Stories of Us and Them: Xenophobia and Political Narratives

by
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Abstract

This dissertation aims to make sense of xenophobia as a specific idea of belonging and exclusion based on the idea of foreignness. I provide a conceptual and normative framework to help us understand xenophobia in terms of its origins, expressions, moral harms, and effects. The secondary aim of this dissertation is to determine how our individual and political identities contribute to individual xenophobic prejudices and acts of discrimination, as well as the construction and upholding of a xenophobic social and political order. Towards this latter aim I argue for a narrative conception of identity, and show how narratives can be xenophobic, but how they can also be conducive to creating a non-xenophobic world. To achieve these dual aims, my argument is worked out in five phases. Firstly, I distinguish xenophobia from racism, arguing that xenophobia differs in its origins and in its effect, which also constitutes its moral harm. The harm in xenophobia lies in a specific form of civic ostracism that excludes particular groups from benefits of civic membership based on ascriptions of foreignness that in turn is based on ideas about belonging. Secondly, I show that xenophobia's origins lie in our ideas about foreignness and belonging, and it manifests in the prejudices that result from ingroup-outgroup differentiation. This is a response to the fear we feel in the face of strangers and the unfamiliar, a remnant of our evolutionary history. I suggest that in our early days as a species, antagonism toward the outgroup gave the ingroup the evolutionary advantage. Xenophobia is therefore a reaction to insecurity about our place and existence in the world, and the third phase of my argument considers place, belonging, and the harms of displacement. These themes are approached from the perspective of the xenophobe and the victim of xenophobia. Regarding the former, I show how a sense of the precariousness of one's own belonging can lead one to seek belonging in the false home offered by nationalism and other exclusionary identities and groupings, with xenophobic discrimination as the result. This excludes the victim of xenophobia from the possibility of belonging, making them vulnerable to the particular harms of displacement. The fourth phase considers the narrative theory of identity, connecting our sense of belonging to our identities and to the narratives we tell about ourselves, our groups, outsiders, and the places we are situated in. The narratives we share and the identities which result from them can be more or less xenophobic, and in the final phase of this dissertation I analyse xenophobic narratives and provide directions that counternarratives can follow to counter xenophobia, on the institutional and individual level. A novel direction for implementing such narratives is provided, inspired by xenophobia's origins in human evolution: playing and games, strategies which are conducive to relationship formation and

collaboration. If xenophobia is a response to apprehensions of belonging, as this dissertation argues, a solution to xenophobia needs to be found rethinking our identities, our place in the world, and in promoting trust and collaboration.

Opsomming

Hierdie verhandeling streef daarna om sin te maak van xenofobie as ’n spesifieke opvatting oor tuishoort en uitsluiting, gegrond op die idee van vreemdelingskap. Ek bied ’n konseptuele en normatiewe raamwerk om xenofobie te probeer verstaan in die lig van die oorsprong, morele kwaad en uitwerking daarvan. ’n Verdere doel is om te bepaal hoe ons individuele en politieke identiteite bydra tot individuele xenofobiese vooroordele en dade van diskriminasie, asook tot die konstruksie en instandhouding van ’n xenofobiese sosiale en politieke orde. Daarom argumenteer ek ten gunste van ’n narratiewe opvatting van identiteit. Ek toon aan dat narratiewe xenofobies kan wees, maar tog ook kan meewerk tot die skepping van ’n nie-xenofobiese wêreld. Om hierdie tweeledige doel te bereik, verloop my argument in vyf fases. In die eerste plek onderskei ek xenofobie van rassisme ten opsigte van oorsprong sowel as uitwerking (wat ook die morele kwaad konstitueer). Die kwaad van xenofobie lê in ’n vorm van sosiale uitbanning, waardeur spesifieke groepe uitgesluit word uit die voordele van burgerlike lidmaatskap, op grond van die vreemdelingskap wat aan hulle toegeskryf word, as gevolg van spesifieke idees oor tuishoort. In die tweede plek toon ek aan dat xenofobie se oorsprong lê in ons opvattings van vreemdelingskap en tuishoort, en dat dit gemanifesteer word in die vooroordele wat voortvloei uit ingroep-uitgroep-differensiasie. Dit is’n respons op die vrees wat ons ervaar teenoor vreemdelinge en die onbekende, wat ’n oorblyfsel is van ons evolusionêre geskiedenis waarin antagonisme teenoor die uitgroep stellig vroeër die ingroep ’n evolusionêre voordeel gegee het. Xenofobie is daarom ’n reaksie op die onsekerheid oor ons plek en voortbestaan in die wêreld. Daarom handel die derde fase van my argument oor plek, behoort en die skade van ontworteling. Dit word benader vanuit die oogpunte van die vreemdelinghater sowel as die slagoffer van xenofobie. Wat eersgenoemde betref, toon ek aan hoe die wisselvalligheid van jou eie gevoel van behoort daartoe kan lei dat jy tuiskoms soek in die skyntuistes wat gebied word deur nasionalisme en ander uitsluitende identiteit en groeperings, met xenofobiese diskriminasie as resultaat. Dit sluit dan die slagoffer van xenofobie uit van die moontlikheid om te behoort, sodat hulle uitgelewer word aan die skade wat ontworteling aanrig. Die vierde fase kyk na die narratiewe teorie van identiteit. Dit verbind ons gevoel van tuishoort aan ons identeite en aan die narratiewe wat ons vertel oor onsself, ons groepe, buitestaanders en die plekke waar ons leef. Hierdie narratiewe en die identiteite wat daaruit voortvloei kan in mindere of meerdere mate xenofobies wees. In die laaste fase van hierdie verhandeling analiseer ek daarom xenofobiese narratiewe en dui ek die rigtings aan wat teennarratiewe kan volg om xenofobie teen te werk, op institusionele sowel as individuele vlak.

’n Nuwe rigting word ook aangedui om dit te implementeer, geïnspireer deur die oorsprong van xenofobia in menslike evolusie: spel as strategie wat bevordelik is vir die vorming van verhoudings en samewerking. As xenofobie ’n respons is op vrese oor tuishoort, soos in hierdie verhandeling beredeneer word, dan moet ’n oplossing daarvoor gevind word in nuwe denke oor ons identiteite en plek in die wêreld, sodat ons vertroue en samewerking kan bevorder.

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Men of Fire[1]

Black men.

The kind uncomfortable with their dark and night,

gathered around a fire

they'd used their own lives to ignite.

These men knew everything about fire:

They spoke with black labels lacing their breath

spirits warming their chests

it is fire they would ingest,

whenever their paraffin-lit homes exploded,

fuelled by their black-man fire

their black-man stress.

Homes overheating

kids choking

whenever these fathers of fire

were inside.

For a long time

their mighty black bodies were mere containers of fire.

Routinely, they swallowed blazing disasters

[1] Shoro, K. K. 2017. *Serurubele*. Modjaji Books, Cape Town, pp. 25-26.

sat fuming, having fiery arguments about who was better –

amaZulu okanye amaXhosa?

Of these fiery confrontations they never grew tired;

instead, these welded them together.

Collectively, tribally,

as they shared their stories of disaster-eating

as they nurtured their anger about everything

their collective fire kept growing.

In unison, they practised.

They went from coughing smoke to spitting balls of flame.

Black dragons,

it was with fire they secretly played

until they swallowed the blaze again.

This was not enough:

they needed witnesses

needed the world to know they had found work

that they were hard at work.

Feeling like they would burn out

if they didn't create something of brilliance

they created a Burning Man

who was foreign to their fire

so he stood no chance.

Men of fire,

black men who show other black men flames.

What does sizzling skin look like?

To you, does charcoal and their dark tone look the same?

What about the smoke?

Ha mosi o siya mollo…mmele[2]

do you have to cover your nose?

How much petrol does a human body need?

How much of your flame did Ernesto Nhamuave need?

[2] Roughly translated from Sesotho: 'when smoke leaves the fire…the body'

Introduction

All sorrows can be born if you put them into a story or tell a story about them.

(Dinesen in Arendt 1998: 175)

We begin with a story. The story of a man called Ernesto Nhamuave, a name that may not be familiar to all, a man known to the world because of a series of photographs. Ash, fire, smoke. A charred body, alive, sitting, crouching, later down on the ground. In the foreground and background police officers, some with guns, some with fire extinguishers. They came too late. The date: 17 May 2008. The place: Ramaphosa informal settlement, Gauteng, South Africa. The context: part of the country-wide attacks against foreigners that started in Alexandra on 11 May 2008 and quickly spread to other communities (see Misago, Landau & Monson 2009).

Nhamuave's last moments spread across the globe in photographs, videos, articles. There would have been those who were shocked, disgusted, horrified. But doubtless there were many who were not, many who supported this act of violence. It is, after all, only one such instance among many. One attack among many, only one life lost. In democratic South Africa, violence against 'outsiders', 'foreigners', is the norm. As South African poet Katleho Kana Shoro (2017: 25-26, my emphasis) asks in her poem 'Men of Fire', "How much of *your* flame did Ernesto Nhamuave need?" She asks these questions because she realises that the violence directed at Nhamuave, the fire, was not ignited by Nhamuave (here standing in for the countless other victims of xenophobic violence and discrimination). The fire burns within the attackers ("…a fire / they'd used their own lives to ignite"; "Routinely, they swallowed blazing disasters"). Shoro identifies the source of the fire: old tribalist animosities ("who was better - / AmaZulu okanye amaXhosa?"); the indignities suffered at the hands of an oppressive and racist regime, and the racism these men may have internalised ("Black men, / The kind uncomfortable with their dark and night"; "their black-man fire / their black-man stress"; "their stories of disaster-eating"). Not knowing how or where to go with this fire, this trauma, but knowing something should be done with it: "Feeling like they would burn out / if they didn't create something of brilliance […] a Burning Man / who was foreign to their fire" (ibid.).

The story of Ernesto Nhamuave is actually two stories, intertwined: the man who was burned, and the men who did the burning (no one was ever arrested). The foreigner, and those who

belong. How these stories are told, interpreted, believed; how they inspire us to act and, specifically, how they contribute to our political realities is one of the two main concerns of this study. The other is the phenomenon of xenophobia – its origins, its meaning, its causes, its different manifestations (beliefs, attitudes, acts, attacks). The two concerns – xenophobia and stories – are intimately linked, in ways I will explore in the chapters to come.

Humans have always been storytellers. It is one of the ways in which we make sense of the world and define our place within it. However, in a celebrated lecture entitled: "The dangers of a single story" (2009), novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie warns of the personal and political perils that arise when a single, dominant story takes hold. Single stories are dangerous because they can dispossess, malign, and destroy people's dignity. They reduce humans to representatives of a single idea and deprive them of the possibility of imagining themselves differently. Yet Adichie goes on to argue that stories can also restore that dignity; they can empower and humanise. This dissertation is an inquiry into the power of stories to shape our lives in both negative and positive ways – specifically, the way in which narratives of exclusion and inclusion shape political worlds.

When we tell stories of who we are as a people, we draw distinctions between ourselves and others: some people are included and others are excluded from the "we" of the story. This dissertation is primarily concerned with a particular form of exclusion, namely xenophobia. My aim here is to develop an account of xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon (i.e. not merely a variant of racism or prejudice in general) and to investigate specific exclusionary narratives as a feature of xenophobia. This lays the groundwork for the constructive part of my project, which is to work out how and to what extent *different* kinds of narratives are able to counteract xenophobic attitudes and practices.

1. The threat of xenophobia

The end of Apartheid in South Africa was a violent and fraught time, but also a time of hope. A new government, new freedoms, and a new constitution that poetically promises that 'We, the people of South Africa […] [b]elieve that South Africa belongs to *all who live in it*' (Republic of South Africa 1996a; my emphasis). Even if this statement did not reflect the reality of the time, as a promise it created hopes of a future in which this will be true, in which the country will belong to everyone, and everyone living within the country's borders will *belong*. A quarter of a century has passed since this country's transition into freedom and democracy,

and many are still waiting on the promise. Indeed, the statement remains just as inaccurate *now* as it was *then*. The reality is that the story of South African democracy is also a story of rising xenophobia and violence toward outsiders. If we were hopeful before the last decade, the widespread violent xenophobic attacks in 2008 destabilised the country and confronted us with an ugly truth: South Africa does *not* belong to all who live in it. The events of 2008 were repeated in the years that followed. Most recently, in August and September 2019, protests against foreigners in Johannesburg and Tshwane lead to large-scale violence and destruction, with the threat of retaliation from foreigners.

In South Africa, anti-immigrant attitudes have been on the rise since 1994 (see SAMP 2001, 2008), with the majority of South Africans adopting a 'South Africa First' policy (Nyamnjoh 2006: 37). The rise in xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiments is not unique to South Africa. Migration is increasingly becoming a central issue in political debates, campaigns, and commentary worldwide. Two of the leading world-powers – the United States of America and the United Kingdom – recently swore in leaders who are known for their explicit anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner sentiments (among a host of other anti-others sentiments they hold). Right-wing movements are gaining popular support and seats in governments across the globe. In South Africa's most recent general elections (May 2019), the far-right Freedom Front Plus almost doubled their support. There are multiple reasons and causes for the resurgence of right-wing populism, but globally it has the same results: xenophobic attitudes are rising, xenophobes are becoming more violent, and xenophobia is being normalised.

The harms of xenophobia will be explained in more detail in the chapters to come, but to understand *why* xenophobia is a problem, and a phenomenon that deserves closer study and attention, I will briefly consider the May 2008 attacks in South Africa:

> During more than 2 weeks of deadly violence that started in Alexandra, Johannesburg, but soon spread across the entire country, 62 people were killed, many more were wounded or raped, while countless homes and foreign-owned business were looted or destroyed. In the end more than a hundred thousand people were displaced from their homes. For the first time since the end of Apartheid, the South African government – after initially downplaying the violence – ended up deploying its armed forces to quell the unrest. (Strauss 2011: 104).

For the moment, I do not want to focus on the motivations behind these attacks. I want to focus on the consequences: 62 dead (Ernesto Nhamuave being one of them), many more injured (physically, psychologically), property stolen or destroyed, more than a hundred thousand displaced. Reading such a brief description of the attack, we may think that those who lost lives, property, homes, those who were injured, are the only victims. Yet these attacks had a profoundly negative effect not only on those who were directly harmed, but also on other foreigners residing in South Africa and on the South African citizenry itself. Not all of the 62 people who were killed were foreign – some were South African citizens mistakenly identified as foreign. The conditions of insecurity and violence that reigned for those two weeks endangered everyone living in Alexandra and the other sites of violence, not only the intended targets of the attacks. Furthermore, the attacks destabilised the country as a whole. Xenophobic violence does not only endanger the lives and property of the people directly concerned, but it also poses a very real threat to the economic, social, and political stability of the country and, consequently, to the survival of South Africa's democracy. The fact that such events occur also says something about the kind of country South Africa is and the kind of people we are. The moral harm in murder, in oppression, and in exclusion is not only directed at the victim, but also at the perpetrator.

The harm of xenophobia lies in the kind of moral world and political realities it creates – a world in which there is little security or trust. Our very basic ability to live together, to work and create and interact and exist, is threatened by xenophobia. Hannah Arendt (1976: 155, 206) uses the metaphor of a boomerang to explain how oppressive ideologies and rigid identities are harmful not only to those who are excluded, but also to those who are initially included. If belonging is rigidly defined and policed, the circle of who 'truly belongs', whether to a nation, a country, an ethnic or racial group, will inevitably become smaller and smaller, and the violence visited upon the outsiders eventually returns to destroy the insiders.[3]

The rise of xenophobia in South Africa is not disconnected from the normalisation of xenophobia globally. Nor should my language – 'rise', 'normalisation' – fool us into thinking there was ever a time when xenophobia was *not* present in human societies. Xenophobia in South Africa is a product of our very specific history, but it is also a manifestation of a global

[3] Arendt also uses the metaphor in reference to imperial violence (throwing the boomerang out) and the violence of the world wars (the boomerang coming back) which in part resulted from European imperialism and domination.

trend that forms part of the story of human history. When I speak of xenophobia, I therefore speak both of local instances and a more general human tendency. I will specify which, where necessary, but this dual nature of xenophobia should be kept in mind. Xenophobia, I will show, manifests in different ways in different contexts. It is even motivated by different reasons, fears, or desires. It is a multifaceted problem, and any attempt at a solution will have to look at both the specific and the broader contexts. Where I write about particular contexts, I choose to focus on South Africa because it is the context from which I am writing, and because the specific way in which xenophobia manifests in South Africa problematises our common conception of the broader phenomenon, and casts light on the misconceptions we have when thinking about xenophobia.

While xenophobia is by no means a new phenomenon, it has received comparatively little attention in academic philosophy. Where xenophobia *is* discussed, it tends to be incorporated into broader discussions on racism, nationalism, or ethnic violence (see Bekker and Carlton 1996; Kim and Sundstrom 2014), and mostly in fields such as sociology or political science. It is the purpose of this study to address this deficiency in the philosophical literature. We need a conception of xenophobia that recognises its relation to other forms of oppression, especially racism, while also providing us with a definition of xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon. Conceptual clarity is necessary if we are to identify xenophobia. Equating it with racism may blind us to specific instances of discrimination, while also blinding us to the particular kinds of harm victims of xenophobic discrimination face and experience.

Against this background, this dissertation aims to make sense of xenophobia as a specific idea of belonging and exclusion as it applies to societies. This idea is not only a feature of individual beliefs and attitudes but is also feature of a xenophobic social order. My secondary focus, then, is on how a xenophobic social order is sustained by exclusionary narratives. This is not an empirical enterprise, in which I attempt to make sense of the material conditions that lead to xenophobia in specific contexts. I rather provide a conceptual and normative framework within which political philosophers can engage with the issue, from the perspective of political narratives. Where I do focus on specific contexts, the aim is to illustrate points made or to show how our preconceptions about xenophobia may not fit reality.

The importance of narratives in fashioning individual and collective lives has long been a distinct research focus in philosophy (see, for instance, Ricoeur 1984, MacIntyre 1984, Taylor

1989, Arendt 1958, 1968, 1982, and Rorty 1989a, 1989b, Schechtman 1996, 2007). Such narratives can comprise stories (e.g. in novels or biographies), but also artworks, images, games, public discourse, propaganda, political speeches and codified law. My theoretical starting point here is narrative theories of identity, specifically the narrative self-constitution view developed by Marya Schechtman, according to which "we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a narrative self-conception according to which we experience and organize our lives" (Schechtman 2007: 162).

This is true for individual lives, but it is just as applicable to political lives. The narrative approach to identity can also help us understand our group identities, and how they were formed. By "political lives" I mean our relationships with others that are mediated by the public, political norms of a society – including laws and other institutionalised rules of behaviour that define specific social roles. These laws and norms are, in a sense, the codification of implicit beliefs and attitudes that circulate in a society, and therefore also contain identity-shaping narratives. My claim is that these beliefs and attitudes include the narratives we tell and that, once a particular set of norms of behaviour has been institutionalised, it also helps to shape, delimit and inform the kinds of narratives that are possible to tell in future and the kinds of identities we will have. The narratives that underlie our group identities and political norms, especially our membership norms, determine our attitude toward foreigners.

My diagnosis of exclusionary narratives as a feature of xenophobia will therefore be supplemented with an inquiry into the kinds of narratives that might foster inclusion rather than exclusion, belonging rather than ostracism, hospitality rather than resentment. To this end, I provide directions for new narratives, and provide a strategy for adapting the kind of language that we use in our narratives to counter the kinds of essentialist thinking exhibited in xenophobic narratives and their accompanying prejudices, attitudes, and beliefs. For this I rely on the work of Leslie (2007, 2017), who looks at the way in which we make generalisations, and how that contributes to us ascribing essentialist characteristics onto other groups. I also follow Arendt (1982) and Nussbaum (1995) in connecting narratives and narration to the imaginative transposition into the lives of others and the ability to judge their lives from a position beyond the confines of their immediate interests. For Nussbaum, we develop this ability primarily through an engagement with literary narratives. Arendt, in turn, treats this imaginative transposition as a feature of the Kantian enlarged mentality, which involves

"teaching the imagination to go visiting" (Arendt 1982: 18), which depends on engaging with narratives of all kinds. These models of narrative judgment, I will argue, provide us with a way forward: they enable us to let go of restrictive stereotypes, to imagine ourselves in the place of the foreigner, and to imagine a world in which foreigners also have a place.

The final contribution of this study is to provide two contexts in which anti-xenophobic narratives can be told and narrative judgment be implemented: in our education system and curricula, where both our approach to teaching and the content of our curricula should be approached narratively. One way of doing this is through guided play, and indeed this is a narrative tool which can be implemented not only where children are concerned, but in contexts ranging from private homes, companies, sports clubs, and public institutions. The incorporation of play is not arbitrary, for we will see that it is a strategy which humans and other animals use to diffuse tension between ingroups and outgroups. This tension, and the aggression which often accompanies it, is part of our earliest development as a species, and xenophobia as we know it today may merely be a contemporary expression of our primal fear of strangers. Yet instead of seeing the latter as an eternal condemnation, or adopting a Hobbesian view of human nature, our equally primal playful instinct shows us that there are alternative possibilities of dealing with such tensions. Where xenophobia is a reaction to our apprehensions about belonging, play situates us in positive relation to those around us.

2. The material aspect of xenophobia

This dissertation approaches the explanation of xenophobia predominantly from a conceptual, psychological, and political perspective. This requires justification, as there is a strong link in scholarship and popular literature on xenophobia between socio-economic difficulties and xenophobia. I therefore want to note from the outset that I do not argue against such explanations of xenophobia, nor do I doubt their relevance and importance. It is crucial that we understand the material conditions that contribute to a rise in xenophobic attitudes and outbursts of xenophobic violence, not only for the sake of explanation but also for that of successful efforts to combat xenophobia. Very often, xenophobic violence is the expression of frustrations felt by the attackers due to their own struggles to provide for their families and meet their basic needs (as the poem by Shoro indeed illustrates). What follows below should not be taken as *the* explanation of xenophobia, but as a contribution to our overall understanding of the phenomenon. We should approach the study of xenophobia holistically, exploring all avenues of explanation and possible solutions.

I offer two main motivations for my decision to shift my focus from the material question, to other aspects of xenophobia. Firstly, it is an established fact that xenophobia and other forms of exclusion, discrimination, and accompanying violence increases in times of economic insecurity, political instability, and social transformation. People who suffer seek explanations for their suffering, and as we will see in Chapter 1 foreigners often become the scapegoat. This connection has been well-documented in academic literature, and for that reason I feel that I cannot make a new contribution. Several studies that look at xenophobia from this perspective are cited in this dissertation, and those scholars illuminate this aspect of xenophobia better than I can. I found the work of Neocosmos (2010), Landau (2006, 2011) and Nyamnjoh (2006) especially illuminating in this regard, while Misago (2009, 2011) and Hågensen & De Jager (2016) provide us with us with a thorough explanation of the ways in which local social and micropolitical factors contribute to the prevalence of xenophobic violence in specific communities.

My second motivation for having a slightly different focus than other studies on xenophobia is my belief that relying only on material or socio-economic explanations of xenophobia is limited. As important as such insights are, the question of why we specifically target or scapegoat foreigners (rather than other groups) remains unanswered. This is the main question I am concerned with in this study – why, in times of economic distress, do we choose to hunker down and exclude 'outsiders'? To answer this, we should look at the political conditions that enable us to exclude others in this way (Chapter 1), and at the psychological factors and historical and evolutionary realities which gave rise to this tendency (Chapter 2). This study should therefore be read alongside literature that focus on social, economic, and local political explanations of xenophobia.

3. A note on language

The concept of xenophobia will be defined and fleshed out in the first two chapters of this study, but the following should be noted from the outset: I use 'xenophobia' to refer not only to acts of violence against foreigners, or to attitudes and actions of individuals. Xenophobia can be present on the individual (personal), group (e.g. citizenry), and institutional levels. Attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and actions can be xenophobic. Where necessary, I will indicate whether I am referring to xenophobic violence, attitudes, prejudices and beliefs, or the effects of the aforementioned.

I also refer to xenophobia as a 'phenomenon', meaning, a thing we experience and perceive in the world. Our self-experiences form part of this, as our thinking about self-identity and the identity of others can contribute to xenophobia. At other times, I refer to xenophobia as a form of oppression, recognising the ways in which xenophobic attitudes and prejudices can be institutionalised and used to hold people down. In this regard, we should think of xenophobia as we do about racism and sexism – as social realities and phenomena that manifest (overtly or covertly) in the world and have specific effects and practical consequences, that are themselves xenophobic or racist or sexist.

As we will come to see, our language has a profound effect on how we perceive others. This is something one should be especially careful of when writing about xenophobia. However, as I discovered, it is difficult to write about xenophobia without in some way relying on the very distinctions that are constitutive of xenophobic attitudes: us and them, citizen and foreigner. To write about xenophobic violence in South Africa without using the words 'South Africans' and 'foreigners' becomes confusing. I could not think of a way to overcome this difficulty, other than admitting it upfront and using it to show how ingrained in our language such distinctions are. So I use the word 'foreigner' to refer to those who are considered alien, outsiders, or those who are legally foreign or have a different nationality.

Writing from within the South African context, I also speak of 'us' and 'our Constitution', not to be possessive of South Africanness, but to alert readers to the ways in which their lives are also enmeshed in the conditions that contribute to xenophobia. We run the risk, when speaking of such matters, of blaming others while not asking ourselves whether we too are xenophobic, or benefit from a xenophobic system, or are complacent in a way which allows xenophobia to flourish in our communities. This is neither helpful nor responsible.

4. A note on methodology

Since this is a dissertation in philosophy, my focus is conceptual and evaluative rather than empirical. That is, I intend to clarify the concepts of narrative identity and xenophobia, so as to establish when and under what conditions the former might be conducive to the latter. Once we have a clearer definition of xenophobia, it will be possible to identify instances or examples of xenophobia and xenophobic political narratives. This will enable me, in turn, to develop an account of the kind of inclusive narratives that might undermine xenophobic beliefs and attitudes.

Existing narratives (e.g. newspaper articles reporting on the xenophobic violence in recent years; etc.) will be analysed to identify common or recurring themes (Chapter 5). The aim of my research is to evaluate the concepts xenophobia and political narratives, and not to provide a case study of specific instances of xenophobia or xenophobic narratives. Given that my concern is with political narratives as a feature of xenophobia, I will limit the analysis of narratives to narratives found in public spheres (such as the media, legislation, and politicians' statements). I will mainly, although not exclusively, focus on xenophobic narratives in South Africa.

This dissertation remains a philosophical investigation into narrative identity, the phenomenon of xenophobia and questions of belonging and membership. Where empirical evidence is required (e.g. prevalence of xenophobia in specific societies, examples of specific instances of xenophobic attitudes or violence), I will rely on relevant published literature (e.g. SAMP 2001, 2008, Crush and Pendleton 2007, Nyamnjoh 2006). The choice of scientific literature was determined by a wide reading on the subject, where I found the same studies were repeatedly referred to or relied on. I therefore take these studies to be authoritative. My aim is to develop an appropriate conceptual and evaluative framework for understanding the empirical phenomena, and not to engage directly in empirical research. On the other hand, while this is a philosophical and academic text, the themes I am addressing are relevant outside academia and theoretical thinking. My concerns are not merely academic. For this reason, I attempt to write in a language that is as accessible to those outside academia as possible and rely on sources that are also clear and accessible. Xenophobia poses an immense threat to the safety and stability of society, and for this reason it should be a topic of serious conversation and debate in all sectors of society. This is my contribution.

5. Summary of chapters

In Chapter 1, 'Xenophobia and Racism', I provide an overview of the relationship between xenophobia and racism, with specific reference to xenophobia in South Africa and its origins in our colonial and Apartheid history, before arguing for a distinct conception of xenophobia. I argue that, while xenophobia and racism often go together and are mutually reinforcing forms of oppression, they differ in origin and in effect. I consider David Haekwon Kim and Ronald Sundstrom's (2014) definition of xenophobia as civic ostracism, and while agreeing with them that the moral harm of xenophobia lies in such ostracism, I argue that civic ostracism alone does not provide us with a distinct conception of xenophobia, but rather that civic ostracism,

when xenophobic, is based on an idea of foreignness and accompanying ideas about belonging. In contemporary societies this finds expression in how we think about citizenship, and I therefore return to South Africa as an example, showing how citizenship and belonging is linked with indigeneity and origin, therefore precluding the possibility of foreigners belonging. This places foreigners in a peculiarly vulnerable position, which allows us to use them as scapegoats for all manner of societal ills. The commonly accepted link between xenophobia and scapegoating is therefore considered in this chapter, but I argue that we still need to ask why specifically foreigners are targeted, which brings us back to the question of belonging. Understanding xenophobia in this light points us toward the distinct origins of xenophobia, which I investigate further in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2, 'Searching for the Origins of Xenophobia', builds on the previous chapter which argued that xenophobia can be distinguished from racism based on its origins. This chapter therefore looks at xenophobia not as it manifests in contemporary times, but rather at its prepolitical and psychological motivations and origins. Firstly, I consider it as a form of prejudice, and I analyse four prominent theories that seek to explain prejudice: social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory, contact theories, and group threat theory. All of these theories can illuminate xenophobia for us in some way. I argue that individual instances of xenophobic discrimination, or individual prejudices, can be motivated with different reasons, and that these theories show us the role identity formation plays in xenophobia, but also the role that fear plays. I therefore then turn my attention to the question of fear, situating the origins of our fear of strangers in our evolutionary history. While our seemingly inherent tendency to be fearful of strangers may seem to general to be of use to our understanding of xenophobia today, I argue that by looking at how animals handle outgroup hostility may provide us with novel ways to reduce our own hostilities, an idea which I develop further in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 3, 'Belonging and Home', I link our underlying fear of strangers with our fear of being displaced and our apprehensions about belonging. Xenophobia, by excluding some, also makes a claim about belonging: *I* belong, *you* do not. Related to this is the notion of place, and of having a place in the world. Belonging also calls up notions of home. Home, place, displacement, and replacement are the dominant themes in this chapter. I argue that having a place in the world is a precondition for freedom, and that being displaced is harmful as it robs one of one's freedom. I consider belonging, place, and home, from the perspective of the

xenophobe and the person against whom xenophobia is directed. Xenophobia is inextricably linked to nationalism, which is born out of isolation and a longing for home. Nationalism provides a false home, but one that is homogenous and demands absolute loyalty. For this reason, belonging can be exclusionary. The consequence of this is the displacement of those who we do not think belong. Foreigners are displaced from their own homes yet struggle to find a new home in host countries. I consider the harms of displacement with reference to the dangers of statelessness, homelessness, and Cara Nine's (2017) work on homes as extensions of our cognitive functioning. This chapter illustrates not only why we value belonging, and how that could lead to apprehensions of belonging, with dire consequences, but also why we should ensure belonging for everyone. This chapter also serves as a bridge between the preceding analysis of xenophobia, the first aim of this study, and the following investigation into narratives and narrative identity, with the aim of achieving the second end of this study.

Chapter 4, 'Narrative Identity', is primarily concerned with the role that stories and narratives play in our conceptions of our individual and group identities. Such identities are not removed from the groups and places we belong to but shape our thinking about belonging. How we think about ourselves and about others determines how we treat others. As the narrative theory of identity is usually applied to questions of personal identity, I start my discussion there. I investigate Marya Schechtman's theory of narrative identity and argue that it can be extended to explain group or political identity. I argue that narratives and storytelling are devices that people rely on to give shape and order their worlds and to give meaning to their worlds, while also being normative with regards to the future. The content and structure of our narratives therefore has a profound effect on the shape of our world, and who we choose to include and exclude. I consider several points of critique levelled against the narrative view, but ultimately, I conclude that these can be overcome.

The final chapter of this study, 'New Narratives', is in part a response to two possible criticisms of my argument that I identified in the previous chapter: that story-telling is limited in its ability to bring about real change, and that people can tell false narratives. As examples of false narratives, I consider common narratives in South African discourse that I would categorise as xenophobic, and indicate how these narratives are based on ignorant, false, or unfounded assumptions. I make suggestions on how we can counter this. In the second section, I address the question of institutional change, and suggest directions that our narratives can take that would have a positive impact on the institutions that directly govern foreigners' lives. One way

to achieve this is to sever the ties between citizenship and indigeneity, and between belonging and territory. I consider this with reference to Joseph Carens (1987, 2000, 2016) and others. While providing directions which new narratives can take, or themes they can address, I devote the rest of the chapter to practical ways in which we can adapt our narratives and implement them. I suggest that we change our language, specifically when making generic statements about groups of people (Leslie 2007, 2017), for xenophobic narratives exhibit essentialist thinking, which Leslie shows is a product of the ways in which we use language to categorise. In the third section, I move from the kinds of narratives we should be telling, to how we should incorporate them into our institutions. I establish a link between narrative, the imagination, and judgement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaum (1995) and Hannah Arendt (1982). A narrative approach to judgment, both legal and political, will ensure that our judgments reflect the fullness of human life, while also being sympathetic toward the challenges faced specifically by foreigners. In the fourth section, I discuss the possibility of incorporating narratives into our education system, by approaching teaching the curriculum narratively, but also by including the narratives suggested earlier in the chapter in curriculum content. Finally, I consider a novel way to reduce xenophobia: through play. Play not only teaches us cooperation and trust, but it can also take on a narrative form. It is therefore a useful tool that can be utilised in all walks of life – schools, personal interactions, company training sessions – to build relationships and provide opportunities for positive interaction and collaboration.

Chapter 1: Xenophobia in Contemporary Society

Introduction

Detailed analyses of xenophobia in philosophy are rare. Studies of this phenomenon are more common in other, more empirical disciplines. Such studies usually investigate xenophobia in a specific context, often with the aim of explaining the social and economic causes behind a particular instance of xenophobia. At other times, xenophobia is a theme in studies on immigration, refugeehood, or nationalism. Across all disciplines, xenophobia is most commonly equated with racism, or seen as a specific form of racism. The aim of this study is to take xenophobia seriously as a phenomenon in its own right; to understand it as a historical phenomenon, as a concept, and as a feature of contemporary society, and to imagine ways in which its negative effects can be counteracted. To this end, we first have to understand how xenophobia is similar to and distinct from other forms of discrimination, especially racism, and what its possible defining characteristics are. That is the purpose of the present chapter.

While many instances of xenophobia will also be instances of racism, I will show that we nevertheless have good reason to treat these as distinct concepts, both for the sake of our understanding of xenophobia *and* of our anti-racist efforts. My discussion takes its lead from the work of David Haekwon Kim and Ronald R. Sundstrom (2014), in which xenophobia is defined as 'civic ostracism'. Kim and Sundstrom's work is relevant because (i) they offer one of the few discussions in *philosophy* in which xenophobia is the main focus; (ii) the relationship between xenophobia and racism is of central concern in their work; and (iii) they offer an account of xenophobia that helps us to make sense of individual *and* institutional forms of xenophobia, as well as the different ways in which xenophobia manifests in different communities or societies. Kim and Sundstrom's work therefore provides focus and a framework for this chapter. While their focus is on xenophobia in the United States specifically, the context-sensitive nature of their theory makes it applicable to other contexts as well, including South Africa.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In Section 1, I consider the relation between xenophobia and racism, looking at the overlaps but ultimately arguing that we need a distinct definition of xenophobia. Section 1.1 deals with the undeniable link that is often found between xenophobia and racism. Here I will focus specifically on the South African context, which

provides us with examples of xenophobia applied in a racist way, but also problematises the too easy explanation that 'xenophobia is a form of racism'. This requires a historical account of xenophobia in South Africa, that, I will show, is in part a product of our colonial and Apartheid history, but that is also not entirely removed from global trends and influences. I draw mainly on the work of Francis B. Nyamnjoh (2006), Michael Neocosmos (2010), and David Mario Matsinhe (2011). Yet even as xenophobia in South Africa is racist in its application, in Section 1.2 I argue that we should also focus on the points of divergence between the two phenomena. To do this, I call upon the work of Kim and Sundstrom, specifically their argument that our national narratives of race make us blind to forms of discrimination that do not fit those narratives. The consequence of this, if we see xenophobia merely as a form of racism, is that racism shelters xenophobia (Sundstrom 2013). Xenophobia and racism differ in their origins and also their effect, and a failure to distinguish between them may blind us not only to instances of discrimination that do not fit our national narratives, but also to ones where race does not play a role. The rest of the chapter will therefore be devoted to developing a distinct understanding of xenophobia in terms of its origins, its effects, and of the distinct political realities that enable and uphold it.

Section Two engages with Kim and Sundstrom's definition of xenophobia. They argue that xenophobia is distinct from racism in its effect – xenophobia places certain groups in vulnerable positions by excluding them from the civic mainstream. This they call 'civic ostracism', which they identify as the core and distinguishing characteristic of xenophobia. This understanding of xenophobia helps us to realise how pervasive xenophobia is, in the sense that it affects every aspect of the foreigner's life, from how they socialise and with whom, to whether they have a political voice. The moral harm in xenophobia lies in this exclusion, as exclusion also prevents foreigners from accessing public goods. I link this discussion to Hannah Arendt's warning about the dangers of exclusion and statelessness. Understanding xenophobia as civic ostracism helps us to recognise the particular ways in which foreigners are targeted and affected, and is useful in conceptualising the moral harm in xenophobia. However, I challenge Kim and Sundstrom's claim that civic ostracism is the *core* or distinguishing feature of xenophobia, as it could be argued that other forms of oppression also ostracise certain groups in this way. I argue that civic ostracism is the consequence of xenophobia, that has at its core an idea of foreignness, which in turn is shaped by how we think about belonging. This provides us with the reason or motivation behind xenophobia. Our ideas about belonging and foreignness shape our attitudes toward others and determine the targets through foreigner

objectification. Once 'foreigners' have been identified, they are ostracised. This creates a condition of perpetual foreignness, in which inclusion or membership is precluded.

In the final section of this chapter, I look at how our ideas about belonging and foreignness find political expression in our membership norms and conception of citizenship, which in turn creates the kind of political conditions under which xenophobia can flourish. I discuss Neocosmos's (2010) four theses on citizenship, xenophobia, and political identity, in which he explains how South Africans, individuals and the state, see citizenship as something given and something dependent on indigeneity or being originally from South Africa. This conception of citizenship effectively excludes foreigners (even those who are naturalised citizens) from true belonging and the benefits of full citizenship. This shows how political factors contribute to the vulnerability of foreigners, which in turn makes them easy targets for discrimination and violence. The second part of this section deals with a common explanation of xenophobia: the scapegoat theory. I show how the scapegoat mechanism works, with reference to the work of René Girard (1986), but I argue that scapegoating itself requires an explanation. We are able to scapegoat foreigners, precisely because of the political circumstances created by our ideas of foreignness.

Ultimately, this chapter establishes the link between racism and xenophobia in specific contexts but shows that we are dealing with two distinct phenomena with different origins. The origin of xenophobia in contemporary society lies in our ideas about belonging and the idea of foreignness, and this determines how we treat foreigners and also how we think about membership to political communities.

1. Racism and xenophobia: connections and distinctions

In academic literature, media reports and editorials, government communications and various organisations' websites we often come across the phrase 'racism and xenophobia'. Racism *and* xenophobia fuel anti-immigrant protests in the United States, racism *and* xenophobia underlie anti-refugee sentiments in Europe. 'Racism' is often named and discussed independently – indeed, there is a wealth of literature on this topic. Yet by comparison we rarely read about 'xenophobia' on its own. This seems to be due to an assumption that our understanding of race and racism adequately captures what there is to know about xenophobia. So, for example, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, on their website for reporting hate crimes, has the following to say under the heading "Racism and Xenophobia": "Racism is

prejudice or hostility towards a person's race, colour, language, *nationality, or national or ethnic origin*" (OSCE ODIHR n.d., my emphasis). The connection between xenophobia and racism is often emphasised in this way, to the extent that xenophobia is sometimes equated with racism. We cannot deny that xenophobia and racism intersect in a myriad of ways, or that they are often "mutually supporting forms of oppression" (Yakushko 2009: 47). Much of this chapter focuses on these intersections. In Section 1.1, my discussion of the South African context will illustrate the ways in which xenophobia and racism intersect. Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 1.2, there are also important reasons for distinguishing xenophobia from racism.

1.1 Racism and xenophobia in South Africa

Comparing xenophobia to racism seems more helpful than the broad 'fear of strangers', as it indicates to us that there is something *about* the stranger that is feared. Xenophobia is not merely a reaction to strangers, but to *specific kinds* of strangers. It is not aversion to all strangeness, but to certain forms of strangeness.[4] It is the fear or hatred of strangers, but with added cultural baggage and political significance. Very often, the 'stranger' *is* a racial stranger or other:

> Although xenophobia and its ills seem to infect just about all societies experiencing rapid social change, not every foreigner, outsider or stranger is a target. Instead, nationals, citizens or locals are *very careful in choosing who qualifies to be treated as the inferior and underserving 'Other'*, and such choices depend on the hierarchies of humanity informed by race, nationality, culture, class and gender. (Nyamnjoh 2006: 38, my emphasis)

Who qualifies as the hated stranger differs from context to context. In South Africa, for example, the victims of xenophobia are predominantly black "and are targeted for their very blackness by a society where skin colour has always served as an excuse for whole catalogues of discriminatory policies and practices", writes Francis Nyamnjoh (ibid. 49) in his comparative study of xenophobia in Southern Africa. Nyamnjoh illustrates the complex nature of the xenophobic attitudes and, specifically, the xenophobic violence so common in South Africa: that it is directed almost exclusively at black African nationals. Asian nationals

[4] In Chapter 2 I will consider the phenomenon's origins in a more general fear of strangers, but it is important to note that how we use the term *today* is more specific.

(Chinese, Pakistanis, for example) do experience xenophobic discrimination, but to a lesser extent. White foreigners are almost never the targets of xenophobia.[5] Following the 2008 attacks and the increase in xenophobic violence ever since, South Africa has become known for its animosity towards other Africans. The country's treatment of foreigners and its immigration policies has earned it the reputation of an aggressive state that 'lives up against, rather than with, its neighbours' (Vale 2002: 10).

Xenophobia in South Africa is therefore particularly interesting for two reasons: (i) it undermines the idea that xenophobia can be simply equated with racism, as xenophobic violence is often directed at black Africans, and often perpetrated by black South Africans[6], yet (ii) race does seem to play a significant role in determining the victim of xenophobic violence or discrimination, here and elsewhere. To understand this complex relationship between racism and xenophobia in South Africa, we therefore first need to ask how and why other African nationals are the targets. The following discussion will of necessity be brief. My aim is to use South Africa as an illustrative example. For studies that comprehensively deal with xenophobia in South(ern) Africa, see (Misago *et al.* 2009; Landau 2011; Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010; SAMP 2001, 2008).

That South African xenophobia is mainly concerned with Africans is illustrated by the derogatory term used to indicate 'foreigner(s)': *makwerekwere*. This term refers almost exclusively to black Africans, who are seen as barbaric, backwards, "the darkest of the dark-skinned [and] less enlightened even when more educated than the lighter-skinned South African blacks" (Nyamnjoh 2006: 39). Unlike much of racist terminology, which started out as neutral description in one language but gradually came to be used in a derogatory way, the term *makwerekwere* was derogatory form the outset, with the purpose of denying black African immigrants "a name of their choice" (Nyamnjoh 2006: 14). The term not only denies other

[5] Where white foreigners are targets of violence, it is mostly a case of opportunistic crime rather than an attack on them because they are not South African.

[6] Note that black South Africans are not the only xenophobic demographic in South Africa. Xenophobia is commonly seen in this way, especially in the media, because of the perpetrators of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic attacks. However, harmful xenophobic attitudes are held by the majority of South Africans (see Crush & Pendleton 2007 for an in-depth study). We also tend to think only of certain forms of violence as 'xenophobic violence', where the intentions are explicitly anti-foreigner. However, foreigners can be the victims of violent attacks and such attacks can be xenophobic even if the intention behind the attack is not. An example would be violence toward undocumented farm labourers or domestic workers. Such violence is xenophobic in the sense that the victims are not protected by the laws and state institutions in the same way as citizens would be. Undocumented foreigners often have no recourse to the law (i.e. they cannot report crimes against them, for fear of detection). The unprotected, vulnerable position in which undocumented foreigners find themselves is xenophobic.

Africans a name, but also an intelligible language – it is an onomatopoeic reference to how other African languages sound to the ears of South Africans. Nyamnjoh (ibid. 39) suggests that the term is "perhaps reminiscent of the Boers who named the local black communities 'hottentots' to denote 'stutterers'". In this sense, it is also reminiscent of the origins of the word 'barbaric', from the Greek *barbaroi/barbaros*, meaning foreign or not Greek, also an onomatopoeic reference to the speech of non-Greeks. A similar word exists in Sanskrit (*barbara* – stammering). Creating names for community outsiders is one of the most basic ways in which humans discriminate (and have discriminated throughout history), in which we put up barriers between *us* and *them*. It is effective, because it allows us to ignore others' plight and attempts at communication or forming relationships.

To deny people an intelligible language also infantilises them, or even dehumanise them by implicitly comparing their language to the noises of animals. It also serves to preclude any form of contact or interaction, as well as any responsibility toward the other – if your language is unintelligible, I *cannot* understand anything you say and, consequently, you *cannot* ask anything of me. This is not mere name-calling, like bullies in a playground. To call people *makwerekwere* is to exclude them not only from the political community, but from humanity itself. Hannah Arendt (1998: 3), who identified our ability to speak with our political nature, argues that when one is excluded from the *polis*, one is deprived of a place in which one's speech makes sense or where one's voice can be heard. Naming a foreigner *makwerekwere* amounts to excluding them from the political, social, and moral sphere.

We are familiar with historical examples of the link between names and violence. Zimbabwean poet Tariro Ndoro (2019: 63) poignantly expresses this in her poem 'Black Easter (reflections)', which deals with her personal experiences of xenophobia in South Africa:

> I say, each life matters
>
> you speak of liberty, emancipation
>
> & other Pan-African rhetoric
>
> but you invented words like kwerekwere
>
> & expected the necklacing not to happen
>
> I tweeted no to xenophobia
>
> but words came before your machetes

Ndoro highlights the fact that the way we speak about others, the language we use determines how we see them and, consequently, what we think we are justified in doing to them. Think, for example, of the language used by the Hutus to refer to the Tutsis in the time leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide: Tutsis as snakes, or cockroaches. In naming them so, some Hutus came to see their compatriots not as fellow citizens, neighbours, or simply human beings, but as pests that need to be eradicated. In using this kind of language, specific associations are made. Snakes are associated with danger, cockroaches are unhygienic. There is also the association with specific practices – killing snakes before they kill us; eradicating cockroaches before they spread disease. The association between the words used and specific practices in turn enabled and inspired violent actions (Beaver & Stanley 2019: 506). In Chapters 4-5 I discuss this relationship between 'words and machetes' with reference to narrative theories of identity.

The dehumanisation and infantilisation that takes place when we use words such as *makwerekwere* is not unconnected to race and South Africa's history of racism. The term *makwerekwere* does not only mean someone who speaks gibberish. It is also used to point out a foreigner from an economically and culturally 'backward' country, and somewhere far distant (Nyamnjoh 2006: 39). White foreigners are assumed to come from rich and culturally sophisticated countries. The link between xenophobia and racism here is clear, as *this* application of the term *makwerekwere* follows the logic of white supremacy, a legacy of the colonial and Apartheid regimes. It is also a consequence of what has been dubbed 'South African exceptionalism' – an idea or ideology not wholly separate from the colonial legacy. The underlying idea is that South Africa is unlike (i.e. better than) other African countries, and therefore not really 'African', but rather "somehow more akin to a Southern European or Latin American country", with higher levels of industrialisation and a more liberal democracy (Neocosmos 2010: 4).

The assumption is that South Africa is economically stronger, has more developed industries, is culturally more sophisticated, and also more peaceful than the rest of Africa. Dubious assumptions, to say the least. Even granted how developed our industries are, Neocosmos (ibid. 5) rightly points out that foreign migrant labour was and still is crucial in the development of our industries. South African exceptionalism is also in part the product of Apartheid narratives, which saw South Africa as the last standing white-led government, a bastion against the darkness of the continent. Some see South Africa as a European outpost that is situated

"accidentally and […] irritatingly" at the foot of the "dark continent" (Lazarus 2004: 610). That white South Africans hold this view is unsurprising. The xenophobia of white South Africans is very intimately linked with racism toward all Africans/people of colour. Historically, the belief that the land belongs to the Afrikaners, as God's chosen people, played an important role in Afrikaner identity (an aspect of which some still cling to). This idea crops up in discussions about land distribution and restitution, but doubtlessly also plays a role in xenophobia toward outsiders (i.e. those not 'of the land').

South African exceptionalism as an ideology or national myth is also present, however, in the black South African social unconscious, as the colonised "idealise themselves in the image of the coloniser" (Matsinhe 2011: 301). Matsinhe refers to Fanon's *Black Skins, White Masks* (2008), where Fanon theorises about the internalisation of racism in the colonial subject. Internalised racism leads the individual to unconsciously "distrust what is black in me" (ibid. 148). Such self-loathing, argues Matsinhe (2011: 302), leads the self-loathers to "loathe those who resemble them the most", as they serve as reminders of their own current or historic oppression. Here we see, and not for the last time in this study, that xenophobia has more to do with the xenophobe and generally very little with the reality of the person(s) at whom xenophobia is directed.

Nyamnjoh (2006: 40) links the striving of South Africans to prove themselves better than other Africans to modernisation and the exclusion, for much of the country's recent history, of black South Africans from the benefits of modernisation. For a very long time, black South Africans were not considered (both in the minds of white South Africans, and legally) as citizens of South Africa, but rather "foreign natives" (Neocosmos 2010: ix). This condition of foreignness was initially introduced by the British colonial administration in 1913 with the Native's Land Act, and subsequently formulated by the Apartheid government, who declared indigenous South Africans as foreigners in their own land. Following the implementation of the 1913 Act, Sol Plaatjie (2007: 21) wrote: "Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth." Legally, this foreign status was ended when full citizenship was extended to all South Africans, but effectively many South Africans still find themselves in a precarious position. The influx of other Africans becomes "a nightmare from the past, for South African blacks eager to prove their modernity and harvest the benefits of full citizenship for long mystified by whiteness" (Nyamnjoh 2006: 40). In "choosing who qualifies to be treated as the inferior and underserving

'Other'" (ibid. 38), South Africans therefore still follow the logic of Apartheid racial hierarchies, where a lighter skin is understood to mean a better, more civilised, person. Taking this into account, it is undeniable that racism and xenophobia are mutually supporting and reinforcing forms of discrimination and oppression.

Xenophobia in South Africa, and more broadly in post-colonial Africa, is also linked to the history of liberation struggles on the continent, and the anti-Apartheid struggles in South Africa. During the early days of the liberation struggles, the reigning conception of citizenship was "unifying, inclusive" and not based on birth (or indigeneity), but residence, and was the product of a kind of nationalism that sought to unite different factions against the colonial power (Neocosmos 2010: 9). This was also supported by Pan-Africanism and calls for continental unity, to see Africa as "one Africa", rejecting "any kind of partition", an Africa that is "one indivisible" (Nkrumah 1963: 217). As nations started gaining independence, however, this shifted. Fanon discusses this in depth in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2017: 165-166). Fanon's concern was with the rising national chauvinism and resultant xenophobia, but also with tribalism and ethnic conflicts (his predictions here were sadly realised in the decades following the liberation struggles). He develops an account of how a liberating, inclusive nationalism can degenerate into national chauvinism precisely as a result of the drive for national – i.e. supra-tribal or ethnic – unification.

A strong call for unification, even if it is for a good cause, may lead to unjust exclusions. South Africa's post-Apartheid 'rainbow nation' building exercise illustrates this very well. Granting the necessity of trying to build a 'new South Africa' and reconciling black and white citizens, this project ultimately contributed to the increase in xenophobia since 1994. This is due, in part, to our failure to come to terms with, and to fix, the injustices of our past. The vaunted unity of the 'rainbow nation' papered over instead of unmaking the logic of Apartheid, which helps explain why the latter is still so prevalent in South African xenophobia. As Fanon shows, the shift from unification to chauvinism is due, in part, to the fact that pre-colonial territoriality (and its accompanying enmities), and the differences between the urban bourgeoisie and the rural classes, were ignored. To understand xenophobia in Africa, these histories need to be understood. On a broader level, and of more direct concern in this study, these examples show us the ways in which political realities, allegiances, and beliefs can create the conditions for xenophobia.

Xenophobia in South Africa is therefore in part a product of colonial group relations, informed by our specific history and context. For Matsinhe (2011), this means that xenophobia in South Africa is *not* a particular instance of a universal phenomenon, but that what we call xenophobia is actually Afrophobia (ibid. 298). This accounts for the post-Apartheid rise in xenophobic sentiments and violent attacks, as "the victimisation of black South Africans [by the white government and populace] is being replaced by the victimisation of African foreigners" (ibid. 296). Xenophobia in South Africa confuses us, as there seems to be no real visible difference – physical, or in terms of socioeconomic status – between the in-group and the out-group: "In many cases, they share ancestries, traditions and languages" (ibid). Like racism, xenophobia often focuses on supposed physical differences. The police and citizens identify 'foreigners' based on physical markers such as skin colour (with darker tones indicating foreignness), hairstyles, dress, how they walk, how they talk, and even what their inoculation marks look like (ibid. 303; Desai 2008: 52). Matsinhe (ibid. 297) calls this the "narcissism of minor differences", a term he borrows from Freud. Antagonism between people who have a partially shared history and culture is possible, as are antagonistic relations between people who look alike.

Remembering his earlier point on self-loathing, Matsinhe (ibid. 302) concludes that from the viewpoint of the South African xenophobe, "African nationals are feared, hated and distrusted not because they are different but because they resemble the former victims of apartheid". Other African nationals remind black South Africans of their own 'inferiority'. It is therefore African nationals' bodies that allow them to be identified. Citizenship includes certain bodily ideals, bodies regarded as familiar. On the other side of this coin there are "fantasies of strangeness" (ibid.). Deviation from the former and conformity to the latter draws negative attention to an individual, often with dire consequences. Matsinhe views bodies as the building-blocks of the nation, and the selection of the 'correct' bodies as a form of patriotism. Those who do not have the 'correct' body "are rejected, labelled coarse and strange, and denied belonging and usefulness" (ibid. 303). The similarities here with colonial and Apartheid ideologies surrounding 'correct' bodies are clear.

On the one hand, the link between racism and xenophobia is enforced here, as Matsinhe suggests that the latter is a product of a system that was held up by racist ideologies and distinctions. Racism and our racist history can go some way towards explaining why the victims of xenophobia are chosen (i.e. why this group of people and not another), which is

crucial to understanding the phenomenon. However, I hope to show that it does not fully explain why we are xenophobic, nor does it account for all instances of xenophobia. What Matsinhe's discussion indicates is the imperfect fit between racism and xenophobia. Granted that racism and xenophobia very often go hand in hand, one has the feeling that there is some difference, even if it is difficult to put a finger on it. This will be investigated in more depth in the later sections of this chapter.

