strengthened repressive function of the state" which centres on the axis of militarism, and law and order to "reassert traditional values, such as law and order, authority, community, work, and family" (Copsey, 2008). Similarly, although not explicitly mentioning the term "strong state", Mudde (2007) followed up his 1995 study with a more contemporary definition which

includes authoritarianism as: "A belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely". Likewise, Rydgren (2005) describes the "sociocultural authoritarianism" of the extreme-right and how that consists of themes relating to law and order.

2.2.3.2 Nationalism

Minkenberg (2003:151) asserts that the extreme-right is comprised of the:

> Myth of a homogeneous nation that puts the nation before the individual and his/her civil rights [and that] is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, other cultural and political criteria of exclusion, to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation, and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity.

This is similar to Mudde's (1995:209) definition of nationalism as: "A political doctrine that proclaims the congruence of the political unit, the state, and the cultural unit, the nation". Eatwell (2000:412-413) argues that what unites parties on the far-right is an 'holistic nationalism' which comprises: "An ethnic conception of the nation [and one that] stresses conversion, expulsion or worse of the 'Other' and the defence of a traditional conception of community". Copsey (2008:80) agrees, arguing that far-right fascist political parties offer a moderate (yet illiberal) form of ethnocentric nationalism. In addition, Mudde (2007:19) identifies "nativism" as the specific brand of nationalism which far-right parties subscribe to. This form of nationalism asserts that states: "Should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007:19). Furthermore, Schain, Zolberg and Hossay (2002), Hainsworth (2008), and Skenderovic (2009) mention some version of ethnic (and hence discriminatory) nationalism within their descriptions of RWE.

2.2.3.3 Racism and Xenophobia

When constructing policies, attitudes of racism and/or xenophobia often perfectly accompany rhetoric of exclusionary nationalism and cultural homogeneity. These beliefs of homogeneity are often advocated on grounds of biological essentialism, that is, there are naturally occurring biological differences between groups of people which are irreconcilable. Therefore, these different groups should not mix (an example is the doctrine of racism). This is important to note as the notions of racism or xenophobia might not be explicitly mentioned by contemporary

extreme-right groups; however exclusionary rhetoric is still promoted and validated because non-natives are seen as a threat to the homogeneity of the host community (Carter, 2018). This falls perfectly in line with Mudde's (1995:213) definition of xenophobia as: "Fear, hate or hostility regarding 'foreigners'". Heinisch (2003:95) agrees, stating that the great anti-egalitarian concern about "racial and ethnic categories" makes racism a core principle of the extreme-right.

Moreover, Mudde (1995:211) explains that racism has always shown up in its traditional form with the: "Belief in natural and hereditary differences between races, with the central belief that one race is superior to the others". However, contemporary racism has evolved into a narrative centred around cultural incompatibility rather than racial hierarchy. Minkenberg (2000) contributes to this notion, asserting that within the extreme-right, a move is occurring away from biological racism to culturalism or "ethnopluralism". The extreme-right does not believe in compatibility between different ethnicities and cultures; thereby advocating for Europeans to reject cultural mixing and sustain the right to be different. This subsequently manifests in "a politically enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities according to geographical criteria, a global apartheid". Rydgren (2005:433) agrees, showing how the extreme-right believes: "Mixing of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction".

This allows extreme-right groups to advocate for xenophobic and racist notions without running the risk of being labelled as racist by the public (Rydgren, 2005). Minkenberg (2000:180) explains that notions of "ethnopluralism" act as a counter-model to concepts such as multiculturalism, immigration, and integration. Immigrants and asylum seekers are framed as external threats; harsh legislation acts as a necessary means to protect the nation's security and ethnos (Heinisch, 2003; Givens, 2005). Hostility towards foreigners and xenophobia are, in fact, the most listed characteristics found within the descriptions and definitions under review (Carter, 2018).

2.2.3.4 Anti-Democracy

In literature, agreement on anti-democracy rests on Betz's argument that the extreme-right demonstrate: "Rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system" (Betz, 1994:4). Particularly disturbing for the extreme-right are those values present within a pluralistic and liberal democracy, along with the institutions and procedures sustaining these values (Carter, 2018). Therefore, Minkenberg (2003) and Mudde (2007) describe right-wing

radicalism as a system of beliefs directed against liberal and pluralist democracy, its underlying values of freedom and equality, and the related categories of individualism and universalism. Betz and Johnson (2004:312) assert that extreme-right parties actively engage in: "An aggressive discourse that directly aims at weakening and undermining the values and institutional arrangements and procedures central to liberal democracy". Ignazi (1992) argues that the contemporary extreme-right is anti-system due to opposition to institutions and procedures promoting and safeguarding political pluralism, along with their attitudes towards individual and social equality. Therefore, they constantly seek to undermine it. Carter (2005:22) agrees, stating that: "If anti-system is taken to mean behaviour or values that undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system, the parties in question are clearly parties that display anti-system tendencies".

2.2.3.5 Populism and Anti-Establishment Rhetoric

Betz (1994:4) emphasizes that extreme-right parties consistently use and weaponize "diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment". Minkenberg (2001:3) describes their dramatization of the "vulnerability of the nation in times of a real or presumed crisis", along with Betz and Johnson's (2004:312) description of their ability to "mobilize on political discontent". In addition, Schain *et al.* (2002:8) describes extreme-right parties as appealing to, and speaking on behalf of, "the ordinary people" and as being "against the corrupt and unrepresented political class".

Worth mentioning is the relationship between fascism, populism, and RWE. "Generic fascism" is a right-wing ideology built upon the displacement of man through the breaking of social communitarian bonds caused by individualization, mechanization, and materialism (Sasso, 1998). Therefore, the only true and legitimate freedom is found within the state when the individual feels: "Beating in his heart the superior interest of the community and the sovereign will of the State" (Gentile, 1925:52). This construction of an "ethical state" has manifested into ideologies such as Nazism and is a key reference within the ideological traditions of the right (Ignazi, 2006). However, contemporary RWE does not hold a commitment to neo-fascism and brandishes characteristics opposing pluralism, the universal idea of equality as a fundamental human right and, in certain instances, promotes collective authority as more important than individual authority (Ignazi, 2006).

2.3 How Does Right-Wing Extremism Manifest?

2.3.1 Operationalization of Radicalization

With extremism comes the process of radicalization into the ideology. Therefore, there is value, when assessing the landscape of RWE within various societal groups, in having an operational definition of radicalization/recruitment. Veldhuis and Staun (2009:4) discuss two different pathways for framing radicalization. The first focus is on violent radicalization, where the active emphasis of operations is on the explicit use of violence to achieve the organization's intended outcomes. The second applies a more general focus where: "Emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals".

There is value in studying both violent and non-violent extremism, especially within the context of RWE. Firstly, focusing only on either violent or non-violent extremism may lead to selection bias, obstructing one's ability to make legitimate statements about causality. To analyze variables relating to violent extremism, one must analyze how they relate to outcomes of non-violent extremism. For one can argue that the causal mechanisms which influence people to participate in non-violent extremism (the attitude and behavioural change) are the same as the factors that cause participation in violent extremism. Therefore, by analyzing causal factors that influence both violent and non-violent extremism, one can gain a critical insight into the link that turns non-violent radicalization into violent outcomes (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Therefore, Borum (2011) lists several definitions from state security agencies. For the purposes of this study, four are found to be of value due to their specific focus on key areas of contemporary radicalization. Firstly, the Dutch Security Service (2005:11) frames their definition in accordance with an active pursuit of disrupting the status quo as a: "Growing readiness to pursue and/or support — if necessary, by undemocratic means — far reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order". Secondly, McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) study is useful due to their inclusion of how dynamics within a group form several mechanisms for radicalization. They describe it as: "Increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008:416).

Thirdly, this is complemented by Wilner and Dubouloz (2010:38) who suggest that when extremism occurs within a person's home environment, it often undergoes a process of "transformative learning" that suggests:

> Radicalization is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour.

Lastly, Crossett and Spitaletta (2010:10) provide a broad definition, attempting to cover the general sociological and psychological tenets of radicalization. They define it as: "The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)".

2.3.2 Radicalization through Social Movement Theory

Radicalization into violent action, or at least being sympathetic to it, is a dynamic process consisting of multiple pathways, and each individual pathway is affected by its own set of variables. Therefore, through this approach, radicalization is not viewed as the consequence of a single decision, but rather as the outcome of a dialectical process which slowly and gradually pushes an individual to becoming more reluctant to accept violence (McCormick, 2003). One of the most promising methods of radicalization analysis is *social movement theory* (SMT).

Zald and McCarthy (1987:2) define a social movement as: "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society". The earliest conceptualization of this is *strain theory* which asserts that due to strained environmental conditions, individuals would become more susceptible to movements due to the collective behaviour occurring as a result of that environment. It is the passive submission over time to these overwhelming social forces that leads to individuals joining a movement (Borum, 2011).

However, contemporary SMT shows us that increasing numbers of strategic and rational operations are occurring. RWE needs growth to survive. Lost members must be replenished to keep the movement alive, and new members must be added to continuously spread the ideology. Therefore, the following tasks are necessary: forming mobilization potential, forming

recruitment networks, arousing motivation to participate and removing barriers to participation (Borum, 2011). For this reason, SMT provides us with concepts to use which hold tremendous utility. Specifically, SMT asserts that political opportunities instead of social threats, organizational resources instead of grievances, and frame analysis instead of ideology are important in conceptualizing radicalization (Caiani *et al.,* 2012). This study will draw on the *political opportunity structure* and how that subsequently feeds into *frame analysis.*

The first source of influence for RWE is the *political opportunity* structure. This consists of the formal political institutions forming the governance structure of a country, in addition to the informal political culture of the country (Kriesi, 1989). The political context of a country is crucial for the rise of a right-wing extremist movement. As Caiani *et al.* (2012:11) explains: "Stable institutional characteristics such as the functional and territorial distribution of powers, as well as the contingent shift in the configuration of allies and opposition, have emerged time and again as important independent variables in explaining social movements' development". As social movements have political influence, they are sensitive to the range of access they have to formal institutional power (Caiani *et al.,* 2012). However, for the purposes of this study, access to formal institutional power does not form the primary focus.

The primary focus on the political opportunity structure will take place within the informal cultural aspect. Known as *discursive opportunities* within the political opportunity structure, these play a crucial role in facilitating the radicalization process through the normalization of extremist beliefs within mainstream public discourse. Closed access to political power sometimes takes the form of the "pressure cooker theory". As Ravndal (2018:20) explains, when: "Radical right parties obtain substantial support followed by political influence, they may function as a 'safety valve', releasing pressure from dissatisfied radical right activists who may otherwise have turned to violence". By contrast, when access to political decision-making is limited, engaging in violent protest becomes a more attractive option.

Therefore, scholars of social movement theory employ the concept of *discursive opportunities* to describe the exploitation of issues that are temporarily "hot" and are used to build a thematization of certain issues. This political resonance can comprise of historically rooted cultural characteristics, strategies formulated to counter opponents, and current conditions of a country's social, political, and cultural fabric (Kriesi, Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995). This predominantly occurs within the public sphere through the communication of messages by

social movement activists to fellow members and potential recruitments. This is crucial in the attainment of information relating to the actions and reactions of authorities, upcoming political opportunities, along with the movements of allies and sympathizers. The communication of these messages, along with reactions by several third-party actors (such as the media), have the capacity to increase or decrease violence (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004).

Therefore, the analysis of these messages is extremely valuable in understanding the dominant ideologies of these right-wing extremist groups, and which issues affect them most. Therefore, the second aspect of social movement theory which will be utilized in this study is *frame analysis*. Frame analysis can be described as: "the dominant worldviews that guide the behaviour of social movements groups" (Caiani *et al.,* 2012:13). To mobilize followers and encourage different forms of action, which can include violence, leaders of social movements create narratives, or collective action frames. Literature indicates that frames can be divided into three categories: *diagnostic, prognostic* and *motivational.*

Diagnostic frames recognize certain occurrences to be in line with crucial societal problems; prognostic frames develop the strategies to tackle these issues, and motivational frames create the incentives for acting on this knowledge (Caiani *et al.,* 2012). The framing succeeds when the target audience perceives the framing as legitimate and incredibly important (Benford & Snow, 2000). In these cases:

> Core narratives produced by a movement resonate with the targeted individuals' conceptions of reality, creating incentives for mobilization and action. Furthermore, successful framing is more likely to occur when a movement's collective action frames resonate with existing master frames, or general orientations embedded in the broader society (Caiani *et al.,* 2012: 79-81).

2.3.3 The Causes of Contemporary Radicalization

As previously mentioned, the rise of RWE in countries relies on contextual factors specific to that region. Much of the literature has focused on how these groups have gained popularity in Europe and North America. Significant features include Eatwell's (2005) five demand and five supply side theories explaining the rise of the extreme-right in Europe. Ignazi (2006) asserts that post-industrialism generated outcomes of: "The weakening of state (and national) authority, the erosion of traditional social bonds, the perceived collapse of conventional moral standards, and the waning of an ordered, hierarchical, homogeneous, and safe society", which

subsequently fueled the need for self-defence and self-reassurance. Lastly, Mudde (2019) places the causes of RWE in contemporary society on four debates centring around protesting the established political parties versus support for extreme-right ideas, economic anxiety versus fear of multiculturism, local motivations versus global encouragement and leader incentives versus organizational appeal.

All these frameworks have utility; however, Piazza (2017) manages to combine all these factors into a simple three-part framework when explaining the motivators for right-wing terrorism. Despite the study being centred around the United States, the three motivators can be effectively applied to the South African context, to identify accurately why RWE is emerging and persisting. The three motivators are: *economic grievance, societal change,* and *political resentment.*

Piazza (2017:53-54) explains that *economic grievance* centres around the feelings of hopelessness, anger, fear, and frustration experienced during economic hardship, which can easily be manipulated by right-wing extremist movements. *Societal change* speaks to the greater inclusion and empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups leading to a loss of previously held privileges within society. Therefore, a rise in groups resorting to violence results from the changing political, social, and economic competition for dominance within the context of demographic and social change. Lastly, *political resentment* involves the perceptions of government and mainstream political systems. Central to extreme-right ideology for decades have been the perceptions of government overreach, tyrannical governance, and unaccountability for mismanagement.

2.4 Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism

History shows us that the far-right tends to flourish in times of crisis. Portelinha and Elcheroth (2016) assert that periods of collective uncertainty are essential for changing the perceptions of social norms. Therefore, no better foundation was laid for the radicalization described above, than the three major worldwide crises of the early twenty-first century. Firstly, the foundation of hostility towards 'the other' was laid by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and beyond. This was then further built upon by the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis. This rapidly saw an increase in the urge to resort to nativism and xenophobia among those worst impacted, as scapegoats for the social and economic insecurity caused by neo-liberal policy failure were sought (Mudde, 2019). Finally, the emergence of the European Refugee Crisis in

2015 saw the opportunity for another re-emergence of right-wing extremism: new Islamophobic narratives combined with older ones originating from the 'War of Terror' which drive xenophobia against asylum seekers and reject European cooperation in the form of Brexit (Campion & Poynting, 2021).

In addition, the evolving political climate of the US has contributed to the mainstream acceptance of right-wing extremist frames, resulting in a contribution to the global wave of RWE that has had impacts on a multitude of countries across the globe. The election of President Obama, in tandem with the economic recession, was used as a key recruitment and propaganda tool by the extreme-right (Auger, 2020). Moreover, the election of President Trump and his presidency characterized by anti-immigration rhetoric against Muslims and Hispanics, conspiracy theories such as the Birther movement, and anti-democratic sentiment echoed by his questioning of the US electoral process, served as key developments in the mainstreaming of once fringe extremist beliefs (Barkun, 2017).

2.4.1 The Fourth Wave of Right-Wing Extremism

What these highly consequential events have allowed RWE to do is to evolve into a heterogenous "fourth wave" which distinguishes itself from the RWE of old through the mainstream nature of the ideology (Mudde, 2019). An ideology that was once left to the fringes after 1945 has seen a rejuvenation; managing to infiltrate political parties and legislative debates of Western democracies. This has seen many countries record a sharp increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme-right activity due to an increase in the electoral successes of right-wing parties in parliamentary elections, the successful recruitment of new members and (both violent and non-violent) protest actions by right-wing activists (Caiani *et al*, 2012).

Importantly, political success cannot be regarded as the sole barometer for the legitimate spread of ideas within mainstream political discourse. Since the inception of the liberal democratic hegemony after the conclusion of World War II (WWII), the extreme-right has realized that its revival is related to cultural power superseding political power; an idea employed most notoriously by former campaign advisor to President Trump: Steve Bannon. Therefore, the survival of the extreme-right is not based on a task that can ever be completed, but rather hinges on maintaining a conducive context with the help of mainstream actors (politicians, the media, academics). This allowed a discursive reconstruction in the 1990s and early 2000s which allowed extreme-right ideas to gain increasing influence over media and public discourse. This

heralded a time, beginning in the mid-2010s, where extreme-right ideas started occupying positions in government and broader society (Mondon & Winter, 2020).

This is what is meant by the mainstreaming of extremism: the process by which previously regarded extreme ideas are normalized as part of the acceptable spectrum of beliefs within the democratic arena. Therefore, in contexts such as political speeches, the media, and a variety of cultural settings, extreme ideas are accepted as normal and rational. This results in normal people encountering extremist beliefs more frequently in their everyday lives, making right-wing extremist engagements more fluid and frequent, opening channels of access to a growing sector of the population. This assists in the growing of RWE globally, since an increasing number of people can be radicalized towards violence and a concomitant decrease in the likelihood that alarms about their efforts will be raised by the public. The mainstreaming of RWE reduces the barrier to entry and broadens the base of sympathizers (Miller-Idriss, 2020).

Key to this is the digital online space as a tool to normalize right-wing extremist ideals within the contemporary fourth wave. Gerbaudo (2019) writes that the growth of "digital parties" reflects a society showing increasingly deep rifts. More specifically, it reflects a new social cleavage of "New Left" supporters being more secular and open to cultural diversity, whilst right-wing supporters are in favour of cultural conservatism. This reflects the profound transformation which society underwent during the Great Recession of 2008 and the diffusion of social media, apps, data, and personal devices through the 'digital revolution'. Therefore, Conway, Scrivens and Macnair (2019) report that the extreme-right have eagerly adopted the fast pace of the online world, being adaptive to new spaces and harnessing new tools with relative ease; often being the 'early adopters' of new internet services. Despite the role the internet has played in a variety of right-wing extremist acts, the online presence of the extreme-right keeps growing, with many RWE websites and forums existing for decades along with an ever-changing and growing variety of new platforms.

Aside from recruitment into groups, Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019) report that the largest threat from the online far-right are attacks by lone wolf agents or small autonomous cells. Perpetrators have a known history of being radicalized on unregulated online forums, being swept up in an online subculture mainly operational on sites such as 4chan and 8chan. Such forums have become a fertile breeding-ground for lone far-right extremists. Examples of the consequences of this form of online radicalization include the car bombing of a Norwegian government building and the massacre of teenagers at a summer camp committed by Anders Breivik in

2011, which in total resulted in the deaths of 77 people (Townsend & McVeigh, 2011); and the New Zealand Mosque shooting in 2019 which saw 51 Muslims gunned down (Coaston, 2019). As devastating as these incidents are, this study will not focus on lone wolf actors within the South African context. Rather, this study will focus on the extreme-right as a social movement, and its various group manifestations within SA

Moreover, especially concerning about the rise of the digital extreme-right is the focus on the recruitment of young people. Groups require older members to maintain leadership and ideology; however, young people are disproportionately affected. Younger people are more susceptible to being impulsive and taking risks as they develop their own identity, along with being the main drivers of modern-day communication and culture (Miller-Idriss, 2020). Therefore, a concerted effort by extreme-right groups to politicize youth spaces such as concerts, festivals, online platforms, and youth-oriented events has been seen. Several studies have indicated the link between youth engagement in right-wing extremist groups and attitudes of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism.

Notable examples are van der Valk's (2014) study on Dutch young people and how political ideas based on ethnic prejudice are more significant than political ideals when engaging in right-wing extremist movements. The second example worth mentioning is Miller-Idriss's (2018) work on the growing involvement of young people in Aryan nationalism and anti-government militias and hate groups (such as the Proud Boys, Three Percenters or Oathkeepers) in the US. Lastly, and most prominently, Feischmidt and Paulay (2017), and Pirro and Róna's (2019) studies show the mobilization of extreme-right young people being carried out by Jobbik (a far-right Hungarian political party) who effectively invested in the grassroots mobilization of the young, uniting various far-right subcultures under one organizational umbrella. National rock music plays a significant role, instilling a sense of pride and identity in Hungarian young people through the rhetoric of Hungary being under threat by alien forces such as globalization, foreign powers, the Roma and occasionally Jewish people (Róna, 2019).

Cachalia and Schoeman (2017) explain that the targeted recruitment of young people is especially concerning within a country like SA which boasts the highest unemployment level among the young, and the highest levels of youth dissatisfaction in the world. Fueled by high levels of poverty and an inability to access any meaningful resources, marginalization is increasing amongst young people due to the lack of social and economic transformation since the collapse of Apartheid, which primarily drives feelings of betrayal and mistrust within the

young. This is further aggravated by a young population that is lacking in adequate education, skills, and employment (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017).

2.4.2 The Organization of the Fourth Wave

Recruitment into the extreme-right can come in a variety of forms with various methods of reaching the desired outcomes (Borum, 2011). The way the contemporary right organizes itself ranges in size, influence, issue/s of concern, intellect, and attitudes towards violence. Even in organizational structure, the extreme-right is extremely heterogeneous. Some groups resemble formal institutions such as political parties, whilst others have more informal structures, such as gangs (Gattinara & Pirro, 2019).

Mudde (2019) provides an appropriate framework for the contemporary structure of the extreme-right. It must be remembered that the organization of the extreme-right is continuously temporal and forever evolving. Therefore, by the time this study is published, some of the classifications may be outdated. However, the framework is still useful as a method of engaging with the organizational roles of extreme-right groups. The three organizational forms of the extreme-right are: *political parties, social movements, and subcultures*. These will serve as organizational categorizations for the extreme-right in SA. As Mudde (2019:65) explains: "…political parties run for elections, social movement organizations do not, and while parties and social movement organizations are reasonably well-organized groups, subcultures are not".

2.4.2.1 Political Parties

To describe them simply: political parties are groups which, in elections, contest for public office. What is important to note is that extreme-right parties are not just competing in elections at a greater frequency than in the past, but are also being elected with larger majorities, with some authors even calling it the fastest growing party family globally (Golder, 2016). These parties are also subject to the heterogenous nature of contemporary RWE, with differences in size, ideology, and demographic targeting present (Mudde, 2019). These parties are leader-centric, highly centralized, and rarely democratize in a legitimate manner (Mudde, 2019). In addition, extreme-right parties do not necessarily spring up due to social movements. Rather, activity in multiple spheres of contestation is regarded as non-mutually exclusive, therefore formation occurs due to strategic and contingent considerations within appropriate contextual opportunities (Gattinara & Pirro, 2019). Therefore, one is seeing a rise in extreme-right political activity in countries with an already strong nativist presence and relevance (Mudde,

2016b) and those which have not had a strong far-right movement post-WWII, thereby contributing to a general political shift to nativist policy and discourse (Pirro, 2015).

2.4.2.2 Social Movement Organisations

The extreme-right manifests outside political parties as well, with a variety of organizations ranging from well-established, highly-structured, and incredibly popular organizations to those so small that they barely occupy a one-bedroomed apartment. Often, these organizations act as structure and permanence to larger social movements. Contemporary organizations can be grouped into three categories. First, *intellectual organizations* are constructed to develop and innovate extreme-right ideas used to educate the public. Second, *media organizations* are created to effectively spread extreme-right messaging across various platforms. Third, *political organizations* are formed to spread political influence but not to contest in elections (Mudde, 2019).

Considering that collective action is the sum of individual behaviour, these social movement organizations are often the manifestation of individual feelings of deprivation, with action arising from a wide range of frustrated expectations (Caiani & Della Porta, 2018). Tarrow (1994) elaborates on this, showing that economic and social crises have often acted as determinants for the emergence and development of radical-right movements and organizations (Prowe, 2004). In addition, political instability and allies in the system have shown mobilizing power (Koopmans, 2005), along with a history of authoritarianism, (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passay, 2005; Mudde, 2007), interactions with subcultures (Bjørgo, 1995) and integration of xenophobic rhetoric within a society's collective psyche (Rydgren, 2005, 2012).

2.4.2.3 Subcultures

Mudde (2019:74) describes subcultures as: "Groups within the larger national culture that share an identity, values, practices, and cultural objects. Within a subculture, people's common identity is based upon a perceived similar culture (including ideas and symbols) rather than an institutional affiliation". This represents a relevant space for counter-cultural and anti-systemic groups aimed at overcoming decades of liberal order, along with political movements pursuing activist, ideological and metapolitical goals (Griffin, 2003). It is important to note that it is not necessarily always true that subcultures lack some sort of formal institution. For example, within the far-right national rock subculture in Hungary there are several festivals, groups and radio stations that bind the group together (Feischmidt & Paulay, 2017; Pirro & Róna, 2019).

These groups have always been a part of the far-right non-party sector (Veugelers & Menard, 2018). However, research indicates that new subcultures are developing predominantly within the online space (Mudde, 2016a).

2.5 Theoretical Framework and Notable Examples of The Fourth Wave

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the extreme-right has shown itself to be heterogeneous, with extreme-right movements manifesting in various countries with multiple theories about their definitions, contextual formations, applications, and actions. Therefore, this study draws on the global literature on RWE to form a chosen framework that will serve as an effective theoretical guide for identifying the various forms of RWE in SA and the determinants for their creation. This framework will be listed and applied to four countries that stand out in research depth regarding contemporary RWE: the US, the UK, Germany, and Australia. These countries have been selected based on the quantity of publications released, their prevalence within Western democracies, extensive media coverage and preference for producing publications in English. Therefore, before embarking on a description and analysis of SA, it is valuable to see how this framework manifests in other countries where RWE is prevalent.

First, to ascertain whether a group falls within the right-wing extremist ideology, or adjacent to it, one needs a clear definition and characteristics. The definition used in this study is derived from Carter (2018) and states that RWE is: "An ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism". Carter (2018) also lists characteristics of right-wing extremist ideology as: a strong state, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, anti-democracy, and populism and anti-establishment rhetoric.

Within the US, right-wing extremist characteristics are predominantly centred around racism, xenophobia, rule of law and anti-establishment rhetoric (Jackson, 2019; Rehman, 2017); ignited by President Trump's distinctly nationalist and xenophobic 'America First' campaign (Mondon & Vaughn, 2021; Parmar & Furse, 2021). RWE in the UK takes issue with the rising levels of immigration (McAlexander, 2020) and therefore adopts radical policies revolving around immigration (xenophobia), authoritarianism (strong state), and traditionalism (nationalism) (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Similarly, Australian RWE sees Asian immigration as a threat to the Australian national identity, thereby boasting xenophobic and nationalistic characteristics (Campion, 2019a; McSwiney, 2021). German RWE derives inspiration from

aspects of historical German nationalism (Backes & Jesse, 1996; Botsch, 2012) which boasts Nazi-era characteristics of authoritarian forms of government, chauvinist attitudes, trivialization of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and social Darwinism (Decker, 2019; Rucht, 2018; Decker, Kiess & Brähler, 2022).

