


Plantation Forestry in Tanzania: A History of Sao Hill Forests, 1939-2015.

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Stellenbosch University*

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March 2018

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entire of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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Abstract

This thesis uses plantation forests from the colonial to the postcolonial period as a lens to explore the history of Tanzania between 1939 and 2015. The thesis discusses transitions within plantation forestry by using the changing history of the Sao Hill, the biggest plantation forest in Tanzania. The thesis weaves together the varied factors that led to the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation, first during the colonial period, when it was established as a means of ameliorating the micro-climates around tea farms and white commercial farms. Secondly, during the postcolonial period, it was part of implementing Basic Industrial Strategy (BIS) policy aimed at introducing industries that could reduce imports from 1967. While the colonial government compensated the customary land owners to get land for afforestation, the postcolonial government did not compensate as it resettled under the rubric of African Socialism, famously known as *Ujamaa* villages, between 1973 and 1976. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that, due to the weak economy, the state resorted to the World Bank to get a loan. The World Bank loan, issued in 1976 and renewed in 1982, influenced subsequent state-driven afforestation behaviour and management in Tanzania. A Biodiversity paradigm (stemming from the 1980s) on forestry conservation attracted international donors to fund more natural forests than plantations. From the late 1980s, economic liberalization was implemented which caused some of the land owners to use ‘weapons of the weak’ to resist the means used by the state to take their customary land. This thesis ends by exploring the means deployed by the government to curb fire outbreaks and encroachment cases at the Sao Hill plantation. While the plantation forest management protected the plantation forest by adhering to some elements of the participatory forest management, a practice more common in the natural forests management, the state tried to control encroachment cases and boundary conflicts with the Sao Hill forest between 1986 and 2013. While participatory methods reduced fire outbreaks, neither the commissions of inquiry nor the participatory measures succeeded in solving encroachment in some villages like Mapanda where two private companies and individual woodlot developers had bought almost three quarters of the village land. Therefore, this thesis argues that the plantation forestry in Tanzania is a product of many factors which can be summarized into environmental and economic ones.

Thesis Keywords: Tanzania, forestry, Sao Hill forest, Mufindi, natural resources, World Bank, Sao Hill saw mill, Mufindi pulp and paper mill, *ujamaa*, villagisation, participatory forest management, woodlot, and land encroachment.

Opsomming

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis maak gebruik van plantasiewoude tussen die koloniale tydperk en nakoloniale Tanzanië as lens om die geskiedenis van Tanzanië tussen 1939 en 2015 te ondersoek. Die tesis mik om die oorgang van plantasie bosbou te demonstreer, deur gebruikte maak van wisselende tonele van Sao Hill, die grootste van hierdie tipe plantasie in Tanzanië. Die tesis weef die verskeie faktore wat gelei het tot die vestiging van die Sao Hill plantasie saam; eers, tydens die koloniale tydperk, as 'n middel om die klimaat om teeplantasies, en plase besit deur wit mense, te versag, en tweedens, tydens die nakoloniale tydperk, as deel van die implementasie van die *Basic Industrial Strategy* (BIS), wat gestreef het om die invoer van basiese goedere, wat Tanzanië in 1967 begin het, te verminder deur die introduksie van nywerhede. Terwyl die koloniale regering die gebruiklike grondeienaars vergoed het vir dié grond om land te verwerf vir bebossing, het die nakoloniale regering nie vergoeding geoffer nie omdat, tussen 1973 en 1979, het die regering die gebruiklike grondeienaars in die rubriek van Afrika-sosialisme hervestig. Die idee van Afrika-sosioalisme het in Tanzanië ontstaan en dié plekke van hervestiging staan bekend as *Ujamaa Villages*. Verder demonstreer die tesis dat, weens die swak ekonomie, moes Tanzanië gebruik maak van 'n Wêreld Bank lening so dat die land se bebossingsdrome bereik kon word. Dié lening, wat in 1976 uitgegee is en in 1982 hernu is, het 'n groot impak gehad op die werkverrigting en bestuur van bebossing in Tanzanië. Weens die biodiversiteitsvoorbeeld van bosbewaring wat gelei het tot al hoe meer befondsing vir natuurlike woude, teenoor plantasiewoude, deur internasionale donateurs, en weens die ekonomiese liberalisering beleide wat in Tanzanië in die laat 1980's op die voorgrond getree het, het van die gebruiklike grondeienaars die wyse waardeur die staat hul land ingeneem het begin bevraagteken. Die tesis eindig met 'n uitleg van die taktiek wat ontplooi was deur die staat om brande en oorskrydingsgevalle by die Sao Hill plantasie te tem. Terwyl die plantasiebosbestuur die plantasiewoude beskerm het deur om trou te bly aan sekere elemente van die deelnemende bosbestuur, 'n algemene praktyk in natuurlikebosbestuur, het die sentrale regering verskeie kommissies gevorm om ondersoek instel na gevalle van oorskryding in dorpe wat grenskonflikte met die Sao Hill woud tussen 1986 en 2013 gehad het. Al het die gebruik van deelnemende metodes gevalle van bosbrand verminder na amper nul teen 2015, nie die kommissies van ondersoek of die deelnemende maatreëls het daarin geslaag om gevalle van oorskryding in dorpe, soos Mapanda, optelos nie. Hier het twee privaatmaatskappye as ook individuele brandhoutbosperseelontwikkelaars amper driekwart van die dorp se grond gekoop.

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of my home and my family in my absence. My brother Abbas Kagalawe, for taking care of my late mother and my small 'tree farm' in my absence.

List of Abbreviations

BIS	Basic Industrial Strategy
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
DC	District Commissioner
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FBD	Forestry and Bee Keeping
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
HFM	History Friday Morning
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JFM	Joint Forest Management
JKT	Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (National Service)
JUWATA	Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi Tanzania- (Trade unions of Tanzania)
LMDA	Logging and Miscellaneous Deposit Account
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
NDC	National Development Cooperation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
RC	Regional Commissioner
SHFPA	Sao Hill Forest Plantation Archive
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPM	Southern Paper Mill
SFM	Sustainable Forest Management
TAFORI	Tanzania Forest Research Institute

TANESCO	Tanzania National Electricity Supply Company
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TAZARA	Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority
TFS	Tanzania Forest Services Agency
TNA	Tanzania National Archives
TPAWU	Tanzania Plantations and Agricultural Workers Union
TUCTA	Trade Union Congress of Tanzania
TWICO	Tanzania Wood Industries Company
UKA	United Kingdom Archive
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
WB	World Bank
WEO	Ward Executive Officer
WWII	Second World War

Dedication

To my mother, Luciana Mdalingwa, (1944-2017)

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology.

1.1 Introduction

Tanzania¹ offers historians one of the best examples of a country that tried to develop its own kind of “African socialism” and concomitantly this part of its history has been written about extensively by scholars both local and foreign, many of whom had more at stake than a straightforward retelling of the past.² These include President Julius Nyerere himself, who wrote on the feasibility and implementation of *ujamaa* or socialism in Tanzania.³ Tanzanian socialism was cemented by the infamous Arusha Declaration, a document which provided the bedrock for the new policy, promulgated on 5 February 1967.⁴ The villagisation policy, one of the facets most analysed by scholars, was certainly among the most extensive state interventions into the lives of ordinary people which, as this thesis will contend, ultimately failed economically.⁵ Oddly, despite being widely criticized by most scholars, villagisation in the Tanzanian context was used by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism to expand the plantation forestry in Mufindi district.⁶ The land seized through villagisation by the ministry

¹ This name is derived from the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Before that, there was Tanganyika known today as mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is known as Tanzania Islands. The term Tanganyika comes from the deepest lake in Africa, found in the western part of the country, and adopted by the British in 1920, when they took over the area from the Germans after the First World War. The Urundi (Burundi) and Rwanda sub-districts were part of this huge German colony called German East Africa (Deutsch-Ostafrika). The two sub-districts went to the Belgians as they defeated the Germans in the western part of the colony. See, for example, Walter Rodney “The Political Economy of Tanganyika 1890-1930” Martin Kaniki (Ed.) *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule* (London, Longman, 1980), 144-145; Hans Schabel, “Tanganyika Forestry Under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919”, *Forestry and Conservation History*, 34, 3, (1990) 139, (130-141); Jon Voss, “Deutsch-Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000”, Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 23-24.

² Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania, A Political Economy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), 280-318; Paul Bjerck, “Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State”, *History in Africa*, 37 (2010), 275-319; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, 1996); Cranfort Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

³ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Essays on Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Donatus Komba, “Contribution to Rural Development: *Ujamaa* and Villagisation”, Colon Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1995), 32-45.

⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Essays on Socialism*.

⁵ See, for example, James Scott, *Seeing Like a State, How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998), 223-261; Idris Kikula, *Policy Implications on Environment: The Case of Villagisation in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University Press, 1996), 71-107; C. Christiansson and J. Ashuvud, “Heavy Industry in a Rural Tropical Ecosystem”, Working Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1-8, (1985), 127-133.

⁶ Mufindi district is one of the three administrative areas of Iringa Region. Other districts are Iringa and Kilolo. The district is bordered to the north by Kilolo and Iringa, to the south by Njombe district, to the east by Morogoro Region and to the west by Singida Region. It is located 80 km south of the regional capital of Iringa.

resulted in the biggest plantation forestry in Tanzania.⁷ The introduction of scientific forestry in Mufindi district, to use Brett Bennett's words applied to other comparative contexts, "reshaped societies, economies and culture".⁸ The independent pro-socialism African government of Tanzania, however, implemented some policies that were either proposed or implemented by the colonial state as plantation forests in Mufindi district and other parts of country. Moreover, many of these big projects run by the government with wood-related businesses were funded by aid from either the multilateral institutions, especially the World Bank, or with bilateral aid, especially from the Nordic countries.⁹ Fundamentally, the kind of socialism debated by many scholars in Tanzania was in some cases precisely what attracted aid to different projects, because after independence in December 1961 the country became one of the 'darlings' of the international aid community.¹⁰ The country was one of the recipients of the highest levels of foreign aid in the world between 1962 and 1983. The dependence on development assistance in funding was not limited to the plantation forest sector alone. In recent years, in terms of macro-economic indicators, Tanzania has improved its performance. However, income levels are still low.¹¹ It was no wonder that the Sao Hill plantation forest, the biggest owned solely by the state, was one of the projects which benefited from this foreign aid – especially from the World Bank, which provided the loans for two tenures (1976 and 1982). The provision of these loans by the World Bank between 1976 and 1992,¹² a period of crisis in the country, ensured the survival of the plantation forests.¹³ This thesis seeks to analyse

⁷ The land taken by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, however, was acquired through negotiations between the former owners and the Sao Hill Project to respect the customary land owners and the sustainability of the forests, which were to be set within the villages – forests in villages. All this took place in the late 1970s.

⁸ Brett Michael Bennett, "Locality and Empire: Networks of Forestry in Australia, India and South Africa, 1843-1948", PhD Thesis (University of Texas at Austin, 2010), 1.

⁹ Sebastian Edwards, *Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis* (Los Angeles, University of California, 2012), 1-6.

¹⁰ See for example, Sebastian Edwards, *Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis* (Los Angeles, University of California, 2012), 1-6.

¹¹ See, for example, Heini Vihemäki, "Participation or Further Exclusion? Contestations over Forest Conservation and Control in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania," PhD Thesis (University of Helsinki, 2009), 6-7.

¹² The 1976 loan was aimed at maintaining and expanding the plantation forests established during the colonial period, while the 1982 loan was an appraisal loan for the mooted pulp and paper mill in Mufindi.

¹³ For the details of the crisis see, for example, Knud Erick Svendsen, "Development Strategy and Crisis Management" Colon Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1995), 108- 124; Samuel Wangwe, "Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the case of Tanzania" Kjell Havnevik, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 149-160; Samuel Wangwe, "Changing Aid Modalities and Tanzanian Development Assistance Partnerships," Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (Eds), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota), 207-221; Werner Biermann and John Campbell, "The Chronology of Crisis in Tanzania, 1974-1986", Bade Onimode (Ed.), *The IMF, The World Bank and the African Debt: The Economic Impact* (London and New Jersey: The Institute for African Alternatives', Zed Books Ltd, 1989), 69-88; Haroub Othman and Ernest Maganya, "Tanzania: The Pitfalls of the Structural Adjustment Programme", Bade Onimode (Ed), *The IMF, The World Bank and the African Debt: The Economic Impact* (London and New Jersey: The Institute for African Alternatives', Zed Books Ltd, 1989), 89-98.

the forces behind the establishment of this state plantation forestry and the response of the surrounding community, where this major project was set.

The plantation forests in Tanzania were introduced by the German colonial authorities. Historiographically, the Germans in Tanzania are given greater credit for plantation forests than the British. The Germans, who were aware of the importance of forests from the very beginning understood desiccation theory, which linked the shortage of rainfall and humidity with deforestation.¹⁴ Götzen, the governor during the Maji Maji uprising (1905-1907), proclaimed that afforestation was “one of the government’s most important and urgent tasks”.¹⁵ During German colonial rule afforestation was also connected to Asian scientific forestry, as the first chief forester appointed in 1903, Paul Otto Eckert, had worked with the Dutch in Java. By 1914 there were 19 German foresters. The Germans were successful in establishing dozens of exotic tree species, mainly in trial botanical gardens in Dar es Salaam and Tanga. The introduction of exotic tree species went in parallel with the gazettement of forest reserves.¹⁶ The Germans lost their huge colony to the British during the First World War and the afforestation plans were set aside.

The First World War in Tanganyika precipitated intensive forest encroachment and thus one of the tasks by the British mandate government was to reclaim the encroached land and where necessary to increase forest reserves. The creation of forest reserves, however, was not a unique case for Tanganyika only.¹⁷ Traditional land use practices – especially shifting cultivation – were regarded as detrimental to the environment and consequently the British, like their predecessors, established protected areas, which restricted local people’s access to the natural resources upon which they depended for their livelihood.¹⁸ The curtailing of the traditional land use systems, in most cases, was driven by economic motives. This was the case for Mufindi, where the white tea farmers were obsessed with the shifting cultivation by the surrounding

¹⁴ Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki University, 1995), 529-536; Hans Schabel, “Tanganyika Forestry under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919,” *Forestry and Conservation History*, 34, 3, (1990) (130-141).

¹⁵ Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, 529-536.

¹⁶ Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, 536.

¹⁷ See, for example, William Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 11, 1, 1984, 62, (52-83); Hans Schabel, “Tanganyika Forestry Under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919,” *Forestry and Conservation History*, 34, 3, (1990) (130-141).

¹⁸ Eliakimu Zahabu et al., *Forestland System in Tanzania, An Overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forestry Management*, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009, 8-9.

communities.¹⁹ This thesis seeks to trace the history of the establishment and consequences of the Sao Hill plantation forests, embedding community history within the history of the state formation of Sao Hill forests.

The colonial government doubled land appropriation in Tanganyika after the Second World War (WW II). Britain's economic needs sparked a new wave of state intervention in the form of development planning from 1946.²⁰ This phase, known as the "second colonial occupation",²¹ was marked by a deeper penetration of the colonial state into nearly all aspects of rural African society. The post-war conservation movement made forestry a central concern in the colonies, including Tanganyika.²² The main challenge for plantation forestry expansion was shortage of land, as it was claimed that exotic trees competed with other cash crops such as pyrethrum, especially around Mount Kilimanjaro, cocoa around the Usambara foothills and tea in the Southern Highlands.²³ It is arguably because of this anticipated competition of plantation forestry with other crops that the World Bank was so keen to develop Sao Hill forest in the remote Mufindi area, subject to the extension of the railroad in that region.²⁴ This study traces the developing of the Sao Hill plantation forest during and after WWII in the name of environmentalism, to remedy the dearth of literature on this period.

After independence, the rhetoric of environmentalism subsided. The language of industrialisation supplanted that of environmentalism. At the time of independence Tanzania

¹⁹ See for example, a Case from India, Donald Worster, (Ed) *The Ends of the Earth, Perspectives on Modern Environmental History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 118-140; Gregory Barton, "Empire forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism", *Journal of Historical Geography*, 27, 4, (2001), (529-552); Ravi Rajan, "Imperial Imperialism: The Agenda and Ideologies of Natural Resources Management in British Colonial Forestry 1880-1950", PhD. Thesis, Oxford University (1994), 324; See an example from Malawi, John McCracken, "Conservation and Resistance in Colonial Malawi, The 'Dead North' Revisited", William Beinart and Joann McGregor, (Eds) *Social History and African Environments*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), 155-174; See an example from West Africa, James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, "False Forest History, Complicit Social Analysis: Rethinking Some West African Environmental Narratives", *World Development*, 23, 6, (1995) (1023-1035).

²⁰ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1961), 195.

²¹ Roderick Neumann, "Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika", *Environment and History Journal*, 3(1997), 48-54, (45-68). See, for example, Gregory Barton, *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 144.

²² See, for example, W. Beinart, *The Rise of Conservation in South Africa, Settlers, Livestock and the Environment 1770-1950* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 95-97; Jamie Monson, "Canoe-Building under Colonialism: Forestry and Food Policies in the inner Kilombero Valley, 1920-1940" Gregory Maddox et al. (Eds) *Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania: Custodians of the Land*, (London: James Currey Press, 1996), 200-212.

²³ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, 195.

²⁴ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, 195.

was a peasant-based economy, and arguably had no fully-fledged economy as was the case for Kenya, the sister British colony in the East African coast.²⁵ One of the ways to promote industries in Tanzania was through plantation forestry. The process of Tanzanian industrialisation, however, was hampered by events such as the Dar es Salaam army mutiny of 1964, preceded by the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964. These events scared off many expatriates and, indeed, some of the long-term settlers who were on the ground.²⁶ To the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (1922-1999), afforestation was intended to increase employment of jobless Tanzanians in the rural areas as well as expand the acreage of trees, which he loved so much that many professional foresters described him as “a tree loving president”.²⁷ This thesis tries to map out Tanzania’s desire for afforestation under the rubric of industrialisation without sources of funding. In this respect, the thesis examines the role of the World Bank in the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forest.

The Sao Hill plantation survived, despite the economic crisis which faced the country between 1974 and 1985. The survival of Sao Hill was directly linked with the World Bank funding and the strings attached. The World Bank brought its own foreign staff to assist in the initial planning of the plantation. Scholars debating plantation forestry in Africa have neglected the debate about the implementation of World Bank loans in developing countries with regard to plantation forestry.²⁸ The World Bank loan ended in 1992, when Tanzania was implementing the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the process which by and large introduced the privatization of many parastatals. These parastatals included the Sao Hill Saw Mill (1996) and the Southern Paper Mill (1997).²⁹ The liberalisation of the economy of Tanzania went in hand with the liberalisation of the tree plantations, whereby individuals and companies were allowed to plant

²⁵ Roderick Neumann, “Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika”, *Environment and History Journal*, 3(1997), 48-54, (45-68).

²⁶ See, for example, Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 161; Cranfort Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 105-116; Lionel Cliffe, “From Independence to Self-Reliance”, Isaria Kimambo and Arnold Temu, *A History of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Kapsel Educational Publications, 1997), 239-257.

²⁷ Laurent Magesa, “Is a Catholic Saint Concealed within the Ranks of African Head of State? A Positive Answer from Tanzania as the Beatification of Servant of God Julius Nyerere has opened!” www.africamission.mafr.org. Accessed on 7/5/2017; Interview with Ladislaus Nsubemuki, a former Director of TAFORI, Morogoro, 5 March 2016.

²⁸ See, for example, Julian Evans and John Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 25; Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantations in Africa”, *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2 (2014) (144-159).

²⁹ The Sao Hill Saw Mill and the Southern Paper Mills were sole consumers of the logs from the Sao Hill plantation.

trees for a variety of consumers.³⁰ This loophole led to massive land alienation in the Sao Hill plantation land for extension and indeed even in the villages around, leading to innumerable disputes. The state intervened with countless commissions of inquiries which were toothless and disorganized. This thesis debates the land question by using these commissions, whose reports have not previously found their way into academic discussions.

The principles of participatory forestry management (PFM), the dominant discourse in natural forest conservation, are explored in this thesis, as the Sao Hill plantation adopted some of its elements not for ideological but rather for pragmatic reasons, as this thesis will show. PFM in the Sao Hill plantation, however, was only aimed at curbing fire incidents and land encroachment. The thesis examines this flexible approach as the Sao Hill management claimed it was the key solution for the problems which arose in the 2000s, when the private sector was moving into the plantation sector. At the Sao Hill plantation, as this thesis will show, the PFM rhetoric was not well accepted, especially on land encroachment, while it meticulously curbed fire incidents. PFM as the dominant discourse in forest management in the liberal economy has been analysed by innumerable scholars³¹ as this thesis will show in Chapter Six.

The Sao Hill plantation forest was the biggest forest³² in the Forestry and Bee Keeping Division (FDB) in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) up to 2015. This is why the Sao Hill plantation, on which this thesis focuses, is highly sensitive for the nation because,

³⁰ Elizabeth Daley, "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s," *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 5, 4, (2005), 526-572.

³¹ G.C. Kajembe et al., *Community Participation in the Management of Protected Forest Areas in East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges* (Sokoine University of Agriculture, 2010), 2-3, L. Isager et al., *People's Participation in Forest Conservation: Considerations and Case Studies* (FAO, 2000), 2; Eliakimu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009), 14-17; T. Blomley and H. Ramadhani "Going to Scale with Participatory Forest Management: Early lessons from Tanzania," *The International Forestry Review*, 8, 1 (2006), 95-98 (93-100); Dan Brockington, *Forests, Community Conservation, and Local Government Performance: The Village Forest Reserves of Tanzania, Society and Natural Resources* (2007), 839-845 (835-848); Thaddeus Sunseri "Something Else to Burn: Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4 (2005), 632 (609-640); The United Republic of Tanzania, *National Forestry Policy*, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Dar es Salaam, 1998), 8; Adcharaporn Pagdee et al., "What Makes Community Forest Management Successful: A Meta-Study From Community Forests Throughout the World" *Society and Natural Resources*, 19 (2006), 33-52; Kate Schreckenberget al., *Forest Policy and Environment Programme: Grey Literature, Participatory Forest Management: An Overview* (London, ODI, 2006).

³² For other plantation forests in Tanzania see, for example, Yonika Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 16, 20 B, 2011, 18-21. These other plantations, apart from the Sao Hill, are North Kilimanjaro forest in Kilimanjaro region, 3 304 hectares, (1926), Kawetire forest in Mbeya region, 1 956 hectares (1937), Ukaguru forest in Morogoro region, 1 700 hectares, (1950), Rubya forest in Kagera region, 1 906 hectares, (1951), Rondo forest in Lindi region, 2 450 hectares (1952), Longuza forest in Tanga region, 2 598 hectares, (1952) and West Kilimanjaro forest in Kilimanjaro region, 6 020 hectares (1954).

apart from timber products, the plantation is a centre for silvicultural research. The FDB was one of the most challenging departments with respect to management of the MNRT. The other challenging department under this ministry was that of Game Reserves. However, this thesis will not dwell on the other departments in the ministry, but confine itself to the plantation forests. The natural forests section will be discussed, where necessary, for comparative purposes only. In Tanzanian politics the MNRT is considered the most sensitive as for three consecutive periods the ministers were sacked for political reasons. The sacking of three ministers through the parliamentary commissions of inquiry between 2006 and 2015 was a clear sign that there are enormous challenges in that ministry. The ministers sacked included Shamsha Mwangunga (2007-2010), Ezekiel Maige (2011-2012) and Khamis Kagasheki (2013-2014). These ministers were sacked mainly because of the problems with either the game reserves department and/or the Forest and Bee Keeping sector. The main challenges which affected the Forestry sector were always perceived by the state as land encroachment by farmers and livestock keepers onto the land for natural and plantation forests, whereas community members saw it as state encroachment on their customary lands.

1.1.1 Mufindi district

The research for this thesis was conducted in Mufindi district, which is one of the four districts in Iringa region. Other districts in this region are Kilolo, Iringa Urban and Iringa Rural. The district was formed in 1964, but became a full-fledged district in 1975 with its own council. When it was established, its headquarters were located in the interior of the district at Kibao, which was originally a very small Indian commercial settlement near the headquarters of the Brooke Bond Tea Company (currently the Unilever Tea Company). The plan to shift the headquarters from Kibao to the current area of Changarawe in Mafinga town (John's Corner) on the Great North Road was planned in the Second Year of the Development Plan in 1975.³³ In 2006 its eastern part was reduced to create Kilolo district. It is bordered by Njombe district to the South, Mbarali district to the west and Iringa to the north. To the north-east lies Kilolo district. The headquarters is at Mafinga town along Great North Road highway. The district is divided into 5 divisions (namely Ifwagi, Sadani, Kibengu, Kasanga and Malangali), 30 wards, 125 villages and 608 hamlets distributed unevenly. Ifwagi division covers about 29.5 percent of the total land area of the district, followed by Kasanga and Malangali with 21.1 per cent each of the total area. Sadani has 16.9 per cent, while Kibengu had only 11.5 per cent of the

³³ A. Moody, "Southern Highlands Social-Economic Study, Mufindi district Report," (Ministry of Finance and Planning 1970), 4.

total land area. It is the only district in Tanzania where forestry-based activities are second to agriculture in terms of income generation.³⁴ The district, however, has the second smallest per cent of the regional area; most of its land is occupied by the forest (10 411.3 square kilometres) leaving only 2 427 square kilometres for human activities.³⁵




Figure 1: Map of Iringa Region showing Mufindi district.³⁶

³⁴ Gerald Monela and Jumanne Abdallah, "Dynamism of Natural Resource Policies and Impact on Forestry in Tanzania," Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (Eds.), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 159-177.

³⁵ United Republic of Tanzania, Mufindi district Socio-Economic Profile, (2013), 1-10.

³⁶ United Republic of Tanzania, Mufindi district Socio-Economic Profile, (2013), 1-10.




Figure 2 : Mufindi district divisions and population based on the 2012 National Census.³⁷

1.1.2 The People

The Sao Hill plantation forest was established officially in 1939 in the then Iringa district, which is the home of one of the prominent ethnic groups in Tanzania, namely the Hehe. The Hehe became famous – at least in the German historiography – during the colonization process in what was then *Deutsch-Ostafrika* or Germany East Africa, because they defeated a German expedition at Lugalo on 17 August 1891 and maintained their resistance for seven years until their chief, Mkwawa shot himself on 19 July 1898.³⁸ Nowadays, the Hehe mainly live in Iringa, Mufindi and Kilolo districts, which form the Iringa region.³⁹ To commemorate Mkwawa's death, the Hehe commemorate Hehe day every year on 19 July.

³⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, Mufindi district Socio-Economic Profile, (2013), 1-10.

³⁸ Alison Redmayne, "Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars", *Journal of African History*, 9, 3, (1968), 409 (409-436). For the details of the death of chief Mkwawa, see A.T & G.M. Culwick, *Ubena of the Rivers*, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1935), 420-421; John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), 107-116; Eric Reid, *Tanganyika without Prejudice, A Balanced, Critical Review of the Territory and the Peoples* (London: Great Titchfield, 1934), 14-15.

³⁹ Joseph Madumula, *Proverbs and Sayings, Theory and Practice with examples from the Wahehe of Southern Highlands of Tanzania* (1995, TUKI, Dar es Salaam), 2.

The exact origins of the Hehe, however, are only conjectural. Scholars who have written about them have advanced theories which are either contradictory or simply difficult to accept, as many of them appear in the Hamitic myth. Many scholars ignored the internal dynamics of the Hehe and pegged their development to either south Ngoni migration or north Nilotic migration. Monica Wilson claims that the Hehe, the Bena, the Sangu, the Gogo, the Nyamwezi and Sukuma have a common origin because of similarities in certain aspects of their culture such as animal husbandry, agriculture and traditional customs.⁴⁰ Oliver and Mathew concurred with Wilson, but they went further by suggesting the direction of the culture for these related ethnic groups by claiming that it was a north-south movement, from the Sukuma and the Nyamwezi, through the Gogo and Hehe and then spread to the Bena, Kinga and Sangu.⁴¹ Oliver and Mathew were strong believers of the Hamitic myth⁴² in their analysis of the peopling of the Great Lakes region. Their belief in the Hamitic myth limits the authenticity of their conclusion on the real origin and development of the Hehe ethnic community.

Michael Musso, an Italian Roman Catholic priest in the Iringa diocese, suggested that the Hehe royal family originated at the Rufiji River and spread northwards, where they gave the birth to the Hehe, Bena, Kinga, Sangu and Gogo.⁴³ Musso argues that the people who came from the north were the Masai and few Ethiopians, from whom the clan of Chief Mkwawa originated.⁴⁴ Musso is seconded by Fulgens Malangalila, who examined the history of the Hehe before Chief Mkwawa's time by tracing the genealogy of the ruling clan of Muyinga.⁴⁵ Malangalila claims the royal family originated from Kilwa, with Arabic affiliations. The main challenge of Musso's and Malangalila's theories is that they have accumulated a great deal of data but without providing any sources. Their arguments are too speculative. After reading the works of these scholars critically, Madumula, one of the prominent linguistics scholars from Iringa, challenged other scholars to conduct more research on the origins of the Hehe rather than criticizing Musso and Malangalila.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Monica Wilson, *The Peoples of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Corridor* (Cape Town University Press, 1958), 6-43.

⁴¹ Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Eds), *History of East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 194-211.

⁴² Edith R. Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time", *The Journal of African History*, 10, 4, (1969), 521-532.

⁴³ Michael Musso, *Mkwawa na Kabila Lake* (Mkwawa and His Tribe), (East Africa Publications Limited, Arusha, 1968), 1-5.

⁴⁴ Musso, *Mkwawa na Kabila Lake*, 4.

⁴⁵ Fulgens Malangalila, *Mwamuyinga, Mtawala wa Wahehe* (Muyinga, the Ruler of the Hehe), (Ndanda/Peramiho: Benedictine Publication, 1987), ix-20.

⁴⁶ Joseph Madumula, *Proverbs and Sayings, Theory and Practice with examples from the Wahehe of Southern Highlands of Tanzania* (1995, TUKI, Dar es Salaam), 5.

A.T. and G.M. Culwick put forward an argument based on oral tradition that the Hehe and the neighbouring Bena originated from three brothers, namely Nguruchawangi, Muyinga and Ngwira, who were hunters from today's Morogoro region.⁴⁷ In their hunting expeditions one of them, Muyinga, reached Ng'uluhe, where he made the daughter of his host, Mduda, pregnant. Muyinga escaped, but his baby boy was to become the source of the noble line of the Hehe of today.

Alison Redmayne made a significant contribution to the study of the origins of the Hehe ethnic group by pointing out that the name itself first appeared in the writings of Richard Burton, an English explorer who passed north of the Ruaha River in 1857.⁴⁸ According to Redmayne, the name Hehe or Wahehe originated from the "war cry" when fighting in the battlefield. They shouted *Hee! Hee! Hee! Vatavangu twihoma, ehee* (Hee! Hee! Hee! Kill the enemies, ehee). From this they came to be referred to by the others (their enemies) as the "Wa-hee-hee" people.⁴⁹

There is today consensus that the Hehe are a Bantu-speaking people of the Highlands of south-western Tanzania. According to the 1957 National census, they numbered 251 264,⁵⁰ becoming the eighth largest tribe, the majority of whom are in what are now the Iringa, Mufindi and Kilolo districts of the Iringa region. The Hehe were formed into a political unit by conquest, but became a genuinely united tribe and the development of complex political institutions. Though the Hehe claim to be a large community, the truth is that many of them came from the conquered small chiefdoms like the Dzungwa (east), Bena (south) Gogo (north), and Sangu (west).⁵¹

1.1.3 Mufindi during colonial rule

⁴⁷ A.T. & G.M. Culwick, *Ubena of the Rivers*, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1935), 420-421.

⁴⁸ Alison Redmayne, "Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars", *Journal of African History*, 9, 3, (1968), 409 (409-436); see also, Alison Redmayne and Clement mwaNdulute, *Riddles and Riddling among the Hehe of Tanzania*, 65, 5/6 (1970), 795 (794-813).

⁴⁹ See, for example, Joseph Madumula, *Proverbs and Sayings, Theory and Practice with examples from the Wahehe of Southern Highlands of Tanzania* (1995, TUKI, Dar es Salaam), 6.

⁵⁰ Tanganyika, *African Census Report 1957* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963), 41.

⁵¹ See the discussion by Gordon Brown and Bruce Hutt, *Anthropology in Action: An Experiment in the Iringa district of the Iringa Province, Tanganyika Territory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 26-35.

Within the Southern Highlands regions, Iringa district underwent the most extensive land dispossession from the customary owners amounting to 3 980 386 acres excluding land under missionaries and Freehold by white planters. The rather high average unit acreage was the result of the inclusion of the holding of the Tanganyika Tea Company's (later Brooke Bond Tanzania, nowadays, Unilever Tea Tanzania) in Mufindi, and Israel Masada's holding of 87 300 acres at Sao Hill. By the 1920s these areas were still within Iringa district and remained so until 1964, when Mufindi district was separated, as was noted above. Mufindi district probably has the largest area of alienated land of any district in Iringa region. Large pieces of land are used as private estates for tea, coffee, the forestry department and government farms. The total area of Mufindi district is 1 117 square kilometres. Tea and coffee plus state farms cover 113 square kilometres. The Sao Hill area-the subject-of this thesis, had 132 905 acres alienated from the customary land owners. This is the area to the south-west of Iringa, which was originally joined together under the name Southern Highlands Estates Limited. Most of the holdings were held under the Chesham Standards Lease, and they were virtually residential. At Mufindi area (around the tea estates), the alienated land comprised 72 760 acres. This area is situated south of Sao Hill and approximately 90 miles from Iringa town centre. This area fell under the Tanganyika Tea Company Limited. It has heavy rainfall most suitable for tea and coffee cultivation. Before the Second World War, the farms were German holdings.

1.1.4 Mufindi, the transition from the Germans to the British 1894-1930s

The years of German rule in Uhehe can be taken as extending from 1894 to 1916, although it is possible to argue that the Germans were not in effective control of the district until after Mkwawa's death in 1898 and that, while he was alive, he was an effective chief in that he was organizing resistance.⁵² The Germans under Von Schele broke into the Kalenga fort in 1894, whereupon Chief Mkwawa and many of his *vansagila* or sub-chiefs fled, though some of them continued to attack the German forces for the next 4 years until Mkwawa himself committed suicide on 19.7.1898 at Mlambalazi, in the vicinity of today's Ruaha National Park. For a short time, during Mkwawa's lifetime, the Germans tried to rule through his full brother, namely Mpangile, whom they installed as a chief but he was suspected of disclosing the German plans to his brother, who was outlawed in Iringa.⁵³ Mpangile was hanged by the Germans on these grounds. After Mkwawa's death the Germans appointed or recognised a large number of headmen or *jumbes* or representatives, a significant number of whom were new and had been

⁵² Alison Redmayne, "The Wahehe People of Tanganyika" (PhD Thesis, Oxford University, 1964), 198-199.

⁵³ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), 117.

vansagila under Mkwawa.⁵⁴ The Germans noted that it was impossible to control all these *jumbes* directly from the military station at Iringa, so two *akidas* were appointed, one in charge of each half of the district.

During the German administration Mufindi was the forest in which Germans from the garrison (*Boma*) in Iringa often went to hunt buffalo and elephants. It was against this background that the British mooted the idea of establishing forest reserves in some parts of Mufindi.⁵⁵ The well-known centres during the German administration of the Iringa district apart from the Iringa garrison were Dabaga, Mufindi and Lupembe. At this time coffee and mixed farming were being experimented with, but they did not become viable crops.⁵⁶ One German settler, namely Schneider, is claimed to be the pioneer of the cash crops and trees in the Mufindi area. He was a craftsman for the Lupembe Lutheran mission and was later transferred to Mufindi, where the Lutherans wanted to establish a new mission in 1912. The mission development was not feasible and instead he bought a farm on which he tried to cultivate coffee, which grew well. He planted cypress trees as well, which the black African community around, according to Schneider, called *mivinyi* (plural) and *mfinyi* (singular). It is claimed by these German pioneers that the name Mufindi came from these exotic tree species, the cypress trees planted by Schneider. All these plans of the small group of pioneers were set aside after the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.⁵⁷ Generally, the Maji Maji uprising of 1905-1907 and the First World War of 1914-1918 disrupted the long-term plans of the German planters in Tanzania.

After the First World War the colony was renamed Tanganyika, with the British now the colonisers. The German settlers were allowed to come back seven years after their defeat in the First World War. Being eager to participate in the economic activities in Tanganyika, they began to arrive in 1926.⁵⁸ Most of them rushed to the Southern Highlands and were supervised by a German Consul based in Nairobi, Kenya. Their economic activities were financed by the Uhehe Trading Company and the Usagara Company. Both companies were supported by the German government and used to buy settlers' produce. There were only a few Germans who worked independently. To make the tea industry flourish, Ludwig Weddige imported an

⁵⁴ Alison Redmayne, "The Wahehe People of Tanganyika", 6-7.

⁵⁵ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, (Ottawa, General Store Publishing House, 1995), 59-60.

⁵⁶ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, 60.

⁵⁷ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, 60.

⁵⁸ Robert Mabele, "The Economic of Smallholder Tea Production, The Case of Njombe district" (PhD Thesis University of Dar es Salaam, 1987), 11.

appropriately hardy variety of tea seed from Java and supervised the building of a processing factory.⁵⁹

By the 1930s there were already more than 80 settlers in Iringa district, most of whom were Germans. In fact, until the outbreak of the Second World War German settlers were predominant in the Iringa district. British settlers began to arrive in great numbers only following the news about the Germans' return to Tanganyika. Governor Cameron's attitude towards British Settlement in the colony changed slightly over time. Once opposed to expatriates, he became sympathetic especially when white Kenyan settlers began to show an interest in the Southern Highlands (mainly Mufindi).⁶⁰

In May 1925 the Colonists Ltd was formed with a capital of only £6 000, provided chiefly by Delamere, Lord Egerton of Tatton and Sir John Ramsden. The company's activities were those of a land agency. Word went round that the Southern Highlands was to become a "Second Kenya" and an exodus from Kenya to Tanganyika, particularly to the Southern Highlands, occurred. Other British settlers went to Iringa through individuals acquiring large portions of land and advertising in Europe and India for prospective individuals to come and lease it. This was the case with Lord Chesham, who formed Chesham Estates Ltd at Sao Hill.⁶¹

Throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s, British settlers kept arriving in Iringa district. Some came from as far as Australia so that by the end of the Second World War the number of British settlers had increased tremendously. Other settlers (especially after the Second World War) in the district included Greeks who came to specialize in tobacco production in the northern part of Iringa district, and Asians who bought and occupied most of the farms of departing British settlers especially in the 1950s as Tanganyika's independence was approaching.⁶²

After their return to Tanganyika from 1926, the Germans remained in the country until the outbreak of WW II in 1939. During that short period the Germans attempted to establish commercial farming with little, if any, success. The crops they attempted to grow included pyrethrum, tea, wheat and other food crops such as maize, beans, peas and vegetables. The

⁵⁹ Robert Mabele, "The Economic of Smallholder Tea Production", 11.

⁶⁰ Robert Mabele, "The Economic of Smallholder Tea Production, 11.

⁶¹ Robert Mabele, "The Economic of Smallholder Tea Production", 11.

⁶² Martin Mkuye, "The Failure of Settler Agriculture in Southern Highlands: Iringa district Case, 1920-1961 (A Research Paper presented at the University of Dar es Salaam, 1976), 16.

German pioneers were interned by the British forces as Mufindi was supposed to be a Nazi stronghold and the British feared confrontation with these Nazi followers abroad.⁶³ All the German settlers in Iringa district headquarters were put into a big warehouse surrounded by barbed wire for two weeks. After two weeks they were transported to Dodoma, to the railway station. Then they were sent to Dar es Salaam, where all German nationals were first interned for the early months of the war. Later, they were divided into two groups. The first group was repatriated to Germany and the second group was transported to South Africa.⁶⁴ From Dar es Salaam the internees of the second group were transported to Durban then inland to Johannesburg, to Leeuwkop prison, a prison for hardened criminals. These internees in South Africa were later transferred to Baviaanspoort prison in Pretoria. They kept moving until they were released at Norton Internment Camp in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia in 1947.⁶⁵ Therefore, the economic potential of Mufindi was earmarked as far back as the period of colonial rule. As this thesis will argue, these economic insights informed the economic plans of the postcolonial government.

1.2 Literature Review

Tanzania is one of the best known examples of a socialist experiment in Africa; its history has been well studied and debated. However, the history of its plantation forests is scanty.⁶⁶ The rationale for plantation forestry in Tanzania, Africa and indeed in the world was always presented from ecological and economic perspectives.⁶⁷ The literature on forestry in Tanzania is rich, especially on conservation of natural forests, arguably because of multinational sources of funds for conservation of biodiversity. While, there is a robust literature on plantation forests from a natural science perspective, there is still little from the environmental humanities – especially the discipline of history.

The historians working on the colonial period in Tanzania differed in addressing their central themes. The historians debating the history of forestry in the colonial period include Thaddeus

⁶³ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, 108.

⁶⁴ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, 108-109.

⁶⁵ Werner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926-1986*, 113.

⁶⁶ Andrew Hurst, "State Forestry and Spatial Scale in the Development Discourses of Post-colonial Tanzania 1961- 1971" *The Geographical Journal*, 169, 4 (2003), 358 (358-369).

⁶⁷ Ravi Rajan, "Imperial Imperialism: The Agenda and Ideologies of Natural Resources Management in British Colonial Forestry 1880-1950", PhD Thesis, Oxford University (1994), 324.

Sunseri,⁶⁸ Hans Schabel,⁶⁹ Juhani Koponen,⁷⁰ Roderick Neumann⁷¹ and Jon Voss.⁷² Sunseri, a meticulous historian of forestry, investigated both natural and plantation forests along the coast of Tanzania, and more specifically around the areas which were associated with the Maji Maji uprising, from the German period to the postcolonial period. He associated the prohibitions of access to the forests in those areas as partly contributing to the uprising. Sunseri's work, albeit very detailed from the German period to the postcolonial era, did not use the Sao Hill plantation forest, as this thesis does. Schabel and Koponen examines the history of forestry with reference to the German period. Their works by and large reveal that the Germans were very dedicated to both natural and plantation forests. To curb the overuse and solve the problem of slow growth of the natural forests the Germans introduced different species in Tanzania in order to test their suitability. From both these studies, it is evident that the labour question in these forests posed a challenge to the Germans. These scholars as a whole are united in agreeing that the black Tanzanians were perceived as essentially (indeed, organically) destructive in the eyes of the state as a result of their agricultural practices.⁷³ Voss describes the ways the British regime gazetted some parts of Iringa district in the late 1930s for "scientific forestry" as the Hehe (an indigenous ethnic group) were perceived to be destroying land by clearing natural forests for agriculture (shifting cultivation). Voss did not discuss the establishment and development of the Sao Hill forests by the state, which is the focal point of this thesis. Neumann discussed the orientation of the British forestry dispensation in the new mandate territory by then (1920s). Neumann implied that essentially the British adopted the Germans methods of forest administration. As was the case for the Germans, the British wanted to transform the forestry sector economically and environmentally. The poor return on the natural forests made the British think of expanding the plantation forests instead. The British desire for plantation forests was essentially influenced by their experience in India and Burma.⁷⁴ The literature on the best practice laid out by the British India colony on scientific forestry is rich, however.

⁶⁸ Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 1-74.

⁶⁹ Hans Schabel, "Tanganyika Forestry under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919," *Forestry and Conservation History*, 34, 3, (1990) (130-141).

⁷⁰ Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki University, 1995), 529-536

⁷¹ Roderick Neumann, "Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika", *Environment and History Journal*, 3(1997), 48-54, (45-68).

⁷² Jon Voss, "Deutsch-Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000", Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 32-33.

⁷³ Jon Voss, "Deutsch-Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000", Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 32-33.

⁷⁴ See, for example, K. Sivaramakrishnan, "Colonialism and Forestry in India: Imagining the Past in Present Politics" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37, 1, (1995) (3-40).

Scholars generally agree that the British India colony was the architect of many of the modern silvicultural processes applied in the forest sector. As a former colony of Britain, by virtue of this history, Tanzania's plantation forests were also influenced. In Africa, South Africa – specifically the Cape Colony – was credited with spreading knowledge on silviculture.⁷⁵ With respect to the Indian foresters, they were trained at Oxford, Cambridge and Edinburgh,⁷⁶ while those for the junior posts like the rangers were recruited in India. As was the case in Tanzania and many other countries, in India shifting cultivation was restricted by the British colonial state. The Indians resisted the imposed “scientific forestry” as did the Tanzanians who were first resettled in Mufindi.⁷⁷

Generally, as noted by Lundgren Björn, with the exception of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the forestry policies of Eastern and Southern African countries borrowed heavily from those of the former colonizing countries, mainly Britain and Germany. During colonial times these countries implemented policies that revolved around delineation, gazettelement and management of state forests and wildlife reserves, with an emphasis on the regulation of forest extraction and hunting. Equally important, the forestry policies and laws of the colonial administrations focused on protection of state forest reserves.⁷⁸ Immediately after the end of the Second World War, with the increased presence of European settlers in some of these countries, significant changes were introduced into the forestry policies to accommodate the broader range of public forest administration (PFA) activities. New and more comprehensive forestry policies were introduced to cater for the more diversified activities of the PFA – in particular, the introduction of forest plantation programmes to meet domestic and industrial timber demands.⁷⁹ The PFA initiated training and research programmes. Thus between the mid-1940s and the beginning of the 1960s many African countries pursued policies with the dual thrust of sustaining

⁷⁵ Brett Michael Bennett, “Locality and Empire: Networks of Forestry in Australia, India and South Africa, 1843-1948”, PhD Thesis, (University of Texas at Austin, 2010); Brett Bennet and Fred Kruger, *Forestry and Water Conservation in South Africa: History, Science and Policy* (ANU Press, 2015), 21-52: Silviculture is the art of applying the knowledge of the requirements of different trees, in tending and regenerating existing woods or in rearing fresh woodland crops, and in working them to the best advantage of the forest owner; For details see, A.F. Broun, *Silviculture in the Tropics*, (London, The Macmillan Company, 1912), xvii.

⁷⁶ The early foresters in Tanzania were educated at Edinburgh. These foresters were claimed by many to be well educated by other foresters.

⁷⁷ For the resistance against scientific forestry see, for example, Kara Moskowitz, “‘Are you Planting Trees or Are you Planting People?’ Squatter Resistance and International Development in the Making of a Kenyan Postcolonial Political Order (c. 1963-78)”, *The Journal of African History*, 56, 1, 2015, 99-118.

⁷⁸ Björn Lundgren et al., *African-Swedish Collaboration Programme on Sustainable Forest Management* (The African Forest Forum, 2011), 16-17.

⁷⁹ Björn Lundgren et al., *African-Swedish Collaboration Programme on Sustainable Forest Management* (The African Forest Forum, 2011), 16-17.

conservation and developing industrial plantations. In Tanganyika the colonial state approved the forest policy of 1953 which, inter alia, recommended that “in addition to an increasing amount of re-generation, tending and improvement of natural forests, the forest department’s total plantation acreage should be increased to at least 40 000 acres of fuel, pole and timber plantations by 1962. [t]his scheme envisages the establishment of 21 planting schemes, 11 for the production of timber and poles and 10 for the supply of fuel”.⁸⁰ However, some of these programmes were not implemented because of the independence struggles. This extensive literature on the development of the plantation forests in Africa does not cover the development of Sao Hill plantation forest.

Upon attaining their independence, most of these countries attempted a review of their forest policies in line with the then significantly changed development realities. Thus from the early to the late 1960s the newly independent countries launched their “home grown” forestry policies, which were often no more than poor replicas of the colonial policies thinly coated with politically correct proclamations. Yet forestry development challenges changed radically since independence. Forest ownership and settlement have become politically explosive, forcing many governments to introduce some radical and drastic changes in forest and land policies, which have not been addressed effectively.⁸¹

With regard to the historical writings, Tanzania had nationalist historians (writing after independence from the 1960s), who argued vigorously over the impact of colonialism on the environment. These scholars argued that the pre-colonial Tanzanian environment was environmentally stable and socially harmonious (the “Merrie Olde Africa” school of thought) and that Tanzanians had been able to control environmental problems before colonization disrupted their traditional practices. These scholars, who include H. Kjekshus⁸² and J. Ford,⁸³ make the argument that the Tanzanian environment was violently disrupted by external agencies such as the slave traders and the colonial projects. These scholars acknowledge that problems associated with the harsh climate were a reality in pre-colonial Tanzania, yet the

⁸⁰ UKA, East African Department, 191/205/01, C.D. & W Scheme for Five Year, Forestry Programme in Tanganyika, 1954-1956, Annex A, Memorandum of Application for a Colonial Development and Welfare Grant of £ 200 000 for Afforestation in Tanganyika.

⁸¹ See, for example, Björn Lundgren et al., *African-Swedish Collaboration Programme on Sustainable Forest Management* (The African Forest Forum, 2011), 16-17.

⁸² Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 145.

⁸³ J. Ford, *The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A study of the Tse Tse Fly Problem*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

Tanzanians were able to adapt until the colonialists disrupted their social cohesion. The scholars made the case that the plantation forests in the colonial period were geared towards increasing the earnings of the state rather than helping African communities. These historians, however, did not explore the ramification of state afforestation in the surrounding communities, which my thesis will discuss by using the Sao Hill forest as example.

The Marxist school of historians in Tanzania (writing from the 1970s) argued that the conservation projects and plantation forest projects were created against the will of the affected communities. They contended further that indigenous knowledge of natural forests was neglected by both the colonial and, more surprisingly, the post-independence governments. Issa Shivji, a lawyer by profession, argued that the Sao Hill Forest was established without the consent of the community who had owned land before being resettled by the state.⁸⁴ However, Shivji did not look at the actual history of the process of resettlement at the Sao Hill forest, which is integral to this thesis. Shivji further identified the land ordinances in Tanzania as emanating from the colonial regimes way back to the 1920s.⁸⁵ He used an example of the 1923 Land Ordinance during the era of British rule as the source of many land problems in Tanzania. W. Rodney debated the impact of the First World War and Second World War on black Africans and their environment.⁸⁶ He maintained that the war combatants drained African reserves, which resulted in famine for the black Africans, decimated their cattle and damaged their environment. He concluded that the British campaign of “Grow More Cash Crops” in Tanganyika (during the Great Depression, 1929-1939) led to the clearing of natural forests for agriculture, which resulted in land degradation. J. Monson debated the clashes between rice-farming communities in the swampy Kilombero valley and the forestry department in Kilombero district in Morogoro region. The farmers depended heavily on canoes to transport their rice produce to the market centres within and outside the district.⁸⁷ She argued that within the colonial realm, the increase of rice farming in the valley meant increased use of the forests (for making canoes) with rare species surrounding the Kilombero tributaries, which were vital

⁸⁴ Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Tanzania, 5, Iringa Region, 1992.

⁸⁵ Issa Shivji, *Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, Faculty of Law, 1998), 15; See also, Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964* (London: James Currey, 1986); Abdon Rwegasira, *Land as a Human Right: A History of Land Law and Practice in Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2012).

⁸⁶ Walter Rodney, “The Political Economy of Tanganyika 1890-1930” in Martin Kaniki (Ed.) *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule* (London: Longman group, 1980), 151.

⁸⁷ Jamie Monson, “Canoe-Building under Colonialism: Forestry and Food Policies in the inner Kilombero Valley, 1920-1940” Gregory Maddox et al., (Ed.) *Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania: Custodians of the Land*, (London: James Currey Press, 1996), 200-212.

for England's markets in the 1930s for furniture. She concluded that the colonial conservation policies (and forestry in particular) failed to understand the tradition of the valley whereby the economy of black African subsistence agriculture depended on the canoes. To the indigenous communities of the valley, canoe making was integral to environmental control (flooded valley), which the colonial government (forest department) failed to acknowledge. Isaria Kimambo and Arnold Temu edited a widely cited study by many historians entitled *A History of Tanzania*, which attracted the young generation. It included chapters on the evolution of the Tanzania we know today. The volume, wide-ranging and well crafted, does not address the plantation forests in Tanzania.⁸⁸ These scholars offer useful – if polemical research – but do not discuss the Sao Hill forest, which is the focus of this thesis.

Post-colonial scholars (writing from the 1980s onwards, some of whom are labelled “post-modern” in the Tanzanian historiographical context) have debated the traumas in the histories of their peoples. Their histories focused on the power imposed by colonial regimes and the post-colonial state, while accepting African agency. They have gone further by questioning the politics of knowledge creation, control and distribution by analysing the functional relations of social and political power. In Tanzania many scholars have applied this school of thought in environmental history. Christopher Conte discussed the state's struggles over conservation in the Usambara Mountains of north-eastern Tanzania.⁸⁹ He considers the impact of landscape change at the expense of the indigenous peoples of the area, who were resettled when the Usambara forest reserve's boundaries were expanded. However, Conte did not discuss plantation forestry, which is the subject of this thesis. R. Neumann analysed the rights of citizens around the Mbeya Range forest reserves when it expanded its boundaries in colonial Tanzania, but did not discuss the development of plantation forests.⁹⁰ Y.Q. Lawi explained the impact of the Tanzanian state campaign and the use of force by the state (through local government apparatus) which resettled the villagers between 1973 and 1976. They were moved from their original homesteads to state-planned villages.⁹¹ In the Tanzanian context this was known as the villagisation policy. During the years 1973-1976 forced

⁸⁸ Isaria Kimambo and Arnold Temu, *A History of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Kapsel Educational Publications, 1997).

⁸⁹ Christopher Conte, *Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004).

⁹⁰ Roderick Neumann, “Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika”, *Environment and History Journal*, 3 (1997), 54, (45-68).

⁹¹ Yusufu Lawi, “Tanzania's Operation Vijiji and Local Ecological Consciousness: The Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974-1976”, *The Journal of African History*, 48, 2007, 8, (69-93).

resettlements/villagisation, was an important feature in the Sao Hill forests as it was used to expand its boundaries at the expense of the surrounding community. Lawi did not link the villagisation policy of 1973-1976 and afforestation, as was the case of the Sao Hill forest. Moreover, Sunseri has researched the natural and exotic forests of the coastal areas of Tanzania.⁹² He argued that population pressure and the need for agricultural expansion impacted on the natural forest reserves. Sunseri criticized the post-colonial independence government for relaxing the protection of forest reserves from 1962 to favour agricultural expansion. Sunseri, however, argues that because of the pressure of population growth and natural forest felling, this was a pragmatic utilitarian decision by the government since plantation forests were necessary for timber and for export revenues.⁹³ Sunseri, however, did not discuss the development of the Sao Hill plantation forests in Tanzania, upon which this study is based. The historians Chuhila and Kifyasi analysed the similarities and the differences of the Sao Hill and the north-west Kilimanjaro forest plantations. Based on their comparative study, it is evident that the Kilimanjaro areas had less land for expansion and, indeed, the forest impinged on the people's land than in Mufindi and hence *taungya* system was introduced earlier in that area than at Sao Hill. Arguably, the north-west Kilimanjaro region had a greater population density than Sao Hill. Their publication, however, does not look at Sao Hill forest and the World Bank funding and bilateral aid, as this thesis will do. Moreover, Chuhila and Kifyasi's publication does not analyse the background of the *taungya* system at Sao Hill, as this thesis will argue. The *taungya* system at Sao Hill was essentially a pragmatic means of protecting the forest from fire as opposed to land shortage which was the case for the north-west Kilimanjaro plantation.⁹⁴

1.3 The International community and forests

From the mid-1980s tropical countries engaged in a review of their forestry policies and legislation. The reviews originated from successive internationally driven pressure for changes in approaches to Sustainable Forests Management (SFM). In the 1980s there emerged a Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), which was supplanted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, commonly referred to as the

⁹² Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 161.

⁹³ Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax*.

⁹⁴ Maximillian Chuhila and Andrea Kifyasi, "A Development Narrative of a Rural Economy: The Politics of Forest Plantations and Land Use in Mufindi and Kilimanjaro, Tanzania; 1920s to 2000s", *International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research*, 4, 3(2016) (528-538).

Rio Declaration, 1992.⁹⁵ All countries that were signatories of that declaration agreed on certain principles and actions on environment and forests, as elaborated in UNCED Agenda 21. The Rio Declaration called upon countries to address a full range of forest-specific and forest-related issues, all of which focus on a radical shift in approaches to sustainable forest management.⁹⁶ The SFM triggered considerable scholarship in the world of forestry and in Tanzania in particular, generating an approach generally branded as participatory forest management.⁹⁷ In short, participatory forest management (PFM) aimed at curbing deforestation of the natural forests by drawing on the resources of the local communities. The PFM at the Sao Hill forest plantation was implemented mainly to curb fire outbreaks and land encroachment. The literature produced by these scholars is used in this thesis to gauge the extent to which the Sao Hill plantation forests deployed the principles of participatory forest management.

There is a group of scholars who have engaged on another current theme, namely the rush to acquire land for plantation forests, because of the high demand for timber, fuel, paper pulp and for carbon sequestration. These scholars include Paul Jacovelli,⁹⁸ Martina Locher,⁹⁹ Blessing

⁹⁵ UN, *The Rio Declaration on Environmental and Development* (1992), 4-6, The Rio Declaration, *inter alia*, urged nations to plant more forests to reduce pressure on primary and old growth forests.

⁹⁶ Björn Lundgren et al., *African-Swedish Collaboration Programme on Sustainable Forest Management* (The African Forest Forum, 2011), 16-17.

⁹⁷ Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 164-168; G. C. Kajembe et al., *Community Participation in the Management of Protected Forest Areas in East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges* (Sokoine University of Agriculture, 2010), 2-3; L. Isager et al., *People's Participation in Forest Conservation: Considerations and Case Studies* (FAO, 2000), 2; The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania, 2001-2010* (Dar es Salaam, 2001), 58-59. See also Eliakimu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009), 14-17; The United Republic of Tanzania: *National Forestry Policy*, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Dar es Salaam, 1998), 13; V.G. Vyamana "Participatory forest Management in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania: Who benefits? *The International Forestry Review*, 11, 2 (2009), 249-250 (239-253); Thaddeus Sunseri "Something Else to Burn: Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4 (2005), 632 (609-640); T. Blomley and H. Ramadhani "Going to Scale with Participatory Forest Management: Early lessons from Tanzania, *The International Forestry Review*, 8, 1 (2006), 95-98 (93-100); Dan Brockington, *Forests, Community Conservation, and Local Government Performance: The Village Forest Reserves of Tanzania, Society and Natural Resources* (2007), 839-845 (835-848).

⁹⁸ Paul Jacovelli, "The Future of Plantations in Africa", *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2 (2014) (144-159).

⁹⁹ Martina Locher, "The Global Land Rush; Local Land Rights and Power Relations: European Forestry Investments in Tanzania", PhD Thesis (Zurich University, 2015), 17-105; Mette F. Olwig et al., "Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania", *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12, (2015), (2316-2336); Christine Noe, "Navigating the Change: Public Responses to Land Ownership and Land Rights Re-allocation," Rwekaza S. Mukandala, (Ed.) *The Political Economy of Change in Tanzania: Contestations over Identity, the Constitution and Resources*, (University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 2015).

Karumbidza and Wally Menne.¹⁰⁰ These scholars are arguing that the private sector in plantation forests has to be accommodated with great care as it touches on the livelihood of subsistence farmers in the developing countries like Tanzania. They have cautioned against the reckless selling of land to private investors in African countries, because of the environmental degradation and land grabbing by multinational and local private companies. Karumbidza and Menne gave an example of the Mufindi district, where the Green Resources company took tracts of land against the will of the customary landowners under pretext of the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism). In Mufindi the Green Resource Company specifically at Mapanda competed for land with villagers. These investors were in most cases multinational companies from Norway in Mufindi district and the United Kingdom in the Kilolo and Pangani districts. The Green Resources company was operating in Uganda as well, and there were complaints from the surrounding communities as articulated by Matt and Kate of Oxfam. These scholars, however, do not use Sao Hill as the case study of land contestations and so this study is able to extend the dynamics of land contestations between villagers and the private sector by taking the reference of Mufindi district.