What Nyamnjoh, Neocosmos, and Matsinhe all make clear is that is that the victims of xenophobia are not randomly chosen, but that there are historical and political reasons why one group of foreigners is discriminated against rather than another within a given context. Given that colonialism and imperialism changed the shape not only of South Africa or Africa, but the whole globe, it is unsurprising that race and xenophobia go hand-in-hand in other contexts as well. For this reason, I am sceptical about claims like Matsinhe's that xenophobia in South Africa is wholly different from xenophobia elsewhere. I think it is more helpful to understand xenophobia as a global phenomenon that takes on different forms in different contexts. For the rise of xenophobia in South Africa is not only linked to the building of the rainbow nation – it is also linked to economic difficulties, a global problem, and the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments worldwide. To see xenophobia in South Africa as something unique and separate would mean that we don't see similar things happening elsewhere, yet we do. In Europe and the United States, in Brazil and Australia, we see a rise of right-wing nationalism and populism fuelled by xenophobic attitudes. We are not isolated from these trends.

Part of understanding xenophobia would be to consider contextual factors and political circumstances, as I have done above. An account of xenophobia that does not investigate its ties to racism would be incomplete, especially if applied to the South African context. That we tend to see xenophobia as a form of racism is due to the undeniable link between the two phenomena, but also perhaps due to an attempt to indicate that xenophobia is as morally harmful as racism, as we tend to treat the two differently even as we equate them:

> In the one hand, racism is regarded today as totally inexcusable, so that, for example, people are held responsible for any casual racist slur in the public arena. On the other hand, xenophobia does not rank high on the list of moral faults, and open expressions of it can even increase support for a political party. (Bernasconi 2014:6)

Comparing racism, which is morally condemned, with xenophobia, which is often not, may therefore help us realise that xenophobia is also wrong. Drawing a moral analogy between racism and xenophobia can be a useful strategy, yet we should be careful lest in comparison, we oversimplify this relationship, equating the one with the other. Racism, as we will see, means different things in different contexts, depending on the specific history of that context. Racism in South Africa is understood, in a commonplace sense, as something perpetrated by white people against black people, both on and individual and on a structural level. This understanding of racism (which I do not dispute) implies that black people cannot be racist. If we equate racism with xenophobia, we will have to conclude that black people cannot be xenophobic. This leaves us with no conceptual tools to interpret or condemn certain instances of xenophobic violence in South Africa. What we need is a way to talk about xenophobia that recognises the role that racism plays in identifying the target of xenophobia, but that can also be identified despite our everyday ideas about what racism entails. I do not deny the necessity of analysing xenophobia through the lens of racism (in the way done above), but rather want to show why we should be wary of relying only on this lens when examining xenophobia.

1.2 National narratives of race

That xenophobia and racism inform and mutually enforce each other in most contexts is undeniable; yet it would have become clear that there is not always a perfect overlap between these two phenomena. There are a number of reasons why we should distinguish between the two. Firstly, equating xenophobia with racism prevents one from making sense of the fear of the stranger who belongs to the *same* race. The conflation may blind us to specific instances of discrimination or forms of oppression because they do not fit our understanding of racial discrimination. Above, we saw that this can be explained in certain contexts by the internalisation of racism and its accompanying insecurities (Fanon), yet it cannot be expected that every xenophobe in the world, every ‘man on the street’, is well-versed in theories and philosophies of race and racism. In everyday public discourse, people’s views on racism may be informed by less nuanced understandings of race.

Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 21, see also Sundstrom 2013) explain how our thinking about race ‘shelters’ xenophobia, making it difficult or even impossible for us to recognise certain instances of discrimination, or forms of oppression directed at specific groups, as discrimination or oppression. This is due to our nationalised rhetorics of racism and our national narratives of racism (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 21). Racism is deeply contextual, and

the context is "significantly, if not uniquely, national" (ibid.). When we speak of 'racism', we are actually referring to a variety of *forms of* racism, each unique to a context. So, for example, Kim and Sundstrom (ibid.) argue that racism against Native Americans is genocide-based; racism against African Americans is slavery-based; and racism against Jews is based in anti-Semitism. In South Africa, racism against black South Africans differs from racism toward other people of colour, both in its extent and its roots. It is the racism of colonial subjugation and fear of the primitive (perhaps akin to the racism directed at indigenous Americans), whereas the racism directed at brown/Coloured people will perhaps in part be slavery-based, and racism toward Indians and other Asians a product of the system of indentured labour, and also more connected to xenophobic ideas of the 'foreignness' of Asians in Africa.[7] An analysis of these potential differences is not directly relevant to my broader study, but suffice to say that the hierarchy of races found in Apartheid logic illustrates the point that we are dealing with racisms, not Racism.

Certain forms of racism will be more prevalent in certain contexts, which in turn gives rise to a nationalised rhetoric of racism and national narratives of racism. Nationalised narratives of racism refer to all the various narratives around race found in a specific nation, whereas the nationalised rhetoric of racism refers to "those dominant narratives that shape monumental history or mythistory of the nation" (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 21). In modern states, this rhetoric is officially anti-racist, as it is the product of that nation's specific history of racist transgressions. So the dominant narrative of racism in Germany is that of anti-Semitism, for obvious reasons. In South Africa, the dominant narrative would be of white (European, settler, colonial, Boer) racism against black (African). The nationalised rhetoric of racism to a large extent determines what counts as racism and what does not, and it serves "nationalistic purposes", as it tells the story of the overcoming of racism in the nation (so the idea of a 'new' South Africa, the 'rainbow nation', and 'born frees' forms part of this rhetoric).

Both the rhetoric and narratives of racism may seem unproblematic, as they highlight injustices and discrimination (in the case of the latter) and are anti-racist or attempts to overcome racism

[7] Nyamnjoh's (2006: 56-63) discussion of xenophobia towards South African Indians illustrates this point. He refers specifically to a song by artist Mbongeni Ngema, 'AmaNdiya' ('The Indians'), in which Indian South Africans are reduced to "*Makwerekwere* with citizenship" and accused of not assuming their national responsibilities. Their belonging is provisional, in a way that the belonging of black South Africans is not. Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 28) identify something similar in the USA, where Asian Americans find themselves in a state of 'perpetual foreignness'.

(the former). However, Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 22) alert us to the fact that such narratives may blind us to incidents of discrimination or forms of oppression that do not fit our public or national narratives of racism. In South Africa, our focus on racism by white people against black people may prevent us from seeing instances of race-based discrimination, such as the racism that Indian South Africans may direct at black South Africans, or the prejudices black South Africans hold toward black Africans. This supports my earlier point that even as we see xenophobia as a form of racism, we are unable to condemn xenophobia in the way in which we condemn racism. Homogenised, dominant understandings of racism obscure the very particular experiences of discrimination faced by immigrants or foreigners and, as Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 21) point out, this is sometimes intentional. It creates a "conceptual and moral loophole" (ibid. 22) that allows individuals, groups, and whole nations to continue to discriminate against a specific group of people, unchecked by the moral outrage directed at acts of racism.

While it is crucial for the anti-racist project to identify racism in all its forms, this does not yet provide us with a full justification for distinguishing racism from xenophobia, as it could be argued that xenophobia is still just a form of racism, and what we need to do is to recognise the narrative of race that informs it, and incorporate that into the nationalised rhetoric of race.[8] However, there are further reasons to justify the distinction. Some reasons relate to the features or characteristics of xenophobia, which I turn to in Section 2. Both xenophobia and racism function to exclude specific groups and targeted individuals from communities, opportunities, and privileges. However, the history of racism is closely tied to that of imperialism, colonialism, and modernity. What we understand by 'race' now is largely the product of Enlightenment rationalism, imperialism, and industrialisation (Niro 2003: 15). It was only after these developments that the concept of race gained the "explicit ideological currency […] culturally and politically" (ibid.: 19) it has today, upon which 'racism' as we understand it today was built. Seeing xenophobia as a *form of* racism, therefore, would under this history of racism imply that xenophobia is a modern phenomenon. However, we know that enmity and discrimination among different groups existed before the advent of modernity and the nation-state. My suspicion is that our fear of strangers (in general) precedes our fear of specific racial or national strangers.

[8] This discussion also indicates the way in which narratives can obscure or illuminate xenophobia, a point which will be pursued in Chapters 4 and 5.

My main concern, however, with the suggestion that we widen our nationalised rhetoric of race to include the possibility (in the South African context) of black South Africans who participate in xenophobic violence, or who hold xenophobic attitudes where other African nationals are concerned, is that this may be misunderstood in public dialogue on racism. In a country where there is still often the denial of racism or discrimination based on race (from white South Africans), and where those on the right make claims to 'reverse racism' (e.g. in referring to affirmative action policies), I think we should be careful of opening the door to this possibility. The 'reverse racism' refrain is heard across the world, an example of which is the right-wing narrative of 'replacement' that I will discuss in Chapter 2. What we need are narratives and rhetorics that illuminate all forms of discrimination, without making room for ones based on imaginary harms while denying existing harms. For this reason, I think it is important to conceptualise xenophobia independently from race, as something which stands alongside racism rather than being subsumed by it. We have a precedent for this kind of distinct-yet-connected analysis in intersectional feminism.

My second overall reason for drawing a distinction is simple: even if racism and xenophobia coincide most of the time, and in most contexts, one can still imagine a situation in which racial differences do not come into play, or do not exist, yet where there is some form of antipathy towards the stranger in our midst – the casual, mutual xenophobia of the English and the French, perhaps. This may seem trivial, in our current context, but the joking stereotypes and small frustrations have their root in a bloody, conflict-ridden history (which, importantly, is not a product of a history of racial discrimination). This indicates that xenophobia requires further explanation. As I suggested at the start, we should rather view xenophobia and racism as mutually reinforcing forms of oppression with "distinct features in regard to their origins, targets, and typical expressions" (Yakushko 2009: 48). This will be the focus of the rest of the study.

2. The distinctiveness of xenophobia

Yakushko suggests that xenophobia differs from racism on several grounds, and in an attempt to define xenophobia we can approach it from any, or all, of these perspectives. We can look at what causes xenophobes to be xenophobic – their attitudes, beliefs, fears, motivations, and drives – and how this differs from the origin of racism. We can ask what, if anything, it is about foreigners that makes them targets, or what the external or political conditions are that enable us to target them (I return to this in Section 3). We can also look at how xenophobia is

expressed, and the consequences thereof. The latter approach is taken by Kim and Sundstrom (2014), who argue that xenophobia differs from racism in the effect it has on those it is directed against, and that that effect captures the unique moral harm of xenophobia. The core of xenophobia, according to them, is civic ostracism. In what follows, I will briefly consider their reasons for identifying civic ostracism as the distinguishing core of xenophobia, arguing that it can indeed help us to understand why and how xenophobia is harmful (Section 2.1). However, I do not fully endorse their definition. I will argue that while civic ostracism is part of xenophobia, it is not unique to xenophobia nor does it help us understand why specific groups are chosen, or why where the origins of our tendency to be xenophobic lies. To fully understand xenophobia, we should not only look at moral harm, but also at the attitudes and beliefs that lead to harmful actions. Kim and Sundstrom does address the question of why foreigners are ostracised, but the deeper question of the origins of xenophobia, and the attitudes and beliefs people hold that makes them xenophobic, remains unanswered. They do argue that we ostracise based on ascriptions of foreignness, leading me to question why they did not identify *this* as the core of xenophobia (Section 2.2). Finally, in Section 2.3, I will argue that the heart of xenophobia lies the motivating *idea of foreignness* and an accompanying sense of belonging, which explains both the target and typical expressions and effects of xenophobia, but also points us in the direction of where xenophobia's origins may lie, which is the direction Chapter 2 will take.

2.1 Xenophobia as civic ostracism

The argument for xenophobia as civic ostracism is framed by two points of departure:

i. "the normative context for xenophobia is the ethical relations of the polity" (ibid. 23), and
ii. "life within groups is profoundly formative of the self" (ibid.)

Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 24) argue persuasively that *inclusion* in the mainstream civic life is both a condition for us to access certain other social goods, including various kinds of social relations, and a social good in itself. This allows them to identify the unique moral harm of xenophobia, which for them is what distinguishes xenophobia from racism. Xenophobia is harmful because it excludes certain groups of people from the possibility of accessing certain social goods necessary for a full life. But what exactly is it that they are excluded from? To put it differently, in what sense is civic inclusion a social good? The answer is that civic inclusion

(i) secures individual agency, which provides individuals with "an abiding sense of meaningful possibilities of action, identity, and relationship formation within institutions, associations, and public spheres generally" (ibid. 24); (ii) it ensures that the individual has *political* agency, as well as access to "goods, jobs, relationships, and statuses"; (iii) allows the individual to feel that they have a legitimate claim to rights and protection; and finally (iv) civic inclusion leads to "confidence in the cultural legitimacy of historically non-normative identities and practices" (ibid. 24-25). In short, civic inclusion fosters the sense in individuals that they belong, that their words and deeds matter (to use Arendt's formulation), that they are connected (through their relationships with others in the civic community), and that their identity, even if it is 'different', is accepted. Importantly, the individual can only feel that their identity has legitimacy and they have agency within the specific context if the broader community in which they are situated approves and accommodates that identity and agency. This leads Kim and Sundstrom to identify another social good, which requires group-belonging or civic inclusion: "the enabling sense of meaningful possibilities in a modern polity" (ibid.).

For now, I will take the importance of belonging to a community or a group as a given. I will give a more in-depth account of the importance of belonging and 'home' in Chapter 3. The importance given to belonging, recognised by communitarian theories, need not be at odds with more cosmopolitan, universalist, or individualist theories. Even more individualistic societies *are* individualistic because of a certain form of group relations. And in highly individualistic societies, people still seek group-belonging, even if this does not mean the traditional groupings of nation, religion, etc. Group belonging is important for us because there are certain things that we value that cannot be found or achieved on our own. As Charles Taylor (1994: 58) puts it, certain goods, friendship for example, can only be "sought in common" and they are, therefore, "irreducibly social". Group membership can also be crucial to identity formation – we define ourselves in relation to others, we are inspired to be or act in a certain way by others. This does not mean that belonging to a *single* group is necessary, important, or desirable. Nor am I saying that group membership to a *nation* or a specific country is a given. It may be important in the way in which the world is structured and divided *now*, but we can imagine a world in which national citizenship is not the only kind of group-belonging that could ensure social goods and a political voice. Furthermore, it is possible to recognise the importance of groups and communities, while also being critical of the kinds of groups and communities that are exclusionary (e.g. countries with completely closed borders) or claim that membership of *that* group is the only legitimate form of membership (i.e. groups that require members to submit

fully for the sake of unity, erasing their individuality). Understanding group-belonging in this sense gives recognition to the social good of belonging, while also precluding the possibility of the unquestioned acceptance of a single group identity as the whole of one's identity (as in nationalism).

Xenophobia as civic ostracism therefore entails the exclusion from the group or civic community and the exclusion from meaningful possibilities, agency, social goods, relationships, and acceptance offered by group membership. To explain the potential effects of civic ostracism, Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 25) draw on Arendt's discussion of statelessness, and specifically her insight that the refugee or stateless person has fewer rights than a criminal:

> Only as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it […] The same man who was in jail yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had no rights whatever and who lived under threat of deportation, or who was dispatched without sentence and without trial to some kind of internment because he had tried to work and make a living, may become almost a full-fledged citizen because of a little theft. (Arendt 1976: 286)[9]

Arendt's point highlights the very specific form of vulnerability that results from civic ostracism. Not all instances of civic ostracism will be as severe as this, but whether the civic ostracism is on the other side of the scale from Arendt's extreme example, or whether an individual finds him/herself in a situation of complete isolation and rightlessness, the motivation behind the ostracism is the same: "the attribution of the cultural alienness of a subject or the felt sense that the subject does not rightly belong to the nation" (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 25). How formal this exclusion is depends on the context. In its less extreme form, it may simply amount to a person feeling out of place because of the ways in which those around them interact (or refuse to interact) with them. This would be similar to a child in school, even if they have the right to be there and are accepted by the teachers, feeling that they do not belong because they are being bullied by other children.

More formal, and arguably more dangerous, forms of civic ostracism relate to ostracisms that are, officially or implicitly, sanctioned by laws and public institutions. Kim and Sundstrom

[9] I discuss statelessness in more depth in Chapter 3.

(ibid. 25-26) connect civic ostracism to Arendtian statelessness by indicating three ways in which the "exclusionary outlook" (i.e. the assumption of cultural alienness and non-belonging) finds expression in law:

i. Where rightful laws are generally and systematically applied only to those deemed culturally alien/foreign.
ii. In morally problematic laws that are explicitly xenophobic.
iii. Where laws are vague or ambiguous yet seemingly neutral, but that are and have historically been implemented exclusively or significantly against those deemed alien/foreign.

Civic ostracism should also be distinguished from "actual ostracization" (ibid. 27) – i.e., when a person is literally expelled from the polity (denaturalisation and deportation). *Such* a form of ostracism is not free of xenophobia, but rather the extreme result of xenophobia. Understanding xenophobia as 'civic ostracism' allows us to identify its presence long before this extreme point. At this point we touch on an important aspect of xenophobia, one which will be of concern for the entirety of this study. Xenophobia is something that is both individual and institutional, something that sticks out its head on all levels and in all corners of society. To understand xenophobia, we need to understand both the motivations and the way it functions among people (individuals, groups, citizens) and in our institutions, specifically but not limited to political institutions. Any strategies developed to decrease xenophobic attacks and the xenophobic attitudes and beliefs that give rise to them, will have to recognise this (see Chapter 5). For Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 26), both the formal exclusions (as above) and "ordinary exclusions, hierarchies, and indignities based upon ascriptions of a subject not properly belonging to the civic community" gives rise to "a xenophobic life-world". Institutional xenophobia relates to laws and policies, whereas individual xenophobia (including the xenophobia of individuals who play a prominent role in institutions, such as political leaders) is when "a belief, affect, or more generally, an attitude or even agentive orientation takes some person or group as not a proper part of one's nation" (ibid.). Both can and do lead to exclusions.

2.2 The limits of 'xenophobia as civic ostracism'

Kim and Sundstrom's definition of xenophobia as civic ostracism provides us with important insights into xenophobia, yet I think that 'civic ostracism' does not do as much as they think it

does in closing moral loopholes or identifying what is unique to xenophobia. I do not dispute that foreigners are ostracised in the way they suggest – this is undoubtedly true, and very harmful for the reasons given. The value of their definition lies in the moral harm it identifies in the effect xenophobia has – the loss of necessary social goods caused by ostracism. Yet it is not clear to me that this moral harm is unique to xenophobia, or that other forms of discrimination (including racism!) do not ostracise individuals and groups from the community in similar ways. For Kim and Sundstrom, this is the *core* of xenophobia, that which distinguishes it from racism. Yet we can easily think of *other* groups that are excluded from the goods of public life in this way.

The South African case illustrates this point very well. One of the reasons often cited in the literature (see Nyamnjoh 2006) to explain the prevalence of xenophobia in South African society is that parts of the citizenry feel disenfranchised and left behind, with little to no access to services, jobs, or even the resources they need to survive. Constitutionally, they have a full range of rights and freedoms. In reality, those rights and freedoms mean very little. They are excluded from the privileges and opportunities richer or better situated citizens have, with very little chance of change. For all intents and purposes, these citizens are excluded from the benefits of being citizens. Not only are their rights and freedoms limited, but also their ability to participate meaningfully in the public sphere. It seems that civic ostracism is also a characteristic of classism and, given the correlation between race and class in South Africa (due to historical factors), racism. Similarly, sexism has also, and still does, exclude many women from fully enjoying their rights and privileges as citizens. Would not all forms of institutional discrimination and oppression be characterised by civic ostracism?

As crucial as it is that we identify what is morally harmful about specific practices, acts, beliefs, or social and political phenomena, we cannot rely on this to give us an adequate definition of anything, nor can we truly judge an action or a situation by only looking at the effects. Kim and Sundstrom's identification of xenophobia as civic ostracism leaves us with two questions – the one already given above, and the related question of what the motivation is behind the ostracization of foreigners. The question is whether there is something unique to being excluded from meaningful participation as a foreigner, as opposed to a poor person, a black person, or a woman. They do, in fact, provide us with the answer to this question, which makes one wonder why they did not identify *this* as the core of xenophobia, rather than civic ostracism which does not seem unique to xenophobia. The motivation behind the civic ostracism of

foreigners is the ascription of foreignness, or the idea that the individual or group does not belong to the nation or community (see Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 25, 26, quoted above). In fact, they point toward this early on in their argument when they distinguish between racism and xenophobia based on the 'driving idea' behind each. The driving idea behind racism is the One Blood imperative, which is based on notions of racial purity and fears if miscegenation. Xenophobia, however, is fuelled by the One Mind imperative, where a nation's culture is deemed superior to alien cultures (ibid. 24).[10]

Xenophobia is therefore not only civic ostracism, but civic ostracism motivated by the ascription of foreignness based on feelings of superiority (of one's own group) and the idea that the other group or individual does not rightly belong. Importantly, this belonging need not be national – other kinds of group-formations can also include and exclude based on their ideas of who belongs and who does not, such as nomadic groups. Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 31) in fact distinguish between xenophobia and nativism, which is xenophobia in defence of the nation-state or with the aim of policy maintenance. This distinction is important, for it points toward the fact that xenophobia precedes nationalist projects even as it is closely tied to nationalism. To define xenophobia more narrowly is to miss instances of outsider-discrimination where there is no nation or even state, but this also blinds us to affective, individual instances of xenophobia. This latter point also makes one wonder why they do not situate the core of xenophobia in its motivations, rather than in its expression or effects, for they state that the individual is xenophobic when he/she holds the belief or affect that the other person does not belong to his/her group. The individual is therefore xenophobic before any act of exclusion or ostracism, which means that civic ostracism cannot be the core defining feature of xenophobia.

2.3 The idea of foreignness

I therefore suggest that we should rather understand xenophobia as a belief (including prejudices), or attitude towards strangers based on the idea that they are foreign and do not belong to the group or community. Such beliefs and attitudes may be expressed or acted upon, and most often are, which results in formal and informal forms of civic ostracism and, in extreme cases, violence. This helps us to distinguish xenophobia from racism on the basis of

[10] These two imperatives can both be present in an act of discrimination or oppression, as with anti-African xenophobia in South Africa or Islamophobia in Europe. Yet they can also diverge, with the nation allowing membership regardless of race, providing that the incoming individuals assimilate fully to the dominant culture.

origin, as Yakushko suggests, while also still allowing us to recognise the important ways in which foreigners are excluded. Xenophobia and racism differ in the historical realities that gave birth them, and in their aims. Racism's history lies in our history of slavery, colonialism, and later segregation/Apartheid, with the aim of domination and exploitation, with the dominating group amassing economic (capital) and cultural privileges. To truly subjugate another race, the belief in their racial inferiority has to be widely accepted. Xenophobia, on the other hand, is a reaction the influx of strangers into relatively established communities or groups, which leads to the members of the community feeling threatened. This feeling of being threatened becomes exacerbated in times of economic or political instability but has its origins in the earliest days of human group formation, as we will see in Chapter 2. Xenophobia therefore does not necessarily consciously seek to dominate, nor is it (like racism) part of expansionist projects – rather, it seeks to protect what is 'ours':

> Xenophobic prejudice typically emphasizes the discomfort with the presence of foreigners in a community and the infringement of these foreigners on the economic, cultural, and social capital of the host community (Yakushko 2009: 49)

Why we feel discomfort when encountering strangers or outsiders still needs to be established, and I will do so in Chapter 2. What is important to realise now are the implications of understanding civic ostracism and any smaller, everyday instance of discrimination, as being motivated by the idea of foreignness. Firstly, the xenophobe is not concerned with the legal question of whether a specific individual is a citizen or foreign. Xenophobia has nothing to do with the actual legal status of the 'foreigner', but with the assumptions that insiders or citizens make about those who they perceive as foreign. This includes assumptions about the legal status of perceived foreigners, but the underlying question here is not primarily the political or legal question of citizenship, asylum, or residence, but the deeper question of belonging to the group one values (which I return to in Chapters 2 and 3). Landau (2006: 135), writing on the South African context, says that "the palpable fear of foreigners suggests a deep, existential apprehension over the meaning of belonging". How we think about belonging and not belonging, about membership and strangeness or foreignness, informs how we draw these distinctions on the political and legal level as well.

Certain groups of people will always be considered foreign, no matter how many generations of them have lived and been born in the country. Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 28) call this 'perpetual foreignness', naming Jews and the Roma (in Europe) and Asian Americans (in

America) as examples. This is also called foreigner objectification, which refers to the explicit or implicit ways in which we label especially minority groups as 'foreign', regardless of their legal status, how long they have been in their country of residence, or their citizenship (Lee, Lee & Tran 2017: 143). Kim and Sundstrom see perpetual foreignness, or foreigner objectification then, as a result of civic ostracism, but to me it seems more like a vicious circle: we have ideas about who belongs and who does not (the idea of foreignness), which when expressed through foreigner objectification determines who we ostracise, which in turn creates "a group-modulated *vulnerability*" (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 27) where some groups are and will always be vulnerable to exclusion because of their perceived foreignness, and on the basis of which we continuously reidentify them as foreign.

Foreigner objectification takes place on many levels, from the seemingly innocent question 'Where are you (really) from?', to surprise when a 'foreigner' can speak one's language (remember the 'unintelligibility' of the *makwerekwere*), to more aggressive forms (e.g. a violent mob identifying someone as a 'foreigner' and attacking them). Foreigner objectification certainly plays a role in xenophobia in South Africa. A study conducted on citizen's attitudes toward foreign migrants by Crush and Pendleton (2007: 68) shows that Southern Africans tend to assume that any foreign national, specifically those from the rest of Africa, are in the country illegally, and there exists a strong link in people's minds between illegality and immigration. This does not only indicate confusion or ignorance about the law, but the rather the sense that, irrespective of the law, a person who is perceived as foreign cannot be anything other than foreign.

The second implication of the idea of foreignness as the motivation behind civic ostracism follows from the first – if who we identify as outsiders is determined by how we think about group membership and belonging, this also relates to the question of our own origins. As our ideas about who belongs and who does not render certain groups perpetually foreign, it leads to what Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 28) refer to as "geographical malediction". The term is based on the idea of corporeal malediction, the mismatch between one's first-person experience of the body and the historical and social meaning that is laden on it by one's condition, circumstances, and society. 'Corporeal malediction' is generally applied to people's experience of racism, whereas 'geographical malediction' does not only look at the race of the other, but at the "historical and social meaning of race" (ibid.) in a specific context or location (this includes the nationalised narratives of race). What Kim and Sundstrom mean by this is that

certain racial others are also seen as national/geographical others. Regardless of a person's nationality (in the sense of citizenship) or their origins (in the sense of where they, as individuals, were born), and regardless of which political community *they* think they belong to, in the minds of the nation, the majority, or their host community, they will remain foreign. The assumption is that they will always have somewhere to go back to and that their loyalty is therefore divided, or that their loyalty lies elsewhere. This aspect of xenophobia indicates the strong link between xenophobia and racism, the ways in which they are mutually reinforcing, but it also shows us where the one differs from the other. Geographical malediction can, and often does, contain the idea of a racial other, but the core is foreignness and not racial otherness. To put it differently: xenophobia identifies its other on the basis of an idea of foreignness often based on the assumed connection between a place and a people, creating a strong link between belonging, origin, and indigeneity. Given how the world is currently divided into different states, our ideas about foreignness and belonging is expressed in political terms. Before I address the question of the pre-political and psychological origins of xenophobia in Chapter 2, I want to look at how the ideas discussed in this section – foreignness, belonging, place of origin – impact our current conceptions of political membership or citizenship. This will illustrate how these ideas are exclusionary and contribute to the ostracism of foreigners.

3. The political dimension of xenophobia

In this section, I will consider the political dimension of xenophobia from two perspectives. Firstly, I will look at how our conception of political membership is informed by our ideas surrounding belonging and foreignness, discussed in the section above. In South Africa, and arguably elsewhere, citizenship or membership to the political community is still strongly tied in our minds to origin and birth. This informs not only individual beliefs about who can be a citizen, but also the state's conception of citizenship. The aim of the discussion is to show how xenophobia manifests in contemporary political contexts. Secondly, I briefly consider the scapegoat theory as an explanation of xenophobia and show how it is our particular political circumstances that determine who we choose to scapegoat.

3.1 Xenophobia and citizenship

In a recent lecture, Sisonke Msimang (2017) identified "the problem of xenophobia [in South Africa], and the ways in which it is particularly directed at African migrants" as a function of "political failure". The failure lies on many levels. Firstly, it is the failure of political leaders

to say or do something against xenophobia, even when it erupts into extreme violence. Secondly, it is a failure of our political imagination – a failure not only to imagine the foreigner as a morally equal person, but also a failure to imagine a different kind of world, or to imagine belonging and membership in such a way that it is not linked to territory or individual origin.

In his explanatory account of xenophobia in South Africa, Michael Neocosmos (2010) investigates precisely the question of the link between xenophobia, our ideas about foreignness and belonging, and our conception of citizenship. His full, complex argument, outlining the relationship between colonialism, neo-liberalism, and xenophobia in the South African context, cannot be considered here. I will focus on one of the key arguments in the text, as it can be applied to other contexts than South Africa as well. Neocosmos posits four theses on citizenship and political identity:

i. "*Xenophobia is a Discourse and Practice of Exclusion from Community*" (ibid.: 13)
ii. "*This Process of Exclusion is a Political Process*" (ibid.: 14)
iii. "*Xenophobia is Concerned with Exclusion from Citizenship which Denotes a Specific Political Relationship Between State and Society*" (ibid.)
iv. "*Xenophobia is the Outcome of a Relation Between Different Forms of Politics*" (ibid.: 15)

The first thesis focuses on the fact of exclusion that (a) specific group(s) experience(s). This exclusion is both social and political. Socially, the group is excluded from *community* (e.g. the nation). Politically, the group is excluded from citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges. This is in line with an understanding of xenophobia as leading to civic ostracism. Importantly, Neocosmos identifies the reason for this exclusion: the existence of the community ('we') is predicated upon the existence of an excluded 'Other'. This requirement is not unique to xenophobia. Toni Morrison (2017: 15) refers to the "social/psychological need for a "stranger," an Other in order to define the estranged self". She links it to our search for belonging to something greater than ourselves – if we identify others as "strangers", it means there is a familiar, a place where we belong and they do not. We identify people as 'foreign' or 'alien', so that we can say that we are 'normal' (ibid.: 29).

For Neocosmos, this tactic when applied within a political community reduces membership and specifically citizenship to indigeneity or autochthony. You are part of the 'we' if you were *born here*, you cannot be part of the 'we' if you were not. Note that this excludes children of

'foreigners' born in the territory, as both indigeneity and autochthony denote the *original* inhabitants (i.e. not only those born in the territory, but those descended from others born in the territory). This also means that citizenship is essentially something passive, something that is given to you by the state at birth. *This* understanding of citizenship precludes any possibility of outsiders gaining access to the rights and entitlements of citizenship. While Neocosmos' focus is on the relationship between state and citizen, this point also holds for any kind of group where membership is seen as a given, passive, and inherited. The result of this is the perpetual foreignness of those who did not inherit.

Neocosmos's second thesis holds that the exclusion referred to above is a political process. It is political for two reasons: (i) the state plays a role, directly or implicitly, in the exclusion, and (ii) only political minorities are excluded. Concerning (i): the state determines who gets citizenship and determines the boundaries of citizenship. These boundaries are the product of the discursive debates between state and society and provide the framework of possibilities for political identities. The state's ideology, especially as it relates to immigration and the presence of foreigners, will therefore have a profound impact on the lives of foreigners within its borders. Economic circumstances may have an influence on the discursive debates between society and state, but they are only *part of* a much larger debate, where the focus is instead on the definition of citizenship. The South African state, through its institutions and leaders, sometimes actively and sometimes implicitly promotes xenophobic attitudes. Xenophobic sentiments are rarely simply "an organic or spontaneous response to street-level tensions" (Landau 2006: 131). Such tensions bubble over because the xenophobic sentiments of the people are either shaped or, at the very least, legitimized by politicians.

Neocosmos's third thesis is a combination of the first two. Who gets excluded from the community will be determined by the conception of citizenship, and its attendant rights and duties, arrived at through the debate between state and society: "Xenophobia is thus intimately connected to citizenship, in other words to the fact of belonging or not belonging to a community, often but not exclusively to a nation" (ibid.). Neocosmos stresses another crucial point, on the question of belonging or not belonging, which supports my argument in the previous section: citizenship is not meant, or understood, in a legal sense. Citizenship here means who the people and the state think *should be* the citizens, not who (legally) are. The fact is that for the xenophobe, the legal status of the 'foreigner' does not matter. What matters is that they are not 'from here' so they do not 'belong here':

> Xenophobia is about the denial of social rights and entitlements to strangers, people *considered to be strangers* to the community (village, ethnic group as well as nation) not just to 'foreigners' as conceived by the law. (ibid., my emphasis)

A person only 'belongs' if they belong on two levels: politically, meaning that they have access to rights and entitlements, and subjectively, meaning that they fit the political identity of the group. This dual nature of belonging indicates how someone can be a citizen (as a legal status, as with naturalised citizens or even permanent residents), while not being considered a citizen, i.e. a 'true' South African, American, etc.

Finally, Neocosmos' (ibid.) fourth thesis: that xenophobia, in terms of its existence, character, and extent, is a product of the relation between state politics (or state subjectivity) and popular politics (popular subjectivity). The nature of the relation between the state and its people, between the formal politics of the former and the informal politics of the latter, can determine the extent to which xenophobia is present in a specific community. Neocosmos refers to popular political movements that push against African states' tendency to be exclusionary by emphasising Pan-Africanism. The success of such struggles will mean a less xenophobic society, whereas a populace that is more submissive to state authority will tend to exhibit a kind of politics that is also exclusionary. If citizenship is passive, as suggested in the first thesis, the likelihood of popular politics following a more inclusive route than state politics is low. However, what Neocosmos does show us is the possibility of mutual influence – the state's conception of citizenship shapes how citizens see themselves (or determines who consider themselves to be citizens) while popular politics can, if the citizens have political agency, change the state-given conception of citizenship. It is conceivable that both sides can be more or less exclusionary and influence the other side to become more or less xenophobic.

How we define citizenship and the membership norms that determine inclusion and exclusion is therefore a product of our attitudes with regard to our own group-identity and our sense of belonging, and the ways in which such attitudes influence present and future political conditions and are influenced by pre-existing political conditions. Foreigners are the targets of our prejudices and discrimination because we view them as absolute outsiders and based on that we erect a world that excludes them in specific ways, which in turn situates them politically in such a way that they are easy targets for future discrimination and scapegoating.

3.2 Scapegoating foreigners

Popular explanations of xenophobia often rely on some version of the scapegoat theory: a local population finds some outsider group to blame for the socio-economic problems experienced by the former, leading to discrimination and even violence (see, for instance, Mbembe 2015; Nyamnjoh 2006). Landau (2006: 127) writes that foreigners in South Africa serve a dual purpose:

> as scapegoats they preserve the postapartheid project's legitimacy by providing convenient explanations for widespread crime, disease, and unemployment. More significantly, a reified and dehumanized foreign "Other" underscores South Africans' shared connection with one another and the national territory.

I want to highlight two things here: the first is that foreigners become *scapegoats*, blamed for our own (or the government's) failings; secondly, foreigners become *sacrifices* – their humanity is sacrificed for our unity. The scapegoat is a metaphor of sacrifice. Scapegoating is, however, not unique to xenophobia, but as we will see the way in which a specific group is chosen as scapegoats can be xenophobic. First, I want to focus on the idea of an individual or group being sacrificed for the unity of a larger or different group. We find this idea in the work of René Girard (1986). Girard is concerned with the way in which internal conflicts in communities are resolved, given that there exists rivalries and competition for the same resources between individuals and groups. How do we overcome this conflict and unite into cohesive and stable communities? Girard's answer: through the sacrifice of a scapegoat. Instead of large-scale violence (e.g. civil war), violence on a smaller scale is directed at an individual or defined group, doing away with the need for more violence. An individual or group is blamed for the instability within the community, and consequently punished. Importantly, this scapegoat mechanism is not recognised as such by those doing the scapegoating. Scapegoating is not a utilitarian 'sacrificing the one for the greater good of the many', recognising that 'the one' is innocent. Girard (2000: 117) argues that those who scapegoat do not see their victims as innocent. Rather, they truly believe that their scapegoats are guilty, as "truly responsible for all the disorders and ailments of the community" (ibid. 14). In fact, scapegoating can only work as long as the victims are perceived as really evil or guilty, and so long as the scapegoaters remain unaware of what they are doing (Girard 1986: 101). Girard sees evidence of this scapegoat mechanism throughout history, and indeed considers it to be one of the foundations of culture (ibid. 100). Considering the validity of this last claim is

beyond the scope of my argument (and not strictly relevant). I think we can accept Girard's explanation of scapegoating as a unifying act, and his insights into the motivation of scapegoaters, without assuming the historical accuracy of all his claims.

While the scapegoat theory appears convincing at face value, it is incomplete, in so far as it assumes that any possible innocent group could have been used as scapegoats; that the choice was arbitrary. This approach allows us to evade the question of how a *particular* group was situated politically that made it possible for them, and not some other group, to become a target of xenophobic discrimination. Scapegoating therefore elides the specific political meaning of xenophobia by subsuming it into the larger (and familiar) narrative of scapegoating. Foreigners serve as easy targets for scapegoating because they are highly visible and vulnerable (Desai 2008: 58), because socially and politically they are situated in such a way that only they can become the scapegoats. Even if those chosen as scapegoats are innocent of the crimes they stand accused of, there is nothing innocent in the choice of who we scapegoat. Their being situated in this way is also not innocent, but a product of institutional arrangements and discrimination and prejudice on the group and individual level. In this sense, scapegoats are not identified or picked at random, but created.

The deficiencies of an overly simplistic scapegoat theory are clearly demonstrated by Hannah Arendt's seminal analysis of anti-Semitism in Europe. Arendt (1976) argues that European Jews were specifically targeted not as one group among many, but as the *only* group situated in such a way – politically, socially, economically – that they *could* have been chosen. The Jews were perceived to be powerful (and therefore any failings of the state could be attributed to their supposed desire to destroy all social structures). They were seen as the "key to history" and "central cause of all evils" (ibid. 10) while in fact they had very little political power. Those who did have some influence – those with wealth – were only a small part of the total Jewish population, yet they came to represent the totality of the Jewish population (ibid. 15). Jews were believed to be rich and therefore powerful, but in fact they had no power; they "became an object of universal hatred because of [their] useless wealth, and of contempt because of [their] lack of power" (ibid.). Jews found themselves "underprivileged, lacking certain rights and opportunities that were withheld from the Jews in order to prevent their assimilation" (ibid. 14). Those that the state used to protect because they were financially useful, lost their protection.

It was, in part, this perceived strength but actual weakness that opened the doors for anti-Semitic violence. In other words, it was the *political position* of the Jews that made them available as scapegoats, and the scapegoating itself was informed by a dominant narrative of "us" and "them". Another aspect of Arendt's discussion on anti-Semitism should be emphasised here: her distinction between anti-Semitism as social discrimination and anti-Semitism as political argument. Social discrimination (in this case, anti-Jewish feeling) turns into a political ideology when it combines with major political issues (ibid. 28). So, in the tensions and conflicts between the different strata of nineteenth century European societies and their states, the Jews came to represent the state and the elite. As conflict between state and society rose, anti-Semitism spread "until it emerged suddenly as the one issue upon which an almost unified opinion could be achieved" (ibid. 25). Because Jews were never fully part of the body politic, and because they retained their trans-national ties, they were also seen as disloyal to the nations in which they lived, and conspiracy theories about Jews secretly controlling all governments gained traction. It was only when anti-Semitism became politically expedient that the conditions were set for the annihilation of the European Jewry.

This brief discussion of Arendt's analysis of anti-Semitism and scapegoating indicates that merely identifying the fact that we scapegoat foreigners is not sufficient. As Michael Neocosmos (2010: 4) points out, foreigner in South Africa *are* the scapegoats, and *can be* the scapegoats, because of the political weakness of foreigners. This is a result of the exclusions based on our notion of citizenship discussed in preceding section. We need to acknowledge this 'political weakness', or the specific situatedness of foreigners, to understand why they (and not others) are blamed for a specific society's ills. This also slightly shifts the blame of xenophobia, from those who perpetrate xenophobic violence to those who create the conditions in which such violence becomes possible and in which it will likely not be punished (although the former are, of course, not acquitted of moral blame). In saying that xenophobia is an act of scapegoating foreigners, we should also ask what their supposed crimes are, and who is really guilty of those crimes. Scapegoating is an act of shifting blame and shifting attention away from one's own guilt or inadequacies. Girard's point that scapegoating can only take place if the scapegoaters are unaware of the mechanism implies an alternative to this kind of response to foreigners and to personal or societal struggles and frustrations. In becoming aware of the *reason* why we choose to scapegoat a specific group, we also become aware of who should take responsibility for the problems facing us (e.g. unemployment, crime). If we want to be

anti-xenophobic, we should unmask our own denial, and the denial of our governments and political institutions (e.g. police forces).

Arendt warns that the scapegoat theory might make discrimination seem more neutral/inevitable than it is, and it might make us blind toward contextual differences and other injustices that accompany xenophobia. It seems almost dismissive to say, 'they were just looking for a scapegoat'. We *should* ask why xenophobia is directed at a specific group and not another – why we choose to scapegoat not all foreigners, but only some. This question is especially important in South Africa, where xenophobia is mainly directed at African nationals and almost exclusively at people of colour. Merely stopping at 'they needed a scapegoat' denies the role that race and the country's turbulent history plays in xenophobia in South Africa, but also the political nature of xenophobia – the ways in which nation-building, our understanding of citizenship, and our political institutions contributes to a xenophobic life-world. Every society has its scapegoats. Who they are and how they are chosen depends on the context.

What we are dealing with here is a continuous process of foreigner identification and objectification that leads to ostracism and scapegoating, being shaped by the past but also shaping the future political circumstances in such a way that the process can continue. Even as this process takes place in our particular political and historical contexts and as it harms those made vulnerable by it, it is kept in place and driven by our ideas surrounding belonging and foreignness.

Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter I identified the conceptual confusion we have in our minds when we think about xenophobia. Conceptually, xenophobia seems to fade into other forms of discrimination: ethnocentrism, nativism, and especially racism. This indicates the close link between xenophobia and other forms of oppression, but instead of seeing them as mutually reinforcing and intersecting forms of oppression, we often treat them as being the same. I showed how this poses a problem both in our thinking and in our ability to identify and morally condemn instances of xenophobic discrimination. I provided a brief overview of xenophobia in South Africa to illustrate how it reinforces and is reinforced by racism, but also how it differs from racism. With reference to Kim and Sundstrom's argument that nationalised narratives of race and racism tend to obscure certain forms of discrimination, I showed how xenophobia, especially in South Africa, escapes moral condemnation precisely because we think of it as a

form of racism. Because the national narrative of racism in South Africa sees racism as something perpetrated by white people against people of colour, and specifically black South Africans, equating xenophobia with racism leaves us without the conceptual tools to make sense of discrimination and violence when both victim and perpetrators are of the same race. The fact that xenophobia in South Africa is almost exclusively directed at black African nationals confirms its relationship to racism, but we realise that we need to distinguish between the two to make sense of the fact that many of the perpetrators of the kind of widespread xenophobic violence we saw in 2008, 2015, and 2019, were black South Africans. If we do not distinguish between racism and xenophobia, our national narrative of race will shelter xenophobia. Given the high levels of discrimination and life-threatening violence against foreigners, we desperately need to develop an understanding of xenophobia that will allow us to morally condemn such actions and to see it as a form of discrimination as serious and as morally reprehensible as racism. This will also help us to make sense of instances of discrimination or forms of prejudice against group outsiders in contexts where there is not a history of racism. I argued that xenophobia differs from racism in its motivations and origin, in its effect, and in the political circumstances that give rise to it. A comprehensive conception of xenophobia should address these three aspects.

In the second section I tried to do just this, with reference to Kim and Sundstrom's definition of xenophobia as 'civic ostracism'. Regarding the effects of xenophobia, I indicated the harms of such ostracism: exclusion from the political community and lack of access to certain goods, including meaningful relationships and accepted identities. With reference to Hannah Arendt, I showed how such exclusion amounts to a loss of the foreigner's voice, which could lead to their complete erasure from the political sphere. Civic ostracism creates a situation of vulnerability for certain groups, based on their foreignness (real or assumed), which renders them perpetual outsiders. We can therefore identify the moral harm in xenophobia in the effect it has on foreigners – in the freedoms it takes away, the actions it prevents, and in the identities it denies or erases. This happens in big and small ways, on all levels of life, and in every context the foreigner finds themselves in. This is why Kim and Sundstrom speak of a xenophobic life-world.

Kim and Sundstrom's attempt to distinguish xenophobia from racism by identifying 'civic ostracism' as its core is, however, limited. They are correct in the identification of the moral harm of xenophobia, but incorrect in assuming that this harm is unique to xenophobia *and* in

limiting their definition to the question of moral harm. I argued that other forms of discrimination can also ostracise individuals and groups in this way. However, if one reads them carefully one can discern what I argue is the real core of xenophobia. Not civic ostracism – this is its effect – but civic ostracism based on an idea of foreignness, informed by our thinking on citizenship and belonging. This distinguishes xenophobia from other forms of discrimination, and is the motivation behind xenophobia. Our ideas about foreignness and belonging are expressed in our beliefs and prejudices, and they point to deeper questions about group formation and identity formation.

These ideas, however, also shape our political realities. In the final section of this chapter, I showed how our individual and institutional conception of citizenship is shaped by our belief that belonging is linked to place and to origin, with reference to the South African context and Neocosmos's analysis of it. Because we think of citizenship and membership in terms of indigeneity, the possibility of extending membership to outsiders is precluded, creating a condition of perpetual foreignness and, consequently, vulnerability. I discussed the role of the scapegoat mechanism in xenophobia, arguing that we are able to scapegoat foreigners precisely because they are situated in this vulnerable position that we created. Foreigners are harmed – killed, attacked, ostracised – because they can be harmed, because they are relatively unprotected due to the particular political circumstances they find themselves in.

These circumstances come into existence and are kept in place because of the pre-political and psychological ways in which we think about belonging, attachment to place, and foreignness. These are the motivations behind xenophobia, expressed in our beliefs and prejudices. Yet we do not yet have an explanation of why we hold these beliefs, why we are prejudiced against outsiders. The question of the origins of xenophobia remains unanswered. In the next chapter I therefore consider the question of the origins of xenophobia in more depth by looking at various theories that explain group formation and in-group out-group prejudice.

Chapter 2: Searching for the Origins of Xenophobia

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I established the following about xenophobia: that racism and xenophobia are related and mutually supporting forms of oppression and discrimination, but that without a distinct conception of xenophobia we will be blind to certain instances or forms of discrimination and harm. I argued that xenophobia is distinct in its origin, and therefore also in its effect, and in the political circumstances that result from it. Xenophobia's effect is civic ostracism inspired by an idea of foreignness and ideas about belonging, which in turn creates the kind of political world in which foreigners are situated in such a way that they are vulnerable to discrimination, oppression, and other forms of harm. Who is targeted by xenophobia and how it is expressed is therefore determined by who we think belongs to the group, and who is foreign to the group. For this reason, we can only fully understand xenophobia if we ask why we make distinctions between us and them, citizen and foreigner, or member and non-member.

My main concern in this chapter is with therefore with the origins of xenophobia, i.e. in the ways in which it is present first and foremost in our thoughts and assumptions about our place in the world. This is not to say that studying xenophobic violence is not important, but I see such violence as a culmination, a climax reached under specific socio-economic and political circumstances, but with its origins in our pre-political tendency to be prejudiced toward group outsiders. For xenophobic violence to take place, we first need xenophobes and a kind of world in which said xenophobes can act with impunity. This world, Kim and Sundstrom's 'xenophobic life-world', exists long before there is violence. If our aim is anti-xenophobic, then we must ask where and why and how this world comes into being. That is the main aim of this chapter.

In the first section, I look at xenophobia as a form of prejudice, and ask where our ingroup-outgroup prejudices originate. Four prominent theories that explain the origins of prejudice will be considered: social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory, contact theory, and group threat theory. As these theories were not developed to explain xenophobia, but rather prejudice and accompanying forms of discrimination, broadly understood, they are of relevance to our understanding of other forms of prejudice (as found in sexism, racism, etc.) as well. However,

they provide us with specific insights on the ingroup-outgroup dynamics that can give rise to xenophobia. My analysis of these theories is comparative, but I will not argue for the superiority of one over the other. This is not fence-sitting, or a kind of theoretical syncretism, but rather the recognition that a single, all-encompassing theory cannot explain all forms and every instance of discrimination. This would deny human plurality and our seemingly infinite ability to think of new ways and new justifications to harm, exclude, and discriminate. To my mind, each theory illuminates some characteristic of prejudice, while exceptions to each can also easily be found. This is most evident in the tension between the contact hypothesis and group threat theory, both of which are supported by empirical evidence. We will see that xenophobic prejudice originates in our identities as individuals and as groups, the value we attach to the group we belong to, and then our encounters with strangers who are different from us. Because we value our ingroup, differentiation from the outgroup takes the form of devaluing them through prejudice and stereotypes. We do this to affirm our own position, but also because we feel threatened by their strangeness.

Section 2 therefore looks at this idea of the threat strangers pose, and at its origins in early human history. I discuss the common definition of xenophobia as a fear of strangers or foreigners and argue that we fear strangers because they challenge our world-views and position, but also because we see them (consciously or not) as a literal threat to our existence. This feeling of being threatened, I argue in Section 2.2, is a product of the way in which humans evolved. In early human history, when survival was a struggle and competition for basic resources fierce, aggressive groups outsurvived less aggressive groups. Outgroup hostility was therefore an evolutionary advantage, and over time it became ingrained in our psyches. As human societies developed, we added cultural and political meaning to this seemingly innate tendency. The fear and accompanying hostility to outsiders may seem too generalised to help us understand xenophobia in our societies, but I argue that studying what is called the ‘xenophobia principle’ in the animal kingdom, and looking at how animals react to outsiders, can provide us with new avenues of thought and new strategies for countering xenophobia in human societies. While many animals also react with aggression, examples from the natural world will be provided of alternative reactions to outsiders or threats, such as cooperation and play.

The following investigation into the origins of xenophobia will therefore help us to not only understand it more deeply, but to also realise that xenophobia is deeply tied to our sense of

belonging in the world and our sense of identity. It is a reaction to insecurities, and while our tendency to react in this manner lies deep, other innate tendencies humans and other animals have – cooperation, play – give us hope that we can be different and that we can build less xenophobic societies and communities.

1. Xenophobic prejudice and group formation

In Chapter 1, I argued that xenophobic civic ostracism is motivated by how we think about ourselves and others in terms of belonging and foreignness. Xenophobia is therefore first and foremost a form of prejudice, which we can understand as "an attitude that regards the members of a salient group, qua members, as not entitled to as much respect or concern as the members of other salient groups" (Altman 2016), where the devalued salient group is the outsider-group, and the valued group is the one to which the xenophobe belongs. Such prejudices are not purely individual but shared within groups (as we will see below), and combined they influence our political institutions, as shown by the discussion of citizenship in Chapter 1. Prejudice is therefore also the precursor of discrimination, of which civic ostracism is a form.[11]

As a form of prejudice, xenophobia shares certain characteristics with other forms of prejudice that find their expression in forms discrimination such as racism, nativism, or ethnocentrism. I now want to delve deeper into the theoretical explanations for the existence of discrimination and prejudice between groups. In this section, I will focus on four prominent theories that can illuminate these aspects of xenophobia:

i. Social identity theory
ii. Cultural socialisation theory
iii. The isolation thesis and contact theories
iv. Group threat theory

All forms of prejudice fail to recognise others (whether the 'other' is a different race, nationality, or sex) as fully human and as bearers of human rights (Jelin 2003: 101). Therefore, when we express or act upon our prejudices this takes the form of exclusion or ostracism (as

[11] For a discussion of the relationship between prejudice and discrimination, see (Altman 2016) and (Ely 1980). Most of the time, prejudice motivates discrimination. There can be exceptions, as with indirect discrimination, but such distinctions I cannot consider here. It may be possible that a person acts in a discriminatory way without holding explicit prejudicial beliefs, but the possibility of unrecognised or subconscious prejudicial beliefs or attitudes should not be discounted.

argued in Chapter 1) and dehumanisation. This chapter, however, is not primarily concerned with the effects of xenophobic prejudice, but rather the reasons why we hold prejudicial attitudes and beliefs. As we will see, our prejudices are closely tied to our group identities and to our psychological reaction to strangers and strangeness.

1.1 Social identity theory

Tajfel (1981: 255) defines social identity as "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in the social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership". The 'group' in question is defined by external and internal criteria. The former refers to outside designations, i.e. people being grouped together based on a shared profession or situation (hospital patients, trade union members). It is the internal criteria that concerns us, as this is how a group is defined by its members through the act of group identification. Tajfel (1982: 2) names two necessary and one associated component in identification:

i. A cognitive component, requiring the individual to show some kind of awareness of their membership
ii. An evaluative component, where the individual's awareness of membership relates to a value the individual ascribes to membership or to the group
iii. An emotional investment in the above components

These components combine to form the necessary conditions for the internal existence of any group. Through a process of self-categorisation, individuals come to identify themselves with a specific group by emphasising similarities between them and members of the group (whether chosen or born into), while down-playing similarities and focussing on difference with out-group members (Kumar *et al.* 2011: 349). So, for example, Norbert Elias (1994: xxxiv) argues that during intergroup interaction, or insider-outsider relations, the insider or 'established' group engages in a collective fantasy, in which the physical characteristics of the outsiders are identified as signs of their inferiority, while the established group's physical characteristics are seen as signs of their superiority. Both social and material/physical differences become stigmatised.

The in-group is seen as positive, due to individuals' need to feel superior or simply the fact that they value themselves more than others, while the out-group is seen as negative. This gives rise to negative stereotypes and prejudice. A stereotype is

> an over-simplified mental image of (usually) some category of person, institution or event which is shared, in essential features, by large numbers of peoples [and] commonly, but not necessarily, accompanied by prejudices (Stallybrass 1977: 601).

