"Use Me!": Enterprise development, nature conservation and patronage in northern KwaZulu-Natal

by
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
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December 2020

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Abstract

iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) was South Africa's first World Heritage Site and in 2019 it became South Africa's second largest protected area. The Park consolidated 16 nature reserves that were created during apartheid, largely through the forced removal of black South Africans. With the dawn of democracy, the new government instituted a land claims process through which local people who were forcefully relocated could claim back such land. At the same time, the government identified nature conservation and ecotourism as prime social and economic drivers in the severely underdeveloped and impoverished region within which iWP existed. This emphasis prohibited land claimants from moving back onto conservation land, but mandated iWP to sign co-management agreements with successful claimants that promised them access to social and economic benefits from ecotourism.

This thesis focuses on one iWP initiative to do just that. In a context of severe socio-economic deprivation on its borders, iWP hired Raizcorp, a "business incubator", to run the Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP). Raizcorp's business development philosophy explained successful entrepreneurship in terms of individual characteristics such as self-motivation and attempted to instil these qualities in REAP participants. This focus on the individual de-politicised the causes of local structural poverty and ignored local limits to the building of independent businesses. Indeed, at the completion of the course, REAP distributed sub-grants, which quietly acknowledged the limited capacity participants had to self-start a business. Furthermore, despite their enthusiasm about the value of REAP's bookkeeping lessons, few participants kept books for their businesses because the technology did not lend itself to the multiple, intersecting businesses and social responsibilities that participants used to create economic security in this precarious context.

REAP's envisaged independent business owners also started to make claims of dependency on iWP in which they framed themselves as clients to a patron. In this thesis, I explain why these claims were made and argue that they revealed a larger social logic in the area. On the one hand, REAP participants used the intimacy established during the Programme to make patronage claims and access iWP's resources. On the other hand, I argued that iWP needed to legitimise their continued existence on claimed land in a context where other local "patrons" supported alternative land uses such as mining. While iWP hoped that by fulfilling its mandate to provide social and economic development projects would do this legitimising

'work', their "clients" agitated for the authority to engage more fully and more conspicuously in the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010).

Opsomming

iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) was Suid Afrika se eerste Wêrelderfenisgebied en in 2019 het dit die land se tweede grootste natuurbewaringspark geword. Die Park bestaan uit 16 natuurreservate wat gedurende apartheid geskep is toe swart Suid Afrikaners onderwerp was aan gedwonge uitsettings. Met demokrasie het die nuwe regering 'n grondeisproses ingestel waardeur plaaslike mense grond waarvan hulle afgeset was kon terugeis. Op dieselfde tyd het die regering natuurbewaring en eko-toerisme geïdentifiseer as hoof drywers van sosiale en ekonomiese groei in iWP se verarmde afsetgebied. Hiérdie klem het beteken dat grondeisers nie kon terugtrek na natuurbewaringsgebiede toe nie en dat iWP 'n mandaat gehad het om mede-bestuursooreenkomste met suksesvolle grondeisers te beding wat hulle toegang tot sosiale en ekonomiese voordele belowe het.

Hierdie proefskrif fokus op een iWP projek wat beoog het om dié doelwit te bereik. In 'n konteks van sosio-ekonomiese nood op hulle grense het iWP 'n ondernemingsfasiliteringsbesigheid namend Raizcorp aangestel om hulle "Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP)" te bestuur. Raizcorp se besigheidsontwikkelingsfilosofie het entrepreneurskap aan die hand van individuele eienskappe soos self-motivering verduidelik en het dié kwaliteite in REAP deelnemers probeer kweek. Hulle fokus op individuele groei het die oorsake van plaaslike armoede ge-depolitiseer en het beperkings op die groei van plaaslike besighede geïgnoreer. Inderdaad, met die voltooïng van die kursus moes REAP sub-toekennings maak wat aangedui het dat deelnemers beperkte kapasiteit gehad het om self besighede te begin. Verder het deelnemers aan die projek ten spyte van hulle entoesiasme oor die waarde van REAP se boekhou-lesse, selde die lesse toegepas. Dit was juis omdat die vaardigheid nie toegewend kon word in die veelvuldige, kruisbefondsingsbesighede en sosiale verantwoordelikhede wat deelnemers moes skep om ekonomiese sekuriteit in die area te bewerkstellig nie.

REAP se gewensde onafhanklike besigheidseienaars het ook begin om klem te lê op hulle afhanklikheid van iWP af en het hulleself ontvorm in kliënte van 'n bekermheer. In hierdie tesis verduidelik ek hoekom hulle sulke afhanklikheidseise gemaak het en argumenteer dat dit deel gevorm het van 'n groter sosiale patroon in die area. Aan die een kant, het REAP deelnemers hulle nabyheid aan die program gebruik om eise op iWP, die bekermheer, se hulpbronne te maak. Aan die ander kant, handhaaf ek dat iWP die legitimiteit, wat sulke eise bewerkstellig het, nodig gehad het omdat hulle bestaan bedreig was deur ander plaaslike beskermhere wat alternatiewe grondgebruike soos mynbou voorgestaan het. Terwyl iWP

gehoop het dat hulle hul mandaat kon vervul deur sosiale en ekonomiese ontwikkelingsprojekte van stapel te stuur en sodoende legitimiteit te bewerkstellig, het hulle kliënte aangedring daarop dat die iWP meer heelhartig en opvallend moes deelneem aan die "politiek van die maag" (Bayart 2010).

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Thank you must be said to all those who gave of their time to speak to me. Thank you to Helen MacKenzie and Khanyisile Mthethwa from iSimangaliso Wetland Park who gave of their personal and professional time to answer my questions and who showed interest in my work. Thank you to Andre Willemse from Raizcorp who was generous with his time and to Matthew Schnieder for making the time to speak to me over Skype.

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Thank you to Thandi Mabika, who became Mkhwanazi during our work together, for your assistance with translation. Thank you for your patience and kindness as I tried to understand how to be an anthropologist.

Thank you to my family, Mom and Dad in particular. I think my study days are done. For now.

Contents

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CEO	Chief Operating Officer
CSD	Central Supplier Database
CSIR	Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research
CWP	Community Work Programme
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EKZNW	Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife
EPWP	Extended Public Works Programme
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GSLWP	Greater St Lucia Wetland Park
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
iWP	iSimangaliso Wetland Park
KBNR	KwaZulu Bureau of National Resources
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LSDI	Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative
LTCA	Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPB	Natal Parks Board
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
P&PP	People and Parks Programme
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
RBM	Richards Bay Minerals
RC	Raizcorp
RDP	Redistribution and Development Programme
REAP	Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative

SEED	Social, Economic and Environmental Development
SETA	Skills, Education and Training Authorities
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHS	World Heritage Site

Figures

*Figure 1: Map of the nature reserves consolidated to make iSimangaliso Wetland Park (Porter 2013: 17).*

Figure 2: Map of iSimangaliso Wetland Park showing its position in relation to South Africa (Porter 2013: xxiii).

Figure 3: Map of iSimangaliso Wetland Park as per the Authority indicating the towns on its borders, public access gates, tourism points and the marine protected area (iSimangaliso.com).

Chapter 1

Introduction: Legitimising nature conservation

The social context

iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) is situated in an area that skirts the major historical territorial battles that occurred between the *Voortrekkers*[1], English and Zulu during colonial expansion and includes territory once influenced by Portuguese colonists. It is not an area that was ever directly fought over, and had long served as a trade route. During the Zulu War (1879-1896), its marginal location meant that it became the place where the Zulu king hid his cattle and where traders could exploit the favourable conditions created by war. During apartheid, the area was a major labour reserve (Dominy 1993; Guy 1982; Walker 2005). The iWP's northern area is more commonly known as Thongaland while the southern area sits on the northern edge of the former Zululand (see Figure 2). The area is also referred to as Maputaland. As such, the area has had a long history of both human settlement and movement, but does not readily feature in the popular imagination of South Africa's political ecology. Yet, iWP has been and continues to be incorporated into and produced by national and international political and environmental interests.

The iWP is South Africa's first World Heritage Site[2] and stretches along 220km of South Africa's north-eastern coastline, covering an area of 358 534 km² (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2017: 8). In May 2019, a further 970 366.57 hectares was added after the Minister of Environmental Affairs gazetted new marine protected areas in South Africa. This made iWP the second largest protected area in South Africa, after Kruger National Park (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2019).

The Park is a conglomeration of 16 nature reserves established between 1950 and the late 1980s, when the apartheid government forcefully removed black people living in the area (Crawford Cousins, James, & Zaloumis 2014: 24; Walker 2005; see Figure 1). Apart from nature reserves, people were also cleared to make way for agriculture, including afforestation plantations and sugar cane farms, as well as for various military and defence force-related reasons (Platzky & Walker 1985). The iWP includes Lake St Lucia, Cape Vidal and the Western and Eastern Shores of Lake St Lucia in the south; Kosi Bay, Sodwana Bay and Lake

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[1] *Voortrekkers* refers to the group of people descendent from the Cape Dutch settlers who left the Cape and moved north into southern Africa in search of farm land and independence from the British settlers.
[2] In order to be listed as a World Heritage Site, a proposed site must meet at least one of the criteria. iWP met three (Anon 2008: 13).

Sibaya in the north, and all that lies in between. Towns and areas on its outskirts include St Lucia, Hluhluwe, Mkhuze, and Phongola, moving from south to north, with the in-between areas being largely, if not widely, populated (see Figure 3).

People living in towns and areas adjacent to the iWP are among South Africa's poorest and under-serviced. iWP is situated in the uMkhanyakude District Municipality, which administers one of South Africa's most impoverished areas (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2017; Osiba Management 2016). The 2011 census showed 41% overall unemployment[3] and a youth unemployment rate of 51% for the area (uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2019). The 2016 household survey showed that 31% of the uMkhanyakude population had a matric certificate and 6% a form of higher education (uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2019). 54% of households were female-headed, 7% of households were connected to a sewerage network and had flushing toilets, 6% of households had piped water inside, 4% had refuse removals, and 50% were connected to electricity (uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2019).

The municipality, like many others in South Africa (Mthethwa 2019), was accused of mal-administration in 2013 and locals complained of a lack of service delivery (Anon 2013). Furthermore, roughly 80% of the population lived on land governed by traditional authorities (Anon n.d.-1) who have recently come under the spotlight after calls were made for the South African constitution to be changed to allow national government to expropriate land without compensation. In response, a High Level Panel report on land in South Africa published information regarding the state of land ownership in the country (Motlanthe 2017). The report detailed high levels of corruption, mismanagement and patronage among traditional leaders, especially on land rich in mineral resources (Claassens 2018; Claassens, 2019; See Chapter 2). As such, iWP has a conservation mandate in a very poor, underdeveloped and poorly run area.

An environmental history

The area's formal conservation history extends back to the arrival of European settlers, whose first interaction with this area was through trade and large-scale hunting. After the decimation of wildlife populations for sport and trade, nature conservation areas were established to protect what was perceived as the last remaining populations of several species of animals (McCracken 2008). Started by British settlers, conservation took a form similar to that of conservation in other British-dominated areas like the United States and East Africa. This form, known as

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[3] At the end of July 2019, Statistics South Africa announced that the country had an unemployment rate of 29%, the highest it has been since 2013 (Smit 2019).

fortress conservation, was exclusionary, racist, purist and over the following century, entailed the scientific management, enclosure and policing of 'natural' spaces (See Chapter 2).

With political liberation in the 1990s, nature conservation in this location saw a radical shift away from its erstwhile exclusionary practices. The land restitution process saw people once forcibly removed become co-managers of areas they had been moved from. Where land had been turned to conservation purposes during apartheid, claimants were not allowed to resettle and entered into co-management agreements with the iWP, who continued to administer the land. But this change in the management of conservation land also gave rise to frustration across South Africa at the slow pace of restitution, which prevented communities accessing benefits promised through this new partnership. Conflicts also arose about the lack of clarity as to what co-management actually entailed (Anon n.d.-2). In conservation circles, there was increasing awareness that communities were not homogenous units and that, if there were benefits generated by conservation, these were not equally accessed. As such, in 2003, the Department of Environmental Affairs called representatives from various land claim communities around conservation areas across South Africa, including those around iWP, to meet at Cape Vidal. The group, called "People and Parks: Processes of Change", presented the so-called Cape Vidal Memorandum at the World Parks Congress held in Durban. From this, the People and Parks Programme (P&PP) was born.

The P&PP had strong backing from international conservation organisations who highlighted the important role that protected areas (PAs) play in conservation, sustainable development and alleviating poverty (Anon n.d.-2). P&PP "was designed to facilitate the active participation of rural communities by supporting the resolution of land claims on protected areas; strengthening governance, participation, access to and benefit sharing from these areas; and developing and implementing a capacity building and awareness raising strategy" (Anon n.d.-2). The Programme was aimed at addressing the power imbalance between the co-management communities and the conservation agencies that managed the land. To this end, "benefits beyond borders" outlined how communities were to be involved in the co-management of land through capacity building and the inclusion in planning and management activities (Anon n.d.-2).

The P&PP also detailed categories of projects that the conservation agency should implement to bring social and economic development to land claimant communities and others living in poverty close to such areas. This included conservation-related projects; development and upgrading of infrastructure so as to attract tourists and generate revenue; development of commercial assets for communities living in or around the park to generate an income so as to

prevent poaching and illegal bio-harvesting by communities; and lastly, supporting ancillary and BEE/SMME[4] development initiatives complimentary to the park (Anon n.d.-2). As such, the P&PP insisted, public- or government protected areas should not only protect biodiversity, they also have to work toward alleviating poverty and unemployment on their borders.

In line with this change in conservation practice, iWP embarked on a range of programmes to fulfil this socio-economic mandate (see Chapter 2). However, the desperate situation of many people living on the Park's borders meant that it was often held liable for the development promises of the state, putting the Park at risk. As one iWP briefing complained, "The biggest challenge was that there is not enough concessions to go around. Due to limited demand the Park had an ecological and viability cap" (Anon 2015). Over time, an antagonistic relationship developed between some of these neighbours and the Park. Over the last fifteen years, there have been several protests against the Park, fence cutting, land invasions, cultivation of crops in the protected area, and the erection of illegal dwellings inside the park. These "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1985) jeopardised the UNESCO status of the Park, which lent urgency to the iWP's drive to economically benefit poor people living on the park's borders.

Legitimising nature conservation

Although the state has had a presence in the area since colonial times, before 1994 it had little interest in gaining the support of the majority of locals. Indeed, the state enforced its rule through widespread violence and the rule of traditional authorities (Walker, 2005). While land use options in the area had not changed post-1994, the new government sought to rule with the consent and acceptance of "the people"; it instituted democratic municipal elections and mandated iWP to drive development projects that would benefit those on its borders[5]. As such, for the past 20 years, iWP has been working to become a permanent and accepted social and state entity in the region. As a state apparatus, it needed to both reform its image and seek to entrench itself as a legitimate local authority. Guided by the P&PP, it sought to do this by

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[4] BEE refers to Black Economic Empowerment. This is a policy in which black people, as understood by apartheids racial classification, have privileged access to markets and jobs as a way to address historical injustices.
SMME refers to Small and Medium Micro Enterprises. Helping black people start businesses and have privileges access was seen as a means to address the income and wealth inequality between white and black South Africans, caused by apartheid.
[5] The undemocratic rule of traditional leadership proved difficult for the African National Congress to get rid of. The ANC's need for the rural vote meant they bowed to the pressures of traditional leaders to be included and therefore protected by the constitution, to be given salaries by the state, and to retain management of land (Leatt 2017; Oomen 2005).

sharing the economic benefits of ecotourism driven by nature conservation with people historically disadvantaged by the Park.

In this thesis, I focus on one iWP development project which sought to legitimise nature conservation. The Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP) was devised to support ancillary and BEE/SMME development initiatives complimentary to the work of the Park. The first Programme ran in 2008, three more have run since, and when I left the field, there was a tender out for a new intake. In total, 185 people had been enrolled across all of the Programmes, 137 had completed it and 50 received sub-grants from REAP totalling over R 7 million (see Chapter 3 and 5). The vision was that local people, both land claimants and others previously disadvantaged but living in the vicinity of the Park, would be able to submit tenders and bid for concessions from the Park, or service sectors created by the market iWP generated. In this way, locals would be drawing an income and creating a stable livelihood from ecotourism driven by nature conservation, and iWP would fulfil its mandate of social and economic development.

Anthropology and anthropologists have had a long and varying relationship with development. Post-World War Two, anthropologists were involved in carrying out development projects in which western countries funded and ran development projects in underdeveloped or third world countries. The logic was that anthropologists could interpret the social dynamics of a development site and act as a mediator between the development agency and the locals, and so play an instrumental role in alleviating suffering (Hoben 1982). Aid organisations increasingly hired anthropologists over the years for this ability. While some anthropologists saw this involvement in a positive light, as they could help to raise standards of living and fight poverty (Hoben 1982), others drew attention to the power dynamics that a concern for the Other's wellbeing often hid (Escobar 1995) and argued that these projects often had very detrimental effects on their target population. As many anthropologists in this field have shown, development projects often left the poor more marginalised and the powerful more powerful (Mosse 2013: 229).

With time, as anthropologists started writing "ethnographies of development" (Van Wyk 2003: 13) rather than working as developers, they became less interested in whether development was good or bad. Instead, anthropologists sought to understand the processes that produced unequal power structures and asked questions about what happened as opposed to whether or not the project was successful. James Ferguson's (1990) *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* is a well-known example of such a study. Instead of focusing on why the project failed or why it failed the people the

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project intended to help, Ferguson explored the effect that the project had on the people and place it was designed to 'develop'. He argued that by rendering poverty technical and making it a site of intervention of carefully crafted programmes, the development apparatus de-politicized poverty (Ferguson 1990: 256). He further explored the unintended consequences of this intervention.

With the move away from development as a "category of analysis" to a "category of practice", David Mosse (2013: 230) argued that anthropologists have also moved away from only seeing "development as a cloak of power". In this, anthropologists sought to understand how development became part of people's daily lived experiences and their understanding of their place in the world. He argued that development as a practice was more about connection than community and wrote that some aid studies have shown "how marginalised people manipulate project discourses, for example refusing the responsibilizing disciplines of participation while making claims (for employment, capital investment, or social protection from outsiders) within a very different politics of patronage and allegiance" (Mosse 2013: 230). James Ferguson (2013: 19) argued that people actively seeking out dependency, which implied a desire for hierarchical subordination, was uncomfortable in a context where decades of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle fought to create free persons who were self-determining and whose prosperity was not curtailed by forms of oppression and injustice. Arguably, development projects have at their core the ideal of liberating participants or target populations from hierarchical economic subordination, to enable socio-economic autonomy. In emphasis and focus, my thesis is inspired by Mosse (2013) and Ferguson's (1990) approaches to development; development as a category of practice that anthropologists can study through ethnography.

Like the large-scale development projects that anthropologists worked on post-World War Two, nature conservation globally was also a beneficiary of large aid agency interventions (Neumann 2002). While their efforts were initially concentrated on saving certain species through fortress conservation, nature conservation practitioners have since the mid-twentieth century sought to align their efforts with social and economic development. Indigenous people were at first thought detrimental to wildlife preservation because of their hunting and resource extracting practices. However, conservationists began rationalising that such behaviour was due to the impoverished state most people living around protected areas lived in, and that wildlife would not be threatened if indigenous people had other means of making a living (Dressler, Büscher, Schoon, Brockington, Hayes, Kull, McCarthy & Shrestha 2010). Goodrich (2016: 22) explained that this alignment of conservation and economic interests took two

forms; privatisation and community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). The logic of CBNRM was based on the involvement of locals in the management and governance of protected areas. As locals used resources themselves, the conservationists argued, they would know how to manage them and so traditional knowledge and management practices were meant to be included in park governance (Dressler et al. 2010: 7). Locals would also benefit from jobs and other opportunities generated by tourism, and might eventually move away from living off natural resources.

Over the years, numerous research studies have critiqued CBNRM. In an overview of CBNRM, Dressler et al. (2010) showed how it has served to impoverish communities where conservation had been privileged over their wellbeing, while CBNRM disempowered locals whose livelihoods depended on multiple, gendered income streams that did not fit into the demands of a CBNRM framework (see Van Wyk 2003). Indeed, Edmund and Wollenburg (2001) and Brandt, Josefsson, and Spierenburg (2018: 31) highlighted the assumption that there was "neutrality" in stakeholder engagements where various groups met to devise strategies toward mutually beneficial outcomes. The so-called win-win that CBNRM strategies implied neglected to take into account unequal power dynamics that structured the stakeholder relations before engagement even began (Brandt et al. 2018). Furthermore, conservation agencies' stereotypical assumptions of homogenous "traditional people" meant that they often overlooked unequal power relations within groups and assumed that traditional leaders were de-facto spokespeople for whole groups (Van Wyk 2003b). This had detrimental effects on women, the elderly and those already marginalised within their own groups (see Chapter 2). As such, CBNRM has not produced a hoped-for Eden, with Dressler et al (2010) even considering it to be in a crisis.

In South Africa specifically, CBNRM never took off as it did in its neighbouring countries due to the more entrenched conservation structures created through colonialism and apartheid, land restitution and the move toward transboundary conservation areas which diverted money away from CBNRM (Dressler et al. 2010: 10). However, in 2003, the National Department of Environmental Affairs affirmed its commitment to community involvement in nature conservation areas with the proclamation of the P&PP. Alongside the use of traditional knowledge in the management of protected areas, which the CBNRM had advocated, there was now a move toward having communities and successful land claimant groups be beneficiaries of public-private partnerships. This was in particular relation to the establishment of lodges and tourism operations. As such, ecotourism and nature conservation and the economic benefits

thereof were to become means of redressing historical injustices in South African nature conservation areas.

Methodology

When I started doing fieldwork in northern KwaZulu-Natal in September 2017, I returned to an area that had special significance for me. As part of Richards Bay's white middle-class, I grew up going to iWP on weekends and in school holidays. It was due to these early childhood experiences that I developed an affinity for nature conservation and for the beautiful natural environs of iWP in particular. My love for this place motivated my research on the iWP and its conservation practice.

I undertook fieldwork between September and December 2017. I moved to KwaZulu-Natal from Stellenbosch and lived roughly an hour to an hour and half from the people I interviewed. iWP had obtained funds from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences to do social research, notably ethnographic work, which examined contemporary life in northern KwaZulu-Natal. They employed Dr Thomas Cousins, my initial supervisor, to drive the formation of this social research unit and to do research on the iWP area. He hired me with funds from this initiative to be his project manager, upon which I helped create the website for the initiative called uLwazi Lokuphila (Anon 2018). Thus, while the programme did not directly pay for my studies, my research was affiliated with it.

