Is Jesus King? A Critical Examination of Paul’s Thought in the Context of the Hellenistic Kingship Topos

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Ancient philosophers employed the topos of ideal kingship as a way to think about monarchy and the superior person who could ascend to this office. Following those modern scholars who have used topoi from Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman moral philosophy to study the apostle Paul’s writings as part of the intellectual milieu of the first century, I compare the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship with Pauline Christology. This comparison is achieved by examining the origins of the ideal kingship topos in fourth-century texts by Isocrates (To Nicocles) and Xenophon (Cyropaedia). These two classical writers emphasize the superiority of the king and the virtues that establish this superiority. The king’s care for his subjects forms the core of this construction of ideal kingship. With the exception of three Neopythagorean tracts entitled On Kingship, no kingship treatises produced by the Hellenistic philosophical schools have survived. Nevertheless, by studying how Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean thinkers deal with kingship in other contexts, I am able to postulate the silhouette of the ideal king as he might have been conceived of in each of these schools. The portrait that emerges from the Neopythagorean writings contributes further to the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship. Selected texts from the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible are also studied in order to determine what Paul might have learned about ideal kingship from them. Next, three Hellenistic Jewish texts (the Letter of Aristeas, Philo’s Life of Moses, and Wisdom of Solomon) are discussed in order to demonstrate the fusion between Jewish and Greek constructions of ideal kingship. Finally, the undisputed Pauline letters are examined alongside the various configurations of ideal kingship found in the preceding chapters. I conclude that Paul has drawn on both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions in order to write about Jesus the Messiah to nascent groups of Graeco-Roman believers.
Antieke filosowe het die *topos* van ideale koningskap gebruik as ’n manier om oor monargie en die mees ideale persoon wat hierdie amp kon beklee, na te dink. Na aanleiding van die werk van onlangse geleerdes wat *topoi* van die Hellenistiese en Grieks-Romeinse morele filosofie gebruik om die apostel Paulus se briewe as deel van die intellektuele milieu van die eerste eeu te bestudeer, vergelyk ek die Hellenistiese *topos* van ideale koningskap met die Pauliniese Christologie. Hierdie vergelyking word gemaak deur die oorsprong van die ideale koning *topos* in vierde-eeuse tekste deur Isokrates (*Aan Nikokles*) en Xenophon (*Cyropaedia*) te ondersoek. Hierdie twee klassieke skrywers beklemttoon die meerderwaardigheid van die koning en die deugde wat sy meerderwaardigheid bevestig. Die koning se sorg vir sy onderdane vorm die kern van hierdie konstruksie van ideale koningskap. Met die uitsondering van drie Neopythagoreese geskrifte met die titel *Oor koningskap*, is daar geen oorblywende koningskap verhandelinge van die Hellenistiese filosofiese skole nie. Nietemin, deur na te gaan hoe Siniese, Stoïsynse en Epikurese denkers in ander kontekste met die idee van koningskap omgegaan het, kan ek postuleer hoe die silhoeët van die ideale koning, volgens die opvatting daaroor in elkeen van hierdie skole, daar uitgesien het. Die beeld wat uit die Neopythagoreese geskrifte na vore kom, dra verder by tot die Hellenistiese *topos* van ideale koningskap. Geselekteerde tekste uit die Griekse vertaling van die Hebrewese Bybel word ook bestudeer om vas te stel wat Paulus moontlik by hulle oor die ideale koningskap geleer het. Vervolgens bespreek ek drie Hellenisties-Joodse tekste (die Aristeadbrief, Philo se *Lewe van Moses* en die Wysheid van Salomo) om die samesmelting tussen Joodse en Griekse konstruksies van ideale koningskap aan te toon. Ten slotte word die onbestrede briewe van Paulus naas die onderskeie konfigurasies van ideale koningskap wat in die voorafgaande hoofstukke aan die orde gekom het, ondersoek. Ek kom tot die slotsom dat Paulus beide uit Hellenistiese en Joodse tradisies put om oor Jesus die Messias aan die ontluikende groepe van Grieks-Romeinse gelowiges te skryf.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For Xenophon’s Persian schoolboys, gratitude is supremely important:

For they think that the ungrateful are likely to be most neglectful of their duty toward their gods, their parents, their country, and their friends; for it seems that shamelessness goes hand in hand with ingratitude; and it is that, we know, which leads the way to every moral wrong. 

(Cyropaedia, 1.2.7; trans. Miller [LCL])

I have incurred numerous debts while thinking and writing about ideal kingship over the past few years. While it is impossible to repay these, I should at least express my gratitude towards those who have been so generous towards me, lest my ingratitude and shamelessness lead me into “every moral wrong.”

Professor Johan Thom has consistently provided me with a model of careful scholarship. I have learnt much in discussion with him over the past decade and I appreciate the scholarly opportunities he has provided beyond the bounds of this study. I am grateful for the guidance he has given throughout the writing of this dissertation.

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CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Paul’s χριστο’ς and the Ideal βασιλέας ................................................................. 1
  The “Philosophical” Paul in His Hellenistic Jewish Context ........................................ 3
  Comparing Paul with the περί βασιλείας Topos ......................................................... 15
  Outline of the Study ....................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 2. Ideal Kingship in Fourth-Century Athens .......................................................... 31
  Isocrates .......................................................................................................................... 31
  Xenophon ...................................................................................................................... 59
  Concluding Comments ................................................................................................. 95

Chapter 3. Kingship in the Hellenistic Schools .................................................................... 100
  Cynic Kingship .......................................................................................................... 101
  Stoic Kingship .......................................................................................................... 115
  Epicurean Kingship ................................................................................................. 125
  Pythagorean Kingship ............................................................................................ 137
  Hellenistic Kingship: Concluding Comments ........................................................... 161

Chapter 4: Ideal Kingship in Israel’s Scriptures ................................................................ 163
  Moses’ Law of the King (Deuteronomy 17.14–20) .................................................... 164
  The King in Samuel and Kings ................................................................................. 171
  Psalms ......................................................................................................................... 181
  Isaiah ............................................................................................................................ 196
  Concluding Comments ............................................................................................... 207

Chapter 5. Hellenistic Jewish Kingship ................................................................................. 211
  The Philosophers’ King in The Letter of Aristeas ....................................................... 212
  Philosophy and the King in the Wisdom of Solomon ................................................. 224
  The Philosopher-King in Philo of Alexandria ............................................................. 232
  Hellenistic Jewish Kingship: Concluding Comments ................................................... 255

Chapter 6. Paul’s Construction of Jesus’ Kingship ................................................................. 257
  Royal Titles ................................................................................................................. 258
  Jesus as God’s Vice-Regent ....................................................................................... 271
  Jesus as Judge .......................................................................................................... 272
  The Model King ......................................................................................................... 287
  The King’s Kindness ................................................................................................. 295
  Christ’s Subjects ....................................................................................................... 311
  Jesus’ Beauty and Wisdom ....................................................................................... 318
  Concluding Comments .............................................................................................. 323

Chapter 7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 325
  The Hellenistic Kingship Topos ................................................................................ 325
  Jesus as Paul’s Ideal King ......................................................................................... 325
  Paul’s Paradigm Shift ............................................................................................... 327
  Between Jerusalem and Athens, or In Alexandria? ..................................................... 328
  Extending the Discussion ......................................................................................... 329

Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 332
ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations not listed in this handbook are noted below.

APh     Ancient Philosophies
APhR    Ancient Philosophy & Religion
*AnPh*  *Ancient Philosophy*
BCAW    Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World
BzA     Beiträge zur Altertumskunde
CCS     Cambridge Classical Studies
*CErc*  *Cronache ercolanesi*
Cleanthes


CMP     Cultural Memory in the Present
Diogenes Laertius

D.L.    *Vitae philosophorum / Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
Dionysius of Halicarnassus

*Ant. rom.* *Antiquitates romanae*

Dtr     The Deuteronomist
DH      Deuteronomistic History
*EC*    *Early Christianity*
EnAC    Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique
Epicurus


HBM     Hebrew Bible Monographs
HellSt  Hellenic Studies
Iamblichus

*VP*    *Vita Pythagorae*
*JLT*   *Journal of Literature and Theology*
*JMB*   *Journal of Mind and Behavior*
*JPol*  *Journal of Politics*
*JSJSup* Supplementary papers to *JSJ* and *JSJ* Supplementa
*JSPL*  *Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters*
*JTI*   *Journal of Theological Interpretation*
Julian

*Or.*    *Orationes*

Lucretius

DRN    De rerum natura


Marcus Aurelius

Med.    Meditations

MnSup   Mnemosyne Supplements

Musonius Rufus


MT      Masoretic Text. Unless otherwise indicated, the MT is quoted from the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia. Karl Elliger and Wilhelm Rudolph, eds. 4th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1990


NHMS    Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies

NIBC    New International Biblical Commentary


NSBT    New Studies in Biblical Theology

NTMon   New Testament Monographs

OCM     Oxford Classical Monographs

ORCS    Oxford Readings in Classical Studies

OSAP    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy


PAST    Pauline Studies

PBA     Proceedings of the British Academy

PBTM    Paternoster Biblical and Theological Monographs
TRANSLATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, English translations of classical, Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman texts have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library. English quotations of the Septuagint and Old Greek Scriptures, including the Apocrypha, are taken from NETS. Translations of the New Testament come from NRSV. The Septuagint and Old Greek text comes from Rahlfs and Hahnhart (see above, LXX). For the Jewish Pseudepigrapha, I use James Charlesworth’s *Pseudepigrapha* (see above, OTP).

ORTHOGRAPHY

For aesthetic reasons, I use traditional Latinate forms for Greek names (e.g., Thucydides instead of Thoukydides). Unless quoting NETS, I follow the NRSV when spelling Hebrew names in English. When a Greek word has become a *terminus technicus* and I am using it as such, I transliterate it and employ italics (e.g., *topos* or *polis*).
CHAPTER 1. PAUL’S ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ AND THE IDEAL ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ

The kingship of Jesus Christ is a common theme in Christian thought. In the twentieth-century, for example, two quite different churchmen proposed the recovery of the figure of Christ the King as a response to the tragedies of the First and Second World Wars, respectively.1 Behind these ideas stand Christological discussions configured around the munus triplex: Christ’s office as prophet, priest, and king.2 These discussions did not originate in the modern period. Sixteen centuries earlier, Christ’s kingship provided fourth-century Christians with intellectual tools to think about the relationship between religious and political power.3 However, the origin of the monarchical aspect of Christ’s person and work can be traced back even earlier.

The canonical Gospels identify Jesus as βασιλεύς, both through their use of the word in a descriptive and titular sense⁴ and, perhaps more significantly, in their narrative construction of his person.⁵ The centrality of the kingdom of God in Jesus’ preaching⁶ and his identification in the Gospels as Israel’s χριστος⁷ contribute further to highlighting the significance of this royal theme in early Christian⁸ literature, while at the same time linking Jesus’ royalty to the narratives defining Israel’s Messiah in the literature of Second Temple Judaism.

1. Pope Pius XI established the Feast of Christ the King in a 1925 encyclical. “When once men recognize, both in private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessings of real liberty, well-ordered discipline, peace and harmony” (Quas primas, §19). Similarly, in the wake of the Second World War, the first General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, W. A. Visser ’t Hoof, drew attention to the implications of the rule of Christ in the church and the world in the 1947 Stone Lectures (The Kingship of Christ: An Interpretation of Recent European Theology [London: SCM, 1948]).
2. For an historical survey of the doctrine, see Gerald W. McCulloh, Christ’s Person and Life-Work in the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl: With Special Attention to Munus Triplex (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 86–144.
3. For the implications of Jesus’ kingship in the early church and beyond, especially in relation to political realities, see Per Beskow, Rex Gloriae: The Kingship of Christ in the Early Church (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1962); Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 46–56.
4. Matt 2.2; 25.34; 27.11, 29, 37, 42; Mark 15.2, 9, 12, 18, 26, 32; Luke 19.38; 23.3, 37, 38; John 1.49; 12.13, 15; 18.37, 39; 19.3, 14, 15, 19, 21.
6. See, e.g., Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 198–474.
According to the author of Acts, Paul appealed to the narratives of the Jewish Scriptures when he announced Jesus as Messiah. The sermon in Acts 13.16–41, for example, surveys the history narrated in these Scriptures up to the person of King David before announcing that Jesus is the promised saviour in the line of David (v. 22–23). That this could be understood as a reference to Jesus’ kingship is made clear in the accusation brought against those in Thessalonica who had responded to Paul’s preaching about Jesus’ messiahship (Acts 17.3): “They are all acting contrary to the decrees of the emperor, saying that there is another king (βασιλέα ἔτερον) named Jesus.” Furthermore, the content of Paul’s preaching is often summarized in terms of the “kingdom of God” (Acts 19.8; 20.25; 28.23, 31). Thus Jesus’ royal office in the preaching of Paul in Acts follows a similar pattern to that found in the Gospels.

When we turn to Paul’s language about Jesus as found in his letters, the christological melody seems to have modulated into a slightly less royal key. It is true that there are elements in Paul’s Christology indicative of Jesus’ kingly reign. This reign is explicitly mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15.20–28, while in Romans 14.9 it is said that Jesus’ death and resurrection occurred so that he might be lord of the living and the dead (νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ). This latter passage might simply speak of authority, but it contributes to the cumulative evidence of Jesus’ royal rule in Paul’s letters, to which might be added his Davidic heritage (Rom 1.3; 15.12), his role in judgment (Rom 2.16; 2 Cor 5.10), and the exalted position granted him by God (Phil 2.9–11). Nevertheless, Paul’s use of royal language seems muted.

Paul never explicitly identifies Jesus as βασιλέας. The lexeme βασιλεύς does not occur in the undisputed Pauline texts, except in 2 Corinthians 11.32, where it refers to King Aretas. The phrase “kingdom of God,” furthermore, occurs far less frequently in Paul’s writings than it does in the

9. The nomenclature describing this body of work is a potential minefield. “Old Testament” leaves one open to accusations of Christian chauvinism. “Hebrew Scriptures” or “Hebrew Bible” are potentially misleading terms because the texts read by Paul were written in Greek. Furthermore, the use of “Scriptures” or “Bible” assumes a certain canonical rigidity which might not have pertained in Paul’s time. Nonetheless, reflecting Paul’s usage, I have chosen to use “Scriptures” as a reasonable translation of γραφή/γραφαι (e.g., Rom 1.2; 15.4; 1 Cor 15.3–4; Gal 3.8, 22) without assuming any particular canonical form. And although most of these writings are now also part of the Christian Scriptures, I will identify them as the “Jewish Scriptures” in reference to their origins.

10. C. Kavin Rowe argues that in this passage Jesus is not in competition with Caesar, but that the kingdom of God is nonetheless shown to be disruptive in so far as it disturbs the socio-political order (World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age [Oxford: Oxford University press, 2009], 92–102, esp. 101–2). Bruce Winter argues that Paul and Silas were seen as revolutionaries who were rejecting Claudius’ decrees (Divine Honours for the Caesars: The First Christians’ Responses [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015], 251–59).

11. Both Jesus (Acts 1.3) and Philip (8.12) are reported as preaching about the kingdom of God. Despite other similarities between Peter’s sermons and others in the book, Acts does not record him preaching explicitly about the kingdom. This does not mean that Jesus’ rule is not emphasized in Peter’s sermons; see, e.g., 2.31–36.

It will become clear in Chapter 6 that despite Paul’s infrequent use of this phrase, God is still spoken of in ways that evoke divine monarchy. However, with the exception of 1 Corinthians 6.9–11 and 15.24, Jesus’ relationship to and role within God’s kingdom is not made explicit in those passages that deal with the kingdom. With the Gospel writers, Paul identifies Jesus as Χριστός, but many consider this word to have lost its original force as “Messiah,” arguing that in Paul’s letters it now serves simply as a second name. At first sight, then, it would seem that Jesus’ royalty has been considerably diminished in Paul’s writings. Before concluding that this is indeed the case, the possibility must be considered that it is not Paul’s presentation of Jesus’ kingship that is muted but the reader’s perception of that kingship.

In this study, I ask whether Jesus’ royalty has truly been diminished by Paul or whether there are royal elements which, despite the absence of explicit kingship titulature, Paul has included through the use of kingship language. In particular, this project is pursued through a comparative study of Paul’s Christological language and the Hellenistic kingship ideal expressed in the περί βασιλείας topos. I conclude that focusing on the kingship topos allows the kingship of Jesus to emerge more clearly in certain Pauline texts.

The “Philosophical” Paul in His Hellenistic Jewish Context

The way in which an object of study is framed plays a determinative role in the results of the study. Pauline scholars have spent the past two-hundred years debating the nature of the milieu within which Paul and his thinking was formed. According to the evidence of the New Testament documents, Paul identifies himself as an exemplary Jew who writes in Greek and shows evidence of having benefitted from a Greek education, although the content and level of that education is debated. Furthermore, a non-Pauline text, Acts, makes Roman citizenship a significant part of Paul’s biography.

13. Rom 14.17; 1 Cor 4.20; 6.9, 10; 15.24, 50; Gal 5.21; 1 Thess 2.12.
14. But see 1 Tim 1.17 where God is ο βασιλεύς τῶν αἰώνων and 1 Tim 6.15 where God is ο βασιλεύς τῶν βασιλείων καὶ κύριος τῶν κυριαρχῶν. In Rev 17.14 and 19.16 this language is used of Christ.
15. Scholarship on this topic is summarized in Matthew V. Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs: Christ Language in Paul and Messiah Language in Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 12–33.
into account in recent Pauline scholarship, as can be observed in N. T. Wright’s approach to Paul’s thought in his *magnum opus*, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God* (2013). In Part I, Wright takes over two-hundred pages to describe not only the Jewish context (pp. 75–196), but also Hellenistic philosophy (pp. 197–245), Graeco-Roman religion (pp. 246–278), and Roman politics (pp. 279–347). Wright describes Paul and his world in the following terms:

> A complex person in a complex time. Paul stands where three great roads converge; and he has made of them another, travelled less, and making all the difference. ... Paul lived and worked, in fact, in at least three worlds at once ... The three worlds overlapped and interlocked in all sorts of ways, and that is part of the point, part of what makes the world confusing and Paul such a complex character.

If it is now common coin among New Testament scholars that Paul typifies a synthesis of Jewish, Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman cultures, ideas, and practices, the question remains as to the specific influences and elements that might be identified in Paul’s writings and the way in which these might be used to illuminate Paul’s letters: What might be said about Paul’s education? Is there evidence that he used Graeco-Roman literary forms or devices? What was his attitude towards rhetoric? What was his approach to the politics of his day? Does Paul show familiarity with the philosophical traditions of the first century? It is this last question, in particular, that has provided the impetus for the present study.


The “Philosophical Paul”

As a starting point in the discussion of Paul’s relationship to Graeco-Roman philosophy it should be observed that the New Testament writers were aware their message competed with those of various philosophical groups. The warning against “philosophy and empty deceit” in Colossians 2.8 pits that which is “according to Christ” against that which is “according to human tradition [and] according to the elemental spirits of the universe.” Acts 17.16–34 portrays Paul in debate with “some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers” in the agora and the Areopagus.

From the second century onwards, competition between Christianity and philosophy had given way to co-operation and co-option in some Christian groups. It is this impulse that contributed to the writing of the apocryphal collection of letters between Seneca and Paul which, while not philosophically profound, indicate a desire in the early church to associate Paul with the Stoic philosopher. The question remains, however, whether the strand of Christianity which viewed Graeco-Roman philosophy positively can be traced back to Paul’s own use of philosophical traditions. Put differently, are there ideas in Paul’s writings which are best understood in comparison with the broader Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition? A number of scholars have answered this question positively.


Badiou, Zizek and Others, Theopolitical Visions 7 (Eugene: Cascade, 2010); Peter Frick, ed., Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers: The Apostle and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Paul in Critical Contexts (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013). But these studies tend to illuminate modern concerns more than they do those of Paul and his first readers. As Bitner correctly observes: “In their pursuit of the political Paul, these philosophers often sidestep questions of historical setting in the interests of appropriating the apostle as a theoretical resource” (Paul’s Political Strategy, 22). For a collection of essays that attempts to reflect Paul’s interaction and debt to ancient philosophy as well as modern appropriations of Pauline thought, see Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, eds., Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). Biblical scholars and theologians have also entered this discussion; see Theodore W. Jennings Jr., Reading Derrida / Thinking Paul: On Justice, CMP (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); L. L. Welborn, Paul’s Summons to Messianic Life: Political Theology and the Coming Awakening, Insurrections: Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). And while these approaches will, no doubt, yield further fruitful readings of Paul, in the study that follows, my focus will be on investigating Paul in the philosophical context of the first century.
The explanatory power of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman texts encouraged Johann Jacob Wettstein, an eighteenth-century scholar, to produce an extensive collection of parallel material within his edition of the Greek New Testament.\(^{25}\) His labours have continued to inspire the search for and publication of parallels between Graeco-Roman texts and the New Testament.\(^{26}\) This recognition of parallel linguistic elements leads to further questions about the nature of the observed parallels. Are these parallels indicative of direct influence in one direction or another? What are the similarities and differences between the way in which the New Testament and other texts have used common terminology and/or concepts?

In contrast to the collection of parallels, studies that answer the sort of question posed in the previous paragraph necessarily work at a higher level of abstraction, requiring careful analysis and comparison of the relevant materials.\(^{27}\) The richest source of comparative material has proven to be the ethical writings of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman periods. In his survey of “primitive Christianity,” Rudolf Bultmann notes,


\(^{27}\) David Runia suggests a typology of four ways in which ancient philosophical material might assist those interpreting the New Testament (“Ancient Philosophy and the New Testament: ‘Exemplar’ as Example,” in Method and Meaning: Essays on New Testament Interpretation in Honor of Harold W. Attridge, ed. Andrew B. McGowan and Kent Harold Richards, RBS 67 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011], 350–54). First, philosophical texts and the New Testament writings show evidence of shared sociological structures as well as similar literary methods and conventions. For a survey of socio-historical and sociological approaches to Paul, see Wright, Recent Interpreters, 221–304. The importance of considering philosophical aspects of the Graeco-Roman world when doing social history is demonstrated most clearly in Abraham Malherbe’s work; see, e.g., Social Aspects of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983). Second, terminology and concepts found in the New Testament resonate with those found in Greek philosophy. The third approach contextualizes a broader common theme (for example, cosmology, anthropology) in order to compare the two bodies of writing. The fourth approach recognizes ancient philosophy as essential for understanding the New Testament texts since it is assumed that the New Testament author is explicitly interacting with ancient philosophy. The search for parallels probably forms part of the second group, while the third and fourth group of studies are the focus of the following paragraphs.
Quite early on the Christian churches adopted a system of morality, with its pattern of catechetical instruction derived in equal proportions from the Old Testament Jewish tradition and from the ethics of popular philosophical pedagogic.28

Behind this assertion lies the comparative and synthetic work exemplified in Bultmann’s earlier studies.29 The relationship between “the ethics of popular philosophical pedagogic” and early Christian writings has been central to the research interests of Abraham Malherbe, whose essay on “Hellenistic moralists and the New Testament” both summed up previous labours in the field and set the agenda for the following generation.30 Given the nature and concerns of the New Testament documents in general—and the Pauline letters in particular—it is not surprising that ethical matters are central. Other topics like theology and cosmogony make an appearance, but Paul’s primary reason for producing his letters is to shape the way of life of the Christian communities to which he writes.31 Primarily because of the dominant influence of the Socratic traditions, ethics plays a central role in the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman philosophical writings that have come down to us.32

Comparative studies of Graeco-Roman and Christian ethics are legion, as are their approaches to the task. Some studies work with large groups of texts and ideas in order to draw broad conclusions. Runar Thorsteinsson focuses on Roman Stoicism (Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus) and Roman Christianity (Romans, 1 Peter, 1 Clement) to conclude that the two ethical systems are quite similar in

31. This is not to deny that Paul’s theology determines the shape of the ethical life to which he expects believers to conform. While this may be spoken of in terms of “indicative and imperative” (see James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 626–31), other configurations are possible. Udo Schnelle offers “participation and transformation” as a more dynamic paradigm within which to consider Paul’s exhortations (Apostle Paul: *His Life and Theology*, trans. M. Eugene Boring [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005], 546–58). See, further, the survey in Nijay K. Gupta, “The Theo-Logic of Paul’s Ethics in Recent Research: Crosscurrents and Future Directions in Scholarship in the Last Forty Years,” *CurBR* 7.3 (2009): 336–61.
many ways, while Kavin Rowe’s comparison of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius with Paul, Luke, and Justin Martyr lead him to the opposite conclusion. Working at a similarly high level of abstraction, Troels Engberg-Pedersen has produced two large works in which he argues for the dependency of Paul on Stoic ethics and Stoic cosmology, respectively.

Some scholars have narrowed their focus in order to compare a specific Graeco-Roman author or text to early Christian writings, or to study a specific concept or theme across a number of texts. Important New Testament themes have occupied the attention of scholars engaged in this comparative exercise. To cite but a few examples: grace/gift has been studied in Paul and Seneca, Pauline anthropology has been considered against the broad background of ancient philosophy, as well as in the context of Stoic and Platonic thought, and the education of women in terms of virtue and conduct in the Pastoral Epistles has been compared with the moral formation of women in Pythagorean letters. While moral philosophy has provided much comparative material, the study of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman political thought has also illuminated certain New Testament texts.

33. Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism.
40. It should be remembered that in some philosophical taxonomies, politics forms part of ethics. Diogenes Laertius, for example, discusses Stoic political thought within the section on ethics (D. L. 7.84–131; cf. 7.39). Brad Inwood notes the difficulty in describing Seneca’s De beneficiis as either a socio-political or ethical treatise: “the political and ethical traditions were never neatly separated in the ancient world” (“Politics and Paradox in Seneca’s De Beneficiis,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 246). Cleanthes, on the other hand, did make the distinction (D. L. 7.41).
The “Political Paul”

The presence of terminological parallels in the New Testament and in papyrological and epigraphic texts led Adolf Deissmann describe a polemical parallelism between the cult of the emperor and the cult of Christ, which makes itself felt where ancient words derived by Christianity from the treasury of the Septuagint and the Gospels happen to coincide with the solemn concepts of the Imperial cult which sounded the same or similar.41

These and similar observations by others would eventually lead to a reassessment by Pauline scholars of the apostle’s relationship to the Roman empire. The rubric “Paul and politics” is often applied to projects undertaken as part of this reassessment, with the “politics” in question usually referring to an anti-imperial stance on the part of the apostle.42 It is probably safe to say that the view that Paul writes in opposition to the Roman Empire—in either a subversive or explicitly antagonistic way—is currently the communis opinio among New Testament scholars.

While this approach to reading Paul has yielded new insights and provided necessary correctives to wholly apolitical readings of Paul and the New Testament, it is not without its weaknesses. There is a small but growing group of scholars who are critical of key aspects of the “Paul and politics”


42. Richard Horsley and the “Paul and Politics Group” of the Society of Biblical Literature are foundational in this project; see the essays in Richard A. Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg: Trinity, 1997); Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation. Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2000); Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2004). Horsley identifies the “aims and agenda” of the group as follows: “to problematize, interrogate, and re-vision Pauline texts and interpretations, to identify oppressive formulations as well as potentially liberative visions and values in order to recover their unfulfilled historical possibilities” (“Krister Stendahl’s Challenge to Pauline Studies,” in Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation, ed. Richard A. Horsley [Harrisburg: Trinity, 2000], 15).

Despite the *prima facie* similarities between Deissmann’s observation of “polemical parallelism” in New Testament language and the attempts in my dissertation to study Paul’s royal language, I do not aim to contribute directly to the “Paul and politics” discussion.44

A number of scholars have used ancient political discourse to illuminate Paul’s letters without necessarily reaching a conclusion about Paul’s attitude to the empire.45 Because of the wealth of archaeological, epigraphical, and legal data relating to the city, Paul’s letters to the believers in Corinth have been the subject of a number of such studies.46 But the other epistles are not neglected. To identify but a few examples: Brigitte Kahl uses visual culture, more specifically, the Great Altar of Pergamum (now in Berlin), to construct an imperial ideology against which she reads Galatians;47 Peter Oakes combines the socio-political history of Philippi with the city’s *reōlia* as they relate to the empire in order to sharpen the context within which Philippians is understood.48 These studies share a concern to situate Paul’s letters within the context of ancient political discourses, but they tend to build their arguments from non-literary material. When they do draw on literary data, they often stop at identifying verbal or conceptual parallels. I will argue below for the need to study philosophical ideas in their broader textual context.

There are some studies which aim to situate Paul in the context of ancient political discourses by focusing on Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman philosophical texts and traditions in order to compare them

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44. As indicated in my concluding chapter, this is not to say that my comparison of Paul’s Christological language with philosophical constructions of kingship might not yield certain results which have a bearing on “Paul and politics.”

45. At the end of his response to the essays in Richard Horsley’s *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, Simon Price rightly observes, with regard to Paul, that “his critiques were not narrowly political, but encompassed broader aspects of local social and religious values” (“Response,” in *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, ed. Richard A. Horsley [Harriscburg: Trinity, 2004], 183). By “narrowly political” I take it that Price is referring to questions of ruling and being ruled, ideal constitutions, and the management of the various institutions of the *polis* or state. If, however, we accept that in the ancient world the “political” included ethics (Price’s “local social and religious values”), legitimate ways of life, household management, and other subjects that can be considered under the rubric of “economics” (see, e.g., Te-Li Lau, *The Politics of Peace: Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books*, NovTSup 133 [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 76–81 and the literature cited there), then Paul’s letters do address the political far more frequently than might otherwise be acknowledged.

46. See, e.g., L. W. Welborn, *Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997); John M. G. Barclay, “Matching Theory and Practice: Josephus’ Constitutional Ideal and Paul’s Strategy in Corinth,” in *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide*, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 139–63 and Bradley Bitner’s recent study (*Paul’s Political Strategy*) which interprets the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians as a form of ancient political discourse which engages with ideas of *politeia* in order to create an alternate civic ideology, but he draws on epigraphic and legal material, rather than philosophical texts.

47. Brigitte Kahl, *Galatians Re-Imagined: Reading with the Eyes of the Vanquished*, Paul in Critical Contexts (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010); see also Hardin, *Galatians and the Imperial Cult*.

to the Pauline literature. Bruno Blumenfeld surveys classical Greek political philosophy and provides a close reading of certain Neopythagorean political texts as a foundation for his reading of Philippians and Romans.\(^\text{49}\) He concludes that many of Paul’s terms such as δικαιοσύνη, νόμος, ἐκκλησία, ἐναγγέλλων are drawn from Greek political discourse. More recently, Anna Miller explores Paul’s writing to the Corinthian assembly by comparing it with what Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom say about the democratic ἐκκλησία.\(^\text{50}\) In his study of peace in Ephesians, Te-Li Lau also employs Dio, but includes the Confucian Four Books as a third-leg in the comparative process.\(^\text{51}\) These studies all demonstrate the value of a careful, in-depth discussion of ancient texts as part of the process of situating the Pauline material in its first-century milieu.

Numerous studies have demonstrated the value of reading Paul through the lens of Hellenistic moral philosophy for situating his writings more accurately in their socio-historical context. Although politics is regarded as a sub-set of ethics in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman thought, political thought is under-represented in comparative studies which give due attention to both the philosophical and the Pauline material. It is this comparative approach that I hope to employ in order to study the presence of the ideal kingship topos in Paul’s writing.

**Kingship in Pauline Texts and Graeco-Roman Philosophy**

Until relatively recently, the possibility that Paul uses ideal kingship language as part of his Christology has not seized the attention of many scholars. There are a number of reasons why this might have been the case: the absence of the title “king” with reference to Jesus in Paul’s writings; the emphasis on Paul’s Jewish context within which the category of “messiah” is seen as sufficiently explanatory of Paul’s language;\(^\text{52}\) the emphasis on ethics and, to a lesser degree, religion amongst those studying Paul and Graeco-Roman philosophy. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of studies have appeared in which the category of “ideal kingship” or “kingship discourse” is used to examine Paul’s writings.

The significance of Graeco-Roman kingship ideals for the study of Paul’s writings has not been ignored.\(^\text{53}\) In Paul’s Offer of Leniency, Donald Dale Walker argues that the πραοτής and ἐπιτύχεια of Christ in 2 Corinthians 10.1 was drawn from a “matrix of ideas” (p. 4) that defined the Greco-Roman ideal of the good king.\(^\text{54}\) Walker’s survey of “the good king” topos (pp. 91–145) is followed by an argument for the presence of these ideas in Paul’s epistles (pp. 145–183). Douglas A. Campbell’s

\(^{49}\) Bruno Blumenfeld, *The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework*, JSNTSup 210 (London: T & T Clark, 2001); see below for further discussion of Blumenfeld’s study.

\(^{50}\) Anna C. Miller, *Corinthian Democracy: Democratic Discourse in 1 Corinthians*, PrTMS 20 (Eugene: Pickwick, 2015).


\(^{52}\) As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Paul’s use of γνωρίζω is not without its problems.


explanation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ55 as it pertains to the opening chapters of Romans employs “a robust narrative Christology developed in terms of ancient kingship” (p. 698) to argue that Christ is portrayed in Romans 1 as God’s messianic agent who is raised from the dead and appointed as lord of the cosmos by God, the divine king.56 James Harrison surveys Greek and Roman writings on the ideal ruler (pp. 279–299) in order to contrast these portrayals with Paul’s depiction of the governing authorities in Romans 13.57 Harrison concludes that Romans 13 must be understood as a type of “hidden transcript”58 in which Paul’s exhortation to the Roman Christians demotes the ruler from the exalted status ascribed to the ideal ruler in Greek and Roman thought while also warning them about the dangers posed by the authorities. These studies highlight the potential explanatory power that Graeco-Roman constructions of ideal kingship provide when studying Paul’s writings. Three studies explore in more detail the New Testament’s use of the conceptual category of ideal kingship.

Bruno Blumenfeld study of Paul’s political thought59 proceeds by comparing Paul’s thought with Hellenistic Pythagorean political writings.60 These texts are divided into two groups: “the polis group,” concerned with matters like law, constitutions, and ways of life, and “the basileia group” which concentrates on kingship.61 In the first half of the book, Blumenfeld discusses these texts and observes certain parallels between them and elements of Paul’s thought, on the basis of which he proposes that this two-tiered system informs Paul’s thought about human institutions and divine rule, respectively. Ideal kingship thought as developed in these Pythagorean writings is used primarily to analyse God’s divine kingship rather than Christology. Blumenfeld’s analysis of the Pythagorean texts is thorough and illuminating. In the second half of his study, Blumenfeld engages in a “political reading” of Romans in order to demonstrate the utility and validity of his earlier comparative analysis. Both parts of the study are coherent and reinforce the claims made in the study. Taken on its own terms, this study provides a

59. Blumenfeld, Political Paul. This is the published version of a 1997 doctoral dissertation completed at Columbia University.
60. My use of “Pythagorean” to refer to these texts is defended in Chapter 3.
61. The polis group (pp. 120–188) includes texts by Archytas, Hippodamos, Callisthenes, Ocellus, Damippos, Zaleucus, and Charondas. The περὶ βασιλείας texts by Diogenes, Ephantus, and Sthenias make up the basileia group (pp. 189–274). A number of themes, notably kingship and law, are found in both groups and these two categories, while heuristically useful, do not arise from the texts themselves.
strong argument for Blumenfeld’s thesis: that “Paul relied on the political tradition of the Classical and Hellenistic world.”

But there is a methodological problem that undermines Blumenfeld’s thesis. In his conclusion, Blumenfeld observes that for his thesis to stand he has had to show that “there is nothing else in the Pauline background that can explain the similarities [between Paul’s thought and Hellenistic political theories].” In his introduction, however, Blumenfeld notes that he chooses to disregard Jewish and Hellenistic Jewish influences on Paul. By ignoring this significant element of Paul’s cultural milieu and cultural repertoire (for which, see below), Blumenfeld weakens his argument considerably. There are only so many sources from which Paul might have drawn intellectually, and since the Jewish sources are removed for methodological reasons, it is not surprising that Paul’s thought is then seen to cohere with what is left. Blumenfeld has successfully demonstrated certain similarities between Paul’s thought and Hellenistic political thought. He has not demonstrated the latter is the source of the former.

Blumenfeld’s study pursued the presence of Graeco-Roman antecedents in Paul’s political thought conceptualized quite broadly in terms of the nature of God’s reign, law, righteousness, human sin, and the nature of early communities of believers. Two studies published after Blumenfeld’s have focused on ideal kingship concepts and language in relation to Pauline Christology.

Julien Smith argues that Ephesians portrays Christ as a type of ideal king. Unlike Blumenfeld, Smith’s main concern is not with the origins or sources of the author’s ideas, but with describing the potential cultural repertoire shared by the letter’s writer and its audience. Smith describes the ideal king in both Graeco-Roman and Jewish thought (chaps. 2 and 3, respectively) before showing how these concepts of ideal kingship might inform a reading of Ephesians.

The section on Graeco-Roman literature provides a discussion of kingship thought in the classical, Hellenistic, and Roman periods. In the first and last of these, Smith discusses individual writers, while the Hellenistic period surveys certain *topoi* (e.g., “the divinity of the ideal king,” “the ideal king as benefactor”). Two shortcomings are present in this section. First, while the breadth of material surveyed is impressive, it is inevitably (and necessarily) somewhat superficial. The entire classical period is discussed in fourteen pages, for example. Second, the selection of certain elements from the Hellenistic period also opens Smith up to the accusation of choosing only those themes in the Hellenistic corpus that are found in the text being studied.

Smith’s survey of Jewish material (Chapter 3) discusses the Psalms of Solomon and the Qumran literature as examples of Palestinian Jewish literature before looking at the Sibylline Oracles, the Letter

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62. *Political Paul*, 302, see also 288, 447–50. Blumenfeld argues that classical political thought is mediated to Paul through the Pythagorean writings. Blumenfeld even goes so far as to suggest that these writings “may be sources for Paul” (p. 123), however, the burden of proof for this thesis is far weightier than Blumenfeld’s study can bear.

63. *Political Paul*, 448.


66. For “cultural repertoire,” see below.

67. For a more detailed discussion, see Carol Atack, “Debating Kingship: Models of Monarchy in Fifth- and Fourth-Century BCE Greek Political Thought” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 2014).
of Aristeas, Philo, Josephus, and the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. The survey has the same strengths and weaknesses as those of the classical and Roman periods in Chapter 2. More problematic, however, is the relatively curt treatment given to texts from the Hebrew Bible. In fewer than eight pages, Smith deals with “Kingship in Ancient Israel.” His treatment of these texts is primarily concerned with the debate around the origins of Israeliite monarchy rather than the textual construction of kingship in these foundational Jewish texts. The presence of quotations and allusions from this corpus in Ephesians\textsuperscript{68} suggest they deserve closer attention than Smith has given them.

Finally, Smith’s penultimate chapter compares Ephesians’ portrayal of Christ with the kingship discourse in the preceding texts under the following rubrics derived from the letter: Christ reconciles the cosmos to God, he is benefactor, he enables moral transformation, household harmony, and victory over oppressive powers. Smith concludes that Ephesians portrays Christ as God’s vice-regent and ideal king.

Smith’s study is impressive in the breadth of the primary material surveyed; the comparison with Ephesians allows him to make his case on the basis of the cumulative weight of these many smaller pieces of evidence. Nevertheless, there are three ways in which my study aims to extend Smith’s results. First, while fewer texts will be examined, those examined will be treated in greater detail in order to establish the way in which the various elements in the constructions of ideal kingship interact with one another. The methodological rationale for this decision is discussed below. Next, I will pay greater attention than Smith has to the corpus upon which early Christian writers, including Paul, drew most explicitly: the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible. Finally, I will take up Smith’s suggestion (p. 247) to explore the portrayal of Christ as a royal figure elsewhere in the New Testament.

This final suggestion was taken up by Joshua Jipp in \textit{Christ is King}.\textsuperscript{69} Following a sketch of “ancient kingship discourse” in Chapter 1, Jipp examines in four subsequent chapters the relationship between Christ and the law, the New Testament hymns to Christ, Paul’s participatory soteriology,\textsuperscript{70} and the themes of justice and righteousness in Romans. He demonstrates how reading certain Pauline texts through the lens of ancient discourses on ideal kingship enables fresh insights to emerge. Jipp’s careful reading of Pauline texts will be engaged more fully—both in agreement and, at points, in disagreement—in Chapter 6 where my debt to his study will become obvious. This current study extends that of Jipp’s in an important way.

Like Julien Smith’s study, Jipp’s work engages with a broad cross-section of the primary sources, rather than a more concentrated examination of particular instances of kingship discourse. Each chapter


\textsuperscript{69} Joshua W. Jipp, \textit{Christ is King: Paul’s Royal Ideology} (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015).

begins with a description of a theme in the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman literature and the Jewish literature—law, praise, shared rule, justice/righteousness—and then proceeds to discuss the Pauline material in the light of those themes. Jipp’s discussion gives more attention to Jewish biblical texts than Smith’s. However, Jipp’s analysis of the Pauline material does not always distinguish between the ideas found in the various groups of texts; he is content simply to identify Paul’s language as derivative of “ancient kingship discourses.”

In this study I examine the kingship topos as it occurs in a select group of sources in order to establish both similarities and differences between the various groups of texts. I thus rend asunder what Jipp has joined together in order to distinguish more carefully between the possible traditions which might be present in the Pauline material.

There is growing interest in the possibility that Graeco-Roman philosophical constructions of ideal kingship played a role in Paul’s thought and language about Jesus. In order to fill some of the gaps in earlier studies and strengthen some of their weaknesses, I propose to study these philosophical constructions of ideal kingship from both Graeco-Roman and Jewish authors. In the following section I address some terminological issues and questions of methodology by which this present study attempts to extend the studies discussed above.

Comparing Paul with the περί βασιλείας Topos

A study of all the possible sources of kingship ideology from the cultural milieu within which Paul lived is impossible. Oswyn Murray rightly observes that

a properly embedded account of kingship ideas would be a lifetime’s work. It would have to embrace king worship, the style of kingship, the Alexander motif, royal regalia and ceremonial, coronation rituals, New Year festivals, and so on. It would have to consider the reflection in the official chancellery style of the ideology of kingship ... It would require detailed studies of the ideology of particular courts, in relation to what later became known as their ethnicity.

As important as these above-mentioned elements are, I will limit myself to a literary study of kingship

71. See, e.g., Jipp, Christ is King, 41–42, 273–81. Campbell feels comfortable treating Jewish and non-Jewish material in the same way because of the shared metaphor of God as king (Deliverance of God, 691, 1116 n. 37). But it is precisely the different ways in which these texts deal with the same fundamental idea or metaphor that is of interest to me.


ideology. Even this, however, presents one with an impossibly wide pool of data from which to draw. The ubiquity of kingship in the Hellenistic world and beyond ensured that kingship is a common topic mentioned throughout the surviving literature. In order to limit the study even further, I will focus on determining and describing the περι βασιλείας topos as it was used to construct ideal kingship. In what follows, I establish the concept of topos as it will be used in this study and then ask where the περι βασιλείας topos might be found.

On Topoi

In ancient rhetorical education, a topos was most likely the place in a handbook where a student might find an idea or argument to be emulated. This usage suggests how the term eventually came to describe a commonplace idea. The term has often been used by New Testament scholars interested in the way in which Graeco-Roman philosophical ideas might present themselves in the New Testament, but their studies have failed to yield a consensus regarding the way in which topos should be used in this field of scholarship.

Within the context of Hellenistic moral philosophy, Abraham Malherbe viewed the topos as “the stock treatment of subjects of interest to the moralist” and “a fairly systematic treatment of a topic of moral instruction.” In a Festschrift for Malherbe, Johan Thom extends and refines the discussion of topos by first distinguishing between three different ancient usages of the term topos: the logical or rhetorical topos that provides lines of argument; the literary topos containing literary themes and motifs; and the moral or philosophical topos. Thom argues that “the notion of an ordered cognitive space underlies all these uses” of topos in various ancient contexts. In the case of the philosophical topos, this space is frequently ordered by a semantic network of questions and answers. Although it is possible to invoke a particular topos by alluding to elements of this network, it is the combination of elements and their relationship to one another that defines the topos and enables its presence to be detected. Thus, what Carol Newsom argues with regard to genre can be extended to topoi:

79. Brunt wants to limit the use of topos to this phenomenon (“Topos,” 496–98).
82. Thom, “Defining the Topos,” 569–70; see also Walker, *Paul’s Offer of Leniency*, 93: “good king topos are so well-known and widespread that they can be invoked with the briefest allusion or used as the foundation for further argumentation.”
“elements” alone are not what trigger recognition of a genre but rather the way in which they are related to one another in a Gestalt structure that serves as an idealized cognitive model. Thus the elements only make sense in relation to a whole. Since the Gestalt structure contains default and optional components, as well as necessary ones, individual exemplars can depart from the prototypical exemplars with respect to default and optional elements and still be recognizable. It is this flexibility which makes the topos such an attractive method of dealing with philosophical matters. Furthermore, the significance of an individual author’s use of the topos lies not exclusively in its presence, but also in the manner in which components of the topos are added, ignored, or changed. With regard to the study of topoi in relation to the New Testament, Abraham Malherbe notes that “a more detailed study of the topoi might very well cast new light on [New Testament] passages which have traditionally been seen primarily from a theological perspective.”

It is this task which is undertaken in this study with regard to the kingship topos. Before this task is attempted, it is important to establish whether we can speak confidently of an ancient περί βασιλείας topos.

Hellenistic Kingship Writings

If, as has been suggested, the presence of a topos is often signalled using περί, then the kingship topos is frequently attested in the Hellenistic period. Diogenes Laertius’ On the Lives of Eminent Philosophers lists volumes entitled περί βασιλείας by Euphantus (2.110), Aristotle (5.22), Theophrastus (5.42, 49), Strato (5.59), Persaeus (7.36), Cleanthes (7.175), Sphaerus (7.178) and Epicurus (10.28). According to Clement of Alexandria, Anaxarchus produced a work entitled Περί βασιλείας (Strom. 1.6). According to Diogenes Laertius, other works with similar titles were written by Xenocrates (Στοιχεία προς Ἀλέξανδρον περί βασιλείας; 4.14), Theophrastus (Περί παιδείας βασιλέως; 5.42; Πρὸς Κάσιανδρον περί βασιλείας; 5.47), Antisthenes (Κύρος ἡ περί βασιλείας; 6.16; Ἀρχέλαος ἡ περί βασιλείας; 6.18). Plato’s Statesman is given the secondary title of περί βασιλείας by Thrasylus (3.58). Unfortunately, except for Plato’s work and a handful of fragments, none of these texts have survived. Further attestation that this was recognized as a topos by at least some ancient authors is found in Stobaeus’ Florilegium which contains a group of excerpts entitled Ὑποθήκαι Περί Βασιλείας (Stob. 4.7.1–76 = WH 4, 249–295). The excerpts collected in this section range chronologically from Hesiod and Homer through to Musonius and Plutarch, and include three passages excerpted from texts

86. For Theophrastus’ treatise on kingship, see Athenaeus, Deipn. 144e; Plutarch, Themistocles 25; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.73 (= frags. 125–127 in C. Friedrich H. Wimmer, Fragmenta, vol. 3 of Theophrasti Eresii Opera quae supersunt omnia [Leipzig: Teubner, 1862], 200) and P.Oxy. 1611.38–97. On the basis of these fragments, Oswyn Murray (“Philosophy and Monarchy,” 18) suggests Theophrastus’ “studies were antiquarian and historical in nature, rather than philosophically interesting or politically useful.” Plutarch mentions Epicurus’ On Kingship (Suav. viv. 13 [1095c–d]; cf. Adv. Col. 31 [1125c]).
87. In his discussion of topoi, Malherbe (“Hellenistic Moralists,” 735–36) notes how “the titles of Seneca’s essays, Plutarch’s Moralia, the diatribes of Musonius, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, and the subject headings under which Stobaeus collects his material, make it sufficiently clear what subjects were discussed with some regularity.”

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entitled Περί Βασιλείας attributed to Diotogenes (§§61–62), Sthenidas (§63), and Ecphantus (§§64–66).

The existence of a Hellenistic topos receives further support from the way in which texts in the imperial period employ similar sets of ideas to speak about kingship. The writings of Seneca (De clementia), Plutarch (Ad principem ineruditum), Musonius Rufus (Discourses 8 = That Kings Should Also Study Philosophy), and Dio Chrysostom (Orations 1–4) all demonstrate continuity with Hellenistic kingship ideals, suggesting interaction with the same kingship topos. The topos can be traced through to the fourth century CE.39

The presence of this topos is indicative of the importance of kingship as a political phenomenon in the Hellenistic period and subsequent theorizing about the phenomenon in ancient political thought.90

As Matthias Haake observes, the emergence of these treatises

reflects the main and most obvious feature of the political history of that [Hellenistic] period: for treatises On Kingship to emerge, a necessary condition was not only the actual existence of monarchs, but also their direct influence on and partial control of the world of the poleis to an unprecedented extent.91

Given the centrality and influence of the institution, it is understandable why kingship has attracted the attention of scholars studying this period. Biographies, specialized studies of various aspects of kingship, and collections of wide-ranging essays have all contributed to our knowledge of the


phenomenon. The philosophical *topos* of kingship as it might have been expressed in the *περὶ βασιλείας* treatises has received less concentrated attention.

E. R. Goodenough’s much-cited article on Hellenistic kingship95 studied the Pythagorean texts, together with another by Archytas, in order to determine the “official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age.”96 At the centre of this philosophy was the idea of the king as “embodied law” or νόμος ἐμψυχος. Because he imitates God and God’s rule of the cosmos, the king is more than human, although less than divine. The king’s virtues are important and by imitating the king’s virtues and his person, his people are saved. Although some of his conclusions have been questioned, Goodenough’s essay served to introduce the Pythagorean texts into the discussion of philosophical constructions of kingship and forms the starting point for a number of more recent discussions of the topic.

Oswyn Murray’s Oxford dissertation investigates the Hellenistic philosophical treatises entitled *περὶ βασιλείας* in order to understand the attitude of educated people towards monarchy.97 In the opening chapters he examines classical and Hellenistic texts. The second half of the dissertation shows how these Greek ideas interacted with and were transformed by indigenous traditions.98 Murray’s discussion is situated historically and relates the philosophical discussion to the political practices of the day. While there is mention of the elements that contribute to the philosophical construction of kingship, the focus is on the way in which these texts sought to legitimate and justify kingship in the Hellenistic period.


97. Oswyn Murray, “Peri Basileias: Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic Period” (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1971). For a summary of Murray’s dissertation and the development of his thinking since then, see Murray, “Philosophy and Monarchy”.

Matthias Haake, too, is concerned primarily with the purpose and function of the Hellenistic περὶ βασιλείας treatises. Haake argues that the περὶ βασιλείας treatises should not merely be considered as types of the Fürstenspiegel since this approach is too generalizing and too broad. Haake treats these texts as a specific Hellenistic genre which he investigates through analyzing the author, addressee, form, content, and implied audience of the περὶ βασιλείας treatises. The known texts are all written by philosophers and addressed to kings. The fragmentary nature of the evidence makes it difficult to say much about form, but the content of these texts is quite consistent: they focus on “the ideal figure of the good king as a factual reality.” The implied audience was “the Panhellenic public of the poleis.”

On the basis of this analysis, Haake argues that the primary role of the περὶ βασιλείας treatises was to function as a form of political communication between the philosopher and king in front of the Greek polis. This discourse played a number of positive roles for all three parties. It served to legitimate the monarch by portraying him in terms of kingship rather than tyranny, and in doing so, encouraged the polis to accept the king as a new form of benevolent power which, up to this point, had been foreign. Furthermore, it communicated to both king and polis a framework of benefaction within which he could act in order to ensure that his subjects would respond positively. The discourse also provided the philosopher with a chance to exercise παρρησία, thus demonstrating that he was a true philosopher, while affording the king an opportunity to tolerate this speech, thus demonstrating that he was not a tyrant. The περὶ βασιλείας genre was thus a discourse between philosopher and king performed before the Greek polis for the benefit of all three parties.

In contrast to both Murray and Haake, I am less concerned with the pragmatics of these texts in their historical contexts and more interested with understanding the conceptual matrices, that is, topoi, created by these texts. My work’s centre of gravity lies closer to the literary and tradition-historical rather than the historical end of the spectrum of approaches. While Haake provides a convincing argument for the purpose and function of the περὶ βασιλείας treatises, he does not describe the content that defined this discourse. Murray also does not describe the combination of elements which defined

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100. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 166–67. For a thorough discussion of the Fürstenspiegel, see Pierre Hadot, “Fürstenspiegel,” RAC 8: 555–632. Walker (Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 103 n. 48) suggests that the good king ideal might function as a mirror for the sake of flattery, a map for guidance, or it might be a map masquerading as a mirror (so Seneca Clem. 1.1) A kingship treatise might represent a real attempt at political thought or it may simply be a rhetorical exercise. Walker’s focus seems to be closer to mine: it is the topos rather than the specific text that is in view. The assumption, however, is that the topos and the περὶ βασιλείας treatise coincide for the most part.

101. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 174–78, quotations from 177 and 178, respectively.


104. See also Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy” who notes not only that Greek intellectuals “sought to tame royal power through an image of the ideal king” (p. 253), but also that “there developed a rhetoric of highly polite communication” between king and subject. The philosophical kingship treatises formed part of this communication.
the texts he studies. In a later essay, however, he provides a sketch of a typical kingship treatise. This treatise might have consisted of an argument for monarchy on the basis of the virtue of the king. These virtues would have been laid out in terms of the ideals of the philosophical tradition producing the treatise and might also have included a list of the king’s duties. Given its philosophical source, such a treatise would, no doubt, have described the relationship between philosophy and kingship. The treatise might also have described the nature and dangers of tyranny. Finally, the necessity of philosophical παρρησία would have been emphasized. In this description Murray by and large blends what individual authors wrote or might have written about kingship. As useful as this composite summary is, the potential differences between various treatises representing different schools of thought are also of interest.

In the first chapter of his book on the *Aeneid*, Francis Cairns provides a similar synthetic survey of the nature of kingship reflected in Hellenistic literature. He concludes with a list of twelve elements that delimit the stereotype of the good king. K1: pre-eminence in virtue; K2: a model for imitation in virtue; K3: the imitator of god to reach virtue; K4: possessor of the cardinal virtues (justice, self-control, wisdom, courage); K5: possessor of other virtues (piety, mercy, kindness, hard work, generosity, foresight, law-observance, care for his people); K6: because of his care for his people, he is recognized as father, shepherd, leader, saviour; K7: lover of peace and harmony; K8: of good appearance; K9: endowed with good advisers and ministers; K10: seeing and hearing everything, often through his agents; K11: ensuring that citizens go about their tasks; K12: deriving kingship from Zeus-Jupiter. Cairns points out that his concept of the good king is derived from secondary literature on Hellenistic kingship and that the elements must be analyzed in the primary sources in order that they be established on firmer footing. It is this sort of analysis that I undertake in my study. Unlike Cairns, but following Murray, I limit myself to studying, as far as possible, Greek philosophical constructions of ideal kingship. This allows me to give the chosen texts sufficient attention while restricting the study to a reasonable length. Where possible, I analyze writings or portions of writings that focus on positive monarchical rule, instead of collecting and synthesizing various statements about kingship. When it comes to the Cynics and Stoics, no suitable text has survived and I am forced to cast my net more

105. “Philosophy and Monarchy,” 21–27. Philip J. Smith (“Greek Images of Monarchy and Their Influence on Rome from Alexander to Augustus” [Ph.D. diss., 2 volumes University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1999], 75–98) provides a similar composite description of aspects of Hellenistic kingship ideals drawn from a variety of sources in order to study the impact of Greek images of monarchy on Rome.

106. Augustan Epic, 1–21.


108. Thom (“Defining the Topos,” 568–69) notes that in some cases the *topos* is defined by a set of questions. With the exception of the dialectical section of the Letter of Aristeas, I have not found a treatise shaped around questions of this sort. However, it is easy to see how these elements might have formed around such questions: What is a good king? The most virtuous person. What are his virtues? Justice, piety, etc. How does the good king act towards his subjects? What is the relationship between the good king and the law? How will the good king act in battle/against his enemies?

widely in order to suggest a reconstruction of kingship thought in these schools with which I may compare Paul’s writing about Jesus.

**On Comparisons**

Jonathan Z. Smith identifies the process of comparison as “a fundamental characteristic of human intelligence,”110 and recent developments in cognitive science seem to bear this out.111 But Smith has also problematized the comparative process, especially in the way it is often undertaken by those studying the New Testament and Christian origins.112 The comparative approach used in this dissertation, therefore, needs briefly to be described and justified.

David Litwa’s study of the understanding and depiction of Jesus’ divinity takes Smith’s warnings seriously in order to define a careful comparative method.113 The method does not assume that similarities arise from direct borrowing nor that they come from a universal human experience.114 Rather, the similarities arise from a shared culture. In the same vein, Abraham Malherbe rightly observes that “Paul and the philosophers inhabited the same space to such a degree that one can conceive of a relationship between them.”115 The space Malherbe has in mind is not only physical space, but also cultural and intellectual space. Using organic language, Malherbe speaks of the “ecology” of the “environment” which early Christians shared with others in the Graeco-Roman world.116 This cultural and intellectual space which Paul is assumed to have shared is described by Johan Thom in terms of a “cultural repertoire:”

[The] contexts the author could have expected his ideal audience to know and to have in common with himself ... formed a cultural repertoire of linguistic, historical, social, or religious

114. For Deissmann, similarities or parallels can be resolved into one of two alternatives: analogy or genealogy (*Light from the Ancient East*, 265–66). In the case of the former, the universal human condition explains similarities; the latter describes more direct dependence and borrowing. The apologist recognizes only analogy, while the amateur sees genealogy in every similarity (p. 266). Deissmann does not offer a third option, but “pledge[s] to no inexorable ‘method,’ but test[s] each case as it arises” (p. 267). For a critique of the ongoing assumption of genealogy or analogy in many comparative enterprises, see Bert Cozijnsen, “A Critical Contribution to the Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti: Jude and Hesiod,” in *The Use of Sacred Books in the Ancient World*, ed. Leonard Victor Rutgers, et al., CBET 22 (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 81–95.
116. Malherbe observes that he has never defined or described an explicit methodology but has worked intuitively. The introduction to the collection of his essays serves as a brief statement of this method (“Introduction”).

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knowledge which author and audience shared and which had to be applied in reading and understanding a text.\textsuperscript{117}

As it pertains to the relationship between specific texts and ideas—in this case, texts and ideas about kingship—Julien Smith explains:

It is not assumed that the audience would have known all, or even many, of the works discussed ... Rather, the assumption is that the works under investigation either reflected or informed a general cultural expectation regarding the reign of the ideal king.\textsuperscript{118}

So, too, in this study, I will assume that Paul would have been able to draw from his shared cultural repertoire various elements that contributed to the \textit{topos} of ideal kingship.\textsuperscript{119}

But this shared culture does not imply identity or uniformity. In the case of the various sub-groups of the first-century Mediterranean world, Litwa argues that this shared culture is defined by “a vigorous process of reciprocal exchange on all levels—social, material, intellectual” which can be usefully analyzed using the concept of “cultural hybridity.”\textsuperscript{120} It is this “reciprocal exchange” that produces the trichotomous Paul who is simultaneously Jew, Greek, and Roman.

For my comparative approach, the recognition of hybridity within a shared cultural space means that attention must be given to both similarities and differences.\textsuperscript{121} In terms of the investigation of a particular \textit{topos}, the way in which an author has adapted or changed elements of the \textit{topos} in order to offer a different answer to an age-old question is as important as the elements the author has conserved.\textsuperscript{122} Using the phrasing of John Fitzgerald, this careful attention to similarity and difference will also allow us to detect a “paradigm shift” in Paul “in which the elements of the old paradigm remain, but they appear in a revolutionary new configuration.”\textsuperscript{123}


\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Christ the Ideal King}, 21; Smith’s methodology is worked out on pp. 8–13; see also Blumenfeld, \textit{Political Paul}, 25–27.

\textsuperscript{119} The approach sketched here is similar in shape to that described by Cozijnsen in terms of “cultural codes and [the] horizon of expectations” (“Critical Contribution,” 89–95).

\textsuperscript{120} Litwa, \textit{Jesus Deus}, 32.

\textsuperscript{121} Litwa, \textit{Jesus Deus}, 33–34. This emphasis on difference as well as similarity is one of the hallmarks and strengths of Malherbe’s studies; see, e.g., Martyn, “De-Apocalypticizing Paul,” 62–65 and Malherbe’s own observations that in his studies, “equal attention is given to the ways in which Paul differs from his contemporaries” (“Introduction,” in \textit{Paul and the Popular Philosophers} [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989], 7).

\textsuperscript{122} Thom, “Defining the Topos,” 569, 573. This two-step process in which sufficient attention is paid to both similarities and differences is one of the defining traits and important strengths of Abraham Malherbe’s various studies; see Martyn, “De-Apocalypticizing Paul,” 62–65. For the importance of emphasizing difference in comparative studies in general, see Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison,” 40, who comments: “comparison is, at base, never identity. Comparison requires the postulation of differences as the grounds of its being interesting.”

In a further methodological step taken in order to move beyond the search for facile verbal parallels,124 I attend to the conceptual matrix of ideas that go into constructing the *topos* of ideal kingship. This matrix is made up of a number of distinct elements or *sub-topoi* that combine to form the larger *topos*.125 In the ideal-king *topos*, these *sub-topoi* include the king’s relationship to law, the king’s virtues, questions around the nature of justice, and so forth. It is not only the presence of a specific sub-*topos* that is important, but also the way in which that element relates to the other elements in order to construct the περί βασιλείας *topos*. If the conceptual elements are likened to building elements, a Corinthian volute or flying buttress by itself says something about a building’s architecture, and the presence of one or another might be indicative of a certain building tradition, but the way in which an individual builder uses these elements to construct a particular structure is even more significant.126

In order to develop the conceptual matrix of ideas or the network of sub-*topoi* that make up the περί βασιλείας *topos*, it will be necessary to study these ideas in the broad context of the texts within which they occur.127 Such an approach allows for a more careful examination of the interaction between the various sub-*topoi* and their function, both individually and as part of the larger *topos*. This means that the conceptual matrices will be established on the basis of a detailed study of a handful of primary texts, rather than a more superficial survey of a larger corpus.

In Chapters 2–5, I attempt to give the classical, Hellenistic, and Jewish texts the detailed treatment described above. The final chapter which investigates the Pauline literature does so thematically and without any claim to comprehensiveness with regard to traditional Pauline themes. Having identified several different configurations of the περί βασιλείας *topos*, the aim in the final chapter is to see whether there are traces of this *topos* in the Pauline corpus. This approach is somewhat different from those approaches usually taken by New Testament scholars in which the focus is on the New Testament, with other texts being referenced and compared as “parallels.” The disadvantage of my approach is that the treatment Paul receives is considerably more brief than might be hoped. To address

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124. Any comparative study of biblical material must note Samuel Sandmel’s caution against “parallelomania”: “…that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction” (“Parallelomania,” *JBL* 81 [1962]: 1); see, also, Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 33, 76–78.


127. Sandmel calls for a detailed contextual study of the “specific” and not the abstract “juxtaposing [of] mere excerpts” (“Parallelomania,” 2).
the Pauline texts at the same level as the other material would have added substantially to an already prolix dissertation. However, I trust Paul’s letters will be dealt with to the extent necessary to establish my thesis.

Following the discussion of *topoi* in his programmatic essay on the New Testament and Hellenistic moral philosophers, Abraham Malherbe concludes with the following paragraph:

These comments are intended to be suggestive only, and to argue that a more detailed study of the *topoi* might very well cast new light on passages which have traditionally been seen primarily from a theological perspective. In order to attain greater certainty, more attention would have to be given to the constituent parts of the *topoi* in both groups of literature in order to determine whether the same complexes of ideas occur in each. The elimination or modification by the NT writers of standard parts of a *topos* would be especially significant. Equally important is the need to determine the function to which the *topos* is put by a writer.¹²⁸

A number of my key methodological considerations are adumbrated in this short paragraph: I will use a Hellenistic *topos* (in this case, the *περὶ βασιλείας topos*) to illuminate the New Testament from a non-theological perspective by focusing on the various elements of the *topos* and the way in which they relate to one another in their own contexts before comparing them while paying due attention to both similarities and differences.

A further assumption in this study is that popular philosophy would have seeded the cultural and intellectual milieu or ecology in which Paul lived with Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman constructions of ideal kingship.

**Popular Philosophy**

I have already touched on the question of Paul’s education,¹²⁹ but note here that if Paul had an advanced Graeco-Roman education,¹³⁰ then it is possible that he would have been exposed to political thought or, at least, political *topoi*, as part of his literary and rhetorical education.¹³¹ If, however, Paul’s education was fairly rudimentary,¹³² then an alternative must be sought to account for his possible

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¹²⁹. For a recent discussion of the *status quaestionis*, see Schellenberg, *Rethinking Paul’s Education*, 17–56.
¹³¹. I am not arguing that advanced education necessarily included a study of philosophy, but that philosophical elements, especially *topoi*, would have found their way into literary and rhetorical education. The final stages of education as evidenced by the Egyptian papyri are described by Rafaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 220–44. Although political thought is not mentioned explicitly, the student could be exposed to these ideas through, for example, the *chreia* or other exercises; see, e.g., Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, eds., *Classroom Exercises*, vol. 2 of *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric*, WGRW 2 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), s.v. *βασιλεία, βασιλεύς, βασιλέως*.
¹³². E. A. Judge argues, “for Paul the art [of rhetoric] was acquired by hard experience rather than by training” (“The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community,” in *The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament Essays*, ed. James R. Harrison, WUNT 229 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 541). Similarly, Ryan Schellenberg concludes, in contrast to Vegge (see above, n. 130), that “the alleged correspondence between Paul and the theorists and practitioners of formal Greco-Roman rhetoric [turns] out to be unsubstantiated and illusory” (*Rethinking Paul’s Education*, 309, see pp. 81–181). He argues, instead, that rhetorical elements identified in the Pauline letters are the result not of “formal education” but of “informal social practice” (pp. 309–10). There are some similarities between this argument and the one made in the
knowledge of philosophical ideas. Popular philosophy has been suggested as the most likely source for Paul’s familiarity with these “philosophical concepts, terminology, and forms of communication.”

Writing at the start of the twentieth century, Bevan views “Hellenistic popular philosophy” as the common ethical teaching found amongst most of the Hellenistic schools that resulted from the moribund state of the Hellenistic world. In this uncertain context, shelter from the vicissitudes of Ὄνη was sought through the cultivation of self-sufficiency and self-control as a buffer against the external world. This inward and ethical turn in philosophy addressed the psychological needs of the average Hellenistic person in a period of cultural and political uncertainty in terms that were “popular,” both in the sense of “wide-spread, common” and in the sense of “simple, straightforward.” Bevan’s argument with respect to the cause of Hellenistic popular philosophy, as well as his general characterisation of Hellenistic philosophy as unsophisticated, might be questioned, but he correctly identifies the phenomenon of a straight-forward, common form of moral philosophy found throughout the various Hellenistic philosophical schools as “popular philosophy.” A century after Bevan, Teresa Morgan identifies the same phenomenon in the Graeco-Roman world in terms of “ethical ideas which were in wide circulation around the Empire and widely shared up and down the social spectrum.”

Although much popular philosophy in the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman period is focused on questions of morality, other fields like cosmology, theology, and politics also form part of this phenomenon.

While the term “popular philosophy” is difficult to define precisely, the Graeco-Roman world Paul inhabited was filled with opportunities facilitating the circulation of these ideas. In addition to

following paragraph about popular philosophy. Phenomena known to us primarily through literary sources would have circulated beyond the world of the literary élite and been accessible to the masses through non-literary means.


135. Robert Sharples, for example, has argued that the inward, ethical turn is not necessarily indicative of a shallow philosophical position (“Philosophy for Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 224). As is the case with Hellenistic philosophy in general, the source of popular Hellenistic moral philosophy should be sought in the classical period, for which, see K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

136. Teresa Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–2. Morgan studies popular morality by tracing proverbs, fables, gnōmai, exempla, and more general patterns through the surviving literature in order to produce a “map” of the “ethical landscape” thus inscribed (p. 13).

137. See the examples cited in Johan C. Thom, “Popular Philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman World,” EC 3.3 (2012): 279–95. So, too, Stanley Stowers: “Placing Paul in the first century intellectual context means that we need to expand the idea of popular philosophy to include widespread ideas about the physical makeup of the cosmos. The focus only on ethics and practical philosophy is too narrow” (“Paul and the Terrain of Philosophy,” EC 6 (2015): 156).

138. According to Blumenfeld, “The term ‘popular philosophy’ covers a Hellenistic phenomenon that is ambiguous as it is widespread” (Political Paul, 18).

the well-described itinerant philosophers,\textsuperscript{140} one might also be exposed to philosophical ideas in a city's public library,\textsuperscript{141} theatre, or through discussion and debate in the stoa where various oral manifestations of popular moral philosophy would have circulated through proverbs, fables, and gnomai.\textsuperscript{142} Statues, inscriptions, coins, and sarcophagi provided further avenues through which ideas might be spread visually.\textsuperscript{143} Even if technical philosophical and other literary texts would have stretched the intellectual ability of the average person, the ideas contained therein might have circulated in less technical texts\textsuperscript{144} or been mediated through interaction with the educated élite.\textsuperscript{145}

While Paul's direct knowledge of philosophical texts and ideas cannot be denied out of hand, such knowledge it is not a necessary postulate for the thesis being argued. The philosophical knowledge on display in Paul's letters is understood as an instance of Graeco-Roman popular philosophy as it would have been found in the intellectual ecology of his day. A comparison of Paul's thought about ideal kingship as it appears in his letters with the ideal kingship \textit{topos} found in other Greek texts is thus viable without the assumption of Paul's dependence on or direct knowledge of philosophical texts.

\textsuperscript{140} Blumenfeld views Paul's knowledge of philosophical ideas as coming "mostly from general school instruction and by listening to the orators who traveled around lecturing" (\textit{Political Paul}, 18). Blumenfeld's broad use of "orator" in this quotation is preferable to the hard distinction he makes between "popular philosopher" and "sophist" (p. 20). The case of Dio Chrysostom shows that these two categories could overlap and that the distinction was frequently used as part of the process of identity formation. As Tim Whitmarsh observes with regard to Dio, "'Philosopher' is not an absolute but a differential category" (\textit{Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 159); see also Glen Warren Bowersock, \textit{Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 11–14; Judge, "Scholastic Community," 540. For the argument that Paul exploits the ancient distinction made between rhetoric and philosophy, see Edgar Krentz, "Logos or Sophia: The Pauline Use of the Ancient Dispute Between Rhetoric and Philosophy," in \textit{Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe}, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas Olbricht H., and L. Michael White (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 277–90.

\textsuperscript{141} Matthew Nicholls ("Roman Libraries as Public Buildings in the Cities of the Empire," in \textit{Ancient Libraries}, ed. Jason König, Katerina Oikonomopoulou, and Greg Woolf [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 261–76) argues that public libraries in the Roman Empire were not meant for a small number of élite readers, but that they were intended for a broad audience.

\textsuperscript{142} See Morgan, \textit{Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire}, 23–121.

\textsuperscript{143} Paul Zanker, for example, notes how imperial imagery was used "to convey a range of civic virtues and values" (\textit{The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus}, trans. Alan Shapiro, Jerome Lectures 16 [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988], 336). This was one way in which ideas "trickled down" to the masses to become part of everyday discourse. The presence of popular morality in inscriptions and papyri remains is discussed by Morgan (\textit{Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire}, 300–321).

\textsuperscript{144} Thom suggests three examples of texts which contain this sort of popular philosophy: the Pythagorean \textit{Golden Verses}, Cleanthes' \textit{Hymn to Zeus}, and Pseudo-Aristotle's \textit{On the Cosmos} ("Popular Philosophy").

\textsuperscript{145} As Gerald Downing puts it: "Stories, ideas, attitudes moved down" ("\textit{A Bas les Aristos}: The Relevance of Higher Literature for the Understanding of the Earliest Christian Writings," \textit{NovT} 30.3 [1988]: 216). Morgan argues that it is quite likely that popular morality bubbles up: "High philosophy begins, at least, by depending on popular ideas, and when ideas appear in popular ethical texts which could come from either tradition, it is rarely safe to assume that they originated in high philosophy" (\textit{Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire}, 274–99, here 299). She also points out that a similar element (an anecdote or proverb, for example) does not necessarily mean the same for the common person as it does for the educated élite.
Outline of the Study

Whether or not Paul drew upon the Hellenistic kingship topos and, if he did, to what extent and in what way, will occupy the penultimate chapter of this study. In order to make the comparisons that will answer those questions, it is important to describe ideal kingship as it is found in a number of different texts in order to circumscribe this topos within the cultural repertoire of a first-century Mediterranean thinker. It is this project which will be undertaken in Chapters 2–5.

It is true, as Haake observes, that no περὶ βασιλείας treatise before Aristotle’s is known to us. Nevertheless, my concern is not primarily with the genre or the title but with the topos reflected in the genre. In Chapter 2, I thus examine two important classical antecedents for the Hellenistic monarchical writings: Isocrates’ To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. The former is studied because it stands at the head of the Fürstenspiegel tradition. Writing about Isocrates’ speeches, Nino Luraghi, for example, observes that “their outline of kingly virtues was to be enormously influential in Greek political culture and beyond.” The Cyropaedia enjoys prominence not only in Xenophon’s oeuvre and in the fourth-century, but also in the history of western political thought. More often than not, Xenophon’s picture of Cyrus the Great is also cast as a precursor to the Fürstenspiegel genre. James Tatum identifies it as “the most influential of all mirrors for princes.”

In Chapter 3, I attempt to reconstruct the outlines of the περὶ βασιλείας treatises as they might have been produced by Hellenistic philosophical schools. While the Pythagorean texts mentioned above, namely, the περὶ βασιλείας treatises attributed to Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and Sthenidas, provide a well-defined object of study, the dearth of Hellenistic literature will force us to follow a slightly

146. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 168 n. 15.
147. Of course, Haake recognizes that the περὶ βασιλείας topos did not develop ex nihilo; see “Writing Down the King,” 168–73.
149. “One-Man Government,” 141; see also de Blois, “Traditional Virtues and New Qualities”; Sidebottom, “Dio Chrysostom”.
different methodological path with regard to the Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean material available to us. Without access to texts which have monarchical rule as their centre of gravity or focus, we shall be obliged to examine the general philosophical traditions for their discourse on ideal kingship.\textsuperscript{153}

Since the corpus of literature from which Paul quotes most extensively is the Jewish Scriptures in Greek translation, it is important to examine the ideal king in this literature to establish the nature of Jewish kingship language that would have been available to Paul. Chapter 4 thus examines kingship texts found in the Septuagintal books quoted or alluded to most often by Paul: Deuteronomy, the Psalms, and Isaiah. Since Paul recognizes Jesus as standing in the Davidic royal line, key passages in Samuel–Kings are also examined for their contribution to Jewish kingship ideology.

Chapter 5 examines the Wisdom of Solomon, Philo of Alexandria’s \textit{Life of Moses}, and the Letter of Aristeas, three Hellenistic Jewish texts frequently identified as having used Hellenistic kingship ideals. These provide three examples of the synthesis of Jewish scriptural and Hellenistic thought on kingship, thus providing a further point of comparison for the following chapter in which I examine Paul, another Hellenistic Jewish writer, for evidence of the Hellenistic \textit{περὶ βασιλείας topos}.

The penultimate chapter discusses Paul’s writings with an eye on the kingship \textit{topos} developed in the four chapters which precede it. This discussion would ideally situate the elements of the \textit{topos} within the respective letters in which they occur while discussing their function within those texts. This procedure would add substantially to the length of this dissertation and so I am forced to examine the various elements synthetically.

A brief concluding summary of the dissertation is provided in Chapter 7.

By the end of this dissertation I hope to have demonstrated the utility of employing a Graeco-Roman \textit{topos} in the study of Paul. Chapters 2 and 3 establish the shape this \textit{topos} takes and also demonstrate the necessity of working with comparative material in its own context before turning to the New Testament. Chapters 4 summarizes foundational Jewish ideas, thus providing a third point of comparison.\textsuperscript{154} Chapter 5 provides three examples of what a Hellenistic-Jewish synthesis of kingship ideals might look like. These examples prepare us for the writings of another Hellenistic Jew, Saul of Tarsus, and his use of this material to write to groups of believers about the Jewish Messiah.

Johann Jacob Wettstein writes the following about the interpretation of the New Testament:

\begin{quote}
If you wish to get a thorough and complete understanding of the books of the New Testament, put yourself in the place of those to whom they were first delivered by the apostles as a legacy. Transfer yourself in thought to that time and that area where they were first read. Endeavor, so far as possible, to acquaint yourself with the customs, practices, habits, opinions, accepted ways of thought, proverbs, symbolic language, and everyday expressions of these men, and with the ways and means by which they attempted to persuade others or to furnish a foundation.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} In examining ideas of kingship in these schools, I include four out of the six groups Malherbe considers important to study in relation to the New Testament (“Introduction,” 5). Peripatetic and Platonic constructions are set aside because they have been extensively studied (see, e.g., Atack, “Debating Kingship”; Blumenfeld, \textit{Political Paul}, 36–94).

\textsuperscript{154} On this, see Smith, \textit{Drudgery Divine}, 33, 99, although Smith’s examples are of a “generic” third point with which two specific cases can be compared. In my case, it is necessary to have the Jewish scriptural material in view lest ideas common to the LXX and Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman material be ascribed solely to Paul’s use of the Hellenistic kingship \textit{topos}. In one sense, the common elements in these two bodies of texts approximate Smith’s “generic” third point of comparison.
for faith. Above all, keep in mind, when you turn to a passage, that you can make no progress by means of any modern system, whether of theology or logic, or by means of opinions current today.\footnote{155 Wettstein, \textit{Η ΚΑΙΝΗ ∆ΙΑΘΗΚΗ}, 2.878; translated and quoted by White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum,” 16.}

This dissertation hopes to demonstrate the utility of reading Paul’s Christology alongside the “opinions, accepted ways of though, proverbs, symbolic language, and everyday expressions” as they pertain to ideal kingship.
CHAPTER 2. IDEAL KINGSHIP IN FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENS

Hellenistic political philosophy is rooted in the turbulence of fourth-century Athens. The democratic polis furnished both its supporters and its critics with the milieu as well as the material for developing and articulating a philosophical discourse that would be taken up by those who inhabited the world created by Alexander’s military successes and his successors. As will become evident in Chapter 3, Hellenistic constructions of ideal kingship drew heavily on their classical antecedents. In fact, when one examines this topos carefully, it becomes clear that the continuities between these two periods are far more significant than the discontinuities. Two Greek thinkers who produced significant texts on ideal rulers are examined in this chapter: Isocrates and Xenophon.

Isocrates

Although his contribution to the intellectual pursuits of fourth-century Greece are frequently overshadowed by those of his contemporaries, Isocrates’ writings were admired, studied, and emulated by thinkers in the classical, Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman periods. In his survey of oratory, Cicero pauses to exclaim:

Then behold! there arose Isocrates, the Master of all rhetoricians, from whose school, as from the Horse of Troy, none but leaders (principes) emerged, but some of them sought glory in ceremonial, others in action. (De oratore 2.22.94)

It is a text addressed to one of these principes that we will examine in this section in order to understand something about Isocrates’ conception of monarchy.

Towards the middle of his life, Isocrates composed a series of texts that have become known as the “Cyprian orations”—Evagoras, To Nicocles, and Nicocles or the Cyprians—because of their link to Evagoras (c. 435–374/3), king of Salamis, and his son and successor, Nicocles. All three texts

1. An Atheno-centric approach is inevitable for two related reasons. First, the majority of sources that have been preserved come from Athens. Second, most of the thinkers examined in this chapter and the next were based in Athens or linked very closely to Athens, even though they came from throughout the Mediterranean world.

2. I am assuming that Isocrates can be credited with some level of political thought, even if this is not a carefully articulated political philosophy. Isocrates’ reputation as a teacher of rhetoric (as displayed in the preceding quotation from Cicero) and the influence his opponents have had on the western philosophical tradition have meant that the philosophical side of Isocrates’ thought has been neglected. For recent works in which this neglect is corrected, see, e.g. Tarik Wareh, The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers, HellSt 54 (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2012); James Henderson Collins II, Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

3. For the connection between these three texts see, e.g., Edward S. Forster, Isocrates: Cyprian Orations: Evagoras, Ad Nicoclem, Nicocles Aut Cyprii (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), 16–21. A fourth text, To Demonicus, is possibly related to this group, if it is true that Hipponicus, Demonicus’ father and a friend of Isocrates’, was a Cyprian (Geogre Norlin, Isocrates: Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library 209 [Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1928], 2; Richard C. Jebb, The Attic Orators: From Antiphon to Isaeus, 2 ed. 2 vols. [1876; repr., London: New York: Macmillan, 1893], 2.80 ). Jebb writes that Demonicus’ father must have been well known (Demon. 11) but that this was not a royal family (Demon. 36).

Evagoras died in 374/3 BCE and it is likely that To Nicocles was written soon after. Assuming that the other works were produced at more or less the same time, the “Cyprian orations” should be placed in a period from the late 370s to the mid-360s (Norlin, Isocrates 1, 2–3, 38–39, 74–75; Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.80–89; Christoph Eucken, Isokrates: Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und
present monarchy in a positive light and would therefore appear to be at odds with the democratic sentiments of Athens. These texts, together with his letters to Macedonians Philip II and the young Alexander III, have led some to view Isocrates as “the specious adulator of personal rulers.” In a slightly kinder tone, David Konstan speaks of “Isocrates’ ambidextrous relationship with both democracies and monarchies.” But Isocrates’ ambivalent response to Athenian democracy is not unique and neither is his “ambidextrous relationship” to monarchy. Isocrates is one of the educated elite of classical Athens who register their dissent to the politics of the day through oratory and written texts. Isocrates’ kingship writings exhibit the tensions that arise from expressing pro-monarchical ideas within a democratic milieu. When seen within the context of his larger body of work, however, these kingship texts seem less eccentric.

Harvey Yunis identifies Isocrates’ writings as part of the phenomenon of emerging “literary rhetoric.” Written texts (as opposed to speeches delivered in front of an assembly) allowed the writer to address political topics to audiences beyond those found in traditional Athenian political and judicial contexts. These written texts, whether letters addressed to monarchs or philosophical treatises about the nature of kingship, allowed Isocrates to explore the complexities of monarchy in a way that was not possible through public speeches. The tension between democracy and monarchy, as expressed in Isocrates’ works, reflects the broader tension between the democratic ideals of his time and the realities of the political landscape of classical Greece. Isocrates’ approach to this tension is characterized by his “ambidextrous relationship” with both democracies and monarchies, a balance that allowed him to criticize Athenian democracy while also acknowledging the validity of monarchical rule.

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Geschichte 19 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 213–15. Evagoras might come from a later date since Isocrates identifies himself as “past his prime” (Evag. 73), so LaRue van Hook, Isocrates: Volume 3, LCL 373 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 2–3; see also Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.103–4.

4. George Law Cawkwell, “Isocrates,” OCD: 769. This is not Cawkwell’s own characterisation of Isocrates but his description of how some view Isocrates; he notes that others treat Isocrates as “the prophet of the Hellenistic world” (769).


8. With regard to “kingship texts,” Isocrates produced both (1) letters addressed to monarchs on the question of sole rule and (2) philosophical texts about monarchy; for this taxonomy in Hellenistic texts, see Matthias Haake, “Writing Down the King: The Communicative Function of Treatises On Kingship in the Hellenistic Period,” in The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, ed. Nino Luraghi, STAM I (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 169–70. According to Haake, the texts in (2) can be further subdivided into (A) those texts that discuss kingship in the context of constitutional debates and (B) those that present the concept of the good ruler directly (“Writing Down the King,” 173). The writings we are concerned with fall largely into the latter group, although Nicoles does contain an argument for monarchy that would not be out of place (even if not very convincing) within a larger discussion of the best polity.

institutions. Despite his avoidance of active political life, Isocrates’ texts constitute a form of political discourse that he means to be of use within Greek society. In one of his later orations, Isocrates claims that he dedicated himself “to giving advice on the true interests of Athens and of the rest of the Hellenes” (Panath. 2). In doing so, he states that he deliberately chose to avoid writing about myths, “marvels and fictions,” and Greek history. He reminds his readers of the focus of his efforts:

I took refuge in study and work and writing down my thoughts, choosing as my field, not petty matters nor private contracts, nor the things about which the other orators prate, but the affairs of Hellas and of kings and of states (περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων). (Panath. 11; cf. Antid. 79–80)

The logos politikos in which Isocrates engaged was thus closely related to the welfare of Athens and the Greeks as a whole. In addition to matters pertaining to Athens, Isocrates’ Panhellenism was necessarily concerned with those of Greek elites from other cities and the affairs of Macedonian and Cyprian kings. Once this “cosmopolitan aristocratic/panhellenic” point of view is recognized, Isocrates’ thinking and writing about kingship can be seen to fall comfortably within the larger scheme and purpose of his body of work.

In keeping with this study’s methodology of examining texts that focus their attention on theorizing about kingship, especially those that take the form of advice given to kings, I will concentrate on Isocrates’ To Nicocles in the remainder of this section. Although the Evagoras also speaks of a king, it takes the form of a funeral encomium and represents a somewhat different genre to the one on which I am focusing. Nicocles is a speech written by Isocrates addressed to the king’s

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10. Isocrates identifies his “small voice” as the reason for this (Phil. 81; Panath. 9–10; Ep. 8.7), so Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 113–14. Yun Lee Too (The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy, CCS [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 74–112) shows that this was part of Isocrates’ self-presentation through which he resisted oratory as a basis of political authority. Through adopting this persona he both aligned himself with traditional models of political moderation and presented his pedagogy as political service.

11. Too argues that, with the exception of his six judicial orations, Isocrates considered his writings as logoi politikoi (Rhetoric of Identity, 19–35). Despite the range of topics addressed, Livingstone notes how, in addition to a very consistent style, “the speeches also have a distinctive, and consistent, moral and intellectual tone, and a distinctive sense of purpose, which create a strong impression of unity” (“Voice of Isocrates,” 271). This sense of unity justifies the approach in which Isocrates’ works are considered as a whole.

12. At Antid. 45–46 Isocrates lists some of the numerous types of prose discourse—genealogies, studies of the poets, histories of wars, dialogues (περὶ τῶν ἐρωτήσεως καὶ τῶν ὑποκρίσεως)—before stating the focus of his work: matters relating to Hellas, the city/state, and civic assemblies (περὶ ... Ἑλληνικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς καὶ πανηγυρικῶς). For the argument that this final element in the list is indeed the most significant, see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 23–24.


14. Ober, Political Dissent, 255.


16. Isocrates suggests that this is the first prose encomium (Evag. 8–11), written in order that Nicocles might emulate his father (73–77). As James Collins puts it, the Evagoras illustrates how “protreptic lives” can be transformed into “protreptic texts” (Exhortations to Philosophy, 178); see also Charles W. Hedrick Jr., “Imitating Virtue and Avoiding Vice: Ethical Functions of Biography, History, and Philosophy,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Ryan K. Balot, BCAW (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 421–39.
subjects in the king’s voice. In this text we see Isocrates adopt the literary persona of the king to speak about kingship. It would also have been possible to include To Demonicus in this section, but there is no clear evidence that Demonicus enjoyed monarchical rule of any sort. Nevertheless, given the similarity in thought (and form, in the case of Demonicus) between these three texts and To Nicocles, I shall refer to them throughout this section in order to illustrate or clarify elements in the treatise addressed to the young king.

Much of the advice contained in To Nicocles is commonplace. Similar ideas are found throughout Isocrates’ own writings and, indeed, in other texts from that period. In this discussion I am not attempting to be exhaustive in my description of Isocrates’ advice to the young king. Neither am I attempting to describe every aspect of Isocrates’ kingship ideology. Instead, my focus is on the way in which kingship elements within this specific text combine to form a matrix of concepts. It is this matrix, consisting both of the concepts and their relationship to one another, which can then be compared to similar matrices identified in other texts.

In the introduction (1–8) and conclusion (40–54), Isocrates offers Nicocles a gift of advice. The advice in the body of the text (9–39) comes in the form of short precepts that seem to lack any logical connection. In Antidosis 68, Isocrates admits that in To Nicocles he had collected separate bits of advice under various rubrics (κατάράκται) instead of writing in a more coherent form as he usually does. Nevertheless, this way of writing, in which one collects the γνῶμαι of poets like Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides, can be profitable for the reader (Ad Nic. 43–44). In excusing the lack of

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17. Demonicus’ father, Hipponicus, lived a distinguished life (Demon. 11), but there is no indication that he was a king. When the subject of governing does come up, Isocrates can speak to Demonicus only of servants and not of subjects (21). Furthermore, Demonicus is encouraged to obey the laws set down by the king and to imitate the king’s life (36). I can find no justification for Collins’ identification of Demonicus as a “young tyrant” (Exhortations to Philosophy, 196–228).

18. As convincingly demonstrated by Collins (Exhortations to Philosophy, 196–228). The authenticity of To Demonicus has been questioned (see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 58 n. 53) but, with Wareh, I consider it “Isocratean enough” (Isocrates and the Philosophers, 42 n. 79) for the purposes of my argument. For an extended defence of the work’s authenticity, see John Edwin Sandys, ed., Isocrates: Ad Demonicum et Panegyricum (1868; repr., London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899), xxxi-xl. For a discussion of the identity of Isocrates’ opponents in Demon, 3–5 and how this might affect one’s view of the text’s authenticity, see Diana Marie Swancutt, “Paraenesis in Light of Protrepsis: Troubling the Typical Dichotomy,” in Early Christian Paraenesis in Context, ed. James Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 141–42 n. 60.

19. Carol Atack rightly identifies the Cyprian discourses as “central to the understanding of Isocrates’ political thought, and to his stress on the moral and practical qualities of the leading individual” (“Debating Kingship: Models of Monarchy in Fifth- and Fourth-Century BCE Greek Political Thought” [Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 2014], 158). It is precisely these qualities that I am arguing form Isocrates’ concept of the ideal king.

20. In his study of the Antidosis and Areopagiticus, Ober shows that Isocrates’ writing consists of much that is conventional and is thus broadly representative of the intellectual climate of fourth-century Athenian elites (Political Dissent, 248–49, 286).

21. Baynes (“Isocrates,” 148–49) is quite dismissive of To Nicocles, identifying it as “a collection of gnomic remarks and maxims, many of surprising banality ... presumably primarily intended to illustrate the verbal dexterity of Isocrates” (p. 149). In what follows I hope to show that in Isocrates’ hands the commonplace is not necessarily banal. A more positive view of To Nicocles can be found in Eueken (Isokrates, 216–48) who considers this text to be a response to Plato’s Republic. Eueken’s assessment indicates the philosophical nature of Isocrates’ work. The evidence that connects To Nicocles to the Republic is tenuous and Eueken’s thesis has not won widespread support, but this is not to deny the reciprocal influence that existed between Isocrates and Plato (Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 55–75). For Isocrates’ influence on Aristotle, see David Depew, “The Inscription of Isocrates Into Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 157–85.
originality in his address to Nicocles, Isocrates states that novelty is not something to be desired. On the contrary,

we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form. (41)

In the treatise addressed to Nicocles, Isocrates has chosen to present the young king with a collection of maxims, most of them containing commonplace ideas, in order to advise him on how to live and rule well.22 A number of scholars have thus classified To Nicocles broadly as hortatory literature.23

Although the most reliable manuscript tradition, represented by G (= Urbinas 111), identifies the text with the superscript ΠΡΟΣ ΝΙΚΟΚΛΕΑ, the remaining manuscripts read προς Νικοκλέα περὶ τοῦ βασιλέαν ἢ περὶ βασιλείας.24 The descriptive subtitle is not likely to be original, yet it shows that at some stage in its transmission, the text was identified as a περὶ βασιλείας treatise. Modern scholarship agrees. In so far as the text takes on the form of sage advice offered to a ruler, Isocrates’ address to Nicocles is considered by Pierre Hadot to be the first Fürstenspiegel.25

While Isocrates did not choose to entitle any of his works περὶ βασιλείας, what we are looking for is a sustained discussion of ideal kingship which will enable us to create the matrix of concepts that constituted the portrait of the ideal king.26 Isocrates’ work To Nicocles proves to be exactly that sort of text.27 As Nino Luraghi observes, “Isokrates’ speeches come closer than any other extant work of fourth-century literature to the medieval genre of the mirror of princes, and their outline of kingly virtues was to be enormously influential in Greek political culture and beyond.”28

22. In his description of Pseudo-Phocylides’ Sentences, Walter T. Wilson observes, “Like any gnomic document, our poem configures itself in relation to a broad fund of traditions expressing the cumulative wisdom of ancient people about the moral life” (The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, CEFIL [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005], 14). There are clear parallels between Wilson’s description of gnomic poetry and Isocrates’ own description of his efforts (Ad Nic. 43–44; see above). The similarity in form between the Cyprian orations and the poets led G. A. Kennedy to describe the former as “a kind of gnomic oratory, reminiscent of the elegiac poets” (The Art of Persuasion in Greece [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963], 190).

23. Jebb identifies To Nicocles, Nicocles, and To Demonicus as Isocrates’ “hortatory letters or essays,” part of his “scholastic works” which are differentiated from his political writings, on the one hand, and forensic speeches, on the other (Attic Orators, 2.78–80). Similarly, Swanutt identifies Isocrates’ writings to Nicocles as “hortatory letters composed of paraenetic advice in good government” (“Paraenesis,” 136). Too provides a summary of the history of attempts to place Isocrates’ work within a specific genre (Rhetoric of Identity, 13–19).


26. Haake (“Writing Down the King,” 166–67) avoids reading the Hellenistic περὶ βασιλείας treatises in terms of the medieval speculum principis genre or Fürstenspiegel so as to avoid blurring the differences between these texts. In this study I am not so much concerned with the περὶ βασιλείας genre as with the topoι that contribute to that genre.

27. Haake (“Writing Down the King,” 168) credits Aristotle with originating the genre of On Kingship. The narrow focus of this excellent study allows for careful examination of the genre, but will exclude by definition texts which have the same form and content but lack this title.

In Isocrates’ own words, he is attempting “to seek a field that has been neglected by others and lay down principles for [monarchies] (νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις)” (Ad Nic. 8). The neglect in this field is perhaps not as total as Isocrates would have his reader believe. Hesiod’s Works and Days and Theogony provide a model of the ideal ruler in the person of Zeus and also contain passages which might be construed as instruction to rulers. And Pindar’s epinicians to Hieron (Olympian 1, Pythian 1–3) serve to construct “a model of virtuous kingship” for the Sicilian ruler. Nonetheless, Isocrates’ innovation was to address his text directly to the ruler in question, an approach made slightly easier, no doubt, by the fact that the ruler had once been a pupil of his. In a later reflection on this work he claims he was “advising (συμβουλέων) [the king] how to rule his subjects” (Antid. 67, my translation). Taking Isocrates’ own description of his work seriously, we can safely follow Hadot in placing To Nicocles at the start of the long line of mirror-for-princes treatises.

As mentioned above, the body of the treatise consists primarily of short, pithy sayings, not dissimilar to various types of gnomic literature. Walter Wilson has shown that gnomic texts of this sort were often structured around the cardinal virtues. Plato’s enumeration of the four virtues in Book 4 of his Republic—σοφία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία—is probably the best-known example, although numerous other examples exist. It would seem that Isocrates does not work with a consistent set of four cardinal virtues. A number of passages contain various three-virtue combinations: at Nicocles 44, for example, he mentions δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια and at Panathenaicus 197, καρτέρια, σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία are listed. And there are one or two points at which four virtues are mentioned, but these differ from the Platonic cardinal virtues. We are somewhat closer to the Platonic list at Evagoras 22–23 where the king is said to have added courage, wisdom, and justice to the beauty, strength, and moderation he exhibited as a boy. These passages indicate that Isocrates

31. Evag. 78; Antid. 30; cf. 40, 93–94; see Norlin, Isocrates I, 39; Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.83.
32. For a survey of chreiae, gnomic poetry, gnomologia, and wisdom instruction, see Walter T. Wilson, The Mysteries of Righteousness: The Literary Composition and Genre of the Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, TSAJ 40 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994), 14–41.
34. See also Evag. 23 (ἀνδρία, σοφία, δικαιοσύνη), Demot. 15 (ἀισχύνη, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη), De pace 63 (σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη), Antid. 111 (οἰκονομία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη) speaking of Pericles, Ep. 9.4 (ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, φρόνιμος).
35. Four virtues are mentioned at Nic. 43 (δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, δεινότητα), but this is in order to emphasise the significance of the first two which are the sole property of the good and noble, while the second two are shared with the base. Nonetheless, if δεινότητα is understood as “cleverness” (so Norlin [LCL] and Too [in Mirhady and Too, Isocrates I, 178]) and thus related to σοφία, we are left with a series of four virtues similar to those of Plato.
36. Helen F. North (Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 35 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966], 147) observes that this is one of the few examples of the rhetorical use
often spoke of virtues in groups of three, sometimes four, especially when describing an ideal character such as Evagoras or Theseus. Furthermore, there is evidence that Isocrates adopts a hierarchy of virtues. He can speak, for example, of piety, moderation, justice, and the rest of virtue (Peace 63), or of courage, wisdom, piety, moderation, and the rest of virtue (Helen 31). Even though these sets of three or four virtues show some variability, some virtues are more significant than others in Isocrates’ thought. It is not improbable, then, that he would use these primary virtues as a method of structuring his system of thought. Indeed, Helen North states that “this very device of converting the canon of cardinal virtues into a framework to support the biographical approach to history” was one of the enduring legacies of the rhetorical schools. The thesis that just such a framework of virtues serves to structure the treatise To Nicocles will now be presented.

In a discussion of gnomic literature, Walter Wilson argues that the canon of four cardinal virtues acts as an organizational device in To Nicocles. It is important to remember, however, that this is not a treatise concerning these four virtues. The virtues are not always named and neither are they expounded systematically. Rather, they form a framework for Isocrates’ maxims—they are perhaps the unnamed κεφαλαία of which he speaks in Antidosis 68—and he used this framework, presumably, because he expected his reader to be familiar with the cardinal virtues.

In the analysis that follows, I adopt the macro-structure of Wilson’s outline of To Nicocles that looks as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–8</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–39</td>
<td>Maxims relating to kingship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–14</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–29a</td>
<td>Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>29b–35a</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
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<tr>
<td>35b–39</td>
<td>Courage</td>
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<tr>
<td>40–54</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
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It is axiomatic for Isocrates that monarchical rule belongs to one who is superior (Antid. 71–72). This idea will prove to be foundational for Hellenistic thinking about kingship. At this point, if we allow it of the four-fold canon of cardinal virtues. The absence of piety is striking, although it occurs elsewhere; see esp. Helen 31 where Theseus is described as acting with courage, wisdom, piety, and moderation. For piety and justice as the primary virtues to be exercised in relationship towards the gods and humanity, see, e.g., Peace 33; Nic. 2.

37. For the hierarchy of Isocratean virtues, see North, Sophrosyne, 144.
38. Most MSS include και τη δικαιοσύνην at this point, which Γ and Ε omit. In light of Isocrates’ discussion in Peace 31–35, it seems prudent to follow the majority at this point, even though Γ is generally considered to contain the most reliable textual tradition (see George Nolin, “General Introduction,” in Isocrates: Volume I; trans. George Nolin, LCL 209 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928], xlvi–xlviii).
41. Wilson, Mysteries of Righteousness, 49–51. Wilson extends the introduction to include §9, but it seems that §9 starts the body of the text with a summary statement of its purpose: to “consider what is the function of kings” (τι τῶν βασιλεύων ἐστιν λόγον); so Eucken, Isokrates, 225.
42. Wilson, Mysteries of Righteousness, 50.
43. I have modified Wilson’s structure slightly at this point. He has the “Introduction” extending from §§1–9 whereas I consider §9 to be part of the body of the text (see below).
as a thesis, it becomes clear why Isocrates might find it appropriate to structure his treatise on the good king around this set of cardinal virtues which serve to define the nature of the superior person.

Allowing for some of the modifications mentioned above, Werner Jaeger’s mid-twentieth-century assessment of the treatise still rings true: Isocrates provides the reader with an “educational treatise for princes” which, although unsystematic at first glance, is not “only a list of practical tricks” but “a portrait of the ideal ruler—a portrait whose unity lies in its ethical consistency, and thereby is completely typical of the spirit of the new era.”

It is to this portrait that we now turn.

**Introduction (1–8) and Conclusion (40–54)**

The opening line of the treatise identifies its recipient as Nicocles, one of those who lead kingdoms (Ad Nic. 1). The text is silent about any other historical matters pertaining to Nicocles and his rule; it could quite easily have been addressed to any number of monarchs. Furthermore, recognizing Nicocles as the primary recipient of this text does not mean we need to deny the possibility that Isocrates had other audiences in view. We may note, for example, that at Nicocles 11, Isocrates, adopting the literary persona of the king, assumes that the Cyprians have “heard” him speak on how a ruler should act. It is presumably the treatise addressed to Nicocles that is in view at this point. Isocrates’ Antidosis provides an even clearer example of the fact that Isocrates expected his text to have multiple readers. Before quoting from To Nicocles, Isocrates explains:

> But my reason for writing upon this subject was that I thought my advice would be the best means of aiding his [sc. the king’s] understanding and at the same time the readiest means of publishing my own principles (τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἔμαυτον). (Antid. 69)

Isocrates hopes that the principles he had made clear to those who read the earlier treatise would also serve him in his present defence. He mentions his honesty and frank speech, his support of the king’s subjects, and his advice to the king regarding his wisdom and understanding (Antid. 70–71). For our purposes we can ignore the audiences of the Antidosis and concentrate on those for whom Isocrates produced To Nicocles. Anyone reading the text would be in the same position as the young king to

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45. The influence that Isocrates has had on the Western tradition is clearly demonstrated by the way in which Machiavelli’s dedication in *The Prince* echoes Isocrates’ opening paragraphs (Wareh, *Isocrates and the Philosophers*, 199–200).

46. This is true for the Cyprian Orations in general (Eucken, *Isokrates*, 213). Isocrates claims, however, that Nicocles is the first monarch to pursue a proper philosophical education (Evag. 78).

47. James Collins shows how Isocrates’ texts “employ advanced literary strategies to speak simultaneously to multiple audiences” (*Exhortations to Philosophy*, 196).

48. If further examples are sought, we might note that at Phil. 12 Isocrates indicates that his discourse is aimed at the king as well as Isocrates’ pupils. The conclusion (Phil. 155) also addresses an audience in the plural (ὑμῶν τῶν ἀκούοντων).

49. On the double audience—mass and elite—of the Antidosis, see Ober, *Political Dissent*, 257–60. Kathryn A. Morgan (“The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates,” in *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, ed. Kathryn A. Morgan [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003], 184–86) observes that in the Antidosis the Athenian demos is also an audience for To Nicocles. She argues that Isocrates uses his past writings to cast those in the audience who disagree with him in the role of tyrants. The *Panathenaicus* also contains a reinterpretation of Isocrates’ speech by his Spartan pupil (235–263) highlighting the way in which its ambiguity allows different audiences to interpret it differently (Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 276).
benefit from the education provided by Isocrates. Anything imparted to the king would be imparted to them. As argued above, To Nicocles should be understood not only as a contribution to the peri basileias genre, but also, more broadly, as a fourth-century philosophical protrepsis in which Isocrates puts forward his educational programme.\textsuperscript{50}

The elements of protreptic are found largely (but not exclusively) in the text’s “frame”—its introduction and conclusion.\textsuperscript{51} We will examine these sections before proceeding to the body of the treatise.

In the introduction and conclusion, Isocrates couches his advice in the language of gift-giving. Others give clothing or bronze or gold in the expectation that they will receive something of equal or greater value in return, thus turning the encounter into commerce (iμπορία; 1). Isocrates, in contrast, engages in real giving by offering what is the finest and most useful and fitting gift, that he might give and the king might receive advice about how the king might govern for the sake of his polis and kingdom (1–2; cf. 54). On the basis of his reconstruction of Isocrates’ relationship with the general Timotheus (Antid. 101–139), Niall Livingstone argues that this passages is indicative of the reciprocal relationship that existed between Isocrates and Nicocles, a mutually beneficial relationship marked by exchange.\textsuperscript{52} But if Nicocles is given this gift of advice (education), what can Isocrates expect in return? Perhaps the reputation of teaching princes and kings,\textsuperscript{53} and the glory of involvement with the political process, albeit in an indirect manner.

The value of Isocrates’ gift is further increased by the fact that it is rare. While private individuals have many opportunities to be educated in the way they should live, kings, generally speaking, do not enjoy the same advice from those around them (2–4).\textsuperscript{54} The result is that, despite honours and wealth and power, kings end up in unenviable positions, having to make impossible decisions and living in fear and danger (4–6). Isocrates implies that these difficulties arise because kingship has been approached without the recognition that “it is the most important of human functions and demands the greatest wisdom (πλειστης προνοιας)” (6). To this end, Isocrates advises the king on “the objects at which he should aim and the pursuits to which he should devote himself” (6). This advice does not usurp the practical, day-to-day advice that a king should receive from those around him, but rather provides the king with a broader framework within which he should consider his conduct. Isocrates’ advice is that which will persuade him to live virtuously (επ’ ἀρετῇ προτρέψεως; 8).

In the conclusion of this treatise, Isocrates returns to discuss the way in which he has sought to persuade his reader. He does not peddle novelties, but presents the king with conventional advice:

\textsuperscript{50} Ad Nicocles and Demonicus were part of Isocrates’ attempt, within the marketplace of philosophical ideas, to “circumscribe the competition” and present his own educational/philosophical agenda (Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 206–19).
\textsuperscript{51} Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 197–206.
\textsuperscript{53} The “accusation” at Antid. 30—that Isocrates educated generals, kings, and tyrants—enhances his pre-eminence as a teacher; cf. Antid. 93–95.
\textsuperscript{54} The teacher and advisor, necessarily the person with the best understanding of what they’re passing on (Panath. 235), is in a similar position to the king (cf. Evag. 44) (Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 266–68).
We should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form. (41)

The commonplace nature of Isocrates’ advice leads David Konstan to note wryly, “None of this is so profound as to make one wish passionately that one had been a classmate of Nicocles while he was attending Isocrates’ school in Athens, in the way one would give a fortune to have sat in on Plato’s lectures in the Academy.”55 Isocrates is aware of the shortcomings of this mode of exhortation, but he argues that most people have tended to concern themselves with what brings pleasure rather than with what is useful (42–49). But the king is not like other people and, unlike the masses, it is this criterion of utility that he should employ when seeking advice (50).56

Isocrates’ conclusion contributes to his attempt to persuade the king to adopt the advice in this treatise. He suggests two main groups that claim to discipline the soul through teaching philosophy: the one through eristic and the other through political discourse (οἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; 51). Although Isocrates identifies himself with the latter,57 a teacher’s worth, he claims, will be seen in whether the student is able to deliberate successfully on matters, in other words, whether the teaching is useful in real-life activities. Isocrates has confidence in the ability of his own educational programme to produce such a student and these closing paragraphs mean to exhort the reader to follow this programme. Having offered the king counsel on that of which he is knowledgeable (54), Isocrates fits his own description of “the good counsellor [who] is the most useful and the most princely of all possessions” (53).

In the frame of the treatise we see Isocrates encouraging the reader to adopt the advice given in the body of the text. The advisor he describes matches the description of Isocrates himself, and the benefits available to the one adopting this advice correspond to those derived by Isocrates’ pupils. The treatise To Nicocles thus serves as both an exhortation to, and an instance of, Isocrates’ educational programme.58

Wisdom (9–14)

The opening passage, §9, sets out to define Isocrates’ main topic: the proper function of a king (τι τῶν βασιλευόντων ἐργὸν ἑστιν). A careful definition will allow him to correctly handle the parts that make up his discourse. The king’s duties are defined as follows: to relieve the state when it is in distress, to maintain it in prosperity, and to make it great when it is small. All royals activities, then,

56. See, e.g., Panath. 1–2 for the same contrast between pleasure and utility. In making this distinction, Isocrates does not deny that a text can be useful in addition to bringing pleasure. He notes that those who would reach the masses will necessarily need to employ this combination of pleasure and utility, as Homer did (Ad Nic. 48–49). See Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 30–33, for further discussion of the pleasure/utility distinction.
57. Isocrates seems somewhat positive without being effusive in his praise towards eristic teaching when it is part of a larger programme of education (e.g. Panath. 26 and Antid. 261), but see Helen 1 for the observation that these sorts of disputations are not only useless but can even be harmful. For the argument that Isocrates meant for all of his writings to fall within the genre of logos politikos, see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 19–35.
would have the good of the state as their goal. Isocrates’ monarchy is no different from other constitutions in this regard.\footnote{Eucken, Isocrates, 225; Jaeger, Paideia III, 93.}

In the first major section of the treatise, the focus is on the king’s intellect and on the virtues related to the mind. If kings are to act for the good of their state, then it is necessary that they must be superior in intelligence (φρονιμωτερον) and must prepare their minds (τὰς ἐαυτῶν γνώμας παρασκευάσωσιν) for the task (10). As much as it is true that the king surpasses others in virtue (11),\footnote{Cf. Nic. 15: “Monarchies ... make the highest award to the best man (τῷ βέλτιστῷ).”} Isocrates makes the noetic superiority of the king explicit at §14, thus indicating its significance within his understanding of kingship.

In Isocrates’ writings, to be “high-souled” (μεγαλόψυχος) is to think the thoughts of an immortal (Demon. 32; cf. Evag. 3, 27). The development of the king’s soul is an important topic. In §11 Isocrates encourages the king to train his soul (ψυχῆ) even more than an athlete would his body.\footnote{61. The maxims contained in the treatise are given to this end since, as he states elsewhere, “[just] as it is the nature of the body to be developed by appropriate exercises, [so] it is the nature of the soul to be developed by moral precepts (τοῖς σπουδάσοις λόγοις)” (Demon. 12; cf. Paneg. 1–2). Nicoles is urged to listen to poets and learn from sages as he prepares himself to rule;\footnote{62. These intellectual pursuits are, again, referred to in athletic terms as γύμνασας “training” (13). The strongest challenge to self-improvement will necessarily come from the king himself as he trains his understanding (τὴν αὐτὸν διάνοιαν ἀσκήσεις; 14), yet another phrase that draws on the semantic field of athletic endeavour.} Nicocles is urged to add to them what is best (νησις) see Michael Davis, The Soul of the Greeks: An Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also Jan N. Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) for an analysis of the soul in Homer, Aristotle, Herodotus, Euripides, and Plato (including caveats about translating the term as “soul”) see Michael Davis, The Soul of the Greeks: An Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also Jan N. Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) for an analysis of the concept in Archaic Greece. André Laks, “Soul, Sensation, and Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 250–70 presents a useful introductory essay that focuses largely on the pre-Socratics.

As much as it is true that the king surpasses others in virtue (11),\footnote{63. Another analogy compares the benefit of philosophical training on the soul with that of medicine upon the body (Bus. 22). See also Democritus 40: “Strive with your body to be a lover of toil, and with your soul to be a lover of wisdom.” The soul/body opposition can be traced back to Homer but its meaning changes together with the meaning of the individual term. Beliefs about transmigration greatly influenced these changes in the sixth and fifth centuries (Laks, “Soul,” 251–52).} Isocrates does not make a precise distinction between ψυχῆ and φρονήσις, and seems to identify soul with mind. Second,
the function of this aspect of a human being is to control the body.\textsuperscript{65} This second point makes it crucial that this aspect of the king’s person be trained in the virtues.

