

Enfranchised Africans and disfranchising
legislations: An analysis of the educated
landowners of Queenstown as an African
middle class, c.1872-1909.

by

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Declaration

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Summary

The right to vote in public political elections for parliamentary representatives in the Cape Colony was determined by various legislations reflected through the Cape franchise. For 34 years, Africans had the right to vote for parliamentary representatives in the Cape Colony under the Constitution Ordinance of 1853 with no barriers of racial discrimination. Under Responsible Government (1872-1909), franchise requirement became more stringent with the aim of excluding Africans from being able to vote given that they had started to register more frequently.

The battle of an emerging African middle class against economic and political forces is explored through the analysis of the implementation of stringent disfranchising legislations implemented in 1887, 1892 and 1894. Newspapers are used alongside a range of government publications to illustrate how the effects of disfranchisement legislations in the Cape Colony were complex and more nuanced than has been explored in existing historiography. The study illustrates some of the effects disfranchisement legislations had on the enfranchised African middle class and uses the Queenstown electoral division as a lens through which it brings this into focus.

The primary tools that were used to achieve disenfranchisement were land and education which are themes used throughout the study to demonstrate persistent voter registration of the African middle class despite the implementation of disfranchisement legislations. The study moves away from the emphasis of African political participation as a primary contributor to maintaining certain politicians in parliament but rather illuminates the agency of Africans who desired to participate in Cape politics through the franchise. What this study aims to contribute to historiography is a perspective on the views and experiences of Africans towards disfranchisement as expressed in a selection of newspapers. These African perspectives are complemented by a statistical analysis of the voters' rolls which more precisely determines the size of affected African voters and adds to an understanding of the extent to which Africans participated beyond 1887 with a focus on the Queenstown electoral division.

Opsomming¹

Verskeie wette, soos weerspieël in die Kaapse kiesreg, het die reg bepaal om in die Kaapkolonie in openbare politieke verkiesings vir parlementêre verteenwoordigers te stem. Ingevolge die Grondwetlike Verordening van 1853 het swart mense 34 jaar lank stemreg gehad sonder die beletsel van rassediskriminasie. Onder die stelsel van verantwoordelike regering (1872-1909) het stemregvereistes egter strenger geword. Dit het ten doel gehad om swart mense uit te sluit van stemreg aangesien hulle al hoe meer as kiesers begin registreer het.

Hierdie tesis ondersoek 'n opkomende swart middelklas se stryd teen ekonomiese en politieke magte. Die ondersoek word gedoen deur die wetgewing van 1887, 1892 en 1894 vir die ontkiesering van swart mense te analiseer. Koerante en 'n reeks regeringspublikasies word gebruik om te wys dat die gevolge van die wetgewing in die Kaapkolonie om swart mense van stemreg te ontnem kompleks en meer genuanseerd was as wat tot dusver in die historiografie ondersoek is. Die studie illustreer 'n paar van die gevolge wat die wetgewing op ontkiesering op die stemgeregtigde swart middelklas gehad het en wel deur die Queenstown-kiesafdeling as lens te gebruik.

Die primêre instrumente wat gebruik is om stemreg te ontnem was grond en onderrig. Laasgenoemde is regdeur die studie as temas gebruik om die volgehoue registrasie van kiesers uit die swart middelklas, ondanks die implementering van wetgewing op die ontneming van stemreg, aan te toon. Die studie beweeg weg van die klem op swart politieke deelname as 'n primêre bydraer om sekere politici in die parlement te hou en belig eerder die agentskap van swart mense wat graag deur hul stemreg aan die Kaapse politiek wou deelneem.

Hierdie studie poog om 'n perspektief op swart mense se sienings en ondervindings van ontkiesering, soos uitgebeeld in geselekteerde koerante, tot die historiografie by te dra. Hierdie perspektiewe word aangevul deur 'n statistiese analise van die kieserslys wat die aantal swart kiesers wat beïnvloed is, meer presies bepaal en wat bydra tot 'n begrip van die omvang van swart mense se politieke deelname na 1887 met 'n fokus op die Queenstown-kiesersafdeling.

¹ Kindly translated by Carine Janse van Rensburg.

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Introduction

Overview

When John Sishuba arrived at Lovedale in 1876 the future seemed bright. The son of a landowning headman, he was sent to Lovedale, the leading school for Africans, to gain an education and join the ranks of the expanding African middle class. This thesis is about the qualified successes of this emerging African middle class in their battle against economic and political forces that tried to stymie their progress. Through the use of a selection of newspapers and various government publications this thesis aims to capture the experiences and responses African individuals such as John Sishuba had with, and to, the implementation of disfranchisement legislations implemented in 1887, 1892 and 1894.

Africans participated in the Cape franchise according to the Constitution Ordinance of 1853 which preceded the implementation of disfranchising legislations. Under this ordinance the Cape franchise was considered liberal because there was no racial discrimination for participation and it allowed all men over the age of 21 who had a minimum income of £50 per annum or occupied a combination of land and property worth £25, to vote.² Disfranchising legislations implemented in 1887, 1892 and 1894 were specifically targeted at African participation and limited their prospects for participation while contributing to extensive political upheaval. The primary tools that were used to achieve this disenfranchisement were land and education. This thesis makes use of these tools to argue for the existence of an African middle class who persistently continued to participate in the franchise despite the implementation of disfranchisement legislations. The motive for this is that both land and education influenced African professions and contributed to the socio-economic position of Africans within society. This thesis further seeks to illustrate some of the effects disfranchisement legislations had on the enfranchised African middle class and uses the Queenstown electoral division as a lens through which to bring this into focus.

² A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. Cape Town: David Philip, 1984, p.4.

African participation in the Cape Colony's franchise has frequently been analysed within the context of parliamentary divisional politics between political parties³ in an attempt to understand how the African vote contributed to the return of parliamentary members who were identified as 'friends of the natives.'⁴ In these analyses, understanding African participation has mainly been viewed in terms of its contribution to maintaining certain politicians in parliament, that is, without attributing to their own agency as Africans who desired to participate in Cape politics through the franchise. What this study contributes to historiography is a perspective on the views and experiences of Africans such as John Sishuba towards disfranchisement as expressed in articles from a selection of newspapers. These African perspectives are complemented by a statistical analysis of the voters' rolls – a methodology previously neglected – which more precisely determines the size of affected African voters. While the most commonly used source is the statistics provided in the Cape of Good Hope debates in the House of Assembly for the deliberation on the 1887 disfranchisement legislation, the voters' rolls used here adds to an understanding of the extent to which Africans participated beyond 1887 with a focus on the Queenstown electoral division.

The study comprises four chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of Queenstown as a geo-political region that allows for an analysis of an African middle class that participated in the Cape franchise. Chapter Two provides a brief discussion of the Constitution Ordinance as an attempt to promote political unification under representative government (1853-1872) in the Cape Colony. It demonstrates how Africans increasingly began to register to participate in the Cape franchise but how this participation was capped with the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887. To that end, the chapter examines the process of implementation of this Act and how additional measures were enforced in an attempt to curtail the registration of Africans. Chapter Three explores the dissatisfaction of Afrikaner Bond members in parliament with the outcome of the Parliamentary Registration Act and how they agitated for new and stricter legislation to be implemented in order to address the franchise. It looks at the different suggestions that were made and how these suggestions often pivoted around land and education. The chapter briefly discusses the meaning education had for

³ S. Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910." *The Journal of African History*, 9:1 (1968), pp.79-98.; R. Parry. "'In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens...': Rhodes, Race, and the Ideology of Segregation at the Cape in the Late Nineteenth Century." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 17:3 (1983), pp.377-391.

⁴ K. Wilburn. "'Friend of the Native?': James Sivewright and the Cape Liberal Tradition." *South African Historical Journal*, 65:2 (2013), pp.271-292.

Africans and how they took it upon themselves to obtain an education. The chapter also examines what continued African franchise participation looked like in the Cape Colony and whether the effects of the disfranchisement legislations discussed earlier in the chapter were reflected in the voters' rolls of Queenstown. The chapter concludes that, although land and education were used as tools in an attempt to disfranchise Africans, both land and education were paradoxically also key elements that allowed for continued political participation and contributed to the persistence of an African middle class. Chapter Four looks at the Glen Grey question as a prelude to the Glen Grey Act and evaluates how the land question specifically affected Africans who lived in the location.⁵ It demonstrates that Africans had a continued desire to occupy land communally which irritated government who promoted land occupation on individual tenure. It evaluates the different elements of the Glen Grey Act, what it attempted to achieve, the response to the Act by different newspapers and the way in which Africans made attempts to contest the Act through petitions.

Terminology

This thesis makes use of the broad term 'African' to refer to the various groups in the Cape Colony that were considered 'natives.' 'African' in this study is therefore inclusive of the Xhosa, Fingo/Mfengu, Pondo, Thembu, Hlubi, Gcaleka, Ngika, among other Bantu-speaking ethnic groups in the Cape Colony. There is a variety of terms that were used during the colonial period, some of which were, and remain, derogatory and which would therefore be inappropriate to use. Scholars have opted for the use of different terms which are considered acceptable and which they feel most comfortable with or which fit their narrative. This includes, among others, terminology such as 'African', 'black,' 'black African,' and 'non-white.' The term that is preferred in this thesis is 'African.' This thesis will also use the terms 'white', 'colonist', and 'European' interchangeably to refer to white people. The Population Registration Act of 1950 introduced a classification of the broad racial groups (under which ethnic groups were classified) African, Coloured, Indian, and White, a classification repealed in 1991.⁶ In the past this classification was often used in a political context to construct laws and policies that would either favour or discriminate against a particular group, regardless of

⁵ A. 86-1880. Cape Printed Annexures. Location Act No. 40 of 1879. The term 'locations' became an official administrative term for African rural settlements in the Cape Colony which is the context in which it is used throughout this thesis. The term 'location' in South Africa (synonymous with Township) later became used for underdeveloped urban areas commonly built on the fringes of towns and cities.

⁶ N. L. Clark & W. H. Worger. *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp.49-50/114.

ethnicity. This study focuses particularly on the African group who was the target for disfranchisement legislations in the Cape Colony. The term ‘native’ will however be used if it forms part of a quote, a reference, or a title.

Historical context

South Africa’s history can be divided into a number of different political periods, each with a unique contribution to understanding the position Africans found themselves in and how government policies contributed towards these positions. Similar to Christopher Saunders and Rodney Davenport⁷ (2000) in their analysis of the history of South Africa, Leonard Thompson (2001) gives an overview of that history spanning colonialism to a post-democratic South Africa which demonstrates how varied the lived experiences of Africans were under the different political regimes.⁸ His work demonstrates how, although there had been clear differences in political regimes and their influence on the South African people, different regimes also influenced one another.⁹ As a British Colony the Cape was administered throughout the nineteenth century according to British colonial structures and regulations.¹⁰ A bicameral parliament under representative government was introduced in the Cape Colony in 1853 with executive officials having to report directly to the British government. Representative government was considered a victory for the political elite who advocated for political inclusiveness, especially with the introduction of a multiracial franchise.¹¹ Despite the multiracial franchise, however, politics continued to be dominated by colonists in the Cape.¹² This meant that, although Africans were theoretically equal to all other citizens in the Colony, in practice colonists were ‘more equal’ than Africans.¹³ Stanley Trapido’s *The Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853* (1964) has been a valuable source of reference for many historians because it usefully maps the factors that contributed towards the implementation of the 1853 franchise ordinance as well as the process through which the franchise qualification was agreed upon.¹⁴ He also argues that while the introduction of representative government in

⁷ R. Davenport & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 5th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

⁸ L. Thompson. *A History of South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

⁹ L. Thompson. *A History of South Africa*. 2001.

¹⁰ W. J. Blignaut. *Die Invoer van Verantwoordelike Bestuur in the Kaapkolonie 1872*. Ongepubliseerde MA-tesis, Stellenbosch Universiteit, 1940.

¹¹ D. R. Edgecombe. “The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910.” *Kleio*, 10:1-2 (1978), pp.21-37.

¹² L. Thompson. *A History of South Africa*. 2001, pp.64-65.

¹³ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*, 1984, p.4.

¹⁴ S. Trapido. “The Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853.” *The Journal of African History*, 5:1 (1964), pp.37-54.

1853 meant that ‘non-whites’¹⁵ were able to participate in politics this was not necessarily done because the government of the day had the best interests of Africans in mind.¹⁶

In 1872 the Cape Colony was granted responsible governance which meant that the executive would report to the Cape parliament and no longer to the British government. Blignaut (1940) examines the important implications of the introduction of responsible governance in the Cape Colony in 1872 and how it affected the position of the British administration. He outlines the process of transition and the various opinions from members of parliament, media and colonists in response to the shift away from the representative government of 1853-1872. He also documents what the transition to responsible governance meant for the Cape Colony.¹⁷ The period of responsible governance in the Cape Colony (1872-1909) is an important period to contextualise the persistence of an African middle class in light of the various laws passed to frustrate the advancement of Africans. African participation in the Cape franchise did not receive much attention during the period of representative governance because not many Africans registered to vote. Trapido has argued that Africans increasingly started to register for the franchise in the early 1880s as a result of encouragement from English-speaking politicians and the African Press.¹⁸ Increased registration by Africans in turn spurred increased agitation and drew attention to franchise legislations and measures of qualification that specifically targeted African participants¹⁹ and which resulted in the implementation of core disenfranchisement legislations. In this context it becomes all the more important to understand how an African middle class positioned itself in a changing society that contributed to shaping inequality in South Africa. This thesis aims to contribute to such an understanding.

Analyses of disenfranchisement are frequently limited to the specific period during which disenfranchising legislations were implemented (1886-1894) generally allowing for no more than 5 years before and/or after. As a result of such limited scope authors such as Ruth Edgecombe (1978) have argued that the lack of racial classification during these years do not allow for an understanding of how the implementation of disenfranchisement legislations impacted

¹⁵ In many government publications and previous studies, such terminology was used as a reference to Africans with the notion of othering them from whites, who in most instances were the ones documenting and writing up these reports. This often automatically grouped all ethnic groups together.

¹⁶ S. Trapido. “The Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853.” 1964, pp.38-40.

¹⁷ W. J. Blignaut. *Die Invoer van Verantwoordelike Bestuur in die Kaapkolonie 1872*. 1940.

¹⁸ S. Trapido. “African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910.” 1968, pp.79-98.

¹⁹ M. Plaut. *Promise and Despair: The First Struggle for a Non-racial South Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016, p.19.

Africans.²⁰ However, with the use of the voters' rolls in this study for years beyond 1886-1894, the introduction of race in 1903 in the voters' rolls allows for an analysis of the implementation of disenfranchisement legislations and how it impacted Africans throughout the period of responsible government. Scholars also commonly refer to statistics provided in the Cape of Good Hope debates in the House of Assembly as a reference point for the impact of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 but have generally not assessed the impact of the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 or the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which this study aims to do.²¹ A recent study by Farai Nyika and Johan Fourie (2020) challenges the numbers used in previous historiography and argues that the impact of disenfranchisement legislations has not been accurately represented precisely because of limited access to correct numbers.²² With the consideration of the study by Nyika and Fourie, this thesis makes use of the voters' roles to further understand African franchise participation and the effects of the various disenfranchisement legislations throughout the period of responsible government.

Literature on disenfranchisement frequently addresses African franchise participation in relation to its role in the advancement of politicians in parliament. For Trapido (1968), Africans became increasingly concerned with elections as a result of the Afrikaner Bond fighting its first organised election campaign in 1884.²³ The rise of the Afrikaner Bond was considered a threat to differential legislations and the illusory protection of the imperial government for Africans. Trapido argues that English-speaking politicians encouraged Africans to register for the franchise with the hope that their votes would help them retain their seats.²⁴ The Afrikaner Bond played a significant role in the process of disenfranchisement and key policies that affected Africans in the Cape Colony. Davenport (1966) analyses the emergence and existence of the Afrikaner Bond as a political party throughout its existence in the Cape in the period 1880-1911.²⁵ He discusses its role and attitude towards both British and Africans and, on a

²⁰ D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1978, p.34.

²¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328; A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2012, p.96; D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1987, p.23.

²² F. Nyika & J. Fourie. "Black Disenfranchisement in the Cape Colony, c.1887–1909: Challenging the Numbers," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 46:3 (2020), pp.455-469.

²³ S. Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910." 1968.

²⁴ S. Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910." 1968, p.79; R. Davenport & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.79.

²⁵ T. R. H. Davenport. *The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African Political Party 1880-1911*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966.

broader scale, the impact it had on the development of South Africa.²⁶ Davenport is of the view that since the Afrikaner Bond was an amalgamation of the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* and the *boeren vereenigingen* (farmers' associations), one of its most important objectives was the protection of the interests of Afrikaner farmers, and thus the Cape Bond's political attitude towards race distinction aimed to 'pass legislation, stock thieving, squatting and other questions important to the farmer.'²⁷ The economic and political nature of the conflict involving the Afrikaner Bond in the period 1870-1915 is further outlined by Giliomee who argues that conflict between classes in the Cape Colony ambiguously transformed into a conflict of ethnicity.²⁸

In alignment with Bundy's (1979) study which outlines the material prosperity of Africans in the 1870s,²⁹ Malherbe (1976), in his analysis of education in South Africa, argues that the Cape had prospered materially in the second half of the nineteenth century which in essence effected the structure of education. He argues that the introduction of responsible government led to a more prosperous Cape Colony and a 'greater interest in the public life of the Colony'³⁰ than ever before. Increasing exports, the introduction of railway construction that opened the interior, encouragement of agriculture and different irrigation methods, access to work at the Cape Town harbour, and the increasing use of the telegraph that connected the Colony to the rest of the world contributed to this prosperity – a 'material prosperity accompanied by a very rapid growth in the number of children attending schools.' Despite this, not all children of school-going age were in fact attending school, especially not Africans.³¹ Additional sources relating to education will further be discussed throughout Chapter 3.

In the following literature review I consider the specific meaning of 'class' used in this thesis with reference to the specific geography (Queenstown) under investigation.

²⁶ T. R. H. Davenport. *The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African Political Party 1880-1911*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966, p.113.

²⁷ T. R. H. Davenport. *The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African Political Party 1880-1911*. 1966, p.113.

²⁸ H. Giliomee. "Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915," *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 14:1 (1987), pp.38-63.

²⁹ C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. London: Heinemann. 1979.

³⁰ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*, Volume 1. Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd, 1976, p.91.

³¹ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*, Volume 1. Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd, 1976, pp.91-92.

Literature review

The north-eastern frontier was the site of the Eighth Frontier War also known as the war of Mlanjeni which spanned the years 1850 to 1853.³² Jeff Peires (1982), who, through an in-depth use of oral history, African texts, and private letters, has been at the forefront in documenting the history of war on the Cape frontier as well as African experiences and conditions in the Eastern Cape,³³ describes the Eighth Frontier War as the ‘longest, hardest and ugliest war ever fought over one hundred years of bloodshed on the Cape Colony’s eastern frontier.’³⁴

Land conflict has always been intensely intertwined with race conflict in South Africa, which has contributed to extensive violence and the notable nine frontier wars.³⁵ At the end of the Eighth Frontier War in 1853 a previously independent portion of African territory was annexed to the Cape Colony and named Queenstown.³⁶ Annexation was spearheaded by Sir George Cathcart who had been instated as Cape Governor (1851-1853) and who aimed to populate a portion of the district with colonists with the hope of creating a defence settlement at its centre. In the process of doing so he allowed Africans who were considered loyal to the Colony to remain in the district by granting them the land they already occupied.³⁷ Legassick (1993) identifies the nineteenth century as the most important and decisive period in shaping the racial order in South Africa.³⁸ His study is complementary to Tim Keegan’s (1996) analysis on racial order in colonial South Africa which argues that even so-called liberal colonists were more concerned with promoting their own self-interest than establishing equality for all.³⁹

³² T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa’s First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. Cape Town: Penguin Books, 2018, pp.11-14.

³³ His work includes: J. B. Peires. *The dead will arise: Nongqawuse and the great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2003.; J. B. Peires. *A history of the Xhosa from 1600 to 1850*. Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.; J. B. Peires, et al. *Umbutho wesizwe: the African National Congress of the Eastern Cape*. King Williamstown: ANCE, Calata House, 2012.

³⁴ Peires, J. B. *The house of Phalo: a history of the Xhosa people in the days of their independence*. Berkeley: University California Press, 1982, p.12.

³⁵ First war (1779-1781), second war (1789-1793), third war (1799-1803), fourth war (1811-1812), fifth war (1818-1819), sixth war (1834-1836), seventh war (1846-1847), eighth war (1850-1853), ninth war (1877-1879).

³⁶ P. J. Lombard. *Die Stigting en Vroeë Geskiedenis van Queenstown (1853-1859)*. Cape Town, South Africa: Archives of the Union of South Africa, 1952.

³⁷ R. Bouch. The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 1990, pp.18/23-25/56; L. G. Robson. The Royal Engineering and Settlement Planning in the Cape Colony 1806-1872. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pretoria. 2011, p.262.

³⁸ M. Legassick. “The State, Racism and the Rise of Capitalism in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony.” *South African Historical Journal*, 28:1 (1993), pp.329-368.

³⁹ T. Keegan. *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996.

Africans were not seen as equal citizens to colonist and more often than not this was reflected in their socio-economic and political position within society, which underscores why an understanding of an African middle class is important. In *Ciskei: economics and politics of dependence in a South African homeland* (1980), Nancy Charton analyses the interrelation between economic and political dependence in the Ciskei and further contributes to the literature that demonstrates the manner and extent to which white rule impacted Africans during the late nineteenth century.⁴⁰ Her work picks up from Peires's *The House of Phalo*⁴¹ and expands the analysis into a later period. Although Peires focuses on a time frame much earlier than the one being addressed in this study, it provides a foundation to understanding how the economy of Africans became vulnerable through contact with colonists and how a pre-colonial African economy later merged into the colonial economy.⁴² The adaption to the colonial economy as a result of the increasing dependence on, and demand for, labour combined with the influence of Christianity resulted in a pluralist society.⁴³ Peires's work also laid the foundation for authors such as Colin Bundy⁴⁴ (1979) and Andre Odendaal⁴⁵ (1983), among many others,⁴⁶ who have analysed how the lives of Africans fit into the colonial structure of the Cape. With the exception of a small number of studies such as *Peasants and the Creation of an African Middle Class in Umtata* (1993),⁴⁷ analyses of an African middle class have often been positioned within a broader analysis of South African history or treated as subsidiary to the narrative of an emerging African working class. Part of what this study aims to achieve is to bring a narrative of an African middle class to the fore through the lens of a specific geography, namely Queenstown.

P. J. Lombard's *Die Stigting en Vroeë Geskiedenis van Queenstown (1853-1859)* (1952) is one of the earliest texts to provide a comprehensive study of Queenstown. It outlines the structure of the town and the colonial influence that was introduced which coincided with the

⁴⁰ N. Charton. *Ciskei: economics and politics of dependence in a South African homeland*. London: Croom Helm, 1980.

⁴¹ J. B. Peires. *The House of Phalo: a history of the Xhosa people in the days of their independence*. 1982.

⁴² J. B. Peires. *The House of Phalo: a history of the Xhosa people in the days of their independence*. 1982.

⁴³ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.2.

⁴⁴ C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979.

⁴⁵ A. Odendaal. African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Cambridge. 1983, p.17.

⁴⁶ He is referenced in several scholarly works done that refer to the early history of Africans (Xhosa specifically) in the Cape as well as the Nongqawuse and Cattle-killing Movement of 1856-7.

⁴⁷ S. Redding. "Peasants and the Creation of an African Middle Class in Umtata, 1880-1950." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 26:3. (1993), pp.513-539.

introduction of representative government in the Cape Colony in 1853.⁴⁸ This text influenced various studies to follow, including that of Megan Voss (2012) who writes about the making of colonial Queenstown as an urbanising centre and the role frontier intelligentsia played in the process from 1859 to 1877. She positions the role of frontier intelligentsia as the driving force behind segregation in the region, which informed moral discourse and the agricultural undertakings that contributed to the creation of the specific socio-economic and political structure of Queenstown.⁴⁹ She identifies the Queenstown Press as being at the forefront of this intelligentsia because it contributed towards the introduction of various institutions that paved the way for the establishment of a colonial order in the region. Voss describes this intelligentsia in the same way Saul Dubow⁵⁰ (2006) describes the colonial intelligentsia, as being ‘English, masculine...pro-education, pro-missionary and pro-technological advancement.’⁵¹ Through the lens of the Queenstown Press Voss’ thesis also looks at how this intelligentsia interacted with Africans in the region. It argues that their relationship pivoted around space and land development as the shaping principles of segregation which were enforced through architecture and agriculture as well as the exploitation of African labour.⁵² It is important to note that although Voss uses the Queenstown Press as a lens to refract the relationship between colonists and Africans in the region, the press hardly incorporated an African voice, perspective or opinions because Africans were primarily viewed as subordinates.⁵³ To correct this deficit, the African Press is the primary source used throughout this thesis as a basis for representing and understanding African opinions and expressions in relation to franchise participation and the introduction of disfranchising legislations.

In his unpublished Ph.D dissertation (1990) Richard Bouch describes colonization in Queenstown to have been underpinned by trade with Africans which ‘encouraged regional incorporation into the capitalist, colonial and world economies.’⁵⁴ He describes Queenstown as a pastoral wool-producing farming district whose economy flourished because of the Eastern

⁴⁸ P. J. Lombard. *Die Stigting en Vroeë Geskiedenis van Queenstown (1853-1859)*. 1952.

⁴⁹ M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 – 1877*. Unpublished M.A thesis, University of Cape Town. 2012.

⁵⁰ S. Dubow. *A commonwealth of knowledge: science, sensibility, and white South Africa, 1820-2000*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

⁵¹ M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 – 1877*. 2012, p.19

⁵² M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 – 1877*. 2012, Chapters 2 & 3.

⁵³ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.12.

⁵⁴ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.12.

Cape's relationship with the wool market of London, England, and how the expansion of the colonial economy allowed it to become increasingly enmeshed in the world economy. By focusing on expending mercantile institutions, Bouch looks at the 'complex interplay of economics with the racial and administrative policies which attended the transactions of the colonial power' with Africans.⁵⁵ Odendaal (1984) argues that tribal authority gradually became redundant and started to disintegrate as traditional ideals were revolutionised and Africans took up their place in the new capitalist and western political order as a result of which fault lines developed in African societies between modernists and traditionalists.⁵⁶ These studies have made significant contributions to our understanding of the socio-economic and political context in Queenstown. However, their analyses primarily focused on the perspectives, contributions and experiences of colonists to better understand the socio-political or economic development of Africans in the region. The description of the African experience has therefore been secondary to that of the colonist. This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of Africans' socio-economic and political experiences and perspectives with specific attention being paid to the emerging African middle class which frequently acted as a voice of the broader African community.

R. Parry argued that 'ideology and economics can be seen as reciprocally influential manifestations of class' structures.⁵⁷ Therefore, when speaking about an 'African middle class' it is important to define what is meant by this phrase and to be clear about who forms part of this collective. Such a definition must, in turn, be situated in the various debates that have contributed to our understanding of what constitutes a middle class. Authors such as J. Raynor and J. M. Raynor (1969) have argued that the middle class is the most vulnerable sector in the class structure because it is in constant flux as a result of its composition and function constantly changing.⁵⁸ To further complicate matters, there is no universally agreed upon measure or definition for distinguishing the working class from the middle class.⁵⁹ This means that an individual or group may have a different position in a different stratification order according to the criteria used by a specific author. For instance, scholars have formulated definitions of 'middle class' according to their 'respective empirical reality and theoretical

⁵⁵ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.10.

⁵⁶ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, pp.2-3.

⁵⁷ R. Parry. "In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens...", *Rhodes, Race, and the Ideology of Segregation at the Cape in the Late Nineteenth Century.* 1983, p.378.

⁵⁸ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.4.

⁵⁹ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.5.

approach'⁶⁰ – something which has continually undermined the possibility of terminological consensus.⁶¹ Despite such differences most literature on the topic of 'class' is rooted in either a Weberian or a Marxist theoretical framework with authors often pitting one against the other. Abercrombie and Urry (1938) assume a Marxist approach and argue that classes should be viewed as entities possessing causal power. As a result their analysis explores the interdependence of different social forces which possess such power.⁶² J. Raynor and J. M. Raynor (1969), on the other hand, apply a Weberian separation of class, social status and power and highlight that, although class status is a function of one's economic position, class, power and status influence one another but should not be mistaken as synonymous with another.⁶³ They identify occupation, income and opportunities of social mobility as key determinants of one's class position.⁶⁴ The analysis in this thesis leans towards distinguishing 'middle class' in line with Weber's separation of economic position, social status and power. While recognising that these factors strongly influence one another the study does not consider the terms to be synonymous.

As a result of the debate on what constitutes a middle class it is recognised that the middle class is not monolithic, in part, because it is often defined using different sets of criteria and, in part, because it often contains subgroups. Combined, this makes the concept of a middle class multidimensional.⁶⁵ In this study, middle class is defined as an intermediate group determined by its socio-economic position and political participation within society. It is identified by factors that influence its socio-economic status and which, in this historical study, allowed members of the middle class to participate politically through the franchise. Factors that allowed for this participation included minimum income, land and property occupation, as well as education. These are often used as standard measures in determining class and an individual's social and economic mobility across classes.⁶⁶ With the absence of specific income information for the African population for the period 1872-1909, the minimum income is

⁶⁰ L. Dreyer. *The Modern African Elite in South Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1989, p.8.

⁶¹ L. Dreyer. *The Modern African Elite in South Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1989, p.8.

⁶² N. Abercrombie & J. Urry. *Capital, Labour and the Middle Class*. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1938, p.1.

⁶³ J. Raynor, & J. M. Raynor. *The Middle Class*. London: Longmans. 1969, p.5.

⁶⁴ J. Raynor, & J. M. Raynor. *The Middle Class*. London: Longmans. 1969, p.6.

⁶⁵ L. Dreyer. *The Modern African Elite in South Africa*. 1989, p.8; N. Abercrombie & J. Urry. *Capital, Labour and the Middle Class*. 1938, p.1; J. Raynor, & J. M. Raynor. *The Middle Class*. 1969, pp.5-8.

⁶⁶ G. Clark. *The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014; D. Grusky, E. Cumberworth. "A National Protocol for Measuring Intergenerational Mobility." Stanford Center for The Study of Poverty and Inequality. 2010.

determined by the £25⁶⁷ requirement for political participation in the Cape franchise. The reason why this indication is appropriate as an indication of class is because participation in the franchise throughout the second half of the nineteenth century was considered to be very high and restricted to a specific population group determined mainly by class.⁶⁸

Recently, the African middle class has become a more topical object of analysis in South African historiography.⁶⁹ However, analyses of this group have mainly been based on their position and function throughout the 20th century and, more recently, in contemporary South Africa.⁷⁰ Although not ignored, the perception of this group in the nineteenth century has commonly been spasmodic or subsumed under a broader analysis of an African middle class in the 20th century.⁷¹ This means that not much work has primarily focused on a nineteenth-century African middle class, especially not work that has made use of a specific criteria such as the Cape franchise that explicitly identifies this class as such a collective and which this study aims to achieve.

The Black Problem by D. D. T. Jabavu (1921) is an example of an analysis of Africans' socio-economic position based on political transitions in the 20th century. It defines an African middle class through the overlap of social status and the interdependence of different social forces.⁷² The book is a representation of African aspirations towards equality for mainly the educated, middle class and an illustration of the position that Africans in the broader context found themselves in. The expression of the experience of Africans focuses primarily on the 20th

⁶⁷ The pound sterling was adapted from 1826 as the standard currency in the Cape Colony similar to other British colonies. The pound was subdivided into 20 shillings and 12 pence at the time (i.e. 12 pence (12d) = 1 shilling (1s), and 20s = 1 pound (£1)).

⁶⁸ E. Roux. *Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's struggle for freedom in South Africa*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1948, pp.64-68.

⁶⁹ J. Visagie, & D. Posel. "A reconsideration of what and who is middle class in South Africa." *Development Southern Africa*. 30:2, (2013), pp.149-167.; R. Southall. "Political Change and the Black Middle Class in Democratic South Africa." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*. 38:3, (2004), pp.521-542.; Crankshaw, O. "Theories of class and the African 'middle class' in South Africa, 1969-1983." *Africa Perspective*. 1:1&2 (1986), pp.3-33.; Du Toit, P, Rivero, C. G, & Kotzé, H. "Tracking the development of the middle class in democratic South Africa." *Politeia*. 22:3, (2003), pp.6-29.

⁷⁰ Du Toit, P, Rivero, C. G, & Kotzé, H. "Tracking the development of the middle class in democratic South Africa." 2003.

⁷¹ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012.; A. Odendaal. *African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation: University of Cambridge. 1983.

⁷¹ R. Southall. "The African Middle Class in South Africa 1910–1994." *Economic History of Developing Regions*. 29:2, (2014), pp.287-310; A. G. Cobley. *Class and Consciousness; The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa, 1924-1950*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

⁷² D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems*. Alice: Lovedale Press, 1921.

century.⁷³ However, the roots of most of these experiences can be traced to the late nineteenth century and the newly formed Union of South Africa in 1910, which further stymied the development of African people, both politically and socio-economically. Jabavu's study is based on four primary themes which correlate with themes that have been identified as significant in the analysis of understanding the position of the African middle class. These are a) political position and participation; b) access to education; c) agricultural practices, and d) economic and social position within society.⁷⁴ This study accepts these four themes as point of departure but focusses on the nineteenth, and not the 20th, century.

Another key publication by Jabavu is *The Segregation Fallacy and other papers* (1928) which also focusses on the early 20th century.⁷⁵ The book is a compilation of papers of which the most striking and necessary for the purpose of this thesis are those that deal with Africans' participation in the vote. A feature chapter in the book is *The Disfranchisement of the Cape Native* which looks at the position of Africans as participants in the political sphere. Jabavu believed that the raised qualification for participation in the franchise was a fair measure to recognize civilized men, more especially those of African descent. He argues that 'the franchise is ethically moral because it places a premium on merit rather than colour.'⁷⁶

Jabavu thinks of disenfranchisement of the Cape 'natives' within the context of the establishment of the Union of South Africa and the accompanying implementation of legislations while disregarding the perceptions or effect of these legislations. For instance, he suggests that Africans from the Cape were not really disadvantaged by the implementation of these disenfranchisement legislations and that they accepted the implementations because they did not want to lose their 'political and social privilege' relative to others in the country (across the borders of the Cape). With the transition to Union in 1910, one could argue that Jabavu deliberately focuses on the 20th century because he formed part of this elite and as such had access to privilege. This, despite the fact that he formed part of a generation that would have experienced the ramifications of what we now identify as disenfranchisement legislations, but which nonetheless allowed him to agree with the raised qualification as a fair standard for

⁷³ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems*. Alice: Lovedale Press, 1921.

⁷⁴ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems*. 1921.

⁷⁵ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The segregation fallacy, and other papers: a native view of some South African inter-racial problem*. Alice: Lovedale Press. 1928.

⁷⁶ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The segregation fallacy, and other papers: a native view of some South African inter-racial problem*. Alice: Lovedale Press. 1928.

distinguishing between, what he considers to be, civilized and uncivilized Africans. In essence, the article shows that disenfranchisement meant different things for different people and that not everyone shared the same view on the implementation of disenfranchisement legislations. Under a subtitle *The Cape Native View*, Jabavu argues that ‘the franchise is thus nothing less than the noblest monument of the white man’s rule, emblematic of his genuineness in practising the precepts of Holy Scripture towards the subject races.’⁷⁷ In his opinion, white people – especially missionaries who made education accessible – have proven themselves to be ‘friends of the natives.’⁷⁸ Although Jabavu writes of disenfranchisement purely in relation to the policies under the Union of South Africa, his reference of African participation is that of the Cape franchise. This makes the stance on the attitude of Africans towards participation pivotal. He highlights that ‘there seems to be no likelihood of keeping the African man down or back from his march towards ultimate liberty in education, economic life, and political privileges any more than it was possible for King Canute to block the ocean tide by an act of volition.’⁷⁹

A further motivation for the research conducted for this thesis derives from the suggestions by Alan Cobley (1990) and Roger Southall (2004) that studies of class in South Africa have largely focused on ‘the origins and development of an African working class’ specifically in relation to the nineteenth century.⁸⁰ Where interest is shown in the socio-economic history and character of the middle class it is predominantly done in the context of its participation in the political mobilization of Africans and the role it played in the creation and development of the ANC.⁸¹ An example of this is Odendaal’s dissertation⁸² (1983) on the political mobilisation of Africans in the Eastern Cape between 1880-1910, as well as his later work *The Founders* (2012) which follows similar themes to his dissertation.⁸³ *The Founders* is an account of how the establishment of the SANNC (later renamed ANC) was the outcome of late nineteenth century’s multifaceted influences that inspired the formation, by Africans, of an organization to represent the interests of Africans. Odendaal identifies the key figures at the forefront of the

⁷⁷ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The segregation fallacy, and other papers: a native view of some South African inter-racial problem.*

⁷⁸ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems.*

⁷⁹ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems.*

⁸⁰ R. Southall. “The African Middle Class in South Africa 1910-1994.” 2014, p.1.

⁸¹ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa.* 2012; R. Southall. “The African Middle Class in South Africa 1910–1994.” 2014; P. Limb. *The ANC’s Early Years: Nation, Class and Place in South Africa before 1940.* Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010; P. Jordan. “The African Petty Bourgeoisie: A Force for Change or for the Status Quo.” *The Economist Unit of the ANC Seminar.* 1984.

⁸² A. Odendaal. *African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910.* 1983.

⁸³ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa.* 2012.

creation of the SANNC and the contributions they made to the political mobilisation of Africans. These leaders were understood to mostly be a product of an educated middle class elite of Africans who have positioned themselves uniquely within the socio-economic structure of the late nineteenth century. In the context of the Cape, these leaders previously participated in the Cape franchise and were often agents who mobilized Africans for a common cause.

Odendaal identifies the African Press as key in encouraging Africans to obtain an education, participate in the franchise, and to engage in matters that concerned Africans and the colony at large.⁸⁴ He also discusses the result of the integration of an African economy into the colonial economy as a consequence of trade and how it further undermined the already existing economic structure in the Cape. Odendaal goes on to explain that within this context there was some form of stratification within African society that allowed for the emergence of a petty bourgeoisie that strived for upward mobilisation in colonial society. Social mobility, however, was beyond the scope of Odendaal's dissertation as he primarily focused on the political mobilisation of Africans. Nevertheless, he recognises that upward mobilisation was restricted as a result of the recurrent constraints imposed by the colonial government. These constraints included disenfranchisement, labour laws and land legislations that tended to create downward mobility and the suppression of Africans. In his dissertation he argues that despite the various constraints that were devised to hinder the progression of Africans, there was a group of Africans that successfully maintained a socio-economic position in the Cape as was reflected in their political participation in the Cape franchise. This thesis explores this group of Africans who successfully maintained their socio-economic position throughout the period of responsible government in the Cape Colony. It also contributes to the understanding of the existence of an African collective in a way similarly demonstrated by Odendaal but without the extensive emphasis on the contribution which that collective made to the establishment of the ANC. This thesis explores how various families in Queenstown, that were not necessarily at the forefront of the formation of the ANC, were keen participants in the franchise.

Although the foundation laid by the nineteenth century African middle class played an important role in the political and socio-economical efforts made at the beginning of the twentieth century, the political changes in South Africa had hindered a linear progression of this collective. This study, therefore, is aligned to analyses of authors such as Abercrombie and

⁸⁴ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012.

