

POROUS LAND BORDERS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Abel Patswaite Letlape

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Science in the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University



Supervisor: Commander (Prof) HAP Smit

Co-Supervisor: Dr JDS van der Merwe

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DECLARATION

I AP Letlape, hereby declare that this thesis entitled ‘Porous land borders and their effects on South African national security is my own work and that I have acknowledged all sources used. It contains no material taken directly from the work of a fellow student, notes for this or any course at this or at any other tertiary institution.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Ansar Beit al Maqdis
ACSS	Africa Centre for Strategic Studies
ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMISON	African Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AQIM	The Islamic Maghreb
ASL	Ansar al Sharia Libya
AST	Ansar al Sharia Tunisia
AU	African Union
BMA	Border Management Agency
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
DOD	Department of Defence
EAC	East African Community
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zones
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

FESC	Faculty Ethics Screening Committee
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLM	Macina Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPI	Growth Promise Indicators
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPP	International Peace Park
ISS	Islamic State in Somalia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Conference on the Great Lakes Region
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
KPIs	Key Performance Indicators
KZN	Kwa Zulu Natal
LPI	Logistics Performance Index
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
REC	Research Ethics Committee
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SAHO	South African History Online

SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SADC	South African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARS	South African Revenue Services
SBER	Social, Behavioural and Education Research
SSA	State Security Agency
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Areas
TTFSE	Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe Program
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
TRS	Time Release Studies
POE	Port of Entry
PSiRA	Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDESAPD	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WCO	World Customs Organization
WDA	World Data Atlas

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ABSTRACT

South Africa currently experiences a high volume of irregular migration from neighbouring African countries and other countries further afield. This type of migration is linked globally to human trafficking, extremism, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, and other undesirable political, economic and social issues. Worldwide there is a perception that South Africa's borders are porous and thus exploited by criminal syndicates. Evidence exists of countless undocumented people who got apprehended by SA law enforcement authorities inside the country. Consequently, this study aims to investigate the causes of porous land border in South Africa, the threats presented by porous land borders, and the land border areas that need diplomatic and security attention. To gain more insight in this matter, eight in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with SANDF military strategy developers, military strategy implementers and experts at the operational level, professional people who are responsible for fulfilling the role of land border safeguarding.

To enhance the rigour of the study, the underlying principles of the Copenhagen School of thought, and the Lee's push-pull theory, the lenses through which the study was approached, were linked to the findings of the study. Furthermore, various sources were used to collect secondary data, which then were triangulated with findings of research interview findings to strengthen the validity and the reliability of the study. The data was recorded, transcribed and analysed manually through thematic analysis. Themes and patterns identified were labelled in the form of a word, a sentence, phrase or a couple of sentences.

The findings of the study illustrated that the main causes of porous land borders in South Africa are a lack of resources, the length and material condition of the border, uncoordinated intelligence, corrupt government officials, the colonial border legacy, liberalist migration policies and laws, lack of integrated overarching national security strategy, the large South African informal employment sector, and ineffective cooperation and collaboration between SA departments of state at national strategic level and parallel departments in neighbouring countries. Pull factors that promote the violation of borders include the fact that human rights are guaranteed in South Africa; that South Africa is a country with a liberal democracy; that, despite its challenges, South Africa is still perceived as a country socio-economically and politically exceeding other countries in Africa; that South Africa has an infrastructure largely unmatched on the continent. Factors identified as pushing nationals away from their respective

home countries in Africa towards South Africa are: poverty and hardship, violence, civil-military conflicts, wars, poor economic conditions and associated poor living conditions. Paradoxically, escaping from these factors to a country with perceived solutions in turn creates emerging threats in the target country, such as economic threats, societal threats, political threats and environmental threats. These threats to the national security of South Africa are closely linked to her porous land borders. The borders between Mozambique and South Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa and Lesotho and South Africa were identified as being the most porous land borders that require urgent attention from governments involved.

Building from these findings, the South African government should prioritise its territorial integrity and border protection as one of its vital interests. While addressing the internal factors attributed to porous land borders, the government should also focus its efforts on stabilising and assisting in the political and economic situation of its neighbouring countries, especially Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho. These countries can play a vital role in becoming a buffer and a first physical line of defence to South Africa in stopping illegal immigrants and contraband before reaching South Africa's porous land borders. The research contended that South Africa should pursue its interest in territorial integrity and border protection through bilateral cooperation, since it is easier to reach a bilateral agreement than pursuing multilateral security initiatives.

Keywords: Border security, border safeguarding, illegal immigrants, porous land borders, national security, migration

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA'S POROUS LAND BORDERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provide an overview of the approach and methodology followed by the researcher in this study. The chapter commences with a background of South African land borders and border management by providing the historical context in which the South African borders were controlled pre- and post-1994. It further clarifies the current mandate of the South African National Defence Force in terms of border safeguarding and the responsibilities of other departments in managing and controlling the South African borders, since border security is not the responsibility of the SANDF alone. The background is followed by the problem statement. The research questions, the aim and objectives of the study are discussed thereafter, and a methodological approach is presented. Then the survey methods for border issues and data analysis techniques employed in this study are explained, the scope of the study outlined, and the research trajectory and structure of the research presented.

1.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND BORDERS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

South African land border security was very tight under the apartheid regime. Africans were restricted and politically not welcome to South Africa (SAHO 2018). It was also not easy for black South Africans to travel abroad due to political reasons. The police, not just professionally, but politically and ideologically dedicated to the apartheid regime were keeping tight control of Ports of Entry (POE). In 1992 immigration officers were introduced in the border areas to take over from the South African police (South Africa 2017b). These immigration officers worked under the Department of Home Affairs which was responsible for executing the laws and providing contemporary services, predominantly to white South Africans.

Before 1994 the government turned a blind eye and covertly encouraged some versions of migration, in particular those that benefitted the country economically at that time. The reasons for that were to benefit from cheap labour from black Africans for the economic benefit. Although African migrants were used for cheap labour they were denied citizenship (Crush & McDonald 2001).

While black people from neighbouring countries were not allowed to apply for citizenship, whites were welcome to apply for citizenship under the South African immigration policy. Yet, over the

period 1960 to 1980, semi-skilled and skilled white migrants from Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia were offered South African citizenship for two reasons. Firstly, the government felt threatened by the high number of blacks who could eventually lead to majority rule and secondly offering other whites citizenship was needed to boost the South African white population numbers (South Africa 2017b).

From 1913 to 1986 black migrants were not allowed into South Africa. They would enter the country either illegally or as contract workers because they were not permitted to apply for either permanent residence or temporary permits. Labour or contract migrants were mostly recruited for the mining industry. The countries who were the main source of labour supply were Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana. The recruitment of migrants was monopolised by a single company called The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). At some stage South Africa had an unacceptably high dependency on labour from foreign countries (78% of the labour force) compared to labour from within South Africa (22%) in the mining industry (TEBA 2002). There were bilateral labour agreements between South Africa and neighbouring states that migrants had to go back to their various home countries to renew their contracts.

The dawn of democracy in 1994 in South Africa led to changes to the policies of the pre-1994 government by addressing the socio-economic imbalances created by the apartheid government. As opposed to the previous government, the ANC led government's approach was based on an interdependent and non-hegemonic approach to enhance economic growth in the region. The country has undergone a rigorous process of crafting policies and legislation on refugees and migration since 1994. These policies and the legislation include the Green Paper on International Migration, and the Immigration and Refugees Act (South Africa 2016b; 1998). New passports for work, doing business abroad and visits abroad were introduced, and exploitative racially based laws were repealed to allow South Africa to integrate into the world, the African continent, the SADC region to become part of the international family of nations.

The post-1994 government decentralised the responsibility for border control and border management in South Africa. Currently, the South African borders are controlled and managed by the Department of Home Affairs in cooperation with other border agencies or state departments, namely Customs, which is responsible for goods movement and collection of tax and duties fees; Immigration, which controls people or human movement; The South African Police Service (SAPS), which provides the detection and prevention of cross border crimes; The Health Department, which controls health risks and communicable diseases related to cross-border issues; the Department of Agriculture, which controls and regulates livestock movement and plant products across borders; the Department of Transport, which deals with maritime and aviation security by

issuing aerodrome and port of entry permits or licences; the Postal Services, which assists the South African Receiver of Revenue Service (SARS) by handling all postal items across borders; the Department of Trade and Industry, which formulates and regulates import and export policies; the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, which administers marine conservation legislation in territorial waters; and South African Intelligence Services, responsible for collecting information on existing or impending security threats (Steinberg 2005).

The SANDF as an entity of the Department of Defence (DoD) forms part of South Africa's border agencies. The SANDF has diverse mandates, including border safeguarding and to act as a deterrent against security threats. The Defence force is also responsible for addressing vulnerabilities both proactively and reactively, such as illegal migration or border crossings, protection of South African citizens and the territorial integrity of the State, prevention of the influx of illegal goods and services, and to provide support to other border agencies (South Africa 2018a).

According to the Department of Defence (South Africa, 2015a), the SANDF is mandated to achieve four strategic goals, and thirteen tasks. The first goal is to protect and defend the Republic of South Africa. the second goal is the safeguarding of South Africa; the third goal is to promote peace and stability in the region, and the last goal is to contribute to developmental and other tasks as ordered by government. Out of the thirteen tasks, task number four is listed as the safeguarding of borders or protection of borders. Protection of the country's land and sea borders and its airspace is also re-emphasized, defined and documented in the Sou of the country. The SANDF is constitutionally mandated to protect South African citizens, the country's territorial integrity, and its sovereignty.

The SANDF is further mandated to protect property and lives of South Africans, maintain essential services, to work together with the SAPS in maintaining domestic law and order, and to support all other state departments in South Africa within its broad mandate of defending national security. The services it provides should be in compliance with international obligations. The constitution allows the President, who is the commander in chief of the SANDF, to employ and authorise the employment of the SANDF to render service inside South Africa or execute border control functions in international waters (South Africa 1996b; 2002a).

The SANDF members employed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 will have the same powers as the South African Police while on duty or when utilised to provide domestic services (South Africa 1996b; 1995a). The SANDF members employed may search, seize, detain and arrest according to the Defence Act 42 of 2002, section 20(2). Once a SANDF member has detained or arrested an illegal immigrant or any other criminal or seized any object or article then she/he hand over the items seized and/or person arrested to the police.

Although the roles of the SANDF include crime prevention, its functions exclude crime investigation which is the primary role of the South African Police. The SANDF mandate also excludes the prevention of petty or routine crime, and only covers crimes that pose serious risks to the constitutional order.

Strategically, the South African military must assure border safety through effective monitoring of border activities, making sure that there are no illegal border crossings, and ensuring that territorial integrity is not violated. Therefore, the SANDF as force multiplier is expected to deploy effective and highly technological intelligence gathering systems to neutralise illegal border crossings. According to Hennop *et al.* (2001) the monitoring systems should include remote controlled aircraft, sensors, night-sight equipment, barrier systems and long distance TVs (LDTVs).

To be able to execute tasks such as foot, vehicle, and air patrol, searching at authorised roadblocks, cordoning off crime scenes, intercepting flights (e.g. UAVs) which cross the border illegally, the SANDF require resources such as motorcycles, mounted vehicles, aircraft, tracker dogs, reaction forces, drug detecting systems, military explosive systems, patrol shelters during adverse weather, tactical airfields, communication systems, logistical support, and border control capacity building (Hennop *et al.* 2001).

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The study is motivated by a growing concern by South Africans about the apparent ineffective control and safeguarding of the country's geographical borders and the rapidly increasing number of undocumented immigrants in the country. Furthermore, failure of the SA government to address the issue of porous borders can have negative consequences for national security. Land borders contribute significantly to the economy of the country. During the financial year 2013/14, revenue collected through South African land borders amounted to R 2 049 184 090, and sea and air revenue collected were R 98 780 074 239 and R 28 213 085 623 respectively. Land-based POE accounted for 84% of human migration, mainly economic migration, in the SADC region, much larger POE volume than that of sea and air (South Africa 2016d).

Advocate Mahlodi, the head of the State Security Agency (SSA) said in an interview (2019) that porous borders are the number one threat to domestic security, thus emphasising that every person coming to South Africa must do so lawfully. He stated that worldwide there is a perception that South Africa's borders are porous, a fact supported by evidence of multiple undocumented people who were apprehended by law enforcement authorities inside the country (Times Live 2019).

The matter of porous land borders in South Africa has resulted in South African citizens, in particular those who are unemployed and poor, becoming intolerant of immigrants for labour, and venting their frustrations by attacking foreign nationals and accusing them of committing crimes and stealing their jobs. Xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals by South Africans have indeed been an embarrassment to the country. Undeniably, porous borders pose a very serious threat to the stability of any country (Crush *et al.* 2017).

According to the Department of Defence (South Africa, 2018a), the SANDF continue to fulfil its mandate of border safeguarding in collaboration with other departments, in spite of tight budget constraints and related limited resource allocation. Currently the military is deploying 15 sub-units to cover 4,471km of borders in North West, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Northern Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa. 2018a).

Kekana (2018) revealed that the main opposition party in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance (DA) raised a concern of “porous borders” due to poor border management and corruption. Furthermore, the party accused the Department of Home Affairs of not knowing how many people in fact enter and leave the country.

During a media briefing on 14 July 2017, the deputy minister of police, Bongani Mkhongu made a controversial statement. He warned about the dominance of foreign nationals in Hillbrow, estimated at eighty (80) percent (Eyewitness News 2017). He cautioned the locals against surrendering their city to foreigners who are committing crimes by trading illegally and hijacking old buildings and potentially taking South Africans’ land. The deputy minister further said this matter needs to be debated rigorously. The deputy minister’s point of view is subjective, not substantiated by any research data, yet deserving of further investigation.

Border security is the first line of defence for any sovereign country and its citizens. This argument is supported by UNSC (2001) which encourages all states to implement effective border security as precautionary measure to counter terrorism and to prevent the movement of illegal goods.

Adding to the problem of perceived porous borders, Africans find themselves caught between self-centred rulers on the continent, political greed, intra-state violence, poor governance, corruption and unscrupulous non-state actors who are pushing their own agendas. Owing to continuous undemocratic and unconstitutional changes taking place in many countries in Africa, South Africa became a country of choice for many foreigners because of its relative stability and perceived and real economic opportunities (South Africa 2015a). There are concerns that some illegal immigrants in South Africa might have been trafficked and thus became vulnerable to exploitation (Walker & Oliveira 2015). Therefore, it is extremely important for the government to understand the root

causes of porous borders and to come up with a strategy to address the matter. South African authorities must be able to keep track of all immigrants entering and leaving the country to deter criminals or law breakers.

Figure 1.1 depicts the large-scale movement of irregular migratory populations from neighbouring countries, especially from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, and African countries further afield. This migration of people is motivated by a combination of factors, inter alia an increase of conflicts, unconstitutional changes of power and political violence in some countries. South Africa remains a country of choice for neighbouring migrants and other parts of the continent as they perceive South Africa as politically and economically stable and presenting many opportunities. These irregular migratory trends in South Africa are linked to illicit economies, human smuggling, illegal activities, extremism, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, et cetera (South Africa 2015a).



Source: Adapted from South Africa (2015a: 2-16)

Figure 1.1: Irregular migratory trends to South Africa

The perceived porousness of South African borders and its apparent link to reigning situations in neighbouring countries and further afield serve as reasons to investigate the causes of porous border and the impact the potential threat thereof to South Africa's national security. UNDESAPD (2017)

revealed that among the top twenty (20) migrant-host countries in the world in 2017, South Africa was ranked 15th with a total number of 4 million migrants. In the African context, South Africa is the number one migrant host country. Škuflić *et al.* (2018) asserted that migrants are attracted by large economies. Parshotam (2018) revealed that according to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), South Africa received 3,142,511 migrants from the SADC region. Without reliable information, estimating the number of migrants to South Africa is not easy. What is known, though, are who these migrants are. Spaan (2015) attested that in Sub-Saharan Africa migrants constitute asylum-seekers, trafficked women and children, (political) refugees, contract labour migrants, (ambitious or desperate) students, highly skilled workers looking for lucrative opportunities, displaced persons, and businessmen.

Although the military maintained a heavy presence on South Africa's borders since the 1970s, historically, border security and control was the responsibility of the police until 1990 when counterinsurgency units withdrew. In 1993 the police were ordered back to the borders (Kruys 2002).

After realising the deterioration of the conditions at the border and the largely uncontrolled influx of immigrants, the South African government reversed its decision on border security. On 10 June 1998, the government made an agreement to hand back the borders to the military. However, by then the damage in terms of deterioration of border infrastructure and border fencing facilities had already been done. The agreement was to provide five aircraft to the SANDF with the allocation of 28 infantry companies equating to 3,752 soldiers (Kruys 2002). Due to budget constraints and the deployment of the SANDF in peace keeping operations in Africa, infantry companies were reduced to 15 sub-units (South Africa 2018a). The SANDF inherited a border situation characterised by dilapidated fencing and poor general infrastructure. Potentially, considering the identified nature of illegal migrants, these factors may imply that porous borders may negatively impact the national security of South Africa. This provides compelling reasons to investigate porous borders and its impact on national security in the South African context.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Several research questions emanate from the challenging situation on South Africa's geographical borders as deliberated in the previous section. These questions are:

- i. What are the causes of porous land borders in South Africa?
- ii. What are the threats posed by porous land borders to South Africa's national security?
- iii. What are the consequences of porous land border to South Africa's national security?

- iv. Which physical areas of the South African porous land borders need to be prioritised?
- v. What are the policy and operational relevance of the results of this study to the SANDF?

1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to explore the causes of porous land borders and their effects on South Africa's national security, and to interpret the results for policy and operational relevance.

1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In order to achieve the aim of the study, the following research objectives were pursued:

- i. To investigate the causes of porous land borders in South Africa.
- ii. To identify the threats presented by porous land borders to South Africa's national security.
- iii. To explain the consequences of porous land borders in terms of South African national security.
- iv. To identify the areas of the South Africa land borders that demand attention.
- v. To formulate recommendations based on the results of the study to inform operational and policy regarding border security in the SANDF.

1.7 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A qualitative research approach was used in this study to elicit responses from participants in the South African National Defence Force who fulfilled any one of the following roles: military strategy developer, military strategy implementer, and military experts at the operational level responsible for land border safeguarding.

The research complied with the Protection of Personal Information Act, No.4 of 2013 and the protection of DOD classified information section 104 of the Defence Act, No. 42 of 2002. Ethics clearance was also granted by Stellenbosch University, Research Ethics Committee (REC). Participation was strictly voluntarily, and all participants completed an informed consent form.

1.8 SURVEY METHODS FOR BORDER ISSUES

According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), the interview and the questionnaire are the most two common instruments used to collect primary data. The main purpose of these instruments is to obtain answers to research questions. Semi-structured interviews were used as a source of primary data collection from eight participants. Only participants who served in border safeguarding over the period 2013 until 2019 were interviewed. Non-probability snowball sampling was employed.

To supplement this information, a desktop approach was used through which documents were sourced to understand the historical background of immigration in South Africa, and to offer a theoretical framework and the literature review for this study. Only SANDF documents in the public domain were consulted in this study; these included the Defence Review, the White paper on Defence, and geographical maps, among others.

The data collection instrument developed by the researcher was piloted to eliminate ambiguity or biasness before commencing with data collection. Five experts from the military were requested to test the initial interview schedule before the interviews would be conducted with the target participants. The military experts who were used in the pilot test were not part of the eight participants who were interviewed during the main survey. To enhance validity and reliability, the primary data collected was triangulated with the secondary data and compared with the theoretical frameworks dealing with border security, the push-pull theory and the Copenhagen School.

1.9 DATA ANALYSIS

Thematic data analysis techniques were used to analyse primary data collected. The semi-structured interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. The transcribed information was read and reread, and the similarities and recurring words, phrases, sentences, and patterns were manually grouped under five main themes, namely, causes of porous land borders, the threats posed by porous land borders, the consequences of porous land borders, land border areas that need attention.

Triangulation was another data analysis technique used to analyse both primary and secondary data. During this process, subthemes that emerged from the transcribed interviews were analysed and compared against the literature review. A comprehensive discussion on methodology, methods, data acquisition and data analysis is included in Chapter 3.

1.10 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on South Africa's land borders. Although the management of border security is a collective and co-ordinated effort shared among various state departments, this study will focus on the South African National Defence Force. The emphasis will be on the root causes of porous borders, and their effects on the national security of South Africa. The participants in this study are experts at the strategic and operational levels of the SANDF responsible for the safeguarding of SA land borders. The findings will be useful in addressing the challenges associated with the consequences of porous borders. The areas of the South African land borders that needs attention, and threats to the national security will be assessed, and remedial action proposed. South African immigration laws will also be examined.

1.11 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis comprises five chapters. Figure 1.2 is a research trajectory map summarising the flow and presentation of the research underpinning the thesis.




Figure 1.2: A research trajectory map

Chapter One establishes the overall approach of the study, the background of South Africa's borders and the agencies responsible for border security and border management, and scope of the study. The chapter will further contextualise the problem statement, the key questions, research aim and objectives of the study. Moreover, the chapter will motivate why there is a need to conduct research on the causes of porous borders and their effects on the national security of South Africa. The methodological approach, the survey methods for gaining insight in the current research topic and its stated objectives, and data analysis will also be briefly described.

Chapter Two will explore the theory/ies underpinning this study. National security and securitisation of borders as key aspects in security studies will be examined. The chapter will probe the causes of large-scale illegal immigration, especially migration from within the SADC region to South Africa. The country's approaches to land border security and border management framework, policies and other relevant documents will be examined. The chapter will also cover border security and management challenges experienced by the SA Department of Home Affairs and other authorities responsible for border management and border security.

Different types of border threats, such as criminal networks, unauthorized migration, and potential terrorists' activities will be scrutinised in this chapter. Different reports reflecting the most recent border security incidents impacting South Africa will be evaluated so that the consequences, i.e. financial losses and threats to human security may be understood. These reports will also help to comprehend how think tanks frame the border position of South Africa. The growing concern of porous borders in South Africa will be assessed from a societal and economic point of view. The chapter will also tap into some lessons learned from other countries by exploring the impact of threats to their respective borders.

The chapter will also explore the effects of porous borders in South Africa, thereby examining South African experiences, strategic approaches, practices and policies in response.

Chapter Three deals with the methodological approach through which this study was conducted and the motivation for the choice of research design. The chapter will address the population and sampling, the data collection approach, data analysis, validity and reliability, and the limitations of the study. Chapter 3 will conclude by describing how permission to conduct the study and ethical clearance was obtained.

Chapter Four will present data analysis of the participant responses to the five research focus areas, namely: the causes of porous land borders in South Africa; the threats posed by porous land borders to South Africa's national security; the consequences of porous land border for South Africa's

national security; areas of the South African porous land borders that need to be prioritised; the relevance of results to SANDF policy and operations.

Chapter five will present a summary of the findings, and the implication of the study for the national security of South Africa. By reflecting on the aim and the objectives of the study, Chapter Five will recommend methods of improving the country's border security and border management practices. In conclusion, some of the limitations of the study and potential for related future research identified by this study, will be highlighted.

1.12 CONCLUSION

In the current chapter, the rationale for the study to assess South African land borders, the methods employed to reach research objectives, the academic and practical contribution the study may make, as well as the structure of the thesis have been introduced. Attention now shifts to theoretical frameworks to deal with border security and the literature associated with border security and South African land borders.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: POROUS BORDERS AS A SECURITY RISK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines previous work published in the context of porous land borders and their effects on national security. The theoretical framework underpinning this study, namely the Push-Pull theory and Copenhagen School of thought are discussed. The relevance, the application, and the limitations of these theories to this study are deliberated. The key concepts of border security and national security are defined.


The chapter also provides a background and an orientation of South Africa's land borders and the political and socio-economic situation of the countries sharing land borders with South Africa. Some of the international approaches to border control/management and continental and regional policy on the movement of people are assessed. The chapter concludes by providing an overview of the development of the Southern African region, the movement of people, and policies guiding South Africa in terms of migration.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

In this section, two theories, namely "push-pull theory" and "the Copenhagen School" will be discussed according to the structure indicated in Figure 2.1. This diagram shows the factors which cause people to decide to migrate from the area of origin to the area of destination. Pull factors primarily represent opportunities and advantages either real, or perceived by migrants to be real of the destination country. The diagram shows that pull factors tend to attract (pull) either highly educated and skilled persons, or those migrating for reasons of personal security, if not mere survival. Professional people or those in managerial positions migrate for reasons very different to security-seeking migrants. They almost exclusively migrate to advance an already positive situation.

Unlike pull factors, push factors naturally tend to be negative factors forcing (pushing) people from their area of origin due to factors such as political expulsions, economic or social failure at origin. This is inevitable, as push and pull factors are inversely mirrored. Push factors represent absence of human needs, push factors either real or perceived provision of the same things needed. Put differently, if personal safety is a human need, the absence thereof or the presence of the opposite (aggression) will push a person away from the condition of need, and a real or perceived space of personal safety will pull that same person towards that space where it may either be provided, or

where it promises to be provided. As people migrate, countries targeted by migrants, if their borders are porous, will pull criminals in equal measure for vastly different reasons. Those reasons pose threats to the economy, and the social, environmental and political situation in the host or target country.



Source: Adapted from (Ravenstein 1885, Lee 1966)

Figure 2.1: Theoretical frameworks

This study will explore the underlying principles of these theories, and their link with both the causes of porous land borders, and the consequences presented by porous land borders for the national security of South Africa. The importance of these underlying theories, and their contribution to answering the central research question in this study will be clarified.

2.3 PUSH-PULL THEORY

This Section discusses the underlying principles of the push-pull theory, the application of this theory, and the limitations of the theory. The theory is also analysed to ascertain its relevance to this study.

2.3.1 An overview of the push-pull theory

The push-pull theory can be traced back from Ravenstein's laws of movement or migration by people from one country to another (Ravenstein, 1885). The Push-pull model is mainly built on Ravenstein's 'laws of migration,' a theory which today is still regarded as the backbone of contemporary migration theory (Dinbabo & Nyasula 2015). The law of migration states that one country receives migrants from parts 'of another country where its population is redundant'. According to Ravenstein's laws, the majority of migrants prefer to travel short distances rather than long distance. The longer the distance the more the number of migrants decrease. It is assumed that knowledge of destinations and travel costs are the contributing factors of either limiting or encouraging traveling. Women engage more in internal migration for positive reasons such as to manufacturing districts and workshops, while men tend to migrate internationally to seek employment. Economic conditions are viewed as the main cause of migration flow. Improvement of transport, commerce and industrial development increases the volume of migration as a pull factor (Ravenstein, 1885).

Unfavourable economic conditions push individuals to search for a better life. Favourable economic conditions pull individuals in predictable directions. Poorer people tend to move to wealthier countries from low- wage areas to higher-wage areas (O'Reilly 2015). New economic theories acknowledge push and pull factors as determinants of migration. Economic theories also recognise intervening variables, such as networks of family and friends, brokers, contractors and the middlemen who facilitate, support and promote migration (O'Reilly 2015). According to Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana (2016), all new categories of migration identified by the researchers are based on push and pull factors.

Massey *et al.* (1993) identified push factors as high unemployment, and low wages, and acute or essential needs. Pull factors are seen as provision of needs and essential material and non-material commodities (food as much as health, safety, etc.). The four core factors that explain the pulling of labour from one country to another are economic dualism, structural inflation, demography of labour supply and motivational problems (Massey *et al.* 1993).

2.3.2 The application of the push-pull theory

Beside the criticism and limitations of the push-pull theory, the model still remains popular in the field of migration (De Haas 2007; 2010). The theory is still dominant and widely used as an alternative way of seeking to understand what motivates the flow of migration.

The study conducted by Stanojoska & Petrevski (2012) provides an overview of the usefulness of the push-pull theory. The study showed that conflicts, economic crises, ethnic cleanings, globalization, social inequality, political instability, wars, discrimination, and the market economy were still the main reasons for migration.

Pesonen *et al.* (2011) conducted a study investigating rural tourism destinations. The purpose of the study was to explore what are the exact motivations behind the push and pull factors. Dolintina *et al.* (2015) also carried out a similar study by applying the push-pull theory factors on what attract sport tourists. In their study, this theory was found to be the cornerstone of tourism behaviour. The theory can be useful to identify deficits or weaknesses in countries of origin and help to propose solutions and craft policies to strengthen those countries and suppress and prevent illegal movement of people, including human trafficking.

2.3.3 Limitations of the push-pull theory

De Haas (2010) presented several limitations of push-pull: firstly, the model is static, because it does not specify how migration affected initial structural conditions; secondly, the theory is a descriptive and post-hoc device in explaining migration. It is characterised by ambiguous factors that explain migration. The ambiguity often confuses direct and indirect causes of migration. Thirdly it confuses macro-level migration (e.g. the urban modern manufacturing sector and rural traditional agricultural sector) determinants with individual migration motives/ variability. The ambiguity of the push-pull theory also obscures micro and macro levels of analysis.

The factors of push-pull theory are generally mirrored in each other. It tends to be two sides of the same coin in explaining the factors in the destination country and in the country of origin. Another drawback of the push-pull model is that it does not differentiate country characteristics (Chen 2017). The model is limited to empirical value, and it is inconsistent in terms of empirical evidence. The model does not allow empirical tests on weighting the factors that explain migration.

Furthermore, De Haas (2007) argues that if underdevelopment and poverty were the fundamental driver or causes of migration, why are there much lower rates of migrant movement from West Africa to Europe and North America? West Africa countries are regarded as very poor and frequently assume precarious status, while Europe and North America are extensively wealthier nations. According to De Haas (2007), the push-pull model tends to ignore people's aspirations.

2.3.4 Relevance of the push-pull theory to this study

Dinbabo & Nyasula (2015) mentions that most of the migration theories such as push-pull theory seek to clarify the causes and effects of cross border movement. Therefore, the push-pull theory is relevant for this study because the research seeks to understand the causes of porous borders and their effect on the security of South Africa.

Internal attributes of pull factors can be categorised as those factors, where governments have influence, while external attributes are associated with push factors (Massey *et al.* 1993). Based on the literature review, one can deduce that causes of porous borders can be explained from migration theory, and the theory may be divided into internal and external attributes.

The authorities and political leaders of the countries of destination have influence and control of internal attributes or pull factors that motivate the migration into their countries. The control does not have to be absolute, but it should be sufficient to exert positive influence over national strategy. External attributes are normally push factors and they are beyond the control of countries of destination.

2.4 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

Section 2.4 briefly explores an overview of the Copenhagen School, the application of the Copenhagen School theory, followed by the limitations of the Copenhagen School theory and the relevance of the School of Copenhagen theory to this study.

2.4.1 An overview of the Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School is connected to a group of researchers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute whose origin date back to 1983. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever are the most distinguished members of the school. The two researchers came up with three concepts of analysing security threats. The concepts are: regional security complex theory; sectors of security; and securitisation theory (Floyd 2007).

Sectors of security consist of five threats associated with security: societal threats, environmental threats, military threats, economic threats and political threats. These sectors are used as analytical tools where security threats are observed (Mangunda 2019). The military sector is linked to power and the use of force. The political sector is associated with legitimacy, while the economic sector is characterized by trade and production. The societal sector is connected to a collective identity, and the environmental sector is linked to the biosphere (Buzan *et al.* 1998). The main goal of the

Copenhagen School of thought is to understand who securitizes (securitizing actors), securitizes for whom (referent objects) and securitizes on what issues (threats).

Mangunda (2019) noted that securitisation is the process through which the securitising actor presents something or issues a threat to a referent object by seeking the adoption of security measures through justification to the audience. In analysing securitisation, the understating of the three concepts Referent object, Existential threat and Securitizing actor is crucial. Referent object is an object which is seen as being threatened; an example of which is the state. Existential threat consist of different components, such as anything that can cause economic harm or political isolation. Wilkinson (2007) acknowledged that securitisation is conceptualised as a ‘speech-act’. Securitising actors are people who must declare whether the referent object is threatened or not. Examples of securitizing actors are political leaders and governments of states.

Cruden (2011) states that once the threat has been securitised or declared, all stakeholders must work together to address the threat. De-securitisation is when the government or political leaders cease to treat an issue as a threat, or they downgrade or downplay the threat.

Regional security complex theory tends to be more intense on the regional scale and less intense on a global scale. Threats are felt more easily at close range; they travel much easier over short distances than long. Military and political threats are strongly felt especially if they are within the region. Security threats tend to be localized within regions and at times become difficult to wholly resolve or analyse (Buzan *et al.* 1998).

2.4.2 The application of the Copenhagen School

This theoretical framework has been tested in various fields such as migration, political dissidence, health, especially with regards to the post-2001 US drive on war against terror (McDonald 2008). Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009) adopted the School of Copenhagen theoretical framework on cyber security as an existing threat. The relevance of the theory has then appeared through a contextual investigation of what has been named the war in cyber space against Estonian society and business organizations in 2007.

According to Bilgin (2011), securitisation theory has made remarkable advances in the studies of security in Western Europe. Lately, the framework has gained prominence globally. Given the nature of outlying international relations, global pervasiveness of mainstream approaches to security, the focus of the theory, and the Western European origins, the securitisation theory made a significant impact outside Western Europe due to its value and it continues to dominate other school of thoughts.

Koma (2015) conducted a study by employing the securitization framework founded by the Copenhagen School. The study examined how Turkey and the European Union dealt with Syrian refugees during 2015. The application of the securitization framework has proven that the incorporation of ‘speech act’ and ‘practice act’ can be helpful in comparative studies.

