

**Responding to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab: A Critique of the African Union's
Counter-terrorism Strategies**

by

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to plague the African continent, despite various frameworks and agendas that the African Union has tabled and established in relation to countering terrorism. The continuously rising terror campaigns of Boko-Haram particularly in northeastern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have developed into regional and to a certain extent, continental threats that have undoubtedly crippled the economies and socio-political landscapes of the territories in which they seek to maintain control.

Terrorism in Africa is a multi-causal phenomenon which requires a multi-dimensional approach. The focus of this study is to unpack and appraise efforts by the African Union to address and tackle the issue of terrorism in northern Nigeria and the Horn of Africa. By employing Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as the theoretical framework, this study broadly offers an assessment and critique of the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union (AU) with specific reference to the inter-governmental organizations' military-driven approach, particularly in its efforts to fight the threat of terrorism waged by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab.

Moreover, this study seeks to uncover how these critiques and further recommendations may assist the AU to adopt multi-dimensional strategies in its efforts to combat Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. In contrast to orthodox approaches to terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies recognizes the advantages of an all-inclusive theoretical framework that addresses and questions pertinent issues of religion, ethnicity, and poverty amongst other socio-economic and political drivers and root causes influencing organizations such as Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab.

Given that the findings of this study indicate that the largely military approach in both case studies has not ameliorated the threat of terrorism, perhaps an alternative to the military centered strategy should be seriously considered – an approach that seeks to address the primary drivers and root causes which encourage the scourge of terror waged by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab. The study recommends that the African Union and its various counter-terrorism institutions need to better prioritize non-military forms of intervention and counter-operations, namely cross-border management; diplomatic engagement; addressing the marginalization of certain religious and ethnic minorities; and dealing with socio-economic disparities such as poverty and unemployment.

UKUCAPHULA

Ubugrogrisi, kuzo zonke iimbonakalo zabo busaqhubeka buxananazile kwilizwekazi lase Afrika, nangona iinkqubo noluhlu lwezinto ezifuna ukwenziwa ezithiwe thaca YIMBUMBA YE AFRIKA kwinzame zokulwisa ubugrogrisi. Imikhankaso eqhubekayo yobugrogrisi ngakumbi eye Boko Haram kumantla empuma elizwe lase Nigeria kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab e Somalia zingenelele kwinqanaba lokuba sisoyikiso kwimimandla nakwilizwekazi le afrika, into esingisele ekuthomamiseni ukhulo loqoqosho nobume boluntu kwezopolotiko apho lemibutho ifuna ulawulo khona.

Ugrogriso kwilizwekazi lase Afrika sisenco esibangwa zizinto ezahlukeneyo, okunyanzelisa ukuba ukuqubisana nako kube nemiba eyahlukileyo. Oluphononongo lugqamene nokucacisa nzulu iinzame zembumba ye Afrika ekujameleni nasekuceleni umngeni kumbandela wobugrogrisi kwilizwekazi le Afrika. Ngokusebenzisa izifundo ezinzulu kumba wobugrogrisi njenge nkcazo eyingcingane, oluphononongo lunikeza uthekelelo nencoko egwebayo kwinkqubo ye Mbumba ye Afrika yokulwisa ubugrogrisi, kwaye igxininisa kwimibutho eyahlukileyo yoorhulumente ethyalwa zezemikhosi kwinzame zokulwisa ubugrogrisi be Boko-Haram kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab.

Okubalulekileyo kukuthi oluphononongo luzama ukuveza ukuba ezincoko zigwebayo nezinye iingcebiso ziyinceda njani imbumba ye Afrika ekumiliseleni iinzame ezahlukileyo ekulwiseni iBoko-Haram kumanntla empuma yelizwe lase Nigeria kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab kwiphondo le Afrika. Ukungalandeli ekhondweni lendlela zokulwisana nobu grogrisi, Izifundo ezinzulu zobugrogrisi ziphawule ukuba semandleni kwenkcazo eyingcingane equibisana negotyagotya imiba yokholo, ubuhlanga kwakunye nendlala njengezinye izinto eziphembelela imibutho efana ne Boko-Haram kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab.

Oluphononongo luyaveza ukuba lendlela yokusetyenzisa kwemikhosi kuzo zombini iindlela zophando aluncedanga ukunqanda ubugrogrisi, mhlawumbi enye indlela ngaphandle kokuqononondisa ekusetyenzisweni komkhosi kungafuneka icingsiswe, njengendlela yokuqubisana nomngeni ozingcambu ezisisisekelo sesenco zobugrogrisi eziphembelela ngamaqela afana ne Boko Haran kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab. Oluphononongo lucebisa ukuba imbumba ye Afrika namanye amaziko alwisana nobu grogrisi batyhile phepha limbi ekubekeni phambili ezinye iindlela ezingeze zomkhosi ukungenelela nokuphikisana nenqubo zokunqunyulwa kwemida, ubunozakuzaku, ukuchwethelwa bucala kwezinye iinkolo

neentlanga; nokuqubisana nomngeni wokungalingani kwintlalakahle nomnotho, njengendlala nentswela-ngqesho.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI:	al-Ittihad al-Islamiya
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FPU	Formed Police Units
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IED	Improved Explosive Device
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Protection and Training Mission in Somalia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IR	International Relations
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
NSF	Somali National Forces
OAU	Organization of African Unity

PSC	Peace and Security Council
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SFG	Somali Federal Government
SNA	Somali National Army
SPF	Somali Police Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UN SOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
US	United States

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

This introductory chapter offers an outline and overview of this study. In order for the study to provide a contextual foundation and basis, a brief and compact background to the study will be provided which will be followed by the rationale behind the choice in advancing this particular field of research. Furthermore, this chapter will briefly outline the respective problem statement and focus of the research. The next section will provide a detailed discussion of the goals, variables, theoretical point of departure, and research questions. In addition, the research design and methodology will be discussed and demonstrated. To conclude this introductory chapter, the fundamental aims of each chapter within this study will be briefly mentioned.

1.2. Background

Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to plague the African continent, despite the wealth of normative structures and approaches related to terrorism and counter-terrorism that the African Union has tabled and established. Historically, the widely-held belief across the continent has been influenced by the narrative that terrorism is not an African problem – an attitude held by many African states to cover their lack of capacity development in countering terrorist organizations (Nurudeen, 2012: 1). According to Ewi and Anning (2006: 34), terrorism in Africa is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which occurs predominantly on a domestic scale and constitutes the destruction, killing, and maiming of innocent civilians in their masses. Modern-day terrorists within the African continent have access to a variety of weapons in their arsenal, ranging from small arms and explosives to nuclear and chemical weaponry.

It is important for one to note that within the colonial African state – which was known for its regular use of force to overpower the actions of interest groups and anti-colonial movements which were against oppressive governmental campaigns and structures – labelled the reactions of anti-colonial movements as acts of terror (Oyeniyi, 2007:117). A well-documented example can be found within the Southern African context (in countries such as South Africa) where the African National Congress (ANC) took up arms in its quest to liberate the majority of South Africans from the repressive apartheid state (Kelly, 2007:16). Furthermore, one cannot neglect the fact that the

post-independence period in Africa has resulted in an increase in terrorist activities by terrorist organizations.

There have been varying arguments and explanations as to why the plague of terrorism increased at an exponential rate at the end of the colonial era and the beginning of independence in Africa. Many scholars including Elu and Price (2015: 402-403) have attributed it to poor economic circumstances, which are in line with the traditional theory of deprivation and poverty, poor levels of education, and historical conditions pertaining to slavery and ethnic conflicts. In addition to Elu and Price's argument (2015: 402-403), one cannot deny that post-independent Africa saw a rise in terrorist attacks as a result of successive governments in many African states which lacked the capacity to establish the necessary structures and key foundations required of a powerful state. This structural weakness opened doors for the expansion of many terrorist organizations which manipulated and capitalized on vulnerable post-independence governments, on widespread tribal, ethnic, and religious disputes, as well as on conditions of socio-economic marginalization. Thus, one can contend that the negative legacies of colonialism inherently destroyed the social, tribal, and ethnic fiber of many African states, leaving behind countries susceptible and exposed to extremist and radical ideologies.

The 1970s and 1980s were tormented by cases of hijacked planes and bombings, such as the hijacking of the Lufthansa flight headed to Mogadishu in 1977, and the bombing of the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1980 (Kelly, 2007:17). Furthermore, as a result of domestic unrest and regional conflict, terror attacks in Africa have increased exponentially since the mid 1990s, as rebel movements and opposition organizations adopted and employed terror tactics and strategies to advance their social, economic and political agendas (African Union Commission on Terrorism in Africa, 2011). The embassies of the United States deployed in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the incident where an estimated 250 people were killed, leaving more than 5000 civilians injured (Aubrey, 2004:16). Other instances of international or transnational terrorism include the 2002 Al-Qaeda-led bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, as well as the sequence of suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003 and the simultaneous attacks at the Sinai resort of Taba, in Egypt (ISS African Terrorism Bulletin, 2004). It is clear that Africa has undoubtedly experienced its fair

share of international terror incidents; however, it is important to note that these are instances of domestic and transnational terrorism which have historically plagued the continent.

Peace and stability across the African continent, and particular in North, East, and West Africa, have been heavily disrupted and continue to be threatened by terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) amongst other groups (African Union Commission on Terrorism in Africa, 2011). It is a result of these circumstances and historical developments that the African Union (AU) was forced to establish a number of strategies and approaches intended to tackle the vicious and frightening trend of terrorism. The first such an intervention can be traced back to the 28th ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which convened in Dakar, Senegal in 1992. It was at this session that the Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African states was agreed upon, whereby the African Union agreed to curb and derail structures and organizations that employ religion, race, or other societal and traditional rationales to justify their repressive and extremist undertakings directed towards various states and actors across the African continent (OAU Assembly, 1992). The AU, the successor of the OAU, has since adopted a number of other tools and mechanisms against terrorism. Two decades after the initial transition of the AU from the OAU, it remains of international importance that the manner in which counter-terrorism responses are carried out in Africa, should be assessed.

This research study aims to explore and unpack the counter-terrorism mechanisms which exist on the African continent by assessing the strategies and measures employed by the African Union since its transition from the Organization of African Unity. The study will assess the internal structures of the African Union, which are responsible for alleviating and tackling terrorism. This will be done by focusing on two substantially different regional environments, namely Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region which Al-Shabaab emerged from and northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin in which Boko Haram has waged its terror campaigns. Within the context of these two regions, this research will assess the structures that exist within the African Union which are responsible for combatting the two mentioned terrorist organizations in Africa, namely Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

1.3. Rationale

As previously discussed, terrorism across the African continent has always manifested itself as a significant and fundamental security threat. However, the dire need and contribution of intergovernmental organizations in attempts to address and tackle the threat of terrorism is a relatively new development. It is important to note that within the historical context of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), combating terrorism was only established on the agenda of the OAU in the 1990s. Prior to these developments, the OAU focused its energy on combating mercenarism amongst other forces of subversion threatening to expand on the continent.

Therefore, the rationale behind choosing this area of study is that the African Union's endeavors and efforts to combat terrorism will prove to be important for the preservation of domestic and regional security across the African continent. In this regard, the African Union's capacity needs to be complementary and exist as a nexus between the continent and the global community, more specifically the United Nations (UN). The AU must serve as a catalyst to fill in the gaps in capacity of its member states and of its regional institutions. In order for the AU to execute its intended task and duty efficiently and effectively, it must carry out introspection and eradicate its internal inadequacies through financial and resource capacity-building.

The rationale for choosing Al-Shabaab in Somalia as one of the case studies of this research will be supported by the premise that the Horn of Africa (the region in which Somalia is located and in which Al-Shabaab predominantly operates) is highly susceptible to national and international terrorist activities (Abrahamsen, 2004:678–679). These terror activities are perpetuated by a number of elements, including weak governments in the region, extreme poverty, and incapacitated border controls. The rationale behind choosing Boko Haram in northern Nigeria as a second case study is to demonstrate the present day brutality and savagery aided by the establishment and continuous rise of Boko Haram – predominantly in northeastern Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin – an Islamic sect that utilizes bombings, targeted assassinations, as well as violent crime across Nigeria (Brigaglia, 2012: 35) and to further assess the measures adopted by the African Union to combat the activities of these terrorist organizations.

This research is important and appropriate because it offers methods to challenge and counter insurgencies and terrorist organizations operating across the African continent, in particular Boko

Haram and Al-Shabaab, which form a continuing obstacle for the African Union and its regional actors. Furthermore, literature on terrorism and specifically on counter-terrorism methods in Africa suggests that in order to alleviate and ameliorate the threat of terrorism on the continent, current methods must be revisited, and subsequently new methods need to be developed. In order for these new methods and approaches to be developed and formed, new forms of knowledge creation must be established. The recommendations from the present research will contribute to informing on and improving policy matters of government and other relevant stakeholders by offering an appropriate and effective strategy to fight terrorism.

1.4. Research Focus

The continuously rising terror campaigns of both Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have developed into an internal, regional, and to a certain extent, global security threat (Kodjo, 2018). With the ever-growing number of members, internal developments and sophisticated technology and weaponry, concise guerrilla strategies, and well-organized suicide bombings, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab's defiance in the regions which they occupy, have crippled both the economies and the social-political development of the countries in which they coexist (Kodjo, 2018).

The focus of this study is to unpack and appraise the efforts assumed by the African Union in addressing and tackling the issue of terrorism across the African continent. Moreover, the focus of this research is to assess the development and undertakings of the Boko Haram group throughout northern Nigeria and simultaneously Al-Shabaab in Somalia, with the purpose of eventually proposing an approach for rectifying the crisis through a thorough assessment of the African Union's counter-terrorism policies. The foremost intention and focus of this research is to discuss the strengths and limitations of the AU's capacity in dealing with the threat of the aforementioned terrorist organizations on the African continent.

1.5. Research Problem

Islamic radicalization has gradually become a global reality, which is currently directed by a number of influences across the board. In a broader sense, terrorism and the terror activities implemented by Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have been described as an "increasing multinational threat, a universal menace with unpredictable mediums of manifestations and justification and with

differing strategic modus operandi” (Nurudeen, 2012: 6). These terrorist organizations employ a multitude of approaches and strategies in their quest to expand their sphere of influence, namely through the employment of state-based terrorism, religious terror campaigns, transnational terrorism, as well as biochemical-terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist organizations such as Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab are notoriously known for inflicting terror through assassinations, hijackings, bombings, abductions and hostage-grabbing, as well as mass shootings and the demolition of public and private infrastructure (Berkouk, 2008: 4).

This proposed research problematizes the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union. Specifically, it problematizes its military-driven strategy which merely confronts and counters the symptoms of the issue, an approach which is currently being employed by the African Union. Its aggravating influence on the stability and security of Sub-Saharan Africa will develop into an even more superior issue and therefore it is important that the African Union and its counterparts address both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism in order to suppress the security crisis waged by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab that continues to plague the continent. Furthermore, this research problematizes the limited research conducted in relation to critiquing the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategies and approaches in relation to the aforementioned case studies. Thus, it suggests that it is imperative that greater emphasis is placed on assessing, explaining, and critiquing the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union (AU) from a Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) perspective and to apply this critique as a basis in making recommendations on how the AU’s currently adopted strategies in combatting Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab can be improved respectively.

1.6. Goals, Variables, Theoretical Point of Departure, and Research Questions

1.6.1. Goals

The goal of this research is to assess the development and undertakings of the Boko Haram group in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab throughout Somalia. Furthermore, the broader goal of this study is to investigate and develop a better understanding of the performance of the African Union’s existing counter-terrorism policies and strategies in northern Nigeria and Somalia and to further propose a grand strategy that includes all stakeholders in the aforementioned regions: socio-economically and politically marginalized groups including women; clan leaders; and militia

leaders, amongst other groups. By using Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as a point of departure, the goal of the study includes assessing whether the current interventions, missions, and approaches of the African Union have the ability to provide sustainable and maintainable resolutions to the various obstacles and challenges posed by Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

1.6.2. Research Variables

Within the research of Security and Conflict Studies, it is important to note that Variable Oriented Research (VOR) is often rejected; the reason being that many factors and far too many immeasurable elements are constantly at play in counter-terrorism operations when asymmetric warfare is carried out by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. That being said, within this study the *dependent variable* (the variable being measured) is the effectiveness of the African Union's strategy in combating and countering Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. The *intervening variable*- which is the one that enables the independent variable to influence the dependent variable is multivariate – it consists of a number of other variables – such as military, socio-economic, technological, historical, and geo-political factors and strategies. The *independent variable* is the current strategy of the African Union in its attempts to combat Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective areas. In addition, this study will investigate the two aforementioned cases, focusing on their acts and operational procedures from 2009 to 2019.

1.6.3. Theoretical Point of Departure

The growing consequences of terrorism on societies across the globe have resulted in a need to establish new techniques and methods within the field of counter-terrorism. As a result, counter-terrorism theory emerged as a model or blueprint for fighting terrorist groups, and individuals associated with terrorist activities. The recent developments within the realm of terrorism studies and specifically the methods and measures needed to counter terrorism has been well captured and documented (Pedhazur, Eubank & Weinberg, 2002: 141; Turk, 2004: 271; Gunning, 2007: 363). Within the realm of international relations, security studies and research, a number of scholars and stakeholders alike continue to argue that the current theories and concepts need to be reconsidered in order for them to include modern transformations in the nature and character of violence (Philpott, 2002: 66-68; Agathangelou & Ling, 2004; Der Derian, 2004; Smith, 2004).

Therefore, one can argue that the most commonly known method for reconsidering the study of terrorism is reflected in some of the earliest successes and results of critical security studies literature. Scholars extending the concept of terrorism beyond the common military narrative have become a growing concern in Critical Terrorism Studies. Therefore, by rather revealing the effects of ecological, societal, and economic structures on the survival of communities and the masses at large, engagements and dialogues are more effective in expanding the political parameters of a formerly narrow area of study (Jarvis, 2009: 26). For this reason, the Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (Jackson, 2007) and Lee Jarvis (Jarvis, 2009) will be employed in this study in order to solve the research problem and will serve as the theoretical anchor for this research.

CTS is a field of study representing terrorism-associated research and scholarship which assumes and espouses a skeptical assertiveness towards state-centric interpretations of terrorism; which does not neglect currently established terrorism knowledge production; yet still challenges broadly established assumptions and beliefs (Stump & Dixit, 2012). As such, instead of being a precise theoretical label, this theoretical anchor is seen rather as an orientation or critical position that looks to uphold and preserve a particular distance from prevalent ideologies and theories. Moreover, it is important that one notes that CTS is built on a number of powerful critiques of the existing employment of orthodox terrorism studies. These include ineffective methods and theories, state-centric approaches, its problem-solving positioning, and its institutional, structural, and intellectual relations to state-security tasks and developments (Gunning, 2007).

1.6.4. Research Questions and Sub-research Questions

With a background that focuses on unpacking and understanding which counter-terrorism strategies and policies exist on the African continent, the primary research question that this study aims to address and elaborate on is:

How and to what extent have the African Union's counter-terrorism policies contributed to adequately combating terrorism in northern Nigeria and Somalia?

In order to facilitate the answering of the main research question, four supportive research questions have been framed. The broader questions this research looks to answer under its agenda are:

1. Does the Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain, and critique the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in northern Nigeria and Somalia respectively?
2. Which counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ?
3. To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in Northern Nigeria?
4. How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?

This study seeks to answer the above research questions through the following approach:

Chapter 2 which serves as the literature review of this study has the task of answering the first supportive question. Chapter 2 focuses on the origins, evolution, and ideological developments of both Al-Shabaab and Boko-Haram respectively. The chapter focuses on the multi-functional regional responses to these terrorist organizations and seeks to discuss the applicability of ongoing and continuous interventions and missions by the African Union's security architecture in northern Nigeria and Somalia. Apart from providing detailed and informative descriptions of key concepts in relation to Terrorism Studies.

While Chapter 2 seeks to provide a detailed and informative analysis on the literature review, Chapter 3 has the main purpose of answering the research study's second supportive research question. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies that will be employed as the theoretical anchor throughout this research study. This chapter seeks to explain the importance of applying CTS as a theoretical framework in order to describe and critique the effectiveness, efficiency, and applicability of the African Union's current counter-terrorism methods, interventions and missions in relation to Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively.

While the main research question guides Chapters 4 and 5, both these chapters have the central aim of answering the study's third and fourth supportive research questions. Chapter 4 answers the study's third supportive research question by following the African Union's intervention in

relation to Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and by employing CTS in order to assess its counter-terrorism approach. Chapter 5 seeks to answer the research study's fourth supportive research question by highlighting an overview of terrorism in Somalia with specific references to the evolution of Al-Shabaab. More important, Chapter 5 will use CTS as an analytical framework in assessing the African Union's counter-terrorism methods in relation to Al-Shaabab in Somalia.

1.7. Research Design and Methodology

1.7.1. Research Methodology and Collection of Data: Qualitative Methodology

Employing Critical Terrorism Study as the theoretical anchor of the present study serves as an important foundation of criticisms of the orthodox and traditional foundations of terrorism studies. According to Zulaika & Douglass (1996:149), the reason behind this is the list of methodological and analytical shortcomings, which include (among a number of other elements): an over-dependence on secondary data and knowledge production; an absence of primary research, and the use of inadequate research processes and methods.

In order to explain the counter-terrorism methods that the African Union has employed in its quest to counter both Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, the present researcher consulted various sources including academic journals, books, articles, publications, reports, official documents issued by the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), as well as online sources such as propaganda put out by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the form of videos, imagery, and social media content. It is important to note that while secondary sources were used for a large part of the research, the present researcher aimed to simultaneously apply both primary and secondary sources as a means of collecting data and information. In addition, primary data conducted from field research, particularly on counter-terrorism strategies, was unfortunately unattainable by the researcher due to potential threats and possible risks.

Therefore, this research benefited largely from primary data obtained from semi-structured interviews with experts, officials from the respective and relevant organs of the African Union Commission, specialists, academics, professionals and political risk analysts with substantial experience and knowledge in the sphere of counter-terrorism within the context of Nigeria and Somalia; focusing on Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively. A minimum of five experts were

interviewed on the abovementioned research questions: preliminary interview questions are included as Appendices A and B. The interviews conducted were strictly face-to-face interviews which took place in Pretoria, and Johannesburg, South Africa. It must be noted, that due to the sensitivity of the research questions, participants who were interviewed chose to remain anonymous. Furthermore, the duration of the interviews varied in time, ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours in which all questions (see appendix A and B) were broadly discussed and interrogated. According to Neumann (2005:149), by utilizing both secondary data and expert interviews, a researcher intentionally ensures that there is simultaneously a “triangulation of observers” in order to guarantee unification of theory and reality. This occurs by including experts’ opinion in order to limit and minimize any biases from the researcher and a “triangulation of sources” enhances stringency, dependability, and findings.

A qualitative method of research was employed throughout this study. According to scholars such as Burnham et al (2008:39), a research method can be deduced as the logical structure of inquiry in which social scientists and scholarly professions alike engage in a particular research study. Neuman (2005: 137) asserts that qualitative research includes collecting in-depth information from a substantially limited number of sources. One may uphold that a qualitative method to this research is necessary and valid since a quantitative method of research, particularly in relation to issues of conflict and security, as well as terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies do not take into account the complex, and challenging nature of many elements associated with conflicts.

1.7.2. Research Design: Multiple Case Study

In the proposed study, a multiple case research study design was employed, which Burnham et al (2008:61) explain as a research design that focuses on groups, events, or communities in a way that enables an in-depth examination and production of data, information and theory. Following the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies as presented by Jackson (2007) and Jarvis (2009), the features of a multiple case study are vividly apparent in this research, as it will look to discuss, in detail, the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategies and policies, by describing the measures the continental organization has put in place in combating Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. The reason for selecting two case studies for this research is not inherently for the purpose of comparison. These two cases provide an interesting

perspective in relation to the methods that the African Union have employed in its attempts to counter two of the most powerful terrorist organizations on the continent.

In light of this research related to the counterterrorism approaches with regards to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, a multiple case study is a reasonable and appropriate study design especially if one is to take into account that this study will also be supported by a powerful theoretical dimension, as well as distinctly and comprehensible research questions which are necessary for reliable results in a multiple case study as this guarantees that the theoretical framework that will be employed throughout this study – in this case, Critical Terrorism Studies – will critique the current realities (Burnham, 2008:56).

1.8. Ethical Implications

As part of this research, a series of interviews were conducted. Interviews were not limited to time constraints, but were conducted according to the available time of the interviewee, and took place at a mutually agreed location. It is important to clarify that all experts and specialists that were interviewed were allowed to decline to answer any of the interview questions that they were not comfortable or inclined to answer. Furthermore, interviewees were allowed to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. Key informants were also given the option of declining or granting the researcher permission to tape record the interviews as a means of collecting all information, which were eventually transcribed for analysis purposes. As soon as an interview was completed, a copy of the transcript was sent to the experts interviewed in order to give them the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and to add or clarify any points as they wish.

In addition, all information that was provided was considered absolutely confidential. Identities have been kept completely anonymous. Furthermore, all data that was collected during this research will be kept safe and securely stored in the universities research lab. Therefore, only researchers associated with this project will have access.

The researcher provided a consent form that was to be filled out by all participants being interviewed before any interview took place. This research study was reviewed and received ethical clearance through the Research Ethics Committee which oversees research conducted at Stellenbosch University.

1.9. Time Dimension

With regards to time dimensions, it is important to note that this study will employ a longitudinal case study design. The rationale for the application of this specific design is the fact that it allows the researcher to focus the intended research of the study and to revise in-depth the topic at hand. As previously mentioned, this research study will assess the African Union's counter-terrorism strategies in Africa, with particular assessments of the deployment of its measures in fighting Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia within the period of 2009 to 2018. The rationale behind the choice of this specific period of time is that both Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab rose to prominence during these years, and continue to be present in their respective regions to date.

1.10. Limitations

This research is an examination into the counter-terrorism approach of the African Union with emphasis on its responsibility in implementing counter-terrorism strategies against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective regions on the African continent. One needs to note that issues related to national and regional security are highly sensitive and remain classified, therefore a researcher could find it difficult to effectively gather primary data on counter-terrorism strategies from the institutions of the African Union, such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), African Centre on the Study and Union Commission (PSDAUC); as well as from experts, diplomats and political risk analysts within the realm of terrorism studies specializing in the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab crisis respectively.

In addition, a limitation of this study relates to the ability of collecting primary data. Within this research, the primary limitations are a result of the incapacity to conduct real and first-hand interviews with former supporters, members, and current members and experts related to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. This is due to the fact that the northern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram significantly functions is still under a considerable amount of threat. In addition to these safety considerations, these terrorist organizations may be reluctant to speak to non-Islamic followers in their quest to establish an Islamic caliphate. Furthermore, travel and accommodation expenses in both Somalia and northern Nigeria will not be feasible. However, such a limitation can be alleviated by acquiring and accessing material from scholars such as Jasmine Operman who have

been able to conduct interviews with former members of these terrorist organizations, as well as work conducted by an additional body of experts such as Professor Ulf Engels, William Ells, Professor Hussein Solomon amongst other experts.

In addition to these limitations, the unfortunate circumstance and situation of inaccurate data and information brought forward by various sources and news outlets in relation to the attacks and the death rates is a significant limitation.

1.11. Research Outline

This study will consist of six chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter served as the introductory chapter, which introduced the reader to the topic of this research study by providing the background to the study, the research problem and research focus. Furthermore, this chapter outlined the broader goals of this study, the theoretical anchor of the study, the research questions it will attempt to answer, as well as the specific methods used. This chapter also acknowledged the ethical considerations necessary regarding the holding of expert interviews.

Chapter 2: Literature Review. Moving forward, Chapter 2 is a literature review which serves as a guide for the research that has already been conducted on topics of terrorism, security, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and contending perspectives in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism studies respectively. The chapter also briefly introduces the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) which will be employed throughout this research study. Thereupon, the literature review will present the origins and background of the African Union's counter-terrorism policies as well as its primary institutions mandated to prevent and rid the continent of the scourge of terrorism.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework: The Importance of CTS as an Alternative in the Fight Against Terrorism in Africa. Chapter 3 broadly unpacks the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies according to which the two cases will be analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5. The chapter examines and critiques the limitations of the orthodoxies that exist within the highly- driven military approach adopted by the African Union in dealing with threat of terrorism waged by both Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria, and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, in particular Somalia.

More importantly, the utility and considered value of Critical Terrorism Studies within the African context will be discussed comprehensively.

Chapter 4: Boko-Haram: Combatting Terrorism in northern Nigeria. This chapter discusses the evolution of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the state of affairs that enabled and accommodated the emergence and further development of the group. This chapter focuses on an examination of the African Union's counteractions in relation to the Boko Haram issue, and employs CTS in conjunction to critiquing the African Union's counter-terrorism strategies and policies to combat the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Chapter 5: Al-Shabaab: The Nature of Counter-terrorism Strategies in the Horn of Africa. This chapter will capture an overview of terrorism in Somalia. Thereafter, it will critically examine the mechanisms employed by the African Union to counter terrorism in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region. Thus, by employing the analytical framework of CTS, this chapter will focus specifically on discussing, addressing, and critiquing the effectiveness of the African Union's counter-terrorism policies in adequately contributing to combatting terrorism in Somalia.

Chapter 6: Conclusion. In concluding, this chapter serves as the final section of this research study. It provides a summary of all the challenges and obstacles that have been addressed and it revisits the research questions that were proposed. Furthermore, based on the concepts of CTS, this chapter suggests recommendations regarding increasingly efficient and applicable ways of implementing the African Union's counter terrorism agenda in relation to both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter serves as the anchor for the remainder of this study. Furthermore, it offers the reader a contextual overview and appraisal of already established studies and literature on various themes, topics and subject matters that are related and important to the research questions and aims of the present study as outlined in Chapter 1. While this chapter will be guided by the primary research question of this study, it will make continuous reference to the first supportive research question which is:

Which counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ?

In order to contextualize the aforementioned research question, the body of literature consulted will be discussed in five different categories. The first discussion deals with the unpacking of contending literature which conceptualizes terrorism with specific reference to perspectives espoused predominantly by orthodox as well critical scholars of terrorism. These contending perspectives are important in understanding the intricacies of all the factors informing the counter-terrorism approaches currently employed by the African Union. Secondly, the subsequent point of discussion will deal with a brief conceptualization of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) and a short overview of the various critiques of orthodox approaches of counter-terrorism offered by CTS, since CTS serves as the theoretical anchor for this study. The third topic for discussion comprises a short outline that briefly traces back the origins, activities, and recent histories of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective regions.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the bulk of literature in this chapter focuses on discussing and appraising the endeavors assumed by the African Union, and its precursor organization, the Organization of African Unity in addressing and confronting the plague of terrorism on the African continent. In addition, the foremost objective is to assess and analyze the strengths, limitations, and weaknesses that exist within the AU's capacity to tackle the threat of terrorism across the African continent. Lastly, by appraising literature published on the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism with specific reference to the African continent, it becomes important to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses in the areas that have been well researched, addressed, and documented

and those that have not. This will play a fundamental role in defining the gaps within the current and published literature.

