THE EFFECTS OF RACE

EDITORS
NINA G. JABLONSKI
with GERHARD MARÉ
The STIAS series

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Hendrik Geyer
STIAS Director
Stellenbosch
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**George Chaplin** is a Senior Research Associate in the Anthropology Department and Lecturer in the Geography Department of The Pennsylvania State University. His interests uses Spatial Science to illuminate the past and present human condition. His studies include GIS, Human Ecology, Spatial Epidemiology, Spatial and Geo-Statistics, Human Biogeography, Palaeontology and Palaeoecological Reconstruction. His work on skin colour adaptation includes historical and geographic differences in attitudes towards skin colour and the development of concepts of race.

**Maureen A. Eger** is a Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology at Umeå University. She is also affiliated with the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies at the University of California and the Department of Sociology at the University of Washington. Her research interests include political sociology, the welfare state, immigration and nationalism. Her work has been published in *European Sociological Review, International Journal of Comparative Sociology* and *Social Politics* among others.

**Zimitri Erasmus** is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg where she holds a post in the Department of Anthropology. She is a leading scholar on the politics of ‘race’ with several
publications in this field. Her research focuses on creolisation, anti-racisms and the politics of knowledge. Her work disrupts colonialism’s ethnological thinking and searches for new ways of thinking about ‘the human’. Zimitri’s latest book, Race Otherwise: Forging a new humanism for South Africa published by Wits University Press takes up these matters.

**Mikael Hjerm** is a Professor at the Department of Sociology at Umeå University. He focuses mainly on prejudice and nationalism in a comparative perspective trying to explain cross-country attitudinal variation. Right now he is focusing on attitudinal development amongst adolescents. He has also published in other areas like gender inequality, happiness and welfare state research.

**Nina G. Jablonski** is Evan Pugh University Professor of Anthropology at The Pennsylvania State University. Her fundamental interests are human and primate evolution, the evolution of human diversity and public education about these topics. Her work on the evolution and meanings of human skin colour led her fulfilling long-term association with STIAS and to write her latest book, Living Color: The Biological and Social Meaning of Skin Color (University of California Press, 2012). Along with Gerhard Maré, she has been the co-convenor of the Effects of Race study group within STIAS’s Being Human Today Project.

**Chabani Manganyi** is a former Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Pretoria. He is currently, a Senior Research Fellow at the university’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship (CAS). In the course of his longstanding professional career, he combined his academic career, during the early years, with a thriving clinical psychology practice in Johannesburg and other cities in the country. The early professional and academic years were the phase of publishing in psychology, the field of specialisation. During his later years at the universities of the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, he focussed his attention on the publication of biographies of some of South Africa’s creative luminaries including Es’kia Mphahlele, Gerard Sekoto and Dumile Feni.

**Gerhard Maré** is Professor Emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He had been Chair of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Critical Research of Race and Identity at the same institution. He has published widely on a range of subjects, especially on ethnic mobilisation and race/racialism. His most recent book is Declassified: moving beyond the dead end of race in South Africa.
Aaron Mauro is Assistant Professor of Digital Humanities and English at The Pennsylvania State University at Erie, The Behrend College. He is the director of the Penn State Digital Humanities Lab and teaches on topics relating to digital culture, computational text analysis and scholarly communication. His articles on U.S. literature and culture have appeared in *Modern Fiction Studies*, *Mosaic* and *Symploke*, among others. He has also published on issues relating to digital humanities in both *Digital Studies* and *Digital Humanities Quarterly*.

Njabulo Ndebele is Emeritus Professor at the University of Cape Town, Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg, Fellow of the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, and chairs the Nelson Mandela Foundation and Mandela Rhodes Foundation. A writer of published fiction and critical essays, he writes on a range of contemporary public issues that challenge South Africa as a fledgling constitutional democracy.

James O'Sullivan is a literary and cultural scholar who is currently a Lecturer in Digital Arts & Humanities at University College Cork (Ireland). He is active in the digital arts and humanities community and his research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed publications, including *Digital Scholarship in the Humanities*, *Digital Humanities Quarterly*, *Leonardo*, the *International Journal of Humanities and Arts Computing*, *English Studies* and *Hyperrhiz: New Media Cultures*.

Göran Therborn is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Cambridge. He has had a chair of sociology at Gothenburg, Sweden, one of political science at Nijmegen, Netherlanddd, and was for ten years co-Director of the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences at Uppsala, Sweden. His most recent books are, *The Killing Fields of Inequality* (2013) and *Cities of Power* (2017).

Theresa Wilson is a Senior Research Technologist for the Jablonski Human Evolution and Diversity Lab at The Pennsylvania State University. She has a background in Anthropology and holds a Master of Science in Library Sciences degree with a focus on Academic and Specialised Librarianship. Her current research interests include diversity in STEM education, text analysis of primary reference sources and evolution of human skin pigmentation.
The Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS), with the support of the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, commenced work on seven theme-based projects beginning in 2013, including the ambitious and wide-ranging theme of ‘Being Human Today’. The Effects of Race (EoR) Project arose in the context of ‘being human today’ because race-thinking and racism continue to frame the lives and define the nature of the human condition for most people in the world. Issues surrounding the meaning and effects of race are prominent in South Africa and the USA with their histories of segregation and they are emerging or re-emerging in many countries experiencing influxes of new immigrants. The EoR Project was conceived as an initiative at the forefront of creative and explicitly transdisciplinary scholarship that would be informed by insights from the social and biological sciences and the humanities. The EoR Project was also envisioned as scholarly with a pragmatic focus, with the aim of creating new scholarship to inform public policy. A ‘core group’ of EoR Project members, composed of senior scholars from diverse fields, was formed. The roster of EoR Project core group members comprised
sociologists, educators, a psychologist, a lawyer, theologian, a geographer and a writer.

As the EoR Project took shape, core group members voiced the need for further research and reflection on ‘race’, especially in the context of contesting visions for a democratic South Africa. They discussed the importance of catalysing innovative and imaginative approaches to ‘finding race’ and dealing with the ‘everydayness of race’, in order that the ‘reality’ of race can be eroded. The primary goal of the EoR Project evolved to being one of informing social change by challenging and undermining existing notions of racial difference. Recognising the tremendous and challenging breadth of this undertaking, the core group decided that it would be beneficial to hold its own discussions and to sponsor ‘group projects’, which would be conducted by individuals or teams of, primarily, junior investigators. A request for proposals was issued in late 2013 and five group projects were commissioned in mid-2014. Three of the group projects focused on the design of educational interventions aimed at curbing race-thinking and racism in South African schools and universities and two on specific aspects of the history of race-thinking in South Africa.

The core group decided to meet at STIAS every year for a period of at least two weeks and discuss a specific theme. The theme for the 2015 discussion was ‘racial templates’, a concept that was clearly articulated and often repeated by the late South African scholar and revolutionary, Neville Alexander. In a 2009 essay entitled, ‘Countering the racial habitus in post-apartheid South Africa’, Alexander wrote:

> The state, or more generally, the ruling classes, in any society have the paradigmatic prerogative of setting the template on which social identities, including racial identities, are based. Subaltern groups and layers of such societies necessarily contest or accept these identities over time. In South Africa, recent examples of this kind of contestation are the categories of ‘Bantu’ and ‘Coloured’. We must remember, however, that even though they are constructed, social identities seem to have a primordial validity for most individuals, precisely because they are not aware of the historical, social and political ways in which their identities have been constructed. This is, ultimately, the psychological explanation for the well-known tenacity of such identities. (Alexander, 2009)

Recognising the ‘primordial validity’ and ‘tenacity’ of racial templates, EoR Project core group members decided to use this theme as the focus for their 2015 discussions. They recognised the sinister power of racial templates to be formed early in life and to unfold and ramify over the years to have profound consequences for individual motivation, ideation and aspirations. Even in the absence of strong governmental forces or formal education, racial identities form and become
durable aspects of personality. The members undertook to explore the nature and ramifications of this phenomenon and the means by which the processes of template formation could be altered – even in the private spaces of minds and homes – as part of the process of ‘being human’.

Before the core group gathered at STIAS in July 2015, members were asked to prepare manuscripts or outlines of manuscripts on the theme of racial templates. The backgrounds and research interests of the members are heterogeneous and the theme of racial templates resonated distinctly with each person and struck different chords. Alexander’s formulation of ‘racial templates’, in the end, was a spark, not a nucleus. Alexander’s own construction of racial templates ignited wide-ranging discussions and even wider-ranging essays. It was, in fact, the tension created by discussion of the concept and nature of racial templates that inspired members to think deeply about the origins and myriad ramifications of race categories, race labelling and racialised identity formation.

One of the most important, but invisible, aspects of this collection is the nature of the academic atmosphere and discourse that helped produce the contributions in their current forms. The discussions of draft papers conducted in 2015 at STIAS were uplifting and intellectually productive because of the careful attention and high respect that core group members accorded one another with. As members became more familiar and comfortable with one another, the discussion became increasingly creative, penetrating and insightful and it was peppered with beneficial bouts of humour. The chapters of this volume reflect the diversity of scholarly interests and perspectives of core group member and the richness of the feedback they shared with one another and took home from the STIAS discussions.

The essays constitute diverse reflections on the creation of racialised identities and the instantiation of race-thinking. The South African authors in the group (Erasmus, Manganyi, Maré and Ndebele) bring with them lifetimes experiencing ‘race’ in all its senses, forms, dimensions and their considerations of the mechanisms and consequences of race formation in South Africa are the heart of this volume. Their essays, along with that of Therborn, constitute the first part of this volume, ‘Race in Racialised South Africa’.

The first chapter in this section is a sweeping personal reflection by Chabani Manganyi that draws heavily on his experiences as a psychologist. Manganyi uses the tools and vocabularies of psychology to examine racism as a ‘disease’ for which there may be a ‘cure’. His critical review probes the deepest origins of race-thinking and summons bodies of literature which summarise attitudes toward ‘the other’. He identifies the critical role played in South Africa and elsewhere by the empowerment of the act of racial classification and the development of durable
and unfortunately resilient associations of race labels with human value. Manganyi traces the history of racial categorisation and racism in South Africa to the present day, emphasising the role played by government leaders in the continuing spread of the disease of racism. Concluding that racism is not inevitable, he leads us to the brink of finding cures for the disease, ultimately through education and the elimination of unequal, racially based access to resources and opportunities.

Following on from this lead, Göran Therborn explores in his essay the phenomena of racism and race formation within his well-established theoretical framework of the three kinds or dimensions of human inequality. He situates racism as a form of existential inequality that – like sexism and patriarchy – affects individuals by denying full personhood. He explores inequality from a ‘micro’ perspective and reveals how racial inequality affects the formation of individual capabilities and self-concepts. In discussing how unequal categories, including race, can be equalised, he trains his sights directly on South Africa. In a penetrating exploration of the stark choices faced by South Africa, Therborn exposes the rarely discussed conflict between categorical equalisation of races and the persistence of economic inequality.

The next essay, by Zimitri Erasmus, on race and its articulation with concepts of the human, examines how anti-racism articulates with the concept of common humanity and thus indirectly explores the notion of whether a common humanity is the ultimate racial template. This essay is steeped in the South African discourse of racialised identity even though it does not reference South Africa directly. Erasmus’s rich and wide-ranging exposition does not tread the well-worn path of canonical literature on racism from the social sciences, but explores concepts of humanity espoused by humanists who have dealt explicitly with racism, including Frantz Fanon, Steven Biko and Sylvia Wynter. Hers is a provocative piece in which she argues that humanists have revealed human life to be valued not in absolute terms of common humanity, but in more relativistic terms of knowledge and cultural practice.

Gerhard Maré, in the next chapter, examines a related body of phenomena dealing with state-sponsored ‘racecraft’ in the persistent application of official racial labelling. Reflecting on decades of realisation of the psychological and social dangers of racial classification, especially in the service of apartheid, Maré dissects the layers of meaning and social destinies associated with race labels. He argues that the templates of identity and behaviour propagated by race labelling, guarantee that individuals can be slotted into an inherently unequal system of production. This chapter is an essential complement to Manganyi’s because it exposes the power and pervasiveness of racial templates as vectors which perpetuate the social ‘disease’ of racism and all the societal structures that uphold it. Maré deflects a pessimistic
outlook, however, by returning to the salutary themes of utopian thinking and ‘constructive imaginings’ especially in the realm of education and a rejection of the inevitability of racism.

The final essay in the first section of the book is by Njabulo Ndebele on the future of blackness. This is a creative exploration and imagining of the future of identity and of the responsibility of identity in South Africa. It explores the difficult territories of identities and the annulment of pre-assigned racial destinies and poses practical questions about the definition of blackness and the life of ‘the black’ after the demise of whiteness. How do long-disenfranchised people regain their humanity? The process of transition, Ndebele argues, from ‘blackness’ to ‘citizen’ to ‘human’ is underway, but much imagination and hard work is involved, because shared humanity is something that, ultimately, all people must achieve together.

The second section of the book, ‘Naming’, comprises three essays which examine the process and effects of labelling the ‘other’. These contributions look at how and why people have come to formally label one another by race and ethnicity, how the labels come to assume and connote value and how they affect the lives of people in democratic societies founded on principles of human equality. The essays in this section come from diverse intellectual traditions, but are concerned with the concepts and processes of identifying and labelling perceived groups and treating them differently because of their identified and labelled status.

George Chaplin’s innovative chapter opens this section by looking at the taxonomy of race ideation. This chapter dissects and explicates the underlying linguistic and ideational ‘operating systems’ of race thinking. Chaplin’s motivation for constructing this taxonomy is to reveal the multifarious pathways leading from different manifestations of race-thinking to different expressions of racism. For scholars who have wrestled unsuccessfully with the linguistic complexities of race-thinking and their connections to racism, Chaplin’s extensive charts showing interconnections will be a welcome relief and worth the patience required to explore them. This chapter provides fertile ground for future scholars seeking to understand the connections between the various articulations of race and the expressions of racism.

In the next chapter, Nina Jablonski, Aaron Mauro, James O’Sullivan and Theresa Wilson examine the vocabulary of race from an entirely different perspective. They draw upon the published newspaper descriptions of two recent and highly publicised cases of racialised violence in the USA and South Africa to examine the language used to describe participants in the incidents and the actions they were involved in. The two incidents in question were the 2014 murder of Michael Brown in the USA and the Marikana incident in South Africa that resulted in the deaths of
34 mine workers in 2012. The analysis undertaken by Jablonski and colleagues was motivated by the senior author’s hunch that the vocabulary used to describe victims and perpetrators of these incidents in newspapers reflected prevailing racialised ideas about their natures and motivations. The chapter is based on a pilot set of textual analyses conducted on newspaper articles from both countries dealing with the incidents and provides a practical toolkit for future explorations of the lexical and rhetorical manifestations of racism and racial identity in the press.

The final essay in this section and the volume is by Maureen A. Eger and Mikael Hjerm and concerns issues surrounding identity formation in modern, multi-ethnic Europe. The express focus of this piece is on societies that are not defined primarily by racialised identities and racism. It is, rather, an exploration of the very premise of identifying otherness by language or ethnicity in multicultural democracies. The authors approach this timely topic by exploring the notion of a common national identity and its interpretation. Their approach provides a historical and comparative sociological framework for understanding how current European political systems accommodate and label government attitudes toward multiculturalism and national identity. Their chapter discusses how adoption of common national identities and the espousal of values of egalitarianism, meritocracy and colour-blindness frame ideologies are folded into concepts of national identity and reconciled with increasing economic inequality between new immigrant and more established communities.

All of the essays in this diverse volume deal with the concept of group identity in the modern state. They explore questions ranging from how concepts of group identity have been formed and framed to the consequences of identity formation for individuals and societies. The chapters reflect the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of their authors and the voices they adopt when writing in those disciplines. What readers will take away from all of these essays is that the identification and labelling of groups is a universal practice. Beyond that, there is tremendous variation in the basis for the identification and labelling and in the degree to which these identities and labels are determinative of outcome. The authors of all of these pieces would, I believe, agree that labelled identities associated with differential treatment – whether conducing to more positive or more negative outcomes – are incompatible with social equality. The tension this creates for life in the modern world is not just a theoretical construct, it is real and is adjudicated in the politics and courts of South Africa, the USA and many other countries. The essays here suggest that injustices of the past can only be partly redressed by labels and the differential weighting of opportunity. The rediscovery of the importance of a shared humanity will ultimately militate the end of officially defined othering and identity ‘templates’ will evolve into ever messier, murkier and more evanescent entities.
This book, in all its diversity and variety, is an excellent introduction to an understanding of race-thinking in the twenty-first century world. Most of the chapters focus on the origins, lingering manifestations and continued evolution of ‘racecraft’ in South Africa, but the discussions are universal in their relevance. The wide excursions into diverse literatures taken by authors here ultimately shed considerable light on the nature and durability of racial templates, even if they do not invoke that descriptive phrase. In each of the chapters, readers hear the well-reasoned arguments and impassioned voices of scholars who live in a racialised world and who yearn for a human one. These contributions are a pavement upon which every serious scholar of race needs to tread.

Reference

PART 1

RACE IN RACIALISED SOUTH AFRICA
Despite the likely belief that democratic governments such as our own and that of the United States of America (USA), have distanced themselves from a centuries old scourge of racism against Africans and people of African descent during the last century, some reported that everyday life experiences of black citizens in both countries are a subject of unremitting academic and public interest. The centuries old scourge of race and racism which became the prime marker of presumed ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races in many parts of the world over time needs to be recognised for the psycho-social scar which it became. One needs to emphasise the fact that the history of race and racism is replete with evidence of human pride and prejudice. During the first two decades of the existence of the democratic state which Nelson Mandela and some of his African National Congress (ANC) senior colleagues helped to bring into being in our country between 1994 and 1999, racism and its predictable companion, inequality, have, to our surprise and disappointment, continued to thrive in post-apartheid South Africa.
The everyday proximity between racism and inequality, which receives such prominence in this essay, is a deliberate one for reasons that will become evident. Noteworthy also, is the fact that unlike the USA and other multiracial countries, we were privileged because of the fact that in preparation for a post-apartheid future, we were determined to make a fresh start. Simply stated, the intellectual, moral and political resources of our people, black and white, were mobilised in a historic enterprise: to deal with the political and related sins of our past with a view to the creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa. Such readiness to work together within the tense atmosphere of years of the South African transition from apartheid to a non-racial democratic society in the years following the release of Nelson Mandela and his fellow Robben Island comrades was not without its drawbacks. However, strenuous formal attempts during the years of transition such as the work of the Government of National Unity and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) are historic examples of concerted efforts to work towards a common national future irrespective of race.

The mid-1990s transition government participated in the structured mobilisation, through public policy making by South Africans of all races, in different spheres of national life, to bring a new non-racist South Africa into being. By the end of the first five years of the transition to democratic rule, I believed that spirited as our commitment to work was as an incoming non-racial government, the management of the transition from apartheid to a democratic non-racist society confronted us with complex challenges that, for the most part, had not been anticipated. Indeed, I and a few colleagues at the University of Pretoria and elsewhere, sounded some precautionary warnings at that time about dark clouds, which were gathering ominously over the horizon (Manganyi (ed.), 2004). In this chapter, I allow myself, and the reader, some leeway to problematise race and racism. In this way, I provide some room for uncertainty and curiosity. In the title, I refer deliberately to ‘perspectives on race and racism’ to capture the range of concerns which have become known over time in a number of countries and in a range of settings which I touch on. It was in the course of recent brushes with the international literature on race and racism that the role of inequality in the sustenance of race and racism stared me in the face for the first time. Without a doubt, the role of inequality in sustaining racism beyond the dawn of a non-racist democratic state in our country is a theme worthy of one’s attention in the future.

Searching for a path to take in order to move our country from a sinister racist past, especially during the apartheid era, was an extremely complex national undertaking. We were confronted with the well-established tenacity of racist policies and practices, known during the last century as apartheid. What gives one a transient sense of relief is the knowledge that there has been a continuing
intellectual search for a better understanding of everyday expressions of racism in different historical periods and countries. It is this universality of the race nightmare, which gives continuing significance and urgency to the problem of race and racism in post-colonial public life in the twenty-first century. In our country, thinking and writing about race and racism is complicated by the centuries old history of colonisation, first by the Dutch and then the British. It is in the light of such a longstanding history, coupled with the widely acknowledged complexity of racism as a psychosocial reality in contemporary public life, that a focus on contemporary perspectives is adopted in this essay.

Working and thinking along these lines, helped me to come to terms with the continuing uncertainty, which casts a sinister shadow over this field of study and its social history despite the vast world literature which continues to be churned out on race and racism. My uneasiness arises from a notable and growing uncertainty in the literature about what the origins and defining ‘signs and symptoms’ of racism really are. In some instances, racism is defined as though it is a psychological state, a disease of sorts. In this regard, I have often wondered whether a ‘disease entity’ concept of racism is either helpful or sustainable beyond its dubious contemporary currency and uncertain explanatory value. Having gone this far, I could not help thinking about a national ‘cure’ for racist behaviour. If racism should prove to be a biological, or a psychosocial affliction, which we sometimes appear to be making it out to be, then a permanent cure would have to be found.

Antiquity: a brief social history of race and racism

I begin my discussion of perspectives on race with a passing reference to the work of Jablonski (2012). Her book, entitled Living Color, opens a window in human evolution history, which reveals human migrations over planet earth as well as changes throughout antiquity of human skin colour resulting in the rich variety of peoples scattered throughout the world. A singular lesson learnt in the course of reading about the evolutionary journey of human skin colour is the sheer complexity of some of life’s puzzles, which we humans are expected to untangle. Skin or ‘living colour’ is one of the primary markers of the body we each live in and live through.

A second long term perspective on race and racism is detailed in the work of McCoskey (2012), author of, Race, Antiquity and its Legacy. In my view, her book is one of the most well thought through contemporary studies of race, antiquity and their legacy. Her text fulfils the task of making us think more carefully about our past in relation to our present as members of the human race, a theme carrying some relevance for us in post-apartheid South Africa. In writing about race and racism in South Africa, we too need to focus on both past and present as suggested
in the title of this essay. McCoskey’s text helped me to consider the alternate ways in which this complex question can be approached in the twenty-first century. In her engaging introduction to a wide-ranging study of race, she poses what she describes as ‘a deceptively simple question’, namely, ‘what is race?’ Her first answer is close to my own theoretical and everyday concerns about racism as a historical and psychosocial manifestation. I am referring especially to racism in instances such as the practice of apartheid, born out of a centuries old colonial occupation of our ancestral homeland coupled with race, inspired policies of legislated racial segregation in pre-1994 South Africa. Writing about what she describes as a ‘racial formation’ McCoskey (2012: 21-22) goes on to say:

At its most basic, race is an ideological structure that organises and classifies perceived human variation. Race thus allows the division of people into broad categories that presume to demarcate according to fundamental differences, such as ‘black’ and ‘white’.

It is important to emphasise the fact that one may add other significant polarities such as ‘civilised’ versus ‘primitive’, ‘superior intelligence’ versus ‘inferiority’. For purposes of greater clarity, she adds: “As the role of skin colour in defining race today suggests, racial differences have traditionally been attributed to biological characteristics, implying that racial categories emerge inherently from the human body” (2012: 2). One should add, for completeness, that considered from the perspectives about race and racism referred to above, the evolution of racialised identities is a psycho-historical phenomenon.

Following a detailed review of the status of race and racism in antiquity, especially amongst the Greeks, Romans and Egyptians, McCoskey arrives at the conclusion that race and racism in the form of more contemporary variations was relatively unknown in antiquity. She writes approvingly of the terminology of a ‘racial formation’ rather than race, meaning the “socio historical processes by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (2012: 2). It is important to note that she makes an important distinction between:

a ‘racial category’, i.e. a racial group whose members are assigned from outside, and a ‘racial identification’, i.e. a racial label actively claimed or asserted by the subject group itself. Greater attention has traditionally been paid to the historic impact of racial categories ... The concept of racial identification allows us to consider the complementary possibility of individual agency: the act of ‘taking on’ race, of asserting one’s racial identity from inside out, as it were. (McCoskey, 2012: 21-22)

We need to recognise the fact that in South Africa, racial categories took precedence in the ‘social formation’ of race and racism especially during the era of apartheid and the legalisation of separate development in the 1950s and beyond. An excellent example of a racial category in South African history is the apartheid era racial
category of so-called ‘Bantus’, a derogatory reference to Africans. It is worth noting that after 1652 following the initial arrival of the Dutch, a series of race based racial categories (attributions from outside) were used by settlers and their descendants to characterise so-called ‘kaffirs’, ‘Bantus’, ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Hottentots’. Centuries later, the ‘taking on’ of race, ‘asserting one’s racial identity from inside out’ found everyday expression in popular socio-political movements such as the Black Consciousness Movement spearheaded by Steven Bantu Biko and his generation in South Africa during the 1970s. It is noteworthy that in her concluding afterword McCoskey emphasises the view that it is imperative for both whites and blacks to appreciate that:

to confront race, to understand the roots and consequences of our blackness and whiteness requires first that we know our own histories and then that we find our own voice ... By gaining a more firm foothold on race historically, including its roots in classical antiquity (both real and invented), I think we can begin to combat its clandestine power over our lives and also see that our modern version of race is far from inevitable or neutral, it is simply a structure of belief that has been so powerful as to convince us that it is the only possible one. (McCoskey, 2012: 200-1)

Such a concluding statement is as assertive and unambiguous as it can be, considering the widespread centuries old psycho-political manifestations of racism beginning as we have noted, many centuries ago.

Another perspective on race and racism is presented in a collection of essays edited by Levine and Pataki (2004). However, for purposes of the perspective on race and racism being considered presently, it is Pataki who takes a furtive look at antiquity by noting that the idea of race started to assume its contemporary ‘modern forms’ during the early years of the seventeenth century. However, Pataki’s curiosity was broad ranging enough to have included the early history of Greece. In his retrospective assessment, reference is made to the fact there was a stage in antiquity during which Greeks considered themselves superior to barbarians. Significantly, Pataki goes on to qualify the above statement by noting that:

... the sense of their superiority seems not to have subtended from any conception of innate or natural moral or intellectual differences between peoples. ... The ancients appear to have been largely indifferent to group phenotypic differences, and they never mixed them with variations in innate endowment and capacity for cultural achievement to concoct a poisonous brew like that fed to modern racism. It is important to see that a social dispensation in which racial distinctions play no significant part is possible: there was such a dispensation. (Pataki, 2004a: 4)

How reassuring it is to learn that in antiquity, there was a non-racial dispensation. Here then is an important observation to make and emphasise in the twenty-first
century. We are reminded of the fact that significant as Greece was in the evolution of culture, statehood and world civilisation, it was during the early stages of its establishment, a state free of overt racist practices. In Pataki’s view, consonant with this conclusion, the preoccupation with race taking root in its contemporary form (‘modern form’) during the early years of the seventeenth century. An important conclusion to be drawn from the perspective on race, provided by Pataki, is that race and racism are not identical twins so to speak. There was a time when races existed without the concomitant existence of the social formation termed racism; without the widespread white narcissism, that became a dominant feature of white racism throughout the world centuries later.

Psychoanalysis, racism and envy

In another essay, entitled “Psychoanalysis, racism and envy” (2004b), Pataki left me with two noteworthy impressions. The first is that within the public domain two conceptions of racism have emerged. To begin with, there are people who believe in the existence of racism without ‘known’ motive. In other words, such individuals believe that although there may be motives to account for racist behaviour, such motives are obscure and unknown. Secondly, there are instances of racist practice ‘without motive’. However, Pataki, for one, was determined to focus on the need for a full understanding of what needs to constitute the primary focus in the investigation of racism: a psychology of racism in which object-relational concerns are central. In such a psychology, we are told:

... the primary expressions of racism will be viewed as motivated – often unconsciously but nevertheless intentionally – and directed at such object-mediated ends as the sustainment of self-esteem and identity, the suppression of fear and anxiety, the mitigation of guilt and envy, and the fulfilment of wishes for specialness, superiority, and belonging. (Pataki, 2004b: 179)

In the delineation of the racist consciousness outlined by Pataki, the racist is motivated, driven by a number of identifiable urges. Central to such a race-centred consciousness are motivation, irrationality and the central roles played by narcissism and envy. However, of singular importance in Pataki’s wide ranging consideration of race and racism is a rare and significant insight to the effect that racist behaviour and practices are neither predetermined nor inevitable. In my view, buried in Pataki’s statement, lies an insightful pronouncement of considerable significance. This insight frees us from an age-old stranglehold of the belief that racism is an inscrutable, inevitable, human foible that is beyond regular personal, moral and jurisdictional regulation. Undoubtedly, the full implications of thinking along these lines about race and racism remain a subject for further exploration. I
return briefly to the theme of the non-inevitability of racist behaviour at the end of this essay.

Colonial subjects and the social history of psychology

In an essay on culture and ethnicity, Voestermans and Jansz (2004: 166) focus on “the ways in which psychological concepts, theories, and instruments were used to conceptualise the nature and characteristics of non-western people, in particular the ‘others’ in the colonies in the past.” Such studies, the authors assure us, were intimately connected to efforts to ‘civilise’ the colonial subjects of the day. Their account helps us to understand the process through which the attribution of racial difference and the alleged inferiority of colonial subjects were constructed and formalised by colonisers during the nineteenth century. It was around this time, Voestermans and Jansz tell us, that a racist psychology school of thought took shape side by side with the claim that colonial ideals and practices were inspired by Christian ideals. With Bibles in hand, religious leaders preached a gospel, which portrayed native peoples in British and other colonies as the cursed children of Ham. People's reluctance to convert to Christianity was interpreted as a signifier of their inferiority, laziness, corruptibility and stupidity. In the course of time, colonialists required a 'more secular legitimation' of relations with natives, which were more reassuring than Christian beliefs.

It was experiences, such as the above, which led to the reworking of the images of ‘others’ as objects of a civilising mission by Christians from the nineteenth century onwards. Voestermans and Jansz identify France and Britain as two of the earliest countries to be involved in colonial civilising missions. Significantly and in the midst of the developments sketched here, the visibility of cultural differences amongst races followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution in 1859. In the course of time, claim Voestermans and Jansz, the impact of Darwinism was such that:

... the conviction grew that Darwinism was not merely a methodology and research orientation, but a model of development of species, including humans, based on inequality. Mechanisms such as 'natural selection' and 'the struggle for life' were held responsible for the existence of superior and inferior races across the globe. This implied a harsh verdict on 'primitive' people: they were backward as a result of their low position on the evolutionary ladder. (Voestermans and Jansz, 2004: 169)

It was in the light of such widespread popularisation of this kind of pseudoscience and its focus on race based inequality that nineteenth century claims were publicly made to the effect that Negroes were a species located, through evolution, halfway between Caucasians and chimpanzees in the universal family tree of creation.
Once slavery and its ancillary exploitation had been legitimised through a carefully orchestrated denigration of the mental abilities of African Americans and Native Americans, the conclusion that whites were intellectually superior in North America appeared incontestable.

Following their review of contributions by psychologists towards a race inspired discipline, Voestermans and Jansz identified a galaxy of well-known early twentieth century American psychologists, which included G. Stanley Hall, Yerkes, Goddard, Terman, Brigham and T.R. Garth. At the end of their review, they arrive at the conclusion that a defence of white superiority (namely a racist one), referring to ethnic, regional and national group differences, especially with regard to intelligence, by that body of psychologists was considered justified. However, such a degrading focus on black people’s alleged poor intelligence was not left unchallenged. Hans Boas, a German by birth, who made New York City his home in those days, became one of the most vocal critics of white supremacist race theories.

I have chosen Andrew S. Winston’s telling statement to bring this section of my discussion to a close. Winston (2004: 3) comments as follows:

> From 1895 when Bache published the first American study of racial differences in a psychology journal, to the contemporary writings of Jensen (1998), Lynn (2001), and Rushton (2001), ‘race’ and ‘racial difference’ have been persistent and troublesome issues for the discipline. Even after a century of severe criticism, discussions of the size of Black versus White Brains still appear in psychology journals, race is still treated as a set of distinct biological categories, and racial comparisons of intelligence test scores are still presented as meaningful scientific questions. Claims of a genetic basis for such differences emerged, receded, and emerged anew. The dynamics of racial difference research occurred against a broader shift in academic psychology: starting in the 1930s, psychologists moved away from confirming old racial hierarchies and took up the study of prejudice. By the 1950s, psychologists played an important role in the fight against racial injustice. Thus, psychology has had an unusual, dual relationship with race involving both racist and antiracist dimensions.

Notable also from Winston’s review of the history of race in the United States, is the fact that while the American Anthropological Association rejected ‘the concept of race’ by the year 1994, psychologists are reported to have been working from a different perspective. They disregarded important public interventions in American race relations such as the legacy around the contributions of W.E.B. du Bois and the verdict in Brown v. Board of Education. Winston decries the situation in the United States and emphasises the fact that psychologists waited until the 1970s. It was only then that a serious examination of the history of linked notions of intelligence and race started to take shape. However, in 1969, Jensen’s *Harvard Educational Review* article advanced the claim that compensatory education in the United States had
failed due to inherited deficiencies of black children. At that time, Jensen was supported by a notorious, but highly regarded American physicist named William Shockley. Shockley championed eugenic programmes to undermine reproduction by people with low IQs. In the light of the developments sketched above, Winston (2004) considered these discussions, which took place in the American Psychologist throughout the 1990s and concluded that:

... the discipline had not resolved the issues of race and racial differences as scientific or pseudoscientific questions. Although many accounts emphasised the demise of race psychology, the work of the contributors ... suggests more a history in which racial research does not disappear but survives and resurfaces with changes in the social landscape. (Winston, 2004: 7)

My own views about race and racism can be traced back to the 1970s and the 1980s. Looming large in my mind at that time, were a motley of political and academic influences which included: psychoanalysis, the neuropsychology of the body image, the writings and popularisation of the activism of Franz Fanon and Steven Bantu Biko, the prime mover of the black consciousness movement in South Africa during the 1970s and beyond. During this phase of my earliest writing on race and racism, my first publications appeared in print in 1973, 1977 and 1985. However, for present illustrative purposes, a brief reference to one of my essays entitled, ‘Europe and its others’ (1985) should suffice.

