

**Global Discourse and Local Politics – The Political Economy of  
Urban Regeneration in Woodstock, Cape Town**

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## **Declaration**

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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## Abstract

It is averred that the postcolonial experience unfurls beyond the unitary structures and teleological frameworks of the Global North. Here, reality is entirely distinct; peculiar in function, particular in form. This ‘democratisation of theory’ has generated substantial insights on the urban experience as ephemeral, informal, and transient. It has redirected attention towards the networks and negotiations of the ‘everyday’, clarifying the much-needed common practices and mundane processes constituting the contemporary city. But this postcolonial epistemological turn, claim others, could potentially be ‘premature’ as cities continue to be profoundly shaped by a wider institutional context interwoven within and mediated through economic configurations of spatial development and geopolitical power. These critics insist on a substantive connectivity and relational geography embedded in political economy. Resultantly, there are calls to stem the tide of increasing disarticulation and fragmentation in critical urban theory and discover ways to move beyond dualistic interpretations of the city.

This study explores the political economy of urban regeneration in Woodstock, Cape Town. The study is grounded in a reflexive epistemology that deflects the ontological dualism proliferating throughout contemporary urban theory. Here, the city is studied in a specificity yet, simultaneously, in a spatial and temporal relationality. Drawing on Foucault and Gramsci, the study excavates and analyses the archaeology of local discursivities and a genealogy of methods whereby, based on the descriptions of these local discursivities, contemporary urban regeneration in Woodstock has come to fruition. Revealed are hitherto overlooked contingencies related to the formation of a discourse to ‘save’ the city from urban decline. Whilst this discursive formation was temporally relevant and valuable, ANC-led Mayoral interventions steered the private sector towards culture. In Woodstock, this was combined with a second generation of self-identified ‘changemakers’ who became a vehicle for infusing the discourse with ideological commitments to the ‘global city’. An exceptional local institutional ii

context soon created a disproportionately powerful and particularly potent discourse. Over time, antagonisms and contradictions of this discourse were ‘smoothed over’ through image construction. These images took the form of intellectual and moralising narratives that manufactured consent, deploying discursive constructs such as ‘caring’ and ‘inclusive’. These constructs normalised the discourse and its inequitable outcomes as inevitable or ‘common sense’. Thus, the discourse appeared to be hegemonic in its workings. However, hegemonies are not always homogenous, and contestations both within and without afford space for alternatives. In eschewing a pessimism that characterises much critical theory, this study proposes discursive points of entry to affect sociospatial integration.

## Opsomming

Daar word beweer dat die postkoloniale ervaring verby die unitêre strukture en teleologiese raamwerke van die Globale Noorde ontvou. Hier is die werklikheid heeltemal anders; besonders in funksie en spesifiek in vorm. Hierdie ‘demokratisering van teorie’ het belangrike insigte gegeneer in die stedelike ervaring as kortstondig, informeel en tydelik van aard. Dit het die aandag na die netwerke en hantering van die ‘alledaagse’ herlei en duidelikheid gebring oor die broodnodige algemene praktyke en doodgewone prosesse waaruit die kontemporêre stad bestaan. Dié postkoloniale epistemologiese inslag kan moontlik egter ‘prematuur’ wees, só beweer ander, aangesien stede grootliks steeds gevorm word deur ’n breër institusionele konteks wat onderling verweef is in en gemedieer word deur ekonomiese konfigurasies van ruimtelike ontwikkeling en geopolitieke mag. Hierdie kritici staan daarop dat ’n substantiewe konnektiwiteit en relasionele geografie in die politieke ekonomie ingebed is. Daar is gevolglik oproepe om die toenemende disartikulasie en fragmentasie in kritiese stedelike teorie te stuit en maniere te vind om weg te kom van dualistiese vertolkings van die stad.

Hierdie studie verken die politieke ekonomie van stedelike vernuwing in Woodstock, Kaapstad. Die studie is gegrond in ’n refleksiewe epistemologie wat afwyk van die ontologiese dualisme wat kontemporêre stedelike teorie deurspek. Hier word die stad in ’n spesifiekheid, maar terselfdertyd tog in ’n ruimtelike en temporele relasionaliteit, bestudeer. Die studie delf rond in en ontleed die argeologie van plaaslike diskursiwiteite waardeur kontemporêre stedelike vernuwing in Woodstock – volgens die beskrywing van dié plaaslike diskursiwiteite – tot stand gekom het. Hiervoor steun die studie op Foucault en Gramsci. Gebeurlikhede wat tot dusver misgekyk is maar verband hou met die vorming van ’n diskoers om die stad van stedelike verval ‘te red’, word blootgelê. Terwyl hierdie diskursiewe vorming tydsgewys relevant en waardevol was, het ANC-geleide, burgemeesterlike ingrypings die private sektor in die rigting van kultuur gestuur. In Woodstock is dit gekombineer met ’n tweede generasie

van selfgeïdentifiseerde ‘veranderingmakers’ wat ’n voertuig geword het om die diskoers met ’n ideologiese verbintenis tot die ‘globale stad’ te besiel. ’n Buitengewone plaaslike institusionele konteks het gou ’n diskoers geskep wat buite verhouding invloedryk en besonder kragtig was. Enige antagonisme jeens, of weerspreking van, hierdie diskoers is met verloop van tyd deur ’n beeldbouproses ‘toegesmeer’. ’n Beeld na buite is voorgehou in die vorm van intellektuele en moraliserende narratiewe wat instemming gefabriseer het deur diskursiewe konstruksie soos ‘omgee’ en inklusief in te span. Dié konstruksie het die diskoers en die onregverdige uitkomst daarvan genormaliseer as onvermydelik of ‘gesonde verstand’. Dit het dus gelyk of die diskoers hegemonies funksioneer. ’n Hegemonie is egter nie altyd homogeen nie, en geskille daarbinne en daarbuite bied ruimte vir alternatiewe. Deur weg te bly van die pessimisme wat ’n groot klomp kritiese teorie kenmerk, doen hierdie studie diskursiewe toegangspunte aan die hand om sosiaal-ruimtelike integrasie te beïnvloed.

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## List of Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

BBM – Bromwell Boutique Mall

CBD – Central Business District

CCDS – Central City Development Strategy

CCID – The City Centre Improvement District

CCTV – Closed-Circuit Television

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

CID – City Improvement District

CIDC – Claremont Improvement District Company

CJP – Central Johannesburg Partnership

CoCT – City of Cape Town

CTC – Cape Town Cares

CTP – Cape Town Partnership

DA – Democratic Alliance

DAG – Development Action Group

DPA – People’s Displacement Unit

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

FIFA - Fédération Internationale de Football Association

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDH – Gross Domestic Happiness

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HWC – Heritage Western Cape

IDP – Integrated Development Plan

IMF – International Monetary Fund

MURP – Mayoral Development Programme

NGO – Non Governmental Organisation

NPA – National Prosecuting Authority

NUP – New Urban Politics

RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme

SAPOA – South Africa Property Owner Association

SDG – Sustainable Development Goals

SME – Small and Medium Enterprises

TDA – Transport and Urban Development Authority

TDF – Tourism Development Framework

TNC – Trans-National Class

TPN – South African Credit Bureau

TRA – Temporary Resettlement Area

UDZ – Urban Development Zone

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNEP – United Nations Environmental Program

WCED – World Commission on Environment and Development

WCOF – Woodstock Community Outreach Forum

WCPG – Western Cape Provincial Government

WESGRO – Tourism, Trade & Investment Promotion for Cape Town and the Western Cape

WEX – Woodstock Exchange

WID – Woodstock Improvement District

WSRRF – Woodstock and Salt River Revitalisation Framework

WTO – World Trade Organisation

ZAR – South African Rand

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# CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

By 2050, the global population is projected to reach 9 billion; 75% of which will be in urban areas (Samir & Lutz, 2017:187). In many of the world's emerging countries, rapid urbanisation continues to outstrip the capacity of cities to provide adequate housing for its citizens (Ezeh *et al.*, 2017), proliferating urban diseconomies (Castells-Quintana, 2017), pollution (Cobbinah *et al.*, 2015), and poor health (Giles-Corti *et al.*, 2016). In higher-income countries, the consumption of energy, food, goods, and services (Greene, 2018) has been juxtaposed with rising inequality (Ahmed *et al.*, 2018), environmental deterioration (O'Neil *et al.*, 2017) and economic uncertainty (IMF, 2018). With much written on the 'unsustainable'<sup>1</sup> patterns and pathways of modern society (Le Blanc, 2015; Chasek & Downie, 2016; Costanza *et al.*, 2017) a considerable body of work postulates how to move 'beyond' its inefficient forms and functionalities (Swilling & Annecke, 2012; Wheeler & Beatley, 2014; Dodds & Donoghue, 2016; Loorbach, Frantzeskaki & Avelino 2017). Whilst some scholars prioritise technological progress (Van den Berg, 2016) or more determined commitments to human well-being (Swilling, Musango & Wakeford, 2016), others conclude that broad structural transitions are needed at the level of societal systems (Frantzeskaki *et al.*, 2017).

However, it has been argued that there remain systemic barriers to any such change (Loorbach, 2014). Some go as far as to say that the discourse informing the potential for change is arrested by the very forces that they believe it should curtail (Bond, 2002; Gunder, 2010; Wanner, 2015). In this vein, international agendas such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

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<sup>1</sup> The absence of a universally accepted and fixed meaning of 'sustainable' is well discussed in the literature (Wheeler, 2004; Dryzek, 2005; Connelly, 2007; Elliot, 2012; Blewitt, 2015). The term is elastic (Holden, Linnerud & Banister, 2016) and highly open-ended (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). This polysemy has 'undermined the credibility of the concept, leading, among other effects, to the inability to translate discourse into practical actions and to distortive appropriations of the term' (Bolis, Morioka & Sznclwar, 2014:7).

which have become the ‘cardinal agenda that will drive socio-economic and general development interventions over the next decade and a half’ (Kumi, Arhin & Yeboah, 2014:540) have been called ‘vague, weak... and meaningless’ (Holden, Linnerud & Banister, 2016:214) – making no reference to structural forces that may suppress, or even subvert, transformation (Gamble, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Kotz, 2015; Streeck, 2016). These scholars believe a hegemonic discourse of ‘development as growth’ obscures the structural inequalities of power in a global political economy that proliferates land dispossessions (Moreno & Shin, 2018), asymmetrical patterns of accumulation (Kotz, 2018) and the interminable consumption of finite resources<sup>2</sup> (Kravets *et al.*, 2018) whilst, simultaneously, articulating solutions that reinforce existing institutional dependencies and relationships (Wanner, 2015).

Yet this epistemological focus on structure and deterministic propensities has raised serious concerns, particularly within the field of critical urban studies (Mabin, 2014; Roy, 2014). There have been calls to untie the local urban experience from global discourse and reflect on a variety of other, subjective processes that are shaping cities (Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2014). Here, there is an insistence made on the importance of theorising autonomy and agency; to move beyond characterisations of the city as a mere passive or unsuspecting prisoner of the global machinery (Trnka & Trundle, 2014; Davies & Msengana-Ndlela, 2015). This movement – coined under the banner of postcolonial urbanism – seeks to ‘valorise the myriad efforts that residents put forth to live and thrive in the city’ (Lees, 2012:283), eschewing generalised assumptions derived from the ‘North’ and welcoming more ‘provincialised’ theoretical bases that are contextualised specifically for the ‘South’ (*ibid.*).

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<sup>2</sup> Consumption of Earth’s natural resources have tripled in the last 40 years (IRP, 2016:28). As the population moves towards 10 billion, consumption of water, food and energy is expanding at a rate that will compound challenges for human health, wellbeing, and the natural environment (Sulston, Rumsby & Green, 2013).

Others have challenged this move away from political economy as perhaps ‘premature’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:160). In a global system that ‘continues to be shaped profoundly by the drive towards capital accumulation, by neoliberal forms of global and national regulatory restructuring, contextual specificity is enmeshed within, and mediated through, broader configurations of capitalist uneven spatial development and geopolitical power’ (ibid:160). Here, the context in which the urban experience unfolds may not be as different between the North and South as the postcolonial urbanists assume (Schindler, 2017). In this intensely globalised era (Reinert, 2017), the global macro-economic superstructure has been referred to as the ‘context of contexts’ (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010:337) – the unavoidable political, institutional and judicial terrain on to which urbanism unfolds.

## **1.2 Macro Theoretical Relevance**

Nevertheless, amidst decades of discussions on global systems of power, a rapid succession of postcolonial and poststructuralist criticism has overturned the theoretical presumptions of imperial discourses and deconstructed the hubris of Northern urbanism (Robinson, 2006; Roy & Ong, 2011; Parnell & Oldfield, 2014). The expectation here is that cities may now ‘be drawn into wider theoretical conversations’ in the ways in which they are made and remade (Robinson, 2014:7). The demise of universalistic models calls for deeply provincialised arenas of knowledge, retreating from generalisations in urban theory (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011, 2014; McFarlane & Robinson, 2012; Seekings, 2013; Sheppard *et al.*, 2013; Oldfield, 2017). These developments are welcomed in the ways in which they shake-up ageing hierarchies and air-out decaying concepts; pushing urban theory to be self-reflexive whilst inspiring a richer plurality of voices (Scott & Storper, 2015). This process can very much be

likened to ‘a democratisation of urban theory’ (Peck, 2015:161). Indeed, cities are now, more than ever, being studied on their own terms and not as mere theoretical imitations (Roy, 2016).

However, in this quest towards particularity, ‘there also seems to be a growing sense of disarticulation, dissipation and fragmentation’ in critical urban studies (Peck, 2015:162). In the poststructuralist attempts to universally claim no universal truths, the urban field is at risk of ‘losing traction in a protracted moment of deconstructive splintering’ (ibid.:162). Conceptual disintegration with diminishing explanatory returns has prompted Blokland and Harding (2014:219) to warn of urban studies becoming a ‘theory-free zone’, with rapidly multiplying disagreements on how exactly cities should be conceptualised. Here, the authors complain that the field is becoming ‘susceptible to endemic and ever-widening discontinuity and disjuncture’ (ibid.:220), rooted in an anti-theoretical propensity ‘to treat every city as a special case and to insist on the futility and dangers of conceptual abstraction’ (ibid.:220). Even abstraction itself has been questioned as neocolonial (ibid.), with provincialised urbanisms positioned higher in the supposed non-existing hierarchy of truth (van Meeteren, Derudder & Bassens, 2016)

Yet ‘we should not compartmentalise knowledge of the South’ (Sutherland *et al.*, 2018:333). Indeed, the ‘intellectual hazards’ of withdrawing from critical conceptual tools such as globalisation (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:154) runs the ‘risk of underestimating pan-urban pressures’ (Peck, 2015:163). It cannot be enough to simply disregard substantive connectivity, recurrent processes and matrices of power (Hart, 2016). Following Peck’s (ibid.:164) claim of ‘a need to address the apparent estrangement of significant currents in poststructuralist and postcolonial urbanism from political economy’, there is high research relevance for seeking new ways to integrate the subjective urban experience with the broader ‘context of contexts’ (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010:337). Amidst stringent calls to move beyond polemical dualism in urban theory and towards an ‘engaged pluralism’ (van Meeteren, Derudder &

Bassens, 2016:258), this research positions urban regeneration – perhaps the very essence of modern urbanism<sup>3</sup> – as a vehicle for this conceptual (re)integration.

### 1.3 Micro Empirical Relevance

Urban regeneration has become a key policy and planning tool in South Africa (Landman, 2018; Gregory, 2019; Visser, 2019). However, when it comes to a distinctly ‘South African’ urbanism there are diverging schools of interpretation. Poststructuralist thought remains rooted in the subjectivity of the urban experience and the local agency of citizens in shaping destiny (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). Here, there is a focus on ‘the sharply disjunct nature of different experiences of the urban which motivates the multiplication of theoretical registers and practice’ (Robinson & Roy, 2016:182), a nature that necessitates a theory ground in ‘time and place’ (Mabin, 2014:21). Structuralists, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of a relational determinism and how individual fate remains tied to an institutional framework (Bond & Ruiters, 2017). In particular, a growing body of work on Cape Town has defined the significance of its ‘neoliberalisation’ (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012; Donaldson *et al.*, 2013a; Kotze, 2013; Walsh, 2013; Ramoroka & Tsheola, 2014; Morange, 2015; Carmody & Owusu, 2016; McFarlane, Silver & Truelove, 2017; Yates & Harris, 2018). As a point of departure, each of these studies assume a ‘known’ history of the city; a history that imported an internationalised model of private urban management. This history has been reduced to an ‘emulation of the West’s privatisation of urban space’ (Ramoroka & Tsheola, 2014:58).

However, the story may be, in fact, much more complicated and contextually specific than has been assumed. In a postcolonial vein of thought, entrenched characterisations of a ‘neoliberal

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<sup>3</sup> Urban regeneration is concerned with the literal remaking of the city (Xie & Heath, 2017). It is a unique process in the urban realm as it embodies the very nature of destruction and creation (Kefford, 2017) and the identity of the contemporary city as evolving, variegated, and hybridised (Peck, 2015).

coup’ (i.e. see Nahnsen, 2002:150 and Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012:921) have diminished the presence of an agency surrounding the formation of the city’s development trajectory. Here, motivations have been speculated on whilst historical processes have been cast under all-totalising and homogenous generalisations. Not only is this empirically questionable, but it denies any chance in clarifying a subjectivity in the development of policies, practices and regimes in Cape Town; it denies a discussion of modes and modalities that may have been, in fact, productive; and it denies a chance to understand and appreciate the microcosms of power and the provincialised forms of local agency at play.

Amidst the scrutiny of on-going gentrifications (Gwaze *et al.*, 2018), there are calls for more work to better ‘understand and unpack the specific context in which [urban] transformations [in Cape Town] and their effects occur’ (Teppo & Millstein, 2015:433); yet work that is liberated from unitary dimensions of analysis and considers the ‘multiple perspectives and realities’ of the postcolonial city (Teppo, 2018:46). Indeed, whilst there is high attention being drawn to urban regeneration in the popular press, greater urgency is needed on *how* and *why* it has been incorporated so naturally in to public policy (Visser, 2019:200). And this is the crux of the matter: in order to unpack urban regeneration; in order to consider the multiple realities at play; and in order to comprehend *how* it became privileged in policy, this research situates the discourse within a spatial and temporal specificity. Such a ‘history of the present’ may offer not only a more historically accurate description of the past but, in so doing, may allow a more productive depiction of the present.

This study, therefore, requires an epistemological reflexivity. Introducing poststructuralist discursive dimensions in to political economy requires a focus on the role of context, interpretation and the transformation of knowledge and symbols between institutions (Death, 2014). At the same time, to understand the means, methods and manners by which forms of knowledge assume positions of truth, it is important to comprehend how power gives

precedence or privilege to certain discourses over others (Maesse, 2015). Consequently, this research employs both Foucauldian and Gramscian critical theory in its conceptual framework.

## **1.4 Relevance for Urban Regeneration**

Whilst there is high relevance for the above theoretical approach and an empirical space motivating a political economy study of urban regeneration in Woodstock and Cape Town, how, then, to precisely situate these discussions within the wider literature of urban regeneration?

Despite a continued prominence in global policy circuits (Ward & Temenos, 2018), urban regeneration remains somewhat uniform in its theoretical development (Roberts, Sykes & Granger, 2016). Historically, it has been premised on economic competitiveness (Campbell, Cox & O'Brien, 2017). Here, the assumption is that disadvantaged areas will develop through the introduction and integration of more affluent residents (Hall, 2014). The expectation is that once middle-class residents are integrated, their social and economic prosperity will 'trickle down' (Lees & Phillips, 2018). This form of gentrification is achieved by replacing social housing with new market properties, improving local amenities and introducing leisure facilities, and thus making the area more prosperous and appealing to incoming middle- and upper-classes (Roberts Sykes & Granger, 2016). Whilst the drive to foster economic competitiveness continues to shape policy (Campbell, Cox & O'Brien, 2017), urban regeneration has since become fused with a commitment to 'culture'. In the early 2000s, municipalities across the globe 'rush[ed] to endorse Richard Florida's celebration of a new creative class in urban centres... In the process, they hope[d] to attract investors, higher income households, [and] the creative class' (Winkler, 2009:363). Such strategies were criticised for

marginalising and displacing existing lower-class residents (Peck, 2005), yet the ascendancy of culture-led regeneration has since been complete (Çaglar & Schiller, 2018).

To offset gentrification, this ascendancy was supported by the rise of community-based, ‘bottom-up’ approaches (Deakin & Allwinkle, 2007; Deakin, 2009; Bailey, 2010; Nakagawa, 2010; Deakin, 2012; Lees & Melhuish, 2015; O'Brien & Matthews, 2015; Ferilli, Sacco & Blessi, 2016; Galvin & Simmie, 2017; Alexandrescu *et al.*, 2018). Whilst this literature is valuable in trying to move beyond a superficial rhetoric of inclusion or cosmetic forms of participation, the focus merely remains on the ‘efficiency’ of forms of participation such as storytelling, community informatics, and culture projects (Hakim & Roshanali, 2018). Notwithstanding a questioning of the very socio-cultural role models that inform culture-led urban regeneration (Çaglar & Schiller, 2018), a major issue here is the *capacity* to participate; the ‘capacity to act’ (Atkinson, Tallon & Williams, 2019:22). For this reason, a political economy perspective is critical as it is explicitly concerned with the distribution of power between interests, ideas and institutions across society (Gowa & Mansfield, 1993; Mansell, 2004; Acemoglu, Golosov, & Tsyvinski, 2009; Phillips, 2017). It is the relationship between these forces that *defines* the capacity to act or be (French & Raven, 1959).

This means to not only interrogate the methods and mechanisms by which capacities are mobilised, but the rules, norms, values and beliefs that shape the existential nature of capacities. This interrogation means trying to decipher how a complex experience such as urban regeneration is constituted from and around certain forms of knowledge and knowing. It means to interrogate the historicity of knowledge and how it has been established in the ‘play of true and false’ (Foucault, 1990:257). Thus, investigations in to urban regeneration require not only a credence to its social particularities (as seen in Sasaki, 2010; Go, Lemmetyinen & Hakala, 2015; Lees & Melhuish, 2015; Gregory, 2015; Alvarez, Go & Yüksel, 2016; Ferilli, Sacco & Blessi, 2016; Zhong, 2016; Hudec & Džupka, 2016; Gainza, 2017; Rahbarianyazd & Doratli,

2017) or to the more mechanical complexities of urban planning (as seen in McDonald, Malys & Maliene, 2009; González, 2011;; Tyler *et al.*, 2013; Newton & Glackin, 2014; Huston, Rahimzad & Parsa, 2015; La Rosa *et al.*, 2017; Bottero, D'Alpaos & Oppio, 2019), but investigations in to urban regeneration must also necessitate the expansion of our theoretical registers in to the spatial and temporal determinants of the discourse that structures possible forms (and alternatives) of urban regeneration.

Despite strong criticism from urban geographers (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Smith, 2002; Harvey, 2008; Tasan-Kok & Baeten, 2011; Tulumello, 2016), most of the research on urban regeneration remains outside a political economy interrogation. Winkler (2012), in her study on the stunted regeneration of downtown Johannesburg, acknowledges that neighbourhood change in the suburb of Hillbrow has been shaped by situated histories of political and economic significance. Whilst she investigated how urban regeneration was constrained by certain historical contingencies, this research pursues an inverse of this relation. Woodstock has radically (and in many ways successfully) regenerated and is still amidst intense sociospatial transition. However, the consequences have been, as discussed, contentious. This research postulates that in in order to better conceptualise the present situation; in order to better understand the complexities at play; and in order to move beyond both reductive descriptions of 'neoliberalisation' or innocuous assumptions of emancipated agency, a political economy analysis (an analysis of the ideas, interests and institutions of society) is required; one situated in a spatial and temporal specificity.

Lastly, combined with the pursuit of both theoretical and empirical contributions, this study also pursues a policy contribution. Certainly, as Horkheimer (1993) argues, critical theory must not only explain what is wrong with the current social reality, but it must also provide achievable practical goals for social transformation. In this research, a policy contribution takes the form of discursive intervention. This is in line with a Foucauldian assumption that

discursive formations contain within them a plurality of competing discourses spanning different disciplines, different actors and producing different meanings that may be possible to change (or influence) over time and across space.

## **1.5 Assumptions and Limitations**

Political economy focuses on how power is distributed and the implications this has for development outcomes (Acemoglu, 2010). It has been described as ‘the original social science’ (Clark, 2016:9). Theorists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx developed broad visions of society that included the intellectual domains of economics, political science, sociology, history, psychology and philosophy (ibid.). Because of this grand and sprawling tradition, the term has, over the years, encompassed different meanings for different people (Weingast & Wittman, 2008). For some, political economy is a field of study that draws on a multiplicity of subdisciplines to theorise the relationship between economics and politics (de Mesquita, 2017). For others, it is a methodological approach that analyses the interactions between institutions and human behaviour and the ways in which the former shapes choices and the latter influences structural frameworks (Frieden, Lake & Broz, 2017).

This research adopts the position of political economy as a methodological approach. Such an approach is predicated on the assumption that society is shaped by the dynamics and interplay of interests, ideas and institutions (Weingast & Wittman, 2008). The relationship between these forces is the expression of power (Magstadt, 2014). However, this research moves past traditional (and perhaps more limiting) conceptions of power as purely structural (Althusser, 2014) and, alternatively, adopts a Foucauldian position of power as diffused (1998). Foucault (2000c) challenges the notion that power is wielded solely by sovereign acts of domination by an oppressive apparatus. His work is marked by ‘a radical departure from previous modes of

conceiving power' and is focused on how it is 'embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them' (Gaventa, 2003:1).

However, caution must be exercised as 'Foucault does not have one theoretical position' (Mills, 2003:109). In fact, he acknowledged that one reason he infuriated his detractors is because he did not hold a singular, unified position (Foucault, 1991b). Moreover, his highly theoretical work is not easy to 'apply' (Mills, 2003). Foucault even questions the discrepancy between theory and analysis, saying that 'theory does not express, translate or serve to apply practice: it is practice' (Foucault, 1977:208). As a result, he never developed a complete methodological position and, in fact, criticised the very notion of formulating one (Foucault, 1991b).<sup>4</sup> What Foucault was more concerned with was a profound and radical scepticism. To 'use' Foucault means 'to question ways of thinking' (Mills, 2003:113). Contrary to assumptions, he was not so much concerned with 'capturing' a trend, but rather in examining the possible forms and formations of expression which are able to circulate (*ibid.*). This is an important distinction: it is not so much 'what people said', but rather 'how they were able to say it' (*ibid.*). This temporal focus is valuable for analysing the role and processes of 'canon-formation'; for how the past comes to be accepted in the present by 'regimes of truth' (Foucault, 1989:131).

It is here that one also enters the theoretical domain of Gramsci (1971), who theorised how cultural formulations – beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values, and mores – become accepted through sedimentation. Here, imbricated processes normalise knowledge as 'common sense'. Therefore, to use Foucault is to analyse contingency and to use Gramsci is to analyse cause. Using Foucault is generally an approach 'of working with his ideas and modifying them in line

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<sup>4</sup> He has remarked: 'Do you think I have worked like a dog all my life to say the same thing and not be changed?' (Foucault, 1988b:14).

with your own concerns' (Mills, 2003:116) and, in this way, 'a truly Foucauldian reading or method is one which moves beyond his writing and thinking' (Mills, 2003:31).

## 1.6 Goal and Objectives

Consequently, this research is interested in how interests, ideas and institutions interreact to inform, shape and determine development processes and outcomes. The primary goal here is to improve understandings of urban regeneration in Cape Town. By using a political economy approach combined with critical theory, the research can shed light on the discourses formed, mobilised and contested at both spatial and temporal scales. By analysing the terrain between agency and structure, the goal is to move away from dualistic interpretations of urban theory (Sutherland *et al.*, 2018) and to seek pathways for (re)integrating the estrangement of postcolonial urbanism from political economy (Peck, 2016:164). This provides, at the same time, a much-needed clarity (Visser, 2019) in determining how exactly interests, ideas and institutions shape current approaches to urban regeneration in Cape Town.

To guide this research, six key objectives are established. Objectives 1 to 3 entail the formulation of the theoretical framework. Objectives 4 to 6 guide the fieldwork and analysis.

- 1) To clarify the political economy of global development and elucidate its driving discourse;
- 2) To explore the political economy of this discourse and conceptualise its expression and use;
- 3) To explore the political economy of the built environment and the epistemology of space;
- 4) To excavate Cape Town's discourse on urban regeneration;
- 5) To explore the political economy of this discourse in Woodstock;

- 6) To offer policy recommendations that may support, repair and/or redress inadequacies and/or deficiencies brought to light as a result of this discourse.

## 1.7 Methodology of the Research

This research uses a political economy approach to investigate and interrogate urban regeneration in Cape Town. This study leans on the philosophical position of constructionism as it examines the development of jointly constructed understandings of the world and how they may form the bases of shared assumptions (Lock & Strong, 2010). The epistemological implications of this are centred on the notion that meaning may be developed in coordination with society rather than separately within individuals (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1995). Therefore, an important point of departure here is that whilst *constructivists* focus on what is occurring within the mind of an individual, *constructionists* focus on what is occurring between an individual and society and how this jointly creates reality (Burr, 2015). As this infers the need for understanding complex social phenomena, a qualitative research approach is used (Yin, 2017). Because this research seeks to expose the spatial and temporal connections of language and behaviour, and the relationship between language and power, discourse analysis in the Foucauldian tradition is used.<sup>5</sup> However, as discussed, Gramscian critical theory is also employed to move beyond the dispassionate, non-interpretative historiography of Foucault so as to potentially offer contributions to knowledge that may affect positive social change. If Foucault is to understand ‘how’ then Gramsci is to understand ‘why’.

In order to generate meaningful data, both deductive and inductive methods are used. The former is necessary to elaborate issues from a macro perspective and deduce facts regarding

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<sup>5</sup> Foucauldian discourse analysis is a development *since* Foucault’s death. It is the interpretive enactment of his ideas that study the relationships of power (Diaz-Bone *et al.*, 2007). This is further discussed in Chapter II.

the institutional architecture of Cape Town, whilst the latter approach is used to identify more contextual (i.e. social and cultural) data in Woodstock. The research design makes use of a single case; an approach that encourages greater immersion and integration into the study area, allowing for understandings that may be overlooked when dealing with the logistical challenges of multiple cases (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016). Moreover, the single case study design has seen notable popularity with postcolonial approaches that both stress the importance of particularity whilst seeking the generation of provincialised theory (Roy, 2016). A multi-stakeholder approach (public sector, private sector and civil society) is employed, bridging a common gap in the urban academic field of Cape Town wherein researchers tend to explore only the experiences of civil society (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012; Donaldson *et al.*, 2013a; Booyens, 2012; Ramoroka & Tsheola, 2014; Teppo & Millstein, 2015; Morange, 2015; Carmody & Owusu, 2016; McFarlane, Silver & Truelove, 2017; Yates & Harris, 2018). In fact, this research has been unable to find other work on urban regeneration in Cape Town that sufficiently incorporates the private sector. This undermines the legitimacy of inferring motivations and assumptions on a key stakeholder group; it limits the possibility of encountering highly diverse (albeit contradictory) data; and it prohibits a full analysis of the dynamics between all stakeholders and how they interact with each other.

Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews were conducted, ranging in length from 1 to 2 hours. This number includes key City Officials, City Councillors, urban planners, architects, media consultants, non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers and activists, heritage officials, lower- and upper-class residents of Woodstock, as well as major property developers and business figures. Combined with documentary and archival evidence (i.e. newspapers, reports, policy documents, frameworks and plans) and the advantages of habitation in the area (vis-à-vis immersion and observation), a significant amount of layered and textured data has been collected. The case study area was primarily chosen because Woodstock can be conceived as

an archetype of contemporary urban transformation. It has a long history as a thriving centre of industrial commerce which has shaped the area's social, political, cultural and physical character. In the early 1990s, the area fell in to urban decline. It soon became one of the more undesirable suburbs in Cape Town. Since the early 2000s, Woodstock has undergone radical sociospatial transformation through targeted urban regeneration, the scale and severity of which has been controversial (Visser & Kotze, 2008; Wenz, 2012; Visser, 2016). Moreover, it is still amidst transition, affording both a suitable amount of time to investigate historical contingencies (Yin, 2017) whilst remaining a current and on-going phenomena of high research interest and relevance. It must be noted that the study of Woodstock cannot be divorced from the context of Cape Town. To tell the story of urban regeneration in Woodstock is, in many ways, to tell the story of urban regeneration in Cape Town.

## **1.8 Outline of the Research**

Chapter I introduces the background of the study and its relevance at macro and micro levels. Following this, it further situates theoretical and empirical relevance within a more specific contribution to the urban regeneration literature. The chapter then raises important assumptions and limitations of the theory to be used, as well as the driving goal and guiding objectives. Lastly, the methodology of the study is explained and a research outline presented.

Chapter II comprises the theoretical framework. It is split into three parts. The first part discusses the global context<sup>6</sup> of development and the rise of its dominant discourse. The second part of the chapter discusses the political economy of this context, whilst introducing Foucauldian and Gramscian understandings so as to form a critically reflexive framework for

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<sup>6</sup> In semiotics, linguistics, sociology and anthropology, 'context' typically refers to those objects or entities which surround an event (Bulcaen, 1995). In terms of critical theory, context can thus be viewed as the entire summation of all discourses that surround a particular time and/or place (Glanzberg, 2002).

conceiving the ways in which interests, ideas and institutions interact with each other and give shape, form and, ultimately, meaning to this context. The third part of the chapter discusses how best to epistemologically understand and position urban studies within this context.

Chapter III provides a methodological framework for the research. This chapter comprises three parts. The first part rationalises the philosophical assumption of constructionism. The second part defines and defends the case study research design and the data collection methods employed. These are interviews, documentation, and observations. The third part clarifies the strategies embraced for the organisation and analysis of the collected data.

Chapter IV offers a history of Woodstock to situate the locale in its spatiotemporal context. The chapter then presents the research findings, divided in to three parts – the public sector, private sector, and civil society. The chapter limits analysis and/or interpretation for the following chapter, leaving only the arrangement and presentation of data.

Chapter V analyses the key findings detailed in Chapter IV using the theory from Chapter II as a conceptual framework. Chapter V is split into four parts. The first part discusses and analyses the archaeology of urban regeneration in Cape Town. The second part of the chapter discusses and analyses how the discourse has matured. The third part of the chapter discusses the practical, sociospatial implications of this discourse. The first and final part offers policy recommendations as points of entry.

Chapter VI concludes the research by summarising the study in its entirety whilst presenting its key contributions. In light of these findings, the chapter offers recommendations for action; discusses the limitations of the study; and, finally, offers avenues for further exploration.

# CHAPTER II – THEORETICAL

## FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter is split in to three parts. As this research is concerned with both global structures and local specificities, and how and where they overlap and are interwoven, this chapter descends from the broad to the narrow. It postulates that all development discourses are wrapped inside the discursive behemoth known as ‘sustainable development’ – perhaps the defining development paradigm of the modern age (Sachs, 2015). The first part of the chapter serves to highlight *how* this discourse has become so dominant. The second part of the chapter seeks to explore *why*. The literature suggests that the terrain of political economy defines the way the discourse unfolds. Despite systematic financial and environmental crises, the literature highlights a profound ability of capitalist discursive configurations to mingle and blend – to hybridise and move well beyond simplistic classifications of uniformity (Kotz, 2015). The third part of the chapter suggests that if political economy has moved beyond the unitary, universal forms that the poststructuralists have fervently rebuked, then this may have important implications for epistemological approaches to contemporary urban theory.

## 2.2 The Political Economy of Development

### 2.2.1 The Discourse of Sustainable Development

The term ‘sustainable development’ became established as a global discourse following the 1987 report by the UN Brundtland Commission, *Our Common Future*, yet originated in the context of the increasing environmental awareness of the 1970s (Blewitt, 2017). Concern for the environment came to prominence with the work of, amongst others, Carson (1962), Boulding (1966), Hardin (1968), and the 1972 publication of *The Limits to Growth*, where

Meadows *et al.* advocate that if population growth and resource consumption continue exponentially, Earth cannot support humanity for more than another hundred years or so. The report challenged, for the first time in mainstream discussions on economic thinking, widespread assumptions regarding the viability of perpetual economic growth (D'Alisa, Demaria & Kallis, 2014), warning of any such possibility on a finite planet (Martin, Maris & Simberloff, 2016).

These concerns reverberated beyond environmental and academic circles when, in 1972, the President of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt, proposed that Europe should not aim at maximising Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but rather Gross Domestic Happiness (GDH) (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). However, in a seminar of the same year, Mansholt (*ibid.*:388) acknowledged:

‘I am worried on whether we will be able to keep under control vested powers that struggle to maintain perpetual growth. Our system as a whole keeps insisting on growth’.

Additionally, the oil crises of the early 1970s highlighted over-dependencies in the developed world on fossil fuels. This prompted debate over the prevailing patterns of resource use and consumption; expressed through an attendant increase in publicly funded research in renewable energy (Kilbert, 2016).

At around the same time, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment convened in Stockholm in 1972. The conference underscored the necessity of reversing global ecological decline through the promotion and creation of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) (Costanza *et al.*, 2014). Other than making a powerful argument for direct action in avoiding irreversible damage to global ecosystems, the summit declaration recognised a

politically committed tone to the essential rights of freedom, equality, dignity, and well-being (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). Moreover, state-led planning and regulation, supported globally by inter-governmental cooperation, was to be positioned as the vanguard of development, with the preamble declaring that governments must stand the greater burden for environmental protection, safeguarding the planet for both present and future generations (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). These outcomes successfully crystallised the underlying issues of responsibility and leadership in global developmental politics (Newell & Roberts, 2016).

In 1987, the Brundtland Commission united world leaders in an effort to create ‘a global agenda for change’ (WCED, 1987:1). This was to represent a dramatic turning point in the discourse. The commission’s report, *Our Common Future*, popularised the term ‘sustainable development’, with its proclamation of meeting the needs of the present without compromising those of future becoming the reference point for succeeding international political discussions (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). Whilst the interdependence of environment and economy, the call for collective action and global cooperation, and the consideration of both intergenerational and intragenerational equity were major themes of the commission’s report (Blewitt, 2015), its core message decreed that although limits exist, economic growth need not be constrained (Barkemeyer *et al.*, 2014). Indeed, these limits can be overcome if ‘technology and social organisation’ are ‘managed and improved,’ ushering in a ‘new era of economic growth’ (WCED, 1987:8). The idea of this new era, where the natural limitations of the planet can be circumvented by new technology and globalisation, positioned growth as a panacea for inequality and environmental degradation, offering a notion of ‘win-win’ that, on the surface, appealed to both the radical environmentalists of the 1970s and the free market economists of the 1980s (Brand, 2012).

The change in emphasis from public regulation to market-based intervention needs to be comprehended within the milieu of the economic crises in the 1970s (Gómez-Baggethun &

Naredo, 2015). When Reagan and Thatcher declared the market, as opposed to government, as the key to human prosperity and freedom, mainstream economics began to endorse market-led policy and deregulation, and, finding favour with the dominant economic ideology of the time, succeeded in becoming privileged in both academia and government policy (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015). The Brundtland Commission's new definition of sustainable development gained immediate and wide acceptance, partly because it sounded positive, but also because it was so vague that everyone could sign up to it (Newell & Roberts, 2016). It was this vagueness, this room for appropriation, which undermined previous understandings of rapid growth and consumption being tied to environmental deterioration (Lorek & Spangenberg, 2014). It was during Brundtland that growth was 'no longer presented as the culprit of ecological decline but as the solution to global social, economic and environmental problems' (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015:389); it was Brundtland that created a critical historical contingency unto which a discourse of 'sustainable development as growth' turned (Spangenberg, 2010).