Secondly, the actions exhibiting these characteristics form an important boundary for this study when determining the scope of research. Ideological components will be measured through the selected application of SMT. To identify extreme-right behaviour, discursive opportunities used to convey right-wing extremist messaging (Kriesi *et al.,* 1995) and the frame alignment used to formulate the desired extremist worldview will be analyzed (Caiani *et al.,* 2012).

In the US, discursive moments of racism and xenophobia predominately occur in white counties where elites play the discursive "ethnic card" to shift electoral outcomes (Nemeth & Hansen, 2021). This has resulted in the mainstreaming of right-wing extremist beliefs, as they are now commonly accepted in public and political discourse (Mondon & Winter, 2020). Similar to the case in the US, Australian right-wing extremists use ethnocentric and structural discursive opportunities to romanticize a nostalgic and imagined frame of the past which they can return to through the elevation of the white identity and enforced notions of the threat of multiculturism (Campion, 2019b). This has taken place predominantly in the online space (Hutchinson, Amarasingam, Scrivens & Ballsun-Stanton, 2021) and is mainstreaming right-wing extremist discourse in Australian society (Maddox, 2014).

The main ideological currents present in the UK are the frames of Neo-Nazism, anti-Islam and anti-immigration movements, identitarian movements, and ultranationalism and neo-fascism (Pauwels, 2021). Like the US, the growth of these movements can be largely attributed to the growth of the increasingly ungovernable online space (Zedner, 2021). In addition, the weaponization of the COVID-19 pandemic by extremist groups, especially online, has further bolstered participation in right-wing extremist activity (Davies, Wu & Frank, 2021; Pantucci & Ong, 2021).

In Germany, groups seek discursive opportunities from aspects of historical German nationalism, the "conservative revolution", and *völkish* frames of the state based on biological and/or cultural racism. This creates a modern frame of older ideologies combined with new ideological fragments driven by societal changes such as ethnopluralism, Islamophobia, 'white

power' (Backes & Jesse, 1996; Botsch, 2012) and Nazi-era narratives of economic growth (Decker, 2019).

Thirdly, an effective grouping structure that is wide enough to cover all the diverse manifestations of RWE in SA but also specific enough to clearly categorize different groups, must be identified. Mudde's (2019) contemporary grouping of RWE holds the most utility. Through the identification of political parties, social movement organizations and subcultures, every manifestation of right-wing extremist ideology can be placed within a specific group to determine what forms of organization are most prevalent.

RWE in the US predominantly takes place within political organizations such as white supremacist organizations, anti-government fringe groups such as QAnon and the Boogaloo Movement and anti-government militias such as the Proud Boys, Oathkeepers and Three Percenters (Pantucci & Ong, 2021). The US is also home to one of the most prominent far-right media organizations: Stormfront (Mudde, 2019), which advances the "alt-right" online subculture.

In the UK, the focal point is National Action, a small political organization that was, in 2016, the first extreme-right group to be banned and categorized as a terrorist organization in the UK since 1940 (Macklin, 2019). Similar organizations are the English Defence League and Britain First (Taylor, 2010; Townsend, 2017). In addition, the UK is home to multiple neo-Nazi political organizations including Blood & Honor and the violent Combat 18 (Jones, Doxsee & Harrington, 2020), and the Islamophobic, racist and xenophobic football hooligan subculture (Mudde, 2019).

Australia has extreme-right political parties such as One Nation, the Conservative National Party and Yellow Vet Alliance who share links with militant street-level political organizations such as the Australian Soldiers of Odin (McSwiney, 2021). Violent political organizations manifest in idiosyncratic, single-issue forms such as the Australian version of Sovereign Citizens (Dean, Bell & Vakhitova, 2016), New Guard and Australia First Movement (McSwiney, 2021).

In Germany, extreme-right groups take the form of political parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany and Alternative for Germany. They are supported by political organizations such as the Identarian Movement and the Patriotic Europeans Against the

Islamification of the Occident, and media organizations such as *Junge Freheit* (Young Freedom) (Klikauer, 2018; Mudde, 2019).

Lastly, a framework of cause must be implemented to answer *why* RWE is prevalent in post-Apartheid SA and showing variance. Multiple structures of determinants are present within the literature; however, Piazza's (2017) three-part framework of social change, economic hardship and political resentment provides the most value. These determinants are sufficiently comprehensive to be easily applicable within a multifaceted society like SA and to provide flexibility of use.

In the US, political resentment towards a perceived corrupt and tyrannical government and social change due to the loss of white, male privilege are the largest drivers of RWE (Stevenson, 2019; Piazza, 2017). In the UK, social change through rising immigration and multiculturalism as well as political resentment drawn from pro-immigration and pro-Covid lockdown politicians are fueling the surge of RWE (Townsend, 2017; Davies, Wu & Frank, 2021). Within Australia, the social change of immigration and multiculturalism which is diluting the traditional white Australian identity is the main driver of RWE. A secondary priority is political resentment driven by anti-elite and anti-establishment characteristics (McSwiney, 2021). In Germany, far-right electoral support is primarily driven by the social change of immigration and multiculturalism, and the economic hardship imposed by neo-liberalism (Klikauer, 2018).

2.6 South African Contemporary Literature

Literature on the contemporary presence of the extreme-right in SA is sparse. What is present, however, is extensive literature on the formation and development of the white Afrikaner identity within SA, and how it influenced political parties and their policy choices. The evolution of this identity through the period of democratic transition and in the initial years of post-Apartheid South Africa is documented (du Toit, 1991; Grobbelaar, Bekker & Evans, 1989; Schönteich, 2004; Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003; van Rooyen, 1994; Visser, 2007; Welsh, 1988, 1989, 1995; Zille, 1988). However, there is very little on the current influences and mobilization of extreme-right groups. A thorough history of extreme-right groups pre-1994 will be given in the following chapter, detailing the development of Afrikaner extremism and the emergence of non-white varieties of RWE.

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The book, *Politics and Society in South Africa,* (Glaser, 2001) does not directly confront far-right politics, but does describe the decline of a social order of legally institutionalized racial dominion, and the rise of capitalism. What is important to note is that the work identifies race, or the broader concept, ethnicity, as the largest issue of concern over every facet of post-Apartheid South Africa and its prospects. This is bolstered by Duckitt and Farre's (2001) study on right-wing authoritarianism and political intolerance amongst whites in majority-rule SA. They found that right-wing authoritarianism and anti-black prejudice is consistent with previous findings, and that political intolerance is central to the authoritarian mode of belief.

However, post-Apartheid literature does little in detailing right-wing extremist organization in SA. Notably Welsh's (1995) work on RWE details the terrorism acts enacted by Afrikaner militia groups and their eventual downfall. Schönteich and Boshoff (2003) released *Volk, Faith and Fatherland,* which provides an historical analysis of the development of the 'white right' in South Africa and how it grew from the formation of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1890s to the Boeremag terror attacks of 2002. This was further expanded in a report by Cachalia and Schoeman (2017) titled *Violent Extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat*. In this report, a small segment is dedicated to the far-right, but once again it predominantly focuses on the Boeremag. Verwey and Quayle (2012) show how the white Afrikaner identity is still constructed under the framework of being embattled and systemically oppressed. Although the stereotypes of the Afrikaner identity are rejected, key Apartheid ideology is still recycled, especially themes of black incompetence and whites under threat.

The latest work available at the time of this study indicating the divergence of the far-right from its traditional white-Afrikaner roots, is Dube's (2021) paper entitled: *Economic Ascendance is/as Moral Rightness: The New Religious Political Right in Post-apartheid South Africa.* The core argument of this paper is that a different form of far-right politics is emerging that breaks from white-nationalism but seeks appeal from the black and white middle-class and aspiring middle class. This brand of far-right ideology is economically neo-liberal, politically conservative, and religiously neo-Pentecostal. It concludes that traditional theories of populism based on race are important, and new varieties of far-right groups in SA are responding to the socio-economic 'crisis' situation in SA.

What is important to note is that previous literature on RWE in SA, mentioned above, has primarily focused on Afrikaner/white extremism, with little being written about the alternative forms that can arise. The traditional white/Afrikaner supremacist forms of RWE still exist and

will be discussed; however, for this study, a definition has been selected that is as inclusive as possible, which will serve to analyze right-wing extremist values within non-white groups as well. This study wishes to depoliticize the term 'non-white' from its Apartheid-era connotations and simply use it as a descriptive term for any form of RWE that is not centered around the white-supremacist ideology of Afrikaner ultranationalism. Therefore, this study is aimed at displaying the full variation of the right-wing extremist spectrum in SA, by analyzing various manifestations within different demographic groups.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter, drawing on the comprehensive literature available, laid the theoretical foundation for the case-study analysis of why RWE is prevalent in post-Apartheid SA, showing its various manifestations. The concept of RWE was operationalized, determining that it is, in fact, a distinctive ideology with identifiable characteristics. The nature of RWE was identified to be fluid and heterogenous in nature, comprising several forms throughout history. Social movement theory was determined to be the most appropriate framework for analyzing radicalization, with discursive opportunities and frame analysis identified as units of analysis. In addition, a framework for potential causes of radicalization into RWE was outlined: economic grievances, political resentment, and social change.

The contemporary wave of global RWE was found to be mainstream in nature, prominent within the digital space and effective at recruitment of the young. Group manifestation was seen in political parties, social movement organizations or subcultures. An analysis of South African RWE literature showed a primary focus on white/Afrikaner extremism, with major gaps in alternative manifestations and post-Apartheid activity. For this reason, this study is necessary in order to gain a full understanding of RWE in SA and to lay the foundation for further research into the specific groups, their recruitment strategies, organizational capacity, and potential for harm. Before embarking on this analysis, the study will be shown to be reliable and valid with a detailed research design and methodology outlined in the following chapter.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This study aims to undertake a thematic analysis of a variety of reliable open and secondary source data to, firstly, establish what types of right-wing extremism (RWE) are manifesting in South African society; and secondly, as a first step to further research into the subject, establish patterns and correlations relating to why RWE is emerging in post-Apartheid South Africa (SA). The design of the research will follow a single-case study design, and a qualitative desktop research methodology. The analysis of the data will be carried out by means of thematic analysis (TA) within a strict theoretical framework determining: the characteristics of right-wing extremist groups, their method of organization, the narratives used in recruitment, and what the potential determinants can be. To accomplish this, TA will be applied to various forms of secondary data which include news articles, public and privately produced reports, and existing books and journal articles relating to the specific characteristics of RWE; all occurring within a strict observation schedule. To ensure the validity and reliability of these sources, Scott's (1990:6) criteria of quality will be applied.

3.2 Research Design and Methodology

3.2.1 Research Philosophy

This study will follow the ontology of social constructivism, which asserts that the world is not quantifiable or measurable, but rather constructed by every experience faced by every facet and moment of a group's life (Allen, 2017). Further, it is the belief that reality is subjective and that universal truths cannot be ascertained because they must always be understood within the context in which they are found (Hays & Singh, 2012). This is beneficial for this study as the research objectives seek to understand how right-wing extremists perceive SA and how they create meaning based on their lived experiences, belief systems and social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

To complement the ontology of constructivism, this study will follow the epistemology of interpretivism. Based on the acknowledgement that social reality is constructed, this epistemology recognizes that there is no single, all-encompassing truth. Rather, reality is made up of multiple truths which are the products of human subjectivities. Therefore, reality is something to be interpreted as it is shaped by subjective experiences. Interpretivism conceptualizes human action as inherently meaningful, with these meanings being temporal,

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historically unfinished and processual. Therefore, contextual, and cultural specifics are key to understanding social phenomena (Kwame Harrison, 2014). This is beneficial to this study as the intended outcomes are focused on engaging with the specific and subjective realities of right-wing extremist groups in SA. The subjective reality meaningful to each specific right-wing extremist group must be analyzed as its own truth, to understand why members of the group are followers of that belief and willing to act on its behalf. Framing the study within a realm of objectivity will lead to bias within the analysis and obstruct the intended outcomes of the study.

3.2.2 Research Type

The relationship between theory and research, in this study, will be inductive by nature. With an inductive stance, the outcome of the research will be the theory. This process involves drawing generalizable influences from observations (Bryman, 2012). This occurs through observing the empirical world and then reflecting on what is taking place. It is an approach based on developing a theory that begins with legitimate empirical evidence and then works towards increasingly abstract concepts and theoretical relationships (Lawrence Neuman, 2014). This is appropriate for this study as very little is known about the extreme-right in SA. Therefore, an engagement with the empirical evidence must first take place to understand the constructions and interpretations of society within the minds of right-wing extremists. Following from that, conclusions about the theoretical relationships between the actors and the causes for their rise can be drawn.

The empirical evidence analyzed will be qualitative in nature. This is easily defined as information that uses natural language in its expression and is therefore not easily reduced to numbers. This is highly applicable to this study as the student is searching for information giving a deeper insight into the qualities of communication, language, social interactions, and meanings. These pieces of information are not numerical (or quantitative) but rather interpretations of the world we live in symbolized by parts of language, discourse, and actions (qualitative) (Allen, 2017). This holds great utility for this study as the overarching goal of qualitative research is the collection and examining of data with the aim of better understanding the subjective truths held by the participants in the study. It allows this study to engage deeply with the categories, processes, and rules of meaning management of the selective participants (Allen, 2017).

In addition, the research will follow a descriptive-exploratory purpose. Exploratory research is used when little is known about a topic, therefore researchers seek to become familiar with the basic facts, settings, and concerns. This is done with the intended outcome of creating a general mental picture of the conditions, generating new ideas and hypotheses, and paving the way for future research (Lawrence Neuman, 2014). Descriptive research is used when a well-developed idea about a social phenomenon is present, and subsequently the researcher wishes to describe it. Descriptive research takes a certain social setting, situation or relationship and seeks to paint a detailed picture of it. This is beneficial as descriptive and exploratory research merge together in practice and complement each other. A descriptive research purpose takes a well-defined issue or question, determined by exploratory research, and seeks to describe it accurately (Lawrence Neuman, 2014). This is appropriate as this study seeks to first explore how RWE is manifesting in SA within the contemporary wave of global RWE, and subsequently to describe the determinants of this rise.

3.2.3 Research Strategy

This study seeks to provide an original, deep, and systemic insight into South African RWE. It aims to facilitate the development of logical explanations and conclusions and does not aim to solve any practical problems. Based on this approach, this study can be categorized as basic research seeking to explain a phenomenon (Rajasekar, Philominathan & Chinnathambi, 2009). In addition, with its sole focus on SA, and the analysis of previously unknown forms of RWE in SA, this study will follow a single-case revelatory case study design.

Yin (2018) prescribes a two-fold definition for a case-study design which covers the *scope* and *features* of a case study. Firstly, the *scope* of a case study describes the empirical method that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 'case') in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident" (Yin, 2018:45). This is beneficial for the purposes of this study as a case study seeks to understand the real-world characteristics of RWE and assumes that this understanding is premised on pertinent contextual conditions relevant to a specific sub-group of the population (Yin & Davis, 2007).

Secondly, the *features* of a case study interact with a "technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points" (Yin, 2018:46). Therefore, the case study research design implements the advantage of using the "prior development of

theoretical propositions to guide design, data collection, and analysis" and relies upon the use of multiple sources of evidence to converge into meaningful conclusions about the concept being studied (Yin, 2018:46). Therefore, Stoecker (1991) describes the case study design as a research method that is an "all-encompassing mode of inquiry" which consists of its own design logic, data collection techniques and data analysis methods specific to the research design.

In short, a case study design can be summarized as research aimed at understanding the nature and complexity of the case in question (Stake, 1995). This is appropriate for the outcomes of this study as the concept of RWE has a variety of data points to take into consideration; can be prompted by several socio-economic factors and has a rich history of theoretical knowledge behind it. Through the combination of these three factors, a case study design allows this study to achieve the intensive examination of South African RWE as set out in the research question.

In addition, this study will follow structured observation (or systemic observation) to promote validity and reliability within the study of right-wing extremist behaviour. Structured observation is a method for systematically observing the behaviour of individuals in terms of a schedule of categories. Rules are constructed to determine what the behaviour should look like and how it should be recorded. (Bryman, 2012). The observation schedule of this study will have four distinct categories to group the behaviour of right-wing extremists in SA. The four categories will be (i) how they are grouped, (ii) the type of behaviour being studied, (iii) which characteristics are present within their behaviour and (iv) the potential determinants of this behaviour. These four categories are derived from previous studies on RWE and are explained in detail in the literature review. However, a short summary will be provided below and shown in Figure 2.

Derived from Mudde (2019), contemporary right-wing extremists are grouped together either as political parties, social movement organizations or subcultures. These groups, as defined by Carter (2018), have a combination of the following characteristics: strong state, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, anti-democracy, and populism and anti-establishment rhetoric. To measure actions, selected elements of social movement theory (SMT) will be employed. To communicate their ideology, groups will use discursive opportunities within the political opportunity structure (Kriesi, Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995) to construct a frame of the world

that recruits will be influenced to adopt (Caiani, della Porta & Wagemann, 2012). This can be motivated by economic grievances, social change, or political resentment (Piazza, 2017).

Grouping (Mudde, 2019)	Characteristics (Carter, 2018)	Actions (Kriesi *et al.,* 1995. & Caiani *et al.,* 2012)	Determinants (Piazza, 2017)
Political Parties	Strong State	Discursive Opportunities	Economic Grievance
Social Movement Organizations	Nationalism	Frame Analysis	Societal Change
Subcultures	Racism and Xenophobia		Political Resentment
	Anti-Democracy		
	Populism and Anti-Establishment Rhetoric		

Figure 2: Observation Schedule

3.2.4 Data Selection

This study will take the form of desktop research and will draw on secondary qualitative data derived from open and publicly accessible materials. These materials will comprise newspaper articles, private and publicly produced reports, academic journal articles and published books. Due to the subjective nature of qualitative research, a wide variety of sources will be consulted to draw from multiple perspectives so as to promote reliability and validity.

To ensure reliability, especially considering that this study will be engaging with a wide variety of qualitative sources, the quality of the documents consulted must be assessed. Therefore, Scott's (1990) criteria for assessing document quality will be employed. According to these criteria, four questions relating to the quality of the document must be asked. If the document meets the requirements raised by all four questions, it is deemed reliable. First, is the document authentic, coming from a genuine and unquestionable origin? Second, is the document credible, free from error and distortion? Third, is the document representative, containing evidence that

is typical of its kind and, if not, is the depth of its untypicality known? Lastly, does the document have meaning, is it clear and comprehensible in the presentation of its evidence?

3.2.5 Data Analysis Technique

The analysis technique of choice for this study is TA. TA looks for insight into communication through the identification of recognizable and recurring themes throughout the data. This technique can operate within a variety of communication contexts, thereby offering a comprehensive understanding of the overall experience of a message, series of interactions or communication events (Allen, 2017). The original data is still left intact to allow for explanation of context, whilst results can be categorized and organized, which in turn allows for the interpretation of various aspects of the research topic by grouping the data into themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Therefore, when searching for themes, the following concepts will be looked for: repetitions, indigenous typologies, metaphors, transitions, similarities and differences, linguistic connectors, missing data, and theory-related material (Bryman, 2012). This is appropriate as the flexible nature of TA allows for in-depth analysis into the issues, problems, similarities, and differences in communication between various right-wing extremist groups. This aids the study's objective of analyzing the variance in RWE in SA and which factors contribute to its emergence.

When conducting the TA, latent analysis will be adopted as this study is striving to understand the meanings, assumptions, and conceptualizations behind the evidence presented at face-value. This requires an in-depth interpretive approach in order to understand how underlying assumptions, meanings and conceptualizations can form part of the themes based on theoretical understanding, rather than based on merely a simple description (Friese, Soratto & Pires, 2018). This is important as the world views of right-wing extremists are communicated in a variety of explicit and implicit ways. This is true especially considering that the contemporary wave of RWE seeks to form part of the mainstream discourse within society, and therefore understanding latent levels of communication is important.

Lastly, engagement with data through TA will be done deductively. The overall research design of the study is inductive. However, to organize the data and categorize the different forms of RWE in SA effectively, a deductive thematic analysis must occur based on pre-existing theory of RWE (Friese, Soratto & Pires, 2018). Through the application of the *Observation Schedule* (see Figure 2 above), and more specifically Carter's (2018) definition and characteristics,

various issues relating to various right-wing extremist groups can be identified, which can then effectively assist the study in analyzing the determinants.

3.3 Possible Limitations

The largest limitation of this study relates to the external validity of case-study research designs. Case-studies cannot be used to make broad generalizations about the population, as the nature of the design renders the cases studied unique and they are not representative samples of a policy area, institution, or tribal group. Therefore, some researchers argue that case-studies should only be used to generate theories or hypotheses, which then require further testing through alternative research designs which then may conclude with wider conclusive generalizations (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008). This weakness is mitigated through the purpose of the study. The purpose of this study is not to provide definitive casual relationships between right-wing extremist groups and the world around them. Allen (2017) explains that the purpose of case-study designs is to make theoretical generalizations, and not broader generalizations. Therefore, the writer of this study is aware of the scope within which the study is operating and seeks to provide the initial connection between right-wing extremist theory and the types of RWE seen in SA today, which in turn will act as a foundation for further applied research.

Secondly, case-study research designs raise questions about the quality of theoretical reasoning in which the study engages. It is not a question of wider generalizability, but rather whether the theoretical arguments generated are supported by the data gathered (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, this study will be based on a strong theoretical framework, outlined in the literature review, which will be incorporated into the design to ensure the validity and reliability of conclusions drawn. By employing a strict observation schedule and accurate TA, this study can make strong associations with reliable evidence between various right-wing extremist groups and the conditions fueling their actions.

Thirdly, the sole use of internet research and secondary sources bring into question the validity of the study. If inaccurate and inauthentic sources are used, the reliability of the study can be brought into question. This is mitigated through the careful use of Scott's (1990) criteria for the valid and reliable selection of sources to ensure quality secondary data is being implemented within the study. Careful attention will be paid to selecting relevant, authentic,

and objective data, and not simply including any evidence that can be found which vaguely relates to the topic at hand.

Fourthly, this study only engages with a limited selection of SMT in the analysis of RWE in SA. Therefore, the study is limited regarding which outcomes and conclusions can be derived. Since this study is primarily aimed at the specific ideologies of these groups, it encourages further research into the recruitment strategies, organizational capacity, and resource richness of the groups identified.

Lastly, limitations in line with the biases of the researcher can arise. As with all qualitative research, subjectivity of analysis and interpretation may be present and may present an obstacle to the outcomes of the study. However, this study is concerned with offering a fair, objective, and balanced account of RWE in SA. Therefore, a well-researched and comprehensive observation schedule, a well-defined matrix of right-wing extremist characteristics/themes, along with the use of multiple sources of information from a variety of sources, will mitigate this risk.

3.4 Conclusion

This study employs a single-case study research design in coordination with qualitative thematic analysis to describe and analyse the contemporary landscape of RWE in SA. With the deployment of a well-defined and adequately researched observation schedule, this study will effectively explain, through TA, why these groups are emerging in SA and the specific causes relating to their rise. Due to the ever-evolving nature of RWE, in this study RWE is not treated as a fixed category, but rather the research design is set up specifically to incorporate many forms of right-wing extremist groups who base their ideologies on different grievances in society. This study is aware of the limitations of the chosen research design and has therefore employed several mitigation measures to ensure the reliability and validity of its findings.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to provide, based on available secondary data, a comprehensive analysis of RWE in post-Apartheid SA. This could serve as a possible framework for further research into the specific groups, including their recruitment, organizational capacity, and potential threat to South African society. Following from this, Chapter 4 will provide a history of RWE in SA, detailing its forms in the period between the emergence of the Union of South Africa in the early 1900s to the various forms of violence

seen in the late and transition stages of Apartheid. This is done to provide the necessary contextual background to identify where RWE in SA started, which forms of RWE have persisted, and which forms are new to South African society.

Chapter 4: History of Right-Wing Extremism in South Africa

4.1 Introduction

To provide an adequate context for contemporary varieties, the history of right-wing extremism (RWE) in pre-1994 South Africa (SA) must first be explored. This will allow one to determine effectively whether present varieties are merely evolutions of past circumstance or entirely new developments. Using past literature, groups will be judged as right-wing extremist according to their compatibility with the definition of: "an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism" (Carter, 2018:174), in addition to the characteristics of a strong state, nationalism, racism/xenophobia, anti-democracy and populism (Carter, 2018). Key links will be shown between the types of RWE seen in South African history, and the characteristics of the formulated theoretical framework.

The context of RWE in SA will naturally begin, and be dominated by, the emergence and evolution of white Afrikaner nationalism, but will also focus on non-white forms of RWE created by the socio-economic conditions of the Apartheid regime. The two primary forms found are Zulu nationalism and political vigilantism. Inspired by the categories listed by Schönteich and Boshoff (2003), the forms of RWE in this chapter will be categorized chronologically as: Afrikaner ethnic mobilization (1899-1947), growth, militarization, and diversification (1948-1990), and political tension and transition (1990-1994).

However, before the roots of RWE in SA are explored, it must be noted that SA has seen extreme-right values since its early inception during the initial stages of colonialism. European colonizers entered SA with policies of extremization against indigenous populations, specifically the San. These were driven by incompatible ideologies relating to the private ownership of land, along with ideologies of racial hierarchy which placed hunter-gatherer populations at the ignominious bottom. It is estimated that between 1770 and 1798, 300-400 San were killed annually and 100 taken as captives (Adhikari, 2010b). However, this is an extremely conservative figure as San killings were severely underreported and it does not reflect killings made by groups outside the British administration, and the loss of life caused by restriction to resources. Therefore, the number is estimated to be well into the thousands and an argument can be made for genocide (Adhikari, 2010b). This resulted in the breakdown of San society and a critical loss of identity. The consequences of this can be seen in contemporary society with the San remaining on the fringes of society; and attitudes towards them which include characterizations and negative stereotyping based on racial hierarchies, a

general lack of interest and a portrayal of the group as remnants of a 'primitive' past (Adhikari, 2010a).

4.2 Afrikaner Ethnic Mobilization (1899-1947)

The first historical development of RWE for purposes of this study is the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism. Within the greater Afrikaner right-wing mythology, the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was an extremely consequential event. The epic scale to which the severely outnumbered forces of the Republican Boers faced the British Empire, the British concentration camps which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 28 000 Afrikaner women and children, the Anglicization policy of the post-war period, and the subsequent removal of social freedom and economic poverty, left a deep scar within the psyche and national consciousness of the Afrikaner (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003). These consequences left the Afrikaners with feelings of hopelessness, as it did not seem that another opportunity would arise to distinguish themselves as a legitimate nation. Absorption by British culture seemed inevitable (van Rooyen, 1994).