Critical elements of securitisation comprised securitising actors, existential threat, referent object, speech act, emergency measures, and result (Silva & Pereira 2019). During the European Union’s securitisation of Syrian refugees in Turkey during 2015 these elements were applied practically as follows: *Securitizing actors* were European Union (EU) and its member states. The *existential threat* was the influx of Syrian refugees, especially from Turkey. The *referent object* was the Schengen system. The relevant *speech act* was a statement of intent of political elites and the authorities to protect or safeguard the Schengen area. *Emergency measures* were to build fences, strengthen border checks and controls, establish border surveillance and have EU-Turkey summits. The *result encompassed* the 2015 Joint Action Plan, Intensive engagements, 2016 Turkey-EU deal, resettlement, relocation, financial aids, and readmission (Koma 2015).

According to Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009), the theoretical framework pioneered by the School of Copenhagen has been applied in numerous contexts of securitisation, including, yet not limited to cross-border trafficking (Jackson 2006), HIV/AIDS as security threat (Elbe 2006) and ethnic conflict (Roe 2004).

Silva & Pereira (2019) denote that during the trials of the securitisation concept, it was found that this framework may examine new threats in countries, and may also serve to establish policies and strategy which seek to address securitisation issues to control the borders in the EU. In Brazil, the Copenhagen School was applied by government to securitise drug trafficking over the period 2011-2016.

2.4.3 Limitations of the Copenhagen School

Besides the great value of the Copenhagen School for the conceptualization of security and an analysis of threats, this framework is confronted by widespread criticism. Charrett (2009) stated that the Copenhagen School of thought failed to address the normative dilemmas within itself. Williams (2003) also attacked the framework for being politically irresponsible by lacking the basis to critically evaluate emergency, enmity and claims of threat.

McDonald (2008) criticised the Copenhagen School for being a narrow-minded and problematic framework because firstly, the speech act and securitising actors are dominated by political leaders. Secondly, the framework encourages only those voices that are deemed institutionally legitimate to

convey the message on behalf of the government as a collective voice. Thirdly, and maybe most essentially, the framework is narrow in its logic of defining the act solely in relations to the designation of threats to security. It ignores the contextualisation of security against a particular background (e.g. expression of core values or normative goal). There has been criticism by a number of scholars both inside and outside Europe that the Copenhagen School is Eurocentric in their approach to security (Aradau 2004; Balzacq 2005; Knudsen, 2001; Williams 2003).

The Copenhagen School is classified as western-centric and characterised through its narrow-minded conceptualisation of security, sharp dichotomy between securitization and politicization, and negligence of practice (Koma 2015). Other scholars are now focusing on non-Western ideas and experiences to add more value to security discussions (Kent 2006).

According to Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009), various authors highlighted several normative implications during their theoretical debates on the status of the theory being euro-centric (Bubandt 2005). The speech act in the framework is centered on power and misleading (Balzacq 2005). Van Munster (2005) argues that the contribution of Copenhagen School to the relationship between political and security is too small.

Wilkinson (2007) opines that for the school to be welcomed as a multilevel and universal framework, there are several issues that need to be addressed: Euro-American assumptions of identity, state and society and considering both Western and non-Western contexts. This will also help the framework to cope with any sensitive situations.

2.4.4 Relevance of the Copenhagen School to this study

The relevance of the Copenhagen School to this study which explores the threats presented by porous borders to South Africa's national security may be tackled by analysing the five main threats associated with sectors of security of the Copenhagen School. These sectors are: societal threats, environmental threats, military threats, economic threats, and political threats.

The Copenhagen School is well-documented and fittingly applied in different disciplines of security and defence management (McDonald 2008). Most prominently, it has been applied previously as an overarching framework in a vast array of analyses of securitisation of migration. Based on its relevance to migration, it is applied in this study as an overarching theory to explore the consequences of porous borders on the national security of South Africa.

For the past fifteen years, this theory has positioned itself well in the lexicon and thought processes of international relations (Hansen & Nissenbaum 2009). The theory has captured the middle ground well by expanding the security studies debate (McDonald 2008).

Wilkinson (2007) indicates that one of the success stories of the Copenhagen School is that it aided in redefining the security concept. The school has been proven valuable in addressing so-called new security issues, such as transnational crime, migration, and intrastate conflict, through security analysis (Floyd 2007).

2.5 SECURITY STUDIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The understanding of security depends on one's personal interpretation of threat and what protection is required to counter that threat. From security studies perspective, the traditional understanding of national security has always been state-centric, state being commonly accepted as supreme national authority. To understand the gradual change of the rethinking of the security concept, Section 2.5 will examine the theoretical understanding of security studies, and then offer descriptions of national security through different critical lenses.

2.5.1 Security studies

Capturing a definition of the concept 'security' has been the cause of much debate and scrutiny since the end of the Cold War. Traditional definitions of national security by Western countries tend to exclude non-military aspects of security. The military alone can no longer be seen as either threat or response to security threat. Updates of the security definition by Third-World states stem from a number of approaches to the definition and cover a multiplicity of meaning. These approaches provide a richer picture that considers issues which engender insecurity as well as physical, political, social and military constraints. There is no doubt that accurately defining security is not as easy as one may perceive (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015).

Although there has been progress in defining security, Brooks (2010) affirm that previous studies conducted by a number of scholars could not come up with a singular definition of security. The culmination of their studies led to a declaration of the concept as diverse and multidimensional.

Haftendorn (1991) emphasised the conceptual ambiguity of security where global security, national security, international security and border security are defined differently by different countries. Baldwin (1997) posits that identity security, economic security, social security, military security and environmental security are forms of security beyond the conventional.

Buzan *et al.* (1998) contend that the definition of security should involve five kinds of attributes associated with security threats, namely *political, economic, societal, military, and environmental*. These attributes are mutually linked and should not be separated or isolated. Therefore, in this study security attributes introduced by Buzan will be used to explore the causes of porous borders, threats that porous borders pose to the security of South Africa, and effects of porous borders on South Africa.

2.5.2 National security

The national security policy is one of the SA government's policy documents aimed at creating favourable international and national political conditions to protect the country against its rivals (Hough n.d). National security policy and other relevant government policies key documents that guide the national security strategy. In terms of the levels of strategy, Government Policy and National Security Policy comes first, followed by National Security Strategy preceded by Interdepartmental Strategies (e.g. military/security, political/diplomatic, economic, psychological/social, and environmental).

Cold War thinking on national security threats based on Western explanations centred around military threats, particularly external threats (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015). After the Cold War, countries classified as Third World viewed national security differently. According to post-Cold War views, threats comprise external non-military threats, threats originating from internal sources or within the country, protection of citizens and state institutions that protect the rights of the citizens (Haftendorn 1991). In this study the researcher will apply Post-Cold War or Third World definitions of security, School of Copenhagen approaches to security, and the push-pull theory in terms of cross-border migration.

The Copenhagen School is not a new phenomenon in migration studies. The securitisation of migration had been deliberated increasingly at European Union level since the 1980s. It was first seen as a threat to national identity. In the United States, the securitisation of migration was observed in the aftermath of the September 11 attack on strategic targets by international terrorists when terrorism was seen as a threat. The other example of the application of the Copenhagen School is the growing intensity of securitising migration on the US-Mexican and Euro-Mediterranean borders because of public fears of potential large-scale movement from Mexico to US, and North Africa to Europe to counter terrorism and organized crime as a top priority (Farny 2016). In terms of the securitization of migration of the Schengen area by European Union, fences were build, and

border surveillance was intensified to strengthen border control against the influx of Syrian refugees (Koma 2015).

In consultation with several of the UN and regional special mandates on freedom of expression and information, there are currently countries engaged in a process of developing a set of Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Mendel 2013).

The Tshwane principles are the international principles of national security and the right to information, drafted by experts from seventy countries and accepted as final in Tshwane, South Africa. The principles provide guidance to policy and law makers of participating states to alleviate the tension between the public and government on which information of national security should be made available to the public, and which information should be kept secret. Access to information by the public can benefit respective governments by obtaining valuable inputs through democratic participation in policy formulation, scrutiny of state action and safeguarding against misuse of power, and the protection of human rights. On the other hand, it is necessary for governments to protect and keep secret information to safeguard legitimate national security interests (Tshwane Principles 2013).

According to principle 9 of the Tshwane principles, information which may be withheld on national security grounds and restricted from public's right of access falls under the following categories: (i) defence plans, capabilities, and operations; (ii) use of weapons systems, communications systems, the production of weapons systems, and use of other military systems; (iii) information added by a state which is classified as secret and necessary for the protection of national interest.

2.6 SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Critical government policies such as a national security policy and national security strategy for South Africa could not be found. Although a national security policy and national security strategy do not seem to exist, aspects of national security are contained in the White paper on intelligence, White paper on Defence, the Constitution, White paper on Defence, Defence review and probably in other government policy documents. The pronouncements of the South African constitution, the Defence Review, the White paper on Defence, and the White paper on intelligence, will be discussed in the current section.

2.6.1 The Constitution of South Africa

The South African national security approach is guided by the SA Constitution. National security in South African context is not limited to the safety and security of the South African citizens; it also refers to safeguarding national interests and values against internal and external threats. South African national security aspects are captured in the constitution of the country. The constitution presents four principles governing South African national security (South Africa 1996b) are:

- i. “National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.
- ii. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.
- iii. National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law.
- iv. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive”.

2.6.2 Defence review

As opposed to narrow definitions of national security during the Cold War which focused on physical protection by means of military power, South Africa is pursuing national security through state power by addressing security threats emanating from, political, social, information, military and economic issues to achieve its goals and objectives. These national objectives are economic, aspirations of South Africa’s people, social, political, cultural and environmental rights (South Africa 2015a).

The defence review re-emphasises compliance with the requirements of Section 198 of the 1996 Constitution. The protection of South African people, her territorial integrity, national sovereignty and national interest is prioritised. South Africa is striving towards a safer and better South Africa, Africa and the world through the pursuit of the Triple-Ps objectives: (a) promoting freedom of *people* from fear, upliftment, development and well-being of the people; (b) protection of the *planet* for future of generations by means of the management of climate change; (c) Ensuring the *prosperity* of RSA, SADC and Africa by means of sustainable economic growth. South Africa prefers diplomatic and political efforts to defuse contentious issues, resolving disputes and conflicts, through a developed and entrenched collaborative approach within SADC and the AU (South Africa 2015a).

2.6.3 The White paper on defence

Pre-1994 all national policy aspects were militarised. The posture of the current government demilitarised most aspects of national security. Cock and McKenzie (1998) ascertained that national security in South Africa is no longer seen as primarily a police and military responsibility. The South Africa White paper on defence (1996, chapter 2(1)) affirms that the South African national security approach to defence has been expanded to include environmental, social, economic and political matters, while security of people became the heart of the South African national security approach. Therefore, it can be deduced that human security is a pillar of the national security of South Africa.

The conditions of South African security all-inclusively are: the freedom of individual citizens to live in harmony, participation of South African citizens in the process of governance, peace and safety, living in a healthy environment which is not a risk to citizens' well-being, the protection of human rights, and access to basic services and provision of needs. According to Booth (1994), if non-military problems such as environmental degradation, poverty and oppression are not fittingly addressed, it could lead to conflict which will in turn destabilise or threaten the security of the state.

The White paper sees existing underdevelopment, violent crime, and socio-economic problems as main threats to the citizens of the country. Currently, external aggression is not seen as an imminent threat to South Africa, which is why the RDP policy is one of the South African government's guiding documents towards maintaining national security (South Africa 1996a).

2.6.4 The White paper on intelligence

The White paper on intelligence sets out the South African national security doctrine with the primary objective of promoting and maintaining national security through stability, peace, progress and development. The South African national security objectives cover core values and the basic principles linked to social justice, development and prosperity, freedom and better quality of life (South Africa 1995b).

South Africa also views national security in broader and more comprehensive terms as opposed to the traditional and narrow approach of Cold War thinking. With the shifting of the international security agenda to economic, social, political, technological, and ethical factors, as well as ethnic, religious and military issues shaping security globally, South Africa recognises that her main threats to national security do not come from a neighbouring, statutory military force, but from non-military sectors mainly within, but also beyond her national borders. These threats encompass, inter alia,

mass-migration, terrorism, overpopulation, political oppression, economic collapse, crime, disease, ethnic rivalry (South Africa 1995b).

2.7 UNDERSTANDING BORDERS AND BORDER SECURITY

According to literature, different definitions of borders exist. In this section the following will be discussed: the definition of borders as a physical barrier, border security, and the key roles of entities responsible for border security. The section will conclude by identifying ideal key performance indicators used to measure the effectiveness of South African border security.

2.7.1 Defining borders

According to Scorgie, cited by Isoke (2015) borders are defined as “blockades and limitation of penetration”. It represents the lines that legally separate and limit the country’s sovereignty. According to Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2018), a border is defined as “an area or a region commonly accepted as a line that indicates the periphery or separates two neighbouring territories”. The word border is routinely used as an equivalent to boundary. It outlines the physical jurisdiction and physical country’s territorial limits. The agreement on border limits is boosted by shaping the boundary through survey marks on the border. Border limits interpret the depiction of the border on the maps displaying the physical border markings in the form of natural or artificial features in the surrounding. The borders or boundaries are marked either by beacons or natural features. The physical tangible boundary markings are used to manage and control people, animals and goods from crossing from the territory of one state to that of another (Okumu 2011).

Borders delineate the state’s sovereignty by defining its territory, and where its jurisdiction and administration starts or ends (South Africa 2015a). Furthermore, the borders ascribe the country’s national identities where the state define its people’s lifestyles, destiny, and language which form part of national culture and privileges. Okumu (2011) also alluded that the privileges offered by the state include but are not limited to welfare benefits, the right to vote, and the enjoyment of certain rights that are not applicable to foreign nationals or non-citizens.

Borders, especially political borders are diverse, these borders can be categorized into two different types, namely natural borders and artificial borders (Guo 2014). Natural borders are characterised and identified by various natural landmark or barriers, such as lakes, mountains, seas, rivers, et cetera. These physical barriers historically played a crucial role in military defence of a territory. Seas, straits, mountains, lakes, rivers, and bays have been commonly accepted by traditional and

territorial leaders as political borders. Unlike natural borders, artificial borders normally do not have a significant natural barrier. These border types are established by political units. Usually, an artificial border is categorised into three types: (i) geometrical border; (ii), cultural border; (iii) artificial barrier (Guo 2014).

Machiavelli said that “fair princes erect walls in their territory to keep illegal and unwanted people out, whereas unfair princes erect walls in their territory to keep their citizens and own people in” (Machiavelli cited by Isoke 2015). In this study, the geographical boundaries shared with six countries neighbouring SA are used as a reflection of the meaning of border.

2.7.2 Border security

Border security encompasses the safeguarding of a country’s air, maritime and land borders or territories by means of monitoring, detecting and protection of all points of entry and borders (South Africa 2015a). Border security entails securing territorial sovereignty through protection and enforcement of boundaries. This is achieved by permanent surveillance through detection and traceability of movement of people and their actions and goods within the national territory, intelligence sharing and the sharing of other resources. Protection and enforcement of boundaries is the main problem on African borders (Okumu 2011).

Border security and border control have been used interchangeably to facilitate the process of limiting the movement of goods, plants, people and animals entering and exiting a country. Border security or border control is characterised by two key categories, namely controlling ports and securing borders. The control of ports entails control of airports, land border and harbours posts. Securing borders, on the other hand, deals with patrolling and monitoring activities and monitoring movement by people and goods along the boundary (Steinberg 2005).

Contemporary scholars have shed light on the plurality of agencies contributing to securing of borders in everyday practices, and on the escalation of problems of border security, such as the increase of cross-border policing over time where military operations are no longer viewed as a threat. Yet, border crime is seen as the main concern (Andreas 2009).

Riley (2006) confirmed that to maintain border security, border patrol utilises diverse methods and equipment, such as observation towers, infrared cameras, barriers around points of entry, fences, and other devices to increase sight lines along the border fence. All of this must be active during the day and at night, and in all weather conditions.

2.7.3 Functions of border security

The functions of border security generally involve the physical control of borders by means of patrolling by the special border protection force or the military. Border security enforces internal immigration laws, and the multinational, intercontinental, and transnational movement of people. Border security prevents drugs, illegal persons, criminals, weapons and other items restricted by government from entering the country. Other functions of border security include screening people through physical searching and inspections to make sure that dangerous goods or people are not entering the border.

Other core functions of border security operations are: (i) deterrence, (ii), exploitation of networked intelligence and (iii) interdiction. Deterrence refers to the actions by a particular security force which persuade terrorists, criminals, or smugglers not to attempt to cross the borders illegally. Exploitation of networked intelligence contribute to the use of shared intelligence information from neighbouring countries and across organizational boundaries, while interdiction is the process of distracting and stopping illegal border crossing (Willis *et al.* 2010).

All these functions help in making sure plants and animals do not transmit diseases that levies and excise tax are paid, unlawful activities and black-market operations at the borders are eliminated and the legality of crossing border and passport documentations is imposed.

2.7.4 Measurement of border security

Olson & Lee (2012) point out four criteria that may be used as a measurement of border security. These are: (i) The incidence and warnings related to terrorism activities at the border post and borders; (ii) the violence happening on both countries sharing the border, based on an assessment conducted to verify how such violence may be linked to security; (iii) seizure of firearms, money and dangerous drugs at the borders; (iv) the efforts targeted at apprehending unauthorized and undocumented migrants.

Côté-Boucher *et al.* (2014) came up with the following series of questions which may assist border agencies, decision makers or security actors in analysing and responding to issues of border security.

- “Which resources (training, technologies, policies, infrastructures and enforcement tools) are used by border governance?”
- How are the actors of border security interacting with those located within borders or crossing the border, and how do border security actors cooperate and struggle with other agencies intervening in border security?

- Which classifications of risk, security, social hierarchies, mobilities, objects, commodities, and human beings apply to border security practices?
- What are the discretions used by border actors responsible for policy implementation?
- What are the borders actors' everyday practices (roles, tasks, work routines, strategies and tactics) in border spaces?"

Olson & Lee (2012) added that policies, the rule of law and strategies such as border patrol strategic plans, anti-drug efforts and the impact of technology and the way they respond to border security challenges may be part of criteria to measure border security.

Table 2.1 below represents a conceptual model of border-security, proposed by Willis *et al.*(2010), which may be used to contribute to controlling illegal border crossing. The model depicts the three fundamental key performance indicators used to assess border functions. The first key performance indicator is interdiction, which entails actions disrupting illegal border crossing; the second is deterrence, which entails the actions or convincing ways that would stop smugglers, criminals, or terrorists from attempting to cross the borders illegally; the third is exploitation of networked intelligence, the action of sharing of intelligence information.

Table 2.1: Border key performance indicators

Objectives	Measures	Focus Area	Source of performance data	Performance variables/ Approach for estimation
Interdict flow	Interdiction rate	Monitoring and Responsiveness	Annual and Monthly Reports	Number of illegal immigrants identified and detected, Response time/turnaround time to stop or interdict illegal border crossing. Number of sorties commissioned.

Objectives	Measures	Focus Area	Source of performance data	Performance variables/ Approach for estimation
		Technology and infrastructure	Availability and serviceability status; repairs, maintenance and repair reports	Effectiveness and efficiency of technology and computer models used to help support performance evaluation and planning. Resources allocation for border security (e.g. Radar, aircraft, Remotely piloted aircraft, etc.); Conditions of the infrastructure
		Terrorism	Intelligent, Counterterrorism and Counter-intelligence Reports	Estimation and likelihood of terrorist intrusion efforts. Updates on trends, observable border routes exploited by terrorist
		Trafficking	Monthly and Annual reports	Amount of drugs covered and the estimation values of the percentage of drug flow. Human trafficking.
		Illegal migration	Daily, Monthly and Annual reports	Estimation and the percentage of illegal migrants apprehended.
		Physical Geopolitical border lines	Border Patrol reports	Conditions and the status of border security fence. Accessibility of terrain, relative knowledge, and tactics applied.
		Goods/products		Number of goods crossing the border illegally (Firearms, vehicles etc.).
		Animal and Plants	Department of Agriculture reports	Cases of animal theft and alien plants crossing the border illegally.
Deter flow	Effects on border-crosser decision - making	Deterrence approach/Strategy	The frequency of revising border security strategy	Best practices should reflect deterring factors such as – consequence of capture – complexity of tactics required to succeed – cost of necessary assets – uncertainties – availability of alternatives


Objectives	Measures	Focus Area	Source of performance data	Performance variables/ Approach for estimation
		Legal framework	Department of Home Affairs (DHA) Statistics and number of cases processed by courts	Non-compliance cases, The penalties, hearing, detention, deportation, punishment practice and the judgements that have positive effects on deterrence of illegal border crossing.
		Immigration and migration Policies	Dates of policies revised	Routinely updates and review policies and their value to improved outcomes
		Values-related practices of border security officials	Reported cases and dismissal of corrupt officials	Number of bribery and fraud cases committed by border security officials
		Neighbouring state	Meetings and seminars	Frequency of meetings held, Bilateral agreement, actions taken by neighbouring countries on illegal immigrants deported back to their countries, deterrence approaches
Exploit networked intelligence	Effective collection, use, and sharing of intelligence	Collection of information	Intelligence, law-enforcement agencies and counter-intelligence reports	Collection of biographic and biometric information, cooperation and sharing of information amongst agencies, operational use of networked intelligence

Source: Adapted from Willis *et al.*(2010: 24)

2.8 SOUTH AFRICAN BORDERS

Border security entails the safeguarding of South African borders. The borders of the Republic of South Africa constitute maritime, air and land borders. Figure 2.2 depicts safeguarding status of the South African maritime, air and land borders. The land border is 4,471 km in length, and the coastline border 3,924 km surface water including, exclusive of economic zones (EEZ) of 1,553,000

km² and Marion Island and Prince Edward Islands with a total surface coverage of 474,400 km²(South Africa 2015a).



Source: South Africa (2015a: 6-3)

Figure 2.2: South Africa maritime, land and airspace safeguarding

2.8.1 South African land borders

South Africa shares borders with six countries. These countries are Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the two land-locked countries within the Republic, Lesotho and Eswatini (see Figure 2.3).




Figure 2.3: South African land borders

The Republic of South Africa is divided into nine provinces, namely Northern Cape, Free state, Eastern Cape, Northwest, Gauteng, Kwazulu Natal, Limpopo, Western Cape and Mpumalanga. All these provinces, except Western Cape and Gauteng, share the country's borders with neighbouring countries. The respective lengths of the border between South Africa and her respective neighbours are as follows: the border between South Africa and Namibia, 897 km, the border with Botswana, 1516 km (the longest border between South Africa and a neighbouring country), the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, 214 km (the shortest border), the border with Mozambique, 493 km, with Eswatini, 229 km, and with Lesotho, 924 km. Some of the South African geographical border features are river borders between South Africa and Zimbabwe, between the southern part of Namibia and between South Africa and the north-western part of Lesotho. The old fence system was erected partially on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the other portion of this fence was erected between the border of South Africa and Mozambique.

According to the Department of Defence (South Africa, 2015a), South Africa's land borders are partially separated by rivers that are mainly seasonally in flood. These rivers play an important role in restricting illicit crossing. Some areas are characterised by mountainous terrain or thick bushes

which hamper patrols and monitoring. The land border conditions portray vulnerability to illicit activities such as narcotics smuggling, rustling of livestock, illegal migration and stolen and untaxed goods. The border conditions also pose the risk of explosives or illicit weapons smuggling by terror groups.

According to the Department of Home Affairs (South African, 2019), South Africa has a total of 54 land Ports of Entry. There are 14 POE between South Africa and Lesotho, 16 between South Africa and Botswana. The total number of POE between South Africa and Eswatini is 11. South Africa and Zimbabwe has two POE. There are seven POE between South Africa and Namibia, four between South Africa and Mozambique.

2.8.2 The International Peace Park shared with neighbouring countries

Guo (2014) reports that International Peace Parks (IPPs), known also as Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), is the term coined to reflect cross-border cooperation between two or more countries sharing a border. So far there is no legal definition of International Peace Parks. What is known, is that an IPP has a definite political objective. Its main objective is to re-establish, confirm or strengthen good relations between neighbouring countries. The Peace Parks can offer benefits of mitigating the escalation of border disputes arising from political problems, in which case disputed borders can be declared demilitarized zones. However, political instability in Zimbabwe is a concern (Ferreira 2004) to South Africa. IPPs helped to maintain and protect the biological health of the vulnerable environment (Munthali 2007). Through International Peace Parks biodiversity in military zones is safeguarded.

Transfrontier Conservation Areas on the border requires cooperation between two neighbouring countries (Duffy 2006). Established International Peace Parks are regarded as protected areas and are found sporadically around the world, also in Southern Africa. Subsequently, these parks form a bond or relationship between neighbouring communities and a common aspiration to acquire knowledge about one another through these TFCAs. In doing so, participating countries may resolve war or international conflict.

The International Peace Parks sharing the borders with South Africa and neighbouring countries are (Guo 2014) Gemsbok National Park, Kalahari Private Reserve, Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (Kalahari Gemsbok National Park) in the Kalahari Desert, which are located on the borders between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. These countries work closely to manage animals in the area, and the land upon which they roam. Richtersveld National Park, Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park, Fish River Canyon are found between South Africa and the Namibian border.

On the borders share between South African, Botswana, and Zimbabwe are found the TFCAs Vhembe-Dongola Nature Reserve, Northern Tuli Game Reserve, Tuli Safari Area and Limpopo Valley National Park. The Kruger National Park is between South Africa and Mozambique borders. In addition to their conservationist (“green”) role, IPPs also contribute to the improvement of the economy, and the alleviation of unemployment in these countries by attracting tourists and other foreign investments. In some cases IPPs can pose serious political ramifications (Guo 2014). To avoid clashes, militaries should include agreement clauses of disengagement in the shared IPP.

The department of environmental services is responsible for regulating control and monitoring of cross-border movement of animals, indigenous plants, dangerous and hazardous materials, and of tourists in the transfrontier conservation areas. SANPARKS has particular challenges such as its employment of only 350 field rangers, 10 dog teams, and having only 40% of rangers with vehicle driving capabilities, and being supported by a limited air wing capability (South Africa 2016d).

2.9 POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF COUNTRIES SHARING LAND BORDERS WITH RSA

Growth Promise Indicators (GPI) is a measure used to assess the potential productivity of countries to create an investment profile for large-scale investment opportunities (KPMG 2018). The methodology of assessing potential productivity is to make projections from reliable business survey results (e.g. IMF, World Bank, etc.) and results of academic studies. According to KPMG (2018), the GPI is based on five indicators, namely Institutional strength, Macroeconomic stability, Openness to catch-up, Human capital, and Infrastructure. Categories used for Quality of Institutional strength are Regulatory quality, Judicial independence, Transparency of government policymaking, Government effectiveness, Corruption, and Business rights. Human capital categories are Education and Life expectancy. Infrastructure categories include Quality of transport, Technology readiness and financial institutions. Openness to catch-up comprises FDI stock and Total trade. Lastly, the category Macroeconomic stability consists of Government deficit and Government debt.

In the following subsections, South Africa’s neighbours are discussed in terms of their political and current socio-economic situations.

2.9.1 Mozambique

Mozambique shares borders with five countries, with the total length of its land border estimated at 4,783 km (CIA 2018). The total estimated surface area of the country is 786,380 km² (WDA 2018), and the length of its coastline is 2,500 km.

In 2017 the country had a population of roughly 28 million. The National Statistical Institute sets the population size at exactly 27,128,530 inhabitants in 2017, and the projected population for 2019 at 30,628,329. The Gini Index (%) score, the statistical dispersion that measures the wealth inequality or income inequality in the country was 39,90 in 2018 (WDA 2019). Mozambique has been classified as one of the countries that is particularly vulnerable to climate change and associated natural disasters. The literacy rate of the country was only 44.9% by 2018, and the quality of education is recorded as low (BTI 2018). HIV/AIDS infection is high, and the country is among the top 10 HIV-affected countries globally. 61% of Mozambicans are Christians, mainly those in the south, while 17.9% are Muslim, predominantly in the north, and the rest hold “other” beliefs.

Mozambique has a long history of its citizens being contracted as labour force to work on South African farms and in its mines. Mozambicans working on the farms in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga were regarded as illegal for some years. Mozambicans are known to cross game parks inhabited by dangerous wild animals illegally to then crawl beneath electrified border fences looking for better living conditions and work in South Africa (McDonald 2000).

2.9.1.1 Political situation

The political situation in the country is relatively stable. The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana / Mozambican National Resistance (popularly known as RENAMO) and Frente de Libertação de Moçambique / The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (popularly known as FRELIMO) are the main political parties in the country. FRELIMO ruled the country since after the country obtained its independence in 1975. The northern part of the country experiences violent attacks of Islamic insurgency (Spangenberg 2017). Political stability remains fragile between the two parties FRELIMO and RENAMO, which resulted in violence and armed confrontations during 2013 (AfDB 2018).

The current government is grappling with Islamic insurgency threats in Cabo-Delgado, where huge amounts of natural gas deposits were discovered. The identity and aim of the armed group operating in the area are both unknown. The names Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamo and Ansar al-Sunnah are used interchangeably. This armed group is linked to Islamic extremists and it is also associated with organised crime syndicates (Allison 2019). So far 139 incidents of terrorism have been reported in

Mozambique, which is high compared to Tanzania and Uganda. Uganda recorded 63 incidents of terror attacks while Tanzania recorded 43 terror incidents over the period 2008 to 2017 (Dang 2019). There is fear that these insurgency activities may spread if not contained incisively.

Under Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the country ranked within the first 25% of most corrupt countries, ranking 142 among 176 countries, with zero being least corrupt, in 2016 (Transparency International 2017).

In the continent Mozambique was ranked low (23rd out of 54) countries according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Based on the results from Global Competitiveness Report business survey 2017-18, Mozambique came under the spotlight as the second most problematic country for doing business with. These ratings, whether real or perceived, place the country in a negative socio-political position (AfDB 2018).

2.9.1.2 Economic situation

The country joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 1994. The government implemented structural programmes to tackle economic challenges. Although there was some growth, high inflation rates hit the country. The already fragile situation was worsened by both severe droughts and severe floods (McDonald 2000).

On 14 March 2019, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe were devastated by Cyclone Idai. Half a million Mozambicans in Beira lost their livelihood, homes and possessions, many had no other means for survival, and they decided to make their way to South Africa, pushed by genuine crises because of the political and socio-economic challenges their country was facing (Ebrahim 2019), lured by promises of a better life beyond the Mozambican-South African border.

In 2017 the GDP of Mozambique was 1,300 US dollar per capita (CIA 2018). Despite the GDP growth, the economy of Mozambique is facing a huge crisis because of its debt. In 2018, the government gross debt as a share of GDP for Mozambique was 100.4 % (WDA 2018). The country defaulted 60 million US dollar for the payment of its creditors. Over the period 2015 to 2016 foreign investment declined by 75%. Donors such as the World Bank and IMF halted their financial support to the country in 2017. The government does not have money and has lost credibility. Owing the country's debt, there was a lack of investment confidence to boost the economy (BTI 2018).

South Africa is one of the major trading partners of Mozambique. In 2016, South Africa accounted for 29% of FDI as the largest investor in the country, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 19% of FDI inflow. South African companies invested in Mozambique in the following

sectors: shopping centres, gas and oil (SASOL), breweries, tourism and mega industrial projects (Mozal), South African Bottling Company [Sabco] (Castel-Branco *et al.* 2015).

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are in a deep crisis because of official state debt. The shortcomings of infrastructure and transportation hamper the opportunities of export of the country's vast natural resources. The periodic severe, often prolonged adverse weather conditions, mainly droughts and floods, render the agricultural sector vulnerable and cause severe, often irreversible damage to infrastructure and farming land (Spangenberg 2017).

2.9.1.3 Illegal border activities

Mozambican border control is not effective and is severely under-resourced. There were no records of confiscation of illegal goods on the Mozambican side, but on the South African side of the border, hidden vehicles and large amounts of drugs were confiscated from Mozambicans (Haysom *et al.* 2018).

Corruption at the Mozambican border posts hamper foreign trade and import procedures (BTI 2018). The country's porous borders, poverty, organized criminal elements, corruption, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and poaching of wildlife threatens the security and stability in Mozambique, and the Southern African region in general. It was reported that some Frelimo associates and government figures are involved as kingpins of narco-smuggling networks. Interpol believes that Mozambique is a hub of drug smuggling (Aslak Orre & Helge Rønning 2017).

According to Haysom *et al.* (2018), Mozambique is a gate way of heroin to South Africa. These drugs enter the northern part of Mozambique from Tanzania and Kenya by road to the Kwazulu-Natal border, and from there drugs are distributed by road to Durban, Pretoria, Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town.

Mozambique is the transit for heroin and hashish from South Asia, and cocaine from South America, destined for South African and European markets. Furthermore, poor regulatory capability and corruption enables large scale money laundering in the country (CIA 2018).

2.9.2 Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country sharing its borders with five countries. The total length of the land border is estimated at 3,229 km. It shares its border with South Africa, 230 km; Zambia, 763 km; Mozambique 1,402 km; Botswana, 834 km. The total estimated area of the land is 390,757 km² (CIA 2018). The country had an estimated population of 14.905 million in 2017 (IMF 2017).