I used an opportunity during an international conference on ‘Europe and its Others’ in 1984 in the United Kingdom to explore the historical attribution of racial inferiority in the work and writing of psychologists, psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, anthropologists and philosophers. I took aim at the views of an assortment of prominent figures past and present (at that time) who made unflattering and derogatory public pronouncements on black so-called primitive people. The arrogant parade of Caucasian bigotry included Hegel’s ill-conceived and regrettable pronouncements in which he wrote about so-called Negroes as ‘natural’ man who displayed humanity in its wild and untamed state. This ‘natural’ man displayed no morality, nor knowledge, about the immortality of the soul. Worse still, the devouring of human flesh was not beyond their reach.

The list in my original account included notables such as Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Engels, Hans Gunter, Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, J.C. Carothers, Simon Biesheuvel and J.C. de Ridder amongst others. Both De Ridder and Biesheuvel (the South Africans in the crowd) exhibited in some of their published work, the kind of contempt with which African people in South Africa were treated during the century of apartheid.

Nevertheless, of special note in the overall review of this theme at that time were the name and views of a psychologist then resident in the USA, H.A. Bulhan. In
1981, Bulhan wrote about an Africa-wide penetration of South African practices in ‘industrial’ psychology especially with regard to the use of psychological tests developed for use amongst Africans by South African psychologist, Simon Biesheuvel and his team at the National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) in Johannesburg. The primary aim of Biesheuvel’s, ‘African psychological research’ was, in his own words, “to gain an understanding of the behaviour of African peoples”, “to provide means of testing the general validity of psychological hypothesis concerning human behaviour” and “to determine the extent to which (the African’s behaviour) is modifiable” (Biesheuvel, 1958: 161-2). However, in South Africa at that time, attributions of racial difference and inferiority were not limited to the NIPR where Biesheuvel was in charge. A second example of racial attributions in the name of science was pronounced in the work of then South African psychologist, J.C. de Ridder, in his 1961 book, *The Personality of the Urban African in South Africa*, based on his research findings at the Public Utility Corporation (PUTCO) in Johannesburg. He had used a modified version of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to investigate the personality of urban Africans in South Africa. Amongst other assertions were conclusions such as the view that urban Africans are prone to anxiety states and insecurity. They had, De Ridder claimed, underdeveloped egos and super egos. He described South Africa’s urban Africans, inter alia, as follows:

In the urban African, anxiety and insecurity are endemic. The personality of the urban African is dominated by the Id – which is to say, by the most ‘primitive’ and pleasure seeking system in the entire personality matrix as formulated in Freudian theory. Africans suffer from a lack of emotional control (under developed ego, super ego) and ‘as a group’ appear to be an aggressive people. (De Ridder, 1961: 55)

What is noteworthy in this context is that during the course of the widespread attribution of inferiority of black people’s intelligence in the mid to late twentieth century, book titles such as *Race, Intelligence and Education*, *The Mind of Men in Africa*, *Mind in the Heart of Darkness* and *The Pagan Soul* achieved wide circulation.

The South African connection

In this section, I will for the purpose of illustration, limit myself to accounts on race and racism written by an increasing number of local scholars (other than De Ridder and Biesheuvel). My prime example is an account on psychology and race in South Africa by Louw and Forster (2004). They begin their account by focusing on the ‘prehistory’ of psychology in South Africa, recalling the segregated facilities and mental health practices of the pre-twentieth century period before the Act of
Union in 1910. They go on to describe conditions in psychiatry hospital facilities in those days as follows:

In 1891, the first asylum opened on the mainland, at Valkenberg Asylum. This was explicitly for white patients only, and black patients were accommodated only in 1916, but in a separate facility across a small river. For currently unknown reasons, it was considered a more humane treatment of mental illness to separate white and black patients in the asylums ... This arrangement continued until the early 1990s, and the advent of democracy. Thus, the mental health profession, psychologists included, are grappling with the legacy of more than a century of colonialism and apartheid. (Louw and Forster, 2004:173)

Louw and Forster highlight the fact that generations of white psychology professionals, together with the majority of white South Africans in our country, ignored years of prevailing racist attitudes and practices amongst psychologists and their response to legalised race discrimination in mental health facilities and practice. They go on to describe developments in South Africa and note the fact that the 1950s turned out to have been a turning point.

Until WWII, the discourse on race in South Africa was not remarkably distinct from scientific and popular discourses elsewhere in the world. A dramatic shift occurred after the war when the South African government implemented the formal legalisation of the segregation of all races. Louw and Forster describe how South Africans started to work against prevailing practices elsewhere through the formal segregation of races in South Africa. At that stage, it turned out to be the first time that the all white government was determined in its resolve to implement an elaborate scheme aimed at the total segregation of its citizens according to race. Accordingly, as Louw and Forster point out, South African psychologists were severely criticised by their international colleagues over a long period of time for their silence with regard to apartheid and its practice in South Africa.

It is enlightening to compare, the brief account about the South African situation above, with the account that Andrew Winston (2004) gives about developments in the USA. Following is a brief, but pointed review of American psychology and its role in the development of racism there. Winston expresses his disapproval of developments there by drawing attention to the fact that throughout the 1990s discussions in the *American Psychologist* had failed to resolve questions about race and racism as pertinent scientific questions. I make this reference to Andrew Winston's perspective because his assessment, coupled with the accounts of Louw and Forster, may help us to think more innovatively about whether optimism about the end of racism in South Africa in the past 20 years of transition was understandable and justified.
Imagine the irony. About a year or so after the end of legislated apartheid in 1994, Dubow, a widely known scholar on South Africa and the theme of race and racism, published a well-researched account of what he described as “scientific racism in modern South Africa”. Overall, it is fair to say that the book was timely, published as it was at a time when substantive political changes were in sight in South Africa. His concerns in his book are wide-ranging and significant. Writing in his introduction he says:

A curious form of collective amnesia has, until quite recently, obscured the centrality of intellectual racism in Western thought during the early part of the twentieth century. Although the existence of racist attitudes has been widely acknowledged … notwithstanding the importance of several pioneering studies of the subject, there has been a considerable under estimation of the extent to which theories of racial difference form part of mainstream intellectual traditions. This silence is now being addressed by a rapidly growing body of sophisticated historical writing, much of it focused on Britain, Europe and the United States. (Dubow, 1995: 1)

Dubow took special note of the fact that race was a dominant reality in the South African public life. Yet, to his surprise, there had been so little interest in the study of the roots of racism. Indeed, this was a subject where remarkable silence was maintained by both the psychology and psychiatry professions until recently.

Without a doubt, Dubow was concerned about what he perceived to have been a lack of interest in the academic study of scientific racism in South Africa. Rightly or wrongly, he believed that the “non-racial tradition of opposition to apartheid” was deliberately downplayed during the course of the transition to democracy from 1994 onwards. He speculates freely about racism’s capacity to cause divisions and says, “On account of its divisiveness, the salience of race has at times been almost wished away” (1995: 4). In the midst of his appreciation of variants of South African historical scholarship and the focus on social history, he expresses concerns about white authors ‘speaking on behalf’ of South African black people and highlights the extent to which South Africa and its neighbours such as Namibia became mainstays of race science during the twentieth century. Based on numerous examples, he illustrates the fact that by the first decades of the last century, South Africa was already “an international repository of data and focus of scientific research into problems of race” (1995: 15). Commenting on the decline of scientific racism elsewhere in the world following WWII, Dubow takes note of the fact that such a development coincided with the rise of full-blown apartheid in South Africa. As he put it: “But, precisely because apartheid’s statutory assertion of white supremacy occurred just as the international race paradigm began to collapse, South Africa has served as an international byword for racism in the second half of the twentieth century” (Dubow, 1995: 19).
Another important theme in Dubow’s list of concerns is the account on “Mental testing and the understanding of the ‘native mind’” (1995: chapter 6) – in which he writes about the role of physical anthropology and its narratives about ‘Bantu’ people and ‘Hottentots’. Of special importance to me is the question of ‘mental testing’ as the ideal road to the ‘native mind’, once a crucial preoccupation of some researchers and institutions of various kinds so meticulously brought to the fore in Dubow’s book. This is what I noted in discussing De Ridder and Biesheuvel above.

In a concluding section entitled ‘denouement’, of Dubow’s later book, *Apartheid 1948-1994*, he recognises the challenges that late president Mandela and his colleagues confronted during the early years of transition from apartheid to democracy in the 1990s. Compromises and give and take along the way were to be expected. In recognising Mandela’s crucial role Dubow says:

Realising a non-racial South Africa therefore amounted to a balancing act that depended enormously on Mandela’s personal powers of persuasion and commanding presence: there is simply no one else who could conceivably do it. (2014: 267)

It was the black majority of South Africa who sustained the bulk of the burden of misery and deaths during the late 1980s and 1990s – the critical years of transition from apartheid to democratic statehood. Notably, it is the same sector of our country’s population, which is currently burdened with the impoverishment arising from structural economic inequality between black and white South Africans with the new black tender-seekers reaping the benefits. Dubow reminds us of the fact that in the midst of the inequality, ‘redistribution’ soon became the code word for ‘black economic empowerment’. Here then was South Africa’s transition reminding us of early 1960s Algeria. It was then that Frantz Fanon drew attention to the emergence of a new bourgeois in that country, an emerging class which put naked self-interest ahead of the welfare of the majority of the people.

Dubow makes a very pertinent point in his analysis of the early days of the South African transition. He notes that it was far easier to eradicate the country’s apartheid institutional infrastructure, its multiple black, coloured and white legislatures, as well as the white minority’s power to oppress the black majority population. Significantly, what remained intact in the course of the whirlwind transition of the last half of the 1990s was, as Dubow (2014) puts it, underlying inequality and other material and social legacies. I should point out that ‘the facts on the ground’ include a great deal more than inequality. No one that I know of has thus far studied the old apartheid ethnic geography as part of the resilient ‘facts on the ground’ of the post-apartheid era. The supreme consequence of the brief picture painted above is that a significant proportion of South Africa’s black majority, that is, the working and unemployed classes, continue to live under conditions of chronic poverty, under-
employment and unemployment. Under the expansive shadow of South African white racism, old and new, lies generations of an old ethnic system amongst black South Africans as part and parcel of yesteryear’s grand apartheid, which we had hoped to lay to rest in the mid-1990s. As matters stand today, all indications are that the remnants of the old National Party ethnic mobilisation are not only in place, but remain a potential of possible ethnic and political instability amongst South Africans.

In the spirit of the first democratic government’s reconstruction and development strategy, under the leadership of President Mandela, the interim government of national unity amongst other strategic interventions, established a TRC. As Dubow (2014) points out, the short-lived TRC was primarily aimed at the high visibility value of national reconciliation, a kind of shock absorber to ensure a smooth transition from white domination towards a multiracial South African nation. Firstly, the Commission identified and highlighted the gross violation of people’s rights, especially black people’s rights between 1960 and 1994. The TRC achieved high public visibility at home and abroad. During the course of its limited lifespan the TRC ‘toyed’ with the complex prospect of implementing a national reparation programme. However, as Dubow points out, the Commission’s public visibility tapered off around 1998, a year during which the Commission’s Report was made public. Some critics will hold on to the view that emotional reconciliation (spiritual and psychological catharsis) superseded the supreme need for an economically just and viable form of restitution. Nevertheless, interesting as the theme of our transition is, what is necessary for the moment is to bring the abovementioned discussions to a close.

In doing so, I would like to refer to a foreword statement by Stephen Frosh, in Derek Hook’s recent book, *A Critical Psychology of the Post-Colonial*, who writes as follows (2012: x):

> The emergence of the new, post-apartheid South Africa has provoked a wave of thinking around ‘race’ and the ‘post-colonial’ that links with developments in other parts of the world, and that has ramifications for academics and activists (some of them the same people) everywhere. If such an apparently entrenched system of racist oppression can be overturned so spectacularly, then maybe there is hope for other struggles; conversely, if such a massive political upheaval does not root out racist ideologies and practices, then what can, and what is it that sustains this racism into the ‘new’ post-colonial world? Indeed, what accounts for the ruthless resilience of white racism?

The abovementioned question is both important and urgent. It could well be the most urgent, if not the most important, challenge of this century. However, I should add that the continued existence of racism in the ‘post-colonial world’ needs to be considered together with the view adopted here, namely that the continued
existence of racism in any post-colonial state is not and has never been necessarily inevitable. Put in terms that are more explicit: racism is not and has never been the realisation in public life of a biological law of human destiny. My plea in the twenty-first century is for the demystification and eradication of both the claims of race as an identity and racism as a social practice, coupled with the co-existing educational and class inequalities, that thrive so mischievously in our country and elsewhere.

The message in contemporary writing, as outlined earlier, is in part that a remedy for the malady named racism has remained out of reach for a considerable period of time, in as many countries as one can think of. The periodic visible resurfacing of affirmations of continuing racist beliefs and practices in post-apartheid South Africa and some American cities should not be shrugged off. They are crude reminders of how old the present is. What concerns me most is an apparent absence of visible resolve in our country and the USA, for example, to deal decisively with the occasional resurfacing of racist behaviour, which often results in the case of the USA at least, in the killing of innocent black people. We must constantly remind ourselves about the historic large-scale pogroms in human history in which race and racism have played a significant role. Racism on a large scale is the kind of scourge that made the trans-Atlantic slave trade possible, Hitler’s killing pogroms possible and South Africa’s Hendrik Verwoerd’s racist separate development programmes possible. South Africans must ask themselves the following question: what sustains the apartheid era’s racist consciousness that are the psychosocial identities which defined black and white relations since the days of the Cape Colony until the twentieth century’s formal consolidation of apartheid racism? The post-colonial and post-apartheid existence of apartheid style black and white racialised identities must remain our century’s lead theme for both on-going research and the implementation of strategies for the systematic eradication of structural sources of race-based inequality in our country. Phrased differently, there is an urgent necessity to unravel the underlying socio-economic foundations and supporting institutional practices, which sustain expanding racial inequality in post-1994 South Africa. In this regard, we need to focus our resolve on the view that racism is not ‘inevitable’. In plain language, post-colonial racism is like its predecessors before, a realisation of institutionalised social, political, educational and economic inequality, which served and continues to serve the interests of the white minority in our country.

Race, racism and the South African transition

Answers to complex questions are often difficult to find. I would be surprised if this statement were not true with regard to the thorny question of race and racism. In South Africa, policy implementation failures became evident in the education and
health sectors by the second decade of a democratic South Africa. In *On Becoming a Democracy* (2004), I describe the transition challenge of coming to terms with choices, as well as burdens of the past which continue to impact on public life especially during the course of a momentous transition such as our own during the course of the mid-1990s.

Twenty years after our liberation, the question we must ask ourselves is: was apartheid’s ideology and everyday practice akin to racist practices elsewhere in Africa and the world? Today, some two decades after liberation in our country, the painful reality is that most of the generous expectations of the Mandela era regarding equality before the law for all South Africans coupled with the dawn of non-racialism in all spheres of life have not yet been fully realised. In 2004 I described one of the important challenges we faced as a country following the transition in April 1994 by proposing that we were duty bound to enlarge the “freedom premium (the legacy of April 1994) in order for this freedom to mean more than the enjoyment of civil rights”. I was placing a well-deserved emphasis on the urgent need for the progressive elimination of race-based inequality in the rising new democratic non-racial South Africa. I must emphasise the point that the parties that negotiated our transition from apartheid to democracy made certain that institutions and legal provisions were deliberately established with a distinct intention to leverage de-racialisation, equality, nation building and the cultivation of national unity. This transition was done by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the short-lived TRC and at one stage, the government of national unity. Without saying as much, the battle against inequality and an associated presumed inferiority of black people was waged from all fronts during the short early epoch of the transition years.

A carefully prepared ‘vaccine’ against the racist evils of the past was hurriedly put into place during the course of the negotiations that happened between 1990 and 1993. My reference here is to the establishment through an act of parliament of our own TRC. Chaired at the time by a charismatic and internationally renowned African archbishop named Desmond Tutu, this transition instrument soon emerged together with our Bill of Rights as beacons of hope of a non-racial democratic future, which beckoned over the horizon of years to come. The overriding belief was that the TRC would serve as one of the spectacular and lasting building blocks of our country’s transition from apartheid racism in late twentieth century South Africa.

Understandably, the transition from a legalised race-based form of statehood into a popular non-racial, constitutional state was not without unexpected challenges. One such a challenge was the rise during the early years of the transition of what the Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka (2004: 8) once described as “the
enthronement of a cult of impunity”. It is worth remembering that such a culture of impunity is centuries old, as far as the relationship between blacks and whites in South Africa is concerned. Not long after the arrival of the first white settlers in 1652, there was not only talk about so-called ‘kaffirs’ but ‘kaffir wars’ and ‘frontier wars’ in today’s Western Cape. The year 1948 became another historic landmark in the colonial history of South Africa. It was then that the Afrikaner-based National Party became the governing party and the long term purveyors of impunity and statutory racist inequality. After 1948, both impunity and legalised racist policies and practices became the hallmarks of South African racism into the early 1990s.

Apartheid became such a trajectory of race-based statutory inequality and impunity. It encouraged me to cast a glance over our own history and beyond our borders into the rest of the African continent. In so doing, I found it difficult to resist a momentary look at the history of colonialism on the African continent since Ghanaian independence in 1957 and the end of apartheid in South Africa in April 1994. The broader trajectory of Africa’s decolonisation need not concern us here. However, I do want to emphasise the historic significance of the All Africa People’s Conference of December 1958 in Accra. That was a continent wide wake-up call initiating the claim for a total decolonisation of the continent from west, north, east and southern Africa.

Franz Fanon, who was present at the conference, is known to have spoken in prophetic terms regarding the power and prospects of failure amongst the elites of the post-colonial states of the 1960s. His daughter, Mireille Fanon-Mendès-France quoted him – from *The Wretched of the Earth*:

> The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in [any] case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country, which it hopes to replace ... It is completely focused on activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry. (Fanon-Mendès-France, 2016: xvii)

As a South African who was privileged to live and work in government through the 1990s transition in our country, I am dismayed by the uncanny familiarity of Fanon’s mid twentieth century pronouncements about the moral and political fickleness of an emerging post-colonial bourgeoisie of the 1960s. Let us remember that Fanon was one of the earliest, if not the most outstanding writer until now, to expose the everyday social and political primacy of skin colour in colonial countries during the last century. Yet, it is important to remember that he was part of a widening political and intellectual intelligentsia that included luminaries such as Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor and the French intellectual notables Morris
Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. Of greater significance is the fact that in 1961, before his sudden death, Fanon completed his last book, a grand finale, entitled _The Wretched of the Earth_ (1963).

In the preceding paragraphs, I was building up Fanon’s prophetic prescience. Following our 1994 salvation from a colonial variation of racial domination called apartheid, I am enchanted by Fanon’s profound mistrust of undeserving post-colonial purveyors of both wealth and power such as some of those who suddenly sprung to light in our country since 1994. I continue to believe that the most promising phase of the South African transition occurred primarily between the years 1994 and 1999, the foundation years of the Mandela-Mbeki transition administration. During those years, the country was at work and President Mandela was visibly in charge. National policy and laws were put in place to undergird the overall governance of the state machinery, the reconstruction and economic development of the country, as well as the de-racialisation of the South African state and society as a whole.

More important, Fanon placed the masses side by side and face to face with the new emerging African bourgeoisie of his day. He found the emerging elites wanting. The recognition and initial intellectual formulation of the practical and historical consequences of the alienation of the people (the masses) from the post-colonial native bourgeoisie must be regarded today as one of Fanon’s most prescient contributions to contemporary studies of post-colonial societies. Our own contribution follows the dismantling of apartheid racism and its supporting infrastructure of laws, racial discrimination and educational, economic and social inequality. Hamouchene (2015) comments:

> This focus and vivid attachment to the wretched of the earth, their lives and their struggle is put in opposition to an instinctive aversion to a national bourgeoisie that will betray the masses, halt liberation and set-up a national system of tyranny and exploitation, reminiscent of the colonial counterpart. Fanon rightly observed how nationalist consciousness can very easily lead to ‘frozen rigidity’, merely replacing the departed white masters with coloured equivalents.

What is more than likely is that both Fanon and Mandela underestimated the avarice of emerging post-colonial bourgeois classes. Interestingly, the substantive post-liberation measures, which were so assiduously developed and ultimately institutionalised in our country after 1994, through both legislation and administrative practice, have been disarmingly ineffectual especially during the later years of the past 20 years. There are numerous examples of policy implementation failures during the post-1994 era of democratic rule. They include failures in critical areas such as school education and the country’s health system, which have reached
chronic proportions in the recent past. However, for immediate purposes, an important area of national concern has to be the existence of unmistakable signs of failure in the domain of racial integration following the highly publicised work of the TRC during the mid-1990s, the adoption of the country’s Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Not surprisingly, race based inequality in South Africa appears to be on the increase and so are the muted murmurs about non-abating white racism from some faceless members of our country’s white community.

Searching for a needle in a haystack

Present indications are that widespread interest in the question of race and racism has reached a new peak in the recent past. While no ready statistics exist, reflecting an increase in the publication rate of books on the subject of racism, indications are that undoubtedly intellectual and popular interest in the subject has been rising locally and internationally in the recent past. It could be that, challenging and exciting as it may be to continue grappling with the challenge of racism in the world on an intellectual plane, in South Africa specifically, practical remedies in the interest of society beyond the limits of mere intellectual disputes is warranted. For a beginning, it would be helpful to accept that from a science and academic point of view, we have a considerable body of writing on an international scale, about the sources, forms of expression, as well as the history of the evolution of both race and racism. The range of perspectives on race and racism reviewed earlier confirm the veracity of this view.

While thousands of labour migrants risk their lives crossing turbulent seas between North Africa and Mediterranean Europe presently, in search of livelihoods in Europe in conditions reminiscent of the age of the slave trade, new thinking should be brought to bear on the crisis.

It would be nihilism of the worst kind to continue providing credence to the implied inevitability of black inferiority coupled with the varieties of its presumed manifestations in everyday life. When race-based social, economic and educational race-based inequalities become the cardinal point of our focus, the false inevitability of racism is focused on and can be thrown into relief and disrepute. Consequently, when the presumed inferiority of black people takes its rightful place as a false social-psychological legitimation of white superiority by race-conscious whites, the prevailing fiction of never ending white superiority is thrown into relief and disrepute. Consequently, democratic governments such as our own are duty bound to develop strategies that purposefully interrupt the age-old hoax of the claimed inevitability of the superiority of white people. What history demands from black people themselves is a self-conscious and well-developed determination to interrupt and discredit the presumed inevitability of racial inequality in South
Africa and elsewhere. I believe that thinking and writing about race and racism needs to be demystified once and for all. So much so, that whiteness (one of the primary incubators of race supremacy) and racism, are deprived of the mystique which has sustained them for such a considerable period of time.

While working on this essay, I found myself grappling with difficult questions; puzzles in respect of which no readily available answers could be found. No immediate answer could account for the fact that most writers on race end up assuming the role of a diagnostician. Answers to questions such as the following are likely to be numerous and varied: is racism an illness? Is it a nasty chronic behavioural malaise? Is it prejudice turned viral? Is it an irreversible psychological affliction for which there is no known remedy? Is racism all of the above combined? Raising questions of this kind has become necessary because a dead end appears to have been reached in the literature on race and racism. While a substantial world literature on racism in different countries, including South Africa and the United States for example, is readily available, complex questions continue to plague us since racism continues to thrive in our country and the USA. Yet, no substantive, self-evident remedies for racist practices appear to be readily available.

When Dubow made the claim that ‘capitalism did not create racism’ (2014: 276), he missed an important point. What is missing in his assertion is the fact that racism and capitalism survive extremely well in close proximity. They feed on each other. The proximity of apartheid racism and capitalism throughout the later course of the twentieth century has been one of the primary precursors of widening inequality between white and black South Africans for example. South Africa’s post 1948 scenario (the rise of undiluted Afrikaner political and economic dominance) needs to be understood in close proximity to Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd’s legalisation of an inferior and infamous Bantu Education (education for Africans) from the 1950s onwards. Verwoerd must have known that black people were not intellectually inferior because of heredity and/ or God’s will. As a psychologist, Verwoerd must have figured out that an artificial kind of race-based intellectual inferiority could be created through a specially designed inferior education system for Africans known as Bantu Education. As is well-known, successive apartheid governments incubated African intellectual inferiority in the country’s school classrooms and universities, using the shameless promotion of inadequate teaching capacity in high schools, colleges and ethnic universities as a weapon.

The shadow of apartheid and white capitalism coupled with carefully crafted race-based policies during the second half of the twentieth century overshadowed any glimmer of hope that the Mandela-Mbeki administrations introduced during the first decade of our transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. Consequently, strategies to interrupt and diminish the assumed inevitability of
race inferiority and intellectual inequality must be shamelessly developed, publicly promoted and acted upon. The differences in race, which installs both uneasiness, the need to subjugate and define the black other on the part of white people, needs to finally be put to rest. Psychologists amongst us need to ask ourselves the question: what happened to the early studies of prejudice? What if racism turns out to be a self-sustaining rationalisation of prejudice with social-psychological, economic and ego enhancing capabilities amongst our white compatriots? This is what I believe it has become in the course of time.

In the recent past, the people of South Africa put their trust in our recently created democratic dispensation with all the rights and responsibilities enshrined in our constitution. We placed our faith in the ‘healing’ powers of truth telling, as well as its potential to promote reconciliation through the work of the TRC during the late 1990s. In the public open court of world opinion, we placed our national trust on relating, reliving and re-enacting our violent, racist and undemocratic past. We chose this path to our national well-being: reconciliation in the present and the creation of a future non-racist democratic society. Undoubtedly, the vehicle for such substantial change was to be the TRC. It was an undertaking, coupled with and indeed underpinned by, an exemplary twentieth century non-racist and democratic Constitution.

Philomena Essed, writing in the Foreword to *Race, Memory and the Apartheid Archive*, says, “The misunderstanding that racism is only about skin colour and explicit racial superiority continues to hold even today, in particular in mainland Europe. A different view on apartheid, revealing mundaneness, confusions and denials, can be an eye-opener to an international audience. The Apartheid Archive Project is a unique platform for South Africans to document their experiences anonymously.” Essed concludes the above assessment by saying, “It is exactly the reluctance to fully process the racial past in understanding the present that hampers the attainment of full equality and dignity for all in Europe, the United States and elsewhere.” (2013: viii)

It should be evident by now that I too entertain a number of difficult questions about race and racism. Firstly, on a deeper level of curiosity: what is it in relations between blacks and whites, which engender such unease as to result in such frantic questioning of each other’s motives? Secondly: what are the elements in skin colour and intelligence which singled out such features as the prime markers of racial inferiority and superiority? Thirdly: is it reasonable to assume in terms of current academic wisdom, that the habitat of racism and oppression (the drivers) are to be found in the human psyche of whites and their victims of racist oppression? Lastly: is the impulse to demean black people an age-old remnant of the instinctual evolution of pre-historic man? Some astute readers will have seen through the logic
of my self-examination as a black person who has spent the greatest part of his adult life in South Africa.

The increased academic interest and writing about race and racism, substantial as it has become in the course of time, leaves me with a lingering sense that experiments such as the American slave trade, German Nazism during WWII, as well as the occupation of South Africa by Europeans since 1652 until our liberation in 1994, caused that racism today still feels like a lingering smell of dubious origin. However, the good fortune is that I have become a firm believer of McCoskey’s view on racism. I believe that white racism’s notable impact on human development in societies such as our own in South Africa is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Racism can be eliminated through the use of carefully crafted national strategies (policies and laws). This include ready access to quality education for all, coupled with the wide scale elimination of racially-based resource and opportunity inequality between black and white South Africans in the employment market.

Is racism and its deadly claims on the lives of millions of black people in our continent and elsewhere in the world, a centuries old human tragedy? Or is it just a nasty outcome of pride and prejudice? Undoubtedly, a sense of God-given superiority of white people, coupled with prejudice against the full humanity of people of colour, has characterised inter-race relations between whites and blacks for centuries. Relations between black and white people have been dominated by a history driven and dominated by racist pride amongst whites accompanied by an ideologically and legally enshrined denigration of black lives at the height of our country’s century of apartheid. Black people lived, until fairly recently, in a country which promoted white superiority as national policy and God’s will. Hendrik Verwoerd, amongst other prominent National Party leaders, championed and exploited such logic to the wildest limits possible.

The imposition over nearly a half century of the twentieth century of sub-standard Bantu Education over generations of African children and their families was a substantive crime against African people, as well as future generations of South Africans. Consequently, black South Africans as the country’s majority population, remained alienated, educationally and economically disadvantaged. For a variety of complex reasons they have remained academically and economically disadvantaged to this day. As a group, we were compelled to function in the national public sphere at levels well below what was reasonably expected of our white compatriots. In this regard, it is worth remembering that it is not only individuals and their families who become life-long failures in politically driven race supremacist environments such as South Africa was before 1994. Indications are that a complex set of economic and political factors may, in all probability, lead to the emergence of a failed state
characterised by extremes of inordinate wealth, crippling poverty and inequality on
the other.

Undoubtedly, skin colour is one important element in the twin human realities
known as race and racism. Within the range of perspectives considered in this
essay and elsewhere, there is no firm evidence to confirm the generally presumed
inevitability of race differences in human abilities such as intelligence and other
human attributes. Indications are that prevailing attributions of black inferiority
are undoubtedly groundless. They serve other ego enhancing needs, as well
as opportunities for economic and political domination of subordinate black
populations. As suggested here, as well as in the available world literature on race
and racism, the twin centuries old drivers of racism are racialised by differences in
biological features such as skin colour, coupled with the concurrent needs to sustain
the development of colonial expansion and the rise of capitalist economic systems.
What is also clear is that while racist practices affect victims on many levels, such
practices appear in society in a manner, which suggests a chronic inevitability of
the outrageous racist behaviour in question. Examples of such highly publicised
racist behaviours in the USA are the sporadic killings of African Americans by
white American police officers in public spaces. However, a contemporary reading
of all these gruesome racist happenings has to be that racist practices against black
people by white compatriots, wherever they occur, are not inevitable.

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“…race is the child of racism, not the father”.
—*Between the World and Me* (Coates, 2015: 7).

Race, racism and inequality

‘Race’ is a large-scale social category and as such comparable to other categories grouping a large number of different individuals under one heading, like gender, age, religion, tribe/ethnicity/nation and class. Currently, the main referent of race is skin colour, but in the nineteenth, early twentieth, century, race was often used as a synonym of ethnicity or nationality, as in ‘the British race’. The Latin American notion of ‘la Raza’, still celebrated on Columbus Day, 12 October, refers to people of Hispanic-American or to Indo-Hispanic American culture. Inversely, skin colour or ‘tone’ can be invoked without necessary implications of ‘race’, as in Indian marriage ads boasting of ‘fair’ prospective brides and have status effects within Black populations, as in Haiti and USA (Keith and Herring, 1991).
Whether or to what extent race ‘exists’ in some essential sense is not an issue here – although I am certainly convinced that race is not a socio-biological determinant. Race is currently used as a social category in everyday, as well as in mainstream political discourse in South Africa, USA and many other countries. As a frequently used social category, race clearly has a social existence.

Like the other above-mentioned categories, race can be an identity, imposed or chosen, a target of state policies, malign or benign, and a vehicle of collective mobilisation. One effect of race, of variable strength and significance, is to raise a competition in these respects with other categories, class, nation, religion, sex/gender and introducing a division between them, or leading up to new hierarchies of division, such as, e.g., the formation of a pan-ethnic white working class in the US (Cherlin 2014: ch.2). For these reasons, a pervasive modern effect of race is to complicate and constrain egalitarian mobilisations and policies (cf. Haller, 2015).

Racism is a manifestation of human inequality, meaning that it is a historical social construction of super- and subordination. It is a translation of a perceived difference, e.g. skin colour, into a vertical inequality of superiority and inferiority (On inequality, its patterns and its dynamics the reader may be referred to a book of mine, Therborn 2013).

Inequality racism is a form of existential inequality, one of the three major kinds or dimensions of human inequality, alongside vital and resource inequality. Vital inequality refers to social constructions shaping human life-courses with respect to life expectancy, health and mental-somatic development. Resource inequality is most frequently measured in terms of income and wealth, but may also include social connections, ‘cultural capital’ and power (to command). While vital inequality creates inequality among humans as living beings and resource inequality among humans as actors, existential inequality impacts us as persons.

Existential inequality affects us as persons by shaping our constitution and recognition as autonomous and integral subjects. Existential inequality allocates maturity or full personhood, degrees of freedom, autonomy, dignity, recognition and respect – and their opposites, immaturity, unfreedom, contempt, disrespect, ignorance, discrimination, humiliation and persecution. To be denied your dignity and autonomy as a person is arguably the most cruel and humiliating of inequalities. The ultimate point of existential inequality is genocide. Racism is existential inequality, along with sexism and patriarchy, with the denial of full personhood to handicapped people and, as a transient form, to people below a certain age.
The production of inequality and effects of race

The generation of human inequality has to be analysed at two levels: at a macro, systemic, population level and at a micro inter-individual, inter-generational level. At the macro level, vital inequality is shaped by population ecology, i.e., how the population is distributed among disease-prone, polluting, or hazardous environments and by the stratification of medical-hygienic knowledge and of the prevailing health care system. Resource inequality is governed by the political economy of mode of production, political rule and policies. Existential inequality is rooted in socio-cultural systems of inferiority and superiority, buttressed and protected by polities and fitted into economic systems, from macho nomad pastoralism to plantation slavery and capitalism.

The micro perspective focuses on the generation of unequal individuals, through inter-individual and inter-generational interaction. This means paying attention to two processes necessary for the making of functioning humans, capability formation and self-formation.