However, the group's ability to interact with other groups – i.e., its 'outside' existence – requires recognition from other groups that it exists. I want to highlight to implications of this understanding of group formation and relation. In Chapter 1 I indicated how xenophobia ostracises certain groups from the civic or political community, effectively curtailing certain possibilities of identity and relationship formation (see Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 24). Tajfel can help us understand how this is possible, as both internal association and external recognition are necessary for a group to be said to exist. If certain minority identities or relationships are not recognised by the majority or by the civic community, there is no way for those relating to those identities to meaningfully interact with other groups: "There can be no *inter*group behavior unless there is also some 'outside' consensus that the group exists" (Tajfel 1982: 2). Conversely, individuals can be externally categorised into groups to which they do not relate (the internal component), for example when foreigners are bundled together under the blanket term *makwerekwere*, a group to which certain values are ascribed from the outside.

In intergroup relations, stereotypes provide us with beliefs about other groups while "prejudice adds an attitudinal component, primarily negative, to stereotyping and is aimed at people who are not cultural insiders" (Kumar *et al.* 2011: 367). Add fear of strangers or outsiders into the mix, and prejudice becomes xenophobia (more on this below). Importantly, social identity theory can help us explain or understand discrimination, or in-group out-group conflict, but it is primarily a theory of group identity. In other words, there is no necessary link between social identity and discrimination. Tajfel (1982: 8) himself points out that attachment to the ingroup and negative attitudes toward the outgroup are "not related in any simple way". Rather, "ingroup favouritism was "relatively independent" of outgroup attitudes" (ibid.). This is a hopeful finding, in so far as it contains the possibility of overcoming exclusionary forms of group identity. So discrimination based on assigning negative characteristics to the outgroup is possible, even common, but not inevitable. It is more likely to happen under conditions where

there is great inequality of power, privilege, or material inequality; where different groups have to compete for certain goods; where group boundaries are seen as set in stone, or where attempts are made to blur such boundaries (ibid. 14). Some of these conditions can be changed through material (economic) changes, such as providing more equal access. Others can be changed through rethinking group identity and the borders separating one group from another. To see such divisions as permeable, as a product of social and political relations rather than as something 'natural' (as with nationalist emphases on blood and indigeneity), would be to understand identity as a fluid thing. In Chapter 4 I discuss the narrative theory of identity, which enables us to do just this.

1.2 Cultural socialisation theory

Like social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory looks at group prejudices and stereotypes to explain discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. The cultural and historical roots of specific prejudices held by dominant groups are analysed. Dominant groups create collective negative images of subordinate or low-status groups (Kumar *et al*. 2011: 350). These prejudices and stereotypes, while not set in stone, are passed on from one generation to the next. Through a process of socialisation – becoming part of their community – children pick up these prejudices. Children can distinguish on the basis of ethnicity or other differences from an early age, and the prejudicial behaviour of the adults in their community gives meaning to the differences they perceive. As they grow up and develop their capacity for reflective thinking, they are able to understand the implication of belonging to one group or another. Children from dominant groups then often come to prefer their group or assume the superiority of their group. Cultural socialisation theory has been used to explain how children learn to be racist, for example. Children acquire a prowhite bias, associating 'white' with 'good' and 'black' with 'bad', "through the verbal learning of color symbolism, which would pertain primarily to human affairs" (Duckitt *et al.* 1999: 150).

Importantly, cultural socialisation theory should not only be understood as an explanation of how children learn out-group bias. Here cultural socialisation corresponds to the social identity thesis. Bias toward the out-group is not necessarily the result of the child being taught to view the out-group societies negatively. One can imagine a child brought up in a relatively homogenous, isolated culture who may react negatively when encountering someone from a radically different culture wholly unfamiliar to them. Prejudice and negative attitudes can also just be the effect of a positive in-group bias, as learned through one's identification with a

group or social identity. Where this bias is strong, any divergence from the norms and customs of the in-group will automatically be viewed in a negative light. The mere fact of difference can be enough to cause prejudice: "the perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorisation per se – is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group" (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 56). Social categories are cognitive tools by which we order our social experiences, but they also act as "a system of orientation for *self*-reference" (ibid. 59), hence this also being a social *identity*. We often categorize in this way by relying on comparisons between different categories or groups, so that the self is in a sense necessarily understood in opposition to the other. Because we wish to maintain our self-esteem, we come to see ourselves and the groups we belong to as being better than the other groups.

The cultural socialisation theory need therefore not be at odds with social identity theory. What we value in life can, in part, be determined by what we are *taught* to value. Children raised in a patriotic home, where rituals celebrating belonging to the nation are followed and encouraged (e.g. attending marches, celebrating public holidays like Fourth of July or Freedom Day along with 'fellow countrymen'), and where symbols of national belonging are revered (a national flag outside one's front door, a portrait of a political leader in the dining room), are very likely to become patriots themselves. Such children will then be more likely to think of themselves as members of the nation (cognitive component), value that membership above membership to other groups they may belong to and value their group more than other groups/nations (evaluative component) and be emotionally invested in the nation (for what is patriotism if not this emotional investment?).

We can easily see how children can acquire xenophobic beliefs in this manner. Indeed, research into xenophobic attitudes indicate that adults also form their beliefs on foreigners based not on direct experience with foreigners, but often on what they read/see in the media or on hearsay - the "verbal learning" referred to above (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 70, 75). 'Knowledge' about the foreigner is often based on stereotypes and stories rather than on experience or attempts to learn more about foreigners (e.g. who they 'really' are, their culture, etc.). Under such conditions of relative ignorance, our judgements rely on the little information we receive from sources we trust – from community leaders, parents, our favourite newspaper. When confronted with unknowns (such as 'strangers'), authority and trust play an important role in our judgements and the beliefs, attitudes, and actions that follow from them:

> People believe information received from sources they trust (whether institutions or friends). Whom you trust depends on who you see as authoritative and legitimate. It also depends, of course, on whom you frequently interact with (Rydgren 2004: 125).

The above captures both the impact of cultural socialisation (who you interact with) as well as social identity (whose authority you value; we tend to value the authority of prominent members of our own groups).

1.3 The isolation thesis and contact theories (CT)

In an early study of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa, Alan Morris (1998: 1125) suggests that "when a group has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming." Such a group is one that is relatively isolated, and therefore unused to and relatively ignorant about outsiders. Morris's point is that South Africans are hostile toward foreigners because of the isolation imposed on South Africans by the Apartheid state – they were isolated from the rest of the continent, and also later the rest of the world due to sanctions. This isolation, enforced with strong borders, was further entrenched by a lack of knowledge or access to information about the rest of the world (due in part to censorship). From this we can develop the isolation thesis: that prejudice is the combined result of initial isolation, in the sense of a lack of contact and of information, and the encounter with strangers or outsiders. Isolation can be imposed, as in the case of Apartheid South Africa or North Korea, or it can be the result of a withdrawal due to negative contact with others. The isolation thesis is therefore correlates to, but is the inverse of, the contact hypothesis, or intergroup contact theory. The contact hypothesis holds that "contact across interest-based and identitarian lines reduce[s] intergroup cognitive, affective, and behavioural biases" (Hayward 2007: 195). It follows, then, that where there is a lack of contact, biases or prejudices remain intact. To understand how isolation contributes to prejudice, I will therefore briefly consider how contact lowers prejudice according to contact theorists.

Waldron (2006: 84) argues that our everyday interactions exhibit and promote cosmopolitan norms. Cosmopolitanism is often seen as the antidote to nationalist and xenophobic sentiments, with its emphasis on universal human rights and human equality. Increased contact of a mundane nature could work against negative, and often unfounded, stereotypes. Appiah (2006: 78) argues that people simply need to get used to one another, and tolerance would follow. This

getting used to one another is a by-product of sharing spaces and encountering one another on a daily basis. Social change, according to Appiah, is brought about when people gradually acquire a new way of seeing things through getting used to how different people/groups do things differently. However, as Benhabib (2006: 153) has pointed out, interaction in no way guarantees increased tolerance: empirical studies of past genocides show that violence takes place between neighbours, not distant strangers. And while xenophobic *attitudes* in South Africa are not necessarily the result of contact with foreigners, xenophobic *attacks* take place within communities where citizens and foreigners live side-by-side, often interacting every day (e.g. where spaza shops are owned and run by foreigners).

It would therefore be simplistic to say that prejudice and discrimination are caused by isolation, and that any form of increased interaction will necessarily alleviate the problem. For example, Crush & Pendleton (2007: 75) have found that, in Southern Africa, increased *personal* contact between people of different nationalities lessens prejudice, while *casual* contact (e.g. economic exchanges, as with the spaza shop example) often has the opposite effect. Hence, the nature of the intergroup contact is key to either promoting or counteracting xenophobic attitudes. The aim of this chapter is not to provide solutions to xenophobic prejudice, but to determine why we are prejudiced in this way. Prejudice is the result of a lack of contact or, where there is contact, the wrong kind of contact. Research on intergroup relations has shown that increased contact between different group effectively works against prejudice and promotes inclusion *if* certain conditions for interaction are met (Kumar *et al.* 2011: 352; see also Allport 1954). We can therefore look at these conditions and see how the failure to meet them contributes to prejudice and specifically xenophobic prejudice. Briefly, these conditions are:

i. *Equal status among groups within the specific context*. This means that the groups interacting within that context needs to see each other as equal and feel that they are considered equal (Pettigrew *et al.* 1998: 66). This provides us with a difficulty when discrimination is the result of inequality, for example political inequality (because citizens are members and foreigners are non-members).
ii. *Pursuit of common goals*. For example, as with athletic teams or team sports. When common goals are attained (e.g. when the team wins), the positive effect is strengthened (Pettigrew *et al.* 1998: 66). This is something I return to in Chapter 5. Pursuing common goals creates a sense of unity and often community, bonding people from different groups together. Such goals need to be established, as members and strangers will likely

not have a shared goal initially. However, establishing a goal is made more difficult due to the ignorance that accompanies isolation, which may make it difficult for insiders to recognise possible shared struggles, drives, or dreams in strangers.

iii. *Intergroup cooperation*. This condition assumes that the previous one is met – a goal needs to be identified first, before different groups can start cooperating with the aim of achieving it. Cooperation is effective because creates unity and builds relationships, but without a shared goal it is hard to achieve. Even if we see life in societies as a kind of cooperation game, the lack of a shared goal will in most cases mean that people compete (to each achieve their own goals) rather than cooperate. Groups who have been relatively isolated may also avoid cooperation or be unaware of its benefits, seeing themselves as self-sufficient. For the isolated group or individual, cooperation may be an alien concept.

iv. *A social climate which supports intergroup contact.* This includes "explicit social sanction" from especially "the authorities, law, or custom" (Pettigrew *et al.* 1998: 66-67). Critics of contact theory may claim that too much emphasis is put on individual contact, yet this condition calls for institutional support. It may be better to speak of the *extended contact hypothesis* or extended contact theory, to emphasise that it goes further than contact between individuals (Brown 2012: 429). It is the institutional or social sanction of the contact that creates conditions of equality necessary for positive contact. In Chapter 1, we saw how civic ostracism – which includes the denial of the 'legitimacy' or possibility or support of certain kinds of relationships or contact – contributes to discrimination between the in-group and the out-group.

Granted that isolation contributes to prejudice, including to xenophobic prejudice when it is a whole group, community, or nation that is isolated, it is by no means clear that contact will necessarily have the opposite effect. Where there is evidence of this, the contact is of a specific form, meeting the conditions indicated above. However, most interactions between insiders and outsiders will not take this form. Other studies suggest that contact rather contributes to prejudice. This brings us to our next theory.

1.4 Group threat theory (GTT)

Group threat theory can explain various forms of discrimination and prejudice, but it is especially applicable to the explanation of xenophobia. Hjerm (1998, 2005) holds that a threat is a condition for the occurrence of xenophobia, and a *perceived* threat (whether real or not) is

a sufficient condition. He distinguishes between theories that explain discrimination by "assum[ing] that racism is guided by a set of assumptions of what minority ethnic groups deserve and how they should act" (Hjerm 2005: 296), which he calls symbolic theories (social identity and cultural socialisation theories would fall under this), and group threat theory which "assumes that conflicts and negative attitudes emerge because groups are competing for new opportunities" (ibid.). When we are faced with something that seems threatening, we either try to escape or withdraw (flight) or we react with aggression (fight) (Bauman 2006: 3). We may act fearfully, defensively, and often aggressively. In this case, the standard definition of xenophobia – a fear of strangers or foreigners – matches the explanation of discrimination offered by group threat theory. Dominant groups feel threatened (and become xenophobic) under the following conditions:

> …high visibility of the subordinate group, impermeable and rigid boundaries between groups, unstable economic times and conflicting political contexts, and competition for scarce resources (Kumar *et al.* 2011: 352)

Group threat theory is therefore claiming the opposite from contact theory: that it is precisely when people are in contact, or when different groups share a space within which they must then compete, that conflict and prejudice arises. At the basis of group threat theory lies the assumption or feeling that one's group is competing with another for scarce resources. This competitive aspect is not unrelated to our economic exchanges or our public interactions, for it is in such interactions that the distribution of resources is often determined. That xenophobia is fuelled by this kind of competition is clear in the kinds of beliefs people have about foreigners, or the kinds of justifications they give for their xenophobic attitudes and actions. Foreigners in South Africa are often accused of taking jobs and undercutting wages, in a country already struggling with unemployment and poverty (Nyamnjoh 2006: 37). They are also made guilty of "stealing South African women; overrunning hospitals, schools, and public housing" (Landau 2006: 131). The narratives underlying these beliefs will be further analysed in Chapter 5. For now, suffice to say that foreigners are perceived as a threat and competition for the many South Africans who find themselves in conditions of material scarcity, already struggling to survive and make ends meet. Yet foreigners are not only perceived as an economic or material threat, but also an existential threat or a threat to the continued existence of the nation, its culture, and the individual. In South Africa, this fear that foreigners threaten our lives is expressed by beliefs that foreigners spread AIDS and other diseases, that they are

involved in crime (including murder), and that they bring weapons and drugs into the country (Nyamnjoh 2006: 37).

The fear or anxiety a person or group may feel when confronted with another group of strangers is called ‘stranger-shock’. Our encounter with a stranger is shocking because “their presence can also deepen social awareness; the arrival of a stranger can make others think about values they take for granted” (Sennett 2012: 38). Such an encounter can lead an individual to draw back into themselves out of denial or fear of the changes such a confrontation can bring to their world-view. Sennett uses the metaphor of donning a mask to describe this process of drawing back, specifically in the context of large, multicultural, and mostly urbanised contemporary societies. This masking is an attempt to protect oneself from possible overstimulation that results from constant exposure to new things, people, and cultures. Ultimately, this leads to individuals becoming uncooperative in shared spaces and projects. Because we “can’t manage [the] demanding, complex forms of social engagement” (ibid. 179) required by the scale and diversity of modern societies, we withdraw from the challenges posed by this society. In this view, it is diversity and not isolation that can give rise to a kind of laager mentality. This is the conclusion pushed by Robert Putnam (2007). Putnam’s studies indicate that the short-term effect of immigration and ethnic diversity is a kind of hunkering down, and a decrease in social solidarity and social capital even within groups. In other words, in communities characterised by racial or ethnic diversity, everyone is less social, even toward members of the same ethnic or racial group.

The repercussions of this hunkering down are wider than just social isolation. Paul Collier (2013: 61) argues that mutual regard is necessary for the well-being of a society and its members in our modern economy. Mutual regard refers to a kind of sympathetic fellow-feeling, expressed through two kinds of behaviour: (i) “the willingness of the successful to finance transfers to the less successful” (ibid.), for example paying taxes for welfare programmes; and (ii) cooperation, especially in the provision of public goods. Where people feel mutual regard, they are more willing to cooperate because they trust each other more; there is also a sense of loyalty and solidarity that inspires us to take care of those in our community who are less fortunate. Such a regard can be built up over time, but it is possible that the ‘stranger-shock’ in times of mass migration and rapid transformation is so strong that these ties cannot be formed. Importantly, this affects the relationships between ingroup members as well:

> The key damaging effect is not that immigrants and the indigenous population do not trust each other; it is that indigenous people lose trust *in each other* and so resort to opportunistic behaviour [such as looting]. (Collier 2013: 81).

It seems, then, that immigration can have a destabilising effect on communities, not only due to the conflicts between the ingroup and the outgroup, but as a deeper threat to the very ties that bind a community. At the extreme end of far-right politics, there are those who see this possible short-term effect of migration as a threat of such magnitude that they argue against any form of migration. The hope is that closed borders will protect the national culture from the dangers of change. One such example would be the right-wing nationalist narrative of replacement, as expressed in the 'replacement theory' of French philosopher Renaud Camus. Camus (in Wildman 2017) sees 'replacement' as "the very essence of modernity", something that happens in all contexts: "Objects are being replaced. Landscapes are being replaced. Everything is being replaced." Camus is specifically concerned with the situation in France, where he believes the growing presence of Muslims will lead to the destruction of French culture and society. According to his theory, the pro-refugee, pro-Muslim policies advanced by the French government and the European Union amounts to genocide by substitution. Replacement is "the worst thing to happen since Nazism" (ibid.).[12]

Replacement theory is a prime example of the fear of the stranger. The most important insight from group threat theory is that our fears and our reactions to those fears are triggered by *perceived* threats. While our perceptions may correspond to reality (e.g. to the presence of strangers in our midst), what is crucial to realise that our fear actually has less to do with the actual foreign person (or even people), and more to do with ourselves. To put it differently: we discriminate against foreigners not based on who or what they are (i.e. whether they really are criminal) but based on what *we* think they are and based on how we think about belonging to a community or a nation. If one is xenophobic, it says more about one's self than about the feared other. This is why ingroup reappraisal is so important. When confronted with a stranger, we are asked to question our own assumptions. We can deny this and hunker down, as we often do, but in a sense contact theory provides us with the antidote to group threat theory. If our fears are based mostly on perceptions, and positive contact can change such perceptions, then

[12] The choice not to cite Camus' own work, but rather an interview with him, is deliberate. While it is important to take note of such theories and opinions as they express what I am arguing against, acquiring his work would have required me to support him financially (by buying or requesting the library to buy his book). For personal reasons, I am unwilling to do this. The interview gives us his opinions in his own words.

we can also face and hopefully curb our fear of the other. Accepting group threat theory as part of the explanation for xenophobia should therefore not make us reach for an anti-immigration conclusion. Rather, it points to the importance of devising immigration policies that mitigate stranger-shock, and the need to create and amplify the conditions for cooperation and the development of new forms of social solidarity over time (see Putnam 2007: 164).

1.5 No one-size-fits-all explanation

In the preceding sections I considered different possible explanations of prejudice, some (like CT and GTT) contradictory. Yet I do not think that any of these theories offer a better explanation than the others. I am sceptical of the possibility of offering a single explanation for all forms and individual instances of prejudice, given human plurality. There also seems to be contradicting empirical evidence in support of the different theories, which hints at the possibility that our prejudices can have different motivations or causes. As I also hoped to show, there are many overlaps between the different theories. Social identity theories and cultural socialisation theory are particularly closely connected, as both focus on the ways in which group identity is constructed and passed along to the next generation. Negative stereotypes and strong yet narrowly defined group identities create boundaries between groups, with people being less likely to initiate contact (CT and GTT). Rigid boundaries between groups, which might make others seem more threatening (GTT), would prevent personal contact between strangers (CT). If people feel more threatened during unstable economic times (GTT), it also makes sense that economic interactions will not have the positive effect other forms of contact has (CT). Each theory sheds light on a particular aspect of group-based discrimination. The first two theories illuminate our relationship with ourselves (i.e. our identities) and the groups in which we grow up, and the implications thereof for our attitudes towards and interactions with others. The latter two theories are concerned with the ways in which we relate, or fail to relate, to others who do not share our group identity. Therefore they help explain the social and political aspects of xenophobia, explaining inclusion and exclusion based on ideas about belonging.

Having said this, all four theories seek to explain intergroup prejudice and the often-accompanying discrimination and conflict as broad phenomena. None of them captures what is unique about xenophobia.[13] Crush & Pendleton (2007: 75n) suggest that xenophobic

[13] This is not a criticism against the theories, as this is not what they set out to do.

discrimination (or anti-foreign intolerance) can further be explained based on three sets of factors:

i. Interactive: amount and character of personal exposure to people of different origin, specifically national origin (this corresponds to contact theories and group threat theory)
ii. Cultural: linking to identity and national consciousness (as seen in social identity theory and cultural socialisation theory)
iii. Material: referring to job and resource competition, relative deprivation, etcetera (corresponding to group threat theory)

Regarding (iii): as set out in the introduction, the aim of this study is to provide an alternative framework for understanding xenophobia, which does not stand in opposition to socio-economic explanations but which goes beyond that. I have briefly considered the material factors that contribute to xenophobia in particular contexts in the preceding sections, and also in Chapter 1. Providing a further discussion is beyond my current scope. Material factors contribute to xenophobia by acting as triggers for xenophobic violence, and by exacerbating people's frustration with their situations, yet as my discussion of the scapegoat theory indicated, such explanations do not in fact explain why foreigners specifically are targeted.

Points (i) and (ii) provide direction for Chapters 3 and 4, where I look at belonging (Chapter 3) and identity (Chapter 4) and how these themes relate to xenophobia. However, we should not be too quick to assume that xenophobia is a relatively new phenomenon, linked to the emergence of the nation-state. We may think of foreigners, belonging, and citizenship in terms of nation-states now (as discussed in Chapter 1), but distinctions between 'us' and 'them', 'member' and 'foreigner' have been made throughout human history (and prehistory), and we would do well to know something of the pre-political origins of this phenomenon lest we think that it can be combatted solely by political or material means. In Chapter 5, I will consider different strategies we can follow to reduce prejudice and counter xenophobia. Some of these rely on political or material means, while others are inspired by the discussion below. In what follows, I situate our tendency to make 'us' and 'them' distinctions in our evolutionary history, but a closer examination of animal interaction will show us that such distinctions need not necessarily result in the kinds of prejudice, ostracism, and violence of xenophobia.

2. Xenophobia's pre-political origins: fear and instincts

In this section, I will show how contemporary forms of xenophobia have their origin in a generalised fear of strangers, expressed as a fear of foreigners, which is a result of the way in which humans as a specie evolved and came to form groups. It is this fear that underlies our prejudices, which causes us to seek safety in groups and to exclude those who we feel threaten the group. In Section 2.1 I will consider the role fear plays in xenophobia and show how our instinctive reactions to fear contribute to us becoming xenophobic. I will then consider the possibility that xenophobia is a product of our evolutionary heritage (Section 2.2) and argue that we can see it at play in the animal kingdom. Indeed, animal behaviourists and biologists speak of the "xenophobia principle" in animal interaction (Section 2.3). I argue that looking at the animal kingdom can help us understand how deep-seated our xenophobic tendencies are, but that examples from nature also provide us with hope for alternative ways of dealing with strangers (Section 2.4). In this I diverge from standard accounts of xenophobia, but as instances of xenophobic violence and discrimination increase worldwide, it is imperative that we consider all avenues and look for new ways to tackle the problem.

2.1 The fear of strangers

Group threat theory sees fear as the driving force behind prejudice, and indeed our common understanding of xenophobia echoes this. Xenophobia is commonly defined as an "intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries" (*Compact Oxford English Dictionary* 2005); "a fear or hatred of foreigners and foreign things" (*The Chambers Dictionary* 2006). Crush and Pendleton (2007: 66) defines xenophobia as a *morbid* dislike for foreigners. *Phobia* translates as 'fear', but as Kim & Sundstrom (2014: 23) points out, this can be misleading. Other emotions have been mentioned above – hatred, dislike, antipathy. Feelings of envy, resentment, disgust, or incongruity can also underlie xenophobic attitudes. This is an important point for two reasons: (a) it recognises that xenophobia is most often an *emotional* response (whether to the mere presence of something or someone foreign, or to socioeconomic difficulties) and not a rational response to reality (xenophobic stereotypes often have little or no basis in reality), and (b) it recognises that the emotions felt by the xenophobe are complex, or that someone's fearing another may not even be a necessary condition for their being xenophobic.

Furthermore, recognising that xenophobia is a negative emotional response makes sense if it is considered from the perspective of group threat theory (the outgroup poses a threat, which gives rise to feelings of fear) and social identity theory (disgust or dislike of whoever or whatever is foreign, including cultural practices of foreigners, as a means to strengthen one's own feelings of cultural superiority). It is important to note that the fear is not necessarily caused by an individual foreigner doing or being something specific, but rather what they symbolise. One may feel fear when confronted by a direct threat (as when someone is standing with a gun to one's head), or in response to a more existential dread – the fear that one's life has no meaning, for example, or the fear that one's place in the world is under attack or being questioned (i.e. the fear of not belonging). Fear can also be a gut reaction to uncertainty. Hunkering down (Putnam) or putting on masks (Sennett) in reaction to diversity or difference are examples of this kind of reaction.

We should be careful, however, of losing sight of the nuanced nature of our emotional lives. On a conceptual level, it may be possible (albeit difficult) to distinguish fear from hatred, antipathy, or disgust. In life, our actions and attitudes are rarely guided by a single emotion. Emotions such as anger and disgust can be fuelled by fear – whether recognised or not – or, at the very least, be very comfortable bedfellows with fear. It is, therefore, an emotion worth investigating. I recognise that a variety of emotions sit behind particular instances of xenophobia but an in-depth analysis of all such emotions is not possible here. I therefore limit my focus to fear.

Humans and animals usually react in two ways to possible threats: we fight, or we try to escape (Bauman 2006: 3). Sometimes, we freeze (think of possums pretending to be dead when a raptor flies overhead, or a philosopher suddenly forgetting what they want to say at a conference). Whenever we find ourselves in an unfamiliar situation, our bodies prepare us for one of these reactions, because unfamiliarity and uncertainty causes us to feel fear. This we have in common with animals – the instinctive fear of that which is unfamiliar. However, fear in humans also manifests in a different way, what Zygmunt Bauman (2006: 3) calls second degree or derivative fear. Derivative fears are socially and culturally recycled; in other words, they are fears we have not in reaction to immediate threats (being chased by a lion), but rather due to our susceptibility to feeling insecure and vulnerable. We often react fearfully to situations – whether fleeing or fighting or freezing – independent of any real evidence of

danger. This reaction stems from our derivative fear, from what we were taught to fear and fearfully anticipate by our culture and socialisation.

But what is this fear? For Bauman (2006: 2), fear "is the name we give our *uncertainty*: to our *ignorance* of the threat and of what is to be *done* – what can and can't be – to stop it in its tracks – or to fight back if stopping it is beyond our power". Or, as Rebecca Solnit (2014: 80) puts it, "adults fear, above all, the darkness that is the unknown, the unseeable, the obscure". Fear is our emotional reaction to situations or encounters in which we feel lost, which we do not know how to navigate, in which we do not feel in control. Of course, material factors can and do exacerbate fear. We feel more threatened by strangers if, for example, our political contexts conflict or if we live in unstable economic times (Kumar *et al*. 2011: 35). We certainly have cause to fear *specific* strangers if we wake up with them standing over our beds, wielding knives. But our fear of strangers and strangeness has a deeper, more existential root, as alluded to above: the encounter with strangeness forces us to question our world-views and our place in the world, and it serves as a constant reminder of the limitations of our knowledge and our lives.

This latter point goes to the heart of our fear of strangers. We fear strangers because we do not know what the result of our encounter with them will be. As we will see below, in the earliest days of human development the encounter with a stranger or a strange group was risky, and often resulted in violence. Those that survived were the ones who were best at eliminating the threat posed by other groups.

2.2 Following our instincts

The study of xenophobia has also been approached from the perspective of evolutionary biology (see Reynolds *et al.* 1987). In these investigations, xenophobia is often equated with ethnocentrism, or the two terms are used interchangeably. I would argue that these two phenomena may share a common origin, but that they are distinct in their modern manifestations. Ethnocentrism, as the name suggests, discriminates based on ethnicity, not nationality (i.e. on the basis of citizenship), as xenophobia in contemporary society often does.[14] If nations were ethnically homogenous, ethnocentric discrimination would be the same

[14] I want to re-emphasise a point made in Chapter 1 – that xenophobia is not always connected to ideas of nationhood, but that it can also be present in any relatively established group.

as xenophobic discrimination. This, obviously, is not the case in most modern states. South Africans unite against foreigners, yet they do not share an ethnic identity. However, used in the context of studies of evolutionary biology, both terms have a broader meaning, referring to a more general approach to strangers or outsiders. In the early days of human development, discrimination against outsiders because they are outsiders occurred, but not necessarily because the insiders thought of themselves in terms of ethnicity (and certainly not in terms of nationality). When talking about this primitive form of discrimination, therefore, I prefer to use 'xenophobia' as we use the concept not only to mean fear of foreigners (i.e. in terms of modern concepts such as nationality or citizenship), but also fear of *strangers* in general. However, where the theories I discuss prefer to use 'ethnocentrism' rather than 'xenophobia', I use their formulation.

Van der Dennen (1987: 1) defines ethnocentrism as:

> a schismatic in-group/out-group differentiation, in which internal cohesion, relative peace, solidarity, loyalty and devotion to the in-group, and the glorification of the 'sociocentric-sacred' (one's own cosmology, ideology, social myth, or *Weltanschauung;* one's own 'god-given' social order) are correlated with a state of hostility or permanent quasi-war (*status hostilis*) towards out-groups, which are often perceived as inferior, subhuman, and/or the incorporation of evil.

Ethnocentrism sees in-group violence as negative and out-group violence as positive, necessary, or desirable. This enmity toward the out-group can possibly be explained (although not excused) by our development or evolution as a species. As group threat theory suggests, outsiders are often perceived as a threat to the safety and stability of a group. Xenophobia or ethnocentrism may be an instinctive reaction to this threat, and one with evolutionary advantage in primitive times, when competition for scarce resources was fierce. Through time, this instinct was given cultural meaning by portraying the in-group as good and the out-group as inferior or evil.

2.3 The xenophobia principle in animals

If xenophobia has its basis in evolutionary biology, it should be present in other species with relatively complex societies as well. Indeed, socio-biologists who study behaviours between groups of animals, whether within a specie or between different species, have identified what they call the "xenophobia principle" (Wilson 2002: 286). The xenophobia principle refers to a

widespread phenomenon where in-group members react violently toward out-group members. Such violent actions include antagonistic chasing, target aggressions, cooperative attacks, and coalitionary killing (Antonacci, Norscia & Palagi 2010: 1). These reactions to strangers have been identified in various lemur, monkey, and other primate populations. In this sense, warfare can also be seen as a xenophobic action perpetrated by one of the larger primates, humans.

What does it mean to say that animals are xenophobic? According to the xenophobic principle (above), resident animals cooperate violently to scare off or kill strangers. In animals, xenophobic aggression differs markedly from territorial aggression, or the aggression found *within* hierarchical social groups. The latter two forms of aggression are directed at animals that are familiar, although not necessarily part of the in-group. These forms of aggression can overlap with xenophobic aggression, but "[the] essence of xenophobia is an aggressive response towards a complete social stranger" (Van der Dennen 1987: 22). Furthermore, the latter two forms are often only for show (a display of aggression to remind everyone of their place in the social order), whereas xenophobia in animals usually involves lethal violence (ibid. 22).

It is not only primates that exhibit these 'xenophobic' tendencies. Some invertebrates (bees, ants, and a few other species of social insects) exhibit the trait, and several vertebrates have also been shown to be xenophobic. These include gulls, gerbils, hamsters, mice, rats, wolves, lions and deer (ibid. 20-21). Xenophobia is especially prevalent in relatively closed and hierarchical social groups and/or groups that are very territorial (ibid. 21). In contrast, species with relatively open societies generally do not exhibit xenophobic tendencies (e.g. bandicoot rats, migratory birds).

The presence of xenophobia in other primates and animals offers a challenge to our understanding of xenophobia as a form of prejudice based on an idea of foreignness. We either have to assume that animals have some conception of belonging and not-belonging similar to our own or give a different name to this phenomenon in animals. The former is not too farfetched, if controversial, as many animals exhibit strong social tendencies. Think, for example, of a wolf pack or a tribe of lions. Of course, this way of belonging is very different from our sense of belonging to a political community, a nation, or a cultural group, and we do not have access to animal minds in a way that would confirm that thinking about belonging is something they do (whether animals' cognitive processes can even be called 'thinking' is

something that is disputed). But animals, at least social animals, do belong to larger groups and on some very basic level attach importance to that belonging. We see evidence of this in the effect that ostracism has on animals (think of the ways in which we see them trying to regain the favour of the group, or follow the group, in nature documentaries) and in the ways in which animals (elephants, wolves) mourn the loss of members of their groups. If we recognise this, we can interpret nationalist thinking, or thinking in terms of foreignness, as humans' distinct way of thinking about belonging – something that developed over time, as we became more complex psychologically, emotionally, and in terms of the structures of our communities.

The other option – calling this behaviour in animals something other than xenophobia – is not something I wish to do, for various reasons. Firstly, the 'xenophobia principle' is a concept that is widely used and accepted in animal behaviour studies, zoology, and related fields. Secondly, I think it is important to realise how ingrained xenophobic thinking (and feeling!) is. To understand xenophobia, we need to investigate all possible avenues of explanation. To say that xenophobia has its origins in our evolutionary history is not to say that cultural, historical, and political explanations of xenophobia are wrong, nor to say that xenophobic attitudes and actions are inevitable. We understand enough of human evolution, instincts, genetic predispositions, etcetera, to know that our actions can diverge from what we were programmed to do by evolution. It would also be wrong to see ourselves purely as the products of culture. As Massimo Pigliucci (2010) argues, if we want to understand a complex form of human behaviour like xenophobia, "it is a category mistake to contrast cultural and biological explanations of behavior." Rather, we can think of evolution and culture as ultimate and proximate causes of human behaviour. While evolutionary theory can explain something of the adaptive advantages of aggression towards outsiders or bias towards insiders, this is of little help in understanding the complexity of human behaviour and interactions. To explain particular instances of a general anti-stranger bias, and to explain the complexity (i.e. the many ways in which it manifests), we need the kind of proximate explanations (immediate causes) provided by a study of culture, politics, and psychology (as in the approach I followed in Chapter 1),

2.4 An alternative reaction to fear

Evolutionary biology can tell us *why* and even *how* our tendency to be xenophobic initially developed, but it cannot serve as a full explanation. Given this, it may seem trivial to emphasise the possible evolutionary origin of xenophobia, especially given the fact that my focus so far

has been on the moral, cultural, and political aspects (i.e. proximate causes). Yet I think recognising *this* aspect of xenophobia can be helpful not only for our full understanding of the phenomenon, but also for providing us with strategies to combat xenophobia by looking at the ways in which other animals act. So far, I have only mentioned examples of animals who act on their xenophobic instincts. However, nature provides us with examples of interactions between animals where there are clear tensions between ingroups and outgroups, but without it resulting in violence and, in some cases, with the tension dissolving and animals forming bonds across group divisions. We can think of how the relationship between (some) wolves and (some) humans changed, which led to the domestication of the wolf. The story of the co-evolution of dogs and humans is one of cooperation where we would have expected conflict. Wolves and humans competed for the same food sources, after all. Yet at some point in history, in independent sites across the globe, these two species realised that cooperation is more beneficial for survival than competition, and from that came one of the most meaningful relationships between humans and other species (see Bradshaw 2012). But cooperation is not the only possible response to competition that animals in the wild have. A study on lemur behaviour suggests that lemurs manage xenophobia through *play* (Antonacci *et al*. 2010). In this study, the resource competed for was not only food but attention from female lemurs. Instead of engaging in a fight, ingroup males would initiate play with approaching outgroup males, which would ultimately dissolve the tension. I return to this study and the potential of play in Chapter 5.

Understanding the role that our evolutionary history plays in how we act and interact today provides us with insight into kinds of interaction that we may not have considered (such as play) if we did not take evolution into account, or with evidence that we can act or interact differently in response to competition with strangers (cooperation). It also allows us to recognise xenophobia as a global phenomenon, which means that despite its complexity and the different ways in which it manifests, we can understand it as something which is and has historically been present in all societies. In Chapter 1, I expressed my scepticism about understanding xenophobia as wholly contextual or claiming that xenophobia in South Africa has nothing in common with xenophobia elsewhere. This latter understanding of xenophobia limits our access to resources that can help us combat xenophobia, for example strategies used by other societies or communities (either in the past, or somewhere else in the world) to promote cooperation and hospitality toward foreigners. We are also better able to understand why strangers are perceived as threats and why this instils so much fear in people, if we see

this as a reaction that is instinctive or, at the very least, one that was coded into our psyches at a very early stage of human development. An encounter with a stranger or strangeness may trigger this reaction regardless of whether the stranger poses an actual threat or not. Importantly, this supports earlier claims that xenophobia is primarily motivated by ideas and prejudices and attitudes internal to the xenophobe, and not by anything specific about the foreigner other than the fact that they are a 'stranger'.

Conclusion

In Chapter 2, I took a broader view of xenophobia, trying to determine where our tendency to be xenophobic originates. In Section 1, I considered and compared social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory, the isolation thesis/contact theories, and group threat theory. All of these theories seek to explain why we form prejudices on the basis of ingroup and outgroup membership. I argued that none of these theories can fully explain xenophobic prejudice or every instance of xenophobic discrimination, but that xenophobia can be motivated for a whole variety of reasons, and that these theories provides us with such reasons. The first two theories are closely linked, and they explain how we come to value our membership to our group (whether cultural, national, religious, etc.) and consequently come to devalue non-members. From my discussion on contact theory and group threat theory, I concluded that instead of being at odds with one another, they show us the consequences of the wrong sort of contact. When contact is negative, we feel threatened by others, thus confirming group threat theory. Contact is positive when participants feel they are treated equally, when they share a common goal and cooperate to achieve that, and when their cooperation is supported by the social climate, including institutions. This will be explored in more depth in Chapter 5, where I look at solutions for the problem of xenophobia.

Section 2 considers common explanations of xenophobia that sees ingroup-outgroup discrimination as a mechanism of intergroup interactions since the earliest days of humanity, where outgroup hostility and aggression provided an evolutionary advantage. I first looked at our understanding of xenophobia as a fear of strangers and foreigners, and at the role which fear plays. I argued that this fear has many origins: our fear of uncertainty, our fear of losing our place in the world or of having to change our world-views, but also quite literally our fear for our existence. This fear is a product of our evolutionary history, where strangers posed a threat to our lives as everyone competed for scarce resources. In our early history as a species, aggression toward outgroups was often an instinctive reaction, for the protection of one's own.

We see this in animals, who exhibit what socio-biologists call the ‘xenophobia principle’. I suggested that recognising xenophobia as a product of the way we evolved as a specie does not mean that xenophobic attitudes and aggression are inevitable, but rather that we can see examples in the animal kingdom of other ways of dealing with strangers. Studying the ways in which animals handle strangers other than aggression may provide us with new avenues to explore in our own interactions. This is an idea that I develop further in Chapter 5.

In this chapter I hoped to show how deeply ingrained xenophobic attitudes are. Xenophobia resides in our minds, our hearts, and our interactions. Our fears and desire to survive, our desire to see ourselves as superior and to protect what is ours, are the birthplaces of the kind of xenophobia we see in contemporary societies. This in no way excuses it, but rather illustrates the immensity of the task before us if we hope to create a less xenophobic world. Xenophobia touches on the deepest aspects of the human condition: our identities, as individuals and groups, and our belonging in the world. In the coming chapters, I will therefore shift my focus slightly from a conceptual and historical analysis of xenophobia, to looking at the importance of belonging and the harms of displacement in Chapter 3, and at identity formation and how identities and our thinking about identities contribute to xenophobia, in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3: Belonging and Home

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have seen that expressions and acts of xenophobia are centred on a core belief: You are foreign, *you* don't belong *here*. Xenophobia is the reaction to the fear of being displaced or replaced, or of having no place, rooted in a primal fear about our own survival. Xenophobia is not only the fear of strangers, but also the fear of being (or becoming) a stranger in the world, and specifically being in a stranger where one should feel at home. In South Africa, for example, widespread xenophobic violence usually breaks out in economically, politically, and socially marginal communities – communities where jobs and other resources are scarce, and where constitutional rights and other entitlements mean very little. In such vulnerable communities, those who had been excluded from the benefits of full citizenship during Apartheid, and who were promised the world when democracy came, are *still* excluded from the full benefits of citizenship. They may be citizens in name, but their situation has hardly changed. In Arendt's (1973: 296) words, they are deprived of a place in which their words and deeds are significant, and therefore effectively deprived of their rights. In a sense, they are still excluded, and this gives rise to a "deep, existential apprehension over the meaning of belonging" (Landau 2006: 135).

Across the globe, individuals and communities situated in this precarious space of not quite belonging, see foreigners as a threat. For example, very often, undocumented migrants from the rest of Africa settle in informal settlements or rural communities, as there is a smaller police presence and control over who lives there. This protects them to an extent, as it hides their presence in the country, but it also endangers them. Faced with these seemingly rich and privileged foreigners, citizens who feel (and are) disenfranchised feel even more marginalised, more alienated from the place to which they are supposed to belong. The only thing they can cling to is the fact that *they* belong *here*, whether by birth or legal citizenship. This status they brandish against the migrants or foreigners, who they firmly believe do not belong *here*. In the preceding chapters, I referred to the connections between a sense of belonging, an attachment to place, and xenophobia. Violent and virulent xenophobia is often justified by fears of being replaced (Chapter 2). People are included or excluded based on origin, with belonging closely connected to citizenship and indigeneity (Chapter 1).

It is therefore crucial that this notion of 'belonging' is investigated, if we want to develop a comprehensive understanding of both the drivers behind and the effects of xenophobia. Belonging calls up notions of home and being at home, and of place, displacement, and replacement. Xenophobia is a reaction to insecurity, and part of that insecurity is linked to a fear that one will cease to belong somewhere. As a result, people exclude others from belonging so that they themselves can belong. This creates a condition of insecurity for the 'outsiders', rendering them vulnerable to certain harms and taking away certain freedoms precisely because they do not belong.

In Section 1, I will consider belonging from the perspective of the xenophobe. First, I will establish the connection between belonging and place, which is often interpreted in a territorial sense. I will show how places of origin influence our perceptions about ourselves and others, establishing a link between identity and place. I draw on the work of Jeff Malpas (1999) to show how places shape our subjectivities, and on Arendt (1998) to argue that part of this process of subjectivity-formation is also a product of the other people we encounter in shared places. In Section 1.2, I argue that the upshot of the connection between place, subjectivity, and identity is that being displaced or feeling that one does not belong is deeply harmful to the individual, but that this also has negative effects on society. I show how people become superfluous (Arendt), and how superfluous people seek meaning and belonging by excluding others. This is further explored in Section 1.3, where I argue that people who feel isolated from the world and from each other often seek belonging in larger groups that promise them a home. With reference to Benedict Anderson's (2006) argument that the nation is an imagined community, I argue that people seeking belonging find a false home in the nation, with nationalism as a result. I then consider the link between nationalism and xenophobia, arguing that while xenophobia does not need the nation, nationalism is always in danger of being xenophobic.

In Section 2, I consider belonging and home from the perspective of the outsider or foreigner trying to establish a new home in a host country. I argue that belonging somewhere, in the sense of having a physical place where one can exist, is a precondition for freedom. Relying on Waldron's (1991) work on homelessness, I establish the link between freedom, place, and existence, and show how in this regard foreigners are similarly situated to the homeless, in that their ability to exercise basic freedom is curtailed because they often struggle to find a place to exist (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2, I link this to the other dimension of Arendt's discussion on

rootlessness: the dangers of displacement and statelessness. I show how easy it is for people to disappear, and intentionally so, when they do not have a secure place in the world. Section 2.3 therefore deals with the question of having one's own place, i.e. a personal home. I consider the feminist critique of home, but ultimately argue that the notion of home can be a regulative ideal (Young 1997), used to be critical of society where it fails to protect the lives and privacy of people. We need to ensure that people have some kind of home, some kind of place to exist, because being displaced is deeply harmful. I turn to the harms of displacement in Section 2.4, specifically the emotional and cognitive harms. I show how personal displacement, i.e. moving home, harms anybody, but specifically that harm is exacerbated when we are dealing with the displacement of migrants and refugees. For this discussion I rely on the work of Cara Nine (2017), who shows us how being displaced places an extra load on one's cognitive functioning, while also putting strain on one's relationships. This in turn impedes the process of starting to feel at home in a new place.

This chapter serves as a transition from the conceptual and historical analyses of xenophobia in the first two chapters, to the question of how xenophobia is related to our identity in the final two chapters. Both those questions are deeply concerned with belonging and having a place in the world, and therefore this chapter is key to understanding why we have apprehensions about belonging and what the dangers of those apprehensions are.

1. False homes and isolated individuals

1.1 Place and belonging

The notion of belonging is intimately connected to the notion of place. One can belong to a family, a group, a community but politically, belonging to a *place* matters: "We define ourselves at least partly on where we are from; we experience feelings of displacement that suggest how important must be the usually ignored signals testifying to emplacement" (Maier 2008: 67). Where we are from is so fundamental to our sense of identity, that it is often one of the first things we tell new people we meet. We also tend to attach certain identities to people based on where they are from or make certain (often stereotyped) assumptions about them. We distinguish between 'city people' and 'country people'. We make derogatory jokes about people from certain towns, and we attach characteristics to individuals based on their nationality. On official forms, we often not only have to fill out our current addresses or home towns, but also where we were born. Opening a bank account, getting a cell phone contract,

taking out a loan, or voting in elections requires an official proof of address – confirmation on a paper that you have an address and, attached to that address, an identity.

The strong link in our minds between belonging, place, and territory plays an important contributing role in people's xenophobic beliefs, attitudes, and actions. For nationalists, and for xenophobes, the specific place or territory matters. In this sense, place "can license the xenophobic, the authoritarian, the military, and even the fascistic" (Maier 2008: 71). And emphasis on attachment and belonging is then a reemphasis on the *Heimat*, the small and local, a nostalgic longing for the past (ibid. 72). It translates into a longing for the good old days, before (for example) South Africa was 'overrun' by foreigners. Foreigners do not belong *here*, in South Africa, because they are not South African. Even ones born here do not belong, because they do not belong to the historical nation, or nations, indigenous to South Africa. But belonging is also metaphorical – the *here* in the statement can also refer to a group of people (like a club, a religious group, or a nation). *This* kind of belonging is not necessarily linked to territory or place. For example, Catholics all over the world may consider themselves part of a single community, and some may believe that some others are not 'really Catholic', i.e., that they do not really belong to that community, based on beliefs they may hold, or how moral their behaviour is, etc., and not due to their location. Both belonging in its metaphorical sense, and belonging linked to place, is relevant to this discussion, as both can be at play simultaneously. The nation, for example, is not only linked to a territory, but also to a narrative or a myth. Nations can exist in diasporas, or diasporic people can still 'belong' to the nation, even when they do not inhabit its territory, or when the nation does not have a territory. Even nomads attach special significance to specific places.

We can think of the link between identity and place in more abstract terms. Jeff Malpas (1999: 176) argues for the necessary connection between subjectivity and place – subjectivity is *embedded* in place. People can only exist as self-conscious subjects if they exist in a place; place is the precondition for subjectivity:

> Place is instead that within and with respect to which and with respect to which subjectivity is itself established – place is not founded *on* subjectivity, but is rather that *on which* subjectivity is founded. Thus one does not first have a subject that apprehends certain features of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead, the

> structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place. (Malpas 1999: 35)

To put it more concretely: the place in which we find ourselves shapes our selves – place provides us with a background or a site within which social interactions and practices take place (ibid. 185). Indeed, this is indicated by our language – we speak of things 'taking *place*'. Malpas uses 'place' in a broader sense than I have above. His understanding can include the spatiotemporal (i.e. a geographical place, or a place in space and time), but he considers it a too limited understanding of place. Place is not mere landscape, nor something we subjectively construct. Malpas is sceptical of claims that see place as merely social and political constructs, or constructs of our subjectivity. Rather, "[e]mbedded in the physical landscape is a landscape of personal and cultural history" (ibid. 1). There is more to 'place' than what is human (the social, the political, the historical). The world in its totality (including objects) is also presented to us through place (ibid. 15). Place is "that wherein the sort of being that is characteristically human has its ground", an "open and yet bounded realm within which the things of the world can appear and within which events can 'take place'" (ibid. 33). This understanding of place is inspired by the Heideggerian *Dasein* (*da-sein* – 'there/here-being'). So our subjectivities are formed by what is given to us in experience, our interactions with such objects and other subjects in space, and by what Malpas calls "Proust's Principle": the idea that our identities are derived from our inhabiting specific places, here understood in terms of location (ibid. 176). The dependence of identity on place comes from the general fact that people, as subjects, share the world/the place they inhabit with other objects and subjects, and the particular fact that our mental lives rely on actively engaging with our environments (ibid. 177). This also implies that our understanding of the world is dependent on place. Elsewhere, Malpas (2016: 381) writes of the "intimate belonging-together of place and thinking, of place and experience, of place and the very possibility of appearance, of presence, of being." What we seek to understand is inspired by what we encounter and experience in the place we find ourselves, and our understanding of that place (or our place in the world) influences how we see and seek to understand what we encounter.

There are those who argue that Malpas's claim is too strong, or his argument too weak – that who we are (our identities, subjectivities, or sense of self) is not determined by place in the way he suggests: "in no non-trivial sense does being who and what one is require that one either is now inhabiting, ever has inhabited or ever will inhabit any particular place" (Christensen

2001: 791). It is not clear to me, however, that Malpas's claim is as trivial as his critics make it seem. His emphasis on the opacity and obscurity of place, on its transcendental nature (1999; 2016: 384) is not of direct concern to my argument. As indicated from the start, I am concerned here specifically with the more limited understanding of place – physical places, but also place as it relates to human history – as this directly relates to politics and political identities. For this reason, Malpas's claim that place influences and indeed determines identity does not seem trivial, even if it is a bit of a truism. I do not think that place is the *only* determining factor in identity-formation – far from it – but that it plays a large role is undeniable. Where we grew up, which places we inhabited and continue to inhabit, provides us with a frame of reference. In a trivial sense, this means that I know certain things, having grown up in a rural town in the Kalahari, that friends who lived their whole lives in Johannesburg are less likely to know. Of course, this knowledge can be gained in other ways. However, the influence of place goes further than exposure to different things (the objects we encounter in experience).

Crucially, a place also contains other people, people who act and react and interact in specific ways (in part determined by what their space asks of them). So different cultures developed in different places and, where those cultures spread through diasporas and migrations, some elements were retained, and some changed. Think, for example, of differences in dialect and accent. Such differences are not necessarily the product of geographical characteristics (mountains or oceans or deserts), but they *are* regional. It is *here* that the seemingly trivial claim becomes important. The places that we share, where we live and interact and form bonds and create culture, gain a special significance for us. We attach emotional meaning to place – we are loyal to our hometowns, our countries. We come to love places, not only for what they mean to us on an individual level but for what they mean to the group we form part of. In this sense, we politicise places. So to say that one's identity is shaped by one's place in the world is to also recognise that one's politics is shaped by the political situation in which one finds oneself (whether in agreement or dissent or apathy).

As we come to value the ways in which places shape our identities, we may feel strongly about protecting those places from change. In a sense, the xenophobic life-world I referred to in Chapter 1 is a place – a place constructed in such a way that it is 'protected' from outsiders. The term 'life-world' refers to our phenomenological and subjective experience of the places in which we lead our everyday lives, and when outsiders 'intrude' upon these places the shape of them may change. We see this in the fears expressed through xenophobic or anti-immigrant

sentiments – the fears that foreigners will bring irreversible change to the culture, architecture, and 'feeling' of a place or a life-world.

The relationship between our phenomenological understanding and valuing of place and politics is central to Hannah Arendt's work. In *The Human Condition* (1998), Arendt discusses the dual nature of place – place as something physical, but also place as the location where things in the world can appear. The Greek *polis*, she writes, "is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose" (ibid. 198). Arendt's view is of the kind that Malpas is sceptical about – for her, "[the] space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action […] Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever" (ibid. 199). Place, as it relates to politics, exists between public actors. I think it is possible to reconcile a limited understanding of Malpas's conception of place with Arendt's "space of appearance". Malpas does not deny the cultural, historical, and political (i.e. human) dimension of place, he is just arguing that place is more than this – that these things take place within place. However, if Malpas's claim that our identities are dependent on place has any depth, it is precisely because of the human dimension of place, because we come to value the ways in which we are shaped by our surroundings and the connection between us and specific places. Malpas's view, while valuably recognising the necessity of being in a place to exist (or to have subjectivity; an important point I return to later in this chapter), can seem deterministic. We *are* shaped by the places we inhabit, but we are also shaped by a whole range of other things. Where it concerns politics, we cannot and, indeed, should not have such a deterministic view of the connection between place and subjectivity, precisely because humans tend to attach political meaning to place, as we saw in the nationalist movements of the past century. We are grounded in place, which to an extent limits what we are able to do and also what political challenges we face, but we also act and interact and appear in this place in response to the challenges set by the very place in we find ourselves. On one point Malpas and Arendt agrees: to exist in this world (whether to have subjectivity, or to appear before others who can confirm your existence), you need a place in which you can exist.

1.2 Rootlessness and loneliness: the dangers of not belonging

If this deep connection between place and identity, subjectivity, or existence holds, it follows that not being in a place, or being displaced, is harmful, not only existentially but, as I will

argue later, morally. I will discuss the harms of displacement in Section 2, as displacement relates more to the situation in which refugees, migrants, and those on the receiving end of xenophobia find themselves. However, xenophobic actions are not only an exploitation of displaced persons' vulnerability. Xenophobia is also a reaction to the xenophobe's own feelings of vulnerability and insecurity relating to their fears about their place in the world.

As was argued in Chapter 1, xenophobia is deeply concerned with the question of belonging. Part of the explanation of xenophobia in South Africa relates to specific grievances that people have that are not addressed by government, for which foreigners are then scapegoated (see also Misago *et al*. 2009). However, such grievances trigger a deeper political insecurity: the fear of not belonging. This fear is ubiquitous in contemporary society, with rising levels of anxiety, belief in fear-based conspiracy theories (the 'Great Replacement', white genocide, etc.), and increased attacks on those considered other (anti-immigrant mass shootings in the USA, gender-based violence in South Africa). I recognise that the examples listed here are more complex, and that insecurity about one's place in the world, or that of the group one belongs to, is not always the root cause behind such actions. However, the conditions of uncertainty and insecurity created by political instability, economic hardships (the recession after the 2008 crash; another recession looming), and climate change (whether acknowledged or not) contributes to feelings of alienation, helplessness, frustration, and loneliness. Such feelings are the breeding grounds of populism and nationalism – -isms that are often accompanied by discrimination and violence against minorities or vulnerable groups.