### **2.2.2 Post-Brundtland and the Institutionalisation of Growth**

Following the Brundtland Commission's promise of an international summit, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (or Rio Earth Summit) marked another watershed moment for the discourse of development (Macekura, 2015). In an attempt by an emerging civil society to globalise the environmental movement, the Summit saw the mass-mobilisation of NGOs (Doyle, McEachern & MacGregor, 2015). Sensing risk from potential anti-industry (anti-growth) sentiment and the possibility of new regulations and laws, international industry sent a delegation in a bid to temper debate (Newell & Roberts, 2016), funding conferences and backing placements across panel discussions (ibid.). A certain degree of success can be interpreted here as key outcomes of the resulting Rio Declaration resituated

poverty as a major destructive force to the environment whilst the notion of excessive consumption by affluent nations was implicitly absolved through the emphasis of economic growth as a developmental panacea (Viñuales, 2015). Here, the ‘eradication of poverty’ was an ‘indispensable requirement for sustainable development’ whilst an ‘open international economic system [...] would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries’ (Morin & Orsini, 2015:120). Much of this language, found across the Rio Principles, reproduces, almost verbatim, sections of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<sup>7</sup> – further indicating the growing influence that the growth discourse had on the formation of global development policy (Cook, 2015).

What is observable from Rio is the reframing of the issue, with the roots of environmental deterioration not to be found in affluence or excess, but in poverty (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015:389). Whilst the Brundtland report describes how ‘poverty places unprecedented pressures on the planet’s lands, waters, forests, and other natural resources’ (WCED 1987: 7), it was the Rio Summit that institutionalised it as a discourse (Morin & Orsini, 2015). Through several key treaties and documents (including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and Local Agenda 21), poorer countries were promised aid if they subscribed to the unilateral, expert-led prescriptions of the summit (Newell & Roberts, 2016). These *Grand Bargains* diverted the focus of unsustainability from the Global North to the South, and, in shifting the issue from growth to poverty, presented the former as an answer to the latter. This new, internationally agreed-upon consensus on sustainable

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<sup>7</sup> An example of this can be seen in Principle 12 of the Rio Principles:

‘Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade’ (UN, 1992:3).

This is highly similar to Article XX of the GATT:

‘...such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’ (WTO, 1994:562).

development thus unshackled growth from any controversy that had plagued it during the 1970s<sup>8</sup> – reframing it as a required step in solving environmental, economic and social challenges (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015).

This momentum was endorsed in the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development in 2002, with Principle 18 proclaiming the power of the market in unifying the development agenda (Becker *et al.*, 2015). Whilst the interconnection of the three fundamental pillars of sustainable development (social, environmental and economic) were reconfirmed, the economic component was emphasised as the keystone unto which the welfare of the other two rested (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015). To illustrate this point, the *Plan of Implementation* repeatedly referenced the mandates of the World Trade Organisation,<sup>9</sup> recommending that policies should avoid distorting international trade (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). The wider influence and implications of this shift in the development discourse can be seen, for instance, in the change in tone when contrasting the United Nations Conferences on Human Settlements Habitat I held in Vancouver in 1976 and Habitat II convened in Istanbul in 1996 (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). Whilst the former pronounced the need to improve quality of life and redress inequities through the support of the State, the latter focused on the need for more ‘productive’ human settlements, making no reference to equity, and accorded developmental responsibility to municipalities, private companies, and NGOs (*ibid.*). The movement from the politically committed tone of pre-Brundtland to market-led technocratic approaches presented development as an *apolitical* problem, obscuring the fact that it is allocative and distributional (Ehresman & Okereke, 2015).

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<sup>8</sup> This stigma being an awareness that unfettered growth may be incompatible with a finite resource base.

<sup>9</sup> One example of this can be seen in Chapter III of the Plan of Implementation:

‘Provide incentives for investment in cleaner production and eco-efficiency... while avoiding trade-distorting measures inconsistent with the rules of the World Trade Organization’ (UN, 2002:8).

The Plan of Implementation references ‘trade’ 67 times. To put this in perspective, the word ‘poor’ is mentioned 16 times and ‘equality’ 36 times.

### 2.2.3 The Green Economy and the Sustainable Development Goals

In 2012, the world assembled once again at the United Nations Conference for Sustainable Development, more commonly referred to as *Rio +20*. UNEP's 600-page dossier on the 'Green Economy', a novel concept marrying sustainable development to economics, was to be centre stage (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). The report states that the 'key aim for a transition to a green economy is to enable economic growth and investment while increasing environmental quality and social inclusiveness' (UNEP, 2011:16). There is a discernible shift in the more egalitarian language used, with an emphasis on equality, opportunity and inclusivity (ibid.). However, the dossier denies the existence of any trade-offs between economic growth and environmental quality – stating them to be a 'myth' (ibid.:16). This is strong language that is challenged by empirical data. Costanza *et al.* (2015) have notably attributed environmental externalities to rapid, unrestrained economic growth:

'...a loss of vital rainforests, species extinction, depletion of ocean fisheries, shortages of fresh water in some areas and increased flooding in others, soil erosion, depletion and pollution of underground aquifers, decreases in quantity and quality of irrigation and drinking water, and growing global pollution of the atmosphere and oceans, even in the polar regions' (ibid.:2).

At the same time, a growing global middle-class may be reducing inequality between some developing countries, but inequality within nations is increasing (Milanović, 2016), with an attendant fall in social mobility as resources are disproportionately accumulated (Chetty *et al.*,

2014; Collins, Collins & Butt, 2015). This is not to aggregate and entirely attribute causality, but to disregard any relationship between consumption and environmental deterioration (Berthe & Elie, 2015); between increasing inequality and asymmetrical patterns of accumulation (Killewald, Pfeffer & Schachner, 2017), has been interpreted as the discursive workings of hegemony (Wanner, 2015) – the intellectual and, in turn, moral leadership of a particular idea, group or discourse.

In this vein, *Rio +20* made no reference to any planetary boundaries or any limits to growth (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). Rather, the necessity of growth is made clear in 19 articles of the Declaration, with affirmations of international trade as the ‘engine for development’ and the ‘critical role’ that liberalisation plays in its stimulation (ibid.:53). In failing to find a clear and coherent way to reconcile economic growth with environmental protection, Dame Barbara Stocking, CEO of Oxfam at the time, asserted:

‘Rio will go down as the hoax summit. They came, they talked, but they failed to act. Paralysed by inertia and in hook to vested interests, too many [world leaders] are unable to join up the dots and solve the connected crisis of environment, equality and economy’ (Washington, 2015:25).

Fisher *et al.* (2014) mark the summit as the most critical failure of the sustainable development movement in 20 years. Daniel Mittler, political director of Greenpeace, was similarly disheartened:

‘The epic failure of Rio+20 was a reminder [that] short-term corporate profit rules over the interests of people...They spend \$1 trillion a year on subsidies for

fossil fuels and then tell us they don't have any money to give to sustainable development' (Washington, 2015:8).

Today, the Sustainable Development Goals, 'a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity' (UNDP, 2018), envisage 'a world in which every country enjoys sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth' (UN, 2015:8). The goals do not, however, acknowledge any structural obstacles to 'universal prosperity' (Hamilton, 2016). Whilst the production of utopian ideals is arguably essential for our political and philosophical imaginaries – something to aspire to – it cannot be sufficient to simply ignore any structural inconsistencies that may attribute, or even aggravate, the currents that spur the creation of such ideals (Koss, 2012). To rely on the current discourse of a sustainable development agenda predicated on a scenario of 'win-win' obscures the fact that development will, in the Brundtland Commission's own words, require 'painful choices to be made' (1987:9). However, the Commission neglected to elaborate on what these painful choices might be, or how they might be made.

In order to develop this discussion, certain premises and assumptions need deconstruction. For instance, it is essential to consider the ways in which discourses function and the ways in which they are constrained by the demands and resistances of interests, ideas and institutions, both from within systems as well as without. Mills (2003:50) likens this process in an analysis of National Health Service in the United Kingdom:

'...hospitals are constrained in what they can do by government policies and government targets; the amount of money and resources which the government allows the hospitals and their relation to private hospitals. They

are also constrained by community groups and health watch-dogs and individuals who have now become influenced by the current notion that it is possible to be compensated financially for medical errors. Although hospitals have a management structure and the managers make decisions about their current direction, they can only do so within the constraints imposed by other agencies, and also within the constraints of the previously established procedures for managing hospitals. The managers may intend that the hospital will provide the best service possible to the community, but their policies may have to be modified by forces beyond their control, such as financial constraints; their decisions may have unforeseen consequences, and they may be involved in crises not of their making. Thus, although the manager of a hospital has ultimate responsibility for the way the hospital is run, s/he is not the only person involved in the formulation of management policy’.

This leads the discussion away from the isolation of the development discourse and prompts a conceptualisation of the power relations embedded in the political economy – in the ideas, interests and institutions of society – that determine what kinds of discourse are even possible.

## 2.3 The Political Economy of Capitalism

There is a body of work detailing the manifold ‘varieties’ of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Coates, 2005; Hall & Thelan, 2009; Thelan, 2012; Hall, 2014). This work emphasises ‘defection, reinterpretation and reform’ (Hall & Thelan, 2009:7) over a century that has seen constant revolution and reinvention. In 1929, for instance, a free-market form of capitalism, which bears a resemblance to the unregulated free-market economy of the modern era, collapsed in to the Great Depression (Skousen, 2016). What ensued was almost 20 years of shifting battles over the future of economic organisation comprising trade unions, radical and reformist political parties, and other divisions of industry (ibid.). In the 1940s, a negotiation materialised between labour and big business forming the basis of a restructured and heavily regulated capitalism, encompassing stronger trade unions, key roles for collective bargaining, the closer regulation of banks, as well as the welfare state (Hein, Detzer & Dodig, 2015). The following twenty-five years has been referred to as the Golden Age of capitalism, a period of swift and widely shared economic growth (Kotz, 2015). In the 1970s, capitalism entered another structural crisis, a lost decade mired by rising inflation, unemployment, dwindling corporate profits, and international monetary and financial instability (Skousen, 2016). In response to this, a new free-market, or neoliberal, form of capitalism emerged at the turn of the 1980s, a development brought about by an increasingly unified business class (Kotz, 2015).

It is pertinent to point out that the term neoliberalism is often used as both ideology and policy model (Goldstein, 2011). This is largely indicative of its role as the dominant modern variation of capitalism (Venugopal, 2015). Indeed, in less than a generation ‘neoliberal principles have spread across every continent and become so integral to public and private life that thinking outside their parameters is almost unthinkable’ (Holborow, Block & Gray, 2013:19). In the

interest of clarity, perhaps the most widely recognised and academically accepted definition of the term is Thorsen's (2010:204) seminal approach, which characterises neoliberalism as:

‘...a belief that the State should confine itself to safeguarding individual and commercial liberty and strong property rights; that market mechanisms are the best way to organize all transactions involving goods and services; that free markets and free trade liberate the creative, entrepreneurial spirit which exists in human society; and that this freedom can lead to greater well-being and better allocation of resources’.

Much work has been written on the marginalisation of trade unions (Upchurch & Mathers, 2012); the liberalisation of domestic and global markets (Chwieroth, 2007); the deregulation of banks (Kotz, 2009); cuts in the welfare state (Hall & O’Shea, 2013), and the privatisation of public services and land (Baeten, 2012). Similarly, there is a large body of work emphasising the benefits of increased trade (Genetski, 2011), inward investment (Sowell, 2012), real wages (Wolf & Resnick, 2012), job creation (O’Brien, 2004) and the diffused, manifold advantages of broad economic growth (Rothbard, 2010). However, this research is concerned with the (re)production of power and how this gives form, shape, prominence and/or privilege to certain discourses over others. In order to interrogate the power relations that characterise and comprise the terrain of modern capitalism – and how this terrain (re)constitutes discourse in its manifold ‘varieties’ – a dialectic of political economy is required.

### 2.3.1 Modernising Marxism

For all the historical focus on what Marxists did once they came to power, it is important to consider that the vast majority of what Marx wrote about was a critique of political economy (Sperber, 2013). Contrary to commonly held belief, he provided very little in the way of a replacement/alternative. What Marx did offer, however, was perhaps history's most comprehensive and sophisticated critique of capitalism (Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018). His theories about society, economics and politics hold that human societies develop through class struggle (Marx, 1848). In the capitalist system, this is manifested through conflict between the ruling class who control the means of production and the working-class who facilitate this control through the selling of their labour (ibid.). Using a method known as 'historical materialism', Marx prophesied that, like preceding socio-economic systems such as feudalism, capitalism formed an unavoidable internal tension that would eventuate its own fall and replacement by a new system: socialism<sup>10</sup> (Marx, 1846). For Marx, class antagonisms would lead to the development of class consciousness and the working-class conquest of political power (ibid.). The result of this would be a classless society based on the free association of producers (Marx, 1867). It is claimed that there are still valuable insights to be garnered from Marx and his theories (Fasensfest, 2018). This is not to endorse the thesis of Marxism *in toto* – but rather recognise some of its conceptual tenets as useful tools for questioning and critiquing political economy (ibid.). However, there remain substantial flaws in his work. These criticisms have come from various positions and disciplines, citing a lack of consistency (Kliman, 2006), a reliance on historical materialism (Giddens, 1995), the necessity of suppression of individual rights (Kolakowski, 1983), as well as economic issues such as reduced incentives (Acemoglu

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<sup>10</sup> Socialism may be defined as a political and economic theory of organisation advocating the means of production, distribution, and exchange be owned or regulated by the community (Cohen, 2008).

& Robinson, 2015). In addition, empirical and epistemological issues have been identified (Popper, 2002).

Historical materialism is considered a core tenet Marxism (Kolakowski & Falla 2008). It is grounded on the idea that society consists of two parts: the base (comprising the forces and relations of production) and the superstructure (comprising of culture, political power, roles, rituals, and the State). As Marx was a materialist, he theorised that the superstructure effectively grows out of the base which, at the same time, reflects the interests of the ruling class that controls this base (Marx, 1846). Here, ideas don't form reality, reality creates the framework for ideas. Thus, a driving proposition of historical materialism is that, because of the relationship between the base and superstructure, any technological developments in the mode of production will inevitably lead to changes across all social relations (Marx, 1846). However, critics argue the reflection of the superstructure in the economic base is a gross simplification of the nature of society (Giddens, 1995). Rather, the influence of ideas, values and cultural norms may be just as (if not more) significant for the course of society (ibid.). Besides, if the superstructure is, in fact, the primary influence and determinate of the base, there may be little justification for the claim that the history of society is one of explicit class conflict (Popper, 2002). This then becomes a causality dilemma as to whether the base or the superstructure comes first (ibid.).

Singer (2001) suggests a manner of resolving this issue. By conceiving the economic base as tangible, one must understand the teleology of Marx's argument: the wresting of control of the means of production (ibid.). If this is the 'goal of history', then the superstructure is the means, the method, and the tool (ibid.). However, Rothbard (2010) argues that Marx's claim that the base of society determined its consciousness in the superstructure is, in fact, backward. Under the influence of Ludwig von Mises, Rothbard claims that it is the 'human conscious' that is driving technological development (ibid.). Rothbard contends that Marx overlooks the way the

base itself arises and that this, in turn, conceals the ‘true’ causal path – this being from the superstructure to the base (ibid.).

Marx’s theory of historical determinism is also suspect (Sowell, 2012). The idea of historical determinism posits that at a specific moment in development, the material forces of society clash with the existing relations of production within the institutional frame of which they have hitherto functioned (Marx, 1859). This process leads to period of social revolution, with changes in the economic foundation eventuating the transformation of the whole superstructure (ibid.). Popper (2002) criticises the explanatory power of historical determinism by suggesting that it could be used to ‘explain away’ any fact, thus making it unfalsifiable. A steadfast defender of the scientific method, Popper (ibid.) was suspect of theories based on a mass effect. Indeed, he argues that any theory that involves averaged quantities and macroscopic behaviours cannot be considered deterministic in the sense that it cannot fulfil the principle of accountability. At the same time, he mistrusted grand predictions of the future, as they often carried an implicit willingness to sacrifice ‘something’ in order to bring about future events regarded as ‘inevitable’ (ibid.).

This raises another issue with Marx, whereby various political economists chastise the erosion of rights (Barber, 2009). Both Friedman (1962) and Hayek (1944) believed capitalism to be a precondition for freedom to flourish in a nation state. Ekelund and Hébert (2013) broadly determine history to have confirmed this pattern. Some theorists argue that the redistribution of property is a form of coercion (Winer, Tridimas & Hettich, 2008). Heilbroner (2013) acknowledges that normative socialist planning cannot co-exist with individual rights, an achievement of Western culture that must be preserved. He writes that socialist culture must produce a commitment to the idea of a morally conscious collective that is, by definition, antagonistic to bourgeois culture, which encourages and breeds the idea of the primary importance of the individual. This culture, devoted to the sovereignty of the person, asserts the

right to free speech and to freely act within reasonable grounds whilst, conversely, a socialist culture deliberately embraces a collective moral goal (ibid.).

Other critics hold that several key tenets of Marx remain economically untenable (Stringham, 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015). For instance, the Marxian labour theory of value (LTV) is a normative concept that argues that the value of a good or service should be (morally) equal to the full amount of labour value (wages) needed for its production. Adam Smith viewed the value of a commodity as the labour the consumer must expend to buy it (Cohen, 2008). Marx modified this idea – asserting the economic value or price of something was determined by the socially necessary labour, rather than by the use or pleasure the owner derives from its utility or scarcity value (ibid.). However, the Austrian School posits this theory as false – explaining how the capitalist is clearly contributing to the work and produce of the factory as they are suspending satisfaction or fulfilment through delayed investment (Buchholz & Feldstein, 2007). Moreover, they argue that value is determined not only by supply, but also by the demands of the consumer (ibid.). Indeed, whilst the labourer contributes to cost, so does the buyer through the very fact of their interest. This move from labour being the total source of value towards an individualist expression presents a significant challenge to Marx's basic assumptions (Robinson, 2006).

Further still, detractors of 'utopian' socialism claim that income sharing massively diminishes individual incentives to work (Zoltan & Young, 2010). They emphasise that in a society predicated on equality of outcome there will be stunted drive and determination (Steger & Roy, 2010). Moreover, it is incentives that increase not only productivity, but ingenuity and originality, with their absence leading to social stagnation or inertia (ibid.). In *Principles of Political Economy*, John Stuart Mill astutely remarked on this phenomenon, observing that 'It is the common error of socialists to overlook the natural indolence of mankind; their tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to persist indefinitely in a course once chosen'

(1965:794). Galbraith (1996) has similarly critiqued excessive commitments to equality as impractical in its assumption of human nature. Galbraith writes that such hope ‘has been shown by both history and human experience to be irrelevant’ (ibid.:59).

Under the weight of these criticisms, and under the light of the authoritarian communist regimes flaunting the failures of practical communism, Marxian theory underwent serious revisions from the 1970s onwards, coalescing in what can be termed today as *post-Marxism*. Post-Marxists are generally wary of classical Marxian claims ‘to be the emancipatory theory par excellence’ as well ‘his [Karl Marx’s] theory of history, his account of the revolutionary subject, his account of ethics, his relation to positivism, vanguardism and intellectuals and the problem of democracy’ (Tormey & Townshend, 2008:349). They hold that there are, however, valuable strains of theory within the corpus that are relevant when analysing the complexities of social phenomena in the modern world (Althusser, 2014).

Marx was, for instance, one of the first thinkers to conceptualise capitalism as a globalising force (Marx, 1852). He had not used the term globalisation in his writings, but he had analysed the process of an internationalising capitalist production and its developmental tendency to spread: ‘The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe’ (Marx, 1848:2). Marx goes on to state that ‘It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere’ with a constant revolutionising of the instruments of production to achieve this aim (ibid.). Marx wrote these words well over a century before globalisation was coined and introduced to academia by Harvard economist, Theodore Levitt, in 1983. Although the spread of industrialisation seems perhaps obvious with hindsight, Marx was not only accurate about what happened in the late 20th century – but he was remarkably precise about why and how it happened: capitalism’s need for new markets and cheap labour (Bieler & Lee, 2017) exponentially facilitated by technological innovation (Kogan *et al.*, 2017) and the interminable consumption of resources (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2018).

Marx's commitment to the implications and consequences of power has also reverberated throughout the social sciences (Der Derian, 2009). Marx never explicitly advanced a theory of power, but his work implicitly addresses it (Marx, 1848; 1857; 1862). Power, for Marx, was not a metaphysical or philosophical abstraction, but a resource. And, therefore, as a resource, power is finite. For Marx, the instrumentation of this power is often seized or captured by economic processes, with the logic of its distribution being the accumulation of capital (Marx, 1867). In the modern day, there is a body of empirical work that points to networks of global corporate influence (Vitali, Glattfelder, & Battiston, 2011), plutocracy (Freeland, 2012), and the ties between power and finance (Kalaitzake, 2017). However, Foucault (1998) challenges the notion that power can be 'possessed' to any such extent. Rather, he understands power as dispersed and pervasive: 'Power is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere' (Foucault, 1998:63). It has neither agency nor structure (ibid.). For Foucault, power transcends politics. It is an everyday, socialised and embodied phenomenon, a 'regime of truth' that pervades society (ibid). Yet, power is also a form to ensure conformity – as understood in Foucault's studies of prisons (1998), schools (1991a; 1991b) and mental hospitals (2000a), where individuals learned to discipline themselves and act in accordance with socially recognised norms communicated through dominant forms of discourse. At the same time, Gramsci (1971) depicted civil society as the arena where ideas and beliefs were shaped. In this approach, power is linked to norms and values, but the key determinants are discourse, knowledge and culture (ibid.). Yet Marx and Engels argue that 'ruling ideas [or regimes of truths] are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships' (1846:64). Knowledge, in this context, is understood as a resource harnessed in the services of power, moulded by political and professional factions who own or control the economic means of production. In this way, Marx's understandings of power presupposes and perhaps even complement those of Foucault

– power is largely exercised through conformity to institutions (Foucault, 1998). These arguments are extrapolated in the following sections.

Marx's work on crisis theory (1857) has also, today, found relevance. For Marx, capitalist growth was disproportionate. He posits that 'equilibrium', a core assumption of neoclassical economics,<sup>11</sup> is but a conceptual hypothesis never practically attained (ibid.). Development is uneven, therefore differing levels of accumulation inevitably lead to an over-accumulation in one or more area (ibid.). This over-accumulation precedes a sharp fall in the rate of profit and then, consequently, a prolonged period of underinvestment during the depression (ibid.). This theory remains one of the most highly debated issues in economic theory as it poses an existential question of whether, as capitalism grows, this very process of growth will undermine its conditions of existence (Cullenberg, 1998; Wolff & Resnick, 2012). Neoclassical economists claim that only exogenous shocks (such as monetary policy) can cause a crisis that efficient markets would otherwise avoid (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). Yet there have been six global recessions since 1970: 1974–75, 1980–83, 1990–93, 1998, 2001–02, and 2008–09 (Prabhakar, 2016). Wider research reveals that between 1970 and 2015, at the national level, there have been a total of 352 fiscal crises, 82 banking crises and 122 currency crises (Gerling *et al.*, 2017). The 2008 financial crisis was merely 'the latest in a long line of similar episodes stretching back some 200 years' (Burnham, 2010:27). For Marx (1867), crises were both systemic *and* systematic to capitalism.

In mainstream policy, however, there remains significant resistance to seeing these issues as systemic (Stiglitz, 2017). Some theorists attribute this in large part to both an ideological and psychological attachment to forms of capitalist socialisation: value, the commodity and the subject form (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010) – an attachment that is made ever more complex and

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<sup>11</sup> General equilibrium theory is a macroeconomic theory explaining how supply and demand in an economy with multiple markets interact dynamically, eventually culminating with the equilibrium of prices (Balasko, 1988).

intricate with capitalism's agile inclination to reconstitute and reconfigure itself during and after crises (Thompson, 2017). And this is a crucial point, despite the patent and manifold flaws within Marx's thesis, his characterisations of capitalism as 1) global; 2) institutionally embedded; and 3) internally contradictory, lay a critical foundation for understanding how discourses work and how they may become hegemonic. This will become clearer as the chapter progresses through its dialectical method. First, it is important to explore how these three facets materialise and simultaneously reinforce each other.

### **2.3.2 The Reconfigurations of Modern Capitalism**

'The truly surprising thing', writes Slavoj Žižek, 'is how easily the idea was accepted that its happening [the financial crisis] was an unpredictable surprise which hit markets out of the blue' (2009:9). Žižek highlights one specific vein of thought: there happened to be substantial warning signs of approaching crisis; signs ignored or otherwise obfuscated by a wide range of groups (ibid.). Instead of debating whether these signs were clear or ambiguous, or whether these signs were buried under an excess of superfluous information, what is observable here is the efficacy of failing or refusing to act on warning signs, and the manner in which a socially-accepted silence may surround unsettling facts, enabling profitable activities to carry on in spite of a general unease over their possible implications (Davies & McGoey, 2012). At the same time, these silences may be harnessed and mobilised to absolve inaction. In other words, it is of little surprise that the crisis, claims Žižek (2009), was readily accepted as a phenomenon striking unexpectedly. Quite the reverse, as key stakeholders potentially held an interest in working together to maintain the appearance of previous helplessness and/or the absence of foresight (ibid.).

Simultaneously, the media indiscreetly focused on the ‘villainising’ of bankers (Glynos, Klimecki & Willmott, 2012). It has been argued that this creation of a scapegoat (the financial sector), one with no real, tangible form, may have served to narrow public debate and marginalise the political dimension of the issue (ibid.). The fixation on moral shortcomings (and on the narrow insignificance of issues such as ‘bonus culture’) pushed out of public sight the wider structural features of the financial regime (Davies & McGoey, 2012). Any calls for reformation instead followed the rebuilding and strengthening of the existing system under the banner of ‘smokescreen slogans’ (Žižek, 2009) such as ‘improved market discipline’ (Glynos, Klimecki & Willmott, 2012). As a result, it is claimed that ‘elites’ have potentially been able to avoid conversations about any possible structural deficiencies of unregulated markets (Schmelzer, 2017).

What arose out of the ashes of the 2008 crisis has been termed as the most recent reconfiguration to modern capitalism (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012). With bailout packages and stimulus programmes having limited success (yet coming at the heavy price of rising sovereign debt) many governments turned to austerity (Gamble, 2014). To vindicate cuts in public spending – entailing retrenchments to the welfare state – the crisis was reframed as a product of government intervention and overregulation (Taylor, 2009). Supranational institutions encouraged a return to pre-2007 economic orthodoxy and the restoring of ‘sound’ economic policy through the reduction of debt (ibid.). This push for austerity has been interpreted as an attempt to deepen and preserve the institutions that may have caused the crisis (Kotz, 2015), whilst being, at the same time, under the light of work that strongly suggests austerity measures are unable to bring about another period of stable economic expansion (Herndon, Pollin & Ash, 2013; Bell, Johnston, & Jones 2014). In an article for the New York Times in 2013, Paul Krugman states:

‘What the Reinhart-Rogoff affair shows is the extent to which austerity has been sold on false pretences. For three years, the turn to austerity has been presented not as a choice but as a necessity. Economic research, austerity advocates insisted, showed that terrible things happen once debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP. But economic research showed no such thing; a couple of economists made that assertion, while many others disagreed. Policy makers abandoned the unemployed and turned to austerity because they wanted to, not because they had to’.

Streeck (2016) interprets this post-2008 restructuring as an authoritarian (top-down) intervention to preserve institutional power relations and a reflexive move to protect the discourse of unrestrained growth as the primary commitment of the State. This, he writes, can further be seen in the way the State as a tax-raising power has relaxed restraints on the interests of capital (ibid.). Tax stagnation coupled with gradually increasing state spending has ushered in the *debt state* (ibid.). As the market and its logic of commodification expands and deepens, the State is obliged to increase its spending on infrastructure, policing and social protection, whilst, at the same time, an organised tax revolt on behalf of elites comparatively reduces the tax base. Owing to alterations in the tax system (typically seen by lowering or even rescinding the higher caps), elites thus have greater capital for investing in the rising stock of government bonds that, due to a risk-free status, have become even more attractive during crises. According to Streeck (ibid.), this results in the State coming to rely on capital from elites rather than taxing them. Where the tax-state was founded on principles of progressive redistribution, the premise

of the debt state is built upon the reverse: it offers a return to capital owners as opposed to divesting them of that return.

However, at the same time, the lowering of taxes in the post-2008 economy remains a key form of encouragement for entrepreneurship that, in turn, leads to job creation and thus economic revitalisation (Parker, 2018). Although, in analysing an unprecedented data set of 632,116 individuals, including 43,223 entrepreneurs from 53 countries, Darnihamedani *et al.* (2018:355) observe that corporate taxes show a negative relationship with innovative entrepreneurship, yet this same report states that ‘whilst reducing start-up costs may lower the barriers to entry and increase the quantity of entrepreneurship, it may not necessarily have a positive effect on the quality of entrepreneurship’ (ibid.:368). The report concludes that ‘although studies investigated the influence of institutions and regulations on the level and the type of entrepreneurship [i.e. Cullen & Gordon, 2007; Branstetter *et al.*, 2014], it is unclear, particularly at the micro-level, how innovative entrepreneurship is affected’ (Darnihamedani *et al.*, 2018:368).

Harvey (2014) interprets austerity reforms as emergency measures to safeguard the monetary, banking and credit systems; restoring the conditions for capital accumulation. Klein (2014) argues that executive authorities were comparatively much slower in responding to the needs of social reproduction (housing foreclosures) or to take affirmative action on environmental protection (Klein, 2014). With budgetary constraints in the wake of financial bailouts and recession, political actors have been forced ‘to make tough choices’ (Vis, van Kersbergen & Hylands, 2011:338). The question of who pays what, when, and how gives rise to increasingly sharp distributional conflicts. Arguably this echoes the Brundtland Commission’s words of ‘painful choices to be made’ (1987:9) in the wake of crises and catastrophe. It is, essentially, those other than the rich that suffered (Jensen & Tyler, 2015; Correia, Dussault & Pontes, 2015; Pearson & Elson, 2015), whilst the discourse problematised in the media and political arenas

did not seem to challenge so much as compliment institutional restructuring (Bruff, 2014; Morales, Gendron & Guénin-Paracini, 2014).

This same discursive process – the process of restructuring – may be observed in the relationship between capitalism and the natural environment (Castree, 2015; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015; Fletcher & Büscher, 2017). Following the alleged ‘contradictions’ that arise when the relationship between people and nature are driven by the profit motive (O’Connor, 1994), it is claimed that the demand for profit will always supplant positive social and environmental outcomes each time they are at odds (Roth & Dressler, 2012). However, at the same time, the search for an increase in profit has certainly delivered both economic and environmental progress through the promotion of efficient use of material resources (Van den Berg, 2016). Even Marx (1894:IV) noted that the ‘capitalist mode of production extends the utilisation of the excretions of production and consumption’ whilst ‘so-called waste plays an important role in almost every industry’ since this ‘reduces the cost of the raw material to the extent to which it is again saleable’ and, therefore, ‘increases pro tanto the rate of profit’. Moreover, capitalism can be conceived as powerful precisely because its functioning depends on the rationality of profit – goods and services are voluntarily offered and chosen when a transaction is beneficial to both vendor and customer. Once ‘consuming green’ becomes the mutually beneficial and the most cost-effective option, a tangible sustainable solution to environmental decline could well be realised (Maslin, 2014). This would entail, however, breakthroughs in clean and efficient energy and technology (ibid.), which is supported by the innovative supremacy of true market competition (Utterback, 1994).

Yet there is potentially a danger of this drive to generate value encouraging excessive commodification (Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015). Ecological commodification owes its success to the environmental movements of the 1980s, with legislation and regulation intended to reduce or limit environmental destruction by capital, instead, creating a new scarcity –

‘allowable natural destruction’ (Smith, 2007:20). This led to the development of new markets in ecological goods (ibid.). This form of green capitalism, which Smith claims to be an ‘environmental veneer for sustained exploitation’ (ibid.:17), has found socio-cultural legitimacy through the ‘green economy’ (Corson & MacDonald, 2012). Whilst Apostolopoulou and Adams (2015) argue that commodification has become a state-sanctioned strategy for radically intensifying and deepening the infiltration of nature by the market, Holmes (2015) has emphasised that it is important to consider how economic policies have also allowed certain forms of conservation to both emerge and thrive. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have, for instance, become a major conversation tool. Through a diverse set of arrangements, the beneficiaries of environmental services, from watershed protection and forest conservation to carbon sequestration and landscape beauty, incentivise those whose lands provide these services with subsidy and/or support. The arrangement of payments for any benefit accrued from forest, field or any other natural ecosystem may provide a way of recognising its value whilst ensuring that its benefits will endure (Sango, Suich & Tacconi, 2013).

Börner *et al.* (2017) have questioned the effectiveness of PES in achieving environmental objective, requiring considerable political work, institution building, and donor funding to become effective. At the same time, their economic gains may become the prerequisite for its ‘health’, with preservation and conservation possibly acting as only a stepping stone for accumulation as oppose to any intrinsic value the environment may hold (Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015). This subjugation of broader practices of sustainability in to the logic and premises of economics can form a system resistant to corrective feedback from the very predicaments it is shaping and through which, in turn, it relies (Büscher *et al.*, 2012). Corson and MacDonald (2012) argue that a key aspect of this attraction and ubiquity is found exactly in its ability to kindle a hybrid consensus-oriented discourse (Corson & MacDonald, 2012).

Kenis and Lievens (2015) argue that this hybrid consensus is the financialisation of nature – a process where capital assumes control of nature, marketing it through certificates, credits, securities, bonds and other speculative instruments to guarantee the greatest profit possible through financial speculation. A key maxim behind this advancement lies in the idea that nature needs to be saved by bringing it to the market (Büscher *et al.*, 2012). This depicts capitalism as the key to future environmental sustainability (Igoe *et al.*, 2010), whilst, eroding concepts of the ‘public good’ and collective responsibility to preserve nature. Igoe (2012) argues that today, highly selective and stylised representations of conservation sites span the globe and bring pieces of conservation ‘hotspots’ in to the daily lives of consumers. These representations comprise spectacular images of flora and fauna, with their hallmark splendour. Boehnert (2016) has called this the co-option of environmental language and imagery. In the appropriation of environmental concepts, the sanitisation of its content and use of its language to market projects of accumulation, markets forces have been able to obscure their own dynamics whilst manufacturing the appearance of an altruistic or charitable agenda (Castree, 2015). The attempt at conserving valued components of nature by transforming voluntary or mandated preferences in to prices is, therefore, more than a matter of economics, it is a question of political economy: markets in environmental goods and services that cannot be separated from social relations of power and inequality (Büscher *et al.*, 2012).

In short, the literature here suggests that (re)formations behind discourses such as ‘improved market discipline’ and ‘green growth’ may, in fact, conceal reconfigurations that further embed market dominance. This ability to extend contradictory realities (the simultaneous retreat yet entrenchment) warrants further theoretical exploration. It requires a fuller abstraction of *how* discourses work and *why* they may be inclined to become dominant or even hegemonic. This is particularly important because it allows us to move past the literature whereby the power

that informs discourse is often assumed oppressive and exploitative. Rather, discourses may be conceptualised as free from such axiomatic assumptions. Foucault (1978:100) argues:

‘...discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’.

This is interesting in that discourses both produce power yet undermine it. Foucault allows one to see power as exercised within and across every interaction (Ball, 2012). This makes it much less a stable element since it can be challenged at any moment (Mills, 2003) and this can, therefore, initiate an entirely different way of exploring power relations in society.

### **2.3.3 Foucault and Beyond the State**

In its most literal sense, discourse has been defined as a form of communication that runs back and forth (Fairclough, 1993). Within the domain of social analysis, discourses are the processes of communication and the construction of meanings (Strauss, 2013). The analysis of discourse has become increasingly popular within the contemporary social sciences (Howarth, 2010), and has its roots in several theoretical traditions, most notably poststructuralist reactions to positivistic perceptions of reality (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002).

Despite a complete and satisfied consensus of the term being an ‘impossible task’ (Rasiński, 2011:7), this research leans towards defining discourse as the role of and relations between, language, social structures and forms of social action and agency (Parker, 2010). The case for such a definition is found in reflecting on the roots and origins of the term’s use and development (ibid.). Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have been credited with bringing discourse to the foreground of contemporary political philosophy (Torfing, 1999). Disillusioned with the economic reductionism of classical Marxian theory, they turned to the role of meaning in the interpellation and identification of political identities (ibid.). Here, discursive analysis assumes that human ideas, beliefs and activities are contingent on the creation and reproduction of ‘signification’<sup>12</sup> preceding the immediacy of fact. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), this approach can be differentiated from Kant’s prescription of *a priori* cognition or the phenomenalist’s identification of the subject as the primary mode of meaning. They argue that philosophers of discourse shoulder the historic centrality of discursive forms and that, as result, one must not overlook the subject in the processes constituting or establishing discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and how signs and speech do not reflect the world in neutrality (Saussure, 1986) but, rather, perform a dynamic role in its creation and destruction (Fairclough, 1993).

But it was arguably the poststructuralist theory of Derrida (1967), Lacan (1966) and Foucault (1968) that best conceptualised the problems of ‘talking about and understanding the world’ (Philips & Jørgensen, 2002:1). However, given the interdisciplinarity of poststructuralism, the term discourse within a context of human consciousness (Lacan, 1966) is not the same as discourse used to analyse the structures of power (Foucault, 1968). Thus, it is the aims that guide the thinker through examinations of discourse which influence theoretical resolution and lines of terminology often preclude easy reconciliation and classification (Wodak & Meyer, 2015). Discourse theory is therefore comprised of a heterogenous field of related ideas bound

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<sup>12</sup> The representation or conveying of meaning.

together by their emphasis on the constructivist power of language (Rasiński, 2011). Whilst language may create social reality, the relationship between discourse and the social world can, equally, assume dissimilar and divergent form. For Derrida (1967), discourse serves as a model for deconstruction. For Lacan (1966), discourse is an immaterial and ethereal bond between society and the individual. For Foucault (1968), discourse concerns how language interlaces with questions that concern its relationship with society and the institutions which determine the production or restriction of statements in a given time and place. In this regard, Foucault's understanding of discourse provides both a temporal and spatial quality.

For Foucault, discursive events constitute discursive formations (1968). This historicity of discursive configurations implies that discourse may be deductive, 'composed of the sum of all the real statements (spoken or written) in their eventual dispersion and in the instance that is specific to each of them' (ibid.:16). Therefore, statements are events – something material, empirical. An 'archaeological' analysis of discourse is thus a description of patterns concerning the ways in which statements transform into other statements and the ways in which they are distinct from others (Mills, 2003). This form of analysis concerns the relationship *between* differing statements – i.e. the manners in which they are bound and the circumstances under which certain statements can emerge (ibid.). These groups can be conceived as *discursive formations* – a system of synchronicity; of conjoined yet perceptibly heterogenous aspects working and relating together. In Foucault's words (1968:200) the elements of discursive formation are:

'...the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) propositions are built up, more or less exact descriptions developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed. They form the precondition of what is later revealed as

and which later functions as an item of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error’.

Knowledge is therefore to be comprehended as a group of elements, formed by discursive practice which become the basis for their constitution. This includes fictions, reflections, relations, institutional regulations and political decisions (Rasiński, 2011). Foucault’s concept of discourse can be compared to a *unit* of knowledge present at a point in time whilst the relations *between* discourses favour the development or domination of specific discursive formations (Hook, 2007). Foucault (1972:60) observes that:

‘These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterisation; and these relations are not present in the object; it is not they that are deployed when the object is being analysed; they do not indicate the web, the immanent rationality, that ideal nervure that reappears totally or in part when one conceives of the object in the truth of its concept. They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority’.

This represents the ‘other’ significant strand of Foucauldian analysis – genealogy. This can be described as a development of archaeological analysis that is more concerned with a

Nietzschean working of power. It is an analysis of the conditions under which one might consider certain utterances or propositions to be considered ‘true’ (Mills, 2003). These conditions coalesce to create systems of formation that privilege certain discourses over others. This, however, does not suggest a homogeneity of institution. Rather, it focuses on their relationship through discursive practices:

‘...knowledge is simply the outcome of the interplay, the encounter, the junction, the struggle, and the compromise between the instincts. Something it’s produced because the instincts meet, fight one another, and at the end of their battles finally reach a compromise. That something is knowledge’ (Foucault, 1994:8).