Bradley who have acknowledged that, although inferences can be made from a period before or after the period being addressed in a study, distinct factors apply to each period that cannot be relayed between the periods or contexts. Abercrombie, who wrote in the 20th century, argues that, based on the changing variants of contemporary capitalism, a contemporary middle class (in the 20th century) cannot necessarily be replicated by using the same measures as used in the eighteenth and nineteenth century for the identification of middle classes.⁸⁵ This is amplified by the use of the Cape franchise which is used in this study for the analysis of an African middle class in the late nineteenth century through the use of the voters' rolls. The voters' rolls which reflected how Africans were registering for the franchise were only recorded during the period of responsible government in the Cape Colony. This means that the same tool (the voters' rolls) cannot be used as an identifier for an African middle class in the years before (during representative government when franchise policies were more liberal), or for the following years (after the formation of the Union of South Africa when franchise policies became more stringent). Bradley who wrote an article in 1875 titled *The question mark over the future of the middle class*, argues that the eighteenth and nineteenth century middle classes were mostly propertied and entrepreneurial groups located between landowners on the one side and urban industrial workers and agricultural labourers on the other side. He contrasts the eighteenth and nineteenth century middle classes to a contemporary middle class which were identified as such based on white-collar occupations from high professionals to routine clerical workers.⁸⁶

Methodology

This study makes use of an empirical-analytical approach through the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. Newspapers of the nineteenth century are used as a primary source because they provide a lens through which to view how people experienced specific events in addition to offering us an understanding of how they expressed themselves through their thoughts and opinions at any particular point in time. Various matters that affected Africans were addressed in these newspaper including themes that this study focuses on, namely, the land question, access to education for Africans, and how changes in education structures affected them, and more particularly, the question of participation in the disenfranchisement legislations that aimed to exclude Africans from the Cape franchise. Newspapers also serve as an alternative to reports where the original is no longer available, which is the case in various

⁸⁵N. Abercrombie & J. Urry. *Capital, Labour and the Middle Class*. 1938.

⁸⁶I. Bradley. "The question mark over the future of the middle class." *The Times*. 7 January 1975. Referenced in N. Abercrombie & J. Urry. *Capital, Labour and the Middle Class*.

court cases related to the franchise, especially contested cases submitted to the Supreme Court as well as petitions that Africans drafted to contest the implementation of the various disfranchisement legislations. Although the press did not always make specific reference to Queenstown or reflected on specific experiences in the region, it still provides insight into the political views and experiences of Africans, the type of activities they engaged in, their common interests, important events that affected them - all of which provide insights into how they viewed disfranchisement legislations and how they were affected by them.

One of the newspapers that is used throughout this thesis is *Imvo Zabantsundu*, the brainchild of John Tengu Jabavu.⁸⁷ Before John Tengu Jabavu established his own newspaper, he was the newspaper editor of *Isigidimi samaXhosa*,⁸⁸ a newspaper established in 1870 in an attempt to cater for Africans as a monthly publication written in both English and Xhosa, which was a first in the Cape Colony.⁸⁹ The initial aim of the newspaper was to promote reading of 'wider subject' among Africans which occasionally reflected the opinion of Africans on education, religion, and Africans customs which were considered 'topics that the rising middle class deemed important.'⁹⁰ John Tengu Jabavu's involvement with *Isigidimi samaXhosa* greatly influenced the establishment of *Imvo Zabantsundu*, which aimed to serve as the 'mouthpiece' of African opinion. Odendaal notes that after a couple of years the newspaper became so popular and important that it always received more letters than it could publish.⁹¹ Therefore, views expressed in *Imvo Zabantsundu* are particularly important as it reflected the views, opinions, and experiences of Africans in the Cape Colony. Similar to *Isigidimi samaXhosa*, it published articles in both English and isiXhosa, which was accommodating to the audience they were targeting. In addition to *Imvo Zabantsundu*, this study also makes use of *The Christian Express* whose publications were unique because of how the newspaper positioned

⁸⁷ Before establishing his own newspaper, he was the newspaper editor of *Isigidimi samaXhosa* (One of the first newspapers to be published in isiXhosa, driven by Christian missionaries - mainly the Glasgow Missionary Society and the Wesleyan Methodist Society. The newspaper was also strongly linked to Lovedale.). He is frequently identified as a political activist and wrote extensively on rights for Africans and the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. He was the first African person to be asked to stand for election in the Cape Colony in 1883. He declined with the view that it would be counterproductive.

⁸⁸ First edited by the Lovedale Principle, James Stewert, who allowed for the collaboration of 'African students who translated some English columns and provided other news of interest.' The newspaper later went on to split in 1873 to *Isigidimi samaXhosa* and *The Kafir Express*, where Elijah Makiwane instated as editor. A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.35-37.

⁸⁹ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.35.

⁹⁰ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.35.

⁹¹ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.35.

itself as sympathetic to the plight of Africans and was a strong advocate for African education and advancement. It mainly expressed the perspective of the Lovedale⁹² missionaries, which meant that, although they were in many instances sympathetic towards Africans during the disfranchisement period, these perspectives also make it clear that Africans were not considered equal to colonists. *The Journal* was a Grahamstown based newspaper that expressed strong opinions on different affairs throughout the Colony. This included events and the experiences of people and organisations outside of Grahamstown and its surroundings, as is evident in the extensive reports on Queenstown and Glen Grey in particular. In one of its publications, it indicated that the paper had ‘a guaranteed circulation in the Eastern Province of four times that of any newspaper’ and dubbed itself as ‘unequaled as an advertising Medium’ which makes opinions expressed in the newspaper useful for an understanding of the different attitudes and experiences related to land, education and franchise participation.⁹³

A variety of Government Publications are also used because they offer important insight into what was happening in the colony. They are significant because they are official records and reflect a wide range of activities and various developments. The use of the Blue Books of Native Affairs, the Voters’ Rolls and the Superintendent-General of Education Reports form part of the Government Publications used. The Blue Books of Native Affairs are a compilation of reports on the account of Africans in their divisions, written by the civil commissioner and the resident magistrate. The reports are therefore observations of the colonial administration on the socio-economic conditions of the location and how things were changing over time. In this study the focus is on the reports for Queenstown during the period 1872-1909, published annually. Through these reports one is able to gain perspective on how Africans received the implementation of policies, their involvement and attitude to the Ninth Frontier War and how they were affected by the drought in the region. The reports also provide detailed insight into socio-economic conditions in Queenstown, noting how things in the region have changed over time. They allow one to identify the opinions and attitudes of Africans towards certain policies and how they perceived the impact of those policies on their lives. For instance, they provide an overview of the responses to the Ninth Frontier War of 1879, the rumours leading up to it, and the degree of involvement of the people of Queenstown. The reports also provide

⁹² A missionary and educational institution initially founded in 1824 by the Glasgow Missionary Society but destroyed in 1834 and later rebuilt. The institution made provision for the education of Africans, both male and female.

⁹³ *The Journal*, 7 January 1874, p.1.

information about the drought, efforts made by Africans to combat its affects, and the degree of wealth measured by how much livestock was in the region, the allocation of land, and the type of crops Africans planted in the different seasons, access to schools, population estimates, and many other statistics.

This study also makes use of the Superintendent-General of Education Reports to gain insight into the structure of schools in the respective areas, the quality of education and the extent of the exposure to education in the region. It provides information on attendance, enrolment, and pass rates of all primary schools for each standard in the Cape Colony. Statistics are provided for public schools, mission schools and African industrial schools. The tables in the reports identify each school by name, the size of the annual grant allocated, school fees and grants donated from other sources. They mainly look at how each institution was funded and to what degree. Although significant, the study will not make in depth use of such information because the focus is not on the schools themselves but rather on the pupils that attended them. The degree of financial support that was provided by the government serves as an indication of the standard of the school and potentially the condition that it was in, based on maintenance and upkeep.

The voters' rolls of the Cape Colony are used as a source to indicate how African participation was affected, with a specific focus on the Queenstown electoral division. The voters' rolls are a compiled list of individuals who were eligible to vote in a particular electoral division. The rolls form part of the Government publications that were recorded biennially and were documented throughout the period of responsible government in the Cape Colony. The primary purpose of these rolls was to estimate and regulate the participation of potential voters per electoral division. They were also used to design elections in the sense of identifying and preventing those who did not qualify for the franchise from participating while monitoring the election process so that people could not vote multiple times. Information was recorded according to the 1853 Constitutional Ordinance and later legislations that dictated the qualifications of the Cape franchise. Eligible candidates had to register every second year with the exception of 1886-1887 which was influenced by the adjustment to the franchise legislation. From the first voters' roll (1872) records included only the electoral division, field-cornetcy, surname, and the individual's Christian name. Due to adjustment in legislation and new requirements, rolls after 1887 include the qualification based on property and ownership as well as the individual's profession/trade. In 1903 the voters' rolls started recording the race

of registered individuals as well. This micro-level data provides the information necessary to determine who the individuals were who participated in the franchise, which field-cornetcy they formed part of, and whether they qualified on the premise of property ownership or profession. As a result of this classification race has been classified into two groups, the first includes whites and coloureds as 'O' and the second includes Africans as 'B.' Whites and coloureds are grouped together in one category because the similarity in surnames makes it challenging to distinguish between individuals in the two racial groups. For the purpose of this study the classification of whites and coloureds in one category is relatively unproblematic because the focus is only on African participants.

From the information provided in the voters' rolls one can arrive at certain conclusions regarding the trends of participation and how they changed over time, particularly in the Queenstown Electoral Division over the period of responsible government (1872-1909). These trends can be analysed in terms of the various categories provided in the voters' rolls, for example, the participation of Africans according to field-cornetcy, trends of occupation/profession of Africans, and more significantly, trends of participation of various African families and how this changed over time. The racial classification was 'E' for Europeans, 'O' for others, 'F' for Fingo, 'K' for all other Africans, and 'H' for Hottentot. These ethnic group classifications were generically used throughout government records. Although the voters' rolls only started to record race from 1903 onwards, racial classification for the years preceding 1903 is arrived at by matching names classified between 1903 and 1909 with names *not* classified in the period 1872 to 1903 (if they participated in previous years). It was found that in many cases those who participated in the franchise frequently appeared on the registration lists throughout the period, which allows one to manually match participants between the different years. To do this, it is assumed that they would have been classified in the same way if they had participated in previous years. In cases where it was not possible to make a match to already identified names, distinct African names and surnames were identified and classified accordingly.⁹⁴ Through the use of the voters' roll as a political tool the study not only evaluates African participation but also explores who the African participants in the Cape franchise were and what their degree of participation was. The significance of identifying and understanding African participation derives from the fact that the Cape franchise qualification

⁹⁴ Examples include Gungu Solomon, Matthew Xuma, Beyana Bodoza, Lingani Lungisa, Mtwa Mnyengeza, Vimba Mtombeni, all of whom appeared on the 1872 Queenstown registration list.

requirements were, at least towards the end of the period of analysis, quite high, which afforded only a select few to participate. It also affords some understanding of how disfranchisement legislations affected African participation. Participation based on qualification automatically distinguished the group of participants in the upper socio-economic spectrum, qualifying them as members of an African middle class. As is true for much of African colonial history there is very little recorded micro-level data for Africans in the Cape Colony – hence the uniqueness and importance of the data provided in the voters' rolls. It affords us valuable insight into a noteworthy group within the African community.

This study makes use of 48 256 observations of voter registration over the period 1872-1909 from the Queenstown Electoral Division recorded every second year. Based on this data the argument is made that the impact and consequences of the implementation of disenfranchisement legislations were more complex, nuanced and varied than suggested by previous historiography.

Chapter 1

Queenstown 1852 - 1880

Introduction

This chapter aims to demonstrate the relevance of Queenstown as an electoral division that reflected the participation of Africans in the Cape Colony's franchise. By focusing on a specific electoral division, one is able to gain perspective on African participation in the Cape Colony at a micro-level. A perspective of participation at such a level contributes to our understanding of how Africans continued to participate politically in the Cape Colony through franchise registration as well as an understanding of what their socio-economic position was throughout the period of responsible government. As an agriculturally based region that experienced urbanisation through trade, Queenstown allows one to analyse the relationship that both colonists and Africans had with the land and why land was considered such a useful mechanism for promoting disfranchisement. The annexation of 1852 meant that, what would become known as Queenstown, was considered part of the 'Colony proper' throughout both the period of representative government and of responsible government. As part of the 'Colony proper,' Queenstown fell under the colonial administration of the Cape government and experienced the transitions of its government structures – unlike the Transkei, Griqualand, and Pondoland which were only annexed at a later stage.

This chapter positions Queenstown geographically in the Cape Colony and outlines the different locations or townships in the Queenstown region. Different African groups are identified on the basis of which location they occupied. However, throughout the rest of the study, these groups will collectively be referred to as 'African.' The use of Queenstown as a lens makes it possible to understand how Glen Grey, located within the borders of Queenstown, was used as the blueprint for both political agitation and the implementation of the Glen Grey Act. In addition to setting the scene geographically, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that the period of responsible government saw a growth in African prosperity and advancement even as land became an increasingly limited commodity that spurred outright competition.

Locating Queenstown

Mr M. R. Robinson, deputy Surveyor General of the Eastern Districts, assisted by surveyor van Reenen, demarcated the first erven¹ in the town of Queenstown in 1853.² These were sized at half an acre and sold at £4 10s per erf. The layout of the town was oriented around a hexagon purposed as a defensive stronghold and buffer zone in case of war and was meant to be occupied by colonists.³ North-east to the town of Queenstown was the Glen Grey location which initially was a sub section of the Tambookie Location. Approximately 40 000 'loyal' and pardoned Thembu⁴ occupied this Queenstown location while, what was identified as Mfengu/Fingo⁵ allies, were located 32km south-west of Queenstown. These locations on the south-west were identified as Kamastone of the Wesleyan mission station, and Ockraal of the London Missionary Society on the site along the Ockraal river.⁶

South-east of the Kamastone and Ockraal Locations was Shiloh, a portion of the Queenstown region which formed part of the Moravian Mission. The Moravian Missionary Society established a station in 1828 at the request of Bawana, a local Thembu chief, which would later become known as Shiloh.⁷ Initially, before 1850, the location consisted of a plural community

¹ A section of land registered in the deed's office as a lot, plot or stand. 'Erven' is the plural of 'erf.' Because they are commonly used terms they are not italicised.

² The central town of Queenstown was also named Queenstown and was primarily occupied by colonists, as opposed to the surrounding locations in Queenstown which were initially mostly occupied by Africans. L. G. Robson. *The Royal Engineering and Settlement Planning in the Cape Colony 1806-1872*. 2011, p.262.

³ L. G. Robson. *The Royal Engineering and Settlement Planning in the Cape Colony 1806-1872*. 2011, pp.260-267.

⁴ 'Despite what Cathcart may have thought, the people who settled in Glen Grey under his plan were not all originally ethnic Thembu. Warner distinguished four 'tribes' amongst them: the Hala under Nonesi, the Ndungwana under Ndarala, the Tshatshu under Yiliswa and the Gcina under Tyopo. The Tshatshu were the late Maphasa's people, under the government of his widow until the majority of his son Gungubele. Tyopo of the Gcina was not of Thembu blood: the Gcina were a group of people assimilated into the greater Thembu polity. By 1853 they regarded themselves as Thembu and were accepted by the proper Thembu groupings in Glen Grey.' R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.121.

⁵ Although the origins of the Mfengu is unresolved with various theories having been presented, at the end of the eighth frontier war and the establishment of Queenstown in 1853, the socio-economic and political institutions of the Mfengu were in flux and unsettled by the conflict. In Queenstown, Sir Harry Smith is believed to have taken the initial steps to have brought the Mfengu under colonial rule through the annexation of the territory along the north frontier in 1847. By approximately 1840 a few Mfengu had settled in the area, followed by a further influx in 1847. (R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, pp.12/22). Moyer's comprehensive study on the Mfengu argues that they moved southward from Natal as refugees who initially reached Gcalekaland after escaping Mfecane. Fragmented groups of Mfengu continued to move and settled in various districts in the Cape Colony - some of their own accord others through the placement of the government. According to Moyer, the greater majority of Mfengu who settled in Ockraal and Kamastone were of the Hlubi sub-community. (R. A. Moyer. *A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape, 1815-1865*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, London University. 1976, pp.107/118/201/218/372.)

⁶ M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 - 1877*. 2012, p.7.

⁷ E. Wagenaar. *A History of the Thembu and their Relationship with the Cape, 1850-1909*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Rhodes University. 1988, pp.27-30.

made up of one-third Khoisan and a combined two-thirds of Thembu, Mfengu and Xhosa.⁸ After the 1850-1853 war Shiloh was reported to have been occupied by ‘rebels’ who joined the Xhosa against the colony which, in most instances, were those who occupied the location before the war.⁹ Slightly north to Shiloh was Whittlesea, a small military outpost established in 1834 during the Sixth Frontier War.¹⁰ These locations made up what, since 1853, has been known as Queenstown. Below is a map that illustrates the positions of the various locations.



*Map 1: 1850s Map of Queenstown*¹¹




⁸ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.20. Large quantities of fruit and vegetables were produced at the station.

⁹ M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 – 1877*. 2012, pp.7-8.

¹⁰ M. Voss. *Urbanizing the North-eastern Frontier: The Frontier Intelligentsia and the Making of Colonial Queenstown, c.1859 – 1877*. 2012, p.8.

¹¹ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. Ph.D dissertation, Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 1990, p.19.




-  Land over 1,200 metres or 3,937 feet
-  Land over 1,600 metres or 5,905 feet
-  Queenstown & region in the 1850s

The significance of Queenstown constituency as a lens through which to better understand African participation in the Cape Colony's franchise derives from the fact that it was predominantly occupied by Africans and was one of the key constituencies to see a significant increase in Africans registering for the vote. Queenstown was identified as one of the six key constituencies in the Cape of Good Hope debates in the House of Assembly that illustrated the need for African disfranchisement.¹² Map 2 below illustrates the relative proportion of the different races as percentages in the various divisions throughout the Cape Colony. The numbers show that the western region was predominantly populated by whites while the eastern region of the Colony was inhabited mainly by Africans. Map 3 highlights this differentiation through the extraction of the percentage of Africans in the different electoral divisions. By percentage, the regions which were predominantly inhabited by Africans were Aliwal North with 83.6%, Wodehouse with 76.2%, Queenstown with 83.3%, King Williamstown with 90%, Fort Beaufort with 68.9%, East London with 73.1%, and Peddie with 91.3%. This was in contrast to western regions where areas such as Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Paarl, Robertson, Worcester, Prince Albert, to name but a few, all had an African population of below 10%.

¹² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68.

Map 2: 1875 Map of the Cape Colony with relative proportions of race expressed as percentages in the various divisions¹³



¹³ Cape of Good Hope, *Census Reports*. 1875. (although the terminology used in the legend are derogatory, the map serves as an important illustration of the division of the different population groups in the Cape Colony. The appropriate labeling according to the current racial grouping would thus be understood as Red = White, Yellow & Blue = Coloured, Sienna = African/Black.)

Concern about increased African participation was a key feature in the Cape of Good Hope debates in the House of Assembly for deliberation for the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887¹⁷ as well as the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892.¹⁸ As justification for the Franchise and Ballot Act, Hofmeyr, leader of the Afrikaner Bond and representative of Stellenbosch, presented to the House of Assembly numbers on registered voters derived from the voters' rolls. He divided the Colony into three parts and identified these as the Western districts,¹⁹ Eastern districts,²⁰ and Frontier Circle.²¹ The Frontier Circle was noted to include Wodehouse, Aliwal North, King Williamstown, Queenstown, and East London.²² As shown in Map 1 and Map 2, compared to the rest of the Colony, the Frontier Circle was predominately populated by Africans. Below is a table that indicates how voter registration increased in the three identified parts of the colony in three election years prior to the implementation of the first disfranchisement legislation:

Table 1: Increase of voter registration according to Western, Eastern and Frontier Circle

Sectional division	1871	1878	1881
Western	20 800	22 192	39 264
Eastern	11 596	17 363	28 753
Frontier Circle	2 888	5 905	12 907

When comparing the election years in terms of a percentage increase it is evident that in the period 1871 to 1878 alone there was a 7% increase in the Western districts compared to a 50% increase in the Eastern districts and almost twice as much voter registration in the Frontier Circle, 104%. Increased participation shows a bigger spike in the period 1878 to 1881 with numbers in the Western districts increasing by 76.5%, in the Eastern district by 65% and in the Frontier Circle by 118.5% (greater still than the previous increase).²³ Hofmeyr reiterated that the Frontier Circle was mostly populated by Africans and that he therefore believed the increase in participation in this region was not due to more colonists registering for the franchise but

¹⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68.

¹⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

¹⁹ Section one (orange) and two (purple) on map 3.

²⁰ Section three (green) and four (red) on map 3.

²¹ Section five (grey) of map 3.

²² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

²³ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

rather indicated an increase in the number of Africans registering.²⁴ This contributed to the agitation aimed at excluding Africans from the franchise.

Africans' relationship with the land and their agricultural position in Queenstown

There was an acceleration of economic change in Queenstown between the 1860s and 1870s due to new forms of economic activity and technology which contributed to the development of various locations.²⁵ An example of this was the increased interest and investment in sheep for the purpose of wool production and the replacement of the pick with wagon drawn ploughs.²⁶ Throughout this period African men were gradually finding alternative ways to accumulate livestock and/or generate income while developing their own fields and locations.²⁷ Advancements continued throughout the 1870s with progress in agriculture as one of the greatest successes among Africans.²⁸ This is confirmed by the Civil Commissioners' Report of 1874 which states that in Glen Grey, where Africans would have bought one plough in 1870, they were buying five in 1874. One of the consequences of this development was that more soil was being cultivated which meant greater overall economic progress.²⁹

W. R. D. Fynn, who was identified as a Tambookie Agent in Queenstown, reported that Africans in the Glen Grey region were becoming a 'very wealthy tribe.'³⁰ Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this referred only to a portion of Africans who responded in a specific way to modernisation and the changes brought about through colonial influence. The response of Africans varied from those who adapted to structural changes within society to those who rejected it. The former is significant for this study because, in accordance with franchise requirements, they were the ones who contributed to the formation of an African middle class, who registered to participate in the franchise and, in most instances, converted to Christianity, assimilated to western norms, and had a basic formal education.³¹ Assimilation increased with the conversion to Christianity and the accumulation of agricultural equipment,

²⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

²⁵ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*. 27:1 (1993), p.4, C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979.

²⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62, Blue Books of Native Affairs, 1877, p.139. Blue Books of Native Affairs, 1876, pp.85-86.

²⁷ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, pp.7-8

²⁸ C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979. Chapter 3.

²⁹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62.

³⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.62.

³¹ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, pp.2-3.

clothing and forms of housing.³² However, government officials were under the impression that this increase in assimilation was due, less to the fact that Africans had ‘warm feeling of loyalty to the Government,’³³ than the fact that they attached themselves to colonists because of ‘self-interest, in the security of property, imperial administration of Justice, and facilities for accumulating wealth’³⁴ - as was pointed out by the civil commissioner, E. Judge.³⁵ Nevertheless, this was a period of advancement for Africans; when they were improving themselves economically to better adjust to changing colonial society.

Queenstown was a predominantly agricultural society which meant that although there were other activities in the region, the most prevalent activities involved agriculture. Therefore, the most notable group of Africans that can be assumed to have adjusted to these changes are those who were involved in agriculture. This is reflected in the phenomenon of the African middle class who registered to participate in the franchise and will be discussed in the chapters to follow. The significance of land as instrumental in determining the socio-economic position of Africans is demonstrated in Chapter 3 which illustrates that throughout the Queenstown electoral division the majority of Africans who registered for the vote were involved in agriculture.³⁶ This suggests a notable aspect of the continued importance land had for Africans at this time.

Upon his return as civil commissioner in 1876 John Hemming was struck by the progress Africans had made in Queenstown. His observation serves as an indication of how Africans in the Queenstown division were advancing throughout the 1870s and which allowed for their continued progression in qualifying for the franchise. He noted that there were ‘many cases of substantial huts and brick or stone tenements,’³⁷ which more often than not were brick houses – something he considered strange in his experience of Africans.³⁸ Many fruit trees were planted and ‘wherever a stream of water could be made available, it had been led out, and the soil cultivated as far as it could be irrigated; the slopes of the hills and even the summits of the mountains were cultivated wherever a plough could be introduced.’³⁹ The extent of land turned

³² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.61.

³³ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.59.

³⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.59.

³⁵ Blue Books of Native Affairs, 1874, p.59. & Blue Books of Native Affairs, 1879, p.181.

³⁶ The documentation of profession in the voters’ rolls was only introduced in 1887 after the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act. Therefore, there is no information available for profession before 1887.

³⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.85.

³⁸ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.85.

³⁹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.85.

over surprised him and he noted that he had not seen a larger extent of land cultivated for years, and that their crops promised to be abundant.⁴⁰

In the Glen Grey location a very large tract of land was reported to have been cultivated with the use of numerous ploughs and wagons.⁴¹ A couple of years before 1876, Hemming noted by way of comparison that during his time in the division the only location that was more progressive agriculturally than Glen Grey, was Kamastone and Oukraal. In these locations Africans were investing in products that were of higher value and that were yielding more profits, such as wool producing sheep which gradually superseded their investments in cattle.⁴² Kamastone and Oukraal were often referred to as one location and, similar to the attitude expressed by Africans in the Glen Grey location, the majority of Africans there preferred to occupy land communally with the exception of a few individuals who opted for individual tenure. The preference to occupy land communally annoyed government officials because they believed that they would be able to better manage Africans if they occupied land on the basis of individual tenure, which was one of their aims they set out for Africans to achieve in the Queenstown division.⁴³ The purpose of official government reports such as those written by the civil commissioner, served to provide government with an understanding of the position of Africans in the Cape Colony. They also assist in understanding how land continued to be used as a form of sustenance and as an instrument for advancement among Africans which, in turn, influenced government's attitude towards Africans.

The relationship Africans had with the land was not limited to how they cultivated the land or the type of dwelling they chose to erect on the land but was also influenced by the livestock that they were able to keep on the land, and how that contributed to increasing their prosperity. With only a small proportion of existing historiography providing details about the prosperity of Africans in the nineteenth century,⁴⁴ this study offers a micro-level analysis which further highlights their socio-economic position in the Cape Colony and how that position was influenced through the use of land. With limited information on the socio-economic position or income of African individuals, census reports and the Blue Books of Native Affairs are the

⁴⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, pp.85-86.

⁴¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, pp.85-86.

⁴² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62.

⁴³ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62; R. T. Ally. *The Development of the System of Individual Tenure for Africa, with special reference to the Glen Grey Act, c.1894-1927*. Rhodes University. 1985, pp.62-66.

⁴⁴ The most comprehensive study has been C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (1979) which many scholars used as a reference to demonstrate the advancement of Africans in the Cape Colony.

closest one can get to sources that allow for a more accurate understanding of the socio-economic position of Africans in the colony.

In the Glen Grey location of the Queenstown district it was recorded in the Blue Books of Native Affairs⁴⁵ that a total population of only 29 000 Africans were in possession of ‘stock amounting to 6 679 horses, 8 578 drought oxen, 22 812 other cattle, 140 528 woolled sheep, 213 other sheep, 4 783 angora goats, and 53 685 common goats.’⁴⁶ This meant that on average each individual man, woman and/or child in the location owned at least 5 sheep, 1 cow, and 2 goats, while a quarter of the population would have owned a horse. Such ownership statistics reveal something important about the socio-economic position of Africans in African dominated locations.

Administration structure in Queenstown

By the 1870s the structure of society in the Glen Grey location was also being influenced by the colonial administration which had instated 8 senior headmen and fifty-six subordinate headmen under them.⁴⁷ The colonial government had great influence in the selection of these headmen since, according to the 1870 commission, the influence of the chosen headmen had to be both beneficial to the people of the location and favourable to the colonial government.⁴⁸ The colonial officer in charge of the location supported this because he believed that such influence greatly contributed to reducing the power of the chiefs, especially given that the mandate of the headmen would then derive from the government and not the chief.⁴⁹

The appointment of these headmen was also influenced by the prospects of the use and ownership of land since land continued to be used as an instrument in determining and advancing an individual’s socio-economic position in the Frontier Circle of the Cape Colony. The colonial officer noted that of the 8 senior headmen, 5 were granted farms from the

⁴⁵ The Blue Books of Native Affairs differed from the Colonial Blue Books which formed part of the Government Publication. More accurately, the Colonial Blue Books prioritized recording information about colonists (and areas that were predominantly inhabited by colonists). There was no distinct source of information about Africans, and when information about Africans was included it was done on account of recording information for the region as a whole (which included information of colonists and Africans).

⁴⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.86; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.139.

⁴⁷ The Civil Commissioner reported that they had “in a great measure succeeded in destroying the influence of the chiefs over the Colonial Tambookies...Our interference with the rule of the chiefs has raised a spirit of independence amongst the people which needs being kept in check” Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.61.

⁴⁸ SG. File. S/140. Queenstown. Section.26. Report of the Commission, 16 July 1870.

⁴⁹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.61.

government because of ‘good conduct and loyalty.’⁵⁰ Extensive improvements were made on these farms which included the erection of substantial brick houses.⁵¹

In Kamastone there were 2 mission glebes⁵² of fifty morgen each, 2 farms of five hundred acres each, and another 2 farms of thousand acres each, all of which were designated for chiefs and headmen. These allotments were commonly occupied communally with the individual whom it was designated to, as the overseer. In addition, fourteen farms of various sizes were allocated to people in the location who were neither chiefs nor headmen.⁵³ The allocation of these lands in the Kamastone location and their size, demonstrate the close nexus that existed between social structure and land in 1876 and how Africans in that location still lived communally, although not according to the same social structure as before the introduction of colonial administration. Preference for communal occupation of land continued despite a small proportion of Africans beginning to prefer taking land up on the basis of individual tenure. The joint population of the Kamastone and Oxkraal locations was 6 212 and was made up of 1 239 men, 1 512 women, 1 716 boys, and 1 745 girls. This population occupied 920 huts and 90 dwellings that were described as ‘good brick houses.’⁵⁴ These brick houses were reported to have consisted of between 3 and 5 rooms and were built by skilled tradesmen, with the exception of only 3 or 4 houses that did not belong to Africans.⁵⁵ While these figures contribute to a perspective of how Africans were adapting to modernization and colonial influence, the perception of the civil commissioner at the time was that many more brick houses would be built as soon as the land question was settled.⁵⁶ Increased demand of land by both Africans and colonists and disputes over administrative control was the foundation of the land question, which will be further discussed as a contributing factor to the Glen Grey Question in Chapter 4.

The introduction of agricultural technology was important in the Cape Colony for increased agricultural production. By 1876 Africans of the Kamastone and Oxkraal locations were increasingly acquiring agricultural technology which contributed towards their agricultural

⁵⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.86.

⁵¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.86.

⁵² Glebe is an area of land within an ecclesiastical parish used to support a parish priest.

⁵³ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.89.

⁵⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.89.

⁵⁵ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.89.

⁵⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.134.

production and reflected how they used the land.⁵⁷ The table below is an indication of the agricultural technology Africans had by 1876 and their estimated cost reported by the civil commissioner's office for the Kamastone and Oukraal locations.

Table 2: Agricultural technology in Kamastone & Oukraal, 1876⁵⁸

Equipment	Quantity	Estimated cost per item
Ploughs	331	£4 each
Harrowes	18	£4 each
Wagons	157	£30 each
Carts	4	£25 each

The report indicated that more equipment was being acquired at a rapid rate.⁵⁹ With the assistance of these technological advancements the 5 035 morgen of cultivated land in the Kamastone and Oukraal locations yielded 11 385 bushels of wheat, 17 189 bushels of mealies and sorghum, 149 bushels of barley, 134 bushels of peas and beans, 128 bushels of potatoes, 9 650 lbs of oat-hay and 935 lbs of dried fruit, in total estimated at its lowest to be worth £6 771 for the year.⁶⁰ African farmers had also started to plant more of the crops that had greater value and required less attention such as wheat, barley and oat-hay. In addition to their acquiring more agricultural equipment that was technologically advanced, and which allowed them to produce a substantial amount of crops, many men in the location were also believed to have owned large flocks, with the livestock in the location amounting to a total value estimated at £112 007.⁶¹ The table below illustrates how much of the different livestock there was in the Kamastone and Oukraal location in 1876 and an estimated cost price of each unit.

⁵⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88.

⁵⁸ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88.

⁵⁹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135.

⁶⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135.

⁶¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135.

Table 3: Livestock in Kamastone and Oukraal, 1876⁶²

Livestock	Quantity	Estimated cost per item
Horses	1 305	£5 each
Drought oxen	4 106	£8 each
Other Cattle	5 957	£5 each
Sheep	72 773	10s each
Goats angora and common	10 324	10s each
Pigs	1 401	10s each

In accordance with the figures provided in Table 3, on average, every man, woman and child in the Kamastone and Oukraal locations would have owned at least twelve sheep, 1 and a half goats, one and a half heads of cattle, and approximately £12 worth of property.⁶³ This agriculture based prosperity in the two locations suggests that many of the men in the location would have qualified for the franchise according to the Constitutional Ordinance of 1853 and some even for the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887, which will be further discussed in Chapter 2. Based on the assumption that the location, with a population of 1 239 individuals, consisted of male-headed households, on average each male would have owned livestock worth approximately £90, owned crops that yielded 9.2 bushels of wheat, 13.9 bushels of mealies and sorghum, and 7.8 lbs of oat-hay, among many other products, for the year 1876.

Drought and conflict as barriers to progression

Despite the exciting advances Africans were making in Queenstown, development in this agriculturally based region stagnated because of the onset of a drought in 1877. Several crops failed where irrigation had not been introduced.⁶⁴ Some locations in Queenstown were more successful in mitigating the immediate consequences of the drought. Glen Grey, in particular, had ‘never-failing’ mountain streams that were well adapted for agriculture. Many of the streams were easily adjusted to facilitate the cultivation of larger portions of the valley and basins through irrigation. The clerk of the location, Mr Drive, was duly impressed by how Africans had taken advantage of the streams to irrigate their land in order to continue to profit and prosper.⁶⁵ Although this had been a considerably innovative and significant attempt by

⁶² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135.

⁶³ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.90.

⁶⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.134.

⁶⁵ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.137.

Africans to combat the effect of the drought, a significant portion of the population still relied on rain for the success of their crops.

During the harvest season of 1877 prospects for a successful yield was poor and in some cases crops failed altogether. The situation became increasingly challenging as the years progressed because there was a shortage of crops and stocks from previous years would either be consumed or sold.⁶⁶ Africans were frequently short of food and fell back on colonial farmers' stock and assistance from government – this, despite the drought having had a significant impact on everyone, regardless of ethnicity. Nevertheless, there were exceptions where some African farmers managed to retain their stock and sustain growth through alternative methods such as acquiring and investing in flocks of sheep.⁶⁷ Africans were increasingly acquiring and investing in flocks of sheep since the quality and value of sheep had been gradually improving alongside that of cattle in the region.

The drought continued with increased severity, which had a depressing influence on everyone in the region⁶⁸ and the progress Africans had been making in the agricultural sphere stagnated significantly. Nevertheless, there were also signs of persistence among these African farmers, evident in attempts to find alternative methods of irrigating the soil. They also turned their attention to crops that were more in demand such as peas, beans, and fruit trees. Bouch observes that 'diversification was a survival strategy to produce marketable produce throughout the year, raising cash to pay taxes and avoiding labour services in the Colony.'⁶⁹ Rainfall reports for the years leading up to 1886 indicate a positive turn of events and towards the end of 1886 the region had made a complete recovery and promised a return to increased prosperity in Glen Grey.⁷⁰

The land question had become increasingly pressing during the seasons of drought and some locations, among them Kamastone and Oukraal, had become more willing to settle land disputes.⁷¹ Although the transition to individual tenure was costly (a survey fee would have to be paid in order for land to be surveyed), lots would have to be registered and the title

⁶⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.138.

⁶⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.138; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.45.

⁶⁸ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.46; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.47.

⁶⁹ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894," 1993, p.15.

⁷⁰ *The Journal*, 2 February 1886. 'Our Diary: Rainfall in Glen Grey.'

⁷¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.85.

transferred to the individual, which was in line with a decision already taken by a commission in 1875 to divide farms into individual allotments and for titles to be taken up on the basis of individual land tenure.⁷² Braun (2015) whose study is based on the survey which resulted in the demarcation of land as illustrated in Table 4 below, argued that government's goal was to reconfigure the location into an idealised African landscape with precise boundaries. This would have allowed for the transformation from an African agrarian landscape, to a colonial landscape with government administering individual agricultural lots opposed to the communal dwellings that Africans preferred.⁷³ Sean Redding (2006) has argued that taking up individual tenure amounted to symbolically surrendering of the local landscape by Africans to the colonial government, a surrender that would continue as financial and legal surrender for Africans who would have to make regular payments to a magistrate or other colonial authority.⁷⁴ When Kamastone was initially settled in 1854, each head of a family was designated 48 morgen (approximately 102 acres) of land but the land was not formally surveyed and no boundaries were introduced,⁷⁵ which allowed for a communal lifestyle. This was envisioned by the government to change as the appointed commission of 1875 finalised how land was to be demarcated and that a surveyor would be sent to survey the land.⁷⁶ Between 1875 and 1877, little improvements were made to buildings, fencing or other work along these lines because inhabitants were waiting for the results of land divisions.⁷⁷

The impression of the Civil Commissioner was that the severity of the drought had made several Africans anxious which resulted in them increasingly expressing a desire to have land divided into individual allotments and farms.⁷⁸ The idea was that if they could be secure on their own land then they could focus their efforts on combatting the consequences of the drought without the added burden of having to shoulder the weight of the land question. This desire showed a greater deviation from their aspiration to occupy land communally and reflected the influence of the colonial government's goal to get Africans to occupy land on individual tenure. However, this was not the attitude of all Africans in the location, as expressed

⁷² L. F. Braun. "A Bad Lot': Local Politics and the Survey of Oxkraal and Kamastone, 1853-1923," *African Historical Review*, 47:1 (2015), p.32.

⁷³ L. F. Braun. "A Bad Lot': Local Politics and the Survey of Oxkraal and Kamastone, 1853-1923." 2015, p.17.

⁷⁴ S. Redding, *Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880-1963*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 2006, pp.13-16;

⁷⁵ S. Redding, *Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880-1963*. 2006, pp.13-16;

⁷⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135.

⁷⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.139.

⁷⁸ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.47.

in an 1877 petition which requested that land should be granted to Africans in the location as seven large farms or sub-locations under group titles (which would have allowed for a continued communal lifestyle) instead of the identified six-acre lots.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the demand for the location to be surveyed was met with the demarcation of land as follows:⁸⁰

Table 4: Surveyed demarcations in Kamastone and Ockraal

Ownership type:	Number:
Grantees	1 779
Double lots for the headman	19
Erven of garden lots for school	16
Farms granted to chiefs (1 000 acres each)	2
Farms granted to chiefs (500 acres each)	2
Mission glebes	2
Villages	99
Erven' for building purposes	1 814
6 Acre lots	1 814
Acres to be cultivated	10 884
The estimated size of location (acres)	127 017

The survey suggests that for every 6 acre lot there would be an erf for building purposes and at least 2 chiefs would have 1 000 acre farms and another 2 chiefs would have 500 acre farms, which means that the chiefs who had previously owned farms in the location would be able to continue doing so. However, demarcation was not done with much consideration of the landscape of the location – as can be seen from John Sishuba's complaint that boundaries would cut off a portion of land and a building site, which in essence would cause further conflict in the location.⁸¹

The Civil Commissioner thought that merely demarcating land was not sufficient to encourage everyone to take up individual tenure and therefore recommended that a land legislation be drafted and implemented across the colony.⁸² His request was partially attended to with the

⁷⁹ L. F. Braun. "A Bad Lot": Local Politics and the Survey of Ockraal and Kamastone, 1853-1923." 2015, p.35.

⁸⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.47.

⁸¹ L. F. Braun. "A Bad Lot": Local Politics and the Survey of Ockraal and Kamastone, 1853-1923." 2015. p.35.

⁸² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.49.

