Queer Logics: From Homonationalism to Homopopulism

By
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

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Declaration

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ABSTRACT (English)

In 2016 and 2017 Europe and North America witnessed the *coming out* of a rumoured backlash against the liberal democratic internationalist post-WWII world order. This led to and intensified a resurgence of populist-nationalist politics that manifested through an array of consecutive presidential and national elections that took place in some of the world's most prominent liberal democracies, namely the USA, Holland, France and Germany. As such, each instance represents a unique set of circumstances and contexts that influenced their internal political climates; however, a shared hegemonic positioning within the global order, along with a history of multilateral relationships, makes the consequences of these (2016/2017) populist-nationalist electoral results far-reaching and inherently global.

The populist-nationalist rhetoric of the 21st century remains closely aligned with notions of exclusionary and respectability politics, and the majority of marginalised communities remain resistant to this. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics have demonstrated new global political outcomes. With a specific focus on LGBTQ politics, this study notes that the rise of populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and North America poses a significant threat to the broader LGBTQ community across the globe. Rights advancement remains low (if present at all) on the domestic and foreign agendas of (right-wing) political entities. This study is particularly interested in the increasing public support for populist-nationalist groups coming from segments of the LGBTQ community itself. As such, it argues that in contrast to previous decades, the 21st century is presenting a new type of LGBTQ politics.

Through employing the lenses of Queer IR, Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" and Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*, this study seeks to expose what it calls "queer collusions" by understanding what seems to be an unconventional and counterintuitive political phenomenon. Through bringing these theories and concepts into conversation, this study conceptualises what it calls a "political and historical shift in European and North American LGBTQ politics," that is, from *Homonationalism* (post-9/11) to *Homopopulism* (post-Orlando/ISIS). The theorisation of *Homopopulism* thus assists in understanding the dynamics associated with this shift, particularly the inclusion of the politics of fear against the backdrop of a declining (neo)liberal world order.

Homopopulism therefore reveals the queer logics of populism, the fearful queer sovereign subjects that authorise it, and the fear-based sovereign leaders who deploy it.

ABSTRACT (isiXhosa)

Ngo-2016 nango-2017, iYurophu noMntla Melika zangqina ukuphuma kwamarhe embuyekezo achasane ne-Liberal Democratic-Internationalist emva kommiselo wehlabathi weMfazwe yesiBini (WWII). Oku kwenze iziphumo nemivuka yendumo-zwe zepolitiki eyathi yabonakaliswa kwintlaninge yonyulo jikelele elandelelanayo yamazwe neyeenkulumbuso eyathatyathwa kwezinye zezizwe ezihlonitshiweyo zeNkululeko yeDemokrasi, ezinjenge- US, iFransi neJamani. Kungoko ke, isehlo ngasinye sahlukile ngemeko nangesimo-ntlalo esiphembelela isimo sezepolitiki, nangona, ubunkokheli obabelanayo kwezezwe lonke kunye nembali yamacala amaninzi obudlelwane enza iziphumo (2016/2017) zohlaselo ezingalindelekanga zonyulo yendumo-zwe zingafikeleleki kwaye zayanyaniswe kwihlabathi jikelele.

Ubuciko bendumo-zwe yenkulungwane yama-21 ihleli isondele izayamanise nembono yezopolitiki yokwahlula neyokuhlonela kwaye noninzi loluntu olukumda wentlupheko ongagqithekiyo luhleli lungagungi. Kodwa ke, inthsukumo yomhlaba yezopolitiki ibonakalise iziphumo ezintsha kwezopolitiki lwehlabathi jikelele. Kujoliswe ngokukodwa kwezopolitiki ze- LGBTQ, esi sifundo siqaphela ukuba ukukhula kwendumo-zwe kwimbali kukhulise iiNkululeko zeDemokrasi eYurophu naseMntla Melika kwenza isisongelo esibalulekileyo kuluntu lwe-LGBTQ ngokubanzi kwihlabathi jikelele. Ukuphuhliswa kwamalungelo kusahleli kusezantsi kwezekhaya nakwezangaphandla ii-agenda ezinxulunyaniswa nemibutho yezopolitiki yasekunene. Esi sifundo sibonakalisa umdla ekwandeni kwenkxaso yoluntu yamaqela endumo-zwe avela kwizintsu ze-LGBTQ ubuqu. Kungoko ke, sixoxa ngokuchasene nezimvo zeshumi leminyaka edlulileyo, inkulungwane yama-21 idandalazisa uhlobo olutsha lwezepolitiki lwe-LGBTQ.

Ngokusebenzisa imbono ka-Queer IR, Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" no-Jasbir Paur's (2007b) Homonationalism, esi sifundo sefuna ukudandalazisa oko ikubiza ngokuba yi-"queer collusions" ngokuqonda imeko yezopoitiki ekhangeleka ngathi ayiqhelekanga nechasaneyo nokuqonda izinto ngokuziva (intuitive). Ngokudibanisa ezithiyori zingentla nesigama kwincoko, esisifundo sivelisa isigama esibizwa ngokuba yi- "lutshintsho kwezopolitiki nembali lwe- LGBTQ e-Yurophu naseMntla Melika" okuthi, ukususela kwi- Homonationalism (emva ko-9/11) ukuya ku- Homopopulism (emva kwe-Orlando/ISIS). Ukubhalwa kwethiyori ye-Homopopulism kuncedisa ekuqondeni ubucukubhede obunxulanyaniswe notshintsho, ingakumbi ukufakwa kwepolitiki zoloyiko (fear-politics) omva kokuhla (neo) kommiselo komgaqo wehlabathi.

I -*Homopopulism* ke ngoko ityhila ingqiqo engaqhelekanga yendumo, abalawuli aboyikekayo abanika imvume yoko, neenkokheli ezisekelwe-kuloyiko ezilumiselayo.

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I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who supported me with this project. My supervisors Prof. Pieter Fourie and Prof. Amanda Gouws for the friendship and exceptional supervision. To Pieter for being so readily available, for always listening, and for sharing your expertise and wisdom. To Amanda, for your knowledge, experience, and material support as SARChi Chair in Gender Politics. To the South African Research Chairs Initiative and the National Research Foundation for funding my studies. To my colleagues in the Department of Political Science, who all offered valuable insights and contributions to me personally and towards my research. To my key informants, Prof. Judge, Prof. Bouchard, Dr Coleman Chavez and Dr Fransch for sharing their thoughts, and to Edwin Hees for editing. To my family and friends for all their unconditional support. To my partner Luke Akal for all the love you've shared; you were at the frontline from the start and I owe much of this to you. Finally, to the many members of the LGBTQ community, past, present and future who continue to fight, often under trying circumstances, for freedom and justice.

List of Acronyms

AFD	Alternative for Germany
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BREXIT	British Exit (from the European Union)
EU	European Union
FN	Front National
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GLF	Gay Liberation Front
GQS	Global Queer Studies
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRC	Human Rights Campaign
IR	International Relations
ISA	International Studies Association
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer
LGBTQIAP	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual, and Pansexual
MEDA	Middle East and North Africa
MSM	Men Who have Sex with Men
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NYC	New York City
REC	Research Ethics Committee
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

US	United States
USA	United States of America
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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Interview Questions

The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews with the study's key informants:

1. Do you believe that the majority of members of the LGBTQ community are inherently progressive when it comes to their political stances? Particularly on issues of immigration, security and war.
2. Do you think LGBTQ rights advancement is an overwhelming priority for LGBTQ politics?
3. Do you think that mature Liberal Democracies have achieved significant inroads when it comes to LGBTQ rights advancement and equal citizenship?
4. Do you think that LGBTQ identity is an important factor when it comes to LGBTQ political behaviour?
5. Do you think that events such as the Orlando massacre have impacted LGBTQ views on immigration, security and war?
6. Do you think that immigration, globalisation and regional integration have advanced or regressed LGBTQ quality of life?
7. Do you think that more LGBTQ individuals are supporting populist-nationalist political parties and candidates in Europe and the US?
8. If so, why do you think this is the case?
9. Do you think that there is a fundamental shift in LGBTQ political prioritisation, specifically from rights advancement to security in Europe and North America?
10. Do you think Homonationalism (Puar, 2007b) is sufficient in explaining such phenomenon?
11. Do you think that populism and the politics of fear are used to entice and intimidate LGBTQ voters?
12. Do you think that more LGBTQ individuals will support populist-nationalist policies in the future, even if they do not condone LGBTQ rights advancement?

Key informants

Associate Professor Bouchard, Danielle. Interview conducted on 29 June 2018. Dr Bouchard is an Associate Professor in the Women's and Gender Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Her expertise is in the fields of postcolonial and poststructuralist feminisms, critical sexuality studies, and queer theory.

Assistant Professor Coleman Chavez, Daniel. Interview conducted on 19 July 2018. Reference to Dr Coleman Chavez will be made with the pronouns their/them/they throughout this study. This is at the request of the key informant because of their disclosure of identifying as Transmasculine. Dr Coleman Chavez is an Assistant Professor in the Women's and Gender Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Their expertise is in the fields of gender and sexuality; decolonial thought and praxis; queer theory; transnational LGBTQ thought; trans studies; performance studies; oral history; local-global race relations and feminism.

Doctor Fransch, Chet. Interview conducted on 24 July 2018. Dr Fransch is a lecturer in the History Department at Stellenbosch University. His expertise is in the fields of sexual violence, race, and the histories of homosexuality.

Adjunct Associate Professor Judge, Melanie. Interview conducted on 2 July 2018. Prof. Judge is an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Law Faculty at the University of Cape Town and a long-time queer activist and scholar. She is an expert on policy and law reform around gender and sexuality rights, particularly in regard to homophobia-related violence, identity, politics and social justice. She recently published the book *Blackwashing Homophobia: Violence and the Politics of Sexuality, Gender and Race* (Routledge, 2018).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction & Rationale

Background

In 2016 and 2017 Europe and North America witnessed the *coming out* of a rumoured "shift" in the liberal democratic internationalist post-WWII world order. This manifested in an array of consecutive presidential and national elections that took place in some of the world's most prominent liberal democracies in these two years, namely the USA, Holland, France and Germany. As such, each instance represented a unique set of circumstances and contexts that influenced their internal political climates; however, a shared hegemonic positioning within the global order along with a history of multilateral relationships, made the consequences of such electoral outcomes far-reaching and inherently global. Such dynamics, along with similar geopolitical foundations and the shared implications of prominent global events, including 9/11, the global financial crisis, and the EU migration crisis, have led to a popular backlash, both in rhetoric and action, against the liberal democratic internationalist status quo that emerged after WWII. The consequential rise of populist-nationalist movements throughout Europe and North America have manifested into significant electoral inroads and resulted in victories that have had, and could continue to have, radical implications for the globe and broader societal relations in predominantly liberal democratic and global dispensations (Broning, 2016). In her interview Judge (2018) states the following in this regard:

> We have seen an erosion of the radical potential of democracy in the global North. A corrosion of a post-WWII consensus that ushered in more radical possibilities both in terms of social relationships but also in terms of economic relationships (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

The very nature of populist-nationalist ideology embodies the politics of fear and intolerance, and in this context an ever-growing backlash against what is perceived as political correctness and an increasingly "soft" and "weak" (feminine, homosexual) Western nation-state (Weber, 1999). The millennial (21st century) nation-state is thus framed as an embodiment of global values that seek to disrupt and erase traditional and historical national identities, more specifically through the promotion of multiculturalism, internationalism and tolerance. Prominent global events that resulted in widespread violence and suffering are therefore pinned, rationally and irrationally, on an ever increasing perceived inability of the Western nation-state to maintain control of its sovereignty in the midst of rapid globalisation.

The war on terror, a policy adopted by the USA and Europe following a series of "on-soil" terrorist attacks after 9/11, saw the first radical shift in domestic and international approaches in Europe and North America. Interventions in the Middle East, accompanied by heightened surveillance and incarceration, ignited the first 21st century debate on human rights and security in an age of advanced biometric technology and drone warfare (Monaco, 2017). The 2007/2008 global financial crisis acted as a further catalyst for the advancement of anti-globalisation rhetoric, as integrated economies that were established under widely supported multilateral agreements resulted in amplified and widespread financial implications for states that had little to do with the source of the crisis (Edey, 2009). The Arab Spring in 2011 created instability and numerous power vacuums throughout the Middle East, opening up space for radical groups to operate with little regulation. In 2013 one such group, ISIS, became the first radical Islamic organisation to establish control over a vast territory, utilising social media to recruit and instigate attacks on Western nations and associated liberal democratic values.

Two years later in 2015, during a protracted civil war in Syria, Europe was struck by a mass migration crisis, a pivotal moment where Europe was forced either to maintain its historically liberal democratic internationalist ideology or revert to closing its borders in the name of protecting its economies and broader national identity. Whilst some European nations such as Germany allowed refugees to enter the country, many EU member states, such as Hungary, resisted in the name of security. This was a result of both top-down and bottom-up resistance, as a growing consensus amongst citizens in Europe was that an influx of refugees would harbour terrorism, put a strain on their economies and erode their national identities. The implications of this, further exacerbated by the Paris and Orlando attacks in 2016, were an increase in support for re/established populist-nationalist political entities, and a marked shift amongst established political groups towards populist-nationalist rhetoric as a means to maintain electoral support (Roth, 2017).

In 2016 the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the USA elected Donald Trump as President. Both these events acted as an electoral outlet for the people of Europe and North America, as they represented a "resistance vote" to established liberal democratic internationalist norms. In France, Holland and Germany populist-nationalist political parties were followed closely by the media; Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and the newly established Alternative for Germany (AFD) aligned themselves with the new "resistance" to the socio-economic and political establishment, offering radical

reforms in the areas of immigration, security, multilateralism and the economy, on the basis of protecting national identity and interests. Although none of these "resistance clubs" achieved an all-out electoral victory in their respective political races, significant electoral gains occurred, positioning these entities at the heart of decision-making centres throughout Europe and North America (Broning, 2016).

The implications of such phenomena raise questions about the roles and positioning of various interest groups and minorities residing in these regions. Non-citizens and immigrants remain the ultimate target of both state and non-state sponsored violence. However, women, LGBTQ groups and people of colour have found themselves closely associated with the perceived breakdown in traditional values, and as active proponents of multiculturalism and liberal democratic internationalism. Judge (2018) states the following in this regard:

> If you look at emerging neo-Fascist and reactionary political leadership, a key characteristic is their homophobia, their transphobia and their misogyny. The racism and the misogyny and the homophobia congeal and come together, so you cannot think of these systems of power apart from one another (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

With specific reference to gender and sexual dynamics, the historical rhetoric of populist-nationalist groups has positioned women in traditional roles, occupying the private space with domestic and reproductive imperatives. LGBTQ individuals were framed as unnatural and opponents of a broader desire to preserve morality and family values. As a result, over the past four decades a majority of women and LGBTQ individuals have traditionally resisted this discourse as a (for the most part) united, progressive force striving for equal rights. The populist-nationalist rhetoric of the 21st century remains closely aligned with the notions of respectability politics, and the majority of women and LGBTQ individuals remain resistant to this trend. However, the shifting geopolitical dynamics in Europe and North America, exemplified by the abovementioned global events, have had specific implications for women and the LGBTQ community.

With a specific focus on the LGBTQ community and the politics of queerness, the advancement of rights in historically mature liberal democracies has been significant over the past ten years. Legal/state recognition of same-sex couples, marriage equality, anti-discrimination and work place protection now form the basis of much US and European state legislation in this regard (Drucker, 2016). Public opinion of homosexuality and trans* issues have also shifted dramatically: a Pew Research Centre "Global Trends & Attitudes" Poll in 2013 indicated a broad acceptance of homosexuality across Europe and North America, with

"greater acceptance in more secular and affluent countries" (Pew Research Center, 2013). Furthermore, two liberal democratic nations (Ireland and Australia) made history by voting overwhelmingly in favour of marriage equality by means of a public referendum. The famous 2011 Human Rights Day speech by Hillary Clinton in her capacity as Secretary of State also saw LGBTQ issues thrust into the global arena and insert itself into the foreign policy objectives of many liberal democratic states, particularly under the umbrella of human rights (Altman & Symons, 2016).

Such phenomena have resulted in the hardening of the boundaries between Western and non-Western states, exemplified through the parameters of modernity. The West has positioned itself as a vanguard for global LGBTQ rights advancement against the backdrop of hostile resistance to LGBTQ issues in many non-Western countries, and more specifically non-secular Arab and African nations. Within the context of growing populist-nationalist sentiment in Europe and North America, along with an associated resentment of non-Western "values," the global divide between pro-LGBTQ and anti-LGBTQ has begun to play itself out within international and domestic spheres. This has been further exacerbated by targeted attacks on the LGBTQ community by radical Islamic groups over the past five years, with significant attention being drawn to the Orlando club shooting in 2016 and the widely propagated public executions of homosexuals by ISIS (Wilson, 2016). This is further substantiated by Bouchard (2018) in her interview: "[The] Orlando [massacre] has been mobilised in that [populist-nationalist] way. LGBTQ rights in the US are becoming conjoined with securitisation and militarisation" (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018).

This "us vs them" narrative has been successfully adopted by a number of politicians, surprisingly by many within the populist-nationalist camp. Although many remain resistant to marriage equality, as this resonates with their traditional and conservative support base, Marine Le Penn, Geert Wilders, Donald Trump and the AFD actively campaigned in favour of protecting the LGBTQ community against "violent foreign ideologies" that seek to erode American and European (Western) values of tolerance and human rights (Feder et al., 2017). As a result, such sentiments have begun to resonate with members of the LGBTQ community residing in these regions, particularly within the context of a growing status of equal citizenry (rights advancement), material access and consumerism. Reported cases of homophobic and transphobic violence being perpetrated by non-citizens (immigrants), particularly of Arab and African descent (Shubert et al., 2017), may have amplified a possible re-alignment of LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America, with activist sentiments demonstrating the

potential moving away from historical solidarity and coalition-building, to prioritising security through national and cultural regulation (Rogers, 2017).

There is indeed an assumption that LGBTQ individuals are inherently progressive, an assumption based on broader historical and traditional sentiments. From the 1970s to the early 2000s the visibility of the LGBTQ community within social justice and progressive circles was overwhelmingly evident, particularly at the height of HIV/AIDS and equal rights activism. This can be supported by statistical and electoral outlets; however, recent data expose a number of developing trends in this regard. In February 2017 a poll conducted through the gay social networking application "Hornet" surveyed approximately 3,200 users prior to the first round of the 2017 French elections. This sample of predominately gay men of average age of 26 provides an informed perspective on a number of areas that fall within the parameters of this subject matter (Martet, 2017).

The first finding was that gay men are mobilised and active politically, with 92% of the participants stating that they intended to vote in both rounds of the election. The second finding was that gay men are indeed shifting their ideological allegiances from traditionally voting for left-aligned groups (33.2% of the respondents indicated that they voted for Socialist Party candidate Francois Hollande in 2012) to centre and right-aligned groups; 13.3% of the respondents indicated that they voted for anti-equal rights candidate Marine Le Penn in 2012, with 19.3% (one in five) respondents indicating that they intended to vote for her in 2017 – a 6% growth in five years. In line with national trends, centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron garnered 38.1% support from the respondents. The third relevant finding was that, when asked to rank important issues that need addressing in French society (participants were given 8 options), Work (77%), Education (49.6%) and Security (45.1%) overwhelmingly occupied the first three positions. LGBTQ rights (36%) ranked in fifth position, whilst HIV/AIDS support received the lowest ranking at approximately 8.1% (Martet, 2017).

Whilst fully acknowledging the contextual dynamics of this poll, particularly that it exclusively surveys gay men living in France, it does point to a growing trend in historically mature liberal democracies. This is particularly relevant when noting Coleman Chavez's (2018) interview statement that: "No, [LGBTQ people are] definitely not inherently progressive, or radical anymore. Nowadays thinking critically about anything is against the nation" (Interview, Daniel Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018).

Such behaviour has been problematised in various academic and activist circles, particularly through the lenses of *Homonationalism* as conceptualised by Jasbir Puar in 2007 (Puar, 2007b, 2017) and Queer IR (Weber, 2016a, 2016b). Although theorised extensively over the past decade, rapidly increasing LGBTQ (public) support (including candidate and campaign participation) for populist-nationalist entities and a subsequent decline in support for liberal democratic internationalist values in Europe and North America as demonstrated in the most recent national elections requires further exploration.

Problem Statement

LGBTQ politics have occupied a prominent space in Europe and North America over the past four decades, with significant policy inroads being made in the areas of rights advancement and equal citizenship (decriminalisation, marriage equality, anti-discrimination). In recent years (after 2011) this has become an extension of the liberal democratic nation-state in the global arena (LGBT rights as human rights), often hardening the boundaries between East and West, North and South through contested approaches. At the receiving end, many members of the LGBTQ community live under the threat of violence from both state and non-state actors across the globe. As such, there is still a significant amount of work to be done in order to extend equal citizenship and protection to millions of LGBTQ individuals around the world. Many liberal democratic nation-states have indeed played a central role in driving LGBTQ issues domestically and globally, predominantly because of the prominence of (permitted) political activism from LGBTQ communities (and Allies) residing in these regions.

The rise of populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and North America poses a significant threat to the broader LGBTQ community across the globe, as rights advancement remains low (if present at all) on the domestic and foreign agendas of associated (right-wing) political entities. What is particularly interesting is the increasing public support for populist-nationalist groups coming from segments of the LGBTQ community, specifically (white) gay men and lesbian women. In contrast to previous decades, the 21st century may be presenting a new type of LGBTQ politics, one that no longer considers sexual and gender identity, and solidarity activism, as guiding components for political behaviour. Notions of queer political and historical shifts have been problematised by queer theorist Jasbir Puar (2007b) in her book: *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, and through subsequent academic explorations. Puar's (2007b) conceptualisation of *Homonationalism* attempts to expose a possible "facet of modernity and

a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality" (Puar, 2013b: 337). This offers a unique lens by means of which to understand 21st century LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America.

The problem now is that there is an ostensibly successful populist-nationalist backlash against the established liberal order in Europe and North America. Subsequently, there are increasing numbers of LGBTQ individuals in Europe and North America who are publicly supporting populist-nationalist political entities. Moreover, many of these predominantly anti-LGBTQ entities are employing strategies to further increase support from gay and lesbian voters. As such, the aim of this study is to understand why and to what extent this seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon is taking place, and whether such a phenomenon indicates a paramount shift in LGBTQ politics. Furthermore, through applying the lenses of Queer IR and *Homonationalism*, this study seeks to explore whether Puar's (2007b) concepts require further theorisation within the context of what Campani & Lazaridis (2017) call a "populist shift."

Puar's (2007b, 2017) conceptualisations of *Homonationalism* in conjunction with Weber's (2016a, 2016b) theorisations and applications of the "queer logics of statecraft" and fearful sovereignty and patriotism, will be applied to assist in solving this problem.

Research Questions

The study is guided by one primary and three secondary research questions.

Is there an LGBTQ political shift taking place in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America?

The three secondary questions are as follows:

1. Does this potential shift entail a move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ rights advancement?
2. Does Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* have the theoretical scope to identify, describe and explain queer politics in the context of this potential shift?
3. Does Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" assist in identifying, describing and explaining the collusions *and/or* resistances that may form from this potential shift?

Theoretical Approaches

In order to solve the research problem and answer the research questions, this study will employ the lenses of Queer International Relations (IR) Theory. More specifically, it will explore Jasbir Puar's (2007b; 2017) theorisation of *Homonationalism* in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (2007b) and *Homonationalism in Trump Times* (2017). It will further utilise the work of Cynthia Weber (2016a; 2016b) and her theorisation of "queer logics of statecraft" (2016) as well as her Queer IR analysis in *Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump* (2016b).

Queer Theory is a field of study that critically explores and disrupts notions of sex, gender and sexuality within conventional analysis. As such, it aims to expose the power dynamics associated with prescriptive heterosexual and hetero/homonormative hierarchies and binary constructions, and in this context within the frameworks of conventional Political and International Relations (IR) theorising. Since Queer Theory's emergence in the 1990s, prominent queer theorists such as Sedgewick (1990, 1993), Butler (1990, 1993) and Berlant and Warner (1998) have played a significant role in developing and endorsing Queer Theory as a political tool. This marked shift from identity-based gay and lesbian studies to an embrace of dissident, non-representational politics has developed significantly as a framework for analysis. In doing so, Queer Theory's far-reaching and interdisciplinary scope has become embedded in many fields across the spectrum of the social sciences, particularly for the purpose of understanding and disrupting power and facets of identity such as race, class, sexuality, gender, nationality and so forth.

The queering of International Relations (IR) has rarely been discussed until recently. Cynthia Weber (2014b) has consistently challenged the field/discipline of International Relations (IR) in this regard. In her article "Why is there no Queer International Theory?" Weber (2014b) claims that Queer Studies has indeed become "Global Queer Studies", generating new and significant insights into fundamental global political processes. In referring to the work of Puar (2007b), Agathangelou (2013) and Scott (2013), Weber (2014b) highlights the point that queer themes around empirical practices and global hegemony do exist. She thus critiques the hierarchies associated with the study of IR by asking "Why does there *appear* to be no Queer International Theory?" (Weber, 2014b: 29).

Cynthia Weber (2016a; 2016b) has since sought to develop the necessary theoretical and methodological frameworks with which to produce Queer IR analysis. In her book

Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, Weber (2016a) outlines the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Queer IR, exposing what she terms "queer logics of statecraft" through drawing from various theoretical and conceptual poststructuralist, queer and IR contributions. This tool for analysis is deployed throughout her book in various case studies, particularly that of Eurovision winner Conchita/Wurst, and the subsequent (*either/or*) global response to their (*and/or*) Otherness. More recently, Weber (2016b) sought to further apply her work by producing a Queer IR analysis of the election of Donald Trump in her article "Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump." Here she exposes what she terms the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" (white, Christian, American), which was figured to authorise a fear-based agenda of the sovereign leader (Trump). The work of Cynthia Weber and the abovementioned two texts (2016a, 2016b), inform a significant part of the theoretical and methodological core of this study.

Furthermore, particular attention is paid to Weber's (2014b) and Schotten's (2014) assertion that Queer Theory, and Queer IR more specifically, are useful for understanding international/global modes of collusion and resistance. In this regard, *Homonationalism* provides the necessary queer lens with which to understand 21st century LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America, also contributing significantly to the theoretical core of this study.

In her book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* queer theorist Jasbir Puar (2007b) seeks to expose complicit and collusive gay, lesbian and feminist approaches to war, securitisation, terrorism, immigration and nationalism. In doing so, she argues that certain segments of the LGBTQ community participate in liberal missionary projects that seek to protect and liberate both non-Western women and queer people from the patriarchy and homophobia that is closely associated with predominantly non-secular societies. Such discourses, she argues, often collude with imperial, neoliberal and nationalistic objectives of the hegemonic US nation-state, occupying a space of moral supremacy attributed to a perceived sexual openness aligned with modernity. Through combining the terms "Homonormative" (Berlant & Warner, 1998; Duggan, 2002, 2003) and "Nationalism" (post-9/11 patriotism and citizenship), Puar (2007a) conceptualises *Homonationalism* as an analytical means to locate her claims. In doing so, she states that her theory explores a reorientation of power relations associated with the nation-state, neoliberalism and sexuality.

> Rather than emphasizing the resistant or oppositional, I seek to exhume the convivial relations between queernesses and militarism, securitization, war, terrorism, surveillance technologies,

> empire, torture, nationalism, globalization, fundamentalism, secularism, incarceration, detention, deportation, and neoliberalism: the tactics, strategies, and logistics of our contemporary war machines (Puar, 2007b: xiv)

The term "Homonationalism" has been developed significantly over the last decade with various contributions and critiques now forming the basis of its conceptual framework. It has also transformed into a popular catchphrase within activist circles, often utilised to describe LGBTQ individuals who are racist, assimilatory and/or conservative. Puar (2013) defends the analytics of her original conceptualisation, cautioning against prescriptive notions in an attempt to maintain its theoretical utility. She does, however, acknowledge its "viral" transformation as a positive campaign for drawing attention to themes associated with regulation, discipline and state control (Puar 2012).

The lenses of Queer IR and *Homonationalism* provide the necessary gaze with which to understand the interaction between LGBTQ politics and increasing populist-nationalism in Europe and North America (see Chapters 4 and 5). According to Puar (2007b; 2013a), a growing neoliberal collusion is amplifying a growing division amongst segments of the LGBTQ community, particularly along the lines of race, class and nationality. As such, *Homonationalism* is often, but not exclusively, manifested through the post-9/11 gay or lesbian (white) citizen and patriot. Through constructing this queer subject of the US nation-state, Puar (2007b) positions LGBTQ politics within a transitional timeframe that illustrates its development from radical solidarity activism to (neo)liberal hegemonic politics (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.4).

Following the publication of *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* in 2007, times have indeed queered even further. This has coincided with events such as the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, the EU migration crisis, Brexit, the Orlando massacre, and the election of Donald Trump, simultaneously producing and demonstrating significant shifts in global geopolitics that point to relevant themes associated with *Homonationalism*. Expanding its original theoretical scope by applying the concept with the purpose of exploring the political dynamics of the last decade (since 2007) may provide new insights into queer politics, and an impending shift in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America.

Understanding such a shift requires both the application and further theorisation of *Homonationalism* as an analytic, more specifically from *Homonationalism* to *Homopopulism*. As such, a new queer disciplinary subject is formed when the works of Puar (2007b, 2017),

Weber (2016a, 2016b) and Wodak (2015) are brought into conversation (see Chapter 5). As will be discussed throughout this study, the exploration of the development of *Homopopulism* assists in exposing the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject" – an authorising queer subject of a fear-based (populist-nationalist) sovereign leader who employs "queer logics of statecraft" as a means to figure versions of sovereignty (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2007b, 2017; Wodak, 2015).

Research Design and Methods

In order to explain LGBTQ political shifts and *Homopopulism* in Europe and North America, this study has consulted a number of academic journals, books, articles and online sources to collect information. The method used to collect the information for this study was predominantly through consulting secondary sources. As such, this research is for the most part limited to a desktop study. However, limited primary data were also collected by conducting interviews. As a student of both Stellenbosch University and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro whilst conducting this research, the secondary data used were accessed through the libraries and databases of these two institutions. The sources used were focused on themes associated with Queer Theory, Queer International Relations, Homonationalism, carceral politics, LGBTQ history, global politics of Europe and North America, populism studies, and LGBTQ, Queer, gender and feminist studies. This study greatly benefited from the in-depth semi-structured interviews. The interviews that were conducted discussed LGBTQ perspectives on the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America, and the key informants were carefully selected based on their association with and expertise on LGBTQ issues, Queer Theory, Queer IR, Homonationalism, global politics, International Relations, and gender, sexuality and feminist studies.

According to Burnham et al. (2008: 39), a research method is the logical structure of the research inquiry that the social scientist is engaged in. As such, the research method that was deemed appropriate for this study is a qualitative method. Qualitative research involves collecting in-depth information from a relatively limited number of sources. This type of research is more concerned with issues of an intricate nature, particularly the richness, texture and feeling of raw data, because its deductive approach emphasises developing insights and generalisations from the data collected (Neuman 2005: 137). In this way the study seeks to contribute to existing data.

A case study design was found to be most useful for this study. Case study designs are extremely popular and widely used throughout the social sciences. According to Burnham et al. (2008: 65), a case study design can be based on single or multiple cases. As such, carefully selected case(s) can provide a robust test of a theory. The case study design enables this study to describe and conceptualise the phenomenon of LGBTQ political shifts in Europe and North America. This study examines one case study, namely the rise of (LGBTQ) populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. Whilst it does focus on the historically mature (European and North American) liberal democratic nation-state in general, this study focuses more specifically on France, Germany, Holland and the United States as examples in the light of their recent national elections (2016-2017).

The purpose of selecting these examples is not necessarily for comparative purposes. These examples provide an interesting look into the interaction between LGBTQ politics and populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. It is precisely as a result of the hegemonic positioning of the historically mature liberal democratic nation-state within global political dynamics that LGBTQ political shifts are analysed within the theoretical framework of Queer IR and *Homonationalism* presented by Jasbir Puar (2007b, 2017) and Weber (2016a, 2016b). This case study and these examples illustrate the political behaviour of the liberal democratic nation-state and LGBTQ individuals, their collusion and resistance, and the (re)orientation of their positioning within global politics.

Ethical Considerations

Addressing ethical considerations is imperative when conducting research in the social sciences, in particular with regards to the collection of primary data. As such, research ethics have been followed with precision throughout this study. The primary data were collected by conducting interviews. Key informants were carefully selected based on their expertise and association with the themes discussed throughout. Confidentiality of key informants is strictly maintained. If applicable, the identity of the key informant is disclosed, depending on their permission to disclose their identity or not. This study follows the strict guidelines as set out by Stellenbosch University's Research Ethics Committee (REC) for Humanities, which granted ethical clearance.