Can Virtue Be Taught? The question must then be asked whether Isocrates thinks that virtue can be taught.\textsuperscript{66} In the \textit{Antidosis} 209–214, Isocrates expresses dismay and astonishment that there are some who think that education and philosophy are not able to improve an individual. These people observe that animals can become more gentle or intelligent through training, yet they deny that human nature, which is far superior, can be improved in this way. Isocrates tells Nicocles that diligence (\textit{ἐπιμέλεια}) is able to make one better and wiser, and drawing again on the analogy of training wild animals, Isocrates argues against those who say that human beings are not able to pursue virtue (\textit{Ad Nic.} 12). Taken at face value, these passages suggest that Isocrates follows the Sophists’ position at this point: that virtue can indeed be taught.\textsuperscript{67} However, he seeks to qualify this basic sophistic tenet.\textsuperscript{68}

While allowing that virtue can be taught, Isocrates argues that the student also needs natural ability and practical experience (\textit{Soph.} 10, 14–15).\textsuperscript{69} Just as an athletic coach is limited by the athlete’s physical ability, so the teacher of philosophy is limited by the student’s nature (\textit{Antid.} 181–185). Someone with great natural ability can succeed even if he or she only receives a mediocre education (\textit{Antid.} 189–190). It is not possible to implant the virtues into those with depraved natures, but an education in Isocratean political discourse (\textit{πολιτικοὶ λόγοι}) can serve to stimulate the student’s development (\textit{Soph.} 21; \textit{Antid.} 274–277). At first glance it might seem that Isocrates is only speaking about oratory and not necessarily virtue. But the description of the \textit{παπαθεσεύνοι} at \textit{Panathenaicus} 30–32 makes it clear that virtue is one of the goals of Isocrates’ educational programme. In order for the student to advance in this programme and to achieve virtue, all three elements—natural ability, practical experience, and education—must be present.\textsuperscript{70} Evagoras is held up as an example of one who, though “gifted by nature with the highest intelligence,” still spent time in inquiry, deliberation, and counsel in order to prepare his mind for rule (\textit{Evag.} 41).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Intoxication can impair the intellect (δουλού) and cause the soul to stumble, as demonstrated by its inability to control the body (\textit{Demon.} 32).
\item \textsuperscript{66} Paul Shorey (“\textit{Φοάς, Μελέτη, Εποσήμη}.” \textit{TAPA} 40 [1909]: 187) observes that the question of whether virtue can be taught forms part of the bigger question about the relationship between φοάς and νόμος. W. K. C. Guthrie, \textit{The Sophists} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) provides a good summary of the origins of these questions: for the φοάς/νόμος, see pp. 55–134; for virtue, see pp. 250–260.
\item \textsuperscript{67} See, e.g., George Briscoe Kerferd, \textit{The Sophistic Movement} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131–38. Guthrie notes that since this claim was tied up with the Sophists’ livelihood, “the suggestion that no teacher could communicate it [virtue] was in Socrates’ day an attack on a large vested interest” (\textit{Sophists}, 257).
\item \textsuperscript{68} It is not necessary to suppose that Isocrates has given any careful thought to this question. He draws on commonplace ideas that are found throughout the literature that precedes him. “Isocrates’ admirable summum of the whole question offered nothing new to any well-informed fourth-century reader” (Shorey, “\textit{Φοάς}.”’ 193).
\item \textsuperscript{69} Cf. Plato, \textit{Phaedr.} 269d. For a discussion of the similarities between Isocrates and Plato on these matters, see Wareh, \textit{Isocrates and the Philosophers}, 58–69, and Shorey, “\textit{Φοάς}.”
\item \textsuperscript{70} Jaeger perceives a shift in emphasis from Isocrates’ position in \textit{Against the Sophists}—dubious about the possibility of teaching virtue—to the exhortation in \textit{To Nicocles} in which Isocrates seems far more positive about training in virtue. Jaeger attributes this shift, not to a fundamental change in Isocrates’ philosophical position, but rather to the change in purpose of the respective texts. He summarizes Isocrates’ position as follows: “Theoretically, he is a pessimist with regard to the philosophical paradox that virtue can be taught. But practically, his will to teach remains unbroken” (\textit{Paideia III}, 95).
\end{itemize}
Similarly, Evagoras’ son, Nicocles, must surround himself with sages and pay careful attention to the teaching of the poets in order that he might improve himself through the education he receives from them (Ad Nic. 12–13). The king should be inspired to pursue the intellectual virtues by remembering that it is “monstrous” for the foolish to rule over those of greater wisdom.71

The “hinge” verse at 15a concludes by stressing the significance of wisdom “for those who set out to do their duty.” But if wisdom is foundational, the length of the following section suggests the centrality of justice in Isocrates’ advice to the young king.

Justice (15–29a)

The lexeme δικαιοσύνη does not appear explicitly in 15–29a, and δίκαιος only occurs four times (17, 18, 20, 24). We might ask, therefore, whether “justice” is an adequate or accurate rubric under which to consider this section.72 The content of this section deals largely with the way in which the king treats and relates to his subjects. That this is indeed central to Isocrates’ notion of justice can be seen from Nicocles 29–47, where Isocrates produces an extended discussion of “the two chief virtues,” σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.73 In the discussion of the latter (Nic. 31–35) the king mentions, among other things, his devotion to advancing the well-being of the state and its citizens (32), the fact that he has never wronged another person (35), and his service to his own citizens and “the Hellenes at large” (35). Justice here is primarily relational and, with regard to the king, consists of dealing fairly with his subjects for the sake of their welfare. The similarities between this conceptualization of justice and the ideas in To Nicocles 15–29a as analyzed in what follows confirm that “justice” is indeed an accurate description of the subject matter of this part of the treatise addressed to the Cyprian monarch.74

The good king must be φιλάνθρωπος and φιλόπολις (Ad Nic. 15b).75 These virtues are perhaps not as altruistic as they might seem at first glance: “all governments ... have the longest life when they best serve the masses” (15–16). Well-disposed friends and the good will (ευνοία) of his subjects will ensure

71. This statement is made as an example of the more general principle that the better should rule over the worse (14). We will examine this doctrine in the context of justice in the following section.


73. There are other examples where δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη occur together in such a way as to indicate that they are indeed the chief virtues or summarize the other virtues; see, e.g., Antid. 84, 274; Panath. 72, 138. Wilson (Mysteries of Righteousness, 44) notes that Isocrates follows popular opinion here in making justice and moderation the most beneficial virtues, in contrast to Plato for whom wisdom was the most important virtue (see Laws 631c). However, Isocrates’ statement in Nicocles does not negate the significance he assigns to wisdom in his advice to kings.

74. When Isocrates seeks to convince his audience that all his writings are intent upon exhorting his readers to virtue and justice (Antid. 67), he quotes To Nicocles 14–39 (cf. Antid. 73), which includes this section on justice. It is clear that δικαιοσύνη was established as a key virtue at an early stage in Greek writing; see E. F. Beall, “Hesiod’s Treatise on Justice: Works and Days 109–380,” CJ 101.2 (2005–6): 161–82.

75. Evagoras was beloved and admired for governing reverently and humanely (θεοφιλων και φιλανθρωπως; Evag. 43).
the king’s safety more than any bodyguard (21).\(^{76}\) The monarch will best establish his authority by convincing his subjects that his concern for their safety (σωτηρία) exceeds their own (24). Isocrates’ discussion of justice shows an interesting combination of *Realpolitik* and real concern for the king’s subjects. On the one hand, there is the recognition that even in a monarchy, the citizens must be kept happy, since a dissatisfied population will inevitably lead to a change of government. On the other hand, the essence of good government is that it must honour those who deserve it and protect all from injustice (16). It is this line of thinking that Isocrates highlights at *Antidosis* 70, where he claims that in the treatise addressed to Nicocles, he is “pleading the cause of [the king’s] subjects, and striving with all my powers to secure for them the mildest (πραοτήτην) government possible.” For Isocrates there is nothing intrinsically unjust about monarchy, as long as φιλανθρωπία characterises the ruler’s dealings with his subjects. The king’s performance of his judicial role provides the clearest example of the combination of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία.

It is not surprising to find the king’s judicial role discussed in a section related to justice. This, after all, is an essential element of the king’s duty within a monarchical government. In order to be δεινος (stern) the good king should not overlook any misdeed (23),\(^ {77}\) yet his authority is not to be established by being harsh or excessive in the punishment he deals out (24). Rather, he should show that he is πραός (gentle, kind) by tempering any punishment he might be called upon to deliver (23). Justice consists not only of punishing those who have transgressed in some or other way, but fundamental to Isocrates’ sense of justice is the necessity of leniency. Strict δικαιοσύνη is thus moderated by φιλανθρωπία. This emphasis should probably be attributed to Isocrates’ teaching about the importance of good will between the king and his subjects.

In Isocrates’ monarchy, the king’s judgment has replaced law. When judging between two parties, impartiality is the most important principle to which the king must adhere (18). The king’s impartiality at this point is compared to “wisely ordained laws” which are described in §17 as being just, beneficial, and consistent, allowing for the speedy resolution of disputes. These laws should, furthermore, encourage industry and discourage frivolous lawsuits (18).\(^ {78}\) The king should adapt and change poor “public ordinances and institutions” according to what he considers best for his subjects, if necessary, imitating what is good in the laws of other countries (17). Whatever their source, with regard to the

\(^{76}\) While Jaqueline de Romilly (“Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will,” *JHS* 78 [1958]: 92–101) is correct that Isocrates usually employs the concept of εὐνοία in the context of foreign affairs, i.e., the relationship between states, it is also an important aspect of the relationship between ruler and ruled. In addition to the passage under discussion; see also *Demon*. 36; *Nic.* 58, 61.

\(^{77}\) Cf. *Evag.* 43 where Evagoras is praised for ruling with strictness (σφόδρα μίν ἀπάντων ἄρχον), and punishing wrongdoers according to the law.

laws, the king’s authority is absolute: “Regard my words as your law” (Nic. 62). Isocrates offers no further exposition in *To Nicocles* of his understanding of law and its relationship to monarchy.

In the discourse addressed to Philip II Isocrates indicates that the king is completely free from the dictates of constitution or laws. Whereas other eminent leaders are necessarily bound by these institutions and unable to act beyond what they prescribe, the king, unhindered by laws or assemblies, is able to act with freedom (*Phil.* 12–15; cf. 127). For this very reason, there is more value in addressing the monarch directly—the very thing Isocrates does in this discourse and in his advice to Nicoles—leaving the ruler to work out the details of the law code suitable to his own state. So absolute is the king’s authority that Isocrates seems to leave little, if any, space for even divine oversight.

*The King and the Gods.* The gods occupy a small role in Isocrates’ writings. There is no indication that he considers the law divine in any sense or that he considers kingship to be an imitation of the divine. The only mention of the gods in *To Nicocles* comes in §20 where the king is urged to adhere to his ancestral practices while at the same time realising that the best sacrifice and greatest worship consists in his being the best and most just man. Similarly, Demonicus is urged to show his piety through both sacrifice but also keeping his vows (*Demon.* 13). Religion is ethical as well as cultic, and so reverence towards the gods and justice towards humanity are the summary characteristics of the good man (*Panath.* 124, 204; *Nic.* 2). In the advice he gives to young rulers, Isocrates does not stray

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79. Similarly, Demonicus is told to obey the laws laid down by kings, but to consider the kings’ way of life (τρόπος) as the greatest law (*Demon.* 36). See below, pp. 51–55, for a discussion of the king as a model.

80. Cf. *Ep.* 1.5 (addressed to Dionysius): “those who wish to bring some serious thing to pass should address the man who is likely most promptly to accomplish in deed that which the word has proposed.”

81. This does not necessarily mean that religion was unimportant in Isocrates’ thought. It could simply indicate that he did not consider religion and the divine significant as part of his educational programme, even if these elements were important in daily life. For a discussion of the centrality of religion and its cult in the *polis*, see Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, “*What is Polis Religion?*” in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, ed. Oswyn Murray and Simon R. F. Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 295–322; Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 118–21; cf. Julia Kindt, *Rethinking Greek Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for an attempt to move beyond traditional models of *polis* religion.

82. At a number of places Isocrates associates piety (σεβασμός) with justice (δικαιοσύνη); see *Antid.* 76, 284; *Plat.* 2. The close link in fourth-century philosophy between justice and piety is discussed at length in Jon D. Mikalson, *Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–207.


84. In the same way, in the *Areopagiticus*, Isocrates argues that a well-ordered community is marked out by proper conduct towards the gods (29–30) and towards one another (31–35), expressed in the same categories of justice observed in *To Nicocles*. 

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far from traditional platitudes: “Fear the gods, honor your parents, respect your friends, obey the laws” (Demon. 16).85

As one moves from considering the king as religious actor to considering the king’s divine nature (or lack thereof), it becomes clear that Isocrates’ conception of kingship lacks the religious and mystical elements that occur in other writers, especially those in the Hellenistic period.86 Isocrates is agnostic as to whether or not human monarchy reflects the divine order, but even if it doesn’t, he claims that the fact that most people assume that Zeus is a king proves the superiority of this form of government (Nic. 26). As will be shown in the following chapter, this parallel between the human and divine king is exploited in a number of περὶ βασιλείας treatises, and frequently around questions of the origin and nature of law. Isocrates, however, shows no such inclination.

One statement, in particular, is frequently cited as evidence for Isocrates’ contribution to the development of the Hellenistic ruler cult.87 In a letter to Philip II, Isocrates states that, should Philip defeat the Persian king, there will be nothing left for him to do except become a god (Ep. 3.5). That Isocrates is indeed attributing divinity to the Macedonian seems unlikely in the light of evidence found elsewhere in his writings. Without wanting to diminish any of Evagoras’ deeds, Isocrates classifies as extravagant and hyperbolic those who speak of rulers as gods among men or mortal divinities (Evag. 72), an attitude he considers characteristic of Persian inferiority (Paneg. 151).88 Isocrates also plays down the significance of “portents, oracles, the visions appearing in dreams” which some claim were associated with Evagoras’ birth (Evag. 21). He gives as his reason for neglecting these accounts the fact that they are known only to a few and that he prefers to speak of those facts that are publicly known.89 In light of §72, however, this statement provides further evidence for Isocrates’ desire to avoid portraying Evagoras’ kingship in divine terms. With Jon Mikalson, then, it is probably best to consider Isocrates’ statement to Philip metaphorically.90


88. The Persian anti-type is also in view at Phil. 124, where the Persians are characterized as effeminate barbarians, unskilled in war and degenerate because of their addiction to luxury.

89. Isocrates traces Evagoras’ lineage back to Zeus via Aeacus (Evag. 12–21; cf. Nic. 42). Rather than demonstrate divinity, this is “to provide his hero with an ethical potential inherited from mythical ancestors” (Tomas Hägg, The Art of Biography in Antiquity [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 35). The genealogical argument may also serve as an argument for the king’s authority (Attack, “Debating Kingship,” 151–52).

90. “Isocrates is, perhaps, not to be taken literally here but as pushing to an extreme a metaphor known since Homer (e.g., II. 24.258–59)” (Mikalson, Hellenistic Athens, 47 n. 2).
In summary, the king is responsible for establishing laws according to which he then exercises judgment, meting out punishment that is, when appropriate, marked by leniency. There is no sense of an external guide or measure according to which these laws should be established. The most important characteristic of these laws, however, is that they exist for and seek to further the good of the king’s subjects. The king’s authority, including that of establishing laws, is based solely on his person.

Government by the Best. The king’s authority in the realm of law, and indeed, everything else, is based on his superiority. William Desmond points out that this definition of the king as “the best,” together with the question it naturally raises—“How is the best defined?”—pervade Homer’s poems.91 In addressing the concerns of Otanes and Megabyzus about monarchical abuses, Herodotus’ Darius responds: “One could describe nothing better than the rule of the one best man (ανδρός ... ἐνός τοῦ ἄριστου); using the best judgment, he will govern the multitude with perfect wisdom” (Hist. 3.82).92 The same emphasis on the superiority and excellence of the king can be found in Isocrates’ kingship writings.

Isocrates encourages Nicocles to remember that it is a terrible thing for the worse to rule the better (τούς χείρους τῶν βελτίων ἄρχειν; Ad Nic. 14). It is of the essence of justice to distinguish between the good and the bad and to treat them differently (Nic. 14). This distinction forms one of the arguments presented in support of monarchy (Nic. 14–15), since it is only in a monarchy that the best person is rewarded with the highest position. This corresponds to the idea of a geometric or proportional distribution of honour and responsibility.93

Absolute monarchy of this sort is open to abuse, however. Without the sanction of any constitution or laws, and in the absence of any divine direction, what is to prevent a king from preying on his subjects?94 Isocrates’ answer is that the character of the superior person will inhibit this sort of behaviour. His nature and personality, rather than institutions and customs, will produce a certain type of ruler and rule. To these intrinsic qualities will be added Isocrates’ paideia which will further enable the monarch to apply the virtues correctly. With regard to justice, for example, love for his subjects and his kingdom (Ad Nic. 15) are crucial since they will circumscribe the best man’s actions towards his subjects.95

92. So, e.g., Aristotle, Pol. 1284b25–34, where someone who excels in virtue (τις γενήται διαφέρων κατ’ ἄρετην) must necessarily rule over all others.
93. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1131a25–30 for his statement of geometric or proportional equality in relation to distributive justice. This is worked out in relation to the distribution of political offices in Book 3 of Aristotle’s Politics. For a survey of justice in Aristotle, see Charles M. Young, “Aristotle’s Justice,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 179–97. Plato, too, is critical of the “indiscriminate equality” that is the hallmark of democracy (Resp. 8.558c). For Isocrates’ comparison of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy in Nicocles, see Kehl, “Monarchie,” 46–51. Kehl argues that Isocrates’ arguments for monarchy are not derived from Herodotus, but should rather be traced back to the Sophists’ discussion of the best constitution (pp. 50–51).
94. This is the concern of both Otanes and Megabyzus with regard to monarchy in Herodotus’ discussion of the best regime (Hist. 3.80–81).
But monarchy is not the only polity that allows the good to exercise leadership; Isocrates recognizes the possibility of other good forms of government. When addressing Athenians, he allows that any of the three regimes—democracy, oligarchy, monarchy—might attain excellence as long as the excellent are allowed to lead (Panath. 131–132). The democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes, for example, recognized this truth and filled the city’s offices, not through the drawing of lots, but by appointing the best and most suited to each position (Areop. 20–22). A democracy in which the most capable exercise authority over the state and in which the people have authority over those rulers will be marked by stability and justice (Areop. 27). The reader is again confronted with a discrepancy in Isocrates’ political thought. In Nicocles he argues not only that monarchy is superior because it awards the superior person with the top position in the state’s hierarchy, but also that monarchy is best able to assess the worth of each citizen and reward him or her accordingly. While some will continue to see Isocrates as hopelessly confused or duplicitous, Isocrates’ understanding of the rule of the superior person seems to provide another example of his ability to produce a discourse that is best suited to a particular audience at a particular time.

Nonetheless, the rule of the best remains a hallmark of Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king. This idea is central in Hellenistic constructions of kingship and we will return to it at the end of this chapter.

**War.** The question of justice in relation to other states is raised in a brief discussion of war (Ad Nic. 24–26). Elsewhere Isocrates holds up the success of sole leadership in war as another proof of the superiority of monarchy (Nic. 22–25). In To Nicocles, the king is advised to be prepared for war, but to have peace as his goal. Isocrates is neither a pacifist nor a warmonger, and his advice comes from one who knows both the cost and the necessity of war. As a general rule, he asserts, the king should deal with weaker states as he would like stronger states to deal with him. Foreign citizens should feel safe within his city and the king to be moderate and sensible in matters pertaining to outsiders (22).

**Friends.** The king’s friends occupy the opposite end of this spectrum. The relational elements within Isocrates’ concept of δικαιοσύνη provide the reason for the inclusion of friendship in this part of the treatise. Isocrates is not alone in bringing questions of friendship into the discussion of justice, but

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96. Later in this discourse, Isocrates introduces a pro-Spartan interlocutor who suggests the possibility that the wisest might at times fail to discern the correct course of action at a particular point and one who is inferior might chance upon the right decision (Panath. 248). This role-reversal is also highlighted by the fact that in this exchange the teacher, Isocrates, has become a pupil (see Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 266–68). Isocrates seems to use the ambiguity introduced by this interlocutor as part of his critique of Athens (Ober, Political Dissent, 364–65)


98. So Baynes, “Isocrates”.

99. So Homer, in a well known clause supporting sole rule: “In no wise shall we Achaeans all be kings here. No good thing is a multitude of lords; let there be one lord, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Cronos hath vouchsafed the sceptre and judgments, that he may take counsel for his people” (Il. 203–206). The context of this statement suggests that it points to the desirability of sole leadership in war and not to monarchy in general (Luraghi, “One-Man Government,” 135).

100. Plato has Simonides summarise Polemarchus’ definition of justice as “To do good to friends and evil to enemies” (Resp. 1.332d). This “traditional” position is subsequently deconstructed and debunked by Plato’s Socrates. Isocrates would seem to agree with Polemarchus’ view (Demon. 26) and Aristotle’s observation about justice, that “the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend” (Eth. eud. 10.1242a20) would seem to lead in the same direction.
the combination of these two topics sounds odd to modern ears since the first seems to deal with the private sphere and the latter with the public sphere. In classical antiquity, however, friendship was understood within broad social structures that crossed the private/public divide. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of the king’s friends.

The strategic political positions that the king’s friends occupy in Isocrates’ treatise suggests that he is using φιλος as a technical term for the king’s close advisors. These are companions bound to the king through friendship who also serve various official functions within the king’s court and beyond.

The king’s friends are crucial for his safety and should be rewarded for their loyalty in order that their good will towards the king is maintained. The king should befriend only those worthy of his friendship. In a surprising piece of advice that combines the teaching on friends with that of benefiting subjects, worthy friends are defined as those who are able to help the king best govern the state, rather than those of whom the king is fond. And those who would best help him govern are those who are truthful and who speak openly to him. They should be confident that they enjoy a certain freedom of speech in the presence of the king. This is the friendly frankness which private individuals enjoy and kings often lack, the very thing that Isocrates provides in this treatise.

The free speech recommended by Isocrates combines social and aristocratic aspects with political and democratic aspects of free speech as described by Kurt Raaflaub. Because of the elevated level of their social class, the king’s friends should be able to address him without fear of intimidation or retribution for speaking their minds. Also in view, however, is the freedom of speech that is necessary

102. LSJ s.v. φιλος, I.1.d.
104. Aristotle also recognises the friendship between a superior and an inferior (Eth. eud. 7.1238b18–39), albeit of a different type when compared to egalitarian friendship.
105. For the role of reciprocity in hierarchical friendships of this type, see Schofield, “Political Friendship,” 43–47.
106. Although the word is not used again, it is clear in the conclusion that this is what Isocrates is offering (50–54). He certainly claims to engage in this sort of frank speech elsewhere (Evag. 39; Antid. 179).
Once again we see Isocrates proposing an ideal kingship which is gentler than that usually associated with autocratic rule since it is tempered with what are usually considered “democratic virtues,” in this case, the free speech considered so vital in democratic Athens.

**Justice in Relationship.** The focus of Isocrates’ advice on justice is primarily relational. The king is to act justly towards his subjects (as benefactor and as judge), towards other states, and towards his friends. Isocrates does not go to great lengths defining justice; he relies on the understanding of the nature of this virtue that he assumes his reader will share. As Johan Thom observes with regard to classical thought, “Justice as a relational concept indicating the appropriate relationship or proportionality between two entities was therefore considered the norm for all behaviour and for all relationships.”

Using rather broad strokes Isocrates paints a picture of what justice would look like in the dealings of the ideal king with others.

**Moderation (29b–35a)**

We have already seen (p. 43) that Isocrates assigns considerable significance to **σωφροσύνη**, judging it to be the “chief virtue” alongside δικαιοσύνη (Nic. 29; cf. Antid. 84, 274). Moderation (**σωφροσύνη**) is ascribed to Theseus at *Helenaen encomium* 31 as that which enables him to govern the city well. The idealized past provides a political form of **σωφροσύνη** that serves to critique Athenian democracy while at the same time forming an important element of Isocrates’ programme of international relations. It is not unexpected, therefore, that Isocrates should include it as one of the head virtues in his treatise for the young king.

The king must not be enslaved by pleasure (**ηδονή**) but should rather rule over his desire (**ἐπιθυμία**) (29). This self-control is described in terms of self-rule, a common motif in the

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108. D. M. Carter (“Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference Between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech,” in *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, ed. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen, MnSup 254 [Leiden: Brill, 2004], 197–220) argues for a difference between ancient and modern manifestations of free speech. In particular, the Athenians conceptualized free speech not as a negative right (the modern understanding: freedom of speech as freedom from censorship), but as “a characteristic of citizens, an attribute, which was a sort of side effect of their political enfranchisement” (p. 198).

109. Cf. Aristotle: “The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view that Justice alone of the virtues is ‘the good of others,’ because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate” (Eth. nic. 1130a2–3).  


112. Elsewhere Isocrates speaks as if it is the single chief virtue: virtue and **σωφροσύνη** sum up the character of those who are noble and good (Areop. 37; cf. Soph. 6, 20). Attack (“Debating Kingship,” 80) suggests this collection of the virtues under **σωφροσύνη** is a response to the Socratic teaching about the unity of the virtues.


114. *Panath.* 151, 197; *Areop.* 13; see Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, 99–102. North (*Sophrosyne*, 142–45) observes that **σωφροσύνη** is used to different ends as the historical situation being addressed in the discourses changes in the first half of the fourth century.
philosophical literature of the time, especially as it pertained to ideal rulers. In contrast to its political use in treatises concerned with Athens and/or the city's foreign policy, σωφροσύνη as it is applied to kings is a moral virtue that emphasizes self-control in the face of the temptations offered by the power and privilege that accompany absolute rule.

Self-control is displayed in various ways: by pursuing only those relationships and activities which are profitable (29), by seeking out only those things that add to one’s virtue (30), by being serious about significant things, rather than busying oneself with trivialities (30). In each of these cases the king is to pursue that which will make him a better person and thus most suited for rule. Since the king is, theoretically, the most virtuous person and occupies his position of authority on that basis, it follows that others might look to him as a model of how they might live.

The King as Model. The king must serve as an model (παράδειγμα) of self-control for his subjects since the character of the state is derived from those who rule over it (τό τῆς πόλεως ὀλίγος ἡθος ὁμοιωτάται τοῖς ἀρχούσιν; Ad Nic.31). In To Nicocles it is only the king’s σωφροσύνη that is mentioned for imitation, but Isocrates states that Evagoras had turned the region surrounding his realm to mildness (πράοτης) and moderation (μετρίοτης) (Evag. 49). Noting that both of these are typically related to σωφροσύνη, Helen North concludes that ruler and subject are, nonetheless, expected to exhibit different aspects of the virtue: “As the sophrosyne of the ruler in Isocratean eulogy tends to be confined to self-restraint, the sophrosyne of his subjects is usually obedience or quiet behavior, rather than more positive civic virtue.” In addition to the king’s virtues, his general pattern of living is meant to be exemplary: “Obey the laws which have been laid down by kings, but consider their manner of life (ἡγού τῶν ἐκείνων τρόπον) your highest law” (Demon. 36). It is the example set by the king, rather than the laws or constitution, that serves the subject as the clearest guide for living well.

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115. Plato’s Socrates says that a ruler should be able to rule himself. Such a person would be moderate and self-controlled, able to rule over pleasure and desire (σωφρόνα ὄντα καὶ ἑρεμητῇ αὐτών ταύτων, τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν) (Plato, Gorg. 491d–e; cf. Resp. 4.430d–431b; Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.1–7, 4.5.1–12; Ages. 10.2: “Agesilus prided himself less on reigning over others than on ruling himself”). See also Demon. 21; Nic. 29.
116. North, Sophrosyne, 145. With regard to the longevity of this sense of the virtue, North observes that “the civic virtue of sophrosyne did not survive the Athenian democracy which gave it birth, but the sophrosyne of the ruler was one of the most persistent and influential aspects developed in the entire history of the concept, and was especially fruitful in history and oratory” (145 n. 67).
117. To be more precise, Isocrates urges the king to conceal his love for trivialities while making public his earnestness. Isocrates’ pragmatism seems to be on view here. If the king must engage in unseemly behaviour, then it is best to keep this secret.
118. As Jaeger observes, “[Isocrates] makes the ideal monarch the representative of his people’s culture, the visible embodiment of the character of his state” (Paideia III, 100). The same idea is expressed with regard to the democratic state; see, e.g., Panath. 197; Areop. 22, 28. Ryan K. Balot (Courage in the Democratic Polis: Ideology and Critique in Classical Athens [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 11–13) notes how certain constitutions were thought to promote certain virtues or vices. Democracy engenders courage while tyranny foments cowardice. Balot cites as examples Herodotus 5.78, 91 (democracy); Xenophon, Hiero 5 (tyranny).
119. North, Sophrosyne, 147.
120. On the basis of Ad Nic. 9, presumably, Jaeger (Paideia III, 93) states that Isocrates is concerned only with the state’s “material greatness and prosperity” and not, like Plato, with the education of its citizens. This passage indicates that the king should be concerned with his subjects’ ethical development, so Kehl (“Monarchie,” 113–14).
same concept is placed in the mouth of the king, who offers himself as a paradigm through which his subjects might reform their lives. He describes his goal in writing to them as follows:

> to set up my conduct as a pattern to my people (παράδειγμα καταστήσαι τὸν τρόπον τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις), knowing that the multitude are likely to spend their lives in practices in which they see their rulers occupied. (Nic. 37)\(^\text{121}\)

That the king will serve as a model is thus an important element of monarchy in Isocratean political thought. The source of this way of thinking, however, must be sought in Isocrates’ pedagogy.\(^\text{122}\)

As we have seen above, Isocrates’ text is addressed to multiple audiences. Not only the king, but also his subjects, and perhaps even some in Athens, were expected to read and benefit from the letter To Nicocles.\(^\text{123}\) As such, Isocrates’ writings provide an insight into his educational programme, within which imitation plays a significant role. The source of imitation is found not only in the teacher, but also in the text and in the paradigmatic examples presented in the text.\(^\text{124}\)

As part of his educational programme, Isocrates urges Demonicus to seek out the example of the noble (ἀντιπουσίματος τῶν σπουδαῖων) and not to imitate the base (μὴ τῶν φαύλων εἶναι μιμήτας) (Demon. 2). Heracles, Theseus, but especially Demonicus’ own father, Hipponicus, all stand as examples that might be emulated (8–9).

> I have produced a sample\(^\text{125}\) of the nature of Hipponicus, after whom you should pattern your life as after an example (παράδειγμα), regarding his conduct as your law, and striving to imitate and emulate your father's virtue; for it were a shame, when painters represent the beautiful among animals, for children not to imitate (μιμίζονται) the noble among their ancestors. (Demon. 11)

Isocrates concludes this section by exhorting Demonicus to rival his father in his way of life (Demon. 12). This language of competition and rivalry occurs in other treatises where imitation is in view.\(^\text{126}\)

The student is encouraged to surpass the example set before him or her.

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\(^{121}\) At this point, of course, the king’s pattern of life is seen most clearly in the text he is placing before his subjects (Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 190). That this is an important goal of this particular text is highlighted at §29 and §47.

\(^{122}\) For a more general discussion of the significance of narrative and examples as part of an ethical education, see Hedrick, “Imitating Virtue”. Robert Hariman (“Civic Education, Classical Imitation, and Democratic Polity,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004], 217–34) discusses Isocrates’ use of imitation. See also Ad Nic. 35.

\(^{123}\) See, e.g., Nic. 11. In some ways, the audience of Isocrates’ orations (Nicocles, the king’s Cyprian subjects, the Athenian assembly) are simply part of the mise en scène of Isocrates’ work, “an enabling fiction” for his written text (Kathryn A. Morgan, “The Education of Athens: Polities and Rhetoric in Isocrates and Plato,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004], 148).

\(^{124}\) At Soph. 17 the teacher must present himself as a model of oratory; for discussion, see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 184–94. For Evagoras as a biographical model, see Hägg, Art of Biography, 30–45; Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 178–79.

\(^{125}\) This is only a “sample” or perhaps a “sketch” (διήγημα); presumably Demonicus is meant to complete the portrait (Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 222, n. 48; cf. Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 194–99).

\(^{126}\) See, e.g., Nic. 59–60; Ad Nic. 12–13.
When the student is a monarch and the example is the teacher, it is difficult for the teacher to be offered as an object of imitation. One should emulate those who are superior to oneself and the king is meant to be superior to all. Niall Livingstone frames the same problem in more general terms: “to ‘become’ an Isocrates is not a relevant goal for a pupil bent on a political career.” Given that Isocrates’ pupils are largely engaged in the political life and will take on roles that he chooses to avoid, what exactly are they to imitate? What elements of Isocrates’ model are they to observe and emulate? The answer is found in Isocrates’ logoi. Although there is a consistent Isocratean identity throughout his speeches, the voices and political perspectives presented therein tend to change. Through following his example, they will be able to assess situations that arise, make correct judgments, and choose the correct course of action (Panath. 30). The other aspect of education, the refining of virtue (Panath. 31–32), is something that Isocrates’ pupils might do through more direct imitation of their teacher, although this is nowhere stated explicitly. Again, it would seem that we are dealing with the problem of those who are greater in virtue (rulers) imitating the lesser (the teacher). Isocrates’ solution to this problem is twofold.

First, Isocrates avoids this problem by not using the language of imitation in this context in the treatise To Nicocles. Instead, he offers counsel that would benefit the king (2, 7, 53–54). The language of imitation is largely replaced by exhortation. And by offering the king this advice, Isocrates positions himself as one of those sages whom the king should send for and keep near if he is to succeed in his office (13).

Second, even if Isocrates cannot serve as a model for the king, another king might Isocrates thus holds up Nicocles’ father as one who might be imitated (Evag. 73–77). In his treatise concerning the deceased king, Isocrates provides Nicocles with a memorial of Evagoras’ deeds and character (73). A memorial text of this nature has numerous advantages over a traditional statue. Its

127. In the realm of rhetoric, however, Isocrates offers the teacher as a suitable, even necessary, model (Soph. 17–18). Too argues on the basis of Against the Sophists that this does not imply that the pupil is a precise replica of the teacher. A good teacher leaves room for a student to create his or her own identity (Rhetoric of Identity, 194–99).
129. Isocrates claims that he is “not robust and vigorous enough for public affairs,” and that he lacks “the two things which have the greatest power in Athens—a strong voice and ready assurance (φωνη ικνη και τολµης)” (Panath. 9–10).
130. For Isocrates’ use of historical examples, see Jaeger, Paideia III, 100–103. The significance of the past in Isocrates is also discussed in Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 219–23. See also Phil. 109–115 where Isocrates encourages Philip II to imitate the model of Heracles. Kehl (“Monarchie,” 78) claims that Isocrates provides us with the first extant Greek texts to use Heracles as an example of ideal kingship. He denies any direct relationship between Isocrates and Antisthenes at this point (pp. 81–82). The source of the comparison with Heracles might be the Macedonian claim to descent from Zeus via Heracles and the Temenid–Argive line (Theopompus frag. 393; see Robin J. Lane Fox, “Philip of Macedon: Accession, Ambitions, and Self-Presentation,” in Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 351).
131. Hägg suggests that the Evagoras’ lack of psychological (and other) detail, even by ancient standards, is the result of the text’s panegyric and protreptic elements—“There is no balance created, or intended, between the personal and the ideal; the ideal is never allowed to take on flesh and blood” (Art of Biography, 40).
132. This is not to deny the worth of physical representations of this type. Mention of the king’s physical beauty at Evagoras 23 suggests that physiognomy played a role in Isocrates’ thought, albeit a relatively minor one.

Xenophon’s Agesilaurus desired to leave behind memorials of his ψωχη rather than his σοµα since the latter was the work of a sculptor for the rich, while the former would exist on the basis of his own efforts and represents the work of the good (Ages. 11.7).
mobility, for example, means that it can be read and appreciated throughout Greece, instead of being confined to one place (74). More importantly, though, those who wish to imitate the person being memorialized can imitate that person’s character and thought as portrayed in such a discourse with far greater ease than they might imitate that person’s physical features portrayed in a statue (75). Isocrates hopes that the descendants of Nicocles and Evagoras will do exactly this. He concludes:

For we exhort young men to the study of philosophy (προτερέπομεν ἐπὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν) by praising others in order that they, emulating those who are eulogized (ζηλοῦντες τῶν ἐκλογοθημένων), may desire to adopt the same pursuits, but I appeal to you and yours, using as examples (παραδείγματι) not aliens, but members of your own family, and I counsel you to devote your attention to this, that you may not be surpassed in either word or deed by any of the Hellenes. (Evag. 77)

Is it possible to determine how this process of imitation might have worked in Isocrates’ thinking? James Collins discerns at To Nicocles 37–38 a pattern in which discourse on noble deeds leads to habituated thought and from there to corresponding action, all of which is based upon imitating the deeds of those whose reputations are envied. These deeds are found in the discourses which Isocrates has prepared for his students. George Kennedy describes Isocrates as practising “a kind of behavioral conditioning.” “In short, studied speech conditions thought which, when exercised, corresponds to measured actions which, in turn, refer the reader again to the measured logos.” Isocratean discourse is found at the beginning and the end of this process, and it is that which turns this process into a cycle.

So, Nicocles is to look to figures in the past as sources for his own actions (which flow from discourse and careful thought), but he, in turn, is to stand as an example for his subjects (Ad Nic. 31). “While drawing on and imitating one collection of wisdom, a person can create another collection for others to imitate.” Isocrates provides a collection of wisdom for Nicocles who, in turn, is to be a model of wisdom for his subjects. Isocrates concludes his treatise to Nicocles by observing that, with regard to the gifts of wisdom contained in the treatise, “even though you make hard use of them every day without fail, you will never wear them out, but will, on the contrary, enlarge them and increase their worth” (Ad Nic. 54). As the king heeds the words of the teacher, he becomes like the teacher and so Isocrates’ educational programme will continue to increase, even in his absence.

Isocrates’ ideal king is to provide his subjects with a model upon which they might base their lives. As they attempt to imitate him, they will become more like him, growing in the virtues that define him as their superior. But to whom might the king look for an exemplar? The king’s father is held up in the Evagoras as a suitable model for imitation—would that the new king surpass this (no doubt, idealized) portrait painted by Isocrates. In addition, Isocrates offers Nicocles a gift of a discourse on how a king should act in order to govern well (Ad Nic. 2). Although this text does not contain any

explicit exemplars, the sages and poets provide the king with maxims from which he should learn (Ad 
Nic. 12–13; 40–49). Isocrates’ counsel, drawing together the wisdom of those who have come before 
him (41), will prove to be a most valuable gift (50–54). 138

Wealth, Appearance. The realm of wealth and possessions requires the exercise of moderation, and 
nowhere is this more true than in the lives of those whose power affords them the opportunity for 
unbridled acquisitiveness. 139 If, as Ryan Balot argues, greed is “one of the most powerful evaluative 
tools in the arsenal of Athenian rhetoric,” 140 then it is essential for a good ruler to avoid behaving in 
such a way as to attract negative evaluation from his peers and subjects. To this end, Isocrates urges the 
king to pursue a good reputation (δόξαν κυλήν) instead of wealth (32). 141 The former is desirable 
because it is imperishable, it is independent of wealth since it is something that cannot be bought, and 
finally, and perhaps most importantly, only superior people (οἱ διενεχοκλόντες) 142 are able to acquire a 
good reputation (32; cf. Demon. 21, 38; Nic. 50). The royal reputation is important because the 
multitude are ignorant of the truth and make their judgment upon reputation (Demon. 17). The king’s 
reputation is thus of prime importance if he is to enjoy the good will of his subjects.

One way in which the king is able to manage his reputation is through appearance. The caution 
against wealth is not extended to the king’s dress; on the contrary, in this regard he should be 
elegant (τρυφώ), since this will indicate to those who gaze upon the king that he is worthy of his 
office. 143 In other matters, however, he should exercise restraint (32). Similarly, at §19, in the section 
on justice, the king is told that the city, like his estate, should be magnificent and royal—for the same 
reason: his reputation—yet he should manage his finances with care. Seen together, §§19 and 32 
illustrate the close connection between δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη in Isocrates’ thought. The royal 
office necessitates a certain level of extravagance; it is important for royalty to appear royal. But justice 
and moderation serve to direct and temper this necessary extravagance so that the excesses often 
associated with sole rule are avoided. Appearance before the king’s subjects is in view at §34 where the 
king is urged to be both courteous and dignified (ἄστεξος ... καὶ σεμνός). The latter is most suited to 
kingship but the former is necessary for social intercourse. While “familiarity breeds contempt,” the

138. The non-royal readers of Isocrates’ texts will find in this gift, and in Isocrates’ other writings, exemplars that they might imitate. This is made explicit in the Nicoles 37 and implied by the fact that the readership of these texts extends beyond those to whom they are addressed.
139. For Isocrates, greed is an important concept not only at the personal level, but also in his political analysis; see De Pace 5–7; Panath. 54–55. For a stimulating study of greed from a social-historical and philosophical perspective, see Ryan K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
140. Greed and Injustice, 7. Isocrates used this criticism against his opponents, calling the Sophists “professors of meddlesomeness and greed” (πλονεζίας ὑπέστησαν εἶναι δωδάκιλοι; Soph. 20).
142. A favourite term of Isocrates’ for describing the sort of person in view at this point; cf. Demon. 48; Antid. 308; Panath. 120.
143. Demonicus, on the other hand, is urged “to be a man of taste, not a fop” (φαλόκολος, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλοποιήσεταί; Demon. 27). The former is magnificent (μεγαλοπρεπής), while the latter is excessive (περίμγγος). The next part of §27 places this exhortation in the context of moderation with regard to possessions.
king should also attempt to be “a man of the people.” At this point σωφροσύνη consists in successfully maintaining the tension between these two poles.\textsuperscript{144}

The closing paragraph (33–35a) in the section on moderation begins with an exhortation given in terms of the goal of Isocratean education: correctly assessing a situation in order to seize the moment and to speak and act in the right way.\textsuperscript{145} Isocrates recognizes that it is often difficult to determine the correct path in all situations,\textsuperscript{146} in which case to fall short (ἐλλείπειν) is more desirable than to overreach (πλεονάζειν); moderation, here μετριότης, is described as lack (ἐνδεια) rather than excess (ὑπερβολή). Perfect moderation would mean hitting the target, making exactly the right decision at the right time, but where this is not possible, moderation will be seen in a cautious, conservative approach.\textsuperscript{147} The route to achieving this ability lies in following Isocrates’ philosophical programme. In addressing whether the king should seek knowledge in experience (ἐμπειρία) or study (φιλοσοφία),\textsuperscript{148} moderation is established when both are pursued (35). It is this combination of theory and practice (in addition to natural ability) that lies at the heart of an Isocratean education.\textsuperscript{149} It is natural that this combination forms a key part of Isocrates’ formation of the king’s person.

If justice is primarily relational in this treatise, then moderation is that virtue which is concerned primarily with the self. It is about ruling oneself, leading a disciplined life, and avoiding excesses and extremes. It is linked to Isocrates’ philosophical programme which has as its outcome the ability to respond correctly at the appropriate time. But the king’s concern for his excellence of his own person has a greater goal in mind. Moderation is an especially important virtue for the king to display since he stands as an example which his subjects will imitate. In this way the virtues of the royal person will be transferred to his subjects and thus the character of the state will be like that of its ruler (31; cf. Nic. 37). The king will know that he has set the right example if his subjects become more prosperous and moderate (ἐνποροτέρους καὶ σωφρονεστέρους) as a result of his care (31). In other words, the success of his example will be seen when his subjects and his state mirror his virtues.

\textit{Courage (35b–39)}

The relatively short length of this section on courage (ἀνδρεία/ἀνδρία)\textsuperscript{150} might arise from the fact

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144} Isocrates see the ideal monarch in terms of “a harmonious balance between the two forces, in uniting which he considers the hardest part of his prince’s education to lie—amiability of character and serious virtue. Either of these qualities is by itself insufficient for a king. Virtue is regal, but chilling. Charm and refinement make it easy to associate with others, but draw one down to their level” (Jaeger, Paideia III, 100).
\item \textsuperscript{145} For a summary of Isocrates’ educational ideas, see Terry L. Papillon, “Isocrates,” in \textit{A Companion to Greek Rhetoric}, ed. Ian Worthington, BCAW (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 60–62.
\item \textsuperscript{146} At Soph. 2 this difficulty is attributed to humanity’s lack of perfect prescience.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Edward S. Forster’s paraphrase, “that right action consists in an avoidance of the two extremes of excess and defect, and is the ‘golden mean’ between them” (Cyprian Oration, 123), seems to assume the ideal situation rather than the difficult one Isocrates has in view in which the correct course of action is not obvious.
\item \textsuperscript{148} For a discussion of the various ways in which Isocrates uses φιλοσοφία, see Livingstone, “Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy,” 19–27. At Ad Nic. 35 the word is being used in a narrow sense to refer to the process of intellectual growth.
\item \textsuperscript{149} See p. 42; see also Antid. 183–192, esp. 187; Soph. 17. Papillon speaks of the “triad of ability, teaching, and practice” which is unified, but not necessarily equally balanced (“Isocrates,” 61). Of the three elements in the triad, the first is most important (Antid. 189).
\item \textsuperscript{150} For the construction of this virtue in classical Athens, see Balot, \textit{Courage}; Joseph Roisman, \textit{The Rhetoric of}}

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that it is not considered a “primary virtue” (like justice and moderation) since it is not the unique possession of the superior person, but is instead a virtue in which the base might share (Nic. 43).151 That courage stands at the bottom of Isocrates’ list of virtues is evident at Panathenaicus 197 where the Athenians ancestors are admired for their self-control (καρτερία) and moderation (σοφρονίσκη) rather than their courage.152 Nonetheless, courage is an important martial virtue which is central—along with wisdom and justice—to Isocrates’ portrayal of, for example, Theseus (Helen 21, 31; cf. 1, 51). Evagoras, too, is remembered for his courage, wisdom, and justice—virtues added, as he matured, to the beauty, strength, and moderation he acquired in his childhood (Evag. 22–23; cf. 65). As these examples suggest, war is the traditional theatre within which courage or “manly virtue” is displayed.153 The Spartans are thus famous models of courage (Panath. 217, 258), though Isocrates is careful also to attribute this virtue to his Athenian audience (Areop. 74). But fourth-century discussions of courage were not limited to war, important as that historical reality was in Athens.154

Isocrates’ discussion of courage in To Nicoles is concerned primarily with reputation.155 The king’s reputation had been on view earlier in the treatise (32), but in this section it is the king’s posthumous reputation that is of concern. A memorial image (εἰκὼν) of the king’s virtue is preferable to one of his body (36); the king’s body is mortal, so he should attempt to leave behind an immortal remembrance of his soul (37).156 Courage is needed if the king is to choose to die well rather than to live in shame (36; cf. Demon. 43).157

Isocrates’ letter to Philip II (Ep. 2) shows how this exhortation needs to be tempered by moderation. The first half of the letter, §§1–11, consists of a mild rebuke for Philip’s recklessness in battle.


151. While terms for “courage” do not appear in this section, as the following paragraphs demonstrate, an Isocratean construal of the virtue is nonetheless present.

152. North, Sophrosyne, 144, 146.


154. The locus classicus for courage is Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides (2.35–46). For a detailed study of the virtue, see Balot, Courage; Isocrates’ particular formulation with regard to Athens is examined in Chapter 7 (pp. 149–176). See also Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 188–92.

155. Reputation is closely linked to honour and shame (Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 64–83; David Konstan, “Shame in Ancient Greece,” SocRes 70.4 [2003]: 1040–47. Incidents or actions that harm (or have the potential to harm) one’s reputation (δοξα) and bring about disgrace (αἰσχρὸς) give rise to shame (αἰσχρὸς); see, e.g., Demosthenes, Fals. leg. 41, 83, 146, cited by Konstan, “Shame,” 1040, n. 32. For Isocrates’ use of δοξα , see Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Use of Doxa,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 34.1 (2001): 61–78; Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Civic Education”.

156. Isocrates’ prose encomium of Evagoras provides Nicoles with precisely such a memorial (Evag. 73–77; cf. 3); see also Phil. 134.

157. “The idea that honorable death in battle was preferable to ignoble cowardice was a cornerstone of the Athenian ideology of masculine honor, a commonplace that speakers could take for granted and use to their own ends” (Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 67).
The king is encouraged to weigh the needs of his people for leadership against his desire for honour in battle. Isocrates concludes (Ep. 2.9–10):

you should not honor that courage which accompanies heedless folly and unseasonable ambition ... nor should you desire such glory (δοξα) as many, both Greeks and barbarians, obtain, but rather that exalted renown which you alone of living men could win.

Philip is to pursue the reputation that attaches to those who live well, rather than the glory of those who die recklessly. The king’s responsibility to his state, both in the letter to Philip and in the exhortation to Nicocles (Ad Nic. 36), serves to moderate the competitiveness that often characterizes ἀνδρεία and its related virtues in Greek society.

It is not easy to place most of the content of the last three sections (§§37–39) under the rubric of courage. There is general advice about acting in a way worthy of the office of kingship (37), living according to the advice one would give to one’s children (38), recognising wisdom in those who speak of important matters and not those who quarrel over trivialities (39). These sayings can be seen to relate to reputation in one way or another. Others are more explicit: advice to imitate those whose reputation he admires (38), and to admire those who are able to navigate well the good and the bad that fate places before them (39).

The reputation Isocrates has in mind extends beyond the martial reputation that usually defined Athenian courage. The fact that the Spartans were courageous is not enough to commend them as examples to be followed. The courage they displayed, tainted as it was by πλεονεξία (Panath. 45–46), focused on military virtues.158 As part of his historical analysis, Isocrates argues that the Spartan’s exclusive focus on military matters to the exclusion of other concerns “were both the expression and the cause of a narrow, and thus ill-informed, vision of what andreia is really for.”159

Courage is a necessary but not sufficient virtue for political leadership. In the Panathenaicus, Agamemnon and Sparta serve as positive and negative examples of this thesis, respectively. The “manly” virtues are only worthwhile if they are exercised within the framework provided by the other virtues, especially those of wisdom, justice, and moderation. “Isocrates both appreciates the importance of the military virtues and worries seriously about the dangerous proclivities of militaristic culture.”160

The warning given in the Panathenaicus to the Athenian assembly in this regard is presumably the same one Isocrates would have given to Nicocles had he expanded his teaching on the topic of courage.

The good king must display courage in every area of life, not only in his dealings with military enemies. He will do so through maintaining a concern for his reputation. Rather than follow the easiest path or the one free from danger, he must choose to act according to the mores of those around him, that they might think and speak well of him. He will do this by following the example of those who have shown themselves able to bear well both the misfortune and the success of life. A central part of the king’s duties have to do with being exactly this sort of model for others.

158. Balot, Courage, 165–66. But Isocrates’ use of the Spartans was not exclusively negative; see Ober, Political Dissent, 280–81.
159. Balot, Courage, 166.
Walter Wilson’s observation that in *To Nicocles* the four virtues of wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage provide Isocrates with a structure for his advice to the young Cyprian prince has proved a useful heuristic tool as we have examined Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king. We have seen that Isocrates does not follow the four categories strictly, but they do provide a framework around which he has constructed his *Fürstenspiegel*.

**Xenophon**

There are no other classical texts that approach the Hellenistic περί βασιλείας genre as closely as Isocrates’ *To Nicocles*. In this part of the chapter I turn to another fourth-century writer who, although he has not supplied us with a kingship treatise, nevertheless produced biographical works that focused on kings. Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* and *Agesilaus* take as their respective subjects the eponymous Persian and Spartan kings. *Agesilaus* is an encomiastic biography of the recently deceased Spartan leader with whom Xenophon was familiar.\(^161\) The *Cyropaedia* is a much longer text that provides the reader with “a portrait of virtue monarchy.”\(^162\)

In addition to the prominence it enjoys in Xenophon’s oeuvre and in the fourth-century, the *Cyropaedia* plays a significant role in the history of western political thought.\(^163\) More often than not, this role is that of a Fürstenspiegel. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg notes that the *Cyropaedia* is often considered the first Fürstenspiegel in the European tradition, while James Tatum identifies it as “the most influential of all mirrors for princes.”\(^164\) Xenophon’s portrait of the Persian king Cyrus II, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, is thus worth investigating as part of the study of fourth-century conceptions of kingship. My working hypothesis, which the following discussion attempts to confirm, is that Cyrus conforms to Xenophon’s concept of an ideal king.

While it might be sufficient to classify the *Cyropaedia* as Xenophon’s biography of Cyrus—bearing in mind the nature of fourth-century biography\(^165\)—the purpose of the biography is contested. Nino Luraghi summarizes some of the recent attempts to explain the pragmatics of the text: “a covert indictment of monarchy ... an educational handbook for upper-class Greeks ... a Machiavellian exploration in the manipulative use of power ... a utopian reflection on the best form of leadership.”\(^166\)

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163. See n. 152 in Chapter 1.


165. Momigliano identifies the work as “the most accomplished biography we have in classical Greek literature” (Greek Biography, 55), but also reminds the reader that it is important not to lose sight of fourth-century biography’s “ambiguous position between fact and imagination” and that fact that we are presented with the “potentialities” rather than the “realities” of its subjects (p. 46).

And it would be possible to expand this list, should one so desire. I will abstain from drawing any conclusions in this regard at this point and will address the matter in the conclusion to this section. The diversity highlighted in the list is partially a result of different approaches taken when reading the *Cyropaedia*. Before turning to the text I will clarify some of the assumptions undergirding this present reading of Xenophon.

### How Should One Read Xenophon?

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the work of the political philosopher Leo Strauss has been influential in Xenophon studies.\(^{167}\) Strauss argued that political philosophers of the past needed to mask the true teachings and intentions of their writings. They did this by writing ironically—producing texts that worked at two levels: the esoteric and the exoteric. The surface meaning of the text comprises the latter, while the former is only accessible to those who are able to “read between the lines.”\(^{168}\)

With regard to the *Cyropaedia*, then, we should not take at face value the claim that the work holds up Cyrus as the supreme example of the fact “that to rule men might be a task neither impossible nor even difficult, if one should only go about it in an intelligent manner” (1.1.3). Rather, the final chapter of *Cyropaedia* in which the decay of Persia after Cyrus’ death is described (8.8) shows those with ears to hear and with eyes to read between the lines that Cyrus and the regime he founded was not perfect since it did not produce the stability and continuity that the best regime should produce.\(^{169}\)

Ancient readers approached the text differently. Plato’s critique of Cyrus’ failure to educate his sons properly (Leg. 3.694a–696b) certainly seeks to tarnish the reputation of the Persian, but given the rivalry between the two (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 11.112; 504f–505a), this negative version must stand in opposition to Xenophon’s more positive version of the king. Cicero’s testimony is more explicit. For

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Cicero, Cyrus represents a “model of just government” with “impressive dignity of ... character” and “matchless courtesy.”\(^{170}\) This positive image of Cyrus has also formed the basis of modern studies.

Bodil Due’s literary analysis of the *Cyropaedia* leads her to conclude that “Xenophon’s main aim and purpose was to describe Cyrus as the ideal leader.”\(^{171}\) Similarly, Deborah Gera concludes, “throughout most of the *Cyropaedia* there is little doubt that Cyrus is meant to be an ideal figure, a successful ruler whose model conduct is well worth emulating.”\(^{172}\) In these readings, Xenophon provides his contemporaries with a positive model for imitation rather than an ironic character whose actions are to be avoided.\(^{173}\)

In attempting to establish the intellectual context out of which Xenophon wrote, Vivienne Gray investigates Xenophon’s literary presentation of leadership as it occurs throughout his works.\(^{174}\) Xenophon’s Socratic texts are used to sketch a pattern of leadership (pp. 5–24) which is then confirmed in the narrative/historical writings, including the *Cyropaedia* (pp. 24–44).\(^{175}\) Gray argues that seven elements are foundational to Xenophon’s theory of leadership. (1) Any community—indeed, any group of people, it would seem—is divided into those who lead and those who follow. Leaders rule and give orders while other must obey. This is a foundational assumption; Xenophon sees no need to argue this point (Mem. 3.9.10–11). (2) The goal of leadership must be the success of the organisation (Mem. 3.2.1–4). For Xenophon’s Socrates, “the impulse to be led comes from the group and ... they define the success they wish to achieve.”\(^{176}\) Only a poor leader seeks his or her own happiness at the expense of the group. (3) Success is defined in terms of “increase.” This increase can be material or


\(^{174}\) Gray, *Mirror of Princes*.

\(^{175}\) The fact that Xenophon presents Socrates as virtuous and wise when Socrates discusses leadership means that we can assume these match Xenophon’s thoughts on the matter and that we can trust Socrates’ voice. Since we are concerned with Xenophon, the question as to whether or not the voice of the “historical Socrates” is represented is not of concern. We note, furthermore, that Socrates and the other ideal figures in Xenophon’s writings share a set of qualities and it is those we are investigating (Gray, *Mirror of Princes*, 8–9). Deborah L. Gera argues that Xenophon presents his reader with various “Socrateses” (“Xenophon’s Socrateses,” in *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, ed. Michael Trapp [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007], 33–50). She observes, however, that “The great leaders found in Xenophon’s non-Socratic writings are in many ways much of a muchness and Socrates seems to be just one more instance of this ideal type” (p. 34). For a discussion of Socratic as it is evidenced in the *Cyropaedia*, see Gera, *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia*, 26–131. Thomas L. Pangle (“Socrates in the Context of Xenophon’s Political Writings,” in *The Socratic Movement*, ed. Paul Vander Waerdt [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994], 127–50) argues that Xenophon seeks to contrast the philosophic Socrates with his political counterparts, especially Cyrus.

\(^{176}\) Gray, *Mirror of Princes*, 12.
moral and is determined in relation to the community rather than the leader. The sage Simonides tells Hiero to increase the *polis* (Hiero 11.13; cf. Mem. 3.6.2). Socrates sought to increase the virtue of his students and friends (Mem. 4.3.18). (4) The leader must be able to gain “willing obedience” from those being led. This is usually achieved when the leader is able to demonstrate that he has greater knowledge than the rest about how to achieve what is best for them (Mem. 3.3.8). (5) Knowledge is therefore a crucial aspect of leadership. Using dialectic, Socrates instructs Euthydemus in the art of ruling (Mem. 4.2) and Xenophon himself writes didactic texts. But knowledge can also be gained through imitation (Mem. 1.3.1; 4.2.40). (6) Not only free men, but also women and slaves, are capable of exercising leadership, according to Xenophon (Mem. 3.9.11; Oec. 7.37). (7) Leadership is universal. Leadership skills might be transferred from one domain to another since the proper management of people lies at the core of successful leadership (Mem. 3.4).

Although this pattern of leadership will not form the basis of my discussion of the ideal king, it will become clear as this discussion progresses that these elements are important in Xenophon’s narrative about Cyrus. The consistency with which Xenophon applies this pattern throughout his writings indicates that he is working with a relatively stable theory of leadership which is transferred to monarchy in the *Cyropaedia*. Cyrus is therefore meant to provide the reader with an instance of ideal leadership within the context of monarchy. This allows us to interrogate the text regarding Xenophon’s teaching about the ideal king. The difficulties and problems raised in the text and highlighted by those who adopt ironic readings of the *Cyropaedia* cannot be ignored, but they do not require an ironic reading. It is possible to read the text within this framework of Xenophon’s portrait of an ideal leader while still allowing the possibility that Xenophon is at times ambiguous, allusive, and subtle.

A detailed study of Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In what follows I will discuss the prologue (1.1), epilogue (8.8), as well as the first (1.2–1.6) and third (7.5.37–8.7) major sections of the *Cyropaedia*. The first section is important since it describes explicitly Cyrus’ education in Persia (1.2, 1.5–6) and in Media (1.3–4). The formation of the ideal king is foundational for the rest of the narrative. The third major section (7.5.37–8.7) explicitly identifies kingship as one of its central concerns (7.5.37): having conquered Babylon, Cyrus now sets out to establish himself in a manner fitting for a king. This final section of the narrative exposes Xenophon’s idea of what absolute monarchy looks like.

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177. For the argument that even these “minor” didactic texts are about leadership, see Oliver Stoll, “For the Glory of Athens: Xenophon’s *Hipparchikos* «Logos»: A Technical Treatise and Instruction Manual on Ideal Leadership,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012): 250–57.

178. Atack (“Debating Kingship,” 98) observes in Xenophon’s Socratic writings “a (largely) consistent set of interlinked values that the individual capable of good leadership and rule in various contexts exemplifies.” Due (*Cyropaedia*, 185–206) comes to a similar conclusion about the consistency of Xenophon's pattern of leadership through a study of other leaders across his body of work.


181. According to Atack, it is in this final section that we find Xenophon’s “most careful analysis of kingship” (“Debating Kingship,” 159); so also Due, *Cyropaedia*, 96.
The central part of the work (2.1–7.5.36) is concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with Cyrus’ military exploits. As we shall see, generalship is certainly a significant part of Xenophon’s kingship ideal. Cambyses’ lessons at Cyropaedia 1.6 are concerned largely with the military qualities a ruler should possess and these qualities are exemplified in the central section of the narrative. But, given the length of the central section, we run the risk of skewing our analysis of kingship by allowing the martial portrait of Cyrus to become the centre of gravity. This section will therefore not be considered in detail in the following discussion, although I will refer to it on occasion in my examination of the work’s framework. Furthermore, since the military traits necessary for successful leadership are discussed in both the first and third sections, our analysis of Xenophon’s portrait of kingship will necessarily take these elements into account. We cannot ignore that one of the reasons that Xenophon chose to write about Cyrus was his success in building an empire through military victory. Our focus, however, must remain on Cyrus the king.

Prologue (1.1.1–6)

The opening chapter establishes the difficulty of rule as the problem the Cyropaedia sets out to address. Here and in the closing chapter (8.8), Xenophon writes in the first person, thus creating the impression that he is not producing an abstract treatise on ideal leadership but rather presenting the results of his own experience. Neither democracy, nor monarchy, nor oligarchy guarantees a stable government (1.1.1), and so traditional political philosophy which debated the best regime would seem to offer no solution to this problem. Those responsible for ruling over animals seem not to have similar difficulties (1.1.2), suggesting that the problem lies with those who are ruled and not the rulers. Nevertheless, since Xenophon’s writings address those who would expect to rule, questions about the possibility of leadership remain central in his work.

The unique success of Cyrus in ruling a multitude of subjects, cities, and nations (see 1.1.4) suggests to Xenophon “that to rule men might be a task neither impossible nor even difficult, if one should only go about it in an intelligent manner (ἡν τίς ἐπισταμένος τοῦτο πράττῃ)” (1.1.3). The rest of the Cyropaedia illustrates what such intelligent rule looks like in the person of Cyrus. Xenophon undertakes to present what he has learned about Cyrus’ origin/family (γενεα), his nature (φύσις), and his education (παιδεία). Each of these three elements will be addressed in the discussion that follows. Before proceeding to this discussion, though, we must address a potential difficulty raised in these opening paragraphs.

Obedience and/or Fear. The opening chapter of the Cyropaedia contains a statement that seems inconsistent with Xenophon’s theory of leadership and which threatens the thesis that Cyrus is Xenophon’s ideal king. Pierre Carlier’s methodological note is important when investigating these
potential difficulties: “In order to count as a criticism, a description of Cyrus’ behaviour must contradisti an ideal that Xenophon himself maintains, not merely one that a modern reader holds.”

The elements of Cyrus’ character or rule that modern readers find troublesome or repugnant (and there are certainly a number of these!) do not disqualify him as an ideal leader unless there is some clear indication that Xenophon is equally troubled or repulsed by them.

The suspect behaviour in the first chapter is Cyrus’ use of fear. Intelligent rule consists in persuading people to submit to one’s rule willingly, which Cyrus managed to do despite the extent of the empire (1.1.3). Further on we are informed that Cyrus’ success was due to his ability to cloak his empire with such fear that no one would resist him (1.1.5). The very next sentence states again that “he was able to awaken in all so lively a desire to please him, that they always wished to be guided by his will” (1.1.5).

At first glance this assertion might easily be mistaken for confusion on Xenophon’s part or careless editing. Alternatively, it might be an example of irony in which the reader is meant to understand that Cyrus was only able to generate “obedience” through fear and that this made him, in reality, a poor leader. A closer look at other passages in which obedience and fear are discussed suggests that this is not the case, and that Xenophon means what he says at this point.

In 1.6, an important passage to which we will return, Cyrus’ father instructs him in a number of matters pertaining to leadership, including obedience (1.6.20–24). Cyrus was taught obedience by his father, then by his teachers (cf. 1.2.8), and finally by the law (1.6.20).

Cambyses distinguishes between two forms of obedience. There is a form of compulsory obedience which comes about through reward—the obedient are praised and honoured. The disobedient, on the other hand, are subject to punishment and dishonour (1.6.20). Compulsory obedience of this type, while still obedience, is considered by Xenophon to be an inferior type of obedience. It is characteristic of slaves and animals (Oec. 13.6–12).

There is, however, a “shortcut” consisting of willing obedience. This second type of obedience is generated when a leader is seen to be concerned with his followers’ well-being and is considered by them to be more able than they are to do something about it (Cyr. 1.6.21–24). Socrates taught that people are willing to obey those whom they believe to be the best (Mem. 3.3.9). Cambyses explains that in the context of ruling, the best person is the one who is able to project wisdom and for this there is no shortcut—one needs truly to be wise if one wants to be perceived as wise (Cyr. 1.6.22).

This theory of obedience is complicated by the nature of those who are being ruled. While those who are good might be willing to obey the best, in his debate with Tigranes, Cyrus argues that the wicked cannot be expected to respond in the same way (3.1.20–21). Only the first type of obedience can be wrought from this group. It is also this recalcitrant group that, at times, needs to be disciplined through fear. This is illustrated at 8.3.5 where the king’s procession is designed to be beautiful in the sight of those who are loyal, but frightening to those who are hostile to him. Fear is thus shown to be an

appropriate tool in the maintenance of obedience in those who are wicked or hostile or generally less inclined to be ruled.\footnote{186}

Xenophon’s theory of obedience takes into account both the ruler and the ruled. All other things being equal, it is proof of a king’s excellence when his subjects obey him willingly (\textit{Oec.} 4.19). However, there are some who will never respond to positive leadership of this nature and they need to be dealt with differently. For this group, reward and punishment—or the fear of potential punishment—are appropriate tools in the hand of the good king. Cyrus declares at a later stage in the narrative that he prefers those who serve him out of love and goodwill over those who do so out of compulsion (\textit{Cyr.} 3.1.28). A good leader will, nevertheless, be able to manage both classes of subordinates.

One final concern must be addressed: fear is usually associated with tyrannical rule. A good general will be able to generate willing obedience from his soldiers while despotic or tyrannical leadership is marked by unwilling subjects (\textit{Oec.} 21.4–8, 11–12). This being the case, does Xenophon present Cyrus as a mixture of good and bad kingship? So Carlier: “Cyrus is a king who does not overlook certain traditional methods of tyrants ... He wins thus the advantages of a king— the sympathy of his subjects—and those of a tyrant—fear.”\footnote{187} At this point, Carlier would seem to be correct. I will argue, however, that this does not make Cyrus a bad ruler in Xenophon’s sight, but rather serves to highlight his adaptability in the context of empire. This is discussed in more detail below (see page 87). In order to make this argument, though, a fuller picture of Cyrus’ rule is necessary.

With regard to the question of Cyrus’ use of fear, Gray’s assessment of Xenophon is an accurate summary of the conclusion we have reached on this point:

\begin{quote}
Xenophon addresses the realities of the limitations on governance by assent perhaps more than modern theory when he acknowledges that the leader chooses to win willing obedience but will always need to consider coercion or other indirect methods on those who strive more for their own success than that of the group.\footnote{188}
\end{quote}

As promised (1.1.6), Xenophon begins his nuanced portrait of this leader with a description of his origin, nature, and education.

\textit{Education (1.2.1–1.6.46)}

Following the prologue (1.1), the first book of the \textit{Cyropaedia} contains a brief discussion of Cyrus’ family and birth (1.2.1), and then moves into an extended description of the Persian education system (1.2.2–16). Part of Cyrus’ youth is spent in Media with his grandfather, Astyages, (1.3.1–1.4.28), but Cyrus returns to Persia to complete his education (1.5.1). The rise of Assyrian aggression

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{186} See also \textit{Mem.} 3.5.5–6 where confidence is contrasted with fear: the former breeds carelessness and disobedience, while the latter makes people attentive, obedient, and more easily disciplined. Fear of punishment is raised again in the (in)famous passage about the king’s “ears and eyes” (8.2.10–12). Xenophon chooses not to dwell on the impact that these spies had on the general population, but focuses the reader’s attention on the fact that they served Cyrus willingly as a result of his largesse (Gray, \textit{Mirror of Princes}, 277–79).
\item \footnote{188} Gray, \textit{Mirror of Princes}, 373–74.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and Cyaxares’ ascent to the Median throne following Astyages’ death provides the context for Cyrus’ first leadership role as an adult (1.5.2–14). As Cyrus prepares to lead his army, his father, Cambyses, teaches him about leadership (1.6).

Γενεαὶ καὶ Φύσες (1.2.1)⁸⁹. Xenophon reports Cyrus’ royal lineage in a straightforward manner. His father was Cambyses, king of the Persians, who belonged to the Persidae, who derived their name from Perseus. Despite this allusion, there is no claim to divine ancestry.⁹⁰ Cyrus’ mother was Mandane, daughter of Astyages, king of Media (1.2.1). This brief description is in stark contrast to Herodotus’ account of Cyrus.⁹¹

We note, first, that Xenophon has removed the dreams and omens that accompanied Cyrus’ birth in Herodotus. This is not because Xenophon wants to remove the divine from his narrative—on the contrary, religion and the divine is important in his portrait of Cyrus.⁹² Rather, Xenophon wants to remove the possibility that Cyrus’ success can be attributed to the favour of the gods. Only Cyrus’ leadership qualities (and Xenophon’s theory of leadership) are allowed to explain his remarkable achievements.⁹³ This is in keeping with Cambyses’ later teaching that “those only who had made

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⁸⁹. According to Dover (Greek Popular Morality, 84), φύσες lies somewhere between birth/“nature” and education/“nurture.” On the basis of 1.2.2, it seems that Xenophon considers γενεαὶ καὶ Φύσες to be closely related, since this is what he claims to deal with in 1.2.1.

⁹⁰. Cyrus’ divine lineage is hinted at on three occasions and, contra Lynette G. Mitchell (“Alexander the Great: Divinity and the Rule of Law,” in Every Inch a King: Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. Lynette Gail Mitchell and Charles Peter Melville, RULE 2 [Boston: Brill, 2013], 95), none of these show conclusively that Xenophon is drawing on the topos of the king’s divine descent. First, Artabazus considers Cyrus the noblest and best man, descended from the gods (4.1.24). Second, Croesus says that Cyrus (1) is descendent from the gods; (2) of royal lineage; and (3) has practised virtue since childhood (7.2.24). Artabazus’ and Croesus’ flattery are “a hyperbolic echo of the narrator’s prologue” (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 158, cf. 264–65 n. 18), but it is not clear that the reader is meant to accept either voice as authoritative. If Xenophon had wanted to counter Herodotus’ more negative account of Cyrus’ lineage with these exalted claims (so Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 275–76), one might have expected them at 1.2.1, not hidden away in a later part of the narrative. Third, Cyrus’ prayers to “ancestral Zeus” (Διός πατρως; 7.1.1) highlights Zeus’ care of the Persians as a people, not Cyrus’ divine parentage (cf. 6.4.20; Plato, Leg. 881d). For Xenophon’s use of mythological ancestry, see Ages. 1.2–5; cf. Isocrates, Evag. 13–18.

⁹¹. Herodotus’ story is filled with violence and supernatural omens. Cyrus first appears at 1.46 in relation to Croesus, but the bulk of Cyrus’ story is told in 1.95–130. Cyrus’ birth and early life is described in 1.108–113. In response to a vision that Astyages has, Mandane is married off to a Persian who is socially far below the Median royal family. At birth, Cyrus is taken from his mother in response to another dream Astyages has. The baby is not exposed as the Median king had ordered but is raised by a herdsman and his concubine in the mountains of Media. Through an unexpected series of events, the ten-year-old boy appears before the king and is recognized. Astyages foolishly allows Cyrus to live, but sends him to Persia, where he is reunited with his parents. Upon entering adulthood, Cyrus persuades the Persians to rebel against Astyages, whose army Cyrus defeats with the help of the Mede Harpagus. For a discussion of the fragments of Ctesias’ version of Cyrus’ life as preserved in Nicholas of Damascus and Photius see Due, Cyropaedia, 135–39; Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 6–10. The Ctesias fragments relating to Cyrus are translated in Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and James Robson, Ctesias’ History of Persia, Routledge Classical Translations (London: Routledge, 2010), 159–76.

⁹². Upon his deathbed, for example, Cyrus is receives a vision foretelling his imminent departure from this world (8.7.2). And this was nothing new—throughout his career he had received omens, signs, and auguries from the gods (see, e.g., 1.6.1, 2.1.1) and he had been faithful in offering sacrifices (8.7.3). See Due, Cyropaedia, 156–58; Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 54–59. John Dillery discusses Xenophon’s understanding of divine agency in history (Xenophon and the History of His Times [1995; repr., London: Routledge, 2003], 179–94).

themselves what they ought to be had a right to ask for corresponding blessings from the gods” (1.6.5–6).

Second, Xenophon has provided us with a rose-coloured history of his hero’s past. The negative elements in which Herodotus seems to delight have been removed and we are left with a sanitized version highlighting the royal elements of Cyrus heritage on both his father’s side (contra Herodotus) and his mother’s side of the family. The slave-to-king motif that forms the backbone of Ctesias’ version of Cyrus’ origins has also been removed. Nothing must be allowed to detract from Xenophon’s ideal leader.¹⁹⁴

The fact that the Cyrus’ ancestry is even mentioned raises the question as to whether the leadership envisaged by Xenophon is inherent or whether it is something that can be taught. Later in the narrative, one of Cyrus’ soldiers states that, like a queen bee, Cyrus was indeed born to be a king (βασιλεὺς γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σῷ φῶς ἐπιφύκειν; 5.1.24), as demonstrated by the willingness with which men follow and obey him (5.1.24–26). The qualities mentioned by Xenophon in 1.2.1 support this statement since they all seem inherited or inherent. The remainder of the chapter, focusing as it does on the Persian education system which formed Cyrus, suggests that acquired qualities are also important. Xenophon refuses to choose sides in the nature-or-nurture debate.¹⁹⁵ Support for this point of view is found at Deconomicus 21.10–12 where “royal rule” comes through education and a noble nature. The final two chapters of the Cyropaedia in which Cyrus’ sons are shown to fail as leaders despite receiving an education from their father (see below, pp. 89–92) suggest that education and genetics are necessary but not sufficient elements for exemplary leadership.

The sketch of Cyrus’ ancestry is followed by a very brief “encomium” which serves to link his heritage to the following section in which his education is discussed.¹⁹⁶ The “barbarians” who tell and sing of Cyrus’ excellences speak of both physical and spiritual aspects of the Persian.

With regard to his physical nature, Cyrus is described as handsome (εἰδος καλλιστος). This is part of Xenophon’s idealisation of his hero (cf. 1.4.27–28; 3.1.41),¹⁹⁷ but the theme is also encountered in Herodotus’ report that when Cyno, the cowherd’s wife, first laid eyes on Cyrus, seeing “how fine and fair the child was” (τὸ παιδί μέγα τε καὶ εὐαίσθητος), she wept and begged her husband not to expose him (Hist. 1.112).¹⁹⁸ The physical aspect of Cyrus’ nature will play a role in his visual presentation of himself (Cyr. 8.3.14), but most of Xenophon’s writing focuses on the moral aspects of Cyrus’ person.

¹⁹⁵ Due (Cyropaedia, 147–52), following Dover’s general observations about the question in fifth- and fourth-century literature (Greek Popular Morality, 83–95), suggests that Xenophon’s distinction between inherent and acquired qualities are not as clear as they might be.
¹⁹⁶ Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 64–65.
¹⁹⁷ So Due, Cyropaedia, 150 n. 10. As Gera observes: “an ideal Xenophonic hero is as perfect physically as he is morally, as beautiful in body as he is noble in spirit” (“Xenophon’s Socrateses,” 36). At 1.3.1 we read that the boy’s grandfather was eager to see him because he had heard he was καλός καρθοκός. The Greek phrase indicates more than just physical beauty (see Werner Jaeger, Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, vol. 1 of Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3rd ed., trans. Gilbert Highet [Oxford: Blackwell, 1946], 11–12), but it includes it.
¹⁹⁸ The “beautiful king” topos can also be seen at Isocrates (see, e.g., Evag. 22), but it was not encountered in the To Nicocles.

67
In what might be read as a programmatic statement, Cyrus is described as having a soul that is most loving of humanity, devoted to learning, and desirous of honour (ψυχή δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος καὶ φιλομαθότατος καὶ φιλοτιμότατο; 1.2.1). The three traits mentioned here are the focus of Norman Sandridge’s book-length study of Xenophon’s leadership theory.199 Sandridge shows how the accounts that follow the introduction illustrate these traits. Even when explicit traits are not often mentioned, we are to understand the king’s nature on the basis of his deeds, because it is there, according to Xenophon, that true virtue is most clearly exposed (cf. Mem. 1.5.6, 4.4.10; Symp. 8.43).200 Given the prominence that these three traits are given in Xenophon’s account, it is worthwhile pausing to consider them in some detail.

**Three Royal Virtues.** An examination of Cyrus’ deeds at key points in his career leads Sandridge to conclude that Xenophon’s construction of Cyrus’ φιλανθρωπία is best described as a fondness for humans that involves feelings of pity, sympathy, affection, and care. It entails gift-giving, tokens of honor, matchmaking, and attention to illness. It may be grand, civilizing, and long-lasting, coming as it does with associations of divinity.201

Cyrus shows this trait even as a young boy in Media (1.4.1; cf. 4.2.10) and in the penultimate chapter of the book, as lies on his death bed, he claims to have been φιλάνθρωπος towards others and that he now looks forward to joining that which benefits humanity (κοινωνησι τοῦ ευεργετούντος ἄνθρωπος). This is not an allusion to the divine, but an acknowledgment that in his burial he will be “united to the earth”—that which brings forth and nourishes the good and the beautiful (8.7.25). Even in his death, Cyrus will be seen to benefit his subjects and his φιλανθρωπία will be on display, as it has been throughout his life (see below).

Cyrus’ generosity and benefaction, summarized again as φιλανθρωπία, is displayed at the micro-level during a victory banquet (8.4.6–8; cf. 8.2.4). After seeing the king share the best of what he had available, Gobryas observes that Cyrus’ φιλανθρωπία excels even his generalship. Cyrus explains that this is because he is required to harm people in exercising the latter, but to do only good in the case of the former. And doing good to others is a crucial part of Cyrus’ success as a leader since it contributes to bringing about willing obedience through demonstrating love and good will towards those who are being ruled. It is only when they are convinced of his love towards them and his ability to bring about what is in their best interests, that the king’s subjects will respond to him with love and obedience (1.6.21; 8.2.1).

This good will extends even to those whom Cyrus has defeated. He suggests that his soldiers deal with those they conquered on the basis of φιλανθρωπία rather than δίκαιοσύνη. Even if the persons, possessions, and property of the conquered city is theirs by law, they will be far better off if they act


200. For the significance of deeds as part of characterization in biography, see Hägg, *Art of Biography*, 5.

with generosity/kindness towards their new subjects (7.5.73).202 It is far better to have old enemies as new friends than to attempt to disarm and destroy them (8.1.48).203

Xenophon’s narrative suggests that φιλανθροπία is the pre-eminent kingly virtue.204 It occurs at significant points in the story and is seen in much that Cyrus does. It is a broad virtue, encompassing other traits like generosity, beneficence, mercy and, clemency. But this doesn’t mean that it stands apart from other virtues. In order for φιλανθροπία to be rightly exercised in victory, for example, it must be accompanied by other important virtues like σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια.205 Still, the significance for φιλανθροπία in Xenophon’s theory of leadership cannot be underestimated, primarily because of its link to the keystone of the entire theory: willing obedience. Cambyses tells his son that willing obedience comes from those who believe that their leader is wiser in matters related to their own welfare than they themselves are (1.6.21). The discussion turns to what this wisdom might look like and how it might be achieved (see below, p. 78), but the point is clear: to be obeyed willingly, a good leader must be seen to be concerned with his subjects’ good (cf. 1.6.42). And doing good for others in this way is foundational to φιλανθροπία.

At 1.2.1 two other traits—φιλοτιµία and φιλομάθεια—are mentioned alongside φιλανθροπία. If φιλανθροπία is as significant as I have suggested, are these other two equally important in Xenophon’s construction of ideal kingship?

Despite the emphasis given to φιλοτιµία in the title and thesis of Sandridge’s book, the virtue is treated quite briefly in Sandridge’s first chapter, which is devoted largely to φιλανθροπία.206 The virtue is rarely explicitly ascribed to Cyrus: in addition to 1.2.1, where Xenophon calls him φιλοτιµότατος, the king is identified with this virtue only at 1.3.3 (cf. 1.4.1), where the young Cyrus wins the affection of the young Median boys and their fathers. Like the English word “ambition,” φιλοτιµία can have negative as well as positive connotations. While the trait is used positively in the Cyropædia of the king and his soldiers,207 perhaps the negative possibilities (and the frequent examples of the wrong sort of kingly ambition) have led Xenophon to be more cautious of using φιλοτιµία in relation to Cyrus.208 Nevertheless, Due is correct when she observes that “Cyrus’ whole life, his career and his success bears witness to his φιλοτιµία.”209

202. See also the important speech that Cyrus gives to his soldiers in 4.2 which alludes to some of the same ideas. Gera’s negative reading of φιλανθροπία at this point (Xenophon’s Cyropædia, 183–84) seems to go against the grain of Xenophon’s narrative and his nuanced approach to warfare. More generally, φιλανθροπία can oppose and correct strict adherence to the law (Vincent Azoulay, Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir. De la charis au charisme, Histoire Ancienne et Médievale 77 [Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004], 322).

203. This attitude of good will also informed Cyrus’ approach to war and plunder: while it is morally acceptable to defend yourself against others, aggressive wars are not considered acceptable. For Xenophon’s attitude to war, see Due, Cyropaedia, 158–63. Due shows how φιλανθροπία informed this view (Cyropaedia, 163–70).

204. “Un thème de prédilection,” according to Azoulay, Xénophon, 320, see 320–23.

205. Due, Cyropaedia, 169–81.

206. Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 34–70/189; see also Due, Cyropaedia, 182–83.

207. Although see Joseph Reisert’s argument that Cyrus exploits his subjects’ love of honour in order to subjugate them to his will (“Ambition and Corruption in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus,” Polis 26.2 [2009] 296–315).

208. J. Joel Farber, “The Cyropaedia and Hellenistic Kingship,” AJP 100.4 (1979): 505. Farber notes that Xenophon uses the term negatively in his other writings; see Mem. 1.2.14, for example.

209. Due, Cyropaedia, 182.
Sandridge’s summary definition is useful in understanding the role of the virtue in Xenophon’s narrative:

[φιλοτιµια] is a love of being honored, but more than just a desire for tokens of distinction. It is often a love of being praised, approved of, or appreciated. Cyrus wants others to feel the fondness for him that he feels for others.210

If we accept this definition, then it becomes apparent why this is the companion virtue to φιλανθρωπια. If φιλανθρωπια describes the king’s actions towards others, φιλοτιµια is related to the desire for a positive response from those to whom the former has been displayed.211

More often than not, φιλοτιµια is a characteristic Cyrus sought to instill in his soldiers and those responsible for leadership in his armies.212 In 8.1.34–39 we see how Cyrus uses his men’s desire for honour—especially their desire to be honoured by the king—in order to encourage them to compete in training, and through this training, to instill other key leadership virtues in them. Cyrus serves as their primary paradigm of leadership (8.1.39) and his φιλοτιµια drives him to strive to remain their superior in all things. But since praise and honour can be used to bring about obedience (1.6.20), the desire to be praised and the love of honour are also important characteristics for those under Cyrus to exhibit.213

The final of the three traits mentioned at 1.2.1, φιλοµαθεια/φιλοµαθια, is only attributed explicitly to Cyrus here, at 1.4.3 and 1.6.38, but, like the other two, it is implied throughout Xenophon’s narrative.214 The account of the Persian education system (1.2.2–16) concludes with the observation that Cyrus was superior to his classmates and that he learned quickly and thoroughly (1.3.1). When visiting his grandfather in Media, the young Cyrus is eager to learn how to ride in order that he might excel the Medes who ride better than he (1.3.14–15). And he once again excels in his Persian education upon his return from Media (1.5.1).

The lessons about riding foreshadow Cyrus’ ability to learn in a military context. In 4.3 he sees the benefit of having a cavalry and successfully exhorts his army to adopt this method of warfare. Cyrus pursues the Assyrian king by adapting the way in which chariots are used (6.1.25–30). These examples stand as explanations for why the Persian military is structured as it is in Xenophon’s time (4.3.23; 6.1.30), yet in the narrative, they serve to portray Cyrus as learning from others and being willing to adapt his armaments and strategies to the advantage of his army, thus illustrating his φιλοµαθεια.215

211. The danger, of course, is that kindness and generosity might simply be seen as a means to achieve honour or praise or respect, so Tamiolaki, “Virtue and Leadership,” 574–76. Sandridge recognises this possibility, but shows that this is not the case in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 49–58/189).
212. In the Cyropaedia it is the ideal soldier who exhibits φιλοτιµια; see, e.g., 1.6.26; 2.1.22; 3.3.10, 59. In his speech to the two-hundred men who go to Media with him (1.5.7–14), Cyrus identifies their love of praise as their possession “most suitable to war” (1.5.12). Wilhelm Schubart, “Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri,” APF 12 (1937): 8, 19 shows that in Hellenistic papyri φιλοτιµια was more often used of the ideal official than of the ideal king.
213. Xenophon again shows his knowledge of psychology when he has Cyrus observe that φιλοτιµια can easily turn into jealousy if it is not correctly managed (3.3.10).
214. Sandridge’s chapter dealing with Cyrus’ φιλοµαθεια is entitled “Curiosity, Aptitude, and Intense Awareness” (Foundations of Leadership, 71–89/189). He includes under this trait, “a desire and aptitude to master subjects that bring honor ... abiding attentiveness (epimeleia) [pp. 78–83/189] ... self-awareness [pp. 83–85/189].”
215. Due, Cyropaedia, 181–82.
While φιλανθρωπία, φιλοτιµία, and φιλοµαθεία are used at 1.2.1 to summarise Cyrus’ character, this brief survey suggests that they are not equally important in Xenophon’s presentation of the Persian king. Cyrus’ φιλανθρωπία is highlighted throughout the narrative and is shown to be the sine qua non of good leadership. While the other two traits are certainly present in the remainder of Xenophon’s account, they do not enjoy the same pre-eminence as φιλανθρωπία and belong, instead, to the collection of other virtues which define ideal kingship in Xenophon’s writings. The next important virtue, justice, is introduced in the account of Cyrus’ Persian education.

Justice in Cyrus’ Persian Education. The Persian system of education is described in 1.2.2–16. This is said to be the education that Cyrus receives up until the age of 12 (1.3.1), but surprisingly, the young prince is absent from the narrative. Instead, Xenophon presents a general description of the four stages of life through which Persian males pass. The focus on education occurs primarily in the sections on the youth and ephebes (1.2.5–12). With regard to the youth, the emphasis falls on justice (1.2.6–7) and self-control (1.2.8). The self-control will be discussed below and so we turn at this point to justice.

Justice is so important in Persian education that Xenophon contrasts the emphasis on teaching justice with the Greek desire to teach literacy (1.2.6) and notes that the institutions of learning can be called “public schools of justice” (τα κοινὰ της δικαιοσύνης διδασκαλεῖα; 1.2.15). The youth are tutored in justice through the example of their leaders (ἄρχοντες), who judge cases of theft, cheating, slander, and the like (1.2.6–7). And by the time they join the rank of the elders (γεραιτεροι), they are expected to judge public and private cases (τα κοινα και τα ιδια) involving those who have failed in some way or another in their duties as prescribed by the law (1.2.14).

The inclusion of ingratitude (ἀχαριστία) within a discussion of justice (1.2.7) might seem odd. According to Xenophon’s Socrates, however, the greatest injustice that one might perpetrate is ingratitude (Mem. 2.2), since it entails the refusal to return a favour or requite a benefit when one is able to do so (Cyr. 1.2.7; cf. Mem. 4.4.24). Gratitude, by this definition, is an important instance of distributive justice in which each person receives that which is due to him or her. The question of how this distribution might be made justly—in other words, how to decide who receives what and how much—is answered by Xenophon in the person of the ideal leader: the ideal leader knows how to distribute goods, offices, and honours justly. Cyrus’ ability to inhabit this role is illustrated in an incident that forms part of the account of his stay with his grandfather, Astyages, in Media (1.3–4).

Cyrus decides to remain in Media when his mother prepares to return to Persia (1.3.13–15). She is concerned about his continuing education in justice but he assures her of his precise (perfect?) understanding of justice (ἀκριβῶς ταύτα γε οἶδα; 1.3.16). He reminds her that he had already been appointed by his teachers as a judge because of this understanding, but he then proceeds to narrate a case in which he was flogged for not deciding a case correctly (1.3.17). A bigger boy exchanged his

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small tunic with that of a small boy who had a larger tunic. Cyrus decided that each boy should keep
the tunic that best fit him, but his teacher rebuked him, saying that he should have judged the matter on
the basis of rightful possession. The question should turn on whether the tunic rightfully belonged to
the boy who obtained it by force/violence (βια, Βία) or to the one who had made or bought it. The teacher
summarized the legal principle as follows:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔρη τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἄνομον βίαιον, σύν τῷ νόμῳ ἐκέλευεν ἂεί τὸν
δικαιότητι τὴν ψήφον τίθεσθαι.

And since, he said, what is lawful is right and what is unlawful is violent,²¹⁰ he bade the judge
always render his verdict on the side of the law. (1.3.17)

Cyrus concludes the story by reaffirming his precise understanding of all matters relating to justice (τὰ
gε δικαία παντάπασιν ἢδη ἄκριβό; 1.3.17). The topic of law is not often raised by Xenophon in the
Cyropædia and this passage is therefore important for one’s understanding of Cyrus’ attitude towards
law and justice.

Deborah Gera argues that the coat incident shows the difficulty of reconciling what is lawful with
what is just, but that “Cyrus needs to be taught especially that the law may seem unfair or unreasonable
at times, but must none the less be obeyed if justice is to prevail.”²²⁰ This position would seem to
match that of Xenophon’s Socrates (Mem. 4.4). Socrates’ own obedience to the law is firstly
emphasized (4.4.1–4) and in his subsequent discussion with Hippias (4.4.5–25), Socrates declares what
is lawful and what is just to be the same thing (τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποδείκνυμαι νόμιμον τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι;
4.4.18).²²¹ This is the same language used by Cyrus’ teacher at Cyropædia 1.3.17, suggesting that the
teacher and Socrates (and therefore Xenophon) hold this position. Does this mean that Cyrus’ initial
judgement was wrong in so far as he ignored property rights? Cyrus’ statement that he was flogged for
judging incorrectly (1.3.16) must be understood to mean that he judged incorrectly in the eyes of his
teacher. It would be strange if Cyrus’ assertion that he understands justice precisely (1.3.17) was
supported by an example in which he was mistaken.²²²

Rather than being incorrect, Cyrus’ desire to give each boy a coat appropriate to his size is
illustrative of proportional justice. As the dialogue with Chrysantas (2.2.18–22) shows, the principle
of proportionality in the just distribution of goods and offices is applied in Cyrus’ leadership of his army
and later his empire (2.3.4–8; 7.5.35; 8.1.19–20, 39; 8.4.3–5). This principle is clearly foreshadowed in
Cyrus’ decision in the coat incident of 1.3.

²¹⁰ Miller’s Loeb translation reads “wrong” at this point, but the question of force and violence is an important one in
the discussion, as will be shown below.

²²⁰ Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 73–76, here 75. For M. Tamiolaki, the incident creates doubt about Cyrus’
attachment to justice and serves to call into question his virtue (“Virtue and Leadership,” 572–74). Rather than question
Cyrus’ justice, however, the incident contributes to Xenophon’s investigation into the nature of justice and its relationship to
law.

²²¹ For a defence of the positivist interpretation of Mem. 4.4 and a discussion of some of its implications, see Donald

The tension between law and (proportional) justice in the coat incident is thus not unambiguously resolved in favour of law. So too, in his discussion with Hippias in *Memorabilia* 4.4, Socrates needs to extend the legal realm to include divine, unwritten law in order to ameliorate this tension, even if the tension is not adequately resolved. An important characteristic of divine law is that it is beneficial, and it is this which explains Cyrus’ decision. Both boys are better off following his judgement—regardless of what the property laws declare—because they both have a coat that fits them well. But even if proportional justice has been done, the bigger boy’s actions cannot be condoned.

The teacher’s conclusion about the case (1.3.17) does not contrast justice and injustice, but justice and violence (τὸ βίατον). The bigger boy’s use of force, violence, and compulsion is the most problematic aspect of this case. What the teacher’s response highlights is a preference for non-violence. Justice, in this case, the fair distribution of goods, should ideally be brought about through persuasion and coercion rather than force and compulsion. There seems to be some irony, then, in Cyrus’ recollection that he was beaten (presumably by the teacher) for judging incorrectly (1.3.16; cf. 1.3.18). It would seem that in Xenophon’s thinking, violence is undesirable, but sometimes necessary and unavoidable, especially in the realm of international politics.

The question of what justice towards enemies might look like is answered by Cambyses in his dialogue with Cyrus in 1.6. The discussion starts with a question from Cyrus about how a leader might gain an advantage over the enemy (1.6.26). Cambyses answers that a successful leader will exhibit a number of negative traits: he will be “designing and cunning, wily and deceitful, a thief and a robber, overreaching the enemy at every point” (δει τὸν μέλλοντα τοῦτο ποιήσειν καὶ ἐπίβουλον εἶναι καὶ κρυψάναι καὶ δολερόν καὶ ἄπατεων καὶ κλέπτην καὶ ἀρσαγα καὶ ἐν παντὶ πλεονέκτην τὸν πολέμιον; 1.6.27, cf. Mem. 3.1.6). When Cyrus rejects this advice, presumably because it seems to go against all that he has been taught about justice, Cambyses goes on to say that he must nonetheless still be the most righteous and law-abiding man (δικαιότατος τε καὶ νομιμότατος ἁνήρ; 1.6.27). He appeals to the Persian education system to show what he means (1.6.28–29). The youth are trained to hunt animals through trickery and deceit, and this is nothing other than preparation for war. At the same time, they are taught not to harm their friends. Cambyses recalls a teacher who attempted to use the same techniques in the realm of justice, teaching boys to be honest and to lie, to slander and not to slander, and so forth (1.6.31–32). This was ultimately unsuccessful since the youth were liable to use the


224. Danzig, “Justice and Law,” 264–65. Xenophon’s thinking about justice is similar to his thinking about obedience. There is a preferred option—fair distribution without violence or willing obedience—but exceptional cases might call for violence or compulsion. For the argument that Xenophon uses this scene to show Cyrus twisting justice, see Tamiolaki, “Virtue and Leadership,” 572–74.
negative skills against one another, instead of reserving them for enemies. Cambyses says that now the
system focuses only on the positive, and boys are taught that if they ever act contrary to the law, they
are liable to be punished (1.6.33). At a suitable age, though, when they are no longer likely to “break
away and degenerate into savages,” young men are taught that which is lawful towards enemies (τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμιους νόμιμα), namely, deceit, cunning, and the like (1.6.34). When dealing with
enemies, justice takes on a different form to that taught to young Persian boys.225

But even when dealing with enemies, it would seem that a ruler might act justly or unjustly. Cyrus
argues that his army did not act unjustly (ἀδικῶς) in marching against Babylon since the Babylonians,
and not the Persians, were the aggressors (7.5.77). The implication is that the aggressor acted unjustly
while the army that acted in self-defence acted justly. Bodil Due rightly observes about Xenophon that,

He accepts war, as all Greeks did, as a necessity which can impose itself on a nation and which
has to be faced and dealt with. In this case a war can be termed δίκαιος, but not an aggressive
war.226

This discussion of justice still leaves the question of the king's relationship to the law of the city
unanswered.

Christopher Whidden is incorrect when he argues that “Cyrus went on to make a career of
ignoring and subverting it [viz. the law] when he thought his will produced a better result.”227 The
examples he cites certainly show Cyrus imposing his will in order to achieve his goals, but the
emphasis in the narrative is on Cyrus' ability to achieve these goals, rather than on law-breaking.
Furthermore, it is not clear that all of the examples would have been considered negatively by
Xenophon. While the United Nations of the twenty-first century might decry looting, the νόμος of
ancient warfare—according to Cyrus, “a law established for all time among all men” (7.5.73)—decrees
that the spoils of war go to the victor.228 The “law” in this case is closer to the universal law of which
Socrates speaks in Memorabilia 4.4 rather than the constitutional law of a state. There is a well-known
passage in the final book which has some bearing on the question of Cyrus and the law.

Following the observation that Cyrus holds himself up as a model of virtue (for which, see below,
p. 85), Xenophon notes the following:

For he thought he perceived that men are made better through even the written law (τοῖς γραφομένοις νόμοις), while the good ruler he regarded as a law with eyes for men (βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις), because he is able not only to give commandments but also to see the
transgressor and punish him. (8.1.22)

This passage has been read negatively, showing Cyrus as one who supersedes the law.229 It is possible,
though, that Xenophon means for the reader to admire the good ruler as one who is not only able to
establish the law (which is what the written law does), but who is also able to pursue and prosecute

225. The paradoxical nature of justice is an important topic in the Memorabilia (4.2.12–23). See also Gera,
226. Due, Cyropaedia, 163.
228. For Cyrus’ attitude to war, see Due, Cyropaedia, 158–63.
229. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 290.
those who transgress the law. Rather than remove the king from the realm of law, this passage serves to identify the king with law. Despite the fact that “[Cyrus] is ruthlessly self-serving and subversive of the status quo,” what Xenophon shows is that when Cyrus chooses to change existing laws, his alterations are always improvements. The assumption behind this state of affairs is that Cyrus has the requisite knowledge both to apply the laws, but also to adjust or even abrogate them as necessary for the mutual advantage of himself and his subjects. The possibility that these powers might be abused is not considered by Xenophon in relation to his ideal leader.

Ideally, the law is considered as a source of instruction and moral development, rather than punishment. The law is mentioned in this regard together with fathers, teachers, and exemplary figures (1.6.20; 2.2.14). Since the king often serves as the most important exemplary figure (see below, p. 85), he can be seen as fulfilling a similar role to the law-as-tutor, even if he is superior to the law in this pedagogical role (3.3.49–55).

The ambiguity with regard to Cyrus’ relationship to law is evident in the final scene of 1.3. In her closing words to her son, Mandane suggests that there are different principles of justice and therefore different laws at work in Media, a tyranny, and Persia, which is marked by kingship (Cyr. 1.3.18). In Media, Astyages is master of all and is able to command the greatest share of goods. In contrast, equality is considered just (τὸ ἴσον ἑσθν δίκαιον νομίζει) in Persia, and the king acts in accordance with the polis and its law, not his own will. This is a restatement of Socrates’ famous distinction between kingship, defined as rule through consent and in accordance with the laws, and tyranny, which is rule of unwilling subjects in which the rulers is not controlled by the laws (Mem. 4.6.12). The following scene opens with the departure of Cyrus’ mother from Media and the observation that “Cyrus remained behind and grew up in Media” (1.4.1). The reader is not surprised, therefore, to find something of the Median tyrant alongside the Persian king in Cyrus as the narrative of his education progresses. This theme will be explored in more detail in the discussion of Book 8 of the Cyropaedia.

_A Father-to-Son Chat._ Cyrus the learner is most clearly on display in the dialogue with Cambyses (1.6) which follows Cyrus being given his first command (1.5). He is put in charge of thirty-one thousand

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230. See Gray, _Mirror of Princes_, 288–89, who appeals to the parallels between this passage and the positive description of the νομοφύλακες in Oec. 9.14 and the ἐξόροι in Lac. 8.3–4.


232. Tatum, _Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction_, 98.


235. Cyrus’ response that Astyages thus teaches his subjects to be content with little can be taken ironically. But if Cyrus is indeed Xenophon’s ideal leader, then we might take the young prince’s words as face value and accept that he truly believes that the Medes can learn to be content with little through their experience of tyranny. Perhaps it is the inexperience of youth speaking, since even the slaves are cared for by the elder Cyrus (8.1.43–44).

236. Gera notes a number of ways in which Cyrus has become his grandfather in the final book of the _Cyropaedia_ (Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 293). The transformation is made explicit at 8.1.40–41 (Tatum, _Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction_, 197).
soldiers in response to a call from his uncle, Cyaxares, who had succeeded Astyages as the Median king. Before departing, he plans to meet with his father (1.5.14).

The significance of the Cambyses-dialogue in Xenophon’s narrative is evident from the ring-structure created by Cambyses’ “return” in 8.5.21–27. Cambyses’ instructions to his “child” (παῖς; 8.5.22) in Book 8 warn against tyrannical traits to which a successful general might be attracted. Cambyses’ second speech concludes Cyrus’ education and the narrative very quickly concludes as Cyrus becomes an old man and dies (8.7). Similarly, the dialogue in 1.6 also concludes with a brief warning against tyranny (see the discussion of 1.6.45 below) but contains more positive instruction. Furthermore, much of what Cyrus is taught by his father in 1.6 is illustrated in his military career described in Books 2–7. The education of the prince that is on display here thus forms a key component of Xenophon’s theory of the ideal leader. The dialogue is framed by the question of piety and relationship to the gods (1.6.2–6, 44–46). In addition to showing his piety through prayer and sacrifice, the successful leader must be educated in reading auguries and auspices so that he will be able to obey the will of the gods and not be led astray by false oracles. He will also understand that the gods do not respond to those who are not first willing to fulfil their own human responsibilities. We have already seen (above, p. 66) how Xenophon hints at this doctrine by excluding any mention of omens at Cyrus’ birth. As Xenophon’s paradigmatic leader, Cyrus must do everything in word and deed that a good leader needs to do in order to lead well. Only once he has done this, may he turn to the gods for aid and for insight into what is humanly unknowable. Cambyses observes, “those only who had made themselves what they ought to be [have] a right to ask for corresponding blessings from the gods” (1.6.5).

As the ideal leader, Cyrus begins his first military expedition with due attention to the gods (1.5.6, 14; 1.6.1; cf. *Eq. mag.* 1.1) and is shown the supreme god’s favour in the form of auspicious thunder and lightning (1.6.1–2). Not only Cyrus’ entry into Media (2.1.1), but indeed the rest of his career is marked by similar care with regard to divine matters (3.3.20–22; 8.1.23–24), and this attitude continues until the end of his life (8.7.1–3). Cyrus’ piety is regularly met with positive omens from the gods (2.4.18–19; 7.1.3; 8.7.2). This is not indicative of a mechanistic view of religion from Xenophon, but illustrates the favour which Cyrus finds with the gods. It also confirms Cambyses’ teaching in 1.6. Xenophon’s ideal leader is marked by piety and a concomitant humility which is seen in

237. Tatum, *Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction*, 75–91. Whidden suggests that Cambyses represents the voice of Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* and the it is he, and not Cyrus, who is the true sage in the narrative (“Cyrus’s Persian Education,” 554).

238. The discussion between teacher and pupil, father and son, king and prince, recalls the Socratic dialogues in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (Gera, *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia*, 50–54; Mueller-Goldingen, *Xenopon’s Kyrupädie*, 109).

239. P.Oxy. 697, 698, 1018, 2101, *P. Varsov.* 1 = Pack 1 1545–9 (Gera, *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia*, 49 n. 90). Stobaeus also quotes large parts of Cambyses’ dialogue (*Cyr.* 1.6.3–6, 8, 10, 14, 17–19, 20–21, 23–28) in a section entitled ἰσοθηκον περὶ ἱστημάτων (4.7.68–75); see Gera, *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia*, 50 n. 91 for further discussion.

acknowledging the limitations of human knowledge and wisdom. These traits are received favourably by the gods, who respond with omens and reward the leader with success.

Piety is an important virtue of the ideal leader, but the discussion now turns to more earthly matters related to “ruling well” (τὸ καλῶς ἀρχεῖν; 1.6.8). The Socratic motif that leadership is interchangeable—that the skills needed to lead men and women in one realm, the home, for example, are the same as those needed to lead in another realm—is raised at 1.6.7, but Cambyses turns his instruction more specifically towards what it means to rule well as a political and military leader.

In keeping with what was observed regarding the ruler’s φιλανθρωπία, Cambyses will teach that good rule is characterized primarily in terms of concern for one’s subordinates: “how to govern other people so that they might have all the necessaries of life in abundance and might all become what they ought to be, this [seems] to us worthy of all admiration” (1.6.7). In order to achieve this, the good ruler will be marked by προνοια and φιλοπονία (1.6.8). The leader’s forethought here seems to be synonymous with the careful attention necessary to look after his subordinates’ needs, and the love of labour is necessary if he is to work continuously to bring about their good. This leadership stands in contrast to the rule of the Medians, who are marked by their desire for more sumptuous food, greater wealth, more sleep, and, generally speaking, a life of greater luxury than their subjects (1.6.8). The Median rulers show no desire to care for their subjects.

Care for subordinates, in the case of an army, includes the question of supplies (1.6.9–11), the army’s health, the location of camps, diet, exercise, friendly competition, and morale (1.6.15–19). Cyrus recalls what he had learned about these things from those who were truly “masters of military science” (1.6.14–15). Their example stands in contrast to the fraudulent teacher who claimed to know the art of being a general, but who taught only tactics (1.6.12–14). The point could not be clearer: a real general needs to acquire knowledge beyond that which is usually associated with military leadership. In particular, the ideal general needs to understand how to care for those under his command. He needs to understand and practice φιλανθρωπία above everything else.

We have already had occasion to discuss Xenophon’s teaching about obedience in this passage (1.6.20–22). The connection with the preceding section now becomes clear: people are willing to be obedient when they believe the ruler is better able to look after their own interests than they are. Or, put negatively, no one is deliberately disobedient when they believe such disobedience will lead to their disadvantage. Xenophon illustrates this point with the well-known examples of a physician and pilot of a ship, to which he adds a guide (1.6.21). In each case, these leaders are obeyed willingly because

241. As one might expect, the degenerate Persian empire of Xenophon’s day is marked by impiety (8.7.7).
242. A love of labour is an especially important military trait and is closely related to the need for a military leader to show endurance and self-control; see below on 1.6.25.
243. Cf. Mem. 3.1.1–11 where a very similar scenario is presented with Socrates playing the role that Cambyses plays in Cyr. 1.6; for fuller discussion and a comparison between the two episodes, see Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 61–64.
244. The same point about willing obedience is made at Mem. 3.3.8–9 in the context of training a cavalry officer and here Socrates uses the example of a doctor, pilot of a ship, and a farmer. The farmer will appear in the following paragraph in the Cyropaedia (§22). Xenophon’s transference of these chunks of ideas (Gedankenblöcken) from one context to another (Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophs Kyrupädie, 123) illustrates, again, the unity of his leadership theory within his larger oeuvre.
their subordinates believe that the leaders are more capable of serving the needs of the subordinates than they, the subordinates, are. Cyrus’ summary of this teaching identifies superior knowledge as the necessary trait to elicit willing obedience (1.6.22).

Cambyses asserts that this knowledge cannot be imitated. The only way to acquire a reputation for being knowledgeable (φρόνημα) is to be truly knowledgeable. A poor leader will be seen as such just as quickly as a bad farmer, horseman, doctor, or musician. In each of these situations, appearance and reputation are not sufficient since each situation requires action, and the result of that action will show up the ability of the one performing it. Learning all that it is possible to learn is the only path to the sort of knowledge demanded of the ideal leader (1.6.23). And knowledge of that which cannot be learned should be sought from the gods.

Knowledge of what is good for one’s subordinates needs to be translated into action. Cyrus considers it necessary to treat subjects in the same way one would treat friends: doing good for them (1.6.24). Cambyses agrees, but extends this into situations when one is unable to do good. A leader should also rejoice with those who are rejoicing, mourn with those who mourn, help those in distress, and ensure that they are not put at any disadvantage. The good leader empathizes with his subordinates, even to the point of placing himself in the same situation as they are. In the military context, this means that the general must be willing to endure the same hardships that his soldiers are enduring (1.6.24). In fact, because of his superior virtue—in this case, his καρτερία—he is even better suited to enduring these things than they are (1.6.25). But the greater honour that is ascribed to the general for facing the same toils (πόνοι) as his soldiers also contributes to lightening this burden—his φιλοτιµία drives him towards good leadership practices.

We pause our discussion of Cambyses’ teaching to investigate virtues related to καρτερία.

The heat and cold, hardship and toil that is endured through καρτερία at 1.6.25 is withstood through ἐγκράτεια at 8.1.36–37. The distinction between these two traits is not consistently or clearly made and both describe avoiding pleasure in the present for the sake of greater future benefits. At 8.1.30–39, ἐγκράτεια is an important part of Cyrus’ training of his soldiers and of himself. The virtue is essential if a soldier is to survive heat and cold, hunger and thirst, hardship and toil. For Persians,
lessons in self-control start with training in matters related to food and drink (1.2.8), and their success in learning these lessons is seen in the way they control themselves while hunting (1.2.10–11). Despite his temporary stay in luxurious Media, the young Cyrus retains the virtues he had been taught in Persia and his endurance and self-control soon win him the respect of his Persian peers (1.5.1).

In the *Cyropaedia*, σωφροσύνη is often associated with ἐγκράτεια (1.2.8; 4.1.14–15; 7.5.76; 8.1.30, 32). Thus, σωφροσύνη plays a central role in the Persian education system where it is once linked to martial skills and exemplified in moderation and even abstinence from food and drink (1.2). Little wonder, then, that the Persians are characterized by this virtue (4.1.14; cf. 1.3.2, 4). There are two extended passages in which the virtue is discussed as it pertains to war (3.1.16–18; 4.1.15–18). The former occurs in Cyrus’ dialogue with Tigranes. Xenophon associates Tigranes with a philosopher whom Cyrus admires (3.1.14), thus making Tigranes someone worth listening to. Thus, σωφροσύνη is something that can be taught and learned, unlike the emotions which simply wash over one.

The passage describing Abradatas’ death and the mourning of Panthea, his widow (7.3), is insightful for two reasons. First, we see Xenophon ascribe σωφροσύνη and all virtue to Panthea (7.3.12). Although there is no direct line drawn to leadership at this point, the narrative has repeatedly connected σωφροσύνη to leadership. The ascription of this virtue to Panthea opens up the potential for her to be a leader, but her suicide removes her from the scene before this theme can be properly developed. We know from other examples that Xenophon thought that women could indeed be leaders and that they were capable of learning the necessary virtues. Second, the passage serves to highlight the importance of σωφροσύνη in Xenophon’s thought since it stands as the chief virtue at this point. This is because self-control is the most important means of bringing about virtue, as Cyrus teaches in the speech to his soldiers at 7.5.72–86.

Not surprisingly, Cyrus exhibits this cluster of virtues in his youth and throughout his life as general and king. The leader’s moderation and self-control in matters of eating and drinking are evident not only when these virtues are explicitly mentioned, but also when they are demonstrated by his actions in, for example, his conduct at banquets (4.2.38; 5.2.14–19). Cyrus’ actions (or inaction) towards the beautiful Panthea serve to illustrate his piety and sexual σωφροσύνη (6.1.47; cf. 5.1.8). Most strikingly, within the empire he creates, Cyrus undertakes to be the very paradigm of σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια which he expects his subjects to emulate (8.1.30–33; cf. 8.1.12, 21). That these virtues


253. For a more detailed analysis of Cyrus’ self-control in these “eating and drinking” passages, see Due, *Cyropaedia*, 170–79. The five symposia in the *Cyropaedia* (1.3; 2.2; 5.2; 8.3; 8.4) are examined by Gera (Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, 132–91).

are important for Xenophon’s ideal leader is once again confirmed by a comparison with the figure of Socrates, of whom Xenophon writes:

in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest (ἐγκράτεστατος) of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute (καρπερικότατος); and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation (πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος) that having very little he was yet very content. (Mem. 1.2.1; cf. 1.3.5–15)

Xenophon’s military heroes exhibit similar traits (Anab. 3.1.23), as does Agesilaus (Ages. 5.2–3). Conversely, the opponents of the Persian army are poor soldiers and will be easily defeated because they do not possess these virtues (Cyr. 1.5.11). The consistency with which moderation and self-control occur in, and are practised by, Xenophon’s most significant characters confirm their centrality in his theory of leadership.255

Returning to the dialogue between Cyrus and Cambyses, we are confronted with a long section in which the king and the prince discuss military tactics (1.6.26–44). While Xenophon’s military knowledge and experience is on display at this point, there is not much that relates to our attempts at sketching Xenophon’s ideal king, other than to point again the significance of military leadership in this portrait.256

The final paragraph of the dialogue begins and ends with a reminder to Cyrus to heed divine omens and respect the omniscience of the gods (1.6.44, 46). Wedged between this teaching, though, is a collection of brief “lessons from history” (1.6.45). Cyrus is warned to keep a watchful eye on those he has armed and befriended lest they turn on him. Despite the exchange of favours, even friends are likely to turn on those who treat them like slaves. Those leaders who fail to be satisfied with their proper share and instead desire to be “lords of all” are likely to lose everything they had gained. And those who have gained great wealth have often been ruined by it.