Capability formation may be seen as skills, motoric, cognitive and social. They have a potential provided by an inherited genetic program, but the extent of the latter’s actualisation and development is determined by interaction with mother, father and/or other proximate individuals. It has been known for some time to be affected also by fetal experiences in utero, such as mother’s malnutrition, resulting in underweight babies, tending to slower and truncated capability development and more prone to heart disease and diabetes later in life. Recent biological research is now beginning to unravel mechanisms of this kind of fetus-mother interaction, as epigenetic processes. They refer to changes in the expression of the child’s genetic program, which do not derive from its DNA. Maternal nutrition, pollution exposure, drug abuse and social trauma during pregnancy are external social factors discovered to be internalisable by the fetus and capable of altering the child’s genetic course. (Kaur et al., 2013; Rezendiz et al., 2013).¹

In other words, humans are not born equal. Socially created, inequality starts before birth, spawning unequal health and life expectancy. After birth capability formation proceeds very fast and its foundations are mostly established by the age of three. While capability, of course, increases well after that, early underdevelopment creates a handicap which rapidly becomes increasingly difficult and by adolescence almost impossible, to repair (Cunha & Heckman, 2009). Unequal capability predisposes adult actors to unequal resources, even before unequal inheritance of property and contacts.

¹ I am indebted to Nina Jablonski for drawing my attention to the epigenetic literature.
Self-formation is the second fundamental aspect of child development, unfolding in interaction with social others. From an existential point of view, the two most significant aspects are the development or not of self-esteem and self-confidence. The very meaning of racism and of patriarchy is to deny self-esteem and self-confidence to black (or any other racial group) girls, and instead to install shame, self-contempt and fear. Such punitive processes are, of course, far from always successful, but they usually inflict lasting wounds.

Prejudice and stigma impact as stressors on the victims and have both somatic and psychological effects (for an overview, see Williams & Mohammed, 2009). Underperformance by the targets is caused by themselves. Experimental psychology has shown that groups, for example of girls and boys, black and white, members of different castes, were experimentally told that they are inferior and then they perform badly on given tasks. The opposite was also true, if told that they are expected to be superior they performed so much better. (Maass & Cadinu, 2003; Hoff & Pandey, 2006).

Children of poor, oppressed and/or discriminated populations are loaded with two sets of heavy burdens, which cause many or most of them to under-perform. One is the burden of social determinants of ill-health, stunted development, deficient emotional security and social stimulation. These are all bearing upon capability formation. The other operates through the negative impacts on self-development of esteem, confidence and ambition by the existential processes of stigmatisation, humiliation and fright. Both these childhood experiences tend to have life-long effects, that start life-curves of cumulated disadvantages (see further Therborn, 2016).

These cumulated disadvantages are ‘effects of race,’ not out of any genetic determination, but effects of experiences of racist social constructions.

The early handicaps of capability and self-formation among the oppressed or groups discriminated against are crucial to equalise the attention and policy practice, not only for their enduring effects on the victims, but for all generations. Systemic existential inequality, like racism and patriarchy, tend to leave a structural legacy of advantages and disadvantages long after the system itself has been dismantled institutionally. This structural legacy tends to reinforce stereotypical prejudice that any disadvantaged population is inherently inferior, whether it is black people, Indians, women, ‘Gypsies’ or poor people in general.

**Two paradoxes of racism in our time**

The three kinds of inequality of course interact with each other and may often be viewed as interwoven or entangled. However, each has its own dynamics and
therefore also its own specific historical trajectory, which brings us into a paradox of our times.

In the first half of the twentieth century, global vital inequality increased, due to better sanitation, diet and health care in the industrial North. After the end of WWII the gap decreased, with the globalisation of preventive medicine and with the start of socio-economic development in the South and in Eastern Europe. That tendency was broken around 1990, with the restoration of capitalism in the ex-USSR and with a catastrophic rise of mortality – to some extent foreshadowed by an Eastern European stagnation of life expectancy from around 1970 and by the hecatomb of AIDS in Africa. Western European data show that intra-national inequality of mortality did not decline in the course of the twentieth century, contrary to the equalisation of income and economic resources. In the last 25-30 years national vital inequality is rising in Europe, as well as in the US.

Economic inequality on a planetary scale increased steadily from the early nineteenth century until the 1950s, whereafter it lay more or less flat on a high plateau until around 2000 and then bending slightly downwards. China is the main factor, if not the only one. Internally, in the rich countries there was a substantial economic equalisation from the end of WWII. Domestic economic inequality, however, is on the rise in most countries since about 1980, except for South America who only experienced this in the first decade after 2000 (see further Therborn, 2013).

It is against this picture that the paradox of a largely simultaneous epochal crumbling of institutionalised, fortified and armed existential inequalities, ancient, as well as modern, stands out and calls for explanation. The contrast was dramatically illustrated in the USA in the first years of this century. At a time of soaring income inequality, bringing the country back to the roaring 1920s before the crash and of mounting gaps of life expectancy, including an absolute decline of life expectancy among the least educated, the USA got its first ever black top military commander, its first black national security adviser (also the first woman) and its first black president.

The last third of the twentieth century brought the most profound and wide-ranging existential equalisation in recorded human history. Institutionalised patriarchy was dismantled in Europe and in both Americas in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in many parts of Africa and Asia. African-Americans got the right to vote and towards the end of the century many indigenous people in the ex-European settler countries were recognised both as people and as collectives. Apartheid imploded. Racial and sex/gender discrimination became legal offences in large parts of the world and were condemned in the United Nations Conventions.
The Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries abolished feudal aristocracies and inherited access to high social positions, but neither did they abolish male sexism nor do away with slavery. The Communist Revolutions decreed away most existing existential inequalities and fought courageously for freedom of marriage and for women’s rights among a recalcitrant patriarchal peasantry. Stalin’s USSR, however, gave many concessions to sexism later on. Both the Russians and the Chinese Communists institutionalised an existential inequality of different rights between ‘the people’ on one hand and the defeated classes, including their families and descendants, on the other.

As we have already noticed, this recent epochal existential equalisation was not part of a general turn of human societies towards more equality. On the contrary, it largely coincided or overlapped with a turn towards more economic inequality, particularly on national level. National income inequality started to rise again after a low point in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world around 1980 and around 1990 in China, Eastern Europe and India. In Latin America the turn came with the military dictatorships, from the mid-1960s in Brazil, the mid-1970s in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, with civilian neoliberalism and rigged elections from 1988. Vital inequality, measured by life expectancy among class and educational groups began to increase within the rich nations in the last decades of the past century and continuing. The global trend of vital equalisation was broken dramatically around 1990 by developments in Africa and in Eastern Europe.

How is this disjuncture of inequality trajectories to be explained? The barest outline of a brief sociological answer would be: the opposite development of the social force of pertinent social categories.

Generally speaking, inequalities change when the relations of force between the superiors and the subalterns change. If the former gains strength and autonomy, inequality increases. If the latter does, inequality declines. The decisive struggles always take place in particular contexts and through particular strategies and tactics. Existential equalisation was driven by women strengthened by a previous rise of mass higher education. Secularisation, by indigenous people also played a role, as well as getting a thin intellectual stratum of their own and then being drawn into national economies.

Racism received several shocks because of its particularly ingrained and fortified character. The defeat of Nazism and the discovery of Auschwitz made public anti-Semitism unsustainable, but not racism per se, as the rise and worldwide tolerance of apartheid showed. Colonial emancipation undercut claims to Euro-White supremacy. USA racism lost its economic rationale with the end of plantation
slavery and the demise of share-cropping agriculture. The black population was strengthened by moving into the industrial North and by its new student generation. A similar change happened in South Africa with black people relocating because of an industrial demand for more skilled labourers and this undermined apartheid. For the USA regime, the Cold War competition provided the context for active Federal support and this dismantled institutionalised racism. For South Africa the implosion of international Communism reduced the regime's fear of black emancipation.

National economic inequality, on the other hand, was pushed by the weakening of the main egalitarian force of the twentieth century, the industrial working class, declining by de-industrialisation in the North, exacerbation by forceful anti-union drives and replenished in China and the new industrial South by new recruits fresh from the land, regimented, fragmented and not yet with a collective culture of its own. At the other end was the distancing from capital and declining dependence on labour by a financing capitalism, awash with petrodollars and pension funds. With respect to vital inequality in the centres of capitalism something similar happened through different channels. On the one hand there was a new upper middle class health consciousness and investments, and, on the other, the rise of a new precariat of insecurities, unhealthy living and working conditions.

These effects of changes in the constellations of force between these classes overrun, but do not wipe out vital and resource effects of existential equalisation. Male-female wage and income gaps have shrunk almost universally, though not enough to stop the overall Gini coefficient and other measures of inequality from rising. In the USA black-white gaps of income and of life expectancy have narrowed somewhat in the midst of general polarisation (Therborn, 2013: 131, 143). To South Africa I shall return below.

The reduction of inequality, or even large-scale equalisation, does not mean that inequality disappears. A series of killings of unarmed African-Americans in 2014-2015 by white people, including white policemen, highlights a vicious persistence of violent racism, in spite of the drastic institutional changes (cf. Goldberg, 2014; Coates, 2015). How should that second paradox, the post-institutional persistence of racism, be understood?

**Racism institutionalised and racism privatised**

We have to distinguish between two kinds of racist and, generally, existential inequality. The one kind is institutional, public, hegemonic, systemic, it is based on power and conquest and operates on a big scale. It also typically derives from a political-economic system of slavery or from servile labour and gets further sustained by systemic labour discrimination. The second kind is habitual, private,
personal, experiential and based on personal experiences that are imagined, learnt or real.

In the current era of privatisations of public institutions and public services, racism has also been privatised. It is also protected from public scrutiny and public accountability – this theme has been extensively developed by David Theo Goldberg (2014: 52ff).

This second, experiential racism is a set of dispositions, or *habitus* to speak with Bourdieu, with two pairs of attitudes: *contempt and fear*, or *resentment and fear*. There is, among not so few people, a contempt for weakness and/or poverty, a contempt which may be attached to certain social categories, be they ethnic (e.g., Roma people in Europe), religious (e.g., poor Christian or Muslim minorities), ethno-religious (most viciously today the Rohingya of Myanmar) or skin-coloured (like black people). Contempt is usually paired with fear, in varying doses: fear for the ‘savages’, the ‘barbarians’ or simply for the uncomfortable proximity of the never quite understandable and predictable miserable. The recent USA police shootings of black people living in ghettos appear to illustrate this kind of racism, which can live on unperturbed by the toppling of hegemonic systemic racism.

Categorical resentment is directed against people imagined to be unjustly privileged in some sense, be they successful ethno-religious minorities, Jews in Europe, Armenians in the Ottoman empire, Chinese in Southeast Asia or previously contemptible groups now viewed to be favoured by new anti-discrimination norms, by affirmative action or simply by the reception of poor immigrants. The accompanying fear is for one’s own or one’s children’s jobs, earnings or status.

Whether institutionalised or privatised, to its targets and victims, “racism is a visceral experience … it dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth” (Coates 2015: 10).

**Categorical and universalist equality**

All social inequalities are received by individuals, having the realisation of their human capability denied or stunted. A process of equalisation can be framed either as opening the doors of opportunity to uncounted, unnamed individuals or by letting (a) specified group(s) in. The early modern Atlantic revolutions, whose (existential) equality so fascinated-cum-frightened Alexis de Tocqueville, were clearly of the former, formally universalistic kind. At the same time, this liberal ‘bourgeois’ tradition demonstrated its implicit limitations from the very beginning. ‘All’ humans were ‘created equal’ according to the Founding Fathers of the USA, who were in fact only white male property owners.
The circle of individuals endowed with rights can of course be widened, which occurred gradually in today’s liberal democracies. Individual personal rights, however, do not deal with the inequality of resources of individual actors, nor with systemic divisions of inequality such as the capital-labour divide of capitalism. From the nineteenth century, this kind of inequality gave rise to socialism as a project of creating an egalitarian socio-economic system. Later welfare states added civic socio-economic rights, sustained by general taxation, public services and redistributive grants.

Categorical rights are ancient, providing hierarchies of estates, castes, religious communities, and ethnic groups with particular rights and protection. They had developed for purposes of a hierarchical order, not for equality, and as such they were targets of liberal and liberal-nationalist individual equalisation, sometimes with disastrous results.

Categorical equalisation is a fast track to overcome the structural legacies of institutional discrimination and inequality in the form of disadvantaged capability formation, damaged self-esteem, self-confidence and discouraged ambition. A history of attempts and strivings at categorical equalisation remains to be written. Early discussions include, from mid-nineteenth century, critiques of the socially destructive effects of liberal abolitions of communal Indian land rights in Latin America. The dissolution of multinational European empires generated collective rights of representation and culture to ethnic minorities, in the wake of WWI. In the same period the British introduced minority rights of representation into their colonial Westminster-type polity of colonial India.

Independent India has developed the most extensive program of categorical equalisation, with reserved electoral constituencies and quotas of higher education and public jobs for the lower castes, and for the previous ‘Untouchables’ below them (see further Sankaran, 2014). Affirmative action for African-Americans later resulted from the Civil Rights movement and soon extended to women’s representation in a number of countries.

On the whole, categorical equalisation measures seem to have worked, in the sense of making positions of status, influence and good earnings more available to (many members of) underprivileged categories. A valuable overview of affirmative action ‘from the Global South’ is from Dupper and Sankaran (2014). In India some castes have claimed to be ‘backward’ too, in order to get inclusion into the quota system. While resented by some members of previously favoured categories, categorical equalisation, for women in particular, has achieved a broad legitimacy. As far as I understand, this seems to be the case also in post-apartheid South Africa.
However, the South African experience also shows that categorical equalisation is not a simple matter even in theory and may in practice develop into blockages and to reproducing stark inequalities.

From apartheid to equality: categorical or universalist equalisation?

Categorical race equalisation was a socio-political necessity in a post-racist democratic South Africa and corresponded to an egalitarian vision of development. There seems to be three crucial issues that have not been widely discussed and thought about in post-apartheid South Africa.

1. From an egalitarian point of view, what should be the priorities of categorical equalisation?

2. Are there any problems, limitations or internal contradictions of categorical equalisation?

3. Can categorical equalisation collide with universalist equality?

There are two areas of priority, power and capability formation. Categorical equalisation is imperative, first of all, with respect to positions of political, judicial and repressive power. This means that the government (ensured by elections), including the top administration, the judiciary, the police and the military, manifest and solidify the transfer of power. It is also important with regard to social services to the public, manifesting a novel relationship between the state and its citizens.

Categorical equalisation of capability formation means targeted education and training of the disadvantaged or previously oppressed population. This has to be a two-pronged approach. On the one end investing is done heavily in early pre-school child development and in elementary education. On the other hand investments are made on access to higher education, facilitating social mobility and providing the new society with new categories of professionals and managers.

In a world of limited resources, there is a dilemma here, how much into one or the other? In the long run, priority engagement with early child development and good basic education for the disadvantaged population would be better, laying an egalitarian foundation for higher education. However, there are short-run political gains from concentrating on access to higher education, students being a loud and volatile political force. Independent India concentrated on the latter, Communist China on the former. Now, China has both a wholly literate, increasingly skilled labour force and some of the best universities of the global South, while India is still burdened with illiteracy and a large unskilled labour force alongside mostly mediocre universities, in spite of an impressively argumentative intelligentsia and a few elite institutions.
The challenges of capability and self-formation, among the grandchildren of apartheid, are tremendous as a survey finding and a couple of ethnographic vignettes highlight:

In the Eastern Cape in 2012, a fourth of all children under the age of three were ‘stunted,’ an indicator of severe maternal and infant malnutrition and a strong predictor of enduring cognitive underdevelopment, albeit not necessarily irreversible (UNDP, 2014a: 44, referring to a study by John Sender).

In the Western Cape “The overwhelming majority of black students in Cape Flats live without stable supporting family structures. Most are born to single mothers or who have fathers who live elsewhere and do not partake in family life … Children sent to school with the hope of securing a better future, find no place of learning and security, but rather a gang warzone where young ‘gangsters’ fight with screwdrivers, pangas, knives and guns” (Adam & Moodley, 2013: 57).

The result has been two decades of basic reproduction of the bi-modal apartheid school system, with low levels of numeracy and of reading ability concentrated in historically black or poor area schools and high capability concentrated in ex-white or affluent area schools (UNDP, 2014a: 43, based on work by Nicolas Spauli).

There are at least two obvious problems with elite categorical equalisation. One refers to technical expertise and public service competence. As passengers or patients, few of us would like to be flown by pilots or to be operated on by surgeons selected by social quotas without proper qualifications. A wide range of public services and infrastructure may suffer from being managed incompetently, but in many fields a determination of proper technical qualifications is less clear-cut than in the two examples just mentioned.

Municipal administrations appear particularly under-qualified and under-performing in South Africa. For the fiscal year of 2013-2014, the auditor-general gave only 40 out of 278 municipalities a ‘clean audit’, 30 of these were concentrated only in two provinces among nine (Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal). Three provinces had not a single clean municipality (Free State, Limpopo and Northwest) and out of Eastern Cape’s 45 municipalities only two were clean. Among the country’s eight metropolitan municipalities only two received a clean audit (Cape Town and Ekurhuleni), i.e., neither the national capital (Tshwane/Pretoria) nor the nation’s business centre (Johannesburg) (Auditor-General, 2014).

A second problem is created by setting quotas of wealth and economic power. It can have an ethnic or ‘racial’ rationale and it has been used extensively well before South

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2 Defined as being at least two standard deviations shorter than the WHO norm for their age.
Africa’s policy of Black Economic Empowerment. In Malaysia, in order to boost the economic weight of (majoritarian) ethnic Malays, and other Native bumiputra who also, like the Indian ‘scheduled castes’, have reserved quotas to scholarships, universities and government jobs (Lee, 2014). This, however, means a deliberate, further reinforced division of the previously disadvantaged population into capitalists and workers, hardly a contribution to overall equality. In traditionalist hierarchical Malay society, still deferential to its sultans and aristocrats, this economic addition to hierarchy has not caused much political turmoil, so far. For an originally socialist liberation movement like the ANC, leading a black society socio-economically compressed under apartheid oppression, creating a black class of privilege is more risky.

A blunt demand of categorical equalisation like Julius Malema’s in 2011 – “We must have everything that white people have” (Posel, 2013: 68) – highlights, as well as hides the underlying complexity. White society in apartheid South Africa was a very unequal capitalist society. Is that something ‘we must have’ too?

Quoting wealth tends to have another negative effect, reaching beyond egalitarian concerns. It elevates personal wealth into a legitimate prime social value, thus providing a strong incentive to political and administrative corruption. This is a means for politicians and public managers to achieve this criterion of achievement, in a new state apparatus under construction without any tradition of a public service ethos.

While in several ways expedient and effective, categorical equalisation can come to collide with universalist equality, even to entrench overall inequality. This happens for two reasons, along two channels. One is that categorical equalisation of elite status can co-vary with undiminished or even increased non-elite inequality. The second is that a political, public opinion focus on categorical elite equalisation and may keep overall inequality out of the view and concern.

A telling illustration of the latter is the National Planning Commission objective, that in 2030 the country should have an economic inequality (Gini) coefficient of 0,6, meaning that in 2030 South Africa should continue to be the world’s most unequal country (perhaps together with Namibia). The poorest 40 per cent of the population were graciously to be conceded 10 per cent of the national income. (National Planning Commission, 2010: 24, 54). In Latin America, the globe’s economically most unequal region, such an objective would now mean a drastic increase of inequality, currently ranging between 0,4 and 0,55) and would have been met by massive protest demonstrations. Around 2010, not a single Latin America country forces the poorest 40 per cent of the population to live on 10 per cent of national income. In Bolivia in 2011 the poor got 15,6 of national household
income, an increase by 6.1 percentage points since 2002 (CEPAL/ECLAC, 2013: Table II A.1).

**South Africa’s persistent inequalities**

After more than 20 years of democracy and under an uninterrupted government by a party committed to categorical equalisation, South Africa is still the most economically unequal country in the world. According to the Gini coefficients of income inequality it varies slightly from one study to another (Tregenna & Tsela, 2012: 36 table 1), but has oscillated just under 0.70 for the whole period of 1975-2010 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 13; Ngepah & Mhlaba, 2013: 76 fig.2.2.a). In other words, overall economic inequality has remained the same as during the last decades of apartheid, while between-race inequality among the rich has declined.

By 1995, income inequality among South African black people had become similar to that among all the races of Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal countries (Gini 0.55; Bhorat & van der Westhuizen 2012: 9 table 3; CEPAL/ECLAC, 2013: table II. A.2) Between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of black people among the highest income group (roughly the top 0.1 per cent) increased from 19.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent, while the white people’s share declined from 73 to 49 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2014: tables 2.3.9 and 2.4.5). However, the white-black gap of median earnings increased from R3,104 in 1993 to R3,810 in 2000 to R3,821 in 2008 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 78 table A.3.2).

Post-apartheid economic inequality has been driven by increasing gains at the top. Inequality among the lowest 80 per cent of the population actually declined somewhat from 1993 to 2010 (UNDP, 2014a: 56). In the early 2000s, the median South African manager was paid three times as much as the median Brazilian manager (UNDP, 2014a: 52).

The resilience of the apartheid era’s economic inequality in South Africa may be compared to the dramatic equalisation of Bolivia, also turning (in 2006) from a settler oligarchy to a post-colonial democracy. Between 2005 (Evo Morales’ government of transformation began in December) and 2011, Bolivian economic inequality was reduced by 13 Gini points, from 0.60 to 0.47 (INE, 2015, Estadísticas sociales). This has been achieved mainly by public control of the main export sector (natural gas), contributing massively to fiscal revenues amounting to around half of GDP in 2012-2014 (Inter-America Development Bank, 2016). Furthermore by public enterprises, services and transfers, alongside a flourishing, actively promoted private sector and by general incomes policies, ensuring that for 2005-2014/2015 workers’ wages increased significantly more than managerial salaries, in the private, as well as in the public sector (INE, 2015, Estadísticas económicas). An Amerindian entrepreneurial class has risen, but as supported entrepreneurs
from the below, and not by categorical quoting into shareholding and boardrooms. Under the new post-colonial government of Evo Morales, the Bolivian economy has grown by about five per cent a year, above five per cent again in 2016 and above four per cent in 2017.³

From 1994 to 2008 the national income share of the poorest 20 per cent of South Africans declined from 2,0 to 1,6 per cent. The share of the richest increased from 53,9 in 1994 to 55,2 per cent in 2001, then falling back to 53,1 (Simkins, 2011: 108). Even more remarkable is that for 1991-1996 when average household income decreased in South Africa, the worst decline befell the poorest 40 per cent among black Africans – who lost a fifth of their income – while the second best-doing group – after the ten per cent richest Asians – were the black top ten (Taylor, 2000: 61). This strange effect of democratisation, of poor black people losing income, might be partly due to the chaotic dismantlement of the bantustans, which together had almost half a million employees (Picard, 2005: 315ff) and their small prebends.

Statistics South Africa does not publish any data on vital inequality, for instance on life expectancy by race (or class). Apartheid statistics did have vital statistics by race, but without bothering with black people. However, from medical and demographic reports a picture can be put together. On the threshold of apartheid, African infant mortality was estimated at ‘40-50%’ and in 1943 a study of metro Durban pinned it down to 483 per thousand (Hellman, 1949: 22). Half of all African children died before their first year birthday. Four out of a hundred white children did then (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1960: B32).

The advent of democracy came to coincide with a life disaster. From 1994 until 2005, South African life expectancy plummeted ten years, from 62 to 52 years (SAIRR, 2016b: 23). Only by 2013-2014 the country was back at the life expectancy of the end of apartheid. The reasons for this were HIV/AIDS and an enormous increase in vital inequality. In 1991 adult prevalence of HIV was 0 per cent among all racial groups. By 2005, when vital inequality culminated, the white HIV rate stood at 0,9 per cent and the African at 20, where it has stabilised since then. The incidence among the other racial categories has increased somewhat, to 5,9% among Coloured, 4,7% among Asian and 2,5% among white people. (SAIRR, 2016a: 612) Since 2010 the number of new HIV infections has stabilised at somewhat more than 320,000 a year (SAIRR, 2016b: 10). The differential rates of HIV/AIDS were part of the apartheid legacy, under new virological conditions, due to the accumulation process by migrant labour. It took, however, a fatally long time for the ANC government to grasp its significance and to start doing

³ https://tradingeconomics.com/bolivia/gdp-growth-annual

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something about it. Black life expectancy in 1984-1986 has been estimated at 60 years (Dorrington et al., 1999), 12 years shorter than white lives (Central Statistical Services, 1997: 3.15). By 2001 the racial life gap had widened to 18 years (Sanders & Chopra, 2006: 73), about the same as the life gap between white and Coloured people in 1969-1971, then 17 years (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1978: 3.19)

Also from the UNDP’s Human Development Reports we can learn that South African vital inequality is very substantial. In 2013 the South African life expectancy index lost 25.7 per cent of its value when adjusted for inequality. That is higher than for the ‘medium development’ group of countries as a whole (21 per cent loss) and higher than Brazil (14.5 per cent loss), but below the average for sub-Saharan Africa, at 36.8 per cent (UNDP, 2014b: table 3). The rate of under-five child mortality – a major determinant of life expectancy in a developing country – in the Eastern Cape is about 2.5 times higher than in Western Cape (Shisana, 2013: 539). South African vital inequality is declining though, from 30.0 inequality loss in 2010 (UNDP, 2010), likely due to clear improvement of the HIV/AIDS situation after the end of the (in this respect) disastrous Mbeki government.

Envoi: racism and inequality

Racism should teach all egalitarians that (in)equality is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, having at least three fundamental dimensions: vital, existential and resource. Like the other kinds of inequality, racism has to be analysed and understood as both systemic/institutional and as private/interpersonal. The latter involve both capability and self-formation-development. Anti-racists should learn from general egalitarians that racism is part of a wider set of existential inequality, including gender, sex, ethnicity, handicap and others. Categorical equalisation, targeting promotion of previously oppressed, discriminated and disadvantaged people are an important fast-track remedy. This, however, can have many different effects, including even becoming a buttress of overall inequality.

South Africa constitutes a social laboratory of world significance. It has achieved an almost unique re-foundation of its nation and state. It went from a conquistador settler nation and state ruling conquered natives to a (by now) ‘normal’ democratic nation/state, a feat in modern times approximated only by Bolivia, a poorer, but less sharply cloven country. Like all settler states, apartheid South Africa bequeathed to its successors an extremely unequal society in vital and resource aspects, enduring long after institutional existential equalisation.

Democracy and universal civil rights are epochal achievements of the new South Africa. While there have been alleviations of poverty and vast extensions of public services, such as electricity and housing, the democratic South African record on
equality is dismal. Income inequality kept hovering around the apartheid standard of 1975 and was very much in contrast with Latin America of the first decade of the twenty-first century. That Latin American moment of equality is now ending in economic crisis and political acrimony, but not in Bolivia, South Africa’s closest kin.

There are probably, as usual, many reasons for this outcome. A concluding, but only circumstantially supported, hypothesis of this paper is that the governmental focus on elite categorical equalisation, strongly supported by powerful social movements, has contributed significantly to this record. Categorical equalisation policies should be evaluated and deployed within a clear framework of universalist egalitarianism.

References


The issue of race as the issue of the Colonial Question, the Non-white-Native Question, the Negro Question ... was and is fundamentally the issue of the genre of human, Man. — Sylvia Wynter (2003: 288)

And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and, I would go as far as saying, the final, resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history. — Edward Said (2003: xii-xiii)

In a passionate response to the paucity of Research Chairs in the Humanities offered by South Africa’s National Research Foundation in 2012, Premesh Lalu (2012) excavates the underlying conception of ‘the human’ from the list of allocated Chairs. He laments the absence in the proposed research of an enabling, agentic conception of ‘the human’. Instead, he finds a paternalistic notion of the human as ‘lack’, in need of ‘benevolent outreach’ (Lalu 2012: 4) and of development. Lalu wants to unsettle this racialised and professionalised frame in which experts are positioned as redeemers of the lives of their ‘subjects’. His lament is in part shaped by two concerns among some scholars of anti-racism in the South African academy.
First, an implicit or explicit “habitual resort to inherited orthodoxies of notions of race and ethnicity” (Lalu, 2012, p. 5) in a politics of blame, guilt, redemption and/or entitlement. And second, a struggle among many of the young people we teach to conceive of what it means to be human (Lalu, 2012, p. 5) without resorting to either colour-blindness or racialized attachments.

Alongside the paternalist humanism noted by Lalu, appeals to ‘our common humanity’ emerge from various political standpoints in South Africa. These are most often linked to arguments that grapple with persistent and growing racial inequalities and with the prevalence of violence in this country. In an edited volume published by STIAS on the subject of humanism in South Africa (De Gruchy (ed.), 2011a), some scholars implicitly or explicitly evoke ‘origin stories’ as they rely on the archaeological, palaeontological, anthropological and/or biological sciences for their notions of ‘common humanity’ (De Gruchy, 2011a; Solms, 2011). Some contributors to that volume engage with a form of Christian humanism that emphasises life enhancing relationships (Ackerman, 2011; De Gruchy, 2011b). In a more recent publication Crain Soudien (2013) revisits what we know about ‘race’ as he deals with the disjuncture between ‘formal knowledge’ about race and everyday practice in post-1994 South Africa. He focuses on knowledge from the biological sciences in his appeal to our common humanity. These works offer me friendship in thought as I explore questions that arise for me as a reader.

Given our colonial history, is it enough to know that as humans we are genetically and biologically the same? Is it enough to assert that birth, death, suffering and uncertain futures are what humans share (De Gruchy, 2011b: 57)? Is it enough to say that birth, death, suffering and uncertain futures are what humans share when most humans are more vulnerable in birth due to poverty, more likely to die and to suffer brutally, and face more uncertain futures than their more privileged counterparts? Is it enough that social difference, as inclusive, is central to post-1994 South Africa’s official knowing (Soudien, 2013)? And, do we have a common humanity outside of a bio-centric conception of the human? Scholars of anti-humanist orientation would say ‘no’ on all counts. The twentieth century humanists of the black radical tradition for whom a critical political consciousness is more paramount than a species-consciousness, would say the same. Frantz Omar Fanon, Steven Bantu Biko and Sylvia Wynter are among these humanists.

In what follows I want first to contextualise both anti-humanist and critical humanist orientations within a brief history of what I refer to as Hu-Manism and its articulation with the idea of race. This history challenges appeals to common humanity premised on archaeology and biology, as much as calls to include all into a bourgeois and colonial conception of ‘the human’. It suggests that if our ‘formal knowledge’ is premised primarily on these sciences, and if ‘inclusion’ means inclusion into a conception of ‘the human’ into which people with histories of
colonisation never comfortably fit, it follows that our formal knowledge cannot meet the demands of everyday anti-racist, decolonial and critical humanist practice. I shall then consider attempts to de-link race and ‘the human’ in selected works by Biko (2004) and Fanon (1986). I end this chapter with a view to further conversation about this contested terrain. To this end I draw on the work of Edward Said (2004) and Sylvia Wynter (2003, 1994, 1984).

**HuManism’s shadow**

Sylvia Wynter’s work is significant for a meta-history of the relationship between ideas of ‘race’ and ideas of what it means to be human. She notes that prior to colonial conquest all human societies mapped their conception of the human onto the physical cosmos making criteria for being human dependent on some version of the supernatural. Premised on the supernaturally grounded theocentric idea, that humans were ‘sinful by nature’, the medieval West distinguished between ‘Chosen’ and ‘Fallen’ humans within the bounds of its cosmographic distinction between spiritually perfect heavens and the ‘fallen’ earth. In this symbolic order of Spirit/Flesh, ‘Spirit’ represented new life inaugurated by Christian baptism, as well as knowledge of things Divine; knowledge of the clergy. ‘Flesh’ represented ‘fallen’ life before rebirth through baptism – “a life that was now ‘death’” (Wynter 1984: 26) – and lay knowledge that was subjugated by the clergy (Wynter, 1984: 26). Furthermore, the medieval conception of God as Omnipotent meant that humans could not know their physical reality because it was ruled by God’s miracles (McGrane, 1989; Wynter, 2003: 277).

However, fifteenth century voyages of the Portuguese, the beginning of travels of conquest and the Copernican revolution enabled an epochal conceptual shift in the Western imaginary from an Omnipotent God to a Caring God who created the universe for the sake of humankind. This caused a shift from irrational man to rational Man who could now know and control the universe (McGrane, 1989; Wynter, 2003: 278). For Wynter, the medieval Christian idea of Spirit/Flesh – was reinvented in history’s forward and backward movements as either Noble/not-Noble; European/non-European; rational/irrational; civilised/primitive; or selected/dysselected in the Culture/Nature binary of the nineteenth century. This implicated Christianity in making the idea of ‘Man’.

‘Man’ is for Wynter an artefact of colonial ways of knowing. For her, voyages of colonial conquest inaugurated ‘Man’, ‘the Hu-Man’, and ‘HuManism’ as racialised and gendered ideas and practices premised on a European and male conception of what it means to be human. This particular Euro-phallo-logo-centric idea was universalised by the West creating a measure for ‘the human in general’ according to which ‘Man’ would decide who could and could not be admitted into the fold.
and to which all humans would supposedly aspire. People who are considered to be less-than-Hu-Man in the Western imagination were relegated to ‘the difference outside’ (Mignolo, 2015) of Europe, outside of the Hu-Man, outside of Europe’s time, outside of its history, its law, its language, outside of its capacity to reason and of its capacity to know the world. Despite these outsides, the less-than-Hu-Man were however placed inside colonial governance (Hesse 2007: 656) for the benefit of metropoles.

Wynter argues that the West’s nineteenth century idea of race enabled it to re-describe its earlier ideas of the human – ‘Man’ with knowledge of the Divine; ‘Man’ with Natural Reason (Wynter, 1984: 29, 33) – as ‘Man’ the natural being who belongs to a natural community in the form of a nation, a race and a culture (Wynter, 1984: 43). Thus, “Man’s being ... [was made into] an empirical thing ... a natural thing” (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91, 94), subjectivities were racialised by making race part of Nature and thus inscribed on and in the human body, and culture was made to work as if it were Nature. This re-description established and sustained Man as the conception of the human through its disavowal of other coexisting forms of understanding the human (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91). It inaugurated a shift in the Western imaginary from mapping ideas of the human onto the physical cosmos, to mapping such onto the physical bodies of all non-European and then making the latter the physical referent of Europe’s HuMan Other (Wynter, 2003: 265).