The creation of a governmental forests service in India in the 19th century set in motion a programme to change systems of forest management in the British colonies with different pragmatic reasons for the respective colonies. The Indian forestry department, partly staffed by personnel trained in Germany and France, systematically erected a framework of resource use modelled along European lines. The flourishing of Indian state plantation forestry was backed by the British, who wanted to protect tea planters who had suffered from the First World War.¹⁰¹ The scenario was very similar to Mufindi, where the argument for establishing plantations was at first backed by the need to improve environment conditions for tea planters. This study draws on these previous studies, but aims at establishing a deeper historical understanding of plantation forestry in Tanzania by tracing its origins and its developments with reference to the Sao Hill forest. The state-citizen relationship will be explored as a key theme so as to establish the agency of both the state and the citizens in the development of the plantation forests in Tanzania. In some sections, the role of the international world

¹⁰⁰ Blessing Karumbidza and Wally Menne, *Potential Impacts of Tree Plantation Projects under the CDM: An African Case Study* (New Delhi, Centre for Science and Environment, 2009); Matt Grainger and Kate Geary, *The New Forests Company and its Uganda Plantations, "I lost my land. It's like I'm not a human being"* (Oxfam: 2011).

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Richard Tucker, "The Depletion of India's Forests under British Imperialism: Planters, Forests, and Peasants in Assam and Kerala" Donald Worster, (Ed) *The Ends of the Earth, Perspectives on Modern Environmental History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 118-140.

organisations (World Bank and IMF) and science are articulated in order to show the external agency beyond the state and citizen.

1.4 Theoretical points of departure and research questions

This thesis was based on primary and secondary sources. It aimed to analyse the different forces at work in the establishment of the plantation forest in Mufindi district by using Sunseri's approach to determining the factors involved in setting up plantation forests.¹⁰² However, this study used only plantation forests as opposed to natural forests and exotic species plantations as Sunseri did. R. and V. Routley's approach to forestry in history was also taken into account, as they analysed Australian forests¹⁰³ by exploring the problems associated with plantation forests, including clear felling during harvesting, soil disturbance and compacting by the operation of heavy machines (during harvesting), burning land for replanting, which results in the reduction of nutrients and organic materials in the soil. This thesis further drew on J.P. Maclaren's work, which dealt with the impact of planted forests in New Zealand.¹⁰⁴ Maclaren discussed the complex debate on the effects of plantations forests on the environment. E. Salim noted that plantation forests are often established without regard to the local community needs and land rights – this is a key premise of my study, which examined the power dynamic in plantation forests, including whether the land used by plantation forests was willingly granted by the native communities to the Sao Hill forest state project.¹⁰⁵ In addition, this thesis used Salim's approach of analysing land encroachment cases in places with plantations. Jean Shelter's approach in analysing the resettlement process in the creation of Serengeti National Park in the Mara region was applied, as the villagisation campaign was used to expand the boundaries of the national park, as was the case in the Sao Hill forest.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, to better understand community responses to state intervention this study used the work of J. Tropp, who analysed the history of memories of the resettled communities in Tsolo district in Transkei, in South Africa.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax*, 143.

¹⁰³ R. and V. Routley, *The fight for the Forests: The Takeover of Australian Forests for Pines, Wood Chips and Intensive Forestry*, (Research School of Social Sciences: Australian National University Press, 1974), 71.

¹⁰⁴ J.P. Maclaren, *Environmental Effects of Planted Forests in New Zealand* (New Zealand Forest Research Institute, 1996), 127.

¹⁰⁵ E. Salim and O. Ullsten, *Our Forests, Our Future, Report of the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94.

¹⁰⁶ Jean Shelter, *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from earliest Times to the Present* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007), 128.

¹⁰⁷ Jacob Tropp, "Displaced People, Replaced Narratives: Forest Conflicts in the Tsolo district, Transkei", *The Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2010, 230-231, (207-233).

The thesis employed A. Mather's theory on forest transition¹⁰⁸ as a way of understanding long-term land use changes in forests and the concomitant relations with the surrounding communities. The theory has two dimensions which were relevant to this study, namely economic development path and forest scarcity path. The economic path refers to the development needs of the nation, as perceived by the state, which may opt for forest products as one of the key areas of its development plans. This scenario can be applied to the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forests, especially in the 1970s, as it was meant to supply logs to the pulp and paper mills in Tanzania. Forest scarcity refers to the threats posed by deforestation and the subsequent measures employed by the state to redress the situation. Therefore, forest scarcity was another reason for the establishment of Sao Hill forests, as it was argued by some scholars that the colonial state in the 1930s took measures to plant forests in some areas of the Iringa district, as its indigenous community (Hehe) were perceived to be having a detrimental impact on the natural Miombo woodlands in applying shifting cultivation as part of their subsistence agriculture.

Given the gaps in the literature, the following questions arise: What was the history of the Sao Hill plantation forest from 1939 to 2015? What were the forces behind its establishment? What were the responses of the community during its inception and expansion? What process did the state use to annex the land from the community for the Sao Hill plantation forests between 1939 and 2015? What were the responses of the community residing on the land? Why did the Sao Hill plantation improve so remarkably during the serious economic crisis in Tanzania during the late 1970s? What were the implications of the Sao Hill plantation forests for the surrounding communities beyond land dispossession? What was the relationship between the Sao Hill plantation forest and the surrounding community regarding poverty alleviation? What was the nature of the shifting relationship between the state and the surrounding community over time in the Sao Hill plantation forests?

1.5 Research design and methodology

This thesis relied on documentary evidence derived from archival sources and interviews, contextualised by but also run against the grain of the secondary literature. My initial focus on

¹⁰⁸ Alexander Mather, "The Forest Transitional Theory", *The Royal Geographical Society Journal*, 24, 4, 1992, (367-379).

plantation forestry was centred on analysing existing secondary sources on the history of Tanzania's plantation forestry. These included published books, theses, published articles and unpublished papers. In this way I was able to identify gaps in the existing historiography and to ask new questions on the history of Tanzania's plantation forestry and seek answers to these questions.

Archival sources form the bedrock of this thesis. Predominantly gathered from the Tanzania National Archive (TNA), housed in Dar es Salaam city, and from the Sao Hill plantation forestry Archive (SHPFA),¹⁰⁹ housed at the headquarters of the plantation. At the TNA the materials found included correspondence between the conservator of forests and the provincial commissioners or/and the district commissioners and the foresters in Mufindi. Other files contained the correspondence between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the white farmers at Sao Hill. The SHPFA held the reports about the general duties performed in the plantation and indeed some of the key correspondence with the ministry was to be found there. This was mainly orders from above and/or reports of implementation to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Starting from the 1970s, the files at the TNA were predominantly the products of the World Bank and FAO correspondence, with respect to Sao Hill plantation appraisal fund. During this period the documents from the Sao Hill plantation management were mainly about the land transfer from the villages to the plantation. All these files enabled me to understand the changing situation of the Sao Hill plantation forestry from 1939 to 2015. Moreover, these files were important as they brought to light what transpired on serious matters such as land acquisition for plantation forestry. The different opinions of the different colonial state bureaucrats on the establishment of the Sao Hill were obtained from these archival files.

Reports of various committees of inquiry that were commissioned during the period under review as well as the evidence that was used in compiling the reports played a vital role in this

¹⁰⁹ The SHPFA is basically a store of files held at the public reception of the headquarters of Sao Hill plantation forest since its inception in 1939. However, the early part of its establishment is well articulated in the files at TNA accession number 24 for the Iringa region in general as the project started under the supervision of the colonial district commissioner; all files were transferred to the National Archive after independence in 1961. The SHPFA therefore has a rich store of documents starting in the 1960s and well documenting events in the 1970s, arguably because of the villagisation exercise in Mufindi district, used to acquire land for expanding afforestation with World Bank funds between 1976 and 1992. The land acquisition in question, albeit well negotiated and documented, later led to major disputes between the Sao Hill plantation and the villagers after the villagisation exercise. There were no special place for reading the files and indeed no special attendant for this section at the time I was conducting my research, though as I was about to leave I was informed that the management had recruited one archivist, who had not yet started her duties. However, during my stay helpful reception secretaries were always more than willing to find me a place to read my files.

research.¹¹⁰ While the reports gave useful insights into the factors that determined policy, the evidence given to the committees was crucial in capturing the voice of the communities in the Sao Hill forest and the district commissioners' office. These voices, as this thesis will show, shaped the running of the Sao Hill plantation forestry significantly.

Whilst the national archive data from TNA played an important role in this thesis, it is equally important to note that the organisation of the TNA is inherently problematic, as one of the prolific scholars of Tanzania's history, Paul Bjerck, remarked "The Tanzanian archives, like other post-colonial archives, are heavily weighted with bureaucratic busywork that hints only obliquely at political purpose".¹¹¹ Because of such problems, my supervisor, Prof, Sandra Swart, had to complement my archival sources by buying some files from the United Kingdom Archive (UKA), which were sent to her digitally. These files were important as they contained information about the details of the two plots set aside for the first planting (Kalinga and Mninga)¹¹² and their respective funding between 1939 and 1961. The Southern Highlands zone archive in Mbeya, albeit well catalogued, was sadly not useful at all for this thesis, as there were no files for the Iringa region but only for the Mbeya region. In short, its role did not include collecting files for the whole zone. The archivist of the zone, however, was very kind to the extent that he shared with me in interviews some challenges they were facing, one being transport of the files from the original sources. When I asked him about the reason behind files for Sao Hill plantation being not archived by the zonal archive, of which he was the key personnel, the archivist responded that he did not know even the geographical location of the Sao Hill forest.

This study benefitted from one independent archive owned by Modest Mtuy, the long-serving forest manager at Sao Hill plantation from 1978-1992. His archive contained the most sensitive information, which the current Sao Hill management did not have. His documents were very informative about the process the Sao Hill plantation went through to get land from every village under the rubric of the villagisation process. The documents were complemented by interviews on two occasions. Mtuy is arguably more or less the only ex-manager who still

¹¹⁰ United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi district 1992, 144-151; SHFPA Sao Hill Manager, Mufindi district Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

¹¹¹ Paul Bjerck, *Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of An African State* (Cambridge University Press), 307.

¹¹² UKA, East African Department, 191/205/01, C.D. & W, Scheme for Five Year, Forestry Programme in Tanganyika, 1954-1956, Appendix A, Tanganyika Afforestation, estimates 1955/60.

remembers every process deployed by the state to take village lands during villagisation and, in fact, he was the manager who surveyed and supervised planting the Sao Hill land from 1978 to 1992. Even when I was doing my field work for this thesis, Mtuy was still consulted on a freelance basis to assist the plantation on some contested boundaries with the adjacent villages. Mtuy was more than willing to allow me to make some copies of some of his invaluable documents. Moreover, Mtuy was the key informant about the two loans from the World Bank, as he was one of the chief negotiators on two occasions, in 1976 and 1982, in New York. It goes without saying that any historian writing about the Sao Hill forest without interviewing Mtuy is likely to mislead on some crucial facts on aspects of land and the World Bank loan.

The Iringa region conservator of forests, Aloyce Mawele, and the Sao Hill public relations officer, Fidelis Mwanalikungu,¹¹³ apart from participating in the interviews, provided me with unpublished government documents which formed part of the 2012 and 2013 commissions of inquiry for areas with contested land in the adjacent villages.¹¹⁴ Without these documents the events which transpired between 2000 and 2015 would have remained unavailable to the researcher and indeed to the public. These officials allowed me to make copies or take digital photos.

This thesis is a product of interviews conducted with 46 people in the Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa and Mbeya regions. The larger number of the interviewees came from Mufindi district where the plantation is located. Because of the expansiveness of Mufindi district I was forced to use a motorbike to visit some villages, which were more than 50 km from the headquarters of the plantation. These villages included Mapanda, Igeleke, Usokami, Ugesa, Ihalimba and Nundwe in the extreme east. My elder brother, Abasy Kangalawe, drove me in those remote villages and hamlets in the heavy rainfall between December and May. Abasy acted as a translator for me in the Mapanda and Usokami areas, where the Ki-dzungwa dialect of the Hehe

¹¹³ Fidelis Mwanalikungu was interviewed several times because the Sao Hill forest manager, Salehe Beleko, appointed him to be interviewed on his behalf, as he was too occupied with administrative duties at the time of field work between January and May 2016. The manager himself, however, was interviewed in January 2017.

¹¹⁴ The government (central, regional and district) in collaboration with the Sao Hill plantation forest formed land commissions of inquiry, whose reports are available at two places. While the SHFPA housed the 1988/89, 1992 and 1994 commissions of inquiries, the Presidential Commission of inquiry of 1992 (countrywide with sections for Sao Hill plantation) was housed in the East Africana Section of the University of Dar es Salaam. The 2012 commission of inquiry was a ministerial commission, while the 2013 commission was authorised by the TFS (Tanzania Forest Services Agency). These reports were very useful as they provided another chance to read the opinions of both the surrounding communities, who sometimes encroached on the land owned by the plantation, and the Sao Hill management.

language was widely spoken. With respect to our transport, in the absence of petrol stations in those remote areas, we had to carry our own container of petro-oil from Mafinga town for our motorbike.

Interviews in the villages were mainly group conversations, while interviews with the officials in the bureaucratic centres were mainly one-on-one. Group interviews were very useful, as it was observed that they created checks and balance among the interviewees themselves as they corrected themselves in explaining some events. After self-correcting as a group, the interviewees provided an appropriate answers to the questions asked. In some cases, based on experience, other villagers were interviewed alone as they were well informed, since they had served in different capacities in their village and/or ward governments. Many bureaucratic leaders in the offices were interviewed after doing some preparation, as they had requested me to disclose the subject of the interviews in advance. This is why many had such detailed information at the ready. While the village interviewees were given a small amount of money for a drink, “*ya soda*”, as a token of respectful thanks for their testimony after the interviews, many of the office holders were given nothing as this was part of the terms of their daily duties.

1.6 Structure and layout

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis, reviews the literature and discusses the theoretical as well as the methodological approaches employed. Chapter Two discusses the labour process in the Sao Hill plantation forest during the period 1939-2015. This chapter maps the main activities carried out in the plantation forest and the main actors during this period. By mapping the main actors, the chapter points out the gender imbalance in the Sao Hill plantation forests. Furthermore, the organisational structure of the plantation is discussed in this chapter so as to provide an authentic understanding of its size and structure. Essentially, apart from discussing the labour question in Sao Hill, this chapter acts as an introduction to the key sections of the plantation and how these relate with other key stakeholders – vertically and horizontally. It demonstrates the labour division and how the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s affected the gender balance in some sectors of the plantation.

Whereas Chapter Two discusses the labour process in the Sao Hill plantation forest, Chapter Three explores factors which precipitated the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forestry

during the British colonial rule. These factors were both environmental and economic. The establishment of tea farms by German nationals in the Mufindi area in 1926 was a key factor for establishment of plantation forests so as to maintain humidity around the tea farms. Furthermore, this chapter argues that the presence of white farmers at Sao Hill increased the impetus for afforestation for environmental conservation and for business, as the white farmers anticipated that the flourishing of the tea industry in Mufindi would increase the demand for packing facilities and timber for construction. The land question as it related to the Sao Hill plantation is another debate within this chapter, as there were misunderstandings even among the colonial officials. The problem of land acquisition led to compensation for the customary land owners. Generally, this chapter argues that conservation issues were intertwined with economic needs.

Chapter Four shifts from debates on afforestation for conservation to industrialisation needs after independence. The industrialisation process in post-independence Tanzania, however, was a replica of colonial measures. The afforestation process for industrialisation in Tanzania was preceded by the World Bank report of 1961,¹¹⁵ which indicated that the economy of Tanzania could improve if plantation forest-based industries were taken seriously. The afforestation process, however, was financed by the World Bank. The afforestation of the postcolonial period, as for the colonial period, included resettlement of the customary land owners. The postcolonial period, as opposed to the colonial period, did not entail compensation for the customary land owners because afforestation coincided with the villagisation process, which resettled people, and the cleared land was used for the forestry project.

Chapter Five examines the outcome of the afforestation programme with a second World Bank appraisal loan. The second loan from the World Bank had certain strings attached, as the World Bank claimed the first loan had produced results below that which had been agreed upon. The second loan, disbursed in 1983, increased acreage and improved infrastructure of the plantation forest. This chapter on the expansion and improvement of the Sao Hill plantation assesses the response of the surrounding communities. Their response, however, was not uniform, as some claimed that the plantation forest had encroached on their customary land, while others

¹¹⁵ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1961).

applauded the project for bringing employment and communication networks to their remote villages.

Chapter Six tries to connect the Sao Hill plantation forests with the wave of economic liberalisation in Africa, which was felt in Tanzania from 1995. In the Tanzanian context, the liberalisation of economy with respect to the plantation forest meant increased competition for land and bidding for tenders for different projects such as logging. Because of the liberalized economy, the incidence of the fire outbreaks and land encroachment increased tremendously. The state and indeed the Sao Hill plantation forest adopted methods from the natural forest protection system, which was perceived as panacea to ensure forest sustainability, namely participatory forest management (PFM). The PFM in the plantation forestry was, however, very pragmatic. It was a top-down approach of assisting the surrounding communities in return for fire protection. The measures were detailed and were, admittedly, capable of limiting fire outbreaks but not land encroachments. The chapter exposes the difference between what PFM intended and what actually happened on the ground.

Chapter Seven draws the threads of all the preceding chapters together and essentially sums up the argument of the thesis that by understanding the history of its plantation forestry, Tanzania can deal with some of the challenges it is currently facing. It argues that the plantation forests of Tanzania can be divided into three phases based on state policies and, indeed, global economic dynamics. Finally, the chapter suggests that current state-citizen contestations over land ownership around the Sao Hill forest can be understood if its history is unearthed on the aspects of land contestations, woodlot developers and the role of women on activities connected to plantation forest such as on venting non-timber products like fruits and fire wood. Therefore, this chapter carries the gist of the thesis that by understanding the history of the plantation forests it is easy to know other related natural resources like land and indeed, its social political backgrounds.

CHAPTER TWO

The labour question in the Sao Hill plantation, 1939-2015.

2.1. Introduction

There is a growing historiography on labour in Tanzania. We now know more about shifts in labour organization, the kind of duties performed and the kind of labourers engaged in different fields. However, in the forestry sector very few scholars have devoted attention to the labour market – especially in plantation forestry. This conspicuous historiographical neglect is arguably because of the dominance of freelance workers in the plantation forestry sector, who could not effectively organize into labour unions, and indeed the fragmented nature of labour in these forest plantations. Consequently, a long history of labour in the forestry plantations has been lost because of this absence of formal structural labour institutions and archival information on labour. This chapter will address this lacuna in narratives about forestry plantation to reconstruct the history of labour. Essentially, it will discuss the key roles performed by labour in the plantation forests by also examining the nature of the gender imbalance in this field. This chapter, however, will focus on the gender and skills aspects, and more peripherally on ethnicity, as it was believed that some ethnic groups were ‘lazy’ while others were ‘hardworking’. The chapter does not enter into the substantial theoretical debates on gender issues and labour relations, but rather tries to map women’s responses to the labour processes at the Sao Hill plantation forestry between 1939 and 2015. The labour question in this chapter, however, does not address labour migration and trade unions, but rather discusses the labour process and its dynamics over time, with a section on gender divisions. The chapter discusses how labour was organised in the varied fields of plantation forestry. It uses archival sources, interviews and published information. The Sao Hill forest management itself formed a key source of the data for this chapter. The chapter begins with a short historiographical exploration of the colonial labour question. It continues by discussing the immediate postcolonial period (1962-1980) and the period of economic liberalisation (1980-2015). In essence, this chapter argues that the labour question at the Sao Hill plantation, a state forestry project, was overwhelmingly dominated by men. The long time span is intended to give space to show the shifting dynamics of the labour process.

Since independence in 1961, the forestry sector in Tanzania has been under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) in the department of Forestry and Bee Keeping (FBD).¹ Over 2 000 staff are employed by the central and local governments in forest management. Until 2010 FBD had employed a total of 1 332 forestry staff. Of these, 178 were university graduates in various relevant technical and professional fields. There were 440 diploma holders and 714 with certificates. There was limited recruitment of labour between 2000 and 2005 in the FBD. More than 50 percent of the 200 staff complement was posted to manage government plantation forests. Sao Hill had the highest number of university graduates, with 13 degree holders, 88 diploma graduates, 213 certificate holders and 105 skilled workers.² Until 2010 degree holders in the FBD constituted only 6 percent of the workforce, diploma holders 11 percent, certificate holders 69.6 percent and skilled workers 13.3 percent.³ These data reflect the hierarchical and almost pyramidal structure of the forestry labour sector in Tanzania, which warrants an historical explanation. Secondly, the varying (and changing) labour duties in the forestry sector require an historical overview because of its underlying forces over time.

2.2 The background of the labour question in Tanzania

The colonial labour history of Tanzania, because of its two phases of colonialism under German and British occupation, is both rich and diverse. Many scholars interested in the labour question have debated the origins and historical location of migrant labour in Tanzania and other destinations such as the mines in South Africa. This section constructs the labour history of Tanzania and the dynamics which shaped the transformations over time.

The establishment of colonial rule in Tanzania (by the then German East Africa Company in 1891)⁴ was based on the motive of exploitation of the natural resources within the colony. The advent of colonialism radically altered the fundamental attributes of the peasant economy, which had been the dominant mode of production during the pre-colonial period. Because of colonialism and the subsequent development of colonial economic systems, capitalism was

¹ Yonika Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*. 1, 16, 20 B, 2011, 42-44.

² Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 43; See, Andrew, Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 52-56.

³ Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 43.

⁴ See, for example, Roderick Neumann, "Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika", in *Environment and History*, 3 (1997) 47 (45-68).

gradually introduced into colonial Tanzania. Subsequently, between 1920 and 1930 the economy witnessed a shift from a predominantly peasant-based production system to a plantation economy with the introduction of cash crops.⁵ From there a proletarian class emerged largely subsisting on labour employment in the newly founded plantations – mainly sisal. They formed a pioneer colonial labour force which increased in size as the plantation economy expanded.⁶ The development of the cash economy also initiated the growth of the export sector. However, forest plantations did not yet form one of these big migrant labour destinations. Nevertheless, there were squatter charcoal plantations in the vicinity of Dar es Salaam after the Second World War.⁷ These early plantations in the coastal areas provided trees for charcoal so as to reduce the pressure of the people harvesting hardwoods in the natural forests.

As was common in most colonies, the main challenges in the colonial Tanzanian economy were transport and the shortage of labour. Bill Freund succinctly expressed this by saying “the basic question of all concerning labour in Africa was how to get it”.⁸ Because of the transport challenge the main economic projects were set around the coastal strips of Tanzania, in today’s Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Lindi, Morogoro and Kilimanjaro.⁹ To indicate how critical the challenge of transporting goods from the interior was, the British noted with frustration in 1928 that “to transport coffee from Mbinga [Songea], to the coast cost twice as much as shipping it thence to Europe”.¹⁰

The expansion of communications networks to the interior was inevitable. As a result of the expansion of communication networks to the interior, between 1924 and 1935 plantation

⁵ Paschal Mihyo, “Industrial Relations in Tanzania”, in Ukandi Damachi et al. (Eds), *Industrial Relations in Africa*, (London, Macmillan Education, 1979), 240-272; See also, Marjorie Mbilinyi, “Agribusiness and Casual Labour in Tanzania”, *African Economic History*, 15 (1986) 120-125 (107-141).

⁶ Walter Rodney, “The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1890-1930”, M. Kaniki (Ed) *Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Dar es Salaam, Historical Association of Tanzania, 1979), 137-140.

⁷ Bill Freund “Labour and Labour History in Africa: A Review of the Literature” *African Studies Review*, 27,2 (1984), 2 (1-58); Thaddeus Sunseri, “Working in the Mangroves and Beyond: Scientific Forestry and the Labour Question in Early Colonial Tanzania”, *Environment and History*, 11, 4 (2005), 366-376 (365-394); Thaddeus Sunseri “Something Else to Burn”: Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4, (2005), 616-620 (609-640).

⁸ Roderick Neumann, “Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika”, *Environment and History*, 3 (1997) 47 (45-68).

⁹ The German white settler agriculture was limited mainly to the Usambara. See for example, Walter Rodney, “The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1890-1930”, M. Kaniki (Ed) *Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Dar es Salaam, Historical Association of Tanzania, 1979), 128-160; John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 287.

¹⁰ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 287.

agriculture developed significantly and migrant labour also played a key role in that growth. By 1929 the railway line from Dar es Salaam to Tanga, built by the Germans in 1919, was extended to Moshi, and by 1934 the Tabora-Kigoma railway line (mainly for migrant labour from Kigoma) had extended to Manyoni, where coal deposits had been discovered. Similarly, between 1927 and 1938 road mileage had increased from 2 650 to 12 000 penetrating areas suitable for the production of cotton, sisal, coffee and tea.¹¹ German stereotypes viewed local ethnic groups as lazy especially, the coastal people, who were described as having “inborn laziness”, and as “indolent” and “idle”.¹² Consequently, both the Germans and the British preferred migrant labour, mainly from the Tanzanian mainland. These areas were referred to as labour reserves, which literally meant that there were areas with a large reliable pool of ‘hardworking people’. These areas included Tabora (Nyamwezi, Sukuma), Lake Zone area (The Sukuma), Kigoma (Waha), and Iringa (Hehe, Bena and Kinga). The selection criteria used to designate these hardworking ethnic groups stimulated many scholarly debates, not only on the description of people within the binary notions of lazy and hardworking, but also on the trafficking of the very ‘hardworking’ people from Tanzanian mainland to the coastal sisal plantations. Juhani Koponen explored exhaustively the German colonial-period labour question with regards to measures of sustaining labourers, while Issa Shivji discussed how laws unfolded in resolving the clashes between the state, the planters and the working class in the sisal industry.¹³ John Iliffe discussed the labour question during both the German and British colonial periods with regards to the brutality of the Germans and the intensified taxation as a means of applying indirect force by the British in recruiting labourers.¹⁴ These studies expanded the understanding of the dynamics of the labour question in Tanzania.

During the colonial period, however, in Tanzania migrant labour was sometimes considered to be a noble duty – especially for those who went to those destinations out of their own choice (rather than being coerced), particularly to the mines in South Africa. The Southern Highlands people of Tanzania travelled all the way on foot to Malawi. Labourers from Songea or Southern Iringa districts embarked at Mwaya, a port on Lake Nyasa, to travel to Kotakota, a distance of

¹¹ Paschal Mihyo, “Industrial Relations in Tanzania”, Ukandi Damachi et al., (Eds), *Industrial Relations in Africa*,
¹² Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, (Helsinki/Hamburg, 1995), 323; See, also, for example, Thaddeus Sunseri, “Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African Historiography”, *African Affairs*, 95, 381 (1996), 592 (581-598).

¹³ Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, 321-440; Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964* (London: James Currey, 1986).

¹⁴ Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 309-325; John Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under Germany Rule, 1905-1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 9-20.

250 miles.¹⁵ Some of the migrant labourers joined the migrant labour sector to get money to buy cattle for *lobola*/dowry, or as a way of accumulating wealth for prestige.¹⁶ The bottom line is that sometimes labour migration was a voluntary exercise, yet force and compulsion by the colonial state in labour migration were dominant.

Some scholars have written about the migrant labour destinations and labour conditions. Iliffe, for example, alludes to some historical names in Tanga to reflect the areas from which the migrant labourers came. These places were “Chumbageni” (the alien’s place), “Ugogoni” (a place for Gogo people from Dodoma region), “Ubena” (a place for the Bena people from Njombe), and “Unyanyembe” (a place for the Nyanyembe people from Tabora).¹⁷ James Giblin surveyed and recorded the names of the Bena (famous migrant labourers) people which reflected their participation in migrant labour in the coast – Tanga.¹⁸ Names such as “Kaziulaya”-European work, “Baharia”-sailor and “Msafiri”-traveller, became common among the migrant labour from Njombe.¹⁹ Sunseri’s discussion focused on the recreation of the labourers besides their tight working schedules. The *ngoma* (drum) dances in the sisal plantations were appreciated by the planters as they were thought of as effective in retaining labourers.²⁰ These scholars are useful for this study as they reflect on the dynamics of labour history, but this chapter will be limited to gender imbalance at the work place by using the plantation forest.

The study of the labour migrations also shifted the focus to women as custodians of the homesteads in the absence of their husbands. Deborah Bryceson, Marjorie Mbilinyi and James Giblin have debated the socio-economic pressures endured by women in the absence of their husbands, who had gone in search of work in the coastal areas of Tanzania.²¹ The colonial

¹⁵ Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964*, 44-45; See also, for example, Bill Freund “Labour and Labour History in Africa: A Review of the Literature” *African Studies Review*, 27, 2 (1984), 20 (1-58).

¹⁶ James Giblin, *A History of the Excluded, Making Family a Refuge From State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2005), 107-155; Thaddeus Sunseri, “Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African Historiography”, *African Affairs*, 95, 381 (1996), 592 (581-598).

¹⁷ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 309.

¹⁸ Giblin, *A History of the Excluded, Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*, 111-116.

¹⁹ Giblin, *A History of the Excluded, Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*, 114-115.

²⁰ Thaddeus Sunseri, “Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African Historiography”, in *African Affairs*, 95, 381 (1996), 591 (581-598).

²¹ Deborah Fahy Bryceson, “The Proletarianisation of Women in Tanzania”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 17, (1980), (4-27); Marjorie Mbilinyi, “Agribusiness and Casual Labour in Tanzania” *African Economic History*, 15 (1986) 121-122 (107-141); Giblin, *A History of the Excluded, Making Family a Refuge From State in*

planters sometimes preferred women migrants who came with their husbands, as they were believed to stabilize working conditions for their spouses. Sunseri points out that “women were integral to the plantation system as producers and as reproducers of the social amenities needed to support male migration”.²²

The brutality of the German labour recruitment system and indeed forced labour, particularly during the Maji Maji uprisings between 1905 and 1907, is well documented in German colonial historiography.²³ The Maji Maji uprising to some extent altered the kind of administration as well as the labour contracts. Governor Rechenberg, after Maji Maji uprising, believed that all forms of forced labour in German East Africa were a source of the Maji Maji uprising and henceforth he encouraged a willing seller-willing buyer system enshrined in the 1909 labour ordinance.²⁴ Because of the Maji Maji uprising, the post-uprising labour laws on plantations led some employers to opt for the employment of women and children.²⁵ When the British took over the colony from the Germans officially in 1920, a mandatory system built on Recheberg’s policy of willing seller-willing buyers was continued, but with the use of compulsory taxation as an indirect force to compel Africans to work on those plantations.²⁶ The willing seller-willing buyer labour recruitment system went well with the indirect rule of the British.²⁷ Concerns about shortages of labour in Tanganyika, however, compelled the first British Governor, Sir Horace Byatt, to discourage settlers from forced labour recruitment until after the Second World War.²⁸ The problems of labour in Tanganyika led to the wide use of the pejorative term “Black man’s country” as a reference to the economy of the country, which the

Twentieth-Century Tanzania, 107-155; See a case from South Africa by Jacob Troup, *Natures of Colonial Change, Environmental Relations in the Making of the Transkei*, (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2006), 59-62.

²² Sunseri, “Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African Historiography”, *African Affairs*, 589; Tiyaambe Zeleza, “Women and the Labour Process in Kenya since Independence” *Transafrican Journal of History*, 17 (1988), 69-70 (69-107).

²³ Koponen, *Development for Exploitation, German Colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania*, 229-240; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*; Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under Germany Rule, 1905-1912*, 9-20.

²⁴ Thaddeus Sunseri, “Working in the Mangroves and Beyond: Scientific Forestry and the Labour Question in Early Colonial Tanzania”, *Environment and History*, 11, 4 (2005), 383-387 (365-394).

²⁵ See, for, example, Marjorie Mbilinyi, “Agribusiness and Casual Labour in Tanzania”, *African Economic History*, 15 (1986)121-128 (107-141).

²⁶ See, for example, Walter Rodney, “The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1890-1930”, M. Kaniki (Ed) *Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Dar es Salaam, Historical Association of Tanzania, 1979), 144-160.

²⁷ See, for example, Jacob Orr, “Where our House was I found only Trees”: Colonial Development and Shared Memory in the Village of Itulike, Tanzania, Master of Arts in History Thesis, (Montreal, Concordia University, 2016), 13-16.

²⁸ Roderick Neumann, “Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika”, *Environment and History*, 3 (1997) 49 (45-68).

British Governor claimed was primarily based on peasant agriculture.²⁹ Consequently, the planters during the British colonial era referred to the shortage of labour in Tanganyika as the “labour calamity”.³⁰

In the wake of the rise of black African nationalism after the end of the Second World War, the labourers formed trade unions to demand better wages and better working conditions. This has been the subject of much scholarly attention.³¹ Trade unions sometimes organized their members to engage in collective job action and strikes. In Tanzania the dockworkers took a lead in strikes. In Dar es Salaam two major strikes took place between July and August 1939.³² The dockworkers’ strike marked the beginning of strikes in other colonial economic sectors as they resisted decasualization.³³ Since the colonial period to the present, however, there has been no study that specifically examines the strikes on the state plantation sector, despite the fact that plantation workers were organized in a trade union called TPAWU (Tanzania Plantations and Agricultural Workers Union).³⁴

The general trends of labour in Tanzania after independence changed as the new government was popular amongst the working class until 1991. After that workers’ strikes increased to the extent that the government forged a “marriage of convenience” with the trade unions.³⁵ In a nutshell, the trade unions of Tanzania underwent a transformation after independence: in 1964 the trade unions were dissolved and re-founded as an affiliate of the ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The National Union of the Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), was the newly forged trade union in which the president of the party (TANU) was elevated to

²⁹ Neumann, “Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika”, *Environment and History*, 49.

³⁰ Hanan Sabea, Mastering the Landscape? Sisal Plantations, Land, and Labour in Tanga Region, 1893-1980s, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 41, 3, (2008) 420 (411-432).

³¹ Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964* (London: James Currey, 1986), 165-178.; Gundula Fischer, “Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian Trade Unions”, *Global Labour Journal*, 2, 2, (2011), 127-131 (125-147).

³² Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964*, 165-178.

³³ Gundula Fischer, “Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian Trade Unions”, *Global Labour Journal*, 2, 2, (2011), 127-131 (125-147); Bill Freund “Labour and Labour History in Africa: A Review of the Literature” *African Studies Review*, 27, 2 (1984), 14 (1-58).

³⁴ Gundula Fischer, “Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian Trade Unions”, *Global Labour Journal*, 13. The TPAWU is a collective sub-trade union for plantation workers like tea, sugar, coffee, and trees. Tea and sugar plantations, however, have recorded strikes, presumably, because many are owned by the private multinational companies.

³⁵ Gundula Fischer, “Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian Trade Unions”, *Global Labour Journal*, 2, 2, (2011), 127-131 (125-147); Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, C.1920-1964*, 227-235.

be the appointee of its top executive leaders (of NUTA).³⁶ In 1978 the trade unions broke ranks with the national political establishment and formed another union outside government affiliation known as JUWATA (Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi Tanzania – Trade unions of Tanzania). The JUWATA was affiliated to the ruling party by then CCM³⁷ (Chama cha Mapinduzi – The Revolutionary Party). The affiliation with the ruling, however, was limited to financial matters – collection of monthly levy from civil servants. After 1982 the relationship between the JUWATA and CCM was difficult due to arguably low remuneration and poor working conditions. As a result of the structural adjustment policies of late 1980s, in 1991 the JUWATA transformed into TUCTA (Trade Union Congress of Tanzania). In all these transformations the state plantation forests workers did not record any significant contribution and, as one forester put it, “the Tanzanian foresters have no common voice and are even not known where they are.”³⁸ The following section discusses briefly the historiography of labour in the state plantation forests.

2.3 Historiographical context in the state plantation forest labour history

The labour question in state plantation forestry has been neglected by historians, presumably because of the kind of labourers who were recruited seasonally. This problem increased with the coming of the private sector, which dominates some sectors like logging. The other reason for the sparsity of historiographical debate about plantation forestry labour organization is that those who perform the daily duties in the plantations fields are most often freelance and seasonal workers. Because of these reasons, there is little academic work on labour relations and organisation in the plantation forests. As this section will indicate, there are a few scholars – like Andrew Hurst and Yonika Ngaga – who focus on labour relations in the plantation forestry, but their focus is on professional foresters rather than the labourers who perform the duties on the ground. Thaddeus Sunseri brought a significant debate on the plantation forests around the coast of the Indian Ocean before and after the Maji Maji uprising.³⁹ In essence

³⁶ Gundula Fischer, “Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian Trade Unions”, *Global Labour Journal*, 2, 2, (2011), 128-131 (125-147).

³⁷ After the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 the union of the two ruling parties of Tanganyika National Union (TANU)-Tanganyika and the Afro Shiraz Party-Zanzibar (ASP) followed and resulted with the formation of the CCM in 1977.

³⁸ Interview with Godfrey Mhina, A forester, Iringa District Council, 25.3.2016.

³⁹ Thaddeus Sunseri, “Working in the Mangroves and Beyond: Scientific Forestry and the Labour Question in Early Colonial Tanzania”, *Environment and History*, 11, 4 (2005), 383-387 (365-394).

Thaddeus argued that, in the absence of labourers in the plantations forests, the foresters decided to apply the taungya system of agroforestry.

Andrea Kifyasi investigated the creation of the squatter system in the Sao Hill plantation during the early phase of its establishment between 1939 and 1961.⁴⁰ Kifyasi claimed that the first labour organisation in Sao Hill plantation was through the squatter system. This chapter will challenge Kifyasi's argument, as the squatter system was just a blue print for solving the labour question, which failed because the inherent nature of jobs in the plantation was seasonal. Yonika Ngaga conducted a numerical and demographic study on the foresters in all forests in Tanzania, while Andrew Hurst discussed the transition process from white to black foresters. Neither of them, however, address labour organisation in the plantation forests like Sao Hill plantation.⁴¹

Thaddeus Sunseri discussed the measures taken by the colonial state to plant exotic trees within the vicinity of the Dar es Salaam city as people excessively exploited trees for charcoal for urban use especially after the Second World War. As the need for charcoal increased in the 1950s, the British government replaced the natural forests with exotic trees so as to increase the charcoal output for the growing city.⁴² As their financial situation was not favourable after the Second World War, the British used the squatters to solve the labour problem and at the same time to curb shifting cultivation within the vicinity of the city.⁴³ The discussion by Sunseri, the renowned historian of forests in Tanzania, however, did not accommodate labour and gender issues simultaneously as the current chapter does. Moreover, this study will extend the debate initiated by Hanan Sabea, who investigated the labour question in the sisal plantation in Tanga in terms of the division of labour based on ethnicity, gender, age and skill.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Andrea Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015" (Dar es Salaam, Master of Arts, University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 59.

⁴¹ Ngaga, *Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania*, African Forest Forum Working Paper Series, 43; See, Andrew Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 52-56.

⁴² On supplanting the natural forests in favour of exotic species see, for example, ⁴² TNA, Letter from the Forest Department entitled "Planting Policy at Mufindi" 17.3.1946 to the Acting Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, Acc. 336: File Reference No. IR/2

⁴³ Thaddeus Sunseri, "Something Else to Burn": Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4, (2005), 616-620 (609-640).

⁴⁴ Sabea, "Mastering the Landscape? Sisal Plantations, Land, and Labour in Tanga Region, 1893-1980s," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 420.

It is clear from the above scholarship that labour organisation in the state-owned plantations is not well understood, especially after independence. This chapter, therefore, fills this gap in the knowledge of the situation by discussing the labour question and forest management in the plantation forests. A dearth of archival sources has meant that the past had to be pieced together from largely oral sources. The chapter tries to answer three key questions. The first question is about the key labour division in the plantation forestry, or to use Freund's words, this study deals with "workplace".⁴⁵ Because the plantation were run by the state, the second question is about gauging the level of gender equality in plantation forests in the period of economic liberalisation in Tanzania in mid-1980s. Thirdly, this chapter tries to show the role played by the World Bank in shaping the labour process in the Sao Hill plantation from 1979 onwards. Finally, this chapter, as a whole, offers an overview to help the reader understand the following chapters as it elucidates the organisation structure of the Sao Hill plantation by describing the key stakeholders – the general manager, division managers and the rangers.

2.4 The colonial state and the labour question in the Sao Hill plantation, 1939-1961

2.4.1 The white "pioneers" of the project

Information about labour organisation in the Sao Hill plantation forest during the colonial era is elusive for two main reasons. Firstly, between 1939 and 1961 the state forest project in Mufindi was still in its infancy, so it could not employ many permanent workers. Secondly, only the professional foresters are recorded in the official records, while those who performed their duties on the ground, especially those who were seasonal or freelance, were simply not noted. However, through interviews (and the scanty archival sources) some insights into the very early period of the labour organisation at the Sao Hill plantation can be reconstructed.

Some of the professional forest pioneers in the Sao Hill plantation worth mentioning are Bernard Gilchrist, an assistant forest conservator of forests in Tanganyika. Born in 1920 in England, Gilchrist spend 20 years preserving forests in Tanzania. He demarcated the boundaries of the plantation forest in Mufindi between 1946 and 1948.⁴⁶ The colonial state sent him to Mufindi to find out the best ways the afforestation programme could be used to regulate climate for tea plantations. His surveys were confined to the tea plantations, in the vicinity of

⁴⁵ Bill Freund "Labour and Labour History in Africa: A Review of the Literature" *African Studies Review*, 27, 2 (1984), 15 (1-58).

⁴⁶ Tanzania Affairs, *Archive for Obituaries*, September, 2003.

Mninga, Irundi and Sawala villages.⁴⁷ In 1948 he left Mufindi for Morogoro region, where he was responsible for the management of the mangrove forest around the Rufiji delta. Additionally, during his tenure in Tanganyika, he prepared a vegetation map for much of southern Tanganyika. Later on he helped to draw up a management plan for the Ngorongoro Crater Reserve.⁴⁸ In 1960 he was elevated to the position of the Tanganyika Deputy Chief Conservationist of forests. It was during this tenure that he drew up a plan for a pulp and paper mill and wrote a five-year plan for forest development in Tanganyika. He retired to England in 1965, where he became the first head of the Scottish Wildlife Trust. He died at the age of 83 in September 2003.⁴⁹

It was the kind of well-known foresters like Gilchrist that most eyewitnesses described as heroic on account of his achievements. Madeusi Chelesi recalled the way Gilchrist used to survey the area for Sao Hill forest on foot in the late 1940s.⁵⁰ In an interview with the Mninga villagers, many interviewees recalled the role played by Gilchrist and they stated that had it not been for him there could have been no Sao Hill plantation today.⁵¹

When Gilchrist left, another senior forester, namely D. Fletcher, arrived in 1949. He was the first officer with the title of “Manager in charge of the scheme”. He officially opened the scheme in September 1949 and did much of the ground work up to March 1953. After Fletcher came W. Carmichael, who held the title of Assistant Conservator of Forests. He worked with the scheme for three and a half years. He left the scheme to L. Dawson, a forester who left in 1956. In May 1956 another forester arrived, J. Gilchrist. He was remembered by Sao Hill forest for gazetting Irunda, Kihanga, Mninga and Msiwasi Forest reserves. He planted most of the trees in the grasslands of the Sao Hill plantations. Finally, J. Ede, the last white forester, came in October 1960.⁵²

These white foresters did the important job of establishing the foundations of plantation forestry in Mufindi. They surveyed and drew maps of the forest project. In implementing such tasks they worked with Africans from the adjacent villages. Many could recall what these

⁴⁷ Mtuy, Mufindi Afforestation Project, How and Why the Scheme Start (Unpublished Record No.8, 1979), 7.

⁴⁸ Tanzania Affairs, *Archive for Obituaries*, September, 2003.

⁴⁹ Tanzania Affairs, *Archive for Obituaries*, September, 2003.

⁵⁰ Interview with Madeusi Chelesi (78), Mninga Village, Mufindi, 14.4.2016.

⁵¹ Interview with Givangeresa Mtavangu (76), Mninga Village, 14.4.2016.

⁵² M. Mtuy, Mufindi Afforestation Project, How and Why the Scheme Start (Unpublished Record No.8, 1979), 7

pioneers did. During a group interview at Mninga village, Mathias Lumwesa recalled that it was like a “blessing” to find a white man working with them around their premises.⁵³ It was thought to be a “blessing” as many energetic men had to travel to the coast to find jobs in the sisal plantations, mainly Kilosa and Tanga, which was very far from Mufindi.⁵⁴ Some of them benefitted from this early knowledge of plantation forestry, especially tree nursery development. Kambaulaya, one of the early tree nursery attendants at Mninga and Irundi area, recalled that the work at the beginning did not pay as well as the tea farms. He said that the tree project did not attract many labourers compared to tea plantations because of the low wages. He said the nursery section he worked with had less money than other sectors within the young forestry sector in the 1950s.⁵⁵

During these early periods of forest establishment in Mufindi there was neither systematic labour organisation nor a labour recruitment agent. People went to hunt for wage labour on their own, as they needed money to pay head tax, which was the main source of income for the colonial government. Taxation was one of the important instruments in the colonial state’s arsenal for coercing Africans into wage labour.⁵⁶ The British in Tanganyika cemented taxation through the *Hut Poll Tax Ordinance of 1922*. Under this ordinance, every owner and occupier of a hut was jointly and severally liable to pay His Majesty a tax prescribed by the Governor from time to time.⁵⁷ The Hut Tax meant that any hut, building, or structure of a description commonly used by ‘natives’ as a dwelling constituted a source of taxation. This kind of tax was a thorn in the flesh of many of the Hehe, who were polygamous. The bottom line is that the taxation strategy was an indirect way of compelling black Africans to seek wage labour. The young state plantation project in Mufindi was one of those destinations of the hut tax payers in Tanganyika. However, this is not to claim that the Hut Poll Tax solved the labour question once and for all in the colonial period in Tanganyika and in Mufindi in particular. The Provincial Commissioner for Southern Highlands in his report to the Governor in 1936 alluded to problems the tea settlers in Mufindi faced with getting labour. The report noted that the Hehe, the dominant ethnic group in Mufindi, were reluctant to seek employment in the plantation estates:

The tea estates in the Iringa and Rungwe districts and coffee estates between them provided employment for some 3 000 ‘natives’. In the Iringa district the Hehe, who constitute the

⁵³ Interview with Mathias Lumwesa (66), Mninga Village, Mufindi, 14.4.2016.

⁵⁴ See for example, Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania* (London, James Currey 1986).

⁵⁵ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, (72), Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

⁵⁶ Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania* (London, James Currey 1986), 11-12.

⁵⁷ Issa Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania*.

principal tribe, are noted for their reluctance to seek work unless forced to do so by economic necessity, consequently, Bena and Kinga from Njombe [district] form the bulk of the labour force in this district [Iringa].⁵⁸

When the governor visited the tea settlers in Mufindi in 1936, he told them that based on his experience of African labour, the only way of maintaining a good supply was to popularize employment by catering for workers' comfort by means of providing good housing and adequate food of the kind to which they were accustomed and by establishing shops in the neighbourhood.⁵⁹

The early workers in some of the sections of the forest project in Mufindi were employed on a contract basis. These sections included tree planting, pruning and drainage system maintenance.⁶⁰ Interestingly, the forest sector at the beginning recruited more adults than youths. This might have been because of the lower wages paid in the forestry sector in comparison to the tea plantations (within the vicinity of the forest project). These adults were much trusted by the infant forest sector in Mufindi, because they did not desert and did not demand higher wages.⁶¹ The forest sector, however, did not recruit women at this stage; yet in the interviews conducted with women, some of them had memories of their experiences in Mufindi, which went way back to 1952. Givangeresa Mtavangu, an old woman at Mninga village, remembered how she used to carry lunch to her father, who had been recruited as a tree planter in 1952 at Mninga: "I remember the start of the pines plantation forest at our village, because I used to send lunch to my father, who was recruited as a casual labourer by one white forester here".⁶² The prohibition of women from forestry work stemmed from perceptions that forestry work was so masculine that women would not perform as well as men. These perceptions, however, ignored the long tradition of women's active participation in precolonial African subsistence farming.⁶³ Moreover, women were not prohibited in the forest sector only; the sisal, tea and pyrethrum sectors also preferred men for what they referred to as the efficiency of men in manual work.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ TNA-Southern Highlands Province Book Report Volume II.

⁵⁹ TNA 24, Railway Rates on Tea in Tanganyika.

⁶⁰ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, (72), Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

⁶¹ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, (72), Mtili Village, 15.5.2017.

⁶² Interview with Givangeresa Mtavangu (76), Mninga Village, Mufindi, 14.4.2016.

⁶³ See, for example, Deborah Fahy Bryceson, "The Proletarianisation of Women in Tanzania", *Review of African Political Economy*, 17, (1980), 6-21 (4-27); Tiyanze Zeleza, "Women and the Labour Process in Kenya Since Independence" *Transafrican Journal of History*, 17 (1988), 69-70 (69-107); Marjorie Mbilinyi, "Restructuring Gender and Agriculture in Tanzania" Ulf Himmelstrand et al., *African Perspectives on Development*, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1998), 166-174.

⁶⁴ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, (72), Mtili Village, 15.5.2017.

Some scholars have argued that there was a squatter system in the forestry project in Mufindi during this period.⁶⁵ The squatter system claimed by Kifyasi, however, was just a proposal which did not materialize at all, as the Hehe did not like the system because it meant social-economic control of the whole of their life.⁶⁶ The Hehe resisted the project as they perceived it as an instrument for the expropriation of their land. They were also repelled by some of the conditions prescribed under the squatter system. These conditions included working for at least 100 days of paid labour, which did not attract the workers.⁶⁷

The planting and replanting season in the Mufindi forestry region was plagued with labour problems as the season converged with maize planting in the adjacent villages and tea plucking in the plantations. There were thus serious problems in recruiting labourers for the plantation forest during the rainy season, because there were more rewarding jobs in the tea industry in Mufindi and the workers would also be busy attending to their subsistence farming.⁶⁸

Forest protection seems to be one of the sectors that posed a serious challenge to the infant project since its inception. Because of that challenge of forest security, labour was recruited to construct fireguards. Because the Sao Hill plantation was located in the middle of white farms, the labour recruited to act as fire guards served the forest and the white farmer's farmlands simultaneously. The District Commissioner (Iringa District) closely monitored the performance of these labourers in constructing fireguards, and the white farmers filed their fire-related complaints to him on several occasions.⁶⁹

Generally, the colonial period because it was in the beginning had no organised working conditions with regards to specialisation in the forest project in Mufindi. During the early 1970s forest inventories conducted by the forest division indicated that most of the stands were understocked due to non-replacement of the trees that had dried out (professionally referred to as beating up) and some plots were neither pruned nor thinned.⁷⁰ The varying spaces were

⁶⁵ Andrea Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015" (Dar es Salaam, Master of Arts, University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 59-61.

⁶⁶ TNA, District Commissioner, Iringa, to the Divisional Forest Officer, Mbeya, 26 February 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁶⁷ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project, How and Why the Scheme Start", (Record No.8, 1979), 5.

⁶⁸ Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project, How and Why the Scheme Start", 6.

⁶⁹ TNA, Acc. No. 24: File F3/5/II 1951-1956: Forestry Bush and Bush Fires.

⁷⁰ TNA, Acc. No. 604, File:FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

presumably due to the fact that the seedlings were planted without polythene tubes as polythene tubes were introduced in the nurseries of Mufindi only in 1978.⁷¹ Ignoring the pruning and thinning affected the diameter and quality of saw logs.⁷²

2.5 The labour question immediately after independence, 1962-1979

Between 1962 and 1979 there was a systematic streamlining of labour into various organized roles and sections in the plantation forestry at Sao Hill. Clear labour sections and to some extent the gender aspect started to emerge gradually during this time. Duties of plantation foresters became more defined and distinct as there was now a more organized division of labour between the nursery, planting, pruning, thinning, protecting and harvesting sections.⁷³ However, not all sections improved at the time. Many developed only after the first World Bank loan in 1976.

The Arusha Declaration, a socialist document that promulgated the Tanzanian economy under an “Africanised” socialist ideology, encouraged the nationwide provision of jobs to people by the state. The Arusha Declaration stipulated that “it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens, and so as to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society”.⁷⁴ The conditions attached in the World Bank loan to Sao Hill plantation forest, however, did not accommodate much of the socialist implementation of the Arusha Declaration.

During the preparations for the World Bank loan phase one, the nursery section at Irundi attracted many people, especially between 1966 and 1976, when the idea of pulp and paper was mooted. The nursery employed people who were specialist in tree species. At Sao Hill plantation forest E. Kisaka was responsible for bringing the best of seeds from Lushoto in the Tanga Province.⁷⁵ The best plant species usually reflected the quality of the nursery. This was because the World Bank loan had as a condition the planting of the best tree species in the

⁷¹ TNA, Acc. No. 604, “Sao Hill Forest Project, Annual Report, July 1977-June 1977; File Name: FD/33/Vol. II: Afforestation Scheme: Sao Hill.

⁷² TNA, Acc. No. 604, File:FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

⁷³ See, for, example, Julian Evans & John Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁷⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Essays on Socialism*, (Oxford University Press, 1977), 14-15.

⁷⁵ TNA, Acc. No. 604, File:FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

plantation. The year 1978 marked the first time seedlings would be planted in the polythene tubes.⁷⁶ The casual labourers who were recruited in this section were of both genders. Men were recruited to mix soil and build the gardens, while women were recruited to fill the polythene tubes with the soil mixtures. This tradition in the nurseries has remained until the present. Irrigating and weeding the seedlings were the tasks for women. These main duties in the tree nurseries have not changed much over time. Sometimes, social and financial constraints make these gender roles flexible.⁷⁷ See Figure 3.



Figure 3: Filling soil in the polythene tubes at the main nursery of Irundi at Sao Hill.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ TNA, Acc, No. 604, “Sao Hill Forest Project, Annual Report, July 1976-June 1977, File Name: FD/33/Vol. II: Afforestation Scheme: Sao Hill.

⁷⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, 22.3. 2016. The June long vacation for students in Tanzania allows some of them (mainly from poor families or junior staff) to participate fully in filling soil in the polythene tubes as seen in the picture above. Students obtain a small amount of money for their own expenses at school when they open by early every July.

⁷⁸ Pictures by courtesy of Sao Hill Plantation Publicity Section. Note the dominance of women.



Figure 4: Men mixing soil and fertilizer at the main nursery of Irundi at Sao Hill.⁷⁹

The second activity in the Sao Hill plantation was tree planting. This was a seasonal job which was done every mid-December to January. Planting was determined by the rainfall patterns.⁸⁰ It was supervised by the headmen in almost all ranges of the Sao Hill. During the early 1960s this was done by the contract labourers. In the late 1960s, however, it was decided that it was too expensive to use contract labourers.⁸¹ Transportation of seeds to the farms was mechanized as the trucks and tractors were used to supply seedlings. At Sao Hill plantation, planting trees was done manually, as many sites were too hilly, but the real barrier was the fact that machines for planting were mostly imported and expensive. The use of manual labour was claimed to carry a social benefit as it allowed money to circulate in the community.⁸² Planting was a demanding task at Sao Hill usually done by energetic youths. Because of the gender biases in labour recruitment, there were few women who participated in the planting. The managers at that time believed that women could not perform as well as men. Modest Mtuy recalled that Sao Hill was built by managers who took their jobs seriously and supervised competently, thus ensuring that planting was conducted well. When he was asked about the work discipline in the plantation sector he said: “The white managers were better than black Africans as the former treated the planting section as part of their research to publish about provenance of such

⁷⁹ Pictures by courtesy of Sao Hill Plantation Publicity Section.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Evans & Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, 213.

⁸¹ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, (72), Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

⁸² See, for, example, Julian Evans & John Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, 213-225.

species in Mufindi”.⁸³ Publishing the planting results at Sao Hill created awareness to the state, public and indeed, attracted silvicultural experts on more trials of types of exotic tree species which could fit with the soil of Mufindi.

Up to this phase there was no streamlined thinning and pruning. Occasionally, there was pruning when the project got funding, but in most cases the postcolonial government faced some challenges in getting funding for plantation forestry.⁸⁴ It was because of the shortage of funding that Tanzania resorted to the World Bank loan in 1976.⁸⁵ The following section details the effect of the World Bank on labour organisation in the Sao Hill plantation forest.

2.6 The labour question during and after the World Bank loan, 1979-1992

2.6.1 The World Bank view on staff for the Sao Hill plantation forest

The problem of getting funding to fully develop the Sao Hill plantation led the government to seek a loan from the World Bank in 1976.⁸⁶ The World Bank streamlined and promoted the morale of the staff at Sao Hill plantation. The World Bank noted that the Sao Hill plantation was expanding well, but it did not promote the morale of the staff. It was the view of the World Bank that any satisfactory outcome in Sao Hill forest was dependent on the morale of the staff. To show the importance of the working staff at Sao Hill plantation, the World Bank pointed out that, “where the provision of money incentives to project staff (working in remote areas) is not possible, the provision of other non-monetary incentives may be equally appreciated and contribute to staff morale and continuity”.⁸⁷ This implied that the World Bank saw the sustainability of the Sao Hill plantation as reliant on a highly motivated workforce. Because of that vision the World Bank funded the establishment of the new administrative structure which still exists up to this day.⁸⁸ The World Bank financed the construction of the Headquarters office and the Divisions offices. It was noted by the World Bank that the project performance

⁸³ Interview with Modest Mtuy, the former Sao Hill Manager, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 14.3. 2016.

⁸⁴ Interview with Modest Mtuy, the former Sao Hill Manager, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 14.3. 2016.

⁸⁵ The World Bank as an institution controlled by mainly the US, Japan and European Union, has innumerable criticisms from Africa and indeed, many of the “developing countries”. The main criticism has been the US and sometimes, the European countries use both the World Bank and IMF as ideological weapons for the countries which are against its policies. For the detailed critical point of view on the World Bank and IMF, see, Eric Toussaint, *The World Bank, A Critical Primer*, (London and Toronto, Pluto Press, 2008), 1-61. However, this thesis doesn’t engage much with those criticism but rather try to elucidate what it rendered to the forest sector in Tanzania by using the Sao Hill plantation.

⁸⁶ United Republic of Tanzania, *Loan Agreement Between the United Republic of Tanzania and the World Bank*, (1976), 10-26.

⁸⁷ The World Bank, *Project Completion Report, Sao Hill Forestry Project- Phase II*, (1992), 8.