The funding stipulated that the research unit hire someone from the local community, so I was encouraged to hire a translator. This was also considered necessary as I am not fluent in isiZulu and this was the primary language of the area. I interviewed three candidates from a group of iWP bursary recipients who showed an interest in the position. I asked Thandi Mabika to assist me. Thandi came from an area roughly 20 minutes from St Lucia and had received a bursary from iWP to study Community Development at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She had just completed her honours degree. Thandi accompanied me when I thought I might need her translation services, gave me local insights into the area, and was a wonderful companion during fieldwork that was often lonely and challenging.

In all, I conducted 19 interviews with project managers from iWP and Raizcorp, and with participants of REAP. iWP gave me a list of potential interviewees whom they had asked permission from to have me approach them. I phoned many of them who then agreed to speak with me. I phoned to organise a time and day suitable to the interviewee and met them either in their home, place of work, a local restaurant, or under a tree (see Chapter 5). Interviews lasted from 40 minutes to two hours and were recorded with the interviewee's permission. I

transcribed the interviews. Where participants were more comfortable speaking in isiZulu, Thandi translated both the questions and answers, and provided me with a translated and transcribed version of the interview.

Beyond the more formal interviews, I also managed to gather ethnographic data as I went about my daily life in the area, as I moved between interviews and as I joined a handful of participants at their places of work for a few days. For instance, I worked in Ms Dunn hot food take-away shop from Monday, 16 October to Friday, 20 October. Ms Dunn was also kind enough to host me at her family home so that I did not have to drive back to my accommodation. I arrived early Monday morning and left late Friday afternoon. On two of the five days, Thandi was with me in the shop. Thandi and I were also present when a protest march took place in St Lucia on 17 November. On the afternoon of 22 November, Mr David Mkhize took us on a tour of local businesses in the area where he lived. On 23 November, we went to Hluhluwe where we spent the day observing and talking to owners of informal stalls in the town. On 24 and 25 November, we visited Ms Doreen Zulu in her hair salon. On 27 November, we accompanied Mr Kwanele Bhengu on a cultural tour he had booked for guests from Europe.

Both Ms Khanyisile Mthethwa and Ms Helen MacKenzie from iWP provided me with various documents from their archive on REAP. Ms Mthethwa gave me documents pertaining to REAP specifically, such as application forms, the advertisements they had used, lists of participants' names and the businesses they started, the tender document for REAP, and the evaluation undertaken by an external party once the project neared completion. Ms MacKenzie gave me the legal documents pertaining to the establishment of iWP, land claim agreements, and material pertaining to the People and Parks Programme. I also read the annual reports and Integrated Management Plan available on iWP's website, the newsletter released roughly once a month, parliamentary feedback sessions, and newspaper articles.

In hindsight, I relied on iWP project managers more than I should have to provide me with names and numbers of participants. A more organic approach might perhaps have been more productive and conducive to more ethnographic types of engagements. I could have asked interviewees to introduce me to their co-participants in the project, their families and neighbouring businesses who did not participate in REAP. However, due to the short time I had for data gathering and the requirements of the project, I was anxious to gather useable, focused "data" which I hoped would give me a relatively good understanding of the area and dynamics.

I also conducted two interviews with the REAP project manager from Raizcorp in Richards Bay. Raizcorp had offices or an "incubator" near South32. [6] In April 2018, I conducted a Skype interview with a senior manager of Raizcorp based at their head offices in Johannesburg.

I moved back to Stellenbosch in April 2018 to focus on writing my thesis. I found it helpful to leave the field as it helped me to focus on analysing my data rather than describing it. I found a community of fellow researchers helped to understand how to analyse and write this thesis.

Ethics

I had familiarised myself with both the International Sociological Association's (ISA) Code of Ethics (ISA 2001) and the Anthropology Southern Africa's (ASNA) Ethical Guidelines and Principles of Conduct for Anthropologists (ASNA 2005) before going to the field. Every individual who agreed to be interviewed was made aware of the purpose of my research, how the interview material was to be used, that I was not able to remunerate them in any manner, and that they could stop the interview at any time. None of the participants objected to me using their first names and surnames when writing my thesis, but as this would be against the ethics reviewed, I have used pseudonyms throughout (ISA 2001; ASNA 2005: 142). Every interview was recorded with permission from the interviewee. I explained that the purpose of my recording was to be true to the interviewees' own words and explanations. Recording meant I could listen for details again. I also explained that nobody else would have access to them or be given permission to listen to them (British Sociological Association 2017). This was all communicated verbally. Where the interviewee was not comfortable with English, this was translated into isiZulu with the help of a translator. I also left a written copy, in English or isiZulu, of everything I had verbally communicated with the participant. My cell phone number and email address were on the copy and I communicated that they were free and welcome to contact me should they wish to.

All interviews were done with an understanding that there would be no remuneration and that the interviewee could decline to be interviewed because of this. However, I did remunerate Ms Martha Dunn for accommodating me at her home while I did my fieldwork in her take-away shop. I paid her cash for each night I spent with her and brought food, as per ASNA's guidelines (ASNA 2005: 142).

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[6] South32 was a mining and processing company in Richards Bay.

I have committed to reporting on my research to iWP and Raizcorp staff I interacted with, and those that I interviewed. I will draw on Ms Mabika's services again to help with translation where needed, should she still be available. If not, I will endeavour to ask for someone else's help.

Chapter outline

Chapter 2 gives an outline of the history of land and nature conservation as it pertains directly to the area that iWP now encompasses and manages. iWP's mandate to conserve nature and drive ecotourism-driven social and economic development was exemplified in the phrase "develop to conserve", and this chapter looks at iWP's strategies to achieve this. I pay particular attention to new local politics that has emerged as locals jostle to access the benefits from conservation.

Chapter 3 focuses on the Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP) and the service provider that iWP hired to run it, Raizcorp. Inspired by James Ferguson's (1990) anti-politics machine, I show why REAP is an anti-politics machine and discuss the limits to its explanatory powers.

Chapter 4 focuses on REAP participants and how Raizcorp's bookkeeping practices intersected with their ways of building a livelihood and creating security. I question why participants were so enthusiastic about these bookkeeping skills even when they did not implement them in their businesses. I suggest that in a context of economic precarity where people had to constantly "make a plan" (Van Wyk 2012), REAP was just another "plan" but also a strategy to draw iWP into participants' social worlds. Creating a kind of social intimacy with the Park then allowed participants to make claims on it. In Chapter 5, I look at the process through which several REAP participants asked the Park to "use" them. Given that REAP's focus was on creating independent businesspeople, these "claims to dependency" came as a surprise to the Park. I argue that the claim betrays a wider social logic that iWP operates in in which patron-client relations are foremost. Furthermore, I show that in participant's patronage claims, they were subtly suggesting that iWP could gain more local legitimacy if it participated in the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010) and became a better patron.

Chapter 2

"Develop to conserve": The conservation history of iSimangaliso Wetland Park

The first time I went camping at Cape Vidal was in March 1998. My school organised a "Dads, Lads and Lasses" weekend camping trip that became an annual event in our school's calendar. Cape Vidal was a popular holiday and fishing destination on the eastern shores of Lake St Lucia, inside what was then known as the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park. Its name changed to iSimangaliso Wetland Park in 2007 following its upgrade in conservation status to a World Heritage Site in 1999. Apart from camping, Cape Vidal also had self-catering log cabins, but the facilities were basic and rustic. Camp sites were booked far in advance, particularly over the school holidays, and people often stayed for more than a week. Deep-sea fishermen in particular, set up camp for months at a time and brought everything but the kitchen sink. They launched their boats at sunrise from Cape Vidal's beach and returned them much later. For my family, and many others, there was a definitely "sense of place" about Cape Vidal (CSIR Environmental Services 1993).

It was on this first camping trip that I heard rumours around the campfire of the possibility of a hotel being established in Cape Vidal. People speculated that the hotel would replace the wash bay area where fishermen cleaned their boats and gutted their fish, which also included a parking lot for day visitors to the beach and beach entrance. The adults also worried that Cape Vidal would lose its ruggedness and tranquillity if a *larnie* (upmarket) hotel was established and that rich tourists would replace the campers and fishermen. In 2003, it seemed that those rumours might become a reality when the CEO of the Park, Andrew Zaloumis, was quoted in the *Mail and Guardian* saying that of the 100km of coastline available, 30km could be used for lodges (Nel 2003).

Local anxieties over the possible loss of this place of natural beauty and personal history stretched beyond Cape Vidal. Similar sentiments drove the fight against mining sand dunes for titanium in the early 1990s (Walker 2005). In June 1989, Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) applied for a mining lease of the Kingsa and Trojan lease areas on the eastern shores of Lake St Lucia for which they had been given prospecting licences in 1976 (CSIR Environmental Services 1993a). A public outcry soon followed and prompted the National Party-led government to commission an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of titanium mining on the eastern shores of the lake, the largest EIA in South Africa's history (Walker 2005).

Over the years that I spent weekends and holidays at Cape Vidal, I watched the removal of pine forests on the Park's eastern shores, the tarring of gravel roads, the creation of various hides and viewing points and the upgrades to the entrance gate and facilities. In the process, 'our' rough holiday spot was transformed into the natural heritage of an international, imaginary, community. It was no longer only a local stomping ground. This was also evident in changes to the local town nearest to the Park, St Lucia. A plethora of new restaurants, accommodation and tourism-orientated curio shops sprang up in the town, often charging high prices and offering luxuries never seen before in the area.

Today, international tourism drives development in St Lucia. While doing fieldwork, I witnessed a never-ending stream of various-sized busses moving in and out of the town. On 9 November 2017, I spoke to a bus driver sitting in the shade next to his bus. He affirmed that he came to St Lucia frequently as it was on his tour company's itinerary for its eastern tour of South Africa. Besides the bus driver, there were families in hired mini-busses and couples in Toyota Corollas whose cars could easily navigate the tarred roads in the Park. As tourists moved out on Fridays, South Africans looking for a weekend getaway moved in with their surf skis and fishing rods. Biker groups from Richards Bay were also known to do Sunday drives and lunch outings to St Lucia.

In 2011, in a Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) feedback session, Andrew Zaloumis stated that in ten years, the number of beds in St Lucia had increased from 500 to 3 000, with an occupancy rate above the national average; that the number of restaurants in the town had risen from three to four to eight to ten; that boat- and tourism related businesses around the Park increased by 89% and that 24 permanent jobs and 3 268 temporary jobs had been created by the Park alone (Anon, 2011). Four years later, Zaloumis reported to the PMG that the Park had created 6 000 direct jobs, far outstripping the 450 jobs mining would have created.[7]

Alongside Andrew Zaloumis's statements about the centrality of the Park to the local economy and the numbers of jobs created, there have been several incidents suggesting local dissatisfaction with the existence of the Park. On 17 November 2017, I watched as residents of Dukuduku, a forested area bordering the southern edge of the Park, marched to the conference centre in the middle of St Lucia town. Apart from their grievances against a local councillor whom they claimed was obstructing development in their area through his corruption of

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[7] The EIA review panel had determined that the mining operation would start seven years after the go-ahead was given, last 17 years and create 159 jobs all in all (Anon 1993).

traditional leadership[8], they also complained that the game reserve was built without consulting them, and that they had lost grazing and farming land, as well as access to areas used for religious practices. Dukuduku residents had a long and antagonistic relationship with the Park (Moore 2002), a conflict that started even before the Park was proclaimed (Anon 2003). As such, this protest was also a demonstration of how the Park was caught up in the airing of other grievances in the area.

Once the protestors had reached the conference centre, their leader, a slight man in a suit who had stood on the back of a *bakkie*[9] driving in front of the march singing struggle songs through a loudhailer, handed over a memorandum of grievances to a councillor. Several expensive-looking vehicles had driven past the protesters from the direction of Mtubatuba where the municipal offices were located. Except for a lone councillor who joined the march leader on the back of the *bakkie,* the councillors now stood inside the fenced-off conference premises.

Apart from complaints about the local councillor, the memorandum alluded to tensions between traditional leaders in the area. The Mkhwanazi's, who led the march, wanted to know where the Mthethwas (those from KwaMbonambi[10] area) fitted into the local history and accused the Mthethwas of colluding with the Mtubatuba Station Commander to create fake committees that undermined the Mkhwanazi' leadership in the area. Another spectator explained that the two groups were vying over ancestral claims to the land and the benefits that accrued to the rightful owners from the Park authorities.

Fortress Conservation

The social, economic and environmental dynamics that underpin the current tensions around iSimangaliso Wetland Park have been created over the last two centuries. The recent apartheid history of forced removals from conservation land on racial grounds was a continuation of a broader historical trajectory which entailed the subjugation and oppression of black people. Starting in the early 1800s, *trekkers* (Dutch descendants) and traders[11] petitioned the colonial government to create black labour reserves because they experienced labour shortages (Platzky & Walker 1985). The Reserves were not successful in channelling black labour to white farms

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[8] The councillor was accused of creating fake committees that interfered with the traditional leadership.

[9] An SUV-type vehicle with a bin typically used for loading and carting heavy goods.

[10] An area 20 km south of Dukuduku.

[11] Trekkers refers to the Boers, descendants of the Dutch immigrants who 'trekked' or moved from the Cape Colony. Traders refers to the British settlers who had landed in Durban. Both parties at this point were looking for farmland.

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(Brookes & Webb 1965) but with the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, colonial authorities levied a hut tax that forced black people to work for wages on the mines. This was the beginning of migratory labour that became part of South Africa's social fabric (Platzky & Walker 1985; Wolpe 1972).

While migration to the Rand was an important part of black people's lived experience in the area of what came to be known as northern Kwa-Zulu Natal, nature conservation was another. The first Zululand game reserves were gazetted on 30 April 1895 (McCracken 2008). Following the Union of South Africa in 1910, the country was divided into four provinces. Since game was viewed as a provincial sport hunting resource, the protected areas created in 1895 and thereafter came under provincial jurisdiction (Brooks 2004). The Natal Province was heavily influenced by British settlers who drew their nature conservation guidance from America and other British-ruled territories, which meant that management of the area took on the form of "fortress conservation" (Brockington 2002). This entailed the forced removal of local or indigenous people from land demarcated for conservation and the prevention of said people from hunting or harvesting from the area.

While conservationists viewed local people's subsistence use of resources as a threat to their efforts to conserve wildlife populations decimated by colonial sport hunting, there were other threats to the reserves' preservation (McCracken 2008). Farmers in the area petitioned to have the reserves de-proclaimed because game harboured tsetse fly that ravaged their cattle (Brooks 2004). Dr Ernst Warren, a zoologist and Director of the Natal Museum, further insisted that the reserves were threatened by an ill-equipped and underfunded provincial authority. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s he lobbied hard among politicians both national and provincial, to have the Hluhluwe game reserve in particular brought under national protection. He thought that having them brought under national legislation might protect them. This seemed a possibility following the establishment of the Kruger National Park under the National Parks Act in 1926 (Brooks 2004).

In the 1930s, the provincial authorities opted to retain control of the Parks when they began making money from nature-based tourism. By following a fortress conservation model, they "(re)created" parks such as Hluhluwe Game Reserve (Brooks 2005). In order to administer and control the newly growing recreational areas for white tourists within their Parks, the province created the Zululand Game Reserves and Parks Board in 1939 (Brooks 2004; 2005). This later became the Natal Parks, Game and Fish Preservation Board, or the Natal Parks Board (NPB) in 1947 (Brooks 2004; McCracken 2008). The NPB management gained legendary status as a quasi-military organisation for the manner in which the male-dominated

organisation protected nature (Draper 1998; Brooks 2004; Crass 2011). They became particularly well known for their game capture and relocation methodology. The NPB counted amongst its successes bringing the white rhino back from the brink of extinction in an operation called Operation Rhino (Draper 1998). It was this body of people and those who congregated around them that played a large role in the establishment of iWP and its focus on ecotourism as a source of socio-economic development.

Late in the second half of the twentieth century, policy makers and conservation officials began to formally recognise the negative social impacts of protected areas on those living close to such areas (Adams & Hutton 2007; Beinart & McGregor 2003; Jones 2006). Up to this point, state authorities forcibly moved local people from areas designated to be preserved spaces of 'wild' or 'pristine' nature. They also restricted indigenous people's access to natural resources necessary for their livelihoods. These were the hallmarks of "fortress conservation" in Africa, North America, Latin America, Australia and Asia (Adams & Hulme 2001; Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington 2002; Jones 2006). Conservationists conceptualised 'pristine' protected areas as recreational areas, not as resources for survival. Such attitudes further impoverished populations living next to conservation areas (Cernea 1997).

In the 1970s and 1980s several policies were implemented that served to protect the human rights of indigenous populations around protected areas and prevented forced removals (World Bank 1984; Colchester 2004). Conservation officials and policy makers came to view local people's impoverishment as the cause of the behaviour conservationists deemed environmentally destructive, such as poaching and grazing in protected areas (Hulme & Murphree 2001). There was a notable shift by governments and non-governmental conservation agencies toward involving local people in the governance of protected areas and toward devising strategies that linked conservation with poverty alleviation (Adams & Hulme 2001). Toward this end, tourism has been punted as being one such, if not *the*, strategy to save nature and people.

With the introduction of so-called "People and Parks" interventions, conservation authorities attempted to create buffer zones around core protected areas in which local people could graze and utilise natural resources (Jones 2006; Wells, Brandon & Hannah 1992). But the most wide-spread intervention has variously been called "community conservation", "community wildlife management", or "community-based natural resource management" (CBNRM) (Hulme & Murphree 2001); a model that has seen local people's greater involvement in managing natural resources that exist in the areas in which they reside and/or greater access to benefits derived from those resources (Adams & Hulme 2001). Within this

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model, some parks gave locals minimal access but shared gate fees with them. At the other end of the spectrum, parks gave independent local institutions control over key resources (Hulme & Murphree 2001; Ngubane & Brooks 2013) because they believed that local people's "traditional knowledge" of local ecological processes meant that they could effectively manage natural resources (Brosius, Tsing & Zerner 1998). As such, conservation agencies and nation states initiated local development plans and emphasised that local people needed to benefit economically from nature conservation (Adams & Hulme 2001; Brockington et al. 2008).

Many scholars have been critical of "People and Parks" interventions across the world. Much of their criticism focused on the portrayal of local communities as homogenous, singular entities that have the power to participate in nature conservation management and that distribute resources equitably (Barrett 2013; Dan Brockington et al. 2008; Dressler & Büscher 2008). The reality, as these scholars have shown, is often more complex (Jones 2006; Kepe, Cousins & Turner 2001; Ngubane & Brooks 2013; Van Wyk 2003). Governments and non-governmental agencies often uncritically required groups of people or a community to apply for or be available for development opportunities, and overlooked divisions along lines of age, gender, caste, wealth, and ethnicity (Jones 2006). In the South African context, tensions over access to resources were exasperated by the fact that benefits were often strongly linked to land claims, which intensified existing internal tensions in communities (Kepe, Ntsebeza, et al. 2001).

Forced removals

In 1913, the South African government passed the Native Land Act which determined that only 13% of South Africa's land was allocated for black occupation. In 1955, the Tomlinson Commission recommended that black areas be consolidated to encourage cohesive ethnic identities and to prevent attachment to European areas (Anon 1983). Using the Native Land Act, the apartheid government enacted these recommendations by forcibly removing black South Africans from land demarcated for white occupation (Platzky & Walker 1985). This consolidation created *Bantustans* or homelands (Platzky and Walker 1985: x) like KwaZulu, where iWP presently exists.

While KwaZulu was a homeland during apartheid (1948-1990), the areas around and including present day iWP became chess pieces in the government's political manoeuvring. Threatened by a wave of anti-colonial and independence movements sweeping southern Africa,

the National Party[12] wanted to control land on the border of Mozambique and the north-eastern coastline. They declared this land 'white' and used nature conservation and afforestation to establish their presence and control over the area. They declared the coastline from Lake St Lucia to Sodwana Bay and the western shores of the Lake a forest reserve, and tested missiles across the Ndlozi Peninsula (Walker 2005). As such, several thousand people were moved from this area between the 1950s and 1980s to establish afforestation, defence force areas and nature conservation under the apartheid regime (Walker 2005). However, in order to adhere to the legislated 13% of land for Bantustans, the government had to 'release' some white land for black occupation - to much opposition from white farmers and nature conservation authorities in this area (Platzky & Walker 1985).

At the height of apartheid, Natal Parks Board were, however, not the only conservationists in Zululand. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the founder and leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and head of KwaZulu, formed the Bantustan's own conservation management organisation in 1982, the KwaZulu Bureau of National Resources (KBNR)[13] (Draper & Mare 2003; Mthethwa 2008). Like the NPB, the KBNR was also responsible for forcibly moving people to make way for conservation areas, notably Kosi Bay Nature Reserve, and to help the state secure land for security reasons (Anon 1990b). Draper and Mare (2003) argue that Buthelezi's creation of wilderness areas was linked to a "Zulu renaissance" and an attempt at nation-building.[14] John Aspinall, an Englishman who shared Buthelezi's nationalist sentiments, donated funds to the KwaZulu Conservation Trust to support the establishment of protected areas that would represent the Zulu nation. This Trust later became the Wildlands Trust, which still has a significant presence in KZN (Draper & Mare 2003).

After apartheid came to an end and the Bantustan system was dismantled, the NPB and KBNR merged in 1997, forming the KwaZulu-Natal Conservation Board, later renamed Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (EKZNW). Ezemvelo governs KwaZulu-Natal's provincial protected areas to this day, including the day-to-day environmental operations in iWP.

The Proclamation

By the late 1980s, local conservation agencies began to take heed of the changes to conservation management practices globally, and make plans to include and make local people

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[12] The National Party was the governing party in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 and instituted the race-based rule of apartheid.

[13] Also referred to variously as the KwaZulu Directorate or Department of Nature Conservation (Brooks 2004; Crass 2011)

[14] Jane Carruthers (2008) has written how nature has been used as a key symbol of identity and nation-building.

beneficiaries of protected areas. They applied for Ramsar[15] status for Lake St Lucia and after its declaration as a Ramsar site in 1986 (CSIR 1993), conservationists believed that the area could achieve UNESCO World Heritage Site status (Porter 2013). They envisioned consolidating 16 separate areas of commercial forestry and nature conservation reserves that had been created over the last century (Walker 2005) to form one large protected area (Dressler & Büscher 2008). Through ecotourism and nature conservation, the Park would serve as an economic and social development driver of the region, they suggested.

In 1989, Richards Bay Minerals announced its plan to mine the eastern shores of St Lucia. As the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) compiled an EIA for this project, the Natal Parks Board laid out alternative development plans that centred on eco-tourism which precluded the resettlement of people (Bainbridge 1993; Porter 2013: 10). While the EIA found that mining would cause irreversible ecological damage and that the area was unparalleled in beauty and ecological uniqueness, and recommended that mining not be permitted, the penultimate decision to opt for mining or ecotourism was left to after the 1994 elections (Walker 2005).