It is, I believe, what Arendt (1973: 459) calls our 'political miseries' – not disconnected from our social and economic ones – that trigger this fear of not belonging. But what are these political miseries? As stated above, our alienation, loneliness, and feelings of helplessness or powerlessness. The question is *why* so many people feel this way, and *what* they do about it. The answer to the latter we already know – people seek belonging in the nation, or in exclusionary communities, cementing their belonging on the non-belonging of others. The *why* is harder to answer, but Arendt locates the cause in capitalist modernity's creation of superfluous things and superfluous people, and in the ways in which we are increasingly becoming isolated from one another. Modern society is characterised by "homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth" (ibid. vii). People feel rootless, homeless, because of "their superfluity on an overcrowded earth" (ibid. 457). The dangers of our overcrowded earth are more evident now than they were in Arendt's time, with climate

change (also a product of human progress and capitalist expansion) threatening our very existence. More people are being displaced, or face situations in which they do not have adequate access to basic resources such as water or food, as physical places in which to exist become fewer and fewer.

Superfluity also relates to the individual's ability to appear and act in the world, and here it links to the discussion in the previous section. The superfluous person – the person without a use for modern society (like the homeless, or the unemployed) – is a person who finds themselves without "a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective" (ibid. 296). The very idea of superfluity suggests the threat of not-belonging or no longer existing. It is indeed the creation of superfluous people that allowed for the extermination of millions in the twentieth century (not only in Nazi concentration camps). It is this being without a place in which one is recognised, in which what one says and does matters, which creates a condition of homelessness and rootlessness. Arendt refers to the modern, atomized individual's "situation of spiritual and social homelessness" (ibid. 352). The individualism of modern society, the boundless drive for acquisition and progress of capitalism, and the seeming limitlessness of it, also contributes to the sense of rootlessness. As a result, the rootless, homeless (literal and spiritual), superfluous masses seek a home in movements that, in their logic if not in name, are totalitarian:

> the masses are obsessed by a desire to escape from reality because in their essential homelessness they can no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects […] The revolt of the masses against "realism", common sense […] was the result of their atomization, of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole sector communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense. (ibid.)

Instead of facing up to the incomprehensibility of reality, something that Arendt would later link to being at home in the world and to political judgment, the masses (or, increasingly in our time, the lonely individual) seeks a home in the "lying world of consistency" provided by totalitarian movements, "in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings" (ibid. 353). We can interpret all exclusionary ideologies – fascisms, nationalisms, right-wing supremacy – as such an attempt to find a home, to secure roots.

Xenophobia, then, is also an attempt to find a home – to insert roots by uprooting others, or to assert one's belonging by excluding others.

Not belonging as a citizen in one's own country, in one's home but not *at* home, can be seen as a form of internal exile. In Chapter 1 (1.1) we saw how South Africans' own sense of the precariousness of their belonging contributes to xenophobia in their own context. Part of this is due to the aforementioned historical status of black South Africans as 'foreign natives' (Neocosmos 2010; see also Schierup 2016), a form of internal exile – of the land, but not belonging. This sense of insecurity surrounding belonging did not end after Apartheid; feelings of insecurity about their new position (as Nyamnjoh argued) created deep, existential apprehensions about belonging (Landau). Unable to deal with our insecurity, we seek sources of security in a kind of anti-African nationalism – the national chauvinism which leads to the scapegoating that Mbembe (2015) speaks of. We believe the narratives told by politicians and other leaders who want to retain their legitimacy and see in foreigners easy targets to shoulder their blame (*this* is our lying world of consistency). The poem with which I opened this study speaks of the frustrations that the superfluous people of South Africa feel, how it explodes their homes until, eventually, the fire is directed at the foreigner: "their paraffin-lit homes exploded, / fuelled by their black-man fire / their black-man stress. / Homes overheating […] they shared their stories of disaster-eating / as they nurtured their anger about everything" (Shoro 2017: 25-26).

Our reasons for feeling that we do not belong where we are, for being uprooted, may differ, depending on one's context and the history that shaped that context. Yet there is a relation between South Africans' apprehensions about belonging, and those in other contexts. Earlier in this study I referred to the idea of 'Great Replacement', a common theme in right-wing conspiracy theories in the USA and in Europe. At face value it may seem like those who fear replacement think that they have a place, but on the contrary it is because they are precariously positioned, because they are uncertain of their place on a very deep level, that they fear being replaced. Camus (in Wildman 2017) sees white nationalism specifically as an expression of people being "very anxious about their destiny", which implies fear about their continued existence. So even if the historical and current political realities that give rise to a fear of not belonging or being replaced differs radically across contexts, the experience of not belonging is similar. A South African who participates in xenophobic violence, or a white nationalist who marches against immigration in America, have very different experiences and reasons for

feeling out of place. How race intersects with their xenophobic attitudes and actions also differ, but at the root of their xenophobia lies the same sense of insecurity about their place in the world and an attempt to secure that place through excluding those who are foreign.

1.3 The nation as home

A desire for home and belonging to something greater than oneself often takes on the form of nationalism. As a concept, nationalism can refer to one of two things: (i) the value members attach to their national identity, expressed in attitudes and actions, or (ii) the striving by members of a specific nation for self-determination. I am primarily interested in (i) – the question of national identity and how such an identity contributes to xenophobia. The usefulness of nationalism in self-determination attempts is widely recognised, as is nationalism as a liberating mechanism, for example in the liberation of African states from colonialism (see Fanon 2017). However, this kind of nationalism is also not free from the threat of becoming xenophobic, as we saw in the discussion in Chapter 1.

To understand how xenophobia manifests in most contemporary contexts, we need to look at the false home of the nationalist. Hjerm (1998: 336) connects xenophobia specifically with our "national identity and national pride", as we see in the relation between South African exceptionalism and xenophobia discussed in Chapter 1. For Hjerm (ibid. 337), national identity is understood in a similar sense to the kind of social identity that Tajfel (see Chapter 2) described:

> National identity could be seen as an awareness of affiliation with the nation that gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others or infuses them with a sense of purpose that makes them feel at home […] National identity is based in similarity to some people and difference (perceived or actual) from others.

Importantly, members of nation who identify strongly with that nation can be more or less xenophobic, depending on how 'others' are understood, i.e. "the criteria on which one's national identity is based or the type of national identity a person has" (ibid.). Hjerm distinguishes between a civic national identity and an ethnic national identity. Those with the former kind of national identity tend to be less xenophobic than those with the latter. How we understand nationhood can, therefore, have a profound impact on how we treat others. I return to this distinction later in the section. For now, the important point is that national identity unites as well as differentiates, and it is in this dual act that the individual finds a home. The

home of the nationalist is therefore dependent on the differentiation between insiders and outsiders. Hence the possibility for xenophobia is present in the very logic of nationalism.

I will not provide a history of nationalism. Such histories abound. It would perhaps be better to speak of nationalisms, to recognise the different forms nationalism can take. The nationalism of those fighting for liberation is vastly different from the nationalism of the Third Reich. I continue to use the singular form, however, as the kind of nationalism I am concerned with will become clear in my discussion. Arendt warned of people seeking belonging in places that offer a false home. A nation, I will argue, is potentially such a false home. Not because nations do not exist, but because they are not what they seem to nationalists. Benedict Anderson (2006: 5) identifies three paradoxes of nationalism:

i. The objective modernity of the nation from a historical perspective, versus the subjective antiquity of the nation from nationalist perspective
ii. The universality of the concept 'nation' (in the sense that there are nations across the globe, and everyone belongs to one) versus the particularity of its manifestations
iii. The political power of the idea of nations or nationhood, versus its relative philosophical poverty

The latter two paradoxes will have to be set aside for lack of space. When I say that nations are not what they seem, I refer to the first paradox Anderson identifies. Nationalists see the nation as natural, sometimes god-given (think of the 'chosen people' narratives of the Afrikaner), and as having a long, or at least a noble, history. Even the idea of the post-Apartheid South African nation, recognised as 'young', views the territorial shape of the nation as defining, in spite of the fact that as a territory 'South Africa' is also relatively new. Such views are completely at odds with what we know about the history of nations: that they are largely the products of modernity and therefore, taking the whole of human history into account, relatively new inventions; that the borders delineating national territories are the products of conquests, exchanges, imperialisms, and deliberations and that there is therefore nothing inevitable in the connection between the member of the nation and the 'homeland'; and that the members of the nation are themselves often the product of an equally complex history of intermarriages, migrations, and cultural exchange.

We can easily understand why the alienated, lonely individual would prefer to believe that the nation is older and more static than it is. For those seeking belonging, inserting themselves into

a grand narrative and long history firmly grounds them in the world – if they have a past, they must belong. Remember also the search for consistency. National myths provide us with such consistency.

Anderson (2006: 6) argues that nations are invented by us – that nations are *imagined political communities*. Nations are imagined in the sense that the members of the community called 'the nation' do not all know each other (as was the case with smaller communities, or theoretically possible at least). Nations are large collectivities of strangers imagine themselves to belong to the same group: "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (ibid.). Nations come into being with the act of establishing, through the imagination, unity with people based on some shared characteristic. This can be a shared or similar culture. Very often, it is a shared territory. Nationalism, writes Anderson, invents nations. All imagined communities have two fundamental characteristics: they are inherently limited, and they are sovereign.

Members of the imagined community see themselves as a fraternity, which "makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (ibid. 7). This is the cost of belonging to the nation, a price which many people will willingly pay for the sake of feeling that they belong. Notice here that nationalism inspires members to die for the nation, not to kill. Killing for the nation, when it takes place (and it takes place so often), is framed as an act of self-defence, protecting the nation from those who would harm it. This echoes what was argued in Chapter 2: that xenophobia is justified by the threat the foreigner seems to pose to the continued existence of the individual, community, or nation.

In the previous section, we saw how internal exile and accompanying feelings of rootlessness lead people to seek a home in nationalism. This also holds for external exile, as the person exiled tries to deal with the exclusion, marginalisation, and frustrations of living in a new country. Due to this, a new phenomenon arose: long-distance nationalism (Anderson 2005: 184). This form of nationalism is one of the ironies of the globalised world – the formation of niches in a world where everything imaginable is theoretically at one's fingertips. It also shows that nationalism is not necessarily directly connected to territory, even if it retains an indirect connection through longings for the homeland. This kind of nationalism could lead to exiles holding xenophobic attitudes toward the members of their host nation, but investigating this in

more depth is beyond my current scope.[15] My main concern is with internal exiles and their xenophobic attitudes toward others who want to enter the 'home' they only precariously belong to. While focussing on diaspora identity, Anderson *does* emphasise that one can be 'in exile' while living in one's own country as well. He refers to the new forms of exile created by industrialisation (Anderson 1994: 317) and its accompanying standardised education. Nation-wide standardised education systems imposed a standardised vernacular, which was closely linked to employment possibilities. If you speak the standard vernacular, you could get a job. If not, employment was scarcer. This caused people to become self-conscious about their local dialects or linguistic practices, causing a sense of alienation or a kind of exile (exile from the new possibilities offered by industrialisation; an internal exile). This new form of exile spread, as global capital and industry grew. Nationalism is often a reaction against just this spread of global capital, against homogenisation, even as capitalism supports and often benefits from nationalism. We see this in the new nationalisms of today: the redrawing of borders, anti-elite populist rhetoric (because only the elite easily cross borders), the hunkering down in the face of diversity.

While nationalism is therefore often a reaction against forced global homogenisation, it is of course itself a program of homogenisation. Nationalists narrowly define culture, values, language, etc. It is not only a reaction to the homogenisation brought by globalisation, but also to hybridity. Nationalists will demand that their language is the only official language, the only spoken language, until an outsider speaks that language (ibid. 316). That which is hybrid is impure and must be purified and cleansed. Because nationalism is a program of homogenisation, any outsider or foreigner represents a possible harm. Homogeneity is the opposite of human spontaneity, with its possibilities for new beginnings and change. For this reason nationalism is necessarily xenophobic, as it has to prevent miscegenation (literal and metaphorical) through contact with foreigners. For this reason, in Sundstrom's (2015: 75) words, nationalism always shelters xenophobia.

[15] That exiles or migrants hold such attitudes is undoubtedly true. We see this, for example, in Jonny Steinberger's *A Man of Good Hope* (2015), an account of a Somalian refugee living in South Africa. As xenophobic attitudes are born out of stranger shock, cultural differences, and valuing one's own group above others, it makes sense that immigrants or refugees may also hold such attitudes regarding their hosts, but the ostracising and institutional discrimination aspects of xenophobia are missing. Negative feelings and attitudes about the hosts can also be the result of their own experiences of xenophobic discrimination (e.g. thinking that South Africans are violent, because of the violence directed at foreigners).

The discussion thus far has shown us the dangers of not belonging, and how it contributes to people becoming xenophobic or participating in xenophobic projects (such as nationalism). The question is whether it is possible to belong without necessarily excluding others. Put differently, the question is whether one's country can be one's political home without opening the door to xenophobia. One answer to this question distinguishes between nationalism, as love of one's nation, and patriotism, as love of one's country. The homogenous nation is very often also ethnically and culturally homogenous, whereas a country need not be. Ethnically and culturally diverse people can all agree that they are members of the same country, and that they love that country (this is closer to our current reality than the idea of a nation). Instead of nationalism, we can have a kind of civic or constitutional patriotism where the love is not of the nation, or the people, or even the territory, but rather the love of your country's constitution and the qualities and characteristics of its political system (see Habermas 1995, Kant 1996, Kleingeld 2012). This may provide us with a basis upon which political unity and solidarity can be built in diverse societies.

However, whether this can work or not is debatable. The South African example seems to provide us with evidence to the contrary: a diverse nation, not united by culture or ethnicity, language or world-view, but seemingly united against outsiders and that nevertheless thinks of itself as a single nation (for the most part). Two things should be noted in response: firstly, the kind of patriotism suggested by Habermas and others requires a real respect and regard for the constitution, something that is not necessarily present in all South Africans. Indeed, if we took the constitution as seriously as we should, we *would* recognise that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'. Secondly, as I already mentioned, political membership or citizenship in South Africa is still strongly connected to the idea of indigeneity, and consequently to territory. A kind of patriotism founded on respect for the constitution and a faith in the political system which it should engender can work to subvert this kind of territorial nationalism.

Critics of constitutional patriotism have argued that commitment to constitutional ideals cannot unite people like a shared (national) identity would, and therefore does not provide us with an alternative form of loyalty from nationalism (see Canovan 2000). I am sceptical about the possibility of a patriotism that is without the threat of xenophobia, for xenophobia is not only strongly connected to ethnicity or race, but also to what the ingroup values and devalues. Even if constitutional patriotism can offer a strong sense of loyalty and unity, the danger of exclusion still remains. If an outsider therefore does not share the values (e.g. democratic values) of the

insiders, xenophobic prejudice can still be the result. An emphasis on the universal values contained in democratic constitutions – equality, respect for human dignity, etc. – is important, but only one in a set of strategies we should follow, and the strategies need not be political. Part of the strength of nationalism is that it relies on pre-political ties, such as birth and blood, which constitutional patriotism cannot provide (ibid. 416, 419). The point is to address people's sense of insecurity and apprehensions about belonging, and part of this is situating them in communities (this need not even be national) in which they can meaningfully participate. As we saw in Chapter 2, the origins of this is prepolitical. Another part is to reduce their sense of being threatened by others, something that the contact hypothesis suggests can only be achieved through positive interactions, a possibility I discuss further in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 4, I consider how a narrative approach to identity may make our political identities less rigid and, because storytelling is also imaginative and affective, help us see others as fully human and not dissimilar from ourselves. Part of this would be to recognise not only shared hopes and dreams and goals (e.g. that refugees flee their countries because they also want their children to grow up in safe environments), but also to see other people's struggles. I therefore turn, now, to a particular struggle facing foreigners but one that should not be wholly unfamiliar to the xenophobe, in light of the discussion above. In the next section, I will consider belonging from the perspective of the strangers in our midst, and show the special harm attached to displacement and how xenophobia contributes to a continuous sense of displacement or not having a true home, and the negative effects thereof on the displaced or homeless person.

2. In a foreign place: displacement and a new home

In the previous section I established the connection between belonging and place, and between place and subjectivity, identity, and existence. I used it to show how those who feel alienated from the world seek belonging in false homes, which can lead them to become xenophobic. These connections are also relevant to understanding the experiences of those who are at the receiving end of xenophobia – those who are considered foreign, or who have to leave their homes for a new home in a foreign land. Public discourse on immigration, emigration, refugees, asylum, and xenophobia (whether justifying or condemning) centre around ideas of place, placement, and displacement. The question is one of belonging to *a* place, but more specifically *this* place that is called *home* by some. 'Home' can be defined in three ways: (i) politically (in the sense of homeland, *heimat*, the nation, etc.) or in terms of community (a group-home); (ii) individually (the personal or family home); and (iii) the world as home (i.e. home in its broadest

sense). While it is important to distinguish between these three different 'kinds' of home, it makes more sense to think of these categories as levels of home. To feel as if one belongs, one needs to be at home on all three levels. The stateless person, the foreigner in a strange land, often experiences a sense of homelessness and loss of home on all three levels. This loss of home amounts to a loss of freedom, especially when attempts to establish a new home, to enter into a new community, are prevented by the xenophobia of those already in the community or place.

2.1 No place to be free

Belonging *somewhere* is crucial to our existence as well as our freedom. We need a space or a place where our bodies can be situated, where we can rest them and nourish them and from which we can interact with others, situated in spaces or places around us. A truism from Jeremy Waldron (1991: 296): "Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No one is free to perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it." It may seem trivial, so simple is this truth, to emphasise that we cannot exist if we do not exist in a place. Yet the history of *displacement* is also one of disappearance, of extermination. We have seen, time and again, how easy it is for people *who exist* to suddenly not have a place in the world, and consequently for them to cease to exist. Strategies of denaturalisation and deportation, which imply displacement and loss of home, are often the first steps toward extermination. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable to this, especially those who are situated in the "murky domain between legality and illegality" (Benhabib 2006: 46) or "holes of oblivion" (Arendt 1973: 459), such as undocumented immigrants or stateless people.[16]

In the past seven years, South Africa has deported more than 400 000 foreign nationals. In March 2017 the government approved a White Paper on Internal Migration that includes the possibility of building detention centres for asylum seekers, something which is in breach of our Constitution and that our president has criticised other countries for doing (Heleta 2019). Those who support deportation can easily counter the argument that people have a right to a place to exist by agreeing that this is a need people have, but that this does not mean the place in which they exist has to be *here*. This is what lies behind the refrain "Go back to where you

[16] For an important argument linking a place to exist to cosmopolitan right, see Kleingeld (2012), and of course Kant (1996). As this chapter is concerned with the link between home and belonging, and the harms of the loss or lack of a home as one of the harms suffered by victims of xenophobia, I do not deal with the issue of cosmopolitan right here.

came from." However, this point is disingenuous. Many people are *here* (wherever here may be) precisely because they cannot be 'where they came from' – because they were displaced from their homes by violence, famine, economic struggles, or natural disasters. And many people against whom this refrain is directed are *from here* – they were born in South Africa, or the United States, or wherever. There is, quite often, no other place, or no safe place to 'go back' to. This is something those shouting "go back to where you came from" should be aware of. To say this is *not* to say, 'You have a right to exist, just somewhere else'. It rather says, 'You do not have a right to exist' or, 'I don't care whether you exist or not.'

Arendt (1973) alerts us to the dangers of statelessness – how it creates superfluous people who so easily fall into the holes of oblivion, how not having a place in the world often leads to a complete removal from the world (extermination). Another group in danger of falling into the holes of oblivion, is the homeless (whether citizen or non-citizen). The plight of homeless persons perfectly illustrates the connection between place and freedom, while also showing the dangers of being displaced. Waldron (1991) connects this general insight to the specific relations between homelessness, freedom, and property rules. A key function of rules of ownership, especially those relating to land, "is to provide a basis for determining who is allowed to be where" (ibid. 296). With private property, only the owner(s) and those given permission by them would be allowed to be there. Where collective property is concerned, the rules are decided upon by the relevant group of people. Homeless people do not have access to private property, unless granted access by the owners. The only place for them to be is on common property – parks, sidewalks, etc:

> One way of describing the plight of a homeless individual might be to say that there is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be […] A technically more accurate description of his plight is that there is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be whenever *he* chooses, no place governed by a private property rule from which he may not at any time be excluded as a result of someone else's say-so [...] the homeless person is utterly and at all times at the mercy of others. (Waldron 1991: 299)

Even in places of common property, such as parks, homeless people are at the mercy of the authorities. Their ability to perform basic tasks, such as sleeping and washing, are inhibited. Of course, everyone is prevented from doing certain things in common spaces, but usually people have private spaces where they can perform these tasks. Some freedoms may be limited

in one space, while acceptable in another. The limiting of our freedom to do as we choose in common spaces has unequal effects on those without a personal or private space:

> Someone who is allowed to be in a place is, in a fairly straightforward sense, free to be there. A person who is not allowed to be in a place is unfree to be there. However, the concept of freedom usually applies to actions rather than locations: one is free or unfree to do X or to do Y […] It follows, strikingly, that a person who is not free to be in any place is not free to do anything; such a person is comprehensively unfree. (Waldron 1991: 302)

The state of being comprehensively unfree is not unique to the homeless but, I would argue, also plagues the condition in which many displaced people, migrants, and refugees find themselves. Those who are denied entry are often kept in detention centres on the borders, on islands (e.g. Manus Island, Australia), or in third countries. Even those who do gain entry are prevented from expressing their freedom in any comprehensive sense. Those who entered illegally are precariously situated – if they are detected, they are vulnerable to abuse and deportation. Avoiding detection means avoiding certain actions, such as seeking protection from the police when you are the victim of a crime. It also makes it harder to find a safe and stable home, as the documents needed cannot be provided. Those who enter legally may seem to be in a stronger position, but the threat of violence (especially in South Africa) limits their freedom and their movements. In its most radical form, displacement leads to statelessness – a condition of not belonging anywhere and, consequently, of lacking the conditions for freedom.

2.2 Statelessness

As homelessness illustrates the connection between freedom and having a private home, statelessness illustrates the connection between freedom, existence, and having a political home. While displaced persons may be a perennial feature of human history, statelessness is a modern condition. Before the formation of sovereign nation-states, borders were more porous. Even while territories and empires and kingdoms existed, the distinctions between ‘here’ and ‘there’, native and foreign, became blurred the further away one moved from the capital. There was also less stringent control of movement across borders (ironic, as we think of our time as the age of globalisation and cosmopolitanism). The displaced person in history is therefore not quite the same as the stateless person today. The distinction between ‘stateless person’ and ‘displaced person’ is an important one to make:

> The term "stateless" at least acknowledged the fact that these persons had lost the protection of their government and required international agreements for safeguarding their legal status. The postwar term "displaced persons" was invented during the war for the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence. Nonrecognition of statelessness always means repatriation, *i.e.*, deportation to a country of origin, which either refuses to recognize the prospective repatriate as a citizen, or, on the contrary, urgently wants him back for punishment. (Arendt 1973: 279).

Displacement, whether internal or to a foreign country, is severely traumatic and places the displaced person at a disadvantage and often in a dangerous position. Displacement

> …breaks up families, cuts social and cultural ties, terminates dependable employment relationships, disrupts educational opportunities, denies access to such vital necessities as food, shelter and medicine, and exposes innocent persons to such acts of violence as attacks on camps, disappearances and rape (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998: 1).

Yet statelessness is a more severe form of displacement, and a consequence of the whole earth being divided into sovereign territories. After WWI,

> Civil wars […] were followed by migrations of groups who, unlike their happier predecessors in the religious wars, were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their homeland *they remained homeless*, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth. (Arendt 1973: 267, emphasis mine)

Stateless people became "the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics" (Arendt 1973: 277) – this remains true to this day, with the number of refugees, displaced, and stateless persons growing daily. As these numbers grow, host nations become increasingly antagonistic and xenophobic toward foreigners, regardless of their legal status. Now, as then, "the only practical substitute for a non-existent homeland was an internment camp" (Arendt 1973: 284). What is worrying about our current situation, is that we have a clear example of what this line of action and reasoning generally follows, and of its potential end in the extermination camps. Yet despite that, states continue to denaturalise, detain, and deport vulnerable groups. Those

who are already without a home – personal and political – are often refused any other shelter. Even where refugees and stateless persons are taken in, loud voices are calling for their expulsion. Despite advances in universal human rights, despite transnational and international agencies that exist to protect these rights, stateless people are still extremely vulnerable. The danger to the well-being and lives of stateless people is clear, as evidenced by the recent atrocities against the stateless Rohingya people in Myanmar. For this reason, the right of every individual to exist in a place should be guaranteed. However, this does not yet guarantee the individual's freedom. The stateless have lost the protection of their state that comes from belonging. To guarantee their freedom and safety, to prevent them from falling through the cracks, some form of belonging should be guaranteed.

2.3 No personal address

Statelessness relates to the loss of one's political home, yet this is always necessarily accompanied by the loss of one's individual home. The value of the individual home is often underplayed, or even ignored, in political philosophy. For Cara Nine (2016: 43), a personal home is a necessity, for "[w]ithout a home, a person has no place to exercise many basic freedoms without first seeking permission". Where 'home' is discussed in philosophy, it is mostly within the context of international displacement. Even where the focus is on more localised displacement (Moore 2015, Stilz 2013), political philosophy often misses out on the harms of local displacement: "our prevailing philosophical theories miss a section of people who may be disproportionately harmed by local displacement: the vulnerable, (poor, feeble, oppressed), who are subject to moves, sometimes multiple moves, within the same community" (Nine 2017: 256). We will come to see that displacement, in any form, is harmful. We tend to focus on the big displacement in the lives of foreigners – from their home country to the host country – but they are also vulnerable to constant internal displacements.

In emphasising the importance of a personal home for freedom and justice, Nine echoes Waldron's (1991: 302) earlier statement that "a person who is not free to be in any place is not free to do anything; such a person is comprehensively unfree." For Arendt, having a private home is a precondition for participation in the political sphere. Indeed, the first step toward rendering people stateless, was to take their homes away, "and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world" (Arendt 1973: 295). The ideal of home sees it as a space into which one

can retire, recharge. Where one can be oneself, protected and safe. The loss of home is the loss of that protection, but also the loss of a place in which one is free to be oneself.

Of course, a home does not offer perfect protection. We can lose our homes, be attacked within our homes, or the home can be *the* site of conflict and abuse. For this reason, feminist theory is often sceptical of the notion of 'home', as a site of domestication and as a private, as opposed to a public, space. Even 'safe' homes can be criticised: "It was recognized that these safe and secure homes were in fact founded on repressions and exclusions, on defences and on the policing of borders" (Weir 2008: 5). Thus, even in a 'safe' home one can feel not at home upon realising the exclusions and oppressions that make your safety possible. These criticisms (see, for example, Honig 1994) are warranted. For many women and children (also men, however not as often), their homes are the arenas in which their families or partners sexually, physically, and/or emotionally abuse them. Moreover, traditional gender roles saw, and still sees, the domestic sphere as the woman's 'place'. For centuries, women have been kept in the bedrooms and kitchens, sometimes with force, and out of the 'public' sphere. In homes where women had more freedom, this freedom is often due to the domestic labour being taken over by domestic workers, nannies, etc. – people (mostly women) who are generally from vulnerable and historically oppressed groups. In South Africa, this role is increasingly being fulfilled by women from other African countries, documented and undocumented (see Nyamnjoh 2006, Chapters 3 and 5 for discussion). Furthermore, the means employed to keep the home safe can be problematic – think of racial targeting and stereotyping by police forces and in neighbourhood watch groups.

While broadly agreeing with the criticisms and recognising the necessity of criticising the traditional notion of 'home', I would argue that the notion of home is salvageable. Despite the countless examples of homes that are abusive, there are examples of homes that are not – homes that are supportive and in which inhabitants can flourish. And while private property necessarily excludes some while including others, one can think of justifiable reasons to exclude strangers. It is not clear that wanting privacy during intimate moments – sleeping, having sex, or taking a bath – would lead to unfair exclusion. The debate on the justifications of private property is beyond the scope of this study, but I think it would be useful to draw a distinction between privacy, and a space in which one can have it, and private property (the latter is not a prerequisite for the former). Privacy requires that we have some control over who can and cannot enter 'our' space. How big that space should be is also a debate for a different

study, but it stops well short of Downton Abbey. Privacy also does not mean the 'private sphere', but rather "the autonomy and control a person has to allow or not allow access to her person, information about her, and the things that are meaningfully associated with her person" (Young 1997: 162).

Iris Marion Young (1997) offers a feminist perspective of home, which recognises the historical oppression of women while identifying positive aspects of home that she argues we should reclaim. Instead of viewing home as solely a space of oppression, Young (1997: 161) argues that the notion of home can become a regulative ideal with which we can criticise society, based on the values of safety, individuation, privacy, and preservation. Instead of completely rejecting home, we should strive to extend the positive values of home to everyone who does not have a (positive) home (ibid. 159). Reducing home to a space of oppression and insecurity, while not offering an ideal of home, does not bring us very far. The 'outside' world is no less violent to women. Young's point is that without an ideal of home, we cannot criticise non-ideal homes – we measure our judgments of homes and society against this ideal. The importance of having a home are perhaps best illustrated by asking what it would be like to be homeless (as Waldron did), or to lose one's home by being displaced.

2.4 The harms of displacement

Cara Nine (2017) argues for the importance of home or attachment to a specific place, and the harm suffered with the loss of home or even just the change of home:

> Place attachment can provide an anchor in life and offer important benefits when we remain in those places to which we are attached. When these bonds are broken, the disruption generally brings about the fragmentation of routines, of relationships, and of expectations, and it upsets a sense of continuity that is ordinarily taken for granted. (ibid. 240)

Even when voluntarily moving to a new home, one can feel a sense of displacement and experience high levels of stress. For Nine (ibid. 241), the potential harm in moving to a new house lies in the burden in places on us cognitively, as she sees our homes as extensions of our minds. When she speaks of home, she refers generally to a permanent dwelling or structure; however, "[a] person need not have a fixed structure in order to form substantial cognitive attachment with certain places", and her argument therefore does not rely on the assumption of a fixed structure or even a familial home (ibid., n4). Nine points out that most philosophical

work on displacement focus on larger places (e.g. one's country), and not on smaller spaces like individual homes. Looking at small-scale displacement is important, because smaller-scale places like our homes or offices help us to function in specific ways, contributing especially to our cognitive functioning. Who we are – "our dispositions, choices, values, and beliefs: (ibid. 242) – relies on our cognitive functions. Here once again the link between our identities and specific places is emphasised. Nine (ibid.) focusses specifically on these cognitive functions: "(1) the ability to form memories, attitudes, beliefs, and emotional attachments; (2) the ability to evaluate, reflect, and revise values, attitudes, and beliefs; (3) the ability to perform actions consistent with one's commitments", functions that she sees as crucial for our ability to be rational agents.

Moving home, voluntarily or not, is a major and often traumatic life event that can have a profound impact on our lives. Most importantly, being displaced negatively impacts one's cognitive functioning, which in turn has several knock-on effects on one's life. To make her argument, Nine draws on the philosophy of mind, specifically the extended mind hypothesis according to which "mental functions are not confined inside the head" (Nine 2017: 243). Our homes and the objects within our homes (i.e. objects external to our minds and selves) enable us to perform our cognitive functions. We organise the objects in our home for optimal functioning by lightening our cognitive load. An example would be photo albums, whether physical or digital, which store our memories externally, outsourcing our cognitive function to an environment we have control over. External objects therefore become part of our cognitive processes, providing that they can be reliably invoked, that they are as trustworthy as memory, and they contain easily accessible information (ibid. 244).

Pen and paper, notebooks, and computers serve as examples. Yet Nine argues that one can also conceive of a space in this way – spaces and places as "complex objects of the extended mind" (ibid.). We construct our spaces in such a way that they support cognitive functioning, or even perform functions for us so that we don't have to. Homes are not the only examples of this – institutions and office spaces also function in this way. Nine refers to this as niche construction, a term borrowed from biology, which describes how "organisms modify their own environments in such a way that the changes become a necessary part of the explanation of the nature of the organism or population, and its adaptive success" (ibid.). The example given is that of beavers building dams and evolving in a way to suit this function.

When we set up our homes, we are busy with niche constructions. Cognitive functions are outsourced to objects and the ways in which those objects are organised in our homes. In making a home, we "[endow] things with living meaning, arranging them in space in order to facilitate the life activities of those to whom they belong, and preserving them, along with their meaning" (Young 1997: 151). It is in a home, organised in a specific way, where we as children first learn about following rules, and principles such as fairness which determine house rules: "The home can play a role in the development of a person's formative memories, beliefs, and values through the home's extended cognitive functions" (Nine 2017: 246).

What happens when we move or are displaced, is that the structures we put in place to increase our cognitive functioning, and the rules we set up to govern our interactions and actions, are disrupted. We separated from cognitive supports and required to use our energy to set up new ones. Vulnerable people, such as people living in poverty, are disproportionally harmed by displacement.[17] Where a non-vulnerable person experiences some harm during a move this is generally only temporary. Vulnerable people often move more often, making it harder for them to continuously create new niches and outsourced functions – their homes are less likely to be trustworthy spaces where they experience household security. Nine (ibid. 253-255) defines household security as:

i. Having reliable and extended access to the home and, when there is interference (e.g. theft), with recourse to the protection of the law
ii. Having control over the contents of one's home, including the management and use thereof
iii. Believing that the conditions of access and control exist
iv. Being free from domination from outsiders regarding the management of one's home

Taking these into account, we can see how foreigners, especially undocumented migrants, may feel insecure in their homes. People who own their homes have more security, but people living in poverty are often at the mercy of their landlords, with financial insecurity making the

[17] "Vulnerability is the diminished capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard. This diminished capacity is most often associated with poverty, but it can also arise when people are isolated, insecure, and defenceless in the face of risk, shock, or stress" (Nine 2017: 13). This definition indicates that immigrants, refugees, and stateless persons are especially vulnerable – very often living in relative poverty, isolated from the communities because they are new and strange and 'don't belong', and with very little security and stability, being at the mercy of immigration authorities and police forces.

situation more volatile. Immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, generally also rent instead of owning property. Undocumented immigrants' situation is even more insecure, as they cannot go to the police in case of theft or break-in, for fear of their undocumented status being found out and them being reported and deported. As a group, they are especially vulnerable to being victims of crime. Vulnerable groups' ability to control what goes on in their own homes can also be limited in several ways: (i) they may have to share their space with other families, as rent can be expensive. This may lead to conflict and instability, as each family organises a home in a different way. (ii) Landlords may include strict conditions about what tenants may or may not do, which also inhibits their ability to control and create their own niches. Lack of privacy and the increased risk of crime contributes to powerlessness and lack of control.

Nine (ibid. 254) states that the "perception of home security may be as important as home security itself". If a person does not believe that their home is secure, they are less likely to invest time and effort in niche creation, to the detriment of their cognitive functioning. As for the question of domination: vulnerable people, due to renting or due to sharing with other families, often have to live according to another's rules. We can be dominated in the homes we rent or live in, in direct or indirect ways:

> Domination can sabotage a home through legal measures, such as forbidding the display of religious symbols […] or controlling the features of built dwellings to suit only the dominant culture. Under domination, inhabitants may not feel that their home structures authentically reflect their desires and beliefs, and it would be difficult for them to rely on these structures as cognitive supports. People who are politically oppressed or otherwise socially vulnerable may be more susceptible to this kind of domination (ibid. 255).

Living without a home means living without the niches or cognitive crutches those with homes have. The homeless or displaced person must expend more energy – cognitive, physical, emotional – to perform the most basic of human tasks: seeking shelter, food, sleeping, ablutions. A person with a home, but without household security, is in a slightly better position than the homeless, yet because of the loss of their cognitive crutches they have to do more to achieve the same as a person with niches in place. This can leave very little energy or time for 'higher' purposes, for self-development or creative work or job-seeking or political participation.

Being displaced is also harmful because it can potentially be isolating. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the dangers of rootlessness and isolations on the part of the xenophobe. However, this discussion also applies to the foreigner or displaced person who has to find a new home. On the part of the xenophobe, anti-foreigner sentiments and actions may be a reaction against his or her own sense of alienation and isolation. Xenophobic discrimination, in turn, isolates and alienates the foreigner through civic ostracism and by making them feel insecure in the outside world. Loneliness is already a condition found among those who try to make a home in a new community, city, or country. It is

> closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness […] To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means no to belong to the world at all. Uprootedness can be the preliminary condition for superfluousness, just as isolation can (but must not) be the preliminary condition for loneliness. (Arendt 1973: 475).

In a way, feeling lonely after moving to a new city or neighbourhood is to be expected. It takes a while to adjust and to meet new people and build new relationships. Usually, people are eventually able to settle into new communities through their work, school, or church. While there are cultural differences between different cities in a country there are enough similarities for people who grew up in the one, to easily make friends in the other. There is some shared history – similar experiences at school, living through the same political and historical events, growing up watching the same television shows, etc. – that would enable one to make connections. Even under these circumstances, forming new relationships can be hard, but it is nowhere near as hard as settling into a community in a new country. Not only is there a bigger 'gap' between people due to national and cultural differences, but immigrants no longer have their support networks close at hand. Distance and financial constraints make it harder to go back home to visit (if this is possible at all – it is difficult for undocumented immigrants and not possible for refugees). Technology makes life easier for immigrants – instant communication is possible and accessible (here once again refugees are at a disadvantage: conditions in their home countries can be such that it is not easy to get in touch with people, e.g. during a war). But social media and online communication cannot be substitutes for human contact. Immigrants report feeling that they must start from scratch in the new country, accompanied by a sense of loss, not only material, but also in terms of their life achievements and personal relationships (Ogunsiji *et al.* 2012: 281).

These factors will negatively impact one's ability to work productively; one's relationships with others (both inside and outside the home) will suffer, and one will find it harder to complete basic tasks than before the displacement. This is a problem for any person who moves to a new house, but it provides an extra problem for the politically displaced, who not only have to build new homes and new cognitive coping mechanisms, but who have to try to fit into the larger, political community (whether a local community or a nation or a state). If one thinks of what is expected of immigrants (whatever their legal status), the scale of the problem becomes clear. In popular discourse and in the kinds of visas one can apply for (e.g. scarce skills), there is a strong narrative of: *immigrants are welcome if they are useful*. This not only from those who are against immigration (and therefore dub all immigrants as lazy and a net drain on citizens' resources), but also from those in favour of immigration. One is almost guaranteed to see an "Einstein was an immigrant" poster at any pro-immigrant event or march. Immigrants are expected to prove their worth. However, if their cognitive (and emotional) functioning is negatively affected by the displacement, their ability to 'prove their worth' is affected.

Having 'worth' or being 'useful' is often used, by some immigrants and people who are pro-immigration, as a justification of immigrants' presence in a country, or an argument for 'letting them in'. The danger of this argument, however, is that it instrumentalises humans; only those who have worth (i.e. can contribute in some meaningful way) to society, are worthy of being homed, of having a place in which to exist. In her discussion on antisemitism in Europe, Arendt (1973) discusses the role that the idea of the 'exceptional Jew' or genius played in the assimilation of the European Jewry:

> Assimilation, in the sense of acceptance by non-Jewish society, was granted them only as long as they were clearly distinguished exceptions from the Jewish masses even though they still shared the same restricted and humiliating political conditions […] exceptional Jews, knew quite well that it was this ambiguity – that they were Jews and yet presumably not *like* Jews – which opened the doors of society to them. (ibid. 56)

Strangers become palatable when they show signs of genius, of being exceptional, yet even then their acceptance is only conditional. Even as the privileges of the exceptional Jews waned, as antisemitism gained political strength and influence, the idea of the 'special' Jew, the Jew who was not like a Jew, lived on. It was popularly believed that "a famous Jew had more right

to stay alive than an ordinary one" (Arendt 2006: 132). For the more liberal eighteenth century Europeans, the acceptance of the exceptional Jew served as proof that "all men are human" and a "demonstration of the dignity of man" (Arendt 1973: 57). It was the fact that despite and while still being Jews, they could be 'like Europeans', that granted them social acceptance.

The consequences of *not* being a genius, of not being a 'good' or 'first-rate' Jew ranged from ostracism and discrimination (as a best-case scenario) to, of course, extermination in the camps. But this function of being a 'genius' or 'exceptional' did not, and does not, only apply to Jews in Europe during that time. Arendt (ibid. 287) discusses the genius in relation to statelessness. Stateless people lack a home (especially in the political, or group-home sense), and are therefore often "without the right to residence and without the right to work" (ibid. 286) wherever they may find themselves. Statelessness, like homelessness, is a condition of invisibility – it was with reference to the stateless Jews during WWII that Arendt coined the term "holes of oblivion". Those who are already unseen can disappear without anyone realising. Nine perhaps does not have such extremes in mind when she warns of the cognitive harm of displacement, yet we should not underestimate the negative effect of reduced cognitive functioning, caused by stress and trauma, can have on a person's ability to function and act in the world.

Displacement is therefore harmful because it disconnects us from our various networks – social, familial, professional, but also from the network of cognitive aids we set up in our homes and offices through niche creation. All of these contribute to feelings of insecurity, loneliness, reduced cognitive functioning, fatigue, stress, and even trauma. Foreigners are especially vulnerable in this regard, as they find it harder to establish new networks and, given their political vulnerability, to find a sense of security inside and outside the home. The ordinary feelings and harms that come with displacement are exacerbated by a political climate in which foreigners are hated, feared, blamed, and harmed. A world in which there is no room for xenophobia must therefore be a world in which there is room for everyone on every level: in public and in private, in local communities and in the country at large.

Conclusion

In earlier chapters, I identified xenophobia as a response to apprehensions about belonging. The aim of Chapter 3 was to show the relation between belonging and home, and xenophobia and its effects on foreigners. The chapter was divided into two parts, one considering belonging

from the perspective of the xenophobe (i.e. apprehension of belonging as a cause of xenophobia) and the other belonging from the perspective of the victim of xenophobic discrimination (i.e. the dangers of displacement and not finding a home). I argue that a sense of belonging and specifically having and specifically having a *place* where one belongs is crucial for human existence and freedom.

In Section 1, I argued that xenophobia is a response to a feeling of rootlessness, not belonging, and isolation on the part of the xenophobe. I discussed the idea of 'place' and how the place we are from – i.e. our home – has a profound impact on our sense of self and self-identity. I consider the dangers of not belonging, or feeling as if one belongs, with reference to Arendt's writing on rootlessness, showing how those who feel out of place seek belonging in nationalist and other exclusionary movements – one's own belonging at the cost of someone else's. Nationalism, I argued, provides the lonely individual with a false home. The nation is an imagined community (Anderson), imagined because we feel ourselves to be related in a deep, important sense to people we do not know but who is part of this 'home'. Nationalism is also a project of homogenisation, and for this reason it is always accompanied by xenophobia – by a fear of those who are other or different. Foreigners threaten the fragile belonging the nationalist or xenophobe feels, and for this they are hated.

Section 2 considered what belonging, or rather the lack thereof, means for the foreigner. Here my focus was specifically on the harms of not having a secure home or a place in which one can freely exist. These harms are the result of xenophobia but are important to take note of for they provide an imperative for the fight against xenophobia. I argued that having a place in the world is intimately connected with our ability to exist freely, and that being without a place is therefore a condition of comprehensive unfreedom. We see this in the ways in which homeless individuals' freedoms are curtailed, but I showed how the situation of the homeless is analogous to that of the foreigner, for the latter is also vulnerable to external forces preventing them from accessing places where they can exist freely. I then linked this discussion to Arendt's work on statelessness, the most radical form of homelessness or place-lessness and showed how the precarious position of the stateless makes erasure and extermination possible. This is not only relevant to discussions on genocide or ethnic cleansing, but it also pertains to xenophobic violence, as the xenophobe can act with impunity precisely because the foreigner is unprotected.

In the final two subsections, I narrowed my focus to the question of having a personal home, and showed how having a home protects one, but more importantly how being displaced from one's home is deeply harmful. Having a home is important for it provides us with a place in which we can exercise our autonomy, and as Nine argued it also serves as an extension of our cognitive functions through niche creation. We organise our homes in specific ways to make living and functioning easier, and to ease our cognitive load. The displaced person, in losing their homes, loses this. If they are unable to find a new home, they have to put in more energy, cognitive and emotional, to perform basic functions. I showed how this places an unfair burden on foreigners, especially as their belonging in a new country is often conditional upon them being able to prove their worth and show that they can contribute to their communities.

One can see why, especially in conditions of scarcity or marginality, xenophobia can arise out of the fear of being displaced or replaced. Being hospitable may be difficult when conditions are cramped and there's not much to share. For many xenophobes, the solution would be to 'send them back to where they came from'. They may not belong *here*, but they do belong *somewhere*. However, xenophobic attitudes can be more extreme, where the question is not one of belonging in a specific place, but one of belonging in the world at all. In this chapter, we have seen what the dangers of not belonging are – either seeking belonging in false homes or having one's very existence threatened. Our sense of belonging determines how we see the world and act in it, and it also determines how others see us. Belonging is therefore a fundamental part of our identities. In Chapter 4 I therefore turn to the question of identity and defend a narrative approach to identity. According to this approach, our identities are the products of the stories we tell about ourselves, and of the ways in which we attempt to make sense of the world and give meaning to our experiences. Part of this is attaching specific meanings to the places we find ourselves in, to our homes, to the groups we belong to, and to the strangers we encounter.

Chapter 4: Narrative Identity

Introduction

In Chapter 3, I argued that a sense of belonging is crucial for human flourishing and, conversely, that being or feeling displaced contributes to feelings of alienation, which fuel the xenophobe's hatred on the one hand, while enhancing the precarity of the potential victims of xenophobia. How we think about place and home in general and the specific places we inhabit has a deep impact on our identities, both individually and collectively. Very often, in response to a question about our lives, we start by saying where we come from. Place matters in identity formation, as well as in identity recognition. One's place of origin, or where one's home is situated, often serves as shorthand for identity when encountering strangers. The connection between self and place, identity and home, is reinforced with narratives of place. We come to know people from different parts of the world in part through stories we hear about those parts (leaving aside, for the moment, the issue of whether those stories are truly representative of their lives), and we tell our own biographical narratives with reference to the places where we grew up, the places we visited that had a profound impact on us, and the places where we live.

Different places can of course mean different things to different people. Xenophobia is, in one sense, believing that people from one's own place (nation or country) are better than people from other places – that South Africans are better than Congolese, for example. Accompanying this belief is a set of assumptions we have about other places and people who come from there. In using place as a shorthand for identity, we tend to stereotype, relying on biases and prejudices and half-remembered facts. Our connection with places changes over time, lessening or strengthening the place's impact on our sense of self-identity. Just as our sense of belonging, and our situatedness, can change, so can our identities linked to place, remaining fluid and open to interpretation (and, consequently, misunderstanding):

> Any place, named or unnamed, has multiple meanings and associations attached to it, and, potentially, multiple identities, for example, because of the activities associated with it, its social history and the personal experience of a particular [person]. (Taylor 2010: 10)

Our assumptions, beliefs, prejudices, and stereotypes about other places and other people are expressed and shared through stories. The stories we tell about significant places forms part of

a broader narrative of self, a narrative that illuminates and shapes our personal and collective identities. The importance of narratives in fashioning individual and collective lives has long been a distinct research focus in philosophy. Such narratives can comprise stories (e.g. in novels or biographies), but also artworks, images, public discourse, propaganda, political speeches and codified law. Storytelling is seen as something inherently human, a way in which we make sense of the world, give meaning, and understand our lives, selves, and also others. Mark Rowlands (2008: 2), on considering what it means to be human (as a species), writes: "our uniqueness lies simply in the fact that we tell these stories [distinguishing us from other animals] – and, what's more, we can actually get ourselves to believe them. If I wanted a one-sentence definition of human beings, this would do: humans are the animals that believe the stories they tell about themselves." Connelly and Clandinin (1990: 2) understand human beings as "storytelling organisms who, individually and socially, live storied lives", and stories are therefore the tools by which we interpret and characterise our experiences and phenomena in the world.

In this chapter I shift my focus from understanding and explaining xenophobia, to asking how our identities and the exclusionary narratives upon which we build our identities contribute to creating and upholding the xenophobic life-world. In the discussion on prejudice in Chapter 2, we saw how prejudice is the result of the process of identity formation (individual identities) and socialisation (i.e. individuals finding belonging in groups). Above, I have shown how our identities are influenced by the places we live in and the people we encounter, including the groups we belong to. This chapter will show how such identities are created through a process of narration, and how the meaning we attach to belonging to specific identity groupings is also the product of our narratives. This offers us hope, for while our narratives are often exclusionary, the sharing of narratives and stories can also create connections between people.

This chapter will be divided into two sections. In the first, I distinguish between 'narrative' and 'story', arguing that narratives are the stories we tell with the intention of distilling themes, giving meaning, and illuminating consequences. Narratives are therefore the tools with which we organise our experiences and our lives (Section 1.1). Section 1.2 briefly considers other prominent approaches to identity – the psychological, the biological – and I argue that the narrative approach better explains how identities take shape and, on a meta-level, allows us to see that theories of identity are themselves identity-forming narratives. I then argue for a specific narrative theory of identity, based on Marya Schechtman's (2007, 2012) narrative self-

constitution view. Ultimately, I argue that our identity-forming narratives, on a very basic level, are our answers to the question, 'Who are you?'. In Section 1.3, I look at the connection between our understanding of identity and the question of personhood. I show how an understanding of personhood can be exclusionary, with reference to traditional Western and traditional African conceptions of personhood. I argue that both personhood and narrative identities are fundamentally communal and, therefore, have political implications. The final subsection therefore deals specifically with political narratives. Such narratives include any narrative that appear in public forums, but also those that shape our understanding of our group's identity, and that influence our interactions with others. I show how our identities are shaped not only by our own narrative constructions, but also by the kinds of political narratives we accept and incorporate into our sense of self. There is a constant interplay between our individual and group-identities, and the latter are products of both our individual and shared narratives.

In Section 2 I turn to the criticisms of the narrative theory of identity. This is necessary to test the validity of my theory, but more importantly the criticisms highlight the challenges facing not only the theory, but also my broader project of countering xenophobia by rethinking our identities and retelling the narratives that shape them. Section 2.1 focusses specifically on Strawson's (2004, 2015) critique that narrative identity theories make unfounded claims to universality, and that many people do not think of their lives or their identities in terms of narrative. Strawson's critique engages with Schechtman's theory, therefore I offer a response to him here. Ultimately, I argue that his critique hits the mark when directed at strong narrative views, but that he is wrong in his belief that identities cannot be narrative in a weaker sense. I argue that, on a very basic level, everyone narrates their identity when asked 'Who are you?', and indeed that Strawson does this himself. This weak sense of narrative identity is sufficient for my purposes.

I also consider the limited potential of storytelling in bringing about societal change in Section 2.2, and the problem of false narratives in Section 2.3, criticisms to which I respond more fully in Chapter 5. Both these criticisms affirm the role that narratives play in our understanding, but they also show us how narratives can fail to achieve the ends I suggest they can – that of helping us create a less xenophobic world. That this is necessary was shown by my discussions of the harms of xenophobia in preceding chapters. The final two criticisms therefore do not go against

the narrative view, but alert us to the limitations of this view and task us with the project of meeting and overcoming those limitations. This is the aim of Chapter 5.

1. Stories, narratives, and identities

1.1 Defining 'narrative'

In our everyday language, we tend to speak of 'stories' and 'storytelling' to refer to accounts we give of events. In academic literature, the word 'narrative' is preferred, although it is often used interchangeably with 'story' (as I do below). If there is a distinction to be drawn, it is a very fine one. Stories and narratives share similar structures, and if there is a difference it lies in the significance we attach to the content. Both attempt to make sense of complex situations by stringing together events, not only in order to say what happened, but also how significant it is (Barwell 2009: 49). Yet sometimes we use the word 'story' to refer to a simple retelling of daily events with no other purpose than to inform, with no special significance or underlying meaning being communicated. However, the way in which I use 'story' and 'narrative' in this study refers to more than a simple listing of chronological events. I take narrative to refer to stories constructed in such a way that they attempt to make sense of human actions, experiences, and events. Narratives are told through a wide variety of mediums – oral storytelling, writing, film and photography, journalism – and permeate all levels of life. Generally, narratives are taken to be intentional: the storyteller crafting a narrative, a person reflecting on their past and making sense of if through narrative. As we will come to see, however, our participation in meta-narratives through the stories we tell are not necessarily intentional or even conscious. This specifically relates to the narrative aspect of our identities and the political narratives. A person may, for example, exclaim that 'a foreigner took my job!' without being aware that such a claim is part of broader anti-foreigner narratives, with implications that go further than their specific context.

Narrative in the context of this study should also be understood as a tool with which we make sense of our past and create a framework for the future. Narratives can do this precisely because they do not simply relay events but connect events and experiences with the specific intention of finding meaning. Stephanie Taylor (2010: 36) defines narrative as "a construction of sequence or consequence [which] therefore encompasses temporal references (including, minimally, 'then', 'after that' and so on) and the logic of cause-and-effect relationships ('so', 'because')." 'Consequence' can be interpreted in two ways here – as referring to causality (X

is the consequence of Y), but also as indicating importance or significance. Narratives do not only tell us what happened, but also why, and why this is important.

Because narratives direct our attention to what is supposed to have significance, a narrative approach to identity is an attempt to interpret, understand, and give meaning to our lives. We do this by identifying themes in our life-story through identifying similarities, patterns, and recurrences. In doing this, we come to understand ourselves as specific kinds of people – we may look at all our past failures, and conclude that we are fundamentally lazy, or unlucky, or victimised. Narratives are also, according to Taylor (2010: 36) social, "because the talk in which they appear draws on commonly held, already existing discursive resources […] out of which we construct what we say and also, because talk is a form of social action". Our individual narratives fit into, draw from, and interact with the narratives of those around us – individuals and institutions.

Jerome Bruner (1990) distinguishes between several conceptualisations of narrative. Firstly, he refers to narratives as constituents of culture. As people tell stories and narratives, these narratives accumulate, giving rise to a tradition, history, and culture. This accumulation of narratives happens not only on a large scale (i.e. peoples, or cultural groupings), but also within family units, companies, or smaller communities. Cultures use narratives normatively, to indicate what is acceptable and what is abnormal in that culture – Bruner calls such narratives canonical. Institutional narratives of the kind I will discuss later fall under this category, as do many of our political narratives. Secondly, Bruner understands narrative as local, contingent, and in the moment. Such narratives are intended to "find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural pattern" (ibid. 49-50). Where canonical narratives are normative, localised narratives are informative, explanatory, and justificatory when there is a deviation from the canonical narrative. Thirdly, Bruner also understands narrative as a means by which we can negotiate, interpret and reinterpret, norms. 'Narrative' in this final understanding refers to actual talking, or telling, relying on "lexical and grammatical usages that highlight subjective states, attenuating circumstances, alternative possibilities" (ibid. 59). To my mind, there seems to be a link between these latter two conceptualisations, if we understand narrative as a tool with which we can bring about societal change (more on this in Chapter 5). Through negotiating and reinterpreting norms, we can tell narratives that provide us with an alternative to canonical narratives – deviations that are

justified when the canonical narrative is, for example, exclusionary (e.g. explicitly xenophobic laws).