Zimbabwe and South Africa share a long cultural, economic and historical relationship. This, relationship and associated mass migration can be traced back to the Mfecane war, over the period 1820 to 1830s, which caused the displacement of communities across Southern Africa. This explains why most indigenous South African groups such as the Ndebele, Tswana, Shangani and others are also found in countries adjacent to South Africa (Chirwa & Kader 2018).

2.9.2.1 Political situation

ZANU-PF ruled the country since its independence in 1980. The party dominated the political space until 1999 when the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged as the strongest opposition party. President Mugabe ruled the country until 2018. The country was once the breadbasket in the region, comprising the largest contingent of educated and skilled workforce per country in Africa. However, in recent years Zimbabwe has become a political liability in the SADC region (Pophiwa 2015). In 2001, international economic sanctions were imposed against President Mugabe and his political associates for perpetration of violence against fellow Zimbabweans, and in 2005 and again in 2008 the sanctions were expanded against the Mugabe regime for undermining the democratic processes and institutions, primarily for reclaiming without compensation land from white Zimbabweans (labeled “land grab” by those opposed to the practice). These sanctions indiscriminately affected the entire population (Mararike 2018).

The greed and use of violence by the ZANU-PF government through the military from the late 1990s onwards divided the nation, which led to civil and social discontent (Onslow 2011). Protection of property rights remains not guaranteed, which continues to weaken the economy. Operation Murambatsvina and the expropriation of farms belonging to the white sector of the population caused the economy of the country to decline, industrial productivity collapsed and the contraction of agricultural production, the livelihood of thousands, caused large scale migration beyond Zimbabwean borders to South Africa (Pophiwa 2015).

The South African government did not take decisive action against the ZANU-PF government. Instead, it exerted limited pressure and opted to pursue ‘quiet diplomacy.’ Many scholars argued that RSA was supporting ZANU-PF as a ‘liberationist brotherhood.’ SADC or RSA military intervention and trade sanctions were also nullified by Pretoria, as it was in the interest of the South African government to minimise the economic meltdown of Zimbabwe, which could further exacerbate the migrant problem, homeland security, and socio-economic problems in South Africa (Onslow 2011). Corruption in Zimbabwe remain an unresolved problem. It impacts negatively on the development and economic growth of the country. According to Thabani (2019,) Zimbabweans

have accepted corruption as the normal way of doing business, particularly in the public sector. Civil servants use their occupational positions to supplement their monthly income through corruption and using state resources for personal gain.

In 2018 the country experienced a military coup from a group of generals who promised to rescue Zimbabwe from an economic crisis, if not economic collapse. Longest-serving leader Robert Mugabe was toppled (Allison 2019), elections were held, and President Emmerson Mnangagwa emerged as the winner. However, the outcome of the election was not recognised by the opposition and certain sectors of South Africa and other parts of the continent and world. Six unarmed protesters were shot and killed by the military during protests against the results.

The Chief of the Zimbabwean Defence Force became Vice-President after the coup. Since the elections the economy of the country has worsened, fuel prices went up dramatically, and there was a rise in civil unrest (Allison 2019). In Zimbabwe, as in neighbouring South Africa, a rise in fuel price automatically increases the price of consumable commodities, the primary expenditure item of the poor and struggling.

2.9.2.2 Economic situation

Since 1980, the economic aspirations of the country took a downturn, the country was reluctant to abandon socialist policies, and unemployment increased. Today the situation has worsened. 95% of Zimbabweans are formally or structurally unemployed (Ebrahim 2019). The people of Zimbabwe devised survival strategies in response to the hardship because of the weak economy. Some of their strategies involved legal and illegal border crossing and informal trade to supplement family income (Zinyama 2000).

More than 70% of Zimbabweans are living below the poverty line. In 2009 the unemployment rate in the country was 95% (Pophiwa 2015). Most Zimbabweans are attracted to RSA because of job opportunities, a more robust democracy, stronger economy, geographical proximity and generally higher standards of living (Chirwa & Kader 2018).

Zimbabwe is facing unserviceable debts since 2016 when the debt stood at 79% of GDP or 11.2 billion US dollar per capita (BTI 2018). In 2017 the government gross debt as a share of GDP for Zimbabwe was 75.5% (CIA 2018).

In the past, the country's SOEs accounted for 40% of the GDP, and played a key role in supporting strategic business in the country by providing agricultural services, electricity, fuel, water, railways, aviation, communications, et cetera. Currently, these SOEs are underperforming and the majority

of them depend on government funding for survival. In 2010 the government listed 10 of its parastatals for privatisation. Unfortunately, none of them were sold due to their enormous debt, unqualified staff and rampant corruption (BTI 2018).

Lake Kariba is shared by Zimbabwe and Zambia and is the main source of hydropower. A 50% reduction of potential power generation annually, due to a drought in 2016, impacted the economy of the country severely (Nhamo *et al.* 2018).

2.9.2.3 Illegal border activities

According to South African Police Services (South Africa, 2016e), illegal border activities on the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa include vehicle smuggling, smuggling of explosives, cigarettes smuggling, drug smuggling, smuggling of explosives, smuggling of counterfeit goods and human trafficking. Zimbabweans are lured by prospects of employment in neighbouring countries, their being desperate leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by employers seeking cheap labour in South Africa, Zambia and Mozambique. In extreme cases, their desperate situation leaves women and young girls vulnerable to a life of prostitution, sex trafficking and domestic servitude (CIA 2018).

Three vehicle theft syndicates were identified as operating between Zimbabwe and South Africa. It was found that the market for these stolen vehicles are in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia (South Africa 2016e). The traffickers staying along the borders are used by vehicle theft syndicates to cross the vehicles over the borders, their charges ranging from R5000 to R15 000 per stolen vehicle. Smuggled explosives are used in RSA for ATM blasts, Cash-In-Transit robberies and illegal mining activities. Illegal cigarettes are sold on the South African black market. Human trafficking is one of the most lucrative illegal trades being run on the Zimbabwean and Limpopo borders (South Africa 2016e).

2.9.3 Botswana

Botswana is a landlocked country which shares its borders with four countries, the total length of the land border being estimated at 4,347.15 km, of which 1,969 km is shared with South Africa. The estimated surface area of the country is 566,730 km². The Kalahari Desert occupies 77% of the country with limited freshwater, droughts and infrequent rain (Mäkelä 2017). The country has an estimated population of 2,214,858 (CIA 2018).

Colonial borders ignored the cultural landscapes of the same communities who share the same cultural, language and ancestral relations in the Tshidilila Molomo area, the border between South Africa and Botswana, with respective communities separated only by a cattle fence (Mahlangu 2016).

Similar to other neighbouring countries of SA, Botswana residents has a history of working in South Africa as contract miners since the 19th century. By the 1970s almost one third of the male labour force from Botswana worked in South Africa.

2.9.3.1 Political situation

The security situation in Botswana is relatively stable (KPMG 2018). Botswana got its independence from Britain in 1965, with the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) ruling the country since its independence (Cochrane and Brown 2019). Botswana is one of the most peaceful, democratic, and stable countries on the African continent, with arguably the best government institutions responsible for checks and balances and for holding officials accountable. Its democratic principles are based on free press, a stable political environment, a broad, liberalized capital account, a good sovereign judicial system and a well-established legal establishment. All elections conducted so far were declared free and fair by SADC, the AU and UN. The success of Botswana is based on committed leadership, an efficient, trustworthy judicial system, tolerable institutional architecture and sensible economic management (Mäkelä 2017).

Corruption in Botswana is minimal because of lengthy prison sentences, strict penalties and high fines for being found guilty of corruption. These punishments are applicable to corporations as well as individuals. However, nepotism does take place, especially in government (Mäkelä 2017). According to Pring & Vrushi (2019), only 1% of citizens would pay bribes for services at clinics and health centres.

2.9.3.2 Economic situation

KPMG (2018) showed that the economy of the country is also stable. They also found Botswana to be the least corrupt country in Africa, which increased the chances of FDI, security and stability. Recently, the government has approved the Immigration (Amendment) Bill of 2016 which gave relevant ministers the powers to approve permanent residence for non-Botswana citizens who stayed in the country lawfully for less than five years, and to foreign investors to boost foreign direct investment (FDI). The currency of the country, the Pula, is stronger than the Rand (RSA currency).

The country managed to recover successfully from the global recession of 2008, but economic growth had been modest since then, because of the shortages of power, water and the downturn of the diamond market globally. The country managed to transform from the poorest to a middle-income country because of sound political leadership, corporate management and fiscal discipline. In 2017 the GDP of Botswana was 18,100 USD per capita (CIA 2018).

The current unemployment rate in Botswana is 36%, comprising mainly youth between the age of 15 to 24 (CIA 2018). The government is lacking in terms of improving public sector efficiency, amendment of tax policies, skilling the labour force, and reforming education outcomes due to insufficient accountability and coordination, capacity building in manufacturing sector, and political constraints. As a remedial action the government is intending to liberalize visa and work permit policies (IMF 2018).

2.9.3.3 Illegal border activities

Botswana was recorded as a source of women and children trafficking, sex trafficking, and forced labour. The country is used as both transit and destination for these activities. Trafficked women and girls are forced into prostitution locally. Youth who are sent by their parents to work as domestic workers are in some cases denied necessities, experience forced labour and are denied education. In the rural and western parts of the country, the disenfranchised San are vulnerable to hard and forced labour at cattle posts and on farms (CIA 2018).

South African (2016e) reported a case where a truck with 70 illegal immigrants was intercepted at Rustenburg in Northwest, en route from Malawi. Soon after the incident another truck with 80 illegal immigrants from Malawi was intercepted in Marble Hall, with more of these incidents reported by the SAPS crime intelligence unit (South Africa 2016e). In 2016 at Grobler's Bridge POE, a consignment of R92 million worth of heroin was intercepted. According to police intelligence, drug syndicates use the neighbouring countries by flying the drugs into those countries from where the drugs are channelled to South Africa as end destination through its porous land borders (South Africa 2016e).

2.9.4 Lesotho

Lesotho is a landlocked country and an enclave of South Africa. The country shares its borders with three South African provinces, namely Free State, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. The length of the border between Lesotho and South Africa is 924 km (South Africa. Defence Review

2015:6-3). The total estimated land area of Lesotho is 30,355 km², and the estimated population is 1,969,334 (CIA 2020).

2.9.4.1 Political situation

Lesotho remains a headache for SADC (Williams 2019). The country has been experiencing political instability since 1993 under authoritarian and military rule which lasted for 23 years. The leaders are failing to bring lasting peace to the Kingdom of Lesotho (Kelly *et al.* 2017). The border of Lesotho is entirely enclosed by South Africa and that makes it dependent upon SA for its security. Lesotho held several democratic elections with varying success, and some challenges. Between 2012 and 2017, the country held three elections within five years because of unstable coalition governments (UN 2017). According to the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Lesotho scored 61.1 out of 100 in 2016 on governance, and in Africa is ranked 15 out of 54 countries, which portrays positive overall governance, but reveals that Lesotho is lacking in human development (UN 2017).

2.9.4.2 Economic situation

The GDP of Lesotho in 2017 grew by 4.5% during the preceding five years. The economy of the country is dominated by the public sector, followed by real estate, business services and finance. The public sector remains the largest employer in the economy and private sector contractors are dependent on the government (UN 2017). The economy of Lesotho's trajectory is dependent on the SA economic outlook and the global macroeconomic outlook of the South African. The recovery of its economy remains fragile, which impacts negatively on the economy of Lesotho. The country imports 85% of its goods from South Africa.

The unemployment rate in the country is very high, especially among young people. The rate of unemployment is linked to low levels of education. Historically, most migrant men from Lesotho were contracted to work in South African gold mines. In the 1990s, the trend changed, and fewer migrants found mining jobs in South Africa because of stricter immigration policies, preference for South African workers, and declining gold prices. Many women from Lesotho are working in South Africa as domestic workers (CIA 2020). Poorly functioning business development services, an inadequate enabling policy and regulatory framework and a weak private sector are some of the contributory factors to a weak economy (UN 2017).

2.9.4.3 Illegal border activities

The borders between South Africa and Lesotho are viewed as highly porous because of strong ties to families and relatives across border, as confirmed by the fact that the Sesotho language is spoken in both countries. The majority of Basotho frequently move to South Africa for many reasons, including shopping, studies, doing business, social visits by families and neighbours, for holidays, to look for work and to pursue educational opportunities and health services (Mahlangu 2016). Children cross over the border to attend schools (Mokoena & Balkaran, 2018). Cross-border crimes such as car theft, money laundering, human trafficking, stock theft and drug smuggling are affecting diplomatic relations between South Africa and Lesotho (Mokoena & Balkaran 2018; UN 2017).

2.9.5 Eswatini

Eswatini is a landlocked country, flanked by South Africa and Mozambique. The country shares the border with South Africa to the north (Mpumalanga province), west and south (Kwazulu-Natal) sides respectively. The length of the border between South Africa and Eswatini is 429 km (South Africa 2015a; CIA 2018). Eswatini is a predominantly rural country with a population of about 1.3-million people (Mndebele 2019).

2.9.5.1 Political situation

Eswatini got its independence from British rule in 1968 (Ndlela & Mano 2020). The Eswatini political system is based on undemocratic monarchical rule, motivated as being traditional. The political system has been criticized based on several grounds. Political parties were banned since 1973 (Baloro 1992), and politicians carry out their own personal campaigns through physical meetings with communities to be voted and elected as Member of Parliament (Ndlela & Mano 2020). In 2008, the king introduced the Terrorism Act. Under this act some political parties, such as the country's main opposition party, as well as some other parties, were categorised as terrorist organisations (Mndebele 2019).

2.9.5.2 Economic situation

Eswatini is categorised as a low middle-income country. The economy of the country is favourable, and the security situation is fairly stable. In 2016 the GDP of Eswatini was 9,800 USD per capita (CIA 2018). Economic growth was expected to recover to 1.1 % in 2019. Eswatini is dependent on South Africa. It may thus affect the prosperity of Eswatini if the South African economy is not

performing well. Like other SADC countries, Eswatini is also facing a high unemployment rate, namely 28.1%, high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, large scale inequality and poverty (Eswatini 2019). The gold mine with a national stake of 25% is held in trust by the king and was opened in February 2016. Workers employed in the manufacturing industries, textile and agricultural sectors are underpaid. Owing to the absence of organisations and political parties critical of the government, there is a rise in the unionised working class (Mndebele 2019).

2.9.5.3 Illegal border activities

Criminal activities on the RSA and Eswatini borders include dagga smuggling to South Africa, and the movement of Eswatini people over the border. The border between South Africa and Eswatini at the Magudu, Matsamo and Ka Joe, once ruled by one king, is now separated by a cattle fence (Mahlangu 2016).

Organised crime with transnational network activities are the major threats to regional security peace and stable governance. Cross-border crime activities include human trafficking, stolen vehicle trafficking, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, hijacking of vehicles, illicit cigarette sales, illicit exploitation of natural resources such as gold and diamonds, cybercrimes, and money laundering (Fafore & Adekoye 2019).

2.9.6 Namibia

Namibia shares a land border of 1,572 km with South Africa. The estimated land area is 824,292 km² (CIA 2018). The population of the country in 2018 was 2.459 million, with 55% of the population rural dwellers, most of whom live in the northeast and north of the country because the area has a more favourable climate (IMF 2019a). A dry climate restricts farming and agricultural potential. Occasional flooding in the northern parts is the main natural disasters affecting Namibia (Christiansen 2011).

2.9.6.1 Political situation

The country is relatively stable, with the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) having won every election since the country gained independence from South Africa in 1990. Despite limited reported cases of favouritism and nepotism, the party has succeeded in managing its leadership change and succession very well (Melber 2017).

The country is a democracy, and the institutions of government are stable. Issues of ownership and unequal distribution of land remain largely untouched, yet a major socio-political contestation in the country (Melber 2017).

2.9.6.2 Economic situation

Tenders are the source of income for many in the private sector. That impacts negatively on the encouragement of innovation amongst entrepreneurs. Weylandt (2018) indicates that the economy of Namibia has been struggling yet continued to be resilient after the global recession. The country's financial system remained sound (Bank of Namibia 2018).

In 2017 the GDP of Namibia was 11,500 US dollar per capita (CIA 2018). According to the Namibian Statistics Agency (2018), a decline in economic growth is experienced since 1993. Unemployment among the youth is at almost 40%. In 2014, total unemployment was 39.2% and increased to 43.4% in 2016 (Weylandt 2018).

2.9.6.3 Illegal border activities

Namibia, like other developing, African countries experiences an increase in criminal syndicates who exploit the country's porous borders. The country border posts lack fitting technology, regular training of customs and immigration enforcement officials, border patrols are inadequate, and corruption among immigration and customs officials is evident (Barry 2006).

From this discussion of the countries sharing borders with South Africa, a few salient points emerged:

- Although there are differences in the circumstances of the countries, in general, they are all comparatively poor by global standards with low economic prospects and its citizens see South Africa as an emigration target which promises opportunities to improve their current condition.
- Political instability in some of the countries may act as strong driver of migration to South Africa which is regarded as a stable democracy.
- Some countries have a long history of supplying migrant labour to South Africa, thus a large portion of their population are generationally familiar with South Africa.
- Along some areas of these countries' respective borders with South Africa, borders established in colonial times, which largely ignored native or local cultural realities, now divide families and tribes.

- Border infrastructure and border management are generally weak.
- Illegal activities and undocumented crossing of people and goods on the respective borders with South Africa are rife.
- Co-ordination of border initiatives, and cooperation among border management officials are generally weak.

All of these factors either contribute to porosity of existing borders, or exploit the existing porosity, which increases the potential of adverse impact on the national security of South Africa.

2.10 PUSH FACTORS AS A SOURCE OF POROUS BORDERS

The root cause of porous borders can be linked to causes of migration. According to Kainth (2010) migration is motivated by economic factors, demographic factors, socio-cultural factors, political factors, and miscellaneous other factors. Carling & Talleraas (2016) affirm that the root causes or drivers of migration are social and political, especially factors such as repression, poverty and violent intrastate conflict.

Pull factors are those factors attracting and holding people either within their country of origin or country of destination. These factors are defined as positive factors (+), while on the other hand push factors are negative factors (-) which repel individuals within a country of origin or country of destination (Lee 1966) away from their trying conditions. Some factors are known as neutral (0), because they leave individuals feeling indifferent in their countries.

2.10.1 Economic factors

Poverty exacerbates porous borders (Foyou & Ngwafu 2018). In most cases, developing countries with a lower per capita GDP repel individuals in their countries because of related unemployment and low income (Kainth 2010). Furthermore, failed and failing states threaten the individual security of citizens, which in turn pose security threats to the national security of neighbouring countries based on the increased likelihood of illegal border crossing.

Economic push factors are perceived to be crucial indicators of state security. The drivers of economic factors are: the uncertainty of economic growth, budget deficit, high unemployment rate, banking system of a country, volatile markets, recessions, foreign direct investment (FDI), the collapse of the global financial system, and long term economic depression (Hill 2014).

2.10.2 Political factors

According to Piazza (2008), political push factors include ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocide and politicide, international war, adverse regime change, failed states, and very poor countries which are more likely to experience or promote terrorism.

Political push factors are difficult to disengage from the other push factors. A study conducted by Aghedo & Osumah (2014) highlighted some of the political push factors emanating from political instability due to insurgency, terrorist attacks, civil wars, riots and violence. The main causes of political instability are: poor governance, greedy and corrupt politicians and officials, and self-centred rulers. Other factors include exclusion or non-representation of ethnic groups in government appointments, unclear foreign policy or policy uncertainty, uncertainty of property rights, and uneven distribution of resources. Kainth (2010) showed that in some cases political factors can either discourage or encourage high numbers of immigration.

2.10.3 Societal factors

Societal factors are poor conditions that propel people to move away from their home countries. These factors include, yet are not limited to crime, famine, poverty, malnutrition, pandemic or epidemic outbreaks, lack of medical facilities, and restriction of ideological and belief practices. These factors cause people to migrate to other countries in the hope of improving their living conditions (Sit 2017).

Kainth (2010) surmises that the difference between rich and educated people and poor and uneducated people is that poor people leave their areas because of economic hardship; rich people willingly migrate to search for even greater comfort.

2.10.4 Environmental factors

Environmental factors that lead to forced displacements include global warming and meteorological disasters (Piguet 2008). Other environmental factors that may lead to the migration of people include droughts; lack of fresh water; resources like oil and water getting depleted; natural disasters such as wildfires, tsunamis, hurricanes and earthquakes (Epule *et al.* 2014).

Carling & Talleraas (2016) anticipated that climate change would continue to cause devastation globally. The lives of people are expected to change because of the associated extreme weather patterns and rising sea levels. Environmental vulnerability will increase the number of migrants.

Piguet (2008) stated that there are three main consequences of climate warming with the potential of causing migration. These consequences are forecast by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The three main consequences are: the frequency of flooding, heavy rains and tropical hurricanes caused by increased temperatures and a rise in evaporation, food shortages caused by droughts emanating from evaporation and a decrease in soil humidity, and rising sea levels.

A study conducted by Epule *et al.* (2014) showed that sub-Saharan African region has the highest number of environmental refugees because of vegetation degradation and droughts. Although rainfall records in the region show a slight increase in rainfall, the reality is that droughts are likely to persist.

2.11 FACTORS PUSHING AFRICANS AWAY FROM THEIR COUNTRIES

Africa is a complex continent. Conflict, terrorism, poor governance and poor political succession in Africa are strong push factors in some countries on the continent. Many Africans from various countries in the continent had been seeking refuge in South Africa, and many were accommodated. During 1990s people from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia fled the conflicts in their countries to seek refuge in South Africa, while people from other neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi followed suit for related reasons.

2.11.1 Lack of basic services

In some instances, Africans flee their countries because of circumstances other than war or conflict. For example, Malawi is well known as a poor country, with 40% of the country's national budget reliant on donors (Ka Platjie 2019). In 2013, the country's basic services, especially education and health services were paralysed by what was called the Cashgate scandal. Malawian government officials looted up to 500 million US dollar. That has resulted in the police and civil servants not getting paid, and hospitals running out of drugs, while the police had to buy fuel on credit. Eighty-five per cent (85%) of the country relies on agricultural subsidy, and 2 to 3 million people suffered food insecurity exacerbated by floods followed by drought in 2014. Many Malawians see SA as a safe haven (Ka Platjie 2019).

2.11.2 Conflict in Africa

Gowan & Rappa (2018) said that United Nations Missions in Africa (UNAMID) employed 78 179 UN personnel (both military and police) on the continent to try to stabilise the countries worst hit by conflicts. In Darfur, the number of military and police in UNAMID is 14 180. It was a joint Hybrid Operation in Darfur between the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping mission to a country in which Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA) (see figure 2.3) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) waged war against the government.



Source: Author

Figure 2.4: AU Military Observer and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in Darfur in 2005

In Darfur, rebel groups felt they had been marginalised by the government. Many died and hundreds of civilians were displaced and others fled the genocidal war for refugee camps in neighbouring Chad. Hundreds, maybe thousands, of women and children were raped, killed, traumatised, displaced, many of whom got lost or lost contact with their parents and families. In the Central African Republic (CAR), the MINUSCA mission consisted of 12 703 personnel. The MONUSCO in Democratic Republic of Congo consisted of 17 207 personnel. The MINUSMA in Mali had 13 423 UN personnel. In South Sudan, the UNMISS mission had 14 528 personnel. Here, more than two million people died, four million were forcefully removed or uprooted from their homes, while 600 000 left their country as refugees after the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army

(SPLM/A) fought the government over power, self-determination, and resources. Other UN missions in Africa, such as UNISFA, MINURSO comprise up to 6 138 personnel. In addition to that, the African Union (AU) is also deploying troops in Somalia, via the African Mission in Somalia (AMISON) (Gowan & Rappa 2018).

2.11.3 Terrorism

De Albuquerque (2017) notes that Africa is increasingly experiencing terrorism, in particular Islamic terrorism. Terror attacks are becoming more frequent on the continent. Organizations linked to Daesh, and al-Qaeda have been increasingly perpetrating terrorist acts on the continent since 2003. Terrorism in Africa is linked to armed conflicts and activities of organisations pushing their respective hidden agendas.

ACSS (2017) released the locations of militant Islamist groups in Africa. Well-known groups included al-Shabaab operating in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The group was also active in the eastern part of Kenya. Boko Haram dominated in the following areas: the northern parts of Nigeria and Cameroon, the southwestern parts of Chad and the southern parts of Niger. Over the period 2015 to 2016, this group was linked to more than 15 018 fatalities and kidnappings.

Other organised militant groups operating under the banner of al-Qaeda are: The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Macina Liberation Front (FLM), Ansaroul Islam, al Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine. They have established bases in Burkina Faso and Mali and are also operating in Niger. The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terror group is also operating in Algeria ACSS (2017).

In Tunisia, there are groups such as Okba ibn Nafaa Brigade, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AST), and Soldiers of the Caliphate. In Libya some provinces were declared as Islamic State by various groups. Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) is controlling Benghazi and Derna, Wilayat Barqa, Wilayat Fezzan, Wilayat Tarabulu, while Ansar Beit al Maqdis (ABM) is found in Egypt. Beside Al Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia there are other smaller groups, such as the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) and Al Hijra, Jahba East Africa Al Muhajiroun. There are also unknown terror groups operating in Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC and Mozambique (ACSS 2017).

2.11.4 Lack of political succession

The refusal to step down by some African leaders flies in the face of the policies and principles of the African Union (AU 2004). The AU charter on democracy, elections and governance expresses

concerns about unconstitutional changes of government which is a major cause of instability and violent conflicts. Many member states within the AU have adopted and agreed to the charter.

Many countries in Africa remain some of the worst governed and most corrupt countries in the world (Diamond 2007). Some African leaders have hand-picked successors to stand for the presidency, while some have used dubious constitutional amendments to extend their stay in power. The following are some examples of the longest serving leaders in Africa: Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has been a leader for almost 43 years. Obiang (76) year old came into power in a coup in 1979. Cameroon Paul Biyaage (85) has been in power for more than 35 years, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo Brazzaville has been in the office for 35 years. Uganda's Yoweri Museveni has been in power for more than 33 years; he was elected in 1986 and was elected again in 2016.

King Mswati III of Eswatini has been in power for almost 33 years. Sudan's Omar al-Bashir ruled Sudan for almost 30 years after staging a coup in 1999. Idriss Deby took power in 1990, and Eritria's Esiar Aboinke has been in power for more than 26 years.

Some of the leaders have been in power for decades, such as Omar Bongo Ondimba, who died in 2009 and had been in power for 41 years. In Angola Jose Eduardo dos Santos stepped down after almost 38 years in power. Robert Mugabe was forced to step down after ruling the country for 37 years.

2.12 CONSEQUENCES AND THREATS PRESENTED BY POROUS BORDERS

Milczarek *et al.* (2013) have proven that porous borders have an effect on national security. Murua & Eguía (2015) noted that the movement of people across borders is an inherent phenomenon and its consequences goes beyond mere displacement of people.

According to Kirikoshi *et al.* (2017), cross-border movement may have serious consequences, among others, illegal immigration and smuggling or trafficking. In addition, traffickers undermine state legitimacy and exploit weak sovereign borders, especially if the border agencies are ill-equipped and lack the means for border monitoring and surveillance (Peterson 2015).

Sayakkarage (2016) conducted a study on the effects of porous borders by evaluating factors associated with national security such as societal, economic and political threats. Osimen *et al.* (2017) presented borderless borders as another threat to national security. Cyberspace is becoming an intractable challenge of managing borders because goods can be sold without border crossing through cyberspace. Turkmen & Merve (2018) also presented several cases where drones are increasingly used to transport illegal goods and drugs across the borders of countries.

Rosenblum *et al.* (2013) identified and classified three main types of threats associated with border crossings: (1) criminal networks, (2) unauthorized migration, and (3) potential terrorists. These types of threats must be prevented at all costs as they pose a significant risk to the national security of a country.

According to Metelev (2016), border threats may be associated with economic, social and legal threats. Economic threats are linked to non-payment of taxes and duties, competition between locals and foreigners in the country's labour market, and illegal raw material export and trade activities. Social threats are linked to domestic labour market dependency of certain professionals on foreigners, smuggling activities, such as human trafficking, while legal threats are linked to the illegal exporting of capital by foreigners and the illegal employment of illegal migrants.

Ultimately, in its extreme form, the unrestricted influx of illegal immigrants can change the demography of a country by reducing the original citizens to a minority. This happened in India where the number of Bangladeshi changed the demography of the state of Assam. Illegal immigration can also be the source of insurgency and community violence (Sayakkarage 2016).

2.13 SECURITY CONCERNS IN SOUTH AFRICA RELATED TO POROUS LAND BORDERS AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

The section commences by introducing direct security, and related concerns of South African citizens, security agencies, politicians, and media regarding illegal immigrants in South Africa. It is followed by these subsections: the initial focus on loss of revenue due to illicit mining; security companies employing unregistered illegal foreign nationals; undocumented foreigners straining South African basic services; evasion of tax and selling of fake goods and unhealthy products; loss of lives and psychological effects due to xenophobic attacks; loss of lives and psychological effects due to xenophobic attacks; poaching and possible extinction of species in South Africa; RSA becoming a haven for extremists and possible terror attacks.

Mcknight (2008) affirmed that there are also many documented foreigners present in South Africa seeking employment, who are exploited for cheaper wages in casual labour like construction, farming and gardening because of hardship experienced in their own countries. Landau *et al.* (2005) and Nnaemeka & Nkechi (2019) recorded that as early as 1994 concerns regarding illegal immigrants in South Africa have been echoed by security agencies, politicians, South African citizens and mass media as a security threat to South Africa. The first incident of xenophobic violence was recorded then. According to Crush and Wade, cited by Nnaemeka *et al.* (2019), some

South African conservative South African academics and politicians are responsible for furthering antifoignier sentiments.

Feketha (2019) notes that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that the African National Congress (ANC) has no negative sentiments against foreigners. The president stressed that foreigners are welcome in South Africa on condition that they entered the country legally. He further said that the ruling party is committed to the proper regulation and management of immigration. The President was also quoted as lamenting illegal foreign nationals opening unlicensed business in townships such as Soweto, Khayelitsha, and others (Majeke, 2019). A senior military leader in the SANDF opined that taking away the responsibility of border safeguarding from the military (SANDF) to other departments (SAPS) was a big mistake (Martin 2011a).

Kainth (2010), Hlatshaneni (2019), and Kirikoshi *et al.* (2017) affirm that security threats may be in the form of poverty due to high unemployment, lack of basic services, trafficking, and other. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure that measures are in place to protect its citizens against any threat or attack.

Maqhina (2019) recorded that in response to a South African parliamentary question in 2019, the minister of Justice in South Africa revealed that there were 13,437 foreigners in SA prisons. The number of undocumented illegal immigrants in prison was 2,052, and from the information from the minister there is no interstate transfer agreement of prisoners between South Africa and other countries. This implies that all foreign prisoners will serve their sentence in South Africa. The South African minister of Home Affairs stated that there were 184976 documented asylum seekers on 31 Decembers 2018, and over the period 2018 to 2019, a total number of 24,266 undocumented illegal immigrants were deported. Of these, 11,863 were from Mozambique; 5,334 from Zimbabwe; 3001 from Malawi; 2,643 from Lesotho; and 324 were from Eswatini (Maqhina 2019).

The main security concerns emerging from the literary are loss of revenue due to illicit mining, the employment of illegal immigrants by security companies, the strain on South Africa's service delivery capacity, due to illegal immigrants, evasion of tax and selling of counterfeit goods, xenophobic attacks, poaching, and possible terrorist activities. These issues will be discussed in this subsection.

2.13.1 Loss of revenue due to illicit mining

According to Martin (2019), South African gold mines have been looted at an industrial scale. The research report has established that the country is losing about R14,4 billion a year due to illicit gold mining, with tons of gold, diamonds, and other precious metals illegally shipped out of the country

through South African porous borders. Unlike countries such as Australia, surrounded by oceans, it is easy to stop illegal transporting of minerals from South Africa because access occur via the sea. In South Africa, minerals are taken out of the country illegally through all forms of transport either via its harbours, airports or across land borders (ISSUP Bulletin 2004). It seems that one of the key drivers of this is the fact that many countries in the region, including South Africa, are not moving towards full-scale regulation and licencing of artisanal scale mining (Martin 2019).

The cause of this is that a lot of former miners who lost their jobs because of the cyclical movement in the gold mining industry found their way back to small disused mines where they mine gold from old deposits. Foreign nationals, mainly from Lesotho, are used for these activities. This illegally mined gold then finds its way to countries like Dubai, India, and others.

2.13.2 Security companies employing unregistered illegal foreign nationals

PSiRA (2017) highlighted the possibilities of employment of unregistered illegal foreigners by owners of the private security industry. According to Hough (2002), the employment of security officers in 2001 amounted to 186 781, and in 2002, such employment increased to 229 447, with the industry growing at a rate of 12,5% over a period of five years. There have been allegations that some of the security companies are involved in unconstitutional and criminal activities.

There was also a concern from the SA government that some companies are training their officials as private armies and hit squads involved in the killing of people, competition and other, and that they are being used as cover for illicit diamond dealings, arms trade, drug trafficking and rhino-horn smuggling. Some security companies have a connection with foreign intelligence services and have mercenary-type roles. There was also a perception that these security companies are havens for a possible third force (PSiRA 2017).

2.13.3 Undocumented foreigners straining South African basic service delivery

Undeniably, democracy in South Africa has encouraged a high number of both legal and illegal foreigners to come to South Africa. The majority of the undocumented migrants continue to originate from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho (ISSUP Bulletin 2004). Undocumented foreigners are exploiting South African basic services, such as welfare provision, education, medical and other services established primarily for SA citizens. According to ISSUP Bulletin (2004), South Africa will continue experiencing undocumented migrants until a socio-economic balance within the SADC region is attained.