⁸⁸ Interview with Modest Mtuy, the former Sao Hill Manager, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 14.3. 2016.

improved remarkably from 1986 onwards, mainly due to staff dedication and project management's efforts to respond to staff needs through the provision of some non-monetary incentives.⁸⁹

The World Bank, however, preferred staff with sound academic qualifications and who were hardworking.⁹⁰ Sometimes the World Bank differed with the government concerning staff deployed to Sao Hill, who in their view were not competent enough to deliver good results in such a big plantation. The World Bank criticized the mediocrity of the staff at the Sao Hill plantation and insisted that having professional staff at every respective department was important. To improve the capacity of staff at Sao Hill, the World Bank suggested that Sao Hill should consult the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) offices based in Nairobi, Kenya, to get the basic criteria in the process of recruiting suitable candidates for posts like Assistant Project Manager (Finance and Planning), workshop manager and work study specialist.⁹¹

The World Bank improved the conditions of houses for the Sao Hill plantation staff by constructing 58 staff houses and other buildings.⁹² This was part of the implementation of the memorandum of understanding between Tanzania and the World Bank. The memorandum stipulated that the World Bank would construct about 44 houses for professional staff and 170 for junior labourers. Additionally, the World Bank pledged to construct about 20 buildings for administrative and social purposes.⁹³ These houses were built at the Headquarters (Sao Hill), Ihalimba and Irundi divisions. The former Sao Hill manager expressed the importance of the World Bank Fund by saying that, "without the World Bank fund there could be neither good houses nor good offices, from the headquarters to the divisions of our project".⁹⁴ Around those houses, there was an acre of farmland for cultivation of maize and beans, which are staple foods in Mufindi. The farms were provided at no costs as an incentive for the forest staff at the headquarters and in the divisions.⁹⁵ Beyond free *shambas* (a small plot or farm), the staff also got free electricity and water. However, it was not easy to provide all these utilities to all

⁸⁹ The World Bank, *Project Completion Report, Sao Hill Forestry Project- Phase II*, (1992), 8.

⁹⁰ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

⁹¹ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

⁹² TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

⁹³ United Republic of Tanzania, *Loan Agreement Between the United Republic of Tanzania and the World Bank*, (1976), 17.

⁹⁴ Interview with Modest Mtuy, the former Sao Hill Manager, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 14.3. 2016.

⁹⁵ The Headquarter (Ihefu area) was 17 km from the Mufindi District headquarters, by de facto, this was the centre for shopping of different goods like food. Ihalimba, the headquarters of division III, was 56 km from the headquarters whereas the fourth division headquarters at Mgololo was at approximately 80 km.

divisions. Sometimes these free benefits could only be acquired after extensively lobbying the managers of such utilities. The former manager of the Fourth Division said, “many foresters did not like to work in the rural areas, especially university graduates.⁹⁶ Because of that I had to lobby the Iringa region TANESCO (Tanzania Electricity Supply Company) to connect my division to the national grid”.⁹⁷ With regard to water utilities, there were initiatives at every division to get water as there were many streams in the area. Each division fetched water from its own source. However, this does not mean that every division had all these facilities for the staff members. Up until 2016 Ihalimba division was not connected to the national electricity grid.

The World Bank also supported staff of the headquarters and the divisions with transport. The World Bank donated five four-wheel drive pick-ups, four motor cycles and twenty bicycles. The transport facilities went in parallel with the construction of about 725 kilometres of roads within the headquarters and the divisions.⁹⁸ Interestingly, the construction of these roads was done by the civil works under the very same forest project, as the World Bank funded it to purchase one construction motor grader.⁹⁹ Because of this kind of monetary backing by the World Bank, any discussion about Sao Hill plantation would not be complete without mentioning the role of the World Bank. As a result of the mediocre standards of staff recruitment in the Sao Hill plantation, the World Bank intervened by bringing in three key personnel to assist in developing the forest’s human resource capacity in 1983. They brought in the Assistant Project Manager (Finance and Planning) and the workshop manager. These two posts, however, were to be occupied by one trainee counterparts¹⁰⁰ as the World Bank aimed at building capacity to the local forest staff.¹⁰¹ The workshop manager was such an important post for the World Bank as they aimed at improving research, trials, training and

⁹⁶ In the 1990’s there were few graduates in Tanzania. Because of that reason, some of the graduates preferred more working in towns with easy access to utilities. As it is now, (2016), the situation has changed tremendously and graduates can work anywhere as unemployment rate in Tanzania is 10.5 percent (Based on Economics global macro models and analysis 2017).

⁹⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, former Manager- Mgololo division, Sao Hill HQ, 13.1.2016.

⁹⁸ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

⁹⁹ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

¹⁰⁰ These were essentially training posts to the Tanzanians nationals because they had no such expertise. The World Bank experts were training the Tanzanians to take those posts as they (World Bank experts) had a contract for two years only.

¹⁰¹ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

studies. The section was projected to cost \$1 000 000 out of the \$7 000 000 which was allocated for the first phase implementation of the Sao Hill project between 1976 and 1982.¹⁰²

There was mistrust between the World Bank and the Tanzanian government about the long leave of some local staff at Sao Hill.¹⁰³ Sometimes, the World Bank did not trust the staff replacements for some vacant posts. During the absence of Mtuy, for example, the World Bank wrote that “Ntumbo has been appointed as the acting project manager in place of Mtuy. According to our understanding, Mtuy should be completing his overseas course in June 1983. I would appreciate receiving your confirmation of this timing”.¹⁰⁴ Generally, the current structure of the labour organisation in the Sao Hill plantation was crafted under the influence of the World Bank as far back as the late 1970s. See Table 1.

With respect to employment from the plantation forests planted during the colonial period,¹⁰⁵ the Sao Hill Saw Mill was responsible for its harvesting.¹⁰⁶ The Sao Hill Saw Mill was established in 1974.¹⁰⁷ It was funded jointly by the NORAD (Norwegian Agency for International Development), TIB (Tanzania Investment Bank) and the Tanzanian government.¹⁰⁸ Before the establishment of the pulp and paper mill, it was the only facility available for harvesting the logs.¹⁰⁹ Between 1982/83 the plantation supplied saw logs to Sao Hill sawmill capable of processing 54 000 m³ of woods per annum. The remaining saw logs were intended to be processed by the pulp and paper mill, which was to be set up in 1984.

¹⁰² United Republic of Tanzania, *Loan Agreement Between the United Republic of Tanzania and the World Bank*, (1976), 17.

¹⁰³ The mistrust came about because the Tanzanian government had allegedly failed to implement the conditions attached to the loan conditions. To see the origin and aims of the World Bank in a critical way, see, Eric Toussaint, *The World Bank, A Critical Primer*, (London and Toronto, Pluto Press, 2008), 17-35.

¹⁰⁴ TNA, Acc. No. 604: File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project, 1.7.1982.

¹⁰⁵ These plantations referred to were planted between 1944 and 1953.

¹⁰⁶ The Sao Hill Sawmill, operating in an area of pine plantations, about 600 km south-west of Dar es Salaam was incorporated in November 1974 as private Limited Company and subsidiary of Tanzania Wood Industry Corporation (TWICO). Its overall objective was to provide the Tanzanian market with more home produced timber and thus to reduce imports. For the details on the NORAD aids in Tanzania, see, Jarle Simensen “The Norwegian-Tanzania Aid Relationship: A Historical Perspective” in Kjell Havnevik & Aida Isinika (Eds) *Tanzania in Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa*, (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 57-70; Thorvald Gran, “The Dilemma Between Mobilization and Control in International Aid, The Case of the Norwegian Sao Hill Sawmill Project in Tanzania” *Public Administration and Development*, 11, (1991), 135-148.

¹⁰⁷ Ladislaus Nsubemuki, *Selection of Exotic Tree Species and Provenances for Afforestation in Tanzania* (University of Joensuu, Faculty of Forestry 1998), 26-27.

¹⁰⁸ Emmanuel Bavu et al., *Evaluation of the Sao Hill Sawmill*, (NORAD, 1983), ix-1; see also, Aleck Mponda, *Focus on Foreign Aid: The Case of Select Norwegian Aided Projects in Tanzania*, (Kyoto University, 1984), 75-89.

¹⁰⁹ Modest Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Project, How and Why Did the Scheme start”, (Unpublished Record No.8, 1979), ii.

2.6.2 The structure of Sao Hill management, 1993-2015

Table 1: Sao Hill Forest Management Structure.¹¹⁰

SAO HILL PLANTATION MANAGEMENT			
135 903 Hectares (General Manager assisted by Operational and Finance and administration managers)			
Division I=12 829 Ha Division manager	Division II=11 169.8 Ha Division manager	Division III=49 000 Ha Division manager	Division IV=23 569 Ha Division manager
Gulusilo, 2 936.16	Sao Hill 2 649.2	Itimbo west 2 958.5	Luiga 19 659.9
Irundi Range 2 078.78	Lusasi/Makalala 523.2	Itimbo east 736.5	Kitasengwa 3 418.05
Mninga 409.48	Matanana 4 532.4	Ihalimba 1 458.76	Magunguli 4 911
Msiwasi 535.09	Kibidula 1 786.6	Vikula 2 075.71	
Ruaha 2 913.55	Nyololo 1 678.4	Mwitikilwa 2 716.93	
Nzivi 3 955.94		Ilasa 2 178.43	
		Kilosa 1 386.67	
		Wami 1 596.2	
		Usokami 33 892.3	

The current structure of the Sao Hill plantation management¹¹¹ borrows a lot from the World Bank kind of administration initiated at Sao Hill between 1976 and 1992. The World Bank, however, noted that some sections of the administration were not functioning well. With respect to organisational structure, the plantation was headed by the general manager, who was also referred to as the manager. He was appointed by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.¹¹² He was also the overall spokesperson for the project.¹¹³ From the colonial period he performed duties under the close supervision of the conservator of forestry. The title of the conservator of forestry was later elevated to the Director of the Tanzania Forest Services Agency (TFS).¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Adopted from Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill administration structure at Sao Hill, 13.3 2016. **Note:** the size of the Division is determined by the number of ranges and, indeed, the size of those respective ranges.

¹¹¹ Management in the plantation forests refers to administering and supervising the personnel in order to bring in labour productivity in the nurseries, site preparation, planting tending (weeding, fertilizing), protection, infrastructure, thinning, clear felling, extraction and haulage. See, for example, Julian Evans & John Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, Third Edition, (Oxford University Press, 2004), 99-104.

¹¹² Many of those managers appointed, in most cases, were those who served as the division managers from the four divisions.

¹¹³ Since its inception of the Sao Hill plantation forest in 1939, no woman has served as the project manager.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Prof. Shaban Chamshama, Sokoine University of Agriculture, 7.1. 2016.

Below the manager there were two assistant managers. The first assistant manager was responsible for planning and utilization (harvesting) and the second one served as the manager for the development of forestry.¹¹⁵ Together with the general manager, these assistants supervised different sections which were in the headquarters (fire protection, civil and finance) and four divisions to develop the Sao Hill plantation. The division managers supervised the daily activities in those divisions. Additionally, every division manager had one assistant and many rangers, depending on the number of ranges.¹¹⁶ The division manager, apart from executing the daily activities within his respective division office, also responded to and implemented all orders from above and was obliged to maintain a good relationship with the surrounding communities, as these plantations were developed on rural lands.¹¹⁷ Most of these division managers had bachelor's degrees from Sokoine University of Agriculture specializing in forestry and conservation. One senior forester said "being a division manager was like being a District Commissioner".¹¹⁸ He compared these two positions to show how busy the office of the division manager was. To ensure checks and balances on financial matters, the division managers had no office of the treasurer. The general manager, through the planning assistant manager had control of the plantation treasury. However, the division manager was supposed to be literate in basic accountancy. The division managers, however, defended their sub-votes from the general manager's office to the TFS director in Dar es Salaam.¹¹⁹ This implied that the division managers were important people in the running of the Sao Hill plantation.

A ranger inspected the sub-division on a daily basis, reported and advised the division manager on the execution of the respective duties. When the division manager was given an assurance on the availability of funding by the general manager, the ranger would recruit the freelance or contract workers for the particular duty.¹²⁰ The ranger was regarded as a very crucial component of the personnel by both the managers and the workers. The ranger was responsible for informing the division managers on what transpired in their respective ranges. They also reported to their respective managers about pruning rounds, drainage system status, condition of the roads, fire prone areas, to mention but a few.¹²¹ Before the freelance and contract workers the rangers were the real "employers" as they claimed they were the ones who created jobs in

¹¹⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹²⁰ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 27.4.2017.

¹²¹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

the ranges. The public relation officer reiterated that the rangers were extremely important people from any angle.¹²² The following section gives details on the divisions in the Sao Hill plantation.

The Sao Hill forest plantation is administered through four divisions, namely Division One, headquartered at Irundi; Division Two hosted by the headquarters of the whole project at Ihefu, close to the Great North Road; Division Three was headquartered at Ihalimba village; and Division Four was headquartered at Mgololo village.¹²³

Division One was the only one inherited from the colonial government and it covered 12 829 hectares. The colonial government established it in the 1950s.¹²⁴ This was the division which had the objective of ameliorating climate around the tea plantations and the white farms at Sao Hill. The Division was located within the vicinity of the Irundi range.¹²⁵ It consisted of five ranges (sub-divisions), namely Gulusilo (2 936.16 Ha), Irundi Range (2 078.78 Ha), Mninga (409.48 Ha), Msiwasi (535.09 Ha), Ruaha (2 913.55 Ha), Nzivi (3 955.94 Ha). See Table 1. Despite being small, the division was the pioneer of large-scale exotic tree plantations in Mufindi district and the neighbouring districts like Iringa, Njombe, Makete, Ludewa, Kilombero and Kilolo. Trials and provenances were undertaken in this Division at the Kigogo arboretum. Interestingly, this was the only division which has had a female division manager since 2014.¹²⁶ When the manager was asked about her feeling of being the only female manager, Glory Kazimiri, a graduate from Sokoine University of Agriculture (Morogoro), said she was comfortable and happy in her job. She admitted that very few girls preferred forestry courses at university level. In her class she estimated that “we were only a quarter of our class at university level”. The main reason which she claimed attracted her to the forestry sector was “environmental conservation”.¹²⁷ However, she admitted that nowadays girls are taking forestry subjects, partly because of awareness but also because other sectors are saturated. The gender inequality scenario was proven in other contexts within Africa such as South Africa whereby the department of labour admitted that “historically, forestry labour was dominated

¹²² Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹²³ Interview with Salehe Beleko, the Manager, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, Sao Hill Headquarter, Mufindi. 27.1.2017.

¹²⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹²⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹²⁶ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹²⁷ Interview with Glory Kazimiri, the manager, Division I, 28.1. 2017.

and there is still more men than women workers in the forestry sector”.¹²⁸ By 2015 the South African Forestry sector had 11 730 men versus 6 188 female workers.¹²⁹

Division Two was created when the Sao Hill forest started expanding into the grassland zone, west of the Irundi range in the land relinquished by two famous settlers, Lord Chesham and Israel Masada. The division occupied an area of 11 169.8 Ha headquartered at Ihefu. The division cuts across the Great North Road and is the nearest division to the Mufindi district headquarters at Mafinga town. The division shares a boundary with the biggest wood industry in Tanzania established in 1974 under the auspices of the Norwegian government (Sao Hill Saw mill). The division expanded its acreage in the West and North West sides under the pretext of villagisation in the Nyololo and Matanana villages. It had four ranges, namely Lusasi/Makalala (523.2 Ha), Matanana (4 532.4 Ha), Kibidula (1 786 Ha) and Nyololo (1 678.4 Ha).¹³⁰

The Third division headquartered at Ihalimba village was the biggest division in the Sao Hill plantation. It had a total of 49 000 hectares divided into nine ranges. The nine ranges were: - Itimbo west (2 958.5 Ha), Itimbo east (736.5 Ha), Ihalimba (145.76 Ha), Vikula (2 075.71 Ha), Mwitikilwa (2 716.93 Ha), Ilasa (2 178.43 Ha), Kilosa (1 386 Ha), Wami (1 596.2 Ha) and Usokami (33.892 Ha). The proposal to divide it in 1979/1980 failed because the adjacent villagers in the eastern part had encroached upon the land. Encroachment and threats from villagers forced the division to concentrate its plantations in the south of the Ihalimba village.¹³¹ The division was created because of the government’s desire to secure the first World Bank loan in 1976. The World Bank loan coincided with the process of villagisation. Land disputes which rose later were largely due to the hurried surveying and the poor implementation of different committees’ resolutions of 1986, 1988, 1992, 2012 and 2013. This division forms the largest Mbalwe-Mfukulembe forest reserve. The villages notorious for encroachment onto this reserve were Mapanda, Kibengu and Usokami. The Iringa Regional Land Commission of 1988/89 proposed restoring certain hectares of land to the villagers from that division. This led to the acquisition of new land at the extremity of the project at Mgololo. Later, between 2011

¹²⁸ Republic of South Africa, *Employment Conditions Commission Report on the investigation into the Forestry sector*, (Department of Labour, 2015), 21-22.

¹²⁹ Republic of South Africa, *Employment Conditions Commission Report on the investigation into the Forestry sector*, 22.

¹³⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹³¹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Ubungo, Oilcom, Dar es Salaam, 15.5. 2016.

and 2015, there were two commissions of enquiry on land, with the second commission issuing the verdict that the land commission of 1988 had no mandate to restore land to the villagers. Consequently, the land previously restored to the villages was still recognised as belonging to the Sao Hill plantation.

Division Four was created in the early 1990s after the reduction of the size of land under Division Three which was part of the recommendations of the Iringa region Land Committee of Inquiry of 1988/89. The reduction compelled the Sao Hill forest manager to seek more land from the Mufindi district authorities. The division was headquartered at Mgololo village in the vicinity of the TAZARA and the pulp and paper mill. The division had a total of 23 569 hectares divided into three ranges, namely Luiga (19 659.9 Ha), Kitasengwa (3 418.05 Ha) and Magunguli (4 911 Ha). The Sao Hill plantation got more land for extension in that division to the extent that it kept expanding throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s.¹³²

The division managers had a substantial number of employees. These employees overwhelmingly came from the surrounding villages to maintain the security of the forest from fire outbreaks and indeed to preserve good relationships with the villagers. The figures of employees for some villages are known, while others are not known, for example, Itimbo village (eight permanent employees: fire section, ranger, patrol, headmen, fire tower attendants), Mfukulembe (two headmen), Ihalimba (14: fire section, secretaries, headmen, drivers, tree nursery attendants), Usokami (four: tree nursery attendants, fire section, patrol), Mninga (eight: tree nursery attendants, patrol), Mtili five (three headmen, two patrols).¹³³ Many of these jobs were predominantly for men, except for garden attendants. A few of these employees had attended short courses on their specific fields, while others relied on their experience. Generally, it was estimated that the division managers managed a minimum of 60 employed workers.¹³⁴

2.6.3 Informal job creation in the Sao Hill plantation forestry, 1993-2015

Tanzania went through a series of top-down but gradual reforms to its economy from 1986 to 2000. These reforms were largely based on the transition from socialism to a neoliberal

¹³² Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹³³ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹³⁴ Interview with Glory Kazimiri, the manager, Division I, Sao Hill, 28.1. 2017.

economic order.¹³⁵ The third president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, criticized socialist-era policies for having been based on state control of the major means of production. The neoliberal policies of the third president of Tanzania acknowledged the role played by the socialist policies in instilling moral, ethical and civil values, which had produced national unity, social cohesion, peace and stability. The neoliberal policies introduced the privatization of many parastatals in Tanzania. These new neoliberal policies were intended to promote competitive markets which were anticipated to increase efficiency.¹³⁶ The Sao Hill Saw Mill and the Southern Paper Mill were no exception. The monopoly in harvesting by the Sao Hill Saw Mill and Southern Paper Mill, the sole state owned firms, came to an end. As a result of state policies to accommodate the private sector, the Mufindi district timber industry was opened for private sector investment from 1996. This was the very year president Mkapa came to power. The Sao Hill Saw Mill was leased to Green Resources, a Norwegian company.¹³⁷ The logging sector was also privatized in 1999.¹³⁸ This was after the closure of the Southern Paper Mills in 1997.¹³⁹ The Sao Hill plantation also responded to the free market economic policies by allowing private logging. The private logging companies are one of the sectors which was categorized as an indirect job creator from 1999. The parallel operations of the state and the private sector, especially within the logging and lumbering section, created more informal jobs where recruitment did not conform to gender equity. Informal jobs refers to employment in which its employees, by law or in practice, hold jobs that are not protected by labour legislation; employees do not pay income tax nor are they entitled to social protections and retirement benefits¹⁴⁰

Sao Hill created direct and indirect jobs for professionals and non-professionals. Through the divisions mentioned above, people were deployed into Sao Hill plantation for formal and non-formal employment. For formal employment, Sao Hill deployed foresters who were educated (degree, diploma and certificate holders). These workers performed their duties at the headquarters or in the four divisions. These were key runners of the plantation, but they were

¹³⁵ Ronald Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 240.

¹³⁶ G. Kajembe et al., *Community Participation in the Management of Protected Forest Areas in East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, (Sokoine University of Agriculture), 2.

¹³⁷ Elizabeth Daley, "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 5, 4, (2005), 531 (526-572).

¹³⁸ Elizabeth Daley, "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 531.

¹³⁹ Andrew Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 184.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Razack Lokina et al., *Social Policy, Gender and Labour in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, The Economic and Social Research Foundation, 2016), 21.

very few in number.¹⁴¹ Being an employee at Sao Hill plantation was regarded as a noble position amongst the foresters. One district forester remarked that “the Sao Hill foresters were the only educated ones who practised what they studied at university level”.¹⁴² Many conservators of forests who worked in the regional headquarters made requests several times to be transferred to Sao Hill.¹⁴³ The foresters working at the Sao Hill were provided with the requisite technical tools to do their work. One assistant manager said that they were on a transition from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive system.¹⁴⁴ The other reason which led to the flourishing of Sao Hill was the legacy left by the World Bank on the organisational structure, infrastructure and good network of roads within the plantation. Moreover, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism received much international support for the project. For example, from 2002 the ministry implemented the Forest Conservation and Management Programme with support from the World Bank, the Government of Denmark and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). One of the aims of the programme was to strengthen the capacity for administration and management of Tanzania Forest Services (TFS).¹⁴⁵

Through observations and interviews, it emerged that there was a conspicuous absence of gender balance amongst the directly employed foresters and other stakeholders at Sao Hill. Many sectors were headed by men, while women were mainly certificate holders and there were few women degree holders in the finance and procurement section. The larger percentage of women employed at Sao Hill worked as secretaries. The manager noted that the disparity was because “women did not prefer science courses related with forestry. Foresters are trained from pure science subjects and most women instead of joining forestry prefer the health sciences”.¹⁴⁶ It is arguably that by tradition, women preferred jobs related with health as it was seen as an extension of domestic works which they were used to.

The second group deployed in the Sao Hill plantation forest in formal employment was the semi-skilled group, which included the drivers, fire guards, headmen and radio call attendants. These were attached to the professional foresters. Again, this group was dominated by men,

¹⁴¹ See, for, example, Ngaga, *Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania*, *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 43.

¹⁴² Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa District Conservator of Forests, Iringa, 22.2. 2016.

¹⁴³ Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa District Conservator of Forests, Iringa, 22.2. 2016.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill forest Headquarters, 27.1. 2017

¹⁴⁵ Gerald Monela and Jumanne Abdallah, “Dynamics of Natural Resources Policies and Impact on Forestry in Tanzania” Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (eds), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2010) 159-177.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Salehe Beleko, the Manager, Sao Hill plantation forest, Sao Hill, 27.1.2017.

especially the drivers, fireguards and headmen, while the radio attendants' section was dominated by women.¹⁴⁷ This group was more concentrated at the headquarters than the divisions, as some of the resources were shared, such as fire guards, trucks and road graders, electricity and water technicians.¹⁴⁸

Moreover, the skilled and semi-skilled group were the white-collar employees at Sao Hill. They were permanently employed by the government through the TFS. They were also not affected by seasonal fluctuations in labour demand as the informal workers were. Many of these were accommodated within the houses built by the World Bank in 1979.¹⁴⁹ Many of them were proud to be working for Sao Hill as they got subsidies to pay their electricity and water utilities. They also got agricultural plots close to their houses and they also got the lion's share of the taungya land system yearly.¹⁵⁰ Their children were sent to school by the Sao plantation bus. Every year they also took the lion's share of free seedlings.¹⁵¹

The informal group of workers is comprised of many people and they are a large complex group. This chapter will discuss some of the groups within the informal labour sector. The logging section formed the largest group of the workers throughout the year. The section became the leading employer of people from all walks of life from 1997, when the pulp and paper mill closed its doors for good.¹⁵² Many people were employed in the logging section as well as in other indirect opportunities which came out of the logging business.

The loggers were employed by the timber business people mainly from Dar es Salaam and from within Mafinga town and the surrounding towns like Makambako, Iringa and Njombe. The Sao Hill plantation sold logs to the business people. The businessmen, however, were not allowed to do lumbering within the forest.¹⁵³ Because of that, the businessmen could only contract an army of chainsaw operators who cut down the logs in the forest. The chainsaw operators were followed by the loaders. The loaders consisted of the most energetic youths. Then the large number of drivers would transport the logs from the forest to saw mills. At the

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Salehe Beleko, the Manager, Sao Hill Plantation forest, Sao Hill, 27. 1.2017.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Fidelis Mwanaliku, the Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 28.1.2017.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 24.3. 2017.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, Mufindi, 8.4.2016.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, Mufindi, 8.4.2016.

¹⁵² Andrew Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 184.

¹⁵³ The reason behind prohibition to do lumbering within the forest was first to prohibit theft of logs in the farms and second was to avoid the sawdust which were claimed to hinder trees growth as it was slow to decompose.

sawmill site the timber traders contracted many lumbers. Security guards were also to be found at these saw mill sites. These workers were paid on a man-day basis and sometimes fortnightly. The Sao Hill plantation forestry management, though, did not directly address the need for gender parity in the forest labour sections, presumably because of the nature of the work in the professional forestry and wood industry, which was largely physical and masculine. Women were granted access to the forest plantation to harvest non-timber forest products (NTFP) like fire wood and passion fruits.¹⁵⁴ Collection of firewood by women from adjacent villages was on condition that they could collect as much as they could as long as they could not hire trucks, unless there was funeral. Firewood was important as in the urban centres some women earned a living through selling fire wood.¹⁵⁵ Women were allowed to harvest and sell the passion fruit. The passion fruit vending business was lucrative for women, although it was limited to the highway running from Dar es Salam to Zambia. The main market was at Nyololo village and the Makwawa police check points only. A 20-liter plastic container filled with passion fruit was sold for 4 000 (US\$ 2) Tanzanian Shillings. One woman could harvest approximately five baskets per day.¹⁵⁶ However, there is no guarantee that harvesting and selling all this passion fruit could be done in a day.¹⁵⁷

In the logging sector another inevitable job emerged indirectly– the category of food vendor (mainly initiated and operated by women). The chainsaw operators bought food from the vendors, especially breakfast and lunch. The sawmilling sites, whether temporary or permanent, needed supplies of food. Additionally, there were youths who owned *kiosks* in the permanent and temporary sites for lumbering and logging. In these *kiosks* the youths sold many basic goods such as salt, sugar, tea, soft drinks and sometimes alcohol. These services were appreciated by the loggers and lumbers. One of the negative impacts of these sites, specifically the temporary logging sites, which was raised as a key concern in the whole district is that they facilitated the spread of HIV.¹⁵⁸ HIV spread widely in the district as some of these workers came from other districts and the temporary sites are a hub for a lot of human social interaction. The District Commissioner reported that Mufindi had a 12 percent HIV prevalence rate, which

¹⁵⁴ On this discussion see, for example, Janet Lowore and Chimuleke Munthali, *Plantation Forests and Livelihood Opportunities for Peripheral Communities, A Case Study from Zomba* (Mzuzu University, 2003), 11-12.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Maula Mdemu (46), fruit seller at Nyololo Village, 23.5. 2016, Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹⁵⁷ See for example, Janet Lowore and Chimuleke Munthali, *Plantation Forests and Livelihood Opportunities for Peripheral Communities, A Case Study from Zomba* (Mzuzu University, 2003), 11-12.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, the District Commissioner, Mufindi, 12.5.2016.

is above the national rate of 8 percent. There were initiatives by the District authority to conduct voluntary HIV testing at those logging sites. The Mufindi District Commissioner noted, however, that there was a very low enthusiasm from these workers to know their HIV status.¹⁵⁹

The second problem caused by the temporary lumbering sites was environmental. These sites had temporary toilets which had no running water. During the interviews, most people who live next to the lumbering camps claimed that the camps were a source of all sorts of litter. The government reacted by setting up one lumbering centre in order to contain the spread of litter in many areas. These camps were famously known as *mabaanda* (many huts) in the Hehe language.¹⁶⁰

The logging camps, apart from poor sanitary facilities were a good place, especially for those villagers who were in remote villages from Mafinga town, the headquarters of the district. These camps provided easy transport and scarce goods as the temporary shops were closer to their villages. Many villagers benefitted in many ways when the lumbering camps were established near them. The camps increased the circulation of money in the villages, as some people could sell their farm produce in those camps. One old Hehe man said, “I can easily sell my bamboo juice, maize or beans to the loggers and lumbers, as they are close to our village as I have no motorbike or bicycle to take them to the Mafinga district market”.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, the District Commissioner, Mufindi, 12.5.2016.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Felix Miho, Mninga Village, Mufindi, 14.3. 2016.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, 8.4. 2016.



Figure 5: Temporary hamlet near the lumbering site.¹⁶²

2.6.4 Seasonal jobs created by the Sao Hill plantation forestry, 1993-2015

The Sao Hill plantation forest recruited workers directly for different seasonal jobs. This was important in the provision of employment to the surrounding communities. It was through these seasonal jobs that some youths found employment opportunities in the Sao Hill throughout the year. These seasonal jobs provided another option for livelihoods in these villages. Because these jobs were seasonal, it was difficult to assess the impact of the Sao Hill plantation on the livelihoods of the surrounding communities. This observation runs contrary to Kifyasi's discussion, which noted different bottlenecks at Sao Hill plantation exploitation section.¹⁶³ The seasonal jobs in the plantation sector, however, were not limited to Sao Hill only. At Mapanda village, for example, Mark Purdon notes that before the coming of GRL (Green Resources Limited), there were 40 tin-roofed houses, but when the GRL came in, the tin-roofed houses rose to 190.¹⁶⁴ At Idete village it was pointed out that the coming of the GRL promoted an agricultural produce market.¹⁶⁵ It is clear that assessing the impact of livelihoods in the plantation sector requires technical knowledge of all the sections within it.

¹⁶² Pictures by courtesy of Sao Hill Plantation Publicity Section.

¹⁶³ Andrea Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015" (Dar es Salaam, Master of Arts, University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 38, 85.

¹⁶⁴ Mark Purdon, "Land Acquisition in Tanzania: Strong Sustainability, Weak Sustainability and the Importance of Comparative Methods", PhD Thesis (University of Toronto, 2012), 15.

¹⁶⁵ Purdon, "Land Acquisition in Tanzania: Strong Sustainability, Weak Sustainability and the Importance of Comparative Methods, 15.



Figure 6: Slashing bushes around the forest.¹⁶⁶

Slashing grass on the two to ten years old trees was one of the activities which contributed to a large extent to the seasonal jobs at Sao Hill plantation. Many youths were recruited between May and July every year, and were paid daily. All this proves that Sao Hill had many ways of creating jobs, both formal and informal.¹⁶⁷ In this context ‘formal’ refers to permanent and casual employment created and supervised by the forest management, while ‘informal’ refers to jobs created by the businessmen who bought logs from the Sao Hill plantation for lumbering.

Planting trees at Sao Hill also provided seasonal employment. This was the task on which more women than men were employed. Women were considered to have greater knowledge about handling young trees than men;¹⁶⁸ however, this should not downplay the role played by men in the planting section. The workers on this section were paid 10 500 Tanzanian Shillings per day, which is equivalent to US\$ 5 based on the 2016 exchange rates.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Pictures by courtesy of Sao Hill Plantation Publicity Section. Note a lady slashing, third from right.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Salehe Beleko, the Manager, Sao Hill Headquarters, Mufindi, 27.1.2017.

¹⁶⁸ See, for example, K.F.S.King “The History of Agroforestry” H.A Steppler and P.K.R. Nair (Eds), *Tenth Anniversary, 1977-1987, Agroforestry a Decade of Development* (Nairobi, International Council for Research in Agroforestry, 1987), 1-5.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill plantation, 27.1.2017.

These planters did not require any kind of professional qualifications, as they were trained on the job to perform their duties by their respective headmen who also supervised them. It was observed that every division recruited people for planting within the vicinity of the villages.

The fire control section also recruited seasonal employees at Sao Hill plantation forestry. This section recruited exclusively the energetic young men because of the nature of the job itself. This section had no gender balance at all, as the firefighting crew were men only. These were seasonal workers from July to December every year.¹⁷⁰ The group is a semi-militarized unit that operated especially between September and December, when they have to stay in camps. The Sao Hill plantation recruited patrolmen, who were given bicycles. Radio call attendants were also energetic youths. Generally, slashing grass, planting and fire control were the main activities for seasonal employment to the people.

2.7 Conclusion

The development of the Sao Hill plantation rural working class was very gradual. It started with a few white foresters, who were assisted by casual labourers from the surrounding communities in Mufindi. The management improved later in the post-colonial period with World Bank funding assistance in the late 1970s. To show the dynamics of management and the kind of labourers employed in the Sao Hill plantation, the chapter discussed the time span from 1939 to 2015.

As from 1996 the government had no direct control of recruitment in some sections, as free market forces determined recruitments. As the Sao Hill Saw mill and the Southern Paper mill were leased to private companies in 1996 and 2002 respectively, the direct creation of jobs was taken from the government. Observation and interviews proved that women were marginalized in almost every section, except planting trees, largely because these kinds of duties were traditionally considered masculine and were thus dominated by men. The planting section was a deviation from the norm, as it preferred women because the management claimed that they were extraordinarily keen to follow the appropriate procedures for planting. Through tracking the labour process, it is a complicated task to establish the direct impact of the Sao Hill plantation forest on the surrounding communities, as some of the activities in the forest are not recorded in the official memory of the Sao Hill plantation. The Sao Hill plantation as the sole

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, 13.1.2016, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters.

state-owned firm has few professional foresters who supervised the seasonal duties and acted as blockers to the timber business dealers, who recruited many workers outside the plantation forest management channel. The complexity of labour organization at Sao Hill plantation makes it difficult to assess its direct contribution to the livelihoods of the adjacent villages, as the official government documents on the employees do not reflect the whole story of labour in the forest plantation. There is a hidden history in the forest.

CHAPTER THREE

“Environmental conservation or is it economic interests?” The Sao Hill Plantation Forest, c.1930-1961.

3.1 Introduction

The Sao Hill plantation forestry, the largest plantation forest in Tanzania was established in 1939 when trials conducted by the British colonial state at Kigogo arboretum proved that exotic tree species could thrive under local conditions.¹ The establishment of the plantation was claimed by the colonial state to be geared at curbing shifting cultivation by the local African population around Mufindi’s humid montane. Tea plantations initiated in Mufindi by Brooke Bond and Lonrho, British affiliated companies, were at the centre of the colonial state’s intervention into existing black cultivation, which was deemed detrimental to the environment. The state intervened by declaring parts of Mufindi areas “forest reserves” and imposed the 1921 Forest Ordinance, which prohibited squatting, woodcutting and grazing activities in the forest reserves. As this chapter will show, shifting cultivation left the impression that local people burned and cleared one forest area, over-cultivated it until it was utterly unproductive, then cleared another area and would continue to do so indefinitely, thus depleting the forests.² Within the environmental conservation rhetoric of the state, economic expectations for tea and wheat was reflected. This chapter, therefore, will consider from a historical perspective the measures taken by the colonial state to promote afforestation in Mufindi.

This chapter deals with the initial attempts of the colonial state to introduce the Sao Hill plantation forest in Mufindi. This period (1939-1961) is referred to as the research phase and experimental stage by the Sao Hill plantation management.³ It argues that the introduction of the Sao Hill forest was the tangible outcome of broader top-down understandings of environmental conservation and economic prospects by both the state and a few influential Sao Hill settlers in colonial Tanganyika. Environmental conservation became important to the state in Mufindi because tea farms required high rainfall and the German commercial tea farmers

¹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Publicity Officer at Sao Hill, 24 March 2016; Also, see, Yonika Ngaga, “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania”, *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*. 1, 16, 20 B, 2011, 16; Andrew. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 95.

² Jon Voss, *Deutsch Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000*, Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 18.

³ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Publicity Officer, Sao Hill, 26.1.2017. It was an experimental period due to the fact that there was no established research on the suitability of the area apart from what was seen from the success of the tea farmers and the role of the Kigogo arboretum.

complained about the declining micro-climate precipitated by local shifting cultivation in the surrounding villages. Tea farming was protected by the colonial state, because tea was exported abroad, mainly to England, and in return this brought foreign capital to Tanganyika.⁴ The recommendation by Robert Troup, the director of the Imperial Forestry Institute, who visited Tanganyika in 1935 contributed to some extent in the development of the plantation forestry in Mufindi.⁵

However, this chapter will demonstrate that the top-down intervention actually legally interfered with the principles of running a trusteeship colony, under which the rights of the customary owners should have been considered under the League of Nations' principle "[i]n framing the laws relating to the transfer of land and natural resources, the administering authority should take into consideration 'native' laws and customs and respect the rights of the 'native' population".⁶ The land owners in the proposed forest reserve were resettled through a compensation scheme because of the trusteeship laws. Yet, as this chapter will show, the colonial state was divided over this compensation scheme: government officials and forest officials, from district level to national level, differed drastically on how to deal with the land question. Customary land owners agreed with the resettlement scheme, but with reluctance. They were forced to comply with the resettlement scheme because the alternative scheme, the so-called "squatter scheme", did not meet their agricultural needs or, as this chapter will argue, their cultural needs. Thus they both overtly and covertly resisted the project in a range of ways revealed by this study.

The chapter is based on data collected during eight months of field research conducted between September 2015 and May 2016 in Tanzania, including accessing government reports at the University of Dar es Salaam. The TNA (Tanzania National Archive), housed in Dar es Salaam city, was the main source of the primary documents from 1920 to the late 1940s. For the period 1945 to 1961 the researcher used data from both TNA and the Sao Hill Plantation Forestry

⁴ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 23.4.2016 Ubungo, Dar es Salaam.

⁵ Robert Troup (13.12.1874 - 01.10.1939) was a British forest expert who spent the first part of his career in Colonial India as Conservator of Forests. He returned to England in 1920 to head Oxford's School of Forestry. From 1924 to 1935 he was the Director of Oxford's Imperial Forestry Institute. This last role led him to visit almost all British colonies. His cumulative report was published by Oxford University in 1940 entitled *Colonial Forest Administration*; See, R. Troup, *Colonial Forest Administration*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 357-360.

⁶ J. Voss, "Deutsch Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000", Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 20.

Archive (SHPFA) housed at Sao Hill Headquarters in Mufindi district.⁷ Furthermore, the chapter benefitted from personal archives and records owned by individuals who worked with the Sao Hill plantation forestry in the early years. One of those officials was Modest Mtuy, who kept his own small archive with records about Sao Hill going back to the 1940s at his residence. Furthermore, this chapter benefitted from interviews with record management unit personnel at Sao Hill headquarters and some individual retirees who worked with this project.⁸ The fresh data challenges the conventional historiographical interpretation in the development of plantations in Tanzania and Mufindi in particular.

3.2 Historiography

Historians debating the colonial period impact on forestry in Tanzania include Jon Voss, who showed how black Tanzanians were perceived as essentially (indeed, organically) destructive in the eyes of the state because of their agricultural practices.⁹ Voss described the ways the British colonial state gazetted some parts of Iringa district in the late 1930s for afforestation, because the Hehe (the dominant ethnic community in Mufindi) were perceived to be destroying land by clearing natural forests for subsistence agriculture. Voss, despite discussing the side effect of shifting cultivation in Iringa district, did not discuss the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forests by the state, which is the focus of this chapter. This chapter, furthermore, extends Neumann's argument that the British colonial regime administered state forests in the same manner that the Germans did. Scientific forestry culture in the eyes of the state meant – separating forests and human activities and in most cases this was used to justify social control over accessing natural resources. Both the Germans and the British used forestry conservation as a way of controlling human interaction with the natural environment.

Neumann analysed the state's implementation of Troup's reports on the aspect of issuing of forest products to railways and mining sectors free of charge. Troup's recommendation suggested the stoppage of this free provision and the implementation of his recommendation resulted in the establishment of native afforestation. Native afforestation was one of the factors

⁷ The SHPFA is a collection of correspondence files found at the general reception of the headquarters. Those files were not sent to the Central Archive in Dar es Salaam because they were crucial for land disputes solving between the Sao Hill and the adjacent villages.

⁸ Oral interviews were audio taped and transcribed for easy reading, while records from TNA were directly typed as the house rules allowed taking only five photos per file. At SHPFA the researcher was allowed to take photos of the file records without limitation.

⁹ J. Voss, "Deutsch Ostafrika-Tanganyika-Tanzania, Agents and Interactions in the Management of Forest Resources, 1891-2000", Quentin Gausset, Stockholm, 2005, 32-33.

which revealed the potential of some areas of Iringa district for exotic tree plantations.¹⁰ This chapter builds on the argument that there was clear connection between the freezing of the free issuing of forest products, as proposed by Troup, and the start of native afforestation in Iringa district. However, native afforestation is central to this chapter as it was linked with the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forestry.¹¹

Furthermore, this chapter takes further the important debates raised by Thaddeus Sunseri.¹² Sunseri discussed both natural and plantation forestry along the eastern coastal strip of Tanzania during the colonial to postcolonial periods, but did not discuss the colonial state's attempts to establish the Sao Hill forest. He meticulously examined the interplay between the state's control of people's access to forestry resources and people's response to this by investigating the hinterland of the Indian Ocean coastal communities of Tanzania from before German colonial rule to the postcolonial era. However, Sunseri's best findings on state-citizen contestation over forest resources control did not include the history of the Sao Hill plantation forests, which is the focus of this chapter.

This chapter is important in revealing the different actors in the plantation forestry sector with the example of Sao Hill, which was the centre of the state policies on plantation forestry since its inception. Christopher Conte discussed the state's struggles over conservation in the Usambara Mountains of north-eastern Tanzania.¹³ He discussed the impact of landscape change at the expense of the indigenous peoples who were resettled when the Usambara forest reserve's boundaries were expanded. However, Conte did not consider plantation forestry, which will be discussed in this chapter.

On the other hand, scholars engaged in the discourses on forestry and conservation developed a body of literature on forestry in the field of silviculture. The outstanding scholars on forestry science include Yonika Ngaga, Luther Lulandala, Shaban Chamshama and Ladislaus Nsubemuki. The general limitation to their scientifically generated knowledge is that they lack

¹⁰ See, for example, James Graham "Changing Patterns of Wage Labour in Tanzania: A History of the Relations between African Labour and European Capitalism in Njombe district, 1931-1961", (PhD Dissertation North western University, Illinois, 1968), 165-166.

¹¹ R. Neumann, "Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualizing State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika", *Environment and History Journal*, 3 (1997), 54, (45-68).

¹² Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 51-52.

¹³ Christopher Conte, *Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004).

the social analysis, and above all, they lacked the archival and interview sources which enrich the social understanding of the historical contexts. This chapter uses some of their findings to enrich the discussion. Generally, there is a dearth of literature from a historical point of view on the factors involved in the establishment of plantation forests during colonial rule, not only the Sao Hill plantation forest, but also to other plantation forests like North Kilimanjaro forest in Kilimanjaro region, 3 304 hectares, (established in 1926), Kawetire forest in Mbeya region, 1 956 hectares (established in 1937), Ukaguru forest in Morogoro, 1 700 hectares, (established in 1950) Rubya forest in Kagera region, 1 906 hectares, (established in 1951), Rondo forest in Lindi region, 2 450 hectares (established in 1952), Longuza forest in Tanga region, 2 598 hectares, (established in 1952) and West Kilimanjaro forest in Kilimanjaro region, 6 020 hectares (established in 1954).¹⁴ See Figures 7 and 8. The following section will discuss the varied reasons which led to the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forest.

¹⁴ Yonika Ngaga, “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania”, *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*. 1, 16, 20 B, 2011, 18-21.




Figure 7: Map of Tanzania showing the distribution of plantation forests in Tanzania.¹⁵

¹⁵ Source: GIS (Geographical Information Systems), University of Dar es Salaam, June 2016.




Figure 8: Map of Mufindi district showing the coverage of Sao Hill Forest with boundaries based on 1976 government gazette.¹⁶

3.3 “The ‘natives’ are destroying the environment”: the colonial state and African agriculture

Early afforestation in Mufindi, which led to the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation forest, was influenced by two main background factors, namely environmental conservation and the economic prospects from tea, timber and pyrethrum. To intervene in what the colonial state referred to as the “reckless” kind of land management by the ‘natives’, it first established the Kigogo arboretum in 1935 to test the possibility of growing the *Pinus Patula* tree species. The

¹⁶ Source: GIS (Geographical Information Systems), University of Dar es Salaam, June 2016.

Kigogo arboretum was in the extreme far south of the Sao Hill plantation forestry. The arboretum brought exotic tree species from Amani (Tanga Province) Botanical Garden¹⁷ to Mufindi for afforestation. The exotic tree species proved to be potentially good for plantation in Mufindi.¹⁸ Furthermore, the seedlings for trials in the so-called “Native Afforestation Schemes” in the Iringa sub-chiefdoms of Kalinga and Kasanga, in Mufindi sub-district, came from Kigogo arboretum.¹⁹ At some point the arboretum collaborated with tea companies, specifically Tanganyika Tea Company, to test the growth of trees in the grassland areas of Mufindi. The Senior Forester applauded the role of the tea plantations in re-afforestation on the grasslands: “Certain areas which I knew as grassland 12 years ago had been successful forested. This is pleasing to note has been done and that fact precludes any suggestion as to the unsuitability of soil in these grasslands for the growing of trees”.²⁰ Transport of seedlings from Kigogo arboretum to the trial sites was carried out by the native authorities, that is, by district authorities assisted by sub-chiefs. The problem of distance from Kigogo arboretum centre to planting sites was a stumbling block in the native afforestation efforts, however, as the District Officer sometimes preferred establishing nurseries closer to the farms, especially at the Kasanga sub-chiefdom in the extreme west of the Kigogo arboretum centre.²¹ The native afforestation schemes, however, were small plots which could not be equated with the Sao Hill plantation forests at all. Until 1939 there was no more than four acres per sub-chiefdom between the fertile areas of Mufindi at Kalinga (sub-chief Dimilamahuti) and at Kasanga (sub-chief Mwatima).²² The native afforestation schemes, despite being small in acreage, worked as a provenance test in the areas that were fertile in Mufindi.

¹⁷ The Amani Botanical Garden was the oldest one since the German colonial period. It was set up by the Germans in 1902 as an extensive arboretum of long-term botanical trial plots for exotic plant species. Species were introduced from various parts of the world for agricultural trials with different economic interests such as medicinal plants, fruits and spices, valuable timber, cosmetics, rubber, oil and ornamental plants. It was closed by the British in 1950. For details, see Tropical Biology Association, *Amani Nature Reserve: An Introduction, Field Guide* (2007), 7.

¹⁸ TNA, Assistant Conservator of forests - Mufindi to the District Officer-Iringa, “Afforestation at Kasanga” 1st February, 1939. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/4: Forestry.

¹⁹ This was a programme by the British colonial government to plant trees for two reasons; one was to curb the ‘natives’ speed of using indigenous tree species for poles and wood. This was typically an environmental reason. Secondly, it was for pilot studies on three chiefdoms on whether the exotic tree species could be planted on Kasanga, Kalinga and Kilolo sub-chiefdoms. The Kasanga and Kalinga sub-chiefdoms proved to be good for those exotic tree species and that’s the reason behind the Sao Hill plantation forests started in these two sub-chiefdoms.

²⁰ TNA, “Senior Forester, Dar es Salaam, to the Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, 17.3.1945. Acc. No.270, Y/6: Iringa Forests.

²¹ TNA, Assistant Conservator of forests -Mufindi to the District Officer-Iringa, “Afforestation at Kasanga” 1st February, 1939. Acc. No.24: File No. 19/4: Forestry.

²² TNA, Forester-Mufindi to the District Officer-Iringa, “Native Authority Wattle Planting in Iringa” 1st February, 1939. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/4: Forestry.

The introduction of afforestation in Mufindi was also partly the result of the Report by the Tanganyika Secretariat on Land and Surveys in 1939. The report showed that Iringa districts' native population methods of agriculture as detrimental to the environment. The Agricultural Director, based in Morogoro, reported that the extensive deforestation and soil erosion of the most pernicious kind were the consequence of the Hehes' kind of agricultural practices, which produced no economic benefits to the nation at large. The director claimed that the Hehe were producing eleusine (sic) [millet] which was entirely utilized for local beer making. The report claimed that Iringa district was situated in a province which deserved a model of soil conservation measures, but shifting cultivation obviated that possibility. The report continued by recommending that clearing and burning of forests for the production of grain crops were to be prohibited and in the absence of adequate administrative and agricultural staff, severe penalties were to be imposed on every delinquent caught. The agricultural director suggested to the Iringa districts' authorities to make their own local Soil Erosion Ordinance to curb environmental degradation. The agricultural director was ambivalent about such soil erosion ordinances, as he further reported that imposing them could be unpopular with the Hehe.²³

These measures to curb environmental degradation in Mufindi, however, replicated those adopted by the British colonial state in India, where they imposed plantation forests on a population reluctant to adopt what the colonial state referred to as "best environmental practices".²⁴ Similarly, destroying forests for millet cultivation for making local beer was similar to what was happening in Northern Malawi in the 1940s. The 'natives' were alleged to cut down trees and collect them in a large heap of about two feet high and burn them. The ashes of those trees were tilled into the ground and planted with millet.²⁵ The colonial rulers in Malawi intervened by compelling the 'natives' to practise contour ridging in the steep hills and also to stop planting on river banks.

Soil erosion and ways to counteract it, however, were not new to the British. In the 1880s the Arabica coffee crop in colonial Ceylon failed because of soil degradation, which was induced

²³ TNA, Tanganyika Secretariat, File Name: Land and Survey No: 26702: Soil Erosion in Iringa District in Director of Agriculture, Morogoro to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 27.1.1939.

²⁴ Gregory Barton, *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 75.

²⁵ John McCracken, "Conservation and Resistance in Colonial Malawi, The Dead North Revisited" in William Beinart and Joann McGregor, *Social History and African Environments*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), 157-169.

by soil erosion. Erosion, which was on the increase, soon acquired extremely serious proportions. In a short time the Ceylonese tea crop was also in danger because of soil erosion, which compelled the launching of soil conservation measures. In India the problem was soon reported as chronic. Indian soil erosion was attributed to the destruction of forests. Stringent measures were introduced to control the rapid depletion of forests.²⁶ These measures were, among others, afforestation and strict control of bush fires. In Tanganyika, for example, the ridging or *matuta* system was among the measures that were applied in Uluguru, Morogoro region, famously known as Uluguru Land Usage Scheme, and indeed, it sparked fierce resistance from the local population.²⁷ The British colonial state in the 1930s passed some resolutions to deal with the deteriorating environment in Africa. Plantation forests were one of the measures to curb the threat. For example, the Council of the Royal Society based in London passed a resolution in 1937; some of the wording is worth reproducing:

This council views with the gravest concern the widespread destruction of the African soil by erosion consequent on wasteful methods of husbandry which strike at the basis of rural economic native welfare, and it is of opinion that immediate steps should be taken for the adoption of a common policy and energetic measures throughout British Africa in order to put an effective check upon this growing menace to the fertility of the land and to the health of the inhabitants.²⁸

Furthermore, the Conservator of Forests based in Morogoro, had the same reservations about the Hehe methods of agriculture which were claimed to be detrimental to the environment. The Conservator of Forests said:

The Hehe system of cultivation (which is followed by the Wazungwa too) destroys the agricultural possibilities of a country faster than other I have seen and I agree with the recommendation that the question of reserving large tracts as forest reserve and removing the inhabitants should be more fully investigated and instructions have been sent to Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to keep in close touch with the district officer, Iringa, and the Agricultural Officer of Iringa based at Itheme, with a view to a combined tour of the area East of Mufindi farm [tea farms] to select such areas and if possible arrange for the concentration of the population further away from the scarp face.²⁹

²⁶ Bethuel Swai, "Crisis in Colonial Agriculture: Soil Erosion in Tanganyika during the Interwar Period," University of Dar es Salaam, not dated, 30-31; See an extensive discussion on soil erosion in Lesotho by Kate Showers, *Imperial Gullies, Soil Erosion and Conservation in Lesotho*, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 135-176.

²⁷ Pamela Maack "We don't Want Terraces! Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme", Gregory Maddox et al., *Custodians of the Land, Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (James Currey, London, 1996), 152-169. See also, Conte, *Highland Sanctuary, Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains*, in the Mlalo Basin Rehabilitation Scheme (MBRS) in the Usambara Mountains in the 1940s-1950s, (Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1997), 126-134.

²⁸ B. Swai, "Crisis in Colonial Agriculture: Soil Erosion in Tanganyika during the Interwar Period," University of Dar es Salaam, not dated, 34.

²⁹ TNA, Tanganyika Secretariat, File Name: Land Utilization on the Udzungwa Scarp in Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Director of Agriculture, Morogoro 16/March/1939.

The Conservator of Forests was ambivalent about establishing plantation forests as the best intervention measure, because he was worried about the expenses of a reservation in the poor market for local timber products in Tanganyika. The poor market for local timber in the Iringa district and the Southern Highlands Province at large was brought about by poor transport. Lack of professional expertise on scientific afforestation was the second factor which made the Conservator of Forests dislike afforestation as the best method of intervening in the shifting cultivation in Iringa district. He was also scared of the risk of fire, as he argued that the ‘natives’ agricultural practices, which included burning grasses, were not compatible with afforestation. Furthermore, the establishment of plantation forestry in Mufindi by the British colonial government was delayed because exotic tree species took too long to harvest. The British colonial government used an example of cypress tree species, which were claimed to take almost up to 40 years to be harvested. Because of this, some British colonial government officials were in favour of leaving this long-term programme of planting exotic tree species to the native authorities than to the central government.³⁰ Based on these reservations, the Conservator of Forests in Tanganyika was of the opinion that these factors could lead to greater expenses for the forestry department.³¹

The 1931-1939 report on soil erosion for the Southern Highlands Province, contrary to the view of the conservator of forests, suggested that the key solution for the soil erosion problem in Mufindi was afforestation. The report noted that destruction of forests in the high rainfall area was evident on the great escarpment between Mufindi and Dabaga. The report said that controlling the destruction of the forest reserves by the native population through the imposition of rules, enforced by district authority, was only limited to areas in the immediate proximity, while in the remote areas patrolling was difficult and hundreds of square miles of forests had been destroyed within living memory.³² The area between Mufindi and Dabaga practised shifting cultivation partly because of high soil acidity and unsuitable crops planted in the area. The colonial state claimed that there was ruthless burning carried out by the local African population in the area between Mufindi and Dabaga on the pretext of counteracting

³⁰ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests-Mbeya to the District Officers-Iringa, “Tentative Memorandum on Native Afforestation, Southern Highlands Province” 26th, July, 1938. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/4: Forestry.

³¹ TNA, Tanganyika Secretariat, File Name: Land Utilization on the Udzungwa Scarp in a letter from the Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Director of Agriculture, Morogoro dated 16/March/1939.

³² TNA, The Southern Highlands Province Report on Soil Erosion by the Director of Agriculture, Acc. No. 77, File Name: Soil Erosion 2/33, 1931-1939.

such acidity. Furthermore, grass burning by the local population in the area between Mufindi and Dabaga was practiced for the purpose of obtaining grazing areas during the rainy seasons. The misuse of fire by African peasants was an idea present among the Germans too. One of the early German foresters, Kruger, claimed that “African farmers [peasants] set fire to as much as a thousand hectares of forest in order to prepare a tiny parcel for sowing, burned large bush in order to drive antelopes into snares”.³³

The suggestions by the colonial state to intervene in these practices by the local population were overwhelmingly focused on re-afforestation. The immediate solution by the state was simply prosecuting the offenders and the longer-term solution was re-afforestation of the areas affected.³⁴ The scenario was similar to that of the German colonial state, which aimed at replacing African shifting agriculture with intensive land use by applying fertilizer, technology, labour management and new crops in German East Africa between 1912 and 1914.³⁵ The Conservator of Forests in Tanganyika based in the Morogoro region was of the opinion that the forestry department in general had the role of imposing rural economic principles on the peasants by saying:

The aim should be a rural economy based on the sound principles of correct land use and this will not be possible without considerable interference with the habits and customs of the African. He must be saved from himself and cured of many malpractices. He must be taught the value of his forests and this will entail a forest department strong in personnel and with assumed financial provision over a long period.³⁶

In the areas close to tea farms, the colonial state claimed that there were few patches of natural forests because of shifting cultivation. Most of the natural forests of the Mufindi district in the early 1930s were claimed to be denuded as a result of shifting cultivation. Shifting cultivation around tea farms was practised by the local African population to avoid couch grass-infested areas. As couch grass did not grow in mature forests, the peasants abandoned their old farms to clear a forested area, not because of a drop in soil fertility, but because couch grass had infested their farms. This tradition led to most of Mufindi land being cultivated to exhaustion at one time or another.³⁷ Behind the colonial state rhetoric, there were the potential economic

³³ T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 51-52.

³⁴ TNA, The Southern Highlands Province Report on Soil Erosion by the Director of Agriculture, Acc. No. 77, File Name: Soil Erosion 2/33, 1931-1939.

³⁵ See, Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 51-52.

³⁶ UKA 42054: The Conservator of Forestry, Morogoro, Forestry in Tanganyika, 1946.

³⁷ M.C. Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8” (Unpublished Report, 1979), 1.

prospects from the infant tea and pyrethrum industries in Mufindi. The Conservator of Forests put it in this way: “if tea and pyrethrum make stable industries [in Mufindi], there may be a demand for certain classes of timber, packing cases, plywood box frames, drying trays and fuel”.³⁸ The statement by the Conservator of Forests implied that tea and pyrethrum farming would bring demands of timber. This meant that apart from ameliorating the micro-climate, the forests had economic gains in Mufindi.

The complaints of the tea planters in Mufindi to the colonial state on shifting cultivation by the local African population culminated in the afforestation of the destroyed land and creation of two forest reserves close to their farms.³⁹ The depletion of the natural forest in Mufindi worried the tea farmers there. After the Second World War the farmers expressed their fears that tea production in the area would decline tremendously if the microclimate was not preserved and improved. The forest department was called in to establish large-scale afforestation to replace the destroyed environment.⁴⁰ The tea planters were mainly Germans who had started planting tea in Mufindi from 1926.⁴¹ In the German times Mufindi was a site of hunting buffalo and elephants by the German colonisers at the Iringa garrison. It was these early German settlers who started planting trees, especially cypresses, and according to them, the name Mufindi came from the early cypress trees, which the ‘natives’ referred to them as *mivinyi* (plural) and *mfinyi* (singular) which eventually became Mufindi.⁴²

The Kigogo arboretum project aimed at ameliorating the micro-climate between Mufindi and Udzungwa highlands, which also created the Scarp Forest Reserve. The Scarp Forest Reserve aimed at protecting the Kilombero River source, whereas the Mufindi Forest Reserve aimed at preventing forest denudation in the areas surrounding the tea farms. The District Officer put it in this way to explain the importance of the two project in Mufindi at that time:

Whereas the Scarp Reserve is intended to preserve Territorial rather than local resources, the essence of the Mufindi Reserve is to prevent forest denudation and increase forest cover in the interests of tea. The scarp reserve is intended to conserve

³⁸ TNA, The Conservator of Forests to the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, “Mufindi Planting Plan” 31.7.1939, Acc.No.336: File No. IR/2.

³⁹ These forest reserves had different names during colonial rule. However, as it is now they are referred to as Ihomasa and Iyegeya, Source: Interview with Joseph Sondi, 27.1. 2017.

⁴⁰ Modest Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8” (Unpublished Report, 1979), 1.

⁴¹ See, H. Kangalawe, “The History of Labour Process in the Tea Industry, Mufindi, 1960-2010s,” M.A. Diss. University of Dar es Salam, 2012, 36. See Weiner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926 to 1986* (Ontario, General Store Publishing House, 1995), 58-63.