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that the methods currently adopted by the African Union must be revisited, and subsequently new methods must be developed. In this way, perhaps the gaps found in this literature review will serve as a step in a new direction for scholars seeking to assess the extent to which counter-terrorism approaches employed by the African Union have been helpful in combating terrorism. It may also highlight the various ways in which the AU can become more responsive in fighting Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively.

2.2. Terrorism

A fundamental issue that exists within literature is that definitions of central concepts are diverse and continuously contested. For example, regardless of the fact that more than a hundred definitions of terrorism were formulated and assessed in the 1984 edition of the journal, Political Terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988), a universal and global definition has been continuously contested and unsuccessfully agreed upon. Regardless of the fact that terrorism has become a widely studied and debated topic over the past number of decades, specifically post- 9/11, the problem of definitional consensus has not been resolved (Crelinsten, 2009). In view of this continuing debate, this section of the review seeks to discuss published literature which provides a conceptual understanding of terrorism. This part of the chapter also intends to offer a clear and concise explanation of some of the most contentious and debatable perspectives, including the responsibility of religion in the currently existing and on-going wave of terrorism, as well as the *definitions of terrorism put forward by the African Union*.

As previously alluded to, there is relative amount of tension within the space of definitional assessment and dialogue of the concept of terrorism. An apparent problem that has led to the unsuccessful agreement of an internationally accepted definition is in relation to who is defined as a terrorist and even more importantly who is doing the defining (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). Therefore, it becomes extremely significant to unpack assumptions that perpetuate the manner in which terrorism is defined, paying close attention to who does the defining, what this definition actually entails, and whose interests it serves. For instance, the understanding of ‘guerrilla’ is often viewed in a positive light, whereas terrorism almost always has a negative

connotation (Schmid & Jongman 1988:49-51). Another example of this analysis of who does the defining is exemplified through Boko Haram, an Islamic sect that was firstly established as a peaceful organisation in 2002 in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. It was declared a terrorist movement by the United States government in September 2013 after the organisation was involved in a number of violent confrontations with Nigerian law enforcement (Crenshaw, 2014: 66-67). This example further reflects Roberts' (2015) argument that the struggle of defining terrorism and the formulation of a framework that determines what a terrorist is and what a terrorist is not, has always been in the hands of powerful states (Roberts, 2015: 62-64).

Ganor's (2002) argument is relatively different to the arguments provided by the abovementioned authors. For Ganor, it is possible to obtain an objective definition of terrorism only if there are actual and real strides to confront terrorism. Thus, Ganor argues that it is by forming a definition on widely endorsed and adopted international laws and principles on what actions are allowed in traditional wars between nations and non-government organisations that such an objective definition can be obtained (Ganor, 2002: 289-293).

Despite decades of debate, dialogue and research on terrorism, no agreement on the universal definition of the concept has been attained (Weis, 2002; Schmid, 2011). This is due to certain political and ideological manifestations, and partly a result of a number of varying disciplines which play a role in the study and expansion of terrorism (Sinai, 2008). While the definitional challenges of terrorism remain, the following section seeks to unpack the role of the African Union within the dialogue of developing a comprehensively accepted definition.

2.2.1. The African Union's Definition of Terrorism

The previous section clearly illustrated that as a result of different schools of thought, and of contending perspectives, finding and developing a universal definition of terrorism is not an easy task, and more important, there are a number of existing definitions for the term. More intrinsically, defining terrorism is a pressing need within the fight against terrorist organizations and even more important, within the study of counter-terrorism. The African Union has formulated a broad and inclusive definition of terrorism, one which does not exempt the attacks perpetrated by state actors, and one which has been endorsed by most of its member states. The Organization of African Unity adopted a definition of terrorism at its 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of

Terrorism, a definition which is still accepted by the African Union, and as such stipulates that an act of terror can be defined as the following:

(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii).

While much of the above literature suggests that there is no universally adopted definition of terrorism, it is clear that the majority of definitions concur that the fundamental objectives of terrorism is to shape an environment of terror, to perpetuate and stimulate fear, and that in most cases it is perpetrated to attain a form of political means.

2.2.2. Contending Perspectives on the Conceptualisation of Terrorism

According to Grosscup (2006), it is clear that the definitional challenge of terrorism exists, and is one of the concerning aspects within the studies and research of the concept. However there is no doubt that terrorism is often referred to as a deliberate and organised violent activity by non-governmental agents in opposition and sometimes in rebellion to an existing system, in order to

achieve political agendas whereby often innocent civilians are victims of extremely violent actions. Roberts (2015), agrees with Grosscup (2006) by arguing that due to the fact that only the state has the right to employ force, the legitimacy of politically-aggravated extremism and violence against state forces by terrorist movements should be questioned and challenged, precisely when innocent civilians are attacked and become victims. Equally, Crenshaw (2014:24-27) shares similar sentiments with the abovementioned scholars, that there is no moral or legal justification for the targeting of unarmed civilians. In fact, as a result, a large number of Western perspectives including those of Crenshaw (2014) agree that the popular notion of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, is extremely flawed because it distorts the idea of freedom through terrorism means.

In contrast to the views of the abovementioned authors, Cloke (2001) and like-minded authors argue that terrorism is, in fact, an activity which can be utilised in the course of the struggle for freedom. According to Botha and Okumu (2007), one of the most popular examples of such sentiments is in relation to the perspective of the former apartheid regime in South Africa which referred to the tactics of the armed wing of the African National Congress, Mkhonto WeSizwe, as acts of terror. To add to the abovementioned sentiments, Oruka (2007) defines terrorism as “the intentional infliction of suffering or loss on one party by another party with no authority or legitimacy to do so, or which appears to have authority or legitimacy but has in fact deprived the sufferer of the minimum ethical consent necessary to recognize such authority or legitimacy”.

Critiques of these mainstream sentiments on terrorism revolve around three thematic issues which are provided by a number of authors. Firstly, Crowley and Wilkinson (2013: 96), strongly argue that within the on-going wave of both domestic and international terrorism, religion exists predominantly as a means rather than an end. Therefore, essentially the short, medium, and long term objectives of Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and terrorist organisations alike are based on political agendas. As a result of the political nature of terrorism, Hoffman (2009:359-362) argues that the depiction of religion as a goal or an objective is a simplification that weakens the inherently political nature of existing terrorism and essentially prohibits the establishment of policies designed to counter and tackle terrorism politically.

Secondly, in addition to such critique, Sageman (2014:565-570) counters the sentiments of mainstream perspectives of terrorism by contending that the inclination of mainstream scholars to intently avoid the problem of state terrorism results in undermining an essential factor of the subject.

Though several books, webpages, and articles have been published with respect to the broad study of terrorism, the volume of publications on overall state terrorism in particular, is relatively low; most of which alludes to the notion that the issue will be the subject of another publication or limiting its literature and commentary to state-only supported and sponsored terrorism. That is why in most cases the definitions of terrorism adopted by western governments and scholars are limited to non-state actors as the primary perpetrators in terrorist activities. In some instances, the lack of terrorism in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their oppressive nature, and the frequency of terrorism in democratic states (despite the existence of spaces for peaceful outcomes) is used as a basis for scholars such as Taylor (2014), to reject the notion that non-state terrorism is a response to state terrorism. This occurred in his response to Sageman's "the Stagnation in terrorism research". However, in reality, one of the fundamental drivers for non-state terrorism is not the fact that the target state or country adopts democratic principles internally, but the fact that it has enforced a specific foreign policy which is rejected by the terrorist organisation (Taylor, 2014:582).

Thirdly, mainstream scholars studying terrorism fail to comprehend the broader historical context in which terrorism has occurred and continues to occur. This is not to say that scholars on the peripheries of mainstream studies agree with the organized killings of innocent civilians which result from terrorist campaigns on the pretext of the on-going unresolved nature of the conflict. The simple gist of it is, that as long as a battle or conflict, for example that occurring in Palestine or Kashmir, continues without a peaceful resolution, there will always be desperate and hopeless groups of people participating in illegal and morally unjust activities which are often extremely violent and vicious towards the enemy group or disliked political entity (Lentini, 2008:133). Furthermore, Lentini (2008) argues that all contexts of terrorism are unique and particular in their own respects, and therefore generalizations are not rational and become illogical (Lentini, 2008:137).

It is clear from the above perspectives on terrorism, that studies, research, and views around the conceptualization of terrorism have indeed progressed over the past two decades, especially in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. While dialogue and debate surrounding the conceptualization of terrorism has advanced, the theoretical perspectives and approaches used as tools of analysis within the terrorism debate have also progressed.

For this reason, the following section seeks to provide a brief outline of the theoretical framework which will inform this research study as well as a short overview of some of the primary critiques offered by CTS in its mission to unpack the ideological, conceptual, and institutional underpinnings of orthodox counter-terrorism approaches.

2.3. Critical Terrorism Studies

As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, this study employs CTS to analyze the identified research problem. According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012:11), a theoretical framework is a system of ideas or conceptual structures that assists researchers and scholars to explain as well as gain an understanding of the broader world system. As such, Smith (2005: 28-29) argues that the most suitable method to reconsidering terrorism studies and research is reflected through some of its initial successes and findings within the literature related to critical security studies. According to Jackson (2007) and Jarvis (2009), Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) can be defined as a set of epistemological, ontological, and ethical commitments that involve and take into account the importance of challenging the processes of knowledge production within the field of terrorism studies; a realization and consciousness of the fundamental ontological instability of the ‘terrorism’ classification; a series of appropriately defined research ethics and a normative guarantee to an emancipatory political praxis (Jackson, 2007: 244).

Jackson (2007:246) contends, further, that the recent evolution of security studies within the realm of international relations, has seen an increase in the number of terrorism scholars and intellectuals alike who have removed themselves from the contemporary underpinnings of terrorism studies which traditionally place an emphasis on problem-solving theory and have placed themselves at the centre of scholarship that critically assesses terrorism. Moreover, it is important to note that CTS is built on a number of powerful critiques of the existing employment of orthodox terrorism studies. These include ineffective methods and theories, state-centric approaches, its problem-

solving positioning, and its institutional, structural, and intellectual relations to state-security tasks and developments (Gunning, 2007).

CTS represents terrorism-associated research and scholarship that assumes and espouses a skeptical assertiveness towards the state-centric and one-dimensional interpretation of terrorism which is often adopted through orthodox approaches and perspectives. Furthermore, this section of the literature review notes that CTS problematizes the military-driven approach which is a counter-terrorism approach that is used by numerous multilateral organizations including the African Union in its mission to counter terrorism on the African continent. This approach held by CTS correlates with its critique of orthodox mechanisms in dealing with the symptoms of the threat of terror, focusing on what it suggests are “quick fixes”. CTS in its entirety supports the notion that for the threat of terrorism to be suppressed, it becomes imperative that multilateral organizations such as the African Union employ a two-pronged strategy which addresses both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism.

While the bulk of the remainder of this chapter focuses on a broad discussion of the strengths and limitations of the counter-terrorism agenda assumed by the African Union, Chapter 3 will provide a broad theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies and its origins. It will also provide a comprehensive explanation and critique of orthodox terrorism studies according to the principles and perspectives of CTS. This theoretical framework will operate as the foundation for the two case studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab that follow in Chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, Chapter 3 will pave the way for Chapter 6 which will provide an examination and evaluation of existing African Union counter-terrorism strategies in order to provide consensus regarding which factors need to be reconsidered in facilitating and assisting the AU in its fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria. In subsequent sections of this chapter, the researcher will briefly discuss the evolution, and most recent developments of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria with specific reference to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively.

2.4. Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

In the section that follows, an overview of existing literature in relation to terrorism in the Horn of Africa will be offered, with specific reference to the terror activities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The intention of this section is to unpack the areas which have been studied and researched by

scholars and experts of terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively. By providing contending perspectives from various authors with respect to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, this section will facilitate the identification of gaps that may exist with specific reference to why groups such as Al-Shabaab employ means of terror to achieve their goals and what solutions should be employed in order to suppress such a terrorist organization. The identification of these gaps could assist regional and multilateral actors such as the African Union and its peace and security structures in the fight against terrorism across the Horn of Africa. The first subsection will concisely lay out a brief historical and regional context which will be followed by a short overview of existing scholarship on Al-Shabaab, its origins and recent history. The third subsection will deal with the scope of counter-terrorism strategies against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. The last subsection will provide an appraisal of literature dedicated to Al-Shabaab.

2.4.1. Historical and Regional Context

It is important to take into account that a large amount of literature that exists on terrorism and counter-terrorism begins with an in-depth overview and detailed discussion that seeks to detail the historical and regional context of the specific case being studied (Ibrahim, 2010; Miller, 2009). In addition, Elmi (2011) provides a brief overview of the historical and regional context, as well as the struggle by local groups for power and resources, colonial and foreign intervention and state repression which precipitated the rise of radical Islam and extremism in the Horn of Africa with specific emphasis on Somalia. Afyare Elmi (2011) argues that it is a combination of the struggle by local groups for power and resources, as well as colonial and foreign interference and further harsh state repression which has led to the current situation and ongoing crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Within the contemporary geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, there are six political entities with substantial Somali populations. The first and most recognizable is the Transnational Federal Government (TFG). The second political entity currently in existence is Puntland which is an autonomous state which, although it recognizes the authority of the TFG, implements independent policies. The third is Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia which has garnered a relative amount of peace with stable governance while seeking to gain independence. The fourth entity which must be noted is the Republic of Djibouti. The Somali National Regional State is considered one of the political entities that exists in this region, while the last is the North-

eastern Province of Kenya (Møller 2009).

As noted above, it is important to bear in mind that there is a combination of factors that have contributed to the rise and expansion of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. All the above-mentioned political entities have played a formidable role in the establishment and formation of what is now known as Al-Shabaab.

The next section will provide contending as well as relating perspectives on Al-Shabaab with specific reference to its origins; evolution and transformation; objectives and motivations; and the scope of counter-terrorism against Al-Shabaab by regional and multilateral organizations which includes the African Union.

2.4.2. Al-Shabaab

One cannot study and assess terrorism in the Horn of Africa without providing an examination of the role played by Al-Shabaab. According to Samara (2010), at its inception, the US. Government identified Al-Shabab (also referred to as the Mujahidin Youth Movement or MYM) as a “specially designated global terrorist organization”. Al-Shabaab was initially declared a threat to international peace and security by the U.S. Government in 2008. The primary aim of the next section is to unpack the body of literature currently in existence dealing with Al-Shabaab, its origins and its most recent history.

i. Origins

From the literary bodies of various scholars inclusive of Mwangi (2012:512) and Marchal (2009), one can contend that Al-Shabaab was founded in 2004. According to statistics provided by AMISOM (2019), the organization now has approximately 9,000 militants. Samatar (2010:322) attributes the current terror activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular those that are conducted by Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, to Somalia’s tumultuous past, whilst their radicalization, extremism, and rise to prominence are associated with the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops in 2006, according to Wise (2011:4). The support propagated by its fighters and supporters is a result of the rise and support of the nationalistic battle and struggle against the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, as well as the rise of the global Jihad movement (Irwin, 2015:167-169).

Wise (2011:5) contends further that the most accurate emergence and transition of the group can be noted between the periods during which the invasion of Ethiopia occurred on 24 December 2004 and early 2008. Irwin (2015:167-168) agrees with Wise's (2011) assertion by contending that the Islamist group rose to prominence as a result of its contestation and resentment which was felt by the majority of Somalis towards the intervention of the Ethiopian military. Moreover, the arguments claimed by Irwin (2015) and Wise (2011) are supported by Masters (2013). Masters (2013) argues that a combination of the Ethiopian military forces and the presence of the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) paved the way for the radical resentment and response that eventually arose. Therefore, one can attribute the creation of Al-Shabaab to the abovementioned factors which Mwangi (2012: 521) states also led to the concoction of nationalist, Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-Western, and anti-American resentment.

ii. Evolution and Transformation

In addition to the origins of Al-Shabaab, scholars of terrorism have attempted to examine an essential component of understanding the complexities that exist within the realm of terror activities conducted by Al-Shabaab by thoroughly examining the evolution and transformation of the Islamist group. Since the successful reinstatement of Mogadishu in 2004 by the TFG and AMISOM, Al-Shabaab has committed and executed a number of horrific and devastatingly violent terror attacks. According to Elliot & Holzer (2009:224), the leaders of the group relentlessly strive for the resistance against the TFG and AMISOM.

According to Mazska (2017), Al-Shabaab endured major changes which began in 2008. Mazska concludes that Al-Shabaab has undergone three phases (from inception to December 2007, January 2008 to April 2008, May 2008 to July 2011) and is currently in its fourth phase (August 2011 to the present). In the first two phases Al-Shabaab emerged as an insurgent group with the strategic objective of replacing the government and later transitioned into a group with the objective of destabilizing the entire region. During the third phase which is seen as an evolving period within the movement, Al-Shabaab intended to engage less in governance and more in violent terror strategies. As a result, Al-Shabaab has now evolved into an organization which seeks solely to utilize violence as a means of achieving its goals and objectives (Marchal, 2011).

The next section provides further discussion regarding assertions made by Wise (2011:8) and like-minded authors who assert that Al-Shabaab has transitioned from a local movement based in Somalia into an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization which has the intentions and objectives of dismantling any Western targets and spaces within its surroundings.

iii. Objectives and Motivations

As mentioned above, Mazska (2017) identifies four distinct phases through which the group has transitioned. For each phase, Mazska questions whether Al-Shabaab's strategic goal has been to overthrow the government or to coerce political concessions. Mazska adds that in the first two phases, Al-Shabaab's strategic objectives were to drive out the Ethiopian military and to further overthrow the Transnational Federal Government (TFG). However, Mazska concludes that as a result of a change in the group's leadership, the strategic operations, and ideological functions have also evolved and changed (as did its sphere of influence) to one intending to inflict violence and terror. Authors of strategic analysis such as Strachan (2008) and Rousseau (2012) add substance to Mazska's deductions by stating that the current goals of Al-Shabaab have moved away from its traditional conventional strategy of seeking to overthrow the Somali government to its more contemporary strategic goal of employing violence to coerce and inflict political concessions from foreign governments. This finding demonstrates that Al-Shabaab's strategic objectives changed from attempting to replace the Somali government to a more transnational strategy of destabilizing the entire region.

iv. Scope of Counter-terrorism Against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa

In addition to understanding the goals, objectives, and the future endeavors of Al-Shabaab, it is important that one should explore the body of literature around counter-terrorism of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. It is clear that the ongoing conflict in Somalia is related to the country's historical development as described in the literary writings of scholars such as Botha and Abdile (2014). Solomon (2015) asserts that it is necessary to review literature that focuses on current counter-terrorism approaches; as well as scholarship which critiques and reconsiders the current methods of intervention and counter-terrorism strategies employed by both regional and multilateral organizations such as the African Union.

Further, scholars such as Buluma (2014:7) assert that the endorsement of the African Union in the fight against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and specifically in Somalia, resulted in the birth of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM comprises trained and equipped forces from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia. AMISOM is regarded as the primary organ which assists the Somali security forces in reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.

While scholars such as Meleagrou- Hitchens and Solomon (2012) have hailed AMISOM as a success for Somalia, arguing that its methods have resulted in the first mission whereby African forces have been used in an African intervention to enforce peace, many scholars such as Mohamud (2014) have criticized AMISOM for “failing to train and improve the Somali forces assisting forces with the necessary equipment needed”. Among other findings, literature by Elliot & Holzer (2009:227) indicate that regional actors need to increase their overall assistance capacity and strength in terms of resources and human capacity if a military focused approach is to be employed within its counter-terrorism campaign.

Williams (2018) argues that while AMISOM have attempted to employ a multi-pronged strategy – within its military, police, and civilian components – there is still an over-reliance on a military centered counter-terrorism strategy that seeks to “degrade and destroy” Al-Shabaab. In addition to Williams (2018) observations, Hesse (2010:72) argues that a military focused approach will not serve in the best interests with respect to the counter-terrorism project against Al-Shabaab. Instead, Hesse (2010) supports the notion of a two-pronged strategy which focuses on attacking both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. Hesse (2010) suggests that a more patient and rational policy strategy aligned and centered primarily on non-military action (diplomatic, information gathering, and economic) may grant the most successful results in confronting Al-Shabaab. The gaps within the currently employed approach of the African Union make it pertinent for this research study to employ the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) to critique the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies of the African Union in relation to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.

This section illustrated the significance that a combination of historical legacies and factors within the Horn of Africa led to the origins, and further transformation of Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, while a number of authors hail the African Union's counter-terrorism agenda in Somalia as a success, many authors contend that in order for the African Union's counter-terrorism strategy to yield the necessary results in its fight against Al-Shabaab, a two-pronged approach needs to be adopted. The following section of the chapter seeks to discuss literature specifically related to the historical context of terrorism in northern Nigeria, the most recent developments that have led to the establishment and formation of Boko-Haram and provide perspectives of the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies.

2.5. Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

The purpose of this section is to review some of the literature dealing with terrorism in northern Nigeria with specific reference to Boko Haram's current operations in the region. In addition, the focus of this section is to review literature that seeks to explain the development and undertakings of Boko Haram throughout northern Nigeria, with the purpose of eventually exposing gaps in literature which could assist regional and multilateral organizations such as the African Union in their missions to rectify the crisis and suppress Boko Haram. This section of the chapter will be divided into three distinct categories. The first category seeks to provide a background and historical context of terrorism within northern Nigeria. The subsection that follows intends to offer the reader a brief overview of literature that espouses the origins and evolution of Boko Haram; followed by a discussion of its motivations and contemporary objectives. Lastly, this section of the chapter will provide a scope of regional counter-terrorism approaches in relation to Boko Haram.

2.5.1. Context of Historical Legacy

Many terrorism scholars including Botma (2015), have linked the rise of terrorism in northern Nigeria to socio-economic and historical factors in Nigeria. While Nigeria has been independent for nearly six decades, the country remains divided along tribal and religious lines. Since it gained independence, the country has undergone numerous military coups which are often linked to the ethnic and religious tensions as mentioned above (Bamidele (2012:35). According to Botma (2015), the links between these divisions are a result of the historical legacies of colonialism.

Botma (2015) argues that as a result of the policy of non-intervention put into place in northern Nigeria by the British colonial regime, missionary schools were established in the South of Nigeria and not in the north of country. This created a clear distinction between the forms of education that were provided in the two regions. Today western forms of education are often rejected in the north by Islamic sects such as Boko Haram. Various themes surrounding Boko Haram will be discussed in the following section.

2.5.2. Boko Haram

The formal name of Boko Haram is Jama'atu Ahl As-Sunna Li-D'awati Wal-Jihad, an Arabic name which in English translates to “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” Furthermore, Boko Haram is a Hausa term which means “Western education is forbidden”. The Islamic sect has waged a wave of terror predominantly in the northernmost region of Nigeria over the course of the last decade through the assistance of its recruits who consist of marginalized young people, depressed and disenfranchised individuals, as well as unemployed young people (Aina, 2016: 36). Agbiboa (2013) asserts that the sect seeks to threaten the peace, stability, and national sovereignty of Nigeria by targeting Nigerian governmental institutions and national symbols. While the Islamic sect initially used violence to attack public and government institutions, it has since extended its acts of terror to include innocent civilians, market spaces and religious structures. It must be noted that the group gained global prominence through the #BringBackOurGirls protests on social media which was a call against the kidnapping of more than 270 school girls in Chibok in 2014 by Boko Haram (Alexander, 2012).

The subsections below give a short overview of literature espoused by a number of scholars in relation to various areas of focus including the origins and formations; motivations and objectives; as well as contending perspectives on the regional responses to Boko Haram.

i. Origin and Initial Formation

According to Sani (2011: 2), during its infant years, the Islamist sect was popularly referred to as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ as a result of its mutual anti-Western ideology as well as its strict use of Sharia law through violent efforts. While Connell (2012:90) asserts that Boko Haram was founded in the mid-1990’s as a religious group under the original name of “Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra”, Bamidele (2012:35) argues that the group was, in fact, founded in 2002 and later began its

transition in 2009 into the insurgent group that it is known as today, under the leadership of a young and charismatic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf.

An abundance of literature on Boko Haram, its origins and further transformations vary largely with regard to the reasons surrounding the creation, establishment, and continuous existence of the Islamist sect (Bamidele, 2012:33). Various scholars are of the notion that the roots of the group lie largely within the “Maitatsine” doctrine (an Islamic fundamentalist manifesto introduced predominantly in northern Nigeria in 1945) (Bamidele, 2012:34). On the other hand, scholars such as Cook (2014:45) argue that Boko Haram ascended as a result of the resurgence of Islamic militant movements across the globe. Furthermore, Solomon (2012) clearly unpacks the factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram. His argument is linked to the group’s response to local grievances, particularly its outrage of the circumstances in northern Nigeria which include increasing grievances with the decreasing standard of living; the corrupt political sphere and a Nigerian state that perpetuates religious divisions throughout the country (Solomon, 2012: 8-9).

Having said that, Ugorji (2016) argues that perhaps there is a very vague understanding of the sect’s ideology, the core causes influencing the scourge of terror waged by Boko Haram which include the sect’s motivations, goals, objectives, and factors which continue to contribute to the crisis. For this reason, literature surrounding such inadequate comprehension will be further reviewed in following sections of this literature review.

ii. Motivation, Goals, and Objectives

Orthodox Islam is the practice deeply rooted and entrenched in the philosophy adopted by Boko Haram. Their ideology is fundamentally associated to the meaning of their name. Perhaps this explains the reason why the group adopted the name Boko Haram, which directly translated literally means “Western Education is a sin” (Onuoha, 2012:2). However, Agbiboa (2013:429) discredits the abovementioned justification suggesting that the group has popularly rejected the translation stating that it prefers the translation “Western Education is forbidden”. As the name adopted by the group indicates, its ideologies are deeply rooted in anti-Western sentiments and values just like those of many other Islamic fundamentalist groups. Boko Haram is under the impression that Western-led education, values, and beliefs are a risk to the traditional beliefs, values, and customs of the broader and predominantly Muslim communities of the northern-most

region of Nigeria (Walker, 2012:3). According to Walker (2012) the group's ideological mission is to overthrow the government of Nigeria; to further implement strict Sharia law within the secular state of Nigerian; and to rid Nigeria of the decadence of Western culture.

iii. Regional Response

Within the scholarship dedicated to understanding the origins and initial formations as well as the motivations, objectives, and goals of Boko Haram, there is a widespread understanding amongst scholars including Crowley and Wilkinson (2013:106) that Boko Haram poses a serious and violent threat to the security, stability, and further socio-economic and political developments in Nigeria and its neighboring countries. In their work, Brinkel & Ait-Hida, (2012), demonstrate that the current measures put in place by the Nigerian government focus primarily on confronting the symptoms of terrorism. The AU, along with its security forces, including the Nigerian government have employed a lackluster military approach to counter Boko Haram, namely through the utilization of military raids; roadblocks; ineffective intelligence operations; military checkpoints; and extrajudicial killings. While a military approach is necessary, it is important that an approach that seeks to address the root causes is put into effect.

As a result, such a response is ineffective, and in fact necessitates an approach that confronts the root causes and symptoms of terrorism to resolve the crisis. Such an approach encompasses an administrative-wide strategy by which the military stretches its operations with the aim of regulating the areas in which the group operates in order to assist the Nigerian government to confront the roots of the threat that is Boko Haram, as well as the circumstances that aid the expansion of this sect in the North-eastern region (START, 2015).

Scholars within the realm of security studies including Solomon (2012) argue that the largest and highest body on the African continent with the highest capacity and influence on security processes and measures is, without a doubt, the African Union (AU). Solomon (2012) further expands his assertions by acknowledging that since its establishment in 2002, the African Union's primary objective has been to reintroduce and reinforce the already-prevalent counter-terror approaches and measures, as well as to facilitate the coordination between states and the regional bodies. While Solomon makes these claims regarding the efforts of the AU, he also acknowledges that the AU is an instrument of the continent that has allowed the state to remain the primary body to combat

terrorism. Scholarly writings of Williams (2014) and Wilshner (2014) indicate that there has been a renewed sense of unity that has taken shape between African leaders in relation to the threat of Boko Haram in the regions that it predominantly occupies. This reinvigorated sense of unity is reflected through the co-operative pledges by African leaders to wage a ‘total war’ in response to Boko Haram. Wilshner (2014) links this renewed sense of unity amongst African leaders to the kidnapping of the Chibok girls.

Through the literature reviewed throughout this section, it is clear that transitional threats such as those posed by Boko Haram are intrinsically multifaceted and demand regional cooperation, and widespread investment towards matters of peace and security. For this reason, it is imperative that one takes into account that as Boko Haram transitions from a localized Islamist sect to a transnational threat; widespread cooperation and mutual intelligence-sharing among neighboring countries, and regional bodies will assist in curbing the organization. Literature centered around regional action suggests that Boko Haram can no longer be considered simply a localized and regional threat. For this reason, the focus needs to be transferred to overpowering the Islamist sect on a broader scale by addressing both the root causes and the symptoms of the crisis posed by Boko Haram.

2.6. The African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Framework

The essence of this section is to discuss and appraise the endeavors assumed by the African Union in addressing and confronting the plague of terrorism on the African continent. In addition, the role of this section is to examine the literature that unpacks the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union. A further objective of the section is to present a discussion of the literature that exposes the strengths, limitations, and further weaknesses that are found within the AU’s capacity to tackle the threat of terrorism across the African continent. Furthermore, this section seeks to provide literature illustrating perspectives that raise questions about the effectiveness of the African Unions’ counter-terrorism agenda. This section also intends to operate as a guide for the two case studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab that follow in Chapters 4 and 5, specifically looking at the strategies that the African Union has adopted to counter the afore-mentioned terrorist organizations, respectively. This section will be guided by the first supportive research question which is:

What counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ?

In addition, the literature that will be referred to, supports the notion that the role and the function of the AU serves as the primary driver in the fight and prevention of terrorism, and thus the inter-governmental organization acts as a catalyst with the capacity to fill in the gaps where its member states and Regional Economic Communities otherwise lack the strength and expertise to do so. In addition to much of the literature that has been reviewed throughout, this section acknowledges that in order to alleviate and ameliorate the threat of terrorism on the continent, the methods currently adopted must be revisited, and subsequently new methods must be developed.