By the early 1990s, the apartheid regime had begun to dismantle itself and democratic elections were on the horizon. The African National Congress (ANC) agreed to the World Heritage Site application that the Natal Parks Board had lodged on the condition that it did not interfere with the new government's desire to engage in a land restitution process. This would include restoring land to people who had been moved from land the World Heritage Site sought to incorporate, and furthermore, ensuring that they benefitted from the Park. The UNESCO nomination was justified and successful on the basis that the settlement of land claims would be done in favour of nature conservation (IUCN 1999: 119; KwaZulu Natal Nature Conservation Services 1999: 63). To this end, the South African government agreed that land restitution in this area would happen without an option to resettle and that land would continue to be used for conservation purposes.

As such, the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park was proclaimed in 1996 and as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999. The World Heritage Convention Act of 1999 incorporated the World Heritage Convention into South African legislation (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 6). The Park was renamed iSimangaliso Wetland Park in 2007 (Anon 2007).

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[15] Ramsar refers to The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. It is an international environmental agreement "that provides the framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources" (Ramsar n.d.).

Alongside this, the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative[16] (LSDI) was launched in early 1996 by the new South African government. This aimed to encourage private investment in agriculture and ecotourism in the area (Kepe, Ntsebeza & Pithers 2001; iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 5). The efforts to make the region an ecotourism hub (Dressler & Büscher 2008) were further extended in June 2000 when Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique signed agreements to create the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area (LTCA). The iWP became central to the vision of turning Maputaland into South Africa's first rural economic hub, stimulating economic growth and creating local employment through eco-tourism (KwaZulu Natal Nature Conservation Services 1999: 57; iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 5).

Since iWP's inception, local communities have laid claim to 100% of its land. By 2017, nine of the 14 land claims had been settled (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2017a). The first land claim was the Bhangazi claim made by the Mbuyazi people for the eastern shores of Lake St Lucia. The only one of its kind, the claim was settled by means of financial compensation of R16.68 million for the claimant group, working out to R30 000 per family unit (Walker 2005: 18). Furthermore, a trust was set up into which a percentage of a community levy generated from gate fees was deposited. Subsequent land claim settlements were in line with the official national policy which entailed the transfer of title deeds to claimant groups and the entering of a co-management agreement between the claimant group and management of the protected area. This co-management agreement stipulated that claimants should be included in empowerment strategies, economic benefits and as a mandatory partner in development opportunities, as well as access to the Park's biological resources (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism *et al.* 2009).

From 2003, South Africa's management of protected areas was guided by the People and Parks Programme (see Introduction). The aim of the People and Parks Programme was to guide the manner in which parks in SA managed the "interface between conservation and communities, in particular the realisation of tangible benefits by communities who were previously displaced to pave way for the establishment of protected areas" (Department of Environmental Affairs 2014: 5). This commitment was made at the 2003 World Parks Congress in Durban, after the Cape Vidal Memorandum called for its establishment (Department of Environmental Affairs 2014: 8). The Memorandum was compiled by representatives of South

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[16] SDIs were initiated in 1995 when government invested in underdeveloped areas to encourage private investment around a growth point they had identified (Jourdan 2011; Rogerson 2002).

African communities who had been forcibly removed, including communities from around iWP, and detailed the manner in which they wanted to be included in these new conservation partnerships (Anon 2003). The signatories demanded that all outstanding land claims be settled as clear ownership and rights to access would enable claimants to access park resources and benefit from partnerships with nature conservation. The Memorandum also stated that communities in co-management agreements with parks needed to be involved in policy formulations, management planning and implementation, have traditional resource practices integrated into management plans, experience "real inclusive management", and be equipped to engage with such responsibilities. Furthermore, the Memorandum stated that as forced removals were detrimental to livelihoods and the most "tangible economic opportunities available to us are mostly through tourism", government and conservation agencies needed to "provide us with the necessary support" to "enter and establish equal partnerships that generate real benefits for our communities" (Anon 2003).

The Memorandum also called for an "enabling national framework for co-management that sets the parameters and principles but allows flexibility to adapt to local contexts" (Anon 2003b: 10). This was fulfilled in 2009 in the form of the National Co-management Framework. This agreement provides a framework for the relationship between the protected area management and the claimant group and details the nature of co-management models, whether they be full or partial co-management or a lease of land. It also details the nature of the benefits to claimant groups as per the co-management model. Benefits include access to land and resources, revenue sharing, participant in management, developmental rights, and involvement in empowerment strategies, for example. At the same Congress, the IUCN passed a key recommendation that ecotourism was the key to conserve biodiversity and maintain protected areas (Brockington, Duffy & Igoe 2008).

Thus, by law, iWP is required to make conservation and ecotourism benefits available to land claimant communities as well as to others previously disadvantaged but living in the vicinity of the Park. While land claimants received legal restitution in terms of the restoration of their title deeds, it was up to iWP and ecotourism through various initiatives driven and supported by iWP, to provide financial restitution.

'Develop to Conserve'

In 2014, the CEO and senior manager of iWP explained that iWP had a "developed to conserve" strategy. As he explained, "[t]he conservation strategy had to be linked to the development of tourism and conservation-associated livelihoods for local communities and

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land claimants" (Crawford Cousins, James & Zaloumis 2014: 25). To this end, iWP engaged in a "re-wilding" process to increase iWP's tourism potential. Twenty different endemic mammal species that had been hunted to local extinction were re-introduced between 2001 and 2014 (Crawford Cousins, James & Zaloumis 2014: 26). This included the re-introduction of several antelope species, lion, wild dogs, cheetah and buffalo. Alongside this was the development of tourist infrastructure such as roads and hides (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2016).

Tourism increased. Some conservation sources suggested that establishments providing accommodation, food and other services had experienced an 89% growth (Crawford Cousins, James and Zaloumis 2014: 26). To ensure that this growth in tourism meant benefits were distributed to those previously disadvantaged, iWP developed its Social Economic Environmental Development (SEED) strategy that devised programmes to equip people to access and take up these benefits. The SEED strategy underpinned all five of the Park's "strategic drivers" and so was "integrated in all functions and activities of the Park" (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 147). Benefit programmes were concerned with "economic transformation and job creation, community-based natural resource use, capacity building and training programmes, and equitable access" (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 147). Previously disadvantaged communities neighbouring the Park as well as living in the Park and land claimant groups were the primary beneficiaries of programmes to build capacity and upskill, generate income, mentoring and tourism developments.

Among the variety of programmes the Park initiated was a craft development programme that saw Mr Price[17] selling goods made by women who lived on the park's borders in their stores (Anon 2006). The Authority has funded 112 tertiary education bursaries in the fields of conservation and tourism for students among the neighbouring communities and land claimant groups, several of whom over the years have worked and continue to work for the Authority. Furthermore, they contracted an organisation that focuses on supporting students from rural areas in higher education institutions (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2019). Entrance to the iWP for school trips is free.

Talking about iWP's approach to development, Mrs MacKenzie, a senior project manager, explained that they were "generalists [with] quite deep project management skills". She explained that iWP understood what was needed from a political point of view and contracted organisations whose core work it was to offer the expertise iWP were wanting to

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[17] A popular clothing and homeware chain store in South Africa

bring to the area. Mrs MacKenzie further explained that they sourced money for projects from various international development agencies. For example, the latest Rural Accelerator Enterprise Programme (REAP) was funded by the Global Environmental Facility. The R66.3 million that iWP received went to several activities, including restoring the lake, bursaries, REAP and capacity building among land claimant communities (Anon 2010; Anon 2011b).

iWP also offered locals annual licences for, among other resources, harvesting *incema* grass[18] and fishing, some specifically for communities living on the borders, and others for holiday makers and sports fisherman (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2017: 131). While iWP viewed overexploitation as a threat to conservation, they allowed for controlled natural resource harvesting as part of a local livelihood strategy, managed through licencing. The Authority attempted to divert pressure from resources in the Park by funding the creation of vegetable gardens and supporting alternative businesses outside the parks (Anon 2009).

More closely aligned with the Park's core business of conservation, iWP also funded the training of numerous nature guides, several of which went on to join REAP. The iWP project managers hired Raizcorp to run REAP, which was aimed at helping entrepreneurs start and build businesses that could access contracts with the Park (See chapter 3, 4 and 5). In particular, iWP wanted to transform the tourism industry. While the objective was to support tourism-related businesses, iWP placed no restrictions on the types of businesses they supported, as long as they were not detrimental to the environment.

The Park's neighbours and beneficiaries

While the land claims process on iWP land seemed straightforward, with neatly defined communities or tribes laying claim to their ancestral land, the process was much more fraught. This was because claimants were firstly conceptualised as a group, not individuals, and secondly, because claimants needed to prove that they were moved from a location rather than having done so on their own volition. Where people formed groups, there were competing claims, often linked to longstanding traditional leadership disputes (Oomen 2005; Mthethwa 2008). Furthermore, between the 1960s and the 1980s, rumours circulated that people would be forcefully relocated from some parts of the area to make way for nature conservation areas. This was indeed the case around iWP. Familiar with the state's violence, longstanding residents started moving on their own accord, often as individual households. Forced removals in general were thus "more diffused" in nature (Anon 1983: 279).

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[18] *Incema* grass is used for thatching and weaving. It is harvested annually, and people come from various parts of KZN to harvest.

The Bhangazi claim was one such contested claim. The Mbuyazi people, who laid the claim for Bhangazi on the eastern shores, had slowly lost access to and was eventually moved from the eastern shores of Lake St Lucia over the course of the twentieth century for various reasons. The last members of the group were forcibly removed to make way for the Cape Vidal Forest Reserve in the 1960s (Walker 2005: 5). The ramifications of such a history for the claims commission was that it was difficult to determine a clear claimant community as people had moved at different times, some on their own volition, and people did not relocate to the same geographical area. Some had come to live under the leadership of the Mpukonyoni Tribal Authority, led by Chief Mkhwanazi. After the Mbuyazis had laid claim to the eastern shores, Chief Mkhwanazi also laid claim to the area with the help of some RBM lawyers with an eye to future mining options. He argued that the Mbuyazi people were "under the Mkhwanazi", making claim to the hierarchical nature of the traditional leadership structures the apartheid government has used to manage the Bantustans. Despite this legal help, the land claims commissions awarded the claim to the Mbuyazi people. But in the interest of inclusion and stability, both groups were included in benefits from the new Park. The Mpukonyoni Tribal Authority would receive 20% of the eastern shores' gate levy, the Mbuyazi Trust 70% and a community conservation trust 10% (Walker 2005; Chief Land Claims Commission 2006).

Another cause of tension and division among groups making claims or applying for iWP programmes was the contested use of "tradition". Nature conservation and the land claims process relied heavily on the notion that local communities were "traditional", a notion which saw the power of traditional leaders, who acted as development brokers, increase (Oomen 2005; Van Wyk 2003). Nature conservation areas wanting to implement their mandate to work with their neighbours did so through traditional leaders who acted as representatives with whom to partner and/or include, increasing their local standing and power. Van Wyk (2003) showed how two traditional leaders neighbouring iWP turned their traditional councils into a board of trustees and their subjects into shareholders, which she argued, developers welcomed because it made investing and negotiations with the groups easier.

The continued existence of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa is a contentious issue. At the dawn of democracy, the ANC envisioned that democratically-elected local municipalities would take over local governance from hereditary "tribal" chiefs in the former Bantustans (Oomen 2005; Leatt 2017). However, traditional leaders opposed the future democratic government's local municipalities because these structures would effectively remove land distribution and dispute resolution from their control, making them redundant (Oomen 2005: 54). Given the hold that traditional authorities had over rural constituencies, the

ANC made various concessions to them in the negotiations that preceded the first democratic elections. These concessions effectively extended traditional authorities' powers through their mandatory inclusion in local municipal councils and the formation of Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Oomen 2005; Leatt 2017; Claassens 2019).

Recently, traditional leadership have come under the spotlight following the findings of a High Level Panel Report on Key Legislation.[19] In a Land Summit held on 21 May 2018, where the findings of this report were discussed, former president Kgalema Mothlante, who chaired the Panel, called traditional leaders "village tinpot dictators" (Motlanthe 2017; Mabasa 2018). In particular, commentators have called for the revision or the repeal of the Ingonyama Trust (Harper 2019). The Trust administers 2.8 million hectares of land, all of which was former KwaZulu Bantustan land, and administered solely by the Zulu monarch (Lynd 2019). In the report, several human rights non-governmental organisations and researchers have shown that the Ingonyama Trust is personally enriching the monarch, and is in violation of several human rights and the constitution (Claassens 2018; 2019; Mthethwa 2019).

The questions around traditional leadership, however, are made in a context where local municipalities have experienced a service delivery crisis (Oomen 2005: 62; Mthethwa 2019). And furthermore, the former Bantustans became the most impoverished areas in South Africa following the end of apartheid, the former KwaZulu in particular (Hickey & Du Toit 2007; May, Woolard & Klasen 2000). In 2019, the Auditor-General revealed that of the 257 municipalities in South Africa, only 18 received clean audits and that this poor management led to increasingly violent service delivery protests (Mthethwa 2019). The Mtubatuba Municipality in particular, a local municipality within the uMkhanyakude District Municipality, was put under administration in 2013 (Anon 2013) and in 2019 the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs put it under administration, due to financial mismanagement (Bhengu 2019).

Politics of the everyday

In this context, iWP's delivery on their social and economic mandate has been challenging. As Ms Mthethwa explained in an interview in August 2017,

> If there is no water, a municipal function, iSimangaliso must bring water. There is a school that burnt down, iSimangaliso must build the school. And the thing is, we are easily accessible, we work in the area, so expectations for development are going to come to us, as the Authority.

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[19] The Report was a review of the Key Legislation in South Africa, the first of its kind since 1994. The aim was to judge progress made to determine how to accelerate socio-economic change in the country (Mabasa 2018).

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> And people are, they are very smart, they understand that the municipality won't do certain things, they don't have the funds or the capacity, so let's go to iSimangaliso.

This lack of service delivery and the visibility of the Park was the reason, Ms Mthethwa reasoned, that people bordering the Park made claims on it. In reports to parliament, iWP spoke about giving water to local communities even though it was not their mandate "in the interest of community relations" (Anon 2016). Not only did iWP exist in poorly developed and resourced areas due to historical reasons, the local municipalities were largely incapable of delivering basic services. As such, citizens received neither services nor personal interventions in their difficulties to access basic water, electricity and housing provisions. As a number of scholars have shown, these newly formed structures have not become an effective alternative to the more socially entrenched traditional leadership (Oomen 2005; Dubbeld 2017).

iWP's relationship with traditional leaders came up when I asked Mrs MacKenzie and Ms Mthethwa about recruitment for their various programmes. There were 14 traditional authorities neighbouring iWP and roughly 80-90% of each of the local municipalities' territories overlapped with traditional authorities (uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2019). The issue, according to Mrs MacKenzie, was about how to get information to as many people as possible,

> So that you don't have leadership acting as gatekeepers, controlling who participates in programmes. Information is power, so for example, some leaders may not disseminate information and application forms so that only a select few know about the application process. In this way they can control the development process and set up relations of patronage with members of their community… The question for us then, is how to design a recruitment process that enables us to deal with the leadership in a respectful way, but that doesn't allow them to gate keep the project.

Traditional leaders were not just "gatekeepers"; they also acted as brokers between development initiatives and communities they claimed to represent (Van Wyk, 2003b). In this role, they have also been active promoters of mining (Claassens 2019). Claassens (2019: 1) has shown that after 2000, several laws, but in particular, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003, have worked in tandem to benefit mining companies and a small group of traditional leaders and elite interests in the ANC. These benefits came at the expense of the property- and citizenship rights of nearly 17 million people living in the former Bantustans.

Since 2017, iWP have been re-confronted by the threat of mining. In both the Integrated Management Plan of 2011-2016 and 2017-2021, mining was listed a threat to iWP. In 2019, a company called Eyamakhosi Resources Pty (Ltd) applied for a mining licence of an area within iWP's southern buffer zone, the same mining area that RBM had sought to develop in the early 1990s. Speculation that this company was a proxy for RBM because the company owners were ex-RBM employees, abounded. However, RBM categorically denied this (Carnie 2018b; 2018a).

While I have no evidence that traditional leaders around iWP were involved in the renewed effort, this application came at a time when there was increasing awareness of the relationship between chiefs, government and mining houses. As supposed representatives of whole communities (Van Wyk 2003b; Oomen 2005) the government's Department of Mineral Resources apparently advised mining companies to deal directly with traditional leaders even though traditional authorities did not have the "legal authority to sign agreements binding the land and other rights of those living within their disputed tribal boundaries" (Claassens 2019: 2). Furthermore, to the south of iWP near KwaMbonambi, RBM paid R74 million to the Mbuyazi Trust[20]; one portion of the money to settle a land claim from forced removals to make way for the mine and the other for development on their ancestral land. A dispute over leadership, eventually settled by the KZN premier, prevented RBM from making the payment into the Trust for ten years (Zungu 2018b; 2018a). There were claims of death threats against one of the potential leaders of a claimant group (Harper 2017). However, in 2019, protests erupted again, still over a dispute in leadership which forced RBM management to close the mine (Brown 2019). As such, iWP's "develop to conserve" mandate was situated in a highly contentious and underdeveloped area.

Park ambassadors

The responses from land claimants and other locals to the proposed conservation areas and economic benefits thereof through ecotourism have varied. Van Wyk (2003b) detailed how the Zikhali Traditional Authority, who successfully reclaimed land, and the Mabaso Traditional Authority, a neighbouring Authority who formed a company that applied for land from Ingonyama Trust[21] to create their own game reserve, both sought conservation-related business ventures. Indeed, iWP's annual reports and parliamentary feedback sessions gave numbers

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[20] Not the same as the above mentioned Mbuyazis.
[21] KwaZulu Bantustan land was put into the Ingonyama Trust, headed and administered by the Zulu King. Effectively this removed control of land from local traditional authorities to the Zulu King.

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which told of increasing benefits and income for beneficiaries. There were increases in hotel beds occupied, visitors per year, revenue generated, jobs created, businesses launched, percentage spent on BEE companies, school children that visited, community members included in its Board of Trustees, and numbers of development programmes. Benefits to previously disadvantaged people and land claimant groups were part of every parliamentary conversation and report, also reported in percentages and targets reached (see Annual Reports on *iSimangaliso Wetland Park*, no date).

However, despite these indications of prosperity and transformation, regular men and women living in the area resisted such plans through every day "weapons of the weak"(Scott 1985). They poached in the park, harvested reeds and grasses illegally and cut down forests (Van Wyk 2003a). Numerous newspaper articles detail local dissatisfaction about ecotourism that has not delivered, and of claimant communities that wanted conservation land returned to them. As early as 1999, an elder from the Mbila community claimed that tourism was not the "golden egg" (Moore 1999). In 2003, roughly 3 000 people from Kosi Bay marched to protest against the lack of jobs and development in the area (Nel 2003). In 2008, Ndumo Game Reserve,[22]a park to the north of iWP and to be included in the LTCA, was invaded and by 2010, roughly 14% of the park had been occupied (Groenewald 2010). Jolly (2017) reported that forests around Sodwana Bay were being cut down because several people were unhappy with iWP, but that this illegal felling had been occurring for a number of years already. These land invasions were fuelled by the extreme poverty of the area and the inability of conservation revenues to make a significant difference to the lives of those living on its borders.

But even people who should have been loyal to the Park because they had benefitted from it, shifted their loyalties from it to other interests. Both Mrs MacKenzie and Ms Mthethwa told me of a protest march against iWP led by a participant of the Park's enterprise development Programme. The man later phoned Ms Mthethwa to explain that as an iWP beneficiary, he had been threatened by others to participate. Mrs MacKenzie gave another example of a land claimant who was fired from his position on the claimants' Trust. During the time that he served on the Trust, he was very vocal against the Park, but as soon as he was fired, he approached iWP, promising to further their interests should they employ him. Mrs MacKenzie and Ms Mthethwa noted that relationships with "locals" were not stable as competing stakeholders

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[22] Ndumo had been subject to a successful land claim, settled in 2000, which saw 114 families awarded 1 200ha but without the option to resettle. The Ndumo community however, claimed that they did not benefit from the reserve because there were no jobs, and it was not attracting enough tourists to earn enough money to use the gate fees to build schools and clinics. Instead, they cleared the bush to farm (Makhaye 2008).

promised mining jobs, as traditional authorities vied over areas of influence and as local droughts and other factors impacted on local people's livelihoods. As Mrs MacKenzie exclaimed, "the kind of bartering and trading that happens around benefits and land and land claims, no, it's very complicated!" And she continued,

> In my view, we cannot expect beneficiaries to stand up and be ambassadors for the Park.
>
> Our mandate is to improve livelihoods and to alleviate poverty. We have to understand that people will position themselves in relation to the Park in many different ways, depending on a range of factors. We have to understand that 'the community' does not exist as a homogenous entity; there are many different interests, ways in which people position themselves.
>
> The Park cannot expect people to put themselves at risk, or to place themselves in a position where they are seen as 'sell-outs' by the community they live with. I do think that through our development programmes and our environmental awareness work we are able to create value for nature that previously may not have existed but, this does not mean that we can ask people to risk their relationships and network, their property or their lives. The politics is extremely complex.

Mrs MacKenzie suggested that it took "a security in your relationship that somebody is not going to come burn your house down, or shoot your cow, or whatever" in order to be an "ambassador" for the Park. This sense of security was also contingent on a myriad of other politics that iWP directly created or were implicated in. As such, the access to benefits from the Park was generating a politics that was constantly shifting as people jostled for access to them.

Conclusion

Up until the late twentieth century, nature conservation in what became the iWP had been carried out at the expense of indigenous or local people. Influenced by local political changes and international shifts in conservation, this changed in the mid-1990s when a new government promoted a new approach called "People and Parks". Under this new approach, the government wanted to restore land to those moved from it but wanted to also ensure restitution occurred while conserving a globally recognised environment. While land claimants were not permitted to resettle, they maintained ownership of the land and entered into agreements that entitled them to social and economic benefits, driven by nature conservation.

However, the claims proved to be highly contentious and contested as claimant groups were seldom homogenous groups. Development programmes used traditional leaders as representatives of communities, a tactic that was deeply flawed. Beneficiary groups were

fraught with tensions which meant that not all previously disadvantaged people had equal access to benefits. So, while some beneficiaries took up the opportunities eagerly, others continued to undermine the conservation space. And it was not to say that those who benefitted remained loyal. The possibility of locals championing conservation and supporting the notion that it could deliver and develop, was complicated by the jostling of people for the benefits. Furthermore, the distribution of benefits from the Park, often attached to a land claimant status, was carried out in the context of highly dysfunctional local municipalities who were largely failing at delivering basic services and an increase in power of traditional leadership whose authority is in contradiction with democratic rule. The Park itself was implicated in politics and generated its own as people jostled to get whatever the Park offered. Stakes must have been high for Mrs MacKenzie to have said that iWP could not ask someone to risk their life to be an ambassador for the Park.