With this shift, ‘race’/culture came to occupy the place of the human divine (Said, 2004: 39) or extra-human ground for the answer to the questions *Who and what are we? What does it mean to be human?* In this place, the idea of race came to do the work of naturalising colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans (Quijano, 2013). Thus European colonists’ and scientists’ hierarchical differentiation of the human; their hierarchical differentiation between the human and the non-human; European Enlightenment scientists’ biological or scientised conception of ‘race’; and colonial conceptions of culture, constitute a constellation of forces that forms Man as a ‘genre of the human’ (Wynter’s phrase) applicable to humans-in-general. Sylvia Wynter demystifies Man as the symbol for all humans (Kamugisha, 2006: 140). Thus we learn that through these processes Western conceptions of human difference are immured by inequality because of the ways ‘race’ as a set of articulated political relations banishes colonised and formerly colonised people from the domain of the Hu-Man. We learn that Europe’s scientisation of ‘race’ and its related biocentric and bourgeois conception of the human sustains ‘the HuMan’ as an extra-humanly determined objective truth rather than “a particular collective *self-representation*” (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 95) created for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans.
This history of the articulation of race with ‘the human’ plays itself out in various ways in the history of South Africa as ‘a difference outside’ Europe. André du Toit alerts us to the evangelical humanism of Dr John Philip, a British colonist in the nineteenth-century and founder of what is today known as the Cape liberal tradition (2011: 118). Strongly influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, Philip’s humanism was in line with Europe’s civilising mission and its sciences’ artefact, ‘Man’. For him, ‘Man’ was the measure of ‘the human’ to which Khoi, San and Xhosa residents should aspire in order to be incorporated into colonial notions of a ‘common humanity’ and into a colonial civil order in which Africans would be eligible for civil rights. Philip held that as God’s creatures, all human beings were endowed with ‘equal natural capacities’ (Du Toit, 2011: 121, my emphasis) irrespective of race.

He spoke against the violence of military conquest, but supported peaceful conversion of ‘the natives’ to the ways of Europe. Notwithstanding his discredit in the eyes of most colonists as “the foremost ‘friend of the natives’ and critic of all things colonial” (Du Toit, 2011: 120), Philip’s praxis is a quintessential example from colonial South Africa of Christianity’s implication in making ‘Man’ the racialised imperial subject and in arguing for conditional inclusion of Africans into this conception of ‘Man’. In contrast to Philip’s incorporationist imperialism, Dubow (2008) and Du Toit (2011) alert us to Jan Smuts’ classical humanism and its ideological function in twentieth century South Africa. Smuts, the mastermind behind segregation and indirect rule, was a ‘separatist imperialist’ bent on preserving European civilisation by maintaining separate institutions for Africans who in his view were barbaric and for the most part incapable of being civilised, in other words, incapable of becoming European. We learn from Saul Dubow that Smuts’ ‘holism’, premised on evolutionist thought – the origin story of nineteenth century ‘Man’ as a natural being who belongs to a natural community – combined an appreciation for the idea of ‘Natural Man’ living in harmony with nature with the idea that human life was not devoid of a greater, extra-human force, or ‘Spirit’ (Dubow, 2008: 55–57). The then embryonic disciplines of palaeontology and anthropology provided enduring sources for his ideas about the history of ‘kinds’ of humans and their racial and cultural differences (Dubow, 2008: 59), in other words, their ‘natural communities’. Moreover, Smuts was at the centre of the South Africanisation of science, a project that supported and gave meaning to the ideology of South Africanism at the centre of the colonial nationalism of twentieth century white South Africa (Dubow, 2007).

These colonial ideas were not anathema to classical HuManism. In his brief exploration of the two forms of imperial HuManism represented respectively by Philip and Smuts, du Toit attributes the ‘dark sides’ of this HuManism to a lack of
self-reflexivity and to the ‘inextricable fusion of Christianity and civilisation’ (2011: 119). Dubow (2007, 1995) reveals the ways in which knowledge production, through the South Africanisation of science, was complicit with these ‘dark sides’ of imperial HuManism. For these competing forms of humanism inside the imperial tradition, the European Rennaissance idea of ‘Man’ was the foundation of their conceptual universe, of their differently racist ideologies and forms of governance and for racist practice as we know it today. Philip and Smuts equally disavowed understandings of ‘the human’ among the colonised.

**Delinking ‘race’ from ‘the human’**

Against these paternalistic and imperial HuManisms and their related racist practices, it is important to remember the ways in which late twentieth century Black Consciousness thought in South Africa engendered an enabling, agentic conception of ‘the human’ amongst oppressed people at the height of apartheid. Biko held to what was difficult at the height of apartheid: living outside of conventional ‘race’ postures of that time. Against black people’s enforced complicity with racist discourses of subservience, unworthiness and inferiority, Black Consciousness advocated, in the midst of crippling oppression, an emancipatory and defiant posture (Biko, 2004: 101) for black people as active social agents who were able to govern their own lives and to make history. This is the challenge Biko’s thought poses for us today: to live outside of conventional ‘race’ postures of this time. I wish to suggest that the value of Biko’s thought for South Africa today lies more in its critical humanist traces than in its valorisation of blackness as an act of personal recovery and political defiance. These traces live in his assertion that “[a]t the heart of true integration is the provision for each man (sic)” (2004: 22). I interpret ‘provision’ broadly here to refer to the conditions – objective, intersubjective and political – for enabling and enhancing life.

These traces live in Biko’s assertion that “Black Consciousness makes the black man (sic) see himself as a being complete in himself” (2004: 102); “not as an extension of a broom or an additional leverage to a machine” (2004: 74); “that beyond material well-being, the fact of being human should be the centre of our social and political concern” (2004: 51); and that through these material and ‘spiritual’ projects we will, in time, be in a position to give ‘the world’ and “South Africa the greatest gift possible – a more human face” (2004: 108). In other words, for Biko the black person is not a thing behind tools of production. Nor is he or she ‘lacking’. The black person thinks and feels. The black person has needs and desires. The black person makes meaning and has imagination.

Granted, all is not critical in Biko’s humanism. He addresses black men and white people of liberal persuasion, but he excludes black women. Thus he leaves
untouched the humiliations and injustices of gendered hierarchies (Gqola, 2001). Furthermore, while Biko cannot be relegated wholly to an essentialist standpoint, there are moments when he locates his humanism in a romanticised construction of African culture as “pure” (Biko, 2004: 45), “close to nature” (2004: 51), characterised by beliefs in “the inherent goodness of man” (2004: 46) and in “community oriented action rather than individualism” (2004: 46). Notwithstanding the contradictions in some of his writing, the value of Biko’s humanism for us today is enhanced when we invite his thought into challenging conversation with critical humanist thinkers like Fanon.

In the oppressive and divisive context of ‘deep’ apartheid, it is not surprising that blackness became Biko’s predominant focus. For him, racial separation for the purposes of domination (apartheid) was dehumanising. Racial separation as a road to liberation, however, was essential for him “at [that] stage of our history” (2004: 18). His argument for such separatism was not premised on a view of segregation as “the natural order” (2004: 18, 21). Instead, separatism was for him a necessary measure at the time to enable black people to deliberate over our understandings of what it means to be human, should we wish to do so, and over our inner and where possible our outer lives, unencumbered by a disabling and disempowering notion of the HuMan as the epitome of whiteness.

While Biko sometimes tends toward a ‘natural’ notion of culture, he very clearly understands ‘race’ and its attendant inequalities and privileges to be historically situated and human-made. For him a society divided by ‘race’ is a “deliberate creation of man” (2004: 96), rather than part of the “natural order” (2004: 18, 21) of things. Nevertheless, Biko only partially succeeds in delinking race from ‘the human’. On the one hand he advocates the abolition of whiteness: “whiteness ... warrants being ... destroyed and replaced by an aspiration with more human content” (2004: 8, my emphasis). On the other, to recover the personhood and agency of that “shadow of a man” (2004: 31) produced by white racism, Biko advocates embracing and valorising blackness as a path for becoming human. Black Consciousness thus sought to demolish “the house that race built” (Lubiano, 1998) while excavating only half its foundation. Biko’s route to humanity for black people passes through racial membership; his route for white people lies in its destruction. His path to freedom lies primarily in a politics of ‘race’: “colour...[being] the greatest single determinant for political action” (2004: 54). On this view black nationalism in the form of Black Power, is freedom.

On the contrary, Fanon warns against the absolutist tendencies of nationalisms, particularly of racialised nationalisms (Fanon, 1990: 119, 131). He writes against négritude or a romanticised rehabilitation of blackness when he refuses to “dedicate [him]self to a revival of an unjustly unrecognised Negro civilisation” or to devote
his life “to drawing up the balance sheet of Negro values” (1986: 226, 229). While, like Biko, Fanon ignores gender, he goes further with delinking ‘race’ from ‘the human’ in his attempt to destroy the psycho-existential effects of “the juxtaposition of the white and black races” (1986: 14). Fanon addresses both poles of the racial binary in his attempt to excavate the entire foundation of ‘race’. He sees a politics of ‘race’ as “an oxymoron” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 87). What does this mean in the context of the subject of this paper? Racialised representations of ‘the human’ as ‘Man’ disavow meanings of ‘the human’ among those racialised as ‘not-Man’/ ‘less-than-Man’. This negation of thought, desire, speech and agency among the (formerly) colonised, each of which is fundamental to political relationship, forecloses such relationship between racially dominant and racially subjugated people. Hence, as Gilroy puts it, “politics ends where ‘race’ lives” (2000: 41).

‘Race’, for Fanon, is the grave in which empire buried – alive – the very notion of humanity. Fanon will not allow empire completely to erase possibilities for disinterring alternative ideas of being human (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, p. 25). Thus, for him the path to becoming human lies not in the denial or embrace of ‘race’, but in recovering ‘the human’ from its grasp. Hence he writes: “I have one right alone: that of demanding human behaviour from the other … I have no wish to be the victim of the Fraud of a black world” (Fanon, 1986: 227–229). Racial membership, for Fanon, offers only a fragile solidarity; one too narrow to accommodate the complexities and multiplicities of human existence and injustice and too close to the very principles of colonial domination. Seeking value in this narrow identity is for him the “great black mirage” (1970: 37). Biko advocates celebrating blackness and making it the centre of politics. Fanon is disturbed by the existence of black as a category “to which one inevitably belong[s], whether one desire[s] to or not. A category that identifie[s] from a distance, without inquiry, without exchange of a single word” (Ehlen, 2000: 87; Fanon, 1986: 117, 126). For him, to assume that racial membership brings peace of mind is to tolerate its misfittings and distortions in exchange for false belonging (Ehlen, 2000: 87). Ehlen suggests “perhaps, for Fanon, it was exactly this false acceptance that would be the most unbearable” (2000: 87).

No common humanity, only ‘genres of the human’

Drawing on Fanon, Sylvia Wynter argues the bourgeois subject, Man, is but one genre of the human, suggesting we do not have a common conception of ‘the human’. For her, among the tasks of radical Black thought is to refuse the insertion of Black life into this bourgeois genre of the human and to excavate and (re)invent hidden genres of the human as a construct, rather than a fact of existence (see Biko, 2004: 51), measurable in one way or another. In other words, a central task of radical
Black thought was and is to recuperate and recreate ways ‘the human’ is imagined and lived by those set outside of Man as a genre of the human (Weheliye, 2014: 8). Put differently, it is to decolonise what it means to be human and so to “produc[e] new formations of humanity” (Weheliye, 2014: 12) from the other sides of power. This is what Fanon means when he writes of rescuing ‘the human’ from the grip of ‘race’ (Sekyi-Otu, 1996) in an effort to begin crafting a new humanism and to imagine humanity otherwise.

Wynter’s suggestion that we do not have a common conception of ‘the human’ rests on the production of ‘pieza man’ as the constitutive outside in relation to hegemonic Vitruvian Man. ‘Pieza man’ was African, enslaved, about 25 years old, healthy and “calculated to give a certain amount of physical labour value against which all the [other slaves] could be measured – with for example, three teenagers equalling one pieza and older men and women thrown in a job lot as refuse” (Wynter cited in Mignolo, 2015: 114). She argues that we continue to work within the parameters of a hegemonic conception of ‘the human’ – Man and its constitutive Other, ‘piece of a body’/ ‘flesh’ – and that we need to construct conceptions of the human post-Man; after-Man; against-Man; conceptions other than that of the liberal humanist subject, Man. If we conceive of modernity/coloniality and of Hu-Man/Black non-person as relationally constituted through political and economic violence, we can explore the ways forces of subjugation and exploitation both press upon and press out forms of the human among ‘pieces of black bodies’/ ‘flesh’/ ‘life that is death’. This means conceptualising new forms of the human from places of catastrophic suffering/injury and of hope in spite of catastrophe, rather than from places of white dominance (Maldonado-Torres, 2008: xiii; Weheliye, 2014: 14). If we are to disrupt the monopoly liberal humanism holds on the idea of ‘the human’, we must reinstate the central place of this idea in the history of Black thought (Weheliye, 2014: 21). This implies neither the inclusion of Black life into liberal humanism, nor the abolition of humanism, but rather reinventing ‘the human’ from the liminal spaces of the oppressed (2014: 25).

In this vein of reinvention, Alexander Weheliye creates “habeas viscus as an assemblage of the human … borne of political violence” (2014: 11). He questions and reformulates Agamben’s (1998: 119–153) conception of bare life and its relation to Foucault’s notion of biopower. For Agamben, bare life is the realm in which all humans are reduced to mere biological life thus erasing all socio-political markers of difference. In contrast, Weheliye is concerned with “why certain subjects are structurally more susceptible to personifying [bare life]” (2014: 35) and with the fact that “most instantiations of bare life do not necessarily entail physical mortality [as in Nazi concentration camps] per se, but other forms of
political death” (2014: 35), for example, slavery, other forms of racialised political and economic violence. He writes:

The conjoining of flesh and *habeas corpus* in the compound *habeas viscus* brings into view an articulated assemblage of the human (viscus/flesh) borne of political violence, while at the same time not losing sight of the different ways the law pugnaciously adjudicates who is deserving of personhood and who is not (habeas) … The flesh, rather than displacing bare life or civil death, excavates the social (after) life of these categories: it represents racialising assemblages of subjection that can never annihilate the lines of flight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation and possibilities of other worlds (2014: 11, 12).

What is the value of this reinvention? First, it turns our attention away from ‘race’ as a ‘human divine’ and toward lived experiences of black people. In this regard, readers will remember that in line with liberal humanism, a Eurocentric, scientised conception of ‘race’ locates what it means to be human in the realm of the extra-societal, the extra-human. In contrast, contemporary radical Black thought locates blackness as racialised assemblages of subjection in their colonial histories and thereby places conceptions of the human both in the realm of lived experiences and in the realm open to human intervention. This move enables a shift toward a critical humanism for which living as a black person produces understanding/knowing for the purposes of living/surviving in the modern world. Thus, black life is not reduced to a socio-demographic location. Furthermore, black suffering, rather than reduced to data, is humanised through recognition of the ways forces of subjugation press upon and press out practices of freedom in the forms of hope, dreams, survival and endurance among oppressed people. Conceptualising ‘new’ or ‘other’ forms of the human from the places of black suffering, as opposed to a place of white dominance, allows one to think *through* rather than *transcend* ‘race’.

In her historical novel, *Unconfessed*, Yvette Christiansë (2006) reinvents a genre of ‘the human’ from the repeatedly broken, stolen life of the central character, a slave woman at the Cape in the nineteenth century. Sila van den Kaap is transferred to the prison on Robben Island after serving some years in a Cape gaol for infanticide. Readers learn about her ‘life that is death’ and her understanding of what it means to be human as she talks to the spirit of her son, Baro. Through this narrative Sila’s humanity, as well as its disavowal is revealed to the reader. She speaks to Baro as a mother would to a son. She believes Baro “[did] not need the boat in which flesh [came] to this place [the Cape]” (Christiansë, 2006: 46). Sila took his ‘life that was death’ because she could not bear the way the slave owner, Van der Wat, “picked Baro up by the arm and swung him away like a piece of rubbish”, all because he, too, yearned to be lifted up onto a horse (2006: 38). She describes her life as “[a] life [that] keeps me from life itself” (2006: 115). She dreams of freedom. She thinks.
She feels. She tells her son and she tells the court “I was heartsore” (2006: 130, 247, 278, 279). Christiansë powerfully counterposes Sila’s ‘knowing’ against the ‘not knowing’ of the prison superintendents; her world of violence and of a life of many deaths against the buttoned, neck-tied and waist-coasted world of colonial officials and slave owners. This novel animates the psycho-social (after) life of slavery at the Cape.

The (after)life, thought, torture and death of Biko animates Weheliye’s conception of *habea viscus*. In the context of apartheid’s law and political violence Biko’s tortured, “naked, manacled, and lonely” (Ndebele, 2000), body becomes ‘flesh’/ ‘life that is death’. The social after-life of his enfleshment and death reveals the incapacity of such violence to annihilate dreams and practices of liberation and possibilities of more human worlds. Biko refused ‘Black’ as a category imposed by the human divine, advocating instead for an understanding of Blackness as lived political experience from which a human face for South Africa could be imagined and fashioned. Black Consciousness thought offers ways of knowing and Being that are pressed from practices of freedom during apartheid South Africa. Sila van den Kaap’s knowing is pressed from her life that “keeps her from life itself” (Mignolo, 2015: 116). She is a woman able to read the world despite being illiterate. She interprets her world and criticises it. Thus, Being through the eyes of the imperial ‘Other’, might be considered a way of knowing.

A living, if imperfect, critical humanism

Given Western HuManism’s tainted history, crafted by the long reach of its brutal and racialised Christian, ‘civilising’ and science arms, concerns about its value for the world today are undoubtedly legitimate. In light of these concerns, how might one build on the traces of critical humanism in Biko’s work, on Christiansë’s creative reinvention of ‘the human’ from the places of Sila’s suffering, and on Fanon’s new humanism? How might one use these advances to think through possibilities towards a living and critical humanism that accounts for the real effects of racialisation on human life? If we accept that history is made by *all* men and women, not only by those in Europe and North America, is it not incumbent on formerly colonised people to refuse, as Fanon did, empire’s desire to monopolise meanings of humanism? Given that histories produced by colonial modernity are interdependent, can one relegate humanism to an exclusive preserve of ‘the West’? For example, Said (2004) and Moosa (2011) remind us that practices at the heart of humanist knowledge – reading, interpretation and critique – were central to the much older Arabic-Islamic intellectual tradition also known as humanism. Already by the twelfth century, long before Western Christian HuManism, these practices were not only established in Arabic universities of North Africa, Persia
and Southern Europe, but shaped politics in the twentieth-century (Said, 2004: 54, 58).

Edward Said (2004) and Sylvia Wynter (2003) each offer convincing arguments for re-inventing humanism as living, critical praxis. Said is concerned with humanism “not as a possession ... of desirable attributes ... [but] as a usable praxis” (2004: 6). Both scholars locate the value of human life within the realm of human intervention, rather than that of the human-divine: origins, science, biology, nature and the market. In short, they locate the value of human life in the realm of knowledge and cultural practice. Neither Said nor Wynter offers an ideal humanism waiting to be discovered or with promises of redemption. On this matter it is best to quote Said at length.

One can acquire philosophy and knowledge ... but the basically unsatisfactory fallibility (rather than its constant improvement) of the human mind persists nonetheless. So there is always something radically incomplete, insufficient, provisional, disputable and arguable about humanistic knowledge ... that ... gives the whole idea of humanism a tragic flaw that is constitutive to it and cannot be removed ... [and] can never be superseded. Another way of putting this is to say that the subjective element in humanistic knowledge and practice has to be recognised and in some way reckoned with since there is no use in trying to make a neutral, mathematical science out of it (2004: 12).

In a word, whatever is within the realm of human intervention is always already imperfect, incomplete and open to critique.

Both Said and Wynter argue for a humanism that emerges from subjugated experiences and knowledges. In the light of recent conversations in South Africa about decolonising the university, its curricula and its pedagogies, intellectuals would do well to heed Sylvia Wynter’s (1994) now older-than-two-decades argument. Her point that the articulation of race with ‘the human’ lies at the foundation of our current order of knowledge, returns me to where I started this piece: Premesh Lalu’s (2012) appeal to the Human and Social Sciences in the South African academy to unsettle racialised conceptions of ‘the human’. Wynter writes:

... if the ostensibly divinely ordained caste organising principle of Europe’s feudal-Christian order was fundamentally secured by the Absolutism of its Scholastic order of knowledge, ... the ostensibly evolutionarily determined genetic organising principle of our Liberal Humanist own [order], as expressed in the empirical hierarchies of race and class [and] ... gender ..., is as fundamentally secured by our present disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (1994 : 53).

In similar vein, Edward Said, fully cognisant of the ways societies are structured in dominance, argues for a secular humanism as critique of Eurocentric epistemologies
and of conditions of existence in- and out-side the university (Said, 2004: 22). For him, the relevance of humanism today lies in its “technique[s] of trouble” (2004: 77): unsettling the ways things have been and are done; questioning the ‘truths’ presented to us as self-evident (2004: 28). On her part, Sylvia Wynter lays the responsibility firmly on our doorstep when she argues, if lay HuManists of fourteenth and fifteenth century Europe could undo prescriptive theological categories of that time, intellectuals in- and out-side today’s academy ‘hold the key’ to undoing prescriptive race/class/gender categories of this time (Wynter, 1994: 52). In a word, “knowledge must be rewritten” (Beer cited in Wynter, 1994: 69). Moreover, you and I need to rewrite knowledge.

Such writing ought to be conscious of one of the limits of Western HuManism’s critique of European theodicy of the late Middle Ages, namely, that it replaced one structural opposition of Sameness/Difference with an articulation of two other sets of oppositions. Spirit/Flesh was replaced with Reason/Lack of Reason and Culture/Nature. These oppositions produce cultural forms of group and self-representation and forms of consciousness through which we learn to know ourselves and the world (Wynter, 1984: 24–28). A living critical humanism would need to make HuManism’s symbolic oppositions the object of its critique (1984: 44). This, for Wynter, is where meanings of ‘the human’ are made: in Representation, not by divine Creation nor by Evolutionary selection (1984: 50). For, given that “meaning pre-existed … speech” (1984: 24), human consciousness and reflective thought is prior to the idea of natural laws of evolution. Thus, there is something in Said’s assertion that humanism as critique might be all we have as we struggle to build a more just future.

References


Chapter 4

TEMPLATES OF ORDERING AND MAINTAINING THE SOCIAL

Racial identities and consequences

Gerhard Maré

Template or templet noun: 1 a pattern, mould, or stencil used as a guide to the shape of something that is being made or drawn. b a thing that serves as a model for other things.¹

Our lives are hinged round with systems of classification, limned by standard formats, prescriptions and objects ... yet few see them [the classification systems and standards] as artefacts embodying moral and aesthetic choices that in turn craft people’s identities, aspirations and dignity. (Bowker & Star, 1999:1)

Introduction

Ideological contestation at times introduces new urgency around older issues, opening new thought and possibilities, focusing on necessary essential social change and even what may be called transformations and revolutions. However, it can also, simultaneously, be founded on the same underlying understanding of

society. This can serve to maintain aspects of common sense, rather than challenge it and ensure continuity rather than rupture it. It can serve as minority power relations, rather than serve majority segments of society, marginalised through the lack of social power: transition rather than transformation.

Such very public contestation swept both South Africa and the USA recently. Dissatisfaction with experience of self-worth amongst younger people, absence of respect from those other than yourself, unequal chances from birth of realising human capabilities and extensive material and related inequalities that characterise life within these societies, came to the boil for many of that cohort. Unsurprisingly it occurred mainly at universities. Dissatisfaction, hurt and anger, expressed through such as #FeesMustFall and #BlackLivesMatter, respectively, dominated social and other media coverage. Unfortunately, these exchanges live on in the present. The experiential and explanatory summary voiced is loud and clear: racism. In the USA racialised and racist police brutality and murder, and apparent wide social acceptance of such actions formed, and still forms, the basis of social protests in several cities. Trump’s campaign and presidency has provided fertile ground. In South Africa too, despite a very different social and political context, anger at experiences of racism and subsequent mobilisation at universities (dominating other on-going and wider social protests at failed basic service delivery), racism has been at the centre of understanding and attempts at solving the problems that have been named in the events.

In this turmoil of questioning racialism – the socially constructed belief in the biological existence of races with essential characteristics – on the few occasions when it is raised, is perceived as racist itself. A long-term commitment in South Africa to exploring non-racialism has been emptied of the little power it ever had, other than rhetorical repetition. Instead race essentialisms – ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ – serve for many to claim or allocate membership and attributes and inform political discourse and action. Within this simplified binary room has been created for sub-divisions and extreme variants (such as ‘colouredness’ and ‘indianness’ and various ethnic and national categories). Karen Fields and Barbara Fields link racialism and racism. Therefore the only escape route, in their discussion of ‘racecraft’, in the context of the USA needs be:

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\text{[T]he first principle of racism is belief in race, even if the believer does not deduce from that belief that the member of a race should be enslaved or disfranchised or shot on sight by trigger-happy police officers .... Once everyone understands that African descent is not race and that African ancestry differs from others only in the racism with which Euro-America has stigmatised it, the problem changes: what is needed is not a more varied set of words and categories to represent racism but a politics to uproot it (2012: 109, italics added).}
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This is where my concerns are located. Why does racialism continue, effectively as the indispensable base for racism in South Africa, when colonial, segregationist and apartheid capitalism had previously ensured, even demanded, its repressive continuation. Why has such a history not contaminated racialism against any future use? To put it another way, why formally classify and informally live, without question, the very basis of apartheid, the everyday acceptance of race itself? Why are the consequences not delinked from the abhorrence of race thinking – ‘racecraft’? And then, what is the link of racialism and racism with other largely accepted continuities – capitalism, traditionalism, sexism, nationalism and the general acceptance of essentialised differences? If race is the problem, from which everything else flows, then the obliteration of other races or race domination, are the (only) answers. This ‘solution’ has been offered during the turmoil in social media, as organisational goals and emblazoned on t-shirts, emanating from all races.

In exploring these concerns the terms ‘template’ and ‘ideology’ will be employed. Template was used as an explanatory concept by South African political activist and influential public intellectual, Neville Alexander, in his discussion of the continuation of racialism and, hence, racism and conflict (Alexander, 2007).

The dictionary definition above provides a way of discussing Alexander’s use of the term. It also stimulates further thinking on how his approach may be employed as a heuristic device in social analysis and towards identifying solutions. Building on previous work (Maré, 2014) I reflect on the maintenance, adaptation and creation of racial and other forms of essentialised social identities. These processes are given effect through templates: variously legal strictures, accompanying policies and practices of classification, and ideological interpellations through the range of socialising engagements that individuals experience during their lives. These social processes of template creation have actual and potentially stultifying and tragic consequences.

I accept, firstly, the primacy Alexander gives to state-created and operated templates in exploration of racialism and racism. Anthony Marx had also drawn attention, in comparative perspective, to the implication of such templates:

State actions were highly consequential in shaping the template of modern race relations. Where and when states enacted formal rules of domination according to racial distinctions, racism was reinforced. ... Where racial domination was not encoded by the state, issues and conflicts over race were diluted. (1998: 267; also see Maré, 2014: 61)

Secondly, my position, as it was for Alexander, is that the central concern of the state is the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. This happens through the Constitution with its clause on private property and the web of subsequent legislation, practices and institutions – most of them systemic continuations
of the past. The white noise of confirmation and assurance of living in the space of capitalist production and consumerism in a multitude of obvious and commonsensical institutional forms or ideological templates is, in effect, everyone’s everyday life. The articulation of class ideology with other interpellations shapes such confirmation, or, at the very least, does not contradict them. The local form of capitalist inequality was given its historically racialised rules and practices especially from the nineteenth century. This form has been the template of transformation since 1994, ‘deracialising capitalism’ remains the expressed goal. My primary focus here, however, is on the templates of racialism in South Africa.

Thirdly, the effects of these templates can be examined through auto-biographical moments. It can either (or both) be illustrated by the common sense of race as biocultural – which could be labelled the ‘born with’ position on essentialised social identity – in other words, a destiny; or/and the immediate or subsequent processes and consequences of realising the possibility and necessity of change – accepting a ‘born into’ approach, thus allowing the possibility of agency (Maré, 2014). Such reflections on the ‘born into’ realisation are also to be found in Nat Nakasa (1964), Mark Gevisser (2014) and Stephen Clingman (in both his biography of Bram Fischer [1998] and autobiography [2015]). Escape, or even reflection, requires critical thinking, stimulated often by sometimes unpredictable occurrences or moments, either personal or social, is what becomes clear.

Templates of identity and behaviour were state-imposed in pre-1994 South Africa through policy, legislation and effectively ensured through policing boundaries and punishing miscreants. This happened within the ether of racial and racist content that existed within legislated bounded spaces (physical, class and cultural). The content of racial templates centrally ensured integration into an unevenly shared world of capitalist production, which determined the overall structure. It had to be, and was, lived out often in small unrecognisable detail, as one would expect is common sense in everyday life: how to answer; what to expect; who to see around you; what and how to appreciate; where to walk; how to talk, dress, sing and play; what to avoid. Race was accepted, even if the consequences for the majority were rejected and vigorously resisted. And yet agency shaped life, as well within this regulated society, the spectacular and brave, the adaptive and also collaborative (Nakasa, 1964; Dlamini, 2009, 2014). For some, such as in the Unity Movement, there was even the clear rejection of race thinking itself, unusual in South Africa with its near total multiracial approach. The formal and the less formal templates of difference are neither synchronous nor necessarily mutually reinforcing. We live complex lives in our individuality. Here may lie some of the possibilities and recognition of the need and actual, disruption of the racialised world.
There is not only the world into which one is born, the ‘prior vocabulary’, that exists for the ways we interpret social life. There is also the incorporation of individuals into an ideological framework, being subjected to and qualified through deliberate calls made upon them. How do we approach the “ideological formation of human subjects” (Therborn, 1982: vii) in its complexity – in mobilisation and contestation? This question is set by Göran Therborn himself in his 1980s essay on ideology and power. On subject formation he notes the “dialectical character of ideology”, expressed in the opposite ways in which ‘subject’ is relevant: “(‘the subjects of history’; ‘the subjects of the prince’). Ideologies not only subject people to a given order. They also qualify them for conscious social action” (1982: vii). In addition, ideologies are ‘social processes’, in various relationships to each other, such as contestation and reinforcement, a “cacophony of sounds and signs” (1982: viii).

With such subject formation, divided into categories of being human, it is also the result of what is made of the subject by those outside the social category. This is an interaction that could be seen as deliberately employed or unintended in its banality. Specimens of a category need the existence of other categories, members of which are not ‘us’ in a variety of ways, thereby confirming ‘us’ and ‘they’, then cast an actual or perceived eye of alternate recognition on ‘us’ (white and black, English and Afrikaner, Zulu and Sotho, Christian and Muslim, male and female, gay and heterosexual). Richard Alba writes that “… identities are socially constrained: that is, they are in part products of the ways others see us and not just our free choices. The influence of social environment is especially strong in childhood” (Alba, June 11, 2015). Escaping, or redefining any of these categories, in South Africa – or local variations in numerous contexts globally – has to occur against the grain of calls, interpellations, directly addressed ‘from within’ the category, and against the grain of the expectations and definitions emanating ‘from without’ (Pillay, 2014, 2017).

In part 1, I discuss ‘template’ and ‘ideology’ in their inter-relationship. In part 2, I extend the argument to include second-level practices and sites of socialisation,

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2 Social identity formation through categories of information gathering (especially such as censuses) appeared in a report on ‘The myth of a white minority’ in the The New York Times (Richard Alba, June 11, 2015). While citizens are expected to identify themselves, or be identified, into race or ethnic categories the already existing common vocabulary of race remains, or is altered to adapt to changing templates of indexing.

Measurement of race categories in South Africa indicates that while the ‘white’ population was 20 per cent of total in 1948, the census picture now shows ‘whites’ to be 8.2 per cent, or third largest ‘population group’, obviously after ‘black’ and ‘coloured’. Available online at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022014.pdf. Also see Nobles, 2000; Christopher, 2002, 2009; Haffejee, 2015 & Maré, 2014.
labelling and stereotyping, ones that fall outside direct state authority and practices, of the everyday and of common sense. I point, in part 3, to the consequences of templates and ideologies, with an illustrative focus on race and racialism. And, finally, I engage in the necessity of utopian thinking, the need to think in ‘as other a way as possible’, to moderate the consequences, or adapt the causal factors, towards being human in the first instance – even to entertain the promise of radical alternatives to racialism. The near impossibility of meaningful change is accepted, in large part because of the common sense of what exists in everyday life and the benefits to the economically powerful of maintaining such distracting notions of the social world.

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Templates and ideologies are useful concepts in my quest towards understanding the route between intention and effect, whether deliberate or unintentional. The distinction I draw, between template and ideology, is required for the purpose as set out in the introduction.

Templates, refer to the state’s functions of policy formulation and execution: creating legislation, providing guidelines for practice, preparing and employing agents in these tasks, involving citizens in executing plans and fulfilling demands and addressing them in political mobilising discourse. In other words it means the ‘ordering’ of society. This can either mean, in a sense, to create an order or in another sense to command behaviour. These templates, in addition, ensure shared strategies in dealing with opposition and responding to proposals of alternatives by such as contesting political parties or class interests. Having templates also fixes the guidelines for gathering information about citizens, how they should be perceived and the world they inhabit (primarily through census taking); thereby creating, rather than simply reflecting, the social world in what it asks for and what it ignores.

Ideologies, on the other hand, refer to interpellations of populations, discourses of identification and perceptions.3 This occurs usually through language, but also with signs and expectations of behaviour (implied or explicit). The purpose is to create subjects who accept a version of what exists, what is good and bad, what is possible in terms of social action, thus qualifying them for roles to perform and to expect. In other words, ideologies serve to confirm the existing allocation and practices of power, behaviour and expectations, in specific forms and contexts, and to deny and contest alternative versions (Therborn, 1982: i-28) – and, therefore, demanding ideological struggle over meaning.