Outline of Study

Chapter 1 is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction to, and formulation of, the research question and objectives. The background to this study is provided along with a theoretical framework for the study. This chapter identifies the research problem and states

the research questions that are posed to guide this study. This chapter focuses on the research design and research methodology. This study also acknowledges the ethical considerations relevant to the gathering of primary data.

Chapter 2 is a literature and historical review of LGBT and Queer. It notes the complexities of identity terminologies. It provides a historical overview of the 20th century with reference to the Nazi persecutions, the homophile movement, Stonewall and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It reviews the development of Queer social movements, from gay liberation to equality and to queer, and the associated methodologies for resistance. Furthermore, this chapter explores the political deployment of LGBTQ manifesting specifically in the movement for marriage equality and the international political juncture of LGBTQ Rights as Human Rights. Finally, it reviews the academic, conceptual and theoretical developments associated with LGBTQ, specifically gay and lesbian studies, poststructuralism and Queer Theory.

Chapter 3 is a literature and historical review of populism and Western politics (Europe and North America). It explores terminologies of populism, particularly with regards to the ideological dispensations of left-wing vs right-wing populism. The chapter provides an historical contextualisation of 21st century politics by exploring prominent and far-reaching global events and responses such as the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU migration crisis, among others. It frames this contextualisation with purpose of exposing a growing backlash against globalisation and the subsequent rise of populist-nationalism. It then provides a historical review of the academic and political development of populism.

Chapter 4 is a theoretical chapter that explores Queer IR and *Homonationalism.* It begins with Queer International Relations (IR) Theory, its journey from Queer to Global Queer Studies, to Queer IR. It then tracks the historical development of Queer IR. In doing so, the chapter explores the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft", acknowledging the theoretical contributions of Foucault (1979), Haraway (1997), Butler (1999) and Ashley (1989), among others. It further explores the historical and theoretical journey of the widely deployed term *Homonationalism.* In doing so, the chapter unpacks the theoretical contributions (US sexual exceptionalism, Queer as regulatory and the ascendency of whiteness) to *Homonationalism* in its founding text by Jasbir K. Puar (2007b).

Chapter 5 is an application chapter that examines the shift from *Homonationalism* to *Homopopulism*. It begins with Weber's (2016b) application of her Queer IR theoretical and

methodological developments to the 2016 election of Donald Trump as US President. It argues that the Trump campaign employed queer *and/or* logics in figuring authorising (fearful) sovereign subjects. It then argues against Puar's (2017) assertion that the current political scene is not exceptional, going further to claim that *Homonationalism* requires an expansion of its theoretical scope. It then takes on the task of expanding theoretical scope of the concept of *Homonationalism*. It does so by conceptualising *Homopopulism* as an analytic of the politics of queer *and/or* the politics of fear.

Chapter 6 draws conclusions based on the study as a whole. These conclusions address the identified research problem and research questions. Conclusions are offered on an LGBTQ political shift in Europe and North America, as well as on the contributions of theory towards understanding this political phenomenon. Finally, this chapter identifies areas for further research.

CHAPTER 2

A Modern History of LGBT & Queer

Introduction

For thousands of years homosexuality and gender non-conformity have featured in the histories of humankind. From the Ancient Greeks and Romans to the Renaissance kings and queens of Europe, gender and sexuality have been documented in the social relations in diverse cultures and communities. Whilst the prominence and existence of homosexuality and gender non-conformity have been accepted, ignored and persecuted throughout history, the politics associated with the LGBTQ community has proven to be inherently formidable and influential. This politics has consistently embodied oppression, discrimination and associated taboos. It has resulted in societal tensions, religious persecutions and socio-political disruptions. Queer politics has even participated in the downfall of political regimes, wars and mass economic turmoil. Most importantly, the LGBTQ community has suffered immensely at the hands of society, the state and dominant social and global systems. In recent years such oppression has been challenged through various mechanisms, and in some respects successfully occupied a moral positioning within a broader rights-based political enlightenment. Whilst notable tensions remain in this regard, reviewing the history that led the LGBTQ community to this point is as important now as it has ever been. For the purpose of this study, any discussion of 21st century queer politics cannot be explored without a discussion of what occurred before. This is particularly relevant in the light of Fransch's (2018) statement that "Historical influence is a very important factor to consider when examining LGBTQ politics" (Interview, Chet Fransch, 24/07/2018).

This chapter provides a comprehensive review and contextualisation of the historical and academic underpinnings of LGBT and Queer. It begins by noting the complexities of the terminologies of the associated themes, attempting to explore rather than definitively categorise the various groupings within the LGBTQ community. This chapter proceeds with a historical overview of the 20th century to explore the Nazi persecutions, the homophile movement, Stonewall and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Doing so entails a review of the development of Queer social movements, from gay liberation to equality and to queer, at the same time attempting to differentiate the methodologies for resistance and the associated tensions in this regard. Furthermore, this chapter explores the political deployment of LGBTQ manifesting specifically in the movement for marriage equality and the international political juncture of LGBTQ rights as human rights. Finally, it reviews the academic,

conceptual and theoretical developments associated with LGBTQ, specifically gay and lesbian studies, Poststructuralism and Queer Theory.

The overall purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the research questions and to provide an overview of LGBTQ as political, activist and intellectual. In doing so, it demonstrates the evolving background of LGBTQ politics, highlighting both the interventions and general phenomena that led to the LGBTQ of 2018. With specific reference to *Homonationalism* and the rise of *Homopopulism*, this contextualisation is imperative in providing the foundation for understanding the political shifts in 21st century LGBTQ politics.

Terminology

Sexuality & Gender

There is often confusion around the meanings of, and differences between, the terms sex, gender and sexuality. Whilst all are equally important when discussing themes associated with gender and sexual politics, it is imperative to understand the associated distinctions, tensions and power-relations.

Sex: refers to a biological and/or physiological assignment, that is, it is a medically constructed definition associated with one's chromosome alignments and apparent genitalia (Bornstein, 2013).

Gender: is more commonly associated with a sociocultural phenomenon, more specifically a social construct. It can be aligned with one's "given" sex; however, this is not necessarily always the case. Whilst it inherently divides people into various categories (male, female, other) based on features, characteristics and behaviours, the deployment of "Queer", "Trans*" and "Other" narratives seeks to disrupt the normative constructions of gender. Judith Butler (1990a) famously argues that gender is a "performance" stating that: "When we say gender is performed, we usually mean that we've taken on a role or we're acting in some way and that our acting or our role playing is crucial to the gender that we are and the gender that we present to the world" (Butler, 1990a).

Sexuality: refers to a person's sexual and/or erotic interests in and attraction to others. This can be associated with physical and emotional arousal as well as a capacity to have erotic experiences with others. Sexuality is closely associated with sexual orientation, where one's attractions are defined by one's sexual interest in men, women, both, other and/or none (Bornstein, 2013).

LGBTQIA+

Often referred to as the "alphabet soup", the LGBTQIA+ acronym has developed and transformed extensively over the past 20 years. Whist the terms 'gay' and 'lesbian' dominated the original terminology associated with non-heterosexual sexuality, the inclusion of gender non-conforming and various "Other" groups has resulted in the acronym's expansion in an attempt to be inclusive and all-encompassing. Many critics argue that the earlier merging of the various sectors of LGBTQIA+ violently erases the unique differences and associated struggles experienced by the diverse array of communities. Others, particularly queer activists, argue that the acronym is prescriptive and that it divides the community along hardened boundaries that create hierarchies, differentiate and normalise. Each letter in the acronym also represents unique political formations; groups within groups have formed and boundaries have developed between those associated with sexuality, those with gender, and those with both. There are political tensions between the deployment of "Gay", "Lesbian", "LGBT" and "Queer" particularly along the lines of identity politics and methodologies for resistance. As such, the terminologies associated with gender and sexuality are inherently meaningful and complex. Without further categorising, normalising and/or further hardening/disrupting established boundaries, this section will attempt to elucidate these complexities. For the purpose of this overall study, the terms "LGBTQ" and "Queer" will be used interchangeably (unless otherwise indicated) in an attempt to acknowledge the associated tensions and complexities.

In her book *Blackwashing Homophobia: Violence and the Politics of Sexuality, Gender and Race*, Melanie Judge (2018) explains the complexities associated with writing and using/disrupting identity terminology. In doing so, she provides a unique strategy with which to acknowledge these complexities, tensions and opportunities. This strategy informs much of the identity terminology deployed throughout this study:

> Identities are messy in their (in)completeness, (in)consistencies and (dis)locatedness. To account for the slippages in and between the ways in which LGBTI subjectivation is manifest, in contextually bound ways, I deploy a smorgasbord of terms: sometimes referring to 'lesbian', other times to 'woman', 'queer', 'LGBTI' or 'gay'. This slippery mix prohibits me from comfortably (and conveniently) settling on a particular formulation that might, wittingly or unwittingly, foreclose other possible meanings (Judge, 2018: 9).

Lesbian: A self-identifying woman whose primary sexual and affectional orientation is towards people who identify as the same gender. Whilst the term 'gay' is often used to refer to women who are attracted to women, in an effort to disrupt hierarchies and to promote

identity boundaries, many lesbian women prefer to be differentiated from gay men (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Gay: A sexual and affectional orientation toward people of the same gender. Whilst this term is predominantly used to describe men who are attracted to men, it is often used as an umbrella term to describe all non-heterosexual orientations. This deployment has been criticised for erasing the identity parameters of various other sexualised and gendered groupings. The term 'gay' is also heavily criticised by queer and radical activists who associate it with 'homonormativity' as well as gendered and sexual hierarchies (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Bisexual: A person whose primary sexual and affectional orientation is towards people of the same as well as other genders. It can also indicate attraction towards people regardless of their gender performance/identity. Critics within and outside the (LGBTQ) community often produce violent narratives around bisexuality by referring to it as a segment or fluid description for gay and lesbian (Stonewall UK, 2017)..

Trans:* Gender non-conforming and/or non-binary people. The asterisk notes that this term is complex and that there are a variety of divisions and identities within the Trans* community itself. Whilst some argue that this is an inclusive gesture, critics argue that it is an attempt to further normalise and/or categorise a non-normative political formation (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Queer: Historically, the term was used to describe something as abnormal or strange. It was further used as a derogatory term to describe people whose gender, gender performance and/or sexualities do not conform to normative and/or dominant socio-political expectations. In recent years the word has been appropriated and reclaimed as a means to strip it of its historical violence. It has been deployed as an umbrella identity that encompasses the entire LGBTQIA acronym as a means to challenge hierarchical divisions and binaries. It has also been deployed politically as a verb and a noun, either to encapsulate non-normativity and/or Otherness. Radical groupings claim the word as a means to disrupt and/or challenge assimilatory and equality-seeking politics. In summary, "Queer" is commonly deployed as a political tool in an attempt to challenge/disrupt dominant and oppositional power-relations (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Intersex: An adjective and/or identity used to describe a naturally occurring phenomenon (without medical intervention) where people develop multiple sex characteristics, often after

birth. Such characteristics do not fit into the dominant and socially accepted categories of male and female, with multiple variations implicit within this definition. Intersex is thus an umbrella term used to describe these multiple variations which are often violently erased through medical interventions and/or narrative building. Whilst these characteristics can be visible or invisible, many intersex people are subject to medical mutilation without consultation. Doctors are often the perpetrators in this regard as they seek to assign sexes based on what they deem is dominant and appropriate. Many intersex people are scarred, traumatised and ostracised as a result (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Asexual: A sexual orientation that is generally categorised by not experiencing any sexual attraction or desire for all genders/non-genders and sexualities. Asexuality is often confused with celibacy, though the two are completely different. Celibacy represents an active choice with regards to abstention from sexual activity; asexuality is not necessarily a choice though it can be in some instances. Some asexual people still have sex and/or participate in sexual activities. As with most of the acronyms, there are many subdivisions of asexuality (Stonewall UK, 2017).

Heteronormativity vs Homonormativity

In 1991 queer theorist Michael Warner published an article titled "Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet" in which he conceptualised the term "Heteronormativity." Whilst drawing from concepts such as Rubin's (1984) sex hierarchy and Rich's (1980) compulsory heterosexuality, Warner (1991) describes heteronormativity as a reference to a set of (normative) cultural assumptions. More specially, heteronormativity distinguishes the "normal" and "natural" form of attraction (men and woman) from the "abnormal" and "unnatural" form of attraction (men and men, women and women, other). In doing so, a hierarchy is established between the two, exemplifying "normal" gender and sexual norms and oppressing "abnormal" gender and sexual (non)norms. This formation of hegemonic social systems, discourses and (private) practices is heavily criticised through Queer thinking. "Homonormativity" thus refers to the idea that (certain) sexual minorities can and should conform to heteronormative institutions (such as marriage) as a means to achieve greater acceptance into the dominant (heteronormative) social system. Duggan (2002; 2003) and Puar (2006) have published extensively on homonormativity, merging neoliberal arguments by exposing what they claim is gay and lesbian capital, consumerism and institutional assimilation. In discussing what she calls the "neoliberal self-governing [homonormative] subject" Judge (2018) states:

> I have alluded to how neoliberal self-governing subjects resist radical politics, opting for a privatised sexuality that legitimises the status quo and its hierarchies of citizenship. Some of the homonormalising strategies discussed indicate how queer integration into normative cultures is contingent upon the rejection of alternative positions that trouble middle-class values and normative whiteness. This is a politics that, in staving off its own precarity, legitimises a certain kind of life as the 'good gay life' through repudiating another kind of gay life. The idealised form of gay life - a white homonormative one - both comprises of and expends value. This imagery of gay life is underwritten by economies of materialism and liberal individualism, and functions as a local coordinate of the global gay discourse. It is in strategies of neoliberal self-care that this gay subject's prospect for a valuable life, free of violence, resides. Constituting a politics of depoliticisation, these strategies undo solidarities that might otherwise be forged across multiple planes of exclusion that, when stitched together, can mobilise action against intersecting forms of violent oppression (Judge, 2018: 97).

The notion of *Homonationalism*, which will be discussed throughout this study, is an extension of this homonormativity, particularly in that it involves the privileging of homonormative subjects along the lines of nationalistic and ideological discourses (Robinson, 2016).

Methodologies for Resistance

In 2007 a prominent queer theorist, Dean Spade, published a chapter titled "Methodologies of Trans Resistance" (Spade, 2007) in which they explore the work of Chela Sandoval's (2000) *Methodology of the Oppressed*. In doing so, Spade (2007) explores Sandoval's (2000) analytical framework for understanding various forms of resistance, consciousness and social movements in the USA. Sandoval (2000) describes how fractures often form in social movements between groups utilising different forms or methodologies, often exclusively and without consensus. Her analysis identifies five categories around which oppositional consciousness is mobilised, more specifically with the purpose of intervening in established power relations. As discussed throughout this study, related divisions have plagued the LGBT and Queer movements across the globe throughout history, making it imperative to understand the terminologies and dynamics of these methodologies as explored by Sandoval (2000) and Spade (2007):

Equal Rights, Reform & Assimilation: This mode represents the idea that "We are the same as you, therefore we can be and do the same as you." Sandoval (2000) states in this regard: "Aesthetically, the equal rights mode of consciousness seeks duplication, politically it seeks integration, physically, it seeks assimilation" (Sandoval, 2000: 56). As such, this mode articulates that the view that differences between the oppressed and the oppressor are over-exaggerated, and that as a result the oppressed should receive equal citizenship (and associated benefits) as this is defined by the oppressor's dominant system (Spade, 2007)

Radical, Transformation & Revolution: This mode challenges the current social order and dominant system, arguing that the assimilation of differences are not possible. As such, it expresses the imperative to restructure society and change or disrupt the norms associated with its structures. In doing so, its ultimate goal is to shift away from the domination vs subordination power axes that is deeply embodied in society (Spade, 2007).

Supremacy & Elitism: In this mode oppressed groups imply that their differences afford them access to a higher evolutionary power, noting this supremacy as a reason for their oppression. As such, groups prescribing to this method believe that they occupy an elevated moral, ethical, social and sometimes physical positioning in contrast to those in power (Spade, 2007)

Separatism & Division: In this mode oppressed groups attempt to emphasise, maintain and protect their differences from the oppressors. As such, they seek to separate completely from the dominant social order with a desire to "create their own." This is in contrast to reforming or transforming existing structures (Spade, 2007).

In the next section, a queer history of the 20th and 21st centuries will be explored, dating back to the early 1930s. This will demonstrate how LGBTQ political formations manifested throughout the globe.

Queer History

The Pink Triangle

In 1972 German writer Heinz Heger published an anonymous memoir of a gay survivor of the Sachsenhausen and Flossenbürg concentration camps. He gave it the title *Männer mit dem rose Winkel* (The Men with the Pink Triangle), which references the upside-down pink triangle used to mark identified homosexuals in the Nazi concentration camps. The book was controversial at the time and inspired the production of Martin Sherman's West End play *Bent*, which starred openly gay actor Sir Ian McKellen. It was the first time any research was presented on the persecution of gays and lesbians under Nazi rule, opening the doors for the development of queer Holocaust scholarship. Heger's (1972) publication was followed by a paper by sociologist Rüdiger Lautmann titled "The Pink Triangle: The Persecution of Homosexual Males in Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany (Gesellschaft und Homosexuality)" (1981) and a renowned book by German American author Richard Plant titled *The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War against Homosexuals* (1986).

It was only in the last two to three decades, with the emergence of LGBTQ activism and discourse, that the history of homosexual persecution under Nazi occupation in Germany and

Europe was brought to light. Whilst a number of memoirs, artistic productions, verbal articulations and literary explorations associated with the gay and lesbian holocaust emerged in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the most prominent, up-to-date and ground-breaking academic study that explores this relatively unexplored phenomenon is a book called *Hidden Holocaust? Gay and Lesbian Persecution in Germany 1933-1945* by Günter Grau and Claudia Schoppmann (Grau & Schoppmann, 1995). Published in 1995, it reviews a number of rare documents, including speeches, policies and recorded data, all of which represent and demonstrate the coordinated and systematic persecution of gays and lesbians under Nazi rule. Since then, various academics have sought to analyse and simultaneously expose the intricacies (and horrors) of the gay and lesbian holocaust, many of whom have contributed significantly to the broader literature on LGBT and Queer explorations. They include the book by queer theorist William J. Spurlin, *Lost Intimacies: Rethinking Homosexuality under National Socialism* (2009).

The first anti-sodomy (anti-homosexuality) law in Germany was promulgated in 1871. The law itself remained unchanged for the most part until the Nazis took over. In fact, prior to that, it was rarely enforced, particularly during the 1920s, when post-WWI Germany was suffering from a protracted economic crisis. As a consequence, cosmopolitan centres such as Berlin became prominent hubs for (sexual) openness, art, theatre, burlesque and a general embracement of queerness. When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, the persecution began almost immediately. It started with members of the Nazi vigilante group, the Brown Shirts, attacking the Berlin Institute of Dr Magnus Hirschfeld, a prominent sexologist and founder of the Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee (Scientific Humanitarian Committee), the world's first gay rights group. This persecution took place in conjunction with the eradication of all progressive literature, including the entities that produced and housed it. Mass arrests of homosexuals followed, gay bars were shut down and the famous cosmopolitan centres ceased to function (Newton, 2012).

Prior to becoming the largest party represented in the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament), the Nazi party released a number of statements reiterating their position on homosexuality calling it "evil" and "deplorable." Following the Nazi's attainment of institutional power, many gay and lesbian Germans believed that their position would change, particularly because of the known homosexuality of a number of high-ranking Nazi officials, including SA Chief of Staff Ernst Rohm. A prominent activist, Adolf Brand, wrote to the

Nazis requesting that they review the references to homosexuality in the anti-sodomy law. The party responded with the following:

> Anyone who thinks of homosexual love is our enemy. We reject anything which emasculates our people and makes [them] a plaything for our enemies. Might makes right. Let us see to it that we once again become strong! But this we can achieve only in one way: the German people must once again learn how to exercise discipline. We therefore reject any form of lewdness, especially homosexuality, because it robs us of our last chance to free our people from the bondage which now enslaves us (Newton, 2012).

Ernst Rohm was murdered in 1935 during the "Night of the Long Knives" and so the war on homosexuality in Nazi Germany intensified. After that, the anti-sodomy law was amended to include any form of social interaction such as touching or kissing between same-sex individuals. By 1941 the Nazi security apparatus had been given full instructions to arrest and place all homosexuals in "preventative custody," code for incarceration in concentration camps. Whilst this had already occurred prior to this date, as was the case with various groups persecuted by the Nazis, the systematic incentive for experimentation on and the elimination of all homosexuals had begun. Between 1933 and 1945 approximately 15,000 gays and lesbians died as a result of starvation, execution, medical experimentation and disease in the Nazi concentration camps of Adolf Hitler and WWII (Grau & Schoppmann, 1995).

The persecution did not end there. Many anti-sodomy laws remained in place throughout Europe even after the end of the war. The case of Alan Turing and his persecution in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that he saved millions of lives due to his code-breaking abilities as a result of the invention of the enigma machine, remains a prime example. These untold segments of history are particularly relevant for this study. After WWII, a liberal democratic internationalist order dominated the Western values system. In the case of Europe and North America, it is this very same order that has, in many ways, facilitated the integration of LGBTQ discourses into state and statutory frameworks, domestically and globally. This calls into question whether the recent populist-nationalist resurgence in these regions will have a significant impact on the lives of LGBTQ individuals across the globe.

The Homophile Movement & Stonewall

On 28 June 1969, twenty-four years after the end of WWII, a routine raid took place at the Stonewall Inn, a well-known gay club located in Greenwich Village, New York. This was not the first time the New York police had raided the Stonewall Inn; in fact, this was common practice, particularly in areas that were known to house cosmopolitan and "sexually deviant"

institutions of queer gathering and refuge seeking. This was, however, different from other raids as this particular instance sparked riots amongst patrons, employees and the surrounding neighbourhood as a result of the growing frustration with police brutality and the systematic targeting of the LGBTQ community. Six days of violent clashes and protests followed, with many historians claiming this to be the very moment that acted as a catalyst for the formation of the gay liberation movement, the first modern, universal and inherently united movement that sought to end the oppression of gay and lesbian individuals. The Stonewall Riots, as they are referred to in LGBTQ literature, marked a significant and notable shift in queer activism, particularly in terms of coverage and exposure. However, there are untold segments of queer history that point to the fact that gay and lesbian organising did occur many years preceding this historical event (Jackson, 2015).

The homophile movement was built on the basis of gay and lesbian solidarity, subtly operating within urban centres across the West since the 1870s, over a hundred years prior to Stonewall. In his book *Sexual politics, sexual communities: The making of a homosexual minority in the United States, 1940-1970* J. D'Emilio (1983) provides a unique exploration of queer movements prior to Stonewall. The author notes that during a state-sponsored crackdown on homosexuality in the 1960s, the homophile movement established three fields in which the oppression of homosexuals was rooted: 1) psychiatry declared gay men and lesbians to be mentally ill; 2) the law criminalised homosexual sex acts; and 3) most religions condemned homosexuals as sinners. The notion that homosexuality was an illness was a significant focal point in this regard, as a member of the movement, Frank Kameny, stated in 1964: "The entire homophile movement … is going to stand or fall upon the question of whether or not homosexuality is a sickness, and upon our taking a firm stand on it" (Carter, 2014).

The author goes further to note that by the end of 1965 the homophile movement was "ready to escape the isolation and marginality of the past and to enter into the mainstream of social and political reform" (D'Emilio, 1983: 196) and that 15 gay groups were known to exist in 1966, increasing to 50 by 1969 (D'Emilio, 1983: 199). Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk (1996) also draw attention to the activity of gay and lesbian movements prior to Stonewall by bringing to light a number of isolated riots that occurred in predominantly LGBTQ areas in Los Angeles and San Francisco.

Cynthia Poindexter's article "Sociopolitical Antecedents to Stonewall: Analysis of the Origins of the Gay Rights Movement in the United States" (1997) examines the organisational process that led to Stonewall and the social changes that followed. Queer theorists, amongst others, have also critiqued accounts of the Stonewall riots, particularly with regard to the binary hierarchies that dominated the narratives associated with this event. A specific focus on the prominence of Trans* individuals and people of colour at Stonewall, such as Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, has emerged in recent literature, contributing significantly to the historical interrogation of the foundation for the first modern LGBTQ movements (Cohen, 2008).

Whilst an array of literary contributions continue to expand the accounts of the homophile movement and the Stonewall riots, there is little doubt that the events of the 1960s set the stage for the renowned gay liberation movement, exposing a radical shift in LGBTQ activism and a significant moment in Queer history.

HIV/AIDS

Dennis Altman and Jonathan Symons, collectively and individually, offer some of the most comprehensive insights into the interactions between HIV/AIDS and LGBTQ in two prominent published works, namely *The End of Homosexual* (2013) and *Queer Wars* (2016). In the first book Altman (2013) offers insights into the history of LGBTQ movements in relation to HIV/AIDS. He dedicates a chapter to this topic: "The 1980s: HIV/AIDS and Working inside the System," where he summarises this tragic yet fundamental period in 20 pages.

> It is impossible to reflect on the homosexual world over the past quarter century without mention of HIV/AIDS, just as it is impossible to discuss the global epidemic without acknowledging the extent to which our perceptions of what is not predominately a "gay disease" remains marked by its particular connection with male homosexuality, even in countries in which HIV transmissions occurs primarily through heterosexual intercourse or shared needles (Altman, 2013: 106).

Altman (2013) discusses the history of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, highlighting that its geo-political impacts on the LGBTQ community were far-reaching often reinforcing the sense amongst gay men that they were worthless, as well as exemplifying the common perception that homosexuality was an illness. He explores the role of government and civil society in this regard, discussing the Reagan Administration's reluctance to address the disease, and highlighting that it was predominately the LGBTQ community that lobbied consistently and

successfully for attention, research and funding, ironically reinforcing the myth that HIV/AIDS was linked to homosexuality (Altman, 2013: 108).

Altman (2013) offers an important historical insight into the emergence of Queer Theory and the interactions between LGBTQ and feminist movements during the start of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. He discusses how HIV/AIDS became a dominant issue for gay men in particular, with a rapid and uneven mobilisation of resources, complicating relations between men and women in the LGBTQ movement. Some lesbian leaders in the movement expressed resentment at this emphasis on a single issue, which was ironic as many demands of HIV/AIDS activists echoed feminist analyses of the health system, particularly as gay men became exposed to a health system that was hierarchical and dominated by financial constraints, issues that women had experienced for a very long time (Altman, 2013: 111).

Altman (2013) highlights a prominent shift that occurred in the global LGBTQ movement after the emergence of HIV/AIDS. He emphasises that HIV/AIDS changed the way in which activists imagined working within the state, indicating that the tragedy of the pandemic assisted gay men the same way in which affirmative action and state services assisted women across the globe. He demonstrates how this period saw gay activists move away from the street activism of the 1970s to organisation building, allowing individuals to attain positions in large community bodies, government and international organisations.

Furthermore, in their chapter "HIV, Health and Human Rights" Altman & Symons (2016) explain how, over the past 30 years, the unfolding HIV/AIDS pandemic connected human rights issues and sexuality (Altman & Symons, 2016: 90). The authors discuss the incorporation of women, men who have sex with men (MSM), sex workers and drug users into public health campaigns, uniting health practitioners and gay activists in the promotion of individual sexual rights. They reveal that governments that adopted a model of engaging with communities, rather than adopting a purely medical response, had greater success in curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, thus resulting in state-sponsored outreach in LGBTQ communities that had not previously existed (Altman & Symons, 2016: 90).

Altman & Symons (2016) go further to refer to a lead essay in the first issue of *Health and Human Rights* to expose a connection between health and human rights, noting that:

> The evolving HIV/AIDS pandemic has shown a consistent pattern through which discrimination, marginalization, stigmatization and, more generally, a lack of respect for the human rights and dignity of individuals and groups heightens their vulnerability to becoming exposed to HIV (Mann et al., 1994).

In doing so, the authors of this essay, including Jonathan Mann, the founder of the World Health Organisation's Global Programme on AIDS, reiterate that human rights and health are "mutually reinforcing" (Mann et al., 1994).

The HIV/AIDS pandemic led to extensive exploration and insight into its impact on the global LGBTQ movements, often through the use of historical knowledge. With an array of successful medical inroads and social mobilisation, HIV/AIDS is now less of a threat to the LGBTQ community and to the world at large. This development has ignited further conversations around sexuality in contemporary global settings, particularly in relation to human rights discourses. The next section will explore the historical development of various LGBT and Queer social movements, as well as the associated activism and advocacy.

Queer Activism and Social Movements

The Gay Liberation (Revolution & Separatism)

The gay liberation movement is often seen as being definitively launched in 1969 following the Stonewall riots in New York City, marking a shift in queer activism and social mobilisation. Though this was not the first gay and lesbian organising initiative to take place, gay liberationists differentiated themselves by adopting alternative methodologies and outcomes with regards to their political activism. One of the most prominent of the gay liberation organisations was the Gay Liberation Front (GLF). It was, in the words of their manifesto, "a militant coalition of radical and revolutionary homosexual men and women committed to fight the oppression of the homosexual as a minority group and to demand the right to the self-determination of our own bodies" (Terence, 1995: 107). It was the first of many radical and militant gay liberation organisations to emerge throughout the United States and Western Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Whilst the pre-Stonewall homophile groups sought to decriminalise homosexuality and challenge associated medical diagnostics, groups aligned with gay liberation agendas criticised their approach, labelling them as "reformist", "conservative" and "respectable." In contrast, organisations such as the Gay Liberation Front sought to "transform" (initiate a Revolution) and/or "remove themselves" (advocate Separatism) from society through radical solidarity and militant activism, rather than seek admission to it (avoid Assimilation) (Weeks, 2015).

Through adopting the feminist feature of "the personal as political" as one of the key methodologies for resistance, the Harvey Milk-inspired "coming out" activism of the gay liberation movement gained momentum across the globe. As such, gay liberation affiliates

organised the world's first Gay Pride event with the sole purpose of engaging in direct action by demonstrating gay and lesbian unity, solidarity, mobilisation and visibility. Whilst the gay liberation movement played a significant role in the development of queer activism, particularly in unifying and universalising LGBTQ resistance, successful inroads with regards to decriminalisation and declassification (as a mental illness) had an impact on the movement. This, in conjunction with the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s, as argued by Altman (2013) and Altman & Symons (2016), intensified the (unintended) desire for collaboration between the state and the LGBTQ community. The equality movement was born.

The Equality Movement (Assimilation)

In 1978 Harvey Milk, a well-known political figure based in the Castro district of San Francisco, became the first openly gay man to be elected to public office in a modern liberal democracy. Having initiated the "coming out" activism that dominated the gay liberation movement, Milk played an integral role in advancing LGBTQ interests, particularly with regards to policy formation. It was in this light that Milk's ambition to run for public office grew, and after almost 10 years of attempting to attain a seat on the San Francisco City Board of Supervisors, he was finally elected. Through adopting a reformist strategy, Milk demonstrated that it was possible to change a system from within. He had thus relinquished his former association with the radical strategies of the gay liberation movement and set the stage for a new era in queer activism. Harvey Milk was assassinated a few months later, before he could run for a seat in the California state assembly. His political career was marked with an array of successes in effecting political change through his role in government (Stryker & Van Buskirk, 1996).

The Milk effect remains one of the key strategies of many LGBTQ organisations today, where policy influence is attained through a combination of access to capital, holding public office and political lobbying. A few present-day examples include the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Victory Institute. Dennis Altman (2013) argues that the global response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic forced sexuality onto the agendas of a wide range of governments as well as national and international organisations, resulting in gay activists becoming vital stakeholders in institutional structures. In his book *The End of the Homosexual* Altman (2013) refers to the 1980s as a period of "working inside the system", attributing an LGBTQ move towards assimilatory strategies to the outbreak of HIV/AIDS. In unpacking the socio-political dynamics of the pandemic, particularly with regard to the

LGBTQ community, the author states with regard to an unintended wave of assimilatory practices: “In health departments, in development agencies, in a few research centres, even in some small areas of the United Nations, it became possible to build a career out of one’s involvement in the gay world” (Altman, 2013: 111).

In their book *Queer Wars* Altman & Symons (2016) refer to China as a case study in this regard, illustrating how engaging with HIV can shift attitudes and change minds about MSM specifically. They refer to the discussion of sexuality as a taboo in Chinese society, demonstrating how this had an impact on HIV/AIDS transmission rates amongst MSM in the country, citing delayed yet significant government action in the early 2000s (Altman & Symons, 2016: 91). The authors go further to discuss the role of developmental aid and its impact on HIV/AIDS in relation to MSM. They draw attention to a global increase in support for international efforts to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, with the integration of treatment programmes into the Millennium Development Goals, as an important threshold. Altman & Symons (2016) highlight this as a clear shift in global trends that led to further material support for the LGBTQ movement, demonstrating that while services directed at marginalised groups such as MSM and Trans* remain under-resourced, the emphasis on HIV/AIDS did in fact create new opportunities for both activists and donors to focus on increased attention to issues of sexuality (Altman & Symons, 2016: 126).