⁴² Weiner Voigt, *60 Years in East Africa, Life of a Settler 1926 to 1986*, 59-60.

the flow of those rivers and streams which run off the escarpment and feed the Kilombero.⁴³

The movement for the Mufindi Forest Reserve gained momentum in October 1948 when the first forester for the new plantation forest (Sao Hill) started setting boundaries for the new forest plantation. However, the main drawback for boundary making was that the exact number of the local African population to be affected had not yet been determined. The state did not have an accurate number of Africans who could be affected to the extent that they would need to be compensated by the project. Bernard Gilchrist, the first forester who surveyed and demarcated the forest reserve, at first estimated this number to be 1 200 families, but later it was estimated to be 550 families. These two figures were later ignored to await the final survey and demarcation by the forester. The number of Africans to be affected by the Mufindi Forest Reserve establishment was later left for further investigation by the provincial authorities.⁴⁴

The process of establishing the Mufindi Forest Reserve allowed the local African population to air their views,⁴⁵ as the first draft of the afforestation proposal included a recommendation that the African population were to be converted to adopting either a squatter system of agriculture or compensated and moved to places of their choice. The meetings with the customary land owners were important as the forester had started setting the forest boundaries. The Africans were suspicious about the project – they feared what was going to happen with the ownership of their customary land.⁴⁶ The Provincial Commissioner for Southern Highlands was uncertain on this too. He put it in this way in one of his letters:

In the meantime I would like you to ensure that the people understand that such demarcation is not final, that their future as squatters in the forest reserve or their movement to the ex-German farms in west Mufindi or elsewhere has not been determined and that Gilchrist's demarcation is not to be taken as the definite decision of the government on the matter.⁴⁷

⁴³ TNA, District Commissioner-Iringa to the Provincial Commissioner-Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya "Proposed Mufindi-Udzungwa Scarp Forest Reserve" 31th, August, 1948. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme. The Kilombero River was and still is the source of water for rice farming and for biodiversity surrounding the Selous Game Reserve.

⁴⁴ TNA, Provincial Commissioner-Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner- Iringa "Mufindi Forest Reserve" 9 October 1948. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁴⁵ The Iringa District Commissioner organized the meeting in the Kalinga (south east of Sao Hill plantation) and Kasanga (South of Sao Hill plantation) chiefdoms.

⁴⁶ TNA, District Commissioner-Iringa to the Provincial Commissioner-Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya "Proposed Mufindi-Udzungwa Scarp Forest Reserve" 31th, August, 1948. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁴⁷ TNA, Provincial Commissioner-Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner- Iringa "Mufindi Forest Reserve" 9 October, 1948. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

The Mufindi Forest Reserve was sanctioned to spend £535 starting in the years 1949 to 1951. The year 1949 was remembered by the Sao Hill plantation forestry as the official start of the professional afforestation in Mufindi by the Tanganyika colonial Forestry Department. The government posted the Senior Forester, D. Fletcher, to Mufindi to execute the work in 1949 too.⁴⁸

The conservator of forests proposed the official planting start in 1951 as there were problems in resettling the 510 African families who were living in the forest reserve. Furthermore, the Conservator of Forests proposed that the families residing in the forest reserve be removed in a piecemeal way by resettling 170 families every year starting in 1949. The resettling was to continue in the year 1950 and 1951, with the same number of African families to be resettled until all 510 families were resettled. Firing of grasses on the proposed forest reserve was not allowed in these three transitional years, that is, between 1949 and 1951, even though they had not yet been compensated.⁴⁹

There were internal plans by the Conservator of Forests for compulsory evictions of those families, but this did not materialize. Some of the members for Land Utilization Committee⁵⁰ from the Southern Highlands province, based in Mbeya, were of the opinion that the 510 African families within the forest reserve should be allowed to occupy the abandoned German farms in Mufindi. The Conservator of Forests objected to the proposal as he argued that it would be difficult to control the ‘natives’ on the well planned farms. Those farms had formerly been owned by the Germans who had tried in vain to grow coffee and wheat.⁵¹ The Provincial Commissioner was in favour of the conservator’s proposal not to evict the African families as he directed the District Commissioner of Iringa to impose control measures on the population residing in the forest reserve. He insisted that this was to control the remaining African population, as they were alleged not to be the customary owners since many were not from the

⁴⁸ TNA, Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province “Mufindi Re-afforestation Scheme” 5 October, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁴⁹ TNA, Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province “Mufindi Re-afforestation Scheme” 5 October, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁵⁰ This was the committee at Provincial level specifically for advising the Provincial Commissioner on land related matters.

⁵¹ TNA, Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province “Mufindi Re-afforestation Scheme” 5th, October, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

Hehe ethnic group. It was assumed that the remaining population were from the Bena ethnic group, who came as migrant labourers to the tea plantations, but later this was proved to be incorrect and they were customary owners.⁵²

British colonial authorities' discussion about planting trees around tea farms deployed scientific justification, especially desiccation theory.⁵³ The colonial state used this to justify its own economic needs and its environmental concerns were merely a smokescreen. Saberwal argues⁵⁴:

Overtime, one observes a two way process, whereby bureaucracies may use science to inform a particular rhetoric, at the same, bureaucratic rhetoric comes to influence the scientific discourse itself, and thereby, the very nature of science. Such an influence is likely to be particularly noticeable where members of the concerned bureaucracy are trained scientists and hence capable of making 'informed' statements on scientific issues.⁵⁵

In this thesis this is true as there was close communication between the District Commissioner Provincial Commissioner (bureaucratic) and the Conservator of forests, foresters and Veterinary officers (scientists) to justify afforestation.

3.3.1 *Barazas* and debates leading to consensus with customary land owners

The district authorities in Iringa conducted the *barazas* (public meetings) in 1947 and in 1948 with the African population (in Kalinga and Kasanga chiefdoms) residing in the forest reserves and the consensus reached was that those African families should be in the squatter scheme as there were nowhere for them to be resettled. To force the Hehe ethnic group into becoming squatters, the District authorities in Iringa ensured before the public meetings that there would be no compensation at that time.⁵⁶ The Conservator of Forests, was of the opinion that the African families be resettled close to the forest, because if they were too far from the forestry

⁵² TNA, Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa "Mufindi Re-afforestation Scheme" 14 November, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No.19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁵³ Desiccation theory is the idea that the land surface dries out because of deforestation, resulting in a decline of rainfall, flash floods, soil degradation and silting of rivers. The theory informed the colonial authorities in colonial India to increase afforestation. For details, see for example Richard Grove, "A Historical Review of Early Institutional and Conservationist Responses to Fears of Artificially Induced Global Climate Change: The Deforestation-Desiccation Discourse 1500-1860", *Chemosphere*, 29, 5 (1994), (1001-1013).

⁵⁴ Vasant Saberwal, "Science and the Desiccationist Discourse of the 20th Century" *Environment and History* 4, 3 (1998), 311-312 (309-3043).

⁵⁵ Saberwal, "Science and the Desiccationist Discourse of the 20th Century", *Environment and History*, 312.

⁵⁶ TNA, District Commissioner, Iringa to the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya, "Mufindi Re-afforestation Scheme" 21 November, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

scheme, it would be hard for the Forest Department to get cheap labourers. Yet the conservator also did not prefer the option that the African families occupy the abandoned German farms, as he was scared of the “bad practices of agriculture” by black Africans:

Under native occupation, however, I fear that the land would very soon suffer through the destruction of forest and bush by shifting cultivation and fire. Existing farm roads would not be maintained and control of agricultural activities would be much more difficult than if the people were allowed to remain where they are within the proposed Mufindi Forest Reserve.⁵⁷

The Senior Forester in Mufindi had to conduct *barazas* again on 12 December 1949 at Kalinga with the African population, who were to be resettled in the presence of the paramount Chief Adam Sapi Mkwawa, the chief of Iringa district, and the sub-chief of the area, Hamisi Chotisamba. The principles of the re-forestation scheme were put before the people assembled, with the addition that no cutting of secondary bush would be allowed in the proposed reserve from 1 January 1950, except in the area prescribed for planting by the forest department and no setting of fires was likely to be allowed. Two people at the meeting had their reservations which are worth reproducing as they appear in the Senior Forester’s report to the Conservator of Forests:

There were only two dissenters: the first was from Mtwango near Kibao, who stated he and his family were already established there as were many others and they would find it a hardship to have to shift their homes. He was told that at present there was no question of shifting homes from other parts of the reserve; new cultivation only would be done in the prescribed area. The second person who dared to dissent wanted to know why the Hehe customary owner should not get compensation as the Wakinga had got two years before and was told that there was no question of the present occupiers being moved out of the reserve, but instead of shifting their cultivation as they pleased as before, they would have to shift as they were told. His second question as to why a man should be punished for fires lit by his irresponsible children was dismissed as trivial. It was again stressed that no compensation would be given and the people were warned that no new building should be attempted inside the first planting block without the senior forester’s sanction.⁵⁸

The plans to develop the Mufindi forest reserve with a squatter system faced a stumbling block as the Southern Highlands Province Land Utilization Committee turned down the plan at a meeting held in Mbeya from 22 to 23 May in 1951. The meeting brought together the Provincial Commissioner, the Director of Forests, the District Commissioner, and the Conservator of

⁵⁷ TNA, Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, to the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands Province, Mbeya, “Mufindi Re-forestation Scheme” 5 December, 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

⁵⁸ TNA, Senior Forests, Mufindi to the Conservator of Forests, Morogoro, “Squatters in Planting Block I” 14 December 1949. Acc. No. 24: File No. 19/21: Iringa Forestry: Mufindi Forest Scheme.

Forests. The reason behind turning down the proposal was the point made by the very director who had argued that a squatter system could not be carried out, as a very large number of people could not be accommodated within the forest reserve.⁵⁹ The squatter scheme plan was difficult to implement as the Mufindi area was accommodating too many people because of its fertile land. The committee was in favour of compensation. The Iringa District Commissioner objected to compensation by putting it in this way:

The suggestion that no inhabitant was to be moved forcibly is, to my mind, completely erroneous. Recently, as put across to the inhabitants at the various *barazas* attended by me, only two options were given, i.e. either to move or else to go in as a squatter under afforestation scheme. This was accepted universally.⁶⁰

The District Commissioner dismissed the opinion of the committee on compensating the local African population, as he claimed those who were found in the forest reserve were mainly ‘aliens’. Those ‘aliens’ referred to by the District Commissioner were the ethnic groups from Njombe district who had come as migrant labourers to the tea plantations in Mufindi. The District Commissioner defended the afforestation project by saying it was intended solely to restore the microclimate in the tea estates.⁶¹ He put it in this way: “I am still a strong supporter of the scheme which I consider essential to the area, and neither do I wish to see its scaling down, nor, least of all, any suggestion of abandonment, which will be fatal”.⁶²

The Southern Highlands Province Land Utilization committee ruled in favour of the rights of the customary owners of land in the proposed forest reserve by demanding a list of those who were to be resettled. The committee stopped any further control of the African local population in the forest reserve until the report on the list of the people under the compensation scheme was clarified.⁶³ The Iringa District Commissioner came with yet another new resolution in 1953. He proposed that the African population around the forest reserve should be encouraged to live in the concentrated villages, which were about ten in number. These villages were created in fear of a shortage of labourers in the proposed plantation forestry. The villages

⁵⁹ TNA, Extracts from Minutes of Southern Highlands Province-Land Utilization Committee, Acc. No.24. File No. 2F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve 1951-1954.

⁶⁰ TNA, Extracts from Minutes of Southern Highlands Province-Land Utilization Committee, Acc. No.24. File No. 2F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve, 1951-1954.

⁶¹ TNA, Extracts from Minutes of Southern Highlands Province-Land Utilization Committee, Acc. No.24. File No. 2F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve, 1951-1954.

⁶² TNA, Extracts from Minutes of Southern Highlands Province-Land Utilization Committee, Acc. No.24. File No. 2F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve, 1951-1954.

⁶³ TNA, Extracts from Minutes of Southern Highlands Province-Land Utilization Committee, Acc. No.24. File No. 2F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve, 1951-1954.

created were Igurusilo, Msiwasi, Lupeme, Sawala, Mtwango, Ndege River, Mgeruka, Mkalala, Nyalubusi and Lukosi.⁶⁴ The Assistant Conservator of Forests was uncertain, however, about the success of the proposed villages as the village sites were drafted in a very simple way and they lacked important features for the ethnic group, like grazing land. Hence the implementation of those villages was anticipated by the Assistant Conservator of Forests to be a most difficult process. There were mainly two reasons for the Assistant Conservator's anticipation of failure of the proposed villages: these were inherent in the culture of the Hehe, who allegedly did not like community life. The Assistant Conservator of Forestry summed up the Hehe culture by saying: "[t]he Wahehe do not live in villages and as I can gather they have no intention of doing so. They would prefer to leave the area than adapt to community life".⁶⁵

The second reason was that most of those African families were cultivating between three and ten acres every year, so the half an acre or one acre per household proposed by the District Commissioner did not satisfy the African local population. Among the ten villages proposed, Sawala was the only one envisaged to succeed, as it already had well established public amenities, a Lutheran Church and a Bena Christian Community.⁶⁶ The importance of these ten villages to the planned forest reserve was based on having labourers within the proximity of the forest.

The District Commissioner suggested that the African families in the proposed villages would have houses close to one another, whereby every family could have an acre or so of land immediately around them for growing green vegetables only. Those villages were planned to last for 20 years. He further suggested that the *shambas* (farms) for food growing be situated in the vicinity of those villages as this would be convenient for the Forest Department. The new *shambas* were to be rotational from year to year as would be determined by the forest department.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 11 April, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁶⁵ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 11 April, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁶⁶ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 11 April, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁶⁷ TNA, District Commissioner, Iringa, to the Divisional Forest Officer, Mbeya, 26 February 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

The Divisional Forest Officer, based in Mufindi, was of the opinion that the African families in the forest reserves should be paid a displacement compensation of 50/= Tanzanian shillings per house. The African families who were to stay in the forest reserves were to work for 100 days paid labour for the forest department. The payment rates were, again, to be determined by the forest administration.⁶⁸ These plans came to nothing, as people were scared of the Forest Department's control of their social life. Furthermore, the plans were a clear sign of the other side of the Forest Department: that it imposed its own sense of order on the locals' social and economic life.⁶⁹ So the feasibility of the squatter system faded away.

3.3.2 Cattle, forests and the culture of the Hehe

Land for grazing cattle for the families residing in the proposed forest reserve was to become a contentious issue. The District Commissioner was uncertain whether proper arrangements could be made to accommodate the livestock keepers. These concerns over land were to become a real problem only if the squatter scheme was going to be implemented. The District Commissioner said that it was understood that livestock were not desirable in a forest reserve, but Chief Adam Sapi Mkwawa had informed him that the Hehe were not going to agree to live without livestock. The District Commissioner recalled the chief explaining that even the families who did not own livestock at that time still nurtured the ambition to own cattle one day – it was a cultural preoccupation.⁷⁰ So the Divisional Forester in Mufindi was forced to consult the Provincial Veterinary Officer (PVO). The Divisional Forester responded as follows to the District Commission:

I am considering what steps we can take with regard to livestock. I have consulted the PVO who informs me that it is quite a normal practice for the Wahehe to send cattle to a more favourable grazing area than that in which they live. He does not consider any culling policy in the future which would be applied to reduce the number of cattle.⁷¹

At that time the Hehe believed that possessing livestock was both a status symbol and simultaneously a sensible way to store wealth and boost agricultural returns with the manuring

⁶⁸ TNA, Divisional Forest Officer, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner 24 February 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁶⁹ See for example, T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), xviii-xix.

⁷⁰ TNA, District Commissioner, Iringa, to the Divisional Forest Officer, Mbeya, 26 February 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁷¹ TNA, Divisional Forest Officer, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner 7 March 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

of fields.⁷² For example, the Hehe bridegroom paid five cattle, two sheep and a little amount of money (but this was flexible). As time went on the cattle and sheep were scarce, hence dowry was converted into both cattle and money, based on what the bridegroom could access easily. Since then the Hehe fixed the dowry price in the form of cattle and the bridegroom could choose to pay in either cattle or cash.⁷³ However, mixed farming and stock keeping were the primary goals of most Hehe people. Travellers had described them as cattle herders in the late 19th century and noted that raiding (by men) rather than breeding kept up their herd sizes. Manuring of fields was an additional motivation to possess livestock.⁷⁴ To show how important it was to the Hehe community to own cattle, Chief Mkwawa gave a reward of three cattle – as a kind of medal for bravery – to a 16-year-old boy named Mwangalumemile Mpunza, who stabbed to death the famous German Commander in East Africa, Emil von Zelewski, during the Lugalo conflict between the Hehe and the Germans in 1891.⁷⁵ The bottom line was that cattle were integral to the Hehe sense of self and way of life, and so this was inevitably a key point of contention in establishing plantation forestry.

The long debate over finding the best ways of resettling the local African population in the proposed forest reserve reached its peak in 1953, when the Divisional Forest Officer decided that all persons in the area who arrived there since the “Great Commoner” (the Governor) issued his embargo on the acquisition of new land in the area in 1947 had to leave without compensation.⁷⁶ The Divisional Forest Officer finalized the resettlement agenda by saying that all people who had rights in the area (under customary ownership) would be fully compensated for any permanent buildings⁷⁷ and crops which they possessed within the area.⁷⁸

The African population in the forest reserve, however, had the second option of remaining in the area subject to cultivating under license. Compensation for the local African population

⁷² Fulgence Malangalila, *Mwamuyinga, Mtawala wa Wahehe*, (Ruler of the Hehe) (Peramiho, Benedictine Publications Ndanda, 1987), 25.

⁷³ Malangalila, *Mwamuyinga, Mtawala wa Wahehe*, 25.

⁷⁴ Edgar Winans, “Hehe” *Encyclopaedia of World Cultures Supplement*, 2002, (Encyclopedia.com 5 July 2016).

⁷⁵ David Pizza, “To Devour the Land of Mkwawa” Colonial Violence and the German-Hehe War in East Africa C.1884-1914 (PhD Diss. North Carolina University, 2007), 96.

⁷⁶ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 1st June, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁷⁷ Only huts built by mud were compensated. Those built by trees and plastered by mud were not compensated.

⁷⁸ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 1st June, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

was implemented in 1954.⁷⁹ The area forming part of the Sao Hill which was affected by this process were Mninga and Kalinga, which were legally gazetted in 1960. The compensation process took into consideration the number of houses and their respective rooms, number of wives, number of children and their respective gender, number of cattle and the number of food stores. Compensation was also paid for permanent trees such as bamboo, wattle and eucalyptus.⁸⁰ Bamboo trees were compensated for, as they were cut by the Hehe to extract the famous juice for the popular local brew among the Hehe community namely *Ulanzi*. The *Ulanzi* attracted business (in the local brew shops) in the rural areas but seldom in the urban areas of Iringa and Njombe Regions.⁸¹ The bamboo juice was a seasonal crop, mainly from November to early May yearly, which is the rainy season in Iringa region.⁸²

To avoid inciting local anger, the graveyards were not interfered with and hence no compensation was paid by the Forest Department. Although the foresters had officially forbidden burials as per the regulations of forest reserves, locals were still allowed to conduct their ritual ceremonies whenever they wished in their graveyards within the forest reserve. The forest department left the graveyards as open spaces within the forests. The size of the open space for the graveyards in the forest depended on the number of graves. Conducting a ritual ceremony at an ancestors' graveyard, however, meant getting a permit from the forest division manager or through a ranger and, indeed, an escort was provided. The reason for a permit was that the Hehe cleaned their graveyards during the dry seasons, which could prove a fire risk in the forest. Depending on their economic status, they sometimes slaughtered a beast as a sacrifice in the graveyard itself. The reason behind compromising on the forest reserve rules and accommodating the Hehe culture was that the spirits of the dead were regarded as extremely important in the affairs of the living of the Hehe community. Neglect of the proper treatment of a corpse, the funeral ritual or periodical offerings were believed to lead to illness, misfortune or death. Prayers for help and advice from the ancestors were also common and

⁷⁹ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 1st June, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

⁸⁰ Interview with Limited Lutego (90) and Anna Luvinga (82) Kihanga Village, on 24 May 2016. Limited Lutego and his wife Anna Luvinga are one of those who were resettled and compensated in 1954.

⁸¹ Elizabeth Daley "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 5, 4, (2005), 529, (526-572); See also, Gasper Ashimogo et al., *Africa in Transition, Micro Study Tanzania, A Research Report* (Sokoine University, 2003), 18.

⁸² Daley "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change*.

involved spitting or pouring libations.⁸³ By permitting the Hehe community to conduct their rituals in their respective graveyards, forestry officials believed that the security of the forest project was protected from arsonists, and an embryonic but potentially useful trust could start to develop between the Forest Department and the surrounding community.⁸⁴

3.4 “Transfer the territory capital to Sao Hill”. The Sao Hill Farmers Association and the plantation forestry in Mufindi

The white Sao Hill Farmers Association had a very different view of the establishment of plantation forests in Mufindi in the late 1950s. These were the farmers who came from the “White highlands in Tanzania” established by Lord Chesham in 1937.⁸⁵ The Sao Hill farmers went so far as to urge the Tanganyika Governor to transfer the capital city to Sao Hill to boost the local commercial farming sector. To convince the Governor, the Sao Hill farmers enumerated a number of factors which, according to them, could lead to the transfer of the capital city of Tanganyika to Sao Hill Mufindi. The first claim by the Sao Hill farmers was the tea plantations; they made their case by saying that Mufindi was the headquarters of the Tanganyika Tea Company Limited (Brooke Bond) which had two factories, a very good hospital and an impressive record of general development on its estates to its credit.⁸⁶ They further claimed that there were two other privately owned tea estates at Mufindi, namely Stone Valley Tea Estates and Idetero Tea Company. Based on these developments, the farmers urged the governor to promote the valuable permanent development as a nucleus in the Sao Hill area; the call for a productive enterprise on a scale commensurate with this very important nucleus was as insistent as it was imperative.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the farmers informed the governor that they had built a very excellent privately owned primary school in the Southern Highlands School, a hotel property, known as the Southern Highlands Club, established by the late Lord Chesham on what was his estate, an aerodrome, also provided by Chesham to serve the club and for the benefit of the settlers, a veterinary depot and dip, all with permanent residential and

⁸³ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, at Sao Hill Forest Headquarters, 14.3.2016, See also, Edgar Winans, “Hehe” Encyclopaedia of World Cultures Supplement, 2002, (Encyclopedia.com 5 July 2016), Edgar Winans, “The Head of the King: Museum and the Path to Resistance” *Comparative studies and History*, 36, 2, (1994), 6-22, (221-241).

⁸⁴ Interview with Galafwata Kihongole (64) at Nundwe Village, Mufindi district on 8. 4.2016.

⁸⁵ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers’ Association.

⁸⁶ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers’ Association.

⁸⁷ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers’ Association.

other necessary buildings, established within a reasonable compass.⁸⁸ The farmers convinced the governor that the Sao Hill block in Mufindi in Iringa region was the third best place to live in Tanganyika. The first two places were listed as the highlands of Kilimanjaro, Meru, Oldean and Mbulu in the Northern Province, and Usambara in the Tanga Province. The farmers had this to tell the governor on the Sao Hill area:

The Iringa-Sao Hill Mufindi area appears to offer the most suitable site for the seat of the Central Government and for the development of the territory's chief centre for industrial and administrative activities. Sao Hill block appears to be the most suitable should it be chosen to provide the seat of the Central Government, the precise site would depend on climatic, health, social and transport factors.⁸⁹

The white farmers urged the colonial government to take a lead in planning and alienating more land for the private sector:

Unless the government has better plans, the farmers' association suggest that all land not earmarked for other purposes in this area be made available for afforestation according to a scheme to be drawn up by government in consultation with local people, and the special efforts be made to secure further settlers to take over areas for such development.⁹⁰

They wrote a letter to the Minister for Natural Resources in 1958, pleading with him to pay attention to the geographical potential of the Sao Hill area. The farmers urged the Minister to convince the state to invest to transform the "idle land of Sao Hill" into a large-scale afforestation area. They claimed that, though the area was treeless, there was every sign that converting it into large-scale forest plantation would be successful. They argued that commercial afforestation could solve the problem of timber, which was scarce and expensive – owing to distances involving heavy transport charges.⁹¹

The Farmers' Association gave credit to the Minister for the afforestation scheme which had started around Kigogo arboretum, but they cautioned him that the rapacious 'natives' of Mufindi" had denuded the forest of more or less all indigenous trees. They built up a narrative of insatiable and destructive locals destroying the local environment, warning the colonial government that if it was not capable of scaling up the project, then private enterprises were

⁸⁸ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

⁸⁹ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

⁹⁰ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

⁹¹ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Minister of Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam 11.8. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

inevitable – if only to save the local environment.⁹² They contended that afforestation could ameliorate the climate by increasing humidity. Interestingly, the farmers reiterated their suggestion that the capital city of Tanganyika be transferred to Mufindi in the Sao Hill area. They convinced the Minister by enumerating a number of climatic features which, according to them, were key features of a proper capital city:

It is possibly eminently suitable for a new capital of Tanganyika when it is decided to remove it from Dar es Salaam owing to the unsuitability of the climate and to its remoteness from much of the territory that is becoming increasingly important to it. Geographically, this area is well situated in relation to the rest of the territory. Climatically, it has probably no rival in Africa, hot nights are unknown, and there are no other climatic discomforts to speak of, as extremes are not experienced. Mosquitos are practically unknown and there is no malaria unless introduced from elsewhere. It has abundant perennial water sources and their distribution over a very extensive area is one of its valuable characteristics. There is plenty of land and its terrain is pleasantly undulating with very little, if any, that could not be developed to advantage within a city's limits.⁹³

The farmers' desire for private enterprise caused them to urge the Minister to attract new settlers with sufficient capital to undertake such big afforestation schemes and eventually bring in a pulp and paper mill to boost the local economy. They had some private investors in mind already. A German paper manufacturing firm was proposed by the farmers to be one of the best firms that could handle such a scheme well. The anonymous German company was claimed by the farmers to have started engaging with Israel Masada, the owner of the 87 000 idle acres around the Sao Hill.⁹⁴

The colonial state responded to some of the requests by the Sao Hill farmers in late 1958. With regard to moving the capital city to Sao Hill, the state explained that the idea was no longer feasible, but the state agreed in principle on the idea of supporting the farmers by loans or subsidizing their production subject to availability of funds. With regard to allowing private enterprise to take the lead in afforestation, the colonial state objected categorically as this meant further land alienation from customary owners.⁹⁵

⁹² TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Minister of Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam 11.8. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

⁹³ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Minister of Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam 11.8. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association; The applauded climatic condition of the Sao Hill was earlier first mentioned by Lord Chesham, see, for example, Lord Chesham, "Settlement in Tanganyika" *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 37, 147 (1938), 2, (184-190).

⁹⁴ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Minister of Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam 11.8. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

⁹⁵ TNA, Minister of Natural Resources to Sao Hill Farmers Association, Dar es Salaam 5.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

The Sao Hill white farmers contributed indirectly to two key developments. The first was the state's awareness that it was possible to revoke "idle land" amounting to 87 000 acres owned by Israel Masada. Secondly, the colonial state became interested in the Sao Hill area through the rhetoric of the farmers, which always insinuated that the area had great potential for afforestation. The following section reveals that afforestation of Mufindi was done more for the sake of the timber trade than for conservation, because in some places natural forests were removed in favour of exotic tree species which are good for timber.

3.5 Exotic trees supplanted natural trees?

The original hardwood forest cover, in some areas in Mufindi, was removed by peasants through shifting cultivation and indeed at some point, especially around Kigogo forest, the state and the tea companies removed natural forests for the sake of planting exotic species. The forester at the headquarters of the Southern Highlands, in Mbeya, wrote to the Acting Conservator of Forests, in Morogoro, about the dilemma of removing the natural forests in order to plant exotic trees: "I have the honour to request instructions regarding the general policy as regards afforestation at Mufindi. I believe you are of the opinion that the principal function of the Kigogo reserve lies in the indirect benefits conferred by the indigenous forest and that the latter should not be cleared, even in part. Nevertheless, the latest written instructions I have are contained in Mr Grant's letter IR/2/1187 of 26.7.1938 which definitely contemplates the conversion of a considerable portion of the indigenous forest to exotic species."⁹⁶ Moreover, the conservator of forests in Morogoro wrote to the Senior Forester in Dar es Salaam saying that "in accordance with verbal instructions I proceeded to Mufindi in 30.1.1945 and inspected certain pasture lands there with a view to their suitability for planting up by Tanganyika Tea Company Mufindi, to replace an area of natural forest ceded to them from Kigogo forest reserve".⁹⁷ The general understanding among the foresters was that the natural forest tree species were too slow to grow and hence had poor potential for timber. The conservator of forests in Mufindi wrote to the Assistant Conservator of Forests in Mbeya (the headquarters of the Southern Highland province) saying that "an enumeration in the Kigogo Forest Reserve around the forest station would hardly show 1 ton of merchantable timber per

⁹⁶ TNA, Acc. 336: File Reference No. IR/2, Letter from the Forest Department entitled "Planting Policy at Mufindi" 17.3.1946 to the Acting Conservator of Forests, Morogoro.

⁹⁷ TNA, Letter from the Conservator of Forests dated 13.2.1945 to the Senior Forester, Dar es Salaam, No. Acc. 336: File Reference No. IR/2.

acre. I hold that we must assume progress and development for this Territory during the next century. If we assume the opposite, we might as well pack up and do nothing in the forestry line. Accordingly I assume that the Iringa-Mufindi farming and planting community will in 50 to 100 years' time require a moderate quantity of good timber and accordingly the Forest Department should take steps to produce it".⁹⁸ In South Africa, between 1910 and 1935 there was almost a similar perception towards the unprofitability of the natural forests by some forest directors. Geldenhuys, an economist without training in forestry, appointed by Hertzog to direct and reorganise the forestry department to implement the Afrikaner nationalist policies which were pro poor whites was quoted as saying, "productivity could be very greatly increased by cutting out all the worthless species and planting up with exotics".⁹⁹ The following section deals with the start of planting and the response of customary owners who were compensated.

3.6 Planting and labourers' responses

After receiving compensation money ranging (in Tanzanian shillings) from 70/= to 560/=,¹⁰⁰ the African families left the forest reserve land. This was typically in accordance with the earlier recommendation of the Assistant Conservator of Forestry in Mufindi, whereby he foresaw that the Hehe did not prefer community life and his words are worth quoting: "...the Wahehe do not live in villages and as I can gather they have no intention of doing so. They would prefer to leave the area rather than adapt to community life".¹⁰¹ The reason postulated earlier by the Conservator of Forests in Mufindi proved true that most of those African families were cultivating between three and ten acres every year, so the half or one acre per household proposed by the District Commissioner was not enough. Many of those resettled African families joined the nearby villages, where they had relatives. Others bought land nearby villages. There was no record of any who went beyond the Mufindi chiefdoms.¹⁰²

The colonial government allocated £535¹⁰³ to be expended on this scheme in 1949 and also gave its approval for the scheme to be implemented over an initial period of three years between

⁹⁸ TNA, Letter from the Conservator of Forests, Mufindi, entitled "Reforestation at Mufindi" dated 26.7.1938 to the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, No. ACC. 336: File Reference No. IR/2.

⁹⁹ Brett Bennet and Fred Kruger, *Forestry and Water Conservation in South Africa: History, Science and Policy* (ANU Press, 2015), 98.

¹⁰⁰ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 11 April, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

¹⁰¹ TNA, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Mbeya, to the District Commissioner, Iringa, 11 April, 1953, Acc. No.24. File No. F3/25 VOL. III-Forestry-Mufindi Forest Reserve.

¹⁰² Interview with Limited Lutego (90) and Anna Luvinga (82), Kihanga Village, on 24th May 2016. Limited Lutego and his wife Anna Luvinga were resettled and compensated in 1954.

¹⁰³ The fund was enough to develop the plantation forestry in Mufindi as the project was still in an experimental stage.

1950 and 1953. With this financial backing and approval for the scheme, the Forest Department started the scheme at the north-eastern end of the land strip in the neighbourhood of Kalinga as it had been severely denuded of forests. The scheme on the ground started earlier with the posting of a senior forester in Mufindi in 1948, who surveyed and demarcated the planting blocks, establishing nurseries to provide seedlings for planting, creating live firebreaks and assessing the feasibility of the squatter system. The species which were planted came from Kigogo arboretum and included *Pinus Patula*, *Cypressus Lusitanica*, *Widdringtonia Whytei* (Mlanje Cedar), *Pinus Radiata*, *Eucalyptus Saligna*, *Eucalyptus Maidenii*, and *Eucalyptus Rorbuta*.¹⁰⁴

Pinus patula was chosen to be the main species with *Cypressus Lusitanica* and *Widdringtonia Whytei* as secondary species. *Hagenia abyssinica* and *Eucalyptus* were chosen for planting along ridges and windbreaks on the ridges. *Hagenia abyssinica* was chosen as the species to be planted on the boundary of the forest reserve, while wattle would be planted in the grassland section of the boundary. *Pinus Radiata* was cultivated on a small scale in one of the nurseries for the first time in 1951.¹⁰⁵

By the end of 1953 a total of 530 hectares were planted at the Kalinga end of the land strip and an external boundary ten metres wide had been planted from the Kalinga end to Mninga. Height growth was exceptionally good for *Pinus Radiata* and good for *Pinus Patula*. That observation influenced the stepping up of the hectarage put under *Pinus Radiata* in the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. In 1954 planting started at Mninga, the south-west end of the land strip.¹⁰⁶ Planting on the extensive grassland sites started in the Irunda Forest Reserve in 1957 and continued after independence. Generally, all the areas reserved for the scheme had been planted up and more grassland sites were allocated for afforestation.

The afforestation scheme, however, faced some drawbacks on both political grounds and in technical aspects at the beginning. There was antagonism from the people who thought that the scheme was evicting them from their land. This thinking was so deeply rooted that the social and economic impact of the scheme could not register in their minds. The plan to use controlled squatters faded away as people did not like the scheme because it was taking away their land.

¹⁰⁴ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 3.

¹⁰⁵ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 3.

¹⁰⁶ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 4.

Even when the ten forest villages were proposed within the forest reserve, people indicated their objection. Furthermore, the areas offered for cultivation included those which had lost their fertility and hence were of poor quality for agricultural crops in the peasants' mode of cultivation.¹⁰⁷

Some of the conditions prescribed in the squatter system reflected more disadvantages for them – for example, having to work for at least 100 days paid labour in the forest plantation – and so were not attractive to the squatters. They also rejected the idea of the state concentrating and controlling their cultivation. In the minds of many former customary owners, it was thought that by refusing to co-operate with the scheme, the land would revert back to them again.¹⁰⁸ Workers in the plantations, including the uniformed forest staff, were threatened when they went to the villages.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, local people did not know the aim of the scheme or were not educated about the value of the scheme. So they uprooted or cut down the newly planted trees.¹¹⁰ In 1961 a forest guard reported to the Forest Officer in Mufindi:

Sir, I wish to inform you that Irunda people have spoiled government afforestation scheme. In IR3 Block No. 3 where it got burnt, they have slashed and uprooted half of the trees that we have planted this year. I do not know if they are big men or young herd boys.¹¹¹

The response to paid labour was also poor and even those who turned up for work were mainly children. The situation was so disappointing that incentives such as higher wages and rations were introduced. The ration incentive seemed to work only in the period from December to March, when the local food (maize) reserves were low. Even with these incentives, the sub-chiefs had to compel labour to work whenever there were poor attendances. Higher wages in the tea companies also attracted forest labour. Planting and replanting were always beset by labour shortages, because just when they were required for these operations, the people were busy cultivating and planting their maize farms and the tea farms were busy plucking their tea as well.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 4.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Modest Mtuy (65), the longest serving manager at Sao Hill Plantation Forest (1978-1992) at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, on 14.4.2016.

¹⁰⁹ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979). See a comparative experience from Kenya by Kara Moskowitz, "Are you Planting Trees or Are you Planting People?" Squatter Resistance and International Development in the Making of a Kenyan Postcolonial Political Order (c. 1963-78), *The Journal of African History*, 56, 1, 2015, 99-118.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Modest Mtuy (65), the longest serving manager at Sao Hill Plantation Forest (1978-1992) at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, on 14.4.2016.

¹¹¹ Sao Hill Plantation Forestry Archive, (SHPFA), Forest Guard, Irundi Forest Plantation to the Forest Officer, Mufindi, 14.2.1961, File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

¹¹² M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

Although the right species were chosen on the basis of the trials at Kigogo arboretum, the tending operations in the first three years were given little emphasis. With poor tending, especially weeding, other factors such as pests and the weather contributed to the problems of establishing the plantation.¹¹³ The poor quality of the tending was highly associated with the low wages paid by the Forest Department, which paid 1/=Tanzanian shilling per month compared with other projects at the time, like tea, within Mufindi district, which paid more than 4/= Tanzanian shillings per month. Elsewhere the sisal estates in the north-east of the country paid 3/= Tanzanian shillings between 1954 and 1960.¹¹⁴

3.6 The land question for Sao Hill Plantation Forest, 1930s-1961

The availability of extensive suitable areas is a prerequisite for any large-scale afforestation scheme. In Tanganyika land was held by the state by virtue of the 1923 Land Ordinance, yet acquisition of land involved discussions and negotiations with the customary owners. These discussions and negotiations were important in areas where the land in question was in great demand by various land users, as was the case in Mufindi. The acquisition of land in Mufindi (around tea farms) was difficult, because the customary owners of the land thought that afforestation would rob them of their land. In Mufindi it was also difficult to get land because most of the fertile land had been parcelled out to Europeans settlers.¹¹⁵

The colonial state took land for afforestation in Mufindi by resettling the customary owners, creating the Msiwasi Forest Reserve of 647.5 hectares as part of a strip of land surveyed on the western side of the tea estates in 1949. Part of this area was occupied by people evicted during the establishment of tea estates (in 1926) and Lord Chesham's farms (in 1937). The local population reacted by threatening forest staff and paid labourers. They did not turn up for paid labour in the forest department and sometimes uprooted young trees. Due to these threats posed by the local population, compensation with a minimum of 50/= up to 170/= Tanzanian shillings in 1954 was issued by the state.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 6.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu at Mtili Village, Mufindi district, Iringa Region on 19.5.2016, He served as nursery attendant between 1956 and 1980 in Mufindi.

¹¹⁵ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.8" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 6.

¹¹⁶ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 3.

Furthermore, by resettling the native population the Forest Department created small reserves, namely Mninga, Irunda and Kihanga, hereby, Mninga is representative of all three. The total area of these three tiny reserves was 549 hectares: Mninga had 138.4, Irunda 328.6 and Kihanga 82 hectares. Mninga Forest Reserve is the south-western part of the land strip surveyed on the western side of the tea estates in 1949. The area was too small, but the foresters claimed that the area was for trials and after that the land would revert to the local population. Despite those plans, the local population continued to intimidate forest staff. So the Forest Department compensated them for loss of huts and allowed them right of way to the Irunda forest reserve.¹¹⁷ Secondly, the forest department acquired land by revoking land leases of two big colonial settlers in Mufindi, namely Lord Chesham and Israel Masada. The history of Lord Chesham went back to 1936, when Iringa district in the Southern Highlands Province underwent massive land alienation of approximately 120 000 acres to a limited company formed for the purpose of developing the land by “non-native settlement” on mixed farming lines.¹¹⁸ That scheme was famously known as the Lord Chesham Scheme, which was made public in the press towards the end of 1936.¹¹⁹ Lord Chesham advertised his appropriation throughout the late 1930s: Even in the middle of the day the air is fresh and invigorating, the sun pleasantly hot, but a fire is welcome in the evening almost the year round. Malaria, tsetse fly and drought, the three main pests of Africa, are not to be found there [Sao Hill] nor is the locust, the bane of all farmers, to be expected.¹²⁰

Lord Chesham bought part of the farm from Col. Arthur Focus, who had attempted to settle the British nationals in vain at Sao Hill in 1925. After the failure of the first plan, Col. Arthur Focus imported horses, cattle, sheep and pigs to Sao Hill. The second project failed too as Nodular worms in the sheep prevented progress. Focus died in 1935 and his land was relinquished to Lord Chesham, who increased its acreage tremendously.¹²¹ Lord Chesham, however, paid due compensation for disturbances to the customary owners, who numbered 278. The customary owners surrendered their rights of occupancy willingly in terms of three options. The first choice allowed the customary owners to continue with their right of occupation, the second was to surrender their rights of occupancy to the company and to move to another area after receiving compensation fund for disturbance, and the third was to remain on the land as a tenant

¹¹⁷ M.C. Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12” (Unpublished Report, 1979), 3.

¹¹⁸ L. Chesham, “Settlement in Tanganyika” *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 37, 147 (1938), 2, (184-190).

¹¹⁹ TNA, “Land and Land Settlements” in Provincial Book-Southern Highlands Book VOL. II. ca. 1920-1940.

¹²⁰ L. Chesham, “Settlement in Tanganyika” *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 189.

¹²¹ TNA, “Land and Land Settlements” Provincial Book-Southern Highlands Book VOL. II. ca. 1920-1940.

of the company. The ‘natives’ unanimously chose to move on receipt of disturbance compensation fund, which was assessed by the administrative authority and confirmed by the Governor too.¹²²

The Hehe, however, heavily resented the taking of their lands at Sao Hill in 1937, when it was reported that the land was leased to a European for permanent settlement. The Sao Hill land owned by Chesham formed the subject of one petition in 1956 filed at the UN headquarters, which alleged that a number of the Hehe in the UN Trust Territory of Tanganyika had been turned off their land by the British. The petition alleged that the land grab had happened in the sub-chiefdoms of Mufindi, Kibengu, Kilolo, Mahenge and Idodi.¹²³ The late Lord Chesham was alleged to have bought several hundred square miles of good land and to have kept it idle and had given part of it to “his fellow whites”. Since Lord Chesham’s death, Africans (Hehe) asked for that land back. One statement in the petition is worth quoting: “The Hehe have great fears that one day their fertile land might be declared ‘White Highlands’”. The petition ended by adding that the Hehe did not want their country become another Kenya and urged the UN to intervene on their behalf.¹²⁴ The other similar case which found its way to the UN from Tanganyika was of the Meru people in North Central in 1952. The Meru people were resettled from their customary land to allow expansion of European land holdings.¹²⁵

Lady Chesham, the widow of the late Lord Chesham, relinquished the land to the colonial government in the late 1950s. She was one of the most popular women in the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) Women’s Wing and she even got a seat in the Legislative Council in the 1958 general election to represent the Hehe ethnic group in the Southern Highlands Constituency of Iringa.¹²⁶

Israel Masada owned part of the Sao Hill plantation of today in the east of the Division I of today with 87 000 acres.¹²⁷ Israel Masada acquired the land in lease form from the colonial

¹²² TNA, “Land and Land Settlements” Provincial Book-Southern Highlands Book VOL. II. ca. 1920-1940.

¹²³ A. Thompson, *Report from UN: Africa Today: Land Grab in Tanganyika*: 3, 5, (1956), 10-11.

¹²⁴ A. Thompson, *Report from UN: Africa Today: Land Grab in Tanganyika*: 3, 5, (1956), 10-11.

¹²⁵ M.L. Bates, Tanganyika: The Development of a Trust Territory, *International Organisation*, 9, 1, (1955), 44, (32-51).

¹²⁶ Salma Maoulidi, “Racial and Religious Tolerance in Nyerere’s Political Thought and Practice” Chambi Chachage and Annar Cassam, *Africa’s Liberation: The Legacy of Nyerere*, (Dar es Salaam: Fahamu Books, 2010), 135.

¹²⁷ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers’ Association.

state in 1952. Nothing of value was developed on Masada's land as he was too occupied with other investments in Kenya.¹²⁸ Because of that, a number of the local African population encroached on his dormant farmland. The land was revoked by the state in 1961 for plantation forestry. Those local populations who encroached on his farm were not compensated by the forest department as they had encroached illegally on privately owned land.¹²⁹ Generally, the land question during this period was critical in Mufindi because of the presence of the tea projects and the white farmers.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to explain the different factors that led to the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation in the period 1939 to 1961 during British colonial rule. The afforestation efforts between 1939 and 1961 were environmentally driven for the aim of increasing production in tea and pyrethrum. The afforestation activities in this period, however, were more experimental than fully-fledged projects. The German tea planters and Sao Hill farmers association directly and indirectly influenced the establishment of the forest scheme in Mufindi. The Kigogo arboretum centre in Mufindi was also instrumental as its research results proved that many exotic tree species could be planted in Mufindi. Power relations in dealing with the deteriorating environment were clearly reflected as the colonial state authorities attributed this decline to the 'natives'. The blaming of the 'natives' recklessness in environmental conservation, however, was not limited to Mufindi inhabitants only in Tanganyika. The land question formed one of the most contested campaigns between the customary land owners and the colonial government as Mufindi attracted many people. The customary land owners, though compensated, kept grumbling and, indeed, they sometimes vandalized the new project openly and secretly. This chapter has argued that the Sao Hill area in particular, and indeed the Iringa Province, had land for potentially large-scale commercial farming with a good climate that suited the European nationals, but the colonial state and the few white farmers on the ground claimed that the native (Hehe) agricultural practices threatened the very climate which favoured the cultivation of tea, pyrethrum and exotic tree species. The government intervention by planting trees was resented by the white farmers, however, as they preferred private enterprise investments.

¹²⁸ TNA, Sao Hill Farmers Association to the Governor, 16.11. 1958, Acc. No. 257 AN/1/21/015 –Sao Hill Mufindi Farmers' Association.

¹²⁹ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, 19.5.2016 at Mtili Village, Mufindi, Iringa Region.

CHAPTER FOUR

“Is it villagisation or land dispossession?” – Expanding Sao Hill plantation in the period of economic crisis, 1962-1980.

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter explored the historical background of the establishment of the Sao Hill plantation by the colonial state in 1939. The key driving force behind the perceived need to establish the plantation was shifting cultivation by the subsistence farmers. The early plantations, with their exotic species, set a precedent: they grew well despite initial problems with the surrounding communities, who were resettled with financial compensation. The state left 6 714 hectares of trees planted at Irundi area/Division I of the Sao Hill forest. The forest they left were a mixture of pine, cypress and eucalyptus trees, all planted between 1951 and 1961. Moreover, the plantation forests that remained were only around tea plantations as they aimed not to produce timber for sale, but rather to ameliorate the microclimate around those tea plantations.

As this chapter will argue, Tanganyika’s political independence on 9 December 1961¹ meant not only a change of administration from the British to black African leaders, but also new paradigms and visions of how to run the independent nation’s natural resources. Natural resources in Tanganyika were essential, as the country lacked a prosperous white settler and plantation-backed economy, as was the case for neighbouring country Kenya.² As one of the classic examples of a socialist experiment in Africa, Tanzania’s postcolonial political history was thoroughly debated by internal and international scholars during the decline of the experiment. These debates concerned the socialist experiment crafted by the first president of the nation, Julius Nyerere (1922-1999, president of Tanzania 1962-1985), as a way of developing the country.³ Nyerere proposed a modernizing vision by combining the benefits of

¹ L. Cliffe, “From Independence to Self-Reliance” I. N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (ed.), *A History of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Historical Association of Tanzania, 1969), 239.

² B.D. Bowles, “The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1939-1961”, M.Y. Kaniki (ed.), *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1979), 181.

³ A. Hurst, “State Forestry and Spatial Scale in the Development Discourse of Post-Colonial Tanzania: 1961-1971”, *The Geographical Journal*, 169, 4 (The Geographical Society, 2003), 361 (358-368); See also, D. Komba “Contribution to Rural Development: *Ujamaa* and Villagisation” C. Legum and G. Mmari (Ed), *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 32-42.

modern science and technology with traditional values of communal⁴ solidarity.⁵ After the Tanzanian version of socialism was formally promulgated in 1967, it touched almost every aspect of the life of its citizens, especially in the building of nucleated village settlements between 1973 and 1976. This chapter explores the effect of this particular brand of socialism on the natural environment especially the engagement with agriculture, by analysing the efforts of the newly independent government between 1962 and 1980 to expand the Sao Hill plantation forestry. The chapter examines this span of almost two decades at the very start of the great “socialist experiment” to explore the process deployed to get land for the Sao Hill plantation forests between 1962 and 1980. The chapter uses archival sources, government reports and interviews. As this chapter will explain, during this period the Sao Hill plantation received external aid from the World Bank and international “development partners” (to use the jargon of the day) such as Norway and Germany.⁶ These external funders supported the pulp and paper mill in Mufindi district for two reasons: to bring about rural transformation and to industrialize the country.⁷ Furthermore, the Norwegian government assisted the Tanzanian government to open the biggest nationally-owned sawmill close to the Sao Hill headquarters. The development partners’ economic support fitted into the state policies of pro-rural development and implementing the Basic Industrial Strategy (BIS), which was introduced in 1967 to reduce imports from foreign countries.⁸ The rural development strategy included villagisation, which to a large extent made the land available for expansion of the Sao Hill plantation forest between 1976 and 1980.⁹

This chapter starts with a brief historical contextualisation, followed by a discussion of the forces which battered the economy of Tanzania between 1962 and 1980 and the efforts of the

⁴ According to Nyerere, African societies were more egalitarian than the one imposed by the colonisers and hence, according to him, that kind of egalitarianism was to be emulated in the new Tanzanian dispensation.

⁵ S. Berry, “Debating the Land Question in Africa” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 4, (2002), 649, (638-668).

⁶ See, for example, S. Chamshama “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in the Eastern and North Eastern African Countries, A Regional Overview *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 18 (Nairobi, African Forest Forum, 2011), 17; A. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 187; Paul Jacovelli, The Future of Plantations in Africa, *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2, 2014, 147 (144-159).

⁷ For a detailed discussion on industrialisation in Tanzania, see, Rune Skarstein and Samuel Wangwe, *Industrial Development in Tanzania: Some Critical Issues*, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1986), 1-25.

⁸ Rune Skarstein and Samuel Wangwe, *Industrial Development in Tanzania: Some Critical Issues*, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1986), 1-25; See also, Aaron Mgeni and Colin Price, “Planning of Forest Plantation investment with the aid of Linear Programming: A Case Study of Sao Hill Forest, Tanzania” *Forest Ecology and Management*, 62 (1993), 51-72.

⁹ Irene and Roland Brown “Approach to Rural Mass Poverty” C. Legum and G. Mmari (ed.), *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 16-20.

young independent state to counter them. The chapter then explores much more deeply the socialist “vision” behind accepting the foreign aid and the idea of a pulp and paper mill in Tanzania, as well as the ramifications for ordinary people around the plantation who had lost their land through villagisation. The thrust of this chapter is that the post-independence government alienated land from the customary owners under the program of villagisation. They not only viewed afforestation as the only option (on the basis of modern and scientific evidence), but it also correlated with the conditions imposed by the World Bank and the needs of the BIS policy.

4.2 Sao Hill forests and villagisation in Tanzania, 1962-1980

This chapter draws on Yusufu Lawi’s outstanding research into the villagisation experience in Iraqwland, in north-central Tanzania.¹⁰ Lawi’s work on villagisation in the Babati district brought to light the measures taken by the state to enforce nucleated villages in Tanzania. In many cases of villagisation in Tanzania the resettled communities went back to their old homes and farms in the early 1980s, because they failed to sustain even their basic needs in the newly created villages. This return of the communities to the old homes and farms after the collapse of villagisation was in parallel with Lawi’s study. However, in Mufindi, as this chapter will show, the land vacated by the resettled people was promptly appropriated by the state for expanding the Sao Hill plantation forest. The people of Mufindi in the villages surrounding the plantation forest thus lost their land permanently – under the pretext of villagisation. This chapter interrogates this state-driven coercive afforestation.

In the case of Mufindi, after negotiating with the village and District Commissioner, the state surveyed the land to ascertain the respective land needs of the villagers. After determining the extent of excess land in those villages, the land was clearly demarcated to separate the new established homesteads under the villagisation campaign from the old homesteads (*mahame* in the Hehe Language). The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism gazetted the abandoned and surveyed land in 1976 to create the Mbalwe-Mfulukulembe forest reserve. This forest reserve became the biggest forest reserve forming the third division of the Sao Hill Forest plantation forests.¹¹ Furthermore, this chapter draws on the work of Andrea Kifyasi, an historian who investigated the livelihoods of the surrounding communities around the Sao Hill

¹⁰ Yusufu Lawi, “Tanzania’s Operation *Vijiji* and Local Ecological Consciousness: the Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974-1976”, *Journal of African History*, 48, 1, 2007, 74, 69-93.

¹¹ M.C. Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12” (Unpublished Report, 1979), 6.

plantation, especially the original aims of the foresters and their current trends on employment and the social responsibility of the plantation to the community.¹² However, Kifyasi's research neglected the role of the World Bank and other development partners who – as this chapter will show – were actually key players in the expansion of the Sao Hill forest in post-colonial Tanzania.¹³ This chapter thus not only fills that lacuna in Kifyasi's analysis, but actually challenges his argument by showing how important the previously ignored role of the World Bank and other multinational organisations was in the original foundation of the Sao Hill plantation forests between 1962 and 1980.¹⁴ In addition to that, this chapter challenges a key contention in Kifyasi's study on the strategies used by the state in securing land for expansion in the 1970s in describing the process used as “land grabbing”. Instead, this chapter will argue that there is evidence showing the genuinely participatory methods employed by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism department to get land for expanding the Sao Hill forest between 1975 and 1976, whereas Kifyasi's argument mixed the villagisation programme, a countrywide resettlement of people, and Sao Hill expansion of its boundaries.¹⁵ Moreover, this chapter discusses the instrumental role played by the World Bank in the expansion of the Sao Hill by drawing on S. Chamshama's work on the role of the development partners generally in the plantation forest, particularly the countries of East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Chamshama summarised the role of development partners in East Africa and in the Horn of Africa without discussing the role of those economic partners in the Sao Hill plantation forestry.¹⁶ This chapter will discuss the details of the World Bank loan in expanding the Sao Hill plantation forest acreage.

This chapter also challenges the contention of Andrew Coulson and Samuel Wangwe, who described villagisation as an uncertain project intended to transform the country economically but that failed miserably.¹⁷ Coulson and Wangwe explored other factors which faced the country in the late 1970s, such as the oil shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/1980, and the war with

¹² A. Kifyasi, “Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities' Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010”, (M.A. Diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 14.

¹³ S. Chamshama “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in the Eastern and North Eastern African Countries, A Regional Overview” *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 18 (Nairobi, African Forest Forum, 2011), 17.

¹⁴ See, for example, Andrew Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 90-96.

¹⁵ Lawi, “Tanzania's Operation Vijiji and Local Ecological Consciousness”, 74.

¹⁶ Chamshama “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in the Eastern and North Eastern African Countries, A Regional Overview” *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 18, 17.

¹⁷ A. Coulson, *Tanzania, A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 280-309.

Idi Amin 1978/1979, but they did not consider the role played by the World Bank loan between 1976 and 1980, which this chapter argues played a vital role in subsidizing the plantation forests.¹⁸

This chapter engages with the work of Jean Shelter, who discussed the creation and expansion of the Serengeti National Park in north-western Tanzania. Shelter argued that the Serengeti National Park increased its boundaries at the expense of the surrounding communities as the state undermined customary rights to the land and access to the wilderness resources.¹⁹ The community around the Serengeti National Park understood land ownership in terms of clan or descent group membership and use rights to larger wilderness resources, while the state understood and exercised a European definition of property rights originating from the colonial era in which the state controlled all land. The Serengeti National Park expanded its boundaries during the villagisation programme (1973-1976). Shelter's analysis of the Serengeti National park will be used in this chapter as an example of other state-owned projects which expanded during villagisation, as was the case for the Sao Hill plantation forest too. Serengeti National Park and Sao Hill forests are examples of state projects which expanded their boundaries under the pretext of creating nucleated villages (villagisation). This chapter, however, will not discuss the creation of the National Parks (as Shelter did for the Serengeti National Park) but will rather discuss the expansion of the Sao Hill forest during villagisation.

Moreover, this chapter extends Thaddeus Sunseri's argument that some villagers in the Lindi region encroached on the forest reserves because in the new nucleated villages the villagers had to meet their immediate basic needs rather than consider the sustainability of forests. Sunseri pointed out that forest reserves along the east coast suffered much, as in some cases the ruling party condoned the encroachment of forest reserves.²⁰ Sunseri's discussion, however, was limited to the eastern coastal communities, whereas this chapter uses the case of Sao Hill in south-western Tanzania. Finally, Sunseri argued that villagisation was a key factor in

¹⁸ S. Wangwe, "Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the Case of Tanzania" Kjell Havnevick, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives* (Uppsala, Seminar Proceedings No.18-Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 151.

¹⁹ Jean Shelter, *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from earliest Times to the Present* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007), 217-218. See also, E. Mapedza "Forestry Policy in Colonial and Postcolonial Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change" *Journal of Historical Geography* 33 (London School of Economics: 2007), 845 (833-851).

²⁰ T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 161.

deforestation, while this chapter will turn this argument on its head, showing that, at least in some cases, villagisation was a factor for increasing forests.

4.3 Internal and external factors which affected the economy of Tanzania, 1962-1980

Between 1962 and 1980 the Sao Hill plantation forest was excessively influenced by internal and external events namely: the Arusha Declaration (1967), countrywide villagisation (1973-1976), collapse of the East African Community (1977), the oil shocks (1973/1974, 1978/1979), the war between Tanzania and Uganda /Idi Amin (1978-1979) and the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s.²¹ The Tanzanian embassy in Sweden summarised the origin of the crisis as follows: “Since 1977, Tanzania’s economy has been battered by events over which she still had no control, namely, 1. 1977 collapse of the East African Community [of which] at least US\$ 100 million replacement was required; 2. 1977/1978 collapse of coffee boom [resulted in] losses of up to US\$100 million per year on export earnings; 3. 1978/1981 Idi Amin invasion and support for new Uganda government US\$500 million on war expenditures, over US\$100 million support to Uganda; 4. 1979/1980 oil price doubling [which led to] US\$ 150 million a year by the second half of 1980; 5. 1979 flood damage to transport crops worth US\$100 million; 6. 1979/1980 drought that was estimated to cause a loss of US\$ 100 million. In 1980/81 drought caused food import bill of US\$50 million. The total cost of these events over the period 1979-1981 comes to about US\$1 500 million that is to say 200 percent of the annual export earnings”.²² These events contributed towards impeding afforestation, as the World Bank report summarised: “economic difficulties during the implementation of the World Bank loan phase one, as there was a shortage of government funds which consequently impeded silvicultural process and infrastructure development at Sao Hill”.²³

²¹ Samuel Wangwe, “Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the Case of Tanzania” Kjell Havnevik, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives* (Uppsala, Seminar Proceedings No.18-Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 149-153; Fantu Cheru “The Role of the IMF and World Bank in the Agrarian Crisis of Sudan and Tanzania: Sovereignty vs Control”, Bade Onimode, (Ed) *The IMF, The World Bank and the African Debt, the Social and Political Impact*, (London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd, 1989), 77-94.

²² Knud Svendsen, “Development Strategy and Crisis Management”, Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari (Eds) *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota), 115.

²³ World Bank, Sao Hill Forestry Project Phase II Completion Report, 1992, 7. According to the memorandum of understanding between the World Bank and the Sao Hill Project (1976), there were some sections which were to be funded by Tanzania, among them was the remuneration of Tanzanian staff. This is one of the sections the World Bank final report referred to that the government was very slow to act on, especially during the economic crisis of the 1980s.