Native Locations Act No.40 of 1879, although it did not completely satisfy his expectations.⁸³ Nevertheless, as Braun has argued, the restructuring of the location did not only negate the pre-existing order but also introduced new tools and challenges which government did not anticipate or completely understand.⁸⁴ A substantial number of Africans applied for demarcated allotments. Images 1 and 2 serve as examples of what a section of some of the lists of claimants looked like. What the images demonstrate is that within some families there were individuals who applied for land on the same farm, which would have allowed such families to continue living communally even though individuals would have had their own title deed. Many Africans preferred taking up a title on land that they had already been occupying under communal tenure. By way of example, Image 1 shows that the Sishuba family applied for lots on Hukuwa farm no. 8 of Kamastone with 46 male applicants, while Image 2 shows the Mgijima family applying on farm no.1 of the Kei and Bulhoek section of the location.⁸⁵ Both families had individuals who frequently appeared on the voters' rolls between 1872 and 1909. The participation of these families in the voters' rolls will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

⁸³ L. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsunduand the Cape Native Policy. 1884-1902*. Published M.A thesis, UNISA. 1974, p.116.

⁸⁴ L. F. Braun. "A Bad Lot': Local Politics and the Survey of Oukraal and Kamastone, 1853-1923." 2015. p.17.

⁸⁵ SG. File S/2150. Oukraal and Kamastone Queenstown division 49. Vols.289-294.

Image 1: Example of claimants on farm no.8, Hukuwa⁸⁶

Claimants on farm No 8 Hukuwa

Dulini	Seshuba	Sinagela	Seshuba
Lufele	Seshuba	John	Seshuba
Sandikiso	Seshuba	Freddy	Seshuba
Plaatji	Seshuba	Peter	Velapi
Kaper	Seshuba	Jeremia	Velapi
Nzoni	Seshuba	Isobuh	Seshuba
Mhlubo	Seshuba	Gwetywe	Seshuba
Biko	Seshuba	Josiah	Seshuba
Nziweni	Seshuba	George	Seshuba
Bonani	Seshuba	Konki	Seshuba
Mangalaza	Seshuba	Intigedwa	Seshuba
Ramcwana	Seshuba	January	Inazwi
Jayaman	Seshuba	John	Inazwi
Mbono	Seshuba	James	Inazwi
Incapukiso	Seshuba	William	Inazwi
Malawana	Seshuba	Peter	Inazwi
Sukwon	Seshuba	Vari	Inazwi
Ineywa	Seshuba	Jonas	Benzell
Redile	Seshuba	Mahloli	Hlali
Inasongo	Seshuba	Metji	Hlali wid
Siswana	Seshuba	Nosanti	Dibetola wid
Dungiso	Seshuba	Leya	Dibetola wid
Chalmers	Seshuba	Edward	Seshuba
George	Seshuba	David	Seshuba
Into	Seshuba	Mantombi	Sigabi
Inhlaba	Seshuba	Ganiso	Jacomyn, wid
Itlunganis	Seshuba		Lalomba
Hlatjiwe	Seshuba	Isji	Inalozengile
Bangani	Seshuba	Inpambani	Inpapama
Fani	Seshuba	Siwani	Inpapama
			Singana

⁸⁶ In many government publications or documents the spelling of African names and surnames vary, as can be seen with the difference in spelling for Sishuba (Seshuba). However, with the repetition of names in different documents one is able to identify if and when the same person or people are being referred to. SG. File S/2150. Oukraal and Kamastone Queenstown division 49. Vols.289-294.

Image 2: Example of claimants on farm no.1 of Kei and Bulhoek⁸⁷

De Kwaal and Kamastone
Native Location

List of Claimants on Sub-location No. 1
Kei and Bulhoek.

Building Lots

Claimant	Remarks
Bery Mkakajima	200 Rds.
Mtshu Velapi	200 Rds. 1998
Bery Velapi	
Bery Velapi	
Beliso Mkakajima	
Loxton Mkakajima	
Edward Mkakajima	
Bani Mkakajima	
Mtoyedwa Mkakajima	
Martha Mkakajima	
Millem Marzave	
Lante Velapi	Side of 5-2-92
Makalo Velapi	
James Mkefe	
Petrus Mkakajima	
Maewela	7. 6. 4. 91
Motyezi Dondolo	
John Dondolo	
Meto Mkefe	
John Mkakajima	
Sosiah Mkakajima	
Inoch Mkakajima	vacant
Senas Mkakajima	
Nonesi Mkakajima	

While a number of Africans took up land on the basis of individual tenure, the demarcation and reallocation of these lands displaced those who had been occupying the land. People who occupied the land would in future be identified as ‘squatters’ despite the fact that, as they argued, they had inherited the right to the land from their forefathers and had occupied the land for more than 25 years.⁸⁸ *The Journal* considered the labelling of these people as ‘squatters’ unfortunate and argued that the land was granted to the people as Crown land, which although not occupied on individual tenure, was considered to be theirs.⁸⁹

Despite the excitement of Africans who were granted land and who were allowed to take up title deeds, the drought made it challenging to afford the survey fee they had to pay. Consequently, the superintendent thought it best to refrain from handing over title deeds without the payment of a survey fee because in many cases the deed would be bartered for food because of shortages experienced as a result of the drought.⁹⁰ The drought persisted and had serious ramifications for many in the location. Livestock no longer had sufficient grass for grazing and for many people the prospects of being able to feed themselves had decreased. Despite attempts to settle the land question in Kamastone the drought negatively impacted Africans’ ability to take up titles of the surveyed land and many of them continued to live as ‘squatters.’ Few individuals and families took up titles and the majority continued to live communally.⁹¹ Nevertheless, in other locations in the Queenstown division, the land question continued to present itself as one of the major unresolved issues. This was especially true in Glen Grey as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The drought influenced the socio-economic position of Africans and impacted on the relationship they had with the land. They were no longer able to cultivate the land or have their livestock graze in the same way they had until then. African prosperity was on the decline, with many of them losing the wealth they accumulated as outlined in the Civil Commissioners’ Reports of 1876.⁹² Africans’ changing relationship to the land further influenced the government’s understanding of their socio-economic position which would, in turn, contribute to the perceptions expressed in the different

⁸⁷ SG. File S/2150. Oxxkraal and Kamastone Queenstown division 49. Vols.289-294.

⁸⁸ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.48.

⁸⁹ *The Journal*, 31 March 1886. ‘Glen Grey, again.’

⁹⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.49.

⁹¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.49.

⁹² C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979.

legislations that would be presented in parliament throughout the period of responsible government.

The experience of the drought overlapped with conflict spurred on by the land question. Alongside challenges posed by the drought in Queenstown, land-related conflicts erupted in 1878 and contributed to the violence of the ninth and final Frontier War which commenced in 1877. In Queenstown this mostly affected the Glen Grey location because of the embedded tension between those who historically recognised the authority of chief Mapassa,⁹³ and the colonial government. This tension derived from the previous frontier war when chief Mapassa was killed in the process of Queenstown's annexation.⁹⁴ It is important to note that Queenstown was established in 1853 through the defeat of Chief Mapassa, who joined Chiefs Kreli and Maqomo in the wars of 1851 and 1852.⁹⁵ The Colony expanded administratively and geographically, to a large degree facilitated by the frontier wars.⁹⁶

Conflict in the frontier was generally motivated by land occupation. The official formation of Queenstown was the result of the Eighth Frontier War which ended in 1853 and which saw Africans forfeiting their land to the British Crown as a result of their defeat.⁹⁷ Scholars such as Peires and Ngcukaitobi consider this particular conflict to have been the longest and largest bloodshed in the eastern frontier.⁹⁸ Conquest through conflict and administrative expansion resulted in the delimitation of Native Reserves which confined Africans to locations and limited land.⁹⁹ However, in 1852, before the constitution ordinance was granted to the Colony, the Glen Grey land was granted to Africans of the location and the proclamations of the Governor became the law of the land. In his proclamation he stated that Royal Regent Nonesi (whose authority superseded that of Mapassa) and her people were allowed to return and reoccupy the land they had formerly owned. Africans were entitled to the same protection of

⁹³ Mapassa, who was "wounded at a battle fought on the Inwani and died of his wounds near Whittlesea" had large portions of his land later granted to European settlers by sir G. Cathcart, and his tribe broken up. Gungebele, the son of Mapassa, was later welcomed by his father's councillors and his people as chief. These proceedings took place against the wishes of the government. Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.181.

⁹⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.46; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.177.

⁹⁵ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.181.

⁹⁶ J. C. Visagie, & J. S. Bergh. *The Eastern Cape Frontier Zone 1660-1980: a cartographic guide for historical research*. Durban: Butterworths, 1985. R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.113.

⁹⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1880, p.177.

⁹⁸ J. Peires. *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Cattle-Killing of 1856-7*. 2003; T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa's First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. 2018.

⁹⁹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.181.

the laws as everyone else under the Queen's authority, which made the location Crown land.¹⁰⁰ After their return, the Blue Books frequently recorded that they were considered peaceful and loyal.¹⁰¹

Various versions and perspectives of how events turned out were subsequently recorded. Yet, what all these variations have in common is that the dispute over land occupation was central to the war. The version presented by civil commissioner, John Hemming, which would have been the official version received by the government, was that Gungubele, son of Mapassa, purchased a farm contrary to the advice he had been given; that he did not fully comprehend the quantity of £2 200 and that the result was one of non-payment.¹⁰² According to Hemming this resulted in Gungubele being sued and requested to show why his estate should not be confiscated. As civil commissioner, Hemming argued that Gungubele did not fully comprehend the power of the law and because of his influence in the Glen Grey location managed to incite other Africans against the government.¹⁰³ This implies that what had caused the extension of the war in Glen Grey was in effect the result of a personal matter combined with Gungubele's standing in the African community.

Hemming continues by describing how assegais were collected at Gungubele's kraal and how the Africans who were incited by Gungubele burnt huts, houses and trading stations, while driving away cattle, sheep, and horses. In his account, these Africans were labelled 'rebels,' many of whom fled the location.¹⁰⁴ Africans of the Glen Grey location did not readily accept Gungubele's defeat. This resulted in an uprising that protested the expansion of the colonial administrative authority which, by 1880, exceeded that of the chiefs.¹⁰⁵ Although the turn of events in these reports are viewed through a colonial lens by a government administrator, the essence of the report highlights the complexity of the land issue. On the one hand, Gungubele felt the need to own the land although it was argued that he did not understand the monetary value of the land, while on the other hand, government officials believed that it was important to enforce the colonial law which would have resulted in the confiscation of the land.

¹⁰⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 6 October 1886. 'Native Opinion': A few more words on the Glen Grey Question; *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, 'Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.'

¹⁰¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, 'The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey'; *The Christian Express*, 2 September 1889, 'The Glen grey Natives.'

¹⁰² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.46.

¹⁰³ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.46.

¹⁰⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.46.

¹⁰⁵ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, p.15; R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000.

Many lives and families in Glen Grey were destroyed not only through the loss of lives but also the loss of property, livestock and agricultural tools and products. The subsequently deserted land was estimated to have consisted of twenty surveyed farms, each of approximately 3 000 or more acres. Some were considered excellent for stock-grazing and cultivation.¹⁰⁶ The status of land as instrument for the expression of socio-economic position was reiterated by the war, as the colonial government confiscated land from those they considered loyal to Gungubele and granted title deeds to Africans who did not previously have title deeds of their own by way of rewarding them for their loyalty to the government. Alongside this, land in the Glen Grey location was being sold off to colonial settlers with the intention that the revenue raised from these sales would be used to pay the cost incurred by the war.¹⁰⁷

A commission was set up to enquire into and deal with the reports of losses sustained by farmers and other residents during the ninth Frontier War throughout the Cape Colony. The commission attempted to identify the extremity of loss sustained but also to account and compensate individuals for those losses.¹⁰⁸ The war was not centred around Queenstown but rather in the more eastern parts of the colony. In the Queenstown Division, losses were mainly sustained in the Glen Grey location with the outbreak of the conflict involving Gungubele, son of Mapassa's clan. Reports submitted to the commission include losses of both property and stock that amounted to significant amounts.¹⁰⁹ Despite the losses sustained as a result of the war, Hemming was of the opinion that the effect of the war was beneficial to the location as, alongside the severity of the drought, it had made Africans aware of the 'supremacy of the European.'¹¹⁰

At the end of the 9th frontier war the Peace Preservation Act of 1879 was implemented with the primary goal of disarming Africans in the Cape Colony. Among colonists the Act was welcomed as "a policy which strikes at the root of the native difficulty."¹¹¹ In June 1876 colonists in the Eastern part of the Cape Colony began protesting what according to them were

¹⁰⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.180.

¹⁰⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, pp.179-180.

¹⁰⁸ Reports of the Commission to Inquire and Report upon the Losses sustained by Farmers and other residents upon the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony during the late war and rebellion of 1877-1878.

¹⁰⁹ Reports of the Commission to Inquire and Report upon the Losses sustained by Farmers and other residents upon the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony during the late war and rebellion of 1877-1878.

¹¹⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.1-79.

¹¹¹ *Cape Times*, 14 March 1879, "Correspondence. The Sprigg Ministry – What it has done and what it proposes to do."

irregular restrictions on African gun ownership. Their request was unsuccessful and instead of government amending arms regulations, they authorized the Colonial Defence Commission, led by Gordon Sprigg, to investigate how prepared they were on the eastern frontier.¹¹² The commission conducted hearings with traders, soldiers, and administrators throughout King Williams Town, East London, Queenstown, Fort Beaufort, and Grahamstown and published an official report in 1877 which explored the relationship of loyalty and gun control with the most pertinent question being if “loyal” Africans should be armed.¹¹³ Although the majority of the accounts advocated that all Africans should be disarmed, a noteworthy account by Joseph Orpen, a humanitarian administrator, magistrate and someone who was considered liberal, advocated that Africans should not be seen as tribes but rather as individuals. His view was that “natives should be treated with fairness, justice and truth [as] these three things existed together, and depended on each other.”¹¹⁴ Orpen measured trustworthiness through material possession by claiming that “natives who had European houses” should have representation in parliament and because Africans were accumulating “a large amount of property” their good conduct towards the government should be guaranteed especially because “guns were property and were often bought with wages.”¹¹⁵ Despite these views, conflict throughout the 9th frontier war further encouraged the disarmament of Africans which was concretized by the implementation of the Peace Preservation Act of 1879.

Similar to the reports provided by various other civil commissioners¹¹⁶, John Hemming, civil commissioner of Queenstown reported that they had successfully disarmed Africans in the division with the voluntary surrender of 1 000 guns and about 4 000 assegais.¹¹⁷ However, the *Cape Argus* dismissed these views and pointed out that reports provided “contained obvious silences” as Africans objected disarmament.¹¹⁸ Without much success, Africans made an

¹¹² W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.210.

¹¹³ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.212-213.

¹¹⁴ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.217.

¹¹⁵ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.217-218.

¹¹⁶ Reports for the Transkei – Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.96, as well as reports for Engcobo - Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.86 indicated Africans volunteered their arms as part of the disarmament movement.

¹¹⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1879, p.179.

¹¹⁸ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.247.

attempt to protest disarmament through the submission of petitions and memorials.¹¹⁹ An example of this is quoted by William Storey (2008) from the Cape Argus as submitted by Joshua (and 441 others) from the Kamastone and Oukraal location in response to disarmament that “our pride and joy has been that we were honoured and trusted by the queen’s government, and anything that takes away our self-respect is likely to lead, sooner than later, to our ruin.”¹²⁰ Storey argued that Joshua’s observation contributed towards the understanding of how government thinking towards race and citizenship was changing which ties into a broader argument that there was an ideological tendency emerging “to regulate African land and labour.”¹²¹

Conclusion

In this chapter the geographical position of Queenstown was used as a lens to better understand African voter registration for participation in the franchise. In addition to positioning Queenstown geographically the chapter demonstrated the relationship Africans had with the land and how this changed over time. Through a discussion of the agricultural position of Africans and their use of the land, this chapter complements historiography that highlights African prosperity through the use of land in the 1870s. It illuminates the fact that although there were Africans who rejected modernization and colonial influence, there was also a sizable proportion of the African population who used it as a tool for their advancement, which contributed to their position in a rising African middle class. This group acquired agricultural technology such as the wagon and the plough in order to increase production; they invested in livestock that was more favourable to the market, and they started to build brick houses. Nevertheless, through the discussion of the social structure in the different locations, it was argued that Africans continued to prefer occupying land communally despite the encouragement to occupy land on the basis of individual tenure. The chapter highlights how both the drought and the war presented severe challenges for Africans and exacerbated the number of economic setbacks they had to endure. The study of African land use in the Cape Colony through the lens of the combined drought and war highlights how African agricultural advancement was stymied. These two key factors contributed to the shrinking of prospects for

¹¹⁹ *The Journal*, 13 August 1897, ‘Disarmament.’; *The Journal*, 15 August 1897, ‘Disarmament.’ *The Journal*, 20 August 1897, ‘Petitions.’

¹²⁰ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.248.

¹²¹ W. K. Storey. *Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.182/248.

continued prosperity and the socio-economic position of many Africans as part of an African middle class. The rights and economic security for Africans continued to be under increasing attack, and the experience of both the drought and war made Africans more vulnerable.

Chapter 2

African franchise participation: implementation of, and reactions to, the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887

Introduction

In 1853, shortly after the annexation of Queenstown in 1852, the Cape Colony was granted representative government. With this came political and structural changes which saw the introduction of a bicameral parliament where the executive had to report to the British government instead of having direct British rule in the Cape. Under this bicameral parliament the Constitution Ordinance of 1853 was implemented and allowed for the introduction of a multiracial franchise in the colony. This political transition was considered a victory for the political elite who advocated for political inclusiveness without discrimination on the basis of race. The Constitution Ordinance stipulated that all men, aged 21 and above, who either owned property worth £25, or a combination of land and property worth £25, or who had a minimum income of £50 per annum, or had a minimum income of £25 per annum where board or lodging were provided, could participate in the franchise.¹ Although there were no racial restrictions to participation in the franchise, throughout the period of representative government politics continued to be dominated by colonists in the Cape.

With the introduction of responsible government in 1872, Africans increasingly started to register to participate in the franchise, which spurred agitation among colonists. This chapter evaluates African political participation during responsible government through the registration for the vote. It seeks to contribute towards an understanding of when Africans were registering to vote, their attitude towards franchise participation, and efforts that were made to qualify for the registration to vote. This narrative is absent from existing historiography and constitutes one of the main contributions of this study. The chapter also highlights the experiences and opinions of Africans as expressed in the press – an often neglected source in the evaluation of African participation in the franchise.

¹ R. L. du Toit. Die totstandkoming van die konstitusie van 1853. Ongepubliseerde MA-tesis, Stellenbosch Universiteit, 1933. D. R. Edgecombe, *The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910*, 1978, pp.34-35, C.O. 50/8, The Franchise and Ballot Act (No 9) of 1892.

Additionally, this chapter also discusses how agitation among colonists, spurred by increased African participation in the vote, resulted in legislative adjustment to franchise requirements such as the creation and implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887. It assesses how, although there was no explicit racial distinction made in the Act, the primary goal of the implementation of the Act was to exclude Africans from being able to register for the vote. In the context of the relationship Africans had with land (as discussed in Chapter 1), this chapter evaluates land as the primary tool of disfranchisement in the Parliamentary Registration Act, the reaction of Africans to the adjustment of franchise requirements, and the effect these adjustments had on African franchise participation. This is related to the fact that only a small proportion of Africans were taking up land on the basis of individual tenure, which is demonstrated in this chapter. The chapter continues by evaluating African political participation through the registration for the vote before the adjustment to franchise requirements and analyses the impact such an adjustment had on African voter registration. In historiography African political participation has frequently been presented with the argument that English-speaking politicians encouraged Africans to register for the franchise with the hope that their votes would help them retain their seats. This has neglected the narrative of the interest expressed by Africans to participate in the franchise and efforts made to remain on the voters' rolls. This chapter focuses on the lived experiences of disfranchisement as reflected in the press. It presents a view of Africans as a collective that asserted their political position in the Cape Colony and, through the lens of the Queenstown electoral division, brings this position into sharper focus.

The occupation of land by Africans in the Cape Colony

To better understand how land was used as a tool for disfranchisement by the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887,² it is important first to outline how Africans were occupying land in the colony and how this changed over time. Through the discussion of the different forms of land available in the Cape Colony, this chapter aims to contribute a new perspective on why land could possibly have been used as a tool for African disfranchisement. As highlighted through the discussion of the relationship Africans had with the land in Chapter 1, land continued to play an important role for both Africans and colonists throughout the nineteenth century. In the Cape Colony, before the second half of the nineteenth century, there

² Statues of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1886. Vol.1, pp.297-305.

was no colonially institutionalised land policy that determined ownership of land. Among Africans, land was occupied in terms of traditional law and custom according to which those who occupied the land inherited it from their forefathers and were entrusted with it for future generations.³ Land was communally occupied under the guidance and leadership of a chief, and while the chief was the sole individual who dealt with concerns relating to land,⁴ he did so within the bounds of the common, shared interests of the people.⁵ The details of the chieftaincy structure are beyond the scope of this study. However, it is important to understand that the chief was entrusted to allocate land and to control access to it by the degree of use but never granted outright ownership because the land belonged jointly to the people. A son could acquire the use of land entrusted to his father and allow future generations access to the same land only because it was held in common.⁶

Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous attempts were made by colonists to manage the use of land under administration of the colony.⁷ Formal measures were taken when the colonial government started to promulgate regulations on land after the Eighth Frontier War ended in 1853. One of the earlier attempts by Africans to reclaim ownership of land relied on the Nongqawuse prophecy which resulted in the 1856-1857 cattle-killings. According to the prophecy their forefathers would rise from the dead and colonists would ‘return to the sea’ which would allow Africans to again regain sovereignty over their land.⁸

As explained by Nongqawuse, the condition for the prophesy to come to fruition was that Africans had to slaughter all their livestock – for which they would be rewarded again once colonists had ‘return[ed] to the sea.’⁹ However, their efforts were in vein and the outcome was irrevocable disruption whereby Africans lost a great deal of land and cattle.¹⁰ The Nongqawuse

³ L. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsundu and the Cape Native Policy. 1884-1902*. 1974, p.101.

⁴ Trapido, Stanley. *African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910*. 1968, p.82.

⁵ E. H. Brookes. *The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day*. Cape Town: Nasionale Pers. 1924, pp.353-4; Reports and Proceedings of the Government Commission on Native Laws and customs: G.4. 1883, p.40 (par108); R. Davenport, & C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.164.

⁶ R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.126.

⁷ T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa's First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. 2018, p.11.

⁸ J. B. Peires. *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Cattle-Killing of 1856-7*. 2003, p.37; A. K. Mager & P. J. Velelo. *The House of Tshatshu: Power, politics and chiefs north-west of the Great Kei River c 1818-2018*, 2018, p.73-79.

⁹ J. B. Peires. *The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing*, 1987; R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, pp.122-123.

¹⁰ T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa's First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. 2018, pp.18-19.

prophecy was an extremely complex historical incident and will not be discussed here other than to mention that it serves as an essential demonstration of Africans' mass resistance to being alienated from their land. Subjection to the colonial administration meant that Africans started to occupy land in a variety of forms that differed from their own laws and customs.¹¹ Tembeka Ngcukaitobi notes that for almost 50 years the colonial government made attempts to implement land regulations under the administration of the colony.¹² Land regulations were implemented in 1858, followed shortly by a series of land policies implemented in the Cape Colony. These included Act no. 19 of 1864, and Act no. 4 of 1867 which specifically addressed the provision of leasing Crown land.¹³ Legislations encouraged Africans to move away from communal tenure and purchase/lease land on the basis of individual tenure instead. Different types of landholdings were introduced in the Cape Colony which presented diversification of land occupation. These diversifications included ownership of Crown land¹⁴ through purchase, leasing of Crown land, surveyed quitrents with titles, un-surveyed quitrents, tenure without title (communal tenure),¹⁵ lease of private colonial land, and surveyed lots with quitrent title.¹⁶

The land and property qualification for franchise participation in the Cape Colony was £25, and under the Constitution Ordinance of 1853 this could be on any type of land holdings. In 1858 the purchase price of one acre of Crown land in the Ciskei¹⁷ was £1 and the minimum area size that could be purchased by Africans was 20 acres. Those who were in possession of 40 acres of purchased Crown land were able to rent a further 40 acres (maximum)¹⁸ on the agreement that they intended to purchase the rented land.¹⁹ Either way, this meant that Africans who opted to purchase land were required to purchase land in excess of £20. Development of the land, for example by adding a building or hut at a minimum cost of £5, would have qualified the individual for participation in the franchise. With increased competition the availability of

¹¹ J. Lewis. *An economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Cape Town. 1984, p.435.

¹² T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa's First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. 2018, p.11.

¹³ Cape Government. *Acts of Parliament 1879*, p.1571.

¹⁴ The territorial area under the authority of the Colonial Government.

¹⁵ In this instance a "hut tax" needed to be paid.

¹⁶ Land ownership for 'loyal subjects' who would pay an annual tax which contributed to funding the administration. The difference between quitrents and lots was that lots were smaller. J. Lewis. *An economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, p.435.


¹⁷ With the focus of J. Lewis' study on the Ciskei, it is not clear whether or not these prices extended to the rest of the colony. The pricing is however relevant to Queenstown because Queenstown formed part of the Ciskei region.

¹⁸ Terms were different for colonists. Colonists could purchase land at £1 per acre on 80 acre sections and could lease and purchase an unlimited amount of land.

¹⁹ J. Lewis. *An Economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, p.436.

land was limited²⁰ and, as Jack Lewis (1984) argues, it was not the government's aim to have a significant number of Africans become landowners.²¹ Nevertheless, the majority of Africans were reluctant to take up alternative forms of land occupation and continued to occupy land communally.²² Notwithstanding the preference of the majority to occupy land communally, throughout the 1860s there was a small portion of Africans who gradually made the shift to occupation of land on the basis of individual tenure. This is reflected in Figures 1 and 2 which indicate that there was an increased interest in individual tenure by Africans who, following the instatement of land regulations after 1858, started to purchase and lease land.

Figure 1: Africans who purchased and leased land on the basis of individual tenure in the Ciskei²³




²⁰ R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.111.

²¹ J. Lewis. *An economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, p.436.

²² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.49. Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62.

²³ These figures were constructed from a table provided in J. Lewis. *An Economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, compiled from B.K. 109, "Population returns for British Kaffraria."

Figure 2: The number of Acres that were being purchased and leased by Africans on the basis of individual tenure in the Ciskei



Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how, shortly after the Eighth Frontier War (1853) and given the effect of the cattle-killings (1856-1857), there was a small but increasing proportion of Africans in the 1860s who purchased and leased land on the basis of individual land tenure. These figures suggest that in 1858 at least 3 081 acres were purchased – a figure which rapidly increased to 16 100 acres by 1864. With the additional 5 713 acres of leased land, these Africans were occupying 21 813 acres of land on the basis of individual tenure. This averaged 31.6 acres per individual by 1864 which meant that those who took up individual tenure in the Ciskei would have met the £25 qualification for participation in the franchise. Lewis lists Charles Pamla (who registered for the vote in 1874 and again in 1876 in the Queenstown electoral division) as an example of an individual who, by 1861, was occupying land on the basis of individual tenure. He argues that although Pamla, with 500 acres of land near Keiskamma Hoek, was probably one of the largest landowning Africans, there were a number of families who purchased land in groups which allowed them to cultivate and exploit the land more intensively.²⁴ The phenomenon of families purchasing land in groups correlates with how

²⁴ J. Lewis. *An economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, p.437.

families in Kamastone made claim to individual tenure on the same farms, as illustrated in Images 1 and 2 of Chapter 1. These examples show how Africans who adjusted to diverse land ownership options presented by colonial influence managed to sustain their customary relationship with the land even though they owned individually demarcated portions of that land.

Figures 1 and 2 afford insight into how a portion of the African population adapted to the new land policies under the colonial government and actively took up land on the basis of individual tenure. It was estimated that, on the presented trajectory for the purchase of land by Africans in the 1860s, more land would be purchased in the 1870s and 1880s.²⁵ This is because Africans who were investing in individual land tenure were considered to have had a relative higher degree of wealth because of the ownership of technologically advanced agricultural equipment such as ploughs and wagons which enabled them to invest in producing agricultural products for which there was a greater demand.²⁶ Nevertheless, when considering the population size of Africans in the Ciskei – which included East London, King Williamstown, and Queenstown – it can be said that the proportion of Africans who had taken up individual tenure by 1864 was minute. While this confirmed the understanding government may have had of Africans' preference for the communal occupation of land, it did reflect Africans' continued expression of a preference to occupy land communally.²⁷

African political participation through the vote

Africans increasingly expressed their interest in political participation during the period of responsible government (1872-1909). In 1874, the Victoria East magistrate declared that Africans were 'beginning to understand that a man with a vote is of more importance than one who does not possess that advantage.'²⁸ He noted that although approximately 700 Africans qualified for the vote in 1873 in the Victoria East electoral division, only 280 sent in claims to register.²⁹ Increased interest by Africans to participate politically by registering for the vote was particularly significant because throughout the period of representative government in the

²⁵ J. Lewis. *An economic History of the Ciskei, 1848-1900*. 1984, p.437.

²⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.90; C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979. Chapter 3.

²⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

²⁸ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.33.

²⁹ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.33.

Cape Colony (1853-1872), Africans rarely registered for franchise participation even if they qualified for it. In a speech delivered in 1885, Mr W. Ayliff,³⁰ parliamentary member for the predominantly African populated district of Fort Beaufort, stated that Africans were ‘beginning to realise what [political] representation really meant; they [know] what their representative ought to do, and they [know] how to ask him to do those things for them.’³¹

This statement was enthusiastically received by Africans as it represented an understanding of their political participation through the registration for the vote and their selection of representatives through whom they were able to make their voices heard.³² Before the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887³³ Africans continued to participate in the franchise according to the Constitution Ordinance of 1853. The Ordinance was an attempt by the Imperial Government to exemplify the principle of equal political rights without discrimination based on race or ethnicity.³⁴ The Ordinance was motivated by the need to promote a sense of unity among all those who lived in the Cape.³⁵ This was continually highlighted by William Porter,³⁶ a lawyer and civil servant whom *The Journal* described as a ‘statesman.’³⁷ His views are especially relevant to understanding the motivation for a multiracial franchise under representative government since he drafted the first constitution for the Cape Colony under which the multiracial franchise was implemented.

In his attempts to emphasise the importance of African participation in the franchise he frequently reassured ‘capitalists’ and ‘landowners’ that there was no need for them to fear losing a ‘penny or an acre’ by having the African population participate in choosing their representatives.³⁸ The fact that he needed to reassure these two groups serves as an indication of what was most valued by colonists and what they rightly or wrongly feared political participation by Africans might mean. For Porter it was important that Africans did not feel

³⁰ See *SA Biografiese Woordeboek* Volume II, p.18 for a biography on him.

³¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 10 June 1885, ‘Editorial Notes.’

³² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 10 June 1885, ‘Editorial Notes.’

³³ *Statues of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1886*. Vol.1, pp.297-305.

³⁴ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

³⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 January 1892, ‘Native Opinion: Justice’s unjust.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 26 October 1887, ‘Native opinion: A Welcome decision.’; *The Journal*, 4 September 1888, ‘Meeting in the Town Hall.’

³⁶ William Porter drafted the first constitution of the Cape Colony in 1853 in his capacity as Attorney-General (1839-1865). Alongside J. C. Molteno and S. Solomon he was also part of the movement that advocated for responsible government in the Cape which was achieved in 1872.

³⁷ Attorney General at the time of the Constitution Ordinance being drawn up.

³⁸ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

threatened or estranged in the colony, like ‘an alien or an outcast, a rogue or a vagabond.’³⁹ It was to the benefit of the colonist, he noted, that Africans felt as though they were part of the colonial family and that they had a stake in the colony. While he was one of the most liberal individuals who advocated for African participation in the franchise and continued political rights, Porter’s rationale was that, because enfranchised Africans would have a stake in the colony, there would be decreased lawlessness and possible ‘evil’ expressed towards colonists by Africans.⁴⁰ This was summed up in his expression that he ‘would rather meet the[m] at the hustings voting for [their] representative, than meet [them] in the wilds with his gun on his shoulder.’⁴¹

With the consideration of beliefs such as that of Mr Porter, *The Christian Express* noted that both statesmen and missionaries believed that through the engagement of African customs and laws as well as the observation of roles in traditional hierarchy – which consisted of the paramount, their chiefs, councillors, and headmen - politics was second nature to Africans;⁴² that from this it followed that, prior to Africans starting to participate in the franchise of the Cape Colony, their continued preference remained promoting and participating in African laws and customs epitomised by the governance of chiefs.⁴³ However, attempts by government to continually weaken the authority of chiefs combined with the political transitions in the Cape contributed to the opposite, namely increased awareness and interest by Africans in political participation in the Cape Colony. Government’s success in weakening the authority of chiefs was expressed in reports by the civil commissioner of Queenstown who, in 1874, stated that the government had ‘in a great measure succeeded in destroying the influence of the chiefs... [and that their] interference with the rule of the chiefs has raised a spirit of independence amongst the people which needs being kept in check.’⁴⁴

Through Africans’ increased registration to participate in the franchise and their becoming more active in colonial politics a portion of the Cape population who sympathised with the

³⁹ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

⁴⁰ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

⁴¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 3 August 1887, ‘A new Era.’

⁴² Political interest did not necessarily mean participation in colonial politics but politics in accordance to Native laws and customs. *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, ‘Native Politics.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.’; *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1892, ‘Some aspects of the Native question.’

⁴³ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1892, ‘Some aspects of the Native question.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, ‘Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.’

⁴⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.61.

Afrikaner Bond⁴⁵ as a political party became increasingly agitated. The motivation for the Afrikaner Bond's agitation was two-fold. In the first instance, they had a prejudice against Africans rooted in the assumption that Africans were inferior,⁴⁶ as a consequence of which they often referred to Africans as 'children.'⁴⁷ In the second instance, they wanted to weaken the influence of English politicians, many of whom they believed were in parliament because of support from the African vote. Members of the Afrikaner Bond were of the opinion that Africans were led to the polls like sheep to vote for English politicians⁴⁸ and that Africans could therefore not be trusted with the franchise.⁴⁹

Agitation against African participation resulted in parliamentary pressure to cap African participation in the Cape franchise through the implementation of various disfranchising legislations. In 1886, a Transkeian Representative Bill was proposed which would have allowed for separate representation from the electorate for Africans and colonists.⁵⁰ The proposed Bill submitted that a qualification of £500 for Africans in the Transkei be imposed while colonists would be allowed to register for the franchise under the £25 franchise qualification.⁵¹ The Bill was however withdrawn and instead the Parliamentary Registration Bill was introduced to the House of Assembly as a Bill that would disfranchise a larger proportion of the African population from the franchise.⁵² Mr Rose-Innes,⁵³ a 'friend of the natives,'⁵⁴ argued that the proposition of a Transkeian Representative Bill was an attempt by Afrikaner Bond members to simply 'throw dust in the eyes of the non-Bond community.'⁵⁵ His beliefs were reported to have been that the intention of the Bill was to strengthen Afrikaner

⁴⁵ One of the first political parties, which initially formed to promote Afrikaner political, social and economic interests in the Cape Colony. Key figures of the party included S. J. du Toit, and J. H. Hofmeyr (who initially was in charge of the Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging). The party is also believed to have been a response to a feeling of alienation of Afrikaners by the English.

⁴⁶ R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.80.

⁴⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, 'Native opinion: A Bombshell.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, 'Native Politics.'

⁴⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 22 November 1888, 'The Native Vote.'

⁴⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 10 June 1885, 'Editorial notes'; Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.98.

⁵⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 4 May 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁵¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 September 1892, 'Playing politics.'

⁵² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁵³ A parliamentary representative for Victoria East who worked closely with J. W. Sauer. They were both considered 'liberal' and advocated for African political rights throughout the late 19th century. See *SA Biografiese Woordeboek II*, pp.335-340 for further reading.

⁵⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁵⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 4 May 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

Bond constituencies in the House of Assembly and ultimately to get rid of parliamentary members who had the support of the African vote.⁵⁶

Sir Gordon Sprigg, who served as prime minister between 1886 and 1890,⁵⁷ was explicit in outlining the goal the Parliamentary Registration Bill was meant to achieve. During debates in the House of Assembly he presented an array of statistics⁵⁸ to demonstrate the growth of the African voter registration in the eastern districts, which Hofmeyr would later refer to as the Frontier Circle.⁵⁹ From the presentation of these numbers it is evident that Sir Gordon Sprigg's objective was to disfranchise Africans.⁶⁰ These numbers have frequently been cited in South African historiography as the primary statistical reference to indicate the surge in African voter registration in the period 1882 - 1886.⁶¹ This surge was used as foundation in the argument to explain why the franchise qualification needed to be adjusted and as justification for the passing of the Parliamentary Registration Bill in the Cape Colony.

Table 5: African participation in frontier districts⁶²

Location	Total men		African men		% increase in African men	
	1882	1886	1882	1886	1882	1886
Year	1882	1886	1882	1886	1882	1886
Aliwal North	1280	1486	260	800	20.3	53.8
Fort Beaufort	1179	1832	160	400	13.6	21.8
King Williamstown	1676	3301	370	1300	22.1	39.4
Queenstown	2080	3301	220	1770	10.6	45.1
Victoria East	628	3769	90	520	14.3	50.8
Wodehouse	1424	2711	50	1325	3.51	48.9
Total	7116	8077	1150	6045	13.9	42.8

Table 5, which reflects the numbers presented in parliament, illustrates how drastically the number of Africans who were registering for the vote had increased between 1882 and 1886. The voters' lists were revised bi-annually which means that lists were composed in 1882, 1884 and 1886.⁶³ In almost all of the locations identified in the discussion it is evident that by 1886 the number of Africans who had registered for the franchise was nearly threefold the number

⁵⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 4 May 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁵⁷ He served as prime minister four times: 1878-1881, 1886-1890, 1896-1898, 1900-1904.

⁵⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68.

⁵⁹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

⁶⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 26 October 1887, 'Native opinion: A Welcome decision.'

⁶¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68; A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.76, D. R. Edgecombe. *The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853-1910*. 1978, p.23.

⁶² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68.

⁶³ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.71.

registered in 1882. As seen in Queenstown, for example, 220 African men registered in 1882. By 1886, this number had increased to 1 770.⁶⁴ The selected locations were predominantly occupied by Africans who were considered the biggest threat to colonial authority because of the rapidly increasing number of African men who had registered for the franchise. However, given the peculiar geographical distribution of the African population in the Cape Colony (as can be seen in Maps 2 and 3, Chapter 1), Africans influenced the elections of only 14 constituencies and in all these they were believed to return to parliament what they considered ‘good politicians.’⁶⁵

Against the background of the numbers presented by Sir Gordon Sprigg which demonstrated how African political participation increased through the registration for the vote, the urgency of having to adjust the franchise in order to disfranchise Africans was concretized. The fact that Africans predominantly occupied land communally justified the exclusion of communal and tribal land as a tool of disfranchisement for government. The argument made in parliament which legitimized disqualifying tribal land as a qualification for franchise purposes was that the majority of Africans preferred to occupy land communally because this expressed their particular relationship with the land and how to occupy it.⁶⁶ Further, that in most cases, if the land so occupied were distributed evenly among those who occupied it, individual quadrants of land would on average not amount to a value of more than £7 10s. The House of Assembly also estimated that the average hut would not be valued at more than £2, which combined with the value of individual quadrants of land would not add up to the £25 necessary to qualify for the franchise.⁶⁷ Therefore, although the Act did not explicitly make a race classification, it effectively made a racial distinction through a valuation of the land tenure under which most Africans, and almost no colonists, occupied land.

Mr Sauer,⁶⁸ who was against the implementation of the Bill, argued that the primary objective of the Bill was to exclude African voters from franchise participation and that with the exclusion of communal and tribal property as a means of qualification, approximately 90-95%

⁶⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.68.