Under the Constitution of SA, undocumented foreigners may enjoy the same rights to public health as any RSA citizen (South Africa 1996b). Data from the electronic health record system from 66 of a possible 81 Johannesburg city clinics indicated that the number of undocumented foreigners accessing health care increased from 32,092 to 82,923 over the period 2016 to 2018 (Hlatshaneni 2019).

ISSUP Bulletin (2004) mentioned that some of the foreigners have acquired RSA identity documentation in an irregular or fraudulent manner, the possession of which makes it easy for them to access these services at the expense of South Africans. This contributes to the compromising of South African national security. Zimbabwean nationalities are associated with robbery, theft. Chinese and Nigerians nationals are well known for being involved in organised crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, etc. Nigerian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi foreigners resort to fake marriages; vulnerable South Africans are bribed to enter into these marriages due to a desperation of foreign nationals seeking South African citizenship (Hlatshaneni 2019).

On the other hand, undocumented foreigners are often abused and exploited by their employers because these employers exploit the migrants' fear of being exposed, arrested and deported. Chinese, Pakistani and Indians use South African neighbouring states as easy gateways to SA, while others again use SA as a transit country to the UK, USA, Australia and other European countries (ISSUP Bulletin 2004).

2.13.4 Evasion of tax and selling of counterfeit goods and unhealthy products

The endemic culture of corruption among immigration officials has led to millions of illegal immigrants, hardened criminals, contraband and unhealthy products crossing through the borders of SA. Charman & Piper (2012) indicate that in Cape Town spaza markets are dominated by illegal foreigners.

According to Ka Platjie (2019), Pakistanis and Ethiopians have taken over some township and metropolitan economies in places like Johannesburg, Sunnyside and Durban, because local governments fail to enforce laws and regulations for starting tuck-shops or new businesses. Some foreigners owning businesses prefer cash to avoid paying tax. Tax collection by the government among these groups are near non-existent.

Fake goods and unhealthy products end up making their way to South Africa's poorest citizens because of the failure of the SA Department of Health and other departments to enforce health compliance standards of goods sold to the SA people (Ka Platjie 2019).

2.13.5 Loss of lives due to xenophobic attacks and its psychological effects

Landau (2010) revealed that in 2008, sixty two foreign nationals and South Africans were accused of being foreigners, and some of their properties were damaged or destroyed (Landau 2010). Recently in Durban, approximately 300 Malawians were attacked. South Africans are not aware that these actions tarnish the reputation of the country abroad. In spite of these attacks on foreigners, Landau *et al.* (2005) predicted that South Africa would likely experience an increased number of foreigners coming to the country because of conflicts and economic hardship in their home countries, or because of migrant labour from neighbouring countries.

Due to these and similar incidents, South African relations with the rest of Africa had deteriorated since 1994 when SA was seen by many as land of prosperity and opportunity which embraced change and welcomed foreigners to her shores. The consequences of xenophobic attacks include loss of lives, loss of property, loss of revenue, social and psychological trauma, loss of dignity, increased criminal activities, and the potential security destabilisation of the country.

2.13.6 Poaching and possible extinction of species in South Africa

Büscher & Ramutsindela (2015) discovered that Southern African peace parks are losing thousands of rhinos due to poaching, which has a negative impact on conservation, biodiversity and the possible extinction of the species. The area affected most is the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, situated between Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique. Watson (2019) affirmed that a survey conducted in Kruger National Park over the period 2013 to 2014 found that more rhinos were poached.

According to Van der Duim *et al.* (2015), nature conservation is creating more than 100,000 employment opportunities in South Africa, especially for rural people. Therefore, the poaching and killing of wildlife will impact negatively on employment opportunities. Although there is a decline in rhino poaching in South African and Namibian parks, Botswana has introduced a much more drastic 'shoot-to-kill' policy. Criminal syndicates know that poachers may not come out of Botswana alive. Botswana is reaping the benefits of this controversial policy because private rhino conservationists are relocating to Botswana (Mogomotsi & Madigele 2017).

2.13.7 RSA becoming a haven for extremists and possible terror attacks

Rifer (2005) indicated that in 1998, Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, a man linked to a terror attack in Tanzania where the American Embassy was destroyed, managed to cross into South Africa to seek

asylum under a false name. Khalfan also worked in Cape Town for a period of more than one year until his arrest in 1999.

Fabricius (2018) reported that there have been incidents of Islamist extremism in the country. The following are some of the attacks associated to terrorism in South Africa especially in KwaZulu Natal (KZN): The killing of a South African/British botanist couple, the attack and murder of two people in a mosque in KZN, and an attack in the Western Cape. The Thulsie twins plotted attacks on United States and Jewish interests, the planting of bombs and cell phone incendiary devices in and around Durban shopping centres and at the July horse race. During their arrest, Islamic State flags were discovered.

Samantha Lewthwaite, the British national known as the white widow and allegedly a member of al-Shabaab, managed to hide in RSA for years. The current conditions in South Africa such as the perceived exclusion of minority communities, inequality, and a high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth, can lead to or create conditions favourable to a rise in extremism (Fabricius 2018).

2.14 ISSUES, CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES RELATED TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERS

Some of the issues of security concerns relating to the borders of South Africa are: insufficient monitoring and control to stop infiltration by terror groups, the smuggling of weapons, the illegal sale or smuggling of South Africa's natural resources, criminal activities, and cross-border disease transmission.

South Africa's landward Ports of Entry are confronted with lack of resources to maintain tighter security, and a shortage of personnel to perform effective border control. The situation is exacerbated by lack of coordination among departments, and inadequate surveillance monitoring systems.

In most cases, there is not an actual physical border to South Africa. Border fences are either destroyed or were not existing in the first instance. There is a lack of surveillance sensors, reconnaissance capacity and communication equipment (South Africa 2016d). The weaker border security has been exploited to facilitate rhino poaching, illegal migration, and the trafficking of people and commodities.

The limited capability of airspace monitoring exacerbates the illegal infiltration of land borders. The Department of Home Affairs presented key challenges of the country's airspace ranging from

air traffic control to appropriate and registered flight training centres, landing facilities, and airspace monitoring. Official stakeholders from various institutions are reported to be colluding with criminals, committing illegal activities such as fraud and theft. Other challenges include the following (South Africa 2016d):

- i. “The emergent trend of the movement by air of illegally mined minerals, stolen high value goods, narcotics, wildlife, and illegal weapons.
- ii. Absence of critical airspace matters on the agenda of border control discussions.
- iii. Combined responsibility between South African Air Force, Air Traffic and Navigation Services in terms of airspace radar coverage.
- iv. Limited capability of low-level radar coverage in the country which leads to uncontrolled movement and an inability to detect medium and small aircraft”.

2.15 INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO BORDER CONTROL

In order to curb the challenges of porous borders and border threats, Holloway (2010) presented some of the existing border management frameworks used world-wide with the potential for improving them by designing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) ideally suited for measuring the effectiveness of border control measures. The United State (US) uses risk management methodologies which are gleaned from economic theories as a framework for border threat assessment (Rosenblum *et al.* 2013).

In general terms, borders are key to national security. However, border management and border security are seen as a low priority in most countries in Africa. As opposed to border security, issues such as political elite protection are enjoying the first security priority. There are few countries in Africa that have formulated national security strategies which address the issue of securing their borders (Isoke 2015).

In a South African context, border management is defined as the enforcement of border law in which the SANDF plays a critical role as sanctioned by the Constitution of South Africa (South Africa, 1996b; 2015a).

2.16 CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL POLICY ON THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

This section discusses the status of northern regions on the policy on the movement of people and is followed by the development of the migration of people policy of Southern African Development Community (SADC).

2.16.1 Current status of northern regions on the movement of people policy

There is a lack of a systematic and coherent strategy among African countries in terms of migration on the continent. The disconnect is visible between the African Union's vision for migration versus the migration practicability and realities of its member states. The implementation of the African Union's Migration Policy, which encourages freer movement of Africans through introducing a common passport, is not fully executed by some regions. So far the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) have made progress in the implementation of freer movement by introducing a common passport to ease migration for labour purposes (Abebe 2017).

According to the ECOWAS protocol, People of the ECOWAS region under the free visa can travel and visit another member state of the region up to 90 days provided they holds international health certificates and a valid travel document (Abebe 2017). Other regions, such as IGAD and COMESA have adopted the protocol of free movement of people, so too ECCAS, AMU and CEN-SAD.

Although some countries such as Nigeria have adopted the freer movement policy in the ECOWAS region, border crime in the country is alarming. Boko Haram and criminal syndicates managed to exploit the country and the porous borders of its neighbouring states. The study conducted by Osimen *et al.* (2017) revealed that criminal activities such as trafficking in human parts and weapons, illicit trade in timber, illegal immigrants, trafficking of natural resources, vehicle crime, drug trafficking, illegal trade in diamond and oil are still taking place in Nigeria.

African countries are facing seemingly insurmountable challenges in managing their borders. In some cases, crimes are committed without even crossing the borders. These crimes are committed through cyberspace because goods and products are sold online (Osimen *et al.* 2017). The same applied to Uganda which has adopted the protocol of free movement of people. The country, which also experiences porous border problems, is vulnerable to growing acts of terrorism in the country. Since the Al Shaabab attack in 2010, the country is concerned about its porous borders because the threat remains real, especially with the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating both in the country and across its borders (Isoke 2015).

The recent border closure by other African countries who adopted and implemented the African Union's Migration Policy for reasons including security concerns, economic considerations, health precautions, and diplomatic disputes were a slap in the face of the AU and the continent's integration efforts. According to Mumbere (2019) the following African countries closed their borders for reasons stated:

- i. Nigeria's customs agency closed its land borders as it struggled to curb smuggling. It barred all movement of goods while strategising on how best to manage import and export goods and by making sure that there is a total control over what comes into and leaves the country.
- ii. Sudan closed its borders with the Central African Republic and Libya for security reasons, to stop illegal border crossing, because the Central African Republic and Libya have been mired in violence for some time.
- iii. In August 2019, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to re-open their borders after their borders were closed due to a diplomatic dispute. Rwanda accused Uganda in February 2020 of backing rebel groups against the current government in Kigali, and of the harassment of Rwandese citizens crossing the border.
- iv. In June 2019 Kenya suspended cross border trade and closed its border with neighbouring Somalia until further notice due to security reasons about the terrorist group Al Shabaab. Apart from security reasons, the country wanted to stop narcotics and human trafficking.
- v. Rwanda closed its border with the Democratic Republic due to the Ebola epidemic in the Congolese city of Goma, which lies across the border from the Rwandan city of Gisenyi. The border was closed because the residents of both cities crossed the border frequently for work and other activities and became liabilities in the spread of the epidemic.
- vi. Barely a year after Eritreans and Ethiopians celebrated the re-opening of the two countries' borders, President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea closed parts of the border without giving any official explanation.
- vii. In August 2019, Cameroon expressed unhappiness about the plans of Equatorial Guinea to erect a wall along the border of Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. These plans angered Cameroonian leaders.

2.16.2 Southern African Development Community migration policy

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the only region on the continent which has failed to fully support the implementation of the African Union's Migration Policy which encourages freer movement of people in the region. Most countries have signed the protocol, some did not commit (Maunganidze & Formica 2018). The reason for not implementing this framework is because of differences amongst member states on political agendas and leadership issues. Efforts

are partisan and piecemeal. The progress is very slow. There is a lack of political will to ratify and implement the protocols.

The region is characterised by unskilled and semi-skilled migration to bigger economies like South Africa as host country. Channelling of movement to bigger economies has its own challenges, such as xenophobic incidents and heightened tension between local citizens and foreigners. There is a mix of opinions on the progress made by SADC member states so far. Some leaders believe SADC moves too slowly in terms of improving migration in the region, while others believe that the region is moving towards control and exclusion. Another perception is that migration is a threat, not an opportunity. The Protocol on the Movement of Persons in SADC was supported and accepted by nine SADC countries. The protocol aimed at allowing people in the region free access to member states without visa for 90 days, provided the person enter the country for lawful purposes.

The Republic of Angola, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Zambia did not commit themselves to the migration policy. The tension between ‘security threat’ and ‘free movement’ dialogue on migration is prevalent. The draft protocol on Employment and Labour, which is supposed to facilitate the elimination of obstacles and easing free movement of labour and capital, services and goods and people from SADC region largely, remains in draft form since 2013. The protocol is supposed to promote and pave the way for the development of labour and employment, for relevant policies, to facilitate labour mobility, increase sustainable productivity, social security measures and practices, enhance industrial harmony and enhance decent work in member states (SADC 2005).

2.17 CONCLUSION

In this chapter the theoretical frameworks underpinning this study, namely the Copenhagen School and push – pull theory were discussed. From the literature review, concept such as security studies, national security border and border security were deliberated. The countries bordering South Africa were briefly discussed and the security concerns in South Africa related to porous land borders and illegal immigrants highlighted. In the next chapter the methodology followed will be presented.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

In this chapter the research methodology will be unpacked by explaining the research method, setting out the research design, discussing the method of data collection, describing the population and explaining how sampling was done. Reliability and validity issues will be explained thereafter,

followed by a discussion of the data analysis and a description of the timeline of the study. The chapter will be concluded with a description of how permission to conduct the study and ethical clearance were secured.

3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING BORDER ISSUES

There are three methods of conducting research, namely qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method research. Mixed methodology is the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. A qualitative methodology was used in this study. Choy (2014) argued that quantitative approaches have different limitations in producing or developing knowledge to those in qualitative approaches. These two methodologies will be discussed briefly in this subsection.

3.1.1 Qualitative research methodology

Qualitative research methods address the social aspect of research. The method is normally used to explore a problem which is not well understood. Qualitative research methodology uses instruments such as open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews, observations, and focus group discussions to collect data. Interviews often take place in a quiet environment, a conference room, or the participant's natural setting (Rutberg & Bouikidis 2018). The philosophical school of thought in qualitative research is based on the interpretivist approach. This method is underpinned by constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. The methodology uses non-numerical analysis to analyse data collected. Qualitative research relies on personal contact and the group being studied for collection of credible and rich data. The researcher is required to build good partnerships with study participants to gain and enhance deeper insight and richness into the context under study, as it is believed that meaning and knowledge are embedded in the participants' experiences. The qualitative research design is flexible and offers unlimited freedom of movement (Tuli 2010).


Some of the weaknesses of the qualitative methodology is that the important issue could be overlooked, that the process is time-consuming, it needs skilled interviewers during primary data collection, and it is a labour intensive analysis process during recoding and categorization. The strength is that more issues are raised through broad and open-ended inquiry, and the ability to probe for underlying beliefs, assumptions and values allow the researcher to gain a full appreciation of an organization and an understanding of driving behaviour (Choy 2014).

3.1.2 Quantitative research methodology

Quantitative methodology is underpinned by a positivist research paradigm. In quantitative research, emphasis is on testing hypotheses and measuring variables or verifying empirical relationships. The research design in quantitative research is fixed and more restrictive because of the objective, single reality that will be studied. The method is normally used when there are unanswered research questions or if there is a lack of research on a particular topic. The philosophical school of thought in quantitative research is associated with empiricist epistemology and realist/objectivist ontology. The method postulates that there are universal laws which enable researchers to predict, describe and control social phenomena. Quantitative research uses instruments such as tests, check lists, questionnaires, inventories, etc. to collect data. Research using a quantitative methodology can range from quasi-experimental, surveying, and experiment to clinical trials for new medication and treatments. The methodology uses statistical analysis to analyse data collected (Tuli, 2010).

Some of the weaknesses of quantitative methodology are that it sometimes requires a large sample size, and that quantitative data may lack, or fail to provide, in-depth description of the experience. The strengths of quantitative methods include data collected may be quickly analysed by using statistical tools and it is time saving in administering and evaluating data. Reliability and validity can be easily tested or critically analysed by using existing and proven statistical methods in a short time frame (Choy, 2014).

Figure 3.1 summarise the philosophical framework of the research practice and the relationships between different methodological traditions and philosophical schools of thought which may be followed by a researcher to investigate a phenomenon. The framework dictates that the researcher can either follow an interpretivist or positivist school of thought once the research problem has been defined. The methodology, which is the strategy to investigate a situation, is classified as either a qualitative, quantitative or mixed. The design in the figure illustrates a plan of when, how and where the researcher will collect data and do the analysis. The instruments/methods indicate the ways and the means of collecting and analysis.



Source: Tuli (2010: 104)

Figure 3.1: The foundation of research practice

In this research, a qualitative methodology was used to gain comprehensive understanding of the participant’s views. Qualitative investigations involve a naturalistic and interpretive approach. This methodology was chosen for the study because it uses different methods and qualitative techniques to collect and analyse data in an effort to interpret phenomena or make sense of the meaning presented or brought forth by people. The methodology encourages critical thinking.

According to the positivist ontology, quantitative data are seen as real facts, therefore, as opposed to positivist ontology, the study followed a humanist or phenomenological ontology which sees qualitative facts as real facts. Epistemology is an approach for acquisition of knowledge (Breakfast *et al.* 2015). Scientific knowledge was acquired by means of interviewing SANDF senior officers who have knowledge of and experience in border security.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

De Vos *et al.* (2011) presented and explained five main types of qualitative research designs or strategies, namely narrative biography, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory and case study. According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014), life histories, participatory research and correlational studies are the other common styles used for qualitative research. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2016: 178) introduced archival and documentary research designs as another form of research strategy. This study followed an exploratory approach which is associated with an interpretivist research paradigm and the documentary research design. Table 3.1 depicts the summary of choice and research design followed by the researcher.

Table 3.1: Choice of methodology and research design

CHOICE	DESCRIPTION
Philosophy	<i>Interpretivist philosophy:</i> According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014) this philosophy is associated with social science. This research was about understanding people's experience (Wagner <i>et al.</i> 2012), and the explanation enabled the researcher to appreciate the reality or subjective meaning of social action (de Vos <i>et al.</i> 2011).
Approach to theory development	<i>Inductive approach:</i> Data was used in this study to gain insight by means of identifying themes and patterns and exploring a phenomenon (Saunders <i>et al.</i> 2016).
Methodological choice	<i>Multi-method qualitative choice:</i> Multi-methods uses more than one qualitative method to collect data (Saunders <i>et al.</i> 2016), therefore interviews and documents were used in this study to collect data. The purpose of using two methods was to overcome the weakness of using only one method.
Strategies(ies)	<i>Documentary research and exploratory approach:</i> Documents were used to collect secondary data and to explore the causes of porous borders, the threats to, and ideal strategy for South African national security. The exploratory approach uses documents or interviews to seek new insights. (Saunders <i>et al.</i> 2016). Therefore, documentary research and exploratory approach were used in this study.
Time horizon	<i>Cross-sectional horizon:</i> The study was cross-sectional because the expectations are to complete this study within one year.

CHOICE	DESCRIPTION
Techniques and procedures	<u>Data collection and data analysis</u> : Semi-structured interview schedules and documents were used to collect data. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis.

A documentary research strategy can be achieved by obtaining data or information from digital sources such as the internet, organisational websites, governmental and other sources available online. When organisational documents are not easily available online, the relevant organisation/s need to be consulted to seek access (Saunders *et al.* 2016).

The reason for choosing exploratory research was to learn more about the causes and the threats to national security presented by South African porous land borders, because little is known about these factors. According to De Vos *et al.* (2011), exploratory research is an ideal strategy that may be used to gain more insight about the situation or phenomenon by asking open-ended questions. Questions were asked because of the lack of basic information and to understand, uncover or clarify an issue, phenomenon, or problem. Exploratory questions normally begins with “what” or “how” and are used during the process of collection data (De Vos *et al.* 2011).

According to Saunders *et al.* (2016), the research design is guided by the way the researcher asks her/his questions, and this may be either by a descriptive, an evaluative or explanatory approach or combinations of these. De Vos *et al.* (2011) added that action verbs such as to describe, to explore, to explain are useful when refining the objectives of the study. These verbs may lead to different objectives.

The benefits of this approach is that an exploratory study may be conducted in many ways, such as by means of focus group, interviews, search of the literature, experts’ interviews or in-depth individual interviews (Saunders *et al.* 2016). Interviews produce new information which enables the researcher to either confirm or refute known information (Brod *et al.* 2009). Other advantages of exploratory research are flexibility and adaptability to change. It allows the researcher to change direction due to new data and insights.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION

The geographical area for data collection involved mainly SANDF military units in Pretoria. The geographical site is where the SANDF headquarters resides, and it is the home of military strategists and operational planners. The participants at Military Strategic and operational levels were selected because they interact either directly or indirectly with members of the SANDF at tactical level who

are involved in border safeguarding. Their responsibilities also cause these officials to interact with other departments responsible for border management and border control at national strategic level.

The research commenced with data collection on 22 July 2019 after the ethics application was reviewed by the Faculty Ethics Screening Committee (FESC) and classified as low risk on the 19th of July 2019. The application was provisionally approved by the FESC, and permission was granted to start with data collection while waiting for the final approval from the Research Ethics committee (REC): Social, Behavioural and Education Research (SBER).

The interviews were well-balanced with representatives from nearly all South African racial groupings being interviewed. Only a member of the Indian group could not be found. All services of the SANDF, namely the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Military Health Services were represented. The SANDF participants who took part in this research were officers in the rank group of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Captain (Navy) and Brigadier General. The duration of the interviews were between 40 and 80 minutes with an average duration of about 70 minutes. The interviews were audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim.

3.3.1 Primary data collection

The primary data collection instrument used for this study was a semi-structured interview schedule. According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014) semi-structured interview schedules normally ask open-ended questions instead of close-ended questions. The questionnaire allows respondents to answer questions as they like and in detail.

A semi-structured interview was used in this study to collect primary data and to gain more insight into the causes of porous land borders of South Africa. Semi-structured interviews save time because the interview usually does not take more than 90 minutes, and because themes and basic questions are listed as a guide prior to the interview (Wagner *et al.* 2012). Audio recordings and transcriptions was used.

Comments and speeches by South African politicians were used as primary sources in order to understand the views of, and to examine politicians' positions on South Africa's migration policies.

3.3.2 Secondary data collection

Although in-depth interviews and participant observation have been tried and tested, document analysis is another method which is very good for collecting authentic data and is more cost-effective than the rest (Mogalakwe 2006). Griffiths (2017) conducted such a study, i.e., using

existing documents and literature to understand the disruptive and destructive nature of cyber-attacks. According to Bowen (2009), some of the benefits of document analysis are that documents are less costly as compared to other research methods, and documents are easily accessible.

Documents were used as secondary sources to gain an understanding of the historical background of immigration in South Africa, and of the theoretical frameworks and the literature backing this study. Data was collected from existing studies, academic journal articles, and migration policies to explore recent incidents emanating from border safeguarding challenges which have the potential to threaten South Africa's national security. Only SANDF documents in the public domain, such as the Defence Review, White paper on Defence, maps etc. were used. Documents were used to provide better understanding and to give a clear picture of the current status of South African border security.

In his study, Bowen (2009) adds the following documents which may be used for systematic evaluation by researchers in their studies: brochures, television program scripts, radio, charts, maps, diaries, attendance registers, minutes of meetings, letters and memoranda, organisational or institutional reports, manuals, survey data, and various public records.

The libraries from various institutions within Pretoria were visited for data and information collection. Internet websites were also explored. Wagner *et al.* (2012) argue that document analysis is not universally recognised as a research method and not sufficiently systematic. Therefore, this method was supported with interviews. As verification and validation of the information collected, experts from academia and the military were approached in person to clarify uncertainties.

3.4 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT

The researcher used semi-structured interviews as a method for collecting data. The piloting of questions was important to provide critical feedback and suggestions, and for refining questions. Piloting also aided in validating questions and making sure that the questions were appropriate to the study. The first draft of the probing questions for the interview schedule was developed by the researcher and consisted of 40 questions (see Appendix A). The questions were then presented to supervisors to the study who provided guidelines for improvement and advised the researcher to align them according to the initial three objectives (main topics), and group them in sections before piloting them. Redundant questions were omitted and those with similarities were combined, corrected and included in the final interview schedule.

The second revised set of questions (reduced from 40 to 17 questions) were designed by applying the three-point scale shown in Appendix B. The questions under each objective (topic) were as

follows: The First objective (topic) consisted of nine questions, the second objective (topic) consisted of six questions and the last topic consisted of two questions. The drafted questions were piloted with military experts who part of the participants in the actual study were not. These experts were then asked to weigh or assess each item on a three-point scale and showing the extent to which they think the questions were measuring or relevant to the objectives the research. The experts then had to select one of the three numbers next to each statement. If they strongly agreed with the statement, they would cross out 3, cross 2 if they thought the statement was useful but not essential, and lastly cross out 1 if they strongly disagreed with the statement and the statement was not necessary. After obtaining feedback from the pilot study, the final probing questions were finalised (see Appendix C). The aim of the exercise was to eliminate redundant questions and verify validity and reliability. During a third and last round, the final development of the interview schedule was presented to the supervisors for final gauging of its validity and reliability before commencing with data collection.

The actual data collection was conducted over the period 22 July 2019 to 22 January 2020. Five experts from the military, two with doctoral qualifications, were requested to assist the researcher by identifying the weakness and the relevance of the questions which were prepared to achieve the objectives of the study. Weaknesses were identified and corrected. Furthermore, a debriefing with the participants was held telephonically to clarify issues that were not clear during the recorded interviews.

The comprehensive evaluation of the interview schedules ensured a final interview schedule that would be able to extract valid and reliable information from participants.

3.5 POPULATION

The South African National Defence Force recognises four levels of planning for war and command of operations. The four levels are: national strategic level; military strategic level, which provides direction by developing and employing military capabilities, operational strategic level, where campaigns and major operations are planned; and tactical level, where those plans are executed (JWP 2009).

The total population for this study consisted of military experts at the military strategic and operational levels who dealt with border security in the SANDF. Only participants who were involved in border safeguarding for at least the preceding seven years, were interviewed. Initially, the researcher identified only six officials. This number expanded for greater depth of data, as participants referred the researcher to other participants who were involved in border safeguarding.

The initial number was obtained from the SANDF (Joint Operations Division). Targeted participants were in a position to provide useful information on border safeguarding.

The participants at operational level had access to information by means of daily and monthly reports from 15 military sub-units who were deployed at South African borders at the tactical level. Participants at the operational level also had access to information from national level through the South African Border Management Agency by virtue of being members on this committee.

3.5.1 Sampling

Non-probability, snowball sampling was used because it was not easy to find potential participants for this study (Kirchherr & Charles 2018). Out of six participants identified and planned to be interviewed, five availed themselves for interviews. Two of the five participants interviewed helped to recruit other participants or referred the researcher to the other participants who were previously involved in border security. Other participants were identified during the interviews and approached to increase the initial number of participants.

This kind of sampling is relying on identified experts in the specified field. It should be noted that even though the number of participants may be identified, there is no guarantee that all the participants will take part in the study (De Vos *et al.* 2011). A total of eight participants were interviewed.

3.6 ANALYSIS OF DATA

The researcher re-read the total of eight transcripts repeatedly to try to understand participants' experiences and to make sense of and gain a holistic idea of the data collected. During this process, diagrams were drawn, and rough notes made by the researcher in an attempt to make sense of the findings and to categorise the themes. Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999) define this process as immersion. Boyatzis (1998) refers to the themes as the meaning derived from recurring activities, feelings and patterns from the conversation topics.

Data was analysed manually. Thematic analysis was used to search for themes and patterns. According to Saunders *et al.* (2016), this technique is flexible and may be used in subjectivist positions. Thematic analysis can also be used in inductive and deductive approaches.

During the thematic analysis process, the researcher identified units of analysis in the transcribed interview through reading and rereading the transcribed interviews. Themes and patterns identified were labelled in the form of a word, a sentence or phrase, or a couple of sentences (Wagner *et al.*

2012). A tabular matrix was used to present main themes and sub-themes linked to alphabetic letters allocated to each participant.

The research findings were strengthened and enriched by linking the objectives of the research, namely the causes of and threats to national security, with push-pull factors and sectors of security threats presented by the Copenhagen School. The application of these theories also strengthens the reliability and the validity of the study from the multidimensional point of view. The principles of the school of Copenhagen and push-pull theory assisted the researcher with the interpretation of data and analysing porous land border security. Security threats were observed and analysed from different angles ranging from the military sector, social, the environment, economic and political.

The security dynamics in the region, mainly the countries that share boundaries with South Africa, were observed. The increase in number of illegal immigrants moving into South Africa, and their relocation to South Africa were linked to push and pull factors associated with socio-economic and political stability as main contributors. Moreover, from the Copenhagen School constructivist approach, there developed a valid argument that illegal immigrants and terrorism threaten national security. This dictates a shift of approach in South African national security policies.

3.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

In quantitative research the success of studies is depended upon reliability and validity, and these two techniques are rooted within a positivist approach and are commonly used in quantitative research. In qualitative research, reliability and validity has been reconfigured with the purpose of enhancing the rigour of the research process (Golafshani 2003).

3.7.1 Reliability

Throughout this project, the researcher considered data collection a key principle where data from multiple secondary sources and primary sources were cross-checked to allow for triangulation. Various sources of evidence were studied for consistencies, uncertainties and to strengthen the reliability and the researcher's standpoint that the results of the research were free from bias. Any important information obtained from the participants were cross verified and cross-checked from two or more sources (both primary and secondary sources) to confirm correctness.

To ensure reliability compliance, all documents used went through a rigorous process of authenticity, meaning, credibility and representativeness checks (Scott 1990). To enhance credibility and accuracy of information that is error free, mainly peer-reviewed journal articles,

books, documents, presentations, and reports prepared for official purposes were used, as they are verified and validated before they were made available to the public. Arguably, such documents are more accurate and have less errors.

According to Holiday (2002), reliability within qualitative research refers to the consistency in the findings of the research. To enhance reliability and to avoid ambiguity during data collection, clear and non-contradictory, probing questions were designed in such a way that the sequence of collecting data was consistent and congruent. The researcher piloted the probing questions as part of methodological rigour.

3.7.2 Validity

Validity testing is used to determine whether the research instrument is measuring what it is supposed to measure. There are several components of validity testing; content validity is one of them (Taherdoost 2016). Content validity is qualitative by nature and it can be achieved by asking experts' opinions and judgements within a specific field of study (Bolarinwa 2016) or by conducting extensive literature reviews (Taherdoost 2016). In this study, face or content validity was achieved through a comprehensive literature review and a rigorous interview schedule development process.

3.8 PERMISSION TO CONDUCT THE STUDY AND ETHICS CLEARANCE

Permission to conduct the study granted by the SANDF and the ethics protocol followed are discussed in this section. The protection and confidentiality of participants and the organisation, informed consent for the interview, privacy and anonymity will also be explained in this section.

3.8.1 Permission to conduct the study

RUREB (2017) mentioned that before conducting research, the researcher must adhere to the following ethical measures: right of the participant in terms of anonymity and confidentiality, permission to obtain information from participants and the organisation of which they are part.

Permission was requested before the researcher commenced with data collection. Authority from the Department of Defence (Defence Intelligence) to conduct the research in the SANDF was granted on the 08 April 2019.

Permission (see Appendix D) was granted with the following conditions: Firstly, the researcher had to adhere the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002), inter alia section 104 of the Act, pertaining to the

protection of DOD classified information, and secondly, the final product of this research must be presented or forwarded to the DOD, Defence Intelligence, Counter intelligence sub-Division for scrutiny and for final authorisation before it can be distributed or published to any entity outside the Department of Defence. This will be done to help the researcher to clear any information that may compromise the national interest and security of the country. Thirdly, classified DOD documents would not be used.

3.8.2 Ethical clearance

According to Arifin (2018), researchers must comply with the principles of safeguarding informants' rights, protect the privacy of the participants, make reports available to the participants, must not exploit participants, and must communicate research objectives. The purpose of ethical clearance was to ensure that participants are not harmed in any way. The study complied with the Protection of Personal Information Act, Act no. 4 of 2013. The researcher ensured that the protection of all participants who took part in this study were guaranteed. There was no reputational harm either to the individuals or the South African Defence Force. The researcher made sure that the identity and personal information of participants were not disclosed in the report.

No one was forced or coerced to participate in this study; participation was strictly voluntarily. The participants were briefed about their rights and the freedom to withdraw at any time before commencement with the interviews. All participants completed an informed consent form (see Appendix E). Permission to use audio recordings were requested from participants prior to commencement of the interviews.

Akaranga & Makau (2016) state that the researcher must create a relaxed environment where confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed. Because some of the participants felt that their names might be made known, biographical information such as age, race, gender, military rank, years in service and the titles of the officials were excluded. The researcher used his prerogative to omit this information and not to present it in the report because a combining of biographic data with responses could potentially pose a threat to the anonymity of participants who wanted to remain anonymous.

The researcher waited until provisional approval was granted by the FESC before commencing with data collection. Final ethics clearance (see appendix F) was also obtained from Stellenbosch University, Research Ethics committee (REC): Social, Behavioural and Education Research (SBER) on 1 August 2019, with the expiry date on 31 July 2022.