2.6.1. The African Union: A Paradigm Shift

Ewi and Anning (2006: 33) argue that the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in the wake of the global war on terror (GWOT) which was initially declared by a former President of the United States, George W Bush, could not have come at a better time. The declaration came at a time when the global order was in need of unity and solidarity. As a result of historical developments and terror campaigns that have plagued the African continent: the slaughtering of hundreds and thousands in Algeria; the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; as well as urban terrorism in Cape Town in the late 1990s, the African Union was forced to establish a number of strategies and approaches intended to tackle the vicious and frightening trend of terrorism.

The following section will offer a concise discussion of the shift away from the policies of non-interference in the sovereignty of state security that had initially been adopted by the OAU in the establishment of necessary mechanisms for combating and preventing terrorism; and which was subsequently adopted by the African Union.

As mentioned above, the historical developments of terror activities that continued to threaten the state of security across the African continent led to a mutual acknowledgement that there was a need for the OAU to establish the necessary mechanisms and strategies to address and deal with the dilemma of violent extremism. It was only in 1992 at its 28th ordinary session which took place in Dakar, Senegal, under the guidance of the OAU, that African states began to move away from the policy of non-interference towards the adoption of a Resolution on the strengthening of cooperation and coordination among its member states (OAU Assembly of Heads of State & Government 28th Ordinary Session, 1992).

Furthermore, one can consider the June 1994 Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African relations, at the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Tunis, Tunisia as a significant milestone of the OAU in its initial participation in the battle against terrorism, and its holistic efforts of pursuing peace, stability, security, and co-operation amongst member states. Sturman (2002:104) contends that amongst many other concerns, this declaration condemned violent extremism, and acts of terrorism which undermine values, principles, and the moral fiber of humanity, specifically the righteous freedoms and liberties of individuals.

Many African scholars dedicated to the amelioration and fight against terrorism on the African continent, including Makinda (2003), argue that the Declaration on the Code of Conduct as adopted by the OAU marked a shift in the approach of responding to the threat of terrorism. It shaped the standards, benchmarks, and continental framework for addressing and preventing terrorism in all its manifestations. In this regard, Dugard (2011:163) maintains that this was also a significant step in the right direction for the African continent as such a declaration paved the way to identify and address the root causes of terrorism, as well as to establish an agenda and framework focused on interstate cooperation in Africa. This is based on agreed criteria for fighting terrorism.

i. The African Union

The transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union, according to Dersso (2010:113-114), did not only constitute a formal transformation, but it served as a regime change which included significant normative and institutional transformations, many of which were unimaginable under the governance of the OAU. The capacity of the newly formed AU to recognize, identify, and acknowledge the urgency of uniting its efforts at the inter-governmental level with the intention of fighting the scourge of terrorism, was significantly highlighted within the Constitutive Act of the African Union, an Act that placed an emphasis on the activities governing the African Union. These include the respect for African bodies, human life, the dismissal and rejection of acts of terror amongst other subversive activities (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000). As previously mentioned, with the purpose of consolidating and strengthening the responsibilities and commitments of member states as agreed upon under the Convention of 1999 and other global counter-terrorism approaches, the African Union Plan of Action was adopted in 2002 at the High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and

Combating of Terrorism in Africa, in Algiers, Algeria (Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, 2002).

According to Article 2 of the OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating of Terrorism, Algiers Convention (2002), the principal objective of the African Union's Plan of Action, as prescribed under its preamble, is to offer solid expression to responsibilities and commitments, as well as to encourage and enhance the capacity of member states to access and adopt counter-terrorism tools through various approaches and measures, thereby establishing a state-wide beneficial counter-terrorism agenda. The Plan of Action as noted in Paragraph 9 of the Plan of Action (2002) embraces a realistic and sensible counter-terrorism approach that significantly seeks to tackle Africa's challenges, especially those concerning security, subversion, and violent extremism. In addition, the Plan of Action clearly amplifies the general and specific approaches that member states are required to adhere to within the realm of addressing, tackling, and countering the scourge of terrorism. These include compliance with and inclusion of measures in important institutions and strategic structures such as police, border control, judicial procedures, financing of terrorism, and information-sharing (OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating of Terrorism, Algiers Convention, 2002).

An additional Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted by the third ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa in July 2004 (Nurudeen, 2012:18). Nurudeen (2012:19) notes that the proposal for the adoption of the Protocol was made by 28 heads of state meeting in Dakar, on 17 October 2001. The Protocol, which also contains provisions on the role of the African Union Commission and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, among other things, provides for adequate measures for the suppression of terrorist financing, human rights protection safeguards, as well as addressing the risks of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Scholars such as Solomon are very outspoken about the major concerns of the AU since its transformation from the OAU. Solomon (2012) argues that since its evolution from the OAU to the AU, the organization's fundamental focus has been centered on reinforcing, strengthening, and implementing its counter-terror mechanisms while encouraging rigorous co-ordination between its member states and the Regional Economic Communities at large. Solomon also insists that the

African Union is an instrument that exists as a nexus between the African continent and the broader global community, and as such, terrorism, as seen in the AU constitutive Act, Article 4(o) exists as a key component of the immediate global dilemma to the African Union.

Furthermore, the literature espoused by Ewi and Anning (2007) addresses how the African Union's counter-terrorism framework is one of the best on paper, which can be reflected in the plethora of interventions the continental body has employed to tackle the rage of terrorism across the continent since its transformation from the OAU. While this may be the case, Fayemi (2004) suggests that on the other hand, the African Union's counter-terrorism mission is continuously strained by a lack of available resources.

2.6.2. The African Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The African Union, on paper and as clearly shown in the previous sections, has, since its transition away from the Organization of African Unity, attempted to transform itself into an intergovernmental body that has embraced an effective and efficient counter-terrorism framework which has been globally applauded. Solomon (2012) embraces the abovementioned discourse by arguing that such reasoning manifests itself in the plethora of interventions undertaken by the African Union in its drive to address and tackle the plague of terrorism on the continent since it moved away from its policy of sovereignty and non-intervention as prescribed under the OAU. It is important that one unpacks the geo-political and economic contexts within the African continent, especially when attempting to gain a comprehensive understanding of the capacity to which the African Union is eligible to represent and govern its member states or even act independently on various issues of continental importance such as the scale of integration throughout the continent and the amount of power and sovereignty that its member states delegate to it (Ewi & Anning, 2006).

Following from the above argument, Fayemi (2007) concedes that the challenges embodied by the African Union in its quest to effectively combat terrorism are not necessarily a result of the monumental scourge of terrorism on the continent, but are rather due to the lack of capacity of African states, regional bodies, and continental organizations to respond efficiently and abruptly to terrorist activities. In formulating this argument, Fayemi's (2007), identifies numerous core obstacles and adversities with regards to security:

- (i) the understanding of historic perspectives of state sovereignty and independence;
- (ii) the growth and rapid escalation of regionalism in the absence of mutually inclusive regional principles;
- (iii) the challenges of overseeing hegemonic regionalism;
- (iv) the rise of elitism under the guise of regional integration, neglecting the wellbeing of the greater African community;
- (v) the formation of structures and institutions which lack the capacity to handle and address these elitist mongers;
- (vi) the notion that regionalism is an externally motivated undertaking (Fayemi, 2007).

Ewi and Anning's earlier views (2006) support Fayemi's (2007) later sentiments by acknowledging that a critical assessment of the implementation and application of the African Union's counter-terrorism framework will uncover that it is being challenged by a number of the above obstacles. Since the African Union transitioned away from its precursor organization, the Organization of African Union, it has embarked on a path of prioritizing counter-terrorism using the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as its medium by establishing coordination and cooperation of its member states, regional economic communities within the African continent, and encouraging interstate and regional collaboration in Africa (Ewi & Anning, 2006:34). A series of dialogues that took place at the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, held in Algiers in 2002, resulted in the African Union Plan of Action which provided an agenda and roadmap for African states, in particular member states of the African Union to employ a series of counter-terrorism approaches. This was discussed in the previous section, and will be further elaborated on in following sections.

Moreover, according to the body of literature reviewed from the works of Nurudeen (2012), it is apparent that within the structures of the African counter-terrorism mission, there is a monumental gap between the political will on the one hand, and the financial and human capacity and resources that are required in order to counter terrorism adequately. Nurudeen (2012) makes an important observation in relation to the counter-terrorism division within the Peace and Security department of the African Union by contending that among several issues inherited by the department, the shortage of staff and human capital is an aspect that has substantially hindered the capacity of the African Union's counter-terrorism prospects in this context. Such an observation is verified within

the UNOSSA (2010) expert paper which speaks directly to the unwillingness of the AU's member states to supply and allocate the necessary financial, technical, and human capital required for the continental body to achieve its desired inputs and to meet expectations. Perhaps the lack of prioritization stems from the historic belief of member states that the current security threat on the African continent is minute in comparison to the manifestations of poverty, health, and international conflicts.

In the next section, the African Union Plan of Action which was briefly referred to above, will be discussed.

2.6.3. AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa

While the previous section aimed to introduce the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union, this section aims at analyzing one of the core programs of that agenda by examining the primary objectives and key intentions of the AU's Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Notably, the Plan of Action was formulated with the objective of delivering a solid expression to the commitments and responsibilities of African stakeholders, member states, and relevant actors to curb and prevent terrorism, while simultaneously enhancing their access to the relevant counter-terrorism tools and instruments (Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, 2002).

Further, the Plan of Action is tasked with formulating robust guidelines, mechanisms and strategies for state-wide shared action in the fight against terrorism by integrating regional, continental, and international scales and standards for ridding the continent of terrorism within specific parameters of Resolution 1373 (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002). In essence, the Plan of Action can be understood as the manifesto or the doctrine which stipulates the African Union's counter-terrorism strategies and endeavors. The Plan of Action emphasizes that in order for the AU's counter-terrorism strategies to be fully effective, there must be integrated action as well as concrete commitment by all stakeholders and actors, particularly member states (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002). According to Ewi and Anning (2006:39), one of the notable achievements of the Plan of Action is the establishment and advancement of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which was expounded in Algiers. Therefore, the Plan of Action of the AU recognizes and emphasizes the

fundamental importance of strengthening the capacity of its member states through joint action, regional cooperation and intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration.

The next subsection will examine some of the developments and advancements of the African Union's Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism since it came into existence by reviewing the work executed by its primary organs.

i. The Peace and Security Council

The African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was launched on 25 May 2004. Nurudeen (2012:7) contends that the Peace and Security Council is tasked with, amongst other responsibilities, the obligation of making sure that the undertaking of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other respective regional, continental, and global mechanisms and mediums co-ordinate in harmony in order to meet the commitments to eliminate terrorism at a regional and continental level.

Solomon (2015:223) notes that terrorism has continued to evolve into a monumental security concern and issue across the African continent, and thus, the PSC has also evolved and emerged as the premier organ of the AU, tasked with, amongst other security matters, the responsibility of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa. Furthermore, Botha and Abdile (2014) in their collaboration on *Terrorism in Africa* argue that since its establishment, the AU has evolved as a powerful organ of the OAU, ensuring that the standards that were prescribed at the Algiers Convention are being correctly and effectively prioritized.

The importance of the role assumed by the PSC in relation to the AU Commission is noted in Paragraph 17, article 5 of the AU's Plan of Action (2002), which unequivocally states the PSC's core responsibilities and tasks. It contends that the PSC is to enhance technical support on legal matters, in particular matters concerning the prevention of terrorism resourcing and financing. Secondly, the PSC is to formulate the necessary laws for the African model law on counter-terrorism and set up guidelines that will assist member states to devise and implement the necessary legislation for preventing and combating terrorism; and most important, like all the other organs of the AU, the PSC has a key responsibility to ensure, as a matter of priority, that it follows up with its member states on matters relating to terrorism, specifically any developments that

member states have undertaken in the fight against terrorism, whether it is on a regional or continental scale (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002).

ii. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

Headquartered in Algiers, Algeria, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism was officially launched on the occasion of the Second High-Level Intergovernmental Summit as part of the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa which took place in October of 2004 (Adekanye, 2006:1). Adekanye (2006:3) suggests that the ACSRT emerged as a component of the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council that would offer technical assistance to the AU on issues relating to terrorism and subsequently offer prevention mechanisms and measures to combat terrorism. Zondi (2016:3) complements the abovementioned arguments and suggestions by contending that the objective of the ACSRT is to collect information, disseminate knowledge, and centralize the research and analysis of terrorism and the respective groups involved in terrorist activities while simultaneously engaging in a series of research and training initiatives with the help of regional and global partners with the sole purpose of addressing and tackling the scourge of terrorism on the African continent. Many scholars, including Zondi (2016), argue that the ACSRT like many other Centers of Excellence on the African continent, will provide the required technical capacities necessary for the counter-terrorism agenda, and will further allow the AU members to translate their roles and responsibilities into proactive actions.

Experts and scholars of terrorism on the African continent including Adekanye (2006), celebrate the ACSRT as one of the AU's most prolific milestones in relation to its endeavors to apply concrete counter-terrorism measures. As mentioned above, with the support of the AU and its umbrella organizations, as well as other respective security organs, the ACSRT has been able to assume an active role in assisting the AU with regards to preventing terrorism. Such a proactive role can be seen through an undertaking of the ACSRT as it set up a forum for the co-operation and integration amongst the AU's member states and its respective regional communities through their Focal Points. These previously mentioned Focal Points convened at their 5th annual meeting in Algiers, Algeria in 2011 in order to discuss the progress and the necessary improvements of

their application and execution of the ascribed Plan of Action for the period of 2010-2013. The Centre has also set up a number of important meetings and dialogues at regional level which included Focal Points and where several decisions and agreements were considered. At the core of these decisions and agreements lay the establishment of a Code of Conduct governing the affiliation between the Centre and the Focal points and the Threat Assessment Template (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2006: 1-54).

Furthermore, the ACSRT played a fundamental role in assisting member states to strengthen their national legislations that would enable them to meet their continental requirements in implementing the African model law on counter-terrorism. To that end, the ACSRT has emerged as an entity that has enabled the AU Plan of Action to develop its capacity in a number of ways in its battle against terrorism.

2.7. Analysis of Literature

The purpose of this section is to assess the literature dissected and consulted throughout this chapter. There are a number of clear-cut observations that can be concluded as a result of the conducted investigation and analysis of past and current literature on terrorism, and counter-terrorism strategies employed specifically by the African Union. There is no doubt that beyond the 9/11 attacks, the evolution of both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in the regions which they have terrorized, has changed the way in which the AU, its member states, scholars, and experts think and assess domestic and transnational terrorism. The literature reviewed revealed the fundamental need to move away from the conventional and orthodox application of studying and dealing with the threat of terrorism, towards applying a theoretical framework that critically explains, assesses and addresses terrorism and counter-terrorism in its entirety.

Furthermore, while it has illustrated that there has been some leeway in the currently employed counter-terrorism approaches, it has encouraged the need for scholars to re-evaluate and reinforce the strategies currently adopted by the African Union.

The two subsections that follow will examine and discuss the strengths and shortcomings of the literature reviewed, and will conclude by identifying any gaps which exist in past and current literature.

2.7.2. Strength of Literature

The literature reviewed on the subjects of terrorism and counter-terrorism specifically, have increasingly dominated public discourse. The abovementioned topics have accumulated much attention, especially within the wake and rise of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in their respective regions. The literature reviewed has also revealed the challenges that scholars, policy makers, and world leaders have had in establishing and formulating a universally agreed-upon conceptualisation and definition of the abovementioned concepts. Many of the authors referenced have demonstrated how the aforementioned concepts have transformed and continue to develop. The literature surveyed serves as a significant basis for the current debates and discourses that are currently occurring regarding one of the most challenging obstacles plaguing the global arena. The literature has emphasised the rapidly increasing nature of terrorism worldwide post-9/11; has identified the main and common drivers surrounding terrorism coupled with some of the solutions to combating terrorism that have been put forward by various authors in the field of terrorism studies.

Further, the literature showcases that a number of factors (failed states, instability, porous borders, fragile economies, weak governance, and poverty) play a role in the expansion of terrorism. Therefore these scholars make it clear that religious, political and economic factors are not the only factors that aid in the facilitation of terrorism. This was made significantly apparent in the section on terrorism in the Horn of Africa with the example of Al-Shabaab predominantly engaging in terrorist activities in Somalia and Kenya, and terrorism in the Northern region of Nigeria, where Boko Haram is currently established.

An additional strength of the literature review, lies in the examples of terrorism which have manifested in Somalia and Northern Nigeria, and the emerging fact of the influence of the historical contexts of both these regions on the state of security in the respective areas. The literature outlining the background historical contexts of the regions in which these areas are to be found, as well as the history and transformation of these organisations, provides a solid basis on which future scholars of the topic can build.

Further, literature espoused by various scholars including Zondi (2016:3), specifically in relation to the African Union, illustrate the shift in the actions of the African Union post-9/11. Literature

assessed stresses that as the AU transitioned from the OAU, it was forced to act as a medium that would enable states and Regional Economic Communities to attain their roles and responsibilities within the continental and global counter-terrorism framework. Additionally, the African Union was forced to redefine and further reinforce its capacity within the international and continental realities on the African continent as a result of the systemic stratification of stakeholders and the dispersal of roles within the Global War on Terror. For this reason, over an increasing period of time, the AU has witnessed the growth in its position as a catalyst for the setting of principles, norms, and standards within the fight against the threat of terrorism on the continent, and subsequently as a nexus between the continent and the international community. One cannot neglect the fundamental importance of the AU as a significant standard-setter resulting from its adoption of the African Union Plan of Action, together with various counter-terrorism resolutions including continuing works; which manifest as the formulation of an extensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law.

2.7.3. Shortcomings of Literature

There are a number of shortcomings and gaps that can be pinpointed in the literature on terrorism and the subsequent countering and combating of terrorism. The literature on terrorism emanates from the Middle East, whereas the volume of overall publications of the terrorist hubs in northern Nigeria and the Horn of Africa in which Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab are currently operating, are relatively low.

Studies that have been conducted in the last two decades, specifically research conducted post-9/11, have presented literature that indicates that there is an abundance of literature that has been advanced in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism measures across the globe. This review of literature also suggests that there is a need to revisit the current counter-terrorism strategies currently employed in the Horn of Africa with respect to the combating of Al-Shabaab, and in northern Nigeria with respect to countering Boko Haram. This literature review has also highlighted a few deficits: firstly, the absence and lack of analysis and assessment of primary sources is a fundamental deficiency in the field of terrorism studies; secondly, the relatively low percentage of researchers who have conducted field research and have had primary and personal contact with terrorists; and finally, the extremely low volume of overall publications devoted to

critiquing research on terrorism studies. This is a reflection of the insubstantial number of pertinent publications centred on empirical research and of the absence of assessed quantitative and qualitative field study.

There are a number of gaps that arise in the literature review which include the inability to explain how individuals shift from being dissatisfied and discontented towards embracing violence as a means of political gain. The issue at hand again is the comprehension of terrorism as reflected in the literature which is still unable to provide clarity on why individuals become terrorists whilst others do not participate in acts of terror. This review of literature also highlighted the engagements and dialogue occurring within and among scholars of terrorism with respect to the component of ‘root causes’ of terrorism. The literature has indicated that over the past few decades, the root causes are not fixed and unchanging, but rather they are fluid, complex and continuously evolving and transforming (Walker, 2012:9-12). Due to the fact that some areas of investigation and review face a number of problems in the gathering of primary information, new, unconventional and alternative approaches and strategies must be developed and initiated. Some of the examples provided in this literature review can be seen as useful and relevant for initiating and further developing strategies for countering terrorist organisations within their historical, political, and social backgrounds and contexts.

Crowley and Wilkinson (2013: 96) suggest that there has been “shortfall of serious scholarly analysis of counter-terrorism”. New, comparative, and relative studies centred on counter-terrorism strategies and methods would permit the growth and expansion of the most relevant and adequate practices which will lead and enhance peaceful collaboration between nations and regions. New manifestations of terrorism categorised by decentralisation and dispersion of ‘networks’ necessitate research and studies on the type of counter-terrorism methods and practices that would best aid in solving the problems they present.

Perhaps, in order to evade counterproductive methods, it has become extremely necessary to study how terrorist organisations view the actions of states and governments, and whether policy formulators foresee the consequences of their actions on the beliefs and principles of terrorists. Governments also must learn from past occurrences and experiences, and strengthen intellectual capacity in combating and countering terrorism. With respect to the role and position of the media,

more research and attention should focus on the ways terrorist organisations monopolise the mass media. This is a fundamental approach in employing new and significant counter-terrorism procedures. Furthermore, the ability for media representation to aid in the rising of tensions, conflict, and subsequently violence, is an extensive space for research.

Long-term sustainable and impactful methods for countering terrorism necessitate a comprehension of the pathways into and out of these terrorist organisations. Research is required to review the processes and drivers of individual and collaborative mobilization. This will aid in better comprehending how these procedures relate to their counter-terrorism strategies and capacities. This literature review highlights that in the study of terrorism and countering of terrorist organisations and their campaigns respectively, literature is dominated and monopolised by a discursive frame that is dissected from the perspectives of western culture and epistemology. It is extremely necessary to enrich research and studies in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism through the development of new and innovative epistemological perspectives. Therefore, comprehension of terrorism and countering terrorism needs to be researched, studied, and debated from non-western epistemological approaches.

2.8. Conclusion

This literature review introduced the reader to concepts and terms relating to terrorism, and the various contending conceptualisations and perspectives on the issue. It exhibited how these concepts have manifested, transformed, and evolved. In addition, the brief literature on CTS exposed that many of the studies and much of the research published in relation to the strategies of countering Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have been centred around state-centric methods of countering these groups, while ignoring, to a larger extent, the role of non-state actors in this project of counter-terrorism.

This chapter has also reviewed literature that has been published on the aforementioned topics in relation to the study of terrorism and the regional responses to terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria respectively. While certain scholars emphasise that it is imperative that a focus on the root causes is adopted in order for progress to be made within the discipline of counter-terrorism, others posit that only destroying the symptoms will suffice. Literature indicates that many scholars maintain that the approach of attacking the symptoms by dismantling the

infrastructure occupied by terrorist organisations, as well as minimising their support systems, has the ability to destroy terrorist sects such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab and that this will bring about a conclusion to the crisis .

This chapter of the research study uncovered the origins and background of the African Union as it transitioned from the Organization of African Unity. Further, in this chapter, the AU's counter-terrorism policy, its primary principles and main mandates to prevent and rid the continent of the scourge of terrorism, were examined.

Chapter 3 will provide a theoretical framework that further explores the limitations and shortcomings of the counter-terrorism strategies currently employed by the African Union. In his attempts to answer the second supportive research question, the writer of Chapter 3 seeks to clearly demonstrate that as a theoretical framework, Critical Terrorism Studies as espoused by Richard Jackson (2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009), is the most suited approach and has the appropriate scope to identify, explain, and critique the counter-terrorism strategies which are currently employed by the African Union in relation to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the regions in which they are currently active.

CHAPTER 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF CTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN AFRICA

3.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 served as the foundational anchor for the remainder of this study. It offered a contextual background, an overview of the study of terrorism, as well as contending perspectives on the conceptualization of terrorism. In addition, the previous chapter reviewed literature that critiques the various counter-terrorism approaches currently employed by a number of stakeholders within the African continent. The aim of this study is to offer an assessment of the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union (AU) from a Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) perspective and to apply this critique as a basis for making recommendations on how the AU can improve its current counter-terrorism approaches with specific reference to the inter-governmental organization's military-centered approach in its fight against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in northern Nigeria and the Horn of Africa, respectively. This chapter is guided by CTS as the theoretical framework according to which the two case studies will be analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5. The research question that will guide this chapter is:

Does the Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain and critique the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in Northern Nigeria and Somalia respectively?

In order to answer the aforementioned supportive research question, this chapter will focus on three specific points of departure with specific focus on CTS and its inherent relation to the success of the AU in alleviating the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and in northern Nigeria. The first part of this chapter offers an overview of orthodox approaches within the field of terrorism and will further examine the limitations of these traditional approaches to terrorism in order to give an assessment of the main problems and challenges informing the conventional and contemporary study of terrorism and counter-terrorism, respectively.

The second point of departure deals with the development of CTS and employs the contributions and commitments of CTS in critiquing the orthodox field of terrorism studies which inherently continues to be the dominant approach in the development of both regional as well as global

counter-terrorism policies, frameworks and mechanisms. Therefore, this part of the chapter seeks to analyze and express some of the most important commitments that inform CTS, while simultaneously distinguishing CTS from its orthodox counterpart. Perhaps even more important, this section of the chapter seeks to provoke debate and an inherent discussion of the overarching assumptions, research foci, strategies, challenges, obstacles and future trajectories within the field of Critical Terrorism Studies. This section of the chapter briefly provides the potential contributions CTS could make as both a theoretical framework and an approach to critiquing the orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism currently adopted by the African Union in the two case studies considered in the research.

The final section deals with an analysis of the method of applying CTS and its considered value within the African context. The main goal here is to explore in what way CTS provides a suitable and encompassing theoretical basis, not only by critiquing existing AU counter-terrorism, but also by creating inclusive and reasoned counter-terrorism approaches. This section of the chapter states its final case for CTS as the necessary theoretical tool for the AU in its fight against the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria by proposing a set of ethical, epistemological, and ontological considerations and commitments.

3.2. Orthodox Approaches to Terrorism

Within the realm of orthodox approaches to terrorism, a large concentration of analysis is placed on the legitimacy of the state as well as countering any actors or elements that challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state. Orthodox approaches to terrorism provide a precise distinction between state and non-state entities or actors, and suggest that non-state actors are illegitimate actors, while state actors are the only legitimate forces (Bayo-Ogunrotifa, 2012:16). Furthermore, Bayo-Ogunrotifa, (2012) contends that orthodox approaches to terrorism place emphasis on the type of violence utilized by individuals or terrorist groups, as opposed to attempting to understand the various factors and reasons to why it occurs to begin with. Orthodox approaches are usually regarded as mainstream approaches because of their adoption of western models of freedom, liberty, the rule of law, as well as their as state-centric commitments (Bayo-Ogunrotifa, 2012: 17). The most prominent theories within the orthodox strand in international relations are Realism and Liberalism theories.

This study adopts a skeptical approach towards the orthodox approaches of studying terrorism and counter-terrorism, respectively, and therefore it is important that a re-evaluation of the current orthodox approaches should be undertaken. The examination of these approaches is not restricted solely to research based on terrorist organizations (in this particular context, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab) but it considers international and global forms of intervention and assistance within the geographical areas in which these groups exist and seek to wage their terrorist campaigns. Within the assessment and critique of orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies does not necessarily seek to emerge as the immediate “fix” that will suddenly cure the threat of terrorism on the African continent. The assessment of orthodox approaches to terrorism detailed below will serve as a path in the necessary direction within the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

3.2.1. Realist Perspective into Terrorism

As a mainstream theory, realism has been a dominant force within intellectual discourse on terrorism for a number of decades. Firstly, realism contends that the primary and key force within global politics is the state, and for this reason there is no actor that is of more importance beyond the state. In addition, realism argues that governments are continuously engaged in a protracted effort in attempts to ensure the survival of their states (Hoffman, 2013). Another position assumed by realists within the orthodox school of thought lies in the state’s selfish striving after its national interests; the primary pursuit being securing national security. From a broader perspective, as alluded to above, the theory argues that the state is the only legitimate actor and any perspectives opposing the authority of the state are deemed illegitimate (Bayo-Ogunrotifa, 2012: 16).

This conceptualization outlined above gives the researcher the impetus required to argue that within the realist perspective, terrorist organizations such Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are considered to be illegitimate non-state actors who challenge and oppose the authority of the state through their continuous growth and the expansion of their terror campaigns which seek to destroy, kill, and maim the public masses while simultaneously crippling the socio-economic infrastructures within the borders of the states which they occupy.

Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012: 16) argues that within the realm of International Relations (IR), it is commonly assumed that as a result of the insecurities of states, the employment of military force

by states in pursuit of securing the national interests is always inevitable. Based on this primacy, one could argue that the realist orthodoxy contends that acts of terror can only be undertaken by non-state agents. For Richmond (2003), this view dismisses any notions that consider the existence of state terrorism within the realm of international relations, and therefore he infers that the state is entitled to monopolize the employment of force which is necessary in its pursuit to preserve power and its general interests, as was previously alluded to (Richmond, 2003:289-291).

As a result of this broadly adopted assumption, realism perspectives focus on terrorism as a phenomenon that is solely embraced by illegitimate non-state actors whose objectives are to terrorize the state and its internal and external structures. This is embodied in Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism. For Hoffman (2013), terrorism can be defined as "acts perpetuated by a sub-national or non-state entity" (Hoffman, 2013). Hoffman's views are further embraced by other well established intellectuals within the realist school of thought, including Caleb Carr (2002) who adopts the infers that, by definition, "terrorism is warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that agents of such violence find objectionable" (Carr, 2002).

One can argue that at the core of these definitional sentiments are the events of 9/11, which led a number of scholars who study terrorism from a realist perspective to embody the notion that terrorism is undertaken by violent and vicious non-state actors, who often receive funds through transnational criminal networks and renegade states, employing acts of terror for political, ideological, economic, and cultural purposes. Among these scholars, Laqueur (2006) opines that these acts of terror are usually motivated by and carried out as a means to achieve a particular ideological outcome in pursuit of attaining self-determination and sovereignty.

Furthermore, Bruce (2013)) contends that the aforementioned definitional underpinnings of terrorism as a result of the occurrences on 9/11 have encouraged western governments, intellectuals, mainstream media, as well policy formulators to devise a subjective and skewed definition of terrorism; one which considers terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Bruce, 2013).

One can argue, that the adoption of realist perspectives by Western states in categorizing groups

and organizations who resist the legitimacy of the state as “terrorists” was seemingly constructed to aid specific interests and means within today’s global hegemonic relations. This inevitably led to the employment of violent and dangerous counter-terrorism strategies including military intervention and forceful regime changes brought to bear against groups, structures, and governments that were in resistance and in opposition to their global interests.

3.2.2. The Orthodoxies of Terrorism Within Liberal Circles

Corresponding with mainstream and traditional approaches to terrorism, lies the liberal approach to terrorism. This strand of thought assesses the ways in which states are able to co-exist within a stable, secure, and ordered global system whereby war is not the byproduct of international relations. Intellectuals of liberalism, including Walt (2003) opine that non-state actors are crucial actors within the international system, and thus, equal emphasis should be placed on them along with state actors. Walt (2003) argues that while states are sovereign entities, it is important to take into account that other actors such as multi-laterals, multi-national corporations, terrorist organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other International and transitional structures play an equally important role in international relations (Walt, 2003:19-22). An important belief postulated within the liberal perspective in its aim to reduce the increased likelihood of terrorism and related forms of conflict is the need for shared economic and socio-political interests between states and institutions.