A combination of factors led to the re-emergence of reformist and assimilatory politics in the LGBTQ community in the 1980s, marking the (re)birth of the equality movement. Whilst the 1990s witnessed a new shift towards a radical (queer) politics, the drive of the equality (formerly homophile) movement did not diminish, as it did in the 1970s. With the wave of decriminalising legislation, successful attainment of public office and material investment in HIV/AIDS, assimilatory strategies gained momentum throughout Europe and North America. Many (queer) critics argue that this was further exacerbated by a new “commercialization of queerness” with corporations sponsoring Pride events and a popular cultural integration of LGBTQ themes in the media (*Will & Grace*, Ellen DeGeneres). As such, it was the equality movement that drove the “LGBT” marriage equality, military recruitment and debates to counter work-place discrimination in the 2000s, establishing the groundwork for mainstream LGBTQ rights advancement (the politics of inclusion) – a strategy that has been both applauded and heavily critiqued (Paternotte et al., 2016).

The Queer Movement

Queer activism is distinct from lesbian and gay or LGBT activism. It distinguishes itself by challenging normative societal relations and celebrating difference. The re-emergence of this radical strategy in the late 1980s coincides with the Reagan (USA) and Thatcher (UK) government responses (or rather lack thereof) to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The direct action associated with the queer movement shares similar principles with that of the gay liberation movement of the early 1970s, critiquing both the economic (neoliberal) and socio-political dynamics of Western society. Much like the equality movement, the queer movement's longevity extended far beyond its founding movement. This resulted in noticeable tensions between the two strategies of LGBTQ activism, particularly as they now occupy similar spaces on the broader political spectrum. The queer movement did arise in opposition to what it considers as the "normative assimilatory" nature of the LGBT equality movement. Through challenging and questioning regimes of 'the normal', including the identity-based binaries of LGBT, the queer movement also gave rise to academic Queer Theory (Brown, 2015).

Queer activism has developed significantly over the past twenty-five years. Its initial values were embedded in a commitment to LGBTQ safety and visibility, particularly with regard to HIV/AIDS in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s and in recent years following the commercialisation of LGBT and significant inroads with regards to (legal) rights advancement, queer activism has since emerged more prominently as a counterpoise to the extension of equal rights and "equality", instead staking its claim to the "right to difference." Much like Queer Theory, queer activism attempts to dissolve the hierarchies and boundaries associated with sexual and gender identities. Alliance and solidarity form a major part of this, elements that briefly united gay men and lesbian women after protracted tensions during the HIV/AIDS crisis. Certain segments of the queer movement often align themselves with anti-capitalist, anti-gentrification, anti-globalisation and anarchist movements. Such associations have further divided the queer and equality movements, particularly along the lines of ideological and political economic boundaries.

> What is sad about the Castro (and similar gay ghettos across the country and the world,) and indicative of what gay people do with even a little bit of power, is that these same smiling gay men have failed to build community for queer (or anyone) outside of their social group. Many gay men (even in the Castro) still remain on the fringes, either by choice or lack of opportunity. But as the most "successful" gays (and their allies) have moved from outsider status to insider clout, they have consistently fought misogynist, racist, classist, and ageist battles to ensure that their neighborhood remain a community for only the rich, male, and white (or at least those who pass). They've succeeded in clamping down on the defiance, anger, flamboyance, and subversion, once thriving in gay subcultures, in order to promote a vapid consume-or-die, we're just like you mentality (Mattilda, 2004: 4).

Statements such as this form the basis of both a queer theorist and queer activist critique of what they claim to be the assimilatory nature of the (LGBT) equality movement. They are fervently opposed to the idea of marriage equality, hate-crime legislation and military service as they view this as an enabler of the queerphobic, neoliberal and carceral nation-state. Consequently, the foundation of 1990s and 2000s queer activism (and theory) is formed on the idea that whilst early queer activism organised against homophobic violence, present queer activism entails organising against the symbolic and material violence associated with "gay assimilation." Critics of this approach often claim that queer activism expends too much energy challenging gay assimilation or "homonormativity", when they should be challenging the persistent violence of "Heteronormativity" (Brown, 2015). The next section will explore LGBTQ politics of the 21st century, specifically marriage equality and the global extension of LGBT rights as Human Rights.

LGBTQ Politics

Marriage Equality

In April 2001 the Netherlands became the first country in the world to legally recognise a state-sponsored marriage between two people of the same sex, followed by Belgium, Spain, Canada and South Africa during the period 2001 to 2006. Since the beginning of the millennium, the marriage equality debate has dominated LGBTQ politics, forming a central part of the equality movement's campaign for equal rights. Many countries across the globe have since legalised same-sex marriage as a result of a combination of political, legal and activist pressure, with Ireland and more recently Australia, voting in favour of marriage equality through popular referenda. The level at which states are measured in terms of being "modern," pro-LGBTQ and pro-human rights is often based on their response (or lack thereof) to same-sex marriage. However, the goal of achieving marriage equality has been highly contested within the broader LGBTQ movement. Whilst a number of anti-LGBTQ forces have mobilised to challenge any advances to same-sex marriage regulations, the LGBTQ community has found itself embroiled in a highly contentious and complex debate about whether marriage equality is desirable, valuable, counter-intuitive and/or advantageous to LGBTQ lives (Bernstein & Taylor, 2013).

Gay liberationist, queer and feminist critiques form the basis of "internal" opposition to same-sex marriage. Depending on the lens, marriage is viewed as an inherently oppressive institution, constructed on heteropatriarchal, binary-dominated and hierarchical narratives. It is further viewed, particularly by proponents of queer thought, as a means of "normalising"

queerness and a method for promoting the neoliberal privatisation of sexuality. Such narratives question whether marriage equality is helpful in mobilising and uniting the broader LGBTQ movement, as many critics claim that it depoliticises queer identities. In the book *Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not Mere Inclusion* (Conrad, 2014) a collection of essays critiques the methodologies of the equality movement, particularly its desire for marriage equality. This book demonstrates a clear and radical dichotomy between queer and LGBT equality discourses (transform vs reform):

> This liberal model of "progression" is one of the primary ways many of us are ideologically trapped into a reformist way of thinking. To understand how gay marriage, like voting, will never lead to liberation, we can look to the histories of many "social justice movements" that only address oppressions on a level of the symptomatic. Gay marriage and voting are symbolic gestures that reinforce structures while claiming to reconfigure them. This scheme will undoubtedly become apparent with "marriage equality" advocates. As they have positioned gay marriage as the last great civil rights battle, will they continue to fight after the Honeymoon? (Bornstein, 2014)

In response, proponents of marriage equality argue that marriage does the opposite of depoliticising queer identities. They state that embedding oneself in an institution that is inherently heteronormative is the best way of challenging such accounts, with same-sex marriage acting as a catalyst for further political mobilisation. In the book *The Marrying Kind? Debating Same-Sex Marriage within the Lesbian and Gay Movement* (Bernstein & Taylor, 2013) various case studies are used to present different perspectives on the marriage equality debate. Heath (2013) argues that marriage is an act of "political testimony" in which thousands of LGBTQ individuals have exerted power and mobilised in often inherently conservative and discriminatory environments.

Either way, the marriage equality debate, as divisive as it is, has drawn unprecedented attention (positive and negative) to LGBTQ causes. Whilst it is currently a central feature of LGBTQ socio-political, legal and historical discourses, issues around violence and discrimination remain prominent throughout the globe. Whether the trend of rights advancement in the West will continue, or whether the attainment of marriage equality represents the climax of LGBTQ citizenship, potentially to the detriment of much needed reformation/transformation, remains to be seen.

Gay Rights as Human rights

When discussing LGBTQ rights as human rights, most of the available literature refers to Hillary Clinton's 2011 International Human Rights Day speech at the UN in Geneva in her

capacity as US Secretary of State, as a turning point for LGBTQ discourses in relation to global politics:

> Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethnic minority, being LGBT does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights … The Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBT people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our foreign policy (Weber, 2016a: 18).

In that very moment, for better and for worse, Clinton intertwined LGBTQ politics with the international human rights framework, officially thrusting the (queer) subject into the realm of international relations. According to Altman & Symons (2016), Weber (2016a) and Langlois (2015), this was indeed a pivotal moment for human rights, LGBTQ rights and international relations (IR). However, many academics and activists differ in their views on how this proclamation by a leading (Western hegemonic) foreign affairs stakeholder, the United States, shaped perceptions of and reactions to global LGBTQ dispensations.

Dennis Altman and Jonathan Symons dedicate a chapter to this theme "Queer Rights as Human Rights" in their book *Queer Wars* (2016: 73). In discussing international norms and global polarisation, the authors highlight the notion that in recent years LGBTQ rights have been a polarising dynamic in global politics, predominantly dividing states along the historical and hierarchical boundaries of "The West vs the Rest" and "Modern vs Traditional." The LGBTQ issue, as it is often called in global forums, is simultaneously constructed and viewed as a discreet tool for Western intervention, further exacerbating the complex debate around defining universal human rights and its subsequent tensions with national sovereignty. Altman & Symons (2016) go further to state that this debate is a popular discourse amongst most contemporary queer activists, institutions and state entities. They claim that many governments are so hostile to the concept of LGBTQ rights as Human Rights that the persecution of LGBTQ people is of international concern, to the extent that "division over gay rights is undermining support for international human rights more generally" (Altman & Symons, 2016: 73).

Anthony Langlois in his chapter "Human Rights, LGBT Rights, and International Theory" (2015) articulates a human rights approach to international relations, illustrating that the international politics of sexuality and gender are "consequential for international theory" (Langlois, 2015: 35). He discusses IR's contemporary interest in the human rights concept, as well as the significance of sexuality within this framework. He emphasises, much like Cynthia Weber (2014), that although sexuality and queer theory are abundant in IR, the

discipline/field fails to effectively utilise LGBTQ perspectives, stating that human rights concepts and LGBTQ perspectives do not fit well with each other. He provides a critical examination in this regard and goes further to identify significant tensions between the two (Langlois, 2015). The author is particularly coherent in emphasising his approach when he states: "The familiar is first made strange, then used to make strange ways of looking at international politics familiar once again" (Langlois, 2015: 35). With this in mind, he demonstrates the need for an expansion of international human rights theory, identifying a significant gap in the literature on human rights and LGBTQ perspectives in critical IR.

These critical engagements with international theory, LGBTQ politics and human rights provide a unique and necessary approach not only to LGBTQ perspectives, but also to human rights theory and international theory in general. Whilst LGBTQ rights as human rights play a significant role in globalising LGBTQ politics and rights advancement, such explorations create platforms to advance LGBTQ causes within global structures as well as within the discipline of international relations itself.

Queer Theory

Poststructuralist Theory

Poststructuralism is associated with the writings of two prominent French philosophers, namely Michel Foucault (1978) and Jacques Derrida (1967). This discourse explores the interpretation of the "self" and the "social," breaking with conventional epistemologies. This way of thinking has earned the label of "antifoundational thought," defined by a refusal to accept individualism and agency as masters of a social body's self. Poststructuralism thus challenges these associated assumptions by questioning subjectivity, social institutions and language, ultimately seeking to explore the constitution of subjectivity in social life rather than identifying an essential origin (Namaste, 1994).

> [Poststructuralism] argues that subjects are not the autonomous creators of themselves or their social worlds. Rather, subjects are embedded in a complex network of social relations. These relations in turn determine which subjects can appear where, and in what capacity. The subject is not something prior to politics or social structures, but is precisely constituted in and through specific sociopolitical arrangements. Poststructuralism contends that a focus on the individual as an autonomous agent needs to be "deconstructed," contested, and troubled (Namaste, 1994: 221).

Through articulating his "repressive hypothesis" in *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* Michel Foucault (1979) considers the idea that sexuality has been repressed throughout history due to its "controversial" nature. He claims that there is a production of sexuality in various judicial, administrative and medical domains, highlighting the notion that speech

associated with sexuality has been prescribed (poststructuralism) rather than prohibited (structuralism). The work of Jacques Derrida (1967) is similar to that of Foucault. In *Writing and Difference* Derrida explores pairs of concepts that are diametrically opposed, which he calls "binary oppositions" (man vs woman, heterosexual vs homosexual). He argues that these "oppositions" are unstable and ultimately break down because the value of each term relies on its (power) relationship with its opposition (Jagose, 1996).

Three recurring themes emerge in the work of both Foucault (1978) and Derrida (1967). Firstly, they both adopt an antifoundational stance, rejecting the "voluntaristic" understanding of agency whereby individual power dictates responsibility and ability; secondly, both authors interrogate the productive nature of power; and thirdly they insist on a need for reflection with regards to the terminologies (identities) that are assigned as the basis for political action. Such themes are aligned with the foundations of Queer Theory, and although Foucault (1978) and Derrida (1967) are not necessarily its "founders," Queer Theory forms part of a broader poststructuralist project:

> Queer theory employs a number of ideas from poststructuralist theory, including Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic models of decentred, unstable identity, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of binary conceptual and linguistic structures, and, of course, Foucault's model of discourse, knowledge and power. Predictably, it does not have a single moment of origin, but is often retrospectively identified as beginning to be crystallised at a series of academic conferences in the United States in the late 1980s that addressed gay and lesbian topics in relation to poststructuralist theories (Spargo, 1999: 40).

Queer(ing) Theory

The term "queer" has taken on many different forms throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries. It was once slang for homosexual, but transformed into a derogatory term used as weapon for homophobic abuse. More recently 'queer' has been appropriated in ways that strip it of its historical violence. Sometimes it is an umbrella term for non-cisgender, non-heterosexual identity; at other times it is deployed as a political formation of "Otherness" as a verb and a noun, or it is used to describe a developing theoretical model that emerged out of feminism, gay and lesbian studies. It is in itself a complex term; within its very nature 'queer' resists precise definitions out of a desire to repel any form of disciplinary and/or normalising regimes. Judith Butler, one of the "founders" of queer theory, states that "normalising the queer would be, after all, its sad finish" (Butler 1993: 21). Annamarie Jagose (1996) goes further to state: "To attempt an overview of queer theory and to identify it as a significant school of thought, which those in pursuit of general knowledge should be familiar with, is to

risk domesticating it, and fixing it in ways that queer theory resists fixing itself" (Jagose, 1996:1-2). There are, however, a number of core values that remain consistent throughout the various developments, combinations and contributions of queer theorising (Jagose, 1996).

> While there is no critical consensus on the definitional limits of queer – indeterminacy being one of its widely promoted charms – its general outlines are frequently sketched and debated. Broadly speaking, queer describes those gestures or analytical models which dramatise incoherences in the allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire. Resisting that model of stability – which claims heterosexuality as its origin, when it is more properly its effect – queer focuses on mismatches between sex, gender and desire (Jagose, 1996: 3).

In the late 1980s queer theory emerged in academic circles in conjunction with a wave of queer activism that was sparked by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Its postmodern, poststructuralist and social constructionist approaches to sexual and gender identity inspired both activist and academic thinking – a discourse that has maintained prominence over the past two to three decades. Drawing from the original works of Judith Butler (1990a,1990b) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990), as well as numerous later contributions, queer theory took shape both from feminist challenges to gender as essential, and from gay and lesbian studies' explorations of sexuality and social constructions. Queer theory thus expands the subject focus beyond that of the homosexual, encompassing any sexual identity and/or behaviour that can be associated with a normative vs deviant dichotomy. Through attempting to debunk stable and correlated sexes, genders and sexualities, queer theory develops from the (gay and lesbian) reworking of a poststructuralist approach to a focus on identity, framing it as a grouping or gathering of numerous unstable positions.

With reference to Judith Butler's (1993) *Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of Sex*, Turner (2000) states:

> The basic approach, central to queer theory, is the investigation of foundational, seemingly indisputable concepts, such as "matter." Queer theorists perform those investigations with an eye to tracing the historical development of those concepts and their contributions to definitions of "sex" and "gender" such that differences of power along those axes of identity pervade our culture at a level that resists fulsomely the ministrations of political actions conventionally defined. Could it be that effective resistance to violence, much less meaningful access to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, requires not merely more legislation, however necessary legislation may be, but also a fundamental reconceptualisation of the political, beginning with our understanding of individual identity as the foundation of political organisation and action? (Turner, 2000: 3).

In his book *A Genealogy of Queer Theory* William Turner (2000) explores a 1998 *New York Times* article by Dinitia Smith in which she discusses the queer theoretical contributions of Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick who, like Butler, is considered one of the "founders" of queer

theory. Turner (1996) argues against attempts to "simplify" queer thought whilst noting significant challenges in translating queer theory. He highlights that through queer lenses "relationships among desire, repressions, and politics become matters for scrutiny" and that "one cannot understand desire and repression without understanding gender, which in our culture is inextricably related to sexual practice and sexual identity" (Turner, 2000: 4). He critiques the notion that Sedgewick and Butler were the first to deploy "queer" to describe such intellectual endeavours. He refers to feminist film theorist Teresa de Lauretis's use of queer theory through questioning the position of women in language and the conceptual regimes constructed by men, all within the context of a social and political order that violently excludes women, except for the purpose of commodification. Turner (2000) argues that: "It is impossible to understand queer theory fully without first understanding something about the specifically and emphatically feminist concerns that motivated Lauretis, Sedgwick, Butler and others" (Turner, 2000: 5).

Queer (ing) International Relations

Queer Theory has expanded globally since its inception in the early 1990s, more specifically in the form of Global Queer Studies (Weber, 2014a). It has also extended into the field of international relations, with much resistance from conventional IR scholars who challenge its disciplinary stability. Cynthia Weber (1999, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a) has, since the publication of her book *Faking it: U.S. Hegemony in a "post-phallic" Era*, (Weber, 1999) propelled Queer into the discipline of international relations (IR). She has subsequently published a number of texts that develop what is now termed "Queer IR" and its theoretical frameworks, whilst arguing in favour of its utility in understanding international relations/global politics. This has informed many theoretical, conceptual and analytical developments that have contributed to and made use of Queer IR perspectives, including Puar's (2007b) concepts of *Homonationalism* and *Homopopulism* – a product of this study (see Chapter 5). Whilst Queer IR is a relatively new field, the contributions of Cynthia Weber and various queer scholars continue to demonstrate the utility and theoretical potential of Queer IR. Accordingly, Queer IR and *Homonationalism* form the theoretical core of this study, as will be discussed in the dedicated theory chapter (see Chapter 4).

Conclusion

This chapter provided a historical overview of LGBT and Queer, more specifically during the 20th and 21st centuries. In an attempt to contextualise the broader debate around *Homonationalism* (see Chapter 4) and more recently *Homopopulism* (see Chapter 5), this

review has a central role within the broader context of this study. By exploring the complexities and tensions associated with the range of terminologies, it reveals the political formations with which various segments of the LGBTQ community align themselves. Through analysing historical persecutions, this chapter demonstrates the purpose and need for the formation of prominent LGBTQ social movements in the latter half of the 20th century, and what the consequences were of those formations for LGBTQ politics. An exploration of these social movements, their methodologies of resistance and their tensions, exposes established hierarchies and divisions specifically played out within heteronormative (and homonormative) state institutions, their reform and/or transformation and the associated collusions. These debates manifested in the political deployment of LGBTQ, particularly with the formation of the marriage equality movement and the thrusting of queer politics into the realm of global politics (LGBTQ rights as human rights). Finally, a review of LGBTQ as an academic enterprise provides the necessary contextualisation and historical background of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks which this study applied as analytical tools, more specifically Queer Theory (Queer IR and *Homonationalism*).

This historical and literature review has demonstrated the evolving nature of LGBTQ politics; by tracking its development this chapter has positioned these histories within the broader context of LGBTQ politics in the 21st century. Such an exploration could contribute significantly to understanding why and how a shift in LGBTQ politics is taking place (from *Homonationalism* to *Homopopulism*). Whilst the necessary historical and scholarly insights have provided a foundation from which to proceed with this study, a further review is required in order to fully contextualise LGBTQ politics within the 21st century. Consequently, Chapter 3 will provide a review of the contemporary geopolitics of Europe and North America; the chapter will explore themes that specifically impact on LGBTQ politics in these regions, particularly in conversation with *Homonationalism*. The recent rise of populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and North America may have implications for the LGBTQ community across the globe. Certain events, such as the war on terror, the EU migration crisis and the Orlando massacre, have led to a push-back against globalisation, multiculturalism and liberal democratic internationalist values, and in order to understand why this has occurred, a historical and literature review is required. A specific focus on conceptualising populism, nationalism and populist-nationalism is necessary, particularly for the purpose of theorising *Homopopulism*.

CHAPTER 3

Populism & Western Politics

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview and contextualisation of 21st century politics in Europe and North America. It also explores the rise of right-wing populism within the broader study of populist-nationalism and LGBTQ politics in these historically mature liberal democratic regions. This is in order to provide the necessary contextualisation, historically and theoretically, of the politics and scholarship that inform the study of populism and so-called Western geopolitics – key areas of inquiry that are addressed in the problem statement, research questions and overall study.

The wave of national elections that took place across some of the world's most prominent liberal democracies in the period of 2016 to 2017 translated a widely debated geopolitical shift into an unprecedented reality. Whilst a number of prominent geopolitical events have impacted on a rapidly globalising world since the beginning of the 21st century, the politics of Europe and North America have been at the heart of a culmination of global political developments, internal dynamics and contextual outcomes because of their hegemonic positioning in a predominantly liberal democratic internationalist (and since the1970s, neoliberal) world order. Discourses seeking to challenge the (neo)liberal status quo have grown in prominence in recent years, particularly as a result of the capitalisation of fear politics as a reaction to catastrophic global events, among other things. The rise of right-wing populist-nationalism in Europe and North America is thus a result of a culmination of historical, contextual and circumstantial dynamics that have framed the Western world, and the Western nation-state more specifically, as a gradually failing political hegemon, incapable of protecting its sovereignty and interests in the midst of rapid globalisation and subsequent global security threats.

After WWII populist discourses fell generally silent following the atrocities that occurred under the fascist regimes that dominated Europe during the 1930s and 1940s. The appeal of populism, however, has steadily increased since the 1980s. Whilst alignments have varied over the years, prominent global events, including the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU migration crisis, have reinforced the tendencies driven by populist rhetoric and subsequent support in many traditionally liberal democratic dispensations. The growth of populist political parties such as Front National (FN) in France, the Alternative for Germany

(AFD) in Germany and the ascendance of populist governments in Poland and Hungary, all point to a dramatic shift in support for right-wing populist politics. Furthermore, the election of Donald Trump as US President in 2016, as well as the UK voting to leave the EU (Brexit), collectively demonstrate that electoral outlets are gradually aligning with populist sentiments in the traditionally liberal democratic internationalist centres of Europe and North America (Abromeit, 2017).

In order to understand the politics of the 21st century and the subsequent rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America, as indicated in the research questions and problem statement of this study (see Chapter 1), this chapter will provide both an historical contextualisation of the politics of Europe and North America as well as an historical review of the development of populism as scholarship, on an epistemological level, and as politics. The chapter begins by exploring the terminology associated with populism, particularly with regard to the ideological dispensations of left-wing vs right-wing populism. It highlights that this study focus specifically on right-wing populism (populist-nationalism) in Europe and North America, as discussed in Chapter 1. The present chapter then seeks to provide an historical contextualisation of 21st century politics by exploring prominent and far-reaching global events and responses such as the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU migration crisis, among others. It frames this contextualisation to expose a growing backlash against globalisation and the subsequent rise of populist-nationalism.

This chapter goes further to provide a historical review of the academic study of and political development of populism. It begins by exploring the continued debate around defining populism, whilst providing various conceptualisations of the different types of populism. It notes that even today populism is volatile and ever-changing, and that defining it within rigid binaries remains unilluminating. Finally, this chapter tracks the intellectual development of populism dating back to the 1960s. It then seeks to provide an overview of the various "waves" of scholarship on populism that developed subsequently, whilst noting a significant increase in the study of populism within a contemporary context.

The next section will explore the terminology associated with populism, nationalism, and left-wing and right-wing ideology. This is in order to fully understand the varying ideological strands associated with populism, particularly that which informs the new politics of Europe and North America.

Terminology

Left-Wing Populism vs Right-Wing Populism

According to Rooduijin & Akkerman (2017), populist political parties, with their "host ideology" (left-wing or right-wing) aside, are united in their critique of what they term "the establishment" (status quo). Huber & Schimpf (2017) argue that the host ideology of a populist movement inherently determines against whom "the people" should rally or unite against (Katsambekis, 2017: 205). These authors claim that left-wing populist entities define "the people" based on class, with a particular focus on the poor and working class. Right-wing populist entities, on the other hand, define "the people" on the basis of multi-class culture, nationality and ethnicity. Left-wing populist entities construct their criticisms through socio-economic lenses with the purpose of "protecting" and "empowering" the proletariat against the backlash of capitalism (populist-socialism). Right-wing populist entities, on the other hand, seek to defend national parameters such as culturalism, nativism and ethnicity through political, social and economic strategies, all with the purpose of protecting "the nation" from "others" (populist-nationalism) (Mudde, 2007). In summary, left-wing and right-wing populism differ in that they embody radically inclusive (left-wing) compared to radically exclusive (right-wing) perceptions of society (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

Whilst left-wing populist entities can be inclusive on a societal level, it is important to note that they are often anti-pluralistic on a political level. Using democracy as the assumed political system, particularly in considering the case studies discussed in Chapter 1 (Europe and North America), left-wing and right-wing populism can be demonstrated through focusing on their interactions with the central features of democracy, more specifically political inclusion and political contestation (Dahl, 1971). With specific reference to minority rights, which occupy a central role in measuring democratic and pluralistic societies, left-wing populist entities generally do not oppose minority rights for as long as they do not present political competition, as they present themselves as the only viable representatives of "the people." As such, left-wing populism (populist-socialism) is exclusive and anti-pluralistic when it comes to power and public contestations; for example, the democratic principles of institutional power and effective opposition are viewed as barriers for implementing "the peoples' will" (e.g. the opposition and the media are colluding to prevent the liberation/freedom of our people) (Huber & Schimpf, 2017). Yet they can be seemingly

inclusive (in their rhetoric) when it comes to societal and political participation (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

Right-wing populist entities are inherently exclusive with reference to all of the abovementioned societal dynamics. Through employing the politics of fear and intolerance, right-wing populism (populist-nationalism) objects to affording rights to political participation to minorities as they view themselves as the only representatives of "the people" (e.g. immigrants should not have voting rights/equal citizenship). At face value, left-wing and right-wing populism may seem easy to define; the former advocates for radical inclusivity, the latter for radical exclusivity. Whilst both may share ideas around political contestation and power, it is also common for these two host ideologies to overlap in a contextual striving to incite fear and/or popularity. Furthermore, there are populist entities that do not have fixed ideologies; Havlík and Stanley (2015) argue that such entities are known as "centrist populist", particularly in that their policy proposals are inconsistent (Huber & Schimpf, 2017).

The scope of this study includes an exploration of right-wing populism and populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. Accordingly, any reference to "populism" in this study will imply right-wing populism and populist-nationalism, unless otherwise indicated. Furthermore, considering their shared definition, and in an attempt to vary the terminology of this study, the terms "right-wing populism" and "populist-nationalism" will be used interchangeably throughout.

Figure 3.1: A comparative summary of the characteristics of right-wing and left-wing populism in traditionally liberal democratic societies in Europe and North America.

Right-wing Populism (Populist-nationalism)	Left-wing Populism (Populist-socialism)
• Radically exclusive • The politics of fear and intolerance • Critiques "the establishment" and "elite" (Liberal, multiculturalism, globalisation) • Populist-nationalism • "The people" are selective multi-class ethnic, nationality, culture • Protect "the nation" from "others" • Politically anti-pluralistic • Supportive of political participation (direct democracy) • Intolerant of opposition and institutional resistance • Limited minority rights • Alternative for Germany (Germany); Front National (France)	• Radically inclusive • The politics of fear • Critiques "the establishment" and "elite" (The rich, neoliberalism, capitalism, globalisation). • Populist-socialism • "The people" are the poor and working class • Protect the proletariat from capitalists (neoliberalism) • Politically anti-pluralistic • Supportive of political participation (direct democracy) • Intolerant of opposition and institutional resistance • Selective minority rights • Syriza (Greece)

(The Author)

The next section will provide an historical overview of 21st century geopolitics, specifically in (but not limited to) Europe and North America. In doing so, it will explore some the events that have acted as catalysts for, as well as continuing to promote, a populist-nationalist resurgence in historically mature liberal democracies.

Historical Contextualisation

The War on Terror

On 11 September 2001 four United States (US) commercial aircraft were hijacked by operatives of the radical Islamist global terror network Al-Qaeda. Two of the planes were diverted to New York, where they crashed into the two towers of the World Trade Centre, the symbolic heart of America's global economic complex. The third plane flew to Washington,

DC, the capital of the USA, where it crashed into the country's defence headquarters, the Pentagon. The final aeroplane's target was the US Capitol, the legislative centre of the Federal establishment. As a result of the intervention of passengers and crew, this plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania (Hayden et al., 2016). This prominent global event came to be known as 9/11 and, whilst it was not the first attack on the US by radical Islamic groups, it resulted in thousands of deaths as the largest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbour (Rapoport, 2017).

The political and psychological implications of 9/11 were inherently global, resulting in a radical realignment of US domestic and foreign policy, particularly with regards to security. Newly adopted narratives also almost exclusively associated global terrorism with religious fundamentalism (Rapoport, 2017). President George. W Bush articulated the government's response at the time in a speech to a Joint Session of Congress, where he officially declared a *war on terror*: "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government which supports them. Our war . . . will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001: 68).

In that very moment a major redistribution of political power took place within the United States, with a renewed authority afforded to the country's formidable security apparatus at home and abroad. Surveillance technologies and strategies were heightened drastically, with drone warfare and small-scale military operations becoming the new norm. After large-scale military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the years that followed, the USA demonstrated that it was prepared to act without the full support of its allies and established global institutional frameworks (Hayden et al., 2016).

Whilst the joint US-UK invasion of Iraq was highly contested amongst global actors, the intervention in Afghanistan was afforded wide support. The USA's Western allies were conflicted about the aggressive response to 9/11. However, following attacks in the UK and Spain, amongst other places, many European states established joint security networks and operations in an attempt to collectively coordinate the response to terrorism. Since then, the War on Terror has been steeped in controversy, often involving overt surveillance, human rights violations and torture. The policy itself has been widely debated, evolved, and drawn on ever-changing levels of support. The Obama administration oversaw a radical shift in US foreign policy, evincing a more pacified rhetoric, accompanied by more technologically advanced, small-scale and precise interventions (e.g. drone warfare) (Hayden et al., 2016).

As a result, the War on Terror, in whatever shape or form, has had a profound impact on global geopolitics, particularly amongst prominent liberal democracies. In present-day popular political rhetoric, a re-emergence of securitised narratives has resulted in the adoption of the war on terror as a means to enhance nostalgic politicking and fear-mongering in response to ever-changing forms of global terrorism.

The Global Financial Crisis

In mid-2007 a collection of unprecedented events in the global financial markets triggered the most severe global financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. After 2008 the global financial crisis (GFC) demonstrated both the economic severity and drastic geographic reach of economic and financial turmoil in an ever-growing volatile, interlinked and globalised international system. Two events with geopolitical significance occurred between 2007 and 2009: the first was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the second was the meeting of the G-20 heads of government in Pittsburgh. These two events marked the beginning and, possibly, the beginning of the end of the global financial crisis respectively. The financial crisis itself was inherently global, although most literature tends to focus on the USA, the decline in growth that affected virtually every single country in the world, although the impact was predominantly on the European and North American (neoliberal) economies (Claessens et al., 2014).

The rapid and highly coordinated mobilisation of international response was unique in itself; the G-20 emerged as a result, overshadowing the exclusive G-7 group, thus indicating a pivotal shift in the global political order. Emerging markets were least effected by the crisis because, some analysts claim, their rigid credit controls and broader market regulation. These countries now had a seat at the table and were no longer disregarded as economic inferiors. A highly criticised globally coordinated "stimulus package" emerged as a response to the crisis, repositioning the global financial institutions such as the IMF and indicating unprecedented levels of global political and economic cooperation (Birdsall, 2012). There have been numerous debates on the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis; ideological clashes become ever more exposed with policy makers; social scientists and economists attempting to answer questions on how it occurred and thus how to prevent it from happening again (Crotty, 2009).

According to most political economic analysts attempting to investigate the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis, the failure to put in place effective regulatory systems played an integral role. Robert Wade's (2009) "The Global Slump: Deeper Causes and Harder Lessons"

states that one of these regulatory failures was the moment in 1999 when the US Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, a measure that had been introduced in 1933 in wake of the Great Depression in order to prevent financial institutions from engaging in the speculative actions that led to the 1929 Wall Street crash. Germain (2009) makes the point about the 2008 crisis:

> This crisis has revealed the unprecedented vulnerability of the financial system as a whole when activities of all systemically significant financial institutions are not in some way supervised by regulatory officials with a mandate for system-wide stability. Such institutions range from mortgage providers to hedge funds to private wealth funds to insurance firms to (until September 2008) investment banks. It is not that these institutions have not been regulated; rather, it is that the manner in which they were regulated did not take into account their potential impact on the overall financial system. They have been regulated in terms of micro-prudential rather than macro-prudential rationales (Germain, 2009: 678).