Finally, as hinted at above, narratives are to be understood as tools with which we organise our personal experiences and lives. Each person tells multiple narratives, as they interpret their life and experience in a multitude of ways. These narratives Bruner calls 'self-accountings', told by individuals, but constrained by the greater narratives of culture and family culture (meaning that individuals can't just make things up). Such self-accountings have the function of situating us in a broader community, or web of others: "The ultimate function of autobiography is self-location […] Through it, we identify with a family, a community, and indirectly with the broader culture" (Bruner & Weisser 1991: 133).

Such narrative self-accountings constitute our personal or individual identities, an idea developed in the narrative theory of identity. Note here the communal aspect of narratives. Narratives need a narrator, as well as an audience. This will become important later on in this chapter. Yet we do not share all our self-accountings with the world. We also try to make sense of our lives, experiences, expectations, and actions through introspection (or by having a debate with an imagined other in front of the mirror!). Even when we do not share our introspective narratives with other people, such narratives have a narrator and an audience. We can think of our consciences in this sense – audiences to our narratives or judgments about our lives, and in turn judges of such narratives' validity. Speaking of 'conscience', however, raises further questions we cannot consider here. Instead, I propose we think of our internal narratives as (ideally) having audiences in two senses. From personal experience (and I know of other people who share this experience), my 'self-accountings' often take the form of conversations with imagined others, usually the person I feel accountable to (e.g. if I wronged a friend in some way and wonder how I will rectify the situation). In a sense, we make others present in our minds, and we anticipate how they will respond or judge us. Of course, they may respond differently in real life, but that is not the point. The point is that even in our internal self-accounting narratives we imagine an audience, and the 'presence' of that audience influences what we narrate. In Chapter 5 I consider Hannah Arendt's theory of judgment and its relation to storytelling, which also echoes this idea that we make others present in our minds when judging.

Arendt (1973) provides us with another way to think of our introspective thoughts having an audience. At the end of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt makes a crucial distinction between the lonely man and the solitary man. Loneliness is dangerous, but solitude is crucial, for only in solitude can we truly think. Loneliness is a condition we can feel while we are among people, but it is a condition that isolates us from those around us, making it impossible to establish contact. Solitude, on the other hand, refers to being alone in the sense of being by oneself, and it is a place in which a person "can be together with himself" and where people have the capacity of "talking to themselves" (ibid. 476). It is here where Arendt brings in the 'audience' to our private thoughts:

> I am "by myself," together with myself, and therefore two-in-one, whereas in loneliness I am actually one, deserted by all others. All thinking, strictly speaking, is done in solitude and is a dialogue between me and myself; but this dialogue of the two-in-one does not lose contact with the world of my fellow-men because they are represented in the self with whom I lead the dialogue of thought. (ibid.)

Of course, the lonely person also has this dialogue with him- or herself. Solitude is crucial for us to come to understand ourselves, but the 'solitary man' that Arendt contrasts with the 'lonely man' never remains by himself – eventually, the solitary person joins others again: "The problem of solitude is that this two-in-one needs the others in order to become one again: one unchangeable individual whose identity can never be mistaken for that of any other" (ibid.). Our narrative self-accountings can only become identities when confirmed by others: "For the confirmation of my identity I depend entirely upon other people" (ibid.). We trust our thoughts, our inner dialogues, when our conclusions are confirmed by other people. The lonely man cannot find this confirmation, and therefore also loses trust in his inner dialogue – even one's own self becomes unreliable. When Arendt wrote about loneliness and solitude, she had not yet developed her theory of judgment, nor had she recognised the link between thoughtlessness and evil (or what she calls the 'banality of evil').

What we should take from this: narratives, no matter what shape they take or where (if!) they are told, are of necessity social and, because this implies interactions between people, narratives pertain to the political. The narratives we construct and tell are also intimately connected to who we think we are, as individuals and groups. Narratives therefore shape our identities, as we will see in the next section, and by doing so they also situate us in place and in relation to others. How we define ourselves as groups and individuals have a profound

impact on how we think about belonging and who belongs, and consequently on who we include and exclude. In Chapter 2 we saw how identity formation, both on an individual level and through being socialised into a group, contributes to prejudice and outgroup discrimination. Prejudicial beliefs and stereotypes are shared through the narratives we share about ourselves and others. How we think about identity formation and about our particular identities therefore has a determining impact on how xenophobic we are.

1.2 'Who are you?': identities as narratives

To understand how group and individual identities enable xenophobia through the kinds of narratives they are based on and distribute, we must first ask what it means to see identity as narrative. In what follows, I will briefly consider the question of identity, and argue that the narrative approach to identity best captures how identities are formed and how our identities impact our interactions. Because the question of identity is mostly framed in terms of individual identity, I will focus on the individual first and then extrapolate to group identities.

Simply put, the question of our identities asks how we can meaningfully claim an identity over time. To say that I have an identity over time is to say that I am the same person over time. How can I meaningfully speak of myself (or my Self) as a child, and myself as an adult, as being the same self? *Are* those two people the same person – do they share an identity? Most people would, without giving it a second thought, answer in the affirmative. We think of ourselves as existing over time, as being the same person even as we change. The cells in our bodies may be replaced, our personalities may alter, we may even come to understand ourselves in a radically different way, but for the most part we feel some connection to our childhood selves (not always – we will return to this below). We generally have some sense of *who we are*, as individuals – some sense of identity. It is our sense of our own identity that links past selves to present and future selves. Our understanding of the process of identity formation explains the nature of the link between past, present, and future selves.

Identity is also about ownership. To say, '*This* is my identity', is to say that I claim ownership over the specific contents of that identity – the personality traits, memories, prejudices, opinions, belief systems, interests, hopes, and passions. How we organise those contents, what we give priority to, differs from person to person. For some, their sense of personal identity may be shaped primarily by their vocation, while for others it is what they do outside of the workplace that defines them. Some attach great importance to the culture or religion they were

brought up in, while others do not. The same goes for national identity. For you, the most important aspect of your identity may be that you are South African, while for me it is that I am a reader, or a dog-lover. Because we build our identities from these blocks – interests, memories, attachments to larger groups – our identities can also change over time, as our positions in life and understanding of life changes. Hence the problem of identity: does it make sense to speak of sameness, if what we call our 'identities' can change? If *we* change? And how does reidentification work – identifying both my younger and older self, as the same person?

There are various theories that attempt to answer this question – the psychological view of personal identity, the biological, and anticriterialism, to name a few (Olson 2003). An extensive discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this study. Briefly:

The psychological view: Also called the psychological-continuity view (see Parfit 1971). An identity persists because mental features are inherited from a past self, and the future self will inherit the same features. Mental features are things like memories, beliefs, and rational thought. The importance given to memory in this view limits it, as we so easily forget things. I may remember an important event from my childhood *now* but forget it in a few years' time. Present and past me will share an identity, but future me will not share an identity with past me because the memory is not shared. The view therefore does not guarantee continuity. The view also assumes a distinction between the psychological and the biological (i.e. I would still be me, if my memories and mental processes are somehow uploaded to a computer or another body). It is unclear that this distinction exists, as debates in the philosophy of mind show.

The biological view: quite simply, the past, present, and future self is the same (identical) because it has the same biological body. The problem with this view is related to the ones identified in the previous view: (a) can we so easily distinguish between mind and body? And assuming that we can, (b) imagine if one's mind is uploaded to a computer, and the body remains behind. According to this view, the body would remain the same, or retain the identity. The body would be the person. Intuitively, this seems unconvincing. We do not think of bodies as being the whole of the person (otherwise we would think differently about death).

Anticriterialism: Unlike the previous two views, anticriterialism does not offer necessary and sufficient conditions for identity. Inherited mental features and biological continuity can be evidence that an identity exists, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. It is unclear,

however, how we can meaningfully speak of identity, or answer the question of identity, without some kind of criteria.

The most prevalent contemporary explanation for personal identity, which also dominates popular understandings of identity, is the theory of narrative identity. This theory offers a more convincing answer to the question of identity over time, or the problem of reidentification, than the other theories. The reasons are as follows:

i. Our understanding of our own identity is taken from the building blocks of identity – the things that we choose to represent us, or that we take ownership of. *How* we understand identity formation (i.e. which theory explaining identity we find convincing) will necessarily shape how we perceive our own identities. The theories themselves then become building blocks to identity (one has the identity of someone who takes a biological view of identity, just as one may have a Christian identity because one believes in the Gospels, or a geeky identity because one is passionate about video games).
ii. The same holds, of course, for people who understand identity narratively (this understanding itself is part of the content of their identity). However, narrative identity works on a different level as well. It does not matter which theory of personal identity one ascribes to. When asked about your identity (i.e. when asked 'Who are you?), you will answer by telling a story about your life or your 'self'. Similarly, when asked how you understand identity, whatever you answer will be answered narratively. (Philosophical arguments are also narratives, in the sense that they seek to explain or account for existence and things we encounter in the world.) One's theoretical understanding of identity becomes a narrative thread in the greater narrative of one's life. In fact, some theorists rely on the narrative view to supplement the psychological view, in an attempt to make up for the latter's shortcomings (see, for example, Slors 1998, 2001).

A narrative understanding of identity also provides us with a framework within which we can make sense of collective identities. Many of the building blocks of our personal identities are linked to collective identities – nationality, membership to a choir or orchestra, cultural and religious groups, one's gender or sexual orientation. Our identities are not only determined by ourselves, but also by the groups we are included in or excluded from (whether by our own

design or not). How much importance we attach to those exclusions and inclusions is up to us. Amartya Sen (2006: 23) warns of the danger of constructing our whole identity based on a singular affiliation, especially singular affiliation to culture, nation, or religion. Instead, we should (and, in fact, generally do) have multifaceted identities, because we belong to many different groups. The problem Sen identifies with identity, is that we often reduce individual identities to a single marker of identity that encompasses and is supposed to define the individual. Very often, these identities are imposed. We do not get to choose which nation or cultural group we are born into, and our parents or caretakers decide in which religion to raise us in (or not). When we choose to accept such an identity as our defining identity, Sen (2006: 9) argues, it may lead to exclusionary practices and violence. Our given identities should be questioned, and we should be exposed to different systems of identification through exposure to other people with different identities.

In Chapter 2 I suggested that, despite our tendency to hunker down when confronted by strangers, positive contact can have the opposite effect. Exposure to other people, cultures, and identities can lower prejudice by learning more about the outgroup, generating affective ties, and by encouraging us to reappraise the ingroup (see Pettigrew 1998: 70-72). Our understanding of our own identity is often formed in part by our understanding that we belong to *this* group instead of *that* group, with the accompanying assumptions about superiority and inferiority. In Chapter 1, I referred to the need for a stranger in order to define the self. Learning about and interacting with other groups will therefore also teach us something about ourselves, and more than just that we may have been wrong in our beliefs and assumptions. We may come to understand ourselves, as individuals and as groups, in a new way:

> Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about ingroups as well as outgroups. Ingroup norms and customs turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social world. This new perspective can reshape your view of your ingroup and lead to a less provincial view of outgroups in general ("deprovincialization"). (Pettigrew 1998: 72)

The affective ties that can result from positive contact can also help us to value other aspects of our identity more, by connecting with someone from a different culture or religion on the basis of a shared hobby or interests. This creates new possibilities for connection and loyalty that are not based on the kind of prepolitical factors that contribute to xenophobic nationalism (belonging related to blood, land, origin) we saw in Chapter 3, but that nonetheless can create

a meaningful sense of belonging. For Sen, such ties and alternative identity-groups provide a powerful antidote to violent and exclusionary identities. We come to know others and are able to establish such affective ties not only through exposure, but through learning more about each other through the stories we tell about ourselves.

A person may, of course, still decide to identify themselves in relation to their race, nationality, religion, etc., despite being exposed to difference. And these identifications need not necessarily be violent and/or xenophobic (there are, for example, many ways to be Christian, or Muslim, or Jewish). Whether our chosen identity is exclusionary and violent is determined by how we think about identity, in general, and what the content of our specific identity is. If we think of identity as something that is naturally given (as nationalists do), or as all-encompassing, then in all likelihood our identities will be exclusionary and close us off to others with different identities (e.g. those not belonging to the nation). Regarding the content of identity: a religious person, for example, adheres to a specific doctrine, which determines how they understand their religion and how they act on the basis of that. Different interpretations of a single religion may be exclusionary and violent (e.g. the religious right in America) or less so (e.g. those who take the Christian doctrine of love and forgiveness seriously). Communities may be more or less hospitable, have permeable or solid borders. Whatever the case may be, it seems that our identities are largely shaped by our thinking on identity or, to put it simply, by the narrative of identity we find convincing. The antidote to identities that tend to encourage exclusionary and even violent practices, would be to start telling a different narrative of such identities – to offer an alternative view of a specific identity, to which the person who identifies may not have been previously exposed. This is not a perfect solution – some will still choose exclusion and violence. I return to the limits of narrative and narrative identity below, but for now I will simply say: perfection is an unreachable goal.

To understand what is meant by ‘narrative identity’, three questions should be answered: “(1) What counts as a life narrative? (2) What counts as *having* a narrative? and (3) What are the practical implications of having (or failing to have) a narrative?” (Schechtman 2007: 159). The answers given to these questions by different theories of narrative identity lie on a spectrum: weak, middle-range, and strong narrative views. In answer to the first question, weak narrative views define a ‘life narrative’ as “a sequential listing of the event in one’s history” (Schechtman 2007: 159). Police reports, meeting minutes, or telling one’s partner what your plans for the day are, would fall in this category. Middle-range views expect narratives to do a bit more work

– they do not only list events, but also explain the relations between the events. Such narratives look at causes and effects, consequences, reasons, meaning. Strong narrative views expect life-stories to be like "an account of a life that approximates as much as possible a story created by a gifted author and edited by a talented editor" (Schechtman 2007: 160). Such narratives have a unifying theme and direction.

In answer to the second question, weak views hold that you *have* a narrative if that narrative impacts your experiences in some way, whether consciously or not. The middle view sees life-narratives as conscious, and something that the person can explicitly narrate when asked. For those holding the strong view, "in order to have a narrative in the relevant sense a person must actively and consciously undertake to understand and live her life in narrative form" (Schechtman 2007: 160). As for the practical implications, weak views hold that one can only function if one has a narrative (as understood above); the middle view requires a narrative for interaction to be possible (engaging in complex activities, especially with others). One cannot have higher order capacities, such as reasoning or autonomy, without a life-narrative. Interaction requires that we account for ourselves in some way to others – that we are able to answer questions about ourselves when asked. Finally, strong views hold that one's life can only be meaningful if one has a life-narrative (Schechtman 2007: 160).

In my view, the strongest views ask too much. If a requirement for identity, or indeed personhood, is that we actively construct our lives as narratives and 'live narratively', most people on earth would fall short of having an identity, or a meaningful life. This is clearly not desirable from a moral perspective (more on this later), nor realistic. Most of our time is taken up by mundane tasks and repetitive actions and interactions. It is, I suppose, possible for an individual to approach laundry narratively, but it is also improbable that many people will do so. The strong views seem to apply more to Disney heroines and characters in musicals than to the average person. The weaker theses may do too little and end up providing us with mere trivialities about people's everyday lives. However, as we will see below, Schechtman later adapted her middle-range view to make room for a weaker narrative view. This weaker view is only one aspect of her ultimate theory, but for reasons I will discuss later in the chapter it is sufficient for our understanding of the functioning of narratives in a political or group-identity context. However, regarding individual narratives the mid-range views seem the most sensible, as they seem to be able to explain reality (i.e. the way most people experience identity and self)

better than the alternatives. Because Schechtman elucidates this view clearly, and the main criticisms engage with her view, I will focus on her theory of narrative identity.

Schechtman (1996, 2012) develops what she calls the *narrative self-constitution view*, according to which "we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a narrative self-conception according to which we experience and organize our lives" (Schechtman 2012: 162). She sees this process as automatic and a result of our socialisation. As we grow up, we come to see ourselves as continuing individuals within society. Our actions and experiences are interpreted as instances that form part of a larger and ongoing life-story, in which the present is influenced and shaped by both the past and future. Our identities are constituted by our life-stories, by the recognition that the past, present, and future, belongs to the same person. Charles Taylor (1989) emphasises the importance of this link between past, present, and future in identity – we can only know who we are, if we know where we come from and we come to know this through narrative: "I understand my present action in the form of an "and then"" (ibid. 47). This 'and then' can be understood as both past- and future orientated, i.e. 'I did this and then ended up here' and '…and then I will…'. These 'and thens' link past, present, and future me and provide continuity for my identity.

With 'narrative', Schechtman means more than a chronological telling of events (which would be enough for the weaker views), but she does not understand identity-constituting narratives as requiring any kind of explicit unifying theme, quest, arc, or take the shape of any literary genre. One's narrative cannot be merely sub-personal (i.e. going on in the background), but it need not be as active and conscious a project as the strong view requires. The middle view requires that we tell stories, but we need not think of them as stories, narratives, or consciously construct them in a specific way. This we do, every day, in response to questions from those around us.

Schechtman (2012: 163) places two constraints on this development of a narrative identity: the *reality constraint* and the *articulation constraint*. The reality constraint "requires that a person's narrative conform to what we are generally accepted to know about the basic character of reality and about the nature of persons" (Schechtman 2012: 163). This would include such things as how old a person can realistically say they are (i.e. if a person claims to be a thousand years old, we would become suspicious), as well as physical constraints (a person cannot be at two places at once; people cannot fly or live underwater, etc.). We can think of examples of

identity-forming beliefs that would do not conform to the reality constraints, such as people who believe that they were abducted by aliens, or that they are gods. While such beliefs may greatly inform those individuals' self-experience and sense of identity, we can regard them as unreliable narrators or, even, delusional. One of the potential dangers of the narrative view is that it may seem to prioritise the first-person perspective over facts (Msimang 2016; DeGrazia 2005: 85). Both of Schechtman's constraints are put in place to prevent this from happening. DeGrazia (ibid.) suggests something similar: "the self-narratives that qualify as identity-constituting are those that are *realistic* or *within reason*, given what we know about the person in question, about persons generally, and about the way the world works." There can be wrong answers to the question 'Who are you?', even if the person answering believes those answers (DeGrazia refers to a woman who believes that she is a snake.)

This constraint applies to narratives other than the personal as well. Regarding history-writing, which she likens to storytelling, Arendt (1968: 238) writes: "Even if we admit that every generation has the right to write its own history, we admit no more than that it has the right to arrange the facts according to its own perspective; we don't admit to the right to touch the factual matter itself". Arendt is here referring to brute facts, or indisputable facts (she uses the example of Germany invading Belgium, stating that no one can say that Belgium invaded Germany). Leaving aside the question of more ambiguous 'facts', or the interpretation and arranging of facts, what concerns Arendt specifically are the ways in which totalitarian movements and propaganda construct new facts, and how lies so easily become political 'facts.' We see this in the kinds of narratives used to justify xenophobic discrimination, narratives that can easily be corrected with reference to empirical facts and statistics (e.g. how many foreigners are actually present in the country, or how many 'take jobs' from citizens). The narrative we construct should correspond to reality, but Arendt also suggests that *how* we construct/arrange our narratives has an impact on our world. How we choose to tell our histories, and how we choose to judge the past, not only impacts how we experience the present, but it is also normative for the future – remember Taylor's 'and then' (Section 1.2). For Arendt, our judgments and stories about the past show us what our world should look like, and who should be part of it. Where our narratives are based on factual inaccuracies, or evasions of facts due to what we choose to include and exclude, as is the case with many xenophobic narratives, we construct the kind of world that excludes foreigners. I return to this concern in Section 2.3.

Schechtman's second constraint, the articulation constraint, "requires that a person be able to articulate her narrative locally when appropriate, or at least to recognize the legitimacy of certain questions" (Schechtman 2012: 163). One should be able to answer questions such as 'How did you get here?' or 'What job do you do, and how did that become your job?' or 'Why did you do that?', or at the very least understand why such questions would be asked:

> The point is that one should not simply be at a loss, or fail to understand the sense of such questions. The requirement here is thus not that one must have a perfectly worked-out and explicit account of why everything in her life is as it is, but rather that she must recognize a certain kind of explanatory obligation, and be able to meet it for the most part. (ibid.)

In my view, this ties in with the shared nature of narratives, discussed in the previous section. Schechtman's two constraints have to be met for a narrative identity to be 'successfully' constituted. Part of this would be the affirmation of that identity from others, or the testing of my identity narrative against the judgments of others. Hilde Lindemann (2014: ix) says that understanding someone requires recognition of their expressions of personality, and a response to that. Our understandings of others and ourselves "consist of a web of stories depicting our most important acts, experiences, characteristics, roles, relationships, and commitments" – these things make up the "narrative tissue" of our identities (ibid.). Understanding one another is important, as it guides our action (how we are supposed to treat each other). To reach such understanding, we must participate in the exchange of stories, often through the kinds of questions that Schechtman mentions. This is common practice whenever you meet someone new – indeed, we are often taken aback when people do not ask questions of us, or answer our questions curtly, whether they fail to understand why you would be interested, or whether they are secretive or very private.

Here the reality constraint and the articulation constraint converge, and once more tie in with Arendt's point about measuring one's judgments, or for our purposes narratives, against those of others. Writing on how Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment can be applied politically, Arendt highlights Kant's notion of publicity – making one's thoughts public and opening them up for scrutiny by others. For Kant, at least as Arendt (1982: 18) interprets him, only evil thoughts are kept secret. This is not to say that people who cannot answer questions about their identity are necessarily evil, but rather to show why we are wary of people who cannot answer

such questions or who are baffled by them. Part of testing one's narrative against reality requires articulating it, sharing it with others, and allowing their judgment.

Schechtman's two constraints highlight the most important aspects of narrative theories of identity. The idea that we are fundamentally beings who tell stories is widely accepted and, for the most part, considered uncontroversial. The popularity of the narrative theory, both inside and outside academic thought (perhaps especially outside), points towards its intuitiveness – people truly feel that this describes their experience. What is most interesting to me are the political implications of this understanding of identity, which I will discuss in more depth below, and how Schechtman's two constraints already hint at that, in that these constraints require of us to put our self-narratives 'out there'. If I had to explain narrative identity to someone in thirty seconds, I would answer (in line with Schechtman's second constraint) that one's identity is the answer one gives to the basic question, 'Who are you?', and that that answer always takes the form of a story. *That* story becomes political when we ask 'Who are you?' and, based on the answer, decide whether you belong or not.

1.3 Narrative Identity and Personhood

Lindemann (2014) connects our identities and our understandings thereof to the process of "initiating human beings into personhood", with personhood defined in terms of four elements: "(1) a human being has sufficient mental activity to constitute a personality, (2) aspects of this personality are expressed bodily, (3) other persons recognise it as the expression of a personality, and (4) they respond to what they see" (ibid. ix). Identity and personhood are not interchangeable concepts, but they are very closely connected, in the sense that we tend to think of persons (however defined) as having identities (i.e. individual characters and personalities). Where the line between person and non-person blurs, for example with very intelligent animals or pets, we also find that our thinking on identity changes. In other words, people who tend to think of their pets as non-human persons tend to do so because they think of their pets as individuals with unique identities and personalities.

Personhood is a difficult concept to get a grip on, but generally the question of personhood (i.e. of who/what qualifies as 'a person') is concerned with who/what can be said to be a moral being, or a being worthy of moral consideration. It is therefore often closely linked to the distinction between species, with humans regarded as having personhood and animals not. For our purposes, this distinction is not of direct concern, except to note that denying personhood

amounts to dehumanising people, a strategy used in all forms of discrimination, often with violent and life-threatening results (genocide, extermination).

Early understandings of personhood saw the person as a being who has rights (Roman), and later a being who has moral value (Stoics, early Christians). While modern (and specifically Western) conceptions of personhood incorporate these ideas, the crucial characteristic for a person is "*the capacity for certain complex forms of consciousness*, such as rationality or self-awareness over time" (DeGrazia 2005: 3, emphasis in the original). The "self-awareness over time" suggests that personhood is also concerned with the question of identity over time. I will here consider Schechtman's initial views on personhood as it developed in her narrative self-constitution view. Schechtman's narrative view is a development of the psychological view of identity (as said above, the narrative view was developed to avoid the shortcomings of the psychological view, and the two need not exclude each other). Four features of personhood can be found in most iterations of the psychological view:

> [M]oral responsibility (a person is rightly held responsible for only her own actions), prudential concern (there is a particular kind of concern that we have only for our own future states), compensation (justice demands that the person who makes a sacrifice and the person receiving compensation be the same person), and survival (there is a basic interest a person has in her own survival). (Schechtman 2012: 164)

The psychological view makes an important distinction between 'human beings' and 'persons'. The difference lies in the persistence conditions of a person, as opposed to a human being. A person is a psychological entity, and the persistence of a person is defined in terms of the continuation of the consciousness of that person. This idea comes from John Locke, who originally developed the psychological view. Locke (1975: 335) understands 'personhood' to refer to a "thinking and intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places." Here we see the connection between personhood and identity, for although personhood relies on certain capacities a being has (being a thinking thing), it also has a temporal dimension – the being must think of itself as a self, and the same self over time. In other words, a person is a being that has identity over time. For Locke, present me and past me are the same person, because of a shared consciousness. Our sense of moral responsibility, our concerns for our future – all of these features are situated in our consciousness and not, as the biological view holds, in our bodies.

That the biological view cannot account for these features of personhood is evident, but it is not clear that the psychological views can. According to Schechtman, while psychological accounts claim these four features, the theories do not in fact reach these requirements. For this reason, we need a narrative view.

The first issue with Locke's view is that it is unclear what exactly is meant by a continuation of consciousness. How does a consciousness continue, even when there are interruptions (like sleep)? Locke's answer is memory – it is our memories that enable us to unite our past selves with our present selves; through memory, we claim different episodes of our past as our own. This is not quite satisfactory – memory is famously fickle. More often than not, we remember things incorrectly, if at all. Our memory of a specific event may change, depending of what happened after. If the continuation of consciousness relies on memory, but memories are untrustworthy, how can we be certain of the identity of said consciousness (i.e. how can we know the consciousness belongs to the same person, or my consciousness now is the same as what I had before my afternoon nap)? One option would be to develop Locke's view, to say that the continuation relies not only on memory, but on other psychological faculties as well. Another could be to look at the content of consciousness – where there is similarity of content, identity could be established. Pre-nap me and post-nap me are the same person, because both felt consciously guilty of not yet finishing their PhD.

For Schechtman, similarity of content is not good enough:

> It is not because I am *like* someone who took an action or worked some number of hours that I am responsible for that action or entitled to compensation; it is because the experiencing subject suffering the consequences (or enjoying the rewards) is the *same* subject who took relevant action. It is not because someone in the future will be *like* me that I care in a particular way about her experiences, but because I expect to experience them myself. And survival is not guaranteed by someone quite *like* me having experience in the future; *I* must have experience. (Schechtman 2012: 166)

Schechtman's point is not that there cannot be a continuation of consciousness, but rather that the links provided by Locke and others between different "portions of life", or different instances of what we want to think of as the same consciousness, is not nearly strong enough. For a stronger link, we need her narrative self-constitution view. Schechtman (2012: 167)

believes that we need a stronger reading of Locke's view – it is not simply memory that provides the link between past and present, but rather our *appropriation* of our past experiences. Not merely remembering, but "being affected by" past experiences: "There must not only be cognitive but affective and practical relations to an action or experience remote in time if it is to be appropriated. In other words, it must be woven into one's narrative" (ibid.). This then also answers Schechtman's question of the implications of the narrative view. Narratives provide us with the link needed to show unity of consciousness over time, which in turn is necessary for being a person, understood as having moral agency, prudential reasoning, and engaging in relations of compensation.

This was Schechtman's early view of personhood, which although critical of Locke is still in line with the general Western view on personhood. There are two broad approaches to a conception of personhood, which also has implications for how we think about identity. Personhood can either be ascribed individually, based on inherent characteristics the individual being has (often rationality). This is the position often taken in the Western philosophical tradition, notably defended by Kant ([1798] 2010) and Locke. In contrast to this conception of personhood stands the idea of personhood as relational or communal, common in the philosophical traditions from Africa (for example Menkiti 1984). A being is a person if recognised as such by those in the community it finds itself in. Menkiti (ibid. 171) writes that, in contrast to Western views, the traditional African view of personhood sees a person as "defined by the environing community" and that individuals can only come to know themselves through their communities (ibid. 172). The distinction as given here between these two broad understandings of personhood is, of course, an over-simplified distinction. The 'later' Schechtman (2014) proposes a conception of personhood that is more akin to the relational and communitarian conceptions found in African philosophies, whereas someone like Kwame Gyekye (1997) is critical of radically communitarian conceptions of personhood, as found in Menkiti's work. These debates, while important and interesting, are beyond my current scope. The important thing to realise is that our understanding of personhood is intimately linked with our identity, and also that how we understand personhood has a very real impact on who we treat as beings worthy of moral consideration.

The more communitarian views of personhood are often offered as an alternative to the kind of view that developed from Locke and Kant. Understanding personhood as a collection of certain features, and specifically making rationality a necessary feature, has its obvious

dangers. What about babies and young children, or people suffering from dementia? Such individuals can easily be classified as non-persons in this view, which could lead others to believe that they can be treated differently. Having personhood in this sense has, for example, never been truly gender neutral, with rationality strongly linked to the masculine and irrationality/emotions linked to the feminine. This has had real-world consequences for women, who were excluded from citizenship through most of Western history, as our idea of personhood (or the rational subject) "defines the idea of citizenship" (Coetzee 2019: 5). In a similar way, colonialism excluded the colonised from citizenship: "the colonised serves as the imminent and material other for the emergence of the rational and transcendent subjectivity that the colonizer lays claim to and on which his status as citizen is then based" (ibid. 6). The problem is that this approach to personhood runs the risk of being essentialist and, consequently, creating vulnerability for whole groups of people who do not share this 'essence'. It also denies the so-called embodied existence of persons – the ways in which environments, places, and others shape our individual existences. This shortcoming is especially clear if one thinks of personhood and identity as being closely tied together.

It is not clear, however, that the alternative view necessarily avoids such problems, at least not in the radical form Menkiti provides.[18] The traditional African understanding of personhood, as described by Menkiti, also excludes certain human beings from the category of 'persons'. According to Menkiti, the traditional African conception has three requirements that need to be met in order for a human being to qualify as a person (non-human animals cannot be persons). Firstly, human beings (or "organisms") become persons through "a process of social and ritual transformation" (Menkiti 1984: 172). Secondly, as this process takes time, a human can only be a person once they have reached a certain level of maturity, specifically in terms of one's moral functions (i.e. moral and rational thinking). One must also be able to meet the obligations that relate to one's station (ibid. 176). The first requirement hints at the social or communal nature of personhood in this understanding, yet both requirements still resonate with aspects of the Western conceptions of personhood. The real difference comes in with the importance given to community. This radical difference comes to the fore in Menkiti's third requirement: "rudimentary psychological characteristics" (ibid. 172) are not enough to ascribe

[18] Note that Menkiti is not necessarily arguing *for* this specific understanding of personhood, but rather discussing the traditional African understanding of personhood (or what he sees as the traditional view). Menkiti is used as an example here as there are parallels between his view and that of Schechtman, although she does ascribe personhood wider than Menkiti does (see Beck & Oyowe 2018).

personhood. The human being must apply their moral capabilities in service of the community by participating in its activities, and following its moral and social rules: "Without incorporation into this or that community individuals are considered to be mere danglers to whom the description "person" does not fully apply" (ibid.).

The traditional view excludes children from personhood, but adults can also be excluded if the latter requirement is not met. The distinction between non-persons and persons is "not just a distinction of language but a distinction laden with ontological significance" (ibid. 174). Given the psychological dimensions of personhood, which see persons not only as moral beings but as beings deserving of moral treatment, this sharp distinction can have dangerous consequences. The fact that the individual's personhood is wholly dependent on the community and on whether the rules of the community are followed poses another problem, one which faces all theories that privilege the community over the individual: the problem of internal minorities. If an aspect of one's personal identity, personality, or being goes against the norms of the community you find yourself in, this can lead to ostracism and even forms of oppression. Historically, this has led to the persecution of minority groups. To relate this back to xenophobia: if ascription of personhood depends on one's following the moral and cultural mores of the community, culturally alien members will not be persons unless they are fully assimilated (i.e. give up their own cultural identities).

The communitarian view need not be as radical. Kwame Gyekye (1997), for example, criticises Menkiti's and similar interpretation of traditional African personhood, as such conceptions do not allow for individual freedoms:

> In the light of the autonomous (or near-autonomous) character of its activities, the communitarian self cannot be held as a cramped or shackled self, responding robotically to the ways and demands of the communal structure. That structure is never to be conceived as reducing a person to intellectual or rational inactivity, servility, and docility. Even though the communitarian self is not detached from its communal features and the individual is fully embedded or implicated in the life of her community, the self nevertheless, by virtue of […] its "mental features" can from time to time take a distanced view of its communal values and practices and reassess or revise them. (ibid. 55-56)

The value of the more communitarian view is that it indicates the importance that other people play in our identity formation, as well as alerting us to the dangers of a loss of community (i.e. the dangers of ostracism or exclusion). Even the more individualist views cannot deny that we are embedded in communities and that, especially politically speaking, this has a profound impact on our lives and our sense of self. As Schechtman's understanding of personhood and identity developed, she moved more towards the kind of communitarian views found in African philosophical traditions; Beck and Oyowe (2018) have argued that her theory resonates with such views, especially Menkiti's (although Schechtman applies personhood more broadly).

Schechtman (2014: 110) defines personhood as living a "person life", which she connects to having a personal identity: "Persons are individuated by individuating personal lives; and the duration of a single person is determined by the duration of a single person life" (ibid). To live a person life does not require the kind of developed psychological capacities found in, for example, Locke. A person life, briefly put, is the kind of life lived by a human being who is embedded in a culture: "Our paradigmatic examples of persons are typical enculturated humans" (ibid. 111) whose person lives start with "social dependence" and "relatively basic cognitive capacities and activities" (ibid. 112). As the person matures, they become "sentient, reflectively self-consciousness, a self-narrator in the sense described by the Narrative Self-Constitution View, and a rational and moral agent" (ibid.). This psychological development is only one aspect of personhood. The other aspect or requirement is "an array of complex and sophisticated interactions with other persons that involve, among other elements, adherence to moral, cultural, or personal norms" (ibid.). Such lives also contain relationships with other people, such as friendships and community ties. These characteristics of a person life are not necessary for a person life – one can lose one (e.g. one's psychological characteristics due to dementia) and still remain a person. Schechtman's view has its own failings, notably that she identifies person-specific practices on the basis of which we supposedly identify others as persons, such as interacting in interpersonal ways. Yet, as Beck and Oyowe (2018: 195) point out, we interact with non-human animals in such ways (and they interact with us), but Schechtman would not extend personhood to animals.

Where does this leave us? The philosophical project of distinguishing humans from animals, of finding essential or shared characteristics, of defining personhood (in whichever way), has opened the door for exclusions, oppressions, and terrible violence. Yet trying to understand who and what we are, and what it means to be human, is in itself a worthwhile project that I do

not think we should abandon, despite the negative consequences of our answers to these questions. The consequences have, after all, not been exclusively negative. It is unlikely that we will ever arrive at an essential characteristic of personhood and identity that does not exclude some, just as it is unlikely that any conception of personhood can ever be truly neutral. However, we do not have to come up with a final answer here. These theories and conceptions are helpful tools by which we can interpret and understand our lives and selves, if we see them not as 'the final word' but as narratives that we tell about ourselves as a species. Remember Mark Rowland's earlier remark, that humans tell all these stories about how or why we are different from animals, but that it is the storytelling itself that reveals us to ourselves. Because narratives are open-ended, because iterations of the same story can illuminate new things, understanding our theories of identity and personhood in this light prevents us from seeing them as final answers, but rather as processes or explorations. The benefit of this is that, where theories lead to violence and subjugation, there is room for alterations and reinterpretations that could have the opposite effect. The important thing to take away from the discussion above is that our identities and personhood are not separate from other people, but that they are shaped through action and interaction, through accounting and publicising our narratives. And this has political consequences.

1.4 Political narratives

Where narratives concern our political lives, they also become political. A "political narrative" can be defined as any narrative that appears in a political forum, such as a speech in parliament, party meetings, or political protests (Shenhav 2006: 247). Propagandistic speeches by politicians are a clear example of this, as politicians tend to give political significance to world events in a way that would further their own ends. Narratives emerging from public institutions, such as laws, judiciaries, or educational institutions, also have a political nature. Political narratives can also be defined by looking at the contents or conclusions of the narratives. If political themes, such as justice, power relations, or belonging, are present, the narrative is political (ibid.). The aim of all political narratives is to shape our political world in a specific way – that is, either to justify or condemn the laws, norms, institutions and practices that regulate how we live together in society.

Individual or private narratives, while not emerging from public institutions or political campaigns, can also be and often are political, albeit not deliberately so. Our identities are not only formed by what's going on inside of us, or even in our circle of family and friends – we

are deeply impacted by our place in the public or political realm (a distinction – private versus political – we can question). Stephanie Taylor (2010: 3) writes:

> Identity is about the interface between what might variously be characterized as the macro and the micro, the exterior and interior, the peopled social world and the individual person within it, as well as other people's views of 'who I am' and how I see myself.

Our individual sense of self, and our self-esteem, are influenced by how others view us, and by what public and political institutions tell us about ourselves. Nationalists are not only nationalists outside the home; white supremacists do not stop believing in their supremacy once they come home in the afternoon. On the contrary, violence in the home is often a precursor for violence in public. One can think of mass shooters/domestic terrorists in the USA, many of whom had complaints of domestic violence on their records. We saw, in the previous chapter, the role the notion of home plays in politics. Our ideas on race, gender, sexuality, etc., – all politically relevant – inform our understanding and treatment of others (and ourselves). A story told in the comfort of one's own home, the 'private' sphere, can have political undertones and political implications.

This is not to say that all narratives are political, but to indicate that narratives we may think of as non-political can contain political elements. It is important to keep this in mind – to remember that the home, just as much as the taxi rank, school, or parliament, can be the birthplace of xenophobic attitudes. However, when speaking of 'political narratives' in this study, I refer mainly to stories told, laws written, or statements made to a public audience. Xenophobic attitudes *in* the home are dangerous because they can leave the home, and once xenophobic attitudes enter the outside world, they contribute to the construction of a xenophobic life-world.

We should also distinguish between our identities and individuals, and political identities. The latter refers to group-identities. There is, obviously, interplay between these two kinds of identity – one's personal identity will in some ways be shaped by the group(s) one belongs to, and the identity and culture of such group(s). Maureen Whitebrook (2014: 4) argues that even individual narrative identities contain aspects relevant to the political: "The construction of narrative identity is a collective act, involving tellers and listeners." Indeed, the very idea of identity assumes the presence of other people:

> …inasmuch as identity means something like 'what the self shows the world' or 'what of the self is shown to the world', together with 'what of the self is recognized by the world', the construction of identity – narrating identity – entails placing oneself in the public sphere, and thus a capacity for taking on a political role. The political aspect of identity rests on an understanding of the self as social, 'situated', and narratives of identity as embedded in other stories, including the wider stories of social and cultural settings. (ibid.)

This is reminiscent of Arendt's understanding of human beings as fundamentally political and acting beings (Chapter 3). Being seen and recognised by others, and having one's identity affirmed, is necessary. The kind of civic ostracism that results from xenophobia (Chapter 1) is morally harmful in part because it prevents this from happening – because such ostracism prevents targeted individuals and groups from "meaningful possibilities of…identity, and relationship formation" and of a sense of "the cultural legitimacy of historically non-normative identities and cultural practices" (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 24-25).

Political narratives, in the context of group identity, can be the myths and history of the nation, the laws and interpretation of laws pertaining to membership, and the directives from leaders that tell us how someone belonging to this group should act and be. South African exceptionalism, discussed in Chapter 1, is an example of this kind of group-identity forming political narrative that clearly contributes to people being xenophobic.

Before I turn to the question of the kinds of narratives that contribute to xenophobia, and the possible directions counternarratives can take to make our identities and accompanying thoughts on becoming less xenophobic, it is first necessary to consider the possible criticisms against the narrative view of identity, and the idea that such narratives can contribute to the creation of an anti-xenophobic or non-xenophobic world. One of these criticisms (Strawson 2004) rejects the narrative view, and it is important to consider for two reasons: (i) Strawson's critique shows us how even the narrative view, if strongly formulated, can lead to unjustified exclusions where people do not think of their identities in terms of coherent narratives, and (ii) my theory is only valid if it can stand up to these criticisms. Ultimately, I argue that it does, but that we should take Strawson's warning of the dangers of too strong a view seriously. However, weaker views are sufficient for my purpose, as individuals and groups need not be aware of the underlying political narratives or narrative themes contained in their beliefs or

prejudices about foreigners, or in their justifications of xenophobia, for such narratives to be harmful.

The last two points of criticism are concerned with the limits of the narrative view, but do not seek to discount the view. Granted that our understanding of ourselves, others, and the world around us is shaped by the narratives we tell about those things, two questions remain: firstly, can stories really be catalysts for societal change? And secondly, how do we deal with the problem of false narratives? Both questions should be answered if, as I suggest in this chapter, the problem of xenophobia can be addressed by rethinking and retelling our identity-forming narratives. These latter two points of criticism therefore provide the direction for the last chapter in this study, where I will consider how narratives can bring about institutional change, what kinds of false narratives contribute to xenophobia and how we can counter them, and how approaches like narrative play can contribute to relationship formation.

2. Criticisms of the narrative theory of identity

2.1 Strawson's critique

Support for and belief in the idea of identity as narrative is widespread. In recent years, the 'power' of storytelling has been lauded in academic research and popular culture. The latter may in part be attributed to novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's 2009 TEDtalk, 'The dangers of a single story', which has been viewed 4.5 million times on TED's YouTube channel. The link between storytelling, or narrative, and identity has been around for much longer in academic disciplines, and it is possibly the most popular view of identity at this stage. Yet there are some who are deeply critical of this view, such as Galen Strawson (2004, 2015).

Strawson argues that the view that identity is, or even should be, narrative, is flawed and not universally applicable. He identifies two broad theses on narrative identity found in literature on the topic: (1) the psychological Narrativity thesis, and (2) the ethical Narrativity thesis (Strawson 2004: 428).[19] The psychological Narrativity thesis is descriptive and empirical, claiming (broadly) that it is in our nature to see our lives and understand ourselves as part of a narrative. The ethical Narrativity thesis is, as the name suggests, normative: we *should* understand our lives and selves in this way – it is the only way to live well and to attain full

[19] Strawson capitalises 'Narrative' to denote a psychological property/outlook, as opposed to *a* narrative (which would presumably just be the story itself, or an instance of story-telling.)

personhood. Strong narratives view would fall under this category. Strawson disagrees with both theses.

To make his argument, he draws several distinctions:

i. The experience of oneself as "a human being taken as a whole" versus one's experience of the self as an inner mental entity (ibid. 429)
ii. Diachronic and Episodic self-experience
iii. Narrative and non-Narrative selves

First, regarding one's experience of oneself: on the one hand, I understand myself to be the same person who was born to my parents, who had specific experiences and achievements in the past. I understand my present self to be the same as the past self, in the sense that I am the same human, "taken as a whole". Others also consider me to be the same. This experience of oneself should be familiar, unless one has no memories.[20] This seems obvious. One's self-experience is something entirely different. You may be fully aware that present-you is the same *human* as past-you, without 'internally' thinking of or recognising past-you as being the same *self* as present-you. This seems less clear to me. How I think of myself has changed, in some ways radically, from the ways in which I thought of myself as a young child. While I can recognise the memories as belonging to me, or as being memories of my life, I may feel distanced from the self in those memories. This seems to be what Strawson means with self-experience. Yet, taking myself as an example (as Strawson takes himself as an example), it is not clear that these two selves, along with the future-self, is as disconnected as Strawson implies. I may not be exactly the same person I was at age six, yet there is enough overlap in what I remember of my inner life for that self to be recognisably *me*. And I imagine that even if there had been more radical internal changes in my self-conception, leading to my past self seeming like a stranger, I would not necessarily no longer think of that self as *my*self. However, Strawson would simply point out that we have different kinds of self-experiences, as he sets out in his distinction between Diachronic and Episodic self-experience.

[20] In which case, others may still see you as the same person (e.g. in the case of an old person with Alzheimer's). Strawson does not really go into others' view of our identities – it is not relevant to his argument, which focuses on individual identity and the self's understanding of itself. However, it *is* relevant to my discussion of group- and political identities. I will return to this.

Strawson is not interested in our holistic understanding of ourselves as humans, but in our inner experience of selfhood. This experience can take one of two forms, Diachronic (which he would argue fits my self-experience) and Episodic (which is how he experiences selfhood). 'Diachronic' refers to a concern with the way something evolves over time, whereas 'Episodic' refers to the experience of things in intervals or as separate events (ibid. 430). Diachronics are more likely than Episodics to experience life in Narrative terms although the connection is not necessary – Strawson argues that one can be Diachronic *and* non-Narrative. A single individual may also change position in the "Episodic/Diachronic/Narrative/non-Narrative state-space", depending on what they are doing, concerned with, their age, or their state of health (ibid. 431).

The distinction between Diachronics and Episodics not only describes different kinds of self-experience. Where one lies will also have a significant effect on one's ethical and emotional life/positions. Strawson's two forms of life-experience point toward deep psychological differences between people, which may easily lead the one group to believe that their experiences are better/more authentic/more in touch with the human condition than the other's. It becomes a new form of discrimination – the questioning of another's sense of self, and legitimacy of their experience, because of the difference. And, as with all distinctions and differences that bring about feelings of superiority and accusations of inferiority, there is a real danger here. If the dominant view is that the self *is* experienced Narratively, and furthermore that it *should be* experienced Narratively, those who do not feel their self-experience fits this model may feel alienated from the possibility of accessing a good life. Strawson is, to my mind, correct in criticising strong Narrative views that claim that sentient creatures become persons *only* when they live narratively, or consciously construct and tell stories of their lives. Strawson does not see himself as fitting this description, and therefore he would not qualify as a person. Nor would, presumably, people living with dementia or Alzheimer's, or people who are for whatever reason unable to narrate their lives. I already indicated that this is a position I cannot support, precisely because of the profound impact of a narrow understanding of 'personhood' on how we treat and mistreat others.

It is important to note that the Episodic person does not live from arbitrary moment to arbitrary moment, forgetful of the past and careless about the future. The way in which they connect to their past- and future-selves just differs. For the Diachronic, that self is essentially the same. For the Episodic, that self is recognisable, but not the same. Yet this does not mean that the past self is completely forgotten in the present: "The past can be alive […] in the present simply

in so far as it helped to shape the way one is in the present" (ibid. 432). Episodics know that they have a past. They have factual knowledge of this past and have memories 'from the inside'. Yet, for Strawson, even recognising these memories as somehow his own does not yet mean that he makes a narrative connection between that self and this self, nor that he has a special interest in his past or future self (ibid. 433).

But it is not only a matter of not being interested in one's past or future:

> …it seems clear to me, when I am experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter past or future in question is not my past or future, although it is certainly the past or future of GS the human being […] I have no significant sense that *I* – the I now considering this question – was there in the further past. And it seems clear to me that this is not a failure of feeling. It is, rather, a registration of a fact about what I am – about what the thing that is currently considering this problem is. (ibid.)

If this is how Strawson experiences life and himself, I cannot argue otherwise. He is making no claims to universal experience, precisely the opposite. That people experience their selves in these differing ways is very probable.

While Diachronics tend to be Narrative, and Episodics tend to be non-Narrative, this is not necessarily so: "one can be Diachronic, naturally experiencing oneself(*) as something existing in the past and future without any particular sense of one's life as constituting a narrative" (ibid. 439). An Episodic, as has been mentioned, has memories of the past and may connect them to the present to tell a story and an Episodic can also think of themselves as having a specific kind of personality (i.e. their sense of who they are is not entirely fragmented). To understand Strawson's distinction between Narrative and non-Narrative, it is therefore not enough to look at his previous distinction. We must also consider his definition of 'narrative':

> I take the term to attribute – at the very least – a certain sort of *developmental* and hence temporal *unity* or *coherence* to the things to which it is standardly applied – lives, parts of lives, pieces of writing. So it doesn't apply to random or radically unconnected sequences of events […] or to purely picaresque or randomly 'cut-up' pieces of writing. (ibid. 439)

Strawson recognises that this definition is not enough – that the link between developmental unity and a narrative life is still unclear. We may look at the life of an animal and see developmental unity, we may even narrate the life of that animal (e.g. one's pet dog), without that life *being* a narrative or of the dog having a narrative identity (in a self-experienced way). Therefore, says Strawson, those who defend the Narrative theses require that a life *be lived Narratively*, in order for it to be a narrative: "One could put this roughly by saying that lower-case or 'objective' narrativity requires upper-case or 'subjective' Narrativity" (ibid. 440).

'Subjective' Narrativity is more than understanding one's life as a unity – it requires a *construction* or *form-finding tendency*. It is not merely giving a sequential account of one's life, but actively *construing* one's life. Finding form in one's life, which may seem filled with arbitrary events, is an act of pattern-seeking. An example would be people looking for 'signs' or omens, either to explain something that happened, or to determine a future course of action or predict the future. A second distinctive tendency of Narrativity is *story-telling* in the sense of taking facts and placing them in a connected account. This may also include a revision of the facts to satisfy our pride or to suite our needs, or due to our cognitive biases. I return to this problem in Section 2.3.

Strawson does not argue *against* Narrativity or narrative as a whole. He accepts that there are people who experience, and want to experience, life in this way. He is, however, arguing against the two aforementioned theses: that *everyone* experiences life in this way (the psychological thesis) and that everyone *should* experience life in this way (the ethical thesis). The first, for him, is factually incorrect, whereas the second is harmful to those who do not, indeed cannot (if our way of experiencing self depends on our genes) live a Narrative life without being untrue to themselves. The Narrative life holds a further danger for him:

> It's well known that telling and retelling one's past leads to changes, smoothings, enhancements, shifts away from the facts, and recent research has shown that this is not just a human psychological foible. It turns out to be an inevitable consequence of the mechanics of the neurophysiological process of laying down memories that every studied conscious recall of past events brings an alteration. The implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being. (ibid. 447)

This may be true, yet for me it does not deal a death blow to the notion of narrativity or narrative identity. Of course we would, in telling stories about ourselves, remember some things incorrectly. We forget important things and focus on the trivial; we get dates, names, participants wrong; our view of things is coloured, even skewed, by our own insecurities, doubts, pride. And as time passes, as we become more familiar with a story, that story may change. Perhaps it changes in response to others' responding to it (where they laugh, what seems to shock them). Strawson says that narratives need not be revisionist, yet here it seems that they are. Does this make our narratives less authentic? Perhaps. Does it take us further away from our 'true' selves? That is more questionable. We can and do speak of people lying to themselves, of people being delusional, in perfectly sensible ways. But it is not clear to me that "accurate self-understanding" is in any way possible. It may be an ideal we strive toward, but I think narratives can bring us closer to, as well as prevent us from reaching, self-understanding. This depends on the narrative and how it is told. Moreover, we do not live in isolation (ideally). We have friends and family and people we share our lives with, who hear our stories and act as fact-checkers and sounding boards. Self-understanding does not come purely from internal 'work' we do ourselves.

My main issue with Strawson's argument, however, is the fact that he is making it, and how he does this. I do not disagree with him on the point that people have different kinds of self-experience, or that people may be more or less 'Narrative'. It is the claim of people being entirely non-Narrative which I doubt. Strawson's argument stands against strong narrative views, but not against weak narrative views. It seems to me that Strawson is denying that he, and other people like him, construct any kind of narrative regarding the self or its identity. Yet here he is, in an academic paper, in a blog post, in a book chapter, telling us about himself. Not a simple relay of facts about his life, but a coherent analysis of his self-experience, from which he draws certain conclusions and insights about his identity. And this is not only his present self – these thoughts and arguments are made over a decade. Of course, present-Strawson knows about past-Strawson, and it may be possible that both could have the same thoughts and self-experience and irritation with the dominant view, yet not be the same selves. Perhaps because he uses himself as an example, his argument reads like a kind of narrative.

My difference with Strawson could simply be explained by a difference in understanding of what 'narrative' entails – a conceptual difference. I find little fault with Strawson's definitions of narrative and Narrative, although I would define it more broadly. When I speak of a narrative

in the context of identity, I mean the answer to the question 'Who are you?'. How you answer that question – coherently, fragmented, vaguely, in detail, interpretive dance – does not really matter. The fact is, most people *can* answer that question, and therefore have a sense of self or identity (those who cannot – babies or people living with dementia, for example – do not have an idea of their individual identity yet or have forgotten it; this need not mean that they are no longer 'persons'). The 'you' can be an individual, a group, a nation, and the answer will give me a sense of his/her/their/its identity and self-image. The question can also be framed in an almost infinite number of ways: Are you a person who loves reading? Do you play rugby? Does the idea of narrative identity make sense to you? Are you the kind of person who would go bungee jumping? Each answer giving the questioner, and perhaps yourself, insight into your identity.

Strawson expects this criticism, that he is also Narrative, even if unconsciously or subconsciously so. His responds, simply: "I think it's just not so, and I take it that the disagreement is not just terminological" (ibid. 448). It seems that, even under the above understanding of narrative definition, I would not be able to convince Strawson otherwise. I acknowledge that, under the strong conceptions of the Narrativity theses he refers to, he is non-Narrative; Episodics are mostly non-Narrative. My definition is weaker – it makes no claims to personhood, to a life lived Narratively, or even to coherence. It simply says: when confronted with the question of our identity, we answer by telling some kind of story. And this, for me, Strawson seems to do. To say that one experiences one's self in one way and not another, to give examples of such experience, even to just say how one experiences oneself right now in the present moment, is to tell a narrative about one's identity. Perhaps I should say, in Strawson's spirit, "I think it *is* just so."