These “lessons from history” read like a warning against tyranny. In these brief statements we are provided with the opposite of the ideal ruler portrayed in the dialogue. The negative portrait becomes even clearer if we remember the most important virtues necessary for the success of the ideal leader: φιλανθρωπία and καρπερία/εγκράτεια/σωφροσύνη. Instead of exhibiting φιλανθρωπία and caring for his friends/subjects, the tyrant treats them like slaves. Instead of self-control and moderation, the bad ruler seeks to control “all” and is characterized by an inordinate desire for wealth.257 The fact that Cyrus maintains until death his hold over the empire he creates indicates that he learned these lessons from his father. He exercises the royal virtues throughout his life, as the narrative in Books 2–7 indicates, and shows himself to be the ideal leader described by Xenophon’s Cambyses. As we

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255. The self-control and moderation exemplified by Cyrus is largely physical and is somewhat distinct from the personal, moral configuration of similar virtues that characterize much of the Socratic legacy (Due, Cyropædia, 225–28). This is due to the nature of the narrative with which Xenophon provides his reader. The strong military emphasis and the virtues related to these pursuits is inevitable, given that his hero is Cyrus.

256. Cambyses discussion of justice has already been dealt with; see above, p. 73.

257. The contrast is evident in the characters of Socrates (self-control) and Simonides (greed) who teach about kingship and tyranny, respectively (Strauss, Tyranny, 33).
investigate Book 8 of the *Cyropaedia* we will have further opportunity to return to the question of whether Cyrus ever ventured into the realm of tyranny.

In 1.6, we see Cyrus receiving an education from Cambyses “that is partly Socratic but not explicitly philosophic.”\(^{258}\) The Socratic form and even certain Socratic elements can be clearly seen in the dialogue, but the focus is exclusively on good leadership. The dialogue between Cambyses and Cyrus is programmatic in that it exemplifies the “education of Cyrus” and also raises specific topics and themes that relate to Xenophon’s description of the ideal leader.\(^{259}\) It is specifically military leadership that is in view since the good king is required to be a good general. Xenophon’s knowledge of, and attention to the details of, martial tactics and logistics is on display here as it is in the *Anabasis*, *De equestium magistro*, and elsewhere in his writings.\(^{260}\) This does not mean that it should be read as a military handbook or a call for military reform.\(^{261}\) The focus of Xenophon’s narrative remains Cyrus’ education which is used as a means to portray his ideal leader. In Cambyses’ teaching, the ideal leader must instill obedience of one sort or another. The primary virtue in this regard is φιλανθρωπία since people are most willing to obey leaders whom they believe are serving the interests of their subordinates. Alongside this concern for subordinates, the cluster of virtues that contribute to self-control, endurance, and moderation must be nurtured in the ideal leader. This group of virtues are discussed by Cambyses and Cyrus in the light of military leadership, but they are shown throughout the *Cyropaedia* to be important virtues for the king to fix in himself and his subjects. It is above all in the final book of the *Cyropaedia* that we see Cyrus the king.

*Kingship (7.5.37–8.7.28)*

This last part of the *Cyropaedia* presents the reader with “a lesson in how to follow up a military victory with the reorganization of a post-war world.”\(^{262}\) Having subdued his enemies, Cyrus must now organize his subjects into an orderly empire. At 7.5.37, Cyrus determines to establish himself in a manner fitting for a king (ὡς βασιλεύειν ἔγειτο πρέπειν) and much of what we see in final section of the *Cyropaedia* provides us with a description of this kingship.

As indicated by the νῦν δὲ of 7.5.47 and 7.5.56, from this point onwards, Cyrus’ leadership has entered a different era which necessitates a different mode of rule. The king begins by distancing himself from the crowd and establishing intermediaries between himself and the people (7.5.37–57). Whereas the demands of war made it necessary for the good general to be amongst his soldiers, now the good king needs time alone with his advisors and friends. Cyrus does not demand this new freedom but manipulates his friends in order that they come up with the suggestion. Xenophon also has

\(^{258}\) Newell, *Tyranny*, 204.

\(^{259}\) For an examination of how Xenophon uses recurrent themes and repeated patterns to create a coherent work, see Due, *Cyropaedia*, 92–114.

\(^{260}\) Other texts, such as the *De equestium ratione* and *Cynegeticus* are also related to military matters. Near the end of the treatise on hunting, for example, Xenophon reminds his reader that hunting “affords the best training for war” (*Cyn.* 12.1).


\(^{262}\) Tatum, *Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction*, 76.
Chrysantas urge Cyrus to take a palace for himself. The way in which Cyrus’ kingship is inaugurated is meant to highlight a point made at 7.5.47: that all of these changes are made in the interest of harmonizing the interests of the leader and those for whom he must care. The new era has the same goal as the former era, even if the means by which this goal is reached might look different. The continuity between “before” and “now” is observed in the continuing importance of virtue.

\textit{Virtues.} Cyrus issues the following warning to his army:

\begin{quote}
Therefore, we dare not become careless nor give ourselves up to the enjoyment of the present moment; for, while I think it is a great thing to have won an empire, it is a still greater thing to preserve it after it has been won. (7.5.76)
\end{quote}

The empire had been won by an army possessed of these virtues\textsuperscript{263} and the empire can only be preserved in so far as virtue is practised. Cyrus exhorts his soldiers to continue to practise virtue as they had in the past (70, 77) for two reasons. First, it is only through virtue that the Persians can establish themselves as superior over others, and therefore as rightful rulers over those whom they have subdued (78, 83). This is an attitude that Cyrus himself held and put into practice (8.1.37, 40). Second, virtue is both the means and the safeguard of true happiness (80–86). Imperial power will bring with it many temptations which can only be resisted through these virtues. Cyrus proclaims that there are no new tricks to be learnt; virtue is still to be practised by the older generation and instilled in the younger generation as it had been in Persia (85–86).\textsuperscript{264} And as before, the example of the older men, but especially of Cyrus, serve as the source and model of this educational programme.

The importance of virtue has been demonstrated in our survey of the various virtues considered essential for the ideal leader to possess.\textsuperscript{265} We need only note at this point that Xenophon continues to ascribe these virtues to Cyrus in this final major section of the \textit{Cyropaedia}. Even in his newfound role as emperor, he continues to exhibit piety (8.1.23–25), πρόνοια and φιλοσοφία (8.2.2; cf. 1.6.8), σωφροσύνη (8.1.30), and ἐγκράτεια (8.1.32), to mention only some of the key virtues central to Xenophon’s depiction of the Persian king. There is thus also continuity in Cyrus’ own practice of these leadership virtues.\textsuperscript{266}

We have already seen the centrality of φιλανθρωπία in Xenophon’s picture of the ideal king and that virtue is once again on display in this section (e.g., 8.2.1). There is a related virtue that needs to be mentioned at this point because of its importance in other kingship texts. If φιλανθρωπία usually involves doing good to others in order to win their favour, πραδότης can be considered “the practice of not harming others in situations where harshness or violence might be expected” and “the tendency not

\textsuperscript{263} The Persian army had already been described as being filled with enthusiasm, ambition, strength, courage, exhortation, self-control, obedience (προθυµιας, φιλοτιµιας, ρωµις, θαρρους, παρακελευσµου, σωφροσυνες, πειθους; 3.3.59).

\textsuperscript{264} Xenophon’s emphasis on continuity shows that it is not the case, as Pangle argues, that “the virtue that the new Persians practice is a grotesque counterfeit of the old Persian virtue” (“Socrates,” 149). As I will argue below, Xenophon is sensitive to the different leadership needs of republic versus empire, but is not critical of those who need to rule the latter.

\textsuperscript{265} See also Due for a synthesis and discussion of Cyrus’ virtues (\textit{Cyropaedia}, 156–84).

\textsuperscript{266} While it might be possible in other contexts to distinguish between military and moral virtues (so Tamiolaki, “Virtue and Leadership,” 565–66), that distinction is not made with regard to Cyrus.
to retaliate when contradicted, rivaled, threatened, or betrayed.”

The king’s gentleness can also be seen as the practical outworking of forgiveness. Cyrus exhibits these traits in his treatment both of those close to him (Araspas; 6.1.31–37) and those who are distant, like prisoners of war (4.4.6–8; cf. 7.5.73). In the trial of the Armenian king (3.1) who was in rebellion against the Medes, Cyrus shows gentleness both in his response to king’s treatment of the σοφιστής (3.1.14) who had stolen his son’s affection (3.1.38–40) and in his treatment of the Armenians (3.1.37). Cyrus’ approach to dealing with the Armenians leads to another passage in which his virtues are praised:

And when they got home they talked, one of Cyrus's wisdom (σοφία), another of his strength (καρτερία), another of his gentleness (πραοτης), and still another of his beauty and his commanding presence (τὸ κύλλος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος). (3.1.41)

Cyrus is willing to show gentleness and clemency in his various relationships and dealings with others. These virtues form part of the cluster of virtues that are centred on his φιλανθρωπία. As is the case with his φιλανθρωπία, Cyrus’ πραοτης is often a means to a greater end. In the case of the Armenians, for example, Cyrus gains greater financial and military support by making them his friends than he might have had they remained conquered enemies (3.1.31–34). The mutually beneficial nature of Cyrus’ treatment of others is thus characteristic of Cyrus’ entire career and is not limited to the final book, although there is one image of this reciprocal relationship that seems especially egregious to some: the shepherd who benefits from his sheep.

Opportunistic Shepherd. The second chapter of Book 8 contains a lengthy display of Cyrus’ generosity and gift-giving (8.2.1–9). Cyrus’ father had linked φιλανθρωπία to εὐ ποιεῖν (1.6.24) and the image of Cyrus the benefactor is dominant in the first part of Book 8. The term is found at 8.1.25 and 8.2.9, but the concept is extended beyond these examples.

Whereas food and drink had already been shown to be an important site for the practise and display of self-control and moderation, they now afford Cyrus the opportunity to display generosity and care for his subjects in the form of lavish banquets, the apotheosis of which occurs in 8.4. It is in connection with Cyrus’ generosity, however, that Xenophon presents another common royal theme: the king as shepherd (8.2.13–14). Xenophon’s Socrates taught that, following the example of Agamemnon, the good general must care for his flock and ensure that his soldiers fulfill their proper function (Mem. 3.2.1). The leader’s primary focus must be to ensure that his subordinates are εὐδαίμονα. But Cyrus is distinguished not only by the desire for his subjects’ εὐδαίμονα, but also by deriving benefit from his flock. This leads Deborah Gera to suggest that Cyrus is closer to Plato’s Thrasymachus (Resp. 343a–b) than he is to Socrates at this point.

268. Discussed in detail by Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 78–98.
269. It is likely that Xenophon has the trial and death of Socrates in view at this point (Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 160–62). Xenophon’s perspective on the matter is not clear (Gera, “Xenophon’s Socrateses,” 39–41): does he sympathise with Tigranes, who lost a beloved teacher, the Armenian king, who lost his son’s affection, Cyrus, who understands both positions, or the teacher himself, who does not hold the king culpable because he acts out of ignorance?
270. The virtue ἐπίσκεψε is not mentioned explicitly in the Cyropaedia but the concept is present in the person of
Although it is possible to read this statement as irony on Xenophon’s part, Cyrus’ discussion with Croesus about the nature of a king’s wealth suggests otherwise (8.2.15–23). Cyrus states that he uses his wealth to enrich his friends which, at the same time, ensures his own safety: “by enriching men and doing them kindnesses I win with my superfluous wealth their friendship and loyalty, and from that I reap as my reward security and good fame (ἐκ τούτων καρπούμαι ἀμφότεραν καὶ εὐκλείαν)” (8.2.22; cf. 8.2.19). Is it possible that Cyrus is being disingenuous here? Is he simply saying these things because they are the sorts of things that politicians say in order to maintain their grasp of power? Is Xenophon intent on portraying the Persian emperor as “a distant, paternalistic despot whose authority rests on lavish gift giving”?272 Xenophon allays these concerns by being quite explicit about the fact that Cyrus practised what he preached (και ταῦτα μὲν δὴ φανερός ἢν ὅσπερ ἐλεγε καὶ πράττων; 8.2.23). His use of wealth is in keeping with his φιλανθρωπία (see p. 68) which, as we have seen, means that he desires the good of his subjects even as he benefits himself. The king and his subjects exist in a mutually beneficial relationship. One way in which this relationship is conceptualized is by comparing it to that between a father and the members of his household.

Father. Xenophon has Chrysantas state that a good ruler should care for his subjects like a good father does for his children and that this is indeed what Cyrus has done (8.1.1).273 Both slaves and nobles alike call him father because of his provision for them, and Cyrus’ love for his subjects is so great that even those he has conquered call him “father” (8.2.9).274 These passages recall Cambyses’ teaching at 1.6.7, where the old king teaches his son that while it is a great task, worthy of the καλὸς κἄγαθος, to provide for his household, it is an even greater task “to understand how to govern other people so that they might have all the necessaries of life in abundance and might all become what they ought to be” (1.6.7). Cyrus agrees and states that this is what it means to govern well (1.6.8).275

It is in keeping with the transferable nature of Xenophon’s leadership theory276 that governing a household well and governing an empire well bear numerous similarities, the big difference between the two being the size of the οἶκος that must be governed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in

Cyrus as demonstrated by his προστήρις.

271. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 295.
273. Is Xenophon influenced by Herodotus at this point? With regard to the matter of tribute, Herodotus notes “that the Persians called Darius the merchant, Cambyses the master, and Cyrus the father; for Darius made petty profit out of everything, Cambyses was harsh and arrogant, Cyrus was merciful (ἡμοιος) and always worked for their well-being” (3.89.3).
274. At Ages. 7.3, Xenophon employs the same father-metaphor, but here the emphasis is on the fact that Agesilaus was a father to his political enemies. It is their status as citizens that guarantees their decent treatment. In the Cyropaedia it is Cyrus’ nature that ensures his subjects will be treated well.
275. If Cambyses in 1.6 serves as a model father and teacher to Cyrus (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 280), then Cyrus is also in many respects a model son and pupil. As Tatum observes, “In his relationship with Cambyses, Cyrus is the antithesis of the recalcitrant subjects Xenophon says human beings are disposed to be. The seemingly effortless way he comes to rule others is shaped by a complementary and equally effortless submission to the power of his father” (Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 82).
Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* a number of ideas that are later applied in the *Cyropaedia*. 277 Cyrus’ solution to the problem of ruling an empire is to establish himself as the father within his political household, the borders of which circumscribe millions of subjects. “Paternalism conceived in a broad sense is the solution to the problem Xenophon raised in the prologue.” 278 This new household will be run on the basis of imitation rather than law.

**Imitation.** The laws which are central to the Persian education system do not consist of prohibitions, like those of other states, but focus instead on forming the character of Persian citizens (1.2.2–3), which they do in conjunction with other figures of authority like fathers and teachers (1.6.20; 2.2.14). But if character formation is central to the goals of the state, the most effective form of instruction comes through the provision of models for imitation (3.3.49–55). So, too, Xenophon’s Socrates:

> To be sure he never professed to teach this [viz. the virtues]; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. (*Mem. 1.2.3*)

As part of establishing and maintaining his imperial “household,” Cyrus trains his subjects, but especially his lieutenants. This is an important step in ensuring a stable government since the nature of any organization is determined by the nature of its leadership (8.1.8; cf. 8.1.12). Cyrus accomplishes this training by presenting himself as a model for imitation (8.1.30–39). The initial focus in these paragraphs (30–33) is on the virtues that have been so central throughout the *Cyropaedia*: self-control and moderation. By practising these through imitating the king, subjects become obedient towards their superiors and well disposed towards one another. The outcome of this training almost has a philosophical ring to it as Xenophon notes that upon seeing Cyrus’ subjects “you would have judged that they were in truth making a noble life (καλος ζην) their aim” (33). But the martial nature of the empire is never allowed to recede into the background (34–39). Cyrus again sets the example for his lieutenants to follow as he continues to train himself and them “in the arts and pursuits of war” (37). Cyrus now embodies that which he had taught his soldiers earlier (7.5.86): those who practise virtue and establish themselves as models for others to imitate are also improved by the process, thus establishing a virtuous cycle in which both the model and the imitators are improved.

Within this virtuous cycle, though, the leader is always superior since improvement only occurs when something or someone superior is imitated. Cyrus and a number of other characters within the *Cyropaedia* all assert this foundational assumption: that the leader must be superior to his or her subordinates (Cyrus: 7.5.78; 8.1.37, 40; Tigranes: 3.1.20; Cyaxares: 5.5.34). The very fact of imitation suggests that there exist traits that can be learnt through such imitation. We have already shown, however, that the monarch—the leader who occupies the apex of the leadership pyramid—is

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277. Newell describes Hiero and the *Oeconomicus* as prologomena to the *Cyropaedia* (*Tyranny*, 190–98). Carlier (“Imperial Monarchy,” 358) notes that, “In the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus governs his empire as Ischomachus administers his estate in the *Oeconomicus*.” See also *Oec.* 4.4–12 where Socrates demonstrates to Critobulus that the “Persian king” pays as much attention to farming and he does to war.

characterized by certain inherent traits and abilities which ensure his success. Even if the young Cyrus is inferior to his Median companions in horsemanship, for example, his inherent love of learning and honour means that he is willing and able to work hard to become the best at those activities in which he did not excel (see, e.g., I.4.4–5), thus ensuring amongst them the superiority he had enjoyed amongst his Persian peers (1.3.1). For Xenophon, then, the superiority of the ideal leader is both necessary and inevitable.

The importance of imitation explains a puzzling aspect of Cyrus’ rule. His insistence that he be paid court by his subjects might strike some as an example of extreme narcissism, but Xenophon suggests an alternative reading of the king’s actions. Following a description of how Cyrus dealt with those who absented themselves from his court, Xenophon observes:

But in those who did present themselves he believed that he could in no way more effectively inspire a desire for the beautiful and the good (τα καλά και ἀγαθά) than by endeavouring, as their sovereign, to set before his subjects a perfect model of virtue in his own person. (8.1.21)

It is only in his presence that his subjects are able to appreciate fully the majesty of the king as they look upon the model placed before them and are transformed as they strive to imitate him. We have already had occasion to mention Cyrus’ physical appearance (see p. 67); here it is the effect that this appearance has on his subjects that is important.279

Cyrus is aware of the importance that his image plays in maintaining imperial rule, not only through inspiring imitation, but also through creating a sense of awe in his subjects. Two examples of this are mentioned in Book 8. First, Cyrus adopts the Median style of dress to enhance his appearance and encourages his lieutenants to do the same (8.1.40–42; cf. 1.3.2–3). Second, Cyrus’ procession from the palace to the sanctuaries (8.3) is designed to communicate the dignity (σεµνοτης) and authority of the king (8.3.1, 21).

As Tatum puts it, “the ceremonies of an empire [provide] proof of imperial power.”280 And this power is recognized:

And when they saw him, they all prostrated (προσεκυνησαν) themselves before him, either because some had been instructed to begin this act of homage, or because they were overcome by the splendour of his presence (ἐκπλαγεντες τη παρασκευη), or because Cyrus appeared so great and so goodly to look upon (τω δοξατε μεγαν τε και καλον φανηναι); at any rate, no one of the Persians had ever prostrated himself before Cyrus before. (8.3.14)

It is significant that Xenophon mentions this incident immediately after a physical description of Cyrus and his royal attire (8.3.13–14). The king’s majestic appearance is meant to convey his power; the response of his subjects makes it clear that the message has reached its audience.


280. Xenophon writes (8.1.40) that Cyrus means to “bewitch” (καταγοητευω) his subjects through adopting this dress. At Anabasis 5.7.9 καταγοητευω seems to be a synonym for εξαπαταω, “deceive,” and that seems to be the sense here too. The garments are designed to hide physical defects and to make those wearing them appear taller or more handsome than they really are. Leaders must not only be superior they must also appear to be superior to their subordinates.

281. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 196.
But Cyrus’ adoption of these costumes is odd given the way in which Median luxury and effeminacy is often contrasted with Persian frugality, itself a sign of self-control and willingness to endure hardship (1.3.2–3; 8.8.15–17; cf. Oec. 10.2–9). What are we to make of the contrast between the young Cyrus who leaves the Median robe behind when he returns to Persia (1.4.26) and the older tyrant who adopts Median makeup and dress, “an indulgence, an affectation of the idle?” Due focuses on the pragmatics of Cyrus’ dress, suggesting that while Cyrus occupies the role of a general in the field with his soldiers he maintains the Persian style of dress; once he is king, he adopts the Median style as a way of generating and maintaining the respect and admiration of his subjects. Due’s reading goes some way to maintaining Cyrus’ reputation as one worth imitating. There are other aspects of Cyrus’ behaviour in Babylon that have led others to suggest that the mature Cyrus has a darker side.

The Ideal Tyrant. The question of Cyrus’ dress is part of a collection of questions about the nature of his rule in Babylon. Gera details a number of ways in which Cyrus’ reign in Babylon is disturbing: the way in which he manipulates his closest allies and friends, his use of eunuch bodyguards, the fact that he comes to supersede the law, his approach to Median dress, and his apparently new approach to food exemplified in the banquet of 8.4. Taken individually, each of these items might be justified and explained within Xenophon’s purposes in the greater narrative. The cumulative effect of these items, however, suggest that Xenophon’s Cyrus has undergone something of a change. He seems to have been transformed into the image of his grandfather, Astyages. This transformation into the Median tyrant has been intimated at various points in the narrative. We noted the role that fear might play in a state in which willing obedience is not forthcoming, for example, and Cyrus’ stay in Media itself exposed him to that political culture. The clearest hint of what was to come is found in the words of Mandane when she warns her son not to return to Persia “with a knowledge acquired from your grandfather here [in Media] of the principles not of kingship but of tyranny” (1.3.18). These hints, when combined with the items mentioned in the previous paragraph, seem to point conclusively to the fact that by Book 8 Cyrus seems to have been transformed into the Median tyrant.

But the argument that Cyrus has been transformed into a tyrant is not without its problems. From the point of view of the narrative, when Cyrus does return to Persia (8.5.21–28) he does not receive

282. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 291
283. Due, Cyropaedia, 36.
285. Detailed arguments relating to each of these matters can be found in the works of those who argue that Cyrus is an ideal leader, e.g., Due, Cyropaedia; Gray, Mirror of Princes.
286. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 197.
287. Central to Nadon’s reading of the Cyropaedia (“From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus,” American Political Science Review 90.2 [1996]: 361–74; Xenophon’s Prince) is the transformation of the political realm from republic (exemplified by Persia) to empire (demonstrated by Cyrus’ rule in Babylon).
flogging his mother had warned him about. Instead, Cambyses warns him about ruling Persia as he does the other nations, that is, for his own personal advantage (πλεονεξία; 8.5.24). Cambyses is concerned for the Persian republic, and his concern is understandable, given Cyrus’ success. But Xenophon has already shown us that Cyrus has not ruled tyrannically in the nations he has conquered. In Babylon, as elsewhere, while benefitting himself, he has continued to seek his subjects’ well-being—in other words, he has exhibited royal φιλανθρωπία towards them (see above, p. 68). We have also seen the continued emphasis in Book 8 on the virtues that had been foundational throughout the rest of the book in defining Xenophon’s ideal leader. On the basis of this evidence we need to conclude, with Pierre Carlier, that the Cyrus of the Cyropaedia does not fit perfectly into the category of either king or tyrant—he is something of a hybrid, as is the regime he establishes.

Throughout the Cyropaedia Cyrus easily adapt to whatever situation presents itself to him, a trait that forms part of his φιλομαθεία. As a child, he quickly learns to negotiate his new existence in Media, and is equally able to switch back to Persian ways upon his return (1.5.1). He is able to function in both republic and empire, as Persian king and Median tyrant. It is not the case that Cyrus is corrupted by empire, rather, Cyrus adopts certain practices necessary for successfully ruling an empire, some of which look tyrannical, but others of which were instilled in him as a result of his Persian (republican) education.

Deborah Gera argues that for Xenophon, imperial rule thus consists of the right balance between kingship and tyranny. As she puts it: “both—benevolence and despotism—are needed to run a large empire successfully.” Except for the characterization of such rule as “corrupt,” her assessment of Xenophon’s argument is correct: an empire demands a different form of leadership from that which is best suited to a polis. Perhaps we need to distinguish between the ideal king and the ideal emperor. The former, the ruler of a willing people, is able to win obedience through persuasion and displaying his excellence for imitation. The latter needs to employ strength and fear at times, since he governs a large region in which not all the peoples exhibit the same level of “civilization” and therefore compliance. Xenophon’s theory of leadership, while transferable between different realms, is sensitive to the necessity of adapting itself to different contexts.

The fact that tyranny is used pejoratively in the twenty-first century (as it was, at times, in Xenophon’s day) should not blind us to the possibility that Xenophon was in fact advocating benevolent tyranny as an ideal form of leadership. We should also not dismiss his insistence that a good monarch seeks the welfare of his subjects even as he pursues his own goals. W. R. Newell argues that

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288. This, of course, is not the return of which Mandane was speaking, but both the return to Persia and the dialogue with Cambyses serve to conclude Cyrus’ education (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 75–96).
289. In most of the Cyropaedia “advantage” seems to be a better translation (LSJ s.v. πλεονεξία, II) rather than “greediness” (πλεονεξία I). It describes how one should treat enemies rather than friends or subjects (see 1.6.28 (bis), 35, 41; 5.5.19; 6.1.55).
292. So Carlier, “Imperial Monarchy”.
294. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 297.
one of the things Machiavelli found so attractive in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* was this portrayal of “an alliance between the prince and the common people based on material self-interest, a project for turning republican virtue outward as the fuel for imperial expansion and prosperity.”\(^{295}\) Whereas Nadon treats this project as negative, and reads the *Cyropaedia* as a warning against this form of polity,\(^{296}\) Newell recognizes in Xenophon’s Cyrus a solution to some of the political questions left unanswered by Plato and Aristotle.\(^{297}\) More specifically, we are exposed to the potential advantages of an imperial monarchy in which the desires of the leader are properly controlled by suitable virtues.

In terms of the coherence of the narrative, Cyrus becomes the monarch Xenophon describes in the prologue: “By the end of his education (8.6.23) he is the perfect monarch Xenophon describes in the prologue, issuing orders to the willing subjects of an empire that embraces all the world worth living in.”\(^{298}\) This recollection of Xenophon’s introduction also reminds us of another observation that the author makes in the opening sections of his work. Cyrus is a unique figure in the political history of which Xenophon was aware (1.1.4). He is the embodiment of the ideal monarch in whom nature and education align perfectly in order to produce the virtues necessary for such a ruler. But his unique existence also explains why his empire did not last in this glorious state.

**Epilogue**

The account of Cyrus’ death (8.7) is usually treated with 8.1–6 and the final chapter, 8.8, is discussed as either an epilogue/conclusion, palinode/retraction or forgery.\(^{299}\) The triumphant tones describing Cyrus’ vast empire (8.8.1) echo the introduction (cf. 1.1.4). The reader is reminded both of Cyrus’ irresistible will and his kind treatment of his subjects which led them to revere his as their father, thus calling to mind a major theme in Book 8.1–7. These thematic parallels serve to integrate 8.8 with everything that came before.

Nevertheless, the very next verse (8.8.2) introduces a dark tone to the book’s finale. After Cyrus’ death his sons “immediately” (εὐθὺς) begin to quarrel and the cities and nations “immediately” (εὐθὺς) begin to drift away from the empire. The empire’s senescence begins even before the emperor’s body is cold. But before examining this decay, we must give some attention to Cyrus’ deathbed scene.

*The Death of the King.* It is unclear how much time passes between 8.6.23 and 8.7.1, but Chapter 7 starts with Cyrus returning to Persia for the seventh time, long after his parents have died. He thus returns as the king of Persia, not only the emperor from Babylon. He presents the citizens with gifts and then proceeds to sacrifice to the gods (8.7.1–3). Even in his death, his φιλανθρωπία and εὐσεβεία are in evidence, marking out his whole life as one of virtue.\(^{300}\)

\(^{295}\) Newell, *Tyranny*, 199.

\(^{296}\) See Nadon, “Republic to Empire”; *Xenophon’s Prince*.


\(^{298}\) Tatum, *Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction*, 189.

\(^{299}\) For a brief summary of the debate around the authenticity of 8.8, see Tatum, *Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction*, 220–25, who accepts Xenophon’s authorship. This position seems to represent the scholarly status quo, see, e.g., Due, *Cyropaedia*, 16–22; Gera, *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia*, 299–300; Mueller-Goldingen, *Xenophons Kyropādie*, 262–71.

\(^{300}\) Cyrus dies a violent death on the battlefield according to Herodotus (1.204–214) and Ctesias (frag. 9.7–8), but
Cyrus’ deathbed speech (8.7.6–28) contains three major elements that need to be examined: kingship themes, Cyrus’ charge to his sons, and the theology of the passage.

First, the most important theme that was raised as part of Xenophon’s portrait of the ideal ruler is once again in view. Doing good to friends (and its mirror image, punishing enemies) forms an important part of rule (7, 28) because “faithful friends are a monarch’s truest and surest sceptre” (13) and the surest way of ensuring their good will is through by showing them kindness (ευεργεσία) rather than compulsion (βία). Right up until the end of Cyrus’ life the nexus between the king’s well-being and the prospering of his subjects is central. The concern is shown in his desire to be buried in a modest grave, so that be might be united to the earth to continue to nourish the world and do good to humankind (8.7.26). The king as beneficent compost is an unusual image that serves to keep in the foreground Cyrus’ φιλανθρωπία. The fact that Cyrus is succeeded by his own offspring and also has left his fatherland (πατρίς) and friends in a prosperous state means that he is blessed (µακαριζόµενος) and will be remembered eternally (8.7.9; cf. 8.7.3). There seems to be very little else that a king could desire upon his deathbed.

Second, a large portion of this speech is given over to Cyrus’ instructions to Cambyses, his heir, and Tanaoxares, his second-born son. This is the first time these princes appear in the narrative and the Athenian stranger’s criticism of Cyrus’ poor education of these heirs and the role that this played in the subsequent deterioration of the empire seems well-founded (Plato, Leg. 694c–695b). A more sympathetic interpretation of Xenophon at this point is also possible, however.

The στάσις between the two brothers is identified as the cause of the failure of the empire (εὐθύς μὲν αὐτῷ οἱ πατές ἐστασίαζον; 8.8.2). It is not coincidental, then, that much of Cyrus’ deathbed charge is given over to urging concord between the two princes (8.7.13–17, 23–24). Self-interest forms part of the argument:

Surely he that has forethought for his brother is taking care for himself; for to whom else is a brother’s greatness more of an honour than to a brother? And who else will be honoured by the power of a great man so much as that man’s brother? And if a man’s brother is a great man, whom will any one so much fear to injure as that man’s brother? (8.7.15)

And the choice between honour and shame arising from brotherly love or enmity, respectively, is also

Xenophon’s Cyrus dies peacefully “at home” in Persia. Herodotus claims that many other stories are known, but that his is the most credible (1.214). For Xenophon, Cyrus’ military exploits end in Book 7 and the remainder of his life is dedicated to ruling the empire well. It would damage his narrative to have Cyrus die in battle.

Xenophon’s narrative presents us with “Socrates’ death scene, but considerably rewritten” (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 210). For a discussion of the Socratic nature of Cyrus’ “philosophic death” see Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 115–31. For the influence of Persian sources on Xenophon at this point, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg, “Death of Cyrus”, although note the concerns of Due, Cyropaedia, 142–43. 301 See, further, Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 225–30.

302. Historical evidence for this strife is lacking, although such strife was characteristic of the Achaemenids in general (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 124); for Cambyses’ rule, see Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake: Eisenbraun, 2002), 49–51. There is some ambiguity—possibly deliberate—at Cyr. 8.8.2, Cyrus’ subjects respond to his father care by honouring his as a father (8.8.1) and it is also his subjects’ στάσις that leads to the empire’s destruction.

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held out as an argument for Cyrus’ sons to get along (8.7.16). The final argument is historical (8.7.23): the past contains plenty of examples of what happens when families are torn apart and marked by enmity instead of love. Xenophon, of course, has the Persian past in view. In his reading of that past, it was the strife that existed between Cambyses and Tanaoxares that led to the downfall of the glorious empire that Cyrus had created. And so he has Cyrus focus almost exclusively on concord when addressing his sons from his deathbed.

In allowing Cyrus to urge the two brothers to act peacefully towards one another Xenophon vindicates the emperor from the charges laid by Plato’s Athenian stranger. 

Cyrus foresaw what awaited his sons and he did his best to inoculate them against the envy and strife that presented the biggest threat to their success. The final chapter of the Cyropaedia shows that despite Cyrus’ education of his sons, they were unable to exercise the same rule that he had. They did not match Xenophon’s model of the ideal king.

Third, except when mentioned in relation to sacrifices and the importance of honouring the gods, the divine has been all but absent in the Cyropaedia. But if Xenophon wanted to show the ideal king forging his own way in this life without divine assistance (see p. 66), what is his understanding of the king’s journey following his death?

The account of Cyrus’ death begins with “a figure of more than human majesty” (κρείττων τις ἡ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον) visiting him in a dream and commanding him to prepare himself for his departure to the gods (8.7.2). He responds by offering sacrifices and thanking the gods for their faithfulness to him. Their care for him is seen in that they have protected him from hubris, thus ensuring a positive end to his life’s work (8.7.3). The final chapter of his life serves to demonstrate the positive relationship between Cyrus’ piety towards the gods and the favour shown him by them throughout his career.

Towards the end of his speech Cyrus begins to muse on his post-mortem future (8.7.17–22). He is not certain whether or not the soul survives death, although he seems to lean towards that conclusion. The final paragraph of this section is indicative both of his agnosticism (εἴ μεν ... εἴ δὲ μή) and his desire that his sons’ recognition of the supernatural influences them for the good:

Now if this is true, as I think it is, and if the soul does leave the body, then do what I request of you and show reverence for my soul. But if it is not so, and if the soul remains in the body and dies with it, then at least fear the gods, eternal, all-seeing, omnipotent, who keep this ordered universe together, unimpaired, ageless, unerring, indescribable in its beauty and its grandeur; and never allow yourselves to do or purpose anything wicked or unholy. (8.7.22)

This discourse on the immortality of the soul is not aimed primarily at metaphysical speculation; it is meant to threaten his sons into behaving themselves after his death, a role to which the gods also contribute. Cyrus needs to find additional means to manipulate his sons into following his teaching once he is no longer around; theology serves to meets this need.

303. I am not arguing here that the Cyropaedia was written in response to Plato’s Laws, but only that Xenophon anticipates and answers the objection raised by the stranger. Sage argues that Xenophon generally portrays Cyrus in a positive light, but that this chapter still shows Cyrus’ failure to educate his sons adequately (“Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”).

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We have already seen how Cyrus’ divine ancestry, while not explicitly denied, is neither emphasized nor portrayed unambiguously (see above, n. 190). The προσκυνήσις Cyrus receives during his procession (8.3.14) is based on the image of majesty that he projects rather than a recognition of divinity. Given Cyrus’ agnosticism regarding the nature and future of the soul, the strange figure’s statement to Cyrus that he is soon to depart to the gods (ἡδη γὰρ εἰς θεοῦς ἀπει; 8.7.2) should probably be interpreted simply as speaking of his death and not hinting at his apotheosis. One is hard-pressed to find in the *Cyropaedia* intimations of the divinity of the king, either before or after his death.

Cyrus’ death-bed scene serves two main purposes, then. It reminds the reader of Xenophon’s ideal king who is marked, above all, by φιλανθρωπία shown in his concern, good will, and care for his friends and state. As Xenophon’s narrative draws to a close, Cyrus’ final scene also serves to exonerate him from any culpability for the unravelling of the empire described in 8.8. He prepares his sons to rule well by warning them against brotherly strife—the very thing that leads to the empire’s ruination (8.8.2). In Xenophon’s narrative, their ineptitude as rulers cannot be traced back to their father’s education. Xenophon’s king remains ideal through his death. It is only the matter of his legacy that Xenophon must still address.

*The Dissolution of the Empire* (8.8.1–27). The final chapter of Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* is a puzzle. Just as in Xenophon’s *Spartan Constitution*, the final chapter seems to undo or deny everything that came before it. Xenophon describes a moral and physical decline in which even those positive elements from the empire’s glorious past which remain have been perverted so that their form remains while their purpose has been lost. Does Xenophon mean this as a critique of Cyrus? Gabriel Danzig identifies four arguments that are usually made against the portrayal of Cyrus as an ideal ruler. Of these, the second is that he was unable to establish institutions that would outlast him. His leadership must therefore be considered a failure.

Contrary to this critique, Danzig defends a positive reading of the *Cyropaedia* for the following reasons: (1) it is an assumption, rather than something Xenophon asserts, that a good leader will create institutions that will survive his death; (2) the final chapter of the *Cyropaedia* is not an implicit critique of Cyrus, but simply brings the narrative into the present by linking Xenophon’s fictional leader to the situation in Persia with which his readers would have been familiar; (3) Xenophon did not believe that institutions would bring good governance, rather, he argued that good leaders ensured good governance.

The ending of the *Cyropaedia* is thus not a critique of Cyrus but should rather be understood as “eulogy” in which the loss of Cyrus is mourned and his greatness emphasized once again. In this

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304. Xenophon’s Agesilaus reckons as arrogant and shameful those who accept worship and divine honours (*Ages.* 1.34), and since Agesilaus’ piety is such a strong feature of his character (*Ages.* 3) we might add “impious” to that list. If we accept this as Xenophon’s position, then the argument that he does not wish the reader to perceive Cyrus as divine in any sense is strengthened.

305. For other surprising endings in Xenophon’s work, see Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader,” 163 n. 7.

final chapter, the reader is shown what an empire looks like when it is not ruled by someone like Cyrus. Xenophon draws on his knowledge of fourth-century Persia in order to present it as the dystopian reality that is the mirror image of the utopia over which his Cyrus presided. The opening paragraphs of this section speak of Cyrus’ empire as “the greatest and most glorious of all the kingdoms in Asia” before describing the extent of the empire and the fact that it was governed solely by the will of Cyrus (8.8.1). There are echoes here of the opening chapter in which Cyrus’ unique ability to govern a huge empire (1.1.3) is placed alongside a description of the extent of the empire (1.1.4–5) The negative vision of empire in the final chapter therefore represents the chaos of a world without Cyrus described in the opening chapter. Without the singular rule of Cyrus, *Endzeit ist Urzeit.*

Some of Xenophon’s audience would have been familiar with fourth-century Persia, and their vision of this state—especially in so far as it had been interpreted through Greek stereotypes—would have been difficult to reconcile with the glorious empire over which Xenophon’s Cyrus ruled. In the *Cyropaedia*’s penultimate chapter, Xenophon rescues Cyrus’ memory from the critique displayed in Plato’s *Laws* and shows, on the contrary, that Cyrus did indeed prepare his sons to inherit the empire. The failure of Cyrus’ progeny cannot be blamed on him. The final chapter serves to further exalt Cyrus as an ideal ruler when it describes what an empire without Cyrus looks like. Admittedly, Xenophon nowhere makes this argument explicit, but the same must be said for the negative argument. We are left, then, with interpreting this chapter within the context of Xenophon’s larger purpose in writing the *Cyropaedia*, and it is to this subject that we turn in the conclusion.

*Xenophon’s Persian King*

Xenophon’s Cyrus unsettles us. His anti-democratic behaviour and sympathies are inconsistent with “civilized” politics and thus incoherent to many in the modern world. It is thus understandable that some are drawn to ironic readings of the *Cyropaedia* which explain the purpose of the book in line with modern sensibilities. But it is Xenophon’s agenda that must dictate our reading of the text if we are to understand its impact within the classical and Hellenistic world. The preceding investigation of Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus suggests that the Persian king was indeed a model of ideal leadership and that Xenophon meant to portray him as such. Many of the traits considered negative by some are in fact part of the explanation of how Cyrus “so greatly excelled in governing men” (1.1.6). All of his

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307. Due, *Cyropaedia*, 16–22; Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”.

308. The epilogue is not deconstructing the vision of the text as much as it is “reaffirming the necessity of the vision by recalling the real world” (Stader, “Fictional Narrative,” 378).


310. For a recent example of this approach, see Whidden, “Cyrus’s Persian Education” who argues, for example, that the *Cyropaedia* is “a work of irony” that “provides a thoughtful critique of empire and imperial ambitions” (540) by showing “that rule by a single hegemonic individual is deeply problematic” (548).

311. I recognize that for many, this assumption might be considered hermeneutically naïve. For a defense of this approach, see Gray, *Mirror of Princes*, chap. 2.
characteristics combine to present the reader with a unique figure who “reduced to obedience a vast number of men and cities and nations” (1.1.3)—Xenophon’s ideal emperor.

Xenophon’s observations about δημοκρατία, μοναρχία, and ὀλιγαρχία in the opening paragraph of the Cyropaedia (1.1.1) suggests to the reader that he or she is about to encounter a political treatise in which the various forms of government are discussed.312 But the absence of any further discussion along these lines indicates the futility of approaching the text in this way.

Xenophon announces at 1.1.6 that he intends in the Cyropaedia to present what he has discovered about Cyrus, a man “deserving of all admiration.” It is this man who appears in almost every scene over the next eight books and who is clearly the focus of Xenophon’s attention. But this presentation of Cyrus serves to do more than simply inform and entertain. Cyrus stands as an example, paradigm, and model to be learnt from and imitated.313 While it is true that Xenophon wants to show his reader how it is that one person was able to govern such a huge empire successfully (1.1.3–6), behind this description of positive government lies a more didactic purpose.

We have already noted the political importance that Xenophon ascribes to the imitation of a leader (see above, p. 85), but does Xenophon mean for his reader also to imitate the ideal king? Can we say, with William Higgins, that Cyrus is both the subject and the object of Xenophon’s education?314 Vivienne Gray argues that Xenophon has “a theory of instructional viewing” in which he “produces the actions of serious men for the consideration of serious men” through the use of various topoi.315 The presence of these topoi across Xenophon’s various works confirm their didactic purpose. Just as the characters in the Cyropaedia are educated as they gaze upon Cyrus and imitate him, so too the reader.316

It might seem odd that the reader is educated through imitating a Persian king. But Xenophon’s original audience consisted of Greek “gentlemen,” καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ, of the sort who benefitted from Socrates’ education (Mem. 1.2.48).317 It was this Socratic education, mediated through Xenophon’s writings, that taught them how to lead in the various spheres of life (see, e.g., Mem. 2.1.1, 4.1.2). And since Xenophon’s leadership theory is applicable across these different spheres of life318—household, farm, polis—the gentlemen who read these texts would be able to transfer what they learnt from Cyrus, the Persian emperor, into their own context and situation.319

312. See, e.g., Herodotus 3.80–88, Plato, Pol. 291d–292a, 302c–303a, Aristotle, Pol. 3.7, 1279a22–1279b10. Although he does not focus on these constitutional forms, Newell (Tyranny, 186–88) argues that Xenophon wants to provide an example of good government by showing how tyranny can be transformed into legitimate leadership.
314. Higgins, Xenophon, 54. For the argument that Cyrus is being educated throughout the Cyropaedia, see Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 90–91.
315. Mirror of Princes, 187–93, here 190 and 192; see also pp. 51–53.
316. If forced to provide a succinct description of the work, Momigliano’s identification of the Cyropaedia as “a paedagogical novel” seems to capture the spirit of the text accurately (Greek Biography, 55).
317. For a discussion of Xenophon’s audience, see Gray, Mirror of Princes, 51–54. Since large parts of the Cyropaedia serve to “entertain and amuse” in addition to instruct the reader, Due argues that it is “popular in the best sense of the word” and that it’s potential audience was fairly broad (Cyropaedia, 234–35).
319. The fact that Cyrus’ expected his subjects to imitate him demonstrates that while it is true Xenophon considers
These gentlemen were not taught about the best regime in the *Cyropaedia* but about the best leader. The book’s tragic epilogue highlights the fact that an ideal king can establish laws and institutions, but that these are not sufficient to guarantee the longevity of the society over which he exercised leadership.\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^0\) The reader is left in no doubt as to the source of Cyrus’ success: it is not his monarchical rule but his character.\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^1\) We have seen how, throughout the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon focuses on the virtues that contribute to Cyrus’ success. The narrative allows Xenophon to display these virtues in an entertaining way, offering an alternative to the dialogues found in the *Memorabilia* or *Hiero*, for example. The unity of Xenophon’s theory of leadership seen across his various works shows that it is this combination of virtues, embodied in Cyrus, that the reader is expected to emulate if he or she is to learn from Xenophon.

We return to a quotation from Cicero’s letter to his brother Quintus:

> The great Cyrus was portrayed by Xenophon not in accord with historical truth, but as a model of just government, and the impressive dignity of his character is combined in that philosopher's description of him with a matchless courtesy; and indeed it was not without reason that our great Africanus did not often put those books out of his hands [see *Tusc.* 2.26], for there is no duty belonging to a painstaking and fair-minded form of government that is omitted in them. (*Quint. fratr.* 1.1.8 [23])

Cicero has correctly identified Xenophon’s chief concerns with Cyrus’ character and his nature as a model. Cicero’s assessment of Cyrus’ imperial rule as “just” and a “fair-minded form of government” is unlikely to receive modern acceptance. This would most likely not have bothered Xenophon. His goal was not to present his reader with an ideal form of government, but rather, with an ideal king.

**Concluding Comments**

In Herodotus’ famous debate about the best constitution, the historian has Darius argue that monarchy, the wise rule of the one best man (ἀνδρός ἐνός τοῦ ἀριστοῦ), is superior to Otanes’ democracy and Megabyzus’ oligarchy (*Histories* 3.82). This skeletal vision of an ideal king was taken up by the following generation and given flesh in writings produced to educate and encourage sole rulers (Isocrates) and other leaders (Xenophon).\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^3\) This classical construction of the ideal king would, in turn, play a central role in European political thought about monarchy.

The stereotype of the good king outlined by Francis Cairns\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^4\) provides a template for the

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\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^0\) Stadter, “Fictional Narrative,” 378.
\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^1\) Due, *Cyropaedia*, 236–37, cf. 25 See also Weathers, “Political Idealism”; Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”; Danzig, “Best of the Achaemenids,” 502.
\(^3\)\(^2\)\(^4\) Francis Cairns, *Virgil’s Augustan Epic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 19–21; see the discussion in Chapter 1.
following brief comparison of Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s kingship ideas. Most elements of Cairns’ model are represented in Isocrates’ portrait in To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. This suggests that they are contributing to a topos which extends well into the Roman imperial period.\(^{325}\)

Although it is important for Xenophon that the king worships the gods in order that they might provide him with auguries (see above, p. 76), a notable absence in both texts is the king’s imitation of the gods in order to reach virtue (K3) and related to that, his deriving kingship from Zeus (K12). The avoidance of these elements is all the more stark when compared to the Hellenistic models discussed in the following chapter in which the religious character of kingship is foundational.

Also missing in Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king are a number of metaphors that Cairns groups under the heading of “care for his people” (K6). The most striking absence, given its Homeric pedigree,\(^{326}\) is the “king-as-shepherd” comparison.\(^{327}\) Generally absent between Homer and the fifth century, the image occurs again in Greek tragedy\(^{328}\) and is thereafter taken up by Plato and others, including Xenophon, as shown above (pp. 83–84). Although it often speaks of monarchical care for a people, it could also carry negative overtones. This attitude is best represented by Thrasymachus when he mocks Socrates for supposing that those who rule do so for any reason other than their own good (Plato, Resp. 1.343a–c), hints of which are present in Xenophon. It is perhaps because of these negative connotations that Isocrates chose to ignore the image in his writings.

In contrast to Xenophon (p. 84, above), nowhere does Isocrates identify the ideal king as “father” of his people. Xenophon’s use of the concept shows that the comparison between the exercise of political authority and household management is well known in fourth-century literature,\(^{329}\) suggesting that Isocrates deliberately avoids this metaphor. However, the corollary to this image—that the king’s subjects are his family and that the realm over which he rules is his estate—is present at Ad Nic. 19, 21. Isocrates’ potentially ominous assertion that “all the property of those who live in the state belongs to kings who rule them well” (21) needs to be balanced by the more positive exhortations focusing on the state’s well-being (9) and the king’s love and care for his subjects (15). Indeed, Isocrates praises politicians of a bygone era for being as careful with the common purse as they are with their own property (Paneg. 76). Isocrates is eager to emphasise the king’s concern and care for his subjects and

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325. See, e.g., de Blois, “Traditional Virtues and New Qualities”.

326. Agamemnon, for example, is often called “shepherd of the people” (ποιμήν λαῶν; e.g. Il. 2.254, 772; 4.413), but the title is also used of other leaders. Johannes Haubold (Homer’s People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation, CCS [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], chap. 1) shows that the metaphor speaks of the leader’s care for his people, but that it was also commonly understood to point to a failure in this regard. The image has antecedents in the Near East (Martin L. West, The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997], 226–27).

327. For the following paragraph, see Roger Brock, Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 43–52.

328. See, e.g., Anthony J. Podlecki, “Polis and Monarch in Early Attic Tragedy,” in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory; J. Peter Euben (Berkely; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1986), 78–79 for Aeschylus’ use of this image in The Persians where to live under a shepherd is to be a slave.

yet he avoids this apt metaphor. The negative authoritarianism sometimes associated with this image might have been unpalatable for his democratic audience.

While Isocrates is certainly familiar with the use of σωτηρία and its cognates in a political context, he does not use σωτήρ as a title or as a description of a role the king should play. The absence of the titular use of this term before the Hellenistic period suggests that we should not read too much into its absence. Xenophon, similarly, does not speak of Cyrus as σωτήρ, although he does say that the king must pay attention to the σωτηρία of his realm (8.1.13). There is one titular use of the lexeme: the name Ζεῦς Σωτήρ is used as a watchword at one point (7.1.10). In general, it is the gods who give victory and salvation (3.3.34; 4.1.2).

Some of the political images used in the classical period to speak of monarchical rule were open to misinterpretation or, more likely, mischievous reinterpretation. Isocrates avoided these images in his text addressed to Nicocles. This formed part of Isocrates’ attempts to advance a positive image of kingship. A key aspect of these attempts was his portrayal of kingship as a milder, and therefore more desirable, form of government. Xenophon’s portrait focuses on the traits the king must exhibit in order to rule as successfully as Cyrus did. He is thus less concerned with portraying the king in terms that subjects would find acceptable. When Xenophon’s king is generous or kind, this is because it contributes to his successful reign.

Although To Nicocles lacks an explicit argument in favour of monarchy such as that found at Nicocles 12–26, the implication is not difficult to draw on the basis of Isocrates’ description of all that defines the good king. A leader marked by wisdom, justice, moderation and courage, who, furthermore, cares for his people (Ad Nic. 15) while prospering the state (9) must surely form an ideal or, at least, preferable government. Those who live under such a king must surely be envied by others just as Evagoras’ subjects were (Evag. 43). A milder government thus benefits both ruler and subject. The latter, for obvious reasons, and the former because it will ensure the longevity of his rule and his safety. Xenophon’s claims regarding the descriptive purpose of his work and regarding Cyrus’ ability to rule (1.1.3) assumes rather than argues for monarchy as the preferred form of government.

A good government was not defined solely on the leader’s ability or desire to provide his people with a gentle government and a prosperous state. Fourth-century ethics and politics were closely related as it was considered of primary importance that the leader improve not only the lot of his people, but his people themselves, a pursuit that necessarily involves ethics. Athen’s ancient kings are credited with training the polis in virtue, justice, and moderation (Panath. 138), for example. And in To Nicocles we have observed how the ethical model provided by the king is central to Isocrates’ understanding of the king’s influence upon his subjects (Ad Nic. 31). Xenophon’s Cyrus provides the

330. The Athenian ancestors were the savours of Hellas (Paneg. 80) and Isocrates hoped that his contemporaries could also fulfil that role (Peace 141). At Ad Nic.24 he states that the king’s subjects must be convinced that his plans for their σωτηρία are better than their own.

same sort of model for imitation (see p. 85). It is the character of the government—in the case of monarchy, the character of the king himself—rather than the type of constitution or a particular set of laws that serves to define political excellence for Isocrates and Xenophon.332

Both Isocrates and Xenophon write for political purposes. The advice offered by Isocrates adds an additional layer to this scheme. The king should stand above constitutions and laws, since these can only serve to hinder the virtuous leader (Phil. 14). But above the king stands the teacher, or, at a minimum, the teacher’s advice if it is adopted by the king.333 Tarik Wareh observes how the pedagogue pursues “a suprapolitical perspective and authority, what Isocrates would call philosophical,” in his relationship with the Macedonian king.334 The same perspective and authority is claimed in To Nicocles. Isocrates’ contribution to political philosophy and the nature of his περὶ βασιλείας treatise addressed to Nicoles needs to be understood against this background.

Isocrates’ ideal monarch is the recipient and beneficiary of Isocrates’ paideia. Only a rightly educated ruler is able to educate his citizens and subjects. At Panathenaicus 30–32 Isocrates describes what an educated person looks like. The educated are able to manage the circumstances which they encounter because of their careful judgment and their ability to determine the correct course of action. They are decent and honourable as they encounter others (τούς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὀμλοῦντας), displaying a high level of tolerance. They exhibit self-control with regard to pleasure and bear misfortune bravely. They rejoice in those things which belong to them by nature and intelligence rather than those they obtain through chance. Isocrates concludes:

Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but with all of them—these, I contend, are wise and complete men (φρονίμους εἶναι καὶ τελείους ἄνδρας), possessed of all the virtues.

This passage serves to illustrate the parallels between Isocrates’ educated man and the portrait of the ideal king presented in this chapter on the basis of Isocrates’ To Nicocles. The parallels indicate that To Nicocles is indeed a philosophical text in the Isocratean sense—that is, it is primarily a means of paideia, of instructing the king so that he might become an educated person. Despite being sceptical of the extent to which virtue might be imparted through education, Isocrates nonetheless exhorted the young prince in the hope of changing him for the better.335

Xenophon’s narrative approach to educating leaders holds Cyrus up as a successful builder of an empire and thus, through Xenophon’s leadership analogy,336 as one worth emulating by those who seek to rule. As argued above (p. 94–95), Xenophon sought to place before his reader the most successful

333. Wareh notes that the discourse “casts [Isocrates’] royal addressee in the role of a student of Isocratean philosophia” (Isocrates and the Philosophers, 157); see also Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates”.
334. Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 156–57.
335. Kehl identifies Isocrates as the foremost educator of leaders (“bedeutendsten Fürstenerzieher”) of the fourth century (“Monarchie,” 117).
336. I.e., the idea that leadership qualities are transferable between different realms, as explained by Socrates (Mem. 3.4); see Gray, Mirror of Princes, 22–24.
leader of whom he was aware in order to educate them in the art of ruling. In doing so, he also preserved for us a model of ideal kingship.
CHAPTER 3. KINGSHIP IN THE HELLENISTIC SCHOOLS

The writings of Isocrates and Xenophon examined in the previous chapter demonstrate that the figure of the ideal king forms part of Greek political thought in the classical period. However, it is one thing to be aware of monarchical rule, another to attempt to thrive under it. Following Alexander’s expedition to the east and his successors’ division of his empire amongst themselves, monarchical rule of one sort or another became the norm throughout the eastern Mediterranean. N. G. L. Hammond can go so far as to say, “The hallmark of the Hellenistic world was monarchy.”

In this chapter, I examine writings from Cynic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Pythagorean sources in an attempt to sketch a portrait of ideal kingship as it might have been constructed in each of these Hellenistic schools. Hellenistic kingship ideals might also be approached through the study of poetry or sculpture, for example, but I examine philosophical texts that focus primarily on kings or kingship in order to suggest the shape of the now-lost περὶ βασιλείας treatises. Given the exiguous nature of the surviving sources, I am compelled to draw on the sometimes fragmentary evidence found in later collections like those of Arius Didymus and Diogenes Laertius.

In the first section, I begin by discussing Antisthenes who, even though he belongs in the classical period, serves as a bridge to Diogenes and the Hellenistic period. Chronologically speaking, Antisthenes should be considered before Isocrates and Xenophon. However, his influence on the Cynic tradition is generally accepted and he is thus discussed as a forerunner to the Cynic movement. The section concludes with a survey of what the Cynic Epistles teach about later Cynic thought regarding kingship. The Stoics are in view in the second section. As with Diogenes, attention is given to their general political thought before the place of kingship within that system is discussed. The third section in this chapter takes a bifocal look at Epicurean kingship. The sources that cluster around the

2. On the use of this adjective to speak of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic and imperial periods, see below, n. 219.
person of Epicurus are examined first before attention is given to Philodemus’ tract addressed to Piso, *On the Good King According to Homer*. Finally, three Pythagorean texts identified by Stobaeus as containing περὶ βασιλείας treatises are examined.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a careful examination of the development of kingship in political thought during this period would require a far more extensive study than can be pursued here. My efforts in this chapter are far more modest. A study of the surviving evidence for political thought regarding kingship for the Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Pythagoreans is undertaken in order to suggest a topos for each group against which Paul’s writings about Jesus might be compared.

**Cynic Kingship**

While Diogenes of Sinope might lay claim to being the first Cynic, Diogenes Laertius finds in Antisthenes the origins of both Cynicism and Stoicism (D.L. 6.19). The relationship between Antisthenes and Diogenes forms part of Diogenes Laertius’ genealogy of Hellenistic philosophical schools and, in particular, it serves to link Socrates to the Stoics: Socrates > Antisthenes > Diogenes > Crates > Zeno (D.L. 1.15). Diogenes Laertius’ tendentiousness has raised doubts that a teacher-pupil relationship ever existed between Antisthenes and Diogenes. Nonetheless, there are enough similarities between Antisthenes and Diogenes to suggest the possibility of some sort of relationship or, at least, influence. Our survey of the Cynic contribution to the περὶ βασιλείας topos therefore begins with Antisthenes’ political ideas.

**Antisthenes on Kingship**

Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue of Antisthenes’ work (D.L. 6.15–18) includes at least one title that is overtly political—Περὶ νόμου ἢ περὶ πολιτείας. Other titles in the same volume—Περὶ καλός καὶ δικάιος, Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας, and Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικῆς—suggest that this volume was concerned, broadly speaking, with political philosophy. The content of these treatises is lost.


10. Laertius claims that Diogenes, when he came to Athens after fleeing Sinope, became Antisthenes’ student (D.L. 6.20). Antisthenes was not in the habit of acquiring students. Nevertheless, because of Diogenes’ persistence, Antisthenes relented and accepted him as such. “Once when he [Antisthenes] stretched out his staff against him [Diogenes], the pupil offered his head with the words, ‘Strike, for you will find no wood hard enough to keep me away from you, so long as I think you’ve something to say’” (D.L. 6.20).

11. See Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Uppsala: Bloms, 1948), 8–12 for an argument against Dudley’s pessimistic view of the possibility of a relationship between Antisthenes and Diogenes. The relationship could have been established through Antisthenes’ writings (Moles, “Cynics,” 417). Susan Prince asserts that Diogenes would have learnt from Antisthenes face-to-face, but not necessarily within a (formalized?) pupil-teacher relationship (“Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics,” in *A Companion to Socrates*, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar [Malden: Blackwell, 2006], 78). Much in this argument hinges on the tricky matter of dating Diogenes’ life. The resolution of this problem does not affect my argument one way or another since the influence of Antisthenes on Diogenes is generally accepted even by those who deny that a formal relationship existed.

12. The systematic arrangement of this catalogue suggests the work of someone with access to the texts (Prince, “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 79)
While a fragment preserved by Stobaeus suggests that Antisthenes was cautiously optimistic about participation in political life,13 Athenaeus (Deipn. 5.63) records that Antisthenes’ “Political Dialogue” (ὁ πολιτικός δίαλογος) comprised an attack on all the Athenian demagogues.14 A similarly cautious attitude is preserved in Aristotle’s discussion of the futility of making laws for those of pre-eminent excellence. Aristotle mentions “a fable of Antisthenes” in which the hares claim equality with the lions (Aristotle, Pol. 1284a11–17). Aristotle fails to reproduce the punch line. The lions’ response, according to one of Aesop’s fables, is “Where are your teeth and claws?” Antisthenes is wary of those who wield too much power in the political realm and since these are, more often than not, the people responsible for creating laws, the sage would not necessarily act in accordance with the established laws (οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους), but according to ἀρετή (D.L. 6.11).

The titles of Antisthenes’ fourth and fifth volumes recorded in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue read as follows: Κύρος, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχίου, Κύρος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, and Ἀσπασία. The first three of these works suggest a link to kingship,15 as do the seven works listed as part of the tenth volume (Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Μίδας, Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος, Κύρος ἢ ἐρώμενος, Κύρος ἢ κατάσκοποι, Μνεῖξενος ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν, Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ἀρχέλαος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας).

This list16 establishes the fact that, in addition to other kingship texts, Antisthenes produced at least two works considered to fall within the περὶ βασιλείας genre: one linked to Cyrus, the other to Archelaus.

Cyrus. As our study of Xenophon demonstrates, the founder of the Achaemenid empire was a common subject of kingship treatises of this time. Antisthenes produced a number of texts that apparently deal

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13. When asked about how one might approach civil life (τοῖς ἂν τις προσέλθῃ πολιτείᾳ), Antisthenes recommended approaching it like a fire: not too close, lest one got burnt; but also not too far, lest one froze (Stob. 4.4.28 = WH 4, p. 197, 7–9).

14. See also D.L. 6.6: “It is strange,” said he [scil. Antisthenes], “that we weed out the darnel from the corn and the unfit in war, but do not excuse evil men (τοίς πονηροῖς) from the service of the state.”

15. It is difficult to account for the presence of a work entitled Ἀσπασία at this point in the catalogue, if the thesis about the political nature of these volumes is correct. According to Athenaeus (Deipn. 5.63), Antisthenes’ Ἀσπασία contains an attack on the characters of Pericles’ sons from his first marriage, Xanthippus and Paralus. In this section Athenaeus attributes to Antisthenes other attacks on Athenian politicians, leaders, and philosophers, so perhaps the Ἀσπασία was a critique of Pericles containing, amongst other elements, a critique of his sons. The fullest ancient account of Aspasia’s life is found in Putarch, Pericles 24, 32. Following her study of the Aspasia tradition, Madeleine M. Henry concludes: “I think we can do no better than distinguish what is provable from what is not and what is knowable from what is not. This having been done, we can say remarkably little about Aspasia of Miletus.” (Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical Tradition [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], 127). Was Antisthenes’ treatise a critique of Aspasia’s sexuality (alluded to at Athenaeus, Deipn. 13.56?) and her position as a strong female subject (so Henry, Aspasia, 30–32)? This assumes that the treatise’s position in the catalogue alongside kingship texts is unimportant.

with Cyrus in one way or another, but most significant for our purposes is the existence of a treatise entitled Κύρος ἡ περὶ βασιλείας (D.L. 6.16), pointing to the significance of Cyrus in Antisthenes’ kingship discourse.

The remains of Antisthenes’ writings on Cyrus are unfortunately negligible. Cyrus is a model (together with Heracles) of the idea that toil (πόνος) is good (D.L. 6.2). Epictetus attributes to Antisthenes the saying: “It is the lot of a king, O Cyrus, to do well, but to be ill spoken of” (Epict. diss. 4.6.20). Arsenius preserves a fragment in which Cyrus is asked about what is “most necessary.” The king responds: “to unlearn the bad things (τὸ ἀπομαθητέν ... τὰ κακά)” (Caizzi 21A). The same saying is preserved by Stobaeus, who attributes it to Antisthenes (Stob. 2.31.34 = WH 2, p. 207, 22–23; Caizzi 21B). It is therefore quite possible that this represents a saying from Antisthenes’ work on Cyrus in which the emperor has been transformed into a philosopher–king who dispenses advice to those around him.

The limited data available to us suggests that, through his toil and suffering, which include being spoken of badly despite his good deeds, Cyrus has been transformed into a sage and a true king. He provides Antisthenes’ reader with an ethical model rather than a political one. The king as sage presents us with the inverse image of the sage as the only true king, a topos we will encounter repeatedly in Stoic thought.

Archelaus. The second of Antisthenes’ περὶ βασιλείας treatises takes Archelaus as its subject. The emphasis on rulers and kingship in this part of the collection suggests that the Archelaus on view is Antisthenes’ contemporary, the Macedonian king who ruled from ca. 413–399. Archelaus’ reputation amongst Greek thinkers was ambiguous. Plato (Gorgias 471α–d) portrayed him rather negatively, while Thucydides (War 2.100) considered Archelaus superior to those who had come before him. However, we need not consider these portraits as contradictory, since the former focuses on Archelaus’ character as evidenced by his ruthless dealings with his political opponents, while the latter has as its focus his

17. D.L. 6.16: Κύρος; D.L. 6.18: Κύρος ἡ ἐρώμενος, Κύρος ἡ κατάσκοπος, and D.L. 2.61: ὁ μικρὸς Κύρος. Cicero Att. 12.38 mentions Books 4 and 5 of Antisthenes’ Cyrus. Athenaeus Deipn. 5.63 notes that Antisthenes speaks ill of Alcibiades in another work on Cyrus. Antisthenes describes Alcibiades as strong, manly, boorish, daring, and beautiful (τεργονὸν οἰρόν καὶ ἀνφόρον καὶ αἰσθητόν καὶ τοίχημα καὶ ὀρατόν) (Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.43). Although it is possible that one or more of these texts speak of Cyrus the Younger (son of Darius II), the significance of Cyrus the Great in Greek kingship discourse is illustrated by Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. See Höistad, Cynic Hero, 73–75 for arguments that these Cyrus-texts do not speak of anyone other than the Persian king. According to Photius, Phrynicius records only one work on Cyrus and one on Odysseus (Caizzi 10).

18. At D.L. 6.3 this saying is attributed to Antisthenes in an argument against Plato; cf. Ajax 5. With reference to Alexander the Great and without mention of Antisthenes, the saying occurs in another form at Plutarch, Alex. 41.1.; see also Marcus Aurelius (Med. 7.36), again, with no reference to Antisthenes.

19. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 75–76.

20. One passage has been ignored: Athenaeus informs us that one of the Cyrus-treatises was critical of Alcibiades’ dealing with women “after the fashion of the Persians” (Deipn. 5.63). It is more likely that the text to which Athenaeus refers has to do with Cyrus the Younger and not Cyrus the Great, especially since Alcibiades and Cyrus the Younger were contemporaries.

21. Ragnar Höistad comes to this conclusion by employing Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus, together with references in Dio Chrysostom, to fill out Antisthenes’ portrait of the Persian king (Cynic Hero, 92–94).

military leadership. Another positive aspect of Archelaus noted in our sources is his patronage of the arts. This patronage was reciprocated, for example, by Euripides, whose play of that name flatters the Macedonian king by changing the name of the founder of the Argead dynasty from Perdiccas to Archelaus.

The only extant discussion of Antisthenes’ Archelaus notes that it contains an attack on Gorgias (Athenaeus, Deipn. 5.63). Our knowledge of Antisthenes’ idea of kingship is not advanced in any way.

What, if anything, might be said of the possible content of Antisthenes’ Archelaus? Might Antisthenes’ antipathy towards Gorgias’ sophistry and rhetoric have spilled over into disdain for poetry and drama? If so, perhaps the treatise was critical of the king as patron. Archelaus’ dealings with his family, while distasteful, were not uncommon amongst the Argeads. A number of Antisthenes’ sayings allegedly recorded by Diocles (D.L. 6.12–13) have a military ring to them. The statement that “virtue is a weapon that cannot be removed,” however, indicates that we are once again in the realm of ethics and not warfare. It was unlikely, then, to have been Archelaus’ military leadership that made him a suitable subject for Antisthenes’ περὶ βασιλείας treatise. We can only guess as to the contents of this work.

Unlike the Cyrus treatise, the Archelaus treatise is named after a contemporary. This raises the possibility that Antisthenes wrote for the king, or at least hoped that the king would read what he had written. If this text was indeed meant as a formal Fürstenspiegel, it might have advised Archelaus to pursue Socratic philosophy, or accept advice along those lines, for the benefit of himself and his people. It is also possible that Antisthenes’ work adopted the name of a well-known monarch (as he did in his Cyrus), albeit on this occasion a contemporary monarch, in order to produce a philosophical-ethical treatise in which the persons of the king and the sage are united. It is significant that both Antisthenes’ περὶ βασιλείας treatises have “biographical” titles and not theoretical or abstract titles. These two titles contributed to the περὶ βασιλείας topos through biography, suggesting that Antisthenes is instructing his readers by holding up exemplary figures for imitation.

Odysseus. In addition to a book on Homer and various Homeric characters (D.L. 6.15–18), Antisthenes wrote at least three works about Odysseus himself. One of these Odysseus-texts (Caizzi 15) has

25. Gorgias was Antisthenes’ teacher before Socrates (D.L. 6.2). Perhaps in this attack we see nothing more than a convert’s loathing of his former way of life.
27. Antisthenes was not adverse to more abstract titles. Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue (6.15–18) includes works such as Περὶ άνθρωπος, Περὶ ανθρώπου, and Περὶ νόμου ή περὶ πολιτείας.
28. Όδοσείως ή περὶ Οδοσείώς, Κύκλως ή περὶ Οδοσείώς, Περὶ τοῦ Οδοσείως καὶ Πηγήλης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κυνός. The first of these is mentioned in the first volume after Αἰας ή Αιάντος λόγος (D.L. 6.13); these are the two works dealt with in this section.
survived and forms a companion to Ajax (Caizzi 14). The two monologues portray an event from the Ilias Parva in which Ajax and Odysseus argue over the right to Achilles’ armour.29

Ragnar Höistad considered these two works “the oldest examples of the discussion of the ideal king.”30 But just below the surface of this kingship discourse sits a debate over the nature of virtue as seen from the perspective of two very different moral types.31 The outcome of this case is not disclosed, although the reader is presumably meant to be aware that it ended with Ajax’ descent into madness and, finally, suicide. Odysseus is allowed to respond to Ajax and, in addition to having the longer speech, is thereby given the final word. The reader is meant to side with Odysseus and adopt the virtues represented by this character.32

In this portrayal of Odysseus, Antisthenes’ highlights his self-abasement and philanthropy.33 These Cynic topoi characterize Antisthenes’ ideal king in the person of Odysseus rather than Ajax.34

With regard to this first of these topoi, the king’s self-abasement consists of two significant elements. First, Odysseus dresses in rags (τὰ ράχη) as part of his disguise (Ajax 6; Odysseus 10). The king-dressed-as-a-slave would have resonated with Cynic thought, renown as Cynics were for their tattered clothing. This topos is taken up in different ways by subsequent generations of Cynics,35 but seems to highlight the same “fundamental antithesis between exterior and interior” of which Xenophon’s Antisthenes speaks (Symp. 4.34).36

This antithesis can also be understood in terms of the physical and spiritual.37 In his closing words (Odysseus 13–14), Odysseus claims that wisdom and bravery in battle should not be confused with being strong (ἰσχύω). A lack of learning (ἀμαθία), which turns one away from that which is excellent, is the greatest evil. Despite Ajax’ virtues as a warrior, he will be remembered as a dumb beast of burden, enslaved by others.38 Physical strength is again shown to be secondary to spiritual strength.39 Prowess on the battle field is meaningless if it is accompanied by ignorance. A person in this

29. The so-called ὀλαων κρίτως, see Aristotle, Poet. 1459a30–b7.
30. Cynic Hero, 95. Höistad also identifies these writings as “a surprisingly rich accumulation of Socratic-Cynic motifs in a Gorgian form” (p. 99).
31. Prince, “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 82–85 Prince argues that Antisthenes’ use of language elsewhere points to a desire “to show rather than tell,” an approach which is “continuous with the later Cynic interest in nondiscursive linguistic genres” (p. 83).
32. This conclusion might be challenged by comparing Ajax’ insistence that the case be judged according to deeds and not words with the statement attributed to Antisthenes that virtue has to do with deeds and nor words (D.L. 6.11). This contrast should not be understood in absolute terms. To Antisthenes is also attributed the opinion that virtue can be taught (D.L. 6.10)—an opinion which is affirmed by his voluminous writings, some of which, presumably, were meant to teach virtue through words. His conversion from Gorgias to Socrates did not mean that he abandoned rhetoric, but subordinated it to philosophy; see, e.g., Stob. 2.31.76 = WH 2, 215 (Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν νίον, εἴπεν, “εἰ μὲν θεοὶ μεῖξέλει συμβίον, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπως, ρήτοριν.”).
34. This is not to say that the figure of Ajax makes no contribution to our understanding of kingship. The theme of the king as physician is a particularly important topos (Ajax 4) which Höistad (Cynic Hero, 101–2) compares to Xenophon, Cyr. 1.6.15, where the physician’s “sufficiency” (and unique ability as the only one able to fulfill the role he plays) is transferred to the king, who alone is able to fulfill the monarchical roles given to him.
36. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 100.
37. According to Augustine, Aristippus gave pre-eminence to the physical while Antisthenes emphasized the mind (Civ. det. 18.41).
38. There is possibly an allusion here to Ajax’ strategic retreat at Iliad 11.544-574.
39. At the end of his speech, Odysseus description of himself as “much-enduring, of many counsels, and inventive” (πολυπλάζας, μολύμης, πολυμήχανος; 14) highlights his intellect over Ajax’ physical superiority. While these epithets could
state is no better off than a donkey or ox which is chained up and forced to do the bidding of others. Odysseus, the man who dresses like a slave, is truly free, while the powerful and successful Ajax is, in reality, enslaved. In the later tradition, this contrast would manifest itself in other ways, but always along similar lines: “outward frugality—inward riches.” This emphasis on the spiritual over the physical should not be understood in an absolute way—just as the soul must be exercised through education, so too the body needs physical exercise. We will have occasion to return to this “double training” when discussing Heracles.

Odysseus’ self-abasement is highlighted, secondly, by his lack of concern with the opinions of others. In the face of Ajax’ accusation that he was willingly humiliated for gain (Ajax 5), Odysseus claims (Odyssey 9) to have acted decisively in battle, even if it was in a manner some might consider shameful (αἰχρός). He acted in this matter because he was not concerned with earning a reputation. Rather, he was willing to go about as a slave (δούλος), a beggar (πιττωχός), and a rogue (μαστιγιας) in order to harm the enemy (Odyssey 9). This ἀδοξία was an important part of Antisthenes’ understanding of the toil needed to advance in virtue.

The other important royal topos, the king’s care for his subjects (φιλανθρωπία), is most evident in Odyssey 8, where Odysseus claims to be a στρατηγός, φύλαξ and κυβερνήτης who saves Ajax and the others. Even at night, while Ajax is snoring, Odysseus keeps him safe and attacks the enemy (10). The contrast is once again evident. It was not the strength and courage of Ajax on the battlefield that saved the Achaeans, but Odysseus’ craftiness. Those best suited to saving their fellow human beings are marked by brains, not brawn.

Antisthenes’ kingship discourse is not about ruling per se. Rather, ethical matters are examined through the prism of ruling figures. Antisthenes’ Ajax–Odysseus diptych, for example, examines type different ways of being: “the straightforward and honorable Ajax ... and the crafty Odysseus ... who always comes off best by his inventiveness, adaptability and shamelessness.” Society might consider these traits unbecoming of a king, but Antisthenes shows that Odysseus is not concerned with his reputation, but rather, with saving the community. Susan Prince notes that Ajax is moulded by his society and behaves according to its code, whereas Odysseus “appropriates and manipulates social categories ... to promote the real interests of society.” The texts thus serve to show “the superior individuality of Odysseus”.

all be understood pejoratively, Odysseus claims that should a wise poet arise, he would memorialize Odysseus for these virtues.

40. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 100.
41. Stob. 2.31.68: Αντιποθένοις δὲ τοῖς μέλλονταις ἄγαθοις ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίως ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν σωσάσθαι.
42. In contrast, Ajax is concerned with the opinion the judges might form about him and asks for judgment of his deeds instead (Ajax 8, 9).
43. The rags Odysseus wears and lashes he bears as part of his disguise, rather than being a source of shame (insinuated at Ajax 6), are his weapons (Odyssey 10).
45. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 95–96.
Cynic sage as enacted by Diogenes. The king is again transformed into a sage. Antisthenes has found Homeric precedent for the figure who will become the Cynic sage.

**Heracles.** Although not linked directly to a περὶ βασιλείας treatise, the figure of Heracles contributes to Antisthenes’ model of true kingship. Antisthenes’ construal of Heracles forms part of what Karl Galinsky has called the “intellectualization” of Heracles, a process seen in a number of classical texts. Isocrates had portrayed Heracles as an ideal for both Philip (Phil. 109–115) and Demonicus (Demon. 8) to imitate. In the case of Philip, Heracles’ alliance with the Greeks against an eastern foe is highlighted, for obvious reasons. Heracles military exploits are not forgotten and Isocrates holds up Heracles’ ordeals (ἄθλοι) as exemplifying toil (πόνος) which is considered praiseworthy. But alongside Heracles’ physical nature, Isocrates commends the qualities of Heracles’ ψυχή, his φιλανθρωπία, and his ευνομία (Phil. 114). Similarly, in a discussion of the superiority of the spiritual over the physical, Xenophon’s Socrates holds up Heracles as an example of someone in whom Zeus delighted for his ψυχή (Symp. 8.29). Heracles has become a model of virtue, the warrior transformed into a philosopher.

Antisthenes observes in both Cyrus and Heracles an example of the truth that toil (πόνος) is good (D.L. 6.2). On the face of it, this saying might speak of the physical labours for which Heracles is well known. The saying in D.L. 6.11 that “the strength of Socrates” brings about virtue shows that physicality and its associated labours could also be conceived of metaphorically. That this was so seems likely from the alternative titles of the work Ἡρακλῆς ἔργα ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἵσχύος. Xenophon’s Socrates recalls Prodicus’ famous parable of Heracles at the crossroads (Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21–34) in order to illustrate the Socratic teaching about the necessity of toil with regard to self-control. Both toil and self-control are crucial aspects of the attainment of virtue. It is also significant that this parable comes in a section concerned with the education of a ruler.

If the surviving Heracles fragments belong to the same treatise or are concerned with commentary on the same treatise, what we seem to have is a description of the hero’s education. The first stage of Heracles’ education comes, like that of Achilles, Asclepius, and others, from the centaur Chiron (Caizzi 24A = SSR V A 92). Chiron’s teaching was concerned with hunting, music, medicine, astronomy—“normal human culture and science.” In another fragment (Caizzi 27 = SSR V A 96), Heracles receives a philosophical education from Prometheus in which a contrast is drawn...
between concern for the things of this world and those which are greater than this world. 56 Another echo of this teaching survives in the saying that establishes rhetoric as necessary for living among human beings and philosophy as necessary for living with the gods (Stob. 2.31.76 = WH 2, 215).

It is with regard to Heracles that Antisthenes teaches that “life according to virtue” is the sought-after goal (D.L. 6.104), that virtue can be taught (D.L. 6.105), and that one ought to be wary of flatterers (Plutarch, Vit. pud. 18). An important part of virtue is to be self-sufficient in one’s “self-image”: just as ἀδοξία should be welcomed, 57 flatterers should be avoided. 58 This advice is related to that given with regard to frank speech (παρρησία). On the one hand, harsh words should not injure the sage, on the other, the temptation to be influenced by flattery is so great that it should be avoided. Although these sayings are not found alongside discussions of frank speech, they would seem to be mirror images of one another. The safe practice of frank speech requires its recipient to accept it gladly. In terms of the one offering it, frank speech is, by definition honest; it is neither unjustly critical nor unduly flattering.

As the discussion of the fragments of Antisthenes’ writing about Heracles has shown, Antisthenes’ focus was largely on ethics and virtue rather than on political philosophy as it is commonly conceived. Höistad’s assessment that these writings provide “an allegorical re-interpretation of the myth of Heracles along purely individualistic [ethical] lines” 59 is sound.

Antisthenes’ Contribution. Diogenes Laertius only catalogues two περὶ βασιλείας treatises written by Antisthenes: Cyrus and Archelaus. In this section I have investigated other works that seem to hold promise to fill out the picture. In some cases, this investigation results in question-begging: by examining an ethical text (Ajax–Odysseus) I conclude that Antisthenes’ kingship writings must have been ethical. This is unavoidable, but also warranted on the basis that the rest of the (fragmentary) material supports the ethical emphasis with regard to Antisthenes’ writings.

The little evidence that remains suggests that these kingship treatises (especially those that focus on Heracles) contained advice of a general kind (“don’t be grateful towards flatterers”), or ethical/philosophical discussion of virtue, rather than explicitly political advice. Prince suggests that Antisthenes’ Cyrus and Heracles “were not discussions about virtue, but fictional dialogues in which virtue was demonstrated through the mimesis or literary representation of virtuous (and possibly vicious) characters.” 60 This is certainly the case with the Ajax and Odysseus, and we might suppose that the Cyrus or Archelaus treatises employed the same discursive strategy.

56. Luz, “Antisthenes’ Concept of Paideia”; Adam Drozdek, Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 141
57. See the discussion of ἀδοξία in relation to Odysseus, p. 106.
58. D.L. 6.4 (=Stob. 3.14.17, WH 3, p. 474, lines 3-6): He [sc. Antisthenes] said it is better to fall in with ravens than flatterers (ἐὰς κόρων ἤ ἐὰς κόλλακς ἐμπόσπιν) since the former devour the dead while the latter devour the living.
60. “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 80.
Cynics and Kingship

Much Cynic discussion of kingship takes place in the form of shorter sayings (χρειά,61 ἀποφθέγματα) and longer anecdotes (ἀπομνημονεύματα), rather than through more abstract discourse. Two characteristics generally mark these accounts. The first characteristic is described as τὸ σπουδαστικόν. In the ancient world the term was associated with the Cynic Menippus,62 but has come to be used more generally to speak of Cynic serio-comic discourse.63 Through humour, Cynics were able to engage in transgressive speech and behaviour without risking the social consequences that these would usually attract. It was this which stood at the heart of Cynic παρασεία, allowing the Cynic sage to “speak truth to power.”64

The second characteristic is related to the first. It is the tendency to appropriate for Cynic purposes the language used by others.65 The most obvious example of this is Diogenes’ subversion of Homeric quotations.66 But at a more basic level, Diogenes “defaced the currency” of language by assuming his own definitions for words common to the rest of society. Rhetors, for example, he called “thrice-human” meaning “thrice-wretched” (D.L. 6.47). Or again, good men are nowhere to be found in Greece, but one might find good boys in Sparta (D.L. 6.27). The redefinition of “king” and “slave,” in particular, will be important in our analysis of the Cynic anecdotes to which we now turn.

Of Sages and Kings. The encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great is recorded by a number of different writers (Cicero, Tusc. 5; Diogenes, Ep. 33; Plutarch, Alex. 14.1–3; Alex. fort. 1.5; Princ. iner. 5; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 4; D.L. 6.38) and each gives to the story a slightly different emphasis.67 There are a number of interesting elements that occur across the various versions. In these

61. One of the definitions offered by Aelius Theon is that a chreia is “a brief saying or action making a point, attributed to some specified person or something corresponding to a person” (cited by George A. Kennedy, Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric; WGRW 10 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003], 15).
62. The most important occurrence for our purposes: in relation to his coming from Gadara, Menippus is identified as ὁ σπουδαστικός by both Strabo (Geography 16.2.29) and Stephanus (Ethnica 3.9.3; cf. p. 193 of the epitome of the Ethnica [A. Meineke (ed.), Stephani Byzanti. Ethnicorum Quae Supersunt. Berlin: Reimer, 1849]). In the same work, Stephanus writes of Βλαιών σπουδαστικών ποιητῶν (p. 357). Diogenes Laertius also uses the word to identify a certain Heracliitus (D.L. 9.17). These are the only five occurrences of the word in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (as of 28 April 2014). For Menippus, see D.L. 6.99–101; Dudley, Cynicism, 69–74. Lucian (Bis acc. 33) calls Menippus “a really dreadful dog who bites unexpectedly because he grins when he bites.”
67. Cicero’s work, for example, argues that virtue is sufficient for happiness. He brings out Diogenes, along with Epicurus, Anacharsis, Socrates, and Xenocrates, to show that money cannot buy happiness and that, on the contrary, happiness is obtained through being content with little. Dio Chrysostom turns the encounter into an opportunity for Diogenes to educate Alexander on the intricacies of Hellenistic kingship ideology. As Richard Stoneman observes with regard to this anecdote, it is “the essence of a good story that it can be used in many contexts, can bear multiple meanings” (“The Legacy of Alexander in Ancient Philosophy,” in Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great, ed. Joseph Roisman [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 330).
anecdotes, Alexander approaches Diogenes yet, as Ineke Sluiter notes, subjects usually approach kings.68 This non-verbal element of the anecdote highlights Diogenes’ superiority. Furthermore, his response to Alexander emphasizes the important Cynic virtues of frank speech and self-sufficiency.69 The king has nothing to offer the philosopher, and the philosopher is not afraid of letting the king know this.

In the classical polis, παρρησία described the citizen’s right to have his voice heard within the city’s political system.70 As democracy was replaced by monarchy, the term came to be used to indicate the honesty and frankness with which one friend could speak to another. “Παρρησία as a private virtue replaced παρρησία as a political right.”71 In the philosophical context, the virtue was essential in a teacher’s instruction of a disciple or amongst philosophical “friends” who would hope to make moral progress. Philodemus’ treatise Περὶ παρρησίας is illustrative of this category. Plutarch’s Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur addressed to Prince Philopappus72 suggests yet another context in which παρρησία is an essential virtue: the Hellenistic royal court. It is here that we see most clearly both frank speech and its opposite, flattery.73

An example of Diogenes’ frank speech is illustrated in his comment on a letter sent from Alexander to Antipater through Athlios: “ἄθλιος παρ’ ἄθλιον δι’ ἄθλιον πρὸς ἄθλιον”—“From a wretch born of a wretch, through a wretch, to a wretch.”(D.L. 6.44). This response leaves the audience in no doubt as to Diogenes’ opinion of kings and those who serve them. Multiple alleged encounters between Cynics and rulers embody this tradition of frank speech and self-sufficiency. There are stories of Diogenes interacting with Philip (D.L. 6.43), Craterus (D.L. 6.57), and Perdiccas (D.L. 6.44). Crates is similarly portrayed in conversation with Alexander (D.L. 6.93). This tradition does not show the Cynic sage giving the king honest, practical advice on governing; for this we will have to wait for the Cynic Epistles (see below). Rather, we see the sage exercising his freedom by criticizing kingship

68. Sluiter, “Language and Learning.” 143. Laertius simply says that Alexander came to Diogenes (Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστή μες φην; D.L. 6.38; cf. 6.60). Plutarch, however, says that Alexander had expected Diogenes to join the politicians and philosophers who had come to congratulate him. And when Diogenes did not come to Alexander, “Alexander went to him” (ιοτός ἐπιστή μες πρὸς ιοντόν; Alex. 14.2). The significance of this was not lost of Dio Chrysostom who starts to say that Alexander went off to pay court to Diogenes, and then tones down this statement by pointing out that, in fact, Diogenes had no court, nor house, nor city of his own (Or. 4.12–13). He does not correct himself, however, by pointing out that Diogenes was a philosopher and that it would be totally inappropriate for the king to pay court to a Cynic philosopher. In Ep. 24, Diogenes “summons” Alexander.


72. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 61–79 argues that this treatise was meant to be read by the prince and that it contained real advice to him from Plutarch.

73. Following a discussion of “parasites” (πέρι παρασιτῶν), Book 6 of Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists contains a discussion of flatterers (πέρι κολάκων) (6.53–80). The majority of the anecdotes and sayings are placed in the context of Hellenistic courts.
itself. These anecdotes contribute to a significant literary topos in which the philosopher confronts a ruler and emerges victorious from their verbal exchange. They illustrate how the Cynic virtues enable the sage “to resist the coercion of tyrants and to expose the pretensions of ‘intellectuals’ and politicians.”

Kingship was antithetical to the achievement of Cynic ends and was therefore to be ridiculed and resisted. Tyrants and those who paid them court were the special object of Cynic scorn (Plutarch, *An seni* 1 (783d); D.L. 6.50; Diogenes, *Ep.* 29, *Ep.* 45; Antisthenes, *Ep.* 8). This resistance by Cynics to what are considered illicit forms of rule forms an essential part of the “anarchist” strand of Cynic political thought which, in turn, is linked to Cynic cosmopolitanism. If the cosmos is the only true politeia, and if nature dictates that the sage does not owe allegiance to any other state, then it follows that forms of power exercised in these illegitimate states must themselves be illegitimate.

This form of Cynicism has been described as “hard” Cynicism. It is marked by hostility and unrelenting critique of kingship. Alongside anecdotes critical of kings, a number of stories serve to ridicule those who would pay court to the rich and powerful. For example, contrary to those who view Callisthene’s relationship with Alexander as fortunate, Diogenes considered the historian hapless (κακοδαιμον) since he would be at the king’s beck and call (D.L. 6.45). Or consider this story:

Plato saw him [sc. Diogenes] washing lettuces, came up to him and quietly said to him, “Had you paid court (ἐθεραπευς) to Dionysius, you wouldn't now be washing lettuces,” and that he with equal calmness made answer, “If you had washed lettuces, you wouldn't have paid court to Dionysius.” (D.L. 6.58)

These anecdotes illustrate the difference between apparent and real freedom and self-sufficiency seen from a Cynic point of view. As long as one was beholden to those in power and dependent upon their benefaction, one could not claim to be truly free or self-sufficient.

Given Cynic antagonism towards rulers and those who pay court to them, the presence of Cynics in Hellenistic courts or in royal retinues—Onesicritus, Bion, and Cercidas, for example—is initially puzzling. Moles argues for a form of “soft” Cynicism in which philosophers accommodate themselves, to greater or lesser degrees, to the various forms of rule they experience: the “general process of fudging a reconciliation between Cynicism and worldly power” begins with Onesicritus and it reaches a climax in the kingship orations of Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 1–4).

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77. For this theme in the Cynic Epistles, see Diogenes, *Ep.* 46; Antisthenes, *Ep.* 8.
79. Moles, “Cynics and Politics,” 148; cf. Stoneman, “Legacy of Alexander,” 332. In this, according to Moles, Onesicritus was following the examples of Antisthenes and Xenophon.
Within soft Cynicism philosophers often act as royal advisers rather than critics. The argument might have run as follows: since the Cynic claims freedom of speech and action before a ruler, the sage will be best placed to act as a royal counsel. Given this assumption, what sort of advice might a Cynic sage give a ruler? A number of the Cynic Epistles addressed to rulers adopt the voice of ancient Cynics and serve to illustrate the advice that a sage might have given a Hellenistic king.

The King as Sage: Advice to Kings. In order to act as adviser to the king, the sage must first convince the king that such a role is necessary. This is done using two different metaphors. In the first, the king is in need of a “master,” someone to whip him into shape:

Consequently you need a whip and an overlord (δεσποστή) and not someone who will admire and flatter (θαυμάσαι καὶ κολακεύσει) you. Indeed, how would anyone ever be benefited by this sort of person, and how would such a person benefit anyone? Only if he chastise (κολαίζω) him like a horse or an ox and at the same time recall him to his senses and pay heed to what is lacking. (Diogenes Ep. 29)

The king needs a master since he is, in reality, a slave (cf. Anacharsis, Ep. 6). This metaphor is related to the Cynic claim that the sage is the only true king (see below).

The second metaphor compares the Cynic sage to a doctor, specifically, a doctor for the soul (Anacharsis Ep. 9; Diogenes, Ep. 40, 49). A doctor is necessary because, as Diogenes writes in Epistle 29, tyranny is a sickness. To mix the two metaphors, then, we might say that the cure for this condition is found in the rebuke and chastisement of a suitable teacher, such as “one of the paedagogues of Athens” whom Diogenes promises to send to Dionysius.

The advice proffered by these advisers consists of a blend of general admonition and exhortation to the Cynic virtues. The king must battle δοξα, appearances or opinions (Diogenes, Ep. 5; Ep. 40), which comprise the real dangers facing a king since to be concerned with appearances is at odds with a life lived according to nature (Diogenes, Ep. 6). Bodyguards and citadels only add to fear and are thus not really able to contribute to the security of the king’s soul (Diogenes, Ep. 29). Real security is found only in the Cynic virtues and in actions that accord with these. The king is warned against drunkenness (Anacharsis, Ep. 3), greed (Anacharsis, Ep. 9), sexual pleasure (Diogenes, Ep. 24), and other excesses. War is senseless (Diogenes, Ep. 40; cf. D.L. 6.85). Like a shepherd is concerned for his sheep, a good ruler is concerned about his subjects (Anacharsis, Ep. 7; Diogenes, Ep. 4[?]); to rule means “to know how to deal with men and to do something for the most noble reason” (Diogenes, Ep. 40). Cynic φιλανθρωπία is a necessary virtue for the king to adopt.

81. To take the letters attributed to Diogenes as an example: we find in that collection epistles addressed to Antipater (Ep. 4, 14, 15), Perdiccas (Ep. 5, 45), Agesilaus (Ep. 22), Alexander (Ep. 24, 40), Dionysius (Ep. 29).
82. In Anacharsis, Ep. 9, Croesus’ immoderate love of pleasure is said to affect his body and soul, but while he has doctors for the former, the latter is ignored. For a king to be truly healthy requires that he tends to this malady.
83. Cf. Diogenes, Ep. 40 in which he proposes to send to Alexander a “judge” (δικαστής) from Athens, since this is the sort of person who ensures that others neither experience nor perpetrate evil.
84. They are unable to protect against disease, for example (Diogenes, Ep. 40).
85. See Malherbe, “Antisthenes, Odysseus, Paul” for discussion of this trope in early Cynicism.
In brief, these letters show the sage urging the king to submit to Cynic philosophy. The most important piece of advice that is given to a king is simply to become a disciple of a Cynic master in order to achieve the Cynic way of life (Diogenes, Ep. 5). As Dio Chrysostom points out to Trajan, such a “wise and prudent” person can prove a competent and perfect guide and helper of a man endowed with a tractable and virtuous nature, and can lead it toward all excellence by fitting encouragement and direction. (Or. 1.8)

“Soft” Cynicism does not represent a total abandonment of Cynic philosophy but is rather a pragmatic response to Hellenistic monarchy. The sage’s παρρησία no longer consists purely of criticism and mockery; it has been replaced by protrepsis and paraenesis. This Cynic exhortation is based on the assertion that only the sage is truly a king.

**The Sage as King.** In a letter addressed to Anaxilaus, Diogenes writes:

I have recently come to recognize myself to be Agamemnon, since for scepter I have my staff and for a mantle the double, ragged cloak, and by way of exchange, my leather wallet is a shield. (Ep. 19)

In Cynic writings kingship is described as slavery, while true freedom is found only by those who following the Cynic philosophy and concomitant lifestyle (Anacharsis, Ep.5; Ep. 6). One of the most dramatic examples of this comes in a story recounted by Diogenes Laertius:

Further, when he was sold as a slave, he endured it most nobly. For on a voyage to Aegina he was captured by pirates under the command of Scirpalus, conveyed to Crete and exposed for sale. When the auctioneer asked in what he was proficient, he replied, “In ruling men (ἵνθρωπων ἀρχην).” Thereupon he pointed to a certain Corinthian with a fine purple border to his robe, the man named Xeniaides above-mentioned, and said, “Sell me to this man; he needs a master (οὗτος δεσπότου χρηζεί).” Thus Xeniaides came to buy him, and took him to Corinth and set him over his own children and entrusted his whole household to him. And he administered it in all respects in such a manner that Xeniaides used to go about saying, “A good genius (ἀγαθὸς δαιμόν) has entered my house.” (D.L. 6.74)

In Crates’ the retelling of this story, those who hear Diogenes’ claim to be a master to those who need one respond by saying to him, “And who is there who, since he is free, needs a master?” Diogenes’ reply is, “All who are base (οἱ φαυλοὶ) and who honor pleasure and despise toil, the greatest incitements to evils.” In this account Diogenes is not sold but taken home by the pirates to whom he proceeds to teach philosophy.

The point could not be clearer. In these stories of reversal the Cynic sage is a true ruler while those who would purchase him from the pirates are enslaved by their vices. A similar point is made in the anecdotes mentioned above in which Cynic philosophers confront Hellenistic kings. The sages’ moral and intellectual superiority over the rulers is emphasized in order to drive home the point that it is the sages and not the rulers who exhibit true royal virtues.

While the insistence on the kingship of the sage is not simply “Cynic pretention [sic]” or “a metaphor for the guiding and counseling function of the philosopher,” neither is it a description of the ideal Cynic politeia.\(^87\) If kingship is defined in terms of excellence (ἀρετή) and its components, if the king is superior in comparison to all others, then it follows from a Cynic point of view that the sage is rightly described in terms of kingship.\(^88\) Only the sage exhibits the virtues necessary to live a life according to nature.

Only the Cynic virtues allow one to rule over one’s own life and, therefore, over others. By exercising self-control and insensitivity to the passions, the Cynic sage denies external forces any influence over his or her life. Similarly, being content with little and learning to live off the land (or its inhabitants!) demonstrates independence and freedom. Kings lived in constant fear, as evidenced by their bodyguards and fortresses. The Cynic, able to sleep without concern in public, showed that he was not controlled by fear. Who, they would ask, is the slave and who is truly free?

In Epictetus’ discourse On the calling of a Cynic, a similar idea is worked out. The sage asks, “And how do I face those persons before whom you stand in fear and awe? Do I not face them as slaves? Who, when he lays eyes upon me, does not feel that he is seeing his king and his master?” (3.22.49; trans. Oldfather [LCL]). Here the Cynic has been sent from the gods as a scout. Once the wretchedness of his or her fellow human beings has been ascertained, the Cynic assumes the role of a divine messenger, bringing to earth the message that a better way of life is possible. In assuming this role, the Cynic becomes an overseer or leader of humanity. This leadership does not consists of rule, though, but of exemplifying this way of life and urging others to follow.\(^89\)

Both of these cases—the kingship of the sage and the slave-like nature of kings—rely on the Cynics’ reversal of common language and ideas. Rulers and others are described as “slaves,” while only the sages are truly free and are therefore kings. Kingship is no longer about ruling and power over the masses; it has become an ethical and individual matter. The Cynic sage is truly king because he is able to rule himself in freedom, endurance, self-control, and self-sufficiency. For the Cynic, a kingdom of one is the most significant kingdom over which anyone could ever desire to rule.

**Conclusion: Cynic Conceptions of Kingship**

Doyne Dawson writes: “The commonest impression left by the anecdotes is that Cynics were antimonarchic.”\(^90\) If practical monarchy is in view, Dawson’s statement is correct. John Moles suggests three reasons why kingship would be criticized by Cynics:\(^91\) (1) the king is rich; (2) his kingship is external rather than internal; (3) his kingship represents nomos. All three elements are antithetical to Cynic life.

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\(^87\) Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 59–60. The guiding element certainly plays a role in this metaphor (see the discussion of Epictetus in what follows) but it is not primary or even central.


\(^89\) Those who lack the Cynic virtues will soon be found out by their fellow-citizens and overthrown, just like bees throw out drones who parade as the queen (Epic. Diss. 3.22.90).

\(^90\) *Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 140.

\(^91\) Moles, “Cynics,” 432; Moles, “Cynics and Politics,” 145.

114
One section within the Cynic tradition—"hard Cynicism"—seems to have been unashamedly antagonistic towards those in power who did not live up to this ideal. In the wordplay and dramatic actions attributed to Diogenes, kings and their courtiers are critiqued. In so far as they failed to exhibit the Cynic virtues and concomitant lifestyle, their lives were not lived according to nature and therefore deserved such criticism. Diogenes’ encounter with Alexander became paradigmatic of this attitude.

At the other end of the spectrum we see “soft Cynicism” attempting to deal with autocratic power through advice and suggestion. Dio Chrysostom attempted to put into practice what the Cynic Epistles had portrayed: kings would do well to appoint Cynic advisers that they might be tutored in the Cynic way of life.

Doyne Dawson observes that the early Cynic tradition exhibits “a surprising degree of consistency, and at the same time a number of puzzling inconsistencies.” The later tradition found in the Cynic epistles is also characterized by “puzzling inconsistencies.” Abraham Malherbe argues that this demonstrates the great diversity found in imperial Cynicism.

The second of Moles’ reasons why Cynics would be critical of kingship, that political kingship is external rather than internal, highlights an important contribution that Cynic thought makes to the idea of kingship. True kingship that accords with nature rather than custom consists of self-rule; other virtues should proceed from this important trait. The idea that the sage is the only true king is worked out in Stoic thought, to which we now turn.

**Stoic Kingship**

Three Stoics are credited by Diogenes Laertius (7.175, 36, 178) with writing περὶ βασιλείας treatises: Cleanthes (331–232), Persaeus (c. 306–c. 243), and Sphaerus (c. 285/265–c. 221). All three philosophers are associated with Hellenistic courts.

Cleanthes’ meagre biography (D.L. 7.168–176; SVF 1.463–480) contains very little reference to his dealings with or opinion of rulers. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoic lectured Antigonus II Gonatas and that at one point the king gave him a gift of three thousand drachmas (D.L. 7.169). Whether true or not, these stories owe their origin to Antigonus’ early association with Athenian philosophers—especially Zeno—and his later support of poets, philosophers, and historians as he attempted to turn Pella into “a minor centre of patronage and culture.”

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93. “Self-Definition”.

94. For the claim that this self-mastery, ἐγκρίτωσι, αὐτόκρατα, stands at the centre of the Socratic project, see, e.g., A. A. Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 3–22.

95. An earlier draft of this section was presented as “Wisdom and Kingship in Hellenistic Philosophy” at the Humboldt Kolleg: Worldview and Way of Life in the Ancient World, held at Stellenbosch on 10–12 September 2012. I am grateful to the participants for the insightful discussion on that occasion.

Persaeus had been sent by Zeno to Gonatas’ court where he acted as secretary and tutor to the king’s son, Halcyoneus (D.L. 7.6, 36; cf. Aelianus, Var. hist. 3.17). It was perhaps in this role that Persaeus produced the περὶ βασιλείας treatise for the prince, just as Euphantus of Olynthus had for his Gonatas (D.L. 2.110).

Sphaerus was associated with the Spartan reformer Cleomenes III (Plutarch, Cleomenes 2, 11) and the Ptolemaic court. Athenaeus records that Sphaerus was summoned to Alexandria by “King Ptolemy” (Deipn. 8.354e–f). According to Diogenes Laertius (who mentions nothing of Cleomenes III), this was Ptolemy IV Philopator (D.L. 7.177). However, there are discrepancies between this account and the one found at D.L. 7.185 which records that Sphaerus was sent by Cleanthes to Ptolemy after Chrysippus had refused to go. In all likelihood, following his defeat at Sellasia in 223, Cleomenes fled to Alexandria where he was received by his erstwhile supporter, Ptolemy III Euergetes. If Sphaerus’ relationship to the Spartan king was as close as Plutarch suggests, it is likely that the philosopher accompanied him to Egypt and to the Ptolemaic court. It was here that he would have associated with both Ptolemy III and, after 221, Ptolemy IV, either of whom might have been the recipients of a περὶ βασιλείας treatise.

Not one of the Stoic περὶ βασιλείας writings has survived. We are thus forced to investigate Stoic political writings more broadly in order to gauge the shape of Stoic thought on kingship.

The Stoic Republic

Zeno and Chrysippus each wrote a treatise entitled Πολιτεια (D.L. 7.4, 34, 188). The contents of these are mentioned at D.L. 7.32–34 (Zeno) and D.L. 7.187–189 (Chrysippus). The treatises are discussed by Philodemus (On the Stoics = P.Herc. 339 and 155), they are mentioned at various points by Plutarch in his anti-Stoic writings (De communibus notitiis contra stoicos and De Stoicorum repugnantiis), and certain elements are also commented upon by Sextus Empiricus in the Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes. The polemical nature of these sources account for the emphasis on the rebarbative elements in the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus and present us with a somewhat skewed and biased version of their texts.

The doxographic remains of Zeno’s Republic might be sifted into three groups: (1) those that are more abstract, such as the idea that only the virtuous are true citizens, friends, family, and free (D.L. 7.32–33); (2) those that speak of institutions, including marriage (cf. D.L. 7.131; Sextus

100. The passages which mention Zeno’s work by name are collected at H. C. Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” JHS 79 (1959): 3–5; see also SVF 1.259–271.
101. In Sextus Empiricus, (Pyr. 3), for example, the examples are chosen to show that the Stoics do not dare practice what they preach (see Katja Maria Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa [New York: Oxford University Press, 2008], 34–51).
102. I am adopting this framework from Vogt, Cosmic City, 29.
Empiricus, *Pyr.* 3.245), education, temples, law courts, and gymnasia (D.L. 7.33); and (3) those that speak of ways of acting/living. This final group includes burial practices (Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 3.248), incest (D.L. 7.188; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 3.205, 246), and cannibalism (D.L. 7.188; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 3.207–208, 247).

With one or two notable exceptions, the modern scholarly consensus is that Zeno’s *Republic*, like that of Plato, was never meant to be implemented. Reports of Zeno’s critique of Plato suggest that the former’s *Republic* was written with the latter’s in view. Just as Plato’s goal in writing the *Republic* had more to do with understanding the nature of justice at an individual level, so Zeno’s purpose in the *Republic* is not to provide a model for a world-state, but to describe how an individual may attain his natural end and perfection in the true polity governed by natural law, even while living out his life in inferior regimes.

Zeno’s primary concern is with the individual sage’s existence as it is experienced between two communities: one to which the sage belongs by virtue of being wise and within which sages and gods share citizenship—the “natural” community—and the other, that community to which the sage belongs “by accident of birth”—the “conventional” community.

The second group of teachings within the doxographic remains of Zeno’s work proclaim the absence or removal of the institutions of the Greek *polis*: marriage, gymnasia, education, law-courts,

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103. Cf. Herodotus 3.38; Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 328c.
104. See, for example, *Resp.* 592a–d; 472c–e; Cicero, *Rep.* 2.52; pace Vogt, *Cosmic City*, 66 who says that Plato’s city could and should be established, but recognizes the controversial nature of her claim.

109. It is unclear to me whether the teaching regarding the community of wives belongs in the second or third group. An argument can be made for both: marriage and its concomitant regulations are a function of *nomos* and the sage might also
temples, currency (D.L. 7.33). This forms part of Zeno’s attack on convention and his promotion of natural law which is equated with right reason (Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102). Once it is accepted that the city consists only of gods and sages who always act in accordance with right reason, it follows that these institutions are no longer needed. Law-courts, to take one example, are not needed since sages will not need others to judge between them. Their morally perfect actions will inevitably lead to the best possible situation for themselves and others. Chrysippus’ assertion (D.L. 7.129) that the usual form of Greek education (τὰ ἔγκυκλια μαθήματά) is “serviceable” (ἐναρθρητικά) makes sense if that passage comes from a discussion of a non-ideal polity.

The reason for the final group of elements becomes clearer when it is recognized that these examples are not meant to be prescriptive, but that they are illustrative or descriptive of the Stoic sage’s ability to always choose the best option in every situation, even when that option is objectionable to almost everyone: “he [the sage] will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances” (γνώσεσθαι τε και ἄνθρωποιν αὐτούς κατά περίστασιν; D.L. 7.121; cf. 7.109). Cannibalism, incest, and other actions of this sort are not encouraged, but neither are they prohibited without exception. Stoic right reason is always dependent on circumstances. Even in sub-optimal circumstances, then, the sage will make the correct choice according to right reason which will enable the sage to live according to nature. It is within this framework that we need to understand Stoic political thought as it pertains to the second community, the “conventional” community to which a Stoic belonged through birth.

Advising the King

Chrysippus wrote four volumes On Lives (Περι βίων; D.L. 7.121, 129; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 2, 9, 10, 20) and at least two On Life and Livelihood (Περι βίου καὶ πορισμοῦ, D.L. 7.188) in which he explored the sage’s life in the conventional community. In keeping with the observation that the sage is by nature suited for society and action (κοινωνικός γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός), not the hermetic life (D.L. 7.123), Chrysippus establishes that the sage may engage in the political life “as long as nothing hinders him” (ἅν μὴ τί κολάῃ; D.L. 7.121). These hindrances would include unspecified “great and
difficult dangers” or the situation in which the sage’s participation had no benefit to the community (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). It is expected, though, that the sage’s participation in political life will promote virtue and restrain vice (D.L.7.121). All the sage’s actions flow from perfect virtue and are in accordance with right reason, thus anything the sage does in the city will promote virtue. The exact nature in which the sage might accomplish these lofty goals is not spelled out, but Chrysippus seems to have suggested three potential ways of procuring a livelihood: by living with a king, from friends, and through wisdom (D.L. 7.189).116

The first of way of life, kingship, entails the sage either being a king himself or enjoying monarchical resources through association with a king, resources that are presumably made available to those advising the king in royal matters (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). If we ask about the types of kings with whom the Stoic sage would consort,117 we are told that the sage will want to advise a king who demonstrates a naturally good disposition and a willingness to learn (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). This is in keeping with the idea that a sage will participate in the political life of a polis that is making progress towards perfection (Stob. 2.7.11b = WH 2, 94). In the case of monarchy, much of the state’s ability to progress will be determined by the ruler. Therefore, the best way for the Stoic sage to benefit the polis—and thus to experience benefits in return—is to advise such a king as is able to make progress himself in the philosophical life.118 Plutarch, however, cites a passage from Chrysippus showing that making progress was not always a defining trait in the kings with whom the Stoics associated.119 The realities of having to deal with less-than-ideal kings in pursuit of a livelihood seems to have made its way into Chrysippus’ work at this point.120

The Best Regime

The reality of imperfect kingship raises the question whether monarchy is indeed the best form of government. A monarchical government would certainly reflect the way in which the cosmos is governed (see below), but Zeno’s ideal polis (best regime?) is arranged along egalitarian lines (although this should not automatically be equated with democracy121). But is an alternative form of government perhaps better suited to the conventional polis? At first glance it might seem that the report

116. Schofield (Stoic Idea, 18–20) understands the negative assessments of these modes of making money in D.L. 7.189 to be due to a later commentator and not from Chrysippus; see also Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 64–65. Arius Didymus also notes three preferred ways of life: the royal, political, and intellectual life which seem to correspond to three ways of making money (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 109). Plutarch records only two of these in Chrysippus’ writing: living with kings and being paid for lecturing (Stoic. rep. 30).

117. For the argument in this paragraph, see Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 67–68. What Erskine doesn’t say is that there are clues in the language of some of these Stoic fragments that, as in Plato’s Republic, there were certainly analogies to be drawn between the polis and the sage.

118. If teleios here is used of the city in the same way as it is to discuss the perfection of the sage, then it is referring to that which is morally good. Similarly, prokopē is read analogously to the progress that a bad person makes towards being good ; see Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 67 n. 8, for the argument that teleios here refers to that which is perfect and morally good.

119. SVF 3.693 = Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1043e + 1047f. Plutarch claims that Chrysippus’ claims are made solely for the purpose of profit.

120. This is perhaps reflected in Chrysippus’ reason for not partaking in the political life: he argued that it was impossible to please both the gods and human citizens for, if he did evil, he would displease the gods and if he did good, the citizens (Stob. 4.3.29 = WH 4, 192). This saying reflects a negative view of the conventional polis rather than a principled refusal to partake in political life.

at D.L. 7.131 provides conclusive evidence regarding Stoic political thought: “The best form of government they hold to be a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy.” The Early Stoa’s admiration for Sparta has led some to argue that it was this city’s constitution that drew Stoic admiration for the mixed constitution.  

The best known argument for a mixed constitution comes from Polybius, writing a century after the early Stoics, although the theory of mixed constitutions had already appeared in fifth- and fourth-century political thought. Cicero associates the Stoic Panaetius with Polybius, suggesting the Middle Stoa as the most likely origin for the Stoic theory of mixed constitutions.

Among the early Stoics, Chrysippus argues that the laws and constitutions of all states are wrong. Cities that do not meet the Stoic ideal are not even considered cities. It is unlikely that the Stoics would feel the need to develop hypotheses regarding the best regime in this context. Unlike other philosophers, the Stoics did not seem to have much interest in the discussion of the merits and demerits of existing constitutions and regimes. The Stoic city was the only institution deserving of the name and, presumably, of careful philosophical discourse. Attention was given to how one might live in less-than-perfect “cities,” but there was nothing to be gained by studying their political organization or proposing incremental changes to an entity that would always remain sub-optimal. As we saw in the previous section, the Stoics’ focus was on the sage as he negotiated these inferior polities.