These fears of a lost identity were exacerbated with the introduction of the 1912 Defence Act. This new act, in a modernizing state, threatened to wipe out Afrikaner Republican masculinity with impersonal regulations and increasingly ignored old Republican protocols. Through the key reforms within the military, including new colonial training methods, uniforms, ranking system, hierarchal bureaucracy, disciplinary codes and promotional norms, Afrikaner military norms were hijacked, Afrikaner Republicans were alienated, and a direct threat was posed to Boer masculinity (Swart, 1998). Tied in with the economic frustrations of Afrikaner farmers directed towards the state's failure to address economic recession, the grounds were fertile for the igniting of Afrikaner Republican nostalgia and provocation into armed rebellion. These Afrikaners sought to destroy a hated present; to recapture an idealized past in an imaginary future (Swart, 1998). In 1914, South Africa's participation in the World War I on the side of Britain was opposed by the Nationalist Party of JBM Hertzog and was the final straw for many Afrikaner Republicans. This resulted in an armed rebellion and an Afrikaner civil war, known as the Boer Rebellion. This was heavily suppressed by the State and led to the deaths of several Boer heroes from the Anglo-Boer War (Boshoff & Schontëich, 2003).

This period of Boer mobilization correlates well with the characteristics of RWE described by Carter (2018). Burdened with feelings of political resentment towards British influence which

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was gaining more control, and economic grievances due to economic recession, a subculture of conservative nationalism yearning back to a nostalgic past of Afrikaner domination started manifesting within portions of the Afrikaner community. This was evident in the division present within the Afrikaner community at the time with the *bittereinders* referring to die-hard Afrikaners and the *hensoppers* who were regarded as submissive to the British State (Coetzee, 1981). This is similar to Murphy's (2009) writing on RWE in the United States where groups long for a "golden age" characterized by increased social power for a particular group or religion, and less government oversight. This subculture's discriminatory and exclusionary outlook on black people and non-Afrikaner whites, in addition to their rejection of democratic procedure through an armed uprising, draws the nationalist Boer subculture in line with this study's definition of RWE.

The defeat of the *bittereinders* resulted in SA committing forces to the allied side in World War II and invading German controlled South-West Africa (now Namibia) and participating in the East African Campaign which followed. The primary motivation for this was the hope that SA would secure South-West Africa as an additional province (Boahen, 1985). The rebellion aided the rise of Afrikaner ultranationalism as the idea of small and heroic groups of men and women standing up for the nation's honour against all odds which was ingrained within the Afrikaner consciousness (Schontëich & Boshoff, 2003). The Boer Rebellion was swiftly defeated, but the spirit remained and was strengthened. It showed Afrikaner nationalists that the battle must be fought within the political arena and the idea of modern Afrikaner nationalism was conceived. The war forced them to organize, covertly at first in the form of the political organization: the *Afrikaner Broederbond*; then in the refined political party: the National Party (Vatcher, 1965).

It should also be noted that the Rand Rebellion of 1922 contained elements of RWE. After 1918, the price of gold first decreased, then increased, which allowed wages to rise. As production and transport costs increased and capital gains stagnated, the price decreased. To protect profits, and with black labour being cheaper than white labour, mines planned to suppress 2000 white jobs, after wages and paid vacations had already been cut. This caused an overwhelming majority of 12 000 white workers to go on strike (Dauvé, 2018). As trade union leaders were failing to advance the workers' cause, groups called *Commandos* were formed independently by white mine workers and were gaining strength and influence. This violent

resistance saw the merging of white working-class syndicalism and traditional Boer republicanism into an armed uprising (Hirson, 1993 & Breckenridge, 2009).

The military connotation of the *Commandos* is purposeful, as defence mechanisms for the early days of the strike morphed into military structures modelled after the *Voortrekkers.* The latter were the group of Boer colonialists who had travelled into interior regions of SA from the Cape between the years 1835 and 1852, in order to escape British rule. This had strong historical and religious overtones as the Boers saw themselves as people chosen by God marching towards a 'promised land'. Even in the early days of the formation of the concrete Afrikaner identity, religious justification for their actions was prominent. This, coupled with the war efforts of 1914-1918, saw the merging of themes of resistance to British power, the people in arms, local mobilization, self-discipline, and imagery of a (white) people under attack, into the violent Commandos group who were seen as superior to another illegitimate force (the State), and to black people (Dauvé, 2018).

Thus, the slogan "For a White South Africa" appeared everywhere during the events of 1922, confirming the racial dynamic to the strike (Hirson, 1993). The Commandos and their alliance with rural Afrikaners sought to restore an Afrikaner Republic where whites ruled by force of arms and black people knew their place at the bottom of the hierarchy (Breckenridge, 2009). This explicit form of racism in the name of an Afrikaner state, tied in with violent rebellion, places the Commandos within the definition of RWE. The rebellion was eventually squashed by an overwhelming military force of 20 000 troops, artillery, tanks, and bomber aircraft. However, this came at a cost as a coalition between the Labour and Nationalist Party defeated the incumbent party of Jan Smuts in the 1924 general election (Hirson, 1993).

Therefore, within this time of crisis, Afrikaner nationalism soared in popularity. Ethnic mobilization was ignited based on treatment as second-class citizens by the British and racial superiority to black people. This led to the eventual victory of the National Party (NP) (previously the Nationalist Party) in 1948. Characteristics of RWE include populist notions of a population under threat, nationalism through the desire for a *volkstaat,* the authoritarian and anti-democratic methods of violent resistance and racist dynamics of white supremacy. Notably, the framing and character of the Afrikaner nation including cultural and biological superiority, an authoritative Afrikaner nationalist identity, and conception through means of violent revolution, gives Afrikaner ethnic mobilization similar characteristics to German RWE, as detailed by Backes and Jesse (1996) and Botsch (2012). In addition, its conceptions of a

white nation chosen by God, and the subsequent interpretation of multiculturalism as a threat, gives Afrikaner RWE characteristics similar to the ethnocentric forms of contemporary Australian RWE, detailed by Campion (2019b).

Critical to this ethnic mobilization strategy, was the centralized leadership structure which hinged on an underground political organization comprising of professional Protestant Afrikaner males. This group, known as the *Afrikaner Broederbond* or BB (Band of Brothers), enacted a deliberate strategy to establish Afrikaner nationalism through creating consciousness amongst Afrikaners based on their traditions, religion, and language. Driven by the idea of the Afrikaner identity known as the *volk,* the BB tapped into the religious inspiration of the Great Trek of the Afrikaner being placed in SA by the hand of God (van Rooyen, 1994).

Another prominent extremist political organization to arise during this time was the *Ossewa Brandwag* or OB (Ox-Wagon Sentry). When SA's Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, declared in 1939 that SA would be entering the Second World War on the same side as Britain, the old anti-imperialist and anti-British feelings of the past were reignited amongst Afrikaner nationalists. They refused to fight alongside Britain in this war. Many of the nationalists went on to form the NP, while the more militant nationalists joined the OB paramilitary organization. Heavily influenced by extreme-right characteristics of nationalism, anti-establishment rhetoric and racism, the OB was ideologically founded upon a localized version of National Socialism (with a heavy Christian influence) and made several attempts to obstruct the war effort of SA through assassination, intimidation, and sabotage (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003). This political resentment resulted in twenty-five bomb attacks that were launched in the Gauteng area between 1940 and 1941 alone, targeting mainly infrastructure, shops, and media offices. The OB's support peaked at half a million members and waned when Germany's defeat in the war became inevitable, with most members switching to the NP (Furlong, 1991).

SA has had elements of RWE since its initial inception. However, Afrikaner ethnic mobilization is the first historical wave of RWE in SA that is still influential in the post-Apartheid period. With the characteristics of a strong state, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, populist notions against a common enemy and aversion to equal democratic principles present, the Afrikaner nationalist subculture fits Carter's (2018) definition of RWE. The longevity of this subculture is owing to the collaboration between the Afrikaner state and private groups, such as the BB and OB, which cemented its frame within the Afrikaner psyche and paved the way for decades of racist, anti-democratic and authoritarian rule. The notion of

a distinct Afrikaner identity, and multiculturalism framed as a threat to it, was used to overcome British rule and would be a key theme in decades of NP rule. Until the introduction of Apartheid in 1948, members of the Afrikaner subculture antagonized the British and black population on all three issues of economic grievance, political resentment, and social change, described by Piazza (2017). Gaining legislative influence, however, would refine the chosen frame of Afrikaner extremists to focus solely on social change and allow the introduction of new extremist groups.

4.3 Growth, Militarization and Diversification (1948-1990)

4.3.1 Afrikaner Extremism

Extreme nationalism grew under the leadership of DF Malan, as the NP sought to consolidate its electoral victory with a strong push to maintain unity amongst Afrikaners. A strong focus of Malan's was to strengthen the alignment of the NP government closer to Afrikaner organizations such as the BB, civil society, businesses, and the Press. This saw an alignment of right-wing extremist beliefs between the political party and various social movement organizations resulting in the fortification of the strong state under Afrikaner identity (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003). In addition, racism and anti-democratic measures were now being legislatively enforced through the implementation of stricter racial laws (with specific focus on the limitation of voting rights to the white population only). These racist laws were critical in instilling measures to exclusively promote Afrikaner interests, reaffirm commitment to the creation of an Afrikaner republic, and actively tackle English-speaking dominance (van Rooyen, 1994). With the NP gaining political power, the determinants of the RWE can be narrowed down to social change. What had previously been political resentment fostered by economic grievance and the suppression of the Afrikaner identity had now evolved into a fear of black integration into Afrikaner society. Afrikaner leaders actively sought to disrupt any attempts at dissolving Afrikaner political power, and the purity of the Afrikaner identity could not be clouded by the infiltration of other ethnicities.

1969 saw the expulsion of four NP Members of Parliament (MPs) caused by their disagreement with the government to allow a Maori in the touring New Zealand rugby side. These rebels, under the leadership of Hertzog, broke away and formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party (HNP). In the months leading up to his expulsion, the influence of Calvinism on Afrikaners was detailed by Hertzog in a speech. Hertzog declared that only

with their Calvinistic value-system could Afrikaners survive the "onslaught against whites in Africa, since liberalism formed an integral part of the English-speaking psyche" (Schoeman, 1974:19). The HNP was explicitly opposed to the immigration of English speakers and Catholics into SA (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003).

This is a valuable insight as it proves the fluid nature of right-wing extremist ideology. Even though the NP and HNP shared similarities in their extremist beliefs and culture, conflict was still evident regarding the lengths at which they were willing to act on them. The NP was not exclusionary enough, according to the HNP, and were thus rendered incapable of protecting the Afrikaner identity against English and Catholic infiltration. As stricter and more exclusionary followers of the Afrikaner nationalist subculture, the HNP challenged the NP and expanded its exclusionary policy to any form of English influence. The fluid nature of RWE, not being bound by similar races or ethnicities, is an important note for this study's contemporary analysis.

In addition, worth noting is the discursive opportunity of an "onslaught against whites in Africa" (Schoeman, 1974:19), which paints the picture of a group under direct threat and being actively targeted. This populist rhetoric acted as a key recruitment tool in aligning the ordinary Afrikaner's frame with one of radical exclusion and unequal social treatment. In principle, the Afrikaner feared domination by English speakers just as much as domination by black people. However, in practice, views were often expressed on racial, rather than on ethnocentric terms. In addition, large portions of the Afrikaner population entered strategic alliances with white right-wing English South Africans to bolster political support. This has led supporters of Afrikaner nationalism to assert that it is expedient and insincere to say their beliefs are based on ethnicity and not on race (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003:18).

This paradoxical and confusing rhetoric regarding race and ethnicity can be best seen in the Afrikaner right-wing paramilitary and political organization, the *Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging* or AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement). An extremist Afrikaner militia, it served as a key enforcer of the racist and Christian-nationalist subculture within the Afrikaner community. Despite the leader of the AWB denying that his organization is racist, he was on record as having said that his organization was governed by its own superior white genes (van Rooyen, 1994). However, in the 1990s a non-aggression pact was formed in the Transvaal between the AWB and Zulu-based political movement: the Inkatha Freedom Party

(van Rooyen, 1994). This is a further example of the fluid nature of RWE and will be explored further later in the chapter.

The AWB was formed as an extra-paramilitary organization to bolster HNP support after a poor electoral showing in 1970. The AWB's emblem, which is controversial due to its similarities with the Nazi swastika, comprises three black sevens that supposedly represent the opposite to the triple-six emblem of the Anti-Christ. The AWB's main purpose is: "to assure the survival of the Afrikaner Boer nation free in his own country" (AWB: Basic Principles, n.d.). In addition, it aims "to establish a free, Christian, republican Afrikaner Boer Nation-state, seceded from the SA on the grounds of the nation's inalienable right to the Boer Republics". This right comes into being through Divine Providence and is solely purposed with serving Him (God) (AWB: Basic Principles, n.d.). With the development of the HNP and AWB, one sees fluidity within the interpretations of protecting the Afrikaner identity.

Despite instituting white supremacist legislation and physically segregating different races, for the AWB and HNP, further lengths of exclusion were required to protect the envisioned *volk* state. The formation of right-wing extremist paramilitary organizations to achieve this additional protection resembles the white supremacist and hypermasculine militia spheres seen in contemporary US RWE (Pantucci & Ong, 2021). However, a key difference is that contemporary US militias are anti-government, whilst Apartheid-era Afrikaner militias upheld and actively defended the exclusionary nationalism of the Afrikaner state through violent means.

In 1982, the Conservative Party (CP) was formed when 18 MPs of the NP broke away under the leadership of Andries Treurnicht. The CP followed a constitutional position of partition, which largely took the form of a Verwoerdian Apartheid. The beginning of the 1990s saw a shift in policy due to pressure from moderates and changing political circumstances which saw the party move closer to the concept of Afrikaner self-determination. This was to be achieved through a smaller, white Afrikaner homeland (van Rooyen, 1994).

Compared to the HNP, the CP was more appealing to middle class public servants (including a small number of English speakers) and Afrikaners. For white and especially Afrikaner politics, the formation of the CP was a watershed moment. After 1982 and the formation of the CP, the forces of the white right were large enough to pose a significant electoral threat and was a large disruptive factor in the government's attempts to reform, and subsequently

dismantle, Apartheid (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003:19). This caused the formation of explicit factions within the NP and broader extreme white right. This demonstrated the resilience of the Afrikaner nationalist subculture present within SA. As the maintenance of Apartheid became too costly, and international political pressure mounted, Afrikaner extremists still sought to resist social change for fear of losing their identity. Therefore, a shift was made within their conception of the strong state from one that was all encompassing to smaller territories, separate from democratic rule, where their exclusionary nationalism and authoritarian governance could still be exercised. 'Afrikaner self-determination' became the justification for this racist and authoritarian form of governance and is still present within Afrikaner RWE today (*News24*, 2021b; Majavu, 2022).

The mid-1980s facilitated the breakout of a revolutionary war by the African National Congress (ANC) as it called upon its followers to make the country ungovernable due to decades of black oppression. This resulted in rent boycotts and mass protests in multiple areas in the country, especially along the Vaal (Ellis, 1998). This is critical for two reasons: firstly, one now witnesses the emergence of forms of RWE that are not Afrikaner-centred. As the Apartheid system had inflicted extreme levels of economic grievance and political resentment amongst the black population, it was only a matter of time before the emergence of parallel forms of RWE manifested in response. Secondly, the emergence and rise in popularity of the ANC as a counterforce to the system of Apartheid, and its revolutionary measures of fighting the government, triggered more serious acts of violence enacted by Afrikaner extremists. As social change was being violently fought for, this created multiple discursive opportunities for Afrikaner right-wing extremists to demonstrate their fear of diversity. Extremist frames of violent resistance to attacks along the ethnic boundaries of the *volk* state once again grew in prominence.

This extremist presence within the Afrikaner state and increasingly hostile nature of South African society saw the first conception of a governmental 'third force'. This was the organizational manifestation of illegal repression through the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) (Ellis, 1998). Created in 1986, the foundations of the 'third force' were laid by President P.W Botha's 'total strategy' to suppress revolting anti-Apartheid movements such as the ANC and Pan African Congress. It resulted in the coordination of direct links between the army, security police, businesses, and local government structures. This strategy was an attempt at the total penetration of the state into civil society through its security infrastructure (Zulu, 1992). It was

a clear manifestation of a strong, authoritarian state that was uncompromising in its racism, anti-democratic practices, and ultranationalism.

It was exposed in 1989 for the use of several 'death squad' initiatives concealed within the security force apparatus (Ellis, 1998). This form of state-sponsored violence is indicative of the persistence and strength of the Afrikaner nationalist subculture within Apartheid governmental structures. It is RWE rooted in its rejection of democratic government institutions in favour of using violent undercover military operations to maintain social control and segregation. Barend Strydom, known as *Die Wit Wolf (*The White Wolf), is an example of a lone wolf attack, described by Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019), manifesting due to the influential power of this subculture. Killing eighteen people and injuring sixty in the 1988 Strijdom Square massacre, Strydom was fueled by the belief that God had ordered blood, and his duty as a 'Boer warrior' was to deliver it (Smith, 2008; Moore, 2018).

4.3.2 Zulu Nationalism

It would be unfair and inaccurate to describe Apartheid-era extremist violence as solely caused by white-Afrikaner nationalism and racism. As previously mentioned, political resentment and economic hardship on the part of the black population, along with emerging social change introduced by the revolutionary efforts of the ANC, held the potential for the formation of non-Afrikaner RWE. Therefore, ethnic cleavage held the potential for dividing the anti-Apartheid movement and facilitating the rise of parallel right-wing extremist movements. Regarding political activism, the ANC had managed to overcome tribal consciousness to a large extent. Even though the ANC was predominantly Xhosa, the last president before its banning, Albert Luthuli, had been Zulu. In addition, national executive members claimed that they were not even aware of candidates' backgrounds, hence tribalism had never been an issue (Adam & Moodley, 1992). However, this was slowly changed by the emergence of the Inkatha social movement in 1979, with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi asserting control (Adam & Moodley, 1992). This formed the emergence of the second form of RWE seen pre-1994: Zulu nationalism.

Under Apartheid, Zulu political elites had had limited autonomy in KwaZulu-Natal, one of the ten black homelands. As long as these homelands had remained members of the Apartheid system, Zulu elites had a relative degree of authority and influence. However, the ANC-led transition to democracy threatened the limited political power of Zulu elites through the new

regime's threat to Zulu hereditary legitimacy and the loss of political power Zulu regions would experience due to simple majority rule. Therefore, due to the fear of political exclusion from central and regional powers caused by a unitary system of simple majority rule, violent actions were carried out by Zulu activists (Choi, 2008). This saw Zulu nationalists share a common political interest with the white Apartheid government and therefore they collaborated against a common enemy: the ANC and its allies (Choi, 2008).

These circumstances resulted in the formation of the neo-traditional Inkatha movement in 1975, aimed at creating a modern Zulu identity. Created by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the movement mobilized tribal chiefs and village headmen as local leaders, who in turn used the Inkatha infrastructure to solidify their own power (Kaufman, 2017). Buthelezi weaponized traditional and gendered concepts of 'home' and 'homeland', thereby causing Zulu men to long for a return to patriarchal values and male domestic control; while incentivizing women with new 'modern' opportunities and the 'god given' gifts of motherhood which would be provided by the KwaZulu-Natal homeland (Waetjen, 1999).

This is an interesting development as the social change and possibility of being excluded from power being caused by the slow unravelling of Apartheid was enough for Zulu elites in Inkatha to justify cooperation with the violent and extremist elements of the Afrikaner state. Inkatha shared a common vision of ethnic homelands with the Afrikaner extremists in government, and therefore actively fought against the ANC and its efforts to establish a pluralistic and equal democracy. Since it was outcompeted at a national level, Inkatha violently defended its provincial stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal, relying on discursive opportunities of the KwaZulu-Natal homeland, the Zulu king, traditional leaders, and proto-Zulu nationalist discourse. This manifested in its own form of xenophobic and nationalistic RWE. It is once again the discursive idea of an identity under threat which facilitated the frame of ultranationalism as the only solution (Piper, 2002).

As the ANC and the NP were preparing for a transfer of power, violence in KwaZulu-Natal and present-day Gauteng reached unprecedented levels due to a civil war between the ANC and Inkatha. Inkatha secretly formed a military alliance with the NP-led state to assert political control, engage in mass violence and actively disrupt democratic transition (Kaufman, 2017). It is estimated that 20 000 people lost their lives during the years leading up to the first non-racial and democratic elections in SA, most of these being attributed to Inkatha (Hickel, 2015).

This conflict was due to Buthelezi's conflation of the Zulu kingdom and KwaZulu-Natal, by claiming that Zulu people were to fight for their survival, since an upcoming democratic SA posed a direct threat to the political power of Inkatha. This frame generated the belief amidst Inkatha supporters that they were under siege, and therefore movement-sanctioned violence was a necessary act of self-defence (Rueedi, 2020).

Under this frame, Inkatha can be regarded as a right-wing extremist group in the years leading up to the early 1990s. They were responsible for perpetrating violence against pro-ANC United Democratic Front communities in KwaZulu-Natal (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1999), often with the assistance of the South African Police (van Niekerk, 1987). Inkatha used Zulu ethnic nationalist propaganda to perpetrate and exacerbate violence in migrant worker hostels in KwaZulu-Natal and present-day Gauteng (Rueedi, 2020). Inkatha was complicit in various massacres including the violent push into the Reef townships in 1990 and an attack on an ANC funeral in Wesselton, Eastern Transvaal. As an additional method of building resistance against the ANC, the SADF provided Inkatha fighters with weapons and training (Zulu, 1992),

Therefore, there were times when Inkatha clearly rejected the equitable democratic institutions proposed by the ANC and resorted to violence and collaboration with the Apartheid government to protect their territory and influence within KwaZulu-Natal. Using the discursive opportunity of a Zulu nation under threat by an 'invading' ANC, ethnic identities were politicized, and a clear 'in'-group and 'out'-group binary was facilitated and violently enforced within these hostels and townships. This 'in'-group and 'out'-group binary speaks to Minkenberg's (2000) modernization theory which asserts that RWE is rooted in the myth of a homogenous nation and different extremist groups have different criteria for citizenship. In this instance, it was the Zulu ethnicity. The nature and intensity of Inkatha's extremism would come to evolve and be reformed over time. However, in the years preceding democratic transition, Inkatha can be regarded as a right-wing extremist movement.

This study suggests that, in a case paralleling the threat perceived by Afrikaner extremists, social change brought by the dismantling of Apartheid, which would result in Zulu elites losing political power, can be regarded as the primary determinant for pre-1994 Zulu nationalism. When one considers Carter's (2018) characteristics to be relevant here, Inkatha subscribes to strong state, nationalism, anti-democracy, xenophobia, and populism. Their exclusionary Zulu

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nationalism and violent cooperation with the Apartheid government against the pro-democracy ANC draws Inkatha in line with Carter's (2018) definition of RWE as it: violently seeks to maintain control and protection of the Zulu kingdom, exploits the political influence of Zulu nationalism to mobilise ground support, does not accept democratic institutions within the maintenance of society, and is hostile to other ethnicities gaining political or social influence.

4.3.3 Political Vigilantism

The ANC's call to make the country ungovernable in the face of the violently oppressive Apartheid regime exacerbated vigilante violence in pre-1994 SA. Although forms of self-governance and discipline had existed before the 1980s, it was by this time that vigilantism in black townships had been viewed as a natural expression against the brutality of the Apartheid government and subsequent injustice and neglect. Discursive opportunities arose centred around taking their community, and country, back from individuals contributing to the injustice and neglect enacted by the Apartheid regime (Mtshali, 2019). The two key slogans of "People's Power" and making the country "ungovernable" radicalized the concept of self-regulation and evolved it into a political struggle (Buur & Jensen, 2004). This would commonly involve extra-legal acts by the liberation movement in seeking self-protection by using People's Courts, Street Committees, and self-defence units. These groups were often politically motivated and actively sought to push 'the struggle' forward in making townships ungovernable (Minnaar, 2001).

It must be noted that vigilantism is a complex issue and can occur for a variety of reasons (Minnaar, 2001). However, what this study is concerned with is vigilantism explicitly based on political motivations. Through its relationship with the state, vigilantism takes a 'benevolent' form fueled by the state's incapacity to police and secure the rights of its citizens. This prompts ordinary people to take the law into their own hands, often in violent ways. It becomes political through the construction of a moral community, where localized sovereignty and authority is exercised over an unstable community and where a moral code must be perpetually followed (Asamoah, 2020).

This results in the construction of the criminal to be profoundly polyvalent. The ever-present criminal can be drawn from groups such as illegal immigrants, gang members, or political opponents. All these hinder the community from accessing further resources and opportunities and are contrary to the dominant group's version of morality. It manifests as exclusionary

nationalism, defined by acceptable moralities, fueled by political resentment and economic grievance. With the failure of the state to maintain law and order, and construct a resourceful societal structure, the performance of violence invariably plays a role in political organizations seeking to regulate their specific communities and enforce their own notions of morality (Buur & Jensen, 2004).

Therefore, although utilizing the struggle against Apartheid as justification for the violence enacted by vigilante groups, it often manifested as the utilization of community anger to deal with political opponents or as the vigilante groups taking the law into their own hands to exert control over a community through violent intimidation (Minnaar, 2001). To gain alternative sites of sovereignty, vigilante groups would violently seize control over administrative, welfare, policing, judicial and other functions of the townships. The identity of 'collaborators' was constructed to sanction a new form of popular justice used to control townships and to deal with opponents (Buur & Jensen, 2004).

People's Courts lent themselves to this abuse of power within the context of the 'struggle against Apartheid' and were used by politically motivated individuals or groups to assert control and remove political opponents by violent and non-democratic means. The extreme outcome of this would be the brutal and public execution of accused 'collaborators' (often through 'necklacing'). With the lack of policing and increasing lawlessness within townships, ample room was available for the seizure of power and construction of common enemies. It is RWE through the violent utilization of community-based holistic nationalism with the aim of excluding ideological opponents, often from other political parties (Minnaar, 2001).

Moreover, Inkatha's violent and politically motivated use of the self-protection unit (SPU) project can be considered right-wing extremist through the form of political vigilantism. Despite containing elements of self-protection, the SPUs were used to develop Inkatha's military capacity that would, by force, prevent elections that did not accommodate Inkatha's wish for self-determination. Inkatha-aligned SPUs even carried out attacks in collaboration with the AWB, an Afrikaner extremist militia discussed previously (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1999). Thus, this study suggests that elements of pre-1994 political vigilantism falls in line with Carter's (2018) definition of RWE due to its holistic nationalism, violent and authoritarian methods of community enforcement, populist rhetoric of

political enemies that should be excluded from the community, and rejection of fair and democratic due process in achieving that exclusion.

4.4 Political Tension and Transition (1990-1994)

4.4.1 Afrikaner Extremism

Cultural divides within the same racial groups continued within the Afrikaner population. Factions within the NP were split along the *verligte* (enlightened) and *verkrampte* (hardline) members. The *verkrampte* faction consisted of conservative reformists who sought to maintain a modest pace of reform of Apartheid in terms of content, style, and tempo. The *verligte* faction supported a more radical lead to reform and sought urgency in the election of legitimate black leaders in the negotiation process, viewing the Apartheid system as expired and doomed. With De Klerk narrowly succeeding Botha after three rounds of voting, his actions would prove critical to easing or igniting the tensions of the extreme-right (Sisk, 1989).

The NP had spent four decades through various social movement organizations, nurturing a frame to its white followers: that their position as whites in SA was precarious and that they were surrounded by blacks who posed a fundamental danger to their united determination and future. Therefore, when De Klerk took over the NP and started rolling back years of messaging from his own MPs by freeing political prisoners, dismantling Apartheid legislation, and beginning negotiations with the ANC, it is unsurprising that this social change would give rise to fanatical leaders and political resistance movements. This was evident when De Klerk visited Ventersdorp in 1991 and was violently confronted by the AWB. This altercation left three AWB members dead and signaled an ominous warning to the De Klerk administration (Du Toit, 1991).