Chapter 3

An Enterprising Self: Raizcorp and enterprise development

South32 is an Anglo-Australian mining and metals company listed on the Australian Securities Exchange, as well as the Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges. It has operations in North- and South America and Australia, and in South Africa, they have an aluminium smelter in the port town of Richards Bay (Anon n.d.-3). Along with Rio Tinto's[23] Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), South32 forms one of the economic pillars of the mining, industrial and export- dominated town of Richards Bay on South Africa's north coast.

I grew up in Richards Bay, but I had never comprehended the extent to which the town relied on these two companies for employment, nor the amount of money they contributed to the local economy, until a conversation in a morning Pilates class while home in the university holidays during 2016 turned to the upcoming retrenchments at RBM. The class and the entire studio's clientele were predominately middle-aged to older white women, some wives of RBM employees or friends of someone who had a connection to the company. The evening class attracted women who were actual employees of RBM. The studio was co-owned by that day's instructor, whose husband had recently retired from a life-long career at RBM. The women in this particular class spoke about the impending retrenchments associated with restructuring taking place at RBM, asking when they would finally know if the person they knew working at RBM would keep their job. Listening to their anxious talk, it felt like many futures hung in the balance. For those who stayed on at the company, life would carry on, but for those who had been "let go", an uncertain future beckoned.

While my Pilates class' experience was about RBM retrenchments, Mr Matthew Schnieder, a senior director at Raizcorp that I interviewed, explained that the same happened when South32 retrenched or restructured its operations. "If anything happens to those industries, then everybody suffers", he said. This was the reason, he explained, that South32 hired Raizcorp. Raizcorp had to encourage entrepreneurship and small business development at South32, which would mitigate the effects of job losses associated with restructuring on individuals and the local economy. The aim was to help start businesses that could supply larger corporates. To this end, Raizcorp was hired to build and run a "business incubator" for South32 in Richards Bay.

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[23] A multinational company that mines in 35 different countries (Anon n.d.-3).

Raizcorp was started in 2000 by Allon Raiz and had its main offices in South Africa's financial hub, Sandton. According to their website, Raizcorp had over 100 full-time employees and had worked with over 10 100 entrepreneurs, developing more than 3 000 businesses per year in different entrepreneurial programmes (Anon n.d.-4). Raizcorp supported businesses from start-ups to those turning over millions of Rands and had a footprint in Richards Bay, eMalahleni, Uitenhage, Cape Town, and Johannesburg, as well as in Zimbabwe, Angola and Tanzania. The company's website indicated that they had future plans to expand their presence to Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and many West African countries, including Nigeria. Raizcorp was not alone in its estimation of its impact on businesses in Africa. In 2017, *The Economist* declared Raizcorp as the only "genuine incubator" in Africa, because it was "profitable without grant funding" (Anon 2017).

I met Mr Andre Willemse, the manager of Raizcorp's Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP), at their Richards Bay offices. I was surprised that it was literally in the shadow of South32. The same safety rules that applied to employees at South32 also applied to this isolated building; like all the other occupants of the building, I had to reverse-park my car to allow for quicker evacuation in the case of an emergency. Having grown up on tech start-up stories like those of Apple, Amazon and Facebook, which started in garages or dorm rooms by so-called visionaries or social pariahs, Raizcorp's corporate industrial location, its looming structure and its quick-exit safety rules were slightly disappointing. Inside, I found the space to be much like any other office space: walled-off areas, beige coloured walls, and blinds covering large windows. Apart from framed photos of many of their graduates on the entrance wall, it was not an inspiring space. Mr Willemse showed me around the offices. I took particular notice of a conference-type room with a long rectangular desk and two classrooms, lined with desks and chairs. In front of these classrooms were white boards and to the side was what Andre called a "pitch patch". This he explained, was where entrepreneurs stood to "pitch" their business ideas.

In his small, largely impersonal office, Mr Willemse explained that the "concept of incubation existed before, but [Mr Raiz] took it to a next level by bringing in the personal development aspect of it". He directed me to Raizcorp's website for more information regarding their approach. The website explained that while they had been described as a "business incubator", Raizcorp saw themselves as "prosperators™". As Mr Raiz explained in an interview with Dr Nikolas Eberl in an interview about leadership, an incubator denoted weakness and illness, and he did not want to put that label on entrepreneurs. Rather, "they are prosperous. So, we are a prosperator" (Eberl 2018). His company's "unique and effective

business model" was called "prosperation™", a term that was trademarked in 2005. The term apparently linked incubation to the "notion of prosperity" (Donnelly 2008). The website boasted that more than 1 500 businesses had graduated from their Prosperation™ programme and they continued to support 500 businesses in their Prosperation™ programme.

Central to Raizcorp's "prosperation" was the story of Mr Raiz's own entrepreneurial experience, an experience he detailed in a video on the company's homepage. In this origin story, Mr Raiz explained how his first business failed, despite financial backing. His business mentor then "surrounded" him with knowledgeable people in the various fields of business, and he successfully reopened the same business. It was this concept, of putting entrepreneurs in touch with people knowledgeable in marketing, finance and business strategy, which animated Raizcorp's entrepreneurship strategy.

This was not a fool-proof strategy, though. Mr Raiz mused that even though businesses were surrounded by all the expertise and had capital, they still failed. This, Mr Willemse said, encouraged Mr Raiz to look into the psychology of entrepreneurs; it brought him back to his own personal journey, in which *he* was supported by his mentor, not his *business*. This was why, he explained, Raizcorp made the person and their personal development central to their "prosperation" model. Mr Willemse continued that because Raizcorp was so ground-breaking in its approach, it had to develop its own learning, teaching and guiding materials and methodology. "Guiding" was unique, it was their "intellectual property", Mr Willemse explained, and central to Raizcorp's entrepreneurial support.

In much the same way that South32 hired Raizcorp to train its one-time employees in starting and sustaining a business, iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) approached Raizcorp in 2008 to help them develop locally-owned tour operating companies that could take up concessions in the Park. In response, Raizcorp started the Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP).

A Charter to Action

After observing the various stories told on the Trioband Islands in New Guinea, Bronislaw Malinowski (1948: 107) argued that myths came "into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant antiquity, reality, and sanctity. Myths, argued Malinowski, do not explain behaviour but justify it, becoming a charter for social institutions (Malinowski 1948: 108). Myths were "not of the nature of fiction…but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies" (Malinowski 1948: 100). Origin myths "cannot be sober

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dispassionate history since it is always made *ad hoc* to fulfil a certain sociological function, to glorify a certain group, or to justify an anomalous status" (Malinowski 1948: 125). They function "especially where there is a sociological strain, such as in matters of great difference in rank and power, matters of precedence and subordination, and unquestionably where profound historical changes have taken place" (Malinowski 1948: 126).

In many ways, Mr Raiz's story of the origins of his business philosophy fulfil in Malinowski's "origin myth", setting up an operational model for Raizcorp. His charter to action resonated with wider neoliberal economic myths. While attending the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in 2012, Mr Raiz claimed in an interview that entrepreneurship could solve many of the world's problems, and that entrepreneurs employed the unemployed. "For every entrepreneur, there are 40 jobs created", he claimed (World Economic Forum 2012). At a local conference called "Tomorrow's Leaders Convention", his keynote speech implored entrepreneurs in the audience to not give up, because South Africa's economy needed them (Raiz 2018). As he repeatedly stated, Raizcorp as a "business incubator", was an institution that created an environment in which entrepreneurs were supported and nurtured. In many respects, Mr Raiz's economic wisdom and work on entrepreneurship chimed with wider economic literature on small and medium enterprises (SMME) and entrepreneurship, which are widely considered to be essential for economic growth, job creation and the solution to many social ills (Dludla 2014; Hansen, Chesborough, Nohria & Sull 2000; Luiz & Mariotti 2011; Nieuwenhuizen 2003; Panfu Eshun 2004; Raiz 2012; Spigel 2017).

While the economic literature emphasises the world-changing potential of SMMEs and entrepreneurship, it also warns of very high failure rates (Campbell 1989). Mr Raiz regularly quoted that 96% of "start-ups" fail within the first few years (Raiz 2012). Since economists have long considered SMMEs to play a vital role in economic growth, they have increasingly emphasised the need to support these businesses to increase their survival (Panfu Eshun 2004).[24] However, according to Mr Raiz (Anon n.d.-4), even given the right support and capital, businesses still failed. In various interviews, Mr Raiz spoke about his belief that entrepreneurial success was about the nature of the individual entrepreneur, something to which his own history attested. This was why, he said, Raizcorp's solution to business failure, its "prosperation" model, could be a charter for action in a much wider economic context.

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[24] The first business "incubator" started in America in 1950s in response to the rise in unemployment and have since appeared in developed and developing countries alike (Panfu Eshun 2004).

Raizcorp's entrepreneurs

YouTube clips of Mr Raiz's keynote speeches and interviews all suggest that he viewed entrepreneurs as unique individuals who did not fit into a normal working environment because they were "wired differently". He paints a picture of an individual who needs to be flexible, adaptable, optimistic, able to learn, take initiative and have agency, able to see and take opportunities, and navigate around obstacles. For example, in a 2012 interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Mr Raiz was asked how the business environment in African countries hindered entrepreneurial growth. He replied that "if an individual is an entrepreneur, these won't matter. They'll find a way to deal with them and progress, and in fact see them as opportunities to growth as they might keep competitors out". For Mr Raiz, these psychological attributes also extended to more physical ones; in one Youtube clip, he described entrepreneurs as people who could tolerate pain and suffering, were willing to take risks, were able to muster resources (which including self-belief) and grabbed all available opportunities (Raiz 2010). Entrepreneurs should also have a "blue heart", explained Mr Raiz, that is, the "ability to get up again and again, and again".

Mr Raiz insisted that one could measure these qualities by determining to what extent an applicant had an internal locus of control. In entrepreneurial psychology, an internal locus of control is a popular measuring tool (Frese & Gielink 2014). The definition and determination of a locus of control stems from Julian Rotter's (1954) social learning theory of personality. In this theory, an internal locus of control is opposed to an external locus of control. People with external loci of control apparently consider their lives to be controlled by God, luck, more powerful others like politicians, or something else, but not themselves (Zampieri & Pedroso De Souza 2011: 980). Convinced that an internal locus of control could predict someone's business success, Raizcorp selected for such individuals among applications through specifically designed psychometric tests. In this, the most personal issues became indicators of business success. For example, having issues with an absent or negligent father was a strong indicator of success in their tests, and even more so if the applicant had a doting mother.

In this entrepreneurial psychology, there was a tension between whether entrepreneurs were made or born that way. Mr Raiz commented on this "unhelpful" tension in an interview with economic reporter Bruce Witfield and explained that one should rather ask under what conditions and in what environment entrepreneurs "precipitate" (Raiz & Witfield 2019). Knowing what kind of socio-economic environment would lead to this process, and what psychological attributes led to entrepreneurship, Mr Raiz worked on designing Raizcorp to

become "facilitators" in this precipitation, creating encouraging environments through its "Teaching and Learning" technologies, as well as its "Guiding" (Raiz & Witfield 2019).

In an interview with Small Business Connect, an online small business support platform, the then chairman of Raizcorp, Kershni Maharaj described "Learning and Guiding" as the two elements that set Raizcorp apart from other business incubators. He explained, "Raizcorp Learning provides the content required to increase beneficiaries' self-awareness and their business knowledge. However, because knowledge in isolation won't help entrepreneurs to grow, Raizcorp Guiding gives them the opportunity to reflect on their new knowledge, as well as relating it to their own individual circumstances" (Anon 2014). These were the pillars of Raizcorp's Prosperation^{TM} programme and was adapted to suit the particulars of "other entrepreneurial programmes", such as REAP. Mr Willemse and Schnieder, as well as Mr Raiz made a distinction between "experiential" and "book knowledge" and made it clear that they valued and built their models on experiential knowledge. As Mr Schnieder said to me, "we deal with *real* businesses", which was why their development technologies put the entrepreneur at the forefront of their own learning.

Socratic questioning, Mr Willemse explained to me, was one way to do this. Mr Willemse explained it as a problem-solving tool in which the person offering help asked the person seeking it open-ended questions that would help them to understand their problem better- and solve it themselves. In this way, he explained, the person seeking help took "ownership" of their problem and solution. Magenta sessions did this problem solving technique in a group situation. The aim of these group training sessions was to foster peer learning and sharing, which in turn, should encourage the formation of support groups and networks to help participants in their entrepreneurial journey. While these Socratic conversations put the individual at the front of their own decision-making and problem-solving, the "pitch patch" got the entrepreneur to physically stand in front of the class to voice their business idea. The idea was to simulate, and so make the entrepreneur comfortable, with a "pitching" experience in which they told potential investors his or her business idea, explained Mr Willemse. Participants also conducted classes and meetings in a boardroom to learn how to navigate the social dynamic of a boardroom.

Raizcorp framed the self as foundational to a business and its performance. Its managers argued that the business would only go as far and do as well as the individual was doing- and that personal and psychological issues could be obstacles to business performance. Guiding was Raizcorp's internally developed and administered personal and business development technique to overcoming such obstacles. Mr Willemse explained the philosophy behind

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guiding as being part of Raizcorp's intellectual property, and so was a little coy on the details of it. But he explained that it was a mixture of coaching and mentoring that focused on business success and built on an understanding of the "type" of persons Raizcorp selected to be in their Prosperation ^{TM} programme. According to Mr Schnieder, a typical entrepreneur in their programme did not like to be told what to do, which a mentor or coach would do. But entrepreneurs could benefit from someone asking them different questions about their business and giving personal advice on how to tackle problems. But always in such a manner so as not to be prescriptive.

The Guides themselves were selected by Raizcorp, went through Raizcorp's own internal training, and were hired to be a Guide. To be chosen as a guide, individuals needed to have personal business experience before they were trained to be a personal Guide to entrepreneurs. This was too part of Mr Raiz's emphasis on experiential knowledge, not book knowledge. Guides were supposed to be able to draw on their own personal business experience when helping others with their business problems. As such, Raizcorp saw money, capital and markets as secondary to business success and focused their attention on developing the individual running a potential business.

The Development Apparatus

The first REAP was launched in 2008. Mrs MacKenzie, who worked as iWP's senior project manager, explained in an interview that at the time, iWP had some money and a desire to enable local black-owned tourism enterprises to take up concessions[25] in the Park. In my interview with him in Richard's Bay, Mr Willemse explained that iWP approached Raizcorp after the ex-Chief Financial Officer of iWP saw Mr Raiz speak at an event "and was taken with what he had to say". Since then, the Programme had been conducted three more times; in 2010, 2012 and 2016, and a tender to continue with the Programme was released in 2017. In total, 185 people enrolled in the Programme, 137 completed it, 50 received sub-grants, and according to the project evaluation undertaken for the funder, the Global Environmental Fund, 75 achieved commercial viability (Osiba Management 2016).

For its SEED (Social, Environmental and Economic Development) programme (see Chapter 2), Mrs MacKenzie explained that iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) "partner[ed] with agencies whose core function is [development] work", especially with experts in fields of

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[25] Concessions refers to the right to conduct tourism related activity on state owned land. A licence is required and can be obtained from the state entity responsible for the land. iWP offer limited concessions, for tourism activities requiring a boat, vehicle or canoe.

development such as crafts, supporting tertiary education students, and enterprise development. She explained that iWP management understood what was needed from a political standpoint, applied for funding from various international development agencies such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and had deep project management skills to ensure their mandate was carried out. Annual reports show that in the years that the programme has spanned, there have been two to three full time project managers, and one person on contract whose sole responsibility was managing REAP. It is in this context that Raizcorp were hired to help develop conservation-compatible small- and medium enterprises capable of winning concessions from the Park.

At the time that Raizcorp won the tender, the iWP's project managers had investigated other "service providers" such as SETA-accredited[26] courses but were deterred by the very rigid and particular training narrative that had to be met in these courses. Mrs MacKenzie compared it to getting a formal qualification. She implied that knowledge dissemination on its own did not ensure practical change. iWP staff seemed to think that Raizcorp's approach to business development would make an impact and change local businesses due to the company's learning processes and personal development philosophy. The notion of flexibility, adaptability and experimentation was appealing to iWP staff who wanted to support businesses and "see impact". Mr Willemse also shared his view of other service providers. "Now classic what has happened at iSimangaliso, they had service providers, and they all come out and delivered training and a couple of days later they leave, and nothing has changed".

While Raizcorp had never done any work in rural areas before and were in the early days of its inception, "they had really good learning processes… and there was a kind of meeting of minds around the personal development stuff", explained Mrs MacKenzie. Similarly, Mr Schnieder recounted Raizcorp's initial conversation with iWP. He explained that they had never done anything like this before or in rural areas, but that their full-time business was supporting entrepreneurs who ranged from being in "the ideation phase" to those "turning over millions". He was confident enough in Raizcorp's ability to "figure it out" and to make it work.

Institutional apparatus: REAP

Mr Willemse explained that in Magenta sessions with REAP participants, the first answers he usually received when he asked participants what problems they faced in relation to starting

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[26] The Skills, Education and Training Authorities to whom different business sectors give money and who then disseminate money through grants and project funding.

and running a business were, "we are black", "we are poor", "the banks do not want to give us money", and "we are rural". "They make it political", he explained. He described how the conversation from that point onwards was like "peeling an onion" as he brought his participants to the realisation that in fact, the bank did not want to lend them money because there may be no market for their business, that their business plan was flawed, and perhaps that there was no compelling economic reason to exist. In other words, Mr Willemse suggested that the causes of their problems lay with people's flawed understanding of economics and that once rectified, they could succeed.

Mrs MacKenzie and Ms Mthethwa enthusiastically embraced Raizcorp's explanation and supported REAP for not "doing for people". Ms Mthethwa explained that it meant that participants with an internal locus of control were not dependent on external factors such as waiting for government to provide a job, house or grant. "So, what are you going to do about it?" was her reply to participants who complained that obstacles prevented their progress and economic gains.

Mr Willemse explained that REAP worked *on* participants to question reality and take appropriate actions to solve their problems and create their own reality. They believed that their participants' problems were "surface problems" and that the real problem, the meta-problem, existed under it. Success, Mr Willemse explained, "comes back to the perception of how people think it must work and the reality". Those who "think about a process and the closest to how it really works are the ones that are successful." He frequently used the term "confronted", underlining the psychological revelations that his method elicited and the actions it called forth. Primarily, he insisted, once a participant recognised the problem, they needed to make a conscious decision whether or not to go into business and what to do about their social situation.

Alongside this prompting to question reality, REAP's methods suggested that participants could create their own reality through personal development. Mr Willemse told me that the course started with topics such as "learning how to initiate a relationship and understand your thoughts", "recognise that your thoughts create your reality", "understand what self-acceptance is", and "analyse what you believe about yourself". Participants were then encouraged to visualise their desired lives through the use of "vision boards". These visualising and self-analysing activities were meant to effect a personal transformation for the participants in which they internalised a business or entrepreneurial identity that chimed with the striving, world-making ideal portrayed in the self-help business literature.

Mr Willemse further explained that a lack of self-esteem and worth also hampered business success. He had crossed Raizcorp's Guiding technique with the psychological

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techniques of Logotherapy after he approached a neurologist to help him understand why participants did not remember what they had learnt the day before. "This led us to the development of purpose and meaning, but at the core of it is self-worth and self-esteem." Since self-worth and self-esteem were at the core of human behaviour, he argued that development initiatives such as theirs should include strategies to build these in participants. The technique he used to build these in participants was to highlight what a participant had done well, amplify it and reflect it back to them. "If you have low self-esteem and self-worth that means you don't believe that you can do something. So, if the only recourse is to have a business which you don't believe you're actually going to do it, you know, what's your chance of success?" he explained. As such, he explained, helping the person to deal with their personal issues was an economic act.

Participants certainly recognised that the REAP Programme was different from other training programmes that they had attended. Mr David Mkhize, a local municipal councillor who had attended countless training workshops, compared his experiences:

> It is true that we learnt a lot about marketing strategies and money management and how do you grow it, how to manage your cash and stuff like that. But I think…the way that they, even just inviting different presenters to come and present, unlike…It was not like school where a teacher will tell you…we played a major part, not them but us, it was us who were presenting to them, our ideas. It was us who was convincing them that our business ideas can be a reality, so I think, that was great in a way, not just going there, sit and listen to them, telling us how to do things, but we are telling them, giving us an opportunity to see, I will do this and that. They were there to say 'have you thought about doing it this way?', so I think, that was a major difference between most of the training I've attended where you just sit there and listen to the presenters, telling you how to do things.

Other participants were less focused on the relationships between trainers and trainees and were enthused about the ways in which the REAP Programme helped them to imagine their futures differently. Mr Bheka Biyela told me that before REAP, he had been interested in business, "now I see myself *in* business". Ms Dunn and Mr Ntombela had undergone similar transformations in the ways they saw themselves as businesspeople rather than just people who wanted to make money. Similarly, Ms Doreen Zulu told me that the program helped her "self-identity". As she explained,

> Before I was just an ordinary person who is in business, now I can say I'm a business lady. You see. Now business is in my nerves. As I told you that I have a lot things that I'm doing but I don't forget that at the end of the day I am a business woman.

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When I asked Doreen how she came to see herself as a businesswoman, she explained that there had been "sessions… where people who used to come to and help us with emotional things and stuff …Not mentors but psychologists". She remembered that,

> One of the things that they did, they said take time, sit by yourself and think about your business, everything about your business, even yourself, silent. I cried with that psychologist, I was thinking of my business, thinking, thinking, thinking, and I ended up crying, and she asked me 'why are you crying?', I said I'm crying for my business, she said, 'what about your business, what is it that makes you cry about your business?' I said no, just because I don't make it, but I want to make it, and I don't know what is missing, and then I sat with her and then she told me that when you are in business you don't need to be emotional, you see, because I use to be emotional, push push, when you see something is not happening don't stress yourself, try

> …Sometimes when you emotional and in business, sometimes you feel like this thing is not happening, let me just leave it and try something new. Then you've got that anger that I keep on trying and try and try but I don't win. Then they helped me that I must try and try and try again. I remember one of the ladies that came in said you are not a successful business woman or business person if you never failed three times or four times. You need to try and fail, and then you go back and look back and see what made you mess up, that made you fail. And then you try to put more effort and then carry on. Right now, as I told you I am a facilitator, but I don't want to be employed as a full-time facilitator, no. I'm freelancing, I need money just to improve my business. I like, there are two companies that approached me to employ me full time, and I said I can't because I have a business to look after. I can freelance but I can't be in the business full time.