⁶⁵ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

⁶⁶ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

⁶⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

⁶⁸ J. W. Sauer was the representative for Aliwal North and was against the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act. He also consistently advocated for African political rights throughout the late 19th century. See *SA Biografiese Woordeboek* Volume II, pp.635-639.

of Africans would be disfranchised.⁶⁹ To qualify the terms of the debate, he outlined how he understood them and described ‘tribal tenure’ as land occupied by a group of people of the same race under the governance of a chief, and ‘communal tenure’ as land occupied by a group of people all of whom had equal right to the land. He argued that notwithstanding these structures, Africans who lived in the regions referred to by Sprigg had a house or a hut on a portion of land which belonged to them and cultivated a portion of land within these structures, from which all proceedings went only to them. This, he believed, was a way of life that did not deserve exclusion from political participation.⁷⁰ Yet, Mr De Wet, Secretary for Native Affairs, believed that the estimated 90% of Africans who would be disfranchised made for a good reason to implement the Bill.⁷¹ In the public realm the drafters of the Bill argued that the Bill was highly misunderstood by the public⁷² and that the intent was to purify the franchise list to ‘make better provision for the registration of persons entitled to the Electoral Franchise.’⁷³ However, the gist of clause 17 – often considered to represent the Bill in its entirety - made it clear that the ‘better provision’ was intended to be one without the African vote since it explicitly stipulated that an individual could no longer participate in the franchise on the premise of communal or tribal occupation of land or place of residence.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, as highlighted by *Imvo Zabantsundu*, publicly no reason was given to explain why the understanding of ‘better provisions’ entailed the exclusion of land held in common or why such tenure should function as the bar to retaining the franchise.⁷⁵

The advocacy against this was that, while it was true that an African location was common property, it was not true that an individual’s portion of it could not be considered their own. On the contrary, it was argued that throughout the time that an individual lives in the location the portion of land was for his exclusive use and when he died or left the location it fell to his heirs, just as his other property would.⁷⁶ Neither the chief nor the headman had the authority to interfere with the property without the consent of said parties. In some ethnic groups, if a man

⁶⁹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.72-73.

⁷⁰ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.72-73.

⁷¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.107.

⁷² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 4 May 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.’

⁷³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, ‘Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.’; *The Journal*, 31 March 1887, ‘The franchise system.’

⁷⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, ‘Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 March 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’; *The Journal*, 28 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’; *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill.’

⁷⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 May 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁷⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, ‘Native opinion: A great wrong.’

left the location and returned after some time, he was still entitled to the lands he previously occupied.⁷⁷ In the report of the *Native Laws and Customs*, witnesses stated that among some groups an individual was at liberty to sell his right to a garden when he was leaving the location. Therefore, most Africans who occupied land in common were astonished that these lands were claimed not to belong to them. The conclusion of this argument was that, although Africans could attempt to make alterations to the terms of their tenure in order to qualify for the franchise based on the requirements stipulated in the Parliamentary Registration Act, new requirements would soon be imposed since this was widely seen as just the beginning of a larger drive for disenfranchisement.⁷⁸

An additional stance members of the Afrikaner Bond assumed was that Africans had a weak understanding of political questions and colonial concerns and therefore should not be involved in such decision making.⁷⁹ *The Journal* contested this view and argued that while colonists were of the opinion that Africans were not skilled in political questions and although that might be the case, many white voters were equally ignorant concerning political questions and yet their franchise participation was not threatened.⁸⁰ The newspaper continued by indicating that despite not many Africans being well informed on general political questions, there was an important set of questions and concerns on which they were better informed than anyone else. These were questions concerning the affairs of Africans, their desires, and customs, which formed a significant part of the colony.⁸¹ Therefore, it was important for Africans to choose representatives who were willing to listen to their concerns and serve as a voice on their behalf.⁸² It was also frequently argued that Africans who participated in the franchise and who contributed in electing their representatives have consistently done so to the benefit of both themselves and the colony as a whole.⁸³

⁷⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, 'Native opinion: A great wrong.'

⁷⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, 'Native opinion: A great wrong.'

⁷⁹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

⁸⁰ *The Journal*, 29 March 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁸¹ *The Journal*, 29 March 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁸² *The Journal*, 29 March 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁸³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 10 June 1885, 'Editorial Notes.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 May 1887, 'The franchise Question.'; *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, 'The Disfranchise Bill.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 November 1887, 'Native Opinion: Gross Tergiversation.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, 'Native opinion: A great wrong.'; *The Journal*, 24 January 1888, 'The Boers and the Blacks.' "They have only returned or assisted in returning men holding views that are fair and satisfactory towards all the inhabitants of the Colony."

Contesting the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887

Mr Jan Hofmeyr, representative of Stellenbosch and leader of the Afrikaner Bond, identified 1887 as a period of great political activity, with the Afrikaner Bond, among other political role players, devoting their energies to the franchise and the question of registration.⁸⁴ The Parliamentary Registration Act as a disfranchising legislation was of great concern to Africans and colonists throughout the Colony. This becomes apparent from the continuous meetings held by Africans and colonial farmers (separately), as well as in articles in the press throughout 1887 and 1888.⁸⁵ As a means of participating in the Cape Colony, Africans mobilised into groups that made use of various mediums, ‘including newspaper columns, electioneering, pamphleteering, petitioning, lobbying and pressure groups, to voice their opinions.’⁸⁶ These efforts are referred to throughout this chapter in an attempt to highlight how Africans experienced efforts to adjust the franchise in a way specifically aimed at excluding them from participating politically in the colony through the vote. An important instrument was *Imvo Zabantsundu* which played a critical role in the political mobilisation of Africans by encouraging those who were eligible to register for the franchise to do so and going so far as to provide its readers with information about place and time of registrations.⁸⁷ The newspaper also served as a representation of the African voice, to speak out against injustices committed by government and various organisations and individuals. It particularly expressed strong opinions against the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 and identified it as ‘the last desperate act of a moribund Parliament, the majority of which are bent upon weakening the electorate of their opponent.’⁸⁸ This came as a result of recognising that the attempt to disfranchise Africans was a means by which members of the Afrikaner Bond attempted to remove English politicians from Parliament whom they believed to have been put there by the African vote.⁸⁹ Efforts by *Imvo Zabantsundu* to shed light on critical issues that affected Africans throughout the Cape Colony were often complemented by *The Christian Express*,

⁸⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

⁸⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu* has made reference and quoted from newspapers of the Cape Colony which included; *The Cape Argus*, the [if ‘the’ is part of the title is should be uppercased) *Cape Mercury*, *the Journal*, *the Penny Mail*, *the P.E. Herald*, *the P.E. Telegraph*, *the Volksbode*, *the Free Press*, *the Graaff-Reinet Advertiser*, *the Northern Post*, *the Kimberly Advertiser*, *the Daily Independent*, *the East London dispatch*, *the East London Advertiser*, *the Cape Times*.

⁸⁶ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.4.

⁸⁷ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.100; S. Trapido. “African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910.” 1968, p.96.

⁸⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 20 July 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native and the Disfranchisement.’

⁸⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 20 July 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native and the Disfranchisement.’

which frequently published criticism of efforts at discrimination such as the Parliamentary Registration Act.

Efforts made by Africans to have the Parliamentary Registration Act revoked serves as an indication of their awareness of the importance of the vote and their increased desire to continue to participate politically in the colony. In an attempt to have the Act withdrawn, Africans persistently wrote petitions against it and made attempts to demonstrate how ‘each [African] had his share of the communal holding safely secured to him under *Native Laws and Customs* as if by title.’⁹⁰ This was complementary to views expressed by Sauer referred to earlier when he contested the Bill during debates in the House of Assembly.⁹¹ Africans argued that they were not necessarily poor or less respectable for occupying land communally and that they stood to lose a great deal if they were no longer to live in communes as they preferred.⁹² Their position was that they were able to maintain their riches in joint partnership under communal tenure and that accepting individual tenure would present them with the unjust dilemma of forcibly dividing up their land which would be the ‘the high road to ruin for many of them.’⁹³ The Act was thought to be a retrograde measure since, for Africans, its implementation would not encourage the accumulation of more riches or allow them to become more respectable or to have a larger stake in the colony, but would have the exact opposite effect.⁹⁴ This view was supported by *The Journal* which advocated the position that those who preferred to occupy land communally should be allowed to do so without the fear of having their rights infringed.⁹⁵

Aware and concerned about racial prejudice, Africans feared the potential damage the newly proposed legislation would cause them and that this was the start of more racially prejudiced legislations to follow. In addition to the petitions drafted and submitted by Africans, they frequently gathered to discuss potential ways forward. An example of this was a series of meetings aimed to address concerns relating to matters relevant to African political participation. One such meeting was held in Oukraal, Queenstown, on 24 May 1887 and was reported to have been a comparatively large meeting. On the agenda was the need to reflect on what the Parliamentary Registration Act meant for Africans and to consider possible measures

⁹⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.’

⁹¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.72-73.

⁹² *The Journal*, 29 March 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 March 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 March 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹⁵ *The Journal*, 29 March 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

for combating its consequences.⁹⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu* considered Queenstown to have done the colony a great service in convening a public meeting to enable people to state their views on a public platform.⁹⁷ According to the newspaper various speeches were delivered, all of which valued the privilege of voting as granted under the Constitution Ordinance which allowed for communal tenure as a means of qualification.⁹⁸ Some people were confused and asked what they had done wrong to be deprived of the franchise. The meeting concluded with the agreement that various petitions should be drafted by elected representatives from the meeting, and that all erf owners should gather to sign these petitions in support of their motion against the Parliamentary Registration Act.⁹⁹ These petitions were later submitted to Mr Frost,¹⁰⁰ the representative for Queenstown, who expressed the belief that Africans were just as entitled to the vote as he himself was.¹⁰¹ Similar to the meeting held in Queenstown, Africans of the King Williamstown constituency hosted a meeting with the purpose of discussing the ‘Native Disfranchisement Bill.’¹⁰² As in the case of Queenstown, they drafted a petition which highlighted five key components and expressed their deep disappointment with the content of the Parliamentary Registration Bill. Africans of the King Williamstown constituency were of the opinion that they were sensible enough to participate in the franchise and feared that the legislation would unfairly deprive a good portion of the population from political participation.¹⁰³ Points that were raised at the meeting included concerns related to the decision to entrust field-cornets with the duty to draft the voters’ registration lists.¹⁰⁴ The final point on the agenda was to discuss clause 17 according to which communal land was no longer to be used as a qualification measure and which was therefore often referred to as representing the whole Bill.¹⁰⁵ Members of the meeting reiterated their preference to hold land communally and expressed the belief that clause 17 would render it almost impossible for Africans to have a voice in government and protect their interests in a constitutional manner. They argued that the clause would infringe on the importance of ‘institutions of their forefathers, [because] a man’s share of the communal holding [was] secured to him by public faith as if by individual title,’

⁹⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

⁹⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁰⁰ Represented Queenstown in the Cape Legislative Assembly (elected in 1874) and served as Secretary of Native Affairs in 1893 during the C. J. Rhodes ministry. See *SA Biografiese Woordboek* Volume IV, pp.177-178.

¹⁰¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 June 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁰² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 January 1890, ‘Native opinion: The King Williamstown Registration.’

¹⁰³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 January 1890, ‘Native opinion: The King Williamstown Registration.’

¹⁰⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.110/132.

¹⁰⁵ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

and that *Native Laws and Customs* were supposed to be acknowledged by the government.¹⁰⁶ This correlated with the view of a correspondent in *Imvo Zabantsundu* who stated that the proposed law would infringe directly on *Native Law and Customs* which amounted to a grave injustice to the African people in the Cape Colony.¹⁰⁷

Africans were deeply discontented and determined to exhaust all channels of the Constitution to obtain redress.¹⁰⁸ In a meeting hosted in July 1887 in Port Elizabeth, a resolution was proposed that could be adopted in all other African dominated frontier divisions of the colony with whatever necessary modification(s). The resolution stipulated, firstly, that a petition requesting the Governor not to sanction the Registration Bill be compiled and secondly, that should the petition be successful, a deputation of about four Africans would be sent to England to present their case to the British Government and the English people.¹⁰⁹ The importance of sending a deputation to the British Government derived from the fact that Africans believed that, since the British government granted them the initial right to the franchise through the Constitution Ordinance of 1853, the British Government should have a say in the franchise being revoked. However, there were concerns about whether or not the Queen would take their plea into consideration, especially because it was passed by such a large majority in parliament. Africans nonetheless considered this as the only constitutional path open for them to seek redress.¹¹⁰ A telegraph was sent indicating that individual petitions were to follow as a result of this meeting.¹¹¹

The hope and consolation of presenting their case to the British Government was that 'if their grievances could but reach the ear of one whom they lovingly and reverently term their Mother, the Queen, they would receive a sympathetic and patient hearing, with the result that even-handed justice would be done without fear, favour, or prejudice.'¹¹² The reply was awaited with much anxiety.¹¹³ The belief of Africans was that sending a deputation to appeal to the English people was important because the financial credit of the colony depended very much on the opinion of their political integrity that prevailed in England. The hope was that if they could

¹⁰⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, 'Native disfranchisement Bill.'

¹⁰⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.'

¹⁰⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 20 July 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native and the Disfranchisement.'

¹⁰⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 20 July 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native and the Disfranchisement.'

¹¹⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 3 August 1887, 'A New Era.'

¹¹¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 20 July 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native and the Disfranchisement.'

¹¹² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, 'Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.'

¹¹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 November 1887, 'Native Opinion: Gross Tergiversation.'

spread information that the new policy was unjust and vexatious towards Africans, the British investors and capitalists would be alarmed and that ‘a pure flame of philanthropy will soon illumine the money-market.’¹¹⁴ This hope was supported by a speech delivered by Mr Leonard, the ex-Attorney General, and one of the first lawyers in the colony in which he argued that the title of the Act was misleading since it was in reality a Disfranchising Bill. The Governor’s office received the petition sent by Mr F. Makwena as representative of the Africans (as decided by the Port Elizabeth meeting) which outlined the suggestions made in the meeting hosted in Port Elizabeth appealing the Parliamentary Registration Act.¹¹⁵

As a result of the persistent petitions, F. W. Chesson, representative of the Aborigines Protection Society of the Broadway Chambers of England, tasked Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor and High Commissioner, with investigating and reporting on the exact effect the newly instated Act had on Africans. The purpose of this report was to conclude whether or not the British Government would get involved by intervening in Cape colonial politics and possibly disallow the legislation. The Queen would evaluate the report provided by Sir Hercules Robinson alongside comments of the African deputation and make a decision.¹¹⁶ If the inquiry showed that the Act only affected a few voters, then the British Government would not get involved, but if the report concluded that the effect was the disfranchisement of a great majority of Africans who were previously registered as voters, then the British Government would intervene and disallow the legislation.¹¹⁷ This evaluation did not, however, make provision for potential candidates who would have qualified for the vote if the Act had not been instated.

The invitation to draft a report was received among Africans as ‘manna from on high’¹¹⁸ because they felt that their cry had been taken seriously by the British Government and they thought that such a report would reflect the injustice of disfranchisement.¹¹⁹ Sir Henry Holland,¹²⁰ a British Minister, informed the Africans that the British Government was prepared to receive their representations and on the strength of this information African delegates from

¹¹⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.’

¹¹⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 September 1887, ‘Native opinion: Her Majesty’s Government and the Natives.’

¹¹⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 September 1887, ‘Native Opinion: Premature Rejoicing.’

¹¹⁷ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, ‘The Disfranchise Bill (The following letter appears in the *London Times*).’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 November 1887, ‘Native Opinion: Gross Tergiversation.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 August 1887, ‘Native opinion: The interference Bogey.’

¹¹⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 August 1887, ‘Native opinion: The interference Bogey.’

¹¹⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 August 1887, ‘Native opinion: The interference Bogey.’

¹²⁰ See SA Biografiese Woordeboek II, p.327 for further reading on him.

Herschel, Queenstown, Glen Grey, Tembuland, King Williamstown, East London, Fort Peddie, Fort Beaufort, Seymore, Cradock, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth shortly assembled to confer about the best way of presenting their case to the Imperial Government.¹²¹ Nevertheless, the necessity of having to send a deputation to England was not agreed on by everyone, as is evident from the *Cape Times* of 17 August 1887 where it was argued that it would be futile to send a deputation to England because the proposed franchise was still an exceedingly liberal one.¹²² The eventual conclusion of the enquiry was that the Parliamentary Registration Act would not be withdrawn or disallowed, with the British Government stating that the Act was not at variance with the Constitution Ordinance of the Colony,¹²³ and that since ‘no power can undo what is done, except the power by which it is done,’ they declined to further interfere with the matter.¹²⁴ The attempt to send a deputation to England inevitably failed because the decision of non-interference was made before they were to depart. Nevertheless, Africans still strongly believed that the Parliamentary Registration Act should be withdrawn as they were of the opinion that the Act was of sufficient importance to justify interference from the Queen.¹²⁵

Africans acknowledged that it could not be denied that in comparison to qualifications in other colonies, especially those surrounding the Cape, the Cape franchise was still a liberal one. However, their grievance was not limited to the matter of legislation itself but included the injustice implied in the motive and manner of the legislation.¹²⁶ Their argument was that clause 17 of the Parliamentary Registration Act distinctly deprived Africans of the right to value the land which they occupied on tribal tenure, together with their house, to make up the necessary £25 that would qualify them for the franchise.¹²⁷ Despite the Act not making a distinction between African and colonists, it effectively made the distinction by limiting valuation of land in terms of the particular tenure under which most Africans of the frontier, and almost no colonist, occupied their lands.¹²⁸

Imvo Zabantsundu further noted that the function of any house was to be a simple dwelling, and that with regard to land, Africans could continue to be ‘well-to-do agriculturalists’ and be

¹²¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 September 1887, ‘Native Opinion: Premature Rejoicing.’

¹²² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.’

¹²³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 26 October 1887, ‘Native opinion: A Welcome decision.’

¹²⁴ *The Journal*, 25 October 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹²⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹²⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.’

¹²⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 September 1887, - ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹²⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, ‘Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.’

wealthy in cattle while living in huts that were hardly worth much in terms of monetary value.¹²⁹ The Act, it concluded, therefore made the substantial stake of Africans in the Colony, and their desire for, and interest in, its peaceful condition, difficult to maintain. Thus, both the message and the spirit of the Constitution Ordinance was believed to be violated, which ultimately resulted in the grievance. The spirit of the Constitution, according to William Porter, was that there should be equal political rights without discrimination on the bases of race or ethnicity¹³⁰ and that African laws and customs should be respected and allow for qualification under whichever form of land occupation. This meant that if the franchise were equal for all forms of occupation - which included a house and land worth £25 - the franchise would not be too high a qualification to require. But the franchise was not equal for all. It was unequal for the primary purpose of removing the majority of Africans from the voters' rolls and to exclude parliamentary members who were believed to be placed there through the votes of Africans.¹³¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu* stated that it was a pity that the Act was designed to disfranchise Africans because, although Africans had dark skin, they were 'morally, socially, and intellectually the equals of those who [were] so anxious to oppress them and deprive them of their just right.'¹³² This debate created a high level of uncertainty and fear regarding the future and many thought it unfortunate that the assumption was made that the locations or reserves did not belong to the Africans who occupied them.

African franchise participation and the impact of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887

For 34 years¹³³ Africans were able to participate in the Cape franchise according to the Constitution Ordinance and although they did not initially participate in the franchise en masse, political participation was deeply valued by African representatives who did actively participate in it.¹³⁴ The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed an upsurge in the number of Africans registering to participate in the franchise.¹³⁵ This spurred agitation to modify the qualification, as illustrated above. Historians of this period have primarily depended

¹²⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 September 1887, 'Editorial Notes.'

¹³⁰ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, 'The Disfranchise Bill.'

¹³¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, 'Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.'

¹³² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, 'Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.'

¹³³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 August 1887, 'Editorial Notes: The Native appeal.'; Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.72.

¹³⁴ *The Journal*, 20 September 1887, 'The Disfranchise Bill', *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.'

¹³⁵ This will be illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.

on the numbers provided in the debates for the Parliamentary Registration Act (Table 5) as the main statistical point of reference in understanding trends in African registration. As identified by Edgecombe in her analysis of the multiracial franchise, the original claims and objections as well as the civil commissioner reports appear not to have survived.¹³⁶ Although there are no reliable statistics available for the registration of voters from the 1853 Constitutional Ordinance until the registration lists of 1872, it has been estimated that of the quarter of a million Africans that were in the frontier districts only approximately 4 000 to 5 000 were registered voters.¹³⁷

With the introduction of Responsible Government in 1872, voters' registration lists were formally published as part of Government Publications which listed all those who successfully registered to participate in the franchise. The analyses of these lists have encountered important obstacles, such as the fact that the racial classification of individuals was not listed for 1872 to 1901. This has made it impossible to determine the exact effect of the Act.¹³⁸ That said, with the expanded analysis proposed in this study to understand voter registration throughout 1872-1909, the introduction of race classification from 1903 to 1909 can be used to retrospectively identify Africans since in most instances there was a repetition in names registered over the years. In cases where there was no classification, distinct Africans' names and surnames were used as a form of identification.¹³⁹ As a result of this classification, all Africans have been grouped together here in category 'B' while a different category 'O' was created for all other racial groups including whites, coloureds and those considered 'others.' The primary reason for this classification is because the aim is to isolate and comment only on African participation. An additional but secondary reason is that in some instances it is impossible to distinguish between coloured and white names/surnames, which makes classification into separate groups challenging for the years prior to 1903. Through this methodology a much more precise effect of the implementation of disenfranchisement legislations in the Cape Colony can be identified to that which has been offered so far in disfranchisement historiography. As stated in the Introduction, the main objective of this study is to fill this gap in historiography and to further extend our insight into African political participation in the franchise through franchise registration. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate registration for the vote as recorded in the voters' rolls in the Queenstown electoral division for the period of 1879 to

¹³⁶ D. R. Edgecombe, *The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910*, 1978, p.34.

¹³⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.106.

¹³⁸ D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1978, p.34.

¹³⁹ Examples include: Gungu Solomon, Matthew Xuma, Beyana Bodoza, Lingani Lungisa, Mtwa Mnyengeza, Vimba Mtombeni, who all appeared on the 1872 Queenstown registration list.

1909. While Figure 3 represents the overall registration in the Queenstown electoral division for this period, Figure 4 represents the distinction of groups 'O' and 'B' in order to show how Africans were registering for the vote between 1872 to 1909 and, more importantly, how they were affected by the implementation of disfranchisement legislations.

Figure 3: Overall voter registration in Queenstown, 1872-1909





Figure 4: Voter registration in Queenstown 1872-1909 according to race



Both Figures 3 and 4 reflect a gradual increase in the registration to participate in the franchise before the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act. The distinction of race in Figure 4 shows that for the first ten years of responsible government in the colony, from 1872 to 1882, less than 200 Africans registered for the vote in the Queenstown electoral division. This, while other races were increasingly registering for the vote on a gradual scale. As represented in the debates around the Parliamentary Registration Act (Table 5), there was a drastic increase of African voter registration between 1882 and 1886. An important inference we can make from these figures is the influence of the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act in 1887, which capped African qualification and resulted in a decline in African registration (which peaked in 1886). The effect of the Act was expected to be seen in the 1888 elections. Therefore, clauses 1 and 3 of the Act made provision for a new list to be

constructed in 1887 as a substitute for the 1886 list so that those who qualified in 1886 but did not qualify after the implementation of the 1887 Act would not be able to vote again in the 1888 elections.¹⁴⁰ The trend of both the overall registration and African registration reflected in the voters' rolls for the Queenstown electoral division correlates with the numbers provided by Hofmeyr in 1891. He indicated that voters in the Cape Colony were reduced by 24.5% and Africans in the Frontier Circle, by 33% as a result of the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act.¹⁴¹ Although this meant that the goal of disfranchising approximately 90% of Africans was not achieved, a notable percentage of Africans were indeed impacted on by the legislation. Not meeting the desired outcome for disfranchisement also meant that a substantial number of Africans continued to register for the vote. A frustration expressed by Hofmeyr, which these figures also demonstrate, was that after the 1888 elections those who were disfranchised were starting to register again for the franchise.¹⁴² *Imvo Zabantsundu* considered it unfortunate that for many Africans acquiring the combination of land and prescribed housing for franchise participation involved a fundamental change in their way of life and that the limitations had very little to do with them being poor, thus in effect agreeing that the £25 franchise was not too high. The newspaper explained that Africans just needed a little more motivation to participate. The hope expressed in *Imvo Zabantsundu* was that Africans would continue to strive for participation in the franchise while simultaneously being of the opinion that African participation was so low that it could not understand why colonists were so anxious about it.¹⁴³ An analysis of the period between 1890 and 1910 will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study.

Further efforts towards the disfranchisement of Africans after the 1888 elections

Shortly before the 1888 elections the Parliamentary Registration Act was passed as law. Given disappointment with its effect, more stringent measures were undertaken in an attempt to remove Africans from the registration lists.¹⁴⁴ To better understand the processes and experiences of disfranchisement for Africans in the Cape Colony, an analysis of events after the implementation of the Act is necessary. This chapter highlights some of the experiences reported by Africans on the stringent measures taken post-1887 and the role of the field-cornet

¹⁴⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion - Muzzling of the natives'; Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.131-132.

¹⁴¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

¹⁴² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

¹⁴³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 18 February 1892, "Native Opinion: The 'Moderates.'"

¹⁴⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, pp.328/334.

as drafters of the registration lists. The apprehension Africans expressed with the appointment of field-cornets as drafters of the voters' lists were validated when the new voters' lists were compiled after the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act. *The Journal* reported that, although in some cases field-cornets had registered 'Blacks, Boers and British,' others have displayed hostility towards Africans and voiced unfounded objections in order to exclude them from registration.¹⁴⁵

Field-cornets were assigned the duty of constructing and revising the registration lists of their location bi-annually. The process of their appointment was contested in the debates in the House of Assembly on the basis that it would be biased because field-cornets were predominantly appointed by members of the Afrikaner Bond in government.¹⁴⁶ The common perception of field-cornets was that they 'were prejudiced, and would not place an [African's] name on the list if they could help it.'¹⁴⁷ Sir George Grey stated that, although he understood why there were objections to the appointment of field-cornets and the request that more professional men should have been appointed, he believed that field-cornets had the ability to be honest and therefore should have no problem compiling the lists.¹⁴⁸ Despite their appointment having been settled, Africans were still apprehensive of these officials and reiterated that the attitude of field-cornets would result in some Africans being excluded from registration or the name of other Africans erased 'as if an unqualified person.'¹⁴⁹ Opposition to the appointment of field-cornets was, however, unsuccessful and the motion put forward for the appointment of civil commissioners instead of field-cornets was denied. Africans were of the view that civil commissioners would act more fairly in such a task because they had a better understanding of the people in the locations.¹⁵⁰ In other words, the preference for civil commissioners was rooted in the pre-existing relationship civil commissioners had with Africans in locations and contrasted with both the nature and extent of experience Africans had with field-cornets. In the end, the civil commissioners' role in the compilation, or rather finalisation, of the lists was that appeals could be addressed to him, though this would have been costly because the appeals process required payment of a fee.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵ *The Journal*, 24 January 1888, 'Native opinion; The Boers and the Blacks.'

¹⁴⁶ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.71.

¹⁴⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

¹⁴⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.110.

¹⁴⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 6 April 1887, 'Editorial Notes'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.'

¹⁵⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.'

¹⁵¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, 'Native opinion, Muzzling of the natives.'

The fears Africans expressed regarding the deployment of field-cornets played out in a series of cases where it was reported that field-cornets refused to register Africans given the perceived ‘extra-legality’¹⁵² of certain conditions. An example of this was the case of a man who was unable to produce a title in his own name because he occupied land in common. However, he was able to produce evidence of being in possession of the requisite property valued at £40. The field-cornet disregarded the property value and refused to allow the man to register with the explanation that, because he occupied land communally, he did not qualify for the vote.¹⁵³ Although it was true that the man occupied land communally, he would have qualified for the vote not only on the basis of a combination of land and property, but because his property exceeded the £25 minimum qualification. In the Alice Ward of the Victoria East constituency the registering officer produced 17 claims which were submitted on the 20th and 31st of December. These claims were rejected because they did not comply with additional instructions that the particular field-cornet had issued.¹⁵⁴ The Africans who had submitted their claims challenged their rejection on the grounds that they were not aware of the additional instructions given by the field-cornet and insisted that their claims complied with the requirements of the Act of parliament. In response, their claims were dismissed for being ‘informal’ because they were written in pencil.¹⁵⁵

In addition to the various cases in which field-cornets presented Africans with obstacles to register for the franchise, the natural prejudice that colonists had towards Africans consistently made things worse. Some colonists were of the opinion that Africans were simply not entitled to the vote and challenged the registration qualifications of Africans.¹⁵⁶ Mr John Ingles of the Victoria East constituency, for example, was not convinced that all Africans approved by the registering officer did legitimately qualify for the franchise and lodged objections against a number of registered Africans on the grounds that their property was of insufficient value. This, despite the value of the properties in question having been confirmed three years before by a court that upheld the valuation submitted by the Africans.¹⁵⁷ Consequent to Ingles’ claims, an investigation was lodged by the Civil Commissioner. Nevertheless, Africans were confident of

¹⁵² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 December 1887, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

their claims and eager to present their cases in court for the thorough evaluation of these matters and, therefore, welcomed the investigation.¹⁵⁸

The seventeen cases of ‘informal’ applications were not the only objections to Africans’ qualification that Major Boyes, the civil commissioner of Alice, had to deal with. He also had to settle approximately eighty objections to Africans who had already been registered by the field-cornet. Mr Rose-Innes took on these cases and, in his capacity as their attorney, extensively engaged the General Secretary of the Native Vigilance Association to argue the matter on behalf of his clients. He led evidence that the market value of most of their properties ranged from £25 to £50 and records from the Civil Commissioner’s office were produced to confirm this in addition to the valuation provided by the Divisional Council. Opposing Rose-Innes were those who swore that the lands and properties in question could not be worth more than £7. In contrast to its previous ruling, the court ruled against the Africans who were subsequently removed from the registration list on the grounds of ‘insufficient value.’¹⁵⁹ Yet, the Africans were determined to have their names on the register and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.¹⁶⁰

Despite attempts to disqualify Africans from participation in the franchise, there were also efforts made to get more Africans to register for the franchise. A correspondent for *Imvo Zabantsundu* identified the continued attempts by certain English colonists who realized the potential of the African vote and thus supported the enfranchisement of Africans as they encouraged Africans who qualified for the franchise to register to vote.¹⁶¹ In the Glen Grey division of Queenstown they managed to successfully get 550 Africans on the registration list. Shortly thereafter, however, 450 of those names were objected to by members of the Afrikaner Bond.¹⁶² The assertion was that because the Afrikaner Bond was not able to disfranchise Africans through the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act, they needed to find alternative methods to try and exclude African participation from the franchise.¹⁶³ Mr E. Garcia, Civil Commissioner of the region, requested that all 450 Africans whose names were objected to appear in court the following Monday at 9 o’clock. More than 500 Africans went

¹⁵⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 15 February 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁶⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 15 February 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁶¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 January 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁶² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, ‘The Registration Act in Queenstown.’

¹⁶³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 April 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

into town on foot to defend their claims. The first 100 were accepted the following day (Tuesday), with only a few being rejected. The rest of the claimants, more than 300 in total, had to endure the inconvenience of having to wait until the Wednesday to have their claims heard in court.¹⁶⁴ In addition to the inconvenience and missing work to have their names registered for the vote, it had been raining all afternoon and the men had no food or shelter. A few men from town pledged to provide them with bread and 180 loaves were distributed among the 300 plus Africans the Tuesday evening. On Wednesday more bread was supplied. As the proceedings continued, Africans had to pay a sum of 4s each ‘to look after their interests’, which amounted to at least a combined sum of £50 or £60.¹⁶⁵ The commitment they displayed by waiting in town for more than a day without food or shelter demonstrated how much they valued political participation in the Cape through the vote. An attempt was made by attorney Mr Bell for the cost incurred by Africans to be paid by those who objected to their claims, but that was unsuccessful. The correspondent who submitted his summary of this series of events to *Imvo Zabantsundu* stated that his biggest frustration was the manner in which the cases were dealt with by the magistrate, especially since ‘English or Dutch voters’ would never be subjected to similar treatment if they had to defend their claim to registration.¹⁶⁶ The following is an account of proceedings as described by the correspondent:

‘The Chief Constable is handed a paper containing the name of person objected to. He calls out the name in court, and a[n] [African] at the door, shouts out the name, and in comes, the voter objected to by the Afrikaner Bond.

The chief constable says, ‘your name?’ –

Answers, ‘Umjala’ or what not –

‘Where do you live?’ –

answer ‘Glen Grey’ and so forth.

Chief constable: ‘Humba!’ If the person called does not appear, the matter will have to be considered another time.’¹⁶⁷

In the course of the Wednesday afternoon hearings ninety Africans were approved to remain on the Queenstown electoral division’s voters’ list. However, these claims were not part of the

¹⁶⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, ‘The Registration Act in Queenstown.’

¹⁶⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, ‘The Registration Act in Queenstown.’

¹⁶⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, ‘The Registration Act in Queenstown.’

¹⁶⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, ‘The Registration Act in Queenstown.’

objections from the Glen Grey division but instead belonged to Kamastone and Ovkraal. At the time when the correspondence of the writer was submitted the magistrate's court was still processing objections from African voters. A substantial number of Africans were not approved to register during these proceedings.¹⁶⁸ As a result, the question that continued to be raised was whether in the cases from Queenstown, Wodehouse and Alice the franchise was not secured on the basis of the proof that they submitted under the qualification requirements of the Parliamentary Registration Act.¹⁶⁹

Articles were frequently published on how the Supreme Court was presented with an array of cases, both of instances where Africans were not allowed to register as well as instances where Africans were allowed to register for franchise participation. Mr Theunis Botha, a representative of the Afrikaner Bond, presented a series of cases in which Africans were successfully registered and appealed the decision to the Queenstown Civil Commissioner. Botha claimed that 'the list of the [African] voters of the Tembuland ward of the Queenstown district should be nullified for two reasons, [being] alleged 'gross irregularity' and 'gross misconduct' which characterised the doings of the field-cornets.'¹⁷⁰ Botha acted on the belief that no persons on un-surveyed plots were entitled to the franchise and that the magistrate wrongly assessed the property qualification under the Disfranchisement Act. However, judges could not detect any irregularity in the manner in which the magistrate arrived at his findings. Botha's application was refused but not without a clear and unambiguous ruling that the Parliamentary Registration Act allowed for no appeal of the decision made by the magistrate. Moreover, the Acting Chief Justice thought it important to make it clear that, as stated in the House Duty Act, section 2, sub-section B and for the purpose of the House Duty, for the definition of a house Africans' stable and/or out-building could be taken into consideration, but that for the purpose of franchise qualification, they should be excluded from the calculation of worth.¹⁷¹

A Select Committee of the House of Assembly was composed to test the Queenstown case against the registration for parliamentary voters. The committee consisted mainly of Bond members such as Sir T. Upington, Hofmeyr, Goldschmidt, Rose-Innes and Theron. Many were

¹⁶⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 February 1888, 'The Registration Act in Queenstown.'

¹⁶⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 April 1888, 'Editorial Notes.'

¹⁷⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 June 1888, 'Native Opinion: The Registration Act in the supreme court.'

¹⁷¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 June 1888, 'Native Opinion: The Registration Act in the supreme court.'

unsatisfied with the selection, but it was not contested.¹⁷² Besides Mr Rose-Innes, *Imvo Zabantsundu* considered this a particularly one-sided inquiry that would seek out prejudiced witnesses to the benefit of the Afrikaner Bond. The report from this committee was argued to have been the very epitome of misrepresentation. Claims that the value of many of the African properties was not worth more than £2 or £3 were contested and the individuals who provided these reports were not qualified valuers and no question was put to them to determine how they arrived at their valuations.¹⁷³ As a result it was concluded that the Parliamentary Registration Act was violated by having allowed the relevant Africans to register for the vote. Parliament resolved ‘that the report and evidence be forwarded to the Government to enable it to give effect to so much thereof as is possible without further legislation.’¹⁷⁴

In light of the judgment of the Chief Justice that the definition of a house included the stable and/or out-building was applicable for House Duty but not for the qualification of franchise qualification, several properties were revalued.¹⁷⁵ The new valuations drastically reduced the value of African owned land which, in some cases, prevented Africans from being able to qualify for the franchise. In previous years government’s Sworn Appraiser fixed the value of African holdings at £25 until re-evaluations were done in 1890 and the value of the same holdings were suddenly and unaccountably lowered to £8.¹⁷⁶ Africans in King Williamstown disputed this by proclaiming that these were not the sums that they would exchange their property for in the property market. To justify their argument, they referred to cases where both buyers and sellers of the properties in question exchanged the properties for £25 each, and sometimes even more than that.¹⁷⁷ There were also cases where lots comprising ten acres were disputed but in which the court was satisfied by the valuation because the men had occupied the lots for more than five years prior to the claims and were able to submit sufficient evidence of their value. *Imvo Zabantsundu* reported that part of this evidence was that records in the local Deeds Office, of which Mr Holland was the Registrar, showed that the six-acre lots sold at prices ranging from £20 to £40 and it could be demonstrated that the prices had never come down as low as £6. The re-evaluation of, and reduction in, the value of land and property naturally created confusion about whether or not a given individual still qualified for the

¹⁷² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 16 August 1888, ‘The Queenstown voter’s registration case once more.’

¹⁷³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 16 August 1888, ‘The Queenstown voter’s registration case once more.’

¹⁷⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 16 August 1888, ‘The Queenstown voter’s registration case once more.’

¹⁷⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 June 1888, ‘Native Opinion: The Registration Act in the supreme court.’

¹⁷⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 January 1890, ‘Native opinion: The King Williamstown Registration.’

¹⁷⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 January 1890, ‘Native opinion: The King Williamstown Registration.’

franchise.¹⁷⁸ In an attempt to defend the value of these lands the Civil Commissioner cited the opinion of the late Mr Porter, given in 1853, as an explanation of what was meant by value under the Constitution Ordinance. According to this explanation ‘value’ was the sum of which ‘a fair appraiser would fix as the price which a fair purchaser, who wanted to buy, would be willing to give.’¹⁷⁹ An example of an actual sale was submitted as evidence and showed that Africans were willing to pay between £20 and £40 for land now valued at £10. Commentary on these cases was that if the value of African land and property was to be handled as it had been in King Williamstown, it would be best to rather consider simply placing a nominal value on what an African may possess instead of changing the franchise.¹⁸⁰

In 1892 the civil commissioner of King Williamstown had to spend two weeks revising the voters’ lists compiled by the field-cornets. Nearly 200 Africans contested and appealed their claims for registration to the civil commissioner with the main bone of contention being the value of their properties which had previously qualified them for participation in the franchise. The Civil Commissioner found that, based on the evidence presented, it was clear that the objective of the field-cornet was to debar Africans from exercising their rights. In the process of reducing the value of some of these properties it was found that one of the field-cornets boasted that Africans would no longer appear as ‘well off’ as they had in the past.¹⁸¹ Although it appeared that the issue at stake before the Civil Commissioner was the fair evaluation of land, the deeper issue was the attempt to use this mechanism as instrument to keep Africans from qualifying for the vote.

The Afrikaner Bond had to continually improvise on their attempts to exclude Africans from being able to vote. This can be seen in the way a condition for franchise participation which had not received much attention in the past was used as a further attempt to disqualify Africans. In addition to the requirements based on gender, income and the occupation of land and property, the 1853 Constitution Ordinance indicated that an individual had to be either a natural-born British ‘subject’, a naturalised British ‘subject’, or a former ‘subject’ of the

¹⁷⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 January 1890, ‘Native opinion: The King Williamstown Registration.’

¹⁷⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 January 1892, ‘Native Opinion: Justice’s injust.’

¹⁸⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 January 1892, ‘Native Opinion: Justice’s injust.’

¹⁸¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 January 1892, ‘Native Opinion: Justice’s injust.’