In 1992, the NP held a referendum amongst whites to measure support for the reform of Apartheid. The reform process received overwhelming support from the liberal opposition, the international community, media and a vast majority of organized businesses and corporations in SA (van Rooyen, 1994). With the CP being completely outweighed in campaign and media resources, only 31% of whites voted against the referendum. Due to their failure in convincing eligible voters to reject the reforms, the CP shifted their focus from electoral success to the less ambitious goal of Afrikaner self-determination within a sovereign Afrikaner homeland

(Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003). In addition, this triggered further considerations from extreme-right political organizations to start using violence and force on an organized scale to pressure the transitioning government to concede to their desires of an Afrikaner homeland (Grobbelaar, Bekker & Evans, 1989).

1992 saw the CP split over its willingness to participate in all-party negotiations and its uncompromising desire to form an independent sovereign state. Five MPs left the CP and formed the *Afrikaner Volksfront* (AVF), a political organization which sought to advocate smaller, but not necessarily sovereign, Afrikaner states in certain regions. This organization was created with the purpose of promoting Afrikaner right-wing unity and igniting the realization of an Afrikaner *volkstaat.* The leader of the AVF, General Constand Viljoen, was a retired head of the South African Defence Force (SADF). In fact, the AVF was led by several former security force generals, giving the organization the scope, willingness and ability to commit violent resistance (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003; Stiff, 2001). Similarly, the Boere-Krisisaksie or BKA (Farmers Crisis Action) was a political organization which had been formed by right-wing farmers to provide aid to needy farmers. In 1991, the BKA 'invaded' and blockaded downtown Pretoria (Kruger, 1995) and in 1993 raided a SADF arms depot in Polokwane (van Rooyen, 1994). This mounting resistance by Afrikaner extremists in the AVF, BKA, SADF and police force led many to believe that SA was on a path to civil war (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003).

Moreover, multi-party negotiations were further disrupted by the attack on the Kempton Park World Trade Centre in 1993. This venue of negotiations, containing many of South Africa's senior political leaders, was stormed by hundreds of white separatists, led by an armoured truck smashing through the eighteen-foot-high-glass in front of the Trade Centre. The attack was spearheaded by Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the AWB. Initially, the protests were supposed to be peaceful, led by the broader coalition of the AVF, but after the police had refused the protestors entry to the World Trade Centre grounds, Terreblanche urged his followers forward, prompting the assault. The protest was supposed to coincide with the vote for the date of the first election involving all races, which separatists saw as the date of their demise (Keller, 1993). Moreover, Willem Ratte, a high-ranking ex-SADF member, ran the preservation of the transmission of the right-wing radio 'Radio Pretoria', an example of an extreme-right media organization. Ratte was also responsible for leading a group of armed men

in the symbolic occupation of Fort Schanskop in early 1994, which was a traditional Afrikaner landmark dating back to the Anglo-Boer war, (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003).

The turning point for the white right came in March 1994 when it unsuccessfully attempted to support the weak black 'homeland' government of Bophuthatswana. Following Bophuthatswana's decision not to take part in the forthcoming election, ANC supporters protested. In some areas, the protests escalated into strike action, rioting and looting. Fearing the loss of his 'country', the President of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope, asked his AVF ally, Constand Viljoen, for assistance. Viljoen responded to his call by mobilizing 1500 armed AVF and BKA members outside the Bophuthatswana capital, along with 500 members of the AWB, at the request of Mangope (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003).

Due to the absence of a clear command structure, members of the AWB went on a rogue campaign of firing at Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) troops and civilians in the capital (Cilliers, 1998). In response, members of the BDF fired at an AWB vehicle, critically injuring the driver, and forcing the vehicle to a standstill. Subsequently, the wounded occupants of the AWB vehicle were executed at point blank range by a member of the BDF. This execution was caught on camera and served as a powerful discursive opportunity that resulted in Mangope loyalists turning against the 'white invaders' and large sections of support threatening mutiny. Mangope ordered the immediate withdrawal of Viljoen's troops, a request with which he complied. The discursive opportunity of the public execution of a white AWB member by a black individual challenged the once fortified identity of white Afrikaner masculine supremacy. This defeated the once invincible morale of the Afrikaner nationalist subculture and exposed the weaknesses of the white right's military capacity (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003). Previously regarded as untouchable, the public humiliation of the white right caused by the events in Bophuthatswana would prove critical in eroding the scope of influence of the Afrikaner nationalist subculture amongst the general population.

In 1999, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that the AVF, and structures operating under its umbrella, had committed gross violations against the ANC, NP, and Pan Africanist Congress. Through the creation of a *volkstaat* in seeking Afrikaner determination, the AVF had committed acts of violence and had attempted to mobilize forces towards an insurrection. Further evidence showed that the AVF had cooperated with elements of security forces and the IFP. The group had established paramilitary groupings in strategic locations to

threaten SA with revolution and to overturn the democratic order (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1999). This study suggests that these findings, which reflect attempts to cause a violent revolution as a means of creating an Afrikaner nation state, draw these groups directly in line with Carter's (2018:184) definition of RWE.

4.4.2 Zulu Nationalism

Further pressure on Zulu nationalists was added with the Boipatong Massacre of 1992 which saw the killing of thirty-eight black individuals by members of the Inkatha movement from a migrant worker hostel area. At the time, Boipatong was predominantly ANC-aligned and the attackers were members of the KwaMadala Hostel, an IFP stronghold. This massacre is widely regarded as the exploitation of ideological conflict and socio-economic cleavage between Zulus (represented by the IFP) and Xhosas (represented by the ANC) (Adam & Moodley, 1992) through state-sanctioned violence by the government's 'third force'. The full extent of involvement by the state is still being debated (Simpson, 2012).

Some of the hostels for migrant workers would become key territories for right-wing extremist radicalization for Inkatha. In the region of Pretoria, Witwaterstrand and Vereeninging, a large majority of the 220 hostels became "fortresses of fear" governed by Inkatha supporters, acting as both sanctuaries for Zulu-speaking refugees and rallying points for Inkatha to mount attacks on neighbouring townships (Segal, 1992). Feeling alienated by the progressive forces of the ANC, which was interpreted to pose a direct threat to their interests, Zulu hostel dwellers bonded to a sense of collective identity as rumours of persecution and expulsion resulted in an 'us' versus 'them' mentality, supporting notions of being under siege and under attack. This provided the enabling environment for collective violence (Das, 1998; Mamdani, 2001), as preemptive attacks were seen as a necessary form of defence in addition to being an enactment and alleviation of fear by violence. This perception of victimhood was carefully constructed and manipulated by the IFP, who espoused Zulu ethnic nationalism in tandem with Zulu migrant workers under threat, to create a propaganda campaign of Zulus under attack. This frame resulted in the emergence of a grassroots militant 'Zuluness' which mobilized hostel-dwellers into violence (Rueedi, 2020).

With hostel-dwellers mobilized, Inkatha's relationship with the Apartheid government and its 'third force' would be critical in its enactment of violence (Zulu, 1992). This was confirmed by the findings of the Goldstone Commission in 1994, which uncovered a network of extremist

criminal activity and violence through weapons distribution, violence in hostels and public transport hit-squad activity (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1999). The IFP was heavily implicated in working with Colonel De Kock, an active member of the 'third force', in providing arms to IFP hostels. In addition, De Kock confessed that third force attacks had been coordinated in collaboration with groups of IFP members (Simpson, 2012).

Further reports show that Inkatha had even been trained by SADF forces and had cooperated on several attacks against the ANC (Zulu, 1992). Groups that had superficially seemed ideologically opposed, found common ground in their desires for ethnic homelands and xenophobic and racist messaging. Therefore, collaboration was founded upon their equal desire for a strong and exclusive ethno-state within their own territories, and aversion to pluralistic democracy in the face of a rising multi-party system asserted by the ANC. Interestingly, Zulu nationalism falls in line with Minkenberg's (2000) modernization theory. It is a movement which rejects the social differentiation and individualization of modernity in favour of a nationally defined Zulu community, having traditional and community roles. This is extremely similar to the notion of the *volk* within the Afrikaner nation state and is a key point of agreement within the relationship between Inkatha and the Apartheid government.

Therefore, the right-wing extremist nature of the IFP continued during the violent years of democratic transition. After intense negotiations, Inkatha would eventually agree to participate in the elections and reform its extremist behaviour (Lynd, 2019). However, up until Inkatha agreed to participate in the democratic process, it maintained its characteristics of a strong state, Zulu nationalism, anti-democracy, xenophobia, and populism. Despite eventually agreeing to participate in the democratic process, its violent resistance to the election, and continued politicization and exploitation of Zulu nationalism still draws Inkatha in line with RWE according to Carter's (2018) criteria within this period. This is especially apparent when Inkatha collaborated with the Apartheid government and violently destabilized the democratic efforts of the ANC and its allies.

4.4.3 Political Vigilantism

Vigilantism in the early 1990s evolved into a wider description of a variety of violent struggles including those between 'war lords' or 'strongmen' fighting to control the resources of informal settlements, violent political clashes between the ANC and Inkatha in KwaZulu-

Natal, witch-purging activities in some areas, and the violent attacks against the ANC by the extreme white right such as the AWB (Minnaar, 2001). Therefore, one sees that apart from simply fighting crime, vigilantism can adopt a strong political motive, seeking to purge communities of specific individuals and ideologies. This was especially apparent with the rise of the Young Lions in the early 1990s.

Known for their extreme methods in the struggle against Apartheid, they were labelled a vigilante group by the Apartheid government due to their alignment with the liberation struggle, but still maintaining their own independent identity. The group engaged in violent methods of public enforcement, serving as both warnings and punishment for Apartheid complicity (Karimakwenda, 2019). They specifically targeted those who supported the Apartheid regime, labelling them *impimpi* (informants or collaborators). They were known for public displays of necklacing and would bomb the houses of suspected collaborators, conduct guerilla attacks on police officers during protests and conduct informal hearings and unlawful punishments, such as *sjambok* beatings, for those suspected of crime in black townships (Buur, 2010; Karimakwenda, 2019).

This study suggests that the ideology of the Young Lions cannot be regarded as right-wing extremist, as they actively fought for a pluralistic democracy and inclusive constitution. However, their actions certainly have right-wing extremist characteristics. The political organization had a distinctive ideological dimension and asserted its form of justice on suspicion and with little, if any, formal judicial process. Despite being affiliated with the struggle, the group acted on grounds of social control within communities, and often participated in their own forms of criminality such as robbery and sexual violence (Seekings, 1993). Democratic procedure was overlooked by using People's Courts and justice was distributed within their own frame of morality and acceptability. Localized forms of community control were instilled as the group sought social control and adopted violent means to achieve it. This draws the group adjacent to authoritarianism, the strong state, anti-democracy, and holistic nationalism according to Carter's (2018) characteristics. The political vigilantism of the Young Lions can be seen to have right-wing extremist characteristics, however, is not regarded as a right-wing extremist social movement.

What is important to note from this example, especially for the next chapter of the study, is South Africa's history of forming violent political organizations in the face of neglected community management by the state. When the state is ineffective at distributing social

rewards in a manner that is perceived to be equitable, and is equally ineffective at policing this neglect, ample opportunity is present for political elites to mobilize support, and self-governance to emerge within communities. The Young Lions show us how, even with a justifiable purpose, unmoderated political organizations can easily adopt extreme-right characteristics to control communities. What contemporary analysis will show us is that within political vigilantism in SA, social movement organisations which once only possessed certain right-wing extremist characteristics, do have the capacity to develop into established and legitimate right-wing extremist groups.

4.5 Conclusion

SA has a long and explicit history of RWE; however, this chapter has identified three primary forms that have emerged and are influential. Firstly, Afrikaner extremism takes inspiration from US and German RWE (Murphy, 2009) as it longs for a perceived 'golden age' where white Afrikaners are politically dominant and socially segregated. Therefore, an Afrikaner nation state must be created to realise and protect this ethnic community. Their plight of an Afrikaner identity under threat began with conflict and feelings of political resentment and economic hardship (Piazza, 2017) under British rule, which began in the 1890s and developed into protecting South African society from the social change of non-white infiltration. This continued into the early 1990s. All characteristics of RWE (Carter, 2018) are seen as this anti-democratic, racist, and persistent Afrikaner nationalist subculture manifests in a variety of social movement organizations (Mudde, 2019), most prominently as the NP political party and political organizations of the BB, OB and AWB.

The second form of RWE seen in pre-1994 SA is Zulu nationalism. Predominately concerned with the social change caused by the ending of Apartheid, and the subsequent lack of direct political power due to the implementation of simple majority rule democracy, leaders of the Inkatha movement harnessed the discursive opportunity of a violent political transition to create a frame of the ANC, and the pluralistic democracy it advocated for; as an enemy of the Zulu kingdom. Primarily drawing from the determinant of social change (Piazza, 2017), its discursive tools draw similarities with the Afrikaner *volk* nation and Minkenberg's (2000) modernization theory. This mutual desire for separate ethnic homelands was a key point of cooperation for Inkatha and its relationship with the Apartheid government, and a key reason why its actions can be described as consisting of: "authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism" (Carter, 2018).

Lastly, political vigilantism is the final form of RWE seen in pre-democratic SA. Vigilantism can be seen to adopt a political dimension, where it polices access into communities based on perceived social and political norms, often dependent on the wills of the community or vigilante group. This is not always explicitly right-wing extremist in nature, as was seen with the Young Lions, but can certainly contain specific elements of the definition. This primarily manifested as the brutal vigilante killings of suspected Apartheid 'collaborators' and exploitation of community protection projects to eliminate political rivals from the community. Primarily driven by social change and political resentment, Apartheid-era political vigilantism shows consistency with four characteristics of RWE (Carter, 2019): the implementation of a strong and authoritarian community, holistic nationalism based on political affiliation, populist rhetoric of communities under threat and thus requiring protection, and violent anti-democratic means of distributing justice. Racism and xenophobia could also be seen within the vigilante groups of the AWB and Inkatha.

Even though the number of explicit forms of extreme-right violence has relatively decreased since Apartheid, it would be foolish to think that extreme-right ideology does not exist today and does not hold a potential for violence. With a South African economy that is characterized by low growth, rising unemployment, and increasing inequality (Padayachee, 2019), a government incapacitated by corruption (Orderson, 2022), and portions of society still seeking radical socio-economic change after Apartheid, a fertile breeding ground exists for the exact type of crisis language that spurs extreme-right activism. Building on the patterns and characteristics described in the history of RWE in SA, the following chapter will paint a contemporary landscape of the various right-wing extremist social movement organizations in post-Apartheid SA, and detail what specific discursive opportunities construct their respective frame.

Chapter 5: Post-Apartheid South African Right-Wing Extremism

5.1 Introduction

This study sets out to answer the question: why has right-wing extremism (RWE) occurred in post-Apartheid South Africa (SA) and what can explain the various manifestations? In the previous chapter, the historical forms of RWE in SA were shown, with a specific focus on their fluidity and sources of influence. This is important, as history plays a crucial role in influencing contemporary beliefs. Using the historical manifestations of South African RWE as a contextual foundation, this chapter will paint the contemporary South African landscape. With the primary manifestations being Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism, and political vigilantism, this study suggests that the three pre-1994 forms of RWE have evolved to present day circumstances.

To accomplish the analysis of these groups, the theoretical framework detailed in the literature review will be employed, specifically looking to identify the type of groups in these three forms of RWE, the characteristics present within these groups, and what communication drives their proximity to the extreme-right. According to the definition chosen, groups will be identified according to a subscribed ideology that: "encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism", showing characteristics of a strong state, racism/xenophobia, nationalism, populism and/or anti-democracy (Carter, 2018).

In this study, the rise of ISIS and the growing threat of Islamic terrorism in SA is acknowledged, largely thanks to an extensive investigation by *TimesLive* (Hosken, 2022a; Hosken, 2022b; Hosken, 2022c). This study acknowledges that similarities can be drawn between RWE and Islamic terrorism (Abbas, 2017). However, due to capacity limitations, this study will not engage with that specific frame of extremism but encourages it as an avenue for further research.

5.2. Afrikaner Extremism

Built upon ideological premises of prophecy, divine rights and white supremacy, this ideology has persisted in contemporary SA. Within the decade following Apartheid, several extremist political organizations were formed with the explicit intention of violently overthrowing the government. Most prominently, the latter parts of 2002 saw the emergence of *Die Boeremag* (Boer Force/Power), a group of Afrikaner extremists looking to fulfil the goal of an independent Afrikaner state. It was a political organization that possessed a philosophy based

on extreme Afrikaner nationalist views combined with a God-given purpose, similar to the ideology of Apartheid era groups such as the *Afrikaner Broederbond* and *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB) with their ultranationalism and religious conviction (Schönteich, 2004). Their plan to overthrow the government through instigating a race war was based on the Anglo-Saxon War era prophecies of Seer van Rensburg. Used as a powerful discursive tool to recruit members, Seer van Rensburg had envisioned a civil war between white and black South Africans, which would eventually lead to a "man in a brown suit" saving the Afrikaner nation and returning them to power (McMichael, 2019). *Die Boeremag* detonated eight bombs in Soweto. Seven destroyed railway lines and one targeted a mosque. Twenty-three suspects were arrested and charged with acts of terrorism, sabotage, treason and the illegal possession of explosives and firearms. 3000kg of explosives were seized during the arrests (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017).

More recently, similar to how the dismantling of Apartheid was characterized as an attack on the Afrikaner identity and way of life, in the absence of the Apartheid system, a new threat has been constructed to encourage mobilization and recruitment. Violent robberies and home invasions against white farmers, described as *plaasmoorde* (farm murders), have been the chosen discursive opportunity for action. Based on populist and anti-establishment rhetoric, this phenomenon has been specifically characterized as a pattern of marginalization and violence which poses a direct threat to the very existence of Afrikaners in SA. These crimes, often described in horrifying and grisly detail, are considered to be a frame of genocide against white Afrikaners, or ethnic cleansing, enacted to violently force white people off their lands. This is often motivated by the land redistribution agenda of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) who seeks to redistribute the overwhelming concentration of land under white control (Bueckert, 2018).

Little evidence exists for this narrative (Brodie, 2013; Wilson, 2018) as only an average of 57 farm murders took place every year (including the murder of black farm workers) between 2017/18 and 2020/21 (South African Police Service, 2021). Despite this, Afrikaner extremists have seized on the infrequent cases of black-on-white farm-related violence to peddle a propaganda campaign aimed at the frame alignment of Afrikaners being in peril and under threat of white genocide (Hill, 2018). This campaign has even caught the attention of the international far-right, with alt-right media personalities including Katie Hopkins, Lauren Southern and Faith Goldy giving it coverage (Bueckert, 2018). Most famously, it even caught

the attention of far-right media personality Tucker Carlson and President Trump who tweeted that he was monitoring the "large scale killing of farmers" in SA (Williams, 2018). In addition, vast international support has been driven online, especially through Facebook (van Eyssen, 2019). This has prompted far-right political organisation Afriforum to tour the United States promoting this narrative (Afriforum, 2019) and international neo-Nazi organisations such as The Base to set up recruitment channels in SA (Wallace, 2020).

The most recent mobilization of this white genocide subculture has been the trial of the alleged murderers of Brendin Horner, a white farm manager who was tragically murdered by stock thieves in 2021. Protests occurred outside the Free State Magistrate's Court in Senekal where two suspects were on trial. Present at these protests was Afriforum and South Africa's largest opposition political party, The Democratic Alliance, who claimed that white farmers are subjected to a "low intensity war" (McMichael, 2021b). Present with placards reading "Boer Lives Matter", the farmers demanded that the two suspects be handed over to them, seemingly to administer their own form of vigilante justice. After this had not been granted, protestors intimidated journalists, attempted to storm the court prison cells and overturned and burned a police van outside the court building (BBC News, 2020; eNCA, 2020). The two men on trial were found to be not guilty and were discharged on all counts due to DNA evidence (Chabalala, 2021).

What this flare-up in violence represents is the perseverance of the Afrikaner extremist subculture of the *volk* identity being under threat. Secondly, it represents a large network of organisations rallying around the same extremist ideas, and acting on them in various ways. Within this ecosphere of Afrikaner extremism, several groups can be categorised as explicitly right-wing extremist; whereas others occupy less extreme positions on the far-right scale such as Afriforum (van der Westhuizen, 2018; Davis, 2017; du Preez, 2016) and the Institute of Race Relations (Maphanga, 2021; Hogg, 2021; Moichela, 2022; Daily Maverick, 2021). These supporting groups will not be analyzed in this study, but further research into their contribution to the far-right ecosphere is encouraged.

Moreover, due to their racism, anti-democratic nature and depth of white nationalism, one of the most prominent extreme-right groups is the survivalist militia, or political organisation, *Die Suidlanders.* Also inspired by the cryptic prophecies of Seer van Rensburg (McMichael, 2019), this group has bought up acres of land, is stockpiling weapons and, guided by an

incredibly detailed 100 page manual, is ready to travel at any moment across the country to defend SA from the forces of a black uprising (Haynes, 2018).

The leader, Simon Roche, has toured the US, meeting with far-right media personalities such as Alex Jones (Info Wars) and prominent racists such as David Duke (Haynes, 2018), perpetuating the myth that white South Africans are "under threat of genocide" (McKenzie & Swails, 2018). Roche was even seen marching with other white supremacists at the Charlottesville 'Unite the Right' rally in 2017 which resulted in the death of an anti-racism activist (Campbell, 2020). With *Die Suidlanders* claiming to have a membership of over 130 000, their recruitment technique that channels through the narrative of victimhood is the same technique employed by known terrorist groups (McKenzie & Swails, 2018).

Another prominent political organisation, known as the *Kommandokorps*, takes a more direct approach in asserting its nationalist propaganda. They are led by Franz Jooste, a former Colonel of the Apartheid era South African National Defence Force. Present at the Senekal trial wearing old generation Boer military attire, and in partnership with a team of trained soldiers, Jooste was quoted saying "if they want a war they will get it" (*Opera News*, 2021). However, what the group is famously known for are its military-style training camps for teenage Afrikaans boys. Targeting young Afrikaners between the ages of 13-19, the group actively exploits the discursive opportunity of these young Afrikaners who have a strong *Boer* identity but struggle to find their place in the new multicultural SA; often fuelled by positive discrimination aimed at redress, which makes it difficult for white young people to find jobs (van Gelder, 2011).

In addition, the group exploits fear, as the high national crime rate is used to construct a discursive narrative of whites being targeted, directly taken from the white genocide subculture (van Gelder, 2015). Within this context, these camps serve as a physical initiation into the militarised masculinity of old Boer war heroes, and mentally indoctrinating biological racism. Citing discredited and incorrect anthropological studies stating that white people have superior biological traits, these camps introduce the mental conditioning of white supremacy to these young people, in addition to the appropriate military response necessary to take on this upcoming threat. This results in recruits burning the current South African flag and being pushed into rejecting the idea of a 'Rainbow Nation' in favour of the Afrikaans ethnically exclusive *volkstaat* represented by the Apartheid-era South African flag (Crossman, 2015). Claiming to have trained 1500 young people between 2000 and 2012, the *Kommandokorps*

have formed a unity pact with the AWB and *Die Suidlanders* to coordinate their security and response for the (apparent) upcoming race war (Sosibo, 2012).

The AWB, an Apartheid-era political organization and militia discussed in the previous chapter, is still present today. However, its prominence has significantly decreased since the murder of its leader, Eugene Terreblanche, in 2010 by one of the black workers on his farm (Smith, 2012). In 2016, the organisation had reported a membership of 5000 and is mainly present online in recruiting members. In 2021, Facebook's Dangerous Individuals and Organisations policy considered the AWB a hate group and threat to society, and banned their use of the platform (McCain, 2021).

In 2019, four members of the political organisation: National Christian Resistance Movement, alternatively known as The Crusaders, were arrested under suspicion of planning terrorist attacks after firearms and bomb-making materials had been found in the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (Khumalo, 2019). The plan had been to launch attacks on black people through the targeting of government buildings and informal settlements (Mitchley, 2020). Their leader, Harry Knoesen, gained notoriety for racist and inflammatory social media posts calling on white South Africans to take up arms and secure the future of the white race in SA (a reference to the infamous 14-word global neo-Nazi slogan). In addition in 2015, he had carried out a publicity stunt by carrying a giant metal cross wearing military camouflage and a sword (McMichael, 2019).

Therefore, this study suggests that what we see in post-Apartheid SA is a continuation of the frame of Afrikaner identity being under threat by multiculturalism. With groups still seeking inspiration from Boer folklore and religious texts, modern day Afrikaner extremists utilise the failings of the ANC and SA's high crime rate to bolster the discursive messaging of a white genocide and the frame of needing to prepare for and react to it. Considering the continued goal of creating a white Afrikaner *volkstaat* and a nationalistic ideology explicitly based on racial exclusion enforced by strong law and order, this chapter finds that Apartheid-era Afrikaner extremism has adapted to contemporary SA and is reacting to present day socioeconomic conditions with the continued goal of creating an Afrikaner nation-state.

5.3 Zulu Nationalism

5.3.1 Inkatha Freedom Party

Post-Apartheid, clashes between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and ANC evolved from right-wing extremist attacks and democratic disruption into an 'unofficial' civil war until a peace agreement was signed in 1999 (Mail&Guardian, 1999). However, up until that point, fueled by past wartime divisions and legacy, the post-1994 period saw the civil war between the ANC and IFP evolve into a complicated network of complicity stretching from the lowest forms of criminality to the highest tiers of the state. Despite negotiating compliance during the 1994 elections and entering into an uneasy coalition with the ANC post-election (Mngomezulu, 2021), the IFP still contained violent elements exploiting notions of Zulu nationalism to maintain support and influence in KwaZulu-Natal. Two high profile cases are worth noting: the Shobashobane massacre and the Nongoma assassinations (Taylor, 2002).

In an area with a history of bloodshed between the ANC and IFP, the Shobashobane massacre saw 600 alleged IFP members armed with automatic weapons, pistols, and traditional weapons, move through the area, killing 19 people, injuring hundreds, and burning down at least 90 huts (IOL, 2011). In addition, the case of the Nongoma assassinations shows that even in areas of hegemonic IFP control, political violence can still spiral out of control. Nongoma, in northern KwaZulu-Natal, has been an Inkatha stronghold for years, but since 1999 has seen more than twenty officials, both ANC and IFP, assassinated by former paramilitary forces. In April 1999, the ANC set up a branch in Nongoma and started actively recruiting members in preparation for the upcoming 1999 general election. This was integral in sparking a series of deadly assassinations as the nature of the conflict shifted from political to economic, and the battleground was formed within the taxi industry (Taylor, 2002).

Ownership of taxi organizations was closely linked with prominent political leaders at the time, who were divided between the ANC and IFP. Over time, other community issues like land disputes and cattle theft fueled the conflict, which led to the influx of guns into the taxi industry, creating a flourishing illegal trade, which in turn resulted in a flurry of attacks and revenge killings. IFP members took control with the assistance of paramilitary trained personnel and with the alleged help of an Apartheid-era trained hit squad, who acted on both sides and played a crucial role in the violence (Taylor, 2002; de Kock, 1998). Within the space of a year, at least seven IFP leaders and six ANC leaders were assassinated (Taylor, 2002). This violence within

the taxi industry was more related to organized crime than RWE. However, it is important to note that the right-wing extremist nature and behaviour of Inkatha certainly led to the increase in organized crime in KwaZulu-Natal during this period.