The Arusha Declaration, however, remained the epitome of these events. The Declaration aimed at trying to create a self-reliant nation and to put in place a code of conduct for the top government leaders.²⁴ The Arusha Declaration as a policy revolved around public control of the economy, development through self-reliance, social equality and rural development.²⁵ To be self-reliant, according to the state in the 1970s, villagisation was inevitable because it facilitated easy distribution of common services. Such services included hospitals, farm implements and good schools.²⁶ Nyerere illustrated the rationale behind villagisation way back in 1962 when he was sworn in as president:

If we want to develop, we have no choice but to bring both our way of living and our way of farming up to date. The hand-hoe will not bring us the things we need today [...] we have got to begin using the plough and the tractor instead. But our people do not have the money, and nor has the government, to provide each family with a tractor. So what we must do is to try and make it possible for groups of farmers to get together and share the cost and the use of a tractor between them. But we cannot even do this if our people are going to continue living scattered over a wide area, far apart from each other, and still haunted by the old superstitious fear of witchcraft, just like our grandfathers. The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation, is to begin living in proper villages [...] For the next few years Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities [...] unless we do, we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village industries [...] If we do not start living in proper village communities, then all our attempts to develop the country will be just so much wasted effort.²⁷

This declaration by Nyerere led to the implementation of the villagisation programme between 1973 and 1976. This made it possible for the Forestry Department to obtain the land for expansion of the plantation forests in Mufindi while, as this chapter will show, the oil shocks and the war with Uganda took up so many resources that Tanzania could no longer be self-reliant.²⁸ The post-war crisis after 1979 made the country entirely dependent on World Bank funds for the Sao Hill plantation forest expansion. In fact, the post-war crisis ended the socialist

²⁴ C. Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968, Nyerere and the Emergence of A Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 231; See also, Irene and Roland Brown “Approach to Rural Mass Poverty” C. Legum and G. Mmari (ed.), *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 13-14.

²⁵ W. Tenga and Sist Mramba, *Manual on Land Law and Conveyancing in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2008), 70-75.

²⁶ G. Sundet, “The Politics of Land in Tanzania,” PhD diss. (Oxford University, 2004), 13.

²⁷ J.K. Nyerere, *Socialism and Unity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 176.

²⁸ G. Roberts, “The Uganda-Tanzania War, the Fall of Idi Amin, and the Failure of African Diplomacy, 1978-1979” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 4 (2014), 690, (539-739); See also, K. E. Svendsen “Development Strategy and Crisis Management” C. Legum and G. Mmari (ed.), *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 115.

experiments in Tanzania and paved the way for a liberal economy in the 1980s. Deborah Bryceson put it this way: “Tanzania’s *ujamaa* socialist experiment ended in the early 1980s as the Nyerere government conceded indirectly and then increasingly directly to IMF demands”.²⁹ Moreover, the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 exacerbated the crisis, as Tanzania used at least US\$ 100 million to replace the previously shared properties -civil aviation (formerly supervised by Kenya), and posts and telecommunication(formerly supervised by Uganda) – in the East African Community.³⁰ Consequently, the Sao Hill plantation survived and expanded amidst the crisis in Tanzania, because it received sustainable funding from the World Bank. To show the transition from the colonial forestry administration to that of the independence government, the following section gives an account of what was done to the forests on the Sao Hill plantation.

4.4 Early activities in the Forest Division related to the Sao Hill plantation forest

After independence in 1961 the Sao Hill plantation was re-imagined by the state as having the potential to be a capital-intensive investment project – the acme of technology-heavy high modernism. The idea was to bring in the biggest saw mill in the country, but also to attract the pulp and paper mills to the project. As was the case for many projects in post-colonial Tanzania, the shaky funding source from the government was the main obstacle to expansion from the late 1960s to the 1970s.³¹

The Forest Division transferred powers from the British to the Africans gradually in the mid-1960s. The British foresters who pioneered plantation forests in Tanzania in the 1950s retired back to the United Kingdom, while others found their way to the Dominion forest services. Other foresters went to work with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).³² G. Kileo, Tanganyika’s first professional forest officer, was appointed Chief Conservator of Forests in 1965. Kileo had worked as the acting Chief Conservator between 1963 and 1964.³³ The

²⁹ Deborah Fahy Bryceson “Agrarian Fundamentalism or Foresight? Revisiting Nyerere’s Vision for Rural Tanzania” Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (Eds), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 71-98.

³⁰ Civil aviation was the main sector battered by the fall of the East African Community. See, for example, K. E. Svendsen “Development Strategy and Crisis Management” C. Legum and G. Mmari (Ed) *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 115.

³¹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 20.5. 2016, Ubungo Oil Com, Dar es Salaam.

³² A. Hurst, “State Forestry and Spatial Scale in the Development Discourse of Post-Colonial Tanzania: 1961-1971”, *The Geographical Journal*, 6. See also, L. Cliffe, “From Independence to Self- Reliance” I. N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (ed.), *A History of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Historical Association of Tanzania, 1969), 243-245.

³³ TNA 634.96: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1963, 26.

departure of the expatriates in the forest division was a signal to the country to train its own forest professionals. The forest school at Olmotony in the Arusha region introduced a course to produce fully trained foresters in 1961 and expanded its buildings and enrolments in 1963.³⁴ Other key events that marked the move to plantation forestry after independence were the drafting of the three-year plan that started its implementation in 1963 to 1965. The three-year plan recorded 5 160 acres of fast-growing exotic softwoods countrywide in 1963. Out of the 5 160 acres planted nationally, the Sao Hill plantation recorded an astonishing 1 311 acres, which was the highest nationwide for a single forest plantation. The 1963 planting record was a new milestone after independence, as it came when the government was facing a shortage of funds not only for plantation forest expansion, but also for running the government itself.³⁵ In 1963 there was a vision of suitable forest industries for the processing of forest products in order to supply the nation with its requirements and build up a valuable export trade in fine timber, plywood, wood pulp and other forest products.³⁶

4.5 The status of plantation forests left by the colonial regime in Mufindi

The following section offers a brief synopsis of what was done by the Forest Division in the forests relinquished by the colonial regime in Mufindi in order to show the problems which arose because of lack of funding and poor management. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the colonial regime left 6 714 hectares of plantation forests in Mufindi planted at Irundi area/Division One of the Sao Hill forest. After independence, those forests came under the administration of the Tanzania Forest Division. The forest had a mixture of pine, cypress and eucalyptus trees. These trees were planted between 1951 and 1961. These plantations lacked best silvicultural practices after independence and hence new options had to be found.

The cattle owners from the surrounding villages grazed in the plantation forests. Grazing in the forest caused soil erosion, compacted the soil and destroyed roads. It was difficult for the Forest Division to prevent this kind of encroachment by the surrounding communities, because it lacked funds to employ rangers and forest guards.³⁷ Uncontrolled grazing was a problem until 1980 in the Irundi Forest Reserve (Division I) in the southern part of the Sao Hill Forest reserve.

³⁴ TNA 634.96: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1963, 11-12; See also, A. Hurst, "State Forestry and Spatial Scale in the Development Discourse of Post-Colonial Tanzania: 1961-1971", *The Geographical Journal*, 7.

³⁵ TNA 634.96: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1963, 12.

³⁶ TNA 634.96: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1963, 2.

³⁷ SHPFA, Manager, Sao Hill Forest Project, "Grazing Livestock in the Forest" to Chairman, Kihanga Village, 16.11.1978. File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

Grazing in the forest reserves caused soil compaction and thus reduced water infiltration and increased surface run off. The Irundi forest reserve was grazed to such an extent that the Sao Hill forest manager claimed that the soil surface was like iron sheets.³⁸

Furthermore, there were subsistence farmers who had encroached on the forest plantation in its valleys during the dry season for gardening. The forest workers, unfortunately, also practised gardening in the valleys of the plantation. The Sao Hill project manager issued a circular to prohibit this practice in 1974. The circular prohibited gardening in the valleys as this was done during the dry season, which was when the fire risk was greatest. The manager was quoted as saying, “No one will be allowed to cultivate in valleys within the Sao Hill Forest reserves without getting a permit from the Sao Hill forest Manager from 31.8.1974”.³⁹ The project manager also noted that illegal cultivation was sometimes carried out in the hidden areas of the project and hence the plantation forest administration had to remain alert to deal with those encroachers. The bottom line of all these problems implied that the Sao Hill forest was underfunded and consequently mismanaged.

In addition to encroachment into the forests, some individuals at Kibao village, for example, claimed that they were not compensated for their trees in the forest reserve which they relinquished in the late 1950s, while at Mninga villagers wanted to be compensated for their right of way, especially those who owned cattle.⁴⁰ The sub-chief⁴¹ of the villages reported the complaints of the villagers to the forest Project Officer at Sao Hill. The sub-chief, Mtemakuwanzi, based at Kibao village, reported that there were 53 acres of trees belonging to the villagers that were uncompensated.⁴² The forest Project Officer rejected the claims as trivial, because the Forestry Department had cleared all compensation claims in 1960.⁴³ The forest Project Officer added that those who owned cattle could use the forest firebreaks and fire lines when sending their cattle to grassland areas.

³⁸ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

³⁹ SHPFA, Manager, Sao Hill Forest Project, “Sao Hill valleys Cultivation” Sao Hill staff/Workers and Village Chairmen, 31.08.1974. File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

⁴⁰ SHPFA, Manager, Sao Hill Forest Project, “Sao Hill valleys Cultivation” Sao Hill staff/Workers and Village Chairmen, 31.08.1974. File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

⁴¹ In the Tanzanian context, the sub chief supervised the sub chiefdom that can be equated to a division area of nowadays. A division is a sub division of the district.

⁴² SHPFA, Forest Officer, Kibao, “Uncompensated trees in the Kibao area- 53 acres” to Forest Project Officer-Sao Hill, 11.3. 1965 File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

⁴³ SHPFA, Sao Hill Forest Project Officer, “Right of Way at Irunda” to Kibao Forest Officer, 15.3. 1965 File MU.01/01/: General Reserves Correspondence.

Fire incidents in the forests were reported throughout 1966, arguably as a result of the prolonged dry season (which hit the whole country), and lack of training and firefighting equipment. For example, at Buhindi 20 acres of *Pinus Caribea* were completely wiped out by a fire carelessly started by a forest guard;⁴⁴ and in Mbulu 500 acres of grassland were burnt.⁴⁵ The worst fire reported in 1966 at Sao Hill forest swept through 660 acres of *Pinus Patula* and *Pinus Elliottii*. Most of those fires were reported to be deliberately started and a number of persons were brought to court and successfully prosecuted in 1967.⁴⁶ The Forestry Division admitted that lack of firefighting equipment and training to be the main reasons by putting it in this way:

In some cases the fires would have been avoided or their damage minimized if the staff had been more prepared and a little more careful when using fire as a silvicultural and a protective tool. Lack of proper firefighting equipment also limited the effectiveness of fire control measures employed by the field staff and consequently the [Forestry] Division is now working out details on effective firefighting equipment and organisation.⁴⁷

The reason for the fires at Sao Hill forest was that some of the peasants who lost their land to the forest were the key perpetrators, while other reasons were related to farm preparation whereby fire started by peasants sometimes went out of hand due to winds especially between September and December. Sometimes the cattle herders⁴⁸ and honey hunters⁴⁹ caused fire outbreaks.

Routine silvicultural operations (like thinning and pruning) were neglected between 1962 and 1975 because of lack of funds from the government.⁵⁰ The delayed or ignored thinning and

⁴⁴ TNA 634.9: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1966, 10.

⁴⁵ TNA 634.9: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1966, 10; In Mbulu, and most of the northern part of Tanzania, fire outbreak was caused by the pastoralists-Maasai- who burnt grasses for their livestock.

⁴⁶ TNA 634.9: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1966, 10.

⁴⁷ TNA 634.9: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1966, 10.

⁴⁸ Mufindi area is chilly and cold, so the cow boys sometimes made fire when grazing and indeed sometimes they failed to control that fire.

⁴⁹ In Tanzania and indeed in many African countries, traditional exploitation/harvesting of honey was through smoking the bees. Exploiting honey, therefore, in the state owned forests was done during nights to evade the forest warders. Sometimes, those honey exploiters were reckless with fire after getting their honey hence fire outbreak in those forests. As it is explained by this thesis on Chapter Six, one of the intervention by the Sao Hill forest management was by issuing beehives free of charge to the surrounding communities so as to curb illegal honey exploitation in the state forest.

⁵⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, public relation officer, Sao Hill forest, 23.3.2016.

pruning were detrimental to the production of large-size girth and good-quality saw logs.⁵¹ The trees planted during colonial rule were harvested by the Sao Hill saw mill, which started operations in early 1976. The Norway Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)⁵² provided technical assistance to Sao Hill saw mill until early in 1996, when it was privatized.⁵³ The saw mill was set up at Ihefu, the headquarters of Division Two of the Sao Hill forest in the former land of Lord Chesham.⁵⁴ With regards to output use, the Sao Hill saw mill aimed at providing saw logs and pulpwood for local industries. The Tanzania Investment Bank, the Tanzanian government and the NORAD funded the Sao Hill saw mill jointly. While the Sao Hill saw mill started in 1976, the Southern Paper Mills was envisaged to start up in 1984 as another customer for the logs from Sao Hill plantation.

4.6 The pulp and paper mill vision and the Sao Hill plantation forestry

In 1964 the government envisaged the Sao Hill project as possibly producing up to 15 000 acres of softwood per year for timber, paper and pulp mill by 1984.⁵⁵ Planting was planned to start effectively in 1968. The project, however, waited for the FAO Timber Trend Study report, which indicated the index for shortage of timber worldwide in the late 1960s. That report became the epitome of grandiose, large-scale planting in two regions of Iringa (at Sao Hill) and Mbeya (at Kawetire) in post-colonial Tanzania. The Kawetire acreage, however, was low compared to that of Sao Hill plantation forest. There was another factor underlying this anticipation: the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) proposal⁵⁶ was confirmed in 1968. The TAZARA railway was anticipated to carry goods wagons of timber, paper and pulp to the Dar es Salaam market and indeed for export. The paper mill was situated at the Mufindi TAZARA station in the extreme south of the district.⁵⁷ The land for expanding plantation forests for pulpwood and papers production was planned.⁵⁸

⁵¹ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

⁵² The NORAD assisted Tanzania on training internal technocrats at the Sawmill headquarter. See for example, Emmanuel Bavu et al., *Evaluation Report 3.83, Sao Hill Sawmill, Tanzania* (NORAD, 1983), 1-15.

⁵³ T. Gran, *The Dilemma Between Mobilization and Control in International Aid, The Case of the Norwegian Sao Hill Sawmill Project in Tanzania in Public Administration and Development*, 2, (University of Bergen, 1991), 139 (135-148).

⁵⁴ T. Gran, *The Dilemma Between Mobilization and Control in International Aid, The Case of the Norwegian Sao Hill Sawmill Project in Tanzania in Public Administration and Development*, 2, (University of Bergen, 1991), 139 (135-148).

⁵⁵ Interview with Mathias Lema, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, 8.4.2016.

⁵⁶ This proposal refers to the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the government of China and Tanzania and Zambia.

⁵⁷ See J. Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway, How A Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009), 95.

⁵⁸ TNA 634.9: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1966, 6.

To implement the state's vision of paper and pulp mills, in 1963 the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources contracted the services of Sandwell and Co., a Vancouver-based global consultant on the feasibility of pulp and paper mills.⁵⁹ The company had to investigate the possibility of creating a pulpwood plantation and developing a pulp-manufacturing site in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean coast (to cut transportation expenses) for export to the world market. The Sandwell report came out in 1966. They advised the government that the pulp and paper mill could be situated at Kongowe in the coastal region should the condition of proximity to the Indian Coast be considered the sole factor. The second site, which was more convincing in their view, however, was the area close the Sao Hill forest at a TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority) rail-crossing area. Exotic trees proved a failure at Kongowe henceforth led to a shift to Mufindi – at Sao Hill.⁶⁰ The conditions for selecting a site for a paper and pulp mill were in consonance with what had been recommended by Björn Lundgren. He remarked that “[w]ith present technology such a mill [pulp and paper] has a fairly high water consumption. Although the technical development may diminish the need for fresh water, a responsible decision must be to erect the mill only where the water supply is adequate”.⁶¹ Modest Mtuy, the longest serving manager at Sao Hill, added that the other reasons behind expanding the Sao Hill forest for the sake of having a pulp and a paper mill came from the president:

The first President of Tanzania the late Julius K. Nyerere loved trees so much. At Sao Hill he visited almost thrice during my tenure as a manager. In 1964 he invited the Canadians to conduct research on pulp industry possibility. They produced a marvellous report in 1966. At first they selected Mufindi and Kongowe-Kibaha (Forest Reserve). Later on in 1975 the silviculture personnel realised that exotic trees did not grow well at Kongowe. In 1972 the government invited the World Bank, which sent officials who visited both places and recommended increase of land for forest extension, especially in the vicinity of Mufindi areas. In the eyes of the state it was luck time, as it was during villagisation campaigns. That's why it was easy to get land for forest extension. Problems came later as those people wanted to go back to their old homes (*mahame*).⁶²

Moreover, the state decided to construct the pulp and paper mill, because at that time long-fibred pulp made from coniferous trees, with high strength, was in high demand throughout the world for the manufacturing of paper and paper boards. The state report cited areas like Asia

⁵⁹ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

⁶⁰ TNA 634.96: United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Report of the Forest Division, 1963, 22.

⁶¹ Björn Lundgren (Ed.), *Land Use in Kenya and Tanzania: The Physical Background and Present Situation and an Analysis of the Needs for its Rational Planning*, (Stockholm: Royal College of Forestry: International Rural Development Division, 1975), 277.

⁶² Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

and the Far East as experiencing a shortage of long-fibred pulp and the produce derived from it. Western Europe was estimated to experience a deficit of three million metric tons per year in 1980 and it was claimed by the Forestry Division that it would not be possible to supply this from traditional sources in Europe. Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) conducted research, which came out with the results showing East Africa as a whole was considered to offer possibilities of lower pulp production costs than either of the traditional timber producing countries or other developing countries such as Chile.⁶³

Sandwell assisted in the preparation of this plan and reported favourably on a project in Mufindi. The consultants started surveying areas which had softwood trees for pulp production in 1963. Mufindi was better than the coastal areas, as it qualified for both growing softwoods and as the site for the pulp mill. Sandwell's report attracted financing from the World Bank because of their positive support for the project:

Tanganyika (Tanzania) has a good opportunity to develop coniferous wood plantations economically; market conditions indicate that the proposed industry should be planned for entry into export market; the Coastal plains are strategically placed for plantation development but their suitability for growing pulpwood has yet to be proved; and of the interior locations with proven pulpwood growing ability, the Mufindi area offers the best potential and gives promise of an adequate return on investment for an unbleached kraft pulp mill.⁶⁴

The government re-engaged the consultants in 1964/1965, directing their attention to the Mufindi area. The government wanted to conform to the recommendations of the consultants' first report. The results of the second survey were positive too. Two suitable alternative mill sites were found in the extreme south to the railway junction in Mufindi. A way was found of transporting pulpwood across an escarpment separating part of the plantation areas from the mill.⁶⁵ Under the price conditions of the time, a satisfactory gross return of 14 percent invested capital was foreseen from the operation of a projected 400 long tons per day unbleached kraft mill.⁶⁶ That rate of gross return, however, was dependent on the extension of the railway to the vicinity of the mill.

⁶³ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania* (Tanganyika Standard Limited, 1965), 2.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 2.

⁶⁵ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 19.3.2016.

⁶⁶ This is a technical term referring to thick brown paper, usually brown paper made from chemically treated wood pulp.

The consultant recommended the production of pulp (rather than paper) and anticipated the products to be exported principally to Asia and the Far East. The possibility of capital returns of the mill, therefore, was based on pulp rather than paper production. The pulp mill was planned to go into production in 1980 or later. It was anticipated that by that time the local demand within Tanzania for pulp and paper board was expected to be up to 20 000 tons per year, of which a proportion would be supplied from the mill at Mufindi. That internal market, though small in comparison with the envisaged production of the mill, was potentially valuable, being relatively more profitable than exports. Additional export markets were anticipated to be Western Europe, which was claimed to be equally as accessible as the Far East, where a high demand was certain to arise.⁶⁷

The consultant reduced profit estimates to 13.6 percent in their report on the production of unbleached pulp because of the distance from Mufindi to Dar es Salaam.⁶⁸ The production of unbleached pulp was recommended, because of the high cost of carrying imported bleaching chemicals, which were not available in Tanzania, anyway.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the development of local chemical sources, for which a supply of electric power was needed, would enable the production of bleached pulp –the consultant advised that this was a possibility that should not be ruled out. Paper production was not considered viable by the consultants at the early stage, but was claimed by the government to have definite advantage when the local market for paper has been built up.⁷⁰

Based on these reasons, the government of Tanzania invited enquiries from other parties, other governments, international financing organisations and private organisations that were interested in financing or providing part of the finance for the development of pulp production in Tanzania.⁷¹ The consultants summarised their findings on the Mufindi pulp project as follows:

This current report has been prepared to choose a suitable mill site in the Mufindi area. It has been concluded that the best site location would be below the Mufindi Escarpment, either close to the proposed site of the Mufindi Railway Station or close to the Kigogo Ruaha River. It has also been concluded that the most economic method

⁶⁷ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 2.

⁶⁸ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 19.3.2016.

⁶⁹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 19.3.2016.

⁷⁰ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 3.

⁷¹ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 3.

to transfer pulpwood down the escarpment would be by truck and would involve the construction of an all-weather road down to the escarpment.⁷²

The consultant group calculated the price conditions at that time (1964) as the gross return on investment for 400 tons per day unbleached kraft mill would be in the order of 14 percent. The return, however, was subject to the availability of land in the areas surrounding the mill site in Mufindi. The consultant made the following recommendations concerning land requirements in Mufindi for a pulp mill:

Steps should be taken to reserve all suitable land for plantation development in the Mufindi area. Plantations should continue to be developed in this area. In addition, trial plantations should be initiated on the underdeveloped area below the Mufindi escarpment. Where several species of trees can be grown successfully, the species which would have the best pulping characteristics should be selected.⁷³

The government used the silvicultural and management experience in Mufindi area acquired far back into the colonial era, when the Kigogo arboretum centre was established in 1935. That was the time when the forest division first planted exotic trees in the Mufindi area. From the Kigogo arboretum centre, planting continued on a small scale in high rainfall forest and bushland sites in Mpanga. From 1957 planting was extended into the grassland sites of Sao Hill and gradually built up to a rate of 2 000 acres of new planting per year by 1965. Up to 1966 there were 6 714 hectares of pines planted at Sao Hill. The operation was on a sufficiently large scale to enable considerable management experience to be gained and had permitted the determination of costs applicable to operations on a scale comparable with the planting of trees for pulp production. *Pinus patula* and *Pinus Radiata* were planted initially at Kigogo. *Pinus Radiata* was affected by needle blight and planting of that species was discontinued. Species planted for pulp wood, based on experience, were to be *Pinus Patula* and *Elliottii* at Kigogo, Mpanga and Sao Hill, and *Pinus Elliottii* at Kihata. Knowledge of the latter site was limited to trials of pines planted in 1964/65, but the site was confidently expected to be very satisfactory for *Pinus Elliottii*.⁷⁴

Land availability was around 117 500 acres for pines, which occurred in three land categories: forest reserves, abandoned and revoked large farms, and public lands. Government held the ownership of the land of all the three categories. The public land, however, carried some small

⁷² Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 4.

⁷³ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania*, 4.

⁷⁴ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 6.

settlements of local people who engaged in subsistence farming. The freeing of this land by these people was to be negotiated by the government.⁷⁵

It was intended that land required for plantations plus a 10 percent additional for dead land, and mill buildings connected with the pulp project, was to be made forest reserve at an early date in order to ensure its availability for the assigned use when required.⁷⁶ Therefore, the expansion of Sao Hill was partly justified by scientific research from consultants contracted by the state. The scientific justification by the state on the basis of consultants' reports informed the forest management on the direction of land acquisition in Mufindi.

4.7 The acquisition of land to realise the pulp and paper mill vision

In 1975 the World Bank and FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) pointed out to the Tanzanian government that plans to have a pulp and paper mill using the wood from the Sao Hill plantations would materialize if land for afforestation could be made available in the vicinity areas of the Sao Hill forest (as per the aforementioned scientific study). The land to cater for the project had to be gazetted (legal ownership)⁷⁷ as a forest reserve.⁷⁸ The estimated total net area required for the industrial plantations by the World Bank loan was put at 50 000 hectares.⁷⁹

The selection of extension areas was based on two factors. Firstly, the process of selection and legalising land ownership had to be carried out within a very short time to enable the first phase of the World Bank loan for the project to take off immediately.⁸⁰ This was a condition insisted upon by the World Bank. The second condition was ensuring that the new land for afforestation be found within the vicinity of the old forests management unit. That meant that the land for afforestation to be within the vicinity of the older plantations (within Mufindi).

⁷⁵ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania* (Tanganyika Standard Limited, 1965), 8.

⁷⁶ Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Forestry Division, *Starting a Pulp Industry in Tanzania* (Tanganyika Standard Limited, 1965), 8.

⁷⁷ Legal declaration of ownership of land by government notice.

⁷⁸ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam 20.3.2016.

⁷⁹ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 6.

⁸⁰ For detailed information on the ways of obtaining land for afforestation and pulp mill, see, for example, Björn Lundgren (ed.), *Land Use in Kenya and Tanzania: The Physical Background and Present Situation and an Analysis of the Needs for its Rational Planning*, (Stockholm: Royal College of Forestry: International Rural Development Division, 1975), 277-279.

Given the above important factors, the following areas in Mufindi district were presented to the District Commissioner and village governments as target areas. The first target was the area between Msiwasi, Sao Hill and Gulusilo Forest Reserves. The second target was the area in the Ifwagi, Nundwe, Itimbo and Mafinga villages. The third target was the area south of the Sao Hill Forest Reserve up to Irunda Forest Reserve. The fourth target was the area between the Old Great North Road and the western boundary of the Sao Hill Forest Reserve. The fifth target was the area to the east of Nundwe *ujamaa* village. Finally, the sixth area was the land to the east and west of the then proposed pulp mill site at Mgololo.⁸¹

Targets one to three satisfied the scientific conditions of developing of plantation forestry, but those villages had a high demand for land for subsistence farmers and other government projects, and hence was removed from the prospective land. The land in category four satisfied the scientific conditions, but the site quality was considered lower than in the Sao Hill Block. The land in category five had a lower population, but it suffered the disadvantage of the long distance from the Sao Hill headquarters, and therefore increased the potential costs of logging and haulage. The land in category six was near the pulp and paper mill site, but suffered the disadvantages of having to wait for species trials and also the area had no communication network-roads and railway.⁸²

Acquisition of land in areas around Msiwasi, Sao Hill and Gulusilo Forest Reserves, Ifwagi, Nundwe, Itimbo, Mafinga villages, Irunda Forest Reserve and Old Great North Road and the western boundary of the Sao Hill Forest Reserve was considered to be extremely important, as phase one of the loan from the World Bank to the project could be used to extend those areas without waiting for preliminary trials for provenances.⁸³ (Provenance refers to the adaption of new species to a new environment/climate.) On the other hand, land acquisition in other areas, such as those under categories five and six, was essential to guarantee land availability for the envisaged afforestation programme. In fact, the loan agreement with the World Bank was conditional on the acquisition of sufficient land for afforestation.

⁸¹ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 4.

⁸² Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 4.

⁸³ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam 20.3.2016.

4.7.1 Strategies of land acquisition at the ground (village) level

This section explains the procedures the state deployed to get land for the Sao Hill plantation. The demand for more land for afforestation by the state came at a time when Mufindi district was reorganizing and resettling people into *ujamaa* (socialist nucleated) villages.⁸⁴ These villages developed as a result of the resettlement of the villagers from scattered areas to the centralized areas selected by the state.⁸⁵ The Forestry Department exploited this opportunity of using the land left by the villagers who were resettled into *ujamaa* (socialist) villages between 1973 and 1974 to raise the question of land for afforestation, as it was thought by the state that there would be no opposition from the people who owned it before because of the customary land ownership.⁸⁶ The villagisation programme, however, was passed as an Act of Parliament in 1973.⁸⁷ The Act gave the president of the United Republic of Tanzania the power to declare any area of Tanganyika⁸⁸ to be specified for any public purpose, and it also gave the Minister for Regional Administration the authority to issue regulations on farming. The Minister had a mandate to nullify, cancel or modify the customary land ownership. It was this act that curtailed the rights of the customary land owners in Tanzania.⁸⁹ The difficulty of acquiring land outside *ujamaa* villages was meant to limit the temptation to go back to the formerly occupied areas.⁹⁰ The survey of the forest reserve boundaries also meant a survey of the *ujamaa* village areas and hence the establishment of fixed boundaries between villages and the forest division.⁹¹

With the above advantages, an approach was made to the district authorities (District Commissioner and Councillors) detailing the Forest Department's plans for the acquisition of

⁸⁴ See, for example, A. Coulson, *Tanzania, A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 280-309, Y.Q. Lawi, "Tanzania's Operation Vijiji (villages) and Local Ecological Consciousness: the Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974-1976", *Journal of African History*, 48, 1, 74, (69-93).

⁸⁵ See, for example, James Scott, *Seeing Like a State, How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), 223-260.

⁸⁶ See the detailed debate on customary land ownership vs statutory ownership by Aida Isinika and Khalmadin Mutabazi, "Gender Dimension of Land Conflicts: Examples from Njombe and Maswa Districts in Tanzania" Kjjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (Eds), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 131-157.

⁸⁷ W. Tenga and Sist Mramba, *Manual on Land Law and Conveyancing in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2008), 70-75.

⁸⁸ The villagisation programme operated on the Tanzanian mainland only, that's why the term 'Tanganyika' was applied in the Act; see the balanced debate on the impact of the *Ujamaa* policy in Tanzania by Daniel Lucas Machunda, "Who Bewitched Us" An Analysis of the *Ujamaa* Policy in Tanzania, In comparison with the policy of the Saemaul Movement in Korea," Master's thesis, (Korea: Korea Development Institute, 2010), 18-29; See also, Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "The land Question, Land Grabbing and Agriculture in Africa" *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, 8, 2 (2013) (23-31).

⁸⁹ W. Tenga and Sist Mramba, *Manual on Land Law and Conveyancing in Tanzania*, 70-75.

⁹⁰ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, Mufindi, 8.4.2016.

⁹¹ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 4.

more land for afforestation and the target areas for acquisition. Discussions with the district authorities led to the establishment of the minimum area required for each village and the forest division was permitted to start investigations for the areas to be acquired. This was important, as other areas made available by the villages could not meet the climate and soil needs of exotic trees. It was agreed between the forest division and the district authorities that the people would be informed that the Forest Division was looking for extension areas. Furthermore the Forest Division would negotiate with the villagers on the location of the boundaries between the village and the extension areas, taking into consideration that each village must have a minimum of 3 000 hectares as its land.⁹²

The district authorities,⁹³ however, ruled out the target areas to the south of Sao Hill Forest Reserve to Irunda Forest Reserve, because this was an extension area for the Kihanga Village. Consequently, this area was dropped completely. The district authorities also ruled out the acquisition of land in the area under category number six. This was the land to the west of the pulp mill site, as this would have interfered with a ranch area. This area was also removed from the target list completely.⁹⁴

4.7.2 Inventing boundaries: the surveying process

The surveying and mapping of the Sao Hill extension areas was completed between 1 April and 30 September 1975. The survey was done hurriedly because the Tanzanian government had been determined to start a pulp and a paper mill project in the country with the support of World Bank funding. Surveying was therefore under pressure by the agreement reached between the government and the World Bank to finance the project. Because of that, some of the villages objected to the boundaries proposed by the state and indeed some villages protested against the project. In order to have enough wood supply to feed the mill, it was necessary to expand the existing project at Sao Hill. The expansion meant the need for more land in the surrounding villages. The forest division was assigned to undertake the surveying of those new areas.⁹⁵

The method to be used to survey the area at the beginning was expected to be aerial survey, a method that was thought to be cheap, quick and more accurate. However, it was unfortunate

⁹² M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

⁹³ District authorities used throughout this thesis refers to the council made between the District Commissioner (representing the central government) and the councillors (representing the people).

⁹⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 9.4.2016.

⁹⁵ M.C. Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

that there were no appropriate aerial photographs covering the extension area, a situation that resulted in a ground survey – a difficult exercise that ended in many errors that were to become a source of conflict with the surrounding communities. This was to be exacerbated by the dearth of knowledge of the original boundaries that led to the encroachment.⁹⁶ The survey was based on permanent features – be they man-made (like roads) or natural features (like rivers) already indicated on internal and external surveys. This method had the advantage of reducing the amount of field work and indeed it was assumed that it would make boundaries permanent and visible to the extent that there would be no need for clearing or maintaining the boundaries in future.⁹⁷

Survey teams from the Forest Division Headquarters in Dar es Salaam were sent to the targeted villages with some terms of reference. One of those terms was to reserve a piece of land within the targeted areas, an area from which a minimum net plantable area of 50 000 hectare could be obtained. This meant that all the targeted surrounding villages had to contribute an area of land to be secured by the forest department of not less than 50 000 hectares. Because that amount of land was needed, every village targeted by the forest department around Sao Hill forest plantation was surveyed to ascertain the land needs of the villagers. To execute such a demanding task, the surveyors conducted a minor census of the village population. The survey team worked with the village leaders and the district authorities to select the best land for exotic trees. The villagers were, however, free to show the survey team the best land for their subsistence farming and only that which they considered bad land for agriculture would supposedly be taken by the Forest Department. However, it was not always the choice of the villagers that determined the selection. Sometimes their suggestions differed and sometimes they were simply ignored. At Mtili village, for example, the Forest Department surveyors rejected the selection of the villagers to use the western part of the village land, which was considered fertile for subsistence agriculture. The forest department surveyors claimed differences arose because the villagers only looked at the fertility of land without bearing in mind the possibility of coordination of the new plantation forests. As such, clear mapping was an integral part of the surveyors' concern, while the fertility of the land was the vital issue to the villagers.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, "The Survey of the Sao Hill Forest Project Extension Areas," (Survey and Inventory Section in the Forest Division, Dar es Salaam, 1976), 2.

⁹⁷ Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, "The Survey of the Sao Hill Forest Project Extension Areas," (Survey and Inventory Section in the Forest Division, Dar es Salaam, 1976), 3-5.

⁹⁸ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu at Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

The surveyors were obliged to negotiate with the village government⁹⁹ on setting boundaries between their areas and the areas to be taken up by the forest division. The surveyors, however, were not alone in setting boundaries between the village land and the Sao Hill Forest land at all levels. There was a committee for dealing with boundary and conflict issues set up by the villagers, which was led by the Malangali Ward Division councillor, Issa Kaulete. Issa Kaulete was nominated to lead the district committee by other ward councillors as he was claimed to be intelligent and prudent. His committee visited almost all villages with complaints on boundary settings. Concerning the Tanganyika African National Union party (TANU), the district chairperson, Sikauka Chang'a, a long-serving TANU and *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) cadre, was engaged to bring consensus on setting boundaries. Sikauka Chang'a, albeit not formally educated, was an extraordinarily influential figure in the district and at regional level in bringing consensus during the process of setting boundaries between villages and forestry division.¹⁰⁰

Each village was supposed to be allocated enough land for its subsistence farming at the time of surveying and for the future planned developments. The survey committee, when allocating land to the targeted villages, had to make a forecast of the village land needs based on their respective populations for 20 years ahead.¹⁰¹ Land allocation in those villages was mainly for subsistence farming and for cattle grazing. At Ihalimba village, for example, they had set two areas for gazing: the Mfaranyaki and the *mifugo* area, because the village had many cattle-owners. The land set aside for cattle owners became famously referred to as *mifugo* [animals] area.¹⁰² The name *mifugo* for cattle grazing in those villages continued even when the livestock had been decimated to zero. At Itimbo village the *mifugo* area was still inhabited by people who still owned cattle, but they were few in number.¹⁰³

The surveying committee had to liaise with district land officials. The district land officials¹⁰⁴ advised the surveyors on the suitability of the land for agriculture. The district land officials

⁹⁹ The village government refers to the village chairman, secretary and hamlet representatives who had a mandate on the transfer of land.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016; See for, example, J. Tropp "Displaced People, Replaced Narratives: Forest Conflicts in Historical Perspectives in the Tsolo District, Transkei" *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 1 (2003), 211-214 (207-233).

¹⁰¹ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹⁰² Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, Mufindi, 8.4.2016.

¹⁰³ Interview with Marco Ngole at Itimbo Village, Mufindi, 15.3.2016.

¹⁰⁴ The district land officials were, actually, representatives of the Ministry of Land and Human Settlements. Therefore, their presence implied the legality of the land transfer from customary ownership to the central government.

assisted the land surveyors, as they well understood the local politics with regard to land tenure in the targeted villages. Furthermore, the district land officials assisted with the land survey because the starting of a national forest reserve meant a technical legal transfer of land from district authorities to the national authority.

Problems met in the process of surveying were brought to the attention of the district authorities, who solved it through either the party channel or the councillors committee. The district authorities in Tanzania wielded both party and government powers from independence (1961 to 1992), when a multiparty system was introduced in Tanzania.¹⁰⁵ Before 1992 the district authorities could transfer the contested land boundaries to either the villagers or the forest division. The district authority's decision was, in effect, the government's decision too.¹⁰⁶

Since the surveying work was to be done in the shortest possible time to allow phase one of the World Bank loan to come into effect, existing and evident natural boundaries (valleys, rivers and hills) were preferred to artificial or constructed boundaries, whenever possible.¹⁰⁷ Maps were produced as soon as the fieldwork was completed so that the gazettelement process could start on the ground.¹⁰⁸ The maps and village agreements were important, as this was a prerequisite for the World Bank loan. The then Minister for Land, Forestry and Water, Ole Saibul, gazetted the areas surveyed for forest reserves in September 1976. Because the transfer of land was so hurriedly organized, there arose some post-survey and gazettelement problems in some villages. The Mbalwe-Mfukulembe reserve experienced notorious encroachment problems since its inception in 1976,¹⁰⁹ as some villages did not reach consensus. These villages were Mapanda, Usokami and Igeleke. This meant that although there was overwhelming support for the Forest Department in many villages, there were some areas that objected to the proposal.

¹⁰⁵ Juma Ngasongwa, "Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System", *Review of African Political Economy, Surviving Democracy?* 54, 1992, (112-116).

¹⁰⁶ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹⁰⁸ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Mathias Lema, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism HQ in 16.5.2016.

4.7.3 Problems which arose out of the surveying in the extension areas

Quite a number of challenging problems arose in the field during the surveying process. One was resistance from the villagers. This happened in the villages where word had not reached about the national afforestation programme. The extreme east of the Mbalwe-Mfukulembe reserve, in villages like Usokami and Kibengu, surveyors were threatened by the villagers. Threats in these villages escalated to the extent that villagers chased away the casual labourers who were developing the tree nurseries. Indeed, even planting in those areas was difficult. The Sao Hill forest manager decided to leave the resolution of the conflict to the district authorities, as it was too difficult to manage at his level.¹¹⁰

A second challenge experienced in the establishment of the project was the constant change of opinion by villagers in the selected villages. It happened that in some cases the villagers would agree on a boundary to separate their land from the forest extension area, only to come back to demand change on the boundary the next day. This was experienced at Nyololo and Itimbo villages. The people whose land was left in the extension land in this case caused the problem. Those areas were not immediately planted, as the people thought that their land had no use to the government and should rather revert back to the customary owners.¹¹¹

The third challenge was that in some villages villagers refused to take land recommended as good for their subsistence farming. That was the case at Mtili village, where the land north of the Msiwazi Forest Reserve was considered by the Forest Division to be fertile and suitable for agriculture. When setting boundaries for the extension land, the Forest Division recommended to the villagers that the land should be included in their land, but villagers who previously resided on the western side of the Mufindi Circle road rejected this and suggested that the land on the western side was to be left to the village. This was a serious conflict, but it was resolved when the district authorities endorsed the land recommended by the forest division for agriculture and hence allocation to the village.¹¹²

The fourth issue was the use of streams with no fixed name(s) as boundaries. Boundary description was beset with problems through the use of streams which had no authentic names.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹¹¹ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹¹² Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Project Report Record No.12" (Unpublished Report, 1979), 5.

This problem could not be solved, but it was hoped that the villagers who had agreed to the boundary knew the accepted boundary and that the map would show that boundary as well.¹¹³

The fifth obstacle was that there was a problem in establishing villages in the extension areas already surveyed. That occurred at Vikula, whereby villagers from Nundwe and Ihalimba moved into an area already allotted to the forest division.¹¹⁴ Such problems were resolved by relinquishing the surveyed land to the new village. Usokami, Kibengu and Igeleke villages claimed and extended their land into the extension areas after gazettelement.¹¹⁵

The sixth problem was that some villagers in the surrounding villages went further by raising the question of compensation. Some people had tried at various times to pursue claims for their property (mainly *mianzi* bamboo trees, a few pine and eucalyptus trees) left behind in the areas acquired by the forest division. Compensation was payable only if the forest division officers took the responsibility of resettling the customary land owners. The customary owners were resettled on the pretext of the *ujamaa* (socialist) villages scheme administered by the party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the government.¹¹⁶

Moreover, the use of different types of boundaries to separate the land owned by the forest department and that owned by the villagers also aggravated the problem of encroachment in the late 1980s. The surveyors used the living natural boundaries at the beginning of the surveying process. ‘Living boundaries’ referred to trees which were planted along the boundaries to act as a beacon or sign of a boundary. Those trees were not cut down and in fact their girth was too large for normal sawing. The trees were used to set boundaries in some villages in the Mbalwe-Mfukulembe forest reserve within Division Three of the Sao Hill plantation forest.¹¹⁷ Living boundaries were recommended in the rural areas where even lay subsistence farmers could see big trees easily. The living boundaries formed by eucalyptus trees were more easily noticed than the beacons, which were not easily recognised by the villagers. The main challenge of the living boundaries was that in some cases the subsistence farmers uprooted the eucalyptus while it was still young and sometimes cut down the big trees

¹¹³ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 150-166.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Modest Mtuy at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 20.3.2016.

¹¹⁶ See a discussion by J. Tropp “Displaced People, Replaced Narratives: Forest Conflicts in Historical Perspectives in the Tsolo District, Transkei” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 1 (2003), 214 (207-233).

¹¹⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 15.3.2016.

in order to hide the boundaries. The boundaries, however, even though disturbed by the subsistence farmers, were consistently recognised by the boundary committees as they were set with grid references.¹¹⁸ See the examples of living boundaries in the Figures below.



Figure 9: An example of a living boundary at Kibengu village.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Interview with Aloyce Mawele, Iringa Forest regional official, 14.5.2016.

¹¹⁹ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.



Figure 10: An example of a living boundary, which was cut down by the peasants at Kibengu village.¹²⁰



Figure 11: The living boundary cut down by subsistence farmers to hide the real boundary.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.

¹²¹ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.

The second type of boundary indication was a beacon made from cement, but was bigger than normal beacons. The subsistence farmers did not know this type of boundary sign as they cultivated both sides of the beacons, which reflected that they were not educated about such types of boundaries. Beacons were alleged to be the colonial marks showing the site where the Germans hid precious metals when they were forced to leave Tanganyika after their defeat in the First World War (1914-1918).¹²² See some examples of beacon boundaries in the Figures below.



Figure 12: A barrel filled with cement as a sign of boundary.¹²³

¹²² Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu at Sao Hill Forest Headquarters 18.4.2016.

¹²³ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.



Figure 13: An extraordinary beacon used as a sign of a boundary at Mapanda Village.¹²⁴

The third type of boundary used in the Sao Hill plantation forest was pits. When the surveyors lacked beacons, they left the pits unfilled and later these acted as boundary signals themselves. See an example below of a pit boundary found at Mapanda village.



Figure 14: A pit used as a boundary at Kibengu Village.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.

¹²⁵ Public Relations Office, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Headquarters, 27.3.2016.

Generally, most of the problems encountered after gazettelement were either from people who wanted to go back to their old farms (their farms were the areas that the forest division took over for afforestation, but were not developed on time or the time for planting was not yet scheduled because of lack of funds), or caused by changes in the village governments following elections. The new leaders in the villages that relinquished their land to the forest department were not aware of the forest boundaries and other leaders sought influence through promising a return of the lost land to the ever-increasing population in the areas.¹²⁶ On top of that, some of the boundary signs used were not understood by the new generation in those villages as noted above.

4.8 The World Bank loan for Sao Hill forest expansion, 1975 -1980

Tanzania applied for a loan from the World Bank in 1975 for an expansion of the Sao Hill forest. The loan agreement was signed on 12 July 1976 in Washington D.C., worth US\$7 000 000¹²⁷ and was estimated to be sufficient to develop 15 750 hectares. That was almost a quarter of the required hectares for the postulated 50 000 hectares for the pulp and paper mill. The implementation of the agreement began in October the same year.¹²⁸ The agreement was conceivably delayed because its sub-sections were too demanding. The borrower on that agreement (Tanzania) was obliged to carry out the project with due diligence and efficiency in conformity with sound forestry professionalism, financial and administrative practices. Furthermore, the borrower was required to provide promptly the needed funds, facilities, services and other resources required for the purpose.¹²⁹

The unique element of aid to Tanzania was the assumption that *ujamaa*, the policy that claimed to be pro-poor in society, would (and did) attract aid.¹³⁰ Sebastian Edwards had the following to say on aid for Tanzania during Nyerere's regime:

¹²⁶ See, for example, T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 161.

¹²⁷ The amount of money was equal to 35 000 000 Tanzanian shillings and was proportional to the hectares estimated to be planted.

¹²⁸ Sao Hill Forestry Project Phase I Agreement, *World Bank Report*, (World Bank 1976), 6 [http:// documents. Worldbank.org](http://documents.Worldbank.org).

¹²⁹ Sao Hill Forestry Project Phase I Agreement, *World Bank Report*, (World Bank 1976), 6 <http:// documents. Worldbank.org>.

¹³⁰ Samuel Wangwe, "Changing Aid Modalities and Tanzanian Development Assistance Partnerships," Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (Eds), *Tanzania in Transition from Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 207-221.

After independence in 1961, the country became one of the ‘darlings’ of the international aid community between 1962 and 1983. Tanzania was one of the highest recipients of foreign aid in the world. A high proportion of this aid was bilateral and came from the European nations, especially from the Nordic countries.¹³¹

Edwards added that massive amounts of this foreign aid was used to finance the vision of socialism enshrined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.

The loan from the World Bank for afforestation, however, was not a new phenomenon in Tanzania and in Africa at large in the post-colonial period. The World Bank financed many agricultural projects in Africa after independence. Some countries, however, got World Bank aid even before independence; for example, in 1950 the World Bank financed Malawi’s colonial government to develop the Viphya plantation forest. In 1978 the World Bank, in collaboration with Belgium and France, financed Burundi to establish a plantation forest. In 1979 Nigeria got World Bank support to develop plantation forests.¹³² Moreover, the World Bank was not the only international agency that financed afforestation in Africa, but the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) also assisted in developing the forest sector in Swaziland at Usutu Pulp Co. (1950), in Tanzania at Tanganyika Wattle Co. (1949) and in Zambia at State Copper belt forest (1967).¹³³ In the Tanzanian context, the World Bank was applauded because it largely eliminated mediocre management in the Sao Hill forest by, for example, insisting that employees be vetted by both the World Bank and the Forest Division. For this reason the new employees after the World Bank loan had international credentials. The World Bank wanted to ensure that the output from Sao Hill forest received an international recognition too. The positions which were affected by the World Bank conditions were those of the project manager, financial controller, a silviculturist and the forest mechanical engineer. One of the World Bank loan conditions is worth quoting:

The borrower shall employ, after consultation with the Bank, and until the completion of the project, a project manager, financial controller, a silviculturist/forest economic and roads/mechanical engineer were to be employed by 15.11.1976.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Sebastian Edwards, *Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis* (Los Angeles, University of California, 2012), 1-6; For the detailed critical debate with left-wing point of view on international aids see, Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).

¹³² Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantations in Africa,” *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2, (2014), 147 (144-159).

¹³³ Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantations in Africa,” *International Forestry Review*, 149.

¹³⁴ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Ubungo-Oil Com, Dar es Salaam, 20.5.2016.

Before the disbursement of the World Bank fund in 1976, there were already activities on the ground. However, getting labourers for the Sao Hill forest before the disbursement of the World Bank loan was difficult, especially during the start of rainfall in December. The Sao Hill Forest managers sometimes resorted to the use of the National Service School recruits based at Mafinga town. The manager's letter to the Headmaster of the school attests to this:

I am proud to let you know that the Sao Hill Plantation Forest has expanded its yearly planting acreage from 800 to 3 300. [...] therefore it is the aim of this letter to let me know the probability of securing your strong youths at your school to assist in planting trees in early December, this year, when the rainfall starts as you know trees have to be planted with first rains.¹³⁵

The World Bank, however, demanded many reports before disbursing the money for the first phase in the Sao Hill plantation forest. One of the reports needed was that on water studies at Kigogo and Ruaha rivers. The Kigogo and Ruaha rivers were close to the site for Southern Paper Mills (SPM). The World Bank wanted to know the water flow, as this was an important element in the development of the paper and pulp mill.¹³⁶ The World Bank, despite the delays, signed an agreement on 12 July 1976 to give Tanzania a loan for expanding the Sao Hill forest acreage. The loan became effective on 12 October 1976 and as a consequence of the delay only nursery and fire protection could be undertaken during the first quarter of the loan implementation period. Activities like purchase of materials, engagement of labour and other project expenditures had to be postponed.¹³⁷ At the level of the ministry (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in Tanzania), the Director of Forests department formed a special task force to deal with the implementation of the conditions of the World Bank to secure the loan and comply with the plan set by the World Bank. The task force aimed at advising the ministry on the best ways of running the Sao Hill forest during the implementation of the World Bank loan. Furthermore, the task force aimed at acting as an immediate mediator to deal with problems related to the loan implementation period. The task force was required by the forest director to provide a detailed report on the implementation of the loan every three months.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ TNA, Manager Sao Hill Forest, 14.11.1975 to Headmaster National Service Army School, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/ VOL. II: Afforestation Scheme: Sao Hill.

¹³⁶ TNA, Forest Project Officer Mufindi, "Water Studies at Kigogo/Ruaha Rivers, 2/February/1976 to General Manager, NDC, Dar es Salaam, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹³⁷ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, "Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977", Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹³⁸ TNA, The Director of Forests Division, Dar es Salaam, "Task Force For Sao Hill Project" to Manager Sao Hill Project- Mafinga, 9/10/, 1976, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

The World Bank insisted on the use of improved seedlings too at Sao Hill forest during the implementation of its loan. The agreement read “there shall be use of best seedlings so as to ensure best output”. The best seedlings were requested from Lushoto, in Tanga region. Lushoto had the best arboretum for exotic trees in Tanzania, as it was established during the German period and was well developed by the British colonial government too.¹³⁹

The 1976/1977 Sao Hill report revealed some problems which the first phase of the World Bank loan faced at its inception. Some of them were that the key personnel, which included the plantation specialist and the financial controller, arrived late in November 1976; the late deployment of key personnel meant a slow start on project execution. The situation was further aggravated by the absence of the project engineer throughout the year. Despite these drawbacks the project succeeded in planting 1 106 hectares. However, the seedlings planted between July 1976 and June 1977 were naked rooted, because the World Bank funds were disbursed late. The use of polythene tubes started in 1978.¹⁴⁰ The introduction of polythene tubes raised hopes on reducing expenses on beating up. The project used only 4 300 000 million shillings out of 12 500 000 million allocated for the year. The low level of expenditure was the result of delays in procurement of equipment and vehicles, a shortage of building materials which held up the building programme, non-execution of the water study, and the problem of weeding as it was not stipulated in the agreements. Certain costs such as local staff salaries and expatriates’ salaries could not be attributed to the project because of the accounting system within the ministry. Practically, it was noted that almost every operation was affected by the lack of equipment and vehicles, together with staffing difficulties.¹⁴¹ In November 1976 a fire affected 93 hectares planted in 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963. Of these hectares, 72 were scorched and 21 hectares were burned completely. There were more than five fires which erupted in this period, but they were successfully contained and prevented from entering in the plantation.¹⁴²

The 1979/1980 report brought to light many things which transpired in the Sao Hill plantation during the final years of implementation of the first phase of the World Bank loan. In the period

¹³⁹ TNA, Forest Officer-Research, Mufindi, “A Tour for Fetching Seedlings” to Manager Sao Hill Project-Mafinga, 6/11/, 1976, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹⁴⁰ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹⁴¹ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹⁴² TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

1979/1980 Tanzania started experiencing the effects of the economic crisis caused by the oil shock, the Uganda-Tanzania War (1978-1979) and the decline of agriculture, the main foreign exchange earner at the time.¹⁴³

The report exposed issues such as, a proposal to divide Division Three into two forest reserves to ease administration. The proposal was tabled by the Director of Forestry (Dar es Salaam) to split the Mbalwe-Mfukulembe forest reserve into two separate forest reserves, namely Mbalwe Forest Reserve and Mfukulembe forest reserve in 1979.¹⁴⁴ The proposal did not materialize, because there were problems related to land boundaries between the forest department and the land owned by the villagers at Usokami village. The Forest Department had planted only 300 hectares at that village. The project manager decided to withdraw the proposal. The boundary conflict at Usokami village was attributed to the village chairman elevated to a ward representative, namely Gerald Mhengilolo. Mhengilolo was referred to by the former Sao Hill forest manager as the most troublesome ward councillor ever seen during his managerial tenure.¹⁴⁵

Secondly, the 1979/80 report contained detailed information about conflict which occurred over the former Allen Estate in the Forest Reserve (Former Sao Hill Hotel) between the forest project and Mafinga National Service (JKT) in 1979. The problem arose between 1973 and 1974 when the JKT contracted a Korean company to develop a strategic plan for future development for them. The Sao Hill forest administration noticed that the Korean company was surveying in the forest reserve for Sao Hill too.¹⁴⁶ The conflict was resolved by the permanent secretaries of the Ministries of Natural Resources and Tourism and that of Defence and National Service.¹⁴⁷

4.8 .1 The World Bank and fire control systems in Sao Hill forest

The 1976 World Bank loan proposed new ways of dealing with fire outbreaks in the Sao Hill plantation forestry when it endorsed its loan to Tanzania. The World Bank assessed the fire

¹⁴³ Samuel Wangwe, *Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the Case of Tanzania*, Kjell Havnevick, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives* (Uppsala, Seminar Proceedings No.18-Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 152.

¹⁴⁴ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, "Annual Report January 1979 to January 1980", Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/5: Afforestation Scheme- Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 9.3.2016 at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 9.3.2016 at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 9.3.2016 at Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam.

control systems before introducing the new approaches. The Sao Hill forest before the World Bank appraisal loan used to place fire breaks of 34 to 40 metres wide. The World Bank reversed that habit by arguing that this distance could not provide security for spot fires during the high wind speeds which was experienced at Sao Hill between September and November. Furthermore, the 34 to 40 metre fire breaks were reported to be too wide and, indeed, were expensive to maintain.

The World Bank recommended that the minor fire breaks of 30 m wide be planted with trees up to the road side. The sides of the fire breaks which were adjacent to the roads were cultivated and ploughed instead of being an open space. The World Bank instructed the Sao Hill plantation forest that the major fire breaks of 40 metre wide be planted with trees of *Pinus Kyasya* species. The World Bank argued that effective fire control did not depend on the width of the fire lines, but on getting highly trained gangs to deal with fire outbreaks in the shortest possible time. They also insisted that the firebreaks be readily passable throughout the year.¹⁴⁸ The Sao Hill project was advised to use 20 to 30 trained people on fire protection in both *Pinus Patula* and *Pinus Elliottii* plantations. The number of fire crews were to include drivers, forest guards and fire fighters. Furthermore, one special car (Land Rover) was to be assigned for fire investigations and fighting. The World Bank also suggested that a local telephone system linking the fire tower and the forest stations in the highlands be installed. Moreover, the forest project was advised to start a programme of educating the surrounding community on the importance of forestry. Education on the importance of forestry and collective firefighting was aimed at promoting good public relations and thus eliminating fires which could be caused by careless smoking, hunters, farm cultivators and arsonists. Moreover, the forest project was advised to have water points/hydrants in the forest plantation essentially for providing water for firefighting.¹⁴⁹

The fire protection section was improved between 1979 and 1980 as two vehicles were delivered to the forest project by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Furthermore, a seven-ton lorry was delivered for the same purpose. Fire towers were manned for 24 hours a day and 12-hour patrol were carried out. The World Bank was preoccupied with the fire

¹⁴⁸ TNA Manager, Sao Hill Project, Mafinga "Fire Control and Organisation" 13 April 1977 to Director of Forestry, Dar es Salaam, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/36/12/2.Fire Reports.

¹⁴⁹ TNA Manager, Sao Hill Project, Mafinga "Fire Control and Organisation" 13 April 1977 to Director of Forestry, Dar es Salaam, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/36/12/2.Fire Reports.

protection measures because two major fires occurred at that time, one in the area planted in 1975 and replanted in 1978. The fire destroyed all tree stock planted in 1978. The area affected in the land planted in 1975 was about 40 hectares.¹⁵⁰ Another major fire occurred in the area planted in 1976, which had been replanted in 1979. A total of 58 hectares were completely destroyed. The culprit was jailed for six months. Lighting caused a fire in the area planted in 1962 (Msonzogo block), which burnt thirty *Pinus Elliottii* before the accompanying downpour put the fire out. The much awaited radio system for fire protection was finally installed in October 1979. Up to January 1980 the project had seven mobile radios (six Land Rovers and one in a lorry) and seven fixed stations, including the control centre.¹⁵¹

4.8.2 The start of the pulp and paper Mill in Mufindi

Construction on the paper mill in Mufindi started to in 1979. Its construction took place piecemeal as it lasted until 1986 when it was opened. Its location was chosen to increase justification for the TAZARA railway in spite of concerns over effluent discharge.¹⁵² In the late 1980s the pulp and paper mill was the largest industrial project in Tanzania as well as the largest industrial project supported by SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) in Tanzania. The mill, with a capacity of 60 000 tons, was expected to produce paper and pulp from soft wood produced in the Sao Hill plantation. Its output was intended to meet the increasing demand for paper. The mill further aimed to add value to local production, with positive impacts on the economy at national, regional and local levels.¹⁵³ The mill was financed mainly by the World Bank, the German Development Bank and the National Development cooperation (NDC) of Tanzania. The initial SPM investment cost was USD\$240 million; however, in the late 1980s an additional USD\$65 million was spent on upgrading and operations.¹⁵⁴

4.9 Conclusion

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 19.3. 2016, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁵¹ TNA, Sao Hill Forest Project, Mafinga, “Annual Report 1st July 1976 to 30th June 1977”, Acc. No. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7: Sao Hill Forest Project.

¹⁵² A. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 65-66; See also, C. Christiansson and J. Ashuvud, “Heavy Industry in a Rural Tropical Ecosystem,” *Working Paper*, 1-8, (University of Dar es Salaam, 1985) 127-133.

¹⁵³ M. Katila et al., *Three Decades of Swedish Support to the Tanzanian Forestry Sector, 1969-2002* (SIDA Department for Natural Resources and Environment, 2002), 97.

¹⁵⁴ M. Katila et al., *Three Decades of Swedish Support to the Tanzanian Forestry Sector, 1969-2002* (SIDA Department for Natural Resources and Environment, 2002), 97.