However, such regulatory failures are not stand-alone causes; the crisis consists of an array phenomena converging at the same time, including global imbalances and income inequality. The rapid growth of developing economies and the global economy at large during the years of 2003 to 2007 was perceived as an indication of sustained long-term growth in the future, but according to Wade (2009), this was based on a flawed growth model. As a result, politicians, academics and ordinary citizens alike, particularly in Europe and North America, criticised the very structural composition of the global economic system. The political, economic and psychological implications of the GFC were as far-reaching as the collapse itself. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their jobs, their homes and their livelihoods because of events taking place beyond their control and even their own borders. Many entities began to capitalise on the emotion and fear associated with economic integration, and so the anti-neoliberal, anti-global, protectionist and isolationist rhetoric of politicians, particularly those in the populist camp, became ever more appealing to broader populations. The backlash against globalisation had begun.

The Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS

In December 2010 protests erupted in Tunisia following a government crackdown. A year later nation-wide protests spread to a number of countries throughout the Middle East and North African region (MEDA). Most of the mass action expressed a common desire for regime change, as most of these governments were inherently authoritarian in nature. Whilst democratic dispensations were established in Tunisia, violent incursions occurred in Libya, Egypt and Syria, eventually developing into full-blown revolutions and civil wars. This unprecedented and unpredictable wave of events came to be known as the Arab Spring, which resulted in the inherent destabilisation of the broader North African and Middle East

region. Incursions, counter-incursions, rebellions, government crackdowns, coups and counter-coups, and international interventions have dominated the complex turmoil that resulted following the Arab Spring uprisings. To this day a civil war continues to rage in Syria with a number of international actors involved. Libya is yet to hold free and fair elections or establish a stable government, whilst Egypt has struggled to deal with the conflict between a secular vs non-secular dispensation that has resulted in further oppression (Hazbun, 2017).

As a result, a number of radical groups formed out of the widespread conflict, particularly radical Islamist groups that were once kept in check by secular authoritarian regimes. The most prominent of these groups is the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), formed out of a desire to establish their own sovereignty, security and alternative world view that inherently embodies the notions of *jihad*, Sharia law and anti-West discourses (Hamid et al., 2017). ISIS was successful in gaining territory in Northern and Central Syria; their ideological dispensation was forced upon hundreds of thousands of individuals falling both within and outside of their sphere of influence. The group has been immensely successful in terms of foreign recruitment and has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks including the 2016 Paris attacks and the Orlando massacre, among others. Whilst ISIS has lost most of its territorial gains, it remains one of the most prominent threats to Western security. Following the rise of ISIS and the Arab Spring more broadly, one of the greatest humanitarian crises has ensued throughout the North African and Middle East region. Mass migrations as a response to persecution and conflict have resulted in an influx of refugees crossing into Europe, creating tensions amongst European nations with regard to their commitments to EU principles such as integrated government, human rights and the free movement of people (Bremberg, 2016).

Brexit and the EU Crisis

In 2015 and 2016 the European Union (EU) experienced an unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants attempting to enter the regional community through various ports of entry by land and sea including Greece, Italy and Hungary. In a space of a year over one million people arrived at EU borders fleeing the nearby conflict in Syria, amongst others. This protracted humanitarian crisis resulted in a large-scale political crisis within the EU, particularly with regard to joint and individual responses from member states. In 1985 the EU had established what would be known as the *Schengen Agreement.* This agreement abolished internal border regulation amongst EU member states, thus allowing for the free movement of people, goods and capital within what was known as the eurozone. Whilst there are

agreements with regard to safeguarding the external borders of the Schengen area, once an individual enters the Eurozone, internal regulations with regard to movement are almost non-existent (The EU Commission, 2017).

As a result, when vast numbers of people began entering and gathering at European member states borders, the EU governance framework was not necessarily equipped to deal with a crisis of this magnitude and for such a protracted period of time. Hungary for example, under the leadership of a Eurosceptical right-wing government, went against agreed-upon EU/Schengen regulations and permanently sealed its internal and external borders. This created a knock-on reaction from EU law makers, governments and citizens, who began to simultaneously question and seek to rectify what seemed to be an internal rebellion among a handful of EU member states, whilst also dealing with one of the largest humanitarian crises in post-WWII history. Germany, on other hand, despite the defiance of many of its citizens and European partners, decided to allow refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict to enter the country. For the growing populist-nationalist movements throughout Europe, this was a prime moment to capitalise on the fears of European citizens and radically drive their Eurosceptical agendas (Kallius, et al., 2016).

At the same time, the UK was debating its own status within the EU. Having joined the developing European Community in 1973 with special privileges, the UK sought to maintain much of its own governance mechanisms, including regulation of its borders and its own currency. Populist-nationalist movements within the UK saw the EU migration crisis and the EU's response as a threat to state sovereignty. Following a number of terrorist attacks in the UK and on mainland Europe, many European citizens saw entering migrants as a potential "Trojan Horse" in that terrorist groups, such as ISIS, could harbour their supporters amongst refugees within EU borders. Thus a culmination of political and economic events, the politics of fear and a rising right-wing movement, saw the United Kingdom voting to withdraw from the EU in a popular referendum in 2016, a move that would significantly weaken both the UK and the EU (Norris & Inglehart, 2016).

The EU migrant crisis and Brexit confronted post-WWII liberal democratic-internationalist global political systems with unprecedented political tests. According to those within the populist-nationalist camp, the status quo was failing to address a number of global security concerns. As a result, electorates within the UK and the EU are beginning to demonstrate a shift in political behaviour, a shift that, as electoral outcomes have shown, is gradually

leaning towards these right-wing and populist-nationalist sentiments (Norris & Inglehart, 2016).

The Orlando Massacre

On 12 June 2016, in the midst of a heated presidential campaign between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, an ISIS affiliate entered Pulse, an LGBTQ night club in Orlando, Florida, and opened fire using an automatic weapon. As a result, 49 of the predominately gay patrons were killed, marking it as the single most violent attack on the LGBTQ community in America. At the time it was also the most violent terrorist attack on US soil since 9/11. Whilst ISIS and various radical Islamic groups actively opposed the LGBTQ community, often posting videos of executions of gay, lesbian and Trans* individuals residing in their spheres of influence, this was the first direct attack by a radical Islamic group on the LGBTQ community of a mass scale on the soil of a liberal democratic nation (New York Times, 2018).

As expected, the United States government under the leadership of then President Obama condemned the attack, along with Democratic hopeful Hillary Clinton. Donald Trump also condemned the attack and, unlike many other right-wing politicians, his rhetoric was inherently unorthodox in that he promised to "protect" the LGBTQ community from "violent foreign ideologies." This narrative was similarly adopted by other populist-nationalist leaders in Europe and North America including Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen and the AFD, marking a significant shift in the traditionally anti-LGBTQ narratives of right-wing populist politicians (Lotter, 2018).

The global implications of the Orlando massacre have not been adequately explored in academic terms, particularly as it represents a marked shift in LGBTQ politics. More members of the LGBTQ community are being enticed into succumbing to the populist-nationalist rhetoric of *Homopopulism* (see Chapter 5) and are now openly supporting right-wing populist entities. This interaction between the politics of queer and the politics of fear requires further academic exploration (Lotter, 2018).

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The Backlash against Globalisation

Globalisation can encompass many different areas; whilst predominantly referred to as a political economic phenomenon, there are prominent elements of cultural and national integration as well. The origins of the present-day dominant globalised political order are to

be found in the post-WWII Bretton Woods conference, where a number of countries met to establish systems of free trade, open markets and global financial institutionalism. As a result, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) were established with the purpose of integrating national economies within a shared global economic system. This liberal discourse was formed on the basis that global integration would inherently ensure a peaceful and prosperous world. In the decades that followed, global integration expanded across the globe, particularly in Europe and North America. This extended to regional systems as well and by 1993 the European Union (EU) was established as the first highly integrated regional economic and political structure. The free movement and circulation of people, goods, capital and infrastructure dominated this liberal internationalist discourse, including the further integration of political and governance mechanisms (Frieden, 2018).

Recent events, including the election of Donald Trump, Brexit and the rise of right-wing populism throughout Europe and North America, demonstrate a growing backlash against globalisation in all forms, as each of these events inadvertently represent anti-global and protectionist narratives – their antithesis. Following an array of prominent global events, including the war on terror and the global financial crisis, among others, the electorates of Europe and North America have increasingly upset the post-WWII liberal democratic internationalist political status quo by voting to resist and roll back on political, economic and cultural globalisation. Integration also allowed for the diversification of cultural norms; this was particularly evident in urban centres throughout Europe and North America. Whilst many individuals, particularly the intellectual elites, embraced the emergence of cosmopolitan centres, they were equally met with growing resentment and fear perpetuated by a combination of populist rhetoric and catastrophic global events. The "foreign other," whether in the form of cultural integration or immigration, has emerged at the centre of both prominent debates and subsequent radical shifts in the geopolitics of Europe and North America. The fear of immigration has indeed come to occupy the most dominant space within the broader backlash against globalisation; however, this is not exclusive of political and economic narratives. As a result, a growing nationalist rhetoric, perpetuated by populist politics, has seen the backlash against globalisation manifest in the hardening of racial, ethnic, cultural and national boundaries (Short, 2016).

The next section will explore populism as an academic discipline and examine its epistemology in order to clarify its historical and theoretical contribution to this study. It will

demonstrate how populism has developed as a field of study in the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations.

Developing Scholarship on Populism

Defining Populism

Despite extensive academic explorations of the nature of populism, there is little consensus on how to define the concept. Most scholars agree that "populism worships the people" (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 4), though there is limited agreement beyond that shared characteristic. There are equally conflicting views on how to operationalise it. Structuralists argue the importance of macro socio-economic factors, institutionalists highlight the prominence of national aspects such as social norms and constructivists emphasise the role of agents, voters, leaders and their roles in acting and playing on traumas, fears and emotions at an individual level (Pappas, 2016). Where there is consensus is that the term itself originated as a formal conception at a conference at the London School of Economics in 1967. Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) later compiled a book which presented the findings of a diverse gathering of experts. In doing so, the authors documented the first attempt to define populism, whilst arguing the importance of understanding populism as a concept. However, much like today, they problematised that there is an uncertainty around explaining it:

> There can, at present, be no doubt about the *importance* of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it *is*. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies? (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 1).

A few years later in the 1970s and 1980s two main approaches dominated deliberations on the implications of the term. The first was associated with modernisation theory, the second with structural Marxism. Their shortcomings were that they understood populism to be the consequence of historical and political factors associated with the developing, post-colonial and peripheral worlds (Pappas, 2014). In line with the prominence of constructivist thought, the 1990s witnessed a new wave of populism studies whereby the roles of both leaders and supporters were critiqued. In the 21st century the scope of the concept of populism has expanded extensively and as a result some scholars have argued it has a reduced analytical utility (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Considering the importance and prominence of populism in the 21st century, it is imperative to explore recent attempts to define the concept before attempting to expand on its modern intellectual journey.

Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron (2013) in their working paper titled "Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda" take on the challenge and attempt to define the concept of populism. The authors identify three conceptual approaches in existing literature, namely populism as ideology, populism as a discursive style, and populism as a political formation, all of which will be discussed below.

Populism as Ideology

Populism as an ideology and movement can be employed through various socio-political contexts, by different actors and through numerous mechanisms. Political parties and leaders may be populists, particularly identified through their narratives in public forums. Cas Mudde (2004) in her piece "The Populist Zeitgeist," explores populism through the lens of public discourse. Commenting on Mudde's (2004) two prominent understandings of public populism, Dinc (2016) states:

> First is the politics of the public, meaning "highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the 'gut feelings' of the people." Second is the "opportunistic policies with the aim of (quickly) pleasing the people/voters." Building up on these two general assumptions, Mudde defines populism as follows: "An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Dinc, 2016: 7).

Populism as Discourse

Populism as discourse is formed as a discursive style and/or narrative that disseminates throughout the broader society. This style is more specifically constructed through a dichotomy of us (the people) versus them (the corrupt elite). Bonikowski & Gidron (2013) do not define this as an ideology as they see it rather as mode of political expression, deployed politically and strategically across the spectrum (left, right, liberal, conservative etc.). Bale et. al. (2011) identify a possible relationship between the media and populism as discourse, highlighting the notion that political leaders are often branded as populists if they appear in the media more frequently than others. It appears then that this definition provides a fluid conceptualisation of populism, particularly in that it describes populism as a form of politics rather than a rigid categorisation of actors (Dinc, 2016).

Populism as Politics

Bonikowski & Gidron's (2013) third approach seeks to expose populisms' contextual limits and fluid nature, going further to highlight the notion that populism is a political strategy. Dinc (2016) argues that these strategies could be associated with policy objectives such as nationalisation and economic redistribution, and/or securing the support of prominent

political parties, leaders and (majority) segments of society. Levistsky and Roberts (2011) describe populism as "a top-down political mobilisation of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo" (Levistsky & Roberts, 2011). This approach thus suggests that populism is not necessarily a "bottom-up" approach as commonly implied. In fact, it argues that charismatic leaders (acting on behalf of 'the people') seek to redefine both the will of the people and the people themselves in order to challenge the establishment. Pinar Dinc (2016) states:

> This definition suggests that in politics populism may be used as a strategy for policy making, political organization, and forms of mobilization within different economic, historical, and political contexts. Political actors, especially charismatic leaders, are important actors in populist politics as they offer a way to not only explain what populism is but also evaluate the mechanisms through which they proceed (Dinc, 2016: 7).

Furthermore, in referring to Jan-Werner Müller's *What is Populism?* (2016), Abroheim (2017) argues that:

> Müller's approach has the advantage of capturing one decisive aspect of right-wing populism that many commentators have overlooked, namely, its tendency to depoliticize its followers and to reduce democracy to a spectacle, in which passive citizens do nothing more than watch or listen to their leaders. Populism can be as much about demobilizing as mobilizing "the masses", as Schmitt and the Nazis also knew. For populists, popular sovereignty is more acclamatory than participatory. This also helps explain why populism often appeals to people who hate politics (Abroheim, 2017: 183).

Populism as Style

In addition to Gidron & Bonikowski's (2013) three approaches, Moffitt & Tormey (2014) provide a further definition of populism in the form of populism as a "political style." The authors argue that there is a relationship between a performing politician and an audience, stating that analysts need to explore what they claim to be a reflective interaction. They argue that such interactions are subject to change whilst going further to identify three "elements" of populist performance, namely appeal to the people; perception of crisis, breakdown or threat; and bad manners. Moffitt & Tormey (2014) therefore unpack the notion of "us vs them" (people vs elite) by exposing the (performance) techniques with which populist leaders distinguish themselves as "one of the people." Pinar Dinc (2016) states:

> By this, populist politicians not only become "pseudo-celebrities," but they also increase the value of ordinary citizens' knowledge, which is defined as "epistemological populism." Second, through real or perceived crises such as globalization, neoliberalism, war, terror, or immigration, populist leaders propose an emergency exit program to the people, usually in favor of "short-term and swift action rather than the 'slow politics.'" As a result, they care

> less about being politically correct or appropriate, resulting often in "tabloid style" politics that involve "slang, swearing, political incorrectness" as opposed to diplomacy (Dinc, 2016: 8).

The Historical Development of Populism

The gradual re-emergence of populism since the 1980s has inspired a new wave of scholarship associated with its study, notably shifting away from traditional debates around utility and agrarian vs urban origins (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Newly developed scholarship seeks to explore the dynamics of populism, ascertain whether it represents democracy or threatens it, and assessing the role of the media in enhancing and/or inhibiting populist movements. Moreover, explorations into the role of leaders, government capacity and longevity are all enhancing the understanding of populism. In order to explore populism in the 21st century, it is important to understand its historical development as both a political phenomenon and as a theoretical concept.

Populism 1.0 (Origins)

The first wave of populism studies originated at a conference at the London School of Economics in 1967, where a group of scholars from various backgrounds and disciplines came together in an attempt to define what they then termed a "political phenomenon." The result was a publication of the conference proceedings in the form of a book called *Populism: its meaning and national characteristics* by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969). Whilst there was a lack of consensus around definitive conceptualisations and operationalisations, this marked the beginning of the intellectual journey that is the study of populism.

During the late 1960s, when scholars began to discuss what would later be termed "populism," they observed that rulers of certain nations were embracing a particular type of political action that often had shared characteristics and objectives. They also noted that while this political action seemed to emerge sporadically across various areas across the globe, it often took erratic and contradictory forms. As such, it was difficult to pinpoint any recurring factors that may have contributed to its adoption, as "populism" was witnessed in communist states, pluralist societies, modern nations, pre-modern nations, post-colonial and colonial states. The question thus arose as to whether populism does in fact have any underlying unity, or whether it is simply an umbrella term used to describe "a multitude of unconnected tendencies" (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Whilst the LSE conference marked the founding moment of populism as a scholarly concept, few of the attending scholars were able to reach consensus on what its nature was, and so Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner's (1969)

ground-breaking book of proceedings lacks a necessary concluding chapter or a synthesis of findings (Pappas, 2016).

Without a clear conceptual understanding, early research associated with populism was difficult to harness. Despite these conceptual shortcomings, significant findings were made. These are particularly evident in the case studies outlined by Pappas (2016) in which they highlight: "premodern movements, such as the Narodniki in imperial Russia; nondemocratic regimes, such as Latin America's post-war autocracies; interwar peasant movements in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; and anti-capitalist and anti-colonial movements in Africa" (Pappas, 2016). Notably, none of these studies focused on mature liberal democracies, particularly in the West. Consequently, the first wave of populist studies fulfilled the purpose of revealing this political phenomenon to the academic world, placing it firmly on the agenda of comparative politics. But it did fail to produce any commonly agreed conceptualisations and definitions, which resulted in conceptual flaws and empirical uncertainties, all of which continue to this day (Pappas, 2016).

Populism 1.5 (Classic)

The second wave in the study of populism emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, predominantly among Latin American scholars. Written within the socio-political context of Latin America during this time, these scholars sought to explore the socio-economic determinants of mass political mobilisation rather than focusing on the conceptual constraints identified in the previous wave. The purpose of this scholarship was to explore "the conditions under which the political participation of the lower classes is channelled through a populist movement" (Germani, 1978: 95). Two distinct approaches emerged: the first was associated with modernisation theory, the second with structural Marxism. Through the lenses of modernisation theory, populism was a means to integrate the newly emerged urban working and middle class that resulted from the fall of autocratic systems and the subsequent rise of capitalism and modernity after WWI and WWII. Through the lenses of structural Marxism and dependency theories, populism was seen as a multiclass political movement that formed in the backlash to Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) – a widely adopted economic policy. This "multiclass" approach thus represented populism as successful cross-class alliances between various sectors (labour, business etc). Whilst there are significant differences between these two approaches, they both share a view that populism is intrinsically linked to historical and political contexts associated with development in the

world's (semi-)peripheries (relations of production and market conditions) (Jansen, 2011: 79).

Scholars associated with this wave of populism studies thus organised their research intention, more specifically focusing on populism as a means for contextual mass mobilisation. Their case studies included countries in Latin America; however, Greece was an exception in this regard. In the 1970s and 1980s Argentina, Mexico, Columbia, Bolivia and Guatemala all shared meaningful similarities in the light of the newly developed theory of populist mobilisation. Whilst this wave made significant inroads in bridging the gap between conceptual intention and research extension, there were a number of shortcomings associated with this era of populist scholarship, particularly with regards to comparability potential. Accordingly, the associated theoretical developments could only be used to explain authoritarian populist movements, in Latin America, under very specific economic and historical conditions. As a result, classical studies of populism are constrained in that they cannot be utilised to understand populism in liberal democracies. Nonetheless, classical populism studies made a significant contribution to the development of the scholarship on populism, particularly in that it exposed populism's mass movement characteristics, the role of individual agency and the relevance of charismatic leadership (Dix, 1978).

Populism 2.0 (Neoliberal)

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the end of ISI economic strategies in Latin America, the material foundations for which state-based populism (classical populism) had all but disappeared, resulting in a broad social demobilisation (Roberts, 1995). Because of this, the utility of the theories of modernisation, structural Marxism and dependency for the study of populism was now being contested. Whilst the study of populism was facing a new scholarly dilemma, the structural Marxist-inspired populist mobilisation did not altogether recede as a political phenomenon. In particular, the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela represented the continuation of classic populist thinking within the politics of Latin America. However, a new type of populism was now emerging in line with the changes in the socio-economic dynamics of the region, a shift that required a further theorisation of populism as a field of study (Pappas, 2016).

In the early 1990s many scholars observed that, contrary to historical trends, Latin American politicians were successfully implementing neoliberal economic policies whilst maintaining immensely high levels of popular support. The most prominent cases were Peru, Brazil and Mexico. They called this "neopopulism" thus setting the stage for a new wave of populist

studies. All of these cases demonstrated a deviation from classic populism in two ways: the first was its social basis, which consisted of individuals in both the rural poor and the urban informal sector as opposed to organised class action; the second was the implementation of neoliberal policies similar to those of the USA and the UK, in which free market economics were prioritised over the former state-based ISI approach (Weyland, 1999). As such, new understandings of populism were required, particularly with regard to the relationship between formerly opposed neoliberal policies and overt popular support. As a result, further questions began to emerge around the role of leaders and their ability to garner support for market-oriented structural adjustments (Roberts, 1995: 82).

A number of important developments emerged in this wave of scholarship on populism. The first was an emphasis on an ever-growing interest in the role of charismatic leaders, particularly those who rose from pluralist rather than oligarchic systems (Hawkins, 2003: 1138). Secondly, populism was viewed as a political strategy, one that was instrumental in mobilising support, and subsequent power, through "direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001: 14). Finally, there were explorations of the narratives, discourses and language patterns used by populist leaders in order to politically mobilise and incorporate the masses. As with the previous waves of scholarship, there were a number of shortcomings in the development of neoliberal populism, particularly in that it retains the comparatively poor flexibility of classic populism. As a result, during this time there were few explorations of case studies that fell beyond the socio-economic parameters of Latin America, with specific reference to Europe and North America. Furthermore, there were few attempts to provide any comparative analysis between classic populism and neopopulism in Latin America itself (Pappas, 2016).

Populism 3.0 (Contemporary)

In the 21st century the study of populism and its scope has grown exponentially. This is in line with the gradual surge in populist politics around the globe, more recently in Europe and North America. Despite substantial investments in resolving a number of conceptual constraints, Pappas (2016) argues that scholars are still lacking connotative precision in this regard. The author attributes this to definitional instability, whilst highlighting that the scholarship on populism has identified a number of recurring definitional approaches:

> populism is understood primarily in terms of actors (the "people," some elite, a leader); actions (mass mobilization, strategic leadership); style (moralistic, dichotomous, majoritarian); domain (old–new, left–right, democratic–nondemocratic, European–non-

> European); consequences (polarization, social homogenization, charisma); and normative implications (threat to or corrective of democracy) (Pappas, 2016: 7).

Pappas (2016) thus argues that although there is significant merit in all the features, these definitional approaches are established on unstable conceptual and methodological foundations, which will "often impede comparative and theoretical efforts" (Pappas, 2016: 7).

Whilst fully acknowledging Pappas's (2016) conceptual critiques of the development of populism studies, it important to review the most recent publications that have sought to address these challenges, further develop the scholarship, contextualise populism in the 21st century and understand the recent surge in what Moffitt (2016) terms "the global rise of populism", particularly in Europe and North America (Moffitt, 2016). In his article "A Critical Review of Recent Literature on Populism" John Abromeit (2017) seeks to position the study of populism within a contemporary context, more specifically within the 21st century. In doing so, Abromeit (2017) reviews the five most recent studies of populism, namely: 1) Ruth Wodak's *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (2015); 2) Benjamin Moffitt's *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation* (2016); 3) Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser's *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (2017); 4) Jan-Werner Müller's *What is Populism?* (2016); and 5) John B. Judis's *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics* (2016).

Abromeit (2017), much like Pappas (2016), argues that the study of populism has notably shifted away from traditional debates. The author also agrees with Pappas (2016) that newly developed scholarship is seeking to explore the definitions of populism. Whilst acknowledging that the study of populism has resurfaced significantly over the past thirty years, Abromeit (2017) argues in favour of academic explorations into fascist, populist and right-wing discourses that were prominent throughout the 1930s and 1940s (i.e. prior to the 1967 London School of Economics Conference), particularly by the Frankfurt School of critical theorists.

John Abromeit (2017) affirms that the interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School offers numerous valuable insights into the study of populism, ultimately claiming that such approaches address some of the shortcomings in the scholarship:

> I have suggested here that contemporary approaches to the study of populism that rely predominantly on discourse analysis, new media, or even political theory are not adequate to the task. Preferable, in my view, would be a return to the sophisticated, interdisciplinary approach to the study of populism that was pioneered by the Frankfurt School Critical

> Theorists in the 1930s and 1940s, in which a non-dogmatic Marxist critique of capitalism, psychoanalytically based social psychology and empirical social research were combined to grasp the powerful right-wing populist tendencies that emerged in the twentieth century (Abromeit, 2017: 185).

Having contextualised the contemporary wave of populism studies and its associated theoretical debates, this review will briefly explore three prominent texts which provide significant insights into the study of right-wing populist politics in Europe and North America.

In her study *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* Ruth Wodak (2015) utilises what is termed the "discourse historical approach" (DHA) to explore the prominent rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist entities. She argues that there is no single overarching explanation for the resurgence of right-wing populism in Europe and North America, going further to attribute the phenomenon to a culmination of factors manifested through varying rhetorical discourses and material factors that are inherently unique to local contexts. She does, however, identify re-nationalisation politics as a recurring feature of most of 21st century populist politics of the West, highlighting four major components of the rhetorical discourses in this regard: "nationalism, anti-Semitism, performance and the media, and gender" (Wodak, 2015).

> In the fifth chapter Wodak (2015) makes an intervention in the ongoing debate about the role of anti-Semitism in right-wing populist parties and whether or not it has – as some commentators have recently claimed – been displaced by Islamophobia among "second-generation" leaders, such as Marine Le Pen or Heinz Christian Strache, who have arguably distanced their respective parties from the open anti-Semitism of their successors and have instead moved toward a chauvinistic concept of "Western Civilization" allegedly under attack by Islam. Wodak (2015) convincingly criticizes this thesis and argues that anti-Semitism is just as important as ever for right-wing populist parties in Europe, even if it must now be expressed in coded forms. She makes clear that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism can and do continue to exist side by side (Abroheim, 2017: 178).

In *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*, Benjamin Moffitt (2016) seeks to provide an interpretation of populism as a style in which the mediated performances by leaders maintain the pivotal essence of populism, rather than ideology or content. The author also goes beyond the traditional scope of populism studies by conceptualising populism as global phenomenon. To illustrate his claim that there are common characteristics, Moffitt (2016) refers to a number of case studies in which he analyses the "performances" of populist leaders around the world. Finally, the author refers to the radical transformation of the media of the past twenty years, claiming that this

phenomenon makes the study of populism qualitatively different from the previous waves, as the "new" media benefitted and advanced populism significantly (Moffitt, 2016).

> In chapter four of his study, Moffitt turns his attention to the much-debated role of the leader in populism. He argues – against Cas Mudde and others – that downplaying the role of the leader betrays a Eurocentric approach to populism; the centrality of the leader to populist movements and parties is the rule, rather than the exception, when one views populism as a global phenomenon. For Moffitt, "it is the leader that should be our main focus when studying the phenomenon, given that they are the figures that ultimately 'do' populism" (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 51–52). Populism differs from traditional political ideologies also in that the leader does not represent but actually embodies "the people". But, as Moffitt points out insightfully, charisma is not necessary to become a living symbol of the "general will"; more important are convincing "performances of ordinariness and outsiderness", which make it possible for people to identify with the leader (Abroheim, 2017: 178).

In *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics* John Judis (2016) provides a historical analysis of the recent resurgence of populism. Through drawing on political theory, particularly the antagonistic nature of populism, the author focuses on the historical socio-economic transitions that took place in Europe and the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. He refers to a political-economic shift from Keynesian to post-industrial neoliberal policies of which he claims occupied a hegemonic status throughout Western society. Judis (2016) views the resurgence of populism as an expression of discontent with neoliberalism:

> So, during periods when neo-liberalism seemed to function well, such as the late 1990s, populism lost support. At other times – most notably in the wake of the 2008 crisis – left- and right-wing populist movements exploded in Europe and the U.S. Judis argues compellingly that populist movements "often function as warning signs of a political crisis" and that they arise "only under very special circumstances" (p. 16), which explains why – as most of the other authors also noted – populism was so weak in Europe and the U.S. during the prosperous postwar decades (Abroheim, 2017: 184).

The author goes further to note the historical transitions of populist political entities in line with such economic transitions. In referring to Marine Le Pen's *Front National* Judis (2016) notes a resurgence of economic nationalism and pro-welfare policies. He argues that such discourses are therefore channelled through nationalistic and anti-immigrant narratives that seek to entice the working class (particularly those hit hardest by the "failure" of neoliberal policies) through the promise of protectionism and socio-economic prosperity (Judis, 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of 21st century politics in Europe and North America and the development of the scholarship on populism and the associated politics . This is imperative in answering the research questions and problem statement highlighted in Chapter

1 (and in conceptualising *Homopopulism* in Chapter 5), particularly in considering the case studies and populist themes discussed throughout. In addressing the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and North America, this chapter sought to connect prominent global events and the discourses of populist politics. Within the context of *Homonationalism* and the rise of *Homopopulism* (see Chapters 4 and 5), such an overview, read in conjunction with Chapter 2, provides the necessary contextualisation in order to understand the histories of both LGBTQ politics and populism, and how they have taken shape in the 21st century. By discussing prominent geopolitical events and responses, such as the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU crisis, among other things, the rise of populist-nationalism and the contextual rhetoric of populist discourses can be better understood. By exploring the scholarship on populism – on an epistemological level and as politics – the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and North America can be understood within developing academic debates, particularly with regards to its varied conceptualisations and operationalisations (or lack thereof). Revealing the different terminologies, ideologies and definitions of populism demonstrates both its complexity and developing nature, whilst simultaneously striving to provide clarity on the overall scope of this study.

This chapter, in conjunction with the previous chapter, contributes significantly to the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*, particularly in providing the necessary literature reviews, historical overviews, theoretical foundations and contextualisations of associated scholarship, discourses and political dynamics. In order to further understand the rise of populism and LGBTQ politics, the next chapter will seek to provide the necessary theoretical lenses with which to investigate these global political phenomena. It will provide an exploration of Queer International Relations (IR) and *Homonationalism*, what they entail, how they can be applied in a theoretical context and why they should be used in this study. The newly developing theoretical framework of Queer IR is proving to be an inherently useful theory of International Relations.

CHAPTER 4

Queer International Relations (IR) Theory & Homonationalism

Introduction

Theory is an important component of qualitative research. The contribution of theoretical principles to this study is essential to solving the research problem and answering the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Queer IR and *Homonationalism* form the theoretical and methodological core of this study, particularly in that they assist in understanding queer modes of collusion *and/or* resistance that operate in the international/global realm. Whilst these theories offer extremely valuable insights, it is important to acknowledge Judge's (2018) assertion that "We need a multiplicity of concepts that we use in a way that doesn't ultimately fix meaning, that opens new passages of meaning and understanding of the world as we think we know it. I find that very useful as an approach" (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). It is this approach that informs the ways in which theory is explained and deployed in this chapter as well as the overall study.

The growing relevance and utility of Queer scholarship in the realms of politics and international relations (IR) is evident in the rapid development of Queer and Queer IR as a theoretical and methodological deployment. Since the late 1990s and the publication of *Faking It* (1999), Cynthia Weber has propelled queer modes of disruption and logic into the realms of IR. Her ground-breaking book *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (2016a), in which she theorises "queer logics of statecraft", and the array of articles that emerged as a result have contributed significantly to the fields of Queer IR and IR more broadly. Despite the constant dismissal of Queer by conventional IR scholars, queer scholarship has proven to be both a useful and necessary tool for analysis. Disrupting the binaries, hierarchies and discourses of conventional IR has opened up new avenues for understanding international relations and global politics, particularly with regard to issues of hegemony, nationhood, security and the global political economy, among others.

Furthermore, modes of queer intellectual curiosity have inspired the work of numerous queer (IR) theorists, even prior to the consolidation of Queer to Queer IR. This includes the ground-breaking work of queer theorist Jasbir K. Puar in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (2007b), where the widely deployed term *Homonationalism* is theorised and conceptualised. It is these texts by Weber and Puar that inform the theoretical and

methodological approaches of this study, both of which will be explored throughout this chapter.