Batavian Republic,¹⁸² or would otherwise have been considered alien.¹⁸³ There has never been a clear reason why the notion of being alien was hardly ever considered in the evaluation of qualification for registration. Speculation has been that it was either because some of the registering officers were not aware of the requirement or that they ignored it, particularly in the years prior to 1884.¹⁸⁴ The subject of being alien was, however, raised in the resident magistrate, Major Eliot's, court. Prominent Africans including John Veldtman, John Kentani, William Mangwevana and Jona Mtshisa were reported to be alien and their qualification for the franchise brought into question. All of these men qualified on high value claims - as seen, for example, in the case of John Veldtman who occupied a house worth more than £50, received a salary of £100 per annum, was holder of a farm which he had title deeds to in addition to which he owned 2 erven in Butterworth while having been 'under the Queen' for more than 32 years.¹⁸⁵

In pronouncing judgement in Veldtman's case it was concluded with reference to clause 10 of the Constitution Ordinance that, although an Act of annexation or a deed of cession may make people British subjects, this did not bring them within the requirements of the franchise. In adjudicating these claims, Major Eliot reasoned that 'if annexation did of itself admit them to the privilege of the franchise it would not have been necessary to make this reservation.'¹⁸⁶ Subsequently, it was recommended that such cases be referred to a higher court if the outcome were to be contested.¹⁸⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu* argued that Veldtman and those who claimed the franchise with him, owed no allegiance to any other power as the natural-born subject of the Batavian Government still did to the Batavian Government.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, a correspondent in *Imvo Zabantsundu* thought it difficult to fully comprehend how a person who was rendered as a British subject by the Annexation Act in the Cape Colony would be required to submit a letter of naturalisation in order to stand on an equal footing with natural-born subjects although they automatically became subjects through annexation. This line of argument was consistent with the view expressed in *Imvo Zabantsundu* that the law as it existed did not exclude from

¹⁸² The British occupied the Cape first in 1795 then returned power to the Batavian Republic in 1803 according to the terms of the Peace of Amiens, followed by the second British occupation in 1806.

¹⁸³ D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1978, p.22, S. Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910," 1978, p.79. R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.79.

¹⁸⁴ S, Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910." 1968, p.79.

¹⁸⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 February 1888, 'Editorial notes.'

¹⁸⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 February 1888, 'Editorial notes.'

¹⁸⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 February 1888, 'Editorial notes.'

¹⁸⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 February 1888, 'Editorial notes.'

the franchise those who came under the Queen's protection by cession of their territory or by conquest. On the contrary, they considered the Annexation Acts as a naturalising Acts under the terms of the 10th Section of the Constitution Ordinance.¹⁸⁹

The racial undertones of the Parliamentary Registration Act were clear, although some colonists tried to put a positive spin on the implementation of the Act in order to justify the racial discrimination outlined in the Act. For instance, at a town hall meeting in 1888 it was argued that the register was designed to rid constituencies of those who had no right to vote, such as the 'three-sticks and sugar-bag voter' like the 'red blanket voters.'¹⁹⁰ The Act, they argued, would serve as a stimulant for those who were excluded from the franchise, to make efforts to qualify for it.¹⁹¹ They contended that in five years, where there was now one African voter, there would then be 100 because Africans would aspire to achieve what they considered valuable to them.¹⁹² In this way the narrative of colonists came to function as the pretext for maintaining that the Act was to the benefit of the African's future because it would motivate them to qualify for the franchise and, in so doing, improve their overall socio-economic position. *Imvo Zabantsundu*, however, expressed the view that this argument was misleading because at the time when the Act was implemented, Africans were already increasingly participating in the vote and that the assumption that their participation was merely limited by the £25 land and property measure, false. It argued that only a limited number of Africans qualified on the basis of the minimum qualification but that the majority were relatively wealthy and capable of qualification if only the qualification remained equal and fair. It continued that, as far as Africans were concerned, they easily compared favourably with other classes in terms of wealth. However, their wealth was unfortunately not necessarily reflected in their possession of 'a decent dwelling house' and land. But, if the vote depended on income, combined with movable as well as immovable property, authorities would discover that Africans were not as poor as many seem to believe.¹⁹³ Therefore, Africans' frustration with the Act not only related to the adjustment of the qualification for the franchise but also to the racial distinction that was implicitly imposed. They considered this the most severe blow to their

¹⁸⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 March 1888, 'Editorial Notes.'

¹⁹⁰ *The Journal*, 4 September 1888, 'Meeting in the Town Hall.' The red blanket voter referred to Africans that continued to prefer living according to their traditional norms and lifestyle.

¹⁹¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, 'Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.' *The Journal*, 4 September 1888, 'Meeting in the Town Hall.'

¹⁹² *The Journal*, 4 September 1888, 'Meeting in the Town Hall.'

¹⁹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 18 February 1892, 'Native Opinion: The 'Moderates.'

rights they had experienced since representative governance was introduced in the colony, and ‘an attempt to cloak injustice under the specious pretext of reform.’¹⁹⁴

Conclusion

This chapter is divided into five sub-sections each of which contribute towards an understanding of the views and attitudes of both colonists and Africans on the question of African franchise participation through the vote as well as the efforts each group made to achieve their goal. Through the identification of African voter participation during representative government, in contrast to African participation during responsible government, this chapter identified why and how political transitions in the Cape Colony influenced African participation in the vote. It outlined how Africans occupied land in the colony and the different forms of land tenure existed in the colony after the introduction of a series of land policies. This contributes to an understanding of why land could have been used as a tool for African disfranchisement – something which has not been done in previous historiography. The chapter also highlighted how land continued to play an important role for both Africans and colonists and the influence the introduction of land policies had on how Africans continued to occupy land in the Cape Colony. It argued that although there was a small portion of Africans who gradually made the shift to the occupation of land on the basis of individual tenure throughout the 1860s, the majority of Africans were reluctant to take up alternative forms of land and continued to occupy land communally – thus explaining the argument presented in parliament which legitimized the disfranchisement of Africans on the basis of tribal and communal land ownership. This concretizes the notion that although the Act did not make a distinct race classification, it drew that distinction through the limitation of land tenure.

Through the evaluation of African political participation throughout responsible government, the chapter contributes to an understanding of how Africans were participating politically in the colony through the vote, what their attitude towards being able to vote was, and the various efforts they made to continually qualify for the vote. It highlights the role of newspapers such as *Imvo Zabantsundu* and *The Christian Express* as representatives of the African voice that made efforts to counter injustices by government, organisations, and individuals of the time. These newspapers were used throughout this chapter as a lens to better understand the experiences and opinions of Africans on franchise participation. The chapter also makes a

¹⁹⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 23 March 1887, ‘Native opinion: Muzzling of the natives.’

contribution to the historiography of African disenfranchisement literature through a quantitative representation of African participation in the Cape franchise. Through the use of qualitative examples, it provides insight into how Africans took varying measures in an attempt to have the Parliamentary Registration Act revoked. It also presents an insight into the Africans' lived experiences of the implementation process and their responses to the drastic measures taken by some field-cornets in their attempts to keep Africans off the voter registration lists.

Chapter 3

Education, Occupation, and the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892

Introduction

Education and occupation were key components that allowed for continued participation of Africans in the franchise. Given the importance of education as a measure of disfranchisement introduced in the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892, this chapter will provide an overview of the education Africans had access to and how they used that access as a tool to qualify for the franchise. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there was serious dissatisfaction among both Africans and colonists with the outcome of the Parliamentary Registration Act which led to the deliberation, among certain colonists, of various measures to use as additional tools of disfranchisement. Because of the Constitution Ordinance there were limitations on the use of race as a measure of disfranchisement as a result of which education and land were instrumentalised to further limit the participation in the franchise. This chapter explores the different suggestions for adjustment of the franchise made shortly after the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act and identifies the Afrikaner Bond as a key driving force for that adjustment.

To better understand the value of having imposed an educational test as a measure of disfranchisement, this chapter looks at the role of both missionaries and government in the provision of education for Africans. It explores how Africans used education as a tool for continued participation in the franchise and how this was reflected in occupation. A number of occupations are identified in the period 1887 - 1909 that reflect the way in which Africans used education as a tool of enfranchisement. These occupations also illustrate what continued franchise participation looked like for Africans and the chapter investigates the extent to which some occupations can be said to have had a greater influence on participation than others. The contribution this chapter therefore makes to African disfranchisement historiography is a perspective on the way education was used as a tool of disfranchisement as, and perhaps because, Africans set out to use education as a tool of enfranchisement. Through an illustration of what continued franchise participation looked like for Africans in the Queenstown electoral

division, the chapter argues that Africans who participated in the franchise formed part of an African middle class that persisted throughout responsible government in the Cape.

The Franchise and Ballot Act

Already by 1889 there were suspicions that attempts would be made to further tamper with the franchise, especially given the low outcome of disfranchisement that followed the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887.¹ Therefore, the introduction of the Franchise and Ballot Act was mainly due to the failure of the Parliamentary Registration Act.² The key driving force behind continued attempts to disfranchise Africans were believed to have been the Afrikaner Bond whose members were of the view that Africans were subordinate, that they did not deserve equal political rights and that African votes went to the English faction of parliament which, if continued at the same rate, would pose a serious threat.³

The Journal reported on an Afrikaner Bond Congress meeting held in March 1889, hosted in Middelburg, where thirty districts were represented. One of the topics raised for discussion at this meeting was the adjustment of the franchise and various suggestions were presented, including that of Mr Lombaard who advocated for the exclusion of Africans who were polygamist, while Mr Van Minnen was of the view that no African should be allowed to vote at all.⁴ Members of the meeting were reminded, however, that the constitution had fixed qualifications and that adjustment of the franchise would have to be done with those qualifications in mind. Reflecting on the meeting, *The Journal* indicated that it supported the proposal that nobody should be allowed to participate in the franchise who could not read or write and advocated that weight should be added to the property requirement along with the possibility of considering a cumulative vote.⁵ At a different meeting, Mr Bekker also proposed that the property qualification should be raised and the Constitution Ordinance amended to the degree necessary to make it impossible for Africans to participate.⁶ This was seconded by Mr Van Rensburg who believed that if things were left unchecked they would soon have no Afrikaner member in Parliament. The outcome was an agreement that if Africans were to be

¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 February 1889, 'Editorial Notes.'

² S, Trapido. "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910." 1968, p.82.

³ R. Bouch. *The Colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.12; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, 'Native Politics.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 September 1891, 'Current opinion: The Press on the Franchise.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 9 November 1891, 'Native Opinion: The struggle again.'

⁴ *The Journal*, 14 March 1889, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁵ *The Journal*, 14 March 1889, 'Editorial Notes.'

⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 March 1890, 'Raising the franchise.'

granted these freedoms of participation and education, colonists would have to ‘keep their thumb on their throats’⁷ which implied that they needed to maintain authoritarian control through consistent monitoring of Africans.

Contributors to *Imvo Zabantsundu* expressed the belief that the precise objective of the proposal to adjust the franchise was to lend more political power to the Afrikaner Bond since the measure adopted in 1887 ‘to purify’ the voters’ registration lists had failed significantly to achieve their members’ goal.⁸ Despite the constant agitation to adjust the franchise, views expressed against African participation did not go unchallenged. An example of this was the response to the view that Africans were being led to the voting polls like sheep to the slaughterhouse.⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu* responded by arguing that Africans think and act too independently for them to conform to views they did not support. Its stance was that the days when the arm of Africans could be twisted had long passed and that their selection of parliamentary representatives served as an indication that Africans were only willing to support those who were willing to support them.¹⁰

Cecil John Rhodes, who became Prime Minister in 1890, was believed to have been aligned with, and supported by, the Afrikaner Bond whose objective it was to ‘dispossess [Africans] of land with a view to assist...the course of events which is said to tend towards making the [Africans] servants and not owners of the soil.’¹¹ At an 1890 caucus of Afrikaner Bond members Rhodes indicated that ‘one of the planks of the political platform on which the new Ministry stands is the raising of the franchise.’¹² He claimed the support of the Afrikaner Bond on the basis that his political views had always been sympathetic to theirs. To drive this point further Rhodes referred to his support of the Strop Bill proposed by the Afrikaner Bond in 1888 as well as views he had previously expressed concerning the ‘native question’ which were similar to the views of the Afrikaner bond.¹³ Although Rhodes was Prime Minister during the implementation of both the Franchise and Ballot Act as well as the Glen Grey Act, the emphasis

⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 March 1890, ‘Raising the franchise.’; *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1890, ‘Lovedale.’

⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 6 August 1891, “Native Opinion: ‘Heads, I win.’”

⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 22 November 1888, ‘The Native Vote.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 May 1887, ‘Native Opinion: The Native Disfranchisement Question.’

¹⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 22 November 1888, ‘The Native Vote.’

¹¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 December 1888, ‘Notes of current events.’

¹² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 July 1890, ‘Tempering with the franchise.’

¹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 August 1890, ‘Native Opinion: The Premier and the Bond.’; C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century,” *Southern African Review of Education with Education with Production*. 19,2 (2013), p.116.

of his views on disfranchisement is commonly demonstrated with reference to the Glen Grey Act.¹⁴ The primary reasons for this are, firstly, that the Glen Grey Act was initiated by him and, secondly, that it was believed he had additional political and economic motives for seeing the successful implementation of the Glen Grey Act, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Opinions on franchise participation were frequently published in newspapers, and in an attempt to respond to the *Cape Argus*¹⁵ where it was suggested that reform should entail raising the franchise, contributors to *Imvo Zabantsundu* argued that the reasons provided for this were rather shallow and would be of no benefit to the Cape Colony.¹⁶ While the newspaper condemned the possible adjustment to the franchise based on the argument that Africans were not able to give ‘intelligent answers’ to ‘simple political questions,’¹⁷ it also suggested that there was plenty of room to improve the political education of both Africans and colonists, and that if government felt so strongly about intelligent answers it should opt for political education rather than the restriction of electoral rights.¹⁸ Rumours of the franchise possibly being raised as a condition of Afrikaner Bond support continued to spread throughout 1890. The possibility was dreaded by Africans to whom the Parliamentary Registration Act had already dealt a heavy blow and many of whom did not think they would be able to oppose new franchise adjustments in the same way they did the 1887 disfranchisement legislation.¹⁹ However, those who were convinced of the truth of these rumours hoped that this new attempt at adjusting the franchise would open the eyes of those who voted in support of the Rhodes Ministry based on the conviction that it was going to govern for the good of all, including Africans.²⁰ Again the argument was made by members of the Afrikaner Bond – as it was for the 1887 Act²¹ – that an

¹⁴ Some of the literature that emphasizes the role of Rhodes in the Glen Grey Act include R. Bouch. *Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894*, 1993, pp.1-24; R. J. Thompson. *Cecil Rhodes, The Glen Grey Act, and the Labour Question in the Politics of the Cape Colony*, 1991. Unpublished M.A thesis, Rhodes University, 1991.

¹⁵ 18 Feb 1892, *Imvo Zabantsundu* published an article titled ‘What is to come’ where it republished the article from the *Cape Argus* which quotes, “The other reform, which we should think would find favour with the Bond would be as much raising of the franchise as would make it impossible to taunt any member with being returned by votes of which he needed be ashamed. It is a mockery of representative institutions that votes should be cast by men who cannot remember the name of a candidate distinctly and who could no more give an intelligent answer to any simple political question than they could fly. If we are to continue with our manhood suffrage, we should go on to universal compulsory education for the one without the other is a mockery of free institutions.”

¹⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 February 1889, ‘Native Opinion: Advising the Bond.’

¹⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 February 1889, ‘Native Opinion: Advising the Bond.’

¹⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 February 1889, ‘Editorial notes.’

¹⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 July 1890, ‘Tempering with the franchise.’

²⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 December 1888, ‘Notes of current events.’

²¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.70-71.

adjustment of the franchise would purify the voters' registration list for franchise participation.²²

While a section of colonists was deliberating how further to disfranchise Africans, a number of those Africans who had lost their right to vote under the Parliamentary Registration Act were making efforts to regain that participation by making improvements to their properties and, in some instances, building brick houses instead of huts. In a Kamastone subsection named Hackney, a mason called Mr Paul Douglas built brick houses at a labour cost of £25.²³ The owner of the house was required to provide him with all the necessary material for this construction and would later pay him the labour cost. Douglas would construct the entire structure, from laying the foundation to building and plastering walls, installing woodwork as well as placing the roof. In 1889 alone he built 12 houses for Africans which roughly cost £40 each, calculated at £15 for materials and £25 for labour.²⁴ His services became increasingly in demand and although it is not clear if the only, or even main, motivation for the construction of these houses was related to franchise participation, their construction would have allowed for franchise qualification in terms of the Parliamentary Registration Act. One particular house stood out from the rest. It was described to have been of superior size and was reported to have cost £70 to build while upon completion it was valued by the inspector at £200. *Imvo Zabantsundu* proudly boasted that these houses in Hackney settled the electoral franchise debate rather effectively and that their owners would all qualify for the franchise to vote for a member of parliament in the elections.²⁵

With the consideration of these developments the Franchise and Ballot Act was introduced to the House of Assembly by Mr Hofmeyr who argued that it was clear that, despite adjustments to the franchise legislation almost five years before their sitting in 1891, there was still widespread dissatisfaction about the franchise and its participants. According to him, the same reasons for the first amendment were still valid and instead of the problem having been solved, it had intensified.²⁶ This was backed by Mr Douglass who agreed that the franchise qualifications under the Parliamentary Registration Act were unsatisfactory and needed urgent

²² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.327.

²³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 March 1889, 'How to build a house with raw Brick.'

²⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 March 1889, 'How to build a house with raw Brick.'

²⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 14 March 1889, 'How to build a house with raw Brick.'

²⁶ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328.

attention.²⁷ The new Act was introduced to the House with the assertion that there was a need ‘to secure due weight in the future for the material and educational interest of the country.’²⁸ Mr Hofmeyr indicated that his proposal was not new and that the notion of introducing an educational qualification had in the past frequently been raised. In support of his argument Mr Hofmeyr provided two examples of members who had previously introduced the notion of an educational qualification. The first was when, in 1859, Mr. John Fairbain introduced a Bill which proposed that voters should send their voting papers through the post-office, the motivation being not only one of greater convenience for the voter but also that it would introduce an ‘educational franchise’ because voters would be required to complete their own voting papers and thus demonstrate that they could read and write.²⁹ The second example was of Mr W. De Smidt who, on numerous occasions in 1869, 1872, 1880 and 1883, proposed an educational qualification. He suggested that voters should have stamped certificates and not be allowed to vote unless they were able to present such a certificate. Mr De Smidt’s motion was rejected on various grounds, one of which being that it would disfranchise at least three-fourths of colonial farmers across the country – something the government could not allow.³⁰ Education as a qualification measure was also suggested by Mr Van Heerden and Mr Le Roux during the debates on the Parliamentary Registration Act. Mr Van Heerden argued that, although uneducated Africans knew how to vote, as a rule they voted for the wrong man and therefore the vote should be restricted to educated men.³¹ Le Roux, on the other hand, stated that the Afrikaner Bond really wanted the introduction of an educational measure that would require of voters to be able to read and write in addition to a raised property qualification, from £25 to £50.³²

Imvo Zabantsundu stated that there would not necessarily be an issue with an educational measure as most of those who were participating in the franchise would qualify. Its concern was rather that franchise requirements should be fair and equal for all races, without any underlying racial distinction – as was implicitly imposed by the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887.³³ The newspaper’s stance was that an education qualification proposal was acceptable

²⁷ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.334.

²⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.327, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 6 August 1891, “Native Opinion: ‘Heads, I win.’”

²⁹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.327.

³⁰ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.327.

³¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.71.

³² Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.72.

³³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 June 1891, ‘Native vote fair play.’

and that many Africans would easily pass the proposed educational test. Nevertheless, concern was expressed that not even the Franchise and Ballot Act would be the final adjustment to the franchise aimed at disfranchising Africans.³⁴

While an education measure would be added as a qualification for the franchise, a cumulative vote was proposed where those who had a certain higher property qualification or higher income would be allowed to have more than one vote while those who merely met the requirements of the 1887 legislation would have only one vote.³⁵ *The Journal* justified the possibility of a cumulative vote as common practice in other spheres and used as example joint-stock companies where the more shares one holds the more votes one has.³⁶ Rev J. S. du Toit³⁷ believed that he needed to ‘take charge’ of the franchise problem. His view was that to adequately address the ‘native question’ the franchise needed to be drastically altered and although there were restrictions to removing any of the measures under the 1887 Act, he thought the next best solution would be a cumulative vote. As far as an education measure was concerned, he believed that basic education would not suffice as a tool of disfranchisement and suggested that only those who had passed their matriculation or higher examinations should be granted a higher vote alongside those who had property worth £200 or more.³⁸ Although Rev du Toit’s opinion was in alignment with the suggestions made by Mr Hofmeyr during the debates of the House of Assembly when the Franchise and Ballot Bill was introduced, the suggestions by Rev du Toit was a more drastic version of adding ‘weight to material and educational interest.’³⁹

The Franchise and Ballot Act was passed in 1892 and introduced an educational measure which required a voter to be able to sign his name, write where he lived and what he did for a living, which would prove that he was able to read and write. It also increased the land and property qualification from £25 to £75.⁴⁰ The Act made an exception for those who were already on the voters’ rolls in their respective constituencies on condition that they would not be absent from

³⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 3 September 1891, ‘Current opinion: The Press and the franchise.’

³⁵ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, pp.330/339.

³⁶ *The Journal*, 14 March 1889, ‘Editorial Notes.’

³⁷ Contributed to the establishment of Die Afrikaanse Patriot, one of the first Afrikaans newspapers in the Cape colony, and later became the Superintendent of Education under Paul Kruger for the Transvaal (1882-1889).

³⁸ 23 April 1891, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – ‘Rev J. Du Toit’s attitude on the franchise.’

³⁹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.327; 6 August 1891, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – ‘Native Opinion: ‘Heads, I win.’”

⁴⁰ D. R. Edgecombe. “The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910.” 1978, pp.34-35; *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1892, ‘Native interests in the Cape Parliament.’

the electoral division where they were registered for the franchise for more than six months. No adjustment was made to the £50 income qualification although one could no longer qualify for the franchise on the basis of a £25 income that included board or lodging.⁴¹ Despite the frequent submissions to use education as a qualification of disfranchisement and the expression of some discontent about adjustments to the franchise, Mr Van der Walt thought that an educational measure was not a very good instrument for disfranchisement because it would only inspire Africans to become educated, which he considered dangerous to colonists.⁴²

A certain amount of surprise was expressed during the franchise controversy over why, compared to the disputes that accompanied the 1887 Parliamentary Registration Act, similar objections were not expressed by Africans and the public as a whole. Some suggested that it was because ‘friends of the Natives,’ namely Sauer, Rose-Innes and Merriman, sponsored the Act and that these men were in a better position to practice deceit – which was what the Act was considered to be.⁴³ The consolation, however, was that the new legislation did not remove anyone from the list based on race – which made it different from the 1887 Act.⁴⁴ Africans only requested that they be provided with a means to make their voice heard, which this legislation seemingly continued to do.⁴⁵ They were satisfied that there was no differential treatment, which they considered most important, and opted not to ‘play politics.’⁴⁶ The *Christian Express* on the other hand was of the opinion that the alteration of the franchise was really no change at all.⁴⁷ This opinion is mirrored by the continued registration of Africans as seen in Figure 4 of Chapter 2, which illustrates Africans’ registration for the franchise in the Queenstown electoral division. Therefore, the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 still did not produce the desired outcomes and so, after the implementation of the Act, rumours started circulating that a third attempt would soon be made to disfranchise Africans.⁴⁸

⁴¹ D. R. Edgecombe. “The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910.” 1978; pp.34-35, C.O. 50/8, The Franchise and Ballot Act (No 9) of 1892.

⁴² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 March 1892, ‘Native Opinion: Honest van der Walt.’

⁴³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, ‘Native Politics.’

⁴⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, ‘Native Politics.’

⁴⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, ‘Native Politics.’

⁴⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 1 September 1892, ‘Playing politics.’

⁴⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1892, ‘Native interests in the Cape Parliament.’

⁴⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 19 January 1893, ‘Native Opinion: The Bond’s aim.’

Africans' education in the Cape Colony

In light of the constant proposals for an educational measure as tool of disfranchisement and its eventual implementation, it is important to better understand the education of Africans in the Cape Colony. This section aims to provide an overview of the type of education that was accessible to Africans with the aim of providing an understanding of why colonists would have considered education as an instrument of disfranchisement. This has been overlooked in enfranchisement historiography. The basis for most studies that focus on African education has been the role of missionaries in Africa.⁴⁹ However, it is important to note that missionaries were not always the only driving force that played an important role in the formal education of Africans.⁵⁰ The question not addressed by these studies is, what was the significance of education that allowed it to be used, both as a tool for disfranchisement by colonists, and as tool for enfranchisement by Africans? This chapter aims to contribute to that understanding.

While the involvement of missionaries in African education was already evident during the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century would see an upsurge in African education due to intense missionary activity.⁵¹ The missionary movement, which played an important role in the education of Africans, thought of education as a tool for converting Africans to Christianity which they considered to be for the greater good of society.⁵² This explains why the education of Africans was an essential feature in early mission work in the Cape Colony. An in-depth analysis of African education is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, an overview is provided to explain why education was considered an appropriate measure to limit Africans from qualifying to vote and how Africans, in turn, used education as a measure to qualify for the vote.

The missionary movement that witnessed the establishment of a series of missionaries in the Cape Colony and throughout South Africa⁵³ included the Moravian Missionary Society in

⁴⁹ Examples are, J. Du Plessis. *A history of Christian missions in South Africa*. Cape Town: C. Struik, 1965; M. E. McKerron. *A sketch of the development of rural education (European) in the Cape Colony, 1652-1910*. Grahamstown: Grocott & Sherry, 1922; S. E. Duff. *Changing childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church evangelicalism and colonial childhood, 1860-1895*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. (There are several scholarly works done on institutions as well - especially Lovedale.)

⁵⁰ J. D. Jansen. "Curriculum as a Political Phenomenon: Historical Reflections on Black South African Education." *The Journal of Negro Education*. 59, 2 (1990), pp.195-206.

⁵¹ L. D. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsunduand Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.190.

⁵² J. D. Jansen. "Curriculum as a Political Phenomenon: Historical Reflections on Black South African Education," 1990, p.206.

⁵³ D. D. T. Jabavu. *The black problem: papers and addresses on various native problems*. 1921, p.12.

1792, London Missionary Society and the South African Society in 1799, the Wesleyan church in 1816, the Glasgow Society in 1821, the Rhenish Society and the Paris Society in 1829, and the Berlin Society in 1834.⁵⁴ At these mission stations and schools Africans were given a basic western education, taught Christian doctrine in combination with British cultural values, and were encouraged to denounce ‘uncivilised’ local customs such as initiation, polygamy and lobola that were fundamental to African social solidarity.⁵⁵ Ngcukaitobi (2018) identified this as ‘the frontier of ideas’, with education, law and religion at its epicentre which would negate African values, beliefs and way of life in many ways.⁵⁶ Furthermore, although these missionary movements extended the scope of African education through the establishment of outstations and local schools that were attached to the central mission station, their primary concern remained religious education and conversion to Christianity.⁵⁷ As a result of this religious focus, ‘many students never achieved functional education, [t]heir school life was too short’⁵⁸ because missionaries assumed that Africans would return to a society that was not literate and in which there would be no use for their literacy.⁵⁹ From the perspective of the missionaries the objective was simply to teach the ‘civilising’ mission and for the students to become ‘useful missionary agents, but not to a point where they would aspire to something more than the missionaries had in mind.’⁶⁰ Missionaries believed that they needed to take precautions to prevent educated Africans from adapting habits that would potentially lead to future resistance.⁶¹

Similar to the limited accessibility to political participation for Africans in the Cape Colony, access to education was delimited along racial lines. Segregation was reinforced with colonists and Africans attending different schools that provided different levels of education.⁶² With the instatement of J. Rose-Innes as the first Superintendent-General of Education in 1839, a new

⁵⁴ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*. London/ New York: Longman, Green and Co. 1917, p.48.

⁵⁵ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.1.

⁵⁶ T. Ngcukaitobi. *The Land is Ours: South Africa’s First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism*. 2018, p.22.

⁵⁷ J. D. Jansen. “Curriculum as a Political Phenomenon: Historical Reflections on Black South African Education,” 1990, p.196.

⁵⁸ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*. 1917, pp.195-198.

⁵⁹ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*. 1917, pp.195-198.

⁶⁰ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*, 1917, p.202. - quoted from a letter from Beecham to Shrewsbury, in Hewson, Healdtown, pp.345-354; P. D. Curtin. *The Image of Africa: British Ideas in Action 1780-1850*. University of Wisconsin Press, 1973, is also useful for further reading.

⁶¹ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*. 1917, p.202.

⁶² A. Leonie. *The Development of Bantu Education in South Africa 1652 to 1954*, Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Montana State College, p.65; C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century.” 2013, p.119.

structure of education was introduced which divided the school system into two classes.⁶³ The first was first-class schools which made provision for an elementary and secondary curriculum, while the second only provided an elementary curriculum.⁶⁴ Initially, missionary schools did not require payment of fees which meant that missionary institutions relied mainly on their home missionary base for funding.⁶⁵ Conditional government grants for mission schools were introduced in 1844 which aimed to support teachers who produced and maintained satisfactory standards according to an inspection by the Superintendent-General of Education. Some of the requirements to attain these grants were that English was used as a medium of instruction and that pupils were given religious instruction limited to a study of the scriptures.⁶⁶ This reinforced the aim of the missionary to use education as a tool to convert Africans to Christianity while leaving the majority without a functional education.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Malherbe argued that the distribution of grants existed more as an idea in the superintendent's head than as a practice in the colony because there was no fixed system for allocating grants (which had to go through a series of complicated legislations and ordinances.)⁶⁸ As a result there was no guarantee that grants would be allocated to all missions that qualified.

The role of the government in Africans' education became more prevalent with the appointment of George Grey as Governor of the Cape in 1854 who served in this role until 1861. His appointment was important for African education, especially with the introduction of the 1865 Education Act which was often referred to as the Grey Plan.⁶⁹ Davenport argued that the aim of George Grey was to 'bring about the maximum socio-economic integration' between Africans and colonists in the Frontier Circle with the hope that Africans would share in a common faith and interest of colonists. However, this would not have been on an equal footing, as the hope was that Africans would serve as useful servants who would be consumers of goods provided by colonists and essentially contribute to their revenue.⁷⁰

⁶³ L. D. Ngeongco. *Imvo Zabantsunduand Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.192.

⁶⁴ J. C. Coetzee. *Onderwys in Suid-Afrika 1652-1960*. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 1975, p.410.

⁶⁵ L. D. Ngeongco. *Imvo Zabantsunduand Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.191.

⁶⁶ Superintendent General of Education reports 1860; J. D. Jansen. "Curriculum as a Political Phenomenon: Historical Reflections on Black South African Education," 1990, p.197.

⁶⁷ C. T. Loram. *The Education of The South African Native*. 1917, pp.195-198.

⁶⁸ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, pp.92-93.

⁶⁹ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. Published Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin. 1969, p.243; A. Leonie. *The Development of Bantu Education in South Africa 1652 to 1954*. 1965, p.78.

⁷⁰ R. Davenport, & C. Saunders. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 2000, p.121.

The 1865 Act was based mostly on the recommendations of the 1863 Watermeyer Commission, chaired by Justice Watermeyer (1861-1863), which was mandated to inquire into the various school structures in the colony as well as the conditions and contribution of the grant system.⁷¹ George Grey approved of the recommendations with the view that ‘the civilization’ of Africans required training in skills for industrial and agricultural work that would allow them to serve as a labour force for colonists.⁷² He thought the purpose of education for Africans consisted in ‘peaceful subjugation’ which allowed for social control.⁷³ Although there were initial prospects of a prosperous Christian based African peasantry under the Grey Plan, the continued struggle for land combined with hardened attitudes towards Africans which influenced accessibility of education for them, stunted this development.⁷⁴ The 1865 Education Act allocated grants to all schools on a ‘£ to £ principle,’⁷⁵ which meant that the central government would pay half of all expenses (inclusive of salaries and buildings), and the local community the other half.⁷⁶ Under the 1865 Education Act, the following order structure was implemented:

‘Order A = [was] almost exclusively for white children. Government salary grants based on the £ to £ principle ranged from £30 for a 3rd class school in rural areas to £400 for first-class schools in the larger towns. The 1st and 2nd class public schools were to offer both elementary and secondary instruction, although the 1st class schools had a fuller secondary curriculum. 3rd class schools, on the other hand, were simply supposed to provide basic education. Order B = Mission schools had the same purpose as Order A. They receive a fixed grant ranging from £15 to £75, which was the level of aid that had existed before the Act. Order B was primarily for coloured and indigent white children, although it included some African day schools, west of the Kei River. Order C = or Aborigines schools (African schools) received aid along...the guidelines outlined in Longham Dale’s 1863 report but they did not have to meet any specific curricular criteria. This category contained the African institutions and their

⁷¹ E. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa (1652-1922)*. 1976, p.94.

⁷² A. Leonie. *The Development of Bantu Education in South Africa 1652 to 1954*. 1965, p.69.

⁷³ J. D. Jansen. “Curriculum as a Political Phenomenon: Historical Reflections on Black South African Education.” 1990, p.198.

⁷⁴ A. Paterson. ““The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930.” *History of Education Quarterly*. 45, 3 (2005), p.381.

⁷⁵ The same as a pound-for-pound principle.

⁷⁶ Cape of Good Hope, Education Act of 1865 and Regulations, pp.1-3, E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, p.95.

subordinate schools and once they became eligible for government support, all of the African schools in the Transkeian territories.’⁷⁷

Given the religious instruction by missionaries and the class structure introduced by J. Rose-Innes when he was Superintendent-General of Education, the education Africans were exposed to was extremely limited. The view of the educational instruction Africans received was that it was a rudimentary form of a manual centred curriculum aimed at preparing them for labour in the minefields and on the farms of colonists and colonial capitalists.⁷⁸ Therefore, the goal of introducing industrial education was to turn Africans into a settled and industrious peasantry that would be available to work the land for colonial farmers.⁷⁹

Hunt Davis (1969) argued that the objective of introducing industrial education was the creation of a working class that would be a ‘docile and efficient labour force’⁸⁰ complacent with, and accepting of, the religious and political structures of colonists and their social supremacy.⁸¹ These measures were further enforced through legislation that would contribute to the suppression of African educational progression. Such initiatives were believed to have been steered mainly by Langham Dale who served as Superintendents-General of Education from 1859 to 1892 and who was succeeded by Thomas Muir from 1892 to 1915. They were both against higher education for Africans and their attitude served as a driving force for the notion of having Africans employed in labour intensive jobs that required fewer of the skills that would demand a high level of education.⁸² This was reflective of the ideological belief that Africans were inferior to colonists which eventually led to intensified efforts by government to segregate education. Segregation of education driven by the concept of Africans’ inferiority was rooted in the assumption that, as a lower class, Africans only needed a basic education because, according to Dale, any further education would only make them ‘singular and dangerous.’⁸³ Such views made it challenging for African students to obtain or qualify for

⁷⁷ Cape of Good Hope, Reports of a Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Report of the Government Educational System of the Colony.

⁷⁸ A. L. Behr & R. G. MacMillan. *Education in South Africa*. Pretoria: J. L. Van Schaik, 1996, p.379; Duff, S. E. “‘Education for Every Son and Daughter of South Africa’: Race, class, and the compulsory education debate in the Cape Colony.” In Brockliss, L, & Sheldon, N (eds). *Mass Education and the Limits of State Building, c.1870–1930*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, p.265.

⁷⁹ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.222.

⁸⁰ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.222.

⁸¹ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.222.

⁸² D. E. Burchell. “African Higher Education and the Establishment of the South African Native College, Fort Hare,” *South African Historical Journal*, 8:1 (1976), pp.77-78.

⁸³ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.243.

further studies to access high-level occupational positions that would have allowed them to comply with the £50 income qualification.

The table below - recorded every five years according to order and class presented in the 1865 Education Act - gives an indication of the number of schools available in the Cape Colony between 1860 and 1900.

Table 6: Number of schools according to 'order' categories, 1860-1900⁸⁴

Classification of schools	1860	1865	1870	1875	1880	1885	1890	1895	1900
Established schools	19	9	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Public schools (Order A) - Class I	11	36	13	33	57	56	51	73	78
Public schools (Order A) - Class II	20	33	54	72	105	81	74	103	96
Public schools (Order A) - Class III	32	77	88	86	73	157	309	435	454
Mission schools (Order B) - Class I	36	61	76	114	-	-	-	-	-
Mission schools (Order B) - Class II	64	100	119	158	368	398	435	588	590
Mission schools (Order B) - Class III	21	15	35	44	-	-	-	-	-
African schools (Order C) - Institutions	-	39	8	9	22	23	25	396 ⁸⁵	11
African schools (Order C) - Day	-	-	40	94	246	179	301	-	547
Boarding Schools for the white rural population	-	-	-	14	40	54	68	3	6
Colleges	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	5	5
Private farm schools	-	-	-	-	-	34	269	751	541
Poor schools ⁸⁶	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	191	250

The table demonstrates that, as per the recommendation of the Watermeyer Commission of 1863, established schools were gradually closed down. The commission made these recommendations on the basis that these schools were too great an expense for the state, that

⁸⁴ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, pp.243/207 (These were compiled from the Superintendent General of Education reports 1860-1900).

⁸⁵ Looking at the numbers for African day schools and Africans institutions, I am assuming that these two groups were counted jointly for 1895 because the number on its own does not look realistic taking into consideration the recording for 1890 and 1900, and also because there was no record for African day schools for 1895, and the provided number would correlate with the rate at which these schools were increasing.

⁸⁶ These were introduced under the regulation of the Superintendent-General Muir from 1893 as a response to Dale's expression that schools, where parents are not adherents of a Missionary Congregation, should be removed from the identification of missionary schools. Additional financial resources were made available to these schools and targeted "poor whites" - C. Soudien. "The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century," 2013, p.119.

they were badly managed in addition to being ‘too liberal and too governmental.’⁸⁷ The number of public schools increased for classes I, II and III, but more drastically for class III, with 454 schools in 1900. Class II of mission schools had the greatest number of schools established over this period, having increased to 590 by 1900 from a mere 40 schools 20 years earlier. Nevertheless, Dale was unhappy with all the schools under mission schools (Class II) being labelled ‘mission schools.’ In 1889 he thought that labelling a number of these schools in towns and villages (mostly attended by the white population), ‘mission schools’ was inappropriate because ‘the parents [were] not adherents of a Missionary Congregation, and it [would] be convenient in future to regard these schools as supplementary to the graded system of Un-denominational Public Schools, and to designate them above Mission schools as ‘Fourth Class Public Schools.’⁸⁸ In response to Dale’s decision and under the directive of Superintendent-General Thomas Muir, ‘poor schools’ that targeted only ‘poor whites’⁸⁹ were established from 1893 onwards. Dale also recommended that with the adjustments made for these schools, the aid provided by the government should become more liberal than that provided for mission schools.⁹⁰ This was also implemented as additional financial resources became available to these schools.⁹¹

Despite the drastic increase in the establishment of schools for the education of Africans, when taking into consideration the population size of Africans in comparison to the number of enrolled Africans, the proportion of Africans who were obtaining some form of education was still small. In addition, upon inspection of the various schools in 1882 it was found that there were 32 443 African and 5 906 white pupils enrolled in the mission schools.⁹² Of these, 26 278 pupils were reported to be below Standard I and that in all the mission schools they had visited, hardly one-fifth of the pupils were present.⁹³ Although it cannot be said that this particular report was a deciding factor in the suggestion to implement education as measure for the disfranchisement of Africans, it can be assumed that a report of this nature would have influenced the understanding government had of African education and that it would have contributed to their decision making process.

⁸⁷ E. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa (1652-1922)*. 1976, p.95.

⁸⁸ C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century,” 2013, p.116.

⁸⁹ C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century,” 2013, p.119.

⁹⁰ C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century,” 2013, p.116.

⁹¹ C. Soudien. “The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century,” 2013, p.119.

⁹² E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, p.96.

⁹³ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, p.96.