For Foucault (1969), to ‘know’ what knowledge is and to comprehend its very essence and production, one must examine the relationship between struggle and power; how people and ‘things’ clash and compete for domination. Indeed, the idea of power is not simply present in Foucauldian analysis – ‘it is by means of the relations of power that the very process of discursive formation is made possible’ (Peci, Vieira & Clegg, 2009:384).

Foucault was deeply unsatisfied with Marxian theories on the State’s role in oppressing people. This negative, ‘one-way traffic of power’ (Mills, 2003:31), fetishises the State as oppressor and the role of ideology in constituting people as individuals (Althusser, 2014). Power, here, is seen as a *possession* – a ‘thing’ coveted and held onto by those in power and which those who are powerless try to wrest from their control (ibid.). Foucault (1980:98) disparages this notion, claiming that power is something which is *performed*, something more akin to strategy than possession:

‘Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or as something which only functions in the form of a chain ... Power is employed and exercised through a netlike organisation ... Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application’.

This conceptualisation of power as a chain or as a net also illustrates how power is diffused across society, as oppose to a mere set of relations between the oppressed and oppressor (Mills, 2003). The centrality of the State in all analyses is one which Foucault eschews. He contends that some thinkers too quickly presume a solidity and permanence to the State, leading analysis away from its fragility and the potentials for change (ibid). Foucault (1991:103) argues that:

‘...overvaluing the problem of the State is one which is paradoxical because apparently reductionist: it is a form of analysis that consists in reducing the State to a certain number of functions, such as the development of productive forces of the reproduction of relations of production, and yet this reductionist vision of the relative importance of the State’s role nevertheless invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied. But the State, no more probably than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly, this importance: maybe after all, the State is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised

abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think’.

To illustrate this, one may consider the diversity of political office – elected representatives from different parties, voted for by different people,

‘...each and all with their own personal and political agenda, needs and ambitions, negotiating with the demands of the Party policy as a whole and the Cabinet’s discipline led by the Cabinet and the Prime Minister who are informed and led by the Civil Service which itself is staffed by people and departments each with their own personal agendas’ (Mills, 2003:48).

And this isn’t even considering other entities of the State – such as the police, legal and judicial systems, as well as an array of other services provided by government. Amidst such profound variance, Foucault (1991) questions the very possibility of a single unified aim. This is not to be in denial of the power that is exacted over the individual by the State by its numerous institutions but, rather, to propose a recognition of the manifold and often conflicting agencies involved in its conceptualisation (ibid.). However, later in his writings, Foucault (1982) did acknowledge the manner in which governments attempt to ‘produce’ the citizen best suited to realise government policies. Power is a mechanism articulating both state *and* civil society; both regulatory apparatuses *and* subjects (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2017). This convergence with Gramscian understandings of power has been highlighted in the literature (Morera, 2000; Ives, 2004; Cocks, 2013; Kreps, 2015). The disciplines of history and geography offer ‘especially valuable interpretations of this encounter’ (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2017:166), whilst Ekers and Loftus (2008:11) see this blend of critical theory as particularly potent in ‘theorising the

urbanisation of capitalist hegemony'. This is because whilst Foucault prompts the spatiotemporal investigation of discursive patterns, Gramscian theory conceptualises why these patterns may be normalised over time.

### **2.3.4 Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony**

If political economy is concerned with the distribution of power (Phillips, 2017), then a critical issue in theory remains how consent to power is legitimised (Langman, 2015). For Gramsci, social power 'is not a simple matter of domination on the one hand and subordination or resistance on the other' (Jones, 2006:3). Rather than imposing will, dominant groups within democratic societies generally govern with *consent* – the maintenance of which is dependent upon the relationships between societal forces (Gramsci, 1971). However, in order to fully appreciate Gramsci's contributions, it is important to briefly clarify his intellectual heritage.

The term 'third face of power' has its origins in Marxian thought; wherein the role of ideology, values and beliefs in the reproduction of class relations, and the concealment of contradictions, are often discussed (Akram, Emerson & Marsh, 2015). Marx (1848) believed that a ruling class used ideology (and its associated ideas and values) to protect and reinforce the social relations of capitalism. This led to Engels's idea of 'false consciousness' – the notion that material, ideological, and institutional processes in capitalist societies mislead the proletariat, who through passive subjugation are unable to recognise and reject their own oppression.<sup>13</sup> False consciousness has been described as a defective form of reasoning, derived from particular forms of socialisation that accept the values and cognitive patterns produced by others, especially from forms of institutional norms and cultural codes that distort the capacity of critical cognition (Thompson, 2015). This phenomenon is intrinsically connected to questions

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<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Lukács (1967:4) with the term originally appearing in a letter written by Engels to Franz Mehring in 1893.

of power as it is the very means through which groups come to submit themselves to the interests of others, particularly the capacity of the elite to distract subjects from questioning the premise and foundation of their social relations (ibid.).

Building on these ideas, Lukács (1967) believed that, under capitalism, consciousness becomes ‘reified’ (materialised), transforming social relationships into a tangible entity, wherein ‘subject and object collapse into each other’ (1911:46). Lukács explains that the capitalist may count its profits at the end of the year and, in the interest of reinvestment or competition, make calculations as to how much wages should rise or fall. However, for the worker, this same calculation becomes a determinant of his whole physical, mental and moral existence (1967). Lukács called this process *unity* – a totality of form and material containing all possible aspects of experience. Any self-realisation or actualisation of the worker is dependent on the decision-making processes of the capitalist. This may result in an inherent restriction of what is known or what can be known, inhibiting the capacity of the worker to even view the system that both subjugates and alienates them (DiMaggio, 2015).

However, there are serious issues with both Marx and Lukács’ analyses in that they reduce ideology to merely an expression of economic relations (epiphenomenalism) and class antagonism (class reductionism). This limits their theories in both practicality and pragmatism (Eagleton, 2007). Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) concept of ideology is, however, more sophisticated than that of his predecessors as it overcomes both epiphenomenalism and class reductionism. Gramsci describes ideology as a ‘terrain’ of practices, principles, and dogmas having a material and institutional nature constituting individual subjects (ibid.:28). Class is not reproduced in the superstructure through elements entirely of its own. There is a possibility for fluidity on the ideological plane. This plane, or sphere, is typically conceived as civil society

Civil society, as defined by Eagleton, is the ‘whole range of institutions intermediate between state and economy’ (2007:115). It is the arena where hegemony is established. In the establishment of hegemony, ideologies may play a key role as they ‘organise the human masses’ (Gramsci, 1971:1492). However, this is not necessarily negative. Gramsci (ibid.) proposes that instead of an oppressive relationship between base and superstructure, it is reflexive and dynamic. Within this formation, Gramsci ‘isolates civil society as having a key intermediary role and proposes that both conservative and transformative projects attempt to occupy consciousness and everyday life through the functioning of a civil society created in their service’ (Jones, 2006:39). Changing or influencing society encompasses a protracted period of negotiation enacted throughout and across institutions through the development of broad cultural and political projects that appeal to all (Gramsci, 1971).

Therefore, the maintenance of hegemony infers the necessity of reproducing the social relations for a given ‘social formation’ (ibid.:277). This is realised through moral and intellectual leadership through a state-civil society nexus. Whilst the State is important to Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony, he depicts it as both central *and* diffused. Indeed, Gramsci brings attention to the relations by which State and civil society are interwoven. He writes:

‘...in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one state to the next, it goes without saying but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country’ (ibid.:238).

Here, Gramsci calls a broader view on how power is consolidated in institutions *outside* of the State: through private enterprises (ibid.:258), the ‘intelligentsia’ (ibid.:5), the Church, unions, and universities (ibid.:40). This is interesting as it has strong resemblances with Foucauldian (2003) concerns of government as a dispersed form of rule. Whereas Gramsci wished to evade any reification of the State, Foucault (ibid.:30) similarly emphasised that ‘it is important not to, so to speak, deduce power by beginning at the centre and trying to see how far down it goes, or to what extent it is reproduced or renewed in the most atomistic elements of the society’. Foucault’s point of departure is the diffused practices and knowledges constituting the ordinary forms of rule whilst, at the same time, acknowledging that relations of power and truth operate within and across broader form of social, cultural, and economic context (Foucault, 2000a:133).

For Gramsci, the realisation of hegemony comes through the daily practices and processes of society that imbue individual and group belief. For instance, in attempting to comprehend support for Benito Mussolini, Gramsci found it necessary to understand ideology as a dynamic and participatory force, as oppose to the veil of ‘false consciousness’ pulled over the eyes of an unsuspecting polity. Rather than being enforced, hegemony infers a far more nuanced approach to ways of thinking and acting – ‘a new conformism from below’ (1971:242). This is shaped ‘through everyday experience illuminated by common sense’ (ibid.:99) – a term referring to the sedimentation of repeated practice, discourse and knowledge across society. An interesting point of comparison here can be made with the term ‘hypernormalisation’, coined by Yurchak (2006:75). Yurchak describes the paradoxes of life in the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s, explaining how much of the population knew the system was flawed and/or failing. However, politicians and citizens alike resigned themselves to maintaining the shared pretence of a functioning society. Over time, this delusion became a

self-fulfilling prophecy and its falsity was eventually accepted by the nation as real; as truth (ibid.).

Foucault (2000a) also had deep problems with Marxian accounts of ideology, maintaining that the positioning of ideology as the sole truth overlooks how truth operates within discourses and practices. Indeed, Foucault was unconvinced ideology must ‘stand in a secondary position relative to something that functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant’ (ibid.:119). Through subjectivation, Foucault (2000b:331) claims:

‘...there are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to’.

Here, power needs to be understood in its relationality and, simultaneously, its anonymity. Indeed, subjects exist in their relational capacity, and thus power ‘is not something that can be divided between those that have it and hold on to it exclusively and those who do not’ (Foucault, 2003:29). Rather, power is diffused; circulating throughout society (ibid.). In this respect, Foucauldian power is the continuous and constant recurrence of knowledges, practices, and discourses; events that, in turn, imbricate through sedimentation to form reality (Jones, 2006). This is, essentially, a Gramscian depiction of power.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the term ‘biopower’<sup>14</sup> arose in Foucault’s work as an accompaniment to individualisation. This concept was developed to (better) approach relations of power that determine populations as regulatory ‘targets’ (Foucault, 2003). Lazzarato (2004)

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<sup>14</sup> Biopower relates to the practice of modern nation states and their regulation of their subjects through ‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 1976:140).

perceives biopower to include the investing, administrating, and controlling of life. Such interventions may be understood as an effort to bring uniformity to the social order (ibid.). In this regard, Foucault acknowledged that ‘biopower was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism’ (1990:171). Here, capitalism as a socio-economic system requires both docility and efficiency: ‘it had to have methods of power capable of optimising forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern’ (1979:141). Interestingly, capitalism here must not be considered causal. In Foucault’s (1994:379) words power does not come from a unitary source but is, rather, ‘the overall effect of a tangle of power relations that allows one class or group to dominate another’. Consequently, both Foucault and Gramsci help in conceptualising how government rationalities may be socially internalised, and this can prove pivotal for comprehending the ways in which policies are mobilised. For Foucault, this mobilisation may involve the management of conduct. His politico-technological approach refers to the control of human bodies through disciplinary institutions such as prisons (1998), schools (1991a; 1991b) and mental hospitals (2000a). Here, individuals learn to discipline *themselves* and act in accordance with recognised norms communicated through a socially dominant discourse. In a similar fashion, Gramsci (1971) depicted society as the arena where ideas and beliefs were actively consent to. Whilst discourse may be strategically deployed in the service of consent, it is the cultural norms and values of the people that are the key determinants of this consent.

In summary, both theorists stress the decentralised nature power. It is ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’. For both Foucault and Gramsci, power permeates civil society; it functions not only negatively; and it constitutes the ordinary, everyday and mundane. If we thus assume that a structural overlay of power is present in the discursive workings of a global political economy, yet this power is, at the same time, decentralised, diffused and dispersed, then this

may have important implications for approaches to urban epistemology. Indeed, it may set the stage for conceptualising the city as both connected yet fragmented.

## **2.4 The Political Economy of the Built Environment**

### **2.4.1 Epistemological Concerns**

Since the decline of developmentalist schools of thought,<sup>15</sup> the failures of state socialism and the deepening of global economic integration, a range of conflicting urban transformations have taken place (Curtis, 2016). Brenner and Schmid (2015:152) explain how the ‘causes, contours, contexts, interconnections and implications of such transformations are widely debated’ and ‘remain extremely confusing in the wake of the global financial and economic crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s’. Despite this, key meta-trends seem to show some manner of consolidation; characteristics that challenge long-held assumptions on the nature of the urban.

First, a geography of uneven development has emerged from the interaction of rapid processes of urbanisation and other forms of stagnation, shrinkage and/or marginalisation, often in close proximity to each other (Smith & Timár, 2010; Smith, 2011). Distinct from geographies of territorial inequality that have been linked to historical cycles of industrialisation, these new varieties of spatial unevenness are not easily modelled through traditional analyses of differentiation (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014). Indeed:

‘The circumstances of wealth and poverty, of growth and decline, inclusion and exclusion, centrality and

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<sup>15</sup> It has been claimed that the developmentalist model formed a system that was rigid and resistant – an ethnocentric and unilateral way for changing the Third World with a decisive lack of cohesion within the models and even the academic community itself (Roy, 2000).

marginality, mutually produce one another at all spatial scales, from the neighbourhood to the planetary. Under these conditions, new approaches to understanding and influencing processes of uneven spatial development under capitalism are urgently needed' (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:152).

Moreover, elementary understandings of what constitutes the urban – i.e. the notion of 'cityness'<sup>16</sup> – have become increasingly nebulous; at least more so than in previous cycles of urbanisation (Pieterse, 2010; 2011). While conceptual framing devices such as 'cityness' are pervasive in mainstream policy (Lepawsky *et al.*, 2015) and research (Nkula-Wenz, 2018), the modern urban condition cannot so easily be grasped in any single form but is consequential of successive replications and repetitions from specific sociospatial conditions (Pieterse, 2011). Brenner and Schmid (2015:152) write that 'rather than witnessing the worldwide proliferation of a singular urban form... we are instead confronted with new processes of urbanisation that are bringing forth diverse socio-economic conditions, territorial formations and socio-metabolic transformations across the planet'. These authors claim that geography and institutional architectures are so varied that any traditionalist notion of the city as a confined, replicable settlement now seems little more than the archaic residue of paradigms long past (*ibid.*). In this regard, the urban is not so much a universal form, but more a process (Thwaites, Mathers & Simkins, 2013). In distinction from inherited ideas of the urban as a stable or static entity, any meaning and/or expression needs to be comprehended as evolving relative to the wider patterns and pathways of global development. Conceived in this way, urbanisation is a

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<sup>16</sup> Sassen (2010) has defined 'cityness' as a semantic attempt to capture the experience of urbanity.

process of continuing sociospatial transformation, an unrelenting quagmire of settlement form and morphology that encompasses entire territories (Brenner & Schmid, 2015).

Second, the regulatory landscapes of urbanisation have undergone severe transformations (Nello & Mele, 2016). Since industrialisation, urban processes have mostly been incorporated within and regulated through hierarchical institutional frameworks (Brenner & Schmid, 2015). However, the turbulent transformations of recent decades (in lieu of the aforementioned discussions on crises) have similarly broken down developmentalist models of urban regulation, making way for substantial reconfigurations of urban governance (Cars, Healey & Madanipour, 2017). These changes can be seen in an intensely varied landscape of networked governance (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010); the spread of state projects of deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and austerity (Mercille & Murphy, 2015); the global rise of place-marketing campaigns and policies for drawing investment (Papadopoulos, Hamzaoui-Essoussi & El Banna, 2016); the formation of a new mainstream whereby local and regional governments prioritise economic growth over social redistribution (Ratigan, 2017); the construction of network and policy transfers to distribute best practice in answer to persisting social, economic and/or environmental issues (Ahern, Cilliers & Niemelä, 2014); and political battles over access to basic services including education, housing, water, health care and security (Langford, Dugard & Madlingozi, 2013). Under these conditions, ‘the terrain of the urban has thus been subjected to a high-intensity, high-impact earthquake through the worldwide social, economic, regulatory and environmental transformations of the post-1980s period’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:153).

To engage with these contradictory realities in a critical yet productive manner thus requires an epistemological reflexivity (Maton, 2003). This necessitates a resolve to challenge established forms of knowledge as well as the intellectual fortitude to contest core categories of investigation. As opposed to assuming the static disconnection between subject and object,

reflexive approaches stress an ongoing, dynamic transformation through social practices and political struggles (Willis, 2007). With regards to the field of critical urban studies, this theoretical obligation must ‘involve not only the constant interrogation of changing urban realities, but the equally vigilant analysis and revision of the very conceptual and methodological frameworks being used to investigate the urban process’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:154).

## **2.4.2 Postcolonial Urbanism**

A key movement that has emerged to challenge the academic urban cartography of recent years is that of the postcolonial urbanists. Intellectuals of this tradition have argued how contemporary urban epistemologies are too derivative from ‘Western’ or ‘Northern’ experiences of urbanisation (McFarlane, 2010). This has been used, it is argued, without reflexivity as a background for the misinterpretation of processes in urban development (Parnell & Robinson, 2012), highlighting a need to explore alternate methods for understanding highly contextual, local patterns of urbanisation (ibid.). Rather than assuming any single ontological stance regarding the urban, postcolonial urbanism embraces the production of ‘new geographies of theorizing’ (Robinson, 2014:57). Its core positions comprise the distrust of totalising claims to the urban experience (Robinson & Roy, 2016); attentive consideration to the context and particulars of local experience within place (Roy, 2016); the scrutiny of ‘worlding’ processes that constitute sociospatial configuration (Datta & Shaban, 2016); and an attention paid to the way in which local urbanisms relate beyond their re/occurring contexts (Mabin, 2014).

The core intellectual framework of postcolonial urbanism has matured towards a post-neoliberal theory that is sympathetic to cities of the Global South (Parnell & Robinson, 2012).

In moving beyond the dominant critiques of neoliberalism, the postcolonialists comprehend policy outcomes as the result of local circuits of knowledge (Roy, 2014). In exploring new lines of policy and practice they hope to shift academic focus towards emerging formations of urbanisation and urban poverty – pursuing a rights-based agenda (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). Whilst Brenner and Schmid (2015) contend that it is perhaps too early to posit this approach as an established research paradigm (considering the academic fragmentation that characterises much of modern urban theory) it is also a timely moment for theoretically reflexive ventures and these theory-driven intellectual incursions. At the same time, there are ‘intellectual hazards’ to be considered (ibid.:154), foremost of which is found in the danger of withdrawing from key conceptual tools such as geopolitical economy and relational geography and condemning them as obsolete relics of Western epistemology (Hart, 2016). Moreover, ‘the idea of specificity is logically intelligible only in relation to an encompassing notion of generality against which it is defined; it is thus best understood as a relational, dialectical concept, one that presupposes a broader totality, rather than as a demarcation of ontological singularity’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:154). Indeed, critics of postcolonial urbanism contend that when observing global political economy, an inextricably interconnected world system continues to be significantly shaped by the drive towards accumulation; by neoliberalised forms of global and national regulatory re/structuring; intermediated through broader configurations of capitalist uneven spatial development and geopolitical power (ibid.). This ‘context of contexts’ (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010:337) is not simply a background condition for contemporary urbanism – it is the inescapable and primary formation of its political, institutional and juridical terrain (ibid.).

However, it is important to clarify ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ or ‘the marked but also constitutive discrepancies between the utopian idealism of free market narratives and the checkered, uneven, and variegated realities’ of modern political economy (Peck, Brenner &

Theodore, 2018:3). How does such a polymorphous institutional terrain find expression spatially? How do the complex contingencies of political and economic restructuring interrelate with existing spaces, architectures, and constellations of power? How are the discourses of ‘competition, choice, freedom, and efficiency’ (ibid.:3) enacted and how are they situated amidst social struggles and cultural conflicts for identity and meaning? What is, in essence, the political economy of space in the modern, capitalist city?

### **2.4.3 The Political Economy of Space**

The political economy of space analyses the production, location and distribution of space in the contemporary city. It studies the relational connectivity between public, quasi-public and private spaces and the porosity of the boundaries between them (Harvey, 2001). When considering the production of space, a central concern for Harvey has been the outer transformation of capitalism (ibid.). This process has been called a *spatial fix* – understood as ‘capitalism’s insatiable drive to resolve its inner crises tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring’ (ibid.:24). For Harvey, the spatial fix dictates the tempo and form of development in the capitalist city. He contends that the city serves as a vessel for the spatial reorganisation and expansion that are needed to manage the crisis tendencies born from overaccumulation (ibid.).

This theory has implications for the shape and form of urban development. Overaccumulation occurs from the tendency of capital to accumulate beyond what can be reinvested profitably. This is otherwise known as market saturation. As a result, the market will typically seek to absorb new space (areas of decline and decay) and bequeath (or invest) it with new infrastructure (developments or projects) to absorb overaccumulation. According to Harvey (ibid.), urban development acts as a vehicle for the capitalist’s need for growth, transferring

overaccumulation to areas 'ripe' for investment. Once market saturation is reached, the pace of development slows and the rate of profit falls, with the market subsequently seeking new areas for expansion and growth.

Harvey's approach is, however, overly value-theoretical (Jessop, 2008), neglecting the extra-economic dimensions at play in the cycles of expansion and retreat. Furthermore, Harvey's work is significantly shaped by an ontological inclination to view social formations as a totality (ibid). Both Fine (2004) and Brenner (2004) highlight how Harvey's core axioms (in particular his theories on accumulation) are too expansive, even generalised, with distinctly variegated factors collated and coiled together under umbrella terminology. Brenner (2004) claims that processes such as mergers and acquisitions, activities of the State in privileging one section of capital over the other, and/or the worsening condition of the working-classes (notably wage decline) are aspects or consequences of the process of expanded reproduction itself. They may not necessarily include the subjection of non-capitalist sectors of the economy to any merciless logic of capitalist profit. Moreover, Fine (2004) questions Harvey's core understanding of dispossession as a precondition for the sustaining of accumulation. Since the ascendancy of speculative finance capital over the historical forms of capital in production there is a lack of dynamics in the production sector and the processes which Harvey gathers under his theory of dispossession are the consequence of this lack of dynamism (ibid.). The privatisation of public sector industries shows how this process is far removed from the sustaining of systemic accumulation, as is evident, Fine (ibid.) explains, in the experiences accelerating the United Kingdom's de-industrialisation across its public sectors.

Notwithstanding the disarming of agency when interpreting the city as merely an 'arena for market-oriented economic growth' (Brenner & Theodore: 2002:368), it remains, however, important to recognise the growing and systemic power of finance that pervades the modern city (Buck & While, 2015). Yet, as discussed, it may not need to be a dichotomy (Peck, Brenner

& Theodore, 2018). How, then, can we conceptually integrate structuralist and poststructuralist approaches to the production of space? How can we investigate the effects of discursive formations that seek ‘optimum’ city-building (Baeten, 2017) amidst the autonomous toils of locality (Campbell, Cox & O'Brien, 2017)? One manner by which to investigate this tension lies in urban regeneration. Here, urban regeneration finds itself in a uniquely political position as it is concerned with the literal remaking of the city and is thus host to an almost unfathomable array of socio-cultural complexities (Xie & Heath, 2017).

Yet, whilst gaining increasing prominence in twenty-first-century policy circuits (Ward & Temenos, 2018), the field remains somewhat linear in theory (Roberts, Sykes & Granger, 2016). For instance, historically, ‘top-down’ urban regeneration interventions have been founded on the notion that disadvantaged areas will develop through the introduction and integration of more wealthy residents (Hall, 2014). Once middle-class residents are integrated, it is assumed that their social and economic prosperity will ‘trickle down’ (Lees & Phillips, 2018). This form of gentrification is achieved by replacing social housing with new market properties, improving local amenities and introducing leisure facilities, and thus making the area more prosperous and appealing to incoming middle- and upper-classes (ibid.). This process soon became fused with a more patent commitment to culture. In the early 2000s, municipalities across the globe rushed ‘to endorse Richard Florida’s celebration of a new creative class in urban centres... In the process, they hope[d] to attract investors, higher income households, the creative class, and tourists to occupy the cafés, galleries, sidewalks, and rehabilitated residential stock of formerly disinvested neighbourhoods’ (Winkler, 2009:363). Such strategies were criticised for marginalising and displacing existing lower-class residents (Peck, 2005), yet the ascendancy of culture-led regeneration was overpowering (Çaglar & Schiller, 2018).

To compensate for gentrification, culture-led urban regeneration began extolling the virtues of community-based, ‘bottom-up’ approaches (ibid.). These approaches acknowledge the role of communities within a given intervention and seek to activate and engage existing communities with decision-making processes (Roberts Sykes & Granger, 2016). The participatory approach to culture-led regeneration is what currently dominates the literature (Go, Lemmetyinen & Hakala, 2015; Lees & Melhuish, 2015; Gregory, 2015; Alvarez, Go & Yüksel, 2016; Ferilli, Sacco & Blessi, 2016; Zhong, 2016; Hudec & Džupka, 2016; Campbell, Cox & O'Brien, 2017; Gainza, 2017; Rahbarianyazd & Doratli, 2017). However, these bottom-up processes are still axiomatically measured by levels of participation as oppose to, for instance, questioning the efficacy (and legitimacy) of socio-cultural role models (Çaglar & Schiller, 2018).

Although there has been significant criticism from urban geographers (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Smith, 2002; Harvey, 2008; Tasan-Kok & Baeten, 2011; Tulumello, 2016), the majority of research on urban regeneration remains outside a political economy interrogation and is predominantly conceptualised through either social policy or urban planning (McDonald, Malys & Maliene, 2009; Sasaki, 2010; González, 2011; Tyler *et al.*, 2013; Newton & Glackin, 2014; Huston, Rahimzad & Parsa, 2015; La Rosa *et al.*, 2017; Hakim & Roshanali, 2018; Alexandrescu *et al.*, 2018; Bottero *et al.*, 2019). The consensus within these fields is that community cohesion and participation are the key factors in successful urban regeneration. However, whilst this research offers important empirical observations, it is important to also theorise how an uneven institutional terrain may belie this (Çaglar & Schiller, 2018). An overemphasis on ‘win-win’ scenarios (Mori, 2017) and all-inclusionary participatory processes (Huston, 2017) may gloss over the fact that urban interventions are inherently political, host to resistance, co-option, and conflicts of interest (Grodach & Ehrenfeucht, 2015; Tulumello, 2016). Indeed, ‘there is significant scope for expanding the registers through which urban regeneration is understood, the array of constitutive actors, objects and practices and their

relational character' (McGuirk, Mee & Ruming, 2016:128). As result, the following sections explore how three major discursive trends have come to define the production, location and distribution of space in the modern city. These trends are the discourses of competition, image and identity.

#### 2.4.3.1 Competition

Although urban competition has occurred for centuries, it has become increasingly utilised (and scrutinised) over the past few decades as the city becomes less the result of socio-cultural influence or design and more an expression of economic forces (Leigh & Blakely, 2016). With globalisation influencing cities around the planet, networks of intercity competition have increased in both spatial and numerical terms, with the contemporary city subject to fewer protective measures<sup>17</sup> and structures than at any time before (Sassen, 2018). These cities are not so much positioned in strict hierarchy but woven together relative to precise participations in certain sectors or activities with spherical influence deciding demand (Camagni, 2017). In this way, improving a city's competitive advantage becomes a major aspect for advancing city status in a globalising hierarchy of urban systems (Buettner & Janeba, 2016). Cities now unprecedentedly contend with one another in a bid to lure international investment, business, tourism, and wealthy (or desirable) immigrants (Sassen, 2018). Urban areas, therefore, become less reliant on their geography for success, and more on 'urban quality' (Garau & Maria Pavan, 2018). The principal task of regulators thus becomes the creation of attractive urban conditions that may entice potential investment whilst, at the same time, safeguarding the city's economic prospects and/or key assets (Baeten, 2017).

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<sup>17</sup> These protective measures include regulations for building and new businesses, trade barriers and freedom of movement (Taylor & Derudder, 2015). Whilst certainly some cities have exercised more control in these areas, globally speaking, cities are more open and interconnected than at any time before in history (ibid.).

This discourse is reminiscent of what Cox (1993) referred to as the New Urban Politics (NUP). Here, a city conceives its own future vision in regional, national, and even global divisions of labour and enters in to an interlocality of competition to realise this vision (ibid.). In pursuit of this vision, growth coalitions emerge that seek to use the resources of the State whilst, at the same time, the State increasingly finds itself captured by the arguments of growth machines through virtue of its own embeddedness in the locality (ibid.). Since the State pulls revenue from a geographically demarcated tax-base, there is an inherent disposition to local fiscal dependence. Therefore, the State becomes, itself, a key stakeholder in the growth machine, eventually utilising its powers to augment this development route (Jonas & Moisiu, 2018). Cox (2016) has written that growth coalitions are typically more singular to cities in the United States. Much of Europe, for instance, is more centralised in governance with stronger labour movements that historically have been more concerned with creating what he calls ‘good geography’ rather than self-serving profit (ibid.). However, Seekings (2000) and Houghton (2011) have situated the phenomena of growth coalitions in Durban, implying the phenomena is dispersed. In Durban, a coalition between business and local government led to the implementing of several large-scale, flagship developments within the city and successfully addressed the dual imperatives of post-apartheid sociospatial integration and wider economic development. Haughton (2011:92) warns, however, if action within a development partnership becomes unequal, and especially if a greater power is held by the private sector, ‘partnerships can become a weak mechanism for negotiating local and global development imperatives’. Haughton writes that power balances are critical and, owing to the transformational potential of coalitions, an imbalance could have far-reaching consequences for social and spatial geography (ibid.).

Whilst ‘there is no consensus in the literature on coalition best practices, apart from agreement on the importance of clear goal definition’ (Wheeler & Leftwich, 2012:22) coalitions tend be

highly adaptive to specific structures of their specific institutional and political context. In the field of political economy, attention has been drawn to the disparities in the economic and political resources controlled by developers as compared to low-income residents (Saito, 2012). A consistent theme in this research is that developers use their resources to influence city officials and proliferate policies that serve the affluent (Angotti, 2008). Knox (2017:15) contends that global cities are being recast through ‘coalitions and partnerships of real estate, finance, construction, and professional interests’ that ‘draw on international capital and markets while engaging locally in tactical politics around land use regulation, policy, and decision-making’. Yet this does not have to be so deterministically negative. With the ‘right’ institutional framework, many cities have had considerable success in the formation of partnerships between local government departments, business groups and chambers of commerce (Taylor & Derudder, 2015). Inclusionary zoning policies have had notable success when combined with regeneration initiatives (Gurran, 2008; van den Nouwelant *et al.*, 2015). Such policies have not only helped battle some of the worse outcomes of economic, social and environmental decline (Roberts, Sykes & Granger, 2016) but have transformed inner-city areas in to thriving, integrated urban spaces (Tyler *et al.*, 2013). Moreover, in analysing over 1400 publications from a wide range of disciplines over a 20-year time period, Roehrich, Lewis, and George (2014:117) found that public-private partnerships tend to ‘combine the strengths of private actors, such as innovation, technical knowledge and skills, managerial efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit, and the role of public actors, including social responsibility, social justice, public accountability and local knowledge, to create an enabling environment’. However, they similarly note that many partnerships fail because of ‘barriers such as an imbalance of power, value and partnership goals between public and private partners (ibid.:116).

The mention of ‘goals’ warrants expansion here. Arguably, the private sector and the public sector have, by definition, different goals. Any structural imbalances may position social and environmental concerns as secondary to economic gains (Wieland *et al.*, 2016). This, in turn, raises questions of possibly competing or contradicting visions of *what the city is* or *who the city belongs to*, or perhaps: *who is driving urban interventions* and *whose interests are best being served?* Geographies of sociospatial development raise important and pressing issues of power and access to the structures that control or influence the levers of change (Schmid, 2012).

Yet, it remains that planning and policy can be profoundly re/shaped by these alliances (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Molotch (1976:310) postulates that growth coalitions have a natural tendency towards building consensus and partnerships amongst politically mobilised local elites whose interests may otherwise conflict. Here, interest groups form coalitions under pro-growth discourses. This framework emphasises that ‘urban redevelopment projects are not simply top-down brute and desensitised impositions on cities from states and/or capital’ but are ‘complex accomplishments between State, and capital interests’ (Mazar, 2018:822). Moreover, growth coalitions are crucial in nurturing a social legitimacy within communities for development projects (*ibid.*). It is argued, in order to acquire acceptance or ‘buy-in’ from citizens (Ward, 2003), growth agents may proselytise an entrepreneurialism that may simplify and hide the complexity of urban redevelopment strategies (Mazar, 2018). Such dialogues can make negotiation and/or discussions opaque and may allow a coalition to operate unaccountable to local constituents (Ward, 2003; Wilson & Wouters, 2003). Therefore, unpacking discourses around urban redevelopment projects offers an avenue for understanding any ‘normalised’ governance processes as well as their development trajectories (Mazar, 2018). This is important, because much of the discourse around urban competition, for instance, alters the way in which urban governance is practised and conceived (Farahani, 2017).

A primary concern of city governance is also its ability to respond to market conditions that are inherently volatile, making long-term planning deeply problematic (Leigh & Blakely, 2016). This suggests that local government needs to either be highly adaptable in response to market shifts or that it needs to master volatility (ibid.). The former encourages short-term gains through reaction to the needs of the market whilst the latter focuses on longer-term gains by trying to manoeuvre and manipulate market demand within the parameters of its own plans (ibid.). Yet, very few cities, if any, have the true capacity to master the volatility of the market or manipulate capital over the long-term (Adams & Tiesdell, 2012). Most cities, particularly in the Global South, must implement shorter-term and less ambitious visions. These visions are often vague and subject to change and instability (ibid.). As an alternative, economic growth is often organised around the capacity to sow and reap shorter-term gains when and where they are available, with any course or path to city ‘attractiveness’ formed more by the grasping of opportunities as opposed to cogent and coherent planning (Lees, Shin & López-Morales, 2015).

As a result, the rationality of urban competitiveness may shift urban governance away from more traditionally administrative logics that provide collective services and towards approaches that focus on creating and/or securing assets (Baeten, 2017). In heavily liberalised economies, where city governance is limited to regulation and support, traditional authority fragments, resulting in an increasing array of actors and stakeholders able to shape the urban region (Waibel & McFarlane, 2016). Although this generates flexibility for market forces and can be considered ‘friendly’ towards investment, it leaves urban management – the responsibility of a city to provide its inhabitants with a liveable environment – to the often uneven delivery and distribution of economic logic (ibid.). Whilst any call for complete equality in the distribution of income and wealth is unrealistic in any modern democracy

(Wesley & Peterson, 2017), perhaps even undesirable as a political aspiration,<sup>18</sup> consistently unequal patterns distribution can violate social norms of distributive justice, contribute to stress and illness, erode social cohesion and trust, and potentially even slow economic growth (ibid.).

#### 2.4.3.2 Image

A core discourse of competitive urbanity is the conceptualising of cities as products or commodities (Anttiroiko, 2014). The ‘commodification’ of the city as merely any other good in the market implies that cities exist as consumer competition, deploying any and all resources to generate a greater competitive advantage in the global market place (Parker, 2015). Moreover, cities are not only arenas in which commodification occurs, they are ‘themselves intensively commodified insofar as their constitutive sociospatial forms – from buildings and the built environment to land-use systems, networks of production and exchange, and metropolitan-wide infrastructural arrangements – are sculpted and continually reorganized in order to enhance the profit-making capacities of capital’ (Brenner, Marcuse & Mayer, 2010:176). Place marketing is an epithet of this rationale. Tourists become consumers, places become products, and local institutions become manufacturers and marketers (Anttiroiko, 2014).

The marketing or selling of cities has stemmed from the need to shift the way in which places represent themselves within increasingly market-oriented and globalised economies (Kavaratzis, Warnaby & Ashworth, 2014). With the decline of traditional industry and the rise of the service economy, the conceptualisation of place has become central to securing

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<sup>18</sup> Maintaining complete equality of outcome, as oppose to equality of opportunity (Sen, 2000), would likely entail gradations towards social tyranny (Capaldi & Lloyd, 2016).

investment and tourism (Colomb & Novy, 2016.). Place branding has developed as a potent tool in the creation and dictation of image and identity (Kavaratzis, Warnaby & Ashworth, 2014). The term can be better clarified as the process of image communication, contextualising it within the field of marketing, colouring an area with a distinctive identity that appeals to specific groups (Zavattaro, 2014). It is based on the ‘visual, verbal, and behavioural expression of a place, which is embodied through the aims, communication, values, and the general culture of the place’s stakeholders and the overall place design’ (Zenker & Braun, 2010:3).

The significance in altering perceptions of place has been emphasised through the understanding that negative perceptions undermine attractiveness and, in turn, profitability (Ferilli, Sacco & Blessi, 2016). As a result, place branding has become linked with the transformation of ‘undesirable’ cities (Campelo, 2017), with the overcoming of unpleasant perceptions vital for successful development and the enhancing and securing of economic growth (Boland, 2014). Whilst the economic ends are arguably essential, postcolonial urbanists may disagree with the means and methods used when imposing imaginaries on the city. For instance, an example can be seen in how Edward Said (1978) and Mary Louise Pratt (1992) have discussed the way a colonial authority feels it is their ‘duty’ to produce information about the colonised. Pratt contends that this production of information was highly partial. Mills (2003:46) explains:

‘...that the Western botanist was setting that information within a Western classificatory system which, in the process, erased the system of classification developed by the indigenous people, which might focus on the use of plants in medicine or in ritual, rather than on the morphological features of the plant, as in the Western model. Thus, Westerners in the colonial period imposed

systems of classification on the colonised countries which they proposed as global objective systems of knowledge, but which were, in fact, formulated from a Western perspective with Western interests at their core... This process of production of knowledge took place through excluding other, equally valid forms of classification and knowledge which were perhaps more relevant to the context’.

This invites a scepticism of the ways in which information may be re/produced, since supposed, ‘self-evident’ truths may, simultaneously, be expressions of power relations. Foucault (1972) argues that a perfect example of how power operates can be found in the production of information that results in something being labelled as fact. For anything to be rendered in this light – the light of truth – it must be subjected to a process of ratification by those in positions of authority (Mills, 2003). Therefore, ‘negative’ perceptions of the city may, potentially, stem from positions of authority that deny images and imaginaries of the disempowered.

For instance, tools such as place marketing are explicitly concerned with constructing, communicating and managing a city’s image, may emphasise certain characteristics (over others) and thus direct the manner through which such an urban identity is perceived or shared (Kavaratzis, Warnaby & Ashworth, 2014). Yet still, this is not inherently negative. City branding is extensively practised across the globe and can be seen in the strategic success of Amsterdam’s *Iamsterdam*, Las Vegas’s *Sin City*, or the more organic communication of Cape Town’s *Mother City* and Jerusalem’s *Holy City* (Anttiroiko, 2014). Branding fashions a unified identity for the city and extends this identity to all its offerings and interactions and, from a consumer’s vantage, creates an inimitability at every level of interaction (Zenker, Braun & Petersen, 2017). Other types of branding include personality branding (typically names from

history), whereby a location weds itself to a famed individual and uses its ‘brand’ for flagship constructions in order to harness recognition and establish a specific association (Vanolo, 2017). These are powerful discursive tools that cannot be underestimated in their power to ‘unite’ a city and drive it towards a common goal (Gilboa *et al.*, 2015).