Fiala (2002) posits that the liberal approach associates terrorism and acts of terror conducted by terrorists and the organizations which they ascribe to, as efforts that threaten and breach the limits of stability and cohesion of states in the international system. In other words, one can argue that liberalism sees terrorists as individuals or groups who oppose any endeavors to establish economic and security cohesion, and in doing so, reject the idea of establishing an international system of economic and socio-political interdependence. In view of liberal terrorism approaches, Parker (2003) extends this view by asserting that terrorists can be considered criminals who commit acts of terror and not central actors who exist within the realm of international relations.

By debunking the aforementioned underpinnings within the liberal strand of thought, it becomes apparent that while there are seeming differences between Liberalism and Realism in relation to how each perspective assesses terrorism, there are a number of fundamental similarities particular

to terrorism within the international system. According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012: 17), both these approaches emphasize the importance of conserving the interests of the state within this international system and the various factors that need to be considered when ensuring that these interests are protected. Further, both these strands of thought adopt the notion that terrorism is a phenomenon undertaken solely by non-state actors.

An important aspect to consider when re-examining the current orthodoxies that exist in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism lies within the very crux of those orthodox approaches which attempt to ensure that Western states monopolize the definitional processes and classifications of terrorists and terrorist organizations. For Jackson, Smyth, & Gunning (2009), this has allowed for an increasingly false perception that military intervention and other destabilizing efforts undertaken by Western states against its own citizens and other weak states across the globe are legitimate; at the same time strengthening the falsehood that terrorism by definition, can only be employed by illegitimate non-state actors who seek to threaten the interests and powers of the state; and also international cooperation and stability.

A review of some of the fundamental assumptions that are adopted within the primary orthodox approaches, leads one to realize that the ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases upon which orthodox approaches are founded, do not seek to address currently established social and power relations which exist to protect and preserve the monopolization of western interests. Rather, there is an increased desire to delegitimize any actors who question and oppose the falsehood disseminated through these orthodoxies.

Following on the above discussion, the next subsection seeks to deliberate upon and debunk the strengths, weaknesses, and faults of the currently adopted orthodoxies employed in the fight against terrorism, with particular reference to counter-terrorism on the African continent.

3.2.3. The Insufficiency of Orthodox Approaches to Terrorism

By critiquing the political orthodoxies, more specifically those of realist and liberal perspectives, one can categorize the state as a possible perpetrator of terrorism, and therefore one can argue that the orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism do in fact constitute state terrorism (Al-Kossimi, 2019: 3). An important argument which informs this section of the research suggests that the focus and emphasis on militarization as an approach perpetuates state terrorism and

increases acts of violence employed by states, in this context, within the African continent. This argument is an extension of the notion that influential multilateral and regional networks which play a role in regional security (such as the African Union) consider citizens to be threats to the national security of states, and for this reason, justify undemocratic counter-terrorism mechanisms and strategies that prioritize state security above the democratic liberties of citizens. Before a discussion into the importance of terrorism studies can adopt a critical approach, it is important that a detailed discussion on the shortcomings of orthodox approaches, in particular the insufficiencies of “problem-solving” strategy, be highlighted.

Following on the above discussions, one can argue that within the discipline of International Relations, the focus of terrorism scholarship on problem-solving relates to the existing approaches to countering terrorism, which are broadly divided into militarizing/realist; criminalizing and liberal mechanisms. According to Vermeulen (2014:32), the militarizing approach refers to the conceptualization of terrorism as a subject of unconventional warfare and its considered approach to preventing terrorism lies within the deployment of military forces as a means of achieving the intended objectives of alleviating the threat of terrorism.

In addition to the militarizing approach, Vermeulen (2014:32) argues that a second approach (considered by scholars and experts within the orthodox school of thought) can be classified as one of criminality which is accounted for across both domestic and international spectrums. These scholars and experts emphasize the need for domestic and international law to prosecute individuals and organizations who practice acts of terror. Domestic contributions consist of considering the importance of intelligence-gathering as a counter-terrorism strategy. Katzeinstein (2002:53) opines that within the criminalizing perspective, there have been important debates around the balance of liberty and security; in turn questioning and addressing the limitations and boundaries of democratic torture.

The last approach which Vermeulen (2014:33) addresses, falls within the liberal perspective. As mentioned in the previous section, this approach alludes to treating terrorism as a symptom of underlying factors rather than understanding terrorism as a technical issue to be curbed, countered, and eliminated. Nossal (2004:131) asserts that while conservatives and realists rely on the military’s capacity to fight existing terrorists and terrorist organizations, liberals prefer to employ

diplomacy as a strategy; utilizing foreign aid and the spread of western values in the pursuit of managing and eliminating the threat of terrorism.

While the above approaches offer different models of causality, it is clear that a noticeable “problem solving” approach informs all of them. Therefore, it is a result of such perspectives and orientations that have enabled the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies within the broad field of terrorism studies. In an attempt to answer the first supportive research question, the rest of this chapter will illustrate that the currently adopted “problem-solving” counter-terrorism strategy employed by the African Union against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab is not plausible nor is it yielding the necessary results.

In moving forward with this chapter, it is important that a distinction between Problem-solving theory and Critical theory are unpacked. Cox (1981) asserts that Problem-solving theory “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1981: 128-129). As such, Cox (1981) contends that the fundamental objective of problem-solving is to ensure that these relations and institutions function coherently and efficiently by constructively dealing with potential causes and issues of concern. As such, one may consider problem-solving theory to be analytically leaning, whereas, Critical Theory, on the other hand is holistic in nature. Leysens argues that under the Coxian lens, Critical theory places emphasis on the development and expansion of a number of state forms in reaction to the alterations in the manner in which social actors relate to the construction, and in response to the reorganization of the global order (Leysens, 2008: 3). In addition, Leysens (2008), maintains that forms of state play a role in shaping various modes of production as well as social actors. In relation to todays world order, the globalization of production has played a fundamental role in reducing the autonomy of the state. An argument and development that Cox (1981, 1987) projected.

Considering therefore, that one of the objectives of this chapter is to apply the central commitments of CTS to identify, explain, and critique the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies by multilaterals (in this particular context, the African Union) an important strategy within the realm of Critical Terrorism Studies is its capacity to disregard and oppose the orthodoxy of political realism and liberalism. This is done by extending the notion of ‘counter-terrorism’ beyond the military, criminalizing, and symptom-driven narrative. It is clear that improved efforts must be

considered in order to curb the problem of terrorism; however it is even more important to have a comprehensive understanding of this threat, in order to adopt in-depth approaches rather than those within the orthodoxies of liberal and realist thought such as criminality- and military-driven approaches which currently enjoy great emphasis.

It is within this line of thought that this research as outlined in the following section considers Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) as a particularly useful theory in critiquing traditional and orthodox counter-terrorism agendas and methods. While arguing that terrorism is as much a social construct as it is a physical act, CTS (unlike most traditional and orthodox approaches) embraces terrorism in relation to a much broader sociological and historical outlook. By placing emphasis on the unequal distribution of wealth, power, and state resources as well as the hegemonic status assumed by the West, CTS tackles, addresses and seeks to explain the multi-causality of terrorism in all its complex manifestations (Maszka, 2017: 97).

3.3. Critical Terrorism Studies

Following on the above section, this section seeks to describe the theoretical commitments of CTS and employ CTS to analyze the identified research problem. According to Conelly, Li, Macdonald and Parpart (2000:54), a theoretical framework is a system of ideas or conceptual structures that assist researchers and scholars to explain or gain an understanding of the broader world system. According to Jackson (2007) and Jarvis (2009), CTS can be defined as a set of epistemological, ontological, and ethical commitments that involve and take into consideration

“the politically established nature of terrorism knowledge; a realization and consciousness of the important ontological volatility of the term ‘terrorism’; and a series of appropriately defined research ethics and normative considerations to an emancipatory praxis” (Jackson, 2007:244).

So, from an ethical point of view, CTS takes into account the importance of always defending and honoring the commitments of the research study at hand, as well as the informants and observers being studied. In addition, as a theoretical framework, CTS adheres to the values and principles of universal human security, as opposed to orthodox views of national security whereby the state presides over all other actors. In addition, ontologically and epistemologically, Critical Terrorism Studies focuses on unpacking and understanding the objectives of knowledge production within

terrorism studies, and more important, the socio-economic and political production of terrorism knowledge; for example, understanding the nature of terrorism and the drivers which influence the behaviors of terrorist organizations. Further, ontologically and epistemologically, CTS is characterized by a broad skepticism towards the ‘terrorism’ label by arguing that the term has always been judgmental in nature, rather than being an analytical term.

As such, Smith (2005) argues that the most suitable method to reconsider terrorism studies and research is reflected through some of its initial successes and findings within literature related to Critical Security Studies. Vermeulen (2014: 23) asserts that there have been a number of scholars who have made valuable and substantial contributions within the literature of Critical Security Studies (CSS), namely Keith Krause, Michael Williams, Ken Booth, and Richard Wyn Jones who owe much of their writings to the vision of Robert Cox within the scope of critical theory in International Relations. Vermeulen (2014: 23) contends that Critical Security Studies has made considerable progress since the mid-1990s, particularly in relation to debates centered around security within International Relations theory. Waever (2004) and Van Munster (207:235) maintain that critical positions within the realm of security studies have been centered on the work of three schools in particular, namely the Aberystwyth/Welsh School; the Copenhagen School; and the Paris School.

Smith (2003:19) argues that the Aberystwyth School is one of the most significant schools where the innovations of Critical Security Studies have materialized. The defining work within this school of thought can be accredited to the abovementioned scholars, namely Krause, Williams, Booth, and Wyn Jones. The anthology *Critical Security Studies* illustrates how this school of thought has played a pivotal role in the development of Critical Terrorism Studies in that it suggests that scholars, researchers, and experts of security should move away from assessing and viewing the world through a state-centric lens. Much like CTS, Critical Security Studies acknowledges that while the state may be part of the solution in issues of security, it also often poses as a threat and an inherent problem, in particular within the African context. This will be demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, in relation to some of the root causes and key drivers influencing Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism. In brief, the Aberystwyth School of thought proposes a theory of security that focuses on the triangulation of security-community-emancipation, respectively. Vermuelen (2014: 24), asserts that these concepts coexist in that the value of security

relates to the emancipation and ‘liberation’ of the community at large.

In addition to the Aberystywth School, the Copenhagen School has positioned itself as an important springboard for scholars of Critical Security Studies. Buzan’s (1983) work, *People, States, and Fear* is central to the current position of this school of thought within security studies. According to Vermeulen (2014), the Copenhagen School is centered on three fundamental ideas: securitization; security complexes (which refers to the regional level of security analysis) and sectors (which involves differentiating between military, societal, economic, and political security).

The Paris School also offers an important contribution to Critical Security Studies and involves the interrogation of empirical assessments of strategies, practices, and processes adopted by various actors and security agencies. In view of this, one may assert that the commitments of this school of thought are reflected within the principles adopted in CTS in that it aligns security with the ability of actors to manage borders, control threats, and to define threatened actors (Focault, 1994).

Further, Vermeulen (2014) argues that the constant challenge of CTS and the study of terrorism will remain inescapable and complex. Therefore, corresponding to Vermeulen’s (2014) assertion, Dixit and Stump (2012:207) suggest a number of methodological approaches that may be advantageous within Critical Terrorism Studies literature. Firstly, the ontological position of the researcher must be clear in its assessment of the relationship between the observer and the observed. In this particular context, the relationship between the African Union and the two cases under investigation, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab must be clear. Secondly, the terms ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorists’, and ‘terror’ must be clearly conceptualized, analyzed, and critiqued as socio-political drivers (Dixit & Stump, 2012:207).

Moreover, Jackson (2007:246) contends that the recent evolution of security studies within the realm of international relations, has seen an increase in the number of terrorism scholars and intellectuals who have removed themselves from the orthodox underpinnings of terrorism studies traditionally emphasizing problem-solving theory, and have placed themselves at the center of scholarship that critically assesses terrorism.

Against this background, it remains important that one should reiterate the nature of problem-solving theory. Cox (1981) argues that problem-solving theory maintains that there are various actors and global issues that must be prioritized. Corresponding to Cox's (1981) assertions, Williams (2014:31), asserts that within security studies, this was inherently illustrated in the belief that Sovereignty is the "indicator of civilization", and that sovereign states are rational actors, and therefore, tensions and conflicts between states should be the primary problems that must be "solved". Cox's (1981) and Williams's (2014) underpinnings of problem-solving theory correspond with the very nature that the theoretical framework of CTS opposes – the over-identification with the state-centric approaches to security, and more particularly, terrorism. In addition, Jarvis (2009:12) adds to this debate by arguing that problem-solving theory perceives terrorism as an unconventional war that can only be dealt with by means of military response.

Therefore, given this shift, it is important that one notes that CTS is built on a number of powerful critiques of the existing employment of orthodox terrorism studies. These include the ineffective methods and approaches including state-centric approaches, its problem-solving positioning, and its institutional, structural, and intellectual relations to state-security tasks and developments (Gunning, 2007: 363-365). Critical Terrorism Studies emerged as a result of a collective concern about the claims and shortcomings of orthodox approaches to terrorism. This subset of terrorism studies insists on unpacking the ideological, conceptual and institutional underpinnings of terrorism. Of particular importance to this study, is the fact that CTS has an important objective of challenging the processes of knowledge production within the field of terrorism studies (Gunning 2007; Silke 2009; Jackson, Smyth and Gunning 2009, Herring 2008). As an approach, CTS interrogates and challenges the "labelling" and widely-held assumptions within the field of terrorism by applying its ontological and epistemological commitments (Al-Kassimi, 2019:27). While orthodox approaches may have their considered faults and strengths, this researcher maintains that a realistic and sustainable approach must still be formulated.

According to Gunning and Toros (2009:92), CTS confronts the widely-held opinion of terrorism as a phenomenon whereby individuals or particular groups are reduced to what is often a subset of their general behavior, by stating that terrorism takes place in the broader context that includes political struggles and challenges. It is in view of this broader context that these scholars see the employment of terror tactics as one method among many others to reach a means to an end. These

include diplomatic dialogue and engagement; nationalism and xenophobic attacks; and the provision of economic and political services such as security, administration, education, and food (Gunning & Toros, 2004: 233-235). For Jarvis (2009) amongst other scholars of CTS, this may correspond with the assertions made above, that CTS discards the politics and notions of naming and labelling particular groups or individuals as terrorist.

A primary focus of this chapter as previously alluded to is to analyze the Critical Terrorism Studies critique of orthodox methods, approaches, and strategies which are associated with traditional and orthodox schools of thought; as well as contending that acts of violence employed by the state (state terrorism) against its own populations and other states have been largely neglected by scholars within the field of orthodox studies.

The following sections will attempt to debunk and explain terrorism using CTS as a theoretical framework.

3.3.1. Critical Terrorism Studies' Explanation of Terrorism

As previously alluded to on numerous occasions throughout this study and specifically in reference to this chapter, CTS adopts an overall skepticism towards the term or label of 'terrorism' primarily because many scholars within the field of critical security studies including Sluka (2002) have identified that, in reality, the term has always been applied within a judgmental rather than an analytical spectrum. For scholars of CTS such as Vermeulen (2014), terrorism is a social construct and not a brute fact. Vermeulen (2014:35) acknowledges that while heinous acts of physical violence are experienced as brute fact, its broader socio-political definition is decided by social agreement as well as by inter-subjective practices and research.

It is important to take into account that CTS does not in any way define terrorism in a manner that neutralizes certain actors while legitimizing the employment of violence to others, simply because they are conducted in particular circumstances. Rather, CTS interprets terrorism primarily as a method or an approach of political tension and violence that can be conducted by both the state and non-state actors (Jackson, 2007: 248). Thus, Tilly (2004:5) argues that terrorism is a "strategy, not a creed". Equally, Tilly (2004:6) expands on his argument by contending that terrorism is not a one-dimensional phenomenon but rather a complex strategy that consists of the intentional targeting of civilians with the primary goal of causing grievous harm, often for political reasons.

Tilly (2004) asserts that, similar to the act of war, terrorism is an extension of politics through the employment of violent measures.

The definition provided by Rapoport and Alexander (1982) defines terrorism as the employment of violence targeting a group of innocent civilians with the intention of coercing them in the direction of a particular political, religious, or ideological end. While scholars of CTS, including Jackson (2010), acknowledge that this is one of the more objective explanations of terrorism, it still adopts terminology that is ambiguous by nature. For Jackson, the issue stems not only in the definitional choice of terrorism, but within the very nature of terrorism itself. Therefore, Jackson (2010) argues that because terrorism is a social construct, it cannot be objectively defined.

Schmid (2004: 202) and scholars of CTS alike argue that it is of vital significance that one take into account that terrorism is not an ideology or form of politics in itself, but rather it is a mechanism which is utilized at a particular period by certain actors for specific political objectives. One of the fundamental underpinnings of CTS is its intention to unpack and debunk comprehensively the political and strategic reasons and justifications as to why certain actors decide to conduct terrorist activities, and the means by which they abandon the use of terrorism as a political approach, specifically within a political and historical context. Therefore, one can argue that for this reason CTS insists on embracing political, historical, and cultural dynamics in order to gain an understanding of the adoption of terrorism by terrorist organizations as a means to an end. Jarvis (2009) contends that as a result of the expansive role that labelling has played within the field of terrorism studies, CTS is determined to question and address the nature as well as the politics of representation by seeking answers as to ‘why, when, how, and for what’ reasons particular groups and individuals end up being named or identified as terrorists or terrorist organizations.

In addition, CTS postulates that the orthodoxies that exist within state-centric terrorism studies have proven to be ineffective at best. Jackson (2007:24) argues that within Critical Terrorism Studies, an assessment of the political and strategic roots of terrorism remains essential within counter-terrorism agendas of actors in order for the issue of terrorism to be dealt with effectively. CTS maintains that its ability to interrogate the political and historical underpinnings of those who participate in acts of terror will fill fundamental gaps within terrorism studies. In support of these

commitments, Jackson (2007:25) argues that CTS embodies the importance of including a broad understanding of the nature and impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

3.4. Applying Critical Terrorism Studies and the Importance Thereof

By referring back to the body of scholarship included in this chapter, it becomes clear that CTS represents terrorism-associated research and scholarship which assumes and espouses a skeptical assertiveness towards state-centric interpretations of terrorism. While CTS does not neglect or reject currently established terrorism knowledge-production in its entirety, it still challenges broadly established assumptions and beliefs, primarily those within orthodox circles (Stump & Dixit, 2012). Therefore, one can contend that instead of being a precise theoretical label, CTS can be seen as an orientation or critical position that looks to uphold and preserve a particular distance from prevalent ideologies and theories. As Joseph (2009) puts it, “CTS scrutinizes orthodox terrorism literature, the discourse it generates and the institutions that produce it”. Therefore, this field of study completely rejects any definition of terrorism that embraces elites, marginalizes women and other vulnerable groups, dismisses central actors such as states and promotes Eurocentric, western-centered or masculinized productions of knowledge.

Furthermore, scholars within the field of critical terrorism such as Maszka (2017) embrace the above assertions by arguing that CTS seeks to broaden the study and field of terrorism by embracing subjects that are otherwise rejected by leading scholars and researchers in the field of orthodox terrorism studies. These include the broader social context of state and political violence, as well as aspects of gender in relation to terrorism. In this way, CTS seeks to deepen the research surrounding terrorism by unpacking and exposing the essential ideological, institutional, and material interests of the field of terrorism. An important observation which was briefly alluded to above, is that CTS is founded upon an analysis of the epistemological and ontological assertions of the field of terrorism. It seeks to unpack and address the objectives of knowledge within the field of terrorism studies, and more broadly, the social and political production of terrorism knowledge (Maszka, 2017:34). The aim of CTS is not merely descriptive in nature, nor does it see a particular field of terrorism studies as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. Its purpose is to address, interrogate, and challenge the dominant commitments of conventionally held interpretations of terrorism.

The second value that CTS holds is that any discussion or dialogue in relation to terrorism should be interdisciplinary in nature and take into account a number of necessary social, political, historical and ideological power structures in order to gain an understanding of the reasons why actors commit heinous acts of terror (Maszka, 2017:97). This approach held by CTS correlates with its critique of orthodox mechanisms which deal with the symptoms of the threat of terror, focusing on what it suggests are “quick fixes”. According to Solomon (2015:224) such an observation is exemplified within the reality of orthodox counter-terrorism mechanisms across the African continent. Solomon (2015) argues that traditional terrorism approaches focus their efforts on dealing solely with terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram rather than scrutinizing the legitimacy of political elites in Abuja or Mogadishu, the capital cities of the two states in which Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab currently operate.

A number of authors including Herring (2008:198) suggest that there is a significant need for critical terrorism studies within global politics. Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that mainstream or conventional terrorism studies neglect class dynamics of terrorism and overlook and omit the acts of state terrorism conducted often by Western states against individuals, particular groups, or in certain cases against other states; while contending that any opposition to the state by non-state actors is illegitimate. Furthermore, Herring (2008) suggests that it is necessary that critical terrorism studies move away from mainstream terrorism studies across all aspects. Scholars such as Herring consider that Critical Terrorism Studies should be employed as a tool that confronts the manner in which terrorism has evolved and transformed into an instrument of power and privilege adopted by states of the West.

Further, in this chapter, the present researcher also advocates the consideration and advancement of a counter-terrorism approach and framework that embraces the commitments of CTS. It is from this point of departure that one may consider that one of the most dominant critiques of orthodox approaches to terrorism studies by CTS is in relation to the “problem-solving” logic as was mentioned above. Furthermore, while CTS is founded upon skeptical attitudes towards mainstream and orthodox assumptions, it is important to take into account that the skepticism of widely-accepted knowledge by CTS does not negate a complete rejection of these political orthodoxies and assumptions (Vermeulen, 2014:77).

Therefore, in this study, the researcher acknowledges the importance of applying CTS as a theoretical framework that assesses and critiques the counter-terrorism strategies currently upheld by the African Union in its attempts to deal with and ameliorate the threat of terrorism espoused by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shaabab in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, within the theoretical scope of CTS, this researcher acknowledges that the militant activities of the terrorist organizations in the geographical regions of the two cases being studied within this research, have developed to encompass more than just the nation state.

In the current chapter, the writer maintains that within the lens of CTS, a number of factors must be accounted for when attempting to understand terrorism and subsequently considering necessary counter-terrorism strategies. By applying Critical Terrorism Studies to the cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shaabab, this study will demonstrate some of the weaknesses that lie within the African Union's widely-held state-centric and military-centered approach to the scourge of terrorism, which can be seen in the cases of Boko Haram northern Nigeria and Al-Shaabab in Somalia, respectively. Therefore, through the employment of CTS as a framework, one can posit that the poor results yielded by the broadly emphasized military strategy employed by the mandated African Union security agencies, namely AMISOM and the Multinational Joint Task Force, are a clear indication that a state-centered approach founded upon the endorsement of military interventions is a very limited and short term strategy. Therefore, it is inevitable that the researcher should employ CTS to critique the state-centric and militarized approach assumed by the African Union in its efforts to curb Boko Haram.

This section had the primary objective of reflecting upon the advantages of incorporating CTS within the analysis of the current approaches to understanding the scourge of terrorism in northeastern Nigeria as well as in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the political orthodoxies that currently exist within terrorism studies and their presence as the dominant theories supporting the currently adopted approaches to dismantling the scourge of terrorism, particularly with regards to the fight of terrorism on the African continent, do not constitute a plausible approach.

This chapter introduced the reader to the commitments that constitute Critical Terrorism Studies.

As a theoretical approach, CTS seeks to engage in the critical assessment of the ontology, epistemology and political praxis of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism approaches, and aims to present and establish various considerations and interpretations into a recognized area of study. Supported by the body of scholarship provided throughout this chapter, it is clear that CTS presents itself as a valuable theoretical framework in providing the necessary assessments and critiques within the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, particularly with regards to the approaches adopted in addressing the scourge of terror waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

When attempting to ascertain why Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab's activities and efforts in northern Nigeria and the broader Horn of Africa have not yet been curbed or ameliorated, it becomes necessary to apply the principles and commitments of CTS. Therefore, by applying CTS as the theoretical framework, research reflected in this chapter showed that CTS is the necessary approach and alternative to assessing, explaining, and critiquing the currently employed counter-terrorism strategies in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, this chapter demonstrates the importance of Critical Terrorism Studies as a theoretical framework in understanding the scourge of political terror with a specific analysis of two particular cases on the African continent. Through the brief application of CTS to the two cases being studied, this chapter has illustrated that terrorism on the African continent came into existence as a result of a number of historical factors, in particular the legacies of the colonial project.

The chapter concludes that the limited and temporary successes in alleviating terrorism in northern Nigeria as well as in the Horn of Africa and driving Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab out of some of their strongholds, is an issue that must be addressed and assessed critically, taking into account a number of perspectives that have been neglected as a result of the domination and monopolization of orthodox and traditional approaches to terrorism studies. Supported by the perspectives of Counter Terrorism Studies, this writer insists that terrorism as a mechanism to achieve socio-economic and political gains can be, and often is, undertaken by both state and non-state actors.

By committing to the principles of CTS, in this chapter, the researcher argues that it is necessary for the African Union to move away from the inherited orthodox and state-centric approach of countering terrorism which it has held since its transition from the Organization of African Unity, to a two-pronged strategy that focuses perhaps on tackling both the root causes and the symptoms

of the threat of terrorism.

In Chapter 4, this theoretical framework will be applied to the first case study, which is the assessment of the scourge of terrorism in northern Nigeria, and will be applied to an assessment and analysis of the approaches and strategies adopted by the African Union in dealing with Boko Haram through the lens of CTS. Chapter 4 will subsequently recommend how these critiques can assist the African Union in reconsidering its state-centric and military driven approach to countering the threat of terror inflicted by Boko Haram.

CHAPTER 4: BOKO HARAM: COMBATING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

4.1. Introduction

In Chapter 3 the researcher posited a theoretical framework for critiquing orthodox approaches to terrorism and highlighted the value of employing Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as an approach to identifying, explaining, as well as critiquing the counter-terrorism strategy currently employed by the African Union. Chapter 4 applies that theoretical framework by providing a critical perspective on the military driven, state-centric and largely symptom-based counter-terrorism approach adopted by the African Union in Nigeria in order to combat Boko Haram. In addition, this chapter seeks to provide recommendations on how critiques of such a counter-terrorism strategy can inform sustainable efforts to curb and combat terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram. In this chapter, the researcher will strive to assess and critique the counter-terrorism strategies currently employed by the African Union, and therefore it will be guided by the third supportive research question which is:

To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in northern Nigeria?

In keeping with the theoretical framework of CTS, the writer of this chapter will first discuss the evolution of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the state of affairs that enabled and accommodated the organization's emergence and further development. CTS will be applied in order to assess and analyze Boko Haram's growth from its previously recognized local 'rebellion' status to the current position it holds as a terrorist group with substantial socio-economic influence with an ability to undertake deadly and grievous acts.

Moreover, in this chapter the applicability of current interventions and missions in relation to Boko Haram in Nigeria, will be explored and discussed, with the African Union as the primary focus of this analysis. Therefore, this chapter will examine the African Union's counter-terrorism strategies and policies by analyzing and subsequently critiquing its approaches to countering and combating the terrorism threat posed by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. The final focus of this chapter will be to address whether or not the African Union, as a continental body, has embraced a 'lame duck' attitude in relation to the Boko Haram crisis in the north-eastern region of Nigeria.

4.2. Boko Haram: The State of Affairs that Enabled its Evolution and Expansion

When employing the theoretical framework of CTS, the researcher, in the next phase of this chapter, acknowledges the major importance that history plays and the process by which identity, diversity and related dynamics are converted into conflicts that require a thorough assessment. This is done in order to achieve an historical and all-inclusive understanding of what, over the past decade, has informed and led Boko Haram – and comparable groups, movements, and organizations throughout the African continent – to act and behave in the manner in which they do. By minimizing and diluting the state-centric and symptomatic approach and incorporating the expansion of socio-economic, political, religious and cultural factors which inform much of the frustrations of Boko Haram, CTS acknowledges the importance of assessing both the symptoms and root causes that have informed the extent of terrorism that is waged by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Furthermore, according to Onuoha (2012), it is important to take into consideration that when Boko Haram initially emerged, it was seen as a non-violent movement. There have been substantial disputes about the origins of Boko Haram. Onuoha (2012) contends that the precise re-emergence of Boko Haram in 2009 has been synonymous with controversy. Onuoha (2012) argues that a large body of literature traces the genesis of the sect to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as its first leader.

Conversely, records disclosed by Nigerian forces reveal that the origins of the sect date back to 1995, as a result of the formation of the Ahlulsunnawal ‘jama’ Ahhijra sect at the University of Maduigiri, Borno State, which was led by Abubakar Lawan. As mentioned above, Onouha (2012) is consistent in his assertion that the sect began and flourished as a non-violent movement until Mohammed Yusuf took over as leader of the sect in 2002. Throughout its emergence and evolution, the sect has been popularised through a number of names including, the Muhamajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and Jama “atuAhlissunnahlidda” awatiwal Jihad. Today, while the sect is globally known as Boko Haram, which, when directly translated from the Hausa language, according to Onouha (2012) literally means “western education is sinful or forbidden”; it rejects that particular description and prefers to be referred to as the Jama “atuAhlissunnahlidda” awatiwal Jihad” meaning a “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad”.

Moreover, according to Silke (2014), while there has been a contestation of the references in relation to the actual name of the sect, its fundamental ideological objectives have remained resolute and clear, namely to establish Nigeria –which positions itself as a secular state – into a caliphate – an area or space centered and governed under the control of a Muslim governor or leader known as the caliph. Boko Haram does not recognize Western ideological thinking, civilization, and ways of life, proclaiming that any way of life that is not in adherence to Islam should be prohibited (Onouha, 2012).

Silke (2014) suggests that it is important to acknowledge the many factors that have aided the transformation of the modus operandi of the sect': from non-violent to the adoption of its extremely brutal tactics in its endeavour to meet its objectives such as alleviating economic disparities, political marginalization, widespread poverty, and arguably *an expansion of its ideology* amongst the abovementioned factors. Viewed through a Critical Terrorism Studies lens, one can argue that ideology is the fundamental influencer and initiator of terrorism. According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012), a popular component of Critical Terrorism Studies is that it acknowledges that an abundance of activities advanced and incorporated by terrorists are often encouraged by socio-economic, political, as well as ethnic, cultural and religious factors. Within the Nigerian context, these factors include high rates of poverty and unemployment as a result of socio-economic disparities; political and religious alienation emanating from the consequences of the legacies of colonialism; and the drive to establish a Sharia form of governance.