Therefore, until the 1999 peace agreement, Inkatha continues some its Apartheid-era extreme-right characteristics and allyship with pro-Apartheid security forces. Despite the violence evolving into organized crime in the taxi industry, Inkatha can still be seen adopting a distinctive political agenda as they continued to violently destabilize the democratic efforts of the ANC within regions of their control in KwaZulu-Natal. Angered by the social change of democratic SA and fueled by political resentment towards the new government that favoured simple majority rule over a Zulu hegemony, the IFP continued to exploit notions of Zulu nationalism to continue its violent assault on the ANC and quest for power and control in KwaZulu-Natal. Still existing today as a pro-Zulu conservative political party, this study suggests that pre-1999 the IFP was still in line with the definition of RWE (Carter, 2018) due to their continued political violence, exploitation of exclusionary Zulu nationalism, collaboration with Apartheid-era security forces and disruption of democratic process.

5.3.2 Radical Economic Transformation

Within post-independence, post-colonial societies, the politics of nativism are frequently adopted to oppose and reverse colonialist representations and Apartheid policies (Breakfast & Chindoga, 2021). Subsequently, these politics of nativism are rooted in the 'national question' which tends to produce pro-native and anti-colonial ideas acting as a counter-discourse to colonial legacies. These policies are often pro-tradition, anti-West, anti-White, pro-land expropriation, calling for radical economic transformation to benefit historically disadvantaged populations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). These policies stretch deeper than simple populism and are rooted in cultural, social, economic, and political processes (Breakfast, Chindoga & Johnson, 2021).

This discourse is actively employed by Zuma and his 'radical economic transformation' (RET) faction within the ANC. The pervasive and influential Zulu nationalist subculture was critical in garnering Zuma electoral support and securing him the South African presidency in 2009 (Ndletyana & Maaba, 2010; Makhanya, 2012; Onstad, 2006; Southall, 2014; Makhanya, 2018; Gumede, 2016; Ngqulunga, 2020). Since losing power, Zuma has effectively built a political organization within the ANC that adopts extremist rhetoric and tactics with the aim of seizing

control of the ruling party. In doing so, it exploits similar notions of Zulu nationalism to mobilize ground support in the same way Inkatha did in the 1980s and 1990s. It has mobilized on racially divisive, authoritarian, populist, anti-constitutional, and anti-democratic discursive opportunities to construct a frame of violent revolution centred on a white monopoly capital elite being the largest enemy to its target demographic: the black majority. Tied in with its use of widespread violence during the July riots of 2021, this study suggests that RET should be classified as a right-wing extremist political organization.

Exclusionary and populist discourse was initially evident in Zuma's characterization of Thabo Mbeki in the 2008 election as an educated elite "waging war" on African traditions (Gumede, 2016). It grew even deeper with the revelation of the extent of state capture and corruption perpetrated by the Gupta family in collaboration with Zuma. To defend himself, Zuma asserted that he was being attacked due to his assault on white-monopoly capital and support for land redistribution (Breakfast & Chindoga, 2021). Using Mandela's legacy of 'togetherness' as justification, Zuma frames 'white monopoly capital' as the common enemy of black emancipation (*News24*, 2017b).

Within a similar vein, at the State of the Nation address in 2017, Zuma expanded on his nativist rhetoric, describing the radical change he wanted to see within South African structures, systems, patterns of ownership, management, and control of the economy in favour of poor black South Africans (Breakfast & Chindoga, 2021). Through exploiting existing factions within the ANC, Zuma strategically portrayed himself as a populist, anti-elitist and pro-poor candidate to garner mass appeal across SA (Vincent, 2011). Therefore, he constructed a poor, black identity under threat to the predatory behaviour of a collaboration between white capital and the black middle class. As the defender of the vulnerable, it was he alone who could bring radical change and address black poverty (Breakfast & Chindoga, 2021) and by allowing the economic status quo to remain, was feeding: "The roots of racial supremacy and exploitation" (Zuma, 2017). This nativist discourse has grown into a legitimate and organized faction within the ANC, dividing the party into two clear sides. The pro-Zuma, pro-Zulu faction, RET, has multiple members in multiple spaces including Zuma's children, political entrepreneurs, criminal organisations, military veterans loyal to Zuma, senior figures of *uMkhonto we Sizwe*, portions of the charismatic churches, and Zulu nationalists loyal to the appeals of an ethnonationalist Zulu state (Fogel, 2021).

A key tactic of the RET faction has been the constant undermining of the country's judicial system and the legitimacy of its ability to dispense justice. Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Tourism and member of RET, published an article in January 2022 calling into question the legitimacy of the constitution, comparing its ability to address the plight of the poor to that of a Panado (Sisulu, 2022). Regarding the justice system, Sisulu stated:

> Today, in the high echelons of our judicial system are these mentally colonized Africans, who have settled with the worldview and mindset of those who have dispossessed their ancestors. They are only too happy to lick the spittle of those who falsely claim superiority. The lack of confidence that permeates their rulings against their own speaks very loudly, while others, secure in their agenda, clap behind closed doors (Sisulu, 2022).

Sihle Zikalala, former KwaZulu-Natal Premier and Provincial Chairperson for the ANC, has also taken aim at the judiciary, calling for a "debate" on the supremacy of the constitutional court over parliament (Harper, 2022). Prominent RET member, Nkosentsha Shezi, has also rejected the state capture report delivered by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo and described it as a "gimmick" (Phungula & Makwakwa, 2022). Most prominently, Shezi also stated that Zuma's arrest was due to a captured justice system as: "When it comes to [former] President Zuma, every rule in the book is broken without any recourse" (Singh, 2021). He also warned that considering Zuma appealing his arrest:

> I am happy that his [Zuma's] lawyers are considering taking legal action against this decision, which may avert a similar situation that we saw in July. The masses of our people must not be intimidated. If our people feel that Jacob Zuma's rights have been trampled upon, they have a right to stand up. We have a right to stand up in defence of our constitution and in defence of our courts (Singh, 2021).

This divisive style of politics saw its most recent peak with the order that Zuma had to hand himself over to authorities in July 2021 to serve a 15-month prison sentence for failing to appear before a commission investigating corruption scandals (Eligon, 2021). What transpired was the mobilization of Zulu regiments, known as *amabutho,* outside the former President's home, Nkandla, to protect him from prosecuting authorities (Duma, 2021). The blatant display of weapons and appeals to Zulu identity and history was an indication of the shift in the balance of power in KwaZulu-Natal with Buthelezi labelling the event as "treasonous" (Harper, 2021), and the act being labelled "unsanctioned" by the Zulu Kingdom (Hyman, 2021).

Since 2008, pro-Zuma forces have threatened to burn the country to the ground if Zuma is ever arrested for one of his multiple corruption charges. In 2021 they did just that with riots triggered by the arrest of Zuma, costing R50 billion and leaving two million people jobless (Erasmus, 2022). It is widely agreed that RET played a large contributing factor (Pillay, 2022a; Pillay, 2022b; Malala, 2021; Makinana, 2021; Felix, 2022; Ericsson, 2021; SABC News, 2022). In fact, State Security agencies had warned President Ramaphosa about the national shutdown potential of Zuma's arrest two months before it occurred (*News24*, 2021a).

This was reinforced by the report on the riots, commissioned by President Ramaphosa, which states that the differences within the ANC can be regarded as a contributing factor to the looting and violence as perpetrators were "responding to the national shutdown calls, and the social media mobilization of the so-called Radical Economic Transformation forces" (The Presidency, 2021). Furthermore, the ANC admits that some of the incitement of violence was caused by its own members. However, it is unclear if disciplinary action was taken against them (The Presidency, 2021). This was further affirmed by statements made by the Deputy Minister of State Security, Zizi Kodwa, who stated that information had been received regarding a "big plot" to trigger domestic instability with "right-wing elements at play" (Buchanan-Clark, 2021).

Kodwa added that: "To an extent, they want to destabilize the country and they also planned what is called in right-wing language, a lone wolf, must start racial tension and racial war in South Africa" (Buchanan-Clark, 2021). The ANC themselves have admitted that the RET faction has rogue elements from the state security apparatus with strong links to the "darker side of civil society" and that they have experience in running operations (Fogel, 2021). The use of social media was crucial within the mobilization of these operations (Mokoka, 2021 & Buchanan-Clark, 2021).

What the events of July 2021 show is that Zulu nationalism has been a lingering force within South African politics for years and has been left untouched. Once utilized by the Zulu nationalist ambitions of the IFP, this subculture has now grown within the dominant political party. RET is utilizing the mobilization potential of Zulu nationalists to grow a new wave of supporters uninterested in democratic process and political pluralism; their priority being the protection of their leader and of their ethnic identity. This study corresponds with Piper (2009) who states that being Zulu does not mean being a Zulu nationalist, and RET's exploits resemble

forms of political tribalism. However, in the battle for control over state resources, past ethnic divisions are exploited (Paret, 2018), and the subculture of Zulu nationalism has shown itself to have violent recruitment potential.

Zulu nationalism does not boast the comprehensive discursive infrastructure and support networks present within Afrikaner extremism. However, RET has shown its effectiveness in mobilizing along ethnic lines and weaponizing discontent towards SA's current socio-economic realities to enact unprecedented levels of violence in post-Apartheid SA. The exploitation of this Zulu nationalist subculture by RET has shown it to be a threat to the establishment of a common South African identity and, when called upon, members of this subculture completely reject constitutional democracy as a procedure to provide fair justice and distribution of power. Therefore, with the violence enacted in its name, its frame built upon exclusionary and racist nationalism, and complete rejection of the democratic and constitutional procedures introduced post-Apartheid, RET falls within this study's definition of RWE.

5.3.3 Black First Land First

Despite not being explicitly Zulu nationalist, the political party Black First Land First (BLF) has close ties to the RET (which is closely aligned to Jacob Zuma) and is equally extremist in its frame alignment and messaging. Allegations relating to its relationship with Zuma and the Guptas surfaced in 2017 when London-based Public Relations firm Bell Pottinger was accused of running a racially divisive campaign in South Africa, ordered by the Gupta family (IOL, 2018). This plan included the use of multiple media channels to advance a harmful narrative summarized in "white monopoly capital" and "economic Apartheid". The goal of this campaign was to create a scapegoat for SA's troubled economy and social conditions, thereby deflecting responsibility away from the state capture allegations facing Zuma and the Gupta family. It was this campaign that birthed the term RET (Joseph, 2020). It was revealed that the leader of BLF, Andile Mngxitama, had formed part of the elaborate plan and was commissioned to write an opinion piece slandering BizNews editor Alec Hogg to frame the national narrative away from the Guptas and to receive funding in return (*News24*, 2017a).

Despite masquerading as a far-left, revolutionary socialist political party, this study argues that the actions of BLF draw them in line with the definition of RWE as stated in this study. In 2016, BLF was launched by Mngxitama (Simelane, 2016) with statements from members that

indicated its black nationalist frame. Thabo Ledwaba described the means necessary to achieve the black agenda as: "The only chance we have in our hands is a revolution. We must develop a model and take power by any means necessary" (Simelane, 2016). After having preemptively stated that the Constitution and Parliament will not help to deliver land redistribution, Mngxitama expressed his grievances towards white people, which included their food production: "We are unwell because white people are poisoning all the food we eat, and their medication makes us dependent". This, along with land inequities and economic supremacy, led Mngxitama to conclude that: "We have lost all the love for the children of white people who have taken our land and our sea. Now the only solution for you to have peace is that they should return our land" (Simelane, 2016). Therefore, the group believes that if the government does not follow through with its plans of land expropriation, they see land invasions and occupations as a legitimate tactic (Powell, 2018).

The issue of land redistribution is a popular discursive opportunity for many political organizations in SA, both left- and right-wing. The political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has shown itself to have adjacent ideological characteristics and tendencies to BLF (Satgar, 2019); however, it is not regarded as right-wing extremist, since the scope of its actions do not fully meet the set criteria. In addition, the state has shown extreme-right characteristics in policing the occupation of land in SA, with ANC ties to ethnic exclusion in KwaZulu-Natal (Makhaye, 2022; Clark, 2018b; Kamolane & Ditshego, 2022) and DA ties to anti-poor discrimination in Cape Town (Dolley, 2022; Payi, 2021). This study encourages further research into the far-right characteristics of these groups; thereby further developing the understanding of the entire far-right ecosphere in SA.

Returning to BLF, members are known for their aggressive methods of action as several incidents have resulted in BLF coming into conflict with the law. ABSA successfully filed an interdict against BLF in 2017 (Singh, 2017) after BLF had: "Engaged in unlawful conduct that included acts of intimidation, insults to ABSA staff, assaulting ABSA staff, threatening ABSA staff with physical violence if they did not accede to BLF's demands" (*SowetanLive*, 2017). This was during a series of protests against ABSA, demanding that they repay bailouts granted to them in the 1990s (*TimesLive*, 2017).

BLF is also known for the intimidation and assault of journalists speaking out against them or their Gupta/Zuma affiliates. In 2017, after having written a column stating that he had been targeted by the Gupta family for writing critical pieces about them, *Business Day* editor Peter

Bruce, was threatened and assaulted outside his home by BLF members. Writing "land or death" on his garage, Bruce was told to go back to Europe since his pieces were fueled by his "racist mind" (Goba, 2017). Ten days later, BLF threatened and accosted another investigative journalist, Micah Reddy. Luckily, they escaped unharmed, but BLF arrived again three weeks later at an AmaBhungane public event where discussions were in progress about newly-revealed data about the Guptas' business empire. BLF members threatened and assaulted another journalist (Krøvel & Thowsen, 2017:26-27). This resulted in the South African National Editors' Forum filing urgent interdicts against BLF for its alleged intimidation, harassment and threatening of journalists (Mail&Guardian, 2017), which it subsequently won (De Wet, 2017).

Further, Mngxitama has made several statements expressing his resentment towards white people. In December 2018, Mngxitama was suspended by Twitter for several threats including that he and his followers would kill all white people and their pets and stating that he would kill five white people for every black person killed in the taxi industry (Nemakonde, 2018; Pijoos, 2018). He elaborated by stating that he would bring SA back to the "dark ages of Apartheid" and that: "We will kill their children, we will kill their women, we will kill anything that we find on our way" (Gous, 2018). 2018 also saw BLF members allegedly assault a female advocate at the High Court in Johannesburg. After the advocate had become involved in an argument with a security guard, BLF members joined in, threatened, and assaulted her whilst shouting "white blood will be spilt" (Germaner, 2018).

In the 2019 National Elections, BLF campaigned on the slogan "Land or Death". This was done with the aim of changing the constitution as: "This constitution is a white constitution and that is why we have to buy our land back from the people who stole it" (eNCA, 2019). However, this was short-lived as the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) had formally deregistered BLF as a political party in November 2019 due to its constitution which stated that only black people could be members of the party (Grobler & Madia, 2019). Claiming that "the entire white establishment is terrified of the black agenda that we represent", the party stated: "Our movement has lost all trust in the entire justice system of this country. We shall not be subjecting ourselves to the kangaroo courts of white supremacy any further" (IOL, 2019). BLF amended its constitution later that year to gain re-registration from the IEC (Nkosi, 2020); however, any white people joining were to acknowledge: "the 1994 constitution (of the

country) is anti-black and must be replaced by a pro-black constitution of redress"; thereby confirming its identity as a black nationalist party (Mvumvu, 2019).

A BLF spokesperson has also been guilty of extreme posts on social media. Lindsay Maasdorp was ordered to delete several social media posts by the equality court in 2022. These include posting the question: "when we kill them?", on Facebook in a discussion relating to white people in SA in 2016, posting on Twitter: "I have aspirations to kill white people and this must be achieved" in 2018, and a posting "5:1" on Twitter in 2018 in response to the death of an elderly white couple, referencing Mngxitama's previous statement about killing five white people for every one black person (*TimesLive*, 2022). Maasdorp also supported a comment on Facebook following the death of three school children in the *Hoërskool Driehoek* tragedy which stated: "Don't have heart to feel pain for white kids. Minus 3 future problems". Maasdorp replied to that post with the comment: "God is responding, why should we frown on the ancestors' petitions to punish the land thieves including their offspring" (Pijoos, 2019).

Therefore, BLF can be categorized as black neo-fascists and right-wing extremists according to the definition stated in this study. It is authoritarian in nature, willing to use violence and intimidation against any form of opposition. Its rejection of South African democratic constitutionalism and war against the judiciary and journalists represents a clear rejection of democracy and pluralism of thought. Despite its assessment of inequalities in SA having merit, its outright hatred for white people and explicit language justifying violence against them portrays a clear frame of ethnic and exclusionary nationalism enforced by a strong state, which is unsurprising considering its ties to Zuma's Zulu nationalism. The group's influence is fading; however, its rhetoric is certainly concerning, if one considers the sensitive racial fault lines in SA; and it contains a potential for lone wolf attacks.

5.4. Political Vigilantism

In this study, the term *political* vigilantism is used as a description for groups pursuing vigilante activity resulting from frustration with state ineffectiveness at providing law and order, and activism outside of the law due to state ineffectiveness at excluding/including certain groups of people from the conception of the community set by the vigilante group (Asamoah, 2020). Buur and Jensen (2004) pinpoint that vigilantism can, in addition to crime, police distinctive ideological positions within the community and violently regulate their own notions of morality. With the end of the Apartheid regime, political vigilantism evolved into two distinct

forms. The first was the continuation of violent citizen policing in response to high crime rates and an ineffective post-Apartheid policing system. Some of these groups adopted definitive political ideologies extending beyond simply combating crime and can be considered right-wing extremist. Secondly, along with the fall of Apartheid came an increase of immigration into SA, particularly from other African nations (Moyo, 2021). This gave rise to devastating and deadly waves of xenophobic violence, with the formal development of anti-foreign organizations, which can be regarded as right-wing extremist.

5.4.1 Vigilante Groups

Oomen (2004:153) points out that towards the end of 1996, *Mapogo a Mathamaga*, roughly translating into: "If you are a leopard, I'll be a tiger", was formed and grew into the largest vigilante network in the country with an estimated 70 000 members and 72 branches around the country. Fueled by local power dynamics and socio-economic struggles, *Mapogo* rose to power due to its frame of alternative citizenship based on patriarchal power and privilege. It was characterized by its hegemonic bloc rallying of conservative factions of rural society rooted in a rights-based discourse on difference. In addition, many *Mapogo* supporters believe the ANC, and the constitution, to be crime-friendly, deliberately attempting to eradicate the influence of traditional leaders. Therefore, they consider African means to be necessary for dealing with issues in African communities (Sekhonyane and Louw, 2002).

Therefore, to deliberately shape the moral basis upon which individuals and communities are governed, *Mapogo* believes that criminals infringe on the rights of others and therefore do not meet the moral criteria allowing them to bear rights themselves. As a group, they challenge the state's restraint on using violence to correct criminality and work to correct the state's extension of rights to criminal suspects. With financial support from membership fees, *Mapogo* asserts alternative values of corporal punishment, respect for the elderly, hierarchy, and the importance of traditional culture (Oomen, 2004). Between 1996 and 2000, more than three hundred members of *Mapogo* were charged with murder, assault, and attempted murder (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002).

Secondly, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) was formed in 1995 as a popular movement in the Western Cape, based on the empowerment of communities against drug usage and violent crime. Whereas the movement's actions started as peaceful protests, they become increasingly violent and militant. The turning point in PAGAD's preference for violence was

its killing of prominent Cape Flats gang boss, Rashaad Staggie (Petrus, 2015). Analysts attribute PAGAD's turn to violence to the infiltration into the PAGAD's leadership ranks of Qibla, a fundamentalist and militant Islamic group (Dixon & Johns, 2001) who sought to implement a strict system of Islamic rule in SA (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017).

Between 1996 and 1998, the group received military style training and its militant arm, G-Force, carried out attacks on gay nightclubs, restaurants and the investigative units and judges involved in dealing with cases against PAGAD. Between 1996 and 1999, the attacks became more violent with an estimated 472 which occurred in the form of shootings, and the use of petrol and pipe bombs, and grenades. Its evolution into radical beliefs and militant rhetoric resulted in confrontations with the Muslim community, who were critical of PAGAD. This, allegedly, resulted in PAGAD carrying out attacks against various Muslim community leaders (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017).

Therefore, this study suggests that groups like *Mapogo* and PAGAD are actively right-wing extremist as they establish clear boundaries for who is acceptable within the community and who is not. Anyone outside these boundaries is not deserving of democratic due process or non-violent reform. Rather, through strong populist rhetoric, these groups subvert the state and its democratic procedures in favour of authoritarian and violent enforcement of law and order. It is a form of exclusionary and holistic nationalism based on a determined moral code which is actively enforced through non-democratic and violent means. It is holistic nationalism through the establishment of a clear 'out'-group. Under the veil of 'enforcing safety' in communities, these groups employ forms of localized and holistic nationalism, enforcing their conceptions of morality on to the construction of the community. These characteristics of strong state, nationalism, anti-democracy and populism bring these groups in line with Carter's (2018) definition of RWE.

What vigilantism shows is that the extension of democratic rights can also lead to the rejection of rights. Groups deemed to be the 'outsider' by vigilante groups are not deemed to have rights. They have stepped over locally imagined and forever evolving boundaries and have, therefore, forfeited their rights. This produces a field of contestation, as criminal suspects are assumed to be suspects no longer, since they have been accused of violating the rights of other citizens. This process is the community creation of distinctive 'in'-groups and 'out'-groups. Therefore, vigilante groups claim to create their own government; to work to be watchdogs for

communities, to be active citizens and to work to repair the political community (Rush Smith, 2013).

Therefore, determination of group inclusion rests within the hands of a minority who are willing to advance populist rhetoric in order to gain popular support for the use of violence. Political resentment towards the ANC-led government and its failure to assert healthy and safe community structures rests at the heart of this right-wing extremist behaviour, as a strong state is sought above all else. It is within this conception of the strong state, and who adds or detracts from it, that openings for the infiltration of racist and xenophobic values are created. Political pluralism is not sought, as the safety of the determined 'in'-group must be established and protected at all costs.

When a political agenda is included in this moral determination, groups are inherently right-wing extremist in nature and fall in line with the definition used in this study. In addition, if there is not a political agenda, and vigilantism occurs based solely on combating crime, such as Operation Wanya Tsotsi (Clark, 2017a), groups can still have far-right characteristics (Clark, 2017b) but are not regarded as inherently right-wing extremist. However, perpetrating vigilante violence, even if it is initially non-political, increases the likelihood of it becoming right-wing extremist. As we saw with The Young Lions, even groups fighting for a pluralistic democracy can have desires for social control and thus exhibit extreme-right characteristics. Therefore, this study finds the extreme-right characteristics and social influence of seemingly non-political vigilante groups worth further research.

The last act of political vigilantism worth mentioning was the mass violence in Phoenix which occurred during the July Riots of 2021. Amidst the spike in vigilantism seen during the riots, 36 people were killed in an area where black townships and 'Indian' suburbs coexisted unequally (Khan, Motaung & Bearak, 2021). This occurred in Phoenix, a community of 180 000 working class individuals just outside Durban. Of the 36 people killed, 33 were black; in an event which some are calling a massacre. Worried about their community under siege, Indian residents erected roadblocks on street corners; indiscriminately stopping black people, sometimes beating or killing them. This further endangered a longtime fragile relationship between the two marginalized groups under white Apartheid rule (Eligon & Mji, 2021). There are reports that even some shack dwellings were burnt down (McMichael, 2021a). This style

of racialized vigilantism also took place in Port Edward, a small town in Western KwaZulu-Natal (Burke, 2021).

Organizer of the Justice for Victims of Phoenix Massacre, Jackie Shandu, claims that a source at the Phoenix mortuary stated that at least 74 people had been murdered during the unrest, despite official reports claiming the number to be much lower. Shandu stated: "The Apartheid legacy that put Indians above Africans in the economic hierarchy of this society laid the foundation for Indian people to look down on us" (Myeni, 2021). South African Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane described the horrific events: "There were videos of Black people being shot execution-style by people brandishing illegal firearms and nothing was done to stop the vigilantism" (Myeni, 2021). With the actions being perceived as racial violence, the hashtag *#PhoenixMassacre* trended on social media, with scenes eerily familiar, echoing scenes from the Apartheid-era: images of armed white and Indian residents holding black men at gunpoint (Panchia, 2021). Other township residents claimed they had heard Indian vigilantes shouting South Africa's worst racial slur in chants of: "Kill the kaffir" (Sartorio, 2021).

Incidents of vigilante violence such as the Phoenix massacre are indicative of a society still burdened with collective trauma from Apartheid; and a normalization of violence that reflects in the manner in which issues such as crime are handled. This violence:

> Is a manifestation of the brokenness and consequent rage and anger that spills out when we have been wronged. The default language of violence and the gruesome nature of this violence that communities resort to as their last option in dealing with problems, crime and criminality is a response to issues and challenges in our present day (Moyo-Kupeta, 2021).

This is similar to the mainstreaming of right-wing extremist beliefs we see globally, and a manifestation of extreme-right violence based on racist exclusion. This study suggests that acts such as the Phoenix Massacre are explicitly right-wing extremist; boundaries of acceptance are drawn on racial lines and in the absence of state intervention, citizens present a brand of popular justice in line with local notions of morality and acceptability (Rush Smith, 2015). In the absence of state order, neglected communities create their own forms of politicized social control and threaten the constitutionally mandated rights of the citizens they claim to protect (Schuberth, 2013).

Therefore, this study finds that the acts in Phoenix fall in line with the selected definition of RWE. Rather than engaging with the democratic system to improve their perceptions of the justice system and foster social inclusion and diversity within their community, Phoenix can be seen creating their own authoritarian forms of law and order based on strict boundaries of ethnic exclusion. It is a version of localized nationalism that is centred around race and a subjective social belief of what is moral. The violent enforcement of these boundaries, fueled by the frame of a community under threat by criminals (which evidently has a fluid definition) and bolstered by historical legacies of racial discrimination, result in an unconstitutional mobilization that fits the characteristics of a strong state, anti-democracy, nationalism, and racism and/or xenophobia (Carter, 2018).

The mainstream nature of extreme violence and extreme-right ideas in SA allows RWE to adopt a fluid nature, similar to international forms of RWE. When certain social circumstances are triggered, conservative vigilante social movement organisations can shift towards a political agenda, mobilize into organized extremist violence, and then disperse and shift back towards the center right to maintain mainstream support. This is often triggered by perceived conditions of threat to a specific community, ethnicity or race, where removal of a specific type of individual is key to remedying the perceived notions of threat.

The social circumstances of high crime rates and past ethnic divisions allows exclusionary right-wing extremist ideas to linger within mainstream discourse and 'activate' into violence when a threat is perceived to be high enough. RWE was not apparent in Phoenix before the riots, but racial tensions since the fall of Apartheid laid the contextual foundation for the retreat into ethnic biases and violent resistance to 'the other' when threat was perceived. Thus, the destruction and fear of the ongoing riots, in tandem with the communication of an 'impending invasion' by the black population 'activated' right-wing extremist responses from the Phoenix community during July 2021. These 'activations' of RWE can happen within a few days, such as the events in Phoenix. They can also take place over time, such as Inkatha's spikes in democratic destabilization, PAGAD's development into an Islamic extremist political organization, and the persistent subculture of xenophobic violence in the following discussion.