The chapter begins by exploring Queer International Relations (IR) theory, its journey from Queer to Global Queer Studies, to Queer IR. It then tracks the historical development of Queer IR dating back to the late 1990s and the publication of *Faking It* (Weber, 1999) to its most recent theoretical and methodological expression, *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (Weber, 2016a). The chapter explores the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Weber's (2016a) text, noting the theoretical contributions of Foucault (1979), Haraway (1997), Butler (1999) and Ashley (1989), among others, to the formation of the "queer logics of statecraft" in Queer IR. It further explores the historical and theoretical journey of the widely deployed term *Homonationalism* by unpacking the theoretical contributions (US sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory and the ascendency of whiteness) to *Homonationalism* in its founding text by Jasbir K. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages Homonationalism in Queer Times* (2007b). The chapter provides two diagrams illustrating the subsequent theoretical developments based on Weber's (2016a) and Puar's (2007b) texts.

The purpose of providing such intricate explorations of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Weber's (2016a) and Puar's (2007b) work is to make explicit the theory underlying this study. This chapter establishes the theoretical lens for the final analysis in the chapter to follow. Both "queer logics of statecraft" and *Homonationalism* will be deployed to critique and contextualise the 21st century international relations/global politics of Europe and North America . This is done to enhance the understanding of a LGBTQ political shift, and in subsequently conceptualising *Homopopulism*.

Queer International Relations (IR) Theory

From Queer to Queer IR

Since the early 1990s Queer scholarship has increasingly explored global and international political dynamics, originally in the form of Global Queer Studies (GQS). Various scholars have since produced a number of significant queer insights into conventional IR themes such as war, security, globalisation, nationalism, state and nation formation, and the political economy, among others. Furthermore, without necessarily attributing their work to Queer IR scholarship, many authors have sought to critically assess how normative and non-normative gender and sexual constructions inform and disrupt global political power relations. As a

result, through the gradual development of Queer to Queer IR, formerly distinct boundaries between Global Queer Studies (GQS) and IR have been disrupted or queered, as it were.

> Queer IR scholars employ methodologies that (like poststructuralist methodologies) do not seek to uncover "the truth" of sexed, gendered, and sexualized bodies, assemblages, institutions, and orders (Foucault 1979). For in what I call a queer logic of the *and/or,* such "truths" are never stable and their representation is never guaranteed; therefore, any attempt to represent them as if they were stable is understood as a political act. For this reason, Queer IR scholars instead track when queer figurations emerge and how they are normalized and/or perverted so that they might challenge but also support heterosexual, heteronormative, cis-gendered, homonormative, homophobic, and trans*phobic assumptions, orders, and institutions. The resulting "deviant knowledges" of international relations these methodologies produce can disorient Disciplinary IR knowledges not only about queer subjects (Ahmed 2006) but also about international relations subjects and the discipline of IR as a subject (Weber, 2014: 598).

As Weber (2014a) argues, Queer IR does make use of IR theories and concepts that are often bound to normative IR literature and debates. Thus, Queer IR can be positioned as playing the role of queering (challenging norms, binaries and power structures) International Relations theory in certain instances. A few examples include formations of security, sovereignty and practice, particularly with reference to the feminist, gendered and queer debates with conventional IR. Weber (2014a) argues that Queer IR scholars have made (and continue to make) significant contributions to both Global Queer Studies and conventional international relations theories, approaches, concepts and debates (Queer IR) (Weber, 2014a).

In his chapter "Introducing Queer Theory in International Relations", Markus Thiel (2017) outlines the complexities associated with defining this very recently developing field of Queer IR. In introducing his text he states:

> Queer theory offers a significant avenue through which to deconstruct and then reconstruct established IR concepts and theories. Stemming from various fields that transcend a narrow view of IR, queer research applies an interdisciplinary outlook to advance new critical perspectives on sexualities, gender and beyond. A single viewpoint in a field as diverse as IR would unnecessarily limit the range of scholarly viewpoints. It would also preclude a nuanced debate about the contents and forms of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) perspectives, queer scholarship and queer scholarly politics in IR. Due to these themes, and because of its diversity, it is difficult to define queer theory precisely. Indeed, a narrow definition of it would not be in line with queer theoretical tenets. Queer theory is not just confined to sexualities or sexual rights. It also questions established social, economic and political power relations – and critically interrogates notions of security (Thiel, 2017: 97).

Thiel (2017) does, however, highlight some of the important debates and conversations that have emerged as a result of the queering of International Relations, some of which have informed the theoretical development of Queer IR. In applying Queer to IR, Thiel (2017) argues that queer disrupts many of the mainstream IR assumptions associated with global politics that are unrelated to sexuality and gender. Queer IR deconstructs conventional

binaries that govern IR thinking as well as recognising the instability of political, social and international orders. As a result, Queer IR assists in exposing and understanding what Thiel (2017) argues is "the fluid, performative and ambiguous aspects of world politics" (Thiel, 2017: 99). Furthermore, Queer IR criticises International Relations approaches that assume "natural and moral hierarchies," for example, troubling the "normalisation" of unconventional sexualities within hetero/homonormative parameters – a strategy that withdraws marginalised sexualities from radical modes of resistance (Thiel, 2017).

> With regard to more classical IR topics, it [Queer IR] critically assesses the assumption that all societies find themselves at different points along a linear path of political and economic development or adhere to a universal set of norms. Hence it embraces ambiguity, failure and conflict as a counterpoint to a dominant progressive thinking evident in many foreign or development policies. As a scholarly undertaking, queer theory research constitutes of 'any form of research positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations' (Nash and Browne 2012, 4) (Thiel, 2017: 99)

Thiel (2017) argues that Queer IR is also more "theoretically inclusive," particularly in ways that LGBT and Feminist scholarship falls short. Finally, he notes that there is a need for queer (IR) theorists to question their own racial, class and Western-centric orientations – power relationships that can be exposed and disrupted through the deployment of queer itself. The next section will therefore explore the development of Queer IR as a theoretical lens before expanding on the recent work of one of the founders of Queer IR, Cynthia Weber. The deployment of Queer IR in this study is particularly important when noting Thiel's (2017) assertion that "In a time when IR is often accused of being parochial, queer theory is a necessary corrective to powerful myths and narratives of international orders" (Thiel, 2017: 103).

Developing Queer IR

The founding work for Queer International Relations (IR), as Sjoberg (2016) argues, was a book published by critical IR theorist Cynthia Weber *Faking it: US Hegemony in a Post-Phallic Era* (1999), in which she discusses gender and sexuality in global politics. She also discusses foreign policy and state identity, fundamentally arguing that these factors are inherently intertwined. By examining US-Caribbean relations through a queer lens, the author demonstrates how sovereign nation-states mobilise "queer performativities." Weber (1999) agrees with mainstream IR theorists with regard to a post-Cuban Revolution US hegemony crisis. Through deploying mainstream, feminist and gendered lenses in themes associated with Queer IR, the author argues that a crisis of hegemony is related to two other/Other

factors, namely a masculinity crisis (feminist and gender IR) and a heterosexuality crisis (queer IR). Laura Sjoberg (2016) states in this regard:

> But *Faking It* is more than a story of the US and the Caribbean – it is a story of US state identity and its influence on US foreign policy that provides an analytical example of relationships between gender and sexuality signification, state identities, and strategic decisions in global politics. In 1999 when *Faking It* was published, no one had made an argument like this in IR. On the book's back cover, Kathy Ferguson calls it 'startlingly original'. In hindsight, both words were apt – *Faking It* was the original use of queer theorising in IR, and its original argument was emphatically that sexuality as much as gender shapes state identities and foreign policy (Sjoberg, 2016: 81).

Over ten years later Cynthia Weber built upon her Queer IR theorising in *Fake It* by publishing three ground-breaking studies: "Queer International Relations: From Queer to Queer IR" (2014a), "Why is there no Queer International Theory?" (2014b) and *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (2016a).

In her article "Why is there no Queer International Theory?" Weber (2014b) claims that Queer Studies has indeed become "Global Queer Studies" (GQS) generating new and significant insights into fundamental global political processes. Weber (2014b) goes further to claim that the transformation from Queer to "Global Queer" has left the discipline of International Relations (IR) predominantly unaffected, highlighting that a noted resurgence of activity in and attention to Global Queer Studies (GQS) has bypassed IR. She demonstrates this by illustrating that "only six journal articles and no special issues on GQS themes have been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR journals" (Weber, 2014b:1). This led Weber (2014) to question why the discipline of IR has not gone "somewhat queer" (Weber, 2014b: 1), referring to Martin Wright's (1960) "provocative term" questioning why there is no "[Queer] International Theory?" (Weber, 2014b: 1).

Weber (2014) challenges the notion that "All of the GQS-themed work produced by IR scholars is so interdisciplinary that it lacks a primary focus on core IR concerns, which is why IR scholars are not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets". Weber (2014b) is quick to address this perception by highlighting that the primary focus of most queer-themed work published by IR scholars in fact entails classic IR concerns such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism and the general practice of foreign policy (Weber, 2014b).

Cynthia Weber (2014b) demonstrates that many queer IR scholars are exploring how failing hegemonic states perform queerness through their conduct of intervention and wars to "solidify their hegemonic status" (Weber, 1999). She refers to Puar (2007b), who discusses

how states "produce themselves and their citizens" as pro-LGBT subjects in part to constitute other states, "civilisations" or peoples as national and global threats. She also cites Agathangelou (2013) and Scott (2013), who discuss how the "articulation and circulation" of global economic value through queer and racialised bodies supports "the practices of empires". Weber (2014b) therefore addresses the question in one clear and coherent claim that multiple queer international theories in fact do exist, leading her to pose a different question in this regard: "Why does there *appear* to be no Queer International Theory?" (Weber, 2014b: 29).

Cynthia Weber's (2016a) latest publication *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* is ground-breaking in that it actively seeks to challenge questions around the utility of Queer Studies in the discipline of International Relations. An extension of her 2014 articles, Weber (2016a) attempts to demonstrate that queer lenses in fact address problems that IR scholars believe are central to the discipline, namely political economies, the geopolitics of war and terror, manifestations of sexual, racial and gendered hierarchies, as well as the implications of this for globalisation, neoliberalism and sovereignty (Weber 2016a). The author attempts to explain some of the broader domestic and global sexualised logics that occur within the confines of state and nation formation, as well as in the organisation of global politics. Through applying a queer perspective to Richard Ashley's (1989) work on "statecraft as mancraft", Weber (2016a) explores her conceptualisation of "queer logics of statecraft" and how such logics operate within global politics to form "sexualised organisations of international relations" (Weber, 2016a).

Furthermore, in "Introduction: Faking It in 21st Century IR/Global Politics" Laura Sjoberg (2016) also builds on Cynthia Weber's (1999) founding piece by discussing Weber's disciplinary contributions within the context of 2016. As such, Sjoberg (2016) argues that although queer theorising has not become a "disciplinary norm", noting that Queer IR "never needed to be at the disciplinary centre of disciplinary IR" (Sjoberg, 2016: 82), Weber's original *Faking It* (1999) is being read by a growing number of Queer IR scholars.

> In 1999, there was no such IR community to embrace *Faking It*. Today, in contrast, *Faking It* is read by an ever-growing critical mass of aspiring critical IR scholars who situate it within a Queer IR literature that argues that sex, gender, and sexuality are key to the constitution of the international arena. Considered in relation to this contemporary Queer IR literature, *Faking It*'s argument that sexual self-perception influences patterns of interstate interaction remains unique today. This suggests that *Faking It* can and should be read with IR current literatures – not only about feminist/queer IR questions but also about identity and foreign policy concerns more widely (Sjoberg, 2016: 82).

Queer IR Methodology & Theoretical Framework

Who is the "Homosexual?"

In her book *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge*, Cynthia Weber (2016a) provides a theoretical and methodological framework within which to use Queer IR as an analytical tool. It is this theoretical and subsequent methodological framework, along with Jasbir Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism*, that forms the core theoretical underpinning of this study. As such, it is imperative to understand the theoretical journey embarked upon by Weber (2016a) in order to utilise her (de)constructed lenses for the purpose of analysing global politics, and in this case, Western populism. Accordingly, the contents of Chapter 2 "Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method: Developing Queer IR Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks" (and others) of Cynthia Weber's (2016a) *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* will be specifically utilised throughout this section.

In introducing her theoretical and methodological approaches, Weber (2016a) asks the questions: "What is homosexuality?" and "Who is the homosexual?" She refers to a "queer intellectual curiosity" – a method drawn from Cynthia Enloe's feminist curiosity (Enloe, 2004) – in which there is a shared refusal to take for granted "the personal-to-international institutional arrangements, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that figure 'homosexuality' and the 'homosexual'" (Weber, 2016a: 19). Weber (2016a) thus argues that such a method investigates how "figurations" or "distillations of shared meaning in forms or images" powerfully associate with and disassociate from material bodies. Such "figurations" are explicitly mobilised in international politics, disrupting conventional assumptions that (homo)sexuality is irrelevant in global politics (Weber, 2016a).

Weber (2016a) begins with a historical account, tracking a brief chronological ordering of the "homosexual" as a figuration of global society. She refers to the 19th -century Victorian account, which is addressed intricately by Michel Foucault (1980) in *A History of Sexuality: Vol. I*, where the "homosexual" is figured as an actor of sodomy (sexual practice between men). Weber (2016a) refers explicitly to Foucault's (1980) argument that the Victorians not only viewed "homosexuality" as an abnormal sexual practice, they also went further to categorise the "homosexual" or "sodomite" as a new "alien strain" or species (Foucault, 1980: 53-71). Weber (2016a) explains Foucault's (1980) assertion that "perversion" was implanted into "homosexuality" as a pathologised embodiment of an "abomination" of "normal" sexuality. Thus the "perverse homosexual" was invented and subject to scientific

study, experimentation, and moral and psychological correction (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate that the notion of the "perverse homosexual" still prevails today, even though such understandings are selectively accompanied by growing sentiments of "the normal homosexual" (Weber, 2016a).

Here Weber (2016a) refers to Hillary Clinton's 2011 Human Rights Day speech (Clinton, 2011), when the then US Secretary of State articulated and legitimised (humanised) sentiments of abnormality often associated with the "homosexual." The biopolitical term "homosexual" is thus discarded and replaced with LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) in an attempt to encapsulate same-sex sexual activity as an act of love within a same-sex relationship rather than a biological aberration. Whilst asserting the Obama administration's foreign policy objectives, Hillary Clinton in that very moment reformed the global figuration of homosexuality and "refigured" the understandings of "homosexuality" as a naturalised desire that is subjected to domestication through (often state-sponsored) institutional modes such as marriage, gay consumerism and gay patriotism (homonormativity) (Duggan, 2003). In demonstrating this "transition", as it were, Weber (2016a) seeks to expose a conventional binary that forms part of domestic and international debates around sexuality: the homosexual as *either* normal *or* perverse (Weber, 2016a). Weber's (2016a) final chronological shift embodies her theoretical disruption of the either/or binary, that is, the case of Conchita Wurst or Neuwirth/Wurst, the Austrian Eurovision star who sparked global political debate around the representation of the European/non-European. Weber (2016a) argues that the case of Neuwirth/Wurst demonstrates the limitation of either/or modes of analysis, as their embodiment can be viewed as normal *and* perverse in a number of registers, specifically those that are imperative for international relations (nationality, civilisation, gender, sexuality). Weber states in this regard:

> These three very different figurations of 'homosexuality' and the 'homosexual' are important not only because they mark major historical shifts in dominant Western perspectives on the 'homosexual' and 'homosexuality'. They also illustrate how specific figurations of 'homosexuality' and the 'homosexual' make it (im)possible for Western 'experts' to categorize people and geopolitical spaces as normal or pathological and to react to them accordingly. This matters for IR because specific figurations of 'homosexuality' and of the 'homosexual' enable and contest specific modes of organization and regulation of national, regional, *and* international politics (Weber, 2016a: 21).

In concluding her theoretical and methodological background account, Weber (2016a) demonstrates that her analysis of the three queer IR and sexualised figurations reveal different alignments of homosexuality with (ab)normality – the perverse Victorian "homosexual", the "normal" Obama administration "homosexual", and the normal *and/or*

perverse Eurovisioned "homosexual." It is important to note that registering these shifting (homosexual) alignments is important for this study, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Weber (2016a) also argues that queer intellectual curiosity of such figurations further produces queer IR methodological lenses with which to investigate IR beyond (homo)sexuality as an exclusive unit, including but not limited to colonialism, human rights, state and nation formation, foreign policy and international communities.

Discourse & Power (Foucault)

In the process of developing her theoretical and methodological framework, Weber (2016a) draws from Michel Foucault's (1979) *The History of Sexuality: Vol. I.* With a particular focus on developing a queer IR method, she applies Foucault's four primary recommendations or instructions on how to analyse modern sexuality. In doing so, Weber (2016a) offers an interpretation of these instructions, particularly within the context of how they inform the theoretical underpinnings of queer IR. Weber (2016a) asserts that Foucault's (1980) central claim in *The History of Sexuality* is that "the organizing principle of sexuality from nineteenth-century Europe to 'the contemporary West' is how sex is "put into discourse" (Foucault 1980, 11), for example, how specific meanings of sexualities and sexual subjectivities are produced through specific – even repressive – discursive formulations that bring sexualities like 'homosexuality' and sexual subjectivities like the 'homosexual' into being" (Weber, 2016a: 25). While various Victorian institutions repressed "abnormal" sexual practices, they also invented the discursive narratives associated with the sexual norm vs sexual deviant binary. Weber (2016a) argues that Foucault's first instruction is to analyse how sex is put into discourse and to examine what emerges from this observation.

Weber (2016a) draws attention to Foucault's (1979) argument that the Victorians produced a scientific discourse on sexuality, referred to as "scientia sexualis", which included biology and psychology, among other disciplines. This "productive power", according to Foucault, invented the "homosexual", leading him to offer his second instruction: analyse the functions and effects of productive power. Weber (2016a) interprets Foucault's (1979) second instruction as finding the means to expose productive power, as Foucault (1979) seeks to demonstrate how Victorian productive power managed the "homosexual" through a biopolitical apparatus. This apparatus, Foucault (1980) argues, produced the "alien strain" of the homosexual as scientific fact, with the "homosexual" as an empirical reality rather than a discovery in 19th-century Europe. Weber (2016a) asserts that "it was through the scientific examination of his 'sexual deviance' and the therapeutic correction he was subjected to that

Victorian society brought the 'homosexual' into being" (Weber, 2016a: 25). This regime of normalisation, as argued by Foucault (1979), subjects the "homosexual" to constant surveillance, managements and correction, located within a system of power/ knowledge/ pleasure.

This brings him to his third instruction: understand productive power as working through networks of power/knowledge/pleasure. Weber (2016a) asks why Victorian society invented the "homosexual", diagnosed this figure and subject individuals to modes of correction and normalisation? She argues that Foucault (1979) asserts that the invention of the "homosexual" made it possible to categorise and identify "normal" sexual behaviour, impose this normality, and distribute socially acceptable understandings of the heterosexual, monogamous, married, Christian couple as the morally appropriately equipped Victorian unit. Thus the normal vs perverse dichotomy is born, one which was distorted (but not disrupted) when Hillary Clinton made her 2011 speech in which she "normalised" the (LGBT) "homosexual" couple as a productive figure of the nation-state. Neuwirth/Wurst, as Weber (2016a) argues, then disrupts the normal vs perverse homosexual dichotomy in that they are figured as a "perverse, underdeveloped homosexual" *and* "normal, developed homosexual" at the same time. Conventional IR, as Weber (2016a) argues, offers a limited analytical scope with which to understand how such (queer) figures operate within global political registers (Weber, 2016).

It is here that Weber (2016a) draws on Foucault's (1979) fourth and final instruction: analyse how understandings of the "normal" and the "perverse" are frozen, without assuming they are either true or forever fixed. Weber (2016a) argues that this recommendation reveals that her three figurations: the "perverse homosexual", the "normal" LGBT individual and the embodiment of both at the same time (Neuwirth/Wurst), are not true or false. Instead, they are "powerful apparent representations whose meanings and functions vary radically throughout history and across the globe" (Weber, 2016a: 27). Weber (2016a) concludes by arguing that Foucault's (1980) method (instructions) exposes the fluidity of figurations of the "homosexual." In doing so, the historical figurations employed by Weber (2016a) and analysed through Foucauldian thought thus highlights an imperative question about modern sexuality: "How did these different understandings of the homosexual (perverse-LGBT-both) come about?" In claiming the importance of Foucault's (1979) work for the understanding of power and discourse, Weber (2016a) also highlights its limitations. She argues that Foucault's (1979) work can be sweeping and "problematically limited to a self-referential

'Europe' as his analytical terrain" (Weber, 2016a: 28). Weber (2016a) draws on the work of Donna Haraway's Butlerian theorisation of figuration in order to further inform her own theoretical development.

Figurations (Haraway)

In developing her theoretical and methodological framework, Weber (2016a) draws extensively on the work of Donna Haraway (1997), more specifically her discussions on "techniques of figuration" (Weber, 2016a: 28). Cynthia Weber (2016a) argues that such techniques allow an individual to employ figuration as a critical conceptual device, going further to claim that Haraway's conceptualisation is compatible with Foucault's analysis. She specifically asserts that Haraway's (1997) work builds on Butler's (1999) notion of "performativity", and that it can help scholars explore the "homosexual figure" in extensive detail (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) defines figurations as "distillations of shared meanings in forms or images. They do not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a signified pre-exists them. Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that bring specific worlds into being" (Weber, 2016a: 28).

In arguing that Haraway's (1997) techniques are useful for analysing how figurations are crafted and employed, Weber (2016a) extracts four key elements from which figurations are formed: tropes, temporalities, performativities and worldlings (Weber, 2016: 28). According to Weber (2016a: 29) and Haraway (1997:11) "tropes are material and semiotic references to things that express how we understand them." Weber (2016a) refers to tropes as non-literal or self-identical to what they describe. She goes further to demonstrate Haraway's (1997) argument that language imposes the deployment of figuration, because it involves displacements that essentially disrupt "identification and certainties" (Haraway, 1997:11). In referring to Haraway's (1997) second element, temporalities, Weber (2016a) asserts that this figurative element represents a relationship to time. She notes that developmental time may not necessarily be applied equally to every figuration. Haraway (1997: 9) argues that figurations are historically rooted in "the semiotics of Western Christian realism", for example, the "perverse homosexual" figuration is built on scientific discourse *and* on the Europe vs colonies binary, whereas the Obama LGBT figure is figured within static and universal moral terms (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) goes further to argue that developmental temporality is inherent in the Obama LGBT discourse, particularly in that it is located in the relations between sovereign nation-states rather than in the figure itself. As

such, a state's measure of development and modernity is based on its appreciation of "gay right as human rights" (see Puar, 2007b on *Homonationalism*).

According to Weber (2016a), understanding the contrasts associated with figurations of "the homosexual" and their relationships with temporalities demonstrates the relevance of Haraway's (1997) third element: performativities. The term was originally developed by Judith Butler (1999) in an attempt to explain gender and sexuality as performance through repeated acts that constitute subject "norms." Weber (2016a) states in this regard:

> Applying Nietzsche's idea that there is no doer behind the deed and that the deed is everything (1999, 33) to an analysis of sexes, genders, and sexualities, Butler argues that enactments of gender make it appear as if sex – which Butler understands as a social construct – is natural and normal, and as if particular sexed bodies map 'naturally' onto particular genders. It is through the everyday inhabiting of these various sexes, genders, and sexualities by everyday people who enact them that the subjectivities of these doers of sexes, genders, and sexualities appear to come into being. This does not mean that – once enacted – performativities freeze sexed, gendered, and sexualized subjectivities and the networks of power and pleasure that are productive of them. Rather, because each enactment is itself particular, it holds the possibility of reworking, rewiring, and resisting both 'frozen' notions of sexes, genders, and sexualities and their institutionalized organizations of power, including those that participate in 'build[ing] the fantasy of state and nation' (Butler 2004, 124; in IR, see Campbell 1992; Weber, 2016: 31).

Weber (2016a) argues that Haraway (1997) employs Butler's (1999) notion of performativity by claiming that "figurations are performative." Weber's (2016a) three figurations (and figures of speech) thus become subject to repetition and are understood to be images of oneself or of others (another state, community, regional body etc.). Hence, the "homosexual" may choose to perform as this figuration *and/or* it may be imposed (Weber, 2016a). For example, the LGBT figure is often embraced as a positive performance, whereas the "perverse homosexual" may not. Others may (and do) find the LGBT figure as constraining, homonormative/homonationalist (Duggan, 2003; Puar, 2007b) and normative.

> Their objections center on how the 'LGBT' is produced by and is productive of institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that value only what they describe as hetero/homonormative ways of being 'homosexual' (in marriage, the military, and consumption) and devalue what they describe as queer ways of inhabiting one's sexuality (Duggan 2003), illustrating a tension between IR conceptualizations of norms as uniformly beneficial (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and (antinormative) queer critiques of norms/normalization. As for Neuwirth/Wurst, by both embracing and exceeding hetero/homonormativities, his/her performative figuration complicates both the 'LGBT and a 'hetero/homonormative versus (antinormative) queer' dichotomy (Weber, 2016a: 32).

Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate that figurations are never stable. She claims that every performance of a figuration depends on a number of factors, including history, geopolitics, performance readings and responses, inhabitation or resistance, among others. As a result,

every performance and its repetitions introduce a new element, thus reiterating that figurations of the "homosexual" are flexible, fluid and ever-changing. Weber (2016a) goes further to critique institutional arrangements of power/knowledge/pleasure, such as heteronormativities and/or homonormativities, stating that they are "likewise less stable than they appear to be" (Weber, 2016a: 33). Weber (2016a) concludes that performativity, in conjunction with the deployment of tropes and temporalities, produces the final element of Haraway's (1997) figuration: worlding. Drawing on the work of Haraway (1997) and Agathangelou and Ling (2004), Weber (2016a) argues that worlding "map[s] universes of knowledge, practice, and power" (Haraway, 1997:11), adding that:

> In the cases of the Victorian 'homosexual', the Obama administration's 'LGBT rights holder' and European debates over Neuwirth/Wurst, knowledge about these figurations, the way they are performatively put into practice, and the power relations running through them combine so differently in each case that it is sometimes difficult to remember that we are speaking about the same general figure – the 'homosexual' (Weber, 2016a: 33).

From this point of departure, Weber (2016a) demonstrates that there are differences in how the "homosexual" is worlded, particularly in that "the maps produced by worlding practices are as contestable as the figurations to which they give specific form" (Haraway, 1997: 11). In once again referring to Foucault (1979), Weber (2016a) concludes that understandings of the "homosexual" and networks of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce this figure are never static. She argues that they are instead an imposition of power on bodies and their (sexual) activities, all of which produces new rules for "the game of powers and pleasures" (Foucault, 1980: 48). It is these games, Weber (2016a) argues, that are projected beyond the realm of private space and intimate relations, and into the realms of national, regional and international/global relations (Weber, 2016a).

Statecraft as Mancraft (Derrida & Ashley)

In tracking Weber's (2016) theoretical journey, it is possible to identify the "layering" of various theoretical and methodological elements that are drawn from the authors discussed up to now. When discussing "statecraft as mancraft" Weber (2016a) goes further to incorporate Foucault's (1980) exposure of discourse and productive power with Haraway's (1997) "Butlerian" (1999) exploration of figuration. By layering these insights to provide multiple perspectives for analysis, an intricate account of the figuration of the "homosexual" is provided. Further incorporating these perspectives with Richard Ashley's (1989) "statecraft as mancraft" reveals how states attempt to "freeze" or stabilise meanings of the "homosexual" in the global political realm (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) thus draws from

Ashley's argument that "it is impossible to understand the formation of modern sovereign states and international orders without understanding how a particular version of 'sovereign man' is inscribed as the *necessary* foundation of a sovereign state and how this procedure of 'statecraft as mancraft' produces a specific ordering of international relations" (Weber, 2016a: 34) as a core underpinning of her queer IR theoretical framework.

Weber (2016a) explores Ashley's (1989) argument through two techniques: first she applies it to her first two "homosexual" figurations (Victorian perverse and Obama LGBT); second, she deploys the work of Foucault (1979: 1980), Haraway (1997) and Butler (1999) to argue that Ashley's (1989) "statecraft as mancraft" simultaneously expands on the understanding of figurations of the "homosexual" and produces unique IR research questions for the purpose of analysing figurations of the "homosexual" in the "sexualized orders of international relations" (Weber, 2016a: 34). Weber (2016a) begins by providing an overview of Ashley's (1989) poststructuralist perspective on international relations, arguing that whilst he built upon Foucault's analysis of "the constitution and problematisation of subjectivities" (Weber, 2016a: 34), he also includes Jacques Derrida's (1977) "deconstructive critique of logocentrism" (Weber, 2016a: 34). She states:

> Logocentrism refers to how '*the* word' – indeed, a singular, specific word signifying a specific presence – grounds all meaning in a linguistic system because of how it is positioned as a universal referent that is located outside of history. In the classical age, 'God' was the most common example of a 'Logos' in a logocentric system. In the modern age, as Nietzsche argued, 'man' displaced 'God' from this logocentric position. Understood as 'a pure and originary presence – an unproblematic, extra-historical identity, in need of no critical accounting' (Ashley 1989, 261), 'modern man' is now the figure who functions in modern discourse as 'an origin, an identical voice that is regarded as the sovereign source of truth and meaning' (Ashley 1989, 261; Weber, 2016a: 34).

Weber (2016a) endorses Ashley's (1989) argument that in international relations theory and practice, "modern man" as sovereign man functions as both "the Logos" of modernity and as the foundation for the sovereign nation-state. This is a result of the shift from monarchical to popular sovereignty, where "modern man" has now given the modern nation-state its sovereign authority (since authority is no longer passed down from "God" to a sovereign monarch). Weber (2016a) articulates Ashley's (1989) argument as follows:

> The state's sovereign authority that had previously been vested in the monarch – as transcendental, as reasonable, as the interpreter of meaning – is now vested instead in 'modern man'. To be sovereign, then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign man as an always already existing domestic presence, as the foundation of its authority domestically and internationally, which emerges from the complex interplay of domestic and international relations (Weber, 2016a: 35).

Weber (2016a) argues that three key points emerge from Ashely's (1989) analysis in this regard, more specifically with reference to the Victorian "perverse homosexual" and Obama's "LGBT rights-holding homosexual" figurations. First, Weber (2016a) asserts that the modern nation-state is inherently connected to "modern man" and that "the sovereign inscription of the modern state is intimately tied to the sovereign inscription of 'modern man'" (Weber, 2016a: 35). She refers to Ashely's (1989) statement that '*Modern statecraft is modern mancraft*. It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears" (Ashley, 1989: 303). Furthermore, Weber (2016a) argues that such sentiments are projected into the realm of international anarchy where "sovereign man" attempts to tame the arena with his foreign policies. Weber (2016a) refers explicitly to the work of Rao (2012), where it is argued that the Obama administration's modern man is a "neo-imperial man" that insists on the post-colonial (perverse homosexual) state to assert the hierarchy of the enlightened US "sovereign man." This (US) sovereign man thus narrates gay rights as human rights in the global arena in order to justify "neoimperial rule" (Richter-Montpetit 2014b; 2014c), an argument that is also put forward by Jasbir Puar (2007b) within the context of post-9/11 nationalism, which will be discussed further in this chapter and critiqued throughout this study.

By providing such examples, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate Ashley's (1989) argument that "paradigms of man are themselves tools of power" (Ashley 1989, 300). In doing so Weber (2016a) moves to her second point, where she argues that such paradigms have implications for understanding the orders of international relations. She refers to Ashley's (1989) notion that "modern mancraft" gives rise to modern understandings of the international order as well as of the modern sovereign state.

> For just as the 'logos' in Derrida's logocentric system makes it possible to establish hierarchies, the 'logos' of 'modern man' as the 'logos' of the modern state organizes international relations according to hierarchies as well. These include reasonable man/pure danger, civilized/barbaric, security/danger, peace/war, domestic/international, and order/anarchy. In this logocentric system, whatever can be narrated from the point of view of 'the logos' and made to 'speak from a sovereign voice' is what is valued and protected; what cannot be made to speak from a sovereign voice (e.g., anarchy and terror) must be violently opposed (Ashley 1989, 284; Weber, 2016a: 36).

Thus Weber (2016a) argues that through expanding figurations of the "normal couple" (heterosexual, white, Christian, patriotic) to include the LGB (not always including the T, as the T is often still considered perverse), the Obama administration "narrated those unreasonable *states* that do not recognise the gay rights of the 'LGBT' as sources of barbarism, instability, and danger to 'modern man', established neocolonial education

policies to enlighten unreasonable states' leaders (e.g., by distributing 'LGBT' human rights tool kits to foreign embassies), and imposed sanctions on *some* states that failed to embrace gay rights as human rights" [queer logics] (Weber, 2016a: 36). In providing this case, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate how "modern man" as sovereign man, authorises and legitimises the possible use of violence (by the sovereign state) on behalf of his "presumed transcendental reason" (Ashley 1989, 268; Weber, 2016a: 36).