In addition, CTS can also be accredited with the fact that it acknowledges that terrorists often fight for the acknowledgement and approval of their ideological beliefs, as well as for separation and independence. Therefore, one can argue that Boko Haram positions itself as a group that largely places an emphasis on the expansion of its ideology. In addition, one can also contend that it harbors the latter agenda too, aligning its ideological expansion with its fight for independence and separation from the greater Nigerian society and secular state.

The Nigerian State and Boko Haram's ideological expansion are the primary points that comprise the following subsection

4.2.1. The Nigerian State and the Ideological Expansion of Boko Haram

It is important that one acknowledges that the Nigerian government has been a critical factor in

both the role that it has played in contributing to the expansion of Boko Haram, as well as an actor in countering it. Silke (2014) contends that in 2009, greatly encouraged by their Islamist caliphate ideology, the sect commenced an anti-government revolt, which was also informed by dissatisfaction with ongoing political corruption. The sect was, to a greater extent, curbed by Nigerian security forces and succumbed to brutal extra-judicial killings which resulted in the death of the sect's charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies as well as other experts including Silke (2014), acknowledge the grave consequences of the brutal killing of Mohammed Yusuf and suggest that this occurrence could have triggered and further encouraged the group's violent extremism that is seen today.

Furthermore, it is important to take into account that Nigeria is considered one of Africa's most ethnically diverse countries, with more than 300 ethnic groupings within its borders. According to Vermeulen (2014:117), history shows that colonial powers never fully considered the extent of their actions when deciding on borders. Nigeria is an existing example that drawing artificial borders around certain geographical areas does not mean that the individuals within that particular territory will consider themselves a nation and will be willing to coexist in unison. Historically, Nigeria has comprised three dominant ethnic groups: the Igbo residing in the south-east region of Nigeria; the Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria; and the Yoruba in south-western Nigeria (Nwabueze, 2013). A consequence of colonialism was the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, which meant that these ethnic groups who had previously existed apart from one another, were forced to assimilate and co-exist (Ochonu, 2014).

An important reality that one should consider in the contemporary context of Nigeria resulting from the results of colonialism, is the religious identity that exists which is dominated by the Christian South, and the Islamic North regions of the country. Nigeria, as is the case with most other African countries, is proof of the consequences of the division of nations and groupings by former colonial powers (Vermeulen, 2014: 82). So when one applies the theoretical framework of CTS, one can argue that orthodox and traditional terrorism studies have placed far too much value and emphasis on state-centric approaches to terrorism, while some of the primary root causes were, in fact, a result of the colonial project. Many of these factors, including the formation of the Nigerian State through the amalgamation of the northern and southern states, have played a

fundamental role in the development of Boko Haram's ideological underpinnings, which seek to overthrow the currently secular state of Nigeria.

This researcher maintains that the political, historical, and socio-economic developments of the Nigerian state must be considered when assessing the emergence and establishment of Boko Haram. It is clear that historical factors stemming from the previous century, as alluded to above, have led Boko Haram to employ the strategies and tactics that they currently employ, in order to achieve their intended objectives. So, when viewed from a CTS perspective, one can argue that the historical influences on the ideological development and expansion of Boko Haram may have been neglected within the traditional and orthodox approaches to understanding terrorism in Nigeria and more specifically, in the case of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. In addition to this sentiment, Vermeulen (2014) amongst other scholars of CTS, calls for the use of the 'terrorism' label to be reconsidered, as it refers to particular individuals and groups. An additional critique of the orthodox and mainstream considerations of terrorism lies in Vermeulen's (2014) assessment of the disputes and conflicts that exist between religion, ethnicity, and regionalism within the context of Nigeria.

Therefore, through the application of CTS, in this section the researcher has assessed the current state of Nigeria as well as the ideological underpinnings that have influenced the rise of Boko Haram into the deadly organization that it is today. In addition, it is important that the approaches to Boko Haram by multilateral institutions and regional actors such as the African Union, should be revisited. While this research indicates that sovereignty is a very sensitive issue, it contends that equally, peace and security of the continent should be considered. Therefore, it is inevitable that this research should employ CTS to critique the state-centric and militarized approach assumed by the African Union in its efforts to curb Boko Haram.

In the following section the nature of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture will be examined, particularly in relation to Boko Haram.

4.3. Understanding the Nature of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture

From the onset of the re-emergence of Boko Haram and its transition from a predominantly ideologically-centered group to one of extreme violence, it has become resolutely clear that the

sect's new agenda offered a grave danger not only to Nigeria, but to the wider region. This is due to the increasing regionalization of Boko Haram's presence. The organization's 'strong-hold' of Borno State shares borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The consequence of extensive porous borders has allowed Boko Haram to expand its strategic terrorism to spill over into the neighboring states of the Lake Chad Basin, namely Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Porous borders and poor state capacity in the Lake Chad Basin have allowed Boko Haram to expand its scourge of terrorism through the following: the ability to move its finances freely without being traced; the mass movement of its new recruits from each of these countries; and the easy flow of illegal arms and weapons. All these factors have made it easy for Boko Haram to conduct cross-border attacks and raids into its respective neighboring countries. Furthermore, the collapse of Libya in 2011 gave Boko Haram the opportunity to establish links with various other organizations in the Sahel, namely Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, based in Mali. These newly-formed relationships played a significant role in increasing Boko Haram's threshold and military capabilities.

So one may question the reason why the African Union did not immediately act upon the resurgence of Boko Haram or why there was a lack of initial mutual co-operation between Nigeria and its aforementioned neighboring countries (Abugbila, 2017: 237). Perhaps the answer lies in the deficit and the lackluster initiative of the African Union's security institutions. This, in turn, encourages one to take the necessary steps to interrogate the entire African Peace and Security Architecture as a means of understanding and further assessing this continental body's ability to ameliorate and flush out the threat of Boko Haram, in order to achieve peace, stability, and democratic legitimacy in Nigeria and its neighboring states.

The African Union's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) serves as the umbrella term for the central instruments of the African Union which are dedicated to promoting peace, security and stability within the African continent. In 2001, the Organization of African Unity, with support from its member states, took a collective decision to integrate the fundamental and pivotal mechanisms of the *OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution into the African Union*, a resolution which was established in 1993 (Engel & Porto, 2009:11). Since its adoption at the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lomé, Togo in 2000, the Union has made great strides not only in establishing and implementing APSA institutions and mechanisms, but in

progressively using them for the sole purpose of conflict prevention, management, and resolution as envisaged in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union (Brubacher, Damman, & Day: 2017).

Further, in response to, and in line with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol aimed at the initiation, establishment and further implementation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the AU is recognised as the institution accountable and responsible for tackling these obstacles and as a result, has initiated and established its new African Peace and Security Architecture (African Union Commission, 2015: 8).

According to Desmidt (2019:83), with the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, a number of internal entities were born which operate as the institutional apparatus of the AU and the REC's daily and regular interventions, peacekeeping, and conflict management activities throughout the continent. The APSA has been described by Desmidt (2019) as an extremely dynamic structure which comprises a number of components. Firstly, the Peace and Security Council is an organ which serves as the decision-making unit for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. Secondly, the African Union Commission is liable and accountable for the implementation of the decisions taken by the PSC. Thirdly, the African Standby Force (ASF) acts as a multidimensional organ of APSA covering elements of policing, military, as well as civilian-oriented operations. Next to the ASF lies the Panel of the Wise (PoW) which serves as an advisory constituent of the APSA. This operation deals predominantly with diplomacy and strategic dialogue. Lastly, the APSA is composed of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which forms part of the AU's early warning system and seeks to provide speedy and timely information that will indicate any potential threats to the PSC and the AU Commission.

4.4. Assessing the AU's Response to the State of Affairs that Enabled the Evolution, Development, and Expansion of Boko Haram

While in the previous section the African Union's Peace Security Architecture was examined, in the following sections the AU's response to the root causes that enabled the evolution, development, and expansion of Boko Haram will be assessed. In this section the advantages of employing CTS as a theoretical framework, such as its ability to address and question pertinent

issues of religion, ethnicity, poverty, and regional politicization will also be emphasized. Throughout the remaining sections of this study, it is strongly argued that organizations such as Boko Haram should be researched, assessed and analyzed by employing an all-inclusive theoretical framework such as CTS which identifies and acknowledges the importance of tackling and addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism.

The nature of the crisis of Boko Haram in Nigeria for the Nigerian government and regional stakeholders, in particular for the African Union, has been an enormous challenge. The manner in which these entities have attempted to deal with the threat of Boko Haram by addressing and attacking the symptoms of the issue through military and state-centric approaches are largely rejected within the Critical Terrorism Studies school of thought. The African Union, in co-operation with the Nigerian government, implemented a security-based military approach – namely through military raids; roadblocks; intelligence operations; and military checkpoints – which disregarded the socio-economic, political, and cultural responses, necessary in the fight against Boko Haram.

In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 contended that “the strategies utilized by the African Union in dealing with Boko Haram have not resulted in the necessary results”. Participant 3’s sentiments are perhaps a reflection of those of the majority of scholars and experts who have been critical of the symptomatic approach embodied by the African Union in its fight against Boko Haram. Participant 3 critiqued this orthodox approach by stipulating that “the starting point is to acknowledge that your role as the African Union should not only be to just put in the ‘band aid’ as it were”. As the interview proceeded, Participant 3 argued that “the responsibility of the African Union’s forces and institutions on the ground should be to actually work on the root causes and the existing faultiness in Nigerian society” (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018). This is very much an approach and outlook that is shared by many scholars of CTS including Vermeulen (2014), who contend that the symptomatic and military-driven counter-terrorism approach employed by the African Union and its counterparts has proven to be ineffective in dealing with the grievances of Boko Haram and the larger issue at hand, which in turn has encouraged large portions of various communities throughout Nigeria to embrace the ideological underpinnings of Boko Haram.

Umar (2013, 38) maintains that a fundamental challenge in tackling the root causes of the Boko Haram issue lies in the current organizational make-up of the sect, particularly as a result of the extra-judicial killing of one of its prominent leaders, Mohamed Yusuf in the mid-2000s. This change in organizational structure has made dialogue between counter-terrorism actors and Boko Haram extremely complex.

In the following subsections of this research, the African Union's response will be assessed by analyzing and subsequently critiquing its symptomatic approach which predominantly comprises a widely-militarized strategy for combating Boko Haram throughout Nigeria.

4.4.1. Addressing the Symptoms of Terrorism Approach: A Military Driven Response

As alluded to above, there have been various factors leading to the development and growth of Boko Haram. When one assesses the current situation in north-eastern Nigeria from a CTS perspective, it becomes apparent that the Nigerian government as well as external stakeholders (in particular the African Union-mandated Lake Chad Basin Commission-led Multinational Joint Task Force) have employed a one-dimensional approach to the issue of terrorism in Nigeria and have neglected to employ a two-pronged strategy that seeks to address and tackle both the symptoms and root causes of the Boko Haram crisis.

The growing regionalization of Boko Haram on the African continent led to the African Union's conclusion that a collective and comprehensive strategy was needed in order to defeat the threat. One such coalition which was established and is currently playing an active role in attempting to curb Boko Haram, is the Multinational Joint Task Force which is deployed under the leadership of the Lake Chad Basin and mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council. As will be discussed below in more detail, the MNJTF was established to fight the internal threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The MNJTF, like many ad-hoc operations, aligns itself with the AU's Common African Defense and Security Policy, which is outlined in Article 3, Section (e) and Article 4, Section (d) of the AU Constitutive Act (Desmidt, 2019). Williams (2018), argues that from a political point of view, these coalitions demonstrate the importance of the idea of collective security and self-reliance which are core principles of the African Peace and Security Architecture, in responding to a mutual threat

In view of the above, it is important to note that these ad-hoc coalitions, and in this particular case, the MNJTF; in tackling the threat of Boko Haram, operate beyond the confines of the official framework of the eight Regional Economic Communities¹ and the two Regional Mechanisms which were established to support the formation of the African Standby Force (AFS). To add to this observation, Albert (2017: 126) argues that the MNJTF is not one of the recognized REC's for peace and security operations in Africa. Albert (2017:126) further extends the aforementioned argument by insinuating that the MJNTF is merely an extension of the member states of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). Albert's (2017) argument encourages one to further interrogate why these countries would initially avoid endorsing the African Peace and Security Architecture to implement their own Peace and Security structures.

It further begs the question why these LCB nations opted initially to neglect the two prominent and integral security communities around them. These security communities include ECOWAS of which Nigeria, Niger, and Benin form part, and the Economic Community of Central African states (ECCAS) which Chad and Cameroon are members of. The next subsections will briefly outline some of the core approaches the MNJTF has employed as part of its military-centered approach. While the MNJTF has been hailed for being able to successfully flush Boko Haram out of some of its strategic territorial bases, its operations are a reflection of the highly military-driven approach that embodies the African Union's counter-terrorism strategy, not only in Nigeria but across the African continent. This strategy has been highly criticized as yielding short-term results to terrorism inflicted by Boko Haram. Within its counter-terrorism campaign, the African Union and its troop of contributing countries have continued to employ a symptomatic approach in their efforts to subdue Boko Haram, comprising predominantly the deployment and utilization of armed forces to establish military checkpoints and raids; working with intelligence services; and providing physical security and protection, all of which will be briefly reviewed in the next subsections.

¹Arab Maghreb Union; The Community of Sahel-Saharan States; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; East African Community; Economic Community of West African States; Intergovernmental Authority on Development; and Southern African Development Community.

4.4.2. Establishment of Check Points

A simple and apparent strategy employed by Boko Haram is to make use of main roads as a means to reach its intended targets. The MNJTF and its forces have established a number of checkpoints as an approach to track, frustrate, and disorganize Boko Haram's movements. Individuals, groups, and vehicles deemed suspicious are rigorously searched and undergo a physical screening (Umar, 2013:41). According to Umar (2013: 41), this process and approach has yielded below-par results. Umar argues that these check points have yielded these poor results due to a lack of resource capacity as well as to poor management and administration. This enables Boko Haram to avoid detection and continuously carry out its grievous attacks against its intended targets, both locally and beyond its Nigerian territories.

4.4.3. Intelligence Operations

The MNJTF, in collusion with Nigerian national security services, has employed intelligence as a means to curb the threat of Boko Haram. The employment of such an approach has yielded relative success in curbing Boko Haram, including the arrest of a number of key members and has reduced the organization's sphere of attack. While intelligence-gathering and -sharing by both the African Union and Nigerian forces has led to killings and the recovery of lethal weaponry of Boko Haram, Umar (2013:42) argues that this approach has yielded limited results because the organization has a high membership turnover as a result of its ability to replace killed or arrested members at a quick rate. Conversely, these operations have also increased military-civilian tensions as many MNJTF forces have been accused of killing and maiming innocent civilians in the process.

In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 criticized the AU's counter-terrorism approach by arguing that "if you look at most of the AU members, you will find that most of their law-enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies are not equipped with dealing with this thing of counter-terrorism" (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018). These views shared by Participant 3 (2018) correspond with McQuaid and Patricio Asufra-Heim's (2015) assertions that the Nigerian government itself has continued to disregard the underlying contextual realities that inform much of the communities of the north-eastern region of Nigeria. This has ensured that the affected communities across northern Nigeria remain hesitant to share the necessary intelligence – which could be of assistance in locating the strategic networks and operations of Boko Haram – with

Nigerian law-enforcement agencies as well as with the African Union-mandated security agencies. In agreement with Participant 3's (2018) assertions, Aina (2016: 70) contends that while the MNJTF as well as the Nigerian government may possess decent military equipment, the joint task force has not demonstrated the ability to use advanced technological intelligence and intelligence-gathering in its strategic operations to subdue Boko Haram in its entirety.

The above-mentioned sentiments coincide with the arguments and criticism that will be put forward in the next section which offers a broad criticism of the strategy employed by the African Union in its efforts to counter the menace that is Boko Haram. In accordance with the commitments of CTS, perhaps one can argue that the operations employed by the African Union have been limited and to a certain extent unsuccessful because they have failed to address the root causes of the issue, such as the alleviation of poverty, eradication of conflict and tension, as well as tackling the rising unemployment rate throughout Nigeria.

4.5. The AU's Response to Boko Haram: The Failure to Address the Root Causes

As Boko Haram has developed from a localized insurgency into an organization with a regional and violent footprint, the Nigerian government as well as the African Union, particularly multilateral security agencies such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Multinational Joint Task force which are primarily mandated by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, have been entrusted with presiding over the peace and security affairs related to the African continent (PSC, 2015: 33.). By applying CTS as the theoretical framework, in the next phase of this chapter, the clear-cut symptomatic and military-driven strategy centered around orthodox and traditional approaches to terrorism currently being employed by the African Union in its response to conflicts will be discussed, examined, and critiqued; and in particular the acts of terror inflicted by Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria.

The manner in which the Nigerian government and the security agencies which are mandated by the African Union have attempted to tackle the threat posed by Boko Haram have proven to yield limited success. The extremely brutal strategies employed by the African Union security agencies have proven to be counterproductive. The heavy reliance on extrajudicial killings – for example the killing of the Boko Haram's first leader, Mohammed Yusuf; the arrest and maiming of innocent individuals suspected to be affiliated to Boko Haram; the killing of innocent civilians through

airstrikes – as an approach to tackling the actions perpetuated by Boko Haram – have perhaps triggered and further encouraged the group’s violent extremism as well as its current militant capacity.

In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 argued that these “tactics are a reflection of the symptomatic counter-terrorism approach” (Interview, Participant 3: 17/07/2018) that scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies fundamentally reject. Furthermore, from a CTS perspective, one may contend that such an approach embodies a ‘lame duck’ attitude that in fact many scholars of CTS including Solomon (2015) argue, fails to address the underlying root issues that encourage individuals to join and endorse the ideological underpinnings of groups such as Boko Haram. For example, Solomon (2015) argues that “military solutions alone are not working”. The Multinational Joint Task Force together with the Nigerian government, disregard salient socio-economic and governance issues that continue to play a role in the vast unemployment and poverty rates – a consequence that Boko Haram been able to take full advantage of in its recruitment strategies.

Perhaps for scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies, a difficult challenge for the African Union and its security agencies lies within the process of identifying, addressing, and tackling the root causes of the Boko Haram crisis. One such factor is a result of the shift within the organizational structure of Boko Haram since the extra-judicial killing of its first leader, Mohammed Yusuf. The group now functions and operates in cell-like structures and therefore, dialogue between the Nigerian government, the African Union and the leadership of Boko Haram has proven to be difficult.

If one is to observe the current counter-terrorism dilemma that the African Union is facing through a CTS lens, one can argue that that the AU is currently being challenged by a lack of stakeholder cohesion as well as by the innate inability to maintain backing from the entire continent in relation to matters of security; particularly issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. In the same light, Abugbila (2017) contends that “despite the slow start, the African Union has implemented a fairly progressive counter-terrorism framework, pushing the LCBC states to co-ordinate their responses to close loopholes and shut down potential safe havens”.

Within the context of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, an additional observation is that perhaps the African Union is currently suffering from the lack of stakeholder effort and support from its

member states. In addition to such an observation, one can argue that the AU finds itself with no member state that is willing to assume a leadership role in relation to the security predicaments and challenges that it finds itself in, particularly with regard to terror-stricken areas such as Nigeria.

Chapter 2 briefly discusses the fairly progressive counter-terrorism framework considered and adopted by the African Union which, according to Abugbila (2017), seeks to “push states to coordinate their responses to close loopholes and shut down potential safe havens”. Contrary to Abugbila’s assertions, Allison (2015) argues that the AU has in fact been unable to assume a leadership role in its entirety in the fight against Boko Haram as a result of its considerations of the sovereignty of its member states’. Allison’s (2015) assertions were reaffirmed by the President of Chad, Idriss Deby, when he stated that “we have seen too many meetings and no concrete action”, and “today, there are four countries affected by Boko Haram, but tomorrow it may be a continental problem” (Al Jazeera news, 2015). Many experts and critics of the security operations of the African Union have postulated that the organization continues to suffer from drastic capacity dilemmas, unable to produce either the necessary human capacity or the financial resources required to deal with terrorism.

More moderate critics including Damme (2015) assert that the African Union’s ‘lame duck’ approach to the issue in Nigeria, among many other security problems, cannot be seen as entirely the fault of the organization. Many of the countries in which it seeks to intervene and play a leading role by assisting with issues of grave violence, including Nigeria, have often not embraced the efforts attempted by the African Union. If one were to recall the discussion that was put forward above regarding the responses of Nigeria to the brutal actions of Boko Haram, one can deduce that both President Jonathan and President Buhari’s initial stance on the idea of an African Union-led approach was not entirely embraced. As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the insurgency, Nigeria was completely opposed to the intervention of any external forces proclaiming that the Boko Haram issue was solely a domestic issue. Jacobs (2015) confirms that the initial attitudes and denials of both the former and current presidents of Nigeria made it more difficult to curb the predicament of Boko Haram; and limited any intervention attempts and counter-terror measures put forward by the African Union in its quest to minimize and combat developments aiding the group’s further expansion. Perhaps, one can argue, that if the African Union as well as its regional forces had been embraced during the initial stages of the Boko Haram upsurge, the

northern region would not have been plagued by the current scourge of terror and many lives would have been saved from the grievous and brutal harm typified by the tactics of Boko Haram.

While the Multinational Joint Task force has yielded substantial territorial gains in its fight against Boko Haram, the AU's Peace and Security Council has failed to assist it in prescribing interventions that are focused both on socio-economic development of the communities in which Boko Haram operates, as well as on attacking its territorial basis through a military-driven approach.

By employing the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies, in the next section of this research study, the African Union's role and in particular the manner in which it has responded to the challenge of Boko Haram will be further discussed and critiqued. While the AU-mandated and LCBC-led MNJTF has achieved relative success in flushing out Boko Haram from a number of strategic territorial bases, it has also previously been gravely critiqued by a number of experts for its lackluster approach to the threat of Boko Haram. In the following section, the AU'S responses to many of the root causes that have enabled Boko Haram's evolution, expansion, and further development, will be analyzed. Therefore, the AU's strategy in combating socio-economic disparities; the move to implement a Sharia form of governance; neglect and political alienation of the Muslim dominant populations of the northeastern regions; and the terror financing of the organization, will form the basis of the following section.

4.5.1. Critiquing The AU's Symptomatic Response to Boko Haram

"There can be no such thing as a purely military solution to an insurgency because insurgency is not primarily a military activity." –General (Sir) Frank Kitson, British Army (Umar, 2013: 47).

The above statement by General (Sir) Frank Kitson of the British Army is a reflection of the limitations that exist within the military-driven approach currently adopted by the African Union in its efforts to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. The African Union's response to the threat posed by Boko Haram is defined by tackling and addressing the symptoms of terrorism. Instead of working with the Nigerian government to establish institutions that are dedicated to eradicating poverty, minimizing unemployment, developing schools, and alleviating the issue of homeless children, the African Union and its mandated security agencies have focused on expanding its

military-centered counter-terrorism strategy. The failure to design such institutions is a reflection of the African Union's disregard of the importance of tackling and addressing the root causes of the issue of terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria.

This position corresponds with the commitments and sentiments of scholars of CTS who argue against the traditional forms of countering terrorism, which primarily focus on the employment of force to resolve terrorist activities. Scholars such as Solomon (2015) offer a body of critique which insists that the employment of armed forces by the African Union to destabilize the activities of members of Boko Haram, is a very short-term approach. While it has proven to have flushed Boko Haram out of its strategic territorial bases, the sect has time and time again re-emerged more deadlier than before; an example of the consequences of simply tackling the symptoms of terrorism while neglecting its root causes. Further, from a Critical Terrorism Studies perspective, this reflects and exposes the orthodox and lackluster approach to terrorism rejected by CTS which informs the African Union's fight against Boko Haram. In addition, while the Nigerian government has been transparent about the inaccuracy of casualty figures, it is apparent that there have been high rates of civilian casualty as a result of the militant operations employed by the African Union.

These realities affirm the assertions made by scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies who critique the African Union's militant approach by contending that limiting the territorial capacity of Boko Haram through the employment of military strategies alone, as practiced by the Multinational Joint Task Force, only takes into account the symptoms of the wage of terrorism espoused by Boko Haram. While this approach by the MNJTF will limit the operating space for Boko Haram, a critique shared by scholars of CTS acknowledges that the sect has been able to continuously launch violent attacks successfully, as has been the case in Maiduguri and surrounding areas in north-eastern Nigeria. Furthermore, by taking into account the commitments of CTS, one can argue that this widespread and continuous violence espoused by Boko Haram is a manifestation of the disregard of the root causes by the African Union and its allied security forces.

To add to the critique, one can contend that Boko Haram's ideological underpinnings have continued to gain widespread support as is evident in its continued rise in membership. Perhaps one may argue that a contributing factor to the rise in membership is a direct result of the discontent

of citizens who feel politically and socio-economically alienated. Grounded in traditionally orthodox approaches to terrorism, scholars of CTS contend that the African Union's military-centered and symptomatic strategy for countering Boko Haram needs to be endorsed by the domestic population if it wishes to isolate Boko Haram and yield the necessary and successful results. In order for the African Union's mandated security agencies, in this particular instance the MNJTF, to tackle Boko Haram in counter-terrorism operations, it remains imperative that the issues and concerns of the domestic population should be considered. The critique espoused through the commitments of CTS that the orthodox approach of dealing with Boko Haram through military intervention alone cannot defeat the organization, is proven through the continuous rise of the sect throughout West Africa. It is important to take into account that Boko Haram operates from an asymmetric position.

Moreover, the currently-adopted counter-terrorism measures by the African Union fail to recognize that an approach which includes tackling some of the socio-economic and political factors driving the Boko Haram sect and also which curbs radicalization, is completely necessary. For scholars of CTS, this is what defines a two-pronged approach. The one-dimensional approach adopted by the MNJTF which has involved the killing of innocent civilians, has led to widespread discontent and a valid backlash amongst communities in the north-eastern regions of Nigeria and turn has resulted in the rise in support for Boko Haram. The continued rise of Boko Haram membership since its re-emergence in 2009 is indicative that such an approach has been received with widespread resentment. The above argument also supports the position by counter-terrorism experts such as Participant 3 (Interview, 17/07/2018) who critiqued AU security forces such as the MNJTF and its application of force in fighting Boko Haram, by suggesting that "for military operations to yield the necessary and positive results, the military needs to be able to acquire and sustain the support of civilians in the north-eastern regions of Nigeria in order to isolate the terrorist activities implemented by Boko Haram".

While these military interventions by the African Union have forcefully dispersed Boko Haram from some of its territorial bases, it has enabled the sect to re-emerge violently in other parts of the country and in the West African region. This military-centered approach facilitates the establishment of newer and stronger cells in other parts of the region which have even resulted in devastating consequences in countries beyond the Nigerian borders including Chad, Niger, and

parts of Benin. This supports the critique that this researcher attempts to postulate through the application of Critical Terrorism Studies, by suggesting that that the African Union's military-focused approach is a reflection of the detrimental consequences of a one-dimensional strategy that excludes measures seeking to address the fundamental root causes of the expansion of Boko Haram. Rather, this approach has led to the further expansion of both the ideological underpinnings and radical asymmetrical forms of warfare that inform the actions of Boko Haram today.

By assessing the African Union's highly pro-military approach, one may offer a further critique of this orthodox strategy by contending that it does not address the multi-causal crisis such as the Boko Haram threat. Furthermore, the extra-judicial killings and mass killings of innocent civilians by security forces have consequently ignited a recruitment campaign for Boko Haram, as many individuals felt largely betrayed by the Nigerian government and the African Union's security forces, as a result of the killing of innocent civilians. As such, it is clear that such an approach only serves to eradicate the immediate threats espoused by Boko Haram at the expense of a long-term and sustainable strategy to ameliorate the violent activities of the sect.

Within the military-driven approach, the AU has also neglected a number of other root causes. Ochonu (2014), like many other experts, contends that the historical social influences accepted in colonial Nigeria, are similar to, if not the same, factors and elements that Nigeria believes to be the root cause of the ongoing instability, violence, and conflict in the current context of Nigerian society. However, Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012) also extensively proclaims that an orthodox approach to countering Boko Haram through the deployment of armed forces, illustrates the disregard of the historical and socio-political factors that inform and shape the nature of Boko Haram's organizational structure and ideological underpinnings.

By applying CTS to critiquing the measures employed by the African Union in countering Boko Haram, it is clear that the military-driven approach deals solely with the symptoms. This is why scholars of CTS, including Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012), suggest that when studying the growth and development of Boko Haram, one should look deeper than the state-centric, and militaristic elements and incorporate a body of research centered around understanding the effects of colonialism; as well as the importance of other root causes such as socio-political consequences

which have led to the rise and expansion of Boko Haram. Only then will the African Union be able to implement a successful counter-terrorism approach.

i. A Disregard of the Socio-Economic Disparities Between North and South

Corresponding to the afore-mentioned ideological underpinnings of Boko Haram , as well as the historical legacies and consequences that have encouraged Boko Haram to carry out its ideological objectives through grievous acts of terror, one may contend that a recurring theme in states across the African continent, including Nigeria, include socio-economic factors, inequalities and disparities which have played a role in the rise of the subjugation and marginalization of particular groups in Nigeria. As previously alluded to in this research, there are deeply entrenched socio-economic disparities in existence between the North and South of Nigeria. When one assesses the Nigerian context, it is evident that these socio-economic divisions are without a doubt some of the most pertinent factors and root causes that have propelled the establishment, emergence, and expansion of Boko Haram. As previously mentioned, the increasing unemployment rates in the Northern region, specifically amongst young people who constitute the greater portion of the population, serve to drive the agitations that are evident in the region, as well as the combination of the abovementioned socio-economic issues and the predicament of radical Islam, which guarantees a better life and wellbeing for martyrs (Rogers, 2012).