The Sage as King

A superficial reading of the Stoic texts suggests that the sage was a multi-talented individual. Only the Stoic sage was the true king, general, admiral (D.L. 7.122; Stob.2.7.11m = WH 2, 108), magistrate, judge, or orator (D.L. 7.122). That this Stoic teaching was well known can be seen in its use by a number of different authors from various traditions and backgrounds—Philo (Names 152; Migration 197), Lucian (Vit. auct. 20), Clement (Strom. 2.4), to name but a few. It forms part of the larger Stoic doctrine that “Only the Stoic sage is x,” where x might also include concepts like “rich,” “free,” “citizens,” or “friends” (see, e.g., D.L. 7.33). Many of these sayings are counterintuitive and were regarded as Stoic “paradoxes.” Plutarch has his characters mock these paradoxes and they

125. Diogenianus ap. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8: “How say you, too, that the established laws and the constitutions of states have all been wrong?” (trans. Gifford); see also Paul A. Vander Waerd, “Politics and Philosophy,” 202.
126. Clement, Strom. 4.26: “For the Stoics say that heaven is properly a city, but places here on earth are not cities; for they are called so, but are not. For a city is an important thing, and the people a decorous body, and a multitude of men regulated by law” (ANF 2.441).
127. So Paul A. Vander Waerd, “Politics and Philosophy,” 199–202; Paul Vander Waerd, “Origins of Natural Law,” 292–93. Despite his suggestion that the Stoics conceived of a mixed constitution as the best form of government, Aalders observes, correctly, that “they seemingly too little interest in the debate about the form of the constitution of the polis … The Stoics were interested in the moral behaviour of the rulers, not in the form of the constitution” (Political Thought, 92, 93).
128. Zeno: When some accused Zeno of speaking in paradoxes (ὅτι παράδοξα λέγει) he replied that at least he was not
refuse to engage the Stoics at this point since, “who has not already had his fill of the arguments in refutation of those paradoxes?” (Comm. not. 1060b; cf. Stoic. abs. 1058b–d). The widespread quotation of these teachings, combined with the Stoic concern for language and logic, suggests that, as we investigate Stoic thought about kingship, we should not dismiss these statements as easily as Plutarch has.

The Stoic teaching that “only the sage is king” is found in Diogenes Laertius and Arius Didymus:

Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule (τὴν βουλεύειν ὁσίης ἄρχῃς ἀνυπευθύνου), which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno’s use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. (D.L. 7.122)\[130\]

Katja Vogt has argued that statements of the form “only the sage is king” do not illustrate the nature of the sage, but rather serve to define him along Stoic lines, that is, in terms of knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.\[131\] While it is true that certain passages define leadership in terms of wisdom and virtue, other passages indicate that Stoic thought included an “ideal” or correct model of certain offices—for example, priesthood (Stob. 2.7.5b12 = WH 2, 67–68)—consisting of specific attributes. These attributes, in turn, serve to define the sage (piety) and, conversely, the fool (impiety).

In the context of D.L. 7.122, the argument seems to be that since (1) knowledge of good and evil is necessary for a ruler, and since (2) only the sage has this knowledge, therefore (3) only the sage is truly a king. From this follows that (4) only the sage is truly free since (5) only kings enjoy “absolute rule” or “rule that in answerable to no one.”\[133\] In the Stoic formulation of the sage’s wisdom (1), (2), and (3) are true for magistrates, judges, orators, and other tasks. Vogt’s assessment holds at this point. However, the conclusion drawn in (4) follows from (5) which relies on a specific predicate of kingship.\[134\] Arius Didymus’ summary (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 108) draws the conclusion (3) on the basis of (5), adding that kingship is the highest office and the one controlling all others (τὴν ἄνορθωσι καὶ τὴν ἕπι πάσας). Here, as in (4) and (5) at D.L. 7.122, certain aspects of kingship are assumed which

speaking lawlessly/indecently (οὗ παράνομος) (SVF 1.281). Cleanthes: “Possibly the philosophers say what is contrary to opinion (παράδοξα), but assuredly not what is contrary to reason (παράλογα)” (apid Arrian, Epict. diss. 4.1.173 = SVF 1.619). See also Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum; De fin. 3.75–76, 4.74–80; Mar. 61.

129. The paradox about kingship is discussed, for example, in Chrysippus’ treatise defending Zeno’s use of terminology (D.L. 7.122).

130. This is repeated in a very similar form at Stob 2.7.11m = WH 2, 108; cf. DL 7.33; Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102.


132. So Chrysippus’ assertion that knowledge of good and evil are necessary attributes of those who would rule (D.L. 7.122).


134. See Philo (Dreams 2.244) where the Stoic formulation regarding the sage as king is repeated in relation to the idea of ἄρχῇ ἀνορθωθῆναι. The phrase also occurs in the Platonic Definitiones (Διαφοραί ἄρχῃ ἀνορθωθῆναι δικαιοῦσα) and is used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. rom. 3.50.3, 6.2.3, 10.49.5, 11.41.2, 19.16.5) and elsewhere in Philo (Embassy 28, 190) to speak of absolute monarchy. For similar ideas see Plato, Laws 9.875b (neg.); 6.761ε no judge is ü. unless he forms the final court of appeal, like the king; Aristotle, Pol. 1295a where it is used to describe tyrannical rule; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.43; 56.5.

121
enable something more to be said about the nature of the Stoic sage. Political language is used in a larger ethical discourse. As A. A. Long puts it, “The concepts of authority, power, ruler and subject, stable government and insurrection have become ways of analysing the self.”135

The Stoic formulation of self-rule begins with the idea that only the sage is truly free while the foolish are slaves (D.L. 7.122; cf. Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 101; SVF 3.618). Chrysippus’ appropriation of the Cynic saying that one should acquire either intelligence or a harness highlights the link between the noetic faculties and concepts of freedom and slavery.136 Concepts of self-sufficiency (αὐτότροκας) and self-control (ἐγκράτεια), both of which characterize Zeno (DL 7.27, 29, 30), form part of this complex of ideas relating to freedom. The sage’s freedom is also defined in terms of independent action (DL 7.121): it is only the wise who are truly able to choose what they really desire.137

The Stoics assert that a foolish person can neither rule nor be ruled since such a person is stubborn (ποθάδης) and unmanageable (ἀνάγωγος) (Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102). In contrast, the virtuous sage will both rule and be ruled. The sage always rules “by disposition,” (κατά διάθεσιν) even if not in reality. This refers to self-rule as mentioned above. The sage will always exhibit the virtues of an ideal ruler, both in regard to himself or herself, and in relation to others. Alongside this, and in contrast to the fool, only the sage is obedient (πεθαρχικός) and capable of following (ἀκολουθητικὸς) a ruler. This saying presupposes a community such as Aristotle’s democratic polis within which citizens enjoy the liberty of ruling and being ruled in turn (Pol. 1317b3). The main point is that the sage, and not the fool, is suited to a communal existence of this nature. The polis is the institution within which such an existence must occur.

Two corollaries regarding the fool follow: the fool is, seen from one perspective, rustic, wild, and animal-like, and, from another perspective, tyrannical (Stob. 2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). The first part of this description contrasts these negative political terms with the idea that the sage is political by nature (Stob. 2.7.6 = WH 2, 75; SVF 3.314), suited to life in the polis and all that is entailed in that common life. In contrast, the fool is unable to act co-operatively, amicably, or spontaneously (Stob. 2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). The foolish life is lived, as it were, in exile (Cicero, Parad. 27–32), outside of the city, the true dwelling place of the Stoic sage.138 The second part of the description of the fool, in which the vicious life is described as tyrannical, contrasts tyranny with kingship. If the latter

136. This doctrine might be traced back to certain Socratic ideas. It is in the Socratic circle that sages are encouraged before ruling others. Part of the “Socratic legacy” (A. A. Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Algra Keimpe, et al. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 617–41) is that the individual has become a political entity.
138. Plato, Phaedrus 296e; for the Cynic tradition see Antisthenes (67 [Caizzi]), Diogenes of Sinope (DL 6.24; Ep. 28.6), and Crates (Gnomologium Vaticanum 386). There are echoes here of the Socratic idea that only the wise are truly able to choose what they really want. Schofield, Stoic Idea, 49.

136. See also Stob. 2.7.11i where the exile is described in terms of being deprived of law and an appropriate government according to nature (πέφηκεν νόμον καὶ πολιτικὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβάλλοντος).
exemplifies all that is associated with positive monarchical rule, the former is marked by cruelty, violence, and lawlessness (Stob. 2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). If the sage is described in the idealistic terms of kingship, the misanthropic, individualistic nature of tyranny marks out the fool. The image of one unsuited to the common life of the *polis* and the image of the degenerate monarch both serve to inform our understanding of the antithesis of the Stoic sage.

As a moral agent, then, the sage is king. The sage is enabled, through right reason, to exercise supreme authority in his or her own life, choosing that which is right in every situation. This also makes the sage fit for life in community, life in the *polis*. In contrast, the fool is unable to exercise this authority of his or her own life and is not suited to communal life. We might consider one example of how kingship ideals were mapped on to the person of the sage.

When examining the ideal kings in Isocrates and Xenophon, we noted that clemency was included beneath the larger rubric of the king’s care for his subjects (φιλανθρωπία). This topic was also considered by the Stoics. For the sage to act with clemency (ἐπιτείκεια),\(^{139}\) is an implicit acknowledgment that established laws are too harsh and therefore incorrect (Stob. 2.7.11d = WH 2, 96; cf. D.L. 7.123). But the law is worthwhile and in accordance with right reason and therefore cannot be wrong. Any attempt to change the law through the application of clemency must therefore be considered misguided and unacceptable for a sage.\(^{140}\) However, the evidence from the Imperial period suggests that there was not a single position regarding this question.\(^{141}\) In contrast to the unyielding judgment of the sage noted above, Seneca tries to convince Nero that “clemency (clementia) suits no one better than a king or prince” (*Clem.* 1.3.3; trans. Kaster). This concession is achieved through distinguishing between clemency and pity (misericordia). The former is marked by Stoic rationality, while the latter represents emotionalism as displayed by “old or foolish women” (2.5.1).\(^{142}\) The kingly ideal of clemency is discussed in the context of the sage and then re-applied, in this case, to the king in his role as judge.

**God as King**

One final source for insight into the Stoic concept of kingship needs to be considered: the monarchical language used in certain Stoic texts to discuss god.\(^{143}\) That Stoics considered the gods in

\(^{139}\) The passage in Arius Didymus begins with a discussion of forgiveness (συγγνώμη) and then moves to talking about clemency/tolerance (ἐπιτείκεια). At this point the two concepts are used in the same way.

\(^{140}\) See Oswyn Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King According to Homer,” *JRS* 55.1–2 (1965): 168, 176–77; Erskine, *Hellenistic Stoas*, 73–74. Erskine’s conclusion that the Stoics could not have had an ideal king in mind since they denied the possibility of clemency is incorrect since it fails to allow that the Stoics could be redefining the Hellenistic kingship ideal at this point.


monarchical terms is clear. In Cleanthes’ Hymn, Zeus is addressed as the “first cause and ruler (ἀρχηγός) of nature, governing (κυβερνῶ) everything with your law” (2), the “highest king” (ὑπάτος βασιλεὺς, 14), and the one “governing (κυβερνῶ) everything with justice” (35; trans. Thom). A text from the Later Stoa makes explicit the relationship between the earthly and heavenly king: “[The good king must be] a true imitator (ζηλωτής) of Zeus” (Muson., frag. 8 Lutz).

A fragment from Book 1 of Chrysippus’ Περὶ θεῶν (SVF 2.1076 = Philodemus, De pietate 11) contains a number terms found elsewhere in the context of discussion of Hellenistic kingship: διοικῶ, εὐνομία, δίκη, ὁμόνοια, εἰρήνη. Similarly, Plutarch notes that Chrysippus and other Stoics rely on the common assumption that the gods are εὐεργετικός and φιλάνθρωπος in order to counter Epicurean arguments against providence (Stoic. rep. 1051e).\footnote{144. See also Cicero’s discussion of Stoic theology of which the third part focuses on the gods’ government of the world, while the fourth that they care for humankind (Nat. d. 2.3).}

Unfortunately, there is nothing specifically Stoic in these epithets or the concepts they describe. As we shall see when examining more explicit kingship texts, this language formed part of a shared vocabulary regarding ideal Hellenistic kingship.\footnote{145. For an example of how these common ideals were translated into specific contexts, see Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King”; Oswyn Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” JTS 18 (1967): 337–71.} If human kingship was indeed thought to be a copy of divine kingship, then these terms will most likely have constituted part of the Stoic kingship ideal and would have found their way into treatises addressed to human rulers. The example of clemency, discussed above, suggests that these royal virtues would have been transformed, where appropriate, through the figure of the Stoic sage-ideal.

Concluding Remarks on Stoic Kingship

Although at least three Stoics produced περὶ βασιλείας treatises, not one of these works nor any Stoic text focusing on kingship is known to be extant. I have therefore attempted to provide an outline sketch of Stoic political thought and the possible role kingship played within that system. Historically, the Stoic stance toward politics was ambivalent. While some philosophers joined the courts of Hellenistic kings, others were more cautious. Their political writings, too, exhibit a similar sense of caution. The Cynic-like critique of society is tempered by the recognition that humanity can only thrive within the context of the polis.

Some of the confusion in the interpretation of Stoic political thought comes from a failure to distinguish between the two communities present in their writing. On the one hand there it the city of sages, represented by the πολιτεία treatises of Zeno and Chrysippus, and on the other, the non-ideal cities in which the Stoic writers found themselves. Stoic writings do not indicate an obvious preference for monarchy in either of these communities, but neither is there an aversion to kingship in favour of either democracy or a mixed constitution. The Stoics were more concerned with the morality of the city’s citizens and government than they were with the particular form of that government.\footnote{146. So Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 93.}

Stoic use of kingship language with regard to the sage must be understood within this ethical framework. Political metaphors are used (along with others) to describe the nature of the sage. At no
point, however, are these metaphors transformed into the impetus for exhorting the sage to enter the political life. As this study progresses, the concept of kingship that emerges from these and other passages will be seen to correspond, with one or two exceptions, to a general ideology of Hellenistic kingship.

**Epicurean Kingship**

Epicurus is credited with writing a περὶ βασιλείας treatise (D.L. 10.28). In a critique of the Epicurean view of music, Plutarch has preserved the only fragment identified explicitly as belonging to this περὶ βασιλείας text (Suav. vit. 1095b–e). According to Plutarch, Epicurus dissuaded rulers from engaging in discussions of poetry and music, urging them, instead, to be entertained by military adventures and coarse buffoonery (στρατιωτικά διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας). From Plutarch’s polemical text we might conclude that Epicurus’ treatise took the form of an address to a king. Epicurus’ exhortation is problematic when viewed against Plutarch’s observation elsewhere that the Epicureans write about kingship in order to encourage their readers to flee the company of kings (Adv. Col. 1127a) and that the Epicureans teach that reigning as a king (τὸ βασιλεύειν) is a mistake and a failure (Adv. Col. 1127c–d). Careful consideration of Epicurean political thought suggests a way in which these apparent contradictions might be resolved.

**The Epicurean Sage and the Epicurean Statesman**

All Epicurean thought begins and ends with pleasure (ηὐδονή). Pleasure is the starting point and the goal of the blessed life (Ep. Men. 128), and the principle according to which all other actions must be referred (RS 25). In keeping with the general trend in Hellenistic ethics, the Epicurean “pleasant” life is linked to the virtuous life (RS 5). Against the eristic caricatures of some, Epicurus defines pleasure in terms of “freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind” (Ep. Men. 131; cf. 128).

“Freedom from pain in the body” implies a level of physical safety, and so a concern for security (ἀσφάλεια) and being safe (θαρρεῖν) lie at the core of Epicurean political thought. Safety is secured through retreating from the masses and living the quiet life (RS 14). The Epicureans did not entreat a solitary life, however. Friendship is essential for the good life (RS 27, 28) and safety is possible within a specific type of community (RS 40). Nevertheless, while Chrysippus could recommend political life as an acceptable means of making a living, this arrangement was unacceptable for the Epicureans. It amounted to servility to either the mob or a monarch (Sent. Vat. 67; cf. 81) and was therefore to be avoided. It is for these reasons that Epicurus advised in his Περὶ βιον that οὖν ἐπὶ

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147. This advice is at odds with the description of the Epicurean sage as the only one able to converse properly on music and poetry (D.L. 10.121b). The polemical nature of Plutarch’s text and the lack of context makes it impossible to know exactly what Epicurus might have been advising at this point.

148. This is not to say that mental security and safety are excluded, as the inclusion of ἀσφαλείᾳ indicates; see below. For recent summary discussions of Epicurean political thought, see Malcolm Schofield, “Social and Political Thought,” in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Algra Keimpe, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 748–56; Schofield, “Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought,” 437–43.
πολιτευ'σ εσθαι [τὸν σοφόν] (D.L. 10.119). The “political quietism” described in this paragraph is how Epicurean political philosophy is frequently characterized. There is, however, another way in which the Epicurean desire for safety and security might be conceptualized and established.

Epicurus sought to develop a theory of justice which ensured that, through the establishment of laws, those who lived in community would be stopped or, at least, hindered from harming one another (RS 31–38). This theory of justice lies behind the positive assessment of laws and governments in Colotes, who writes

The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace (πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἰργομνὸν) and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this way, we shall live a life of brutes (δυρχεῖ και δυρχωμαῖα), and anyone who chances upon another will all but devour him. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1124d)\(^{152}\)

Laws and government would thus have a positive role to play since they promote the general well-being of the sage by providing physical security and peace of mind (ἀταραξία) (cf. RS 40). In the words of A. A. Long: “an Epicurean will value political communities insofar as they are conducive to the stable provision of those things he regards as supremely worthwhile.”\(^{153}\)

The Epicurean sage navigates this tension between the sequestered life and the good brought about through the political community by a cost/benefit analysis, or a “rational calculus”: \(^{154}\)

It is, however, appropriate to make all these decisions by comparative measurement (συμμέτρησις) and an examination of the advantages and disadvantages. For at some times we treat the good thing as bad and, conversely, the bad thing as good. (Ēp. Men. 130; trans. Inwood and Gerson)

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149. Other texts express similarly negative views: “We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics” (Sent. Vat. 58).

150. Jeffrey Fish points out that one reason Usener thought that the Ratæ sententiae were compiled by a lesser mind than Epicurus was because the collection failed to emphasize what Usener took to be the central political tenets of Epicureanism: μὴ πολιτεύσῃσθαι and λοιπὴ βίοςας (“Not All Politicians Are Sisyphus: What Roman Epicureans Were Taught About Politics,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, ed. Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], 73; see Hermann Usener, Epicurea [Leipzig: Teubner, 1887], xlv). Aalders depicts the Epicureans as dissenting from the existing political order through “political quietism” (Political Thought, 39–50). However, quietism does not necessarily imply an apolitical position. Epicurus argues that his philosophy retains everything needed for society to thrive—justice, friendship, economic co-operation—while eliminating those things which were not truly conducive to happiness. As A. A. Long and David Sedley put it, “Epicureanism would be better regarded as a radical but selective critique of contemporary politics, rather than the apolitical posture with which it is frequently identified” (Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, vol. 1 of The Hellenistic Philosophers [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 136–37).


152. On the generally conservative nature of the Epicurean epigones and for methodological considerations regarding the use of polemical sources such as Plutarch, see Geert Roskam, Live Unnoticed (Διόθε βιωμαῖα) (On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine, PhA 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 30–33. For similar thoughts expressed by Hermarchus, see Porphyry, Abst. 1.7–12; discussion in Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 76–79.


154. See Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 35–36. The phrase “rational calculus” is his.
The importance of this principle in Epicurus’ system becomes clear when one notices that it occurs elsewhere in his writings (e.g. RS 8; Sent. Vat. 16, 71). Following Geert Roskam, we might characterize Epicurus’ approach as “a moral philosophy of conditional qualifying.”

Roskam has shown how the Epicurean rational calculus allows one to give full force to the maxim ἀλθεὶ βιώσας (frag. 551 Usener), while at the same time accounting for those texts which suggest that the sage might engage in politics or benefit from the political order. Following Roskam’s lead at a number of points, Sean McConnell has produced an essay in which he reconstructs the “nuanced and sophisticated” Epicurean view of kingship. Kingship is mentioned in the sixth of Epicurus’ Κύρια Δόξα (= Ratae sententiae):

The natural good of public office and kingship (ἀρχής καὶ βασιλείας) is for the sake of getting safety from [other] men (τὴν εξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν), [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this. (RS 6; trans. Inwood and Gerson, p. 32; slightly modified)

And the subsequent maxim is closely related:

Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire security against [other] men (τὴν εξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν). Thus if the life of such men is secure, they acquire the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake of which they strove from the beginning according to what is naturally congenial. (RS 7; trans. Inwood and Gerson, p. 32)

We have already seen that this security is indeed a key element in Epicurean political thought. The question is whether rule or kingship is able to provide this security and, if so, in what way.

The phrases τοῦ θραύσαν εξ ἀνθρώπων (RS 6) and τὴν εξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν (RS 7) have usually been understood negatively: “security against or from other people.” Roskam has argued that these should be read positively: “security coming from other people.” The preceding translation of RS 6 is sufficiently ambiguous at this point, but RS 7 should read “believing that this is the way to acquire security from [other] men,” if Roskam is followed. Read this way, the argument in RS 6 and

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156. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, see esp. 33–62. Roskam has also produced a volume that examines Plutarch’s engagement with this theme: Geert Roskam, A Commentary on Plutarch’s De Latenter Vivendo (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), see pp. 19–27 for a summary discussion of the Epicurean approach to political activity. The view that Epicurean political activity is not absolutely forbidden but accepted in certain situations seems to be the current consensus, see, for example Eric Brown, “Politics and Society,” 180–82; Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 72–73, 96–98.
158. The phrase ἀρχής καὶ βασιλείας was excised by Usener (Epicurea, 72) who argued that it was a gloss on εὖ ἄνων. Usener has been followed by Cyril Bailey (Epicurus: The Extant Remains. With Short Critical Apparatus. Translation and Notes [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926], 352) and Robert D. Hicks (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. Robert Drew Hicks, LCL 184–185 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925], 664). McConnell, “Kingship,” 180 rejects the phrase because of the grammatical awkwardness caused by its inclusion, but suggests that rule and kingship would have been considered potential goods. Both Roskam (Live Unnoticed, 57) and Tiziano Dorandi (Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, CCTC 50 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 816) accept the phrase as genuine.
159. Or “public office” (Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 37).
RS 7 is that political power is able to provide security to those who wield it, in which case it is a natural good. On the other hand, one might observe that history is filled with examples where such power did not bring about the desired safety. In those cases, political office should not have been sought. What we find in these two maxims is “an application of the rational calculus to the domain of politics.”

Where political rule, including kingship, provides the sort of safety and confidence that leads to ἀταραξία, it is considered a good and something to be pursued and desired. This is not an absolute rule, though, and each situation needs to be assessed carefully by the Epicurean sage.

The manner in which security is brought about by public office is not examined or explained carefully in our extant sources. We have already mentioned Colotes’ assertion that kings and magistrates can bring security and peace (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1124d), presumably through establishing laws that are beneficial to all their subject and by exercising their political power to ensure that those laws are obeyed. Similarly, in the remains of Hermarchus’ argument (Porphyry, Abst. 1.7–12), the role of leaders is to establish laws that protect individuals from each other and from “external” disturbances, whether marauding beasts or enemies. Our texts are silent on the constitutional makeup of the polities envisaged by Colotes and Hermarchus, but monarchies, it would seem, are best positioned for establishing and enforcing laws.

All other things being equal, it would seem that Epicureans would prefer monarchy above other political systems. The fact that there is no explicit statement to this effect has led some to surmise that the school had no preference when it came to systems of governance. But if monarchy offers the Epicurean the best possible chance of avoiding entanglement in public affairs, it must be the most attractive option.

There is little indication in the early Epicurean writings as to the nature of the ideal king. Under normal conditions the king, for his own sake, would not be an Epicurean since the sequestered life represents the “default position” in Epicurean thinking. However, the king would act so as to ensure that the Epicureans under his rule were able to live a life marked by ἀταραξία. A comment by Plutarch suggests that Epicurus did recognize that for those who are by nature “lovers of honour and fame” (τοὺς φιλοτιμοὺς καὶ φιλοδοξοὺς), to live the quiet life would lead to more disturbances than to

162. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 39.
164. A “mixed” community of sages and others is envisaged here since sages would never harm one another and would therefore not have any reason for protective laws of this nature (RS 21; D.L. 10.117). Nevertheless, such a community would still need justice; see Eric Brown, “Politics and Society,” 191–96.
165. Schofield, “Social and Political Thought,” 743–44, pace Marcello Gigante and Tiziano Dorandi, who argue that the Epicureans had a preference for monarchy (“Anassarco e Epicuro ‘Sul regno,’” in Democrito e l’atomismo antico: atti del convegno internazionale Catania 18–21 apr. 1979; Francesco Romano [Catania: Facoltà di lettere e filosofia, Università di Catania, 1980], 479–97; see Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 54; McConnell, “Kingship,” 182–87). Much of Gigante’s and Dorandi’s argument hinges on a dubious emendation of D.L. 10.121b (see below) and must be rejected.
166. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 54–56; McConnell, “Kingship,” 188–89. In an ideal situation there would be no need of kings or law. What is envisaged here is the Epicurean response (or desire), given the practical realities of the day.
167. Epicurean philosophy assumes a certain environment within which the goods can be obtained and within which the Epicurean community can exist in safety. As Long observes, “It needs a neighbouring environment which will tolerate the Epicurean community ..., and provide it with any basic materials absent from the Garden that its members require in order to ‘live as happily as Zeus’ (Sent. Vat. 33 = LS 33.1)” (“Pleasure and Social Utility,” 179–80).
engage in politics (Transq. an. 465f–466a). The ideal king would presumably be such a person who would be unsuited to the quiet life.  

Would an Epicurean sage pay court to a “good king” of this sort? Plutarch’s assessment of the Epicureans is that they write about kingship to discourage their readers from consorting with kings (Adv. Col. 1127a). We might ask, again, whether this should be understood in an absolute sense. The polemical nature of Plutarch’s works, together with his own observation that Colotes dedicated a work to “King Ptolemy” (Ptolemy II?) (1107c) should give us pause for thought. The way in which Diogenes Laertius has recorded a similar saying gives us a better sense of how Colotes might have qualified his pronouncement (10.120b): just as the sage, when in need, would make money through wisdom, so in due measure and only at the appropriate time (ἐν καιρῷ), will the sage serve a monarch. The “appropriate time” will presumably be that moment when to refuse to pay court to a king would do more harm than good to the sage. As an example of this in the life of Epicurus, Roskam cites the sage’s decision to approach the king (albeit through emissaries) when slandered (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1126c). We also have the example of Colotes, who dedicated at least one treatise to a Ptolemy. This does not necessarily mean that he paid court to the king, but it is indicative of a desire to influence the king and thereby, if only tangentially, partake in politics. The title of Colotes’ treatise—“On the point that conformity to the doctrines of the other philosophers actually makes it impossible to live” (περὶ τοῦ ὁτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφῶν δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν εστὶν; Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1107c)—suggests a work that is both philosophical and polemical, perhaps indicating a certain competitiveness amongst philosophical groups for the king’s ear (and purse!).

The Epicurean sage would, in certain circumstances, pay court to a ruler and, by extension, influence politics through advice and counsel. The sage should guard against performing these services out of a desire for wealth or honour (Sent. Vat. 67, 81). Perhaps his service in this regard might be done out of concern for which is beneficial to all humankind (Sent. Vat. 29).

**Philodemus’ Good King**

We turn finally to a text that most closely approximates an Epicurean περὶ βασιλείας treatise. Philodemus’ treatise Περὶ τοῦ καθ’ Ὀμηρον ἁγαθοῦ βασιλείας (On the Good King According to

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168. Epicurus himself also seems to leave open the possibility of some attaining safety through being esteemed and admired (RS 7), although this will always represent the exception rather than the rule.


172. Roskam (Live Unnoticed, 54–55) argues against placing too much emphasis on ὅμορφον. Epicurean engagement with leaders like Idomeneus and Mithres show that the saying has wider applicability.

173. See Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” for the argument that Philodemus’ treatise draws heavily on the conceptual framework of Hellenistic kingship treatises.
Homer) exists in one manuscript discovered at Herculaneum: P.Herc. 1507.\(^{174}\) Only the second half of the text survives in a somewhat mutilated form.\(^{175}\)

The poor state of the scroll makes it difficult to determine Philodemus’ main line of argument. Unlike Philodemus’ other writings, there is no evidence that he drew upon Epicurean texts when composing this treatise.\(^{176}\) Rather, as the final column suggests, Homer is his primary point of departure: “... of the starting points, Piso,\(^{177}\) which it is possible to take from Homer for the correction of positions of power (ἐπανόρθωσιν δυναστείων) ...” (col. 43).\(^{178}\) Philodemus draws on Homeric examples (both negative and positive) to prove that a good life—although not the ideal life of the Epicurean sage—is possible if a ruler moderates his power through the exercise of the royal virtues. It provides “a positive case for a form of Epicurean statesmanship.”\(^{179}\)

In Oswyn Murray’s estimation, The Good King does not truly represent Imperial Epicureanism and, instead, points to a contradiction between Epicurean theory (quietism) and Epicurean practice (active political participation) of that time.\(^{180}\) It is the case that not all Epicureans of the first century chose the quiet life. In the 40s there were Epicureans in the factions for and against Caesar, with Cassius standing as the most famous example of the latter.\(^{181}\) But our discussion above has shown that Epicurean theory was not as clear-cut as “μὴ πολιτεύοντα” would suggest, thus allowing for a rather broad approach to political life. It is not the case, as Murray states, that “the Epicureans despised both poetry and politics.”\(^{182}\) Epicurean political philosophy allows for its adherents to participate politically (albeit in exceptional circumstances) and this is born out by first-century followers of that school.\(^{183}\)


__175__ Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King.” 162–64.

__176__ This is not to say that Philodemus did not write from an Epicurean perspective. With regard to his writings in general, Roskam observes that “crucial importance is given to loyalty to Epicurus ... Philodemus’ main purpose is not to develop new insights, but to interpret Epicurus’ view correctly” (*Live Unnoticed*, 102).


__178__ Murray (“Philodemus on the Good King,” 178) sees Philodemus’ use of “rule” as being a veiled reference to Roman *principes*. For Asmis (“‘On the Good King’,” 45) that which needs “correction” is Homer’s description of how those in power behave, and it is in Homer himself that one finds such correction.


__180__ Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 165.


__182__ Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 173.

__183__ For a more nuanced discussion of the Epicurean attitude towards poetry, see Asmis, “‘On the Good King’.” Philodemus thought poetry useful for entertainment but generally not for instruction. Although instruction through poetry is not completely impossible, prose is preferable (13–17). In this regard, then, “The Good King” is somewhat odd since Philodemus goes on to draw positive moral teaching from Homer.
Jeffrey Fish argues that, far from being contradictory and void of true Epicurean philosophy, Philodemus’ text exhibits remarkable similarity to the Epicureanism of his day, as seen, for example, in Cicero’s Epicurean spokesperson, Torquatus (*De finibus* 1, 2).184

Despite the presence of these specifically Epicurean elements (discussed below), Murray’s assessment of the treatise’s dependency on general Hellenistic kingship theory remains accurate.185 The importance of certain virtues in those who would rule successfully and the exhortation to cultivate those virtues are standard elements within kingship writings. It is to these virtues we now turn.

The importance of the royal virtues is predicated on the assumption that the king’s nature is essential for the welfare of his subjects. Part of Odysseus’ speech before Penelope (*Odyssey* 19.109–114) is quoted twice in *The Good King* (cols. 4 and 30). In the speech, Odysseus speaks of:

> some blameless king (βασιλέως ἀμώμονος), who with the fear of the gods in his heart, is lord over many mighty men, upholding justice (τείχος τείχειν); and the black earth bears wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit, the flocks bring forth young unceasingly, and the sea yields fish, all from his good leading; and the people prosper under him (ἐξ ἐνυγνωσίας, ἐρέτωσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ). (*Od*. 19.109–114; trans. Murray [LCL])

The point is clear: a good king—defined here as one who is blameless, fears the gods and upholds justice—benefits and brings blessing to the land and people over whom he rules. The well-being of the people is tied to the king’s fitness to rule.

We might fill out the nature of this good king by investigating the advice given in column 24 of *The Good King*:

> ... let us advise that which is good for a king (τὸ σπουδαῖον βασιλέα παραινώμεν): to hate a severe, harsh, and bitter character (ἀοστηρον μὲν καὶ τριχα τὸ ἡ̄ς καὶ πικρὸν ἐρυθράρεν), and to practice mildness, fairness, royal gentleness and leniency (πραος δικιος καὶ ἐρετεος καὶ τὸ βασιλέως ἡμερον καὶ συγγνωμονικόν) to the greatest extent possible, as leading to a stable monarchy and not to a despotic exercise of power by fear. (trans. Asmis; modified)

In the same passage the Persian king Cambyses is held up in contrast to the Homeric king who is “gentle like a father,” πατήρ δ’ ὦς ἧπιος ήν (Homer, *Od*. 2.47).186

The recommendation of virtues, combined with a warning of their inverse vices, were stock elements in kingship treatises. The careful cultivation of these virtues leads to a stable monarchy since the people governed by such a king will love their leader187 and not feel the need to rise up against him as they might against tyrannical rule exercised through fear.188 From an Epicurean perspective, in which safety is central to living the good life, a good king must be marked by these virtues since they ensure the longevity of his reign through the love of his subjects.

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185. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” passim.

186. Philodemus observes that political careers often end in misfortune (Roskam, *Live Unnoticed*, 113–14). Examples of poor or bad kingship would have been used to illustrate this point.

187. For references to this topos, see Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 89 n. 63.

188. Col. 5 also seems to contain a critique of those who would rule through fear. Hector is held up at this point as one who was loved by his people. This love is displayed most vividly by their mourning at his death.
The specific virtues which lead to this type of safety include πραο'της, η/πιο'της, and ἐπιείκεια. Since Epicureans understand law and justice in terms of utility and advantage, it is not surprising that a certain amount of flexibility in interpreting and applying law is not only allowed but, indeed, recommended, as suggested by these virtues. Epicurean praise for these virtues contrasts strongly with the Stoic assertion that the sage is αὐτητρός and that it is wrong to act with συγγνώμη and ἐπιείκεια. Not only does the application of gentleness and clemency accord with Epicurean thinking on law and justice, it also contributes to the king’s safety by engendering love in his subjects for him. The recognition that excessive leniency might also bring about bitterness among the king’s subjects explains the fragment in col. 25:

... so that he may appear gentle (πρόος), not through laxity, but through discernment; because of gentleness (ἡπιο'τητα) he may be loved, but because of firmness (ἐπιτρατον) when necessary, he may not be despised. (my translation)

The virtues commended in Philodemus’ treatise are commonplace, yet they are reconfigured along Epicurean lines. The instrumentality of the virtues is an additional example of Epicurean influence. The virtues are not ends in themselves, but rather serve the goal of bringing about the king’s security. This instrumentality is missing in other philosophical systems in which the virtues are telic.

The activities apart from ruling in which a king might appropriately engage formed another common topos in Hellenistic literature. Columns 16–24 of The Good King are concerned with the king’s leisure activities. The section began with a discussion of the king’s attendance of and behaviour at symposia (περὶ τῶν συμποσίων; col. 16). The mention of Nestor’s cup (col. 17) introduces a discussion of drunkenness and perhaps gluttony. This topos is extended through reference to the Phaeacians (cols. 18–19), often portrayed as “proto-Epicureans.” An Epicurean would be especially sensitive to accusations of excess and it is not surprising, therefore, that Philodemus seeks to rehabilitate the Phaeacians as characterized by moderation and decorum. Furthermore, the king’s symposia will not be marked out by vulgar entertainment (col. 20) or the coarse laughter of a “scoundrel” (col. 21). In addition to symposia, the king and his courtiers will spend their time in worthwhile pursuits: “in some athletic activity or armed competition” like the suitors on Ithaca (col. 22).

189. Epicurus is remembered for his ἡμερότης and αὐτάρκεια (Sent. Vat. 36).
190. RS 31–38; see Alberti, “Epicurean Theory” for a full discussion of law and justice in the Epicurean philosophical system.
191. See, for example, D.L. 7.117; Stob. 2.5.11d = WH 2, 95–96.
192. Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 89–90.
194. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 36. See also the ancient sources cited by Asmis at p. 36 n.141: Seneca, Ep. 88.5; Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.513a–c; ps-Plutarch, De Vita et Poesi Homerī 2.150, amongst others.
195. At first glance, Plutarch’s report at Suav. viv. 1095c–d seems to contradict this. He asserts that Epicurus’ περὶ βασιλεσίας dissuaded rulers from engaging in discussions of poetry and music, urging them, instead, to be entertained by military adventures and coarse buffoonery. As mentioned above, it is impossible to know exactly what Epicurus was arguing since the context of his advice is missing. We are also dealing with a hostile source. It is possible that Epicurus was simply discouraging conversation about the arts and encouraging the king to listen to those who would discuss matters that were useful for ruling: politics, military strategy, or kingly virtues (so Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 103 n. 125). If this is indeed the case, then the characterization of this discourse as “buffoonery” would belong to Plutarch and not Epicurus.
Philodemus’ approval of martial pursuits raises the more general question of the way in which the good king is to relate to war itself. In col. 27 he writes that it is necessary, for this reason, that a good ruler to be a lover of victory (φιλόνικον εἶναι τὸν ἄγαθὸν δυνάστην), not a lover of war or a lover of battle (my translation).

War was to be a means and not an end. A king who behaved otherwise was likely to bring trouble upon his subjects (col. 27). Philodemus exonerates Homer from asserting anything different by pointing out that, because of their love of war, Ares and Achilles were loathed by Zeus and Agamemnon, respectively. Similarly, in col. 29, we read that Homer and his heroes hate those who love war and strife (τοὺς πολέμου καὶ τοὺς ἑρικὸς φίλους).

The thread of security that is woven throughout this treatise is visible again in col. 28 where the king who thinks that internal strife will protect him in some way is considered to be thoroughly depraved and lazy. “Divide and conquer” is a foolish strategy for dealing with internal matters since, as Nestor says, “friendless, lawless, homeless is the one who loves terrible civil strife” (col. 28, trans. Fish; cf. II. 9.63–64). In addition to this speech given before Agamemnon, col. 28 also mentions to Nestor’s dealings with the ambassadors (II. 9.179–181) and Patroclus (II. 11.656–803) as examples of one who advocates an end to strife. In col. 29 Nestor and Odysseus are put forward as wise leaders who, because they do not exhibit any envy or love of war or strife, are able to work together for the good of their subjects.

The section on warfare ends, fittingly, with a picture of peace. The exemplar in this case is the Phaeacian people whose idyllic land, free from strife, illustrates the benefits that accompany peace. The insertion of Odysseus’ speech before Penelope (also found in col. 4, see above) highlights the importance of a just king in this regard. Philodemus is not a pacifist, nor does he have a naïve view of how such a situation might be brought about. The Phaeacians enjoy peace and ensure that it will last because they are constantly preparing for war through training and physical exercise (col. 31). Philodemus’ portrayal here challenges the common view of the Phaeacians (and therefore Epicureans, see above) “as self-indulgent idlers.” Peace and security in a community, both internally and externally, are of central importance to Epicureans (RS 14, 40). Internal strife is to be avoided at all costs, yet it might become necessary to prosecute a war against those on the outside who threaten to disturb the community. A good king will pursue victory for the sake of peace; war is never to be an end in itself.

Columns 32–34 deal with the matter of good counsel. Wisdom, in particular, is the most important virtue that a good counsellor should possess. Nestor and Odysseus are once again

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196. Dorandi restores the text as [ση][ν]νυστέχων, but I have followed Olivieri, Asmis, and Fish who all read [νο]νυστέχων.
197. See Asmis, “‘On the Good King,’” 40–41.
198. Asmis, “‘On the Good King,’” 41.
199. The theme seems to have been raised towards the end of col. 31 which concludes with a discussion of the council of the Phaeacians.
200. The focus, according to Asmis (“‘On the Good King,’” 41–42), is on the good king’s wisdom. However, those who are mentioned by Philodemus in this section are praised for their wisdom as counsellors, not for their wisdom in general. The section also refers to Alcinous coming to a council (col. 31) and to “good counsels for kings” (διοικήτης τοῦ βασιλέως) (col. 33). Furthermore, it would seem that Philodemus has added Ἰουλῆ to Πριαμοῦ πόλιν διεπεράσαμεν αἰτήν, a phrase

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Philodemus’ heroes (col. 32): if Agamemnon had ten counsellors (συµφράδµονες) such as Nestor, Troy would have fallen easily (Il. 2.371–374); Odysseus is described as being godlike in wisdom (Od. 13.89), and it this, presumably, that makes him superior in counsel and in war (Il. 2.273). Nestor praises Agamemnon and Achilles not only for their military prowess, but also because they excel in counsel (Il. 1.258). Philodemus also alludes to the invitation extended to Meriones and Antilochus to attend the counsel because of their φρόνησις (col. 33; cf. Il. 10.196–197). As Asmis points out, φρόνησις was, for Epicurus, the supreme virtue from which all other virtues flowed (Ep. Men. 132). 201

What did Philodemus have in mind when including this section in his treatise? In Homer, the council often consists of a meeting of those who generally relate to one another as equals. Murray argues that this is how Philodemus has understood the council since he writes with one eye on the Roman senate. 202 Be this as it may, if Philodemus is writing to and for Piso, one who had held positions of authority in which such counsel would be important, then it is not impossible that he is speaking of a ruler accepting wise counsel from subordinates.

We have already seen (p. 129) that the Epicurean sage will consort with rulers under certain circumstances, presumably to provide wise counsel. 203 The desirability of a philosophically informed ruler is highlighted by Philodemus in his third book on rhetoric:

it would be a fine thing, to be sure, if the politician were also practised in philosophy, that he might be still more vividly and energetically a good man; and for this reason we [sc. Epicureans] say that philosophy, both generally, when it accompanies a personal disposition for politics and when it gives suggestions appropriate for political arrangements, will make an astronomical difference for the better. 204

The sage’s philosophical tutelage will therefore be the most valuable contribution he or she might make in such a relationship. Philodemus’ work On Frank Criticism provides further insight into the nature of Epicurean practice in this regard. 205 Those who, by nature, are suited to leadership, would do well to appoint an Epicurean advisor/tutor so that the ruler might benefit from wise counsel. The nature of this advice would, no doubt, be tempered by Philodemus’ teaching that philosophy and politics are autonomous pursuits. 206 Even if the sage cannot—and therefore will not—give political advice, he or she can offer the politician “general moral advice which may free the politician from his moral troubles ... and which may (but need not) contribute indirectly to his political success.” 207

from (Od. 3.130), in order to draw attention to the fact that it was wise counsel and not military might that defeated Troy. It is the wisdom of the king’s council that is in focus in this section.

201. “‘On the Good King’,” 42. The semantic distinction between φρόνησις and σοφια varied with time and between authors in the same period.


204. Rhet. 3 col. 15a, 16–31. I cite the translation provided by Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 95.

205. Although Epicurean friendship provides the context for this treatise, this does not preclude situations characterized by unequal power and status; see David Konstan, et al., “Introduction,” 23–24.


The king’s physical appearance is the subject of cols. 37–38. Demetrius Poliorcetes “who prided himself on his beauty” is held up as an anti-hero, alongside Paris (cf. Il. 3.54–55). The example of both show that beauty alone is not sufficient to guarantee success. It is difficult to make sense of the remaining part of col. 37. The paragraph mark between line 23 and 24 might suggest a change of topic or, as is more likely here, “mark off a general remark from its instances.”\(^{208}\) The text that follows reads:

... make the kings godlike (\(\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\delta\iota\epsilon\varsigma\)), which pleases me at any rate. For this strikes awe into the base (\(\tau\omicron\nu\gamma\omicron\delta\acute{o}\phi\omicron\nu\)) and makes [kings] similar to the best [beings], whom it is necessary to imitate. That is why he addresses them as godlike and god-resembling (\(\theta\upsilon\o\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\delta\iota\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\kappa\varsigma\kappa\iota\upsilon\kappa\acute{e}\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma\)). (trans. Asmis; slightly modified)

If, in addition to power and awesomeness, being godlike implies something about the king’s appearance, it would seem that his visage did have a positive role to play in the king’s person. Philodemus agrees with Homer’s description of the Greek kings as “godlike” since, like the gods, their visage causes the masses to be awestruck, while the comparison encourages kings to emulate the gods. Examples are cited where both Agamemnon and Achilles vindicate this opinion (col. 38; cf. Il. 2.477–483; 22.26; 5.5–6; 22.31). The king’s appearance thus has a practical, utilitarian benefit.\(^{209}\)

Odysseus is offered as a counter-example to show that this statement should not be understood in an absolute sense. Odysseus appears in the guise of a beggar or as someone unimpressive. Nonetheless, he is successful and his superiority inevitably comes to the fore because it consists in his wisdom, not his outward appearance. It is “the inner imprint of the soul” that is essential to good rule.\(^{210}\)

Before concluding, one final item in Philodemus’ treatise needs to be given attention. Fame/glory (\(\kappa\lambda\acute{e}\omicron\omicron\varsigma\)) is a central theme in the \textit{Iliad} where it is frequently linked to war and, ultimately, death.\(^{211}\) First mentioned in relation to the drinking songs of the symposia (col. 19), it seems to have been an important part of the final section of the treatise (cols. 39–43). Col. 41 lines 7–8 speak of those yearning for a reputation (\(\delta\omicron\acute{e}\zeta\)), a line reminiscent of RS 7, which cautions those who seek to be esteemed and admired that safety is not always achieved in that manner. We have seen how Epicurean

\(^{208}\) Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 166.

\(^{209}\) Asmis, “‘On the Good King,’” 43. A utilitarian view of beauty (or nobility?) and the virtues (\(\tau\omicron\nu\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu\kappa\omicron\tau\acute{a}\) and \(\upsilon\alpha\omicron\rho\omicron\tau\upsilon\acute{a}\)\)—acceptable as long as they provide pleasure—is attributed to Epicurus’ \(\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron\tau\varsigma\ \Theta\ell\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\) (\textit{Athenaeus}, \textit{Deipn.} 12.67, 546f).

\(^{210}\) Asmis, “‘On the Good King,’” 43–44 Odysseus is not named in col. 38, but he appears in the first part of what remains of col. 39. Asmis’ identification of Odysseus as the subject of the last part of col. 38 is therefore warranted.

teaching allowed a place for those whose nature compelled them to follow that route to safety.\textsuperscript{212} As an end in itself, however, this desire for honour is misguided (\textit{Sent. Vat.} 81).\textsuperscript{213}

It is unclear how Philodemus deals with the theme of glory/fame in \textit{The Good King}. While the Homeric citations he includes are usually positive with respect to fame, there is a negative example (\textit{Od.} 24.200–201) as well as a possible mention of “correction” (\textit{ἐπανορθώσεις} col. 42 line 20, cf. col. 43 line 18).\textsuperscript{214} Does Philodemus caution his reader against the excessive desire for fame expressed by Homer’s heroes? Or, as Asmis suggests, does he perhaps argue against the pursuit of fame while at the same time recognizing its inevitable accompaniment of good rule?\textsuperscript{215} Elsewhere Philodemus seems to agree with Epicurus’ assessment of the potential (albeit precarious) that fame has for providing security (\textit{RS} 7).\textsuperscript{216}

\textit{Concluding Remarks on Epicurean Kingship}

Our survey of Epicurean political thought has shown that, under certain circumstances, kingship is able to provide an Epicurean community with the safety and security that is so central to the Epicurean \textit{telos}. Although the Epicurean sage will choose the quiet life over political engagement, this is not an absolute rule. Again, under certain circumstances, the latter might serve to minimize disturbances and should therefore be chosen. It is possible to imagine a situation in which an Epicurean might be king, but it is more likely that an Epicurean sage might serve in the court of a king by advising him in philosophical matters. No Epicurean \textit{περὶ βασιλείας} treatise has survived to indicate what such philosophical advice might look like, but a related text provides clues as to what might have been included.

In the middle of the first century BCE, as Rome was transformed from republic to empire, Philodemus, produced an analysis of kingship in Homer in order to advise his patron, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, on matters of good rule and leadership. \textit{On the Good King According to Homer} provides an Epicurean analysis and defence of Homer’s portrayal of rulers and an example to be followed. Philodemus reads Homer through the lens of Hellenistic kingship ideology. His Epicurean commitments can be observed at various points but they do not overwhelm the more generic nature of his advice. To be sure, Philodemus would have had one eye on the political situation in the late Republic,\textsuperscript{217} yet he produces a piece of literary analysis that avoids technical philosophy and political thought in order to encourage his benefactor to think about how a ruler might best ensure his safety. In

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{212.} RS 7, cf. McConnell, “Kingship,” 179–82. Lucretius seems to think it highly unlikely that fame will ever contribute to a peaceful life (\textit{DRN} 5.1120–1126).
\textsuperscript{213.} \textit{Pace} Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 174 for whom the mention of \textit{kλοῦς} as a posthumous reward provides “[t]he only cogent instance of Epicurean influence.” Cicero found in Epicurus an inconsistency on this point: his will, making provision for his followers to remember him after his death, contradicts other statements concerning death (\textit{De fin.} 2.100–101. Julia Annas notes that Epicurus is not inconsistent if the primary goal of the remembrance is so that his followers might imitate him (in Cicero, \textit{On Moral Ends}, trans. Raphael Woolf; ed. Julia Annas, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 59 n. 67).
\textsuperscript{214.} Lines 18–29 of column 42 are very poorly preserved, however, and not too much weight should be given to this reading since there is no context for it.
\textsuperscript{215.} Asmis, “‘On the Good King’”; 44.
\textsuperscript{216.} \textit{De adul.} 4.1–12, see Roskam, \textit{Live Unnoticed}, 111–13.
\textsuperscript{217.} Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 173–82.}
this way, Philodemus might have attained the Epicurean ideal of contributing to political life while limiting his exposure to that which might bring pain and disturbances.

**Pythagorean Kingship**

Stobaeus’ florilegium contains three περὶ βασιλείας treatises attributed to Pythagorean writers: Diotogenes (Stob. 4.7.61–62 = WH 4, 263–270), Ecphantus (Stob. 4.6.22 = WH 4, 244–245 + Stob. 4.7.64–66 = WH 4, 271–279), and Sthenidas (Stob. 4.7.63 = WH 4, 270–271). These kingship texts form part of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, a collection of pseudonymous works attributed to Pythagoras and his followers.218 As yet, no clear consensus regarding the authorship, provenance, or date of these Pythagorean writings has emerged.219

Pythagoras and his followers were the subjects of a number of biographical-philosophical investigations in the Classical and Hellenistic period. Aristotle, Xenocrates, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, and Zeno of Citium all produced works relating to this early stage of Pythagoreanism. This interest stands in contrast to the ancient sources’ silence regarding the existence of a Pythagorean “school” in the Hellenistic period.220 Walter Burkert argues that the Hellenistic period saw a flood of Pythagorean writings (including the pseudonymous texts mentioned above) but no Pythagoreans.221 The absence of evidence of a school and an obvious Pythagorean genealogy has meant that Hellenistic Pythagoreans have not fared well in the twentieth century.222 The Pythagorean school is supposed to have died out in the middle of the fourth century BCE, only to be revived as Neopythagoreanism in Alexandria in the second or first century BCE and Rome in the first century.223

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219. The lack of consensus regarding the dating of these fragments makes it difficult to know how to refer to them. Those who argue for an early date refer to them as “Hellenistic Pythagorean” (i.e., Holger Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period.*, Acta Academiae Aboensis. Humaniora. 24.3 [Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961]). Johan Thom opts for “Neopythagorean” (“The Passions in Neopythagorean Writings,” in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, RMCS [London: Routledge, 2008], 67–68) while Bruno Centrone prefers the adjective “pseudo-Pythagorean” (“The Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” in *A History of Pythagoreanism*, ed. Carl A. Huffman [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 315–40). Since the writers of these texts were attempting to be “Pythagorean” (whatever that might have meant for them—see Peter Kingsley, *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995], 320) I will simply use the adjective “Pythagorean,” without thereby implying any continuity or discontinuity with the earliest Pythagorean tradition. Similarly, while acknowledging that these Pythagorean texts were pseudonymous, I refer to the authors of the περὶ βασιλείας treatises as Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas, rather than as Pseudo-Ecphantus, etc.


This account has been challenged at a number of points by Peter Kingsley. He argues that the differences between early Pythagoreanism and Neopythagoreanism are not as great as scholars often claim. The thesis that the former was characterized by reason and logic while the latter was highly influenced by oracular revelation and divination cannot be sustained. In both periods the mathematician and the scientist belong together with the prophet and the priest. With regard to the Hellenistic Pythagorean texts, Kingsley notes (contra Burkert) that it is difficult to imagine the production of Pythagorean texts without Pythagoreans:

In the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be assumed that writers of literature purporting to be Pythagoreans will have had sympathies with Pythagoreanism and will very probably have considered themselves as standing in the line of Pythagorean tradition.

The extant Pythagorean texts have been assigned dates spanning six centuries: from the early Hellenistic period to the third century CE. Erwin Goodenough examines four Pythagorean treatises in order to flesh out “a great philosophy of royalty ... the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age” and places them in the Hellenistic period on the basis of their conception of kingship. The language of these περὶ βασιλείας treatises—an archaic or archaizing Doric—is analyzed by Louis Delatte in the second part of his study. He finds that the dialect, vocabulary, syntax, and style of the three περὶ βασιλείας treatises all belong in the first or, more likely, second century CE. In his review, Goodenough agrees with Delatte’s linguistic analysis (and dating) while voicing dissent with Delatte’s conclusion that much of the philosophical theory is Stoic; Goodenough holds to the argument in his 1928 essay that the treatises are, instead, “Platonic-Pythagorean.” One would hope that Delatte’s linguistic analysis might provide a solid foundation for establishing the date of these texts, but Holger Thesleff’s study leads him to disagree with Delatte and to suggest the middle of the third century BCE as the date of composition of the Pythagorean texts in general. In the same year that Thesleff’s book appeared, Burkert published a two-part article, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica,” in which he argued that some of the Pythagorean texts might be as early as the third century BCE and that, in general, these texts contributed to, rather than resulted from, first-century Roman Pythagoreanism. A decade later, in the published proceedings of a symposium on pseudepigrapha, Burkert argued that the Pythagorean texts were written between 150 BCE and the third century CE, while Thesleff, unwilling to abandon his view that these are essentially Hellenistic texts, nevertheless agreed that they might have been


227. Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” *YCS* 1 (1928): 53–102; the quotation is from page 102. In addition to the three περὶ βασιλείας treatises mentioned above, he considered Archytas’ περὶ νόμου και δικαιοσυνής (Stob. 4.1.135–138; 4.5.61), which also contains a handful of passages discussing kingship.


produced towards the end of the second century BCE. In a published version of a 1991 doctoral dissertation, John Martens reviews the various arguments about the dating of the Hellenistic Pythagorean kingship texts and concludes that linguistic analysis is unable to determine definitively the date of the kingship treatises. He proposes that a comparison of the ideas found in the texts point in the direction of a date in the Hellenistic period.

A growing number of scholars are content to place these works in the early Imperial period (first century BCE to first century CE), seeing in them affinities with Middle Platonism. Bruno Centrone argues that this group of pseudepigrapha demonstrates a systematic philosophical coherence. The texts represent a “Platonizing system” into which Aristotelian doctrines have been introduced, a situation which is best explained if they were produced in the first century BCE to first century CE.

While a definitive answer to the question of the dating of these texts might be impossible, given the complexity and paucity of the evidence, the discussion that follows will proceed on the assumption that a late Hellenistic or early Imperial date for the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλεῖας treatises is possible and that they provide us with examples of the topos of ideal kingship.

In what follows I will provide a summary discussion of each of the three Pythagorean kingship treatises. This will be followed by a synthetic exploration of some of the key ideas found in these writings. Through this approach I hope to highlight the similarities as well as the significant difference between these three texts in order to establish a sketch of the ideal king in Pythagorean thought. Extensive commentary on these texts can be found in the works of Erwin Goodenough, Louis Delatte, and Bruno Blumenfeld. Each of these scholars suggest numerous antecedents and parallels to the vocabulary and ideas found in the Pythagorean texts. The discussion that follows will only draw attention to these elements when they contribute to the attempt to define the Pythagorean ideal king.

**Ecphantus**

The longest Pythagorean περὶ βασιλεῖας treatise is that of Ecphantus. Although a Pythagorean named Ecphantus was known in antiquity, he is not the author of the kingship treatise

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233. John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, SPHAMA 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 165–67. This material is found in an appendix (pp. 165–174) discussing the date of the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλεῖας treatises.

234. With regard to the political treatises, see Bruno Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Early Empire,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 567–75. Francesca Calabi (God’s Acting, Man’s Acting: Tradition and Philosophy in Philo of Alexandria, trans. Helen C. Tooke, SPH 4 [Leiden: Brill, 2008], 185–88) provides a useful summary discussion of the debate around dating before agreeing with Centrone’s position. Thesleff modified his 1961 position arguing, in 1972, that the Pythagorean texts should be dated to the late second century BCE and that they were composed in Italy, “at the periphery of the Scipionic Circle” (“Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica,” 83–84).

235. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings.”


238. Four fragments (about 1480 words) of the treatise have been preserved (the first of which is not included in Goodenough’s 1928 article). The text can be found at Thesleff 79.1–84.8 (= Stob. 4.6.22; 4.7.64–66 = WH 4, 244–245, 271–279). For commentary on the Ecphantus text, see Delatte, Traité, 164–244; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 191–234.
preserved by Stobaeus. Ecphantus places kingship within the harmony and good order that defines the cosmos (79.8–80.7). Within this sphere the king is a unique individual who shares in both humanity and the divine. Kingship is spoken of in abstract and personified terms (80.7–21) as something pure and radiant which only a true king will be able to bear. The one who occupies this particular office is an intermediary between God and humanity, not only in terms of his being, but also as he purifies his subjects. This happens as they imitate the king just as the king imitates God. This is a prime example of a pattern seen in various Pythagorean treatises in which each “system” imitates the one above it (80.22–80.26). Imitation relies on the good will that must exist between ruler and subject; the opposite end of this spectrum is defined by a complex of ideas that includes compulsion, force, and fear (82.28–83.9). The king’s _logos_ serves as an antidote to his subjects’ forgetfulness from their “indwelling wickedness” (τὰς κικίας ἐνοικεσθαι; 83.13).

Self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) is the primary divine and thus royal virtue (82.7–27) which is also linked to ruling oneself. Justice is an essential part of the way in which the king relates to his subjects (83.18–24) and Ecphantus concludes (83.25–84.3) by adding self-control (ἐγκρατεία/ἐγκρατησ) to self-sufficiency and contrasting these virtues to the vices of extravagance (πολυτέλεια), incontinence (ἀκρασία), and arrogance (ὑβρίς). All of the virtues have the king’s intelligence (φρόνησις) as their source, just as God is the intelligence of the cosmos (83.4–8).

Ecphantus provides us with a prime example of what Carol Atack refers to as “cosmic monarchy”—the idea that kingship is part of cosmic order and that the king brings this cosmic order to bear upon a society. The means by which the king participates in this cosmic order and benefits his subjects is through his imitation of the divine. This is discussed in more detail below. Cosmic monarchy is contrasted with virtue monarchy in which the excellence of the king’s character is what entitles him to rule and also forms the basis of his subjects’ imitation. It would seem that Pythagorean kingship represents an attempt synthesize these two models.

_Diotogenes_

Stobaeus preserves two fragments (4.7.61 and 4.7.62 = WH 4, 263–270) from a treatise entitled _περὶ βασιλείας_ attributed to a certain Diotogenes. It is possible to read the opening and _242_ These fragments run to 112 lines in H. Thesleff’s edition (Pythagorean Texts, 72.25–75.16). For commentary, see Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 64–73; Delatte, _Traités_, 245–73; Blumenfeld, _Political Paul_, 234–53. Except for some fragments from a work entitled _περὶ ὀσπότης_ (Stob. 3.1.100 = WH 3, 50; Stob. 4.1.96 = WH 4, 36–38; Stob. 4.1.133 = WH 4, 79–81), we have no other texts produced under this name. The _περὶ ὀσπότης_ fragments present political ideas that are quite different from those of the _περὶ βασιλείας_ fragments (Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 64–65). There is no evidence of a Pythagorean named Diotogenes in the list recorded by Iamblichus (VP 267). This raises the intriguing question why the author would have chosen an unknown name for this text. The same question can be asked of the Sthenidas text.
closing lines of this short treatise as a brief introduction and conclusion to a relatively informal text which begins with the theme of justice and ends with a discussion of the divinity of the king. At first glance it might seem that Stobaeus has preserved an entire text in two parts (Stob. 4.7.61 and 4.7.62). However, it is not obvious that the second fragment follows the line of thought from the first.\footnote{In Thesleff’s edition the first fragment (71.18–72.23) is separated from the second (72.25–75.16) by editorial notation (72.24).} There is an even more abrupt break in the flow of the text at 73.9: a discussion of the king’s virtues (72.29–73.9) turns into a discussion of the people as a reflection of the soul (73.9–19). It would seem that we are dealing with a lacuna in the text both here and at 73.15.\footnote{Goodenough reads the sentence at 73.14–15 with what follows (“Hellenistic Kingship,” 71) but it seems that the theme of injustice belongs with the discussion of vices found at 73.9–14.} We are therefore dealing with a number of fragments or excerpts and not a complete text. Nonetheless, the major features of Diotogenes’ portrait of the ideal king can still be perceived quite clearly.

Diotogenes establishes kingship on the concepts of justice and law (71.18–23), portraying the king as “embodied law” (see below) and a legal ruler. The duties (ἐργα) of the king are tripartite in nature, consisting of military, judicial, and religious functions (71.23–72.6). The author expounds each of these in what follows (general: 72.6–9; judge: 72.9–15; priest: 72.15–23). In each of these cases, the duty can only be performed well if the king gives attention to acquiring the abilities required within each field through intellectual effort. The relationship between God and king is explained by means of an analogy: as the polis is to the world, the king is to God (72.19–20). The king is thus a god among human beings (72.22–23). Like Ephrantus, Diotogenes emphasizes the king’s virtues. He chooses to stress the king’s self-control (especially with regard to pleasure) and his proper use of wealth. The king’s virtue defines his superiority and thus his position of authority (72.25–73.9). The vices of the king’s subjects are discussed in Platonic terms as the disordering of the various parts of the person. The goal of this section is to point out the need for the king to bring the various parts of society into harmony with one another, just as the parts of the individual person must be brought into harmony (73.9–19).

The final section prepares the “prince” for the political role he will be required to play (73.19–74.4). The king must prepare both body and mind that he might present himself positively before his people. He must appear σειμνός (majestic), χρηστός (gracious), and δεινός (fierce) in order to rule successfully (73.19–75.8). The final part of the fragment (75.8–16) concludes with the observation that these virtues characterize the gods, especially Zeus, “the Father of gods and men.” The essence of Diotogenes’ kingship theory is presented at 75.15–16: “It is necessary to remember, with regard to all of these things, that royalty is the imitation of the divine” (ἐπί πάσι δὲ τούτων μνημονεύειν δὲ ὁτι θεόμιμον ἐντι πράγμα βασιλεία). Starting with the king’s close adherence to justice achieved through enacting law in his own person, the king is to imitate God in each and every way possible, including fatherly care for his subjects, thus bringing about harmony in his realm.
Sthenidas

In this brief text,245 the otherwise-unknown Sthenidas of Locri246 asserts that monarchical rule is achieved as the king imitates God in his wise and kindly relationship to his subjects. In addition to emulating God’s wisdom, the king, like God, be high-minded (μεγαλόφρον), gentle (ἡμερος), and content with little (ὀλιγοδής). Like God, the king should evidence a fatherly disposition towards his subjects. God is also described as nourisher (τροφεύς), teacher (διδασκάλος), and lawgiver (νομοθέτης) (188.7–9). As Blumenfeld puts it, “God’s fatherhood covers the entire developmental cycle of the human being and of the polis—from the nursery to political maturity and from foundation to law reform.”247 Finally, Sthenidas comments that nothing which lacks a ruler is good, that rule is only possible with wisdom, and therefore, that the wise and lawful king will be an imitator and servant of God.

The king’s imitation of God is central in all three περί βασιλείας treatises and can rightly be considered as a foundational element of the Pythagorean theory of kingship.248 In the following sections, this element of Pythagorean kingship will be discussed in more detail, together with other important themes that emerge from these texts. The first matter relates to the relationship between the king and the law.

The King and Law: Νόμος ἐμψυχος

Questions surrounding the nature of law are at the heart of ancient Greek political philosophy.249 The Pythagorean kingship tracts, focused as they are on the nature of the king, have less to say on the relationship between the king and law than one might expect. There are glimpses, however, of an intriguing development in Hellenistic political philosophy in which the king is considered the embodiment of law.250 If, as suggested above, these texts belong to the late Hellenistic or early Imperial period, then Diotogenes’ writing contains the first occurrence of the term νόμος ἐμψυχος (71.21–22; 72.23) to describe this aspect of ideal kingship.

Although the phrase νόμος ἐμψυχος is not found in the extant literature of the classical period, certain elements that contribute to this concept can be traced back to that time. The outline of what would become the νόμος ἐμψυχος theory can be seen when Isocrates tells Demonicus that he should follow the laws set down by the king but, more importantly, consider the king’s “manner of life”

245. The text runs to only 200 words—18 lines in Thesleff’s edition (187.9–188.13) = Stob. 4.7.63 = WH 4, 270–271. Commentary can be found in Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 73–75; Delatte, Traités, 274–81; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 254–64.
246. Iamblichus mentions a certain Σθενωνιδας amongst the Locrians (VP 267).
249. As Richard Winton observes, “The contrast between nomos and phusis ... constitutes the single most fertile and most influential idea to emerge in fifth-century Greece” (“Herodotus, Thucydides and the Sophists,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 98).
(τρόπος) the highest law (Demon. 36). Xenophon’s Cyrus famously considers the good ruler to be a “seeing law” (Cyr. 8.1.22), contrasting the king’s ability to identify and punish transgressors with that of the written law, which is only able to bear testimony to commands without enforcing sanctions for their transgression.

However, it is Plato’s philosophical foundation upon which the Hellenistic theory would be built. For Plato, as elsewhere in the Socratic tradition, rule consists, above all, of the correct exercise of the intellect. In the Statesman, the interlocutors agree (Pol. 293b-d) that ruling is an “expertise” (τέχνη) and that the only true constitution is “the one in which the rulers would be found truly possessing expert knowledge” (τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμωνας). This knowledge raises the ideal ruler above the law. Written laws are flawed because they are unable to address every situation at all times, and so the wise king is the best ruler (294a–b), able to act in the best possible way through his expertise, without taking any notice of written laws (300c–d).

This ideal king—“some natural genius” who enjoys true freedom and knowledge (Leg. 875c–d)—would seem to have many affinities with the philosopher-king described in the Republic. His vision of the Good leads to imitation of, and assimilation to, what is organized, constant, just, and rational (Resp. 500c–d). Similarly, Aristotle argues that a being who excels the rest of humanity in the same way that the gods do deserves to rule and not to be ruled (Pol. 7.1332b16–27). Indeed, such a person would be like a god among men (ὅσπερ γὰρ θεόν ἐν ἄνθρωποις εἰκός εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον); people of this nature are themselves law (αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμος) and cannot be expected to obey laws (Pol. 3.1284a3–14).

Plato is pessimistic about the possibility of coming across this sort of ruler—unlike the “king bee” [sic], a superior human being of this nature does not appear spontaneously in a city—and so written laws are indeed necessary (Pol. 301d–e). It follows, then, that “when [imperfect] monarchy is yoked in good written rules, which we call laws, it is best of all six [constitutions]; but if it is without laws, it is difficult and heaviest to live with” (Pol. 302e).252 Those who read these words in the generations after Plato were all too familiar with imperfect monarchy and the scarcity of the ideal ruler.

The Stoic concept of the sage as king is as additional stream flowing into this conceptual pool. As already shown above (see p. 120), the Stoic development of this concept has more to do with understanding the sage than it does with understanding kingship. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the Pythagorean writers from exploiting Stoic concepts for their own purposes.

While classical thinkers had wrestled with the theory of absolute monarchy, it was exactly this sort of ruler that eventually came to dominate the Hellenistic world. The three Pythagorean περὶ

251. This is the main argument in Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, Il basileus come nomos empsychos tra diritto naturale e diritto divino. Spunti platonici del concetto e sviluppi di età imperiale e tardo-antica, Memorie dell’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici 34 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2006), for which I rely largely on Peter Van Nuffelen’s review (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2007.06.21; http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2007/2007-06-21.html). See also Aalders H. Wzn., “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ”; Martens, One God, 31–66. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1311–12 considers the νόμος ἐμψυχος concept to be a philosophical response to the claims of the divine ruler cult. It served to weaken claims of divinity since the king was an image of God, not God himself. While the concept would, no doubt, have provided the sort of justification envisaged by Chesnut, the work of Aalders and Ramelli demonstrates that its roots lie, instead, in the perennial philosophical discussion of νόμος.

252. For the importance of the law and a law-abiding ruler, see Plato, Leg. 715b–d.

βασιλείας texts conceptualize absolute monarchy within this milieu, even if they do not have in view a
definite historical king. 254 From the standpoint of political thought, the question of the relationship
between king and law must be addressed. Diotogenes approaches this question through the νόμος
ἐμψυχος concept.

The precise nature of what it means for the king to be νόμος ἐμψυχος is not spelled out in any
of the treatises being examined. 255 Oswyn Murray has also shown that the use of νόμος ἐμψυχος in
Cicero, Philo, Musonius Rufus, and later writers is so diverse that one cannot speak of the history of an
idea but only identify “the changing use of a phrase.” 256

Diotogene’s treatise begins by declaring that the king is (per definition) “most lawful” and
“most just” by virtue of being “living law” and “legal ruler” (71.18–23). His distribution of justice in
both public and private spheres imitates God’s rule of the cosmos (72.9–15), 257 an important theme to
which we will return below. Through justice, the king is to bring his realm into harmony with his rule
(τὸ ποιή μὴν ἄρχων τε καὶ ἀγεμονην τὸ ὅλον ἐξοναμίσθαι; 72.12). The precise nature of this harmony
is not described. But since the next sentence (72.14–15) speaks of the king acting positively for the
sake of his subjects, we should probably assume that this harmony relates to the well-being of those
over whom the king rules. 258 As “living law,” however, the king’s actions towards his subjects must be
marked by justice and law. 259

There is no indication in the Pythagorean texts that the king is accountable to a council for his
actions. A lesser form of consultation—that the king surround himself with wise and honest advisors—
is also not mentioned. As “living law,” the king’s rule is absolute. It is therefore accurate to
acknowledge his power as being ἀνυπεύθυνος—beyond criticism and not accountable to anyone 260—and
to recognize that this transforms him into a god among the rest of humanity (72.22–23). 261

254. A text like the Letter of Aristeas, in contrast, places its discussion of kingship very clearly within the Ptolemaic
dynasty, see Jonathan More, “Kingship Ideology: A Neglected Element in Aristeas’ Charter Myth for Alexandrian Judaism,”
in Septuagint and Reception, ed. Johann Cook, VTSup 127 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 299–319. Although there are no explicit
links to historical rulers in the Pythagorean texts, in Marten’s estimation, the ideas they espouse clearly belong in the
Hellenistic period (One God, 168).

255. So Blumenfeld: “this is a given, assumed known and not explained, a self-evident axiom requiring no
demonstration” (Political Paul, 235 n. 200). As mentioned above, however, Diotogenes does link the king as νόμος ἐμψυχος
to his absolute power and his being like a god among the rest of humanity (72.22–23).

256. Murray, “Peri Basileias,” 274–80, here, 276. Cicero provides evidence for the combination of the leader excelling in
virtue who brings justice through establishing laws (Off. 2.41–42) and who owns his own exemplary life as law (Resp. 1.52).
Cicero also conceptualizes the magistrate as speaking law (Leg. 3.2–3). In the first century CE, the phrase can be found in
Philo (Mos. 1.162; 2.4; Abr. 5) and Musonius Rufus (8.81 = Stob. 4.7.67 = WH 2, 283). Plutarch writes that the king should
be ruled not by written laws but by ἐμψυχῳ ... λόγῳ (Princ. iner. 780c). For Clement of Alexandria’s use, see John W.

257. The king is thus able to do what Plato’s lawgiver is not: balance the interests of the common good and the private
individual (Leg. 875a–b).

258. That the king should treat his subjects justly and act in their best interests is an important aspect of the περὶ
βασιλείας τόπος and is discussed more fully below.

259. Diotogenes recognizes the potential tension between justice and mercy but does not attempt a resolution. See p. 157
for further discussion of this point as it pertains to 74.26–75.8.

260. The Platonic definitions of βασιλείας and δοσιτεία both include ἀνυπεύθυνος as characteristic of monarchical rule
(Def. 415b; 415c); see also Chrysippus’ definition of the kingship of the wise (D.L. 7.122): τῆς βασιλείας ὁσὶς ἄρχης ἀνυπεύθυνος.

261. For Diotogenes’ use of παρασχηματίζω, transform, see below (p. 150).
However, for the king to be a “legal ruler” (νομιμος αρχων; 71.22) suggests that there is a certain law against which he can be measured. It is presumably this law from which he must not depart when attempting to benefit his subjects (72.12–15). Before he is able to bring harmony to the polis he must establish an order of law within himself (73.16–17). Implicit in all of these statements is the idea that the king does not define law, but is subject to some other law with which he must align himself.

Unfortunately, Diotogenes does not provide us with a description or discussion of the law against which the king might be measured. It is possible to argue that the law in view is the law of nature or some sort of divine law, and this would preserve the king’s absolute authority amongst humanity. Diotogenes is clear that the king derives his authority from God (73.17–18). This divine right to rule ensures that the king’s authority cannot be usurped by any other human being, while at the same time establishing God as an authority above the king.

Nevertheless, as νομος εµψυχος, the king is the embodiment of the divine law for his subjects. From their perspective, he is the law. There is no higher authority to which they might appeal, since the king stands between the divine and human, and it is only by gazing upon him that his subjects are able to glimpse the divine (see below, p. 150).

It is also possible, however, that this tension between king and law as it appears in Diotogenes’ writing represents the same tension caused by the transition of authority from written code to monarchy that John Martens recognizes in Archytas.263 This is not to argue that Diotogenes writes in a period in which monarchy is in some way subservient to the law. Rather, his writing has yet to reflect the philosophical justification of absolute monarchy.

Ecphantus does not use the phrase νομος εµψυχος and has even less to say than Diotogenes on the subject of law. Viewed from a cosmic perspective, the king is the being most suited to rule because of his share in divinity (79.15–17; cf. 80.4–5). This might suggest the king’s absolute authority since the one most suited to rule should not be ruled by anyone or anything else. But like Diotogenes, there are certain points at which Ecphantus’ allows his readers an unintentional glimpse of another type of rule.

At one point Ecphantus asserts that humanity can be purified through becoming like that which rules them, whether law or king (80.22–24). This statement recognizes that one might live either under (written) law or under a king, but it does not say that these two might exist within one system. Ecphantus is emphatic about the necessity and goodness of rule within the cosmic order (81.2–3), but fails to specify the nature of that rule. A further discussion of the necessity of law within the political

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262. See Delatte, Traité, 262–63.
263. Martens, One God, 35–37. Archytas distinguishes between two forms of law: the king as εµψυχος and the written law as α»ψυχος (Thesleff 33.8–9). Like Diotogenes, Archytas also understands the king to be accountable to the unwritten law; see below. Hayes’ “Discourse 4” summarizes various discussions around the contrast between the “flexible, unwritten, ‘living law’” and the “inflexible, written, ‘dead letter’” (What’s Divine About Divine Law? Early Perspectives [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015], 66–70). The Platonic solution, taken up by the Pythagoreans, is found in the νομος εµψυχος concept. Hayes’ focus is more philosophical in contrast to Martens’ more historical analysis.
community (81.22–24) is not any more illuminating with regard to the nature of that law, since it could refer either to the “embodied law” or to the written law. Nevertheless, we see that Echphantus’ portrayal of the ideal king is also unable to do away completely with all law external to the king.

The only contribution that Sthenidas makes to this topic is the observation that God is lawgiver (νομοθέτης; 188.9) and the king should imitate him in this. The “lawgiver” title is ambiguous. It could refer to a leader, like Solon or Lycurgus, who created laws for his people, but if Sthenidas’ conception of the king is similar to that of Diotogenes’ in this regard, then the king as “lawgiver” refers to the way in which the king embodies law in the midst of his people. Of interest at this point is the connection to imitation of the divine that Sthenidas draws with regard to this function. Before addressing this topic in the following section, it is worth noting that another Pythagorean text offers a discussion of king and law that clarifies the development of political thought as it is reflected in the περὶ βασιλείας we are examining.

In Archytas’ Περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαστικῆς264 the author distinguishes between written law and unwritten law. The latter is the law of the gods, which is also equated with nature (33.19–28). Archytas elsewhere identifies law with both the written, inanimate law (ἀφνισμὸς γράμμα) and the living king (ἐμφασίας βασιλεύς) (33.8). Both written law and embodied law function to harmonize the community and to bring about concord and virtue. Implied in Archytas’ view of the law is that whichever law is in place, whether it be the written law or the embodied law, it needs to conform to divine law. When this divine law is transgressed, the king becomes a tyrant and his people are slaves (33.11–12). Later in this treatise Archytas goes on to praise the mixed constitution of Sparta as exemplifying the best constitution (34.16–27). The concept of divine law in Archytas’ treatise serves to remove the tension that might arise between constitution and king since both written and embodied law, if they are good, will always be in harmony with the divine law and thus with each other.

If the king is merely one of the elements in Archytas’ political philosophy, within the περὶ βασιλείας treatises we have been examining the king has moved to the foreground and become the focus. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the law are still on display in Diotogenes and, to a lesser degree, Echphantus. It seems impossible for these thinkers to rid themselves of the idea that the king needs to be measured against something. The spectre of the tyrant—the lawless monarch—lurks in the background.265 The writers examined in this chapter seem incapable of moving away from the idea that something is needed to temper the ruler’s absolute authority. These treatises are not addressed directly to kings and no explicit advice is offered in this regard. Nevertheless, the divine law remains as a possible standard against which a ruler might be measured or measure himself. Even if the abstract concept of divine law remains implicit and undeveloped in the περὶ βασιλείας treatises, the Pythagorean writers suggest that the ideal king should be measured against God himself.266

264. The text can be found in Thesleff, Pythagorean Texts, 33–36 (Stobaeus 4.1.135–138, 4.5.61 = WH 4.82–88, 218–219). For discussion, see Martens, One God, 35–37; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 124–39.
265. Martens, One God, 37.
266. Martens, One God, 65–66.
Imitation of God

The most striking and, perhaps, defining characteristic of the king in the Pythagorean texts is his imitation of God. The idea is mentioned by Sthenidas (187.11; 188.2, 12–13) and occurs throughout Ecphantus’ text (80.3–5; 81.4; 82.20). Diotogenes draws on the analogy between God’s rule over the cosmos and the king’s rule over the state (72.18–23) to explain that the king is νόμος ἐμιπτηγὸς and, therefore, like a god among men. His concluding statement, however, places the whole treatise into the context of imitation: “It is necessary to remember with regard to all of these things, that royalty is an imitation of the divine (θεόμοιον ἐντὶ πράγμα βασιλεία)” (75.15–16).

Plato, most famously, speaks of assimilation to God (ὁμιόωσις θεῷ; Theaet. 176b) in the context of distancing the soul from the body through acquiring virtue and avoiding vice (cf. Phaed. 64e). The assimilation process is also in view in the Timaeus (90a–d) and Republic (500b–d; 613a–b), albeit with a slightly different emphasis in each text. This concept contributed to the telos within Aristotle’s thought and that of the Epicurean and Stoic schools, even if it was modified slightly in each case.

Amongst certain Middle Platonic thinkers, the source of the idea of assimilation to the divine was traced back, via Plato, to Pythagoras; more specifically, the Pythagorean command to “Follow God” was understood as seminal to this doctrine. Eudorus of Alexandria (see Stob. 2.7.3 = WH 2, 49), for example, cites Plato’s Timaeus, Republic, and Theaetetus as expounding this Pythagorean doctrine. Plato’s qualifier in Theaetetus 176b (“as far as possible”) is thought to refer to the faculty by which humanity can imitate God, that is, through the intellect and its virtue, wisdom.

As the example of Eudorus indicates, imitation of God became an increasingly important part of ethics in the Platonisms of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman periods, often being cited as the τέλος of human life. The one striking difference between the way in which these thinkers applied this concept and the way it was used in the Pythagorean περί βασιλείας texts is that the latter predicate it

267. In the TLG corpus θεόμοιον occurs only here and at 73.28, where the king’s majesty is an imitation of the divine (ἀ μάν γὰρ σεμιότας θεόμοιον ὑάμρχουσα πράγμα). Other words used in the Pythagorean treatises to speak of this concept include: Ecphantus: ἀρχέτυπον (80.3–4); τόπος (80.5); μιμήσας (81.4 bis); God is described as ἄξιομήμον “worthy of imitation” (82.20); Sthenidas: ἄσπιτος αντίμος καὶ ἔκτολος τὸ πράσιν θέα (187.11); καὶ μιμήσας τοῦτον (188.2); μιμάς ... ἄσπιτος τὸ θέα (188.12–13). Diotogenes also speaks of “drawing near” (συγγεγράμου) to the gods (74.10).

268. There is not too much of a distinction to be made between ὁμιόωσις and μιμήσις in the context within which these are being considered here (see George H. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity, WUNT 232 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 159). If anything, μιμήσις might imply a slightly more active process, but this should not be overemphasized since όμιόωσις θεῶς as the pursuit of virtue is itself active.


273. See, for example, Dillon’s observation that, “As regards the telos, on the other hand, the ideal of Likeness to God is adopted by Plutarch as by everyone else after Eudorus” (The Middle Platonists, 229); see also 43–44, 192, 299–300.
primarily of the king and not of humanity in general. Even if men and women do come to imitate
God through their imitation of the king, it is primarily the king who is called upon to imitate God in his
rule over the cosmos and his virtues.

Sthenidas links the king’s imitation of God to wisdom and virtue (187.9–188.4). In these brief
passages Sthenidas portrays the king as a sage, drawing links similar to those we saw in the Cynic and
Stoic writings earlier in this chapter. Imitation of the divine also has a significant rational component
in Ecphantus for whom God is the intelligence (φρόνησις) of the cosmos (84.4–5). Unless he imitates
God’s intelligence, the king will be unable to maintain the order of his realm, since the virtues
necessary for such rule are impossible to attain without intelligence (84.4–8). The emphasis on the
mind should not lead us to conclude that the Pythagoreans argued for passive imitation through
contemplation leading to flight from the world. Rather, the mind’s assimilation to the divine is
displayed in ruling well, just as God rules the cosmos well. Diotogenes also links imitation of the
divine to virtue and the mind (74.10–12), but this forms part of the king’s imitation of God’s majesty.
In addition to being majestic, the king must imitate God in being gracious, and fear-inspiring (73.23–
74.4; 75.8–16). The focus in the latter part of Diotogenes’ text (73.15–75.8) is very much on how the
king presents himself to his subjects and his actions towards them. The nature of the king is not
primarily in view.

Ecphantus describes something of the king’s nature when he explains (79.20–80.4) that since
the king is a copy of God, who created the king using himself as an archetype, the king is unique
amongst humanity. Created out of the same material (οὐλη) as the rest, he is, nonetheless, most divine
(θειότερον). At first glance, then, it would seem that the king is (at least) a semi-divine being. The
following phrase (80.1–2) limits this: his divine status exists because he enjoys the greatest part of the
good that is found in common human nature (θειότερον δ’ ὁ βασιλεύς ἐν τῇ κοινῇ φύσει πληνευκτών
to κράσσονος). It is possible that the “image of God” concept is at work here even though the precise
phrase it not used. The way in which the fragment at 79.3–7 is interpreted will influence our
understanding of Ecphantus at this point.

The fragment begins by establishing the plight of humanity: despite having God as a

274. It is therefore possible to distinguish between a royal model and a more general anthropological model of
assimilation to God. For the latter, see Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 332. Van Kooten, Paul’s
Anthropology, 95–112 discusses the evidence for the “image of God” as it pertains to both king and humanity in general.
275. So Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1317–18. This point is discussed in more detail below on p. 152.
276. For the imitation of God’s virtue, see also Ecphantus 81.4; 82.20–27.
277. For a summary of the evidence of Plato’s ambivalence on this question, see Kathleen Gibbons, “Moses, Statesman
and Philosopher: The Philosophical Background of the Ideal of Assimilation to God and the Methodology of Clement of
of being “genuinely ethical” or an otherworldy “intellectual enterprise.” In the Pythagorean texts the ethical and intellectual
cannot be separated.
278. Earlier in the treatise, Diotogenes had also described the king in terms of three functions—military, judicial, and
cultic—rather than in terms of his nature.
279. For the link between “image of God” and “assimilation to God,” see Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 124–81.
280. For commentary on this passage, see Delatte, Traités, 184–95; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 200–204.
281. Despite the superscript (Ἐκφάνην εἰς τὸν Περὶ βασιλείας) Stobaeus includes the fragment (79.3–7 in Thesleff’s
edition) in the sixth chapter of his fourth volume (4.6.22) and not in the seventh, where the other περὶ βασιλείας fragments
have been collected (4.7.64–66). The surviving fragments lack a coherent “narrative” or logical structure, making it difficult
to discern any definite order into which they may be placed. The context of the fragment currently being discussed (79.3–7)

148
father/progenitor (γεννητωρ), the human race has been weighed down and oppressed in its migration to earth (79.3–5). Humanity’s corrupt nature implies the inability to see God (79.7). It is only through the mediation of the king, who shares something of the divine spirit (θεομορφῆς τὶς ἐμπνοῆς, 79.5–6), that humanity is able to ascend in contemplation of the divine. The exact way in which the king’s mediation works is not spelled out at this point, but the language of revelation, sight, and contemplation (δείκνυμι, πρόσωπι, θεόμαι; 79.6, 7) suggest the idea of gazing upon the king and imitating him.284

Much hinges on one’s reading of θεομορφῆς ἐμπνοῆς at this point. In Delatte’s interpretation, Ecphantus has melded religious ideas from Hellenistic mysticism with philosophical Stoicism and applied what was originally predicated of all humanity to the person of the king. In the earlier form of this idea, humanity was infused with the divine breath in order that it might ascend to God.285 In Ecphantus’ model, it is only the king who receives the divine breath; humanity’s ascent occurs through the king’s mediation.

The “king-as-mediator” model has been critiqued by Thesleff who identifies the θεομορφῆς ἐμπνοῆς as reference to “the universal soul with, perhaps, a touch of the Stoic πνεῦμα.”286 Thesleff argues against the notion that the king exhibits a soteriological function at this point. In light of the prominence given to the king’s salvific function at 83.11–17, Thesleff is perhaps too quick to dismiss this reading.287 The king’s ability to ameliorate the human condition (see also 80.22–81.10) suggests that Delatte’s reading is in line with Ecphantus’ conception of the king that unfolds through the rest of the treatise.288

If we attempt to harmonize 80.1–2 with 79.3–7, we must conclude that the divine inspiration which the king enjoys is nothing other than his being formed in the likeness of the divine. This element

has been further confused as Stobaeus has appended two sections from other fragments to it (WH 4, 244.19–245.5 = 4, 272.9–14 = Thesleff 79.20–80.4 and WH 4, 245.5–8 = 4, 278.2–5 = Thesleff 83.1–4).

282. For discussion of the migration theme in other literature, see Calabi, Tradition and Philosophy, 196–98.
283. The king is not mentioned explicitly at this point, but I follow Delatte in assuming that this expression refers to the king (Traités, 184–85). Delatte argues that Ecphantus has attributed to the king what is attributed to humanity’s ψυχή by other writers (Traités, 191–93). But the passage might also be translated without any reference to the king, so Menahem Stern, ed., Appendixes and Indexes, vol. 3 of Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, Fontes Ad Res Judaicae Spectantes (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1984), 37. Given the focus of the remaining fragments, however, it seems more likely that Ecphantus has the ideal king in view at this point. This seems to have been Stobaeus’ reading of the fragment since he appended two other kingship fragments to it (see n. 281).
284. In the following section I discuss the subjects’ imitation of the king and the work of his logos (p. 151).
285. Delatte cites Philo (Alleg. Interp. 1.37; Worse 84, 86) as a parallel (Traités, 192).
286. Thesleff, Introduction, 69–70. This also seems to be the implication of Chesnut’s translation (“Ruler and Logos,” 1318 n. 32).
287. The date of composition of the text is tied in to the question of influence. Delatte (Traités, 191–92) considers these texts late and therefore, finding similar concepts in Philo, he argues that the Alexandrian writer stands behind Ecphantus at this point. Thesleff (Introduction, 70), on the other hand, argues that Ecphantus is early and that the Pythagorean and Philo share a common source that might be found in the Early Academy. Calabi also argues that these writers share certain sources, but that these show Middle-Platonic influences. Like Thesleff, she rejects the possibility that either of these writers influenced the other (Tradition and Philosophy, 215).
288. Burkert, “Pseudopythagorica,” 52–53 (followed by Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, 33–37) argues that Ecphantus was influenced at this point by Jewish creation literature (esp. about Gen 1 and 2). See Calabi, Tradition and Philosophy, 185–215 for an argument against Philo being an influence on Ecphantus. George van Kooten also argues against any Jewish influence on the Pythagorean writings (Paul’s Anthropology, 118–24), but suggests that their might be a “perceived dependency” arising from common ideas held by both Jews and Pythagoreans (122).
of divinity, in turn, is seen to be the superior part of human nature, which adheres to the king more than any other human being. The king’s mediation must therefore consist in enabling his subjects to imitate him in such a way that they come to imitate the divine and, through this, to attain to the highest state of humanity. Elsewhere, Echphantus describes the king as something foreign and alien (ἀπόδημον τι ἐντὸς χρῆμα καὶ ξένον) that has come to humanity from the heavenly king (81.10–13). The description here further highlights the king’s distance from humanity but does so without ignoring his role as intermediary. It must be granted at this point that Echphantus’ concept of the ideal king—especially the king’s origin and the nature of his salvific role—exudes more mysticism than that of either Diotogenes or Sthenidas. We have certainly progressed some distance from Plato’s assimilation described in terms of the acquisition of virtue (see above, p. 147).

Diotogenes’ observation that the good king will draw near to the gods through separating himself from human passions and exceeding in virtue (74.9–12) is closer to Plato’s ideal. This, in turn, cautions us against taking too literally Diotogenes’ assertion that through imitating the divine order and ruling with absolute authority, the king has been changed into a “god among people” (Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχάμαται; 72.22–23). The king’s status is delimited by the phrase “among people” and might be better translated as “like a god among people.” He is superior, but only within the human and earthly realm (72.18–19). As such, he is the object of his subjects’ imitation and, through this imitation, they are able to make moral and spiritual progress. This does not make him “a divine savior figure,” at least, not a divine saviour figure in the same way that Echphantus’ king is.

Finally, the king’s imitation of the divine ensures that he is superior to other human beings (Echphantus 79.20–80.1; Diotogenes 72.18–23) and thus best suited to rule. That the better should rule and the worse obey is taken as axiomatic in these and other Pythagorean texts. The next point to consider is the relationship between the king and his subjects.

The King and His Subjects

The king’s imitation of God follows a pattern found in the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha in which the lower or lesser system imitates the one above it. “Thus the political community ought to reproduce within itself the harmonization of the cosmos.” If imitation describes how the king is to relate to God, it follows that the king’s subjects must imitate him (Echphantus 82.3–6; Diotogenes 72.19–20).

289. It is this which makes the king νόμος ξένος, see above.
290. Priam mourns the deceased Hector as ὁ θεὸς ἔσχε μετ’ ἀνδρόσων “one who is a god among men” (Il. 24.258); see the remarks by R. Brock (Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle [London: Bloomsbury, 2013]) regarding the divinity of Homeric leaders. At Theaetetus 176b, Plato’s insistence that assimilation to God be understood as “becoming like God,” not “becoming (a) god” is indicated by κατὰ τὸ ὄντος, “as far as this is possible.”
291. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1317: “the king was beginning to turn into a divine savior.”
292. Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism,” 571; Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 334. For this idea in Plato, see Resp. 4.431b, 443b. However, in Plato’s Laws it is ultimately the law that should rule over willing subjects (3.690b).
293. Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism,” 571; see also Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 320–21, 334; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 207.
Ecphantus envisages two ways in which subjects might be controlled (82.28–83.9): the one way is characterized by force (βίοτο), necessity (ινάγκη), and obedience/persuasion (παιθοῦ), all of which are linked to fear. The second, superior way is marked by imitation that arises within a relationship of goodwill (εἰρηνοῦ). Delatte’s attempt to argue that persuasion stands between spontaneous imitation and fear arises from his observation that a number of other elements in the Pythagorean texts follow a tripartite scheme. While this is certainly correct at other points in the treatise, the argument at 82.28–83.9 proposes a binary scheme in which subjects follow the king willingly or unwillingly. The first of these is described in terms of imitation, and the king alone is able to produce good in human nature as his subjects come to imitate him (83.9–10)—he is a “saviour by example.” Ecphantus relates this salvation process to the king’s logos (83.11–17).

In both the passage concerning the king’s logos and the fragment found at 79.3–7, Ecphantus portrays the king as a mediator between his subjects and God. Ecphantus’ language of wickedness and sin is used in contrast to the good (83.9–10). If humanity was once pure (καθαρός; 79.4), this state is not regained through priestly mediation and sacrifice, but through contemplation of the divine in the ruler. When the language of sin is used in combination with purity (80.22–81.2), the latter is achieved through imitation of the ruling element (king or law) that embodies the divine.

Diotogenes, when writing of the king bringing his subjects into harmony with himself (72.12–14; cf. 73.15–16), develops the imitation theme along similar lines as Ecphantus. According to Diotogenes, the community’s “harmony” should be attuned to the king (73.18–19), a state which is achieved by the king through presenting himself properly to his subjects. His majesty, graciousness, and fearlessness should be evident to all. Those who gaze upon him will be suitably ordered (κατακεκοσμημένοι) because of the superiority not only of his appearance (as important as that is for Diotogenes), but also of his mind and soul (74.12–19). Although Diotogenes does not use the language of persuasion, the relationship between the king and subjects described here fits comfortably within Ecphantus’ prescriptions in this regard.

Plato’s *Timaeus* (90c–d) provides a potential model for the king-subject relationship. There the divine part of human nature is perfected through contemplating the cosmos. As a human being comes to understand “the harmonies and revolutions” of the universe, so the “revolutions” in his or her own head are corrected and understanding is restored to its original condition. Through contemplating that

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294. In Plato’s *Statesman* (276d–e), the distinction between king and tyrant is made on whether subjects are governed willingly (εὐθένος) or by force (βίοτο). So, too, in Aristotle (Pol. 1285a27–28), kings rule the willing (εὐθένος) according to law while tyrants rule the unwilling (ἀτέκνος). As discussed in Chapter 2, this neat pattern is destroyed by Xenophon’s Cyrus who rules through fear as well as by instilling in his subjects the desire to please him (Cyr. 1.1.5), see Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 90.


297. See above, p. 148, for a fuller discussion of this somewhat obscure passage.

298. *Contra* Blumenfeld, *Political Paul*, 209–11, the ideas here are closer to Plato than to Paul. At Resp. 500b the ruler reproduces the likeness of the Good within his subjects.

299. For Ecphantus, communion, love, and goodwill are essential components of the harmony that should exist between a king and his subjects, but in each case these exist in the earthly realm as a copy of their heavenly counterparts (81.13–82.6).
which is excellent, humanity is restored.\(^{300}\) The Pythagorean model, in keeping with the theme of the king as mediator, would have humanity contemplate the royal example in order to be restored.

Even though contemplation and influence flows in one direction, there is also a bilateral aspect to the king-subject relationship. Diotogenes exhorts the king to treat his subjects well. Justice (72.9–15; 74.19–26) tempered with mercy (74.26–75.16) define a good king, and to these he should add benefaction (72.14–15; 73.26). Sthenidas’ king is described as a father who is merciful (ήμερος; 188.3), gentle (ηπιος; 188.6), a step-father or nurse (τροφεύς)\(^{301}\) and teacher (διδάσκαλος) of all that is good for his subjects (188.8).

We find in these descriptions the common concern for kings to act in their subjects’ best interest. History confirms that Hellenistic kings did not always behave in this way. The inclusion of this element in the περ βασιλείας topos achieves two things: First, it paints an ideal picture and indicates something of the desires of the masses. Second, by framing these concerns within a treatise about the ideal king, those who produced these writings were perhaps able to give expression to these desires which might not otherwise be possible within an absolute monarchy.

**Noetic Rule**

There is a strong noetic component to ruling, according to the Pythagorean writers.\(^{302}\) Sthenidas insists that if the king imitates God, thus fulfilling his role as earthly ruler, he must necessarily be a sage (χρή των βασιλεία σοφόν ήμεν;187.10). We have already come across this idea in Cynic and Stoic thought, although the Pythagorean author seems more concerned with the imitation of divinity at this point than with the king-as-sage theme.\(^{303}\) When contrasting the earthly ruler with God, Sthenidas notes (187.11–13) that God possesses wisdom (σοφία) while the king only has understanding (ἐπιστήμη). But even if the king might never achieve divine wisdom, the intellectual component of kingship is still acknowledged.\(^{304}\)

In Ecphantus this idea is cast in moral (as opposed to philosophical) terms. Since proper rule is predicated upon the virtues, and the royal virtues—δικαιοσύνα ... και ἐγκράτημα καὶ κοινωνίαν “and their sisters” (84.7–8)—exist only through intelligence/wisdom (φρόνησις), it follows that intelligence is crucial for the king to exercise his reign. The God-king parallel is again at work here: since God is the φρόνησις of the cosmos by virtue of his using his νόος in ordering it (Ecphantus, 84.4–6), so the

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\(^{300}\) For a brief discussion of this, see Sedley, “Godlikeness,” 316–24; Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 93–95.

\(^{301}\) It is difficult to decide on an English gloss since both nurturing and nourishing are in view. See Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic Background the 1 Thessalonians 2,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 60–63 for a discussion of the cognate σφάς in the context of Hellenistic philosophical guidance.

\(^{302}\) This is, again, a concern within the Socratic circle. In Plato, the king is marked out by his knowledge (ἐπιστήμη; Pol. 258b): “the power of any king to maintain his rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in comparison with the understanding and force of his mind (την της νοης σύνασαν και ρώμη) (259c; trans. C. J. Rowe in Cooper). Similarly, Xenophon’s Socrates attributes kingship not to those defined by sceptres, the choice of a people, fate, or force. True kings are those who know how to rule (τοις ἐπιστατιῶν ἄρχειν) (Mem. 3.9.10).

\(^{303}\) So Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 256 n. 298 contra Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 74–75 and Delatte, Traité, 274–75.

\(^{304}\) Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1318.
king should use his mind in ordering his realm. The king’s divine mind enables him to bring about good and avoid evil (83.18–20).

Diotogenes says more about the specific knowledge necessary for a king to govern well. The king should give careful attention to the art of war (πολεμίζειν καλῶς ἐπισταθεὶς; 72.1), studying the law (νόμοι καλῶς ἐκμαθῶν; 72.2), and reflecting on the nature of God and virtue (φύσιν θεῶ καὶ ἄρετᾶν ἐκλογαιόμενος; 72.3). This intellectual effort is necessary in order that he might fulfil the royal offices of general, judge, and priest (71.23–72.23).

As important as the king’s intellect is, there is no mention in these treatises of the education of the prince. The closest one gets to the idea of education is the ruler’s imitation of the divine, and even here the process or means to this end is not spelled out by any of our authors. However, if the περὶ βασιλείας text is meant to be read as a Fürstenspiegel, then it functions as part of royal education. In that case, one would not necessarily expect explicit reference to the prince’s education, but might find, instead, a suitably humble exhortation to heed the text’s teaching. Unfortunately, the fragmentary nature of our texts means that none of them contains a formal introduction or conclusion where such an exhortation would most naturally be found.

Since kingship is primarily a matter of the king’s mind and his imitation of the divine, it is not surprising that there is nothing said about dynasties and hereditary kingship. It is the excellence of the individual king that makes him fit for kingship and not his relationship to his successors.305 The one possible exception is glimpsed in Sthenidas’ contrast between God who is king and ruler “by nature” and the earthly ruler who is king “by origin (γένεσις) and imitation” (187.11–13). Does γένεσις here refer to the king’s genealogy, thus hinting at the idea of hereditary rule? Nothing else in the Pythagorean treatises suggest this reading. On the contrary, the emphasis is always on the extraordinary nature of the individual, rather than on his family or any inherited power or right to rule.306

In keeping with the philosophical tradition, the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλείας texts portray ruling as primarily an intellectual endeavour. Diotogenes indicates an element of study or attention necessary for the king to excel in certain essential activities. Ecphantus chooses to highlight the set of royal virtues that arise from and cannot exist apart from the king’s intelligence. These intellectual virtues are an indispensable part of the Pythagorean concept of the ideal king, but they form only part of a larger complex of virtues ascribed to the king.

The King’s Character

In their portrayal of the ideal king, the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλείας treatises resort to a number of virtues and metaphors that are commonplace in Hellenistic descriptions of kings and kingship. The

305. For two case studies of dynastic succession, see Matthias Haake, “Agathocles and Hiero II: Two Sole Rulers in the Hellenistic Age and the Question of Succession,” in The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, ed. Nino Luraghi, STAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 99–127. Haake notes that “due to the main characteristics of Hellenistic kingship there were no fundamentally accepted rules of royal inheritance independent of the individuals involved” (107).

306. This element of royal ideology is completely absent from the philosophical justification of kingship in the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλείας treatises. If Hellenistic kingship has, at its core, the idealized memory of Alexander, then the failed attempts to continue his dynasty might explain the absence of the concept of hereditary kingship as part of the larger kingship topos.
presence of these *topoi* within the somewhat esoteric Pythagorean treatments of kingship illustrate just how stable the core of the kingship ideal was in the Hellenistic period and beyond.

Diotogenes captures the essence of the Pythagorean argument with regard to virtue: “for it is necessary that he excel all others in virtue and for this reason to be judged worthy to rule” (73.2–3). All three writers attribute to their ideal king multiple virtues. These are found throughout Hellenistic kingship texts and serve to prop up the doctrine that only the most excellent person is capable of monarchical rule.\(^{307}\) If a πρι βασιλείας text is read as a *Fürstenspiegel*, these virtues become desiderata expressed by the king’s courtiers, rather than descriptions of that king.

A list of the royal virtues mentioned in the Pythagorean treatises would be tedious, both in production and consumption.\(^{308}\) In what follows, the various virtues have been grouped and discussed so as to allow key themes to emerge.

Self-sufficiency (αὐτόκρατεια) is the primary virtue for Ecphantus. He identifies self-sufficiency as the sovereign virtue (ἄρχη) since, like a monarch, it leads all others but is itself not led by anything (84.1). This seems to be an argument through definition. It identifies the virtue that most closely corresponds to monarchical rule and elevates that virtue to the supreme place. The argument finds support in the divine realm, however. God’s self-sufficiency is seen in his lack of officials and attendants (82.17–18). Instead of issuing orders and insisting on obedience, divine rule is effected through instilling in humanity the desire to imitate God (82.20–21). This forms part of Ecphantus’ argument in favour of imitation as the only legitimate way of ruling over subjects (82.7–27; 82.28–83.10). Self-sufficiency thus becomes central to Ecphantus’ conception of kingship. But Ecphantus also employs self-sufficiency in a more conventional way.

Self-sufficiency engenders self-control (ἐγκράτεια)\(^{309}\) and these two virtues guard against extravagance (πολυτέλεια), incontinence (ἀκρασία/ἐγκράτεια), and their result, violence (ὀβρίς) (83.25–84.3). The common concern that kings avoid luxury and greed lies implicitly behind this observation. The violence in view could refer to a general observation that greed often drives strife and contention, or it might refer more specifically to the way in which rulers extract wealth from their subjects.

Diotogenes also uses the *topos* of self-rule when warning the king about wealth and its attendant vices. The king must not be conquered by pleasure (ἡδονή), but must, instead, cultivate ἀνδραγαθία.\(^{310}\) In cultivating virtue in this way the king distinguishes himself from the masses (72.25–29). The warning against greed (πλεονεξία) carries with it the recognition that wealth is necessary that a ruler might benefit his friends (φίλως εὔεργετέν), support the poor (δεσμένως ὑπολαμβάνει), and

\(^{307}\) The reason for that excellence is not always clear. Is it because the king naturally excels in virtue (71.18–23)? Or because of something inherent which allows him to imitate the divine and in this way exhibit superior virtue (188.2–4)? Is he chosen by God who then produces virtue in him (81.10–13)?

\(^{308}\) A selection of virtues are mentioned here to illustrate their commonplace nature: Sthenidas: μεγαλόφορος, ἀµρος, and ολογράφος (188.3); ήτοις (188.6); Diotogenes: δίκαιος (71.18–23); νόμως (71.18–23); ανδραγαθία (72.25–28); Ecphantus: φιλία, κοινωνία (82.1); εὐνοίας (82.3); ἐγκράτεια (83.25).

\(^{309}\) Socrates said that the better king is the one able to rule his own emotions (δυνάμενον ἀρχειν τῶν καθόν) (apud Stob. 4.7.26 = WH 4, 255), cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.5.1. So, too, Isocrates *Ad Nic.* 29 (ἀρχει σαυτοῦ ... κρατῆς τῶν ἐπιθυμιών), *Dem.* 21 (ἐγκράτειας ὅσκαλος πάντων ... ἀρχεῖ ταῖς δ ἡδοναῖς).

\(^{310}\) Here best translated as “manly virtue” rather than “courage.” Presumably the association of ἡδονή with τροφή (luxury, softness, effeminacy) is in view at this point.
bring his enemies to justice— all unavoidable aspects of kingship. A general exhortation concludes this section:

So whichever king is self-controlled (σώφρον) with regard to pleasure, is given to sharing (κοινωνικός) with regard to possessions, and is prudent (φρόνιμος) and powerful (δυνατός) with regard to his rule, such a person would truly be king (73.6–9; my translation).

Behind this exhortation (albeit one hidden in an observation) lies the recognition that kingship is necessarily combined with wealth and power. Within a royal dynasty, these are passed from one generation to the next. Seen from a practical perspective, for those not born into this position, wealth and power are the means by which kingship is obtained and sustained. Giving a nod towards the Realpolitik of the Hellenistic period, Diotogenes recognizes this and urges the king to temper wealth and power with the relevant virtues, of which self-control/self-rule is the most important.\footnote{311}

Although self-control is important for Diotogenes, he suggests that there is a more significant paradigm within which the king would circumscribe his actions. In imitation of Zeus, the ruler of all (75.8–16), the ideal king should be majestic (σεμνός), gracious (χρηστός), and fearsome (δεινός).\footnote{312} Diotogenes explains this exhortation as follows:

For majesty, a godlike thing, can make him admired and honoured by the multitude; graciousness will make him popular and beloved; while the ability to inspire fear will make him terrible and unconquerable in his dealings with enemies, but magnanimous and trustworthy towards his friends (73.28–74.4; trans. Goodenough).

In this section the emphasis seems to have shifted from the virtues themselves to the king’s display of these virtues. At 74.12–19 Diotogenes states that the king’s mind, physical appearance, and actions must supersede those around him to such a degree that those who gaze upon him are brought into order (τὸς πολιτικὸς λόγος ὑπενθύμισθαι; 71.15–16). Diotogenes’ explanation of the process that brings about this change sheds some light on Pythagorean thinking about the king’s control of his subjects: “For the appearance of the good king (τὸ ἀγαθὸν βιοτέλεσις πολιτικὸς)\footnote{313} ought to direct the soul of those who gaze upon him no less than a flute or harmony” (74.17–19).\footnote{315}

\footnote{311} Diotogenes’ phrasing at this point—καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς δὲ μετὰ δίκαιας ἀμύνασθαι (73.31)—suggests a defensive or retaliatory war rather than aggression on the part of the king.

\footnote{312} At 73.9–14 Diotogenes seems to offer an alternative reason for the importance of self-rule. Since the political body (δῆμος) exhibits the same relationship between its various parts as the soul, the king who is able to rule his own soul would have the knowledge necessary to rule his subjects. Or so the argument would seem to run. A lacuna in 73.9 separates this paragraph from the previous one. For Diotogenes’ analysis of the soul, see e.g., Plato, Resp. 435c–445e. The parallels between the political and the individual is also found in this work. At Resp. 368e–369a, Socrates proposes to search for justice at the macro-level, that is, the polis, in order to understand justice in the individual.

\footnote{313} Delatte (Traités, 264) identifies a similar triplet of virtues in Philo (Rewards 97), except that καθηρεύσῃ τὸ κύριον κυρίεραν. Philo predicates these virtues of a leader-figure raised up by God in an eschatological battle. Delatte also finds a similar scheme in Cicero (Off. 2.1–10), which he traces back to Panaetius’ influence (Traités, 265–66). He suggests that Panaetius is also the source for these ideas in Diotogenes (which would support Delatte’s later dating of the Pythagorean texts), but no unambiguous evidence is presented which proves that the influence necessarily flowed in that direction.

\footnote{314} The is the only occurrence of this noun in the TLG data set (accessed 14 April 2015). Diotogenes creates it by nominalising προσαγωγός (Doric προσαγωγός).

\footnote{315} The text reads σολάκε καὶ ἀρμονίας. Delatte (Traités, 270–71) argues that ἀρμονία must refer here to a stringed instrument like a lyre. But at 73.15 Diotogenes uses the image of the lyre to describe the way in which a king might control a city. He is thus able to refer to that instrument when necessary. Although the “flute and lyre” merism would be pleasing, Diotogenes seems concerned not to lose the emphasis on “harmony” at this point.
Diotogenes compares the affect of the king’s appearance on his subjects to the effect that music has on those listening to it. It is not the “numinous experience” and “mystical ecstasy” described by Blumenfeld—as Delatte observes, any sense of religious sentiment is entirely absent at this point. The centrality of music and harmony in Pythagorean philosophy is well known. In addition to its significance in Pythagorean mathematical thought, the later biographical tradition attributes an ethical/therapeutic role to music. Just as music is able to correct a person’s character and life, by projecting the right image for his subjects, the king is able to order his subjects as they respond to the image being presented to them. In neither case is the mechanism of change described, it is simply assumed.

Diotogenes makes use of another musical analogy in the section expounding χρηστότης, graciousness (74.19–75.8). Justice stands in the same relation to community (κοινονία) as rhythm does to motion and harmony does to the voice (74.23–25). The excellence in each case consists in the rightly-ordered working of a complex entity. Motion can be chaotic or rhythmic, a voice can produce a cacophony or harmony, similarly, a community can produce injustice or justice, depending on how its various parts are brought together. Before he is able to bring about this harmony in the political body, though, the king must ensure that the various parts of his own soul are suitably harmonised (74.20–23). It is not primarily justice applied by the king to the state that is in view at this point—justice is also what brings harmony to the relationship between the king and his subjects. In this statement we can glimpse coherent, even if not profound, political thought. If the king’s role is to bring the state into harmony with himself (73.15–16), and if this only happens through his bringing justice to bear on the community, then it is essential that the king is the most just person (71.18–19). As such, he is to act as judge and distributor of justice (72.9–15). The idea of divine imitation is never far in these treatises and Diotogenes considers it fitting that the king acts in his realm as God, the ruler (ἡγεμόν) and leader (προστάτης) of the cosmos, does in his (72.10–11). In his capacity as judge and distributor of justice, he must act in relation to the general public (ξιωνός) and the individual (διοικ) As “embodied law,” the king is in a unique position, through imitation of the divine, to assure that potentially conflicting interests are brought into harmony.