Between 1962 and 1980, Tanzania experienced seismic socio-political events that affected many economic sectors including the forestry sector. Villagisation as part of the operations of the ruling party, TANU, was claimed by some environmental scholars such as Y.Lawi¹⁵⁵ and I. Kikula¹⁵⁶ to be detrimental to the environment. This chapter argues that, contrary to this, there were some cases where villagisation was used in a positive way with beneficial environmental effects, like some parts of Mufindi district where the programme was used to expand the Sao Hill plantation. The Sao Hill plantation forest, during this span of 20 years, was planned to increase its output to the extent of establishing industries to process pulp, paper and wood for internal consumption and foreign export. The land for expansion of the forest, however, was another milestone, as the negotiations for the transfer of land from its customary owners (villagers) left many disputes which later, warranted commissions of inquiries from different state organs. With respect to land acquisition, this chapter has challenged A. Kifyasi's contention that there were no negotiations between the state and the customary owners by arguing that there were negotiations between the state and the customary land owners at the time of acquisition.¹⁵⁷ However, this chapter argues that during the negotiations, the state, through party machinery, dominated the negotiations. The party (TANU later CCM) in Mufindi assisted the state to expand the Sao Hill forest as opposed to what was revealed by Sunseri in Lindi district.¹⁵⁸ Domestic and international events affected the expansion mission as the government failed to contribute to the expansion processes and hence they relied on the World Bank only. While the Arusha Declaration and villagisation helped in expanding the acreage of the Sao Hill forest the Uganda-Tanzania War (1978-1979), the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and the oil crisis signalled the start of an economic crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s. These external factors combined with the internal factors, gradually, halted the Tanzania's socialism programme. The rushed surveying of the land as a prerequisite for securing a loan from the World Bank, by and large, left problems at the Sao Hill forest. This chapter has tried to connect those events orchestrated by the state as it desired to expand the Sao Hill plantation, sadly without funding, as there was an economic crisis and hence the World Bank loan remained the sole funder of the project. This chapter has unearthed the complex

¹⁵⁵ Yusufu Lawi, "Tanzania's Operation *Vijiji* and Local Ecological Consciousness: the Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974-1976", *Journal of African History*, 48, 1, 2007, 74, 69-93.

¹⁵⁶ Idris Kikula, *Policy Implications on Environment: The Case of Villagisation in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University Press, 1996).

¹⁵⁷ A. Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities' Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010", (MA Diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 2015).

¹⁵⁸ T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 161.

process the Sao Hill forest used to secure land as a condition to get a loan from the World Bank. The loan from the World Bank was necessary as the country was battered by economic crisis which, eventually, halted socialism policies.

CHAPTER FIVE

“Negotiating with donors and the peasants for sustainability?” Economic liberalization and the Sao Hill Forest, 1981-2000.

5.1 Introduction

The Sao Hill plantation forest between 1981 and 2000 literally survived as a result of a second loan from the World Bank, which was obtained in 1983. The World Bank’s appraisal fund for the plantation forest had strings attached, because the first phase loan disbursed in 1976 was allegedly not well implemented. The second loan was disbursed at the beginning of an economic crisis, which started in the late 1970s and ended in the mid-1980s.¹ There was pressure from the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) with regard to reforms in the economy of Tanzania when the appraisal fund was signed. The IMF proposed significant top-down measures: that the government devalue the currency by at least 50 percent, increase the price of basic foods, freeze minimum wages and reduce government spending from 1982. Tanzania, however, remained adamant not to abide by the IMF and World Bank’s proposed reforms at first (1981-1985).² Yet, in 1986, in the face of a civil servants salary payment³ crisis, declining terms of trade, mounting debt and currency deflation, Tanzania belatedly accepted the terms of an IMF Economic Recovery Programme.⁴ While these events were unfolding at a macro level, booming population growth and increasing divisions over land ownership led to several land commissions ranging from Presidential (countrywide) to District Commissions in Mufindi district.

This chapter will discuss the initiatives implemented in the Sao Hill plantation forest in the two decade period between 1981 and 2000. The chapter will use data from primary as well as secondary sources: archival sources from the Sao Hill plantation forests archive (SHPFA) in Mufindi district and a handful from the central archive housed in Dar es Salaam (TNA) were utilised. In addition, the chapter draws on oral sources through interviews with different

¹ Andrew. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 187.

² Jacob Arnold, “Approach to the International Monetary Fund” *Tanzanian Affairs*, 14, (Business and the Economy, 1982) <https://tzaffairs.org/1982>. (Available 24.9.2016); See, for example, Anna Muganda, *Tanzania’s Economic Reforms-and Lessons Learned*, (The World Bank Report, 2004), 1-7.

³ The government was failing to pay salaries to its civil servants. The government resorted to rescue from the IMF and World Bank.

⁴ A. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods”, 187; See also, Devesh Kapur (Ed.), *The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 2, Perspective* (Washington D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 169.

stakeholders ranging from the ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism officials to the villagers living in the vicinity of the forest. The period under discussion was preoccupied with external pressure with regard to both scientific paradigms and policy changes. The biodiversity paradigm was emerging in or during 1980 in the field of conservation worldwide. In Tanzania the paradigm influenced some key economic partners to shift from funding plantation forests to focusing funding efforts on natural forests. This new paradigm understood the forest as not merely an aggregation of individual trees, but as an integrated, organic entity, comprising all the innumerable living organisms that exist from the roots deep in the ground to the crowns of the trees that sway high up in the sunlight.⁵ The paradigm expanded the stakeholders from plantation forest experts to the village forests. Indeed, the paradigm introduced participatory forest management strategies.⁶ One of the outcomes of adopting the biodiversity paradigm in Tanzania was the creation of the Udzungwa National Park as part of the Eastern Arc Mountains in 1992 with habitats of exceptional biodiversity.⁷ The exceptional biodiversity areas were referred to as biodiversity ‘hot spots’ and their habitats were claimed to be under extreme threat because of deforestation.⁸ The paradigm, indeed, attracted some key donors in support of plantation forests and the shift to natural forests, which were allegedly under more severe threat than plantations were. This chapter therefore argues that between 1981 and 2000 the Sao Hill forest, experiencing a lack of funding from the government, resorted to negotiations with external bodies for funding and internally with villagers in order to sustain the land allotted for extension. The Sao Hill management adopted some new rhetoric of participatory forest management, the natural forests method used to protect fire and land encroachments. Furthermore, this chapter argues that as Tanzania was implementing the economic liberalisation policies imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1986, ironically the pulp and paper mill in Mufindi closed its doors for good in 1997.⁹ The pulp and paper mill was integral to World Bank funding as it was the main customer of logs from Sao

⁵ Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 166.

⁶ E. Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009), 11.

⁷ See, for example, Fortunata Msoffe, Conservation Enforcement in Udzungwa Mountain National Park. How to protect Biodiversity While Promoting a Good Neighbourhood, Berkeley, at <http://Berkeley.edu>. (Available on 18/10/2016).

⁸ T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 165; See also, Christopher Conte, *Highland Sanctuary, Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains*, (Ohio University Press, 2004), 150-151; Ladislaus Nsubemuki, *Selection of Exotic Tree Species and Provenances for Afforestation in Tanzania* (PhD diss., University of Joensuu, 1998), 27.

⁹ A. Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998”, 187-194.

Hill forests, and indeed, this was the only way to realise profit from both, the Sao Hill plantation and the pulp and paper mill. The closure of the pulp and paper mill in Mufindi created a crisis for the Sao Hill forest.

The chapter starts with a brief history of the period, followed by a discussion of the second loan from the World Bank. The chapter then dwells on the land commissions which affected the mapping of Sao Hill forest plantation. The chapter ends by discussing the short-lived pulp and paper mill and the aftermath of its closure for good in 1997. This chapter unearths the contexts that faced Tanzania to the extent of abandoning some of its core principles-socialism and self-reliance, giving way gradually to neoliberal policies. The chapter enumerates a number of internal and external factors and its implication on the plantation forests sector of Tanzania.

5.2 Historiographical matters

This chapter will draw from and challenge, sometimes extend debates from various scholars discussing plantation forestry in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter draws from Andrea Leys and Jerome K. Vanclay, who discussed the conflicts arising from changes in land use in Australia. The conflicts came about as plantation forests in Australia expanded rapidly to respond to the increased demand from domestic consumption and export of saw logs, paper and paperboard products. The Australian farmers in the proximity to those plantations, however, were not happy with the change in land use in temperate regions, which were once used for traditional agriculture enterprises such as dairying, and sheep and cattle farming.¹⁰ Leys and Vanclay add that in Australia the owners of plantation forests removed the remnant native tree species from land prepared for the establishment of plantations.¹¹ Remnant tree species accommodated non-timber products like mushrooms and fruit, hence they were crucial to human consumption and environmental sustainability. This chapter draws from Leys and Vanclay's discussion to examine disputes arising from land for subsistence farming and cattle grazing in the villages around the Sao Hill plantation forest. This chapter will not discuss the ecological impacts as Leys and Vanclay do with reference to the experience of Australia. Moreover, the chapter will draw from Evaristo Mapedza, who discussed the conflicts of land use emanating from the convergence of dual tenure, which arises when subsistence farmers

¹⁰ Andrea J. Leys and Jerome K. Vanclay, *Land Use change Conflicts Arising from Plantation Forestry Expansion: Views Across, Australian Fence Lines* (Southern Cross University, 2010), 1-10.

¹¹ Leys and Vanclay, *Land Use change Conflicts Arising from Plantation Forestry Expansion: Views Across, Australian Fence Lines*, 9.

understand land ownership through the lens of customary land ownership versus the state which uses legislation.¹² The people around the Mafungautsi forest in Zimbabwe felt that the legally demarcated forest reserve land for establishing the forest was stolen from them. They claimed that the colonial state took their land under the pretext of using scientific evidence.¹³ Mapedza's argument is more or less similar to what happened in the villages around the Sao Hill forest. People around the forest felt that the land used by the forest department was theirs. They could justify this by showing the graveyards of grandparents, and their remnant trees of bamboo and eucalyptus. This chapter will draw from Mapedza's perspective to explain the focus on the land taken under the pretext of the villagisation operation in Tanzania between 1973 and 1976.

This chapter also draws from C. Conte and E. Zahabu, who discussed the role played by the surrounding communities in the natural forests. The sustainability of the forests from 1992, when Tanzania signed the Convention for Biodiversity, depended a great deal on the compromises reached between the forest-based communities, the donors and the state interests. The communities around the forests were integral to sustainability, as they depended heavily on the forests' products for their survival.¹⁴ Based on the biodiversity paradigm, these scholars argued that the survival of the forests needed a participatory way of protecting forests. This chapter will draw on Conte and Zahabu's discussion because in the 1990s the Sao Hill plantation forests negotiated with the surrounding communities on boundaries by forming land commissions so as to ensure the sustainability of the forest.¹⁵

Furthermore, this chapter draws from the work of T. Sunseri, who debated the social conflicts in the forests in the hinterland of the east coast of the Indian Ocean. Sunseri's meticulous work brought to light the conflicts between the state and the customary land owners which centred

¹² Evaristo Mapedza "Forestry Policy in Colonial and Postcolonial Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change" *Journal of Historical Geography* 33 (London School of Economics: 2007), 845 (833-851); On the debate on traditional land rights see, K. Warner, "Patterns of Tree Growing by Farmers in Eastern Africa" J.E.M. Arnold and P.A. Dewees (Ed.) *Farms, Trees and Farmers, Responses to Agricultural Intensification* (London: Earthscan Publication, 1997), 102-104.

¹³ Mapedza "Forestry Policy in Colonial and Postcolonial Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change" *Journal of Historical Geography* 33, 845.

¹⁴ Christopher Conte, *Highland Sanctuary, Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains*, (Ohio University Press, 2004), 150-151; Eliabu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009),10-11.

¹⁵ Christopher Conte, *Highland Sanctuary, Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains*, 150-151; Eliabu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009),10-11; Interview with Raphael Lutumo (70), Ihalimba Village, Mufindi, 6.4.2016.

on the forest ownership.¹⁶ In the early 1990s the population increase and the failure of socialism caused the people around the forests to demand more land for subsistence farming. Some villagers of Nzasa in Kisarawe district went further by petitioning the forest division to release forest reserve land for farming and they also challenged the accuracy of forest borders. These peasants threatened forest workers. This chapter examines these scenarios by using the communities around the Sao Hill forest in Mufindi district. The chapter discusses the misunderstandings that arose because of the land that was taken for the forest, but was not developed into plantations. Subsistence farmers who relinquished their land during villagisation encroached on the land, when they saw that the land was idle despite it being legally owned by the state through a notice gazetted in 1976. The inadequate methods for fixing the boundaries exacerbated the conflict.

The arguments put forward by Jacob Tropp and T. Sunseri on forest boundaries as a source of contestation between the forest departments and the peasants are useful for this chapter. Forest boundaries are always being negotiated because of either population increase (land for peasant or commercial farming/grazing) of the forest surrounding communities or the international pressure on conservation of some areas with unique species which deserve preservations. Tropp argued that in the Tsolo district in South Africa the colonial government was forced to redefine the boundaries for conservation and for settler farming. The redefinition led to the resettlement of the local communities, whereas in Sunseri's case at Kazimzumbwi forest reserve, the state expanded the forest boundaries because of pressure from the non-governmental organisations in favour of conservation to preserve unique species which were on the verge of extinction. This chapter will not debate the extension of the forest boundaries, but will discuss the reduction of the size of plantation forest's extension areas in the Sao Hill forest reserve for subsistence farming and grazing because of population increase in the surrounding villages.¹⁷ This chapter also draws on the work of Samuel Wangwe and Knud E. Svendsen, who elaborated on the implications of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund support for the economy of Tanzania. The two economics scholars note the long time it took for Tanzania to sign the economic reforms, namely from 1978 to 1985. While Tanzania was obsessed with the currency devaluation, the IMF and the World Bank were concerned with the

¹⁶ Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 178-179.

¹⁷ Jacob Tropp, "Displaced People, Replaced Narratives: Forest Conflicts and Historical Perspectives in the Tsolo District, Transkei", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 1, (2010), 212-214 (207-233); T. Sunseri, "Something Else to Burn: Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4, (2005), 610-612 (609-640).

deteriorating economy. Wangwe and Svendsen, however, did not link the IMF/World Bank economic liberation programme in Tanzania with plantation forestry. This chapter will discuss the connection between economic liberalization and plantation forestry in Tanzania.¹⁸

5.3 World Bank loan II for Sao Hill, 1981-2000

The Sao Hill forest survived in the years between 1981 and 2000 as a result of the World Bank loan. The loan worth US\$12 000 000 was approved on 13 April 1982 and became effective on 16 March 1983.¹⁹ With the exchange rate of 140 Tanzanian shillings at the time, the loan was worth Tsh. 1 680 000 000. In the Tanzanian context at the time of disbursement, given the economic crisis of the time, this was indeed a handsome loan. The loan aimed at expanding the Sao Hill forest plantations to meet the needs of the pulp and paper mill envisaged way back in the mid-1960s. Furthermore, the World Bank loan phase II was intended to consolidate and strengthen the project implementation and management capacity in the forests established under phase I. The major project components of the loan were maintaining 1 106 ha of forests developed under the phase I loan, establishing of 10 000 ha of new plantation and the construction of forest roads, tracks, fire breaks, fire towers and more buildings for workers. The loan was aimed at consolidating the plantations to meet the needs of the pulp and paper mill which was commissioned in 1985.²⁰ The country faced many economic difficulties during the implementation period and the consequent shortages of government funds caused serious delays in the implementation period. For most of the project years, less than half of the funds from the state requested were approved. Under those circumstances, project management decided to speed up the afforestation programme through World Bank fund at the expense of sound silvicultural practices and infrastructure development.²¹

The Sao Hill forest management reconsidered the World Bank report on the performance of the first phase loan and promised to adhere to the terms of the second phase loan. Some of the key reservations expressed by the World Bank on the implementation of the loan on the first phase had to do with staff changes. The World Bank loan conditions stipulated that the staff

¹⁸ Samuel Wangwe, "Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the Case of Tanzania" Kjell Havnevik, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives* (Uppsala, Seminar Proceedings No.18-Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 151-154; K. Svendsen "Development Strategy and Crisis Management" C. Legum and G. Mmari (Ed) *Mwalimu (Teacher), The Influence of Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Press, 1995), 117-124.

¹⁹ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 1.

²⁰ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 1.

²¹ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 1.

allocated to the forest project had to have international credentials to avoid the mediocrity experienced in the first phase. The transferring of technical staff, sometimes on the grounds of political considerations, did not please the World Bank. These transfers, as reported in the first phase of implementing the loan, compromised the professionalism of the operation and indeed the output too.²²

The World Bank report on the first World Bank loan was suspicious of the financial management of the Sao Hill plantation. The report indicated that the financial controller was not independent in disbursing the money, as was stipulated in the agreement. Interference in the finance management insinuated that the fund was being tampered with by some officials, especially in getting the project off the ground (between 1976 and 1977). The long-serving manager, Modest Mtuy, admitted that the earlier administration before him had tried to tamper with the money for the Sao Hill appraisal loan phase one:

The World Bank wanted to freeze the loan at the very beginning of the implementation because of Sao Hill forest project administration mismanagement of fund. The Division of Forests and Bee Keeping Director was forced to send me there to rescue the situation. At Sao Hill I was the most hated forest manager as I clung to principles of silviculture and abiding by the loan agreement which I was a key part of the delegation to New York, together with Emanuel Mnzava [the Forestry and Bee Keeping Director at the time] and Athumani Janguo [who represented the members of parliament at that occasion].²³

The World Bank had emphasised the qualifications of the employees of the Sao Hill forest project, as it took for granted that proper credentials were a key element in robust forest management and development. The forest project was sometimes advised to consult the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) in the exercise of identifying and recruiting suitable candidates for the Sao Hill forest. The most contentious positions, however, were those of the assistant project manager (Finance and Planning), workshop manager and silvicultural specialist. The World Bank, moreover, suggested that should the management of Sao Hill project fail to consult the FAO, the Nairobi World Bank office could also be consulted.²⁴ The World Bank also requested the Curriculum Vitae of the aforesaid officials. The World Bank was very eager to know the credentials of the manager who replaced Modest Mtuy, the Sao Hill forest project manager most appreciated by the World Bank, when he took a short leave

²² TNA, Manager Sao Hill Forest Project “Comments on Project Performance Audit Memorandum” to World Bank, Washington DC, 25.4.1983, Acc. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7 Sao Hill Forest Project.

²³ Interview with Modest Mtuy, the longest serving manager at Sao Hill forest, 1978-1992, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam Tanzania, 14.3.2016.

²⁴ TNA, The World Bank “Sao Hill Forestry, Phase II: Supervision Visit” to Director of Forests, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Tanzania 1.7.1982, Acc. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7 Sao Hill Forest Project.

for his Master's degree at Edinburg University in 1982.²⁵ Those measures meant that the issue of the qualification of workers was extremely important in the second phase loan from the World Bank. It is acknowledged by many forest stakeholders that the second phase eliminated mediocre performance in the running of the Sao Hill forest plantation.²⁶

The World Bank loan phase II was aimed, first, at the development of 18 000 hectares planted during the phase I loan signed in 1976. Secondly, the loan aimed at establishing an additional 10 000 hectares for the production of saw logs and pulp wood, the construction of about 160 kilometres of forest secondary roads and 725 kilometres of tracks, upgrading of some 120 kilometres of secondary forest roads to primary standard and maintenance of such roads, and purchasing of trucks.²⁷ Furthermore, the loan was aiming at construction of 58 staff houses and other buildings and structures, and the maintenance of such houses and buildings. Strengthening of the mechanical engineering services, and designing financial and management information systems for the project management were also part of the main loan fund.²⁸

Moreover, the communication and transportation unit in the forest project was given a high priority in the second phase of the loan to the forest project. Vehicles, tractors, machinery and initial spare parts were to be bought. The tender bids to buy those facilities, however, had some strings attached, as it stipulated that domestic manufacturers were to be allowed preference of only 15 percent, while the remaining 85 percent was subjected to internationally recognised bidders.²⁹

The final World Bank report, which came out in 1992, assessed the implementation of the second loan to the Sao Hill forest project. The World Bank report admitted that the main objective of establishing plantation trees to supply the emerging wood-based industries in Mufindi was reached. The World Bank further admitted that the plantations would reduce pressure on the natural forests for timber and energy. It was reported that the long-sought aim

²⁵ TNA, The World Bank "Sao Hill Forestry, Phase II: Supervision Visit" to Director of Forests, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Tanzania 1.7.1982, Acc. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7 Sao Hill Forest Project.

²⁶ Interview with Fidelis Mwanaliku, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

²⁷ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 1.

²⁸ TNA, Sao Hill Forestry Phase II: General Procurement Notice 31.7.1982, Acc. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7 Sao Hill Forest Project.

²⁹ TNA, Sao Hill Forestry Phase II: General Procurement Notice 31.7.1982, Acc. 604, File No. FD/33/23/7 Sao Hill Forest Project.

of ameliorating the climate was reached, verified by the reduction of wind movement and the return of wildlife.³⁰ The World Bank report, however, cautioned on project sustainability:

It would be difficult to achieve sustainability if the project were to be managed under a normal government subject to lengthy bureaucratic procedures. A management system with an autonomous body and an assured source of finance is vital for the long-term sustainability of the project.³¹

Generally, the World Bank phase II strengthened silvicultural management in the forest project and, indeed, it succeeded in establishing an internationally reputable degree of professionalism in the daily running of the Sao Hill plantation project.

5.4 Land commissions for Sao Hill, 1982-2000

This section deals with four land commissions to revisit land problems related to villages around the Sao Hill forest. The Iringa region land commission of 1988/1989 was the first one to revisit the land problems in the villages around the Sao Hill forest. Two commissions were formed by the Mufindi District Commissioner, in 1992 and 1994. The presidential land commission formed in 1992 had some cases from Mufindi district related with Sao Hill forest too.

The Sao Hill forest experienced a lot of cases of encroachment ranging from subsistence farmers to private forest companies' developers. By the 1990s the importance of plantation forests for earning cash was well known by the surrounding communities. Cash was earned through selling logs to independent loggers who were timber businessmen. Because of the profit earned from forests and knowledge disseminated by the forest department there were many cases of encroachment. To solve this problem, the regional land department formed a commission to revisit the land disputes related to the Sao Hill forest.

The first land commission was formed in 1988 by the Iringa region Land Committee. The Iringa region committee on land disputes with the villages around the Sao Hill forest left a long lasting legacy as it suggested that the 'excess' land should be returned to the villagers. The committee was formed on 10 November 1988 to investigate the land disputes between the

³⁰ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 10.

³¹ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 10.

forest department and eight villages, namely Itimbo, Wami-Mbalwe, Ugesa, Vikula, Usokami, Kibengu, Udumuka and Mfukulembe.³² The committee was led by J.D.C. Mgaya, who was by then the Regional Land Officer (Iringa Region). The regional Land Committee visited the villages which had land problems with the forest department. However, this committee was not the first one, because there was the previous land committee formed in 1986 by the Mufindi district authorities, whose records were not found either at Tanzania National Archive or at the Sao Hill Forest Archive. The 1988 regional Land Committee was formed on the grounds that the earlier committee (1986) did not reach consensus with the stakeholders. It was reported that the Sao Hill forest management was adamant to return the land to the villages.³³ The 1988/89 Land Committee established the causes of the land disputes between the villagers and the Sao Hill plantation forest by listing the causes: firstly, some villages did not reach consensus on boundaries with the surveyors of the Sao Hill forest plantation in 1976. In some villages the Land Committee heard the shocking truth when the villagers informed them that they first noticed that their land was relinquished to the Forest Department when they saw the surveyors surveying. This scenario was the case in Mfukulembe village and in some parts of Usokami village.³⁴

The second cause of the land dispute arose when it was alleged by some villagers that the surveying committee inserted the boundary beacons in the land disputed area in the absence of the village leaders in the hot spot villages. The problem of surveying was reported by the regional Land Committee to be caused by the surveyors who lacked the geographical knowledge of the area they were surveying. The Iringa region, where Mufindi district was, has a rolling landscape with many hills and valleys, which presumably perplexed the surveyors. To survey well, the surveyors needed to know the names of the many hills, valleys and rivers. The regional report revealed that the surveyors' names of places of Mufindi district villages found on their maps were not applicable in some of villages. For example, at Itimbo village there was a river boundary, namely Makadupa, which was reported as non-existent in that village since it was established.³⁵ In addition to that information, the regional report discovered that some of the surveyors were not trustworthy, because they distorted the land boundaries from the ones

³² SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

³³ SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

³⁴ Interview with Aloyce Mawele, Iringa region Forest Official, 16.5.2016, Iringa Region Headquarters.

³⁵ SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

agreed with the villagers. It was assumed that the surveyors were in such a hurry that they tampered with the agreed boundaries. Surprisingly, distortion of the boundaries was influenced neither by the forest department nor the villagers, but by the surveyors themselves, who were new in the montane zone of Mufindi district.³⁶ The villages which experienced land disputes were those which had relinquished their land through the villagisation process (1973-1976). Many villagers, who were not well educated, thought that the land which had not been planted was theirs. They thought it was of no use to the forest department as it was seen to be standing idle. This scenario proved that the rural communities accepted the customary ways of land ownership, while the government understood land ownership through the Western system- statutory system- whereby the subsistence farmers own the land in usufruct terms.³⁷

Thirdly, the regional Land Committee report produced more interesting results. The report indicated that in some villages the villagers were aware of the surveying process and boundaries. The real problem, however, was population increase and greed for land, which forced them to take refuge in claiming ignorance about the boundary signs. To prove the population increase factor, the regional land committee conducted a micro census of human beings and their livestock and found that there was a tremendous increase of population and livestock. The land left to them was not enough for subsistence farming, which was the basis of their livelihood, see table 2. For these reasons the villagers were forced to encroach on the forest reserve for grazing and, for some of them, even for subsistence farming.³⁸ Population pressure was the cause for the Itimbo and Vikula villages to encroach on the forest reserves. At Vikula village subsistence farmers encroached on the forest land and felt optimistic that the forest department would return the land to the villagers without informing the District Commissioner. The forest department was forced to change the boundaries of the forest to let the overpopulated Vikula village get more land to meet their subsistence needs in liaison with the District Commissioner.³⁹

Table 2: Population increase in the villages adjacent to Sao Hill plantation⁴⁰

³⁶ SHFPA “Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988” File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages), Interview with Mathias Lema, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Headquarters, Dar es Salaam.

³⁷ SHFPA “Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988” File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

³⁸ SHFPA “Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988” File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

³⁹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, 14.3. 2016

⁴⁰ United Republic of Tanzania National Census, 1988 and 2012.

Village	Ha	Population 1988	Population 2012
Itimbo	4 857	2 063	3 817
Wami	3 411	1 433	2 163
Ugesa	2 127	4 269	6 518
Vikula	3 227	982	1 907
Usokami	6 006	2 981	4 120
Mfukulembe	3 252	1 375	2 860
Kibengu	3 411	1 812	2 917
Mapanda	7 518	1 927	3 417

The regional Land Committee visited the eight villages engaged in land disputes. The Land Committee had the mandate of returning land to the villages and/or adding land to the forest department. To take away land from the villages or add to the plantation, the committee made an estimate of land demand in the villages for all purposes for the next 20 years. From 1988 the forecast land use demands was to reach a maximum in 2008. The land granted per family depended on the population per village, number of people per household and the number of households with livestock. Each household, according to the regional land report, was liable to get three hectares for subsistence farming. The Land Committee allocated land for an *ujamaa* farm also, as those farms acted as the primary units for imparting socialist ideas. The *ujamaa* (socialist) farm was granted a portion of ten hectares. There was also land for a forest for firewood for the community, which took up 14 hectares. The settlement land claimed 0.4 hectares per household, while animals took a sum of land amounting to three and half hectares to every household with cattle. Services shared by the community, such as schools and dispensaries, were allocated 15 hectares.⁴¹

The regional Land Committee of 1988/1989 generally reduced the land from the Sao Hill forest project amounting to 7 322 and it reverted back to the villagers for subsistence farming. Five villages benefited from the regional land commission, except Mfukulembe, Udumuka and Mapanda. These villages were found to have excess land, as it was revealed that they had leased

⁴¹ SHFPA “Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988” File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

some of their land to the investors. Mfukulembe village had leased its land to the Teresina Congregation Sisters (Roman Catholic Iringa Diocese), while the Mapanda and Udumuka villages had leased their land to private tree growers and maize growers respectively.⁴²

The 1988/89 land commission remained a cornerstone of the Mufindi district land committees formed in 1992 and 1994. The 1992 and 1994 land commissions made follow-up visits to cross-check the implementation of the regional land deliberation on the villages with land disputes with the Sao Hill plantation forest. The regional land committee (1988/1989) reduced the Sao Hill forest by a total of 7 322 hectares, which land then reverted back to the five villages.⁴³ The removal of such a big piece of land from the forest project led the manager of the overall forest project to table a new land petition before the Mufindi District Commissioner in the middle of 1990. He made a case that the forest plans of planting trees for the pulp and paper mill would be impeded by the loss of the land that reverted to the villages according to the regional land commission's findings. The forest manager suggested to the District Commissioner that the land in the extreme south of the district in the proximity of a proposed pulp and paper mill could make the best replacement. The land in the suggested villages in the south of the Sao Hill forest project was claimed to be lying idle. This was a reference to a big farm which was allocated to be a state dairy farm, a plan that did not materialize. The manager wanted the farm be part of the land for replacement.⁴⁴

The manager made the case that the villagers were ready to accommodate the forest project, as they could benefit directly and indirectly by being in the proximity of the forest project. The benefits of developing plantation forestry in the extreme south of Mufindi in the proximity of the TAZARA⁴⁵ (Tanzania Zambia Authority) and the pulp and paper mill, however, were not

⁴² SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

⁴³ SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

⁴⁴ SHFPA "Report of Boundary Dispute between Sao Hill Plantation Forest and the Villages, December, 1988" File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

⁴⁵ TAZARA has been in an indirect project to the Sao Hill timber business especially at Sao Hill Saw mill. However, at the beginning the assumption was that the TAZARA would benefit the products of both Mufindi paper mill and Sao Hill Saw mill. The reasons behind all these can be categorized into the following: first, conflict of interest among the transport business class which, arguably, includes the politicians who owns countless trucks who freight cargo from Sao Hill to Dar es Salaam - for retail and export, secondly, the scale of economy of using the trucks and the railway do indicate that the use of trucks was cheaper than the railway, "railway costs and charges and the relationship between are more complicated than those of road transport", see, for example, Ngila Mwase, *Railway Pricing in Developing Countries: A comparative Analysis of Tariffs and Unit Costs of the TAZARA and Competing Routes in Southern Africa*, e. journal, 21, 2, (1989), 189-217, thirdly, there was a consensus discussion that the TAZARA did not have enough wagons for timber from Sao Hill, in the mid of the

limited to the villagers only, but to the mill too. The logs, the very raw materials for the paper and pulp mill, could be made readily available nearby if the land could be granted to the forest department. The climate ameliorating factor for the mill was another significant reason put forward by the forest manager before the District Commissioner, as the mill attracted considerable debate on its environmental impacts. The treatment of effluents from the mill, for example, was suggested by some scholars to undermine its sustainability.⁴⁶ Additionally, the forest was to work as a buffer zone between the mill and the surrounding villages around Mgololo area.⁴⁷ The other points made by the forest manager to make a case for expanding the Sao Hill forests in the Mgololo ranges were that the surrounding villages would benefit from silvicultural education, seasonal employment and some permanent employment.⁴⁸ The manager's land petition before the District Commissioner was successful and hence the Mgololo Division was formed to make the fourth administration area of the Sao Hill plantation forest in the early 1990s.⁴⁹

Mufindi District appointed the Land Commission to consolidate the implementation of the findings of the 1988/89 regional Land Commission in 1992. The 1992 district commission was headed by Kalabezile and the secretary was P.A. Mamkwe, the manager of the problematic Third Division, headquartered at Ihalimba, of the Sao Hill plantation forest. Mamkwe was appointed by the district authorities as secretary because the villages visited by the 1992 district land commission fell under his administration, the Third Division. These villages were Itimbo, Igeleke, Usokami, Wami, Rungemba, Ilasa, and Ihefu in Mufindi district and Mfukulembe, in Iringa district. Because of time constraints, the district land commission admitted that they did not visit Mfukulembe village, despite being mentioned several times in the report as the key site of the encroachers on the land in Itimbo village.⁵⁰

journey to Dar es Salaam way. The distance between the Sao Hill Saw Mill (Mafinga) and the railway station at Mgololo was 72 km, a barrier which compelled the timber traders to opt for the truck freighters instead. When the Mufindi and pulp and paper mill was privatized in 2002, the transport of papers from the area was through trucks bearing inscription MUFINDI PAPER, arguably, for trade advertisement.

⁴⁶ See, for example, C. Christiansson and J. Ashuvud *Heavy Industry in a Rural Tropical Ecosystem*. 14, 3, (1985), 124-128 (122-133).

⁴⁷ The paper and pulp mill was set at Mgololo village in the extreme south of the Mufindi district. By virtue of village name other scholars use the term Mgololo pulp and paper mill (MPM) or Southern Paper Mills (SPM).

⁴⁸ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Request for Land Substitution" to District Commissioner, Mufindi, 21.7. 1990, File No MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

⁴⁹ Interview with Modest Mtuy, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 14.3.2016.

⁵⁰ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

The report from the district Land Commission brought up issues that were significant and warrant a discussion based on the geographical location. The first recommendation by the Land Commission was that the District Commissioners from Mufindi and Iringa districts had to meet to deliberate on the border problems, as it was noticed that villagers were not aware of the boundaries of the land for their village. This recommendation made sense to the Itimbo, Rungemba and Mfukulembe villages. The Itimbo village government reported to the land commission that all encroachers of the Sao Hill land in their village came from the Mfukulembe village, which was administratively under Iringa district.⁵¹ The land commission, surprisingly, found the Itimbo villagers guilty of cultivating the land deliberated by the 1988/89 Iringa region land commission to be under the Sao Hill forest. The villagers from Itimbo were cultivating seasonal crops at Katenge in the Isukumawoko valleys, which were in the forest reserve-extension areas for Sao Hill forest.⁵²

The second geographical area visited by the district land commission was the extreme east of the Sao Hill project at Igeleke and Usokami villages. Usokami and Igeleke had land disputes arising from a population increase. The difference between Usokami and Igeleke villages was that the latter was not visited by the regional land commission of 1988/1989. The district land commission found that the Igeleke subsistence farmers had encroached on the forest reserve to the extent of building permanent houses and planting seasonal and permanent crops too. The committee discovered 19 households that had 171 people close to the Ihang'ana natural forest reserve. The Igeleke villagers admitted that they had violated the law by encroaching on the forest reserve. The district land committee was sympathetic about the shortage of land in the village and advised the village government to make a petition to the district authorities for more land via the Third Forest Division manager, P.A. Mamkwe⁵³, who was the secretary of the district commission. The villagers claimed that the Ihang'ana natural forest reserve deprived the subsistence farmers of their land in the villages with ever-increasing populations. The district land committee stopped the villagers from farming in the forest reserve.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Modest Mtuy, "Mufindi Afforestation Scheme, Land Acquisition for Afforestation at Sao Hill", (Record No. 12. 1979), 11.

⁵² SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁵³ P.A. Mamkwe, the secretary of the 1992 Mufindi District land commission on Sao Hill forest was also the manager for the Third Division, the subject of the commission, with its headquarters at Ihalimba village.

⁵⁴ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

The Usokami village problems were arguably exacerbated (if not created) by the village leaders. The district land commission revealed that the villagers, upon direction by their leaders, violated the 1988/1989 regional land committee agreements. The villagers had distributed the land belonging to the Sao Hill forest project among themselves under in the pretext of setting up village projects. The villagers planted trees in the forest reserve and claimed they belonged to the school and the village as part of *ujamaa* projects. The district land commission discovered that those trees belonged to individuals within the village and were not part of *ujamaa* projects as was claimed by the village leaders. For these reasons, the committee advised the village leaders to table a petition before the district authorities via the forest manager of the Third Division so as to own those trees legally.⁵⁵

At Ugesa village in the south of Usokami, the village government claimed to have relinquished 400 hectares to the Sao Hill project in 1988/89 regional land commission and hence they claimed that they had no problem with the forest department land. However, one villager, namely Mailombili Kalinga from Usokami village, tabled a petition before the Mufindi District Commissioner that the Ugesa village relinquished the 400 hectares to the forest department by encroaching on his customary owned land amounting to 50 hectares. He wanted his land back. The district land commission had no direct response to the Mailombili case, as it concerned the two villages of Ugesa and Usokami that were supposed to meet and resolve the border dispute.⁵⁶

The last geographical locations the district land commission visited were the Ludilo, Ilasa and Ihefu villages. There was a misunderstanding about the land relinquished to the Sao Hill forest project. The village administration had records indicating that they had only relinquished ten hectares, while the forest department at Ilasa sub-offices had planted more than 70 hectares.

The district Land Commission of 1992 summarised these problems as coming from three important sources. The first problem was the population increase in those villages, which put pressure on available land. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the signing of the IMF agreements on economic reforms which entailed retrenchment of many civil servants, land

⁵⁵ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager “Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁵⁶ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager “Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

became a major source of income generation for many of the villagers and, indeed, the economic side of the plantation forests was becoming profitable hence land was required for private woodlots too.⁵⁷ The second source of the problems in those villages came from the land tenure systems in Tanzania. While the subsistence farmers understood land ownership in a customary way, and indeed claimed to own big portions of land inherited from their grandparents, the state worked according to the lease system, where legal ownership was justified through surveying, and a lease did not exceed 99 years. In almost all villages in Mufindi, it was discovered that villages had no proper records of the land they owned and, as a result, they kept petitioning the district authorities for more land every year.⁵⁸

The final source of problems in the villages came from the poorly coordinated administration of the Iringa region and the Mufindi district and indeed Tanzania at large. The district authorities wielded the power that could be used to solve the village land problems in liaison with the two ministries of Natural Resources and Tourism, and Land and Settlement. Presumably the district commission's office did not inform these two ministries on land disputes caused by transfer of land from one ministry to another at village level and, as a result, the land problems in the villages around the Sao Hill forest increased. The district land commission did not go into detail in their recommendation, but only said that solutions were to be found with the District Commissioners of Mufindi and Iringa. They also suggested that the Divisional and ward secretaries had a vital role to play in solving disputes in the villages around the Sao Hill plantation forest.⁵⁹

5.5 *Hatukushirikishwa* (we were not consulted, we didn't participate):- The 1992 Presidential Land Commission

The 1992 Presidential Land Commission, which was formed by the second president of Tanzania, Ali Hassani Mwinyi, and led by the renowned constitutional expert at the University of Dar es Salaam and constitutional reform activist, Prof. Issa Shivji, addressed the countrywide outcry about land ownership. The Commission visited every region in Tanzania

⁵⁷ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁵⁸ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁵⁹ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 22.5. 1992, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

mainland and heard the land problems from all over the country.⁶⁰ The Presidential Land Commission did not visit the Sao Hill plantation forest; however, the questions which were tabled before it with regard to the Sao Hill forest deserve some consideration.⁶¹

At Mafinga town, the headquarters of Mufindi district, there were some questions about land ownership in that small town established in 1975. The Sao Hill forest recorded two important questions for the Presidential Land Commission. The first question was asked by the long-serving Chairman of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and later CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), and a councillor of Mafinga town, Sikauka Chang'a. Chang'a wanted to know the reason behind the endless changing of the boundaries of the Sao Hill forest to the disadvantage of the surrounding communities. He admitted before the commission that he was part of the Mufindi district land committee which set the boundaries of the Sao Hill forest between 1975 and 1976. The forest officials responded to the land commission by promising to write back a detailed report to the commission later.⁶² The response of the forest management, however, did not appear in the 1992 Presidential Land Commission final report. The publication by the chairman of Presidential Land Commission, Issa Shivji, on landownership in Tanzania in the post-Arusha Declaration implies there were undemocratic trends in transferring land from the customary owners to the central government projects. His comments suffice to explain what the forest management failed to explain in response to Sikauka's question. Shivji summarised that there was no democracy in land ownership in Tanzania when he commented that "[m]ore land, very often belonging to the customary holders in the villages, was alienated to them through government allocations justified by the notion of 'public interest or national project'".⁶³ Shivji stated that the peoples' grievances over land throughout Tanzania were summarised in the repeated phrase "*hatukushirikishwa* (we were not consulted, we didn't participate)".⁶⁴ The presidential commission recommendations on the Sao Hill plantation forest land did not sort out the problems of land of the people in Mufindi.

⁶⁰ Tanzania in this context refers to Tanzania mainland because Zanzibar has its own internal government under the banner of The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.

⁶¹ United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi District 1992, 144-151.

⁶² United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi District 1992, 144-151.

⁶³ Issa Shivji, *Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, Faculty of Law, 1998), 8-15; See, M.F. Olwig et al., Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of Land acquisitions for forest plantations in Tanzania, *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12, (2015), 2322-2325 (2316-2336).

⁶⁴ Issa Shivji, "Contradictory Perspectives on Rights and Justice in the Context of Land Tenure Reform in Tanzania" *Tanzania Zamani, A Journal of Historical Research and Writing*, 4, 1&2 (Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1998), 68.

In addition, Sikauka tabled a petition before the presidential commission that the Sao Hill plantation forest had to return some of its land to the customary owners after harvesting, as the presence of the forest infringed their culture and, indeed, the tradition of Hehe land tenure whereby the parents were traditionally obliged to prepare land for their children. In Hehe culture the land to be inherited *lilungulu* (land inherited from parents) was for both male and female children. The daughters' land inheritance in the Hehe community came about when the daughters married men from far away. To ensure that their daughters remained in the proximity with their parents after marriage, the Hehe fathers relinquished their land to their in-laws. The land relinquished to the daughters became theirs completely, so that even the brothers could not reclaim it.⁶⁵ Sikauka was recorded saying:

We the Hehe traditionally, based on our discretion, do allow the husband(s) of our daughter(s) to come and join her in my land. Even when it happens that my daughter dies, her husband can marry a new wife and use the same land he cultivated with my deceased daughter.⁶⁶

Based on the above testimony by Sikauka, the Hehe culture was impinged upon with the ever-expanding Sao Hill plantation forest. Ponziano Kapuna, the Kihanga councillor, seconded Sikauka's agenda of returning part of the Sao Hill plantation forest land to the customary owners before the 1992 Presidential Land Commission. Kapuna suggested returning land on the grounds of the population increase in the villages he represented (Mninga and Kihanga). He recalled that the Sao Hill plantation forest started at Mninga village between 1955 and 1957, and at Kihanga village between 1957 and 1958. The years the forest project started at Kihanga and Mninga reflected the population increase too. The councillor was quoted as saying:

We request the forest project to return part of the land to the villagers after harvesting. Population has increased tremendously nowadays. As it is now, when our cattle trespass into the forest we are exorbitantly fined while we willingly relinquished our customary land to the forest project. No more land to construct our new buildings or increase the size of our farms. At the time they established the project the population was very low, while now [1992] is 3 385 people for Mninga village and 2 004 people at Kihanga village. The people of Mninga and Kihanga villages, however, love the forest project but are pressed by land shortage exacerbated by the presence of tea plantations in the north-west of our villages.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi District 1992, 144-151.

⁶⁶ United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi District 1992, 144-151.

⁶⁷ United Republic of Tanzania Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters Report, Iringa Region, 5, Mufindi District 1992, 144-151.

Despite such complaints by the villagers, the land under the Sao Hill plantation forest never reverted back to the customary owners, neither at Kihanga nor at Mninga villages. The presidential land commission was the best platform for addressing land problems in Tanzania, but it was in fact a toothless commission as it had no impact on either the Mufindi villagers or on other regions and their respective districts. The final land commission was formed by the Mufindi district council in 1994 to cross-check the implementation of the regional land commission formed in 1988/89 and the district land commission of 1992.⁶⁸ The 1994 district land commission was headed by S.A. Mbelwa, the land official in Mufindi. It visited a few villages and indeed it had some shortcomings as it was timed for October, one of the busiest months for preparing farms.⁶⁹

5.6 These villagers are not fools! : The D.C. opinion on land encroachments

The steps taken by the 1994 Mufindi district land commission in the villages around the Sao Hill plantation forest were detailed and rigorous. They noted that changes to the village governments created problems.⁷⁰ The village files were not kept well, to the extent that the boundaries were not recognised by the new village governments. Similarly, retired village government leaders resisted the forest project boundaries with their respective villages. The absence of the deliberations on the village files meant that the new leaders had to re-start engaging afresh with the forest project.⁷¹ Additionally, almost all villages visited did not adhere to the deliberations of prior land commissions of 1988/89 and 1992. Villagers had encroached on the forest lands again. The 1988/89 and 1992 land commissions advised the villagers to apply for more lands legally by writing to the District Commissioner via the Division III forest manager. Those deliberations were not observed at all. At Igeleke village, for example, the 1992 land commission advised the village to apply for more village land, advice which they did not heed. The villagers took the law into their own hands and encroached on the forest lands. They had built many permanent houses and were farming in the forest reserve. At Itimbo village the villagers had encroached extensively on forest reserve lands by taking advantage of

⁶⁸ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager “Mufindi District Land Commission, 18.10.1994, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁶⁹ Rain in Mufindi starts in the late November to April, and henceforth, October and early November, is more or less not accommodating meetings as no one will attend because villagers are busy with farms preparations.

⁷⁰ Modest Mtuy, “Mufindi Afforestation Scheme, Land Acquisition for Afforestation at Sao Hill”, (Record No.12.1979), 11.

⁷¹ SHFPA Sao Hill Manager “Mufindi District Land Commission, 18.10. 1994, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

the fact that the boundaries were not clear to them. At Igomtwa Village the trees of the living boundary were simply violently uprooted.⁷²

These four land commissions (the regional land commission 1988/89, the 1992 presidential land commission, the Mufindi district land commission of 1992, and the Mufindi district land commission of 1994) brought to light four lessons with regard to the land problems of the villages in the proximity of the Sao Hill plantation forests. First, it was clear that there was disconnection between one district and the other district and indeed, between one ministry and the other within the government. This was reflected by those land commissions' findings which were not implemented. The commissions came up with recommendations which could solve almost all problems, but these were not implemented. The Mufindi District Commissioner was quoted as saying "the government has been late to act on time with regard to the land problems around the Sao Hill forest project".⁷³

Secondly, there was the fundamental problem of the understanding of what constituted land *ownership*. The village governments and the villagers were adamant about their customary land ownership. Consequently, the subsistence farmers did not adhere to the recommendations of almost every land commission. This rigidity was a clear sign that the villagers did not care about those commissions. While the villagers understood land ownership in the customary way, the forest department and the commissions understood land ownership in legal terms (lease system).⁷⁴ The villagers gave an almost uniform response when they were asked about their opinion on those land commissions. Karisto Mdemu (60) from Udumuka village had encroached on 30 acres of the Sao Hill forest reserve. He had planted the encroached land with maize, beans and eucalyptus trees. When he was asked about compensation by the state, he was positive by saying: "I agree with the suggestion of compensation, but I had better be assured resettlement land for replacement first before being compensated for my seasonal and permanent crops".⁷⁵ Leah Ubamba (30) had encroached on the Sao Hill forest reserve at Igeleke village and had planted on it eucalyptus trees (six acres), maize (three acres) and beans (two

⁷² SHFPA Sao Hill Manager "Mufindi District Land Commission, 18.10. 1994, File No MU/10.01 File Name: Government Reserves: General Correspondences.

⁷³ Interview with J.W. Kasunga (59), the Mufindi District Commissioner at Mafinga Town, district Headquarters, 18.5.2016.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Issa Shivji, "Contradictory Perspectives on Rights and Justice in the Context of Land Tenure Reform in Tanzania" *Tanzania Zamani, A Journal of Historical Research and Writing*, 4,1&2 (Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1998), 57-62.

⁷⁵ Interview with Karisto Mdemu, Udumuka village, Mufindi, 12.4.2016.

acres). When she was asked about the solution to her land encroachment, she said: “I will obey the directive of the government if I will be compensated”.⁷⁶ Clauson Kapata (57), one of the leaders at Igeleke village, said: “the best option and sustainable solution for many villagers was the Sao Hill forest to change the boundary so that the villagers who had encroached the land would be out of the forest reserve”.⁷⁷ John Nyaulingo (55) who had encroached on 13 acres of the land in the Sao Hill forest and planted maize, beans and trees, resented strongly any kind of compensation by saying: “I am not ready for any amount of compensation by the Sao Hill forest, as I have a big family which depends entirely on farming”.⁷⁸ John Kalambo (68) from Udumuka village had encroached on three acres and planted maize, beans and eucalyptus trees, was not ready to be compensated on the grounds that there was no alternative land to go. Herena Mwenda (53) had encroached on half an acre and she had planted food crops (maize and beans) for 15 years; she said: “I plead to the government to return the land to me as I have no alternative for subsistence farming”.⁷⁹ Simon Mgungile (68) from Mapanda village had encroached on four acres in the Sao Hill forest reserve and planted beans, maize, Irish potatoes and wheat. He was ready for compensation as a last resort, but he preferred the land size of the Sao Hill plantation be reduced to let him continue with his subsistence farming.⁸⁰ Two perceptions emerge from these responses: first, throughout the responses, there was the implied meaning that the villagers agree with the Sao Hill forest management that they had encroached on its forest reserves; and secondly, there was an implied resistance to either compensation or resettlement throughout their responses. The villagers were essentially not ready to be compensated because, arguably, the process of drawing the boundaries had not been democratic, and secondly, there was no other idle land available for their subsistence farming and, indeed, the villagers had knowledge about planting trees and so they did not need to let their land go.

Thirdly, purported population increase in the surrounding villages was exaggerated in the name of customary land ownership and politics. The 1992 land commission came with a recommendation that suggested surveying land of all villages around the Sao Hill plantation forest. However, the respective authority (Ministry of Land and Settlement Development) did not implement this recommendation. The failure to implement the commission

⁷⁶ Interview with Leah Ubamba, Igeleke village, Mufindi, 17.4.2016.

⁷⁷ Interview with Clauson Kapata, Igeleke village, Mufindi, 17.4.2016.

⁷⁸ Interview with John Nyaulingo, Igeleke village, Mufindi, 17.4.2016.

⁷⁹ Interview with John Kalambo and John Mwenda, Udumuka, village, Mufindi, 12.4.2016.

⁸⁰ Interview with Simon Mohele, Udumuka village, Mufindi, 12.4.2016.

recommendations by the Ministry of Land and Settlement Development was presumably due to the failure of the district land officials to notify the ministry on time. Similarly, population increase in the villages around the Sao Hill forest was exaggerated politically. The District Commissioner stated bluntly that he was of the opinion of formalising land ownership to the villages which had encroached on the forest land. The condition for formalising was that such villages had gone far by developing public buildings (schools and hospitals) with well-defined leadership on the encroached land. The District Commissioner was quoted saying:

These villagers are not fools, we have executed our duties in these villages while we knew that they were in the forest reserves by sending them: village executive officials, teachers, doctors and extension services officials. They have participated fully in local and general elections, while they are in those villages in the forest reserves. If we dare to inform them that they reside on land belonging to the forest project, they will not understand us and they will notice that we government officials have double standards.⁸¹

The District Commissioner, however, did not condone encroachment on forest reserves under the disguise of dealing with the population increase, but he referred to the weakness of the state to act on time to the problems of the citizens. The villagers were to be informed immediately by the Sao Hill or government to stop developing the public buildings. To the District Commissioner, demolishing those public structures could mean causing political disputes in his district which was against his oath of office.⁸²

Fourthly, three of the land commissions (presidential land commission of 1992, 1992 Mufindi district land commission, and the 1994 Mufindi district land commission) had no mandate to change boundaries of the land. The regional land commission of 1988/89 was well sanctioned with a mandate to adjust the land boundaries of the forest and that of the villages. Based on that mandate of adjusting boundaries, however, the 1988/89 land commission has been cited by some scholars as being the only land commission which was sanctioned to revisit land disputes related to the Sao Hill plantation forest.⁸³

5.7 The pulp and paper mill and its aftermath, 1984-2000

⁸¹ Interview with J.W. Kasunga (59), the Mufindi District Commissioner at Mafinga Town, district Headquarters, 18.5.2016.

⁸² Interview with J.W. Kasunga (59), the Mufindi District Commissioner at Mafinga Town, district Headquarters, 18.5.2016.

⁸³ See for example, A. Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities' Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010", (MA Diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 14-36.

The pulp and paper mill, the main historical catalyst of Sao Hill plantation forest expansion in the 1970s, started operating officially in 1984. A feasibility study was conducted in 1975 by a Finnish company with funding from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA).⁸⁴ The mill was criticized at the very beginning on the grounds of the remoteness of its site. Its location was 80 km from the Sao Hill forest headquarters and 640 km from Dar es Salaam, the city which hosted more than 95 percent of its domestic market. The remoteness of the area was mitigated to some extent by the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) which started to operate in 1975.⁸⁵

The pulp and paper mill was launched with a heated debate on the best practice of harvesting the logs from the Sao Hill plantation forest in early 1982. The meeting was chaired by the Director of Forestry, E. Mnzava. The debate was a heated one because it aimed at harmonizing the harvesting processes of the two rival harvesters of the Sao Hill plantation forest. The first harvester was the Sao Hill Saw Mill opened in 1974 under the auspices of the Norwegian government.⁸⁶ The Sao Hill Saw Mill harvested the trees with a wide girth, whereas the pulp and paper mill aimed at harvesting the small girthed trees in the Sao Hill forest.⁸⁷

The pulp and paper mill, a state owned enterprise, was given a mandate to harvest its logs after the plans of the director of the Forestry Division were halted by the joint meeting of the Sao Hill forest, Sao Hill saw mill and the pulp and paper mill management, which met on March 1982 at Sao Hill forest headquarters. The options tabled by Mnzava merit detailed discussion. The first option suggested that the Forestry Division had to harvest the trees and sell to both its main customers, namely the pulp and paper mill and the Sao Hill saw mill. This option was found unfeasible on the grounds that the Forestry Division was a government department managed, like most government departments, through lengthy government procedures, delays would certainly occur in areas such as purchasing of machinery and equipment and indeed spares needed urgently.⁸⁸ Similarly, this option meant turning the Forestry Division into a forest commission or a forest unit service which was to become independent of the parent Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Forming a commission was anticipated to take a long time

⁸⁴ A. Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 16, 5, (1987), 282, (280-286).

⁸⁵ A. Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 16, 5, (1987), 282, (280-286).

⁸⁶ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

⁸⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanaliku, Sao Hill Plantation forest Headquarters, 17.5.2016; For other assistance on timber logging before independence, see, A. Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 137.

⁸⁸ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

because of the government bureaucracy involved. Moreover, the Forestry Division was forbidden to deal with the harvesting section as it was argued that it lacked a business orientation. The logging unit at Meru forest, owned by the Forestry Division, was argued to be too small and did not have enough equipment.⁸⁹

The second option was to create a separate harvesting company for harvesting woods that would deliver logs to the two users. One of the advantages of this option was that it would be independent and would also guarantee a fair distribution of logs to both parties by ensuring each customer gets good quality logs. The Director of Forestry added that it could ensure resource utilization and could be in a better position to control plantation abuse and carry out cost control. The pulp and paper mill representative warned that this option was not feasible as it was argued it could not ensure supply of wood on time. This option was left hanging on the basis that, should it be allowed to operate, it needed a huge capital investment for logging by that company before it could embark on the harvesting business.⁹⁰

The third option suggested the formation of a big company which could own the mills and plantations and hence harmonize all problems coming from either the pulp and paper mill or the Sao Hill saw mill. The idea of such a company was good and was praised by the members. Its main obstacle was that it could take too long to initiate and run such a giant company. However, some members couldn't see why it should take too long. The option was promised at making the then bodies (Sao Hill forest project, Sao Hill saw mill and the pulp and paper mill) departments of such an envisioned multi divisional company. This option was seen as feasible but its implementation was to be gradual. It was therefore also dropped.⁹¹

The fourth and final option was premised on making each customer do its own logging. The suggestion fitted well with the enormous capacity of the pulp and paper mill built on having creditworthiness, expertise (expatriates from India and Sweden), training and qualitative knowhow.⁹² The pulp and paper mill suggested that it could harvest for its own consumption as well as for the Saw Mill.⁹³ The Sao Hill Saw mill rejected the offer from the pulp and paper

⁸⁹ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

⁹⁰ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

⁹¹ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

⁹² A. Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (St. Oxford, 2004), 100.

⁹³ TNA Sao Hill Forests, Extra Ordinary meeting, 11.1.1982, Acc. No. 604/ FD/33/23/6.

mill by indicating that it would harvest for itself. The Saw Mill's suggestion was viable as the bureaucracy within the ministry and indeed delays in buying equipment were imminent. The final resolution was to set the regulating authority, within the forestry section (within the Sao Hill forest headquarters) which acted as a broker. Harvesting was left to the two prominent companies themselves.⁹⁴ The Forestry Division was to remain the key seller of the forest products, because this was part of the agreement of the loan from the World Bank

The Mufindi pulp and paper mill had the shortest life. It was criticized since its inception because of the site selection by environmental scholars and traders. Its gradual decline was rooted in the crisis and the pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The World Bank and IMF emphasised the neoliberal political and economic strategies for the state. The liberalization of the economy in Tanzania signalled the distancing of the National Development Corporation from the funding and managing the pulp and paper mill.⁹⁵

Despite the support from the expatriates, the pulp and paper mill produced below standard paper, which also failed to compete with imported paper because of its distance from the markets. The Print Park Tanzania Company, a printer of the government newspaper, which was one of the major Mufindi paper consumers and printer of the newspapers, stated that it would have to spend US\$700 to buy a ton of Mufindi pulp and paper, while it spends US\$370 for the same amount of imported paper.⁹⁶ The paper from Mufindi pulp and paper mill was also poorly packed and the delivery system was so inadequate that it damaged half the ordered amount.⁹⁷ For these reasons, the Print Park Tanzania Company abandoned the Mufindi pulp and mill papers. They were followed by Tanzania Publishing House (TPH), Kibo Paper Industries (KPI), Tanzania Elimu (Education) Supplies and the National Printing Company (NPC).⁹⁸

The final challenge of the pulp and paper mill was that of the alleged ignorance of its workers and poor coordination. While the key stakeholders of the mill, NDC (the National Development Cooperation staff) resided in Dar es Salaam city, 640 km from the site, the expatriates working for the Storthert, a Canadian company, were trusted by the NDC to manage and operate the

⁹⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanaliku, Sao Hill Headquarters 18.5. 2016.

⁹⁵ A. Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 200; see, Anthony Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 16, 5, (1987), 283, (280-286).

⁹⁶ Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 281.

⁹⁷ Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 281.

⁹⁸ Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 281.

pulp and paper mill for six years. The Storthert company personnel were regarded as having insufficient experience in paper management and, as a result, they sub-contracted the mill to the Seshasayee Paper and Board Mills from India to provide technical experts to the mill. The allegations levelled towards Storthert Company were ignored by the NDC, and instead, it claimed that the problems which were facing the pulp and paper mill were caused by the high tariff of electricity, sold by TANESCO (Tanzania Electrical Supply Company) while many scholars agreed that the project was not a prolific state business.⁹⁹ The pulp and paper mill finally closed its doors for good in 1997 in the midst of economic liberalization policies, whereby the devaluation of the currency crippled the state and preventing it from funding the ailing parastatals.¹⁰⁰ Without donor support, the forestry industries were pushed towards privatization.

The closure of the pulp and paper mill for good in 1997 opened a new era of politics of harvesting woods in the Mufindi district. The structural adjustment programme (s) of 1986 created pressure on the Sao Hill Saw Mill to improve efficiency. The centre for the debate was around the rights of harvesting. The Sao Hill Saw Mill, privatised in 1996 to Green Resources Limited, had remained the sole harvester of the Sao Hill forests. Because of liberalisation policies, individuals and companies were allowed to bid for harvesting.¹⁰¹ Individuals and companies applied for harvesting licenses.¹⁰² These harvesting licenses were sometimes allegedly ill-gotten by more influential harvesting companies and influential government leaders.¹⁰³ There were widespread complaints in Mufindi from the late 1990s on harvesting permits, when many parastatal sectors were privatized during the third phase of the administration under the presidency of Benjamin Mkapa.¹⁰⁴ The people of Mufindi district had mixed reactions with regard to harvesting trees in the Sao Hill plantation. Many wanted the

⁹⁹ Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 16, 5, (1987), 281, (280-286); For a detailed report on problems of the parastatals see, for example, Sebastian Edwards, *Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis* (Loss Angeles, University of California, 2012), 1-6.