Usman (2015) attributes the increase in youth membership of Boko Haram to the failure and incapacity of the Nigerian government and its multilateral counterparts – such as the African Union – to effectively decrease youth unemployment rates, particularly in north-eastern Nigeria. Like many African countries, young people comprise the majority of the population, and Nigeria, like many of its African counterparts, finds itself with an abundance of graduates who are discovered roaming the streets looking for unavailable jobs (Usman, 2015: 90-94). The currently-employed African Union strategy fails to recognize and acknowledge that while some young people in Nigeria receive formal tertiary education, their qualifications, more often than not, come with no value, and as such they opt to pledge allegiance to Boko Haram (Vermeulen, 2014: 101). In addition to the above argument, there are many perspectives related to the rationale behind pledging loyalty to such a brutal and violent organization, including frustration resulting from the inability to secure employment. In simple terms, one may argue that education in Nigeria is devalued to a point where the educated population is undervalued while the uneducated political

elite establish themselves in privileged positions. Further, the above assertion is supported by Ucha (2010) who argues that an educational qualification does not guarantee any form of employment in Nigeria. Like many societies, a rise in unemployment rates accelerates poverty, and in turn triggers the rate at which crime and violence increase. Ucha (2010) contends that it is in fact the victims of this unemployment upsurge that are left with no choice but to opt in the direction of kidnappings, armed robberies, and a number of other violent activities, most notably in the name of Boko Haram.

Akanni (2014) contests that, like many African countries, unemployment is a fundamental factor that has shaped the socio-economic climate of Nigeria. Outcomes of the present research study critique the African Union for its failure to assist the Nigerian government in implementing socio-economic policies that are resolute in directing mechanisms which seek to alleviate unemployment and related socio-economic obstacles. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment rate in Nigeria increased from 20.42% in the fourth quarter of 2017 to 23.13% in the fourth quarter of 2018.

As previously mentioned, while economic issues are a nation-wide problem, the northern region of Nigeria, which is Muslim-dominated, is largely affected by socio-economic disparities. This is worrisome, taking into account that the northern region makes up a large portion of Nigeria's oil production and exportation. The statistics mentioned above are a reflection of the high levels of poverty that plague this particular region. By applying CTS to the socio-economic disparities that inform the northern-most region of Nigeria, one can contend that these factors are a representation of some of the core roots and causes that have led much of Nigeria's young to adopt extreme religious views and subsequently join organisations such as Boko Haram. As previously mentioned, there is an abundance of young graduates who roam the streets of Nigeria in search of jobs that the Nigerian government is capable of providing, but is unwilling to do. It is not surprising that the majority of Boko Haram's members comprise young people within Nigerian society.

In view of this, CTS offers a critique that as the Nigerian government and the African Union continue to neglect the day-to-day realities and struggles of its population, in particular of its young people in the northern regions, it provides fertile grounds for Boko Haram and similar groups to

flourish (Gottlieb, 2013). Moreover, a number of scholars including Umar (2013) argue that Boko Haram's ideological underpinnings are not exclusively about rejecting the idea of Western education, but also about addressing the failure of the Nigerian government to provide the necessary services and opportunities for the Nigerian populace. This has been a point of contestation that has allowed Boko Haram to mobilize and radicalize the unemployed, unskilled, and largely poor youth to join the organization in its campaign to establish an Islamic Caliphate, thereby eliminating the secular state of Nigeria. Boko Haram has logically positioned itself as an alternative that could bring about socio-economic progress and change for the poor, the unemployed, and the unskilled.

By focusing on flushing out Boko Haram by means of military force, the African Union and its security forces have failed to tackle the socio-economic gaps that have made the sect the appealing alternative that it is today for those living in widespread poverty. A critique supported by this research maintains that by focusing on the symptoms of terrorism espoused by Boko Haram, the African Union's mandated MNJTF has failed to deal with the issue of youth unemployment, poverty eradication, and education accessibility amongst other socio-economic issues impacting the predominantly Muslim dominant northern region of Nigeria. Furthermore, grounded on traditional orthodox theory, the African Union's symptomatic terrorism approach turns a blind eye to the importance of assisting the Nigerian government in implementing programs and policies that seek to encourage young Nigerians, and all those who feel the need to endorse Boko Haram ideologically to explore entrepreneurial and innovative routes that would create employment and increase job security.

ii. Neglecting Rampant Corruption and Political Alienation

In line with the abovementioned sentiments, one can argue that the widely-propagated argument by many African scholars and intellectuals, that the Western style of governance was not plausible in Africa to begin with, has been largely neglected and under-analyzed within the realm of traditional and orthodox terrorism studies. Nigeria's political and historical context serves as an illustration that speaks directly to the disparities that exist between the general Nigerian population and the governing political elite. Like any society that vividly turns a blind eye to the socio-economic hardships of its citizenry, the Nigerian ruling system has succumbed in many ways to a loss of legitimacy among its general population where the ordinary citizen no longer ascribes to,

nor believes in, the political, economic, and legal systems in place (Forest, 2012).

Adetoro (2012) supports the above proclaimed critique of the Nigerian government by arguing that corruption continues to impact negatively on the internal and moral fabric of Nigerian society, where there are corrupt occurrences entrenched in literally every system and structure that is governed by political authorities, including the country's national security forces. It is no surprise that the citizenry at large have grown frustrated with the Nigerian government, together with the armed forces of the African Union deployed to curb the threat of terror espoused by Boko Haram. This has made Nigeria fertile ground for Boko Haram to wage its war against armed forces of both the Nigerian government and the African Union's mandated security agencies.

Furthermore, Forest (2012) reminds one of the common practice and party protocol of power rotation which exists between the southern Christian electorate, and the northern Muslim constituency. Political analysts in Nigeria, including Johnson (2011), argue that since the unfortunate death of former President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, there have been continued frustrations as a result of the political discomfort from northern electorates. This dissatisfaction attained prominence due to the general sentiment that the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan who reigned from the Christian southern elite was illegitimate because it did not adhere to the mutual party protocol of power transition, which according to the northern elites, should have kept a northern individual in power.

These sentiments were equally shared by Maselane in an interview conducted in Pretoria in 2018 who acknowledges that "there has been an unwritten political agreement in Nigeria that if a president comes from the South, the next one is going to come from the north. So Yaradua did not finish his term, so the north expected the next president to come from the North to finish the term, but then there was President Goodluck Jonathan who came from the South". Maselane states, further, that in his view "when Boko Haram started, it had the support of political leaders because they wanted to undermine President Goodluck Jonathan and they wanted to render the North ungovernable" (Interview, DD Maselane, 30/06/2018).

One can argue that this led to the unfortunate and unintended consequences which Maselane describes: "...where the animal they allowed to grow, then decided to bite back to a point where Boko Haram became so powerful that even the same political establishment in the North that

supported it became victims of Boko Haram” (Interview, DD Maselane, 30/06/2018).

By adopting CTS as the theoretical framework at the center of the debate, one can contend that the adoption of the federal model of governance in Nigeria was established without considering the socio-political tensions including ethnic and religious divisions which consequently led to a large portion of the population advocating for the implementation of Sharia law as an alternative to the Western model of governance (Ozioigbo, 2008:3). Such a development has led advocates of CTS to criticise the African Union’s orthodox approach to countering Boko Haram by arguing that it overlooked the gap that the sect identified and used to its advantage as a result of the socio-political circumstances in Nigeria. Therefore, proponents of CTS argue that the promotion of Sharia law as an alternative form of governance by Boko Haram has become appealing to citizens who reside predominantly in the northern regions of Nigeria because Boko Haram took advantage of advocating the implementation of Sharia law as a solution to the failures of the secular Nigerian government. This is another example of how Boko Haram has been successful in expanding its ideological objectives by appealing to the roots of the issues that face Nigerian society.

In addition to the call to implement Sharia law in the northern-most region of Nigeria, efforts by former President Obasanjo and his administration to include Boko Haram and its leaders in a discourse that would presumably lead to conciliation, negotiations, and civil talks, were initiated in September 2011 in Maiduguri between former President Obasanjo and members of Boko Haram. The initiative was eventually supported and embraced too, by then President Goodluck Jonathan. While this approach could have yielded successful results, scholars including Ejiofor (2015) criticize the African Union for not playing a fundamental role in mediating talks between Boko Haram leadership, and the Nigerian, Chadian and Cameroonian governments who had suffered attacks at the hands of Boko Haram and as a result the meeting yielded poor results as the degree of trust between the respective stakeholders dwindled. Boko Haram had presented a number of demands to Obasanjo, including the termination of arrests and killings of its members; remuneration in the form of compensation to the families of its members who had been killed and injured by Nigerian forces; and the prosecution of security authorities responsible for the killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf (Ejiofor, 2015).

iii. Failure to Contain the Terror-Financing of Boko Haram

One of the causes that the African Union and its counterparts have failed to address and tackle is

rooted in the terror-financing of Boko Haram. Abugbila (2017) believes this is greatly supported by wealthy members, as well as by politicians who allow the group to sustain and develop its structures and mechanisms for the overall operation of the group's strategic areas of arms and weaponry procurement, training, and compensation of its members. Agbiboa (2013) suggests that previously, the Nigerian government was unable to trace the sources of Boko Haram's terror-finance. However, the arrest of a number of Boko Haram members in 2012 exposed that the primary funding of the group had come in the form of donations not only from its members but from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliated groups in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. Other experts also believe that Boko Haram's main source of funding is gained in the name of Al-Qaeda, as well as from the Al Muntada Trust Fund (Agbiboa, 2013: 42).

Former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, openly expressed the fact that there have been groups of Nigerian authorities within the Nigerian government who have supported Boko Haram in various capacities; funding and the distribution of economic resources being some of the forms of support (Murtada, 2013). Like many terror organizations, Boko Haram derives its finances through the robbing of local banks, with an estimated number of 30 bank attacks ascribed to the group in 2018 alone (Aina. 2016:43).

Therefore, it remains important to critique the current strategy of the African Union which fails to trace the sources of Boko Haram's terror-financing and its lucrative underground economy. In an interview conducted in Pretoria in July of 2018, Participant 2 gave an account of the importance of 'going after' Boko Haram's financial tools. "Coming back to terror-finance which I would base my counter-terror strategy, is to go after its money. I am a big advocate. I have seen it work. Once you take their money, they can't do anything. You disrupt them." (Interview, Participant 2, 09/07/2018)

This is a fundamental strategy which has been neglected by the African Union's mandated security agency – in this particular instance, the MNJTF – in fighting Boko Haram. This does not involve extra-judicial killings but as Participant 3 stated, "a strategy that allows us to trace, neutralize and disrupt the flow of money of terrorist organizations" (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018). Perhaps the African Union is ill-equipped to tackle and neutralize the financial flow of Boko Haram. This is a sentiment that Participant 3 equally shares, "I mean if you look at most AU

members, you'll find that in terms of their law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies are not equipped to deal with this thing of counter-terrorism and tracing and neutralizing the flow of money of these organizations such as Boko Haram" (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018).

4.6. Does the African Union Have the Capacity to Defeat Boko Haram?

Boko Haram has plagued the northern region of Nigeria and its neighboring countries and this research has provided evidence as to why it is considered one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the modern world. In its ruthless pursuit of forming an Islamic Caliphate across the African continent, its members have wreaked havoc by employing grave tactics which include the bombing of public spaces, kidnapping schoolgirls and the assassination of political officials (Abugbila, 2017). As was previously argued, while the Nigerian government had initially been ineffective in preventing the lawlessness that was perpetuated by Boko Haram, the formation and efforts of the African Union Multinational Task Force have proven to be relatively successful in various ways.

There have been many concerns regarding whether the MNJTF would lead to the deployment of troops competent in dealing with the Boko Haram sect or if it was just another method to disguise troops who were already engaged in the war against Boko Haram (Aina, 2016: 70). However, regardless of these concerns, soldiers from neighboring countries including Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroon assisted Nigeria in effectively combating and recapturing a number of strategic territorial bases that had been seized by the sect, thereby demonstrating that the collaboration of African national armed forces serves to be effective in that capacity.

Ever since the formation of the MNJTF, African nations have continued to work together to tackle the issues surrounding terrorism. One cannot deny that apart from many of its shortcomings, the joint efforts among African countries under the umbrella of the African Union, has had a monumental impact. However, this research offers a critique of the bittersweet successes of the African Union's security agencies, particularly of the MNJTF's ability to flush Boko Haram out of strategic territorial bases. It critiques this military approach and argues that this strategy has proven to be symptomatic and at best, short-term. This writer maintains that while there has been widespread determination of African nations accompanied by the support of international stakeholders in the form of military training and provision of resources, arms, and equipment, the

AU together with the LCBC have failed to implement structures and initiatives that can assist the Nigerian government to address and tackle some of the most prominent root causes necessary when fighting Boko Haram.

Therefore, while the largely military-driven strategy by the African Union and its security agencies, specifically the MNJTF, has been praised by a number of observers across the African continent including Abugbila (2017), outcomes of this research suggest that the continental body's military-driven approach will continue to aggravate the already sensitive issue and encourage Boko Haram to continue its violent acts of terror in Nigeria. The clear neglect and disregard for the root causes in particular by the MNJTF as has been outlined throughout this chapter, are factors that have led to the re-emergence of Boko Haram. So one may contend that the orthodoxies that exist in the current AU's strategy will continue to regionalize the insurgency. This researcher maintains that while the AU's Peace and Security Architecture forms a substantially strong and advanced counter-terrorism agenda, it has yet to have any clearly evident success in preventing and annihilating terrorism on the African continent.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter has critiqued the orthodoxies that exist within the symptomatic and military-driven counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the African Union in its efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism waged by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The strategies employed by the African union were further critiqued for failing to address the root causes, namely: existing socio-economic disparities; political and religious alienation; the drive to establish a Sharia form of governance; and failure to contain the terror-financing of the organization. The strategies were critiqued for aligning with orthodox approaches to terrorism, while neglecting a two-pronged strategy that seeks to address both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism as broadly espoused in the commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies.

In line with the critique provided throughout this chapter, outcomes of this research suggest that from a regional perspective, the African Union will require a paradigm shift forged by the manner in which member states co-operate with one another in order to withstand, address, and further combat the threat that is Boko Haram. The critiques offered in this chapter are proof that transnational threats such as Boko Haram remain intrinsically complicated and therefore a

multifaceted and multi-pronged strategy should be at the core of dealing with such a threat.

Further, the critiques of the currently employed African Union strategy show that an enhanced African Union strategy and collaboration with the Nigerian government and its neighboring countries is necessary to reduce the cross-border supply of weapons, and money; as well as to limit the ease with which terrorists are able move across the region. In addition to such improvements, the advancement of its intelligence apparatus, the analysis, gathering, and sharing of information among member states who pledge allegiance to the fight against Boko Haram, are equally important.

Continuing the discussion of the African Union's counter-terrorism strategy, in the next chapter the commitments and principles of CTS are applied by arguing that it is necessary for the African Union Mission in Somalia to move away from its predominantly state-centric and military-consumed counter-terrorism approach to a two-pronged strategy that focuses on addressing and tackling both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism.

Chapter 5 applies this theoretical framework to the case study, which is the assessment of the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somalia; as well as an assessment and analysis of the approaches and strategies adopted by AMISOM in dealing with Al-Shabab through the lens of CTS. Chapter 5 subsequently recommends how these critiques can assist the African Union in reconsidering its state-centric and military-driven approach to counter the threat of terror inflicted by Al-Shabaab.

CHAPTER 5: AL-SHABAAB: THE NATURE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

5.1. Introduction

By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, Chapter 4 provides a broad critique of the orthodox approaches to terrorism which inform the African Union's counter-terrorism strategy with particular emphasis on the manner in which armed forces such as the Multinational Joint Task Force have adopted a largely symptomatic and military-driven approach in dealing with Boko-Haram in Nigeria. While this is the reality in Nigeria and its surrounding neighbors, a similar reality can be highlighted in the Horn of Africa and the nature in which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has opted to combat Al-Shabaab who continues to threaten the stability of an already fragile and weak state.

By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, in this chapter, the researcher seeks to assess, explain, and critique the roles of regional and multilateral actors particularly the broader efforts of the African Union in responding to the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, with major focus on Somalia. By applying CTS as the theoretical anchor, the researcher hypothesizes, in this chapter, that the traditional state-centric counter-terrorism approach employed in the Horn of Africa focuses primarily on militaristic measures, consequently excluding and undermining the importance of a two-pronged strategy to address and tackle the root causes that have given rise to Al-Shabaab's scourge of terror in the region. Therefore, in line with the primary objectives of this research, this chapter will be guided by the fourth supportive research question of the study, which is:

How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?

In this chapter, an overview of terrorism in the Horn of Africa will be offered, with particular focus on the causes and drivers that have enabled and encouraged terrorism in this country. In conjunction with the nature and drivers of terrorism, this chapter will highlight the strategic terrorism waged by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in the broader Horn of Africa. Thereafter, this chapter will highlight the various approaches to countering terrorism at regional level, with

particular emphasis on the approaches adopted by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While the present researcher acknowledges that there has been substantial progress in the coordination and implementation of counter-terrorism efforts, by AMISOM, he takes into account that the Horn of Africa continues to be confronted by a number of issues including terrorism, substantial intra- and interstate conflict, increasing socio-economic and political discontent and marginalization, and significantly, a lack of state capacity to deal with the scourge of terror; much of which is a consequence of the actions exerted by Al-Shabaab in the region. Therefore, the final focus of this chapter is to offer a broad critique of the counter-terrorism strategy currently employed by the African Union in the Horn of Africa.

The critiques provided in this chapter suggest that much like the case of Boko-Haram in Nigeria, attempting to merely treat the symptoms – which has been the primary approach adopted by AMISOM and corresponding AU security agencies – does not serve as a viable long-term option, nor is it a plausible solution.

5.2. A Critical Understanding of the Nature and Drivers of Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

As has been illustrated in the previous chapter in relation to the emergence of Boko-Haram, Al-Shabaab too, has a rich history of its own. While Chapter 2 provided a short historical account of the Horn of Africa, this section applies Critical Terrorism Studies in the pursuit of understanding the historical circumstances and drivers that inform the current realities of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa, with specific emphasis on the socio-political, economic, and historical legacies that have influenced the establishment, emergence, and further expansion of Al-Shabaab in the region. In addition, an important observation that CTS advances in both case studies, is that both the geographical areas in which these terrorist organizations operate – in this particular context, Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa – is informed by a unique history which was influenced by various international and external stakeholders whose legacies are still discernible in the current realities of their societies.

The next subsection will provide an account of some of the most salient drivers and root causes that have propelled the expansion of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa Region, namely poverty, unemployment, political and economic marginalization, power politics, identity

politics, the resistance to the establishment of AMISOM in Somalia, as well as widespread mal-administration and weak governance.

5.2.1. Objectives and Ideology

In line with the underpinnings of Critical Terrorism Studies, it is important to reiterate that as a theoretical framework, CTS maintains that terrorist organizations are often founded, amongst other factors, upon a set of ideological objectives and beliefs. Therefore, Gartenstein-Ross (2009) asserts that Al-Shabaab's ideological objectives can be divided into three strands: its inception and evolution; from the al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI) to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU); and finally Al-Shabaab; as the organization is commonly known today. While all three evolutionary stages of the organization emphasized the establishment of a Sharia-led state, the visions of the AIAI and the ICU were nationalistic, in that they focused on the territories within Somali borders and the establishment of a country in which Somalis were the dominant ethnic group. According to Mingst and Karns (2006:100), the second strand relates directly to Al-Shabaab's affiliation and allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Mingst and Karns (2006) suggest that this move is proof of Al-Shabaab's primary concern which is to participate in the broader global jihadist movement. Curran (2011) asserts that the message overtly conveyed by Al-Shabaab in its public statements is one that signifies the move away – in Somalia's climate of nationalistic socio-political struggles – to a wider struggle within the context of worldwide jihad. The last strand can be understood as the organization's capacity to administer and govern.

To this end, Vermeulen (2014) along with other scholars of CTS, argues that it remains important that the African Union, in its attempts to fight and combat Al-Shabaab, continuously follows and addresses the ever-changing ideological underpinnings that inform Al-Shabaab's motivations and objectives. By monitoring and following the evolving ideological underpinnings of Al-Shabaab through the lens of CTS, the present researcher suggests that the African Union and its security agencies will be better able to understand the inner workings, the developments, and nature of terrorism waged by Al-Shabaab.

5.2.2. Power Politics

Along with the ideological underpinnings and objectives that inform the scourge of terror waged by Al-Shabaab, Williams (2018) suggests that one of the driving factors of the scourge of terrorism

inflicted by Al-Shabaab today is a result of what he terms “power politics” (Williams, 2018: 7). The fall of the Siad Barre regime and essentially of the central government of Somalia in the early 1990s, resulted in a chain of political power struggles centred around resurrecting both the state and national institutions and further maintaining control over these institutions.

In agreement with Williams’s (2018) assertions, Menkhaus (2014) argues that Somalia’s political environment has been influenced by what he terms “non-state security providers”. Therefore, Al-Shabaab depicts itself as an entity able to provide security, governance, and justice for the local populations in which it operates in the absence of legitimate state governance or what many political pundits including Rotberg (2003) consider ‘weak states’. Rotberg (2003) argues that states may be categorized as ‘weak’ or as ‘failed’ based on an array of factors, namely geographic, physical, or fundamental economic constraints, as well as on issues of internal instability, mal-administration, and political corruption amongst other pertinent factors. Rotberg (2003) contends that weak states generally consist of a combination of ethnic, religious, clan-centered and other inter-communal conflicts and differences.

By applying the principles of Critical Terrorism Studies and interrogating the dominant interpretations of weak states – much like the one provided by Rotberg (2003) – one is able to classify Somalia as a weak and fragile state as a result of its numerous regions which have been governed by non-state actors – such as AMISOM and Al-Shabaab – who have been in a position to govern through various measures including coercion and to a certain extent, popular support. The control assumed by these alternate “non-state security providers” is often largely violent, especially in the case of Al-Shabaab, and this, therefore, further supports the classification of Somalia as a weak state.

A notable example of these power struggles for consideration is the rise and establishment of the Union of Islamic Courts which ran up against the interests of the TFG. In 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts emerged and further expanded into the brutal organisation known as Al-Shabaab. According to Peck (2007), there was mutual consensus amongst the Somali public which embraced the revival of public order by the militias, primarily as a result of the non-existence of state institutions and structures for the most part, for a number of decades. The Union of Islamic Courts,

however, was flushed out by an Ethiopian intervention task force. The political leadership of the Courts was forced to retreat in Eritrea, while the armed wing continued its operations in Somalia. In addition, scholars of CTS such as Vermeulen (2014) argue that the Ethiopian intervention generated and garnered immense support for Al-Shabaab, as many Somali nationals considered Ethiopia their arch-enemy. By examining these circumstances through a CTS lens, this researcher asserts that such national sentiments and power struggles were crucial factors in cultivating conditions for Al-Shabaab to successfully mobilize and organize both nationally-oriented and jihadist-centered fighters in order to yield the effective hybridization of national jihadism and liberation it has come to represent and symbolize.

5.2.3. Identity Politics

Much like the struggles for political power in Somalia which opened up a gap for Al-Shabaab to mobilize, an important factor that one needs to consider in the reality of Somalia is contained in the clan-divisions. It is common knowledge that in the final years of Siad Barre's dictatorship, the Somali state was divided into contending and somewhat belligerent clan-centered factions (Wise, 2011:3). Throughout the colonial era, six major clan families dominated strategic spheres of Somali society. Within the colonial economic structure, clans transitioned from competing for natural resources such as water, livestock and arable land to contesting for political authority linked to economic incentives (Mohamed, 2009:7). One of the observations obtained by applying CTS to this subsection is that the weak state of Somalia's socio-political order is a result of the evident clan divisions. While individuals within Somali's society are referred to as 'Somalis', Vermeulen (2014) asserts that most people prefer to be addressed according to their clan names. This loyalty is a clear indication of the importance of considering CTS as framework for assessing the socio-political conditions, in particular by naming issues of clan contestations as potential salient drivers and root causes that have influenced the expansion of Al-Shabaab and its terrorism campaign.

These considerations are important in order to provide an all-inclusive explanation and critique of the approaches and methods for countering terrorism. Therefore, in this study it is maintained that it is necessary to link CTS to this point of departure, as CTS embraces pluralistic perspectives in relation to the assessment and analysis of the terrorism phenomenon; more so within the context of the African continent. This observation points to the role that colonialism has played in its

capacity to trigger the grievances of various clans which in turn manifested in the very foundations from which Al-Shabaab indirectly emerged. The aforementioned observation leads one to argue that perhaps the lack of nationhood in Somalia, a country deeply embroiled in clan divisions, is a factor that might have been disregarded by orthodox and traditional intellectuals of terrorism, and that the state-centric approach leads experts, intellectuals and scholars alike to simply assess the Somali state while neglecting the salient factors and underlying drivers that may have led to the emergence of Al-Shabaab.

5.2.4. AMISOM's Presence as a Potential Driver

Along with the socio-political drivers that have been considered above, the researcher asserts that perhaps the establishment and current presence of AMISOM in Somalia needs to be taken into account when considering some of the key drivers that have influenced the establishment and continuous expansion of Al-Shabaab's scourge of terror. This argument is supported by Ligawa (2018) who maintains that the arrival of AMISOM in Somalia sent a series of aggravated waves across Al-Shabaab's cells within the Horn of Africa. Therefore, as it stands, the current researcher maintains that while AMISOM has played a fundamental role in countering Al-Shabaab, it has also played a pivotal role in perpetuating the organization's violent acts of terror.

In addition to the assertions above, Hassan (2012) suggests that many of the interviewees who were interviewed as part of the study, *Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-Shabaab and Youth*; had built up extreme discontent towards AMISOM as a result of the intense bombing of towns across Somalia which led to the destruction of both property and life. Hassan (2012) argues that many young people in Somalia joined Al-Shabaab in order to seek revenge and protect themselves from the military attacks of the armed forces of AMISOM. In addition, there had been increasing discontent as a result of a range of human rights abuses including gang rapes, gender-based violence and the unwarranted killings of innocent civilians which had been conducted by AMISOM armed forces.

When one applies CTS to the abovementioned assessments, it is important that the terror attacks and activities waged by Al-Shabaab should be understood against the background of the scale of attacks waged against them. In addition, through the application of CTS to the study, one may argue that the arrival of AMISOM forces, predominantly within its militarized capacity, has played

a pertinent role in perpetuating the aggravated response by Al-Shabaab and subsequently serves as a consequence of the reality that informs much of the brutal attacks that have been executed by Al-Shabaab.

While this research by no means attempts to justify the rationale behind Al-Shabaab's attacks, it remains of the utmost importance that Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism should be understood and considered according to the current context in which it operates. Crouch (2018) asserts that this is a crucial dynamic that must be taken into account in order to understand Al-Shabaab's employment of violence towards Somalis and the Somali state. Furthermore, within the lens of CTS, this researcher asserts that gaining an insight into the rationale behind Al-Shabaab's grievous acts of terror opens up the opportunity to explain and critique the current methods and approaches to countering Al-Shabaab. The researcher, therefore maintains that by adopting CTS, one may begin to link the rise in violent extremism as espoused by Al-Shabaab to the military threat enforced by the armed wing of the African Union Mission in Somalia, along with its armed allies.

However, it is important to remain clear that this writer does not postulate that Al-Shabaab would reconsider and employ less harmful strategies, had circumstances been more conducive for it to do so. The argument throughout this study does not maintain that the rise of Al-Shabaab is solely a result of the consequences of the establishment of AMISOM and its military approaches. Rather, through this research, the researcher acknowledges that the currently adopted military-driven strategy employed to counter Al-Shabaab has played a role in the expansion of Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism and therefore, must be reconsidered as it has proved to encourage Al-Shabaab to engage. In corresponding to the commitments of CTS, scholars, researchers and experts are able to consider other forms of productive strategies, namely the importance of political dialogue in addressing the socio-economic and political issues that have encouraged members of Somali society to seek an alternative in Al-Shabaab. Emphasis on dialogue allows for the opportunity to attach substantive importance to the demands and needs of civilians.

5.2.5. Mal-administration, Weak Governance, and a Neglect of Socio-Economic Issues

In support of the above-mentioned causes and drivers, Gatuiku (2016: 24) proposes that the weak nature of governance and state administration, particularly in the case of Somalia, can be attributed to the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Gatuiki (2016) further cites the salient porous

borders across the region as a dominant cause and driver. Mal-administration has led to an increase in porous borders in the region, which has consequently facilitated the rise in the free flow of weapons and undocumented individuals who tend to be a threat to the national security of particular states. An additional argument regarding the abovementioned drivers and causes of terror in the Horn of Africa is the spread of radical Islam as a vehicle to address the vivid poor socio-economic conditions and widespread poverty which has been a contributing factor to the socio-economic marginalization of a significant portion of Somalia's population.

Furthermore, CTS scholars, including Vermeulen (2014), argue that in the case of Somalia, perhaps the division between tradition and modernity has played a role in defining the complex political environment and the struggle for power. The division has resulted in a sense of illegitimacy and intrinsically a leadership deficit, which has made it tough for the parties involved to reach a mutual understanding and beneficial compromise. In addition, external variables, existing across both regional and international lines, have played a fundamental role in the deterioration of the political climate, primarily as a result of the employment and implementation of state-centric and military-focused channels and approaches to achieving sustained security and political stability in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa.

This section has illustrated that a number of factors must be taken into account when attempting to understand the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, when viewed through the lens of CTS. Therefore, it remains important that the AU should move away from its one-dimensional military and state-centric approach and move towards employing a multi-pronged strategy that focuses on both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region. Furthermore, this section of the chapter indicates that all the factors and drivers discussed above (ideological objectives, political power struggles, clan loyalty, and the neglect of socio-economic issues such as poverty, a lack of education, and unemployment as a result of mal-administration and poor governance) have led to the emergence of the ideological underpinnings that inform the nature of Al-Shabaab's terror campaign.

5.3. Understanding the Nature of the AU's Responses to Al-Shabaab

The previous section of this chapter was an attempt to unpack the nature and impact of some of the factors that have molded Al-Shabaab into the brutal transnational organisation that it is today.

In addition, the section included an account of some of the fundamental elements that inform the structural make-up of Al-Shabaab and the factors and drivers that have propelled the organisation to undertake some of the grievous acts of terror in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, from this point of departure, one can assert that by assessing the situation on the Horn of Africa through the lens of CTS, one cannot and should not turn a blind eye to the vast challenges and continued obstacles the region inherently faces; many of which are a result of weak governance and mal-administration; infrastructural under-development and stagnation; poverty and social marginalization; intermittent brutal conflict, and other sources of human insecurity stemming fundamentally from the plague of transnational terrorism and organized crime in the region.

Governments across the region, in particular those who are member states of the African Union, have often lacked the capacity to address decisively the scourge of terrorism that continues to plague the Horn of Africa region. It is important to note that the broader region of the Horn of Africa has been at the center of multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism-related discussions and efforts since the early 1990s. Schwartz, Shetret, and Millar (2013: 102) point out that while the dialogue in the early 1990s in the region was extensively focused on the transnational security risks stemming from Yemen as a result of the dangers posed by Al-Qaeda cells firmly established around the broader sub-region, at the present time the conversation and strategic efforts are focused on Al-Shabaab and in particular its complex and dynamic regional presence.