Like Doreen, many of my interviewees started with "if you are an entrepreneur" as a way to explain how such a person should act. Entrepreneurial language was indeed part of several interviews. Ms Busisiwe Gumede, whose interview was conducted in isiZulu, spoke of needing to sell herself, to put herself out there. Ms Hlengiwe Buthelezi said a similar thing. Mr Bheka Biyela spoke about how an entrepreneur needed to be, rattling off characteristics such patience, to believe in yourself, and that life will not be "straight" and you should not give up.

Over the 18 months of training, REAP's personal development topics and "tools" were augmented with information on finance, business management and marketing strategies. Mr Willemse explained how he constantly linked the business content of the course to the notion that the participant's thoughts created their reality. This was particularly prevalent when he dealt with finances and participants said things like, "that person is thinking rich" or talked

about "dirty money" or said that "money is the source of all evil". "If this is what you believe, why would you want money then?" he asked participants. Mr Willemse argued that by having such negative thoughts, participants stood in the way of their business and held themselves back from prosperity.

However, none of the participants I interviewed spoke about money in this manner. In this social context, money, in fact, enabled sociality (see Chapter 4). Indeed, where participants did start to allude to wanting to make more money by growing their business, they quickly turned to claims of "wanting to help the community", perhaps looking to turn themselves into small patrons (see Chapter 5). Ms Zulu said,

> They [iWP] funded me with six computers and salon equipment. As I've told you, I've got a computer certificate. It is my dream to open up my very own skills development centre to train people because I don't want to be like a salon as you can see, because I am from a deep rural area[27], I just want to give the youth, maybe if I can give the youth the skill they can open up their own businesses.

Lessons about psychology and business where however, well received by some REAP participants. Apart from being taught that one's thoughts affected business success, Mr Lungani Ntombela, who entered REAP with a bird guiding tour company, said that he learnt "that whatever happens in you emotionally can affect your business, because it can slowly affect production of the business". The underlying implication of REAP was that the person was responsible for their economic wellbeing, and that becoming an entrepreneurial individual in REAP's mould gave you access to the market.

The Guides

Ms Mthethwa was the iWP project manager for REAP but underwent training by Raizcorp to be a Guide. This was so she could facilitate the personal development lessons and provide help in the field. She joked that she needed to go for counselling training as she spent most of her field visits listening to people's personal issues. For example, she told me about a woman who had taken in a teenage nephew and who, as Ms Mthethwa explained, was "acting out" and she did not know what to do about him. She understood listening to participants' social issues as important as she agreed that the person underpinned the business, and that their wellness determined how the business was doing. She saw her job as encouraging participants to take

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[27] I asked Ms Zulu what this meant, "from a deep rural area". She said it meant that she was very poor.

action to resolve issues they told her about, so that they did not interfere with the business's performance.

Ms Mthethwa also told of a time where a REAP participant had told her of his involvement in protest action against the Park. He had been obliged to participate because he feared that fellow community members knew he had received help from iWP and would target him if he did not join their protest. So not only did iWP staff help with businesses, they mediated relationships between participants, other locals and the Park. Indeed, Mrs MacKenzie spoke about relationships being central to REAP. She emphasised the need to have more than one facilitator in the classroom of 15 or so people, because there was likely to be someone who just did not get along with the facilitator. Mr Willemse himself spoke about how at first, participants were hesitant to speak with him. But he explained that they began to trust him and open up when he started "showing up at their homes and businesses", wanting to know how they were doing. Indeed, Mrs MacKenzie said that people often requested that he visit them. Ms Cele, a participant, told me she enjoyed having Mr Willemse come around, because he was "filled with ideas".

Mr Willemse explained that Raizcorp's guiding worked a bit differently in this area because none of the participants had an internal locus of control. For this reason, Guides worked extra hard to encourage participants to "take action", "solve their problems" and "take a risk". In this, the Guides seemed to be playing a contradictory role. While they were part of iWP's mandate to develop small businesses and represented Raizcorp, who provided support for such businesses, they were simultaneously encouraging participants to be independent, because Raizcorp could not provide for everyone.

"We were stealing from our businesses"

While REAP's lessons and guiding emphasised the interconnection between entrepreneurs and their psychological states, other lessons on bookkeeping for instance, focused on the ways in which participants had to separate themselves from their business. When I asked participants what the main lessons were that they learnt from REAP, they frequently replied that it was to separate their businesses from themselves and learning to pay yourself a salary. "I never realised how many times I was stealing from my business" exclaimed Mr Ntombela, "because sometimes you have that in your mind that this is my business so you can do whatever you want to in your business". He explained this new understanding of having "a positive relationship with our business". Ms Martha Dunn had a similar experience. "I know when you're making money every day it's kind of easy to spend it on everything, but then when you

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get trained, you understand this is not your money. The moment I spend it anyhow it's the business that suffers the most and ultimately I am the one suffering the most because I won't have a business and then there's nobody supplying me with any sort of income."

Bookkeeping was meant to play a central role in this process. Not only was basic money-in, money-out practices meant to help people monitor if they were "stealing from their business", but it was also meant to help participants "turn R100 into R150", as Mr Willemse said. By keeping books, participants could grow their business's profitability, ensure that money stayed in the business and that they had enough to start another business. Individuals were thus both called to have their selves underpin their business and separate themselves from it by applying the appropriate bookkeeping methods to accumulate money.

"Shifting" queries

Through the training period, and particularly after receiving REAP's sub-grant, REAP's project managers used the notion of "shifting" to denote the movement of a business from survivalist to entrepreneurial. However, project managers were interested in the failure of many businesses they "helped" to "shift". Many of them hoped that my research would shed light on why this was so, given their training and the provision of a sub-grant. I asked Mrs MacKenzie why she thought some businesses did not "shift". Her response was, "Everyone has their wound that they grapple with", a response that implied that personal issues lay at the heart of business failure.

Mr Willemse's response laid the blame on Raizcorp's inability to control its selection of participants. REAP's funder viewed the psychometric tests as discriminatory, so the company could not select for individuals with an internal locus of control. So, Raizcorp designed the questions on the application form to determine where an applicant's locus of control lay. Applicants were then short-listed and interviewed. In his experience though, he explained, everybody had an external locus of control. He explained to me that in conversations with participants he had been told outright that they expected government to provide jobs and housing. He considered this sentiment to be evidence of an external locus of control. Group training sessions were designed such that participants could learn from each other's practices. However, he said, participants did not want to share their business ideas or challenges in fear that others would steal their idea or laugh at them. He reasoned that this too was because participants had an external locus of control. For this reason, the roles of Guides and Guiding were amplified when Raizcorp rolled out the Programme in the area. Secondly, he explained,

[the participants'] business plan was fundamentally flawed from the first day, and what happens is you're dealing with an external locus of control, if you go there with them, which I did at one stage, you are told 'no no no, you're being too harsh now, you've got to give them slack', then you realise that it's my agenda to build them into a business, but there might be another agenda here. We have to be seen to be giving the grants. So … it's two different intentions for two different outcomes.

Mr Willemse reasoned that because iWP needed to be seen giving out goods in order to fulfil their political mandate, businesses that were "fundamentally flawed" were chosen, and this was the reason they did not "shift".

The second characteristic of the Programme and reason participants were not "shifting" was that Raizcorp was working in a severely impoverished local economy, he said. Mr Willemse and the iWP project managers explained that most businesses were survivalist businesses, started out of necessity because there were very few job opportunities available. Mrs MacKenzie explained that REAP did not deal with the poorest of the poor in the area but, she estimated 75% of the participants were survivalist businesses. Such businesses supported the household, and maybe an extended family member, but the prospect of them growing to create jobs was limited. Indeed, Mrs MacKenzie made it very clear to me in our second interview that she did not think they were working with entrepreneurs, but rather with necessity-based businesses. There were a handful that needed help with books and tendering, needs that seemed to signify to her something close to the proverbial enterprise and entrepreneurship. Mr Willemse explained that very few were entrepreneurial businesses, that is, businesses where the entrepreneur saw a gap in the market, took a risk and was rewarded for the risk taken. Ms Mthethwa considered entrepreneurial businesses to be those that "went beyond your community". The entrepreneur was the individual who opened a second shop, perhaps in a separate location, or abandoned their first idea because they realised it was not going to work and started something else. The transition from survivalist to entrepreneurial was difficult, explained Ms Mthethwa. "You [either] start something because you are hungry and you want to make an income, or you've started something because you've identified a gap in the market".

This real poverty was part of the reason iWP decided to give sub-grants. As Ms Mthethwa explained, participants simply did not have friends, family or funds to borrow from, while getting loans from formal institutions required financial records that very few people kept. Mr Willemse also remarked that he had never heard of anyone in the area getting

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government funding. Funding came from various international development agencies. As Mr Willemse acknowledged, many businesses would just not get off the ground without such help. Once participants had gone through the 12 months of REAP training, those who had attended 80% of the training sessions were eligible to apply for a sub-grant. Those interested in applying for this grant had to participate in a "business think". This entailed the development of a business plan and the subsequent "pitching" of their business idea to a panel consisting of Raizcorp and iWP members. The "pitch" included what their business was and what equipment they would need.

Participants received a sub-grant which was given in the form of equipment rather than cash. Mrs MacKenzie explained that their funder, the Global Environmental Facility, prohibited money from being given out. In any case, she said, "There would definitely have been cases where individuals would have used the money on other things." Some of the participants agreed. Duduzile Cele, who ran a small school, said she would have used the money to pay teachers' salaries, because it could have been her most pressing need at the time. There were instances where equipment that REAP supplied through the sub-grant stood unused or were sold for cash. Another participant wanted cattle. However, due to his proximity to iWP and the World Heritage Site regulations on agricultural activity in the vicinity of the border, his request was denied. He applied for and received a tent, which he subsequently sold.

The fact that businesses did not use their goods, sold them or did not flourish, perplexed Mrs MacKenzie as the sub-grant procedure and subsequent hand-out was fraught with tensions. The Programme evaluation, done by an external party to both iWP and Raizcorp, noted that it was only when Raizcorp went through the sub-grant application process that its "Virtual Call Centre" set up to help participants throughout the training period, was used because participants wanted to know when they would be receiving their grants (Osiba Management 2016). Mrs MacKenzie reflected on the sentiment from participants on the grant, saying that they presented not having goods as the single reason that they and their business was not going to succeed. Mrs MacKenzie commented that the number of applications for REAP had increased over the years and speculated that it was because people could see the goods others had received through the Programme's sub-grants. Ms Zulu, a REAP participant, lamented the fact that people applied because they wanted the sub-grant. She considered such applications to be by people who were not serious about business and just wanted goods.

Furthermore, Ms Mthethwa said, iWP was viewed as being the only governmental body that responded and delivered. They were also a source of employment. Apart from full-time employment, several participants were registered in government's central database. Businesses

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that tendered for work at government departments were required to be registered on this database. And indeed, all the ladies that I interviewed who had catering businesses had catered for iWP events, functions and training events. Ms Dunn explained that she often had questions about how or why she got work from iWP. Mr Mkhize had claimed that now that he had been trained and funded by them, iWP should give him work. While encouraging participants to be independent business people was all good and well, was it possible for businesses who had minimal or no other market or employment options not to become dependent on iWP for work?

I asked both Mr Willemse and Mr Schnieder if an individual had to be "entrepreneurial" to thrive in a market that I increasingly realised was severely constrained by a lack of money. "What if you cannot be this type of person?" I asked them. "What happens to you?" At first, Mr Willemse talked about the documentaries on socialism and the kibbutz in Israel that he had watched; he had linked these documentaries to the situation in Maputaland. He explained that he was investigating different ways to structure the social and economic so as to "redistribute resources". His answer to my question then implied that different types of economic and social systems should be created in this area- and that REAP's training perhaps did not answer this question. But, he said, the debate about ecotourism and nature conservation versus mining as the local economic development driver often came up in classes. He had no opinion on what the better option for the area was, and showed his apolitical position in his response of, "Well, if it is what the people want." He was there to develop people to access the economy, rendering economic development technical.

Conclusion

In 1990, James Ferguson analysed the Thaba-Tseka Development Project in Lesotho to understand the processes through which governance structures were produced. Taking a Foucauldian lens to development apparatus and its deployment, Ferguson (1990: 13) stated that "[A] structure always produces itself through a process, and through a struggle: and the sense of structure… can only be grasped through that sometimes surprising and ironic process, and never by merely labelling the structures with the name of those whose interests it serves". Thus instead of focusing on why the Thaba-Tseka project failed or why it failed the people the project intended to help, Ferguson explored the effect the project had on the people and place it was designed to "develop". He argued that by rendering poverty technical and making it a site of intervention of carefully crafted programmes, the development apparatus de-politicized poverty, becoming an "anti-politics machine" (Ferguson 1990: 256). Ferguson (1990: 256) showed how the "conceptual" apparatus of the development project deemed the state apolitical

and as mere distributors of services. He detailed contestations in hierarchy between the Lesotho governing party and the development project managers, which affected who reported to whom and who had control over development funded resources. Furthermore, while the Thaba-Tseka project was deemed a failure, it had built infrastructure that the state, and thus the governing party, began utilising in an area it had previously not been present. The unintended outcomes of this project, Ferguson (1990: 256) argued, was to extend the state apparatus.

iSimangaliso Wetland Park rendered economic development and poverty technical by contracting in a service provider to encourage and support those who had been previously disadvantaged by the previous political dispensation to start businesses that could win tenders and concessions from the Park. In this way, iWP could report that it was combating poverty and bringing about economic and social development opportunities to the region (iSimangaliso Authority 2017). This fulfilled iWP's social and economic development mandate. The company they outsourced this mandate to, Raizcorp, also rendered economic development in technical terms.

REAP worked as an anti-politics machine by pushing the responsibility and onus of getting out of poverty, of economic freedom, onto the individual. Personal issues became both signifiers of potential success and hindrances that needed to be overcome to ensure success. This could be done with the help of Guides, who also helped participants determine and create the 'correct' mental attitude and view of the world to be able to access the market. The notion that was put forward was that participants needed to become a certain type of person to access the market and be prosperous. This involved re-arranging their relationship with their self and business and using the technologies to manage and therefore increase their wealth. In this way, citizenship was replaced by entrepreneurship, implying that the individual was responsible for their well-being, not government.

Despite their belief in the validity of their intercession, REAP project managers questioned why many businesses it supported did not "shift" after technical support such as Guiding, knowledge dissemination and goods were given. REAP suggested that personal development and transformation could help individuals to access "the market". The emphasis on creating independent, self-driving people was undermined by the nature of the precarious life that comes from living in an economy of little diversity and option to practice that independence.

In the next chapter I explore the tension between the bookkeeping practices taught and encouraged by REAP in a social context in which livelihoods are built on reciprocal exchange, hybrid livelihoods and social networks.

Chapter 4

"I was stealing from my business": Enterprise, survival strategies and broadened networks

Taste of Africa hot food take-away was situated on the corner of a four-way intersection on the main road into Khula Village. Khula is a township just outside St Lucia. Ms Martha Dunn rented the store from women who lived on the property, as did Jimbo's tuckshop next door, and the car wash immediately in front of the store. I spent the week working in the shop with Sibahle, the shop stewardess. She was originally from Empangeni, a small town roughly an hour south of Khula Village and came to Khula specifically to work in this take-away store. Sibahle rented a room in the RDP[28] house on Ms Dunn' property roughly one kilometre away in the less central and quieter part of Khula. Ms Dunn had explained that she preferred hiring women that were not originally from Khula as this prevented shop stewards from disappearing home during the day or their friends and family making made claims on them while they work in the store.

In the store, the days followed a similar routine. Sibahle arrived at the store every morning at around 7:30 am. She opened the customer door to let in the light, turned on the two deep fryers to heat the oil, and made popcorn in the carnival-like popcorn maker. She asked a young man (there always seemed to be someone around) to fill up a 30-litre drum with water from the tap next to the car wash. This was the shop's water supply. While the drum was being filled, she swept the floor of the small rectangular store and wiped down the counters. Then, she pulled out a bag of pre-cut potato chips out of the deep freezer and fried it, ready to be served fresh when customers started coming a little later. She also fried off some *amagwinya.*[29] Sibahle always prepared the dough using 10 kilograms of flour the night before and left it to rise overnight.

I joked with Sibahle that she was the "queen of *m'gwinyas*" for the effortless way she churned them out. She scooped up dough with her right hand and broke off the excess with her left. She then threw the dough back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, until it was a rounded mass from which she squeezed off a lump between her left hand's thumb and index

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[28] RDP is refers to the Redistribution and Development Programme. The state driven programme aims to build houses and provide electricity and water for the severely impoverished.

[29] A ball of deep fried dough.

finger. The pale-coloured mass was transferred to her cupped right hand where it sat snuggly before she gently placed it into the heated oil. She made about 15 to 20 at a time and left them to softly sizzle in the cooker until golden brown, occasionally pushing the top bunch down to ensure they all cook. She repeated this routine twice a day because by midday, the first batch was usually sold out. Sibahle sold roughly 100 of these per day.

The shop officially began trading at 8:00. Its trading rhythm was determined by school children and the working day. It got busy at around 10:30 when the Selethukhanya high school children come out for their lunch break. They made up the bulk of Ms Dunn's customers and mostly bought *m'gwinyas* for R2. Occasionally, someone would make a '*loction* or "Zulu burger", by adding a slice of polony for R1, and even less occasionally a slice of Parmalat cheese for R2. The second most popular buy was small portions of fries for R6. They were always smothered in chili sauce, sometimes with peri-peri, mustard, tomato sauce, or vinegar, sometimes a combination of them, sometimes all them. Very few students bought large portions of chips for R10, or fish and chips for R15. It quietened down at around 11:30 or so, although I was never sure when classes resumed as there were always a few boys who never returned and hung around the car wash. After the morning's rush more *m'gwinyas* and chips were made, and perhaps popcorn. The next wave of children were the pre-priMartha and priMartha school children who finished school at 13:00. They bought popcorn for R1 or lolly pops from Jimbo's Tuckshop next door. The high school children finished school at 14:30 and came by to buy a *m'gwinya* or two and chips again. It was busy again between 16:00 and 18:00. During this time, a more diverse clientele frequented the shop. Adults and teenagers bought *m'gwinyas* and chips, the younger children bought popcorn, sometimes chips. Occasionally, some parents might send their young children to buy fish and chips. As the sun set, Sibahle began making the next day's batch of dough for the *m'gwinyas* and the young men that hung around the car wash began drifting away. Fezi, who rented the car wash, always stayed to help Sibahle close at 19:00. He was repaid with a *m'gwinya* and/or chips.

During quieter periods, predominantly older working men frequented the shop, buying the more expensive items on the list. A taxi driver bought two Russian sausages and chips, another two bought fish and chips and popcorn. Two Eskom repairmen bought R10 worth of chips each. An army official bought tripe, which Sibahle had made especially for him. A handful of men bought combos (Russian sausage, three slices of bread and chips for R 12). School teachers bought fish and chips. Other customers included a Transnet employee, contractors making speed bumps on the newly tarred road, young men who had an

entertainment company, waiters from restaurants in St Lucia, tour guides and CWP[30] and EPWP[31] workers. One lady told me that she sold Avon. There were also numerous people who said they were not working. Mrs Dunn explained that the biggest source of income in the town was the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) grant[32], which was why she was "in the business of R2s and R10s".

Ms Dunn explained that most of her customers were children, because of the schools nearby but also because parents often sent their children to the tuckshop. She remarked that these children all bought with R10 notes or silver coins while the older people bought with notes of R20 or more. The fact that most of her customers were children worked out well for Ms Dunn because, she said, they answered her market research questions about their economic situation truthfully. Ms Dunn noted the amounts of money that children handled at her shop, because it indicated how much pocket money they were given. Knowing this, she "thought about ways to make sure that all that money comes to me". When the cost of oil, sugar and flour increased, she needed to increase the price of *m'gwinyas,* but she said, she needed to consult with her main clients, the children, first. She explained that she had noticed that her sales were average, and if she increased the price, she risked losing clients. So, she consulted her clients, asking if their parents could increase their pocket money. The children reported back that their parents could not afford an increase, which was why she reduced the size of the *m'gwinyas*. In this way, she did not lose money and kept her clientele relatively happy. The children noticed the size difference, she said, but were happy that the price did not go up. She was dependent on how many units she sold, not on how much each unit was because of the nature of the local economy, she explained.

Ms Dunn had been a participant of the Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP). One of the most valuable lessons she had learnt from REAP, she told me, was to separate herself from her business so that she could pay herself a salary (see also Chapter 3). The Programme had made her realise that she had been "stealing from her business", because she thought all the money that she earned was hers and that she could do what she wanted with it. This sentiment, that REAP had brought them to the realisation that people could steal from

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[30] Community Work Programme is an initiative by the South African government to reduce unemployment and poverty rate by providing work opportunities for maximum 100 days per year at a payment of R25 per day. The aim is to create a stable and predictable income for participants (Anon 2010).

[31] Extended Public Works Programme is an initiative by the South African government to reduce unemployment and poverty through work on a temporary or contractual basis. The focus is on skills development (Anon n.d-5.).

[32] SASSA grants refers to a cash payment made to eligible members by the South African government. There are eight different grants, the most widely claimed is the children support and foster child grant, elderly, and the disabled.

themselves and that one needed to measure out a monthly salary, was widely held among all the participants I interviewed. Ms Dunn found this teaching so useful that she wished Fezi, the car wash business owner, could receive such training too. She explained that neither Fezi nor the young men who helped him at the car wash, understood what it meant to run a business. The young men did not understand that Fezi had rent to pay and had bought the equipment they used, such as the Kärcher pressure hose, the paint brushes to clean the vents, the buckets, the washing liquid, cloths and polish. Fezi gave the schoolboys that hung around the car wash small daily stipends, which they topped up from tips. But, explained Ms Dunn, Fezi either did not man his business adequately or was not aware of what was happening, and they often "scooped" the whole payment for a wash. Shaking her head, she remarked that "people" did not understand the costs of running a business.

Life on the margins

Ms Dunn knew what she was talking about; she owned several business ventures. Apart from the take-away at Khula, she had another take-away in a residential area roughly 30 minutes south of Khula, iWP had trained her as an environmental educator and hired her for school tours, and she did high-end catering. Ms Dunn catered for government functions and workshops, among others. This included events for iWP. However, she had experienced a decrease in work from government because, she reasoned, it was cutting back on spending. These various streams of income saw her through the entire year, because each stream had "a season". The environmental education saw her through February and March and the catering from April through to December. January was her quietest season. Even the take-away business was quiet because people renting in Khula went home to Durban for the holiday season.