3 USA Republican candidate performances in 2015/2016 illustrate the social processes of ‘interpellation’ or ‘address’ very clearly, as does race politics in South Africa.
Firstly, the one does not exist without the other: templates also do ideological work, as well as are shaped by and shape ideologies. In summary, creation and managing of specific types of subjects is the effect both of state templates and of formal ideological discourses.

To take a concrete example, the apartheid-era Population Registration Act (PRA, 1950), was a drastic and far-reaching exercise in ‘indexing the human’. On the one hand it confirmed an existing ideological interpellation and political practice and on the other it created an adapted template by initiating an alternate ideological discourse. This was not the first template for ‘population groups’ (with races then counted in further demographic categories: sex, age, location, education, income, birth rates, and so on). The PRA continued and confirmed in the first instance continuation of allocation in race terms, but now there were also further division into ethnic templates (see, for example, Terreblanche, 2002; Posel, 2001; Norval, 1996 & Moodie, 1975). It would guide law makers and bureaucrats who ensured that the constituting elements in the ‘something’ to which the dictionary definition of ‘template’ refers, were available; that the pieces would fill the space intended, guiding the social engineering and policing agents. It directed the bantustan policy.

These templates had existed historically in formal and informal ways, in colonies and Boer republics and then in the Union of South Africa after the creation of a state (‘nation state’ does not ever ring true in South Africa) in 1910. The PRA set in motion and allowed formal processes, far beyond anything previously attempted: multiple laws relating to economic, labour, spatial, social, religious and other dimensions of any society; the placing of individuals in the racial and ethnic shape of the template and giving ‘proof’ – the ‘dompas’ and other ID documents – of such allocation, from that moment for those already born and through birth certificates to each future generation. The stencil ensured, through controls and at times vicious policing and murderous action, obedience to the allocation and intended behaviours and acceptance of the consequences of such allocation, as well as the resistance from different forms and locations. Always the state maintains and regulates the template of class (of the relations of production), of capitalism and of property. Race and ethnicity served to provide context-appropriate shape to capitalist practice and profits.

However, the informal ways of the race template, my interest here, reflected human cognition, socialisation and behaviour, accumulated, adopted and adapted from birth. Homo sapiens is social and the largely blank slate at birth carries outlines of scribbles made before the cohort for whom it is recreated – such as seeing the traces of permanent markers misused for whiteboard lessons in previous classes, for previous cohorts of learners. Gendered perspectives, race, religion, ethnic group, nation, all exist as ‘the past’ for groups, the world into which we are received, even
if experienced, and ensured individually as born with. Then we also need to add the genetic markers of species and appearance.

A second point is that the templates referred to in this essay are essentially templates of difference between and not of collectivity and inclusion of all. The only shared allocation is to ‘race’ (but in the plural), not ‘human’. Under apartheid ‘citizen’ was also ‘race’. Other than banal and ineffective calls for ‘nation-building’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘non-racialism’ and the like, the state post-1994 has attempted to obfuscate the crudity of the templates of difference it employs (race and nation, subjects and citizens, to name just two sets). It occurs behind the veil of common sense or populist necessity. Firstly, necessity is presented as that of addressing inequality and secondly it is inter-related, as required in attending to the racially discriminatory legacies of apartheid. These are goals nobody can, or should, disagree with. But the form of the solution, the template of race, is both ineffectual and abhorrent. I have, deliberately, previously called it a “crime against humanity” (Maré, 2014: 121, 126). However, the purpose is also to ensure political and economic power through race-populist simplification; making sense for some, while being claimed for all.

The formal templates of racial difference – through legislation and the subsequent demands required for additional classification in creating the standards, the data, the measures (Bowker & Star, 1999) – reinforce and confirm the already-existing informal templates, those of already-given social identity. Ironically the present and the past of difference mutually reinforce each other; the formal tales that are told of apartheid, in the way they are told, serve to justify the apparently unavoidable present. Class is now to be ‘deracialised’ (through a twist of logic, reflecting the ‘national demographics’ of races in all employment categories, rather than doing away with race classification). Most importantly, capitalist ownership, control and management too must be racially representative. The smooth transition of capitalism into a new South Africa, now with old and new bourgeoisies as beneficiaries and as aspirational models of appropriate behaviour, is thus assured. In addition apartheid’s ethnic bantustans are now to be returned to allegedly pre-colonial forms, continuing to serve ‘traditional authority’ and, in mediated and complex ways, the ‘modernised’ and westernised holders of political and economic power outside of these areas. The state itself, within 1910 borders, includes many

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4 I wish to draw attention, as I have done in previous writing, to the distinction between difference and diversity that Jo Beall (1997) utilised in the development policy field. What is called ‘diversity’ in South Africa (a positive, as in ‘the rainbow nation’) is actually ‘difference’ (a dangerous negative in its top-down fixing, as can be illustrated with regrettable ease) (also Maré 2015).
of the apartheid created or preserved internal ethnic fragmentations and suggested population allocations (Maré, 2014: 80-82).

Lastly, recognising and examining templates demand that not only state institutions be included, but also supportive – or for that matter oppositional – creators of specific versions of what exists and what change may consist of. Research centres, cultural bodies, political parties and their policies and the media, all contribute to creating templates of seeing the world as consisting of races, offering descriptions and arguments, that focus on the social construct ‘race’ as the near-exclusive basis for understanding and acting in and on the world. Performances, such as television coverage of parliamentary debates or political rallies, are racialised in their verbal expression; social media are saturated with race, racialism and racism; a vast number of forms require the completion of blocks asking for race confirmation and require a multitude of overseers. The overlap between template and ideology is clear.

II

The ideology of race as participated in by citizens as raced-subjects already created through socialisation, rather than as the discourses and actions predominantly expressed and guided by the state through templates, is shaped by a large and complexly interacting number of determinants. Here it is more appropriate to speak of subject formation through ideology – individuals located in their ‘proper’ social identities. Templates exist and operate through multiple material and institutionalised forms – such as educational sites, class and race differentiations expressed in spatial forms and religious institutions – thereby reflecting the articulation of legal and policy templates with state and civil apparatuses and their material effects (Bass et al., 2012). These identity continuities include confirmations, powerfully expressed, in turn, though a range of moral, hurt, alienation and anger emotions. These are themselves guided by notions of what exists and what appropriate responses are. They contribute to effective ideological subjection and qualification in Therborn’s terms – a powerful over-determination, in other words. Ian Hacking deals with ‘making up people’ and the ‘loop’ that is created in the dynamic process of naming. He comments: “These reflections on the classification of people are a species of nominalism. But traditional nominalism is static. Mine is dynamic; I am interested in how names interact with the named” (2006: 23).

Templates, however, provide the structuring infrastructure for these more ephemeral contributions. State-level templates ensure continuity, not only to demand, confirm and reward, but to deny the need to question what already exists. Alternative visions of what could and should be, such as the already mentioned
Constitutional commitment to ‘non-racialism’ and ‘dignity’, therefore remain at the level of empty and contradictory repetition by politicians, heard as cynical obligations.

The well-publicised voices of student protest in South Africa (and the USA) from 2015, should be noted here, as illustrative of the public processes of identity maintaining, claiming and renaming. In addition, the use, effect and implications of social media on contemporary social identity formation needs to be integrated into studies of issues and moments (such as the student protests) in the ideological confirmation of identities. It is essential to a fuller understanding of the events and trends mentioned above and many more globally. Social media excludes (through unequal access to and ability within the technology) and includes (cyber ‘communities’ can be created) and ideas can be confirmed as valid with ease and extra-ordinary speed. Violent action can be as easily called for as avoided; enemies and ‘friends’ are identified and rumours get started with ease; mobilisation is within reach in an instant. A good example of this is the taxi drivers who utilised cell phones to mobilise in their disruption of anti-xenophobia marches in Durban in April 2015. Statements and claims do not need evidence to exist as fact. The ‘echo effect’ ensures that confirmatory messages are selected. The worlds of facebook, television shows, celebrity, twitter, etc., are homogenising through consumption of the same – but not necessarily in individual detail. We receive information and set values against the backdrop of an existing individual vocabulary, even if that individualism may itself be levelling amongst certain sections of global society, through calls to a ‘we’. Consumerism is a good example of such individualism within the social. The call by Brian to the gathered multitude, in Monty Python’s ‘Life of Brian’, that “We are all individuals!” tumultuously and enthusiastically received with, but a single voice saying ‘I’m not’, seems relevant?

A very powerful inclusionary, and thereby also exclusionary, term in mobilising and in making claims has been experience. ‘Experience’ was used – vehemently at times – in feminist debates in South Africa in the early-1990s. It is so at present in a period of intense identity politics. Brian Fay’s (1996) discussion of the question whether you need ‘to be one to know one’ and his answer remains directly pertinent to present race-debates in South Africa for it has enormous consequences in the process of fixing templates of difference and in the search (or absence of searches) for solutions. ‘Races’ are claiming racialised experiences – obvious enough. But, if you can say an experience is unique, or rather uniquely shared in its mobilising social form, it serves to include. It also excludes and totally silences those whose

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5 The term ‘community’ I reject, for its mostly unqualified and misleading use. It serves to hide the tensions, conflicts and hierarchies of powers found within the implied inclusive claims under a cloak of homogeneity.
experiences have been defined as different, beyond the pale. Again I must turn to the word ‘essentialising’, whether through race classification or through claims made for biological, bio-cultural and/or experiential expressions of race belonging.

If memory (for that is all we immediately have of experience, unless ‘experience’ is perceived to be embedded, fixed or essentialised in being) is linked to the apparent individual, social-identity tension that may make sense of voluble contemporary race politics in South Africa. This politics is at times presented, especially within the apparent confidentiality of social media, as defiantly irresolvable, from ‘both’ sides: “My hurt and anger can only be resolved if you are removed from the equation”; “There is no resolution to what we have suffered and continue to experience while you and those who fall under your label, as the cause, are there”; “Julle staan in die pad van ons selfvervulling as ‘n minderheidsgroep”; or “Go back to India”. Fay does not deny the relevance of ‘experience’ to exploring social or individual lives, but ‘experience’ is not a given (a ‘fact’, the uncontested ‘truth’); it has to be ‘understood’ through questioning and reflection:

Sensitivity heightened by shared experience is often an important step in understanding the lives of others: … But genuine understanding goes beyond sensitivity. To know others – indeed to know oneself – is to make sense of their experience. For this one needs, in addition to sensitivity, the ability to decipher the meaning of their experience. (1999: 28)

Here the frequent arrogance of those who benefited from apartheid in effect to deny the need to ‘make sense’ of acknowledge and respond to the experience of all those now classified as ‘previously disadvantaged’, is blind and inhumane.

The calls and the questions raised by the students in 2015, and the sometimes too easy acceptance of these calls as valid to the context to which they were addressed, require testing for their claims of more encompassing validity. The task of understanding what sense a marginalised majority, in its disaggregated multiple forms, make of existing dominant discourses and interpellations of anger remains.

On this more material and extensive level, the continuity of traditional authority and traditional landholding, affects a very large proportion of the marginalised – more than 16-million necessarily racialised South Africans. Historian, William Beinart, compared this to the Verwoerdian intention, within apartheid’s template of identity, and of social, economic and political organisation of a category of citizens. He writes:

See Emmanuel Mgqwashu ‘Decolonisation should be about appreciating difference, not despising it’, The Conversation, November 30, 2015, in a growing debate about race populism in the student and related protests. Available on-line at: theconversation.com/Africa
It may seem mischievous to suggest that Jacob Zuma’s thinking on chiefs and traditional authority echoes that of the infamous apartheid leader H.F. Verwoerd. But, oddly enough, the two men had similar decisions to make about the future of rural South Africa, and the path Zuma is choosing is not all that different from the one his white predecessor trod.\(^7\)

The notion of tradition as an ethnic distinctiveness, were at times violent fragments of race categories that was tragically illustrated in what is now the province of KwaZulu-Natal in the decade after 1985. In ‘tradition’, race and ethnicity is combined or fragmented in distinctive ways.

III

State templates – created, maintained and nurtured – shape the limits of possibility for subject formation in society. Shared racialism is the result of the race templates, as it had been under apartheid. Race categories, as descriptors of social identity, confirm the belief that continued acceptance of its common sense existence will, could and/or should be rewarded in material ways – even if effectively only for some. Reinforcement occurs through a ‘magic encyclopedia’ of perpetual confirmations (to borrow a term from Walter Benjamin [Maré, 2014: 49-52]): the racialised form of presentation of state achievements – the census and extensive institutional reporting providing the necessary race-categorised statistics; through the appropriate comparison with apartheid’s racist legacy of inequalities; through shaping the South African dream of displays of consumption heaven to be realised in racialised form and so on. Identity politics dominate the South African and probably global, scene in this second decade of the twenty-first century.

Kwame Anthony Appiah (2014), developing his WEB du Bois lectures, reflects on du Bois’ life, devoting a section to ‘Identity now’. I refer briefly to his summary of the “contemporary philosophical theory of identity”(2014: 147), in which he identifies four main elements. Firstly, for social identities to exist the labels that identify them have to be there. Self-identified labels used in contemporary South African claims emanate from the colonial and settler political order – but with occasional claims to ‘time immemorial’; from the state’s templates of race;\(^8\) from media – increasingly social media with its rapid spread of the short-term new, often linked to consumer trends; from political mobilising calls; from intellectual voices; from pasts presented in confirming ways; and more.

\(^7\) Available on-line at: http://www.customcontested.co.za/verwoerd-zuma-chiefs/ website of the Centre for Law and Society, at UCT.

\(^8\) Lee Stone and Yvonne Erasmus produced a useful overview of legislation that directly replicates apartheid race categories (Stone & Erasmus, 2012; Maré, 2014: 52).
The second element refers to “norms associated with social identities”, of which Appiah writes as ‘ought to’ behaviour and ‘ought to’ expectations from and towards others. He warns that these may not be very moral behaviours and expectations; in fact, they may seem banal, but nonetheless also dangerous (Appiah, 2014: 149). Therborn’s “power of ideology” (1982) applies here, as does Appiah’s “honor codes” (2010). The violent and degrading enforcement of a ‘no-trousers’ rule on women at a taxi rank in Durban, as well as on racist treatment of fellow rugby supporters, can serve as just two South African examples. The consequence of the naming templates, therefore, also creates forms of behaviour, the display of and discourses around, which reinforce race labels and identification.

This element is linked to the third, namely subjectivity that ‘requires’ that I act in a certain way because I am of that sort, even that kind. Ideological interpellations of subjects as ‘Zulu’ or ‘Afrikaner’, ‘white’ or ‘black’ provide numerous examples of expected behaviour (Therborn, 1982; Hacking, 2006). The label of traitor – as in all such situations, even in mild mode, is powerfully and dangerously employed for failure to obey the necessity of required action – coconut, faggot, terrorist, counter-revolutionary.

Fourthly, a point that brings together the individual and the social, “[n]orms of identification are central in the project of individuality, which is the creation of a distinctive human life”(Appiah, 2014: 151). However, what if that ‘distinctive human life’ is also self- and other-perceived as predominantly – during distinct occasions, but potentially available all the time – that of a specimen of a category (Bauman, 2000: 227); effaced through templates and ideologies of difference, through the processes indicated above? All consequences, positive and negative, flow from here.

Appiah also draws attention to the ‘multiple nature’ of identity – the case for du Bois, too, in his life course – the personal/individual and the social find different expressions at different moments and in different contexts: I fall in love as an individual, but express it in ways that are socially and historically already there. This also applies, therefore, to who exists as the ‘you’, ‘they’, the other who is/are not ‘me’/’us’: whites, colonialists, Indians, amakwerekwere, blacks, Jews, Nigerians, female – and the derogatory terms employed in each case.

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See BBC article on the images used in target practice by soldiers in training (www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30573936, accessed January 2, 2015). This core of my concerns is drawn, as so often (Maré, 2014), from such as Zygmunt Bauman (2000) and Roberto Toscano (2000).
Let me immediately admit that I am increasingly influenced by climate change pessimism – for readable examples, see Nordhaus (2015a, 2015b), and Kingsnorth (2014) – when trying to find a way out of the mess of essential social identities within which we exist: ‘pessimism’ about humanity’s ability to act to minimise the effects, as the past is already unavoidable. Structurally it is much the same. Specific forms of capitalist production and consumption continue to exist, to be the existence for most. Reading newspapers and perusing magazines, watching television and with the ether of social media visible in billions of hands, it is possible for all with the power of consuming to live in near oblivion of the consequences of climate change for humanity. It seems that the misery that has occurred through racism in its own many forms, related notions of essentialised differences through the ages and in viciously on-going form today, may fade into insignificance for many of the immediate and marginalised victims as humanity faces self-made extinction. But until then race remains a form of mobilisation. Refugees flee starvation, as well as vicious religious, ethnic or nationalist warfare. As Paul Kingsnorth (2014) concludes a review:

Neither [Naomi] Klein nor [George] Marshall [authors of the books reviewed] can convincingly tell us how we should get from where we are to where we need to be in the time available; but then, neither can anyone else. Reading these books back to back, I’m inclined to side with Daniel Kahneman, whom Marshall spoke to in a noisily oblivious New York café. Kahneman won a Nobel Prize for his work on the psychology of human decision-making [and received an honorary doctorate also from the University of Stellenbosch in 2015], which may be why he’s so gloomy. “This is not what you might want to hear,” he says, but “no amount of psychological awareness will overcome people’s reluctance to lower their standard of living. So that’s my bottom line: there is not much hope. I’m thoroughly pessimistic. I’m sorry”.

William Nordhaus, some months later (2015a), does make a suggestion, but with extensive doubt as to successful global and in-time application. In the case of race, ethnicity, nationalism, sexism and religion we are not talking ‘standard of living’ in material terms (for anyone except a few), but apparent existential/ontological security and templates that fix them. We are also experiencing the crude use of these social identities in populist mobilisation, by the powerful or towards power and benefits.

How then can we possibly offer reasonable alternatives, avoid the consequences of what I have sketched above, of ‘racecraft’, as Karen Fields and Barbara Fields term racialism (2012: 18-19, 207)? We should not even be listening, or have to listen, to those who wish to argue against racialism, essentialism or climate change: in this way the student who initiated ‘Rhodes must fall’, in an interview with Chris Barron
in the *Sunday Times* at a certain point refused to answer questions because they were asked by a white man, Barron.10

There is enough reinforcement of whatever position one holds to obviate the need for evidence or debate. To return to social media and the internet in general, Michael Massing, in his evaluation of digital news media, notes that with so much information available, along with the consequent need to set interest-selection parameters very narrowly, the necessity “produces its own potentially worrisome by-product – the fragmentation of the audience. Some have cited this phenomenon as an important factor in the growing ideological polarisation in America, with people gravitating to sites that reinforce their preconceptions” (2015). There is enough extreme examples of positions with which to associate: “… social media have become a sluice gate for the dissemination of misogyny, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and vitriol” (2015), confirms Massing, also in readers’ comments sections in all media. It takes but a second on the internet to find such examples. The use of social media in recruiting for Isis often discussed in media in the USA, referring to academic units aimed at understanding the processes.11 Why does it appear that there are no strong institutions in South Africa, or elsewhere, critically examining racialism and essentialism in general, along with racism and sexism? A cynical reply would be because there are material benefits for those who maintain templates, not just existential rewards that focus on racism, but rather on its racial infrastructure that serves immediate political ends.

How do we escape, or at least talk of alternatives that address the fundamental issues that affect the majority of people? How to make that leap where the *starting point* demands alternative goals and, hence, perspectives? What if those goals can be realised only if the starting point is shared responsibility, complexity, debate and collective action (however small the collective may be initially)? Are we incapable of utopian ways of thinking, an imaginative positing of a desired future? For without conceding to initiating conversation, to engaging in imagining, moving beyond what is there in the mind, there is truly no way out.

Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel *The Buried Giant* (2015) raises this issue. Do we have to lose all memory to enable such a starting point of cohabitation, or is it possible to

10 While revising this essay I came across a statement from the contradictory Israeli president Reuvin Rivlin, responding to the “tragedy we are now living in”, referring as much to Arab-Israeli relations as that within Israel itself, with the growth and acceptance of Jewish extremism as a common sense: “I’m not asking if we’ve forgotten how to be Jewish,” he said, “but if we’ve forgotten how to be human” (David Remnick “The one-state reality: Israel’s president speaks up for civility, and pays a price”, *The New Yorker* November 17, 2014).

incorporate memory, respectfully and considerately, and therefore effectively, into the larger project of cosmopolitanism and humanism?

If templates provide the mould, the stencil, limiting what we can, and should, imagine and engage with, then the solution has to lie, not in another template. If ideological interpellations insidiously fix those guidelines in the way we operate as subjects, confirming an unchanging ‘born into’, then we limit human possibilities. The solution cannot, should not, be a counter stencil with other shapes, letters and symbols already cut into it, but in visions that are open, appeals that do not call or cast subjects into categories, but that allow (even demand) the questioning of categories with their already-existing final solutions implied. A potential answer is to reject templates of difference and find shared goals to address collectively – this is where a new honour code should be constructed, which holds an inclusive collective together. In calmer times I suggested that commitment to an expanded notion of democracy could be such a goal, an argument to which I wish to return at some point. In South Africa culture serves to define diversity as difference – effectively another outline in the template – reduced to an empty claim most appropriate to the advertising for consumerism and tourism publicity.

Amongst the elite there is no need to have visions of inclusivity. What you have you do not wish to share and what you hanker after you wish for yourself in the first place. Racist arrogance of ‘white South Africans’ was such that for decades inclusivity could be defined through the obviousness of exclusion. How do we convince of the need for inclusivity? By imagining a truly equal South Africa, to confront the costs and benefits and for whom in each case it would mean to demand in various ways and to participate actively towards such a goal.

The utopian thinking which Rick Turner (1972) proposed in the early 1970s – against the background of apartheid repression, but also within the ferment of black consciousness and revival of worker militancy (Moss, 2014) – rests on recognising, firstly, that there is a primary problem to be solved, in its complexity and multiple articulations. It is here that what Appiah (2010) calls an ‘honour code’ exists to justify an existing problematic practice or system – in effect a dishonour code. Secondly, that the problem, once recognised, is perceived to remain because it is lived as common sense about which little or nothing can be done – the existing code(s) and the ‘status’ attached to them stand in the way; ideologies deny that efforts to address them have effects or that it is being addressed by those who are capable of achieving success and not ‘us’. It is thus the ordering of things, within the existing templates, which has to be eliminated, that which is deemed unquestionable. The third step is to imagine a utopian ideal – shared austerity to address climate change and inequality, vastly different life chances, diversity rather than difference, human dignity for all – a vision of what should be. Lastly, it requires
stepping back into the present to identify the obstacles in the way of resolution; impediments that requires to be addressed collectively in order to approach the utopian idea; in a process guided through measures shaped, in debate, by the goal. So now we are back to my starting point.

Neville Alexander recognised that the major block in a slow process towards realisation of a non-racial utopian goal is the existence of a state that maintains the same template of race as before. Elimination of that block is itself a *sine qua non* in many social contexts of the greater goal of equality in its multiple dimensions (Therborn, 2013). The template exists for reasons similar to what should have been left behind – ensuring the continuation of the uneven and unequalising, rewards of capitalism, albeit in a ‘deracialised’ manner. The ideal of non-racialism should guide a process through multiple means: each identifying obstacles, each demanding specific resolution. It is certainly not colour-blindness, a label that serves frequently as one of the obstacles towards such imagining.

The existing honour codes and dishonour codes attached to the process of classification and to the results of such classification deliberately have to be rewritten. The idea of the mutability of social identities has to be made acceptable – while acknowledging the power of experience, of repetition, of selection based on what has become ingrained, of personal value and apparent indispensability to being human. This was what the proponents of black consciousness demanded, against apartheid’s fixed template.

To escape, however, we need to allow ourselves, as Rebecca Solnit (2006) writes, “to get lost”, to expose ourselves to uncertainty, to search and find value in the search. The common sense of the template that links achieving equality through maintaining race categories – in effect the *dishonour code* – has to be challenged. Through confirming a strong commitment to equality and dignity but showing that race – as racism and race discrimination, but also as racialism – is one element in the *failure* towards equality and, moreover, carries its own dangerous consequences as it had in the past. What Göran Therborn (2013) refers to as ‘existential inequality’, including racism, is used since 1994 in effect – whether intentionally or unintentionally – to bolster capitalism as a system, the primary source of ‘resource inequality’ and therefore also a major source of ‘vital inequality’ – the class-race debate silenced.

Karen Fields and Barbara Fields effectively link ‘racecraft’ with inequality, the real, rather than constructed, issue – already in the title of their book: *Racecraft: the soul of inequality in American life*. Racecraft, they write, as

[d]istinct from *race* and *racism* does not refer to groups or to ideas about groups’ traits. ... It refers instead to mental terrain and to pervasive belief.
Like physical terrain, racecraft exists objectively; it has topographical features that Americans regularly navigate and we cannot readily stop traversing it. Unlike physical terrain, racecraft originates not in nature, but in human action and imagination; it can exist in no other way. (2012: 18-19, 201-203)

They return to this terrain and the effect on human action and the need for ‘constructive imagining’, where it most counts, towards the end of the book:

Racecraft operates like a railway switch, diverting a train from one track to another. It is unlike a railway switch, however, in that the switchman seldom controls where the train ends up. It may end up on a siding in the middle of nowhere, its passengers stranded. By crowding inequality off the public agenda, racecraft has stranded this country [the USA] again and again over its history. It may do so again, permitting an economic sickness that arose from inequality to be treated homeopathically by further doses of inequality, which may eventually provoke rage that will sweep away respect for democratic politics and the rule of law. Forestalling that calamity is our duty. The first and fundamental step in that direction is to observe racecraft in action, study its moves, listen to its language and root it out. Only after doing so will we be prepared for the still harder work of tackling inequality. Are we up to it? (2012: 289-290)

Because of the massive weight of templates created or maintained by an existing state, with a popularly elected governing party and the existence and confirmation of racialised social identities – and maybe despite these immovable factors – smaller initiatives, as part of ‘constructive imagining’ are essential. The ways of illustrating utopian thinking, of offering and exploring steps along the way despite the obstacles, should display the same play of imagination: from innovative changes in education – books, art, play, creativity – to creativity in many fields. Achille Mbembe (2015) writes that “Literature and music in particular are also practices of desecration and profanation. Each in its own way involves a paradoxical and at times risky play with limits – both the limits set by moral or political orders and those that shape language and style, thought and meaning”. Mbembe (2015) concludes, and that is the challenge, because it is exactly what templates do not accept and allow, “Africa will never be a given”. Race cannot be a given if we are to confront, bravely, what equality means.
References


‘BEING-BLACK-IN-THE-WORLD’ AND THE FUTURE OF ‘BLACKNESS’

Njabulo S. Ndebele

I

The #RhodesMustFall Movement began at the University of Cape Town (UCT) on 9 March 2015. On that day human faeces were thrown at the commemorative statue of Cecil John Rhodes. Until then, the statue of the controversial entrepreneur and benefactor who donated land on which the university was built, had dominated the commemorative heraldry of the university. With an imperial loftiness Rhodes pondered the world spread out in front of him, as well as that he presumed existed behind him. He would do that in perpetuity. To this new breed of student, the statue’s daily dominance and the history it recalled, despite his philanthropy, had become intolerable. The defacement of the statue was soon followed by calls for it to be removed. A debate ensued nationally about history and commemorative statues, but it did not save Rhodes’ statue. On 9 April 2015, one month after the student movement had begun, the statue was swiftly and dramatically removed.
Student protesters deemed the statue a painful relic of colonial times; except that this relic, they argued, continued to breathe life into the economic order and the social arrangements supported by it on campus and in the large society beyond. Its imperial effects have displayed a resilience often glaring, but sometimes not easy to recognise in the current post-apartheid present. The removal of the Rhodes statue would also be the onset of the ‘decolonisation’ of the University of Cape Town, a process in which the adverse effects of a colonial legacy could be unveiled, altered, or be replaced by a new order. The demands of the student movement subsequently spread to other campuses in South Africa, their disruptive intent acquiring a global reach. They were to resonate also at Oxford University where Rhodes exerts a significant commemorative presence.

At the heart of the call for the ‘decolonisation’ of UCT was a more elemental source of student disaffection: being ‘black’ in a ‘white’ world. The #RhodesMustFall movement projected ‘blackness’ as a critical element in the discourse of protest against the ‘whiteness’ of Rhodes’s legacy and its resilient effects. The ‘black body in pain’ needed to be affirmed as human against its dehumanising depreciation as exploited labour in more than a century of captured service to Rhodes’s imperial, capitalist vision and the strong racist under/overtones that drove it. The colonial economic system and its politics established and developed superior-inferior relationships between ‘white’ and ‘black’ humans respectively. It is common to approach this relationship from the perspective of its driving agency: ‘whites’ oppressing ‘blacks’; or civilised ‘whites’ as superior humans, oppressing uncivilised, sub-human ‘blacks’. In reality, the system dehumanised both. It is the less recognised dehumanisation of ‘whites’ by the very system they created which is the target of the uncovering intent of the ‘decolonial’ project.

It is to be assumed that part of the ‘decolonial’ project is to change the attitudes of ‘whites’ towards ‘blacks’ by getting them to abandon racist attitudes and behaviour associated with them as a group. The urgency in this has to do with the perception that South African ‘whites’ did not give up much to make the post-apartheid reconciliation objective more successful. ‘Whites’ seemed to assume that the country they claim to have ‘built’ is desirable as is to everyone in 1994, including the millions of ‘blacks’, who were on the receiving end of its being ‘built’.

So what is expected of the ‘unveiled colonial’: remorse, guilt, identification as Africans, adopting Bafana Bafana national soccer team, moving from the ‘white’ suburbs to the ‘townships’, giving away a portion of their wealth in some way, whose accumulation on a social scale is fundamentally questionable on historically, moral and ethical grounds, adopting African names, learning African languages, transferring their skills…? The list of the forms of transformation expected of them is potentially infinite, but it could be reduced to a single item.
It is reasonable to expect that ‘white’ South Africans disentangle themselves from a pre-1994 social order in which injustice and unfairness had been institutionalised. The impact of such an order on personal and group conduct, towards themselves and others outside of the group, was so deep that it takes a purposeful unlearning to change and then to open themselves to new learning with others. It was clear by 1994 that South Africa despite its best official ideological intentions up to that point was by struggle and default evolving into a different society. Public and private institutions would have to radically review what Zeus Majosi in a recent open letter to talk show John Robbie, called their “cultural architecture”.¹

Perhaps the question of what is to be expected of ‘white’ South Africans can partly be answered by asking another one. What did the ‘blacks’ of South Africa have to become once they had been conquered? There is a long list here. It includes that they had to give up their social systems as they had lived them for generations before the arrival of ‘whites’; they were forced to become workers; they dispersed over the entire southern African landscape to work; in their travels and places of work they exchanged languages; over time they intermarried massively, blurring cultural boundaries and rendering them porous; they became locally cosmopolitan in ways that those that consigned them to servitude, locked in their legalised privileges, couldn’t; they worked in ‘white’ people’s homes, and got to know far more about ‘whites’ than ‘whites’ bothered to know about them; and as the economy grew out of control for those who ‘built’ it, they, in addition to being workers, became graduates, managers, lawyers, scientists, engineers, politicians, chief executive officers and state presidents.

The question of who becomes what or who after being something they would rather not continue to be, can be both simplistic and complex all at once. Descriptions can typify simplistically at the same time as they can amplify meaningful, complex ways. It all suggests that for South Africans, compelled by a set of historical circumstances to cooperate, at first, out of a system of structured compulsions, later the energies released out of such compulsions become too powerful to be contained by compulsion and now have to enter the space of dynamic interactions. By definition that space will now be coloured by the numerical primacy of those once disenfranchised. Thus, by another definition, the responsibility of the now enfranchised to play the leadership role, their numbers demand is enormous in a mandatory kind of way. What is the society they envision for all?

In the reality of the protest movement’s unfolding a question emerged for me. If ‘black pain’ was a state of being to which those who were ‘black’ felt consigned, not only in the respective institutions in which they found themselves, but in the general

¹ http://thedailyvox.co.za/letter-john-robbie-everyone-else-heard-702-interview/
societal environment, what is it that constituted relief from ‘black pain’? It seemed to me that this was a deeply historical question whose import resonated beyond the political moment. There had to be a notion of ‘black’ well-being and objective conditions that supported it, for it had to be affirmed and it had to flourish. What were the features of the alternative identity and social value of ‘black’ well-being after the termination of ‘black pain’ when ‘whiteness’ had been removed from the scene? What is ‘black’ well-being? In what kind of society would it flourish? Would there still be ‘blackness’ after the demise of ‘whiteness’?

I began to ponder these questions in a brief discussion paper entitled *The End of Blackness* presented at the Effects of Race (EoR) group seminar at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) in July 2015. It is not a title I chose without some trepidation. For a start, I felt that a paper with such a title, presented as it was at that very moment that the #RhodesMustFall movement unfolded at the University of Stellenbosch, could be courting provocation and controversy. As it turned out, three of the student leaders of the #RhodesMustFall movement at Stellenbosch University were present at the seminar and participated in the discussion. It turned out to be discussion worth having.

Indeed, as the movement unfolded across the country, the seminar was the first time I had the opportunity to confront in a space of collective thought what was beginning to gel in my mind. It seemed to me that a great deal of what I heard from the movement came across as very similar to what I and my generation said some 40 years ago. I sensed a vital connection with the energy at play. What seemed new to the current generation of students, came across to me as a replay of times past under different circumstances. A thought then crystallised. I faced an intergenerational dissonance. What are the dynamics of such dissonance? What did it all mean?