Furthermore, it has been well-documented that in the last decade, regional capacity assistance and technical support provided to the Horn of Africa have fundamentally failed to place substantial emphasis on the importance of civilian counter-terrorism approaches and methods (Schwartz, Shetret, and Millar, 2013). Therefore, within the framework of CTS, this study argues that this is a fundamental and key strategic approach in the field of counter-terrorism, yet the African Union and its member states have often under-utilized this approach, opting to adopt a military-driven approach which has largely been the case in the battle against Al-Shabaab. When one discusses and understands the nature of the African Union's means of combating and countering Al-Shabaab, it is important that one should consider two points of view: firstly, understanding both the contestation against and the grievances of Al-Shabaab from a local point of view; and secondly observing the combating and countering of the organisation from a regional and continental

perspective. Both are of equal importance and will form a fundamental component of this section of the chapter.

Moreover, this research suggests that the formation and implementation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) proved to be an important development in the fight to curb Al-Shabaab. The African Union Mission in Somalia was formed as part of an integral body, actively operating under the jurisdiction of the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 and subsequently approved under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 on 20 February 2007. Its inherent objective was to combat any security threats in Somalia, in particular the continuously developing and complex issue of Al-Shabaab in the region (Ramdeen, 2017:5). According to AMISOM (2014), the peacekeeping mission can be identified as the successor of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace and Support Mission to Somalia, or IGASOM, which was initially set up as an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia. While the mandate of the African Union's Mission in Somalia had been relatively broad, its primary objective was to assist the Somali National Army (SNA) and the transnational government in its fight against Al-Shabaab (AMISOM, 2016). Moreover, when viewed in this light, it is clear that the current context of the region is informed by a range of complex variables.

In order to comply with the theoretical underpinnings of CTS, the next subsections of the chapter will provide an assessment of the current approaches and methods employed by the African Union's forces, with a particular focus on the components that inform AMISOM and the nature of its strategies in combating Al-Shabaab.

5.3.1. Assessing AMISOM's Response to the Scourge of Terrorism

As noted in the above section, AMISOM is a dynamic operation with a vigorous and broad mandate. It is a multidimensional operation that executes a number of various tasks. According to Hesse (2016:574), the African Union Mission in Somalia has three fundamental components which have a common purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia: the Military Component which remains the armed wing of the mission; the Police Component of the Mission which comprises hundreds of police officers from a number of African countries including Niger,

Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Sierra Leone who are tasked with assisting with basic police operations, such as crime prevention, and the prevention of human rights violations. In addition to the police component, AMISOM includes the Civilian Component, which seeks to deal with political, humanitarian, gender-based, and civil society concerns (Williams, 2015).

5.3.2. Components of AMISOM

i. Military component

Since its implementation, AMISOM's military component has undertaken a number of activities that are in line with its mandate which is to impose military power; conduct counter-insurgency and stabilization operations. Some of the activities within AMISOM's operations include the following:

- Force protection procedures such as clearing supply routes and reinforcing base defenses;
- Securing key and strategic supply routes through the deployment of troops;
- Civil-military coordination operations deployed to assist local civilians with accessing basic needs which include medical health care, water, and the purchasing of food;
- Engaging in well structured and coordinated dialogue with clan representatives; and most important within the context of this research study, offensive operations against known Al-Shabaab elements (Crouch, 2018: 37).

While the mandate of AMISOM's military undertakings may appear to be well-organized, the military component of the mission has often come under major scrutiny and criticism – much of which will be discussed in the following section – as a result of perceptions about its stalled military offensives in its fight against Al-Shabaab. Williams (2018) argues that AMISOM's ability to conduct effective military operations is hindered by an enemy (Al-Shabaab) that chooses to engage in asymmetric warfare, as opposed to a conventional military contestation. Some of AMISOM's most recent military operations exemplify Williams's (2018) assertions. A case in point can be attributed to Operation Jubba Corridor of 2015 which was an operation established to attack strategic Al-Shabaab combatants near the Jubba River Valley. In addition, AMISOM

launched Operation Antelope in 2016 as a means to re-establish over 150km of roadways in order to establish four strategic trade routes in the HirShabelle region. Both of these operations stalled prior to their achieving their intended objectives. More recently, AMISOM launched a further joint operation – Operation Safari Hunter – in order to eliminate Al-Shabaab and reclaim territories under the organisation in the Lower Jubba River area. While this operation showed signs of improved coordination owing to its capacity to integrate a number of important forces, the operation was unsuccessful in achieving its objectives (Crouch, 2018:6).

Some of the unsuccessful military objectives undertaken within the military component of AMISOM in pursuits to destroy and degrade Al-Shabaab, have enabled Al-Shabaab to maximize its lethal attacks on AMISOM territory and bases with devastating effect. The militant organisation is aware of the increasing danger its brutal forms of offensive pose to AMISOM troops. Al-Shabaab's commanders have continuously employed these tactics to their advantage. According to Borasora, Walter & Filipec (2017:134), while the increase in troops from 2012 was necessary, it becomes even more important for the AU and its troop of contributing states to increase its military strength and personnel across the spectrum, in order to strengthen the volume of the military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Therefore, one can argue that AMISOM can only garner success if its troops are provided with the necessary adequate training and resources. It is unrealistic to expect the military wing to possess a threat to one of Africa's most superior terrorist organizations while fighting with the current inferior weaponry and poorly trained military personnel at its disposal.

Zadock (2016) argues that the military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia should serve as a pivotal ally to the Somali National Army by providing the necessary leadership needed to steer the operation in the successful direction. However, as will be examined and further critiqued below, AMISOM troops have often been caught up in various scandals including the selling of military equipment to locals. Often this equipment ends up in the hands of Al-Shabaab members. Such discrepancies have left many doubts regarding the legitimacy of the mission and they render the efforts of AMISOM extremely counterproductive.

ii. Police Component

In addition to the armed wing of AMISOM, Kimani (2013), contends that the police component of AMISOM was established with the intention of establishing law and order as well as playing a

fundamental role in peace-building and political stability processes in Somalia. Since its formation, AMISOM's police component has worked closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in order to assist the Somali Police Force (SPF) to develop into a powerful and effective force. According to the AU Commission (2015), this was done through various ways, namely through the establishment of various police structures which sought to serve as an advisory, mentoring, and training task force offering a broad range of policing services such as human rights observance, and crime management in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Jowhar, and Beledweyne.

While the police component of AMISOM has demonstrated some significant and important developments since its inception, the Mission's Police Component has struggled with a number of challenges often related to an inability to reach its objectives as a result of limited human capacity in various police units throughout Mogadishu. Therefore, when viewed through the lens of CTS, this researcher argues that in order for the Police Component of the mission to be highly successful and to execute its intended objectives at full capacity, there must be an injection of highly competent staff members as well as of the necessary equipment needed for the Formed Police Units (FPU) to be able to respond to the security threats that have plagued Mogadishu since the inception of Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations in the region.

The above assertions are supported by Ligawa (2018), who emphasizes that the shortage of skilled and specialized trainers within AMISOM has created an integral challenge which has at times destabilized and delegitimized the work of the Police Component. Furthermore, Williams (2018) argues that amongst its training challenges, the component has suffered severely as a result of inexperience and issues related to language barriers. An approach that this study has highlighted through the application of CTS, is the importance of non-military forms of intervention, namely through civil engagement, and potential dialogue between the various stakeholders involved. Therefore, a proposed approach would be the integration of personnel capable of speaking the native languages of Somalia which would strengthen the ability of the National Security Forces to liaise and communicate with local populations.

iii. The Civilian Component

In addition to the important work that the Police Component seeks to undertake in Somalia, the Civilian Component effectively covers a range of political, humanitarian, and civil society

dynamics. Further, it also serves as the political decision-making body in Somalia, acting on behalf of the African Union Peace and Security Council (Ligawa, 2018:202). Neus (2013:67) contends that since its inception, the Civilian Component has suffered from a series of multi-dimensional peace operations due to a shortage of civilian capabilities such as a lack of specialists, experts, and professionals trained to deal with the structures and process of the rule of law; as well as institutions dealing with issues of securitization, in particular police as well as justice and corrections personnel. According to Williams (2018), AMISOM is certified to have 70 foreign civilian personnel, of which 14 are consultants and 58 of them are national members of staff.

Ligawa (2018:202) contends that much of the staff incapacity and slow civilian recruitment process can be equated to the tendency of staff members to leave the institution once they have gained the necessary valuable work experience. This leaves a massive gap in expertise. Another observation made in Ligawa's (2018:202) study is that a large portion of the civilians are often trained in accordance with the preference of the donor rather than that of the needs of the mission itself. As such, one could contend that there is a dire need for the African Union to reconsider the compensations of the staff members within its civilian operations and provide the necessary guidance and training in accordance with the necessary demands of the African Union Mission in Somalia. One cannot deny the critical and important role that this particular component of the mission plays on behalf of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

AMISOM's civilian component comprises six units:

- (i) The Political Affairs unit which is tasked with assisting the AU PSC's regarding political decision-making in Somalia.
- (ii) The Public Information unit which is mandated to distribute information related to AMISOM's activities.
- (iii) The Humanitarian Liaison unit which is responsible for liaising with various humanitarian agencies.
- (iv) The Protection, Human Rights and Gender unit which seeks to implement the AU's agenda on human rights and gender-based practices.
- (v) The Security Sector Reform unit which is mandated to undertake AMISOM's key security matters.
- (vi) The Civil Affairs unit which is arguably one of the most important elements of the

civilian component in that it is mandated to facilitate the implementation of AMISOM's overarching mandate across all local political levels (Williams, 2018).

By applying CTS as a theoretical framework, one can argue that this is a case in which AMISOM could assert its capacity as an entity capable of addressing the basic needs of civilians; an opportunity, however, that AMISOM and its forces fail to take advantage of. In support of the above argument, Mohamud (2014) contends that much of the negligence and decline in strategic awareness by AMISOM and its forces at critical times – such as the example provided above – in its fight against Al-Shabaab can, in part, be linked to the Mission's disregard for the importance of a people-centered approach – one which seeks to take into consideration the basic needs of the civilians and the population at large, as opposed to continuously attacking the symptom that is Al-Shabaab.

Viewed in this light, one cannot deny that AMISOM has played a substantial role by its attempts to curb the militant organisation. In addition, while the discussion in this chapter does not dispute the relative success achieved by AMISOM, the following section reflects the application of Critical Terrorism Studies in order to provide a critique of the abovementioned approaches to countering Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.

5.4. A Critique of AMISOM's Role in Fighting Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa

While AMISOM and its regional partners have been able to push back Al-Shabaab from a large portion of its strongholds, the Mission still faces major drawbacks and challenges as a result of its largely militarized approach which has, to a large extent, ignored some of the key drivers that encourage Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism; namely the problematic nature of its armed forces; a clear lack of state capacity and mal-administration; competing national priorities as a result of clan divisions; and the failure to develop institutions dedicated to addressing the socio-economic disparities which inform the realities of the current state of Somalia. A critique of the current counter-terrorism measures in the Horn of Africa will uncover that merely treating the symptoms – which has been the primary approach of the African Union and its allies – no longer serves as a viable option.

By employing CTS as a theoretical framework to unpack, explain, critique and move away from the orthodox and traditional approaches to terrorism which inform the nature of AMISOM's

peacekeeping and counter-terrorism mechanisms in combating Al-Shabaab, the researcher is able to gain an increasingly nuanced perspective on the understanding of the dynamic drivers and root causes of the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. By applying Critical Terrorism Studies within this research study, a greater focus can be brought to bear on addressing the various root causes and drivers that have propelled Al-Shabaab to undertake the grievous acts of terror. Such an approach would mean a shift away from a largely militarized approach and entail an increasingly holistic approach focusing on both the symptoms (attacking the military operations and leadership structures of Al-Shabaab) and the root causes (addressing the socio-economic grievances and disparities as well as political marginalization) of the Al-Shabaab issue in Somalia and throughout the broader Horn of Africa region.

In this chapter, much like the previous chapter, the importance of a military strategy is not dismissed; however, it proposes an equal or greater emphasis on a multi-pronged approach that seeks to tackle and address the multi-dimensional grievances of Somali society. Crouch (2018) suggests that the African Union's counter-terrorism strategy in parts of the African continent has frequently been driven on the premise of "degrade and destroy". Therefore, by opposing this approach to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, it is suggested in this research that employing a critical lens to terrorism – in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region – would allow for the implementation of a multi-pronged approach which focuses on de-escalating violence, supporting reconciliation, as well as addressing and tackling the root socio-economic issues that underpin much of Somali society. Crouch (2018) asserts that once the symptoms and root causes become the focus of analysis (as opposed to merely the military destruction of a particular stakeholder), counter-terrorism approaches begin to shift towards more productive methods.

This section of the research concurs with Crouch's (2018) assertions by suggesting that through the lens of CTS, one is able to begin to view the socio-economic issues, human rights abuses, and civilian deaths (amongst other grievances felt throughout Somali society) as the result of historical consequences which have been further perpetuated through the orthodoxies of a military intervention. Therefore, in the following subsections of this chapter, CTS will be further employed in order to provide a critique of the currently held counter-terrorism measures reflected within the orthodox approaches to Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism. The subsections below offer a critique of the African Union's counter-terrorism agenda in the Horn of Africa by asserting that

AMISOM's largely "degrade and destroy" military approach has, for the most part, disregarded some of the most salient underlying causes of Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism.

5.4.1. AMISOM's Incapacity to Deal with Somalia's Political Crisis

Williams (2018) argues that within the broader context of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region, a viable and effective political strategy is necessary to address the root causes and key drivers of the Al-Shabaab issue. Corresponding to the above-mentioned argument, this researcher asserts that within the wider context of the issue presented by Al-Shabaab particularly in Somalia, lies a political crisis driven by debates around the necessary systems of governance and state-building institutions.

This research, then, offers a critique of the orthodox and traditional approaches that have been adopted by AMISOM in its pursuits to diminish and eliminate Al-Shabaab, by asserting that it has at times taken precedence over the safety and security of civilians within Somali communities. In relation to Crouch's (2018) aforementioned assertions, Participant 1 offers a corresponding critique of the mission's counter-terrorism approach by maintaining that "AMISOM has not been very effective in reforming and re-establishing the necessary political processes in Somalia" (Interview, Participant 1, 07/07/2018). Thus, by employing CTS as the framework to assess and critique AMISOM's capacity to implement a political strategy to address some of the pertinent drivers of Al-Shabaab's scourge of terror, one can contend that it remains important that AMISOM should ensure that Somali nationals are at the forefront of any political dialogue, rather than being recipients of political decisions forcefully implemented by foreign donors and external constituencies.

However, by applying CTS in order to critique the measures employed by AMISOM in countering Al-Shabaab, it is clear that its focus on "degrade and destroy" – the counter-terrorism approach as termed by Crouch (2018) – has neglected the root causes and key drivers that inform the wider grievances that have encouraged Al-Shabaab's violent contestation for political and state power. Similar to the case of Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria, political and economic marginalization of portions of Somali's population – namely young people – have forced the young of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa to opt to join Al-Shabaab as a result of poor and corrupt political administration and governance; a factor that has largely been ignored by AMISOM under its "degrade and destroy" strategy. For this reason, it remains important to critique AMISOM's

strategy for its incapacity to address the scourge of terror waged by Al-Shabaab by means of political dialogue. While one acknowledges Al-Shabaab's refusal to co-operate by means of non-violent political engagement, AMISOM's complete disregard of this option has led Al-Shabaab to maintain its violent military contestation.

i. A Critique of AMISOM's Military Component: A Lackluster Security and Stabilization Approach

Regarding the importance of AMISOM's military unit, Ligawa (2018) contends that the establishment and expansion of AMISOM's military component has generated a sense of relative security throughout previously Al-Shabaab-controlled territories which has enabled the peace process in the country to start taking shape. For civilians in various Al-Shabaab territories, a sense of accountable governance and institutional legitimacy has been instilled as a result of the expansion of AMISOM's military component.

While one cannot gainsay the optimism stressed by Ligawa's (2018) assertions, in this study AMISOM's military component is assessed from a critical perspective by applying the underpinnings of CTS. Viewed in this light, it is important to take into account that AMISOM has often drawn criticism for its inability to secure stability within the jurisdiction of primary routes and roads in areas and regions that it had captured from Al-Shabaab, which has meant that civilians still face the risk of being either killed or violently intimidated as well as being subjected to extortion and heavy taxation by members of Al-Shabaab; all of which has resulted in the continued rise of economic hardship.

Although Ligawa (2018) expresses the above-mentioned sense of optimism in relation to the military presence of AMISOM in Somalia, Participant 4, in an interview conducted in Pretoria, voiced concerns regarding many of the obstacles that remain for the troops currently on the ground in Somalia. Participant 4 asserts that there are still "the terrifying bombs that are still being detonated throughout the streets of Mogadishu and surrounding cities and villages" (Interview, Participant 4, 22/07/2018). Corresponding to Participant 4's assertions, Williams (2018) contends that AMISOM's military component is informed by a lack of pertinent strategies necessary to stabilise the territories which it has recaptured from Al-Shabaab, and thus, Al-Shabaab has continuously exploited this strategic deficit through the consistent terrorization of civilians.

Therefore, to add to the critique, while AMISOM has been relatively successfully in achieving its military objectives, namely recapturing the most strategic population centers and trade routes that were previously under the control of Al-Shabaab, through the commitments of CTS, one can argue that the state-centric and military-driven approach has failed in curbing Al-Shabaab's asymmetric strategies and persistent tactics of destabilization and harassment. Therefore, from a Critical Terrorism Studies perspective, this researcher argues that AMISOM's drive to execute its predominantly military strategy in destabilizing and eradicating Al-Shabaab, has failed to establish and build legitimate institutions dedicated to addressing and tackling pertinent security challenges – that Al-Shabaab continues to inflict on civilians – as well as on effective structures committed to delivering basic needs and services. Further, in applying CTS to critiquing AMISOM's lackluster stabilization and offensive efforts, one can argue that the mission's limited capabilities are a result of its limited non-military components and its neglect to incorporate civilians and local leaders in its counter-terrorism approach.

ii. AMISOM's Disregard of Human Rights Abuses

Amongst other criticisms that still haunt AMISOM to date, are accusations of human rights abuses including allegations of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation by its forces which were released in a September 2017 Human Rights Watch report. This non-governmental organisation detailed a series of accounts of sexual abuse, violence, and exploitation largely committed by AMISOM forces against Somali women and young girls in many of its bases in the capital of Mogadishu. The soldiers representing the African Union are said to have employed a number of strategies to lure vulnerable women and young girls into performing sexual activities and other unspeakable actions (Human Rights Watch, 2017:44).

The report offers an in-depth critique of AMISOM by conducting a series of interviews in attempts to expose the African Union's soldiers for the horrifying crimes they committed. Thus, scholars of CTS including Allison (2014) argue that one cannot detach AMISOM's supposed success from its failure to protect the most vulnerable. By further applying CTS in order to critique AMISOM's disregard for human rights, this researcher asserts that such an assessment makes it difficult to hail AMISOM as a success story in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, let alone in the horn of Africa when there are records of malicious intent and activities as well as firsthand accounts of

oppressing the very civilians that it is tasked to protect and defend. Allison (2014) sums up the actions illustrated by AMISOM forces as a “reason for the abused victims to join militant organizations such as Al-Shabaab because such actions portray the ‘good guys as the bad guys’”.

As was contended in this research study in Chapter 3, by employing Critical Terrorism Studies as the theoretical framework, approaches to terrorism that marginalize women and other vulnerable groups are firmly rejected in the present study. For this reason, while this research acknowledges and supports AMISOM’s dedication to prioritizing the safety and security of women and young girls; and its inclusion of marginalized groups in its peace processes under its Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda; CTS is used in this study to criticize much of the human rights abuses perpetuated by AMISOM armed forces. The Mission has failed to fully embrace its “zero-tolerance” policy and is yet to formulate an accountability framework which could see harsher consequences for perpetrators. However, the researcher acknowledges that this is not entirely an AMISOM problem, but an issue related to the AU Commission’s lack of agency in establishing an overarching directive consisting of records and screening processes for AMISOM’s personnel who have been found guilty of perpetuating human rights abuses.

The CTS critique of AMISOM is in relation to the human rights abuses including gang rapes, sexual exploitation and discrimination, as well civilian deaths as a result of drone strikes that AMISOM troops, regional forces and various proxy militia have continued to perpetuate since 2009. While AMISOM has made relative strides in advancing a Women, Peace, and Security agenda dedicated to prioritizing the safety and security of women and young girls; and including women and young girls in its peace processes, this research agrees with the commitments and sentiments of various scholars of CTS who argue that AMISOM has failed to establish an effective and overarching mandate that explicitly deals with gender issues amongst other human rights grievances. For this reason, the Mission will continue to be met with serious enmity by those victims and civilians that it claims to be protecting. This has further reduced its capacity to claim the moral high-ground over-Al-Shabaab, allowing victims of human rights abuses to strongly believe Al-Shabaab’s narrative that AMISOM and its allies are the reason for substantial human rights violations.

iii. AMISOM’s Territorial Negligence and Disregard of the Importance of Local Governance

While the African Union Mission in Somalia has often been hailed as a relative success story in

its fight against Al-Shaabab, a conclusive defeat over Al-Shabaab has not been achieved. The reality is that instead of suffering defeat, Al-Shabaab's armed units have often opted to evacuate and withdraw to smaller, more remote, rural cells which have allowed the organisation to regroup and re-strategize in order to re-emerge as the formidable and brutally dominant regional presence it is today. Subsequently, other radicalized groups and well-trained and experienced fighters within the structures of Al-Shabaab are able to continue carrying out attacks across the Horn of Africa (International Crisis Group, 2017). According to Abshir (2018), AMISOM has prioritized the objective to remove and eradicate Al-Shabaab by means of military force, and therefore has neglected the importance of local governance and reconciliation in many of the areas recaptured by AMISOM.

This rhetoric was further extended in the above-mentioned interview with Participant 4 who blamed the strengthening of Al-Shabaab's regional presence on the negligence of counter-terrorism forces and multilateral organizations fighting terrorism in the region, more specifically, AMISOM. Participant 4 notes that:

“... anybody who is trained militarily, you know that if you flush out your enemy, you don't leave a vacuum in that area, you need to come in so that you can be in a position to educate the people so that if these people want to come back for the second time they are not given a chance and that the people would not only be waiting for you because AMISOM had done quite a good job in Somalia for an example but then what would happen is that they would flush out Al-Shabaab but then they would stay in the villages or districts for a few days and then leave, and what would Al-Shabaab do? They would come back and kill all those that are collaborating with AMISOM and then it's back to square one” (Interview, Participant 4, 22/07/2018).

In agreement with the sentiments offered by Participant 4, findings of this research offer a criticism of AMISOM's military strategy for its incapacity to establish interim local structures to ensure cohesive and effective administration and governance following the elimination of Al-Shabaab in certain districts, villages, or cities reclaimed by AMISOM forces. This research further applies CTS as its framework to critique the orthodoxies that exist within such an approach. It contends

that within the traditional framework of approaching terrorism lies a lack of understanding of the necessary procedures and processes needed within such an intervention. This critique offered under the framework of CTS corresponds with the view of Participant 4 who contends that “there isn’t a holistic approach to the Somalia issue. There should never be a vacuum left” (Interview, Participant 4, 22/07/2018).

Crouch (2018) states that AMISOM’s territorial negligence post-Al-Shabaab elimination has led to the re-emergence of clan-driven conflicts in many of the AMISOM liberated areas as a result of mal-administration and a lack of local governance structures. An example provided by the Saferworld (2018) report asserts that the inter-clan contestations for political power in Marka town in Lower Shabelle by the Biyomaal and Habr Gedr as well as other significant local clans is a result of the power vacuum left behind by AMISOM. Further, the same Saferworld (2018) report provides views shared by clan militia leaders who contend that Al-Shabaab had made efforts to reconcile clan-contestations and disputes; however, with the elimination of Al-Shabaab, clan-contestations amongst opposing clans in the area had risen dramatically. Typical of AMISOM’s lackluster approach in establishing the necessary administrative and local governance structures, various clan leaders have criticized AMISOM’s reconciliation efforts by contending that the approaches that were suggested were “short-term pragmatic agreements”.

In response to the abovementioned critiques, after applying CTS, one may assert that AMISOM’s military approach which is centered on the complete elimination and decimation of Al-Shabaab, has taken precedence over dealing with various key drivers and root causes of the issue at hand. This approach has neglected to establish legitimate local institutions and accountable structures of governance; has neglected to employ non-military approaches such as primarily by utilizing its civilian component for addressing the prevalent clan-contestations that exist amongst Somali communities. These are a few of the societal dynamics and factors that may encourage individuals to embrace the ideological underpinnings of groups such as Al-Shabaab.

Adding to this debate, Williams (2018) argues that the challenges faced by AMISOM’s civilian components primarily in recently recaptured Al-Shabaab territories are a result of the Federal Government, regional administrations and AMISOM’s partners’ lack of support and backing in

expanding the Mission's civilian and police components. Therefore, the findings of this chapter certainly concur with the commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies by contending that counter-terrorism and stabilization approaches in Somalia and in the broader Horn of Africa cannot solely be based on armed security and military intervention, but need to entail a comprehensive multi-pronged and people-centered approach. Within the realm of terrorism in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region, when one assesses AMISOM's approaches to terrorism, one can argue that the Mission has to a large extent neglected the importance of engaging with a wide range of stakeholders such as community leaders and clan militia leaders. Further, it has neglected to take into consideration the grievances of ordinary people, namely young people, women, and other marginalized members of society – a commitment widely held by CTS.

iv. Failure to Track and Trace Al-Shabaab's Financial Flows

Much like the case of Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria, one of the root causes that the African Union and its mandated missions have failed to address and tackle is the combating of the terror-financing of Al-Shabaab. Like all insurgent groups or terrorist organizations, Al-Shabaab is faced with the dire task of generating and raising funds, be it from illicit or licit networks. According to a report titled "*Somalia: Al-Shabaab- It Will Be a Long War*" released by the ICG (2014), Al-Shabaab pays its members between \$150-\$500 monthly and cares for the fighters within its ranks. In addition, veterans and families of 'martyrs' are regularly compensated for their deeds. However, the financial channels of the organisation comprise an important point of departure which must be examined within this discourse.

According to Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010:32), in addition to its checkpoint taxes as well as its control over various strategic ports in the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab generates its funds through robust extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and by imposing war taxes. In a more expanded assessment, Vilkko's (2011) findings offer an argument that suggests that the external sources of funding for Al-Shabaab are Somalis and those who align themselves with the group's ideological underpinnings within the Somali diaspora; Hawala money transfer networks; and Somali business networks within the diaspora. In a similar fashion, the internal financial channels involved are not restricted to direct financial control of cash flows, taxations and import duties from strategic ports such as the Port of Kismayo. Furthermore, protection fees collected from industries as well as from aid communities also serve as financial income for the organisation.

Like many militant organizations, Al-Shaabab must generate revenue in order to compete on the military front. Crouch (2018), asserts that much of Al-Shabaab's capital flows are generated from civilian populations. Al-Shabaab employs a taxation and revenue-generation system called Zakat which has allowed the organisation to sustain itself financially. The implementation of Zakat on essential goods such as livestock and harvest crops has often been enforced through violent means as many civilians are killed and maimed for resisting and opposing. Keatinge (2014:19), suggests that the organisation is able to generate its internal revenue from its control over strategic ports and markets which has allowed it to substantially advance its strategic capacities.

Further, a 2018 report released by Saferworld entitled *Counter-terror and the logic of violence in Somalia's civil war: Time for a new approach* illustrates that regional security agencies have attempted to shut down Al-Shabaab's revenue generation by blocking and targeting its international and regional financial flows through the control of major ports and important import and export routes. For example, the Kismayo Port located in Kismayo where Al-Shabaab had its 'headquarters' was able to generate between \$35 million to \$50 million per year. In addition to the targeting of strategic ports, Menkhaus (2014:156) suggests that Al-Shabaab acquires its income through the collection of taxes at strategic and popular checkpoints. This implication is supported by Anderson and McKnight (2014:11), who note that amongst some of the various checkpoints established by Al-Shabaab, Buula Xaaji Checkpoint requires trucks seeking to pass through to pay anything between \$250 and \$500 depending on the size of the trucks. Anderson and McKnight (2014) contend that in 2013, the large sum of \$650,000 worth of tax was collected per month at the aforementioned checkpoint.

In view of this, a number of interviewed senior analysts in the abovementioned Saferworld report indicated that the intended strategy by AMISOM and various regional security bodies did not yield the intended results because of the inadequacy of governmental management and pointed out that AMISOM held ports which forced traders to use Al-Shabaab-held routes for efficient transportation of their goods. Tracing, tracking, and subsequently curbing Al-Shabaab's financial flows will serve as an important step in reducing the organization's terror activities across the Horn of Africa – an approach that AMISOM has blatantly neglected. Therefore, one can offer a critique through the lens of CTS by suggesting that while there have been attempts at tracing and tracking the financial cash flows of Al-Shabaab, AMISOM and its allies have, in its efforts to curb the

organization's terror objectives, lacked a coherent and effective administrative and management strategy to limit and restrict the financial endeavors of Al-Shabaab.

v. A Disregard of Al-Shabaab's Effective Global Recruitment Processes

Al-Shabaab's leadership structure can be characterized as successfully dense and flexible – a reflection of the organization's composition of dynamic cells, and widely spread units. At the top, Al-Shabaab is administered by a supreme Commander-in-Chief known as an Emir, who is supported by a council composed of ten members. Shuriye (2012) notes that this ten-member council is tasked with the responsibility of serving as an advisory body with limited powers. By analyzing Shuriye's (2012) assessment, one can contend that the organization's leadership structure borrows the composition of its structure from the Islamic State (IS) in that both political and military personal are employed and tasked with the responsibility of overlooking each region under the control of Al-Shabaab. An Islamic Police (*aysh al-Hisbah*) informs the nature of its security structures; and a *hisbah* oversees and administers its religious councils and the Sharia courts.

According to the BBC (2017), there are believed to be between 7000 and 9000 Al-Shabaab fighters and between 500 and 3000 foreign fighters who are predominantly Somali, Sudanese, Yemenis, Saudi, and Kenyan nationals; all who have joined the organisation for various reasons. An important and beneficial assessment in line with the commitments of CTS is offered by Botha and Abdile (2014) who present a study which focuses on the sociological underpinnings of the radicalization and recruitment of Al-Shabaab. CTS espouses the importance of counter-terrorism bodies in understanding the reasons why individuals join terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab.