316. Blumenfeld, Political Pau 246; Delatte, Traité 270.
317. “Through music Pythagoras produced very useful corrections to human character and life” (Iamblichus, VP 115, my translation; see 110–115 for examples). Similarly Cleinias of Tarentum is said to have played the lyre in order to calm the Pythagoreans, it was also known outside of those circles, see Martin L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 31–33.
318. The idea, again, is Platonic and is seen most clearly in Book 4 of the Republic. In Resp. 4.443c–444a, for example, justice is that which harmonizes the three elements of the soul, allowing each its proper function and place. The just state functions analogously. But ἥχοςμορφόν is also a significant element in Aristotle’s philosophy (see esp. Eth. nic. Book 5 and Pol. 3.1280a8–1284b34). In a recent discussion of justice, Johan Thom notes that it is, for Aristotle, “the social virtue par excellence” (“Justice in the Sermon on the Mount: An Aristotelian Reading,” NovT 51 [2009]: 319–24, here 320).
319. Justice is the central virtue for the king in his judicial role (72.9–15), and there, too, it is described as bringing his subjects into harmony with himself and his rule.
320. The distinction between the king-made law (νόμος κοινος) and local tradition (διος νόμος) is what is in view here, according to Goodenough (“Hellenistic Kingship,” 67–68). Goodenough’s reading might be seen as an extension or refinement of the classical distinction between natural law and the law of the city, or universal and particular law (see e.g., Aristotle, Rhet. 1.1373b1–18). Delatte (Traité, 251), in contrast, sees Diotogenes focusing on the state as a whole and on the individual (see e.g., Aristotle, Rhet. 1.1373b19–24).
The section concludes by describing the king as “doing well and benefiting” (ἐν τῷ ποιῶν εὖ καὶ εὐφρενεῦν) his subjects, without negating either justice or the law (72.14–15). The title εὐφρενεῦις is again one that was attached to a number of different Hellenistic kings. Diotogenes envisages the possibility that a system of benefaction might be open to abuse and thus he emphasises that the king as benefactor should also be marked by the judge’s concern for justice and law.

There is another passage in which the king’s exercise of justice and care for his subjects are joined. In 74.26–75.8, the just king is described as gentle (ἐπιευκῆς), and merciful (εὐγνώμων). These virtues are portrayed as counsellors (πάρεδροι) of justice. They don’t “share the throne of justice” (Goodenough), as if gentleness and mercy are equally as important as justice, but rather, justice is best served by taking them into account. It is important to note that ἐπείκεια at this point does not carry the juridical weight that it does elsewhere; “gentleness” is therefore a better translation than “clemency.” Although ἐπείκεια and εὐγνώμοσθην are brought together in the realm of legal δικαιοσύνη by Pseudo-Aristotle (Magn. Moral. 2.1198b–1199a3), the way in which Diotogenes’ king will show himself to be just at this point is not through carefully balancing strictness and leniency with regard to the law, but through caring for those in his kingdom who are least able to care for themselves. We see in this section an appeal to the king to treat the most vulnerable of his subjects well. Those in need will be assisted. Those petitioning the king will be given aid without regard for their ability to honour the king in return for his benefaction (75.1–8). The same instinct that led Sthenidas to urge the king to imitate God in being kind (ἡμιν; 188.6) is at work here in Diotogenes. Without the power of exile or voting a leader out of office, subjects within an absolute monarchy are reliant on the king’s mercy and kindness to shield them from his power.

The element of kindness and gentleness is less conspicuous in Ephphantus’ treatise. Nevertheless, he does recognize that the political community must be marked by love (φιλία) between the king and his subjects, a relationship that is also expressed in terms of goodwill (εὖνοους) shown by both parties (81.13–82.5). He compares this to the relationship between father and son, shepherd and sheep, law and those who use it (82.5–6). The “king-as-law” topos has already been discussed above. We must examine briefly the first two images together with other metaphors used of the king.

The king as shepherd is a common metaphor found throughout the Ancient Near East and the Mediterranean region. In Homer the phrase describes kings, often Agamemnon, but without any

321. E.g., Ptolemy III, Ptolemy VII, Antiochus VII, Mithridates V.
322. For a discussion of the use of ἐπείκεια during the early Roman Empire and a definition, see Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 38–52. Walker’s definition is summarized in Appendix 1 (Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 331–35). In view at this point in Diotogenes is “the easy, kind and generous treatment shown to subjects or inferiors” (definition 2g) rather than “a ruler’s mercy (or leniency or clemency)” (definition 2h) or “a technical term for a reasoned and humane application of laws and sanctions” (definition 3).
323. The sense in which Diotogenes uses the word here is closer in meaning to LSJ B.II.1.a: “meet and right, fitting” rather than “legally exact” (B.1.1.b) or “lawful, just” (B.1.2).
324. One would expect fierceness (δυσνοῦς) to be addressed in the next section. Instead, the final paragraph discusses the three-fold set of virtues as they are exhibited by the gods. The third section must therefore have been lost at some stage in the manuscript’s transmission (Delatte, Traité, 264).
325. Ephphantus uses vou[c] instead of θητήν. The former is a general term used to described a person in charge of a flock or herd (LSJ, s.v. vou[ç]c; cf. Plato, Theaet. 176d; Resp. 370d), however, the reference to a flock (ποιμὴν) makes it clear that a shepherd is in view at this point.
326. For discussion of this theme, see Brock, Political Imagery, 43–52. See also numerous references to primary and
According to Xenophon’s Socrates, the comparison is used is because the king must act for the good of his subjects (Mem. 3.2; cf. Cyr. 1.6.8). Similarly, when disputing the nature of justice with Thrasymachus, Plato’s Socrates concludes that proper rule is like “the art of the shepherd” in that each “is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which [it] is set” (Resp. 345d). The image is used primarily to speak of the ruler’s care of and responsibility towards his subjects. Ecphantus' statement assumes this relationship and takes the argument one step further by turning this relationship into the basis of a state of goodwill that exists between ruler and subject. For this desired state to exist, the ruler must be concerned for the well-being of his subjects. The shepherd is his first example, followed by the father, and the law. In each case, the respective figure should be concerned for the welfare of whatever is subordinate to it, thus producing the mutual goodwill necessary for the political community to thrive. The third element in this series, the law, is included on the assumption that proper law exists for the good of those who live under it and that they will willingly submit to it. If the use of “law” at this point is somewhat confusing, the image of the king as father is more easily understood.

According to Sthenidas, God’s kindness (ηπιος) results from his being “father of gods, and father of men” (188.5–6). At 75.11–13 Diotogenes quotes the same Homeric phrase to which Sthenidas alludes and ties God’s fatherhood to his gentleness (χρηστός) which, in turn, causes him to be beneficent (ευεργετικός) and generous (ἐγαθοδότης) towards all. In both cases the king is encouraged to emulate God’s fatherhood and the related virtues. Both metaphors—the king is a father and a shepherd to his people—are used to portray the ideal king as one who is concerned for the well-being of his subjects. Additional functions that a good king should fulfill are described using other metaphors commonly found in Greek political texts.

At 72.6–9 Diotogenes describes the king’s role as leader using three common images—the pilot of a ship (κυβερνήτης), a charioteer (ητόχος), and a physician (ιατρός). Each of these is
credited with saving those over whom they “rule.” The σωτηρ-ideal is common in Hellenistic kingship ideology. Here it is predicated of the “king and general” (βασιλέως δὲ καὶ τῶν στραταρχῶν) who rescues those in danger during war. It is not surprising to find salvation tied to the king’s duty as general since it is often in battle that the king is seen to function as saviour of a people or a city. Ptolemy I Soter, for example, received this epithet from the Rhodians for rescuing them when they were besieged by Demetrius in 305–304 B.C.E. The final sentence in this section relates this salvific function to the fact that each of these—pilot, charioteer, physician, king/general—is the ἕρως, ἐπιστάτης, and διμουργός, respectively, of a system. In view at this point is the leader’s role of organising and arranging a specific system—the political/military system that the king/general forms to achieve the salvation of his subjects. The king-as-warrior is an important part of the topos of the ideal king. However, the concept is not found in either Ecphantus or Sthenidas, and here, in Diotogenes, it seems to have been softened by focusing on the king as leader and organiser, rather than on the king as triumphant conqueror of his foes. If pushed to account for this irenical trend in these texts, we might hypothesize that it is due to a certain weariness from living in a time of “ubiquitous war.”

As a result of his imitation of God, the king shares the divine virtues (81.9–10), but more than that, these virtues are understood to be the work of God in the king (81.12–13).

Concluding Comments on Pythagorean Kingship

Almost fifty years ago, Oswald Murray considered the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha a product of a “motley band of vegetarians and wizards which thought itself from time to time to be the Pythagorean school.” Bruno Centrone’s recent survey points to increased scholarly appreciation for a group of texts which aim at a systematic description of a particular blend of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, even if they lack the profundity of other philosophical writings.

334. Philo describes the king as a physician, general, and pilot, amongst others (Spec. Laws 4.186). The point of comparison is that each has the power to make things better or worse for those under their authority.

335. We have already seen how Ecphantus envisages the king as religious-ethical saviour. At this point in Diotogenes’ treatise the more common idea of the king as military-political saviour is in view (see, e.g., Frank W. Walbank, “Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. Frank W. Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], 82; Francis Cairns, Virgil’s Augustan Epic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 20–21; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 238).

336. Pausanias, Descr. 1.8.6. For the siege itself, see Pausanias, Descr. 1.6.6; Plutarch, Demetr. 21–22. The most detailed account of these events is provided by Diodorus Siculus (20.81–88, 91–100). Diodorus does not mention the epithet but he does describe the construction of a “Ptolemaeum” in order to honour Ptolemy as a god (20.100.4). In general, a king’s ability to offer protection and salvation was seen as a reason for honouring him in the same way as gods were honoured; see, e.g., Arthur Darby Nock, “Soter and Euergetes,” in The Joy of Study: Papers on New Testament and Related Subjects Presented to Honor Frederick Clifton Grant, ed. Sherman E. Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 127–48; Angelos Chaniotis, “The Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine, BCAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 433, 440–43; Angelos Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History, Ancient World at War (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 72–75.

337. So Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 237, who translates the three terms as “leader,” “manager,” “initiator.”

338. Chaniotis, War, 2 Chaniotis observes further, “There is hardly any moment in which a geographical region was not directly involved, or indirectly affected, by a military conflict” (2). This assertion is illustrated in the remainder of the first chapter (1–17). See also John Serrati, “Warfare and the State,” in Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome ed. Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby, vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 461–97.


340. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings.”
Centrone describes the authors of the pseudepigrapha as “Pythagoreanizing Platonists, who considered themselves to be heirs to the Pythagorean tradition, with a firm belief in the continuity between Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle.” The use of Platonic and Aristotelian language and thought in the Pythagorean kingship treatises accords with this description. The use of names connected with famous Pythagoreans and the clear attempts at connecting the ideas in these treatises with those of traditional Pythagoreanism suggests that they might rather think of themselves as “Platonizing Pythagoreans.”

With regard to the lack of profundity exhibited in the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, John Dillon observes:

All this Pythagorean activity, however, seems to have occurred on the non-philosophical, or at least sub-philosophical, level. The treatises are bald and didactic, stating their doctrine without attempt at proof and aimed at an audience which, it would seem, was prepared to substitute faith for reason. This description is also true of the kingship treatises which present neither a carefully constructed political philosophy nor a justification of monarchy, even if they could contribute to both. There is another group which, while not necessarily intent on substituting faith for reason, might appreciate “bald and didactic” philosophical tracts: new initiates or lay people would benefit from a simple statement of the group’s position on monarchy or ethics or economics, which could form the basis for subsequent discussion. The absence of more complicated treatises might nullify this thesis in so far as there is no evidence of a Pythagorean school. But the absence of advanced texts might hint at the attempt by later Pythagoreans to mimic the tradition of Pythagorean secrecy and oral teaching associated with Pythagoras.

At the heart of these constructions of ideal kingship in a Pythagorean mold was the idea of imitation. The king must imitate the divine and his subjects must imitate him. Continuing the trend observed in Isocrates and Xenophon, the Pythagoreans envisage a form of virtue kingship in which the king’s various virtues set him apart as the most superior man and thus the one worthy and able to rule.

The other striking development in these treatises is the concept of the king as νόμος ἐμπνοος. I argue above that the Pythagorean use of this phrase is an attempt to maintain the king’s authority and

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341. “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 337 For the homogeneity of the doctrine in the pseudepigrapha, see also Thesleff, Introduction, 73.


344. Even if the ascription of secrecy and exclusively oral, esoteric teachings to Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans has no basis in history (Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, 150–62; contra Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. Edwin L. Minar Jr. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972], 178–79, 192), it is well established later in the tradition (see, e.g., D.L. 8.6, 15, 42).
independence while at the same time positing a standard external to the king against which his reign might be measured. The tracts do not provide us with enough evidence for how their writers envisaged this working itself out in terms of the king’s judicial and legislative activities.

**Hellenistic Kingship: Concluding Comments**

In this chapter, I have examined the way in which the Cynic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Pythagorean schools constructed ideal kingship. It has become evident that the first three schools agreed that it was acceptable, perhaps even desirable, for the sage to advise the king that he might progress towards this ideal. In the case of the Cynics and Stoics, this advice would be an encouragement for the king to pursue these ways of life in order to move towards becoming a sage himself. For the Epicureans, philosophical advice to the king aimed at making the Epicurean life possible for those who chose to follow it. Philodemus’ treatise on Homeric kingship addressed to Piso is an example of Epicurean advice, even if the philosophical approach is not typically Epicurean and the addressee not, strictly speaking, a king.

Foundational to this philosophical advice was the idea inherited from the classical period (see Chapter 2) that the king should be the best man, the most superior being. And as was the case in the classical period, what marked the king as superior was his exercise of the philosophical virtues. As Oswyn Murray notes:

> Hellenistic views of kingship were based on ideas common since the fourth century, that the justification of monarchic rule lay essentially in the virtues of the monarch. This created an ideology, or (as I might have said a generation later) “a discourse,” a general set of attitudes, which could be and were used to justify the rule of particular kings. The result was not so much a political theory or even political thought as a literary genre or a collection of *topoi* and analogies.

Some virtues obviously belong in the collection of royal traits exalting the king—justice and courage, for example—while others, like clemency, can be construed as forming part of a dialogue between the king and his subjects. In each of the schools, however, ideal kingship was seen in terms of virtue monarchy.

In the Pythagorean texts, virtue monarchy was joined with the idea of cosmic monarchy, which included the idea that the king imitate the divine (see above, p. 140). These two models work together since through his imitation of the divine, the king receives certain divine virtues which enable him to rule and which are also imitated by his subjects. The centrality of the virtues in Hellenistic kingship ideals points beyond the political community to the individual and the ethical.

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345. If the authors of the Pythagorean περὶ βασιλείας treatises hoped they would be read by rulers, then they too would have considered it acceptable to serve in the royal courts in this way. The dating difficulties and absence of any historical context make it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about the readers of these texts.

346. Behind this impulse stands Plato’s philosopher-king (*Resp.* 473c–c).


348. For the idea that the kingship texts were part of a dialogue between king, *polis*, and philosopher, see Matthias Haake, “Writing Down the King: The Communicative Function of Treatises On Kingship in the Hellenistic Period,” in *The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean*, ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 165–206.
Cynic and Stoic thought in particular kingship is used as a model to think about the sage. As A. A. Long observes with regard to the Hellenistic period, “The concepts of authority, power, ruler and subject, stable government and insurrection have become ways of analyzing the self.” Not surprisingly, given the metaphor being employed, self-rule and self-control were considered foundational virtues.

Chapter 5 will return to these constructions of kingship to explore how they are used by Hellenistic Jewish authors. In order to tease out accurately the various strands of thought in these hybrid models, though, it is important to identify an additional model of kingship upon which these Jewish authors drew: ideal kingship as it is described in the Jewish Scriptures.

CHAPTER 4: IDEAL KINGSHIP IN ISRAEL’S SCRIPTURES

In this chapter I construct a model of ideal human kingship as it is found in parts of the Jewish Scriptures. Although my primary question in this dissertation is concerned with Paul’s possible appropriation of Hellenistic philosophical ideals of kingship, Paul’s familiarity with the Jewish texts means that their construction of kingship needs to be excluded if I am to isolate Hellenistic elements in his writings.

In order to limit the length of this part of the study, I will only look at selected passages from the Deuteronomistic History (Deuteronomy–Kings), the Psalms, and Isaiah. The limited scope is warranted for three reasons. First, this group of texts is representative of the three parts of the Jewish canon: the law (Deuteronomy), writings (Psalms), and prophets (former prophets: Samuel, Kings; latter prophets: Isaiah). Second, the three groups of texts being examined contain a number of the most significant passages in which concentrated discourse about kingship can be found.1 In attempting to mirror as closely as possible the approaches taken in the previous two chapters, I will examine passages in which the focus falls primarily on kingship or within which the ideals of kingship are explicitly expressed. Third, in his quotations of, and allusions to, the Jewish Scriptures, Paul draws most frequently from Deuteronomy, the Psalms, and Isaiah.2 If the frequency with which he quotes these texts provides an estimate of their influence on him, then our use of them to sketch a model of kingship with which he might have been familiar is warranted.

The kingship of Israel’s god, the Lord,3 is often considered to be the defining feature and/or organizing principle of not only the Hebrew Bible, but the entire body of literature that comprises the Christian Scriptures.4 The centrality of divine monarchy in the texts of the Hebrew Bible is matched by the presence and prominence of a human king who stands in relation to Israel’s god and Israel’s people.5

1. The following might be included in a more extensive study: Jer 23.1–8; Ezek 34; 37.15–28; Zech 9.9–13.
2. Paul cites Isaiah 28 times, the Psalms 20 times, and Deuteronomy 15 times. Only Genesis (15 times) receives similar attention (Dietrich-Alex Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus, BHT 69 [Tübingen: Mohr, 1986], 33).
3. The Hebrew divine name served to distinguish Israel’s god from the gods of the surrounding nations. In the Greek Scriptures, the divine name is usually translated as κυρίος. I will refer to Israel’s god either as “the Lord” or “God.”
5. The period of the ancient Near East reflected in these texts is dominated by kingship (see, e.g., the essays in Nicole Brisch, ed., Religion and Power: Divine Kingship in the Ancient World and Beyond, University of Chicago Oriental Institute Seminars 4 [Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2008]), and substantial scholarship in the mid-twentieth
I will not pursue the development of Israel’s kingship or the historical nature of kingship ideology in this chapter. Rather, the object of study is the concept of kingship as it appears in the texts of the Jewish Scriptures. The image of the ideal king will be pursued through a synchronic analysis of the texts in the Septuagint, since this is most likely how Paul would have encountered and understood them. Since Deuteronomy functions to anchor the Deuteronomistic History, and, by happy coincidence, also contains the most concentrated discourse on kingship in the Jewish Scriptures, the so-called “Law of the King” in Deuteronomy 17.14–20, I begin by examining this passage.

Moses’ Law of the King (Deuteronomy 17.14–20)

The narrative that extends from Deuteronomy to 2 Kings portrays the period from Israel’s imminent entrance of the promised land through to the Babylonian exile of Judah, the southern kingdom centred around Jerusalem. Leadership is a key theme in this narrative. Moses, Joshua, and the different “judges” take on roles of leadership which might be termed monarchical, but it is Saul who is recognized as Israel’s first king. Following Saul’s unsatisfactory reign, the reigns of David and Solomon are often perceived as the high point of Israelite monarchy, since the rest of the narrative tells of the dividing of the kingdom and the exile of Israel in the north and, later, Judah in the south.

The stylistic, linguistic, thematic, and theological similarities in Deuteronomy and the books of the Former Prophets have led to the recognition of a certain coherence in this body of literature which has been explained in different ways. Martin Noth’s thesis of a “Deuteronomistic history” (DH) created by an exilic author-editor he called the Deuteronomist (Dtr) continues to serve as the paradigm which subsequent hypotheses have refined or modified. But while diachronic literary and tradition-historical approaches have led to advances in the scholarly understanding of this body of texts, they are not suitable for the purposes of this study.

Since the goal of this part of the dissertation is to examine constructions of ideal kingship in Jewish texts as they might have been read and understood by Paul, a synchronic, narrative approach to
passages within DH is more appropriate. This involves treating Dtr not as a redactor who simply joined together pre-existing sources with linking passages, but as an author who, in addition to making judicious choices about which sources to use, where to use them, and how to link them, has also rewritten and edited these sources in order to produce a coherent text narrating an historical account.  

Within this account, the “Law of the King” in Deuteronomy 17.14–20 contains the first concentrated discussion of human kingship.

The Law of the King in Context

Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22 contains instructions about various offices in Israel: judges and officials (16.18–20), the king (17.14–20), priests (18.1–8), and prophets (18.14–22), between which are interspersed related instructions regarding worship (16.21–17.7; 18.9–13) and legal proceedings (17.8–13). Dean McBride argues that the central section of Deuteronomy, chapters 12–26, form “a social charter of extraordinary literary coherence and political sophistication” which, following Josephus, he identifies as a type of “constitution” for Israel. Norbert Lohfink considers Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22 to be “a comprehensive piece of legislation concerning the principal functions of power in Israel,” the primary goal of which was the distribution of power within the nation.

The Law of the King does not place kingship within a clear, detailed legal framework. Instead, “merely a shadowy existence is allowed here to kingship in Israel.” The passage does not provide Israel’s king with a set of rights and responsibilities but is meant, instead, “to inculcate a spirit of lawkeeping.” Careful attendance to the law is at the heart of Deuteronomy’s theological vision and, as this section will make clear, the Law of the King provides the reader with “an ideal charter for kingship that is consistent with the character and content of the Mosaic instruction in the rest of this book.”


14. Lohfink places the final redaction of this legislation in the exilic period and argues that its current form is the result of interaction with the Israelite monarchy. As such, Deut 16–18 is a “utopian theory” rather than legislation that might have been implemented (“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 346). So, too, Bernard Levinson: “Deuteronomy submits a utopian manifesto for a constitutional monarchy that sharply delimits the power of the king” (“The Reconceptualization of Kingship in Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History’s Transformation of Torah,” *VT* 51.4 [2001]: 511).


17. Patrick D. Miller, *Deuteronomy*, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox, 1990), 147.
Choosing God’s King

The opening verse of this section establishes the context for Israel’s monarchy. After conquering the land, Deuteronomy envisages a request from the nation for monarchical leadership: “I will set a ruler (ἄρχωντα) over me, like the rest of the nations that are around me” (Deut 17.14). There is no indication at this point in Deuteronomy that there is anything wrong with the desire for a king, although Israel’s desire to be like the nations is more problematic. Deuteronomy 7 commands the Israelites to destroy the nations they conquer, not to enter into any political agreements with them, and not to marry their sons and daughters, lest they lead the Israelites to follow after other Gods (cf. Deut 12.29–30; 18.9–14). Israel’s distinctiveness as God’s people is axiomatic in the narrative of the nation’s history. Verbal parallels with the incident at 1 Samuel 8 where Israel demands a king (cf. 1 Sam 8.5), provide further support that kingship like the nations was seen as rebellion against God. It is the nature of Israel’s monarchy, rather than monarchy per se, that is potentially problematic.

The first part of Deuteronomy 17.15 confirms the acceptability of kingship. Moses instructs the people that when they desire a king, they are to appoint the king chosen by the Lord. The theme of God’s choosing is an important one in Deuteronomy. God chooses the nation (e.g. 4.37; 7.6–7; 10.15), the place where God or God’s name will dwell (12.5, 11, 14; 16.6, 11), and the Levitical priests who serve there (18.6; 21.5). God’s choice means he has determined that a specific state of affairs must exist and that this state has his blessing. Kingship is one of the things that the Lord has chosen and must be seen as falling within God’s purposes and rule. The fact that the Lord has chosen a king suggests that the main question is not “Should there be a king?” but “What should the king look like?”

18. Grant, King as Exemplar, 193 identifies four key elements in Deuteronomy 17.14–20 that will serve to structure our discussion of the passage: (1) the king is chosen by the Lord (vv. 14–15); (2) the king is to be like his fellow Israelites (15, 20); (3) the limitation of royal power (vv. 16-17); and (4) the centrality of torah in the life of the king (vv. 18-19). Similarly, Miller (Deuteronomy, 148–49) draws three main conclusions from this passage: the limitation of royal power, the king’s allegiance to the Lord, and, joining Grant’s second and fourth points, that the king must be a model Israelite (especially with respect to torah).

19. The LXX translation, Καταστήσω ἐμέ· ἐμοὶ ἄρχων... is in keeping with the translator’s decision to use ἄρχων for γίνεται when Israel’s rulers are in view and to use βασιλεύσεως for the Lord or a foreign king (John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Deuteronomy, SCS 39 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995], 286). This usage is most evident at Deut 33.5 where γίνεται is translated with ἄρχων since the translator has (mis)understood the passage to be speaking about Moses and not the Lord (Wevers, Deuteronomy, 541). The LXX translation also allows Deut 17 to refer to Israel’s rulers between Moses and Saul who were not called “king,” such as Joshua and the judges.


21. “[T]o ask for a king like the nations is then a rejection of Yahweh and his ways” (Gerald Eddie Gerbrandt, Kingship According to the Deuteronomistic History, SBLDS 87 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986], 109, original emphasis).

22. In contrast to Gerhard von Rad’s conclusion that “kingship is conceived, almost reluctantly, as a concession to historical reality” (Deuteronomy, 119), Mark O’Brien reads Deut 17.14–15 as permissive, rather than concessive (“Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22,” 165).

23. It is difficult to discern how the people’s choice of king is related to the divine act (von Rad, Deuteronomy, 120). In the book of Samuel it is the prophet who anoints the king on the Lord’s behalf (1 Sam 9), following the people’s request for a king (1 Sam 8).

Like One of His Brothers

In addition to being chosen by God, the king must be appointed from among the Israelites: “One of your own brothers you shall appoint as ruler over you” (17.15). The appointment of a foreign king is forbidden. No explicit reason for this prohibition is provided, but it is consistent with Deuteronomy’s general warning against foreign influences (see above).²⁶

The first part of verse 20 provides a further clue as to the type of kingship these instructions are attempting to create. The king is to keep God’s law “so that his heart may not be exalted above his brothers.” The emphasis here falls on the king’s humility. By following God’s law he will not think of himself as superior to the rest of the Israelites but will be the first among equals.²⁷

The use of familial metaphors in Deuteronomy emphasizes the unity of the nation.²⁸ Any distinction or tension between the tribes is only hinted at in Deuteronomy.²⁹ The tribes must fight together to conquer the various enemies inhabiting the land, and none may rest until the Lord gives rest to their “brothers” (3.12–20). The appointment of a king from among his “brothers” contributes to this theme so that kingship may not disturb the essential unity of God’s people.³⁰

Israel’s unity is seen above all in the covenant established by the Lord with the ancestors of the generation addressed by Moses in Deuteronomy (see, e.g., 7.12; 8.18) which, paradoxically, the Lord made with the generation addressed by Moses (5.2–3).³¹ Moses addresses his words to “all Israel” (1.1; 5.1), the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (1.8). Deuteronomy 4–5 and 29 set the entire book within the context of this covenant which looks back to the events described at Exodus 19–20 where the multitudinous descendants of the seventy who originally went in Egypt (Deut 10.22) are constituted as “a royal priesthood and a holy nation” (Exod 19.6). It is therefore necessary for Israel’s king to be a “brother” since only a “brother” falls under this covenant. The significance of this will be explored

²⁵. Grant, King as Exemplar, 196–99; Gerbrandt, Kingship, 189.
²⁶. It sounds absurd for a people to appoint a foreign king over themselves. David Daube suggests that Abimelech (Judg 8.29–9.57), whose father was Gideon, but whose mother was a Canaanite, is in view at this point (“One from Among Your Brethren Shall You Set King Over You,” JBL 90.4 [1971]: 480–81). The importance of the king being under the covenant (see vv. 18–20) which the Lord had established with the nation and individuals of Israel seems a more likely explanation for this decree (Gerbrandt, Kingship, 111).
²⁷. Given their jurisdiction in cultic (18.1–8; cf. 10.8–9) and judicial affairs (17.8–13; cf. 21.5), as well as their authority in matters of the law (31.9, 24–26; 33.10), the Levitical priests seem to have wielded an enormous amount of power, according to Deuteronomy. If the king was indeed “the judge” of 17.9 (McBride, “Polity,” 241), this might have been an attempt to balance the power of the Levites.
³¹. This verse dissolves the gap that exists between the past and the present in Deuteronomy. “The covenant is not an event, a claim, a relationship of the past; it is of the present” (Miller, Deuteronomy, 67). The covenant thus establishes an inter-generational unity in Israel.
further when we look at Deuteronomy 17.18–20. Before then, however, it is necessary to look at verses 16 and 17 which introduce three additional areas in which the laws limit Israelite kingship.

**Weapons, Women, Wealth**

Deuteronomy 17.16–17 bars the king from acquiring many horses for himself, and from acquiring many wives, and from amassing great quantities of silver and gold. “Weapons, women, and wealth: why else be a king?” wonders Wright.32 These proscriptions limit the king’s power within the nation and restrict his ability to engage either diplomatically or militarily with the nations around Israel. Internally, the laws contribute to a more egalitarian type of kingship by making the king more like his “brothers” and less like the kings of the surrounding nations.33 Externally, these limitations force the king—and, by extension, Israel—to rely on the Lord for protection.34

The prohibition against acquiring horses is usually understood in military terms, although commerce and wealth might also be in view.35 In contrast to other ancient Near Eastern societies, Israel’s king has been removed from providing military leadership, raising armies, and waging wars. In Deuteronomy, Israel would seem to have no standing army, but when the nation does go to war, an army will be assembled from the various tribes in the manner described in Deuteronomy 20.36 It is the Lord, and not the king, who fights on behalf of his people to give them victory (Deut 20.4; cf. 3.22).

The temptation to return the people to Egypt most probably has in view the sale of Israelite slaves in return for horses. Such actions would reverse the exodus by returning Israelites to the condition of slavery from which the Lord had redeemed them. Although the Lord retains this option as punishment for covenant disobedience (Deut 28.68), no king may place his fellow Israelite in this position.

The prohibition against multiplying wives (v. 17a) is put in place lest his heart be led astray by them (μεταστήσεται αυτοί ἐκ καρδιά). In Deuteronomy, being led astray or turning aside almost always happens with regard to the Lord, his ways, and his laws (e.g., 5.32; 7.4; 9.12, 16). This is also the case in the immediate context of the warning about many wives (17.11, 20). While élite marriages certainly had economic, social, and political implications,37 at Deuteronomy 17.17 a multitude of wives carries religious dangers. No mention is made of foreign wives at this point, but given the absence of restrictions on polygamy in ancient Israel and the prohibitions against marrying foreigners because of

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34. Dutcher-Walls, “Circumscription of the King,” 603–4. Dutcher-Walls employs social-scientific tools to illuminate the internal and external implications of these restrictions. She assumes the law had been developed by élites in seventh-century Judah to address the nation’s situation as a vassal of the Assyrian empire. In her reading, these laws deny the king the opportunity to assert military, political/diplomatic, and economic independence and “thus support a strategy of acquiescence to the domination of Assyria” (615), while simultaneously reducing the king’s power in relation to other élites (616).
36. Lohfink (“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 345) suggests that Deut 17.16 alludes to a mercenary force rather than a standing army. With regard to the officials of Deut 16–18, Lohfink argues that the “officers” appointed at 16.18 are those who appoint “commanders” (20.9) in times of war.
37. Dutcher-Walls, “Circumscription of the King,” 608; see also Norbert Lohfink who argues that both the king’s harem and his wealth would have been intended as displays of magnificence and signs of the prosperity of the state (“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 349).
the religious dangers inherent in such relationships (Deut 7.3–4; cf. 1 Kgs 11.1–4),

38 it is quite likely that foreign wives are meant. Since royal marriages were often used to seal international agreements, this law would restrict the king’s ability to engage in international diplomacy. 39 This reading of the prohibition against multiplying wives stresses, once again, the king’s and nation’s dependence on the Lord for their safety. 40

Finally, the restriction on amassing silver and gold is not an absolute prohibition but a warning against excessive wealth. 41 If we assume that the thread of the king being like his “brothers” runs through the Kingship Law, then the reason for this prohibition is clear. Power—especially monarchical power—always brings with it the potential to generate great wealth. Israel’s king is to resist the temptation to enrich himself at the expense of his “brothers.” 42 Not only is power able to generate wealth, but wealth can establish and maintain political power, both internally and externally. The king’s avoidance of excessive wealth would mark him as odd in the ancient Near East where kingship and great wealth frequently accompanied one another. In his attitude towards silver and gold, the king is once again shown to be unlike the kings of the other nations. Like his “brothers,” the king is to depend on the Lord and not his wealth. 43

The limitations placed upon the king serve to make the king more like his “brothers” and thus, distinguish his kingship from that of the kings of the surrounding nations. “The legislation is not primarily about how the king is to rule his people but about how, once the option of having a king is taken up, he can effectively counter the desire to be like the nations.” 44 Furthermore, once the usual devices of rule—military might, international diplomacy, wealth—have been removed, the king can only rely on the Lord as the source of a successful reign. The final section in the Kingship Law establishes the conditions for the Lord’s support of such a reign.

The King and Torah

In Deuteronomy 17.18–20, provision is made for the king to study and follow God’s law so that


39. Grant, King as Exemplar, 203; cf. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 111.

40. If foreign wives are not in view, the passage prohibits the king from providing a royal harem for himself. In this case, the emphasis would be on the distinction between Israel’s king and those in surrounding nations for whom harems were a symbol of wealth and status (Gary N. Knoppers, “The Deuteronomist and the Deuteronomic Law of the King: A Reexamination of a Relationship,” ZAW 108 [1996]: 402). Assuming, too, that the average Israelite would not be in a position to maintain a harem, this part of the law would also ensure that the king’s family situation was similar to that of his fellow Israelites.

41. While the same construction is used here to warn against “multiplying” horses and wives (οὐ πληθυνεῖται ἑαυτῷ), the clause about wealth is modified by σφοδρῶς, indicating that excessive wealth is the problem.

42. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 112. If, as some have argued, vv. 18–19 were inserted at a later stage, this argument is strengthened with regard to the original prohibition, since v. 20a continues with “so that his heart may not be exalted above his brothers.” In Dutcher-Walls’ reading, this prohibition against excessive wealth represents an attempt by the élite to limit the king’s control of the economic surplus (“Circumscription of the King,” 609).

43. Grant, King as Exemplar, 203–4.

he and his dynasty may enjoy a long reign over Israel. Upon his ascension to the throne, the king must “write for himself this second law in a book from the priests, the Levites” (v. 18). In the opening paragraph of Deuteronomy we read, “Moyses spoke to all the sons of Israel according to all that the Lord had commanded him for them” (1.3) and Moses then expounds “this law” (1.5; cf. 4.1). Repeated references in the closing chapters of Deuteronomy to “law,” “this law,” and “the Book of the Law” (29.29; 30.10; 32.46; 33.10), combined with provisions for regular reading of the law (31.10–13) and its safe-keeping (31.24–26), suggest that Deuteronomy is indeed “this law” which the king is meant to copy, read, and follow. The link with the Levitical priests (17.18 and 31.25) corroborates this thesis.

The centrality of the law in the life of the king arises, in part, from the fact that in Deuteronomy νομῶν has become more than instruction and even more than law—it has become the word of God.

The centrality of the law is seen in the king’s relation to it. The law must be with him and he must read it so that he might “keep all these commandments and these statutes to do them” (Deut 17.19). In contrast to other ancient kings who promulgate law, Israel’s king is subject to a law that he did not make. Furthermore, in Deuteronomy 16–18, provision is made for judges to execute justice throughout the land (16.18–20) and for difficult cases to be taken to the Levitical priests and “the judge” (κριτῆς; 17.9, 12), both of whom reside in the place the Lord will choose (17.8–13).

Deuteronomy 17.20 links the purpose of this unusual limitation to the text’s “democratizing” tendency: the king must submit to the law “so that his heart may not be exalted above his brothers.” This levelling process occurs as the king submits to the same law as the people (e.g., Deut 5.1, 28–33; 26.16–19), not turning from it to the right or the left.

The conditional nature of God’s blessing implied in the clause “in order that he be long-lived in his rule, he and his sons among the sons of Israel” (Deut 17.20), is mirrored in the various warnings issued to Israel: “And you shall be watchful to perform all the words of this covenant in order that you may understand everything that you shall do” (29.9). In both cases, then, the king and the nation are to express careful obedience to God’s law in the knowledge that their future success or failure—blessing or curse—will depend on their adherence to the decrees and statutes of their god’s law.

Put shortly, by living under God’s law, the king is to be an exemplar of “torah piety” and covenant obedience. His adherence to the covenant the Lord made with Israel makes the king a “model Israelite.”

The fundamental task of the leader of the people, therefore, is to exemplify and demonstrate true obedience to the Lord for the sake of the well-being of both the dynasty and the kingdom.
King and subject share a common goal: to learn to fear the Lord. This observation is generally correct, but one should note, especially in light of the history recounted in the book of Kings, that the nation’s future is not explicitly linked to the obedience of the king at this point in Deuteronomy. His reign and the reign of his descendants depend upon his faithfulness. Nevertheless, to the extent that the king serves as a model for the nation, it would indeed seem to be the case, as this historical narrative progresses, that “as goes the king, so goes the kingdom.”

The final verses of the Law of the King thus serve two purposes. First, they establish the king as an example for the people to follow and a model to imitate. Second, they place the king in the same position as other Israelites in relation to the Lord. The focus in Deuteronomy is on the nation and the nation’s fortunes as it negotiates its new situation in the land of promise. Deuteronomy 17 does not create a direct link between the king’s obedience and the fate of the nation, but that connection becomes evident later in Israel’s history.

The King in Samuel and Kings

The theme of kingship looms large in the books of Samuel and Kings, but in this section I highlight just three significant points in this account. First, the inauguration of Israelite monarchy is described in 1 Samuel 8–12. These chapters are important because they echo a number of themes already hinted at in Deuteronomy 17. Second, the figure of David will be examined by focusing on a significant passage, 2 Samuel 7, in which the Lord enters into a covenant with David and the Davidic dynasty. Finally, the book of Kings describes two good kings, Hezekiah and Josiah, who are set apart in the narrative because of their reforms.

The Inauguration of Monarchy: 1 Samuel 8–12

The book of Samuel serves, among other things, as a bridge between the period during which judges ruled the tribes of Israel and the monarchy. Samuel himself is a pivotal figure, acting first as a judge within Israel and then serving as the instrument of the Lord’s appointment of a king in the inauguration of Israelite monarchy described in 1 Samuel 8–12. The first and last chapters of this section contain the most concentrated ideas of monarchy and will receive attention in what follows.

53. The books of Samuel and Kings are identified in the LXX as Kingdoms. I shall use the English nomenclature when referring to these texts.
54. Samuel is part of Noth’s DH, but this thesis and its various presuppositions and corollaries have come under scrutiny; see, e.g., the essays in Cynthia Edenburg and Juha Pakkala, eds., *Is Samuel Among the Deuteronomists? Current Views on the Place of Samuel in a Deuteronomistic History*, AIL 16 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013). For the literary delimitation of these chapters, see Dennis J. McCarthy S. J., “The Inauguration of Monarchy in Israel: A Form-Critical Study of 1 Samuel 8–12,” *Int* 27.4 (1973): 401–4; Lyle M. Eslinger, *Kingship of God in Crisis: A Close Reading of 1 Samuel 1–12*, BLS 10 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1985), 43–53.
55. Saul’s various accessions to kingship in these chapters means that 1 Sam 8–12 has been a focal-point for source-critical studies of the book, presenting scholars with “among the most vexed questions in biblical studies” (Tomoo Ishida, *The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel: A Study on the Formation and Development of Royal-Dynastic Ideology*, BZAW 142)
but the preceding chapter is also significant for understanding the flow of the narrative.

In 1 Samuel 7, we find Samuel acting as judge (δικαστής/δικαζό) in Israel (v. 6c; cf. vv. 15–17). However, Samuel’s involvement in rescuing Israel from the Philistines is limited to interceding for them (vv. 5, 8–9) and offering sacrifices to the Lord (vv. 9–10, 17). While the reader is given one example of the “men of Israel” pursuing and slaughtering the Philistines (v. 11), this only happens following the Lord’s intervention (v. 10). The emphasis in the narrative is thus on the Lord delivering Israel (v. 13; cf. v. 3), while Samuel’s role as leader is portrayed largely in terms of a mediatorial role. Samuel’s faithful performance of this role provides the context for the inauguration of Israel’s monarchy in the following chapter.

The people disapprove of Samuel’s appointment of his sons as judges (1 Sam 8.1–5), since his sons turned aside after gain, took bribes and perverted justice (v. 3). The elders of Israel ask, instead, that Samuel appoint a king to judge (δικαζον) them, like all the other nations (v. 5). While Samuel’s displeasure at this request (v. 6) might result from personal reasons, the request is seen as a rejection of Israel’s god: the Lord says to Samuel, “they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me from being king over them” (v. 7). The full significance of this rejection is made clear towards the end of this passage where the request is repeated in an expanded form: “a king will be over us, and we too will be like all the nations, and our king will judge us and will go out before us and fight our battle.” (1 Sam 8.19b–20). Samuel’s exemplary leadership in 1 Samuel 7 had shown the Israelites that it was the Lord who fought on their behalf. In 1 Samuel 8, their confidence in both Samuel and the Lord has shifted and they now look to a king to be their champion. Not only is the Lord rejected as the people of Israel trust a human king for their deliverance instead of the Lord, but implicit in this rejection is a problematic desire to be like the nations who have a king to lead them in battle (see above, p. 166).

The Lord’s rehearsal in 1 Samuel 8.8 (cf. 10.17–19) of Israel’s unfaithfulness places the nation’s rejection in the context of the covenant established by the Lord with Israel. This connection is made even more explicit in 12.6–11 where the Lord shows faithfulness through the repeated rescue of Israel as he raises up those—including Samuel—who deliver the nation from Israel’s enemies. The Lord’s defeat of Israel’s enemies establishes his rule and is thus closely linked to the theme of the kingship of...
In contrast, the Israelites displays faithlessness by doubting the Lord’s ability or desire to rescue them. The Israelites’ doubt is displayed in their request for a king (12.12).

It is somewhat surprising, in light of Israel’s disobedience and faithlessness, that the Lord agrees to give the people a king (8.9, 22; 12.13). Within the broader Deuteronomistic context, however, it is not unexpected, since Moses had already indicated that such a request would be granted (Deut 17.14-15).

It remains to ask about the purpose of 1 Samuel 8.10–18 within this reading of chapters 8 and 12. In verse 9, Samuel is commanded by God to listen to the people, but to testify to them (διαμαρτυρέω) “and tell them the just claim of the king (τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ βασιλέως) who shall reign over them.” What Samuel describes is the servitude of the elders’ sons and daughters and the king’s demand for a tenth of all they produce. Ronald E. Clements argues that an anti-monarchical source lies behind this passage which “contains some of the sharpest and most incisive criticisms of the institution of kingship which are found in the Old Testament.” Against this view, Robert Polzin points out that these are “the monarchic rights and practices without which no king could effectively govern ... the normal baggage accompanying an ancient royal state.” Seen from this second perspective, the “rights of the king” are neutral, rather than negative, with regard to the question of monarchy in Israel.

In contrast, the final warning in 1 Samuel 8.18—that the Lord will not answer on the day Israel cries out for relief from the king—is indeed negative, as is the fact that Israel refuses to listen to Samuel (v. 19a), even when he speaks the words of the Lord (v. 10). However, the nature of kingship is problematic, rather than monarchy itself, as verses 19b–20 confirm when the people once again ask for a king “like other nations.”

From this survey of 1 Samuel 8 and 12 it becomes evident that the book of Samuel is neither anti- nor pro-monarchical. Dtr situates the origin of Israel’s monarchy in a time of social change and ongoing concern about the nation’s safety from its neighbours. Samuel’s success in leading the nation...
is tempered by the looming threat of the appointment of his corrupt sons as leaders. The representatives (elders) of Israel demand that Samuel appoints a king like the nations to lead them against their enemies. This request is interpreted as a failure to trust the Lord for their deliverance and thus a rejection of the Lord’s covenant with Israel. Nevertheless, following the nation’s repentance, the Lord agrees to the appointment of a king within the context of the renewal of the covenant with Israel. Had the nation requested a ruler like Samuel (1 Sam 7) who trusted in the Lord and modelled faithful behaviour, the confrontation might have been avoided.

This account accords with the major themes of Deuteronomy 17.14–20: (1) the covenant is of primary significance not only for Israel, but also, and especially, for Israel’s king (cf. Deut 17.18–20); (2) Israel’s distinctive nature as the Lord’s chosen nation is illustrated by the fact that the king must not be like those of the nations, since this is seen as a rejection of the covenant; (3) the king and people must trust their god to fight their battles and deliver them from their enemies; (4) the description of the rights of the king circumscribe, albeit in a very limited way, the king’s future actions in a way similar to Deuteronomy 14.16–17; (5) we also note that the elders’ request for a king corresponds to the request for a king in Deuteronomy 17.14, while the Lord’s appointment of Saul through Samuel (1 Sam 9.17; 10.1, 24; 11.15) corresponds to God’s choosing (Deut 17.15).

The tension between Israel and the Lord in 1 Samuel 8 prepares the careful reader for Saul’s problematic reign. The Lord’s faithfulness to the nation is constant, though, and works itself out in the reign of Israel’s greatest king, David, son of Jesse.

**Good King David**

The story of David’s monarchy includes an extensive pre-history which tells how David replaces Saul as king (1 Sam 15–2 Sam 3) before securing his sovereignty over all Israel in the City of David/Zion/Jerusalem (2 Sam 4–9). The rest of the story of his reign (2 Sam 10–1 Kgs 2.12) describes war-time victories, murder, adultery, and palace intrigues that make him one of the more

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68. For which, see J. Randall Short, *The Surprising Election and Confirmation of King David*, HTS 63 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
interesting characters of ancient literature.70 The sheer length of the Davidic narrative suggests his importance in DH, but also makes it difficult to survey Dtr’s portrait of Israel’s great king. And his story lacks a passage in which the nature of his kingship is explored in a concentrated fashion. Fortunately, the book of Kings contains a number of passages in which David’s monarchy is remembered and used as the criterion against which other kings are measured. Before turning to these we examine briefly one of the central passages in the story of David’s reign, 2 Samuel 7.

The significance of this passage for the rest of the Hebrew Bible can be gauged from William Schniedewind’s study of the reception history of 2 Samuel 7.71 The passage is important because of the central role David plays within the history of the Israelite monarchy narrated in Samuel–Kings and it also plays a pivotal role in DH.72 Dennis McCarthy, for example, has shown that the passage contains a number of key Deuteronomistic themes, serving both to sum up what has come before and anticipate what follows.73

The reference to “the day [the Lord] brought up the sons of Israel from Egypt” (2 Sam 7.6) establishes as a context for this prophecy Israel’s broader history and the covenant which establishes Israel as a people. The theme of “rest” (v. 11), now promised to David, echoes the promises made to Israel throughout DH (Deut 3.20; 12.10; Josh 21.44; Judg 3.11; 5.31; 8.28). Both David and the people enjoy this rest because the Lord has destroyed the king’s enemies and made David’s name great, thus providing a place74 in which Israel might be “planted” and where the nation will no longer experience trouble from enemies (vv. 8–11). Given the history that precedes this passage, it might be surprising that David’s success as a military leader is not mentioned (cf. 1 Sam 8). But this serves to emphasize the Lord’s agency in these matters, another significant theme that runs through DH.75

70. “David, in a word, is human, fully, four-dimensionally, recognizably human. He grows, he learns, he travels, he triumphs, and he suffers immeasurable tragedy and loss. He is the first human being in world literature” (Baruch Halpern, David’s Secret Demons: Messiah, Murderer, Traitor, King, The Bible in Its World [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 6). Halpern argues that the book of Samuel presents the reader with pro-David propaganda in the form of a literary creation. Halpern’s portrait offers the reader “a glimpse of David as his enemies saw him.... the anti-David or, by implication, the anti-Messiah” (p. xv). Steven L. McKenzie’s King David: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) reaches similar conclusions about the historical David, reading the biblical narrative as apology. For a critical review of these two works, see Steven Weitzman, “King David’s Spin Doctors,” Prooftexts 23.3 (2003): 365–76. David M. Gunn (The Story of King David: Genre and Interpretation, JSOTSup 6 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1978], 21–26) provides an older survey of works that treat 2 Sam 9–20 as political propaganda. Regardless of the motives that lie behind it, these readings are united in their recognition of the generally positive portrayal of David in the narrative of Samuel and Kings.


72. See, e.g., Firth, I & 2 Samuel, 381 and the bibliography mentioned there.


74. Schniedewind (Society, 36–37) notes a tension between the Deuteronomistic understanding of “place” (место; тόπος; LXX) as the temple where the Lord would dwell, and this passage’s use of “place” for the land. The tension is alleviated by the king’s relationship to both elements.

75. Gerbrant, Kingship, 170.
Although the term “covenant,” does not appear in 2 Sam 7.1–17, the covenantal language that occurs in the passage leads the reader to conclude that this is indeed a covenant established by the Lord with David and his “house.”

“House” (οἶκος) proves to be something of a *Leitwort* in this passage. The initial scene is set in David’s οἶκος ("palace"?) (vv. 1, 2), the building of the οἶκος ("temple") of the Lord is then in view (vv. 5, 6, 7; cf. v. 13), and in vv. 11–12, it is David’s οἶκος ("dynasty") that will be built by the Lord (cf. v. 16). The passage is thus primarily concerned with the Lord’s temple and David’s dynasty.

The Lord’s promise to build David’s house (2 Sam 7.11b) is already hinted at in the promise to make David’s name great (v. 9). The Lord’s activity—this time on behalf of David and his dynasty—is once again at the centre of this passage as the Lord promises to establish the kingdom of David’s offspring (vv. 12–13). The close relationship between Israel’s god and Israel’s king is confirmed through the use of the adoption formula in verse 14a. The legitimacy of the Davidic line is thus firmly established through the divine sanction David’s sons receive. In the narrative that follows, it is this Davidic line, as opposed to the line of Jeroboam and the kings in the northern kingdom, that seems to carry forward the only hope for the Lord’s people. The narrative thus illustrates the unconditional nature of this eternal covenant (vv. 15–16) in which “the Davidic king may be disciplined, but ... not be set aside.”

Although not a central theme in the passage, 2 Samuel 7 raises another royal element: the king as shepherd. The Lord mentions those rulers who were commanded to shepherd his people (7.7; cf. 2 Sam 5.2). This is followed by the observation that David had been a shepherd before he was designated as ruler of Israel (7.8; cf. 1 Sam 16.11; 17.15, 20). Nothing more is said about this metaphor at this point, but it occurs throughout the Jewish Scriptures as an important description of Israel’s ideal leader.

76. Firth, *1 & 2 Samuel*, 380–88; see the reference to this event as the “eternal covenant” (διαθήκη αἰώνιας), in David’s prayer (2 Sam 23.5). Later texts also reflect on the passage in terms of “covenant” (e.g., Pss 89, 132; Isa 55.3).
78. In DH the focus is on the Name of the Lord (e.g., Deut 5.11; 12.11; 14.23; 1 Sam 12.22; 2 Sam 6.2, 18; 7.13, 23), but this promise from the Lord is reminiscent of that made to Abram (Gen 12.2), thus linking the Davidic covenant to the Abrahamic covenant and the larger biblical narrative.
80. As will be indicated below, even though the promises to the Davidic line are extended to Jeroboam and his “house” (1 Kgs 11.37–39), the history of the northern kingdom shows that line to be incorrigibly wicked. The Davidic line does not always fare much better, but the presence of a handful of kings who live up to David’s example are signs of hope in that dynasty. 
83. The metaphor occurs again in 2 Sam 24.17; 1 Chron 21.17. David’s shepherding of Israel is celebrated in Ps 78.70–72 and similar language is used of the future Davidic king (Ezek 34.23; 37.24). Moses had also been a shepherd (Exod 3.1; see Num 27.17) and Israel’s god was understood as a shepherd (Gen 48.15; 49.24; Ps 23.1; 80.1). For the place of this metaphor within the metaphor of God as king, see Brettler, *God is King*, 36–37.
David is held up as the standard against which the Israelite monarchy is subsequently measured. Solomon’s reign seems to start well and he is compared favourably to David (1 Kgs 3.3, 6–7, 14). Solomon asks that the Davidic promises be extended to him (8.25) and the Lord agrees to this, providing Solomon follows David’s example (9.4). In these passages David is described as faithful to the Lord, righteous, upright in heart, as one who walked in the ways of the Lord, obeying the Lord’s statutes and commands. These traits are linked to the promises of 2 Samuel 7. Later, however, the nation is split and ten tribes removed from Solomon’s realm because he did not keep the Lord’s decrees and laws as David did (1 Kgs 11.33 LXX).

As the kingdom starts to tear apart, Jeroboam, presumptive ruler of the northern tribes, is given the opportunity to follow David’s example. At 1 Kgs 11.37–39 Jeroboam is told that he must do what the Lord commands, walk in the Lord’s ways, do what is right in the Lord’s eyes by keeping the Lord’s statutes and commands, just as David did, thus ensuring the Lord’s presence with the king and the longevity of his dynasty. But Jeroboam fails to live up to this standard (14.8–9). From that point on, the kings of Israel, the northern kingdom, who follow Jeroboam are described as wicked (1 Kgs 15.26, 34; 16.19, 25–26, 30; 22.52; 2 Kgs 3.2–3; 13.2, 11; 14.24; 15.9, 18, 24, 28; 17.2) and they are measured against their forebears (often Jeroboam), but never against David.

The theme of David-as-example can be observed in the regnal formulae for the Judahite kings that drive the narrative of 1–2 Kings. Amongst the kings of Judah, some are described simply as doing evil (2 Kgs 21.2), while others are compared to the kings of Israel (2 Kgs 8.18, 27) or to their wicked fathers (2 Kgs 21.20; 23.32, 37; 24.9, 19). Two kings, Abijah (1 Kgs 15.3) and Ahaz (2 Kgs 1.62), are explicitly contrasted with David.

Abijah’s example is instructive because Dtr notes that the king’s dynasty is maintained and Jerusalem kept strong “for David’s sake” (1 Kgs 15.4): “because David did what was right in the sight of the Lord, and did not turn aside from anything that he commanded him all the days of his life, except in the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (15.5). The Lord’s promises to the Davidic dynasty are reaffirmed on the basis of David’s faithfulness to God’s torah, not on the basis of the performance of individual kings. But Dtr is not content to whitewash David’s past. The book of Samuel notes a number of disturbing elements in David’s reign and here in the book of Kings, the reader is reminded of the distasteful way in which David dealt with Uriah (see 2 Sam 11). This is surprising, given David’s exemplary status in the rest of 1–2 Kings, but perhaps it is included to explain why the Davidic dynasty

84. So McKenzie, King David, 188–89, arguing that success of the Davidic apologetic/propaganda in the book of Samuel led to David occupying this significant role in Israel’s history. On the David-theme, see Iain W. Provan, Hezekiah and the Books of Kings: A Contribution to the Debate About the Composition of the Deuteronomistic History, BZAW 172 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), chap. 4, in which Provan teases out both the “comparative” and “promissory” elements of the David-theme.
85. Not only do these passages establish David as an exemplary figure, they also establish a close link between Solomon’s rule and the covenant of 2 Sam 7 (McCarthy, “II Samuel 7,” 134).
86. For a discussion of the characterization of kings achieved through the various judgments describing them, see Robert L. Cohn, “Characterization in Kings,” in The Books of Kings: Sources, Composition, Historiography and Reception, ed. Baruch Halpern and André Lemaire, VTSup 129 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 91–93.
87. The pattern is established during Solomon’s reign; cf. 1 Kgs 11.11–13, 34–36.
experiences such trials despite the Lord’s covenantal promises. Regardless of the shortcomings of Judah’s kings, the Lord’s covenant with David will be honoured and upheld by the Lord. However, the promises of the covenant cannot be used to sanction wickedness.

Finally, a good king of Judah can be described simply as one who “did what was right in the sight of the Lord” (2 Kgs 12.3 LXX) or can be compared positively to his father (1 Kgs 22.43; 2 Kgs 15.3, 34). Amaziah does right in the eyes of the Lord, yet “not like David his father” (2 Kgs 14.3). None of these kings effect the removal of the “high places” (1 Kgs 22.43; 2 Kgs 12.3; 14.4; 15.4, 35) and cannot therefore be compared to David. There are, however, three kings who are compared favourably to David. The first is Asa who “did what was right before the Lord like his father David” (1 Kgs 15.11). Asa banished idolatrous practices (15.12) and deposed his mother, Ana, cutting down and burning the image she had made for the worship of Asherah (15.13). But despite his evident zeal for religious reform, Asa is unable to remove the “high places” (15.14). Nonetheless, since “the heart of Asa was perfect with the Lord all his days” (15.14), his reign is measured positively against the example set by David. Asa’s attempts at religious reform commend him to Dtr who lauds him for it. Unlike the other two kings who are compared to David (see below), the account of Asa’s reign is quite brief (1 Kgs 15.9–24) and does not draw the same sort of attention as their stories do.

The promises in 2 Samuel 7 are remembered as being at the heart of the Lord’s relationship with David and the Davidic line; the ideal king is described primarily in terms of his relationship with Israel’s god. The single most important trait characterizing a good king is “doing right in the eyes of the Lord,” something in which the kings of the northern kingdom fail, as do most of the kings in the southern kingdom, although there are a handful that are described in more positive language, albeit briefly. There are, however, two striking exceptions to this trend.

These two examples of kings of Judah who are compared favourably with David occur in extended passages towards the end of the Kings narrative. They serve to confirm the exemplary nature of David within DH and also highlight the centrality of the covenant in understanding Israel’s ideal monarchy. Before turning to these two kings, one unusual element of David’s kingship needs to be noted.

David is unusual (but not unique) amongst Israel’s kings in being described as physically superior to their subjects. When Saul is introduced into the narrative following Israel’s request for a king, he is described as follows: “tall (τοιούτου), a good man (ἀγαθὸς), and there was not among the sons of Israel better than he; above the shoulder and upward he was taller than all the land” (1 Sam 9.2). Saul is superior to others in the land and his physical appearance confirms this. Saul’s failure suggests that this is an unreliable indicator of ideal kingship.

88. Compare Nathan’s warning/curse in 2 Sam 12.10–11: “Now therefore the sword shall never depart from your house, for you have despised me ... I will raise up trouble against you from within your own house.”
89. Provan, Hezekiah, 94–98, 100–113.
90. The MT has him deposing his grandmother, Maacah.
After Saul’s failure, Samuel is sent to anoint one of Jesse’s sons to be king over Israel (1 Sam 16). When Saul sees Eliab, presumably the eldest son, he assumes this is the one who is to be anointed. But God responds: “Do not look on his appearance or on the posture of his size, because I have rejected him, for God will not look as a mortal will see, for a mortal will see into a face, but God will see into a heart” (1 Sam 16.7). In contrast to his brother—but, more importantly, in contrast to Saul—the youngest son, David, is described as “the smallest” (ὁ µικρός; v. 11). Yet, when he arrives on the scene, the narrator observes: “this one was ruddy with beauty of eyes and was good in appearance to the Lord (πυρράκης µετὰ κάλλους ὄφθαλμον καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὀράσει κυρίῳ). And the Lord said to Samouel [sic], “Rise, and anoint Dauid; for this one is good (οὗτος ἀγαθὸς ἔστιν)” (v. 12). Similarly, when David is first described to Saul, Saul’s attendant says of David: “he knows how to play music, and the man is intelligent (συνετός), and the man is a warrior (πολεµιστής) and prudent with words (σοφός λόγῳ), and a man good in appearance (ἄνηρ ἀγαθὸς τῷ εἶδει), and the Lord is with him” (v. 18). David’s description as an ideal king in these verses is marked by an emphasis on his physical beauty. As was the case with the ideal Hellenistic king, David’s physical appearance is superior to those of his subjects.

The final (potential) king to be described in this way is Absalom (2 Sam 14.25–27). This description comes not when the reader is first introduced to Absalom, but at his return from exile, following Absalom’s murder of his brother in 2 Samuel 13. The description might lead the reader to expect a change of heart in Absalom, perhaps he is to be David’s successor. The seditious events in 2 Samule 15, however, put paid to these ideas.

The portraits of Saul, David, and Absalom are unusual amongst the Jewish kings that would follow. In keeping with the general nature of characterization in the Jewish Scriptures, no other king’s appearance receives the same attention that theirs does. But rather than define ideal kingship in these books, superior physical appearance is indeterminate. While David fulfills the ideal, both Saul and Absalom prove to be failures. The statement in 1 Samuel 16.7 is vindicated: “a mortal will see into

92. This could be a platitude not to judge a person by what is external but by what is internal, although in context, it seems to be a rebuke of the prophet for assuming to know the Lord’s anointed without a word from the Lord (cf. 1 Sam 16.3); so Peter D. Miscall, 1 Samuel: A Literary Reading, ISBL (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 116–17. But these two readings are not opposed to one another, as illustrated by the comments in Bodner, 1 Samuel, 169–70.

93. This could be speaking of David’s age, but it is most likely an allusion to his height, which stands in contrast to that of Saul (1 Sam 9.2; cf. 17.38–39); see McKenzie, King David, 64–65, who finds other allusions to David’s short stature elsewhere in Samuel–Kings.

94. Bodner (1 Samuel, 171) observes the “inscrutability of the divine ways” at this point in the narrative: Samuel has been told not to judge by outward appearances, and yet here is one whose outward appearance is described in glowing terms.

95. McKenzie (King David, 51–67) shows how these attributes summarize aspects of David’s kingship from his anointing (1 Sam 16) until his death (2 Kgs 2).

96. Robert Alter notes about characterization in the Jewish Scriptures that, in general, “we are given only the barest hints about the physical appearance ... of the characters” (The Art of Biblical Narrative [New York: Basic Books, 1981], 114). On characterization, see Alter, Biblical Narrative, 114–30; Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative, Bible and Literature Series 9 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983), 23–42; Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 321–41.
a face, but God will see into a heart.”  

There are, however, other exemplary aspects of kingship which does attract the attention of the narrator.

**The Good King as Religious Reformer**

Both Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.1–20.21) and Josiah (2 Kgs 22.1–23.30) are held up as “models of godliness” and ideal kings. They are not the only kings who are praised by Dtr, but their reigns are portrayed as exemplary. While Joash (2 Kgs 12.2) is praised for doing right in the eyes of the Lord, and other kings of Judah are praised for doing right like their fathers did (e.g., Jehoshaphat [1 Kgs 22.43], Azariah [2 Kgs 15.3]), only Asa (1 Kgs 15.11), Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.3), and Josiah (2 Kgs 22.2) are praised for following the example of their “father” David. Given the exemplary nature of David (see above), these commendations draw the reader’s attention to the special place Hezekiah and Josiah occupy in the book of Kings. They serve as examples of kings who manage to do what David did.

Hezekiah’s praise is linked to the removal of the “high places,” the groves, and Neesthan, Moses’ bronze snake (2 Kgs 18.4; cf. v. 22). When Asa had attempted to reform Judah’s cult, he had failed to remove the high places. Similarly, none of Hezekiah’s predecessors had attempted to remove the bronze snake. Hezekiah has clearly distinguished himself by going beyond the cultic reforms of all those who had come before him. Special attention is drawn to the fact that he “hoped (ηπισεν) in the Lord God of Israel” (18.5) and displays this by following the Lord and keeping the commandments given to Moses (18.6).

However, the character of Hezekiah is not perfect. In 2 Kings 18.9–16 he strips the temple of its treasure in order to pay tribute to the king of Assyria. This flaw is remedied in the following narrative (18.17–19.37) in which Hezekiah turns to the Lord and is shown to trust him for Jerusalem’s deliverance. As David Janzen argues, “the incomparability of Hezekiah’s eventual trust rewrites his history so that, in his evaluation, it appears as if he had never sinned at all.” This theme is meant to

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97. As Sternberg puts it, “the relations between surface and depth in character still resist univocal (unitypal, unmetonymic) fixture” (*Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, 362).
99. David Janzen, “The Sins of Josiah and Hezekiah: A Synchronic Reading of the Final Chapters of Kings,” *JSOT* 37.3 (2013): 349–70 argues that 2 Kgs 18–25 presents Hezekiah and Josiah as examples for Jehoiachin to imitate. This idealized view is argued for by Noth, for whom Josiah’s reign is characterized “as an episode which does no more than show how things should have been done all along ... what should have been the case but was not” (*Deuteronomistic History*, 73–74, 80); see also Phil J. Botha, “‘No King Like Him.’ Royal Etiquette According to the Deuteronomistic Historian,” in *Past, Present, Future: The Deuteronomistic History and the Prophets*, ed. Johannes C. de Moor and Harry F. van Rooy, OtSt 44 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 36–49, who reaches the same conclusion using a social-scientific approach.
100. See Provan, *Hezekiah*, 57–90.
101. The extended descriptions of Hezekiah’s reforms at 2 Chron 29–31 stand in contrast to the rather brief mention in 2 Kings 18.4.
102. Although arguments from silence are tenuous, Dtr’s observation that “until those days the sons of Israel had been making incense offerings to it” (2 Kgs 18.4) seems to emphasize Hezekiah’s unique action with regard to the idol.
103. See Janzen, “Josiah and Hezekiah,” 357–59. The summary descriptions of Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.5–7) and Josiah (2 Kgs 23.25) might be compared to the description of Saul as the “anti-king” in 1 Sam 13.13–14.
104. See, e.g., the conclusion of Hezekiah’s prayer (2 Kgs 19.19) which is answered positively by the Lord through Isaiah (19.20–34). The promise-to-David theme occurs at the conclusion of this prophecy (19.34).
encourage Jehoiachin with regard to the potential deliverance of Judah. It should also instruct Jehoiachin (and others who read it) about the trust that a good king should exhibit.

A similar situation pertains to Josiah who is implicitly critiqued through the writer’s recollection of the fact that Josiah reigned for seventeen years before he undertook his reforms (2 Kgs 22.3). Nevertheless, Josiah’s repentance and the reforms he institutes lead to the erasure of all that had come before. The Lord’s forgiveness is demonstrated by the prophetess’ pronouncement that Josiah will be buried in peace and that he will not witness the disaster that will befall Jerusalem (22.20).

The reforms that lead to this blessing are occasioned by the discovery in the temple of the book of the Law (βιβλίον τοῦ νόμου) by Hilkiah the high priest (22.3–10). Josiah acts as a result of this book being read to him. He gathers the nation’s leadership and its people and “he read in their hearing all the words of the book of the covenant (τοῦ βιβλίου τῆς διαθήκης) that had been found in the Lord’s house” (23.2), following which the king and the people renew the covenant with the Lord (23.3). The sincerity of this covenant renewal is shown in the cultic reforms that follow (22.4–24). The writer concludes by once again praising Josiah:

Before him there was no king like him, who turned to the Lord with his whole heart and with his whole soul and with his whole strength, according to all the law of Moyses, and after him none arose like him. (2 Kgs 23.25)

The two main themes in the account of Josiah are the king’s allegiance to the covenant that exists between the Lord and his people, and the centrality of the book/law of Moses that describes the nature and terms of that covenant.

It is possible to conclude on the basis of the accounts of these two kings that the ideal king is characterized by trust in the Lord and obedience to his covenant and its stipulations as described in the book of the Law. These two kings are thus portrayed in a manner meant to exemplify the central criteria of Deuteronomy 17.14–20.

Psalms

From the opening promises of the Lord to his anointed king (Ps 2), to the repeated refrain of “The Lord became king (ὀ κύριος ἐβασιλεύσεν)” in Psalm 92.1; 95.10; 96.1; 98.1 LXX and the


107. The possibility of restoration following exile is held out in Solomon’s prayer (1 Kgs 8.46–51) as it is in Deuteronomy 30 (J. Gordon McConville, “Narrative and Meaning in the Books of Kings,” Bib 70.1 [1989]: 47–48). The question of whether Kings ends with hope or despair remains a crux interpretum within DH scholarship.

108. Botha, “‘No King Like Him. . .’,” 48–49. For Marvin A. Sweeney (King Josiah of Judah: The Lost Messiah of Israel [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 168–69, 176–77), only Josiah meets the requirements of Deut 17.14–20. There are elements of Josiah’s actions that do not adhere to the stipulations found in the broader context of Deuteronomy 16–18 (see, e.g., Ronald E. Clements, “A Dialogue with Gordon McConville on Deuteronomy: I. The Origins of Deuteronomy: What Are the Clues?” SJT 56.4 [2003]: 515–16). However, the most significant elements of Deuteronomy’s “Law of the King” are mirrored in the narratives at the end of Kings.

109. When quoting from the LXX, or when the LXX diverges significantly from the MT, I use the LXX versification so that this passage might be consulted in the LXX. When referring to a psalm, as in the first part of this sentence, I use the versification found in English translations.
celebration of the Lord’s kingship in the concluding psalms of praise (see, e.g., Ps 145.1; 146.10; 149.2), kingship is a significant theme in the book of Psalms.\textsuperscript{110}

In his survey of Psalms scholarship, David Clines observes that, “of Psalm study in general since 1955 it may fairly be said that the work of Gunkel and the early Mowinckel has to a very large extent provided its framework and presuppositions.”\textsuperscript{111} Gunkel identified a group of psalms that focused on Israel’s king. These he identified as “royal psalms” on the basis of their content rather than their form.\textsuperscript{112} Mowinckel accepted this group (with one or two adjustments) and argued that these psalms represented real Israelite and Judahite kings who were understood as representatives of their community.\textsuperscript{113} Nowhere was this representation more important than in the nation’s annual religious festivals, including an annual enthronement ceremony.\textsuperscript{114}

The Gunkel-Mowinckel approach to the Psalms has been given further nuance by more recent scholars. John Eaton argues that Gunkel has not gone far enough in identifying royal psalms and adds a further fifty-four psalms to Gunkel’s collection by attributing a number of the “anonymous-I” psalms to a royal figure.\textsuperscript{115} Eaton’s collection of kingship psalms might be a bit too large; Stephen Croft, while still in general agreement with Eaton, suggests that the speakers of these anonymous psalms might include cultic ministers and private individuals.\textsuperscript{116} In these more recent studies, nevertheless, the king remains a central figure, as he did in the work of Gunkel and Mowinckel.

Since the mid-1980s there has been a growing appreciation for, and study of, the book of Psalms as a unity.\textsuperscript{117} Gerald H. Wilson is a significant voice amongst those advocating this approach to


\textsuperscript{111} According to James L. Mays, in the Psalter, the kingship of the Lord “is the comprehensive theological metaphor” (Psalms, Interpretation [Louisville: John Knox, 1994], 48).


\textsuperscript{116} Steven J. L. Croft, The Identity of the Individual in the Psalms, JSOTSup 44 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987).

studying the Psalter. Wilson argues that the first three books of the collection (Pss 1–89) explain the story of the rise and fall of Davidic kingship, while Books 4 and 5 (Pss 90–150) point to the future in which the Lord will exercise his divine kingship. Wilson’s book concludes as follows: “YHWH is eternal king, only he is ultimately worthy of trust. Human ‘princes’ will wither and fade like the grass, but the steadfast love of YHWH endures for ever.” Wilson’s thesis that Davidic kingship diminishes into insignificance towards the end of the collection and that there are consequently no messianic elements in Books 4 and 5 has been challenged. Regardless of whether one follows Wilson at this point, the centrality of the theme of kingship when the book of Psalms is viewed as a unity is evident.

Which Psalms To Study?

In this section I will analyze the following “royal psalms” in order to determine the portrait of kingship that emerges from them: 2, 18, 20, 21, 45, 72, 89, 101, 110, 132, 144. This group represents Gunkel’s “royal psalms” which have been adopted as such by a number of other scholars. They suit the methodological criterion of texts that focus largely, even if not exclusively, on kings and kingship. Gunkel himself had identified this group on the basis of “the fact that they are concerned entirely with kingship.” But does the portrait that emerges represent ideal kingship?

While it might seem strange to speak of “ideal kingship” in the context of a larger collection of texts in which the king is at times shown in a negative light, the inclusion of these elements serve either to highlight the nature of the king’s relationship with the Lord (dependence, repentance) or reflect historical incidents. Eaton thus speaks of the Psalms’ portrait of the king as “an ideal, though


119. Wilson, Editing, 228.


121. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 99–120. Gunkel included only parts of Pss 89 (vv. 46–51) and 144 (vv. 1–11), but I shall view the whole psalm as a royal psalm (see Eaton, Kingship, 56–57).

122. For a survey of the scholarship on the royal psalms, see Scott R. A. Starbuck, Court Oracles in the Psalms: The So-Called Royal Psalms in Their Ancient Near Eastern Context, SBLDS 172 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999), 19–66. Starbuck note that the psalm’s in Gunkel’s group “are treated as royal by almost every modern commentator” (p. 66 n. 202). Divergences from this group are usually minor; for example, Mowinckel excludes Ps 144 but adds Pss 28, 61, 63 (Psalms, 47). Rowe’s study includes Ps 118 as well as 2 Sam 23.1–7 (God’s Kingdom and God’s Son: The Background in Mark’s Christology from Concepts of Kingship in the Psalms, AGJU 50 [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 31–59). Gottwald ignores Pss 101, 132 but includes Ps 146 (“Kingship in the Book of Psalms,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Psalms; William P. Brown [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 437–44).

123. The significance of these royal psalms is elevated since they also serve as strategic markers when the editorial activity within the Psalter is considered; see Gerald Henry Wilson, “The Use of Royal Psalms at the ‘Seams’ of the Hebrew Psalter,” JSOT 35 (1986): 85–94 and Jinkyu Kim, “The Strategic Arrangement of Royal Psalms in Books IV–V,” WTJ 70 (2008): 143–57.

124. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 99, original emphasis; see Mowinckel, Psalms, 47; Gottwald, “Kingship,” 437.
intersecting with actual experience.”125 But even the historical incidents found in the psalms have been chosen and recounted in such a way as to contribute to the portrait of the ideal king.

Following a study in which the royal psalms are compared to royal psalms, hymns, and prayers from the ancient Near East, Scott Starbuck concludes that the absence of specific royal names in the Israelite psalms indicates that they have been recontextualized to speak of kingship more generally.126

The [royal psalms] are psalms whose concern is the institution of Israelite kingship. Their protagonist is an unspecified king; hence he is a typological representative of the “office” of the institution.127

It is this “typological representative” that we consider to be the ideal king of the final redaction of the Psalms.

In the remainder of this section I will present a synchronic view of the royal psalms in which the most significant elements of kingship are gathered together within the following heuristic categories: the king as he stands in relation to (1) the Lord; (2) the people of Israel; and (3) the nations.128 To limit the length of this section, detailed exegesis of each passage is not described.129

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126. Starbuck, Court Oracles.

127. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 102, 104, 204, 206.

128. Eaton, Kingship, 135–97 presents 27 categories in his description of the ideal king. While the precision of these categories is helpful, the presentation is perhaps too diffuse for our purposes. Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 50–57 summarizes his own analysis of Davidic kingship under the headings of the king’s relation to the Lord, the people, and the cult. Gottwald, “Kingship” employs three different categories: the king as military leader, the king as securing peace and justice in Israel, and the bond between the Lord and the king.

129. In addition to the standard commentaries, the following provide focused discussion of the royal psalms: Eaton, Kingship, 111–29; Starbuck, Court Oracles, 113–19, 123–68; Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 37–50; see also Hans-Joachim Kraus, Theology of the Psalms, trans. Keith Crim (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986), 107–23.


131. The figure in Ps 1 is described as “blessed, happy” because of their concern for God’s law. This concern for the king’s faithfulness to the law is seen especially in relationship to the Davidic covenant (Ps 89.30; cf. 2 Sam 7), but also more generally (Ps 18.20–22). Grant has argued that within its canonical context, the combination of Pss 1 and 2 expresses a Deuteronomic theory of kingship (King as Exemplar, 65–70).

132. I will refer throughout to the English psalm and verse numbering system, which differs slightly from that found in the Hebrew Bible and the Septuagint. These incongruities arise, in part, because English translations do not assign a verse number to the superscriptions. For the significance of these titles in the interpretation of the Psalter, see Brevard S. Childs, “Psalms Titles and Midrashic Exegesis,” JSS 16.2 (1971): 137–50; Elieser Slomovic, “Toward an Understanding of the Formation of Historical Titles in the Book of Psalms,” ZAW’91 (1979): 350–80.
In one instance (105.15) the plural is used to refer to the prophets (cf. 1 Chron. 16.22; 1 Kgs. 19.16; Sir. 48.8), but in all the other cases reference is made to a single figure who is associated with Israel’s god—he is consistently referred to as “the Lord’s anointed one” or, when the Lord is being addressed, “your anointed one.” A number of instances make it clear that the anointed one is a king (2.2, cf. 2.6; 20.6, cf. 20.9) and, more specifically, a Davidic king (132.10, 17).\(^{133}\)

The anointing of the king was a sign that he has been chosen by the Lord.\(^{134}\) In Psalm 2 the king exclaims, “I was established king by him, on Sion, his holy mountain” (2.6).\(^{135}\) The theme of choice is made explicit in Psalm 89.3 where “Dauid my slave” stands parallel to “my chosen ones” (τοῖς ἐκλεκτοῖς μου; 88.4 LXX; cf. 78.70). The fact that the king is the Lord’s chosen ruler, anointed by him for the task, places him in a special relationship which is characterized in filial terms in Psalm 2.\(^{136}\)

Son. In Psalm 2.7 the king repeats a decree (πρόστασιμον) of the Lord: “My son you are; today I have begotten (γεγέννηκα) you.” While some identify traces of divine kingship in this decree,\(^{137}\) it seems more likely that the language refers to the Lord’s acceptance of this particular Davidic king as the Lord’s chosen ruler. Although Egyptian court ideology might provide the form and language at this point,\(^{138}\) the content of this imagery should probably be understood in terms of Israel’s adoption as the Lord’s first-born child (Exod 4.22–23; cf. Ps 89.27).\(^{139}\) Just as the covenant promises and obligations brought the relationship between the Lord and Israel into being, so the covenant with David and those

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133. In addition to kings, priests and prophets were also anointed; see Mark J. Boda, “Figuring the Future: The Prophets and Messiah,” in The Messiah in the Old and New Testaments, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 38–39 and references there. Lisbeth S. Fried distinguishes other anointed figures from “the Lord’s anointed one,” who is always a royal figure around whom a royal theology is constructed, influenced not least of all, by Psalm 2 (“Cyrus the Messiah? The Historical Background to Isaiah 45:1,” Harvard Theological Review 95.4 (2002): 379–83). For the argument that only kings were anointed before the exile and that it was only following the demise of the monarchy that others were anointed, see Roland de Vaux O.P., Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 2nd ed., trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 104–6. John Day reconstructs the place of anointing within the coronation ritual (“Some Aspects of the Monarchy in Ancient Israel,” in New Perspectives on Old Testament Prophecy and History: Essays in Honour of Hans M. Barstad, ed. Rannfrid I. Thelle, Terje Stordalen, and Mervyn E. J. Richardson, VTSup 168 [Leiden: Brill, 2015], 161–63).

134. The centrality of the Lord’s choice has already been discussed in relation to Deuteronomy 17.14–20 where it was noted that the people’s request for and/or choice of a king did not necessarily negate or diminish the Lord’s choice (cf. 1 Sam 10.1, 24; 12.13 [Saul]; 16.12–13; 2 Sam 6.21; 7.8 [David]). The machinations behind Solomon’s accession to the throne do not stop Adonijah from recognizing that Solomon received his sovereignty from the Lord (1 Kgs 2.15).

135. In the MT it is God who announces his establishment of the anointed one.

136. So Mays, Psalms, 47: “The basic assertion [of Psalm 2] is that the king’s installation is a divine act.” Roland de Vaux observes that this aspect of royal ideology is universal in the ancient Near East (Ancient Israel, 100–101).

137. For a recent examination of the divinity of the Israelite king, see Adela Yarbro Collins and John Joseph Collins, King and Messiah as Son of God: Divine, Human, and Angelic Messianic Figures in Biblical and Related Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 1–24. Egyptian parallels are often adduced (see, e.g., Grad Granerød, “A Forgotten Reference to Divine Procreation? Psalm 2:6 in Light of Egyptian Royal Ideology,” VT 60 [2010]: 323–36), while Mowinckel, Psalms, 62 points to parallels between the king’s recitation of the Lord’s decree (Ps 2.7) and the reading of the god’s decree in the Egyptian enthronement ritual. But Grant, King as Exemplar, 63, suggests this act in Ps 2.7 might refer to the reading of Deuteronomy or a pre-canonical version of the work as required by the Law of the King in Deut 17. For a brief survey of the primary objections to the presence of divine kingship in the Psalms, see Clines, “Psalms and the King,” 690–93; Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 52.


who would follow in his dynasty (2 Sam 7) establishes a close relationship between the Lord and this royal line. Similar sonship language is thus used in the covenant (2 Sam 7.14) and in texts related to it (Pss 2, 89) to express this close relationship which arises out of the Lord’s choice of the king.

It should also be noted that in its immediate context, this filial language stresses the exalted nature of Israel’s king and his relationship with the Lord in contrast to the kings of the surrounding nations who, presumably, cannot call themselves “sons of the Lord.”

Neither “son of the Lord” nor “son of God” appears in Psalm 110, but the language of the psalm—especially Psalm 110.3—is considered by some scholars to contribute to the theme of divine sonship. However, this passage’s meaning is by no means clear. The Septuagint translator struggled with the meaning of the verse and introduced the “Morning Star.” More recently, the NRSV translates Ps 110.3b as follows: “From the womb of the morning, like dew, your youth will come to you,” and includes an alternative reading of the second colon: “the dew of your youth will come to you.” In contrast, Yarbro Collins and Collins offer the following translation by re-pointing the Masoretic text: “In sacred splendor, from the womb, from dawn, you have the dew wherewith I have begotten you.” For Dahood, this colon speaks of the Lord’s youth given to the Lord’s followers. Starbuck’s exasperation in attempting to understand this passage is tangible: “as v. 3e [sic] presently stands in the MT it is nonsensical,” and he resorts to arguing that the text is corrupt. The “dew” language—the crux interpretum with regard to the nature of kingship in this passage—is thus notoriously difficult to interpret. Based on this and other puzzles in Psalm 110, it seems unwise to conclude that it provides decisive evidence for divine kingship in ancient Israel.

Even though it does not contain “son of god” language, Psalm 45 is sometimes adduced for divine kingship. At first glance, Psalm 45.6 seems to address the king as “god,” but the psalm is a wedding song that necessarily indulges in exaggeration. Verse 2, for example, asserts that the king is “the most handsome of men” and verse 16 predicts that the king shall have many sons who will be “princes in all the earth.” According to Hans-Joachim Kraus, the Hebrew term אלפים אלים is therefore “not a reliable indication of apotheosis, but a bold stroke of the court style in praise of the ‘divine.’” It is also

140. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 165.
141. See, e.g., Yarbro Collins and Collins, King and Messiah, 15–19, and Eaton, Kingship, 147, who also attempts to link the imagery to the king’s anointing and/or baptism (p. 124). On the dating of Psalm 110, see the summary by Day, “Aspects of Monarchy,” 163–64.
145. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 149.
146. Kraus, Theology, 110.
possible to read verse 6 as referring to the king’s god, in which case we are certainly not dealing with any sense of divine kingship.

Despite the suggestive language of Psalms 2, 45, and 110, there is no unequivocal evidence that the king in the royal psalms is considered divine. It is likely that Israel’s tradition at this point has been influenced by the language found in its neighbours’ courts, but this language has been “demythologized” and incorporated into the theology of divine choice. The king’s exalted status as the supreme individual within Israel results from his being chose as the Lord’s son, a decision indicated through anointing, but which nevertheless does not exalt him to super-human status. The king’s feet of clay, his all-too-human weaknesses are evident in Psalm 89 in relation to the covenant which inaugurated Davidic kingship.

Covenant. References to the Davidic covenant (2 Sam 7) are explicit in Psalm 89 (see vv. 3–4, 28–37). Knut Heim identifies Psalm 89.19–37 as “a poetic expansion of Nathan’s oracle.” The theme of the king’s sonship (vv. 26–27) appears right before mention of the covenant in v. 28, thus further confirming the link between these ideas (cf. 2 Sam 7.14). As the king cries out to the Lord, “My Father you are my God and supporter of my deliverance!” (Ps 89.26 = 88.27 LXX), the Lord identifies the king as “firstborn (πρωτότοκος), high among the kings of the earth” (88.28 LXX). The covenant between the Lord and David establishes a special bond between Israel’s god and those chosen by the Lord who would follow after David as Israel’s rulers. This bond is described in terms of the relationship between father and son.

This bond makes the latter half of the psalm (89.38–51) all the more shocking. The psalmist laments the fact that the Lord has renounced the covenant with the Lord’s servant (v. 39), a covenant that was meant to be inviolate and permanent (vv. 33–37). Most shocking of all, it is the Lord who is portrayed as fighting against the king (v. 40), it is the Lord who permits the king’s enemies to prosper (vv. 41–42), and it is the Lord who removes the sceptre from the king’s hand and destroys his throne (v. 44). The nadir of the lament is reached in the final stanza: “Lord, where are your mercies (τα ελέην) of long ago, which you swore to Daid by your truth?” (v. 49 = 88.50 LXX; cf. 18.50; 21.7).


149. It is striking, as Kraus notes (Theology, 109–10), that one way or another, what is said of the king in the Psalms always involves the name of David.

150. Knut M. Heim, “The (God-)Forsaken King of Psalm 89: A Historical and Intertextual Enquiry,” in King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, LHBOTS 270 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 297. Heim notes that in its canonical context the vision of v. 19 must refer to the words of God spoken to Nathan the night before the promises were given to David (cf. 2 Sam 7.4).

151. For a different reading of the Hebrew at this point, see Mitchell Dahood S. J., Psalms II: 51–100: Introduction, Translation, and Notes, AB 17 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 310, 319. The main point remains, however: the Lord has turned against the king in battle and now fights on behalf of the king’s foes.
The Lord’s covenant and promise are also on view in Psalm 132 where the tension between its unconditional and contingent nature becomes evident. On the one hand, “the Lord swore to David the truth, and he will never annul it” (131.11 LXX), but the Lord states that David’s sons will only be given David’s throne if they keep the Lord’s covenant and decrees (v. 12). The concluding promise, that the Lord will establish a Davidic ruler within the temple/Zion (v. 17), confirms the unconditional nature of the covenant without indicating any sanctions for disobedience. The possibility that the Lord would discipline his “son” is in view in 2 Samuel 7.14–15, but with the reassurance that such discipline would only be temporary. Although this disciplining element is not explicit in Psalm 89, there are hints that the Lord’s renunciation of the covenant is not final.

Knut Heim argues that the tension between the Lord’s eternal promises and the dire situation accounted by the psalmist gives Psalm 89 an “open-ended” feeling: there is “the defiant hope that the divine promise as expressed in Nathan’s oracle is still valid.” The postscript—“Blessed be the Lord forever. May it be; may it be.” (88.53 LXX)—makes this hope clear and, in the context of the psalm, looks to the Lord to raise up a Davidic king in order to display his love and faithfulness. The bond between the Lord and the king, expressed in Psalm 89 in terms of the Davidic covenant, is the basis of this hope.

Psalm 89 concludes the third book of the Psalter. The opening of the collection starts off well (Ps 2), but ends badly (Ps 89), suggesting a trajectory through Books I–III that traces the decline of Davidic kingship. The final verse was most likely appended to the psalm not only as a conclusion to Book III, but to Books I–III. The verse asserts hope not only that the Lord will answer the prayer to “remember” (89.47), but also that the trajectory of Books I–III would be reversed.

Servant. The royal person in Psalm 89 combines the figure of the Lord’s servant with that of David and the anointed one: “I found David my slave (τὸν δούλον); with my holy oil I anointed him” (Ps 88.21 LXX). “Servant” is clearly a relational rather than functional description, expressing intimacy, trust, and authority. The designation for David comes from 2 Samuel 7 where it occurs throughout. As in that passage, the Lord’s covenant is made with the Lord’s servant, David (Ps 89.3). In the superscription to Psalm 18 (παῖς) and at Psalm 144.10 (δούλος), the designation is used of David to speak of the Lord’s rescue of the king. It is, however, also the servant (δούλος) who is taunted (Ps 89.50) and with whom the covenant is broken (Ps 89.39). The servant is thus both “humble and highly privileged.”

152. Heim, “Psalm 89,” 303.
156. Wilson, “Seams” argues that the placement of Ps 89 at the end of Books I–III points to Israel’s hope in the Lord as king, expressed in Books IV–V; the covenant with David, however, has failed (p. 90).
158. In Ps 89.50, עבדיך is understood as a “plural of majesty” (Dahood, Psalms II, 320). The plural has been translated
The King as Vice-Regent. God’s kingship forms a significant theme within the Psalter and the presence of Israel’s king in the royal psalms does not diminish this in any way. A hymn embedded within Psalm 89 (vv. 5–18) praises the Lord’s kingship. In the final verse, Israel’s defence/support (ἀντίληψις) is “the Lord and the Holy One of Israel, our king” (my translation). The king plays an instrumental role in the Lord’s support of his people. When the king fulfils a function that the Lord fulfils, this does not diminish the Lord’s rule in any way. The Lord thus appoints Israel’s king as a vice-regent (2.6; 110.1, 5) to rule the Lord’s people and to fight against the Lord’s enemies. In the words of James Mays, the kingship of David “actualizes in the world what is reality in heaven. David’s kingship is the agency through which the LORD’s rule is extended from heaven to earth, and his dominion over cosmic chaos expanded over historical confusion.”

One of the corollaries of this appointment is that there is a correspondence between the dominion of the Lord as king in heaven and the earthly reign of the Lord’s anointed king. The Lord sits in the heavens (Ps 2.4) while he has enthroned the king on Zion (2.6). This correspondence is understood not as identical or equal, but as reflective. In Psalm 89, for example, the characteristics of the Lord found in vv. 1–18 are echoed in the description of the Davidic king in vv. 19–37. Both are portrayed as powerful, David will rule over the sea and rivers (v. 25) as the Lord rules over the chaotic waters (v. 9). The Lord’s righteousness and justice (89.14) elsewhere characterize the king (101.1). And while the king is the most high of the earthly kings (ὑψηλὸν παρὰ τοῖς βασιλείσσον τῆς γῆς; 88.28 LXX), the Lord is the Most High (ὑψιστός; 9.3 LXX; ὁ ὑψιστός; 17.14 LXX). Not only does the glory (δόξα) and majesty (μεγαλοπρέπεια) in which the king participates comes from God (20.6 LXX), it is more properly ascribed to God (μεγαλοπρέπεια: 95.6 LXX; 110.3 LXX; δόξα: 23.10 LXX; 28.1–2 LXX).

We noted in Chapter 3 that the appearance of Hellenistic kings played an important role in their kingship. There were hints of this idea in the portrait of David (see p. 178), but the Psalms are generally silent about the visage of the king. Psalm 45.2–3 is the one exception. Not surprisingly, given that this is a wedding song, the king is portrayed as “youthful in beauty ... beyond the sons of men” (ὅφρας κάλλει παρὰ τοὺς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων) and as one who is “powerful ... in [his] bloom and beauty” (δυνατε, τῇ ωραίοτετί σου καὶ τῷ κάλλει σου; 44.3–4 LXX). The king is frequently described in terms of his character (righteous, blameless, law-keeping) and his relationship with God, but his physical appearance is unimportant to the psalmist.

In conclusion, James Mays argues that the royal psalms are primarily about the relationship between God and Israel’s king: “[They are] confessional, formulaic, poetic, and ideal ... [transcending] as such in the Greek Psalms.

159. Eaton, Kingship, 150; cf. Kraus, Theology, 122–23. In this the servant is similar to the servant of Deutero-Isaiah.


162. Eaton, Kingship, 142–46 considers a number of additional ways in which the king is drawn into the Lord’s aura.

163. Theodotion describes the king of Psalm 45 in terms of his ἡγείμνον, “beauty” or “majesty” and uses the same word to speak of “the beauty of the holy one” (Ps 109.3); see William Horbury, Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ (London: SCM, 1998), 97, who also notes that this language is used in Pss. Sol. 17 and 18.
human existence and human history.”

In the Psalms, the reader encounters the one who stands in the line of David as God’s son, servant, and vice-regent. The king receives these designations on the basis of the eternal covenant established between the Lord and the Davidic line. The promises of the Lord form the basis of this close bond between God and king.

Israel’s People and Their King

Psalm 101, according to Martin Luther, represents “David’s mirror of a monarch.” In this psalm, the king sings of the Lord’s “mercy” (ἐλεος) and “justice” (κρις) (Ps 100.1 LXX), while claiming to be blameless before the Lord (vv. 2–3, 6 LXX) and confessing that “a crooked heart did not cling to me” (v. 4 LXX). These traits are displayed in the way he rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked in his kingdom (vv. 5–8). Elsewhere the psalmist prays for the king to be characterized by righteousness and justice (Ps 72.2), and that he would benefit the poor, needy, and oppressed (72.4, 12–14). The psalmist’s concern is that the king ensures that the weak and marginalized within society are treated equitably. Just rule is thus seen as an essential characteristic of the Lord’s chosen king.

Ultimately, though, the psalmist recognizes that it is the Lord whose throne is established on righteousness and justice (89.14) and that the Lord provides for the poor and needy (132.15). Psalm 82 portrays the Lord condemning other gods for their injustice which they display by favouring the wicked instead of the weak. Protection of the weak is thus recognized as the will of the Lord, and in so far as the king exhibits these qualities, he is imitating the Lord and embodying the Lord’s reign. It is the Lord’s justice and righteousness that empower the king to be just and righteous (72.1).

The righteous king who imitates the Lord in this way can expect to live a long life (72.5; 21.4), a gift from the Lord which is closely linked to the prosperity of the people (72.3, 6, 15–16). The blessings of the righteous king and his people thus coincide (144.12–15). The king’s life, based upon his righteousness within the covenant (18.20–30) is seen to bring life to the people.

“The king is ipso facto a saviour,” according to Roland de Vaux. While the king often plays this role in a military context, the king’s actions on behalf of the needy and the prosperity that result from his righteous reign justly make him the saviour of Israel in Psalm 72.3–4, 12–14. Outside of Psalm 72, the psalmist avoids using this language with reference to the king, suggesting that the emphasis must fall on the Lord as saviour. It is God who saves both the king (18.3; 20.9) and God’s people (28.9; 80.3, 7).

164. Mays, Psalms, 46.
170. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 110.
171. So Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 55.
What cultic roles do the Psalms ascribe to the king? We have seen there is a sense in which the king is the Lord’s representative leader of Israel, but is there any indication that the king represented the people before the Lord? We have noted that the Deuteronomistic History seem ambivalent at this point. While Deuteronomy 16–18 separates the priestly from the royal functions (cf. 1 Sam 13.8–15), 2 Samuel 6.16–19 has David offering priestly sacrifices and blessings. This last incident, the ark’s arrival in Jerusalem, is recalled in Psalm 132. If the psalms are read as derived from the king’s enthronement ceremony and other rituals, then it follows that the king occupies an important place in the life of the nation’s cult. Psalm 132, for example, would suggest a regular ceremony re-enacting the events of 2 Samuel 6 in which the king plays a central role.

Psalm 110 is perhaps the most striking psalm with regards to the king’s cultic role. In this psalm, the Lord appoints the king as “priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedek” (109.4 LXX). The murky figure of Melchizedek is mentioned explicitly in the Jewish Scriptures only here and in Genesis 14.18–20. The difficulties in this verse have led some to remove Melchizedek altogether. Joseph Fitzmyer’s conclusion that the so-called “Melchizedek scroll” found at Qumran (11QMelch=11Q13) was not influenced by Psalm 110 would seem to support this conclusion. This conclusion is contested by David Mitchell who does find the influence of Psalm 110 in the Melchizedek scroll. Further supporting Melchizedek’s presence is that fact that at least one other early interpreter of the psalm, the Septuagint translator, understood the psalm to be talking about Melchizedek.

The psalmist’s use of Melchizedek seems to be inspired by the fact that Melchizedek is at once both “king of Salem” and “priest of God Most High” (Gen 14.18). Melchizedek would therefore seem to be an ideal typological candidate if the psalmist was attempting to unite the offices of priest and king in one person.

When combined with Psalm 20.3 in which the king is seen offering sacrifices, Psalm 110 offers the strongest evidence that the Lord’s chosen king also functioned as a priest. However, Hans-Joachim Kraus’ cautious conclusion regarding the king’s priestly role in Israel’s history should be heeded. He writes, “Hypotheses concerning the role of the king in worship are to be kept within bounds, the

172. In contrast, the Chronicler records Uzziah’s punishment for entering the Lord’s temple to make an offering (2 Chron 26.16–21).

173. Eaton, *Kingship*, 125–27 Eaton’s discussion of the king’s cultic role can be found on pp. 172–77. It is interesting to note that most of discussion draws on the larger group of kingship psalms that he has defined; Gunkel’s smaller group of royal psalms does not seem to offer much evidence for the king’s cultic role.

174. See, e.g., Dahood, *Psalms III*, 112 or the NRSV’s alternative translation: “You are a priest for ever, a rightful king by my edict.”


177. Ps 109.4 LXX: Συ־ζείμον οίς τον αιόνιον κατά την τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ. This connection between Melchizedek and Ps 110 was also an important element for at least one early Christian writer who drew on LXX Psalms (see Hebrews 7.3, 17, 21).

178. If the psalmist understood “Salem” to be Jerusalem, as later interpreters did, then the link is strengthened because of the mention of Zion (Ps 110.2).

179. Peter C. Craigie argues that these were sacrifices offered by the king before he went off to war (Peter C. Craigie, *Psalms 1–50*, WBC 19 [Waco: Word Books, 1983], 185–86); cf. 1 Sam 7.7–11; 13.8–15.
bounds drawn by each of the texts and by the form in which they have been preserved.”

Psalm 110 is undoubtedly a martial psalm and beyond the appellation, the king’s priestly duties are not mentioned.

Within the royal psalms we also observe the king at prayer. The king’s prayers are described by others (20.1; 21.2) or asked for by the Lord (2.8). Assuming that the king prays, the psalmist is confident that the Lord “will hearken to him [the anointed one] from his holy heaven” (19.7 LXX). In another parallel between God and the king, the king answers the needy when they call upon him (72.12), just as God responds to the king when, in his distress, he calls upon God.

The king bears witness to the Lord’s love, faithfulness (89.1), and to the Lord’s great deeds on the king’s and Israel’s behalf as seen throughout the Psalms (e.g., 89.5–18; 18.7–19). Psalm 144.9–11 suggests that both petition and praise formed part of the king’s singing before the Lord.

Finally, the close relationship between the king and the temple in Psalm 132 has already been observed. Lest the king be allowed to dominate the site of Israel’s cult, the presence of the priests at 132.9, 16 should also be noted. In general, though, the cultic actors in the Psalms are either the king or the congregation. With the exception of the singers/musicians, priests are almost entirely absent.

The royal psalms envisage the king’s participation in Israel’s cult. The nature of the king’s activities are not always clearly spelled out, but it would seem that the king prayed for himself and the nation, and that, at times, he offered sacrifices. A more confident conclusion regarding the king’s cultic role is probably not attainable on the basis of the data available to us in the Psalms.

The King of Israel and the Nations

A triangular relationship that exists between the Lord, the Davidic king, and Israel. In the royal psalms this relationship often becomes linear, with the king mediating in various ways between the Lord and the nation. In this final section we consider briefly an element that falls outside of these relationships: Israel’s neighbours.

Enemies. The negative perspective on “the nations” starts in Psalm 2.1 and continues throughout the royal psalms. The presence of enemies in all of the royal psalms ensures the impression that “engagement in warfare” should be considered “the principal activity of kings.” This state of affairs arises because the nations set themselves up against the Lord and his anointed (Ps 2.1–2).

180. Kraus, Theology, 117.
182. The superscriptions of a number of psalms link them to the Levites: eleven psalms are attributed to the “Sons of Korah” (42, 44–49, 84, 85, 87, 88) and a dozen more to “Asaph” (50, 73–83); for the Levitical links between these groups and their connection to the Davidic court, see, e.g., 1 Chron 9.19; 15.4–5, 17; 16.4–5, 37. For further discussion, see Martin J. Buss, “The Psalms of Asaph and Korah,” JBL 82.4 (1963): 382–92.
183. Whether this reflects the historical marginalization of the priesthood or is the result of a scholarly myopia, unable to see beyond Mowinckel’s enthronement ritual, remains an open question; see the discussion and warnings in Kraus, Theology, 84–85.
In the previous paragraph, it is assumed that the nations and the enemies are identical,\(^{185}\) and this is certainly the case in most of the royal psalms. The one exception can be found in Psalm 101.8: “Morning by morning I would kill all the sinners in the land in order to destroy from the Lord’s city all who practice lawlessness” (Ps 100.8 LXX). In this psalm, the king exhibits a general antipathy towards the wicked within the nation.

If Psalms 1 and 2 are read together as an introduction to the Psalter (see n. 130, above), then the wicked who plague the way of the righteous individual in Psalm 1 are identified in some way with the nations of Psalm 2 who rage against Israel’s god and king. Patrick Miller suggests that Psalm 1 serves to highlight the theme of the Lord’s dealings with the righteous and wicked, respectively, and the conflict between the two.\(^{186}\) This conflict might occur at the individual level or, more commonly in the royal psalms as Psalm 2 makes clear, at the corporate level between nations, but with Israel’s king as representative.

At certain points the battle is portrayed as being fought on a cosmic scale. The unnamed enemies of Psalm 18.3 are identified in verses 4–5 as Death and Hades. The Lord’s response to the king’s cry for help is to leave the divine temple (v. 6) and to demonstrate the Lord’s salvation in a theophany (vv. 7–15). By the end of the psalm, however, mythic-poetic language has given way to the more historical discourse of “enemies” and “nations” (vv. 46–50) over whom Israel’s king triumphs.\(^{187}\)

An important theme found throughout the royal psalms is that it is the Lord who saves the king from his enemies (e.g., 18.3, 17, 40, 47; 20.6; 110.1; 144.10–11).\(^{188}\) The Lord’s defeat of the king’s enemies is tied to the covenant (89.22–23), and so one of the purposes of this rescue of the Davidic king is that his dynasty might continue (132.17–18). The covenant that exists between the Lord and the king also means that the Lord’s enemies are the king’s enemies (18.50–51). The way in which the kings and rulers of the earth are to show their service and fear of the Lord is to be loyal and subservient to the Lord’s anointed (2.11–12).\(^{189}\)

At times the psalmist describes the Lord as fighting and destroying enemies (20.6; 21.8–12), while elsewhere it is the king who defeats enemies (2.9). Both of these elements are combined in Psalm 18, for example, where the Lord strengthens the king (v. 32) and prepares him for war (v. 34), while the king pursues and strikes down his enemies (vv. 37–38), which he is able to do since the Lord subdues and defeats them (v. 39–40). In one shocking passage, it is the Lord who empowers the king’s enemies to defeat the king as part of the Lord’s judgment upon the king for his rebellion against the covenant

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\(^{185}\) Derek Wittman provides a recent survey of scholarship on the identity of the enemies in Psalms (“The Kingship of Yahweh and the Politics of Poverty and Oppression in the Hebrew Psalter” [Ph.D. diss., Baylor University, 2010], 85–92).


\(^{187}\) There are a number of other psalms that employ this mythic-poetic language; see, e.g., 74.13–15; 89.9–10, 25; 116.3. The assessment of Kraus regarding these mythical powers seems sound: he argues that mythical language has been used to describe Israel’s experience of its enemies in transcendent terms (Theology, 134).

\(^{188}\) For this theme, see Kraus, Theology, 120.

\(^{189}\) So Starbuck, Court Oracles, 166–67. For an alternative interpretation which considers the last verses of Psalm 2 to refer to the Lord, see Dahood, Psalms I, 6, 13–14.
The overall impression created by the royal psalms, however, is that it is the Lord who is sovereign over the king’s enemies and that it is the Lord who subdues them and subjects them to divine wrath through the human agency of the Davidic king.190

The Future. It remains to ask whether the royal psalms hint at a future and/or eschatological king/Messiah, and it is with regard to the king’s enemies that this question might be most easily pursued.

When assessing the eschatological and messianic elements in the royal psalms, Sigmund Mowinckel states that these psalms originally spoke only of historical, not future, kings. The psalms’ messianic language is explained by the fact that the king was idealized using the same imagery and concepts used by the prophets to speak of the Messiah, but without speaking of a future/eschatological king.191 Roland de Vaux, on the contrary, argues that a number of psalms, “had a twofold meaning from the moment of their composition: every king of the Davidic line is a figure and a shadow of the ideal king of the future.”192 Similarly, John Eaton considers the future hope expressed in the royal psalms “to be as old as kingship itself.”193 Even if Mowinckel is followed at this point, it is still possible to agree with those who argue that the inclusion of the royal psalms in the Psalter shows that they were interpreted along messianic lines at a relatively early stage, even if they were not originally messianic. Jamie Grant, for example, argues that the cultic celebration of Davidic kingship introduced eschatological overtones into psalms that originally spoke only of historical/reigning kings.194 The significance of eschatological elements increased as the psalms were read in the light of the exile and subsequent historical developments within Israel.195

There are certainly points in the royal psalms at which the nations should be understood in an historical and local sense. Psalm 18 praises the Lord for a victory that has already been won (vv. 16–19, 31–42), following which the king is made “head of the nations” (v. 43). The superscription envisages David speaking this psalm about his personal enemies within Israel and the surrounding nations. Psalm 101 carries a similar local tone (see, esp. v. 8). There are other psalms, however, that would seem to carry eschatological overtones.

The royal psalms envisage a time when the enemies of God/Israel/the king will be subdued and when the king will rule over the nations and their kings (72.8–11; 89.27). The Lord promises the king

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190. Wittman, “Kingship of Yahweh” observes that in the kingship-of-God psalms, the emphasis falls on the Lord as the one who subdues the nations on behalf of the people of Israel who are portrayed as poor and oppressed.


192. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 100.


194. Grant, “Psalms.”

195. Clines, “Psalm Research II,” 120; Grant, “Psalms,” 109–12. Amongst those pursuing canonical readings of the Psalms, arguments for a messianic programme can be found in Mitchell, Message of the Psalter; Mitchell, “Lord, Remember David”; Sneary, Return of the King. The most prominent scholar arguing against a strong messianic thread is Wilson, Editing, although his earlier position has been modified slightly (see Wilson, “King, Messiah”).
(2.8) that the Lord will make the nations his inheritance. “Inheritance” has special resonance, coming, as it does, after the declaration of divine sonship (2.7). In Psalm 135.10–12 the psalmist recalls how in the past the Canaanite kingdoms were given as an inheritance to Israel. In Psalm 2, however, the second colon of verse 8 makes clear that the promise includes “the ends of the earth” (cf. 72.8; 89.25) thus expanding the geographical horizon upon which this promise will develop and necessarily pushing it into the future, although the psalm contains no unambiguous eschatological elements. This raises the question whether there is any sense in which the royal psalms might be read eschatologically.

If Psalm 110 is approached as a collection of short oracles, the individual elements can all be explained through parallels with ancient Near Eastern royal ideology in which the images form part of an exalted court style. However, David Mitchell has argued that when read as a unity, the psalm takes on an eschatological shape. The king’s enthronement at the right hand of the Lord (Ps 110.1) is not simply part of an annual ceremony in which he is “enthroned at the right hand of the invisible but nonetheless present Lord,” rather, the words suggest “that the king is being offered a place in Yhwh’s heavenly throne room or divine council,” which is how a number of early interpreters understood the psalm. The fact that the subjection of the king’s enemies (vv. 1–2) happens through an earthly battle (vv. 5–7) in which the king leads his people (v. 3) does not negate this reading, rather, it points to the continuity between the Lord’s heavenly rule and the Lord’s earthly sovereignty exercised through his chosen king.

At least four of the royal psalms, Pss 2, 72, 89, 110, seem to transcend their historical and geographical context in order to portray the king in exalted terms. David’s empire has become a world empire, with the king at the centre of the cosmos. This lofty language might simply reflect exaggerations of the type found in various examples of royal ideology or, as Hans-Joachim Kraus argues, statements in these psalms about the universal dominion of Israel’s king “are the reflection of a comprehensive mandate which Yahweh, as creator and Lord of the world, has entrusted to his chosen king.” This mandate involves bringing the nations under subjection, not ultimately for the sake of punishment but for blessing (72.17), as the king brings fertility and prosperity to his subjects (72.16; cf. 144.12–15). This mandate thus extends into the future and beyond the geographical borders of Israel. The elements discussed briefly in this section illustrate how the Psalms came to be read as speaking of Israel’s future rescue under a divinely appointed king.

This study of the so-called royal psalms has allowed us to develop a rough sketch of Israel’s ideal king as he is presented in the Psalter. The portrait that has emerged has much in common with the one found in the Deuteronomic History. This is not surprising: many of the psalms draw explicitly from this tradition, especially in the way they focus on Davidic kingship. The king is chosen by God and

198. Dahood, Psalms III, 114; see also Kraus, Theology, 115–16.
200. Kraus, Theology, 122.
must walk in the ways of the Lord. Another way of conceptualizing this relationship is in terms of the Davidic covenant (2 Sam 7). The king must be like God in promoting righteousness in the nation. He achieves this through caring for the poor and marginalized, ensuring that justice is done, and in defending God’s people from their enemies. In summary, the king’s reign on earth is an image of the Lord’s reign in heaven.

Isaiah

The book of Isaiah does not contain a concentrated discourse on kingship and, were it not for the significance accorded Isaiah by Paul,²⁰¹ might not have been included in our investigation of kingship texts according to the methodology outlined in the first chapter of this study. Nevertheless, the theme of kingship is present in Isaiah and its shape in the book will be explored in this section.

There is a distinctive development of the theme of kingship²⁰² within the three major parts of Isaiah (1–39, 40–55, 56–66).²⁰³ In Isaiah 1–39, the focus falls on a human king from either the present or the future. The most significant passages in this regard are found in chapters 7, 9, 11, 16, and 32; these texts will be investigated more carefully in what follows.²⁰⁴ Israel’s human king is absent from Isaiah 40–55 (with the exception of the mention of David at Isa 55.3), but there are numerous references to the Lord’s kingship. Two significant figures also appear in this section: Cyrus—“the Lord’s anointed one” (45.1)—and the servant of chapters 42, 49, 50, and 53, whose potential as a royal figure I shall investigate below.

Israel’s god, the Lord, stands above all the royal figures in Isaiah. The final chapter of Isaiah begins with a vision of the Lord’s reign: “Heaven is my throne, and the earth is the footstool of my feet” (66.1). Spoken in the context of the temple (vv. 1–6), these words are reminiscent of Isaiah’s


²⁰⁴. Williamson entitles the chapter in which he discusses these texts, “The ideal king” (Variations, 30–72). The same group of texts are dealt with at greater length by Wegner, Kingship and Messianic Expectation.
vision in chapter 6 in which the prophet sees his lord seated upon the heavenly throne and his glory filling the temple (6.1). The focus of Isaiah’s vision (6.5) is “the King, the Lord Sabaoth.” It is this vision of the Lord as king that ties together the various parts of the book of Isaiah.\textsuperscript{205}

Isaiah’s King of Justice and Righteousness\textsuperscript{206}

The human kings mentioned in Isaiah are usually part of the historical narrative within which the prophecy unfolds. Isaiah receives his vision “in the reign of Ozias and Ioatham and Achaz and Hezekias, who reigned over Judea” (1.1), and the vision that constitutes his call (6.1–13) occurs “in the year that King Ozias died” (6.1). Judah’s king shares the stage with the kings of Aram and Israel (7.1), Assyria (7.7, 17; 8.4, 7; 20.1; 36.1), Egypt (36.6), Babylon (14.4; 39.1), and the kings of the nations (14.9, 18; 60.10–11; 62.2). These references do not provide us with any insight into Isaiah’s understanding of ideal kingship, but there are a handful of passages that do suggest the outlines of this portrait.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Isaiah 7, especially the “virgin birth” of verse 14, in Christian interpretations of the book.\textsuperscript{207} However, with regard to the question of Isaiah’s understanding of ideal kingship, the passage does not yield much. This conclusion is supported by Rodrigo de Sousa’s study of the Greek translator’s messianism. He summarizes his findings on Isaiah 7 as follows: “the rendering of LXX Isa 7:14–16 does not give sufficiently strong evidence of a conscious, systematic messianic reading of the passage.”\textsuperscript{208} At most, we can conclude with H. G. M. Williamson that the passage teaches “that Isaiah was deeply committed to the fact of a divinely

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{205} Williamson, \textit{Book Called Isaiah}, 37–56; see also Brevard S. Childs, \textit{Isaiah}, OTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 539. Thomas Wagner (\textit{Gottes Herrschaft: Eine Analysen der Denkschrift [Jes 6,1–9,6]}, VTSup 108 [Leiden: Brill, 2006]) provides a detailed analysis of Isa 6.1–9.7, the Isaiah “memoir” (Denkschrift), using the kingship of God as a \textit{Leitmotiv}. Wagner also provides a recent survey of scholarship on the kingship of the Lord (pp. 2–12).
\item \textsuperscript{206} In this section “Israel” is used in both its narrow sense, that is, to refer to the northern kingdom, and more broadly, as in this heading, to refer to the Lord’s chosen nation. In doing so I follow the precedent set in the book of Isaiah in which both are used and distinguished by the context in which they occur. For the former, see, e.g., 7.1; 8.14; examples of the latter are found at 9.8; 41.3, frequently in parallel with Jacob (e.g., 14.1; 46.3; 49.5).
\item \textsuperscript{207} In the index of John F. A. Sawyer, \textit{The Fifth Gospel: Isaiah in the History of Christianity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), for example, there are slightly more references to Isa 53, but Isa 7.14 is by far the most frequently cited single verse. Christian interest in the passage is driven by its use in Matthew’s birth narrative (Matt 1.23).
\item \textsuperscript{208} Rodrigo F. de Sousa, \textit{Eschatology and Messianism in LXX Isaiah 1–12}, LHBOTS 516 (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 70–102, here, 101.
\end{itemize}
appointed leader of the people within the framework of God’s broader purposes for Zion.”