Schechtman (2012) responds to Strawson's criticism of the narrative view, which includes a criticism of *her* work, by developing and clarifying her narrative self-constitution view. One possible response to Strawson she considers is to simply say that he misunderstands 'narrative' (which is my feeling). How Strawson describes his experiences – that he experiences some special relation with other parts of the human Strawson's life, and that they constitute a life as a whole, even if they seem like different selves – seem similar to her view. Another possible response would be to focus on the duration of the narrative, instead of the strength of the narrative. Strawson's distinction between human being and self, like the psychological view's distinction between human being and person, makes this possible. For Strawson, the narrative

view fails because he assumes that the duration of a narrative should be equal to the duration of a human life, yet Schechtman shows why this is not necessary:

> Since the narrative self-constitution is devised as a means of expressing the intuitions behind the psychological approach to identity, however it does not and should not insist that the duration of an identity-constituting self-narrative must be the same as the duration of a human life. *Persons*, after all, are distinguished form human beings on this view […] The fact that Strawson does not view his entire human life as a narrative thus does not serve as an objection to the narrative view if each self* is constituted by a narrative internal to it. (ibid. 168)

Both responses seem legitimate to Schechtman, yet she is aware of the possible contradiction. The first sees the narrative life as more or less corresponding to the human life, as different 'episodes' are recognised as belonging to the same whole, even when there is not a deep connection to all the different selves or phases. The second view sees the narrative life, or rather lives, as necessarily having shorter duration than one's human life, but it requires a strong identification with the different narrative selves. This tension points toward two different questions of identity answered with two slightly different narrative theories, where Schechtman had previously only seen the need for a single theory. Strawson's criticisms had revealed this tension to her. When asking questions of personal identity we should, argues Schechtman, distinguish between 'persons' and 'selves'. When we speak of persons, we are mixing two different (but not unrelated) things: a notion of the self like that proposed by Strawson (a self-experiencing 'I'), and a more practical understanding of personhood connected to social contexts:

> [A] person is conceived as the bearer of certain complex social capacities that carry important practical implications. A person is a moral agent who can be held responsible for her actions, a reasoning creature who can be held to be irrational when she acts against her interests, and a creature capable of a range of complex relationships with other persons. (ibid. 169)

Whereas Schechtman's earlier view saw the self and the person as co-extensive (and both correspond to the length of our individual lives), she now holds that they need not be. This is not to say that they are unconnected – for a complete understanding of one's identity, both need to be taken into account. Our narrative identities contain narrative accounts of selves *and*

narrative accounts of persons, "and the question of how strong a narrative is required or how long it must endure will depend, at least to some extent, on which is receiving emphasis" (ibid.). The latter account is weaker than the former. Personhood enables us to interact with others in specific ways (as quoted above), and this simply requires of us to recognise ourselves as continuing beings whose past actions have implications for our present rights and responsibilities, and that this past and present has an impact on our future (ibid. 170). However, one need not associate very strongly with it, or see the past self as somehow fundamental to the present. Our personhood is also closely connected to our bodies, as personhood is what enables us to interact with others, and others tend to recognise or reidentify us by recognising our bodies. *This* narrative account is relatively weak, in terms of the kind of association it expects between persons and their narratives. This is also primarily the account that I am interested in, the reasons for which I will give below.

The narrative account of selves is a stronger account, and it differs from the previous account in its temporality. The duration of the self need not correspond to the duration of the person, body, or human. This aspect of Schechtman's new theory corresponds to her earlier self-constitution view, barring the realisation of the temporal difference, and therefore I won't go into more depth.

Strawson's view of himself therefore fits the weaker narrative account of persons. *This* view does not expect the kind of sweeping, constructed narrative Strawson criticises, but it is also more than a trivial sequence of events. It is simply "an explanatory account of how actions and events lead to other actions and events, how we come to be in the position we are in and where that position is likely to lead us" (ibid. 171). This echoes my response to Strawson – that in writing about how he is *not* narrative, he is providing us with precisely this kind of account. And this weak narrative account is sufficient for my purposes in this study for two reasons. Firstly, as Schechtman (ibid. 172) points out, we need to be able to tell this kind of story about our lives for us to participate in "distinctive activities and interactions" with other people. Having a narrative in this weak sense (which I think of as being able to answer the question 'Who are you?') is necessary for social and political interaction.

And this brings me to my second reason: we are concerned here not only with personal narratives, but also and primarily the *political* narratives that shape our political identities. This includes our identities as individuals and how that impacts our interactions with others, but it

also includes our group identities such as our national identity. And this kind of identity is not simply personal identity on a grand scale. As Derek Parfit (1971: 3) points out, we ask questions about personal identity that we do not ask about national identity, or our criteria for the latter is different from that of the former. We do not worry about 'identity over time' concerning our group identities, as we do concerning our personal identities. While personal identities engage with group identities, and it is therefore necessary to have some understanding of how they function, solving the conflict between those who argue for and against a narrative conception of the self is not necessary to make the weaker, and descriptive rather than normative, point that we *do* tell stories about ourselves, individually and collectively, and these stories shape how we and others see ourselves, as well as determine the shape of our interactions (interpersonal and intergroup).

The power of the narrative theory of identity lies precisely in its flexibility, which allows for it to account for both personal and group identities. This is due to the open-ended nature of narratives. Schechtman may speak of narrative self-constitution, but this 'constitution' is never finished (not even at our death, as our loved ones continue to remember us and contribute to the narratives of our lives). To think of identity as narrative is to see identity-formation as "an ongoing process of narrative self-interpretation that brings coherence and psychological intelligibility to the fragmentary nature of lived experience" (MacKenzie & Poltera 2010: 32). Whitebrook (2014: 5) writes that understanding identity as constructed by narratives does not ensure the kind of unity Strawson thinks narrative theories are aiming at:

> [N]arrative may exhibit a lack of pattern, an absence of closure. Such instability may appear politically threatening, or even dangerous; but attention to narrative also shows how instability – disorder – can be a characteristic of coherent stories. The narrative process itself – narrative telling – is significant here. Narrative understood by way of process – form, narrative structure, style and techniques – suggests that coherence is in the telling. Uncertainty, fragmentation and disunity can be contained in the narrative by way of content and form, what is told and the telling of it. (ibid. 5-6)

Narratives allow us to order the chaos around us without it becoming a totalitarian project of absolute order and control – narratives expect spontaneous action on the part of its 'characters', it delights in unexpected twists and surprises. Politically, thinking of identities as narratives can undermine the rigid kind of identities that we find in nationalisms and fundamentalisms

(which see identities as natural or predetermined in some way). The nature of narratives or storytelling also allows for emotional connection, for us to *see* the other as similar to ourselves, or to imaginatively share in their struggles and joys and so establish commonalities, upon which relationships can be built.

2.2 The limits of story-telling

Storytelling is *not* a panacea, and it is crucial that we realise this even as we celebrate the ways in which it *can* bring about change. The problem with storytelling is that it generally happens on an individual level – two strangers, perhaps, sitting opposite one another and sharing their life stories. This is not nothing, but it will not bring about world peace. Stories can be more widely shared – through film, television, the media, literature – yet even as we binge watch the same shows on Netflix, this experience remains largely individual. Listening to another person's story is a step in the right direction, but it is also just that: the first step. The power of storytelling – to connect us to others on an emotional level – is also its limitation. For while xenophobia and other forms of discrimination are fuelled by emotions, they are kept in place by institutions. Hearing a refugee's story may bring about a change of heart in me, but if I do not act on that change of heart in the public sphere, nothing will change.

This limitation is something that popular South African writer and storyteller Sisonke Msimang chose to address when she was asked to do a TEDTalk in 2016, which she titled 'If a story moves you, act on it'. This talk is significant, as it is a response to Adichie's viral talk referred to earlier. Where Adichie lauded the power of storytelling and exposed the 'dangers of a single story', which reinvigorated the idea that storytelling is the best tool with which to fight discrimination, Msimang, while appreciative of Adichie, wants to draw our attention to the limitations of storytelling. It is also significant as Msimang herself does recognise the potential power of stories. She is the head of Storytelling and Training at the Perth-based Centre for Stories, an organisation that uses storytelling "to inspire social cohesion and improve understanding of diverse communities" by cultivating stories "that inspire thought, spark empathy and challenge intolerance", with a specific focus on the stories of marginalised people – "refugees, migrants, people of colour, sexual minorities, the elderly, and people with disabilities" (Centre for Stories n.d.).

Msimang (2016) provides us with four reasons to be sceptical of stories' ability to make the world a better place. Firstly, stories create the illusion of solidarity. It is precisely the ability of

stories to form emotional connections, to help us empathise, which is also its limitation in this sense. In a world that prescribes stories like a doctor would prescribe medicine, we may feel that either telling a story, or especially *listening* to a story, is enough. That is all we have to do – we have to create opportunities and spaces in which those whose stories generally go untold, can tell their stories. And those in privileged positions should sit and listen and be moved emotionally. Listening to inspiring stories give us a sense of solidarity, a "feel-good factor" that may make us feel like we did the work in the story (we climbed Everest to raise money for charity, or we opened our homes to refugees). Except, of course, we did not: "You haven't done anything. Listening is an important but insufficient step towards social action." The sense of solidarity, the connection, remains trivial and unsustainable unless it spurs us into action. This is not to say that listening cannot be hard and listening to stories that make us uncomfortable *are* challenging. It is just not enough.

Msimang's second point has serious implications for the claim that stories can counteract bias (a claim which she does endorse). The capacity of stories to bring about change is limited by the fact that we tend to prefer stories with likeable characters, and we ignore or dismiss stories about or from people we do not like. Where a person holds a very strong xenophobic (or racist, or sexist, etc.) biases, it is considerably more difficult to get them to listen to the story, or to have them make the kinds of emotional associations necessary to make storytelling a success. We see this perhaps most clearly in responses to survivors of rape and sexual assault who share their stories.

Msimang's point raises a further question: if strong biases or prejudices prevent us from being able to really hear certain stories, how do we fight the bias or prejudice? To say that we will do so by telling stories is circular. It is unclear that it is possible at all without institutionalising intolerance of discriminatory attitudes (e.g. by incentivising tolerant attitudes and punishing intolerant ones). Here we link with Msimang's third point: that stories remain personal, while we should be focussing on 'the bigger picture'. The celebration of storytelling has also led to us starting to value what we feel, in response to stories, more than what we know (facts). This means that, even where stories reach us emotionally, we tend not to connect the content of a specific story to larger, societal causes: "we applaud someone when they tell us about their feelings of shame, but we don't necessarily link that to oppression. We nod understandingly when someone says they felt small, but we don't link that to discrimination" (ibid.). At this point I want to insert a further thought, which Msimang does not discuss in relation to this point

of hers. There is a disconnect, a distance between storyteller and listener, which remains even when we establish a link of solidarity and empathy. Our emotional reaction to a story can lead us to forgetting that this distance is there, that even as I have a kind of fellow-feeling, I do not fully know what the storyteller experiences or feels. Thus I can relate to her because I know what shame feels like, but because the causes of our shame may differ, I assume that I see the full picture when I don't.

Msimang's point is that because stories individualise people, we forget how those individuals fit into society. The positive side of this individualisation is that individualising strangers/others can help work against stereotypes, which relies on generalities ('All X people are Y'). The negative side is that we tend to remove these individual stories from the contexts in which they take place – we see stories of suffering as having individual causes, instead of societal. So a xenophobic attack is committed by a person with hatred in his heart; evil deeds are done by evil people. We too easily see such people as aberrations, and not as people enabled by a society to do what they do, indeed as products of their societies. So we may celebrate or condemn individuals through stories, without ever bringing about structural or societal change.

For Msimang, storytelling and listening should be intellectual work (the listener should be critical, ask questions), and should be followed by action in the world. She says, "it is justice that makes the world a better place, not stories" (ibid.). We see storytelling as so fundamental to human existence that we almost see it as "so natural an activity that it requires no attention to technique" (Whitebrook 2014: 4). To see narratives and stories as intellectual work is to pay attention to the kinds of stories, how we tell them, and what they require of us in terms of actions. What stories *can* do, if we take them seriously and think critically about their implications (i.e. ask what the story says about society) is alert us to instances of injustice that we may not have been aware of, or provide us with the necessary emotions (e.g. anger in reaction to a story about a person's experience of injustice) that will compel us to act to establish a more just society. Msimang's goal is not to dismiss storytelling, but rather to put it in its place: a starting point. From there, those listening to the story have to *do something*. To relate this back to xenophobia: the stories we tell and the stories we listen to have to translate, somehow, into societal and institutional change that would ensure the protection of foreigners. In Chapter 5, I develop this idea, specifically to the institutions of citizenship and borders and the narratives accompanying it.

2.3 False Narratives

A final criticism that poses a real problem to narrative identity has to do with false narratives. What is to stop someone from narratively constructing an identity for themselves, an identity that they project into the world, that is completely false? Conmen and spies do this regularly, even if they assume each identity only for brief periods of time. They do not believe in those identities, but we can imagine someone telling a false narrative about themselves and believing it (we all have blind spots). Narratives also necessarily leave some things out – we cannot tell our life-stories in excruciating detail, due to time constraints and the fickleness of memory. This can also potentially be a problem – a person can tell a tragic story about their parents being murdered, leaving them orphaned, and leave out the fact that they murdered their parents. This omission is significant, as knowing that part of the story will greatly change one's judgment of their character. False narratives are *especially* dangerous in the political sphere, where politicians often use lies for their own political gains or to achieve their own ends. Many of the kinds of narratives told about immigrants have little or no correspondence to reality, yet people readily believe them. Through such narratives, and immigrant identity is constructed by the local population (often through the media, or by politicians). I will discuss such narratives in more depth in Chapter 5. The consequences of such false narratives we see around us: widespread xenophobic violence and discrimination, even the death of individuals presumed to be foreign.

There is a distinction here between narratives that are deliberately false, i.e. that intend to lie, and narratives that are unconsciously so, as where a person is delusional or where they have incorrect information. However, the effects of both kinds of false narrative are the same, in the sense that both, for example, lead to xenophobic attitudes. Speaking of false narratives assumes some kind of 'true' narrative, the truth of which can be difficult to establish (especially given the subjective nature of personal narratives). When I speak of false narratives, I specifically refer to narratives that contradict that which can be known or independently established, or that contradicts what we already know about the world and human life. So we have reason to be sceptical of a person claiming to be the reincarnation of Napoleon, and we can outright reject the identities of people claiming to be us (i.e. if someone is impersonating you or stole your identity). We can also distinguish between understanding why someone may think that they are, in fact, a dog, and agreeing to or confirming that identity (thinking of them as if they were a dog). These facts are uncontroversial. It becomes more difficult when we deal with social or

political facts, and as I already mention in such cases we are concerned with brute facts – who invaded who, who enslaved who. Where such facts are disputed, as for example we see with holocaust deniers, we *should* measure the narratives against historical evidence and, for the most part, this will be sufficient in establishing the truth (whether those telling the narratives will believe the facts is another problem). Of course, even historical narratives (i.e. things we take to be historically true) should be judged especially when new evidence comes to light.

A possible solution then to the problem of false narratives, specifically pertaining to individual identities, would be third-person storytelling – i.e. the people around you counter your false narrative, with their memories of the event or of you. Schechtman's two constraints on narrative provide a partial solution here. Narratives and identities arising from them should be judged against reality, or what we know thereof, and against the person's own ability to sensibly and coherently answer questions about their identity. This is also what Bruner means when he says that narrative is constrained by community and family. What we are able to believably say about ourselves is determined, in part, by what others know about us. For example, if I decide to change my appearance in such a way that I convince other people that I am of a different race (as Rachel Dolezal did), my parents can provide evidence that this is not the case, by telling *their* narratives about me growing up, showing photographs, etc. Third-person accounts can therefore prevent this problem in some instances but not in all. If I am convinced of the 'facts' of my life, I may simply refuse to believe third-person accounts. Or I may be isolated from people who knew me growing up. For example, I may move to the other side of the world, where it will not be easy for new acquaintances to 'fact check' my identity (although it is much easier than before). Finally, those around me have no clearer view of things as they 'really' are – they are just as prone to blind spots, prejudice, cognitive bias, and false memories as I am. Once again, the potential power of stories is limited by our biases and prejudices.

This brings us to a further problem: often, the issue is precisely the fact that the third-person narratives about me, or the group I belong to, are false (and not my own narrative). For people also form their own judgements of me, even when taking into account my own self-conception I shared with them. So I may think of myself as hardworking and successful, but the person listening to my stories of success think of me as narcistic and arrogant. Lindemann (2014: 82) explains why this can be an issue:

> the second- and third-person stories that enter my identity can misrepresent me, but I will nevertheless be treated according to that misrepresentation […] Sometimes these inaccurate portrayals are benign […] but other times they are not. If the master narratives depicting my social kind portray me as lazy, dirty, slutty, and stupid, people with enough social power to benefit from seeing me that way are apt to treat me that way. In fact, the narratives purport to *justify* treating me that way. Additionally, my own consciousness may be infiltrated by those narratives, and then I will treat myself that way.

Countering such misrepresentative narratives is possible – "identity can be rehabilitated by counterstories that represent the person in a more accurate and respectworthy light" (ibid.) – but it will only work if those who benefit from the current misrepresentational narrative take up this new counternarrative. The question is, how to we get people to believe or 'take up' counternarratives in this way? Or, where people base their narratives on false facts, how do we get them to believe the facts? Part of the issue here is that people are attached to specific narratives to a variety of reasons, and such attachments are very strong where there are emotions involved (such as fear, or love of one's country) or when it is a question of being in power, and the counternarrative questions that power.

Another issue is our inherent cognitive biases, which are often strengthened by our emotional attachment to our narratives or our power. Our beliefs about the world and our prejudices, whether conscious or not, in a sense shape what we are able to see. We are biased in all kinds of ways, but for this discussion one form of cognitive bias is especially relevant: confirmation bias. In short, confirmation bias involves only recognising or believing facts that align with our already held beliefs. I may believe that women are more intelligent than men and would take an actual intelligent woman as proof of that 'fact', while ignoring any evidence for intelligence in men. Thomas Gilovich (1991: 84) looks at the strange beliefs people hold (e.g. that homeopathic medicine works). He says that, when confronted with a new fact, we ask ourselves one of two questions. If the fact is in line with our world-view, we ask '*Can* I believe it?', whereas if the fact conflicts with our world-view we ask, '*Must* I believe it?'. To put it differently, if we really want to believe something to be true, we want to know whether we have any reason for believing it to be true. We will consider the evidence and grab onto the first piece of evidence we find in support of the thing we want to believe. Anyone who has been a teenager in love will recognise this strategy – a smile, a simple greeting, even the desired

person looking in your direction is taken as evidence that they feel the same. Whether this piece of evidence, this 'fact', is good or not, whether it is a scientific fact or pseudo-science, or absolute nonsense, does not matter. We take it as proof that we are correct, and as a justification of our belief.

On the other hand, when we do *not* want to believe something, we lament "*Must* I believe this?". This is a crucial distinction. *Can* is open, ready to be convinced, *must* is closed, and precludes any possibility of belief. Both are equally problematic, as both express a bias, but the distinction explains why people seem to pick and choose the evidence they find convincing. If you ask, '*Must* I?', you are already subconsciously answering 'no'. Instead of looking for evidence to support our implicitly held belief, we look for evidence to disprove the undesirable belief and, once again, we grab onto the first piece of evidence which will help us disprove it. Say, for example, that you believe the narrative that immigrants are illegal and criminal. You may know immigrants who lead perfectly lawful lives, but you will disregard them (or make an exception, 'they are *like* us, not *really* like other immigrants'). However, the moment you open the newspaper and see a headline about an immigrant who got caught for doing something illegal, you will rejoice because your belief has been justified. We look for reasons, often just a single reason, to doubt claims that do not align with our world-views.

So far, the only suggestion has been to provide the correct facts, yet we have to accept that people will not necessarily be convinced by facts. This is not to say that fact-checking, or telling accurate narratives, are unimportant. It is, as I have repeatedly said, crucial that our narratives correspond to reality as far as possible. Deliberately false narratives are used for propagandistic purposes, and such lies should be exposed. But this is only the first step. We see, every day, how people who are confronted by facts refuse to believe them (climate change denialists and anti-vaxxers spring to mind). In the next chapter, I will offer strategies of dealing with false narratives that misrepresent, and the cognitive biases that prevent us from accepting facts. The existence of false narratives, while problematic, does not negate the idea of narrative identity. On the contrary, it confirms that our identities and even our actions are shaped by the kinds of narratives we choose to tell and choose to listen to.

Conclusion

In this chapter I provided an overview of the narrative theory of identity. Throughout human history, we have used storytelling as a means to interpret our world and our place in the world.

In this sense, stories also shape our world and our identities. This is the basic idea behind narrative theories of identity: that we construct our identities by telling stories about ourselves and about others. Stories situate us in the world and in relation to others, and for this reason they can also be used as tools with which we include and exclude. Our identities and specifically our group identities, therefore, can also be exclusionary or be more inclusive.

In the first section of this chapter was divided into four subsections. In the first, I defined 'narrative' and 'story'. Although I argued that the two can be used interchangeably without much confusion, I understood narratives to refer to broad themes in our stories that we call upon to interpret and give meaning to our world and through which we want to relay information about the world. Stories are more episodic, whereas narratives are open-ended – they do not necessarily have an end. Importantly, narratives and stories are normative, in the sense that we communicate our norms and values and ideals through them. The second subsection showed how narratives can be identity-forming, and how a narrative approach to identity better explains how our identities are formed and understood than other theories of identity. Here I specifically discussed Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view, according to which we shape our experiences and organise our lives in terms of a story we tell ourselves about our selves. We bind our past, present, and futures into a narrative, whether consciously or not. I argued that our sense of self, or our identities, are basically our answers to the question 'Who are you?', and that this question is always answered by a life-story. The narrative view, I showed, also has implications for our political narratives, as it is closely linked to our conception of personhood and as narratives are necessarily relational – there is a listener and an audience. Narratives are shared, and in so doing we also create group or political identities. The narratives that we then tell about ourselves as groups are political narratives, and these include everything from myths about the nation, written and oral histories, to laws and political speeches. Political narratives are normative in that they delineate who we, as a people, are, and also how we should act. By implication, our political narratives also determine who we exclude and who we include. Therefore such narratives can be xenophobic.

The second section of this chapter looked at the criticisms of the narrative theory of identity. One prominent criticism, as formulated by Strawson, received the most attention. Strawson's argument against narrative identity was discussed at length, and I offered my response. The criticism holds that not all people live narratively or think of their lives in terms of a narrative, but rather that some people see their lives rather as episodes, without necessarily thinking of

their past and present selves as the same self. Moreover, the normative aspect of narrative identity is harmful, as by implication it means that only lives lived narratively have value. While agreeing with Strawson that strong narrative views are harmful in this sense, I argued that a weaker narrative view is not, and that his response to the narrative view and explanation his own self-experience in fact constitutes a narrative.

The further two criticisms are not against narrative theory as such, but rather indicate its limits or challenges it has to meet. I gave an overview of these two points but will show how these challenges can be met in the next chapter. In brief: storytelling is limited in its ability to bring about societal change unless it leads to action (Msimang), and the narrative theory of identity also allows for false narratives to shape our ideas about ourselves and especially about others. Politically speaking, such false narratives can be extremely harmful. I argued that we can find a solution to the problem of false narratives in Arendt's and Schechtman's work. For both, narratives (or history-writing, in Arendt's case) have to be measured against known facts about the world. Many of the false narratives that we tell about others, especially about foreigners, can be shown to be false. This I do in the next chapter.

To understand our identities as narratives is to think of identities as a process, not as predetermined or given. Who we are is told and can be retold, our stories interwoven with those of others. Thinking of identities – both individual and as groups – as narratives allows for interpretation and reinterpretation of the stories of our past, providing us with the means of making our identities less exclusionary. Narratives, in their nature, are also open to change and twists and turns. Narrating as an activity can allow for spontaneity and be open to what is new, which can serve as an antidote to dogmatic and fundamentalist identities and the prejudices and exclusions they give rise to. I turn to this possibility in the next chapter. The challenges identified by the last two points of criticism provide the framework for Chapter 5, as I have to show how telling new or different narratives can have a positive effect on society, which as we will see requires change on an institutional level. The problem of false narratives is a serious one, as xenophobic narratives are often based on false facts, and half-truths that are often deliberately obscured. In the next chapter I will therefore identify the kinds of narratives we tell about foreigners and suggest directions that counternarratives can take and strategies for telling them and implementing change.

Chapter 5: New Narratives

Introduction

In Chapter 4, I identified several limitations to the narrative theory of identity and the ability of narratives to bring about societal change, and specifically for our purposes to make society less xenophobic. This chapter will respond to two of the challenges identified in more depth: the question of countering false narratives, and of the relation between listening to narratives and being inspired to act. As was emphasised, we have to realise that the telling and retelling of narratives is only the first step, but a very crucial step, towards constructing an alternative to the xenophobic life-world. The benefit of recognising our political narratives *as narratives* is that it draws our attention to the constructed nature of narratives. Some narratives can reveal truths while others can gloss over truths, or even convey falsehoods. Storytelling is a process of picking and choosing from experience, from memory, or from the available material, and that there is a deliberateness to how we choose what is included, and what is left out in a story. Understanding our identities in this way helps guard against rigidity and the idea that identity is something given to us, or something we are born into. Rigid identities are not only dangerous for those not of the identity, but ultimately unsustainable even for those who adopt the identity.

A narrative approach to identity, on the other hand, sees identity as something created, brought into being, an identity that is still on its way, which progresses as one's story progresses. Sharing our narratives, accounting for ourselves through stories, also allow us to connect in one of the most basic human ways, a connection that can take place across all the borders we erect between 'us' and 'them', 'me' and 'you' – national borders, age gaps, religious or cultural differences. Connections across such separations are crucial in a world in which people are feeling increasingly isolated and, as we saw in Chapter 4, seek belonging through exclusion of others. In such situations, a deep commitment to the community one belongs often leads to xenophobia, as one wants to protect the community at all costs. Missing are the kinds of connections which seek to establish commonality and relationship across group divisions, connections which undermine the rigidity of exclusionary communities. But such connections are dependent upon the kind of narrative that is told – a narrative that is open, that seeks connection, and not a narrative used as a tool in service of exclusion. That the latter kinds of narratives exist and do unmeasurable harm is something which those who have faith in the power of storytelling should admit.

The first section in this chapter will therefore look at the kinds of narratives that support xenophobia, with a focus specifically on the South African context. These narratives, however, are not unique to South Africa – across the world we find examples of anti-immigrant sentiments and even xenophobic violence being justified because 'they take our jobs' or 'they threaten our culture' or 'they are criminals'. As I argued in the previous chapter, the first step to take to counter such narratives is to measure them against evidence, which I will do here. False narratives are told by those in power to scapegoat vulnerable groups and avoid accountability, and therefore we have to make them accountable, and hold ourselves accountable, by first determining how much truth and untruth such narratives contain. I identify three common themes in anti-foreigner narratives that express our xenophobic attitudes and also seek to justify discrimination and violence. These are (i) foreigners are harmful to the economy; (ii) foreigners do not belong here; and (iii) foreigners pose a threat to us. Within these themes, I discuss several beliefs and prejudices which are contained in these broad narratives and indicate how we can criticise them. Narratives corresponding to the first theme – such as foreigners taking jobs or sponging on the welfare system – can countered with facts and with establishing more material security, yet such narratives also touch on the second theme of belonging. The counternarratives I suggest in Section 2 will therefore address primarily the question of belonging, as I argued in the chapters preceding that this question lies at the heart of people's xenophobic prejudices and attitudes.

In Section 2.1, I address the criticism discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the limited power of storytelling by considering the potential of narratives to bring about institutional change. I argue that institutions already contain narratives, either by being narratives themselves (e.g. constitutions) or by having an institutional identity informed by narratives. Such institutional narratives shape our lives and possibilities of action in various ways and change on this level will have far-reaching effects on the shape of our political world and our interactions with others. I then turn to the question of how institutional narratives can be changed and conclude that the responsibility lies with exemplary individuals within the institutions, and pressure groups that hold institutions to account.

In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I consider institutional change in the realm of citizenship and borders in response to the conclusion reached in Section 1. As xenophobia is deeply rooted in our

narratives about belonging, an anti-xenophobic project will have profound implications for our conception of citizenship, territory, and borders. Drawing on the work of Joseph Carens (1987, 2000) I argue for a counternarrative to the dominant ones that link citizenship to indigeneity, and that sees the nation as a family. Such a narrative emphasises connection along other lines than nationality or origin, while also undermining the essentialist idea behind the connection between citizenship and indigeneity. I then consider the territorialism that accompanies nationalism and xenophobia, and argue for narrative about borders that understands borders not as predetermined, natural, or permanent, but as products of specific histories, arbitrary, and open to change. Problematising borders in this way can help sever the link between belonging and territory and open the door for alternative narratives of belonging. In Section 2.3 I then consider how the language that we use in our narratives, especially the generalised statements we make about ourselves and others, contribute to prejudice and essentialist thinking. I suggest ways in which we can change this, with reference to Sarah-Jane Leslie's (2017) work on generics. Leslie shows us how essentialist thinking is a product of generalisation, as a cognitive tool, which under most circumstances is harmless and correctly applied but, when applied to the social and political world, leads to essentialising groups. Because Leslie provides us with the kind of language that works against essentialist thinking, her work is relevant to the question of telling new kinds of narratives.

Section 3 investigates the relationship between narrative or storytelling, judgment, and the imagination. The aim here is to show how narratives and narrative thinking can be incorporated into our political judgments and our institutions. The section provides a framework for judgment which individuals can rely on in their daily life, but also in their attempts to bring about institutional change as suggested in Section 2.1. I discuss Martha Nussbaum's (1995) literary imagination and Hannah Arendt's (1982) theory of political judgment. Both Arendt and Nussbaum argue for a form of judgment that is imaginative, in the sense of making others present in one's mind or taking on the experiences of those affected by one's judgments. This allows for judgments, in both a legal and political sense, which take the fullness of human life into account, serving as an antidote to dehumanising and instrumentalising ways of dealing with political questions.

Finally, Section 4 provides us with one particular context in which the kind of judgment suggested above, and the anti-xenophobic narratives suggested in earlier sections, can be implemented to great effect: in our education system and the school curriculum. This is not the

only sector where change should be implemented, but as narratives are also normative with regards to the future (as argued in Chapter 4), we should look to the future, our children, for change. I argue that we should understand our curriculum as narrative and teach it in a way which situates the facts in the world children live in and gives meaning to those facts. I also show how the narrative approach to teaching is more effective than other methods in relaying information.

The final part of this section provides us with a novel tool that institutions and individuals can use to share anti-xenophobic and inclusive narratives, strengthen the imagination, and promote cooperation and connection between strangers.[21] This tool is given to us by our evolutionary heritage: play. I refer to studies on animals that show how play diffuses xenophobic tension, and studies on children that indicate that play, whether structured or unstructured, narrative or not, is not only the most effective way of transmitting education but also teaches children social cooperation. Play therefore provides us with an answer to the problem of people not believing facts, as it packages facts in a different way. Play, we will see, is also a narrative form. Finally, I consider the potential of games – sports, board games, and especially video games – to contribute to an anti-xenophobic project. I argue that games not only foster positive relationships because people share in the fun, but also that they promote effective communication and cooperation, and that their immersive nature makes them exemplary vehicles for sharing both philosophical ideas and positive narratives. This chapter therefore shows us how we can apply the theory of narrative identity to the problem of xenophobia, with the aim of providing solutions to said problem. If xenophobia is a response to apprehensions of belonging, as I argued throughout this study, a solution to xenophobia needs to be found rethinking our identities, our place in the world, and in promoting trust and collaboration.

1. Xenophobic Narratives in South Africa

Our discussion thus far has shown us how narratives, whether individual or group-based, shape our identities and our perspective of ourselves and others. What we believe about ourselves, others, and the world, will inevitably shape our actions and interactions, and our narratives show what we believe and what prejudices we hold. If narratives have this world-shaping and world-creating potential, it follows that narratives can contribute and indeed form the "xenophobic life-world" discussed in Chapter 1. There, we saw that xenophobic violence is not

[21] Novel in its application to this problem.

sudden and random, but the consequence of a life-world in which xenophobia is tolerated, accepted, and even encouraged. A life-world in which the majority of people and institutions already hold xenophobic beliefs and prejudices, expressed in xenophobic narratives. The increase of xenophobic violence in post-Apartheid South Africa has gone hand in hand with "a heightened language of hysteria and demeaning 'Othering' of African immigrants" (Desai 2008: 51) not only in social settings, but also in the press, in parliament, and especially state institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police Service.

So to understand xenophobia, and xenophobia in South Africa in particular, we need to look further than humankind's instinctive fear of the unfamiliar and natural longing for belonging. We need to look at the actual things that people believe about foreigners, the reasons they give to justify xenophobic violence and attitudes, and how those beliefs are expressed in the narratives they tell about themselves and others. This will, ultimately, help us work toward a solution – towards telling different kinds of narratives. I focus on South Africa specifically, because it is where I am writing from and because it is a country characterised by xenophobic violence. Many of the narratives I will consider are in fact global – the same anti-immigrant or anti-refugee claims are made in the United States, in Europe, in Australia. This discussion, while local, therefore has broader significance. The narratives, or narrative threads, that I identify are sourced from a range of empirical research done on xenophobia in South Africa. I will look at peer-reviewed studies, but similar narratives can also be found in the media. Newspaper articles and opinion pieces may have limited perspectives or be particular (e.g. interviewing only one victim/perpetrator), but they do give an indication of what people think and tell 'on the streets.' Furthermore, the media (including social media) is one of the main mediums through which xenophobic narratives are spread. In a 2007 study of xenophobia in Southern Africa, Crush and Pendleton (2007: 70) found that people got most of their information (or, more often, misinformation) about migrants from media sources. The number one source then was television, followed by radio, personal interaction, and then newspapers. Despite 'personal interaction' being listed third, their study found that citizens have very little personal contact with non-citizens (ibid. 80), and another study found that "the vast majority of South Africans form their attitudes in a vacuum, r*elying mainly on hearsay and media and other representations*" (SAMP 2008: 4, my emphasis) This means that the different forms of media are the strongest contributors to citizens' 'knowledge' of foreigners. The situation today will look different, with more people having access to the internet and the rise of social media.

There are two broad kinds of xenophobic narratives: those we tell about foreigners (e.g. 'they steal our women') and those we tell about ourselves, which have exclusionary effects (e.g. South African exceptionalism). The latter need not be explicitly xenophobic, or even concerned with others, for it to have xenophobic undertones or implications (i.e. I can believe that this land is my land because I was born here, as were my parents and their parents and their parents' parents, without ever consciously thinking that those who weren't born here, don't belong here. Yet the implication is clear.) I will focus on the explicitly xenophobic narratives we tell, i.e. the reasons we give to justify our hatred toward foreigners. The narratives we tell about foreigners seem to fall under three broad themes: (i) that foreigners are harmful to the economy; (ii) that foreigners do not belong here; and (iii) that foreigners pose a threat to our lives. These have been alluded to before, with points (ii) and (iii) discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. My discussion here will focus on the more concrete aspects of these themes. In Chapter 4, I held that narratives are the responses we give to questions about identity – ours and others' – and through which we arrange facts and give meaning to facts and experiences. Narratives are also the medium which we use to express our beliefs and prejudices, with the aim of sharing them with others. Below we will see how facts are interpreted, arranged, erased, denied, all in service of anti-foreigner prejudices and beliefs, and how these are spread in the form of narratives, and in turn accepted and believed in by those who hear these narratives.

1.1 Foreigners are harmful to the economy

In their comparative study, Crush and Pendleton (2007: 72) found that South Africans are especially averse to allowing entrance or membership to the nation to foreigners, with "economic harm" being the major deterrent, whereas neighbouring SADC countries fear overpopulation the most. Foreigners, so the story goes, are harmful to the economy because they (i) take 'our' jobs and undercut wages; (ii) put a strain on the welfare system, especially on healthcare and education; and (iii) are arriving in ever increasing numbers, taking up space and using up resources – this is often referred to as the 'wave' of immigrants/refugees/foreigners. Water metaphors are common in anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner narratives – tsunamis, waves, foreigners streaming across the borders, institutions drowning in paperwork and needy foreigners.

The effect of socio-economic factors on people's attitudes toward foreigners has been widely studied. It is certainly true that material scarcity, or economic insecurity, have an impact on

how secure people feel in their own homes or positions, and how likely they are to see foreigners as a burden:

> Perceptions of relative national and personal economic circumstances have been shown to have a strong correlation with attitudes towards outsiders. When perceptions are negative, scapegoats are required and often the visible and invisible foreigners "amongst us" take the blame. (ibid. 76)

However, this is only part of the story. Crush and Pendleton (ibid. 80) found that the economically stronger SADC countries – South Africa, Namibia, Botswana – are far more negative about the presence of foreigners than the economically weaker Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Swaziland. The difference between these two groups is that the latter are (generally) migrant-sending, while the former are (generally) migrant-receiving. It is therefore not simply a matter of the have-nots looking for someone to blame (although that is sometimes the case), but also the age-old story of the have's not wanting to share what they have. It is not only the poor or disenfranchised who are xenophobic – "the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes" (ibid.). Of course, there are different levels of economic security (or the perception thereof) among different individuals within a country. The economic inequality in South Africa no doubt contributes to xenophobic attitudes – the poor measure themselves against the rich, and may see others in their class as competition, or as preventing them from gaining economic security. The rich may be fearful of losing what they have or may want to become richer by exploiting foreign workers. In either scenario, internal problems (inequality) are blamed on outsiders. Scapegoating, as we saw in Chapter 1, happens because it is easier to find a scapegoat, than to address the actual causes of problems. What should be clear here is that, despite the claim that foreigners harm the economy, it is not their actual or potential harm that matters or determines citizens' attitudes towards them, it is the citizens' perception of their own economic security (or lack thereof). This is not to say that migrants do not have an impact on countries' economies, but rather that the facts surrounding that impact are not what shape people's attitudes or give rise to the idea that they are harmful.

'They take our jobs'

Perhaps the most frequent accusation levelled at migrants across the globe is that 'they take *our* jobs!' Immigrants are accused of settling for lower wages or working in situations that go

against labour laws. For employers hoping to increase their profit, undocumented (and hence unprotected) migrants are ideal employees. They can pay them less than the minimum wage, without benefits, contracts, or the promise of permanent employment. There can be no doubt that this is something that happens. However, there seems once again to be a dissonance between how regularly this is actually the case, and citizens' *perception* of how regularly this happens. Despite this 'fact' being widely believed, the 2007 study found that

> Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner […] Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner […] Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. (ibid.: 72)

It is likely that this may occur more often in unskilled jobs (such as farm labourer or domestic worker) than skilled, which means that those who are most vulnerable (the unskilled and unemployed) may have reason to feel cheated. However, the issue is once again more complex than a foreigner coming in and 'taking' a job. One has to wonder at a system that allows that kind of exploitation by (i) not protecting all people from exploitation from employers, regardless of citizenship, and (ii) making it possible that an exploitative wage is even desirable. As with the broader 'economic harm', it seems that in the labour market foreigners become the scapegoats for a deeply unequal system.

Another fact should be considered, when comparing the unemployment levels of migrants versus citizens. Research has shown that many migrants are employed because they *create* opportunities for themselves, especially in informal economies. Migrants become street vendors, selling wares bought or crafted, or spaza shop owners in informal settlements. In such instances, they do not take jobs from citizens, but sometimes create jobs for citizens (see Nyamnjoh 2006: 73-74). Ironically, another charged levelled against job-stealing foreigners is that they are also lazy. This is perhaps more common in, for example, the USA than in South Africa. Crush and Pendleton (2007: 72) found that "people from outside are not seen as particularly more or less hard-working than citizens." The laziness of immigrants is common refrain in right-wing or Republican discourse in the USA. The question is, how can the same group of people be lazy and sponges on society, *and* steal jobs? One certainly cannot accuse the xenophobe of consistent beliefs.

The narrative that foreigners are 'taking our jobs' is not harmless. It not only joins other anti-foreigner sentiments in creating and upholding a xenophobic life-world, but it has in the past served as a justification of violence:

> In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed the roof trying to escape the crowd. This violence was visited by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally […] who had gathered to protest under the banner of an organisation called 'Unemployed Masses of South Africa' (*Pretoria News*, 4 September 1998, in Desai 2008: 51)

The anger and frustration of the rally-goers was taken out on the three men (whether they, as individuals, 'stole' jobs or not). One can imagine the reasoning of the crowd: *They are foreigners, and therefore part of the group that causes the crisis of unemployment in South Africa. For that reason, they can and indeed should be harmed.*

Part of the reason why unemployment or job scarcity are blamed on foreigners is that people believe that there are more foreigners in the country than there actually are. The water/wave metaphors I alluded to earlier express this – it is never a trickle, but a wave. The country is 'drowning in foreigners'. However, studies show that we generally overestimate the number of foreigners in the country, with Crush and Pendleton (2007: 68) showing that South Africans believe between 25-35% of the people in the country are foreigners. Establishing this number is difficult, given how many foreigners are undocumented, but even if we take this into account the numbers are overestimated. A Stats SA report from 2012 (following the 2011 census) indicated that there were around 2.2 million foreign-born individuals in South Africa (Stats SA 2012), while estimates in the media at the time said around 5 million, with the assumption that most of those are undocumented (Wilkinson 2015). In all likelihood the number increased since 2011, but the difference between the estimates of Stats SA and the estimates of the media is telling. Of course, xenophobic people may consider people born in South Africa, but of foreign descent (e.g. Indian), as 'foreign', so accurate statistics about foreign born individuals will not convince on this score. This raises the question of who truly belongs, which we discussed in Chapter 3, and the link between belonging, citizenship, and indigeneity discussed in Chapter 1. I return to narratives about belonging below.

'They sponge on our welfare system'

Foreigners are also accused of putting a strain on the welfare system. In 2007, 8.6% of South Africans believe that foreigners should be kept out because they cause shortages on housing, food, and services (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 72). Given the rise in xenophobia since then, one can safely assume that this number, if changed, will only be higher. On Crush and Pendleton's 'Stereotyping Scale', they listed several activities – positive and negative – and asked respondents to what extent they think migrants in their home country are involved with these activities. The activities are (on the negative side) taking jobs, committing crimes, sending earnings out of the country, using the welfare services, bringing diseases, and (on the positive side) creating jobs and bringing scarce or necessary skills to the country. The mean scores of the negative activities far outstrip those of the positive activities. For example, "create jobs" got 3/10, whereas "using welfare" got 7/10 (with '0' meaning no migrants do this, and '10' meaning all of them do this). The fact that using welfare is perceived negatively is already telling – the healthcare, education, and other welfare systems are seen as 'ours'. This possessiveness over healthcare resources no doubt springs from resource insecurity – the most economically vulnerable citizens have no choice but to rely on the state for healthcare, and the state is not providing as it should. There is a shortage of doctors and other medical staff, a shortage of medicine and treatment options. Moreover, the healthcare system is vulnerable to municipal and provincial mismanagement and government corruption.

Many immigrants who come to South Africa also rely on the public healthcare system, as they rely on public education (another sector that is understaffed, under resourced, and underfunded). Given the scarcity, citizens' feeling that they are in competition with foreigners is understandable. Yet once again this feeling is based on the incorrect assumption that the scarcity is the fault of the foreigners, instead of mismanagement and corruption (once again, the socio-economic or material aspect of the problem). The feeling is also based on a political assumption: that the resources belong, first and foremost, to citizens. In a way this makes sense, if one considers that citizens pay taxes which in turn is used to fund public institutions, but many citizens in South Africa who make use of the public healthcare system are not tax-payers. So this is not a case of 'I paid for it, they're getting it'. Citizens assume that the state has to provide for them in a way it does not have to provide for immigrants. While states do have responsibilities toward citizens that they do not have toward non-citizens, this does not apply in the case of healthcare and education (when speaking of modern democratic states). Access

to healthcare and education are universal human rights and are guaranteed by the South African constitution for everyone who lives within the state's borders, regardless of citizenship. Moreover, many immigrants have been naturalised, given residency, or asylum. A naturalised citizen, at the very least, has just as much right to state resources as other citizens. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, the legal status of foreigners, or even the foreign status of individuals, does not matter. One simply needs to be perceived as a foreigner, for other citizens to assume that you are illegal and have no right to state resources.

Tangentially related to this issue is the question of the relationship between immigrants and the state, and how that affects their ability to access healthcare and education:

> African immigrants had already learnt to live on the margins of the system, finding ways to get their children to school, finding jobs and shelters to live in. At the same time many had to learn to live at a distance from the repressive arm of the state. (Desai 2008: 50).

The above quotation hints at another way in which xenophobia threatens the quality of life of immigrants in South Africa. The reality is that going to the hospital or sending their children to school may place immigrants in an awkward (at the least) or even dangerous position, especially if they are undocumented. A simple, necessary thing like going to the doctor can alert the authorities to a person's presence of South Africa, which can have dire consequences. For this same reason, undocumented migrants are more vulnerable than citizens when they are victims of crime. Crimes against them may go unreported, because they do not want the authorities to identify them (and because migrants often suffer at the hands of the police force, where xenophobic attitudes are rife). This means that migrants do not only have to think of direct threats to their safety and lives, as when they are attacked by citizens who are angry at them for 'stealing' jobs and resources, but their lives are also threatened in a more indirect way because accessing healthcare, education, and justice is a big risk to take. If we understand xenophobia as a system of exclusion (the 'civic ostracism' of the 'xenophobic life-world' – see Chapter 1), then this is another form of exclusion. Migrants are not only excluded from social settings, or from political decision-making. They are often even excluded from the things one needs to live a basically decent human life.[22] This exclusion is not separate from the xenophobic

[22] I should point out here that many, if not most, South African citizens have insufficient access to these things – safe shelter, food, healthcare, and education (which I consider a basic need, as an education provides one with the skills to find a work, which in turn provides one with the means to take care of one's other needs). This is, for the

narratives in question – healthcare workers, teachers, police officers are, after all, also citizens who may hold xenophobic attitudes based on such narratives. Where the belief exist that migrants do not have the right to 'our' healthcare and 'our' education, individuals and the institutions they belong to will try to prevent them from benefitting from such public institutions.

To counter this belief and its expressions in narratives, we would need accurate and clear information on the state of our healthcare system (or education, or justice, etc.). Not only how many migrants make use of public healthcare – a number that is likely to be overestimated – but also the reasons why the healthcare system is in crisis. That this crisis is due to things other than 'foreigners taking over', is clear. This, however, would require a level of honesty and accountability on the part of public servants and political leaders that we are unaccustomed to. I have no suggestions for how we can make politicians more honest. Strategies like encouraging whistleblowing (and protecting whistle-blowers), institutions like the Public Protector (if it is functioning as it should, which is also not a given), an independent judiciary, non-governmental agencies that serve as watchdogs, as well as civil protest are ways in which politicians and public servants can be held more accountable, and truths uncovered.

But, as I suggested, the problem goes deeper. What needs to change are people's *beliefs* about who has the right to what. The strategies listed above will only work if there are people that make them work, and people who have the will and conviction to do so. The narrative in question here rests on the assumption or belief that foreigners do not have the same right to care and protection and support because they are not from here and do not belong here. What is needed is a narrative that questions this notion of belonging (as discussed in Chapter 3), but also one that problematises the link between 'belonging' and 'ownership'. We need to imagine a form of belonging that is not possessive, but that recognises that one can belong alongside others. This will surely be easier if material circumstances were different – if there were more resources to go around. Scarcity creates insecurity, which encourages competition.

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most part, due to the inequalities in our society and resource scarcity. The causes for the lack of access are therefore different. Migrants' access is impeded by xenophobic attitudes (e.g. nurses refusing to treat them) and the threat of being deported, whereas citizens are impeded by poor or ineffective service delivery, general scarcity, and other factors external to them (i.e., they are not shown away because of who they are, and they do not fear being detected and deported). Under certain unique circumstances, citizens may be similarly impeded. Think of, for example, sex-workers who are the victims of crimes or women who are abused by their partners who may feel that they cannot go to the police for protection because the police will not protect them, may even threaten and abuse them (or, in the case of sex-workers, arrest them), or will ignore them.

Yet it is not inconceivable that, even in times of scarcity, people can act differently. Evidence of this is found in the field of disaster studies. The almost Hobbesian idea that under conditions of scarcity, people will resort to violence to ensure access to basic goods has been undermined (at least in part – of course people *do* sometimes act like this) by studies done in the aftermath of natural and manmade disasters and the experiences of the people who are directly affected by such disasters. After hurricanes or earthquakes, great fires or terrorist attacks, when people are on the edge of life and access to resources cannot be guaranteed, we do not only see dog eat dog competition, but also altruism, solidarity, and empathy, often between people who under normal circumstances would not have reached out to each other (see Solnit 2009). Of course, there is a difference between scarcity due to a disastrous event, and prolonged scarcity due to material inequality. Any solidarity formed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster will have a hard time sustaining itself if conditions do not change and fatigue and frustrations set in. However, the fact that people *do* bond together in this way suggests something about what humans are like, which goes against the Hobbesian narrative of human nature. It seems to me that the narrative of humans as inherently competitive, of survival of the fittest, is not based on reality but rather a tool in the hands of those in power, to legitimate their power. If we believe that instability and scarcity will necessarily lead to violence and a state similar to war, with every person acting solely in their interest, we more gladly give up our freedoms to 'ensure' stability. This is not an idea which I can develop in full here, although it would be worthwhile to pursue it. For my current purposes, it is enough to say that a counterstory based on altruism in the face of disaster, cooperation instead of competition, can have a powerful effect in changing how people think about human interaction and conflict under conditions of scarcity, especially as the ecological crisis we find ourselves in threatens our already scarce resources.

1.2 Foreigners do not belong here

The issue of belonging and membership is central to xenophobia, as we saw in Chapter 3. Xenophobia is, in one sense, a response to a feeling of not belonging (alienation, isolation), but also a way to define belonging – to draw borders between us and them, members and non-members. Throughout this study, we have seen how belonging in South Africa specifically is linked in our minds to citizenship and indigeneity. Xenophobia, as argued in Chapter 1, is a form of exclusion or ostracism based on idea of foreignness. The broad narrative of foreigners not belonging here is not always explicitly expressed. Our narratives about our own belonging, about 'us' or 'we, the people' or what it means to be South African, while giving identity to us,

can explicitly or implicitly exclude those who do not share in that identity. Our self-narratives and our narratives about others are intricately linked. Sometimes we define our identities based on what we are not, in the sense that we construct an other so that we can assert 'I am not like that'. This is what Morrison (2017: 15) means when she speaks of our need for a stranger to define ourselves. This is not only applicable to individual identities, but especially to the creation of a unified national identities: "For autochthons, excluding visible others can strengthen loyalties to the space they occupy and ratify abstract notions of an indigenous nation" (Landau 2006: 126). Creating the nation in this way is part of South Africa's historical heritage, with citizenship defined in terms of the racial other. At the end of Apartheid, the need for uniting the nation called for a new other: "South Africa's redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship is based on the creation of a "new other"; the "non-citizen", the "foreigner", the "alien"" (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 64).

Yet in a way our self-conceptions also determine which narratives about others we choose to believe. So South Africans believe narratives about other African nationals being "uneducated", "primitive", or "backwards" (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 39) because we believe the narratives of our own exceptionalism and our right to belong because we were born here, or our ancestors are from here.

National identity therefore plays a determining role in how xenophobic people are. In Crush and Pendleton's (2007) study, it was found that most respondents valued nationality and national identity very highly, with many expressing pride in their identity and the desire that their children should share that identity (ibid. 77). Importantly, the following was concluded:

> Birth is massively important to most people in the determination of "national belonging", as is having parents and grandparents born in the country…Far less important in this regard is race…less than half the population in each country feels that it is essential to be 'black' in order to be a citizen. (ibid. 79)

The 'foreigners do not belong here' narrative usually contains the following ideas: foreigners look different, act differently, speak differently – they are clearly not from here. To belong, you must be from here, and from nowhere else. It is not enough to have been born in South Africa. Your heritage must be purely South African, going back generations, to be able to say that you are from here. Your legal right to be in South Africa does not matter. Even South African citizens, ones who are 'originally' from South Africa, are doubted because they do not

look or sound 'South African': "This stereotyping and lack of concern for immigrants' rights was exemplified by a police officer who arrested a South African citizen, who was quickly deported because 'he walked like a Mozambican'" (Desai 2008: 52).

This is perhaps the biggest challenge facing any kind of anti-xenophobic project. A counternarrative would have to sever the links between citizenship, territory, birth(right), membership, and belonging, without losing sight of the importance of having a place to belong. This would require a reinterpretation of our membership norms and our borders. I return to this at greater length in Section 2.

1.3 Foreigners pose a threat

I have given considerable attention to the role that fear and perceived threats play in xenophobia, emphasising that xenophobic attitudes and violence are often a reaction not to an actual foreigner posing a threat (i.e. standing with a gun against one's head), but a feeling of being threatened on the side of the xenophobe. The object of the xenophobe's hatred is an object of his or her imagination. Relating this broad narrative back to the previous two, we see that foreigners are believed to pose a threat to the economic flourishing of the citizen, and to the citizen's place in the world (Chapter 3). In Chapter 2, I discussed how the foreigner is also seen as an existential threat. Worldwide, this narrative of foreigners menacing our lives and livelihoods fuels xenophobia:

> There is a generalized perception amongst citizens in Southern Africa that their countries are under siege from outside. This perception, correct or not, is at the heart of any xenophobic discourse. (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 68)

What sort of stories do we tell, other than 'taking jobs', that indicate that xenophobia is about feeling threatened? Foreigners are accused of being criminal, of bringing diseases like AIDS into the country, of being drug traffickers, stealing 'our women', exploiting women through prostitution, and a whole range of other crimes (ibid. 75; see also Matsinhe 2011: 298). These are all common stereotypes, widely believed and distributed by the South African Police Service, the Department of Home Affairs, the media, and political leaders. Following the most recent series of xenophobic violence (August-September 2019), which saw many people choosing to return to their countries of origin, President Cyril Ramaphosa not only denied that South Africans are xenophobic (during a speech in Zimbabwe to a crowd of Zimbabweans), but also (at an ANC meeting) said that foreigners in South Africa should obey the country's

laws, protocols, and regulations (Ntshidi 2019). This at a time when cities are burning and people are being killed for being foreign amounts to victim-blaming, and Ramaphosa's comments supports the narrative that foreigners are criminal. While not denying that some foreigners engage in criminal activities – organised and opportunistic – this is also overestimated. The issue is that foreigners are assumed to be criminals based on their foreignness, and not on any behaviour on their side. *Any* foreigner can become the victim of xenophobic violence regardless of their criminality or, more likely, lack thereof.

Foreigners are regarded as criminal not only based on their assumed activities (like dealing drugs), but also simply because they are *here*. This is a question of education and ignorance about the law. Locals (including public officials like police officers) tend to assume that nationals from other African countries are here illegally, vastly overestimating the number of undocumented immigrants in our borders. In our minds, we confuse immigration with illegality (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 68). There is also some confusion about the different potential legal statuses foreigners can have – naturalised citizens, permanent residents, refugees, and scepticism about whether refugees are 'really' refugees (ibid. 70). Here a more accurate understanding of the laws surrounding immigration and refugeehood, perhaps through public education programmes, would go some way in undoing the stereotyping narratives that brand all foreigners as 'illegal'. A big part of the problem is also how the media reports on immigrants – research has shown that immigrants are often labelled 'illegal', regardless of their legal status.[23] This reinforces the link between immigrant/alien/refugee and illegality/criminality. The South African government's own mixed messages on this question exacerbate the problem, as public statements such as Ramaphosa's (above) reinforce stereotypes, while the laws and policies relating to refugees and immigrants cause confusion. For example, the refugee system and the system of immigration control are governed by the same laws and policies, with the result that the refugee system cannot fulfil its duty of protection but rather becomes an immigration control mechanism (Amit 2011: 486). This makes it easier for the public to tar all foreigners with the same brush.