So, by applying CTS to the discussion above, it becomes clear that when attempting to curb the expansion of the threat of Al-Shabaab, the need for the African Union and its security agencies to take into account the rationale behind individuals' joining terrorist organizations is of great importance and will be emphasized in this study. While this study is not comparative in nature, CTS is the theoretical framework that is applied to both case studies and therefore, it is important that a few similarities are highlighted throughout Chapter 5 in order to afford this study the opportunity to concisely critique and eventually recommend appropriate counter-terrorism approaches to the African Union. Some of these similarities include the fact that, much like

Nigeria, young people in Somalia make up a large portion of the country's population, and much like Boko-Haram, Al-Shabaab's structures are made up of predominantly young people, of which many remain unemployed.

This writer of this study maintains that it is important to apply CTS in order to gain an understanding of some of the key drivers that encourage young people to join Al-Shabaab. Such an assessment will allow the African Union to take into account and address the increasing frustrations of young people as a result of the grave socio-economic realities that have encouraged them to join groups such as Al-Shabaab. By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, one can argue that the orthodoxies within the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies by the African Union – AMISOM, in this particular context – have disregarded the importance of addressing (amongst other social issues) the challenge of youth unemployment and the lack of access to education which encourage young people to join Al-Shabaab. More important, through the lens of CTS, one can assert that the orthodox approaches currently upheld by the African Union's mandated missions and operations in Somalia have failed to prioritize the importance of formulating policies, and implementing programs dedicated to assisting young people to participate in the socio-economic processes of society – an approach suggested in this study that would play an important role in discouraging young people from joining such organizations.

The study conducted by Botha and Abdile (2014) referred to earlier, supports the aforementioned assertion. This study indicates that the reasons why individuals, in particular young people, join terrorist groups, include a broad spectrum of factors namely economic difficulties, religious motivations, and a lack of basic education. Above all, the assessment presented above is yet again a reflection of the significance of employing a CTS framework when examining various factors and drivers that inform Al-Shabaab's scourge of terror in the Horn of Africa. While it is important to flush out the militant objectives of Al-Shabaab, a simple straightforward orthodox method that is symptomatic in nature cannot be considered sufficient and therefore, it remains important for the African Union and its security agencies to adopt a theoretical framework such as CTS in order to assess the complexities and factors – such as widespread youth unemployment – that have opened up gaps for Al-Shabaab to effectively conduct mass recruitment across the Horn of Africa.

As this section of the chapter has attempted to demonstrate, Al-Shabaab incorporates much more

than ideological underpinnings in its terror campaign across the region. The brutality of its activities and attacks in the Horn of Africa not only garners the attention of the international community, but more important, draws the attention of its local populations, who are more likely to be persuaded by elements of financial inclination, legitimate security, and accountable governance. In answer to this, CTS attempts to include these elements and factors in order to build a more profound, holistic comprehension of some of the ways in which the African Union and its security agencies can counter Al-Shabaab.

5.5. Adopting an Effective Counter-terrorism Approach in Somalia

While the previous section applied CTS to critique some of the pertinent gaps that exist within the AU's military-driven approaches to the threat of Al-Shabaab, this section of the chapter seeks to provide a series of recommendations which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

As previously mentioned, the application of CTS throughout this study does not position this theoretical framework as an immediate cure of terrorism in Somalia; rather it emphasizes the importance of the African Union being assessed from a critical perspective, in order for a set of effective recommendations to be suggested. Moreover, while the African Union Mission in Somalia has had its successes, this chapter of the study suggests that the African Union should endorse a number of adjustments and amendments within the current counter-terrorism operations in Somalia.

It is important to reiterate that the present researcher does not disregard the importance of combating the military aggression of Al-Shabaab, and therefore suggests that in order for the African Union to be successful in its military endeavors, it is important that troops of contributing states prioritize resource allocation for its joint task forces and missions through consistent financial support; through the steady turnover of human capital and well-trained military personnel; and dependable and advanced military artillery.

In line with the above suggestions, outcomes of this study emphasize the limitations of orthodox and extremely military-driven approaches to countering Al-Shabaab, and propose that the African Union along with its various security agencies in Somalia and the Horn of Africa should prioritize non-military forms of intervention and counter-terrorism measures – an approach that has been heavily emphasized throughout this study, both in relation to how the African Union deals with

Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria and how it combats Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This writer suggests that regional cooperation between troops of contributing states and AMISOM could open up opportunities for effectively implementing non-military forms of intervention, namely through dialogue and engagement with Al-Shabaab's leadership.

Further findings from this study suggest that it is important that the African Union and its mandated missions and operations consider various socio-economic and political factors that influence the undertakings of Al-Shabaab, such as issues of clan-divisions, youth unemployment, poverty, political and economic marginalization, amongst other factors causing dissatisfaction. Even more important, is the fact that Somalis should be at the helm of the conversation and dialogue on peacekeeping and peace-building operations. It is clear that the military approach to combating Al-Shabaab in Somalia has not yielded its intended objectives, and therefore, in this study it is proposed that the African Union Mission and other security agencies in Somalia create institutions and structures committed to playing a role in assisting Somalis to recommend potential policies, resolutions, and approaches to solving the issue of Al-Shabaab in their country. Setting up public platforms of engagement is a necessary approach and a step in the right direction, which could lead to establishing frameworks which take into account the socio-economic and political factors that have influenced individuals to join Al-Shabaab.

5.6. Conclusion

In Chapter 5 a critique has been presented of some of the orthodoxies that inform the military and symptomatic-centered counter-terrorism approach undertaken by the African Union in Somalia and in the broader Horn of Africa, particularly within the various components that make up AMISOM. In this chapter the framework of CTS has been applied to the case study by assessing the scope of terrorism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia. Further, an assessment of the approaches undertaken by AMISOM in countering Al-Shabaab has been presented. The approaches adopted by AMISOM were fundamentally critiqued for their neglect in addressing some of the most pertinent root causes and issues that inform the Al-Shabaab crisis, namely: socio-economic grievances and political marginalization; the problematic nature of AMISOM's armed forces; a lack of state capacity and widespread mal-administration; as well as competing national priorities in the form of clan contestations. While the researcher acknowledges that AMISOM has attempted to take the initiative in applying a multi-pronged strategy across its

military, police, and civilian components, in this chapter the critiques of AMISOM are based on its over-emphasis of a military-centered counter-terrorism approach based on its stringent “degrade and destroy” point of departure; thereby neglecting some of the key drivers and root causes of Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism.

In relation to the critiques offered throughout this chapter, this research shows that as a result of the magnitude of Al-Shabaab’s regional presence in the Horn of Africa, African Union counter-insurgency bodies including AMISOM will have to acknowledge that only once the symptoms as well as the root causes become the focus of analysis (as opposed to merely the military decimation of Al-Shabaab) will its counter-terrorism approaches begin to reap the intended results in line with its objectives. Therefore, the critiques provided throughout this chapter acknowledge that the strategic terrorism espoused by Al-Shabaab present a multi-faceted threat to the Horn of Africa region and therefore a multi-dimensional strategy is required to deal with the issue.

Furthermore, the critiques of AMISOM’s current approaches to the challenges presented by Al-Shabaab have illustrated that there must be increasingly concerted efforts by a range of stakeholders including neighboring governments and various multi-lateral institutions across the region. Enhanced collaboration amongst regional actors will play a pivotal role in reducing Al-Shabaab’s regional territorial presence; limit the cross-border funneling of money and weapons; and constrain the organization’s ability to move freely across borders.

To this end, the following chapter concludes this study. In Chapter 6, key findings of the study are reviewed and its primary contributions are recapped. Chapter 6 subsequently recommends how the critiques offered in Chapters 4 and 5 can assist the African Union, its various security agencies, and its allies, to reassess its largely military-driven counter-terrorism approach to the threats posed by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab in northeastern Nigeria. Finally, the study’s limitations are provided and recommendations for future research are presented.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1. Introduction

The key objective of Chapter 5 was to examine the counter-terrorism strategy currently employed by the African Union, in particular AMISOM; to discuss the applicability of its strategy, and to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of such an approach in relation to the strategic terrorism waged by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region. By applying Critical Terrorism Studies as the theoretical framework for a critique of AMISOM's counter-terrorism efforts, Chapter 5 endeavored to answer the fourth supportive research question which was:

How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?

Chapter 6 begins by recapping the research problem and explicitly answering the research questions. Thereafter, a brief overview of Chapters 2 to 5 forms an integral part of this chapter. In a conclusion to the aforementioned chapters, this chapter will review the primary findings of the research while simultaneously considering the theoretical limitations of the research study. The final focus of this chapter will be to offer a set of recommendations for future research on the necessary counter-terrorism strategies on the African continent, coupled with a summary of concluding remarks.

6.2. Research Problem and Questions

The focus of this study is to describe, explain, and further critique the efforts adopted by the African Union in addressing and tackling the scourge of terror waged across the African continent. More important, the focus of this research is the assessment of the development, expansion, and undertakings of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and simultaneously, of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region. By applying the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies, the aim of this research study is to critique the African Union's counter-terrorism approaches to these two case studies with the purpose of eventually proposing recommendations for the currently upheld approaches to terrorism in the cases specific to Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.

The continued scourge of terrorism across northeastern Nigeria and the broader Horn of Africa region gave rise to the research problem that was concisely stated and presented in Chapter 1 of this research study. This research has problematized the military-driven strategy currently adopted by the African Union and its various security agencies which merely confront and counter the symptoms of the terror activities waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, consequently disregarding the root causes of terrorism. This approach is unlikely to lead to a sustainable and far-reaching amelioration of terrorism, not only in the abovementioned regions but across the African continent. Based on the research problem stated above, this study intends to highlight the value of Critical Terrorism Studies critiques of the orthodoxies that exist within the traditional and military-centered approaches currently upheld by the African Union and its various mandated institutions. Furthermore, by interrogating the research problem, this study has the primary objective of eventually uncovering how these critiques and further recommendations may assist the AU to adopt increasingly multi-dimensional strategies in its efforts to fight terrorism on the continent. Therefore, the main research question guiding this study is:

How and to what extent have the African Union's counter-terrorism policies contributed to adequately combating terrorism in northern Nigeria and Somalia?

In order to facilitate the answering of the main research question, four supportive research questions have been framed. Therefore, the study's first research question reads: *What counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ?* The literature review offered in Chapter 2 had the task of answering this. Chapter 2 introduced the reader to concepts and contending perspectives within the study of terrorism. In this chapter, the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies which was widely employed as the theoretical anchor throughout this research study, was discussed. In addition, Chapter 2 provided a historical outlook on the origins, evolutions, and ideological developments of both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively. More important, Chapter 2 uncovered the origins and background of the African Union's counter-terrorism policies as well as its primary institutions mandated to prevent and rid the continent of the scourge of terrorism. The analysis deduced from the literature review suggests that many scholars hold the view that a multi-dimensional approach centered on addressing and attacking both root causes and symptoms of terrorism has the ability to ameliorate the threat of terrorism waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

The remaining three supportive research questions were considered in relation to the theory supporting this research study. Thus, while Chapter 2 intended to provide a detailed and comprehensive review of existing literature, Chapter 3 had the primary objective of answering the research study's second supportive research question which reads:

Does the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain, and critique the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in northern Nigeria and Somalia respectively?

Chapter 3 focused on contextualizing Critical Terrorism Studies in order to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and applicability of the African Union's current counter-terrorism methods, interventions, and missions in relation to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. The theoretical framework of CTS in Chapter 3 concurrently critiqued the orthodox field of terrorism studies which inherently continues to be the dominant approach employed in the development of both regional as well as global counter-terrorism policies, frameworks, and mechanisms. Moreover, the utility, analysis, and considered value of CTS within the African context was discussed comprehensively.

While the main research question guides Chapters 4 and 5, both these chapters have the central aim of answering the study's third and fourth supportive research questions. Chapter 4 seeks to assess and critique the counter-terrorism strategies currently employed by the African Union, and therefore serves the purpose of answering the study's third supportive research question which reads:

To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in northern Nigeria?

In this chapter, the African Union's counter-terrorism approach in northeastern Nigeria in relation to Boko Haram was examined and CTS is applied in order to offer a critique of the effectiveness and plausibility of its counter-terrorism approach.

Chapter 5 was guided by the fourth supportive research question which was:

How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?

The primary focus of Chapter 5 was to provide an overview of Al-Shabaab's strategic terrorism in Somalia and across the Horn of Africa and subsequently to employ CTS as a theoretical framework in assessing and critiquing primarily the African Union Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM) counter-terrorism approaches.

6.3. Main Findings

The main argument presented in this study is that the counter-terrorism approach adopted by the African Union in its fight against the threat of both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab has been largely centered on dealing with the symptoms of terrorism while disregarding the driving factors and root causes of the issue at hand, and therefore, it has not been able to yield the intended results. Furthermore, in this study, an attempt was made to apply the framework of Critical Terrorism Studies in order to broaden the knowledge and understanding of terrorism undertaken by both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, and further widen the scope for future knowledge production and research into the necessary approaches to dealing with the threat of terrorism on the African continent. The threat of terrorism on the African continent continues to develop and evolve at an exponential rate, and for this reason, some of the most recent acts of terror may not have been considered in the study.

6.3.1. Critical Terrorism Studies: A Necessary Alternative Approach in Terrorism Studies

By recapping the body of literature discussed throughout this research study, it is clear that Critical Terrorism Studies represents terrorism-associated research centered on the skepticism around state-centric and traditional underpinnings of terrorism. This study has shown that CTS seeks to broaden the study and field of terrorism by considering subjects that are often rejected and disregarded under the orthodoxies of traditional and mainstream terrorism studies. The study adopted a skeptical approach to the most prominent theories within the orthodox strands in international relations, namely the Realism/Neo-Realism and Liberalism/Neo-Liberalism schools of thought. Within the analysis of both these theories, this study examined their broad emphasis on the various forms and types of violence employed by 'terrorists' and how to counter these 'terrorists', which is in opposition to an approach encouraging understanding of the various factors

and key drivers that influence these ‘terrorist’ behaviors to begin with.

It was also pointed out that in the case of AMISOM in Somalia, aspects of gender and human rights abuses were perpetuated by AMISOM troops. Further, this study utilized CTS to gain an understanding of the reasons why particular actors commit violent acts of terror. This was an important development that was emphasized and expanded throughout the research study and corresponds with the study’s critique of orthodox approaches to terrorism which simply deal with the symptoms of terrorism as opposed to employing a multi-pronged consideration that incorporates addressing both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism. Such a multi-pronged approach involves a military approach that does not take precedence over a civilian and people-centered approach, but rather equally tackles socio-economic disparities in the form of economic marginalization, poverty, and unemployment; political alienation by corrupt political elites; and ethnic and religious tensions and contestations that are prevalent in both Nigeria and the Horn of Africa.

By upholding the commitments of CTS, this research has shown that it remains necessary for the African Union and its various security agencies to move away from the orthodoxies that exist within its currently adopted counter-terrorism agenda. This agenda seeks to use military force in order to combat its enemy in this context; through military checkpoint checks; military raids; intelligence operations; and the employment of drone airstrikes and other military-driven offences towards Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. The researcher has argued that traditional approaches to terrorism continue to disregard the acts perpetrated by Western states against civilians. More important, through applying the principles of CTS, the researcher asserts that mainstream approaches to terrorism consider opposition to the state by non-state actors as illegitimate. However, the researcher contends that terrorism as a tactic to obtain socio-economic and political objectives can be undertaken by both state and non-state actors.

6.3.2. The Multinational Joint Task Force Position in North-eastern Nigeria

Boko Haram has plagued the northern-most region of Nigeria and its neighboring countries and this research has proven why the group has been considered one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in modern times. The growing regionalization of Boko Haram on the African continent led the African Union to establish an increasingly collective and comprehensive strategy

to defeat the threat. One such coalition that has been highlighted throughout this study which has proven to be playing an active role in its efforts to curb Boko Haram, is the Multinational Joint Task Force which is deployed under the leadership of the Chad Basin and mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council.

Taking into account that the Multinational Joint Task Force which is mandated by the African Union and commanded by the Lake Chad Basin Commission has achieved relative success in flushing out Boko Haram from a number of strategic territorial bases, this research study also presents a critique of its lackluster approach to the threat of Boko Haram. In addition, this study presents a critique of the orthodoxies that exist within the symptomatic and military driven counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the African Union in its efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism waged by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The military strategies – including airstrikes; military raids; military checkpoints; and attempted intelligence operations amongst other approaches – employed by the African Union’s armed forces, were further critiqued for failing to address the root causes, namely existing socio-economic disparities; political and religious marginalization; the drive to implement a Sharia form of governance; and the failure to curb the terror-financing of Boko Haram. The strategies were critiqued for aligning with orthodox approaches to terrorism, while disregarding a multi-dimensional approach aimed at tackling both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism which is broadly recommended within the principles of Critical Terrorism Studies.

In addition, the critiques offered in relation to Boko Haram illustrate that cooperation between the African Union and the Nigerian government and its neighboring states is necessary in order to deal with the issue of porous borders which have given rise to a cross-border supply of weapons and money for the organisation.

6.3.3. AMISOM’s Involvement in Somalia

Similar to Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism is largely influenced by the consequences of its rich history which informs the current socio-economic and political realities of present-day Somalian society. The consequences of colonialism have contributed to the clan-divisions and contestations that currently exist in Somalia.

Similarly, to the African Union's counter-terrorism approach to Boko Haram, the strategies adopted by AMISOM were critiqued for their neglect in addressing some of the most pertinent root causes and issues that inform the Al-Shabaab crisis, namely socio-economic grievances and political alienation; the abuses perpetuated by AMISOM's forces; broad mal-administration; and clan-divisions. While this research has shown that AMISOM has attempted to take the initiative in applying a multi-pronged strategy across its military, police, and civilian components, the Mission has been critiqued for its over-reliance on a military-driven approach in combating Al-Shabaab, neglecting the fundamental root causes and key drivers that inform the strategic terrorism waged by the organisation.

The researcher maintains that in order for the African Union's counter-terrorism operations to combat the threat of terrorism waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, there must be increasingly concerted efforts by a range of stakeholders, namely the MNJTF and AMISOM. Enhanced cooperation amongst regional actors will play a fundamental role in diminishing the two organizations' regional territorial presences, and limit their capacity to move freely and wage their scourge of terror across borders.

6.4. Recommendations

In order to explain the counter-terrorism approaches employed by the African Union in relation to the threat posed by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective territories, a number of academic journals, books and online databases were consulted in order to collect data. As mentioned in Chapter 1, while secondary sources were used for the most part of this research study, both primary and secondary sources were applied in the study for the collection of data and information. Primary data collected from field research, particularly in relation to engaging with current or former members of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab was unattainable, due to potential threats and risks that may have arisen. However, this research benefited immensely from primary data obtained from semi-structured interviews with experts and officials from relevant institutions within the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, specialists, academics, professionals, and political risk analysts with substantial experience and knowledge in the spheres of terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively.

Therefore, with regard to the various tools of data collection and sources consulted, when one

recaps the two case studies discussed in this research study, it is clear that there is still an abundance of research to be done and gaps to be filled in relation to understanding the internal structures and operations of terrorist groups, and more important, how governments, multilaterals, and various stakeholders can play a productive role in addressing and tackling potential threats. While this writer contends that CTS does not necessarily position itself as the immediate “fix” that will suddenly cure the threat of terrorism and instability in north-eastern Nigeria and Somalia, it maintains that one cannot disregard that it has proved to be a valuable framework that will serve as a path in the necessary direction within the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Throughout this study, the theoretical framework of CTS was applied in order to question the processes of knowledge production in relation to terrorism studies, especially through the critique of orthodox approaches to terrorism. Therefore, one can conclude that challenging these processes gives researchers an opportunity to gain a broader and wider understanding of the threat of terrorism which could lead to a change in how experts, scholars, multilaterals, and various actors view, address, and tackle the scourge of terrorism.

As was established in Chapter 1 of this study, terrorism across the African continent is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which has manifested as a result of a combination of factors and drivers, and therefore, requires analysis, assessment, and responses from multiple perspectives. This research acknowledges the complexities that exist within the study of “terrorism” and the nuances and complications that are linked within the definitional position and contextualization of terrorism, particularly with reference to questions such as “Who is defined as a terrorist?” and “Who does the defining?”. This research suggests that terrorism and counter-terrorism researchers, experts, and stakeholders should move away from merely perceiving terrorism as a criminal act to understanding it as a strategic tool or mechanism which has the objective of addressing fundamental grievances. By simply tweaking the conventional underpinnings of terrorism, this research suggests that an array of gaps open up for the possibility of future research on the matter.

Furthermore, this study emphasized these complexities, particularly through the continuous assessment of and focus on the socio-economic and political reasons and factors which have encouraged the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab and their expansion into the violent organizations that they are today. While this research has explicitly

indicated that there are resounding similarities between the two organizations in the study, particularly in relation to the drivers and root causes influencing their acts of violence, there are some stark differences in their modus operandi, especially in the manner in which their shared ideology of Jihad manifests. While both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab share an ideology that embodies radical Salafism which is deeply rooted in the condemnation of any opposition of Islam, it would be extremely naïve for the African Union, policy-makers and various stakeholders to employ the exact same strategies in dealing with the strategic terrorism waged by these two groups. As previously mentioned, while they may have shared ideological underpinnings, there are some differences in their modus operandi which the African Union and its various security agencies must take into consideration when formulating counter-terrorism frameworks and approaches.

Moreover, it is clear that within the study and field of terrorism, it is important that the religious beliefs that influence groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab should be studied in greater depth. In view of the ideological underpinnings of both these groups, it was stressed in this study that their shared ideology of Jihad is encouraged by their absolute rejection of Western systems, in particular Western forms of governance, which in both case studies was a result of the legacies left behind by colonialism. This point of departure was alluded to on countless occasions throughout the study and forms a basis for future research to enquire into, in order to understand a significant driving factor that influences terrorism on the African continent.

In view of the above suggestions, both groups have been clear about their discontent in relation to widespread international and external involvement in the territories which they occupy or attempt to take control of. While the outcomes of this study suggest that regional involvement and cooperation are integral in the fight against both these organizations, they maintain that perhaps the reduction of international involvement and an increase in regional integration may increase the likeliness of successfully implementing strategic non-military approaches such as dialogue and engagement with both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

In addition, the limitations of the orthodox and extremely military-centered approach to countering both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have opened up opportunities to formulate and implement alternative approaches to the threat of terrorism waged by these organizations in their respective capacities. The African Union and its various counter-terrorism institutions should place a higher

premium on non-military forms of intervention and counter-operations – a point of analysis that has been emphasized throughout and formed the focus of this study.

With that in mind, it is important that the AU should strengthen its resource capacity if it is to play a significant role in the alleviation and prevention of terrorism on the African continent. The gaps that are found between the intended approaches and the measures currently adopted lie within the allocation of resources – human, financial, and military – and for this reason, there is an over-reliance and dependence on foreign stakeholders and actors. To realize this, it is important that the African Union should work together with its various security institutions to provide its joint taskforce operations with adequate and efficient human, financial, and military capacity. In this respect, this researcher suggests that there should be a sense of unity, common objectivity, and mutually beneficial networks amongst the troop of contributing member states of the African Union and its regional security agencies in order for any counter-terrorism frameworks and agendas to be effective.

Findings of this research study suggest that by continuously engaging Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab through the means of military combat, while neglecting an approach which seeks to politically address the primary drivers and roots encouraging the form of violence waged by both these two groups, the African Union and its various security agencies will merely sustain the threat of violent activities undertaken by them. Upon observing the strategic acts of terror waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, it becomes clear that future operations instituted by the AU should be informed by frameworks which consider the socio-economic, political and historical factors that have informed many of the grievances which encourage individuals to join violent and extremist groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

When trying to understand why Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab's violent terrorism have not yet been curbed, it becomes necessary to apply the principles and commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies. Through the application of CTS, the researcher has shown that the violence waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab affects predominantly Nigerians and Somalis. In addition, it has proven that terrorism on the African continent came into existence as a result of a number of historical factors, in particular the legacies left behind by colonialism, which consequentially inform the current reality of the societies in which both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab perpetuate

their violent acts of terror. Therefore, this study recommends that the Nigerian and Somali citizenry must be considered in conversations around peace-building initiatives. The African Union should set up think-tanks and institutions that are dedicated to assisting the citizens of both these countries to recommend the necessary policies and potential resolutions. Given that the largely military-driven approach in both cases has not ameliorated the threat of terrorism, perhaps an alternative to the militaristic approach should be seriously considered – an approach that the findings of this study explicitly support. It is important to take into consideration that such a process entails thorough research to examine not just the general consensus, but the plausibility of such a process – bearing in mind the various risks and threats of all actors, stakeholders, and constituencies involved.

This is precisely why this research study should be adopted by future terrorism researchers and counter-terrorism policy-makers. While, the African Union's counter-terrorism approaches have their strengths which have undoubtedly resulted in a number of successes, particularly through the measures adopted by its various joint taskforce operations, this research has demonstrated that the recommendations from this research could serve as a reliable, realistic, and alternative guide to the currently adopted frameworks of the threat of terrorism throughout the African continent. To this end, it is clear that Africa's struggle against the plague of terrorism can be curbed if there is mutual co-operation between the African Union and its relevant stakeholders and member states. The AU should consistently think of new ways in which to improve its counter-terrorism policies and strategies.

6.5. Concluding Remarks

The key objective of this study was to assess whether the currently employed policies, agendas, and frameworks of the African Union address the current scourge of terrorism, and simultaneously to offer a critique of the widely-employed approaches currently in use for addressing and dealing with the strategic terrorism embraced by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively. By considering the research questions presented in Chapter 1, this final chapter sought to provide a set of recommendations for the counter-terrorism measures that are currently in place within the structures of the African Union.

While many scholars, professionals, and experts on terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively,

have severely critiqued the measures and mechanisms adopted by the AU's counter-terrorism programs, this chapter demonstrates the commendable achievements of the AU, taking into account the many challenges and obstacles that it faces, particularly in relation to security. However, findings and recommendations from this research reiterate that the various programs and frameworks that have been established by the African Union should be translated and converted into proactive action if the brief of the continental organisation is to be taken seriously: that of an intergovernmental body dedicated to eradicating terrorism across the continent; and if it is to achieve its desired goals and objectives of combating and defeating terrorist organizations in all their forms, at local, regional, and continental levels.

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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews held with key informants of the study:

APPENDIX A: BASIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. *Biographic Information*

a).

Name:

Occupation:

Country of Residence:

Highest Qualification:

Years of experience:

Other:

b). May I please have consent to record this interview?

2. *From the political, economic, socio-cultural, historic, geographical, technological and military factors influencing, which do you think is the most decisive in aiding Boko Haram's terrorist activities? And which do you think is the most influential factor?*
 3. *Given your experience and academic expertise, what do you identify as factors aiding to the ineffectiveness of the African Union's response to the Boko Haram crisis?*
 4. *Where do you think that the African Union's attempts at resolving the Boko Haram crisis is directed at?*
- a) The root causes?

b) The Symptoms of the conflict?

c) Both?

5. *Where do you think that the African Union's attempts at resolving the Boko Haram crisis SHOULD be directed at?*

a) The root causes?

b) The Symptoms of the conflict?

c) Both?

6. *Strategies and tactics used by the African Union in its attempts to destroy Boko Haram*

a) What strategies and tactics have you identified as being used by the African Union?

b) Which of those tactics do you think are the most effective?

c) Which of those tactics do you think should be altered or completely rejected?

7. *What other issues do you think are influential in understanding the African Union's current approach in tackling Boko Haram?*

8. *In your opinion, why has the African Union yielded such poor results in its fight against Boko Haram?*

9. *How best can the African Union effectively resolve the Boko Haram crisis?*

It is important to note that the questions above, are only a basic and preliminary source of information collection from experts and specialists.

APPENDIX B: BASIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Biographic Information

a).

Name:

Occupation:

Country of Residence:

Highest Qualification:

Years of experience:

b). May I please have get consent to record this interview?

2. *From the political, economic, socio-cultural, historic, geographical, technological and military factors influencing, which do you think is the most decisive in aiding Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities? And which do you think is the most influential factor?*

3. *Given your experience and academic expertise what do you identify as factors aiding to the ineffectiveness of the African Union's response to the Al-Shabaab crisis?*

4. *Where do you think that the African Union's attempts at resolving the Al-Shabaab crisis is directed at?*

a) The root causes?

b) The Symptoms of the conflict?

c) Both?

5. *Where do you think that the African Union's attempts at resolving the Al-Shabaab crisis SHOULD be directed at?*

a) The root causes?

b) The Symptoms of the conflict?

c) Both?

6. *Strategies and tactics used by the African Union in its attempts to destroy Al-Shabaab*

a) What strategies and tactics have you identified as being used by the African Union?

b) Which of those tactics do you think are the most effective?

c) Which of those tactics do you think should be altered or completely rejected?

7. *What other issues do you think are influential in understanding the African Union's current approach in tackling Al-Shabaab?*

8. *In your opinion, why has the African Union yielded such poor results in its fight against Al-Shabaab?*

9. *How best can the African Union effectively resolve the Al-Shabaab crisis?*

It is important to note that the questions above, are only a basic and preliminary source of information collection from experts and specialists.

APPENDIX C: KEY INFORMANTS

DD Maselane: Interview conducted on 30 June 2018. DD Maselane is an intelligence analyst for the Horn of Africa region at the South African State Security Agency. DD Maselane has represented South Africa as a foreign service officer in various capacities in the East Africa region.

Participant 1: Interview conducted on 7 July 2018. Participant 1 is an intelligence desk officer at the South African State Security Agency focusing on the broader Horn of Africa region. Participant 1 has represented South Africa as a foreign service officer in various capacities in missions in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Participant 2: Interview conducted on 9 July 2018. Participant 2 is an intelligence desk officer at the South African State Security Agency, focusing on the East Africa region, with a particular concentration on Somalia and Kenya. Participant 2 has represented South Africa as a foreign service officer in various capacities in missions in a number of countries within the Southern Africa and East Africa region.

Participant 3: Interview conducted on 17 July 2018. Participant 3 is an intelligence analyst at the South African State Security Agency, focusing on the West Africa region.

Participant 4: Interview conducted on 22 July 2018. Participant 4 is an executive director for an NGO focusing on dispute resolutions in Africa. Participant 4 has been part of various delegations to Somalia in efforts to assist in the establishment of sustainable peace in the East African nation.