Isaiah 9.5–6 LXX contains a striking description of a Davidic ruler, but one which has been transformed dramatically in translation. The salvation of the Lord, described in verses 1–4, reaches a climax in verse 5 with the gift of a child (παιδίον), a son (υἱός). The reading of Isaiah 9.5 MT reflected in most English translations identified the child by four names, each of which describe the ruler in exalted terms and provide insight into the portrait of the ideal ruler in Isaiah. The Greek translator has understood the Hebrew quite differently. The son is called “Messenger [or Angel] of Great Counsel (μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελος; 9.5 LXX), leading some to suggest that he is a priestly figure, while others read ἄγγελος more literally and argue that he is an angelic being. Whether one understands this figure in priestly or angelic terms, his kingship cannot be denied. We read that “sovereignty (ἄρχω) was upon his shoulder” (v. 5) and that it will know no boundary (v. 6). Foreign dominion has been replaced by the rule of this god-given child. Mention of the “throne of David and his kingdom” (v. 6) allow the identification of this figure as a king in the Davidic dynasty.

Within the literary context of Isaiah, the poem speaks not simply of a coming king who will improve on the reign of Ahaz (see 7.1), but it takes on eschatological overtones which turn the exalted kingship language into language that speaks to the book’s messianism. These eschatological

209. H. G. M. Williamson, “The Messianic Texts in Isaiah 1–39,” in King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, LHBOTS 270 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 244–54, here 254. Wegner’s study of Isa 7.10–17 (Kingship and Messianic Expectation, 63–137) leads him to conclude that while the passage was originally not meant to be understood as messianic, “the redactional shaping of the passage appears to have been intended to engender these ideas” (p. 136). Ronald E. Clements defends the view that the child of Isa 7.14 is a son of the prophet and that a later redactor turned him into a prince through the addition of 9.1–6 (“The Immanuel Prophecy of Isaiah 7:10–17 and Its Messianic Interpretation,” in Old Testament Prophecy: From Oracle to Canon [Nottingham: Westminster John Knox, 1996], 65–77). M. J. de Jong argues that the earliest form of Isaiah 7 contained an encouragement to Ahaz (e.g., 7.7–9), whose subsequent disobedience is in view in a later addition which was critical of the Davidic dynasty (see, e.g., 7.17) (“From Legitimate King to Protected City: The Development of Isaiah 7:1–17,” in ’Enlarge the Site of Your Tent’: The City as Unifying Theme in Isaiah: The Isaiah Workshop – De Jesaja Werkplaats, ed. Archibald L. H. M. van Wieringen and Annemarieke van der Woude [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 21–48). Despite their views on the original intention of Isaiah 7, these scholars all agree that in its canonical form the text is meant to be understood along messianic lines.

210. In the discussion of this passage, I am following the versification in Alfred Rahlfis and Robert Hahnhart, eds., Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006), 577–78. In English translations of the MT, as well as in NETS, this is vv. 6–7.

211. Rodrigo de Sousa (Eschatology and Messiahism, 103–37) discusses these verses in detail.

212. Read in the historical context in which the poem was first written, these names “express important aspects of an ideal polity and government, which was certainly never realized in ancient Israel and, at the same time, intimate a certain transcendental aura attaching to royalty in the ancient Near East” (Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 19 [New York: Doubleday, 2000], 250).


overtones grow louder when we read of the peace without boundaries that results from the king’s reign (v. 6). Peace is more than the cessation of hostilities, “peace is what happens when a righteous order prevails.”²¹⁵ The order that the king will establish and uphold is marked by righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) and judgment (κρίμα) “from this time onward and for evermore” (v. 6). In acting as the Lord’s agent to bring about righteousness and justice, the king establishes the properly ordered society of which Isaiah speaks throughout his prophecy.

Three qualities summarize the nature of this society: righteousness, justice, and truth/faithfulness.²¹⁶ Not only do they characterize the Lord (5.16; 28.17; 32.16), but they describe the society that the Lord desires and acts to restore (1.21, 26; 28.17; 32.16–17; 33.5). Although the king is not a central figure in all of the passages that speak of this future society, as we saw above with regard to chapter 9, when he does appear he is the focus of the hope of righteousness and justice and truth.²¹⁷

The book of Isaiah looks forward to a time when

a throne shall be restored with mercy (ἐλέος), and he shall sit on it with truth (ἀληθείας) in the tent of Dauid, judging and seeking judgment (κρίνον καὶ ἐξητῶν κρίμα) and quickly procuring righteousness (δικαιοσύνην). (16.5 LXX)


Using language that seems to be proverbial rather than referring to a specific king, Isaiah 32.1 speaks of a king exercising dominion with righteousness and justice. These same qualities are on view in the portrait of the Davidic “shoot” of Isaiah 11.1–9.

He shall be girded with righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) around the waist and bound with truth (ἀληθεία) around the sides. (11.5 LXX)

Verses 11.3b–4a have a decidedly judicial ring to them, but the language of seeing eyes and hearing ears alludes to 6.10 and serves to distinguish this figure from the sinful nation to which Isaiah is sent to preach. Isaiah 32.3 looks forward to a time when eyes will see and ears will hear and adds that minds will make good judgments and tongues speak well (32.4). This is not a description of the king but of the period in which the king reigns, a time in which the curse of 6.10 is reversed and the ideal society marked by righteousness and justice is established.

Martial elements are not absent from Isaiah’s portrait of the king, even if they are somewhat muted. Isaiah 11.4b points to the deliverance that this Davidic ruler will bring through his defeat of the wicked. Related to this is the shelter and refuge he will provide (32.3). The goal of the ruler’s warring is the previously-mentioned peace, now achieved at the international as well as the national level. At a number of points, most famously at 2.4, the book looks forward to “the eschatological horizon of the abolition of war.” The utopia described in 11.6–9 should be read as the result of this ruler’s work which now encompasses not only Israel and the nations, but the whole created order.

One striking element in Isaiah 11 still needs to be mentioned. The following is said about the rod that comes out of Jesse’s root:

And the spirit of God shall rest on him,
the spirit of wisdom and understanding (σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως),
the spirit of counsel and might (βουλης καὶ ισχίου),
the spirit of knowledge and godliness (γνώσεως καὶ εὐσεβείας).
The spirit of the fear of God will fill him. (11.2–3a LXX)

219. Verses 6–9 describe the period inaugurated by this figure. Williamson excludes it from his discussion (“Messianic Texts,” 264–68), but vv. 1–9 should probably be read as a single poem; so Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 262–65; Childs, Isaiah, 97–106.
220. Williamson, Book Called Isaiah, 259–60.
221. Roberts, “Divine King”.
222. Trygve N. D. Mettinger suggests that “the martial charisma of Saul and the judicial one of Solomon have merged in the image of the ruler in Jes [sic] ch. 11” (King and Messiah: The Civil and Sacral Legitimation of the Israelite Kings, ConBOT 8 [Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1976], 248–49).
223. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 250
224. Childs, Isaiah, 104.
If it is accepted that Isaiah 11 is about the king of the Lord’s people, other texts about God’s spirit and kingship should inform our understanding of these verses.\[^{225}\] In 1 Samuel 10, Saul is anointed and given the spirit of the Lord, proof of which is seen in Saul’s ability to prophesy and, in 1 Samuel 11, following a further endowment of the spirit (11.6), in Saul’s military victory.\[^{226}\] In 1 Samuel 16.13–14, famously, the spirit of the Lord falls\[^{227}\] upon David after his anointing and departs from Saul, signalling his demise. In the following chapter, David’s defeat of the Philistine Goliath is proof that the Lord empowers David and gives him victory (1 Sam 17.45–47). When the Lord elects a king, this is demonstrated by anointing and reception of the spirit which empower the king that he might rule the Lord’s people.\[^{228}\]

In Isaiah 11.2–3, the “resting” of the Lord’s spirit upon the king endows him with seven qualities: wisdom, understanding, counsel, might, knowledge, godliness, and fear of the Lord. This is an example of the spirit providing “an abundant reservoir of skill and knowledge” for the service of God,\[^{229}\] as illustrated in Exodus 31.3, for example, where the spirit of God fills Bezalel with σοφίας καὶ συνεσεultur of his work. In this case, the filling of the spirit is for the construction of cultic elements; in Isaiah 11 the wisdom and understanding have to do with the art of ruling.

According to Hilary Marlow, the combination of the king’s counsel and might “suggests both the ability to devise a plan or strategy and the heroic power to carry it out.”\[^{230}\] Given the assertion in 11.4c, that the king will slay the wicked, Marlow is perhaps a bit too hasty in seeking to soften the martial implications of the “might” of the king through which his stratagems are achieved.\[^{231}\]


\[^{226}\] The pattern of the spirit’s empowering presence in this account is very similar to that found in the book of Judges; see Firth, “Spirit and Leadership,” 270–77. But the relationship between the spirit of the Lord and Israel’s leadership goes back even earlier in Israel’s history. In the account found at Numbers 11.16–30 this relationship is clearly in view as some of Moses’ leadership responsibilities devolve from him to the seventy elders.

\[^{227}\] For the use of הָעַל in this context, cf. Judg 14.6, 19; 1 Sam 10.6, 10, although not too much should be made of the specific verb used to describe the action of the spirit (Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 55–56); see, e.g., Num 11.29; 24.2; Judg 3.10; 6.43; 1 Kgs 19.7.


\[^{229}\] Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 54. Levison cites, as an example, Exod 28.1–3: “You [Moses] must declare to all the wise of heart whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom (חכמה) that they must make garments for Aaron...” (28.3; my translation). The NRSV’s translation of Exod 28.3 obscures the role of the spirit: “And you shall speak to all who have ability, whom I have endowed with skill...”


vision of 11.6–8 must nevertheless be understood as the ultimate goal of the king’s application of his strategy and power.

Finally, “fear of the Lord” is a foundational element of Israel’s kingship. It is used to describe the king of Deuteronomy 17.19, and David speaks of “ruling in the fear of God” (2 Sam 23.2). The knowledge, godliness and fear of the Lord of Isaiah 11.2–3a should be understood against the background of Israel’s wisdom tradition (see, e.g., Prov 1.7; 2.5) and speaks of the king’s moral character as it relates to the Lord.

Marlow summarizes well Isaiah 11’s contribution to the book’s portrait of an ideal king:

In Isaiah 11, the prophet’s description of the coming king brings together wisdom traditions and those connected to royal ideology to present the picture of someone with the skill and wisdom to govern well and protect his land and his people, and with the attitude of humility and reverence towards Yahweh that will ensure God’s continuing presence and protection.232

Although the picture is quite feint through most of Isaiah 1–39, it is possible to discern Isaiah’s portrait of an ideal ruler of God’s people. A synthesis of the various traits delivers a traditional picture of Israelite kingship: the king is chosen by the Lord and is in close relationship with the Lord. The king is one who is wise and judges fairly, and who defeats the enemies of Israel and the Lord in order to bring about peace. This peace is not simply the cessation of hostility between Israel and the nations, but refers to an ideal society marked out by righteousness, justice, and truth. In the later parts of Isaiah (chaps. 40–66), the responsibility for the attainment of this goal is shifted to the servant of the Lord.

The Servant of the Lord

In Isaiah 1–39, both Isaiah (20.3) and David (37.35) are called “servant” (παίσχος) of God. The term is used far more frequently in the latter parts of the book to refer to a specific figure or group.233 This distinctive usage led Bernhard Duhm to identify four “Servant Songs” (Ebed-Jahwe-Lieder)—42:1–4;234 49:1–6; 50:4–11; 52:13–53:12—which, he argued, were post-exilic texts composed after the rest of Deutero-Isaiah and inserted into this work without much thought.235 Duhm’s hypothesis very quickly became a “generally accepted axiom” amongst Isaiah scholars (albeit in a modified form), but it has not been without its opponents.236 Recent scholarship tends to interpret the Servant Songs in the context of Deutero-Isaiah237 and this is the approach that will be followed in the subsequent paragraphs.
Regardless of the way in which scholars reconstruct the history of the Servant Songs, much research continues to focus on the identity of the Servant. Tryggye Mettinger lists an entire catalogue of historical individuals who have figured in the discussions of the Servant: the prophet himself, Duhm’s unknown teacher of the Law, Isaiah, Uzziah, Hezekiah, Josiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Job, Moses, Jehoiachin, Cyrus, Sheshbazzar, Zerubbabel, Meshukkam, Nehemiah, and Eleazar.

Fortunately, our study of Isaiah’s portrait of kingship does not require of us to uncover the identity of the Servant, but simply to identify how the figure contributes to the book’s conception of the ideal king.

Several scholars accept that the Servant does indeed exhibit some royal characteristics. Since the Servant is not explicitly identified as “king” or “ruler,” it would be methodologically incorrect to include all of the Servant’s characteristics within our portrait of Isaiah’s ideal king. What I will attempt in this section is to produce a summary sketch of those elements that are generally recognized as contributing to the identification of the Servant as royal. The studies by Antti Laato and H. G. M. Williamson will provide the starting point for my discussion of the Servant as a king-like figure. Laato collects a number of parallels between extra-biblical material (especially Akkadian royal inscriptions) and the Servant Songs and Cyrus material in Isaiah 40–55 to show how these passages in Isaiah draw on royalty traditions. Williamson presents five elements that demonstrate the Servant in Isaiah 42.1–4 is royal in some or other way.

(1) The opening words, “Here is my servant” describe the designation or commissioning of a significant figure. The parallels with 1 Samuel 9.17 and 12.13 illustrate a similar formula which is used in designating a king.


238. See, e.g., Roy F. Melugin, “Isaiah 40–66 in Recent Research: The ‘Unity’ Movement,” in Recent Research on the Major Prophets; Alan J. Hauser (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 142–94 who surveys recent research on Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah. I follow the convention of capitalizing “Servant” since Isaiah 40–55 seems to speak of a specific figure rather than a generic “servant.”

239. Mettinger, Farewell to the Servant Songs, 45.


242. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 47–68. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat Laato’s parallels but simply note them and refer to the relevant pages in his study. Both authors make these arguments with regard to the Hebrew text, but they hold with regard to the Greek too.


“Servant” is used to speak of those chosen by the Lord for a specific task, including, but not limited to, the king; see, e.g., 2 Samuel 3.18; 7.5; Psalm 89.3, 20, 39, 50; 132.10.245

(3) “Whom I uphold (מִךְּנַה)” (Isa 42.1) contains a relatively rare verb that is used of the king in Psalm 63.8 and indicates God’s support and protection of the king.246 Although a clear verbal parallel to the Lord’s pleasure shown towards the king (“in whom my soul delights”) does not occur in the Hebrew Bible, the concept—that of divine love and favour towards the king247—is evident, for example, at 2 Samuel 7.15; 22.51; Psalm 18.50; 21.7.

(4) The concept of divine election248 presented in the phrase “my chosen one (יְרוּשָׁא/ז ἐκλέκτος μου)” (Isa 42.1) is important in Israel’s kingship ideology; see, e.g., Deut 17.15; 1 Sam 10.24; 16.1–13; 1 Kgs 8.16; 11.34. A striking parallel is found at Psalm 89.3 where “chosen one” and “servant” combine to speak of the Davidic king.

(5) The reception of the Lord’s spirit (Isa 42.1; cf. 48.16) is often associated with kingship, as discussed above with regard to Isaiah 11.2.

While none of these elements serve as indisputable proof, their cumulative weight suggests that the Servant in Isaiah 42.1–4 is royal. This thesis is strengthened by the presence in chapter 42 of the justice (vv. 1, 3, 4), faithfulness (v. 3), and righteousness (v. 6)—themes closely linked to the king in Isaiah 1–39, as demonstrated above. Furthermore, 42.6–7 point to the Servant’s role in bringing salvation not only to God’s people (Israel), but also to the nations.249

While Isaiah 42 has a single royal figure in view, the image of the Servant is more complicated in other passages. At a number of points the Servant is spoken of in corporate terms, usually in terms of Israel and/or Jacob (e.g., 41.8; 44.1–2; 45.4). Like the Servant in Isaiah 42, this Servant is also chosen (41.8–9; 43.10; 49.7) and receives the Lord’s spirit (44.3; 59.21). Other royal characteristics include the Lord’s foreknowledge of the Servant. Although Isaiah 49.1—“From my mother’s womb he [the Lord] called my name” (cf. v. 5)—sounds very similar to the prophet’s self-description in Jeremiah 1.5, the Lord’s foreknowledge of those he would elect as king is on view at 1 Kings 8.19 (Solomon) and 13.2 (Josiah).250 The following verse, “He made my mouth like a sharp dagger” (Isa 49.2), might be understood as referring to a prophetic task, but could also be speaking of the king’s judicial function or, more generally, of the power that the word of the king has (cf. 11.4).251 Like the Servant of Isaiah 42, the corporate Servant’s task includes the salvation not only of Israel, but also the nations (49.6).252

245. So Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55, 299. For the Akkadian parallels, see Laato, Servant of YHWH, 54–55. In Jeremiah, the Lord can also speak of Nebuchadnezzar as “my servant” (25.9; 27.6; 43.10).
246. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 58 In both places, the Greek translators gloss this verb with ἀντιλημβέω.
250. For the concept in extra-biblical texts, see Laato, Servant of YHWH, 56–57.
252. Richard L. Schultz argues that Israel’s election and salvation leads to the offer of universal salvation (“Nationalism and Universalism in Isaiah,” in Interpreting Isaiah: Issues and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and H. G. M. Williamson [Nottingham: Apollos, 2009], 122–44). Israel’s salvation is cast in terms of a new exodus (49.8–12; see Laato,
Finally, the Servant is described in exalted terms (ὑψωθήσεται καὶ δοξασθήσεται σφόδρα; 52.13)\(^{253}\) that are elsewhere used for the Lord, the divine king (e.g., 6.1; 5.16; 57.15).

Isaiah 55.3 proves to be a key verse in understanding the Servant’s royal corporate identity. The covenant once made with David is now shifted to Israel, suggesting that the community comes to take on the role of the king.\(^{254}\) This is confirmed when the Lord makes an eternal covenant with “them” (διαθήκην αἰώνων διαθήκης αὐτοῖς; 61.8), presumably the same group who will be involved in the restoration of Zion (61.4), the same role that Cyrus, another important royal figure, plays in the earlier part of Isaiah (see below). If the corporate nature of the Servant in Isaiah 40–55 is uncertain, the repeated use of the plural, “servants,” in Isaiah 56–60 suggests that this is indeed the direction in which the theme develops.\(^{255}\)

One final passage should be mentioned. The figure of Isaiah 61.1–3, even though he is not explicitly identified as a/the “servant,”\(^{256}\) exhibits a number of the same royal characteristics already observed: the spirit of the Lord is upon him, he is anointed, and he is an agent of rescue and salvation (v. 1). Other aspects of this figure’s activity find echoes in Isaiah 40–55, such as his proclamation (v. 2; cf. 40.2–6) and bringing comfort (v. 2; cf. 49.13; 51.3, 12, 19; 52.9; 54.11), leading Williamson to conclude that this figure represents a “composite character, a bringing together into one of all those whom God had earlier said he would use for the salvation of his people.”\(^{257}\)

Although the Servant of Isaiah 40–55 is never identified as “king” or “messiah,” this brief discussion indicates that the Servant bears certain royal traits and characteristics, some of which are shared with the figure of the ideal king that one encounters in Isaiah 1–39.\(^{258}\)

Thus the “Servant” of Isaiah 40 ff. can be understood as a complementary portrait of Yahweh’s agent, which corresponds to the King of Isaiah 1-39. The similarities suggest this correspondence, while the differences reflect the emphases of their respective sections within the chronological and thematic development of the book of Isaiah as a whole.\(^{259}\)

One of the most significant differences in Isaiah 40–55 is the “democratization” of kingship suggested by the corporate Servant. But this is not the only indication that kingship has been removed—whether

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\(^{253}\) The question of whether the Servant is individual or corporate in Isaiah 52.13–53.12 is particularly complicated (see, e.g., Laato, *Servant of YHWH*, 156–65) and I will not attempt a solution at this point.

\(^{254}\) So Williamson, *Variations*, 113–29; see also Edgar W. Conrad, “The Community as King in Second Isaiah,” in *Understanding the Word: Essays in Honor of Bernhard W. Anderson*, ed. James T. Butler, Edgar W. Conrad, and Ben C. Ollenburger, JSOTSup 37 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 99–111, who argues that the five “fear not” oracles (Isa 41.8–13; 41.14–16; 43.1b–4; 43.5–7; 44.2b–5) are “war oracles” that are usually addressed to kings but, in Isaiah 40–55, are addressed to the community.

\(^{255}\) Williamson, *Variations*, 192.

\(^{256}\) For a brief discussion of the history of this question, see Childs, *Isaiah*, 502–3.

\(^{257}\) Williamson, *Variations*, 174–88, here, 188; see also Childs, *Isaiah*, 504 who recognises that the figure in Isa 61.1–3 describes himself “in the garb of the figure of the servant of Second Isaiah.”

\(^{258}\) Recognising the royal elements in Isaiah’s description of the Servant does not preclude the possibility that he is also described as a second Moses and/or a prophet-like figure (see, e.g, Gordon P. Hugenberger, “The Servant of the Lord in the ‘Servant Songs’ of Isaiah,” in *The Lord’s Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts*, ed. Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and Gordon J. Wenham [Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995], 105–40).

\(^{259}\) Schultz, “King in Isaiah,” 159.
temporarily or permanently—from the Davidic line: there is one more significant royal figure in Isaiah 40–55 that has not yet been mentioned and Isaiah’s surprising characterization of Cyrus must be investigated before concluding this section.

**Cyrus**

Xenophon’s version of Cyrus has already been encountered in Chapter 2. The Judahite exiles in Babylon do not make an appearance in this narrative, but, like Xenophon, the biblical tradition remembers and interprets Cyrus’ career in a positive light.\(^{260}\) In Isaiah, Cyrus’ name is only mentioned at 44.28 and 45.1, but a number of passages speak of this king and his role within the Lord’s plan for the nation.\(^{261}\) He is referred to as “righteousness from the east” (41.2), “the one who is from the rising of the sun” (41.25), “a bird from the east” (46.11).\(^{262}\) He will tread down rulers like a potter treading clay (41.25).\(^{263}\) More specifically, Cyrus will defeat Babylon (43.14; cf. 47.1; 48.14, 20) in order to set free those the Lord had sent into exile (45.13) and, most startling, he will rebuild the Lord’s temple and city (44.28; 45.13). Cyrus thus fulfills the role that the Lord’s king is expected to fulfill. He is the Lord’s messiah/anointed (\(\chiριστος\); 45.1);\(^{264}\) apart from the Lord, “the real king in Second Isaiah is a Persian!\(^{265}\)

Klaus Baltzer argues that Isaiah 45.1–4 represents the installation of Cyrus as the Lord’s king.\(^{266}\)

This would have been shocking to many who heard or read Isaiah:\(^{267}\) Israel’s God is now working

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\(^{260}\) See, e.g., 2 Chron 36.33–23; Ezra 1.2–4; 6.2–5; Dan 1.21; 6.28; 10.1. As seen in Chapter 2, the Greek tradition also portrays Cyrus positively. Amélie Kuhrt (“Cyrus the Great of Persia: Images and Realities,” in *Representations of Political Power: Case Histories from Times of Change and Dissolving Order in the Ancient Near East*, ed. Marlies Heinz and Marian H. Feldman [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007], 169–91) provides a thorough reading of all the evidence and suggests a less idealistic portrait of the Achaemenid emperor: “Instead of a young idealistic liberator with a new vision for ruling the world, we can begin to define a king, heir to an already fairly significant realm, who deployed both brutal and placatory gestures in a calculated and effective manner” (p. 180). The same points are made in Amélie Kuhrt, “Ancient Near Eastern History: The Case of Cyrus the Great of Persia,” in *Understanding the History of Ancient Israel*, ed. H. G. M. Williamson, PBA 143 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107–27. The Cyrus cylinder is partly responsible for the positive and uncritical view of the emperor; for Kuhrt’s deconstruction of this reading of the cylinder, see “The Cyrus Cylinder and Achaemenid Imperial Policy,” *JSOT* 25 (1983): 83–97.

\(^{261}\) For a recent argument that the conquering king in Isa 45.5–7, 45.11–13, and 48.12–15 is Darius and not Cyrus, see Rainer Albertz, “Darius in Place of Cyrus: The First Edition of Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 40.1–52.12) in 521 BCE,” *JSOT* 27.3 (2003): 371–83. The similarities between these Cyrus/Darius passages (see Laato, *Servant of YHWH*, 36–38) indicate that they deal with the same concept of kingship and they can thus be treated together, regardless of whether or not Albertz’ thesis can be sustained.


\(^{263}\) At Isa 45.9–10 the metaphor is adjusted: the Lord is the potter and Cyrus is a tool in the Lord’s hand.

\(^{264}\) The Lord calls Cyrus “my shepherd” at Isa 44.28, but this metaphor is missing in the Greek translation.


\(^{266}\) *Deutero-Isaiah*, 221–26 See also Fried, “Cyrus the Messiah?”.

\(^{267}\) Liesbeth S. Fried (“Cyrus the Messiah?” 392) suggests that the rebuke in Isa 45.9–13 is aimed at those who cannot accept Cyrus as the Lord’s anointed one. It is more likely, however, that this warning is addressed to the nations and not the people of Israel (Childs, *Isaiah*, 354); the latter are mentioned in the third person (Isa 45.11).
through the Achaemenid line and no longer through the Davidic line. On the face of it, this seems correct. Cyrus, not David or David’s son (2 Sam 7), will (re)build the Lord’s temple and city (44.24–28). If David provided the “prototype” of “the Lord’s anointed” (e.g., 1 Sam 12.3; 16.1–13),268 this title now belongs to Cyrus (Isa 45.1). Liesbeth Fried points out that even though prophets and priests were also anointed, the title “the Lord’s anointed” or “his anointed” refers exclusively to the legitimate ruler of the Lord’s people. And, more than a title, “it connotes a theology.”269 Cyrus has come to inherit not only the title, but also the entire complex of ideas and expectations tied up with the title.

Given Cyrus’ disappearance after Isaiah 48, though, it becomes evident that his role is only temporary in the book of Isaiah. Cyrus’ anointing should indeed be understood against the background of the anointing not only of kings, but also of prophets and priests: he is “set aside for a divine commission,” but there is no indication that either he or his descendants enjoy this privileged status before Israel’s God once his commission has been completed.270 The contours of that mission can be discerned in Isaiah 45. Cyrus acts for the sake of Israel (v. 4) and the reputation of the Lord (vv. 5–7), but ultimately, it is all of creation that will benefit (v. 8).271 This rough outline bears some similarity with the Servant’s role as he brings salvation to Israel and the nations for the sake of the Lord’s glory (see above).

There are additional verbal and conceptual parallels between Cyrus and the Servant,272 but the differences should not be overlooked. Cyrus defeats the Lord’s enemies and establishes the conditions for the new exodus and the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, while the Servant will lead the people back through the desert, bringing salvation to the nations even as he rescues Israel.273 In both cases, though, the description of these two figures draw on royal tradition as found in the Hebrew Bible and royal ideology from Israel’s neighbours.274

**Concluding Comments**

In this chapter I have attempted to sketch various portraits of kingship that are found in a select group of texts from the Jewish Scriptures. The texts from Deuteronomy, Samuel and Kings, the Psalms, and Isaiah were chosen because these are the books from which the apostle Paul drew most frequently. While it is important to remain open to the possibility that Paul’s understanding of kingship was based partly on other scriptural texts, the survey in the present chapter should at least provide an outline, a

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268. See Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 225 and references provided there.
270. Childs, *Isaiah*, 352–54, here, 353; cf. Williamson, *Variations*, 5–6. Similarly, the Assyrian king is merely an agent through whom the purposes of the Lord are accomplished (Isa 10.5–11) who is, in turn, punished once he has fulfilled his purpose (v. 12).
274. So Laato, *Servant of YHWH*; see, for the extra-biblical parallels, pp. 47–68; the Servant, pp. 69–155; Cyrus, pp. 166–95.
rough model, of the kingship ideal found in the Jewish Scriptures upon which Paul might have based some of his thinking.

In Deuteronomy 17.14–20, the “Law of the King” defines the nature of Israelite kingship in three significant ways (see pp. 164–171). (1) The king is chosen by the Lord. This proves to be defining characteristic in all the texts studied in this chapter. (2) The king is not to be like the kings that rule Israel’s neighbours. The usual trappings of royalty—weapons, women, wealth—while not denied him, are restricted. This curtailment forces the king to rely on the Lord instead of some of the usual sources of power. (3) The corollary of the previous point is that the king should be like his fellow Israelites. Not only should he be chosen from among them, but he must also follow God’s law. In this, he acts as an exemplar of Israelite piety. This passage serves as a yardstick against which kingship in the following books can be measured.275

The nature of kingship in Samuel and Kings (pp. 171–181) is more variegated—a result, most likely, of the combination of the disastrous reigns of Saul, Solomon, and others, with the lofty promises attached to the reign of David. In the books of Samuel and Kings the narrative seeks to address the nature of Israelite kingship rather than the question of whether monarchy is a good or bad development. More specifically, since the narrative arc begins with great promise (the inheritance of the promised land) and ends with disappointment (the exile in Babylon), it invites questions about the contribution of Israel’s leadership to that situation. The most significant aspect of Israelite kingship is faithfulness towards the Lord, his covenant and the covenant stipulations. David’s kingship and the covenant established with him and his dynasty are central in this regard (see pp. 174–180). David’s faithfulness is highlighted throughout the narrative of his reign and in those texts which compare other kings to him. The kings that are portrayed positively are those who act to ensure that the cultic elements of the nation’s life are ordered according to the covenant. This is especially the case with Hezekiah and Josiah (pp. 180–181).

The king’s participation in and contribution to the cultic life of the nation has been at the centre of much twentieth-century research on the Psalms. In the second major section of this chapter, I have focused on the portrait of the king that emerges from those Psalms (pp. 181–196). Some important themes emerge from this investigation. Israel’s kingship is portrayed in Davidic terms and the Davidic covenant between the Lord and David reflected in 2 Samuel 7 is considered foundational. The king’s faithfulness to this covenant is seen as determinative in his relationship with the Lord. Through this covenant the king is chosen by the Lord and becomes the Lord’s anointed. This close relationship is also described using filial language. However, while the king, as “son of God,” is not divine, he is the most exalted person within Israel. And because of Israel’s exalted status amongst the nations, the king is necessarily the most exalted person in the cosmos. This exalted status is not diminished through use of the term “servant” to describe the king and this designation is also indicative of the king’s status as the Lord’s vice-regent who is given dominion over Israel and the nations that mirrors, albeit at a lesser scale, the Lord’s dominion over the cosmos. As vice-regent, the king imitates the Lord’s justice and

275. Noth, Deuteronomistic History, 300.
righteousness, especially with regard to the poor, oppressed, and marginalized within Israel. The corollary of this position is that the king must oppose the wicked both within and outside Israel. The latter group are often identified as “enemies” against whom the Lord wages war through the agency of the king. Echoes of the psalms’ poetic portrait of the ideal king can also be found in Israel’s prophetic tradition.

Kingship in the book of Isaiah is marked by a number of the same characteristics already noted in DH and the Psalms: the king is chosen by the Lord, anointed and given the Lord’s spirit. Isaiah’s vision is overwhelmingly corporate, even as it makes space for an individual ruler. The ideal society, marked by righteousness and justice, is achieved as various rulers fulfill their mandates as the Lord’s agents: the king in the earlier part of the book, the Servant and Cyrus in the latter parts. The surprising announcement of Cyrus as the Lord’s “anointed” reminds the reader that the Davidic dynasty becomes less and less significant throughout the book, presumably in response to the effective end of that dynasty in the exilic period. Nevertheless, the Davidic covenant is not forgotten (see, e.g., Isa 9.7; 11.1), even as it is transferred to the nation in the latter part of the book (55.3; 61.8).

One of the most striking differences between the ideal king in some of the Greek writings already investigated and that of the Hebrew Bible is that the latter is almost never described in terms of his “virtues.” Rather, the king’s relationship to the Lord and fidelity to the covenant is paramount. The king acts as warrior/saviour, in both the present and the future. The king is expected to act righteously and ensure a just society, yet he is not consistently described as “righteous” or “just.” The closest we get to a description of the king’s virtues is in Isaiah 11 where he is associated with wisdom, understanding, the ability to strategize and act accordingly,276 and piety through the spirit of God. But even at this point, if this statement is associated with the king’s anointing, these traits are linked to the king’s coronation and the Lord’s provision, rather than virtues inherent in the king’s person. This correlates well with Williamson’s conclusion that in Isaiah (and, I would argue, elsewhere in the Jewish Scriptures) the emphasis falls on the king’s role rather than on his person.277 In Isaiah, the most significant role this ruler plays (whether the Davidic king of chapters 1–39 or the Servant or Cyrus) is concerned with the rescue of the Lord’s people in order to establish an ideal society marked by justice and righteousness. In Isaiah, this future rescue also comes to include the nations who turn to serve the Lord. As in the Psalms, the realm of Israel’s king is expanded beyond the geographical boundaries established under David and Solomon. While the hope for a ruler that will accomplish this salvation is sometimes focused on a sitting ruler, more often than not the book of Isaiah looks to a future ruler who will inaugurate this state, thus contributing to the development of messianism in the post-exilic period and beyond.278

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276. This is not a new development within the narrative of Judahite kingship. Solomon was known as the wise king par excellence (e.g., 1 Kgs 3.1–28; 4.26–34; 10.23–24).


The messianic ideal plays an increasingly important role in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman periods of Israel’s history. In the next chapter, however, I attempt to identify Jewish texts from these periods that draw not on this developing messianic ideal, but on the various constructions of ideal kingship presented in the preceding chapters.
CHAPTER 5. HELLENISTIC JEWISH KINGSHIP

In Chapter 3, we observed some of the continuities and changes in philosophical thought concerning ideal kingship that occurred in the Hellenistic period in the wake of Alexander’s conquests and the transformation of the political landscape of the eastern Mediterranean following his death. In this chapter, three Jewish texts from the Hellenistic period are examined in order to survey the way in which Jewish authors of this period might have been influenced by the same Zeitgeist. Of particular interest is the way in which Hellenistic kingship ideals interacted with those found in the Jewish Scriptures.

The first text that will be examined, the Letter of Aristeas, is part of a larger cultural project identified by Erich Gruen as “the production of stories that gave Jewish matters a place in the high policy of Hellenistic kings.” Within this project, the Letter of Aristeas is significant because it contains an extended section which draws on the topos of the ideal king and perhaps even directly from Hellenistic περὶ βασιλείας treatises. The next text examined in this section, the Wisdom of Solomon, does not contain a similarly concentrated discourse on kingship, but scholars have noted its indebtedness to Hellenistic kingship ideals. Finally, selected passages from Philo’s On the Life of Moses will be examined. Philo explicitly identifies Moses as the model philosopher-king and also shows evidence of familiarity with ideas common to the ideal kingship topos, thus making his biography of the Jewish leader a suitable candidate for investigation in this chapter.

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1. In terms of chronology, Wisdom of Solomon and Philo’s writings should be described as Graeco-Roman texts, if we decide that the Hellenistic period ended in 30 BCE with the death of Cleopatra VII. As Glenn Bugh observes, this is “a choice of convenience and custom” (“Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 2). Because of the continuing cultural and intellectual influence of the Hellenistic period on these writers, we are justified in identifying them as “Hellenistic.” For Wisdom of Solomon, see James Miller Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences, AnBib 41 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970); for Philo, see Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The Jewish Philosophy’: Reading Moses Via Hellenistic Philosophy According to Philo,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria, ed. Torrey Seland (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 129–54.

Sylvie Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas (London: Routledge, 2003), argues that Hellenistic Jewish literature should be considered part of the larger body of Hellenistic literature rather than as a distinct category. While I agree with a number of Honigman’s arguments, for the purposes of my study, the distinction is necessary. The manner and extent to which the Jewish Scriptures influenced and were used by the authors in this chapter allows us to distinguish them from the Hellenistic authors considered in Chapter 4.


John Barclay argues that Jewish Hellenization can be plotted along three axes: assimilation, which looks at social integration; acculturation, concerned with language and education; and accommodation, the use of acculturation.\(^6\) In this chapter I am concerned primarily with the second category. To what extent do these texts display an awareness of Hellenistic models of kingship? In what way were these models adapted? How did these three authors use kingship ideals from the Jewish Scriptures within their construction of ideal kingship? The way in which other Hellenistic Jews write about kingship will inform the penultimate chapter of this dissertation in which Paul’s writings about Jesus’ kingship are studied.

Just as Athenian authors dominated the chapter on classical Greek writings and, to a lesser extent, the Hellenistic writings, Alexandrian Jewish authors dominate this chapter. This phenomenon illustrates the shift during the Hellenistic period in the scholarly centre of gravity from Athens to Alexandria of which these texts are both product and witness.

The Philosopher's King in The Letter of Aristeas

The Letter of Aristeas\(^7\), is neither a letter\(^8\) nor was it written by Aristeas. Humphrey Hody’s *Contra historiam Aristeæ de LXX interpretibus dissertatio* (1684) is one of the earliest works to argue against the text’s authenticity and historicity.\(^9\) The Letter is universally recognized amongst modern scholars as pseudepigraphical and its historical value questioned. Nonetheless, there is a growing appreciation for its value in understanding second-century Alexandrian Judaism.\(^10\)

The Letter\(^11\) is framed by the translation into Greek of the “divine Law” written “in Hebrew

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8. While this is the majority position, L. Michael White, “Epistolarity, Exhortation, and Apologetics in the Epistle of Aristeas,” *EC* 6 (2015): 179–219 argues that the text’s presentation of itself as a letter needs to be taken more seriously by scholars.

9. Although Ludovicus de Vives and Joseph Scaliger had raised doubts even earlier than Hody (Hadas, *Aristeas*, 5–9, 84–86); see also Wright, *Aristeas*, 6–11.


11. Discussions of the text’s genre notwithstanding, the work is traditionally identified as the “Letter of Aristeas”; see the titles of the two major English commentaries: Hadas, *Aristeas* and Wright, *Aristeas*. I will follow Oswyn Murray and refer to both the author and character as Aristeas and not Pseudo-Aristeas, “since he was inventing himself, not impersonating another” (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 343 n. 7); pace Honigman, *Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship*, 2; Wright, *Aristeas*, 20.
characters” (Let. Aris. 3). The translation is requested by Demetrius of Phalerum, the keeper of King Ptolemy II Philadelphus’ library (9–11), and the translation is eventually executed (301–307) by 72 Jewish sages sent to Alexandria by Eleazar, the high priest in Jerusalem. This basic narrative occupies a surprisingly small part of the Letter but is fleshed out with a number of excursuses which are not digressions but which contribute to the author’s larger purpose. One of these excursuses (187–300) deals with a seven-day symposium during which the king asks each of the Jewish sages a question about kingship. This excursus needs to be seen within the broader purposes of the letter.

**Purpose of the Letter of Aristeas**

Because it is the earliest independent witness to the Septuagint, the purpose of the Letter of Aristeas has often been understood in terms of this translation. Moses Hadas, for example, following Paul Kahle’s thesis, argues that the purpose of the Letter is to give authority to a Greek translation produced around the time the Letter was written. The problem with this approach to the Letter’s purpose is that it fails to account for the various excursuses and the fact that the translation is so infrequently mentioned in the narrative.

Seeing broader societal concerns reflected in the Letter, an earlier generation of scholarship considered the Letter to exemplify Jewish apologetic literature addressed to a Gentile audience. Victor Tcherikover’s mid-twentieth-century study of the Letter of Aristeas points in the opposite direction. He argues that this text “was composed not for propaganda among the Greeks, but for the needs of the Jewish reader.” Tcherikover’s position constitutes the majority opinion with regard to the audience of the Letter.

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12. Sylvia Honigman notes that digressions of this nature are not unusual in Hellenistic prose compositions (*Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship*, 17–25, 37).

13. “Septuagint” (LXX) is used here to refer to the Greek translation of the first five books of the Hebrew Bible and not the larger body of the Greek Jewish scriptures (=“Septuagint/Old Greek”).


15. Henry Thackeray, for example, writes: “[The author’s] main object is to commend and magnify the Jewish nation, with its laws and institutions, in the eyes of the Greek public for which he writes, by narrating the honour bestowed upon it by a Greek monarch and the praise accorded to Jewish wisdom by heathen philosophers” (*The Letter of Aristeas: Translated with an Appendix of Ancient Evidence on the Origin of the Septuagint*, Translation of Early Documents. Series II. Hellenistic-Jewish Texts [London: SPCK, 1917], x); cf. Henry Meecham who subtitiled his volume on Aristeas, “a study in early apologetic” (*The Oldest Version of the Bible: ‘Aristeas’ on Its Traditional Origin. A Study in Early Apologetic with Translation and Appendices.* [London: Holborn, 1932].)


17. For a summary of this discussion, see Barclay, *Jews in the Diaspora*, 148–50. Barclay, however, argues that there is no need that the question of audience be posed in either/or terms, and that Aristeas addresses Gentiles and Jews; cf. Hadas, *Aristeas*, 60 who writes of “strengthening the self-esteem of the Jews themselves and perhaps heightening their esteem in the eyes of the dominant environment” and also Shutt, “Aristeas,” 10: “its underlying motive and purpose are mixed.” Abraham Wasserstein and David Wasserstein are among the few modern scholars who still hold to the older thesis when they write about “the clearly apologetic and propagandistic purpose of the Jewish author who endeavours to show the pagan reader how well respected the Jews were at the Ptolemaic court” (*The Legend of the Septuagint: From Classical Antiquity to Today* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 25).
Although scholars differ on points of detail—Benjamin Wright identifies “a dizzying array of purposes” proposed for the Letter—there seems to be broad agreement that the Letter of Aristeas was written primarily for a Jewish audience as a means of justifying and strengthening a particular Jewish identity within the Alexandrian Jewish community. This identity was constructed, partly, through the production of a charter myth which had at its centre the Alexandrian translation of the Jewish scriptures from Hebrew into Greek. This myth necessarily looked even further back to Israel’s own “charter myth”—the events of Israel’s escape from Egypt as they are recorded in Exodus. While the biblical aspect of the myth would have distanced the Jews of Alexandria from their neighbours, the author sought to decrease this distance through the use of the elements of Hellenistic intellectual culture. The theme of Alexandrian textual scholarship combined with Hellenistic philosophical topos and language placed within a Hellenistic literary composition would have assured the readers of their place at the table of Hellenistic culture. In the remainder of the section I will explore the author’s efforts more closely by examining the seven-day symposium hosted by Ptolemy II Philadelphus.

The Symposium

In an extended excursus (187–300), Aristeas describes how, over a period of seven days, Ptolemy entertains the Jewish sages who arrive from Jerusalem in order to produce the translation for his library.

The Sages. From their first appearance on the narrative scene, it becomes obvious that the Letter seeks to portray these Jewish scholars as Hellenistic sages. In Eleazar’s response to Ptolemy request for “elders of exemplary lives, with experience of the Law and ability to translate it” (39), Eleazar states that 72 elders, ἀνδρας καλους και ἀγαθοὺς,20 were chosen in the presence of all (46). Each is then named in 47–50. The names reflect the elders’ Jewish heritage but provide evidence for the Hellenism which both influences the author and to which he aspires.21 In the reader’s next encounter with this group they are described as “men of the highest merit and of excellent education” (τοὺς ἀριστους ἀνδρας και παιδειας διαφεροντας), the result of their noble birth (121). These are men whom one would expect to be at home in the upper echelons of Hellenistic society in Alexandria.22

20. This is as close as one can get to describing someone in terms of καλογαθία without actually using the word. Kovelman, Between Alexandria and Jerusalem, 122 notes a similarity between Let. Aris. 122 and Exod 18.21 LXX (quite different from the MT), where those to be appointed as officers (χιλιαρχοι) are described as “capable, god-fearing men, righteous men, who hate arrogance” (ἀνδρας δυνατους θεσπετες, ανδρας δικαιος μισουντας υπερισπιαναν). But Kovelman’s assumption that the “officers” represent the same group as the 70 elders (πρεσβεις) of Exodus 24 is unwarranted.
22. So Rajak, Translation and Survival, 62: “As we have seen, he represents the Jewish sages as quintessential Greeks, on top of their other attributes, and he thus asserts Jewish participation in the great Alexandrian work of revitalizing and reconfiguring Athenian culture.”
As befits gentleman of this class, they are highly educated. They are described as being knowledgeable, not only of Jewish literature, but also that of the Greeks (121). They rise above "conceit and contempt" and engage "in discourse and listening to and answering each and every one, as is meet and right" (122). This trait is clearly essential in their discourse with the king that will follow. In good Aristotelian fashion, they take "the middle way as their commendable ideal," avoiding any "uncouth and uncultured attitude of mind" (τὸ τραχύ καὶ βαρβαρόν τῆς διανοίας; 122). When the Alexandrian philosophers express admiration for these Jewish scholars (200–201, 296)—who "surpassed them in attitude and eloquence" (235)—their identification as Hellenistic sages is complete.23

The presence of these men at a series of banquets hosted by Ptolemy (187–300) ensures that the reader is presented with an ideal Hellenistic royal symposium24 at which the king is entertained and educated by a group of philosophers.

The Royal Symposium. The Hellenistic royal symposium is, according to Oswyn Murray, modelled on the tyrannical symposia of archaic Greece, the Macedonian royal feasts, and the banquets of the Persian king.25 Murray argues for the importance of the performative aspect of the royal symposium wherein the king displays certain aspects of his person for public consumption.26 But the symposium is also known to us as a literary form, of which the symposia of Plato, Xenophon, and later, Plutarch and Athenaeus are the best known.27

In the Letter of Aristeas we are provided with a literary symposium that purports to provide an accurate account of a royal symposium (297–300).28 These two elements—the historical and the literary—combine to present us with, on the one hand, a performance of the king’s virtues and, on the other, philosophical instructions on ideal kingship.29 In the Letter, however, the king’s virtues are seen primarily in the type of questions he asks and his response to the answers given.

“On Kingship” in Aristeas. Both Günther Zuntz and Oswyn Murray argue that the author of the Letter of Aristeas drew on the tradition of περὶ βασιλείας writings in his narration of the royal symposium.30

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27. These texts are literary representations, not of the royal symposium, but of the more general symposium (for which, see Jason König, Saints and Symposiums: The Literature of Food and the Symposium in Greco-Roman and Early Christian Culture, Greek Culture in the Roman World [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 6–17).

28. Aristeas’ idealized version is nonetheless marked by “ignorance and confusion ... about the actual practices of early Hellenistic symposia.” (Murray, “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” 22–23).


In Zuntz’s view, the Letter’s ideas about kingship go back to a single περι βασιλείας source, which has been combined with other sources that reflect Greek popular philosophy. Zuntz feels confident about reconstructing Aristeas’ περι βασιλείας Vorlage from the questions and answers that pertain directly to kingship. Murray observes that the discussion around the banquet is also influenced by the author’s Jewish thought. He disagrees with Zuntz on the nature of Aristeas’ kingship source. Murray argues that multiple sources inform the writing of the author, “who had doubtless read widely in kingship literature.” Furthermore, Murray’s observation that Aristeas uses his sources quite freely—not only here, but throughout the Letter—makes it impossible to reconstruct them with any degree of certainty.

I have discussed the Letter’s particular view of kingship expressed in the symposium and elsewhere in the context of a “charter myth” for the Alexandrian Jewish community. In that essay I attempt to distinguish between three different “types” of kingship portrayed in the various parts of the Letter: Hellenistic, Egyptian, and Jewish. In what remains of this section, I shall focus on the kingship elements in the symposium, using Murray’s observation that the narrative contains elements from Hellenistic kingship writings, Hellenistic moral philosophy, and Jewish thought. While I am in general agreement with Wright’s observation that there is not much to be gained from teasing out the various sources and the traditions to which they belong, these three categories are heuristically useful for dealing with an otherwise unwieldy text, even if absolute certainty regarding the tradition-history of the Letter remains elusive.

Hellenistic Kingship

A number of questions situate the symposium within Hellenistic thinking about kingship. The first two questions ask how one might maintain one’s kingdom/kingship (βασιλεία) (Let. Aris. 187; cf. 271) and how a king should act (189), while another inquires about “the most needful characteristic of kingship” (209), and yet another about “the definition of kingship” (211). Moreover, at the conclusion of the symposium, the king expresses gratitude to the sages for providing him with the doctrines of royal rule (294). Through these questions and answers, one is able to catch a glimpse of the kingship writings that inform the Letter of Aristeas.

Oswyn Murray notes that Aristeas’ kingship doctrine is defined in three primary ways: the king must ensure the well-being of his subjects, he must exercise justice, and he must be characterized by

34. The reconstruction/outline offered by Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I,” 28–29 consists of 8 headings: fundamental virtues (188–90), ethical qualities (206–33), largesse (225–27), just administration (239–53), the bond of eunoia (262–73), the exercise of power (279–281), the king’s daily life (283–287), and essentials of kingship (288–92). While there are indeed smaller clusters of related material, such as the one discussing the king’s life (283–287), the Procrustean outline offered by Zuntz has failed to convince subsequent scholars (see, e.g., Wright, Aristeas, 339).
36. See also 265, 267, 271, 283–87, 291.
certain royal traits and virtues. Space constraints make the enumeration and discussion of all the elements that contribute to these themes impossible. In what follows, I will highlight a handful of examples in order to demonstrate the presence of these aspects of ideal kingship.

Subjects’ well-being. The king must be marked by clemency and love of humanity (ἐπιλεκτικός καὶ φιλανθρωπία; 290). According to Murray, φιλανθρωπία is the central royal virtue from which all others flow. The king will exercise φιλανθρωπία by remembering the pain that humanity faces and not inflicting further pain (208). The king’s love of humanity will ensure that he treats his subjects well and that they respond with love (265). This bond of good will between ruler and subject was emphasized in a number of the texts studied in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and is the defining element of the subject-ruler relationship in the Hellenistic kingship ideal.

Other concepts contribute to this idea of the king’s φιλανθρωπία. The king shows concern for his subjects by exercising careful foresight (προνοία) and benefitting (εὐεργεσία) them like God does (190; cf. 201). “Doing good to all” (εὐεργετῶν ὑπὸ ἄπαντας; 249) is another way of talking about the king’s relationship to his subjects, whose well-being should be at the centre of his thinking (245) and should even inform his choice of officials (271). By benefitting his subjects, the king ensures their good will towards him; it is from this pool of subjects that the king should choose his officials and advisors (264; 270).

The king’s care of his subjects might be seen as an end in and of itself. But a slightly more utilitarian tone is sounded in 204–205, where the sage answers that the king might remain rich if, amongst other things, he ensures the good will (εὐνοία) of his subjects through benefaction (εὐεργεσία). The longevity of the king’s reign is best guaranteed by treating his subjects well (188; 271) and his security is guaranteed by εὐνοία since this is the strongest weapon (230). Aristeas joins Isocrates and Xenophon in pointing out that the king’s interests are best served when his concern is for his subjects’ interests.

The Letter of Aristeas holds the subjects’ well-being and prosperity as central. The most essential possession for a king is spoken of in terms of the reciprocal relationship of love and good-will that exists between the good king and his subjects (265) and “the greatest thing in kingship” (trans. Wright) is described in terms of the subjects’ well-being: to establish them in peace and to guarantee justice (291). It is to the latter that we now turn.

38. For detailed exegesis of the symposium passages, see Wright, Aristeas, 335–424. Still useful are the notes provided by Hadas, Aristeas, 172–215.
39. “Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World,” in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers, ed. Tessa Rajak, et al., HCS 50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 24. Given Aristeas’ greater purpose, it is not surprising that Ptolemy II is described in this way, even if these words are placed on his own lips (Let. Aris. 36).
40. The genitive in the phrase τῶν ὑποτευτεμένων φιλανθρωπίας καὶ ἀγάπης at 265 has been understood in both a subjective and objective sense. I follow Wright, Aristeas, 403–4 and Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 353–54 in seeing both suggested: the king shows φιλανθρωπία towards his subjects and they respond with love.
Justice. Justice is an important element within Aristeas’ construction of ideal kingship. The concluding answer proclaims that justice, along with ensuring peace, is the greatest achievement of kingship (291; cf. 209). Justice must govern the king’s general dealings with others (189; 212; 232; 267) because of the temptation to use power to his own advantage in such a way as to pervert justice (215).

The king’s more specific judicial function is on view at 191 when he is urged to show equality (ἰσος γένους) in his “dealings and judgments” (cf. 263). In this way, he will be seen to have behaved correctly even by those who have not succeeded in their cases or petitions before him.

Furthermore, the good king’s judgements are tempered by clemency, ἐπικέκαια. Wrongdoers are to be punished less severely than they deserve in order that they might turn from evil (188; cf. 207). Surprisingly, clemency is urged in the paragraph immediately after the one holding up equality as the way to establish justice (191–192). The author of the Letter seems not to feel the tension highlighted by the Stoics between urging the king to act with both justice and leniency.42 Perhaps the Aristotelian attempts to make ἐπικέκαια part of δίκαιοσύνη is on view at this point.43 As seen by its pairing at 290 with love of humanity, ἐπικέκαια should perhaps be seen in its broader sense of kindness and mercy, rather than in its more legal sense of clemency or leniency.44 The question of the role of law naturally follows on from this discussion.

While the narrative frame of the letter speaks of the divine law (3), which is also the law of the Jews (30) and for which the high priest provides an extended apology (128–171),45 the discussion of kingship has little to say about law from the perspective of political theory. Aristeas assumes that the king should follow the law since the legislators have been appointed by God for the good of humankind (240). By following the laws the king will be following the commandment of God and will thus be acting justly (279). The Hellenistic discussion of the king’s relationship to the law in the light of his irreproachable rule has vanished and we are left simply with a king who is required to follow the established law. The king must follow “the laws” (plural) rather than the singular “law,” suggesting to Benjamin Wright that the Letter is referring to some law code rather than to an ideal law.46 The “commandment” (πρόσταγμα) of God which the king follows in this way might have in view an abstract ideal law or, more likely, refers to a divine prescription that the king should follow the established laws. This would serve to curb the king’s power and, together with the argument for kindness/ἐπικέκαια, guard against oppressive rule.

The Letter also appeals to the king to follow the laws for the sake of his posthumous reputation (279; cf. 230–31; 278) and to follow justice for the sake of his conscience (215). Furthermore, the

42. Wright, Aristeas, 43–44.
44. For a full definition of ἐπικέκαια, see Donald Dale Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology and Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter Fragment, WUNT 2/152 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 331–35. I am suggesting that Aristeas’ use is closest to Walker’s definition 2(c), “a friendly or democratic bearing towards one’s lessers,” or 2(g), “the easy, kind and generous treatment shown to subjects of inferiors.”
45. See Wright, Aristeas, 246–313.
king’s officials (280) and generals (281) should also be concerned with justice and the king should make appointments accordingly.

Alongside φιλανθρωπία, justice (τὸ δίκαιον/δικαιοσύνη) is a foundational characteristic of ideal kingship in the Letter of Aristeas. The author shows concerns that are similar to other Hellenistic writers. Both justice and clemency are necessary traits, but the author is either unaware of or unconcerned with the tension created when both traits are encouraged. With regard to the question of the king and the law, the author requires the king to submit to the laws. They thus limit the power and authority characteristic of Hellenistic kingship.

**Virtues.** In the penultimate question (288–90) the king asks whether a commoner or someone of royal descent is the best king. Perhaps the king was setting up his interlocutor with something of a dilemma: Ptolemy II belonged in the latter category, but his illustrious father, who started the Ptolemaic dynasty, might be considered to fall into the first category. The Jewish sage avoids the false dichotomy with an answer that accords with the one seen in earlier chapters: the one who is by nature superior (τὸν ἄριστον τῇ φόσει) should reign (288). Such a person is described in terms of a noble character and education (ἡθος χρηστόν καὶ παιδείας; 290), the type of person the banquet discourse has been describing all along.

We have already noted the foundational nature of the virtues of justice and love of humanity, but other traditional royal traits are added to these. When the king asks about the goal of courage (ἀνδρεία), the answer—accomplishing that which one intended—is given in Stoic terms. The martial view of courage is on view at 281, albeit in a slightly modified form that focuses on appointing leaders who will protect the lives of soldiers. Moderation (σωφροσύνη) is seen as making the greatest contribution to the king’s health (237). Most people need to exercise moderation (μετριότης) in terms of eating and drinking, but kings need to be wary of the desire to expand their territory (221–223). Moderation here is spoken of in the context of self-control (see below). The king’s entertainment should also be marked by decorum and restraint (284), and it is this restraint which is a mark of his love of wisdom (285). Furthermore, wisdom (σοφία) teaches the king to be merciful (207) and brings about a clear conscience (260). There is a marked absence of talk of the science of ruling or royal wisdom. This might be because the author intends the entire banquet discourse to be understood in these terms. In the only explicit question dealing with φρονησις, the king asks whether to act with this sort of royal wisdom (τὸ φρονεῖν) is something that can be taught (236). The sage informs him that it is a disposition of the soul which comes from God.

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47. Ptolemy I came from a noble Macedonian family with some connection to the royal family through his mother, but cannot be thought of as royal (Günther Hölbl, A History of Ptolemaic Egypt, trans. Tina Saavedra [London: Routledge, 2001], 14); see pp. 21–22 of Hölbl’s work for Ptolemy’s assumption of the title βασιλεύς.
48. Hadas’s attribution of this view to a Cynic-Stoic conception of kingship (Aristeas, 212) is too narrow; this is the foundational assumption of all Hellenistic kingship (Wright, Aristeas, 421).
49. Hadas, Aristeas, 178; Wright, Aristeas, 347.
50. Wright, Aristeas, 381 notes the same connection between health and moderation made by Plato (Charm. 157a).
51. Gruen cites this as an example of Aristeas’ subversive humour (“Aristeas and the Septuagint,” 147).
A number of answers teach that virtue comes from God (216; 236–239; 243), but the author also draws on another theme that we have regularly encountered in other texts: it is through the imitation of God that the king will be blameless (210) and benefit his subjects (190; 281). The Letter identifies the Jewish god with Ζεύς and Δίς (16), the supreme Greek god, and also speaks of his uniqueness (μόνος ὁ θεός) and dominion (δυναστεία) (132). The fact that the human king should imitate this god suggests that kingship is an appropriate metaphor to apply to this god. Yet nowhere is the Jewish god explicitly called king, although there are two passages that speak of God’s rule over the cosmos (θεός τον πάντα κόσμον διοικεῖ; 254; cf. 195). Given the prominence of the metaphor in other writings being examined in this chapter, it is surprising that the Letter only refers to God’s kingship in very muted tones. To this observation should be added the fact that the king is not presented as God’s representative or image—the mystical type of kingship on view in the Pythagorean writings is absent. Perhaps the fact that the only kings on view in the Letter are non-Jewish has caused the author to temper his view of kingship at this point.

Also missing is any indication of how the king might improve his subjects. In the Pythagorean treatises, for example, we saw that subjects were to imitate the king as the king imitated the divine. In this way humanity reflected something of the divine virtues. At 218, the king is urged to act in a manner worthy of the office since his subjects will be watching him, but this is said for the sake of his reputation, not their improvement. There is a question about bringing the “heterogeneous multitudes” (παμμιγών ὄχλων) of the kingdom into harmony (267) that potentially allows the sage to apply Pythagorean political theory along the lines seen in the kingship treatises. However, the response simply points the king once again to the importance of justice. The framework of the Letter points to the fact that the divine law is now available in language that Jew and Greek alike can understand. While the author stops short of exhorting non-Jews to follow this law, the law’s excellence in teaching justice/righteousness (noted especially in the apology, 128–172) suggests its suitability for guiding the life of citizens in place of the example of the king.

The Letter is also conscious of the need to warn the king against certain traits and we note the presence of a number of vices: arrogance (262–263), envy (224), and anger (253-254) are all mentioned as potentially destructive of kingship. The king is warned about idleness and pleasure (245), and is told later in the discourse that he should spend time reading literature beneficial to his rule (283) and speaking at banquets with learned men (οἱ φιλομαθεῖς) (286–287) since these activities would benefit his subjects. When he does indulge in entertainment, he should do so with decency and moderation (284–285).

As in so many of the kingship texts already examined, the Letter of Aristeas defines kingship in terms of the rule of a superior person. The king’s superiority is described in terms of a characteristic matrix of royal virtues. Whether these were originally meant to flatter or exhort the royal reader, they

53. Philo’s writing (see below) shows an attempt to do both through linking the king’s example to the law by means of the idea of “embodied law” or νόμος ἐμπνευσμένος.
have found their way into the topos of ideal kingship from which the author of the Letter has drawn. The Letter therefore serves as a prime example of the what the Hellenistic περὶ βασιλείας treatises might have contained.54

However, the reader who perseveres through the king’s questions and the sages’ answers is struck by the extent to which kingship is absent in a large proportion of the discourse.55 The advice is applicable to a broader audience and bears more than a passing resemblance to the moral advice found in Hellenistic philosophical writings.

Hellenistic Moral Philosophy

The king asks a question (195) that would not have been out of place in any of the classical or Hellenistic philosophical schools: Τι καλλιστον αύτῷ πρός το ζην ἢ εἶνεν; The author’s Jewish roots do not allow him to speculate further along philosophical lines and the sage’s answer is given in terms of the sovereignty of God.56 On other topics, however, the author allows the sages to display their mastery of Hellenistic philosophy.

We have already noted the sages’ discussion of the virtues that play such an important role in Hellenistic philosophy. To these we might add the question about getting a good night’s sleep which leads to a discussion of dreams and generates one of the longer answers in the discourse (213–216).57 The discussion at 197 of how one might navigate life with “equanimity” (μετρίως) might seem to derive from Peripatetic concerns, but the sage’s answer is given in terms of adopting a certain “preconception” or “mental scheme” (πρόληψις). The use of this term suggests that Stoic ἀπάθεια rather than Aristotelian equanimity is in view at this point.58 The author’s use of the technical vocabulary for moral progress (ἀπταιστος, διευθύνο) at 188 demonstrates an easy familiarity with at least parts of this tradition.59 More examples can be pointed out,60 but these should suffice to demonstrate that, in addition to drawing from Hellenistic writings about kingship, the author has used one or more sources that provide him with vocabulary and concepts from Hellenistic moral philosophy.

There also seems to be an attempt to give the banquet digression a philosophical form. Michael White notes that the sages’ answers bear a certain resemblance to gnomic sayings, indicating “a

55. Zuntz is of the opinion that about half of the questions and answers do not address kingship (“Aristeas Studies I,” 30). According to Murray (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 349), only 18 questions reflect Hellenistic popular philosophy. I suspect Zuntz counts every question that contains any element of Hellenistic philosophy while Murray is only counting questions which bear no connection to thought on kingship. Neither scholar provides a list of the passages to which he is referring.
56. Eleazar considers the main objective of life to be concerned with (contemplating?) the sovereignty of God (141; cf. 132).
57. The author of the Letter already signalled an interest in dreams at 160. The Peripatetics, in particular, seem to have been concerned with questions of sleep and dreams. Aristotle’s On Sleep and On Dreams no doubt inspired others like Theophrastus (D.L. 5.45) and Strato (D.L. 5.59). Diogenes Laertius mentions that Chrysippus wrote about sleep in his work On the Soul (7.50) and notes part of the Stoic discussion (D.L. 7.158).
58. Wright, Aristeas, 346–47.
60. Murray (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 349) cites the discussion of envy (224), sorrow (232), of philosophy, impulses, and the passions (256), and living as a stranger (257) as further examples; see also Wright, Aristeas, 425.
conscious effort to ‘translate’ elements of the Jewish moral tradition into recognizable and normative Greek equivalents.”

Two passages are of special interest for our discussion of kingship. In the first, the king asks for a definition of kingship (Τις ὁρος τοῦ βασιλέως ἐστιν; 211), while in the second, the king asks about the greatest form of rule (Τις ἐστιν ἀρχή κρατίστη; 221). However, instead of an answer given in terms of political theory or ideal kingship, both questions receive answers that focus on self-rule. Yet another passage teaches that those who cultivate the virtues (like the king?) will find themselves respecting self-control and righteousness instead of the rule of pleasure (278). We have already noted that the Socratic theme of self-control/self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) was central in classical thought and that this idea was extended in the Hellenistic period as part of a general pattern in which political concepts were used to engage in moral analysis, especially of the self. The author of the Letter has drawn from the same pool of thought.

**Jewish Kingship**

We turn finally to ask how the author’s reading of the Jewish scriptures have influenced his conception of kingship. There are only a handful of instances where the Letter quotes the Septuagint, but he feels no need to rewrite the Jewish scriptures as part of his narrative. Rather, at certain points he has drawn on Jewish thought, broadly conceived, as part of his discussion of kingship.

The most obvious element is the direct reference to God as part of every answer—either as a model to follow or to petition for God’s help. At 200–201 and 235 the king and the philosophers acknowledge this as the reason for the sages’ excellence. It is not so much the appeal to the divine or the recommendation of piety (210) that is exceptional, but the emphasis that the author places on the role of God in the life of the king. If, according to the Jewish high priest, everything in life is concerned with the sovereign power (δυναστεία) of God (141), then this should certainly be true of royal rule.
Most scholars agree that 193 represents a Jewish understanding of war: when asked about how a king might remain undefeated, the sage answers in terms of confidence in God instead of military might. Similarly, 194 asserts that military forces are useless apart from the fear of God. Hellenistic thought did allow for divine intervention in battle, but here the Letter seems to deny traditional military exploits in favour of a policy reminiscent of Psalm 19.7–10 LXX and 1 Maccabees 3.19 in which victory is determined solely by God. The advice to be moderate in one’s desire for territorial conquest (Let. Aris. 223), furthermore, would also have seemed odd to those accustomed to defining their kingship in terms of military victory and “spear-won land.”

A number of important aspects of Jewish kingship are, however, missing in Aristeas’ banquet discussion. The idea that the king was specially chosen by God was a central tenet of the Jewish kingship texts examined in Chapter 4. While an implication of God’s sovereignty is the assertion that the king rules at God’s pleasure (199; 219; 224), there is no text that speaks of his special appointment by God to this role. Perhaps the fact that the Letter deals primarily with Graeco-Egyptian kingship prevents the author from pursuing this idea any further than this. Also missing is the sense of a future ideal king, as seen in some of the Isaiah passages. If Aristeas’ focus is on the Pentateuch, however, this is not surprising. What is surprising is the absence of exhortations regarding the law. While the king is certainly told to follow the law given by the legislators (240), the plural suggests that traditional Greek lawmakers are in view and not Moses. The appeal forms part of the Greek discourse on the king’s relationship to law, rather than the Jewish discourse on the king’s faithfulness to the Mosaic ordinances. The Mosaic law is unlikely to be in view at 279 (see the discussion above, p. 218). It is true that in the narrative, Ptolemy demonstrates deep reverence for the books containing the Jewish law (177; 312; 317), but this confirms that they are worthy to be included in his library (10); there is no indication that Aristeas expected the Egyptian king to be found “diligently observing all the words of this law and these statutes” (Deut 17.19).

There is no appeal to the Jewish scriptures for a model of kingship and the kingship discourse at the banquet contains only a handful of Jewish elements that might be considered peculiar within a Hellenistic milieu. In the realm of political thought, then, there is very little in the Letter of Aristeas that is particularly Jewish.

Aristeas: Concluding Comments

Erich Gruen writes that the Letter of Aristeas “testifies most eloquently to the appropriation of Hellenistic culture to express the preeminence of Jewish values” while showing “self-assurance and a

67. Hadas, Aristeas, 76.
70. Contra Wright, Aristeas, 371, 426.
71. Compare this statement to 312 where the king marvels at the genius of the lawgiver (singular)—a clear reference to Moses, whose name is mentioned only once in the Letter (see 144).
sense of comfort and belonging in the realm of Ptolemaic intellectual society.” This self-assurance is clearly on view in the Letter of Aristeas in the discussion between the Ptolemaic king and the Jewish translator-sages. However, in contrast to Gruen, I would argue that it is not their sly irony or subversive speech that indicates the author’s self-assurance, but the sages’ ability to engage in political discourse with a Hellenistic king in his own terms.

In an excursus modelled on symposium literature in which the author has also borrowed from the gnomic tradition, the monarch and the sages discuss kingship in terms familiar from other Hellenistic writings, suggesting that one or more περὶ βασιλείας treatises provided content for the author of the Letter. The sages also draw effortlessly from Hellenistic moral philosophy and couch their answers in Jewish piety. While Jewish particularism is on view at other points in the Letter, here the sages show themselves to be masters of a “universal” philosophy which is perfected through their appeal to the divine.

The ideal reign constructed in the banquet discourse displays all the markers of virtue kingship. The king’s virtues are directed towards his subjects and God. Their well-being is to be his primary concern. And he can best work towards their well-being by recognizing that every element of his kingship is directed by and dependent upon God.

While it is certainly the case that this lengthy section serves to enhance the prestige of the Jewish sages and thus the status of the translation which they produce, unlike other contemporaneous Jewish writers, the author’s appeal to Jewish superiority is “restrained” and understated. The goal of this part of the narrative is not to argue for the superiority of the Jewish sages (although they are clearly superior), but to show that their philosophical advice is suitable for a Hellenistic king. As valued advisors in the royal court, the translators are welcomed on their own terms. In this way the author shows that Jews belong in Alexandrian society alongside Greeks.

Philosophy and the King in the Wisdom of Solomon

The Wisdom of Solomon consists of three main parts, 1.1–6.21, 6.22–9.18, 10.1–19.22, which, following John Collins, we might identify as the “book of eschatology,” the “book of wisdom” and the “book of history.” The “book of eschatology” addresses the “rulers of the earth,” urging them to

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73. This slippage between the author and the characters of the text assumes the conclusion of Janovitz: that the author presents himself and his philosophical/theological positions in the persons of the sages and the high priest (“Rhetoric of Translation,” 134–38).
75. Wright, Aristeas, 427.
76. Wright, Aristeas, 426, cf. 68.
“love righteousness” (1.1). The author proceeds to contrast the ungodly/unrighteous with the godly/righteous and the section reaches its climax with a picture of the eschatological vindication of the righteous (5.1-23). The conclusion of the section is once again addressed to “kings” and “judges of the earth,” (6.1) urging them to “honour wisdom, so that [they] may reign forever” (6.21). This address to kings suggests that the book be included in our discussion. This suggestion is further strengthened by the fact that in the second part of the Wisdom of Solomon, 6.22–9.18, the author reveals himself indirectly as “Solomon,” King David’s great successor. Finally, the “book of history” is a “vivid ode to divine Wisdom, explaining her saving work in history” by means of seven antitheses or comparisons in which God’s salvation of the Israelites is compared to his judgment of the Egyptians. This section also contains extended digressions on God’s mercy (11.16–12.27) and on idolatry (13.1–15.19). Kingship ideas recede in this section, but are still present in the author’s vision of the divine monarchy.

There is no clear evidence indicating the book’s date of composition. The text’s literary dependence on the LXX suggests 100 BCE as the terminus post quem. This might be lowered to 30 BCE on linguistic grounds, although the lack of comparative literary evidence from this period gives reason for caution. Allusions to the book in the New Testament suggest the middle of the first century CE for the terminus ante quem. The social location of the persecuted “righteous” best fits the period of Jewish persecution under Caligula’s reign (37–41 CE) but it could just as easily have been written in the late Ptolemaic or early imperial periods. The text can thus safely be dated to somewhere between the beginning of the first century BCE and the middle of the first century CE. The theological and philosophical traditions reflected in the Wisdom of Solomon would therefore have been available for Paul’s use.

78. The personification of wisdom in 6.12–16 suggests that it belongs with the following section. Put differently, 6.17–21 can be seen as an appendix inserted by the author to smooth the transition between the two sections (Reese, “Plan and Structure,” 392).
The author of Wisdom, Pseudo-Solomon, was a pious Jew who shows a knowledge of the Jewish biblical tradition as well as the Hellenistic literary tradition. His Greek is excellent and he is familiar with Hellenistic philosophy, suggesting that he was the recipient of a Greek education. Despite the author’s adoption of “the imagery, vocabulary and theories of contemporary Stoicism,” Maurice Gilbert argues that “he shows no mastery of these philosophies. His knowledge, indirect, seems to derive only from his general education.”

The Egyptian provenance of the work is accepted by the majority of commentators. The recollection of God’s judgment against the Egyptians and the author’s antagonism towards them as evinced in the third part of the book leaves little doubt as to the identity of the “ungodly,” although it is possible that apostate/assimilated Jews are also in view in the opening chapters of the work. The author was clearly writing from within an Egyptian context and was most likely a member of the Jewish community in Alexandria.

God as King

As was the case in a number of the biblical texts studied in Chapter 4, for Pseudo-Solomon, God is king. God is never called βασιλεύω, but God will reign (βασιλεύσει) over the righteous who, in turn, judge nations and rule over peoples (Wis 3.8). God manages (διέκα) all things rightly (12.15a) and has “sovereignty (δεσποτεύω) over all” (12.16b). God is sovereign (δεσπόζω), yet judges with mercy (ἐπιμείκται) and governs (διοικεῖ) with forbearance (φείδεται) (12.18). God is kind and true and long-suffering, ordering all things with mercy (15.1). God’s providence is mentioned throughout (14.3; 17.2; 6.7). God acts as a “pilot” in the universe (14.3). God is also portrayed as benefactor of the righteous (εὐεργετέω Wis 3.5; 11.5, 13; 16.2; εὐεργεσία occurs in 16.11, 24). Like a good king, God punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous as part of God’s governing the cosmos.

Given the close relationship between personified Wisdom and God (7.26), “she” is similarly described in royal terms: Wisdom is εὐεργετικός (7.22), φιλάνθροπος (1.6), concerned with justice...
and orders all things well (διοικεῖ τὰ πάντα χρηστῶς; 8.1). Wisdom stands behind those who rule this world, allowing and enabling them to rule (6.20–21; 8.10–11).  

In his portrayal of God, Pseudo-Solomon draws on the same pool of vocabulary and imagery as the Pythagorean kingship treatises. However, some of the characteristics and attributes used in constructing human kingship in the Pythagorean texts are here used to speak of the divine king. Is there polemical intent on the part of Pseudo-Solomon, as Luca Mazzinghi suggests? While others speak of kings as benefactors and governors, the author of Wisdom suggests that these characteristics belong properly to God. In light of the critique of ruler cult (see below), it seems likely that Pseudo-Solomon seeks to draw this absolute distinction between God’s kingship and the types of exalted kingship expressed in the Pythagorean texts and elsewhere.

**The Ideal King**

The most obvious human king in the Wisdom of Solomon is the character of Solomon. Although Solomon is not mentioned by name, the traditional title of the book recognizes the allusions to David’s son, especially in the prayer of chapter 9 (see 1 Kgs 3.6–15; 8.23–61) and the emphasis on wisdom (see, e.g., 1 Kgs 3.28; 4.29–34). This emphasis on wisdom led to the person of Solomon being associated with a number of writings in the Jewish wisdom tradition (Prov 1.1; 10.1; 25.1; Song 1.1; cf. Sir 47.12–22). Even though the words of this book have been placed on the lips of Solomon, the Davidic dynasty is alluded to only once (Wis 9.12) and it is not the covenant with David and his house that is of significance, but those covenants made with the people of Israel (Wis 12.21; 18.22). As will be seen in what follows, this shift from individual Davidic monarchy to a more “democratic” sense of kingship is a key element in the book. But individual monarchy is not absent, and so we turn first to the ideal king of the Wisdom of Solomon.

In the Pythagorean treatises, divine kingship provides a model for human kingship to imitate. In the Wisdom of Solomon, both God and Wisdom are described in language that is also used of the king, leaving the reader in no doubt as to the similarity between the earthly and heavenly rulers, but there is no indication that the earthly king’s sovereignty comes through imitation of the divine king. Instead, sovereign rule comes through relationship with Wisdom (Wis 6.21; 8.10-18), which, in turn, is a gift
from God (Wis 7.7; 8.21; 9.10, 17). The absence of imitation language is striking, especially when the allusion to Genesis 1 in Wisdom 9.1-3 would have allowed the author to discuss this *topos* in terms of humanity's creation in the image of God.

The nature of the king provides another contrast between the Wisdom of Solomon and the Pythagorean texts. In the latter, the king takes on semi-divine qualities (see ch. 3). In Wisdom 7.1–6, Pseudo-Solomon speaks of his common humanity: he is “a descendant of the first-formed individual born on earth” (v. 1), and his mortality: “for no king has had a different beginning of existence, but there is for all one entrance into life and the same way out” (vv. 5–6). Behind this assertion lies a critique of the ruler cult, the etiology of which is describe in Wisdom 14.15–21. The divinity of the ruler is not attacked directly, but implicit in this broader critique of idolatry is the denial of any divinity to that which is not God (Wis 14.20b).

While Pseudo-Solomon’s king is not divine, he is related to the divine through the figure of Wisdom. Divine Wisdom, portrayed as a desirable, beautiful bride (Wis 8.2), dwells in/with the king as a gift from God, bringing with her great honour (8.10-12), political success and military victory (8.14-15; 9.10-12). In addition to making the king suitable for war, Wisdom imparts the cardinal virtues: σοφία, φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, and ἀνδρεία (8.7).

At the heart of the prayer in the Wisdom of Solomon is the request for Wisdom: “Send her [Wisdom] out from the holy heavens, and from your glorious throne send her, that, being present with me, she may labour with me, and that I may learn what is well-pleasing before you” (9.10). The extended prayer in chapter 9 is essential, since Wisdom is only obtained through prayer (8.17–21).

Personified Wisdom is linked with the spirit of God at a number of points in the Wisdom of Solomon. The royal author reflects on his prayer and observes that God answered with a gift of...
understanding (φρόνησις) and a spirit of wisdom (πνεῦμα σοφίας) (7.7). In 1 Kings 3.12, one of the passages being echoed here, Solomon is given “a prudent and wise heart” (καρδιὰν φρονίμην καὶ σοφὴν; 3 Kgdm 3.12 LXX). The nature of God’s gift has been intensified as it was in Isaiah where, for example, “the (divine) spirit of wisdom and understanding” (πνεῦμα σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως; Isa 11.2) rests upon the king. The association between Wisdom and spirit of the Lord/God occurs elsewhere in the Book of Wisdom (1.6–7; 9.17). Not only are Wisdom and spirit spoken of in similar ways, but Wisdom and God’s spirit fulfill similar roles within the book’s cosmology. At 7.24, for example, it is Wisdom that “pervades and penetrates all things,” while at 12.1, God’s “incorruptible spirit is in all things.” Although Pseudo-Solomon never draws the link explicitly, Wisdom is closely associated with the divine spirit.

The foundational trait for the Wisdom of Solomon’s ideal king is thus personified, God-given Wisdom. Not only do the king’s virtues flow from Wisdom, but his martial ability and success, his ability to judge rightly, his position amongst his subjects and the rulers of other nations, and his reputation—all these and more depend on Wisdom dwelling with the king. The traits of the ideal king, especially his close relationship with Wisdom, serve, furthermore, to indicate the transformation of Solomon into a Hellenistic sage. Pseudo-Solomon’s use of this idea enables an interesting development within his kingship ideology that extends kingship in what might be called a “democratic” manner.

Democratic Kingship

We note, first, that spirit is not limited to the person of the king. Pseudo-Solomon also uses “spirit” to speak of that which, together with “body” and “soul,” constitutes general human existence (Wis 1.4–5). Behind Pseudo-Solomon’s anthropology lies Stoic cosmology and the biblical creation account. The strong Stoic influence on Pseudo-Solomon’s understanding of spirit is evident when spirit is described as that which “fills the world” and “holds all things together” (1.7; cf. 7.24; 8.1). In the biblical passage, Genesis 2.7, the Lord blows “a breath of life” (πνοὴν ζωῆς) into the man’s face that he might become “a living being” (ψυχὴν ζωήν). This passage is paraphrased at Wisdom 15.11 when God inspires within the person an “active soul” (ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν) and a “life-giving spirit” (πνεῦμα ζωτικόν). This is the same spirit that returns to God upon a person’s death (15.16).

Since all people experience the spirit—and therefore also Wisdom, given the close relationship between the two (see above)—and since Wisdom is central in the book’s description of kingship, we might expect kingship to extend to the rest of humanity in some or other way. This idea is worked out

110. John R. Levison, Filled with the Spirit (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 142–45.
by Pseudo-Solomon through another reference to the biblical creation account. Wisdom 10.1–2 notes that Wisdom protected the unnamed Adam and “gave him the strength to rule all things (κρατήσατε ἀπάντων).” Similarly, in the previous chapter we overhear a prayer from the author in which he recognizes that God created all things by God’s word (Wis 9.1) and through divine wisdom, “formed human beings to rule (δεσποζω) over the creatures” and to “manage (διεπω) the world” (vv. 2–3). In Genesis 1.26–28, at the climax of the word-wrought creation, God creates humankind in the divine image, commanding humanity to exercise dominion (κατακυριευω) over the earth and rule (αρχω) over its animals. According to Judith Newman’s reading of Wisdom 9, Pseudo-Solomon uses this biblical creation tradition as part of a project that involves “the democratization of kingship.” The apparent failure of the Davidic dynasty in the post-exilic period has led Pseudo-Solomon to envisage all of humanity as potential rulers by virtue of their creaturehood. The antithesis between the righteous Israelites and the wicked Egyptians in chapters 10–19 suggests that it is only the former that might enjoy God’s blessing, including this rule. The eschatological vision of Wisdom 5.15–16 in which only the righteous receive immortality along with the symbols of sovereignty confirms that only those who show themselves to be righteous, those who are children of God (2.13, 18), will rule in this way. They are those who “will judge (κρίνω) nations and rule (κρατεω) over peoples” as vice-regents under the Lord who will be king (βασιλευω) over them (3.8).

Pseudo-Solomon envisages an eschatological “democratic monarchy” which exists in this text alongside Israel’s traditional Davidic monarchy. Both types of monarchy are characterized and empowered by God’s spirit and Wisdom. For those who love righteousness (δικαιοσυνη), an important qualifier mentioned above, Wisdom’s labours (πνοι) produce the cardinal virtues (8.7). Although the immediate context of this verse suggests that the Davidic king is in view, Pseudo-Solomon concludes the verse by stating that these are most profitable in the lives of humans, not only the king.

The Kings of the Earth

The final instance of kingship in the Wisdom of Solomon relates to those addressed in the first part of the book: “Love righteousness, you who judge the earth (οἱ κρινοντες την γην); think about the Lord in goodness and seek him with sincerity of heart” (Wis 1.1). The chapter that concludes this section contains an exhortation to the same group to attend to Pseudo-Solomon’s words: “Hear therefore, you kings (βασιλεις), and understand; learn, you judges (δικασται) of the ends of the earth” (6.1). This group is also addressed as τυραννοι (“princes” [NETS] or “monarchs” [NRSV]; 6.9, 21).

In the biblical tradition, Solomon’s wisdom becomes internationally known and attracts the attention of the surrounding rulers:


113. Pseudo-Solomon uses τυραννος in a neutral sense here (cf. 12.14; 14.17). At Wis 8.15 the noun is modified in order to give it a negative meaning (τυραννοι φρικτοι, “dread monarchs” [NRSV], “dread princes” [NETS]).
And all the people used to come to hear the wisdom of Salomon, and he would receive gifts from all the kings of the earth who were hearing of his wisdom. (3 Kgdms 5.14 LXX = 1 Kgs 4.34)

And Salomon was greater than all the kings of the earth in riches and in discernment. And all the kings of the earth were seeking the face of Salomon to hear his discernment, which the Lord gave into his heart.(3 Kgdms 10.23–24 LXX = 1 Kgs 10.23–24)

Taken at face value, the Wisdom of Solomon addresses this group of foreign rulers:114 those who “rule over multitudes, and boast of many nations” (Wis 6.2), those who “delight in thrones and scepters” (6.21). Wisdom of Solomon then stands as an exhortation from Israel’s wisest king for these rulers to seek out Wisdom from Israel’s god in the same way that he, Salomon, did, in order that they might enjoy the same success, because “desire for wisdom leads to a kingdom [or kingship]” (6.20). There is another way in which this address to rulers might be understood.

In Chapter 3 it was noted that Hellenistic political ideas and language—in particular, conceptions of kingship—were used as a way of engaging in ethical thought. The Stoic claim that only the sage is truly king says more about what it means to be a Stoic sage than it does about what it means to be a king. James Reese observes that texts putatively addressed to kings “became the ordinary vehicle for tracing the moral ideal of Hellenism.”115 He argues that, in the same way, Pseudo-Solomon uses language and ideas about kingship to talk about the ideal sage.116 Salomon is held up as the ideal king in Israel’s history because of his traditional link with wisdom. The Wisdom of Solomon is not addressed to the rulers of the nations who might become kings through imitating Solomon, but to the “democratic kings” identified in the previous section who, through imitating Solomon (or Pseudo-Solomon) become wise.

One important item related to kingship remains to be discussed: the place and nature of the law. The “kings” are urged to listen to Pseudo-Solomon and adopt wisdom (6.1–11) because, as servants of God’s βασιλεία, they have not kept the divine laws or walked according to the divine purposes (6.4) and are therefore under the threat of God’s judgment. The sortes or “chain-syllogism” of 6.17–20 points out that the desire for Wisdom will lead to faithfulness with regard to her laws and that this, in turn leads to incorruption. The fact that being brought near to God in incorruption/purity is linked to kingship (6.19–20) provides further proof of the ethical nature of kingship in this text. “The desire for wisdom has been shown to make one near to God,” writes David Winston, “and it is this divine intimacy which is the source of all sovereignty, both spiritual and earthly.”117

It is difficult to define precisely the nature of the law in the Wisdom of Solomon. On the one hand it is clearly God’s divine law (6.4; 16.6; 18.9), “the imperishable light” mediated to the world through God’s people (18.4). These references would seem to be to the Mosaic law as found in the Jewish scriptures. On the other hand, natural law is sufficient to explain that which the author has encouraged

114. So Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 101: “The author is clearly addressing the pagan world-rulers.”
115. Hellenistic Influences, 72.
117. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 156. It is on the basis of the law that the righteous reproach the wicked (2.12) who, in turn, are described as “lawless” (1.9; 4.20).
or critiqued. Societies and cultures without the Decalogue forbid murder, adultery, theft, and deceit (see, e.g., 14.22–29). And the condemnation of idolatry (see Wis 13–15) is based not on the commandment found at Exodus 20.4–6 or Deuteronomy 5.8–10, but on the observation that such behaviour is ignorant and foolish. Despite mention of the law, it is the concept of “justice” that provides Pseudo-Solomon with a universal category against which the deeds of the righteous or wicked can be measured.

Pseudo-Solomon’s understanding of law mirrors the tension that exists between Greek and Jewish thought on the matter. While he has been able to meld the two traditions in the case of Wisdom/spirit (see p. 228), he has not been as successful in dealing with the question of law. With regard to kingship, however, it is clear that the law, whether natural or revealed, is something external to the king/sage and provides a standard against which his life might be ordered and measured.

In the conclusion to his study of the addressees of the Wisdom of Solomon, James Reese states, “The Book of Wisdom was not written for a popular audience but for the religious education of a group of Jewish students who were preparing for life in the Hellenistic metropolis [Alexandria].” Having established the kingship of God, Pseudo-Solomon uses the figure of Solomon as an ideal king to teach his students about being wise. King Solomon shares traits with the biblical figure as well as with the ideal sage-king of the Hellenistic philosophers. Kingship is recast along “democratic” lines on the basis of the biblical creation tradition and the personified figure of Wisdom provides a goal to which all human beings can aspire. In constructing kingship in this way, Pseudo-Solomon provides the students of his school with a hybrid model comprised of Jewish and Greek elements. In the following section the thinking of the most influential, if not most exceptional, student of such an Alexandrian school is studied.

The Philosopher-King in Philo of Alexandria

Philo of Alexandria was a prolific Jewish scholar who produced numerous religious, philosophical, and historical texts in the first half of the common era. His enthusiastic reception into...
the Christian tradition\textsuperscript{124} ensured the survival of his writings which, in turn, secured his reputation as “the most obviously outstanding of those who sought to marry Jewish faith with Hellenic culture, to retail Greek culture to the Jews and Jewish knowledge to the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{125} His writings thus provide us with another example of one who might be expected to combine Hellenistic philosophical ideas with a Jewish view of the world.

Philo was deeply influenced by his Greek education which most likely culminated with the study of the Greek philosophical tradition. His debt to Platonism, Stoicism and Neopythagoreanism can be clearly seen in his writings.\textsuperscript{126} It therefore comes as no surprise that Jerome calls him a “Platonist” and Clement of Alexandria identifies him as a “Pythagorean.”\textsuperscript{127} But Philo is, above all, an exegete of the Jewish scriptures. The bulk of his work comprises commentaries on the Greek translation of the Pentateuch arranged in three series: the “Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus”, the “Allegorical Commentaries,” and the “Exposition of the Law.”\textsuperscript{128} These two aspects of Philo’s intellectual world—the Jewish and the Greek—have been described as two foci in an ellipse.\textsuperscript{129} As we move through Philo’s writings we sometimes find them exerting equal influence, sometimes the Jewish elements prevail, and at other times Greek concepts dominate, but he is never able to escape the pull of either tradition.

Philo’s political thought owes much to Greek political philosophy.\textsuperscript{130} In seeking to describe the


\textsuperscript{125} Morris, “Philo,” 813.


\textsuperscript{127} Morris, “Philo,” 871–72. Jerome, De vir. ill. 11; Epist. 70 ad Magnum oratorem 3; Clement, Strom. 2.15 (72, 4); 2.19 (100, 3).


influence of Hellenistic kingship ideals in his writings, I will focus on the two books that comprise his Life of Moses. While other treatises could also be examined to investigate Philo’s thought on leadership, Philo writes that the first book on Moses tells “the story of Moses’ actions in his capacity of king” (Moses 1.334), while the second book begins with the claim that Moses exemplified the Platonic philosopher-king (2.2).

Philo’s claim that Moses is the ideal king might seem surprising since the Bible, Philo’s primary source, nowhere identifies Moses as “king.” However, Philo is not the only ancient writer to see Moses as Israel’s first king. Parts of the rabbinic tradition understand Moses to be the “king in Jeshurun” (Deut 33.5; NRSV), and Jewish texts written in Greek also view Moses as king (e.g., Sib. Or. 11.35–40; Ezekiel the Tragedian 68–89). Even if it is not unique, the Alexandrian exegete’s extensive treatise about Moses’ kingship affords us a significant glimpse of the construction of ideal kingship at the point at which Jewish and Greek ideas of ideal kingship intersect.

**Philo’s Life of Moses**

The two books that make up Philo’s Life of Moses are quite different. The first is a chronological account of Moses’ life that follows the biblical text from Exodus 2 to Numbers 32, while the second is structured around Moses’ roles as legislator, priest, and prophet. In the opening lines, Philo identifies his text as a “life” (βίος; 1.1) through which he hopes to rectify the neglect Moses has received at the hands of “Greek men of letters” (1.2). As Louis Feldman argues, this statement suggests that Philo’s intended audience consists of non-Jews who are unfamiliar with Moses but deserve to know something about him. As further evidence for this position, Feldman points to Philo’s account of the translation of the Pentateuch (Moses 2.25–44). According to Philo, this Greek translation was made for the sake of the nations, not Greek-speaking Jews (2.27, 43–44), in the hope that the nations would adopt God’s laws as their own, effectively becoming proselytes. Taking as his starting point Philo’s portrayal of

131. Friederike Oertelt, *Herrscherideal und Herrschaftskritik bei Philo von Alexandria: Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel seiner Josephsdarstellung in De Josepho und De somniis II*, SPhA 8 (Leiden: Brill, 2014) examines the theme of rulership through a comparison of the contradictory portraits of Joseph in On the Life of Joseph and On Dreams 2. The former is explicitly about the statesman, ὁ πολιτικός (1, 34), rather than the king, but the king is sometimes included within the broader category of the statesman. Barraclough (“Philo’s Politics,” 486–506) discusses the leading figures in Moses and Joseph as ideal rulers. At the other end of the spectrum, the figures of the prefect Flaccus and the emperor Gaius in Against Flaccus and On the Embassy to Gaius, respectively, provide Philo’s with the wicked ruler or tyrant. Finn Damgaard, “Philo’s Life of Moses as ‘Rewritten Bible’,” in *Rewritten Bible After Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. Jörgel Zsengellér, JSJSup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 242–44 suggests that Moses might be read as a companion piece to Flaccus.


Moses as king, Finn Damgaard argues that the *Life of Moses* is “a political response to the situation of the Alexandrian Diaspora Jews.” As such, it serves to demonstrate to both Jewish and non-Jewish readers that the “founder” of the Jewish people embodied Greek as well as Jewish virtues. By doing this, the biography seeks to carve out a place for the Jewish tradition within Alexandria and to justify the Jewish presence there.

If we adopt Arnaldo Momigliano’s common-sense definition of biography, “an account of the life of a man from birth to death,” the *Life of Moses* certainly fits this description. We might go further, however, and note that the text also fits within the genre of “rewritten Bible.” While much of the first book of the *Life of Moses* retells the story of Moses as Philo finds it in his Bible, significant insight into Philo’s thought is gained by paying attention to where his retelling departs from or adds to the biblical tradition. In his definition of “rewritten Bible,” Philip Alexander’s ninth characteristic of the genre is:

*Rewritten Bible texts make use of non-biblical tradition and draw on non-biblical sources.... they seek to draw out the sense of Scripture and to solve its problems, and at the same time to read non-biblical material into Scripture, thereby validating it and preventing the fragmentation of the tradition.*

The Jewish extra-biblical tradition is on view when Philo states that his sources comprise “the sacred books” as well as what he has learned “from some of the elders of the nation” (*Moses* 1.4). Even more striking, however, is Philo’s use of the philosophical tradition to explain the biblical tradition. Philo’s fusion of Greek philosophy into the biblical text is not so much to prevent fragmentation of an existing tradition as it is to harmonize two traditions. In attempting to understand Philo’s use of the Hellenistic kingship *topos* I will give attention to the significant points at which Philo departs from the biblical tradition. We turn now to investigate Philo’s portrait of Moses as king.

137. Damgaard, “Philo’s Moses,” 245.
138. As Gregory Sterling observes: “There was a tendency for some Diaspora Jews to tell the stories of their own communities in the light of biblical stories set in the same locales. The stories offered them an opportunity to legitimate their community’s presence in the Diaspora” (“The People of the Covenant or the People of God: Exodus in Philo of Alexandria,” in *The Book of Exodus: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation*, ed. Thomas B. Dozeman, Craig A. Evans, and Joel N. Lohr, VTSup 164 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 424).
141. Alexander, “Retelling,” 118. Alexander has the addition of legendary material primarily in view, but in the case of Philo, philosophical sources play a far bigger role.
142. Recent discussions of some of the traditions around the figure of Moses can be found in Axel Graupner and Michael Wolter, eds., *Moses in Biblical and Extra-Biblical Traditions*, BZAW 372 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007).
Moses’ Early Years

The biblical account of Moses’ birth in Exodus 2.1–10 reflects the stark, straightforward manner used in much Hebrew narrative. In contrast, Philo adds numerous details and explanations to his account in order to show how Moses was prepared for the kingship to which he would later be appointed. In particular, Philo emphasizes Moses’ genealogy, his exceptional nature, and his education.

Genealogy. Philo begins by noting that Moses was a “Chaldean” (Moses 1.6). Moses is identified as a “Hebrew” at 1.15, but “Chaldean” here serves to heighten the antiquity of Moses’ people. Philo then proceeds to describe Moses’ parents as “the best of their contemporaries,” from the same tribe (according to Exod 2.1 they are both Levites) and exhibiting a strong affection for each other (Moses 1.7). Although the point is not made explicit in the biography, as the progeny of two Levites, Moses enjoys “a double link with truth” (Prelim. Studies 131–132) according to Philo.

The importance of the genealogy in royal biographies has already been discussed in relation to Xenophon’s Cyrus (see above, ch. 2). Philo stands in the same Greek biographical tradition.

Person. A number of elements in Philo’s description of the person of Moses point to Moses’ royal nature from a very early age. Moses’ superior appearance was apparent from birth. Exodus 2.2 LXX explains that his parents disobeyed the Pharaoh’s orders to murder male offspring and instead hid him because they saw he was beautiful (ἰδον δε αυτο ἀστειον). Philo recalls this tradition (Moses 1.9) but also has the king’s daughter take note of the baby’s “beauty and fine condition” (ευμορφιαν και ευχηαν; 1.15). Once weaned, he was still “noble and good to look upon” (ευγενη και άπει οφθηναι; 1.18). When he first encountered Moses, Jethro, Moses’ future father-in-law, was struck by his appearance (ανς) and then his intention (βούλημα) since “great natures are transparent and need no length of time to be recognized” (1.59). Like the Greek writers examined earlier in this study, Philo sees the importance of the king’s superior appearance. Philo has expanded the biblical tradition of Moses’ beautiful appearance but stops short of the exalted treatment given this subject in later rabbinic texts.

In addition to his physical appearance, Moses’ character marked him out as exceptional. As an infant he did not “delight in fun and laughter and sport,” but was characterized by a bearing of modesty (αιδος) and seriousness (σεμνος) (1.20). In his adolescence, Moses grew in “good sense” (φρονησις) and was thus able to control his passions with the “reins” of moderation (σωφροσυνη) and patient endurance (καρτερια) (Moses 1.25). Philo compares the impulses of the soul to a restless horse.

144. Cf. Alleg. Interp. 2.51–52 where Philo interprets Deut 33.9 and Deut 10.9 to mean that the Levite has only God as his portion.
146. In the New Testament, see Heb 11.23 (κλον άστειον το παιδιον) and Acts 7.20 (ην άστειος το θεο); see also Josephus, Ant. 2.231 (passim).
148. Philo is indebted to Plato (Phaedrus 235c-e) for this imagery.
These impulses are the cause of both good, when led by reason, and bad, when they turn to anarchy (1.26). Moses’ ability to control himself through the application of reason was noticed by those around him:

His associates and everyone else, struck with amazement at what they felt was a novel spectacle, considered earnestly what the mind which dwelt in his body like an image in its shrine could be, whether it was human or divine or a mixture of both, so utterly unlike was it to the majority, soaring above them and exalted to a grander height. (1.27)

This self-control was seen in the curbing of his prandial and sexual appetites (1.28), his frugality and spurning of luxury (1.29), and the fact that his philosophy was matched by his life (1.29). Moses’ virtues form an important part of his royal nature; Philo returns to this theme later in his biography (see below).

No doubt with an eye on some of his kinsmen in Alexandria, Philo notes Moses’ continued loyalty to Judaism. Despite his good fortune in being adopted into the Egyptian king’s family, Moses refused to act like those who “subvert the ancestral customs ... by adopting different modes of life” (1.31). Instead, he “was zealous for the discipline and culture of his kinsmen and ancestors” (1.32).

Education. There is no mention of Moses’ education in Exodus. The writer of Jubilees thought it necessary for Moses’ father to teach him how to write (Jub. 47.9), but also passes over this period of time with exceptional brevity. Philo, in contrast, includes an extended discussion of Moses and his education. As a young child Moses applied himself to hearing and seeing that which would benefit his soul (Moses 1.20) and, in addition to those from Egypt and Greece, enjoyed a selection of international teachers, beyond whom he soon progressed (1.21). Moses’ education seemed to be a case of “recollection (ἀνάμνησις) rather than learning (μάθησις)” (1.21) and, like Abraham, Moses was self-taught:

the gifted soul takes the lead in meeting the lessons given by itself rather than the teacher and is profited thereby, and as soon as it has a grasp of some of the first principles of knowledge presses forward like the horse to the meadow. (1.22)

Jaap Mansfeld suggests that at this point Philo “improvises an explanation for Moses’ development toward his outstanding role as the prophet of God.”¹⁴⁹ Philo could not allow the Greeks to teach Moses, since Greek philosophy comes from Moses. It would not have been possible for Jewish teachers to partake in the education of an Egyptian prince, and the Jewish Scriptures are chronologically impossible as a source of education. Philo’s only recourse is thus “to a Platonizing suggestion: in going beyond his teachers, i.e., toward philosophy, Moses seems to remember what his soul would have known before entering his body.”¹⁵⁰

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Moses’ curriculum included the encyclical subjects and was most likely modelled on Philo’s own education,151 thus indicating the importance that this education held for Philo, “for he cannot imagine the development of his greatest hero in any other terms.”152 There are also a number of similarities between Moses’ education and the course proposed by Plato for the education of the upper-class in his city.153 Moses was thus educated in the tradition of the Platonic philosopher-king,154 but he only received his initial education in Egypt. Moses’ philosophical credentials were not yet sufficiently established; to do this, Philo transports him to Arabia where Moses studied philosophy, which must follow the encyclical subjects.155

Moses of Arabia

Following the discovery of his murder of an Egyptian slave-driver (Exod 2.11–15a), Moses fled to Midian where he married Zipporah, the daughter of Jethro/Reuel, the Midianite priest, and fathered a child (Exod 2.15b–22). In Moses 1.47, Philo’s Moses withdrew to the more generically-titled Arabia where two important elements were added to his development as king. First, his philosophical education was completed. With his own reason as trainer (see above), Moses exercised virtue in preparation for the theoretical and practical life through studying the philosophical doctrines (1.48). The goal of these studies was that he might distinguish truth from appearance. Although he had been trained by his Egyptian teachers in “philosophy conveyed in symbols” (1.23), the philosophical training he received in Arabia concluded his education.156

The second important aspect of his Arabian retreat was the training in leadership (ἡγεμονία) he received when put in charge of his father-in-law’s flock:

For the shepherd’s business is a training-ground and a preliminary exercise in kingship (μελέτη και προγυμνασία βασιλείας) for one who is destined to command the herd of mankind, the most civilized of herds, just as also hunting is for warlike natures, since those who are trained to generalship practise themselves first in the chase. (1.60)


153. Plato discusses how philosopher-kings might be produced: in their earlier education as “athletes of war” (521d), the young men were to be trained in gymnastics and music and the arts (521e–522b; cf. 376e). This elementary training was followed by arithmetic (522c–526c), geometry (526c–527c), solid geometry (527d–528a), astronomy (528b–530c) and harmony (530a–531c). The “coping-stone” (534c) over all these subjects was “dialectic” (διαλεκτικής) (531d–535a).


156. Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 74.
This is not a defence of the fact that Moses served as a shepherd, but represents a theme already encountered in Xenophon’s *Cyrus* (see Chapter 2). Philo finds Moses caring for his father-in-law’s sheep at Exodus 3.1 (cf. 2.17, 19) and this enables him to link Moses’ career to the *topos* of the king-as-shepherd. “Shepherd” is, for Philo, the highest title that a king can receive because it signifies his care and protection of his subjects, his φιλανθρωπία. It is only the “perfect king” (βασιλεύς τέλειος) who can accurately be described in this way (*Moses* 1.61–62). This image of the gentle king, so at odds with the picture Philo has painted of the Pharaoh (1.36–39), is an important part of Philo’s construction of ideal kingship in the person of Moses and one which we will encounter again.

*Moses’ Appointment as Leader*

Philo recounts Moses’ encounter with the divine at the non-burning bush, Moses’ return to Egypt, the ten plagues, and the nation’s escape (*Moses* 1.63–146). While careful study of these passages will illuminate more of Philo’s exegetical strategy, for our purposes, Moses’ role as leader comes to the fore again at *Moses* 1.146–162, another section that contains substantial extra-biblical material in what David Runia identifies as “an excursus [on Moses’ kingship] with a somewhat more theoretical character.”

**Appointed by God.** As seen in Chapter 4 of this study, the ideal king in the Hebrew Bible is chosen and appointed by God. So, too, Philo’s Moses, who received his kingship from God as a reward (γέρας) for his virtue (1.148). The king’s divine appointment is contrasted with “those who thrust themselves into positions of power by means of arms and engines of war and strength of infantry, cavalry and navy” (1.148; cf. *Rewards* 54). This “pacifist” model of kingship stands in contrast to the martial ideal on view in, for example, Diotogenes (72.6–9), while at the same time suggesting a critique of Roman imperial rule. It should also be observed that Philo does not find Moses as a warlike figure in his

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157. Feldman, *Philo’s Moses*, 73 suggests that Philo, like Josephus (Ant. 2.263), felt the need to mount a defence of Moses’ status in light of Gen 46.43: “all shepherds are abhorrent to the Egyptians.” For an allegorical defence of Moses’ position as shepherd, see *Sacr.* 50–51, where what is abhorrent to the Egyptians is explained in the light of Exod 8.26 as being the virtues which every fool—that is, Egyptian—detests. Other passages in which shepherding is seen as an important aspect of rule are discussed briefly by Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 519.

158. At a number of points in the Hebrew Bible, the Israelites are spoken of as sheep without a shepherd in the context of absent or inadequate leadership (e.g., Num 27.16–17; 1 Kgs 22.17; Isa 13.14; Ezek 34.5–6; Jdt 11.19).

159. For further discussion of this *topos* in Greek political thought, see Roger Brock, *Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 43–52.


161. That this is indeed an interruption of the biblical text can be seen from the fact that the discussion of the multitude that left Egypt (*Moses* 1.147) comes from Exodus 12.37; the “six hundred thousand” only occurs here and at Exod 38.26. The discussion of the route of the exodus in *Moses* 1.163–166 comes from Exodus 13.17–22. The biblical material between these passages contains further directions for celebrating the Passover and is ignored by Philo, as was the Passover material in the beginning of Exodus 12.


biblical sources. Rather, as noted in our discussion of Israelite kingship, it is Israel’s god who fights on behalf of the nation (cf. Moses 1.142, 176–180, 214–219) and on behalf of God’s appointed king.

Philo is also aware of the people’s role in choosing a king. Commenting on Deuteronomy 17.15, Philo dismisses the appointment of rulers by lot but recognizes the validity of an elected ruler, while at the same time managing to argue that this choice, “made by the whole people with the same mind,” is ratified by God (Spec. Laws 4.157). In Rewards and Punishments Philo reconciles these two ideas by observing that Moses did not become king through military means, rather,

It was God who appointed him by the free judgement of his subjects, God who created in them the willingness to choose him [Moses] as their sovereign. (Rewards 54)

Philo thus has no difficulty in reconciling the divine appointment of a king with the free choice of the people. At the conclusion of the episode under investigation (Moses 1.147–162), Philo writes that Moses “received the authority which they [the people] willingly gave him, with the sanction and assent of God” (1.163).

The superior nature of Moses’ person has already been demonstrated in the narratives of his birth and upbringing and here, Moses’ character forms the basis of God’s choice of Moses as the king of God’s people. The biblical narrative does not allow Philo to raise the question of dynastic rule at this point, a very important question, given the prominence of the Davidic dynasty in the Hebrew Bible. Nonetheless, Philo includes a comment about the fact that Moses allowed reason to trump his natural affection for his children and thus refused to promote them to positions of power in the present or as successors for the future (Moses 1.150). The same distaste for hereditary rule is on view in Philo’s discussion of Moses’ establishment of the priesthood (2.141–158).

Following the construction of the tabernacle, the next step was to choose the most suitable people (τοὺς ἐπιπλησμενούς αἰρεθήναι) to serve as priests (Moses 2.141). Philo stresses that Moses chose his brother as high priest “out of the whole number” (ἐξ ἀπάντων) of suitable candidates, and he did so “on his [Aaron’s] merits” (ἀριστίνην) (2.142). Similarly, Moses appointed Aaron’s sons as priests because of their piety (εὐσέβεια) and holiness (ὀσιότης), the most important traits for those who would be priests. Moses ignored his own sons because he did not consider them “worthy of this distinction” (2.142). As in the case of the king, appointment of the priests is also considered to have been made with “the consent of the whole nation” (2.143). Philo thus guards the memory of Moses against charges of nepotism (φιλοίκειος; 2.142), such as those raised at 2.278 (cf. Num 16), by pointing out that Moses’ choice was made on the basis of the candidate’s character and with the consent of the people.

n. 1. Goodenough identifies this and other practices against which Philo writes as reflecting “the spirit of Roman imperial elections” (Politics, 93).

164. Wolfson argues that Philo is uniting two biblical traditions which focus, respectively, on God’s appointment of the king and the people’s choice of a ruler (Philo, 2.226–331); see also Goodenough, Politics, 92–93.

165. Philo is aware of David and Solomon, but mentions them as psalmist and writer of proverbs; the Davidic dynasty is never brought up in Philo’s extant treatises (Wolfson, Philo, 2.333–34). Since Philo’s writings are focused on the Pentateuch, they do not require him to say anything about the Davidic dynasty.
Furthermore—although the point is not made explicitly at *Moses* 2.142—in contrast to the claims made by those leading the rebellion against Moses, the appointments made by Moses were the result of divine direction (2.278).

Philo’s discussion of Moses’ refusal to advance his sons in either the political or cultic sphere hints at a negative view of dynastic rule. Philo stresses the appointments of priests were made on the basis of merit, seen especially in terms of priestly virtue. The appointments were made with the consent of the people, behind which lay divine choice. The same elements can be seen in the account of the appointment of Moses as king, where God’s choice and the decision of the people are both made on the basis of the king’s virtue.

*Moses’ Virtues.* Moses’ virtue/excellence is identified as an important element within his appointment as king. It was “on account of his goodness and his nobility of conduct and the universal benevolence (ἀρετῆς ἔνσεως καὶ καλοκαγαθίας καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄπαντας εὐνοίας) which he never failed to shew” that he was made king (1.148). While Moses is clearly an example of virtue kingship, the last of these three traits, his “benevolence” or goodwill shown to all, seen often in his concern for his subjects, is raised as perhaps the most significant reason for his suitability as king.

Moses renounced his rule in Egypt because his nobility of soul and magnanimity of spirit and natural hatred of evil (ψυχῇς εὐγένειαν καὶ φρονήματος μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μισοπόνηρον φόβος) would not allow him to see his fellow Hebrews mistreated (1.149). His virtues were directed towards those who would be his subjects. The implication is that he already felt a responsibility towards this people which included but went beyond the position he occupied in Egypt. He thus gave up that position to lead the Hebrews away from Egypt. Since he rejected the wealth of the Egyptians, God rewarded him with “the greatest and most perfect wealth”: the earth, sea, rivers and all the elements therein. He was a partner with God in God’s possessions, given to Moses “as a portion well fitted for [God’s] heir.” As a “friend of God” he shares in God’s possessions, since “what belongs to friends is common” (κοινα τὰ φιλῶν) (1.155–156). In addition to exalting the figure of Moses, in these verses Philo seeks to explain Moses’ miracles: the elements obeyed him as their master. Inspired by this observation, Philo manages to wed the biblical text to some Hellenistic philosophy: God possesses everything but needs nothing. The “good man” (ὁ σπουδαίος)—in this case, Moses—possesses nothing but partakes in the things of God since he is a world citizen and thus receives the whole world as his portion (1.157).

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166. In Exod 28.1–5, Aaron and his sons are identified by God.

167. Similarly, when reflecting on Gen 23.6, “you [Abraham] are a king (βασιλεύς) from a god among us,” Philo argues that Abraham gained faith (Gen 15.6) and therefore possessed all the other virtues. He was thus considered king by those around him “because of his greatness of soul” (*Virtues* 216).

168. Moses’ desire to benefit his subjects stands in stark contrast to Philo’s villainous rulers: Gaius, Flaccus, Sejanus (Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 490).

169. Despite rejecting all that the Egyptian court had to offer him, Moses still showed “gratitude for the kind treatment” he received, thus exhibiting the appropriate response to that situation (*Moses* 1.32–33).

170. Cf. Exod 33.11.
In addition to this example, we have already observed how Moses’ rejection of his sons as leaders (see above) was for the benefit his subjects and to further their interests rather than his own and those of his immediate family (1.150–151).