However, challenging perceived (particularly imposed) truth invites the questioning of legitimacy. The commodification of place can, for instance, come at the expense of pre-existing heritage (Su, 2015). The link between heritage as a consumable experience and urban regeneration as an economic activity is highly attractive to market forces (Ashworth, 2014). This is primarily as it permits the use of culture as a commodity (Johnson, 2009). Marschall (2012) highlights, for instance, how much of the FIFA 2010 World Cup ostensibly celebrated black South African heritage whilst it merely used this imagery as a discursive tool that served the selling of the event to middle- and upper-class tourists, visitors and local elites. Marschall (*ibid.*) points out that the slums on the drive from the airport were concealed by huge walls to hide the unpalatable imagery of poverty. In efforts to promote highly aestheticised imaginaries, sedimented ideals may proliferate, in turn, consumer identities that slowly erode or replace indigenous individualities (Colomb & Novy, 2016). This has important implications for identity and belonging in the contemporary city.

#### 2.4.3.3 Identity

Henri Lefebvre (1974) was perhaps the 20<sup>th</sup> century’s foremost thinker in emphasising the philosophy of urban space. Lefebvre devoted a significant amount of time in his work to understand the centrality of place in what he called the reproduction of social relations of production (*ibid.*). He postulates that space is a social product based on values, and the social production of meanings which, in turn, affects spatial practices and perceptions (*ibid.*). This

theorisation infers a shift of perception from space to the processes of its production, as well as the embrace of the contradictory, conflictual, and, ultimately, political character this has (ibid). Based on Lefebvre's legacy, scholars including Harvey (1992), Hayden (1997) and Soja (1988) also began focusing on the connections between space and the forces of social production. These scholars questioned how exactly space is made and whose ideas and visions of such space are represented. In short, *what is the identity of the city and who does it belong to?*

The idea of identity is an essential construct of everyday life. As Heidegger (1969:26) has written: 'everywhere, wherever and however we are related to beings of every kind, identity makes its claim upon us'. Identity provides a place with an originality and individualism – distinct from other places and can serve as a metaphysical foundation of 'being' (ibid.). This identity is, however, not fixed in absolute, and can vary with changes in attitude and/or situation (Casakin & Bernardo, 2018). Whilst this identity is often allied to experiences of the eye and the mind – akin to any objective physical appearance of the city – each individual may construct self-consciously or un-self-consciously a specific identity; often coalescing to shape a 'common identity' (ibid.). In this way, group identities can be formed – socially accepted and agreed upon ideas of meaning and value.

When re/developing cities so as to attract investors and/or tourists, the homogenisation of space may be a particularly problematic outcome (Buck & While, 2015). If the physical structure (or feature) can determine place and place meaning it may, in turn, influence the symbolic meanings of landscape (ibid.). This can indeed create variegated and diverse landscape of meanings, observable in cities such as New York and Paris; cities with innumerable amalgams of meaning. In places that may have weaker, more fragile identities, newer impositions may insensitively overwrite (Chen, Orum & Paulsen, 2018). This is problematic in postcolonial nations that have struggled for emancipation both psychically but also symbolically (Sepe,

2017). Unwelcome impositions on the urban landscapes may, in time, affect perceptions and attachments to places resulting in a dislocation between living and belonging which may, in turn, threaten social cohesion (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015)

The extremity of this scenario may imbue ‘inauthentic’ urban landscapes and foster a sense of ‘placelessness’ (Shim & Santos, 2014:106) – a term defined as a lack of connectivity between physical landscapes and meaning; one that cuts across broader physical, cultural and emotional contexts (Freestone & Liu, 2016). In this regard, placelessness has been described as an environment that has lost meaning or belies an encroaching attitude that does not acknowledge the significance of its historical or cultural attachment (ibid.). David Harvey (1990:302) writes:

‘Place-identity, in this collage of superimposed spatial images that implode upon us, becomes an important issue, because everyone occupies a space of individuation (a body, a room, a home, a community, a nation), and how we individuate ourselves shapes identity. Furthermore, if no one “knows their place” in this shifting collage world, then how can a secure social order be fashioned or sustained?’

Certainly, such a scenario could threaten social cohesion and there is a need to approach places contextually to better understand the complexities of what actually provides and gives identity and meaning, be it objects, structures or images (Belanche, Casaló & Flavián, 2017). In this regard, substituting local forms of identity with commercialised forms may be problematic (Carmona, 2015); a process that has often been linked to mass-tourism (Wang & Chen, 2018). Such landscapes have been termed ‘other-directed architecture’ – architecture consciously directed towards outsiders; be it the spectator, the passer-by or the consumer (Shim & Santos,

2016). The outcome of this may foster places that offer little in terms of deeper meaning and value – particularly in terms of identity – to the people living and working in them, but appear centred towards outsiders (ibid.).

On the other hand, these processes have the potential to create new, variegated urban landscapes (Carmona *et al.*, 2010); remarkable amalgamations that reflect both new and old histories, sensibilities; values; ideals; even climate and topography, as well as the very roots of social organisation (ibid.). Not only can the urban form of any people physically express all this, being the combined effect of all the histories and contradictions that a society embodies, it also helps shape the vision of society itself (Jenkins & Forsyth, 2009). It can be conceived as both a mirror of that society and an instrument shaping its future (ibid.).

## **2.5 Synthesis**

This chapter began with tracing the global development discourse from the Brundtland Commission to the present day. Broadly, solutions to socio-economic and environmental concerns have largely been left to the market mechanisms of financialisation, privatisation and commodification (Barbier, 2016). It is claimed that these mechanisms contribute to increased productivity of goods and services, enhancing social and economic freedoms for the broader benefit of society (Perkins, 2017). Detractors argue, however, that these mechanisms aggravate inequalities (Kaufman, 2018), environmental exploitations (Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015) and dispossessions (Harvey, 2012). They contend that the obscuration of these externalities is an expression of power relations (Wanner, 2015); an obscuration seen in the way that repeated crises prompt not revisions but reconfigurations (Kotz, 2015; Streeck, 2016), allowing for the continuation of existing institutional forms (Peck, Brenner & Theodore, 2018).

There is a tendency in the social sciences to characterise this discourse as the produce of an oppressive and exploitative machinery (Wanner, 2015; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015; Barbier 2016). Others have criticised such an interpretation as overly deterministic (Venugopal, 2015); a ‘reductionist and linear understanding’ (Chandler, 2014:48) that obfuscates the complex ways in which modern neoliberal capitalism is constantly being made and remade (Kotz, 2015). This complexity calls for critically reflexive approaches on how discourses are formed and mobilised (Izsó, 2019). Using Foucault, it is possible to move beyond the tired relics of Marxian thought that presume the constant deployment of oppression in political economy. Indeed, Foucault’s ontology offers a more nuanced and systematic emphasis on the socio-political and, as a result, offers an ‘unburdening and liberation of Marx in relation to [the] dogma which has constrained it’ (Foucault, 1988:45).

Similarly, in the field of critical urban studies there has been a danger of aggregating and subsuming under the umbrella of ‘neoliberalism’ urban dynamics that may well have little connection with each other (Pinson & Journal, 2016). Venugopal (2015:165) warns against the ‘diminished analytical value’ of omnipresent or omnipotent processes of totalising causation. This leads to the over-identification of problems that simplify the genealogy of cause and effect, channelling streams of intellectual exploration away from identifying alternative well-springs of change (ibid.). This hinders progress in understanding how ideas and processes might mingle and blend with other phenomena; producing hybrids that may, in fact, more accurately represent causation (ibid.).

Yet, this hybridisation is, in fact, critical. The terrain of capitalism today does not exist in a ‘pure, uncut, or unmediated form’ (Peck, Brenner & Theodore, 2018:3). Rather, it is ‘partial, polycentric and plural’ (ibid.:3). In this vein, the political economy of contemporary neoliberalism has been referred to as a process of,

‘...always-incomplete transformation, to a prevailing pattern and ethos of market-orientated, market-disciplinary, and market-making regulatory restructuring, one that is being realised, never more than partially, across a contextual, uneven institutional landscape, in the heterogeneous, coevolving and often countervailing political-economic conditions’ (ibid.:7).

This polymorphism can be observed, for instance, after the financial crises of 2008, where market logics and structures expanded in to the public sector (Streeck, 2016; Mavelli, 2017). Rather than revision, this suggests – and remains historically consistent with (Duménil & Lévy, 2011) – a profound ability to ‘reconfigure’ (Kotz, 2015). This may suggest that the highly polymorphic and variegated tendencies of the modern neoliberal political economy are, in fact, compatible with poststructuralist approaches to the nuanced and nebulous experience. The implications of this for urban studies are significant both theoretically and empirically as it provides a possible conceptual bridge between political economy praxes of power and the postcolonial attention to complexity, fragmentation, and subjectivity. In turning now to Cape Town, the study explores the urban regeneration of Woodstock, using the theory discussed in chapter to provide a framework for layered and contextually specific analyses.

## CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY

### **3.1 Introduction**

Research methodology can be defined as the ‘plans and procedures that cover the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation’ (Creswell, 2013:2). The development of a suitable research methodology encompasses several crucial choices that require articulation and justification. Guiding the core decisions are the philosophical assumptions, the design of the research, as well as both the methods of data collection and analysis. This chapter is separated in to three parts. The first part rationalises the philosophical assumptions that derive the methods used. The second part defines the research design as well as the data collection methods employed. Finally, the third part clarifies the technical strategies embraced for the organisation and analysis of the collected data. The chapter concludes with a summary.

### **3.2 Research Methodology**

The primary goal of this research is to investigate the political economy of urban regeneration in Woodstock, Cape Town. This involves the interrogation of the ideas, interests and institutions that give shape to its processes and outcomes. With the research expressing a need for understanding social phenomena, a qualitative research approach is adopted. Qualitative studies have been defined as an empirical inquiry investigating contemporary phenomena within a real-life context, particularly useful when the borders between phenomenon and context are not easily defined (Yin, 2017). Qualitative studies rely on multiple sources of evidence, with data needed to converge in triangulation – using more than one method to collect data on the same topic to assure cogency and validity (Hancock & Algozzine, 2016). Baxter and Jack (2008) define the case study approach as a rigorous method for analysing singular

phenomena; encouraging exploratory, fluid and flexible, context-sensitive investigation. Researchers have generally used case studies across a variety of disciplines, emphasising the detailed contextual analysis of events or conditions and their fluid relationships (Stake, 2010). Whilst case studies often encompass mixed methods incorporating quantitative and qualitative approaches, Yin (2017) observes they are traditionally constructivist or interpretive and are typically more connected to qualitative research. Fundamental to understanding qualitative research is the idea that meaning is socially constructed by individuals in interaction with the world (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013). Here, the world, or the reality that is being observed, is often not a static or solitary phenomenon. Rather, it may be that manifold constructions and interpretations of reality are in a state of varied motion, altering over time and space (Creswell & Poth, 2017).

Qualitative research is frequently concerned with comprehending what these interpretations are (*ibid.*). It seeks to know the circumstances within their exceptionality as part and parcel of a specific context and the interactions there within (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). This understanding is an end in and of itself, eschewing inclinations to calculate certain futures in favour of understanding the present nature of a setting. It questions the meaning for actors in that setting – what their lived experiences might be; what meaning they might have; and how the world appears from such a position (*ibid.*). It is then paramount to provide communication that is authentic to anyone with interests in this setting, with analysis striving for both a deep yet broad understanding (Creswell & Poth, 2017).

Charles and Mertler (2011) identify three key principles for the case study. First, the provision of vivid or powerful depictions of an individual or phenomenon is paramount; second, is the explanation/s given; and third, is the deliverance of assessment and evaluation. Yin (2017) further highlights that because case studies cope with technically distinct situations where there

are numerous variables of interest, they typically rely on many sources of evidence, with the convergence of this evidence being of high importance. Indeed, it is vital to stress the significance of using diverse sources of information – a diversity that allows for complex and intricate aspects to be uncovered and laid bare (Patton, 2014). This assists the development of theoretical propositions guiding the collecting and subsequent analysis of data (Yin, 2017).

Stake (2010) classifies the case study in three distinct classes: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. Intrinsic case studies are valuable for cases which are highly idiosyncratic whereby there is little intent to create theory or generalise the findings. The instrumental case study, on the other hand, seeks to better comprehend a theoretical question or problem. The collective case study should be used when addressing a specific issue with the intention of supporting existing literature or theory. Within these categories, Yin (2017) distinguishes a further three categories of case study: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. The exploratory case study is characterised by a lack of detailed preliminary research, with data collection typically taking place before the defining of a research question. Explanatory case studies seek the establishment of cause and effect, with a clear and intentional pursuit of exposing how an event may occur and, also, in what way this could affect the outcomes. Finally, descriptive case studies are primarily concerned with describing phenomena within their context (ibid.)

### **3.2.1 Research Philosophy**

When designing research, a critical first step is to identify the most appropriate philosophy that underpins the investigation (Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmias & DeWaard, 2014). In dealing with the fundamental issues associated with a specific field of knowledge, philosophy clarifies the guiding principles involved in the conduct of research (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Grix (2018)

describes philosophy as a way to analyse the principles of method, rule and hypothesis that are, can be, or have been applied to knowledge or experience.

Researchers naturally differ in their philosophical approach to work. However, there are two major historical schools of epistemology frequently employed in scholarship, dominating the literature; positivism and phenomenology (ibid). Positivism holds reality to be objective, ontologically assuming it as a knowable entity from which laws can be defined and built (Macionis, 2010). As positivists hold that society, like the physical world, functions relative to these general laws, they are inclined towards working with observable social realities, with research forming law-like generalisations comparable to those formed by physical and natural scientists (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The researcher, in this case, assumes the role of the objective analyst that makes detached interpretations about data collected in a supposed value-free manner (ibid.). There is, therefore, an emphasis on quantitative data collection and highly structured methodologies that encourage and facilitate quantifiable observation, statistical analysis and replication (Bordens & Abbott, 2013).

Phenomenology alternatively upholds that the world is subjective and socially constructed by the individual and interpreted within a framework of individual cognition (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Phenomenologists are concerned with the way people experience social phenomena in the world, specifically focusing on what things *mean* – the understanding of not only what is happening but *why* it is happening – rather than merely identifying and measuring phenomena (Creswell & Poth, 2017). To this end, phenomenologists are principally concerned with the idea that human experience and the ordering of social reality is a dynamic and even polymorphic source of data, rather than the notion that true research or discovery lies in the measurement of an existing physical phenomenon (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).

Implicit across the social sciences are several key philosophical assumptions regarding the nature and form of the social world, including assumptions about reality, knowledge, human nature, and the purpose and process of research (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, and existence with what is believed to constitute reality (Blaikie, 2009). It concerns questions on what exists or can be said to exist, and how one can, or is able to, understand or comprehend. It concerns what is believed to form or comprise of subjective rationality (Grix, 2018), and as such, is highly problematic to rebut empirically (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Ontological assumptions are often of two principle positions: objectivism or constructivism. Objectivism is the ontological position that asserts that a given phenomenon exists independent of actors. Constructivism, in contrast, asserts that all phenomena are continually formed/reformed by actors. Grix (2018) notes that objectivism views phenomena as existing independent of consciousness and experience; that truth and meaning is inherent to them as objective objects and, consequently, research can ascertain this truth and meaning.

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and knowing (ibid.). It is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge and heavily preoccupied with the establishment of philosophical foundations for determining what forms of knowledge may be possible and how one can certify that such knowledge is acceptable or valid (ibid.). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) observe that epistemological assumptions have two divergent positions: positivism and interpretivism. Positivism, as briefly discussed, posits the necessity of the scientific method, of which a theory is typically measured against observations (Grix, 2018). At the other end of the spectrum is interpretivism, related to constructivism (the notion by which people construct their own understanding and knowledge of the world through experience and reflection on these experiences). Interpretivism holds that to understand the world one must seek to interpret everything in it (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Whilst it has been claimed that the social

world may not be subject to the same manners of investigation as the natural; historically, a substantial portion of academic research published in the social sciences are, in fact, highly positivist (Abrams *et al.* 2018). Such research has been perceived as being more rigorous and reliable, whilst also having a greater impact on policy and public opinion (*ibid.*).

Lastly, axiology is the philosophical study of value (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). In applying this concept to research, the researcher is concerned with how their own value systems and those of any group or institution to which they belong impact on or intertwine within. The connection between a researcher's axiological stance and their research goals can raise the contentious issue of values in research (Walter & Andersen, 2013). Generally, researchers aim to produce value-neutral knowledge based on observable objective facts. However, where this is feasible or even desirable has been questioned by contemporary social science researchers (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Social research, it is claimed, struggles to remain value-free as long as social sciences remain part of the social world in which social phenomena occur (Walter & Andersen, 2013). Notwithstanding, it remains prudent in the research design process to reflect on the motivations and aspirations behind the research question.

Whilst Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010) have argued for more pragmatism in research so as to avoid engaging in what they see as unproductive discussions on concepts such as 'reality' and 'truth', this study understands the philosophising of perception and belief as essential to the way in which research is undertaken (Walter & Andersen, 2013). From design to conclusion, it is critical to understand and discuss these aspects so as to solidify congruency, consistency and coherency, whilst, at the same time, ensuring that prejudices and limitations are understood, exposed, and minimised (Creswell & Poth, 2017). If this is not undertaken, and incompatible methodologies are adopted, the coherence and, more importantly, the integrity of the work may be undermined (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).

Consequently, this research leans towards a philosophical position of constructivism. This is for several reasons. First, the research deals with variegated subject realities. What may constitute knowledge of reality can be conceived as an individual or collective construction of the mind with different groups perceiving the world differently. Second, the research wrestles with multiple theoretical interpretations, owing to its multidisciplinary nature – meaning that more than one explanation and/or discussion may emerge. Third, as value-free research is at best contentious, elementary assumptions, beliefs and values will unavoidably influence the processes within. Fourth, the use of qualitative data during interviews can be analysed and interpreted in multiple ways – yielding highly complex and contextual understandings. Finally, the understanding of phenomena in their natural environment is essential, aiding the researcher in comprehending social processes and allowing for complexity and contextual factors to emerge (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Not only does this facilitate understandings of the *how* and *why*, but it also enables the researcher to be responsive to the fluid and organic manifestations of social phenomena (Yin, 2017). At the same time, it remains important to be wary of the limitations and risks in any research endeavour. Constructivist data collection can be time-consuming, and its analysis is challenging and complex (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Furthermore, the researcher must acknowledge that patterns and/or explanations may not emerge, potentially weakening the weight and impact of the research (ibid.).

### **3.2.2 Research Approach**

Research approach can be described as the plans and procedures for research, ranging from broader assumptions to more detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Informing the decisions that condition the research approach are the philosophical assumptions made. The selection of the research approach is also contingent on the nature of the research problem or issue being studied, the researchers' personal experiences,

and the audience (Grix, 2018). Research approaches are generally considered to be quantitative or qualitative, deductive or inductive, and primary or secondary.

Quantitative research is an approach that tests an objective theory by a close examination of variables in cause-and-effect (O'Dwyer & Bernauer, 2013). These variables are often measured by instruments so that numerical data can be analysed with statistical processes and procedures. Those who engage in this form of inquiry are often most concerned with testing theories deductively, building in protections against bias, controlling for alternative explanations, and the ability to generalise and replicate findings (ibid.). Quantitative research can also afford a high degree of scientific objectivity (Creswell & Poth, 2017). By operationalising variables, quantitative research can measure change, allowing important comparisons and the quantification of correlations (ibid.). In providing important descriptive statistics about a population or location, this approach facilitates the grasping of key characteristics and is particularly valuable in large-scale social surveys and cross-country social research (Hasan, 2016). Conversely, qualitative research is an approach typically used for exploring and understanding how individuals or groups ascribe meaning to phenomena (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). This process of research deals with emerging questions and procedures. With data often collected in the participant's natural setting, qualitative research builds themes and ideas inductively through the interpretation of data (ibid.). Engaging in this form of inquiry often focuses on rendering the complexity and intricacies of a situation (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Although qualitative studies can fall prey to researcher bias, problems of replicability, and restrictions in scope, qualitative research produces 'thick (detailed) description of participants' feelings, opinions, and experiences; and interprets the meanings of their actions' (Rahman, 2016:104). Through interviews, observations, documentary analysis, as well as a literature review that develops sensitivity to observation and interpretation, qualitative research can be

highly useful in yielding complex explanations, conceptually rich theory and contextual understanding (Yin, 2017).

Deductive reasoning is concerned with working from more general information towards the more specific (Tjora, 2018). This can be referred to as a ‘top-down’ approach due to the researcher starting at the top with a broader spectrum of information and working their way down to more precise conclusions. In example, a researcher may begin with a theory on their topic of attention. Following this, they would attempt to slim down the theory into a more precise hypothesis which can, in turn, allow for testing. The hypothesis can be further tapered when observations are collated. Eventually, this leaves the researcher with the possibility of testing the hypothesis against particular data, which leads to a validation of the original theory and the arrival at apposite conclusions (ibid.)

Alternatively, inductive reasoning works the other way, following a movement from specific observations towards more broad generalisations and theories (Creswell & Poth, 2017). This is typically called a ‘bottom-up’ approach. A researcher may begin with observations, measuring patterns and regularities and finally work towards a general conclusion or theory. While deductive reasoning has a more scientifically confident approach to ensure that inferences are kept to a minimum (providing the essential premises are true), inductive reasoning has the capacity to contest conventional or established thought, and may thus arrive at paradigm-shifting generalisations; albeit, however, with the chance of things going wrong (Grix, 2018).

With this research expressing a need for understanding social phenomena, a qualitative research approach is taken. In order to generate meaningful data, both deductive and inductive approaches are necessary. The former is used to investigate phenomena from a macro perspective (i.e. deducing facts about the institutional context of Cape Town) whilst the latter

approach is used to identify more contextual data (i.e. social and cultural), collated and then analysed to make inductive generalisations.

### **3.3 Research Design**

This next part of the chapter discusses the design of the research. Research design has been defined as the logical link from the research questions to the research conclusions (Yin, 2017). It can also be described as the plan guiding the investigator through processes of collection, analysis and interpretation (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Indeed, the research design is a ‘model of proof that allows the researcher to draw conclusions concerning causal relations amongst the variables under examination’ (Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmias & DeWaard, 2014:77).

#### **3.3.1 Comparative versus Single Case Study Design**

Yin (2017) has suggested that case study research is unique amongst research methodologies because there is no objective or required format to follow. The format is something for the researcher to develop themselves (Yin, 2017). Moreover, due to often conflicting epistemological hypotheses and the complex, even concealed, characteristics inherent to qualitative case studies, scientific thoroughness is difficult to apply (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016). As a result, using the case study approach requires careful consideration of the motivations behind and for the research (Yin, 2017).

Save for identifying the case and the case study type to be implemented, researchers need to consider whether it is wise to use a single case study or follow a multiple case study design (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016). An important difference here is that with the latter, the researcher is studying multiple cases to try and conceptualise the differences and the similarities between

these cases (ibid.). The researcher can analyse the data both within each situation and across. Through comparison and contrast, the researcher may explain whether the findings are significant or not. Evidence created from a multiple case study design has been seen as strong and reliable and able to form substantial and convincing theory when the presuppositions are grounded in empirical evidence (Yin, 2017).

However, single case studies have also been praised in their ability to produce rich and composite theory (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016). The more case studies a researcher has, the less observation they will have with the cases in question. On the other hand, a single case study design facilitates greater immersion and integration in to the study area, allowing for deeper understandings that may often be overlooked when dealing with multiple cases. This is particularly important in qualitative social sciences, where the nature of issues being discussed are not always immediately obvious, requiring extensive investigation and delineation of context and situation (Yin, 2017). This ultimately better lends itself to the questioning of old theoretical relationships and the exploration of new ones (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016).

The single case study is chosen for this research because of the political, economic, social and spatial complexities of both the Woodstock suburb, and its wider setting, Cape Town. However, in order to address any drawbacks of carrying out a single case study research – namely the generality of its nature or the possible lack of clearly measurable data – this research also makes use of the embedded approach, developing subunits of analysis that assist in concentrating the research inquiry. These subunits are the different stakeholder groups *within* the case study area. A traditional multiple case study design may look at urban development across multiple cities. Here, the chances of gathering and/or attaining deep information from stakeholders in different cities creates logistical challenges. If it is achieved, there are chances it may be narrow, or uneven in its distribution, possibly skewing the results and undermining a legitimacy for comparison (Campbell, 2003). Within a single case study, however, key

stakeholders (i.e. the public sector, the private sector, and civil society) can become their own embedded units of analysis, affording the time and care necessary to uncover deep and diverse data that a more concentrated study logistically enables. This also means that the researcher can explore the case study with the ability to analyse units *within* the case, i.e. between the units of analysis and, therefore, fashion a cross-case analysis (Yin, 2017). This facilitates the ability to secure the depth of a single case study design yet maintain modes of comparison and contrast (i.e. how different stakeholder groups in Cape Town perceive, enact or experience urban development) central to triangulation.

### **3.3.2 The Selection of the Case Study**

The research recognises three key facets that the selection of the case study must respond to. First, the case study must be relevant in so far as it is an on-going phenomenon of continued academic and public interest, one that requires careful examination to explicate the implications and consequences that are often overlooked, misinterpreted or concealed. Second, the case study represents ideas and theoretical areas that are of interest to the researcher. Third, the case study must retain a degree of objective academic interest so as to further enhance or enrich contemporary research.

In May 2015, the researcher travelled to the inaugural Chicago Forum on Global Cities to identify and determine pertinent themes and ideas in circulation amongst the global elite. World leaders, including business innovators, education visionaries, cultural luminaries, and civic pioneers gathered to discuss and debate the myriad forces influencing cities and how they, in turn, have the potential to lead the world. A theme pervasive during the event was the role of the private sector in forging pathways. Development and prosperity were linked to economic growth; whilst conversations on inequality, class or historical legacies of power were avoided.

Broad social upliftment was considered the inevitable outcome of economic gain. This was a critical motivation for the researcher in deciding to explore the relationship between the episteme<sup>19</sup> and global development discourses.

As the researcher was based in Cape Town, there was an interest in determining a South African perspective with regards to this relationship. Whilst there has been a growing body of work on Cape Town's supposed 'neoliberalisation' (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012; McDonald, 2012; Morange, 2015; Teppo & Millstein 2015; Ernsten, 2018), many of these studies perhaps all too readily characterise the city as a passive victim of structural oppression. On the other hand, the growing postcolonial literature (Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Mabin, 2014; Roy, 2014) has perhaps too 'prematurely' (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:160) sought to cast off the theoretical chains of global political economy and the manifold facets of substantive connectivity. This begged the question of whether or not urbanism could be both relational yet autonomous; non-deterministic yet still restrictive. Moreover, from an empirical perspective, there was a lack of interrogation in to the opinions, beliefs, and/or values of the private sector – key drivers of Cape Town's development trajectory and instrumental for comprehending the complex, differentiated agency that may be overlooked in homogenous characterisations of the 'private sector'. As a result, investigations in to Cape Town's urban regeneration trajectory have not, to this researcher's knowledge, been adequately pursued.

Furthermore, Woodstock is a particularly interesting suburb for a number of factors. It has a long history as a thriving centre of industrial commerce which has considerably shaped the area's social, political, cultural and physical spheres. Moreover, the scale and severity of Woodstock's transformation provides a significant amount of information to test the theoretical

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<sup>19</sup> Foucault (1980:197) defines the episteme as the strategic apparatus which permits the separating out from among all the Statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within. He says that 'in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice' (1966:168).

framework. It is, quite literally, in the midst of radical transitions – spatially, socio-economically and culturally. Moreover, as this process began as far back as 2003, it affords a suitable amount of time to investigate and interpret cause and effect (Yin, 2017).

### **3.4 Data Collection**

The collection of data in case study research can be complicated. This is primarily because data collection processes, as described earlier, are not routine prescriptions. Yin (2017) identifies three key principles of data collection that must be addressed. First, data collection must use multiple sources of evidence. Second, the researcher must create a case study database. Third, a ‘chain of evidence’ needs to be maintained (ibid.:124). These principles were important for achieving data of higher quality, increasing the consistency, integrity and legitimacy of the research outcomes.

In adhering to these principles, the research data was gathered using three key sources of evidence. These sources are divided between documentation, interviews, and direct observation. As discussed, using multiple sources of evidence is a significant strength of case study research. It facilitates the development and convergence of potentially disparate or difficult lines of inquiry through processes of triangulation (ibid.), producing what has been termed more rounded and ‘thickly’ detailed data (Greetz, 1973). The subsequent subparts of this chapter explain the strategies used to collect this data, whilst also delineating the strengths and limitations found in their usage.

### **3.4.1 Documentation**

Documents are a critical source of evidence for this research. These primarily include strategic frameworks and policy documents, as well as reports and administrative papers. Also used was prior work on similar and related case study areas, as well as historical sources of note. Most of these documents were collected through internet searches and library visits. They were particularly valuable in the earlier phases of the research, assisting with the need for fixed and factual information that could be re-read and cross-referenced repeatedly, as well as being major sources of understanding in to the contexts and histories of the case study. Moreover, these documents facilitated the development and focusing of the research questions and lines of inquiry. Further still, these documents, particularly key policy documents such as the Integrated Development Frameworks (IDPs), or the Spatial Development Framework, were measured against the information collected from interviews for consistencies, contradictions and other avenues of interest.

### **3.4.2 Interviews**

Interviews – referred to herein as personal communications – are largely the most significant source of evidence in this study. In order to address the research questions, a wealth of information was needed pertaining to the opinions, beliefs and direct experiences of key stakeholders. These stakeholders can be broadly separated into three groups: the public sector, private sector, and civil society. Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews were conducted, ranging in length from 1 to 2 hours. The interviews were conducted in person and were recorded with a voice recorder for later transcription. The key purpose of these interviews was to gather sufficient data on past and present experiences of urban regeneration in Woodstock

and Cape Town. The researcher needed enough data to compare and corroborate views, beliefs and opinions between and amongst stakeholders, thus the relatively high number of interviews undertaken compared to doctoral research in similar fields (Minnie, 2011; Yeboah-Assiamah, 2018).

With high preparation beforehand (denoting a structured approach), the interviews themselves were very loosely structured so as to mimic conversation. This was critical because the researcher wanted to maximise co-operation and refrain from imposing subjective premises and positions. Furthermore, the subject being discussed is emotive for some and controversial for others, thus interviewees (specifically local government and private developers) needed to be conversationally led to avenues of discussion that a more structured approach could expose as contrived. Indeed, Legard, Keegan and Ward (2013) believe prepared unstructured interviews to be the most in-depth. They are ‘conversation with a purpose’ (ibid.:138), intended to allow researchers to collect unnaturally, in-depth and nuanced information. This opinion is similarly shared by Morse and Corbin (2003:336) who describe the unstructured interview ‘as a shared experience’ whereby ‘researchers and interviewees come together to create a context of conversational intimacy in which participants feel comfortable telling their story’. The researcher determined overly formal acts of interaction to be a barrier to quality and nuanced discussion.

This form of narrative methodology encompasses the study of individual stories and explores the lived significance of those experiences (ibid). A key weakness of such an unstructured approach is the very nature of its lack of structure (Seidman, 2013). Unstandardised formats can challenge the reliability of data as questions, as well as the patterns of conversation that may lead to each question, vary (ibid.). This also raises serious issues of wider replicability as each interview is unique and highly qualitative (Mosley, 2013). On the other hand, unstructured interviews allow for particularly rich and varied data; the development of a relationship with

the participant; whilst ambiguities in any answer can be probed for further understanding and meaning (Clandinin, 2013). Moreover, a key intention of an unstructured interview is to expose the researcher to unanticipated themes so as to help him or her develop a better understanding of the interviewees' reality from the interviewees' perspectives (ibid.). This is critical for understanding the issues at hand from the interviewees' point of view.

There is also some dissension on the notion of validity testing when it comes to narrative methodologies (Overcash, 2003; Polkinghorne, 2007; Wells, 2011; Thomas, 2012). This is because qualitative data is unique in and of itself and, therefore, inherently difficult to replicate (Yin, 2017). Sandelowski (1991:162) has written that efforts to impose validity testing may suggest a misplaced preoccupation with the obtaining of rote, surface-level information at the expense of understanding experience and expression. Narrative approaches have thus seen widespread use in cognitive sciences, organisational studies, knowledge theory, anthropology and sociology (Mosier & Fischer, 2010).

Accordingly, in this research interviews are framed in a manner of discussion, creating a relaxed and informal setting where the interviewee may talk about something that may be concealed in a more rigid, formal setting. Negative publicity over the past few years has created a defensive quality. Indeed, issues in this research (such as gentrification, race and/or class) are sensitive and polarised in contemporary South Africa. As a result, the researcher wanted to encourage open-ended, informal discussion to elicit deeper, often withheld, views and beliefs. Even semantically, *why* questions were avoided, as such questions may encourage a calculation and deflection on the informant's part, whilst using *how* questions typically prompt more considered, conversational responses (Yin, 2017) that may lead the interviewee to sharing information they have been previously disinclined to.

The researcher selected interviewees from three key stakeholder groups – the public sector, the private sector and civil society. These included developers, urban planners, architects, heritage officials, politicians, lower- and upper-class residents, NGOs, and activists.<sup>20</sup> This was important as to better understand the development process as a whole – particularly when seeking to understand the role of socio-cultural narratives. Many studies on Cape Town (Booyens, 2012; Ramoroka & Tsheola, 2014; Teppo & Millstein, 2015) tend to investigate phenomena in the social sciences from the specific angle of a stakeholder, which limits interpretation and generally manufactures a more predetermined argument. By interviewing a wider range of stakeholders, with divergent views, beliefs and interests, a range of data can be compared, contrasted and correlated to yield keener insight. This is particularly valuable when considering discourses on power, and how some groups/individuals may influence others.

Accordingly, purposeful sampling, the preferred sampling method in qualitative research (Babbie & Mouton, 2012), is the method used in this study. This concerned a set of key criteria that guided the researcher in selecting a focused group of potential participants. The following criteria were thus developed:

- **Criterion 1:** Individuals that both serve and have served within the core management structure of Cape Town city governance. This includes both local ward councillors of Woodstock and individuals on the Mayoral Committee of the City, as well as current and former figures involved within the executive body of city management. Moreover, professionals working in the area of heritage were pursued owing to their intermediary role and position in change management and the implications this has vis-à-vis conservation and development in the city.

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<sup>20</sup> See Personal Communications on page 294 for list of interviewees.

- **Criterion 2:** Individuals involved in the private sector re/development of Woodstock and the wider City. The researcher pursued interviews with key figures of private-led regeneration projects as well private architects and urban planners who had been contracted by the City or private developers to work on developments in Woodstock.
- **Criterion 3:** Individuals with direct, lived experiences of urban regeneration projects in Woodstock. This includes individuals who have been served notices due to their homes being bought out for regeneration projects; long-term local residents (both lower- and upper-class) who have witnessed the transformation of Woodstock and are thus able to comment on the sociospatial and cultural dynamics of change; local civic leaders and community organisers; as well as NGO workers who work in the area.

### 3.4.3 Observation

The method of observation was also employed in the collection of data. This enabled a broadening in the understandings of the case study area, with observations of daily routines and activities taking place in and around key sites of interest (i.e. the regeneration projects of the Woodstock Exchange, the Foundry and the Old Biscuit Mill, amongst several others). Observation occurs when the researcher assumes the role of an outsider and observes the group/s he or she is studying (Babbie, 2015). This meant that during and even prior to fieldwork the researcher had some sense of engagement with the area, becoming part of the process being observed. During many walks, photographs and notes were taken, undertakings that helped inform a more nuanced understanding of the neighbourhood – one grounded in sensory experience as opposed to more separated or isolated research.

### 3.5 Data Analysis

An analysis of any discourse primarily involves the study of ‘language-in-use’ (Gee, 2010). As this study collects data from interviews *and* documents, this includes an analysis of both speech and text. It is important to clarify that discursive analysis ‘is not based on all the physical features present, not even all those that might, in some conceivable context, be meaningful, or might be meaningful in analyses with different purposes’ but is rather ‘based on the details of speech that are arguably deemed relevant in the context where the speech was used and that are relevant to the arguments the analysis is attempting to make’ (ibid.:9). Therefore, establishing context was the first point of order. This includes making notes of where the material came from and how it ‘fits’ into the area of study (Strauss, 2013). Thus, the social and historical context of each source was considered. This included asking questions such as: what language the source was written in; what area and place it was from; who wrote it and when; and who published it and when (Gee, 2010).

Following this, additional information on the production of the material was required, including institutional and/or personal background. For example, when at looking at early documents of the Cape Town Partnership or the City of Cape Town, it was important to consider who the author was; who the editorial staff were; what the general political position was at the time; and what affiliation there may have been with other organisations (Gee, 2010). Moreover, as some scholars argue that ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan, 1964), careful consideration was given to the medium in which information was presented and how it may have shaped meaning.

The next stage involved the coding of data. This means ‘assigning attributes to specific units of analysis, such as paragraphs, sentences, or individual words’ (Gee, 2010:21). This comprised

of marking statements in the speech or text that deal with certain patterns and related themes (or discourse strands). These categories are broadly based on the topic of study (i.e. urban regeneration and/or urban development) as well as key issues raised in the theoretical framework (i.e. ideas and views of urban change and transformation). For instance, words such as ‘growth’, ‘inclusive’, ‘global’, ‘progress’ – words that carry meaning and imply a degree of technical, intellectual, philosophical and/or moral consequence.

The arranging of data according to the substance of its content also required a preliminary examination of its structure (Strauss, 2013). This allowed the comparing of weight and balance within the text (i.e. was preference or privilege given to a particular discourse). Following this, an analysis of linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms was required. This involved the analysis of particular word groupings (i.e. common themes), grammatical features (i.e. the use of pronouns such as ‘we’ or ‘us’), modalities (i.e. the use of words such as ‘should’ or ‘could’) and evidentialities (i.e. expressions such as ‘of course’ and ‘obviously’). The next stage of analysis required a combing of statements, and the placement of these findings within the broader research context established earlier. The writing up of this material was also seen as part of the process of analysis, as the continual revisiting and scrutinising of data yielded more links and connections between the data.

### **3.6 Research Ethics**

In coordination with the Research Ethics Committee, the researcher informed participants of his intention to use information acquired during discussions towards the study, if and when said information was of potential value for the study. Following disclosure, with his position as researcher recognised, the interview process was again explained so that each participant could make an informed decision; consent necessary to the fundamentals of good research

(Seidman, 2013). Moreover, steps were taken for the collection, control, storage and access of information, in line with Research Ethics Committee guidelines. Namely, these were:

- **Data collection and recording:** Data was collected using a voice recorder whilst taking sparring and intermittent notes of import. The former approach provided potential for review and later corroboration with other sources of collected data whilst the latter approach allowed the researcher to focus keenly and participate in conversation, with the ebb and flow of interaction unmarred by excessive note taking.
- **Data storage and protection:** Data was stored and protected on a university provided computer in order to allow for the protection of research findings. This also allowed for reanalysis if necessary. A copy of the interview transcripts and the identity of interviewees was lodged with the academic supervisor.
- **Data presentation:** Due to the sensitive nature of the matter being discussed (as highlighted earlier), and after further consultation with the Research Ethics Committee, it was decided to keep participants anonymous. Participants have thus been assigned a letter of the alphabet in the order they are introduced in the text. For concealed yet contextual anonymity, a temporally opaque job description accompanies their introduction and can be cross-referenced on page 294.

### 3.7 Synthesis

This research leans on the philosophical position of constructionism. This is because the research deals with various subject realities where no sole truth may exist. What may constitute knowledge of the world can be conceived as an individual or collective construction of the

mind with different groups perceiving the world differently. Also, the research wrestles with multiple theoretical interpretations, owing to its multidisciplinary nature, meaning that more than one explanation and/or discussion may emerge. Moreover, value-free research is contentious in the social sciences, with elementary assumptions, beliefs, and values inexorably influencing its processes. Finally, examining phenomena in their natural environment is essential, helping the researcher better comprehend social processes and, thus, allowing for more complex and contextual factors to emerge (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Not only does this facilitate deeper understandings of the *how* and *why*, but it also enables the researcher to be responsive to the fluid and organic manifestations of social phenomena (Yin, 2017).

With the questions posed in this research expressing a need for understanding social phenomena, a qualitative research approach is taken. A qualitative methodology may lend itself to highly contextual analysis and rich, nuanced interpretations (Creswell & Poth, 2017). In order to generate meaningful data, both deductive and inductive approaches are necessary. The former is used to investigate phenomena from a more macro perspective and deduce facts about the institutional context of Cape Town, whilst the latter approach is used to identify more contextual (i.e. social and cultural) data, collected and then analysed to make inductive generalisations.