Education as a tool for participating in the franchise

With reference to Bundy's (1979) argument that Africans were adapting to the Cape Colony's institutions, systems and norms,⁹⁴ Malherbe highlights the economic development of the Cape Colony in the second half of the nineteenth century and argues that material advancement of the colony was an important influence on the attitudes of both colonists and Africans towards education.⁹⁵ He argues that the introduction of responsible government led to a more prosperous Cape Colony and a 'greater interest in the public life of the colony' than ever before. However, this contributed to agitation among colonists as is evident in the introduction of discriminatory legislations that aimed to cripple the development of Africans.⁹⁶

With the exponential growth of African-based institutions, government called for compulsory education for colonists and encouraged them to obtain an education in order to occupy professions that would allow them to assert their superior position in society. This was a goal that Dale personally prioritized and he promised to 'see that the sons and daughters of the European colonists...have at least such an education...as will fit them to maintain their unquestioned superiority in this land.'⁹⁷ The view at the time was that a poor, white, and uneducated person was an existential threat to the position and future of white power in the Cape Colony which needed to be upheld.⁹⁸ As a result of the progress Africans were making as a consequence of education, measures were taken to stunt the advancement brought about by education and to further manage the competitive position Africans occupied in the Cape labour market. One of these measures consisted in decreasing funding for those schools that catered for Africans - as can be seen in the drop of funding from £6 387 in 1890 to £1 338 in 1910 for mission schools, a significant drop that negatively influenced education opportunities for Africans.⁹⁹

Mission schools continued to play an important role in making education accessible for Africans and offered a diverse range of instruction depending on the availability of resources. There was a small selection of mission institutions that offered Africans the acquisition of skills

⁹⁴ C. Bundy. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 1979, pp.40-41.

⁹⁵ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, pp.91-92.

⁹⁶ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, pp.91-92.

⁹⁷ C. Soudien. "The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century," 2013, pp.115/118.

⁹⁸ C. Soudien. "The making of white schooling in the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century," 2013, p.118.

⁹⁹ A. Paterson. "The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls": Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930," 2005, p.387.

beyond basic industrial training, thereby contributing to the formation of an African middle class. Major mission institutions that were at the forefront of providing such an education included Lovedale, Healdtown, and Lesseyton, to name but a few. Even though the bulk of the curriculum at these institutions aimed at training Africans for priesthood¹⁰⁰ they also had industrial departments where Africans could train for trades that required specific skills, such as ‘carpentry, woodwork, masonry, bricklaying, telegraphy, plastering, leather work, and shoe-making, wagon-making and so on.’¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, opportunities in these departments were limited and they made provision for only a fraction of African pupils in mission schools. Andrew Paterson (2005) illustrates that, of the African students who attended these mission schools, by 1922 those who obtained such training made up approximately one percent only.¹⁰²

Access and exposure to education were understood as fundamental to the advancement of Africans in a colonial society, especially with the constant pressure they were confronted with relating to the land issue, which was a constant threat. Increased pressure to stunt African education encouraged Africans to look for alternatives, both inwardly and outwardly. They made attempts to progress and advance educationally without the assistance of the government. This resulted in the paradoxical situation, which is the focus of this section, namely that although education was used as an instrument to disfranchise Africans, Africans also used it as a fundamental tool for enabling their continued participation in the franchise in the Cape Colony.

During the period of responsible government in the Cape Colony Africans increasingly started to invest in their own education. They saw this as a constitutional strategy where they would ‘fire with the pen to protect their rights’ as identified by the idiom by Isaac Wouchape.¹⁰³ Africans complemented, and later superseded, efforts previously made by both missionaries and the Grey Plan. They increasingly enrolled in schools and voluntarily contributed financially to their education beyond the African taxes they had to contribute to the overall colonial education system.¹⁰⁴ This is evident in, for example, the mid-1870s when Africans

¹⁰⁰ A. Paterson. “The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930”, 2005, p.385.

¹⁰¹ A. Paterson. “The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930”, 2005, p.385.

¹⁰² A. Paterson. “The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930”, 2005, p.72.

¹⁰³ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.44.

¹⁰⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs.

made large financial contributions to the improvement of educational institutions. Examples of these include the contribution of £5 600 of the £7 000 required for the erection of the Blythswood missionary institution;¹⁰⁵ £1 000 of the £1 500 for the expansion of Clarkebury; £3 900 of the £5 300 needed for the construction of the Kilner Educational and Industrial Institute. There were also smaller contributions to day schools in different locations.¹⁰⁶ This reflected a belief, widely held at the time, that ‘Africans had to own their own future.’¹⁰⁷

Some Africans expressed the view that they needed to rise as Africans to help themselves because it was not in the colonist’s interest to do so. Instead, the aim of the colonist was to suppress Africans by depriving them of their rights and one mechanism for achieving this consisted of implementing legislation that would exclude them from participating politically through the use of the vote. However, Africans committed themselves to continue to work with ‘friends of the natives’ by strategically aligning themselves with those they considered sympathetic to the African cause.¹⁰⁸ Leonard Ngcongco (1974) - who analyses Cape Native Policy 1884 - 1902 through the lens of *Imvo Zabantsundu* – noted that the newspaper defended the accessibility of education to Africans and urged all those who were interested in the welfare of Africans to object to views expressed by the Superintendent General of Education, Langham Dale, because he consistently highlighted the poor outcome of education for Africans while never proposing any solutions.¹⁰⁹ In discussing the role of government policy Ngcongco found it noteworthy that in government circles Africans were often considered children. With this in mind, Ngcongco argued that children should not be corrected through brutality but that ‘parents’ should instead be obligated to reason with children, especially given the fact that Africans were highly capable and eager to learn.¹¹⁰ Although most of the education obtained in the majority of mission schools and institutions were limited to an elementary Standard Four level and the occasional provision of Standard Five level education, strides were made by the African middle class to further their education beyond these levels.¹¹¹ With Africans’ access to higher education limited, they had to explore alternatives. One such alternative was to look

¹⁰⁵ A. Roger. *The early history of Blythswood missionary institution*. 1977.

¹⁰⁶ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*, 1969, p.247.

¹⁰⁷ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.56-57.

¹⁰⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 March 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 September 1894, ‘The plan of campaign.’

¹⁰⁹ L. D. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.198.

¹¹⁰ L. D. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.198.

¹¹¹ A. Paterson, “The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930”, 2005, pp.387-388.

outside the country – mainly to Britain and the USA - for higher education opportunities.¹¹² The *South African Native Affairs Commission* observed that, ‘asserting, as they do, that they are denied in South Africa opportunities for higher education, the independent [African] bodies have sent or have encouraged the parents to send youths to America for a course of instruction in the *Negro* colleges.’¹¹³ These attempts were frowned upon by government as the commission further went on to highlight that ‘the atmosphere of racial animosity in which the education is acquired [in the Cape Colony], render an extension of this practice undesirable.’

In addition to these efforts, strides were also made locally to organise self-help schemes to further secure an education for Africans and their future generations. Collective efforts included the formation of voluntary associations such as the Lovedale Literary Society, the Healdtown Mutual Improvements Association (complementary to the Healdtown Teachers’ Association), the Burnshill Young Men’s Mutual Improvement Association, the Stockenstrom Original Africander Association and the D’Urban Teachers’ Mutual improvement Society. Some of these organisations openly discussed and encouraged participation in the franchise and encouraged their members to stay informed about public affairs.¹¹⁴ Through these voluntary bodies, Africans developed organisational and procedural skills that can be assumed to have further contributed to their advancement. Odendaal argued that these efforts made by Africans contributed to the establishment of a new form of consciousness that increasingly extended into the sphere of electoral politics and the desire to vote.¹¹⁵ He identified that the aspiring African middle class increasingly mobilised politically to protect African rights which resulted in the first generation of a new style of political activists who aimed to represent African voices.¹¹⁶

One organisation which had a great influence in the Frontier Circle was also one of the first and longest lasting organisations of the late nineteenth century, namely the Native Educational Association (NEA).¹¹⁷ The organisation was created in 1876 with the intention of establishing

¹¹² D. E. Burchell, “African Higher Education and the Establishment of the South African Native College, Fort Hare.” 1976, p.66.

¹¹³ SANAC, 1903-5, section 329.

¹¹⁴ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.63-64.

¹¹⁵ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.38.

¹¹⁶ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.43-44.

¹¹⁷ In 1906 it became the South African Native Teachers’ Association (SANTA).

a teacher's association in Alice and was led by the grandson of Makhanda Nxele, who is primarily recognised for leading the battle of Grahamstown in 1819. Makhanda Nxele's grandson was known as John Gawler, son of a policeman, who would go on to become the head African teacher at St Matthew's College.¹¹⁸ The initial attempt to get the organisation off the ground failed but with the continued emphasis on how important it was to have an association of such a nature, another attempt at reviving it was made in 1880 which eventually succeeded in 1882. At its founding in 1882 the organisation adopted a constitution which aimed at encouraging Africans to take 'special interest in all educational matters, in schools, in teachers and all others engaged in similar work, the aim of which [was] the improvement and elevation of the native races; to promote social morality and the general welfare of the natives.'¹¹⁹

The NEA soon extended its membership to Africans who were not directly involved in education or teaching. This allowed it to become more inclusive of the needs and progression of Africans as a collective and it increasingly made efforts to encourage those who qualified for the franchise to register and vote.¹²⁰ Another organisation that would play a key role in this cause emerged in the Glen Grey location. Known as the Thembu Association it existed and functioned alongside the South African Native Association.¹²¹ Odendaal argues that these organisations and others such as the Native Educational Association and Imbumba Yama Nyama were also political organisations in the sense that they aimed to unite Africans as a people.¹²² The Glen Grey based organisations were against disfranchisement legislations and saw the Afrikaner Bond as a threat. They encouraged participation in the franchise and efforts by Africans to progress socio-economically.¹²³

African participation through occupation

Agricultural and industrial education was essentially implemented in the Cape Colony with the idea that it would serve as a low skill mode of education to sufficiently equip to participate in

¹¹⁸ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.59-60.

¹¹⁹ NLSA, Bokwe papers, voll. Native Educational Association constitution, pp.68-9.

¹²⁰ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.60-62.

¹²¹ Initially identified as Mbumba but later translated.

¹²² A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.75/67/56.

¹²³ *Isigidimi samaXhosa*, 2 June 1884, 'Ukukula kwe Mbumba.'

a segregated colonial society in which they would provide a labour force for colonists.¹²⁴ A monthly report on education published by *The Christian Express* stated that ‘the greatest difficulty and obstacle in the way of training native young men as tradesmen, is their want of educated intelligence.’¹²⁵ While the Select Committee of the Cape Legislative Council on Education of 1896 made it clear that, in their view, African state-aided education should continue to be provided only at elementary level and that ‘agricultural labour should be encouraged in every way possible.’¹²⁶ One of the outcomes of structuring education in this way was the emergence of a small African middle class whose members continued to participate in the politics of the colony and who made attempts to contribute to the social order within African society.¹²⁷ The contribution of this chapter to South African historiography consists in an illustration of how agricultural and industrial education contributed towards Africans’ participation in the franchise, which is reflected in the professions Africans indicated as their measure of qualification. The focus on an industrial and agricultural curriculum for African education meant that a specific range of professions which required such skills would be occupied mainly by Africans in the Cape Colony. In the remainder of this chapter ten of these occupations are explored in order to illustrate how education was used as a tool of enfranchisement.

With the introduction of the Parliamentary Registration Act, information recorded in the voters’ rolls adjusted to the new requirements of participation. In addition to the name, surname, and electoral division of an individual, occupation and qualification were first recorded after the implementation of the Act in 1887. The record of these additional criteria provides a lens for understanding what occupations this particular collective participated in and how this changed over time. As a collective who formed part of an African middle class this demonstrates how the bulk of Africans who participated in the franchise managed to maintain their socio-economic position and what efforts they made to continually register to vote. The voters’ rolls do not provide an indication of an individual’s income or their exact wealth, which is a measure often used for social stratification.¹²⁸ What it does provide, however, are markers

¹²⁴ A. Paterson. “‘The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls’”: Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930.” 2005, p.380.

¹²⁵ *The Christian Express*, 1 January 1885, ‘Monthly Summary.’

¹²⁶ This was with the idea that they should be equipped to work for colonial farmers and not necessarily for their own agricultural advancement.

¹²⁷ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.222.

¹²⁸ J. Raynor, & J. M. Raynor. *The Middle Class*, 1969; L. Dreyer. *The Modern African Elite in South Africa*, 1989; N. Abercrombie & J. Urry. *Capital, Labour and the Middle Class*. 1938; G. Clark. *The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility*. 2014.

that can be used as indicators of a persons' socio-economic status in society. Markers provided by franchise requirements included a gender qualification, an age restriction, an education measure, and an income and property qualification.¹²⁹

Table 7: Franchise qualification requirements 1853-1892

Years for which these requirements applied	Be male	21 years old or above	Being able to read and write	Min income OR land and property valued at or above	
From 1853	Yes	Yes	No	£50 p.a.	£25
From 1887	Yes	Yes	No	£50 p.a.	£25 ¹³⁰
From 1892	Yes	Yes	Yes	£50 p.a.	£75 ¹³¹

Education was important to qualify for a certain occupation. Occupation was central in achieving either the income qualification or the land and property qualification which would entitle the individual to participate in the franchise which, in turn, would possibly have allowed for continued participation despite the implementation of further disfranchisement legislations. According to the requirements of the qualification for the vote, it is clear that Africans who participated in the franchise formed part of an African middle class. To illustrate how participation in the franchise changed over time according to their professions, ten different occupations from across different sectors have been selected for analysis. The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate that, given that the majority of the Africans who registered for the franchise were either farmers/agriculturalist, the bulk of Africans continued to prefer working the land. This chapter demonstrates through the use of voters' rolls that, as a result of industrial training provided by missionary institutions, Africans increasingly came to work as carpenters and tinsmith, among other professions. This study will not rank occupation according to the different sectors, as it demonstrates that the majority of African participants in Queenstown were distinctly active in the farming sector. However, a series of professions that form part of

¹²⁹ Identified in the Franchise and Ballot Act discussed in: Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328; *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1892, 'Native interests in the Cape Parliament'; D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1978, p.34; *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1892, 'Native interests in the Cape Parliament.'

¹³⁰ Communal and tribal land were excluded from the land and property qualification under the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887

¹³¹ This only applied after the 1892 Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 where if a person had not registered for the franchise before 1892 or if the person had been registered before 1892 and had been absent from the electoral division where they were registered for the franchise for more than six months.

different sectors are identified, which is used to illustrate how Africans who were participating in the franchise were participating in non-farming/agricultural occupations.


The voters' rolls recorded qualification and profession separately, which makes it clear whether an individual qualified according to the £50 minimum income per annum or on the land and property qualification. In the Queenstown location the majority of African participants qualified on land and property which meant that a large proportion of the individuals that owned or worked the land did so to the degree of franchise participation even after the implementation of both the Franchise and Ballot Act, as well as the Glen Grey Act (which will be discussed in Chapter Four). With the adjustment of legislations, the recording of information of participants followed suit. Within the first year of recording occupation, records indicate that 95% of qualifying African men were farmers. This left only 5% for alternative occupations which included higher-paying occupations such as carpentry, ministry, teaching, clergy work, masonry, or working for the government as, for instance, a police officer.

Table 8 provides the numbers for each of the different occupations between 1887-1909 from the voters' rolls for the Queenstown electoral division, followed by Figure 5 which illustrates how this voter registration and farmer occupation changed over time.

Table 8: African participation according to 10 selected occupations 1887-1909

Year	No. Registered	Farmer	Constable	Teacher	Carpenter	Clerk	Police	Tinsmith	Minister	Mason	Store keeper
1887	912	868	5	1	4	5	2	0	2	1	1
1889	795	709	2	12	12	5	6	8	1	1	5
1891	852	746	5	6	6	7	10	6	4	2	7
1893	825	702	7	0	6	10	10	6	5	3	5
1895	774	658	13	4	10	5	14	9	4	3	3
1897	760	633	13	8	13	5	12	8	4	2	5
1899	796	619	26	33	20	8	4	8	5	4	7
1903	966	717	42	8	20	16	8	12	10	3	13
1905	990	736	25	30	17	15	8	10	9	12	15
1907	876	641	26	24	13	15	9	7	5	9	3
1909	572	432	15	15	8	12	3	0	3	11	2

Figure 5: African participation in Queenstown according to profession qualification, farmer/agriculturalist 1887-1909¹³²



The identification of African participation according to their profession qualification of farmer/agriculturalist is an important criterion to take note of since, throughout all three disfranchisement legislations, land had been used as an instrument of disfranchisement. African farmer participation in the location saw a 20% decline from 1887 when 95% of Africans who registered to vote identified their professions as farmer/agriculturalist, to 75% of registered Africans in the same profession by 1909. The drop from 95% to 75% was however

¹³² The blue bar represents the number of Africans registered for the franchise while the grey bare represents the number of Africans according to farmer/agriculturalist profession. The blue dotted line represents the trend line according to which Africans registered for the franchise, while the grey dotted line represents the trend line for Africans according to farmer/agriculturalist profession.

not linear as individual participation fluctuated over time, which meant that participation according to the profession also fluctuated. Various possible factors explain the continued participation of African farmers/agriculturalist despite the implementation of disfranchisement legislations. One such factor is that under the Parliamentary Registration Act the assumption was made that if communal land was excluded, approximately 90% of Africans would be disfranchised.¹³³ The rationale behind this was that the majority of Africans were living on land under communal tenure and preferred to do so. This meant that if communal land was excluded Africans would not qualify in addition to which, if the land was to be divided and converted to individual tenure, the value of Africans' huts would on average be £2 and the divided land £7 10s, which would not be sufficient for franchise participation.¹³⁴ During the debates for the implementation of the 1887 legislation the facts that many Africans had been in possession of land, were cultivating their land, and occupied huts of a higher monetary value than presented in the debates or that they already had brick houses, seem to have been ignored.

Malherbe highlights the fact that encouragement of agriculture and different irrigation methods had been an essential contribution to education and economic advancement in the late nineteenth century.¹³⁵ This allowed for progressive farmers to maintain their position and contributed to their continued participation in the franchise. As discussed in Chapter 1, a substantial number of Africans were making progress in agriculture, made efforts to acquire agricultural technology and were producing crops and livestock more favourable to the demands of the market. The chapter also illustrated how, since the 1860s, Africans were increasingly taking up land on the basis of individual tenure. These factors would have allowed for their continued qualification for the franchise, specifically with the combination of efforts made to obtain an education while making efforts to retain their land and cultivate the soil. The drought of 1877-1884 affected many negatively and caused them to lose a great deal of their prosperity. However, a minority of the population were innovative in irrigating the soil, adapted to using different farming tools such as the wagon and the plough, and planted foods that were more profitable at the time, such as peas, oat-hay, and wheat.¹³⁶ They also invested in livestock for which there was a greater demand, such as woolled sheep and participated in agricultural

¹³³ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.107; Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, pp.72-73.


¹³⁴ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.107; Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1887, p.70.

¹³⁵ E. G. Malherbe. *Education in South Africa*. 1976, pp.91-92.

¹³⁶ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, p.88; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.135. Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1875, p.87.

shows.¹³⁷ These shows were first introduced in 1873 and yielded substantial profits. They were identified by *Imvo Zabantsundu* as an ideal platform to use for the advancement of Africans.¹³⁸

Figure 6: African participation according to selected alternative occupation, 1887-1909



Industrial education contributed alternative professions to the predominant farmer/agriculturalist profession. Figure 6 illustrates that Africans were using a variety of non-agricultural/farming professions to qualify for participation and how this changed from 1887 to 1909. Professions that were strongly encouraged by missionaries as well as the policy of the

¹³⁷ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62; Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1877, p.139. Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1876, pp.85-86.

¹³⁸ L. D. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.198. M. S. Griffiths. The development of native policy in the Transkei and in the Tembu location of Glen Grey between 1870 and 1900. Unpublished M.A thesis, Rhodes University. 1939, pp.21-22.

Cape Colony's education department shortly after the Constitution Ordinance of 1853, included training Africans to become preachers and teachers with the idea that Christianity would be expanded through the preaching and teaching of the gospel.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, under responsible governance, the government advocated for Africans to be taught basic manual work as more formal education would pose a threat to the prospects of colonists who would then have to compete in the job market.¹⁴⁰ A profession that reflects manual work in these graphs is tinsmiths. Tinsmiths were important in the production of a variety of products including, among other products, trunks for travel, essential eating utensils and kitchenware such as mugs and bowls as well as basins.¹⁴¹ In 1875 a carpenter's shop and a tin factory were set up at St Matthew's institution which subsequently went on to expand into industrial departments which catered for carpentry, tinsmith work, blacksmith work, wagon making, farming and girls' domestic work. With the expansion to additional departments the institution generated a substantial income. This is seen in its growth of profit which increased from £3 2s 6d from sales in the carpentry shop and £2 4s 6d from sales in the tin factory in 1875 to a total income of £4483 17s 1d between June 1882 and June 1883.¹⁴² One of the courses provided as part of the industrial curriculum at the Lovedale institute was clergy-training which was introduced in 1841 alongside other practical industrial and academic training which would have equipped pupils to qualify for school-leaving examinations.¹⁴³ These courses afforded Africans the skills to take up employment in the relevant fields, which would later afford a salary high enough to participate in the franchise and to continue doing so.

Continued African participation

Davis argues that in the Eastern Cape there was a pattern of generations of educated Africans securing schooling for their children and later descendants since there was an increased likelihood that those who were educated would want their children to be educated as well.¹⁴⁴ This is backed by the observation made at Lovedale where it was reported that it is evident that those who were receiving instruction at the institution were the sons and daughters of Christian

¹³⁹ A. Paterson. "The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls": Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930." 2005, p.385.

¹⁴⁰ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, p.12; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 July 1892, 'Native Politics'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 September 1891, 'Current opinion: The Press on the Franchise'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 9 November 1891, 'Native Opinion: The struggle again.'

¹⁴¹ F. Lux. *Royal Tinsmith work – their enamel products span South Africa*.

¹⁴² *The Christian Express*, 1 July 1884, 'Missionary News: St Matthew's missionary and industrial institution.'

¹⁴³ D. E. Burchell, "African Higher Education and the Establishment of the South African Native College, Fort Hare," 1976, pp.60-61.

¹⁴⁴ R. H. Davis. *Nineteenth Century, African Education in the Cape Colony: A Historical Analysis*. 1969, p.207.

parents whom themselves had obtained some form of schooling, either at the same institution, or at least at an elementary school of some sort.¹⁴⁵ From this group individuals went on to become ‘teachers, ministers, law agents, magistrate’s clerks, interpreters, carpenters, storemen, transport riders, blacksmiths, telegraph operators, printers, clerks, journalists,’ among other professions.¹⁴⁶ In the same vein, both Odendaal (2012) and Brock (1974) came to the conclusion that education became desirable as a means of advancement and social acceptance, and often also as a means of playing Europeans at their own game.¹⁴⁷ Odendaal continues by recognising that the desire for education among those who were considered ‘school people’ was evident all over the colony and provided students and their families with future opportunities to connect in unique and powerful ways.¹⁴⁸

Social mobility was an important aspect of the participation of Africans in the Cape franchise. This was reflected in the collective and individual efforts made by Africans to send their children to school. Land and education were fundamental to social stratification as it affected occupation.¹⁴⁹ An important aspect of social stratification is social mobility, and to a large extent, *intragenerational* mobility lays the foundation for the possibility of *intergenerational* mobility. It is also greatly influenced by inequality, which was prevalent in the Cape Colony.¹⁵⁰ The high franchise requirement meant that the prospects of both intra- and intergenerational social mobility can be deduced from the qualification measures imposed. Data constraints on Africans, African occupation, or income have been a barrier to studying social mobility during the colonial period. This is the case for various developing countries in contrast to developed countries (mainly in America and Europe) where extensive studies have represented mobility on different levels and in different contexts. South African literature has drawn attention either to class structures, which often emphasises downward African social mobility, or class struggle primarily influenced by political institutions and their policies at any given point in time.

¹⁴⁵ J. Stewart. *Lovedale: Past and Present A registration of Two Thousand Names*. Lovedale: Lovedale Mission Press. 1887, p.xxiii.

¹⁴⁶ J. Stewart. *Lovedale: Past and Present A registration of Two Thousand Names*. 1887, pp.32-33.

¹⁴⁷ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.33; S. M. Brock. *James Stewart and Lovedale: A reappraisal of missionary attitudes and African response in the Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1870-1905*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1974, pp.20-21.

¹⁴⁸ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.35.

¹⁴⁹ Hout, M. “More Universalism, Less Structural Mobility: The American Occupational Structure in the 1980s.” *American Journal of Sociology*, 93 (1988), pp.1358-1400.

¹⁵⁰ Hout, M. “More Universalism, Less Structural Mobility: The American Occupational Structure in the 1980s.” *American Journal of Sociology*, 93 (1988), pp.1358-1400.

Studies by authors such as Christopher Saunders,¹⁵¹ Andre Odendaal,¹⁵² and Leonard Thompson¹⁵³ have offered an understanding of an African middle class through the concept of the ‘educated elite’ who often had a high degree of political involvement or contributed to the formation of the ANC. These included individuals at the forefront of both the class struggle and liberation struggle in South Africa during the colonial period such as Elijah Makiwane,¹⁵⁴ John Tengu Jabavu,¹⁵⁵ Tiyo Soga,¹⁵⁶ Sol Plaatje,¹⁵⁷ Isaac Wauchope,¹⁵⁸ John Knox Bokwe,¹⁵⁹ and Paul Xiniwe,¹⁶⁰ among others. Nevertheless, there was a broader African middle class that

¹⁵¹ C. C. Saunders. “The New African elite in the Eastern Cape and some late 19th century origins of African nationalism.” *Institute of Commonwealth Studies*. Collected Seminar Papers. 10, pp.44-55.

¹⁵² A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.95-96; E. Roux. *Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man’s struggle for freedom in South Africa*. 1948.

¹⁵³ L. Thompson. *The History of South Africa*. 2001.

¹⁵⁴ Born to Christian parents, Makiwane also attended the Lovedale Institution. He was the first African to become a minister of the Free Church and later went on to become the Pastor of the Church at Macfarlane in 1877, the same year he would marry Maggie Majiza whom he had three children with. He became an assistant teacher at the Mission School in 1867, teaching the junior classes (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*. Johannesburg: Esson. 1930, pp.34-35).

¹⁵⁵ Attended school in Healdtown, where he was born in 1859. He became a teacher at Somerset East and a later also became a local preacher. He became the editor of the *Isigidimi Sama Xosa*, printed and published by Lovedale Institution and later went on to establish his own newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu*. He was known as a “politician, a diplomat, an educator, and a Christian Gentleman.” Jabavu passed the Matriculation Examination in 1885, the same year he would marry Elda Sakuba, whom he had four children with. (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.22-23).

¹⁵⁶ First ordained African to the minister of the Gospel, born 1829 in Gwali to one of the chief councillors of Gaika. He also attended Lovedale and went on to continue his studies at Inchinnan in Scotland. He became an evangelist at Kieskama at Amatole, before he left South Africa again in 1850. He completed a course at the Theological Hall of the United Presbyterian Church in 1856 at Edinburg. In 1857 he married Janet Burnside, with whom he had four sons and three daughters (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.90-91). D. Williams. *Umfundisi: a biography of Tiyo Soga, 1829-1871*. South Africa: Lovedale Press, 1978.

¹⁵⁷ Most popularly known for his work “Native life in South Africa,” (1969) Plaatje has been identified as an intellectual, linguist and politician. He initially worked as an interpreter to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction and later went on to become one of the founding members of the SANNC with Rev J. L. Dube as president (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.244-245). B. Willan. *Sol Plaatje: A Life of Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, 1876–1932*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2018.

¹⁵⁸ He attended the Lovedale Institute in 1874, at the age of 22, and passed the government examination for elementary teachers in 1875. He went on to teach at Uitenhage and in 1883 became a clerk and interpreter in the Magistrate’s Court in Port Elizabeth. He eventually also went on to become a minister. T. D. Soga described him as someone that was “very kind, a real gentleman, and a true Christian” (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.106-107).

¹⁵⁹ Youngest son to Jacob Bokwe. He attended Lovedale in the preparatory classes an institution in 1866 and joined the College Department 1869-1872. He later went on to work as a clerk at the institution and contributed to the formation of the *Kaffir Express* in 1872. He later went on to become a bookkeeper and later acquired telegraphy. He served as office-bearer in 1875 and later qualified for the ministry of the Presbyterian Church (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who’s who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.6-7).

¹⁶⁰ Xiniwe enrolled as an advanced student at Lovedale in 1881. He occupied various occupations, firstly starting off as timekeeper at the railway and went on to become a telegraph operator. He passed the elementary teachers’ examination and went on to teach at Edward Memorial School in Port Elizabeth. After some time as a teacher, he

participated in the Cape franchise whose members were not necessarily at the forefront of politics. An analysis of this group has not been presented before and this chapter will offer such an analysis for the Queenstown electoral division. In South Africa, historic information on Africans is scattered and presents a challenge to following particular groups of people, organisations or individuals over time. Therefore, micro-level information provided in the voters' rolls contributes a unique perspective and source for better understanding the socio-economic position of an African collective in the Cape Colony.

invested in entrepreneurial ventures by opening stores as a merchant and became a hotel proprietor, with one of his most popular hotels in King Williamstown known as the Temperance Hotel. He married Miss Ndwanya with whom he had five children, whom all went on to obtain an education and progress socio-economically. (T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who's who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.108-109).

Figure 7: African franchise participation in Queenstown during 1872 -1909 according to surname




Figure 7 is a representation of African participation in the Queenstown electoral division throughout the period of responsible governance. Surnames have been used to identify the different families that registered for franchise participation from 1872 to 1909. The assumption is that those who shared the same surname in the electoral division were related in some form

and will therefore be referred to as a family. Family surnames are clustered into small circles which make up the overall circle. This includes all African family surnames registered for the franchise in the Queenstown electoral division. The size of the small circles is determined by the number of times a family name appears in the voters' rolls throughout the period 1872 - 1909, which means that the more often a surname appears throughout this period, the bigger the circle that represents the family's surname. The family surname that appears most often in the Queenstown electoral division appears at the centre of the large circle, which is then followed by surnames that appeared less frequently (and in descending order in the list next to the circle). Therefore, the surnames that appeared least in the Queenstown electoral division make up the periphery of the overall circle.

The structure of representing registration for franchise participation by means of circles that map the frequency with which a surname appeared in terms of the size of a circle, allows for a visual impression of how participation varied according to family structures, as some families had members who registered more frequently than others throughout the period 1872 to 1909. It also serves as a reflection of how, although this collective represents an African middle class, the positions of the different families varied within this class structure. Through the representation of family names in descending size of the circle or place on the accompanying list, it is evident that the most prominent family names reflected in the Queenstown electoral division are not necessarily those of families that are familiar in South African historiography to have been at the forefront of African political mobilisation.

Yet, there are families that have been recognised in historiography to have had political influence, or that is recognised to have held a different leadership position. For instance, an example of a family name that is known in historiography for religious leadership is Mgijima, through the leadership of Enoch Mgijima who was the head of the religious group known as the Israelites.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, an example of a family surname prominently reflected in the Queenstown electoral division registration list and known in historiography for having had some form of political influence, is Pelem.¹⁶² James Pelem – who attended the Healdtown

¹⁶¹ R. Edgar. *Because they chose the plan of God: The Story of the Bulhoek Massacre of 24 May 1921*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2018.

¹⁶² A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012. C. Bundy, & W. Beinart. *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movement in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. 21 January 2012. *Daily Dispatch*. 'ANC honours first vice-president.' A. Mgaqelwa, S. E. Mqhayin, et al. *Abantu besizwe: Historical and Biographical*

institute alongside his brother Meshach Pelem, and friends John Tengu Jabavu, and Jonas Goduka – was known as a political mobiliser in Glen Grey, who formed part of the NEA. He was involved in a number of organisations and served as the secretary of SANNA (South African Native National Congress) which would later become the ANC, and often addressed petitions to the government on behalf of the people of the location.¹⁶³ His brother, Meshach Pelem,¹⁶⁴ was known as an intellectual and businessman whom Ngcongco also described as a progressive farmer and notable political leader¹⁶⁵ and also played an essential role in the early days of the ANC.¹⁶⁶ He became the vice-president of SANNC in 1891 and was often associated with John Tengu Jabavu as a friend and fellow activist. Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century he was an important figure in the formation of various organisations that advocated for African education and political participation in the Cape Colony. Meshach, who trained as a teacher at Healdtown, was a chief instigator for the Imbumba Yama Nyama organisation, although he did not play as active a role after its establishment.¹⁶⁷

Although it cannot be assumed that every family unit had a linear father-son structure or that there were siblings in these family units, it is important to note that there were families that did display a father-son and sibling structure. Based on the frequency of surnames featured in the voters' rolls one can link family members on a more micro-level than the one presented in Figure 7. As indicated in that figure, the most frequently participating family units in the Queenstown electoral division were the Sishuba, Mgijima, and Mandindi families. In Figure 8 below, the two most prominent family units are used as examples of what such family participation trends would have looked like and offers a glimpse into how intragenerational and intergenerational social mobility would have been reflected in the voters' rolls. These figures represent the various individuals that formed part of the specific family unit and the different years each individual registered for the franchise.

Writings. 2009. K. Mkhize. "To see us as we see Ourselves": John Tengu Jabavu and the Politics of the Black Periodical', *Journal of South African Studies*. 3.44. 2018.

¹⁶³ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.61/76-77, C. Bundy, & W. Beinart. *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movement in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930*. 1987, p.83.


¹⁶⁴ Biography also provided in T. D. Skota. *The African Yearly Register: Being an illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (who's who) of Black Folks in Africa*, 1930, pp.234-235.

¹⁶⁵ L. D. Ngcongco. *Imvo Zabantsunduand Cape Native Policy 1884-1902*. 1974, p.109.

¹⁶⁶ 21 January 2012. *Daily Dispatch* – 'ANC honours first vice-president', by A. Mgaqelwa.

¹⁶⁷ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, pp.58/67-68/76/85/103-107.

Figure 8: Participation of individuals with the surname 'Sishuba' in Queenstown, 1872-1909



The figure illustrates how frequently individuals with the 'Sishuba' family surname registered in the Queenstown electoral division in order to participate in the franchise. The first such registration was recorded in 1872 when the voters' rolls were first compiled as part of the Government Publications. Registration under the surname gradually increased over time, from only one individual in 1872, to 24 individuals in 1895, reaching a peak in 1905 with 30 registered voters, and a total of 22 registered voters in 1909.

Through the names of the individuals recorded in the voters' rolls one can draw relationship links from alternative sources. In 1872, the first recorded member of the Sishuba family was Joshua Sishuba, a local Wesleyan Methodist preacher who was reported to be of royal

descent.¹⁶⁸ Joshua Sishuba will be used as an example of how a father-son relationship can be traced and how registration for the franchise can serve as an indication of social mobility. It was quite common for an educated African to become a preacher given the extensive focus on religious studies in missionary institutions and the encouragement from both missionaries and the Cape's education department for Africans to obtain an education that would allow them to become either a preacher or a teacher. This was with the explicit aim of further expanding Christianity among Africans.¹⁶⁹ Joshua being of royal descent, as well as his occupation as a preacher, would have placed him in a likely position to qualify for the franchise throughout the period in which he registered to vote. Yet, although being a preacher was an alternative profession which some men used as a means of qualification for the vote when occupation was first recorded after the implementation of the Parliamentary Registration Act, Joshua identified his profession as that of 'farmer' and did so throughout the period in which he registered for the vote.

From Joshua Sishuba's death record we learn that he had seven children, including George Sishuba who participated in the franchise 11 times, from 1884 to 1909, and Isaiah Sisuhuba, who signed off his father's death record and who first registered in 1899, one of only two times he registered for the vote.¹⁷⁰ Isaiah Sishuba attended Lovedale in 1879,¹⁷¹ one of the most prestigious schools for Africans during the colonial period which saw pupils from across Southern Africa register for an education.¹⁷² Similar to his father, he went on to become a preacher in the Methodist church. Instead of serving in the Cape he went to preach in the Orange Free State. He was extremely unhappy with the explicit segregation of races and discrimination towards Africans in the Orange Free State and left to join the A. M. E. church in America for a short while. Upon his return to South Africa, he became the presiding elder of the A. M. E. church for the Johannesburg district. When the Anglo-Boer War broke out in 1899 Isaiah returned to the Cape Colony which is the first year he registered for the franchise.¹⁷³ Taking into consideration how high the qualification requirements were by the time Isaiah

¹⁶⁸ L. R. Harlan. & R. W. Smock. *Booker T. Washington Papers Volume 11: 1911-12*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1981, p.274.

¹⁶⁹ A. Paterson. "The Gospel of Work Does Not Save Souls": Conceptions of Industrial and Agricultural Education for Africans in the Cape Colony, 1890-1930." 2005, p.385.

¹⁷⁰ Cape Province, Probate Records of the Master of the High Court, 1834-1989.

¹⁷¹ J. Stewart. *Lovedale: Past and Present*. 1887, pp.211/338.


¹⁷² A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.35.

¹⁷³ J. Stewart. *Lovedale: Past and Present*. 1887, pp.211/338.

qualified to register for the Cape franchise,¹⁷⁴ his status as belonging to the African middle class is indisputable.

John Sishuba, who was enrolled at Lovedale in 1876,¹⁷⁵ was one of the first and longest registered members of the Sishuba family. He was a headman in Kamastone who dominated local politics and later became the leader of the Kamastone Iliso Lomzi branch¹⁷⁶ in addition to which he served as spokesperson for the 1898 SANNC conference which was hosted in Queenstown.¹⁷⁷ As far as the Sishuba family is concerned it is evident that the core participants, Joshua, John and Lufele, laid the foundation for the expanded future participation of other participants that shared the same surname.

Figure 9: Participation of Individuals with the surname 'Mgijima' in Queenstown, 1872-1909



¹⁷⁴ All 3 disenfranchisement legislations had been implemented by this time.

¹⁷⁵ J. Stewart. *Lovedale: Past and Present*. 1887.

¹⁷⁶ R. Edgar. *The Finger of God: Enoch Mgijima, the Israelites, and the Bulhoek Massacre*. 2018, pp.27/34/03/127.

¹⁷⁷ A. Odendaal. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. 2012, p.151.

Figure 9 illustrates how frequently individuals with the ‘Mgijima’ family surname registered in the Queenstown electoral division to participate in the franchise. Jonas Mgijima was the only participant in 1872 and was joined by Booy Mgijima in 1874. In South African historiography the most prominent individual to carry the Mgijima surname is Enoch Mgijima, who is renowned for his involvement and influence as leader of the Israelites. The Israelites were a religious group who occupied Ntabelanga in Bulhoek, Queenstown and considered the area a holy village, where they prayed and celebrated Passover. Despite not having a title deed for the land they believed the land was to be used for religious practices, which resulted in land disputes with the government that culminated in the tragic Bulhoek Massacre of 1921 in which nearly 200 people died.¹⁷⁸ Enoch was the youngest of 9 children,¹⁷⁹ born to Jonas Mgijima who participated in the franchise in the period 1872 - 1909 since he was a prosperous farmer in Queenstown. Similar to the Sishuba family, the Mgijima family formed part of the Wesleyan Methodist church which played a prominent role in the way Jonas raised his children. The church had a noticeable influence on the family in the way it encouraged studies at prominent schools such as Lovedale and Zonnebloem.¹⁸⁰ Enoch¹⁸¹ participated in the franchise along with his brothers Charles and Edward where all three brothers ironically started participating after disfranchisement legislations started being imposed. When looking at how these specific families participated in the franchise throughout the period 1872-1909 it can be seen that, as father, Jonas Mgijima laid the foundation for the future participation of other family members. The trend reflected in these family units¹⁸² is that the elite (e.g. Jonas) maintained their position in society as almost all their children attained the same high-ranking occupations as their fathers. In most instances, the individuals and families who remained on the voters’ rolls were either prosperous pastoral farmers or received an education through missionary training. The trends in these figures suggest that within family units there was some degree of social mobility which is reflected through persistent political participation.

¹⁷⁸ R. Edgar. *The Finger of God: Enoch Mgijima, the Israelites, and the Bulhoek Massacre*. 2018.