5.4.2 Xenophobic Vigilantism

Xenophobia has emerged as a strong and violent subculture within South African black communities post-Apartheid, and has seen a steady increase through the 2000s in townships and informal settlements (Misago, Landau & Monson, 2009). Sporadic incidents of violence have occurred since the fall of Apartheid, but large and distinguishable waves of violence took place in 2008, 2015 and 2019. These attacks left hundreds of foreign nationals dead, hundreds of businesses looted and burnt down, and thousands displaced from their homes (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010; BBC News, 2015; Dixon, 2015; Watson, 2015; Regchand, 2019; Singh, 2019; Mitchley, 2019; Burke, 2019).

What is important to note is that the 2015 wave was triggered by comments made by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini who referred to foreigners as "criminals" and instructed them to "please go back to their countries" (Karimi, 2015; South African Human Rights Commission, 2016). This resulted in creating a "prevailing atmosphere of fear" which ignited an already extremely volatile xenophobic subculture based on immigrant resentment (Nair, 2016). It is important to note the overlap between ethnic nationalism and xenophobic behaviour. With the idea of a Zulu nation being under threat by foreigners, the characterization of these non-nationals as criminals serves as moral justification for their violent exclusion from South African society due to the perceived threat that they pose to the community; another example of the mobilization potential of Zulu nationalism.

Attacks from 2020 onwards have primarily occurred after months of build-up as anti-immigration rhetoric circulated on social media, accusing immigrant shop owners of cheating customers by selling out-of-date goods, stealing jobs, and defrauding the state (Burke, 2019). Of particular concern is the discriminatory and abusive treatment of non-nationals by law enforcement officials. The police have been found to specifically target foreign-run businesses in cracking down on counterfeit goods, ransacking foreigners' shops during raids and, in coordination with the Department of Home Affairs, conducting abusive documentation raids in areas known to be populated by non-nationals (Human Rights Watch, 2020b). The period of November 2020 to March 2021 saw more businesses looted and petrol-bombed by people claiming to be a part of the ANCs *uMkonto we Sizwe* Military Veterans' Association. These attacks took place, once again, as people demanded that jobs be reserved for South Africans (Mulaudzi, Lancaster & Hertis, 2021).

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Evidence suggests that these attacks are carried out by ordinary members of the public: men, women, old and young. This has led analysts to attribute those responsible for the attacks to unidentifiable and anonymous mobs (Misago, 2017). However, these attacks can most certainly be attributed to identifiable groups and individuals who act as primary instigators or masterminds with specific political agendas: often local community leadership structures or influential organizations such as business associations. The idea behind the 'unidentifiable mob' is simply an attempt to erase agency from those key actors who are responsible for the violence (Monson & Arian, 2008:26). It requires active mobilization to link the connective tissue between discontent and xenophobic violence. Well-known mobilization techniques, such as haranguing and parochial patronage, are utilized by local violence entrepreneurs to stir crowds into well-organized and targeted attacks on non-nationals in SA (Misago, 2019).

This form of mobilization initially developed and engaged with recruits online but has now manifested into a tangible political organization with boots on the ground. This is the concerning aspect of the extremist xenophobic subculture in SA. A subculture that was once decentralized and exploited by local political entrepreneurs has evolved into a centralized formal political organization looking to remove foreigners by any means necessary. This study suggests that Operation *Dudula* (OD) is the formal manifestation of South Africa's xenophobic subculture into an active political organization unconcerned with democratic procedure or human rights.

The movement Put South Africa First (PSAF) first appeared online in 2020, raising alarms for human rights defenders and foreign nationals after it had organized a march on Nigerian and Zimbabwean embassies in Pretoria in September 2020 (Khumalo, 2019). Acting on stereotypes, the movement alleges that foreign nationals are responsible for a range of crimes including robbery, sex-related crimes, slavery, kidnapping, and human- and drug-trafficking. No evidence is presented for such claims (Bornman, 2021). One leader stated that they do not care if they are labeled xenophobic as: "Children are going missing every day, and our government is not doing anything about it. Nigerians are known to be at the top of the list" (Khumalo, 2019). In addition, another organizer insisted that foreigners should even be denied their rights stating: "Our constitution should also be amended because our constitution is a problem", insisting that a constitution should be valid for South Africans only (Khumalo, 2019).

Largely present online, analysis has shown this organization to be peddling an extensive digital propaganda campaign against migrants. The Centre for Analytics and Behavioural Change showed that between 2020 and 2022, PSAF infiltrated over 50 000 social media accounts, peddling divisive content and disinformation. These seeds of violent mobilization were extremely prevalent during the 2021 local government elections (Centre for Analytics and Behavioural Change, 2022). Exploiting known misconceptions, the group actively engages with people who have little contact with non-nationals and are unaware of the benefits to the economy of immigration (Charles, 2020).

With xenophobic sentiment incredibly prevalent online and within the political sphere, the formation of an actively violent political organization deliberately seeking out foreigners, such as OD, or "beat back" in Zulu, was inevitable. OD is a splinter group from the PSAF movement, which has the backing of the All-Truck Drivers' Foundation and the disbanded *uMkhonto we Sizwe* Military Veterans' Association (Ho, 2022). However, it is more proactive in their mobilization of ground forces and aggressive action (Myeni, 2022). Founded after the 2021 July riots, they target drug-traffickers and businesses employing illegal immigrants. According to OD, the state is ineffective in responding to concerns and therefore they must take it upon themselves to carry out citizens' arrests (Nebe, 2022). Following its launch, several anti-immigrant groups were inspired to start forming in a similar capacity such as the Alexandra Dudula Movement (Myeni, 2022).

Formed by 33-year-old Nhlanhla Lux Dlamini, the group is known for its 'clean up' operations targeting businesses owned by foreigners whom OD deem illegal. When police conduct searches, they require permits, but OD believes they do not. OD reflects the growing lawlessness adopted by groups in SA, indicating a shorter distance between them and extremism. These operations escalated in violence when a father of four in Diepsloot was beaten and burnt alive after mobs went door to door demanding to see visas (Ho, 2022). Dlamini was arrested, shortly after had OD started operations, for theft and defeating the ends of justice; occurring after OD members had allegedly raided a Soweto resident's home, accusing him of selling drugs. Dlamini was released on bail to the cheer of 200 people donning OD regalia in support of him who were outside the gates of the court building (Tandwa, 2022).

Leaders of OD confirm its message by stating: "Our law enforcement is ineffective…. Law enforcement was not enforcing the law, which Operation *Dudula* does with ease". In response to their enforcement of the law, another leader added: "We are … pushing for accountability.

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The community here is fed up [with] the illegal foreign nationals and their illegal drug trade and we cannot live side by side with them because of their involvement in crime" (Simelane, 2022). The group now has branches countrywide including in several parts of Johannesburg and Durban (Africa News, 2022). Law enforcement is on high alert as tensions build within the informal settlements within which OD operate. Already there have been violent clashes, leaving three Zimbabwean men injured in Alexandra (Simelane, 2022b). One person died in a clash in Kliptown, Soweto, when OD members marched on Chicken Farm informal settlement (Tshikalange, 2022). Recently, OD stands accused of burning down the Yeoville market due to its occupation by foreign traders (Smillie, 2022). Nhlanhla Lux eventually cut ties with the group in 2022 after claims that the political organisation's hatred towards foreigners was too extreme (Nkanjeni, 2022).

As shown by amaBhungane (2022), xenophobic nationalism is an entire ecosphere, with many individual elements contributing to a larger extremist subculture. Not all members are inherently right-wing extremist, but they adopt the characteristic of xenophobia as a cheap method of gaining popular support. This xenophobic ecosphere consists of political parties such as ActionSA and the Patriotic Alliance, media organizations, social media campaigns and grassroots political organizations such as, *uMkhonto we Sizwe* Veterans Association and the All Truck Drivers' Forum. These groups can be considered frame-adjacent to RWE as they display extreme-right characteristics within the pursuit of their respective goals. Thus, with a large variety of social movement organizations utilizing the discursive opportunity of xenophobia to gain individual support, this study suggests that the manifestation of a formal right-wing extremist political organization completely dedicated to the cause of forcefully removing foreigners was inevitable.

Central to these xenophobic attacks is the following of a path of racism, directed commonly towards African migrants (Choane, Shukile & Mthombeni, 2011). This discrimination stems from various factors such as a fear of losing identity and social status, the perceived idea of intimidation which foreigners pose to citizens' economic success, and feelings of superiority (Solomon, 2008: 2-5). Several analysts have asserted that this rise in xenophobic violence cannot be divorced from the practice and ideology of new nation-building. Xenophobia can be considered the very real and tangible manifestation of the negative implications of democratic nationalism (Crush, 2002). The democratic process has resulted in the construction of a new national identity based on citizenship. Therefore, by using citizenship as a criterion, the frontier

guards of the new national identity can revoke the rights of non-citizens when the nations' borders and heartlands are being policed (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010).

This has created social control fueled by 'Rainbow Nationalism'. The ANC's post-Apartheid goal of creating an "over-arching non-ethnic South African nationalism" practically left no clear path for how the nationalisms of the past were to be integrated into the shared vision for social change (Beetar, 2019). Therefore, politics adopted a narrow, xenophobic, and nativist nationalism that favoured indigenous characteristics as key to belonging; in order to gain and retain power (Neocosmos, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). This was facilitated by the failure to develop a transcontinental national identity by national government (Neocosmos, 2008).

Within the context of high expectations post-Apartheid being met with non-delivery from the state and increasing inequality, dissatisfied nationals direct their resentment towards immigrants and ethnic minorities as the most obvious scapegoats (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008). A remaining feature of Apartheid is the co-existence of abject poverty amongst a large segment of the population juxtaposed with immense wealth in the hands of a small minority; a phenomenon growing increasingly prevalent in areas such as Alexandra, a poor and densely populated township which borders the high-income area of Sandton. Most urban centres have poor settlements on their fringes that are overpopulated with inadequate resources, where unemployment is common, especially among black youths (Zondi, 2008). Therefore, the existence of extreme economic inequality acts as an exacerbating factor to xenophobic violence (Nell, 2009). This was seen in OD's shutdown of Park Station in 2022, demanding that authorities ban foreign vendors from selling goods (eNCA, 2022).

Hence, the ANC-led government is hesitant to confront xenophobic violence as it blatantly exposes the illusion of South African exceptionalism and has subsequently fostered a subculture of unchecked xenophobia and impunity relating to public violence (Ukwandu, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010; Amnesty International, 2019). A new category of denationalized citizens has been created. It once constituted the black population living under the Apartheid government; currently it comprises non-nationals living within South Africa's borders. (Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2019). Citizenship is something that is actively made by populations, but its relationships and distinctions are made by the state. Through the illusion of nation-building and the state's extra-legal, and sometimes overtly illegal, ways of dealing with non-nationals, the violent exclusion of foreigners is birthed by the state, motivated by economic circumstance, and perpetuated violently by its citizens (Mosselson, 2010).

Therefore, this study suggests that xenophobia can be regarded as a legitimate right-wing extremist subculture within SA. Its believers assert a version of exclusionary nationalism based on citizenship through the strong use of violence and authoritarian policing, designed to remove foreigners from the economic and political spheres of operation. It forms a frame that places foreigners outside the boundaries of moral action and justifies violence and exclusion towards them as an appropriate measure of improving living standards in the absence of tangible economic and social reform (Solomon, 2019). This is similar to the 'crises' of immigration that has driven RWE in Europe and the US (Mudde, 2019). The combination of poor socio-economic conditions, and government complicity in resenting foreigners, has motivated citizens to embrace their own authoritarian form of law enforcement which rejects the constitutional democracy of SA in favour of an exclusionary strong state, with a clear 'in'-group and 'out'-group based on nationality. This becomes more concerning when the subculture develops into formal and centralized right-wing extremist political organizations such as OD.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter identified three primary forms of post-Apartheid RWE in SA. Evolving from the same forms pre-1994, the manifestations of Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism and political vigilantism are still present in democratic SA. Five discursive issues were identified as critical to the frames of these groups as they hold tremendous persuasive potential within South Africa's socio-economic conditions. The five issues were identified as: social inequality, ethnic tensions, immigrants, land, and crime. Fitting within the global fourth wave of RWE (Mudde, 2019), these issues are heterogeneous and do not manifest in isolation in SA. Figure 3 details the relationship between the social movement organizations analyzed in this chapter and the issues relevant to them. What is important to note is that a key theme to all social movement organizations is inequality, with every group wanting to change the structure of South Africa's distribution of social rewards. Upon this foundation of inequality, one sees additional issues specific to individual communities being exploited for recruitment purposes.

Afrikaner extremism persists post-Apartheid, relying on discursive opportunities of high crime rates and land redistribution, in order to construct a frame of the Afrikaner being under threat of white genocide. This manifests into several social movement organizations all with the common goal of advancing the Afrikaner nation state. With the right-wing extremist

characteristics (Carter, 2018) of a strong state, nationalism, racism, anti-democracy and populism, Afrikaner extremism meets Carter's (2018:174) definition of RWE.


Figure 3: Relationships of RWE in SA

RET, a political organization seeking to become a political party, uses discursive opportunities of social inequality and the mobilization potential of historical Zulu nationalism to assert a frame of a black (and specifically Zulu) identity under threat by white elites and their overwhelming economic power. It actively slanders South Africa's democratic institutions and employs the violent potential of past ethnic divisions to assert social control centred around its political agenda. This study argues that RET meets the criteria of RWE set out by Carter (2018) due to its authoritarian, exclusionary, nationalistic, anti-democratic and populist characteristics.

Xenophobic by nature, SA's xenophobic subculture and supporting groups, such as OD, are regarded as right-wing extremist due to their use of economic issues as a discursive opportunity to construct a frame of lower income South Africans being under threat by foreigners who are stealing their jobs and committing crimes. This frame is nuanced and does contain further ideas

of a lack of a common South African identity and police compliance. However, the exclusionary nature of this subculture, in addition to its authoritarian methodology, nationalistic ideology, anti-democratic beliefs and populist messaging, classifies the xenophobic subculture in SA and OD as right-wing extremist according to Carter's (2018) definition.

Important to note about these issues is that their use within extremist narratives participating in mainstream discourse is increasing and becoming more normalized. The idea of a white genocide and calculated killings of Afrikaans farmers has mainstream appeal within local and international policy discussions. The radical and revolutionary 'anti-white monopoly capital' language of RET and BLF are regular themes within economic debates regarding wealth redistribution in SA. South Africa's xenophobic subculture is so normalized, entire social media movements are frequently created around the removal of foreigners. This coincides with Mudde (2019) and Miller Idriss's (2020) description of the current fourth wave of RWE being distinguishable by its mainstream nature. Hence political parties are adopting these issues, since the cultural power of these issues supersedes political power, thereby providing a conducive context for legislators to act upon (Mondon & Winter, 2020). The mainstreaming of violence and extreme-right ideas allows community circumstances, such as crime and/or ethnic tensions, to harbor extreme-right violence; waiting for perceptions of threat to trigger mobilization. This can 'activate' right-wing extremist violence which can then disperse after a period of time to maintain mainstream support.

In addition, South African RWE has also shown itself to have a strong digital presence, similar to the global contemporary fourth wave (Gerbaudo, 2019; Scrivens & Macnair, 2019). This is particularly prevalent within the subculture of xenophobia as its mobilization potential has been shown to be vast and deadly. What started online as anti-foreigner hashtag campaigns evolved into the formal political organisation: OD. In addition, the narrative of a white genocide against Afrikaans farmers also has incredible traction online, with it consistently generating international attention. The online space has been critical for the recruitment of new members by Afrikaner extremists and xenophobes. Despite little evidence of lone wolf attacks (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019); the growth of the extreme-right online space certainly encourages this and is a point of concern.

Moreover, the targeting of young people is another similarity which South African RWE shares with the global fourth wave (Mudde, 2019). A key recruitment strategy of Afrikaner extremists looking to assert frames of Afrikaner nationalism is the targeting of young Afrikaans boys who struggle to find identity within a multicultural SA. This is also prevalent within SA's xenophobic subculture and violence committed in the name of RET as young people are most impacted by poor economic conditions and the lack of a concrete South African identity within a multicultural SA

This chapter has successfully identified the various manifestations of RWE in post-Apartheid SA. With the respective discursive opportunities and relevant frames of Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism and political vigilantism understood to be compatible with Mudde's (2019) fourth wave and Carter's (2018) definition of RWE, the following chapter will analyse *why* these discursive opportunities and subsequent frame alignments have successful recruiting potential. To accomplish this, Piazza's (2017) framework for the determination of right-wing extremist violence will be applied to post-Apartheid SA.

Chapter 6: Determinants of Post-Apartheid Right-Wing Extremism

6.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to determine *why* right-wing extremism (RWE) has continued to manifest in post-Apartheid South Africa (SA). Piazza (2017) provides a valuable framework which can be used to determine the causes of right-wing extremist violence. It is important to note that within the United States (US), the three categories of political resentment, social change, and economic hardship are mutually exclusive, boasting their own theories and characteristics applied to three specific US social conditions. Within the South African context, these three determinants certainly hold value in understanding the causes of the right-wing extremist landscape. However, in order to attain a full understanding of the complex socio-economic conditions prompting RWE in SA, they cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, these three determinants all play an interrelated role in a broad socio-economic context that allows different types of right-wing extremist belief and violence to arise.

In this study it is argued that the primary determinant of RWE in SA is a fundamental lack of social change since the Apartheid era. The study acknowledges that the advent of democracy in SA certainly brought about some critical changes, such as the democratic election process and an inclusive constitution. However, the material changes at grassroots level, in combination with the choice and implementation of how the state has carried out some of its duties, has resulted in a socio-economic context where the majority of South Africans are not realizing their expectations of a free and democratic SA; which in turn leads to societal alienation, frustration and radicalization into right-wing extremist belief systems as solutions are sought for undesired socioeconomic conditions.

Economic hardship and political resentment both play crucial roles in maintaining this lack of societal change. Through the macroeconomic policy choices and implementation of the African National Congress (ANC) led government, black South Africans are not granted the economic freedom they were promised post-1994. Through a militarized police force, political resentment festers as citizens become alienated from the state which is perceived to be an enemy of progress and safety. The issues of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), land reform and state corruption perpetuate both economic hardship and political resentment.

This chapter will analyze this interrelated network of determinants of right-wing violence in SA. First, the lack of societal change and its importance will be detailed. This will be followed

by a detailing of how the macroeconomic policy choices of the ANC-led government have institutionalized inequality, poverty, and social alienation. Third, SA's militarized police force and its actions will demonstrate how political resentment is solidified by maintaining Apartheid-era social conditioning. Lastly, the issues which combine economic hardship and political resentment will be detailed, demonstrating their relationship with how they have not just caused a stagnation of social change, but have arguably exacerbated it.

6.2 Social Change

6.2.1 Afrikaner Extremism

In Piazza (2017), societal change is described as a motivation for right-wing extremist violence due to the perceived threat of greater inclusion and the empowerment of previously disenfranchised groups such as women, ethnic, religious, and racial minorities. Although within certain sections of the population this is celebrated, it displaces the traditional dominance of white, Christian males which is also the demographic most represented within American right-wing extremist movements. Simi (2010:265) explains through the example of the election of Barack Obama, the first black US president, that this served as a reinstation of the right-wing extremist narrative of "white distress at the hands of multiculturalism".

This study suggests that this is prevalent in SA with the persistent existence of white, Afrikaner extremism. Despite the primary argument of this study being that a lack of social change has occurred since Apartheid, which superficially should appease the South African white right, the latter still perceive themselves as an identity under threat as Apartheid-era attitudes of entitlement have not changed. The end of white-minority rule in SA was a traumatic experience for followers of the extreme Afrikaner right. Democratic SA introduced an assertive Africanism in the public sector, policies of racial redress seeking to bring justice to the previously marginalized population, strains of high crime and unemployment, and an overhaul of national symbols. These factors have imposed narratives of multiculturalism and reconciliation, and the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission saw the once unquestioned understandings of Afrikaner history, identity and morality contested and replaced (van Zyl-Hermann, 2018). However, what exacerbated these feelings is the failure of the ANC-led government to build a new, inclusive, and distinctive democratic South African identity. Therefore, Afrikaner extremists perceive the introduction of multiculturalism as a fundamental threat to their identity as they feel excluded from and targeted by the 'new' SA, and thus still

deem the socioeconomic organization of Apartheid as appropriate for the protection of their heritage and culture today.

Therefore, following the demise of the Afrikaner nation state, white communities struggled to come to terms with their new status as minorities in SA without privilege or majority power (Alsheh & Elliker, 2015; Steyn & Foster, 2008). This resulted in the construction of a defensive and exclusive ethnic identity built upon a foundation of victimhood and post-Apartheid marginalization, commonly seen within the extreme-right as a method of maintaining power, privilege, and racist ideologies (van Zyl-Hermann, 2018). These powerful ideological distinctions allow a narrative of an identity under threat to be constructed, with the ruling ANC elite and the African majority perceived to be the enemy. It is a narrative that questions representative democracy and demands special protection and privilege for the minority as they are excluded, vulnerable and targeted in a multicultural SA due to their racial identity (van Zyl-Hermann, 2018).

Consequently, we see extremist groups rallying around the concept of 'the people' or *die volk.* Although this populist means of identification is not new, it drives a common identity through shared similarities based on language and history (Panizza, 2005:9). The nationalist discourse that arises from Afrikaner extremist groups is one of a group experiencing collective suffering, who must therefore redeem themselves by resisting oppression. Extremist groups frame themselves as the front line of defence against a multicultural SA for the culturally similar *volk* who boast a shared history of triumph and a collective present of marginalization and victimhood. Although empirical evidence suggests that the salience, meaning and intensity of Afrikaners' post-Apartheid identity shows great variety (Davies, 2009), it is important to note the extreme cases of post-Apartheid Afrikaner ethnic nationalism, and the potential for violence which these fringe groups can show. Little evidence suggests that most Afrikaners will rise to invoke a military and political struggle set to topple the government (Baines, 2013); however, there is certainly evidence of right-wing extremist fringe groups, with the potential for violence, who align their frame with these notions of an alienated, victimized, and marginalized Afrikaner identity.

6.2.2 Non-white Extremism

Piazza (2017:56) shows that white male resentment is a crucial emotional catalyst for building support for RWE, as we have seen above. Moreover, Piazza (2017) also notes that the broader

literature on right-wing extremist violence suggests that economic, social, and political competition for dominance by groups in the context of demographic and social change increases the likelihood of the dominant group engaging in violent conflict. Therefore, this holds specific validity within the South African context as the minority extreme-right still exists; however, one also sees a majority black population competing for resources under the oppressive post-Apartheid system. Therefore, in line with the purpose of this study to demonstrate varieties of RWE, especially outside the white right, the effects of economic, social, and political circumstances on the majority black population are of particular interest.

What is important to note is, despite some Afrikaner groups calling for a separate homeland as they feel the new government will enact revenge on them for past violations (Krog, 2002), the white economy was not substantially affected by the transition to democracy. When the ANC won the first democratic elections in 1994, it opted for an agenda that set black reparative and restorative justice to occur without deconstructing the economic nature of the country. Choosing a conciliatory path, the democratic government made efforts to transform certain social structures but adopted a pragmatic and non-racial path that did little to redistribute economic power (Rotich, Ilieva & Walunywa, 2015).

Therefore, although the white population has lost political control and influence, a large percentage still dominates the economy. White racial privilege is still present within the South African capitalist structure and racism, with its roots in colonialism, still filters through the economic system in a nuanced manner (Booysen, 2007). Consequently, a large portion of the black population still lives outside the Mandela vision of an equal and equitable 'Rainbow Nation'. Even within the democratic period, race is still critically intertwined with class struggles, thereby sustaining Apartheid-era economic hierarchies. At the root of the failure of the ANC-led government's redistributive agenda is the anger, frustration and bitterness of a black population who feel they are still disenfranchised within a white economy.

Yes, the path of reconciliation and non-racialism was the most practical considering the depths of violence seen during the years of transition (Rotich *et al*., 2015); however, its effects are no less devastating for a population promised economic and social freedom. Therefore, both the Apartheid system and democratic SA create a binary system of inclusion and exclusion based on race, class, gender, and ethnicity. The failure of the ANC-led government to address Apartheid-era structural and institutional inequalities not only exacerbates these binaries, but continues to drive poverty and unemployment (Tshishonga, 2019). These factors drive large

facets of the population to feelings of social isolation and therefore make them increasingly vulnerable to extremist belief systems offering solutions.

This is especially devastating for young black people. As members of the ANC during Apartheid and encouraged by political motivations, they enacted extreme acts of violence, to which the Apartheid government retaliated in equal and higher measure (Marks, 2001). It is a young population who saw violence as a justifiable means of delivering social change, resulting in a young violent post-Apartheid group rooted in this history of militarized anti-Apartheid political parties. Therefore, South Africa is experiencing acts of violence carried out by young black people influenced by right-wing extremists; since the transition to democracy did not deliver employment, better living conditions, better education, and spatial justice. Above all, rural areas are degenerating as time moves on (Rotich *et al.,* 2015).

Post-Apartheid cities are critical in demonstrating the new socio-economic inequalities that mirror the social settings of the Apartheid era. Black South Africans who fled to the cities hoping for socio-economic opportunity instead encountered a mirage. With little opportunity present, this has created astounding levels of racial poverty within cities like Cape Town and suburbs like Sandton, which still reflect the spatial and economic segregation seen during Apartheid (Robins, 2000; Houssay-Holzchuch). Historically white neighbourhoods still have exclusive access to resources whilst informal settlements are still dominated by rural to urban migrants and non-nationals. In tandem with the rise in gated communities designed for the white population and black middle class, Apartheid-era social segregation and exclusion is still rife (van der Westhuizen, 2016; Singh, 2005).

Therefore, this study suggests, in post-Apartheid SA, one finds a majority black population that, despite now wielding political power, still does not wield economic power and feels a sense of exclusion and entitlement to spaces previously reserved for whites only, such as residential areas, urban spaces, and conservation areas (Dlamini, Tesfamichael & Mokhele, 2021:129). Many who suffered under Apartheid are still left waiting for equitable redress, more than 20 years later. This effect of waiting generates powerful and negative notions of power and betrayal (Mueller-Hirth, 2018). These feelings of entitlement to social resources that were once restricted can form a critical and influential part of a black South African's identity (Magubane, 1996). Hence, when the promises of these entitlements are not delivered, a vulnerability to extremist rhetoric is created, since reasons and responsibility are sought for their destitution.

As frustration grows, several responses are viable, with violence being the most probable (Wilson & Magam, 2018). These feelings are easily manipulated by political entrepreneurs and social movement organizations seeking mobilization to drive their exclusionary political agenda. While most of the population is left feeling alienated from the constitution and democracy which had promised them freedom, it is easy to exploit that vulnerability and historically shared similarities (such as race and ethnicity) to drive movements that reject democracy, are authoritarian, and advance exclusionary or holistic forms of nationalism in attempts to aid their failing socio-economic conditions. Members of a failing socio-economic context seek people to blame and target for their condition, and this study suggests that RWE provides the simplest 'in'-group/'out'-group binary to facilitate that desire in SA.