Weber's (2016a) third and final point that she draws from Ashley's (1989) analysis is that none of the figurations discussed throughout (modern man, modern state, international orders) that are understood in IR as "variations of order versus anarchy" are stable or ahistorical (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) argues that

> …the reasonableness of 'modern man' can always be shown to be unreasonable, just as the order of domestic politics can always be shown to contain aspects of anarchy. To put it in Derrida's terms, the binaries that order domestic and international relations constantly deconstruct themselves, making them both unstable and (because unstable) unreliable. What this means is that various invested actors – from citizens to states to formal international institutions – constantly attempt to stabilize these unreliable hierarchies and the figurations that authorize them so they *appear to be* ahistorical, given, and true, so that they might more reliably function in domestic and international politics (Weber, 2016a: 37).

In applying such an argument to her Victorian (perverse) and Obama's (LGBT) "homosexual" figurations, Weber (2016a) asserts that the immense effort to construct such rigid figurations (often in the face of global resistance) demonstrates a case point in itself. She argues that this explains why international/global politics is assumed to be dangerous by sovereign nation-states, because refusing to bend to the will of a national sovereign, man will *expose* sovereign man and his sovereign order that he protects as ahistorical and non-contingent as being historical and contingent, particularly in the (anarchical) international realm. According to Weber (2016a), this is why "the order/anarchy boundary is so highly policed, both in international practice and in international theory" (Weber, 2016a: 37). In concluding her theoretical derivation from Ashley's (1989) Derridian analysis, Weber (2016a) argues that, much like Foucault's and Haraway's analyses, Ashley suggests "contemplating how figurations and the orders (and anarchies) they produce and that are produced by them are fixed and frozen as well as unfixed and unfrozen" (Weber, 2016a: 37). She further argues that because Ashley's (1989) analysis is embedded in IR thinking, it further generates particular IR research questions that contribute to development of the methodological foundations of her own analysis, specifically in that it provides techniques with which to analyse "how 'modern man' is figured as sovereign man on behalf of sovereign

nation-states and how specific figurations of 'modern man' as sovereign man participate in the production of domestic and international orders" (Weber, 2016a: 38).

Weber (2016a) therefore raises the following questions, which are inherently embedded in her Queer IR theoretical and methodological exploration. Weber (2016a) goes further to utilise and critique these queer IR research programmes and layered inputs discussed throughout, inevitably producing her own theoretical lens which forms the theoretical backbone of this study: the "queer logics of statecraft" (Weber, 2016a)

- How does speaking 'the truth' about 'homosexuality' and the 'homosexual' participate in the organization and regulation of international relations? (Weber, 2016a: 38)
- What ordering principles of sexuality generate and sustain – and are generated and sustained by – figurations of the 'homosexual', and how do they function in international relations? (Weber, 2016a: 38)
- How do figurations of the 'homosexual' function as instances of 'statecraft as mancraft', and how specifically is this normality or perversion figured as 'the logos' of or against 'sovereign man'? (Weber, 2016a: 38)
- How do these ordering principles of sexuality and figurations of the 'homosexual' as or against 'sovereign man' work together to order international relations? (Weber, 2016a: 38)
- What do various practices of statecraft as mancraft make possible in world politics, and what contingencies are rendered necessary by and through these practices? (see Ashley,1989; Hopf, 2010) (Weber, 2016a: 38)

Queer Logics of Statecraft (Weber)

In this section Weber (2016a) provides a critique of her theoretical exploration in relation to the authors she has drawn from up to this point (Foucault, Haraway, Butler, Ashly, Derrida). She then seeks to provide theory with which to analyse and understand international relations/global politics in the form of the "queer logics of statecraft" by further theorising Queer IR. Weber (2016a) begins by arguing that while her developed research questions contribute significantly to queer IR research programmes, they are limited in that they encompass Derrida's perspectives on deconstruction and its connection to the "logos" and the "plural" (Weber, 2016a). She elaborates that Ashley's Derridian analysis draws on the claims that "deconstruction is not something we bring to a text; rather, it is something that is inherent in a text" (Weber, 2016a: 38), going further to state:

> The logocentric procedure that tries to impose a singular meaning upon a text or a discourse, then, is always as political as it is impossible. This explains why politics – like the politics of statecraft as mancraft – endlessly loops through circuits in which states (or other political communities) attempt to impose order on anarchy. By critiquing the logocentric procedure as it functions in domestic and especially international politics, Ashley's analysis takes us some way toward understanding how 'paradigms of man are them- selves tools of power' (Ashley 1989, 300), not just in specific times and places (as in, e.g., Kuntsman 2009; Puar and Rai

> 2002; Puar 2007), but more generally. For Ashley explains how these impossibly singular normal or perverse paradigms of sovereign man attempt to figure impossibly singular normal or perverse international orders in their own image. This is how actors attempt to impose order onto anarchy (Weber, 2016a:39).

In establishing this argument as a relevant account within her broader theoretical exploration (and that of Queer IR), Weber (2016a) argues that Ashley's (1989) Derridian analysis falls short of recognising how figurations of sovereign man are utilised to establish domestic and international orders. She asserts that there is a missing account of what she calls the "plural logoi":

> What is missing is an account of how *not just a singular logos but a plural logoi* potentially figures sovereign man and orders international politics in ways that *construct and deconstruct* these figures and orders (Weber, 2016a: 39).

Weber (2016a) goes further to argue that this is particularly relevant for Queer IR because this "plural logoi" can be read as simultaneously normal *and/or* perverse as it is understood through enactments of sexes, genders and sexualities, as well as numerous registers of authority. She notes that plural logoi, particularly normal *and/or* perverse logoi, can be perceived as counterintuitive, stating the following with reference to Ashley's (1989) Derridian argument:

> This is especially the case because of how Derrida initially sets up the 'logos' as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) 'word' that he opposes to the necessarily plural (and possibly perverse) 'text'. Following Derrida, Ashley analyzes accounts of sovereign man as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) 'sovereign orderer' who is opposed to the necessarily plural (and presumptively perverse) 'anarchy'. While Ashley insists on the plurality of man, he does not consider how this plural man might function as a sovereign man who might be necessarily plural (Weber, 2016a: 39).

Weber (2016a) argues that Ashley's (1989) Derridian analysis does not seek to explore how "the plural" may be empowered as (simultaneously) foundationally normalised *and* foundationally perverted. She goes further to claim that Ashley (1989) neglects to seize a vital opportunity, particularly in exploring how the normal *and/or* perverse plural "might function as a possible or even necessary foundation of meaning in a logocentric system, rather than always in opposition to the singular (presumptively normal) logo" (Weber, 2016a: 39). Weber (2016a) then draws on the work of Roland Barthes (1976) and his articulation of the rule of *and/or* in order to demonstrate the plural logoi and expose its implications for understanding statecraft as mancraft (Weber, 2016a).

Weber (2016a) applies both *and/or* and *either/or* logics to notions of sex, gender and sexuality in order to further demonstrate its utility. She notes that *either/or* operates within conventional and binary logics, imposing a choice to encompass either one term or the other

(not both) in order to justify the "true meaning" of a text, discipline, person or act. Weber (2016a) thus seeks to demonstrate contrasting understandings by disrupting these binary logics with *and/or* (Queer) logics. She argues that *and/or* acknowledges how the meaning of something or someone can be located beyond the *either/or* binary, particularly in understanding that someone or something is not simply fixed by singular meanings. Rather, true understanding insists on acknowledging that a person or a thing can be constituted through simultaneous (sometimes even "contradictory") and multiple meanings that do not conform to the boundaries of the *either/or* dichotomy. In asserting the plurality of the *and/or*, Weber (2016a) states:

> According to the logic of the *and/or*, a subject is *both* one thing *and* another (plural, perverse) while *simultaneously* one thing *or* another (singular, normal). For example, a person might be *both* a boy *and* a girl while *simultaneously* being *either* a boy *or* a girl. This might be because a person is read as *either* a boy *or* a girl while also being read as in between sexes (intersexed), in between sexes and genders (a castrato), or combining sexes, genders, and sexualities in ways that do not correspond to one side of the boy/girl dichotomy or the other (a person who identifies as a 'girl' in terms of sex, as a 'boy' in terms of gender, and as a 'girlboy' or 'boygirl' in terms of sexuality). In these examples, a person can be seen as *and* while simultaneously being *or* because the terms 'boy' and 'girl' are not reducible to traditional dichotomous codes of sex, gender, or sexuality either individually or in combination, even though traditional *either/or* readings attempt to make them so (Weber, 2016a: 40).

In applying Barthes's (1974) *and/or* rule, Weber (2016a) notes that the plural that "constitutes a subjectivity" can also be more than one thing *and/or* another: "For a subjectivity can be one thing *and* another *and* another, and so on, as well as one thing *or* another *or* another, in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities, as there are multiple sexes, genders, and sexualities individually and in combination" (Fausto-Sterling 1993; Weber, 2016a: 41). Weber (2016a) argues that there are indeed limitations to Barthes's (1974) *and/or* rule as an expression of singular notion. This further reveals a number of possibilities in relation to plural logics, particularly in Weber's (2016a) pluralisation of the plural (and/or) rule itself. The author thus argues that two important elements are highlighted throughout this discussion. First, the binary *either/or* logic that imposes choice automatically excludes the plural logics of *and/or*.

> Plural logics of the *and/or* contest binary logics, understanding the presumed singularity and coherence of their available choices (either 'boys' or 'girls', either normal or perverse), their resulting subjectivities (only 'boys' and 'girls'), and their presumed ordering principles (either hetero/homonormative or antinormatively disruptively/disorderingly queer) as the social, cultural, and political effects of attempts to constitute them as if they were singular, coherent, and whole. Therefore, it is only by appreciating how the (pluralized) *and/or* constitutes dichotomy-defying subjectivities and (anti) normativities that we can grasp their meanings (Weber, 2016a: 41).

Second, according to Weber (2016a), when the now pluralised *and/or* complements the *either/or*, meanings are articulated differently. This is because in the pluralised *and/or* meanings are not structurally regulated by the slash that governs or divides *either/or*. Rather, meanings are "irregulated" by the slash (and additional slashes) that connect terms in a number of ways that overtly disrupt the *either/or* binary and rule. As Weber (2016a) puts it: "The (pluralized) *and/or*, then, is a plural logic that the *either/or* can neither comprehend nor contain" (Weber, 2016a: 42).

Weber (2016a) thus argues that the pluralised *and/or* is a 'Queer Logic' (Weber, 1999: xiii), because it inserts a systematic, non-decidable plurality into discourse that effectively disrupts the understandings of normativity and antinormativity, particularly with regard to the normality *and/or* perverse constructions of sexuality and gender. In essence, this disruption acts as a method for resisting binaries that accumulate differences (Crewshaw 1991; Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) justifies her deployment of queer logic by drawing on Sedgwick's definition of queer, whilst simultaneously queering the Barthesian *and/or:*

> [Queer is] the … excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or *can't be* made) to signify monolithically' … as exclusively '*and*' or as exclusively '*or*'. Identifying these often illusive figurations, the now queer Barthesian *and/or* suggests how we should *investigate* queer figures. Barthes's instruction is this: read (queer) figures not only through the *either/or* but also through the (pluralized) *and/or* (Weber, 2016a: 42, citing Sedgewick, 1993: 8).

Weber (2016a) notes that while Barthes's (1974) recommendation applies to the reading of literature, his queering of *and/or* (pluralised) can also be applied to the works and contexts of foreign policy. She argues that sovereign man (as a plural logoi in a logocentric procedure) can figure foreign policy and participate in ordering and disordering international/global politics. Weber (2016a) refers specifically to the case of the 2014 Eurovision winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst as an example of "how the 'normal *and/or* perverse homosexual' can function in logics of statecraft as mancraft as *both* a singular 'sovereign man' *and* a plural 'sovereign man'" (Weber, 2016a: 42). By dedicating a chapter to this debate, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate that Ashley's (1989) statecraft as mancraft is more complicated than originally asserted. According to Weber (2016a), this is because the logos/logoi of the "logocentric procedure" can be singular and plural by being normal *and/or* perverse with regard to gender and sexuality as well as manifestations of international/global politics, such as nationality, civilisation, religious and secular authority. The author goes further to argue that statecraft as mancraft can be a queer activity (as well), often resulting in an alternative sexualised order of international/global politics (Weber, 2016a: 43).

Weber (2016a) seeks to establish the validity of her theoretical guiding principle/tool: queer logics of statecraft. She argues that it is not as simple as adding the singular "homosexual" (as either sovereign man or his foil) to account for queer instances of statecraft. Instead, observing how plural logics (and/or) function in global politics (queer logics of statecraft) can assist in understanding how the normal *and/or* perverse plural influences sovereign figures, their adversaries (and fears), and the queer orders that these figures simultaneously produce and are products of (Weber, 2016a). The author goes further to argue that:

> Queer logics of statecraft are evident in those moments in domestic and international relations when actors or orders rely upon a queerly conceptualized Barthesian *and/or* – an *and* that is at the same time an *or* in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities – to performatively figure sovereign man, the sovereign state, or some combined version of the order/anarchy and normal/perverse binaries as normal *and/or* perverse (Weber, 2016a: 43).

Cynthia Weber (2016a) therefore asserts that utilising the lenses of "queer logics of statecraft" to analyse international relations/global politics reveals (by following and extending Ashley's (1989) arguments) the categories that connect *and* break apart foundational binaries, such as order/anarchy and normal/perverse. This exposure entails an understanding of the "stabilising slash" in these binaries as multiplying, disrupting and complicating structures, figures and orders, rather than categorising, stratifying and simplifying (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) argues that this disruption encourages the questioning of how the plural *and/or* "is introduced into these binaries to both establish and confound their meanings and the meanings of 'men', 'states', and 'orders' as well as the meanings of 'sexes', 'genders', and 'sexualities' which are foundational to them" (Weber, 2016a: 43). In drawing from Butler (1999), Weber (2016a) argues that queer logics of statecraft insist on an imperative understanding of how the plural is "performatively enacted", thus exposing numerous national and international/global figurations and logics that can be queerly enacted. In drawing further from Sedgewick (1993), Weber (2016a) goes on to assert that queer logics of statecraft inherently expose how sexes, genders and sexualities that resist monolithical understandings (queer) are (unexpectedly) produced by and products of (normal *and/or* perverse) sovereign men, sovereign states and sovereignly ordained (authorised by the sovereign man) orders and anarchies (Weber, 2016a).

> Queer logics of statecraft, then, do not just describe those moments when the performatively perverse creates the appearance of the performatively normal. Nor do they describe only the opposite, when the performatively normal creates the appearance of the performatively perverse, although those can be among their effects. Rather, queer logics of statecraft describe those moments in domestic and international politics when the logos/logoi as a subjectivity or the logos/logoi as a logic is plurally normal and/or perverse in ways that 'confound the norm, normativity [antinormativity]' (Barthes 1976, 109; Wiegman and Wilson 2015) of

> individually or collectively singularly inscribed notions of sovereign man, sovereign states, or sexualized orders of international relations (Weber, 2016a: 44).

Weber (2016a) notes that queer logics of statecraft may still give rise to "institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations" (Berlant and Warner 1995, 548: 2), particularly those that make sovereign men, sovereign states and international/global orders static and hierarchical. The author refers to conceptualisations of homonormativity (and homonationalism) and heteronormativity which refer to notions of sexual organising (Duggan, 2003; Puar, 2006; Puar 2007). This means that disruptions of norms, binaries and, as Weber (2016a) argues, anti-norms, queer logics of statecraft can also construct novel institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that are built upon a disorientating *and/or* reorientating plurals. It is in this light that queer logics of statecraft are used as the theoretical lens of this study in order to build upon Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*, and conceptualise *Homopopulism*. This is particularly relevant with regard to Weber's (2016a) claim that such deployments can make (un)conventional understandings "more alluring, more powerful, and more easily mobilised both by those who, for example, wish to resist hegemonic relations of power and by those who wish to sustain them" (Weber, 2016a: 44; see also Weber 1999 2002; Puar and Ra, 2002; Puar 2007). As such, Weber (2016a) states with regard to the deployment of the queer logics of statecraft and their specific pluralistic (*and/or*) dynamic:

> Unlike heteronormativities and homonormativities, though, we cannot name in advance what these institutions, structures of understanding, and practical (dis)/(re)orientations will be. We cannot know if they will be politicizing or depoliticizing. To determine this, it is necessary to both identify the precise plural each particular queer logic of statecraft employs to figure some particular 'sovereign man', 'sovereign state', and international order, always asking, 'For what constituency or constituencies does this plural operate?' (Weber, 2016a: 44).

In her book, *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge*, Cynthia Weber (2016a) argues that European leaders sought to mobilise Neuwirth/Wurst as *either* normal *or* perverse within the realm of international relations/global politics, going further to claim that these traditional logics of statecraft failed to understand the gendered, sexualised, national, powered, ordered and global political dynamics associated with the plurals registered in this figure. The author states the following in this regard, and concludes with an additional set of research questions for both international theory and practice. It is these questions, along with the various contributions and explorations evinces throughout this section, that contribute significantly to the theoretical foundations of Queer IR, queer logics of statecraft, *Homonationalism*, and the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this study:

> European leaders failed to consider Neuwirth/Wurst through the lens of queer logics of statecraft, they generally failed to appreciate what plural(s) constituted him/her/them and how the plural and/or logic he/she/they embodies is what made their attempts to claim or disown – to normalize or to pervert – this normal and/or perverse figure both possible and impossible. Yet it is this very failure on the part of European leaders to read Neuwirth/Wurst through the plural(s) that constitute(s) him/her/them that suggests an additional set of research questions for international theory and practice, including the following (Weber, 2016a: 45):
>
> - Can a paradigm of sovereign man be effective without being – as Ashley claims the ideal type of 'sovereign man' must be – 'regarded as originary, unproblematic, given for all time, and, hence, beyond criticism and independent of politics' (Ashley, 1989: 271)?
> - What happens when a political community like a state or the EU considers grounding itself upon a pluralized *and/or* logoi? (Weber, 2016a: 45)
> - Under what conditions might this be desirable or even necessary, and what might it make possible or preclude? (Weber, 2016a: 45)
> - How might queer logics of statecraft affect the organization, regulation, and conduct of international politics? (Weber, 2016a: 45)

In developing these theoretical and methodological frameworks of Queer IR, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate how the queer logics of statecraft contribute significantly to the field of International Relations and to understandings of international relations/global politics. Weber is particularly interested in the case of 2014 Eurovision winner Conchita/Wurst as well as other figurations, more specifically the 'unwanted im/migrant', the 'terrorist', the 'gay rights holder', the 'gay patriot', and how they function in national, regional, and international games of power associated with sovereignty, all of which encapsulate the key themes of this study. While the Conchita/Wurst case will not be discussed any further in this specific study, it acts as significant marker and contribution to the development and understanding of (Queer IR) theory (Weber, 2016a).

The diagram below (Figure 4.1) provides a summary of the abovementioned theoretical development of Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft." This tool of Queer IR is informed by various scholars and texts; their contributions are outlined below as initiated by Weber's (2015) initial conversation (Queer Intellectual Curiosity) on some of the theoretical and methodological tenants of Queer IR.

Figure 4.1: Cynthia Weber's (2016a) Theoretical and Methodology Framework in *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge*



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The next section will explore Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* as theorised in her ground-breaking book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. The purpose of including *Homonationalism* in this chapter is to situate Puar's (2007b) work as both a product of and contribution to Queer IR. Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* further informs a key theoretical contribution to this study, providing one of the lenses with which to examine the problem and answer the research questions.

Understanding Homonationalism

Developing Homonationalism

This section provides a brief illustration of the development of Jasbir Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism* within the broader context of Queer and Queer IR scholarship. This next section will briefly explore the theoretical contributions that make up the conceptual underpinnings of Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*. The purpose of exploring the development of *Homonationalism*, as well as its theoretical contributions and conceptual underpinnings, is in order to fully understand its initial foundation. This is so as to effectively deploy and critique Puar's (2007b) arguments within the geopolitical contexts of 2018, whilst

simultaneously drawing Weber's (2016a) theorisation of the queer logics of statecraft, all of which will be discussed in the next chapter.

In her ground-breaking book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* Jasbir Puar (2007b) introduces her conceptualisation of "Homonationalism", which was informed by her work on "Homonormativity" specifically her article "Mapping US Homonormativities" (Puar, 2006). The book has two primary purposes, namely to explore the emergence and dynamics of *Homonationalism,* and to rethink intersectionality and identity by employing assemblage theory. Puar (2007b) analyses sexuality as an "assemblage" of bodies, movements and representations. The ultimate aim of *Terrorist Assemblages* is therefore to expose complicities and collusions among LGBTQ and feminist approaches to war, terrorism and immigration, going further to (queer) critique hegemonic notions of "foreign" (Muslim) sexual orders (Martin, 2010).

Puar (2007b) is thus the coiner of the widely deployed term "Homonationalism" and its associated theoretical underpinnings in *Terrorist Assemblages.* Whilst noting Schotten's (2014) claim that queer theory is useful for political theory, particularly in thinking about hegemony and empire, as well as theorising modes of resistance to it, Puar (2007b) employs Queer Theory and, as Weber (2014) argues, Queer IR lenses for analysis in this regard. Puar (2007b), like many queer theorists, is interested in mobilising queer as a verb and political formation, particularly to disrupt the interaction between queer (homonormative) politics and (post-911) nationalistic ideology that she calls "homonationalism" and queer as regulatory. This normative "historical shift" and "facet of modernity" (Puar, 2013b) that embodies the politics of sexualised nation, emerges from an inherently complex and theoretically dense postructuralist critique:

> Simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer and representative recognition of LGBTQ subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights and the expansion of state power to engage in surveillance, detention and deportation. The narrative of progress for gay rights is thus built on the backs of racialised and sexualised others, for whom such progress was either once achieved but is now backsliding or has yet to arrive. This process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologised perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, specifically Muslim others, upon whom Orientalist and neoOrientalist projections are cast. Homonationalism is thus not simply a synonym for gay racism or another way to critique the 'conservatisation' of gay and lesbian identities, but instead an analytic for apprehending the consequences of the successes of LGBT liberal rights movements (Puar, 2013a: 25).

Since the publication of *Terrorist Assemblages* , Jasbir Puar has published a number of texts discussing the developing nature and deployment of *Homonationalism*. She criticises what

she calls the "reductive applications" of *Homonationalism*, particularly in activist circles. In 2013 Puar published an article titled "Rethinking Homonationalism", where she claims to clarify her original conceptualisation.

> Instead of thinking of homonationalism as an accusation, an identity, a bad politics, I have been thinking about it as an analytic to apprehend state formation and a structure of modernity: as an assemblage of geopolitical and historical forces, neoliberal interests in capitalist accumulation both cultural and material, biopolitical state practices of population control, and affective investments in discourses of freedom, liberation, and rights (Puar, 2013b: 337).

The author then followed up with a more intricate and detailed article titled: "Homonationalism As Assemblage: Viral Travels, Affective Sexualities" (Puar, 2013a). Puar (2013a) highlights the notion that her intention for *Homonationalism* is fundamentally to build upon the work of Lisa Duggan (2002), her exploration of "Homonormativity" and her theorisation of neoliberalism and the domestication of queer communities. The author points to *Homonationalism* as a critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses' production of (equality) narratives, particularly their association with progress and modernity, and their establishment of hierarchies of (neo-liberal) citizenship at the expense of other/Other populations. This is further exemplified by Puar's endorsement of Mikdashi's (2011) work on homonationalism in *Gay Rights as Human Rights: Pinkwashing Homonationalism*, where the author attempts to define the concept (queer as regulatory) as a type of "neoliberal identity politics" (Mikdashi, 2011).

Many scholars have criticised what they call "inconsistencies" within Puar's (2013b) explanations. In her article "Homonationalism: From Critique to Diagnosis, Or, We Are All Homonational Now" Heike Schotten (2016) tracks the development of Puar's (2007b) original conceptualisation by differentiating homonationalisms 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0. The author argues that *Homonationalism* has evolved from a critique of politics into a diagnostic of international political relations. Schotten (2016) further argues that while these transitions offer insights into global politics, in the process *Homonationalism* loses its critical capacity as well as its distinctiveness as a political formation, becoming incapable of critically analysing strategies of resistance, activism and political discourse.

> I examine this transformation neither to proscribe nor condemn terminological innovation, but rather to address questions about activism and solidarity raised by it. Tracing what I call homonationalism1 through the development in Mikdashi's work into homonationalism1.5 and up to the present moment of a new, updated homonationalism2, I argue that homonationalism has broadened significantly beyond the theoretical frame and US political context in which it was originally articulated in *Terrorist Assemblages*, a transformation that attenuates the

> distinctive character of homonationalism as a political formation in its own right and diminishes its critical force (Schotten, 2016: 352).

More recently Puar (2017) released an updated edition of *Terrorist Assemblages* in which she includes an additional postscript titled "Homonationalism in Trump Times". This postscript contextualises *Homonationalism* within the context of the Donald Trump presidency and the rise of populist-nationalism in North America and Europe, highlighting the notion that discussions around homonationalism are more important now than ever. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. While there are various contestations around the meanings, deployments and transformations of *Homonationalism*, there is little doubt that Puar's (2007b) theoretical and conceptual framework in *Terrorist Assemblages* provides a powerful tool for analysis, particularly with regards to queer themes associated with war, terrorism, immigration, hegemony, empire, security, global politics, discipline and regulation, among other factors. Cynthia Weber comments as follows on the themes covered by Jasbir Puar within the broader context of Queer IR:

> Queer IR scholarship has demonstrated the role of non-normative understandings of gender and sexuality in representations of the figure of the Muslim terrorist and/or insurgent and the ways in which these knowledges have shaped security practices in the War on Terror. Queer IR draws our attention to how the will to knowledge about sexuality and gender in this context is deeply shaped by cultural ideas about racial difference and colonial forms of power to construct internationally dangerous figures – like "the terrorist" and/or "the insurgent" – and those who need to be secured from them like "the docile patriot" (Richter-Montpetit & Weber, 2017).

Figure 4.2 illustrates the theoretical development of *Homonationalism* as outlined in Puar's *Terrorist Assemblages* (2007b). It demonstrates how *Homonationalism* has contributed to and is informed by Queer IR thinking and theorisation. It further illustrates the two major pillars of *Homonationalism* as discussed above, namely "Homonormativity" and "post-9/11 Nationalism."

Figure 4.2: Jasbir Puar's (2007b) Homonationalism in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*



(The Author)

Theorising Homonationalism: Queer as Exceptional & Disciplinary

In order to understand and deploy and/or resist homonationalism, it is important to explore its foundational theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. In doing so, this section will refer to Jasbir K. Puar's introductory chapter "Homonationalism & Biopolitics" in the original *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (2007b) . It will also draw extensively from Heike Schotten's (2016) article "Homonationalism: From Critique to Diagnosis, or, we are all Homonational now". This is because of the coherent, detailed and contemporary analysis of the theoretical contributions of what the author terms "homonationalism 1," the *Homonationalism* that she argues appears in Puar's original *Terrorist Assemblages* (2007b), the text and framework that is utilised throughout this study. It is noted that the content throughout Schotten's (2016) article presents varying (developing) forms of *Homonationalism* (1.5, 2.0 etc.) as discussed in the previous section. However, for the purpose of this study, Schotten's (2016) "Homonationalism 1" will be the only stage explored in this regard. This strategy is deployed specifically in line with Schotten's (2016) argument that "homonationalism has broadened significantly beyond the theoretical frame and US political context in which it was originally articulated in *Terrorist Assemblages* [2007]" and in the light of the analysis that will be conducted in the next chapter.

"Homonationalism" is a term formed of a combination of the words "homonormative" and (post 9/11) "nationalism." In developing this term, Puar (2007b) draws on the work of Lisa Duggan (2002, 2003) as well as her own work on "homonormativity" (Puar, 2006). It is important to note that the term "homonormativity" appeared prior to Duggan's (2002) work, more specifically in Berlant and Warner's (1998) *Sex in Public*. Schotten (2016) notes that Puar's (2007b) work draws specifically from Duggan's (2002) conceptualisation of "homonormativity" and not on Berlant & Warner (1998). The authors argue that "homonormativity" cannot be equally compared to "heteronormativity" because of the specific power and hierarchical relations associated with societal (subtle and compulsory) heterosexuality (Berlant & Warner, 1998). Duggan's (2002, 2003) "homonormativity" differs significantly from that of Berlant & Warner (1998), particularly in that she exposes an intersection of neoliberal and sexual politics. She further argues that such intersections demonstrate a marked shift from the original "liberal/left"-leaning progressive politics of the "gay movement" to one that embraces the free market and associated neoliberal cultural, economic and political practices (homonormativity). Schotten (2016) notes that "homonormativity" is often solely associated with gay assimilation, while in Duggan's (2002, 2003) original conceptualisations, it refers very specifically to neoliberal sexual politics as well (upward distribution of wealth, privatisation, market sovereignty) (Schotten, 2016).

It is Duggan's (2002, 2003) original version of "homonormativity" that informs Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*. This is further articulated in *Terrorist Assemblages*, where Puar (2007b) discusses "exceptionalism" in relation to queerness. Schotten (2016) states:

> For Puar, queer's exceptionalism functions as both an immunization from critique and a regulatory mechanism, disciplining queers into proper modes of transgression or deviance (and labeling them "assimilationist" if they fail). Rather than make an ideal out of transgression, which becomes its own regime of proper queerness ("a regulatory queer ideal that demarcates the ideal queer" 2007, 22), Puar instead encourages political analysis and self-reflection that can account for various types of complicity (2013) (Schotten, 2016: 354).

Puar (2007b, 2012) specifically notes that queerness does not necessarily occupy a space of confounded radicalness. This is based on her argument that queer can participate in hierarchy and violence. As such, Puar's (2007b) initial conversation with "homonormativity" (and its relation to *Homonationalism*) is very much within the context of Duggan's (2002, 2003) "sexual politics of neoliberalism" its collusion with [*and/or*] (as argued in the next chapter) resistance from, LGBTQ subjects. In her interview, Judge (2018) states:

> Neoliberalism is interested in conflict and war, and it sows the divisions that prop up nationalisms. We are seeing an antidemocratic politics emerging in all of that, and your

> question is an essential one; where are the queers in this? Of course the queers are on both sides of the line; the queers are central to some of the forms of resistance that we are seeing in the Middle East, we are seeing in Africa, some of the most exciting political resistance movements are coming from the gender and sexual margin, on the one hand, and then you are seeing the "co-opted queer" in the ruling establishments that are basically taking on their resistant counterparts – we are not outside these systems of domination (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

Puar's (2007b) employment of "nationalism" in her terminology is not explicitly defined in *Terrorist Assemblages* . She does, however, consistently refer to "nationalism" as an ideological dispensation associated with the US nation-state, and more specifically post-9/11 ("melting pot"; see next chapter) registers of patriotism and citizenship. In doing so, Puar (2007b) locates *Homonationalism* as a collusion between (homonormative) homosexuality and US nationalism that is simultaneously produced by patriotic, inclusive narratives [and/or] gay and queer (patriotic) subjects of the sovereign state (Puar, 2007b; Weber, 2016). Puar (2007b) thus seeks to demonstrate that the nation-state is not solely heteronormative and patriarchal, as many feminist and queer scholars have sought to establish(Weber, 1999, 2016). Instead , the nation-state is also homonational, simultaneously sanctioning and producing homosexuality through "normalised" modes of institutionalism (patriotism, marriage, consumption) [and/or] "queering" racial others as threats to the nation, its national security and its values. In summary, Puar (2007b) seeks to expose how (a certain kind of) homosexuality colludes with the nation, rather than remaining beyond the periphery (Puar, 2007b). Schotten (2016) therefore argues that Puar's aim in *Terrorist Assemblages* is "theorizing US national homosexuality, or homonationalism" (Puar, 2007b: 49).

Throughout Puar's (2007b) theoretical journey a number of major innovations emerge, forming the theoretical spine of *Homonationalism.* The first of these manifestations is US sexual exceptionalism. Puar (2007b) positions US exceptionalism as a key IR deployment for understanding hegemony and imperialism. She includes the word "sexual" and forms the term "US sexual exceptionalism" as a mode for understanding how global narratives and behaviours are shaped around the perception that the United States (and the West more broadly: see next chapter) is morally superior (and successful) in its tolerance of gender and sexual diversity, and progress in advancing gay and women's rights.

> Unravelling discourses of U.S. sexual exceptionalism is vital to critiques of U.S. practices of empire (most of which only intermittently take up questions of gender and rarely sexuality) and to the expansion of queerness beyond narrowly conceptualized frames that foreground sexual identity and sexual acts (Puar, 2007b: 10).

The second manifestation that makes a significant theoretical contribution to *Homonationalism* is what Puar (2007b) terms "Queer as regulatory." This core element of Puar's (2007b) work refers to a relationship between queerness and biopolitics, that is, in this context, queer life is regulated at the expense (death) of the sexual and racial Other.