¹⁷⁹ five girls and four boys.

¹⁸⁰ See J. Hodgson. *A history of Zonnebloem College, 1857-1870: a study of church and society*. Unpublished M.A thesis, 1975, for further reading.

¹⁸¹ Enoch completed school in the Queenstown area until Grd.5 and did not continue education because he had severe headaches which forced him to remain at home.

¹⁸² Other families in the Voters’ rolls reflect a similar sequence, although to varying degrees.

Conclusion

Through the discussion of the various suggestions made from as early as 1889 to further tamper with the franchise, this chapter highlighted the dissatisfaction among various parties with the outcome of the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887. It shows that, while suggestions were made to further disfranchise Africans, Africans explored alternative ways to have more Africans register for the franchise. The chapter provided an overview of African education in the Cape Colony which, in turn, allows for an understanding of what it meant for education to have been used as a tool of disfranchisement. That is the contribution this chapter makes to South African historiography. In addition, the chapter also highlighted the role of both missionaries and the government in the provision of education for Africans and argued that the use of education as a tool of disfranchisement was as a result of the low level of education provided to Africans with the primary purpose of education having been to convert Africans to Christianity.

Finally, this chapter also explored efforts Africans made to obtain an education. It highlighted their contribution to the erection of schools, the formation of organisations, and to seeking opportunities outside the Cape Colony. The role of education as a tool of enfranchisement was further highlighted through the demonstration of the occupations Africans identified as qualification measures which permitted continued participation in the franchise. In addition to a perspective on the influence of education as a tool of enfranchisement reflected through occupation, this chapter also contributes to an understanding of the emergence of an African middle class by showing how family names consistently appeared in the Queenstown voters' rolls, which also suggests that persistence as an African middle class allowed for sustained involvement in the Cape franchise.

Chapter 4

Glen Grey and the Glen Grey Act of 1894

Introduction

A particularly important piece of legislation in the history of disfranchisement attempts was the Glen Grey Act of 1894. The Act was complementary to the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 because it, too, used land tenure as a tool for disfranchisement. The Glen Grey location, which the Act was named after, was used as the blueprint for the legislation. However, shortly after its implementation, it was also applied in other locations to varying degrees because government officials had the mandate to implement the Act in different locations, either as it was, or with the necessary adjustments they considered best reflected the requirements of the specific location in which it was to be implemented. Although analyses of the Glen Grey Act have varied over time, there are two key components that have always drawn the attention of different historians and scholars and which form the subject of investigation in this chapter. The first was land occupation and tenure as a measure of qualification for franchise participation, and the second, the labour tax this Act imposed on African men.

This chapter discusses how the issue of land tenure in the location was one Africans had been eager to resolve since the 1860s; how, considered an agitation that had been prolonged over many years, the contestation over land became intolerable because Africans were confronted with the tension between instability and desired security on the land. The chapter also demonstrates some of the complexities of land tenure in the Glen Grey location which collectively became known as the Glen Grey Question and which the Act was meant to have been a solution to. An undervalued dimension of the Glen Grey Act seems to be the Glen Grey Question which can be interpreted as a prelude to the 1894 legislation. One of the few sources that outline the importance of the Glen Grey Question is Bouch's article *Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894* (1993).¹ Following Bouch, this chapter outlines the Glen Grey Question in order to better understand the already existing complexities in the Glen Grey location which contributed

¹ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993.

towards the larger land question in the Cape Colony. Although the land issue became known as the Glen Grey Question in the location, land disputes were not unique to Glen Grey but reflected larger concerns in the colony. Thus, events and procedures in Glen Grey contributed toward the reshaping of Cape parliamentary politics and the developing labour economy.

The Glen Grey Question and attempts to address land disputes

As identified in Chapter 1, Glen Grey was formally demarcated as a location by Governor Sir George Cathcart after the Mlanjeni War and as part of the settlement of Africans in the newly formed Queenstown. As a result of the war, chieftainship institutions were disrupted which afforded colonists scope to impose colonial institutions and structures on Africans aimed at further weakening the authority of chiefs.² The location saw a struggle among colonial authorities, chiefs and the local people to define land tenure administration, ownership and authority, all of which would later become core issues addressed by the Glen Grey Act.³ Initially, Sir Philip Wodehouse, who was appointed Cape Governor in 1862, proposed that Africans in Glen Grey should be moved east of the Indwe river. However, negotiations with the chiefs and their paramount failed and only a small portion of Africans left the location in 1865.⁴ In Glen Grey, Nonesi was the paramount under whom four main chiefs presided with several sub-chiefs and headmen under them. Later, in 1865, local authorities attempted to weaken chieftainship institutions by imposing a stipend system similar to the one introduced in *British Kaffraria* in 1855 in order to supplement their chiefly income which was generated through fines. This further altered the foundation of African leadership since chiefs were no longer ranked according to their position under Nonesi, but instead according to the preference of the local colonial authority.⁵

With the increasing pressure imposed on chieftainship institutions, chiefs felt threatened and requested that the land they occupied be granted to them as farms on the basis of individual tenure so that they could nurse their chieftaincies in secure seclusion.⁶ Although their request was honoured, it was coupled with similar farms being granted to wealthy commoners. This

² A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.1.

³ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, p.5.

⁴ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, pp.132-133.

⁵ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, pp.3-4.

⁶ R. Bouch. *The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland, 1852-1886*. 1990, pp.136-140.

further undermined the autonomy of chiefs and contributed to the shaping of a new class of Africans since 1867,⁷ namely the African middle class. Granting land to commoners on the basis of individual tenure aligned with government's preference to have more Africans occupy land on the basis of individual tenure instead of their preferred form of communal tenure.⁸ With the transition to responsible government in 1872, Charles Brownlee⁹ was instated as the Secretary of Native Affairs (1872-1878) and committed himself to having more Africans occupy land individually instead of communally while he continuously strived to replace the power of chiefs with that of the local colonial authority.¹⁰

The complexity of the conflict over land in Glen Grey would later become known as the Glen Grey Question. While it formed part of the larger land issue in the colony, it set the stage for what would later become the Glen Grey Act,¹¹ as was confirmed by a correspondent for *The Journal* who was of the opinion that the Glen Grey Question not only concerned the rights and interests of the inhabitants of Queenstown but those of all the inhabitants of the Cape Colony.¹² In an attempt to address the Glen Grey Question, a commission was appointed in May 1870 to investigate the state of affairs in Glen Grey and to assess how, in addition to the already existing magistracy of Queenstown, another magistracy could be introduced in the location. This was motivated by the realisation that the hut tax that was introduced the previous year had to be tightly regulated and monitored. The government used tax as an instrument to monitor and manipulate Africans' activities – something which would also be seen later with the introduction of a labour tax under the Glen Grey Act. Nevertheless, Bouch argued that the 1870 commission had 'a deep undercurrent of antagonism' which could be seen in their methods of obtaining information - which commissioners admitted was 'a system of espionage in the

⁷ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, p.5.

⁸ R. T. Ally. *The Development of the System of Individual Tenure for Africa, with special reference to the Glen Grey Act, c.1894-1927.* 1985, pp.62-66.

⁹ For further reading, see; J. S. Bergh. *Die lewe van Charles Pacalt Brownlee tot 1857.* Gepubliseerde Ph.D-tesis, Stellenbosch Universiteit. 1981. SA Biografiese Woordboek I, pp.130-133.

¹⁰ V. M. Master. "Colonial Control in Thembuland and Resistance to it, 1872-1885." 1966, pp.3-4.

¹¹ 6 October 1886, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Native Opinion: A few more words on the Glen Grey Question.'; 20 March 1890, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Native Opinion: The Bond Scheme.'; 3 July 1890, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Editorial Note.'; 18 December 1890, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Native Opinion.'; 18 June 1891, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Creating Solutions.'; 7 July 1892, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'Glen Grey Report.'; *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, 'Glen Grey question.'; 27 October 1892, *Imvo Zabantsundu* – 'The Glen Grey condition.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 5 July 1893, 'Settling Glen Grey.'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 July 1893, 'The Glen Grey Natives.'; *The Journal*, 15 August 1893, 'Glen Grey Land Question.'; *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, 'Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.'

¹² *The Journal*, 2 December 1885, 'The Glen Grey Natives; To the Editor of *The Journal*.'

working'¹³ and according to which those who were least reliable were identified and empowered to influence the preferred outcome of the commissioners' report.¹⁴ He comments that 'the depth of discontent was not well understood and [that] administrative changes were made which did not address issues of popular sensitivity.'¹⁵ Bouch further notes that the commission had a hidden agenda to restrict Africans from accessing land and eventually to extend colonial settlement into the location, which was a strategy that would be implemented in the mid-1880s when the attitude of the government towards Africans had progressively hardened.¹⁶ Bouch's stance was that the Glen Grey Act was 'rooted in established thinking about minimalist land requirements, labour supply, and justifications for coercion.'¹⁷ The period 1870 - 1880s witnessed a series of contestations that supported Bouch's observations. This chapter seeks to contribute to our understanding of events that represented such established thinking in the lead-up to the Glen Grey Act of 1894.

The 1870 commission's recommendations for the geographical restructuring of the location were implemented and amounted to dividing the land into blocks of 12 000 to 16 000 morgen and subdividing each into farms of 2 000 morgen - except for already individually surveyed, titled farms. This, it was argued, would allow for the continuation of communal tenure in the location which would counter people's hostility towards government.¹⁸ As a result of its recommendations Glen Grey was split into two sections, with the northern tip forming part of Wodehouse and the larger, southern part remaining part of Queenstown.¹⁹ Africans in the southern division were allocated 104 farms ranging between 1 500 and 2 000 morgen each. The new magistracy was introduced by means of a government-appointed senior headmen who received instructions to oversee the various blocks directly from the magistrate and under whom junior headmen were placed in charge of individual farms.²⁰ Of these farms eleven were

¹³ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, pp.7-8.

¹⁴ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, pp.7-8.

¹⁵ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, pp.7-8, pp.9/16.

¹⁶ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894," 1993, pp.9/16.

¹⁷ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894," 1993, p.9.

¹⁸ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894," 1993, pp.7-8.

¹⁹ The government initially suggested that when dividing Glen Grey into 2 divisions, the one should be occupied by colonists only, and the other by Africans. The commissioners however thought this impractical with hostility and conflict as the ultimate outcome if implemented according to the government's suggestion.

²⁰ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, p.60.

granted to former chiefs or their sons and other Africans who had rendered what was considered exceptional service to the government. Through this arrangement government believed that ‘interference with the rule of the chief had raised a spirit of independence.’²¹ Despite this transformation, the Civil Commissioner continued to advocate for the implementation of stricter laws that would specifically outline these roles in the location in order to eventually give outright power to the magistrate and removing chiefs completely. He thought that, although these adjustments were politically a good sign, they did not necessarily make Africans good ‘servants.’²² The stance of the Civil Commissioner makes it clear what the actual aim at the time was, while the recommendations of the 1870 commission and the division of land indicate how they intended to achieve that aim.

Land removals and the Glen Grey Question

Africans were confronted with the combined devastation of the drought that struck in 1877 and the final frontier war which started in 1879, as a result of which they were left even more vulnerable than they had already been.²³ Although the drought had a negative impact on Africans in the Glen Grey location, it also brought to the attention of both Africans and colonists the agricultural capacity of the land in Glen Grey and highlighted what the irrigation potential was. This was reflected in the various efforts that were made by Africans to continue to produce food and sustain themselves throughout the period of drought. Agricultural capacity and irrigation potential thus further heightened the competition for the land as colonial farmers in the surrounding regions increasingly advocated for the removals of Africans for land to become available for purchase. Africans were making numerous attempts to retain their land and to continue living on the land they had inherited from their forefathers.²⁴ However, counter efforts were being made by both government and colonial farmers to remove Africans from the Glen Grey location.

In a meeting of approximately 400 colonial farmers in 1886 in Dordrecht, Wodehouse, the main item on the agenda was to advocate for the removal of Africans from the Glen Grey location.²⁵ The strongest advocacy came from Mr Du Plessis M. L. A. for Queenstown who, in strong support of the resolution presented at the meeting, said the removal of Africans had been

²¹ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62.

²² Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1874, pp.61-62.

²³ The effects of the drought and the war are discussed in Chapter 1.

²⁴ Blue Books of Native Affairs. 1878, p.49.

²⁵ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

decided upon by parliament in terms of a resolution proposed and carried by him in the House of Assembly.²⁶ According to that resolution, land in the Transkei that was not occupied by colonists should be distributed to Africans who had been removed from the Glen Grey and Fort Peddie locations. From discussion among these colonial farmers, it was evident that the pressure that would be placed on Africans in the Glen Grey location would exceed what was presented in parliamentary reports.²⁷ The colonial farmers pledged their support for the resolution to achieve that object and although they used allegations of theft to justify why Africans had to be removed, nobody offered any evidence of such theft.²⁸

Alternative land of 200 000 morgen was offered to Africans to move to Qumbu and individuals such as Mr Bekker spoke persuasively in favour of removing all Africans from the locations and selling their land.²⁹ Although their common goal was to remove Africans from the Glen Grey lands, some thought it important to do so in a more honest way. Mr Bradfield, for instance, pointed out that as far as he knew the land available at Qumbu amounted to 25 000 morgen and not the previously indicated 200 000 morgen; that only those who were willing to be removed from Glen Grey should be relocated, and that those who were unwilling to move should not be pressured into doing so. This view was however not popular and did not find much support at the meeting. On the contrary, Mr W. J. Van Rensburg, who was committed to the removals, received loud cheers for stating that ‘the question of the removal of these [Africans] had been definitely decided upon, and it was, therefore, useless to discuss the matter any further. Go they must, and the land must be occupied by whites.’³⁰ The opinions expressed at the meeting clearly indicated a determination to remove Africans from the Glen Grey location whether they were willing to move or not.

Two weeks after the colonial farmers’ meeting at Dordrecht, Africans of Queenstown held a meeting at Mount Arthur to consider their position after they had had an interview with Mr de Wet, Secretary of Native Affairs. They expressed their disappointment in him since he refused to hear their case and accused them of having no legal right to the land they occupied in their locations. Among those present were the Rev E. J. Warner, Mr W. J. Hugbos, J. Zodala, M. Rene, B Noboza, J. M. Pelem, M. Myangi, and approximately 300 other prominent men. The

²⁶ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

²⁷ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

²⁸ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

²⁹ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

³⁰ *The Journal*, 6 January 1886, ‘The Journal.’

land question was one that Africans had long been confronting and for clarity on what exactly they were dealing with they turned to Mr Qwalana Ngelo who believed that if there were more clarity and everyone had the same information, they would be able to better deliberate on what would be best for the people of the location. He therefore asked Mr Werner to explain to the Africans present what the advantages of title deeds were, which he did.³¹ The conclusion of their discussion was that it would be better for Africans in the Glen Grey location to apply for title deeds. However, this would not be for an individual title because, as explained below, it was also concluded that individual title would be the surest way for them to end up in Qumbu.³²

When the project of converting the Glen Grey lands into farms for the benefit of colonial farmers and their sons got underway, Africans were directed to proceed to East Griqualand to inspect certain reserve lands in the Tsolo and Qumbu locations. The proposal was that they would choose land in these locations in exchange for their land in Glen Grey. A few headmen accepted the proposition which created the impression that they were speaking on behalf of all Africans in the location, although this was not the case, which resulted in a lot of confusion.³³ Africans who did accept the proposal and moved were not satisfied and complained that the land they had identified when they first visited Griqualand during their negotiations was not the same land that was granted to them but had instead been reserved by government.³⁴ The Ndonga people (some 30 or 40 families) were also warned to move although no one from those farms had agreed to move to Qumbu.³⁵

Another meeting of the Glen Grey Africans was held on the 17th February during which all the headmen were to consider the matter of securing a title to their farms on behalf of their people. Similar to the previous meeting, the unanimous decision was that it was best to take up communal holdings as they always have.³⁶ Taking up individual titles was considered the first step in the process of alienating Africans from their land. The argument for this was that, under the stress and pressure of poverty or drunken habits or other similar conditions that pressurised people to evacuate their homes and find new places to live, lands held as individual title could

³¹ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, 'Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur'; *The Journal*, 6 March 1886, 'The Glen Grey Removal.'

³² *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, 'Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur'; *The Journal*, 6 March 1886, 'The Glen Grey Removal.'

³³ *The Christian Express*, 1 December 1886, 'Glen Grey Natives and their new homes.'

³⁴ *The Christian Express*, 1 December 1886, 'Glen Grey Natives and their new homes.'

³⁵ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, 'Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.'

³⁶ *The Journal*, 6 March 1886, 'The Glen Grey Removal.'

easily be given away by, or taken from, Africans. Thus, the individual title was considered by many an easier way to seize African lands³⁷ and explains why a large proportion of the African population was not keen on individual titles. *The Journal* argued that those who were promoting individual title for Africans were also not as interested in the endeavour as they suggested, but instead, their desire was to remove Africans completely from the location, although gradually. The newspaper advocated for the communal occupation of land because, as far as Africans were concerned, ‘united they will stand, singly they will fall under the relentless tread of the white man, who desires the lands.’³⁸

More than anything else, the outcry of the Glen Grey people was motivated by the fact that they would be leaving land that was superior to the land they would be placed on.³⁹ It was common knowledge among the people in the location at the time that the lands recommended for the relocation of the Africans of Glen Grey were too narrow for the immense population that would be crowded on them.⁴⁰ Generally speaking it was nearly impossible for people to make any progress amidst the unsettled state of the land question and they believed that it was the duty of government to bring the controversial question to an end without any further delay.⁴¹ A committee was formed by Africans after the Mount Arthur meeting to finalise their decision and to decide on the best way to present their case to parliament. The committee further deliberated on how they would obtain titles to their land and the best form of title for the people as a whole. They believed that it was also important that a means be adopted of preventing the issue of title generally becoming of interest to people again in future.⁴²

A dilemma that the government was confronted with was that the Glen Grey location was never demarcated further than the blocks and farms under administration of the headmen. This meant that boundaries were nominal and only served the purpose of defining the powers and duties of the headmen and that individual allotments were not available for purchase. This legitimized Africans’ notion that land was always one location occupied communally, especially in the matter of grazing stock. Therefore, taking away any part of the location affected all the people

³⁷ *The Journal*, 22 March 1886, ‘The Journal.’

³⁸ *The Journal*, 31 March 1886, ‘Glen Grey, again.’

³⁹ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, ‘Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.’

⁴⁰ *The Journal*, 1 April 1886, ‘The Journal.’

⁴¹ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, ‘Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.’

⁴² *The Journal*, 11 February 1886, ‘Our Diary: Glen Grey titles.’

in the location and not only those who were deprived of part of the land by compelling them to move.⁴³

By 1886 the Glen Grey land question had become notorious and frequently featured in public print and discussions at public meetings.⁴⁴ *The Christian Express* gave much credit to *The Journal* for being at the forefront of calling attention to this question, which the newspaper thought to be disgraceful and went on to characterise as ‘a land robbery on a large scale – a great wrong and a public crime.’⁴⁵ Among the various important publications in *The Journal* that addressed the question were those that defended people who had made the move to Qumbu and who had indicated that, although they had moved willingly, most, if not all of them, would have preferred to remain where they lived if they could have been assured of their position. The newspaper continued the argument with the stance that, if government had offered them the option of title deeds to the land they already occupied, with the exception of a few, all would have stayed and opted for title.⁴⁶

The Christian Express thought it was important to highlight that it was not only the Africans of the Glen Grey location who were affected by these changes. A further example was presented of the case where, after the Land Commission of 1883, 80 000 acres of ground around Tsolo and Qumbu Residencies were reserved and granted to loyal Africans such as Lawu Siwundla and Rayi Siwundla.⁴⁷ These men were believed to have established themselves as prestigious men in the location and of having accumulated substantial wealth and networks. They had built comfortable homes and cultivated their land to produce wheat, oat-hay, potatoes and a variety of other vegetables. They supplied several families of African and colonial descent with what was considered excellent quality dairy produce. They were therefore considered assets to the location where they had settled as permanent residents and also of being models of education and enlightenment while serving as important agents for the future development of the location.⁴⁸ It was noted that, with the removals of the Glen Grey Africans to Tsolo, men such as Siwundla were being evacuated from the land which they had made their

⁴³ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, ‘Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.’

⁴⁴ *The Journal*, 31 March 1886, ‘Glen Grey, again’; *The Journal*, 12 February 1886, ‘Further mischief at Glen Grey’; *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.’

⁴⁵ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.’

⁴⁶ *The Journal*, 22 January 1886, ‘Tembu Meeting at Mount Arthur.’

⁴⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 December 1886, ‘Glen Grey Natives and their new homes.’

⁴⁸ *The Christian Express*, 1 December 1886, ‘Glen Grey Natives and their new homes.’

home.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Glen Grey Question affected more than just the people of the Glen Grey location. According to Bouch, one of the results of the Glen Grey Question was a marked increase in the politicization of Glen Grey in which the ability of headmen to register even mild protest against government actions was broken and the educated elite rose to prominence in organizations such as the Thembu Association.⁵⁰

The government ordered the magistrate of Lady Frere to personally remove Africans from the Glen Grey location. The plan to execute these instructions was to have the surveyor in the location on duty on a daily basis and that if any of the Africans were interested in the land they would have to make a bid like everyone else.⁵¹ Evacuated land was to be auctioned.⁵² Africans responded through a representative and indicated that they were satisfied with the land they were occupying and that they had no desire to go anywhere else. They requested, instead, that government ensured their occupation and granted them title to the lands they were already occupying.⁵³ Despite their request, the magistrate sturdily advised them to make preparations to be removed since the order had already been given and would be carried out. He gave them the option of choosing places for themselves elsewhere in the district if they were reluctant to move to Qumbu. The alternative was for the magistrate to locate them where he saw fit, which may not have been to their liking.⁵⁴

Africans continued to be hopeful that the government would see their perspective and let them remain where they were as they had only recently recovered from the drought as a result of rains falling and continuing to do so. They made it clear that they were happy with their location and took it as confirmation that ‘nature herself’ was against their removal since it was providing them with rain which allowed them to make the best of their lands.⁵⁵ A couple of months later, Mr Frost went to Glen Grey with the approval of the Queenstown Farmers’ Association in order to get as many Africans removed as he possibly could. The idea was that the lands would be divided according to results by the surveyor and put on public auction, with a preference that it would be occupied by colonial farmers.⁵⁶ Frost was a prominent farmer in Queenstown

⁴⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 December 1886, ‘Glen Grey Natives and their new homes.’

⁵⁰ R. Bouch. “Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894,” 1993, pp.18-19.

⁵¹ *The Journal*, 12 February 1886, ‘Further mischief at Glen Grey.’

⁵² *The Journal*, 22 March 1886, ‘The Journal’; *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1889, ‘Two Divisions.’

⁵³ *The Journal*, 12 February 1886, ‘Further mischief at Glen Grey.’

⁵⁴ *The Journal*, 12 February 1886, ‘Further mischief at Glen Grey.’

⁵⁵ *The Journal*, 12 February 1886, ‘Further mischief at Glen Grey.’

⁵⁶ *The Journal*, 1 April 1886, ‘The Journal’; *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1889, ‘Two Divisions.’

who had commanded troops during the ninth frontier war. Later, in 1893, he became secretary for Native Affairs in the Rhodes administration.⁵⁷ He was believed to have been a hard man, and although George Theal neglected to identify the specific methods used by Frost, Wagenaar (1988) mentioned that he imposed pressure through force and made threats of dispossession if people refused to move.⁵⁸ Frost, however, blamed resistance by the people in the location on missionaries and traders.⁵⁹ Reports indicated that a detachment of mounted police, accompanied by the Magistrate of Lady Frere and acting under the instructions from government, destroyed the huts of Africans who refused to move from Mackie's Neck, in Glen Grey.⁶⁰

The process of destroying Africans' homes that government officials wanted to evacuate was described as follows: 'It was thought too glaring to burn the huts, so the supports were cut off and then mounted to the top, the hut being squeezed flat to the ground.' Acting under instructions from government, the officer in charge of this degrading act of destruction took the precaution of first having the people exit their huts and removing their belongings before they proceeded to demolish their structures. It was further described that 'the poor women and children set outside meekly, with their hands on their knees, surrounded by their goods and chattels,' watching the operation in despair.⁶¹ No special or valid reason was given to explain why some of the Africans in the location were being removed except for claiming that the location was overcrowded and that there were many 'squatters' who were probably responsible for the alleged stock theft.⁶² Many Queenstown merchants objected to the removals and advocated that the Africans in the Glen Grey location formed part of the strength of the colony and that they were the producers of its wealth. They claimed that deportation of the African people was not economically sound, politically safe, or morally right.⁶³ In fact, Mr Clifford Holden was of the opinion that there would not have been an outcry about the removal of Glen Grey Africans had it not been for the Queenstown shopkeepers and merchants who feared that

⁵⁷ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894." 1993, p.21.

⁵⁸ E. Wagenaar. *A History of the Thembu and their Relationship with the Cape, 1850-1909*. 1988, p.202.

⁵⁹ R. Bouch. "Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894," 1993, p.18.

⁶⁰ *The Journal*, 18 September 1886, 'The Glen grey land Robbery (D.f Advertiser)'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 16 October 1886, 'The Glen Grey evictions.'

⁶¹ *The Journal*, 18 September 1886, 'The Glen grey land Robbery (D.f Advertiser).'

⁶² *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, 'The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey'; *The Christian Express*, 2 September 1889, 'The Glen grey Natives.'

⁶³ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, 'The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.'

they would lose customers. His view was that they objected to the removals, ‘not because they love a black man one bit but simply because they supply them with goods.’⁶⁴ *The Journal* questioned if it were possible that in a Christian country such a scene could be contemplated with indifference and without the excuse of war that could prompt such cruelty – all just because Africans had black skin.⁶⁵ It expressed the opinion that such actions tainted the reputation of the colony because it demonstrated that everyone was not considered equal in the colony.⁶⁶ Land was evacuated as resistance increasingly weakened. A total of nine farms were vacated which were later subdivided into 28 smaller farms and sold in 1886 and 1887 - all apparently to colonists.⁶⁷

Imvo Zabantsundu reported correspondence of Sir George Cathcart and identified two important proclamations for making a case against the Glen Grey removals: one, conferring the territory of Glen Grey to the Tembus, and another, defining the boundaries of the territory. It also reported that the eagerness of colonists to claim the Glen Grey location was not new and that the main obstacle that prevented colonial farmers from occupying the land in the past had been the protection of the previous government.⁶⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu* commented that, given the series of events that had taken place in the location in relation to the Glen Grey Question, Africans needed to be commended for their efforts to retain the land of their forefathers. It noted that their actions were worthy of being replicated in other locations that were experiencing similar challenges. The newspaper clearly stated that the attempt to remove the Glen Grey Africans from their land was a grave injustice because they had occupied those lands for generations and that the dwelling of an African was just as much his castle as the house of an Englishman was his.⁶⁹

Mr Botha, a prominent member of the Afrikaner Bond, was of the opinion that the Glen Grey people who were occupying land communally should be regarded as squatters who had no right to the land they occupied and should therefore be removed in order to make room for colonists who wanted land. It was clear that Africans were to be treated as a subjected race and not as

⁶⁴ *The Journal*, 8 October 1889, ‘The Glen Grey Natives.’

⁶⁵ *The Journal*, 18 September 1886, ‘The Glen grey land Robbery (D.f Advertiser).’

⁶⁶ *The Journal*, 18 September 1886, ‘The Glen grey land Robbery (D.f Advertiser).’

⁶⁷ R. Bouch. “Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894,” 1993, p.19.

⁶⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 6 October 1886, ‘Native Opinion: A few more words on the Glen Grey Question.’

⁶⁹ *The Journal*, 6 March 1886, ‘The Glen Grey Removal.’

equals.⁷⁰ *The Journal* challenged this stating that, after occupying the land for more than 30 years under the protection of the Crown, it was too late to claim that Africans had no right to the land and that any claim to the contrary made evictions from the land unjust.⁷¹ Mr Botha later argued that Africans were previously allowed to remain on the land ‘by the neglect of the past government’ and labelled them ‘rebels.’⁷² He believed that it was government’s duty to see to it that land be occupied by colonial farmers.⁷³ In an attempt to refute this claim, W. Clifford Holden offered a general historical statement derived from his work on the *Past And Future of the Kafir Races* (1866)⁷⁴ which gave a general, historical overview of the position of the Africans who occupied Glen Grey as evidence of how long they had been occupying those lands. He reminded readers that at the close of the last war a large section of the colony had been taken from Africans and given to colonial farmers. A correspondent for *The Journal* considered the matter to have been one of the first successful attempts by the Afrikaner Bond to remove Africans from their lands and have them ‘scattered broadcast over the land, surviving about like wild animals.’⁷⁵

Proposed solutions to the Glen Grey Question

Amidst the back and forth over whether Africans should continue to occupy the Glen Grey land or whether they should take on individual tenure, a petition to the House of Assembly was signed by colonists that advocated for Africans to be removed from the lands because they were disloyal and predatory.⁷⁶ *The Christian Express* thought it unwise to remove Africans from the Glen Grey location because it made the population ‘scanty’.⁷⁷ However, an interesting addition to their argument was the suggestion that government should use these Africans as a labour force - a suggestion rationalised by the claim that, if Africans were removed from the locations colonists would indeed gain a few farms but over time businesses in Queenstown would fail and fewer cargo ships would enter the ports to support businesses in the region.⁷⁸ An example of such a business was the Morum Bros. which not only employed several Africans with a salary high enough for them to qualify for the franchise but which also supplied Africans

⁷⁰ *The Journal*, 5 October 1889, ‘The Journal.’

⁷¹ *The Journal*, 5 October 1889, ‘The Journal.’

⁷² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 5 October 1889, ‘Afrikanders and the Glen Grey Natives: The Opinion of a Bond Leader.’

⁷³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 5 October 1889, ‘Afrikanders and the Glen Grey Natives: The Opinion of a Bond Leader.’

⁷⁴ W. C. Holden. *Past and Future of the Kafir Races: In Three Parts*. London: Holden, 1866.

⁷⁵ *The Journal*, 2 December 1885, ‘The Glen Grey Natives; To the Editor of *The Journal*.’

⁷⁶ *The Journal*, 27 April 1886.

⁷⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.’

⁷⁸ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.’

with the kind of goods that encouraged the adoption of colonial norms.⁷⁹ *The Christian Express* considered this economic suicide and a moral failure which the prosperity of the colony could not be built on.⁸⁰

In an attempt to put the Glen Grey Question to rest, the government appointed a commission in 1892 to investigate concerns related to the issue.⁸¹ The commission was headed by Mr B. H. Holland, Civil Commissioner of King Williamstown, and additionally composed of Mr John Frost, M. L. A. for Queenstown, and Mr W Janse van Rensburg, M. L. A for Wodehouse.⁸² The agitation had been prolonged for years and eventually became intolerable. *Imvo Zabantsundu* noted that Africans complied with heavy hearts with all requests of the commission through their different representatives.⁸³ Their attitudes were motivated by previous experiences which invariably resulted in the confiscation of their land. The newspaper stated that it was important to note that although there had been previous attempts to address this issue through a commission, previous commissioners failed to gain the confidence of the people because, at one point or another, all the proposed commissioners were associated with calculated transactions aimed at tampering with the liberties of Africans.⁸⁴ That said, what made this commission different from previous commissions was the fact that it was not empowered to evict anyone. Its mandate was to collect as much information as possible on all matters relating to the dispute between Africans of the location and the claims made by colonists in the adjoining location.⁸⁵

The Glen Grey Question was a burden for many years, not only to the people of the location but the eastern frontier of the colony as a whole.⁸⁶ The appointment of a commission made Africans feel unsettled despite them being recognised to have been the ‘finest specimens of their class [and] a hardworking thrifty community’⁸⁷ on all levels who had been unable fully to develop their location throughout the period of the land disputes.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the commission surprised many with its report and Africans expressed deep satisfaction with its

⁷⁹ R. D. Morum. *Six Generations in South Africa*. 2016.

⁸⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey.’

⁸¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 April 1892, ‘A drop of comfort.’

⁸² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

⁸³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

⁸⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

⁸⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 28 April 1892, ‘A drop of comfort.’

⁸⁶ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, ‘Glen Grey Question.’

⁸⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

⁸⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

conclusions.⁸⁹ The commission stated its conclusions based on the evidence of Rev E. J. Warner who maintained that the Africans had a right to the Glen Grey lands. In July, Mr Faure presented the report containing the conclusions of their investigation to the House of Assembly.⁹⁰

The Christian Express noted how impressed they were with how thorough the work of the commission was. The newspaper commended how the commission travelled all through the location to conduct interviews with the chiefs, headmen and some of the oldest residents in addition to which they also consulted historical records as well as some of the earliest records obtainable concerning the Glen Grey Question. From historical research, the members of the commission found that the land that was classified as the Glen Grey location as well as other lands in the surrounding were proclaimed by Sir George Cathcart on 22nd November 1852 to be handed over to Africans who ever since held the land on the basis of tribal tenure.⁹¹ In 1865 a small portion of Africans had moved across the Indwe and a few farms in the location had been exchanged, but the greater portion of the land had been occupied by the same people whom it was initially granted to and their descendants. This made them lawfully entitled to the land in the location. However, the commission expressed frustration that during 1879 there had been several Africans in the Glen Grey location who rebelled but were again allowed to return to the land that they formally occupied once the war was over. They expressed regret at the fact that measures were not taken in this regard, but they were also not in a position to make a recommendation on the matter because ‘the rebels’ were condoned and it would have been impossible to distinguish them from other people in the location because they were so integrated in the community.⁹²

Many Africans were satisfied that the report confirmed what was often argued.⁹³ Nevertheless, the most important aspect that needed to be taken into consideration, beyond what they found, was what their recommendations moving forward were. The commission recommended that each African should be given a specific portion of the land to cultivate. The location would be divided into a surveyed diagram and title deeds which it estimated would on average cost £3

⁸⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, ‘Glen Grey Question.’

⁹⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, ‘Glen Grey Question.’

⁹¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, ‘Glen Grey Question’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 21 March 1892, ‘Native Land tenure - Confused ideas’; *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1886, ‘The Compensating Balance at Glen Grey’; *The Christian Express*, 2 September 1889, ‘The Glen grey Natives.’

⁹² *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, ‘Glen Grey Question.’

⁹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, ‘Glen Grey Report.’

12s.⁹⁴ The commission inquired what the preference of occupation was and found that 2 356 people were in favour of title deeds while 1 312 were against it. The commission assumed that those who were absent from the location for work related reasons were also in favour of title deeds and concluded that this expressed the desire of the majority. It also noted that the division of land would contribute towards labour difficulties in the colony since a man's child would be compelled to seek work elsewhere because there would be insufficient land per family to support more than one cultivator. A further recommendation was that for those who were not interested in title deeds a portion of the location should be demarcated for them to inhabit communally while the Glen Grey location was made a fiscal division.⁹⁵

The location was identified to cover 248 476 morgen of land which altogether consisted of a succession of approximately 22 large basins surrounded by very high, rocky, mountains. The soil in the valleys was suitable for agricultural purposes and the grazing ground considered to be good.⁹⁶ Many of the lands were irrigated through an irrigation system that could be extended. Burweed flourished in parts without any efforts being made to eradicate it. The location was identified to have had 7 500 inhabited huts occupied by 18 926 males, half of whom were thought to be children. The stock possessed by the African inhabitants consisted of 262 221 sheep and goats as well as 83 431 cattle and horses. The commission thought that it would be impractical to reduce the size of the location since the land was barely sufficient for those who were already occupying it.⁹⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu* expressed relief and congratulated the commission on their fairness and the justice afforded Africans.⁹⁸ It expressed the belief that government acted wisely in their attempt to settle the Glen Grey land question given that for many years this question had given rise to great unrest and apprehension in the Eastern Frontier.⁹⁹

The people of Glen Grey held a meeting to evaluate the recommendations of the commission and drafted a memorandum for consideration by government which was later forwarded in the form of a petition.¹⁰⁰ It stated that the majority of people were willing to accept title deeds on

⁹⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, 'Glen Grey Report.'

⁹⁵ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, 'Glen Grey Question.'

⁹⁶ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, 'Glen Grey Question - Natural features and population.'

⁹⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 October 1892, 'Glen Grey Question - Natural features and population.'

⁹⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 7 July 1892, 'Glen Grey Report'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 21 March 1892, 'Native Land tenure - Confused ideas.'

⁹⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 5 July 1893, 'Settling Glen Grey.'

¹⁰⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 October 1892, 'The Glen Grey condition'; *The Journal*, 29 August 1893, 'Petition from Glen Grey.'

the condition that the land be divided into commonages and title be given to the commonages; that the people be allowed to elect a board of management from within their own ranks and that the board should have the authority to regulate commonage irrigation rights; that traders should not be allowed to erect shops, garden plots or anything else, without the consent of the board of management and the people; that land may not be used for security of debt; that land may not be sold without the consent of the people and the government, and in cases where someone died and had no survivors or heirs, that the land be transferred to the board of management.¹⁰¹

According to *Imvo Zabantsundu*, government was believed to have acted wisely in their attempt to settle the Glen Grey land question.¹⁰² That said, *Imvo Zabantsundu* found it disappointing that Africans of the location were not signing and forwarding petitions to further express their desire on how to settle the land question once and for all. It thought that the faith Africans were putting in their parliamentary representation and the petitions they had previously submitted to the government were insufficient to achieve their goals. The reasoning for this, the article explained, was that consistent action in the present would emphasize the seriousness of the matter and that it was the ‘present action that gains the day.’¹⁰³ To further support its position the newspaper referred to the fact that the *Frontier Guardian* also understood this since they continually indicated how the Afrikaner Bond in the district was rapidly sending petitions for presentations to parliament asking that, if titles were to be granted to Africans in the Glen Grey district, that it should be done with a clause to the effect that title holders may be allowed to dispose of their allotments after four years.¹⁰⁴ The Glen Grey land question was a concern that vitally affected every African and demanded special attention in order to be brought to a close. Therefore, the consideration was that whatever would apply in Glen Grey should also apply to other regions despite the comparatively small patches of land in the colony occupied by Africans.¹⁰⁵ Although it was appreciated that government had acted with dignity in withdrawing the Glen Grey Lands’ title resolution, arguments were made about the inadvisability of giving Africans title without some sort of restriction and the eventual

¹⁰¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 October 1892, ‘The Glen Grey condition.’

¹⁰² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 5 July 1893, ‘Settling Glen Grey.’

¹⁰³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 July 1893, ‘The Glen Grey Natives.’

¹⁰⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 12 July 1893, ‘The Glen Grey Natives.’

¹⁰⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 21 March 1892, ‘Native Land tenure - Confused ideas’; *The Christian Express*, 1 November 1893, ‘Morality in parliament.’

progression of allowing land to be taken.¹⁰⁶ In concluding the matter it recognised the important role played by those who prioritised shedding light on the matter; the action of the Africans themselves in calling public meetings; those who forwarded petitions and telegraphs as well as those who had sent a deputation to Cape Town, and, most of all, those individuals who had been mindful of the interests of Africans, all of whom contributed to the outcome.¹⁰⁷

The Glen Grey question was a prolonged issue in the Cape Colony. This meant that the Cecil John Rhodes administration inherited a pre-existing adversity. Rhodes' awareness of the fact that agitation in the Glen Grey location was heightened by the introduction of the Glen Grey Bill into parliament by the motion of the Afrikaner Bond through Mr Hofmeyr indication that the Cecil John Rhodes administration manipulated the issue for political and economic ends. In 1892, proposals were submitted to address the Glen Grey Question, but a solution had to be concretized with regard to the implementation of legislation. The legislation presented in this case was the Glen Grey Act of 1894. Parliament was presented with the Glen Grey Bill in July of 1894 and it received the governor's assent for it to pass as an Act by August the same year. Rhodes claimed that the spirit of the Bill was to govern Africans according to African laws and customs.¹⁰⁸ One of the key elements of the Act was the clauses that outlined how land and local affairs would be administered and disposed of.¹⁰⁹

When evaluating the Glen Grey Act, it is evident that government had taken into consideration the 1892 memorandum and 1893 petition of the people in the location. As stated above, one of the conditions was that a management board be appointed that would, among other duties, regulate commonage irrigation rights.¹¹⁰ Under the Glen Grey Act, Location Boards, which headmen were eligible to be members of, were given control of the commonage attached to locations in order to encourage local self-rule.¹¹¹ Allowing headmen eligibility to form part of the location board allowed them, to some extent, to continue with duties similar to what they had before, but in a different way. This, however, would be temporary as new location board members were instated every year. An additional condition of the petition was that land would

¹⁰⁶ *The Journal*, 15 August 1893, 'Glen Grey Land Question'; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 13 September 1893, 'Native Lands Legislation.'