3.9 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the methodology and methods used to conduct the research presented in this thesis were described. A qualitative methodology with interviews of selected experts was chosen as an appropriate methodology with a snowball sampling approach used to select participants. Eight experts in border security were interviewed. In Chapter 4 the focus will now shift to data analysis and the presentation of the findings of the research.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POROUS BORDERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

This chapter focus on the results of the findings of the interviews. The structure of the chapter was informed by the five main questions of the study: What are the causes of porous land borders in South Africa? What are the threats posed by porous land borders to South Africa's national security? What are the consequences of porous land border on South Africa's national security? What areas of the South African porous land borders need to be prioritised? What are the operational and policy relevance of the current research results to the SANDF? The research findings are presented in the order of the causes, the threats, the consequences, and vulnerable border areas identified as needing to be prioritised.

4.1 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSES OF SOUTH AFRICAN POROUS LAND BORDERS

This section presents the main themes, sub-themes, words, phrases and verbatim dialogues recorded during participant interviews, with all associated themes which constitute the causes of porous land borders of South Africa. Lack of resources, the length and condition of the border, uncoordinated intelligence, corrupt government officials, the colonial border legacy and liberal South African migration policies and laws are presented first. This is followed by a discussion of the lack of an integrated, overarching national security strategy, the issues surrounding the informal employment sector and a lack of cooperation and coordination. The section concludes with an explanation of push and pull factors.

4.1.1 Lack of resources

During the interviews, lack of resources emerged as the main contributing factor to South Africa's porous land borders. All the participants believe that a lack of resources, ranging from human resources, technology, infrastructure, and insufficient budget allocation, is the main causative factor of porous borders. A study of the South Africa Department of Defence Annual Report for the 2017/18 financial year confirms the lack of resources to safeguard the borders of South Africa (South Africa, 2018a).

Participant D cautioned that trying to stop people completely from coming through South Africa's porous land borders is not going to be an easy task. The participant further stated that countries such

as the United States have the same problems on their southern border despite allocating much more resources than what South Africa is capable of, but still they cannot completely solve the problem. Mazza (2017) affirms that US president Donald Trump announced the building of an impenetrable concrete wall to secure the US-Mexico land border as the country struggled to cope with the movement of illegal immigrants. Participant F endorsed the position taken by Participant D by saying that there is no quick solution to the lack of resources. Participant D stated that identifying priorities in resource allocation is needed because the country cannot afford to fix all infrastructure because of the current economic situation. However, if the country can determine priorities in land border resource allocation, and plan intelligently, at least some of the border challenges will be addressed.

Participant H reiterated that the SANDF is doing the best they can with what little they have but it is impossible to effectively cover the entire border, given the lack of resources. In the following sub-section, the lack of technological, infrastructural, human, and budgetary resources are viewed through the eyes of the participants.

4.1.1.1 Technology

Eighty percent (80%) of the participants argued that more information is required to understand what exactly is happening on the South African land borders, and that technology appears to be the solution. The participants believed that a thorough assessment needs to be conducted with the aim of strategically understanding the root causes of porous land borders. The assessment should identify all the routes of smugglers and illegal immigrants, and determine a surveillance concept, a plan that needs to be adopted, and the platform required to execute the plan. The SANDF has been given the responsibility of border safeguarding in 1998 after taking over from the police (Kruys 2002). Much still needs to be done. Collaboration and interaction from local agencies and neighbouring countries' law enforcement agencies and all relevant stakeholders are required to be able to develop an ideal technological solution (Maluleke & Dlamini 2019). Participant F tabled the idea of the fourth Industrial Revolution.

“So, if you look at the fourth Industrial revolution (4th IR), we will have to look at more clever options, focusing mainly on technology to support us to make the borders less porous and we will have to change our concept of operation to be more proactive and this case to have reaction force capability. So we must be able to pick the incident or the problem early and you must have a quick reaction capability, and once again taking into consideration our geography most probably you will have to have the concept where you operate mainly in the third dimension meaning Air. So, you

must probably have to look at the larger air capability that can link up with early warning capabilities in order to react faster to what has happened.” (Participant F)

Based on the length of the land borders of South Africa, all participants indicated that the solution to the porous land borders of South Africa probably lies in an increased use of technology. They further attested that there is a need of a diversity of technology to support the SANDF in securing national borders. The participants stated that the mixture of technology should include early warning capabilities, quick response capabilities, and reaction force capabilities.

Moreover, participants reported that equipment such as mobility packages, land cruisers, troop carriers, command and control vehicles, ambulances, and logistical support vehicle, etc. are required by the SANDF if border security forces are to be increased to 22 companies. It has been proven in the EU that technology is extremely useful in dealing with irregular border crossing, its detection and to distinguish between foreigners and citizens (Ferreira 2019). In this regard, participants said the following:

“In this modern era, we need the correct combination of technology and manpower, but budget constraints prevent the realisation thereof.” (Participant H)

“The vastness of our borders varies with their problems. In the Northern Cape illegal cross border by human is not the real problem. However, there are some activities of smugglers using aircraft. There were incidents of unauthorised aircraft crossing the border. Lack of radar coverage and surveillance is the problem in our country.” (Participant A)

During the interviews it also became clear that the expansion of the current strength of the SANDF from 15 companies to 22 companies *“might also not be a cheaper option and the Alfa and Omega.”* (Participant D) because additional equipment and personnel would be required.

The participants alleged that the SANDF does not have enough serviceable assets or quick response capabilities to project the reaction force in the theatre of operation, especially in the areas where illegal border incidents or activities are taking place. During the Parliamentary oversight, the respective Chiefs of the South African Air Force and the South African Navy reiterated that the Air Force and Navy are struggling to keep up with the maintenance and repair of both air and naval assets because of budget constraints (Davis 2019).

Participant B acknowledged that the benefit of technology is that it can operate in harsh conditions, it can be effective in hot and cold weather, during the day and night, in the mountains, desert, bush, open areas, and they can be tailor-made to operate in the specific geography of the specific

environment. In some cases, humans cannot operate in such conditions. Participants F and G added the following benefits of technology:

“With technology you can pick up cell phone signals that come across the borders and you can pick up trends and start analysing trends etc in that environment.” (Participant F). In addition to cell phone signals, Participant G mentioned how the EU is benefiting from technology.

“Countries in Europe, they’ve got the technology. Once you enter the EU and your passport is scanned, wherever you’re moving shows up in millions of computers and they know exactly where the people are. We don’t have that technology, so we are trying to implement something way behind the technology and this is the big challenge.” (Participant G)

There was an agreement among participants that neither extra feet on the ground nor technology is the solution to porous land borders. Participants B, D, F and G stated that it is a fact that the South African Defence force does not have the capabilities to secure the entire land border on their own.

4.1.1.2 Infrastructure

Participants E and F noted from observing border infrastructure that there were no fences. Fences were either stolen or dilapidated to such an extent that vehicles were able to cross the border seemingly at will. Alternatives such as putting rocks on the border were implemented to circumvent this.

Participant D stated that in Ndumo in the northern part of KwaZulu Natal, there is a regular 12-foot barbed wire fence. The criminals normally check where the military is deployed and while busy with the patrol, they outflank them, go straight to the fence with their vehicles, cut it and cross. Once they are in Mozambique, the soldiers cannot pursue them. The participant concluded by saying it is impossible for the soldiers to cover the whole border under these conditions.

“If you are talking about cause and threats, you will see in our meetings we are addressing, things like our infrastructure, which is one of our main causes that is why our borders are so porous. The infrastructure on our borders and the POE is almost non-existent, so it is so easy for the people to cross.” (Participant G)

The infrastructure that the military uses is supposed to be budgeted for by the Department of Public Works (South Africa 2016c). The SANDF is not responsible for the maintenance and repairs of the border fence and the road anymore.

“In the past funds were allocated to the SANDF to address the conditions of the fence between Zimbabwe and RSA borders. However, that money was taken away by the Public Works

Department, currently there is no fence, and the terrain along our border is almost non-negotiable by the vehicle.” (Participant C)

The Caledon and Limpopo rivers form part of the international borders between RSA and neighbouring countries. The findings from the interviews showed that all the farmers along these rivers are depended on the water from these rivers. Normally these farmers from Zimbabwe and Lesotho are issued with licences by the Department of Agriculture to access water from these rivers. Currently, the farmers cannot have access to the river because the gates are locked due to the maintenance contract and the contract of issuing licences not being in place. Due to drought in Zimbabwe, farmers force their way by bringing their cattle to the river through the fence.

4.1.1.3 Human resources

All participants mentioned that there is not enough personnel on the ground to perform physical border patrols. The SANDF deployed about 15 companies along the borders, consisting of approximately 200 personnel each, while the minimum requirement is 22 companies (Kruys 2002; South Africa 2018a). The DHA is also experiencing staffing challenges while traveller volumes continue to increase at the Ports of Entry (POE) (South Africa 2018b).

To address the issue of personnel shortages, reserve force members are utilised for border patrols. These reserve force members work for six months and are then sent back home to wait until the next call-up. After six months, some might not be called-up again. During the interviews, there was a mixed feeling amongst participants about the utilisation of the reserve force members in terms of cost saving and ethical behaviour:

“Reserve force members are called up to assist in the border. The reserve force member’s save cost to the Department because they are paid only for a call-up. The advantage of utilising reserves is that they are only coming in during the tour of duty and go away while the permanent force members might go to the same areas continuously and might build up a relationship with the locals which might not be good because the chances of being corrupt are good.” (Participant B)

While participant A view Reserved Force Members through a different lens, Participant H mentioned that if people are involved there will always be the risk of unethical behaviour like corruption.

“It is easy for some of the reserve force members to take bribes as source of addition income. In most cases you might find that these members are not committed to their work and their morale is low because they are employed on a temporary basis.” (Participant A)

Although Participant D and F agreed that there is not enough personnel on the ground to perform border safeguarding duties, they believe that an increase in personnel alone is not the solution.

“There are other members at the strategic level who think that to address the issues of land borders in South Africa, boots on the ground is the solution and this thinking is misleading and unfortunately this concept has taken hold of in some strategic minds in the Defence force and beyond to say the SANDF need more troops to deploy in the border and then the problem will stop and solve the porous border issue. Looking at the geography of South Africa and difficulties of the terrain, boots on the ground will never make it even if you deploy the entire Defence force there will always be a gap.” (Participant F)

Participant D stated that whether “you have 15 companies or 22 companies or 170 companies or 520 companies”, it will not solve the problem. An integrated intelligence enabled approach will be much better. The SANDF should not concentrate on 22 companies as a magical number to resolve a complex border situation. The SANDF must concentrate on obtaining empirical information, then they can utilise their troops much more effectively.

4.1.1.4 Budget

The SANDF is struggling to fulfil its mandate, due to budget cuts. While other defence forces across the globe are gradually increasing budgets to address security threats, the SANDF budget is declining (Lineberger & Hussain 2018). Failure to keep up with the current technological changes, and research and development, the SANDF will become redundant as a national security deterrent instrument.

Six of the participants stated that the SANDF finds itself in limbo because technology is expensive and putting 22 companies on the border will not be more affordable. The budget of the South African Department of Defence budget was reduced from R50.6 billion to R47.9 billion in 2018, a shortfall of R2.6 billion for the 2018 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (DefenceWeb 2018). This hampered the SANDF in fulfilling its mandate.

“If we are going through with the plan of deploying 22 companies we cannot, at the moment we can only deploy 15 companies and the minister has said that in her speech, obviously when we are looking under that we are under resource because this mission is cost driven.” (Participant D)

Budget cuts are affecting SANDF operations. The Defence Industry Strategy draft showed a deterioration in the budget from 1989 until 2017, mainly through cuts in technology, Defence Force acquisition and Research and Development funding (NDIC 2017).

Most of the participants highlighted that, due to budget constraints, the SA Air Force can avail only limited aircraft to support the ground forces because their maintenance contract for servicing aircraft is insufficient. Participants said that the SANDF does not have ground to air / air to ground / air to air resources readily available to move and intercept illegal border activities. They reported that illegal aircraft can land anywhere in unmanned airstrips, they may land on a farmer's piece of land, or on roads, off-load contraband and get airborne to return unscathed to where they came from.

Weak economic growth has a negative impact on the security of the country and could lead to a deterioration of national security (DefenceWeb 2018). It is envisaged that due to the downturn of the South African economy, the future of border safeguarding may be bleak, because resources are provided via various state departments. For example, the infrastructure of the land border is the responsibility of the Department of Public Works.

The Defence force is not the custodian of border fences and roads. National intelligence and secret services are responsible for updating other departments with the information related to security issues, and the Department of Home affairs is responsible for POE. Participant C and Participant B mentioned that there is only one scanner at Durban harbour to scan the containers coming out of docked vessels, and there is no such scanner in other POE to scan trucks. There are detection or sniffer dogs to deploy, but these dogs can only do so much. Funding is the main source for a comprehensive, coordinated onslaught on criminal activities.

“I think the Defence budget is severely lacking. The budget to introduce technology are not going to be cheap. I think it is a good thing to invest in technology. If the Air force is already flying highly technological jets, then it is better for them to operate new UAVs. Now suddenly saying police now start operating UAV. I think in a developing country like South Africa the military can play a bigger role in border safeguarding. In my opinion, a country like South Africa can develop a coast guard and a border guard, but that is just going to split the funds because they are going to take it away from the existing budget of other entities, such as the SANDF. I think operation Corona is working, and we can make it much more efficient.” (Participant D)

4.1.2 The length and conditions of the border

Sixty percent (60%) of participants reported that the land border is very long, and that each part of the land border is different to another. Therefore, trying to stop people passing through illegally will remain very difficult. Participants also said South Africa will never have the capabilities to cover all borders 100% effectively. The cost involved in completely stopping illegal border crossings will be huge. The Defence Review, the document representing the SANDF policy, confirmed that the

total length of South African borders is vast, and emphasised that securing the border is complicated by the diversity of physical environments encountered along the borders (South Africa 2015a). In this subsection the length and physical border conditions as causative factors of porous borders will be presented

4.1.2.1 Length of the land borders

Most of the participants argued that even 22 companies will not be sufficient to cover the entire border, considering the distance these companies have to cover. Based on helicopter reach, even if the SAAF were to allocate between 5 to 10 helicopters, it would still not be easy to respond effectively to the security challenge posed by illegal migration.

“The other challenge is that the SANDF is stuck within 10 km area inwards from the border. The military is permitted to operate within that 10 km, except in the area like the Kruger Park where the SANDF is permitted to operate throughout the park. Once the belligerents (e.g. illegal immigrants etc) come through, if he skip that 10 km line he is free to go where ever he want to go because the military is not mandated to pursue anybody who crossed that 10 km line. From the military point of view this become very difficult for the military to execute the operation.”
(Participant F)

Participant F explained the concept of the battlefield. By applying the design concept of campaign planning, i.e. considering close, rear and deep operations in the theatre of operation, the allocated space is restrictive. Furthermore, the participant said that deep operation cannot operate in another country. So, by turning the concept around, close operation lies within 10 km from the border, the rear operations lies external to the border in whichever country, and deep operation lies, for argument’s sake, internally in whichever province, e.g. Limpopo Province. So, operations must be conducted in rear, close and deep areas. In the rear area, own forces cannot be deployed; trust relationship with the neighbouring country is established to secure early warning. In the close area, own forces are deployed as a barrier on the specific area and observation post, supported by technology, to secure early warning to be able to despatch aircraft (helicopter) for quick response. The military cannot operate in the deep area, unless they operate in support of another department, and mainly operate in collaboration with the SAPS.

“So, you cannot talk land border without thinking of air and maritime borders because is easy for somebody to just fly in and cross the land border and land in the little airstrip that is within 10 km within the border, offloads his goods, gets airborne from there and flies back again at low level and no one can see him but now the goods are in our country. Similarly, somebody can come up with

the ship, then get off the ship and swim to the land and again it will become a land issue.”
(Participant G)

4.1.2.2 Physical border conditions

South African land borders range from desert conditions through mountainous areas to dense, almost jungle type terrain. Participant B stated that the temperature on the borders varies from 26 degrees to more than 40 degrees Celsius. When the temperature reaches 40 degrees, it becomes difficult for troops to operate effectively. The same applies in the Maluti mountains where the temperatures may be equally extreme by being too low to allow effective troop deployment.

“We are struggling to drive on those roads. So, all these contribute for not fulfilling our mandate for border protection or border safeguarding.” (Participant C)

Furthermore, the border consists of parks and rivers. According to Participant C, E and G the water levels of the Limpopo River, Gariep River and Caledon River can differ substantially between seasons. During the rainy season, people cannot cross the river because of crocodiles and the fast-flowing river, especially Limpopo River. However, during dry seasons people walk across the river quite comfortably due to low water levels in the river. Participant C mentioned that one can even drive through the river with a motor vehicle, especially during winter. In some areas there is no fence, and other areas the borders are not controlled.

Participant B felt that parks were supposed to be a deterrence against illegal crossing; should act as a double layer of security, but it seems not to be the case in fact. According to McDonald (2000), Mozambicans risk their lives by illegally crossing game parks fraught with dangerous animals. Participants felt that it is often difficult to discern whether the people moving around the parks are criminals, or in fact tourists or rangers.

“The parks are the easier way of the people to cross the border illegally. SAN Parks do act as deterrence due to wild animals at Kruger National Park, but illegal foreigners come from Mozambique and from South Africa to poach rhinos and we do not have a mandate to act against rhino poaching. Our mandate is border safeguarding. At Kruger National Park people are afraid of lions and leopards. Illegal immigrants normally do not come to South Africa through the park, only poachers do.” (Participant D)

4.1.3 Uncoordinated intelligence

Ninety percent (90%) of the participants believed that border safeguarding is supposed to be intelligence driven rather than focusing on human resources only. During the interviews it was found that the intelligence system in South Africa is disjointed and does not talk to the police system, the police in turn is not talking to SSA... so, this poses a serious problem. Lack of intelligence was reported as the biggest challenge because there reportedly was no means of getting security clusters together. Already in 2005 a study conducted by Hannah *et al.* (2005) validated the fact that over the past years the South African intelligence community was politicised by appointing ANC loyalists in strategic intelligence positions for political gain, that there were failure in the integration of previous rival intelligence personnel. As a result of the lack of trust, parallel intelligence structures were developed. Despite the efforts of crafting an admirable system in terms of legal framework, the implementation intelligence system has been poor.

Focusing their attention and efforts on the areas where illegal movement is in fact taking place will make the SANDF more efficient. Participants said it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of the SANDF in terms of preventing illegal border crossing because the area that they need to cover is too large for a few soldiers on the ground. Although the SANDF has a success rate of catching criminals and illegal immigrants, the fact remains that the number of contraband and illegal immigrants that manage to get through South African porous land border undetected is unknown because of inadequate intelligence. There are no records of those entering the country illegally.

During the interviews, it was evident that it was unknown to those interviewed at least, exactly what is happening on South African borders. Deploying fitting, state of the art technology and doing an appreciation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and collaborating closely with National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Secret Services were highly recommended by interviewers. Human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) appear to be lacking. Once again, the participants agreed that the SANDF must focus on getting information and data so troops on the ground may be utilised more effectively. Doing so, it will be easy to gauge the success rate of collecting information about illegal border crossing.

Participants reported that what is happening at the borders is not really a military problem, and that the military is treating the symptoms instead of the causes. Illicit money flow, drug trafficking and other activities are criminal activities which are the responsibility of the police and Interpol and police / Interpol Intelligence. Only lower-level people get arrested while the kingpins or main drug lords who orchestrated all these criminal activities get away. The SANDF is designed to protect the borders against armed threats or trans-border military, and border control deals with the movement

of people or goods across borders, which is the responsibility of other departments (Ndhlovu 2018). From the research results lack of in-dept intelligence emerged. This sub-section begins with a discussion of the lack of coordination of human intelligence (HUMINT), followed by an exposé of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT).

4.1.3.1 Lack of human intelligence coordination

Although signals and imagery technology are dominant in intelligence services, HUMINT has been central in fighting terrorism. HUMINT played an important role in providing information that resulted in either the killing or capture of high profile individuals regarded by many governments as global threats to security, such as Saddam Hussein in 2003 and Osama bin Laden in 2011, through cooperation between military and civilian intelligence services (Rodriguez-Hernandez 2013). In this regard, participants expressed themselves as follows:

“The biggest challenge is that the intelligence community in South Africa is not talking to each other, DI refuses to share their intelligence with SSA, and the SSA refuses to share the intelligence with DI. These two have to sit together and talk to each other. To address the situation, a National Risk Management and Targeting Centre (NRMTC) has been created where SSA, NICOC and DI all will be part of the committee. Previously there was no committee of this kind, now and in that structure, there is now room for the whole intelligence community to start talking together.” (Participant G)

According to Participant G, the National Border Management Coordination Centre (NBMCC) Committee was to coordinate intelligence in order for security-focused decisions to be made based on intelligence.

“If you look at the concept of operations, to my opinion what we must address at the operational and tactical level is two things. Firstly, we must look at the centre of gravity of the enemy in military terms and in this case the enemy are criminals and secondly our own centre of gravity. Surely the enemy centre of gravity is the access routes to their final destination. So, if you can take these access routes you can stop them before they can end up in Johannesburg with the contraband. So how is it possible that these criminals can cross the border with the truck illegally with millions of Rands of goods and start illegal businesses? The centre of gravity for the enemy is the communication routes. So, if we know the routes the enemy are taking and we know when they are taking it, we can stop them and that is why the operations in deep is so important. You can only do that when you work with the SAPS.” (Participant F)

Participants added that the other source of intelligence the country has at their disposal is the population. Sectors of populations of countries almost know about illicit trade routes, and when criminals or their illicit goods will be crossing national borders. However, the population is often deeply fearful of these criminals. Thus, even when they have information about illicit migrant activities, they will seldom pass it on to the military or any other anti-threat institution. The intelligence system must be developed to include covert operations externally, and the use of Special Forces so that criminals may be prevented or arrested before entering South Africa.

4.1.3.2 Signals intelligence and imagery intelligence

Participant C, D and G mentioned that not enough work had been done to date to determine a surveillance concept and plan. The SANDF is looking at the Defence Force Sensors Strategy, but that is still a work in progress. The participants further admitted that there is not enough surveillance at tactical, operational and strategic level. Participants added that it is imperative to determine where the main routes of smuggling and movement of people and staff are, and where to employ tactical surveillance. With good tactical surveillance it will be easy to restrict illegal border movement and react swifter and more decisively for better border safeguarding.

Although the neighbouring countries will not allow the use of electronic surveillance in their area, civilian airport radar with coverage reaching beyond national borders can be used as a substitute to detect illegal aircraft used to transport contraband or drugs. South Africa is already working on the Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JI²M) concept where coordination of the security cluster is taking place at NATJOINTS and PROVJOINTS within the country. On the other side forums such as the Operation Liaison Committee (OLC) and the Operational Border Liaison Forum (OBLF) are also taking place between the SANDF and neighbouring countries military commanders. By applying this concept, radios can be used by the SANDF and other security institutions in neighbouring countries as part of a multinational force to inform one other on the movement of illegal immigrants and smugglers. Meetings between the SANDF and institutions in neighbouring countries is already taking place. This opportunity needs to be exploited.

“Cell phone signals can also be used to pick up trends and start analysing trends of illegal border crossing. This can be achieved by conducting operations in the rear areas, the close areas and in the deep areas. The intelligence community can partner with mobile telephone service providers such as Vodacom and MTN for pre-emptive intelligence to counter the criminals move. Another good example is to work with Tracker South Africa. A well-focused and actionable intelligence is what is required to know when and where criminals are going to cross. Currently

these syndicates are caught by chance. It should be understood that here the military is dealing with criminals and not conventional warfare, and if the SANDF need to succeed in border safeguarding, it must adopt a new approach.” (Participant E)

All participants reported that radar coverage is a problem. The number of illegal aircraft crossing the borders is unknown, since it is possible for some illegal aircraft to fly at very low altitude and without a flight plan. Air resources are not always readily available and on a regular basis to move and intercept illicit trade by air. In terms of imagery intelligence, the SAAF normally assists, and shares security-based information with SSA, but a lot more needs to be done.

Participants expressed the opinion that it is too early to change to unmanned technology. They highlighted the fact that an appreciation of the situation and a staff capacity test must be done first to ensure affordable and feasible solutions. The feasibility study should look at aerial reconnaissance via either unmanned or manned aircraft. An appreciation will help in determining the options of either going for static sensors, or an aerial option, or both.

4.1.4 Corrupt government officials

All the participants indicated that corruption is rife among government officials. The study conducted by Musuva (2015) attested that corruption, lack of consequence management and ailing institutions such as DHA are hindering the efforts of government to address issues of immigration. In the past 20 years, R700 billion were lost in SA owing to corruption. And there is an indication that corruption is getting worse because of weak leadership in state institutions, lack of commitment to support, a general lack of respect for the law, undermining of law enforcement institutions, the criminal justice system and prosecution authority (Mathekga 2017).

Corruption exacerbates the influx of contraband and illegal immigrants into the country. Participants felt that consequence management seems not to exist in state institutions dealing with border management and control, and that there is a lack of accountability or prosecution of those officials committing corrupt actions. It should be noted that the SANDF is not mandated to do law enforcement; law enforcement is a police function. Only at sea the South African Navy is mandated to do law enforcement, according to the Defence Act.

This subsection will discuss unethical behaviours that were identified as drivers of the influx of contraband and illegal immigrants to South Africa. These unethical behaviours are corruption, and the lack of consequence management.

4.1.4.1 Corruption

Seventy percent (70%) of participants stated that corruption among officials is one of the biggest threats to the integrity and effectivity of the SA Department of Home Affairs, the SAPD and customs, the very same people who must manage, control and protect RSA borders. Instead of doing their job with zeal and integrity, many of these officials take bribes, which compromises the security and safety of South African citizens. SA Department of Home Affairs has plans to address these issues, but whether these plans are feasible is unknown.

When asked about the behaviour of soldiers on the borders, Participant D stated that the SANDF is a microcosm of the greater society of South Africa. If in other departments bribery and corruption prevail, it only makes sense that it will also happen in the SANDF. Bribery and corruption are symptoms of inequality and poverty in the country.

Consequence management is addressed in the Border Management strategy document. The DHA was accused of being an ailing institution riddled with inefficiency and corruption, thus endangering the state's efforts to address the issues around immigration (Musuva 2015). Participants agreed with this by reporting:

“Through the corruption from Home Affairs, some of the illegal immigrants end up getting the job legally through illegal ways in South Africa or selling illegal contraband as a source of income.”
(Participant C)

According to Participant A, C and F there were incidents where criminals attempted to bribe military members. However, those criminals were apprehended by the police. On a regular basis, criminals and illegal immigrants try to bribe military personnel. One illegal immigrant was apprehended while trying to cross the border, and alleged that previously he bribed a South African soldier with as little as R300.

Participant A suspected that there are some reserve force members who are taking bribes as a source of additional income because these reserve force members work for only six months before getting sent back home to wait for the next call-up and associated income. After six months some might not be called-up again, which is morale breaker. It was found that the SANDF has a plan to ensure that its soldiers are not collaborating with criminals. It uses its military intelligence personnel and deploy them clandestinely to monitor activities of troops. There is also a military police contingent to monitor the troops and to make sure they do not commit criminal acts.

Participant C said that at one stage there was a joint operation between SAPS and the Mozambican police at Salamanga bridge. This bridge is on the only access route to Maputo. However, corrupt officials who were taking bribes from stolen vehicles on the other side of the border created conflict

between the South African and Mozambican police. Eventually, the Mozambican government asked the RSA government to withdraw the SAPS because its members were impeding Mozambican operations. The withdrawal of the SAPS was confirmed by the police commissioner of KwaZulu-Natal, who refused to provide further details because of the "sensitivity of the matter" (Mthembu 2005: Online).

4.1.4.2 Lack of consequence management

Some South African institutions are failing its citizens. Some owners in the private security industry employ unregistered, illegal foreigners without any consequences (PSiRA 2017; Hlatshaneni 2019). An increasing number of undocumented foreigners are accessing health care without any actions taken against them, while contraband and unhealthy products are sold to the poor and no one is prosecuted (Ka Platjie 2019).

Participants indicated that SA state institutions are not taking ownership of their responsibilities to hold those who are breaking the laws accountable. Illegal immigrants are establishing spaza shops in the yards of South Africans citizens without business permits and the authorities are failing to bring illicit traders and domestic citizens who harbour them. The unfair stereotypes towards foreign nationals in South Africa and the response of local citizens to foreigners has been shameful, as was evident through violent attacks on foreigners. Such attacks have a long and brutal history in post-apartheid South Africa, dating back to at least May 2008.

“In Ladybrand most of the Spaza shops on the borders are owned by the Pakistanis and Chinese, and some of them are not legal in the country.” (Participant C)

According to Participant A, C and G some businessmen and farmers in South Africa rather hire illegal immigrants than local citizens. They do so because they do not have to pay them the state enforced minimum wage, and because these migrant people are desperate for jobs, thus they cannot complain to the authorities and expose their illegal presence in the country. Corruption is rife among both South African and foreign businessmen. Corruption reigns all over in formal and informal businesses, and no decisive actions are taken against corrupt individuals.

All participants concurred that some illegal immigrants trade with contraband, drugs, or are involved in prostitution, while others are involved in armed robbery. Armed robbers operate all over in South Africa, yet law enforcement agents are not arresting many of these criminals. Some parts had even become no go zones to South African citizens because these areas are controlled by drug lords.

“One can buy cell phone SIM cards of all the service providers which are already rigged, from foreign nationals’ shops.” (Participant A)

The Participant asked in whose name these SIM cards are RICAed? When one buys these sim cards, illicit dealers do not ask for proof of address, name and identification number. This is a serious breach of security in the country.

“The telecommunication companies (Vodacom, MTN, Telkom, Cell C) and the police are allowing these without any consequences. Police intelligence are supposed to have detected this a long time ago.” (Participant C)

According to Begum & Ali (2013), anonymous SIM cards are posing a severe security threat to the society and the nation, as they can be easily misused by criminals and insurgents to commit crime.

“We’ve got the best policies and laws in the country, but the problem is we cannot enforce them. The government officials are the main cause because they are not enforcing our laws. This is applicable to all the government departments. Everyone must do his or her job in this country because all the officials are paid to do their job, and everyone must honour their responsibilities. There is the lack of commitment amongst government officials, and nothing is done to these officials.” Participant C

According to participants, the South African authorities are confused about their own laws and policies. What is written and what is done are not the same, which confuses the entire justice system, thus causing a gap in the justice system.

“It is easy to come to South Africa and sometimes illegally put up shops, establish illegal business so on and on. It seems there is no consequence for crime in RSA.” (Participant D)

4.1.5 Colonial border legacy

Eighty percent (80%) of participants agreed that the history of border establishment is one of the causes of porous borders. Participants mentioned that some youths who live in neighbouring countries attend school in South Africa by crossing the border on a daily basis. This is especially true for the borders with Botswana, Lesotho, and Eswatini, where people believe that there is an informal agreement between South Africa and its neighbouring countries for those children who are staying on the other side of the border to attend school in South Africa, but there is no such formal, written agreement. Africa is unique, that is something one needs to accept.

Some people living near the borders regularly visit relatives and friends in South Africa, making migration management and control a complex problem. Research by Crush *et al.* (2005) support the

views of participants in this study by reiterating that in Southern Africa informal cross-border movement of people has a long history and that there are various reasons for this. According to their research, these reasons include colonial boundaries cutting through communities, leaving members of the same family and societies geographically displaced, in extreme cases, in different countries.

Participants reported that when the colonial powers developed the borders, they never took into account that people of the same families sometimes were living on both sides of the border. There are people who would attend the regular markets on a Saturday, crossing the borders freely. In Lesotho people daily cross the border illegally to buy items in South African shops. In some places there is no fence, and no control, so the problem is how to manage that, and whether it should in fact even be controlled? The fact is that it is so easy to cross the border in most places because the fences are so dilapidated; in some areas totally destroyed.

Participant G recounted a border dispute between South Africa and Namibia. Namibians want the middle of the Gariiep River to be the border, while the actual border is the high-water mark on the Namibian side. This has potential consequences in terms of water rights, water usage and water security.

4.1.6 Liberalist migration policies and laws (pull factor)

All the participants agreed that South African migration policies are too liberal and reflect the liberal RSA constitution (South Africa 1996b). Such policies will not stop people from coming to South Africa, when obviously, they want to live in a better society. On the other side, the SA government will hardly change its policies to become more draconian, the kind of policies reminiscent of the history of human rights abuse under Apartheid rule. It would also go against the international protocols South Africa is signatory to.

This next section presents the lack of deterrence of existing migration policies and laws, liberal migration policy, and policies which restrict military response. The absence of a border safeguarding policy concludes the section.

4.1.6.1 Lack of deterrence of migration policies and laws

The participants stated that South African immigration policies are not a sufficient deterrent; they have been relaxed in such a way that illegal immigrants are aware of their relaxed state and readily exploit their weaknesses. Furthermore, illegal immigrants know their rights, and once they are caught, they know that they will get free transport to an immigration centre and free food while they

await corrective measures. Then they will get Human Rights lawyers who will help them to apply for a permit to enter South Africa legally. They know RSA soldiers will never mistreat them or shoot at them because the SANDF is bound by the Law of Armed Conflict and other international protocols they have to respect. Owing to the lack of penalties, or punishment, and the leniency of our immigration policies, it will be difficult to stop the influx of illegal immigrants into the country. However, there are consequences for more serious crimes such as car theft and drug trafficking.