A single case study has been chosen as the research design, an approach that may facilitate greater immersion and integration in to the study area, allowing for rich understandings that may often be overlooked when dealing with multiple cases (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016). This is particularly important in qualitative social sciences, where the nature of issues being discussed are not always immediately obvious, requiring extensive investigation and delineation of context and situation (Yin, 2017). This lends itself to the questioning of old theoretical relationships and the exploration of new ones (Kratochwill & Levin, 2016).

Within a single case study, key stakeholders (such as the public sector, the private sector, and civil society) become their own embedded units of analysis, affording the time and care necessary to uncover deep and diverse data that a more concentrated study logistically enables. This also allows the researcher to explore the case study with the ability to analyse units *within* the case, i.e. between the units of analysis and, therefore, fashion a cross-case analysis (Yin, 2017). This gives the researcher the capacity to secure the depth of a single case study design yet maintain modes of comparison and contrast (i.e. how different stakeholder groups in Cape Town perceive, enact or experience urban development). This also allows the research to bridge a common gap in the urban academic field of Cape Town, whereby researchers tend to focus on one specific stakeholder group, narrowing the argument and smoothing over the chances of encountering controversial or contradictory data. A major strength of this research resides in its ability to tell different stories, giving voice to competing interpretations and explicating how both structure and agency may shape and form the urban development trajectory.

## CHAPTER IV – CASE STUDY

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter serves to present the collected case study data. The chapter is split into two parts. Part I highlights important historical trends in Woodstock, Cape Town. This situates the area in a spatial temporality, a prerequisite for any sound discursive analysis (Gee, 2010). Moreover, this is particularly important when contextualising the historical and cultural complexities of the post-apartheid city (Haferburg & Huchzermeyer, 2015). In Woodstock, early signs of gentrification and displacement are revealed, as well as organised attempts to reinforce segregation and inequality. An interesting facet is highlighted in neighbourhood attempts to historically resist exogenous political pressures of change, with evidence of community cohesion and solidarity that fought against apartheid impositions. This sharply contrasts with the fragmented, disorganised and disempowered Woodstock of recent years, one that appears weak in the face of steeper gradients of change. Part II presents the key findings of data collected from twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with key informants, supplemented with documentary and archival data (i.e. newspapers, reports, policy documents, frameworks and plans). As mentioned prior, this chapter limits theoretical interpretation, with the findings carried forward to Chapter V in the pursuit of inductive analysis. It should be noted that the stories presented in this section may not be what they appear. Indeed, considerable documentary excavation, cross-referencing, and comparison are needed to go beyond the commonly perceived and accepted narratives of urban development in Cape Town.

## 4.2 A History of Woodstock

### 4.2.1 The Rainbow Suburb

Although the first Europeans known to have scaled Table Mountain were Portuguese seamen under the command of Antonio de Saldanha in 1503, it was not until 1651 that the board of the Dutch East India Company, the *Seventeen*, chose to establish a small colony at the Cape, where ships could pull in for water and supplies whilst the sick be treated (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2010). Jan van Riebeeck arrived at Table Bay on 6<sup>th</sup> April the subsequent year with an expedition of almost ninety men. He went ashore the next day to begin construction of what would eventually become the Castle of Good Hope. In response to growing skirmishes with the local population, in 1660 van Riebeeck planted a wild almond hedge to better shield his settlement from incursions, a move perhaps symbolic as the first spatial division imposed by Europeans in the region (ibid.). Like many colonial conquests, the foundation of Cape Town was thus born out of battles for the ownership of land (Etherington, 2014). In South Africa, these early struggles arguably sowed the seeds for systems of control that would later develop in the twentieth century under apartheid (Thompson & Berat, 2014; Wilkins, 2017).

However, Cape Town's colonial history highlights a more variegated pattern than that found in many other urban areas in South Africa, with several working-class neighbourhoods reflecting a multi-racial demographic profile (Besteman, 2008). Woodstock, a former suburb and current inner-city neighbourhood, is one such example, long reflecting a high degree of mixing and interaction amongst peoples from various socio-economic, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds (ibid.). Indeed, as far back as 1865, the census of Woodstock (then known as Papendorp) is characterised as racially mixed, with whites, coloureds and blacks living side by side as neighbours (Field, 2001). In 1891, the editor of the local newspaper, *Cape Argus*,

observed how, due to heavy integration, it would be highly problematic in separating ‘the white and coloured population’ with most of the lower-class areas of the city racially mixed (Bickford-Smith, 2001:16). Successive waves of immigrants settling in the area continued to contribute to a ‘melting pot’ of race and culture: British settlers in the early 1900s; rural Afrikaners in the 1920s; Eastern European Jews in the 1930s, and Southern Europeans in the late 1930s and early 1940s, while in the 1960s and 1970s an influx of immigrants from Mozambique and Angola (Bickford-Smith, Van Heyningen & Worden, 1999).

Despite its history as a highly diverse suburb, the extent of integration and interaction between the different population groups in Woodstock was undoubtedly limited, characterised by a single broad spatial divide (Garside, 1993). *Upper Woodstock* became predominantly occupied by white residents whilst *Lower Woodstock* became predominantly home to non-white population groups (ibid.). This divide was exacerbated when, in the early 1900s, as Cape Town grew, the socio-economic character of the neighbourhood began to change from that of farming and fishing to industrialisation (Badham, 1987). However, as an inner-city neighbourhood, Woodstock offered working-class communities (and immigrants) real benefits in the form of affordable housing, proximity to places of work and education, and access to public transport (Garside, 1993). Its location meant that residents (both Upper and Lower) had access to the major employment, commercial, cultural and social opportunities of the city centre compared to people living in the newer suburbs that were developing further afield (Dewar, 1977). As the metropolitan area developed, the roads running through Woodstock became key transport corridors, with *Main Road* and *Lower Main Road* becoming arteries of local economic activity and communal livelihood (Garside, 1993).

Dewar (1977) drew attention to the variety of functions that characterised the different streets of Woodstock. On Lower Main Road, for instance, a concentrated commercial strip developed where individual shops were grouped together in ways that were attractive for both residents

and pedestrians (ibid.). This illustrated a high degree of what Garside (1993) deemed a modern urbanity, a continuous and coherent space that incorporated both public roads and private shops, with both private and public space resolved in mutual socio-economic relationships (ibid.). Moreover, Lower Main Road, in particular, became more than a mere channel of movement and commerce. It became a crucial social space, where citizens would meet and network, offering ‘place-making’ value to the residents. Similarly, shops were not only for trading, but also served as places wherein residents of varying social classes would interact (Dewar, 1977). Figure 1 below situates Woodstock in geographic relation to the rest of Cape Town. Figure 2 displays a road map of the suburb, with Lower Main Road highlighted to show the historic boundary of Upper and Lower Woodstock.




Figure 1. Woodstock in Cape Town. Source: Google Maps, 2018.




Figure 2. Woodstock and Lower Main Road. Source: Google Maps, 2018.

#### 4.2.2 Institutional Impositions

In 1948, the National Party came to power and began to impose apartheid policy on South African society. One of the most notorious laws aimed at enforcing white domination was the Group Areas Act of 1950, which sought to ban racially mixed residential areas across South Africa (Clark & Worger, 2016). This Act can be regarded as a cornerstone of the apartheid system (ibid.). Daniel Malan, the Prime Minister, stated at the time: ‘I do not think there is any other Bill affecting the relationships between the different races, the non-Europeans and the Europeans in this country, which determines the future of South Africa and of all population groups as much as this Bill does’ (Christopher, 1989:255). When presenting the Bill to Parliament, Theophilus Dinges, Minister of the Interior, declared it to be ‘one of the major measures designed to preserve White South Africa’ (Christopher, 2001:450).

The aim of the Act was to enforce the urban spatial segregation of racially defined population groups, demarcated by the Population Registration Act of 1950, with towns and cities separated into *group areas* for the exclusive use and sole residency of each categorised group (Clark & Worger, 2016). Once an area had been designated for the use of a group, those residents who did not form part of the group were made, by force, if necessary, to leave and assume residence in an area specifically created for that group (Berrisford, 2011). The city centres were zoned as white areas whilst the areas zoned for other race groups were located out on the urban periphery (ibid). The Group Areas Act was not only about the forced removal of people from one location to another; more fundamentally it meant the uprooting of people from the places of their childhood, from their workplaces, their schools, friends and families and, ultimately, from the lives they were building (Clark & Worger, 2016).

The full effects of the Act were not experienced in Cape Town until the 1960s, after the Act was amended in 1957 (Mabin, 1992). In 1966, District Six was declared a white group area and over the following 15 years, some 60 000 people were forcibly removed (Hart, 1988). This inner-city neighbourhood had a particularly heterogeneous population and evinced a strong sense of community and cosmopolitanism, with group intermarriages and several religions being practised side-by-side (Mceachern, 1998). Historically, District Six was regarded as a place of refuge and the first port of call for most of the city's new immigrants and the destitute (Ballantyne & Uzzell, 1993). For many residents there, being thrown out of their homes and neighbourhood by the apartheid government was a physical violation of their identity as citizens (Erasmus, 2001), leaving them disorientated and disempowered (Field, 2001). Figure 3 below illustrates the divisions imposed on Cape Town by the Group Areas Act.



Figure 3. Group Areas Act in Cape Town. Source: Bickford-Smith, Van Heyningen & Worden, 1999

Despite the devastating effects of the Group Areas Act on coloured working-class neighbourhoods across Cape Town, Woodstock had escaped the worst impacts of the legislation (Christopher, 2001). This was because Woodstock had remained ‘unproclaimed’ and the local authorities had not pursued a racial designation. However, this did not go unnoticed. In 1986 President P.W. Botha declared that ‘Woodstock must become coloured as it is not a white area’ (Garside, 1993:32). As a result, Cape Town witnessed the launch of the *Open Woodstock* campaign – a protest movement against the designating of Woodstock as ‘coloured’ rather than a place open to all (ibid.). In 1987, *Cape Times* headlined an article on this campaign: ‘Forget colour, says Woodstock’ (ibid.). The article argued that Woodstock and its residents, businessmen, clergymen and even councillors rejected the notion that the neighbourhood should submit to any classification based on colour or race (ibid.). Garside

(ibid.) observes how an article in the *Financial Mail* titled ‘Group Areas: Not for Woodstock’ made recommendations that local authorities should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to be racially integrated or not. Similarly, an article in the local pamphlet, *Weekly Mail*, declared that the people of Woodstock want to live as they have always done and see no reason for government interference (ibid.). In response to this, the apartheid government, whilst not declaring Woodstock an open area, backed off from implementing removals in the neighbourhood (ibid.).

This is a critical point in the suburb’s history. In the face of institutional forces defining clear and unambiguous policy, the residents of both Upper and Lower Woodstock came together in a shared vision of equality and justice. In the face of powerful exogenous influence, community organisations – spanning race, culture and class – fended off perceived discrimination and unwanted imposition. The life and vitality of the *Open Woodstock* campaign assisted in laying the bedrock for a later repeal of the Group Areas Act in its entirety (ibid.). At the same time, this massively contributed to the forging of a progressive identity in Woodstock through its celebration of a diverse yet cohesive suburb.

### **4.2.3 Incremental Change**

Despite this collective effort of community resistance, early signs of gentrification were, in fact, visible in Woodstock. The first empirical research on this came from Garside (1993). According to this study, the inner-city neighbourhood of Woodstock was already changing in terms of its demographic profile in the 1980s, with working-class families being replaced by middle-class. The findings indicate that both Upper and Lower Woodstock experienced displacement, and that both white and coloured working-class households were vulnerable to the changes taking place.

During the late 1980s, these trends gained momentum (ibid.). With the declaration of Woodstock as an ‘open’ or ‘grey’ area in 1987, increasing amounts of more wealthy citizens from the coloured community began settling in Lower Woodstock (Visser, 2002). Garside (1993) observed that local homeowners, noticing the change of working-class renters with middle-class renters, began redeveloping their rundown terraced houses to secure higher rental or selling value. Incrementally, long since established working-class residents were evicted because of their insufficient financial means and subsequently forced to look for more inexpensive housing – whether in alternative areas of Woodstock or the neighbouring inner-city slums (ibid.). This pattern began repeating itself in Upper Woodstock with working-class white and immigrant groups being replaced by white professionals enticed by the immediacy of the CBD (Visser, 2002). Creatives, in particular, were attracted by Woodstock’s quaint architecture and its scenic views of both Devil’s Peak and Table Mountain (Garside, 1993).

This initial cycle of gentrification in Woodstock was brought about by the measured desire of a creative class to make the area their home (Sitas, 2018). This can perhaps be interpreted as a more benign process of social mobility. For instance, in Slater’s (2007) seminal article *The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research*, he draws very real differences between micro-patterns of movement (such as personal preferences) and macro policies (such as state policy and/or legislation) that encourages large-scale spatial transformation. The latter is more profound in its effect than the former and should not be confused when criticising any form of social mobility in the city (ibid.).

Indeed, despite early attempts at what Garside (1993) deems gentrification, change was, rather, uneven, slow, and generally unable to alter the structure, nature or character of the area (Visser, 2002). In fact, in the late 1980s, Woodstock began to decline. This decline has been attributed to Woodstock’s lack of classification (*vis-à-vis proclaiming*) by the State, leading the City to significantly decrease investment and, over time, this resulted in urban decay (ibid.). By the

early 1990s, the post-apartheid government's policy of tariff liberalisation had also taken its toll, as competition from Asian textile imports led to the closing of many industries in Woodstock (Wenz, 2012). These factories had significantly contributed to the economic life of the area and, with their closing, decline set in. The factories were, for the most part, left empty and unused, causing the neighbourhood to deteriorate physically whilst, at the same time, vital sources of local employment vanished (ibid.). As people lost their jobs, and the once thriving factories and work-spaces began to decay, the degeneration of Woodstock worsened. Increasing poverty levels, as well as a concomitant rise in drug abuse, gangsterism and vandalism, became highly visible, affecting the desirability of the neighbourhood (Samara, 2011). Moreover, with derelict commercial and industrial spaces in Woodstock being left empty, vagrants moved in, whilst outside, on the streets, others set-up semi-permanent residence in alleyways, cul-de-sacs and under bridges (Visser & Kotze, 2008). In general, Woodstock became known as poor, dilapidated and unsafe (ibid.).

It is argued that not until the early 2000s did this change (Booyens, 2012; Wenz, 2012; Donaldson *et al.*, 2013; Teppo & Millstein, 2015). The following section details a verbalised story of this change – from the points of view of the public sector, private sector and civil society – whilst also bringing to light how this change may have relied on earlier contingencies. As mentioned, full discussions and/or interpretations are, however, reserved for Chapter V.

## **4.3 Urban Regeneration in Woodstock**

### **4.3.1 The Public Sector**

In order to expunge, contextualise, and clarify urban regeneration in Woodstock – as outlined in the aims and objectives – it is critical to investigate the roots and foundations of urban regeneration as a policy in the City's development agenda.

This story begins with the advent of the post-apartheid era – when all spheres of government came together to collectively focus energy on improvements to the delivery of basic services in Cape Town. At the time, upkeep and maintenance of inner-city services and infrastructure, even though being in a poor state of disrepair, was low. The inner-city of Cape Town began to fall into a spiral of urban decline and was slipping beyond the control of local government.

**Participant A**, a former Chairperson of the SME Development Portfolio (Personal Communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017) remarks that the pattern of decline worsened when the local state appeared unwilling and unable to form an adequate response to the economic downswing (ibid). The vacancy rate for inner-city buildings was climbing and infrastructure was showing signs of increasing dilapidation. Leisure amenities were few and far between, with crime rampant (ibid.). These worsening urban issues required a swift response and pressing action by the authorities. This, however, apparently did not come. **Participant B**, a City Ward Councillor for Cape Town, explains: ‘things were in such a state... the authorities eventually realised that the City needed a new angle’ (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017). Urban regeneration was, at the time, a low priority whilst the democratisation of all spheres of government remained at the forefront of public concern (ibid.).

By the late 1990s, business leaders across Cape Town were warning the City that the CBD was in danger of dissolving. **Participant A** asks – ‘How do you save a city?’ (Personal Communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017). He explains that:

‘Cape Town and its CBD was now a mess... there were signs everywhere of complete physical and social decay... The streets had become unsafe and nobody really walked around anymore... Businesses were packing up shop and leaving... Homeless people and beggars everywhere... It used to be so beautiful’.

In 1998, fearful of economic disaster, the City and a group of business leaders opened a dialogue to try and fix these problems. The solution, **Participant A** explains, was to create a private entity for the central city – hopeful ‘to turn things around’ (ibid.). Hanief Tiseker, who at the time was Business Areas Manager for the City, was given *carte blanche* by Rod Young, Director of Economic Development, in setting up the Cape Town Partnership (CTP). **Participant C**, a public official in the Economic Department for the City of Cape Town, reminisces that this was ‘A very exciting time... things were so bad, and the Partnership offered a way out...a lifeline’ (Personal Communication, 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2017).

**Participant D**, a former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the CTP, comments that at this time: ‘The Cape Town news was instrumental in gathering support for the Partnership... They hailed every success along the way’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). He notes that Shaun Johnson, former Chairman of the CTP and Executive Director of the Mandela Rhodes Foundation, encouraged reporting on the central city in all the papers to rally support (ibid.). Johnson ‘almost instantly got on board Independent Newspapers for the project and that was a major step’ (ibid.). **Participant E**, a leading communications strategist and managing director of a major Cape Town based marketing firm, used findings to highlight the need for private-sector leadership. She comments:

‘There was a sort of war being waged in the public arena... It’s important to understand that we had to get people interested and motivated for it... So, we pushed a lot of positive stuff over and over, it had to be in everyone’s faces every day, and we were... From 1998 till 2003, you couldn’t open a paper that didn’t have some sort of partnership article’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017).

**Participant D** (former CEO of the CTP) relates a similar position, stressing this importance: ‘Without the required passion, a call to action, there would have been no change... so with public opinion behind you, that was a major part of what you needed’ (Personal Communication, 17th October 2017).

On 9<sup>th</sup> December, 1998, **Participant F**, a former City Manager for Cape Town recommended that a draft by-law be revised so that Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) could be set-up throughout the city (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). He further made the recommendation that they be termed ‘City’ Improvement Districts (CIDs) and thus apply not only to business areas, but also to mixed-use and residential areas. **Participant F** explains that the CIDs need to be conceived as the operational arms of the executive CTP (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). CIDs operate in a largely similar fashion as their international counterparts, in that they are part and parcel of broader measures (i.e. economic liberalisation) that seek the promotion of investment and the creation of a sanitary and safe environment that is appealing and favourable to business (ibid.). This model had particular success in Cape Town. The City Centre Improvement District (CCID) Annual Report of 2010 remarks that Lorlene Hoyt, a researcher for the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluded, after studying almost one thousand CIDs worldwide, that: ‘Comparatively speaking, CID organisations in Cape Town set new standards’ (CCID, 2010:20).

Despite such commendation, ‘In the early days of the CTP, money was very tight’, says **Participant D** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). ‘The South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA) were our biggest financiers... without them, I don’t think this thing would have got off the ground’ (ibid.). Many key members of the CTP’s administrative infrastructure were members of SAPOA, including Colin Bird, a founding member of the CTP; Derek Stuart-Findlay, the aforementioned media magnate who was later the CTP Chairman;

and also, David Jack, former Chief City Planner for Cape Town. This arguably gave SAPOA an influence in the developments of the CTP, including its direction of priorities and interests (ibid.). An example of this early influence can be seen in the fact that SAPOA was for a long-time lobbying the City for depreciated replacement values to be switched to a market value basis.<sup>21</sup> **Participant F** explains that using the CTP's capacity as an official public-private conduit, this was finally achieved in 2000 (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

**Participant D** explains that just before this, however, in early 1999, Minister Patrick McKenzie deferred approval of the CID legislation (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). The Minister sought to offer a seemingly small, but significant change to the by-law to include both owners *and* tenants. This meant that a fifty-one percentage of approval was needed by both rateable property owners and tenants to create a CID in Cape Town. The rationale behind this was that highly residential areas, including Woodstock, were comprised of a large amount of leased housing, and their voice would be disqualified if this amendment was not made (ibid.). Wendy Hartshorne, property consultant and also member of SAPOA then sent by fax a letter to all CTP members, notifying them that SAPOA required immediate meeting with the Minister to find a resolution (ibid.). Colin Bird, in a fax sent to the Minister on 17 March, 1999, warned 'we are clearly most disturbed by this development because no objection had been received during the statutory advertising period' (CTP, 2009:38). Bird further warned that Cape Town was 'deteriorating by the hour and delays must be minimised' (ibid.:38). The matter came to a quick resolution through a private workshop between CTP directors and advisors (ibid.). As a result, the Cape Town Partnership was able to register as a Section 21 entity in May of 1999 and officially became active two months later.

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<sup>21</sup> Depreciated replacement costs are typically used by local government to offer a more equitable basis of property valuation as compared to purely market forces (French & Gabrielli, 2007).

The backing down of the City over this issue is pivotal as it set an important precedent for the power and role of the CTP. It also gave a political legitimacy to the private sector to operate without the input of renting tenants; a substantial body of Cape Town's residents. After these key early events, the CTP's first publication – titled 'Promoting Cape Town City's Centre as the Heart of a World Class City' – outlined its driving vision. **Participant F** explains that this was an important landmark in concretising a shared developmental trajectory (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). In order to achieve this vision, the City began inviting input from the private sector on many of the council's work groups. **Participant D** explains that it was not long before the CTP's reputation for competence and efficiency meant that it was asked to help deal with issues of homelessness, street-children and begging in the city – originally outside its mandate (Personal Communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017).

By the early 2000s, the City was introducing by-laws with input from the private sector (ibid.). One of these by-laws sought to integrate a variety of older regulations under a single law, encompassing a large selection of social ills – including loitering, urinating in the streets or causing public disturbance. The use of skateboards would similarly be prohibited in the streets, as would washing or drying of clothing. Moreover, people will no longer be allowed to beg within six metres of ATMs, bus or rail stops, or within three metres of an entrance to a building or vehicle. Neither will they be allowed to beg on any public road. Whilst there were many who were exasperated by anti-social and illegal behaviour in the city, social workers, such as **Participant G**, director of a major NGO based in Woodstock, were anxious that such a by-law would de-facto criminalise poverty (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

These by-laws were only at the last minute repealed when the new ANC Mayor for Cape Town, Nomaindia Mfeketo, arrived in office and strongly criticised that such laws would criminalise homelessness. **Participant G** (ibid.) says that 'The idea of the private sector having any say in the law is wrong... the law should be about protecting the people, about protecting everyone'.

Yet, in 2004, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) asked for both financial and logistical backing from the Cape Town Partnership for the creation of community courts in Wynberg, Mitchells Plain and the CBD (CTP, 2009). Not long after this, the Cape Town City Centre Improvement District's director was selected to serve on the National Prosecuting Authority oversight committee (ibid), signalling its increased influence in the maintenance of the city's law and order.

As time marched on, the media continued to praise the partnership between the City and the private sector. In 2008, an article in the *Cape Argus* proclaimed the 'Turning of the tide', offering 'congratulations and continued support for the City Improvement District' (CTP, 2009:36). The article also mentions that 'the city [Cape Town] looks forward with confidence to its [the CTP's] tackling of new problems' (ibid.). Yet, NGO director, **Participant G** (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017), claims that while the 'clean-up' operations by the CTP were being praised, many of the social ills it sought to clean-up had merely been moved elsewhere. She argues that street children, for instance, migrated to the adjacent suburb of Woodstock to escape the securitisation of the CBD (ibid.). Because the CID model had spread to other suburbs, these street children would experience similar marginalisation until they drifted even further afield to the Cape Flats where they would often end up joining gangs (ibid.). **Participant G** contends that the tide had not so much turned as it had been diverted.

Another point of interest at the legislative level is the year 2002, when Finance Minister Trevor Manuel announced what was to become the key policy in driving urban regeneration across Cape Town – the Urban Development Zone (UDZ). UDZs are an incentive to encourage investment in underperforming parts of the city. The policy stipulates that the full cost of refurbishing a property could be wrote-off over five years at twenty percent per year. With regards to new buildings, the entire cost may be wrote-off over a period of seventeen years, with twenty percent wrote-off in the first year alone. **Participant F** explains that despite being

regulated at a national level, UDZs have the fiscal stability of local governments (i.e. the City's ability to generate more revenue) at its core (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

**Participant D** (Personal Communication, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2017) comments how 'With regards to Cape Town we were expectant of an increase in outside investment, particularly concerning property redevelopment... and of course an incentivisation for upgrading or refurbishing'.

These expectations were met as development in Cape Town soared. Construction was at such a speed that, by the close of 2004, **Participant F** (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017) said that developers were running weeks in delay trying to secure supplies, becoming scarce in the resultant 'boom'. **Participant F** was even told that the city had run out of cranes. He explains that these shortages were ultimately excellent news as they highlighted the success of the city and the revitalisation of the economy.

With investment overflowing, it was around this time (in 2004) that Woodstock was declared part of the Urban Development Zone. In an interview with **Participant H**, a Mayoral Committee Member for Cape Town, the merit of the UDZs were discussed. **Participant H** remarks that:

'Cities in this country need to both balance the fiscal imperative within the policy framework... And if you also look at policies such as the National Development Plan, the UDZ is really something that works within that context... It is important to see the UDZ as an essential part of this process... in securing wider fiscal stability'  
(Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

When asked why areas beyond the geographic boundaries of the CBD were included in the UDZ, **Participant H** affirmed the prudence of UDZs as a development initiative and that 'as

wide a catchment area as possible is preferred' (ibid.). **Participant D** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017) suggests that the catchment area may have been complemented by 'behind the scenes' lobbying. In early 2003, the CTP and SAPOA initiated a joint commercial property portal to be hosted on the Partnership website. The website was aimed to encourage investment and detailed a number of opportunities to be viewed and enquired on, directing potential business straight to the CTP. This project, at the time, received support from Mayor Mfeketo, encouraged by the economic revitalisation of the CBD. There was, in short, an ostensible consensus reached between the City and the private sector that property-led developments were highly effective for stimulating growth. It was at the end of this year that the City would submit its application for *two* UDZs. The first of these extended beyond the CBD to include the neighbouring suburbs of Woodstock, Salt River and Observatory. It was also the CTP that aided in the preparation of the Council's submission to the National Treasury on urban regeneration tax incentives contained in the Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2003 (CTP, 2009).

Earlier that year, however, a group of almost 30 NGOs joined with the City in conceiving and approving the Woodstock and Salt River Revitalisation Framework (WSRRF). **Participant I** an architect and urban planner who worked on this project, explains:

'The Framework was an idea for the regeneration of the whole area... It had a clear and detailed vision with various strategies and proposals... The main area of the Framework was geared to include urban design with an opportunity for historical and cultural preservation, as well as the restoration of important public spaces... It was put together with a spatial and social obligation which comprised of various smaller projects with clear

and practical community-based participation’ (Personal Communication, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

Thus, it would seem that by 2004, two competing discourses of development were being pursued, both outside and also *within* government. One that was a partnership between the City and the private sector – centred on economic incentives to encourage growth and investment. The other, a framework, authorised by the City yet to be implemented by civil society – a sociospatial approach to address apartheid geographies that, **Participant I** (ibid.) explains, ‘...from the outset and throughout the process, stressed a qualitative living environment’. It is here important to note that whilst quantitative (i.e. economic returns) *and* qualitative (i.e. quality of life) considerations have both been heralded by the City in policy and rhetoric, the precedence of the former over the latter is consistent with its wider policy frameworks.

In turning to these wider policy frameworks, the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is the 5-year overarching framework that guides all development in the city. Looking at the 2007 IDP, the document stresses ‘Seven Strategic Focus Areas’. The first of these focus areas, before attention to health, safety or security, is ‘Shared Economic Growth and Development’. The first line of this focus area is described as ‘A strategy to attract investors, business and visitors and to grow and retain existing businesses is vital. This can be done by the creation of a strong enabling environment for business’ (CoCT, 2007:20). The 2012 IDP shows a similar narrative. Under a new Mayor, Patricia de Lille, the document sets out ‘5 Pillars’ to ‘guide the municipality’s planning and budgeting’ (CoCT, 2012b:8). The first of these pillars is the ‘Opportunity City’. The first line of this pillar explains that ‘Only the market – as a key part of an economic-enabling environment that allows for competitive and inclusive growth – can truly provide the opportunities that lift people out of poverty and provide them with dignity’ (CoCT, 2012a:34). And finally, the latest incarnation of the IDP, 2017, prioritises 11 ‘Strategic Focus

Areas'. Once more, the first of these focus areas is 'Positioning Cape Town as a forward-looking, globally competitive business city' (CoCT, 2017a:34).

This commitment appears to have been highly effective. Over the period 2003 to 2015, a total of 240 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects were recorded in Cape Town (WESGRO, 2016). These projects represented a total capital investment of ZAR 63.77 billion, which equated to an average investment of ZAR 265.98m per project. Capital investments from 2009 to 2013 exceeded investments over the period 2003 to 2007, suggesting that the city's investment portfolios were thriving. A subsector breakdown across 13 areas of FDI in to Cape Town between 2003 and 2015 puts *real estate* services at 17.76% of all capital expenditure (WESGRO, 2016). This is more than double the next sub-sector, wireless telecommunication carriers (7.03%) and four times the one after that, freight and distribution services (4.66%) (ibid.). During these same years, the city experienced broad economic growth with an average of 4% annual increase in GDP between 1998 and 2008 with a 6% increase in 2004 and 2005, and 5% in 2006 (CoCT, 2008b:22).

**Participant H** remarks that UDZs were likely a key determinant in encouraging investment in real estate (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017). This investment, and in Woodstock in particular, was accompanied by intense competition for commercial and residential space. This, however, unavoidably antagonised the city's housing crisis,<sup>22</sup> exacerbated by predominantly commercial developments taking precedence over social housing projects, including the Woodstock locations of Earl Street, Mountain Road, Pickwick Street, Pine Road, Dillon Lane, and Bromwell Street. These areas have been petitioned by civil society organisations as suitable locations for social housing. Whilst **Participant H** (ibid.) insists these projects are forthcoming, urban planner, **Participant I** (Personal Communication, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2017),

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<sup>22</sup> As of 2018, the housing backlog in the province stands at 575, 000, while the City of Cape Town have said that there are 320, 146 people on its database who are waiting for housing (Department of Human Settlements, 2018).

contends that many of these projects have been ‘in the pipeline since 2004’ whilst, during this same period, and as the above data suggests, private residential and commercial development thrived.

**Participant F** explains that fierce competition for housing is the unavoidable impact of opening a local market to global demand (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

**Participant H** similarly concludes that these are the unfortunate but inevitable costs of development (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017). Whilst he accepts that the City has, by and large, failed to address the issue of access to affordable housing, he remains adamant that the City’s current policy direction is correct. Moreover, he is resolute that economic transformation must be the driver behind broader urban change, remarking that current policy is underpinned by ‘the need to rebuild the economic base of our declining areas and attract investment across the inner-city areas’ to ‘restore private sector confidence’ (ibid).

**Participant H** notes that whilst the social implications of development are complex, ‘we cannot simply obstruct development’. He closed the interview with ‘we have to go down this development path... even though it makes some people uncomfortable’ (ibid.). This sentiment is backed by Alan Winde, Minister of Economic Opportunities. Speaking during his budget briefing in March 2017, the Minister stated that unlike certain foreign states (he references Germany and France) with a higher social mandate and more regulatory control, ‘In our province [Western Cape], we will not tolerate businesses being slowed down’ (WCPG, 2017a).

### **4.3.2 The Private Sector**

When reviewing the chronology of urban governance in Cape Town, it may appear that ‘recognition’ of catastrophic urban decline did not follow directly after the first post-apartheid elections, nor did it stem from any councillor or public servant. It may appear that the

propagation of decay that later justified the creation of the CTP in 1999 was conveyed through the media between 1998 and 1999, at the same time when the partnership was created. It also may appear that this press coverage became key in pointing towards the inefficiency of public authorities and finer fidelities of sharing City governance responsibilities with the private sector. Media consultant **Participant E** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017) was responsible for this marketing and branding exercise, whilst handling the general domestic and global marketing research of the CTP. She recalls how businesses in the CBD were unprecedentedly ‘brought together’ to back the CTP, with her agency eventually winning an international award for public relations practice. So successful had the media storm been in unifying the issues of cause and responsibility that Shaun Johnson, the editor of several of the foremost newspapers in the city (under the media conglomerate Independent Newspapers Cape), was later to become Chairman of the CTP itself. **Participant D** (a former CEO of the CTP) comments ‘We put a lot of effort in, *a lot of effort*, to changing people’s mindsets... and we eventually brought in Shaun Johnson, editor over at *Cape Argus*... He had a good sense of how to influence people’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

When questioning this, **Participant C** comments that the city was then engaged in fraught regional and international competition: ‘Properties were becoming worthless... Tourism was under stress... Something had to be done’ (Personal Communication, 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2017).

**Participant F** remarks that this idea was very much the driving narrative at the time (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). He explains that ‘It, of course, required a large amount of convincing... but it was to save the city’ (ibid.). Indeed, ‘We need to act now if we want to do this... if we want Woodstock and Cape Town to become what it can be,’ says **Participant J**, a property developer in Woodstock. **Participant J** is in a unique position being both a major developer in Woodstock and the managing director of local media company. He insistent on bringing a worldly aesthetic to Woodstock, and making it the trendy, prosperous and vibrant

community that he believes it should be (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017). Here, the discourse of ‘saving the city’ appears to have moved in to other spheres of the city, albeit in new and interesting ways.

‘But it wasn’t always like this,’ he explains. ‘Woodstock used to be a dive. A hole. You couldn’t walk here at night... Drugs. Crime. Homelessness. Prostitution. It was all out of control... and the government wasn’t doing anything about it’ (ibid.). He then goes on to explain how Woodstock had been neglected and ‘left behind’ (ibid.). For **Participant J**, it was the UDZ that ‘changed everything’ (ibid.). It was both a legislative incentive that made developments in Woodstock highly profitable, yet it was also a signification of responsibility. For instance, **Participant J** both lamented the incapability of the City for ‘getting things done’ yet was thankful for the fact that developers in Woodstock had been granted a high degree of autonomy (ibid.). Interestingly, **Participant J** was unaware of the lineage of this autonomy (those responsible for the legal framework unto which his businesses have flourished). This potentially marks a departure from the earlier formations and the arrival of newer, younger generation of developers with different goals; different aspirations; and different discourses.

At around this time, the CTP changed leadership. The *Cape Argus* reported that the appointment was expected to help restore the ‘faltering’ relationship between the City council and the CTP (*Partnership For The People*, Cape Argus, 6 August 2003). **Participant D** explains how there was feeling in the City that the CTP were taking too much credit (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). This is interesting as **Participant F** (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017) comments that just a few years prior, some ‘unnameable’ members of the City were getting annoyed with the Partnership’s ubiquitous press coverage frequently outshining the roles, responsibilities and commitments of civil servants. **Participant F** then said it was time to ‘keep a low profile... stay behind the scenes... let the politicians take the credit’. He remarked and that now ‘culture became our mandate’ (ibid.).

The first major development in Woodstock was the Old Biscuit Mill. Indeed, **Participant J** says, ‘It all started with the Biscuit Mill... those boys saved Woodstock’ (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017). A landmark moment in Woodstock’s transformation, the development of the Old Biscuit Mill (see Figure 4 below) was finished and opened in 2005. What was previously a Pyotts Biscuit factory was transformed into a creative centre housing a mixture of businesses such as studios, offices, retail spaces, restaurants and craft food markets. It has since become internationally renowned and an extremely popular destination for tourists. The development of the Old Biscuit Mill is important because, soon after, similar nexus points of commercial development<sup>23</sup> soon followed. Perhaps the most notable of these, due its size and location, is the Woodstock Exchange (see Figure 5 below).



*Figure 4. The Old Biscuit Mill.*

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<sup>23</sup> Theory holds that surrounding land-value typically rises with new development (Wiley, 2015).



*Figure 5. The Woodstock Exchange.*

Local property mogul, **Participant L**, a key figure in the Biscuit Mill’s development, was quick to praise the UDZ in ‘paving the way for investment’ (Personal Commutation, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2017). He also acknowledged the instrumental role his company had played in transforming the area (ibid.). He notes how the subsequent influx of numerous designer retail stores, restaurants, art galleries and high-end antique furniture stores – which have also come to Woodstock – are making it a new ‘creative-hub’ of the city (ibid.). **Participant M**, a Director of a major property firm in Cape Town and who has worked with **Participant L** on the Biscuit Mill and other ventures across the city, praised the visionary qualities of his partners in ‘seeing and believing what Cape Town could be’ (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017). **Participant M** went on to explain that:

‘Cape Town’s natural beauty has always been an attraction for foreigners... right back to the 1930s... it’s

always been a beautiful city... but we had lost that and we've since been trying to get it back... that's what we want to do... we want to make this City a global wonder... like it should be... like Barcelona, like London, cities that aspire to greatness. Cape Town can do this. Cape Town should do this... but more work needs to be done if we want to compete with these other cities'.

**Participant L** remarks that a key strategy in pursuing this vision rests not only in psychical transformation (i.e. buildings). He is committed to diversifying what the city has to offer the world: 'sports and cultural events... fairs and festivals... it's the growth of culture really... and it's increasing the appeal of Cape Town as an iconic destination' (Personal Communication, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017). This desire to imagine Cape Town in such a manner became increasingly consistent with planning and policy frameworks. The Central City Development Strategy (CCDS), for instance, was a landmark visioning project in 2008 created to cement a 'unified' vision between the Cape Town Partnership and the City to guide development (CoCT, 2008a). This vision-shaping document 'encapsulates the principles to guide Cape Town into a sustainable, economically viable, citizen-orientated future' and remained 'in effect' until 2018 (ibid.). The Mayor of Cape Town at the time, Helen Zille, comments:

'The purpose of the Central City Development Strategy is to inspire and to capture the public imagination about what the future of the Central City could be. We want to mobilise stakeholders around a shared vision and specific strategies, and to generate a measurable delivery plan, in order to manage growth and lead change over

the next ten years. The Central City Delivery Plan, which will be finalised early in 2009 and will be implemented via public-, private- and community partnerships' (CoCT, 2008a:4).

This discursive shift is also reflected on the outside, with Cape Town itself becoming an increasingly desirable destination. In 2007, Cape Town fended off competition from a host of cities to be ranked by the USA's prestigious Travel and Leisure magazine as the number one city in Africa and the Middle East, as well as claiming tenth spot in the 'Best City in the World' category. Cape Town's Mayoral Committee Member for Tourism, Simon Grindrod, commented on the city's performance: 'Our vision for Cape Town is to be a world class city not only for all our citizens but also as a tourist destination. To achieve this, we must strive to improve every aspect of what Cape Town has to offer' adding that such awards 'will thus have a direct and positive effect on job creation and growth in the economy for the residents of Cape Town' (Brand South Africa, 17 July 2007). Only the year before, Cape Town had jumped 17 positions in the International Congress and Convention Association's global rankings. In an interview with Cape Argus, Executive Deputy Mayor of Cape Town, Andrew Arnolds, affirmed that 'the city's positioning in the international market has huge potential in addressing many of our socio-economic problems in South Africa' (Cape Argus, 22 July 2006).

Back in Woodstock, the expansion of 'creative clusters' in the form of large commercial developments was taking off, with City policy reflecting the primacy of culture-led development. The Spatial Development Framework (CoCT, 2011:9) calls for a 'well-maintained, City-owned attractions and tourism precincts will enhance people's quality of life, and contribute to investment and tourism' whilst the 2012 IDP (CoCT, 2012:46) explains how global cultural events (i.e. the FIFA World Cup) 'will play a critical catalytic role in the positioning of Cape Town as a key events and tourism destination'. This policy direction

spawned the Tourism Development Framework (CoCT, 2014:12), which seeks the ‘Building [of] a globally competitive city through institutional and regulatory changes’. This framework proposes that creative tourism be fostered as a niche market, with connections nurtured between creative industries and tourism, and with creativity integrated in to Cape Town’s brand image (ibid.). Even the vision for The Western Cape Design Strategy (WCPG, 2013) – to recognise the Western Cape as a leader in providing design-led products, services and solutions to the global marketplace – began to align itself with a culturally committed tone to development.