¹⁰⁰ A. Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998," PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004), 200; See, Ngaiza, *Paper at a Price: Southern Paper Mill, Tanzania*, 16, 5, (1987), 283, (280-286).

¹⁰¹ A. Hurst, "Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998, 189; Interview with J.W. Kasunga, Mufindi District Commissioner, Mafinga, 19.5.2016. See also, Elizabeth Daley, Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change* 5, 4, (2005), 531 (526-572).

¹⁰² Interview with J.W. Kasunga, the Mufindi District Commissioner, 15.4.2016.

¹⁰³ Andrea Kifyasi, "Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities' Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010", (MA Diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 2015), 62-86.

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Elizabeth Daley, "Land and Social Change in a Tanzanian Village 2: Kinyanambo in the 1990s", *Journal of Agrarian Change* 5, 4, 531.

harvesting business, a lucrative one, to be granted to them first rather than to “foreign” business stakeholders. One timber trader at Mafinga town was heard saying that:

We relinquished our land to the state when we were ignorant about tree planting and all sorts of activities related with forest plantations including logging; now we are able. They are reaping a lot from our district, while our village roads are in poor condition. We want logging be exclusively for the people of Mufindi.¹⁰⁵

They wanted to be trusted to harvest on the grounds that they were the ones who relinquished their land for the forest department. This scenario formed a heated debate in Mufindi that forced the ministry to intervene several times.¹⁰⁶

The Mufindi District Commissioner was categorically against such claims by the Mufindi people whom he described as “egoist and anti-national unity”.¹⁰⁷ He reiterated that in Tanzania, natural resources were there to benefit all Tanzanians and not districts with regard to the proximity of those natural resources. The District Commissioner gave examples that Dar es Salaam city brought to the nation almost 70 percent of revenues to the Tanzanian economy, yet those revenues were consumed by the whole nation at large. The District Commissioner ended by warning the perpetrators of such egoistic and anti-nationalist actions:

This scenario in Mufindi district should not be entertained as it goes against the constitution which stipulates that all Tanzanians as a collective entity own all natural resources of the country. Boundaries of the district or region in Tanzania just meant effective administration and not to the extent of claiming ownership independently of the resources found in those localities.¹⁰⁸

He added that the game reserves, like Serengeti and the Ngorongoro Crater, where he had once served as District Commissioner too, brought revenue which also benefitted the Mufindi dwellers indirectly.¹⁰⁹ The softwood timber business in Tanzania earned the nation approximately US\$ 130 million annually.¹¹⁰ The large portion of the timber came from Sao Hill forest. Timber from Sao Hill was marketed internally to Mufindi Paper Mills (privatized officially in 2002 to Rai Group company, based in Kenya), the Sao Hill Saw mill (privatized

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Maula Chaula (51), Mafinga Timber Trading Centre, 18.5.2016.

¹⁰⁶ A. Kifyasi has enumerated well the grievances of these surrounding communities to be favoured in the granting of harvesting permits. The main challenge to his argument is his overwhelming reliance on the surrounding communities without allowing for the state to respond to the allegations. See A. Kifyasi “Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities’ Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010”, 62-86.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, the Mufindi District Commissioner, 15.4.2016.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, the Mufindi District Commissioner, 15.4.2016.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, the Mufindi District Commissioner, 15.4.2016.

¹¹⁰ Green Advocates International, *Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI)*, (2014), 21.

in 1996 to Green Resource Limited, a Norwegian non-governmental organisation), small saw mills, while externally timber was sold to the following countries (based on the value of trade): Kenya, China, United Arab Emirates, European Union and Norway, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi and Uganda. Moreover, 61 percent of the household income in Mufindi district was earned by timber trading, while the district council collected the log cess/royalty tax which also made a significant contribution to the district revenue compared to other sources of revenues.¹¹¹ This argument goes against Kifyas's argument that the plantation forest and Sao Hill in particular had less impact on the livelihood of the surrounding communities.¹¹²

The District Commissioner, however, argued that he was not condoning ill-gotten harvesting licenses through corruption at the Sao Hill plantation. He said that the district government tried to collaborate with the Sao Hill plantation to ensure that the timber traders hailing from the district, especially those who employed many casual labourers, got harvesting licenses. The preference for people from Mufindi was because they were part of bringing peace to the district and allowed money to circulate in the district. He revealed a shocking truth that many Mufindi dwellers had no capital for running logging and sawing operations, but they wanted those harvesting licenses for selling with a token amount of cash from big companies because these companies had capital from either logging profits or from other business. He was quoted saying "many of our harvesting licenses seekers cannot really lumber as they claim. The secret behind this is that they sell their harvesting licenses to big lumbers. The big lumbers revealed before me that the original receivers of the harvesting license sold for a token money".¹¹³ The District Commissioner was seconded by one non-governmental organisation findings which estimated that more than 500 permit holders could not afford harvesting, instead they re-sold their permits to those with capital.¹¹⁴ The re-selling of the harvesting permits was allegedly to be a secret deal and hence no tax authority recorded these transactions.

¹¹¹ Egid F. Nkwera, *Influence of Timber Trading on Poverty Reduction in Mufindi District*, Master's thesis, Sokoine University of Agriculture, 2010), 65-67.

¹¹² See, Andrea Kifyasi "Sao Hill Forest and Local Communities' Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2010", 62-86; See also, Gerald Monela and Jumanne Abdallah, "Dynamism of Natural Resource Policies and Impact on Forestry in Tanzania" Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (eds), *Tanzania in Transition, From Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 159-174.

¹¹³ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, the Mufindi District Commissioner, 15.4.2016.

¹¹⁴ Green Advocates International, *Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI)*, (2014), 43.

Harvesting trees in the Sao Hill plantation and its licensing politics was a double-edged sword. If the surrounding population were not given enough licenses to harvest, there was imminent danger of arsonist actions in the plantation forest. The long-serving CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi*) secretary in Mufindi cautioned the Sao Hill plantation management and the District Commissioner to handle the issue of harvesting licenses with great care as it could lead to arsonist actions, as happened in the early 1980s.¹¹⁵ Tasili Mgodha recalled what happened in 1983. He said that the surrounding communities were not given licenses to harvest trees from the Sao Hill forest, except only when trees were burnt by fire outbreaks. Recognizing that the surrounding communities could not get harvesting licenses unless the trees were burnt by fire, the surrounding population allegedly committed arsonist actions by burning 6 498.3 hectares of the Sao Hill forest in 1983.¹¹⁶ The hectares destroyed by outbreaks of fire were blamed on the alleged rigidity of the Sao Hill plantation management, who did not allow the surrounding communities to benefit from the forests they protected indirectly. Mgodha recalled that the Prime Minister in the early 1990s, Samuel Malecela, paid an official visit at the Sao Hill plantation project during his tenure; he ordered the forest project to allow the surrounding communities to participate in harvesting the logging and sawing with special favour as they were partly key stakeholders in the security of the forest, protecting it from arsonist actions.¹¹⁷ In contrast to Mgodha's advice, Modest Mtuy, the long-serving manager at Sao Hill plantation forest from 1978 to 1992, was of the opinion that the surrounding communities, specifically those who were implicated in committing arsonist actions, be rejected from harvesting the free of charge burnt trees. Mtuy recalled that during his time it was observed that the more the surrounding communities were given burnt trees for free the more arsonist actions were reported. For these reasons, the forestry department decided not to give them trees for free so as to prevent the arsonist actions of the perpetrators.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the Sao Hill plantation forest had to negotiate carefully with these surrounding communities, because if they were not

¹¹⁵ Interview with Tasili Mgodha, (81) on 18.5.2016, Mafinga Town.

¹¹⁶ Interview with, Tasili Mgodha (81) a retired long serving District Commissioner for Njombe, Sumbawanga, Newala, Ludewa, Lushoto, Tanga and Tabora districts during party supremacy between 1972 and 1992. By virtue of the party supremacy, he served in those districts as a District Commissioner and a general secretary of the TANU/CCM in those districts. Interviewed on 18.5.2016 at Mafinga town, Mufindi district; See also, TNA, E.M. Ntumbo and S.M. Malya "Rehabilitation of Burnt Plantations at Sao Hill Forest Project" October 1984, Acc. No. 604:Sao Hill Forest Project, File: FD/33/23/8; See also, Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 7.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Tasili Mgodha.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Modest Mtuy, 10.4.2016 at Kigamboni.

listened to, they could use the “weapons of the weak” to fight back, that is resort to arson.¹¹⁹ The two contrasting arguments by the former CCM chairman in Mufindi district and the former Sao Hill manager can be contextualised to hold water through the infamous “weapons of weak”. This is true as the communities around the Sao Hill forest, a great number of them had no capital of logging and lumbering, yet, they had one cheap weapon-fire-which they could use to threaten the Sao Hill forest management, to give them harvesting permits, and indeed, sometimes to commit real arsonist actions as they did in 1983. While the former CCM chairman was sympathetic to the villagers, arguably, because he was once their ward representatives for ten years, the former manager saw it economically as he claimed the process of allowing them could escalate more arsonist actions. To the former manager, it was further noticed through his body language, that he preferred the original plan of establishing Sao Hill forest-of supplying logs to the pulp and paper mill and the Sao Hill Saw Mill. The third option of allowing independent loggers, according to him was, economically a loss to the state. Moreover, this chapter has extended the debate by Thaddeus Sunseri and Jacob Tropp by assessing the conflicts arising from forest boundaries by using the plantation forest. Sunseri and Tropp discussed the boundary related conflicts from the natural forests.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the key issues which went into the records in the period between 1981 and 2000 with regard to the Sao Hill plantation forest. Generally, the state negotiated with different stakeholders in order to sustain the forest for posterity. Key issues worth mentioning in that period are the second and final loan (signed in 1983) from the World Bank to the forest plantation, but with strings attached when compared with the first loan of 1976. The final report of the World Bank report carried the central message on the entire experience between 1976 and 1992. The World Bank loan fund ended officially in 1992, when the country was liberalizing its economy. Population increase in the surrounding communities of the Sao Hill plantation forest went hand in hand with a growing hunger for land for subsistence and for wood lots. To respond to the population rise, the Sao Hill plantation forest project was forced to consolidate its boundaries through different commissions. Those commissions were, by and large, too weak to solve the encroachment problems. The liberalization of the economy partly halted some government-related wood industries such as the pulp and paper mill, which was

¹¹⁹ For details on arsonist actions, see, T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 71-72, 138-140; James Scott, *“Weapons of the Weak” Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, (Yale University Press, 1985), xvi, 29.

closed for good in 1997, unleashing the politics of tree harvesting in the Sao Hill forest in tandem with the Sao Hill Saw Mill, which was also privatized in 1996.

The chapter has brought to light some events which are coming into the forestry scholarship for the first time; such events are like the role of the World Bank. Previous scholars have neglected the role of the World Bank in the development of the Sao Hill. This chapter thus has extended the debate by Samuel Wangwe and Knud Svendsen¹²⁰ who explored the role of the World Bank in Tanzania but did not connect it with the development and consolidation of the forest. Furthermore, this chapter has added to the debate on the impact of the *ujamaa* policy in Tanzania, showing how some of the recent problems facing the country on land-related conflicts are the lingering legacy of this policy. Moreover, the woodlot development by the customary land owners discussed in this chapter nicely illustrates the transition from socialism to a neo-liberal economy. This has extended the debate by K. Warner,¹²¹ who discussed the patterns of tree planting in East Africa. Finally, the chapter has shown the ways the state negotiated with the surrounding communities by forming commissions of inquiries and indeed, sometimes, providing them harvesting permits. Negotiating with those customary land owners and giving them harvesting permits in the absence of the pulp and paper mill, which closed in 1997.

¹²⁰ Samuel Wangwe, "Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the Case of Tanzania" Kjell Havnevik, *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives* (Uppsala, Seminar Proceedings No.18-Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 151-154.

¹²¹ K. Warner, "Patterns of Tree Growing by Farmers in Eastern Africa" J.E.M. Arnold and P.A. Dewees (Ed.) *Farms, Trees and Farmers, Responses to Agricultural Intensification* (London: Earthscan Publication, 1997), 102-104.

CHAPTER SIX

“Emulating participatory forestry management or is it land encroachment?” The state-citizen relationship in Sao Hill Forest, 2001-2015.

6.1. Introduction

The most recent phase of plantation forestry in Tanzania investigated here is that between 2001 and 2015, a period of economic liberalisation that saw the lifting of the government monopoly over some economic activities to admit the private sector. From 1998 private investors (from within and outside the country) became interested in woodlot development¹ with the aim of making a profit.² As discussed Chapter Five, the Sao Hill plantation had been sustained for almost 14 years by World Bank loans between 1976 and 1992. However, in 1992 the World Bank funding came to an end and its final report enumerated a number of doubts over the sustainability of the Sao Hill project, concluding that “the management of industrial plantations, such as Sao Hill, cannot be successfully carried out under normal government bureaucracy”.³ The World Bank was not uncertain on the sustainability of the Sao Hill forest by referring to the bureaucracy shown during the 14 years of assistance. It criticized the government of Tanzania: “Nevertheless, although dictated by economic difficulties, the fact remains that the government did not fulfil its commitment to provide adequate funds to complete implementation on time, nor did it review project targets and objectives in line with available resources”.⁴ To ensure continuity of the Sao Hill plantation after 1992, the concept of “community participation” was deployed under the rubric of a “biodiversity paradigm”, which viewed all flora and fauna in the reserved and unreserved land as interrelated and hence deserving of protection from human exploitation.⁵ Community participation in forestry management refers to any programme that intentionally involves local people in its forest activities.⁶ The ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in Tanzania defines the concept as

¹ Woodlots are planted (with *de facto* exotic) trees or tracts of a forest designed for small-scale production of products like wood fuel or timber for businesses. See, for example, Tonje Helene Refseth, “Norwegian Carbon Plantations in Tanzania: Towards Sustainable Development?” (Master’s thesis Oslo University, 2010), 40.

² Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantation in Africa”, *International Forestry Review* 16, 2, (2014), 146.

³ *Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania* (World Bank, 1992), 17.

⁴ *Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania*, 18.

⁵ See, for example, Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 164-168.

⁶ Robin Barr et al., *Sustainable Community Forest Management, A Practical Guide to FSC Certification for Smallholders*, (The Waterloo Foundation, 2012), 1-2. The definition is flexible based on the type of forest (natural or plantation) and the stakeholders involved in the area. This chapter confines itself to participatory forestry management in the plantation forests aimed at curbing fire outbreaks and prevent land encroachments.

strategies of involving communities and stakeholders in forest management.⁷ Before 1990 many of the so-called natural forests were placed in the “open access category”, hence making them prone to encroachment by the surrounding communities.⁸ Encroachment was a threat to sustainability.⁹ The Sao Hill plantation adopted some measures, with modifications, used in the natural forests to curb fire outbreaks and prevent encroachment from the surrounding communities.¹⁰

The World Bank’s grim prophecy came true when production at the Sao Hill plantation came to a standstill in 1990 and then stagnated until 2006.¹¹ This chapter explains how this happened and examines the survival strategies adopted by the managers at the Sao Hill plantation in the absence of a loan from the World Bank, to which they had become accustomed. The chapter then explores the relationship of the forest project with the surrounding communities, highlighting diverse community responses to the attempts to embrace what came to be understood as “participatory management”. The case of Mapanda village is used to highlight the impact of privatization and the disjunction between the mere rhetoric of participatory community management and what was really implemented by the state. Such a case study explores both the positive but largely negative side of the private sector incursion into the plantation forest sector as part of the historical narrative of community-state relations over the forest.

This chapter uses archival sources from the Sao Hill plantation Forest headquarters in Mufindi, and oral sources gathered from the officials in the Ministry of Natural Resources in Dar es Salaam, as well as from officials and villagers from Iringa region, Iringa district and Mufindi district. Some of the officials from the Iringa region and the forest officials in Mufindi district, in addition to taking part in interviews, were willing to provide the researcher with some key policy documents, which are otherwise unavailable for academic perusal. From these sources

⁷ Zakia Meghji, *Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania*, (World Forestry Congress, Quebec, 2003), 1. For the details of the community participation on plantation forests in Tanzania, see also, The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania, 2001-2010* (Dar es Salaam, 2001), 49.

⁸ See, for example, Vincent Kihyo, *Forest Policy Changes in Tanzania: Towards Community Participation in Forest Management*, (World Bank, 1998), 4.

⁹ The World Bank, *A World Bank Country Study, Putting Tanzania’s Hidden Economy to Work, Reform, Management and Protection of its Natural Sector* (Washington D.C., 2008), 9.

¹⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Public Relation Officer, Sao Hill Headquarters, J.W. Kasunga, DC, Mufindi District, 18.5.2016.

¹¹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Forest, Publicity Officer, 28.1.2016.

two key themes emerged: the survival strategies adopted by the Sao Hill plantation, and the land contestations between the state, villagers and the woodlot developers.

The chapter starts by contextualizing the period by providing an overview of the recent history of the forest. It then looks at the events that transpired in the early 2000s which affected the running of the Forestry Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. This chapter, however, will discuss the key challenges facing the Sao Hill forest management with regard to the land around the plantation. The Sao Hill forest management sought solutions within the paradigm of participatory forest management, many of which failed. The chapter explains the fire rescue section as an example of an initiative which was successful. It ends by discussing the problems that faced specific divisions, especially Division III, which led to the Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism visiting in person and subsequently forming a committee to address the best ways of dealing with what came to be called “encroachment” by the TFS (Tanzania Forest Services Agency).

Fundamentally, this chapter offers a story of resilience and pragmatic choices: the Sao Hill plantation managers were compelled to adopt – albeit unevenly – a form of community participatory forest management for tactical reasons in the wake of the withdrawal of World Bank funding. The refusal of the World Bank to provide funding because of the central state bureaucracy and lack of accountability, local population pressure, active encroachment from surrounding villages, and the demand for land from the private sector were serious challenges for the Sao Hill plantation management. However, as this chapter will show, while the discourse of participatory management was deployed, it was implemented unevenly and in some places it was not implemented at all.¹² The state, however, retained control of the key aspects that defined community participation in the Sao Hill plantation. In the plantation forests, like Sao Hill, the state implemented a more paternalistic form of corporate social responsibility drawn from the World Bank recommendations made when they withdrew their assistance to the Tanzania forestry sector.

6.2 Recent history of ‘participatory forestry management’

¹² See for, example, G.C. Kajembe et al., *Community Participation in the Management of Protected Forest Areas in East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges* (Sokoine University of Agriculture, 2010), 2-3, L. Isager et al., *People’s Participation in Forest Conservation: Considerations and Case Studies* (FAO, 2000), 2.

This chapter draws on Mette Olwig et al., who researched the increase in land claims in Mufindi district between 2000 and 2014 for planting exotic trees under the rubric of economic liberalisation.¹³ They focused on the Chogo and Mapanda villages located in the extreme eastern part of Mufindi district, in the proximity of the Sao Hill forest plantation, to assess the impact of the liberalisation of the economy on land ownership. Their study revealed that neither the village government nor the district land officials adequately oversaw the companies and individuals who bought land: Chogo village, for example, was discovered to have planted more than 1 000 hectares of trees, but neither the village government nor the district government had formal information about the owners.¹⁴ Their research focused on recent developments but lacked the long historical context of plantation forestry concerning the many land claims by the private sector in Mufindi for planting trees. This chapter will fill the gap by connecting the current land claims in the villages in the proximity of the Sao Hill plantation forest with the long history of plantation forestry in Mufindi.

This chapter uses Paul Jacovelli's work on the broader challenges of governance of the private forest plantations sector in Africa. Jacovelli proceeded from the premise that the role of the state changed when the private sector became a key competitor in the plantation forest sector. Jacovelli notes that the private sector-owned – as opposed to the state-owned – plantations have been driven by short-termism in profit-making, sometimes without abiding by sustainable silvicultural procedures.¹⁵ Land contestations in the rural areas for plantation forests become central asset as individuals, profit-making companies and indeed, sometimes the government competed for the same piece of land.¹⁶ However, Jacovelli's study does not look at Sao Hill plantation forest at all, so this study will test his argument and examine his contention with examples from Tanzania. Moreover, Jacovelli argues that this paradigm added gender as the key element in making the forests sustainable, and this chapter tests whether this was the case in Sao Hill.¹⁷

¹³ Mette F. Olwig et al., "Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania", *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12, 2015, 2323 (2316-2336); See also Eliakimu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009), 13-17.

¹⁴ Olwig et al., "Inverting the Moral Economy", 2320 (2316-2336).

¹⁵ Jacovelli, "The Future of Plantation in Africa", 146.

¹⁶ See, for example, Sara Berry, "Debating the Land Question in Africa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 4, 2002, 653-654 (638-668).

¹⁷ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania, 2001-2010* (Dar es Salaam, 2001), 58-59. See also, Eliakimu Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania: An overview of Policy Changes in Relation to Forest Management*, (Department of Ecology and

This chapter also engages with the work of V.G. Vyamana, who focused on the benefits of the participatory forest management in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania.¹⁸ He argued that community participation improved the forests, but the promise of livelihood improvement failed as the poor people were excluded from decision making at the village levels. His study, however, assessed participatory forest management in the *natural* forests, while this chapter is concerned with assessing participatory forest management in the *plantation* forest and can thus test whether the fact that it was plantation forest made a difference.

This study benefitted from T. Blomley and H. Ramadhani's work on the origins of participatory forest management in Tanzania.¹⁹ They cautioned that participatory forest management, albeit celebrated by the forestry policy makers, did not prove a panacea in terms of sustainability.²⁰ However, Blomley and Ramadhani do not discuss participatory forest management in plantation forests such as Sao Hill, which is what this chapter addresses. This chapter will discuss in depth participatory forest management at Sao Hill in order to establish the major aspects of participation in the plantation forests.

Participatory forest management has received robust critique too. Dan Brockington undertook a political analysis by using one village in the Rukwa valley in south-western Tanzania, where he came up with the astonishing results that at village level there was no participatory method applied at all. He argued that corruption among village leaders was rampant to the extent that even justice in the primary courts could be bought by influential villagers.²¹ Similarly, Thaddeus Sunseri associated participatory forestry management with state forestry encroachment on common land that was formerly used by the surrounding community for grazing and hunting.²² This chapter extends but also challenges the arguments by Brockington and Sunseri, because participatory forest management in the plantation need not include

Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2009), 14-17, The United Republic of Tanzania: *National Forestry Policy*, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Dar es Salaam, 1998),13.

¹⁸ V.G. Vyamana "Participatory forest Management in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania: Who benefits? *The International Forestry Review*, 11, 2 (2009), 249-250 (239-253).

¹⁹ T. Blomley and H. Ramadhani "Going to Scale with Participatory Forest Management: Early lessons from Tanzania, *The International Forestry Review*, 8, 1 (2006), 95-98 (93-100).

²⁰ Blomley and Ramadhani "Going to Scale with Participatory Forest Management", 97.

²¹ Dan Brockington, *Forests, Community Conservation, and Local Government Performance: The Village Forest Reserves of Tanzania, Society and Natural Resources* (2007), 839-845 (835-848).

²² Thaddeus Sunseri "Something Else to Burn: Forest Squatters, Conservationists, and the State in Modern Tanzania", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 4, (2005), 632 (609-640).

encroachment but rather can be based on a mutually beneficial relationship. This chapter, therefore, discusses the measures taken by the Sao Hill plantation forest to deal with the problems of encroachment and fire outbreaks in the surrounding communities in order to rethink the specific case study examples in some earlier historical arguments more generally.

6.3 Policy and programme reforms in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism

Economic liberalisation and the raft of socio-economic reforms were introduced at the end of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's regime in 1995. From the parastatals these reforms trickled down to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The Ministry aimed at bringing in policies that embraced so-called sustainable forest management as enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.²³ The main pressure for reform came from the World Bank and IMF under the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).²⁴ The reforms in the Ministry were understood to be policies that sought to implement participatory forest management.²⁵ The trend of decentralizing the Forestry Department went hand in hand with decentralization and the devolution of all the political departments to regional, district and village levels. This overarching aim of decentralisation was part of the implementation of the World Bank and IMF policies, which discouraged central government monopoly of the power at the expense of the local governments and the private sector.²⁶ The World Bank and IMF policies aimed at making the local governments and private sector participate fully in the economic development of the country. Similarly, participatory forest management was partly aimed at enhancing local biological diversity and saw the rural people as key partners in addressing both environmental and poverty-related problems.²⁷ The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism responded to decentralisation by introducing policies and laws in the

²³ UN, *The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development* (1992), 4-6, The Rio Declaration, *inter alia*, urged nations to plant more forests to reduce pressure on primary and old growth forests.

²⁴ See, for example, Arielle Levine, "Convergence or Convenience? International Conservation NGOs and Development Assistance in Tanzania", *World Development*, 30, 6, (2002), 1048-1053, (1043-1055); See also, Jan Shelter, *Imagining Serengeti, A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Times to the Present*, (Ohio University Press, 1999), 223-230.

²⁵ Zahabu et.al, *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania*, 11.

²⁶ See, for example, Cheryl Payer, Tanzania and the World Bank, *Third World Quarterly*, 5, 4, (1983), 809-810 (791-813); Goran Hyden and Bo Karlstrom, Structural Adjustment as a Policy Process: The case of Tanzania, *World Development*, 21, 9 (1993), 1396-1397, (1395-1404); Paul Kaiser, Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation: The Demise of Social Unity in Tanzania, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, 2, (1996), 231-232 (227-237); T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 169-170; Knud Erik Svendsen, "Development Strategy and Crisis Management", Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari (ed.), *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere* (London, James Currey, 1995), 108-124.

²⁷ Zahabu et.al, *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania* 11, see also, Anna Muganda, *Tanzania's Economic Reforms and Lessons Learned* (The World Bank, 2004), iv; UN, *The Rio Declaration on Environmental and Development* (1992), 4-6; World Bank, *Opportunities and Challenges in the Forest Sector*, (2002), 3-5.

forest division that were in line with the needs of participatory forest management. The Tanzania National Forestry Policy that came into effect in 1998 advocated community empowerment in forest management. The first intervention was a pilot study on natural forest conservation by local African scholars, funded by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and overseas pro-conservation and afforestation organisations like SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) at the Duru-Haitemba Forest in Babati District (in north-central Tanzania).²⁸

One of the major catalysts of change in the policies implemented by the Ministry was the National Forestry Policy, which was intended to raise awareness of the essential linkages between the environment and development by promoting both individual and community participation in environmental issues.²⁹ On a macro-economic level, the policy intended to reduce direct government involvement in production, thereby creating an enabling environment for a strong private sector. Overall, the 1998 National Forest Policy followed the decentralizing trend by proposing reduced state investment in the plantation forestry by encouraging and accommodating the private sector. However, as this chapter will show, the implementation of these policies on the ground, with respect to Mufindi district, left a lot to be desired.

The National Forest Policy was cemented by the National Forest Programme, which was promulgated in late 2001. The first item on the agenda of the National Forest Programme was participatory forest management, with a particular focus on the social dimension of gender. Participatory forest management of resources was argued to be a panacea for rectifying the gender imbalance in the economy overall and in the forest sector specifically.³⁰ The strategies

²⁸ Brockington, *Forests, Community Conservation, and Local Government Performance*, 837. See also, Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania*, 12, Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 167-168.

²⁹ The United Republic of Tanzania, *National Forestry Policy*, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Dar es Salaam, 1998), 8.

³⁰ Participatory forestry management was *de facto* meant for natural forests. However, in Tanzania, some of its core principles were adopted in the state-owned plantation forests to redress problems of fire outbreaks and encroachment. In the natural forests, the concept is understood more broadly as it aims, among other things, to improve unregulated activities such as charcoal burning and timber harvesting, improve biodiversity, increase number of species of both flora and fauna, increase game numbers, improve water catchments and raise awareness. For the details, see K. Hamza and E. Kimwer, *Tanzania's Forest Policy and Its Practical Achievements with Respect to Community Based Forest Management in MITIMIOMBO* (Morogoro, Tanzania Association of Forests, 2003), 30-31; Gerald Monela and Jumanne Abdallah, "Dynamism of Natural Resource Policies and Impact on Forestry in Tanzania" Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika (eds.), *Tanzania in Transition, From Nyerere to Mkapa* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2010), 159-174.

which were employed to resolve these shortcomings were community-based forest management (CBFM) and joint forest management (JFM).³¹ These programmes employed by the Ministry operated in tandem with measures entailing collaborating with local governments in the management of forests in the general lands and local government forest reserves.³² The CBFM and JPM were not applied equally to the natural forests.³³ The Sao Hill plantation exploited some of the principles of participatory forest management and forged it into a form of corporate social responsibility in the villages surrounding the plantation.³⁴ Participatory forest management between Sao Hill management and the adjacent villages was evinced through improvement of public infrastructure and raising forest awareness. The villages were assisted to maintain roads, school buildings and dispensaries, while the Sao Hill plantation was assisted by protecting the forest from fire, encroachment and wood poachers.

These measures came at a time when the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism claimed that the plantation forests lacked funds from the government to increase the plantation's productivity and ability to maximize revenue in a sustainable way. Without those participatory forest management measures, the plantation faced the severe threat of fire.³⁵ The government admitted that the net planted area and growing stock were declining in terms of area and quality because of a lack of funds and political will. Furthermore, the plantation forests under central government management were understocked as a result of inadequate management, fire prevention and encroachments.³⁶ At Sao Hill plantation the management estimated that from 1996 to 2000 there was no planting programme because of shortage of funds. Indeed, the management openly conceded "there was no political will in those years".³⁷ The failure to extend the plantation in these years was partly due to the absence of funds from the World Bank loans, which had ended officially in 1992 as noted, but also due to mismanagement of

³¹ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania*, 2001-2010 (Dar es Salaam, 2001), xii.

³² The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania*, xii.

³³ Community-based forest management (CBFM) refers to the management of natural forests which are run solely by the respective communities around the forest, while joint forest management (JFM) refers to the management of natural forests by both the government (district or central) and the surrounding communities. These two types of management are referred collectively as participatory forest management (PFM).

³⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

³⁵ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 26.1.2017.

³⁶ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania*, 2001-2010 (Dar es Salaam, 2001), 23.

³⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

funds obtained after selling logs. The formal name of these funds which can be estimated by calculating the number of hectares of the trees to be harvested is stumpage.³⁸

To improve the situation in the plantation forests, the Sao Hill plantation and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism introduced the Logging and Miscellaneous Deposit Account (LMDA) in 2000. LMDA retained funds generated from state-owned forest plantation amounting to about 45 percent of the forest royalties to service silvicultural and road maintenance activities in the plantations.³⁹ LMDA aimed at increasing internal revenues from the forest products and services. At Sao Hill plantation forest the LMDA was credited to have increased revenues tremendously. It was estimated by the Sao Hill management that the LMDA brought in between eight and 11 billion Tanzanian shillings depending on annual allowable cut (AAC) per year.⁴⁰ At Sao Hill plantation up to 2009 the mean allowable cut reached 1 035 m³ annually.⁴¹ The LMDA was introduced to rescue the financial situation, which was claimed to be in a worse state in the plantation forests because all funds and revenues before were deposited into the central government's treasury account. The management of the Sao Hill plantation admitted that the money collected and deposited in the central treasury account from logging the plantation were ironically not disbursed back to the plantation for further production. The state's failure to fund the plantation led to the decline of many sections of plantation forests.⁴² The section below will elucidate the experience of the Sao Hill plantation with participatory forest management which was similar to social corporate responsibility to its surrounding villages. But the term "participatory forest management" was unfamiliar to the Sao Hill management.⁴³ They often referred to it (participatory forest management)-as good neighbourhood with the community around the forest. What was seen crucial by the Sao Hill forest management was to assist the community in the adjacent villages for the pragmatic

³⁸ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

³⁹ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania*, 2001-2010, 84; See also Yonika Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*. 1, 16, 20 B, (2011), 17, 50, Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016; Interview with Joseph Sondi and Salum Yakuti, Surveillance Section, Sao Hill Plantation Forest, Sao Hill Forest Headquarters, 26.1.2017.

⁴⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016. Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) refers to the grown up forests and are due for harvesting in the respective year, measured in cubic metres.

⁴¹ Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 47.

⁴² Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

⁴³ This point serves to explain that the term "participatory forest management" is not unanimously well known by all stakeholders, whether from the state side-Sao Hill forest management, or from the beneficiaries of the programme-surrounding community. Yet, this is not to say that all stakeholders does not understand the term.

reason to protect their forest from fire outbreaks.⁴⁴ The perception of the community around the Sao Hill forest, who received assistance, was also unique, as they perceived it-Sao Hill forest-as one of the big national agencies with all means of technology and funds to deal with its problems and the surrounding community. The reality of the story was that the Sao Hill forest was not even an agency⁴⁵ in the national rankings but merely the biggest national plantation forest which had a well-established track record under the Forestry Division and one of the sections in the directorate of natural resources, in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.

6.4.1 The Sao Hill forest and the surrounding villages in the “participatory forest management model”

The Sao Hill plantation forest management assisted the surrounding villages to achieve a positive outcome for forest sustainability in the early 2000s. The Sao Hill plantation management developed the mutual relationship with the surrounding communities with the aim of curbing fire outbreaks.⁴⁶ The Sao Hill plantation management, furthermore, interacted with the adjacent villages like any other participatory forest management by assisting them materially and with public education on fire outbreaks, HIV, bee keeping, general agriculture and – more rarely – religious events (both traditional and modern ones).⁴⁷

The Sao Hill forest management increased the concentration of activities in the surrounding villages between 2010 and 2013. It was reported that cases of fire outbreaks declined quickly in the same years as the villagers in the adjacent areas appreciated the assistance from the Sao Hill plantation. The reduced fire outbreaks meant that material support to the surrounding villages worked well and indeed the villagers also felt that activities of the Sao Hill forest were to their mutual benefit.⁴⁸

The assistance to the villages was attractive enough to make the plantation forest seem an equal partner to some of the villagers. The Sao Hill plantation took over the services previously offered to the villagers by the state. The 2010/2011 period for example, ended with assistance

⁴⁴ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Surveillance Section, Sao Hill Plantation Forestry Headquarters, 26.1. 2017.

⁴⁵ In the context of Tanzania, an agency is any government parastatal which is accredited by the president to deal with a special duty (usually professional) in order to increase government revenues.

⁴⁶ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

⁴⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Plantation Headquarters, Mufindi, 28.1.2016.

⁴⁸ Interview with Gaitan Kalole, Chairman Ihalimba Village, Ihalimba Village, 19.4.2016.

to four villages, namely Kitasengwa, Itimbo, Ihalimba and Nyololo. See the details of the assistance in Table 2.

Table 3: Villages assisted by the Sao Hill forest, 2010/2011.⁴⁹

Village	Details of assistance	Cost in Tsh.	Division
Kitasengwa	Village government office construction	4 997 064	IV
Itimbo	Building of a house for the village doctor	4 966 620	III
Ihalimba	Village dispensary construction	4 947 150	III
Nyololo	Village dispensary construction	4 976 000	II

The village leaders admitted appreciating the support they got from the Sao Hill plantation forest management. They came to believe that the Sao Hill forest had become an equal partner to the villagers in almost all walks of life.⁵⁰ Gaitan was quoted saying that “the villagers at Ihalimba depend on the Sao Hill forest for many things, for instance, assistance on fire outbreaks on their woodlots.”⁵¹ He stated that sometimes the forest depends on villagers to assist in putting out wildfires and they offer the service free of charge because of good neighbourhood relations they had built. He added that the Sao Hill forest disseminated knowledge on tree planting to the villagers, which is why the villagers were able to maintain their independent woodlots.⁵²

The Sao Hill forest management again managed to assist four villages in the 2011/2012 financial year. The forest management argued that it was clear that there was a direct connection between fire control and village assistance.⁵³ The villages in Division III, which was prone to fire, were given a higher priority. See Table 3 below for the details of assistance in 2011/2012 financial year.

⁴⁹ SHPFA: File Title: An Evaluation of Wildfire in the Sao Hill plantation forest, 2015 prepared by Fidelis Mwanalikungu.

⁵⁰ Interview with Gaitan Kalole, Chairman Ihalimba Village, Ihalimba Village, 19.4.2016.

⁵¹ Interview with Gaitan Kalole, Chairman Ihalimba Village, Ihalimba Village, 19.4.2016.

⁵² Interview with Gaitan Kalole, Chairman Ihalimba Village, Ihalimba Village, 19.4.2016.

⁵³ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill plantation headquarters, 28.1.2016.

Table 4: Villages assisted by the Sao Hill forest, 2011/2012.⁵⁴

Village	Details of assistance	Cost in Tsh.	Division
Mkalala	Building primary school classes	3 499 000	I
Vikula	Building of a house for the village doctor	4 374 500	III
Wami	Village dispensary construction	4 469 000	III
Mninga	Building of classes at Mlimani primary school	4 800 000	I

The villagers in the above villages acknowledged that they benefitted a great deal from the presence of the Sao Hill forest. At Mninga village, for example, one elder said that the forest project in their area had reduced youth urban migration, as they could find temporary jobs in the proximity of their homes.⁵⁵ He said when he was a youth in the early 1970s he was forced to travel as far as Ismani, in Iringa district, for casual employment by the big maize farmers, as he could not find work locally in Mufindi. He declared that the situation had improved as youths could now secure employment in their own villages. Another elder affirmed that the forest project had assisted them in improving public infrastructure like schools, dispensaries and government offices in their villages.⁵⁶

The District Commissioner indicated that the services provided by the forest project were a peace-making strategy. He revealed that the forest project distributed more than 1 000 000 seedlings free of charge in the surrounding villages.⁵⁷ Supplying seedlings free of charge helped the villagers to develop village forests and individual woodlots. By virtue of having those woodlots, the villagers gradually became part of the forest project directly and indirectly. They came directly involved in putting out fires whenever they occurred because they were protecting their own woodlots and indeed they protected the greater forest project owned by the government. The result of these efforts was remarkable as they reduced fire incidents to zero by 2015.⁵⁸ (The fire control systems and incidences, however, warrant a separate section within this chapter as those systems of controlling fire were complicated). The Sao Hill

⁵⁴ SHPFA: File Title: An Evaluation of Wildfire in the Sao Hill plantation forest, 2015 prepared by Fidelis Mwanalikungu.

⁵⁵ Interview with Mathias Lumwesa (66 years), Mninga/Kihanga Villages, 14.4.2016.

⁵⁶ Interview with Madeusi Chelesi (72 years), Mninga village, 14.4.2016.

⁵⁷ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

⁵⁸ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

plantation management increased assistance to the surrounding villages in the financial year 2012/2013. See the details of assistance to the adjacent villages in Table 4:

Table 5: Villages assisted by the Sao Hill forest, 2012/2013.⁵⁹

Village	Details of assistance	Cost in Tsh.	Division
Nundwe	Building of a house for the village doctor	3 156 000	III
Ibatu	Village dispensary construction	1 252 500	II
Mwitikilwa	Village dispensary construction	4 620 000	III
Kasanga	Construction of two classes, an office and a store	2 850 000	I
Changalawe	Building three primary school classes	3 571 510	II
Ugesa	Building of two primary school classes and one house	4 877 500	III
Kihanga	Building two classes for primary school	3 780 000	I
Ludilo	Construction of two teachers' houses	1 048 000	III
Usokami	Building a market	551 200	III

This assistance was deeply appreciated by both villagers and the village leadership. For example, at Nundwe village the village executive officer said that the Sao Hill management helped them construct new office buildings for the village secretary. Furthermore, the forest management gave them a certain number of hectares to harvest free of charge.⁶⁰ For example, the Nundwe village executive officer said in 2015 that his village was given a permit to harvest hectares equivalent to 200 cubic metres.⁶¹ He said that the village government did not harvest, but instead they sold the permit to big logging businessmen as they had no sawing facilities. It was presumed that Nundwe village did not harvest on its own because of lack of capital, which is always necessarily high in logging. The money obtained by selling their forest harvesting slot was planned to be used on improving public services such as buildings for schools, dispensaries and administration offices for their village. To the villagers of Nundwe this was an enormous profit as many were heard saying that had the forest department not been present

⁵⁹ SHPFA: File Title: An Evaluation of Wildfire in the Sao Hill plantation forest, 2015 prepared by Fidelis Mwanalikungu.

⁶⁰ Interview with Godfrey Mkongwa (35 years), Village Executive Officer at Nundwe Village, 8.4.2016.

⁶¹ Logs are calculated in cubic metres because before harvesting the length and girth of the log is calculated. This is the official measurement in the timber business.

in their village, those public services could to be maintained only by money collected directly from them. At a group interview at Nundwe village Galafwata Kihongole and his fellow villagers said, “though the forest department took our fertile land under the pretext of villagisation in 1977, it is clear nowadays that the development we see in our village is directly linked to the presence of the plantation forest”.⁶²

The villagers’ narrative of mutual benefit was attested to by the relatively lavish modern houses they owned. Their situation was in stark contrast to villages without such assistance in Iringa District. The villagers applauded the Sao Hill forest management for disseminating knowledge about agriculture, because at this village almost all villagers’ farms were in good condition as a result of abiding by principles of good farming disseminated by the fire control systems of the Sao Hill forest. The Sao Hill forest management and the District Commissioner explained that they were obliged to educate the adjacent villagers on good modern farming practices as an expedient means of making them self-reliant rather than depending on the forest for resources.⁶³ The second reason was that education helped entrench and inculcate the idea of a mutually beneficial relationship between the villagers and the forest management. The villagers agreed with the forest management, especially when there were fire incidents: they conceded that it was no longer the duty of the forest project only, but rather a duty of both villagers and forest management because the villagers had their own woodlots to protect as well. Indeed, they willingly assisted in putting out fires in the areas close to Sao Hill forest so as to maintain the mutual relationship they had cultivated.⁶⁴

To assess how those adjacent villages were benefitting (or not) from the Sao Hill programme one could contrast them usefully with the villages which were further away from the Sao Hill plantation forests. The Forest Officer in Iringa district said that they envied the Sao Hill project as it was endowed with huge capital from the government. He gave examples of villages like Mfukulembe and Kibena from Iringa district, which had poor public social services, little health care and dilapidated school buildings, while the villages near the forest (like Itimbo and Ihalimba) were well funded by the Forest Department.⁶⁵ One villager from Mfukulembe village

⁶² Interview with Galafwata Kihongole (62 years), Clemence Mhomanzi (50 years), Gallen Mpangala (65 years) and Augustine Mhomanzi (51), at Nundwe Village, 6.4.2016.

⁶³ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016, Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁶⁴ Interview with Galafwata Kihongole (62 years), Clemence Mhomanzi (50 years), Gallen Mpangala (65 years) and Augustine Mhomanzi (51), at Nundwe Village, 6.4.2016.

⁶⁵ Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa district Forest Officer, at Iringa district headquarters, on 14.5.2016.

similarly insisted: “my village did a grave mistake by rejecting relinquishing part of the village land to the forest project in 1975”.⁶⁶ This was in reference to the developments which were achieved by the neighbouring villages – admittedly a generation after those who had relinquished the land in 1975 – because of the support from the Sao Hill forest project.⁶⁷ It was presumed by Itimbo villagers that Iringa district residents were obliged to fund their own public infrastructure – unlike their neighbours in Mufindi.

6.4.2 Fire control strategies in the adjacent villages

Fire outbreaks have been one of the major threats to the sustainability of the Sao Hill plantation forest since its establishment in the late 1930s. In 1983, for example, a fire claimed 6 498.3 hectares.⁶⁸ Between 2000 and 2011 a total of 8 227.8 hectares worth 846 million Tanzanian shillings were burnt.⁶⁹ On the other hand, between 2000 and 2011 the Sao Hill plantation managed to extinguish more than 143 fires.⁷⁰ The Sao Hill forest management argued that it was estimated that from 1970 to 2007 the forest experienced at least ten fire incidents every five years coming from the adjacent villages. In 2010 the Sao Hill plantation conducted a survey whose results indicated that honey harvesting, farm preparation, hunting, arson, loggers’ camps, fishermen, herders and envious people were the main causes of fire outbreaks from the adjacent villages.⁷¹ High wind speeds in Mufindi, where the wind is blowing from east to west during the dry season between July and mid-November, were argued to be the main causes of the fires.⁷² In most cases reported, fire outbreaks in Mufindi were related to land use practices. Fire was central to farm preparations between August and November in the adjacent villages. However, sometimes herders, hunters, fishermen and honey hunters⁷³ were responsible for fires in the dry seasons.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Interview with Joshua Nyanyamba (54), Mfukulembe village, 8.4.2016.

⁶⁷ Interview with Joshua Nyanyamba (54), Mfukulembe village, 8.4.2016.

⁶⁸ TNA, E.M. Ntumbo and S.M. Malya “Rehabilitation of Burnt Plantations at Sao Hill Forest Project” October 1984, Acc. No. 604: Sao Hill Forest Project, File: FD/33/23/8.

⁶⁹ Fidelis Mwanalikungu “An Evaluation Study on Wildfire in Sao Hill Plantation Forest”, (Unpublished document 2010), 22.

⁷⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁷¹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁷² Fidelis Mwanalikungu “An Evaluation Study on Wildfire in Sao Hill Plantation Forest”, (Unpublished document 2010), 23.

⁷³ These are people who trespass into the forest for the purpose of hunting honey. The traditional way of honeying is through fire smoking.

⁷⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

To mitigate fire problems, a series of measures was taken to improve firefighting methods. The Sao Hill plantation forest first trained 25 of its staff members by sending them to Johannesburg, South Africa, for a one-month short course on firefighting in 2010.⁷⁵ When the staff members went back after the firefighting training, their first task was to revamp firefighting crews, ensure the provision of firefighting equipment and maintaining good social relationships with the adjacent villages, despite some long-standing differences in some forest divisions. One aspect of revamping the fire crews was through increasing the mobile patrols in the adjacent villages. Since 2007 each fire guard has been provided with a bicycle to facilitate investigation and detection in watching out within a specific area assigned.⁷⁶ The patrol officers were required to know thoroughly their ranges and its sub-divisions. In addition to that every patrol man was required to write a daily observation report describing, for example, the kind of activities going on in the nearby farms, fishing activities and women who were allowed to collect firewoods free of charge.⁷⁷

At the heart of the firefighting strategy was the standby crews. This group was comprised of vigorous male youths and was tantamount to any police unit. The group came into the camps from July to early December yearly. The group was headed by a forest division staff member, or in his absence a scheduled range officer of the area in question. At any fire outbreak, the fire crew leader received a message from the dispatcher, always through a walkie-talkie. Thereafter, the crew would drive to the fire site. On arrival at the site the fire crew leader took command on the firefighting operation. Similarly, the fire crew leader was expected to report to the headquarters of the forest division about the details of the fire, especially whether the available firefighting crews were able to combat it on their own or would need more assistance.⁷⁸ Table five shows the distribution of the fire crews per forest division in the Sao Hill plantation forest.

⁷⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁷⁶ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁷⁷ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁷⁸ Fidelis Mwanalikungu "An Evaluation Study on Wildfire in Sao Hill Plantation Forest", (Unpublished document 2010), 23.

Table 6: Fire crews distribution in the Sao Hill plantation per division/village.⁷⁹

Sn	Area/Division	Location Name/Village	Fire crew groups	Average	Total personnel
1	I	Irundi	2	21	42
2	II	Matanana, Ihefu	2	23	46 or 47
3	III	Mwitikilwa, Kilosa, Ilasa, Itimbo, Ihalimba and Vikula	6	15	90
4	IV	Luiga, Kitasengwa	2	21	42 or 43
5	Villages	Kitasengwa, Itimbo, Mtili, Matanana and Kihanga	1	10	50

To make fire suppression sustainable, every range officer and sub-division manager was equipped with walkie-talkies, especially from July to December each year. Each fire tower was provided with a bicycle. New fire towers were constructed at Kifumi, Kilosa, Ilasa and Sawala. Maintenance of Itimbo fire tower was scheduled for 2014. The fire towers stations were to send reports from high-risk fire areas like Irundi which bordered a grazing area.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Fidelis Mwanalikungu “An Evaluation Study on Wildfire in Sao Hill Plantation Forest”, (Unpublished document 20115), 23.

⁸⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.



Figure 15: Itimbo fire tower (photograph by author).⁸¹

Training the adjacent villagers in fire control systems and assisting them materially was thought to be the best method to protect the forest – and to further ensure a mutual relationship, as both parties benefitted. Materials and service support to the adjacent villages were a means of developing a mutually beneficial relationship for the security of the forest. In the financial year 2014/2015 the services provided were divided into two categories of workshops and infrastructures. In the financial year 2014/2015 the villagers of Mwitikilwa, Sawala, Kitilu, Itulituli and Nundwe received the annual training. The educators formed a group of 15 professionals and administrators. The educators included but were not limited to foresters, agriculturalists, herbalist/witchcraft practitioners, veterinary officers, bee keeping experts, medical doctors, teachers, religious leaders, District Commissioner’s representatives, councillors, entertainment groups and influential people in the respective villages. The number of villagers who attended the training sessions did not exceed 50 per village.⁸²

The topics varied and so did the educators. The forest official who organized the training explained that he used to teach the villagers about fire control methods. He said that he educated them that before setting on fire during the process of burning grasses for cattle grazing or farm

⁸¹ A photograph by the Author 29.10.2015.

⁸² SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, “Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest” 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

preparations the villagers were to report to the nearby forest station. Depending on the human resource at their disposal, the forest station would then arrange a time for clearing a farm(s) by fire. The forest stations provided a company of six to ten men armed with fire-extinguishing equipment. The forest educator said that sometimes it was not necessary to report to the forest station if it was too far; instead the villagers were educated to approach the village executive officers in their respective villages. The village executive officers had at their disposal experienced men who had attended fire training and control courses to assist them. Every village had ten people trained in managing fires.⁸³ There was no charge to get assistance from these men, but sometimes the owners of farms provided a local brew at their own discretion as part of thanks for the assistance.⁸⁴ Any villager who started a fire without permission from the local authorities was fined. In some villages there were stipulated fines for laws breakers. At Kihanga village, for example, the culprit was obliged to pay into the village communal “kitty” two bags of cement and 1 000 burnt bricks per event.⁸⁵ These material things were additional to what was prescribed as “table negotiations” fines, which amounted to 25 000 Tanzanian shillings.⁸⁶

The Sao Hill forest management encouraged education on making beehives and sometimes the management made and distributed them to the villagers free of charge. For example, in 2014/2015 Malangali Secondary School, one of the oldest secondary schools in Tanzania, was given five beehives.⁸⁷ In the years between 2007 and 2010 free beehive distribution benefited Mtula, Mtili, Kitilu, Matanana, Kitasengwa and Itimbo villages.⁸⁸ Knowledge about beehives was important to stop adjacent villagers trespassing into the forest for honey. To prevent those trespassers, free beehives were to become a central theme of making the adjacent villagers get honey without depending on the Sao Hill forest.⁸⁹

To make villagers more self-reliant, the Sao Hill management taught them ways to develop their own tree nursery for raising funds. This method was reported to make some villagers earn money for their living. Some villagers were reported to have formed small organisations to

⁸³ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁸⁴ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016.

⁸⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁸⁶ Interview with Madeusi Chelesi (72 years), Mninga village, 14.4.2016.

⁸⁷ SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, “Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest” 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

⁸⁸ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

⁸⁹ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016, Fidelis Mwanalikungu, 28.1.2016.

develop tree nurseries in an advanced way similar to that of the Sao Hill plantations. The Sao Hill plantation management acted as a patron to these growers' groups. Some of the groups which were well known by the forest management included *Hewa Safi* (Clean Air) based at Mafinga town, the Imehe Women's Group based at Nyololo village, and the *Ogopa Moto* (Beware of Fire) group based at Kihanga village.⁹⁰ To promote these groups and individuals financially, the forest management sometimes bought their tree seedlings and either planted in its extension areas or distributed them to the villagers free of charge. However, these groups and individuals did not target the Sao Hill forest plantation as the sole customer; they had developed their customers from individual forest growers.⁹¹

The price of one tree seedling was estimated to be between 100 to 200 Tanzanian shillings. Mwanalikungu, one of the patrons for these groups, said that developing tree seedlings was one of the lucrative businesses conducted by those villages adjacent to the forest. The negative side of the tree seedlings business was that in the long run, indirectly, it reduced the area of land that was used for food crops in Mufindi and increased land grabbing, as everyone in Mufindi wanted to have his/her own woodlot.⁹² The District Commissioner, who by virtue of his title, was the chairman of the Mufindi district Peace and Security Committee was quoted saying "people in Mufindi district have planted trees everywhere even on their farms where they used to plant food crops".⁹³ The District Commissioner said his committee was about to circulate a by-law to force the villagers to abide by agroforestry practices whereby every household would have to divide its land into sections for food crops, forestry and grazing land. He said that without such stern measures the district was likely to be plunged into a food crisis.⁹⁴ The opinion of the District Commissioner was shared by an agroforestry professor from Sokoine University of Agriculture. Luther Lulandala was quoted saying "agroforestry is the panacea for all problems related to fire woods and hunger, as everyone will produce the two items at his/her farm".⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016, Fidelis Mwanalikungu, 28.1.2016.

⁹¹ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016, Fidelis Mwanalikungu, 28.1.2016.

⁹² See, for example, Mette F. Olwig et al., Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania, *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12 (2015) 2323-2334 (2316-2336).

⁹³ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

⁹⁴ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

⁹⁵ Interview with Prof. Luther Lulandala, Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro Region, 7.1.2016.

6.4.3 People’s reasons for excessive tree planting in Mufindi

When the villagers were asked about excessive planting of exotic trees – especially pines – in their food crop farms, they responded that their land was exhausted and the staple food crops they produced, maize and beans, had a lower market value than timber.⁹⁶ The other reason shared by many villagers was that the Sao Hill plantation forest had attracted wild animals – especially monkeys, baboons, and wild pigs – that were now eating their crops.⁹⁷ The villagers were not allowed to hunt these wild animals to protect their crops, because the rules of the forest reserves prohibited hunting. The villagers argued that they were thus forced to convert their food farms into woodlots contiguous with the Sao Hill plantation out of fear of such animals.⁹⁸ One elder was heard lamenting that they were not even allowed to enter into the forest to hunt those animals with weapons (including guns) unless they acquired permits from the Sao Hill forest management. He complained: “if you have a food crop farm in the area bordering the Sao Hill forest, you will have to sleep there as in the day you will have to ward off monkeys and baboons and in the night you will have to ward off wild pigs”.⁹⁹

6.4.4 Road maintenance assistance

The Sao Hill plantation Forest management supported the adjacent villages by maintaining village roads. The following table details the villages that were assisted by the Sao Hill forest with regard to roads between from 2007 to 2014.

Table 7: Road maintenance assistance to the adjacent villages.¹⁰⁰

Sn	Village/Street	Connected Village(s)	Distance in Km
1	Ihalimba	Igomtwa and Usokami	26
2	Itimbo	Lyasa	8
3	Vikula	Wami-Mbalwe	17
4	Maguvani	Mtambula	15
5	Kinyanambo street	-	3
6	Ifupira	-	4.5

⁹⁶ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

⁹⁷ Interview with Paulo Kifyasi, Mapanda Village, Mufindi, 27.1. 2017.

⁹⁸ Interview with Raphael Lutumo, Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016, Godfrey Mkongwa, Executive Village Officer, Galafwata Kihongole, Nundwe Village, 6.4.2016.

⁹⁹ Interview with Kambaulaya Mtavangu, Mtili Village, Mufindi, 19.5.2016.

¹⁰⁰ SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, “Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest” 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

Beyond training and infrastructure maintenance, the Sao Hill plantation forest management allowed the adjacent villagers to perform some activities which were considered to be part of improving good relationships and indeed, made the plantation forest more sustainable. Some of these permits included allowing the adjacent villagers to practise “taungya agriculture”.¹⁰¹ This is the system whereby villagers and forest staff are given the right to cultivate food crops in the clear felled plantation forest land during the early stages of establishing the plantation forest. Cultivation is often allowed to continue until trees shade the crops because of canopy closure. The taungya system originated in Burma whereby peasants in the areas with a shortage of land were allowed to cultivate in the logged forests. The British introduced the system in 1950 to deal with shortage of land and labour in some regions like Tanga and Coast.¹⁰² It was resented by the peasants from the Coast as they were evicted when trees reached three years (the stage when canopy is formed by these trees)¹⁰³ The aim of the taungya system was partly to assist the people without land to cultivate food crops and at the same time weed and protect the young trees.¹⁰⁴ Between 2000 and 2015 the taungya system in the Sao Hill plantation forest was practised on almost all clear ranges where trees had been felled.¹⁰⁵ The plantation forest staff and the villagers around the plantation were allocated plots in these areas with felled trees to cultivate annual crops, in this case maize and beans, and at the same time taking care of the young replanted trees.¹⁰⁶ The villagers appreciated this plan whenever they got the plots.¹⁰⁷ The challenge of the taungya system at Sao Hill plantation was that the forest officials and their families took the lion’s share of the land set aside for the taungya system whenever the opportunity arose.¹⁰⁸ The Sao Hill forest management allotted a certain number of acres of farms with felled trees to the adjacent village leadership. The process of parcelling the total

¹⁰¹ Taungya system at Sao Hill plantation forestry was practiced for one year only. This was affirmed by the research done by O. Ndomba, et al., “Perils of Taungya to the Productivity of Forest Plantations and Need for Modification: Case Study of Meru Forest Plantations in Tanzania,” *International Journal of Agriculture and Forestry*, 5, 5, (2015), 267-275.

¹⁰² T. Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 94-95.

¹⁰³ Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 137-138.

¹⁰⁴ Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*, 93-94; See, V. Agyeman *Revising the Taungya Plantation System: New Revenue-Sharing Proposals from Ghana* (Republic of Ghana, 2011), 1-8; Julian Evans and John Turnbull, *Plantation Forestry in the Tropics*, 3rd Edition (Oxford University Press, 2004), 320-321.

¹⁰⁵ SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, “Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest” 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

¹⁰⁶ SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, “Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest” 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Raphael Lutumo (70 years), Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Raphael Lutumo (70 years), Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016.

acres to the individual villagers was carried out by the village leaders.¹⁰⁹ There were thus obvious inequalities in the distribution of the plots to the villagers as the Sao Hill management wielded decision-making power. Despite such unavoidable challenges of coordinating of the taungya system at Sao Hill plantation, the practice was successful. First, it was observed that the taungya system provided jobs for women from the surrounding villages.¹¹⁰ The second feature of taungya in Mufindi was that it made the plantation forestry an “equal partner” to the villagers and hence the forest was more or less becoming part of their daily life and indeed it was respected.¹¹¹

The final measure that was used by the Sao Hill plantation management to instil a sense of a shared relationship with the adjacent villagers was distributing tree seedlings free of charge.¹¹² The free seedling distribution strategy cajoled the villagers into becoming partners in afforestation together with the Sao Hill plantation forest. The number of seedlings distributed was above 10 000 000 to the 48 surrounding villagers every year.¹¹³ The expected result of this strategy introduced by the forest management was successful, as it was reported that between 2010 and 2016 the cases of fire outbreaks were reduced to zero.¹¹⁴ The reduction was due to the fact that the villagers became foresters as indirectly they became vigilant about fire outbreaks.