“Undocumented immigrants can easily commit crime in South Africa. These criminals know the conditions of prisons in South Africa are far better than in their countries of origins which are harsh. Foreigners who committed crime in the country will serve their sentence here in our country because there is no agreement that I am aware of that allows the transferring of criminals back to their countries to serve their sentences there.” (Participant A)

Furthermore, the participants reported that if you apprehend 10 illegal immigrants today and you hand them to the SAPS, they go through the Home Affairs system, gets deported and a few days later the same people are apprehended again. If they are caught and repatriated, they will try again and again until they manage to cross the border successfully. The whole system of apprehending these people and getting them to a department of internal affairs or Home Affairs and repatriating them appears ineffective.

“There are no consequences for illegal immigrants in South Africa.” (Participant F)

“This morning I was concerned when I looked at the news. Stones were thrown at the SAPS by foreign nationals and police had to run. This is totally unacceptable and a disgrace. In other countries such things will never happen. The question is if police lives are in danger, what must they do? As long as they can justify their action why can't they act?” (Participant E)

“Throwing a policeman or soldier with stones during protests or riots in most countries in Africa is not happening and foreigners will never do this in their country of origin because they know that they can be killed.” (Participant B)

South Africa and other countries should consider entering in an agreement where illegal immigrants should be deported to their home countries without costs incurred by the departing country. That should act as a deterrent to illegal immigration. If that happens, illegal immigrants will know that if they cross the borders illegally there will be consequences from their home country once they are returned. This will contribute towards curbing illegal immigration.

4.1.6.2 Liberal policy

South African laws and policies have been identified as among the most liberal in the world regarding immigration laws. The country's policy on public health prohibits discrimination against children under the age of six years and pregnant women inside its borders, irrespective of their migration status. They thus enjoy access to free healthcare (Chekero & Ross 2018).

The migrants moving to South Africa are rising in number. These migrants and illegal immigrants are mainly from Asian and other African countries (Spaan 2015; Parshotam 2018). It includes asylum seekers and refugees. Most of the migrants and illegal immigrants are fleeing armed conflict, economic hardship, and political instability in their home countries. They often find themselves stranded in South Africa. However, others are not here because of legitimate or humanitarian reasons, but due to criminal agendas (South Africa 2015a).

“Looking from our constitution we become quite liberal and with that looking in our foreign policy, our foreign policy state that we will support and participate with our neighbours. I think there is a lot of policies that indicate that we should allow legal movement of people and on the basis of that we do not erect big walls as an obstacle, it is not an idea. The idea is not to stop everybody coming in but rather to funnel them through the legal process. We are bound by international, continental and regional laws we subscribe to and our foreign policy, and for the fact that our internal policies that are quite liberal is one reason of the cause's porous land.” (Participant D)

The issue of providing illegal immigrants free basic health services is a pressing Department of Home Affairs and Department of Health issue. Participants highlighted that foreigners can go to the hospital free of charge, while South Africans often find it difficult to access health care facilities because they do not have money to go to hospital. South Africans are sitting in long queues, and there are no beds available. Participants expressed concern about the number of foreigners occupying these services while South Africans are denied access because of their occupying facilities meant for South Africans.

“I am not a xenophobic person, but this is the reality. Foreigners are treated the same and better than South Africans. There will be time when we will not sustain this any longer and South Africans will riot against its own government.” (Participant G)

4.1.6.3 Policies are restrictive to the military

The SANDF is structured and designed for fulfilling its primary functions as stipulated in the Constitution (1996). Its equipment is also designed to support its constitutional mandate in

particular. This implies that the SANDF does not have dedicated capabilities and equipment aimed at border safeguarding (Ndhlovu 2018). Furthermore, since 1994 the SANDF was weakened by political decisions. The SANDF moved away from being an aggressive military force and was transformed into a more peaceful, defensive and democratically inclined entity (Hough n.d).

Almost all participants mentioned that there are three main issues that hinder the SANDF to execute their border protection mandate optimally. Firstly, soldiers are trained for warfare and not trained for crime prevention and border duty. The infantry deployed on the borders is not configured for border safeguarding. The military police are much better equipped to deal with crime than an infantry soldier. The other shortcoming is that the military deploys on the borders without military legal officers. If illegal immigrants can be arrested and a proper case can be made against those who engage in criminal activities, and they are then charged, fined, or jailed, there would be some kind of deterrence system in place.

Secondly, the participants stated that the SANDF is stuck within the area of 10 km from the border inwards, and this is a national strategic problem. The integrated border management strategy is hampering military personnel to operate within the area of 10 km from the border inwards, so changing this will definitely enable the military to perform their duties more efficiently. According to the participants, the regulation of only operating in an area within 10 km from the border is written into the integrated border management strategy and is not part of the Defence Act yet. However, there is also nothing written in the Defence Act that backs the military in case illegal immigrants cross the area of 10 km.

Thirdly, the participants felt that the stipulations of the Constitution and Defence Act are restricting the military in fulfilling its mandate. Every single time the military is deployed in the country, or its mandate needs to be extended, the only person who can authorise this is the president. The turnaround time to deploy the SANDF in the country is taking too long and the military becomes reactive instead of being proactive. Sometimes the permission is granted too late to respond to incidents, and no action could be taken in time to prevent or deal with a particular incident.

Although participants are unanimous in their assessment of the impact of these factors on the border duty mandate of the SANDF, it is recognised that these are complex issues that can neither be resolved quickly, nor resolved by instituting simple remedies.

4.1.6.4 The absence of a border safeguarding policy

Martin (2011) cited Dr Johan Burger when stating that South Africa lacks a clear strategy for border management, and a single border control policy document providing clear guidelines to all

government departments and need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of those tasked to safeguard SA against cross-border threats.

The SANDF is conducting border safeguarding in the absence of relevant national policy and legislation on border safeguarding. The SANDF was deployed on the borders based on presidential intent as pronounced in a presidential speech in 2013. The presidential intent and the concept were then approved in 2015 by parliament, and since then there was a struggle to get the Act approved by Parliament. Once the Act is approved, policy may be crafted.

During the research interviews, Participant G argued that in the military *“we first write our strategy and from the strategy we write the policy and from our policy we then develop our plans and doctrine. In civilian companies they will first put up the policy and from that policy they will write a strategy, and that why they will always say strategy flow from policy. The same way out of the vision we write a strategy on how we want to achieve our vision and that strategy must be aligned with legislation. That is why the Defence force developed their safeguarding sub-strategy based purely on the presidential intent”*

In 2015 a border bill was drafted and submitted to parliament in 2016. Participants stated that there is much disagreement about why this bill is taking such a long time to be passed by parliament. Currently the Border Management Agency (BMA) bill does not address the roles and functions of the military in border safeguarding, but rather focuses only on POE. It is alleged that the bill took a lot of responsibilities away from customs, SARS, and the SAPD. The bill places all departments under the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), which then created political contestation. There are unresolved political matters, and the bill remains non-final, so South African borders are becoming even more porous.

“The current South African border management policy is disjointed and compartmentalised which prevent it from being effectively implemented.” (Participant H)

The constitution and the Defence Act also state that the SANDF services such as the SA Navy, SA Army and SA Air Force can only be under a command structure of the SANDF and cannot fall under the command of any other department.

“If you look at the BMA bill, it breaks border safeguarding into two parts, a policing function and a defence and protection function. It says that the defence and protection function will always be the responsibility of the SANDF, and that the policing functions will fall under the BMA and if the Defence Force gets involved in policing functions, then it will be under the BMA. I do not know how practical that will be. So, although we are not directly affected by the BMA bill, if we will be involved in policing on the border, it will affect us.” (Participant D)

The participants cautioned about the concept of greater unrestricted movement adopted by ECOWAS, which sounds plausible and may possibly alleviate the challenge of porous borders. Participants generally support the concept of reasonably unrestricted movement, but only on condition that the movement of undocumented people is traceable, and that their whereabouts should be known to authorities. Technology and proper infrastructure were viewed as a solution to this problem, two factors often lacking on the continent. Participants said that this concept is working in EU because their member states have the necessary systems in place.

4.1.7 Lack of an integrated, overarching national security strategy

The majority of participants indicated that the main aspect of insufficient border security is that there is no integrated, overarching national strategy that addresses all issues of border safeguarding. As long as there are many departments involved in border management, their strategies should be aligned to an integrated national border strategy. The SANDF does have a border safeguarding strategy which is a sub-strategy to the national military strategy. According to participants, the DOD uses the Operation Corona plan, a cabinet memorandum that was drawn up in 2010, and other documents that cover Air and Maritime borders as a guiding document for border safeguarding. The other guiding document is the Defence Act, which gives the Chief of the SANDF the mandate to do protection on the border. It is unknown whether other departments have similar strategies to support the presidential intent. The views of the participants are backed by a study conducted by Martin (2011) that found that South Africa lacks both a clear strategy and policy document to guide state departments on border control and border management issues.

During the interviews it was found that the problems associated with porous land borders was mainly criminal in nature, problems which by implication fall more in the SAPS domain than the military domain. Therefore, national police leadership should present its strategy that supports the integrated national border strategy.

None of the participants interviewed were familiar with the contents of the National Security Strategy because this document is not open to public. This document is supposed to be the first step in the direction of engaging with the broader issue of effectively controlling SA borders. The participants agreed that a single department cannot take the responsibility for comprehensive border security, neither the SAPS, the SANDF, DIRCO or any other department.

Participants said that there are many documents, policies, strategies, plans, yet they are in different departments which are poorly coordinated. Participants stated that the two organisations, NATJOINTS and the BMA in fact oppose each other, despite the fact that the same people are

involved in most of their respective meetings. Furthermore, participants alleged that they do not think it is feasible to put all border control functions under one umbrella, as stipulated in the BMA, because one department cannot be in charge of every aspect of border security.

“But if you go and look at the Border Management Bill, Home Affairs says it will take over everything. I think it will be very difficult for such a authority to run everything. It will be much better if the BMA will be a coordinating Act, to coordinate the efforts of all Departments. The departments should come together and formulate a common strategy. I think the Defence force has learned lots of lessons, since the military have been in and out of the border for many years. I think a much better approach would be an integrated approach where different organisations work together to better secure the border.” (Participant D)

The coordination of different departments at the POE had been a challenge, a fact which was tabled at the previous Parliamentary Monitoring Group meetings (PMG 2018).

During this scientific investigation it became evident that currently state departments follow a silo approach towards border security, which is bound to fail. The Joint Interagency and Interdepartmental and Multinational (JI²M) approach is the only way of successfully dealing with porous land borders. The private sector should also be included. To date, a suggested non-primary role player, the SANDF is one of the state departments that is really doing more than can reasonably be expected in terms of border security.

“I do not think that the national security strategies and policies guiding the SANDF’s border safeguarding is based on a comprehensive updated threat analysis that includes all the threats from all the domains.” (Participant H)

However, Participant G mentioned that there are many organisations involved in the Integrated Border Management Strategy (IBMS), and that they in fact highlight all relevant threats.

Participant F and G proposed that the current problem of border safeguarding must be addressed at all three levels, the national strategic level, the military strategic level and at operational/tactical level. At military strategic level all services of the SANDF are utilised to address border security. At operational and tactical level, execution takes place. The national policy, national laws, et cetera. must enable all the government entities to do their work effectively.

Participant F acknowledged that there is no quick solution to address all the challenges of South African porous border. At least the government is trying to respond to the threat by starting with the BMA bill. The military strategy comprises a border safeguarding sub-strategy. The participant further stated that Rome was not build in one day, and that the Department of Public Works can start to prioritise the fixing of border infrastructure.

4.1.8 Informal employment sector (pull factor)

Ninety per cent (90%) of the participants reiterated that the South African informal employment sector is also contributing to porous borders. Many South Africans would rather hire illegal foreigners to work in their gardens than hiring a South African because they know that illegal foreigners will do better work, while some South Africans tend to stay away and boycott. In some cases, farmers are employing illegal immigrants as well, ostensibly for the same reasons.

“Foreign syndicates are also creating networks with some of the South Africans who are scanning the environment on the constant basis to identify the gaps and pave ways for illegal movement of contraband. Other South Africans are involved in vehicle theft and selling them to the neighbouring countries.” (Participant C)

From the participants’ point of view there are South Africans who are benefitting from illegal activities, although they might talk about illegal border activities as a bad practice. Participant C said that there are people in the neighbouring countries who help illegal immigrants to enter South Africa, and who organise transport on the South African side. In South Africa there will be taxis on specific days on specific routes who pick up illegal immigrants in possession of contraband and bring them and their goods to Gauteng.

“I also heard the news yesterday that the parks board has arrested their own members who are involved in rhino poaching. Why because the member had hope to better their own living circumstances.” (Participants B)

4.1.9 Lack of cooperation and collaboration

Participants explained that the DoD has a bilateral agreement between the SANDF and the militaries of neighbouring countries. They hold meetings attended by officers at tactical and operational levels. There are formal defence committees with members from different countries.

“Coordination takes place on the various levels, for example within the security cluster, NATJOINTS and PROVJOINTS.” (Participant H). In this sub-section the cooperation between countries is discussed, followed by a discussion of interdepartmental cooperation.

4.1.9.1 Cooperation between countries

Participants mentioned that there are forums between South Africa and neighbouring countries at tactical level, operational level and strategically level. For example, in the Operation Liaison

Committee (OLC), at tactical level, the commander at Messina liaises on a weekly basis with the military commander from Zimbabwe to discuss issues of mutual interest, and to plan deployment to affected border sections. This happens mainly because neighbouring countries are also struggling with limited physical resources, and an insufficient number of troops on the ground to cover the entire border. Cooperation agreements exist between South Africa and Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Eswatini, respectively.

At the operational level, the Operational Border Liaison Forum (OBLF) is where the Director at Joint Operational Headquarters holds a quarterly meeting with tactical commanders of affected countries to discuss border issues. The Defence Committee meets at the strategic level, whereas the Chief Operations of the SANDF will engage with the Chief Operations of neighbouring countries.

Collaboration between these countries is very good as they are experiencing similar challenges in respect of limited resources as South Africa. However, Participants C and F mentioned that the sharing of information with Mozambique is infrequent and inadequate. There was even a disagreement between the South African and Mozambican police, following which the Mozambican government asked the SAPS to withdraw from the joint operation at Salamanga bridge, allegedly because SAPS are hampering their operations (Mthembu 2005).

“In Mozambique you have policemen in charge of the border, which make it a lot more difficult for a Defence organisation to work with the police.” (Participant A)

4.1.9.2 Interdepartmental cooperation

The SANDF and other South African departments of state also have meetings at the operational level, called Provjoints, the Provincial Joint and Intelligence Structure. The Chairperson is the Police Commissioner of the Province, and the Co-Chairperson is the Officer Commanding of the Provincial Tactical headquarters. During the interviews it was found that the relationship between the SANDF and other departments responsible for border management is sound. Meetings are held on a monthly basis. The main purpose of these meetings is to discuss and try to solve border problems at the tactical level.

The only challenge is that there is continual change to the people on SA's borders which makes it very difficult to have a proper picture of intelligence on the ground. Companies may be rotated, but there should be a stable, permanent intelligence organisation on the ground. Police operations happen at station level. The commanders are on the border for only six months and do not have time to build a relationship with other role players, or to familiarise herself/himself with the area of

operation. All participants felt that at national strategic level there seems to be much disagreement between departments; delay in finalising the BMA bill is evidence of these differences in opinion.

4.1.10 Other pull factors

Participants felt that it is the historic view/perception from illegal immigrants that South Africa has more money and better employment opportunities than in their own countries, a questionable claim in many respects. Fifty per cent of the participants argued that the social grants and free medical care for children are also becoming a serious pull factor. Another aspect is that South Africans integrate refugees into our society, while our neighbouring countries keep refugees in refugee camps. Participants believe that poor prosecution of criminals makes the country especially attractive to transnational crime syndicates, because sentences are lenient, prosecution rates are very low, and the country does not have the death penalty anymore. The geographical location also makes South Africa attractive as a transit country to reach other destinations.

“Human rights are guaranteed to every person in the country even for criminals. The health system and education are so relaxed that it even allows and accommodate illegal immigrants.” (Participant C)

The participants alleged that South Africa is attracting more immigrants because the country is prosperous, and because the constitution of the country is so liberal that it opens doors to everyone. In terms of service delivery, even with all the problems that South Africa has, it is still better than most other countries neighbouring South Africa. The general perception is that SA is a better country to live in.

The immigrants coming to South Africa is a mixture of professionals, and skilled and unskilled labourers, mostly in their middle age, coming to South Africa in the hope of getting jobs. In South Africa there are more commercial farms, more shops, and more mines and business industries than in the neighbouring countries.

Participant C and F contemplated that illegal immigrants who are coming to South Africa harbour the perception that South Africa is a place of gold, milk and honey and that there is a better life to be had in the country.

Participants stated that people are attracted by good infrastructure. South Africa is perceived as having good roads, highways, schools, railways, harbours, hospitals, airports, and beautiful, modern cities.

“The pulling factor is that South Africa is more cosmopolitan with eleven official languages. It is easy for illegal immigrants to hide in the population, while in other prosperous neighbouring countries with a strong and healthy economy such as Namibia and Botswana, it will be more difficult, because of the small population and weak infrastructure. If a foreigner enters their system, they will be easily identified by locals.” (Participant D)

4.1.11 Push factors

All eight participants agreed that illegal immigrants coming to South Africa are not only from Zimbabwe, but they are also from all over Africa and other parts of the world. Some come illegally to South Africa due to conflicts such as those in Somalia, CAR, South Sudan, and the DRC, while others are from the Great Lakes region. There are many push factors in the rest of Africa, due to wars and instability in parts of Africa.

During the interviews it was observed that other factors contributing to the problem of illegal immigrants is poverty. Illegal immigrants avoid going through POEs because it costs them money when they cross the border legally. Passports are expensive and beside that there are other costs involved, which some people cannot afford. Some cross the border illegally because they are afraid of being asked to produce documents aimed at protection of SA citizens, such as immunisation cards.

Participants believe that the reasons which compel illegal immigrants to cross borders illegally as opposed to following the legal processes to enter South Africa is a total disregard for law and order. Furthermore, many Africans do not believe in borders and believe in free movement across the continent as they please, as they would in a United States of Africa. They also know that they do not really have a legal reason to cross at a border post legitimately and will not be allowed to enter. Another factor is the cost of legal travel documents in their countries of origin. Criminality and human trafficking also play a role in the number of illegal crossings taking place as they purposefully avoid official ports of entry.

Furthermore, prevalent hardships in countries in Africa act as push factors. In Mozambique, the economy is so bad that people are even prepared to risk their lives by crossing the Kruger Park where, besides security measures, there are lions, snakes, leopards and other dangerous animals. For them, to live in an informal settlement in South Africa is regarded as better than remaining in dire situations back home.

In Malawi there are droughts, with associated harsh living conditions, and regular shortages of food (Ka Platjie 2019). Similarly, in Zimbabwe political instability, a struggling economy, and high

unemployment rate are significant factors which push Zimbabweans to South Africa in search of a better life (Ebrahim 2019).

4.2 THE THREATS PRESENTED BY POROUS LAND BORDERS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

Identifying the threats emanating from porous land borders is critical because that can provide insight in interventions needed to rectify the problem. These threats impact negatively on the South African economy, the South African society at large, the political system and the physical environment of the country. Threats to these sectors will be discussed in this subsection.

4.2.1 Economic threats

Six participants mentioned that South Africa is facing very high risks of contracting diseases from people, animals and plants brought into the country illegally. This has the potential of crippling the economy and destroying the agricultural export market. Moreover, the participants reported that there are contraband goods coming into the country with the potential of harming the manufacturing sector and creating unfair competition. Additionally, participants announced that money is also flowing out of the country through illegal means which consequently reduces the country's internal revenue.

“Most illegal migrants receive wages/income in South Africa, but the majority of that money is sent to their countries of origin and not spend here to grow our economy.” (Participant B)

All participants asserted that corruption in terms of employment of illegal migrants makes South Africa less attractive for foreign investment. In addition, participants felt that the employment of illegal migrants at lower wages contributes to the unemployment of local citizens, and SARS not benefiting from tax revenue collection.

“Unfortunately, most illegal migrants don't have any skills needed for employment and they become part of the high number of unemployed or unemployable people in our country. This leads to an increase in social ills and criminality. This in turn makes South Africa less attractive for investment and increase stress on our limited resources available to address critical issues in the country.”
Participant H

All eight participants voiced the concern that illegal businesses, employment of illegal immigrants, trading with contraband, and goods finding their way to foreign countries illegally are posing serious threats to the economy of the country.

“Over the period April to December 2018, undocumented illegal immigrants arrested were 9790, contraband goods worth R37 373 985.00 were confiscated, 44 weapons seized, 6 834 kg of dagga worth R12 294 240.00 found, and 1 927 livestock, and 140 stolen vehicles recovered. Over the period January to April 2019 4 724 undocumented, illegal immigrants were arrested, contraband goods worth R8 084 069.00 confiscated, 4 weapons, and 2970 kg of dagga worth R5 343 03.00 found, and 1 257 livestock, and 44 stolen vehicles recovered. This constitutes just the tip of the iceberg because all these were confiscated on the border only. The figures exclude undetected items and those coming through POE.” (Participant C)

The apprehension of illegal foreigners, the recovery of weapons, stolen live-stock and vehicles, the arrest of criminals and confiscation of contraband goods and dagga are recorded as operational successes in the defence annual report (South Africa 2018a).

Participants revealed that other factors contributing to economic treats are illegal goods finding their ways out of the country, contraband trading, employment of illegal immigrants, and illegal businesses. These factors are unpacked in Subsections 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.4.

4.2.1.1 Illegal businesses

All participants maintained that illegal foreigners are exploiting the country’s informal economy and added that illegal foreigners establish businesses illegally and undermine the South African tax base because they do not pay tax. Participants felt that any person establishing a business must register or obtain a permit and that the same should apply to refugees and asylum seekers who are integrated into local society. Participant B proposed that foreigners must have a certain amount of money to be able to open a formal business, and their business must be registered to benefit the South African economy.

During the interviews it was alleged that illegal owners of the business know that they are at risk of prosecution by government because they are not paying taxes, but irrespective of that, they are prepared to take the risk because the business is lucrative.

Participant E mentioned that most of the illegal immigrants hire the buildings from South Africans; they are aware that when their businesses get burned down through acts of arson, they only lose the stock, but the owner of the builder incurs more losses.

Seven participants agreed that opportunities for South African entrepreneurs and the general population are taken away by illegal immigrants, besides their engaging in illegal economic activities in addition. South Africa lacks a strategy to protect local formal and informal businesses and to skill and support its citizen in the establishment of small and medium enterprises.

“In some places foreign nationals are running illegal brothels where South African youth are used as prostitutes.” (Participant A)

Four of the participants reported that there is an increase in anti-foreigner sentiment, thus the frequent incidents of arson aimed at spaza shops.

4.2.1.2 Employment of illegal immigrants

All eight participants reported that some of the South Africans citizens, farmers, private and public sector employers, and security companies are employing illegal immigrants for cheap labour. This denies many SA citizens access to local jobs.

Participant B felt that the employment of illegal immigrants is causing tension between South Africans and foreign nationals, citing instances where foreigners were subject to brutal attacks, and accused of taking jobs from locals.

Three of the participants reported that illegal immigrants are threatening the South African labour market. However, these immigrants often find themselves vulnerable for gross exploitation because of their illegal status. South Africans might hire undocumented immigrants for a month, and a day before payment they call the police to arrest them, knowing they cannot seek help from the police. The participants further alleged that unemployment among SA citizens is skyrocketing unrealistically, because illegal immigrants are included in calculation of current unemployment statistics.

4.2.1.3 Contraband trading

All eight participants stated that illicit cigarettes, cheap clothing, and fake exclusive or top branded sport wear end up in the South African informal trade market through porous land borders.

“South African manufacturing sector and the country’s tobacco industry are already under severe strain because of the imports of contraband.” (Participant H)

The participants claimed that the selling of contraband have a ripple effect on the economy of the country, impacting negatively on formal business and small and medium enterprises who diligently

pay their taxes and employ local citizens. Participants pointed out that selling of contraband could result in closure of legal businesses and retrenching of citizens, which in turn may spark anti-foreigner protests and xenophobic violence.

Participant C added that contraband does not adhere to national quality assurance standards, such as health and safety standards, and the consequence therefor may result in illness or death.

“All these illegal cigarettes do not comply with the South African tobacco laws and has a bigger tar content. Cigarettes are not good at all but those are even worse to the lungs.” (Participant A)

Participant G also spoke about illegal medicine entering the country through land POEs. The participant said medicine is only allowed to be brought into the country by means of air POE, and not by car across the border.

4.2.1.4 Illegal goods finding their way out of the country

All participants shared the sentiment that the threats of porous land borders can unfold in many ways, including smuggling of illegal goods, and human trafficking. The participants mentioned that most of the goods that are finding their way out of South Africa illegally are vehicles, livestock, illicit money, and illicit gold and diamonds.

Moreover, participants argued that if one looked at illicit money flow, one will get an idea of the problem of porous borders, because illicit money flows are indicative of illegal activities such as the drug trade.

Four participants believed that the illegal flow of drugs could create a big threat because it is proven that terrorists are involved in the illegal movement of contraband.

“Terrorism make use of illegal movement of goods, because if they can smuggle drugs, they can smuggle guns, bombs and whatever else that is a potential threat. There are high possibilities that these money finding their way out of the country are funding illegal activities in other countries.” (Participant D)

4.2.2 Political threats

The participants indicated that the illegally employment of illegal immigrants, especially in private security companies, is posing massive threats to the national security of the country, because these immigrants can end up accessing confidential or state secret information and hand it over to the

enemies of South Africa. Illegal immigrants in the security sector can be easily recruited as spies because they are not vetted.

“High numbers of unemployed foreigners can become a risk as they compete directly with unemployed locals for recourses, and this can place increased pressure on government on all levels do deal with the demands and expectations for effective service delivery. More importantly, large communities of foreigners can also place undue pressure on government departments at all levels with impossible and irrelevant demands.” (Participant H)

During the interviews all participants deemed it important to note that foreigners can also have different political views than that of South Africans and may cause political incidents because SA allows these groups freedom of movement and speech inside the country.

Subsection 4.2.2 reported the political threats presented by porous land borders in South Africa. Terrorism is discussed next, followed by the lack of political cohesion and the problems caused by riots and violence.

4.2.2.1 Terrorism

Six participants reported that porous land borders pose terrorist threats to South Africa. Participants alleged that some of the members of terrorist groups are already operating covertly in the country, such as those that happened at the Durban Mosque and in Cape Town. Moreover, the participants mentioned that poor governance and corruption, failed states and high rates of unemployment foster favourable conditions for terrorism. The main concern from participant in this study is that terrorists can easily recruit the youth who are facing high rates of unemployment, and even undocumented foreigners because they feel that they have nothing to lose.

Although some of the participants agreed that South Africa is not yet a target for terrorism, they noted that, due to porous borders, the terrorists might use the country as a safe haven from which to operate, and to establish training camps because it is easy to enter and exit the country. This should be a cause for concern.

“I rather say we have civil disobedience, civil threats to government than terror threats because for terrorism there must be a group that is unhappy with the government. Nevertheless, this do not mean that the country is free from terror attacks, and we should be prepared for to things like that.” (Participant F)

The findings from the participants also indicated that housing groups associated with terrorism and terror could endanger the sovereignty of the state and may ultimately lead to the implementation of sanctions against South Africa.

4.2.2.2 *Lack of political cohesion*

The majority of participants noted that there is a lack of political will and cohesion among the various parties to confront and solve the issue of porous borders which impact directly on human security. Participants reported that South African political parties are failing the citizens of this country, as well as foreigners who are in the country legally. The following are some of the views of the participants regarding this issue:

“Instead of confronting the issue of illegal immigration they are playing political games with this.”
(Participant B)

“Some parties made blatant statements about opening the borders for Africans without mentioning its plan and position on illegal immigration, and this can be seen as political opportunism.”
(Participant A)

“On one hand some political party blamed another for using foreigners to vote for them during the election (Participant C), “While on the other hand, another party accused the ruling party for the growing number of illegal immigrants in the country.” (Participant F)

“Making sweeping political statements for political gain can intensify the attack on poor innocent foreigners who are here legally and can cause xenophobic attacks where innocent people are injured and die.” (Participant D)

4.2.2.3 *Riots and violence*

Five participants warned that South African citizens are gradually losing their patience because they have a perception that illegal immigrants do illegal activities, deal in drugs, loot South African resources, commit crime, and bribe locals and government officials for favours. Participants felt that this is a good recipe for creating political instability in the country because by bribing government officials, the national security of the country can easily be compromised.

“Illegal immigration could have and already has a severe negative impact on the level of crime and violent crime in our country with far-reaching effects on all facets of our society. High crime rates have a negative impact on foreign investment and our economic growth and at the same time the

demand on our infrastructure and resources is increasing because of the high number of illegal immigrants present in our country that are not contributing to our economy but taking remittances out to their countries of origin.” (Participant H)

Participants said that the government is under pressure from local communities to restore safety and security. When they do act against illegal foreigners, they receive negative exposure in the global media which makes it very difficult to maintain a good balance between risk and control. On the issue of the growing number of illegal immigrants, Participant A warned about possible violence in South African society.

“Illegal immigrants are all over South Africa, in the squatter camps, the townships, in the suburbs, and in the cities and their numbers are growing day by day, month by month and year by year. The South African citizens are inciting xenophobic violence, and there may come a time when these foreigners are going to say, “enough is enough”, and then there will be violence between South African citizens and foreigners.” (Participant A)

4.2.3 Societal threats

Participants perceived socio-economic issues as a major problem for South Africa because the country already has a very high unemployment rate, and the majority of the unemployed have either no skills, or limited education. Participants indicated that this situation already places severe strain on our tax income base, and South African resource availability and infrastructure. Participants also believed that the majority of illegal migrants are poorly educated and unskilled. They place undue pressure on the country’s limited resources and infrastructure that can result in retaliation from the local population through xenophobic acts.

“People that are not well nourished and live in poor unhygienic conditions are more prone to contract diseases and these can cause large outbreaks that place additional strain on our health infrastructure and resources. Most illegal immigrants are not vaccinated and can contribute to large outbreaks of vaccine preventable diseases like for instance measles.” (Participant H)

During the investigation it was evident that different cultural and religious practices that are not acceptable to the South African society can also give rise to intolerance and conflict with host communities. These practises can also cause embarrassment for South Africa if it takes place within the country.

In this sub-section, the issues related to societal threats associated with porous land borders, namely foreign nationals owning properties and land, basic services and crime, are viewed through the lenses of the participants.

4.2.3.1 Foreign nationals owning property and land

Seven participants pointed out that there is a high number of foreign nationals, refugees and asylum seekers migrating to South. This is becoming a massive threat in terms of the availability of land to accommodate them, while land remains a pressing issue in South Africa. South Africans are already staying in squatter camps, and are waiting upon government for land and housing, yet it appears foreigners can buy land and own a big house. There are rich Africans such as the Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, Nigerians who can afford to own property and stay in very large houses. This can create a negative sentiment among South African communities who are living in poverty.

The participants warned that it should be noted that South Africa is still in the process of addressing the issue of land redistribution while on one side foreigners continue to own, claim in a certain sense, property. Participants said that South African government must learn from other countries, where a foreigner is not allowed to own land and / or allowed to buy a house but can rent because the ground belongs to native citizens.

4.2.3.2 Basic services

Managa (2012) predicted almost a decade ago that South Africa is the most likely country to experience more protests because of poor service delivery. Furthermore, these protests will be more violent as compared to the previous years and characterised by looting, xenophobic attacks, and reactionary police brutality.

Four participants felt that the demographic increase of illegal foreigners is putting a larger burden on basic services such as security, health, education, sanitation and water, services which are already under stress.

“It is evident that the issue of basic services is becoming an issue. South Africans are not happy. We see recently, almost every week in the country, in Mamelodi, Shoshanguve, Soweto there are protests against the lack of basic services. Schools and other government infrastructure are burned down because of frustration. So, the cake slices are getting smaller and smaller because it should be shared with illegal foreign nationals.” (Participant A)

The participants believed that with current economic challenges and the resulting economic downgrade by international financial institutions, the South African government will not be able to sustain the provision of free education, health services, and other services to the growing number of undocumented immigrants, because the more the number increases, the more schools, clinics, et cetera will be required. The sewage systems, electricity and other services will not cope with the growing population of millions of foreign nationals living in South Africa. As the quality of basic services decline, South Africans will confront and riot against its government for failing to prioritise basic services to citizens and legal immigrants.

However, Participant D argued that providing health care should not be confuse with providing houses, because health care is a basic human right. Furthermore, the participant thought that the government should give health care to anybody who is sick, but citizens should get housing first for as long as the shortfall in housing exists.

“Health, education and social spending (grants) is also under strain because of the large number of additional people that makes use of these facilities.” (Participant H)

4.2.3.3 Crime

All eight participants agreed that criminal activities are prevalent along the South African land border and that it impacts on national security by means of smuggling, human trafficking, transnational criminal syndicate activities, illegal grazing, wildlife crime and violations of South African airspace and territorial waters.

It was very clear from the participants that South African internal stability, crime rate, economy, food security and national heritage are negatively affected by these activities. Participant H reported: *“We are also constantly affected by cybercrime and unfortunately due to its abstract nature it is not well understood and countered yet.”*

Participants opined that human trafficking and drug trafficking occurring on porous land borders will have severe consequences for the future of the country because some foreign nationals are involved in introducing the South African youth to prostitution and highly addictive drugs.