6.3 Economic Hardship

The basic argument is that grievances motivated by economic hardship, especially in working class, modest to low-income households working in blue collar manufacturing or agricultural industries, produces emotions of fear, anger and hopelessness which provide a fertile breeding ground for right-wing extremist frame alignment (Piazza, 2017). Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation is valuable in understanding how economic hardship is useful to right-wing extremists, as there is a discrepancy between an actor's *value expectations* (the conditions of life they believe they are entitled to) and an actor's *value capabilities* (the conditions or goods they think they are capable of getting). The intensity and scope of a collectivity's perception of relative deprivation determines the potential for collective violence (Gurr, 1970:63).

Pridemore and Freilich (2006) argue that right-wing violence takes the form of political violence in economically depressed communities, as they seek to enact revenge against a racial or ideological enemy whom they hold responsible for their relative deprivation. What further assists the right-wing recruitment process is that economic hardship often alienates people from mainstream society, resulting in higher right-wing extremist activity as economic conditions worsen (Perliger, 2012; Michel & Herbeck, 2002). Falk, Kuhn and Zweimüller (2011) agree, showing that right-wing criminal activity increases in frequency when unemployment is high.

6.3.1 Macroeconomic Policy Decisions

The ANC has governed SA since its democratic inception and has a history of implementing various macroeconomic strategies, with marginal gains to show for it (Enaifoghe, 2019). What

can be determined is that SA's constitutionally guaranteed right-based approach to social policy resulted in the country taking a liberal-egalitarian approach to social and economic development. Despite a redistributive paradigm being the policy platform of the ruling party, in practice, various configurations of ideological, contextual, economic, and political pressures have influenced the actions of the labour movement, business and civil society; which in turn have resulted in a list of compromising policies since 1994 that have not always worked together (Plagerson, Patel, Hochfeld & Ulriksen, 2019).

This study suggests that there is a fundamental disagreement within the relationship of economic growth and social development as the ANC-led government's macroeconomic policy originally argued for 'growth through redistribution', whereas international and national investor pressure forced a reversal to 'redistribution through growth' (van der Westhuizen, 2015). Tied in with weak implementation abilities of the ruling party to deliver high quality social services and an economy consistent in underperforming, thereby limiting state capacity and protecting structural unemployment, the result is a South African economic situation where the need for effective translation of macro-policy into practical programmes cannot be underestimated (Plagerson *et al.,* 2019).

This is reflected in the South African government's current macroeconomic policy: the National Development Plan (NDP) which is criticized for simply being a vehicle for "indigenized neo-liberalism" (Satgar, 2012). Due to implementation challenges, the NDP serves as confirmation that the ANC-led government remains committed to its neo-liberal economic roots and prioritization of global over local interests (Allogio & Thomas, 2013). It possesses the same 'redistribution through growth' paradigm that has plagued previous economic policies and it fails to address the intersectional tensions between economic and social policy (van der Westhuizen, 2015). For this reason, it is heavily criticized for its inability to progressively restructure and industrialize the economy, create employment and solve poverty through adequate redistribution (Cilliers & Camp, 2013).

This study suggests that this is due to the neo-liberal backbone that has consistently supported the ANC-led government's post-Apartheid economic policies. Through six key economic decisions, the ANC-led government has favored business growth that came with devastating social costs. First, the choice of macroeconomic policies that favour privatization and dependance on the foreign market does not favour the working class. Second, the choice to

enter the free-market economy excludes many people in SA from participating due to historical discrimination. Third, their guidance by globalization disallows the government to transform national and local economies. Fourth, to lower budget deficits, social spending is lowered. Fifth, the implementation of a value-added tax on basic goods harms the poor. Sixth, the reduction of social programmes hinders the social reproduction of the poor (Kgatle, 2020). Therefore, Schneider (2003) argues that policies engaged in: "draconian fiscal conservatism and cut social programmes, thereby hurting the poor, while bending over backwards to repay Apartheid-era debt".

These concerns are shown to hold validity as unemployment still has not been reduced to 14% and GDP has been steadily declining since 2008 (Faku & Moeti, 2020). This has served as a key recruitment tool for Zuma and his radical economic transformation (RET) faction as a populist response to three decades of socio-economic hardship faced by millions of South Africans (Mostert, 2015). However, what is important to note is that RET is not a new concept economically, rather, it is a distraction from the failings of the ANC-led government and a populist mobiliser of support for Zuma (Mutize & Gossel, 2017).

SA has macroeconomic policy that fundamentally struggles between social justice and neo-liberalism, which privatizes the basic needs of people on the ubiquitous market, commodifying every aspect of society. This is prevalent in SA, as the poor often cannot afford services and if they are available, bureaucratic inefficiency and limited state capacity often impede access to them (Williams, 2009). Thus, Seekings and Nattrass (2015) argue that this continued macroeconomic failure driving persistent inequality, poverty and unemployment is fundamentally due to public policies being reformed since Apartheid and not transformed. Therefore, the discursive opportunity of 'economic transformation' is tremendously important to the recruitment efforts of RET and BLF.

Therefore, this study argues that the choice of neo-liberal policy that exacerbated the inequality created under Apartheid and failed to stimulate economic development and growth is what fundamentally drives economic hardship in SA. Through 'market-friendly' policies, the macroeconomic decisions of the ANC-led government sustained Apartheid-era economic institutions, thereby undermining the prospect of human development, social justice, and long-term sustainable economic growth. For it is through the free market that racial disparities and inequality prevail, as the capitalist system is fundamentally designed to reward those with

resources and connections, making a neo-liberal policy attitude perfect for the rewarding of elites (Schneider, 2018).

This is a fundamental factor in the growth of right-wing extremist movements within poor communities in SA. Evidence shows that the key to sustainable growth, overcoming socio-economic inequality, forming an inclusive society, and achieving a balance of the global economic system is through social justice (Abashidze, Inshakova, Solntsev & Gugunskiy, 2020). This is bolstered by the fact that within South Africa, income boosts happiness at both an individual and aggregate level. This indicates that the absolute effect of income is incredibly important in maintaining happiness within South African society, thereby decreasing desire for social change (Kollamparambil, 2020). Therefore, with SA being the most unequal society in the world (World Bank, 2022), there is certainly large potential for collective violence against the system administering these extreme levels of economic injustice. In these instances of social alienation and frustration, right-wing extremists provide persuasive notions of community and protection as solutions for social destitution.

In addition, this study suggests that the social isolation caused by economic hardship is a driving force behind the xenophobic violence seen in SA. The use of a neo-liberal economic framework promoted equality without justice as efforts were made to appease international organizations, communities, and investors rather than tend to domestic interests. Environmental tension is created when average underprivileged South Africans realize that their constitutional rights have been further undermined due to not being granted the material benefits of citizenship; all the while competing with foreigners for economic opportunity (Nyamnjoh, 2006:5). This is further exacerbated by the growing inequality and discrimination seen in post-Apartheid SA, along with a lack of service delivery, housing, and basic consultation (Burns, 2008:120). This widening gap between the rich and the poor builds resentment and frustration, especially within the black population, and therefore leads to xenophobic hostilities towards migrants, especially black migrants (Choane, Shulika & Mthombeni, 2011).

Nowhere is this more evident than in the spaza shop sector where there is direct competition between foreign and locally-owned spaza shops; however, due to a lack of trust, poor business education and general socio-economic conditions, local and foreign spaza shop owners do not coopt for mutual benefit (Hare & Walwyn, 2019). In addition, despite government enacting

pro-small business policies, this has not seen tangible benefit on the ground, and foreign-owned spaza shops have been seen to outperform local-owned spaza shops due to the employment of smarter business strategies within a largely unregulated market (Mukwarami, Tengeh & Iwu, 2018; Chipunzi & Phalatsi, 2019), as well as a lack of funding and empowerment from the state for local shops (Malgas & Zondi, 2021). This has resulted in foreign spaza shopowners being direct targets and victims of xenophobic violence which has resulted in the loss of several lives and poverty (Yesufu, 2021c).

6.4 Political Resentment

The next primary determinant of RWE listed by Piazza (2017) is political resentment towards a 'big government'. Taking place within the US context, 'big government' is often employed as a term that encompasses allegations of government overreach into the private lives of citizens' groups (Piazza, 2017:58). These forms of overreach, perpetuated by politicians, are regarded as unaccountable and tyrannical and therefore frame a common enemy for the formation of RWE (Gamson, 1975).

This results in a feeling of alienation towards society, as individuals see themselves as not having a voice within mainstream politics, and therefore they vilify and resent politicians. This is especially apparent when specific policies are enacted by politicians which seemingly target the freedom and liberty of far-right groups (such as policies of gun control in the US). Acts of violence are then interpreted to be a necessary means of renewing the political system (Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Michel & Herbeck, 2002; Perliger, 2012).

Within SA, the US example is not directly comparable as gun control policies in SA do not exert the same levels of emotion towards personal freedom as they do in the US. Opposition exists, but it is not large enough to warrant direct legislative attention, and it predominantly falls within larger issues used by the extreme-right such as farm murders and high crime rates (Makhafola, 2021). However, there is another certain determinant of political resentment through government overreach that drives a variety of violent acts perpetuated by extreme-right or extreme-right adjacent groups. This is policing in SA, and its effect on communities.

6.4.1 Policing Policy

Given the history of brutality, violence, suppression, and exaggerated involvement in South African society of the Apartheid-era South African Police (SAP) (Cock, 2005; Stuurman,

2020b), institutional efforts post-1994 sought to reform policing around a human rights-based ethos (Onishi, 2016). This prompted the formation of the South African Police Service (SAPS), which comprised of integrating various Apartheid-era police bodies and armed wings of liberation movements into the existing SAP structures. This resulted in an institution that is still rigid and hierarchal in nature, unable to work with other departments such as the Department of Education or Social Development (Lamb, 2018:938); an institution which has a militarized culture enforced by strategies formed at the SAPS headquarters in Pretoria and actions being directed via a 'top-down' method of instruction (Lamb, 2018).

So, despite most of the functions of the SAP and South African Defense Force having dissipated with the demise of the Apartheid regime, the current formation of SAPS has been inclined to fall into the same militaristic practices of Apartheid-era policing. Since 2010, SAPS has called in the paramilitary Tactical Response Team, National Intervention Units, and the increasingly militarized Public Order Protection units to fight crime, suppress civil unrest and carry out militarized raids in high crime areas of Cape Town and Johannesburg; while it employed the South African National Defence Force in the gang-ridden region of the Cape Flats in 2015 and 2019 (Stuurman, 2020a). In the management of protests, post-Apartheid era SA has witnessed the deaths of citizens protesting for better service delivery, higher wages, improved working conditions and an end to poverty and alienation (Yesufu, 2021a). Its methods have earned SAPS the label of one of the most brutal policing systems in the democratic world, as SAPS kills three times more people per capita than do the police in the US (Stuurman, 2020b).

This is motivated by an extreme tough-on-crime rhetoric by SAPS which has come to dominate communication with the public (Onishi, 2016). This has been apparent throughout the times of Ministers of Police, with the consistent approval of state-sanctioned police killings. In 2012, Bheki Cele, the then Minister of Police and Police Commissioner, stated that: "A policeman should not die with his gun in his hand....Your job is to arrest criminals and if someone makes your job difficult, make sure it is not you that will be killed" (Davis, 2014). In 2018, the then Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, bolstered this narrative by stating: "When I say, 'shoot to kill, no retreat', I mean it. I will make sure that the law protects you" and "Do not allow yourself to be shot and die when you are holding a gun; shoot until you run out of bullets" (Liebenberg, 2018).

This tough-on-crime rhetoric can be seen as a response and contributing factor to police violence, as resources are increasingly dedicated to SAPS every year (Bruce, 2022). However, despite this consistent effort by government to fill the police ranks with more officers and resources, SA's crime statistics are still some of the worst in the world (Gerber, 2022). Apart from this, many crimes in SA are regarded as severely underreported due to the ineffectiveness of SAPS in assisting victims (Basdeo, 2018; Lancaster, 2017). This is in addition to the allegations made against SAPS members themselves with more than 42 000 criminal complaints, including rape, killings, and torture, being made to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate between 2012 and 2019. Despite this high number, figures are regarded as underreported, only encapsulating a fringe of actual incidents (Egwu, 2021). Therefore, SAPS is often regarded as an institution which is ineffective, brutal, and corrupt and enjoys little public confidence (Kynoch, 2016).

This lack of public trust and confidence is completely rational and justifiable, and is reflected in public attitude towards the Police (Roberts, Bohler-Muller, Struwig, Gordon, Mchunu, Mtyingizane & Runciman, 2017). This brutal history of violence that has showed no signs of slowing down has been consistently shown in the media and has resulted in a widespread lack of trust and confidence in the Police by citizens (Yesufu, 2021b). There is widespread concern around the quality of service and overall professional conduct of the Police. This view of a corrupt, incompetent, and poorly trained SAPS is often tied in with a view of the criminal justice system being in turmoil; which further bolsters feelings of mistrust and a lack of confidence in the ability of the justice system to ensure safety and security (Govender, 2018).

Despite this, and its electoral advantage decreasing with every electoral cycle, the ANC-led government still sees fit to crush protests and resistance to its activities with the use of excessive force. The post-Apartheid SA is characterized by a militarized, anti-human rights-based Police force that is interpreted to be a necessity (Stuurman, 2020a). Furthermore, it is a symptom of a wide social conflict about the stagnating nature of SA's transition. Neo-liberal reforms have perpetuated, and in some cases exacerbated, socio-economic inequality and adjacent insecurities. Rather than addressing the core of these issues with political and economic reform, the state chooses to use its 'tough-on-crime' rhetoric and policies as a thinly-veiled mask to hide its silencing of voices in opposition to its neo-liberal policy decisions and corrupt activities (Clarke, 2018a).

Steinberg (2014) shows how, in the years following Apartheid, SAPS had a major focus on effective policing and building community relations and legitimacy. However, since 2000, once the ANC had realized it could exert control over SAPS, its focus shifted to protecting elites and the political order. Within a short span of time, SAPS began reaching Apartheid levels of political protection; its primary employment was to serve as tools of battle between different factions within the ANC (Kynoch, 2016). This led to the *Mail & Guardian* criticizing this development as: "[t]he use of the police, intelligence services and National Prosecuting Authority to fight personal, professional, and political battles has reached crisis proportions in South Africa, and perhaps poses the single greatest threat to the country's crime-fighting endeavors" (Mail & Guardian, 2013).

Therefore, this study argues that the ANC-led government has fostered an ideology within policing that places development after crime reduction, market protection and political influence. Nowhere is this more evident than in Cape Town, where the nuanced dimensions of underdevelopment are reduced to a one-dimensional strategy of gangsters being the problem and increasing numbers of police and prisons being the solution. The result of this conflation of development and crime reduction is the widening of a police net that engulfs increasing numbers of poor South Africans every year and no structural change for those caught in it. This stifles the genuine and sustainable development of townships as the entire holistic nature of policing under this neo-liberal system is intimately tied to the growth requirements of the market (Samara, 2009). This became most apparent during the Marikana Mine Massacre where SAPS worked in tandem with private mine owners, Lonmin, to protect the mining industry from widespread destabilization and therefore protect the interests of political elites and the business class (Bruce, 2019). It is a state-sanctioned social control of the poor which drives feelings of alienation towards the state and political resentment.

Two things result from this alienation and political resentment. The first is community policing and vigilantism as described in the previous chapter. Despite only a few being mentioned, post-Apartheid SA is littered with non-state security forces and policing models. However, as seen previously, the lack of regulation and due process, tied in with a reliance on violence, often results in these groups exacerbating community tensions and distributing brutal acts of justice in equal measure as do their SAPS counterparts (Kynoch, 2016).

Secondly, as communities increasingly feel that they cannot rely on SAPS for protection, the utilization of private security forces has become more frequent. However, alienation from one force does not necessarily mean allegiance to the other. These forces still possess exactly the same prejudices and insecurities which citizens fear from the state (Cooper-Knock, 2016). Private security has been seen to be generally classist, racist, exclusionary, exploitative, and punitive as regulations are not firm enough to deal with the excessive use of private security force (Asomah, 2017). They display similar motivations to the urban neo-liberal centred approach of policing by SAPS described above (Asomah, 2017). Groups targeted who are often perceived as threats are mostly young, black men who are not neatly dressed and often walk in a group (Bremmer, 2004; Cock, 2005; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Samara 2010). These further drive polarization between the poor and the rich and pit black against white, which inevitably drives social alienation and feelings of political resentment (Asomah, 2017). Thus, both an increase in community policing and private policing increases the likelihood of RWE.

In addition, the consequences of policing culture and the implementation of law enforcement in SA must also be applied to the rampant xenophobic violence which South Africa has witnessed since the advent of democracy (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001). Since the demise of Apartheid, South Africa's immigration policy has not substantially changed and is dramatically similar to Apartheid's policing practices. Despite amendments made for the protection of human rights, the discretion allowed to the police in enforcing and interpreting laws has institutionally and symbolically entrenched a lack of legal status. Non-nationals experience a poor police response time to reports of violence against them, receiving unequal treatment from their local police stations in the access of basic services, such as document verification (Freeman, October & Edwards, 2022). This has further resulted in discriminatory patterns of detention and deportation (Algotsson & Klaaren, 2018). With a lack of oversight, border control has been characterized by military-style policing where corruption and human rights abuses are rampant (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001). This has further bolstered xenophobic attitudes within the population as violence enacted against non-nationals goes unpunished, whilst law enforcement is equally culpable in the enactment of violence against foreigners.

6.5 Economic Hardship and Political Resentment

6.5.1 Black Economic Empowerment

Due to the divisive effects of Apartheid, especially within the labour market, the South African government embarked on numerous policies aimed at empowering specific groups and

individuals. Therefore, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) emerged as a concept in the early 1990s over and above the ANC-led government's Reconstruction and Development Programme and was implemented in 1994 as an indirect measure of tackling labour market inequity with an initial focus of increasing black ownership of shares in major corporations. In 1998, immense scrutiny ensued as a result of the policy which solely enriched a small number of well-connected politicians and businesspeople in the wake of growing inequality and poverty. This caused the concept to be repackaged as 'broad-based BEE' where the ownership of businesses is still a priority, but the policy scope has been expanded to include fair representation, employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise development and corporate social investment (Ponte, Roberts & Sittert, 2007).

It is a complex programme that has subsequently grown and become an integral part of everyday South African business life (Krüger, 2014). It comprises several documents appropriating anticolonial and anti-Apartheid language to justify the implementation of affirmative action and BEE policies that give the impression of major transformation within power relations, economic and decision-making structures, especially within the private sector. However, the documents limit the vision of empowerment within existing structures and institutional practices and in this way distributive inequality and unjust constraints on the lives of black people are simply continued (Makgoba, 2021).

Economically, BEE has done little to address the economic hardship of black South Africans. It is evident that the black middle class has increased since the inception of the policy; however, it is widely agreed that most of the poor have gained virtually nothing from the affirmative action or BEE policies, with a select few having been the recipients of reward from the policy (Alexander, 2006). This is evident within the marginal (at best) reduction of employment or wage gaps since Apartheid with most of it occurring amongst individuals from designated groups at the top of the skills ladder which has had no impact on the average previously disadvantaged individual (Burger & Jafta, 2010). This advancement of the black middle class in tandem with the rise in unemployment amongst the unskilled majority has resulted in growing inequality (Jeffery, 2013).

The economic consequences of BEE have been detrimental: a massive loss of skills, the wasting of public revenue by inexperienced public servants and BEE 'tenderpreneurs', the encouragement of corruption within a new political elite and the allocation of over R600 billion

to BEE ownership deals that have only benefitted a select class of political elite (Jeffery, 2013). It is market-friendly redress (Ponte *et al.,* 2007:950) which encourages corruption through intimate ties between the public and private spheres (Jeffery, 2013). BEE has failed to create a well-educated, skilled, entrepreneurial, and independent black middle class, but has rather manufactured an "ill-prepared and greedy elite" dependent on their political connections to the government (Filatova, 2011:31-32).

In this way, the manifestation of BEE in practice results in government awarding and paying 10 to 20 percent more for tenders procured on a preferential basis, and the intended beneficiaries (often the poor and marginalized) receive that much less. In addition, the preferential procurement of government contracts often results in a lack of the experience and financial ability required to manage delivery deadlines and maintain standards. Therefore, poor workmanship and a failure to complete projects have been rife within government social services, especially within the government's RDP low-cost housing programme (Jeffery, 2013).

This study suggests that this has manifested into tangible political resentment within the black population, since the failure to impact citizens at a grassroots level has been noted. In addition, the policy is deemed to be full of negative stereotypes, stigmatization, malpractice, and a lack of oversight (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013). It has also undermined black achievement by raising doubts about whether black individuals have been placed in positions on merit or through policy. This has clouded the genuine achievement of black South Africans and has strengthened the racist argument that black success mainly arises from BEE (Botsis, 2007). Overall, a negative connotation of BEE and its philosophy, aims and objectives has been created. BEE has created a new culture of entitlement within the select few beneficiaries (or tenderpreneurs) and ANC cadres who now serve in various governmental organizations. This has done extremely little in fostering harmonious racial/working relationships among the people of SA (Krüger, 2014).

Within the white population, the tangible economic hardship faced by the black population is not as severe due to them having been the overwhelming economic beneficiaries of the Apartheid system. However, it is increasingly difficult for a white person to find employment in certain sectors (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013). Therefore, BEE is a major source of political resentment for white extremist groups. What is worthy of economic notice, is that white companies have had tenders rejected by the government, based on ulterior motives, despite in

some instances having better pricing and functionality scores than black companies competing for the same tender (Madlanga, 2019). This makes the white population victims of BEE corruption and 'tenderpreneurship' as well.

This study suggests, within the white population, political resentment is primarily driven by feelings of "reverse racism and discrimination", as preferential treatment is being given by the government to black instead of white people (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013; Krüger, 2014). This can be interpreted as a form of modern-day prejudice against white people as government seeks to redress the inequalities of Apartheid (Pincus, 2003). This manifests in feelings of social isolation as these white extremists would prefer to forget about Apartheid but rather face anti-white narratives in the media; a lack of employment opportunities due to being white, and discrimination on the job because of being white (Ansell, 2004; Oosthuizen & Naidoo, 2010). This demonstrates a new white anxiety resulting from changing race relations and social change, since the previous processes that had exemplified the dominance of being white over other races, are now under perceived threat (Hughey, 2010).

6.5.2 Land

The failure of the South African government to address the issue of land inequality post-Apartheid, and subsequent development, has resulted in a national struggle for land reform (Moyo, 2007). Almost three decades after the end of colonial and Apartheid rule, the South African state has still failed to tackle land inequality effectively. Despite the ANC claiming that land reform will be a "catalyst" within its vision to reverse the effects of Apartheid, this has not manifested, with most black people remaining in poverty; land conflict being rife and illegal land occupations and evictions being a persistent characteristic of democratic SA (Akinola, Kaseeram & Jili, 2021; Akinola, 2020). 79% of land in SA is privately owned (predominately by white people); 14% is state-owned and 7% is unaccounted for (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2013).

This has perpetuated economic hardship and the neo-liberal land redistribution framework of 'willing buyer, willing seller' effectively marginalizes both the rural and urban poor (Moyo, 2007). This neo-liberal framework has also faced budget constraints, which has several implications including: competing priorities within the budget for land in the agricultural and land sector, many different professional stakeholders being involved (the private sector, land valuers, land practitioners or lawyers and several officials from different government agencies)

and the rising cost of land since the inception of the policy (Kepe & Hall, 2016). This contributes to the systemic underdevelopment and economic hardship of the black population and fuels political resentment. Large portions of land are owned by the white population in the face of growing black inequality, while the state is reluctant to give up its land, which in part is starting to become unviable (Akinola *et al.,* 2021). In addition, the over-emphasis of historical privilege (credit services, electricity, irrigation, and marketing infrastructure) given to large commercial farms over small-scale farming (Moyo, 2007) fuels the underdevelopment of small farms and exacerbates farm conflicts and attacks leading to loss of life and property (Burger, 2018:2).

Furthermore, due to skewed land arrangement and threats arising from unresolved land issues, conflict, land-violence, structural violence, and hunger have become rife (Akinola, 2020). These unresolved social, economic, and political security threats arising from land issues are driving the call for policy change. However, what is concerning is that the government's new rhetoric around the policy of land expropriation without compensation (LEWC) might face challenges in fairly and effectively redistributing land and could follow the pathway of BEE, only allocating land to new elites. This is due to the chosen 'top-down' approach of LEWC, since the ANC-led government did not consult with communities, the black majority and land reform panels on issues of land redistribution (Akinola, 2020). With the history of factionalism within the ANC, the transfer of land is a contentious issue within the ruling party as Zuma's RET faction makes this a divisive topic within the 'winner takes all' lineage of the ANC (Matseke, 2021). This has been most furiously opposed by minority groups, especially by white farmers (Akinola, 2020) who are exceedingly attached to an Afrikaner identity (Piotrowski, 2019).

LEWC and farm attacks are crucial in the production of the 'white genocide' narrative. The attacks and murders on farms have increased over the last few years; however, this is in line with the general upward trend of serious and violent crime in SA. In addition, independent inquiries have shown that an overwhelming majority of farm attacks comprise of robberies, with no indication of a sinister politicized force looking to specifically target white farmers (Clack & Minaar, 2018).

However, political resentment not only resides with white farmers. This study suggests that informal settlement inhabitants also harbour political resentment and subsequent social

alienation. Fundamentally, land is essential to the symbolic representation of justice and the issue of citizenship. Having land, and knowing one has the rights to own it, is essential in establishing a South African identity. This is something a large majority of the black population is deprived of. Informal sector inhabitants feel alienated and insecure as they fear brutal police violence associated with evictions. Their health is also affected as, without adequate land and development, the landless poor are bound to informal settlements that do not have adequate sanitation, electricity, and water. Without secure land rights, investment does not happen within informal settlements. In addition, with LEWC threatening confiscation of their land, farmers are reluctant to invest in agricultural infrastructure which subsequently threatens food security (Jarstad, 2021). A lack of land reform ensures that the poor remain poor, and inequality increases. This has invoked tensions between Black Africans and white/Afrikaans communities, based on identities under threat (Matseke, 2021), which has created ample room for extremist groups to exploit these discursive opportunities to achieve frame alignment for their causes.

With the advent of democracy in SA, many hoped for the 'Rainbow Nation' as envisioned by Nelson Mandela. However, the state, through the classification and implementation of affirmative action programmes, kept racial classifications alive and in this way created an environment of conflicting ideas, as is explained by Vorster (2018:1):

> The State had to keep racial classification alive to enforce affirmative action programmes; the individualist nature of Western human rights discourse collided with egalitarian and communalist African worldviews; and neo-liberal economic policy did not yield a sufficient trickle-down growth effect, nor did it agree with the socialist beliefs that were historically part and parcel of African nationalist identity (Vorster, 2018:1).