Ms Dunn had a tertiary degree but had been unemployed for three years before she saw the advertisement for REAP in the newspaper. After participating in REAP, she now had two shops, each with a stewardess which gave her time during the day to do catering and to tend to the vegetable garden she had on the piece of land the *induna* (traditional leader) gave her. Ms Dunn and her children lived with her mother, who all lent unpaid labour to her catering business. At the time of my research, Ms Dunn eldest daughter was finishing primary school and was going to a girls' Catholic boarding school in Durban. Ms Dunn explained that many people opened the same businesses in the area, even right next door to one another. But, because so many people did that, they "ran each other into the ground". So, she said, she had to have "business savvy" to stick it out in such a competitive environment so that she could

survive and continue to provide her daughters with the superior education she was currently paying for.

Like Ms Dunn, Bongani Cebekhulu also had a tuckshop, and ran a tavern, which he explained was his "backbone". Mr Cebekhulu had a long history of entrepreneurship. He started selling containers of five litres of petrol from his home when he was a high school student. After finishing school, his parents did not have money to send him to university while his matric marks did not qualify him for a bursary. So he started working for various companies contracted to Richards Bay Minerals (RBM). His objective though, was to use the money to fund building his own tuckshop and tavern, which he subsequently did. The work at RBM was quite "straining", so he began work as a driver for the deputy mayor of uMfolozi Municipality, a job his grandmother informed him about. When the deputy mayor was voted out of office, he had to leave, but in his time there he had made connections with people who harvested timber from Mondi.[33] He had already started his own company harvesting timber, but had been side-tracked by his work as a driver. After losing his job, and with the encouragement from these connections, he began looking for timber contracts again. Over the years, he has bought himself several vehicles, built two houses and paid for both a "white" and traditional wedding.[34] Mr Cebekhulu also joined the REAP Programme and used the sub-grant money he received from them to pay off a vehicle. He employed his two brothers as drivers in his extended business network.

Bheka Biyela, another REAP participant, also did not have funds to attend university after school. He had met the owner of Bhejane Nature Training when he worked as a car guard at Kosi Bay, where he lived and contacted the man to see if he could help him when he finished school. The owner sponsored him for six months of training as nature tour guide, which enabled him to get a job at St Lucia Kayak Safaris. Mr Biyela worked there for six years. When the owner of the kayak company wanted to sell the business to Mr Biyela, he suggested that he apply to participate in REAP, which he subsequently did. However, the business proved too expensive for him to buy with REAP's sub-grant, and so he bought car wash equipment instead with the grant. He opened a car wash in Kosi Bay but bought cheap sponges and buckets to use. He found that the business was not doing well because there were few people with cars. The area was very poor. His stepbrother though, had bought a second-hand game viewing

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[33] Mondi is a commercial forestry company. They have large forestry plantations in northern Kwa-Zulu Natal and a processing plant in Richards Bay.

[34] A white wedding refers to a western styled wedding ceremony in which the bride wears a white dress. A traditional wedding refers to a wedding in which Zulu customs are part of the ceremony. This would entail the slaughtering of goats and cows on the day.

vehicle, which Mr Biyela used to transfer tourists from nearby lodges to the beach at Kosi Bay. When the vehicle broke down, and the car wash was floundering, he found work as a tour guide at Zulu Nyala Game Lodge. When we met, he was in Hluhluwe talking to the municipality about a plot of land to build his car wash on. He exclaimed that if the municipality gave him the land, he would take the REAP goods out of their packaging and use them, not the old cheap goods he had bought to use in the car wash in Kosi Bay.

Doreen Zulu also worked and lived in Hluhluwe. Like Mr Biyela, she complained that the location of her business was a problem, but she had loyal customers who had cars and who came to her salon because she had proper salon mirrors and chairs. She had received these through REAP, as well as six computers. She had originally planned on opening an internet café with the computers, alongside her salon. But she had decided to use them to start a skills development centre in which she would teach computer skills to the locals. She was in the process of having her course accredited and registered with SETA.[35] When we spoke, Phinda Private Game Reserve was building two classrooms for a crèche in Ms Zulu's home area of Mnqobokazi. She had noticed that many of the older women who typically looked after the children, left them at home to tend to their vegetable gardens quite a distance away. So she approached Phinda about building a crèche, which they were doing. She planned to open a skills development centre there too. Ms Zulu had started studying Administration at university but did not complete her course. She returned home and worked as a waitress and then trained as a chef at Zulu Nyala. She then opened her own hair salon, which, like Ms Dunn and Mr Cebekhulu's tuckshops, was her "backbone" business. She had been employed by the Big Five Municipality as a computer trainer, but on a contractual basis. She also taught at Venture Creation in Durban but did not want to move there to take up a full-time position because she wanted to open her own business, the skills development centre. She had employed two women to work in her salon, which gave her the flexibility to work in Durban as well as do catering for events and workshops. iWP was also one of her clients.

Duduzile Cele described her arrival in KwaMduku as coming at a time when mothers were dying but nobody yet knew that it was because of AIDS. She saw many grandmothers being saddled with the responsibility of raising young children. Responding to the resultant crisis of care-giving, Duduzile organised that these children attend "school" in a garage she persuaded someone to lend her. She was a trained school teacher, but did not have materials to

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[35] SETA refers to Skills Education and Training Authorities. Businesses pay money to SETA who distribute money through grants to projects that aim to upskill and train people.

teach with. The *induna* walked by once and wanted to know what was happening with all these children, and upon the explanation, gave her a piece of land to build a school on. Apart from organising the young children, she also helped the grandmothers and widows make candles (there was no electricity), soup and beaded items to sell as there was no form of income for them. Duduzile also established a relationship with Phinda Private Game Reserve.[36] It was part of Phinda's guest experience to bring tourists to the "community" and show them what various projects community leaders were undertaking. I do not know how Phinda came to know of Ms Cele specifically, but she did tell me that the *induna* had given her land to build her school on. And as *indunas* are considered spokespersons for their communities (see Chapter 2 and 5) he may have told Phinda about whom to visit, and suggested Ms Cele. Over the years, guests from Phinda have regularly donated school materials to this small school. Many high-profile people such as the Duchess of York donated entire buildings. Another guest donated mini-busses[37] and sponsored Ms Cele's trip to visit schools in the United Kingdom. Today, the school is a private school that teaches all grades up to matric. Duduzile's son was the headmaster of the school.

Someone had shown her the advertisement for REAP, so she applied, was short-listed for an interview and selected to participate in the 2012 cohort. She had identified herself as a "community developer" on the forms, but she explained, they told her that she was a business person. They wanted her to say "I", not "we" when she referred to the work she was doing. Her sub-grant was a printing machine that she used to print logos onto school uniforms. This was the business that she ran for herself and that supplied the school uniforms for the school she founded.

Hlengiwe Buthelezi received a trailer and other goods relating to her catering company with the REAP sub-grant funding. She had gone to university to study a course related to Information Technology, but did not finish. She also attempted to study Education through Unisa, but did not finish that either. Hlengiwe had worked on a contract basis for Africa Health Research Institute,[38] inputting data for six months, and after two years of unemployment, opened her own construction company from money earned there. iWP had contracted her company to build the pathway from a parking lot to the beach in St Lucia. However, she explained, she found the male-dominated environment very uncomfortable and opened a

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[36] Phinda Private Game Reserve took guests to visit community projects in the area surrounding the reserve.
[37] Each mini-bus can seat 16 people.
[38] ARHI is based just outside of Mtubatuba, roughly 30 minutes in land from St Lucia, and focus on health related research including HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis.

catering and decoration company instead. This company was also contracted to iWP for events. Apart from iWP, she also catered for other government departments, in particular the Department of Education. But they had reduced their tenders, so there was less work now, she explained. Using the money earned from the construction company, she opened a tuckshop in Mtubatuba, a town roughly 15 minutes from St Lucia. However, she closed it because the rent was too high and there was too much competition. She was also not in the right location, she said. Now that she knew how to manage her money better, she was thinking of re-opening it. Hlengiwe was married, but her husband, a qualified school teacher, worked in Mpumalanga. She preferred that he lived far away as it meant he did not know how much money she was making with her businesses. "There is this mentality of men that if you have money then they don't bring anything for home, so I have to hide it", she explained. This meant that her husband would continue to give money to support the children. Her eldest daughter was about to start at Pioneer High School, a boarding school with a good educational reputation in Vryheid.

Social networks, reciprocal exchange and hybrid livelihoods

This is most certainly not an exhaustive description of all the participants or even of the life of each participant mentioned, nor of the types of businesses open and supported. However, it was evident that REAP participants' livelihoods were deeply socially embedded, that they had a hybrid of livelihoods and that social networks played an important role in creating and sustaining these. Neves and Du Toit (2009a; 2009b) argued that these were methods of social protection that mitigated against the risk of poverty and marginalization, characteristic of people who made up the informal economy or were survivalists.[39] The concept of an informal economy and it being separate to a formal one was critiqued when the term was first coined by Keith Hart in 1973 (Hart 1973). Indeed, Neves and du Toit's (2007) research has highlighted how integrally connected the two are, and suggest rather that the poor are "adversely incorporated" into the formal economy.

In recent years, economic anthropology has turned to understanding the nature of this integration and how people on the margins survive. Neves and du Toit's (2009a) research focused on two regions of South Africa: urban Cape Town and rural Eastern Cape. The two areas have a historical link due to apartheid in that the rural homelands were structured to be

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[39] Survivalist or necessity based businesses refer to businesses that are not tax registered and which is an activity undertaken by persons not able to secure regular wage labour, otherwise known as formal employment. Such businesses are started by individuals with little or no skills or money. The activity is driven by a state of poverty and unemployment, and the need to survive (Ligthelm 2004; Rogerson 2000)

black labour reserves for urban white capital (Wolpe 1972). However, the migratory route and movement of people has continued in democracy, and the two localities, they show, serve to mitigate against severe impoverishment and enable the survival of households. Typically, money earned from wage labour in urban areas serve to uphold rural homesteads which were largely responsible for reproductive and care activities. They highlighted the need to take into account "the complex, spatially extended and many-centred networks created by household fluidity, inter-and intra-household flows, care chains and migration" (du Toit & Neves 2009a: 25). They concluded that it was these social networks and reciprocal exchange that mitigated against households and individuals' marginality and vulnerability, reducing the risk of individual and household destitution. In my research area, very similar patterns held; some had family who contributed to households many kilometres away. For instance, Ms Busisiwe Gumede relied on support from her adult sons who had studied engineering and worked in Johannesburg, and Ms Buthelezi's husband in Mpumalanga contributed to the household income.

A number of economic anthropologists have also shown that many poor households in South Africa engaged in "hybrid livelihoods" (du Toit & Neves 2009b; 2009a) or were forced to "make a plan" (Van Wyk 2012) as they negotiated the precariousness of their economic positions. "Elite and poor households alike survive through hybrid livelihood strategies, linking together incomes from a variety of different sources: smallholder agriculture, informal self-employment, grants and remittances, and different kinds of service provision and reciprocal exchange" (du Toit & Neves 2009b: 9). As du Toit and Neves (2009b) showed, in these conditions, the boundaries between enterprises and households that started them were porous, such that it was often not clear if households were selling or eating their stock. Ilana Van Wyk (2003a) found a similar survival strategy among women targeted by a craft development programmes run by the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, [40] of which iWP was envisioned as being the crown jewel. Outside the LSDI programme, women mitigated economic risk and vulnerability through being part of a social network built on reciprocal exchange (Van Wyk 2003a: 149). However, once they joined these programmes, the demand that participants focus solely on craft production, due to the organiser's gendered ideas about work and household structure, undermined several women's participation in this network, and

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[40] The Spatial Development Initiative was a post-apartheid development plan aimed at creating economic growth centres through public-private partnership in the most underdeveloped and economically neglected areas of South Africa (Rogerson, 2002). The Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative was based on ecotourism and agriculture.

in effect, jeopardised their livelihood security. The crafts did not pay enough to live off, women could not exchange anything from their position on the programme and it took much of their daylight hours preventing women from engaging in any other kind of work (Van Wyk 2003a).

While hybrid livelihoods are embedded in social networks and reciprocal exchange which alleviate risk, each livelihood activity also served to feed and uphold another in monetary terms (Devey et al. 2006). In his research on a commercial farm on the Zimbabwean-South African border, Maxim Bolt (2012a: 127) found that formal and informal livelihoods constituted each other. Bolt (2012) found residents, both South African and Zimbabwean, undertook several informal activities from their residence on the farm that relied on the wages earned by themselves or others from the farm and neighbouring farms. In fact, he showed that securing waged employment was not only central to buy stock with, but it secured a place of residence from which to do business. Formal wage employment served as the basis of trade. In another article, Bolt (2014) drew attention to the different forms money took (cash, digital or commodities), and further, how these different forms enabled and determined different forms of economic activity. While Bolt drew attention to the variety of goods, such as soap, Zimbabweans in particular converted their waged earnings into to be sold across the border, James Ferguson (1992) noted that, in Lesotho, not all goods could be converted equally or readily back into cash. He showed how cash could be converted into cattle, but only back into money under particular circumstances, notably under duress. And in this, he argued, wealth could take on different forms, making it difficult to compare the wealth of households.

Similarly, Elizabeth Francis's (2000) research in the rural areas of southern and East African countries pointed to the same survival mechanisms of social networks, reciprocal exchange and hybrid livelihoods. In *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on a New Politics of Distribution,* James Ferguson argued that making a living in such a manner was a form of work. He framed the "making, negotiating, contesting and sometimes evading the social and affective claims" (Ferguson 2015: 96) as forms of work which he termed "distributive labour" (2015: 94–101).

As such, rural marginal and vulnerable populations have similar survival strategies. It is not possible to think about money and livelihoods without considering sociality, as these networks and exchange provided a layer of risk management that existed only if they were actively engaged in. Focusing on one income-generating activity reduced time spent on other livelihood activities, which increased the risk of destitution should this one activity not be fruitful enough. But, focusing on one activity also reduced the level of engagement with social networks and the possibility of reciprocal exchange, which increased marginalisation and the

risk of impoverishment. Vulnerability and poverty were reduced and managed by reciprocal exchange enabled through social networks that facilitated and were facilitated by a multiple of livelihood strategies, which consisted of agriculture, formal and informal economic activities (Francis 2000).

In relation to this literature, there are some specific observations to be made about the situation in my research area. First, it was interesting to note the centrality of nature conservation and ecotourism to the local economy, and how the industry had become part of participants' livelihood strategies (see also Van Wyk 2003b). Participants claimed that they benefitted greatly from charity and development programmes initiated and facilitated by conservation authorities, developed skills through employment which became sources of income elsewhere and found permanent employment. Secondly, many REAP participants' "backbone" businesses provided a form of security and helped participants build their lives. While literature reviewed emphasised the role of wage labour in providing security (du Toit & Neves 2009b; 2014), we saw in Ms Dunn and Mr Cebekhulu that a tuckshop or tavern provided security to mitigate against the short-term earnings of seasonal or contractual work. This brings into sharp focus the concepts of formal and informal work. While tuckshops and taverns were usually considered survivalist informal activities, they were, in this instance, providing the stability usually considered characteristic of formal work. This enabled owners to undertake economic activities considered to be formal (as they required contracts) but had the nature of informality due to their short term nature (Bolt 2012a).

"I was stealing from my business"

The socially embedded nature of informal businesses in my research area suggested, as Neves and du Toit (2014: 135) claimed, that the maximizing of profit and the minimising of costs "inadequately captures the potentially multiple objectives of economic informality". Are such activities to survive or to accumulate, and how does this difference in motivation shape the nature of economic activities? With this in mind, along with the above observations of how they were very similar to survival strategies in other parts of South Africa, how does one make sense of the following responses by participants to my question of "what was the biggest thing you learnt from REAP?" They jokingly responded that they learnt that "I had been stealing from my business", and that they had to separate themselves from their business.

Several participants spoke about their lives before they received REAP training, when they thought that all the money they earnt in their various businesses was theirs to spend like they wanted. This changed after the REAP workshops. Ms Zulu explained, "I learnt to separate

myself from my business because before I was like "'oh, I have R200, I must spend it', and after I receive that training, I have learned the fact that if you have a business it does not mean I have money. I am employed by my business." Ms Cele said that she too had learnt this lesson. "Actually, what happens now when you start a business and start to get money, 'Ha, I've got money now, let me buy a car', and forget about the business, so REAP taught us about that." She thought businesses failed because they had not learnt this ability to separate the owner from their business. "Most of the projects are closed down now because they see money and do the personal thing and forget about the business." I asked if this was because the owners did not manage their businesses. "Exactly", she replied, "[b]ecause when they see money, they see themselves rich. They don't know you have to work money in order to have money." Ms Dunn shared very similar sentiments,

> I also learnt how to manage my finance. I know when you're making money every day it's kind of easy to spend it on everything, but then when you get trained, you understand this is not your money. The moment I spend it anyhow it's the business that suffers the most and ultimately I am the one suffering the most because I won't have a business and then there's nobody supplying me with any sort of income.

But implementing this lesson of ringfencing money earned from a business was harder said than done in an area where people were generally very poor, where people did not know how much they would be earning each month, and where each one of the REAP participants were embedded in multiple social networks. This became particularly clear when I asked the REAP participants if they would have preferred to receive money over the subgrant. I was surprised when Ms Cele replied, "No, I don't prefer money, it was good that they bought me this, because sometimes when the money comes, it was salary time and I don't have money for salaries, and I [would] just pay the staff [with any money that came in]". She often had trouble getting parents to pay for their children's school fees, she explained. In this context, she would have "eaten" the money from REAP to keep her school going.

Mr Mthembu explained that although many REAP participants learnt about bookkeeping and how to keep the money from their businesses separate from their households, many would still be tempted to "eat" the REAP money because they still adhered to a "culture of spending" rather than saving. He explained it as follows,

> So, let's say like this, you are able to sell oranges where you can get R 1 000 a day. Ok, so you are glad you get R 1 000 a day. But, on your way back home, you pass by the supermarket and you buy one or two things. This is not even planned, but just because you have money, you will spend. So, people still have got the culture of spending rather than the culture of saving money.

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> This culture has got to develop, small businesses just spend money… I think these things are very difficult, because it is not the culture of the black people to… I think this financial management thing… businesses are not a cultural thing. We had a lot of cows, ok, although we were concerned for not losing each cow, because I think that [savings] should have evolved around that, if one should be concerned about not losing a cow out of 100, why should you not be concerned for spending money in the wrong way.

In his speculation as to why people in the area did not have a "culture of saving", Mr Mthembu touched on a different 'cultural' subject, about what people consider to be valuable. Like Ferguson (1992) who observed the cultural value of cattle in Lesotho, Mr Mthembu recognised that in this area too, money and cattle have different social values. It is not always possible to convert goods from one form to another and have the value maintained, as the value of goods are constituted by social norms, which in turn infer different social standings. So while a household may be low in cash and be deemed poor, it may have many cattle, and so be considered wealthy. In Mr Mthembu's answer, he was also subtly pointing to the fact that behaviours associated with savings and care were constituted by the form of the goods to be saved and cared for.

REAP's purpose was to start businesses that would return profits using bookkeeping methods as the tool to monitor whether this objective was being fulfilled. Their teaching that participants had to separate themselves from their businesses implied firstly, that these businesses made enough to cover their costs and expenses, and secondly, that the income was predictable and regular enough to be controlled, divided up, and acted upon. Saving and planning how one's income was used required knowing how much was coming in each month, on what date, and what predictable and controllable expenditures existed (Van Wyk 2012). None of the REAP participants I interviewed ran businesses where such predictability was common. For instance, in Ms Dunn case, her businesses were seasonally busy, which meant that she kept the quiet businesses going with profits from that season's main earner while her "backbone" business plugged any leftover expenses. Also, we have seen that income from one business was used to support other businesses and livelihoods. Support of businesses and livelihoods did not always take on a monetary form either. For example, Fezi got *m'gwinyas* from being a security guard, Ms Dunn had unpaid labour in the form of family, cultivating relationships with church attendees was how Ms Busisiwe Gumede told people about her catering and decorating company. So how does one do books for money that criss-crosses

between businesses, and changes value across various livelihood activities? And how does one quantify the intangible inherent in references to work opportunities and the return of favours.

While it may indeed have been very difficult to keep books for such economic activities, this does not explain why people who explicitly valued the REAP lesson to separate money earned from their businesses from their household expenses, did not keep books. All three project managers and the Osiba management report[41] (2016) noted that it was near impossible to get accurate financial data from the participants in the REAP Programme. They noted that participants were not diligent in keeping records or did not want to show them to iWP and Raizcorp. Mrs MacKenzie remarked that people did not have time to do the required books because they were busy keeping their multitude of livelihood activities going. Ms Mthethwa and Mr Willemse were more suspicious about the motivation of this lack of proper bookkeeping, saying that "people knew about SARS[42]", implying that REAP participants were trying to avoid paying taxes. They also speculated that participants thought that support would be withdrawn if their business was doing too well or not well enough.

For the REAP managers, bookkeeping helped business owners to organise their finances, to keep a record of what was spent and what was earned, and to see whether a person was "stealing from their business". Indeed, Ms Mthethwa said that basic stock-taking revealed to an elderly participant that his sons had been stealing from him. So how does one correlate the immediate response of "I learnt I was stealing from my business", with not actually doing the book work that underpins such a logic of separating self from business? I cannot speculate how many participants did or did not actually kept books, perhaps in private or in more informal formats, but I want to use this line of questioning to respond to Neves and du Toit (2014) prompt to ask questions about objectives in economic activity. And in this, I turn to the next most given answer, the one that was either in the same sentence as the first answer or followed shortly thereafter: "they funded me".

The distribution of grants though, created a different dynamic, within businesses and between iWP and participants. Both the iWP and Raizcorp project managers said that the Guiding and teaching should have really started once the equipment had been distributed, because "it's changed your business". "Now you have a facility, you have a stove when you have not had one, you've changed gear, and some people have completely taken that in their stride and others have really struggled with it," explained Mrs MacKenzie. Some participants

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[41] This Report was compiled by Osiba Management on behalf of the programme funders, the Global Environmental Fund. It was a programme evaluation of REAP.

[42] The South African Revenue Service is a government organisation that collects tax.

did not know what they wanted, some sold their equipment, and others were not using their goods, she continued. Given that I have shown that conservation and ecotourism establishments and activities have become but one of participant's livelihood strategies, perhaps participating in REAP was seen by the participants as a way to engage with iWP. In this, they were working to draw iWP into their social network, to enable reciprocal exchange of some kind, or have some aspect of iWP income form one of their multiple livelihood strategies. Participating in REAP was part of "making a plan".