This sub-section has explained the ways the Sao Hill forest management made a connection with the adjacent villages for the sake of socio-environmental sustainability like protecting the forest from arson as well as anthropogenic but accidental fires. The result of all these firefighting strategies were shown by the decline in fire events, which numbered 143 in 2000, then four outbreaks in 2011 and finally zero in 2012.¹¹⁵ The following sub-section tries to contextualize the nature of the independent woodlots developed in the villages adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation forest as one of the current trends in Mufindi district.

6.5 “Everyone is becoming a forester in Mufindi”: The woodlot developers in the adjacent villages

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Joseph Sondi, Sao Hill Forest Surveillance Section, Sao Hill Headquarters, 26.1.2017.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹¹¹ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹¹² Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

¹¹³ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

The income of people of Mufindi district, specifically in the villages adjacent to the Sao Hill forest, was reported by the District Commissioner to be directly or indirectly connected to forest products or non-timber forest products. The District Commissioner said to the author that “everyone in Mufindi district is a forester *knowing or unknowingly*” (author’s emphasis).¹¹⁶ This scenario has been proved in other contexts like Kumaon in the Western India Himalayas whereby villagers resented the colonial afforestation programme between 1911 and 1916. Later, after the decentralisation process in which villagers were made stakeholders of the conservation of the forests, the size of hectares of forests increased as the villagers who had previously used fire as a weapon of the weak became key protectors of the state forests and foresters.¹¹⁷ The District Commissioner was referring to the extent the principles of forestry were employed by the people in Mufindi. He said that many people in the rural areas in the villages adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation were developing their own woodlots.¹¹⁸ Some of those people in the rural areas were working as agents for town dwellers who wanted to buy land for developing new woodlots in their villages. Equally important, some villagers were selling their woodlots with trees that were five or more years old, when they were pressed with immediate financial problems. Jacovelli referred to this situation as the undefined “new wave of investors in the forestry sector”.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, the lumbering industry employed people from almost all walks of life in Mufindi district. There were big timber traders who owned saw mills based at Mafinga town.¹²⁰ These big timber traders employed drivers who drove their trucks for hauling logs from the harvesting sites to the saw mills or camp sites. The drivers were assisted by an army of loaders and in the harvesting sites there was another army of experienced loggers. There were also women food vendors on the harvesting sites and at the saw mills.¹²¹

This sub-section, however, focuses on one group of beneficiaries of the Sao Hill plantation. These are the woodlot developers in the villages adjacent to the Sao Hill forest. They were divided into two groups: those with little capital and technology, and those with more capital and technology. The first group was mainly formed by villagers who learnt about afforestation

¹¹⁶ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

¹¹⁷ See, Arun Agrawal, *Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2005), 1-9.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

¹¹⁹ See Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantations in Africa”, *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2, (2014), 149, (144-159).

¹²⁰ Interview with George Mwangala, Timber trading centre at Mafinga, 18.5.2016.

¹²¹ Interview with Jowika Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mafinga Headquarter, 18.5.2016.

by observing what they saw in the Sao Hill plantation forest. The latter group was mainly successful timber traders who wanted to have their own plantation forests. The successful timber traders composed of business people and sometimes, politicians and some civil servants who invested their pension funds on forests.¹²²

The first group of woodlot developers was formed by villagers who were connected to the Sao Hill plantation forests and, indeed, they planted their trees on their customary land hence they did not encroach on the Sao Hill land for extension. Many of them had woodlots with trees from five to 20 acres.¹²³ Villagers and, indeed, some forestry staff members in Mufindi district were more than willing to reveal the size of their woodlots. Many were proud to reveal the size of their woodlot possessions as it implied social status. The village leaders interviewed replied that they had their own woodlots too. One village executive officer was quoted saying that “I was not born in this village but I have already lobbied the village elders to find me a piece of land, hence, last year I planted five acres of pine [*Pines Patula*] trees”.¹²⁴ Based on their perceptions it was a shame for the villagers adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation if they did not own at least two acres of trees.¹²⁵ Some youths at a timber trading centre at Mafinga town were willing to mention some villages where one could buy pieces of land for woodlots.

These villagers in the adjacent villages prepared their own seedlings. Some of them were subsidized with seedlings they got from Sao Hill forest. In terms of best practices for the seedling preparation, theirs were of low quality.¹²⁶ The spacing of trees in those woodlots was also not necessarily accurate. These farmers depended on the education service provided by the Sao Hill plantation forest management under the rubric of fire protection strategies for adjacent villages. Extension services were rare, not only for woodlots but also for food crops.¹²⁷ The trees under these small scale woodlot developers were harvested earlier than the minimum tenure, which is between 20 and 25 years. This category of woodlot developers was not recognised by financial institutions. The villagers could not access bank loans, partly because their land was held under customary land ownership, which was either not legally recognised

¹²² See, for example, Paul Jacovelli, The Future of Plantations in Africa, *International Forestry Review*, 16, 2, (2014), 149, (144-159).

¹²³ Interview with Raphael Lutumo (70 years), Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016.

¹²⁴ Interview with Godfrey Mkongwa, Executive Village Officer, Nundwe Village, 6.4.2016.

¹²⁵ Interview with George Mwagala, Timber trading centre at Mafinga, 18.5.2016.

¹²⁶ See, for example, United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *Desk Study for Developing Mechanisms and Policies that Strengthen the Private Plantation Forestry and Related Value Chains* (2014), 18.

¹²⁷ Interview with Raphael Lutumo (70 years), Ihalimba Village, 6.4.2016.

or the villagers had no knowledge of such registration.¹²⁸ The customary land ownership in Tanzania was complex in the sense that much of what was claimed to be owned customarily was not actually registered.¹²⁹ Throughout the field research these villagers did not mention bank loans, but certainly some of them might have had bank loans attached to other mortgages than their woodlots.¹³⁰

The villagers harvested these trees whenever they thought they could get any wood of any girth. One timber trading woman at Mafinga town was quoted as saying, “the villagers are forced to rape these young trees because they are pressed with financial problems like school fees for their children”. She used the term ‘rape’ to imply the young trees were prematurely harvested by the villagers.¹³¹ The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism spokesperson on plantation forestry was of the opinion that the woodlot developers from the adjacent villages benefitted from knowledge disseminated by the Sao Hill plantation by coincidence. It was by coincidence as the aim of educating the villagers-by Sao Hill forest management- was not to make them full-fledged foresters but at least to make them have low skills of developing their own trees so that they can depend on themselves rather than relying on the state forest-Sao Hill. He said that before 2000 there was a tendency among the villagers to depend on the Sao Hill plantation for everything.¹³² He revealed that the ministry had once organized a workshop on harvesting technology for the surrounding community. Mathias Lema sympathized with the village woodlot developers by saying the right foresters who were meant to assist the village woodlot developers were the district foresters, but they were arguably underfunded. One district forest officer was quoted as saying, “we are underfunded to the extent that we have failed to visit the woodlot developers”.¹³³ The district authorities’ foresters in Tanzania resorted under the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government. By virtue of resorting under this Ministry, the priority of forests was very low as the Ministry had more important sections than forests. The politicians (councillors and members of parliament), who served for a five-year tenure, were alleged to be opposed to long-term projects such as plantation forests.¹³⁴ Because

¹²⁸ United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *Desk Study for Developing Mechanisms and Policies that Strengthen the Private Plantation Forestry and Related Value Chains* (2014), 66.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Abdon Rwegasira, *Land as a Human Right: A History of Land Law and Practice in Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2012), 223-227.

¹³⁰ Interview with George Mwangala, Timber trading centre at Mafinga, 18.5.2016.

¹³¹ Interview with Maula Chaula (51), Mafinga Timber Trading Centre, 18.5.2016.

¹³² Interview with Mathias Lema, TFS (Tanzania Forest Services Agency) Department, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, 22.5. 2016.

¹³³ Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa district Forest Officer, at Iringa district headquarters, on 14.5.2016.

¹³⁴ Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa district Forest Officer, at Iringa district headquarters, on 14.5.2016.

of such problems caused by politicians, many foresters under the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Governments in Tanzania, preferred to work under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, where, according to them, they could utilise their potential to the maximum. They were under-utilized and indeed they were a disappointed group.¹³⁵ The next section completes this part on the woodlot developers by discussing a few groups of foresters who owned large tracts of land with medium-size capital in comparison to village woodlot developers.

This second group of woodlot developers were the few people and companies who had capital and technology. These individuals included Paulo Ndendya and Isdore Kindole, while the companies were the Green Resource Company and the Highland Forests Company. This group of woodlot developers were all found in the contiguous zone in the Third Division of the Sao Hill plantation.¹³⁶

The Green Resource Company is one of the well-known private afforestation organizations in Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique.¹³⁷ This company is owned by Norwegian nationals and operates East Africa's largest sawmill in Tanzania based at Sao Hill in Mufindi. It produces poles for power lines too. This was one of the companies which received a certificate for carbon harvesting in Mufindi. It is the largest independent investor on the area adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation. It has 99-year leases on 18 379 hectares.¹³⁸ The company has been well organized since 2006.¹³⁹

The Green Resource company is not a competitor to the Sao Hill plantation as it represented the key customers of the Sao Hill loggers. When the Sao Hill Saw Mill was privatized in 1996, some of the Norwegian expatriates bought the mill. Instead of sticking to just buying wood, they started planting trees. They provided casual employment to the Mapanda villagers. The company, however, was criticized by environmental experts claiming that it was converting

¹³⁵ Interview with Prosper Njau, Iringa district Forest Officer, at Iringa district headquarters, on 14.5.2016.

¹³⁶ United Republic of Tanzania of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 21.

¹³⁷ Green Resource Company Limited, "Reforestation in Grassland areas of Uchindile, Kilombero, Tanzania and Mapanda, Mufindi Tanzania" (Unpublished report 2009), 2-3.

¹³⁸ Mette Olwig et al., Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania in *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12 (2015) 2319-2320 (2316-2336).

¹³⁹ Blessing Karumbidza and Wally Menne, *Potential Impacts of Tree Plantation Projects under CDM* (Clean Development Mechanism), *An African Case Study* (Timber Watch, 2009), 7.

the grassland to eucalyptus forests and hence destroying the ecosystem and, above all, the land transfers in the villages were claimed to be exploitative.¹⁴⁰

The Green Resource company afforestation is sometimes connected to the intersecting themes of climate change adaptations measures. These adaptations which included afforestation are enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 whereby protection enhancement and promotion of forests was listed to among policies.¹⁴¹ Plantation forests were listed as one of the adaptations for achieving emission limitation and reduction commitments. Within the Kyoto protocol countries signatory countries were obliged to account for the outcome of afforestation, reforestation and deforestation achievements. Article 2a (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol emphasised afforestation:

Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation.¹⁴²

The challenge of adaptations measures through afforestation to mitigate emission is that it has over planting of trees to the extent of threatening food security in some areas as it is testified through the Mapanda case in this thesis.

The second company in this category is the Highland Forest plantation, a subsidiary company of Kunder Sing Construction based in Dar es Salaam.¹⁴³ The company had encroached on the Sao Hill plantation extension reserves and had already planted 2 500 hectares of eucalyptus trees. The company had allegedly obtained land through the corrupt leaders of Mapanda village in 2009. This company had already established houses for the workers and because of the remoteness of the village, the company was developing its own airdrome. The Third Division manager stopped the development of this airport and the plantation development as all the land

¹⁴⁰ Blessing Karumbidza and Wally Menne, *Potential Impacts of Tree Plantation Projects under CDM 2009*, 15-21. The villagers were heard saying the company bought their land at the time when they were ignorant about land worth.

¹⁴¹ Risto Seppala et al., *Adaptation of Forests and People to Climate Change: A Global Assessment Report* (IUFRO-International Union of Forest Research Organisation, World Series 22, 2009), 204-209.

¹⁴² United Nations, *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, (1998), 2.

¹⁴³ United Republic of Tanzania of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 20.

planted was within the Sao Hill extension areas.¹⁴⁴ This company was one of the reasons behind the formation of the ministerial commission of inquiry on the encroachment status on the villages surrounding Sao Hill plantation forest in March 2012. The next section discusses this commission of inquiry.

6.6 The Ministerial Commission of Inquiry on land encroachment, 2012

This commission was formed after the official visit of the then minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, the honourable Ezekiel Maige, to Sao Hill plantation forest on March 2012. The commission of inquiry was headed by Dr Ismail Aloo, a lawyer and Arbitrator of Conflicts for the Forestry Department. The Sao Hill plantation management was represented by seven members. The commission, apart from visiting the plantation forests visited the natural forest reserves which were under the supervision of the Sao Hill plantation.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the details of the report will not be reproduced in this chapter, but the chapter will focus on the relationship of the Sao Hill plantation with the adjacent villages which sold the land to the private company-Southern Highland forests.

The commission of inquiry admitted that the absence of the funds from the World Bank after 1992 led to a halt in planting trees in the extension areas.¹⁴⁶ The commission of inquiry report cited the liberalisation of the economy of Tanzania in the late 1990s as one of the reasons that led the government lack capacity for expanding the Sao Hill plantation. On the other hand the independent woodlot developers, under the rubric of engaging with the private sector, were encouraged and, indeed, some of them, encroached on part of the Sao Hill extension services.¹⁴⁷ The unique part of this land commission of inquiry was that it accommodated the opinion of the encroachers (companies and villagers). It is therefore conceivable that listening to the opinions of the encroachers was an aspect of the participatory forest management model, which encouraged the participation of all stakeholders during conflict resolution to promote sustainable forest management.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 20. See also, Mette F. Olwig et al., Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12, (2015), 2320 (2316-2336).

¹⁴⁵ These natural forests under Sao Hill supervision were Ihang'ana (Division III), Iyegeya Division (III), and Ihomasa (Division I).

¹⁴⁶ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District*, 11.

¹⁴⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District*, 11.

¹⁴⁸ Zahabu et al., *Forestland Tenure Systems in Tanzania*, 11.

The ministerial commission of inquiry found that part of the problem of encroachment was caused by bottlenecks created by the 1988/1989 Iringa region commission of inquiry. The major conclusion of the 1988/1989 Iringa commission of inquiry was that a big section of land owned by the Sao Hill plantation, especially in the Third Division of the plantation, should revert back to the villagers. Furthermore, it gave the villagers a loophole that whenever they felt in need of more land for subsistence, they could send their petition via the District Commissioner to the regional commissioner. The villages which were mentioned to have encroached on the Sao Hill forest extension land were found to have used such a loophole to apply for more land. Their applications, however, were not implemented at any level. The ministerial commission of inquiry astonishingly revealed that many of the petitions which were filed for the 1988/1989 Iringa region did not reach the right stage, which was the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania. The ministerial commission, therefore, revealed that no petitions from the villagers with respect to 1988/1989 Iringa region land committee had been endorsed. That statement implied that part of the land thought to have reverted to the villagers as far back as 1989 was still in the control of the Sao Hill plantation by virtue of the general government notice gazettement of 1976¹⁴⁹ which officially transferred some portions of the village land in Mufindi district to fall under the Forestry Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. For the details see, Figure 19.

¹⁴⁹ United Republic of Tanzania of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 13.




Figure 16: The Act which transferred the village land to the ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in 1976.¹⁵⁰

The ministerial commission of inquiry conducted village meetings to hear local opinions on encroachment. Some of the discussions with the commission of inquiry with some villages they visited are worth considering. One of these villages was Mapanda, which had problems of both encroachment and selling off the land to the private woodlot company developer, namely Highland Forest plantation managed by a Kenyan national. The village had a total of 76 villagers who had encroached on the Sao Hill plantation extension areas. They had planted pines trees and seasonal food crops like maize and beans.¹⁵¹ This village had sold the land belonging to the Sao Hill plantation, estimated to be about 2 500 hectares belonging to the

¹⁵⁰ SHPFA, Forest Publicity Official to Sao Hill Forest Manager, "Supported Villages/2014/2015 by the Sao Hill Plantation Forest" 10. 8.2015. File No. MU/12.13/IV *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (Socialist Villages).

¹⁵¹ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District*, 23.

Highland Forest plantation. The private company had planted the area with the eucalyptus trees. The Highland Forest Company initially wanted to build the small airport on their claimed land. The Sao Hill forest management claimed that the private company obtained the land by corrupt means by giving money to the village leaders before the village meetings.¹⁵²

The second village warranting discussion was Kitasengwa. The village was under the Fourth Division founded in the 1980s. The committee discovered that the Sao Hill plantation encroached on the village land.¹⁵³ The villagers had provided land temporarily to the Sao Hill plantation for a tree nursery in 1982. The Sao Hill plantation had subsequently included the area on their official maps. The inclusion of the area for a tree nursery in the Sao Hill forest map without negotiating meant encroachment on the village land by the Sao Hill forest management. The committee ruled that the villagers were to be compensated or the area under tree nursery be returned to the customary owners. These two villages offer useful lenses into the problems that prevailed in the villages adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation forest.

In assessing such problems, the commission of inquiry realised that there were contradicting and confusing authorities on who exactly could arbitrate in the enduring debate on the boundaries between the villages and the Sao Hill plantation forest. Those villages were found to have a village land lease authorized by Iringa region land officials.¹⁵⁴ The Iringa region land commission of 1988/89 had returned part of the land belonging to the Sao Hill plantation forest to the villages. The Ministerial Commission rejected all land dispute initiatives arbitrated by either the district or the region. The ministerial commission concluded that the district and regional authorities had no mandate to return the land to the villagers unless the process included parliament which had the powers of returning the land to the villagers. Therefore, the Member of Parliament (MP) from Mufindi district was the right person to make a petition for the land return- something which did not happen. The district land official when asked about the right person to educate the villagers on forest land encroachment was quoted as saying “provided that the district level approved the transfer of its land to the Ministry of Natural

¹⁵² United Republic of Tanzania, Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District, 13.

¹⁵³ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District*, 13.

¹⁵⁴ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 33.

Resources and Tourism in 1976, then, all powers of protecting that land fell under the recipient ministry. Therefore, no other authorities could claim return of the land to the villagers”.¹⁵⁵

The District Commissioner was earlier quoted as saying that “the government was too slow to act to the encroachment cases in the Sao Hill plantation expansion areas”.¹⁵⁶ The commission stated that the opinion of 1988/1989 Iringa region commission of land inquiry did not reach the right stage, which was the United Republic of Tanzania Parliament. Therefore, the Ministerial Commission ordered the district and the regional authorities to inform the villagers that the land they claim had reverted back to the villages was legally not binding as the regional authorities (District and regional administration) have no power to return land under the central government, that is, under the direct ownership of the ministry.¹⁵⁷

The commission was of the opinion that the individuals and companies which had encroached on the Sao Hill plantation forest extension areas be compensated for their trees or be given a special contract lease until they harvest their trees. Many villagers were of the opinion that they could harvest their trees and then the land could revert back to the Sao Hill plantation forest.¹⁵⁸ The District Commissioner too, for the sake of peaceful transition, was in favour of letting the encroachers be registered and harvest their trees when they have reached full growth.¹⁵⁹

With regard to Highland Forest plantation, the measures were a bit different from those applied to the other encroachers. The Sao Hill plantation Forest communicated with the Iringa region land official on whether he knew anything about this company. Paul Msimbe responded that the Highland Forest plantation was directed to see the land officials in Mufindi district. The company did not abide by this procedure, but instead they connived with Mapanda village leaders to get the land without informing the top authorities. The company, conceivably, did not follow any legal procedures to get land as it was found that there were no records of this company at the Ministry of Land and Human Settlement. The Ministry of Land and Human Settlement spokesperson was sympathetic to foreign nationals who wanted land for investing: “the foreign nationals, especially the Kenyans, are prone to corrupt village leaders because they

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Leonard Jaka, Mufindi District Land Officer, 20.5.2016. Mafinga Town, HQ Mufindi District.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mufindi, 17.5.2016, Mafinga Town.

¹⁵⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 35.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Gabriel Luvinga, Nyololo Village, 14.4.2016.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with J.W. Kasunga, District Commissioner, Mufindi, 17.5.2016, Mafinga Town.

rush to get land without understanding the right procedures of getting land for investing in Tanzania.”¹⁶⁰

Finally, the ministerial commission of inquiry suggested that its opinions needed to be implemented immediately as it was observed that many people were preoccupied with woodlot developing. Woodlot developing by individuals and companies was becoming a threat to the seemingly idle land in the extension areas of the Sao Hill plantation forest.¹⁶¹ The Sao Hill forest management claimed that it was planning to establish patrolmen in all its adjacent villages to curb encroachment.¹⁶²

The above commission was immediately followed by another commission of inquiry formed by the Director of the TFS (Tanzania Forest Services Agency). The TFS was formed in 2010 to elevate the Tanzania forest sector to the level of an agency. Its aim was to increase revenue from both natural and plantation forests.¹⁶³ TFS replaced all activities of the Forest and Bee Keeping Department of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.¹⁶⁴ The TFS commission of inquiry was comprised of one member from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, the manager of the Sao Hill plantation, regional and district leaders of the ruling party, CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), district authority leaders (land affairs and administrative) and village elders. The TFS commission of inquiry wanted to get the views of the encroachers on ways of implementing the opinions and suggestions put forward by the ministerial commission of inquiry of 2012. Some of the terms of the reference of the TFS commission of inquiry were to ascertain whether the encroachers were willing to be compensated. The commission engaged with many stakeholders at grassroots level. It succeeded to get opinions from almost all the encroachers (companies and independent woodlot developers).

Listening to the opinion of the encroachers could be understood as part of participatory forest management of a kind. This short section elucidates what transpired from this last commission of inquiry. The TFS suggested that the Sao Hill plantation forest had to engage with the other

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Mathias Lema, TFS (Tanzania Forest Services Agency) Department, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, 22.5. 2016.

¹⁶¹ United Republic of Tanzania, *Preliminary Ministerial Report on the Out growers, and Sao Hill Forest Reserves, Mufindi District* (2012), 35.

¹⁶² Interview with Fidelis Mwanalikungu, Sao Hill Headquarters, 28.1.2016.

¹⁶³ Interview with Prof. S.A.O Chamshama, Sokoine University, Morogoro region, 7.1.2016.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Prof. S.A.O Chamshama, Sokoine University, Morogoro region, 7.1.2016.

stakeholders to implement the suggestions of many commissions of inquiry, including the suggestions this commission put forward.¹⁶⁵ This commission revealed that the Sao Hill forest management had accumulated a number of commissions of inquiry recommendations but it seem that those recommendations did not help them stop the endless encroaching on its extension land by companies and individuals, especially at the Third Division-Mapanda, Igeleke and Usokami.¹⁶⁶ The TFS commission of inquiry suggested that the politicians such as councillors, members of parliament from Mufindi district and the ruling party should assist in educating the villagers, who were adamant that they would not move from the land they encroached on by claiming that they had no other place to resettle.¹⁶⁷ The challenge of using politicians – as suggested by the TFS commission – was that the dominance of the ruling party, which had pioneered land dispossession in the 1970s under the pretext of villagisation, had forfeited the trust of many villagers. See Figure 17.

Finally, the TFS commission of inquiry disclosed that encroachers such as the Igeleke villagers did not like resettlement as they claimed that the Sao Hill plantation had not reached any agreement with them. Many families claimed that the land claimed to be owned by the Sao Hill plantation was inherited from their grandparents.¹⁶⁸ Others claimed that they were not aware of the boundaries of the plantation forest.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Stakeholders Report (2013), 10.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Aloyce Mawele, Iringa Regional Forestry Conservator, Iringa Region HQ 18.4.2016.

¹⁶⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Sao Hill Plantation Forest Stakeholders Report (2013), 12.

¹⁶⁸ Interview Adelina Nyaulingo, Igeleke Village, Mufindi, 20.5.2016.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Leusia Kanyika, Igeleke Village, Mufindi, 20.5. 2016.



Figure 17: Regional, district, ward and village political leaders discussing encroachment problems.¹⁷⁰

6.7 “The Mapanda Village fire outbreak is the national fire”: The Mapanda Village Land Grabbing

Mapanda village represented a unique case among the villages in the area adjacent to the Sao Hill plantation. The village was estimated to be located 56 km east of the Sao Hill forest headquarters. The village had a big land reserve that accommodated the two independent companies, namely the Green Resource Company, which bought 6 000 hectares of land in 1997, and the Highland Forest Company, which bought 2 500 hectares of land in 2003. The land sold to the Highland Forest Company was contested by the Sao Hill plantation forest management as they claimed the land sold by the Mapanda village belonged to them from as far back as 1974. The villagers opposed the claim by the Sao Hill forest as they argued that there were no records at the village on the procedures used to relinquishing their customary land to the Sao Hill plantation way back in 1974 during the villagisation process. As a result of such misunderstandings, the Regional Commissioner for Iringa and the ruling party (CCM) delegates from regional level visited the Mapanda village in 2012 and intervened in the

¹⁷⁰ Courtesy by Fidelis Mwanalitungu, 28.1.2016.

contestation between the village and the Sao Hill Forest management. As a result of this intervention, the planting and developing of the land contested between the Sao Hill forest and Mapanda village were suspended together with the independent plots owned by individuals who had planted in that area. In addition to the village selling land to the two big companies, individuals from Mapanda village sold their land to countless unregistered independent foresters.¹⁷¹ It was repeatedly implied by the Mapanda villagers that these land purchasers were, inter alia, well-known politicians with influence in the government. To complement the allegations, the Mapanda Ward Executive Officer (WEO) was heard saying that “any fire outbreak¹⁷² at our village is always the national fire, as it burns the woodlots owned by politicians and successive businessmen who are influential in decision making”.¹⁷³ The WEO was quoted blaming his predecessors, who were claimed to sell land unwisely to unregistered people and the two companies. He said many successive businessmen and politicians had bought tens of thousands of hectares of land by using the names of their relatives or fake names.¹⁷⁴ Interestingly, many of the buyers were granted a certificate of land lease for 99 years.¹⁷⁵ The villagers asked, in a mood of desperate frustration, whether the researcher could assist them write a petition to the president to revoke those land leases. They estimated that if the situation remained as it was, within the next decade their village would be plunged into “civil war” because of a shortage of land.¹⁷⁶

Land selling by the Mapanda village government and individuals in the village started to backfire in early 2010. With a population boom in the village, the youths who were jobless used “the weapon of the weak” – fire – to find new employment.¹⁷⁷ The arsonists of Mapanda village burnt the woodlots owned by the private investors. Other weapons of the weak along with arson are foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage.¹⁷⁸ Frankline Ndi noted that in West Cameroon the people at Nguti village

¹⁷¹ See, for example, Olwig et al., “Inverting the Moral Economy”, 2321.

¹⁷² The fire outbreaks referred to Mapanda village was typically arsonist actions targeting forests of individuals who were suspected to buy land through corruption. The perpetrators claimed to have no land for subsistence farming. The fires could be controlled at the village level and indeed did not go further to burn the Sao Hill forest, which was far from this village.

¹⁷³ Interview with Howard Kinyaga, the Mapanda Ward Executive Ward Officer, Mapanda Village 27.1.2017.

¹⁷⁴ See, for example, Olwig et al., “Inverting the Moral Economy”, 2321.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Howard Kinyaga, Tibery Kihwelo and Paulo, Mapanda Village, Mufindi, 27.1.2017.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Howard Kinyaga, Tibery Kihwelo and Paulo, Mapanda Village, Mufindi, 27.1.2017.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Howard Kinyaga, Tibery Kihwelo and Paulo, Mapanda Village, Mufindi, 27.1.2017, See, for example, James Scott, *“Weapons of the Weak” Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, (Yale University Press, 1985), xvi, 29.

¹⁷⁸ James Scott, *“Weapons of the Weak” Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, xvi, 29.

resisted covertly by destroying the farm products from the investors' farm.¹⁷⁹ At Mapanda village, it was estimated that 75 percent of the woodlots in the village were owned by people who were not citizens of Mapanda. The male youths with a land hunger organized themselves covertly and burnt some woodlots of the foreign villagers in order to create casual employment for themselves in the following planting season. The casual employment created by the arsonists involved replanting of trees in the following planting season.¹⁸⁰ By 2014 Mapanda village started importing food as almost all their land had been grabbed by either private companies or independent forest developers. One villager was heard saying that “those people with money were clever enough because they bought our land when we were still ignorant about its value. We are now regretting our decisions as we are now slaves on our own land”.¹⁸¹ The villager bluntly admitted that he had planted 20 acres of trees in his customary land. He said at Mapanda having 20 acres was the least number of acres to own as others, according to the villager, had as many as 100 acres of trees. This implied that the Mapanda villagers had planted trees excessively. One villager claimed that they planted trees because the independent companies and individual tree developers had brought in wild animals like baboons and monkeys, which ate their food crops.¹⁸² Generally, the Mapanda land case represents the bad side of the private sector in woodlot investment in the absence of a morally motivated and organized local government.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the survival strategies deployed by the Sao Hill management in the absence of World Bank funding between 2001 and 2015. The survival strategy depended on the LMDA mechanism, pioneered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, to rescue the dwindling financial backing of plantations in the country. LMDA retained 45 percent of plantation forests revenues for steering production and reduced the Ministry of Finance's slow pace on disbursing the funds for developing the plantations. Internally, the Sao Hill plantation forest improved remarkably its relationship with the adjacent villages by implementing practices of participatory forest management, derived from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in 2001 through its directive, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania (2001-2010)*. The participatory forestry programme, at Sao Hill plantation in particular, aimed at

¹⁷⁹ Frankline Annum Ndi “Land Grabbing, Local Contestation, and the Struggle for Economic Gain: Insights from Nguti Village, South West Cameroon”, *SAGE Open*, January-March (2017) 2, (1-14).

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Haward Kinyaga, Tibery Kihwelo and Paulo, Mapanda Village, Mufindi, 27.1.2017.

¹⁸¹ Interview with John Mgungile, A villager at Mapanda Village, 27.1.2017.

¹⁸² Interview with Paulo Kifyasi, A villager, Mapanda Village, 27.1.2017.

curbing fire outbreaks, which were claimed to be a chronic problem. Participatory forest management in a broader sense, as stipulated by the National Forest Policy, encouraged private sector involvement in the previously solely state-owned plantation sector.

The opportunity for private sector involvement in plantation forestry triggered a rush for land. This scramble by woodlot developers led to increased encroachment on the forest reserves, especially at the Third Division of the Sao Hill plantation. Encroachment of the forest reserves in the Third Division led to two commissions of inquiry in 2012 and 2013. Since its creation, the Third Division had suffered from porous boundaries with the adjacent villages.

Some villages suffered severely from the rush for land by private companies and individual woodlot developers. At the beginning of the land rush some villagers thought that they had excess land and sold it for a cheap price as they considered it to be idle land. Green Resource Company and Highland Forest Company at Mapanda village, for example, set a precedent for countless and unregistered woodlot developers. The villagers were unaware of the value of their land in early 2003 and were thus exploited by both the private companies and individual woodlot developers. The chapter has succeeded to connect the problem of encroachment and indeed the rush to the land, with the long history of Sao Hill. Therefore, the chapter has filled the gap left by Olwig et al.,¹⁸³ who did not connect the problems of land encroachment at Mapanda and Chogo villages with the history of Sao Hill.

The villagers responded to the land grab by covertly burning the woodlots owned by the non-village woodlot developers in order to create jobs. As this chapter has argued, in the long run, the villagers were of the opinion that the President of the United Republic of Tanzania should intervene by revoking the land leases of the non-villager woodlot developers in their village; they claimed that “a civil war might erupt” because the villagers were oppressed and experienced food shortages. Essentially, they argued that, because of a big part of their land was bought by those external villagers, the villagers were becoming slaves in their own land. This scenario at Mapanda has ascertained the argument by Jacovelli¹⁸⁴ that managing the plantation forests in the private sector is difficult as they are determined to reap profit only. Therefore, this chapter exposed that there is a form of “participatory forest management” in the

¹⁸³ Olwig et al., “Inverting the Moral Economy”,

¹⁸⁴ Paul Jacovelli, “The Future of Plantation in Africa”, *International Forestry Review* 16, 2, (2014).

plantation forests, which has not been previously addressed by the key scholars of forestry history like Thaddeus Sunseri¹⁸⁵ and Brett Bennett.¹⁸⁶ The chapter shows that the dominance of the state in decision-making reduced the strength of the efficaciousness of the participatory forestry in the plantation forests, however.

¹⁸⁵ Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009).

¹⁸⁶ Brett Michael Bennett, "Locality and Empire: Networks of Forestry in Australia, India and South Africa, 1843-1948", PhD Thesis (University of Texas at Austin, 2010).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

This thesis reconstructed the history of the Sao Hill plantation forest between 1939 and 2015. It used the history of Sao Hill, the biggest plantation forest in Tanzania, as a lens into understanding the broader history of Tanzania. The thesis contributes to the historiography on environmental change, natural resources management and, specifically, the forestry sector, which makes an interdisciplinary endeavour, bringing together issues of society, politics, economics as well as the environment. Furthermore, this thesis extends the debate over natural resources management in the highest forex earner ministry – Natural Resources and Tourism – which has been one of the most difficult ministries to lead because of alleged corruption. Corruption and nepotism in the ministry – in some of its key sections like game reserves – showed how vulnerable the ministry was to scandals masterminded by successful business cartels. Therefore, by examining one section within such a complex, indeed byzantine, ministry, namely that of the plantation forests, this thesis contributes to the history of the environmental history of Tanzania regarding the governance of natural resources. The thesis adds to an already robust wider historiography, especially the work of Andrew Hurst,¹ Thaddeus Sunseri,² Yonika Ngaga³ and Shaban Chamshama.⁴

To demonstrate the changing history of the Sao Hill plantation, the thesis engaged with the forest transition theory of Alexander Mather.⁵ The theory was useful in examining the policy changes effected by the state amidst external pressure exacerbated by the strings attached to international loans. Moreover, a population boom in the communities around the forest played a key role in the shifting land use. According to this theory, factors such as obvious deforestation and industrialisation makes the urgent implementation of afforestation projects necessary. But, according to transition theory, afforestation influences, both intentionally and unintentionally, other transitions in land use and impacts on the affected communities. The

¹ Andrew Hurst, “Not Yet Out of the Woods, A Political Ecological of State Forestry Policy and Practice in the Mainland Tanzania, 1961-1998,” PhD diss. (Oxford, 2004).

² Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009).

³ Yonika Ngaga, “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania”, *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 16, 20 B, (2011).

⁴ S. Chamshama “Forest Plantations and Woodlots in the Eastern and North Eastern African Countries, A Regional Overview *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*, 1, 18 (Nairobi, African Forest Forum, 2011), 17.

⁵ Alexander Mather, “The Forest Transitional Theory”, *The Royal Geographical Society Journal*, 24, 4, 1992, (367-379).

introduction of plantation forests in Mufindi district, as has been affirmed in other contexts by Brett Bennett's work, "reshaped societies, economies and culture" in very significant ways.⁶ Therefore, this thesis investigated the forces that drove the changes in the plantation sector of Tanzania by using the Sao Hill plantation forest as a case study.⁷ The study showed that there was a clear periodization of major transitions in land ownership, from the customary owners to the forest department, entailing transitions in the land use, and indeed, transition from small scale afforestation to large scale afforestation.

This thesis has shown that political, scientific and economic factors were deployed by both the colonial and post-colonial states to justify the forest transition at Sao Hill. Chapter Three explained that the Kigogo arboretum was established for testing the possibility of planting exotic tree species by the British colonial government in 1935, four years before declaring the area's potential for growing exotic tree species. Chapter Three demonstrated that the tea planters and a handful of white farmers were at the centre of the afforestation, although the white farmers had the opinion of leaving afforestation to the private developers to take the lead. In the eyes of the colonial government, the German tea farmers and white wheat farmers at Sao Hill area showed clear signs of the economic opportunities available in the area that the white farmers had claimed to be "precarious" because of shifting cultivation by the "native" black Africans. Chapter Three argued that the state engineered afforestation clashed with the customary land owners' system of land management. The system of land management of the customary land owners – especially land for cultivation, which ranged between two and a half to three acres and finding suitable land for cattle grazing – led the state to rescind the planned squatter system in the proposed forest. As a consequence of that clash, the state resorted to financial compensation to resettle the surrounding communities at Kalinga and Mninga areas.

The British succeeded in developing 6 714 hectares of trees between 1939 and 1961, the year that Tanzania became independent. This area was inherited by the post-colonial government but with a slight shift of policy. While the colonial government was determined to supply wood to the agrarian sector, especially the infant tea and pyrethrum industry in Mufindi, the post-colonial government was much more ambitious about developing the secondary industry – the

⁶ Brett Michael Bennett, "Locality and Empire: Networks of Forestry in Australia, India and South Africa, 1843-1948", PhD Thesis (University of Texas at Austin, 2010), 1.

⁷ See, for example, Thomas Rudel, Laura Schneider and Maria Uriarte, "Forest Transition: An Introduction" *Land Use Policy*, 27, (2010), (95-97).

saw mill and the paper and pulp mill. Chapter Four discussed the development of these mills in Mufindi district as part of implementing the Basic Industrial Strategy policy (BIS) adopted in 1967 to reduce imports from foreign countries.⁸ The implementation of BIS, however, was very gradual as the government lacked funds for consultants and for the development of the industries, and as a consequence, the government resorted to loans from multilateral (World Bank) and bilateral (Norway and Germany) funders.⁹ This multinational aid, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five, left a lot to be desired regarding the relationship between the Sao Hill forest management and the surrounding communities. The World Bank for example, was responsible for surveillance of the forest from 1976 to 1992. As a consequence, the World Bank was applauded by the state and indeed by citizens as it protected the forest from the economic crisis which faced Tanzania between the late 1970s and 1980s.¹⁰ This was because the World Bank's binding contracts and the loan conditions guaranteed the flow of funds to the plantation forest during the economic crisis.¹¹ Unfortunately, when the World Bank ended the financial assistance in 1992 to Sao Hill plantation, with uncertainty on profit realisation from that forest. The profit was to be obtained from the two mills (Sao Hill sawmill and Mufindi pulp and paper mill), which harvested logs from Sao Hill plantation. Because of these doubts, the World Bank and IMF told the government to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which were perceived at the time (1992) as a panacea for all economic problems facing Tanzania, and indeed many developing countries in general. Considering the multiple sources of funding of the forestry sector in Tanzania, this thesis recommends a fresh study on the role of the bilateral and multilateral aid to the forestry sector in Tanzania between 1962 and 2015.

This thesis has discussed the methods the postcolonial government deployed in grappling with the perennial "land question" in expanding the Sao Hill plantation forest. The "land question" was just as much a "people question", as the state had to engage with the communities living in the earmarked areas. The land for expanding the Sao Hill plantation brought further

⁸ Rune Skarstein and Samuel Wangwe, *Industrial Development in Tanzania: Some Critical Issues*, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1986), 1-25; See also, Aaron Mgeni and Colin Price, "Planning of Forest Plantation investment with the aid of Linear Programming: A Case Study of Sao Hill Forest, Tanzania" *Forest Ecology and Management*, 62 (1993), 51-72.

⁹ See for example, T. Gran, *The Dilemma between Mobilization and Control in International Aid, The Case of the Norwegian Sao Hill sawmill Project in Tanzania in Public Administration and Development*, 2, (University of Bergen, 1991), (135-148).

¹⁰ The state and citizens applauded the World Bank as it protected it from the economic crisis. Yet, the conditions set by the World Bank especially on land aspect left a lot to be desired to the communities around the Sao Hill forest.

¹¹ See for example, Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992).

protracted contestations especially over imposing and policing the boundaries between the forest and village lands. When it was proven that the fund for expanding the Sao Hill plantation could be obtained from the World Bank in 1975, the country was implementing the villagisation policy compulsorily resettling people. As a consequence, the Sao Hill plantation management – through influential ruling party leaders and local councillors – lobbied for the customary land owned by the resettled villagers in Mufindi district to be used for its scheme for plantation forest expansion. The land that was owned exclusively by the state was one of the strings attached by the World Bank to guarantee the security of the forest. Chapters Four and Five of this thesis showed that the plantation management succeeded in securing land without compensation in many parts of the villages cited by the consultant group that the places were good for exotic tree plantations. However, there were villages which either did not agree with the boundaries or objected categorically to their land being relinquished to the forest project. With respect to “the land question” at Sao Hill – especially the land taken in the period between 1973 and 1976 under the villagisation programme – this thesis recommends a fresh study to capture more detailed testimonies from the customary land owners and the state.

Surveying and imposing boundaries by the forest management in the selected villages was done with supersonic speed as it was the condition to secure the World Bank loan. It was no wonder that the boundaries imposed by the Sao Hill management backfired, especially when it became clear that the state had failed to sustain the villagers in the *ujamaa* villages amidst the economic crisis in the late 1980s.¹² Some of the villages – especially in the east of the Sao Hill plantation – with contested boundaries encroached on the land claimed to belong to the plantation forest. Encroachment on the extension land for Sao Hill was exacerbated by the liberal economic policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund in Tanzania in 1986. Among others, the IMF pressured the government of Tanzania to halt the government monopoly on the market and allow the private sector to operate instead. In the plantation sector, companies and individuals were allowed to plant trees. As a consequence land deals and sometimes land grabbing increased tremendously in Mufindi district. Some of the villagers sold their land and sometimes they sold land that belonged to the Sao Hill plantation. The state responded by forming many land commissions of inquiry in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1992, 1994, 2012 and 2013. These commissions were convened by different government authorities ranging from the

¹² See for example, Ronald Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 240-251.

district to the president, but they did not curb the speed of encroachment in some villages like Mapanda. The reason behind their failure was that the commissions' resolutions sometimes contradicted the laws of Tanzania and hence they could not be implemented. Considering the weighty reports of these commissions of inquiries into land contestations between the Sao Hill and the adjacent villages, there is a need to investigate the reasons behind their failure. The many land commissions of inquiry offers another avenue for further research by assessing their terms of references and the reasons behind their failure to solve the contestations on the ground. Chapter Five shows that the World Bank loan ended officially in 1992 and subsequently the Sao Hill plantation declined in both land management and financial status between 1992 and 2000. In this period of almost a decade Sao Hill failed to expand planting in its extension areas, and neglected pruning and thinning operations. As a consequence, the government sought a sustainable solution internally to rescue the status of the plantations in Tanzania by introducing the Logging and Miscellaneous Deposit Account (LMDA) in 2000. LMDA retained funds generated from state-owned forest plantations amounting to about 45 percent of the forest royalties to service silvicultural and road maintenance activities in the plantations.¹³ The LMDA was credited with improving the ailing situation of Sao Hill, as silvicultural activities started to be implemented again by early 2007.

The liberalized market economy, evident from 1996, however, brought some changes on the labour front and, indeed, prompted heated contestation on who owned the logging rights. With regards to the labour question, as was explained in Chapter Two, many of the labourers in the Sao Hill saw mill and the Mufindi pulp and paper mill were laid off once the industries were privatized. The pulp and paper mill was shut between 1997 until 2002, when it was re-opened and privatized to a Kenyan firm, Rai Group Company. The Sao Hill sawmill was privatized to a Norwegian firm, Green Resource, in 1996. Against this background the Sao Hill plantation, a state owned entity, sold its logs to three categories of customers namely: Mufindi paper mill, Sao Hill saw mill and individuals who had the capital to engage in logging. The selection of these individuals permitted to log prompted an impassioned debate between the Sao Hill plantation management and the new lumbering individuals, especially those who came from Mufindi district. The people of Mufindi claimed that because they had relinquished their land to the forest department for compensation in 1944, and in terms of the logic of villagisation

¹³ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, *National Forest Programme in Tanzania*, 2001-2010, 84; See, also, Yonika Ngaga, "Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Tanzania", *African Forest Forum Working Paper Series*. 1, 16, 20 B, (2011), 17, 50.

between 1973 and 1976, they should be given the first priority to do logging. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Five, the state responded that these ‘natives’ of Mufindi lacked the technology and capital for and – indeed – that they were even sabotaging national unity. While the people of Mufindi accused the Sao Hill management for being corrupt in providing logging permits, the forest management responded that the Mufindi villagers must obtain permits just like any other independent lumber in Tanzania. It was implied through interviews I conducted in 2016 and January 2017 that some of those individuals from Mufindi district who got logging authorization simply sold their permits to those who had the necessary capital and technology for harvesting. Kifyas’s¹⁴ discussion dwelt in detail with this contestation, but with a bias towards the communities around Sao Hill as he was determined to demonstrate the impact of the Sao Hill plantation on the adjacent societies.¹⁵ These claims by the people of Mufindi, as demonstrated in Chapter Five, were dismissed by the state as they were infringing the constitution, which stipulated that the resources found in Tanzania belonged to all Tanzanians regardless of the original provinces.

The liberalized economy in Tanzania affected some sections of the Sao Hill forest with respect to gender balance. Men were predominant in most sections except planting and nursery sections. As this thesis discussed in Chapter Two, the gender imbalance came from the very nature of the work, which was claimed to be more masculine and too manual. Hence men were favoured over women in some sections. As this thesis has argued, with regards to elite foresters, the educational background of women was a stumbling block, as many women who preferred science – the very basic criterion for being a forester – opted for the medical sector. The gender aspect, however, could be the topic of future research, such as the participation of women in other forestry-related business, referred to as dealing with non-timber forest products such as selling fire wood and fruit.

Because of the liberalized economy after 1996, the number of informal land deals in the adjacent villages and encroachment increased in some areas owned by the Sao Hill plantation forests. To curb this problem, the Sao Hill plantation management deployed something like “participatory forest management”. As discussed in Chapter Six, the measures deployed to

¹⁴ Andrea Kifyasi, “Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015” (Dar es Salaam, Master of Arts, University of Dar es Salaam, 2015).

¹⁵ Kifyasi, “Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015”.

address the problem were, to a great extent, not innovations but rather familiar traditions in the management of natural forests. These measures, albeit applauded by many villagers in Mufindi, failed to offer a panacea to land encroachment in some of the villages like Mapanda. Interestingly, the measures deployed reduced cases of fire outbreaks to almost zero in the areas around the Sao Hill forest plantation; within the villages, however, fire cases were still a formidable problem – as shown in the case of Mapanda village. The reduced fire risk was partly due to the liberalized economy, which encouraged the villagers to plant their own woodlots, and to the active intervention of the Sao Hill forest management, who also encouraged villagers to plant their own tree woodlots. By having their own trees, the villagers became more vigilant about fire outbreaks, as was the case for the Sao Hill management. Moreover, Sao Hill management supplied tree seedlings for the woodlot developers and sporadically educated the villagers on preparing their own nurseries to raise their tree seedlings. In Chapter Six the thesis summarised these measures as “converting the villagers to foresters” so that they could share in protecting the forest. The woodlot projects in the surrounding villages warrant further research projects – especially on understanding the size of their woodlots, management structure and the kind of silvicultural processes adopted.

As a result of the increased land deals in the Sao Hill adjacent villages, some villages considered by the private tree planting companies and individual woodlot developers as having excess land, its land were grabbed more than other villagers. Maladministration by some of the village leaders in those villages was implied in interviews, as some of the villages had almost all their land sold to the independent tree company developers. The Green Resources Company and the Highland Forest Company and countless individuals had bought land at Mapanda village. The individuals who bought land, however, were not registered in the village documents.¹⁶ The villagers later regretted their decisions as the population increased and hence also the demand for food. The bottom line is that land use in the villages around the Sao Hill forest has changed to the benefit of the liberal economy.

This thesis has responded to, and in some cases challenged, earlier scholarships on environmental history in Africa and Tanzania in particular. The thesis has challenged the

¹⁶ See for example, Mette F. Olwig et al., “Inverting the Moral Economy: The case of land acquisition for forest plantations in Tanzania”, *Third World Quarterly*, 36, 12, 2015, (2316-2336).

scholarship of Y. Lawi,¹⁷ I. Kikula¹⁸ and T. Sunseri,¹⁹ who argued that *ujamaa* and the villagisation policy had negative impacts throughout on environment. This thesis argues that although the villagisation policy was detrimental to the environment as they had argued, in some cases, like Mufindi district, villagisation was used in a meaningful way by expanding the state-owned plantation forests. The case of Mufindi district was similar to what Jean Shelter²⁰ argued with respect to Serengeti National Park, which also increased its game reserve area under the villagisation policy. Villagisation as one of the state's interventions was, indeed, criticized by these scholars, yet there were some aspects of the policy which are worth emulating even nowadays – as the state benefits financially through the timber business from Sao Hill forest.

Secondly, this thesis explored the role played by the multilateral aid agencies – the World Bank and IMF – in funding for the Sao Hill forest. It acknowledges that, to the extent of assisting it to endure the economic crisis which battered Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s, these external agencies were helpful. Again, this thesis goes against much of the current scholarship, as many scholars have criticized these financial institutions for merely replicas of colonialism – arguably because of the strings attached. Third, this thesis, apart from acknowledging the truth that the plantation forests depend on the availability of land, has confirmed the World Bank's²¹ recommendations that the adjacent communities are equally important as they are central to the security and indeed the sustainability of forests. To prove the importance of the adjacent communities, this thesis has applied James Scott's²² famous model of the “the weapon of the weak” by analysing the threat of fire and land encroachment posed by the surrounding communities and the survival strategies deployed by the Sao Hill forest as part of fostering a mutual relationship. Finally, this thesis has challenged A. Kifyas's²³ argument that the presence of Sao Hill forests was an indirect threat to the livelihood of the adjacent communities. To

¹⁷ Yusufu Lawi, “Tanzania's Operation Vijiji and Local Ecological Consciousness: The Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974-1976”, *The Journal of African History*, 48, 2007, 8, (69-93).

¹⁸ Idris Kikula, *Policy Implications on Environment: The Case of Villagisation in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University Press, 1996), 71-107.

¹⁹ Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax, State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009).

²⁰ Jean Shelter, *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from earliest Times to the Present* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007), 128.

²¹ Sao Hill Forestry Project, Phase II, Project Completion Report, Tanzania (World Bank, 1992), 1.

²² James Scott, “*Weapons of the Weak*” *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, (Yale University Press, 1985), xvi, 29.

²³ Andrea Kifyasi, “Sao Hill Forest Plantation and Local Communities Livelihoods in Mufindi, 1960-2015” (Dar es Salaam, Master of Arts, University of Dar es Salaam, 2015).

challenge Kifyas's central argument this thesis has enumerated a number of measures the Sao Hill forest management adopted to assist the adjacent communities, arguably as a pragmatic way of protecting the forest from fire outbreaks and land encroachments.

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Appendix

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Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August, 2015

Regional Administrative Secretary
Dar es Salaam Region

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Mr. Hezron R. Kangalawe** who is a bonafide staff of the University of Dar es Salaam who is currently pursuing doctoral studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa and who is at the moment required to conduct research as part of his study programme.

In accordance with government circular letter Ref. No. MPEC/R/10/1 dated 4th July 1980, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam is empowered to issue research clearances to staff members and students of the University of Dar es Salaam on behalf of the government and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). I am pleased to inform you that I have granted research clearance to **Mr. Kangalawe**.

I therefore request you to grant him any help that may enable him achieve his research objectives. Specifically we request your permission for him to meet and talk to the leaders and other relevant stakeholders in your region in connection with his research.

The title of his research is "**Plantation Forestry in Tanzania: A History of the Sao Hill Forest in Mufindi District, 1939-1990**".

The period of his research is from **September 2015 to June 2016** and the research will cover the **Dar es Salaam Region**.

Should there be any restriction, you are kindly requested to advise us accordingly. In case you may require further information, please do not hesitate to contact us through the Directorate of Research, Tel. 2410500-8 Ext. 2084 or 2410727 and E-mail: research@udsm.ac.tz.

Yours sincerely,

VICE CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM
P.O. Box 35091
DAR-ES-SALAAM


Prof. Rwekaza S. Mukandala
VICE-CHANCELLOR

QUOTATION OF REF. NO. IS ESSENTIAL



United Republic of Tanzania
MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM
TANZANIA FOREST SERVICES (TFS) AGENCY



Address : "TFS"
Tel No : (+255) (022) 2864249
Fax No : (+255) (022) 2864257
E-mail : mpingo@tfs.go.tz
In reply please quote: TFS. 297/402/01/56

P.O.BOX. 40832
DAR ES SALAAM

26/08/2015

The Vice Chancellor
University of Dar es salaam
P. O. BOX 35091 DAR ES SALAAM

RE: PERMIT FOR HEZRON R. KANGALAWE (Staff of University of Dsm) TO ENTER AND CARRY OUT RESEARCH IN SAO HILL FOREST RESERVE, IRINGA REGION.

Please refer to the above subject and your letter with Ref: AB3/12 (8) of August 4th 2015.

By this letter, "Entry Permit" is hereby granted to HEZRON R. KANGALAWE, (% Circular letter ref. no. MPEC/R/10/1) to conduct research in Sao Hill Forest Reserve with title '*Plantation Forestry in Tanzania: A History of the Sao Hill Forest in Mufindi District, 1939 - 1990*'.

The permit is subject to the conditions prescribed hereunder.

1. Taking all such necessary precautions not to interfere or unrest Plantation management activities or create a situation thereof, in connection with the research operations.
2. Taking all reasonable precautions not to enter into conflict with forest adjacent communities or create a situation thereof, in connection with the research operations.
3. At Researcher's own expense deposit at TFS Library in Dar es salaam, one copy of any publication of any sort and any other publicly available information arising out of or produced in connection with the research.
4. The permit is valid for one year with effect from 1st September 2015 to 30th June 2016.


Lema Mathias

For. CHIEF EXECUTIVE

c.c. ✓ The Researcher: Mr. HEZRON R. KANGALAWE – University of Dar es salaam
The Director General, COSTECH P. O. BOX 4302 DAR ES SALAAM
The Sao Hill Plantation Manager, P.O. BOX 45 MAFINGA

HALMASHAURI YA WILAYA YA MUFINDI
(Barua zote zitumwe kwa Mkurugenzi Mtendaji Wilaya)



S.L. Posta 223
SIMU: 026-2772614
FAX: 026-2772070
Email: dedmufindi@gmail.com

Kumb.Na.HW/MUF/S.50/17/92

09/03/2016

To whom it may concern,
Mufindi District Council.

**REF: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MR.
HEZRON R. KANGALAWE SEPT 2015 TO JUNE 2016**

The heading above is concerned.

Mr Hezron R. Kangarawe is the bonafide staff from the University of Dar Es Salaam who is currently pursuing Doctorial Studies at Stellenbosh University in South Africa. He is at the moment required to conduct a research to meet his study programme. The title of the research is "**Plantation Forestry in Tanzania , A History of Sao Hill Forest in Mufindi District, 1939 - 1990**".

Therefore you are begged to give him all necessary assistance and cooperation so as he could accomplish his task at the right time.

Thanks

Barbina J. Matemu
For District Executive Director
MUFINDI

**Copies: Vice Chancellor,
University of Dar es Salaam,
P. O. BOX 35091,
Dar es Salaam.**

DISTRICT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
MUFINDI

**: The Manager,
Sao Hill Plantation,
MUFINDI - Give him Cooperation.**

UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHANCELLOR
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Telefax: +255 22 2410078



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E-mail: vc@admin.udsm.ac.tz
Website address: www.udsm.ac.tz

Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August 2015

The Director
Southern Highlands Zonal Archive
Mbeya Region

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Mr. Hezron R. Kangalawe** who is a bonafide staff of the University of Dar es Salaam who is currently pursuing doctoral studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa and who is at the moment required to conduct research as part of his study programme .

In accordance with government circular letter Ref. No. MPEC/R/10/1 dated 4th July 1980, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam is empowered to issue research clearances to staff members and students of the University of Dar es Salaam on behalf of the government and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). I am pleased to inform you that I have granted research clearance to **Mr. Kangalawe**.

I therefore request you to grant him any help that may enable him achieve his research objectives. Specifically we request your permission for him to meet and talk to the leaders and other relevant stakeholders in your organization in connection with his research.

The title of his research is "**Plantation Forestry in Tanzania: A History of the Sao Hill Forest in Mufindi District, 1939-1990**".

The period of his research is from **September 2015 to June 2016** and the research will cover the **Southern Highlands Zonal Archive**.

Should there be any restriction, you are kindly requested to advise us accordingly. In case you may require further information, please do not hesitate to contact us through the Directorate of Research, Tel. 2410500-8 Ext. 2084 or 2410727 and E-mail: research@udsm.ac.tz.

Yours sincerely,

VICE CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM
P.O. Box 35091
DAR-ES-SALAAM


Prof. Rwekaza S. Mukandala
VICE-CHANCELLOR

QUOTATION OF REF. NO. IS ESSENTIAL

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Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August 2015

Regional Administrative Secretary
Morogoro Region

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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The title of his research is "**Plantation Forestry in Tanzania: A History of the Sao Hill Forest in Mufindi District, 1939-1990**".

The period of his research is from **September 2015 to June 2016** and the research will cover the **Morogoro Region**.

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Yours sincerely,


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P.O. Box 35091
DAR-ES-SALAAM
VICE-CHANCELLOR

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Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August 2015

The Secretary General
Chama cha Mapinduzi
Dar es Salaam

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE

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Yours sincerely,


VICE CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM
P.O. Box 35091
DAR-ES-SALAAM
Prof. Rwekaza S. Mukandala
VICE-CHANCELLOR

QUOTATION OF REF. NO. IS ESSENTIAL

**OFISI YA WAZIRI MKUU
TAWALA ZA MIKOA NA SERIKALI ZA MITAA
HALMASHAURI YA WILAYA YA IRINGA**



Baruazoteziandikwekwa:
Mkurugenzi Mtendaji wa Wilaya
SIMU: (026) 2702828/2702585
FAX NO: 2701776

Kumb. Na. IDC/S.20/21 /iii/36

S.L.P. 108
IRINGA
TANZANIA

08.02.2016

KWA YEYOTE ANAYEHUSIKA

YAH: UTAMBULISHO WA BWANA HEZRON R. KANGALAWE

Mtajwa hapo juu ni mtumishi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Dar - es - Salaam anayesoma masomo ya shahada ya Uzamivu katika Chuo Kikuu cha Stellenbosch cha Africa Kusini.

Ili kuweza kukamilisha masomo yake, anafanya utafiti kuhusu Msitu wa Sao Hill ulioko Wilaya ya Mufindi kwa kipindi cha kuanzia mwaka 1939 - 1990.

Anaweza kuhitaji kupata baadhi ya taarifa katika eneo la Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Iringa. Hivyo unaombwa kumpatia ushirikiano wa kutosha ili aweze kukamilisha utafiti wake.

Nakushukuru kwa ushirikiano,

Donald Mshani,
**Kny: Mkurugenzi Mtendaji (W),
IRINGA.**

Nakala:

Bwana Hezron R. Kangalawe
S.L.P. 35091,
Dar - es - Salaam.

UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM

OFFICE OF THE VICE CHANCELLOR

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Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August 2015

The Director General
Tanzania Forestry Research Institute (TAFORI)
Dar es Salaam Region

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Mr. Hezron R. Kangalawe** who is a bonafide staff of the University of Dar es Salaam who is currently pursuing doctoral studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa and who is at the moment required to conduct research as part of his study programme.

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Yours sincerely,


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Ref. No: AB3/12(B)

Date: 4th August 2015

The Director
Dodoma Region Achieves
Dodoma Region

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VICE-CHANCELLOR

QUOTATION OF REF. NO. IS ESSENTIAL



UNIVERSITEIT • STELLENBOSCH • UNIVERSITY

22 July 2015

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

Hezron RR. Kanglawe is a bona-fide PhD (History) student in the Department of History at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is working on his thesis titled: “*Plantation Forests in Tanzania: A History of Sao Hill Forest 1939-2015, Mufindi District, Tanzania*” and therefore will be conducting fieldwork in Tanzania between August 2015 and June 2016.

The research is fully sanctioned by the History Department. Please assist him in any way possible.

For any enquires contact me, his supervisor, as follows below.

Thank you

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sandra Swart'.

SANDRA SWART

Associate Professor

History Department

Stellenbosch University

sss@sun.ac.za Phone: +27 21 808 2390 cell: +27 (0) 83 654 2794