[23] See Chapter 1, section 2.2.

The kind of reinterpretation of membership norms, citizenship, and borders I discuss in Section 2 will also go some way in solving the problem, as illegality is assumed because we cannot imagine that an outsider can legally (i.e. legitimately) belong.

2. Stories for Change

2.1 The question of institutional change

In the previous chapter, the shortcomings of a narrative approach were discussed. One such shortcoming is the fact that the medium of narrative is limited – stories can open worlds, can help us get to know each other, can make us more sympathetic or empathetic, can build bridges…but only up to a point. Stories may inspire us for a moment, but we move on, or forget. Stories, being particular, may also blind us to institutional and structural injustices. We may interpret a person's telling of their life story as an indication of their personal suffering, without asking how that suffering was brought about by racist, sexist, or xenophobic structures, or without connecting this story to other similar life-narratives and drawing any conclusions from that. Storytelling runs the risk of being too individual, changing some hearts and minds, but they do not necessarily bring about institutional or societal change.

What is clear, when we study xenophobia, is that we need both a change of heart and mind, *and* institutional change. Individuals' xenophobic attitudes, we have seen, are in part informed by the anti-foreigner narratives that political leaders and the media spew. Furthermore, the ways in which our institutions are structured, along with the underlying narratives that guide them, determine whether foreigners will be protected or not. Our laws and policies relating to immigration, our police, the asylum-process, Home Affairs – all these institutions play a cardinal role in the safety (or lack thereof) of foreigners who come to South Africa. Over time, if individual attitudes toward foreigners change, the institutions will also change. But institutions change slowly, and while we wait people are being ostracised and even killed. As with South Africa's decision to legalise same-sex marriages in 2002, institutional change should sometimes come first and hope the people follow.

Can the narrative approach be effective on an institutional level? For that to be the case, we need evidence that (a) institutions have identities, and (b) that institutions tell, or ascribe to, specific narratives that influence how they function. The second requirement is easily met –the rules governing institutions can be interpreted as narratives, as indeed South Africa's Constitution is sometimes viewed as a narrative or a document containing narratives and myths

(and a nation-shaping narrative at that) (see Motha 2011). One can think of other examples: The Declaration of Independence (USA), the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948). These institution-forming documents tell a narrative about the kind of people we (whether as a nation or humanity as a whole) want to be, and the kind of society we want to live in. These documents, read as narratives, imagine a better future for those involved – one that would not have the same injustices or systems of oppression as the system that went before.

The question of institutional identity is perhaps a bit trickier. It may be better to speak of institutional culture (recognising the close link between culture and identity, on an individual as well as a group level). The idea that institutions or organisations – whether they are schools, businesses, the army or police forces – have specific, individual cultures originated in the 1950s (Jaques 1951) and became increasingly popular in recent decades. Such cultures are governed by the history and traditions of the institution, the rules, regulations, policies, and codes of conduct. We can interpret these things as narratives, in the sense that they give expression to the view the institution has of itself (i.e. the kind of institution it is, or aims to be), and they provide the regulative ideals of the institution. Remember that narratives not only seek to give meaning, but that they are also normative, expressing not only who we are but also who we should be and who we want to become. This is a question of identity, and one which institutions are also concerned with.

I will briefly illustrate how institutional identity relates to narrative at the hand of an example. Think of the difference between a police force that believes its goal is to serve the public, and that gains its legitimacy from the support and trust of the public, as opposed to a police force that sees itself as above the law, not only enforcers but creators of the law (as in a police state). The difference between the first and second kind of police force lies in the institutional culture of the force, and in what they believe their place in society is (to serve and protect, or to control). Members of the force will learn this by how the history of the force is presented to them and by what their superiors expect of them and permit them to do. The process of relating to the history of the institution, and of sharing that history and its accompanying traditions with new recruits, is an act of narration: organising facts and experiences with the goal of relaying information, including information about the kind of institution it is (i.e. its identity), and of providing norms for action. So the South African police force may see itself as an institution which has to protect the South African people, and given its historical role in upholding oppression, it may have a culture of allowing violence against those who are not of the people

it has to protect, with 'the people' now being all South Africans, but not foreigners.[24] In Chapter 1 (Section 1.1), we saw how the transition into democracy did not end victimisation and oppression at the hands of those in power, but who the victims are (previously black South Africans, now African nationals) and who the powerful are (previously the white government, police force, and populace, now all South Africans) (see Matsinhe 2011: 296).

Narratives can, perhaps, be seen as a necessary requirement for positive institutional change. Sceptics of the 'power' of storytelling may remark that stories cannot change the world, that they cannot bring liberation – only material change, and the change in social conditions, can. But how can we know that change is necessary, what form that change should take, or how society should look afterwards? To put it differently: is change, liberation, or emancipation possible if we cannot, or do not, imagine an alternative? In the precious chapter I said that stories can alert us to injustices we are unaware of. To know the way forward, we need a sense of where we are going. We need to be able to imagine a path forward and communicate it to those who will join us. In other words, we need a narrative that can inspire us.

My question in this section is how anti-xenophobic narratives could be institutionalised, or the role of narratives in institutional formation and culture. We saw in the previous section that xenophobic narratives are broadcast from almost all the influential institutions in South Africa, from the media to the police, the Department of Home affairs, and prominent political leaders. In the most recent general election (May 2019), many parties including the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) made stronger immigration controls one of their campaign policies. In the United States and, most recently, the United Kingdom, the highest institutions (the presidency, the prime minister) are inhabited by two highly xenophobic, racist men who came into power, in part, because their anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner stances enjoy wide support. How can narratives help us when xenophobic narratives are so entrenched in our public institutions?

From the outset, I should make clear that what I am offering here is not an 'easy solution'. Institutional change is slow, as is societal change – especially if it is in a positive direction (humans seem to be better at becoming suddenly bad, than suddenly good). I am not sure that

[24] I am leaving aside the question of equal protection of citizens, yet I want to acknowledge that we have reason to believe that even among citizens, protection by the police force is not equal, nor are the distribution of resources (number of officers, vehicles) across communities. My focus here is not on the failings of our police force, but rather on showing that police forces have specific cultures which relate to institutional identities.

there are any fast solutions. Changing perspectives, changing narratives, will be a long and hard task. Fortunately, the world's history of revolutions and rebellions show us that movements can gain massive support, and in rare cases seemingly overnight. Neither do I think a world without xenophobia is attainable, yet this should not discourage us from trying everything we can to combat xenophobia, and from doing the storytelling and educational work needed to achieve that.

We face a further problem of circularity: for institutional change to happen, institutional and individual narratives need to change; for *that* to happen, the people in the institutions need to commit to activities and strategies such as story-sharing and imaginative judgments; however, to get them to do this, they need to be incentivised, and the most efficient way to do that would be if institutional culture changes. The best we can do, perhaps, is to rely on exemplary individuals within our institutions and society, as well as pressure groups, to put pressure on institutions to change. Such individuals and groups do exist, and historically great institutional change has been brought about through such pressure, including boycotting, revolutions, and civil protests. Such actions provide the incentive for institutional change.

Douglass C. North (1990,1991) argues that institutions are fundamentally incentive structures that determine the shape or direction of our political, economic, and social interactions. Institutions provide us with the 'rules of the game', which incentivise individuals to act in certain ways and not others. These rules can be formal (laws, rulebooks) or informal (codes of conduct, conventions) that tell us what we can do and, when we break them, is used in determining the punishment (North 1990: 4). Importantly, institutional change is influenced by individual beliefs and ideologies, defined as "the subjective perceptions (models, theories) all people possess to explain the world around them" (ibid. 23, fn. 7), as individuals make their choices on the basis of their subjective perceptions. Although North does not use the term, narratives (as identity-giving stories) are the kinds of "subjective perceptions" North is concerned with. This does not only mean that subjective perceptions play a role in how individuals react to the incentives provided by institutions, but also that what is incentivised and what is punished is determined by our subjective perceptions, as our perceptions and incentives are socially transmitted and "part of the heritage we call culture" (ibid. 37). Institutional change, as I have suggested, therefore comes from the individual's response to "the incentives embodied in the framework" (ibid. 83).

Msimang argued that stories only have a lasting power if those of us inspired by them, are also inspired to act (see Chapter 4, Section 2.2). To act, in this case, means to change our institutions and the incentives they embody through narratives that tell a different kind of story from the dominant, exclusionary, xenophobic narratives that shape institutional and individual identities. To summarise: Society and the individuals contained therein can become less xenophobic if *not* being xenophobic is incentivised through institutions, and this will happen when exemplary individuals decide to change the incentive structures in accordance with their anti-xenophobic counternarratives. This calls to mind the individuals Arendt (1970: ix) discusses in her *Men in Dark Times*:

> [E]ven in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination [and] such illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given them on earth…

A sentiment that echoes Bertolt Brecht (2018: 787)

> In the dark times, will there also be singing?
>
> Yes, there will be singing
>
> About the dark times.

Our task is clear: tell, listen, sing, and (as we will see), play. Do this to cast light on the harms done by xenophobic narratives. I now turn to the content of our 'songs'.

2.2 Citizenship and borders: a different approach[25]

In the previous section, as well as Chapters 1 and 3, we saw that belonging or membership is closely linked with territory and (place of) birth (or indigeneity). This is common in South Africa, but also elsewhere in the world – remember Kim and Sundstrom's (2014) point that some groups are 'perpetually foreign', regardless of how long they or their ancestors have been in the country. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with valuing the place one is from. It becomes an issue when we make origin a necessary requirement for belonging, and when not belonging has a severely negative impact on the non-member's life. That this is the case

[25] Parts of this section have already been published (Cilliers 2018).

with xenophobic discrimination should be clear by now. My concern here is providing a direction our counternarratives can take that would change the way we think of belonging, citizenship, and borders, but in a way that could (and should) be institutionally applied. In this I take my lead from Joseph Carens (1987, 2000, 2016) and his work on the ethics of immigration.

Carens (2016: 425) argues that an ethical approach to immigration "will entail changing some rules and also paying attention to informal mechanisms like social norms, incentives, practices of recognition and conceptions of national identity, all of which affect inclusion and exclusion." Carens is specifically concerned with (liberal) democratic states and their responsibilities toward refugees and immigrants. Xenophobia is not limited to such states, but the fact that it is present in states supposedly concerned with rights and the protection of freedoms, democratic states is of special concern here. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, the painful irony of xenophobia in South Africa is that it has increased drastically with the birth of our democracy. In his early work (1987), Carens argues for fewer restrictions on immigration and more open borders, as the main approaches to political theory, if taken to their logical conclusions, are commensurable with his conclusions (he specifically considers the theories of Rawls, Nozick, and utilitarian approaches). In brief: it is not hard to imagine how this argument can be made relating to Nozick's libertarianism, as borders and restrictions on immigration hamper individuals' ability to freely participate in the free-market (ibid. 253). Behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, Carens argues, nationality should also be arbitrary from a moral point of view, and nationality is precisely the "sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds" (ibid. 256) which Rawls is concerned with when he excludes, for example, race and gender from being morally relevant in decisions about the principles of justice.

Carens (2000) makes an interesting argument regarding citizenship and our feelings of connectedness with our compatriots. An argument often levelled against more lenient immigration policies and porous or open borders is that we have a stronger moral responsibility to those we share a community with, specifically those who are also from our own countries. Citizenship creates connections and relationships of reciprocity. Very often, the nation is compared to the family. Carens has a few points to make in response to these familiar kinds of arguments, two of which I will briefly consider. Firstly, leaving aside the question of whether we should view the nation as a family (Carens says no), what these kinds of arguments hope to show is that it is not unjust to favour compatriots over foreigners, just like it would not be

unjust to favour one's family members over others. However, this argument falls flat in its latter assumption, for there are indeed instances where we do think it is morally wrong to show favour to one's family members. We see this in our laws against nepotism, or in family members of a company hosting a competition being prohibited from entering. It is therefore not always acceptable to favour one's family over others: "our notions of justice constrain the extent and ways in which we think it is acceptable for us to favor family members" (ibid. 638). The analogy to the family does not do what those arguing for it intend. A further point can be made: people form meaningful connections with others outside their own families, often more meaningful than the relationships they have with their families. Even if the family analogy is accepted, it still does not necessarily support favouring your 'family' over others.

Another important point that Carens makes, related to the previous one, is that people form strong connections across borders, not just within borders. 'Connection' and the reciprocity it entails can therefore not serve as a justification of more stringent immigration controls. This argument is circular – it intends to show that citizens are more strongly connected to one another than to non-citizens, but this only works if "the greater connection among citizens is treated as self-evident or citizenship itself is treated as the measure of connection" (ibid. 641). Saying that the connection between citizens has a stronger moral weight than between non-citizens assumes that such connections are more special or stronger, which is not necessarily true. There is no necessary, inherent, or natural connection that binds citizens together. Unity is created or imposed. Once we realise this, the doors are opened for the possibility that others can also become citizens or members, and that new and alternative connections can be formed. An anti-xenophobic counternarrative will have to understand connection in this way – as something important, but not as something necessarily linked to citizenship.

The implications are twofold: firstly, detaching 'citizenship' from 'connection' in the familial or 'inherent' sense will draw our attention to the fact that a personal sense of connection is not needed for us to consider ourselves morally responsible to others, or owing something to others as a matter of justice. Carens (2000: 641) points out that we cannot only understand justice in terms of reciprocity, for that would not explain why we owe something to compatriots who do not contribute to the society, nor would it explain why killing or robbing those who do not form part of our society would be unjust or wrong. Carens grants that reciprocity forms part of justice, but even with that granted "it does not follow that we are entitled to exclude others who would like to enter those reciprocal connections" (ibid.). A conception of justice and moral

responsibility that is not based only on reciprocity or on compatriot-connection will help us avoid the problems identified above regarding our duties toward non-contributors as well as non-compatriots. One way to do this is to understand our connection to our fellow 'countrymen and women' not in terms of legal status or origin, but in terms of the space we share and the institutions that shape that space. We already have a narrative that encapsulates this view: the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: "We, the people of South Africa [believe] that South Africa belongs to all who live in it" and, consequently, all who live in it belong here.

For this counternarrative to gain traction, two more aspects relating to belonging and citizenship need to be addressed: firstly, the link between indigeneity, origin and citizenship and secondly, the related question of borders, belonging and territory. There are many strategies we can employ to construct counternarratives which would sever the links between indigeneity and citizenship and belonging and borders. Carens' reading of Rawls provides us with one – emphasising the moral arbitrariness of being born in one place rather than another – or we can consider narratives that show how immigrants contribute to the health (metaphorical) and wealth of a country, or in countries with large and old immigrant populations (USA, Australia), how the cross-border movement of people is part and parcel of the country's identity. Such narratives are inherently political, for they deal with our group identities and our relations to other groups. These narratives are already being told, from antifascist political protests to storytelling festivals to novels to political debates.

The link between belonging and territory can be severed by emphasising the fluidity of borders over time, for example showing how our current borders are the product of a long history of conquests and conflicts, colonisation and decolonisation. In Chapter 3 I considered the role that place and belonging plays in xenophobia, specifically in relation to nationalist territoriality. Uncoupling citizenship from indigeneity will already lead us to question the 'naturalness' of the place in which we find ourselves (i.e. being 'South African'), but we can go deeper by problematising the very idea that this place, in my case South Africa, necessarily exists in the shape it does now. The fact is that the current shape of South Africa is relatively new, a product of our most recent history. Added to that, most countries in Africa are, territorially, the result of the subdivision of the continent by colonial forces. After liberation, most of these borders remained intact, even if many consider them to be "artificial borders" (Nkiwane 1993: 67). The dividing up of Africa threw together different ethnic, tribal, or religious groups, while in some

instances separating other groups who before had belonged together. This does not mean that in the interim new identities along national lines could not be formed, but it does recall Anderson's point that nationalisms assume a long history where there is none. Historical narratives which emphasise the changing nature of borders, coupled with narratives which emphasise the historical movement of people and the accompanying changes in groups, can lead us to question what it means to be 'South African' or 'French' or 'Australian'.

This can be a useful strategy against xenophobic narratives, and one we should pursue. However, it is one we are already familiar with. I want to suggest a different strategy, one that can be combined with the more familiar ones. This strategy relates to the structure of our language – the words we use in our narratives – and our cognitive mechanisms that we employ to categorise what we encounter in the world. It provides us with practical advice on how to change the language of our narratives, which can be applied to individual as well as institutional and political narratives. I refer to the work on generics by Sarah-Jane Leslie (2007, 2017). As we saw in Chapter 2, the reason why such a strong link exists between citizenship, belonging, and indigeneity, is because of the prejudices that result from group formation. When we distinguish between the ingroup and outgroup, we categorise and tend to essentialise characteristics of both groups. We see origin specifically as an essential characteristic of a person (which is why, as I suggested in the previous chapter, we have stereotypes about people from specific places). Leslie tells us why we essentialise in this way, how that negatively affects the world, and what strategies can be applied to our expressions. She therefore provides us with the linguistic tools with which we can tell less essentialist narratives.

2.3 Against essentialist thinking

'Generics' refers to generalised statements we make about the world, like 'dogs are loyal' and 'philosophers are quirky'. Relying on such statements to communicate information shows that we tend to generalise from our experiences with one thing (my dog) to other things (all other dogs) if they seem to belong to the same category, with the similarity often determined based on physical characteristics. This kind of generalisation seems to be a very basic thing humans do: "Long before we learn to talk, our expectations concerning novel members of a category are shaped by our experience with already-encountered members" (Leslie 2017: 393). So if I was bitten by a dog as a child, I may generalise that experience and live with a fear of dogs for the rest of my life. Most of the time, these generalisations are useful and innocuous. They help us to identify things that are similar ('trees have branches and leaves') that makes

communication easier (if I ask you to meet me under the tree, you will not wait for me under a gazebo, even if you do not know which tree I meant). However, such generalisations can become problematic if they are used in service of a specific mechanism: "the route by which we reach general conclusions regarding dangerous or harmful features" which reveals "a cognitive bias that has contribute to certain virulent forms of prejudice" (ibid. 394). 'Birds have feathers' and 'Muslims are terrorists' are both generic statements, yet the latter is clearly harmful whereas the former is descriptive and uncontroversial.

Leslie (ibid. 395) calls such generalisations about harmful features *striking property generalisations*. She (2007: 375) is concerned with whether we assign truth conditions to generic statements. A statement like "mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus" (ibid. 376) is true, even if only a small number of mosquitoes do (conversely, the generic statement 'mosquitoes don't carry the virus' will be false, even if most don't). This is a striking property generalisation because mosquitoes who do carry the virus pose a threat to us. To be true, generic statements of this kind require only that some of the individuals in the category/kind possess the mentioned characteristic. Not all generic statements are intuitively true in this way. Striking property generalisations "are special in that their predicates express properties that we have a strong interest in avoiding" (2017: 396). Categorising in this manner is also a product of our evolution. The evolutionary advantage to this kind of thinking is clear – the person who believed 'wolves kill people' had a better chance of surviving than the one who waited for the wolf to make its intentions clear.

How does this tie in with xenophobic narratives? Leslie argues that because this kind of thinking or generalisation works in some contexts, we assume that they work in all contexts. We draw no distinction between 'hungry lions are dangerous' and 'foreigners are dangerous'. In the non-social realm this way of thinking may be useful, but in the social realm it does far more harm than good. The negative effect of this is compounded by the fact that we very easily obtain such generalisations but getting rid of them is harder. It is clear that the narrative themes identified in Section 1 exhibit this kind of thinking: 'foreigners are criminals', 'foreigners bring disease'. Some of these generalisations may be based on personal experiences with individual foreigners, for there are without a doubt individuals who, for example, engage in criminal activities such as selling drugs. This poses a difficulty, for any narrative which tries to claim the contrary will be dismissed by xenophobes, who only have to point toward the nearest example of a foreigner who deals drugs. This is the difficulty with our tendency to generalise.

We only need one hungry lion, or one rabid dog, to be wary of them all: "Our most basic method of generalization seems to encourage us in reasoning from "some" to "many" or "most," or even to "all," at least when striking properties are in play" (ibid. 398) – Leslie calls this the introduction condition – but even a considerable amount of healthy dogs or law-abiding foreigners will not make us give up our generalisation. While the introduction condition is "undemanding", the elimination condition is more demanding. Where striking properties are concerned, we will continue making generalisations essentialising those properties "*over and above our beliefs about the prevalence of the property*" (ibid. 397, emphasis in the original). Taking this into account, one may despair of our ability to think in ways which do not essentialise. Leslie, however, provides us with two reasons to hope.

Despite our very strong tendency to generalise in this way, rooted in our evolutionary history and in our psychology, this kind of generalisation is not inevitable. Increased interactions with individuals from the stereotyped or essentialised social group (e.g. 'foreigners') counteracts this kind of thinking: "Familiarity and knowledge can get us to view increasingly narrow kinds as the basic-level kinds" (ibid. 414). Through exposure we come to learn that 'Muslims (basic-level kind) are terrorists' is false. We may define narrower kinds: 'religious fundamentalists', or 'members of Al-Qaeda'.[26] Through contact, we come to see that not all members of the group share the feared characteristic. Reading or hearing stories about other people can, in this case, also count as 'contact', as it can give us knowledge and insight into people we were ignorant of. Where stereotypes essentialise and generalise, stories individualise, helping us to narrow down our generalisations.

This insight of Leslie's echoes the contact hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 2. There we saw that specific forms of contact can be conducive to lowering prejudice. In the final section of this chapter, I will suggest a form of contact which will create the sense of a shared goal and promote collaboration, but for now I want to focus on one of the important processes which takes place during positive and especially sustained contact. Pettigrew *et al.* (1998) identifies the internal processes which take place during and after positive contact, which result in people being less prejudiced. Two of these we see in Leslie's point above: learning about the outgroup, and ingroup reappraisal (ibid. 70, 72). Learning about the outgroup can help to work against

[26] Note: I am *not* saying that 'religious fundamentalists are terrorists' – this is merely an illustrative example. Most people who believe in fundamentalist doctrines are *not* terrorists.

stereotypes and judgments based on ignorance or incorrect information or assumptions about the group. It gives the ingroup a fuller picture, which can help humanise the outgroup in their minds. As suggested above, this learning can take place in direct contact (e.g. storytelling sessions, facilitated interactions) but also through gaining more information about the outgroup. In Section 4.1 I suggest how we can approach our school curriculums narratively, and part of that should include subjects (such as history and life orientation, but also literature) which have modules focussing on telling stories about other places and people.[27]

The second process relevant to our discussion which Pettigrew identifies is ingroup reappraisal. Prejudices are expressions of the kinds of generalised statements Leslie is concerned with, and positive interactions with others can not only lead us to question the essential characteristics we previously ascribed to them, or narrow down our generalisations, but it can also lead us to question what we held to be essential about our own identities. As xenophobia expresses both a belief that the xenophobe belongs necessarily or naturally, and the foreigner does not, addressing how we think about ourselves in this way is also crucial. This kind of reappraisal can sever the link between citizenship and indigeneity, as suggested in the previous section. The encounter with a stranger poses a challenge to our world views, because theirs may be (radically) different. Our understanding of our own identity is often formed in part by our understanding that we belong to *this* group instead of *that* group, with the accompanying assumptions about superiority and inferiority. In Chapter 1, I referred to the need for a stranger in order to define the self. Learning about and interacting with other groups will therefore also teach us something about ourselves, and more than just that we may have been wrong in our beliefs and assumptions. We may come to understand ourselves, as individuals and as groups, in a new way:

> Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about ingroups as well as outgroups. Ingroup norms and customs turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social world. This new perspective can reshape your view of your ingroup and lead to a less provincial view of outgroups in general ("deprovincializaiton"). (Pettigrew *et al.* 1998: 72)

[27] This is already an aspect in our curriculums, but as we will see in the next point Leslie makes, *how* we tell these stories – i.e., the language we use – has an impact.

Another strategy Leslie suggests for fighting the kind of bigotries that result from essentialising or generalisation thinking concerns the way in which prejudices are transferred (from one generation to the next) through our language. Our tendency to essentialise or think in terms of generics seems to be a universal feature in human cognition, but what we choose to essentialise (i.e. which kinds) varies across cultures and contexts. This means that "we are not hard-wired to form the specific social categories that we do" (Leslie 2017: 415). This raises the question of how and why we learn specific categories. Leslie suggests that our language contains cues that children pick up on, which indicates to them which groups should be essentialised:

> [O]ur very choice of words to describe racial, ethnic, and religious kinds may subtly communicate to children that these kinds are to be essentialized. We need not say anything negative about these groups – the use of generics or even simply labels may communicate that these are essentializable groups, and so open the door to prejudice. (ibid. 418)

Cultural socialisation theories (Chapter 2.1.1) show us how prejudices are transferred across generations, as children learn both ingroup and outgroup bias from authority figures. Leslie's findings support this. She refers to a study in which different groups of children were read different versions of the same story, the one frequently using generic language, while the other contained no generic language but used specific noun phrases (ibid. 416). The book was about creatures called Zarpies, and the first version would state "Zarpies hate…", whereas the second version would say "*this* Zarpie hates…". The results were conclusive: children in the first group treated Zarpies as an essentialised kind, whereas children in the second did not.

This provides us with a way of working against our inherent tendency to make generalisations, where such generalisations have no place (i.e. as applied to human groups and affairs). Leslie suggests that instead of categorising, we should describe. Speaking of 'the Zimbabwean poet' instead of 'the poet from Zimbabwe', or 'a Muslim person' instead of 'a person who follows Islam' signals to children that there is something essential about being Zimbabwean or being Muslim and, consequently, something essential about nationality or religion. This insight need not only be applied to children. Changing how we speak or how we label can change how we think about people – how essential or natural we take certain characteristics or even identities to be. This change in how we speak and think provides us with a tool we can use alongside other strategies to help sever the link in our minds between citizenship, belonging, and

indigeneity. We can learn that there is nothing essential or natural about 'being South African', and that even being 'from here' is not inherent to our identity or personhood.

The changes in our language which Leslie suggests can be implemented in how we report about incidents involving foreigners in the media, in our everyday speech, but perhaps most effectively in how we teach to our children. Leslie's research shows how a very simple change in the stories our children are exposed to teaches them to essentialise or individualise different kinds of people. This can add to the transformatory potential that narratives have, making them more effective in bringing about real change. As I suggested in the previous section, narratives and stories can connect us to others in a special way, as they are often emotive and imaginative (an idea I return to in Section 3). If our narratives rely on a kind of language which has been shown to work against our tendency to overgeneralise and essentialise, their effect can go deeper. Those who wish to bring about change and to work against xenophobia should therefore be careful of the kind of language that they use, and create narratives (whether policies, everyday stories, public speeches, books for children, or games) which makes use of descriptions rather than essentialised categories.

3. The Narrative Imagination and Judgment

The previous section showed us the directions and themes our narratives can take to work against the negative effects of the kind of xenophobic narratives discussed in Section 1. Such narratives will have a profound effect on our identities and our institutions, especially institutions governing membership norms, borders, and citizenship. The question still remains how we can incorporate such narratives into the functioning of our institutions. In what ways can the exemplary individuals who want to change institutions to be less xenophobic, use narrative as a tool to achieve that change? In the final section of this chapter I will suggest the kinds of activities we can pursue to achieve this. Before we come to that I will consider how we can make narratives present in our judgments, including but not limited to the legal or judicial sense.

3.1 Poetic Justice

Understanding laws and regulations, or indeed institutions, as narrative-free things can limit the power or efficacy of such institutions or even obstruct justice. This is the basic idea behind Martha Nussbaum's (1995) notion of *poetic justice*. Nussbaum (ibid. xiii) identifies a problem in contemporary society:

> Very often in today's political life we lack the capacity to see one another as fully human […] Often, too, these refusals of sympathy are aided and abetted by an excessive reliance on technical ways of modeling human behavior, especially those that derive from economic utilitarianism.

This is arguably still as true today as it was in the 1990s, as we came to rely increasingly on technology to facilitate our interactions. New forms of interactions were made possible by the internet and especially by social media, and while this did create novel ways of connecting to people, it has not necessarily led to people forming more or better connections overall. While contributing to the formation of connections and promoting relationship formation in some instances, our new technologies also often contribute to our inability "to see one another as fully human", as anyone and everyone is exposed to the wrath (bullying, trolling, death threats) of anonymous individuals. Social media for the most part remains a place where people can express their bigoted opinions about other races, nationalities, sexual minorities, or women with almost no consequences. This effect is compounded by the 'bubbles' that social media algorithms create, ensuring that you almost only see things that are in line with your own ideological beliefs. That our online interactions mirror the kind of economic utilitarianism Nussbaum is concerned with is evidenced by the politically irresponsible ways in which companies like Facebook ensure that they get as many users, clicks, and traffic as possible.

Nussbaum is concerned with what falls through the cracks when we only rely on economic or utilitarian models. Such models, while useful in some contexts, cannot be relied upon as a complete guide to political relations, both among citizens, and between citizens and state institutions. In public discourse, in law-making, in politics, rational argumentation is enriched by adding storytelling and literary imagining. Nussbaum acknowledges the limitations of storytelling or her 'literary imagination', the same limitations we are concerned with here:

> The literary imagination has to contend against the deep prejudices of many human beings and institutions and will not always prevail. Many people who tell wonderful stories are racists who could not tell an individualized empathetic story about a black person […] Our society is full of refusals to imagine one another with empathy and compassion, refusals from which none of us is free […] Even when we have found a good story to tell, we should not hope to change years of institutionalized abhorrence and discrimination by appeal to "fancy" alone, since

> fancy, even when adequately realized, is a fragile force in a world filled with various forms of hardness. (Nussbaum 1995: xvii)

Fancy, storytelling, and the literary imagination cannot stand alone. Yet a rationality without the "ingredient" of the literary imagination becomes purely instrumental, calculating. Such a rationality will fail in the aims of justice. Similarly, our contemporary dream of equality will remain a dream if we only rely on utilitarian calculations or imagination-free rationality, for the latter cannot "enter imaginatively into the lives of distant others" (ibid. xvi) and is therefore blind to their particular needs and struggles.

For Nussbaum, we limit the power of fancy with our prejudice and our unequal and narrow cultivation of our sympathies for fellow humans. Instead of rejecting fancy because it is imperfect, Nussbaum suggests that we rather consistently and humanely cultivate fancy and construct "institutions, and institutional actors, who more perfectly embody, and by institutional firmness protect, the insights of the compassionate imagination" (ibid. xviii). This means recognising the ways in which certain kinds of narratives contribute to people's oppression and suffering, or exhibit individual and societal prejudices, while at the same time telling different kinds of narratives that do the opposite. This also means that, for the literary imagination to be effective, its work needs to be public and not merely private. For Nussbaum, the literary imagination is essential to public rationality and it provides us with an ethical stance that allows space for rules and formal decision procedures.

Our need for more tools in our rational toolbox is becoming more evident. The kind of rationality that Nussbaum criticises – a rationality that deems itself as superior to the emotions, as justifiably devoid of fancy, a purely logical and instrumental approach – is blind to so many realities of the human condition. While many problems can be reasoned away in this way, many problems we face cannot be solved through this kind of instrumental rationality, precisely because they spring from our emotional lives, if one considers the role that fear plays in xenophobia. One can, for example, try to counter a white supremacist's narrative that white people are inherently intellectually superior by pointing toward the countless geniuses of colour and the large number of white people who are far from intelligent. This, however, seldom convinces those with deeply held prejudicial beliefs. The kind of rationality that Nussbaum criticises, is a rationality that believes that all we need to make our calculations are *facts*. But facts are not always convincing. While some people are swayed by evidence and empirical facts, others are not. An individual may even happily agree to change their opinion on one topic

(e.g. climate change) when confronted with the evidence, while refusing to change their minds about another (e.g. that all foreigners are not criminals) when given those facts. This will depend on the kind of person, what they hold more or less important, and what they believe about themselves and the world (i.e. the narratives they choose to believe or not).

This is not to say that facts and fact-checking, and reasoning based on those facts, are not important – I discussed this in the previous chapter with reference to Arendt's emphasis on the importance of the factual matter in our judgments. Altering or changing facts, or positing 'alternative facts' that are glaringly false, is a totalitarian strategy. Totalitarian movements shape and create 'truths' to suit their propagandistic needs. People fall for this trick, because these new 'truths' may align with their deeply-held prejudicial beliefs, or because they are comfortable to believe. The facts are changed and arranged in such a way that they seem to wholly explain everything – they do away with uncertainty completely – bringing into being a "lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself" (Arendt 1973: 353). The false narrative told by a totalitarian logic explains fully, and therefore relieves the masses form the responsibility of thinking and judging for themselves, of trying each on their own to make sense of the world. Factual truths are very often inconvenient or scary – think of the evidence supporting climate change, and its implications for our future as a species. It would perhaps be *rational* to believe the evidence, given that we will then be able to take the necessary steps to save what we can. However, if we look at how the world is reacting to facts like climate change, it is clear that humans very often choose comfort over truth. When confronted with facts, we often believe and act *irrationally*. For this reason, facts or reason alone cannot be relied upon to bring about positive change in any area where humans' deepest fears and prejudices are concerned.

The question arises that, if we cannot rely on rationality to counter the irrationality of prejudice, what can we do? Nussbaum may offer different reasons for why she is sceptical of 'pure' rationality than I do above, but her insights are useful. On the one hand, both Nussbaum and I recognise the value of rationality and facts. However, we both want to make the point that this does not tell the whole story – that our reality cannot be fully understood or wholly explained by relying only on rationality. And, I would add, nor can it change for the better. What is needed is a way to meet people where they are – in the messiness of life, with their biases and prejudices and irrational judgments and emotions. Narratives do this. Narratives illuminate and communicates things that calculations and data are unable to do.

3.2 The literary imagination

I have been speaking of 'narratives', 'narrative identity', and 'public narratives.' These concepts are not exactly the same as Nussbaum's 'literary imagination' or 'fancy'. To understand her relevance here, we must understand what is meant by the 'literary imagination', and how it links, to my mind, with narratives and narrative identity.

When Nussbaum refers to the literary imagination, she is interested in it as a form of "public imagination, an imagination that will steer judges in their judging, legislators in their legislating, policy makers in measuring the quality of life of people near and far" (Nussbaum 1995: 3). I am interested in both its public and personal forms, recognising as Nussbaum does the potential in both forms. Public institutions, after all, are made up of individuals, and one individual with a strong personal capacity for literary imagining may take the institution they form part of in new directions. Similarly, imaginative institutions may influence the thinking and imagination of the individual members in a positive way.

Nussbaum's specific focus is on the novel as literary genre, looking at the inner lives of the characters, but also the kind of feeling and imagining created by the telling and the reading of the text. It is not only the content of the novel that is important, i.e. what story is being told, but also the way in which the story is told, the shape it takes. A novel's educational and illuminating potential lies on many levels: the actual story or plot, the inner lives of the character, the experience of the reader, and the author or novel's intentions with the reader. When busy with literary analysis, all of these facets are considered. Similarly, we should question our own individual and group narratives, as well as the narratives of others, from all these perspectives. Not only to listen to the story itself, but to ask why is it being told, why in this specific way, why by this person, and why to oneself? One's skill in this almost sceptical reading of or listening to stories can be sharpened by increased exposure to stories. To use Nussbaum's terms, we build and strengthen our literary imagination by reading novels and by engaging with other forms of storytelling.

The reason Nussbaum chooses to focus on the novel form is the special nature of novels: novels can be morally controversial because they provide us with a "normative sense of life" (ibid. 2). Novels are often descriptive, in that they show us how people who differ from us live, but they are normative in the sense that they can illuminate possibilities for a different kind of life or future. Novels provide us with "visions of humanity", "a complete sense of social life" (ibid.).

Like other forms of literature, novels focus on what is possible, what can happen, while also asking of readers "to put themselves in the place of people of any different kinds and to take on their experiences" (ibid. 5). It is this dual power of novels – to show new possibilities, to take on others' experiences – which activates the literary imagination.

The question is, how is such 'taking on experiences' possible? Narratives, especially the kind found in novels, work on two levels: the general and the particular. When reading, a reader can connect and emotionally invest in characters because of shared hopes, fears, and human concerns (the general aspect). We understand and sympathise with characters because we know what it is to feel what they feel. This creates the connection that allows us to 'step in'. But we are also touched and, at times, transformed by the particular, concrete situations of the characters; by the ways in which their contexts differ from ours, or their reactions to situations familiar to us, or their unique struggles. Having already formed a bond with them, we are open to learn from the strange, new context of the characters. Nussbaum emphasises the usefulness for our own reasoning and judgment of this constant play between the general and the particular:

> In this way, the novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical reasoning that is context-specific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially universalizable concrete prescriptions by bringing a general idea of human flourishing to bear on a concrete situation, which we are invited to enter through the imagination (ibid.: 8)

Nussbaum likens this way of ethical reasoning to Adam Smith's notion of the 'judicious spectator', or 'impartial spectator'. In asking how we can judge impartially, Smith is asking primarily how we can judge our own conduct. He offers the idea of an 'impartial spectator' as a reflective device – in our minds, when judging, we imagine what the judgments of others will be and measure our own against that. This prevents us from judging purely in our own self-interest:

> In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves […] The conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper. The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened (Smith 1976: 153-154).

If we cannot have a literal spectator (whether friend or stranger) against whom we can measure our judgments, we must call upon our inner impartial spectator. This spectator, as a reflective device, helps us to view our own sentiments and motives at a distance from us, allowing us to see them more clearly. Amartya Sen (2010: 70) also calls on Smith's spectator in his criticism of the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. Smith's spectator can help us understand justice in way that (i) uses comparative assessment instead of transcendental solutions; (ii) takes note of social realities; (iii) allows for incomplete social assessments, while still providing guidance for a move toward a more just society; and (iv) incorporating voices from those outside a specific group (in his discussion, a specific contractarian group).

Smith's idea is not unique – it has some things in common with Kant's disinterested aesthetic judgments. Kant, in turn, inspired Hannah Arendt's theory of political judgment alluded to above. There are therefore certain similarities between Arendt's theory of judgment, and Nussbaum's call for literary imagination in judges. Nussbaum is critical of Kant, while both Kant and Arendt would doubtless shudder at the thought of opening up political theory and policy-making to the emotions. For Arendt (1998: 243), emotions like love should have no bearing on the political sphere, as they are fundamentally apolitical and antipolitical. There is a difference, however, between using love as a driving-force behind political decision-making and judgments, on the one hand, and judging in such a way that it accounts for the role that emotions *do* play in human interactions, social and political, on the other. To ignore the latter would be to miss crucial information and insights. What Nussbaum and Arendt both recognise is the importance of the imagination in our political judgments. I will briefly consider Arendt's theory of political judgment before returning to Nussbaum.

Arendt's (1982) incomplete theory of political judgment (incomplete due to her death) is a creative reading of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, as set out in his *Critique of Judgment* (Kant 2007). Where Kant was concerned with aesthetic judgment, Arendt saw the seeds for a theory of *political* judgment. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant is especially concerned with reflective judgment, where we judge from the particular to the universal (ibid.: 15). Reflective judgments, unlike determining judgments (judging from the universal to the particular), have the benefit of flexibility. Determining judgments rely on what we already know but cannot help us when we need to judge something new. Reflective judgments, because they start from the particular, can. When making aesthetic judgments, we judge from our own particular perspective, namely our own taste. What I find beautiful differs from what others find beautiful.

Kant also argues that such judgments are disinterested, because they are concerned with our experience of the beauty, and not with the objective existence of the object we are judging (we can find things in dreams beautiful). Our delight in an object is not dependent on that object's existing, and because we are not concerned with its reality, we are able to judge it disinterestedly. However, because our particular judgments are disinterested (i.e. not springing from personal desires), we expect other people to share this judgment (ibid. 43). This gives the judgment a universal claim to validity. We therefore measure our own aesthetics judgments against those of others, which gives them a measure of objectivity. We look for confirmation of our taste in the tastes of others, and we feel that others should share our judgments. This measuring of our own judgments against those of others, and the expectation that others should agree, is based on what Kant (ibid. 68) calls the *sensus communis*, or common sense – something we all possess, evidenced by the fact that we are able to communicate our judgments and understand one another. (I am simplifying greatly, for the sake of space, but the minute details of Kant's argument are not directly relevant.)

Kant's notion of a form of judgment which is particular, but which gains universal validity by measuring it against the judgments of others, provides us, according to Arendt, with a framework from which we can make political judgments. The unpredictability of human action and the unprecedented events of the twentieth century (specifically the Holocaust), convinced Arendt that traditional forms of judgment are inadequate. We need a form of political judgment that is impartial yet takes the measure of complex human realities; that has universal validity but allows us to form judgments of the unprecedented; and, importantly, does not only 'listen' to one voice. In making political judgments, we should take everyone involved into account (incorporating voices from outside, as Sen suggests). To do this, we should share our judgments (Kant called this publicising) with others. This need not be understood literally. As with Smith's impartial spectator, one can make others present in one's mind by imagining the possible judgments of others. The person who opens their mind in this way, the person with an enlarged mentality, becomes a world-citizen. The point of this form of judgment, of this kind of mentality, is to avoid parochialism while still being rooted in the particular. What Arendt, Kant, Smith, and Nussbaum have in common, therefore, is an appreciation for the important role that a diversity of voices play in forming judgments, specifically (with the exception of Kant) political judgments, and the necessity of the imagination to make these kinds of judgments.

Nussbaum's literary imagination effects this – the imaginative act of making others present, of taking others into account – by valuing fancy. Stories are powerful and they exercise our literary imagination and our ability to make inclusive, disinterested judgments, because of certain features of the genre. In fictional storytelling, characters are distinct and they exhibit psychological depth and complexity. In stories, the flat images we have of strangers (like foreigners) are fleshed out and given life and we realise that there are similarities between those lives and ours even when there are differences in our concrete circumstances. We realise that characters have complex inner lives, and we wonder about these inner lives. Stories are also participatory. There is a writer or a teller, a reader or a listener. The former creates, the latter interprets (which is also a creative exercise). Readers and listeners can become emotionally involved with the stories, but can also appropriate the story as their own, "showing possibilities for human life and choice that are in certain respects their own to seize" (ibid.: 31). This investment in the characters also open our eyes to the fact that other people, people different from us (Nussbaum uses the example of the workers in a Dickens novel) have stories of their own to tell, which makes them profoundly human. This mind shift is important, for many forms of oppression are tolerated and supported because we cannot imagine the other as fully human. Dehumanisation starts in our minds and influence the material conditions that prevent some from flourishing: "Dehumanize the worker in thought, and it is far easier to deny him or her the respect that human life calls forth" (ibid.: 34).

Importantly, the literary imagination should not replace the rational or scientific in our decision making but supplement it. Without it, citizens will fail to develop certain moral capacities that will allow them to apply the normative conclusions of moral and political theories to their own lives and realities. The literary imagination engages our emotions, because emotions are part of the structure of stories. Critics of the emotions see them as blind forces that prevent us from thinking rationally, as threats to good judgments, as a weak spot in humans who should strive to be stable and not needy. Nussbaum convincingly disproves these assumptions. Our emotions are not mere impulses – grief, anger and joy are not the same as hunger or thirst. She sees emotions as "ways of perceiving" the world, connected to our cognition and judgments, influenced by and influencing our more rational selves. Emotions are not necessarily 'irrational' or 'unchecked' (ibid.: 61). Anger can be a completely rational response, for example, to abuse or injustice. And a person who does not respond to the loss of a beloved with grief is not a person I would trust. Yet, for some reason, we think this is the way we should act, should judge. *This*, for Nussbaum (ibid.: 67), is the true irrationality.

Rationality helps us to determine how much it is reasonable or prudent to feel in a specific context (e.g. how much pity to feel for someone, based on the nature of their loss), whereas the literary imagination helps rationality see beyond figures, utilitarian calculations, and see the nuance and complexity of human lives, to find adequate solutions to problems.

In arguing for room for the literary imagination in policy making, judgment, and political theory, Nussbaum is not asking us to do something wholly alien, or to learn a strange new skill. We already have this capacity in us, for "all of human life is a going beyond the facts, an acceptance of generous fancies, a projection of our own sentiments and inner activities onto the forms we perceive about us" (ibid.: 38). In fact, we use this capacity regularly, but not always in the positive way that Nussbaum envisions. Stereotyping, xenophobic and other discriminatory narratives are ways in which we go "beyond the facts", in which we believe fictions, metaphors, and fanciful projections. The content of our stories matter – how they align with facts, how they interpret facts, but also how many stories (individual lives, different perspectives) are contained within our bigger stories. Fancy, in Nussbaum's sense, is generous, it sees more than there is, but unlike negative stereotypes it is hopeful, giving and forgiving.

Nussbaum's main concern is with the institution of the judiciary. Can judges, in their interpretation of laws and constitutions, use and develop their literary imaginations? Nussbaum thinks this is possible. A judge's technical and legal knowledge, legal reasoning, and the constraints put on interpretations of the law by precedents, form the structure within which the judge's literary imagination can work. Without the law (or, in the broader context I am interested in, without institutional structures), judgment is not possible (ibid.: 117). Without the literary imagination, however, the judge's judgments will not reflect the "historical and human complexities of the particular case" (ibid.: 81). Rather than clouding his or her judgment, the literary imagination and its basis in emotions commits the judge to neutrality, because the literary imagination allows us to place ourselves at a distance from our private concerns by incorporating the concerns of others into our judgments. Yet this neutrality does not mean that judges should distance themselves from social realities:

> [I]ndeed, she is enjoined to examine those realities searchingly, with imaginative concreteness and the emotional responses that are proper to the judicious spectator […] the literary judge would look in particular for evidence that certain groups

> have suffered unequal disadvantages and therefore need more attention if they are to be shown a truly equal concern. (ibid.: 87)

The literary imagination is attentive to inequalities and disadvantages because it opens our eyes to other forms of life, other people's struggles, and it illustrates how those struggles may have been caused by the world. Literature and narratives more broadly can make us attentive to injustices on a personal and global scale, to the inequalities between groups, but also to the personal struggles and strivings of individuals. For Nussbaum, the literary imagination importantly allows us to individualise people in the way I suggested in my discussion of generics, to look at them as equals and not purely members of a (despised) group:

> Group hatred and the oppression of groups is very often based on a failure to individualize. Racism, sexism, and many other forms of pernicious prejudice frequently ground themselves in the attribution of negative characteristics to the entire group […] portraying the group as altogether subhuman […] This does not mean that even in contact with an individual one cannot find many ways of dehumanizing him or her in thought. It means, however, that when one does manage for whatever reason to take up to the individual the literary attitude of sympathetic imagining, the dehumanizing portrayal is unsustainable, at least for a time. (ibid.: 92)

Nussbaum recognises that many public servants may not list 'reading novels' as their favourite pastime (although it may be more popular among judges). This poses a serious challenge to the incorporation of the literary imagination into political, economic, and legal theory as well as practice. As I said above, all humans have the ability to think fancifully. But the literary imagination is fancy that is cultivated for the purpose of recognising oppression, injustice, and the disadvantages people face, and also for the purpose of recognising the common yet unique humanity of others. Simply reading novels will not necessarily do this (not all well-read people are necessarily morally exemplary individuals). But even if one granted that reading or listening to stories can have a positive effect, can open people up towards others in many instances (which Nussbaum argues for, and I agree with), we would still face the problem of a broader public that generally does not read. In South Africa, there is the added problem of a lack of access to books, even where there may be a desire to read. This is why literacy programmes, especially under children, and public libraries are so important. The aim is not to

change every single person's heart or prejudices (once again, unattainable), but to change enough perspectives to bring about societal change.

A further point should be made in response to this problem. Reading novels is by far not the only way with which we can engage people's imaginations or change their xenophobic perspectives. Nussbaum chooses to focus on novels, but my focus throughout has been all kinds of storytelling, and all genres of narrative (from history writing to everyday conversations). Below, I even discuss games as narratives. On grassroots levels, initiatives exist that bring people together to share their stories. One such initiative is the Human Library, an organisation that organises story-sharing events worldwide. The basic idea is that the library contains 'human books' and it provides a safe space in which 'readers' can engage in dialogue with the human books, asking and answering difficult questions. The 'books' are volunteers who want to share their stories, and generally come from groups that are "often subjected to prejudice, stigmatization or discrimination because of their lifestyle, diagnosis, belief, disability, social status, ethnic origin etc." (Human Library, n.d.). It may sound strange to 'take out' a person as one would a book. However, given that all participants consented and did so because they believe their story can have a positive effect, the idea holds promise.

The Human Library works with a wide variety of organisations and institutions, from public libraries to private sector companies. Similar work is done by the Centre for Stories mentioned in Chapter 4. Elsewhere, such storytelling happens in more informal contexts, for example with churches and NGOs organising facilitated workshops in which people from different communities and backgrounds come together to share, listen, and connect. What is needed is institutional commitment to make such meetings possible – not only from institutions such as the church or the NGO sector, but especially from the public sector.

Nussbaum's 'literary imagination' provides us with an ideal of how we should think and judge, as well as with examples of legal judgments made where she thinks the judge employed the literary imagination (ibid.: 99-117). However, her theory does not solve the problem of developing the will to acquire or cultivate the literary imagination. Any strategy that we develop, any course of action we propose, will face this problem. Novel reading is limited, for the accessibility reasons given above, but also due to the history of the novel, and the form that novel-reading takes. As an activity, reading novels can isolate us from the world, or keeps us in what Arendt would call the private sphere, even if we sometimes discuss what we read with

others, sometimes on public forums, or even when the subject of the novel is political. Historically, reading novels is also an activity pursued by the bourgeoisie. Although this pursuit is by no means exclusive to the middle classes, the novel even in its modern form (and consumption) to some extent retains that link. Furthermore, many novels do not seek to form connections or sympathies, or even to educate – many, if not most, seek simply to thrill or entertain. One can question Nussbaum's choice of the novel, but the novel is by no means the only genre of storytelling that can cultivate the literary imagination. Below, I propose two alternative types of narrative that might play the same role as the one Nussbaum envisages for the novel.

4. New narratives

4.1 Curriculum as narrative

I will briefly consider a single context or public institution in which we can promote the literary imagination and storytelling, which to my mind will have the largest impact: education. A child's formal education serves two purposes. Firstly, to develop the child through the transference of knowledge and skills, which in turn will help the child navigate the world (e.g. get a job when they become adults). Education therefore enables a child to participate in society. Secondly, where public education is concerned, education is a means through which a state can shape its citizens and so its future (Hjerm 2005: 291). Narratives to counter xenophobia can be incorporated into children's education in two ways: (i) through promoting diversity in schools; and (ii) through the curriculum (understood as a narrative, or containing narratives, itself), which would include the teaching of democratic values.

The role of storytelling in curriculum development and teaching has been a subject of inquiry in pedagogical studies for a couple of decades. Stories are recognised as part of the classroom: "Textbooks tell stories and teachers bring stories to tell, stories about the subject matter they teach, or curriculum stories. These stories are narratives that organize the curriculum and are communicated in the classroom throughout the school year" (Gudmundsdottir 1991: 201). The curriculum serves as a kind of grand narrative, with teachers telling shorter stories to fit and give meaning to specific modules. Storytelling is used as a strategy in answer to "a special teachers' problem" (ibid. 208) that of translating what they know into words for the children to be able to acquire that knowledge. Weaving the contents of the curriculum into a story aids learning, more so than merely relaying facts. It better captures the attention of learners, while also giving them the tools to interpret the facts and deduce meaning; telling a story adds "an

ordering principle and a structure of meaning that is, at its root, fundamentally moral" (Sandlos 2010: 5). So history lessons, life orientation classes on diversity, and even economics classes can become meaningful to students in a way it would not if they merely approached the knowledge as a list of facts. They will be able to recognise the moral implications of those facts (e.g. the fact of colonialism) and gage appropriate responses.

The education system often falls prey to the kind of rationality Nussbaum criticises, with schools chasing pass rates and academic goals set by education departments, and less 'useful' directions of study (music, art) battling for funds while other school-related activities, notably boys' sports like rugby, are funded. Teaching and learning are approached like one would approach a to-do list, with 'knowledge' measured according to how well a student can answer test questions. This kind of instrumental approach to education is limited (in terms of what can be truly learned) and limiting (in the sense of limiting the potential of the learners). Where curricula are designed in this to-do-list fashion, they may seem meaningless to both learner and educator. Through approaching the curriculum as a narrative, educators create meaning by relating the facts to the lives of students and the contexts they find themselves in (see Gudmundsdottir 1991 for discussion). An educator who does this exhibits Nussbaum's literary imagination, for they do not approach education instrumentally – i.e. meeting targets, ensuring good grades, and merely relaying facts – but they ask how and why what they teach is meaningful, and how their subjects are relevant to the lives of their students and to the world outside. This kind of imagination will also enable teachers to adapt their teaching styles and curriculum stories to face particular challenges, for instance in dealing with a particular learner who has difficulty concentrating, or who exhibits behavioural problems like aggression in class. Here storytelling also comes into play: teachers share their experiences and strategies with one another, and experienced teachers exhibit a kind of practical case knowledge, or 'recipe knowledge', about what works and what does not, in general but also in response to specific students (ibid. 211).

We should not only approach teaching and the curriculum narratively, but also incorporate the kinds of narratives suggested in Section 2 into the curriculum, using the non-essentialist language that Leslie proposes. So we can learn in history lessons about a war between France and England, but fought by 'soldiers on the French/English' side, or about the contribution of migrants to industrialisation and mining in South Africa, and speak of 'migrants from the rest of Africa' instead of 'foreign migrants'. Teachers should be trained in such a way that they are

able to acquire this specialised kind of knowledge, and imaginatively create meaningful narratives about their subject matter. Subject matter (especially where it relates to our social and political lives) should include a diversity of perspectives and lend itself to the medium of storytelling. The biggest change should come in how we approach knowledge acquisition, and here I do not have any suggestions other than stating that we should not view knowledge in purely instrumental terms, but as part of the human story. I leave it to the pedagogical experts to work out how we can achieve this, but I make one suggestion in this direction when I consider guided play in Section 4.2 below.

4.2 Social play and narrative games

4.2.1 Our evolutionary heritage

As has been argued above, any response to xenophobia or attempt to make people less xenophobic must take place on the institutional and individual levels. Institutional change is only effective in so far as institutions are deemed legitimate by the people and are accepted by the people. Individual change, on the other hand, is only broadly effective if it has an impact on institutions. On both these levels, xenophobic narratives have to be countered with new narratives. But our whole notion of narratives and narrative identity faces a problem. In Chapter 2, I considered the possibility that the phenomenon of xenophobia may have a basis in evolutionary biology. Xenophobia, in its broadest sense, seems to exist in human cultures across the world, and throughout the ages, and even in the animal kingdom. Out of this instinctive fear, many forms of xenophobia and discrimination arose, taking different forms depending on the context. If xenophobia, broadly defined, is innate or instinctive, then the idea that we can somehow change who we are and how we react to others by simply telling stories seems frivolous. But 'phenomenon x gave early humans an evolutionary advantage' does *not* mean: 'humans evolved (genetically) to *necessarily* exhibit phenomenon x tendencies.' When I argued in Chapter 2 that xenophobia seems to be instinctive, I did not mean that it was inescapable. While our genetic and evolutionary history, just like our social norms and traditions, play an important role in who we are and how we act, it does not tell the whole story: '"Built-in" does not mean unmalleable; it means "organized in advance of experience"' (Marcus 2004: 40).