> While we can point to the obvious problems with the emancipatory, missionary pulses of certain (U.S., Western) feminisms and of gay and lesbian liberation, queerness has its own exceptionalist desires: exceptionalism is a founding impulse, indeed the very core of a queerness that claims itself as an anti-, trans-, or unidentity. The paradigm of gay liberation and emancipation has produced all sorts of troubling narratives: about the greater homophobia of immigrant communities and communities of colour, about the stricter family values and mores in these communities, about a certain prerequisite migration from home, about coming out teleologies. We have less understanding of queerness as a biopolitical project, one that both parallels and intersects with that of multiculturalism, the ascendancy of whiteness, and may collude with or collapse into liberationist paradigms. While liberal underpinnings serve to constantly recenter the normative gay or lesbian subject as exclusively liberatory, these same tendencies labor to insistently recenter the normative queer subject as an exclusively transgressive one (Puar, 2007b: 22).

Puar (2007b) further analyses a photograph by Poulomi Desai, published in 2003, that depicts what Puar (2007b) claims is "a Muslim cleric staging terrorist drag" (Puar, 2007b: 11). In doing so, the author seeks to expose a queer disciplinary (regulatory) subject, namely the queer secular liberal. Operating within the apparatus of queer liberalism and queer secularity, Puar (2007b) argues that queer liberal secularity insists on a specific transgression of (religious) norms, particularly those that bind the subject to religious parameters. Thus the "queer agential subject" can only be located beyond the periphery of religious norms which, as Puar (2007b) argues, conflate agency and resistance. In arguing that religion, particularly Islam, has "supplanted race as one of the irreconcilable binaries between queer and something else" (Puar, 2007b: 13), Puar states the following whilst locating queer liberal secularity within the discourse of binary and queer as regulatory:

> For queer Arabs and Muslims the either/or plight thickens: queer secularity understands observance of religious creed, participation in religious public spaces and rituals, devotion to faith-based or spiritual practices, and simply residence within an Islamic nation-state (floating upon the supposition of the separation of church and state in non-Islamic nation-states; for example, the denial of Christian fundamentalism as a state practice in the United States) as marks of subjugated and repressed sexuality void of agency. But regardless of complex affinities with Islam, Arab nation-states, and Muslim identity, the agency of all queer Muslims is invariably evaluated through the regulatory apparatus of queer liberal secularity. This further contributes to apolitical readings typically ascribed to the refusals of western modernity that may be enacted by Islamic followers (Puar, 2007a: 13).

Puar (2007b) argues that queer liberal secularity emerges most prominently in relation to Islam. This is because Islam, deployed universally, is perceived as inherently less tolerant of and yielding to homosexuality than Christianity and Judaism. Even with the deployment of

"secularism" as a supposedly tolerant and all-encompassing religious world view, Puar (2007b) seeks to expose the hierarchies associated with queer liberal secular orders and their affinity to Western (religious/non-religious) discourse and hierarchy. In doing so, Puar (2007b) insists (as she does with most of her critiques in *Terrorist Assemblages)* that she seeks to explore the "resilience and stranglehold of this discourse, its operating logic, the myths and realities it manufactures" rather than establishing associated truths and falsehoods (Puar, 2007a: 14). This study seeks to follow the same methodology in this regard.

Puar's (2007b) third and final "imbricated manifestation" of *Homonationalism* is the ascendancy of whiteness. Intricately linked to Queer as regulatory, Puar (2007b) draws from the work of Rey Chow (2006), who argues that "homonormativity" reproduces racial, class and national norms, as well as those of sexuality and gender. These norms are specifically constructed around modes of consumption, materialism and neoliberalism. Puar (2007b) argues that it is the ascendancy of whiteness that locates Muslims on the periphery of "appropriate" multiculturalism. In speaking to the poststructuralist influence on the text, Puar (2007b) draws on the work of Michel Foucault (1989) in her discussions on Queer as regulatory and the ascendancy of whiteness. Schotten (2016) argues that Puar's (2007b) approach to racism is similar to Foucault's (1989), particularly her assertion of "queerness as a process of racialisation" (Puar, 2007a: xi). Puar (2007b) thus argues that the intersection of queerness and biopolitics divides (constructs a binary of) sovereign subjects into those who must live (be protected and nurtured) – the (white) gay patriot – and those who must die (be eradicated, removed) – the queer/perverse/racial non-national, non-citizen "terrorist" (Puar, 2007b). Puar (2007b) thus positions queerness as demarcating nationhood, national belonging, and "racialised patriotism," through narratives of proper multiculturalism. Hence, binaries are constructed on the basis of racial/national disloyalty, and proper secularity/irrational religiosity (specifically "anti-modern" fundamentalist Islam). Thus the "terrorist" figuration is born of the racial, national, religious and sexualised parameters of (post-9/11) *Homonationalism*:

> September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.' This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are dis-identified as citizens.This disidentification is a process of sexualization as well as of a racialization of religion. But the terrorist figure is not merely racialized and sexualized; the body must appear improperly racialized (outside the norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place. Thus the terrorist and the person to be domesticated – the patriot – are not distant, oppositional entities, but 'close cousins.' Through

> this binary-reinforcing 'you're either with us or against us' normativizing apparatus, the war on terror has rehabilitated some – clearly not all or most – lesbians, gays, and queers to U.S. national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am invoking as 'homonationalism,' short for 'homonormative nationalism.' (Puar, 2007b: 38).

Schotten (2016) in her critique of Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism* argues that US sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory and the ascendency of whiteness (the three manifestations of *Homonationalism*) form vital theoretical contributions in this regard. She goes further to assert that these contributions concurrently locate *Homonationalism* within a unique political register, for without US sexual exceptionalism, there would be no connection to the US imperial agenda. Furthermore, without Queer as regulatory and the ascendancy of whiteness, there would be no exploration of racial power dynamics. As Schotten says:

> Crucial in their interconnectedness to describe the post-9/11 domestic scene in the United States, these three phenomena are concomitant but distinct and do not necessarily entail one another, either logically or historically. Taken together, however, they constitute a distinctive theoretical contribution of this text and make clear that the homonationalism of *Terrorist Assemblages* requires both US sexual exceptionalism and queer as regulatory for its complete conceptualization as a racialized project of US empire (Schotten, 2016: 356).

In the context of this study and the analysis in the next chapter, Schotten (2016) offers three contemporary observations of the original *Terrorist Assemblages* text. These observations, which will be briefly discussed, offer important insights into the benefits and limits of Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*, some of which will be addressed through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* in Chapter 5.

Schotten's (2016) first observation is with regard to the scope of *Homonationalism.* The author argues that Puar's (2007b) text is written primarily within an American context. She notes Puar's (2007b) brief references to the Netherlands and United Kingdom (UK), but asserts that *Homonationalism* is conceptualised on the analytical basis of (post-9/11) US policies and discourses. She argues that this is further substantiated through the manifestation of US sexual exceptionalism as a key theoretical component, going further to claim that understanding globalising *Homonationalism* (though relevant) "is neither a task of this text nor a guiding theme of the term's original formulation" (Schotten, 2016: 356). This study, through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*, will seek to globalise *Homonationalism* (see Chapter 5). Schotten's (2016) second observation is that *Homonationalism* is presented not only as form of state behaviour or policy, but also as a phenomenon that is manifested among various subjects and non-state actors, including (global) organisations, groups and individuals. Schotten (2016) states in this regard:

> Homonationalism moves in more than one direction: not simply from the state to subjects, but also from subjects toward the state. Homonationalism thus cannot be understood as solely a state practice or as requiring a unified notion of the state or state power, as some have suggested (Currah 2013; Ritchie 2015). Puar not only emphasizes the partial and fragmentary nature of homonationalism's movement (2007: 10), but also clearly states that it does not operate along a simple, top–down model of power. Homonationalism is also a practice of queer subjects, who align and identify themselves with the nation and nationalist projects (Schotten, 2016: 357).

Schotten's (2016) third observation is that *Homonationalism* is not necessarily confined to right-wing political dispensations. In fact, she argues that Puar's (2007b) interests are in the manifestations of *Homonationalism* in liberal/progressive/left-wing political dispensations, which are often subtle and masked. This particularly relevant for this study, since *Homopopulism*, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is interested exclusively in right-wing political behaviour and dispensation (particularly concerning its rising global hegemony). Much like her criticism of queer exceptionalism, Schotten (2016) notes that Puar (2007b) seeks to expose violence against the Other along the whole spectrum of society, and in *Terrorist Assemblages* she is particularly invested in demonstrating that homonationalisms infiltrate sectors where such phenomena are least expected, such as in feminist, gay, queer and progressive circles. Puar (2007b) provides the following account of a mode for tracking and resisting such collusions:

> It is precisely by denying culpability or assuming that one is not implicated in violent relations toward others, that one is outside of them, that violence can be perpetuated. Violence, especially of the liberal varieties, is often most easily perpetrated in the spaces and places where its possibility is unequivocally denounced. What is at stake in defusing queer liberal binaries of assimilation and transgression, secularity and religiosity? If we are to resist resistance, reading against these binaries to foreground a broader array of power aliations and disaliations that are often rife with contradiction should not provide ammunition to chastise, but rather generate greater room for self-reflection, autocritique, and making mistakes. It is easy, albeit painful, to point to the conservative elements of any political formation; it is less easy, and perhaps much more painful, to point to ourselves as accomplices of certain normativizing violences (Puar, 2007a: 24).

Schotten (2016) concludes by providing the following conceptualisation of Jasbir. K Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* as articulated in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.* Whilst noting that the scope of this study cannot fully comprehend the intricate foundations of this theoretically dense text, this conceptualisation and its theoretical and conceptual underpinnings discussed above will guide the broad understanding of *Homonationalism* going forward.

> As explicated in *Terrorist Assemblages*, homonationalism consists of, on the one hand, the marshaling, inclusion and solicitation of gay and queer people by the US nation-state to serve its domestic and foreign imperial interests (e.g. through marriage, military service, the use of

> "gay rights" as a legitimating discourse for military aggression and war); and, on the other hand, gay and queer complicity with the US state, whether individual or organizational. I refer to this two-part definition as homonationalism1. US sexual exceptionalism and queer as regulatory are integral to it (Schotten, 2016: 357).

Conclusion

When applying a set of theoretical lenses to assist in solving a problem and answering research questions, it is imperative to understand the theory and its methods of application. This chapter sought to outline and unpack the necessary theoretical, methodological and conceptual approaches that make up the foundational theoretical lenses of this study. Two prominent texts were explored, both of which inform Queer IR as scholarship and its theoretical development within Queer and IR more broadly. The work of Cynthia Weber (2016a) and Jasbir K. Puar (2007b) make up the majority of the literature presented above; however, the work of various scholars inform their theoretical explorations, many of which are highlighted throughout. As a result, the "queer logics of statecraft" (Weber, 2016a) and *Homonationalism* (Puar, 2007b) are investigated and deployed as the theoretical lenses to inform the analysis of the themes, questions and case studies presented in this study. In doing so, this chapter proceeded with a historical review of Queer IR as scholarship, going further to unpack the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that inform the "queer logics of statecraft" as presented in Weber's *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (2016a). It then explores both the historical background and theoretical contributions that inform Puar's (2007b) conceptualisation of *Homonationalism,* drawing from the original edition of *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* and the recent work of Heike Schotten (2016) in *Homonationalism: From Critique to Diagnosis, or, we are all Homonational now*.

In providing a historical, theoretical, methodological and conceptual overview in this chapter, and previous chapters more broadly, this study utilised the literature explored up to now in order to guide the analysis and inform the conclusion in the final two chapters. Moving from a densely historical and theoretical exploration in this chapter, the next chapter will apply the scholarship and produce a brief analysis of the themes discussed throughout, including but not limited to LGBTQ politics, populism (as the politics of fear), nationalism, patriotism and sovereignty. In doing so, it will explore, extract, critique and deploy the work of Weber (2016a) and Puar (2017) where they apply their own theoretical frameworks (discussed above) in an attempt to understand the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North

America and its collusion with queer politics. The next chapter will then theorise and conceptualise new understandings of *Homonationalism* through deploying the theoretical and methodological recommendations and applications of Weber (2016a, 2016b) and Puar (2007b, 2017). It will conceptualise a new political phenomenon that has occurred concurrently with the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America: *Homopopulism* – the (queer) logic of the politics of fear *and/or* the politics of queer.

CHAPTER 5

From Homonationalism to Homopopulism

Introduction

The application chapter of a qualitative study is where theory is applied and "brought to life", as it were. This is in order to solve the problem and answer the research questions posed in the research proposal (see Chapter 1). This analysis chapter does just that, contributing to the overall findings of this study. Through deploying Queer IR and *Homonationalism* (see Chapter 4) in order to understand a LGBTQ political shift in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America, this chapter tests the utility of these theoretical lenses. In doing so, it provides new theoretical insights through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*, thus solving the problem and addressing the research questions that inform the overall study.

The re-emergence of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America has, in many ways, disrupted the hegemonic (neo)liberal status quo. As a result, various global actors and subjects, including queer subjects, have sought to co-opt (or be co-opted) and appropriate queer discourses and subjectivities for the purposes of figuring sovereign subjects and asserting Othering agendas. This has been witnessed across the globe, from the United States, to France, the Netherlands and Germany, where recent (2016/2017) elections revealed a geopolitical shift in the global political scene. Donald Trump holding an LGBT flag at a campaign event in Colorado, and Geert Wilders publicly supporting the Dutch LGBT community against the "onslaught of Islam" are but some of the more overt indicators of how right-wing politics is using queerness. In his interview Fransch (2018) states that "Populist-nationalism and queer politics work well together where people are very attached to their national identity – where Othering is possible and where specific groups are framed as responsible for the problems in a society" (Interview, Chet Fransch, 24/07/2018).

Queer IR, and more specifically Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft," assist in exposing the way that hegemonic actors employ queer logics in order to receive and/or assert sovereign authorisation (domestically and globally). Jasbir K. Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism* provides the analytics with which to understand how queer can be implicated as a regulatory discourse, particularly through registers of sex, gender, sexuality, race, class and nationality. In order to provide the scope within which to answer the research questions and address the problem statement of this study, this chapter demonstrates how

theory can be applied in order to understand the current global political scene, as well as the locations of queer within it. It explores two texts by queer theorists Cynthia Weber (2016b) and Jasbir K. Puar (2017) in which the authors seek to apply their theoretical undertakings, explored in Chapter 4, to the rise of populist-nationalism, and in their specific case, the election of Donald Trump as the president of the world's hegemonic powerhouse, the United States.

This chapter begins with Weber's *Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump* (2016b), where she applies her Queer IR theoretical and methodological approach to the 2016 election of Donald Trump as US president. It argues that the Trump campaign employed queer *and/or* logics in figuring authorising (fearful) sovereign subjects. It then explores Jasbir Puar's (2017) postscript that appears in the later expanded edition of her study, where she seeks to contextualise *Homonationalism* within the current political scene. This study argues against Puar's (2017) assertion that these times are not exceptional, whilst going further to claim that *Homonationalism* requires an expansion of its theoretical scope. Finally, through bringing Puar's (2007b, 2017) and Weber's (2016a, 2016b) theoretical and conceptual outcomes into conversation, this chapter takes on the task of expanding *Homonationalisms* theoretical scope. It does so by conceptualising *Homopopulism* as an analytic of the politics of queer *and/or* the politics of fear.

The purpose of exploring these applications is to demonstrate both the valuable contributions and the shortcomings of Weber's (2016a, 2016b) and Puar's (2007b, 2017) theories and methods, which is an important objective in line with this study's research questions and problem statement. Furthermore, through drawing on both Puar's (2007b, 2017) and Weber's (2016a, 2016b) theories and their applications, this chapter seeks to bring these Queer IR explorations into conversation with each other. This is in order to conceptualise a new "historical phenomenon" within the "facets of modernity"– *Homopopulism.* It is this (queer) political shift (from *Homonationalism* to *Homopopulism*) and/or analytical tool (through the convergence of Weber's and Puar's work) that will assist in understanding a queer (LGBTQ) political shift in Europe and North America. In using Puar's (2007b, 2017) own terminology, times are indeed queer, perhaps queerer than ever before.

Sovereignty, Sexuality & the Will to Trump

Applying Queer (IR) Logics: Fearful Sovereignty & Patriotism

After publishing her book *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (2016a), Cynthia Weber participated in a symposium to which she invited various critiques and supplementary contributions to her ground-breaking (Queer IR) theoretical and methodological work. Weber (2016b) wrote her concluding response to the symposium by putting her Queer IR analysis to work and making her theoretical stance "come alive" as it were. As such, she produced yet another significant text by applying her theories and methods in order to simultaneously understand and resist the 2016 election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States. This piece titled *Sovereignty, Sexuality And The Will To Trump: A Queer IR Analysis And Response* is particularly relevant to this chapter and the overall study in two ways: first, it demonstrates how the "queer logics of statecraft", and Queer IR more broadly (see Chapter 4), can be used as a lens for understanding global political phenomena; second, the case to which Weber (2016b) chooses to apply her analysis covers a theme that is integral to this study and the associated research questions, specifically the rise of populist-nationalism and the resistance from *and/or* collusion by queer subjects.

Cynthia Weber (2016b) thus reiterates her argument in *Queer IR* that:

> [S]overeignty, sexuality and all political scales from the intimate to the international are inseparable. So, too, are the intersectional ways sex, gender and sexuality function in relation to and through, for example, race, class, ability, religion, 'civilization' and colonialities. One cannot understand sovereignty without understanding how sexuality functions intersectionally at every scale, and one cannot understand sexuality without understanding how sovereignty functions intersectionally at every scale (Weber, 2016b).

Weber (2016b) seeks to demonstrate this argument in practical terms, noting that while similar critiques are found in various critical fields – such as critical race, postcolonial and decolonial studies – none of them insists (as Queer IR does) on focusing on the functions of sex, gender and sexuality. In asserting her understanding of "sovereignty" (a key concept in her analysis) as a "political delusion", Weber (2016b) argues that political delusions about sex, gender and sexuality are inherently connected to delusions about race, ability, religion and nationality, particularly with regard to her discussion of "sovereign subjectivities" (see Chapter 4). Weber's (2016a) theorisation of the "queer logics of statecraft" helps scholars understand how "sexed, gendered and sexualised 'sovereign subjects' and 'sovereign nations'" are constructed with the purpose of ordering the world in specific ways (Weber,

2016b). It is through these lenses that Weber (2016b) seeks to understand and resist Trump's presidency.

Weber (2016b) focuses specifically on the strategies of the Trump campaign building up to the November 2016 election. She argues that it used "three interrelated ideas at the heart of a US conception of sovereignty to figure a particular 'US sovereign subject' who could authorise a Trump presidency" (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; see Chapter 4). Weber (2016b) goes further to argue that these three ideas are patriotism, the "melting pot" myth, and the American Dream, all of which simultaneously figure a "US sovereign subject" through sexed, gendered and sexualised, as well as racial, religious, classist and ableist registers and orders. At the heart of this formulation is what Weber (2011, 2016) terms "fear-based patriotism," a tradition that she explores in detail in her 2011 book *I am an America* (Weber, 2011). Through the deployment of this conceptualisation in her analysis, Weber (2016b) seeks to demonstrate a resurgence of political Othering, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Puar, 2007b; see Chapter 4). In constructing "foreigners" (outside the state) and "illegals" (inside the state) as a threat, Weber (2016b) argues that fear-based patriotism's modes of Othering groups "US Americans into trustworthy, loyal citizens vs. risky, (potentially) disloyal citizens". The deployment of "fear-based patriotism" forms an integral contribution to the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*, which is discussed in final section of this chapter.

Weber (2016b) thus argues that the Trump campaign ignited an anti-Muslim, post-9/11 fear-based patriotism, whilst simultaneously expanding the scope of US fears (by also capitalising on other catastrophic world events) (see Chapter 3). Weber (2016b) notes that the Trump campaign presented the "radical Islamic terrorist" as a universal threat to US citizens whilst also building upon traditional constructions of racial, sexual and gendered biases in order to figure "'the underdeveloped', 'the un-developable', 'the unwanted im/migrant', 'the terrorist', and some 'LGBTQs' as dangerous perversions of and threats to 'the real America'" (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2007b; see Chapter 4).

Weber (2016b) argues that the Trump campaign simultaneously instilled the notions of whom US Americans must fear and distrust, whilst crafting a specific figuration of "the fearful US citizen" that could authorise a Trump presidency (Weber, 2016a; 2016b; see Chapter 4). Weber (2016b) calls this authorising figure the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject", going further to argue that:

> [The subject is] generally a white, US-born, Anglo, Christian, heteronormative, able-bodied man or woman, who was groomed to respect striding masculine forms of white authoritarian leadership (like those of Trump and Russia's Vladimir Putin) more than the 'rigged' democratic process. The campaign figured the most trustworthy patriots of them all as white working-class men who had been sold out by the Clintons and by President Obama (Weber, 2016b).

Whilst the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" forms an integral part of Weber's (2016b) analysis, this study will argue in the final section of this chapter (through the deployment of homonationalism) that this authorising subject is also queer and homonormative (Puar, 2007a; see Chapter 4).

Weber (2016b) argues that this specific (Trumpian) fear-based patriotism is formed out of the reform of traditional post-9/11 patriotism, particularly that which values "American diversity." In other words, the Trump campaign's methods of Othering was not compatible with the former narrative of the "melting pot" (US citizens "melt together" in a diverse, harmonious and homogenous nation) that informed conventional post-9/11 patriotism and the subsequent Bush and Obama campaigns/administrations. It is on this basis that the next section will critique Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* and its contextual utility, particularly in that it is conceptualised through the registers of post-9/11, liberal and "melting pot" nationalism.

In this regard, Weber (2016b), much like Puar (2007b), notes that

> …the liberal tolerance ideology that informs the melting pot myth always allows for some US Americans not to be tolerated, because they are unmeltable or improperly melted US Americans. And it allows US leaders and ordinary citizens to change their minds about who is meltable and who is unmeltable at any time.

Weber (2016b) exposes how the Trump campaign utilised the "melting pot" myth in a new way, particularly by locating those Americans who are and those who are not "meltable" or "tolerable" (Weber, 2016b). Whilst this is a relevant observation under conventional liberal hegemonic dispensations, this study further argues that the liberal tolerance ideology is succumbing to the rise of a more explicitly exclusive political intolerance, the same ideological dispensation that notably informs the Trump campaign and *Homopopulism* (see the following two sections of this chapter).

Weber (2016b) goes further to note a number of contradictions associated with Trump's stance on the "homosexual" particularly with regards to the subject location within the tolerable, meltable/intolerable, unmeltable dichotomy (through the deployment of "queer logics" (and/or) this study will, in the final section, argue that the homosexual subject is

implicated in both). Weber (2016b) argues that Trump is "consistently inconsistent on this front" (queer logics), noting that he has simultaneously supported and rejected LGBTQ interests in various theatres. Whilst noting that this article was written in 2016, Trump's actions and reactions remain in line with Weber's (2016b) observation to this day, appointing an openly gay US ambassador and at the same time signing "religious freedom" (right to discriminate) executive orders.

Weber (2016b) thus suggests that this "rewriting" of the "melting pot" myth, manifested through fear-based patriotism, is further accompanied by Trump's portrayal as the embodiment of the "American Dream." That is, as Weber (2016b) argues, a "sovereign dream", where US citizens can become sovereign over their own lives by generating their own wealth that is collectively beneficial to the broader US sovereign-state capitalistic project.

> Trump appealed to white, Christian, male, working-class voters in particular by acknowledging their failure to achieve or to retain their American Dreams and by reassuring them that their failures were the fault of domestic and foreign enemies who had stolen this Dream out from under them. Domestically, these enemies were immigrants, Muslims, Mexican Americans, African Americans, and anyone else who was getting an unfair advantage in the politically-correct, rigged system or anyone who was channeling those unfair advantages to undeserving groups. Internationally, it was countries like China who were 'raping' the US through its trade practices, with the help of career politicians like the Clintons, who Trump blamed for the neoliberal free trade agreement NAFTA (which, when it passed the Senate in 1993, had more support from Republicans than Democrats) (Weber, 2016b).

Weber (2016b) argues that Trump's portrayal of himself "as politically incorrect, self-made, ruthless, 'art of the deal' bullying businessman who – like them – knew who America's real enemies were" (Weber, 2016b) convinced many (mainly white) voters that he understood them and that he was the only one who could address their issues (e.g. implementing protectionist economic policies, particularly in the context of the global financial crisis – see Chapter 3). He simultaneously convinced the middle- to upper-class white voters that his unconventional economic policies would benefit them through the implementation of tax cuts. Through noting the logics that inform the Trump campaign's exclusive populist-nationalist rhetoric (see Chapter 3), Weber (2016b), deploying her own lenses of queer (and/or) logics, states:

> This means that Trump did not win the presidency *in spite* of his vile comments about and vile behavior toward women, 'the gays', 'the blacks', 'the Mexican rapists' and 'the radical Islamic terrorists'. He won the presidency *because of and/or in spite of* these comments and actions and because of how his campaign mobilized them to create a coalition of fear-based, misogynistic, Christian, patriotic whiteness (Weber, 2016b).

Weber (2016b) asserts that sex, sexuality and gender played an integral role in the construction of Trump's "US sovereign subject"- a figure that was particularly appealing to (and embodied by) predominantly white US Americans (and as this study argues, many queer subjects too).

Furthermore, a crucial aspect of Weber's (2016b) analysis is her assertion that the Trump campaign did not solely figure the "US sovereign subject" through *either/or* logics, but it used queer (*and/or*) logics as well. While Trump pitted a number of binaries (meltable/unmeltable; trustworthy/untrustworthy; good citizen vs. bad citizen), he was "consistently inconsistent" on which subject was located where. Statements such as "There can be no discrimination against gays. I'm against gay marriage" (Weber, 2016b) embody the appropriation of queer logics.

> Comments like these were implicitly and explicitly made in the register of sex, gender and sexuality throughout the campaign, and they were more consistent with *and/or* logics and *neither/nor* logics than they were with either/or logics. These statements demonstrate how some of the paradoxical figures and logics found in queer discourses were co-opted by the Trump campaign for its own purposes (Weber, 2016b).

Queer IR and Queer lenses more broadly can assist in understanding how queer discourses are appropriated by hegemonic actors, including sovereign subjects, sovereign leaders and sovereign states. Such notions present an integral theme presented consistently throughout this study. Queer IR scholarship has been particularly critical about the ways in which queerness, sexuality and gender have been weaponised and utilised as tools of chauvinist/imperial statecraft and empire. Terms such as "Homonationalism" and "homocolonialism" are often deployed through attempts by Queer IR scholars to problematise associated practices of, for example, diplomacy and foreign policy (Richter-Montpetit & Weber, 2017). These questions have informed much of Cynthia Weber's work, as demonstrated in her 2014 article "Why is there no queer international theory?":

> It is, therefore, vital to pose a second set of Queer IR research themes and questions that take account of how "queer" is sometimes claimed in the name of normalizing and depoliticizing understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality rather than contesting them. Research questions that explore these dimensions of queer often investigate how the nonmonolithic character of queer signification – a queer logic of "and/or" – is appropriated by hegemonic actors, alliances, and orders as a national and international strategy of governance through securitization and marketization (Weber, 2014: 599).

In her 2016 Queer IR analysis, Weber (2016b) thus exposes two notable elements in the strategies of the Trump campaign. First, through asserting fearful patriotism, the Trump campaign figured the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" (through registers of sex,

sexuality, gender, race and class) to authorise Trump as the sovereign leader of the sovereign state. Second, the Trump campaign appropriated queer logics as a method for doing so. As a result, his win came as a surprise, as conventional modes of analysis were incapable of understanding how and why this could/did occur. Queer (IR) lenses thus assist in understanding the deployment of queer logics and figurations of sovereignty, all of which featured prominently in the Trump campaign. Perhaps it would bode well for those who have continuously discarded queer theoretical and methodological frameworks to introspect on their own theoretical scope in this regard.

Weber (2016b) further notes with regard to the appropriation of queer discourse, cautioning against an "antinormative" blindness that can dilute or obstruct queer deployment:

> …exclusively anti-normative, always contrarian, somehow liberating understandings of 'queer', 'queers', and 'queer logics' can obscure the fact that 'queer' – just like any (dis)position, strategy, or tool – can be captured, mimicked, and mobilised to map the world in despicable ways. Alt-Right offers one important example of a white supremacist organization adopting techniques of the left for such purposes. How the Trump campaign mobilized what (otherwise) might appear to be queer logics of statecraft to de-normalize Clinton's 'neoliberal US sovereign subject' on behalf of Trump's (re)normalized 'repressed, entitled, white US sovereign subject' is another. There is no reason to believe that, as President, Trump will abandon the very logics and tactics that helped win him the Presidency (Weber, 2016b).

For the purpose of this study, it is also important to note that while queer logics were applied to the case of Trump's election in a US context, Weber's (2016b) analysis can be deployed in various contexts, particularly in understanding the queer logics and sovereign figurations that often underpin the rise of populist-nationalism across Europe and North America. This is discussed throughout this chapter.

The next section will present a brief discussion of Jasbir Puar's (2017) *Homonationalism* within the context of this rise in populist-nationalism. It will look at the recently published postscript to *Terrorist Assemblages*, whilst critiquing the theoretical scope of *Homonationalism* outside the realms of (neo) liberal hegemony. It also positions *Homonationalism* as a major theoretical contribution, along with Weber's (2016a; 2016b) "queer logics of statecraft" and "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject", to the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* in the final section.

Figure 5.1 summarises the theoretical contributions to and development of Queer IR and Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft." It further demonstrates how these theoretical lenses are applied, resulting in new theoretical developments that also inform this study.

Through applying Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" (see Chapter 4), the queer logics, resistance *and/or* collusions associated with the election of Donald Trump are exposed. Furthermore, it is through a Queer IR analysis that Weber (2016b) exposes the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" as an authorising subject of the fear-based sovereign leader.

Figure 5.1: Cynthia Weber's (2016b) *Sovereignty, Sexuality & The Will to Trump*



(The Author)

Homonationalism in Trump Times

Contextualising Homonationalism: Ten Years Later

In 2017 Jasbir K. Puar collaborated with Tavia Nyong'o and produced a Tenth Anniversary Edition of Puar's (2007b) ground-breaking book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Tavia Nyong'o (2017) wrote a new foreword to the text, while Puar (2017) added a 15 page postscript titled: "Homonationalism in Trump Times". Collectively, both academics sought, in some respect, to contextualise Puar's (2007b) widely deployed term *Homonationalism*, 10 years after it's unveiling in *Terrorist Assemblages.* Nyong'o's (2017) brief yet insightful foreword tracks the various manifestations of *Homonationalism*, whilst exploring the political dynamics of the Orlando massacre and, as she argues, the relevance of queer and assemblage theory in understanding war and hegemony (Puar, 2017).

Puar's (2017) own postscript is as dense and theoretically complex as the text itself, offering both a challenging and insightful look at *Homonationalism* in Obama's and Trump's America (noting that the original *Terrorist Assemblages* was written and published in 2007 during the Bush administration). In summary, the Tenth Anniversary Edition of *Terrorist Assemblages* seeks to justify the notion that understanding (and resisting) *Homonationalism* is as important now as ever before, particularly in light of the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States and the subsequent (as Weber, 2016a, 2016b would argue) sovereign figures that were formed as a result (Puar, 2017). "Homonationalism in Trump Times" (Puar, 2017) is important for this study, firstly because it explores one of its integral themes (the rise of populist-nationalism), although this is not stated explicitly. Secondly, it exposes how *Homonationalism,* as originally conceptualised in *Terrorist Assemblages* in 2007, cannot be contextualised without acknowledging a need to expand its theoretical scope. This section therefore critiques *Homonationalism* in its current form, whilst acknowledging its continued relevance in political, activist and academic circles. It exposes its theoretical shortcomings 10 years later, particularly within the context of the fall of the (neo) liberal hegemony. As a result, whilst drawing significantly from *Homonationalism* and from Weber's (2016a, 2016b) theoretical contributions, this section goes further to conceptualise *Homopopulism* in the next (final) section of this chapter.

As is the case with the original *Terrorist Assemblages*, "Homonationalism in Trump Times" with its associated critique confined itself to an exclusively American context, written within the context of the War on Terror, and the subsequent global (neo) liberal hegemony. In

discussing the terrorist script (or figure, as Weber (2016a, 2016b) argues) and the relevance of *Homonationalism* in 2017, Puar states:

> On this day, the terrorist script feels largely unchanged from the post–9/11 moment. There's no need to exceptionalize the trauma of the current political scene, of which Trump is a symptom, not the cause. Debates about rupture and continuity forego more incisive analyses about scale, intensification, affect, speed, contractions, expansions, and tactics. The jolt of Trump is not that he revealed something heretofore unknown, but that he has accelerated and vastly expanded the scale of disregard, extending precarity to, yes, your back yard: it's in your backyard. Amidst constant refrains about the horror of our contemporary political scenario, I am continually struck by the discursive and material resonances with the war on terror (Puar, 2017: 224).