Moses’ attitude to wealth provides Philo with a thread to which he might add another bead that turns the discussion back to Moses’ royal virtues. Moses’ attitude to wealth was quite different from that of other rulers. Even though he possessed “nothing” and lived a life of moderation in regard to food and dress, he was liberal in those treasures that a ruler should have in abundance (1.153):

ἔγκράτεια, καρτερία, σωφροσύνα, ἀρχίνουα, συνέσει, ἐπιστήμα, πόνοι, κυκοπάθεια, ἰδιονύ υπεροψία, δικαιοσύνα, προτροπαί πρός τά βέλτιστα, ψόγοι και κολόσας ἀμαρτιανόντων νόμιμοι, ἑπανό καὶ τιμαί κατορθοῦντων πάλιν σὸν νόμο.

self-restraint, continence, temperance, shrewdness, good sense, knowledge, endurance of toil and hardships, contempt of pleasure, justice, advocacy of excellence, censure and chastisement according to law for wrongdoers, praise and honour for well-doers, again as the law directs. (1.154)

Louis Feldman examines Moses’ virtues in great detail, noting that he “presents a paradigm of beauty and godliness, a speculum principis.” The patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were themselves models of virtue and Moses stands at the end of this exalted line (Moses 1.76; cf. Abraham 52; Good Person 62). Philo agrees with the Stoics that to have one virtue is to have them all (Moses 2.7; cf. D.L. 7.125), and he is aware of the Platonic cardinal virtues (Moses 2.185; Creation 73; Alleg. Interp. 1.63–64; Good Person 159) which he uses, like Isocrates (see ch. 2), to structure his writing (Spec. Laws 4.135; Virtues). But here, when writing of Moses as king, he provides a list of virtues that speak of ideal kingship: the emphasis on self-rule, willingness to endure toil, and the rejection of pleasure have been seen repeatedly in the texts examined in earlier chapters of this study. The inclusion of “advocacy of excellence” is unusual, but not out of place if it speaks of the king’s exhortation of his subjects. Finally, justice, the sine qua non of the royal ideal, is here joined to the punishment for evil and reward for good according to the law (cf. 2.4). Similarly, in the second book of the biography, Moses the legislator is presented as possessing the following four virtues: love of humanity (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον), love of justice (τὸ φιλοδίκαστον), love of goodness (τὸ φιλόγαθρον), and hatred of evil (τὸ μισοσόνηρον) (Moses 2.9). It is significant for Philo’s understanding of Moses’ rule that love of humanity occurs first in the list and should be considered the premier virtue under which justice and the other virtues function.

173. There are also variations on the Platonic scheme. At Worse 73, εὐσεβεία replaces ἀνόητα while δικαιοσύνη is dropped at Worse 114. In the Jewish “schools” the cardinal virtues are taught and practised, together with εὐσεβεία, ὁσιότης, and all the other virtues (Moses 2.216).
Philo’s Moses has been shown to be superior to the rest of humanity in a number of different ways in the course of the biography. This allows Philo to recognize that God appointed Moses as king on the basis of Moses’ virtues. Philo is thus familiar with the Greek idea of virtue kingship and the excellent ruler, but Philo’s list of Moses’ virtues show a bias in favour of those virtues which are beneficial to the king’s subjects (cf. Abraham 261). Philo is aware of the traditional cardinal virtues, but when he chooses to catalogue Moses’ virtues, he includes those virtues which highlight Moses’ desire to benefit his subjects, thus reinforcing the idea that the king’s concern for his subjects is of primary importance.\footnote{175. Cf. Moses 1.328.}

*Moses’ Ascent*. Moses’ excellence not only ensures that he is appointed king, but it also allowed him to ascend to the divine. At Exodus 20.21, following the people’s request that he stand as mediator between them and God, Moses entered the darkness where God was (Μωσῆς δὲ εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν γνώσον, οὗ ἦν ὁ θεός).\footnote{176. The influence of the text upon which Philo draws should not be underestimated. With regard to Philo’s understanding of the vision of God, Scott Mackie comments: “Though Platonic philosophical contemplation and the practice of virtue are occasionally implicated, in most cases exegetical text work appears to be its underlying basis” (“Seeing God in Philo of Alexandria: Means, Methods, and Mysticism,” JSJ 43 [2012]: 148).} In Exodus, this “darkness” refers to the dark cloud and smoke enveloping the mountain, but Philo interprets this event as Moses’ entrance into “the unseen, invisible, incorporeal and archetypal essence of all existing things” (ἐπὶ τὴν ἄξοδη καὶ ἄξωματων τὸν ἄντων παραδεξιματικὴν οὐσίαν) (Moses 1.158). This entry into darkness is the fulfillment of Moses’ yearning to behold the divine,\footnote{177. Cf. Exod 19.16, 18; 20.18; see John William Wevers, *Notes on the Greek Text of Exodus*, SCS 30 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 316–17.} as Philo sees it expressed in Exodus 33.13 (Posterity 13–17; cf. Names 7–10).\footnote{178. Mackie notes that not all ascents in Philo lead to the divine vision and not all visions of the divine are the result of an ascent, nevertheless, the two are usually linked (“Means, Methods, Mysticism,” 148).}

Adela Yarbo Collins’ six-fold “typology of ascents” is a useful heuristic tool with which to analyze this passage.\footnote{179. The imagery and language used of Moses’ ascent is strikingly similar to that of his “translation” (Moses 2.288–291) (Meeks, *Prophet-King*, 124–25; M. David Litwa, “The Deification of Moses in Philo of Alexandria,” SPhiloA 26 [2014]: 20–22).} Moses’ ascent in Philo may be placed into Collins’ Type 2 and Type 4. The immediate context suggests the suitability of Type 2, “Ascents of the king” (pp. 142–143). Although Moses’ deification is not in view (see below), certainly Moses’ role as mediator is at the centre of Philo’s thought at this point. Type 4 deals with “Ascents of Cultural Heroes” (pp. 145–158) and in this case the ascent certainly contributed to Moses’ legitimacy (Type 4a), since, following his ascent, he was seen to have “the sanction and assent of God” (Moses 1.163). But the ascent also seems to be for the purpose of revelation (Type 4b), since in the darkness, Moses “beheld what is hidden from the sight
of mortal nature” (Moses 1.159). Before examining how Philo uses Moses’ ascent to describe him as receiving divine revelation and legitimizing his authority as king, the possibility that Type 5 is in view needs to be considered.

Type 5 deals with ascents that are related to initiation in the mystery cults (pp. 158–159). Erwin Goodenough famously understood Moses’ ascent—indeed, all of Philo—against the background of Graeco-Roman mystery religions. Goodenough’s understanding of this aspect of Philo has generally not been accepted. Without denying something of a mystical element in Philo’s thought, most scholars understand the Alexandrian to exist somewhere between the two poles of “Philo the philosopher” and “Philo the exegete”—in the words of David Runia, a “philosophically orientated exegete.” The biblical texts engaging Philo’s attention as exegete is not difficult to establish; at this point, neither is his philosophical inspiration.

In Plato’s allegory of the cave (Resp. 514a–517a), the ascent of the potential ruler from the dark cave towards the light of the sun is explained to Glaucon as “the soul’s ascension to the intelligible region (τὸν νοητὸν τόπον)” where it can behold the form of the good which itself brings into the visible world all that is right and beautiful (Resp. 517b–c; LCL). That this Platonic scheme is indeed what lies behind Philo’s understanding of Moses’ ascent is suggested by his use of similar ideas elsewhere. In Philo’s explanation of Exodus 25.9 he describes how Moses received instructions regarding the construction of the tabernacle:

He saw with the soul the immaterial forms (ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας) of the material objects (τῶν ... σωμάτων) about to be made, and these forms had to be reproduced in copies perceived by the senses (ἀισθήματα μιμητά), taken from the original draught (ἀρχετύπου γραφής), so to speak, and from patterns conceived in the mind (νοητῶν παραδειγμάτων). (Moses 2.74; LCL modified)

Philo’s adoption of this element of Plato’s thought is also on view elsewhere (Spec. Laws 1.45–48; cf. Exod 33.18; and Creation 24–25; cf. Gen 1.27). Philo recognizes Plato’s philosopher-king in Moses...
(cf. Moses 2.2) and understands Moses’ ascent into the darkness at Sinai in terms of the climax of the philosophical education of Plato’s ruler.\textsuperscript{188}

Philo’s autobiographical comments at Special Laws 3.1–6 (cf. 2.85), where he describes his own philosophical experiences in similar Platonic terms, further serves to confirm that Moses’ ascent is meant to be understood within his philosophical endeavours. “For Philo,” as Alan Segal observes, “the activity of the mind, under the guidance of scripture, leads to ascent to the divine.”\textsuperscript{189}

As suggested by Collin’s Type 2 and Type 4a, Moses’ ascent legitimates his appointment as king (Moses 1.163).\textsuperscript{190} The fact that he beheld the “immaterial forms” (drawing on the language of 2.74)—that which is “hidden from ... mortal nature” (1.158)—suggests some form of education or revelation (Type 4b)\textsuperscript{191} which turned Moses into a model for his subjects to imitate.

\textit{Imitation and the Living Law.} Upon completion of the ascent, Plato’s philosopher-king is expected to descend and to take up rule over the city (Resp. 519d–e). Plato describes the way in which the philosopher-king will benefit his subjects as follows:

At the age of fifty, those who have successfully negotiated their way through the preliminary exercises must turn their gaze to the good and then use it as a pattern (παράδειγµα) for ordering the city correctly, an activity which includes the continuing study of philosophy, holding office and educating future generations (Resp. 540a–c).

Moses’ presentation of himself as a model for the Israelites to copy implies his descent for this same purpose. In Philo’s retelling of the Sinai event, Moses returned as a “well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model (παράδειγµα) for those who are willing to copy it” (Moses 1.158). Philo concludes, “Happy are they who imprint, or strive to imprint, that image in their souls” (Moses 1.159; cf. Moses 2.74–76). Like that of the Platonic philosopher, Moses’ ascent has as its goal the improvement of the people over whom he exercises authority.

The people’s improvement comes about through imitation. As Philo notes in Moses 1.160–161, it is a commonplace that “meaner men emulate men of distinction.” Rulers, who by definition are the superior ones who provide the model for imitation, should use this in their governing office. Elsewhere Philo observes that, like Moses in his role as king, the sage (ὁ σοφός) and the person of worth (ὁ σπουδαιός) exists, in part, not for his own glory but for the benefit of those around him:

For to gaze continuously upon noble models (καλῶν παραδειγµάτων) imprints their likeness in souls which are not entirely hardened and stony. ... And therefore those who would imitate these examples of good living so marvelous in their loveliness, are bidden not to despair of changing for the better. (Rewards 112–115)

\textsuperscript{188} As important as Moses’ role as prophet and priest is to Philo, these are not on view in Philo’s discussion of Moses’ ascent at Moses 1.158 (contra Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 13–14). Philo is aware of the other ascents described in Exodus. In particular, his discussion of Moses’ priesthood (Moses 2.66–108) refers to that of Exodus 24 in which Moses received instructions regarding the construction of the tabernacle. In particular, his discussion of Moses’ priesthood (Moses 2.66–108) refers to that of Exodus 24 in which Moses received instructions regarding the construction of the tabernacle.


\textsuperscript{190} So, too, Runia, “God and Man,” 54: “The entry into darkness is not meant to indicate a divinizing initiation rite, but enhances Moses’ qualifications for kingship.”

\textsuperscript{191} On Plato’s cave allegory and education, see Sedley, “Art of Ruling,” 262–71.

245
[Moses] used to incite and train all his subjects to fellowship, setting before them the monument of his own life like (στηλίτευσας τῶν ἰδίων βίων) an original design (γραφὴν ἀρχέτυπον) to be their beautiful model (παράδειγμα καλὸν). (Virtues 51)\textsuperscript{192}

When discussing the Patriarchs, Philo stresses that it is the sage’s life that should be heeded and not merely his words, although these should be in harmony (Prelim. Studies 69–70).\textsuperscript{195} Imitation of the sage is a controlling theme in Philonic ethics as it is in Stoic ethics. This is especially true for future kings who would find a guide by looking to Moses as their archetype (ἀρχέτυπον) and model (παράδειγμα) (Virtues 70–71). There is another reason, in addition to his ascent, why Moses is worthy of imitation.

At the conclusion to this section, Moses is described as “living and reasonable law” (νόμος ἐμψυχὸς τε καὶ λογικὸς; Moses 1.162; my translation). God made him like this, knowing that Moses would one day be appointed as legislator. As legislator, a king must command what is right and forbid what is wrong, and since this is also what the law does, Philo states the “the king is a living law, and the law a just king” (τὸν μὲν βασιλέα νόμον ἐμψυχον, τὸν δὲ νόμον βασιλέα δίκαιον; 2.4). We have already had occasion to investigate this phrase (νόμος ἐμψυχος) as it was used by Diotogenes (ch. 3), noting that each occurrence of the phrase needs to be investigated in context, without assuming any continuity between the way in which various authors used it. In terms of Moses 2.4, then, we observe that Philo uses sees Moses’ role as νόμος ἐμψυχος in a general legislative sense: the king, when doing what the law does, can be referred to an νόμος ἐμψυχος.

At its most basic, then, Philo’s statement at Moses 2.4 simply draws an analogy between the function of a king and that of law, and since the two are so similar, they might be spoken of in terms of one another. But the fact that at 1.158–162 Philo links this concept to that of imitation and Moses’ ascent suggests the possibility that something else lies beneath Philo’s use of νόμος ἐμψυχος.

We begin by noting that the Patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—are also described as ἐμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι (Abraham 5). Philo identifies these figures as the general (unwritten) laws which are archetypes upon which the particular (written) laws are based (Abraham 3).\textsuperscript{194} The Patriarchs embody the law and follow the law because they live according to the law of nature (Abraham 61; 275–276; Good Person 62). In so far as they follow perfectly the law of nature, the Patriarchs are sages (σοφοί,) in the Stoic mould.\textsuperscript{195} Philo takes the law of nature one step further, though, and argues that

\textsuperscript{192} Just as Moses presented his own βίος to his subjects for imitation, Philo presents Moses’ βίος for his readers (Moses 1.1). Although he stops short of calling the reader to imitate Moses, his pressing desire that Moses by known by more readers (1.1–4) does raise the question as to why this should be the case.


\textsuperscript{194} There are echoes here of Aristotle, who writes of particular and universal laws (νόμον τὸν μὲν ἰδίον, τὸν δὲ κοινὸν): particular laws are established by each people with reference to themselves, while “universal law is the law of nature” (κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν) (Rhet. 1.13.1373b1–9; cf. Eth. nic. 1134b18–35a5); see David Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” ANRW 21.1: 372–416. Hindy Najman, “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law,” SPhiloA 11 (1999): 55–73 argues that Philo’s thinking about law is an attempt to harmonize the universal and the particular in order to “authorize” the Mosaic law.

\textsuperscript{195} See Winston, “Sage and Super-Sage” for the argument that Philo’s sage is essentially the Stoic sage, but that
the divine law revealed to and by Moses mirrors the law of nature (Creation 1–3; Moses 2.11, 51–52). Since the Patriarchs lived before Moses produced this written law, they could not have followed the Mosaic law, but by following the law of nature, they embodied the universal, unwritten, and divine law in themselves and in their lives. The Patriarchs are thus described as “unwritten law” and “embodied law.”

At Moses 1.160–162, Philo joins in the person of Moses the two functions of the νόμος ἐξεπνεύσας. He is both the legislator, but his is also, like the Patriarchs, one of those whose lives function as perfect examples for imitation. By joining these two functions in Moses, Philo avoids the tension that exists between the unwritten law—of which Moses is the embodiment—and the written law Moses produced.

Using language which he might have found in Pythagorean kingship treatises, Philo speaks of Moses, the ideal king, as embodied law. When doing so he combines a legal idea—the king functions in the same way as the law—with the somewhat more mystical, mimetic concept. In the case of the latter, the person of the king serves as a model for imitation because, as the perfect sage, he embodies what it means to live according to nature and follow the unwritten law. We should note, further, that Moses also serves as the archetype and model for all of Israel’s future leaders (Virtues 70). This exalted status of Moses in this passage raises one final question related to his nature.

Moses’ Divinity. After noting Moses’ superlative virtue and his fellowship with God, Philo states, with regard to Moses’ ascent to the divine, that Moses “was named god and king of the whole nation” (Moses 1.158). The question of Philo’s understanding of Moses’ divinity has occasioned voluminous discussion without any apparent consensus. The problem is one of Philo’s own causing. As Goodenough notes, “On the question of the divinity of Moses Philo falls back into one of his frequent vacillations between points of view which cannot be reconciled.” On the one hand, Moses is called “(a) god” in a number of passages, frequently in relation to Exodus 7.1, where the Lord made Moses

Moses is portrayed as a “super-sage.” For “life according to nature” as the goal of the Stoic sage, see Rene Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, CCS (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25–29.

196. Martens (One God, 103–30) demonstrates that these forms of “higher law” form a unity in Philo’s thought.
197. For the law of nature in Philo, see Winston, “Ethical Theory,” 381–88. Wolfson describes three very specific “laws of nature” (Philo, 1.332–47) but the concept is broader than this in Philo’s writings and needs to be considered as part of what it means to live “according to nature” (see Philo, 2.165–200).
198. Martens (One God, 88–89) observes that Philo is unique in identifying an individual with unwritten law.
199. The identification of the law of nature with the written law of God would have generated for many of Philo’s contemporaries an “unthinkable paradox”; the law of nature is necessary unwritten because it must be universal (Hindy Najman, “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?” SPhiloA 15 [2003]: 55–56).
200. The most recent survey of the problem can be found at Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 1–4; see also Holladay, Theios Aner, 103–98; Runia, “God and Man”; Wendy E. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” SPhiloA 2 (1990): 51–71; Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 331–57.
202. In addition to Moses 1.158, see Alleg. Interp. 1.40; Worse 161–162; Names 19, 125–159; Sacrifices 8–10.
god to Pharaoh: ‘Ιδοὺ δὲ δειδακτά σε θεον Φαραώ. On the other hand, Philo seems determined to uphold a strict monotheism in passages like On the Embassy to Gaius 118, where deification (θεοπλαστήσαι) is called “the most grievous impiety, since sooner could God change into a man than a man into God.” “That God is one” is one of the five most important lessons that Genesis teaches, according to Philo (Creation 171; cf. Alleg. Interp. 3.82; Virtues 214). This, according to Roberto Radice, “is for Philo a dogma of faith and tradition.” Moses, while exemplifying the perfection of the human race, remains firmly entrenched on this side of the human-divine chasm.

Commenting on Embassy 118, Mary Smallwood reminds us that among the Greeks the line of demarcation [between god and humanity] was frequently blurred, and their idea that a man’s virtues or his services to his fellows might carry him over the border and make him a god spread to the Roman world.

The possibility that this aspect of Greek thought has played a significant role in Philo’s theology cannot be ignored on the basis of an a priori appeal to the monotheism of Philo’s Jewish background. Furthermore, for many Jews of this period God’s metaphysical status was not unique, except in so far as God occupied “the top of a pyramid ... of divine beings.” Any study of this topic must therefore take heed of David Litwa’s caution against “disjunctive thinking about the divine” in which “an impermeable barrier” is established between the divine and the created world.

In Philo’s thought, the divine world is not limited to the supreme deity, the Existent (ὁ ὄντος τὸ ὄν), but includes the Logos, the creative and ruling powers which bear the titles “God” and “Lord” (Abraham 121–122; QG 2.15), the stars, which are at times spoken of as “manifest and visible gods” (Creation 27), and angels, exemplars of “purity and excellence” who do the bidding of the Existent (Dreams 1.139–143; cf. Abraham 107–113). Despite his Stoic affinities at a number of other points, however, Philo does not usually identify the cosmos itself with the divine. Nevertheless, there are elements within the cosmos which are not to be identified with the Existent but are still identified as “god” or “divine” by Philo.

Certain passages seem to indicate unequivocally that Philo thought of Moses in this category.

203. The meaning of “monotheism” within the period under consideration is itself disputed; see Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 6, n. 25 and the literature cited there.
204. “Philo’s Theology,” 129.
207. “Deification of Moses,” 5. Litwa attributes this to later Christian theology. But it should also be noted that the early Christian tradition does sometimes speak of salvation as “deification” (Hellean, “Philo on Deification,” 51), a doctrine that is traced back to 2 Peter 1.4: “so that through [God’s promises] you may escape from the corruption that is in the world because of lust, and may become participants in the divine nature (θειὸς κοινὸς φύσεως).”
208. For Philo’s view of the divinity of heavenly bodies, see Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 250–51.
209. For a brief discussion of these elements, see Radice, “Philo’s Theology,” 135–44.
211. Goodenough argues that Moses, and possibly other sages, constituted for Philo a “third race,” similar to the Hellenistic “divine man” (θειὸς ἀνθρώπος) (Light, 223–29).
At *Sacrifices* 8–9, for example, Moses is stationed at the side of the divine (according to Deut 5.31). Moses’ translation upon his death (Deut 34.5) provides Philo with further evidence of Moses’ extraordinary nature and is the grounds for Philo’s description of Moses as “a loan to the earthly sphere”\(^{212}\) and one whose virtue exceeds the ordinary virtue of kings and rulers and who is thus appointed as god (as per Exod 7.1). In response to a question about Exodus 24.2, Philo asserts that only Moses was able to approach God because of his prophetic mind which, since it was “divinely inspired and filled with God,” became like the monad.\(^{213}\) Thus, “[Moses] is changed into the divine, so that such men become kin to God and truly divine” (*QE* 2.29).\(^{214}\)

The emphasis on Moses’ mind reminds us that, in keeping with much of Greek philosophy, it is his rational soul/mind that is divine. In Philo’s particular case, however, this divinity is derived from the Logos which plays a mediating role between the world and the Existent.\(^{215}\) While this solution eases the tension created by the question of how a transcendent God might be at work in the world, from another perspective it simply pushes the question one step further down the line. In regard to the divinity of the human being understood in relation to the Logos and to the Existent, David Runia observes

> It is clear that Philo would not wish to abrogate the divide that separates God and man. But it is not easy for him to give a clear indication of where God’s true divinity ends and man’s derived divinity starts.\(^{216}\)

Alongside the examples noted above, we also need to take note of the instances where Moses as “god” is interpreted metaphorically or allegorically. At *On the Change of Names* 125, “god” is one of the names of the many-named (πολυωνυμός) Moses. This title is explained in two ways. First, he is god because he is wise, and thus the ruler of the foolish (*Names* 128). Kingship is described analogically in terms of being “god”; the sage stands in relation to the foolish as the Existent, the universal king, stands in relation to the world. Second, Moses is “god” to Pharaoh because, like the Father, he is merciful and benevolent in the punishment he metes out to Pharaoh (*Names* 129). These texts suggest that Moses’ divinity should be understood in terms of imitation of the divine rather than participation in the divine.\(^{217}\) Philo’s language in these examples is more philosophical than theological (if it is ever possibly to tease these apart in Philo’s thought). Thus, Philo can write of Moses as “having passed from a man into a god, though, indeed, a god to men, not to the different parts of nature” (*Good*)

\(^{212}\) At *Tongues* 77–82 sages in general are described in a similar way.

\(^{213}\) Similarly, the angels, who are “all mind through and through, pure intelligences” are also described as “in the likeness of the monad” (*Spec. Laws* 1.66).

\(^{214}\) Feldman correctly sees Philo’s desire to keep Moses separate from the monad in *QE* 2.29, but he concludes, incorrectly, that because Moses is said to be “kin to God,” Philo cannot really mean what he writes: “That [Moses] is truly divine indicates that he is not actually divine, since he is only akin to G-d” (*Philo’s Moses*, 344, original emphasis).

\(^{215}\) Runia, “God and Man,” 64–73.

\(^{216}\) Runia, “God and Man,” 73–74; cf. the discussion at *Dreams* 2.228–236 where the sage’s mind is something superior to men but less than God (229), and where the perfect person is described as existing “on the border-line between the uncreated and perishing form of being” (234).

\(^{217}\) So Helleman, “Philo on Deification” who bases her argument on the Platonic assimilation to the divine.
The context of this statement, coming as it does in one of the more philosophical treatises, provides further guidance as to how it should be understood. Moses is Philo’s perfect sage—the only person who is truly free, virtuous, and royal.

In the discussion of Moses’ appointment as king, Philo is drawing on the idea that kingship describes the sage. We have already remarked on Philo’s portrayal of Moses as sage, and although Moses is not identified as σοφος in Moses 1.147–162, there are a number of indicators that Philo’s discussion of Moses at this point draws from the sage-king ideal of Stoic-Cynic and Platonic thought. The cornucopia of virtues (1.154) identified Moses as a sage. The “good man,” ὁ σπουδαιος (1.157), is in view, a term Philo uses interchangeably with ἀστεῖος and σοφός, as becomes clear in the treatise That Every Good Person is Free. We also see at this point in Moses one of the Stoic paradoxes that are on view in Good Person: even though he possessed nothing, Moses partook in the wealth of God (Moses 1.155–157). Like other Stoic-Cynic sages, Moses was a “world citizen,” κοσµοπολιτης (1.157). As already discussed, his ascension in this passage is modelled on that of Plato’s philosopher-king rather than on that of the mystagogue.

When Philo notes that Moses was “named god and king of the whole nation” (Moses 1.158), the second title informs the first. Moses became god of the nation to the extent that he exercised the godly function of rule. He is not transformed into a heavenly figure but is recognized as the supreme example of the earthly sage. This is not to deny that elsewhere Philo is capable of speaking of Moses as a divine figure. In his construction of Moses’ kingship at this point, however, Philo chooses to employ a model that draws heavily on the Platonic and Stoic-Cynic model of the philosopher-king.

Moses as Legislator, Priest, and Prophet

The second book of Philo’s treatise On the Life of Moses treats Moses’ work as legislator, priest, and prophet, functions which are joined, in the person of Moses, to the kingly and the philosophical (Moses 2.2; cf. Moses 1.334; Rewards 52–56). A careful exegesis of these functions as portrayed in this book would require much more space than that available to me in this chapter. In the following

218. A similar qualification is found at Worse 161, where Philo states that Moses was not appointed a god to Pharaoh in reality but only in appearance (µὴ πρός ἀλήθειαν ... δὲ δόξῃ).
220. Philo identifies the “cosmopolitan” as one who lives according to the will of nature, which he identifies as the Law that is in harmony with the world (Creation 3). In other words, the “cosmopolitan” is another word for the sage who lives according to nature.
221. Wayne Meeks (“Moses as God and King,” in Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, ed. Jacob Neusner, SHR 14 [Leiden: Brill, 1970], 354–71) finds a tradition of Moses’ ascent and enthronement in Samaritan writings which suggests to him that Philo also understood this event to signal that Moses shared in God’s kingship. Feldman, in contrast, denies Moses any divinity and argues that Philo is, instead, portraying Moses in a way that is meant to contrast and oppose the Samaritan tradition (Philo’s Moses, 348, 357).
paragraphs I shall simply draw out some of the key features that contribute to Philo’s portrait of Moses as ideal king.

Legislator (2.8–65). Philo uses “legislator” (νομοθέτης) more than any other title to describe Moses.224 The word is rare in Philo’s biblical source, where it refers exclusively to God,225 but Philo joins other Jewish writers who frequently identify this aspect of Moses as integral to their portraits of the Jewish leader.226

We have already noted Philo’s identification of the king and law as those elements within a polity which command and prohibit right and wrong, what should and should not be done, respectively, which makes the king a “living law” and the law a “just king” (Moses 2.4; cf QE 2.68). Without providing any further argument, Philo concludes from this that it is fitting that the office of legislator be combined with that of king in the person of Moses.

Like the sage, the legislator should possess all the virtues, but some are more important than others in the legislative task: love of humanity (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον) ensures that the law-giver will serve the common good; because of his love of justice (τὸ φιλοδίκασθαι) he will honour equality; his love of what is good (τὸ φιλαγαθον) will ensure that he approves and attempts to supply that which is good for others; and through his hatred of evil (τὸ μισοπόνημον) he will reject the “dishonourers of virtue” (2.9). All of these virtues are brought together in the person of Moses and displayed in his law.

Philo argues that Moses was “the best of all lawgivers in all countries” (2.12) and provides a number of proofs. The laws have remained unchanged despite the often difficult circumstances that the Jews have faced (2.14–16). What’s more, the Jewish laws have been noticed and drawn upon when other nations have instituted their own laws (2.17–24), as shown by the presence of a weekly day of rest and an annual “holy month” observed by “the Greeks.”227 The clearest indication of the universal significance of Moses’ laws for Philo is its translation under the Ptolemies from “the Chaldean tongue” (2.26) into Greek (2.25–44).228

Philo’s ambivalence regarding the source of the Mosaic law—human or divine—is on view in the opening sentence of the treatise on Moses.229 Philo observes that some describe Moses as “legislator of the Jews” while others see him as “the interpreter of the Holy Laws” (Moses 1.1). The latter would seem to be in view when Philo emphasizes God’s role in revealing the law. Philo asserts that the

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225. νομοθέτης: Ps 9.21; 83.7 LXX; νομοθέτω: Exod 24.1; Deut 17.10; Ps 24.8, 12; 26.11; 83.7; 118.33, 102, 104 LXX.
227. This is a condensed version of the argument that all Greek philosophy comes from Moses (e.g., QG 4.152; Heir 214; Good Person 57). Elsewhere Philo takes a more nuanced view on the relationship between Jewish and Greek philosophy (see Wolfson, Philo, 1.141–42).
228. For Philo’s understanding of the translation, see Hindy Najman and Benjamin G. Wright III, “Perfecting Translation: The Greek Scriptures in Philo of Alexandria,” in Sibyls, Scriptures, and Scrolls: John Collins at Seventy2 vols., ed. Joel Baden, Hindy Najman, and Eliezer J Tigchelaar, JSJSup 175 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 897–915. Other accounts of this translation are found in Aristobulus, the Letter of Aristeas, and Josephus. For a discussion of Philo in the broader context of this developing tradition, see Wasserstein and Wasserstein, Septuagint, 35–50.
primary reason for the supremacy of Moses’ law was that the one who was Father and Maker of the world was also the Lawgiver who gave the law in accordance with the divine ordering of the universe so that whoever followed the law would also live according to nature (2.48). Other passages support the former point of view when they praise Moses for his role in producing the laws (2.45–47). Both positions are in view at Hypothetica 6.9:

So whether what [Moses] told them came from his own reasoning powers or was learnt from some supernatural source they held it all to come from God.

As with the question of Moses’ divinity, Philo does not seem concerned to resolve. 230

Priest (2.66–186). The priestly role follows the legislative as the second office which Philo joins to kingship. With the exception of Psalm 98.6 LXX, which states that Moses and Aaron are among the Lord’s priests, Philo would find no explicit statement in his biblical source about Moses’ priesthood. However, the Pentateuch depicts Moses functioning in a priestly role,231 and it is from this tradition that Philo feels confident in identifying Moses as a priest.232 The political developments in Rome provided Philo with another instance of the combination of priesthood and kingship,233 and he would also have found the king acting as priest in some of his Hellenistic sources.234 At Virtues 54, however, Philo is critical of those following Moses who would serve as both king and priest. This comment should probably be read in the light of the Hasmonaean reign, but it perhaps also serves to highlight the unique nature of Moses.

In a very condensed statement of the king’s duties as priest, Philo highlights the service of God (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπείας) and prayer on behalf of his people (Moses 2.5; cf. Rewards 56). Behind this statement stands the conviction that no people can thrive without God’s blessing. If the priest is to be successful in his office, piety (εὐσεβεία) is the chief virtue he must possess (Moses 2.66). Moses’ natural gifts provided the basis upon which this pious life might be built, but it was brought to

230. So Najman and Wright, “Perfecting Translation,” 903–4. Feldman (Philo’s Moses, 268–71) recognizes both positions in Philo but argues that he consistently portrays Moses as more than a “mere transmitter of the laws” (p. 270) or a “mere agent of G-d” (p. 271).

231. See, e.g., Exod 24.6; cf. Lev 8.24–9.30. Lierman (New Testament Moses, 66) observes that Moses experienced the presence of God in the tabernacle in a way that exceeded that of the priests (Exod 25.22; cf. Lev 16.2). Lierman concludes, “in the first century all these pieces of Moses lore would have implied that Moses had functioned for his people as priest” (p. 67).

232. Philo finds Moses in charge of the Levites at Exod 32.25–29 (Sacrifices 130). With Moses clearly in mind, Philo observes that the true priest is also a prophet who serves the Existent according to virtue rather than birth (Spec. Laws 4.192); see Lierman, New Testament Moses, 67–68. This is perhaps why Philo highlights the excellence of Moses’ parents and mentions that they are from the same tribe (Moses 1.7), but fails to identify them as Levites (Exod 2.1) even though he is aware of this aspect of Moses’ genealogy (Prelim. Studies 132).


234. See, e.g., Diogenes 72.15–23. There are also some similarities between Philo’s concept of the king’s priestly duties and Xenophon’s emphasis on the king’s piety. Philo writes elsewhere that “the early kings were at the same time high priests” (QE 2.105), but fails to identify these early kings.
perfection through an ascent to the divine (2.66–70). This ascent to “an inaccessible and pathless mountain, the highest and most sacred in the region” (2.70) lasted for forty days and nights, and was accompanied by fasting. Philo understands this ascent in terms of a priestly purification process during which time Moses was fed by “the better food of contemplation (θεορία)” (2.69). Moses descended more beautiful than he ascended, and his person was marked by “dazzling brightness that flashed from him like the rays of the sun” (2.70; cf. Exod 34.28–35). Just as the ascent described at Moses 1.158 served to legitimize Moses’ kingship,235 this ascent legitimates his priestly role by emphasizing the purification process which perfected his piety.

This priestly piety is not in view in the bulk of the remaining section on Moses’ priestly office, which is given over to a discussion of his preparation of the tabernacle (Moses 2.71–108) and the other priests (2.109–158). But piety was shown by both Moses and the Levites in the incident of the Golden Calf (Moses 2.159–173; cf. Exod 32) and is the cause for the elevation of the Levites to the priesthood (cf. Spec. Laws 1.79).

The priestly office is defined by piety. Because it directs the human being towards the divine, piety is the source of all other virtues (Decalogue 52), the “queen” of the virtues (Decalogue 119; Spec. Laws 4.135, 147), and “that most godlike of qualities” (Dreams 2.186).236 As has already been seen, Moses, possessed of all the virtues perfectly, including piety, was thus uniquely situated to fulfill the role of priest. As the priest-king, Moses was able to worship the Existent correctly, and offer prayers and supplications that his subjects might be rescued from evil and be blessed with what is good.237 This mediatorial role in which Moses represents the people before God is balanced by the next in which he speaks to the people from God.

Prophet (2.187–287). The Pentateuch portrays Moses as a unique prophet. Other prophets receive revelation in the form of visions and dreams, but the Lord spoke with Moses face to face (Num 12.6–8; Deut 34.10). Philo is aware of this tradition and writes of Moses: “Is he not everywhere celebrated as a prophet?” (Heir 262). Moses is the chief prophet (ἀρχιπροφήτης; Names 103, 125; Dreams 2.189) and “the most perfect of the prophets” (Decalogue 175).238

Philo knows of prophecy as (1) interpretation of divine utterances; (2) answers revealed to particular questions; and (3) ecstatic utterances given under divine possession (Moses 2.188–191).239 In the discussion of Moses as prophet, Philo passes over the first type of prophecy (2.191), but

235. The relationship between this ascent and that of Moses 1.158 is not explicitly described by Philo. The ascent in Exod 20.21 which lies behind 1.158 makes no mention of a forty-day ascent or the accompanying fasting. The forty-day period suggests Exod 24.18 and/or Exod 34.28–35 and Moses’ glowing visage upon his descent (2.70) would point to the second of these.

236. Piety’s “twin” is φιλανθρωπία (Virtues 54). The former is directed towards God, the latter towards humanity.

237. For examples of Moses as intercessor, e.g., Moses 1.128; Dreams 1.143; Planting 46.

238. See Lierman, New Testament Moses, 43–44 for further titles and references. For a more extensive discussion of Philo’s understanding of knowledge, see Wolfson, Philo, 2.3–72 who discusses prophecy within the broader context of Philo’s epistemology.

239. These categories can overlap. At Decalogue 175, for example, Moses is said to have interpreted the sacred utterances (category 1) when filled with the divine spirit (category 3).
presumably would include under this type those instances in the Pentateuch when the Lord speaks directly to Moses.\textsuperscript{240} Philo then discusses the second (2.192–245) and third (2.246–287) types of prophecy by providing examples from Israel’s history as found in the Pentateuch. Although Philo notes that, strictly speaking, only the third type is prophecy, in each of the phenomena being discussed, God is the source of knowledge; it is this sense of divine revelation that ties them together. From this it follows that it is important for the king to exercise prophecy because through divine revelation the prophet-king discovers what reason alone is unable to grasp (2.6, 187).

While prophecy included knowledge of the future—a prophet was provided for God’s people lest they indulge in divination (\textit{Spec. Laws} 1.64–65)—prophecy also dealt with the present. Philo provides a number of examples in which God provided an answer to Moses’ question about dealing with a particular incident, such as the punishment suited to a particular instance of blasphemy (2.192–208; cf. Lev 24.10–16). Divine knowledge was needed lest the punishment was too heavy or too light, and once received, the divine answer was then included in the law of Moses. This incident exemplifies the connection between prophecy and law.

John Lierman points out that Moses’ function as lawgiver and prophet are closely related,\textsuperscript{241} so much so that Moses can be called “the prophet of the laws” (\textit{Virtues} 51) and “the one who prophesied our laws” (\textit{Spec. Laws} 2.104). Like prophecy, parts of the law are revealed to Moses, and both “the art of legislation and prophecy” come through “wisdom given by divine inspiration” (\textit{Prelim. Studies} 132). Furthermore, prophecy seems to be linked to priesthood since the revelation to Moses of the model upon which the tabernacle was based is also considered a form of prophecy (\textit{Moses} 2.76) and Philo observes that Moses was “taught the patterns of the holy tabernacle” (2.141), presumably through divine revelation. As Philo notes when considering the priest who acts as judge in difficult cases (Deut 17.8–9), “the true priest is necessarily a prophet” (\textit{Spec. Laws} 4.192). The three offices discussed in Book 2 of the \textit{Life of Moses} are thus related to one another. Like the virtues, each of these offices is essential and to fall short in any one of them leads to an imperfect form of rule (\textit{Rewards} 56).

With a poetic flourish, Philo asserts the following with regard to Moses’ roles as king, legislator, priest, and prophet:

\begin{quote}
Beautiful and all-harmonious is the union of these four faculties; for, intertwined and clinging to each other, they move in rhythmic accord, mutually receiving and repaying benefits, and thus imitate the virgin Graces whom an immutable law of nature forbids to be separated.
\textit{(Moses} 2.7\textit{)}
\end{quote}

In order to lead God’s people as their king, Moses was a prophet who was given divine knowledge of the future and who was also able to inquire directly of God with regard to the correct course of action to be taken in difficult circumstances. As priest he could intercede for his subjects in God’s presence. As lawgiver he was able to provide his subjects with a set of laws modelled on the law of nature which he was able to behold through his reason. The common and central element in these various offices is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{240} E.g., Exod 33.11; Num 12.8; see Wolfson, \textit{Philo}, 2.36–43.
\end{itemize}
the divine. Through occupying these four offices Moses stands between God and the nation, thus playing a mediating role that is similar to the played by the Logos in the heavenly realm.

**Philo: Concluding Comments**

In his treatise *On the Special Laws*, Philo discusses the kingship laws of Deuteronomy 17.14–20 (4.157–169). The provisions made in Deuteronomy for the copying and reading of the law ensure that the king remains “a badge of blameless rule, sculpted according to the archetype of the kingship of God” (*Spec. Laws* 4.164; my translation). These laws, as we have seen in this section, are the written laws Moses produced on the basis of the law of nature, which is also the divine law. It is not surprising, then, to find the written laws extolling a form of kingship which mirrors divine kingship. But Moses did more than produce the written copy of the law, he embodied it. Future kings could thus either study the law or, even better, study Moses himself, the ideal king (*Virtues* 70).

Philo’s portrait of Moses as ideal king takes as its basis the biblical account of Moses’ life and adds to this account in order to explain or expand the biblical tradition. In the Pentateuch, Philo finds Moses acting as lawgiver, priest, and prophet (*Moses* 2). These offices form part of a larger complex of ideals which include that of king. While there are clear indications of Moses’ kingship in the earlier part of his life (1.1–70) as recounted in Philo’s biblical sources, nowhere is Moses explicitly identified as king. Philo explains that in an ascent to the divine, which follows Moses’ rescue of God’s people (1.71–146), Moses’ royal office is recognized and legitimized (*Moses* 1.147–162). Moses’ kingship in this passage is seen to be a combination of the Platonic philosopher-king and the Stoic king-like sage. We have also seen ideas similar to those present in the Pythagorean kingship treatises emerge from time to time in Philo’s writing about Moses. With regard to the various traditions intertwined in Philo’s presentation of Moses, Ray Barraclough observes:

> This is not simply mechanical eclecticism on his part, but springs from his belief that what is to be admired in the Greek ideals for rulers is present in Moses, and that what the Jewish scriptures wrote of him complemented this Hellenic estimate of the ideal ruler.  

Philo thus provides us with a prime example of ideal kingship constructed in one part of the world of Hellenistic Judaism.

**Hellenistic Jewish Kingship: Concluding Comments**

All three texts studied in this section originate in Alexandrian Judaism from roughly the middle of the second century BCE to the middle of the first century CE. They illustrate the way in which Jewish authors were influenced by the Hellenistic intellectual milieu in which they worked. With regard to Barclay’s axes of acculturation (see above, p. 211), it has been observed that all three authors show an awareness and understanding of Greek culture and, more specifically, of the Greek philosophical tradition. They should be placed fairly high on the acculturation axis.  

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Nevertheless, all three authors belong somewhere in the middle of the accommodation axis, indicative of “those who propounded some Hellenistic interpretation of Judaism but preserved its difference or uniqueness in certain respects.”

Our three authors critique Graeco-Roman culture, especially in religious matters—theriolatry (Aristeas), ruler cult (Pseudo-Solomon), ignorance of Jewish law (Philo)—but this opposition to Graeco-Roman culture is countered by attempts at integration in other areas. The focus in this section has been on the way in which these writers have integrated the Greek philosophical tradition of ideal kingship in their thought and writing to produce a synthesis of the Greek and Jewish intellectual traditions. In the following chapter, Saul of Tarsus is examined to see whether he exhibits a similar synthesizing inclination.

2014], 102–28), while Aristeas and Pseudo-Solomon probably belong a bit lower down in the category of “familiarity with Greek literature, rhetoric, philosophy and theology” (Jews in the Diaspora, 95).

244. Barclay, Jews in the Diaspora, 98.

245. Torrey Seland (“Philo as Citizen,” 73) writes: “[Philo] might to some extent be considered an acculturated Jew, but far from being assimilated.” For the opposing position, see Borgen, “Survey of Research”. The Wisdom of Solomon is an example of “cultural antagonism” or “cultural aggression,” in Barclay’s estimation (Jews in the Diaspora, 181–91), but he admits it remains “an elusive document, hard to categorize and difficult to place in a historical context” (p. 181). For a view of Wisdom of Solomon closer to the one I am expressing, see Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 195–202 who speaks of a “convergence with Greek culture” (p. 202).
CHAPTER 6. PAUL’S CONSTRUCTION OF JESUS’ KINGSHIP

Having examined in earlier chapters the way in which ideal kingship is constructed in classical and Hellenistic Greek thought, I proceeded to sketch out kingship ideals as they appear in the books of the Jewish scriptures from which Paul draws most frequently. In the preceding chapter I have looked at three examples of how Jewish writers in the Diaspora have blended Hellenistic and Jewish language about kingship. It remains to ask whether and, if so, how Paul uses kingship language from these two traditions and whether he does so in a way similar to these other Hellenistic Jewish authors.

Paul’s language about Jesus will first be examined in terms of three royal titles: “Christ,” “Son of God,” and “Lord.” This will be followed by a functional and relational analysis of the figure of Jesus in Paul’s writings in which kingly elements will be sought in Christ’s various acts on behalf of God and God’s people, and in his relationship with God and those who might be considered Christ’s subjects.

In order to deal with the various elements of Paul’s royal Christology, this chapter will necessarily be selective. I will discuss key texts that illustrate the point under discussion, rather than attempt to list and investigate every passage that might have a bearing on a certain word or concept. My argument is not that every passage about δικαίοσύνη, for example, can be illuminated by reading it in the light of “justice” in the Hellenistic kingship topos, but that such a reading is enlightening in the case of some passages. My overarching concern, however, is to investigate the Pauline writings within the context of ancient constructions of ideal kingship described in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. This present chapter will not only demonstrate the presence or absence of certain elements of the kingship topos in Paul’s writings, but, in keeping with the methodology described in Chapter 1, will also draw attention to similarities and differences in the elements that Paul shares with other writers.

In the introduction to this study, I noted that Paul nowhere calls Jesus “βασιλεύς.” Except for 2 Corinthians 11.32 which speaks of King Aretas, the lexeme does not occur in the Pauline texts being studied. Paul’s most common way of referring to Jesus, even more common than the name “Jesus,” is


2. While “Jesus” is frequently used to speak of the earthly person and “Christ” reserved for the post-resurrection figure, this is a modern distinction, not one made by Paul and not one that I will follow closely (see, e.g., Udo Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology, trans. M. Eugene Boring [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005], 105–8; Stanley E. Porter, “Jesus Christ’ in Paul’s Letters,” in Sacred Tradition in the New Testament: Tracing Old Testament Themes in the Gospels and Epistles [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016], 227–45). Although I will show in the next section that “Christ” does at times still bear the weight of “Messiah” in Paul’s writings, this has been all but lost in modern discourse. I will tend to use “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Jesus Christ” interchangeably.

3. Elsewhere in the Pauline corpus, βασιλεύς is found only in 1 Timothy 1.17; 2.2; 6.15. The first and third examples speak of God as “king” and “king of kings,” respectively. The verb βασιλεύει occurs more frequently (Rom 5.14, 17, 21; 6.12; 1 Cor 4.8), but only once has Christ as its subject (1 Cor 15.25). While κυριεύω is used of Christ once (Rom 14.9), other words related to the idea of monarchical reign are absent (δεσποτζω, διοικεω, τυραννευω).
as Χριστός, “Christ.” I will start this chapter by discussing Paul’s use of “Christ” and two other “titles of majesty”—“Lord,” and “Son of God.” The goal in this section is not to trace the origins of these titles (although I will be drawn into this discussion at points), but rather to demonstrate that in Paul’s writings they bear royal weight.

Royal Titles

The titles given to Jesus have played an important role in modern Christology. Wilhelm Bousset’s study set the agenda for much of the twentieth century in which attempts were made to trace the origins and development of the various titles. The problems inherent in “titular Christology” have been noted. The subsequent lack of progress in this field led Nils Dahl to call for more attention to be given to the “syntax of christological language,” that is, the roles that various designations of Jesus occupy in the New Testament, as opposed to the “vocabulary,” that is, the titles themselves. Alongside this attention given to syntax, Dahl suggests studying the sources of christological language. These sources are “linguistic resources—words, phrases, forms, and patterns of composition—that existed prior to their use in speaking about Jesus.” Jens Schröter notes correctly that the “titles of majesty” used by Paul should not be thought of as circumscribing a particular set of concepts inherited from Judaism and transferred to Jesus—as if the water drawn from one pool is simply poured into another. “Rather,” Schröter argues, “their application to Jesus represents a special case of reception, in which certain semantic features were actualized and connected with his activity and fate.” While Schröter’s


5. These are the same titles studied by Ferdinand Hahn, The Titles of Jesus in Christology: Their History in Early Christianity, trans. Harold Knight and George Ogg (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2002) who calls these “titles of majesty” (p. 11). Hahn’s study of the development of these titles focuses on the canonical Gospels and thus also includes “Son of Man” and “Son of David,” which do not occur in the Pauline texts. Although the latter is implied in Rom 1.3, the absence of the former is intriguing, especially given its prominence in the Gospel tradition and the possibility that Paul draw on the 1 Enoch 37–71, as argued by James A. Waddell, The Messiah: A Comparative Study in the Enochic Son of Man and the Pauline Kyrios, Jewish and Christian Texts in Contexts and Related Studies 10 (London: T&T Clark, 2011), where the title is used frequently. Waddell suggests that potential misunderstanding caused by a competing Adam-soteriology led Paul to avoid using “Son of Man,” lest Jesus be subordinated to Adam (pp. 186–201).


assumption is that these features were drawn primarily from Judaism, I am interested in the possibility that concepts taken from Greek kingship texts might have been used in addition to those drawn from Jewish texts. One final comment must be made with regard to these Jewish texts before we examine Paul’s titles for Jesus.

Elements found in Jewish kingship texts are taken up into messianic texts, but the study of messianism and Messiah language is a much bigger enterprise that cannot be entered into at this point. Such a study would be complicated by the fact that many consider the term “Messiah” not to have had a univocal meaning, but that it was filled by different individuals and groups with a variety of concepts. Some, such as William Green, would deny any real significance to messianism and messianic thought in Israelite religion, Judaism, and early Christianity. For Green, the presence of Messiah language is not necessarily significant since “messiah” is all signifier with no signified. In contrast, William Horbury represents those more confident of finding a messianism which, although exhibiting diversity, is marked by “an underlying unity arising from its roots in biblical tradition on the king.” If Horbury’s assessment of Jewish messianism is correct, we might expect to uncover something of this royal tradition in Paul’s writings. In what follows, my concern is thus not with messianism, messianic expectations, messianic speculations or the figure of the Messiah per se, but,


12. James Charlesworth comments, following the 1987 Princeton Symposium on the Messiah, that no member of that symposium “holds that a critical historian can refer to a common Jewish messianic hope during the time of Jesus” (“From Messianology to Christology: Problems and Prospects,” in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity: The First Princeton Symposium on Judaism and Christian Origins, ed. James H. Charlesworth [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992], 5). But the absence of “a common Jewish messianic hope” does not preclude the possibility that there are sufficient similarities in the various “messianic hopes” so as to be able to speak of a broad messianism (or to arrange a symposium around the idea) which various groups would recognize as such.


rather, with the royal aspects of these elements in so far as they can be found in Paul’s writing about Jesus (the) Christ.

**Christ**

There seems to be a *prima facie* case to be made for Jesus’ kingship in Paul’s writing on the basis of Paul’s use of χριστός to speak of Jesus. The etymology of this word is linked to the idea of anointing, and it was used to translate the Hebrew פשע, “anointed one/messiah.” To the extent that the “anointed one” in the Jewish Scriptures is frequently a royal figure (see Chapter 4), and assuming that Paul’s use of χριστός is influenced by these texts, the royal connotations of this title when used of Jesus would seem self-evident.

Yet the majority of scholars writing on New Testament Christology argue that, despite its etymology, χριστός is not used by Paul to denote “Messiah” but, rather, is used as a proper name appended to that of Jesus. It is sometimes acknowledged that Paul understands χριστός to mean “Messiah”/“anointed one” but that the significance of this title has disappeared. Andrew Chester identifies this as “the paradox of Paul’s usage [of χριστός]”: “he knew that Jesus was the messiah ... yet, in his writings at least, he lays no emphasis on Jesus as messiah, and makes very little of messianic tradition more generally.” The term χριστός is then explained as a name or, in the phrase Χριστός Ἰησοῦς, as a “titular name” and *cognomen*, assuming that Ἰησοῦς functions as the *nomen*.

There is a smaller group of scholars who contend that χριστός continues to bear the weight of “Messiah” in Paul’s general usage. N. T. Wright, for example, has argued in a number of places that

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16. *LSJ* s.v. χρῖον, χριστός.
17. See, e.g., 1 Sam 2.10; Ps 2.2; Isa 45.1. Twice in John’s Gospel, the Aramaic is transliterated as μοσίας and glossed as χριστός (John 1.41; 4.25).
19. For a survey of modern scholarship starting with F. C. Baur, see Novenson, *Christ Among the Messiahs*, 12–33.
22. Chester, “Christ of Paul,” 111. Similarly, Hengel, “‘Christos’ in Paul,” 68 argues that when Paul refers to Jesus as ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, the *nomen* is Ἰησοῦς, Χριστός is to be read as the *cognomen*, and κύριος as an honorific title. A full discussion of this use of χριστός is now found in Novenson, *Christ Among the Messiahs*, 64–97, who concludes that χριστός should be understood as an honorific accompanying a name, such as Ἀντιοχος Ἐπιφανής or Πτολεμαῖος Σωτήρ, and not a title or name. Novenson argues that χριστός retains messianic overtones.
χριστος carries the weight of “Messiah” whenever Paul uses it.23 In an innovative study that attempts to avoid the stalemate reached in tradition-historical studies, Matthew Novenson employs linguistic arguments to show that Paul does indeed use “Messiah language” when speaking about Jesus and that Paul’s language should be understood not in contrast to, but as an example of, Jewish messianic language.24

My concern here is to show that at least some of the passages in which Paul uses χριστος to refer to Jesus envisage Jesus as a royal figure. The argument in this section consists of the demonstration of three correlated hypotheses: (1) Paul uses messianic language to speak of Jesus; (2) Paul understands Jesus’ person and ministry in terms of messianic passages; and (3) Jesus fulfills certain messianic functions.

Nils Dahl cites a number of Pauline passages where the reader might detect “messianic connotations.”25 Chester disagrees: “In the majority of these [passages cited by Dahl], it seems to me difficult to find any real messianic sense.”26 Chester defines Messiah as “the agent of final divine deliverance,”27 but it is unclear which of the elements in this description he finds lacking in Paul’s writing about Jesus. Certainly, it is not immediately evident that a relationship exists between the singular seed/descendant of Abraham and the Messiah (Gal 3.16)28 nor why the rock that followed Israel in the wilderness (Exod 17; Num 20–21) is identified as the Messiah (1 Cor 10.4).29 Other texts, however, do link Paul’s use of χριστος more closely with Israel’s Messiah. According to Dahl, it is in the opening verses of Romans that “Paul speaks most clearly of the messiahship of Jesus”30 and so it is with this passage that I begin.31

In the opening verses of Romans, Paul introduces himself in relation to “the gospel of God” (Rom 1.1). This gospel is promised through the prophets in the holy Scriptures (v. 2) and is concerned with God’s Son (v. 3). In addition to being called “God’s Son,” this person is identified as “Christ Jesus” (v. 3).23


24. Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs.

25. Rom 15.6; 1 Cor 1.23; 10.4; 15.22; 2 Cor 5.10; 11.2-3; Gal 3.16; Eph 1.10, 12, 20; 5.14; Phil 1.15, 17; 3.7. (“Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” 17, 24 nn. 11 and 12). There is some overlap between these passages and the texts studied by Novenson to illustrate Paul’s use of Messiah language (Christ Among the Messiahs, 137–73): Rom 1.3–4; 9.1–5; 15.3, 7–12; 1 Cor 1.23; 15.20–28; 2 Cor 1.21–22; 5.16–17; Gal 3.16.


28. But see Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs, 138–42; Wright, “Messiahship in Galatians”.


1), 32 “Jesus Christ our Lord” (v. 4), “Jesus Christ” (v. 6), and “Lord Jesus Christ” (v. 7). A number of combinations of “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Lord” are thus present and no specific meaning seems to adhere to any particular combination. Of interest, though, is Paul’s expansion and explanation of “his [God’s] Son” (v. 3) 33 through the use of two balanced participial clauses: τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματός Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, “descended from David according to the flesh” (1.3) and τοῦ ὄρισθέντος υἱοθετοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεύμα ἁγίος εἰς ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, “declared to be Son of God with power according to the spirit of holiness by resurrection from the dead” (1.4). 34

Paul’s own claim is that the gospel he is announcing was promised by God in the Jewish scriptures (Rom 1.2). Although there are no quotations from the Greek Scriptures in the passage under consideration, there is evidence that points to those texts as the source of Paul’s language about Jesus. The first participial clause provides the only explicit reference in the undisputed Pauline corpus to Jesus’ Davidic descent, 35 suggesting to most commentators that Paul is using an inherited confessional formula. 36 Novenson notes that 2 Samuel 22.51 LXX (= Ps 17.51 LXX) provides the linguistic combination of χριστός, Δαυὶδ, and σπέρμα. 37 The link between “David” and “seed” is also found in 2 Samuel 7.12. Although the term χριστός is not present in 2 Samuel 7.12, Donald Juel has shown how the passage was understood in messianic terms by those producing the Qumran texts and by early Christians. 38 Even if the way in which this LXX terminology is used to speak about Jesus is not original to Paul but is, instead, mediated through some pre-Pauline Christian tradition, its presence shows that Paul feels confident in what this language expresses about Jesus. In using this language, Paul anticipates the same tradition on display in the later New Testament writings which linked Jesus

32. Some early manuscripts, notably P 26 κ A, read “Jesus Christ.” The phrase in v. 1 was most likely attracted to this form found at vv. 4, 6, and 7. 33. The phrase “Son of God” will be dealt with below. It is worth noting, however, that both participial phrases are controlled by the identification of Jesus as “his [God’s] son” (v. 3), suggesting that there is an element of divine sonship that existed before the event described in v. 4 (C. E. B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, 2 volumes, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975], 58). 34. See Joshua W. Jipp, “Ancient, Modern, and Future Interpretations of Romans 1:3–4: Reception History and Biblical Interpretation.” JTI 3.2 (2009): 241–59 for a survey of how these verses have been handled by ancient and modern interpreters. 35. Compare 2 Tim 2.8: “Remember Jesus Christ, raised from the dead, a descendant of David (ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ)—that is my gospel.”


37. Christ Among the Messiahs, 168. Paul’s familiarity with this psalm is evident from the fact that he cites Ps 17.50 LXX at Rom 15.9. For the argument that Paul understands Jesus to be the Messiah who prays the psalms in Rom 15, see Richard B. Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms: Israel’s Psalter as Matrix of Early Christology,” in The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 101–18. Hays’s conclusions support the main point I am arguing with regard to Rom 1: that “the Davidic messiahship of Jesus is a significant aspect of Pauline Christology” and that “the conventional wisdom that Christos in Paul is a name, not a title, is seriously misleading” (p. 117).

to the Davidic dynasty. Thus, echoing language from the Jewish Scriptures, Paul identifies Jesus as the Messiah who stands in Israel’s royal line as David’s descendant.

Paul’s claim that these things were “promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures” (Rom 1.2) seems to be stretched to breaking point when it comes to the question of the resurrection. However, Martin Hengel argues that 2 Samuel 7.12 strengthens the link between Messiah and resurrection. God’s promise in this verse to establish the Davidic dynasty was translated into Greek as καὶ ἀναστήσω τὸ σπέρμα σου μετὰ σέ. Once it is accepted that Jesus stands in the line of David, it is easy to see how this text could have been connected to Jesus’ resurrection. Furthermore, Psalm 89 (which is thematically related to 2 Samuel 7) provided the early Christians with a text in which the Davidic Messiah experiences suffering, humiliation, and ultimately, vindication.

Key royal passages in the Jewish Scriptures thus provide Paul with the language he uses to speak of Jesus as Messiah.

But Paul’s exegesis of certain biblical passages also shows that he considers Jesus to be the Davidic Messiah and that the importance of these texts for Paul extends beyond their provision of messianic language. In order to illustrate this we have to look to the conclusion of the body of Romans. The focus of Romans 15.7–13 is the work of Χριστός that stands as an example to be followed (15.7). The collection of quotations from the three sections of the Jewish scriptures (Law: Deut 32.43; Prophets: Isa 11.10; Writings: Ps 18.49 [=2 Sam 22.50]; 117.1) are apparently drawn together by the catchword ἔθνη. But Paul’s choice of these passages is governed by another consideration. If it is accepted that Paul’s quotations, allusions, and echoes of the Jewish Scriptures evoke the larger context from which they are drawn, at least two of these quotations are messianic.

Psalm 17 LXX speaks of the suffering and vindication of God’s king (βασιλεύς) and anointed one/Messiah (χριστός), that is, David and his descendant (σπέρμα) (Ps 17.51 LXX). We have already

39. See, e.g., Matt 1.1–17; Luke 1.32, 69; 3.23–38; John 7.42; Acts 2.30; Rev 3.7; 5.5; 22.16. The question as to the extent to which Paul was influenced by the same tradition that gave rise to these writings cannot be entered into at this point.

40. Ps 17.51 LXX = 2 Sam 22.51 LXX heightens the link between king and messiah by identifying “his [God’s] king” (βασιλεύς αὐτοῦ) with “his [God’s] Messiah” (τοῦ χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ). If Paul’s text is indeed influenced by this verse, he could not have missed the fact the Jesus is God’s Messiah and thus God’s king.

41. Paul asserts in an earlier letter that the death and resurrection of Χριστός happened κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς (1 Cor 15.3–4). In his own mind, in any case, the link seems well established; see also Luke 24.25–27, 44–46; Acts 2.29–33 where the same link is made.

42. Hengel, The Son of God, 64; see also Wright, Faithfulness of God, 818–19.


44. Hays identifies this as “the letter’s rhetorical climax” (“Christ Prays the Psalms,” 114). The passage is usually seen as the conclusion to 14.1–15.6 (so Cranfield, Romans, 739; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33 [New York: Doubleday, 1993], 705–6).

noted the possibility that these texts provides Paul with some of the Messiah language used in Romans 1.1–7. The use of this passage at the end the body of the letter suggests a christological inclusio. This hypothesis is strengthened when the centrality of the resurrection, and thus, by implication, Christ’s suffering and death, is noted in the opening verses of the letter. Isaiah 11.10, the quotation found at Romans 15.12, speaks of the root of Jesse that “stands up to rule nations.” The passage that precedes this, Isaiah 11.1–9, was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 in terms of its contribution to royal ideology. Paul’s use of Isaiah 11 brings that complex of ideas, including the future Davidic Messiah, into view.

This quotation from Isaiah also raises the theme of the Messiah’s eschatological rule over the nations, the same theme that occurs in Psalm 17 LXX. The reason (διὸ τοῦτο; Ps 17.49 LXX) for the Messiah’s praise of the Lord is his vindication (vv. 47–50), which includes the subjugation of the nations.

From this brief consideration of Paul’s quotations in Romans 15, I would argue that Paul reads these messianic texts from the Jewish scriptures as speaking about Jesus. Not only does he understand Jesus’ ministry and messiahship in the light of the Jewish scriptures (Rom 1.2), but his understanding of own ministry is also shaped by the messianic shape of those scriptures.

The focus of Paul’s ministry is, according to Romans 1.5, “to bring about the obedience of faith among all the Gentiles (εἰς ὑπακοήν πίστεως ἐν πάσιν τοῖς ἐθνεσιν) for the sake of his name [i.e., “Jesus Christ our Lord” (see v. 4)].” The same phrase is found in the letter’s concluding paragraph (Rom 16.26; cf. 16.19). At the start of the letter’s concluding section, Paul once again speaks of his ministry in terms of the obedience of the Gentiles (Rom 15.18). These references point to the importance of obedience in the letter. More will be said below about obedience and its attendant virtue, faith. Here it is important to notice that the theme of obedience also points to its corollary, Christ’s ruling function, the same theme we saw introduced through the quotation of Isaiah 11.10.

Although Kenneth Pomykala’s study concludes that “there existed in early Judaism no continuous, widespread, or dominant expectation for a Davidic messiah,” what his study also demonstrates is the existence of Jewish texts in which a stubborn thread ties the Davidic dynasty to messianic expectations. Paul’s letter to the Romans would seem to provide another example of just such a

47. For the claim that the resurrection provides the interpretive key to the entire letter, see J. R. Daniel Kirk, Unlocking Romans: Resurrection and the Justification of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).
49. The use of λαοί at Ps 17.47 LXX instead of ἐθνεῖ (cf. v. 49) reflects the Hebrew which has יִשְׂרָאֵל and יִשְׂרָאֵל in vv. 47 and 49 (Ps 18.48, 50 MT), respectively. The consistent use of the plural indicates that the nations are in view throughout.
50. For the argument that chapter 16 is indeed part of Paul’s original letter, see Harry Gamble Jr., The Textual History of the Letter to the Romans: A Study in Textual and Literary Criticism, SD 42 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977).
51. Fitzmyer (Romans, 237) thinks “obedience” has “a pejorative connotation” at Rom 1.5 and prefers to translate the phrase as “a commitment of faith” (cf. 1.8; 15.18; 16.19, 26). But in Romans it is not obedience per se that is problematic (so Rom 5.19), rather, the object of obedience determines whether obedience is seen positively or negatively (Rom 6.16).
52. The Davidic Dynasty Tradition in Early Judaism: Its History and Significance for Messianism, Early Judaism and Its Literature 7 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 270; see also Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The One Who is to Come (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 33–133 for a discussion of the development of the idea of the Davidic dynasty in the Jewish scriptures, the Septuagint, and extrabiblical Jewish writings. In addition to the texts mentioned in the preceding discussion, the link between
text.\textsuperscript{53} It is true, as Martin Hengel, observes, that Paul never advances proof from the scriptures that Jesus is the Messiah, but that he assumes it.\textsuperscript{54} On the basis of the observations made regarding Jesus’ Davidic lineage and messianic rule in Romans, we are warranted in taking Paul’s use of Χριστός at face value. The gospel that Paul announces, which he finds adumbrated in the Jewish scriptures, does indeed have as its focus the Davidic king, the Messiah, Jesus.\textsuperscript{55}

The second participial clause in Romans 1.3–4 provides us with a suitable starting point for establishing the royal significance of the second “title of majesty,” namely, “Son of God.”\textsuperscript{56}

**Son of God**

I start this section with a discussion of some Pauline passages in which the royal Son of God makes an appearance. This is followed by a brief discussion of the possible antecedents for Paul’s sonship language. In addressing the question in this order I am following the example of Martin Hengel’s short but influential study.\textsuperscript{57}

In Romans 1.4, Paul states that through his resurrection from the dead,\textsuperscript{58} God’s Son (Rom 1.3) is now shown to be “Son of God with power.”\textsuperscript{59} Jesus’ resurrection proves to be an inflection point:\textsuperscript{60} following this event it is no longer adequate to think of Jesus’ messiahship purely in terms of his human descent within the David line since it now continues in a different sphere.\textsuperscript{61} Summarizing his gospel in 1 Thessalonians 1.9–10,\textsuperscript{62} Paul commends the church for the reports that they “wait

the Davidic dynasty/seed and the messianic king is drawn in Jer 23.5–6; 30.9; 33.14–18; Ezek 34.23–24; 37.24–25; Pss Sol 17.21.

53. Because Paul’s writings are often the object of study, it is easy to miss the fact that they also provide additional examples of Jewish messianic texts, as Novenson points out (Christ Among the Messiahs, 8–10, 176–78).

54. “‘Christos’ in Paul,” 67. Similarly, Donald Juel writes, “The confession of Jesus as Messiah is the presupposition of NT theology, not necessarily its content” (Messianic Exegesis, 81).

55. Additional arguments for this conclusion as they pertain to Paul’s other writings can be found in Wright, “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’”; Wright, “Messiahship in Galatians”. Novenson (Christ Among the Messiahs) argues that “Christ” is an honorific that is capable of bearing the royal weight for which I have argued in this section.

56. The capitalization of “Son of God” and “Son” here and elsewhere indicates my understanding that it is primarily used in a titular sense. However, I consider the significance of the title to lie in the filial relationship it expresses (so Larry W. Hurtado, “Jesus’ Divine Sonship in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans,” in Romans and the People of God: Essays in Honor of Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Sven K. Soderlund and N. T. Wright [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999], 221–22).

57. Hengel, The Son of God; cf. Hurtado, “Jesus’ Divine Sonship” who takes the same approach for his study of sonship in Romans.

58. The preposition in the phrase εἰς ὑποστάσεως νεκρόν might be understood causally or temporally (Hahn, Titles of Jesus, 250). It seems that both are in view in Rom 1.4: the resurrection is both the way in which God exalts Jesus and the point in time from which his exaltation becomes evident (James D. G. Dunn, “Jesus—Flesh and Spirit: An Exposition of Romans I.3–4,” JTS NS 24.1 [1973]: 57 n. 1).

59. Most recent commentators understand ἐν δούλῳ to be modifying θεόθεν rather than ὁρισθέντος (e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 62; Fitzmyer, Romans, 235; Richard N. Longenecker, The Epistle to the Romans: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016], 68–69); see Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 107 for a dissenting voice.

60. For the determinative nature of the resurrection on Paul’s understanding of Jesus, see N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 241–67; for Rom 1.3–4, see pp. 242–45.

61. It is this to which κατὰ πνεύμα ἀγωστόν refers. The contrast between the Son’s messianic work κατὰ σάρκα and
(ἀναμένω) for [God’s] Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead—Jesus, who rescues us (Ἡσου τὸν ρώμενον ἡμᾶς) from the coming wrath” (1.10). Just as in Romans 1, following his resurrection, Jesus is understood to have ascended to heaven as the Son of God. The question remains whether this, too, reflects an element of kingly rule. First Corinthians 15 indicates that this is indeed the case.

The general discussion in 1 Corinthians is about the resurrection. In 15.20–28, Paul sketches out an eschatological timeline in which the return of the Messiah (v. 23)—the one who has already been raised—occurs immediately before or at the same time as “the end” (v. 24), at which time

he hands over the kingdom to God the Father (ὅταν παραδῶ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ), after he has destroyed every ruler and every authority and power. For he must reign (ὅτι γὰρ αὐτὸν βασιλεύει) until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy to be destroyed is death. (1 Cor 15.24–26)

Finally, “When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one who put all things in subjection under him, so that God may be all in all” (1 Cor 15.28). The details of the eschatological timeline and the unfolding of God’s reign described here have occasioned some disagreement.63 But regardless of where one places the rule of Christ temporally, the importance of this passage for my study is its use of both “Messiah” and “Son of God” to speak of Jesus in terms of one who reigns as God’s vice-regent or plenipotentiary. The quotation of Psalm 8.7 and the allusion to Psalm 109.1 LXX in vv. 27 and 25, respectively, further this impression.64

Psalm 8.5 LXX identifies the subject of the psalm as a “son of man” (υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου), a human being who is crowned with glory and honour, set up over the works of God’s hands, and under whose feet all things have been subjected (vv. 6–7). At Hebrews 2.6–8 (and probably Ephesians 1.22) this figure in Psalm 8 is identified as the resurrected Jesus. Similarly, Psalm 109 LXX was regularly read by

κατά πνεῦμα is not to be understood antithetically (Dahl, “Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” 19–20) or in terms of quality (contra Dunn, “Jesus—Flesh and Spirit”; James D. G. Dunn, Romans, 2 volumes, WBC 38 [Dallas: Word, 1988], 19–20).


63. L. Joseph Kreitzer, Jesus and God in Paul’s Eschatology, JSNTSup 19 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 131–64 argues that, similar to some apocalyptic texts (4 Ezra and 2 Baruch), 1 Cor 15 envisages a temporal, earthly messianic kingdom inaugurated by Jesus’ parousia, and which is eventually replaced by God’s eternal, heavenly rule. Against this position, Charles Hill argues that Paul sees Jesus’ reign inaugurated at his ascension (“Paul’s Understanding of Christ’s Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20–28,” NovT 30.4 [1988]: 297–320; see also Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 755–56).

64. For Paul’s use of the LXX at this point, see John Paul Heil, The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians, SBLsBL 15 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 205–11; on 1 Cor 15.27, see also Christopher D. Stanley, Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature, SNTSMS 69 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 206–7. Stanley recognizes the allusion to Ps 109.1 LXX, but ignores the passage for methodological reasons.
early Jewish and Christian interpreters as messianic. Both of these verses have undergone a “christological transposition” in Paul’s hands. In both cases, the Psalms originally speak of God subjecting all things under the feet of a human being (Ps 8) or his king (Ps 109 LXX). Paul has Christ subjecting all things under his own feet. The start of this process is Jesus’ resurrection. From that time onward he reigns in order to destroy “every ruler and every authority and power” (πᾶσαν ἀρχήν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν; v. 24), following which, he returns sovereignty back to God, his Father (v. 24), “so that God may be all in all” (v. 28). Paul thus finds in the Jewish Scriptures the idea of one who rules universally under God’s rule, and the language of sonship in relation to this rule is found in Psalm 8 and Psalm 109 LXX. But this does not explain Paul’s use of “Son of God.” What might the title have suggested to Paul and his readers?

We begin by noting the corporate use of this language. Groups of people were referred to as “sons of God” in the Septuagint, a usage with which Paul is familiar. But Paul’s articular references to Jesus as “the Son of God” or “his (i.e., God’s) Son” are of a different nature. N. T. Wright argues that within the Jewish world, “son of God” would be heard as referring to Israel as a corporate entity or to Israel’s king. This royal association would be strengthened if Martin Hengel’s suggestion that υἱός θεοῦ was derived from παῖς θεοῦ is correct. That the latter phrase is understood as a royal appellation amongst early Christians can be seen in Acts 4 where, in close proximity, both David and Jesus are identified as the Lord’s “servant” (Acts 4.25, 27). The royal association with the phrase “son of God” is further strengthened by two scrolls found at Qumran. The first, 4Q174, a florilegium of messianic texts, interprets 2 Samuel 7 along messianic lines, identifying the son (2 Sam 7.13–14) as a “branch of David” (本当 다윗) who will arise to restore the Davidic line. The second, 4Q246, speaks of a future ruler

66. Jan Lambrecht, “Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15:20–28,” NTS 28 (1982): 507. It is also possible that Paul draws on an earlier Christian tradition at this point (see pp. 508, 512).
67. For a discussion of the Adamic overtones in this passage, see below.
68. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 755–56. contra Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’” 165 who nevertheless allows for “the interchangeability or the unity of action of God and Christ.”
69. Hay identifies “a significant but not major tradition” in which titles of divine sonship were interpreted together with Psalm 110 (Glory, 110).
70. The term might refer to heavenly beings (Gen 6.2, 4; Job 1.6; Ps 88.7 LXX) or Israel (Deut 32.43 LXX; Hos 2.1 LXX) or, more broadly, God’s people (Wis 5.5; Ps Sol 17.27).
71. E.g., Rom 8.14, 19; Gal 3.26; 4.6.
72. “The Son of God” (Rom 1.4; 2 Cor 1.19; Gal 2.20); “his Son” (e.g., Rom 1.3; 5.10; 1 Cor 1.9; 15.28; Gal 1.16; 4.4; 1 Thess 1.10). This usage stands in contrast to the anarthrous use of the singular at Gal 4.7 to speak of the Christian. As Hurtado argues, “Paul’s consistent use of the definite article seems intended to make a strong distinction between the use of divine-sonship rhetoric for others and what he intends to assert as true of Jesus” (“Jesus’ Divine Sonship,” 222).
73. Resurrection, 724 (cf. Bousset, Kyrios Christos, 91–94). Israeli: Exod 4.22 (προτότοκος); Jer 31.9 (προτότοκος); Hos 11.1 (ψηφασκός); Mal 1.6 (υἱός; implied). These references are singular and thus denote Israel as a body, in contrast to those in n. 70 which use plural nouns to refer to the people of God. King: 2 Sam 7.14; 1 Chr 17.13; Pss 2.7; 89.26–27.
74. Hengel, The Son of God, 65. For the LXX use of this term in a royal context, see, e.g., 1 Chr 17 passim; 2 Chr 6 passim; Ps 17.1 LXX.
as “Son of God” and “Son of the Most High.” These texts indicate that “Son of God” was understood in a messianic, and thus kingly, sense in Jewish texts of the Second Temple period, opening the possibility that Paul used this title in the same way.

If we turn from the Jewish scriptures to the Greek and Graeco-Roman world, the texts examined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation contain allusions to the language of divine sonship, but this phenomenon does not play a major role in their construction of kingship. We noted that Cyrus was provided with a divine genealogy, but that Xenophon chose to play down the tradition, preferring to attribute the king’s success to his superior leadership. There is nothing about Nicocles’ heritage in To Nicocles, but when Isocrates writes in the king’s voice, he mentions the king’s divine genealogy (Nic. 42) in order to make an argument against illegitimate offspring. The king’s superiority—and thus implicit authority—comes from the virtues he has cultivated, rather than from his origin.

The most obvious parallel to Paul’s language of divine sonship is found in Roman imperial ideology. More than a century ago, Adolf Deissmann pointed to the designation of the Roman emperor as divi filius and θεοῦ υἱός in inscriptions scattered across the Mediterranean world. The post-mortem deification of an emperor meant that his son became the “son of a god,” and this formed part of the new emperor’s legitimation. As Edward Pillar concludes:

The desire to claim the relationship of son to the new [imperial] divinity may demonstrate awareness that the deification of the emperor after death was in fact a vitally important aspect of the legitimization of the rule of the successor.

Imperial apotheosis and divine sonship did not necessarily coincide with the imperial cult, but these phenomena were related, as indicated by the inscription from Gytheum of festival regulations for celebrating the imperial cult (ca. 15 CE): “[The agoranomos] shall celebrate the first day for the god Caesar Augustus, son of the god <Caesar>, our Saviour and Deliverer.”


77. More recent studies of imperial cult avoid philosophical sources (see, e.g., Ittai Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002], 3–4), preferring to approach these questions through archaeology, sociology, and ritual.


79. Resurrection, 198.

The possibility that language from the imperial cult provided the background to Paul’s usage had been noted but dismissed by Bousset because, he claimed, the cult of the emperor was not dominant in the time that Paul wrote. More recent research on Roman religion and the imperial cult has challenged Bousset’s claim, arguing that emperor worship was more pervasive than previously thought, and also that it functioned more subtly than an earlier generation had assumed. N. T. Wright can thus claim that the imperial cult had, in Paul’s time, become “the dominant cult in a large part of the empire.”

In both Jewish and Graeco-Roman traditions, “Son of God” thus carries royal overtone. Whether or not the parallel between Paul’s language and imperial ideology explain the origin of Paul’s use of “Son of God,” the language of divine sonship would have been understood by many of Paul’s readers against that background, especially if the Jewish messianic overtones were lost on Paul’s non-Jewish readers. Nevertheless, the Pauline passages investigated above demonstrate that the Son of God was still, for Paul, linked to messianic and Jewish royal ideas.

Lord

The final title of majesty to consider is κύριος which speaks broadly of one having power and authority, and is thus commonly used as a term of deference. As was the case with the titular use of “Son of God,” the term resonates within a number of Jewish and Graeco-Roman contexts. With regards to the Graeco-Roman background to this title, Bousset argued that it is central to understanding the development of Christology in the Hellenistic church and that κύριος had its roots in Greek cults of various deities and rulers. Other scholars have demonstrated the possibility that the Jewish scriptures


84. For a fuller discussion of the problems behind the various Graeco-Roman antecedents, see Hengel, *The Son of God*, 23–41. The emperor cult is discussed briefly on p. 30.


provide Paul with this language. Approaching the question from a slightly different angle, William Horbury argues that the cult of Christ developed from Jewish messianic cults which had, in turn, been influenced by Greek and Graeco-Roman ruler cults.

Paul shows that he is aware of the use of κύριος to speak of Graeco-Roman deities (1 Cor 8.5) but he also affirms the exclusivity of Jesus Christ as Lord (ἐξ κύριος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; 1 Cor 8.6). Paul’s use of the term in its absolute sense, ὁ κύριος, indicates Jesus’ “special status and dignity.” In particular, Jesus’ lordship is associated at a number of places with his death and resurrection, which seems paradoxical, but is explained in the Philippian “hymn” (Phil 2.6–11). Jesus’ humble obedience to death on the cross is predicated as the reason for his exaltation: ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ θεός αὐτὸν ὑπερήφανον (v. 9a). As part of this exaltation God gives Jesus “the name that is above every name” (v. 9b–c), that is, “Lord.” There is some debate as to whether or not “Lord” is indeed the name that Jesus receives, but if verse 11 provides the climax of this section, the confession that “Jesus Christ is Lord” would seem to be conclusive. Jesus’ lordship is thus the climax of his vindication by God. This passage thus mirrors the pattern found in Romans 1.3–4: Jesus ignominious death is followed by divine exaltation which, in both cases, means that he is called Κύριος.

Paul’s appropriation of the language of Isaiah in Philippians 2.10–11 confirms in a striking way that κύριος is understood in terms of Jesus’ universal rule. In Isaiah 45.23 it is God who says, ‘to me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall acknowledge God’ (NETS). The passage emphasizes the exclusive nature of YHWH as god and saviour (Isa 45.21) and this is certainly the way Paul understands it in Romans 14.11. Yet in Philippians, Paul asserts that it is Jesus who receives the universal worship that elsewhere belongs properly to YHWH. If it is true, as some have argued, that this passage is meant as a polemic aimed at the emperor, this serves further to confirm the aspects of rulership and authority inherent in the confession that “Jesus Christ is κύριος.”

In this section I have not attempted to argue either that a distinct Christology adheres to each of the “titles of majesty,” or that the titles bear their full semantic weight every time they are used.


89. Jewish Messianism, 109–52.

90. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 245.

91. See, e.g., Rom 4.24; 10.9; 1 Cor 2.8; 6.14 and Dunn, Theology of Paul, 244–52.


93. So Bockmuehl, Philippians, 143–44, 147; Fantin, Lord of the World, 252–59. See, further, Samuel Vollenweider’s essay in which he argues that Jesus is portrayed in Philippians 2.6–11 as an antitype of hubristic rulers (“Der ‘Raub’ der Gottgleichheit: Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Vorschlag zu Phil 2.6[-11],” NTS 45 [1999]: 413–33).

94. Heeding the warning given by Hurtado, “Retrospect and Prospect,” 23.
Rather, I have shown that “Christ,” “Son of God,” and “Lord” are each able to carry connotations of royal rule in Paul’s writings. I have not attempted to argue conclusively for a particular origin for each of these titles. They are found with royal connotations in Jewish and Graeco-Roman sources. If pushed to make a decision, I would most likely follow William Horbury in his conclusion that while these titles recall the Graeco-Roman ruler cults, they come to Paul from the Jewish Scriptures and Jewish messianism.95

From this perspective, then, it is a truism to say that Jesus was, in Paul’s eyes, “king” and would have been identified as such on the basis of these titles by Jewish and Graeco-Roman auditors of Paul’s letters. If Jesus’ kingship was an important element in Paul’s thought, we should expect this role to be reinforced by Paul’s description of Jesus’ relationships and deeds. In the remainder of this chapter I examine these relationships and deeds against the backdrop of the different elements that make up the Hellenistic περὶ βασιλείας topos outlined in the earlier chapters of this study.

**Jesus as God’s Vice-Regent**

The relationship between God and king is not as important in the earliest Greek texts studied in chapters 2 and 3 as it is in the Pythagorean and Jewish texts. In the first group of texts, there is a sense in which the king should imitate God in ruling over the earthly realm as God rules the heavenly realm, but the language remains largely impersonal and almost mechanical. In the second group, however, we find texts that speak of the divine creation and sending of the king (Ecphantus) or of the divine appointment of the king (Deuteronomy; Psalms; Isaiah) to rule on earth as God’s vice-regent.96 Philo’s Moses is perhaps the best example of this: not only is God’s guiding hand present from his birth (Moses 1.12, 17, 19) but he is given his office by God (1.148), and this office is described in terms of shared rule (1.155) which extends to Moses sharing the title of “god and king” with God (1.158).

The preceding discussion of Jesus’ royal titles establishes kingship as a foundational element of Paul’s understanding of Jesus’ person. Jesus is understood to exercise his royal rule not independently, but as God’s vice-regent or plenipotentiary. This dependency is illustrated in a number of ways.

In Philippians 2.6–11, it is God who exalts Christ (v. 9). Following, as it does, the statement about Jesus’ death on the cross, this verse must refer, at the very least, to the resurrection (cf., e.g., Rom 10.9; 1 Cor 6.14; Gal 1.1). Also in view, however, is Christ’s exaltation to a position of honour and power at God’s right hand (cf. Rom 8.34), as implied by the universal worship that Christ receives in Philippians 2.10–11. Christ’s position at God’s right hand is an allusion to Psalm 110.1 where the throne next to God’s throne “symbolizes highest honour and closeness to Yahweh.”97 Christ’s relationship to God is thus defined by the fact that it is God who exalts Christ following Christ’s obedience (Phil 2.9–11),

96. Julien Smith, *Christ the Ideal King: Cultural Context, Rhetorical Strategy, and the Power of Divine Monarchy in Ephesians*, WUNT 2/313 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 175 provides a list of passages from the Imperial period that speak of the king functioning as God’s vice-regent.
rather than Christ exalting himself. And even this exaltation and the worship received by Christ is “to the glory of God the Father” (Phil 2.11). Furthermore, Christ’s reign is understood to culminate with his handing over of the kingdom to God the Father, following which Christ will be made subject to God’s reign (1 Corinthians 15.20–28). Christ is thus seen to play a central role in God’s dealing with the world, but there will come a point in time at which this role will cease and God will himself be seen as the great king under whom everything is subjected.

Jesus’ dependence on God is further illustrated by the role that God’s Spirit plays in Jesus’ work. Jesus’ baptism is understood as a sign of his messianic identity in both the Synoptic tradition and John’s Gospel (Matt 3.13–17; Mark 1.9–13; Luke 3.21–22; cf. 4.16–21; John 1.32–34), but although the Spirit is central in Paul’s theology, he does not refer to the Spirit’s role in Jesus’ baptism. However, it was observed in the earlier discussion of Romans 1.3–4 that the “spirit of holiness” (πνεῦμα ἁγιωσίνης) plays a role in Jesus’ resurrection and exaltation. Scholars continue to debate the precise meaning of this phrase (which is found only here in Paul’s writings)—whether it is a reference to God’s Spirit or to the spiritual realm. Elsewhere, Paul writes that Jesus was raised by the Father’s glory (δόξα) (Rom 6.4) and by God’s power (δύναμις) (1 Cor 6.14) and that Jesus lives by God’s power (δύναμις) following his crucifixion (2 Cor 13.4). If God’s Spirit is the means by which God acts powerfully in the world, then we are justified in understanding Romans 1.4 as a reference to the Spirit of God and to see the Spirit’s involvement in Jesus’ resurrection. And if the Spirit’s role in Jesus’ resurrection is recognized and placed alongside the centrality of the resurrection in Jesus’ exaltation as Lord (Rom 1.3–4), then we might recognize something of the pneumatological element of Old Testament kingship ideology (see above, ch. 4) in this relationship.

In this section we have noted that Christ’s kingship is not exercised independently of God’s, but that Christ is portrayed as God’s vice-regent. His obedience in Philippians 2 is rewarded as God exalts him, but, as 1 Corinthians 15 shows, God’s kingly reign is ultimate and supreme. In the sections that follow, we will note how, as God’s vice-regent, Jesus fulfills a number of royal roles.

Jesus as Judge

The role of judge and the dispensing of justice was central in ancient conceptions of kingship, from Cyrus’ education (Cyr. 1.2–3) to Diotogenes’ “most just man” (ὁ δικαιότατος) who fulfills the roles of general, judge, and priest (72.6–23). While the king’s judicial functions are curtailed in

98. Schnelle demonstrates how Paul’s pneumatology integrate various parts of his theology (Apostle Paul, 486–93).
99. For the former view, see Cranfield, Romans, 64; Fitzmyer, Romans, 124–25, 236; for the latter, see Eduard Schweizer, “Πνεῦμα, Πνευματικός,” TDNT 6: 416–17. Gordon Fee (God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul [Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994], 478–84) argues that the reference is to the Holy Spirit but that “the Spirit in the passage probably has to do with the heavenly, eschatological sphere of life, into which Christ by resurrection has now entered” (p. 484).
101. So Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 487; others deny that the Spirit was the “means” by which God raised Jesus (see, e.g., Fee, God’s Presence, 484), arguing that it is always God who is active in the resurrection.
Deuteronomy 17, other Septuagint texts emphasize this aspect of ancient kingship. The royal figure in Isaiah 11, for example, is said to judge with righteousness and Psalm 72 prays that God will give the king right judgement so that he might judge with justice (vv.1–2). This theme takes an eschatological turn in Psalm 109.5–6 LXX where the lord enthroned at God’s right hand will “judge among the nations” on “the day of his wrath.” Given the confusion of pronouns in this psalm, it is possible that this “day of wrath” was interpreted with reference to the king. It is more likely, however, in keeping with other passages in the Jewish scriptures, that it was understood to refer to the eschatological day of God’s wrath and judgment, often referred to as “the day of the Lord.”

In Paul’s writings, the eschatological day of judgment is interpreted christologically. Paul knows of the day of God’s wrath and judgment (Rom 2.1–11; cf. 1.18; 3.6), but God’s judgment happens “through Jesus Christ” (Rom 2.16). Romans 14.10 envisages all people standing before God’s “judgment seat” (βηθον), but in 2 Corinthians 5.10 it is before Christ’s βηθοτ that all must appear. Thus, “the day” on which humankind is judged (1 Cor 3.13) is the “day of the Lord” (1 Cor 5.5; 1 Thess 5.2) and “the day of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 1.8). The Old Testament “Day of the Lord YHWH” thus becomes, in certain cases, the “Day of the Lord Jesus Christ.”

The idea of another agent acting in judgment on God’s behalf is not unprecedented in Jewish writings. Figures like Enoch (in the Similitudes of Enoch, i.e., 1 En 37–71) and Moses (Philo, On the Life of Moses; Ezekiel the Tragedian) are exalted to positions in which they exercise judgment.

He [God] placed the Elect One on the throne of glory; and he shall judge all the works of the holy ones in heaven above, weighing in the balance their deeds. (1 En 61.8; trans. Isaacs in OTP; cf. 51.3; 55.4; 62.5; 69.29)

This development most likely occurred under the influence of passages in which the Israelite king is shown to be responsible for dispensing justice on God’s behalf (see Chapter 4). Just as in Psalm 110, this exalted figure is portrayed as exercising judgment from a heavenly throne, thus emphasizing the

103. In Zeph 1, for example the “day of the Lord” (vv. 7, 14) is “a day of wrath” (v. 15) and “the day of the Lord’s wrath” (v. 18); see also Isa 13.6, 9; Ezek 7.5–12; Joel 2.1–11; Amos 5.18–20; Mal 4.1–3. The “day of the Lord” is associated with the Divine Warrior theme (see below). In this section, however, I focus on the aspect of judgment associated with this “day.”

104. The imagery is somewhat different in Romans 8.33–34 where, in a passage filled with forensic allusions, Jesus is portrayed as an advocate or defence counsel, interceding for his people at the right hand of God, who justifies his people. Elsewhere Jesus is also spoken of as the one who saves his people from (God’s) future wrath (Rom 5.9; 1 Thess 1.10).

105. For other variations, see 1 Cor 3.13; 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 1.6, 10; 2.16.

106. Waddell, Messiah, 163–66; Kreitzer, Jesus and God, 129. The lack of consistency regarding the identity of the figure who stands as the final eschatological judge—God or Jesus—is part of what Kreitzer calls “a bifurcated eschatological scheme” which reflects the tension between God and Messiah in their respective eschatological roles, while at the same time demonstrating attempts to resolve this tension (pp. 24, 163).


108. For the relationship between this Psalm and the Enochic literature, see Hay, Glory, 26–27.
link between judge and king, as well as the belief that this figure occupies these roles under the authority of God.

As God’s vice-regent, Jesus occupies the heavenly throne from which he exercises judgment. Jesus’ judgment may have a present aspect to it (1 Cor 11.27–32), but the focus is more often than not on the eschatological “Day of the Lord.” Closely related to the figure of the judge are two inextricable concepts: justice and law.

**Justice**

It is tempting to seek Paul’s teaching about justice purely in his use of δικαιοσύνη and its cognates. This approach, however, yields miserly dividends because of the diverse ways in which this word group is used. It is generally accepted that words in this family are important elements of Paul’s soteriology, but the precise meaning and implications of his use of this language, especially the important phrase δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, is contested. What exactly is it that God is doing when “justifying” believers? Is he declaring them “righteous” or making them “righteous”? Does the “righteousness of God” refer to divine activity or divine attribute? Is the sense of this groups of words to be sought primarily in forensic, ethical, or relational terms? We are not able to wade too deeply into the debate, but simply note a few salient points as they pertain to the possibility that Paul describes Jesus in royal terms as a just judge. Without attempting to reach a conclusion about righteousness language in Paul’s writings, I will show that the sense of forensic justice and, with it, the figure of the judge, are present in some instances of Paul’s use of “righteousness” and “justification.”

As seen in the first two chapters of this study, δικαιοσύνη plays an important role as one of the cardinal virtues in classical and later Greek thought. When applied to the ideal king, the virtue serves to link kingship to justice in both a narrow, forensic sense as well as a broader, ethical sense. The same is true of the Septuagint’s use of the word. God’s anointed king will execute justice and righteousness (ποιεῖν κρίμα καὶ δικαιοσύνην) in the land (1 Kgdms 2.10; cf 2 Kgdms 8.15; 3 Kgdms 3.9 LXX). The importance of judicial and ethical language in Isaiah’s portrayal of ideal kingship is on view at Isaiah 11

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110. Rom 1.17; 3.5; 3.21, 22, 26 (implicit); 10.3 (bis); 2 Cor 5.21; Phil 3.9. The δικ–word-group occurs throughout the Pauline corpus, although there are particularly significant clusters in Rom 1–4; 9–10; Gal 2–3.

(see above, ch. 4), where the royal figure who is “girded with righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) around [his] waist” (v. 5) is the same one in verses 3–4 who will rightly administer justice (κρίνω and ἔλεγχον).

To observe that δικαιοῦω and δικαιοσύνη characterizes the good king’s character and deeds along forensic lines is not to argue that other semantic fields are not present. As some have pointed out, the LXX use of righteousness language frequently occurs in relation to the covenant established between God and God’s people. Understood against this background, then, Paul’s righteousness language potentially occurs in both a forensic and a relational sense. The important point for this study is the possibility that righteousness language bears forensic weight in Paul’s thought, even if this use does not exhaust its meaning.

It is against this forensic configuration of Paul’s use of righteousness-language against that Douglas Campbell mounts his extensive argument in The Deliverance of God. Of particular interest to my study is Campbell’s argument that, in Romans, the ancient discourse on kingship is focused on, and realized by, Jesus Christ. Drawing on an observation made by Richard Hays and others—that Paul’s programmatic statement of God’s righteousness in Romans 1.16–17 contains an allusion to

112. In classical usage, the verb δικαιοῦω followed by a personal object almost always bears a negative sense: to “punish” or “condemn” (James B. Prothro, “The Strange Case of δικαιοῦω in the Septuagint and Paul: The Oddity and Origins of Paul’s Talk of ‘Justification’.”, ZNW 107.1 [2016]: 51–56; cf. J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul: A Linguistic and Theological Enquiry, SNTSMS 20 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972], 47). In the Septuagint the opposite is true. There the verb is most often used positively with respect to a personal object to mean “vindicate” or “clear from a charge” (Ziesler, Meaning of Righteousness, 52–69). The context in which this language occurs often lends judicial overtones to the word group. In Exodus 23.7, the Israelites are told, “you shall not acquit the impious person (ὥς δικαιοῦσας τὸν ἁπέθαν) for the sake of a bribe.” In the MT YHWH makes his own unwillingness to acquit the guilty the basis for Israelite justice (John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Exodus, SCS 30 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990], 361). This makes Paul’s description of God in Rom 4.5 as “the one who acquits the ungodly” especially shocking. The LXX changes the first-person verb ἐλέγχει into the second person: ὡς δικαιοῦσας and adds the motivating factor of the bribe. The verb thus describes the way in which a judge must act only in regard to the innocent and not the guilty. In Psalm 81 LXX, God presides in the divine council as a judge (δικρινεῖ; v. 1) and commands those who have been judging unjustly and showing partiality (v. 2) to “give justice (κρίνω) to the orphan and the poor / and to vindicate (δικαιοῦω) the lowly and the penurious” (v. 3; my translation). These examples demonstrate that δικαιοῦω can carry a forensic sense in certain passages of the LXX (Prothro, “Δικαιοῦω In Paul and LXX,” 59–60).

113. For other LXX uses of this word-group, see the discussion in Ziesler, Meaning of Righteousness, 47–67 or Chris VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2006), 246–72. VanLandingham’s conclusion that “none of the δικαίων group of terms is intrinsically forensic” is puzzling since meaning is never “intrinsic” to any lexeme but must be established on the basis of usage in context. The use of this word-group discussed in this section demonstrate that a forensic sense is primary in certain instances and that it is not impossible for Paul to have used these words in a similar way.

114. In addition to Ziesler (Meaning of Righteousness, 36–43, 52–67), see Wright, Faithfulness of God, 795–804.

115. Ernst Küsemann (“’Righteousness of God,’” 172) notes that Paul’s use of δικαιοσύνη Ἰησοῦ has Jewish precedents which should contribute to our understanding of Paul’s language. The two aspects of justification/righteousness in Paul’s thought should not be collapsed into one another, neither is it right to give priority to one or the other; so Ziesler (Meaning of Righteousness, 147–211), who also includes the very important element of incorporation, or being “in Christ,” as part of this discussion.


117. Deliverance of God, 695. Jipp argues for a similar position, albeit along slightly different lines; see below.
Psalm 89.2—Campbell argues that an “ancient discourse of kingship” informs Paul’s understanding of the righteousness of God. Based on the Psalms’ depiction of both the divine and human king, Campbell argues that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Romans 1.16–17, then, speaks of God’s saving, liberating action in Christ. Paul uses kingship discourse to portray God as the sovereign who delivers his people through his appointed agent.

Campbell’s argument is convincing with regard to Romans 1.16–17 and the other passages in Romans in which he perceives Paul drawing on this particular aspect of kingship discourse. However, his desire to argue against what he calls “justification theory” means that he understates the forensic elements that are present in Paul’s righteousness language elsewhere. In Romans 8.33–34, for example, the figure of God as the one who justifies (ὁ δικαιῶν) occurs in the context of judicial language of charging (ἐγκαλέω) and judging (κατακρίνω). Again, in Romans 5.18 and 2 Corinthians 3.9, the language of righteousness and justification occurs in opposition to that of judgment and condemnation. Compared to classical examples, the δικ- word-group is surprisingly positive in Paul’s usage; in this Campbell is correct. He is incorrect, however, to minimize the judicial aspects of this language.

As the divine king—and, therefore, judge—God will act with justice in order to reward the righteous and punish the wicked (Rom 2.1–16; 1 Cor 5.13). Each person is treated according to their deeds (Rom 2.6) and without favouritism (v. 11). God cannot be accused of injustice since this would immediately disqualify God from judging the world (Rom 3.5–6). With regard to the relative paucity of this note of judgment, it should be remembered that Paul’s letters are addressed to fellow believers; judgment upon the wicked is thus not as prominent a theme as is the vindication of the righteous. This latter theme is consistently linked to Christ. Believers are justified “in Christ” (Gal 2.17) or “in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 6.11), and God’s justification of these believers results from Christ’s death and resurrection for them (Rom 3.21–24; 4.25; Gal 1.4; 2.21). In both cases, whether in judgment or vindication, Paul asserts that God acts justly through Christ.

Given the role that Christ plays as God’s agent, and in light of the role that Christ plays as eschatological judge (see above), it is surprising that he is rarely identified as the one who exercises

118. Deliverance of God, 688–704. The references to those who also perceive an allusion to Ps 98.2–3 at Rom 1.16–17 can be found at p. 1114 n. 22. Campbell’s “rereading” of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Rom 1.16–17 provides him with the title of his book: “the deliverance of God” (p. 699). See, further, Joshua W. Jipp, Christ is King: Paul’s Royal Ideology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015), 233–71 who argues that Paul’s discourse on justice draws heavily from the Psalms and Isaiah.


120. So, e.g., Fitzmyer, Romans, 420–21; Margaret E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, ICC (London: T&T Clark, 1994), 249.

121. It is this portrayal against which Campbell revolts. In his rereading of Paul, God is exclusively benevolent (p. 71); but see Clark, “Review of Campbell, Deliverance,” 78. As Udo Schnelle astutely notes, “The concept of the last judgment gives theological expression to the conviction that God is not finally indifferent to the way people live their lives nor to history as a whole” (Apostle Paul, 585).

122. The role of these statements in Rom 2 within Pauline theology is a notorious problem in New Testament scholarship; see, recently, N. T. Wright, “Justification by (Covenantal) Faith to the (Covenantal) Doers: Romans 2 Within the Argument of the Letter,” Covenant Quarterly 72.3 (2014): 95–108. For an older but still useful survey of some of the significant problems in Romans 2, see Klyne R. Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace - to the Doers: An Analysis of the Place of Romans 2 in the Theology of Paul,” NTS 32.1 (1986): 72–93.
justice. Christ’s judgment is twice mentioned explicitly: Paul states that all must appear before Christ’s judgment seat to receive their due (2 Cor 5.10) and identifies Jesus Christ as the one through whom God will judge humanity’s secret thoughts at the final assize (Rom 2.16). This judgment forms part of a series of events inaugurated by Christ’s return (ταραοφσία; 1 Cor 15.23; 1 Thess 2.19; 3.13; 4.15; 5.23). Yet Paul does not speak of Christ’s impartiality or his ability to judge justly in the same way as he does of God’s. Is Christ indeed a just judge, according to Paul?

A number of scholars have argued recently that Jesus is “the righteous one” (ὁ δικαίωται) of Habakkuk 2.4 as quoted in Romans 1.17 and Galatians 3.11. It is because Jesus is the righteous king, that he is resurrected and enthroned in heaven. He is then envisaged to adopt the kingly role of making his subjects righteous. This happens through his death and resurrection (Rom 4.25–26). While these arguments are convincing, and while Paul’s construction of Jesus as an ideal king is corroborated at other points in this present study, these passages do not seem to attribute forensic justice to Jesus.

Taken at face value, Jesus as ὁ δικαίωται in Romans 1.17 could be understood to refer to “Jesus the just one,” but similar constructions elsewhere suggest that a broader sense of righteousness is frequently in view when Jesus is described in this way. Jipp correctly notes that righteousness language occurs together with ideas of kingship and reign in Romans 5.12–21. In verse 16, however, it is God’s gift that leads to δικαίωμα—an act of justification or acquittal. This divine gift comes through one man, Jesus Christ (v. 17), whose one act of righteousness (ἔνος δικαιώματος; v. 18) is characterized in verse 19 as “obedience.” Throughout this passage there is a contrast between the two singular figures of Adam and Christ. The point is repeatedly made that Christ’s positive actions not only nullify but exceed Adam’s negative actions. Nevertheless, there must be elements of congruity between the two figures for the contrast to be effective. Adam’s sin (ἁμαρτία) and transgression (παράπτωμα) are thus made ineffective and are surpassed by Christ’s righteousness and obedience. Moral and volitional, rather than forensic, concepts seem to provide the basis for comparison, and so Christ is best described in this passage in terms of being ethically righteous. Other passages demonstrate that the righteous (δικαίωται) person is defined in terms of obedience to God’s law, that is, in moral and ethical terms (Rom 2.13; 3.9–18). It is thus Christ’s ethical righteousness, rather than the virtue of justice, which is in view when Paul describes him as “righteous” or speaks of his “righteousness.” It is this quality which forms the basis for God’s acquittal of human beings.

123. That Jesus is understood as judge in early Christian writings is evident from Acts 10.42; 17.31; 2 Tim 4.1.
124. Waddell, Messiah, 163–66. See also the foregoing discussion about the Day of the Lord.
125. Campbell, Deliverance of God, 699–704; Stephen L. Young, “Romans 1.1–5 and Paul’s Christological Use of Hab. 2.4 in Rom. 1.17: An Underutilized Consideration in the Debate,” JSNT 34.3 (2012): 277–85; Jipp, Christ is King, 253–57. For use of this title to refer to Jesus elsewhere in the NT, see Acts 3.14–15; 7.52; 1 Pet 3.18; 1 John 2.1–2; see, further, Richard B. Hays, “Apocalyptic Hermeneutics: Habakkuk Proclaims ‘the Righteous One’,” in The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 124–36. Only the final example bears a forensic sense, but even here Jesus is portrayed as advocate (παράπτωμα) rather than judge.
126. See Jipp, Christ is King, 257–59 who argues the suffering servant of Isaiah 53 stands behind this Pauline passage.
127. Christ is King, 259–65.
128. Paul’s argument in the opening chapters of Romans is that human beings lack this moral righteousness, but this does not change the nature of this righteousness.
129. This argument is strengthened if πίστις Χριστοῦ is understood in terms of Christ’s obedience; see below.
For Paul, both God and Christ adopt the eschatological role of judgment. However, he usually depicts God, rather than Christ, as the just judge who acquits in the present those who become righteous through Jesus Christ (Rom 3.22; Phil 3.9). From this perspective, Christ might be considered the means whereby God acquits his people, rather than the one who acquits. Although Paul most likely understands Christ, like God, to be a just and fair judge, this element of ideal kingship is never made explicit.

_Clemency_

The requirement for the king to show justice was often expressed alongside the desire that he act with clemency and mercy. In certain configurations of ideal kingship, clemency (ἐλεημοσύνη) is portrayed as necessary to balance absolute justice. Paul’s contemporary, Seneca, spoke of clemency as “moderation that diminishes a due and deserved punishment to some degree” (Clem. 2.3; trans. Kaster). If we survey the Pauline corpus for occurrences of clemency, mercy, and the like, we find a cluster of these concepts in Romans 9–11. In this passage, Paul argues for mercy as a fundamental characteristic of God who acts with favour towards his people instead of exercising judgment, or rather, exercises mercy in his judgment. Earlier in the letter, Paul states that it is this aspect of God’s character that is meant to lead people to repentance (2.4) and it is the same trait which draws praise from the Gentiles (15.9)—that is, from those who have become “vessels of mercy” instead of “vessels of wrath” (9.22–23). In Romans 3.25 Paul states that God left earlier sins unpunished in order that he might display his righteousness (v. 26). The justice God exercises in this verse is therefore not strict retributive justice, but rather his clemency shown towards those who are associated with Christ through faith.

Cilliers Breytenbach shows that in this portrayal of God, “[Paul] stood firmly in the Jewish tradition that the abundance of God’s mercy and compassion towards the disobedient outweighs their sins.” The influence of Exodus 34.6–7 can be seen not only in the rest of the Jewish Scriptures, but also in Paul’s writings. In this passage, God is described as “compassionate” (οἰκρίμων), “merciful” (ἐλεημον), “patient” (μικρόθυμος), “very merciful” (πολυέλεος), and as “doing mercy” (ποιῶν ἔλεος) because he “takes away acts of lawlessness and of injustice and sins.” Breytenbach argues, furthermore, that even though the language of χάρις comes from the realm of benefaction, perhaps even imperial
benefaction, as James Harrison argues, this metaphor is frequently mapped on to the domain of God’s mercy and compassion as expressed in the Jewish Scriptures.

When the pattern of God’s mercy as found in the Jewish Scriptures is joined to the observation made above—that Paul usually talks about God, and not Christ, as dispensing justice—it is not surprising to find that it is usually God, and not Christ, who acts with mercy and compassion, even while Christ is instrumental in averting God’s judgment (1 Thess 1.10; 5.9). There is possibly an exception to this observation in 2 Corinthians 10.1 where Paul speaks of Christ’s ἐπιτάχθαι.

The lexeme ἐπιτάχθαι and its cognates occur in Paul’s writings only at 2 Corinthians 10.1 and Philippians 4.5. In the latter case ἐπιτάχθαι is something Christians are to exhibit (cf. 1 Tim 3.3; Titus 3.2; Jas 3.17). In 2 Corinthians 10.1, however, Paul appeals to the Corinthians to respond positively to his request on the basis of the προφήτης and ἐπιτάχθαι of Christ. Scholars debate the origins of Paul’s language at this point. This characterization of Christ as meek, gentle, gracious is sometimes traced back to Jesus’ words recorded in Matthew 11.29: “I am gentle (προφήτης) and humble in heart (τυπανός τῇ καρδίᾳ).” And while some have sought the origin of this Matthean language in a Wisdom Christology, others have suggested that the language found in Matthew evokes the Old Testament figures of the Servant, Moses, the Messiah, the Son of God, or the king.

It is also possible that behind Paul’s description of Christ in 2 Corinthians 10.1 stands the christological tradition on view at Philippians 2.6–8. Here Christ’s humble nature is demonstrated in his willingness to obey God to the point of death. As we noted earlier in this chapter, in Philippians 2, the end of Christ’s humility is his exaltation and kingly rule (vv. 9–11).

Whether Matthew’s figures from Israel’s history or a kenotic Christology stands behind 2 Corinthians 10.1, the traits of προφήτης and τυπανός are linked to kingship. But it is not necessary to choose between the Gospel tradition and the Christology represented in Philippians. Rather, Paul is speaking at the same time of both the “earthly Jesus” as represented in the Gospels and the risen Lord

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136. Cf. Rom 12.1 where Paul’s appeal comes “by the mercies of God” and Rom 15.30 where he appeals “by our Lord Jesus Christ.” In 2 Corinthians 10, however, Paul will proceed to offer not Christ, but rather, himself “as a model drawing on the traits of Christ through participation in him” (Dustin W. Ellington, “Not Applicable to Believers? The Aims and Basis of Paul’s ‘I’ in 2 Corinthians 10–13,” JBL 131.2 [2012]: 328). Jan Lambrecht argues that Paul was sidetracked from his original desire to begin an exhortative section (2 Cor 10.1a) and that 10.1b–13.10 is a rather lengthy excursus (“Paul’s Appeal and the Obedience to Christ: The Line of Thought in 2 Corinthians 10.1–6,” Bib 77.3 [1996]: 398–416). Questions around the integrity of the text of 2 Corinthians need not delay our discussion at this point. The major issues are summarized by Mark A. Seifrid, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, PNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), xxix-xxx.
137. See, e.g., Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 375; Victor Paul Furnish, II Corinthians, AB 32A (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 455, 460. This is not to assume that Matthew is earlier than 2 Corinthians, but rather that Matthew contains a saying of Jesus which can be traced back to Jesus’ ministry and which might have been known in the earliest churches. We also note that the coming king of Matt 21.5 is described as “gentle” (παράζ), following Zech 9.9.
139. So Furnish, II Corinthians, 460; Thrall, Second Corinthians, 600.
revealed to him by God (Gal 1.15–16). 140 It is implausible that the early church’s Christology which is glimpsed in Paul’s writings was not linked in some way to the memory of the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth which were eventually codified in the earliest Gospels. 141

Drawing on some of the same evidence presented is earlier chapters of my study, Donald Walker argues that Paul’s appeal to Christ’s πραοτής and ἐπιείκεια in 2 Corinthians 10.1 needs to be understood primarily against the background of ideal kingship in Graeco-Roman texts, rather than the dominical saying in Matthew 11. 142 Walker’s study of these individual words and their collocation 143 leads him to translate the phrase as “the leniency and clemency of Christ” that Christ exercises as the risen and exalted king. 144

At one point in his study Walker states that “grace, acquittal, and reconciliation feature prominently in Christ’s rule.” 145 While Paul would, no doubt, respond positively to this statement as it characterizes Christ, the same pattern seen in Paul’s portrayal of divine justice is present in his portrayal of divine clemency: it is usually God who displays these traits while Christ is instrumental in bringing about justice and clemency for God’s people. It is more often God, rather than Christ, who is characterized in terms of royal justice and clemency. Ultimately, though, the Hellenistic discussion of clemency in the discourse on ideal kingship was a discussion about the relationship between the king and law.

**Christ and God’s Law**

In earlier chapters, we observed how discussions of the relationship between king and law often masked more fundamental questions about kingship, human/positive law, and how these two phenomena related to divine/natural law. 146 In these chapters we also noted a number of possible configurations of the relationship between king, law, and divine will: (1) the king might embody the divine will in his own person and, as such, be considered “animate law” (νόμος ἐμψιχός) (Diotogenes); (2) the king might submit to established, written law which, when rightly ordered, expresses the divine will (Aristaeas); 147 (3) the king might implement and himself follow the divine law as it is expressed in

140. Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 375.

141. See Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 472–77. Porter, “‘Jesus Christ’ in Paul’s Letters” demonstrates that the modern distinction between “the Jesus of history” and “the Christ of faith” was not made by Paul.


143. Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 38–90. The combination of πραοτής/πραοτής and ἐπιείκεια occurs at Philo, Creation 103; Plutarch, Pericles 39.1; Sertorius 25.4; Caesar 15.4; 57.3; Moralia 80b; 729c; Pericles and Fabius 3.1; Lucian, Somn. 10; Alexander the False Prophet 61; Appian, Basilica 1.5; Dio Cassius, Historiae Romanae 53.6.1; Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.72/549d; Julian, Panegyric in Honour of Empress Eusebia 106a.

144. Walker’s discussion of the relationship between 2 Corinthians 10.1 and Matthew 11.29 occurs at Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 183–88. His conclusion is that such a relationship does not exist and that this identification of Christ is wholly Paul’s.


146. Christine Elizabeth Hayes, What’s Divine About Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) examines the different ways in which the relationship between human and divine law were understood and expressed. Her taxonomy and summary of ten Graeco-Roman “discourses” about law are especially helpful (pp. 54–89).