Controlling claims

While REAP encouraged participants to control how they spent their money and use bookkeeping practices to help them do so, the sociality of goods and money meant it was not really possible (Ferguson 2015: 95). As such, participants needed to devise other methods to stop people from making claims on them, and in that way, save money. Ms Mthethwa explained,

> I've had people who have been doing well in their businesses wanting to find ways of coping because now they are seen as the person to go to if you have a problem, the person that will offer support, financial or anything. I think in most rural areas, for example if you have a car, your car becomes a community taxi. So I've had people reach a certain level of success now finding it very difficult to cope because of increasing demands on their resources and trying to find ways to deal with that…you know that, Michelle has a car, and now someone's daughter is sick and you have to be woken at 11pm and take them to hospital. You become the local counsellor and go to person, so they've been grappling with those issues. You also don't want to turn people away because of fear that some people might start demotivating you because you are now not helping out, you are bigger and better.

Mr Willemse said Ms Dunn dealt with this by opening her second shop in a different area, where nobody knew her, and in this way, nobody knew how much money she could possibly be making. She also managed these expectations by hiring a shop stewardess from outside of Khula Village. Ms Dunn herself said that she often got questions as to why or how she managed to receive the catering contracts from iWP. Indeed, Ferguson noted the strong claims people experienced on their resources so much so that money was converted to goods, such as cattle. This prevented claim-making and so enabled savings (Ferguson 1992; 2015: 95).

It was however, beneficial to keep the social networks and contacts alive. As the vignettes of participants lives showed, news of opportunities and jobs were shared through these networks so it was necessary to keep contacts happy. As such, attempting to save money needed not accounting methods, but ways to manage the social nature of money.

Conclusion

The vignettes into participants lives showed how socially embedded businesses were, but also how precarious local lives were. Indeed, economic anthropology has shown that the precarity of living in impoverishment is mitigated by reciprocal exchange, social networks and hybrid livelihoods. Having a "backbone" business I showed help to create stability where work was seasonal or contractual. Furthermore, participants' livelihoods were built on goods of different value which could not easily be exchanged. As such, bookkeeping was not conducive to the social reality of making a life in this area.

So why then were participants so positive about participating in REAP and learning to pay themselves a salary? Or in other words, why did they not implement what they had learnt? Bookkeeping required a predictable and fixed income, which none of the participants had. Furthermore, what may be deemed business resources were often used in these social networks and exchanges to build on individuals' social networks and in so doing, decrease their risks in the longer term. Should the owner of the business not engage in these networks, they risked losing a security that came from being deeply embedded in these networks. Keeping one's profits and resources for oneself removed one from these networks. There existed a tension then, between building security through relationships or profit and savings. And in an area of such poverty, where the market is poor and unpredictable, an individual needed to assess which form of security was going to be the most secure.

Looking at participants' livelihood strategies, I showed that conservation areas had become part of participants' social networks and one of their multiple livelihoods. Indeed, Ms Dunn, Ms Gumede, Ms Zulu had all been hired directly by iWP to cater for events. Ms Dunn did environmental education for school children, hired by iWP. So, given that we can see the ways in which locals have "made a plan" to make a living, participating in REAP may have been one more effort, one more option in their plan making. Seeing the centrality of iWP in many of these participants lives, how is that locals may have tried to embed iWP into the social networks? In the next chapter, I look at how participants made claims to dependency in an effort to embed iWP in their social network.

Chapter 5

"They invested in us, now they must use us": Patronage and Parks

Nosi had a bakery in a complex previously owned by Space Construction, which they had built and used as offices when the company built the R22. The R22 is a tarred road that connects Hluhluwe to Sodwana Bay and was one of the first projects completed after iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) was established (Govender 2013). Space Construction gave the complex to the local Traditional Authority which, at the time, consisted of two buildings and a roofed parking area, all fenced in with chicken mesh-fencing. At the time of my visit, the Traditional Authority was renting the office space in the first building to a seamstress and a copy-printing-fax business, while the Umfolozi College had opened a satellite campus in the other building. The complex's managerial committee had approached Phinda to build the third building, which Nosi was renting. Nosi sold bread, scones and cakes to people and *spaza*[43] shops, a skill she had developed after working in Jock Morrison's bakery.[44] As I was observing the clean-up operation after a long day and the loading of packets of scones into a white *bakkie*[45] destined for a *spaza* shop, I mentioned the Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP) to Nosi. She explained that she had applied to it because she could use a vehicle to transport her cakes but was not selected. Delivering them via a taxi was a little difficult. During our conversation, Nosi's daughter handed me a thick slice of cake, which I shared it with Thandi, my research assistant, and David, whom we met outside.

Mr David Mkhize acted as our tour guide. I had met him twice before, once with the project managers Ms Khanyisile Mthethwa and Ms Lindiwe Masinga from the Park and the other for an interview as a former REAP participant. The interview had taken place about a month earlier and five minutes north of the bakery, in a fenced-off area just off the R22. In the shade of a clump of trees, benches formed a large square. It was a popular socialising spot and several empty beer bottles lay around the base of the trees. David and I sat some 30 metres from the R22, watching various vehicles go by; expensive tourist cars with out-of-town number plates, air-conditioned busses and minibuses with tourism branding, government vehicles, construction vehicles, local taxis, and various run-down local cars. There were a few young men wearing threadbare clothing washing a taxi nearby and as our conversation continued,

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[43] Informal trading store.
[44] A cash-and-carry store.
[45] A vehicle with a large rear bin, mainly used for loading and transporting goods and people.

more drifted in. We had been discussing the high poverty and unemployment rate in the area.[46] Looking at the young men, Mr Mkhize commented, "Yes, they are very poor, very, very low employment rate. Just look around you, all those guys should be in [work], they are working age".

In other parts of the country with similar economic conditions , social grants and social networks mitigate against the vulnerability of such poverty and financial insecurity (Neves & du Toit 2009; Ferguson 2015; see chapter 4). But before I could ask David about it, he referred back to a conversation I had witnessed between himself and Ms Mthethwa and Ms Masinga when I accompanied them on a field site visit. Usually accompanied by a Raizcorp staff member, they would visit each current and former participant in iWP's REAP roughly three or four times a year to see how they were getting on. Although part of Raizcorp's "Guiding methodology", iWP staff explained that they accompanied Raizcorp staff or conducted visits of their own so as to maintain an up to date understanding of what was happening "on the ground". On this visit, we had met Mr Mkhize on a sandy side road, just off the R22. They conducted their conversation in Zulu, and I did not know what was being discussed, but when I met Mr Mkhize a month later outside the local bakery, he referred back to our meeting.

Mr Mkhize complained,

As I was telling the lady on that day, Khanyisile and Lindiwe, …I don't think iSimangaliso Wetland Park in terms of…supporting our businesses they are doing enough. Yes… they have trained us, supported us, but now I think we can do a lot of business within iSimangaliso itself. That is why I say I am not convinced that they have done enough… Saying we have groomed, trained these people, we need to groom them up to a certain level until they can stand on their own.

He also repeatedly stated that he had been trained, equipped and "just dumped outside". Mr Mkhize was a local councillor from 2000 to 2011 and in 2014 was a REAP participant. He received five weed-eaters and two chain saws to open a grass cutting and maintenance company from the Programme. The idea was that he would bill his landscaping services to the local municipality and schools and do road maintenance. The recent drought had drastically reduced his landscaping business because the grass was simply not growing. He remarked, "If I am expected to be employed by this community who are also unemployed, how are they going to support me?" Mr Mkhize continued that the local economy, like the rest of the South Africa,

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[46] According to StatsSA, the unemployment rate in this area was close to 39% (Statistics South Africa, 2011).

was in recession and that you often had to negotiate your prices downwards in order to do "any business".

Ms Doreen Zulu argued that the Park should "use" her because she had "benefitted" (see Chapter 4). But as she continued, she began detailing a conversation she heard on the radio a few days earlier, which my research assistant had also told me about. A local Zulu-speaking radio station held a debate between the Park's senior manager, and leaders and elders from various communities around the Park. They accused the Park of not delivering on its development mandate and were arguing for the possibility of mining to return to the area. This conversation made Ms Zulu very angry and was the reason she explained that the park should "use" her.

Mr Kwanele Bhengu complained that the political pressure on the Park to deliver development meant that when the Park had used his services, he felt like it was merely showcasing him for political ends. Mr Bhengu was trained through iWP as a nature tour guide in 2006 and was REAP participant in 2012. His business, Kwanele's Cultural Tours, was on the main road in St Lucia and offered cultural tours, game drives and hired out bicycles to tourists. Throughout our interview, he complained that he could not compete with other tour operators because he did not have a game viewing vehicle. He had to hire vehicles which were not always available. When a contingent of government officials visited the Park in 2013, iWP hired him to give them tours of the Park "because we have been on the REAP Programme". However, he complained that he felt used "like a puppet" to show other government departments that iWP were delivering on their development mandate. He took issue with driving ministers around the Park in a uniform that said "Kwanele's Cultural Tours" but in a vehicle iWP hired from another tour operator. Mr Bhengu was adamant that iWP should give him a game viewing vehicle.

Creating independent citizens

James Ferguson (2009:172) stipulated that liberalism entailed finding the right balance between the public and the private, between state and market. Neoliberalism, he said, blurred the distinction by "deploying new, market-based techniques of government within the terrain of the state itself" (Ferguson 2009: 172). "At the same time, new constructions of "active" and "responsible" citizens and communities are deployed to produce governmental results that do not depend on direct state intervention" (Ferguson 2009: 172). Neoliberal citizens were supposed to respond to incentives, prudently choose from among different forms of action, and rationally assess risks (Ferguson 2009: 172). In the African context, Ferguson argued,

neoliberalism took on a different form. It involved all the same policies and reforms, but a very limited development of such a subject (Ferguson 2009: 173).

REAP had arguably been designed to create a neoliberal subject. REAP's personal development methodology emphasised the development of an "internal locus of control" in its participants and encouraged participants to be entrepreneurial, risk-taking and independent individuals (See chapter 3). These are supposedly hallmarks of a democratically governed and neoliberal people. Arguably, the new democratic dispensation had fulfilled its mandate in that it had restored its citizen's human dignity because they could now be autonomous and independent individuals (Ferguson 2013: 224–225).

iWP expected these independent, self-driving individuals to view the Park as one company among many to whom participants could tender for work, in particular tourism-related businesses. iWP hoped that future relations between it and REAP participants would be mediated by its Central Supplier Database (CSD) where service providers were registered, and that contact would be initiated by its SMS advertising of tender opportunities. These tenders would fulfil iWP's mandate of driving social and economic development, and transforming the tourism sector and other service provision needs, without direct intervention in local lives. This hoped-for business relationship would also alleviate some of the pressure iWP was experiencing from its neighbours to provide employment or development to alleviate their poverty (see Chapter 2). However, contrary to such hopes and plans, REAP participants such as Ms Zulu, Mr Mkhize and Mr Bhengu were unwilling to become independent of the Park, declared their dependence on the Park, and insisted that the Park should "use" them.

Patron-client relationships

In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists were very interested in patron-client relations at the level of the state. However, the study of patron-client relationships had, up until this point, been largely a marginal field of interest which involved the study of informal and small group interactions, notably among peasant and agrarian societies (Kaufman 1974: 284; Befu 1977; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1981: 271).

Patron-client relationships are characterised by unequal power and monopoly access to resources (Hall 1977; Scott 1977) and involve a powerful figure, the patron, who, in exchange for loyalty and personal assistance from a client gives security, benefits, or both (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980: 49-50). While the patron may be the more powerful figure in the dyadic relationship, the patron is dependent on the client too, and so both parties "have power over each other" (Befu 1977: 273; cf. Hall 1977: 511; Scott 1977: 125). Indeed, Scott (1977:125)

argued that there is no need for patron-client relationships "if the force or authority at his [the patron's] command is alone sufficient to ensure the compliance of another". Hall (1977: 511) argued that clients will meet their obligations to the patron for as long as their needs are met. However, while it has been argued that the vertical nature of patron-client relationships undermine the horizontal relationships between clients (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980: 50), Scott (1985) showed that solidarity among clients was likely when the patron did not meet their expectations. As such, patronage typically occurs in a "context in which community norms and sanctions and the need for clients require at least a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity; the power imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship" (Scott 1977: 125).

Characteristic of patron-client relationships is their personal, face-to-face quality (Scott 1977: 126). Scott (1977: 126) explains that while both actors are "alive to the instrumental benefits of their association, it is not simply a neutral link of mutual advantage" and the relationship can stretch over many years. Often, relationships can survive severe testing. Furthermore, this relationship entails a "multiplex relationship", meaning that exchanges occur through multiple roles or events between the patron and client, "rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds" (Scott 1977: 126). Unlike an "explicit contractual relation" then, the relationship can endure for a long time, or at least, for as long as the two have something to offer each other (Scott 1977: 126). The number of clients a patron has is limited by both a patron's capacity to have a personal relationship with clients, as well as the vastness of their resources (Scott 1977: 126).

The study of patron-client relations as a form of social exchange grew in prominence as scholars sought to use this concept to understand larger social exchanges and macro-politics, notably in state organizations and political parties (Kaufman 1974). Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980: 46) argued that new types of patronage "may appear" as societies once dependent on patron-client relationships moved to establish modern democracies. Indeed, Scott (1977: 124) argued that patron-client relationships "thoroughly penetrated" bureaucracies and political parties in Southeast Asia, undermining the formal structure of authority. Kaufman (1974: 297) explained that the "formal-legal roles" in a democracy "disguise the patron-broker-client transactions which constitute the 'real' basis of power and coordination."

In post-independence Africa, such relationships have been described as neo-patrimonial and are most often applied to politicians who leverage state resources and infrastructure in patron-client relationships where loyalty and votes are at stake (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62–63; Hyden 2006: 96). Social scientists often argue that such forms of personal rule was characteristic of African social orders before colonialism and did not

disappear with the advent of multiparty democracies. Today, these old forms have been mixed up with constitutional law and the state apparatus (Hyden 2006: 96). So, while formal bureaucratic structures exist, they "disguise" the informal social relations of patron-client relationships which constitutes real power. Politicians and bureaucrats in these contexts have access to state resources, which they use for personal gain and in exchange for resources, ask for loyalty and votes (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62).

It is has been widely thought that this form of rule and the social instability it caused in Africa was due to Africa's dependency on the west, a relationship instated through colonialism. Jean-François Bayart (2010: xi-xxxvi) however, argued that this position of dependency was one that African leaders have been instrumental in making and maintaining, because African politics is a practise of extraversion[47] , that is, an active mode of dependency. By looking at African social orders over a *long durée,* Bayart argued that extraversion, which entails patronage, has been a feature of social and political systems on the continent long before colonialism. Extracting resources through trade and war and redirecting the spoils to social clients was the basis of African social organization. As such, patron-client relationships were the lynchpin of this social, economic and political order. In the postcolonial era, the state appropriated this social order, building on layers of patronage set down by earlier regimes.

The central tenant in Bayart's book, *The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly,* is how African leaders go about legitimising the state as a powerful entity. He argued that it does this by using state resources to build a class of people dependent on them, who in turn, become the dominant class. People are drawn into this process through evidence of the state's "belly", or wealth. Bayart (2010: 242) showed that the struggle for power in postcolonial Africa was a struggle for wealth because a "man of power who is able to amass and redistribute wealth becomes a 'man of honour'. In this context, material prosperity is one of the chief political virtues rather than being an object of disapproval." The ability to "eat" resources and show off one's wealth as a way to entice followers is known as the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010: 228–259).

James Ferguson (2013:224) explained African dependency in very similar terms. Looking at the Ngoni people, he showed that contrary to Western and liberal traditions that framed independence and autonomy as indications of dignity and freedom, the Ngoni framed individual personhood in relational terms. But Ferguson also showed that among the Ngoni,

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[47] Bayart (2010: xvii) defines extraversion as "the creation and the capture of a rent generated by dependency and which functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggle".

patron-client relations were a central organizing feature of their pre-colonial existence and that an individual's personhood was derived from dependency within these same polities. Wealth was measured in the number of followers a man had (Ferguson 2013: 228). As such, "hierarchical dependence here, as throughout the region, was not a problem or a debility – on the contrary, it was the principle mechanism for achieving social personhood"(Ferguson 2013: 226).

The manner in which personhood was established, that is, through membership rather than independence, continued throughout the colonial era into apartheid in the form of wage labour and racial membership (Ferguson 2013). Ferguson argued that while these systems were brutal in nature, men experienced membership, felt belonging, and were still valued and fought over. However, both forms of membership came to an end at roughly the same time, at the dawn of democracy when many men were rendered independent from, or surplus to, the groups that lent them social value (Ferguson 2013: 229). As he exclaimed, "Their problem today is *not* that they are being subordinated and subjected – it is worse. The real problem is that they have become not *worth* subjecting" (Ferguson 2013: 231). Ferguson (2013: 231) showed that, instead of being happily independent, men seek to build up new dependencies to enmesh themselves in new networks of dependencies in order to be able to make claims on others- and enable their survival (see Chapter 4). The only alternative to seeking dependence on other poor people, he argued, was to seek dependence on "an actor with a greater capacity to provide and protect" (Ferguson 2013: 231).

Ferguson (2013)'s "surplus people" could arguably form part of Partha Chatterjee's (2004) political society. Chatterjee (2004: 66) observed that while all citizens in a democratic India had equal rights, two civil societies existed; a liberal and a political civil society. While all citizens had the right to governmental programmes, he argued, the "benefits that are meant to be available in general are effectively cornered by those who have greater knowledge of and influence over the system" (Chatterjee 2004: 66). The liberal civil society was better equipped and able to claim their rights, and because of this *had* rights. The political society included the poor and underprivileged who had the same rights but the not the same means and resources to use their rights, leaving them with "entitlements" (Chatterjee 2004: 69). The dual nature of this civil society, he showed, resulted in a dual governance strategy where liberal civil society was "affirmed and protected within the legally constituted domain" (Chatterjee 2004: 74) while the political society used identity and positionality to struggle for their rights and alter the political field (Chatterjee 2004: 59).

Patronage in Zululand

Patronage has a long history in Zululand. Adam Kuper (1993: 486) argued that there were two political processes which were the basis of historical Zulu social order; the homestead and patron-client relationships. He contended that while Zulu society experienced changes under Shaka[48], patron-client relationships remained as a relationship form that linked individual homesteads with the royal house, such that no homestead was disconnected from its king. Furthermore, he stated that "an established, indeed universal, northern Nguni - perhaps pan-Nguni - house system was the basis of all the politics in the region in the nineteenth century" (Kuper 1993: 486).

The formation of Bantustans under the apartheid regime defined not only the ethnic identities of groups, but also territory to be governed and gave the leadership a different organising mechanism, bureaucracy, to become independent states. However, the central organising feature of patronage remained. Hyslop (2005: 782) described how in the declining stages of apartheid, the regime spent "billions of rands" on "recruiting black civil servants to staff the homeland bureaucracies, on supporting traditional chiefs, and on construction projects in homeland capitals", so that "homeland leaders presided over massive patronage networks". However, traditional leaders did not disappear with the dawn of democracy. Through clever political manoeuvring, the institution came to be enshrined in the constitution and leaders were put on the national payroll (Leatt 2017: 85–121; see Chapter 2).

In KwaZulu, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the Prime Minister, managed to secure all land under the Ingonyama Trust, overseen by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. As the second largest land holder around iWP, the Trust was meant to undertake various development initiatives on behalf of the people who lived on Trust land. The recent High Level Panel Report on Land indicated that this did not happen and instead, that the traditional authority was plagued by high levels of corruption, mismanagement and patronage (Motlanthe 2017). Furthermore, various media exposes have shown that the economic benefits generated through mining activities on land overseen by traditional leaders had been appropriated to enrich such leaders and their networks (Bloom 2016; Claassens 2018, 2019; Bloom & Wales-Smith 2019).

This corruption and patronage is also evident in the running of local municipalities (Ndletyana, Makhalemele & Mathekga 2013). Indeed, Mr Mkhize explained that "doing tendering with government depends on who you know" and that officials awarded work to

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[48] Shaka was the king of the Zulu kingdom from 1787 to 1828.

friends and family or to businesses they owned. And while he had been a councillor, he implied that he was now out of the circle, so to speak. Locals widely commented on – and condoned - such behaviour in the former president Jacob Zuma. Popularly political commentary labelled him a "big man" for his opulent consumption, epitomised in using state funds to build his private home in Nkandla, and marriage to three wives (Johnson 2010; Cilliers 2017). He was a noted traditionalist and widely liked in northern KwaZulu-Natal for his ability to act as a patron to those that followed him (Karim, Davis & Shoba 2019).

Most people living around iWP lived on Ingonyama Trust land and were subject to the Traditional Authority of *indunas*[49] and chiefs (see Chapter 2). On a local level, my participants described experiences of and had grievances with patronage in the area. This criticism was particularly pronounced among women. Ms Zulu criticized iWP's sharing of development opportunities with traditional leadership because "they just pick their families. They don't even tell people who are reliable or valuable for that thing. They say, oh, iSimangaliso says there is a grant for the SME's, oh you my daughter go, you my sister go." Ms Duduzile Cele's experience explains well how the area works. A lady from Australia had sent her a cheque and material goods to help her start a candle-making business in the area. The Australian woman sent the goods to the municipality which was "run by the IFP and the traditional authorities". These authorities did not inform Ms Cele that the goods had arrived, but was congratulated by several people for winning a cheque of R 50 000. As she complained,

> You know what they did? They went to canvas the political members, IFP, they said 'look, look, there is a big cheque, R50 000, a project ngaDuduzile has won this cheque'…they were calling people to come join the IFP, they help people, they give people cheques. But I never saw that cheque.

As such, during my research, the iWP existed in an area where social exchange was governed by patronage.

iSimangaliso Wetland Park as a patron
The iWP did not just exist in an area where patronage governed social exchange; it too could be considered a patron, or were seen to act like one. Given that iWP owned large tracts of land in an area with few economic opportunities, it was perhaps not surprising that patron-client relationships developed between it and communities surrounding the park. While residents of the area have long been connected to the "outside" through migrant labour, iWP and Raizcorp

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[49] *Indunas* refers to "headmen", men instated by traditional rule to govern over a territory and those living in it.

were viewed as both patrons and brokers who could connect locals with resources which would in turn bring about prosperity and freedom. This suggested the dependence of clients on their patron. Indeed, David recognised that if iWP themselves could not help him, they could connect him to someone else who could. "iSimangaliso can offer us many opportunities, they are connected", he said.

iWP also hired companies from other parts of South Africa to do work designed to benefit their clients. Furthermore, unlike programmes run by a far-off government, or faceless NGOs (see van Wyk 2003), the REAP project established close relationships between participants and iWP. Through the guiding process central to REAP's and Raizcorp's entrepreneurial support, participants formed personal relationships with members of the iWP staff, notably the project managers (see Chapter 3). Ms Mthethwa explained that the iWP and Raizcorp staff visited people in their homes or businesses and that they "sit with you, have endless cool drink and *madumbie*s (type of local potato) and all sorts of things [with you]" while they discussed your business. As a guide (see Chapter 3), she often dealt with participants' personal issues, which marked a new type of intimacy with these development "partners". For instance, she described witnessing, through the project, how a woman became financially independent, bought her own home, left her abusive husband and continued with her sewing business, making curtains and bedding. As such, a personal and intimate relationship were built between the Park's intermediaries, Ms Mthethwa and Ms Masinga as well as Raizcorp staff such as Mr Willemse, and REAP participants.