**Participant J** remarks on the importance of bringing creative-types together and creating vibrant communities (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017). When asked about the other, older communities, he contends that gentrification is a tool of political correctness that stifles change and that the ‘transformation of Woodstock is ultimately for the benefit of everyone living here’ (ibid.). **Participant N**, CEO of a major Cape Town property group, relates a similar story (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017). He observes that ‘All these factories around Woodstock... this wasted space... it’s not viable any more... Woodstock can only survive by re-inventing itself’. He too made comparisons to global cities such as Lisbon, Barcelona, and Madrid, and he concedes that developers in the area are united in ‘raising Cape Town’ (ibid.). His company is currently working (with various other parties) on a 400-unit complex called the Woodstock Quarter both on and behind Gympie Street, Woodstock (see Figure 6 below).



*Figure 6. Gympie Street Redevelopment.*

**Participant N** envisions this will ‘offer a fresh and vibrant atmosphere... with spaces and activities for a multi-functional locale’. When asked who or what this locale is, **Participant N** responded that everything will be ‘locally sourced and locally inspired’. The website for the Woodstock Quarter markets a ‘perfect balance between luxury living and convenience; perfectly suited to the aspiring urban-living homeowner and investor’.<sup>24</sup> **Participant C**, a public official in the Economic Department for the City of Cape, states that, in this way, Cape Town is ‘trying very hard’ to mimic and compete with internationally renowned cities (Personal Communication, 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2017). Having the right image and brand is vital for new businesses to both migrate to Cape Town and choose the city as a base for a start-up. The City seeks to do this in two key ways: promote competitive advantages and promote the

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<sup>24</sup> Woodstock Quarter, 2018.

physical and spatial factors that offer growth potential (ibid.). Woodstock offers this. **Participant C** (ibid.) agrees that large, derelict buildings on cheap land coupled with a discernible vibrancy make Woodstock an easily marketable location. Under these conditions, property developer, **Participant M**, described heritage conservation as a ‘challenge’ in Woodstock (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017), with many of the large developments (such as the Exchange) conforming to global architectural aesthetics. Property developer, **Participant J**, ends his interview with: ‘It’s not just that I can’t stand ugly buildings... but urbanisation is something culturally leading... its inspirational’ (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017). He goes on to conclude that ‘if the City is just going to sit around and wait... it will always be a backwards city. It’s up to us to take the lead’ (ibid.). Similarly, property developer **Participant N** ends his interview with a similar call to action: ‘This is a unique time to participate globally. For Cape Town to reinvent itself as a design capital... as a leading city... the time to act is now... or we will miss it’ (Personal Communication, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017). There are many interesting sides to these comments, not least the discursive transformation from economic rescue to cultural recovery. However, who or what is driving, shaping and forming these discourses may not be so clear. These stories will need further excavation (combined with full and proper analysis) in the following chapter. For now, the research moves on to illustrate the stories of civil society amidst these events.

### 4.3.3 Civil Society

**Participant K**, a board member of the Woodstock Community Outreach Forum (WCOF), claims that the changes Woodstock is undergoing are fragmenting its long-standing community (Personal Communication, 10<sup>th</sup> May 2017). He describes a ‘feeling like you suddenly don’t belong... somewhere you and your family have lived all your lives’ (ibid.). According to him,

Woodstock used to be ‘tight-knit’ (ibid.), a community where various peoples from all walks of life could and would inter-mingle. It was what made Woodstock ‘different’ and is enshrined in its proud history as the suburb that fought back against apartheid segregation. He acknowledges, however, that this ‘differentness’ is also likely what has attracted outsiders looking to escape blander living in other parts of the city (ibid.).

**Participant K** explains that ‘the first major development started with the Biscuit Mill... right in the heart of Lower Main Road... As I said it wasn’t so bad because they promised local jobs and it was going to bring new business in to the area... It was going to help the community grow’ (ibid.). However, after development had finished, opportunities for unskilled or semi-skilled residents were not offered. Rather, they were contracted out to private firms.

**Participant K** explains that he and many at the WCOF felt betrayed. But there was very little they could do. They had even signed and approved a participatory process for its development.<sup>25</sup>

**Participant K** believes that a lesson was learned – that developers were not to be trusted (ibid.). He explains that over the years he has managed to stall one or two developments from taking off on the pretext of false community participation. However, he says there is only so far this line of defence can be taken:

‘There are now more careful participation initiatives...

Many of these are not honest... You know, men in suits

handing 300-page files to a household with little or no

education... asking them what they think’ (ibid).

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<sup>25</sup> Where planning proposals in Cape Town may have an impact on abutting neighbours, the community or the surrounding environment, public participation and/or consultation is required with/for interested and affected parties. However, participation/consultation need only limit itself to either: 1) registered notices to surrounding property owners; 2) advertising in the press; or 3) a notice erected at site. A 30-day notice period is usually allowed for comments to be submitted for/against the proposal.

‘It can be intimidating... and it can be embarrassing’ says **Participant O** (Personal Communication, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2017), a former resident (evictee) from Bromwell Street in Woodstock. ‘When they come like they do, it’s very hard to argue because they have papers and legal documents [that] we don’t really understand... It makes it hard [to have a conversation]’. Bromwell Street has reached international news over the past few years (The Guardian, 25 May 2017) as a ‘poster’ site for contested development. In 2013, a group of developers bought up the entire street and served eviction notices to its tenants, who claim that they should have rights after living in these houses for, in some cases, almost 100 years. The absence of any affordable housing nearby leaves them with few options – notably the Temporary Resettlement Areas (TRAs) of Blikkiesdorp and Wolwerivier, 26km away.

Others experience a different kind of change in the neighbourhood. **Participant P**, a resident of Lower Main Road lives opposite the Bromwell Boutique Mall (BBM), a high-end mall of designer goods and expensive eateries. ‘These places are not for your local person’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017). **Participant P** explains that before its redevelopment, the BBM was an unsafe, dilapidated building which housed unsavoury types (i.e. vagrants and drugs users). She and her neighbours, all occupants of a small row of heritage listed homes, did not object to any redevelopment because they believed it was in the interest of the community (ibid.). ‘Of course, we said we don’t want drunks and drugs and all that hanging around here... we were excited to have something nice. Something new’ (ibid.). However, she and her neighbours were disappointed to see a development that ‘isn’t for us... this is for travellers, tourists and rich people. Not for us’ (ibid.) She says that after a short while, this sense of exclusion matriculated to a broader level of psychological-access, claiming her and her neighbours’ children are not ‘physically allowed in to the Old Biscuit Mill,’ an injustice all the more considering she lives only a short distance (500 meters) from the site and that the clientele of

its Saturday market routinely park in both her and her neighbours' parking space (Figure 7 below depicts the row of houses where she resides). She continues:

‘Whoever is in charge of this... if they really cared about us, if they really cared about the local community, they would give us something to do for our youngsters... Now it’s just fancy cocktail bars and fashion stores that we don’t really feel welcome in... and Saturday markets that our kids are barred from... It’s just so obvious that they don’t want us there... so we don’t go’ (ibid.).



*Figure 7. Homes opposite the Bromwell Boutique Mall with Bromwell Street developments behind.*

**Participant Q**, also a former resident and evictee of Bromwell Street and a local spokesperson for many residents in Woodstock claims that: ‘It’s not just about money. Yes, we can’t afford

these rising rates and the costs of [new] local amenities... it's about *rights*' (Personal Communication, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2017). She explains that many of the long-standing members of the community are having their rights restricted. 'First, they make all these new developments... then we're not allowed to be part of it' (ibid.). She claims that the cameras, the fences, the security, they are there for the protection and safety of others, because 'this stuff was never here before' (ibid.). **Participant P**, who is now thinking of leaving Woodstock, claims that 'they promise one thing to get the community on board and then give them something different' (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017). When asked about whether she felt it was fair, **Participant P** responded that 'I accept it now... Things change, which I accept'.

'It's all a sham,' says **Participant R**, a board member at the Woodstock Improvement District (WID)<sup>26</sup> and part-time local activist (Personal Communication, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2017). 'There is no real participation or consultation,' he says, 'and when there is, it is dictation'. He points to the internet, for example. 'Both the developers and the Council say many of their ideas and plans are accessible online, but half of Woodstock doesn't have adequate access to the internet. They have limited data. It's a bread and butter issue for them'. But 'developers are clever', he continues, 'and opportunistic... they will create a supposed platform for discussion, but in reality it's a one-way thing. And they want it that way'. He points to the current major development *Wex Living* (see Figure 8 below), situated opposite the Woodstock Exchange. The developers of the project, the same as those of the Old Biscuit Mill, describe the project as 'an iconic 10-storey, mixed-use building to be developed... with restaurants, shops and offices on the double-volume ground-floor, two floors of parking and six floors of apartments' (**Participant M**, Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

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<sup>26</sup> The Woodstock Improvement District has seven board members. Six of these are property developers, including Andre Potgieter, the developer of the Bromwell Boutique Mall. Swarbreck is the 'outside presence' on the board and is there to provide a 'voice for the community' (Personal Communication, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2017).



*Figure 8. WEX Living Residential Development.*

**Participant R** explains how this development was not in the papers for a long time, despite its size and scale. This was because, he claims, ‘the developers learned their lesson with the whole palaver on Bromwell Street’.<sup>27</sup> But ‘there actually were people living there, in the factory unit’. Although it was unclear whether this area was fit for accommodation, **Participant R** continues:

‘These people... who are alive but don’t exist. They don’t exist legally. There is no paperwork. No birth certificates. But they live there. They pay rent. Were they


<sup>27</sup> Swarbreck here is referring to the highly negative press that property developers received during the evictions of Bromwell Street over 2016 and 2017. A large part of this coverage is owed to the campaign efforts of *Reclaim the City*.

consulted? Were they asked? No, they were kicked out. But how? With less direct means than before... Now the hot water is turned off... the windows are taken out while they are at work. Then they have to leave you see... it's not 'kicking them out' but getting them to leave on their own free will' (Personal Communication, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

Interviews revealed several interrelated claims of developers bending or breaking laws. Amidst the buying up of property all over Woodstock, **Participant P** tells a story of fraud on behalf of local developers who tried to seize her house in 2015 (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017). She was offered the right to buy her home 14 years prior. She took that option. However, the owners of the property at the time did not put the property in her name. The Sunday Brothers, who own a string of properties along Lower Main Road, never registered **Participant P** and never performed the sub-divisions, despite her paying the money. Some years later they tried to claim ownership of the house and evict her. She explains that she was at a serious disadvantage in proving and arguing her case against 'a legal team of educated businessmen' (ibid.). With the help of a local NGO (*Ndifuna Ukwazi*) who offered legal counsel, the issue managed to find its way to the High Court, where **Participant P** won. She was advised to pursue a criminal case and prosecute as the evidence uncovered explicated egregious fraud. She chose, however, to settle outside of court.

'Many are not so lucky in Woodstock,' says **Participant S**, an activist for a legal NGO based in Cape Town. He believes that the housing shortage in Cape Town is amounting to a 'humanitarian crisis' (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2017). He explains that across the inner-city, commercial developments are forcing the prices of homes to rise at a level above inflation – excluding the poor from accessing housing in suburbs in or around their social

networks or places of work. The average rent for a one-bedroom apartment in Cape Town is now approximately R7000, more than double what the average South African earns a month (TPN, 2017). This price of rent has increased by 50% since 2010. This situation is compounded by a lack of affordable housing. For instance, there has been no affordable housing built in Woodstock for 20 years. Those unable to afford rising rentals are relocated to Blikkiesdorp or Wolwerivier – Temporary Resettlement Areas (TRA). The Blikkiesdorp TRA (seen in Figures 9 and 10 below) has been described by interviewees as a dumping ground ravaged by poverty, illness and drug-induced crime, with few basic services (**Participant O**, Personal Communication, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2017). Those that have refused relocation because they need to be near work have found themselves taking to the streets or squatting nearby (ibid.).



*Figure 9. Blikkiesdorp I. Source: Bohatch & Hendricks, 2017.*



Figure 10. Blikkiesdorp II. Source: Bohatch & Hendricks, 2017.

**Participant O**, another evictee, claims that many have taken to the streets rather than relocate to the TRAs (Personal Communication, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2017). The *Haven Night Shelter*, an NGO focused on the care and protection of the homeless has observed these occurrences. Notwithstanding the conditions of the TRAs, Blikkiesdorp and Wolwerivier are 24km and 26km distance from Woodstock respectively. **Participant O**, currently homeless after losing her house on Bromwell Street, is staying with relatives in the neighbouring suburb, Salt River. To move to the TRAs would entail her to lose her job due to commuting times. She would

rather share a room with relatives and remain hopeful for alternative housing solutions, either nearby or in Woodstock itself.

Yet social housing may not be forthcoming. **Participant S** (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2017) claims that vested interests in government office<sup>28</sup> prevent the development of social housing on former earmarked sites such as Earl Street, Mountain Road, Pickwick Street, Pine Road, Dillon Lane, and Bromwell Street. **Participant S** claims that this, at the administrative level, is indicative of a widening culture of condemnation against the poor. For instance, he points to the Judge presiding over the Bromwell Street eviction court case, Leslie Weinkove, who notably drew attention with some of her 2017 comments in court (ibid). These included: ‘What’s the point of being near a school? What’s the point of them being near transport? Where are they going to go?’ And: ‘Charnell? She is a kitchen assistant in Observatory and now she’s an expert. She doesn’t know what the budget of the city council is; she doesn’t know what money they get... She doesn’t know this stuff, she is a kitchen assistant’ (News 24, 31 January 2017).

**Participant T**, a former director on the board of the WID also claims there is a ‘culture of anti-poor pushed by the City’ (Personal Communication, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2017). He relates a direct experience of the City evicting locals on behalf of developers in Woodstock:

‘The Bromwell Boutique Mall was an issue that I worked on. In the lane, where that nice little coffee shop is now... well, that lane is, in fact, a public lane. On this public lane, vagrants were living. Who knows what hard times befell them that they ended up living there? But

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<sup>28</sup> In January 2016 it emerged that the Western Cape Department of Public Works sold the Tafelberg site in Cape Town, in spite of calls from the Human Settlements Department that it be reserved for social housing. Western Cape head of public works, Gary Fisher, who oversaw the Tafelberg sale, was said to have personally profited R190 million from the sale (McKune, 2016).

what is important is that, for all intents and purposes, they were citizens of the city, of the neighbourhood! Born and raised in Woodstock but pushed down in life to the point that they lost their homes. One morning I go there, and a gentleman arrives revving his motorbike to scare people and then shouting that he is from the DPA [People's Displacement Unit]. He walks over, this young man, and claims: 'We beat you guys! We got you! And now we going to move you!' Then the truck came, and they began chucking all the homeless people's stuff in the truck. So, I thought something wasn't right here. I stood before the truck and yelled at them: 'Where is your court order?' They didn't reply but that made them mad for this was clearly an illegal eviction, so they had to leave... They really thought they could just do that and get away with it'.

**Participant U**, an architect and board member of the Woodstock's Aesthetics Committee, finds that when it comes to regulations, the City too often looks the other way. 'The rate and scale of departures [regulatory relaxation for development] is getting out of control' (Personal Communication, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2017). He supposes that it is because the City needs money, and 'when a developer says to them that they can add more units if they build a little higher or move a little into another zoning boundary... This means more units sold, more people sold to, and so more ratepayers. The whole food chain of profit'. However, he continues that:

'This culture of departure... It has set so many precedents. When there is no need for them. There is just

no need. A perfectly fine building should be able to be constructed within the limits of the original design. But the maximisation of profits always dictates more. A little more height, a little more floor space, a little less public walkway' (ibid.).

**Participant U** also comments on how some of these companies can be imposing: 'They often come to us saying "We have approval from the mayor. Let's get to work"... What are we meant to say to that? It puts us in a difficult position' (ibid.).

**Participant T** tells another story of his neighbour Nick van Huyssteen, a prominent developer in the area who developed the Woodstock Foundry, an industrial art complex surrounded by up-market eateries, creative studios, and coffee shops. He explains that:

'As a neighbour, I wanted to talk to him... to see what he had planned. I could see he had started building something across the road from me... but he didn't want to talk to me. I found out that he had started building without any permission from anyone... I reported this and the building inspector came and closed the site down... However, within two weeks he is building again. His problems were 'solved' it seems... But there was no neighbour's consent filed. When I inquired about it and raised the issue with the council, the head of the building department told me he had waived the neighbour's consent... Why?! How?! And *then* he started building Tribe Coffee. He got the place by

offering 900,000 Rand to the imprisoned son of the old man who owned the house. The son got out of prison and kicked his own father out. I phoned the building inspector again and once more they had no idea he was building! The building stopped but, once more, it resumed after only a couple of weeks' (Personal Communication, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

He claims that for this developer, breaking the law can be smoothed over in just a couple weeks. However, **Participant T** cannot secure permission to add to his own house: 'I have been waiting to get permission to extend a room for three years. They're still deliberating on it... It's one rule for us and one rule for them' (ibid.).

**Participant B**, a City Ward Councillor, has a 'deep, abiding suspicion of building inspectors... The attention and detail paid in some cases... and the lack of it in others... it can be shocking' (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017). He believes 'kick-backs are obviously occurring... But how to prove that? Some decisions just fly straight in the face of sound planning theory'. He also claims that he has been offered 'millions' in the past to 'look the other way' when working for the City on Project Scope – the planning, design and construction of the Cape Town Stadium for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. He rejected the offers but says: 'we know people colluded... it's just impossible or perhaps suicidal to try and prove it'.

**Participant I**, architect and urban planner, comments that even when operating within the law, the City turns a blind eye to some 'truly awful tactics' by developers (Personal Communication, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2017). She explains that there is a trend of developers buying up large units of housing and then allowing them to degrade. This is done in Woodstock because many of the buildings are heritage listed, and often they will lose their heritage status if conditions are run

down enough. So, they ‘spend no money providing services... letting the building degenerate until upgrading, or gentrification becomes the only viable option’ (ibid.). It is a way of technically rezoning land and a way of displacing people, she explains. ‘This has been done in Woodstock to consolidate certain blocks, such as the BBM, and it’s technically legal. It’s difficult to prove intention’.

On Junction Road, the ‘slumlord’ Eli Gottschalk brought up a large block of residential premises. The conditions there were squalid, says **Participant T** (Personal Communication, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2017). He has posted on his website pictures of them, and further describes:

‘There was no running water... Toilets blocked... Truly disgusting... Yet the landlord collected rent and refused to repair or upgrade because it is mostly immigrant tenants there and they are in no position to petition local authorities over human rights and housing laws. Then when it was time to sell, all of them were kicked out. And oh, in what interesting and resourceful ways! Such as bricking up the entrance to rooms while tenants were out! Room by room. He [Eli] knew what the conditions were like. It was his property. He collected rent whilst they lived in that hovel, then kicked them out. Like they were animals’ (ibid.).

‘But is this all that surprising?’ says **Participant R**. At the WID board meetings, **Participant R** says there is a sense of aggression against anyone deemed obstructive to Woodstock’s development (Personal Communication, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2017). Former WID board member, **Participant T**, corroborates this view (Personal Communication, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2017). After the

BBM incident and other smaller incidents where he tried to clamp down on unauthorised development activity, he claims he was psychically threatened by the General Manager. His obstruction of developments drew the ire of Elad Kirshenbaum, a property developer who ‘you do not want to cross’ (ibid.). His wife interjected in the interview here, saying: ‘He had to leave the WID. For his own safety’ (ibid.).

**Participant R** claims that there is still a culture of intimidation at the WID – where dissenting views on development are met with pressure and coercion. These can also include more passive references to ‘having lunch with the mayor’ who has ‘okayed everything,’ putting him always on the back foot in table discussions (Personal Communication, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2017). He goes on:

‘It’s interesting because the Council doesn’t actually have a psychical location to make themselves available for any discussion or meeting yet when any developer needs to get hold of them, they all suddenly seem to have each other’s phone number, or are able to ‘meet-up’ for lunch’.

**Participant V**, an architect and heritage practitioner, tells a similar story:

‘There are developers in the city that seem to hold a lot of power... for instance, we [in her capacity as an architect with a specialisation in heritage] had a meeting with a developer, a city heritage official and a city urban designer to discuss a particular development and how heritage can be satisfied within this project... and one of the key outcomes was that the building’s façade was too

close to the road... not only was it clearly against regulations but it was, in effect, repossessing a public walkway... public space. So everyone left the meeting, and when the heritage official got back to her office, she immediately received a phone call from the mayor's office asking for 'reconsideration' on her professional opinion... so the developer had gone back to *their* office, phoned the mayor and complained that 'your heritage official is saying I need to do this and that'... and just like that, it was fixed. You see the kind of pro-development stance we are working with here?' (Personal Communication, 16<sup>th</sup> August 2017).

**Participant W**, an official for Heritage Western Cape (HWC), explains that there is a patent lack of trust towards the City from heritage officials. Heritage is not really given much priority in local or regional government. In fact, there are only 4 of them at HWC and they often get over 1000 applications a month, from a range of civil society groups and individuals trying to protect their environment. This is despite the IDP (CoCT, 2017a:53) claiming a core 'Spatial Priority' of the City is to 'celebrate and reinforce Cape Town's diverse historical legacies'.

**Participant W** declares that while she would like to be able to offload some of the work to the City, 'It's hard to give them a complete license. Look at Bo Kaap. The corner of Rowe Street.<sup>29</sup> We can't really trust them' (Personal Communication., 5<sup>th</sup> April 2017). She went on to explain that HWC is not politically driven – it 'has a clear mandate to act in the best interests of the people of Cape Town, to preserve their history and their culture... The City, however... it's

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<sup>29</sup> This heritage listed site in Bo-Kaap was sold by the City via an online auction for R1.4 million in June 2016. It was then subsequently sold by a private developer for almost R3 million.

very much driven by other influencing forces (ibid.)'. She declined to comment specifically on what those forces are. **Participant X**, another heritage official for the City of Cape Town believes, however, that 'We [heritage officials] are very much considered a nuisance' (Personal Communication, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2017). **Participant W** believes that 'If heritage was left to the City, most of it would be gone within a decade' (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

When asked whether developers contravene regulations regarding heritage and/or conservation, **Participant W** replied:

'Things like this happen all the time... We do try and take legal action. Because it is illegal. However, we haven't had a successful prosecution yet. Prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute developers. They say it is because there are real crimes going on... That may be, but what does that say about attitudes to heritage? What does that say to attitudes to different [middle-class] kinds of crime? Heritage is not seen as important, glamorous, or pressing. But it's important' (ibid.).

**Participant W** claimed further that:

'There is one big developer in particular, who I cannot name... that is constantly breaking laws. Week following week. We threaten prosecution and he backs down... but then he just does it again, somewhere else. The developers... they push and push... the fine is only 10,000 Rand... which is nothing for them'.

She finished her interview with a warning: ‘Some day in the future, a lot of Capetonians may wake up and wonder where their city has gone’ (ibid.).

Yet for developer **Participant N**, ‘the city is moving towards the future’ (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017). But who is steering? Woodstock residents **Participant P** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017) and **Participant K** (Personal Communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2017) find it increasingly difficult to recognise and relate to Woodstock. They both feel as if they have very little control. City Councillor, **Participant B**, ends our conversation by saying that against the scale and force of change sweeping through, developers can only really be contested legally, and ‘even then they hold all the cards’ (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2017). He continues: ‘Community organisation is vital... The strength of your civic is crucial... In Observatory, we have a strong community. Nothing gets by us without a fight... but Woodstock, it’s much more fragmented, and will suffer as a result as organisation and mobilisation become extremely difficult’ (ibid.).

**Participant Y**, a programme coordinator at a major urban NGO that specialises in mediating between developers, the State, and local communities through partnerships, research, training and lobbying activities, agrees with this view. She highlights how a ‘key struggle for us is the disorganisation and disinterested nature of some civic groups’ (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017). **Participant Z**, of the same organisation, explains how it has become increasingly hard to bring communities together (Personal Communication, 19<sup>th</sup> May 2017). She also explains that ‘Compared to the past... communities are much more fragmented... Development has been breaking down the social fabric of the area’. NGO Director, **Participant G**, adds: ‘It is the pace of it all that is so hard to deal with’ (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017). She goes on:

‘Things are changing and there are so many issues on so many fronts... We have ward committees, and Integrated Development Plans with their processes of participation... then we have developers doing whatever they want in the meantime... people are disillusioned... they feel disempowered... perhaps they feel why bother fighting when they know they can’t win?’

This is sharply contrasted with that of the developer **Participant J**, who finishes his interview with: ‘This is only the beginning... we need to act now if we want to do this... if we want the city to become what it can’ (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017). NGO worker, **Participant Y**, echoes this timeliness, albeit from a rather different perspective: ‘There is an opening right now to restructure the city... we cannot miss this window... if it closes, with the ongoing sale of public space, of land and housing, it will be *very hard* to come back from’ (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

## 4.4 Synthesis

This chapter detailed the stories of stakeholders involved in the urban regeneration of Woodstock and Cape Town. It should be noted that this synthesis shies away from theoretical interpretations and analyses. However, amongst the many stories told, this chapter brought to light three discursive trends. First, an important historical formation regarding the City’s discourse on market-led urban regeneration. Here, private developers gained a foothold in shaping the form of urban intervention in the inner-city. Whilst this seems to have been a valuable approach to steer Cape Town away from urban decline, the discourse surrounding ‘crisis’ and ‘salvation’ appears to have provided a high degree of socio-political legitimacy.

Second, coupled with the creation and enactment of legal incentives and the relaxation of regulations, a successive generation of private developers appear to have melded discursive ideals of the ‘global’ city with the increasing spatial power afforded to them by historical contingencies. Third, the enactment of this socio-cultural vision appears to have engendered steeper gradients of development in Woodstock and may have resulted in the sanitising of the lower-classes – a dislocation and displacement that may be subverting the post-apartheid agenda of sociospatial integration.

CHAPTER V – ANALYSIS AND  
DISCUSSION

## 5.1 Introduction

This chapter is split into four parts. The first part highlights the historical formation of Cape Town's current approach to urban regeneration. This serves to highlight key contingencies from which urban development in Cape Town has subsequently unfurled. Here, a small group of local entrepreneurs rallied the city behind an institutional restructuring that positioned the private sector as protectors against urban degeneration. Whilst this discursive formation was relevant and valuable at the time, a second generation of self-identified 'changemakers' became a vehicle for inculcating this discourse with ideological commitments to the 'global' city. This quickly inspired culture-led urban regeneration. Whilst this approach has found currency in global policy circuits, the private sector in Cape Town had, as discussed, been granted an unusually high amount of leverage in urban governance, thus forming an exceptional institutional context. As a result, the discourse of culture-led urban regeneration became disproportionately potent. Over time, any antagonisms and contradictions of this discourse (vis-à-vis the City's post-apartheid ameliorative agenda) appear to have been 'smoothed over' through image construction. These images take the form of intellectual and moralising narratives that have manufactured consent under agreeable concepts such as 'caring' and 'inclusive'. This has normalised the discourse and its inequitable outcomes as inevitable; as 'common sense'. The discourse appears to thus be hegemonic in its workings. However, this hegemony is not homogenous, and contestations both within and without afford space for alternatives. Indeed, in eschewing a pessimism that characterises much critical theory, the final part of this chapter offers discursive points of entry to affect positive social change.

## 5.2 Historical Contingency

How public and private actors interrelate in the context of ‘restructuring’ has been described as a transformation from government to governance (Gunder, Madanipour & Watson, 2017). According to Stoker (1989), this transformation, in its simplest form, entails the reorganisation of formal institutions to include the involvement and/or participation of private entities in urban management. Today, the literature is highly saturated with arguments and claims proselyting improvements in the production and provision of services (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011) or prophesising a diminished accountability and the unevenness of distribution (Koch, 2013).

However, this part of the analysis is less interested in polemical disputes and normative prescriptions and more interested in both the archaeology of local discursivities and a genealogy of methods whereby, based on the descriptions of these local discursivities, such partnerships came to fruition (Foucault, 1980a). By working through a chronology of events, one can discern a more dispassionate history of thought – a history of structures that may have produced and shaped the boundaries of knowledge, ideas, truths, representations and discursive formations. By deconstructing these components, one can shed light on how ‘accepted’ knowledges may hold, in fact, an arbitrariness or mere chance, and that supposed ‘truths’ are merely conditions and products of a certain time and certain place.

For instance, as **Participant F**, former City Manager for Cape Town, explains: the inclusion of the private sector is ‘the only way’ to navigate the complex and strenuous responsibilities of local government (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). At the same time, as **Participant H**, Mayoral Committee Member for Cape Town, solemnly reminds: ‘We have to go down this development path’ (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017). Both statements, made by high-ranking members of the City, exude an accepted truth of inevitability; a singular

resignation to the norm of the present; ‘a history without a choice’ (Foucault, 1984:91). However, the ‘forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny’ (ibid.:91). One must question, therefore, from whence this supposed inevitably came. One must uncover the processes and procedures that gave life to its seemingly inviolable nature.

The findings in Chapter IV revealed interesting historical contingencies; counterpoints from which the succeeding decades of development in Cape Town may have turned. The most prominent of these involves a succession of events over the course of 1998/1999 that swiftly and irrevocably altered the institutional dynamics of the city. However, an appreciation of absolute context is necessary (Gee, 2010). As **Participant D** explains:

‘The CBD [in the late 1990s] was a complete mess... Crime and homelessness were rampant, and businesses had all but fled... There was no investment coming in and the government were clearly unable to handle this issue. Something had to be done... You have to understand that it was up to us’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

This statement is important because it captures the sentiment of several interviewees regarding the state of the city at the time – the city as deteriorated, degenerated, declined. It also infers an individualist responsibility; an autonomy of action that lies beyond the scope of the ordinary; the everyday. In Gramscian tradition, it implies a moral leadership – that ‘it was up to us’ (ibid.). As **Participant F** remarked: ‘it was [an intervention] to save the city’ (ibid.).

Whilst ‘truth’ lies beyond the scope of interpretation here (or rather its veracity is not so much the point), what is important is how discourses of decline and intervention merged; a synchronicity that would soon serve to mobilise action. This is where the history becomes

complex. For indeed, there are competing claims as to where impetus lies. It is true that recognition of a City in ‘crisis’ did not publicly happen following the onset of democracy, nor did it explicitly stem from any Councillor or Mayoral Committee Member. **Participant A**, former Chairperson for the Department of SME Development, recalls as much, emphasising that the publicising of ‘decline’ and ‘decay’ was communicated through the media in the late 1990s (Personal Communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017). Nahnsen (2002:150), in her work on Business Improvement Districts, has likewise observed that from 1998 a succession of apocalyptic articles spontaneously appeared in the local press. This was a chorus that, in unison, presented a coordinated narrative: ‘*Save Our City! Creeping Decay Is Eating It Away*’ (Cape Times, 14 September 1998); ‘*Big City Clean-Up Vital, Say Experts*’ (Cape Times, 28 October 1998); ‘*CBD: A Wasteland Of Crime And Grime?*’ (Saturday Argus, 14 November 1998); ‘*Act To Save The CBD*’ (Cape Times, 18 January, 1999); ‘*Cape Town CBD On Downhill Slide*’ (Sunday Times, 11 April 1999).

Yet, from where did this come from? Who drove the campaign that **Participant E** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017) was later to win an international marketing award for coordinating? Investigations in to the originators of this discourse point to the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA). Whilst **Participant E** was a media consultant working on behalf of the CTP, its founders – including developers Theodore Yach, Colin Bird, Mike Flax and Wendy Hartshorne – were all members of SAPOA, including Chief City Planner at the time, David Jack. This created a powerful link between political and economic institutions that would facilitate the formation of a shared developmental aim. Yet, with SAPOA’s explicit mission to ‘represent, protect and advance our members’ commercial property interests’ (SAPOA, 2019), a cynical line of thinking may construe this early formation as an inevitable push for property-based solutions to urban ‘decline’ and ‘decay’. However, because this was a precarious time for a nation recently emancipated from the reigns of an apartheid regime,

democratic consensus was needed. This consensus was to be forged in the furnace of civil society using the media as a mouthpiece.

Consensus was made all the easier as Derek Stuart-Findlay, another founder of the CTP, was the owner of *Independent Newspapers*. Moreover, he was also Regional President of SAPOA. However, whilst it has been claimed that this strategic placement of individuals mobilised a highly effective discourse of State ineptitude and private sector dependability (Didier, Peyroux, Morange, 2012), it may be just as important to remember that although there may or may not have been material – albeit ultimately unknowable – interests involved, this mobilisation cannot so idly be construed as Machiavellian manoeuvrings to coerce the polity to action. The Cape Town CBD was certainly in a severe predicament, with high levels of crime, psychical decay and capital flight (Visser & Kotze, 2008).

Indeed, there are evidences to show this was not merely a ‘neoliberal’ usurpation of governance purely generated from the conspiratorial advantages of a media-controlled narrative. Rather, it could perhaps be construed as the last resort of a grass-roots movement desperately trying to ‘save’ their city. Members of SAPOA and the City were, in fact, meeting as far back as 1994. **Participant F** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017) explains how the Cape Town ANC-led City Council inherited a situation where a third of the municipality had not received any capital infrastructure expenditure in half a century. Limited budgets were reoriented away from the already struggling CBD towards areas such as Gugulethu; areas in drastic and dire need of services. This created a *catch-22*. The CBD was the failing but fundamental economic engine of the city that needed investment to counteract further capital flight;<sup>30</sup> whilst many of the outlying suburbs had been criminally underinvested as a result of decades of racial

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<sup>30</sup> Between 1995 and 2003, property values in the CBD fell by 60% (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012:920).

discrimination. Therefore, an intervention that leveraged the authority of the City and the capital of the private sector could be construed as a middle-ground.

In 1995 an early meeting of a body known as the *Cape Town CBD Business Caucus* presented the City with a list of issues that they believed needed immediate redress – issues ranging from sanitation and safe parking to security and trading (CTP, 2009). It was determined these issues were the cause of mass capital flight. A meeting of a group named the *CBD Emergency Task Team* was held in September 1996. This meeting was presided by Councillor Hanief Tiseker and comprised of several prominent representatives of Cape Town’s private and public sectors including the Council, Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Business Caucus, the SAPS and the Office of the Attorney-General (ibid.). The outcome of this meeting was a suggestion that a Section 21 company would be the correct solution for the CBD and that such a proposal would need to be submitted to the relevant Chief City Planner. However, as legislation had to be created, this would be a complex and a hitherto unprecedented task with ‘many moving parts’ (**Participant F**, Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

In the meantime, the Emergency Task Team hired (through personal donations) 30 homeless people in the CBD for a pilot street cleaning project (CTP, 2009). In terms of security measures, 25 civil society ‘reservists’ were also hired on a six-month contract to provide a ‘visible’ boost to security presence (ibid.). These services would form the bedrock – the genealogical methods – that would come to define the CTP’s mandate. At around this time (1996) Wendy Hartshorne formed *Cape Town Cares* (CTC) – a joint initiative between the City and anyone concerned or affected by the life of the CBD. This was a collective action that spawned further off-shoots such as the *Broom Brigade*, an initiative to put the unemployed to work and help clean the city (ibid.). At a meeting in early 1998 Theodore Yach notes<sup>31</sup> that ‘...the social element cannot be

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<sup>31</sup> Proposed City Improvement District and Cape Town Limited Structures and Objectives, 21 August 1998 (CTP, 2009).

over-emphasised. The only long-term sustainable route to success is to deal with the social issues on a holistic basis and not just to move the problem to another precinct' (ibid.:11).

It may thus be argued that the formative years of the CTP (1995 to 1998) were a series of grass-roots<sup>32</sup> movements – coordinated by a handful of key figures. This pre-legislative time was financed through personal donations; with the CTP living on a 'shoe-string' budget in an office large enough for one desk and one chair (**Participant D**, Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). Whilst the future platform of the CTP would run on contributions from the private sector (and later the City), a long and arduous road, populated with petitions, meetings and workshops was needed to 'get people on board' (ibid.). **Participant E** says she went, with very limited initial success, door to door, 5 days a week for several months trying to convince businesses in the CBD that it was in their long-term interest to support the CTP: '...it was tiring and thankless work' (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017).

In early 1997, a one-page notice<sup>33</sup> was distributed advertising a major workshop on how to develop the CBD. The notice stated that: 'We seek your support both monetary and in attendance,' asking residents to 'please add your weight and influence' (CTP, 2009:11). In an interview some years after, Colin Bird comments that '...it was the only time I knew of where business actually got together to do something about a situation they saw was deteriorating to a point where it would never be redeemable if nothing else was done. It was totally apolitical. There was a lot of disbelief about the potential, but no one was trying to earn money or get votes. It was being done for the right reasons and that's why it worked' (ibid.:11).

The personal industriousness of these formative years belies reductive interpretations of cynicism. Indeed, 'After 1994, City budgets were reallocated to help bring services to

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<sup>32</sup> Defined as a movement which uses the people in a given district, region, or community as the basis for a political or economic movement (Gove, 1961).

<sup>33</sup> Memorandum from Mitchell Duplessis Associates to John Powell/Colin Bird: SAPOA, 20 March 1997.

impoverished areas of Cape Town and this meant that the CBD lost much of its budget' (SACO, 2016:39). Therefore, business owners were faced with an existential threat and responded accordingly. It used the resources at its disposal, its entrepreneurial acumen, to enact a movement of determined local agency and find a workable method to fill the investment gap created by redirected funds. It was not until late 1998 that the 'media campaign' began. Moreover, it was *not* spontaneous. In fact, months before the articles of 'catastrophic' urban decline, the *Cape Argus* (3 August 1998) led with a front-page story clearly explicating that the City and a consort of business leaders were in discussions over setting up a private enterprise to run the city's business areas. They promised substantial improvements in the delivery of services for the inner-city. In this article, Andrew Boraine clearly states that within two months an interim structure would be set up to create the partnership (ibid.). Thus, the press campaign that followed may be less the result of fear-mongering to sanction the 'neoliberalisation' of the city, and more the natural workings of a media machine prone to dramatic sensationalism. This is all critical because it not only brings to light highly significant historical contingencies concerning the institutional architecture – architecture that would come to frame urban development in Cape Town – but it also forces a more nuanced reassessment of the situation that belies simplistic assumptions of unscrupulous manoeuvring.

By 1999, a by-law for the 'Establishment of City Improvement Districts' promulgated in the Provincial notice 116/1999 (CoCT, 2000). An important distinction here is that whilst the Central Johannesburg Partnership had also formed as early as 1993 (Morcol *et al.*, 2008), it was also not legislated until 1999 (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012:920). Moreover, the Cape Town Partnership was established via an unprecedented City by-law whilst the Central Johannesburg Partnership was established via Provincial legislation. This provided a highly autonomous amount of leverage with regards to its operation. What this implies is a thoroughly unique structure involved in the creation of the Cape Town Partnership. Its inception,

assembling, and legislation were exceptional – a concoction that created a highly effective platform for a radical turnaround. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, in reviewing its formative years, Lorlene Hoyt, a researcher for the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluded, after studying almost one thousand CIDs worldwide, that: ‘Comparatively speaking, CID organisations in Cape Town set new standards’ (CCID, 2010:20).

The final version of the CTP by-law established CIDs to ‘prevent the degeneration of cities and towns and the consequential urban decay’ (CoCT, 2003:3). Yet as Foucault (1986) insists, texts, statements and events – all discourses – when uttered take on a new life. They become something else; open to interpretations and amalgamations; unforeseen and unknowable deviations that may have far-reaching significance.