“If the borders are porous, you can have hardened criminals crossing the border and they can threaten the society or terrorising them. This can be very serious threats and need to be countered.” (Participant B)

Furthermore, two of the participants stated that an alarming trend is that some immigrants obtain South African IDs fraudulently and managed to get grants and free RDP houses, while South

African citizens are staying in squatter camps. Five participants were unhappy about the dominance of foreigners in some areas, with Sunnyside and Hillbrow mentioned as prime examples.

Participant A argued that illegal immigrants who are visiting clinics for medical assistance free of charge must be reported to the police and get arrested, and only asylum seekers, refugees and legal immigrants must be supported at all cost.

Participant D had a different viewpoint. The participant felt that the migrant threat is much less of a threat than the crime threat. The Participant argued that people tend to look at all the negatives of migration and ignore the positive. The participant said that there are many migrants with good qualifications that could be of benefit to the South African economy, and no one can claim that they are taking somebody's 'job because there might be no South Africans who have that particular qualification. The participant further stated that migrants have been wrongfully accused by the community for problems that are created by government. Participants reported an increased risk of prostitution, criminal activities and human trafficking as migrants who left their home countries with nothing become desperate to earn money for survival.

Two participants mentioned that it is unfortunate that where there are unemployed and uneducated communities there is always a high level of substance abuse that causes an increase in violence; especially against women and children; drug abuse; drug trafficking and other related criminal activities.

4.2.4 Environmental threats

According to the views of the majority of participants, illegal cross border movement cause the spread of diseases. Furthermore, participants mentioned that wildlife crime can cause the extinction of the country's unique species and South African heritage. There was a feeling that the extinction of key species can also negatively affect our ecology, and that that will reduce food production capabilities. The introduction of alien species (plants and animals) could have severe detrimental consequences for indigenous species, and could further contribute to extinction of species and environmental degradation. Participant H alluded that environmental degradation associated with illegal overgrazing, especially along the Lesotho border, has the potential to reduce South African livestock production.

The following sub-section first establishes how drought, pollution caused by informal settlements, poaching, and the spread of disease are viewed as security threats.

4.2.4.1 Drought

All participants mentioned that water security is becoming a problem in South Africa and that some provinces are already affected. The participants stated that farmers from the neighbouring countries force their way to South Africa due to drought in their countries. They migrate to places such as the Free State at the Caledon River, and in Limpopo at the Limpopo River.

Participant D added that the rivers forming the international borders with Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Namibia are becoming potentially problematic because when the rivers subside, it affects the international border. The reduced flow of the river causes it to lose its ability to stop people from crossing, something that is exacerbated by the fact that there is no fence.

“There is a border dispute between South Africa and Namibia. According to South Africa the border is on the highwater mark on the Namibian side of the river. Namibia is disputing that and belief that the centre of the river is the border line separating the two countries.” (Participant G)

4.2.4.2 Pollution

All participants pointed out that the huge influx of foreign nationals, especially in Gauteng, and the accompanying expansion of the informal settlements, are going to be a burden on the environment, because in the informal settlement areas there is no formal structure for removing waste and rubbish.

Participants said that South Africa is not able to accommodate everybody coming to the country while the living conditions are poor, and poverty is prevalent in the country. Participants revealed that the South African infrastructure has been developed to accommodate a certain number of people, and the municipal services will not be able to cope with the increasing number of illegal immigrants because they are not included in budgets for these services. The provisioning of sanitation services, waste removal services, sewage systems, housing and electricity for additional people, with specific reference to illegal immigrants, will have a massive impact on the environment.

“Another environmental threat is if you have huge communities that haven’t got electricity, you will always have these threats of open fire and smoke.” (Participant D)

Three of the participants stated that ESCOM is already experiencing near insurmountable challenges, and the situation will become worse with the proliferation of illegal electrical connections and a rapidly growing population because the country uses coal to generate power, a resource constantly under threat. Hence there will be expectations from ESCOM to provide for millions of illegal foreigners living in South Africa. The power grid may become unsustainable and

may eventually collapse. If that happens the future of South Africa will be bleak, and the economy will deteriorate further. Moreover, participants said that finally that will create discontent in the population and could escalate to political turmoil.

4.2.4.3 Poaching

According to five of the participants interviewed, there is a high demand for rhino horn in other countries, syndicates are targeting South Africa. Poaching is a big problem and South Africa is gradually losing species in game parks. More significantly, the participants said wildlife attracts more tourists to the country, so if poachers reduce the number of rhinos, tourism will be affected and unemployment around parks might increase. Ironically, poverty was identified as the main driver of poaching. The reason for poaching is that it offers hope to improve those forced to poach for survival.

“I have been in Mdumo recently. What is interesting, is that the Mozambicans living across the border killed all their animals and now come to our side to poach our animals.” (Participant F)

4.2.4.3 Disease transmission

Four participants stated that the theft of animals, poaching of wildlife and plants crossing the border illegally may harm the environment because of cross-border transmission of diseases through animal or plant. Humans present an equally testing problem. Overcrowding of certain areas not designed for many people will have an environmental impact. In addition, humans may cross the border with transferable diseases, such as Ebola, if they bypass POEs without going through a health screening process.

“The country this year lost the status of a foot-and-mouth free country because of five cattle that were affected at Mandimbo. It must be taken into account that in Mozambique and Zimbabwe foot-and-mouth disease are prevalent. There was an anthrax scare about a month ago in Lesotho and that led to the tightening of border control measures. Our troops were provided with personal protective clothes.” (Participant C)

During the interviews it was highlighted by participants that informal settlements also have a very negative environmental impact through environmental degradation and water pollution that will make these areas susceptible to disease outbreak. Most illegal immigrants end up in the informal settlements, leading to their uncontrolled expansion and potential adverse impact on the environment.

4.3 CONCLUSION

In Chapter 4, factors contributing to the causes of South African porous land borders and the threats presented by porous land borders to the national security were outlined, and the areas of land borders that need to be prioritised were identified. This was done by analysing the response from the participants in the study and substantiating the analysis by including verbatim statements from the responses.

In Chapter 5, the concluding chapter of this thesis, a summary of the main findings of the research will be presented and remedial actions to address the causes and threats presented by South African porous land borders will be suggested. The limitations of the study and avenues of further research will also be presented.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The research reported on in this dissertation has its genesis in the perceived porosity of the land borders of South Africa and the implications it may have for South African national security. The South African National Defence Force is one of the departments of State tasked with border duties. However, doubt has been expressed about the effectiveness of the safeguarding of the South African borders, and the serious consequences of porous borders for South African national security. By doing an intensive analysis of relevant documentation, developing interview schedules, and interviewing important role-players inside the SANDF tasked with border duties, this research investigated land borders in South Africa from an SANDF perspective.

In this concluding chapter, the aim and objectives of the study will be revisited, and the reaching of these objectives reflected upon, the findings and implications of the study summarised, and the recommendations flowing forth from the results, presented. A succinct conclusion and limitations of the study, as well as suggestions for future research will conclude the chapter.

5.1 REFLECTION ON THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The study aimed to investigate the causes of porous land borders and their effects on South Africa's national security from the South African National Defence Force perspective. The investigation was guided by five main objectives, to identify the causes of porous land borders, the threats posed by these porous borders, the consequence of porous land borders to the national security of South Africa, to discuss South African borders that were found to be particularly vulnerable, and to present operational and border safeguarding policy recommendations relevant to the SANDF. The aim of the study was achieved successfully through the reaching of the objectives revisited in the subsections below.

5.1.1 Objective 1: The causes of porous land borders in South Africa

The first objective set for the research was to identify the causes of porous land borders in South Africa. During research interviews the following eleven main themes emerged as contributing factors to the causes of porous land borders in South Africa: Lack of resources; the length and conditions of the border; uncoordinated intelligence; corrupt government officials; the colonial border legacy; liberalist migration policies and laws; lack of an integrated, overarching national security strategy; problems associated with the informal employment sector; ineffective cooperation

and collaboration of state department at national strategic level and other neighbouring countries; a diversity of pull and push factors.

Hundred per cent (100%) of participants indicated a **lack of resources** as the main contributing factor causing porous South African land borders. The resources required as reported by participants include adequate, modern technology; adequate, well trained human resources; better infrastructure; an adequate budget. There is a shortage of 7 companies on the border, to be increased from the current strength of 15 to 22 companies. This deficit leaves security gaps on SA borders.

However, participants agreed that extra feet on the ground alone was found not to be the only solution to porous land borders, and that technology is required as a force multiplier. The benefit of technology is that it can withstand harsh weather conditions and can cover vast areas, even those inaccessible to soldiers. It can also operate both during daytime and at night.

The South African Air Force supports both land and maritime border safeguarding, and it is highly technological driven. With current budget cuts and peace support deployment, it has become very difficult for the SANDF, especially the Air Force, to support Operation Corona effectively. There is a lack of early warning capabilities, such as surveillance systems, radar coverage, and others for reconnaissance and monitoring, and as a source of intelligence collection. The cooperation between the SANDF and private companies, such as mobile phone companies, can assist with technology and the sharing and exchange of information. Quick response capabilities and the projection of the reaction force in the theatre of operations are a challenge. The findings also indicated that infrastructure such as the border fence is in bad condition, making it easy for criminals to cross the border illegally and to conduct smuggling operations on the border.

The participants indicated that conditions on the South African **land border is diverse and that the border is very long**. This implies that it will be difficult to secure the entire land border. The cost of totally stopping people from crossing the border will be high and South Africa will probably never have enough abilities and capabilities to cover its borders 100% effectively. However, the participants agreed that SA may reduce and limit the influx of illegal immigrants and contraband. Even with more air support, twenty-two SANDF companies will still not be sufficient to cover the entire 4 471 km land border. The physical characteristics of the South African land border and conditions which range from desert to SAN parks, mountainous and dense almost jungle-like areas make the terrain difficult for the movement of patrol vehicles. The seasonal nature of the Limpopo, Gariiep and Caledon rivers makes it easy to cross illegally during the dry season.

Ninety per cent (90%) of the participants believed the success of the military operation lies in adequate, up-to-date and coordinated **intelligence**. It was found that South African Intelligence

institutions are disjointed. Human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) are not well coordinated among state departments responsible for border management, border control and border safeguarding. Both DI and SSA refuse to share the intelligence they collected, yet the police is sharing intelligence with the military. Illicit money, drugs, and human trafficking are more criminal in nature, and the military is not equipped or trained to stop it. Currently, the SANDF is treating the symptoms of the problem. There is not enough surveillance at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It was found that the SANDF is pursuing the Defence Force sensors strategy. There is a lack of cooperation between intelligence communities, the population, private sector and neighbouring countries on cross border criminal activities.

All the participants indicated that **corruption, bribes, and lack of consequence management**, especially among DHA and SAPS officials, are rife. These types of unethical behaviour enable the influx of contraband and illegal immigrants over South African land borders. Evidence of this lack of accountability and law enforcement is visible all along the border. Contraband is sold while the police are watching and there are no arrests. Law enforcement is a police mandate, and not that of the SANDF.

Participants further indicated that the demarcation of land borders between South Africa and its neighbouring countries is a **legacy of colonial era administration**. This is one of the major problems causing the South African land border to be porous, especially the border with Lesotho and Botswana. When the borders were established, the cultural landscape and families living in the border areas were ignored. Some of these borders separated families. In some cases, children from neighbouring countries cross the border on a daily basis to attend school in South Africa. Relatives and friends on both side of the border cross the border to visit one another daily. Another reason for regular crossing of the border is to buy items in South African shops. These regular crossings make it difficult to establish when illegal immigrants in fact cross, or when illegal activities are taking place.

According to the participants, South African **migration policies and laws are liberal** and do not act as a deterrent to illegal border crossing. Illegal immigrants are exploiting the laws. When illegal immigrants are apprehended and deported, they try again and again until they manage to cross successfully because they know there are no real consequences, penalties or punishment for transgressing. The liberal laws thus make it difficult to stop the influx of illegal immigrants into the country. The participants stated that the policies are so liberal that even illegal immigrants are almost routinely allowed to access basic services in South Africa.

Participants further alleged that many of the illegal activities happening on the borders are actually **crimes**, something the military are not trained to address. The SANDF is also confined to operating within the area of 10 km from the border inwards, something which makes their operations difficult.

South Africa lacks an **integrated, overarching national strategy** and a single border control policy guiding state departments and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each state actor involved in safeguarding South Africa against cross-border threats. This leads to duplication, and a general lack in coordination.

Informal employment is the next cause mentioned by participants. The South African society is also a contributing source of porous land borders. It was found that criminal syndicates have created intelligence networks, using South Africans who are constantly scanning the environment to pave the way for them to enter the country illegally. Some South African farmers, private companies, and citizens rather hire illegal foreigners instead of South Africans because foreigners are perceived to be hard workers, and they dare not complain if not paid the minimum wage. In many cases there are no consequences for these actions, and that attracts further illegal immigrants to South Africa.

Participants identified **collaboration and coordination** between South Africa and neighbouring countries at tactical level, operational level and the strategically level as being generally very good. However, the participants were doubtful about the cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique. All these countries are experiencing the same challenges as those experienced by South Africa in terms of lack of resources. Interdepartmental cooperation at tactical and operational level is good, but less so at national strategic level.

Pull Factors are another source of the influx of immigrants into the country, causing South Africa's porous land borders to be exploited. South Africa was found to be a prosperous country, liberal, and respecting human rights. Even amidst all the problems that South Africa is facing, the country still provides better services and remain a better country to live in than other neighbouring countries.

The **push factors** contributing to South African porous land borders identified by the participants are that immigrants are leaving their countries of origin to come to South Africa because of violence, conflict, wars and political instability in their respective home countries. Some countries are experiencing economic hardship and an extremely high unemployment rate, natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and periodic shortages of food.

One of the miscellaneous push factors is the cost of applying for passports. Because immigrants cannot afford passports, they resort to crossing the border illegally. The same applies to immunisation certificates. Crossing borders illegally to attend school, visit families divided by

colonial era administration and to buy goods from South African shops along the borders are other reasons for illegal border crossings, as reported by the participants in this study.

5.1.2 Objective 2: Threats presented by porous land borders to South Africa's national security

The Copenhagen School was used to aid the researcher in analysing the threats posed by porous land borders to South Africa's national security. The concept of security is so diverse and multidimensional that previous studies conducted by scholarly researchers could not come up with a singular definition of security (Brooks 2010). Therefore, the Copenhagen School was used in this study as an approach and guiding school of thought to assess land border security, since it encompasses a wide spectrum that take into account political, economic, environmental and societal factors as they emerged onto the security agenda. It is within this realm that the understanding of land border security can be best interpreted. In this study, the Copenhagen securitisation of the South African land border emerged as follows:

- **Securitizing actors** are South African security agencies, politicians, citizens and mass media concerned with illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants in South Africa have been echoed by these actors as a security threat to South Africa as early as 1994 when the first incident of xenophobic violence was recorded. (Landau *et al.* 2005 & Nnaemeka & Nkechi 2019).
- **Existential Threat** refers to the influx of illegal immigrants to South Africa from her neighbouring countries and other African countries that are linked to human smuggling, extremism, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, and other undesirable political, economic and social issues.
- The **Referent objective** is to protect South African land borders.
- **Speech act** involves statements by South African politicians and authorities to protect or safeguard the vulnerability of the South African land borders. For example, the current president of South Africa stated that foreigners are welcome in South Africa on condition that they enter the country legally (Feketha (2019). Advocate Mhalodi, the head of SSA said that every person coming to South Africa must do so lawfully (Times Live 2019). The Democratic Alliance (DA) raised a concern of the South African porous borders. The deputy minister of police, Bongani Mkongi warned about the dominance of foreign nationals in Hillbrow (Eyewitness News 2017).

- **Emergency measures** involve the returning of the SANDF to safeguard South African borders, building of border fences, and the establishment of a Border Management Agency.

Although migration has positive impacts, it may inevitably create problems, especially when the borders of the destination country are not well controlled and managed. In South Africa, economic threats, societal threats, political threats, and environmental threats were identified as the most important emerging security threats presented by porous land borders.

The country has attracted illegal immigrants because South African citizens, farmers, and both private and public companies employ illegal immigrants, sometimes because they can pay them less than minimum wage which they would have to pay local citizens, without having to be concerned about possible consequences for transgressing labour and other laws. This is especially true in the security and agricultural sectors. At the same time as illegal foreigners are employed, South Africans are suffering from a high unemployment rate.

It was found that illegal immigrants have established illegal businesses, sometimes selling contraband. Most of them do not pay income tax. Others have established illegal brothels and engaged in human trafficking. Vehicles, livestock, minerals, and illicit money find their way out of the country, while drugs and contraband are readily brought into the country because of its porous land borders. All these illegal activities destroy entrepreneurship opportunities for South African youth and creates unfair business competition, which could lead to termination of formal businesses and retrenchment of South African workers. In addition, illegal products and medicines that had not been approved by the South Africa medical authorities may cause harm to the health of the population. All of these could cause resentment towards foreigners, even legal immigrants by association, which may lead to xenophobic attacks and the destruction of infrastructure which belongs to foreigners and even that of citizens as collateral damage.

In many parts of the country, illegal immigrants are straining South African basic service delivery such as health care, education, and municipal services. The South African youth are introduced to or forced into drug and prostitution by some illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants also gain illegal access to social grants and free housing because of either flawed housing control systems, or through illegal immigrants acquiring South African identity documents fraudulently. Some illegal foreign nationals own property, while most of the citizens continue to live in abject poverty and stay in informal shanty town settlements in spite of political liberation in 1994. If seen against the backdrop of the unresolved land redistribution issue, this may lead to great unrest and instability. The

disproportionate increase of illegal foreign nationals in places like Hillbrow and Sunnyside is making South Africans feel threatened. The shortage of land and space to accommodate illegal immigrants is a threat and is creating negative sentiment towards foreigners, both legal and illegal. With a further increase in the number of illegal immigrants due to the porous borders, South Africa will not be able to accommodate uncontrolled influx, and service delivery protests will likely increase.

Lack of political will and cohesion among political parties to address the issue of porous borders pose a very serious threat to national security. South Africans are becoming impatient and losing trust in government's willingness and ability to address the challenges presented by illegal immigrants due to porous land borders. This may lead to an increase in violent protests. The security of the country may be compromised because of the employment of illegal immigrants by security companies. These immigrants may gain access to sensitive government documents or information and be recruited as spies for foreign agencies.

It was found that South Africa is under threat of terror attack due to its porous land borders. The incidents of terror attacks reported in the country are evidence that terror groups are already operating in the country covertly. Due to the already high unemployment rate in South Africa, an increase in illegal immigrants may lead to South African youth and illegal immigrants in the country being recruited by terror groups.

The influx of illegal immigrants due to porous land borders may have a huge environmental impact in the form of diseases, pollution, and poaching. Water scarcity is becoming a problem in South Africa and neighbouring countries. The international border rivers are running dry year on year which leads to neighbouring farmers forcing their way into South Africa, especially in the Free State. Theft of livestock and plants may harm the environment and spread diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease. Poaching poses the threat of losing South African indigenous wildlife and species. Transferable diseases like Ebola may become a problem due to the uncontrolled movement of people over the country's porous borders. Overcrowding in informal settlements and other residential areas caused by illegal immigrants could have a massive impact in terms of municipal service delivery, such as water and sanitation, waste removal, and power supply, while air and land pollution can become an even more serious problem because of the overcrowding in informal settlements and other residential areas.

5.1.3 Objective 3: Consequence of porous land borders for South African national security

The consequences of porous land borders are linked to undesirable economic, social, and political issues. The main economic issues mentioned by participants in this study are looting of South African mineral resources, and illegal immigration increasing the rate of unemployment in South Africa, while the government is struggling at the same time to resolve the unemployment problem. Differences in culture and religion are causing disputes among South Africans and foreign nationals and lead to xenophobic attacks. Influx of illegal border crossing foreigners increase the already overcrowded informal settlements, and contribute to an already adverse pollution situation.

Table 5.1 presents a broad summary of the threats related to South African porous land borders. The likelihood is based only on known historical trends in terms of threats. Although the potential consequences are vast, this table denotes the most important information available on loss of life, financial costs, injuries and illness, psychological distress directly related to certain threats.

Table 5.1: Potential consequence of porous land borders

Selected porous land borders threats		
Scenario	Likelihood (Known Frequency)	Potential Consequence (Financial Cost and loss of life)
Terrorists illegally enter South Africa to commit violent acts of terrorism.	Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, who was linked to a terror attack in Tanzania, entered South Africa illegally in 1998 (Rifer 2005) while Samantha Lewthwaite, a member of Al-Shabaab, managed to hide in South Africa (Fabricius 2018). There have been attacks associated with terrorism in KZN and the Western Cape (Fabricius 2018). In another incident, South Africans Thulsie twins with links to a terror group were arrested in South Africa.	In KZN, terrorist attacks claimed the lives of a South African/British botanist couple; the murder of the couple occurred in a mosque in Verulam, KZN. There was also another incident in Malmesbury, Western Cape. The Thulsie twins plotted an attack on United States and Jewish interests in South Africa, malls, as well as the venue and event of a major horse race in South Africa. It is estimated that these attacks could have caused billions of Rands in destroyed and damaged properties, loss of multiple lives, damaged reputation and related loss of tourism.
Criminal syndicates smuggle illegal drugs into South Africa.	Between April 2018 and December 2018, the SANDF seized 6834 kg of dagga. Between January 2018 and April 2019, 2970 kg of dagga was seized. In 2016 at Groblerbridge POE, a consignment of R92 million worth of heroin was intercepted (South Africa	National data on drug trafficking and related deaths in South Africa could not be found. However, between April 2018 and December 2018, the SANDF confiscated dagga worth R12 294 240. Between January 2019 and April 2019, dagga worth R5 343 03 was seized by the SANDF. Some estimates indicate that Mozambique is a gateway of heroin to South Africa,

Selected porous land borders threats

Scenario	Likelihood (Known Frequency)	Potential Consequence (Financial Cost and loss of life)
	2016e). Methaqualone is also exported to the RSA, while poor regulatory capability and corruption enable money laundering in the country (CIA 2018).	these drugs enter the northern part of Mozambique from Tanzania and Kenya en route down to the South African border in KZN, and from there, the drugs are distributed by road to Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria and Nelson Mandela Bay (Haysom <i>et al.</i> 2018). The economic and social impact of illegal drugs had been estimated at billions of Rands. Other consequences of drugs include illness caused by unhealthy contraband; psychological distress in families; direct economic costs because contraband destroys the manufacturing sector, create unfair competition, and perpetuate tax evasion.
Criminal syndicates smuggle counterfeit goods, weapons, livestock, vehicles, and illicit minerals into and out of South Africa.	It was reported that illicit minerals find their way out of South Africa. Between April 2018 and April 2019, the SANDF seized counterfeit goods, weapons, livestock, and vehicles being smuggled into and out of South Africa.	South Africa is losing about R14, 4 billion a year due to trade in illicit gold, diamonds and other precious metals (Martin 2019). Between April 2018 and December 2018, the SANDF confiscated contraband goods worth R37 373 985.00, as well as 44 assault weapons, 1 927 livestock, and 140 stolen vehicles. Between January 2018 and April 2019, the SANDF confiscated contraband goods worth R8 084 069, four guns, 1 257 livestock, and 44 stolen vehicles. It is estimated that South Africa is losing billions of Rands due to counterfeit goods, livestock, vehicles and illicit minerals and weapons crossing our borders illegally. Some counterfeit goods also represent threats to the health and safety of South Africans.
Illegal immigrants enter South Africa.	Between April 2018 and December 2018, the SANDF apprehended 9790 illegal immigrants. Between January 2019 and April 2019, a further 4724 illegal immigrants were arrested. The number of illegal immigrants accessing health care in South Africa increased from 32 092 to 82 923 between 2016 and 2018 (Hlatshaneni 2019). Illegal immigrants are also employed by owners of the private security industry, PSiRA (2017).	Since 2008, illegal immigrants were frequently attacked, and some killed in acts of xenophobia. Approximately 300 Malawians were attacked in Durban in 2019 (Ka Platjie 2019). The consequence of illegal immigrants in South Africa has resulted in damage and destruction of property, loss of lives, and psychological effects due to xenophobic attacks. There are allegations that some security companies hiring illegal immigrants are involved in unconstitutional and criminal activities. Some companies are training their officials as private armies and hit squads, others are used as cover ups for illicit diamond dealings, arms trade, drug trafficking,

Selected porous land borders threats		
Scenario	Likelihood (Known Frequency)	Potential Consequence (Financial Cost and loss of life)
		rhino-horn smuggling, and yet others are havens for a potentially destabilising third force. Some security companies have a connection with foreign intelligence services (Hough 2002) and these immigrants may be recruited as spies and may gain access to sensitive government documents or information compromising South African national security.

5.1.4 Objective 4: Areas of the South Africa land borders that need to be prioritised

Although there was no consensus among participants about the porous land borders that need attention, the borders with Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho appears to be the South African porous land borders responsible for most problems, and they consequently need the most urgent attention and intervention.

Issues on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe are mainly known for illegal import and export of contraband, vehicle theft and smuggling, illegal crossing of immigrants, fence cutting to access illegal cattle grazing and theft of fencing material, illegal grazing and movement of animals, possession and dealing in illicit diamonds, gold and other precious metals. This border between South Africa and Zimbabwe is a headache and a concern to South Africa. Moreover, the participants mentioned that the Department of Public Works identified three areas for which a project is registered to do fence and routes upgrades on the Zimbabwean border from Pontdrift to the Kruger National Park. The participants cemented their argument by saying that the South African borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe are the most vulnerable to illegal movement and that the economic situation in those two countries is much worse than in other neighbouring countries.

On the border between South Africa and Mozambique the main concerns are vehicle theft, contraband, and illegal immigration. The border between these countries, especially in the Pongola area, are considered the most problematic and should be prioritised. Most of these borders are easy for illegal immigrants to cross. The stability of these three countries directly impacts on South African national security.

Participants believed that the Eswatini border is known for illegal border crossing activities and needs attention. Participant B concurred and said that the Eswatini border is known for dagga smuggling.

The border between South Africa and Lesotho is well known for cattle theft and dagga smuggling. Participants believed that the Lesotho border needs more attention, especially on the Free State side. Participants highlighted that the problems on the Lesotho border are exacerbated by colonial problems. The border between South Africa and Lesotho is crossed daily, with some children from Lesotho attending schools in South Africa. Lesotho is notorious for cattle theft. During the interviews it was revealed that the SAPS was taken to court by the farmers' union because of porous border which had resulted in livestock theft, such as cattle crossing illegally from Lesotho to the Free State. The SANDF inherited the case when the border was handed to the military.

Namibian borders do not pose a threat to South African national security. According to the participants, the border with Namibia is stable, and not a problem area. Unmanned border areas will remain a challenge until such time as the SANDF is resourced sufficiently to deploy the remaining seven companies and deploys a good surveillance system. So far there are no real solutions, mainly because of funding. The SANDF requires 22 companies to effectively protect our land borders. So far there is nothing more the SANDF can do, so the current situation leaves the country, and especially the community and farmers along the borders, exposed to threat.

In Botswana there are seemingly less problems, except for the legacy of borders drawn during the colonial era which have divided families. In general, the Botswana border is relatively stable. However, participants stated that the eastern part of the border with Botswana, experiences serious threats at the moment because of the influx of people from the DRC and Zimbabwe. This influx is the result of people who are fleeing conflict in the DRC, and the political and economic instability in Zimbabwe.

5.2 FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of the study, implications of the study for South African national security and the recommendation flowing forth from the study are presented in the next subsections.

5.2.1 Findings of the study

The sources of the porosity of South African land borders can be categorised as internal and external. Internal factors entail matters that can be address by government, such as provisioning of resources, sharing of intelligence between state departments, facilities, replacement of dilapidated infrastructure, securing the logistics to safeguard South African land borders and putting an end to corruption. External factors are those beyond the government capability, which are also expressed

as push and pull factors. These factors are motivated by political and socio-economic aspects of the neighbouring country, including better business opportunities, employment, educational prospects, marriage prospects, and family structures.

The porosity of the South African land borders poses national security threats associated with criminal activities and possible extremism in South Africa. Illegal immigrants have impacted the demographic, social, economic, and political stability of South Africa. Rapid, uncontrolled increase in illegal immigration poses a security threat and has already caused socio-economic friction between South Africans and immigrants.

Other common security issues South Africa faces are transnational crimes like drug trafficking, cross-border terrorism, and human smuggling. Trafficked drugs such as cannabis, heroin and cocaine had become common phenomena in South Africa. These activities pose a threat to national security. The trafficking of women, children used for sexual exploitation, forced labour in commercial farming, the drug trade, and petty crime are all connected to illegal immigration. Illegal weapons entering the country are frequently used in crimes across the country. Stolen vehicles, untaxed goods, illegal cigarettes and alcohol are smuggled daily to neighbouring countries.

South African citizens are vulnerable to these threats because of the ineffective or suboptimal functioning of government departments and law enforcement agencies. The SA government does not have supporting programs on public safety, and awareness programs to share knowledge and information with its citizens, especially in terms of intelligence coordination to mitigate threats.

Illegal yet skilled, and even unskilled foreign nationals are more attractive in the job market than native South Africans because some employers in the agricultural sector, hospitality industry, larger firms, and even ordinary citizens may hire undocumented immigrants, and most of them are reliable, hard workers and motivated labour. Spaza-shops owned by foreign nationals are not registered with licences to operate, they do not have local bank accounts and a tax number, and they are not inspected by the relevant departments such as the Department of Health or the Department of Agriculture. All of this has dire consequences for health and safety and has direct economic impact due to evasion of tax and selling of unhealthy products.

Foreigners who are in South Africa without any permit are in contravention of the laws and are deemed as illegal foreigners. Those foreigners shall be deported unless they are ex post facto officially authorised to stay. An immigration officer has the power to arrest and detain without warrant a foreigner awaiting deportation or anyone who is in the country illegally (South Africa 2002b).

No one may employ an illegal foreigner or foreigners whose status does not permit them to seek employment. Employing foreigners not permitted to work in South Africa or illegal foreigners in a business is a serious offense and is subject to one year of imprisonment or a fine. Other prohibitions on illegal foreigners include but are not limited to providing them training, offer them overnight accommodation, or assist, abet, or aid them in any manner (South Africa 2002b). However, organs of State may render services to illegal foreigners under the constitution.

The immigration laws in South Africa is to administer control, and to simplify and facilitate the process of permanent and temporary residence in the country. It aims at promoting human rights by preventing and deterring xenophobia at all levels of state, its respective organs, and by the community. The laws are applied to discourage, detect and deport illegal foreigners. The Act encourages legal border crossing at Ports of Entry only (unless special authorisation is granted). Under these laws, the government is mandated to detect, deter and punish those who cross the borders illegally. It also regulates the influx of foreigners, and administer refugee protection and citizenship by naturalisation (South African 2002b).

South Africans are permitted to enter, exit and stay in the country on condition that they have been issued with valid documentation. No person, a citizen or a resident can live or enter South Africa except when in possession of a valid passport. A foreigner may enter the Republic provided that she or he had been issued with relevant travel documentation. There are 13 types of permits that may be issued to foreign nationals: Study permit, Visitor's permit, Medical treatment permit, Asylum, Treaty permit, Corporate permit, Cross-border and transit passes, Retired person permit, Work permits, Diplomatic permit, Relative's permit, Business permit, Exchange permit and Crew permit (South Africa 2002b).

Permanent residence is granted on two conditions, known as direct residence, and residence on other grounds. Permanent residence is restricted for the following individuals: Foreigners with infectious diseases, those previously deported, persons associated with racial hatred practices or violence, or anyone who had been linked to crime or terrorism.

Foreigners with an outstanding warrant or a conviction in respect to terrorism, torture, genocide, money laundering, drug trafficking, kidnapping and murder do not qualify for either a permanent or temporary residence permit (South Africa 2002b).

Some guesstimates show that more than 90% of foreigners in RSA are from African countries (Mbiyozo 2018). South Africa should recognise that the majority of Africans from neighbouring countries are fleeing difficult or dangerous situations in their home countries.

The examined push-pull theory and School of Copenhagen have been put forward to understand the causes of porous land borders and their impact on national security. Previous work conducted on these theoretical frameworks (push-pull theory and School of Copenhagen) showed that these theories remain popular, dominant and had positioned themselves well in both the lexicon of international relations (IR) and migration.

The literature review also showed that the dominance of foreign nationals in terms of populace and unrestricted influx of illegal immigrants have the potential of changing the demographic pattern of a host country, as was evident at Assam in India, with the related potential threat to the political power of the host country. The number of registered migrants from the SADC region alone in South Africa is estimated at 3,142,511 million, with the total number of migrants in RSA from neighbouring African countries and other countries further afield is estimated at more than 5 million. The total number of illegal immigrants entering South Africa through its porous borders is unknown because confirming records or data could not be found (Kekana 2018).

The literature review revealed that the concept of security is diverse and multidimensional, and that a singular definition would be invalid. National security is also defined differently by countries. In South Africa, the concept of national security is contained and explained in the constitution, the White paper on intelligence, the White paper on Defence, Defence Review and other government policies.

The borders of South Africa are vast, which may pose challenges to the SANDF to cope in safeguarding them. South Africa is not the only country facing the challenges of controlling its borders. Other countries in Africa are experiencing the same challenges, even though they have implemented the AU's Migration Policy on freer movement of Africans. The literature showed that both the causes and threats related to borders may be classified as economical, societal, political, environmental and miscellaneous factors.