To say that humans have an innate tendency to react fearfully to strangeness, is not to say that humans are innately violent. Some may be more open to strangeness than others, and even those who react fearfully will react in different ways. We may feel fear but react with curiosity

and determination instead of violence. This means that we can understand xenophobia as a very old phenomenon, shared with other animals, and connected to our innate fear of strangeness, while also understanding xenophobia in its current form as a product of our narratives. We can understand our narratives as stories about that fear, or reactions to that fear. Seeing this fear as innately human, we still have room for the possibility that we can act and react in ways that are *not* xenophobic.

When speaking of xenophobia in the animal world, I do not refer to aggression between different species, but rather to aggression between different groups of the same species, such as two prides of lion in adjacent territories. I suggested, in Chapter 2, that if we want to understand xenophobia fully, we need to look at instances of it in the animal kingdom. Our closest biological relatives, chimpanzees, are highly aggressive and highly xenophobic. Yet other primates, such as bonobos, are friendlier and more open to strangers from other bonobo groups. Bonobos, like humans, have the capacity to be *xenophilic* as well as xenophobic, dependent on the circumstances. Xenophilic, in this context, means "prosociality toward unfamiliar individuals" (Tan, Ariely & Hare 2017: 14733). It is this prosociality that enabled early humans to form large societies built on trust. Prosociality in animals (including humans) is communicated using signals of positivity, which establishes trust between the sender and receiver. There are various theories about why humans developed this ability more than other animals: we inherited it from our primate ancestors; it developed through uniquely human institutions such as intermarriage, or it is a product of group selection. Tan *et al*. suggest that prosocial responses to strangers are found in species other than humans as well "where the selfish benefits of bonding with new partners outweigh the costs" (ibid.). The benefit here would be expanding social networks, and the costs of potential aggression from the stranger. Bonobos exhibit such traits, for example choosing to share food with a strange bonobo instead of a familiar one, even when there is no possibility for social reward (ibid.). Another way to check prosociality is to look for contagious yawning, which indicates social rapport between the yawners. Chimpanzees yawn when members of their group yawn, but not when group outsiders yawn, whereas bonobos yawn for both (ibid.). Of course, in the bonobo world as in the human one, there is often aggression between strangers. Yet these findings indicate that being xenophobic is not the only way that animals have evolved to deal with strangers, or that acting to one's own advantage precludes prosocial behaviour.

Animals use different strategies to survive. Aggression is not always the only means to secure survival. Cooperation, evasion, submission, and most importantly for our purposes, curious and playful interactions, are often more effective to ensure survival. It is in *these* kinds of reactions which, I believe, an alternative reaction to fear and strangeness can be found, which would counter our seemingly innate xenophobic tendencies. Our fear of strangeness stems from how uncomfortable and insecure we feel when faced with the chaos of unpredictable life and unknown others. Writing on this reaction of ours to chaos, Toni Morrison (2019: viii) has the following to say:

> I have been told that there are two human responses to the perception of chaos: naming and violence. When the chaos is simply the unknown, the naming can be accomplished effortlessly […] When chaos resists, either by reforming itself or by rebelling against imposed order, violence is understood to be the most frequent response and the most rational…

However, argues Morrison, our response to control either through categorisation or through force is not the only response to chaos (in whatever form):

> There is, however, a third response to chaos […] which is stillness. Such stillness can be passivity and dumbfoundedness; it can be paralytic fear. But it can also be art. (ibid.)

Art – whether storytelling (Morrison is of course concerned with the importance of writers and literature), painting, dancing, or developing games – is as much an 'instinctive' reaction to the unfamiliar, as is violence and control. But unlike violence and control, art can be creative and not destructive. Art is also, usually, collaborative (even if sometimes in small ways – the writer writing, the reader reading).

4.2 Play as a tool to moderate xenophobia

Our fear of strangeness and strangers is fortunately not the only remnant of our evolution. We already know that we are also storytellers, but another innate trait of humans is that we like to *play*. We share this trait with almost all other animals. We rely on play and games to gain knowledge (think of animals learning to hunt and fight through play), to form social bonds, to let off steam in a non-aggressive way, and simply to entertain us. In a recent study on xenophobia in wild lemurs, a group of scientists (Antonacci *et al.* 2010) investigated the role of games and playing in managing xenophobia. Humans have long been aware of this ability.

In ancient times, the Olympic Games were staged after (according to mythology) the Oracle of Delphi said that a sport competition would end the Peloponnese wars (and, in fact, the Games were followed by the Olympic Truce). It is not only formal or structured play that holds this potential. Research in child development found that "play fighting (or rough and tumble) leads to the direct inhibition and regulation of aggression, thus improving social integration" (ibid. 1). The potential of play to reduce xenophobia is down to the flexibility and improvisation found in play, which inspires cognitive and behavioural innovation. The impact on people when working together for a common goal (e.g. to score a goal) should also not be underestimated. For me, play is also effective because it is fun and, one can assume, doing fun things together strengthens relationships.

So, how did the lemurs act? The question the study poses is what the benefits of play between adult lemurs are, as adult-adult play is relatively scarce, and more specifically whether it is used to manage xenophobia. They selected a specie of lemur, the sifaka, where adult-adult play occurs. Like most lemurs, the sifaka live either dispersed (solitary or in pairs), or in xenophobic groups sealed to outsiders. The only time the group composition varies is during mating season, when males visit other groups in search of receptive females. The researchers (ibid.: 2) made several predictions, of which the following are relevant here:

i. Play is not solely affinitive behaviour (unlike grooming).
ii. Under certain circumstances, males would modulate and moderate their xenophobic response (to prevent females from mating with unfamiliar males), as more males can be beneficial to the group (increased vigilance and protection). Play is used as an ice-breaker to curb the xenophobic response, so a higher level of play is expected between males unfamiliar with each other, and a decrease of violent or agonistic interactions after play.
iii. Rough play will be more common among in-group males than between strangers, as playmates must trust each other during rough play, to avoid escalation into serious fights.

Prediction one was supported by their findings: grooming mostly took place among group members and was clearly an affinitive behaviour. Play, however, took place between in-group and out-group males and females. Interestingly,

> …ingroup males engaged in play with outgroup males more than with ingroup ones, [while] females engaged in play with ingroup and outgroup males at comparable levels. Hence, male-male adult play seems not to be a purely affinitive behaviour, but mostly a means to test emergent relationships between strangers. (Antonacci *et al.* 2010: 4)

The second prediction was supported. The researchers found that adult play is utilised to manage new social relationships, rather than as a means to maintain existing relationships:

> [Our] results indicate not only that play is the interface between strangers, but also that it has a specific function in reducing xenophobia […] normally expressed by this species via aggressive chases. Aggressions by ingroup males were preferentially directed toward outgroup males […] After play, conflicts between unfamiliar males plunged to the levels observed between familiar males. (Antonacci *et al*. 2010: 6).

Prediction four was partially supported – ingroup males engaged in aggressive play with outgroup males, but for shorter periods of time than with ingroup members. An explanation for this could be animals' reaction to social stress. Studies have shown that there is an increase in social play when rats who were separated are reunited again. Social play appears to be a toolkit for controlling aggression and overcoming stress and, in this instance, of curbing xenophobia, which ultimately allows outgroup males to become part of the group. Note that some aggression remains but the nature of or motivation behind that aggression changes – in-group males start treating out-group males in the same way as they treat each other. While social play has the potential to decrease instances of certain kinds of aggression, it cannot prevent all forms of aggression.

I suggest that there is great potential in using play to mediate between ingroup and outgroup individuals, of curbing xenophobia and building relationships of trust and cooperation. That play can have positive social impact is clear from the studies done on animals (as above) and children, which indicate that the mere fact of playing together is already beneficial. Playing can also be an educational tool, an important point to note when thinking about strategies to educate people about 'foreigners' and for incorporating anti-xenophobic narratives into school curricula. Above, the issue was raised that people may simply choose to ignore facts about foreigners, refugees, or immigrants, because they remain blinded by their prejudices.

Fortunately, a simple relaying of facts is not the only way to transfer information or to educate. Studies done on language acquisition and mathematical teaching among children indicate that games, or guided play, is often the best way for a child to learn. Guided play can take a narrative form, with children being asked to tell a story as they play with objects.[28] One challenge very young children face as they learn language is to identify objects which belong to the same category – to know that a palm and a baobab and an oak all belong to the category 'tree', or that elephants and humans and dolphins are all 'mammals'. The same problem arises in teaching children geometric shapes, especially unusual instances of shapes. Yet multiple studies have found that children acquire the ability to transfer their existing shape knowledge to new, atypical shapes if they are taught those shapes through guided play with adults. Recognising that children thrive in free play, 'guided play' utilises the combined benefits of free play and adult supervision to attain specific learning goals (Weisberg *et al.* 2016: 178). Children taught in this manner can identify far more shapes than children taught by didactic instruction (Verdine *et al.* 2016: 157). Guided word play also help with language acquisition, with adults "[providing] new information for children to learn while playing and guiding children to think and explore ideas and experiences that they may not have thought of on their own" (Wasik & Jacobi-Vessels 2016: 772).

Through play, children also receive a social education. They learn to share, to trust, to play by the rules, to formulate rules, and importantly to get along with other children (see Gagnon and Nagle 2004). As a young pre-schooler, games such as 'cops and robbers' were very popular among my peers, as were games that imitated what we saw adults doing (work-work, marry-marry, teach-teach, etc.). These games always involved an element of role-playing and storytelling, but also of othering, with clear normative implications (good cops vs bad robbers). Perhaps we were taught some of these games (the first is certainly played more widely than my rural hometown), but even when we made them up we used the games to draw distinctions, enforce moral norms, and even sometimes create hierarchies. Playing seems to be a way in which children get to know the world, but also a way in which they attempt to make sense of it and navigate through it.

[28] This is the approach taken in narrative play therapy, a form of therapy which in part aims to help children develop a strong sense of self, i.e. identity (see Cattanach 2008).

An important aspect of play is this fact that it teaches us cooperation, and the ability to construct, follow, and enforce rules. This ability has clear political advantages. In my discussion of contact theory in Chapter 2, I emphasised the fact that contact can only have a positive effect (i.e. lessen prejudice) if it is of the kind that promotes intergroup cooperation, as cooperation requires trust, and together they are the foundations for relationship-building. Playing, within the confines of the rules set by the game (whether formal or informal), allows players to test one another and determine the trustworthiness of the other. Even games in which players all compete against one another rely on cooperation, not in the sense of helping each other out but in the sense of cooperating with the rules of the game. This is in the interest of all the players. Even if a cheater may be having fun by not cooperating, once the cheating is discovered fun is no longer possible (because other players will refuse to continue playing). Cooperation and trust as necessary aspects of games is what leads political theorists to see political life as a kind of cooperation game, in which individuals may have diverging goals, but such goals can only be achieved if we all follow the rules of the game. I will consider one area of game-playing to illustrate the ways in which we can use games to tell anti-xenophobic narratives, which includes sharing facts in a manner that, like the teaching of facts in school, would be more effective if done narratively.

4.3 Games and gaming: unlikely allies to our cause?

In recent years, a new trend in the gaming world saw video games starting to take a more narrative form, with players investing more in their characters' well-being, even where the characters and their circumstances may differ radically from the players. Game developers are including philosophical ideas (often relating to questions around AI, which is also a form of otherness) into their games. Like other forms of narrative fiction, video games often offer alternative realities or counter-factuals, asking the player to imagine a different kind of world in comparison to the one they live in. Games of all sorts are also ideal mediums for philosophical thought experiments. The benefit of games, especially video or digital games, is the immersive experience offered. Games offer accessible, sustained immersion and, on top of that, they are interactive in ways that books and films, for example, rarely are. What you do in a game *matters*.

It is a stretch to say that the road to world peace is paved with gaming consoles. Many games do not promote peace – the enduring popularity of first-person shooter games is a clear indication of this. Added to that, access to the technology required to play video games remains

an issue. However, gaming *is* becoming more popular as younger generations increasingly live their lives online (think of the current worldwide popularity of Epic Games's 2017 release *Fortnite*, with 250 million players in March 2019). The increasing pervasiveness of games and gaming, as well as other relationship-forming digital interactions (e.g. social media) should not be underestimated. For decades, parents, politicians and the media have fearfully wondered about the negative impact games have, to the extent that criminal activities are sometimes blamed on games. We are ready to accept that games have a deep impact, if that impact is negative, but we rarely ask about potential positive impacts.

As game developers increasingly incorporate narratives and philosophical ideas in their games, sometimes consulting professional philosophers as part of the development process, the potential to develop games that would encourage openness to others, curiosity, and cooperation increases. Video games are also recognised as a means to teach philosophical concepts to the public (i.e. outside of academia) in a way that is accessible and applicable to people's everyday lives (see Webber & Griliopoulus 2017).

Video games may be the newest form of gaming we do, but developments in more traditional forms of game-playing also create room for new, non-xenophobic narratives, or promote cooperation. Tabletop games (such as card games, board games, or dice games) are prevalent throughout history, in cultures across the globe. Such games are still very popular today. A few games exist that deal specifically with questions relating to refugees and immigrants, such as the United Nation's Refugee Agency (UNHCR 1995) simulation or role-playing game (RPG) *Passages*, and the *The Migrant's Journey* series (Migrant Journeys, n.d.). In the *Journey* games, each player is assigned a character and the game represents the journey of that character – a migrant or asylum seeker – from their country of origin to the new country where they try to build a new life. Along the way they meet with challenges (such as crossing the border with no papers), and they learn about migration, immigration laws, and the obstacles migrants have to overcome. The game is facilitated by people who are familiar with the realities migrants face on their journey and in their new country (ibid.).

With *Passages*, the UNHCR recognised that

> Games are one of the best methods to help people understand phenomena which are complex and far removed from their everyday lives. A game allows participants

> to experience emotions in a very personal and enduring manner, but on a smaller scale than in real life. (UNHCR 1995)

Passages is a simulation game or RPG, in which players literally have to pretend to be their character. RPGs like *Passages* are perhaps our richest potential resource if our aim is to change xenophobic attitudes through play. RPGs can take various forms – online, in person, table-top. Importantly, RPGs are by definition narrative, cooperative, collaborative, and interactive. Moreover, they require more imaginative 'work' from the player than your standard computer or mobile game. The player is given descriptions and perhaps even images, but imagining the stories and the worlds fully is the player's responsibility. It follows that the better you imagine the world, the more you will be immersed, and the better you will play.

What is most interesting about RPGs is the nature of such games. If we understand RPGs as exercises in collaborative narration, they offer us a tool with which pro-'stranger', anti-xenophobic narratives can be told and, what is more, this tool can function on both an individual and institutional level. Individuals play these games, but institutions can facilitate or host such games. Many organisations, especially in the corporate world, already have resources set aside for 'team building' exercises, of which some could be categorised as social play. It is not inconceivable that RPGs similar to *Passages* could be played in such contexts. A closer look at the motivation behind *Passages* and the rules of play will illustrate how RPGs are collaborative narratives.

The aim of *Passages* is to create awareness among young people specifically about what the UNHCR calls the "refugee tragedy" (UNHCR 1995). Part of this tragedy is the xenophobia that refugees face in their host countries and the fact that "xenophobic tendencies threaten the centuries old tradition of granting asylum" and, therefore, the UNHCR's strategy for protecting refugees includes "explaining to the public exactly who refugees are and what they have been through", because people need to "understand that refugees are not a threat to them, but are themselves threatened" (UNHCR 1995). The agency's reason for developing a *game* to achieve these ends is quoted above. They chose a simulation (or RPG) game specifically because it

> works through the creation of a simplified but dynamic scale model of reality. It is an effective way of allowing people to live and feel a remote situation. This particular game is designed to help create awareness, arouse emotions and encourage participants to take action on behalf of refugees. (UNHCR 1995)

The more concrete goals of the game is to have participants discover the struggles that refugees face, feel something of the psychological anguish caused by being displaced and fleeing to a new place, understand the process refugees go through to become refugees, think about solutions to the problems, change their attitude to be more welcoming to refugees, and encouraging them to take action on refugees' behalf (UNHCR 1995). These are high goals, and it is unlikely that every individual who plays a game like *Passages* will achieve them all, or that any changes that may occur during the game will be sustained for a long enough period in every single instance. Games are not *the* tool to end xenophobia, but they offer *a* tool (or a few tools) that may help in that struggle. The likelihood of failure, the imperfection of the outcomes, should not be a deterrent to try and use this tool. We saw, with the lemurs and studies done on children, that social play *can* and *does* work.

Participants in a game of *Passages* are divided into 'families' and each given a character. They are expected to study this character, and during play to become that person. The players learn of a terrible event that occurred, which forces them and their family to flee. They enact the separation from home and social connections, and the anxiety of escape. They decide what to take with them and what to leave behind, and how they will make the journey. All decisions they make will have an impact on their journey and the outcome of the game. Other realities faced by refugees are enacted: finding shelter, dealing with overcrowded conditions, filling in forms in foreign languages, dealing with hostile border officials, living in the refugee camps, applying for asylum, trying to 'fit in' in a new cultural context. After playing the game, participants attend a debriefing session where they share what they felt and thought while playing, and what they learned (UNHCR 1995).

The narrative aspect of RPGs is clear – the game tells a story, but the players also become actors or participants in that story. Through their decisions, the shape of the story is changed, and potentially its outcomes. Moreover, players do not play only as individuals but as teams or at the very least they have important interactions with others. In this way, players collaborate in telling the story, even if they may be in conflict in the game. The skills learned in RPGs should be transferrable to real-life situations. Many games are very complex and require problem solving skills, often requiring players to work together to solve the problems. Any actions have real (in the game) consequences, and players can clearly see what caused them to be denied asylum. Of course, in life we cannot always identify causes as easily, but the games can teach people not to be thoughtless or reckless but rather to consider what the best course

of action may be. Because there is sometimes an element of chance in such games, players need to think strategically, and they know that violence does not necessarily bring success.

Games need not necessarily be explicitly philosophical or about xenophobia or immigration to foster relationships (the lemurs certainly weren't playing *The Journey*). Once again, the point is playing *with other people*, whether the game's content is concerned with xenophobia or not. Even a game like chess, which is highly competitive and arguably has a xenophobic tinge – it is about war, after all – can bond people together. However, it should be noted that games can have a serious negative effect on us as well, depending on the *kind* of game. There are without a doubt games, and gaming communities, that are explicitly xenophobic, racist, sexist, etc., just as there are games and gaming communities that actively promote and celebrate aggression and violence. Many mass shootings, from those at Sandy Hook (2012) to the 2011 attacks in Norway, are perpetrated by avid gamers who, indeed, practice their tactics in video games. The popular imagination quickly grasps at this as an explanation of the violence and games doubtless have an influence in some instances, yet it should be noted that this influence is often overestimated, and the data is by no means conclusive (see Ferguson 2014 for discussion). Yet many online games do become meeting places for white supremacists and other groups with oppressive, violent ideologies. Furthermore, there are games that actively promote violence against women and minority groups. For example, in 2002 a game called *Ethnic Cleansing* (National Alliance 2002) was published, in which neo-Nazi or KKK characters have the opportunity to kill Jews, Muslims, African-Americans, and other minorities.

Even more 'tame' games that do not expressly promote extremist ideologies sometimes become sites of xenophobic, racist, sexist, and homophobic discrimination and abuse. Massive online multiplayer games like *EVE Online* (CCP Games, 2003) draw players from across the globe, yet players seem to prefer allying themselves according to national identity. Furthermore, some nationalities are viewed especially negatively. In *EVE*, Russian players are accused of being aggressive, unnecessarily violent, insular (for speaking Russian and not English on forums, and only forming alliances with other Russians), and cheaters, violating game rules for their own gain (Goodfellow 2015: 344). They are considered "other", different from other players, and this is often explained with reference to their "Soviet" nature and cultural differences. Some players call for the removal of the Russians from the global servers to their own, Russian server – an online version of 'go back to where you came from'. Russian players, in turn, express negative prejudices about especially American players (ibid. 356).

Real world prejudices and animosities are replicated in the virtual world, with similar narratives being told.

The existence of games such as *Ethnic Cleansing* and the real-life horrors they echo and inspire do not, however, disprove my point. Nationalists, terrorists, white supremacists recognise the potential of games to create community, to train, to tell their desired stories and, sadly in this instance, it is often effective. Fortunately, these are not the only or even the majority of games in existence. The challenge is to create games based on different kinds of narratives. There are countless games in which the focus is not conflict, violence, warfare, or national or ethnic difference. As we see with *EVE*, the absence of nationality in a game's design does not prevent national alliances from forming. However, other online games are designed in a way that actively counteracts such alliances.

I will briefly discuss one example, to show how this is possible: the indie adventure game *Journey* (Thatgamecompany 2012). In *Journey*, players find themselves in a seemingly empty world. The aesthetics remind one of the Middle East without stereotyping or exoticisation. The player follows a journey through the desert, with the goal of reaching a high mountaintop. What makes this game interesting is the way players encounter other players when played online. As you go on your journey, you may be joined by another player. You do not have any information about this player (who they are, where they are from) during the game, although you can find out after completing it. The only means of communication is to signal the other player with your unique musical chime. This chime easily becomes a way of greeting, of calling, and of thanking. As the two players continue their journey, they can help each other by recharging flight power, showing in which direction to go, etc., but they cannot harm each other or prevent the other from continuing on the journey. *Journey* also has a narrative aspect (even if it is not explicit), as your journey follows a tapestry that was woven about your life. What this game shows us (and there are many games that do this) is that it is possible to create games which (a) are representative of cultures other than the dominant European/American cultures (even if it is not specific), and in a positive way; and (b) allow for collaboration without the option of harm (i.e. allows only for positive interactions). Even given the choice to 'go your own way', players usually choose to collaborate and help each other.

Another beneficial skill taught by many games is effective communication, both in speaking and listening. Some games require imaginative and effective communication, like the table-top

game *Dixit* (Libbelud 2008), in which players share clues describing illustrated cards. Each player gets a turn to share a clue based on a card of theirs, and the other players have to pick a card from their pile that matches the clue. The players then vote on which card they think is the original card. The game requires players to be imaginative in two respects: firstly, thinking of a clue (each card has a different, fantastical and weird illustration), and secondly to imagine what the other players are thinking (in order to interpret the clue and vote for the correct card). Games such as these require players to step outside of their own minds and ways of thinking, and into the minds of other people, in a way not dissimilar from the kind of representative judgments proposed by Nussbaum, Arendt, and Smith.

Granted that video and board games can do the things I suggest (develop narrative skills, strengthen bonds), the problem of unequal access remains. Being able to play games means that one has the time, the resources, and the digital and/or analogue literacy. This excludes a large portion of the world population. It is unlikely that gaming is a pastime that many people have access to in the communities in South Africa where violence typically breaks out. In response to this problem, I offer a few points. Firstly, I suggest gaming as *a* tool in a whole toolbox of strategies to tell anti-xenophobic narratives. As such, I think this is a novel suggestion that can only increase in potential as games and technologies become more accessible. We need new and innovative ways to share stories and promote philosophical (i.e. critical) thinking, and I think gaming or playing can do this.

Secondly, while video games as an example because they offer a particular kind of immersive experience which holds great potential for my purposes, I am not *only* concerned with video games or, for that matter, any kind of formal game. I am talking about all kinds of games, and all forms of social play. It is hard to imagine a community existing that does not engage in some form of play at some time (whether through sport, or ritualised dancing, or culture-specific games). At the very least, where children are present games will be played. Children have an astonishing capacity to develop games with the most meagre resources (a box, a tin, a handful of pebbles holds a world of possibilities). Creating open access games can also work against this limitation.

Thirdly, many public institutions are set up in such a way that incorporating play would not be difficult or require much resources. I already mentioned the corporate world's love of 'team building' and training courses that often includes practical activities like games. Schools and

many religious institutions already have these structures in place, the former because play is often already part of the educational toolbox, the latter because their aims are (in part) to create community. It is perhaps not wise to ask a philosopher for practical advice on how to apply their idea(l)s to the world, but even a glance at our curriculum and community institutions should convince one that it is possible to incorporate game-playing of the kind I suggest (especially games such as *Passages*, which are open access).

An area of play I did not consider, but which has a strong potential in achieving similar aims – cooperation, relationship building, communication – is of course sport. Sport is not as clearly narrative as the other forms of playing I discussed. Nevertheless, love of a sport and support of a team is an important factor in the identities of sport-lovers, and it is true that narratives are constructed around these identities and specific sports events (think, for example, of the legendary status of the 1995 Rugby World Cup Final). I chose to focus on video and board games, as they have a clearer narrative purpose and structure, and as little research has been done in this direction (compared with sport).[29] I will, however, briefly discuss sport as a form of anti-xenophobic play. The first thing to mention is the fact that sport, just like play between lemurs or dogs, is often seen as a proxy for war – George Orwell (1945) famously said that "sport is war minus the shooting". The positive aspect of this is that it can diffuse tensions, as we saw with the lemur study. The negative side is that sport can become a site of virulent and even violent nationalism. Just as with video games, the potential of sport to bind people together is used by nationalists to suite their purposes. So authoritarian and totalitarian regimes promoted mass sport as a nation-building strategy, and support of elite sport (e.g. national teams) as unifying (see Koch 2013 for discussion). However, studies also support the claim that sport can improve intergroup relations, among other positive benefits: "It has been shown that sport events can enhance individual and collective capacities, improve efficacy, create social capital and, where poverty is implicated, promote social and economic justice and well-being" (Schulenkorf & Edwards 2012: 380).

It is conceivable that, as with gaming, the ability of sport to have a positive effect depends on the context. Sport on a national level may too easily promote nationalism or competition, whereas sport on an informal level (friendly games, but perhaps even if competitive) is more

[29] The distinction between video game or board games and sport is misleading. Some table-top games, like chess, are considered forms of sport, while Esports (electronic sports), i.e. competitive gaming, is a rapidly growing industry, with the esporting community currently campaigning for a spot in the Olympic Games.

likely to achieve the kinds of ends we are after. Sporting days and matches that are facilitated in such a way that it promotes positive interaction and having fun can be organised at schools and in communities where there is tension between foreigners and citizens. Here team sports like soccer would work best, with low stakes (so that competition is not too fierce) and 'mixed' teams (i.e. not different nationalities playing against each other).

The biggest benefit of play, in whatever form, is that it promotes the kind of imagination Nussbaum and Arendt are after, through activities and resources that are more accessible than novel reading. I have already shown how the imagination can be activated in games, but even in team sports imaginative judgment is necessary, for a player cannot act on her own but has to think about the movements of other players in relation to her. Whether games will promote xenophobia, or help fight xenophobia, depends on the content of the game and the culture of the gaming or sporting community in which it is played. We are quick to condemn the negative potential of (competitive) games, when we should be focusing on the potential positive impact that *other kinds of games* can and do have. The benefit of cooperative games, whether online, at a workshop, or in a sports stadium, is that they shift our attention away from ourselves. I almost want to call it the Playful Veil of Ignorance. Playing together, even if it *is* a competition creates a sense of camaraderie. The aim of most games is, primarily, to have fun. And when we have fun, we more easily form a connection with those we are having the fun with. Yet even when we are not playing with a stranger, the mere act of play can teach us valuable skills. Games require trust (that everyone will play by the rules) and cooperation. Depending on the kind of game, they can strengthen our narrative skills, our imagination, our communication skills, and our ability to 'walk in another's shoes.' We can also learn about the world and about other people through games, which can be a powerful counter to harmful prejudices that are often the product of ignorance and isolation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I joined my earlier discussion of xenophobia to the theory of narrative identity, to show how our narratives about ourselves and about foreigners contribute to creating a xenophobic world in which foreigners are unsafe and reviled, but also to show how we can retell our narratives, or tell new narratives, in a way that would work against the negative effects of xenophobia. The intention here was not to provide us with a detailed action plan against xenophobia, but rather to indicate avenues of thought and action that we could follow.

In the first section, I looked at the kinds of justifications that are given for xenophobia, or the 'facts' about foreigners that people believe in. I identified three broad narrative themes – that foreigners are harmful to the economy, that they do not belong 'here', and that they pose some kind of threat – underlying xenophobic attitudes and discourses. I discussed these with specific reference to the South African context and showed how they are either based on false assumptions (e.g. about who has a right to what, or about the responsibilities of the state), false 'facts', or half-truths. The intention here was to show how we should measure narratives against known or discoverable facts, but also to show how our beliefs, assumptions, and prejudices about foreigners find expression in narratives, and how those narratives in turn lead to specific actions or harmful practices such as civic ostracism and violence. However, the problem of getting people to believe the facts still remained, as did the question of how counternarratives can effectively work against the effects of xenophobic narratives.

Section 2 addressed the latter point, identified in Chapter 4 as one of the limitations of narrative views: the problem of the limited potential narratives have to effect societal change. For narratives to really change anything, I argued, they should not only inspire individuals but should also be institutionalised. Only through institutional change can real change come about. I argued that institutions, like individuals and groups, have identities and that these identities are also informed by certain narratives (e.g. institutional policies). Depending on the shape they take, some institutions provide us with identity-shaping narratives, as is the case with constitutions. The problem of institutional change is circular: society can only change if institutions change, but institutions only change if the individuals that form part of institutions desire a change. What we need, I argued, is exemplary individuals who can inspire other to put pressure on institutions to change.

Before showing how such individuals should act or judge (this was discussed later on), I first had to look at where institutional narratives can have a positive effect. In Section 2.2 I therefore provided some markers for the directions which our political narratives can take, focussing on the most effective areas of our public institutions we can target to bring about change that would be beneficial for those of foreign descent who live in our borders. These targets are our borders and the laws governing them, and our membership norms and our ideas of citizenship. I provided arguments for why we should reinterpret how we understand borders and citizenship, and suggestions for what ideas we should base our new narratives on. Instead of providing specific narratives, I rather chose to provide a strategy which can be incorporated

into all our narratives that would effectively undermine the kind of essentialist thinking we see in xenophobic narratives. I showed that our connection between borders, belonging, indigeneity, and citizenship, boils down to how we categorise people through forming prejudices and shaping our identities. Leslie's work on generics showed us how our generalisations about people can lead to essentialist thinking, where we see the generalised properties as necessarily part of everyone belonging to the essentialised group. So we come to see nationality and origin as essential characteristics. Leslie's suggestion that we should change our language, from referring to people using generalisations to rather offering descriptions about people, was accepted and I suggested that our narratives adopt this kind of language, especially the narratives which we tell children given, as we saw in Chapter 2, that children learn who they should be biased against through socialisation.

In Section 3, I returned to the question of institutionalising narratives, and specifically of how exemplary individuals should contribute to bringing narrative to institutions. I looked at how narratives or narrative thinking can be incorporated into our judgments, political and legal. I relied on Nussbaum's idea of poetic justice and the literary imagination, and Arendt's theory of political judgment, for this. Both theories require us to employ our imaginations, so that we are able to recognise the struggles of others and measure our judgments against theirs. This prevents us from being parochial, and also from instrumentalising or dehumanising others. For this study's purposes, the kinds of judgment Nussbaum and Arendt call for demands that we not only listen to foreigners but take them (their lives and opinions) into consideration and involve them when making decisions, especially policy decisions, which would affect them.

In the final section, I discussed the possibility of incorporating narratives into our education system, by approaching teaching the curriculum narratively, but also by including the narratives and language strategy suggested in Section 2 in curriculum content. Within the education system, the kind of judgment suggested in Section 3 can be implemented to great effect. I showed how a narrative approach to teaching makes learning more efficient, as it gives meaning to the facts and allow students to relate such facts to their own lives. What they learn in lessons about the historical movement of people, the ways in which national borders were determined, or about unfamiliar cultures, can lead them to question their own world-views and undermine their assumptions about the naturalness of their place and identity, as I suggested in Section 2.

Finally, I considered a novel way to reduce xenophobia: through play. This section builds on the conclusion of my second chapter: that deep down xenophobia is a response to a primal fear of strangers, and a product of our evolution. The question here was therefore whether the natural world provides us with examples of how we can reduce outgroup aggression, and I discussed a study which showed that lemurs reduce xenophobic tension through play. This led me to consider games as a possible way in which we can incorporate narratives into our interactions. This section addressed both the question of making facts believable and effecting real change, as I argued that games can be played in public and in private, and that structured play, which has a narrative element to it, has been shown to be a more effective teaching tool than a mere relaying of facts. I showed how playing is often a narrative exercise, as any game has rules of some sort, often an aim, and sometimes a backstory. I discussed video games, board games, and sports as tools we can use in schools, organisations, and informal settings to foster the kind of imagination required in our judgments and to immerse ourselves in the experiences of others, and in so doing gaining some understanding. Play, I argued, is effective because it allows people to bond while having fun, because it can open our minds to new ideas and new narratives, and because it teaches us crucial cooperation skills that we can apply when cooperating with others in the world. In the act of play we can set our rigid identities to the side, and the relationships created and knowledge gained may provide the basis for new identities, imaginatively situating us in relation to those around us.

Conclusion

The poem with which I started asks the question, "How much of your flame did Ernesto Nhamuave need?" (Shoro 2017: 25-26). This question goes to the heart of what I uncovered over the course of this study: that xenophobia in all its forms and manifestations, is not about the foreigner. The presence of strangers, the political and economic context one finds oneself in, all of these things exacerbate the situation and contribute to xenophobic attitudes being expressed and acted upon. But the fact that humans are xenophobic, in their thinking and in their feelings as well as in their actions, is primarily due to how they think and feel about their own place in the world, their own apprehensions about belonging and anxieties about their existence. The flames burn in the xenophobes, and the foreigners in our midst become the scapegoats for our own pain, failings as a society, and rigid yet insecure identities.

At the outset of this dissertation I set out two aims: firstly, to make sense of xenophobia as a specific idea of belonging and exclusion based on the idea of foreignness (Chapters 1-3), and secondly to determine how our individual and political identities contribute to individual xenophobic prejudices and acts of discrimination, as well as the construction and upholding of a xenophobic social and political order, and how we can construct a less xenophobic world (Chapters 4-5). These combined aims contribute toward our philosophical understanding of xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon, a topic which receives relatively little attention in academic philosophy in comparison with other forms of prejudice, discrimination, or oppression.

The first step in my argument was to provide a conceptual analysis of xenophobia by investigating its origins, expressions, and its moral harms and general effects. Chapter 1 considered xenophobia as a contemporary phenomenon, and one which has close ties with racism. Because xenophobia and racism so often go hand in hand, we tend to equate them or to see xenophobia as a form of racism. I provided an overview of xenophobia in South Africa, with the aim of showing how the two overlap, but also how our understanding of racism could prevent us from identifying and condemning xenophobic discrimination. The link between xenophobia and racism is enforced in the way it manifests in South Africa, as xenophobic violence in South Africa is directed primarily at people of colour and specifically other African nationals. This is a product of our very specific colonial and Apartheid history. In other countries, anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner sentiments are also mostly directed at outsiders who are also racial others. Yet in the South African context the link between racism and xenophobia

is undermined, as xenophobic violence is often perpetrated by black South Africans and directed at black Africans. Even considering the possibility that the racist logic of colonialism and Apartheid had been internalised by some black South Africans, a superficial equation of racism and xenophobia leaves us without the conceptual tools to make sense of anti-foreigner discrimination where both the perpetrators and the victims are of the same race. I explained this with reference to Kim and Sundstrom's argument that our national narratives and rhetoric of race only recognises certain forms of discrimination as racist and therefore morally harmful, and that equating xenophobia with racism therefore shelters xenophobia.

For this reason, I argued that we need a distinct conception of xenophobia. This does not mean that I denied its connection to racism, but rather that I saw them as often reinforcing forms of oppression that also manifests separately in some contexts or instances. I considered Kim and Sundstrom's attempt to distinguish xenophobia from racism, where they looked at the effects of xenophobia to find its distinguishing characteristic. They argued that the core of xenophobia is civic ostracism, and that this also constitutes its moral harm as outsiders are prevented access from certain goods. While agreeing broadly with their argument, for indeed xenophobia does harm foreigners in this way and it is morally condemnable for that reason, I argued that this does not yet provide us with a distinct conception of xenophobia. Other groups are also ostracised in remarkably similar ways. We should rather ask what the motivations behind civic ostracism are. The difference between xenophobia and racism therefore lies primarily in the driving motivations behind each. I argued that xenophobia is civic ostracism based on an idea of foreignness that is informed by how we think about belonging. This points towards the prepolitical and psychological origins of xenophobia, to which I turned in the second chapter. Before I did that, however, I showed how these ideas about foreignness and belonging find political expression in how we think about citizenship. I argued that xenophobic ostracism is the result of a conception of citizenship that is linked with indigeneity and origin, and that this also determines who we identify as scapegoats to blame for all manner of societal ills. This chapter showed that xenophobia is a reaction to our apprehensions about belonging, but it also becomes a way in which we regulate belonging.

To understand contemporary xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon, I therefore had to ask where our ideas about belonging, and foreignness originated. This was the aim of Chapter 2. I first looked at xenophobia as a form of prejudice, where our prejudices are the result of ingroup-outgroup differentiation and a reaction to our anxieties and fears when confronted with

strangers. This argument was made by drawing on four theories that seek to explain prejudice: the social identity theory, the cultural socialisation theory, the isolation thesis and contact hypothesis, and group threat theory. In my discussion, it became clear that these four theories each highlight specific aspects of prejudice and that these theories, rather than standing in opposition to one another, can be brought into conversation with one another. The social identity theory and cultural socialisation theory showed us how individual prejudices are the result of the process of identification or identity formation, and how such prejudices are then shared and transmitted socially as we become part of groups. For this reason, I turned to the question of individual and group identity and the role they play in xenophobia later in the study. The final two theories pointed toward our emotional and psychological response to strangers, and I argued that isolation and superficial contact contribute to prejudice formation, whereas positive contact lessens prejudice. The latter point was further investigated in Chapter 5, where I looked at solutions to the problem of xenophobia.

That we react fearfully in the presence of strangers, as the discussion on group threat theory showed us, led me to look at the primal origins of this fear. I situated the origins of the fear driving xenophobia in our evolutionary history, where aggression toward outgroups gave the aggressors the advantage. Thus our tendency to be hostile towards outsiders is born out of a survival instinct, of which we see evidence in other social animals as well. I suggested that we have this reaction to outsiders because we fear what they may do to us, and over time we gave political and cultural meaning to this instinct-driven tendency. While we are dealing here with a generalised fear which at face value may seem too broad to give us insights into contemporary xenophobia, I suggested that on the contrary a further investigation in this direction can provide us with insights into alternative ways to deal with our fear of strangers. This is a suggestion that future studies on xenophobia can take up. Alternative strategies for dealing with strangers and our fear of them are found in the world of animals, where some species react not with aggression but with collaboration or with tension-diffusing play. These strategies were also developed in Chapter 5. Recognising this early, prepolitical origin of xenophobia can also help us make sense of its contemporary manifestations as a search for belonging and excluding others from belonging are reactions to a deep sense of insecurity about our place and continued existence in the world.

Having established that xenophobia, whether expressed through prejudice or through violent actions, is at its core a response to our apprehensions of belonging, the idea of belonging had

to be investigated. In Chapter 3, I did this by looking at belonging from the perspective of the xenophobe and the perspective of the victim of xenophobia. This strategy helped me make sense of how our old insecurities surrounding belonging contribute to us becoming xenophobic today *and* how our xenophobia then precludes the possibility of belonging for foreigners or outsiders, which relates to civic ostracism and the harms of xenophobia as discussed in the first chapter. The first part of this section established the connection between place and belonging. While acknowledging that group-belonging can be separated from place or territory, this link needed to be established for in our current political circumstances we tend to think of belonging and foreignness along national lines and consequently along territorial lines. This connection is not necessary, but it is common. I also explained the role place plays in how we define ourselves, a point which would become important in my later discussion of narrative identity. Here I relied on Malpas' idea that being in a place is a precondition for developing a subjectivity, and that the shape the latter takes is dependent on the conditions in the former. This includes the other people we encounter in the places we find ourselves in, and how we relate to them and interact within in those places, as Arendt showed us.

This discussion established that who we are is deeply tied to where we are, and the implicit question then is what happens when we feel disconnected from the world around us, when we feel that we do not belong. With reference to Arendt's discussion on superfluity and the dangers of rootlessness, I argued that people who feel insecure in their belonging seek security. This security is often, although not always, found in the false home offered by the nation and nationalism. I argued that it was a false home, because as Anderson showed us the nationalist's home is not what he thinks it is – it is not historical, nor homogenous and pure – and nations are imagined communities where belonging is withheld from those who do not conform to the rigid and homogenised identity of the nation. This does not create true security, and the nationalist turns to xenophobia to cement his own belonging, by defining himself in opposition to outsiders. In the twisted logic of xenophobia, one's own belonging is ensured by preventing others from belonging.

This point brought me to the second part of the chapter, where I looked at what the implications of not belonging are for the person against whom xenophobia is directed. In Chapter 1, we already saw how foreigners are excluded. Here I argued that exclusions and displacement amount to a complete loss of freedom, for having a place in which one can exist is a precondition for freedom. To substantiate this, I referred to Waldron's work on homelessness,

where he showed that the homeless person cannot freely act or even freely perform the simple deeds to take care of his or her basic needs, because they have no place where they are free from the interference and domination of others. I showed how the situation of foreigners in a host country is analogous to that of the homeless, in that their ability to exercise basic freedoms is curtailed by their struggle to find safe places to live and prevented if they are completely denied a place to live. This then led me to a discussion on statelessness, the most radical form of not belonging or not having a place. The danger of not having a place is not only in losing one's freedom but, under extreme circumstances, in ceasing to exist. The position of the stateless, and the ways in which historically they were treated, showed us how exclusion is the first step toward extermination. Therefore it is crucial to secure a place of safety for foreigners, and while we have reason to be critical of the idea of 'home' (as my brief discussion of feminist critiques of homes showed), this part of the chapter showed that the harms of not having a home far outweigh those concerns. Being without a home is not only harmful in big ways, but also in smaller ways which directly impact the foreigner's ability to participate in their new communities. In the final section of this chapter I therefore looked at the personal harms of displacement, arguing along with Nine that displacement of any sort has a severe negative effect on one's cognitive and emotional functioning, but that foreigners are especially vulnerable to these negative effects, as their precarious position and their political vulnerability prevents them from creating the kinds of niches and cognitive tools in their homes which other people, over time, can.

Chapter 3 served as a bridge between the chapters that achieved the first aim of this dissertation, and the final two chapters that were concerned with meeting its second aim, for what we saw in Chapter 3 was that how we answer the question of belonging is tied to how we think about ourselves, i.e. to our identities. To belong to a group is to accept a certain kind of identity, and we think about our identities also in terms of the places where we are from. Chapter 4 therefore looked at how our identities are shaped, and specifically how our identities contribute to us being more or less xenophobic. The aim of this chapter was primarily to defend the narrative theory of identity, which I then applied to the problem of xenophobia in Chapter 5. The first section set out the theory of narrative identity, while the second dealt with criticism and limitations of the theory. The idea that our identities contribute to narratives came not only from the previous chapter, but also from the discussion on Chapter 2 on how our identities are constituted through a process of socialisation and incorporation into groups. This chapter argues that this process is a narrative process, i.e. that we express who we think we, as

individuals and groups, are through the narratives we tell about ourselves. This has implications for how we view others, because this too is shaped by how we portray them in our narratives. I argued that narratives are the stories we tell to interpret and give meaning and structure to our experience, and that narratives are also normative. Applied to narrative identity, this means that our narratives about ourselves and others indicate which identities are acceptable or legitimate, and which ones are not, and also how we should then act toward those with unacceptable identities.

To understand how narratives shape identities, I gave an overview of Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view. While her theory applies to individual identities, I argued that we can extrapolate from that to the question of group and political identity. Schechtman's theory incorporates the idea that our identities are the products of our socialisation into groups, a process that requires of us to be able to articulate our self-conception, which we consciously do through narratives which bind our past, present, and future selves together. I concluded that on a very basic level, our identity-constituting narratives are the stories we tell about ourselves in response to the question, 'Who are you?'

After establishing that, I asked how identities relate to personhood, as how we conceive of personhood has historically contributed to the exclusion and oppression of specific groups not deemed persons. I briefly considered the differences between traditional Western and traditional African conceptions of personhood, although a comprehensive discussion of such differences was beyond my current scope. Identity is linked to personhood, for we think of persons as beings who have unique identities, or personalities. I showed how Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view implies a more communal approach to personhood, which she herself later formulated, and concluded that our identities and our personhood are not separate from the places we find ourselves in and the people we share them with, but rather that we are recognised as persons through expressing our identities through narrative. Because of this relational or communal aspect to both personhood and narrative identity, what I argued up to this point had political consequences and I therefore turned to the idea of political narratives. I defined political narratives as those that are told in public which pertain to our political lives, i.e. group life. Where individual narratives shape individual identity, political narratives shape group-identity. The two are not disconnected, as our individual identities situate us in relation with others, and individuals rely on the normative components of political narratives to show them what to do. The implications of this for the broader theme of this study were that our

group identities tell us how people, or persons, should look and act and be, and also how those who deviate from the prescriptions of that identity should be treated.

My discussion on narrative identity provisionally indicated that we interpret belonging, including who belongs and who does not, based on our understanding of ourselves as individuals and as groups. However, I had not considered criticisms of the narrative view, and I therefore turned to that before I asked what the implications of the view are for my study of xenophobia. I discussed three criticisms, one which had to be addressed because it disputed the validity of the view, and the final two because they posed specific challenges that needed to be overcome in my final argument (Chapter 5) that we can reduce xenophobia by telling anti-xenophobic narratives. The first criticism considered was that levelled by Strawson, who argued that narrative theories are not only wrong but dangerous, as the normative claims they make – that you *should* live your life narratively – can become a basis of exclusion and discrimination, for there are people who do not think of their lives in terms of narratives. I agreed that his arguments hit the mark concerning strongly narrative theories, but that ultimately his arguments do not hold up for, according to the weaker theories I endorsed, which merely see one's life-narrative as a response to the question 'Who are you?', Strawson's argument provides us with a narrative about his life. The narrative theory therefore still remained the most comprehensive explanation of identity formation.

The final two points of criticism I discussed but elaborated on and responded to in Chapter 5. These were: (i) the question whether narratives can bring about societal change, given that they are often told at grass roots level and that they individualise and may therefore blind us to structural and societal forms of oppression and injustice; and (ii) the fact that we often tell false narratives, which may result in delusional identities or which may have harmful effects given the normative nature of narratives. I suggested that the latter challenge can be met by holding narratives to account and measuring them against what we can know about reality, but that this is a limited strategy given our reluctance to accept inconvenient facts, or facts which do not align with our existing world-views. Responding to these two criticisms was therefore the task of Chapter 5, where the specific question I addressed was how xenophobic narratives contribute to discrimination and violence against foreigners, and whether we can tell counternarratives which would have the opposite effect.

In Chapter 5 I did four things: (i) I identified narrative themes which contribute to xenophobia, and showed how they constitute the kinds of false narratives warned against in the previous chapter; (ii) I provided directions for counternarratives which would undermine our xenophobic assumptions about belonging; (iii) I suggested how such narratives can be institutionalised, in response to the challenge that narratives on their own cannot bring about societal change; and (iv) I provided contexts and mechanisms we could rely on to incorporate anti-xenophobic narratives in our individual and political lives. Note that the claim was never made that xenophobia will disappear, or that the strategies and directions I suggested are the only ones we should follow. Rather, I offer them as my unique contribution to the greater project of fighting against the presence of xenophobia in our societies, recognizing that while we cannot do away with it completely, we can certainly strive to be less xenophobic.

The first section of this chapter offered three main narrative themes found in anti-foreigner public discourse in South Africa, which express prejudices and beliefs about foreigners: that they are harmful to the economy, that they do not belong here, and that they pose a threat. As themes, the latter two had already been addressed and I therefore only briefly considered them with reference to specific utterances. The first theme we find in many different narratives about foreigners, usually centring around the idea that foreigners are taking jobs and illegitimately using up state resources, at the cost of citizens having access to such resources, such as healthcare. I showed how these narratives misinterpret facts or are based on false assumptions, but ultimately, they boil down to the idea that only those who belong deserve access to goods, and therefore we are dealing here once again with ideas about belonging and foreignness. I therefore turned my attention to the question of what kind of narratives we can tell that would counteract the effect of xenophobic narratives.

For any counternarrative or anti-xenophobic narrative to be effective, I argued, they must be able to be told on an institutional level. This raised the question of institutional change, and I showed how institutions also have identities which are formed by the narratives they tell about their histories, purpose, and goals. I argued that the problem of institutional change is circular, for institutional change is necessary to bring about societal change, as institutions offer us incentives to act in certain ways and not in others (North), but that institutions will only change if the individuals who form part of institutions change. For this reason I argued that our hope lies in exemplary individuals and organisations who put pressure on institutions to change. Before turning to the question of how this can be achieved with the help of narratives, I briefly

considered the kinds of directions our narratives can take and which areas of our public institutions should be targeted for the best results. These targets are our borders and the laws governing them, and our membership norms and our ideas of citizenship. Targeting them will sever the link between citizenship and indigeneity, discussed in Chapter 1, as well as the idea that there is something essential about being of a certain place, or belonging to a certain group. While I provided theoretical directions which future studies can investigate – emphasising that one's place of birth is morally arbitrary (Carens, Rawls), or that the shapes of our national territories are relatively recent and the product of a long and fluctuating history – I chose to rather provide a strategy which could be implemented in *all* counternarratives. I did not want to be too prescriptive about the content of such narratives. I suggested that we look at the kind of language we use when we speak about others, and for this I relied on Leslie's work on generics. This showed us how our reliance on generic statements lead us to essentialise salient characteristics about other groups, which in turn contributes to prejudice and discrimination. Leslie suggested that instead of generalising we should describe, as studies done on children show this to be an effective strategy in preventing essentialist thinking. If we speak of "the Zimbabwean person" instead of "the person from Zimbabwe", we signal that being Zimbabwean, and by implication nationality, are essential characteristics. This is the kind of thinking exhibited by xenophobes.

In Section 3, I returned to the question of how narratives can be told on an institutional level, and specifically of how exemplary individuals should contribute to bringing narrative to institutions. In this discussion I followed Nussbaum and Arendt, who connected narration to the imaginative transposition into the lives of other people. Nussbaum was specifically concerned with judgment in a legal sense, and Arendt in a political sense, therefore their theories lend themselves to telling narratives in institutions. Nussbaum showed us how judges can incorporate the literary imagination into their judgments, which would allow them to take the fullness of human life into account, where Arendt's theory of judgment requires of us to incorporate the possible judgments of all effective parties into account. This means that when we form judgments on foreigners, we should measure our judgments against theirs and adjust accordingly, implying taking their needs and existence seriously. I argued that these models of judgement provide us with a way forward: they enable us to let go of restrictive stereotypes, to imagine ourselves in the place of the foreigner, and to imagine a world in which foreigners also have a place. I followed this with a short section discussing the potential of incorporating narratives into our education system by interpreting and teaching the curriculum as narrative,

and by incorporating the kinds of narratives around citizenship and borders, suggested above, into curriculum content. This line of thought is one which future research projects in education and curriculum studies can pursue.

Finally, I ended this study on a hopeful note. Throughout it I indicated how ingrained xenophobia, or more broadly the fear of strangers, is in the human psyche and in our societies. We saw how animals also exhibit a form of xenophobia (Chapter 2), and earlier in Chapter 5 how the essentialist thinking that forms part of xenophobia and other forms of prejudice is expressed in our language and a product of our cognitive development. Leslie indeed suggests that the ability to generalise gave some early humans the evolutionary advantage. This final section, however, showed us that this is not the whole story, but that humans, like some other animals, have other strategies they can rely on when confronted with strangers. I discussed one: play. I showed how play helps children to gain knowledge about the world, including information about the social world and their place in society. Play also teaches children collaboration and promotes relationship formation. The latter we see in animals as well, and I discussed a study which found that play is used as an effective tool to manage xenophobic tensions in lemur populations.

I suggested that play provides us with the kind of positive interactions which social contact theory argues will reduce prejudice. I then considered the kinds of games we can play to promote collaboration, the transfer of information about other people, and relationship formation. Video games and board games were discussed, but I left open the possibility that other forms of play can also be effective (such as sport). I chose the former two forms of play as they have strong narrative elements, which provides us with a way of incorporating anti-xenophobic narratives, and as they are deeply immersive forms of play. Specific games were referred to, notably role-playing games which focus on the challenges faced by refugees and migrants. Such games activate the kind of imaginative thinking Nussbaum and Arendt were after. While by no means claiming that games will be our salvation, I argued that play and narrative games offer a novel way to reduce xenophobia that can be implemented in our social contexts, schools, community events, organisations and companies, and public institutions.

The ability of play to reduce tension between strangers, and specifically tension created by our xenophobic tendencies, deserves further attention and study. This last section of this dissertation may seem the least philosophical, but I hope that serious consideration will

convince us otherwise. Play, being fun and often frivolous, is often accompanied by laughter, and as Walter Benjamin (in Knott 2014: 10) wrote, "there is no better starting place for thought than in laughter". To only think 'seriously' on matters such as xenophobia, important as it is, can lead us to despair for the future.

This dissertation contributes to the study of xenophobia, in all fields, by providing a philosophical analysis of a phenomenon which has been relatively neglected in philosophical studies, while also bringing theories into conversation with the realities of xenophobia. My particular contribution is the recognition that xenophobia is first and foremost a response to deeply human anxieties about belonging, and further studies in the field can build on my conclusions reached above to think about ways in which a sense of secure belonging can be guaranteed for all, without reverting to exclusionary, rigid, and isolationist means to construct homes. The harms of xenophobia are clear, as is the need to fight it in any way and on every level we can. I have suggested two main, and related, strategies for how this can be achieved – through storytelling, and through play – which provide ample material for further study. The latter, brought into relation with narrative identity and the problem of xenophobia in human societies, is a direction which to my knowledge has not yet received serious consideration elsewhere. As our world is facing uncertain times, with global political instability, the threat posed by the climate crisis, and economic uncertainty and scarcity hanging over our heads, the likelihood that individuals and communities will become more xenophobic is a real danger. For this reason, it is crucial that we understand xenophobia fully – its origins, its effects, and the harms that result from it. This dissertation did not aim to be a definitive and final study of the phenomenon, but rather a signpost indicating the roads our thoughts, discourses, and actions can follow.

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