### **5.3 Discursive Deviation**

The early success of the CTP cannot be understated. This success was most observable in the reduction of ‘grime and crime’ and its concomitant effect on property prices. Former City Manager, **Participant F**, comments:

‘We [the Partnership] had enormous success in cleaning up the city... The CIDs kept the streets, previously filthy, safe and clean... And the presence of security offices across the CBD halved crime in a matter of a couple years... And of course, investment flooded in after this... It’s what everyone had been waiting for’ (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

So successful were the CTP that in 2002 the newly elected ANC mayor, Nomaindia Mfeketo, specifically told **Participant F** in a private meeting to stop ‘over-performing’ and ‘taking so much credit’ (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). Yet what dangers may arise when one party in a partnership becomes too influential; too powerful? Here, we are reminded of Jenifer Houghton’s warning: ‘if the ability to cause action within a development partnership is unequal, and especially if the greater power is held by the private sector, partnerships can become a weak mechanism for negotiating local and global development imperatives’ (2010:90). Whilst relying on the private sector to fund or co-fund urban governance is hardly unprecedented and has, in fact, been met with success in cities in the West,<sup>34</sup> the relationship has traditionally been arbitrated by explicit systems of demarcation (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012). Chapter IV shows that in Cape Town, however, this distinction appears to have become somewhat unclear. The fact that the CTP was enshrined in law to ‘prevent degeneration’ (CoCT, 2003:3), combined with numerous overlaps of influential figures in both the Planning and City Management offices, suggest a reordering in the balances of power. Moreover, over time, the City became increasingly reliant on the CTP and its CIDs to (effectively) deliver services. This dependence blurred the distinctions between discourses (i.e. the traditional, separated roles and responsibilities of the State and the private sector). This can be visibly seen in the discourses that not only circulated an increasingly axiomatic commitment to economic growth but also in the securitisation needed to ‘protect’ it.

By 2001, the Central City Improvement District (CCID) was funding 143 security personnel and eight mounted security officers (CTP, 2009). The results were immediate, with reported crime dropping 50% by 2001 (ibid.). In June of that year, a by-law was submitted to the City

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<sup>34</sup> In a global study of public-private partnerships, Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) found that project success rates deeply depend on transparency and accountability, risk management, public sector competence and partnership communication. Projects that fell short on these factors typically suffered from severe local contestation, often in the form of protests and/or wider public outcry.

for managing informal trading. The Partnership did not so much intend to remove informal trading, but rather aimed to regulate it, as informal trading was seen as a barrier for the creation of more formalised, law-abiding neighbourhoods (**Participant D**, Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). By mid-2002, reported crime in the CBD had decreased by a further 50% from the previous year (CTP, 2009). These were staggering achievements that created a high amount of confidence which soon became reflected in the housing market. Figure 11 (below) illustrates the stagnant growth across the city between 1995 and 1999. This began to change with a marked 17% increase from 2000 to 2001.




Figure 11. Average House Price in Cape Town. Source: ABSA, 2016.

By 2006, the CCID alone had extended its operations to 10 response vehicles, 16 undercover officers, as well as extensive 24-hour CCTV surveillance (ibid.). In this same year the CCID's director was selected to serve on the National Prosecuting Authority oversight committee (ibid.). In unison, the media proclaimed the 'Turning of the tide', offering 'congratulations and continued support for the [Central] City Improvement District' (ibid.:36). It is important,

however, to interrogate this narrative further. Particularly in the light of comments made by NGO director, **Participant G** (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017). She claims that many of these clean-up operations merely moved social ills elsewhere. She believes that, for instance, rather than helping, securitisation (such as patrols, surveillances and spatial partitions) have forced street children to simply drift further afield to the Cape Flats (ibid.).

Such a claim is certainly complex and well beyond the scope of this study. Figure 12 (below) seems to show that, following dramatic early falls, crime in the CBD has ‘levelled out’ over the past decade, with equal gains and losses since 2007. Comparatively, crime in Woodstock appears to show a more consistent fall.




Figure 12. Total Reported Crime. Source: SAPS, 2018.

One explanation for these dipartites may reside in the fact that Woodstock’s regeneration began almost 5 years after the CBD, the latter of which made significant reductions in crime during its first several years. It does, however, remain to be seen if crime will continue to fall in

Woodstock or if it will also ‘level out’. This is because obstinate levels of crime, in the presence of an increase in securitisation, may suggest structural issues.

These commitments to securitisation make an interesting comparison with evolving policy texts. For instance, Cape Town’s first IDP (CoCT, 2001) is consummately social in its orientation. The document (ibid.:44) states that the driving forces behind its vision are ‘...the current reality of deepening negative city indicators in areas such as HIV/Aids, TB, infant mortality, crime, homelessness, unemployment and education levels’. These are deeply social issues that are not given center stage in the later incarnations of the IDPs. The 2001 document goes on to mention ‘the dignified city’ and the ‘accessible city’ several times in its vision (ibid.:44). This can be compared with the more economically orientated vision of the 2012 IDP: ‘The vision of the City of Cape Town is threefold... To be a prosperous city that creates an enabling environment for shared economic growth and development; To achieve effective and equitable service delivery; To serve the citizens of Cape Town as a well-governed and effectively run administration’ (CoCT, 2012a:34). Here, the focus is on efficiency, prosperity, and progress. Yet, at the time, we can also see the city as increasingly ‘caring’ and ‘protective’. The 2001 IDP mentions ‘care’ or ‘caring’ 14 times yet 42 times in the 2012 IDP. Similarly, the term ‘protect’ is used 8 times in the former and 18 times in the latter (and 25 times in the latest 2017 IDP). ‘Prevent’ is used 10 times in the 2001 IDP and 45 in the 2012 document. This is a strong discursive complement to the CTP’s evolving services of security. These discursive developments between security and efficiency seem to coincide with Foucauldian notions of ‘discipline’ and ‘biopower’. This may suggest a matriculation of the discourse driving urban development towards a politico-technological approach; one where ‘discipline is the technology deployed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers, biopolitics is deployed to manage population’ (Foucault, 1992:239).

At the same time, another major discourse to evolve over this period is that of the ‘inclusive’ city. It is particularly interesting when considered in tandem with the importation of ‘global’ discourses on culture and lifestyle, the latter of which seems to exclude a body of residents in Woodstock. According to Chapter IV, this may take the form of physical and financial exclusion as well as, and perhaps more significantly, cultural (and thus emotional and psychological) exclusion. Whilst it is important to remember that cycles of inequality are, in many ways, a common occurrence to the capricious dynamics of the modern, fluctuating city; obscuring this process with moral-laden discursive terms may undermine social cohesion through marginalisation (Carmona & Wunderlich, 2013) and, simultaneously, render ambiguous pathways of compensation, traditionally in the form of social housing and other social safety nets in liberal democracies (Hall, 2014).

Yet, where exactly did this discourse of ‘global’ come from? Or, perhaps a better question – how did this discourse make its way in to the core urban development discourse? One thought-provoking angle of inquiry here is the idea that the City pushed the CTP towards other, less ‘tangible’ forms of urban intervention. Indeed, Shaun Johnson comments that:

‘Around 2003 was a rocky period... It is a willing partnership, not an enforced marriage. Once partners don’t want to be partners any more, the partnership won’t exist... There were certainly people within politics and within the structures such as the Council and others that did not like the existence of the partnership. Possibly they felt it was treading on turf that was rightfully theirs, and possibly that it was too successful at self-promotion’ (CTP, 2009:49).

And as highlighted earlier, former City Manager **Participant F** explains that:

‘Certain public workers, who I will not name, became very angry with us because we were taking all the credit in the papers and what not... We were drawing too much attention, and this displeased a lot of the Council because it looked as if we were doing their job... So, it was time to keep a low profile... stay behind the scenes... let the politicians take the credit’ (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

As result, there were forced leadership changes and the CTP were then ‘asked’ to move in to ‘other areas’ of operation (ibid.). This constitutes a direct involvement by the Mayoral Office in the partnership and a radical upsetting of the balance of power that, arguably, redirected the CTP away from its original mandate of operational service provision. Indeed, **Participant F** remarks that after this, ‘culture became our mandate’ (ibid.). Once more, this challenges any notion of the private sector ‘neoliberalising’ urban governance in the City. If anything, it may be construed as the other way.

As a result, by 2004/2005, the CTP launched *Creative Cape Town* – a program that ‘champions the integral role that the creative economy plays in the life of our city, country and continent’ (Creative Cape Town, 2018). The Creative Cape Town initiative was principally realised through heavy branding and marketing of the city as international, cosmopolitan and modern city (CTP, 2009). Culture was to become its official policy ‘to build an inclusive civic identity and grow the economy’ (ibid.:81). As Chapter IV highlighted, policy documents soon adopted this approach (CoCT, 2008a) with the City establishing a directorate for Tourism, Events and Marketing in 2011, mandating it to position the city globally and improve its visitor economy.

When combined with the newly introduced Urban Development Zones (UDZs), a powerful combination was created. The UDZs would act as a mechanism to implement large commercial regeneration projects of considerable cultural influence. The Bromwell Boutique Mall, the Biscuit Mill, the Woodstock Exchange, the Foundry, the Woodstock Quarter, and the Iron Works – developments catering to tourists and middle- and upper-classes with the culturally committed tone of the ‘global’ city. Here, a new generation of young entrepreneurs capitalised on the institutional landscape. Some of these developers were not shy of their obligations:

‘It’s not that I just can’t stand ugly buildings, but I think urbanisation is something culturally leading. It has to be inspirational... Look at London, look at New York, cities that aspire to greatness... This is why changemakers are important. We have to lead this change’ (**Participant J**, Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

Each developer interviewed acknowledged a large part of Woodstock’s attraction lies in its ‘vibrant’ appeal – an organic landscape that entices the consumption preferences of the modern consumer craving authenticity. Whilst there is nothing objectively problematic with this process, issues arise with its intensity – which may proliferate cultural isolation, particularly when considering the monopoly of supply. Without oversight or regulatory control, this potent mix has the potential to dramatically alter the sociospatial patterns of any working-class suburb. In the interest of the City’s commitments to redress the inequalities of apartheid, it is important to not ignore the social dynamics at risk. These social dynamics are Woodstock as the only significantly heterogenous neighbourhood left in the inner-city. The maps below (Figures 13 and 14) illustrate the diversity of Woodstock vis-à-vis the wider City (with Woodstock situated in the centre of each map).




Figure 13. Racial Distribution of Cape Town I. Source: Frith, 2018.




Figure 14. Racial Distribution of Cape Town II. Source: Frith, 2018.

In Woodstock, the City of Cape Town (2011) census data shows that 69.4% of black African households earn under 3200 ZAR per month. 40.8% of coloured households also earn under this figure. This is compared to 13% of white households that earn within a similar bracket. 76.6% of white households earn above the median national average of 12,000 ZAR per month. This does not also take in to consideration that the average coloured household is almost double in size (4.42) than the average white household (2.52). The issue here is that an urban regeneration discourse predicated on global culture is invariably white and middle- and upper-class whilst, the lower-classes in Woodstock are invariably black and/or coloured. Patterns of exclusion would thus engender racial concentration, rather than integration.

Moreover, what is also of high interest here is the discourse that surrounds this phenomenon. For any class-based society to function in relative harmony – for any semblance of social cohesion – there must be a degree of acceptance that the current status quo represents the best interests of all. Force and overt coercion cannot be a permanent feature of a democratic society. In order to preserve a sense of harmony and accord, the State must, therefore, limit any overt manifestations of antagonism. Interestingly, the term ‘inclusive’ is mentioned twice in the 2001 IDP, 8 times in the 2007 IDP and 86 times in the 2012 IDP. This appears to be in perfect tandem with the rise of the earlier example of the ‘caring’ city. This discourse of the ‘caring’ and ‘inclusive’ city seems to both coincide with an increase in highly contested commercial developments and the increasing securitisation to protect them (the following section details more of this contestation). It was also around this time (2012) when Mayor Patricia De Lille launched a new platform of governance based on the ‘Caring City’ and ‘Inclusive City’ (CoCT, 2012b). However, De Lille explained that ‘the competition between cities as the engines of global growth is growing fiercer’ (ibid.). The breakdown of the budget thus reflects this. In 2012, the strategic divisions of ‘Finance Services’ received ZAR 1.7 billion, ‘Corporate

Services’ received ZAR 1.7 billion, ‘Safety and Security’ received ZAR 1.3 billion, whilst ‘Human Settlements’ received R27.4 million and ‘Social Development’ received ZAR 58 million. This is interesting because the ‘Human Settlements’ budget would be the mechanism to provide alternative (‘inclusive’) housing options to those excluded from gentrifications and the ‘Social Development’ budget would help alleviate (or ‘care’ for) those who may be subject to socio-economic inequalities. In the Gramscian tradition, we can observe how these discourses of ‘caring’ and ‘inclusive’ seem to be both sedimenting (consistent laying over the time) yet, simultaneously, discursively concealing acute patterns of gentrification.

This disjuncture is also found at the micro-level with similar discursive trends inside Woodstock. The vision of the Woodstock Improvement District (WID, 2016b), insists that ‘the WID is completely committed to ensuring that this [Woodstock] remains a place each person can call home in the weeks, months and years to come’. However, only 52.19% of Woodstock’s residents between 15 and 64 years old are economically active (CoCT, 2017b) and 69.4% of black African households and 40.8% of coloured households earn under 3200 ZAR per month. The average rent for a single bedroom household is now between ZAR 7500 and ZAR 10000 per month (PayProp Rental Index in IOL, 2018). This renders it unclear how Woodstock can ‘remain a place each person can call home in the weeks, months and years to come’. In fact, in the 2017 budget for the Woodstock Improvement District, ZAR 2.4 million out of a budget of ZAR 5 million is dedicated to ‘security services’ (WID, 2016a). Just ZAR 22 thousand is allocated for ‘social upliftment’. To put this in perspective, the WID allocates ZAR 18 thousand of its annual budget to ‘Printing and stationery’. Aggressively attacking crime and avoiding its structural origins (i.e. inequality, alienation and poverty) is not a solution that potentially has the interests of ‘everyone’ at heart.

Within the private sector, this disjuncture appears vindicated by a moral responsibility. The language used by **Participant J**, and each developer interviewed, is predicated on a deliverance

of Cape Town to ‘global’ city status. Each developer referenced cities such ‘London’, ‘New York’ and ‘Barcelona’ and as their visions for Cape Town. Indeed, as **Participant N** ends his interview: ‘This is a unique time to participate globally... For Cape Town to reinvent itself... as a leading city’ (Personal Communication, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017). This sentiment of looking abroad for what Cape Town should be at home, and the urgency that seems to drive it, permeates urban regeneration. This can be compared to the ‘saving the city’ discourse that was prevalent some two decades earlier. Whilst both carry a moral tone, the earlier discourse was inward looking, whilst the latter appears to be outward looking. Perhaps looking excessively outward is to blind ourselves to the faults and fissures closer to home. The unintended outcome of this implies that, in this global game of the intrepid self-made-man, it is up to the entrepreneurship of each citizen to harness the opportunities made available to them. It is, ultimately, the ambition of the individual citizen that determines their own well-being, security and happiness. To fail in reaching satisfactory levels does not necessarily constitute any right to claim further efforts by or intervention from the City. Poverty or destitution may, therefore, result from individual failure as oppose to any lack or structural deficiency.

## 5.4 Sociospatial Transformation

‘Whoever is in charge... if they really cared about us, if they really cared about the local community, they would give us something to do’ (**Participant P**, Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

Grodach and Silver (2013) claimed that the ‘global city’ has become the site for cultural policy formations that have adopted ‘creative city’ policies and its global discourse of the ‘creative economy’. Building on Hackworth and Smith’s ‘waves of gentrification’ thesis (2001),

systemic crises have forced struggling governments into alliances with the private sector. The subsequent handing over of public housing stock has resulted in market-driven residential developments that typically exceed the affordability of the lower-classes (Grodach & Silver, 2013).

This is not exactly what has happened in Woodstock. Here, the Palms, the Exchange, the Foundry, the Iron Works, the Old Biscuit Mill, the Bromwell Boutique Mall, the Salt Circle Market, and the Woodstock Quarter are *not* residential projects. They are commercial developments catering towards a specific lifestyle preference. NGO worker, **Participant S**, comments:

'Woodstock is changing... perhaps faster than any other suburb... and the developers haven't even started building residential yet... It's all mostly commercial, once residential units begin in earnest, there's no going back' (Personal Communication, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

**Participant L**, a principal developer of the Old Biscuit Mill, confirms this (Personal Communication, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017). He and his partners have also worked on the Woodstock Exchange, the Woodstock Quarter, and the Foundry. As one of the largest developers in Cape Town, he is yet to 'go residential' in Woodstock (ibid.). This is changing with the WEX Living development, to be opened in late 2019 opposite the Woodstock Exchange. This development will be a series of high-end flats over nine floors in the heart of Lower Woodstock, on Lower Main Road, and will likely be, in his own words, a 'game-changer' (ibid.). What this statement implies is that patterns of gentrification have not yet been supported by any significant residential accompaniment. When this does happen, however, it will likely launch Woodstock

in to a new, more intense phase of transformation; one which may heighten the already existing patterns of exclusion or displacement raised in Chapter IV.

However, it is important to remember that the private sector cannot so easily be subsumed in to a single entity. Whilst broadly influenced by global patterns of contemporary capitalist culture, as well as commitments to maximise financial returns for their investors, developers operating in Woodstock are aware of the dire housing situation. **Participant L**, for instance, explains that if social housing were economically viable, he would be ‘happy’ to lead the way (Personal Communication, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017). However, it is simply not a feasible business model. He is merely following the road laid down before him (ibid.). This is an interesting point for several reasons. There is an implicit assumption of resignation here; of both staying on course (vis-à-vis institutional path dependences such as, for instance, the UDZs) and ‘playing it safe’. If only the risk-taking, entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector could somehow be harnessed; somehow leveraged in to a position of responsibility that mirrors the progressive ‘changemaker’ status – the intellectual and moral leadership – that developers have, at other times, bestowed on themselves. This point will be expanded on in the next section. However, returning to the above comment, there is also a suggestion of inevitability; a suggestion of development staying a course of clear-cut, inarguable ‘common sense’; a common sense derived from years of discursive sedimentation. Indeed, the alternatives are simply infeasible, unviable, irrational.

This resigned inevitability can similarly be seen in the attitude of some of the residents of Woodstock themselves. Upper Woodstock residents **Participant Z1** (Personal Communication, 25th August 2017) and **Participant Z2** (Personal Communication, 30th August 2017) illustrate this. Whilst they disagree with the idea of displacement and the isolations and/or exclusions suffered from patterns of gentrification, they are passive in supporting change because the hardships of poverty are an everyday occurrence in Cape Town

and gentrification is, in many ways, a natural phenomenon in a city with such inequality. Could the discourse of urban regeneration perhaps invoke a dissonance; an ignorance of alternatives that renders the current reality as inviolable; as ‘common sense’? Here, ignorance occurs when a discourse seeks to side-step discomfort. At a personal level, this strategy can be used when engaging in pleasurable and selfish activities that may be harmful to others or even to one’s future self (Thunström *et al.*, 2014). When an individual engages with or commits to certain patterns of behaviour, despite any suspicion that such behaviour is destructive or damaging, uncomfortable knowledge (or inconvenient truths) are typically resolved by choosing to simply avoid the discomforting information or thought (van der Weele, 2014). At a discursive level, ignorance may shape social attitude and norms. This is compatible with Foucault’s (1991) assumption that discursive formations are strategic. Discourse is not only a statement, but also the rules and conditions whereby a statement is formed and the processes whereby a statement is circulated, and others excluded. This shapes not only what is known and not known, but also, crucially, what *can* be known.

It is here then, in this space between what is known and what is not known, that legitimacy may be found in maintaining routines, identities, patterns, processes and trajectories. This manufactures consent amongst those who are unaware of the contradictions embedded in the structures in which they are part of. This complicity is a crucial implication for the perpetuation of any hegemonic idea, entity or discourse. Such an idea of civil society as unwitting accomplices in the maintenance of consent may not rest easy. This is not without an irony, however. Historians and cultural anthropologists are quick to infer the mistakes, perversities, and irrationalities of ‘elites’ yet slow to apply similar standards to ‘the people’. Yet to deny this political subjectivity is to deny the existence of a terrain upon which discourses are articulated and mobilised. This allows for the acceptance of a subjective society, rather than subordination to an objective superstructure. Civil society appears as the mediating agent. It is

the place of formation and reproduction and it is also the first stage in the competition of ideas; the first phase in the struggle for hegemony. Civil society appears as the place where relations of State and economy, of public and private, are defined and redefined.

To return to this theme of inevitability, we are reminded of the comments made by **Participant F**, former City Manager for Cape Town and **Participant H**, a Mayoral Committee Member. They both explain how ‘We have to go down this development path’ (Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017) and that it is ‘the only way’ (Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). Yet through omission is raised the implicit suggestion of alternatives. There are perhaps missed opportunities. Woodstock is the last highly heterogenous neighbourhood to remain in the inner-city. This heterogeneity is the healing thread that could shape (if not symbolically) a unified South Africa. Yet there remains in Woodstock, on the one hand, a housing crisis<sup>35</sup> combined with a local State that hasn’t built social housing in 20 years. On the other hand, there is private sector that doesn’t hold social housing to be economically viable and so continues to pursue high-end commercial developments. This is further combined with devolved legislative powers;<sup>36</sup> a culture of regulatory relaxation;<sup>37</sup> and developers pushing (and potentially breaking) legal barriers<sup>38</sup> whilst, at the same time, reducing other working professionals in the city to mere facilitators.<sup>39</sup>

These factors, whilst not calamitous in and of themselves, are intensified amidst the shortfalls in affordable housing that have been promised in Woodstock for 20 years. A point of interest

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<sup>35</sup> As of 2018, the housing backlog in the province stands at 575, 000, while the City of Cape Town have said that there are 320, 146 people on its database who are waiting for housing (Department of Human Settlements, 2018).

<sup>36</sup> The CTP and its CIDs under allowed to enforce city by-laws, including many of those which it wrote – i.e. those on informal trading, polluting, petty crime and public nuisance (CTP, 2009).

<sup>37</sup> **Participant U**, an architect and board member of the Woodstock’s Aesthetics Committee, says ‘The rate and scale of departures [regulatory relaxation for development] is getting out of control’ (Personal Communication, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

<sup>38</sup> Chapter IV highlights several stories related by Councillors, architects, urban planners and civil society members of minor law breaking on behalf of developers in Woodstock.

<sup>39</sup> As discussed in Chapter IV, this includes architect and urban planner **Participant I**, architect and consultant **Participant V**, heritage official **Participant X**, and Woodstock Improvement District board member **Participant R**.

that illustrates the ebb and flow of this discourse (that being the discourse of affordable housing) can be witnessed in 2017. Six months after meeting with Mayoral Committee Member, **Participant H**, the City, after years of mounting pressure, called for an emergency briefing at the Civic Centre on 24<sup>th</sup> October, 2017. In this meeting, the City outlined proposals for affordable housing to foster the often encouraged sociospatial integration (CoCT, 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018). In an interview with *Ground Up*, Brett Herron, Mayoral Committee Member for Urban Development, stated the City has taken ‘a 180-degree change in its approach to affordable housing’ (de Greef, 2017). Herron goes on to say that ‘where development takes place, and what development takes place, needs to change’ for the City to meaningfully ‘address the spatial legacy of apartheid’ (ibid.). Accordingly, five sites of City-owned land were highlighted for potential development. These sites were: Fruit & Veg City (with 50 units of social housing); New Market Street (300 units of social housing); Pickwick Road (600 units of social housing); Woodstock Hospital (700 units of social housing); and Woodstock Park (200 units of social housing). These are located on the map (Figure 15) below.




Figure 15. Map of Proposed Social Housing in Cape Town's Inner-City. Source: Rawoot, 2017.

The proposals in Woodstock are of particular interest here. In its development prospectus, the City states that Woodstock and Salt River currently have 5,187 households (CoCT, 2017b). Between private developers and units developed by social housing partners, the City plans for a minimum of 1800 affordable housing residential units – that's a 34% increase in households; a substantial increase. Whilst the City's '180-degree turn' on social housing is commendable, there are issues over the viability of the Woodstock projects. 700 units on a site of 1.84ha is an extremely tight fit. For comparison, the Steenvilla social housing project has 700 units on a property over 3 times this hectare size. Moreover, the Woodstock projects are targeted towards households earning at least 3,500 ZAR, immediately discounting 30% of Woodstock's residents. In fact, only 52.19 % of Woodstock's residents between 15 and 64 years old are economically active and, as discussed, 69.4% of black African households and 40.8% of coloured households earn under 3200 ZAR per month. Furthermore, the 700 units does not include any of the mixed higher income and commercial units outlined in the prospectus.

Because of this, and other compounded reasons, the protest movement *Reclaim the City* occupied the Woodstock Hospital. This movement claims the City has repeatedly broken promises to provide affordable housing in the inner-city (such as with the sale of Tafelburg); that it has treated public participation with contempt;<sup>40</sup> that there are no actual timelines for affordable housing at any of the sites in question; that these new proposals are not actually new;<sup>41</sup> and that the city has, in fact, been losing affordable housing.<sup>42</sup> This implies a discourse, once more, contradicting reality. Whilst there are without doubts sincere efforts to eventuate these projects within all parties, they are (the projects) patently unviable – economically and socially. In the Gramscian tradition, this potentially renders the discourse of affordable housing (vis-à-vis the ‘caring’ and ‘inclusive’ city) as little more than an obfuscation. At the time of writing there remain no approved plans for social housing on these sites.

The momentum for these projects heralded by Bret Herron quickly died out. The frameworks and planning documents remain online, languishing in obscurity, as those charged with Woodstock’s regeneration pursue other plans of development. This entire fiasco was remarkably similar to the previously discussed momentum of the City-led 2004 Woodstock-Salt River Revitalisation Framework which, at the last moment, was pulled and in its place a submission made to the National Treasury for two UDZs. This left 30 NGOs mystified after two years of planning, of which all the documents also remain online.

The hegemony of the current approach to urban regeneration – coupled with the attendant discourses of simultaneous spaces of inclusion and exclusion – has certainly exacerbated those in the City. On the 1<sup>st</sup> November 2018, Brett Herron resigned as the Mayoral Committee

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<sup>40</sup> Brett Herron has been accused of ‘strong-arming’ the development plans with little to no public participation (de Greef, 2017). He has stated that ‘We’re not debating if the projects should happen, or where they should happen. That’s been decided already, and we need to move forward’.

<sup>41</sup> The Woodstock Hospital site was identified as being well suited for affordable housing as far back as 2002, just as at Tafelberg, where a 2012 feasibility study concluded that social housing on the site was feasible.

<sup>42</sup> Historically, the Woodstock sites included residential units which housed nurses employed at the adjacent hospitals.

Member for Urban Development, explaining that his party's 'promise to integrate communities is a lie' and that 'behind the scenes the insiders have been killing the projects off' (Herron, 2018:5). He goes on to state that 'I have watched the lies and spin that have been fed to our residents through media enquiries' (ibid.:2) and that the DA are, in fact, 'opposed to the provision of well-located affordable housing' (ibid.:5). There likely exists no better person to weigh the City's urban development politics than Councillor Herron.

However, this pessimism, although telling, stands unhelpful in the interest of a productive analysis. Rather, it serves to highlight disparities and deviations within a seemingly heterogenous hegemony. This is consistent with Gramsci's (1971) assumption that hegemonies are constantly evolving and subject to repeated forms of contestation within and without. The above example of the 2004 Woodstock-Salt River Revitalisation Framework is of interest here as it enables the characterisation of the policy process as discursive competition. If this study has shown that both property developers and public officials are amenable to notions of change, then this provides a canvas upon which to make suggestions for points of entry.

## **5.5 Discursive Intervention**

Spatial segregation imposes costs on households, society, and the State; costs that may become difficult to reverse over time (Chetty *et al.*, 2014; Benner & Pastor 2015; Chetty, Hendren & Katz 2016). Economic and racial segregation have been shown to have negative effects not only on people with lower incomes or of racial and ethnic minority, but on all residents within a metropolitan region (Darden, Malega & Stallings 2019). Moreover, higher levels of segregation have been associated with lower incomes, lower educational attainment, and lower levels of safety for *all* area residents (Arcs *et al.*, 2017). A more integrated and egalitarian

urban form may therefore be in the interest of all stakeholders in the urban regeneration of Woodstock, as this may contribute, in turn, to a safer and more prosperous city.

However, in lieu of the neighbourhood's past and present discursive developments, what conditions may be needed to encourage an integrated and egalitarian urban form? What interventions may provide a pathway that is both progressive yet practical? As shown, the challenges outlined in this chapter may not be breached by either the public or private sector alone, whilst any serious grass-roots challenge to the hegemony is unlikely to materialise independently. Creative solutions are needed that leverage the position of the City as a planning and land use management regulator, one that facilitates an institutional environment that both activates and enables the private sector to willingly participate in solutions that foster sociospatial integration. This research suggests an Inclusionary Housing Policy at the municipal level to incentivise the private sector in pursuing affordable housing in tandem *with* their commercial and residential regeneration ventures.

Inclusionary housing has been defined as 'a range of local policies that tap the economic gains from rising real estate values to create affordable housing' (Jacobus, 2015:7). These policies seek to tie the creation of homes for low-or moderate-income households to the construction of market-rate residential or commercial development (Chaskin & Joseph, 2017). Typically, there are two primary goals here. First, increasing the supply of affordable housing; and second, promoting sociospatial integration (Jacobus, 2015). However, in the context of this research, they both fall under a third, perhaps more important, goal – a discursive one. Indeed, the potential of inclusionary housing lies not only in the 'amount' of affordable housing that may result, but rather its symbolic role in encouraging a discursive shift away from the current trajectory.

In South Africa, there currently exists a draft policy for inclusionary housing at the national level. This policy, however, was never officially adopted owing to a lack of institutional enthusiasm, particularly from the private sector. Indeed, there have been ‘a myriad of problems facing the inclusionary housing policy in its current formulation, and it seems unlikely to take off, unless some of the key issues are addressed and further actions are taken to make inclusionary housing more effective’ (Klug, Rubin & Todes, 2013:678). The core challenges appear to be the lack of legislative and institutional support from other spheres of government coupled to developer claims that the pricing and percentages of low-income housing are financially unviable (ibid.). This research proposes to address these challenges via an Inclusionary Housing Policy that is informed by the dynamics of the local property market; leverages local policy and regulatory context; and is underpinned by a flexible, incentive-driven approach to activate willing participation from the private sector.

Inclusionary housing is reliant on local land use planning processes leveraging the production of affordable housing (Chaskin & Joseph, 2017). Such a policy intervention is, at the same time, tied to local land and property markets, the performance of which means that local governments are well-suited for both understanding and responding to local conditions for incentivising production (ibid.). Moreover, Cape Town already has a regulatory context that is highly compatible with the intended aims and outcomes, i.e.:

- The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act stresses the importance of spatial transformation and justice in planning and land use management. Section 24D explicitly mentions that land use schemes should ‘include provisions to promote the inclusion of affordable housing in residential land development’ (CoCT, 2013:36).

- The Integrated Urban Development Framework explicitly calls for the creation of an ‘inclusionary housing policy... that incentivises property developers to include a level of affordable housing in their developments’ (CoCT, 2016:66).
- The Integrated Development Plan stresses the need for Cape Town to be a ‘more inclusive, integrated and vibrant city that addresses the legacies of apartheid with regard to the built environment, rectifies existing imbalances in the distribution of different types of residential development, and avoids the creation of new structural imbalances in the delivery of services’ (CoCT, 2017a:28).
- The Integrated Human Settlements Plan calls for the ‘support of higher-density, affordable apartment-unit investments’ encouraged by ‘investment incentives, planning and building plan approvals, and special concessions in respect of development contributions’ (CoCT, 2016:13).
- The Urban Design Policy is explicitly to help ‘guide the design process and formulation of development proposals so as to address the segregated nature of the city inherited from apartheid’ so as to ‘make Cape Town safer, more economically prosperous, socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable, while also making it look and work better for all those who live in and visit the city’ (CoCT, 2013:3).
- The Densification Policy aims to ‘contribute to the creation of good-quality, efficient and sustainable urban environments’ (CoCT, 2012c:5) by recommending ‘different packages of incentives’ such as ‘land use measures, financial mechanisms, and procedural improvements’ (ibid.:11).

- The Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Framework states that ‘the city requires stronger initiatives to redress past injustices and promote inclusivity’ (CoCT, 2015:12), recommending that incentives may be used that ‘stimulate private sector development’ and ‘leverage public investment’ in the creation of a more compact and inclusive urban form (ibid.:50).
- The Municipal Spatial Development Framework stipulates the need for an ‘inclusive and integrated city’ as a core drive for development (CoCT, 2018c:14). The document states that it is critical to ‘address existing imbalances in the distribution of different types of residential development and avoid the creation of new structural imbalances’ (ibid.:56).

Further, research has shown that inclusionary housing policies have the greatest effect in strong residential land markets; particularly land markets of high demand (Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Morrison & Burgess, 2014). In this vein, Cape Town is considered one of the more consistently high-performing residential markets globally, with the city’s high-end residential developments growing an average of 10% per year and routinely placed on ‘top-ten’ lists of global housing investment indices (PCG, 2016; 2017; 2018). An Inclusionary Housing Policy could be a mechanism to capture the value of this incredibly profitable land market.

However, perhaps the fundamental choices to be made are whether the production of affordable housing units is mandatory or voluntary and how – or in what form – the policy should enact participation. A mandatory approach would mean that developers would be legally obligated to include a certain amount of affordable housing units as part of any development (Jacobus, 2015). Conversely, a voluntary application would mean that developers would be able to choose whether or not they utilised certain incentives offered by the City (ibid.). These

incentives may comprise the flexibility of development standards and/or planning bonuses (i.e. density and height). This point is crucial. SAPOA CEO, Neil Gopal, has criticised the Inclusionary Housing Policy in Johannesburg as misguided in its use of mandatory implementation, claiming that this may negatively affect the feasibility of residential developments and is burdensome to private developers already experiencing declining returns and profit margins (James, 2018). He recommends a more flexible approach to the underlying economic conditions and health of the residential property market (ibid.). A middle-ground, therefore, would be a targeted mechanism that activates when, for instance, zoning has been changed or where there may be a particularly robust housing market. This is commonly known as Inclusionary Zoning and can be a powerful tool to incentivise the development of below market-rate rental and/or ownership housing (Calavita & Mallach, 2010). Incentives such as density bonuses, expedited approval, and fee waivers, can be awarded to developers who participate in the scheme.

In the international policy arena, inclusionary housing policies traditionally stipulate that contributions take the form of either a fixed amount or through negotiation (Squires, Heurkens & Peiser, 2017). To maintain flexibility and maximise interest, contributions to affordable housing may take the form of on-site, off-site, and in-lieu (Lerman, 2006). In Cape Town, to encourage the production of on-site builds, contributions may be formed around a ‘sliding scale’ system. This would mean that less contributions are needed for on-site development with a higher value for off-site. Fees paid in-lieu would entail the highest contribution. However, ‘in a highly divided and unequal society, where markets are conservative, and expectations of returns on property investment are high, and where there is little real political impetus for challenging spatial divisions, it may be difficult to move developers beyond the models they have forged’ (Klug, Rubin & Todes, 2013:678). Yet, at the same time, this research has shown there is interest by developers in approaching such a policy; a policy with the right incentives.

Therefore, in order to further aid the uptake of this policy, other incentives may be offered to reduce development costs incurred by developers for inclusionary housing projects. These are a reduction in the parking required per residential unit; a fast-track connection time to bulk services infrastructure with a reduction in the monthly payable rates; a reduction of rates and taxes payable; and, more favourable lending rates to developers facilitated/mediated by the City. Many of these policies have been used with success internationally (Calavita & Mallach, 2010), yet they do require political will (Jacobus, 2015).

In sum, there are numerous and conflicting demands for land, but it is essential that interests are fairly and transparently weighed against each other. Land is arguably different from any other asset in that its value is derived not only from its size and quality, but also from its location, and the opportunities that this offers in achieving other, less tangible goals such as social integration and redistribution (Ackerman, Clawson & Harris, 2015). Indeed, a shift is needed which recognises the long-term and multiple values of land, with policies that prevent decisions based on short-term financial rewards at the expense of long-term social integration. An Inclusionary Housing Policy at the municipal level could be a progressive yet practical way of supporting this shift.

## **5.6 Synthesis**

An analysis of the findings contains many layers to a complex, composite story. For some, the story of Woodstock's urban regeneration began in 2004 with the approval of the UDZ and the opening of the Old Biscuit Mill. Others have posited the origins of this trajectory to be 1999, when a by-law was established to create a private company to 'to run the city's business areas' (CTP, 2009:14). Whilst this was without doubt an important legislative milestone, it encourages an analysis predicated on a usurpation of governance by 'neoliberal' corporate

interests (Didier, Peyroux & Morange. 2012). Rather, members of SAPOA were meeting the City as far back as 1994. Here, a grass-roots movement of concerned citizens petitioned across the public and private sphere, as well throughout civil society, for the support of a platform that could fund the ailing CBD amidst budgetary restructuring. The discourse of ‘saving’ the city was very much the glue that bound the movement together, creating both a broad and effective platform of participation (through its various programmes) and socio-political legitimacy (through its wide and consensual support). Aside from the archaeology of this discursive formation, what is also particular about its founding is the legislature behind its inception. As the CTP was enshrined in city law it has been provided a higher amount of autonomy vis-à-vis, for instance, the CJP, which falls under provincial legislature. Thus, the entire structure of its foundation can be framed as an exceptional example of local drive.

Whilst the genealogy of the CTP can be founded in its commitments to ‘crime and grime’ (CTP, 2009), the discourse of ‘saving’ the city would soon mature and mutate in a myriad of ways; it would mingle and blend with new players and new actors, creating new discourses. A key contingency in this development is the intervention of the Mayoral Office; an intervention that redirected the operational duties of the CTP *away* from service provision and towards an explicit focus on ‘culture’. This was, at the same time, combined with the enactment of UDZs, setting the stage for a new generation of young entrepreneurs to assume an exceptionally high amount of freedom to ‘remake’ Woodstock. Whilst there is nothing objectively problematic with the processes of culture-led regeneration, issues arise in Woodstock with its intensity – particularly when considering the absence of the State and the monopoly of supply. Moreover, Woodstock remains the last highly heterogenous neighbourhood in the inner-city, and its classes fall heavily along racial lines. Thus, the exclusion and/or displacement of the lower-classes through concentrated cultural regeneration will likely reproduce apartheid sociospatial patterns.

The intensity of this process appears to be pacified through image construction. These images take the form and shape of both intellectual and moral narratives that appear to obscure negative externalities whilst engendering consent under vague yet highly agreeable concepts such as ‘caring’ and ‘inclusive’. This seems to have ‘normalised’ the discourse and its inequitable outcomes as inevitable; as ‘common sense’, with alternatives simultaneously marginalised as unrealistic or even unattainable. In this way, the discourse appears to be hegemonic. However, this hegemony is not homogenous, and contestations both within and without are present. In abjuring a pessimism that is commonplace to much critical theory, this chapter offers a discursive point of entry in the form of a municipal Inclusionary Housing Policy. There is high legislative and policy precedence here, and this approach provides a progressive yet practical ‘middle-ground’; one that both redresses patterns of sociospatial inequality yet preserves economic growth.

## CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION

## 6.1 Introduction

This chapter brings together the overall outcomes of the study, summarising its core considerations, evidences and insights. First, a research summary is tied to the Research Objectives of Chapter I. From this, the contributions of the research are then defined. These are threefold: a theoretical contribution, an empirical contribution, and a policy contribution. The chapter then discusses the limitations of the study and concludes with recommendations and areas for future research.