The findings in the literature showed that South Africa is losing about R14,4 billion a year due to illicit mining. Tons of precious metals from SA are finding their way illegally through porous borders, while public and private security company owners are employing unregistered illegal foreigners to curb this illicit trade. The number of undocumented foreigners accessing health care in Gauteng increased from 3,2092 to 8,2923 over the period 2016 to 2018. Tax collection among foreign nationals is difficult because some foreign nationals who own businesses prefer cash in order to avoid paying tax. Fake goods and unhealthy products are sold to the poorest citizens who do not have financial access to regular products.

Consequently, land borders provide economic opportunities to people abroad, yet and at the same time they pose challenges ranging from loss of revenue due to illicit trade to strained basic service delivery, and in extreme cases, terror attacks in the host country.

5.2.2 Implications of the study for South African national security

Porous land borders impact equally but differently in the source or neighbouring country and South Africa as the country of destination. The impact may be negative or positive. Influx of illegal immigrants through porous land borders impact domestic security in South Africa in the form of non-military threats such as the spread of disease, environmental impacts, the economic and social burden of refugees and asylum seekers, transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit goods, environmental pollution, deforestation, increase in rate of unemployment, cross-border terrorism, population growth, adding more pressure on government institutions like schools, clinics, and hospitals to provide basic services to its own citizens. The findings of the study revealed that at a higher level, there is need for an integrated, overarching national security strategy and comprehensive policy guidelines dealing with border safeguarding.

On the positive side, both South Africans and their families in neighbouring countries that are divided by colonial era borders benefited from South African porous land borders by being able to visit their families and relatives without using POEs. Children from neighbouring countries who are crossing the borders to attend schools in South Africa constitute a long-term investment in building brighter futures for these children and reducing the need for generational trans-border migration. South African business owners are also reaping the benefits from neighbouring foreign nationals who cross the border daily to buy basic needs from the South African shops along the borders and returning to their country. Due to the unique situation of Lesotho as a landlocked nation a bi-lateral agreement between South Africa and Lesotho must be facilitated to ease border management between these countries. Foreign nationals, especially women and children who are fleeing conflicts, wars, violence, political instability, and socio-economic problems in their countries of origin can easily cross the borders and apply for asylum.

This study provides empirical evidence that can be used by policymakers to address the challenges of South African porous land borders and by taking into consideration both the negative and positive impacts of porous land borders

5.2.3 Recommendations

The South African government should prioritise territorial integrity and border protection as one of its primary interests. While fixing the challenges of the country's borders, the government should also focus its efforts on stabilising and assisting in the political and economic situations of its neighbouring countries. If South Africa's neighbouring countries are not politically and economically stable, push factors will prevail, and the country will continue to experience an influx of illegal immigrants and will have to deal with the associated consequences.

The focus of intervention should be directed at the borders with, and the situations in, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho. Once these countries are politically and economically stable, and South African borders are more secure, we can reap more benefits out of this initiative because these neighbouring countries can play a vital role in becoming a buffer and a first line of defence to South Africa and to stop illegal immigrants and contraband before reaching South African land borders from further afield.

The South African government should also decide whether it wants to pursue the less restricted movement of people from the continent either through a bilateral approach, as part of SADC, or through a wider AU initiative. South Africa should develop a national strategy of border safeguarding. Since there is still a disagreement on the unrestricted or less restricted movement of people in the SADC region, it is recommended that South Africa should pursue its interest on territorial integrity and border protection through bilateral cooperation. By doing this, instead of focussing on multilateral agreements, it is easier to reach and operationalise agreements than where the complex interests of a variety of countries must be accommodated to reach an agreement.

Africans are leaving the continent for Europe, while many are coming to South Africa illegally because of her porous land borders, due to problems in their own countries, and the seeming absence of political solutions to those problems. Low economic prospects and political instability in some neighbouring countries have consequences for South Africa in terms of political, environmental, societal and economic issues which are seen as systematic risks. Over the long term, South Africa should play a bigger role in promoting sustainable peacekeeping and peace enforcement solutions, and in strengthening its borders. South Africa must reach collective agreements with SADC countries to better address illegal migration. South Africa must also lead the SADC region in addressing the issue of illegal immigrants at multilateral dialogue forums within the African Union.

Foreign policy requires two things: clear formulation and consistent implementation. South Africa should move away from an idealist version of what the country would like to have, to a more realist version in line with current realities. One thing to focus on is to address the vulnerability which is

something politicians do not like to speak about. The military are the right people to address this issue because they have vested interests in the vulnerability of the country and how to defend those vulnerabilities. South African foreign policy should clarify its position on the principles and interests it wants to pursue. The principles might be the ideals that the country would like to aspire to, but national interests are bound to the vital interests of the country. The issue of territorial integrity, for example, needs to be prioritised.

Another recommendation flowing forth from the research is that the South African government should re-establish the National Security Council. The National Security Council may act as a coordinating mechanism that can bring the SANDF, DIRCO, actors in the intelligence community, economic actors and other role players together to address the overall security threats presented by porous land borders. Once the National Security Council has been established, the South African national security policy and strategy can be formulated and implemented. From this national security policy and strategy, a defence strategy should be developed to guide a border safeguarding strategy and a defence diplomacy strategy that will enable the SANDF to continue to engage in peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcement operations, primarily in Africa.

South African state departments have a constitutional obligation to carry out their functions not only with transparency and accountability, but importantly, with efficiency. South African citizens and foreign nationals who are in the country legally, must assist South African law enforcement institutions by reporting illegal immigrants to the South African Police and by holding relevant departments and functionaries to account to the courts. Holding the accounting officer of the department responsible and liable will force respective departments to take action against its corrupt officials and those who are not doing their jobs effectively and accountably. The criminal justice system in the country should be capacitated to ensure that there are consequences for criminals, both citizens and other. The police must do their work with pride and diligence, and those who disregard the laws of the country must be arrested, prosecuted and withdrawn from service.

The reality is that some politicians have been accused of aggravating, if not fuelling the xenophobic attacks. It is difficult to quell a form of violence based in resentment and hatred and competition for resources. The issue of xenophobic attacks is not new, but the situation is becoming worse. The evidence is that the influx of illegal immigrants has been known to political leaders for the past 25 years, yet the government is failing to address this problem.

It is recommended that South African political leadership should be encouraged to come together and address this matter once and for all and stop political point scoring. In this endeavour, South

Africa will not be able to solve these challenges alone; it needs the support from its African counterparts. As a matter of urgency, the President should address these matters at the AU.

South African immigration policies lack deterrent. The country should consider moving away from a liberal approach towards a more realistic approach to immigration by migrants from a continent and nations to whom SA remain indebted for their support in its struggle for liberation. It requires a diplomatic balancing act. Policies where jobs and certain types of business are reserved for citizens had discouraged the volume of migration to other countries and should be considered by the South African government. Foreign nationals should be employed on condition that no local candidates are available, something that is supposed to have been the case all along. At the same time, the government should investigate attracting critical skills, and retain those critical skills from foreign nationals which will in turn grow the economy and attract Foreign Direct Investment to the country. A list of skills and businesses required from foreign nationals should be published in the South African Labour Relation Act and should guide the employment of foreign nationals.

The success of the SANDF hybrid strategy depends on the availability of intelligence. This is because the South African land borders are vast, and Intelligence plays a critical role in strategy development.

Some of these crimes are committed in cyberspace because goods and products are sold online, and drones can be used to transport drugs and contraband goods, therefore a thorough appreciation is required to craft an integrated overarching national strategy taking into consideration 4th IR developments where technology and UAVs should be considered a force multiplier, and sources of improved surveillance. At a national security level there must be a coordinated strategy for intelligence that will include SSA, Defence Intelligence and SAP crime intelligence so that everyone on the borders can have a comprehensive and complete intelligence picture.

South Africa through its Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) and other committees at national level are attempting to address the challenges of South African porous borders. One of the main issues identified is the lack of a single, comprehensive border management policy, and overarching national security policy and strategy. The drafting of the Border Management Bill was a good initiative towards safeguarding South African national borders. It is common practice that national policies precede departmental strategies. Therefore, it makes sense that a border management policy should precede the crafting of the SANDF border safeguarding strategy. The features of an operational and border safeguarding policy relevant to the SANDF are primarily guided by the two South African military policy documents, the Defence Review and the White paper on Defence,

supported by other government documents such as the South African Defence Act, the SA Constitution, and the White paper on intelligence.

The defence review reflects defence policy, and it re-emphasises the safeguarding of South African borders as the primary responsibility of the SANDF. The Cabinet ordered the SANDF to return to border duties in 2010. The Cabinet pledged to support the SANDF with helicopters, light aircraft, army units, air and land reaction forces, as well as electronic surveillance to counter illegal intrusion. However, the defence review that was approved by Parliament is based on a Defence budget comprised of 2% of GDP. Because of the continuous budget cuts, the stipulations of the Defence Review are not easy to implement.

The White paper on Defence acknowledged the changes and challenges the region experienced since the end of the cold war, and the problems of poverty, unemployment and other non-military threats. According to the White paper on Defence, the SANDF will fulfil the responsibility of border protection together with the SAPS, with the police focussing on combatting crime by controlling the flow of illegal immigrants and arms into South Africa.

The constitution entrusted the right to defend and protect the country, its territorial integrity, and its people, guided by the principles of international law and protocols regarding the use of force, to the SANDF. Therefore, the SANDF will always apply laws such as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The Constitution allows the president as the only person who may authorise the deployment the SANDF to defend the country, support the South African Police Services (SAPS) and to fulfil an international obligation (RSA 1995).

The Defence Act affords the SANDF the mandate to arrest, seize any article, and detain any person whilst engaging in an unlawful act. After arresting such a person, the SANDF must immediately hand the arrested person or seized article over to a police official or an appropriate functionary designated by a relevant law.

Since the National Security Policy (NSP) and National Security Strategy (NSS) in South Africa could not be sourced in this study and are not familiar to the members of the SANDF military strategy developers interviewed, it is evident that only some departments participated in the drafting of the national security policy and national security strategy. Therefore, it is recommended that the National Security Council (NSC) should be re-established as soon as possible. The NSC should facilitate the process of fast-tracking the promulgation of the NSP and NSS to guide the SANDF/security related policy and strategy. The NSS should take cognisance that the SANDF is funded at 2% of GDP. The NSC should apply the Tshwane Principles of national security and the

right to information to segregate the information which may be withheld on National Security grounds and restricted from public access.

A continuously decreasing SANDF budget shows the difficulties of implementing and executing the recommendations of the 2015 Defence Review. Therefore, SANDF priorities, capabilities and structure should be redesigned to make it realistic and affordable. The two main documents representing defence policy, the Defence Review and the White paper in Defence are more than five years old. It calls for the revisiting of these documents.

Authors such as Mbiyozo (2018) suggest that South Africa should come up with policies which may address the migration of both semi-skilled and skilled foreigners from neighbouring countries. According to Mbiyozo's (2018), RSA is not performing well in addressing the flow of migration from its neighbouring countries. There is also no factual evidence of migrants posing elevated security risks to South Africa. Detention in South Africa does not deter migration. Yet, while the rest of Africa is in support of moving away from detention models, the RSA is prioritising them. Some of the recommendations proposed by Mbiyozo (2018) are that RSA should prioritise on low-skilled worker visas for the SADC region to match labour market demands. A costly plan for building asylum processing centres, estimated at R298 million, should be abandoned and set aside. Instead, South Africa should focus on improving effective management of immigration. President Cyril Ramaphosa should reject the BMA Bill based on the impact it could have on trade and legitimate traveling. The South African public and politicians should oppose xenophobia at all costs and recognise its dangers.

Scholars such as Nnaemeka & Nkechi (2019) suggest that South Africa should introduce an immigration policy which will limit the number of immigrants the country can accommodate to avoid overpopulation. These scholars opine that with the dwindling economy it will be difficult for the government to cope with an uncontrolled increase in population size, given the current resources and basic services needed for its own citizens. The high unemployment rate in South African exacerbate xenophobic attacks on immigrants.

5.3 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study dealt with national security and porous SA land borders only. Air and maritime borders were excluded. The study was also limited to the South African National Defence Force at the operational and strategic levels. The interviews excluded the tactical level. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot be generalised to air and maritime borders, the tactical level of operations, or

other departments responsible for border management and control. These limitations constitute targets for future research.

Snowball sampling was used, and by virtue of its features and characteristics, some of the limitations, especially those related to participants referrals, were experienced. Out of five participants initially identified, only two took part in the study. However, the effect of this was mitigated by referrals to other experts in the field who participated in the study. Although this limitation was dealt with, future researchers should take notice of this.

It is recommended that a similar study be conducted and extended to include other departments such as the Department of Home Affairs, South African Revenue Services, South African Police Services, and other departments responsible for border management and border control. Since the focus of this study was on land borders, such a study should also include the South African air and maritime borders and include information at tactical level.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The significant findings of this research offer empirical support to South African National Defence Force policy makers and strategists who represent the DOD at the Parliamentary Monitoring Group and other committees at national level. This study does not only add value to the practical and theoretical issues surrounding border safeguarding, but also to border control and border management. Furthermore, the research bridges the gap in research investigating border security and border management in South Africa. The outcomes of the study offered insight into the push and pull factors impacting on porous land borders. The study found that illegal migrants left their country of origin to come to South Africa because of wars and instability, lack of security, poverty, hardship, violence, poor economy, droughts, harsh living conditions, lack of food security, lack of political stability, and high unemployment rates.

The main attractions causing migration to South Africa are a better health system than back home, better education, and guaranteed protection of human rights. Furthermore, South Africa is perceived as generally a better country to live in, has good infrastructure, lenient criminal sentences and low prosecution rates for criminals, a liberal constitution, better services, being considered a lucrative market for contraband, having a favourable geographical location as transit country for illicit activities to reach other destinations. These push-and- pull factors require an intervention from national government by means of both bilateral and multilateral approaches to finding resolutions or mitigation strategies.

Participants in this study confirmed that for effective and successful border safeguarding the SANDF requires human resources, modern technology, sound infrastructure, appropriate funding, and a combination of coordinated human, signals and imagery intelligence. The SANDF participants identified that there is an urgent need for effective border control and border management at national strategic level, something which proved to be inadequate due to ineffective cooperation and collaboration of state departments. Moreover, the study discovered that the lack of a national security policy and an integrated overarching national security strategy seem to be the main contributing factors to porous land borders. Such a national policy and strategy is supposed to be guiding the SANDF border safeguarding strategy.

The findings indicated that all the neighbouring countries of South Africa are very close in terms of economic, social and political history and that they are also dependent on the economy of South Africa. This is mainly due to a past migration history during which foreign citizens were used as a source of labour in South African mines and the farming sector. Undocumented immigrants, contraband, an unknown number of immigrants and the increasing number of illegal immigrants who are in the country fraudulently worsen the socio-economic problems of the country and pose a variety of security threats.

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APPENDIX A: INITIAL PROBING QUESTIONS

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What type of illicit crimes are prevalent and consistent across South African borders?
2. What are the factors contributing to porous borders in South Africa?
3. What challenges does the South African National Defence Force face in safeguarding the borders?
4. Which border area/s in South Africa are the most vulnerable to illegal crossing, and what solutions can be implemented?
5. What technology, border surveillance or monitoring systems does the South African National Defence Force use as a force multiplier to detect the movement of illegal migrants?
6. In what conditions is the boarder infrastructures and facilities?
7. Were there incidents of South African National Defence Force members or South African Police Service members being physically attacked by violent illegal migrants or criminal syndicates crossing the border illegally? If so elaborate?
8. Have there been incidents of illegal migrants attempting to bribe South African Defence Force members, if so, have there been members that have accepted bribes? What actions have been taken against these members?
9. How many illegal migrants have been arrested by the South African National Defence Force members and handed over to the South African Police Services over the last five years? Elaborate the main reasons for illegal border crossing amongst apprehended illegal migrants
10. Is there any service level agreement or Memorandum of Understanding between the South African National Defence Force, the South African Police Services and other border agencies?
11. What standard operating procedure does the South African National Defence Force follow once an illegal foreigner has been apprehended?
12. Are there incidences of attempted border fence cutting or theft of border fencing material?
13. Are there any illegal activities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft system reported to the South African National Defence Force or South African Police Services?
14. How many static airspace surveillance and aircrafts are allocated to border tasking for rapid deployment, and what should be the requirement?

15. What are the impacts of illegal border crossing and illicit crimes to the South African society, economy and environmental management?
16. Do you think there is political will in South Africa to address the issues of border security and management? Elaborate
17. How do porous borders affect the South African commercial farmers along the border, and how does this impact on food security?
18. How is the corporation between the South African Defence Force, rural communities, farmers and agricultural organisations on safeguarding South African borders?
19. Are there cases reported to the South African Defence Force or the South African Police Services of the hiring of illegal migrants for cheap labour? Elaborate the details of such cases.
20. Were there incidents where farmers or rural communities were physically attacked by illegal migrants to gain access to boarders? Elaborate on such incidents.
21. What is the South African National Defence Force success rate on border security and law enforcement. Can you share data, incidents and information about success stories?
22. What is the cooperation, communication and information flow between the different state departments and border agencies operating within and along the borders?
23. If there is collaboration, how frequent do border agencies and the relevant departments meet on border agenda?
24. Is there a bilateral agreement between South Africa and neighbouring countries in the SADC region on border security? If so, how effective is this agreement?
25. What were the gaps identified by South African National Defence Force during taking over of border functions from the South African Police Services and how is the South African National Defence Force addressing those gaps?
26. How is the South African National Defence Force coping with 15 companies and the minimum resources allocation?
27. How are the terrain conditions around South African borders? Do these conditions hinder border patrol by South African National Defence Force members?
28. Can you explain the weakness of laws impacting on the effectiveness of the execution of safeguarding of the South African borders?
29. What is the involvement of the South African National Defence Force trans boundary protected areas, and what is its cooperation with the neighbouring countries?

30. Which international border management and control practices do you think the South African National Defence Force or South African government should adopt?
31. How can the existing border safeguarding capabilities be improved in securing the country's land borders?
32. What possible economic and societal threats can be associated with porous borders in South Africa?
33. How do cross border criminal activities pose threats to the South African national security?
34. What are the political threats and effects that can be linked to porous borders in South Africa?
35. Is the South African National Defence Force conducting patrols 24 hours? If so, what are the challenges faced by soldiers during night patrols and what is the nature of illegal border crossing activities during nighttime?
36. Which land borders are the priority of the South African National Defence Force and why?
37. How does the SADC region and South Africa collaborate to combat illegal boarder activities in the region?
38. According to reports on apprehended illegal migrants, what are the reasons compelling them to cross boarders illegally as opposed to following legal processes to come into South Africa?
39. Is corruption in other departments a contributing factor to porous borders in South Africa, and what are rapid solutions to address this issue?
40. What is your perception of the feelings of communities living close to the borders about the South African National Defence Force?

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS VALIDITY TEST

Dear Sir/ Madam

I am a registered student at Stellenbosch University. I am engaged in a research project on exploring the causes of porous borders and their effects on South Africa's national security.

The purpose of this document is to pilot and pre-test the validity of the interview questions before commencement of the interview.

You are humbly requested to assist me by identifying the weakness and the relevance of the questions to achieve the following objectives in **appendix A: (a)** to explore the causes of porous land borders in South Africa **(b)** to explore the threats presented by porous land borders to South Africa's national security, and **(c)** to explore the areas of the South Africa land borders that needs attention. You are welcome to offer advice on the gaps identified.

Instructions: This survey deals with your opinion judgment on the validity of these question for the study. You're requested to assess each item by applying a three-point Likert scale. Please show the extent to which you think the questions are measuring what the researcher is intending to measure by comparing the questions with the objectives. Do this by picking one of the three numbers next to each statement. If you strongly agree with the statement, cross out **3**, cross out **2** if you think the statement is useful but not essential, and lastly cross out **1** if you strongly disagree with the statement or you think the statement is not necessary.

The questionnaire should take you about 5-10 minutes to complete. Please answer the questions by making an **X** across the number in the spaces provided. The information you provide will be treated in the strictest confidence.

Please return the completed questionnaire by emailing or WhatsApp it to xxxxxxx@yahoo.com or **0000000000** by no later than **10 June 2019**. If you have any questions or would like further information, please feel free to WhatsApp me.

I thank you

(A.P. LETLAPE)

STUDENT STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Section A: Exploring the causes of porous land borders in South Africa.

Theme number	Interview questions	Not necessary	Useful but not essential	Essential
1	In your view does the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have enough resources to cope with safeguarding the land borders?	1	2	3
2	Is ethical behaviour an issue within the SANDF or other departments that are involved in land border protection?	1	2	3
3	Is the SANDF effective in terms of detecting, preventing and interdicting illegal land border crossing?	1	2	3
4	Is there a structure for coordination and cooperation among official entities responsible for land border protection?	1	2	3
5	Do you think the current South African border management policy is adequately clear, and does it have a deterrent effect in dealing with illegal crossing	1	2	3
6	What do you consider to be the shortcomings of the national security strategies and policies guiding the SANDF border safeguarding?	1	2	3
7	How is the SANDF coping with the vast geographical border, yet almost no border fencing?	1	2	3
8	Why does South Africa seem to be a target (pull) country for migration while we have other neighbouring countries like Botswana, Namibia who are economically and politically stable?	1	2	3

Theme number	Interview questions	Not necessary	Useful but not essential	Essential
9	What are the reasons compelling illegal immigrants to cross borders illegally as opposed to following legal processes to come into South Africa?	1	2	3

Section B. Exploring the threats presented by porous land borders to South Africa's national security.

Theme number	Interview questions	Not necessary	Useful but not essential	Essential
1	What are the possible economic threats that may be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?	1	2	3
2	What are the possible political threats that may be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?	1	2	3
3	What are the possible societal threats that can be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?	1	2	3
4	To what extent could illegal immigration impact negatively on South Africa?	1	2	3
5	What criminal activities are prevalent along the South African land border and what are their impact on national security?	1	2	3
6	What are the possible environmental threats that can be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?	1	2	3

Section C. Exploring the areas of the South African land borders that needs attention.

Theme number	Interview questions	Not necessary	Useful but not essential	Essential
1	Which area of the land border is vulnerable and needs the most attention from the SANDF, and why?	1	2	3
2	According to the defence annual report, the SANDF has 15 units deployed along land borders instead of 22 units. How does the SANDF deal with unmanned areas?	1	2	3

APPENDIX C: FINAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Section A: Exploring the causes of porous land borders in South Africa.

1. In your view, does the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have enough resources to cope with safeguarding the land borders?
2. Is ethical behaviour an issue within the SANDF or other departments that are involved in land border protection?
3. Is the SANDF effective in terms of detecting, preventing and interdicting illegal land border crossing?
4. Is there a structure for coordination and cooperation among official entities responsible for land border protection?
5. Do you think the current South African border management policy is adequately clear, and does it have a deterrent effect in dealing with illegal crossings?
6. What do you consider to be the shortcomings of the national security strategies and policies guiding the SANDF's border safeguarding?
7. How is the SANDF coping with the vast geographical border and almost no border fencing?
8. Why does South Africa seem to be a preferred target (pull) country for migration while we have other neighbouring countries like Botswana and Namibia are also economically and politically stable?
9. What are the reasons compelling illegal immigrants to cross borders illegally as opposed to following legal processes to enter South Africa?

Section B. Exploring the threats presented by porous land borders to South Africa's national security.

1. What are the possible economic threats that can be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?
2. What are the possible political threats that can be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?

3. What are the possible societal threats that can be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?
4. To what extent could illegal immigration impact negatively on South Africa?
5. What criminal activities are prevalent along the South African land border, and how do they impact on national security?
6. What are the possible environmental threats that may be associated with porous land borders in South Africa?

Section C. Exploring the areas of the South African land borders that need attention.

1. Which area of the land border is vulnerable and needs the most attention from the SANDF, and why?
2. According to the defence annual report the SANDF has 15 units deployed along land borders instead of 22 units, how does the SANDF deal with unmanned areas?

APPENDIX D: PERMISSION LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

RESTRICTED

 defence intelligence
Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Telephone: (012) 315-0215
Fax: (012) 326-3246
Enquiries: Brig Gen T.G. Baloyi

DI/DDS/R/202/3/7
Defence Intelligence
Private Bag X337
Pretoria
0001
eB April 2019

**AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DOD)
COL A.P. LETLAPE**

1. Receipt of a request letter SANDC/R/103/1/61 to conduct research in the DOD dd02 April 2019 with a research proposal attached as per requirement is acknowledged.
2. Col A.P. Letlape – who is a student on Security and Defence Studies Programme (SDSP) 05/19 - is hereby granted permission from a security perspective to conduct research in the DOD on the topic entitled **“The Causes of Porous Borders and their Effects on South African National Security,”** to be submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters Degree in Military Science (MMIL) under the auspices of the University of Stellenbosch as requested.
3. After the completion of the research, the final research product must be forwarded to Defence Intelligence (DI), Sub-Division Counter Intelligence (SDCI) for a final authorisation before it may be published or distributed to any entity outside the DOD.
4. Access to DOD information is however granted on condition that there is adherence to inter alia Section 104 of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002) pertaining to protection of DOD Classified Information and the consequences of noncompliance.
5. For your attention.



CHIEF DIRECTOR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE: MAJ GEN
KS/KS (Col A.P. Letlape)

DSTR

For Action

Commandant SA National Defence College (Attention: Col A.P. Letlape)

Internal

File: DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX E: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH



UNIVERSITEIT • STELLENBOSCH • UNIVERSITY
jou kennisvenoot • your knowledge partner

STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

You are invited to take part in a study conducted by Mr Abel Patswaite Letlape, Masters student from the Faculty of Military Science of Stellenbosch University. You were approached as a possible participant because of your knowledge and experience in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the field of border safeguarding.

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to obtain the information from the South African National Defence Force Senior Staff Officers who are responsible for safeguarding South African land borders. The crux of the study is to understand the causes of the influx of illegal immigrants into South Africa and the consequences therefor.

2. WHAT WILL BE ASKED OF ME?

If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to answer questions related to land border safeguarding during the interview. The interview questions consist of three sections. In the first section you will be asked about the causes of porous land borders. In the second section you will be asked about the consequences of porous land borders. In the third and final section you will be asked about the areas of South Africa which need attention. The estimated time for the interview is one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes. If you decide to take part in the study, you will be required to sign this informed consent form. The location of the interview will be at a place of your choice.

3. POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

There are no procedures in the study that may result in personal risk, discomfort or inconvenience.

4. POSSIBLE BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO THE SOCIETY

The benefit of participating in this study is that you will make a contribution towards establishing the causes and possible solutions to porous land borders. Participants will have access to the final research product free of charge and on request.

5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION

Please note that you **will not be paid** to participate in the study.

6. PROTECTION OF YOUR INFORMATION, CONFIDENTIALITY AND IDENTITY

Your interview answers will be totally anonymous, and your identity will not be revealed under any circumstance. Also, nobody will be able to connect any answers to you in any recognisable way. The results of this study might be published in a scientific journal and/or presented at scientific meetings, but again without revealing the identity of any research participant. The original and audio-recorded interview answers will be stored in a safe place for five years, after which they will be destroyed. The information received during the project will only be used for research purposes. The Researcher himself, Mr A.P. Letlape will transcribe interviews. You will be requested to grant the permission to record interviews prior the commencement of the interviews.

7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any stage without any penalty or future disadvantage whatsoever. You don't even have to provide the reason/s for your decision.

8. RESEARCHERS' CONTACT INFORMATION

If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact Abel Patswaite Letlape at xxxxxxx@yahoo.com, 012 000 0000, and/or the supervisor Dr Justin Van der Merwe at xxx@ma2.sun.ac.za, 022 000 000.

9. RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact Ms XXXX at the Division for Research Development.

DECLARATION OF CONSENT BY THE PARTICIPANT

As the participant I confirm that:

- I have read the above information and it is written in a language that I am comfortable with.
- I have had a chance to ask questions and all my questions have been answered.
- All issues related to privacy, and the confidentiality and use of the information I provide, have been explained.

By signing below, I _____ agree to take part in this research study, as conducted by Abel Patswaite Letlape.

Signature of Participant

Date

DECLARATION BY THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR

As the **principal investigator**, I hereby declare that the information contained in this document has been thoroughly explained to the participant. I also declare that the participant has been encouraged (and has been given ample time) to ask any questions. In addition, I would like to select the following option:

	The conversation with the participant was conducted in a language in which the participant is fluent.
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Signature of Principal Investigator

Date

APPENDIX F: REC NOTICE OF APPROVAL**NOTICE OF APPROVAL**

REC: Social, Behavioural and Education Research (SBER) - Initial
Application Form

1 August 2019

Project number: 9685

Project Title: The Causes of Porous Land Borders and their Effects on South African National Security: A South African National Defence Force Perspective

Dear Mr Abel Letlape

Your REC: Social, Behavioural and Education Research (SBER) - Initial Application Form submitted on 16 July 2019 was reviewed and approved by the REC: Humanities.

Please note the following for your approved submission:

Ethics approval period:

Protocol approval date (Humanities)	Protocol expiration date (Humanities)
1 August 2019	31 July 2022

GENERAL COMMENTS:

Please take note of the General Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines.

If the researcher deviates in any way from the proposal approved by the REC: Humanities, the researcher must notify the REC of these changes.

Please use your SU project number (9685) on any documents or correspondence with the REC concerning your project.

Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

FOR CONTINUATION OF PROJECTS AFTER REC APPROVAL PERIOD

Please note that a progress report should be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee: Humanities before the approval period has expired if a continuation of ethics approval is required. The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary)

Included Documents:

Document Type	File Name	Date	Version
Research Protocol/Proposal	MMil_Final Proposal	18/06/2019	final
Budget	Research Budget	19/06/2019	1
Data collection tool	Abel Interview guide or questionnaire_19 June 2019	19/06/2019	Final
Proof of permission	Authority to conduct research in the DOD Col AP Letlape	19/06/2019	1
Default	CV JUSTIN VAN DER MERWE 12 April 2019	20/06/2019	1
Informed Consent Form	Abel consent sheet_15 July19	15/07/2019	2
Default	SU Ethics Response sheet_15 July 19	15/07/2019	1

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the REC office at xxx@sun.ac.za.

Sincerely,

REC Coordinator: Research Ethics Committee: Human Research (Humanities)

National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number: REC-050411-032.

The Research Ethics Committee: Humanities complies with the SA National Health Act No.61 2003 as it pertains to health research. In addition, this committee abides by the ethical norms and

principles for research established by the Declaration of Helsinki (2013) and the Department of Health Guidelines for Ethical Research:

Principles Structures and Processes (2nd Ed.) 2015. Annually a number of projects may be selected randomly for an external audit.

Investigator Responsibilities

Protection of Human Research Participants

Some of the general responsibilities investigators have when conducting research involving human participants are listed below:

1. Conducting the Research. You are responsible for making sure that the research is conducted according to the REC approved research protocol. You are also responsible for the actions of all your co-investigators and research staff involved with this research. You must also ensure that the research is conducted within the standards of your field of research.

2. Participant Enrolment. You may not recruit or enrol participants prior to the REC approval date or after the expiration date of REC approval. All recruitment materials for any form of media must be approved by the REC prior to their use.

3. Informed Consent. You are responsible for obtaining and documenting effective informed consent using **only** the REC-approved consent documents/process, and for ensuring that no human participants are involved in research prior to obtaining their informed consent. Please give all participants copies of the signed informed consent documents. Keep the originals in your secured research files for at least five (5) years.

4. Continuing Review. The REC must review and approve all REC-approved research proposals at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk but not less than once per year. There is **no grace period**. Prior to the date on which the REC approval of the research expires, **it is your responsibility to submit the progress report in a timely fashion to ensure a lapse in REC approval does not occur**. If REC approval of your research lapses, you must stop new participant enrolment, and contact the REC office immediately.

5. Amendments and Changes. If you wish to amend or change any aspect of your research (such as research design, interventions or procedures, participant population, informed consent

document, instruments, surveys or recruiting material), you must submit the amendment to the REC for review using the current

Amendment Form. You **may not initiate** any amendments or changes to your research without first obtaining written REC review and approval. The **only exception** is when it is necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants and the REC should be immediately informed of this necessity.

6. Adverse or Unanticipated Events. Any serious adverse events, participant complaints, and all unanticipated problems that involve risks to participants or others, as well as any research related injuries, occurring at this institution or at other performance sites must be reported to Malene Fouche within **five (5) days** of discovery of the incident. You must also report any instances of serious or continuing problems, or non-compliance with the REC requirements for protecting human research participants. The only exception to this policy is that the death of a research participant must be reported in accordance with the Stellenbosch University Research Ethics Committee Standard Operating Procedures. All reportable events should be submitted to the REC using the Serious Adverse Event Report Form.

7. Research Record Keeping. You must keep the following research related records, at a minimum, in a secure location for a minimum of five years: the REC approved research proposal and all amendments; all informed consent documents; recruiting materials; continuing review reports; adverse or unanticipated events; and all correspondence from the REC

8. Provision of Counselling or emergency support. When a dedicated counsellor or psychologist provides support to a participant without prior REC review and approval, to the extent permitted by law, such activities will not be recognised as research nor the data used in support of research. Such cases should be indicated in the progress report or final report.

9. Final reports. When you have completed (no further participant enrolment, interactions or interventions) or stopped work on your research, you must submit a Final Report to the REC.

10. On-Site Evaluations, Inspections, or Audits. If you are notified that your research will be reviewed or audited by the sponsor or any other external agency or any internal group, you must inform the REC immediately of the impending audit/evaluation.