For a start I could attempt a comparative perspective. If ‘black pain’ is a current reality on our historically ‘white’ campuses, 40 years ago, my ‘black pain’ was far less campus based than it was a result of a more generalised sense of being oppressed across the entire South African landscape. The apartheid-imposed limitations on my movements were remarkably countered by an internal sense of expansiveness I experienced as the very meaning of ‘black consciousness’ at the time. A being externally depreciated in value by an exploitative economic order discovered profound inner value. My fear of ‘white’ people, no matter how economically or militarily powerful they may have been, was replaced by an enormous sense of inner possibility and power which did not in any way minimise the brutal reality of what could happen to me were I to fall into the hands of the ‘white’ system. Despite the overt power of the racially oppressive system, there was something in me beyond its reach. Something in the national environment, articulated on some individual campuses in 2015, had reached the inner core of ‘black’ students and appeared to
have destabilised that core significantly. What was it in the 20 years democracy that led to this situation?

There was another historical reality. The majority of ‘black’ students in South African higher education 40 years ago were registered in ‘historically black universities’. They were on campus as a manifestation of what it was required of ‘black’ people to do if they wanted a university education. They were required to apply to institutions specifically designated for them. There, they were ‘blacks’ first and then ‘black students’ after. There, their colour a given, required little justification. There was something numerically normal about that situation. ‘Black’ people were just too many to exterminate and their labour too vital for such extermination to be contemplated. The ‘white’ state needed to devise ways to control them in their vast numbers. In the total scheme of things it was impossible for the ‘white’ South African state to close the doors of human aspiration for people to participate in the fullest complexity of social endeavour even if ‘white’ ideology demanded otherwise. Thus in the context in which ‘black consciousness’ developed and evolved, ‘black’ students were naturally more vocal where the stakes for their being ‘black’ were considerably higher. They were a voice of a downtrodden people.

From the beginning, ‘black’ presence on a ‘white’ campus has always had to be justified. A legal instrument was created to administer and process such justification. There had to be and still has to be an argument to be advanced for ‘black’ students to be there even after two decades of democracy. Thus, ‘black’ students on a ‘white’ campus carry the burden of self-awareness, of ‘intruding’ that their fellow students at ‘black’ campuses are not burdened with. But the latter do carry a different burden. It is the burden of class and the perception of institutional inferiority. Yet, ‘black’ students at ‘historically black universities’ are comparatively less vocal as ‘blacks’ than those at ‘historically white institutions’. Numerical size and ‘cultural architecture’ seem to modulate self-awareness and identity.

Forty years later, in a country in ‘black’ hands for 23 years, I feel far more in a ‘black’ country than in a ‘white’ one. In this ‘black’ country, I feel no insistent compulsion to be designated ‘black’, even far less so to designate myself as such. Then staring at me is a dissonance of the moment: that between a current generation of ‘black’ students who treasure the designation ‘black’ and an older generation that is less insistent on the designation. Between the older generation and the overwhelmingly vast majority of ‘black’ students on ‘black’ campuses is the question: what is the prospect for less stridency on ‘black’ identity and a greater confidence in engaging with historic opportunity? But the relative minority of ‘black’ students at ‘white’ institutions seem uniquely placed in a space to sharpen the critique of that historic opportunity. One can see in this the prospect of a student movement across the
higher education system that is founded on an entirely different set of activist premises. What could be the enabling historical context for such premises?

II

In 1973 Chabani Manganyi published the book *Being-Black-in-the-World*. Reading this book in 2016 got me to ask another set of questions. What if student activists of the #RhodesMustFall had in large numbers encountered this book in their undergraduate syllabus at any South African University they had randomly chosen to attend? What if they had studied this book together with the writings of Steve Biko and Franz Fanon and other related books as standard curriculum fare in a country so remarkably described by James L. Gibson? “Perhaps no country in history has so directly and thoroughly confronted its past in an effort to shape its future as has South Africa” (2004: 1). The story of such confrontation would have been expected to be a learning country’s preoccupation. This does not appear to have been the case.

There are many more books which could have formed the base of a shared, foundational or intellectual culture in the educational system. This could have happened across the body of knowledge spanning fiction, biography, autobiography, poetry, drama, history, political science, philosophy, anthropology, sociology and science. A store of books and other educational media across these fields of knowledge would have become standard fare in a curriculum to stimulate imaginative thinking and speculation about a new society, its contours and its prospects. What would have been the cumulative impact of such knowledge on the #RhodesMustFall discourse on ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ in the context in which they were engaged in recent protest? To what extent would the running discourse of protest not only have expressed a broader and deeper awareness of alternative intellectual currents, but also represented a significant advance on a local tradition of radical critique in South Africa?

Of course, individual #RhodesMustFall activists on their own may indeed have been exposed to these and more thinkers. Their exposure to such thinkers is surely the gift of their resourceful, questing spirits, reminiscent of many black consciousness activists of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in the late 1960s and early 1970s who discovered on their own, vistas of knowledge that radically expanded their thinking despite prohibitions on, and restrictions to, knowledge by the apartheid state. While such prohibitions and restrictions were formally lifted in 1994 they seemed to have remained by default as a weakness in systemic commitment to a radical, comprehensive and integrated review of the educational curriculum across the entire education system.
SASO student activists’ response to systemic prohibition was to read extensively and learn collectively outside of the restricted prescribed syllabus, thus providing for themselves a self-motivated subversive norm of alternative learning. Fortuitously, they were laying foundations for encountering a forbidden imaginary. Their venture into this imaginary could very well have provided a pedagogical opening towards the imagining of alternative content for a future system of education. It is reasonable and unsurprising that after two decades of freedom, the #RhodesMustFall activists should expect that the legacy of such a subversive norm would by now be the foundational norm of pedagogy in the new South Africa.

What if, when they undertook their disruptive activism in 2015, they had been learning in a public system of education in which they, and their generational peers, were grounded in an alternative local imaginary that had been enjoying systemic affirmation by the new state for 21 years? This could have enabled them to acquire a sense of being-in-the-world that would accord them the ability to interact with knowledge systems around the world with some confidence. Against such a background, what would have been the content and tenor of their disruptive discourse?

It is in answer to this last question that Manganyi’s writing acquires a special resonance. What is it in Manganyi’s book Being-Black-in-the-World that the students and their teachers would have been grappling with intellectually? In all likelihood they would have been shaped by a different discourse of critique that was built on the foundations laid in 1994. This situation suggests that in 1994, only one part of the struggle for liberation ended. What was the other part that should have begun?

This other part, that is arguably more vital, required yet another question that needed to be asked. How do South Africans visualise the nature and character of the constitutional society, the fullness of which they have yet to achieve and for which they struggled for close to a century? How did it become that at the point of liberation the liberated, despite their best intentions, seemed to lose focus. The agenda of transformation seems to stall in the face of a resurgence of the politics of racial conflict reminiscent of pre-1994 conflicts.

III

In Being-Black-in-the-World Manganyi conveys a grounded faith in the elemental nature of human transformations that have been going on in Africa before and since the continent’s at first curious, and then violent, interaction with Europe. It is here ‘on the African continent’ he asserts, “where the great and intricate drama of being black-in-the-world is taking place” (1973: 3). It is his characterisation of the drama as intricate that captures my attention.
The intricate is necessarily complex. Complexity of any kind can invite impatience and nervousness of the restive or frustrated kind; or it can induce excitement or yearning born out of eagerness. The former, in the environment of colonial or apartheid repression, can lead to reactive violence, or to the danger of the ‘emotive’; while the latter reaction can call the impatient self to order in favour of curiosity and the desires of eagerness to inquire and perhaps to hit on invention and unexpected resourcefulness. Thus, grappling with the intricacies of complexity may indeed result in creativity and inventiveness.

For Manganyi, both reactions to complexity, stimulated as they would be by real life social interactions, call out to be understood for what they are. This kind of understanding out of inevitable social engagement is the basis of Manganyi’s faith that out of 300 years of a violent, often brutal interaction between Africa and Europe, a reflective and activist African agency can arise and restore African selfhood and inventive assertiveness in reshaping the human face of the world.

If there are intricacies in the drama of being-black-in-the-world, the work of Charles van Onselen (1996) has shown that relationships between ‘black’ and ‘white’ South Africans have generated their own set of intricacies. Mutual dependence and interdependence are possible even in inherently conflicted human situations. Intricate relationships arise when unavoidable contact between people generate some logic of cooperation. South Africa has been a space for such logics to play out for three centuries. In 1994 yet another phase began in that kind of history. Without this kind of perspective we may become a record that keeps playing on the same scratch, placing ourselves outside of evolutionary renewal.

It is against such a context that Manganyi argues that ‘being-in-the-world’ with a ‘black body’ has similar human implications as ‘being-in-the-world’ with a ‘white body’. The fundamental similarity in both these experiences of being-in-the-world is in the shared human necessity to make culture, which “may be understood as constituting the most concrete medium for the structuring of the dialogue between man and the universe”. If there are any differences, they are differences of lifestyle indicative of different ways in the respective histories of “being in dialogue” with the world (Manganyi, 1973: 37).

Significantly, Manganyi conceives of the relationship between people and their environment as dialogical. What is different between people, as in the same manner that their cuisine may be different, is in the nature of the ‘dialogue’ each ‘being-in-the-world’ has with itself; with the people around it; and the world of objects around it. The sense of history and of being in it emerges from these three forms of dialogical interaction singly or in combination.
It ought then to make a decisive difference what ‘being-black-in-the-world’ is able to deploy in its recovery from what has been a fraught dialogical interaction over several centuries with ‘being-white-in-the-world’. More than bring attention to its pain, at the hands of its aggressive, oppressing antagonist, Manganyi seems to be saying, ‘being-black-in-the-world’ must foreground the values of its lifestyle, a product of its culture making proclivity which may be fundamentally different and potentially more self-enabling in confronting and negotiating a persistently hostile and dominating ‘being-white-in-the-world’. At stake is the human view of the world as oppressed ‘blacks’ have seen it, lived it, even in the most difficult existential circumstances and continue to see it and often value it as they re-establish their place in the world.

Thus far, the ‘blacks’ have yet to project with sufficient confidence, knowledge and authority their perspective of ‘being-black-in-the-world’. Against five centuries of ‘being-white-in-the-world’, dominating the world and the repressive cultures of that dominance, further restrained and contained as it has been by its existential discomfort with the condition of oppression, ‘being-black-in-the-world’ has yet to deploy the liberatory potential of its worldview with an authority and decisiveness. Such self-assertion is critical if the perspective of ‘being-white-in-the-world’ has to seriously engage with an alternative value system, particularly that resurging, reforming, recreating and emerging from worlds doggedly repressed by ‘whiteness’. The urgency of challenging ‘being-white-in-the-world’ with new self-affirmations by the liberated humanity of ‘being-black-in-the-world’ takes on greater significance against the background of other changes occurring in the world. The demographic ascendance of the so-called Global South, beyond numerical superiority, taking full advantage of a technological inheritance and aspects of an economic system that once oppressed them, is a case in point. ‘Being-white-in-the-world’ has to take note and to respond according to a new logic of adaptation against the background of its own increasing loss of dominance.

In the South African context, such a development makes possible a new set of relationships that might emerge that promise over time a kind of functional parity that works to the benefit of a common identity that is forged out of a collaborative mutuality in a constitutional democracy. It becomes decisively critical that the ‘black-white’ relationship not assume a hegemonic dominance as a public preoccupation, as has been the case up to this point. In this fundamental adjustment in relations between world-views, ‘blacks’ are poised to bring far more onto the stage than their ‘pain’. There is more to the world than the history of ‘white’ racism.

Indeed, the freedom from the colonial and apartheid preoccupation with the black-white relationship ought to promise new worlds. The ‘black-black’ relationship is
no longer what it was at the time of conquest. It has evolved phenomenally through social coagulations in the mines, factories, farms and township settlements. Languages, customs, music, cuisines, dances and world-views were exchanged and shared, thus reducing tribal affiliations to a degree of historical significance. Such exchanging and sharing, as already alluded to, created widespread, interpersonal relationships that resulted in almost universal intermarrying across tribe, geography, religion, education and class, cutting across the normal restrictive cultural boundaries.

While this coagulation may have taken place over time and through compulsions of various kinds, it is not easy to dispel the notion that the establishment in January 1912 of The South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which later became the African National Congress (ANC) provided formative ideological affirmations which underscored non-tribalism as a formative value. It is for this reason that this value should have stood side-by-side with ‘non-racialism’ and ‘non-sexism’ in section 1, chapter 1, of the founding provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. For over a hundred years of struggle this value was durable in its ability to unify black South Africans against the declared objective of the apartheid state to create and consolidate tribal divisions through dogged state intervention. Non-tribalism has been a formative value in the social cohesion of the ‘black’ oppressed and now offers space for ‘white’ South Africans de-tribalised from their ‘whiteness’.

The SANNC was the African response to “the racial exclusion and discrimination under the new Union of South Africa, established in 1910. Cross tribal from the outset, but limited to the nascent black intelligentsia, it spread its representativeness across class, education, and geographic barriers encompassing the southern African region from which South African capitalism recruited its labour. SANNC aspired to unite Africans in the advancement of their political and socio-economic status”.2

This speaks to the issue that without the de-centring of the black-white relations, racial thinking in South Africa might persist to the hegemonic advantage of the ‘being-white-in-the-world’ worldview, even when both black and white South Africa might desire otherwise. This is against the historic fact of the aggression of ‘being-white-in-the-world’ in the last 500 years of world history, such that even the nature of reactive resistance to that aggression in the South African context often comes across as itself having been encapsulated in the very spectacle of aggression even as the liberation movement fought the good fight in the long struggle. That is to say, even the resistance to ‘being-white-in-the-world’ often reproduces in

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the actions of the ‘black’ resisters some of their opponents’ values and action in the terms and means of combating them. This will remain so for as long as the alternative world-view of ‘being-black-in-the-world’ is absent from the battlefield. What will it take for the ‘blacks’ of the world, particularly in South Africa, to project a new sense of ‘being-the-world’, which is not galvanised by the sense of burden, but by the freedom of agency and initiative?

IV

In a post-1994 South Africa that had expressed its vision of a new society through fundamental changes in the social realm and explored it through the educational curriculum, the #RhodesMustFall activists would almost certainly have read and discussed in the university curriculum another seminal work that is almost certain to have shaped their activist discourse. This work presents a rich supplementary and bold experiential context to Manganyi’s theoretical rigour.

Native Nostalgia by Jacob Dlamini, equally rigorous in its exploration of the challenge of social visioning, exploded into the South African public sphere in 2009. In this book, he asks the question: could someone who has lived in a South African township during apartheid after a long and by many measures, difficult life, ever be nostalgic for that township life? Was it possible to be nostalgic for life deemed pathological? To the chagrin of many habituated to the terrible conditions of township life as a ready and habitual justification for politics of protest, Jacob Dlamini answered in the affirmative. Thus, he began a cross generational conversation with Chabani Manganyi.

“We (South Africans)”, writes Manganyi, “have been telling all and sundry that we are capable of teaching the world something novel about racial harmony and peaceful co-existence in a multi-racial (multi-national?) society. Perhaps it is time for us to turn inward and assess whether our claims are not in excel of our progress” (1973: 6). The challenge of ‘teaching the world’ for South Africans would have to be based on a lot more than declarations to do so, although such declarations may arise out of various emotional moments of a deep and genuine desire to do so. Such desires can indeed have the potential to be one of the ‘ties that bind’, but all of South Africa has to work at giving reality to those ties.

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3 It is most fortuitous that as I am writing this, I am listening to a musical group I had never heard of before. Their name is The Soil and the name of the album is ‘Nostalgic Moments’. It fuses the urban and the rural with an inventive genius that is definitively ‘township’ and in its authenticity and self-confidence, participates in the universal, which is always reflected in local authenticities.
For black South Africans, ‘teaching the world’ may well be entangled with what lessons there are to learn and to share with confidence out of the experience of more than a century of living in regulated townships and population-depleted rural communities. This is despite, and perhaps even because of, asserts clinical psychologist Manganyi, they have “the highest cumulative unfavourable social experiences to be found. These are populations at special risk, from a mental health point of view” (1973: 8). Yet, they are not devoid of value.

However, this acknowledges the reality of ‘native nostalgia’ for township settlements with the “highest cumulative unfavourable social experiences” (Manganyi, 1973: 6). Jacob Dlamini deploys qualifications about the extent of such nostalgia. For example, he would say, ‘native nostalgia’ exists despite of apartheid, not because of it. But such qualifications, which reflect the complexity of his own thinking, never outweigh the overwhelming evidence by which Dlamini makes us view the township and its possibilities with new eyes.

The ideological isolation of ‘black’ townships from ‘white’ suburbs has also carried an unexpected, if unheralded blessing: the existential absence of ‘whites’. Instead, general ‘white’ presence, in the form of repressive laws, was abstract. This allowed for ‘black’ existential cultures to emerge over time that gave township life across the country a universal familiarity among those trapped in them. This made possible living spaces inaccessible and unavailable to ‘whites’, yet formative of ‘black’ identity over time.

On the other hand, the physical, existential reality of ‘whites’ out there beyond in their towns, gated suburbs, manicured lawns, parks, city halls, shopping malls, offices and factories, was accessible to ‘blacks’ as workers on a daily basis. As a result, it could be said, ‘whites’ have a constrained existential knowledge and experience of the totality of the South African human environment. Their predominant experience of that reality has been to devise laws to contain, from their perspective, the ‘other’, unknown and unknowable. As in 1994 and beyond, South African ‘whites’, living inside the cocoon of their own creation, were the least prepared to contribute experientially to the challenge of a new human reality in the country. Much of the totality of the South African human environment is alien to the average ‘white’ South African. Whatever there was of their predominant contribution was out there in the form of the plethora of apartheid laws and what those laws have conveyed of the economic, political, and social attitudes that were the bases for their promulgation. Beyond this, there is a human space in the township that no ‘being-white-in-the-world’ could easily occupy. That space has been the site of both pain and joy that make ‘black’ experience so elementally human. It is this space that fascinates Jacob Dlamini.
Dlamini gets us to reflect on several markers of township culture that characterise the township across the land as a space of culture. Township streets flow continuously with human energy. This street energy is a defining feature of the African city to the north of South Africa in for example: Accra, Lagos, Bamako, Nairobi, Cairo, Dakar and Kampala. This kind of city ambience is generally in sharp contrast to the silent street cultures of South Africa’s ‘white’ suburbs where neighbours may live side-by-side for many years and exchange greetings mainly on casual mutual sightings. Driving or walking through them still evokes in me to this day, the sense of being watched and that a police vehicle could appear at any moment to confront me to show cause why I should not be bundled into a police van to cleanse the suburb of me.

To this day, all South African towns and cities die at night. This is not so in the metropolitan cities of the world. There might be a story in there of how ‘whiteness’ in South Africa perceived its urban communities as spaces of clinical isolation and its postured silences as evidence of the civilised European outpost. I explored a version of this perspective in my essay on South African game parks (2007). But the differences in city ambience are not necessarily a judgement, but a view on lifestyle. Except that in the South African context difference will more often shift beyond the descriptive to the comparative superior-inferior relationship.

One can extrapolate something else from the phenomenon of streets flowing with energy. African cities like most others in the world retain much of their critical mass of human energy that is expended in the spatial setting of home and work. In South Africa, township energy is exported massively to the white urban spatial settings on a daily basis. Thus, the best of township human energy is expended away from its spatial communal life. Townships were designed not to provide for a range of basic human needs: food, clothing and entertainment, and increasingly, basic education. They were designed not to support Manganyi’s dialogical relationship of creativity between people, the communities and their physical world. They were designed to violate that relationship. In townships people were daily forced to enter a dialogical world of ‘being-white-in-the-world’ in which they would be objects in the hands of a population of those privileged to have legislated away the competition of those they turned into workers. Thus, one of the greatest gifts of being human, to work for your own sustenance, was transformed into working for the sustenance of others. It was a dispiriting and dehumanising existence in the oppressive service of others.

Such observations are not made in order to repeat the habitual indictment of ‘being-white-in-the-world’, but rather and more importantly to underscore the necessity to reimagine township environments in which people in them grow and flourish from their own energies and that when they go out of the township they carry the sense of who they are from what they have created. It is the act of creating and the
conditions in which that creativity takes place that present themselves as decisive in the necessity to effect a radical change in relations of power in which townships, which are home to millions of the South African population, become the centre of gravity in the future human environment of South Africa. In this universe, ‘white’ suburbs as we see them today would structurally be ancillary to the greater human transformation in the townships.

For the sake of emphasis, Jacob Dlamini reflects on one, among other factors of township life that speak to the dialogical relationship between inhabitants of the township and their surrounding environment. ‘For me’, Dlamini writes, as I am sure for many of my friends, after-school play was the most important part of our street life. Here we played soccer, marbles, spinning tops, a cricket-like game called bhati, a card game called boom, umgusha (high jumps), kites, wire cars and, of course, black mampatile (hide and seek). But these were not just street games. They heralded in their own way the change in seasons. You could tell what season it was by watching games children played. Local merchants would know what toys to stock by observing the sequence of games. This was not, however, a simple case of supply and demand but an illustration of a cosmology in which each segment played its part without having to be told what to do. There was, of course, a simple logic to this. Black mampatile was a winter game because the sun set early in winter making it easy to find hiding places spots in the dark where boys and girls could make out. There might be far more profound cosmology in the games children played. (2009: 58-59)

The essence of Dlamini’s observations is that first, the social situation he describes played out in exactly the same way in every township. Second, it is remarkable that such distributed practices never achieved organised institutional status in community setting to become an organised skill based feature of competitive gaming with an established and rooted institutional presence. The weight and extent of restriction on township residents was not only in physical movement, but also in how restricted by default was the range of imaginative play in social organisation through self-governing institutional architecture created over time out of community practice.

When Africans were conquered, dispossessed and dispersed across the sub-continent, who and what did they become? About the ‘what’, mostly we can say they became workers. The trajectory of what they became began some 150 years ago and it led them all the way to Marikana on 16 August 2012 where the South African Polices Services shot protesting workers, killing 34 and wounding 78 of them. What does ‘being-white-in-the-world’ on behalf of capital do when workers who make ‘unreasonable’ demands and by not returning to work, and thus adversely

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4 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marikana_killings
affect the production of platinum that could force the mine out of business? Arrest them. Lay them off. Shoot them. The analogy with captured slaves is not far from the mind. The analogy has been relevant for over a century. It has to give way.

V

But who Africans became is another trajectory. Who did they become in their overwhelming numbers in townships? Even in the rural areas, those who were not required as labourers and got left there by relatives who went to the distant mines: who did they become over time? Despite being “populations at special risk” living in “the highest cumulative unfavourable social experiences to be found” (Manganyi, 1973: 6) they were, where they were, not slaves. They had the space, no matter how minimal, to create a life. It is this that fascinates Jacob Dlamini. This situation does provide a window to be prised open by a determined, visionary state.

To drive the point home, there is another book that ponders the possibility of this window opening out further. Ferial Haffajee’s new book bears the title of a question: What if there were no Whites in South Africa? The book with a provocative, tongue-in-cheek title wants to attract the eye of a South African anxious about the future in the present dominated by the past. It gets close to the essence of the thought behind the title of my presentation ‘The End of Blackness?’ It is in restating that the future of South Africa ultimately does not lie in the relationship between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’, but in what happens in the townships and rural areas of South Africa where the vast majority of South Africans live, and who, when they have created a new world for themselves and all who live in South Africa, will no longer be ‘black’, but citizens of South Africa.

Haffajee looks around and is disturbed by a rhetoric of protest that calls for changes that are actually occurring such that whatever change has occurred is not seen as part of a list of achievements of the new democracy. The perception of an almost uncontested dominance of white power gives little credit to transformational shifts since 1994. Looking at the world around her, Haffajee avers:

... my life is defined by and led by black power in all its manifestations and tributaries. From where I sit, blacks are the centre of my gaze in all ways.

And that is why I find our narrative of black disempowerment by whites, of black domination by whites, of black marginalisation by whites, so hard to fathom it makes me feel like I am going stark raving mad. I feel as if I’ve come up against the power that does not know its nature or its influence – it is what I think. We need a new Steve Biko for the twenty-first century to hold up a mirror of black ability and beauty to see once again the possible and the potential. (Haffajee, 2015: 1068, kindle)
Where do those who ‘being-black-in-the-world’ look for self-affirmation and self-validation if not in themselves? The implication of Haffajee’s observation is that enfranchised ‘blacks’ show a tendency to look for change in ‘white’ people over whom they may not in the short to medium term have total control. The new South African ruling class, asserts Haffajee, “is no longer white; it is demonstrably black” (Haffajee, 2015: 21). Therefore it is located within a majority condition that, in continuing to identify itself as colour coded, reduces the capacity for agency in social action whose success will render colour irrelevant and at that point affirm the condition of human freedom and dignity.

This tendency to deny agency also occurs at the same time that another nascent trend accentuates Haffajee’s concern. Eusebius McKaiser latest book (2015), *Run Racist Run: journeys into the heart of racism*, is an angry book, written in the wake of continuing acts of petty racism emanating from sections of ‘white’ South Africa and which are frequently reflected in the media. McKaiser critiques among other things what he terms ‘myths of white excellence’ in the face of their ‘unearned privilege’, which they have achieved through legislated lack of competition from oppressed black South Africans. In this he sets out to explain ‘white’ South Africans to themselves, through their inability for deep self-critique. Thus, the store of general knowledge that ‘black’ South Africans had of ‘whites’ goes beyond the outward manifestations of their power towards deeper territory of as it were explaining ‘whites’ to themselves. This stance subverts the normal flow of who gets to know about who, and gets to explain them. It is a radical shift in perspective and signals another part of the shift that Haffajee had observed.

Steve Biko has an expression for what is at play here: “the envisioned self”. “Blacks”, he writes, “are out to completely transform the system and to make of it what they wish. Such a major undertaking can only be realised in an atmosphere where people are convinced of the truth inherent in their stand. Liberation therefore, is of paramount importance in the concept of Black Consciousness, for we cannot be conscious of ourselves and yet remain in bondage. We want to attain the envisioned self which is a free self” (1996: 49). The greatest challenge for South African ‘blacks’ is to achieve their envisioned self and to invite the entire human condition of the country to participate in it as the new site of human freedom.

The historic transition from ‘blackness’ to citizen and human is underway, but more work needs to be done to imagine the emergence of the alternative South African human norm in the life to be lived in the future that has to be made out of the changing present. Perhaps the world of the end of ‘blackness’ is within reach. The thing is to dream it more.
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PART II

NAMING
AN INFORMATIONAL TAXONOMY
OF RACE-IDEATION

George Chaplin

Introduction

Race is a continuing controversy. It is a controversy mainly about definition. In many fields of academic endeavour, like anthropology, race was so charged with meaning that discussion about definitions of race had almost ceased, although discussion of the effects of race continued. From race’s ideological development during the trans-Atlantic slave trade, until its maturity in the civil rights era, the discussion around race in the USA has been mostly ineffable because the definitions of race have been fluid, unstable and self-serving. Racism, as a purposeful prejudicial action, is often only too obvious and well understood.

Much more subtle and widespread is what I term here Race-ideation that is thought that includes race as a concept. Racial-ideation is not necessarily overtly discriminatory, but it does have the effect of reifying the idea of race, that is, that races do exist, that they are a real thing and nothing more. The analysis presented here is an examination of the usage of Race-ideation and how racism engages with
it. The language of race and racial studies is both entrenched and depauperate, often confused, with definitions that change between disciplines and over time (Maré, 2011). Race as a concept is not well defined, it changes through time, by place, by social group and by academic discipline and institution. Often people engaged in racial discussion are not referring to the same thing and this prevents resolution of disputes. Neoracism results from the conflation of socially defined stereotypes of long-standing and equally archaic biological concepts (Graves, 2015). Because of these lexical deficiencies, I have used here a series of descriptive, hyphenated terms for this study such as Race-ideation and Race-belief, which I have defined in a glossary.

Informational content can be examined as a taxonomy, by its semantics (Goldberg, 1992) or by descriptions of its content, e.g., as a Schema (Telles & Paschel, 2014). These methodologies permit the unpacking of complex and often overlapping or contradictory explanations into a more simple explanation that has utility for comparative work. As such, they provide a model of the idea and not a comprehensive survey of every possible meaning. I look only at the major warrants of the arguments about claims that race is a real entity, either through positivism or constructivism. I do not attempt to bring any resolution to the race controversy. Instead, the development of taxonomy represents an attempt to find commonality between many varying definitions of race. Another approach to unpack the meaning of race is to look at the philosophical underpinning of Race-ideation. There are both ‘Race-positivist’ camps and ‘Race-phobia’ camps in philosophy, e.g., see Spencer (2009, 2011) and Ludwig (2015), but the investigation of race in philosophy deserves a more comprehensive review than can be provided here.

Informational taxonomy looks at classifications of informational groupings. As used here, Informational Taxonomy is the knowledge of how classification of information is performed. Information is data. It is natural to try to classify knowledge and information into clustered and hierarchical groups and these can be represented in graphical form. This is a natural process for the human brain and hence all thinking. An example would be that we recognise we have a head and that it is different from our torso and both these individual items are part of the larger inclusive thing, which we call our body and to which all manner of other ideas might be attached.

Information taxonomy seeks to study how knowledge is derived from new information found in data. An example from geography is illustrative: we know

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1 “Taxonomy as a science of order proceeds in two ways. First of all, it analyses wholes into units: constituent parts, elements, variables etc. The aim ... is the establishment of relations of identity and difference between things. Secondly, taxonomy brings things together in groups and arranges the groups into a hierarchical system” (Slaughter, 1982: 9).
that geographers call Africa a continent and that politicians divide that continent into countries. The governments of those countries divide it into ever smaller administrative units. Knowledge about continents is constructed from classes and individuals within the class definition. Continent is the class, and Africa the individual entity. Africa itself contains the class of countries, and that class contains more individuals like the Republic of South Africa or the Kingdom of Morocco as two separate countries that are individuals. Within a country, further classes can be defined, like administrative areas, e.g., the individual of Gauteng or the Western Cape. The rules regarding the classification process in this example consist of definitions for continent, political entities, nation states and their administrative areas. These definitions are a mixture of geographical rules such as contiguity, separateness, exclusiveness and also political ideas and their historical contingencies reflected as people’s consensus of what area belongs to a country. We might know that we are in the Western Cape, but not understand all the ramifications behind this individual place’s historical and geographical determination. These might not be universally agreed because these ideas are the result of human social and thought processes. Individual items are always spatio-temporally restricted. They are not laws of nature or even simple facts.

Similarly, informational taxonomies can be used to look at the concepts underpinning Race-idealation. Race to a sociologist is a class concept, but to a biologist it refers to individual things, as real-kinds, as described by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century. In his first edition of the *Systema Naturae* in 1735, Linnaeus described four individual entities to accommodate humans: European, African, Asian and American Indians (Jablonski, 2012). These are clearly geographic constructions. Linnaeus and others later added more biological conceptions of identity, such as, skin colour, hair type, skull shape, physique, etc., and mental constructions about the temperament, nature and intelligence of people (Jablonski, 2012). The final ideas added to race descriptions were broadly those derived from the emergence of the nation-state, which is a geo-political entity with distinct linguistic and cultural ethnicities. This is a heady mix of information that can be used to subdivide each characteristic used to define each race and to create further subclass items. This process hit its peak with dozens of races being described within Europe alone, e.g., *The Races of Britain* (Beddoe, 1885). In South Africa, the primary division under apartheid was into whites and non-whites. The non-whites variously incorporated other ethnicities of Blacks or Bantu, Coloured that included those of various mixed race persons people and sometimes also Malays, San or Khoekhoe, and Asiatic people like South Asian Indians. These classifications were never stable despite

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2 An individual is a discrete entity comprising one part of a class. A class has a definition, whereas an individual can only be described (Ghiselin, 1997).
huge effort under the apartheid regime to systemise them. The most stable division in South Africa was the Us-Them divide between the politically dominant whites and all others. In the estimation of the ruling class of Afrikaners, even the whites were further split along linguistic-ethnic lines to have the Afrikaans speaking in-group and lower out-group of the English settlers. At an earlier period this division was reversed because whilst Britain ruled the southern tip of Africa for what is called the long century, it was the Afrikaner who was considered the less regarded out-group. This indicates that for any classification system, it is always a historically contingent concept.

In modern thinking, there are many definitions of race, types of racial thinking, theories of racial classification and expressions of racism. In the following analysis presented below I have gathered and organised the main warrants used in developing race arguments. These include a mishmash of social, cognitive, religious, political, nationalistic, geographic, ethnic, physical, medical or biological ideas.

Analysis

The analysis presented here is not the application of the taxonomy to individual theories or specific examples or race talk. Therefore, I will not provide or reference specific examples of each manifestation of Race-ideation or racism as it is used today. I will not discuss the extensive interactions between major manifestations of racism (e.g., how economic and medical applications of race combine to disadvantage minority groups). The warrants of Race-ideation that are abstracted in the analysis, therefore, come from many different theories that utilise race. They are presented only as a model of how the warrants can be applied and how they can interact in almost endless permutations.

The analysis is presented below as a series of figures. These figures are supplemented in much greater detail in a series of on-line supplemental figures. For print reproduction, only abbreviated versions of the figures can be presented. The figures are all interconnected and cross reference one another in ways that are not capable of representation in a two dimensional graphic. The analysis of the figures is broadly hierarchical and will be referred to by a numerical key. Although there is no strict hierarchy in the figure design the ideas are presented as either mostly dichotomous divisions or sometimes as polytomous entities (where an item might

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3 The more detailed and much larger supplemental charts of taxonomic connections are available to view and download as pdf files here: https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/concern/generic_works/4mw22v493. This is part of the George Chaplin’s Data Repository at The Pennsylvania State University Scholarsphere doi:10.18113/S1HK9F, which also has more metadata about the files.
be represented more than once, as is the case with any incompletely resolved taxonomy. There is much more information presented in the printed charts than in the textual descriptive analysis presented here and greatly more information in the supplemental figures on-line as PDF documents. There are two examples of how the analysis of complex ideas can be assembled to look at the development of a particular manifestation of race thinking. These are for Institutional Racism or Medico-Racial Theory.