A lot has happened in the 10 years since *Terrorist Assemblages* was published in 2007. Whilst the "terrorist script", as Puar (2017) rightfully notes, is still deeply embedded in American (and more broadly Western) society, the dynamics of the War on Terror have shifted and expanded significantly. Two significant events have occurred that Puar did not acknowledge in her 2017 postscript but are inherently influential of how *Homonationalism* has manifested (and developed) in a contemporary context. The first is the 2011 Arab Spring which, with a contribution of a number of factors, ultimately gave birth to ISIS (see Chapter 3). The second is the 2016 Orlando massacre (Tavia Nyong'o did discuss it in her foreword, though she explored only her perception of the causes and not the effects), which saw the most deadly attack on American soil since 9/11 (see Chapter 3). What is more relevant about these two events within the context of *Homonationalism* is how queer discourses and subjectivities are intertwined with the subsequent politics that followed. ISIS used its various social media platforms to present videos of alleged homosexuals being thrown off rooftops, an act that was, for a number of reasons including those embedded in homonationalisms, condemned by the UN Security Council. The Pulse night club where the Orlando massacre took place was a gay club, and this was the first direct attack on the queer community by a global terrorist network (ISIS claimed responsibility). Following these events *Homonationalism* was expanded by both queer subjects and hegemonic actors (such as the US nation state) that sought to appropriate LGBT and Queer discourses (see previous section). In her interview, Judge (2018) states that:

> The [post-Orlando] politics of fear has been effective. There has been an effective use of a "populist-thuggery" on one level. There is a certain thuggery in the Trump regime in its post-truth rhetoric. Bullying meets this post-truth narrative and it is desperately trying to show a veneer of respectability and civility in amongst that thuggery. And the homosexual is the perfect subject to help with that "veneer building," that "respectable politics." As in Africa where homophobia is used to prop up autocratic regimes, in the global north you have

> homonationalisms being mobilised to prop up equally autocratic, regressive and patriarchal leaders (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

Furthermore, in her postscript Puar (2017) does not acknowledge the global geopolitical trends occurring electorally, and the subsequent rhetoric and policy assertions/outcomes forming as a result (as well as the queer and fearful logics that often inform such trends and outcomes). Whilst this study agrees that "[the election of] Trump is a symptom, not the cause" of the current political scene, Puar (2017) does not acknowledge what that political scene is and where it is heading. It is thus useful to further acknowledge what Judge (2018) states with regard to the historical nature of theory:

> I don't think there is ever one theory. There is never one lens through which one can understand social and political phenomena – they appear as if they are now, but they are also historical. They have deep historical roots and we see them in the realm of whatever dominant discourses, including theoretical discourses, are in play (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

In this regard, it is important to note that (as discussed in Chapter 4) *Homonationalism* is formed out of a critique of a hegemonic (neo)liberal order and the queer complicity and collusion within it, as well as rooted in post-9/11 patriotism. As noted throughout this study, that hegemonic (neo)liberal order is declining (see Chapter 3). Even in her foreword to *Terrorist Assemblages* Tavia Nyong'o (2017) notes that a political shift has occurred, and that there are implications for *Homonationalism*: "But even if homonationalism was never intended to explain everything about the ways neoliberal (and now neofascist) political formations seek to engage the question of sexual diversity and gender nonconformity, it remains an indispensable tool for grappling with the ambiguous present" (in Puar, 2017: xiv). Weber (2016b) further adds to this critique when she notes (see previous section) that the (liberal) melting pot of post-9/11 patriotism (the same one that informs Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism*) has been stripped of the valuation of "American diversity" demonstrated specifically through the rhetoric of the Trump campaign and subsequent presidency (Weber, 2016b).

Whilst this study agrees that Puar's (2017) analysis remains a valuable tool for understanding political formations (both past and present) it takes the position that *Homonationalism* requires further theoretical development. This is in order to expand its scope (contextualise), address its "global blindness," speak to the geopolitical shifts occurring globally (the rise of populist-nationalism), acknowledge the queer logics that often inform *and/or* manifest from these shifts, and factor in the deeply embedded notions of the politics of fear (populism),

patriotism and sovereign figurations that embody, collude with *and/or* resist registers of sex, sexuality and gender, among others. Judge (2018) states in this regard: "Homonationalism does have currency now. Is it sufficient on its own or as a singular lens? Of course not, as with any other idea, concept, notion. Should it be spoken, theorised with and against? Yes" (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

This is where the valuable Queer IR contributions of Cynthia Weber (2016a, 2016b) can supplement Puar's (2007b, 2017) analysis. Equally, Puar's (2007b, 2017) work on *Homonationalism* can contribute significantly towards complementing Weber's (2016a, 2016b) theoretical applications, particularly in understanding the "fearful, patriotic sovereign (Queer) subject." This will be discussed in the next (final) section of this chapter. Through deploying Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft," her subsequent exposure of the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" (Weber, 2016b), Puar's (2007b, 2017) *Homonationalism* (see Chapter 4) and Wodak's (2015) "populism as fear" (see Chapter 3), the next section will lay the groundwork for conceptualising *Homopopulism* – an 'expansion pack' of *Homonationalism* that seeks to contextualise queer politics and its collusions in the current (populist-nationalist) political scene.

Conceptualising Homopopulism

The Politics of Queer and/or the Politics of Fear

In their recent publications both Weber (2016b) and Puar (2017) acknowledge the current political scene, that is, the growing support for and election of right-wing political entities (the rise of populist-nationalism) in Europe and North America authorised by (certain) sovereign subjects/bodies. Whilst Puar (2017) argues that there is nothing exceptional about these times, which makes *Homonationalism* more relevant today than ever before, the previous section sought to argue that the theoretical scope of *Homonationalism* requires expansion. Weber (2016b), like Puar (2017), does not necessarily discuss the exceptional state of the current political scene, she does, however, offer a number of theoretical contributions that, in conversation with *Homonationalism*, can assist in understanding the location of queer discourses and subjects within the broader global political realm. Therefore, this section will draw from the various contemporary, historical and theoretical explorations discussed throughout this study in order to conceptualise a new political phenomena and/or analytical tool – *Homopopulism.*

Before moving forward, it is important to note two important factors raised by Puar (2017) in her postscript to *Terrorist Assemblages*. The first is that *Homonationalism* is "a structuring facet of modernity" and a "historical shift" or "historical moment" rather than a parameter of identity or an accusation (Puar, 2017: 230). The second is that Puar (2017) "intended *Terrorist Assemblages* more as an incitement to debate than as a corrective" (Puar, 2017: 227). These two statements matter significantly in a discussion of *Homopopulism* and to the broader intentions of this study.

First, in acknowledging how *Homonationalism* has been deployed globally (see Chapter 4), and that *Homopopulism* is built on many of the theoretical foundations of *Homonationalism*, the concept remains an analytic rather than a prescription. This is particularly in line with how queer (which informs its theoretical core) is deployed in this regard (see Chapters 2 and 4). However, if *Homopopulism*, like *Homonationalism*, is appropriated in different forms, it only adds positively to on-going debates around queer discourse and subjectivity. Second, like Puar's (2017) purpose in *Terrorist Assemblages*, the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* is intended to incite debate and lay the groundwork for further investigation rather than to cast any aspersions. Judge (2018) states the following about *Homonationalism* in this regard: "The question is, what value does it [*Homonationalism*] bring? Where are its limits? Rather than does it work or no?. Should we chuck it out? – we cannot do that" (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). It is thus important to note that *Homopopulism* cannot exist without *Homonationalism*, and while the scope of this study does not necessarily allow a full critique of Puar's (2017) complex yet insightful work, nor does it claim to offer all the solutions in this regard, it does seek to start a conversation about extending *Homonationalism's* theoretical scope.

With that said, and acknowledging Puar's (2017) call to explore the histories of *Homonationalism*, this study seeks instead to explore the futures of *Homonationalism*. In doing so, it argues that, in line with the changes in the global political scene (from liberal order to populist-nationalist order – see Chapter 3), a new "historical moment" within the facets of modernity has occurred, that is a shift from *Homonationalism* to *Homopopulism.*

In her interview Judge (2018) states that "It is interesting to read homonationalism within the changing concept of the state since 2007. It is less the "homo" and more the "nationalism" – how are we rethinking "nationalism?" (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). The concept of *Homopopulism* is situated in a post-Orlando/ISIS nationalist context (rather than post-

9/11) and in a political order that is no longer rooted in a (neo)liberal hegemony and melting-pot patriotism (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, *Homopopulism* is informed by queer politics (see Chapter 2) *and/or* a fearful sovereignty that is embedded in the appropriation of "queer logics" (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; see Chapter 4).

As a result of the rise of *Homopopulism*, a new queer disciplinary/regulatory subject is emerging known as the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject" that is also playing an integral role in authorising fear-based sovereign leaders who are increasingly employing "queer *(and/or*) logics" (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2017). It is this fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject that is no longer favouring liberal rights-advancement discourses and subsequently authorising fear-based sovereign leaders. As such, it is these (populist) leaders who (queerly) promote "security" agendas (in order to relieve the fear) at the expense of racial (black, brown), gendered (women, non-binary), sexual (homosexual, queers), classist (poor), national (immigrants, rapists), and Other figurations (terrorist, unmeltable, disloyal citizens). Judge (2018) states:

> None of us are outside of power – we are all implicated, it operates through us, we all wield it and deploy it. It is obvious that queers on the top of the social and economic hierarchy will be implicated in the power arrangements that keep those hierarchies intact because they are products of those hierarchies. So of course you get fascist queers, so of course LGBT people would be implicated in those forms of power, including ones that deny homosexuality itself. Internalised homophobia is also a dimension of why they would be absorbed into a system of power that ultimately works against you as a sexual subject (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

In her interview Bouchard (2018) further states that "We have to assume that that is the case [more LGBTQ people voting right-wing]. Some LGBTQ people cannot be let off the hook for being implicated in fascist politics. However, there are many people who are critical of this [shift]" (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018).

In exploring *Homopopulism*, it is important to note that there are four major theoretical contributions that inform its conceptualisation. Bringing Weber's (2011, 2016b) Queer IR analysis of the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" into conversation with Puar's (2007b, 2017) *Homonationalism* informs the exposure of the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject", as it draws from both Weber's (2011, 2016b) notions of fearful sovereignty and Puar's (2007b, 2017) notions of homonormativity and queer as regulatory. Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" further assists in understanding how fearful, patriotic sovereign subjects, and in this case fearful patriotic queer sovereign subjects, are counter-intuitively complicit in authorising fear-based sovereign leaders that do not necessarily serve queer

interests. Weber's (2016a) theory further exposes how fear-based sovereign leaders employ queer *and/or* logics in order to figure sovereign subjects to authorise their sovereign leadership.

For example, after the Orlando massacre, Trump asserted that he would "protect the LGBTQ community from hateful foreign ideologies," but a year later he banned transgender soldiers from serving in the military. Furthermore, in their interview Coleman Chavez (2018) noted (in dismay because of Dr Coleman Chavez's views on the global violence perpetrated by the US military) that "There has been a resurgence of Trans* folks, especially Transmasculine folks, in the [US] military" (Interview, Daniel Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018), in spite of this blatant affront by the US state.

Moreover, bringing Weber's (2016a, 2016b) understandings of sovereignty into conversation with *Homonationalism* assists in exporting the concept of *Homopopulism* globally, that is, beyond the confines of American sexual exceptionalism to *Western* sexual exceptionalism. This is particularly relevant in the light of Weber's (2016a) argument that

> To be sovereign, then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign [subject] as an always already existing domestic presence, as the foundation of its authority domestically and internationally, which emerges from the complex interplay of domestic and international relations (Weber, 2016a: 35).

Finally, the work of Ruth Wodak (2015; see Chapter 3) and her analysis of "the politics of fear" within the rhetorical context of right-wing political strategies, highlights the explicit presence of populist-nationalism politics embedded in Weber's (2016b) concept of "fearful sovereignty and patriotism." Thus Wodak's (2015) work in conversation with Weber's (2016a, 2016b) and Puar's (2007, 2017) reveals two conceptual underpinnings of *Homopopulism.* First, *Homopopulism* is informed by interactions among the politics of queer *and/or* the politics of fear. In their interview, Coleman Chavez (2018) stated the following in this regard:

> [Fear politics] has been very successfully mobilised. Political rhetoric has become more important than critical engagement – there is a conservative rage. Fear is working too well and is deeply connected to the economy. Fear is thus operating in multiple ways – compromises are happening on all sides [of the political spectrum] (Interview, Daniel Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018).

Second, queer lenses assist in understanding populism and its fear-based, popular strategies, specifically because queer logics are exemplified, asserted *and/or* appropriated by both populist strategies (fear-based sovereign leader touting fear-based politics) and the recipients

of those strategies (fearful, patriotic sovereign queer subjects). Judge (2018) states the following in this regard:

> The fear factor cuts across the mobilisation of populism, populism needs that, it needs people to congeal around particular signifiers of sameness in relation to that which is excluded, or resisted, or denounced. Of course gay people are lured into that…it would be done so through the fear of a loss of power, probably mostly racial and gendered power, and also the power of nation e.g. "Make America Great Again." For gay white men, economic interests are really at the centre of this (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018).

Homopopulism is therefore the result of the incorporation of fearful (populist) sovereignty and patriotism with *Homonationalism*, simultaneously exposing the queer logics associated with the interactions among the politics of queer *and/or* the politics of fear. It is product of queer collusions (voluntarily and involuntarily) with the rise of populist-nationalism, its associated authorising sovereign subjects and sovereign leaders, and its inherently regressive and violent Othering strategies. It is a historical and political phenomenon that, if not resisted through effective solidarity and coalition building, could result in unprecedented queer-on-queer violence. As stated by Bouchard (2018) in her interview: "Populism is being used to target marginalised communities. It is about refining queer politics, a method for separating and [LGBTQ] demobilisation" (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018).

Thus the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* by way of various theoretical contributions assists in answering the research questions posed in this study, particularly as to whether there is a queer political shift. In her foreword to *Terrorist Assemblages* Tavia Nyong'o (2017) states, in discussing the election of Donald Trump, that "white women voters were among the demographics who opted for security theater over feminist solidarity" (in Puar, 2017: xii). In appropriating this statement, this study argues that through the phenomena of *Homopopulism*, LGBTQ (Queer) politics is 'opt[ing] for security theatre over [Queer] solidarity' (The Author).

This chapter thus assists in addressing the research problem and answering the research questions through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*. The existence of *Homopopulism* is indicative of itself in that there is indeed an LGBTQ political shift occurring in Europe and North America in line with the resurgence of populist-nationalism. The fear-mongering security discourses employed by populist-nationalist leaders (fear-based sovereign leader), and endorsed (authorised) by many LGBTQ individuals (fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subjects), is indicative of a shift towards security politics and away from rights-based politics. The backlash against the (neo)liberal order perpetuated in/from the rise in populist-

nationalism is not accounted for in Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism*, nor is the associated politics of fear and contemporary historical influences. As such, *Homonationalism* requires an expansion of its original theoretical scope – *Homopopulism* begins that process. Furthermore, the contributions of Weber's (2016a; 2016b) theory and its application form an integral part of this study, particularly in exposing the "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" figuration and the queer *and/or* logics of "fear-based sovereign leaders." It does not, however, expose the role of the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject" in authorising "fear-based sovereign leaders" – bringing Weber's (2016a; 2016b) theory and its applications into conversation with Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism*, assists in exposing this queer political collusion.

The three figures below compiled for this study assist in demonstrating how *Homopopulism* is conceptualised. Figure 5.2 illustrates its theoretical journey through identifying the various theoretical contributions discussed in each chapter of this study. Figure 5.3 illustrates the historical journey of *Homopopulism* within the broader context of LGBTQ political history, as well as the impact of influential geopolitical developments throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Figure 5.4 is a comparative table that illustrates the similarities and differences between the epistemological characteristics of *Homonationalism* and *Homopopulism*, particularly in terms of historical context, discourse, logic, subjectivity and theory.

Figure 5.2: Illustrating the theoretical contributions to Homopopulism



Figure 5.3: Graphic charting the historical shift from Homonationalism to Homopopulism



(The Author)

Figure 5.4: Comparative table presenting key epistemological features of Homonationalism & Homopopulism

Queer IR	
Homonationalism	Homopopulism
• Post-9/11 nationalistic citizen • (Neo)Liberal order • Rights-advancement discourse • Nationalism • Melting-pot patriotism • Inclusionary • Liberal-saviour • US sexual exceptionalism • Homonormativity • 9/11, GFC • Progressive • Assemblage	• Fearful queer sovereign subject • Populist-nationalist order • Security discourse • Populism • Othering patriotism • Exclusionary • Nationalist-rejecter • Western sexual exceptionalism • Homonormativity • Orlando, ISIS, Trump • Regressive • Queer (and/or) logics

(The Author)

Conclusion

This chapter sought to demonstrate the utility of Weber's (2016a, 2016b) and Puar's (2007b, 2017) theoretical and methodological frameworks through exploring their applications within the context of a shift in the global political scene, more specifically the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. The chapter began with Weber's (2016b) Queer IR analysis of the election of Donald Trump in 2016, noting the queer logics (through applying the lenses of the "queer logics of statecraft") appropriated by the election campaign as well as the sovereign (authorising) figurations that emerged as a result. Her exposure of the "fearful, sovereign patriotic subject" which, brought into conversation with Puar's (2017) *Homonationalism*, informed a key theoretical contribution to this chapter as well as the overall study.

Puar's (2017) postscript to *Terrorist Assemblages*, which sought to contextualise *Homonationalism* within the current political scene, was also explored and critiqued. As a result, this chapter argued that under the current shifting political order (liberal to populist-nationalism), *Homonationalism* requires an extension of scope and further theoretical development. The chapter sought to demonstrate that *Homonationalism* has shifted to *Homopopulism* through interactions among the politics of queer *and/or* the politics of fear. Furthermore, through mobilising various theoretical contributions, specifically Weber's (2011, 2016a, 2016b) "queer logics of statecraft" and "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" as

well as Puar's (2007b; 2017) *Homonationalism* and Wodak's (2015) "politics as fear", this chapter conceptualised *Homopopulism*, but goes further to argue that it is informed by a new queer disciplinary/regulatory (authorising) sovereign subject: the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject."

The next chapter is concludes this study. It will seek to utilise the various historical, theoretical and conceptual explorations throughout this study in order to reaffirm the solving of the research problem and the answering of the research questions. More specifically, as demonstrate in this chapter, it will take *Homopopulism* to task, attributing this (queer) political phenomenon to the shift in LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America (from liberal rights-advancement discourses to populist-nationalist security discourses). It will also provide a brief synopsis of this study as well as highlighting its limitations and suggesting areas for future research.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Synopsis of the Study

In order to understand the 21st century LGBTQ populist-nationalist political shift in Europe and North America, Chapter 2 of this study presents a modern history of LGBT and Queer within the context of various socio-political and academic developments. Whilst the Stonewall riots are considered a significant catalyst for radical LGBTQ politics in the so-called Western world, the politics of "the homosexual" have featured significantly throughout modern history. This study considers a number of cases where 20th-century queer activism existed prior to Stonewall, more specifically during the Nazi persecutions and the homophile movement's drive for decriminalisation that followed. While Chapter 2 provided the necessary terminological explanations, noting the complexities associated with the LGBTQ acronym and Queer as a deployment, it also revealed the evolving nature of LGBTQ politics as well as the subsequent formation of social movements and strategic modes of resistance. This is particularly interesting when considering how historically sensitive LGBTQ politicising is to the shifting dynamics of global and domestic geopolitical trends. A review of the development of heteronormativity and homonormativity was especially important in this regard, particularly in demonstrating how these concepts inform both *Homonationalism* and as a result *Homopopulism.*

In acknowledging the histories of LGBTQ politics, this study seeks to review the intellectual development of Queer. It establishes the founding philosophy of queer as a scholarship in poststructuralism, particularly in the work of Michel Foucault. In order to contextualise the foundations that inform the theoretical deployments of this study (Queer IR and *Homonationalism*), Chapter 2 thus provided a necessary overview of Queer Theory, its origins and its founders, more specifically the work of Eve Sedgewick and Judith Butler in the early 1990s. Whilst this chapter does not specifically explore the theoretical underpinnings of Queer IR and *Homonationalism* (as is done in Chapter 4), it does contend that these two lenses/analytics are inherently informed by Queer Theory.

Chapter 3 seeks to provide an overview of populism in practice and in rhetoric (as politics), as well as in scholarship (epistemologically). This is in order to elucidate the necessary historical and theoretical foundations that inform *Homopopulism* – the analytic with which to solve the research problem and answer the research questions. Defining populism has proven

to be difficult, as this study seeks to demonstrate the different waves, strands and deployments of the term over the past 60 years. In doing so, Chapter 3 establishes the necessary terminology that is deployed throughout this study, more specifically a comparison between right-wing and left-wing populism, and the acknowledgement of right-wing populism (populist-nationalism) as the focus point in this regard. The historical review of 21st century geopolitics provides the necessary contextualisation with which to understand the rise of populist-nationalism in this era, specifically the global events that often formed the basis of right-wing populist rhetoric and the subsequent politics of fear and "Othering" that manifested as a result.

The development of the scholarship on populism is particularly relevant as it provides an opportunity to review the associated literature. This assists in understanding populism, what forms it can take, how it is deployed and how it has changed so dramatically in the 21st century. The role of the media and technology has had a significant effect in this regard, and so scholars have sought to expand the literature on populism in more recent years, compared to its original conceptualisation in the 1960s. The "fear factor" that informs much of the populist-nationalist rhetoric that is witnessed today is specifically explored by the work of Ruth Wodak. This is an important exploration, particularly in conceptualising *Homopopulism* (Chapter 5) and in understanding how queer subjects are often enticed into supporting populist entities – a useful contribution that assists in solving the research problem and answering the research questions.

Chapter 4 establishes the theoretical and methodological core of this study. More specifically, the theoretical and methodological frameworks that inform Queer IR and *Homonationalism* are explored. In following on from the literature review of Queer Theory (Chapter 2), this study tracks the recent academic journey from Queer to Queer IR, firmly establishing Queer as a useful and critical lens of International Relations. In doing so, the study explores the work of Cynthia Weber as one of the founders of Queer IR, going further to examine her recent contributions to Queer IR scholarship, that is, the "queer logics of statecraft." Through drawing on the work of various scholars, Weber (2016a) provides a useful theoretical lens through which to understand sovereignty and sexuality as well as the queer logics that inform many of the associated figurations. Through the "queer logics of statecraft", the domestic and the international are mutually informative of each other, once again propelling queer into the international realm. Such lenses assist in answering the research questions, and in the solving of the problem statement of this study.

The theoretical component of this study is further informed by the work of Jasbir Puar (2007b) and her theorisation of *Homonationalism* (homonormativity and nationalism). Chapter 4 seeks to understand *Homonationalism* through exploring both its theoretical journey and its theoretical underpinnings with the purpose of examining notions of exceptionalism and queer as regulatory within the (neo)liberal post-9/11 order. When brought into conversation with one another, *Homonationalism* and the "queer logics of statecraft" assist in understanding 21st century LGBTQ political shifts in Europe and North America.

It is in Chapter 5, the application chapter of this study, where the theory discussed in Chapter 4 is applied in order to answer the research questions and address the problem statement. Here Cynthia Weber's "queer logics of statecraft" is applied to the election of Donald Trump as US president in 2016. Through exploring the rhetoric of the Trump campaign the queer logics of his presidency are exposed. Furthermore, Weber (2016b) explains the process of how sovereign subjects authorise sovereign leaders, going further to argue that "fearful patriotic sovereign subjects" authorise "fear-based sovereign leaders" (such as Trump) who employ queer logics of statecraft.

Jasbir Puar's (2017) postscript, in which she seeks to contextualise *Homonationalism* in 2017, is also examined. This study contends that *Homonationalism* cannot be contextualised in the present day without an expansion of its theoretical scope. This is because it was initially theorised against the backdrop of an established (neo)liberal order and, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, this (neo)liberal order is being disrupted by the rise of populist-nationalism. Chapter 5 introduces a new analytic with which to understand queer as regulatory and what Judge (2018) calls the "co-opted queer" (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). This new concept is called *Homopopulism*, and it emerges from bringing *Homonationalism* and "queer logics of statecraft" into conversation. As a result, the "fearful patriotic sovereign subject" becomes the "fearful patriotic queer sovereign subject" with the concept of *Homopopulism* assisting an understanding of the queer logics of populism, the fearful queer sovereign subjects that authorise it, and the fear-based sovereign leaders that deploy it. The existence of *Homopopulism* is thus indicative that there is indeed a LGBTQ political shift occurring in Europe and North America.

Solving the Research Problem

This study has sought to understand a visible LGBTQ political shift in Europe and North America in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in these historically liberal democratic

regions. It notes that populist-nationalism represents a significant threat to LGBTQ rights advancement, particularly in that rights advancements remains low on the domestic and foreign agendas of many right-wing political ideological dispensations. This study accordingly notes with interest the growing support for populist-nationalist sentiments (both in rhetoric and electorally) from segments of the LGBTQ community. In the light of the recent wave of 2016 and 2017 national elections in Europe and North America, more LGBTQ-identifying individuals are visibly aligning themselves politically with, and participating (as candidates and activists) in the campaigns of, populist-nationalist entities. Furthermore, many populist-nationalist entities are becoming equally receptive to LGBTQ support, demonstrating an unconventional association with LGBTQ "interests", particularly through a (populist) security rhetoric. This is evident when examining the campaigns of populist-nationalist entities in the USA, France, Holland and Germany, where issues around immigration, security and surveillance have been fused with the protection of marginalised groups, and in this case, the LGBTQ community.

As such, through employing the lenses of Queer IR, Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" and Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism*, this study has sought to solve the research problem and answer the research questions by understanding what seems to be an unconventional and counter-intuitive political phenomenon. Through bringing the above theories and concepts into conversation, this study has conceptualised what it calls a political and historical shift in European and North American LGBTQ politics, that is, from *Homonationalism* (post-9/11) to *Homopopulism* (post-Orlando/ISIS). The theorisation of *Homopopulism* thus assists in understanding the dynamics associated with this shift, particularly the inclusion of the politics of fear against the backdrop of a declining post-WWII liberal democratic internationalist global order. Why is this happening? Through *Homopopulism* populist-nationalist leaders are employing queer logics in order to gain a broad range of electoral support, including that of the LGBTQ community. Furthermore, members of the LGBTQ community are being bullied/enticed through fear-based politics to support populist-nationalist political entities. Thus the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject" is successfully authorising the "fear-sovereign leader", who is employing queer logics in line with their populist strategies.

These collusions predominantly serve the interests of the populist-nationalist entities as their unconventional "interests" in the LGBTQ community are quickly disbanded once they achieve electoral success. The emergence of *Homopopulism* thus represents a disruption of

historically conventional (rights-advancement) LGBTQ politics in the 21st century. To what extent is this happening? As demonstrated throughout this study, its prominence is inherently global, as are the consequences of its inception.

Answering the Research Questions

The study's primary research question is*: Is there an LGBTQ political shift taking place in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America?*

There is a geopolitical shift occurring in Europe and North America that is marked by a resurgence in populist-nationalist politics. This is particularly evident when examining the recent wave of national elections that took place across these historically mature liberal democratic regions over the past three years – populist-nationalist entities have made significant electoral inroads and their anti-(neo)liberal, anti-establishment rhetoric is being increasingly accepted and endorsed by a diverse range of people, marginalised communities included.

Whilst the implications for the LGBTQ community are evident, particularly in the traditionally anti-LGBTQ sentiment of these exclusive right-wing political entities, many LGBTQ individuals are complicit in this populist-nationalist resurgence. This has been exposed through selective election polling, but more importantly it is visible through the active participation of openly LGBTQ individuals in the campaigns (as candidates, activists and voters) of populist-nationalist political entities (fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject). Furthermore, many populist-nationalist entities are increasingly (unconventionally) receptive to LGBTQ political support and, as witnessed in the 2016 and 2017 elections in the US, France, Holland and Germany, many populist political leaders are claiming (queer logics) to protect LGBTQ "interests" in the name of security (fear-based sovereign leader).

As such, a LGBTQ political shift is indeed occurring in line with the populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America. The conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* assists in understanding this political phenomenon, and while it is assumed that many LGBTQ individuals historically do not endorse populist-nationalist sentiments (which can often be the case), the past three years have demonstrated that there are in fact many who do. While there are noted complexities associated with universalising an entire LGBTQ political formation, traditional LGBTQ political alignments are being disrupted by *Homopopulism*. For the benefit of successful LGBTQ resistance, coalition-building and solidarity, these collusive disruptions are exposed through conducting this study and answering this research question.

The secondary research questions are addressed below.

1. Does this potential shift entail a move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ rights advancement?

This study has established that a LGBTQ political shift has taken place in Europe and North America. It has further established that this political shift is in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence as a backlash to the post-WWII (neo)liberal order. Moreover, it has noted the ways in which the politics of fear has influenced this shift, specifically the ways in which a security-based rhetoric has been deployed in order to entice/bully LGBTQ individuals. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is conceptualised as *Homopopulism* and it entails a prioritisation of security over LGBTQ rights advancement. This is exposed in how anti-immigration and securitisation rhetoric is deployed, and subsequently endorsed, in favour of protecting LGBTQ subjects and the so-called "Western values" that reject the anti-LGBTQ, immigrant, non-secular, Other.

This study contends that an LGBTQ political shift in Europe and North America does entail a move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ rights advancement.

2. Does Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* have the theoretical scope to identify, describe and explain queer politics in the context of this potential shift?

This study has established that Jasbir Puar's (2007b) concept of *Homonationalism* does have the theoretical scope to identify, describe and explain a historical and political shift in queer politics in a post-9/11 US context. Importantly, *Homonationalism* introduces the idea of queer collusions with systems of hierarchy and power. This is particularly in line with the melting-pot patriotism and the (neo)liberal hegemony that existed in 2007 when her ground-breaking book *Terrorist Assemblages* was written and published.

This study does, however, contend that Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* requires an expansion of its theoretical scope within the context of new historical developments (GFC, Orlando/ISIS) and a subsequent backlash against the (neo)liberal hegemony that has resulted in/from the resurgence of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. As such, this study finds that Jasbir Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* does not have the full theoretical scope to identify, describe and explain queer politics in the context of the political shift outlined in the primary research question. As a result, it conceptualises *Homopopulism* in

order to understand queer collusions within the context of a rising populist-nationalist hegemony and associated Othering patriotism.

3. Does Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" assist in identifying, describing and explaining the collusions *and/or* resistances that may form from this potential shift?

This study has established that Cynthia Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" assists in identifying, describing and explaining how populist-nationalist leaders employ queer logics, as a populist strategy in order to entice/bully support. Weber's (2016a; 2016b) "queer logics of statecraft" does expose how, in the case of Donald Trump's election, the (white, Christian, American) "fearful, patriotic sovereign subject" is implicated in authorising the "fear-based sovereign leader." Whilst this study resolves that this is an important revelation in the context of a populist-nationalist resurgence, it finds that Weber's (2016a; 2016b) theory and its application fall short in explaining how the queer subject is figured as an authorising sovereign subject. This study therefore brings Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism* and Weber's (2016a; 2016b) "queer logics of statecraft" into conversation in order to expose the "fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject" through the conceptualisation of *Homopopulism.* This study consequently affirms that Weber's (2016a) "queer logics of statecraft" does assist in identifying, describing and explaining collusions *and/or* resistances within the context of a populist-nationalist resurgence, but not queer collusions *and/or* resistances without the contributions of Puar's (2007b) *Homonationalism.*

Areas for Future Research

It is clear that Queer International Relations (IR) has developed significantly as a theoretical force in International Relations. Throughout this study, its utility has been demonstrated, particularly in the way it has so successfully assisted in the understanding of various themes, including state and nation formation, global political economy, war and security, power and hierarchy, and LGBTQ politics, among others. The same can be said about *Homonationalism*. However, the idea of Queer lenses in International Relations is relatively new and there is ample room for further theoretical and methodological development. The conceptualisation of *Homopopulism* was indeed the result of bringing Queer IR theories into conversation in order supplement and complement one another, so as to contribute to its theoretical journey. That journey is, however, far from complete, and in considering Queer resistance to boundary, binary, stability and conformity, it is possible that that theoretical journey may

never be complete. And Queer would certainly want it that way. This implies that the field of Queer IR is boundless and in constant need of disruption in order to keep the Queer alive.

In many ways *Homopopulism* shares the journey of its theoretical progenitor. Its novelty is unquestionable; however, its utility has yet to be critiqued. It is the result of the start of a new conversation, and it is deployed with purpose of encouraging further discussion. This study invites further contributions to and disruptions of *Homopopulism* in subsequent research. It further invites the application of the concept to various case studies, histories, contexts, futures and geographic locations. It is worth noting that this study did not explore cases in Africa, Asia, South America and the Middle East, hence there is an essential need to bring Queer IR lenses, and Queer lenses more broadly, to the subaltern world. Furthermore, the global implications of *Homopopulism* in Europe and North America, specifically for queer subjects around the world, require further exploration, as do new modes of resistance.

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