¹⁰⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 13 September 1893, 'Native Lands Legislation.'

¹⁰⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1894, p.464.

¹⁰⁹ *The Journal*, 17 July 1894, 'The Glen Grey Bill.'

¹¹⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 October 1892, 'The Glen Grey condition'; *The Journal*, 29 August 1893, 'Petition from Glen Grey.'

¹¹¹ Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1894, pp.412/460.

not be bought or sold without the consent of the management board and the people.¹¹² Under the Glen Grey Act, however, land could not be transferred without the consent of government and the people did not necessarily have to be consulted. Granted land was also to be forfeitable in case of rebellion or conviction of theft as indicated in the petition.¹¹³ Although there seem to be similarities in the petition forwarded by the Glen Grey people and the Glen Grey Act, conditions were restructured in a way that would disadvantage Africans and serve the economic and political interests of the Rhodes administration under the pretext of addressing the Glen Grey Question.¹¹⁴

Presenting the Glen Grey Act

The Christian Express expressed the belief that the Glen Grey Act was a difficult subject that spurred much debate. They therefore cautioned against misunderstanding its details when it was still in the form of a Bill.¹¹⁵ After a lengthy delay to provide for responses to the Act with the hopes of adjusting the Bill, the newspaper expressed bitter disappointment that the Bill was passed as an Act.¹¹⁶ It expressed the opinion that the Act would not benefit Africans in any way and was certainly not a satisfactory settlement of the Glen Grey Question.¹¹⁷ They responded by analogy, claiming that generosity was not easily mistaken, ‘as stones are not often mistaken for bread.’¹¹⁸ In their view and based on the frequently held meetings by Africans and their appeal to the Queen, the impression was clear that Africans were getting stone from the Bill being passed, and not bread.¹¹⁹ *The Christian Express* considered the Act strange and questioned what its real intent was, whether the Glen Grey Act was not designed to entrap Africans into going to prison and if it would not result in Africans being removed from the land and registration lists. The newspaper thought that, despite the Act’s intent, its effect would be to handicap Africans in every possible way, preventing advancements and the freedom of occupying land because of the colour of their skin.¹²⁰ The newspaper further claimed that contrary to their view, Sir Gordon Sprigg thought the Act to be a ‘gentle stimulant’

¹¹² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 27 October 1892, ‘The Glen Grey condition’; *The Journal*, 29 August 1893, ‘Petition from Glen Grey.’

¹¹³ *The Journal*, 14 July 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹¹⁴ *The Journal*, 14 July 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 11 December 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Act.’

¹¹⁵ *The Christian Express*, 1 February 1894, ‘The lines of policy and an illustrative circular.’

¹¹⁶ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, ‘Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.’

¹¹⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, ‘Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.’

¹¹⁸ *The Christian Express*, 1 February 1894, ‘The lines of policy and an illustrative circular.’

¹¹⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 February 1894, ‘The lines of policy and an illustrative circular.’

¹²⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, ‘Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.’

which would eventually benefit Africans. He was severely criticized for this opinion and similar views he had expressed concerning the Registration Act and the Disarmament Act in previous years.¹²¹ The newspaper went as far as to compare the views of Gordon Sprigg with those of slave holders in America by stating that ‘the slave holders of Virginia held that slavery benefited the Negroes, which seems to be the same mentality of Gordon Sprigg and the supporters of the Glen Grey Bill.’¹²² *The Cape Times* was also quick to criticise the Act, especially its disfranchising component.¹²³ A major part of the dissatisfaction with the Glen Grey Act related to clause 26 which served as an important complement to the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 crafted with the purpose of franchise participation. The clause stipulated that although allotted land was demarcated as individual tenure, it would be deemed communal for franchise purposes.¹²⁴

Concerning the land question, the Act made provision for the location to be divided into allotments of four morgen and granted to individuals who either already held land, or approved persons who submitted claims to land. The idea, which was also expressed during the deliberations for the Parliamentary Registration Act, was that if the land was demarcated as individual titles then allotments would not be sufficient for voter registration in addition to which descendants would be compelled to seek employment.¹²⁵ The opinion of *Imvo Zabantsundu* was that the Act was not such a blessing as those who promoted it were trying to make the people believe it to be.¹²⁶ People were complaining bitterly that their land, which had maintained their families for decades, was being taken away from them with the objective of reducing them to poverty and making it impossible for them to live in their homes. They complained that surveyors also surveyed grazing land which the people of the location thought were excluded from what was outlined in the clause on the understanding that sufficient land would be kept for grazing purposes.¹²⁷ The finding of 1895 was that the lands surveyed in Glen Grey were far exceeded by the number of claimants in the location.¹²⁸ Mission stations and freehold land on quitrents where exempt and individual allotments disadvantaged many

¹²¹ *The Christian Outlook*, 1 October 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹²² *The Christian Outlook*, 1 October 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹²³ *Cape Times*, 13 July 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill’; 16 July 1894, - ‘Editorial Note.’

¹²⁴ D. R. Edgecombe. “The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910.” 1978, p.36; *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, ‘The Native Policy of the Government.’

¹²⁵ R. Bouch. “Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority Led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894,” 1993, p.21.

¹²⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, ‘Again, the Act.’

¹²⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, ‘Again, the Act.’

¹²⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, ‘Again, the Act.’

Africans who previously held larger portions of the location in addition to limiting their use of land. The annual fee to be paid per four morgen was 15 shillings and 3 shillings per every additional morgen. By 1897, Africans had already paid approximately £12 000 for survey expenses related to the Glen Grey Act which indicated that they were taking up lots.¹²⁹ Lot holders could not confer their land through a will, and an heir who was already a lot holder had to choose between either inheriting his father's lot or keeping his own but could not own both simultaneously. The remaining land that was not allotted would become part of the commonages, but the government would at any point be empowered to use these commonages to build roads, railways or dams, among other public works. This created uncertainty regarding the rights to land for Africans which, in turn, would have stymied any development.

Disenfranchisement legislations were complementary to labour market discrimination,¹³⁰ which was further heightened by the labour tax of the Glen Grey Act. The Act firstly reduced the size of allotments to four morgen which, although owned on the basis of individual tenure, was considered communal property for franchise purposes. The second section of the Act attached a labour tax that required Africans to work outside of their location for at least three months a year or to pay a tax of 10s. This would have limited the time they could invest in working on their own land. Both these factors were intended to remove Africans, but more particularly farmers, from the voters' rolls. Nevertheless, when looking at the trend of participation in Queenstown, although there had been a decline in participation it could not have been to the degree which the government desired. Africans continued to persistently participate in the franchise with the majority of them retaining their occupational positions as farmers/agriculturalists.

The second section of the Act which also caused severe backlash was Clause 33. It stated that African men in the location whom the magistrate considered capable of labour had to pay a tax of ten shillings per annum which he would be exempt from if he worked outside the location for three months in the year.¹³¹ He could become permanently exempt from this tax if he worked outside the location for three consecutive years. Having to pay taxes was not a new concept for Africans. Under the location Act of 1869 and 1874 Africans were charged a hut

¹²⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 May 1897, 'The Blue Book on Native Affairs.'

¹³⁰ A. Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginning of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. 1984, p.2; A. Atmore & S. Mark. "The imperial Factors in South Africa in the 19th century; Towards a reassessment." 1974, p.125.

¹³¹ *The Journal*, 14 July 1894, 'The Glen Grey Bill.'

tax and ‘squatters’ on private land had to pay tax for their occupation.¹³² However, the labour tax of the Glen Grey Act was a measure beyond the tax measures Africans had been confronted with before. Although it was mainly devised to draw men into the labour market, the clause would have greatly impacted African franchise participation, especially for those who continued to participate according to the qualifications of the Parliamentary Registration Act.

The Franchise and Ballot Act exempted men who were already on the voters’ rolls before 1892 from the measure that increased the land and property qualification to £75 on condition that they were not absent from the electoral division in which they were registered for more than six months at a time.¹³³ For men who continued to register for the franchise on the £25 land and property qualification identified in the Parliamentary Registration Act and who left the location for longer than that in an attempt to accumulate enough money to pay the annual lot fee, the probability of remaining on the list was slim.¹³⁴ The *Cape Times* reported that the Labour Commission of 1893-4 was established with the aim of no longer leaving the question of labour in the Cape Colony to chance or circumstance.¹³⁵ Its recommendations were therefore incorporated into the Glen Grey Act with a labour clause that contributed to the further expansion of the African working class since it compelled Africans to become a labour force on the farms of colonists and the mines in Kimberly and the Transvaal.

Interpretations of the Glen Grey Act have emphasised Rhodes’ dual economic and political motive derived from his involvement in the mining industry and as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony at the time. Although this is true, this chapter draws attention to the Glen Grey Act as a measure of disfranchisement but agrees that the labour clause mainly served the economic interests of the Cape colonial farmers through the influence of the Afrikaner Bond members of the Cape parliament because the tax was earmarked for the use of agricultural and trade schools. The labour tax component has received much attention in historiography from a variety of perspectives. Eddie Webster (1978)¹³⁶ has argued that the Act was one of three key Acts that were central in generating labour for the mining industry. His analysis is

¹³² F. J. Kirk. “Race, Class, Liberalism, and Segregation: The 1883 Native Strangers' Location Bill in Port Elizabeth, South Africa.” 1991, p.300.

¹³³ Identified in the Franchise and Ballot Act discussed in: Cape of Good Hope, *Debates in the House of Assembly*. 1891, p.328; *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1892, ‘Native interests in the Cape Parliament’; D. R. Edgcombe. “The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910.” 1978, p.34.

¹³⁴ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, ‘The Native Policy of the Government.’

¹³⁵ *Cape Times*, 28 July 1894, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹³⁶ E. Webster. ‘Background to the supply and control of labour in the gold mines,’ in E. Webster (ed, *Essays in Southern African labour history*. Johannesburg: Ravan, 1978.

complimentary to the study by Jill Nattrass (1981)¹³⁷ who identified that the Bill improved the supply of labour to the mines. These arguments have been contested by authors such as R. J. Thompson and B. M. Nicholls¹³⁸ (1993) who have argued that the primary driving force of the Act was to generate labour for Cape farms. Analysis of the Act has varied over time, based on the perspective of the author and the focus of their narrative. Some authors such as Edgar Brookes have expressed different views in different sections of their work.¹³⁹ Either way, the Act made provision for a labour bureau to be set up whose council would receive applications by employers indicating their need for labour and who would then arrange with Africans in the location who were looking for employment.

The Christian Express thought that a period of one year for neglect on the part of the holders was too short a period to judge a man's fitness for holding the allotment. It argued that the Act must have been motivated by vengeance because previous Acts allowed for at least three month's grace for the rent of the incoming year and five years for the payment of arrears prior to the possibility of invoking the Derelict Lands Act to allow for forfeiture of title deed. It questioned if the Glen Grey land was at all intended to allow land to remain in the hands of Africans.¹⁴⁰

Although the blueprint of the Act was the Glen Grey location, it had an impact on the whole colony because the Act made provision for its application by proclamation, 'in whole or in part, and with such modifications, as may be necessary,' to other districts inhabited mainly by Africans.¹⁴¹ *The Journal* considered this to have been 'a large order' and expressed the hope that Parliament would not implement the Bill as an Act in its existing form since it regarded the Act as a proposal to assume power to dispose of land in all African districts.¹⁴² The government would therefore be further given the discretion to adjust the law whichever way it saw fit, whether it would be to the demise of Africans or not.¹⁴³ This was considered to have

¹³⁷ J. Nattrass. *The South African economy: its growth and change*, 1981, p.157.

¹³⁸ R. J. Thompson, & B. M. Nicholls. "The Glen Grey Act: Forgotten dimensions in an old theme." 1993.

¹³⁹ E. H. Brookes. *The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to Present Day*. 1924. E. H. Brookes. *A South African Pilgrimage*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1977.

¹⁴⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, 'Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.'

¹⁴¹ *The Journal*, 17 July 1894, 'The Glen Grey Bill.'

¹⁴² *The Journal*, 17 July 1894, 'The Glen Grey Bill.'

¹⁴³ *The Journal*, 17 July 1894, 'The Glen Grey Bill.'

been a ‘blanket that could stretch to cover almost anything’¹⁴⁴ since any number of adjustments could be made at any given point in time.¹⁴⁵

Contesting the Glen Grey Act

The Africans of Glen Grey were extremely unhappy with the situation. Reports from the location claimed that Mr Jenner’s work was not necessarily based on the demarcation of the location and was aimed at removing African voters’ names from the existing registration lists and people from the land.¹⁴⁶ Similar sentiments were expressed by Africans in other locations of the colony as large meetings to protest the Act continued to be held in the Transkei. In addition to their petitions to the government of the Colony, a petition was also sent to England. One such petition from Tsomo was signed by 404 men and submitted in January of 1895.¹⁴⁷ In one month alone, twenty-four petitions relating to the Act were submitted by Africans, something which *Imvo Zabantsundu* considered to have been unique because Africans had never protested against a measure to such an extreme extent.¹⁴⁸ *The Christian Express* expressed the belief that the Act was clearly an Afrikaner Bond-directed piece of legislation which was misdirected because Africans’ prosperity and progress affected the government and colonists just as much as it did Africans themselves even though they were most directly affected. The newspaper continued by arguing that in the long run colonists would pay for the mistake of the Glen Grey Act since an additional injustice consisted in the fact that, without the African vote, white men whom Africans had confidence in would now be kicked out of parliament.¹⁴⁹ *The Christian Express*’ conviction was that the majority of the Cape Colony’s population would no longer have a voice even though their representatives were not of the same race.

The Act was highly contested by Africans who continually sent petitions to the government with the hope that the legislation would be withdrawn. Africans in the King Williamstown district wrote and signed a petition against the Glen Grey Act which stated that Africans’ rights were once again infringed, but this time from all possible angles. They believed that the land

¹⁴⁴ R. J. Thompson. *Cecil Rhodes, The Glen Grey Act, and the Labour Question in the Politics of the Cape Colony*. 1991, p.109.

¹⁴⁵ R. J. Thompson. *Cecil Rhodes, The Glen Grey Act, and the Labour Question in the Politics of the Cape Colony*. 1991, p.109.

¹⁴⁶ 14 November 1894, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, ‘Native Opinion: Topic of the day – taking votes away.’

¹⁴⁷ 8 January 1895, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, ‘The Agitation of the Transkei.’

¹⁴⁸ 8 August 1895, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, ‘The Glen Grey Act.’

¹⁴⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 November 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill – Its real meaning.’

they occupied, and which was now to be divided according to the Act had been secured to them through treaty obligations which were now being encroached on.¹⁵⁰ It was their understanding that such historic agreements were absolute and granted them the right to communally occupy land. The petitioners argued that the Cape Parliament had no right to divide the land into plots that could be alienated from them by the consent of the government of the day and transferred to those who had never lived in the location.¹⁵¹ In addition to the King Williamstown district having forwarded petitions protesting the Act to the Secretary of the state, other regions, including Herschel, also drafting petitions against the Act. A Queenstown based newspaper recommended appealing to England as ‘a temperate but persistent movement for the amendment of the Act.’¹⁵² Similar to what happened in the case of the Parliamentary Registration Act, Africans pleaded for the imperial government to intervene in the hope that, because the Bill was passed so quickly, it could be reconsidered and ideally withdrawn. Africans drew up a petition which made this point¹⁵³ and which also referred to the labour tax as ‘qualified slavery.’ They thought that such a petition would excite comment in England and the House of Commons, and that the Cape government would not be able to show that the Act had the support of the colony since it had been rushed through Parliament without due consideration by the people of the colony.¹⁵⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu* expressed gratitude to the people who had been moved to protest the Glen Grey Act. Mr Veldtman, whose qualification for the franchise was questioned under the Parliamentary Registration Act for not being a natural-born British ‘subject’, a naturalised British ‘subject’, or a former ‘subject’ of the Batavian Republic,¹⁵⁵ also submitted a protest against some of the Act’s provisions to the member for the Territories.¹⁵⁶ Meetings were held, telegraphs dispatched to the Premier and concern was expressed through the newspapers by Africans in the hope that the Act would be withdrawn.

The drafters of the Bill thought cheap labour was the solution to the colony’s economic difficulties.¹⁵⁷ *The Christian Express* stated that cheap labour was the real motive and objective

¹⁵⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹⁵¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹⁵² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 October 1894, ‘Current Opinion 1874: The Glen Grey Act Agitation.’

¹⁵³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 October 1894, ‘A letter to the statutory of state for the colonies - Broadway chambers, Westminster, S. W 4th October 1894’; *Imvo Zabantsundu* 8 August 1895, ‘The Glen Grey Act’; *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹⁵⁴ *The Christian Express*, 1 September 1894, ‘The Glen Grey Bill.’

¹⁵⁵ Discussed in Chapter 1, and referenced from *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 29 February 1888, ‘Editorial Notes.’

¹⁵⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 8 August 1894, ‘The Natives moved.’

¹⁵⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

of the Act, an objective premised on the assumption that the African population as a whole was entirely idle. The newspaper considered this a false assumption and that it was unfair that such opinions could influence the creation of legislation such as the Glen Grey Act which created cheap labour.¹⁵⁸ While it conceded that many Africans may be idle, it also argued that there was nothing exceptional about this and that there were idle people in every country under the sun. While it may be true that Africans did not necessarily work as regularly, as thoroughly, or as cheaply as colonists would have liked and that, where higher qualifications were required, work was not always at the level required,¹⁵⁹ it was important to recognise that all unskilled labour in the country was supplied by Africans which made colonists entirely dependent on Africans. This meant that a general refusal by Africans to work would completely paralyse all industries in South Africa, ‘from the docks of Cape Town to the mines of Johannesburg.’¹⁶⁰ The newspaper noted, for instance, that a single mine near Johannesburg employed 1 600 Africans who worked double shifts and that the wealth generated in Kimberley changed the social standing of colonists on the back of African labour as if ‘with a magician’s wand.’ It concluded its argument by stating that there was ‘probably not a farm in the whole colony, nor a road’¹⁶¹ or any public works where Africans were not at work.¹⁶² The paper expressed the fear that legislation such as the Glen Grey Act could cause more damage than if Africans decided to rebel by not working at all.¹⁶³ The opinions expressed in *The Christian Express* were shared by other newspapers such as *Imvo Zabantsundu* which expressed the view that the Act would not only fail to produce more labourers but that it would inflict a lasting injury on both ‘masters and servants’ which would take the colony many years to rectify.¹⁶⁴ It indicated that by 1894, and for some time before, there had already been more Africans who applied for work than ever before. The Act implemented a labour tax that was difficult to completely understand. ‘Hundreds and thousands leave every month for the fields, coal mines and other places [to] seek work, and we have [as *Imvo Zabantsundu*] ourselves seen many of these poor [Africans] returning home without getting any [work].’¹⁶⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu* expressed the hope that inspections of locations in Tembuland and Fingoland would prove the senselessness of the labour tax. It also reported that in Lady Frere government officials had found that there was a

¹⁵⁸ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁵⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁶⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁶¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁶² *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁶³ *The Christian Express*, 1 April 1895, ‘The right Hon C. J. Rhodes at Glen Grey.’

¹⁶⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, ‘Again, the Act.’

¹⁶⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, ‘Again, the Act.’

grave misconception regarding the position of Africans because they found that almost all Africans in the district were already employed. This state of affairs should have been humiliating to the government and the Act should therefore be amended.¹⁶⁶ This supports Thompson's contention that the Glen Grey Act was generally not a success and that it failed in its objective to boost labour supply.¹⁶⁷

Africans were of the opinion that the Act would make them slaves because they were forced to work and they saw no dignity in forced labour which they believed would, in the long run, make them loath work. They also argued that the law allowed scope for 'masters' to lower wages because they knew that Africans were forced to work and could therefore take advantage of them. Three points in particular were raised. In the first instance, that Africans would be exploited since there was a risk that work certificates could be withheld, which would mean that they would either work for free or not find work at all. Secondly, that if they were forced to find work outside their location, they would be deprived of the opportunity to work the land they had been granted. The third point was that the lifestyle change they had to adapt to was not beneficial to any African since there was a stark contrast between town and the locations of their homesteads¹⁶⁸ where they worked the soil, looked after their livestock and were more often than not thought to be a kind and dutiful husbands and fathers who took pride in caring for their families. This was in contrast to the lifestyle they would be exposed to in towns where they would be presented with many temptations and vices, such as alcohol and women who were not their wives.¹⁶⁹ If they were forced to work outside their locations, they would be forced to go to towns where they would change from being decent Christian men to become 'ruined in soul and body,'¹⁷⁰ in some cases returning home with a disease that would become the curse of their wives and children, and have no money to provide for them.¹⁷¹ In some cases, men never returned home, leaving parents, wives and children to fend for themselves. These conditions were referred to by *The Christian Express* as the 'curse of the Glen Grey Act,' an

¹⁶⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 25 April 1895, 'Again, the Act.'

¹⁶⁷ Thompson, R. J. Cecil Rhodes, *The Glen Grey Act, and the Labour Question in the Politics of the Cape Colony*. 1991.

¹⁶⁸ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, 'The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).'

¹⁶⁹ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, 'The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).'

¹⁷⁰ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, 'The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).'

¹⁷¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, 'The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).'

Act which it argued went against the trend in other countries where the cry was ‘back to the land.’¹⁷²

Contrary to Africans who had a preference for communal tenure and who in many cases were unskilled labourers, Africans who were making progress through agriculture and education thought it unfair that the Act would universally be applied to all Africans, regardless of their position in society. They argued that they were not being idle but were instead already contributing to the advancement of the colony.¹⁷³ The African man was making efforts by ‘build[ing] a square house, not a hut; [sending] his children to school and pay[ing] for them; who is loyal to the powers that be and does his best to help law and order.’¹⁷⁴ To further support their argument and defend their position against the Act, they presented the following as a case in point:

‘[A]t the end of 1893, there were in the [African] districts across the Kei one million three hundred thousand woollen sheep, at, lowest value over four hundred thousand pounds. The value of wool clipped under many disadvantages was over seventy-seven thousand pounds. Besides they own half a million of goats valued at one hundred and twenty thousand pounds. Finally, they have herds of cattle, many horses, and not a few wagons. Over five thousand pounds has been contributed by these men to the building of one of the large schools across the Kei. Over a thousand a year is paid by them in fees to this school, and they had a council to help manage it when Mr Rhodes had hardly begun to dream of painting the map red. To another [African] institution on this side of the Kei, men paid in the same year over two thousand six hundred pounds, in fact, a larger sum than the Government grant for all purposes.’¹⁷⁵

In light of these facts, Africans questioned whether the Glen Grey Act was really in the interest of the colony as a whole or just the Afrikaner Bond.¹⁷⁶ *The Christian Express* thought it ironic

¹⁷² *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, ‘The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).’

¹⁷³ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, ‘The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).’


¹⁷⁴ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, ‘The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).’

¹⁷⁵ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, ‘The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).’

¹⁷⁶ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1895, ‘The Black side of things (By a confessed Negrophilist – the Cape Times).’

for the government to implement such a law when the *Blue Books of Native Affairs* reported at length in the various magistracies how peaceful and progressive Africans were.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 4 of Chapter 2, Africans in the Queenstown electoral division continued to register for franchise participation with almost no Africans disfranchised as a result of the implementation of the Glen Grey Act. Figure 10 below provides an illustration of the qualification which Africans indicated as their measure of qualification to successfully register for the vote and table 9 shows the qualification requirements for the franchise.

Figure 10: African franchise registration in Queenstown according to qualification



¹⁷⁷ *The Christian Express*, 1 May 1897, 'The Blue Book on Native Affairs.'

Table 9: Franchise qualification requirements 1853-1909

Years for which these requirements applied	Be male	21 years old or above	Being able to read and write	Min income OR land and property valued at or above	
From 1853	Yes	Yes	No	£50 p.a.	£25
From 1887	Yes	Yes	No	£50 p.a.	£25 ¹⁷⁸
From 1892	Yes	Yes	Yes	£50 p.a.	£75 ¹⁷⁹
From 1894	Yes	Yes	Yes	£50 p.a.	-----

Under the Glen Grey Act, although individual title was granted, for franchise purposes the land was considered communal land, which would have prevented Africans from using land as a qualification measure.¹⁸⁰ However, Africans who already held land under individual quadrants or title were exempt from the Glen Grey Act as the aim was to demarcate communal and tribal land.¹⁸¹ With the consideration of the continued registration of Africans to participate in the franchise as illustrated in Figure 4 of Chapter 2, in Figure 10 it is illustrated how Africans were qualifying for franchise participation according to either income, property (which have been grouped as buildings), and a combination of land and property. What can be deduced from the figure is that after the implementation of the Franchise and Ballot Act, there was a decrease of Africans identifying the combination of property and land as their measure of qualification. However, with the decrease of registration on the qualification of a combination of property and land, there was an increased indication of property as a measure of qualification which would make up for the numbers lost by those who indicated their qualification measure as that of a combination of land and property qualification. This reflected the response and impact of the identification of land as a qualifying measure for franchise participation under the Glen Grey Act. Additionally, the effect of the implementation of the Glen Grey Act is also visible in the identification of income as a qualification measure after 1894 to 1909, in comparison to the identification of income as a qualification measure for years before the labour tax of the Glen Grey Act. The figure illustrates that the increased identification of income as a qualification measure after 1894 saw a decrease in the identification of property and the

¹⁷⁸ Communal and tribal land were excluded from the land and property qualification

¹⁷⁹ This only applied if a person had not registered for the franchise before 1892 or if the person had been registered before 1892 and had been absent from the electoral division where they were registered for the franchise for more than six months.

¹⁸⁰ D. R. Edgecombe. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." 1978, p.36.

¹⁸¹ *The Christian Express*, 1 August 1894, 'Notes on the Glen Grey Bill.'

combination of land and property as measures of qualification which most evidently takes a turn in 1899. Nevertheless, the identification of income as a qualification measure peaked in 1903, then further decreased towards the end of 1909.

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted how the land question had become an increasingly pressing issue for Africans. It identified how the land question in Glen Grey translated into the Glen Grey Question, which formed part of the larger land issue in the Cape Colony. In contrast to the strides that were being made by Africans both government and colonial farmers were making efforts to have Africans removed from the location mainly through land removals. Therefore, Africans in Glen Grey desired to continue living on the land communally as they believed that dividing the land into individual lots would be the first step in alienating them from their land.

Three views at the centre of the Glen Grey Question need to be highlighted in order to understand the heart of the matter. Firstly, there was the view of Africans in the location who wanted to formally secure, through a title, the land they held as grants of Crown land by the proclamation of the Governor. However, they wanted such titles to be granted communally and not individually since they believed that individual title would divide them and lead to the eventual loss of land. Secondly, there was the attempt by government to have Africans of the location take up title deeds on the basis of individual tenure and not communal tenure. Granting land to Africans on the basis of individual tenure was understood as a government strategy aimed at gradually removing Africans from their land given that Africans would not be as unified under individual tenure as they would be on communal land tenure. The understanding was that it would be easier to convince or manipulate Africans to the degree where individually they would lose their land and over time become landless as a people. The third view was advocated by the Farmers' Association and the Afrikaner Bond to promptly remove Africans from the location. These conflicting views contributed to both the complexity and duration of the Glen Grey Question and formed the basis of a long lasting tension. The specific contribution this chapter makes to South African historiography is the analysis of the way these three issues added to the complexities of the Glen Grey Act.

Through the analysis of the Glen Grey Question and land disputes in the Glen Grey location, this chapter argued that while the Glen Grey Act of 1894 was presented as a solution to the

complexities of the Glen Grey Question, it in fact further complicated matters for Africans by not only affecting the franchise but also the way they were allowed to occupy land and where they needed to work. The Glen Grey Act therefore added to the very complexities Africans were presented with in the location by limiting their political participation through the use of land. An analysis such as the one offered in this chapter contributes to our understanding of the role land continued to play in the colony and how the demands of Africans were manipulated to the political and economic benefit of the colonial government.

Conclusion

As demonstrated throughout this study, it is evident that the effects of disfranchisement legislations in the Cape Colony were complex and more nuanced than has been explored in existing historiography. The two political regimes in the Cape Colony before 1910 had different approaches to African participation in the franchise. Under Representative Government (1853-1872) participation requirement was more liberal although not many Africans took up the franchise, while under Responsible Government (1872-1909), franchise requirement became more stringent with the aim of excluding Africans from being able to vote given that they had started to register more frequently. Existing historiography has argued that Africans increasingly participated in the franchise because they were encouraged to do so by English politicians and the African press, mainly *Imvo Zabantsundu*. However, this study has argued that although Africans did not initially take up the opportunity to participate in the franchise en masse, political participation was deeply valued by African representatives who did actively participate in the franchise. This was demonstrated through the different attempts Africans made to remain on the registration lists in the Queenstown electoral division.

Pressure in parliament for disfranchising policies were primarily instigated by the Afrikaner Bond based on prejudice towards Africans and amounted to an attempt at weakening the influence of English-speaking politicians with the belief that many of them were in parliament because Africans voted for them. The first attempt was made through the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 which implicitly imposed a racial qualification based on the premise that most Africans had a preference for occupying land communally and therefore communal tenure was excluded as a qualification for the franchise. Through the discussion of how Africans continued to express a preference to occupy land communally, despite pressure to take on individual tenure, this study contributes to our understanding of why land was considered an ideal instrument to use for disenfranchising Africans.

Historiography on African disfranchisement identifies the use of land as a tool for disenfranchisement and that Africans continued to occupy land communally but has not explored the question of whether there were alternatives presented to Africans, or if they ever strived en masse to take up individual tenure. Therefore, what this study contributes to historiography is an analysis of why Africans continued to occupy land communally and how

this affected the possibility of their continued registration for the vote. It is argued that although a small proportion of Africans adjusted to diversified forms of land tenure from the 1860s onwards, after the introduction of a series of land policies Africans continued to express their preference for occupying land communally. By way of example the study discussed how the Queenstown region was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1852 and land granted to Africans as Crown land, which allowed them to continue occupying the land according to *Native Laws and Customs*. Land laws were implemented in the Colony, including Act no.19 of 1864 and Act no.4 of 1867, which made provision for purchasing and leasing Crown land. These laws allowed for different types of landholdings which introduced diversification of land occupation in the colony. Africans were encouraged to occupy land on individual tenure, which a number of them did. Nevertheless, because the majority of Africans continued to express a preference for occupying land communally and in light of the need to disqualify Africans from the franchise, it was thought that disqualifying communal tenure would thereby disqualify the majority of Africans from registering for the vote, which this study shows was not the case.

To better understand the notion that Africans had an increased desire to register for the vote and continued to make efforts to secure their ability to be able to register for the vote, this study highlighted how Africans frequently held meetings to deliberate how they could curtail disfranchisement legislations and to encourage those who qualified to register for the franchise. They repeatedly forwarded petitions in an attempt to have the Act withdrawn and demonstrated that, although they occupied land communally, each one owned his share of the land. They also raised funds for a deputation to be sent to England in an attempt to dispute the legislation. However, the British government indicated their preference not to interfere in local affairs, especially after Sir Hercules Robinson was assigned to draft a report to assess whether the effect of disfranchisement was indeed to the degree as claimed by those who opposed the legislation. Africans expressed the opinion that as a people they were sensible enough to participate in the franchise and feared that the intended legislations would unfairly deprive a good portion of them from participating in the franchise.

Concerns were further heightened with the deployment of field-cornets as drafters of the registration lists because it was believed that they would act prejudicially against Africans. Through the examination of reports on the experiences and opinions of Africans as published in the press, the fears Africans had were substantiated by documented cases of field-cornets who rejected the application of Africans who evidently qualified for the franchise. The press

also highlighted that there was a commitment to having the Parliamentary Registration Act work, as was seen in the case of properties belonging to Africans being revaluated with prejudice and their market value reduced. This tactic continued to be used under the Franchise and Ballot Act as well. A number of Africans did not take the revaluation of their properties lightly and escalated their discontent to the Supreme Court for further deliberation. As a result, the question that continually arose was whether in the Queenstown and Wodehouse cases, the franchise was not secured to Africans based on the proof that they submitted under the qualification requirements of the Parliamentary Registration Act. The African press was of the view that, because the Bond was not able to disfranchise Africans through the implementation of the disfranchising legislations, they needed to find alternative modes to try and exclude African participation from the franchise.

On the other side of the spectrum, efforts were made to encourage Africans to register for the franchise. The Supreme Court received a flood of complaints about cases where attempts had been made to get Africans who had had registered removed from the list, or cases where Africans had unjustly been denied registration on the list. An additional attempt made by the Afrikaner Bond to remove Africans from the lists consisted in raising the issue of being 'alien'. Prominent Africans had to defend their allegiance and position in the colony. While Africans acknowledged that in comparison to qualifications in other colonies the Cape franchise could be considered a liberal one, they argued not only against the qualification being too high, but rather that the qualification measure introduced a racial element to the franchise that specifically aimed to disfranchise Africans. An argument was made that Africans were not necessarily poor but had a preference for simple dwellings as agriculturalists who were wealthy in livestock and that they simply preferred to occupy land communally.

Through the discussion of the debates held in the House of Assembly, the frustration of a small percentage of Africans who were being disfranchised was discussed. The third chapter highlighted how, already by 1890, there were rumours spreading that, as a condition for support from the Afrikaner Bond, the new ministry proposes to introduce a measure to raise the qualification for the franchise. Hopes were high among Africans that the rumours were untrue, especially given that the Parliamentary Registration Act had already come as a heavy blow. The chapter examined the different proposals presented for disfranchisement and showed how, based on the assumption that Africans were receiving only an elementary education, an educational test was implemented as a measure of disfranchisement.

Education was one of the most popular proposals for disenfranchisement put forward in debates concerning the franchise qualification under both the Constitution Ordinance and the Parliamentary Registration Act but was never used as a qualification measure until the introduction of the Franchise and Ballot Act. Education for Africans under responsible government had become more restricted which made the idea of an education measure a feasible instrument for disenfranchisement. The view at the time was that African education should aim at preparing Africans for manual labour instead of being a more formal book-oriented education. The aim was to equip Africans only to the degree necessary for them to occupy labour intensive jobs as there was a fear that if many obtained a higher education, they would become a competitive force for higher paying jobs.

Education played a fundamental role in the advancement of both Africans and colonists, especially in light of the fact that land was under increased threat and that to qualify for the franchise, alternative occupations needed to be created outside of farming. This was however restricted by government policies for education, among other factors. The contribution this study makes to historiography is an analysis of the education provided to Africans in the Cape Colony in order better to understand the intention and effects of introducing the Franchise and Ballot Act. The study also explored the efforts Africans made to acquire an education and how education was used as a means of enfranchisement. Although their initial efforts were complementary to those made by missionaries, theirs eventually superseded those and went beyond basic financial and infrastructural investment. Africans progressively enrolled in schools and made voluntary financial contributions to their education and the establishment and improvement of educational institutions, beyond the taxes that they had to pay by way of contribution to the overall colonial education system. This illustrates that generations of educated Africans were making strides to secure schooling for their children and later descendants.

The original claims to the franchise and reports submitted to the Civil Commissioner do not seem to have survived, a fact which has discouraged historians from investigating African participation in the franchise. Attempts have been made to investigate the voters' roles in order to fill the gap, but these attempts have been limited by an emphasis on the years of disfranchisement. One particular limitation has been the classification of race, because the racial classification of individuals was initially not listed. However, with the expansion of the

timeline in this study, race was identified and replicated for previous years, which makes a statistical contribution to historiography. Through the inspection of the voters' rolls of Queenstown, two key points were made. Firstly, that the drafters of the legislation did not achieve their goal of disfranchising the majority of Africans (the objective having been 90%), and secondly that, although a substantial number of Africans were disfranchised, a considerable number of Africans continued to remain on the registration list. Use was made of the occupation Africans gave as a qualification measure and which was recorded from 1887 onwards. This allowed for a perspective on what jobs Africans were doing that allowed for continued participation and if there had been drastic changes following the implementation of the different disfranchisement legislations. Evidence shows that the result was that the majority of the participating Africans continued in farming/agriculture with a small percentage branching out into other professions. The study also looked at what the trend of participation in the Queenstown electoral division was and found that there was a pattern of family units voting. Additionally, it explored who participated in the franchise and argued that those who consistently participated in the franchise formed part of a burgeoning African middle class. This study therefore further contributes to our understanding of how education influenced occupation which essentially allowed for continued participation in the franchise. This was also because education became desirable as a means of advancement and social acceptance and often as a means of playing colonists at their own game.

The third attempt at disfranchisement was made through the implementation of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. The study argues that historically a neglected dimension in the analysis of the Glen Grey Act has been the Glen Grey Question, which served as a prelude to the 1894 legislation. It argued that the land issue was one Africans were long confronted with and eager to settle as far back as the 1870s because they desired security with regard to the occupation of land. Although the Glen Grey Question focused primarily on Glen Grey, it was a matter that affected Africans across the eastern frontier of the Colony and contributed to reshaping Cape parliamentary politics and the developing labour economy. The structure of authority and the form of administration of land was at the heart of the Glen Grey Question. Government's aim was to weaken the authority of the chiefs by having Africans occupy land on individual tenure instead of their preferred form of communal tenure. The commission appointed in May 1870 was identified as an attempt by the government to address the Glen Grey Question and to assess how a magistracy could be introduced in the location in addition to the already existing magistracy of Queenstown.

The significance of highlighting the Glen Grey Question as a prelude of the Glen Grey Act derives from the fact that it allows for further exploration of the significance of land as a tool of disfranchisement. This study should therefore be read complementary to the limited historiography that has so far explored the relationship both Africans and colonists had to the land and how this changed over time. The argument was made that the Glen Grey Act was embedded in pre-existing thinking which was used by the Rhodes administration to advance their political and economic interests.

This study argued that, given the continuation of the land dispute in Glen Grey, Africans experienced pressure from both the government and colonial farmers of the surrounding regions which they tried to resist in various ways. An important consideration explored here is how the circumstances in the location made it challenging to make improvements in the location because the land question remained unresolved. A second attempt was made by government to address the Glen Grey Question in 1892 with the appointment of a different commission to investigate concerns related to the issue. Although Africans had their reservations about the commission they were by and large pleasantly surprised by its recommendations. That said, there remained elements which Africans did not entirely agree with which resulted in them submitting a memorandum. The implementation of the Glen Grey Act made it clear that the memorandum was acknowledged but that the demands made by Africans were manipulated in a way which would essentially amount to disadvantaging them.

The overall purpose of this study has been to demonstrate how the different disfranchisement legislations had influenced Africans' voter registration. The Queenstown electoral division was used as a lens to bring into focus how Africans participated in the franchise and whether, or to what extent, African participation was influenced by the implementation of the various disfranchisement legislations. Through the provision of various illustrations that identified African franchise participation in the Queenstown electoral division, the study concluded that Africans persistently continued to participate in the franchise throughout the period of responsible government. It argued that African franchise participation in the Queenstown electoral division reflects the existence of an African middle class who managed to continuously register for the franchise. To that end, the study made use of examples of families that illustrate the fact that family structures played an important role in the continued participation of Africans in the period 1872 to 1909. By dividing the study into three different

sections according to the three disfranchisement legislations, the study conducted a micro-analysis of how Africans experienced the different legislations and the influence the instruments of disenfranchisement had on them. The study therefore contributes to a perspective of African disfranchisement through the lens of the African experience thereby contesting the narrative that the contestation around African participation was mainly represented by the English-speaking faction of parliament.

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