**Differential Cognition**

**Figure 1  Self Not-Self Discrimination**
The most basic human discrimination is that of differential cognition that identifies self and non-self. The act of recognising these differences can lead to racism, but it might not. This will be investigated further. From our post-colonial standpoint at the start of the twenty-first century, it might be thought that Race-belief has always been universal, but that is not true throughout history nor is it true in all places. Even today, there may still be small groups with little or no contact with outsiders that have never experienced Race-ideation. The recognition of self and non-self, kin and non-kin, is initially free from any judgement.

In-group is nearly always preferred to out-group, with 'We are The People' being a common name formation for traditional ethnic societies and implying that others are not ‘The People’ or possibly that they are not even humans at all. This basic identity cognition engenders ideas of us and other as an Us-Them dichotomy and is used as dialectic. This leads to feelings and preferences and, consequently, to biases. The biases to this point are inherent and result in preference for self, kin and in-group and are related to identity formation. To these inherent and somewhat natural preferences and biases, implicit bias is added. Development of implicit bias in individuals is formulated from their historical and social contingencies, but when the individual can recognise them she is free to accept or reject them. Recognition of bias is often not realised, as implicit biases tend to be subtle and pervasive. The consequential conscious choice is to accept and act on the implicit biases. The other choice is to fail to acknowledge implicit bias even though it was recognised or not. Alternatively, one can actively reject and reverse biases. This might not even be a one-time decision, but a fluid situation where implicit bias is acted upon or rejected as the situation changes, e.g., when bias is rejected only with the knowledge that the actor is being observed.

The net result of these cognitive processes is that those with strong biases will discriminate further, leading to personal enmity towards another individual. This personal dislike can be mapped to race from the actions of racism. This will lead to what is termed here as Strong Racism. The other side of the balance is Weak Racism arising from recognised or unrecognised implicit bias. Even when implicit bias is actively denied, it will still lead to Weak Racism. In this way differential cognition can give rise to some level of racism. It is unlikely that persons subject to the present dominant world-culture can be free from implicit bias. People who are uncomfortable around people different from themselves, or people who hold racist beliefs may seek to avoid them.

Although it is common parlance to speak of characteristics that are, for instance, typically French or of the national temperament of Germans, it has long been recognised that these are non-thinking political formulae and that all French persons are individual actors not subject to a collective will. Therefore, even in the
most racially divided society like the antebellum, slave-owning, American South, there were Southern abolitionists. Geography, it can be said, is not destiny (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). Having an implicit bias does not necessarily control how an individual decides their actions, but does strongly influence them (Eberhardt & Randall 1997).

**Figure 2 Race-ideation supporting feelings of Strong Racism**

![Diagram](image)

Strong Racism is a conscious racism that is mentally acted upon. It can be Overt Racism where the racism is openly displayed and may even be a source of pride, as in white supremacist movements. Overt Racism is more common when racism is widespread or dominant in the culture and is supported by peer pressure. It is strongest when sanctioned by Theological Racism or the mandate of theology, as this is an emotional attachment that is unlikely to yield to logic or evidence. Covert Racism is strong conscious racism, but one where prejudicial feelings are hidden, but still acted upon. Covert Racism is more common now because societal opinion has moved away from acceptance of open racism as in the days of the Jim Crow South or Apartheid South Africa. People are more reticent to express racist thought in public or in private when the audience’s opinion is unknown or possibly not supportive of racism. Therefore, Covert Racism can be as subtle as a passive acceptance or support for the racism of others or institutions, or it can be the personal active promotion of racism, but one that is publicly hidden. Overt and Covert Racism are often opposed by Aversive-racist ideology, which still recognises...
the racism, but does nothing to combat it. Aversive-racist ideology can be avoidance of the race concept, people who are deemed different or towards racists. This aversion still leaves the racism intact even if it does not actively support it.

**Figure 3a & 3b**  *Race-ideation supporting feelings of Weak Racism*

**Figure 3a**

- Passive Racism
- Aversive Racism non dialog
- Ideas embedded in race or racism

- Class confounding
- Different but equal with equal opportunity
- Race paternalism
  - Whiteness dominates
- Race is geography
  - Pan-Africa/Asia

- Educational abilities differ
- People of colour don’t experience same injustices
- Assuming one can speak for another

**Figure 3b**

- Passive Racism
- Aversive Racism non dialog
- Ideas embedded in race or racism

- Class hierarchy coincident with racial categories
- Ethnicity as a surrogate for race
- Health biology follows racial classification
- Personal local experience extrapolated to race & ethnicity
- Patrimony hierarchies

- Theologically ordained inequalities
- Language follows race or ethnic boundaries
- Ethnic beliefs are pathology
- Stereotyping
- Missionary activities
- Guilt & redemption
Weak Racism is hidden unconscious or unrecognised racism that results from unrecognised biases. It can operate through others or through indirect passive racism. It might be as subtle as aversive racism, that is, the avoiding of others and acts of othering, or it can be manifest as support for such acts. Weak Racism is often found in well-meaning reactions, e.g., race paternalism, confounding class, or confusing ethnicity for race.

**Figure 4  Engaging in Race-ideation**

Race-ideation arises from an effort to explain biases and differential cognition. This leads to the belief that race has some explanatory value. The first major dichotomy is between those indulging in Race-ideation and those seeking to avoid it. Race-ideation is not racist ideation or racialist thinking, it is rather an effort to justify or explain racially biased cognition. It recognises that race as an idea exists and that race has an explanatory power for observations made within some social sphere. This can be Actualised Race-ideation as in Race-belief and this divides into Strong Racism or Weak Racism. On the other side of Actualised Race-ideation is Non-Race-ideation. This is expressed as Oppositional Race-ideation, that is, the concept that race is not ultimately real, but that the idea has utility (e.g., it is useful for combating the effects of past racism). This is not Race-phobia because Oppositional Race-ideation is not against the very idea of division into races. Instead, Oppositional Race-ideation accepts the fact of race and recognises that race existed in some people, circumstances, periods or places and has created harm. Oppositional Race-ideation is altruistic in nature, seeking as it does to reverse discrimination resulting from past Race-belief. Oppositional Race-ideation is found in critical race theory and post-colonial race studies. However, Oppositional Race-
ideation still reifies the concept of race and has a very indirect effect of supporting Weak Racism.

**Race-ideation that accepts race**

The acceptance of race can arise from the belief that it is a real kind or that is some construction. The latter is more common today, but many theories accept race as representing real kinds that can be described not defined. The strongest of these is Theological-race.

**Figure 5 Development of Race-ideology**

Race-ideation when systematically applied gives rise to Race-ideology. Race-ideation when applied can be used for beneficial or detrimental societal actions.

**Race-ideology used in combating effects of race**

The first dichotomy of Race-ideology is that race is real at some level versus Oppositional-Race-ideology. Oppositional-Race-ideology has it that race was once real, or thought to be real by some group and though Race-ideology has caused pain
or trouble it should be embraced so that its results can be reversed or ameliorated. It recognises that, through spatio-temporal conditions, Race-belief caused damage and Oppositional-Race-ideology seeks to undo the harm. This is not the opposite of Race-ideology and many race rejectionists recognise that others have Race-belief but the Oppositionists themselves try to ignore or suppress it. However, the Oppositionists still suffer in that they engage in Race-ideation and that far at least, they reify the race concept. This is seen most clearly in those that claim colour-blindness or post-racialism, often in the forlorn utopian hope that racism will go away on its own. This is akin to a child’s hope that the monster under their bed will go away if they keep their eyes tightly shut. Colour-blindness is not free of Race-ideology and often not even free of covert or hidden racism.

**Figure 6**  *Race-ideology, race as real or as socially constructed*

Of those who do have Race-ideology, there is first a division between those with the belief that race is a Real Kind and, therefore, that race is an objective fact to be discovered, recognised and described. On the other side are those with the belief that race is a social-intellectual construction without any objective reality. People holding these two concepts might or might not be cognisant of the division presented here. Many who think race is real are nevertheless relying on arguments with both biological and social ideas intermingled. However, here they can be usefully separated for further analysis.
**Race-ideology of race as real gives rise to Race-belief**

Race-belief is based on the premise that race it is a real kind. This belief recognises that there is some objective fact behind race. Theology is the strongest warrant, biology is next and then economic models conflating ideas of educability and class.

**Race in Economic-political philosophy**

Various efforts have been made to explain enduring racial patterns in the terms of economic theories, with most recognising race as a real term. From either a Capitalist or a Marxist point of view, race and class are often confounded and so are seen as one and the same. Races can be the subject of exploitation as in capitalism and racial colonialism. Alternatively, racist class-exploitation needs to be undone by Oppositional-Race-ideology, that is, exploitation is to be ameliorated by judicial control or affirmative action. If not opposed, a large race-class imbalance may be cause for revolution. These approaches still assume that race is a real thing. Marx, and particularly Engels, being products of mid-nineteenth century thought, saw race as real and at least for Engels hierarchical too (Paul, 1981). However, they thought that once class warfare ended, then race would no longer matter. They saw that slavery was not a matter inherent to being African, but an appropriation of human capital (Lee, 2011). It can be argued that capitalists have a vested interest in exploiting or even promoting racist attitudes (Crain & Matheny, 1999; Lee, 2011). This is used as a way of preventing the poorest class from presenting a united front for wage pressure or working conditions. This is a policy of divide-and-conquer using race as a wedge issue within the group of poorest people, seen in the union and labour strife of the 1920-1935 period in South African mines and the southern US States (Crain & Matheny, 1999; Lee, 2011; Cox, 1970).

**Figure 7 Race-ideology: of race as only relatively true gives rise to Race-construction**
Race is ultimately untrue, but it is a social construction and so depending on how it is defined it is true to some people and so race is experienced.

**Developed racialist ideology**

**Figure 8  Race is absolute or relative**

Race is seen as either something real that can be identified or is a social construct that is itself only relatively real.

**Post-racialism and Neo-racist theory's underpinnings**

Post-race theory accepts that races were once real, but that modern social theory has moved beyond any ideas of racial categories. Neo-racists believe that a new concept of Race-belief can be developed with heuristic and hermeneutic utility to overcome current power imbalances and legacies of past racial injustice. Neo-racists
are seeking to right past wrongs of racist action and thought. An example of this is the appellation ‘People of Colour’ and similar formulations. These assume that something unites a disparate group of different ethnicities in the face of apparently non-coloured people (the predominant white culture). Skin colour is, again, destiny and can be complicated by colourism and inter-ethnic rivalries within the ‘People of Colour’ group. The effort to rebuild an equitable Race-belief is likely to fall back on theological or biological race conceptions and ignores the observations of social scientists that race, as a social construction, is always unreal.

**Figure 9**  *Two types of patently real race*

Race is an absolute reality because it is or was theologically ordained or because it is a biological fact that can be described.
**Theological absolute races**

Race-belief from theology was previously widespread, even universally. Still today a third of Americans and many South Africans are creationists and presume that human variation was created and eternal (Graves, 2015; De Gruchy, 2011). The problem with theologically derived races is that there are more theologies than there are religions. Therefore, there is no means of deciding the truth objectively. Theologically speaking, race is true as it is a revealed truth, but this depends on whether the religion allows conversion to this belief that race must endure within certain groups. The in-group becomes a biological isolate. Science is unable to tackle this faith-based racism. This feeds the Us-Them divide and is almost always self-serving.

**Biologically real races**

**Figure 10  Biology is not determinate, but predictive**
Similar to the Race-belief of hard biology is a soft biological Race-belief. With the soft biological Race-belief phenotypic variation is considered to be predictive of a series of probabilistically determined genetic traits. That is the likelihood that any particular variant is higher in one geographic deme compared to another geographic deme. There is a difference in the probability of certain traits between differing geographic groupings, e.g., Sickle Cell Anaemia is considered to be a trait of Africans rather than being a characteristic of people from malaria zones. Some traits are thought to influence one another through gene frequency and weak correlation to phenotype and biology. Race was once thought to be indicative of intellectual, social or moral predispositions. These soft phenotypic determinants have differing probabilities of occurring in differing groupings be they geographic, ethnic, social, e.g., or the vicious tropes that Jews are more prone to meanness or Africans to crime.

**Figure 11 & 12  Hard race-belief or race as determinate**

![Diagram](image-url)
Hard Race-belief comes in two warrants; the rarer is that Race-belief is a Hard Social Construction. Local geographic groupings give rise to different inherent social, intellectual, mental conditions and these are reflected in fixed cultures. These are passed on and are substantiated within the culture working through inheritance as a meme. This Hard Social Construction is akin to a Positivism of Race-belief and it reached its zenith in ideas of cultural-racial superiority with European culture taken to be above all other cultures. This met its zenith at the end of the nineteenth century when the climatic development theory was promulgated as a social-Darwinist answer to European colonial domination. This Hard Social Construction of race lives on in subtle undercurrents, but is rarely met in academic discourse.

The other branch of Race-belief is that race is a real, observable biological fact. This Race-belief is the most common and frequently interdigitates with soft social race constructions. For biological Race-belief the simple observation that variation in skin colour and hair type are added to geographic population determination, reinforces the belief that humans can be divided into physical races. The races are recognised by a series of correlated genetic and phenotypic properties.
Race is a social construction, but nevertheless is rendered real because a large fraction, or a majority, of the population recognises it as having explanatory power or some utility. These conceptions are real only in social contexts and are abstractions of identity. Therefore, they are temporally restricted, embedded culturally and a cause of implicit bias. These historically-contingent ideas frequently contain class assumptions and have biological borrowings. They are also based in a place and borrow geographic assumptions about populations. The fact that these race constructions can be deconstructed and shown to be false has not done away with them. They are endurable identities and become self-fulfilling destinations both for the dominant culture and for those it subjugates (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). When social Race-belief is added to biological Race-belief, Race-positivism and
Race-phobias can arise. Social constructions of race can only be easily recognised in the presence of observable differences. Mere clusters of underlying genes do not lend themselves to observation. Compare the attitude to sickle cell anaemias and thalassemia – these both are similar adaptations to blood cell formation as a result of living in a malarial area. However, it is only sickle cell that is considered a racial adaptation.

**Figure 14a & 14b  Race-ideology supporting personal and institutional forms of racism**

This chart is presented as an example how Race-ideology is expressed in personal and social racism with the development and maintenance of institutional racism. Racism can be driven both by racist individuals using overt and covert racist acts, by passive racism as a member of a peer group or through stereotyping. Governments can promote or restrict racism or just turn a blind eye to it. Institutional racism can occur in any type of organised body and ranges in its expression from acceptance and approval of overt and covert racism to much more subtle acceptance of Weak Racism or an absence of policy to prevent unrecognised and passive racism. A lack of reporting measures, lack of support for whistle-blowers, lack of investigation or hearings into allegations or patterns of racism, are all evidence of institutional racism. This is true even where no racism has been reported because when mechanisms for action and receipt of reports of racism are absent it is to be
Figure 14a

Racist ideation leading to racism

- In individuals: More powerful individuals have disproportionate effect (e.g., CEO) however very large numbers of less powerful individuals have a large effect too.
- In Government:
  - Racist legislation seeking to promote and expand prejudice
  - Perpetual protection of racism in individuals and media
  - Race-blind hiding or negative past race policies, not seeking to address inequalities

Unrecognized racism, Peer group pressure & peer group response, Overt racism, Covert racism & acceptance

Figure 14b

Institutional Racism (government body, social organization, non-profit, departmental healthcare corp., commercial company, charity, other quasi-government bodies)

- Acceptance of overt, public, individual racism
- Acceptance of covert, unrecognized, passive racism

- Lack of policy or training to recognize covert etc. racism
- Lack of sanction for overt, covert, or passive racism
- Lack of means to report racism
- Lack of investigation and hearing into allegations

Evidence of institutional racism even where not reported
expected that the reports will also be absent. However, this absence is the result of institutional racism, conspiring to silence critics rather than true absence. Provided there are policies in place and support for actions and hearings or support for victims, if there are then still no formal reports of racism, this is indicative of racism being suppressed by the institution and shows it is making efforts to prevent racism. This alone is lack of institutional racism. It does not mean that the individuals within the institution are not racists. These frameworks show that the institution does not condone racist attitudes and punishes those members who act on their Covert-racist attitudes.

**Figure 15a & 15b** Race-belief influence on racialised medicine. An example of Race-ideation and its subtle bias in a medical situation

![Race-belief influence on racialised medicine](image-url)
There are members of the medical community who are actively calling for the retention or the expansion of racial categorisation in the medical field, e.g., the retention of racial categories by the National Institutes of Health in the USA.

Racially informed medicine can follow one of three models. The theological model of race is rarely if ever invoked despite the creationist beliefs of many doctors. These people presumably believe that human types were fixed by some deity in the form that they are recognised today. This betrays ignorance of the fact that race is a modern construction that has arisen from the time of the Enlightenment in the service of chattel slavery (Jablonski, 2012).

Race as a social construction does not seem so prevalent in the medical field. The medical application of race tends to muddle biological definitions with social, ethnic, class issues and continues to recognise such groupings long after they had social valence. Medical race theory continues to misapply climatic and other biologic theories, to self-identified and socially recognised groups of people and label these as races, e.g., the U.S. Census categories.

Evolutionary models of Race-belief in medicine are quite pervasive. These follow the hard biological model or the soft biological model. The hard biological model assumes that traits travel together, that biology is always determinate over behaviour, that there were once pure ancestral types, but these are inferior as evolutionary change is beneficial, consequently admixture weakens individuals. At their strongest, hard biological Race-belief ideals leads to Race-positivism. This in turn leads to laws against miscegenation, racial separation and will ultimately lead to ideas of racial hygiene, eugenics and even genocide.

The soft model is more common now since population demes are considered as primarily important. However, population ideas still consider that phenotypic traits group together and are correlated to genotype and that they are selected by the environment and influenced by pleiotropy. This is not by absolute selection, but by having higher probabilities of certain things being found together. Much of the variation is modelled as neutral or random, in other words having no effect. There is little empirical evidence to support the observation that adaptation to something like sun strength, has evolved in parallel in many populations and should be indicative of any other biology. Neither is there any theory as to why neutral variation in non-coding areas of DNA should have any systematic biological effect. Yet, non-coding or other non-adaptive DNA like that of the mitochondria, are often used in phylogenetic and cladistics reconstructions. The soft model of racially informed medicine sees biology as not being so determinate of outcome, but rather interacting with social and environment pressures in various ways. This is the basis of the nature and nurture argument and some evolutionary developmental theories.
often called Evo-Devo. Its downfall is that it does not recognise that recombination so thoroughly mixes DNA as to obliterate race separation through hybridisation, a process that has never stopped in human history. It would be much more medically correct to speak of traits rather than define unstable classes of humans.

There is not one type of African because there is more variation in Africa than there is in the rest of the world (Tishkoff et al., 2009; Hsieh et al., 2016). Geographically, there is not one evolutionary pressure in Africa, but a multitude of climatic, ecological, ethnic, linguistic and geopolitical factors, so that speaking of an African has no medical benefit is true of all other admixed genetically diverse mobile populations. It is true having dark skin, staying inside and avoiding sun will lead to vitamin D deficiency in places with lower solar energy. This is true regardless of whether the darker skin is found on a South Asian, Southern Han, a West African, a Khoekhoe, a San, a North African, a Melanesian, an Australian Aboriginal, or a Southern European if any of them are living in western Scotland. It is the trait that matters. Similarly, bodily appearance can tell us very little about the genetic mosaic that is a human and is not a reliable guide to disease risk. Race is not shorthand to a good medical history. It might be interesting from a health disparity point of view, but this is confounding class and poverty. The global South is poor not because of its races, but because of the legacy of unfair colonial trade practices and the repatriation of profits generated by multi-national corporations (Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2012).

Biologists tend to want to make race synonymous with a geographic deme or even a subspecies, which are not real biological individuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A deme can only be defined and is not something as real as an Aristotelian Individual (Ghiselin, 1997). Similarly, groupings found as clusters of genes (Spencer, 2015), depends on which genes are investigated and most studies have been chosen to be geographically diverse and hence divergent (Marks, 2013). Admixture from past demes of archaic hominins such as Neanderthals, Denisovans and an unknown ancient African genetic ancestor, could be used to partition humans into groups, such as two groups of Sub-Saharan Africans, versus all non-Africans from an early Neanderthal introgression, and then an extra derived group of Denisovan Asio-Melanesians (Sankararaman et al., 2016; Vernot et al., 2016; Hsieh et al., 2016). These groupings have no obvious connection to current conceptions as to race, or skin colour, and are only reflective of dispersals of archaic groups in the very distant past and are present at very low levels in the genome. Race affirmative suggestions of genetic diversity do not reflect whole genomes. Ultimately in genetic studies every human individual is a unique case unto themselves and are more closely related to siblings than to any other. The answer to this genetic health conundrum will be the advent of personalised medicine where an individual's genes are looked
at directly to determine health consequences of their genetic complement, much more comprehensively than any race assignment.

Discussion

The analysis has identified enduring conceptions that provide the warrants for race-based thought. Race includes ideas of biology, and social concepts. Race is constructed on-the-fly according to historic contingencies, and local imaginings. In the predominant world-culture, white is certainly privileged and can be coercive. Colourism is found in many cultures and is not limited to those ethnically European (Jablonski, 2012). Observation of race is so universal within the predominant world-culture that it is seen as normal. This analysis provides a framework for recognising which warrants are being used to support any particular manifestation of Race-ideation. It is by identifying the underlying basis of racial thought that the effects of Race-ideation are exposed. Race can be applied at the individual and the social group level, and even illogically, e.g. X is a good person, but I do not like her race in general or they are fine individually, but when they get together they are different. The person is getting lost in the label.

This analysis presented here provides an analysis of the warrants of Race-ideation and how race thinking degenerates into actual racism. This serves the practical process of enabling race researchers to unpack race thinking in the complex interaction of ideas.

Race as biology does not discover a real kind; there is nothing that a logical positivistic explanation can discover. Without any ‘facts of nature’, assertions about race are just an idol of the market place, a conventional truth embedded in a mass of unsubstantiated assumptions. Such facts of common usage are nothing more than a report on personal likes and dislikes (“a statement about the condition of one’s glands” [Zarefsky, 2001: 10]). Such belief in the reality of an idea hints at irrationalism and can be disposed of by argumentation. Although scientific racism was an extension of logical positivism, modern science will reject race because it has no basis in verifiable facts at the biological level. The individual nature of a racial grouping is falsified in that it is never unique. The biology of race is one of local adaptation and genetic bottlenecks, nothing more. The biology is never predictive of outcome or even predictive of other biological traits traveling in some correlated or deterministic biological space. Race as a sociological class is also equally unreal. To geographers a place is only a collection of individuals with differing probabilities among various propensities (Paniagua, 2016). The class of Sub-Saharan Africans, for instance, contains many ethnicities and one wonders what unites them in the mind of a Race-affirmer. They are only a unit in that they are subject to power imbalances caused by past racism, post-colonial mind-sets, or
that they were subject to othering in a white-dominated, world culture (Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2012).

Socially recognised classes are always fluid and ill defined. No matter how specific a template is defined it will never be able to fit every individual into a class without error. Take old age as an example. It too is historically contingent and unstable. Who is old in one culture, compared to another, varies depending on the local demographic structure. Attitudes towards the old may vary from veneration to denigration depending on the society. In any case, a sociological class has no actors as these are always individuals. Any class derived in a sociological setting, is contingent upon the assumptions and biases in that social milieu, at one point in time and at a specific locality. So while it might be useful to think about conceptions of race in Alabama in 1840 as they were held by slave-owning elites, those conceptions are not necessarily identical to race concepts held by different actors even within the same highly spatiotemporally restricted definition, e.g., the slaves themselves or contemporaneous southern abolitionists. These conceptions are not amenable to extrapolation to different localities or times. So when claims are made that the USA census categories are well understood, that might be true with reference to a majority within the USA at one census period (Spencer, 2015). However, the census categories have changed over time. It also ignores the findings of the Plessy v. Ferguson USA Supreme Court case that a person might be defined as black by law even if not recognisable as such (Hoffer, 2012). There was an enormous state operation within apartheid South Africa that sought to adjudicate such cases, which was never successful to anybody’s satisfaction. Such unstable formulations are at best not universally true and at worse are little better than people’s reports of their own preferences and states of mind. Even such a strongly racist person as Adolf Hitler was able to justify to himself the continuing exalted position of Luftwaffe Field-Marshal, Erich Milch, who was declared an honorary Aryan under Nazi law. In this case, military necessity overrode extreme anti-Semitism. Cultural beliefs about a race or an individual are not facts about a population, but probabilities drawn mostly from positive ideas about values and worth. Anyway, race as a category is not clearly as well defined as age or status, but might be more related to attempts to track coalition membership (Cosmides et al., 2003; Lieberman et al., 2008). Categorical impositions of templates are invariably self-serving. Much of the current racial discussion falls into category mistakes with regards to education, class, or poverty being mapped to biology. These category mistakes are due to the workings of past racism, segregationist policy and ubiquitous post-colonial thinking. These informal and illogical preferences are then usually decided by force, be it physical or intellectual, or if not by force then at least, cause bias.
The analysis presented here provides a comparative approach that might lead to less miscommunication resulting from discourse that is using non-compatible assumptions. However, this analysis does not itself decide whether Race-ideation is harmful. The tension between recognising race and denying it, is one that has moved on little since Booker T. Washington wrote about it in his 1901 autobiography, *Up From Slavery* (Washington, 1901). It is certain that all derogatory apppellations and attributions of race need to be curtailed. The past misuse of Race-ideology still needs to be recognised, and will not disappear by ignoring it. Equally new forms of Race-ideologies need to be avoided. Eventually, Race-ideation will cease to have the power to harm.

**Conclusion**

Biologically based Race-belief is an excellent example of Charlton’s Zombie theory, in that it has long been shown to be wrong, false, and dead, but still it refuses to lie down (Charlton, 2009). Socially constructed race has also been long-seen as invalid by social scientists, but the fact remains that it too is enduring. For Race-ideation to be so endurable in society it must be serving some purpose. I believe that purpose is an informational one, one that is a shorthand for looking at many social problems that can be mapped to Race-ideation, such as class, education, post-colonial thought memes, and political empowerment. Race is a historically contingent fact that has not yet outlived its own heritage, although it has outlived its utility. Race labels are themselves destinations because in the subconscious there is no negation. Every time race is invoked in any setting, it reinforces the concept that there are races. These concepts are so baggage-laden that they weigh down human achievement.

**Glossary**

**Actualised race-ideation**  
Acting on racial thoughts

**Aversive-race-ideology**  
The active avoidance of racists and racism either individual or institutional

**Aversive-racism**  
The active avoidance of people who are deemed different

**Colour-blindness**  
The negation of colour and colourism as a social factor and rejection of affirmative action as a result

**Critical Race Theory**  
Is a theory that holds that even without individual racists the power structures and institutions hold that race is reflected as institutional racism derived from power imbalances and white privilege
Oppositional race-ideation  The active combating of racism even when race is thought to be unreal by the use of race to counteract previous racist attitudes

Post-Colonialism  A branch of Critical Race Theory that looks at the residue of racism and attitudes in colonised countries even after the colonial power has left or looks at the attitude in the institutions of past colonial countries like the United Kingdom

Race-belief  The races are real and divide Homo sapiens into subgrouping by some racist-ideology

Race blindness  Accepts that race is real either by positivist or constructionist definitions, and posits that if race is ignored it will cease to have effect. This is in opposition to Critical Race and Post-Colonial Race Theories

Race-constructivism  The idea that race is constructed by social processes and does not hold to any objective external facts

Race-ideation  The idea that race has an informative power

Race-phobia  The idea that race division is harmful and wrong

Race-positivism  The use of positive racial identification to racially divide humanity

Racism  Prejudicial acts in the name of race on the believe that race is hierarchical

Racist  One who propounds racism

Racist-ideology  A systematic thought program to apply Race-ideation in social, biological, theological or some ethnic system

Strong Racism  Racism that is acted upon knowingly

Weak Racism  Racism that is unconsciously acted upon or is thought not to be important

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WHAT DO WORDS REALLY SAY?

Newspaper coverage of the Marikana and Michael Brown incidents and an inquiry into media reinforcement of templates of group identity

Nina G. Jablonski, Aaron Mauro, James O’Sullivan and Theresa Wilson

Introduction

Identity is malleable. Ideas about the nature of people associated with particular identities are also malleable. This study is not about identity formation or racial templates *per se*, but about the portrayal of identity and group identity in specific contexts, and how portrayals of identity contribute to the reinforcement of templates and stereotypes of group identity. Here we sought to examine the contexts in which identity words, or nominative case nouns as they are known in linguistics, are used in newspaper articles. Identity words such as ‘man’ and ‘police’ can occur in the subjective case or objective case, and have different emotional connotations depending on their contexts. Our focus was on newspaper stories dealing with two relatively recent, high-profile incidents of public violence, one in the United States and one in South Africa. Both incidents were of interest because they involved people of different so-called races. The rhetorical portrayal of such incidents is thought-provoking because they often employ stereotyped
descriptions of individuals and groups and emotive descriptions of people and their actions, even if the incidents themselves are not ‘racial’. Whether used deliberately or unconsciously, stereotyped and emotion-laden verbal portrayals of people and situations affect reader attitudes and can, potentially, sway public opinion and reinforce or even redefine stereotypes. In this way, the evolution of seemingly ‘objective’ portrayals of violent incidents in news reports through time can be seen as a process of passing through ever-narrowing lexical and semantic funnels created by the often subconsciously applied linguistic tools of emotive description.

This chapter represents the results of a pilot study about methodology, specifically, an application of methods of digital textual analysis to the analysis of word frequency and the emotional ‘temperature’ of word use. We reasoned that this approach might be applicable to the study of racialised terminology and, specifically, to questions relevant to the racial templates. We explored specific methods of textual analysis to determine the contexts in which certain identity words were used and what sentiment was evoked by specific identity words in specific written contexts. We chose as our focus of study a small subset of the vocabulary of identity, group identity, and conflict, in newspaper accounts of two high-profile incidents involving personal violence. Verbal descriptions of such incidents involve interesting linguistic constructions because the act of violence presumes a single destructive direction of the action predicated by the controlling subject on the object.

The focal events of interest were, in the USA, the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, on 9 August 2014, and, in South Africa, the shootings of miners at Marikana, near Rustenburg, in August and September 2012. We were interested specifically in investigating how identity words were used in newspaper descriptions of individuals and groups involved in violent incidents and what sentiments were evoked by the passages in which these words occurred.

We employed discourse analysis to explore relatively the large bodies of text from newspaper accounts of the Marikana and Brown incidents. We limited the scope of our analysis to newspaper articles, rather than transcripts of news broadcasts or news blogs, because – as documents – they convey the thoughts, feelings, ideas, beliefs and intentions of the social actors who write them. The textual and context/content analyses that are the foundation of discourse analysis permit observation and discovery, from large bodies of text, of attitudes, behaviours, concerns, motivations and culture of the text producer from an expert point of view (Bauer et al., 2014).

Newspapers are common sources for content analyses because they provide materials that can be examined for trends over time from a daily or weekly source. They were considered ideal sources for this study because they were standardised
and, at least in theory, rigorously edited. In the original conception of this study, we sought to investigate temporal trends in the frequency, context and connoted sentiment of words used in the newspaper accounts of the Michael Brown and Marikana incidents in order to study changes in frequency in the use of words used to describe people and actions and the sentiments they engendered. We changed our approach midway in the analysis, however, and sought instead to understand the context of divisive terms by placing them in context.¹ Our primary goal became the understanding of the context of divisive terms and the sentiment connoted by key words in context. We also hoped to gain some insight into any differences that might exist in key word usage, context and sentiment between American and South African newspapers.

Methods

The types of textual analysis employed in this study were drawn from techniques of Natural Language Processing (NLP), which make possible the analysis of large bodies of text. We performed the analyses using Python’s Natural Language Tool Kit version 3 (NLTK) and concentrated on those analyses that would reveal information on the contexts in which specific words were used (Bird et al., 2009). We selected some methods of analysis because their visual outputs made for easier identification of patterns and recognition of meaningful results.

The corpora for analysis were derived from two daily American newspapers, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal (East Coast print and online versions) and from two weekly South African newspapers, The Independent (Saturday and Sunday) and The Sunday Times. These were selected because they were national, as opposed to regional, newspapers and because they are widely read. The time span over which the corpora were sampled was 9 August 2014 to 31 May 2015 for The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal and 16 August 2012 to 31 December 2014 for The Independent and The Sunday Times. Corpora were harvested from library databases available from The Pennsylvania State University: LexisNexis Academic (The New York Times, The Independent, and The Sunday Times) and ProQuest (The Wall Street Journal). Searches using simple keywords restricted to the body of the article were conducted in all available editions of the newspapers. The corpus dealing with the Michael Brown case from American newspapers is referred to hereafter as the ‘Brown corpus’ and that dealing with the Marikana incident from South African newspapers as the ‘Marikana corpus’. Texts were

¹ The initial preparation of the corpora was done under the supervision of one co-author (J.O.), while most of the analyses were conducted by another author (A.M.). Because the corpora were not originally divided according to date when they were being prepared, analyses of temporal trends in word use could not be performed.
prepared for frequency and trend analyses by removal of stop words, or words which have very little meaning, such as ‘and’, ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘an’, and similar words. Both corpora comprised 888,030 words with 33,085 unique word types.

Analyses conducted

We generated concordances for several keywords and cross-referenced these with sentiment analysis using both TextBlob and the NLTK. Visualisations were created using MatPlotLib (Hunter, 2007).

We conducted the following specific analyses after applying the NLTK’s standard stoplist:

1. tabulation of most frequent words in each of the two corpora;
2. frequency of selected keywords and phrases that described emotions or that have emotional connotations in each of the two corpora. These were: ‘anger’, ‘angry’, ‘black’, ‘man’, ‘male’, ‘black male’, and ‘black man’;

The location of selected words in each of the two corpora visualised in lexical dispersion plots. The words selected comprised some of the previously selected keywords listed in item 2 above, as well as some others. Lexical dispersion plots permit evaluation of consistence and correlation of concepts and, in our case, evaluation of correspondence between words of interest. They are abstract representations of usage patterns of a word or phrase in a document (Hoey et al., 2001).