Apart from its patron-client relationships with people in the REAP Programme, other patrons in the area also recognised iWP as a patron and called on it to fulfil in its duties as one. For instance, on 12 March 2019, iWP supported the Umthayi Marula Festival which saw "the community unite in preparing the special traditional *marula* [a type of fruit] beer and present it to the King of the Tembe people" (iSimangaliso Wetland Park 2019). Apart from the King and various other traditional leaders, the Mayors from the various municipalities, the provincial chair for Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs as well as the president of the National House of Traditional Leaders were in attendance. In front of 20 000 people they "all commended iSimangaliso on great work being done and looked forward to more benefits and developments in the region through iSimangaliso as a key tourism driver and an organisation mandated to deliver social development to communities adjacent to the Park" (iSimangaliso Wetland Park 2019). iWP's social and economic mandate and the expectations thereof were kept alive by such public acknowledgements.

Apart from being landowners, iWP was also one of very few employers in the region (see Chapter 2) and had a mandate to deliver economic and social benefits to the communities that surround the park (see Chapter 2). As part of the land claims process, land claimant communities were fully aware of this development mandate, which has created a mutual expectation (Scott, 1977: 125), among iWP staff and the land claimant groups as well as previously disadvantaged people living in the Park and its borders that the economic benefits of nature conservation and tourism would go to "the people."

Indeed, since the Park's inception, various newspaper articles detailed local people's expectations of iWP and nature conservation to bring development and benefits (Moore 1999, 2002; Nel 2003; Jolly 2015). Aware of these expectations, the iWP warned in its 2011-2016 Integrated Management Plan that,

> Many people, particularly land claimants and neighbouring communities, have high expectations of the economic opportunities that the Park will generate. Such expectations of a natural asset and of the tourism sector are unrealistic. iSimangaliso is committed to fulfilling its development mandate but cannot singly resolve the regional economic issues, including the alleviation of widespread poverty" (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2011: 61; cf. (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism *et al.* 2009: 1).

This sentiment has been shared in Parliamentary Feedback Sessions, along with reasons as to why the Park could not meet these demands. "The biggest challenge was that there are not enough concessions to go around. Due to limited demand the Park had an ecological and viability cap" (Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Tourism 2015).

After David had argued that a certain percentage of tenders offered by iWP should go to REAP participants, I asked how he thought iWP could support participants without showing favouritism.

> No, they just need to regulate it and say, because they are coming from the community who is… this is iSimangaliso Wetland Park's area… we are part of them, we are family. We were trained by them, so we cannot really call it favouritism, there must be a percentage of work be given to people trained by iSimangaliso rather than letting us go. They invested in us, so they need to support us and see that we are growing.

Mr Mkhize's assertion that "this was iSimangaliso Wetland Park's area" acknowledged iWP's dominant presence in the area. It was also a subtle acknowledgment that he viewed iWP as a patron and that as a patron, iWP was responsible for giving him, who lived in their area, work.

Given that Mr Mkhize viewed iWP as a patron, his logic for participating in REAP was to build a relationship with them so as to become a visible client. Indeed, he stated "we are part of them, we are family. We were trained by them." As such, participating in the Programme was a form of social work to build a personal relationship with the Park. However, iWP did not see itself as a patron and resisted such demands. Indeed, Mr Mkhize declared that they just "dumped [him] outside". The point of discrepancy between iWP and the participants was on the social institutions which governed the deployment of this work. Through REAP, iWP saw itself as having trained participants to start and run their own business, who would equip them to tender for work on their own accord. iWP believed that this fulfilled their mandate and that they had no further responsibility to REAP participants. Mr Mkhize however, viewed iWP as a patron who would continue to support him and his business, because as a patron, that was their responsibility. He felt he should be guaranteed work.

As my conversation with Mr Mkhize continued, it materialised that he was not only offering his garden maintenance services to the Park but his social assistance too. While iWP did not expect social assistance, just tenders, Mr Mkhize believed that this was what he could offer. Ms Zulu also offered her personal assistance with iWP's troubled image on local radio. As such, while both claimed dependency on their patron, they also assumed the status of a client that could be "used" by the Park in two ways. First, in a manner synonymous with the "politics of the belly", which involved being used to show off the Park's wealth, and secondly, out of a knowing that this is the politicking that needs to be done, something that iWP were either not aware of or did not want to engage in. They were offering themselves to be used, to help the Park in understanding and navigating these politics. In so doing, they were hinting that the Park was not acting like a good patron and needed local guidance in this regard.

"Use us, we benefitted": Politics of the Belly

At first glance, Ms Zulu's motive for being "used" seemed to be informed by an altruistic interest in furthering REAP's project to ensure that more local businesses would grow and survive. She criticized the patronage she observed around her and suggested that this was part of the reason why businesses failed; because such people were not passionate or interested in business. But as our conversation continued, I began to understand that she defined a successful business based on whether a sub-grant recipient sold their equipment or not (see chapter 3). She believed that the continued existence of the equipment, such as Ms Zulu's hair salon equipment and laptops, made iWP locally visible. Anybody enquiring where Ms Zulu received her goods could see that iWP had provided all the things in her salon. The visibility of the

materials distributed was proof that iWP was delivering on their socio-economic mandate. Ms Zulu wanted to help iWP to choose participants who would be more likely to "survive", which meant that they did not sell their equipment, and so remained visible representatives of iWP's ability to give, and so of iWP's patronage.

Similarly, Mr Mkhize alluded to iWP's need to support businesses from around the Park and in particular those who had been through REAP, so that they remained open, working and visible, proof that iWP was a source of socio-economic development in the region. The organisation was able to upskill people, give them required goods, and furthermore, employ people through their businesses. Mr Mkhize argued for iWP to take ownership of the businesses that they had helped start and support.

> We were groomed by them, supported by them. Now for them to stand up and say these are the business people we have developed… because if they are not doing that, they will end up and say we have trained these people, we supported them financially in terms of equipment for them, but where are they? Are their businesses growing? Only to find most of them are not.

Both Ms Zulu and Mr Mkhize argued that iWP was not making visible the work it did in fulfilling its socio-economic mandate and that they were offering to help iWP do so. Their argument though, went beyond simply showing that iWP was fulfilling their mandate and keeping their promises. Their argument was centrally about "the politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010: 228-259). Mr Mkhize, while arguing for tenders, was saying that in hiring him, iWP would be supporting him and therefore showing off the Park's ability to support its clients, showing off its "belly". Ms Zulu made a direct clientage appeal,

> We benefitted from them, they must use us, they need to take us to the community, just to tell the community that they helped us. I heard in the radio last week that people were complaining about iSimangaliso, that they is not helping the people and I was so cross about that, I was so cross, because I benefitted from iSimangaliso so if they can do that for me, why can't they do it for others? Because iSimangaliso never uses us. They need to take us back to the community, to tell them what iSimangaliso did for us, you see.

Her appeal to be "used" was not to be hired through a tender, but to be "used" towards iWP's needs, notably to sing their praises when their critics were vocal- but also as proof that iWP could "provide". Like Mr Mkhize, she was hinting that iWP either did not understand this politics or chose not to engage with it. Either way, not only was she putting herself forward to be used by her a patron to sing praises to other (potential) clients, but put herself forward to

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her patron offering her knowledge, her loyalty, about how to understand and navigate these politics. Furthermore, what was being suggested by both Mr Mkhize and Ms Zulu, was that if iWP wanted legitimacy, they needed to engage with this politics. iWP needed to show its "belly".

Politics of the marginal

Kwanele Bhengu was, in this sense, meant to be evidence of iWP's "belly". Mr Bhengu came from the Western shores, an area to the west of Lake St Lucia with a long land claims history. He was trained through iWP as an NQF (National Qualifications Framework) Level 2 nature tour guide in 2006, opened Kwanele's Cultural Tours in 2010, and was a REAP participant in 2012. His wife had also been sponsored by iWP to be trained as nature tour guide and was his business partner. Through the REAP grant, he received a laptop and ten bicycles, and had bought three more since then. He hired a game viewing vehicle to give tours when he had bookings, and used tourists' own hired vehicles to give the cultural tours in. As such, he has been both a beneficiary of iWP in the sense that he has received skills training and goods and continued to be employed by the market the Park created. However, he felt that iWP had cheated him. As he said, "every time we did the paperwork in the classroom and you go and present" they asked, "what is the main main main need of your business?" Mr Bhengu identified a vehicle each time and expected that he would get one through REAP. He was of the understanding from the time he started training as a tour guide that "the main aim was to start our own business so they empowered us, so we can start our own business". When REAP only gave him the bicycles and a laptop, he was filled with bitterness and resentfulness toward iWP.

This anger went deeper than just resentment over an unfulfilled promise. Mr Bhengu felt that iWP had used him when they hired him to drive the parliamentary delegates around the Park in his own uniform, but in a vehicle iWP had hired for him to drive. He knew that he had been chosen because he had been a beneficiary of REAP and as such would advertise the benefits of the Programme. He explained how he had fielded questions from the parliamentarians about whether this was his business but that he had to explain that he had a business but not a vehicle. Mr Bhengu explained that a proper tour operating business had a vehicle and that not having one diminished his standing as a business man in front of these important guests.

This was not the first time that the Programme had "used" him in this way. The McNulty Prize made a video with him in it (McNulty Prize 2016). Andrew Zaloumis, the CEO

under whom REAP had been initiated, had been nominated for this prize, and Mr Bhengu had been featured as beneficiary of the Programme. In February 2017, Mr Bhengu also appeared in a magazine called *Destiny Man* as a beneficiary of the Programme. According to him, the article said that R180 million was granted to small and medium enterprise (SMME) development and that REAP had given R7.8 million to 130 enterprises over the eight years it had been working in the area. Mr Bhengu complained that he "only go about…R 75 000" and that there was no mention of R180 million. When I asked Mr Bhengu where he got the amount from, he explained that iWP received a "certain budget to do all these Park facilities" and that they did their own fundraising. He admitted that he did not have the exact amount that the Park had for such work but said that "even if you can ask Khanyisile and all the people that were involved, it is written there, 30 SMMEs were supported through the REAP Programme, and you know you look at this higher amount of money you can see they should have divided it up".

Whether REAP had R7.8 million or R180 million to spend on local businesses was beside the point. Mr Bhengu understood there to be millions of rands for SMMEs, and he felt that the Park should have bought him a vehicle with that money. As such, Mr Bhengu had done all a client was meant to do for their patron. He had been used to show their "belly" and sung their praises. Indeed, he had been shown off in the manner Mr Mkhize and Ms Zulu were beseeching iWP to use them. But he felt that his patron was not holding up their part of the relationship, and he was incensed that he had to pretend that his patron had fulfilled their end of the relationship. Furthermore, he believed that iWP had the means to fulfil their mandate to him but did not.

What Mr Bhengu suspected was that iWP's development programmes were a distraction and that it had no intention to transform or change local socio-economic conditions or challenge the elite's hold on jobs and positions. The Programmes were there to show parliament and others that iWP was working toward or meeting its commitments, when in fact, as he said, white people still "owned" the concessions and traditional leaders used their status to become partners or start ventures of their own. "The concessions in the Park are still owned by white people or *indunas*, the chiefs, [who frequently act as a white businessperson's] black economic partner. We are 100%, 110% BEE, I don't have any silent partner. I am just doing it myself and my wife". He vowed that,

> By next year, I am just going to bid. We have the new CEO of iSimangaliso, let's hope he just changes as well, let's hope he is someone who won't be biased, someone who is just going to just put the tender document on the table and say, 'let's bid'. You cannot have the same

concessions for five, ten years, doing the one and the same thing…so ja…it's all about corruption, it's all about whose been in the industry for the long time.

Although Mr Bhengu suspected that white-owned companies had concessions in the Park, iWP's management policy determined that all contractors, including tour operators, should have BEE status.[50] And where a private company sought to start a venture on land in the Park, they were required to have an equity partner, notably a land claimant group on whose land the venture existed (iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority 2017: 120–121). Mr Bhengu however lamented the fact that "some of the people won't try a black business man in this small town, if you realise it is me and Lungani", but continued, "Dumisani is out there because he is also a big chief then he can get all those preferences." Dumisani Gumede was the *induna* of Khula Village and was in partnership with a "white lady". They had a tour operating business that did boat cruises on Lake St Lucia. As such, Mr Bhengu felt marginalised. He did not have the resources to compete nor an elite position to be a likely candidate for a partnership with a well-resourced white-owned company needing an empowerment partner to do business with the Park. What he did have was his identity and positionality, that of "black", "land claimant", and "tourism business owner" and he used these to make claims on state resources, making him part of Chatterjee's (2004) political society.

I enquired of Ms Mthethwa about Mr Bhengu to understand his intense anger, why he felt cheated and what was to be done about a vehicle. "Have you met Bongani?" she asked. "He had received a vehicle". She continued to explain that iWP could not purchase the vehicle outright for him because they had a ceiling amount stipulated by the funders of the Programme. He used the money allocated to him through REAP to pay off his vehicle he was able to purchase with financing from a bank. This was explained to everyone, she said.

> Unfortunately for Kwanele and a number of other tourism businesses, they did not have those financial records. They were not banking, they did not have the insurances and public liabilities and registrations that they needed to have. They could have applied as an individual because we gave them both options, apply as Khanyisile or as Kwanele Tours business, but they did not have those things in place and the expectation was that iWP should provide which I don't think is fair. Even government would not have done that. If they had set a figure, said this is how much we can finance, and you are unable to provide the difference, what is iSimangaliso supposed to do? And that was the case for Kwanele… the process was fair and square and it

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[50] BEE status refers Black Economic Empowerment. In an effort to distribute wealth and so decrease wealth disparity between black and white people, businesses contracted to government must be 51% owned by black people.

was up to him to apply. And in fact he applied twice, because the vehicle idea is not going through, I'll apply again. He then applied to do bicycle tours, and the idea was he would do the tours, get his finances on track, all the tourism registrations and liabilities and then we can talk about finance.

What is to be made from these two different experiences? Ms Mthethwa explained it like this, "the difficulty is when people feel like they have no other option, they tend to blame."

Conclusion

The central tension of this chapter has been the manner in which nature conservation could be legitimised by people who live on its borders and whom it promised to serve. iWP used REAP to navigate the difference between a political and liberal society in the area (Chatterjee 2004). By "empowering" its participants with business acumen and equipment, they supposedly became members of a liberal society who would do their paperwork and be able to apply for loans and tenders. By alleviating poverty and providing jobs, iWP would be able to legitimise nature conservation as a social and economic developer. Indeed, Mr Mkhize, Ms Zulu and Bongani were evidence of this and part of this liberal society who enacted out their rights.

iWP also attempted to use REAP to manage the expectations on them to deliver. Bureaucracy distanced iWP from the people. However, participants made a claim to dependency and viewed contractual relationships as cold and devoid of personhood. Participants who were expected to become service providers wanted the warmth and familiarity that patronage entails. The participants were attempting to create a system in which they were known through their dependency status to iWP. What iWP did not prefigure, was that they slotted into an area that practiced patronage and that members of the newly emerging liberal society engaged in the "politics of the belly". And, because of this, the iWP had to legitimise their existence not only by fulfilling its mandate, it also had to show off its ability to provide for its dependents. The participants I interviewed suggested that iWP were not acting like good patrons and offered to help iWP understand and engage in this politics. This placed iWP in a catch-22 situation; it did not necessarily want to show off its ability to provide, because while it had lots of land, it did have enough financial resources to go around.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The African National Congress (ANC) envisioned that ecotourism and nature conservation would become social and economic development drivers in the improvement of the severely underdeveloped and impoverished region of northern KwaZulu-Natal. The declaration of iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iWP) as a World Heritage Site was the jewel in the crown of the larger Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative whose economic focus was nature conservation, ecotourism, and agriculture. As an organ of state, iWP had a mandate to implement this development by becoming a training and skills development hub for this region-wide project. Other organs of state, specifically local municipalities, were widely acknowledged to be in crisis while the undemocratic and often autocratic rule of traditional leadership still held sway. iWP thus experienced enormous pressure to deliver economic development because they were a large entity working in the area and because they were widely seen as the only responsive and capable state entity (see Chapter 2).

Alongside the announcement that ecotourism would drive development, the ANC also embarked on a land restitution process which eventually saw 100% of iWP being laid claim to. While land claimants received ownership of the land, they were not permitted to resettle on it. iWP continued to administer the land as conservation land, but signed co-management agreements with land claimant communities that entitled these groups to social and economic benefits that ecotourism and nature conservation would generate. It fell upon iWP to help claimant groups realise these benefits. The Park did this through their "develop to conserve" mandate and their Social, Economic and Environment Development strategy. However, tensions arose locally over who were rightful land claimants to iWP land as this entitled people to benefits. Traditional leadership had also been strengthened post-apartheid and they used their position to act as brokers for "their people" (Van Wyk 2003), often in opposition to conservation. As I showed in Chapter 2, iWP's new development mandate gave rise to a politics which intersected with established livelihood patterns, old hierarchies and positions of marginality, which meant that development was not a uniform experience nor an equally beneficial one. I argued that the access to iWP's promised benefits was generating a politics that saw locals jostling to gain access such benefits.

This thesis looked at one iWP initiated project that promised to deliver benefits to its participants. The Rural Enterprise Accelerator Programme (REAP) was initiated by iWP to enable and equip locals previously disadvantaged to start businesses that could bid for tenders and concessions from the Park. In Chapter 3, I argued that this development initiative functioned like an "anti-politics machine" (Ferguson 2010). iWP itself rendered poverty technical by employing a business development company, Raizcorp, to help locals start businesses, and REAP was an anti-politics machine because it pushed the onus of getting out of poverty onto the participant. Since Raizcorp ran the REAP Programme, their business development philosophy, which centred on entrepreneurial personal development, were central to the development project. As such, REAP's training implied that the participant had to become a certain type of person to access the market and to be able to prosper (see Chapter 3).

However, REAP's personal transformation goals and how these were supposed to translate into successful entrepreneurship came up against the poverty of the local economy (see Chapter 4). Indeed, REAP's distribution of sub-grants was an acknowledgement of the severe impoverishment of the region and the fact that most participants could not access start-up grants from formal financial institutions. The bookkeeping techniques participants learnt on the REAP also did not fit with the very real manner in which people in the area built their lives. Locals built social security through actively engaging in reciprocal exchange, having a hybrid of livelihoods strategies, multiple seasonal businesses and social networks. REAP participants had various income streams that all served to feed and support not only the household, but other income streams so that businesses were constantly cross-funded and money flowed between these activities. They also used the money they generated through businesses to actively engage in and be part of social networks that were not necessarily part of the business world. Not engaging in these networks and disallowing people from making claims on your resources jeopardised an individual's social security in the long term. In contrast with these local practices, the bookkeeping techniques that Raizcorp taught encouraged participants to save and partition money to be used for personal salaries and business expenditures alone. If participants applied this technology, they would effectively withdraw from wider reciprocal exchange networks and limit their economic activities to a single, probably seasonal, business. In a context of economic precarity, this would increase their risk of marginality and poverty.

In chapter 4, I contrasted this reality with the fact that REAP participants enthusiastically insisted that the most valuable thing they learnt from the project was its bookkeeping lessons, which taught them been "stealing from [their] business". Yet, REAP participants did not apply their bookkeeping knowledge. If their livelihood strategies did not

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lend themselves to neat ledgers, why then the enthusiasm? I argue that the manner in which livelihoods were made in this area were about both "making a plan" (Van Wyk 2012) and a social connection. By participating in REAP, participants might have viewed the Programme as yet another venture that might or might not reap some rewards; either through the sub-grants or connections to important local "patrons" such as iWP.

The area's social logic of patronage, and indeed participants' motivation for participating, became evident when participants made claims to dependency on the Park (see Chapter 5). As Ferguson (1990: 13) said, "the sense of structure… can only be grasped through [a] sometimes surprising and ironic process". Indeed, REAP was meant to create self-sufficient, independent business entrepreneurs and yet saw those self-same individuals asking to be "used". iWP envisioned that the project would produce entrepreneurs who would value the Park for the business opportunities it would create and at the same time, become independent from direct social support from the Park- and make fewer demands on it. By claiming dependence, REAP participants were also framing themselves as experts on patronage and highlighted ways for iWP to legitimise itself among the local population as a patron by engaging in the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010). Participants implored iWP to "use" them to show off iWP's ability to not only fulfil its mandate, but provide for its clients. They were suggesting that the iWP were not acting like a good patron, and offered their services in a show of loyalty to educate them on the nature of this politics and how to engage in it (see Chapter 5).

David Mosse (2013: 230) argued that anthropologists have returned to analysing development as "category of practice" and in doing so, showing how development was a practice more of "connection than community". Indeed, partaking in REAP was a way for participants to build an intimate relationship with iWP which enabled them to put forward their patronage claims. Mosse (2013: 230) outlined how participants in a similar project exercised their agency in "manipulating project discourses" but then making claims to various project resources "within a very different politics of patronage and allegiance". Undoubtedly this was evident in the development project I analysed.

REAP and iWP operated in an area in which patronage was central to the social and economic order. iWP's need to find local legitimacy, especially against the backdrop of land claims, and its mandate to deliver development meant that they opened themselves up to being pulled into this network. Referring to both Bayart (2010) and Ferguson's (1990) argument that dependency was not only about being able to make claims to resources but about establishing personhood, I argue that accepting the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 2010) and politicking by

its rules might be one way for iWP- and nature conservation- to gain legitimacy by affirming the personhood of those it had failed in the past. As such, by entering into relationships of patronage, iWP might, as Ferguson (2013) asserted, indicate that locals were worthy of subjugation.

iWP operated in a context of extremes where impoverishment, underdevelopment, a municipal delivery crisis, and traditional leadership rule contrasted with the area's beauty and wonder. While the Park itself did not necessarily have the financial resources to act like the patron its size would suggest, the manner in which they needed to acquire their legitimacy did not allow them to be modest.

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