## 6.2 Summary of Research Objectives

The overarching goal of this research was to provide a political economy analysis of urban regeneration in Woodstock, Cape Town. However, the study aimed to move beyond reductive descriptions of ‘neoliberalisation’ on the one hand and the growing unioocular attentions to hyper local processes of supposed ‘autonomy’ on the other. Thus, a theoretical framework was conceptualised in response to ‘a need to address the apparent estrangement of significant currents in poststructuralist and postcolonial urbanism from political economy’ (Peck, 2015:164) and the need to reconcile the subjective urban experiences with visible objective processes (Sutherland *et al.*, 2018). The vehicle for this was to be urban regeneration and this integration was realised by bridging the dualistic dichotomies of urbanism as either subservient to Northern paradigms and hierarchies or entirely separated and sovereign in its Southern complexities. Thus, the research assumed an epistemology of the city as substantively connected to wider processes (Hoyler & Harrison, 2017) yet highly particular and nebulous in the way it both relates to and (re)produces these processes (Brenner, & Schmid, 2015).

This abstraction required an epistemological reflexivity (Maton, 2003). As opposed to assuming a static disconnection between subject and object, a reflexive approach was needed that stressed an ongoing, dynamic transformation through social practices (Willis, 2007). This theoretical obligation ‘involves not only the constant interrogation of changing urban realities, but the equally vigilant analysis and revision of the very conceptual and methodological frameworks being used to investigate the urban process’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:154). This was done by employing Foucauldian and Gramscian critical theory – an approach not without precedent (Ekers & Loftus, 2008; Howarth, 2010; Sevilla-Buitrago, 2017). In fact, as Mouffe (1979) has argued, Gramsci considered many of the theoretical concerns that were to become central to Foucault’s oeuvre. Both theorists conceptualise relations of power as dispersed and operating throughout society; as working not only negatively; as constituting the ordinary, everyday and mundane; and as functioning in a ‘bottom-up’ manner, affording an active agency as oppose to the passivity that populates a large body of the social sciences (Thévenot, 2011). Whilst Gramsci and Foucault do differ in their graduated interpretations of structure, this is, in fact, a core complementary as it affords a two-sided analysis of ‘why’ and ‘how’ power and knowledge may be (re)produced (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) and thus facilitates a multifaceted analysis of phenomena; one that eschews the ‘dehistoricisation and dematerialisation of the dynamics of modernity’ (Lazarus, 2011:22) and embraces its spatial and temporal relationality.

Objective 1 – To clarify the political economy of global development and elucidate its driving discourse

In order to understand the global context of local discursive trends (and the lines and linkages that may connect them), a brief overview of the dominant development discourse of the modern age was required. Chapter II began with tracing this discourse from the Brundtland Commission to the present day. Broadly speaking, solutions to socio-economic and environmental concerns remain left to the market mechanisms of financialisation, privatisation

and commodification (Barbier, 2016). Whilst these mechanisms contribute to the increased productivity of goods and services, the protection of the environment, and broader enhancements of social and economic freedoms (Perkins, 2017), critics have claimed that they exacerbate inequalities (Kaufman, 2018), environmental exploitations (Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015) and dispossessions (Harvey, 2012). They contend that the obscuration of these externalities is an expression of power relations (Wanner, 2015); an obscuration seen in the way that crises prompt not revisions but reconfigurations (Kotz, 2015), allowing for the continuation of existing institutional relationships (Peck, Brenner & Theodore, 2018).

However, in order to develop this discussion, certain premises and assumptions need deconstruction. For instance, it is essential to consider the ways in which discourses function and the ways in which they are constrained by the demands and resistances of interests, ideas and institutions, both from within and without. This prompts a conceptualisation of the power relations embedded in the political economy – in the ideas, interests and institutions of society – that determine what kinds of discourse may be possible.

Objective 2 – To explore the political economy of this discourse and conceptualise its expression and use

A Gramscian (1971) analysis of the above process may reside in the workings and practices of hegemony – an ideology that justifies the social, political, and economic status quo as natural and inevitable. Yet what distinguishes Gramsci from other theorists (particularly in the Marxian and post-Marxian tradition) is his refusal to accept the oppressive characterisation of this dominance (Jones, 2006). Indeed, there is a tendency in the social sciences to characterise this discourse as the produce of an oppressive and exploitative machinery (Wanner, 2015; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015; Barbier 2016). Others have criticised such an interpretation as overly deterministic (Venugopal, 2015); a ‘reductionist and linear understanding’ (Chandler,

2014:48) that obfuscates the complex ways in which modern neoliberal capitalism is constantly being made and remade (Kotz, 2015). This hybridisation is, in fact, critical. The terrain of capitalism today does not exist in a ‘pure, uncut, or unmediated form’ (Peck, Brenner & Theodore, 2018:3). Rather, it is ‘partial, polycentric and plural’ (ibid.:3). This polymorphism can be observed, for instance, after the financial crises of 2008, where market logics and structures expanded in to the public sector (Streeck, 2016). Rather than revision, this may suggest – and remains historically consistent with (Duménil & Lévy, 2011) – a profound ability to ‘reinvent’ (Kotz, 2015). This suggests the highly polymorphic and variegated tendencies of the modern neoliberal political economy are, in fact, compatible with poststructuralist approaches to the more nuanced and nebulous experiences of reality.

If this is the case, what implications does this have for the conceptualisation of power and, in turn, possible forms of knowledge? Gramsci (1971) claims that power does not only reside in the State, but within civil society itself, seen through the (re)production of knowledge in the daily lives of people and groups. What constitutes the stability of a hegemonic idea or discourse is the repeated, everyday actions; the rituals, rhythms and routines of society that, over time, permit hegemony to become based on shared, complicit social processes. In this way, Gramscian concepts of hegemony provide an innovative ‘middle-ground’ position (Carroll & Ratner, 1994), avoiding both the ‘class reductionism’ associated with much critical theory and the ‘fragmentary relativism’ that characterises most postmodernist work (ibid:7).

Similarly, Foucault’s (1968) work on the nexus of power and discourse is valuable in helping theorists to consider ‘how we know what we know’; where that information comes from; how it is produced and under what circumstances (ibid). Key to understanding this process is the notion of discursive formation – ‘the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) propositions are built up, more or less exact descriptions developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed... [and] form the precondition of what is later revealed as and which later functions

as an item of knowledge' (ibid.:200). This is patently similar to Gramsci's theory of sedimentation (1971:326), where everyday expressions of power, over time, lead to culturally accepted norms; norms that may have, at one time, even appeared conflicting to the interests of society. Here, repeated expressions of power (i.e. discourses) imbue 'rituals of truth' (Foucault, 1977:194) that eventually become internalised and self-regulating. When applied to critical urban theory, these approaches provide powerful tools that point the way towards an understanding of the city as a historical and on-going 'play' between discourses; performances that, over time, may constitute certain lines (knowledge) and the preclusion of others.

Objective 3 – To explore the political economy of the built environment and the epistemology of space

What implications does this have for the epistemology of space? As geographies of uneven development emerge from the interaction of rapid processes of urbanisation (Smith & Timár, 2010; Smith, 2011), it is claimed that new varieties of spatial unevenness are not so easily modelled through traditional analyses of differentiation (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014). In fact, understandings of what even constitutes the urban have become unclear (Pieterse, 2010; 2011). Whilst conceptual framing devices such as 'cityness' are pervasive in mainstream policy (Lepawsky *et al.*, 2015) and research (Nkula-Wenz, 2018), the modern urban condition is not easily grasped in any single form but, rather, may be consequential of successive replications and repetitions from specific sociospatial conditions (Pieterse, 2011). Brenner and Schmid (2015:152) write that 'rather than witnessing the worldwide proliferation of a singular urban form... we are instead confronted with new processes of urbanisation that are bringing forth diverse socio-economic conditions, territorial formations and socio-metabolic transformations across the planet'. These institutional architectures are so varied that any traditionalist notion of the city as a confined, replicable settlement now seems little more than the archaic residue of paradigms long past (ibid.). No longer stable or static, urbanisation is a process of continuing

sociospatial transformation; a muddled morass of variegated forms and morphologies (Brenner & Schmid, 2015).

Moreover, the regulatory landscapes of urbanisation have undergone severe transformations (Nel-lo & Mele, 2016). Whilst formerly having been incorporated within and regulated through hierarchical institutional frameworks (Brenner & Schmid, 2015), crises in the political economy of recent decades have made way for substantial reconfigurations in urban governance (Cars, Healey & Madanipour, 2017). These changes are seen in the varied landscapes of networked governance (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010); the spread of state projects of deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and austerity (Mercille & Murphy, 2015); the global rise of place-marketing campaigns and policies for drawing investment (Papadopoulos, Hamzaoui-Essoussi & El Banna, 2016); the formation of a new mainstream whereby local and regional governments prioritise economic growth over social redistribution (Ratigan, 2017); the construction of network and policy transfers to distribute best practice in answer to persisting social, economic and/or environmental issues (Ahern, Cilliers & Niemelä, 2014); and political battles over access to basic services including education, housing, water, health care and security (Langford, Dugard & Madlingozi, 2013). Under these conditions, ‘the terrain of the urban has thus been subjected to a high-intensity, high-impact earthquake through the worldwide social, economic, regulatory and environmental transformations of the post-1980s period’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:153).

How does such a polymorphous institutional terrain find expression spatially? How do the complex contingencies of political and economic restructuring interrelate with existing spaces, architectures, and constellations of power? How are the discourses of competition, choice, freedom, and efficiency enacted and how are they situated amidst social struggles and cultural conflicts for identity and meaning? And this is where the case study comes in to play. This research postulates that one manner by which to investigate these tensions lies in urban

regeneration. Here, urban regeneration finds itself in a uniquely political position as it is concerned with the literal remaking of the city and it is thus host to an almost unfathomable array of socio-cultural and political complexities (Xie & Heath, 2017).

#### Objective 4 – To excavate Cape Town’s discourse on urban regeneration

The story of urban regeneration in Woodstock has often been originated to the landmark redevelopment of the Old Biscuit Mill in 2004 (Lemanski, 2006; Booyens, 2012; Gregory, 2019), an event that initiated, it is claimed, a decade of intense gentrification (Wenz, 2012). Chapter IV highlighted how developers<sup>43</sup> similarly conferred the central significance of the Old Biscuit Mill as the ‘game-changer’. Mayoral Committee Member, **Participant H**, holds another popular opinion, that it was the institutional mechanism of the Urban Development Zone (UDZ) that, in fact, triggered redevelopment in the area. This was also an opinion shared by architect and urban planner **Participant I**, as well as NGO workers, **Participant Y** and **Participant S** – a broad and generally accepted opinion that market-driven policies launched a new urban trajectory. Whilst there is a body of work that has characterised Cape Town’s ‘neoliberalisation’ (Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, Didier & Morange, 2008; Millstein, 2010; Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012; MacDonald, 2012; Donaldson *et al.*, 2013b), this reductionism overlooks critical contingencies and obscures a profoundly more nuanced and subjective story.

Perhaps a more significant point of entry lies in reviewing and mapping the chronology of the discourse. Here, interesting contingencies are to be found in 1998, where local business began petitioning the City for a new form of urban intervention to bring an end to rapid capital flight. These individuals implored Hanief Tiseker, Business Areas Manager, and Rod Young, Director of Economic Development, to set up the Cape Town Partnership (CTP). Later that same year,

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<sup>43</sup> Participants J, L, M and N.

Shaun Johnson, editor at *Cape Argus* encouraged reporting of the CBD nearing collapse, using *Independent Newspapers* as a mouthpiece. So successful was this campaign that **Participant E** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017) was awarded an international accolade for her work in marketing the project. This chronology may imply that the ‘recognition’ of ‘urban decay’ did not follow the first post-apartheid elections, nor did it come from any public servant, but rather it was a coordinated media narrative used to sensationalise urban decline and push through regulatory restructuring.

However, the story is, in fact, considerably more layered than may be assumed here. It has been suggested that the early strategic operation of the CTP and its CIDs was the cunning mobilisations of a discourse proselyting State ineptitude and private sector fidelity (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012). Yet, it is perhaps equally important to remember that although there may or may not have been material – albeit ultimately unknowable – interests involved; this mobilisation cannot so idly be construed as Machiavellian manoeuvrings to coerce the polity to action. The Cape Town CBD was certainly in a severe predicament, with high levels of crime, psychical decay and capital flight (Visser & Kotze, 2008). Indeed, the archaeology of events show this was not merely a ‘neoliberal’ usurpation of governance purely generated from the conspiratorial advantages of a media-controlled narrative. Rather, it could perhaps be construed as the last resort of a grass-roots movement of local actors desperately trying to ‘save’ their city. Members of what would become the CTP were, in fact, meeting with the City as far back as 1994. **Participant F** (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017) explained how the newly elected City Council inherited a situation where a third of Cape Town had not received any capital infrastructure expenditure in half a century. Limited budgets were thus reoriented away from the already struggling CBD towards townships such as Gugulethu; townships in drastic and dire need of services. This created a seemingly irreconcilable dilemma for the nascent local government – the CBD was the failing but fundamental economic engine

of the city that needed investment to counteract further capital flight; whilst many of the outlying suburbs had been severely underinvested as a result of decades of racial discrimination. Therefore, given these circumstances, an intervention that leveraged the authority of the City with the capital of the private sector could be construed as a rational middle-ground.

And this is where much of the story remains untold. From 1995, early meetings of a body known as the *Cape Town CBD Business Caucus* presented the City with a list of issues that needed immediate amends. Following this, the *CBD Emergency Task Team* was formed and held its first meeting in September 1996. Convened by Councillor Hanief Tiseker it included several prominent representatives of Cape Town's private and public sectors such as the Council, Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Business Caucus, the SAPS and the Office of the Attorney-General. Whilst the outcome was a suggestion that a Section 21 company would be the best solution to fund the massive deficits in service provision, legislation would have to be created (**Participant F**, Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017).

In the meantime, the Emergency Task Team began hiring the homeless for pilot street cleaning projects and civil society reservists to provide 'visible' boosts to security presence. These services would form the bedrock that would come to define the CTP's early years. At around this time (1996), initiatives such as *Cape Town Cares* (CTC) were set up by the CTP, 'on-the-ground' partnerships between the City and citizens concerned or affected by life in the CBD. This spawned further off-shoots such as the *Broom Brigade*, an initiative to put the unemployed to work and help clean the city. Indeed, at a meeting in early 1998 Theodore Yach notes that '...the social element cannot be over-emphasised. The only long-term sustainable route to success is to deal with the social issues on a holistic basis and not just to move the problem to

another precinct'<sup>44</sup> (CTP, 2009:11). By early 1997, open-door workshops on how to help the CBD were being conducted by the CTP. To repeat the words of Colin Bird:

‘...it was the only time I knew of where business actually got together to do something about a situation they saw was deteriorating to a point where it would never be redeemable if nothing else was done. It was totally apolitical. There was a lot of disbelief about the potential, but no one was trying to earn money or get votes. It was being done for the right reasons and that’s why it worked’ (ibid.:11).

It may thus be argued that the formative years of the CTP (1994/1995 to 1998/1999) were a series of grass-roots movements. This pre-legislative time was financed through personal donations with the CTP living on a ‘shoe-string’ budget. It was a long and arduous road, populated with petitions, meetings and workshops needed to ‘get people on board’. The personal industriousness of these formative years belies reductive interpretations of cynicism. Its agency undermines the accusation of corporate strings attached to the marionette of global capitalism. Rather, this was a discernible movement of local actors to ‘save’ their city (**Participant F**, Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). Indeed, ‘after 1994, City budgets were reallocated to help bring services to impoverished areas of Cape Town and this meant that the CBD lost much of its budget’ (SACO, 2016:39), thus business owners in the CBD were faced with both an existential threat to their livelihood and the everyday realities of living within urban decline.

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<sup>44</sup> This is a profoundly important point as it contrasts so strongly with the discourse in the following decade.

It was not until late 1998, after 4 years, that the aforementioned ‘media campaign’ began. Yet again, this was *not* spontaneous. In fact, months before the articles of ‘catastrophic’ urban decline circulated, the *Cape Argus* (3 August 1998) led with a front-page story clearly explicating that the City and a consort of business leaders were in talks to set up a private enterprise to run the city’s business areas. Thus, the press campaign that followed is less the result of fearmongering to sanction the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the city, and more the workings of a media machine prone to sensationalism. This is critical because it not only brings to light significant historical contingencies concerning the institutional architecture of the city, but it also forces a more nuanced reassessment of the situation that belies simplistic assumptions of unscrupulous manoeuvring.

By 1999, a by-law for the ‘Establishment of City Improvement Districts’ promulgated in the Provincial notice 116/1999 (CoCT, 2000). The final version of the CTP by-law established CIDs to ‘prevent the degeneration of cities and towns and the consequential urban decay’ (CoCT, 2003:3). Here, it is important to remember that the CTP was legislated municipally and not provincially like the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP). Whilst this was a testament to the close relationship between the City and the private sector, it also, more importantly, highlights a unique institutional structure from which later mechanisms and discourses would use as an exceptionally powerful platform for local urban regeneration.

Objective 5 – To explore the political economy of this discourse in Woodstock

Due to the early success of the CTP, tension arose in the partnership with the Mayor’s Office. In late 2002, **Participant F** was told to ‘back off’ in the scale and, somewhat extraordinarily, the success of its ‘crime and grime’ service provisions (Personal Communication, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017). This is critical because at the same time, a project entitled the Woodstock-Salt River Revitalisation Framework had been in planning for almost two years. Yet, in 2003, the Mayor’s

Office ‘forced’ leadership changes within the CTP and a few months later the Woodstock-Salt River Revitalisation Framework was pulled, and, in its place, a submission made to the National Treasury for Woodstock to become an Urban Development Zone.

This extraordinary turn of events, once more, belies the notion of the CTP (or even the private sector) pulling the strings of ‘neoliberalisation’ in Cape Town. It also meant that the original mandate of the CTP was strong-armed away from its operational commitment to service provision. Indeed, **Participant F** says that, from there on out, they [the CTP] had to ‘remain behind the scenes’ and that, as a result, ‘culture became our mandate’ (ibid.). Culture was now to become official policy for them – an approach that would filter through to its CID. Moreover, the downfall of the Woodstock-Salt River Revitalisation Framework as a discourse of social upliftment would set a pattern of precedence for the next decade and a half in Woodstock; a pattern of constant failures to launch social projects amidst the compounding, sedimenting weight of a new discourse.

Instead, a new generation of young entrepreneurs, now legally, financially, *and* culturally encouraged to lead urban regeneration in Woodstock, imported a global imaginary to the discourse. Whilst there is nothing objectively problematic with the processes of culture-led regeneration, issues arise in Woodstock with its institutional setting that had created a monopoly of supply. On the one hand, a housing crisis is combined with the City leaving residential development in Woodstock (including social housing) entirely to the private sector. Yet, on the other hand, the private sector doesn’t hold social housing to be economically feasible and thus continues to pursue high-end culture-led developments. In Woodstock, this coalesced with devolving legislative powers to CIDs; a culture of regulatory relaxation; and minor, yet repeated, legal violations. Resultantly, whilst there has been no social housing in Woodstock for 20 years, what has taken place is a highly potent form of culture-led regeneration. Each developer behind each project references cities such as ‘London’, ‘New

York' and 'Barcelona' as their inspiring visions. At the same time, they acknowledge a commitment to lead the suburb's transformation and eventuate its true potential. In the absence of any State intervention in Woodstock, it is the current, on-going influence of *their* imaginaries, globally inspired, that are coming to (re)define Woodstock. To ignore this influence, to suggest that the suburb's development trajectory should be divorced from this patent relationality, is counterproductive (and counter factual) for urban theory.

Moreover, this potent combination has multiple layers of significance. Aside from questions of possible isolation and alienation, economically only 52.19 % of Woodstock's residents between 15 and 64 years old are active (CoCT, 2017b:8) yet the average rent for a single bedroom household is currently between ZAR 7500 and ZAR 10000 per month (PayProp Rental Index in IOL, 2018) – well above the 3200 ZAR per month that 69.4% of black African households and 40.8% of coloured households earn. This is important because Woodstock remains the last highly heterogenous neighbourhood in the inner-city (see page 173 for graphical map), yet its classes fall heavily along racial lines. Thus, the displacement of the lower-classes is likely to reproduce apartheid sociospatial patterns.

Yet these outcomes appear to be 'smoothed over' through image construction. These images have taken the multiplying form and shape of intellectual and moralising narratives that deploy consensual concepts such as 'caring' and 'inclusive' – statements that have risen and rapidly reproduced in chronological discursive tandem with securitisations and sociospatial exclusions. The power of these discourse cannot be understated, as it appears to obscure not only the reproduction of sociospatial inequality, but also the possibility of alternatives. Indeed, 'We have to go down this development path' (**Participant H**, Personal Communication, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2017). It is 'the only way' (**Participant F**, Personal Communication, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017). Both statements, made by high-ranking members of the City, characterise accepted truths of inevitability and resignations to the norm of the present situation. It is seemingly, 'a history

without a choice' (Foucault, 1984:91). This resignation can similarly be seen in the attitude of some of the residents of Woodstock themselves, passive because gentrification is deemed an unfortunate albeit relatively natural phenomenon in a city with such high inequality. Here, current realities are rendered inviolable; as 'common sense'. It is reminiscent of Foucault's (1991) assumption that discursive formations are strategic. Discourse is not only a statement, but also the rules and conditions whereby a statement is formed and the processes whereby a statement is circulated, and others excluded. This shapes not only what is known and not known, but also, crucially, what *can* be known.

In sum, whilst the early discursive formation behind urban regeneration in Cape Town was valuable in assembling the necessary institutional structure to enact swift and decisive action, its 'appropriate-at-the-time' response laid a precedent that, when the core discourse shifted, found itself ill-suited to the complex dynamics of sociospatial integration in the post-apartheid city. Intervention from the Mayoral Office forced the original mandate of the CTP away from its operational duties of 'crime and grime' and towards an explicit commitment to culture. Soon after, a second generation of 'changemakers' became a vehicle for infusing the discourse with ideological commitments to the 'global' city. Whilst this approach has found currency in global policy circuits, the private sector in Cape Town has, as discussed, been granted an unusually high amount of leverage, thus forming an exceptional institutional context and thus creating a compelling,<sup>45</sup> potent,<sup>46</sup> and powerful<sup>47</sup> hegemonic discourse.

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<sup>45</sup> Vis-à-vis its moral narratives of the 'caring' and 'inclusive' city.

<sup>46</sup> Vis-à-vis the monopoly of supply in Woodstock that is enacting uniformly high-end projects.

<sup>47</sup> We are reminded of the multiple the failed social housing projects from 2004 onwards, the latest of which, in 2017, culminated in the spectacular resignation of Brett Herron, the Mayoral Committee Member for Urban Development, explaining that his party's 'promise to integrate communities is a lie' (Herron, 2018:5).

Objective 6 – To offer policy recommendations that may support, repair and/or redress inadequacies and/or deficiencies brought to light as a result of this discourse

Hegemonies are, however, rarely homogeneous. They are dynamic and multi-faceted, subject to contestations both without and within. For instance, developer **Participant L** explains that if social housing were economically viable, he would be ‘happy’ to lead the way (Personal Communication, 12th June 2017). However, as it currently stands this is not feasible, whilst he has a legal obligation to maximise returns for his investors (ibid.). Therefore, if city officials (such as Councillor Brett Herron) complain of institutional gridlock and developers about the viabilities and lack of incentives; rather than try to tackle both problems separately, a solution can be found in bridging them. Introducing an Inclusionary Housing Policy may provide a pathway that leverages the position of the City as a planning and land use management regulator, whilst facilitating an institutional environment that both activates and enables the private sector to willingly participate in solutions that foster sociospatial integration. When considering local, regional and national documents and frameworks, there is a clear policy precedent for the creation of such a policy. Pages 186 to 188 of this research details and outlines a local regulatory compatibility with the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, the Integrated Urban Development Framework, the Integrated Development Plan, the Integrated Human Settlements Plan, the Urban Design Policy, the Densification Policy, Transit-Oriented Development Strategic Framework and the Municipal Spatial Development Framework. Moreover, with research showing inclusionary housing policies to be most effective in strong residential land markets (Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Morrison & Burgess, 2014), Cape Town – as one of the more consistently high-performing residential markets globally<sup>48</sup> – is in a prime position to capitalise on the value of its incredibly profitable land market.

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<sup>48</sup> As seen in PCG, 2016; 2017; 2018.

In closing, as **Participant H** finished our interview: ‘Be careful.... Of those who don’t want change. The city is going to change. People need to understand that’. Indeed, change is, certainly, the only constant in life. Perhaps, then, what can be changed (again) is the discourse currently driving urban regeneration in Cape Town – a discourse that has grown beyond its original temporal purpose and spatial utility. This research recommends that to challenge this discourse requires policy intervention. The contestations within various spheres of Cape Town clearly suggest it is ripe for such a discursive shift.

### 6.3 Contributions

This research makes contributions to the empirical study of urban development in Cape Town; to critical urban theory; and to policy as a pathway for progressive yet practical intervention.

Empirically, the research excavates the archaeology of local discursivities in Cape Town and a genealogy of methods whereby, based on these local discursivities, contemporary urban regeneration has come to fruition in Woodstock. This was in response to ‘understand and unpack the specific context in which [urban] transformations [in Cape Town] and their effects occur’ (Teppo & Millstein, 2015:433), drawing attention to the need to comprehend exactly *how* and *why* urban regeneration has been incorporated so naturally in to public policy (Visser, 2019:200). Much urban analysis in Cape Town has ‘rested upon a taken-for-granted understanding of the post-apartheid state (and the post-apartheid city) as a neoliberal one’ (Millstein, 2017:262) which renders invisible the nuances and complexities embedded within its transitions. Rather than assuming the ‘neoliberal’ usurpation of urban governance in Cape Town’s policy formation – an assumption that dominates the literature (Didier, Peyroux & Morange, 2012) – this research highlights critical historical contingencies from 1994; contingencies that frame a discursive formation as less the choreographies of global capitalism

and more the committed mobilisation of a local, grass-roots movement. This remains unacknowledged in the literature.

Moreover, its discourse appears to be grounded in sincere attempts to ‘save’ the city from urban decline. Not only is this important for (re)situating historical accuracy and moving ‘beyond neoliberalism’ as the bottomless well of all explanation; not only does it allow an appreciation of subjective agency in the trajectory of urban development in Cape Town; but it also allows a more precise analysis of how (and why) the discourse changed. Indeed, whilst this original discursive formation appears relevant and valuable at the time, it was redirected by interventions from the ANC-led Mayoral Office. Coupled with the enactment of Woodstock as a UDZ, a second generation of ‘changemakers’ spearheaded a new discursive formation built on the backs of the prior discursive drive of ‘saving’ the city. This new formation was, however, predicated on ideological commitments to the ‘global’ city. Whilst this approach has been welcomed in international policy arenas, in Woodstock it made use of an exceptional institutional context of regulatory relaxation, financial incentivisation, and the general absence of the State; coalescing in to a total monopoly of supply regarding the trajectory of urban regeneration. This created an extremely potent discourse that has resulted in class-based (and thus racial) sociospatial restructuring. This is problematic because Woodstock remains the last heterogenous neighbourhood in the inner-city. Today, discursive sedimentation through both institutional reproduction and image construction have formed a discursive frontline for the continual creation of consent. The extensive nature of its penetration simultaneously contributes to the misrecognition of the structural inequalities embedded within the trajectory that the discourse continues to define.

Regarding critical urban theory, postcolonial analysis continues to deconstruct paradigms of urban theory and reorient critical urban studies towards the unique; the particular; the inimitable experiences of Southern urbanism. Whilst this has been important for re-orientating

debates and discussions in new and stimulating directions, it may also be ‘premature’ to cast off relational processes (Brenner & Schmid, 2015:160); processes that could help us better understand the myriad ways in which power is expressed, knowledge produced and discourse formed. In response to Peck’s (2015:164) claim of ‘a need to address the apparent estrangement of significant currents in poststructuralist and postcolonial urbanism from political economy’, this research has shown urban regeneration in Cape Town to embody this hybridisation. The institutional terrain is not a clear-cut local or global form, rather it is a complex web of both, with lines and linkages that spread both temporally and spatially. The discourses that have shaped the city – that continue to shape the city – are coevolving and countervailing. Moreover, to reject this substantive connectivity and its relationality is not only counterfactual but assists in the service of the very power structures that poststructuralists claim to be emancipated from. Indeed, disarticulation, fragmentation and misrecognition are the *modus operandi* of a hegemonic discourse empowered by the disintegration of (viable) alternatives. In this light, approaches that seek to divert attention away from the structural dimensions of political economy may even be conceived in Gramscian terms as a ‘passive revolution’ – a movement garbed in the rhetoric of the radical yet serving to maintain the structures that support and sustain existing institutional relationships. Integration is paramount. Urban processes may be both objective *and* subjective; coercive *and* consensual; structural *and* autonomous. It is not a dichotomy of absolutes, with the story of urban regeneration in Cape Town explicating this.

Finally, this research discards with the wanton pessimism that too often characterises analyses of power. Hegemonies are fluctuating and contested phenomena. However, contestation must take the right form<sup>49</sup> whilst also capitalising on the right moment (i.e. vis-à-vis the ebb and flow of popular opinion and/or dissent within and across the ideas, interests and institutions of

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<sup>49</sup> This point is expanded on in the following section of ‘Recommendations’.

society). A policy contribution is, therefore, made through the suggestion of a middle-ground between the imperatives of economic growth and State responsibilities for improved sociospatial integration. As the research has shown, there is currently a gap in the public, private and civil spheres for change. There is dissatisfaction with the 'status quo'. An Inclusionary Housing Policy could be an appropriate response to appease all parties and instil progressive yet practical sociospatial integration.

## **6.4 Limitations**

Similar to any research project, this study was not without its limitation. First, regarding sample size, and despite encompassing a wide breadth of views, beliefs and opinions from City Officials, urban planners, architects, media consultants, NGOs, heritage officials, lower- and upper-class local residents, as well as property developers and business figures, the inclusion of additional stakeholders would have rendered more detailed findings, and would have allowed for even deeper and more contextual data. Nonetheless, the research was fortunate to be granted interviews with Councillors, key City Officials, and Members of the Mayoral Committee, access far beyond the scope of similar PhDs in this area and field (Minnie, 2011; Yeboah-Assiamah, 2018).

Second, regarding the reliability of data, qualitative research studies (particularly those that make use of long-format interviews with participants) challenge the objectivity of data. Issues here include selective memory; the telescoping of events that occurred at one time as if they occurred at another time; the misattribution of positive events and outcomes to agency or the negative attribution of events and outcomes to external forces; as well as the exaggeration of acts and outcomes to embellish and/or seem more significant than they are/were. These are limitations inherent to any qualitative study. However, they can be themselves limited through

triangulation – a fundamental approach for ensuring validity. Data was compared and cross-referenced within stakeholder groups, between stakeholder groups, and with historical and archival records, documents, and publications.

A third limitation is the very limits of the researcher. As discussed earlier in the study, Foucault (1981) challenged the idea that knowledge is objective and value-free. Indeed, critical theory upholds that both the conscious and unconscious values of the researcher are inextricably linked to interests, genders, races, classes, histories and hidden agendas. Moreover, this is all rooted in the singularity composed by an individual in a specific moment in a specific place. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, these are very real concerns within research and many of them are, by definition, inescapable (Gerhard, 2008). Whilst some critical theorists may go as far to posit that the very ideals of objectivity, efficiency, prediction and control are themselves values (Held, 1980), it would be disingenuous to not take precautions (in both the preparation and the collection and analysis of data) that account for systemic volatilities of qualitative research. For data not to be configured as biased, random or irrelevant, it must be considered in all its complexity and make imperative to work with what Geertz has termed ‘thick description’ (1973:10). Here, the ‘detailing of an expanded set of the ingredients in the situation, in its multiplicity and variation, is what allows the production of consistency for the data’ (Ferreira-Neto, 2018:23). These limitations have been approached through extensive third-party feedback, particularly from examiners. This has motivated multiple reanalyses and driven a stringent search for alternative explanations to the phenomena discussed in the study.

## **6.5 Recommendations**

When making recommendation to affect change, it is important to couch considerations within practical and political realities; realities that serve to highlight both the relevance and suitability

of progressive policy intervention and underscore why current populist approaches may be counterproductive to their own aims and to those of whom they seek to champion.

Firstly, Chapter IV brought to light how Dewar (1977) and Garside (1993) have characterised Woodstock historically as multi-racial and diverse in class, with a high degree of shared meaning and neighbourhood identity. Despite a relatively heterogeneous population, the suburb evinced a strong sense of community and cosmopolitanism. In meetings with the Woodstock Community Outreach Forum (WCOF), this is a historical view shared by the Chairman and the rest of the board. Due to these close bonds, in 1986, when President P.W. Botha declared that ‘Woodstock must become coloured as it is not a white area’ (Garside, 1993:32), Cape Town witnessed the unprecedented launch of the *Open Woodstock* campaign – a grass-roots movement against the designation of Woodstock as ‘coloured’ (ibid.). In 1987, the *Cape Times* headlined with: ‘Forget colour, says Woodstock’ (ibid.). Within a year, the apartheid government backed off and Woodstock remained ‘unproclaimed’. In short, what we can very much see here is the attitude of civil society – unified and resistant against imposition.

This is a far cry from the Woodstock of today. Residents, community officials and local NGOs all characterise the suburb as fragmented, uncommunicative and, ultimately, disinterested. There are two current approaches to ‘unite’ Woodstock. The first approach seeks to lead the subaltern with radical campaigns of protest, petition and occupation. This movement is a highly vocalised minority, with somewhat antagonistic methods of operation. The second approach is largely comprised of more ‘middle-ground’ NGOs, most notably the Development Action Group (DAG); organisations that seek to open constructive dialogue between stakeholders and effect gradualist change.

With regards to the first approach (and in line with a Gramscian interpretation of power), serious issues arise when we consider how hegemonies work. In the true vein of the national-

popular, *Reclaim the City* have assumed an intellectual and moral leadership with the promise of material reward for struggle. Yet, successful grass-roots movements cannot not be imposed but, rather, must be rooted in their own ‘moral and intellectual world’ (1971:102). In Gramscian terms, the protest movement of *Reclaim the City* is inauthentic as its claim of leadership has originated outside the group that it seeks to lead and is, arguably, an inappropriate (and thus incompetent) vehicle for rallying support. This can be seen in the disinterested character of the suburb (vis-à-vis the *Open Woodstock* campaign of 1980s).

As this middle-class movement is very much concerned with constructing identities for the local working-class as ‘oppressed’ and ‘without voice’, it may participate in the very ‘oppressive’ machinery that it claims to be fighting. On the surface, subculture movements may act out a rejection of their parent-culture values, but the efficacy of this rejection is displaced by the contradictions that remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture (Jones, 2006). This is certainly not to discount the obviously very real issues of sociospatial inequality that this research and others have questioned. Rather, the point is that *Reclaim the City* will potentially be ill-suited to fully articulate a counter-hegemony because they are also dominators when seen through their own prism of race and class. Without authentic leadership, middle-class protest movements – which deprive organic leadership of the subaltern – will find difficulty in receiving widespread support. It was, for example, integral to the development of politicised black identity, in both South Africa and the United States, that their emancipation was theorised and represented by black intellectuals (ibid.). An ‘inorganic’ intelligentsia would also likely enforce group-ideological identities (i.e. radical, socialist, Marxist, anarchist) by proxy on to the group that it seeks to lead. For instance, it would be disingenuous to champion housing rights on behalf of the homeless whilst assuming representation of their political persuasion. The power disparity between leader and led makes this usurpation all too possible.

Therefore, the second approach, with its commitment to dialogue, facilitation and negotiation, is likely more valuable. Rather than a dramatic ‘war of manoeuvre’, Gramsci termed this approach as a ‘war of position’. For comparison, he was convinced that Russia was exceptional in the circumstances<sup>50</sup> that allowed the Bolsheviks to swiftly gain control of government in the bloody October Revolution of 1917. The shockwaves of this event reverberated across Europe and radical communist factions wanted to maintain a similarly puritanical party-based movement for the overthrowing of capitalism. Gramsci was convinced, however, that negotiations with and between other parties and movements, both lateral and horizontal, was paramount. He was, however ignored, and several revolutionary movements across Europe were easily suppressed or simply fell apart due to lack of coordination and support. The point here is that, save for exceptional circumstances, discourses and/or movements are more productively shaped when hybridised with already existing attitudes, beliefs, values and norms – the pre-existing arena of civil society. To completely overpower and impose a new form of living is not only extremely unlikely in terms of its success but it would require an autocratic State apparatus to implement and maintain. Negotiation is key, and this research has shown that interested parties across the public, private and civil spheres amenable to progressive transformation can work from without *and* within to engender change. This is why this research recommends an Inclusionary Housing Policy that both leverages the position of the City as a planning and land use management regulator yet, at the same time, facilitates an institutional environment that both activates and enables the private sector to willingly participate in shared solutions.

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<sup>50</sup> Russia in 1917 was still an essentially feudal society, in which the great majority of workers were illiterate peasants (Jones, 2006:21).

## 6.6 Areas for Future Research

In considering the limitations raised above, as well as the theoretical, empirical and policy outcomes of the study, future research could be developed along two paths: one constructivist and theoretical, the other positivist and applied.

As urban regeneration continues to rise in popularity across the globe (Nedučín, Krklješ & Gajić, 2019; Chiu, Lee & Wang, 2019), a first pathway of further research could be to widen the angle of research and adopt a similar theoretical framework for other cities, comparing spatial and temporal developments, trajectories and experiences. This could yield interesting comparative insights of which channels may (or may not) form and cement local discourses on urban regeneration as well as provide windows of knowledge in to how social and political context may shape discursive developments.

A second valuable research path could be through an applied, positivist approach to test the validity of Inclusionary Housing Policy to affect change at the level of discourse and, by extension, test the broader efficacy of discursive policy intervention. Whilst such investigations are consistent with work that calls for the analysis of how exactly to better facilitate and incentivise the private sector to work with socially orientated urban regeneration (Squires, Heurkens & Peiser, 2017), a specificity is needed when investigating the post-apartheid city due to its social, cultural, historical and spatial complexities.

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## Personal Communications

*Participant A.* Former Chairperson of the SME Development Portfolio. 2017, October 2.

*Participant B.* City Ward Councillor for Cape Town. 2017, May 27.

*Participant C.* Public official in the Economic Department for the City of Cape Town. 2017, November 22.

*Participant D.* Former Chief Executive Officer for the Cape Town Partnership. 2017, October 17.

*Participant E.* Award-winning communications strategist and managing director of a major Cape Town based marketing firm. 2017, July 17.

*Participant F.* Former City Manager for Cape Town 2017, October 30.

*Participant G.* Director of a major urban NGO based in Cape Town. 2017, May 14.

*Participant H.* Mayoral Committee Member for the City of Cape Town. 2017, April 27.

*Participant I.* Architect and urban planner. 2017, October 10.

*Participant J.* Property developer based in Woodstock. 2017, May 5.

*Participant K.* Board member of the Woodstock Community Outreach Forum. 2017, May 10.

*Participant L.* Property developer based in Woodstock. 2017, June 12.

*Participant M.* Director of a property firm based in Cape Town. 2017, May 27.

*Participant N.* CEO of a large Cape Town based property group. 2017, June 14.

*Participant O.* Lower Woodstock resident and evictee of Bromwell Street. 2017, March 20.

*Participant P.* Lower Woodstock resident. 2017, March 17.

*Participant Q.* Lower Woodstock resident and evictee of Bromwell. 2017, June 8.

*Participant R.* Board member of the Woodstock Improvement District. 2017, March 24.

*Participant S.* Activist from a legal NGO based in Cape Town. 2017, April 5.

*Participant T.* Former board member of the Woodstock Improvement District. 2017, March 29.

*Participant U.* Architect and board member of the Woodstock Aesthetics Committee. 2017, March 20.

*Participant V.* Architect and heritage consultant. 2017, August 16.

*Participant W.* Heritage official at Heritage Western Cape. 2017, April 5.

*Participant X.* Heritage official for the City of Cape Town. 2017, November 10.

*Participant Y.* Programme coordinator at a major urban NGO based in Cape Town. 2017, May 14.

*Participant Z.* Project officer at a major urban NGO based in Cape Town. 2017, May 19.

*Participant Z1.* Upper Woodstock resident. 2017, August 25.

*Participant Z2.* Upper Woodstock resident. 2017, August 30.