Analysis of the overall, positive or negative, direction of the combined Brown and Marikana corpora used sentiment analysis. Sentiment analyses mainly focuses on determining the overall positivity, negativity, or neutrality associated with specific text passages or connoted by specific words within texts (Liu, 2012). Positive terms tend to be active or prospective in nature in the context of sentiment analyses, while negative terms tend to be destructive or restrictive;

1. finding the words associated with the words, ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’ and ‘death’ in the combined Brown and Marikana corpora, we used NLTK, the distributional similarity function. This analysis finds other words which appear in the same contexts as the specified word and lists the most similar words first;
2. to find the contexts where the words, ‘police’ and ‘shooting’, appeared in the combined Brown and Marikana corpora, the NLTK common context function was used. This function lists the most frequent common contexts associated with the keyword first. This analysis draws results from statistically significant terms across the frequency distribution.
Results

Most frequent words

Tabulation of the most frequent words in the Brown and Marikana corpora is presented in Table 1. ‘Police’ is one of the most frequently used words in both corpora. The most frequent words in the Marikana corpus were those associated with politics, namely ‘ANC’ (the political party), ‘Government’, ‘Zuma’ (then South African president), and ‘Politics’. The second most commonly occurring words were those relating to the Lonmin platinum mine, where the Marikana incident took place, to the miners and mining. Place words were the most frequent words in the Brown corpus, with the most common of these being ‘Ferguson’, the city in which the Brown incident took place. The high rate of occurrence of ‘New’ and ‘City’ were associated with common references to ‘New York City’ and the high-profile violent death of the African-American man, Eric Garner, as he was being apprehended by police.

In the table below the total size of the Brown corpus is 5,993,132 characters; the total size of the Marikana corpus is 4,684,075 characters. Note that the word ‘police’ appears twice in the column for the Brown corpus; the first instance denotes the number of occurrences of the word when it appeared in lower case letters, the second indicates when it appeared with an initial capital ‘P’.

Table 1  The most common words in the Brown corpus and Marikana corpus after removal of stop words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BROWN CORPUS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES</th>
<th>MARIKANA CORPUS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Said</td>
<td>10034</td>
<td>Said</td>
<td>3065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>8339</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>2681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>7901</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>2152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson</td>
<td>3385</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>3343</td>
<td>Marikana</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>Would</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2542</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>1788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2198</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>Zuma</td>
<td>1406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>1694</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Occurrences of specific words and phrases

Searches for occurrences of specific keywords, notably the word ‘black’, revealed distinct differences between the Brown and Marikana corpora (Table 2). ‘Black’ appeared far more frequently in the Brown corpus than in the Marikana corpus; the phrases ‘Black male’ and ‘Black man’ were also common in the Brown corpus, but almost absent in the Marikana corpus.

Table 2: Frequency of occurrence of selected keywords in the Brown corpus and Marikana corpus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL SIZE OF CORPUS (NUMBER OF CHARACTERS) OR KEYWORD</th>
<th>BROWN CORPUS</th>
<th>MARIKANA CORPUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total size</td>
<td>5 993 132 characters</td>
<td>4 684 075 characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2981</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>4825</td>
<td>4243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black man</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Lexical dispersion plots

The physical order of appearance of selected keywords is displayed in the lexical dispersion plots for the Brown and Marikana corpora (Figure 1a and 1b). In both corpora, the word ‘people’ is very common throughout, but there the similarity in the corpora ends. In the Brown corpus, the word ‘police’ is more common throughout, as is the word ‘black’. Further, the common association of ‘black’ and
‘man’ noted for the Brown corpus in Table 2 is visible here; a similar association is uncommon in the Marikana corpus.

**Figure 1** Lexical dispersion plots of the Brown corpus (a) and the Marikana corpus (b), showing the physical distribution of selected words in the texts.
**Sentiment analysis**

The results of the sentiment analysis of the combined Brown and Marikana corpora are shown in Figure 2. Both of the words associated with race (mostly from the Brown corpus), ‘white’ and ‘black’, were common and associated with negativity, with ‘black’ being more common and more negative than ‘white’. All of the positive words, including ‘question’, ‘peace’, and ‘calm’ were less common.

**Figure 2** Results of the sentiment analysis of the combined Brown and Marikana corpora.

![Sentiment Analysis Graph](image)

**Words which appear in the same context as specific nouns**

The results of the search for words from the combined corpora that appear in the same contexts as ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’ and ‘death’ are listed below. The words listed after the word of interest occur about the same number of times as the focal word and in the same contexts. The most similar words are listed first.

**Police:** the people officers government ANC protesters workers and city it miner he
profits country they state officer that shooting law

**Shooting:** police ANC country case city protests officer government commission world
time strike community day department people president and decision state

**People:** officers police protesters workers they we it you miners the them and that men us
protests time government country leaders
Death: family case and shooting work police the people that killing it time workers
protests life government violence this body in

The contexts in which specific nouns appear

The results of the search of the combined corpora for the contexts in which the
nouns, ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’, and ‘death’ appear are listed below. The most
similar contexts are listed first. The underscore character indicates the position of
the noun of interest.

Police common context: internal_probe hit_held to_no_full_division prosecutors_
officials although_recorded previous_shooting received_commissioner night_
confronting york_add of_swat another_force controversial_cases the_narrative
of_shootings puts_tactics each_station the_brown up_officers chest_said

Shooting common context: the_incited officer_of and_scenes no_from a_at the_
Monday the_on fatal_will brown_have a_shot the_let the_berkeley police_said
problematic_that ferguson_had year_deaths the_stopped the_probe police_
police will

People common context: because_are beyond_who black_resulted palestinian_
although ordinary_just_of_shareholder with_an because_mobilise managing_
and with_less with_who ten_were example_were suddenly_were denied_
constitutional black_who chaotic_were beyond_power young_beginning
helps_record

Death common context: brown_have martin_the brown_still the_on joburgers_
knocked violent_by to_as brown_jeffrey brown_noted gurley_unspeakable
his_legal to_a than_the authorities_not with_ayanda a_sentence his_richard
joshua but brown_at

Discussion

The Michael Brown and Marikana incidents sparked extensive news coverage
in traditional newspaper and broadcast media, as well as in social media, in the
United States and South Africa. Despite the density of media coverage of these
events, relatively little scholarly attention has been focused on the nature of this
attention and how it may have affected public attitudes. The Marikana incident has
been investigated more thoroughly by scholars than the Brown incident (Duncan,
2013; Rodny-Gumede, 2015), but in only one of these papers, Duncan (2013), is a
content analysis of the first ten days only of news coverage presented. The scholarly
papers on Marikana have focused on how the coverage of the incident reflects
on the nature of the press, but not in detail on how the media coverage affected
public attitudes. A similar lack of scholarly attention has been focused on the
Michael Brown incident, with only one scholarly paper published to date (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015) that deals with the nature of the social media (Twitter) coverage that developed in the days after the incident. To our knowledge, ours is the first detailed discourse analysis of the newspaper coverage of the Brown and Marikana incidents, and the only study in which American and South African newspaper coverage was compared.

In this study, we were concerned primarily with methodology and in seeing if standard modes of modern textual analysis could shed new light on the nature of language used to describe sensitive and high-profile news incidents. We were not concerned with deconstructing the nature of the journalism about the two incidents for the sake of understanding journalistic philosophy or approaches. Rather, we were intent upon comparing the frequency and context of usage of key identity and action words in order to investigate how the lexicon of the media affected public attitude formation. Our hope was to be able to understand how word choice in formal media coverage affected attitude formation. This work is an act in progress and we recognise that, in order to better understand the effects of word choice on attitude formation, we need to be able to follow the continuing coverage of these and related incidents over periods of time longer than one year.

The stylistics of journalism demands at least a veneer of objectivity in the service of providing descriptions of facts that are known. Journalists themselves are sometimes unaware of the subtle emotional connotations of word choice and word placement because of their lack of awareness of the subtle biases that their culture exerts on them. Also, because of the intense pressures under which contemporary journalists operate, they resort to recycling their own and other’s prose, a practice aptly described as ‘churnalism’ (Davies, 2008). This practice increases the likelihood that descriptive phrases become common parlance in the mind of the reader. The mind of the reader is, of course, not a blank slate. Implications of journalists’ statements about facts are often left latent within a reader’s and a community’s own biases and presumptions. Thus, anti-police or anti-protester sentiment is largely in the domain of readers. Further, the importance and emotional impact of a particular piece by a reader will depend on its placement within a newspaper. Is it a cover story with a prominent headline, or a minor column amidst other accounts of violence or misfortune on an inside page? This is something that we did not account for in this analysis. The nature of contemporary reporting means that reader participation and sentiment is often tied to the moment, and that the salient message derived from a piece of factual reporting is influenced by its placement on a page, the other media that a reader may have consumed in the hours or days before and the many implicit biases that most readers harbour. The banality of mere reportage means that we
have difficulty pulling the larger sentiment-based signal from the grinding churn of daily accounts of violence.

The most important substantive finding to emerge from our study was that, that word choice reflected dominant attitudes in the USA and South Africa toward people involved in incidents of public violence. The high frequency and consistent use of the word ‘black’ in the Brown corpus contrasted with the near absence of ‘black’ from the Marikana corpus. In the USA, the killing of Michael Brown was discussed in the media from the outset as a racial incident, in which the racial identities of the victim and his assailant established the central dialectic which framed all subsequent discourse. The Brown incident illustrates what Feagin has termed ‘the white racial frame’, which dominates American culture through its pervasive influence on stereotypes, metaphors, images, emotions and inclinations toward discriminatory action (2013). The Marikana incident, by contrast, was not framed in South Africa as a racial incident and descriptions of participants in the incident as ‘black’, ‘white’ or otherwise were rare. Marikana was framed in South Africa as a political incident over the rights of organised labour to determine miners’ salaries. For most South African readers, the miners shot at Marikana did not need to be described as ‘black’ because they were assumed to be so. The violence perpetrated against them was not based or provoked on the basis of deep-seated or subconscious enmity toward them as ‘black’. Rather, the incident was examined through a political lens as to whether the police action against the miners could be justified on the basis that, officially, the miners had been undertaking illegal strike actions on corporate property.

Through the preliminary analysis of newspaper treatments of two recent, violent incidents in the USA and South Africa we carried out here, we demonstrated that our chosen methods had the potential to be effective in uncovering trends in keyword frequency and use. The major result of this study with respect to methodology was that relatively small newspaper corpora such as those examined here were not very useful in the interpretation of attitudes or temporal trends in public opinion. These methods could be much more highly illuminating when applied to larger bodies of text (e.g., collected social media messages such as Twitter feeds) in the future. Even though journalistic text tends to be emotionally flat by comparison to other forms of nonfiction and of fiction writing, the tools of text analysis can be usefully applied to interrogating large bodies of text for extraction of information on attitude formation. We encourage social scientists and humanists interested in such matters to pursue similar analyses. Critical examinations of the textual framing of facts will become more important in the future as American and South African societies continue their long struggles against racialism and racism.
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The rise of neo-nationalism and civic integrationism in multi-ethnic Europe

Maureen A. Eger and Mikael Hjerm

Political philosophers have long argued that it is easier to build a collective identity, solidarity and trust in homogeneous societies (Mill, 1975) and social scientists have lent empirical support to this claim (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Ziller & Schübel, 2015). Globalisation, European Union enlargement and an increase in asylum seeking have contributed to unprecedented ethnic and racial diversity in European countries (Castles & Miller, 2003); thus a growing concern among scholars, politicians and laypeople alike is whether immigration-generated diversity may undermine the solidarity required for the functioning of liberal democracies (Wolfe & Klausen, 1997; Goodhart, 2004). This question is maybe best articulated by Rawls (1996: xvii): “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”

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Some argue that institutions, or “prescriptions about which actions are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 1986: 5), hold tremendous promise for social justice, equality and democracy (e.g., Rothstein, 1998; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Brady, 2009). Can institutions be formed so that they promote practices that are viewed as normatively good or just? Rothstein (1994) claims that this is possible: as long as individuals trust that the institutions are substantially just; individuals believe burdens are divided fairly; and, importantly, policies are implemented in a procedurally fair and transparent way (see also Levi, 1990). To the extent that these prerequisites are fulfilled, institutions have the potential to structure social life in ways that then reinforce the very norms that inspired their design (Rothstein, 1998). Thus, institutions not only ensure individuals certain rights and responsibilities, they may also promote civic mindedness, social justice and equality.

Given such potential, it becomes important to understand what kinds of institutions promote civic values in ethnically plural societies. Over the past 25 years, scholars have debated this question, some arguing that recognising cultural difference is necessary to ensure the equal treatment of ethnic groups, while others claim only a neutral state promotes equity and equality. In this essay, we review this philosophical debate between multiculturalism and liberalism and then assess what types of policies actually exist in contemporary European societies. We find that, in practice, most countries have adopted policies indicative of civic integrationism, which is arguably reflective of neither philosophical approach. While these policies are often lauded as inclusive and important for immigrant integration, we argue that these policies nevertheless promote cultural homogeneity. And, considering cultural homogeneity is the nationalistic goal of the so-called radical right in Europe, we contend that civic integrationism is a softer version of neo-nationalism, the political ideology of these increasingly popular parties. In other words, we argue that civic integrationism and neo-nationalism are two sides of the same political coin.

Liberal and multicultural approaches to ethnic plurality in democratic societies

Up till the early twenty-first century there has been two dominant ways to frame the solution to the equality problem phrased by Rawls: the multicultural approach (or so called liberal multiculturalism) (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995, 2007); and the liberal approach (Rawls, 1996; Rex, 1996; Modood, 1997; Joppke, 2004). The former proposes recognition or differentiation of rights between individuals belonging to different groups, whereas the latter claims to be blind to group differences. There are, of course, large differences within the two approaches. Even so, there is a quite clear demarcation line between them. The multicultural
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The liberal approach wants the state to recognise, in a soft version, that there are different ethnic and cultural groups in every society; and, in a strong version, to assign individuals in such groups differentiated rights to enable people to choose the life they want to pursue. The liberal approach claims state neutrality and privatisation of culture.

The main critique aimed at liberals is that the position of ethnic and cultural group blindness is ultimately homogenising (e.g., Taylor, 1994). It implies that the supposed neutrality of the state and equal treatment ultimately will lead to oppression of people based on their group belonging. The basic argument is that liberalism is not a functional solution to the coexistence of ethnic groups within a territory. The state is not and can never be neutral, which suggests that the values and norms of the dominant national majority will prevail and continue to influence the civic sphere. This in turn will diminish the sphere of action possible for individuals not belonging to the national majority. It is also argued on an individual level that people from the majority population will apply liberal arguments in order to oppose political decisions aimed at diminishing inequalities as they give preferential treatments to specific groups (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). For example, that the white majority in the USA does not only object to affirmative action, but that they do so because such policies are unfair in the name of liberalism.

Liberalism is, in itself, a non-neutral expression of the dominant group, which suggests that it can never be the meeting ground that unifies different conceptions of the good life. Thus it will, in the end, oppress groups of people not belonging to the majority, and will do so in the name of universalistic humanism (McLaren, 1994). The main critique towards liberalism as not being a functional solution to the equality problem in plural societies is also well supported in the empirical literature dealing with negative outcomes for ethnic minorities in areas where fundamental principles of liberalism, like meritocracy and colour-blindness, are at the forefront. For example, situational testing studies repeatedly show that immigrants are more likely to be screened out (Carlsson & Rooth, 2007). Another example where the liberal policy of colour-blindness is expected to prevail is within the courts, where judges in fact evaluate cases of racial harassment differently dependent on the race of the judge (Chew & Kelley, 2008).

From the liberal standpoint multiculturalism is under critique from a number of different points. It is argued that the politics of recognition in the soft version (Loobuyck, 2005) and granting specific rights in the strong version of multiculturalism (McLaren, 1994) is in fact preserving the status quo in that it manifests boundaries between groups as it builds on the idea of mutually exclusive, involuntary, non-changeable groups. This contradicts the very idea
of liberal democracy built on voluntary, non-exclusive, associations striving for specific rights.

The idea that preservation of the distinctiveness of national cultures, be they in majority or minority, is of importance (Miller, 1995) is in fact a nationalistic argument. Miller even claims that nationalism is needed, but not in the sense of a congruity between nation and state or the will to achieve a ‘one nation state’. Instead, Miller argues for what is commonly referred to as cultural nationalism, which is taken to be the promotion of certain national cultures (often by the state) over others. The cultural nationalist argument, as well as part of the multicultural argument, rests on the assumption that culture provides values and strategies that allow individuals to pursue a certain kind of life (Tamir, 1993; Raz, 1994). No individual is free if she is deprived of the things that are essential for her having a good life. The preservation of ethnic identities is empirically supported. For example, the interrelation between a migrant’s ethnic identity and the national identity of the country promotes well-being amongst immigrants (Phinney et al., 2001); or that general adaptation is better when immigrants both retain their cultural identity and connect to the larger society (Berry et al., 2006).

In practice, however, it is not clear that cultural and political nationalism are ever distinct. There are certainly examples from history where a consensus existed that a national minority had a just claim to statehood because of maltreatment as a result of a hegemonic national culture. This could imply that any minority living within any state boundary would be subjected to such unjust treatment and suppression of their culture and therefore justified in political nationalism.

A related problem with multiculturalism and the politics of recognition is the impossibility to recognise all groups or cultures since norms and values across groups are not always compatible (Levy, 2000; Barry, 2001). Different groups of people often disagree about norms, values, practices and common understandings of what the good life entails. When such issues not only are different, but also incompatible across groups of people, it is impossible to assign equal value to those groups, especially in cases where incompatible values, norms or practices compete for influence in the public sphere.

The rise of multiculturalism as a philosophical idea partly sprung from observations of ethnic inequality. It came about as a solution to the problem of increasing inequality between ethnic groups, to remedy prior wrongdoings towards indigenous groups and to empower new immigrant populations. Colour-blind liberalism did not seem to be able to provide a solution to these problems. However, the tide has turned again where multiculturalism seems to be in decline not only as a philosophical project, but more consequentially in actual politics.
The problem with the latter is that multiculturalism is being replaced by something that is cloaked as liberalism, but in fact only has weak relationship to the term and its meaning.

Political responses to immigration in contemporary European societies

Scholars of immigrant incorporation have constructed typologies that identify whether countries’ policies intend to ‘assimilate’ foreigners or embrace ethnic difference in the ‘multicultural’ sense (Brubaker, 1992; Castles & Miller, 1993; Soysal, 1994). Yet, today, these typologies have little relevance. In recent years, many have claimed that the era of multiculturalism is moribund, especially in Europe where countries have shifted from policies that recognise cultural difference to policies that effectively ignore the cultural diversity of immigrants (Back et al., 2002; Joppke, 2004; Meer & Modood, 2011). Although some scholars insist that multiculturalism is merely changing (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006; Kymlicka 2010) there is general agreement that, at the very least, multiculturalism is threatened.

Indeed, as multiculturalism was a response to the failure of liberalism to address social problems such as socio-economic inequality and discrimination, critics of multiculturalism also point to its apparent inability to reduce inequality or promote social cohesion and trust. Those most critical of multiculturalism have even gone as far as to suggest that it promotes terrorism (Phillips, 2006). Given any normative theory of justice must be based on what is politically possible to implement (Miller, 1995; Rawls, 1996). A serious problem with multiculturalism has been the lack of public support for multicultural policies (Hjerm, 2000; Citrin et al., 2001).

Essential to this shift away from multiculturalism and group-based rights is the notion that liberal democracy and its core values of individual rights and liberties need protecting (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). In recent decades, European countries have transitioned from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. Much of this immigration has been a form of economic and intra-European migration due to the enlargement of the European Union. The political unrest and wars in North Africa and the Middle East have fuelled large-scale migration predominantly from Muslim countries. If ethnic identity is paramount to other forms of identity, this suggests that it will be more difficult for immigrants from countries with very different cultures to ‘fit in.’ Famously described as a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993), many have expressed concerns that non-secular or non-Christian immigrants will transfer illiberal or undemocratic values to the public sphere.

The idea that increasing immigration may threaten liberal democracy itself appears to be rather widespread, as this concern is articulated not only by liberals, but
also, and perhaps most strongly, by the European radical right. Many of these parties, especially in Western Europe, have softened their rhetoric from purely racist arguments to ones about protecting Western values, an argument that in some sense is compatible with liberalism. For example, Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch anti-immigrant party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), has argued that showing ‘intolerance for the intolerant’ is the only way to ensure the survival of liberal values. Therefore, at first glance, it may seem that European societies have returned to policies based on liberalism, but we argue this conclusion is premature. Instead, we contend that European countries have embraced a more aggressive form of immigrant incorporation (Kundnani, 2012) and that this new ‘liberal’ approach is in fact an illiberal response to, real or perceived, external threats to core values of the modern liberal democracy (Triadafilopoulos, 2011).

We argue that increasing immigration to Europe, and Western Europe in particular, is associated with two different political movements: civic integrationism and neo-nationalism. The first essentially ignores ethnic diversity and focuses instead on participation in civil society. However, in contrast to integration promoted by liberalism, the integrationist approach conditions participation in civil society with a thick form of collective national identity. Policies consistent with this philosophy are considered inclusive, because they make it easier for immigrants to become Swedish, Spanish, or Italian. Neo-nationalism, on the other hand, emphasises ethnic boundaries, by arguing that ethnic difference and immigrant integration are wholly incompatible. Policies consistent with this ideology are exclusive, such as ending immigration or limiting foreigners’ ability to access a national welfare state or have rights to citizenship.

Considering one approach calls for the inclusion of immigrants and the other calls for their exclusion, these approaches may, on the surface, appear opposites. However, we argue that civic integrationism and neo-nationalism are, in practice, two versions of the same political philosophy, namely that culturally homogeneity is preferred to cultural diversity. Indeed, both versions use liberal rhetoric to advocate for a culturally homogenous solution to the classical question of the survival of liberal democracy. While they differ in regards to the policies they prescribe and the extent to which diversity can be tolerated, these political responses are similar in that they both imply a move away from multiculturalism.

Civic integrationism

‘Integration’ is the official policy prescription of government ministries throughout Europe. The notion that immigrants should do their best to ‘fit in’ has been increasingly institutionalised in the form of national civic integration policies. What civic integration actually entails is complicated, as evidenced by tremendous
variation in European countries’ integration policies. However, underlying all these policies is the philosophy that, to have the same individual rights as citizens of a particular country, immigrants are obligated to demonstrate that they have earned those rights.

By emphasising the rights and responsibilities of denizen- and citizenship, civic integrationism, at the very least, implicitly calls for immigrants to become part of the majority culture by adopting the social, political and economic behaviours of native-born citizens. Many view integration as relatively non-controversial, as the integration of immigrants holds some promise for both foreign- and native-born. If immigrants are successful at fitting in, immigrants benefit in that they are gainfully employed and able to participate in civic and political life. Moreover, the native-born benefit, because integration does not challenge the dominant culture. Indeed, through the process of integration, immigrants become more like the native citizenry versus the other way around. And, if immigrants pose no real threat to the national culture or liberal democracy, natives may become more open to immigrants, a plus for social cohesion and social order. Further, natives may become more open to immigration, which is associated with long-term economic benefits (OECD, 2014) and may provide a partial solution to Europe’s demographic challenge (i.e., the combination of aging populations and low birth rates).

Thus, policymakers have an interest in developing policies that make it easier for immigrants to ‘fit in’ into everyday life. Developed cooperatively by the British Council, Migration Policy Group, the European Commission and a variety of national research partners, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2015) assesses and compares the inclusivity of countries’ integration policies in eight key dimensions: labour market mobility, permanent residency, access to nationality, political participation, family reunification, antidiscrimination, health and education. MIPEX also ranks countries on the basis of their inclusivity score, a composite measure of policies across all policy dimensions.

Countries vary in their approach to immigrant integration. Some countries provide almost equal access to the labour market and relatively short waiting times for permanent residence or citizenship. Some countries explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or national origin. Other countries are arguably more protectionist and nativist, maintaining stricter rules about work and residency permits, local voting rights, social welfare and access to citizenship. Between 2007 and 2014, most European countries have become more inclusive, albeit to varying degrees. However, four Western European countries have become more exclusive: Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.
Some countries have developed other policies that make it more difficult for particular potential immigrants to immigrate in the first place. For example, the Netherlands has some of the most restrictive immigration policies in Europe, based on the assumption that people from particular countries will have difficulty fitting into Dutch society. Therefore, prospective migrants from non-Western countries must prove they can and are willing to adapt to Dutch society and policies require that much of this process occur prior to arriving in the Netherlands. The Civic Integration Abroad Act of 2006 requires certain foreign nationals aged 18-65 to complete an examination held at a Dutch consulate or embassy in the migrant’s country of origin or residence. Prospective migrants must know 500 Dutch words to pass the language portion of the exam. They must also pass a ‘culture test’ that asks questions about Dutch society, including its history, institutions, geography, as well as social norms about parenting, work, gender and sexuality. Migrants must essentially prove that they are able and willing to become Dutch. Yet, these requirements exist only for foreign nationals from certain countries; immigrants from Europe and other industrialised countries, such as the United States, Canada and Japan, are exempt from these policies. In addition, people with work permits, who are also more likely to come from an industrialised country, as well as their family members are also exempt. Of course, the Netherlands is not the only country in the world with different visa requirements for immigrants from different regions of the world, but this policy, with its emphasis on integration prior to immigration, signals a departure from other models of integration. The Human Rights Watch (2008) has described this policy as highly discriminatory.

Other countries have developed policies that restrict specific cultural, religious, or ethnic customs from the public domain. For example, in 2010, France banned wearing clothing that covers your face in public places. Although this ban theoretically restricts a variety of different forms of clothing, the law was specifically designed to stop women from wearing the Islamic burqa and niqab. Belgium passed a similar law in 2011. Several towns in Italy and the Spanish city of Barcelona have imposed bans on wearing clothing that covers one’s face in public. In 2013, the Swiss canton of Ticino also banned the Islamic veil in public places. Critics of these laws argue the policies discriminate against religious minorities and are incompatible with freedom of religion and expression – both liberal democratic ideals. In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld France’s ban, citing civic integration and social cohesion as legitimate goals of the French state.

Neo-nationalism

In recent years, scholars have identified an increase in nationalism among radical right parties. The common denominator of radical right parties is opposition
to immigration (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Iversflaten, 2005). However, exclusionary attitudes and policy preferences can be viewed increasingly through the lens of nationalism. Betz and Johnson (2004: 323) argue that ethno-national identity is central to contemporary radical right party platforms and rhetoric: “Reduced to its core, radical right-wing populist ideology is a response to the erosion of the system of ‘ethno-national dominance’, which characterized much of the history of modern nation-states”. Supporters of radical right parties view immigration, globalisation and EU integration as threats to the sovereignty of European national states (Kriesi et al., 2008).

Eger and Valdez (2015: 127) define neo-nationalism as a “form of nationalism occurring in a context of settled boundaries whereby increased ethnic heterogeneity or supranational authority calls into question who has access to or sovereignty over an already established nation state”. Thus, they see neo-nationalism as a boundary-maintenance project rather than one centred on nation building. Similarly, Gingrich and Banks (2006: 5) define neo-nationalism “as the nationalism of the current phase of transnational and global development”. Importantly, they identify nationalist notions of kinship and ‘sameness’ as central to neo-nationalist rhetoric. Using election manifesto data, Eger and Valdez (2015) show that contemporary radical right parties oppose multiculturalism and increasingly emphasise a traditional, national way of life. Using European survey data, they find that citizens who believe that immigrants undermine national culture are more likely to vote for a radical right party. These voters also oppose the enlargement of the European Union and believe either that immigrants should earn social rights over time or that they should never receive the same social rights and welfare benefits as native-born.

Radical right parties are increasingly relevant in European politics, although their actual impact on policy is difficult to quantify. Akkerman (2012) analyses the impact of radical right parties in centre-right governments on policy outcomes in nine countries between 1996 and 2010. He finds that radical right parties have not directly influenced immigration or integration policies and that centre-right parties have been primarily responsible for legislative changes. Mudde (2013: 9) also argues that the effect of radical right parties on immigration and integration policy has been at most indirect. However, using election manifesto data, Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) show that all party families have adopted a more negative stance towards immigration since 1990. However, with the presence of a relevant radical right party, other party families become more anti-immigrant in their rhetoric and policy preferences.

Some would argue that, considering the impact of the radical right appears limited, European countries are somewhat safe from the xenophobic and exclusionist sentiments championed by these parties. However, we argue that neo-nationalism
is, in reality, a more extreme version of civic integrationism. Given the fact that ‘immigrant integration’ is widely accepted as necessary for social cohesion and the preservation of national cultures, the direct impact of radical right parties may be irrelevant. Indeed, there may be disagreements among parties and the native-born regarding the value of immigration, which is arguably why radical right parties in recent years have been increasingly successful, but there is little disagreement regarding the task of immigrants once they arrive. Immigrants throughout Europe have an obligation to integrate culturally.

Cross-national trends

If civic integrationism and neo-nationalism were opposites instead of, as we argue, two sides of the same coin, we should find evidence of this cross-nationally. Therefore, we ask whether the inclusivity of integration policies is inversely related to the popularity or relevance of anti-immigrant, radical right parties. Descriptive statistics suggest figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the inclusivity of these policies and support for radical right parties. In figure 1, support for the radical right is measured as the percentage of votes the party received in the last national election. As countries have different electoral thresholds, in figure 2, we organise countries by the inclusivity of integration policies and relevance of the radical right party. If parties pose an electoral threat to other parties, they are classified as relevant. Otherwise they are classified as fringe or non-existent if no such party exists. Both figures demonstrate that the inclusivity of these policies is not related to the presence or popularity of a radical right party. This suggests that national integration policies and support for parties with exclusive policy preferences are not mutually exclusive. Further, figure 3 shows that change in the inclusivity of integration policies is unrelated to change in support for radical right parties. Most countries have adopted more inclusive integration policies, but this is unrelated to the change in electoral support for radical right parties.

We argue that, in many cases, the radical right and mainstream liberal politicians have the same goal. By ignoring ethnicity and possibilities for cultural difference, civic integrationism arguably promotes cultural homogeneity, the nationalistic goal of the radical right. Some claim that this new aggressive approach to immigration-generated ethnic diversity is actually an illiberal response to threats, real or perceived, to the modern liberal democracy (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). Political actors in some countries maintain that immigrants should adopt the cultural values of their new country. In other words, immigrants should change what they believe. According to Joppke (2010), this is an illiberal response to ethnic diversity, and obviously, not something that can be implemented in any meaningful way. Policies that incentivise or regulate behaviour, on the other hand, may or may not be consistent with liberal ideals.
**Figure 1** Political responses to immigration in Europe

![Graph showing political responses to immigration in Europe](image)

*Sources: MIPEX; Parties and Elections in Europe; authors’ calculations*

**Figure 2** Inclusivity of integration policies and relevance of European radical parties, 2014

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<tr>
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<td>Halfway (40-59)</td>
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*Sources: MIPEX; Parties and Elections in Europe; authors’ calculations*
Conclusion

John Stuart Mill assumed that trust was a prerequisite for a functional society (Mill, 1975). A common national identity, the argument goes, helps facilitate interpersonal and political trust and may override sub-group interests such as class or religion. Indeed, a common nationality is a fundamental prerequisite of a demos. The relationship between nationality, identity and political trust appears in various theoretical streams, such as the system-building tradition (Hirschman, 1970; Rokkan, 1974; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983; Rokkan, 1987; Bartolini, 2007), democratic theory (Dahl, 1989; Held, 1991) and some elaborations of Easton’s system support theory (Easton, 1965, 1975). Beyond recognising the necessity of a common national identity, political philosophy has not ascertained whether a civic identity is sufficient or whether social cohesion requires some degree of ethnic homogeneity.

Multiculturalism was a response to the failure of colour-blind liberalism to create equality between various groups in society. In recent years, countries have moved away from the politics of recognition and ostensibly returned to a more liberal
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approach to managing diversity. However, we argue that this return to liberalism is in fact a move towards something different and fundamentally illiberal. Indeed, the new liberal approach cannot be accused of being colour-blind anymore, because it actually promotes a thick form of social cohesion based on fuzzy references to western liberal democracy, while assuming both whiteness and the preservation of national cultures as the only viable solution to the classical problem of equality in ethnically diverse societies.

It is important to emphasise that this notion is not entirely new. Mill argued in favour of a liberal solution, but his own version also assumed a thick form of national cohesion as he could not imagine a liberal democracy in plural societies. Cederman define demos as “... a group of people the vast majority of which feels sufficiently attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic discourse and binding decision-making” (2001: 144). However, as most others, he does not define the content of such attachment. Some argue in favour of a thick version where demos and ethnos needs to coincide (e.g., Lijphart, 1977; Scharpf, 1999), whereas others argue in favour of a more thin version of attachment (e.g., Habermas, 1992; Viroli, 1995). Regardless of the answer to this, not to mention the question of how large the ‘vast majority’ need to be, it seems that the current trend in Europe is accommodating an approach that would make Mill proud. Namely, an approach that is liberal in that it promotes a thin form of identity and attachment to civic institutions, while at the same time ensuring that ‘we the people’ consists of those alike.

The neo-nationalism of the radical right differs from civic integrationism in that the former explicitly seeks homogeneity in the name of a thick form of cohesion whereas the integrationist approach focuses on a thin form of cohesion. Still, the latter approach does not embrace liberalism, but comes much closer to the ideas of Mill, formulated in a time before the multi-ethnic society, in assuming that the ‘we the people’ are those that do not only share a willingness for binding decision-making, but also share some kind of ancestry.

Acknowledging the problems with this shift does not bring us any closer to a solution. Rawls’ fundamental question remains hanging in the air. Is there a way to protect liberal democratic values without simultaneously making them vulnerable? This remains an important challenge for modern democracies, especially considering the rise of radical right parties in Europe. We do not have the solution. However, we think it is worth acknowledging that while abandoning multiculturalism may not have been fundamentally wrong, there are drawbacks, both political and moral, to pursuing cultural homogeneity in the name of liberal values.
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