This study suggests, with the post-Apartheid ANC-led government failing to deliver any substantial socio-economic change and failing to develop a national identity, this resulted in groups pulling closer based on their own conceptions of identity. This has allowed the land reform debate to manifest into an 'us versus them' mentality (Piotrowski, 2019) which allows extremist rhetoric to thrive as groups perceive themselves under threat. This is further exacerbated by the media which has been found to marginalize counter-hegemonic and alternative voices due to, in part, its intimacy with Apartheid-like economic and ideological rationalities. This results in the issue of land reform and redistribution being framed negatively

within the media which fuels the negative perceptions of the white/Afrikaner community and the social alienation of the poor and dispossessed (Radebe & Chiumbu, 2022).

6.5.3 Corruption

Corruption, and its subsequent consequences, is systemic and endemic in South African governance with South Africans experiencing state capture, low forms of economic growth, low employment levels and institutionalized inequality and poverty (Lund & Cois, 2018). Corruption is a contributing factor to the continued economic hardship faced by many South Africans, with some reports indicating that GDP could have been 10%-30% higher and an additional 500 000 to 2.5 million jobs could have been created between 2010 and 2017. This suboptimal performance is driven by internal factors such as widespread policy uncertainty (as described under macroeconomic policy failure), structural constraints and the mismanagement of state-owned resources and enterprises (corruption) (Salahuddin, Vink, Ralph. & Gow, 2019).

This is unsurprising as corruption weakens state institutions and gradually depletes a country's economic potential; which, within SA, drives the growth of poverty, especially under the neo-liberal framework instituted by the ANC-led government (Salahuddin *et al.*, 2019). What drives corruption within SA is a factional battle within the ANC between the pro-Zuma order who are synonymous with corruption and state power abuse despite trying to rebrand themselves under the RET ideology, and the pro-Ramaphosa order seeking to align the party within the narratives of Mandela's ANC. This hegemonic battle affected the movement of the state and compromised its institutions as deliverers of organizational policy and governance. This resulted in massive impacts on the ANC-led government's ability to deliver services and its credibility (Booysen, 2018).

This was most apparent during the Zuma presidency where the state's relationship with the Gupta family and subsequent enactment of state capture was discovered (Martin & Solomon, 2016; Dassah, 2018; Adam, 2018). Therefore, von Holdt (2019) asserts that corruption is a mechanism of class formation that works in tandem with processes such as BEE and land reform to form a new black elite. This has resulted in the exacerbation of an informal political economy which existed before the Zuma presidency, and is shaped by a network of patronage and factionalism. This system is inherently violent, as the struggle for power over resources

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and access to opportunities requires the enforcement of faction cohesion and the crushing of community resistance. Corruption and anti-corruption both form part of this political system, as assertions of anti-corruption emerge at particular times for particular reasons. Within this current period, anti-corruption efforts by President Ramaphosa are being used to encourage business interests; however, his 'anti-corrupt' government is still filled with corrupt figures, thereby rendering the informal system of politics patronage pervasive. This predatory nature of corruption was evident within the numerous corruption scandals uncovered during the distribution of goods and services to citizens in need during the Covid-19 pandemic (John, 2021; Mantzaris & Ngcamu, 2020).

In addition, South African citizens are being impacted at grassroots level due to corruption within municipalities. The Auditor-General's report for 2019/20 showed that of 257 municipalities, only 11% in the country received clean audits and only 28% could provide the Auditor-General 'quality financial statements to audit'. In addition, R26 billion was recorded as irregular expenditure and around R3.47 billion was regarded as fruitless or wasted expenditure (Chelin, 2021). In combination with rampant service delivery protests, this has earned, at times, the entire local government sphere the reputation of failing and being dysfunctional (Glasser & Wright, 2020).

Failing municipalities are fundamentally caused by corrupt leadership which is widespread within the public sector. Poor leadership within local governments suffocates the economy and is widespread throughout the public sector, from national to local government (Mbandlwa, Nirmala & Fagbadebo, 2020). Political resentment and economic hardship are created as the electorate is deprived of basic water, electricity, and safe municipal roads whilst authority figures live in luxury. This also impacts employment as investment is discouraged. An example is the firm Clover, who relocated its production plant from Lichtenburg, a town in the North West, due to poor service delivery such as inadequate road quality and inconsistent water supply (Mbanyele, 2021). Moreover, further political resentment and social isolation is derived from this culture of corruption not being limited to the ANC. The two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters, have also been caught up in their own corruption scandals (Mbanyele, 2021).

Therefore, this study suggests that this has resulted in a population that is dissatisfied and extremely frustrated, manifesting in frequent service delivery protests (Burger, 2009). Corruption, mismanagement, and political malfeasance has left the ANC-led government with

an inability to deliver on promises and has alienated most of the population, who had already been deprived of full human rights under Apartheid. This resulted in feelings of frustration, aggrievement and social alienation (Mbeki, 2011). The manifestation of extremist violence, and especially xenophobia, is a consequence of this built-up anger and frustration, where senseless death, looting and destruction of property is a hallmark characteristic. Due to corruption arising from this violent informal political system, most South Africans have not had their expectations met by the post-Apartheid regime, and therefore seek scapegoats for their poor conditions, or even just an avenue to displace their anger and aggression, caused by built-up frustration (Wilson & Magam, 2018:102).

6.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, an answer was sought as to why different varieties of RWE are prevalent in post-Apartheid SA. Piazza's (2017) framework was deemed to be valuable; however, it could not be applied directly. Rather than the three determinants of economic hardship, political resentment and social change being mutually exclusive, in this study the categories have been amalgamated into an interrelated network of determinants which broadly covers the varieties of right-wing extremist violence seen in SA.

As seen in Figure 4, this study suggests that social change is the primary underlying determinant for all right-wing extremist violence. For the extreme Afrikaner right, this is due to the advent of democratic SA and the subsequent multiculturism that infringes on their frame of an Afrikaner nation state or *volkstaat*. In addition, the ANC-led government's attempts at redress, such as BEE and land reform, despite being ineffective, allow the extreme Afrikaner right to craft a narrative of alienation and marginalization; as corrective justice is perceived to be an attack on minority rights and the erasure of the Afrikaner identity. For the black population, the lack of socio-economic change, and persistence of Apartheid-era inequalities, due to a variety of failings from the ANC-led government, entrench the same feelings of alienation and isolation felt during Apartheid. So, with the promise of social change not being delivered, a variety of forms of violence driven by economic grievance and political resentment manifests from this, as groups seek to demand forcefully the change in conditions they were promised with the fall of Apartheid. Thus, this study agrees with Glaser's (2001) analysis on race, or the broader concept of ethnicity, as the largest issue of concern over every facet of post-Apartheid South Africa and its prospects.

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Figure 4: Determinants of RWE in South Africa

This study finds that an important difference between South African RWE and forms in other Western democracies is that internationally RWE primarily centres around government overreach and white people losing privilege to minorities due to progressive social developments. This was seen to be common in the United States, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Jackson, 2019; Campion, 2019a; Botsch, 2012 & McAlexander, 2020). Yes, SA does have elements of this within Afrikaner extremists who have a nation-state ideology similar to German right-wing extremists (Decker, 2019) and an affinity for forming white supremacist militias as those found among American right-wing extremists (Rehman, 2017). These are rooted in US and Australian notions of RWE as an ideology rooted in white supremacy and romanticizes an imagined frame of the past where enforced notions of the white identity are not under threat by multiculturalism (Campion, 2019b).

However, in SA, the white minority is not targeted to a similar degree as are other minority groups overseas. Discursive opportunities are constructed around white-dominated economic power, but little direct action occurs against them. The key difference between South African

RWE and that of other Western democracies is that the majority of RWE in SA does not originate from an ethnic/racial majority seeking to antagonize and marginalize an ethnic/racial minority, where the latter are perceived to pose a threat to the majority's economic and social privileges (Mudde, 2019; Campion & Poynting, 2021).

We see RWE in SA predominantly occurring within a racial majority demanding social privileges that were once withheld from them through the Apartheid regime, and still held from them due to a lack of socioeconomic change in SA. Within this state of social alienation, issues of economic hardship and political resentment are exploited to villainize and target a perceived 'out'-group as a means of remedying poor socioeconomic conditions. This even occurs when groups share a similar race and social class. This has occurred most frequently within SA's xenophobic subculture, where black foreigners are specifically targeted by groups such as OD. This is a strong commonality with most right-wing extremist movements overseas as immigrants are often sought as scapegoats for socioeconomic issues (Mudde, 2019). In the case of RET, the political organization is not necessarily advocating for a Zulu nation state, like Afrikaner extremists. However, RET recognizes the overwhelming demand for social change within the black population and explicitly exploits past ethnic divisions and fragile economic conditions to construct a specific threat to the non-white population in order to mobilise ground support aimed at undermining the South African democracy and constitution for their own political agenda.

With issues of economic inequality, ethnic tensions, land redistribution, as well as crime and immigrant integration remaining largely unresolved post-Apartheid, the unchanging social situation has left ample discursive opportunities for political entrepreneurs to pivot on, and recruits to be emotionally invested in. This is compatible with Ignazi's (2006) description of the extreme-right, because of SA's changing historical contexts and socioeconomic problems. As Apartheid-era ethnic divisions still plague SA, RWE in SA certainly comprises McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) description of defending the 'in'-group. However, this study argues that RWE in SA also comprises the Dutch Security Service's (2005) conception of extremism as a willingness to enact far-reaching changes violently in society, which fundamentally threaten democracy.

Therefore, Afrikaner extremists fit Piazza's (2017) determinant framework best, as they hold similar economic power, political history, and social grievance against the state as do US right-wing extremists. Zulu nationalism and political vigilantism are not directly compatible to

Piazza's (2017) framework due to the lack of previous economic and social power held by non-whites in SA. The key difference between Afrikaner and black right-wing extremists in SA is that black right-wing extremists in SA fight for social change rather than try to resist it or regress it. Their conditions of economic grievance due to a post-Apartheid neo-liberal economic system and political resentment fostered by government mismanagement and 'over-policing' drive their fight to change the social reward structure of SA. These resentments and grievances, however, are personally strong enough to justify the use of violence and neglect of democratic institutions to achieve them; as these same institutions who promised improved socio-economic standards failed to deliver. Therefore, it is the methodology of enacting social change in an attempt to correct historical limitations on access to social privileges, rather than seeking to preserve, maintain and develop historical privileges, that fundamentally differentiates Zulu nationalism and political vigilantism from Afrikaner extremism, and most forms of RWE seen internationally.

Similar to the global fourth wave (Mudde, 2019), the South African extreme-right is extremely complex and heterogenous. Within the far-right ecosphere, multiple groups from multiple demographics compete for power. Within a society facing multiple socio-economic issues, an ineffective government, political opportunism and unremedied ethnic wounds remaining after decades of segregation, there is fertile ground for right-wing extremist groups to construct a narrative of threat, and violence to be enacted according to their ideology and agenda. This chapter sought to simplify this complex network and provide a clear pathway for reasons why violent RWE is manifesting in SA. This was found to be primarily rooted in social change, driven by single and combined factors of political resentment and economic hardship as described by Piazza (2017), with diversification primarily seen along racial and ethnic lines.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

With right-wing extremism (RWE) being known to flourish in times of crisis (Mudde, 2019), South Africa (SA) is no exception to the global rise currently occurring within Western democracies. More than two decades after Apartheid, one not only sees RWE manifest within the remnants of Afrikaner extremist fringe political organizations such as the *Boeremag;* but alternative forms outside the white nationalist ecosphere, with the July riots of 2021 and rampant waves of xenophobic violence seen post-1994 serving as key examples. The socio-economic issues used as discursive opportunities by these social movement organizations share a similar mainstream nature to the most prominent feature of the fourth wave of global RWE: its mainstream nature (Mudde, 2019; Mondon & Winter, 2020). With the existence of a broader far-right ecosphere, which this study did not have capacity to analyze, extremist ideas from the groups analyzed in this study are starting to infiltrate policy circles and legislative discussions, holding large recruitment capacity. This raises concerns about their potential for further violence. Consequently, this study found it critically important to evaluate what forms of RWE are manifesting in SA and why they have emerged in post-Apartheid SA.

This final chapter will conclude the study by detailing five key developments. First, an overview of the study will be given, restating the findings of each chapter and how they contributed to the overall findings of the study. Second, problems encountered during the research will be highlighted to aid the transparency regarding the research process and methodology behind the findings. Third, the research question will be addressed, summarizing the findings that ultimately address the stated objectives of this study. Fourth, a note on the contributions of this study to the broader literature on right-wing extremism will be made. Fifth, avenues for further research will be listed to ensure the continued development of this novice set of research into contemporary South African RWE. Lastly, this chapter will end with some conclusionary remarks.

7.2 Study Overview

After the background, rationale and research objectives outlined in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presented a review on the existing literature of RWE. It was found that RWE can certainly be categorized as a distinctive ideology, rooted in anti-democratism and anti-constitutionalism. This contributed to the selection of Carter's (2018:174) definition of RWE as the guiding

theoretical point of reference for this study: "an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism". This is complemented by the selection of Minkenberg's (2003) five characteristics of the extreme-right as an additional point of guidance: *strong state, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, anti-democracy and populist and anti-establishment rhetoric.*

The operationalization of RWE followed, with social movement theory deemed the concept holding most utility for this framework. Using the definition of a social movement as: "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (Zald & McCarthy, 1987:2), the selected elements of discursive opportunities and frame analysis from the broader social movement theory framework, described by Caiani, della Porta & Wagemann (2012:9), were selected as units of analysis. Piazza's (2017) framework for the causes of right-wing terrorist violence was deemed to be complementary. Its three determinants of *political resentment, economic hardship*, and *social change* contain a theoretical foundation sufficiently comprehensive to be decisive and valid, but still flexible enough to have utility within diverse socio-economic contexts.

This culminated in the description of the current wave of RWE (known as the *fourth wave*) seen around the globe, with specific reference to its mainstream nature, heterogeneity, online presence and targeting of the young. Mudde's (2019) use of political parties, social movement organizations and subcultures was selected as the categories used to identity extreme-right manifestations in SA. The overall framework above was then applied to the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia to highlight its effectiveness. The literature review concluded with a summary of the current literature on RWE in SA, highlighting a lack of contemporary literature on the subject.

Chapter 3 contained the detailed research design and methodology used in the study. Using an ontology of constructivism and an epistemology of interpretivism, this study employed an inductive research type, analyzing qualitative data. Used in tandem with a descriptive-explanatory purpose, a single-case study research strategy was judged as most effective due to the intensive examination it allows, especially considering the variety of data points, rich history of literature and variety of contextual cues surrounding RWE. The qualitative data is secondary in nature, utilizes desktop research of open-source data and employs thematic analysis. Using the framework described in the literature review as a comprehensive

observation schedule, deductive thematic analysis assisted in contextualizing South African RWE within the current global rise.

Chapter 4 sought to lay an adequate contextual foundation through the description of the history of RWE in pre-democratic SA. Using the three historical periods of 1899-1947, 1948-1990, and 1990-1994, this study was able to identify three distinct manifestations of right-wing extremism: Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism, and political vigilantism. This indicates that RWE has historically branched outside Afrikaner extremism and mirrors the heterogenous nature seen in other nations. These manifested in all three types of grouping as described by Mudde (2019) and found a common determining cause in social change, driven by various factors of political resentment and economic hardship (Piazza, 2017).

Chapter 5 analyzed the contemporary manifestations of RWE in SA, looking to identify the various forms seen post-Apartheid. Evidence indicated that the three forms of RWE seen pre-1994 carried over into post-Apartheid SA, evolving to current problems and the effects of historical injustices (Ignazi, 2006:4-10). Afrikaner extremism persists, harnessing a narrative of white genocide to justify violent action and government overthrow in the name of an Afrikaans nation state. Zulu nationalism evolved from the actions of the Inkatha Freedom Party to the Radical Economic Transformation faction within the African National Congress (ANC) and its supporting party: Black First Land First. Political vigilantism primarily evolved into rampant xenophobic violence being organized into formal and centralized political organizations such as Operation Dudula. These forms of RWE in SA were found to have the same mainstream nature as the global fourth wave of RWE, in addition to its characteristics of a strong online presence (Scrivens & Macnair, 2019; Gerbaudo, 2019) and focus on recruitment of the young (Miller-Idriss, 2020:40-44).

Chapter 6 analyzed the determinants of the rise of these groups using Piazza's (2017) framework of economic hardship, political resentment, and social change. This study suggests that the fundamental determinant for RWE in SA is social change. For white extremists, it is driven by the loss of empowerment and marginalization felt as a result of social and economic forms of redress employed by the ANC-led government post-Apartheid. For the majority black population, it is driven by the lack of social change seen since the end of Apartheid, with the 'Rainbow Nation' promises not having materialized for most. Both effects drive social alienation, since a better distribution of social rewards is desired. Violence is seen as a justifiable means of achieving change as 'out'-groups are sought as a means of venting

frustration and placing responsibility. Various socioeconomic factors within economic hardship and political resentment both drive the overarching determinant of social change within RWE in SA.

7.3 Problems Encountered

Due to the analysis of qualitative data generated from a wide variety of sources, the data analyzed can lack homogeneity. This can range from statements given by members of the identified groups to policy decisions, to decisive actions in the name of the group. This limitation was mediated by a well-researched and clearly defined theoretical framework, tied in with extensive research of multiple sources from open-source data vetted by Scott's (1990) criteria for quality sources.

Secondly, the use of open-source data posed a few challenges. Firstly, the research for this study was derived from secondary data predominantly from news agencies and official reports from private organizations. Not all this data is freely accessible, hence paywalls posed a problem in certain areas of research. This was mediated by either paying the necessary amount as it fell within the budget for research, or by consulting alternative sources. Secondly, considering that this research seeks to identify groups from different demographics, texts were occasionally in languages different to English. Hence, translation of certain texts and articles posed a challenge, especially in the context of colloquial language being used. This was mediated by attaining translations from credible and suitably qualified sources.

Thirdly, the non-bias and non-judgmental interpretation of the data analyzed posed a problem within the study. The researcher, like any other human being, has his own opinions, thoughts, and beliefs. So, when dealing with the highly divisive and controversial ideology of the extreme-right, remaining objective and non-judgmental can present a challenge, especially if the researcher has opposing viewpoints. This problem was overcome with the following of the observation schedule, using its detailed nature as a strict set of boundaries within which to place information. In addition, frequent consultations with other researchers about the content being analyzed assisted in remaining within the set boundaries.

7.4 Addressing the Research Question

Based on the findings of the secondary research in Chapters 5 and 6, one can return to the research question stated in Chapter 1: *Why has right-wing extremism occurred in post-*

Apartheid SA and what can explain the various manifestations? Consequently, the research question has two objectives. First, what are the different forms of RWE seen in post-Apartheid SA, and second, why have these different forms emerged? The contemporary social movement organizations identified were seen to continue from the pre-1994 forms of Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism, and political vigilantism.

Drawing on the research done in the literature review, RWE can be regarded as an ideology rooted in social change. Therefore, when determining why RWE is showing prevalence in post-Apartheid SA, one must reflect on the social change occurring in SA. Due to the legacy of Apartheid, two different realities still exist, and these realities are determined by race. This has an obvious and devastating effect on social and economic opportunity. Becoming the most unequal country in the world does not happen by chance, it happens by design. Thus, within the manifestation of this purposefully unequal system, you will have groups who want to maintain their institutionalized privilege, and those who want to fight for their deserved rights. Both have the capacity for RWE. Therefore, when reflecting on the social change occurring in SA, one must differentiate between the realities of those who benefitted from Apartheid and those who did not.

For those who did benefit from Apartheid, predominantly the white and Afrikaans population, democratic SA is a sharp shift away from the *volkstaat* envisioned by the architects of Apartheid. With a distinctive identity rooted in ultranationalism stretching back to the days of British colonial rule, Afrikaners constantly fear their identity and culture being erased. Therefore, when a new, liberal, and multicultural SA becomes reality after decades of Afrikaner rule, this is a social change that is objectively difficult to process for Afrikaner ultranationalists. Tied in with SA where violent crime is rampant and where the implementation of ineffective economic redress policies has made economic conditions more difficult for the white population, the stage is set for the *swart gevaar* narrative of Apartheid to evolve into present day South African conditions. Therefore, we still see the yearning after the traditional Afrikaner *volkstaat* and traditional values manifesting in various forms such as survivalist militias, fringe terror cells and/or militarized Afrikaner youth camps.

For the majority black population, the social rewards of the 'Rainbow Nation' promised with the fall of Apartheid has not become reality. The economic, social, and spatial legacies of Apartheid are still in plain sight for everyone to see, and for the poor black population to

experience. Tied in with an ineffective government that seeks to alienate the majority through violent policing, corruption and neo-liberal economic policy, the black population is still forced to construct and govern its own communities and path to freedom. It is a combination of all three determinants, a fundamental lack of social change rooted in economic hardship and political resentment, which drives the brands of right-wing violence which manifests outside the white demographic. The democracy and constitution implemented since the fall of Apartheid has done little to grant the majority the freedom they so desperately fought for. Therefore, there is little reason to respect democracy and constitutionality when the fight for social change continues. As the Report of the Expert Panel into the July 2021 Civil Unrest (The Presidency, 2021:145) states: "It cannot be that almost three decades into our democracy, there is still such deep racialized poverty and inequality in our society. Without an end to or a reversal of these conditions, we will only see greater insecurity, which will require more diversion of resources to security".

Therefore, when dissecting RWE in SA, variance occurs along the issues of social inequality, ethnic tension, crime, immigrants, and land. Due to socio-economic history of SA, these are intertwined with race. The white right is still relatively consistent in its messaging and positioning, using crime, land, and ethnic tensions as key recruitment topics. Major variance occurs within black forms of RWE in SA as a variety of approaches and discursive opportunities exist for exploiting the dire socioeconomic conditions currently present. Zulu nationalists mainly campaign on issues of social inequality and ethnic tensions; villainizing white elites in a quest to seize control of the ANC and overturn the democratic institution of SA. Xenophobic groups, like Operation Dudula, see recruitment success with issues of crime, immigrants, and social inequality. Foreigners are blamed for the socioeconomic troubles of South Africans and the lack of a common multi-cultural South African identity is exploited to violently expel foreigners.

This variance can be attributed to the multifaceted nature of the socio-economic hurdles that SA faces. Sensitive ethnic fault lines are still present within communities, immigration increased post-Apartheid and the ANC-led government has failed to create a common post-Apartheid South African identity and equitably redistribute economic power. Within economic hardship, Apartheid-era economic power has been relatively maintained within the hands of a white minority. Within political resentment, communities are perpetually alienated by a

militarized and politically motivated police force. Both of these determinants are driven by the issues of corruption, land redistribution and Black Economic Empowerment.

Thus, this range of socioeconomic issues provides predatory ideologies with a variety of discursive opportunities to pivot and campaign on. Unlike Europe, where right-wing groups mainly centre around immigration, or the US, where right-wing groups mainly centre around white male supremacy, SA has an amalgamation of socioeconomic factors and historical developments that firstly, cause its ability to be reformed post-Apartheid to stagnate and secondly, gives traction and mobilization potential to a variety of issues to be used and exploited by right-wing extremist groups looking to recruit supporters.

7.5 Research Implications

This study, based on secondary data, seeks to analyze the contemporary forms of RWE in SA. This will be the first study on contemporary South African RWE. Therefore, simply as a research output, this study fills a major void within extremist South African literature. With a global surge in RWE, and the socio-economic prospects of SA looking pessimistic, the contribution that this study makes to the knowledge of potential sources of violence from extremist groups is an important stepping stone in advancing counter-terrorism efforts.

Secondly, this study provides a replicable framework to be used within other countries. Through the construction of a framework that draws from the rich history of right-wing extremist literature, and with specific efforts to ensure that it is comprehensively detailed, yet flexible enough for diverse application, it boasts tremendous potential for identifying right-wing extremist groups and movements forming in other countries. This is especially true when these right-wing extremist movements are as diverse as South Africa's, manifesting in political party attitudes, a variety of social movement organizations and historically developed subcultures.

Thirdly, it presents a framework that can be applied within Africa and other developing nations. With most of the right-wing extremist research taking place in the developed world, such as the United States, Europe and Australia, little research exists on how RWE can form in countries that are historically victims of these developed nations' colonial and imperialist conquests. Therefore, this study can be used as a point of departure for the analysis of right-

wing extremist movements in countries that have histories of colonialism and systemic oppression.

Lastly, due to the mainstream nature of the fourth wave of global RWE, it is important to identify which issues are being used to normalize right-wing extremist beliefs within political discourse and debate. These issues pose a fundamental threat to democratic engagement and due process in a country. Therefore, this study serves as an appropriate guide for the analysis of key topics within political discourse and legislative development in SA, and how it can be used by right-wing extremist action and recruitment.

7.6 Avenues for Future Research

This study is merely the beginning of the development of right-wing extremist literature in SA. Simply focusing on the analysis of right-wing extremist discursive opportunities and worldviews through frame alignment, this study only sought to identify extremist groups and to track the reasons for their prevalence. However, there is still a plethora of information to be researched. Specifically, as mentioned throughout this study, there is an entire network of groups who are not explicitly extremist but utilize extreme-right issues and narratives to draw support and contribute to mainstreaming far-right beliefs. As a first point of departure, this study encourages further research into the scope and influence of the broader ecosphere of the far-right in SA.

Secondly, the other elements of social movement theory can be applied to SA, analyzing the practical implications for the prevalence of these groups. This involves utilizing the full political opportunity structure and application of organizational resources. This will allow us to determine accurately the full scope of influence these groups have and which tangible resources they have at their disposal to support the movement. This can determine the potential for growth, recruitment capacity and the ability to inflict further violence.

Thirdly, with right-wing extremists connecting with other groups across the globe at an increasing rate, a detailed analysis of the similarities between South African RWE and other forms seen across the globe can hold tremendous utility. This study showed how Afrikaner extremism is compatible with global neo-Nazism, with recruitment bases being set up in SA. Therefore, understanding how international groups draw inspiration from and influence South African groups, will be critical for future counter-terrorism efforts.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter tied together the findings and implications of this study, thereby attempting to answer why right-wing extremism has occurred in post-Apartheid SA and shows various manifestations? Through the study overview, the methodical and logical nature of the study was shown, detailing how it incorporated a comprehensive and diverse body of right-wing extremist literature, South African historical developments, and prominent contemporary findings to determine the three main forms of RWE in SA which are: Afrikaner extremism, Zulu nationalism, and political vigilantism. Using an effective determinant framework, the study reflected that the primary cause of RWE in SA is social change, further exacerbated by economic hardship and political resentment. Extremist variance was found to be rooted in a South African socio-economic context, characterized by issues of inequality, ethnic tensions, land, crime, and immigrants. These topics have a strong racial dimension resulting from SA's Apartheid history. These findings are regarded as important due to three factors: the lack of data on contemporary South African RWE, the avenues it provides for deeper right-wing counter-terrorism investigations in SA and the replicability of the framework for other developing nations.

RWE is something that cannot be underestimated. The threats it poses to the democratic order, pluralist nature and equitable human rights-based structure of Western democracies is real. Worryingly, erosions within these important facets of social construction are already being seen around the globe. With RWE having a history based on division, and the rudimentary efforts present in trying to instill social justice in South African society, SA is not exempt from this threat, as many paths to radicalization exist for a large majority of the population. The findings of this study are the first illustration of the breadth and scope of the extreme-right in contemporary SA. Therefore, it unquestionably acts as the point of departure for greater research into understanding the extreme-right in post-Apartheid SA and how to effectively close the paths to radicalization.

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