147. This is similar to the position espoused by Xenophon’s Cyrus, but the supreme leader is also able to adapt the law as he sees fit. There is an underlying assumption that the good king will do so for the sake of his subjects. Similarly,
the written law (Jewish Scriptures); the king might provide his people with a written law based on his own person (νόμος ἐμφύσης) and on the unwritten laws of nature, both of which are understood as an expression of divine law (Philo).

A full-blown discussion of Paul’s understanding of the place and role of the law would require its own monograph. My concern in this section is to examine the relationship between Christ and the divine law in the light of the discussion in earlier chapters about the relationship between the ideal king and the law. The following section investigates the question of Jesus’ obedience to the law, but first the question of Jesus’ replacement of the law is examined.

Paul’s Jewish heritage ensures that his starting point for thinking about law is the Torah: God’s holy, just, and good commandment (Rom 7.12) which was given at Sinai to Moses (Rom 5.14; 1 Cor 9.9; Gal 3.16–19). In Jewish thought, the written law revealed at Sinai through Moses is an expression of the divine will for God’s people. Yet, in statements that would have been shocking to some of his Jewish readers, Paul argues that the law is not able to bring about humanity’s righteousness before God (Rom 3.20; 9.30–10.4; Gal 2.16; Phil 3.9), but instead, vivifies sin and produces death (Rom 3.20; 5.20; 7.7–11). At best, the law is a παιδαγωγός, a temporary guardian, until the arrival of Christ (Gal 3.24–25), who is described as the τελος of the law (Rom 10.4). Regardless of whether one
understands τέλος as “goal” or “termination” or both, Paul’s language suggests a radical change in humanity’s relationship to divine law.

Paul identifies the Christ-event as the fulcrum in the history of God’s dealing with humanity, and it is this event that reconfigures the way in which the law functions. In Brian Rosner’s language: the law has been “repudiated” as law-covenant, “replaced” by Christ, and “re-appropriated” as prophecy. The use of these different functions attempts to recognize the variegated way in which Paul describes the law. Without using exactly the same language, Joshua Jipp argues that understanding Jesus in terms of the discourse around ideal kingship enables the relationship between Christ and the law to emerge more clearly. I turn, first, to a puzzling phrase in Galatians.

The reference in Galatians 6.2 to the “law of Christ” is quite unexpected. In the early chapters of the letter, Paul sets up “law” against the categories of “faith” and “promise.” In the christological narrative in Galatians, the latter have surpassed and replaced the former. It is therefore surprising that in the concluding section of the letter Paul urges his readers to “bear one another’s burdens, and in this way you will fulfil the law of Christ (ἀναπληρώσετε τόν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ)” (Gal 6.2). In Galatians, the only other reference to believers fulfilling the law comes in 5.14: “For the whole law is summed up [has been fulfilled; πελάθησαί] in a single commandment, ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.’” The verbal and conceptual similarities between these two verses suggest that they be interpreted in terms of one another.

Joshua Jipp understands the perfect passive in Galatians 5.14 to refer to Christ’s fulfilling the law by providing “the perfect pattern and embodiment of love for neighbour as demanded by Lev. 19:18.” This pattern of love is found in Jesus’ life and, above all, in his self-giving death. These themes, although not central to Paul’s argument in Galatians, are raised throughout and can be seen, for example, in Christ’s giving of himself to deliver his people (1.3–4); his giving of himself for Paul (2.20); his obedience to God displayed in being born of a woman, under the law, in order to redeem those under the law (4.4–7) by becoming a curse in their place (3.10–14).

154. The matter is surveyed by Fitzmyer (Romans, 584–85), who opts for “goal,” while Longenecker (Romans, 848–52) opts for “termination.” Moo (The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT [Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1996], 636–42) suggests that τέλος bears temporal and teleological weight, thus both ideas are in view. This final approach seems best suited to address the way in which Paul speaks of the law as a unity which, nonetheless, meets the believer in different capacities (see Rosner, Paul and the Law, 43).


156. Christ is King, 60–76.


158. Cf. Rom 13.8–10. The quotation is from Lev 19.18; see Douglas J. Moo, Galatians, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 349–50 for a brief discussion of this verse’s reception history. In addition to Paul’s use of this verse, it is important in the rest of the Christian tradition: see Mark 12.31 (par); Matt 5.43; 19.19; Jas 5.8.

159. Jipp, Christ is King, 64; see also Richard B. Hays, “Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ,” CBQ 49 (1987): 268–90; Moo, Galatians, 345–48. For the more conventional reading that sees the believer fulfilling the law through love, see James D. G. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, BNTC (London: A&C Black, 1993), 289–92. For a survey of Pauline texts that speak of believers fulfilling the law, see Rosner, Paul and the Law, 121–24.

160. Hays, “Christology and Ethics,” 276–80. The debate around the meaning of πίστις Χριστοῦ is related to this discussion and will be mentioned in the following section.
paradigm of self-giving love, and if the command to love one’s neighbour (Lev 19.18) is understood as summing up or being in some way central to the law, then it follows that Christ fulfills the law through his embodiment of love.\textsuperscript{161}

The identification of Christ as the one who fulfills the law through love suggests a way forward in understanding Paul’s use of “the law of Christ” in Galatians 6.2. This phrase has been interpreted as referring to (1) the law of Moses, now re-interpreted by Christ; (2) the command to love; (3) Christ’s ethical teaching; (4) Christ’s example; (5) a combination of (2)–(4).\textsuperscript{162} Against (1), it should be observed that Paul’s polemic against those who would place the Galatian believers under the law (cf. 3.25; 4.21) would lose much of its power if he replaced one form of Mosaic law with another. Instead, the “law of Christ” in Galatians seems primarily to refer to (4): Christ’s example of self-giving love. Christ’s ethical injunctions (3) are not absent in Paul’s writings, but they are few and far between.\textsuperscript{163} Assuming Christ’s example mirrored his teaching, (3) might also be implied in (4). Similarly, in so far as these ethical injunctions and Christ’s example focus on love, (2) is also present in (4). Without denying the presence of these themes—and thus recognizing (5) as a suitable solution to this question—the driving theme behind fulfilling the “law of Christ,” however, must be Christ’s paradigmatic self-giving love, that is, option (4). In the words of Richard Hays, Paul presents to his readers “not a body of rules, but a regulative principle or structure of existence, in this case the structure of existence embodied paradigmatically in Jesus Christ.”\textsuperscript{164}

Joshua Jipp’s contribution to this discussion is to show how Christ’s embodiment of the law might better be understood against the background of the king as νόμος ἐμπνευσός. In common with Diotogenes’ portrayal of the king and Philo’s Moses, Christ embodies the divine law in his own person.\textsuperscript{165} If, in Classical and Hellenistic thought, the king as living law was meant to address the shortcomings of the written law,\textsuperscript{166} this reading of Paul suggests that the law of Christ as defined above—Christ as the paradigmatic embodiment of law, the living law—is seen to replace the written law of Moses.\textsuperscript{167} To read Paul in this way does not solve all the problems that orbit the question of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} Outside of the early Christian tradition (see above), there is no indication that Lev 19.18 was understood in this way before Paul. This understanding of the verse is most likely derived from Jesus himself (Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 291–92). For Jesus’ use of Lev 19, see Dale C. Allison Jr, \textit{Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History} (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 351–74.
\item \textsuperscript{162} For this taxonomy and references to those holding these positions, see Moo, \textit{Galatians}, 376–77. For a demonstration of the growing acceptance of (1) in current scholarship, see Todd A. Wilson, “The Law of Christ and the Law of Moses: Reflections on a Recent Trend in Interpretation,” \textit{CurBR} 5 (2006): 123–44.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Dunn, \textit{Theology of Paul}, 650–51 notes eight or nine echoes of Jesus’ teaching that are found in Paul’s paraenesis.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Jipp finds a similar emphasis in two other Pauline passages. In 1 Cor 8–10 Paul identifies himself as being “under Christ’s law” (ἐν ... ἐννομίας Χριστοῦ; 1 Cor 9.21), reminiscent of Gal 6.2 (\textit{Christ is King}, 67–70). And as he did in Gal 5.14, Paul refers to Lev 19.18 in Rom 13.8–10; this command to love finds practical expression in the context of Jew–Gentile relationships in the Roman church (Rom 13.8–15.13) (pp. 70–75). The theme of Christ’s self-giving love is found throughout these passages and, as in Galatians, serves to provide Paul’s readers with a pattern to imitate.
\item \textsuperscript{166} This is Hayes’s “Discourse 4” which focuses on the contrast between the superior, unwritten, living law, and the inferior, inflexible, written law (\textit{Divine Law}, 66–70). In the case of Philo’s Moses, of course, the written law was not yet available and it was Moses himself who provided the people of God with the law, first in embodied form and then in written form.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Paul employs the written, inferior/unwritten, superior contrast elsewhere in his letters: Rom 7.1–6; 2 Cor 3.6. In
\end{itemize}
“Paul and the law,” but it does indicate how reading Paul’s Christology with reference to ancient constructions of ideal kingship might move the discussion forward. To identify Christ and his behaviour as “paradigmatic” assumes that they stand as examples to be imitated; the believer’s imitation of Christ will be examined below.

The Obedience of Christ

One further matter related to the king and law deserves some consideration. The Deuteronomistic History and Psalms emphasized the necessity of Israel’s king obeying the divine law. The king was not free to create new legislation, nor even, in Deuteronomy 17 (see above, ch. 4), to pronounce judgments on the basis of the law. Rather, the king was to obey the divine law and in doing so, provide a model that his subjects might follow. It is perhaps under the influence of this line of thought, but certainly also in keeping with the Hellenistic debate around the nature of the king-law relationship, that Aristeas argues that the king should submit to the laws laid down by legislators. With the exception of Romans 13.1–7, Paul has very little to say about human legislation, but is there any evidence that Paul portrays Jesus as adopting this stance of obedience towards the divine law?

Christ’s obedience is a theme that has occupied Christian theologians since at least the fourth century. John Murray considers the obedience of Christ to be “the unifying or integrating principle” for the various descriptions of the work of Christ and Richard Longenecker identifies this complex of ideas as “the foundational conviction of New Testament Christology.” While Jesus’ obedience to the Father is an explicit theme in the Gospels and Hebrews, its significance in the Pauline literature remains disputed.

In a comparison of Adam and Christ (Rom 5.12–21), Paul contrasts the disobedience of the former with the obedience of the latter without defining the nature of either disobedience or obedience. In the concluding passage, Paul first contrast Adam’s one trespass (παράπτωμα) with Christ’s one righteous act (δικαιότης); while the former leads to condemnation, the latter leads to “justification of...
life” (v. 18).\(^{172}\) In verse 19, the trespass is described as disobedience while the righteous act is spoken of as the obedience of the one (διὰ τῆς ὑπακοής τοῦ ἑνὸς). Adam’s trespass refers to the events of Genesis 3.1–7 and, given the central place that Christ’s death occupies in Romans (3.25; 4.25; 6.1–4), the one righteous act must refer to this climactic event.\(^{173}\) The question, however, is whether Christ’s obedience mentioned in verse 19 encompasses only this one righteous act or whether it is his whole life that is in view. Theologians have used the categories of Christ’s “active obedience” to indicate his life lived in faith and obedience to the Father and “passive obedience” to speak of his death on the cross.\(^{174}\)

The narrative in Genesis does not record Adam as leading an especially dissolute life following the sin in Genesis 3 and it is most likely, then, that in verse 19 Paul still has in mind Adam’s one sin and act of disobedience.\(^{175}\) If Paul’s argument is running along parallel lines, then it is Christ’s one act of righteousness/obedience—his death on the cross—that is in view (“passive obedience”) in verse 19, rather than his whole life (“active obedience”).\(^{176}\) This conclusion is bolstered by Paul’s language in Philippians where Christ’s death is held up as the pinnacle of humble servanthood: “[Christ Jesus] humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross” (Phil 2.8).\(^{177}\) The conclusion that Romans 5.18–19 and Philippians 2.8 focus on Jesus’ death as the clearest display of his obedience to God’s will (“passive obedience”) does not preclude the possibility that other Pauline passages speak of his “active obedience.”

Over the past century, a growing number of scholars have seen in Paul’s phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ a reference not to believers’ “faith in Christ” but rather, the “faithfulness of Christ.” While Gerald O’Collins might be correct when observing that “the tide seems to have turned in favour [of the latter],”\(^{179}\) the debate continues and there is no clear consensus or even majority view on the matter.\(^{180}\)

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\(^{172}\) The nature of the genitive in the phrase εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς is unclear. Regardless of whether it constitutes a genitive of apposition, purpose (Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 421) or result (Cranfield, *Romans*, 289), what is clear is the link throughout Romans between justification/righteousness and life (e.g., 1.17; 5.21; 6.20–23; 8.1–11).

\(^{173}\) Dunn, *Romans*, 284–85. In contrast, Cranfield, *Romans*, 289 argues that this phrase in v. 18 refers to Christ’s whole life, just as v. 19 does.


\(^{175}\) The Genesis narrative is clear, however, regarding the ongoing deleterious effect that this initial trespass has on Adam’s progeny.

\(^{176}\) Dunn, *Romans*, 283. Cranfield argues that Christ’s δικαίωμα refers not to a single “righteous act” but rather Christ’s “righteous conduct,” and that the verse thus refers to, “the obedience of His life as a whole” (*Romans*, 289).

\(^{177}\) This idea is found elsewhere in the early Christian tradition. Hebrew 5.8 reads “he learned obedience through what he suffered.” The larger context of Heb 5.1–10 makes it clear that Jesus’ crucifixion is in view (William L. Lane, *Hebrews*, 2 volumes, WBC 47 [Dallas: Word, 1991], 121).

\(^{178}\) With some minor variations, the phrase occurs in the undisputed Pauline texts at Rom 3.22, 26; Gal 2.16 (*bis*); 3.22; Phil 3.9. Once it is accepted that these texts speak of Christ’s faithfulness, it is also possible to extend the argument to texts like Rom 3.25 (διὰ πίστεως ἐν τῷ ἀντίοις ἀμέτα) and Rom 5.1 (Διὰ χαρίσματος σών ἐκ πίστεως; see Stephen L. Young, “Paul’s Ethnic Discourse on ‘Faith’: Christ’s Faithfulness and Gentile Access to the Judean God in Romans 3:21–5:1,” *HTR* 108.1 (2015): 30–51).


At its most basic level, the debate is whether the genitive noun, Χριστοῦ, should be understood in an objective or subjective sense. Although this is primarily a grammatical question, scholars on either side of the debate agree that linguistic arguments are insufficient for determining the meaning of the phrase; the debate is essentially a theological one. The voluminous literature generated by this intractable debate cautions against seeking an easy solution. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note the possibility that certain texts speak of Christ’s faithfulness.

We have already established that Paul speaks of Christ’s obedience, and since obedience and faithfulness can be considered as cognate themes, it is certainly possible that πίστις Χριστοῦ occupies the same semantic domain. But does drawing πίστις Χριστοῦ into the discussion enable one to say anything more about Christ’s obedience than what was said in regard to Romans 5? The answer seems to be “no.” It is unlikely that Paul has a broader obedience in view (“active obedience”) when speaking of Christ’s faithfulness since his discussions of the theme in Romans 3, Galatians 2–3, and Philippians 3 all occur in the context of Christ’s death. Paul does not deny Christ’s active obedience, it is simply not an important element within his arguments in these letters. When Paul writes of Christ’s faithfulness and obedience, then, his focus is on Christ’s “passive obedience” displayed in his death on the cross.

The theme of kingship achieved through suffering is reminiscent of the Cynic ideal of toil seen, above all, in the figure of Heracles. However, the parallels between Heracles and Christ extend beyond this one theme, suggesting that the greater complex of ideas surrounding the hero, rather than kingship itself, played a significant role at this point.

If Paul’s language of obedience and faithfulness has as its focus the cross, is there any evidence that Jesus’ obedience to the law finds a place in Paul’s theology in a way similar to that in the Gospels? In Galatians 4.4–5 Paul says that “when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son,
born of a woman, born under the law (γενόµενον ὑπὸ νόµον), in order to redeem those who were under the law."\(^{186}\) The phrase γενόµενον ὑπὸ νόµον indicates that Jesus was born a Jew (cf. 1 Cor 9.20), which brought with it the obligation to follow Torah.\(^{187}\) The following clause (Gal 4.5a)—ὶνα τοῖς ὑπὸ νόµον ἐξαγοράσῃ—indicates both the divine purpose and the result of God’s sending his son: the redemption of those under the law.\(^{188}\) While the process of this redemption and its link to Jesus’ Jewishness are not obvious on the basis of these verses alone, Paul’s argument in 3.10–14 explains that through his death Christ bore the curse that properly belonged to those who were under the law and unable to keep the law.\(^{189}\)

Christ’s redemption in Galatians 3 is described in terms of a “an exchange curse:”\(^{190}\) he redeems God’s people from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for them (v. 13). But in order for this formulation to function correctly, Christ must not be under the same curse as those for whose sake he will become accursed. One way in which Christ can avoid the curse is if he keeps the law since, according to verse 10, those who do not remain in the law and do what is written are cursed, they experience the “curse of the law” (v. 13).\(^{191}\) Christ’s conformity to the law lies behind another passage in which exchange is highlighted: “For our sake [God] made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (2 Cor 5.21).\(^{192}\) That Jesus “knew no sin” implies his obedience to the law, and Paul’s logic in Galatians 3.10–14 also requires this obedience. Christ’s obedience to the law remains an unspoken assumption, rather than an explicit element, in Paul’s argument in Galatians.

One final element to note in Galatians 3.10–14 is Paul’s assertion that the curse was transferred to Christ through his crucifixion. Paul finds the connection between “curse” and “crucifixion” in Deuteronomy 21.23: “cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree” (Gal 3.13).\(^{193}\) The precise way in which this exchange occurs remains elusive. What Paul seems to have in mind, as in Romans 5 (see above), is a representative Christology in which Christ identifies with God’s people.\(^{194}\)

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186. If this is a pre-Pauline confession (so Richard N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, WBC 41 [Dallas: Word Books, 1990], 166–67), it nevertheless receives Paul’s approval, as evidenced by the argument that follows.
188. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 172.
189. The central argument of Hays’s thesis is that these two passages are related through “a single foundational story” (*Faith of Jesus Christ*, 73–117, here 80); see also Moo, *Galatians*, 212–13.
190. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 121.
191. We are once again in heavily disputed territory. In the “traditional” reading of Paul, the curse falls upon those who attempt to live by law instead of by faith because they are unable to fulfil the law perfectly (see, e.g., Moo, *Galatians*, 201–5 and the list of modern commentators on p. 202). Representing one form of the “New Perspective,” James Dunn, argues that the curse falls on those who fail to do the law in that they “[put] too much weight on the distinctiveness of Jews from Gentiles ... those who invested their identity too far in the presumption that Israel was set apart from ‘the nations’” (*Galatians*, 170–74, here 172).
192. The idea of Christ’s sinlessness is found throughout the early Christian tradition: Heb 4.15; 1 Pet 2.22; 1 John 3.5; see O’Collins, *Christology*, 280–84 for further discussion. O’Collins’s discussion of the faith of Jesus (pp. 262–80) focuses on the question of belief rather than fidelity.
193. For textual matters pertaining to Paul’s quotation of Deuteronomy, as well as references to other Jewish writings from Paul’s day that link this text to crucifixion, see Moo, *Galatians*, 222–23.
The passages examined in the preceding paragraphs indicate the centrality of the cross in Paul’s conception of Christ’s faithfulness and obedience. It is Christ’s “passive obedience” which dominates Paul’s thinking. While some passages seem to allude to Christ’s “active obedience” and faithful keeping of God’s law, this theme is only arrived at by filling in some exegetical gaps. Deuteronomy’s image of the king as an exemplary, law-abiding Israelite is thus not central to Paul’s writings. At best, one might infer this aspect of Christ’s person, but it is not an integral element in Paul’s conception of Jesus’ kingship.

**The Model King**

In the Hellenistic kingship ideal, the king’s virtue resulted from his imitation of God. In turn, the king provided a model for his subjects to imitate. In this section three related elements within Paul’s Christology are examined to establish the extent of their conformity to this vision of kingship.

**The Imitation of Christ**

Imitation plays an important role in the king’s rule according to a number of authors surveyed earlier in this study. Philo’s Moses, for example, improves his subjects by providing for them a model (παράδειγμα) to copy (Moses 1.158–161). Both in Philo and in the Pythagorean texts, as subjects gaze upon the king, they are transformed. Joshua Jipp notes the importance of the presence of the king in this encounter between king and subject and links this to the Pauline concept of union with Christ. It is, however, possible to examine the imitation and union motifs separately, and it is the former that will occupy us in this section.

It is striking that most of the examples of explicit calls to imitation in the Pauline letters set Paul up as the example to be copied rather than Christ (1 Thess 1.6; 1 Cor 4.16; 11.1; Phil 3.17; Gal 4.12). While some scholars have focused on the Pauline call to imitation as an imposition of power and a form of coercing obedience from his readers, others, noting the “accent of humility, self-denial, self-giving, self-sacrifice for the sake of Christ and the salvation of others,” see in Paul a desire that his believers model their behaviour on the example of Christ. Paul serves as a paradigm only in so far as he himself looks to Christ as a paradigm to be imitated. This pattern is on view most clearly at 1 Corinthians 11.1: “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.”


196. See, e.g., de Boer, *Imitation*, 92–205, who provides an exegetical study of these passages with a focus on the call to imitate Paul. De Boer also includes exegetis of Acts 20.35; 2 Thess 3.7–9, 1 Tim 1.16; 2 Tim 1.13; 3.10.


198. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’,” 359; de Boer, *Imitation*, 207.

199. The imitation of Christ is mediated through Paul (Schnelle, *Apostle Paul*, 568–69). De Boer argues that Paul saw the need for this mediation to fall away as believers matured (Imitation, 215).
In what is possibly his earliest letter, Paul writes to the Thessalonians that he is thankful they “became imitators of us (μιμήται ἡμῶν ἐγεννήθητε) and of the Lord” (1 Thess 1.6). This statement is descriptive rather than prescriptive, describing the effect that acceptance of the gospel had in the lives of these believers. In particular, Paul points to the manner (“with the joy of the Holy Spirit”) in which they accepted the θλιψις which followed their turning to God. It is this joyful acceptance of suffering that Paul considers to be Christ-like. Similarly, in his letter to the believers in Philippi, Paul’s call to imitate him (Phil 3.17) occurs in the context of a warning about “enemies of the cross of Christ” (v. 18) and Paul’s own desire to imitate Christ’s suffering (v. 10). Paul’s exhortation that the Corinthians imitate him (1 Cor 4.16) is followed by the promise that he would send Timothy who would remind the Corinthians of Paul’s “ways in Christ Jesus” (v. 17) which, in 1 Corinthians 1–4, is the way of the cross. These examples suffice to indicate that when Paul calls his readers to imitate him, Christ is always the ultimate object of imitation. When Paul writes about imitation, both with regard to himself and thus the imitation of Christ, the focus is on Christ’s self-giving and humility, seen supremely in his vicarious suffering and death. In Graeco-Roman moral discourse, virtuous figures were regularly held up for imitation. If the king is understood as the supremely virtuous person, it follows that he, above all others, who should be the object of imitation.

The Image of God

There are instances in Paul’s letters where imitation of Christ as an ethical ideal is replaced by the idea of conforming to, or being transformed into, the image or likeness of Christ. Paul writes that those God foreknew were “predestined to be conformed to the image (συμμόρφωσις τῆς εἰκόνος) of his Son” (Rom 8.29). Similarly, those who see the glory of the Lord “are being transformed into the same image (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα)” (2 Cor 3.18; cf. 4.4). In both cases, as in the case of imitation...
(above), the ethical transformation of the believer is in view, although some sort of final, eschatological transformation is also indicated in certain passages.\textsuperscript{206}

The significance of the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ is further heightened by the fact that Christ is, for Paul, the image of God (2 Cor 4.4; cf. Col 1.15). As believers take on the image of Christ, they thus take on the image of God and provide the world with a glimpse of the divine:

Bearing the image of God, through the agency of the Messiah, thus emerges as one of the foundation themes of Paul’s vision for what we may call “new humanity”... Paul is not leaving the cosmos without images to mediate the presence of the one true God. On the contrary. The world, the cosmos, is already presented with the one true Image, the Messiah himself.\textsuperscript{207}

The question is whether this notion of the divine image bears royal connotations in Paul’s writings. In other words, is it an aspect of Christ’s kingship for him to be in the image of God? And if this is indeed the case, does it follow that for the believer to be conformed to the image of God’s Son connotes the believer’s share in Christ’s royal rule?

Despite the ongoing discussion amongst theologians regarding the image of God,\textsuperscript{208} Richard Middleton identifies “a virtual consensus among Old Testament scholars” in which the image of God in Genesis 1 is interpreted as the delegated rule and royal function that human beings exercise on earth.\textsuperscript{209} That this understanding of the meaning of “image” was current in certain strands of Second Temple Judaism is confirmed by Sirach 17.1–4, where humanity’s creation in the image of God is associated with authority, power, and dominion over the world.\textsuperscript{210}

In contrast to the royal language that adheres to the idea of the image of God in the tradition represented by Sirach, when Paul speaks of Christ as the image of God in 2 Corinthians 4.4, there is nothing explicit about Christ’s kingship.\textsuperscript{211} Rather, the thrust of the passage is on the revelatory aspect.

\textsuperscript{206} Wright, \textit{Faithfulness of God}, 438–42, demonstrates the ethical nature of Paul’s use of image language. The transformation in Phil 3.20–22, like that in 1 Cor 15.42–49, is related but speaks of the eschatological transformation of the believer’s body. With regard to 2 Cor 3.18, Furnish (\textit{II Corinthians}, 240–42) draws attention to the dynamic nature of the transformation inaugurated in the present, but extends into the eschaton, at which time the bodily transformation mentioned in Phil 3 and 1 Cor 15 occurs. Fitzmyer (\textit{Romans}, 525) and Longenecker (\textit{Romans}, 739) read Rom 8.29 in this way; Dunn (\textit{Romans}, 483) concedes that Paul has a process in mind, but argues that Rom 8.29 refers to the end of that process.

\textsuperscript{207} Wright, \textit{Faithfulness of God}, 441–42.

\textsuperscript{208} For brief surveys of this discussion, see Anthony A. Hoekema, \textit{Created in God’s Image} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 33–65; J. Richard Middleton, \textit{The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1} (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 15–24.


\textsuperscript{210} I am not arguing that this is the only, or even the dominant, understanding of “image” in Jewish texts, only that this understanding is present in some texts. Contrast Wisdom 2.23 where the image is associated with incorruption and immortality or Philio’s \textit{Creation} where the image is interpreted along Platonic lines (Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The Image of God’: Becoming Like God in Philo, Paul, and Early Christianity,” in \textit{Portraits of Jesus: Studies in Christology}, ed. Susan E. Myers, WUNT 2/321 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012], 157–73; Gregory E. Sterling, “Different Traditions or Emphases? The Image of God in Philio’s \textit{De Opificio Mundi},” in \textit{New Approaches to the Study of Biblical Interpretation in Judaism of the Second Temple Period and in Early Christianity: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, Jointly Sponsored by the Hebrew University Center for the Study of Christianity}, 9–11 January, 2007, ed. Gary A. Anderson, Ruth A. Clements, and David Satran [Leiden: Brill, 2013], 41–56).

\textsuperscript{211} This, in turn, is in stark contrast to Col 1.15–20 which is filled with royal language apparently predicated on
of Christ’s mediatorial role. Paul has just stated that those who contemplate the Lord’s glory are transformed into “the same image” (2 Cor 3.18)—most likely the image of Christ the Lord, since elsewhere Paul speaks of this same transformation into the image of Christ, rather than into the image of God.

In Romans 8.29, the believer is said to conform to the image of God’s Son. There is no explicit royal language in the immediate context, but we have already seen (above, pp. 265–269) that “son of God” language can be associated with kingship. The emphasis in the earlier part of Romans 8 is on the present and eschatological transformation of the believer, especially with regard to ethical matters. The allusion to Psalm 109.1 LXX in Romans 8.34 certainly carries messianic, and thus royal, overtones (assuming the allusion was heard by Paul’s readers). However, Christ’s intercession in this verse (οὐ καὶ ἐντογγάνει υπὲρ ἡμῶν) suggests that he bears a priestly role or that of an advocate. It is ultimately the love of God in Christ (v. 39; cf. v. 35), demonstrated in Christ’s intercessory role, which assures the believer of his or her final transformation into the image of God’s Son.

This eschatological transformation is most explicit in 1 Corinthians 15.49 which concludes a section in which the first Adam—the first person, the earthly person—is contrasted with the last Adam, the heavenly person (1 Cor 15.44b–49). Paul’s main concern seems to be with timing: the physical (τὸ ψυχικὸν) must precede the spiritual (τὸ πνευματικόν). The climax of this section is the statement that believers will “bear the image of the heavenly man” (v. 49). There is nothing in the passage to suggest that “image” bears some of the royal elements it does in other Jewish texts. However, it should be noted that the climactic conclusion of the believers’ transformation (1 Cor 15.49) is part of a larger section concerned with the resurrection and the eschaton (1 Cor 15.1–58). Although Christ’s present kingship is assumed, the focus in vv. 20–28 is on the eschatological events through which this kingship is brought to completion. The resurrection and future transformation of believers into the image of the heavenly person constitute a part of these eschatological events and are thus related to Christ’s kingship, even though there is nothing to indicate that the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ necessarily includes royal elements as part of this change.

Before turning to Paul’s use of the figure of Adam, we note that in both Romans 8.29 and 2 Corinthians 3.18, the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ occurs in relation to δοκιμασία, “glory” (cf. Rom 8.30). The same is true of 1 Corinthians 15 where the spiritual body that will be

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212. See, e.g., Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 222, 248, who notes the parallels between Paul on the one hand, and Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon, on the other and traces the similarities back to Wisdom speculation in Hellenistic Judaism.


214. The contrast indicated here has already been adumbrated (1 Cor 2–3), suggesting that Paul is returning to a question plaguing the Corinthian church, possible one raised by them because of a religious-philosophical exegetical tradition inherited from Alexandrian Judaism (Gregory E. Sterling, “‘Wisdom Among the Perfect’: Creation Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” *NovT* 37.4 [1995]: 355–84).

215. Has Paul played down this aspect of eschatological transformation because of the Corinthians’ overzealous proclamation of their kingship in 1 Cor 4.8?
raised in power and glory (vv. 43–44), is the same body that will be transformed into the likeness of the heavenly person (v. 49). The link between the fall of Adam and loss of glory is well-established in a number of Jewish texts and provides Paul with this key element of his soteriology.\(^{216}\) Paul is thus drawing on a nexus of ideas in which the image of God and the glory associated with that image was given to Adam, was subsequently lost, but is being renewed in humanity through the work of Christ.\(^{217}\) It is this which encourages Paul to speak of Christ as “the last Adam” (1 Cor 15.45).

The New Adam

The link between the image of God and the figure of Adam was noted in the previous section. That Adam is associated with dominion in certain Jewish traditions is established by 4 Ezra 6.53–54 which describes the creation on the sixth day of “cattle, beasts, and creeping things” before observing that “over these [God] placed Adam as ruler over all the work which [he] had made.” The author has conflated ideas found in Genesis 1.26–28 with those from Genesis 2.4–7, 19–20 in order to turn Adam into a king-like figure.\(^{218}\) While Adam is rarely mentioned by name in the Pauline literature being examined in this chapter,\(^{219}\) Dunn argues that Adam and the Genesis account lie just beneath the surface of key Pauline passages like Romans 1.18–32; 3; 5.12–21; 7.7–13; 8.19–22 and Philippians 2.6–11, and that Adam is thus a significant figure for Paul’s Christology and soteriology.\(^{220}\) Whether or not Dunn’s assessment of Adam in Paul’s theology is correct,\(^{221}\) the question that needs to be addressed is whether the link between Adam and Christ contributes to Paul’s understanding of Christ’s kingship.

Romans 5.12–21 contrasts Adam and Christ as two representative figures, each of whom defines the future of their respective “descendants.”\(^{222}\) Throughout this passage, the two figures are

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216. These references are collected at Dunn, *Christology in the Making*, 102 n. 15. For the link with Paul’s soteriology, see pp. 106–107. Again, the claim that there are certain strands of Judaism which exhibit this tradition is not the same as the claim that this position is representative of Second Temple Judaism. John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism*, JSPSup 1 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), studies seven Jewish texts to demonstrate that there is no single Adam tradition, but that the respective authors adapt and use Adam differently within their larger projects.

217. 1 Cor 11.3–16 contains the same complex of ideas, but it does not have direct bearing on the point being argued here. I note, however, that even if kingship language is absent, the idea of dominion of one sort or another, is not (see v. 3).

218. In addition to the explicit mention of dominion in Gen 1.28 (κατακυριεύσατε ... και ἄρχετε), the account in Genesis 2 also contains royal imagery when understood within the broader socio-cultural context in which it was written (Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary*, rev. ed., trans. John H. Marks, OTL [London: SCM, 1972], 77, 83).

219. Rom 5.14 (biss); 1 Cor 15.22, 45; cf. 1 Tim 2.13–14.


221. Dunn’s reading of Phil 2 has proved especially controversial; see Wright, “Adam,” 373–84.

antithetical. The only trait they share—the reason Adam can be described as a “type” of Christ, the one who is to come (τόπος τοῦ μέλλοντος; 5.14)—is the way in which they are representative of all their respective descendants. Although this passage uses language of dominion and reign, it is not Adam and Christ who reign in their respective spheres, but death (vv. 14, 17), on the one hand, and grace through righteousness (vv. 21), on the other. These elements are said to enter the world and reign through their respective human representatives. Paul’s personification of these elements has occasioned a number of different explanations. For our purposes it should be noted that while dominion is thus an important theme in this passage, neither Adam nor Christ are explicitly depicted as reigning but, instead, occupy representative roles. Paul does write that those who receive grace and righteousness through Christ, will reign (v. 17).

Christ’s reign is mentioned explicitly in 1 Corinthians 15. In verse 25, this reign is explained through a quotation from Psalm 8.7. This psalm is quoted here and elsewhere in early Christian writings in combination with Psalm 109.1 LXX, most likely because of the shared idea of the subjection of God’s enemies. But there is another reason why Psalm 8 attracted the attention of Christian readers. The psalm echoes the narrative of Genesis 1–2 in speaking of all creation being placed under the rule of ἄνθρωπος and ζωή άνθρώπου (Ps 8.5 LXX). It is quite likely this latter phrase (a translation of שָׂם בָן א) which drew the attention of the early Christian readers of these Greek psalms and contributed to their understanding of its messianic implications. Although the figure of Adam is not mentioned explicitly in the psalm, it is humanity understood corporately and in some relation to creation which is primarily in view. And since both Adam and Christ are representative figures in whom humanity is summed up (Rom 5.12–21), this psalm could be read both as speaking of humanity’s experience in Adam before the fall, and of humanity’s experience in Christ after his resurrection, ascension, and session at God’s

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Exegetical and Theological Study (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 343–49 argues that each figure represents a domain of sin and death, on the one hand, and life and righteousness, on the other. For Dunn (Theology of Paul, 94–97, here, 94), “Paul encapsulates all human history under [these] two archetypal figures.” This does not mean that elsewhere Paul’s participatory language, “in Christ,” does not bear more theological weight than this.

223. In certain Jewish exegetical traditions mortality results from the human condition—the Hebrew adām read in terms of humanity—rather than from the figure of Adam (Levison, “Adam as Mediatorial Figure”). Paul, it seems, would not disagree, but he roots this human condition in the disobedience of Adam.

224. Unlike 1 Cor 15, the contrast here is not primarily temporal, but speaks to those who are either “in Adam” or “in Christ” and thus find themselves under the reign of death or life, respectively. Thus, Martin de Boer observes, “we do not have successive temporal epochs but two conflicting, warring orbs of power that are cosmically conceived” (The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5, JSNTSup 22 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988], 173).

225. According to de Boer, Rom 5–8 represents Paul’s “mythologization” programme in which he deploys “cosmological-anthropological” categories in contrast to the forensic-eschatological categories of Rom 1–4 (“Paul’s Mythologizing Program in Romans 5–8,” in Apocalyptic Paul: Cosmos and Anthropos in Romans 5–8, ed. Beverly Roberts Gaventa [Waco: Baylor University Press, 2013], 1–20). According to Longenecker, Paul uses this language to address Gentiles who would not be familiar with Jewish categories like “redemption” and “justification” (Romans, 581–84).

226. Eph 1.20–22; 1 Pet 3.22; Pol. Phil. 1.1; see Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’”, 166–68.

227. E.g., Lambrecht, “Christological Use of Scripture,” 505–7; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 754–55. Hengel suggests that the two psalms were sung together by the earliest Jerusalem congregations and that “they mutually interpreted one another” (‘‘Sit at My Right Hand!’,” 166–67).
right hand. Read together, as they often were by early Christians, Psalm 8 and Psalm 109 LXX join Adamic and Davidic elements in the person of Jesus the Christ. The combination of these texts in 1 Corinthians 15 supports the idea that the figure of Adam represents, for Paul, dominion and authority, as it does in Genesis 1–2. Adam/humanity’s role as God’s vice-regent over creation is lost through the events narrated in Genesis 3, and it is this situation which Christ remedies.

Having established the connection between Adam and rule, we might return to Romans 5 and read that passage in a slightly different light. Although neither Adam nor Christ are spoken of explicitly as ruling, the theme of dominion permeates the passage and in the light of our reading of 1 Corinthians 15, we might assert more confidently that the representative roles played by Adam and Christ in this passage are linked to their ruling roles in the realms of death and life, respectively.

Turning to the hymn in Philippians 2.6–11, we see Christ described as the being “in the form of God” (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων), yet “taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness” (2.6, 7). Scholars disagree as to whether the text alludes to the Adam narrative and whether the “form of God” should be understood in relation to the “image of God.”

However, if, as suggested above, the Adam/Christ contrast is, partly, about dominion, and if the portrait of Christ in Philippians 2.5–11 is painted in colours meant to contrast Hellenistic or Graeco-Roman rulers, then it is quite possible that the figure of Adam is also lurking in the background of this passage. Regardless of how the details are interpreted, the general shape of the narrative is one of descent (vv. 6–8) followed by ascent (vv. 9–11), and being “in the form of God” mirrors the exaltation of Christ, with all it implies about royal rule (see above, p. 270).

George van Kooten, citing Plutarch, demonstrates that the ruler’s reflection of the image of the divine was an important element of Graeco-Roman kingship ideology:

> The ruler is the image of God (εἰκὼν θεοῦ) who orders all things ... by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God (ὁμοιότητα θεοῦ) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity. (Princ. iner. 3 [780e–f])

Even though the language of divine image was not used in any of the texts studied in earlier chapters of this dissertation, the importance of the king’s imitation of God as part of this kingship discourse (from

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228. Those who argue that Paul is alluding to Gen 1–3 in some way include Dunn, Christology in the Making, 114–21; N. T. Wright, “Jesus Christ is Lord: Philippians 2.5–11,” in The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 90–97; Hansen, Philippians, 138–42. Those who deny a link with Genesis, often wary of Dunn’s argument at this point against Jesus’ pre-existence, include Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 121–23; Gordon D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 209–10; Bockmuehl, Philippians, 131–33. Bockmuehl recognizes that an analogous narrative is at work, even if concrete allusions are not present: “The problem is, however, that the undeniable counter-analogy between Philippians 2 and Genesis 3 in general is not easily pinned down in particulars” (p. 133; original emphasis).


which Plutarch is drawing and furthering) was demonstrated. These two elements—“image of God” and “imitation of the divine”—are thus closely situated within the ancient discourse of ideal kingship. From this flows the idea that the king’s subjects should imitate him if they are to pursue the goal of assimilation to the divine.\textsuperscript{232}

Christ, too, is seen by Paul as one to be imitated. In addition to the exemplary role that Christ plays in relation to the law, there are also passages which speak explicitly of imitation. The believer’s imitation of Christ is focused especially on Christ’s self-giving and sacrificial death which serves as a model of love between believers. Closely related to the idea of imitation is that of the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ. We have seen that this concept has ethical implications both for the present and for the eschatological future. We noted, further, that the scriptural connection between image and rule (Gen 1.26–28) is present in passages like Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15, and Philippians 2, once the link with the figure of Adam (Gen 2.4b-25) is established. We might summarize the underlying structure of Paul’s thought as follows: Christ is the last Adam (1 Cor 15.45) through whom the effects of the disobedience of the first Adam are undone that humanity might be transformed into the image of God. This transformation has a present and future ethical component, but also includes Christ’s people sharing in his rule, thus enjoying in the eschaton the dominion over the world for which they were created.

\textbf{The King’s Kindness}

The relationship between king and subject is central in conceptualizing ideal kingship. We observed in a number of texts that the king was required to act in such a way as to establish good will and affection between him and his subjects. The subjects were also expected to respond to ideal kingship with loyalty and obedience. The subject’s response will be examined in the following section. In this current section I analyze the way in which Paul portrays Christ’s action on behalf of his subjects.

In the concluding chapter of his important study of the benefactor, Frederick Danker observes that “no subject dominates Graeco-Roman literary and non-literary texts as does the remembered benefactor.”\textsuperscript{233} The title ευεργέτης, “benefactor,” was given to or adopted by a number of Hellenistic kings (for example, Ptolemy III, Antigonus III, and Mithridates V).\textsuperscript{234} Although the titular use on display in the epigraphic record\textsuperscript{235} is absent in the texts examined in earlier chapters of this present study, in these texts the ideal king is constantly urged to exhibit ευεργεσία towards his subjects.\textsuperscript{236} However, the theme of benefaction extends beyond the use of this word-group.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{232} George van Kooten argues that Graeco-Roman philosophical categories, specifically that of Platonic assimilation, contribute to Paul’s understanding of image and assimilation (\textit{Paul's Anthropology}, 199–219). As van Kooten himself notes, however, the link between Adam and image in 1 Corinthians 15, together with the significance of Adam elsewhere in Paul’s letters, points to importance of Genesis 1.26–27 in Paul’s understanding of the image of God (pp. 205–206).
  \item \textsuperscript{233} Frederick William Danker, \textit{Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field} (St. Louis: Clayton, 1982), 488.
  \item \textsuperscript{235} For a thorough discussion of fifty-three epigraphic benefaction texts, see Danker, \textit{Benefactor}, 57–316.
  \item \textsuperscript{236} E.g., Diotogenes, 72.14–15; Let. Aris. 249. Xenophon’s Cyrus is typically mercenary in his attitude towards euergetism. In Wisdom of Solomon, God’s kingship is illustrated by his display of beneficence (3.5; 11.5, 13; 16.2, 11, 24).
\end{itemize}
Danker’s reconstruction of a “profile of benefactors” from the epigraphic evidence yields a portrait of the benefactor containing language related to ideal kingship: ἀρετή, φιλανθρωπία, δικαιοσύνη, ἐπίλεικεια. 237 Similarly, Jerome Neyrey argues that it is insufficient to study the subject by looking only at texts that contain the title εὐεργέτης. He lists six titles that commonly express divine benefaction: βασιλεύς, πατὴρ, σωτήρ, εὐεργέτης, δημιουργός, δεσπότης. 238 Seen from this perspective, the portrait of the ideal king and ideal benefactor all but coincide. 239 This is not surprising if, as has been observed, one of the goals of producing images of ideal kingship was to encourage rulers to exercise virtues that expressed themselves in care for their subjects. The most important role the king could play, from the perspective of his subjects, was to enable them to thrive. Whether this was expressed in terms of the king’s εὐνοοῖα, φιλανθρωπία, or εὐεργεσία is, in some ways, irrelevant. 240 The king’s positive attitude towards his subjects from which flows his active work for their well-being is of primary importance. In this section, I consider divine action in Paul’s writing against the backdrop of these concepts.

**Gift-Giver**

The εὐεργεία—group of words occurs infrequently in the New Testament, 241 but the goodness, kindness, and benevolence of God towards humanity is frequently on view, especially when Paul employs the language of grace/gift (χάρις). 242 John Barclay provides a “lexicon of gift” to illustrate a number of terms related to grace that contribute to Paul’s expression of divine benefaction: χρηστότης (Rom 2.4), ἔλεος (Rom 15.9), εὐλογία (Rom 15.29), δίδωμι (1 Cor 3.10; 2 Cor 5.5). 243 By tracing this semantic domain through Paul’s writings, we note that they show him praying or giving thanks for benefactions similar to those found in other Graeco-Roman text: 244 healing from ill-health (2 Cor 12.7–8), 245 assistance and comfort in times of distress (2 Cor 1.3–7); rescue from opponents (Rom 15.30–


240. For εὐνοοῖα, see Schubart, “Hellenistische Königsideal,” 8–15. In chapter 2 we saw that φιλανθρωπία served this purpose in Xenophon’s Cyrus. Danker understands the ruler’s actions in terms of εὐεργεσία (Benefactor).

241. Lk 22.25; Acts 4.9; 10.38; 1 Tim 6.2.

242. See Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 24–51 for a survey of “gift” in the Graeco-Roman world. The most important contribution of Barclay’s magnum opus is his “taxonomy of gift/grace” which recognizes six “perfections” of gift: superabundance, singularity, priority, incongruity, efficacy, and non-circularity (pp. 66–78). In Barclay’s re-reading of Galatians (pp. 331–446) and Romans (pp. 449–561), Barclay argues that Paul has different perfections and combinations of perfections in view at different points in these two letters. A model like that of Neyrey’s (“Benefactor and Patron”) which insists on reciprocity as a key element, thus runs the risk of misinterpreting those Pauline passages where non-circularity, for example, is present.


245. The exact nature of Paul’s “thorn in the flesh” is debated, but some sort of physical ailment is most likely (Furnish, II Corinthians, 528–29, 550; Graham H. Twelftree, Paul and the Miraculous: A Historical Reconstruction [Grand
31). Paul uses gift-language to describe the believer’s reception of God’s Spirit (Rom 5.5; 1 Cor 2.12–14; 2 Cor 1.22; 1 Thess 4.8) and spiritual gifts (Rom 12.3–8; 1 Cor 12.1–31). Paul’s ministry is considered a divine gift (Rom 1.5; 15.15; 1 Cor 3.10; 15.10).

There are passages in Paul’s writings in which grace is associated with Christ. In addition to passages in letter openings in which “the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ” is placed alongside, or identified with, the grace of God, Paul can speak in letter endings of the grace of Christ without mentioning God. Outside of the Pauline letter endings, this way of speaking about grace without reference to God is unusual, occurring only at 2 Corinthians 8.9 and possibly at Galatians 1.6. For Paul, therefore, it is primarily God, and not Christ, who is the gift-giver. If the genitive in the phrase ἡ γὰρ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and its variants is understood as epexegetical, then Paul’s focus is on Christ and his work as the gift given by God. The prime example of this way of thinking of the Christ-event is perhaps Romans 8.32, where, in an argument from the greater to the lesser, God’s giving his own Son guarantees that he will give believers “all things.” Furthermore, the Christ-event effects justification for God’s people which is also described in gift-language (δικαιοσύνην ἐν Χριστῷ) with God as its source. Elsewhere Paul writes that the justification which comes through Christ (ὁ ὄχλος) provides access to God’s γὰρ τοῦ (Rom 5.1–2). In Romans 6.23, God’s “free gift” (χάρις) is eternal life “in Christ.” These examples could be multiplied, but in each case we are dealing with God’s action towards believers, mediated through Christ. Thus Barclay: “in all

Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 158–62), especially if this ailment is also the “weakness of the flesh” Paul speaks of in Gal 4.13–14 (so Dunn, Galatians, 233; Twelftree, Paul and the Miraculous, 155–58).

246. In short, “the gift of the Spirit provided the motivating and enabling power by which [believers] were to live” (Dunn, Theology of Paul, 413–41, here 414).

247. See, further, Orrey McFarland’s demonstration that Paul does not separate this gift of apostleship from the divine gift given in the person of Christ (God and Grace in Philo and Paul, NovTSup 164 [Leiden: Brill, 2016], 156–76). The reading of Rom 1.5 I have adopted here and below accepts that γὰρ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and its variants is understood as epexegetical, then Paul’s focus is on Christ and his work as the gift given by God. The prime example of this way of thinking of the Christ-event is perhaps Romans 8.32, where, in an argument from the greater to the lesser, God’s giving his own Son guarantees that he will give believers “all things.” Furthermore, the Christ-event effects justification for God’s people which is also described in gift-language (δικαιοσύνην ἐν Χριστῷ) with God as its source. Elsewhere Paul writes that the justification which comes through Christ (ὁ ὄχλος) provides access to God’s γὰρ τοῦ (Rom 5.1–2). In Romans 6.23, God’s “free gift” (χάρις) is eternal life “in Christ.” These examples could be multiplied, but in each case we are dealing with God’s action towards believers, mediated through Christ. Thus Barclay: “in all

248. Rom 1.7; 1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2; Gal 1.3; Phil 1.2; 1 Thess 1.1; Phlm 3.

249. Rom 16.20; 1 Cor 16.23; 2 Cor 13.13; Gal 6.18; Phil 4.23; 1 Thess 5.28; Phlm 25. Jeffrey A. D. Weima, Neglected Endings: The Significance of the Pauline Letter Closings, JSNTSup 101 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 78–87 calls this the “grace benediction,” noting that it occurs in all the Pauline letters and consistently contains three elements: Paul’s wish, its divine source, and mention of the recipient. All of these occurrences are found in the endings of Paul’s letters. In contrast to ancient letters which often concluded with health wishes, Paul sought to show his concern for his readers’ spiritual well-being, providing an inclusio with the divine grace spoken of in the letters’ openings (Weima, Neglected Endings, 85).

250. And even one of these two cases is “suspect”: important manuscripts (including p46) omit Χριστοῦ at Gal 1.6 (so Dunn, Galatians, 38 n. 1, 40; the argument for the inclusion of Χριστοῦ is summarized by Moo, Galatians, 86. See also Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. [Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 1994], 520–21).

251. Weima sees a genitive of source in the concluding formulae, i.e., “the grace that Jesus Christ has and gives” (Neglected Endings, 81). In contrast, John Reumann writes, with reference to Phil 4.23. “The gen[itive] is not subjective ... but epexegetical or explanatory, grace is God’s bestowal that consists of actions through the risen Lord, Jesus Christ” (Philippians, 742); cf. BDF §167. On Christ as the divine gift, see McFarland, God and Grace, 103–53.


253. In Galatians, Barclay argues for a “Christological configuration of the gift of God” in which Paul “interprets the
these cases, there is the closest possible identification between God and the Christ-event, but the source of the action is consistently God.”

Since God is the figure who provides the gift, we may think of God as benefactor or patron. Believers respond with gratitude (Rom 1.8; 1 Cor 1.4; Phil 1.3; Phlm 4) or by honouring God through making his benefaction known (Rom 1.8; 1 Thess 1.8). It is, above all, the believer’s response of loyalty (πιστις—see below) which defines their relationship to God. The gratitude, loyalty, and honour with which God’s “clients” reciprocate confirm the presence of the metaphor of benefaction/patronage in Paul’s writings.

God’s benefaction is in view in Paul’s life. Not only his conversion, but also his apostleship is viewed as a divine gift (Rom 1.5; 12.3; 1 Cor 3.10; 15.10). As Zeba Crook puts it: “Through the mission to the gentiles, and by establishing communities of gentile believers, Paul is working hard to spread and promote the good name of his patron.” In so far as this role mediates between benefactor and client, Paul can also be considered as a “broker” of God’s χάρις—the one who facilitates the relationship between the benefactor and the client. Since it is God who is predominantly portrayed as benefactor, it is worth noting that Paul can on occasion portray himself as Christ’s client or ambassador. This configuration is possibly in view when Paul calls himself a “servant” (δουλος) of Christ Jesus (Rom 1.1) who receives apostleship through him (Rom 1.5).

But Christ might also be understood as a “broker” who mediates between God and God’s people. Prayers are offered “through” Christ to God (Rom 1.8; 7.25) and God gives his subjects victory through Jesus Christ (1 Cor 15.57). At the final assize, God’s people will be gathered together and receive salvation through Christ (1 Thess 4.14; 5.9). In these and other ways, “Jesus, then, mediates the heavenly patronage of God to us, even as he functions to mediate earthly petition and praise to the heavenly patron.”

divine beneficence celebrated in Judaism through the prism of the Christ-event” (Paul and the Gift, 333).

254. See the discussion in Campbell, Union with Christ, 73–94, 239–48.

255. Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 451–52. In addition to warning against using this observation to separate God and Christ in ways that Paul does not, Barclay also notes the presence of exceptions: in Gal 1.4 and 2.20 it is Christ who gives himself (cf. Rom 5.8; 2 Cor 8.9).

256. For the current debate around the distinction between benefaction (Greek) and patronage (Roman), see Bruce A. Lowe, “Paul, Patronage and Benefaction: A ‘Semitic’ Reconsideration,” in Paul and His Social Relations, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Land, PAST 7 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 57–84. Both systems function within monarchical rule.


258. Crook, “Divine Benefactions,” 22. For Paul’s conversion as benefaction, see pp. 15–19; for his apostleship, see pp. 19–25.

259. Lowe, “Paul, Patronage and Benefaction,” 81; cf. 1 Cor 4.1; Phil 1.1. This is not to argue that the “broker” image exhausts Paul’s use of slave/servant language.


Saviour

A number of Greek texts combine εὑργε'της and σωτη'ρ, suggesting that rescue be considered one of the ways in which beneficence is shown.262 Not surprisingly, some Hellenistic kings received the honorary title “saviour,” most famously Ptolemy I and Antiochus I.263 The title σωτη'ρ did not occur in any of the kingship texts examined in earlier chapters of this study, but the concept was seen to be present in demands for the king’s provision of deliverance and safety from enemies.264 As such, the salvation provided by the king formed part of his φιλανθροπία—his love for his subjects—displayed in these instances by providing them with help in times of need.265 This sense of the king’s ability to provide salvation is also tied to the ruler cult and explains why this title is so important within the cult: when the king does what the gods generally do—in this case, provide rescue—the king deserves honours similar to those received by the gods.266

In the Jewish Scriptures, the title σωτη'ρ is used almost exclusively for God.267 When a human agent such as Othniel (Judg 3.9) or Ehud (Judg 3.15) is identified as “saviour,” it is because God has raised them up and empowered them for the task. Roland de Vaux’s observation, quoted in Chapter 4, that “the king is ipso facto a saviour”268 must be understood against the foundational assertion that God is Israel’s saviour. The human king’s role as saviour is derived from that of God, as illustrated in 1 Samuel 11. Following Saul’s routing of the Ammonites (vv. 1–11), the new king exclaims, “today the Lord has wrought deliverance in Israel” (v. 13).269 Messianic figures are generally not identified as saviours in the Greek Bible, but there are two suggestive passages that link the future king and salvation. In Isaiah 49.6, God says to his servant that he, the servant, will be “a light of nations ... for salvation to the end of the earth.”270 And in Zechariah 9.9, the foal-riding king is described as “just and

264. The title was also frequently used of the gods, in which case salvation was often from illness or other dangers outside of human control (Nock, Early Gentile Christianity, 36–37).
267. See, e.g., Deut 32.15; 1 Sam 10.19; Pss 23.5; 24.5; 61.3, 7; 78.9; 94.1 LXX; Isa 12.2; 17.10; 45.15; 62.11. For discussion of these texts, see Werner Foerster and Georg Fohrer, “Σωτηρία, Σωτηρία, Σωτηρία,” TDNT 7: 965–1024. I have been unable to consult Franz Jung, ΣΩΤΗΡ: Studien zur Rezeption eines hellenistischen Ehrentitels im Neuen Testament, NTAbh 2/39 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002) and rely on the reviews of Pieter Van Der Horst (Memosyne 56.6 [2003]: 745–47) and Angela Standhartinger (Review of Biblical Literature 6 [2004]: 390–93) for its contents and argument.
269. My study of 1 Samuel 8–12 (in Chapter 4) argued that it is not kingship per se that is problematic in these chapters, but Israel’s rejection of God as their deliverer.
270. In the Hebrew text, the servant is made a light so that God’s salvation (“my salvation,” שמש) will reach the end of the earth.

299
salvific” (δίκαιος καὶ σώζων σώτος). In both cases, though, these agents of salvation are dependant on God for their ability to bring deliverance.

In keeping with the pattern found in the Greek Bible, God is identified as σωτήρ in the New Testament (e.g., Luke 1:47; 1 Tim 2:3; Titus 1:3; Jude 25), but the title is also extended to Jesus (e.g., Luke 2:11; John 4:42; Acts 5:31; Titus 1:4; 2 Pet 1:1). Matthew is certainly aware of the etymology of Jesus’ name and its link to salvation (Matt 1:21), but Luke, although he identifies Jesus as saviour, is either unaware of this etymology or chooses not draw his reader’s attention to it (Luke 1:31), despite the importance of this theme in Luke’s birth narrative and elsewhere in his Gospel (see 1:69, 71, 77; 2:11, 30; cf. 3:6; 19:9). The title plays an important role in the soteriology of the Pastoral Epistles. The presence of the title in other early Christian texts highlights its absence in the undisputed Pauline letters.

Only once in the texts being studied in this chapter does Paul use the word σωτήρ. In Philippians 3:20, Paul reminds the believers, “our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ.” Verse 19 establishes a contrast between earthly things (τὰ ἐπίγεια), which lead to destruction, and the heavenly citizenship of Paul’s readers (v. 20), which guarantees their salvation. There are other passages, however, which associate Christ with future salvation, thus implying his role as saviour. In Romans 11, Paul draws on language from Isaiah to argue that “all Israel” will be saved when “the deliverer” (ὁ ῥῦμανος) comes from Zion (Rom 11.25–27). First Thessalonians 1.10 also speaks of Jesus as the one “who rescues us (Ἰησοῦν τὸν ῥῦμανον ἡμᾶς) from the wrath that is coming.” Despite the absence of the title, Christ takes on the role of saviour in Paul’s writings. Following this observation is the question about the nature of that from which Christ saves his people.

A handful of passages speak of salvation from God’s wrath. The aforementioned 1 Thessalonians 1.10, for example, is possibly a summary of Paul’s gospel preached to the Thessalonians, which

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271. For the argument that Paul’s σωτήρ Christology is indebted to Jewish rather than Greek thought, see Cullmann, Chrestology, 238–45; Nock, Early Gentile Christianity, 40. Malherbe (“‘Christ Jesus Came Into the World to Save Sinners:’ Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles,” in Collected Essays, 1959–2012, in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 436–37) argues that since there is no evidence that the Messiah was ever called “saviour,” the New Testament identification of Jesus as σωτήρ must derive from the Greek world.

272. In keeping with general Greek usage, Jewish authors like Philo and Josephus felt free to identify human figures as σωτήρ; it is thus striking that the New Testament limits this language to God and Christ (Martin Karrer, “Jesus, der Retter [Süderr],” ZNW 93 [2002]: 170).

273. Matt 1:21: καλέσας τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦν· αὐτὸς γὰρ σώσε τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν. Ἰησοῦς is a translation of יישוע, which is understood in the Hebrew Bible and elsewhere (e.g., Philo, Names 121: Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἴσημα [σωτηρία κυρίου] to relate to the Lord’s salvation (Karrer, “Retter,” 153–56).

274. Malherbe, “Soteriology”.

275. Bousset (Kyrios Christos, 310) asserts that Paul’s language at this point is most likely influenced by “the eschatological language of the Old Testament.”

276. Against the argument that the deliverer in v. 26 is God and not Christ, see Fitzmyer, Romans, 620, 624–25; Longenecker, Romans, 898–900. The lexeme προσώματ is used infrequently by Paul, but when used substantively it can refer to Jesus (1 Thess 1.10). In 2 Cor 1.10 the verb clearly refers to God’s past, present, and future deliverance. The agent of deliverance is ambiguous in Rom 15:31.

277. It is not universally accepted that the salvation in view happens at Christ’s return; see the discussion in Cranfield,
would confirm the centrality of Jesus’ return as saviour of his people from God’s wrath (cf. 1 Thess 5.9). This wrath may have a present expression (1 Thess 2.16; Rom 1.18), but it is above all on the final day of judgment that God’s wrath will be experienced. In both Philippians 3.20 and 1 Thessalonians 1.10, this is the day on which Jesus Christ will show himself to be σωτήρ.

The passages mentioned in the previous paragraph point to sin as the cause of God’s present and future wrath. The refusal to recognize God and to acknowledge God appropriately is identified as the foundational sin in Romans 1.19–23. As God gives people over to their sins, God’s wrath is displayed through the inevitable results of those sins (vv. 24–32). In the words of Wisdom of Solomon: “a person is punished by the very things by which the person sins” (11.15–16).

The connection between these ideas and Christ’s deliverance can be observed as we return to Philippians. Paul’s prayer for the Philippians is that “in the day of Christ [they] may be pure and blameless (εἰλικρινεῖς καὶ ἁπρόσκοποι), having produced the harvest of righteousness (καρπὸν δικαιοσύνης) that comes through Jesus Christ” (1.10–11). If “pure and blameless” describes the absence of sin, “the harvest of righteousness” describes the presence of good works. The same concepts, good works joined to the idea of being “blameless and innocent” (ἀσεμνοὶ καὶ ἀκέραιοι; v. 15), are once again connected to the “day of Christ” at Philippians 2.12–16 (cf. 1 Cor 1.7–8; 1 Thess 3.13; 5.23).

If we arrange this complex of ideas temporally, we see that human beings move from being in a state of sin, and thus under the threat of God’s wrath, into a state of innocence. Believers are sustained in this blameless state until the future “day of Christ,” when he returns as their saviour. The missing element at the centre of this process of deliverance is, of course, the Christ-event. More specifically, salvation is effected by the confession of Jesus’ lordship in the context of his death and resurrection (Rom 10.9–10) which, in turn, is linked to the forgiveness of sin (Rom 3.21–26; 4.25) and ongoing avoidance of sin (Rom 6.1–11). For the sake of coherence, the nature of salvation must correlate with the condition it addresses—the cure must address the disease. From the foregoing discussion it has become evident that Christ’s work as σωτήρ addresses the wrath of God by dealing...
Paul employs a number of different image and metaphors to speak about the way in which God deals with humanity’s sin.286

In Romans 3.214–26 Paul uses language that speaks of release and deliverance from slavery and imprisonment (ἁπόλυτροσις) to emphasize the freedom that believers experience, cultic language (ὑλαστήριος) brings to mind atonement and ritual purity, and forensic language (δικαιώματος/δικαιοσύνη) speaks of the removal of guilt.287 The first of these images brings to mind the idea of liberation—a theme closely associated with deliverance and the σωτηρία.288

Paul’s use of liberation imagery is the complement to his assertion that those who find themselves apart from Christ are enslaved.289 In Galatians 4.1–11, believers are described as having been enslaved by τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου before they turned to Christ and they are in danger of being enslaved once more should they accept the false teaching about which Paul is warning.290 The exact nature of these forces is less significant for our purposes than Paul’s declaration that believers have been redeemed (ἐξαποφεύγω) through God sending his son (v. 5). The slavery image reoccurs in 4.21–31 in the allegory of Hagar and Sarah. Paul’s major concern in Galatians is to encourage the Galatian believers to remain in the freedom (ἐλευθερία) they enjoy because of Christ’s liberation (5.1; cf. 5.13). This theme is announced in the introduction of the letter as Paul declares that the Lord Jesus Christ “gave himself for our sins to set us free from the present evil age (ἐξαποθετέοντος τοῦ ἐνεστωτοῦ ποινοῦ)” (1.4).291 The link between sin, enslavement, and Christ’s liberation is further worked out in Romans.

286. For a fuller discussion of Paul’s future soteriology as it is unfolded in Romans, see Cilliers Breytenbach, “‘For in Hope We Were Saved’: Discerning the Time in Paul’s Letter to the Romans,” in Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors, NovTSup 135 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 239–56.


289. Paul’s liberation imagery is central to those who argue for an “apocalyptic Paul.” Martyn, for example, notes that Paul regularly speaks of “Sin” rather than “sins,” “identifying it as a power that holds human beings in a state of slavery. And he sees liberation rather than forgiveness as the fundamental remedy enacted by God” (Galatians, 90). For an historical survey as well as critique of this approach to reading Paul, see N. T. Wright, Paul and His Recent Interpreters: Some Contemporary Debates (London: SPCK, 2015), 135–218. Wright expresses doubt as to whether apocalyptic and covenantal/salvation historical approaches to Paul are as antithetical as is sometimes portrayed; see also David A. Shaw, “Apocalyptic and Covenant: Perspectives on Paul or Antinomies at War?” JSNT 36.2 (2013): 155–71. Of course, it is not necessary to postulate an “apocalyptic Paul” in order to think of Christ’s work in these terms; see, for example, Gustaf Aulén’s classic treatment, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement, trans. A. G. Hebert (London: SPCK, 1961). For attempts to think about the atonement in non-violent categories, see the essays in Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin, eds., Stricken by God? Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007).

290. The identity (and translation) of τὰ στοιχεῖα is tied to the question of how they can enslave both groups. Following Martinus de Boer’s argument (“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” NTS 53.2 [2007]: 204–24), Barclay translates the term as “physical elements of the world (Paul and the Gift, 409) which stand in contrast to its invisible Creator (p. 410). Martyn agrees that this might have been the original meaning for the Galatians, but he argues that through the letter, Paul changes the phrase to indicate the various pairs of opposites—Jew/Gentile, slave/free, male/female (Gal 3.28)—which are determinative for life outside of Christ (Galatians, 393–406). For the argument that Paul here refers to abstract “basic principles,” see Longenecker, Galatians, 165–66.

291. It should be noted that the rescue in this verse, in keeping with the warnings Paul gives the Galatians later,
Romans 5.12 describes sin’s entrance into the world through one person, with death following in sin’s wake. Both sin (5.21) and death (5.14) reign. Sin is also described as ruling or controlling (κυριεύω) those who are under law (6.14; cf. v. 12). People in this situation are obedient—and thus enslaved—to sin and, as in 5.12, this slavery leads to death (6.16). The nexus between these three enslaving and oppressive elements is summarized at Romans 7.11: sin, seizing an opportunity provided by the law, brings death.

Not surprisingly, given the pattern discerned in Galatians, slavery language in Romans is also countered by language of freedom. Those who were previously under the dominion of death will receive grace and righteousness in order that they might “exercise dominion in life through the one man, Jesus Christ” (Rom 5.17). Those who were once slaves to sin are freed from sin but become slaves to God (6.20–22). The climactic statement in Romans 8.2 announces freedom, but also replaces one law with another: “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free (ἡλευθέρωσεν σε) from the law of sin and of death.” Nevertheless, oppression by sin, the law, and death is replaced by freedom expressed in terms of the gift of life and righteousness.

Absent from these passages in Romans is talk of Christ as liberator (but cf. Gal 1.4; 5.1). Those who receive God’s gift and righteousness reign in life through Jesus Christ (Rom 5.21), believers live together with him because they died with him (6.8), and believers die to the law through his body (7.4). While Christ thus certainly plays a role in bringing freedom and establishing believers in this new life, the gift—eternal life (see 6.23)—comes from God (6.15, 16; cf. 8.11), and believers are to offer themselves to God (6.13) and become slaves to God (6.22). The one exception to this pattern comes in Romans 7.4 where believers are said to be freed from the law that they might belong “to him who has been raised from the dead,” that is, Christ. But even this belonging to Christ is in order to “bear fruit present rather than future (Longenecker, Galatians, 8–9). Although their future well-being is also at stake, by (re)turning to τά στοιχεία τοῦ κόσμου, Paul’s readers risk being enslaved in the present, with all the negative consequences that entails. As Martyn observes, “The human plight consists fundamentally of enslavement to supra-human powers; and God’s redemptive act is his deed of liberation” (Galatians, 97).

292. Death at this point most likely refers to “moral death or spiritual death” rather than “bodily demise” (de Boer, “Paul’s Mythologizing Program,” 11).

293. For a fuller discussion of slavery within the broader theme of violence, see Gaventa, “Rhetoric of Violence”.

294. Despite the awkward singular, I read σε here and not με (Jewett, Romans, 474). The poorly attested ηματις is an attempt to harmonize the text with Rom 8.4 (Metzger, Textual Commentary, 456).

295. It should be noted at this point that one form of slavery or law is replaced by another. To these passages could be added those in which Paul, his co-workers, and other believers are described as “slaves” to God or Christ (e.g. Rom 1.1; 1 Cor 7.22; 2 Cor 4.5; Gal 1.10; Phil 1.1). Gaventa mentions this note of “compulsion” that accompanies freedom in Christ and seems to want to categorize it as part of the violence of Romans (“Rhetoric of Violence,” 66), but this sense of slavery to God seems unavoidable since absolute human autonomy would seem to place one back in the realm of sin. Paul knows only two ways to live: in Adam or in Christ (Rom 5.12–21); as a slave to sin or a slave to righteousness/God (Rom 6.15–23).

296. It is possible to read Paul’s talk of “slavery” against the background of Cynic and Stoic moral philosophy; see §§567, 578 in M. Eugene Boring, Klaus Berger, and Carsten Colpe, eds., Hellenistic Commentary to the New Testament (Nashville: Abingdon, 1995). We observed in Chapter 3 how slavery and kingship could be reconfigured around moral lines. True kingship, and thus freedom from slavery, was defined in terms of self-control and right reason. With the exception of Rom 5.17, it is not the individual who is described as reigning, but grace and righteousness (Rom 5.21; 6.14, 18) or obedience (Rom 6.16). It is, above all, God to whom believers must submit (Rom 6.22) and who is thus the royal figure in this passage.
for God.” Although the work of Christ in obedience to God is the same in Romans and Galatians, the language used in Romans makes Christ’s role instrumental. It is God who is at work through Christ in order to liberate human beings that they might serve God. A glimpse at 1 Corinthians 15, a passage which is similar to Romans 5–8 in many ways, pulls this statement into focus.

Although the language of slavery and freedom is missing from 1 Corinthians 15, Christ is still described as the one who liberates God’s people by destroying every ruler, authority, and power (πᾶσαν ἀρχήν καὶ πᾶσαν εξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν; 1 Cor 15.24) before destroying the final enemy, death (v. 26). The destruction of death refers to the final resurrection (vv. 35–58) at which point “death has been swallowed up in victory” (v. 54) and the sin-death-law nexus is finally destroyed (vv. 55–56). Following this final victory, Christ, the Son, is himself subjected to God so that God may become “all in all” (vv. 27–28). Christ’s historical role as “an agent exercising God’s sovereignty” thus comes to an end, his kingship is shown to be temporary and ultimately subordinate to the kingship of God the Father.

Christ’s work as saviour/liberator must therefore be seen within the larger context of God’s action on behalf of God’s people. The Jewish Scriptures provide the conceptual background for God’s action in this regard.

In addition to using the title “saviour” to speak of God (as noted above), the Jewish Scriptures frequently portray God as saviour/redeemer/liberator of the people of Israel. God’s greatest salvific act in Israel’s history is the exodus:

I am the Lord, and I will bring you out from the domination of the Egyptians (ἐξέδρασεν ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς δυναστείας τῶν Αἰγύπτων), and I will deliver you from slavery (ῥύσωσα ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς δυναστείας), and I will redeem you (λυτρώσωσα ὑμᾶς) by a raised arm and great judgment. (Exod 6.6; cf Deut 7.8)

The influence of this narrative is clear when the exodus is evoked in Isaiah to speak of the oppression experienced by God’s people in exile and of their liberation by God:

Do not be afraid of the Assyrians when they beat you with a rod and lift up their staff against you as the Egyptians did. ... The Lord of hosts will wield a whip against them, as when he struck Midian at the rock of Oreb; his staff will be over the sea, and he will lift it as he did in Egypt. (Isa 10.24–26; cf. 11.15–16; 52.4–12)

297. See, e.g., de Boer, Defeat of Death.

298. These three “are abstract terms for some sort of governing entities, probably supraterrestrial or even mythological” (Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 32 [New York: Doubleday, 2008], 572); cf. 1 Cor 3.22: κόσμος, ζωή, θάνατος, εὐεργετής, μέλλοντα καὶ ἔρθουσαν ἀπὸ τῆς δυναστείας, ἀρχή, ἐξουσία, μᾶλλον, δυνάμεις, ὑψωμα, βασιλέα, and τις κτίσις επέκρινε.


300. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 574.

301. See also 1 Cor 3.21b–23; “… all belong to you, and you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God.”

302. So, e.g., ὁ λυτρωτήρ: Isa 41.14; 43.14; 44.24; Jer 27.34; 1 Macc 4.11; ὁ σώζων: Isa 43.3; 60.16; Ps 16.7; 1 Macc 4.11; ἐξαπορούμενος: 2 Sam 22.2; Isa 60.16; ὁ ῥωμέων: Isa 59.20.
The New Testament writers, and Paul in particular, pick up exodus language and themes when speaking of God’s salvific work now revealed in and accomplished through Christ.\(^{303}\) The theme of salvation would also resonate with those familiar with this role as ascribed to the ideal Hellenistic king. God’s defeat of Israel’s enemies in order to effect the liberation and salvation of God’s people is tied to the theme of the Divine Warrior.\(^{304}\) Is there evidence that Paul understood Jesus in similar terms?

In identifying Divine Warrior themes in the New Testament, Tremper Longman points to the fact that in Paul’s writings, “the day of Christ” has, in some cases, replaced “the day of the Lord” (1 Cor 1.8; 5.5; 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 1.6, 10; 2.16).\(^{305}\) Since the latter is related to the Divine Warrior theme in the Jewish Scriptures,\(^{306}\) it follows that Paul’s transformation assumes that Christ plays a similar role. Against this it should be noted, as discussed in the section on Christ as judge, that judicial rather than martial language dominates the passages which speak of “the day of Christ.” Martial language is present elsewhere in Paul’s writings, however.

We have already noted the way in which language of liberation and salvation, closely linked to language of military victory, is used to speak of Christ in passages like 1 Corinthians 15. His destruction (κταργήσιον) of “every ruler and every authority and power” (1 Cor 15.24), for example, implies that he functions as a warrior in ridding the cosmos of God’s enemies. The ultimate victory over death is given by God “through our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 15.57). As Robert Jewett notes, Paul’s triumphant cry that “in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us (ὑπερνικώμεν διὰ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός ἡμᾶς)” (Rom 8.37) “brings Paul’s discourse within the scope of divinely inspired warriors and kings who win total victories over their foes.”\(^{307}\)

In the Pauline writings being examined, the foes defeated by Jesus are usually described as personified cosmic powers:\(^{308}\) the rulers, authorities, and powers of 1 Corinthians 15.24 or the στοχεῖα which enslaved God’s people before Christ’s coming (Gal 4.3, 9; cf. Col 2.8, 20). The precise nature of

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\(^{307}\) Jewett, *Romans*, 548–49. Yet the source of the believers’ victory in Romans 8.37, “the one who loved us,” is ambiguous: Christ’s love is spoken of in v. 35, while “the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord” (v. 39) sees God as the source with Christ mediating this love.

\(^{308}\) See above, n. 298. This stands in contrast to the Gospels, for example, in which Jesus is often depicted as defeating demons; see Ragnar Leivestad, *Christ the Conqueror: Ideas of Conflict and Victory in the New Testament* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 27–80; Keith Ferdinando, *The Triumph of Christ in African Perspective: A Study of Demonology and Redemption in the African Context*, PBTM (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 183–240. When Satan is mentioned in the Pauline writings, it is usually as humanity’s foe (1 Cor 5.5; 7.5; 2 Cor 2.11; 11.14; 12.7; 1 Thess 2.18) whom, believers are assured, God will crush (Rom 16.20).
these elements are not of primary concern. What is of interest at this point is that Christ is depicted as defeating them or leaving them enervated (Rom 8.37–39), with the guarantee of their final defeat at his return (1 Cor 15.24–28), when he brings everything under his control (Phil 3.20). Sin is also described as a power that is defeated by Christ (Rom 8.3–4) as is death (1 Cor 15.57). The former happens through Christ’s death, the effects of which, including the defeat of death itself, are only consummated at his parousia.

While Paul never describes Christ explicitly as a general or warrior, the language of Christ’s victory of the powers and his liberation of his people could certainly arouse these images in the minds of his readers. We noted in Chapter 3 that the Hellenistic period was, in the words of Angelos Chaniotis, “the period of the ubiquitous war.” It was observed in earlier chapters that while authors felt the need to mention the king’s role as warrior or general, they often did so in muted tones, choosing to emphasize the peaceful outcome of war, rather than war itself. It has been demonstrated by others that Paul is familiar with the language of war and warfare, and yet his description of Christ links him with these themes only by implication. This raises the possibility that Paul, like some of the authors discussed earlier in this dissertation, was aware of the horrifying realities of war and, therefore, chose not to describe Christ with explicitly martial titles. If we accept that Paul does see Christ as a warrior, we must also note that Jewett’s point about Romans 8.37 is true throughout Paul’s writings: “The particular victory Paul has in mind is won through love rather than competition.”

Before turning to other aspects of the king’s benefaction and euergetism, there is one further Graeco-Roman image that Paul uses to describe God which needs to be noted. The Roman triumph, “the most important and well-known political-religious institution of the [New Testament] period,” is used by Paul as part of a discussion of his ministry. In 2 Corinthians 2.14, God is portrayed as the triumphator who celebrates his victory over Paul (Τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ πάντως θριαμβεύοντι ἡμᾶς ἐν

309. See Leivestad, Christ the Conqueror, 92–115 for a more detailed discussion of the relevant passages. Oakes, Philippians, 139 suggests that Paul’s imagery in Philippians 3.20 “must be an analogy with a military leader of a state.”


313. This can be compared to the most explicit image of Christ as a warrior king in Revelation 19.11–16; see Longman, “Divine Warrior,” 297–302.

314. Jewett, Romans, 549.

315. Scott J. Hafemann, “Roman Triumph,” DPL: 1004–8, here 1004. Two recent works, Mary Beard, The Roman Triumph (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) and Ida Östenberg, Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman Triumphant Procession, Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture and Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), approach the triumph in terms of mimesis and performance, respectively. Beard, in particular, is pessimistic about being able to reconstruct the historical triumph accurately and focuses instead on the literary presentation of the triumph.
τοῦ Χριστοῦ). It is not necessary for our purposes to spend too much space interpreting Paul’s use of this image. We simply note that God, rather than Christ, is once again portrayed in a position of authority and power. In this case, paradoxically, it is Paul himself, rather than the enemies mentioned above, over whom God has triumphed.

Given the variety of contexts in which the title and concept σωτήρ occurs, two essential questions that need to be answered when attempting to understand each particular instance: “Saviour from what?” and “How is this deliverance achieved?” Kings are often granted honours for saving their subjects from the oppression of their enemies through military force. The saviour gods are frequently petitioned or thanked for deliverance from illness. Paul is aware of God’s deliverance in times of personal danger and illness (2 Cor 1.8–11; Phil 1.19; cf. 4.11–13; but see 2 Cor 12.7b–10), but these instances are rare and their significance pales in comparison to Christ’s great victory over the cosmic powers and his rescue of God’s people from God’s wrath by dealing with their sin through his death on the cross. The nature of Jesus’ salvation makes him an unusual saviour. Paul’s language might have produces echoes of imperial ideology that reminded his readers of the emperor’s claim to be σωτήρ, but the nature and means of his salvation would have struck them as out of the ordinary.

Creator

None of the texts studied in earlier chapters of this dissertation have sought to emphasize the king’s role as founder (κτίστης) of cities. Nonetheless, Alexander was remembered as a great founder of cities and his successors would likewise be honoured for their role as founders of cities. The king would frequently be celebrated as κτίστης in conjunction with his role as σωτήρ and ἐυεργέτης.

316. There is some debate around precisely how this verse is to be understood (see Furnish, II Corinthians, 174–75; Hafemann, “Roman Triumph,” 1005–7; the passage has recently received extensive treatment in Christoph Hellig, Paul’s Triumph: Reassessing 2 Corinthians 2:14 in Its Literary and Historical Context, BTS 27 [Leuven: Peeters, 2017], but I have not been able to obtain a copy of this volume). In context, Paul’s apostolic ministry is the focus of the metaphor. According to Hafemann, Paul is speaking of the suffering that accompanies this ministry (Suffering and Ministry in the Spirit: Paul’s Defense of His Ministry in 2 Corinthians 2:14–3:3 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990]), while Cilliers Breytenbach argues that the focus is on the way in which the knowledge of Christ is spread through Paul’s ministry (“Paul’s Proclamation and God’s ‘Thriambos’: Notes on 2 Corinthians 2:14–16a,” Neot 24.2 [1990]: 257–71). The prepositional phrase, εν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, is best understood as causal: “on account of Christ”: Paul engages in his ministry because of and for Christ (Campbell, Union with Christ, 142–43). Colossians 2.15 uses the same language, but in this instance the rulers and authorities who have been despoiled by God are being led in the triumph as captives.


319. So, for example, Oakes, Philippians, 129–74.

320. Although this reputation is most likely overblown, see Richard A. Billows, “Cities,” in A Companion to the
Paul is familiar with the Septuagint use of κτισμα to speak of God as the creator (Rom 1.25; 1 Cor 11.9; cf. Gen 14.19; Deut 4.32; Isa 45.8; Ps 89.13), but he does not refer to Christ explicitly as κτισμα. There is, however, one passage in the Pauline texts under consideration which seems to speak of Christ as the agent of creation.\(^{323}\) In order to address the problems the Corinthians faced with food offered to idols (1 Cor 8.1–11.1), Paul asserts in 1 Corinthians 8.6 that the one and only God, the Father, is the source of all things (ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα) and that the one and only Lord, Jesus Christ, is his agent (ὁ οὖν τὰ πάντα). The origin of this passage is not significant for our argument.\(^{324}\) It should be noted, however, that the possibility that popular philosophy lies behind Paul’s language at this point\(^{325}\) lends further support to the proposition laid out in the first chapter of this thesis that Paul knew and could employ to his own ends the language and ideas of Graeco-Roman popular philosophy.\(^{326}\) In this case, Paul uses philosophical language to assert Christ’s role as the agent of creation.

Not only is Christ the agent of creation, he also inaugurates the process leading to the new creation—the eschatological world which is free from the present ills that beset humanity and, indeed, the cosmos (Rom 8.18–25).\(^{327}\) There are two passages in which the phrase καινη κτισμα occurs (2 Cor


322. See, e.g., the examples noted in Jim, “Private Participation”. The title οἰκισμα could also express a similar idea.


324. For recent discussion of this passage, see Ronald Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity, BZNW 145 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 141–61; Sean McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150–71. The idea that Christ is the agent of creation is not unique to Paul (see John 1.3–4, 10; Col 1.15–20; Heb 1.2–3). The fact that similar language is used in these texts (see the table produced by Calvin D. Redmond, “Jesus: God’s Agent of Creation,” ASS 42.2 [2004]: 301–2) suggests a common source.


326. The proposition that Paul was familiar with popular philosophy is not negated if Cox is correct that Paul’s language in 1 Cor 8.6 comes from a Greek-speaking Jewish liturgy which had been deeply influenced by Middle Platonism (By the Same Word, 354; see also Bauckham, “Paul’s Christology of Divine Identity,” 214–15). Rather, it shows that Paul understood the religio-philosophical implications of this tradition and felt comfortable employing it for his own purposes.

327. Ryan Jackson (New Creation in Paul’s Letters: A Study of the Historical and Social Setting of a Pauline Concept, WUNT 2/272 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010]) contends that the cosmological elements of Paul’s concept of new creation cannot be ignored and needs to be combined with the anthropological emphases. For the former, see Ulrich Mell, Neue Schöpfung: eine traditionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Studie zu einem soteriologischen Grundsatz paulinischer Theologie, BZNW 56 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989). Moyer Hubbard (New Creation in Paul’s Letters and Thought, SNTSMS 119 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002]) argues that the concept of new creation was primarily anthropological.
and which lend support to this understanding of Christ’s work. Paul’s main point in 2 Corinthians 5.11–19 is that his ministry is a ministry of reconciliation, but that he, Paul, is not the primary reconciler; it is God who is reconciling the world to himself through Christ. At the personal level, the “new creation” of v. 17 is wrought through the believer’s reconciliation to God achieved through Christ’s death (2 Cor 5.15; cf Rom 5.1–11). The same phrase, καινή κτίσεως, is used in Galatians 6.15 to press home Paul’s point regarding the insignificance of the circumcized-uncircumcized distinction amongst believers in the era following Christ’s death (cf. Gal 5.6). That is, in light of the new creation inaugurated by the Christ event, the sorts of things that separated human beings are no longer definitive for those who are united in Christ and who thus participate in the new creation (cf. Gal 3.28; 5.6).

Paul employs philosophical categories to speak of God as the source of creation and Christ as the agent of creation. Christ’s death, resurrection, and ascension serve to inaugurate the new creation which believers enter through participation in Christ. Christ can be considered the founder of this new people, although, as demonstrated above, Paul’s language often portrays God as the primary actor in the drama of salvation with Christ as an agent effecting God’s purposes.

Reconciliation

The king is traditionally thought of as a figure able to establish peace. Historically, this peace was frequently attained through the spear, although the kingship treatises tend to discuss this aspect of Hellenistic kingship in muted tones. In this section we note briefly another implicit indicator that Paul thought in terms of a divine kingship which was effected through Christ, the divine agent. Cilliers Breytenbach demonstrates that Paul’s use of reconciliation language (καταλλαγή, καταλλάσσω, δέομαι, πρεσβεύω in 2 Cor 5.18-20; cf. Rom 5.10–11) is drawn from that of Hellenistic and Roman

328. Furnish, II Corinthians, 321–37. Cilliers Breytenbach sees in 2 Cor 5.17 “an implicit reference to Paul being called by God” (“Salvation of the Reconciled [with a Note on the Background of Paul’s Metaphor of Reconciliation],” in Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors, NovTSup 135 [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 181), but would presumably not deny that Paul would extend this description to all who are “in Christ.”

329. For the argument that what is in view in Gal 3.28 is not equality but inclusion, see John H. Elliott, “The Jesus Movement Was not Egalitarian but Family-Oriented,” BibInt 11.2 (2003): 173–210. In his apocalyptic reading of Galatians, Martyn understands 3.28 “to announce nothing less than the end of the cosmos,” noting further that the allusion to Gen 1.27 implies that “the structure of the original creation [has] been set aside ... an implied reference to new creation” (Galatians, 376–77). Karin Neutel’s study of this verse (A Cosmopolitan Ideal: Paul’s Declaration ‘Neither Jew Nor Greek, Neither Slave Nor Free, Nor Male and Female’ in the Context of First Century Thought, LNTS 513 [London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015]) suggests that Paul’s new creation language should be read in conversation with ancient utopian discourses, such as those discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

330. Paul’s comparison of his role with those of Apollos and God in 1 Cor 3.5–9 bring to the fore two aspects of his understanding of the founding of congregations of believers. First, it highlights the priority of God, noting that Apollos and Paul are mere servants (δουλοί). Second, Paul can indeed think of himself, under God, as a founder of churches (cf. Rom 15.20–21; 2 Cor 10.15–16), a picture that agrees with the portrait of Paul presented in Acts.
diplomacy, which Paul has adapted in a number of significant ways. The most striking change Paul makes to the reconciliation paradigm is found in his insistence that it is God who is reconciling sinful and estranged humanity to himself, whereas it is usually the responsibility of those who have caused the rift in relationship to initiate the reconciliation process. Paul has also merged the categories of reconciliation and atonement, both of which he understands to come through Christ’s death.

Within this particular configuration of reconciliation, Paul casts himself in the role of Christ’s ambassador (ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ οὖν πρεσβευόμενον) who entreats others on Christ’s behalf, yet it is God’s appeal and it is to God that people must ultimately be reconciled (2 Cor 5.20). This reconciliation is necessary because human beings are described as being in a state of enmity towards God (ἐχθροί ὄντες; Rom 5.10) because of their sin (Rom 5.8; cf 1.18–3.20).

It is possible to consider Paul’s ambassadorship in general terms in which divine kingship does not play a part since, of course, it is not necessary for Paul to be transferring all characteristics of the metaphor from the source to the target. But the inherent polysemy of metaphorical language means that it is not always clear which characteristics are intended. The presence of ancient diplomatic language allows for the possibility that when Paul describes his ministry as fulfilling an ambassadorial role, he is doing so because of his understanding of divine kingship. As we have seen in previous sections of this chapter, God is portrayed as the king since it is God to whom human beings must be reconciled. This reconciliation happens through Christ, who is once again the agent of this action towards God.

This section began with the observation that ideal kingship is often tied closely to the king’s actions on behalf of his people. In contrast to the abuses which often characterize those with unrestrained power, the ideal kings constructed in the discourses studied in Chapters 2–5 acted for the good of their subjects. In return, subjects displayed good will and obedience. The subject-ruler relationship established along these lines ensured concord, order, and mutual flourishing.

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331. Breytenbach, “Salvation of the Reconciled”; see also Thrall, Second Corinthians, 436. For the argument that in 2 Cor 5 Paul is drawing on the image of Moses as mediator and the one who reconciles God’s people to God, see Anthony Bash, Ambassadors for Christ: An Exploration of Ambassadorial Language in the New Testament, WUNT 2/92 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 87–116, 122–23. Breytenbach argues that Paul’s use of reconciliation is quite different from that found in other Jewish writings (pp. 176–179), while Margaret Thrall suggests Paul might have developed his understanding “in conscious contrast” to that of other Jewish writers (p. 430).


334. Thrall identifies this as an “apostolic” plural (Second Corinthians, 432).

335. The phrase ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παρακαλοῦντος δὲ ἡμῶν should not be understood in terms of potential or unreality (as the NIV translation does: “as though God were making his appeal through us”), but expresses, rather, Paul’s conviction that God makes an appeal through Paul (Thrall, Second Corinthians, 437; Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 259).

336. See, e.g., the discussion in Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 255–68 which recognizes the metaphor (pp. 257, 259) but focuses on the state of enmity that exists between the parties, rather than on the royal nature of the one sending the ambassador.


338. So Campbell, Deliverance of God, 696, writing about Rom 1.1–5 and Rom 5.1–11.
Paul draws on the language of benefaction, salvation, liberation, and creation to describe the relationship between God and his people. In some cases, this language is applied to Christ, but more often than not, it is applied to God, with Christ functioning primarily as the agent through whom God accomplishes good for God’s people. The response required of subjects forms the focus of the following section.

**Christ’s Subjects**

While discussion about those over whom Christ rules has not been absent up to this point, in this section I turn to the question of the relationship between Christ and his subjects. Two major topics are discussed. The first has to do with the question of obedience and the second deals with the question of participation.

**Obedience of Christ’s Subjects**

Despite the somewhat negative connotations of “obedience” in certain theological traditions, the concept is not absent in Paul’s writings. We note, firstly, that on a handful of occasions, the language of obedience (ὑπακοῶ, πείθω, ὑποτάσσω and cognates) is used to speak of the stance required of believers towards Paul, his emissaries, and those appointed to positions of authority by Paul. The Corinthian believers are expected to respond positively to what Paul wrote in an earlier letter (2 Cor 2.9; cf. Phlm 21) and in their reception of Titus (2 Cor 7.15; cf. 1 Cor 16.15–16). In contrast, Paul and those with him refused to submit to the “false brothers” who had infiltrated their ranks (Gal 2.4–5). Behind Paul’s bold claim to authority which allows him to make these demands and to resist the demands of others stands God and God’s Messiah (Gal 1.1; 2 Cor 1.1; cf. 10.8, 13.10). The believers’ obedience to Paul is founded upon their obedience to God and Christ.

Believers are first and foremost obedient to God. Romans 6.15–23 uses slave imagery to speak of the believers’ change of allegiance: they are no longer slaves to sin, but slaves to God (Rom 6.22) and, as such, must obey their new lord. It is for this reason that Paul can call on the Roman believers to offer themselves wholly to God (Rom 12.1–2; cf 15.18). Although the language in Romans 12 has cultic overtones, the sense of obedience is not absent. In Philippians, Paul urges the believers to adopt the same attitude as Christ Jesus (2.5–11), an attitude of humble obedience to God the Father (v. 8). Paul can therefore urge them to continue to live lives marked by this Christ-like obedience towards God (Phil 2.12).

339. For a discussion and critique of this tendency, see Mark Jones, Antinomianism: Reformed Theology’s Unwelcome Guest? (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2013).

340. For 2 Corinthians, see Thrall, Second Corinthians, 179. More broadly, on the authority of Paul and co-workers, see Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 57–93.

341. The believer’s life of obedience can also be spoken of in terms of obedience to God’s Spirit (Rom 8.1–12; Gal 5:16), but this theme will not be pursued.

The believers’ obedience to God is often expressed as obedience to God’s law. The Roman church is called upon to fulfil God’s law through loving one another (Rom 13.8–10). Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 7.19, Paul asserts, somewhat surprisingly, that circumcision and uncircumcision are nothing, but that obeying God’s commandments is everything. Despite the tension that is established when these positive statements are placed alongside Paul’s negative statements about the law, what is clear is that Paul understands the life of the believer to be characterized by obedience to God and his law in some form or another. I have already argued above that obedience to God’s law is now reconfigured around the person of God’s king, Jesus the Messiah. This is clear when Paul speaks about the need for the believer to fulfil the law of Christ (Gal 6.2) or when he claims that despite not being under the law, he is, nonetheless, not free from God’s law and is under Christ’s law (1 Cor 9.21). But being obedient to Christ’s law is only part of a bigger picture in which the believer is called to be obedient to Christ himself. Despite the problems raised by Paul’s polemical and metaphorical language in 2 Corinthians 10.1–6, what is striking is his description of the purpose of his ministry as “[taking] every thought captive to obey Christ (ἐις τὴν ύπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ)” (2 Cor 10.5). The prostration of the entire cosmos in Philippians 2.10, likewise, implies obedience to Christ. This universal subjection is also on view in 1 Corinthians 15.24–28 where, in the eschaton, everything must submit to Christ (cf. Phil 3.21) before Christ himself is made subject to God. The argument that Paul understands obedience to stand at the centre of the life of the believer is further strengthened when the nature of πίστις is considered. The well-established tradition of understanding πίστις as “faith”—assent to, or belief in, certain propositions—has been challenged.
recent scholarship. The shift has already been observed above with regard to the phrase πιστις Χριστουñ which, it has been argued above, is best understood in both the objective and subjective sense: “faith in Christ” and “Christ’s faithfulness/obedience.” The question is whether the meaning of πιστις on display in the subjective reading—“faithfulness” or “obedience”—can be found in passages which speak of those who follow Christ. An examination of a key element in Romans suggests that it can.

In the opening of the letter, Paul explains his ministry by means of a subordinate clause which identifies “Jesus Christ our Lord” as the one “through whom we have received grace and apostleship to bring about the obedience of faith (εις υπακοην πιστεως) among all the Gentiles for the sake of his name” (Rom 1.5). The significance of the “obedience of faith” is seen in the fact that the same prepositional phrase, εις υπακοην πιστεως, occurs in the letter’s final doxology at 16.26. A further passage describing the nature and result of Paul’s ministry uses related language: “For I will not venture to speak of anything except what Christ has accomplished through me to win obedience from the Gentiles (εις υπακοην εθνων)” (15.18).

The last-mentioned passage, Romans 15.18, establishes that Paul saw the obedience of the Gentiles as something achieved by his ministry in “word and deed” (v. 18). In a proto-Trinitarian formulation, Paul relates the signs and wonders to the powerful working of God’s Spirit (v. 19), but asserts that the obedience of the Gentiles is what Christ has accomplished through him (v. 18), and that this constitutes his priestly service before God (v. 16; cf. v. 17). Paul understood his mission to the Gentiles both “as a personal vocational imperative and as an inevitable theological corollary to his understanding of God’s promises and purpose.” The cultic language of v. 16 and the use of “signs and wonders” in v. 19 echo themes from Israel’s Scriptures and serve to establish continuity between the people of God in those Scriptures and the Gentile believers who have been brought into the people

346. As part of his re-framing of Paul’s soteriology, Douglas A. Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s Gospel: A Suggested Strategy, JSNTSup 274 (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 178–207 re-frames the meaning of πιστις both in terms of its semantic domain—arguing that personal trust and fidelity be added to the usual understanding of true belief—and it’s function in Paul’s soteriology; see also Campbell, Deliverance of God, 377–92. Matthew Bates argues that “allegiance,” defined in terms of “mental affirmation,” “professed fealty,” and “enacted loyalty,” is a better English translation for πιστις (Salvation by Allegiance Alone: Rethinking Faith, Works, and the Gospel of Jesus the King [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017]). Teresa Morgan’s study of πιστις/ fides (Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015]) is undertaken within a much broader context which includes the Greek and Roman social, political, and religious world, the Septuagint, and the New Testament texts. She argues that the New Testament use of this concept is rooted in the Graeco-Roman world within which the early believing communities were formed, but that it then proceeded to evolve. Nevertheless, within the various texts she studies, πιστις/ fides is shown to be primarily a relational concept focused on trust, trustworthiness, and faithfulness (see the concluding summary on pp. 501–509). These studies all share the conviction that Paul’s use of πιστις extends beyond “the faith,” “belief” and even “trust in something or someone,” to include the sense of “faithfulness” and “obedience.” I have been unable to consult the essays recently published in Jörg Frey, et al., Glaube: Das Verständnis des Glaubens im frühen Christentum und in seiner jüdischen und hellenistisch-römischen Umwelt, WUNT 373 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017).

347. This doxology contributes to the notorious text-critical cruix in the Pauline literature: the concluding chapters of Romans (see Gamble, Textual History of Romans). Jewett provides an extensive bibliography of those who argue for and against the authenticity of 16.25–27 (Romans, 998 nn. 5 and 6), while himself arguing that the verses are an interpolation (pp. 998–1002). For a recent argument that the doxology is authentic, but composed apart from Romans, see Longenecker, Romans, 1083–86.

348. See also Rom 5.19; 6.15–18; 16.19.

349. Dunn, Romans, 856.
of God through Paul’s ministry. The inclusion of the Gentiles within the people of God means that they, like the people of God constituted in Israel’s Scriptures, must be characterized by obedience. This conclusion confirms the centrality of obedience as the believer’s response to the gospel message, but it remains to ask how the phrase εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως should be understood.

The main exegetical question has to do with the nature of the genitive, πίστεως. Broadly speaking, this is an adnominal/adjectival genitive which modifies or limits ὑπακοή. Paul thus understands his apostolic task amongst the Gentiles in terms of bringing about obedience which has been configured or defined in terms of faith. If we follow Morgan recognizing that πίστεως is primarily a relational term, Paul’s phrase speaks of the obedience that is characterized by this relation between God and the believer, a relationship which is established through Christ, and a relationship of which obedience forms an important part without constituting it.

The mention of this faith relationship in the next section establishes the thesis put forward in the previous paragraph. When Paul writes to the Roman believers that he longs to visit them “that we may be mutually encouraged by each other’s faith” (Rom 1.12), he is speaking to those who are “are full of
goodness, filled with all knowledge, and able to instruct one another” (15.14), yet he still desires to proclaim the gospel to them (1.15), presumably in order to encourage their faith. As demonstrated in Romans 14.1–15.13, the letter is Paul’s attempt to suture the division between the “weak” and “strong” in Rome in order that Jew and Gentile together might engage in an act of eschatological worship, which is nothing less than a commitment of oneself to God (Rom 12.1–2). Faith and obedience are thus bound together.

With Dunn, I would argue that the obedience of faith constitutes “a crucial and central theme” in the letter to the Romans. Romans 1.5 can thus also be considered “a programmatic statement of the main purpose of Romans,” as Garlington puts it. This being the case—and if we accept that Romans, while it addresses particular concerns among the believers in Rome, is also the most comprehensive and mature statement of Paul’s theology—we are justified in seeing the human response of obedience to Jesus’ kingship as an important part of Paul’s thought. The “gospel of God” (Rom 1.1) which Paul announces entails not only assent to certain propositions regarding Jesus, but “unconditional submission to his lordship.”

Before concluding this section, we should note one final element relating to the obedience of faith. According to Romans 1.5, Paul’s mission is to be exercised among “all the Gentiles” (ἐν πάσιν τοῖς εὐθνεσίν). While Romans 15.19, 23–24 demonstrate a geographical strategy behind Paul’s mission, the theological foundation for this strategy is provided by texts from Israel’s Scriptures that speak of the eschatological gathering of the Gentiles. Jesus’ universal dominion is thus complemented by the call for universal obedience.

If Paul conceptualizes Jesus in terms of Hellenistic ideal kingship, then one would expect to find Jesus’ people responding to his kingship with obedience. In the foregoing section we have seen that

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359. This is the main thesis of Miller, Obedience of Faith.

360. Dunn, Romans, 17–18; see also Miller, Obedience of Faith, 175–80.

361. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 10; contrast Du Toit, “Faith and Obedience,” 67. who, with others, thinks that Rom 1.16–17 is more likely to fulfill this role.

362. This is not to attempt to resurrect Melanchthon’s view of Romans as a “compendium of Christian doctrine”; I recognize that many important Pauline themes are not raised in Romans (so Longenecker, Romans, 2–3).

363. Donald B. Garlington, “Faith’s Obedience and Israel’s Triumphant King: Romans 1:5 Against Its Old Testament Backdrop,” in Studies in the New Perspective on Paul: Essays and Reviews (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2008), 57. While arguing that obedience plays a central role in the believer’s response to Christ’s kingship, I have not attempted to enter the debate regarding the role this obedience plays in the final judgment (see Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 44–71; VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification; Alan P. Stanley, ed., Four Views on the Role of Works at the Final Judgment, Counterpoints: Bible and Theology [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013]).

364. So W. Paul Bowers. “Paul and Religious Propaganda in the First Century,” NovT 22 (1980): 316–23, who contrasts this geographical element of Paul’s understanding of his mission with other forms of first-century religious propaganda. As Arland Hultgren observes, if Paul was interested in Gentiles as individual Gentiles, “there were plenty of Gentiles in Roman Palestine and Syria to occupy him for a lifetime. But he proclaimed the gospel to various ethnicities, the nations of the world in which he lived” (“Paul’s Christology and His Mission to the Gentiles,” in Paul as Missionary: Identity, Activity, Theology, and Practice, ed. Trevor J. Burke and Brian S. Rosner, LNTS 420 [London: T&T Clark, 2011], 117).

this is indeed the case. Not only is obedience explicitly mentioned, but recent research on πίστις demonstrates that at the core of Paul’s message about Jesus as the Christ is the requirement of a faithful, loyal, obedient response by those who recognize Jesus’ kingship.

Union With Christ

Paul frequently uses language like ἐν Χριστῷ, εἰς Χριστὸν, σὺν Χριστῷ, διὰ Χριστοῦ, as well as a number of striking metaphors (including “body of Christ”), to describe the relationship of believers to Christ. This is recognized as a central aspect of his soteriology, usually summarized by the phrases “union with Christ” or “participation in Christ.”

While the precise meaning of the foundational phrase “in Christ” is debated, one particular thread in this discussion has a possible bearing on Paul’s understanding of Jesus’ kingship. In response to E. P. Sanders’ argument that participation rather than justification is the central soteriological element in Paul’s theology, Richard Hays proposes that this participation be understood in four different ways: participation as (1) belonging to a family; (2) political or military solidarity with Christ; (3) belonging to the church; and (4) living within the Christ story. These models of participation, Hays argues, are complementary, not exclusive, with each one providing a different view on “the complex reality to which Paul’s participation language points.” As an example of the second of these models, Hays cites Romans 6.1–11, noting that in this passage, “Christ is the king who through

366. For an extensive survey of New Testament scholarship on this subject, see Campbell, Union with Christ, 31–64; Macaskill, Union with Christ, 17–41. Macaskill also discusses how this theme developed in Patristic and Eastern Orthodox theology (pp. 42–76) and Lutheran and Reformed theology (pp. 77–99). The rest of his book is devoted to studying the nature of the union between God and humanity as expressed in the New Testament. Campbell’s Union with Christ is a thorough exegetical analysis of all the relevant Pauline phrases and metaphors, followed by a discussion of how these work in Paul’s theology. Both authors have contributed essays to Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell, eds., “In Christ” in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation, WUNT 2/384 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014). The recognition in recent scholarship of the importance of union/participation for Paul can probably be traced back to E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM, 1977). While most scholars understand participation to function in concert with justification as soteriological models, Campbell (Deliverance of God) pits the two against each other, arguing that the justification model of understanding Paul must be replaced by an apocalyptic model which has participation at its core. His reading of Romans, upon which this thesis is largely based, has proved provocative, but has not garnered much support; see the contributions in Tilling, Beyond Old and New.

367. Campbell concludes that the idiom is not formulaic and its meaning at each point in Paul’s writings needs to be understood in context: “These idioms can express instrumentality, close association, agency, recognition, cause, kind and manner, locality, specification or substance, circumstance or condition, the object of faith, incorporation, union, reference or respect, and participation.” (Union with Christ, 67–199, here, 199). Contrast this to Novenson’s conclusion (Christ Among the Messiahs, 119–26) that most instances of the phrase should be understood in terms of the conventional locative use, including the figurative uses of “time at which” and “means by which” or “agent through whom.” Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 481–82, also argues that the primary meaning is locative, referring to a sphere of being, but that other complex statements can grow from this basic understanding.


369. Hays, “‘Real Participation’,” 348.
his death and resurrection has triumphed over the powers of Sin and Death ... To be joined with him in baptism is to belong to him, to come under his sovereignty."  

N. T. Wright argues that Paul’s writings are best understood if it is accepted that Χριστός means “Messiah” and that Paul’s use of εν Χριστω is understood in terms of incorporation, that is, as denoting “the whole people of whom the Messiah is the representative." Asserting that this “incorporative sense” is “endemic in the understanding of kingship, in many societies and certainly in ancient Israel,” Wright cites a handful of texts from the Jewish Scriptures to illustrate this view (2 Sam 19.40–43; 20.1; 1 Kgs 12.16), but admits the insufficiency of this data. In his later work, Wright argues that the events of Jesus’ death and resurrection forced Paul to read the Jewish Scriptures in this incorporative way.  

Joshua Jipp also argues that Jesus’ messianic role, through which he both shares in God’s kingship as well as represents the people of God, serves to explain much of Paul’s participatory language. Jipp shows how in Paul’s writings, Christ’s rule enables his people to share in his divine sonship and inheritance, the Spirit of God, the Messiah’s resurrection and glorification and triumph over his enemies. It is because his people are “in the Messiah,” that what is true of him is also true of them. And these things are true of the Messiah because of the relationship he enjoys as God’s vice-regent who shares in God’s kingly rule. The concept of “Messiah” thus provides the link between Jesus’ sharing in divine kingship and the royal rule which his people are said to enjoy through him.  

The texts studied in Chapters 2 and 3 did not draw attention to anything approaching this idea of the subjects’ participation in, or union with, the king. There is a sense in which the king’s subjects naturally share in his victories or losses—it does not make sense to speak of a king losing a war but of his subjects winning, for example. If a king is successful, and assuming he is a good king who seeks to benefit his people, they will share in this success. It is thus something of a truism that “as the king goes so goes the nation,” but there is nothing equivalent in these texts to Paul’s incorporative language. The same is true of the Jewish texts examined in Chapters 4 and 5.  

370. Hays, “‘Real Participation’,“ 341–43, here, 342 Without drawing exactly the same conclusion, Sanders (Paul and Palestinian Judaism) writes that participation in Christ means a “transfer of lordship” (p. 549), from that of sin (conceived of not only as transgression, but also as a power), to the lordship of Christ (pp. 546–47).  

371. Wright, “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’,” 46; cf. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 825–35: “the ‘incorporative’ thought and language which so pervades Paul is best explained in terms of his belief that Jesus was Israel’s ‘Messiah’” (p. 825).  

372. “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’,” 46–47. These passages are cited and discussed more fully in Wright, Faithfulness of God, 828–30 where Wright admits they do not explain Paul’s usage (p. 830).  

373. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 827.  

374. Jipp, Christ is King, 139–210. He adduces evidence from the Jewish Scriptures for the king’s participation in divine kingship and the king’s representative role (pp. 149–65) and demonstrates a similar pattern in Paul. See also his essay on the same theme in Ephesians: Jipp, “Sharing the Heavenly Rule”.  

375. See, e.g., the discussion of the Epicurean use of Homer (Od. 19.109–114) to illustrate this point (above, ch. 3). This theme is also found in the Psalms (see above, ch. 4).  

376. As a potential parallel to these ideas, Jipp cites Seneca’s De clementia in which the emperor is described as the “head” and Rome as the “body” (e.g., 1.3.5; 1.5.1; 2.2.1). On Seneca’s metaphor, see further Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics and the Body of Christ, SNTSMS 137 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35–39. While this provides us with a parallel to Paul’s “body of Christ” language which, in turn, is related to his ideas of participation and union, some distance remains between this metaphor and Paul’s “in Christ” language.
The king of Deuteronomy 17 was meant to be an example for his people to imitate, and we saw that in certain psalms the king mediates God’s blessing so that what is true of the king is true of his subjects, but this does not bring us closer to Paul’s “in Christ” language. Without demonstrating direct dependency on a specific group of passages, Grant Macaskill’s study places the New Testament’s theology of participation and union very clearly in the context of the Jewish Scriptures. More specifically, the intertwining themes of Israel, 
\textit{torah}/law, covenant, and temple provide the New Testament writers with the conceptual resources from which “in Christ” language is developed.

I have argued above that Paul’s use of \textit{Χριστός} should be understood to connote, and at times to denote, Jesus’ kingship. It is also evident, as Jipp demonstrates, that a number of the blessings that accrue to believers—those who are “in Christ”—resonate with ideas of royal rule. It is not the case, however, that this participatory language has any antecedents in either the Graeco-Roman or Jewish kingship literature studied in earlier chapters of this dissertation. Paul did not derive his \textit{ἐν Χριστῷ} language from the discourse of ideal kingship and it is unlikely that Paul’s first readers would have understood it as such.

\textbf{Jesus’ Beauty and Wisdom}

Before concluding this chapter, I raise briefly a number of topics pertaining to my comparison of Paul and the ideal kingship \textit{topos} of the Graeco-Roman world.

\textit{The Beauty of the Lord}

It was demonstrated that in certain texts, the king’s physical attributes play an important role in defining his kingship. In the Pythagorean treatises, for example, as the king’s subjects gaze upon his majesty, the state is brought into harmony. As is fitting for a wedding song, Psalm 44 LXX describes Israel’s king in terms of his youthful beauty, but, generally speaking, no comment is made on the physical appearance of the king in the Jewish Scriptures. A similar lack of concern regarding Christ’s physical attributes is present in Paul’s writings. Despite having experienced a revelation of

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377. We have already noted Wright’s struggle to identify any biblical antecedents for this language. Jipp shows how there is precedent for the idea of Israel’s king sharing in divine rule and for being the people’s representative and mediator (\textit{Christ is King}, 149–65), but fails to demonstrate any additional antecedents (other than those mentioned by Wright) for the language of incorporation or union.

378. Macaskill, \textit{Union with Christ}. Chapters 4–5 establish the background, while chapters 6–11 provide a reading of the New Testament texts (not only Paul) against this background.

379. N. T. Wright, presumably, would agree, while at the same time arguing that these elements are first drawn into the single figure of the Messiah before expanding again to include Christian believers (see, e.g., for \textit{torah}: \textit{Faithfulness of God}, 1032–37). Against the idea that the church conceptually replaces Israel in Paul’s thought, see Sanders, \textit{Paul and Palestinian Judaism}, 511–15.

380. However, with Macaskill, \textit{Union with Christ}, I would see other Jewish elements as providing some of the conceptual framework for Paul’s language.

381. See above, ch. 3. For Xenophon’s use of this \textit{topos}, see ch. 2.

382. For Ps 44 LXX, see ch. 4. For a discussion of the description of kings in DH, see ch. 4.

383. The New Testament is not without references to the physical. According to Mikeal Parsons, Luke deconstructs ancient physiognomic assumptions regarding the lame, blind, and so forth, by focusing on Jesus’ interaction with these groups (\textit{Body and Character in Luke and Acts: The Subversion of Physiognomy in Early Christianity} [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006]), and Paul’s opponents in 2 Corinthians seem to have attacked Paul’s physical appearance on the basis of

318
Christ’s body is of concern in so far as it stands metonymically for his death (Rom 7.4; 1 Cor 11.23–26) or has become a metaphor through which Paul speaks of, and to, the community of believers (1 Cor 10.16; 12.27). Because Christ was raised by God, his body has been transformed into an exalted form which anticipates that which all believers will experience (1 Cor 15.42–56; cf. Rom 8.11–23). In Philippians 3.21, the believer’s present “body of humiliation” stands in contrast to Christ’s “body of glory” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ). Although the context is that of Christ’s royal power, this power is not linked to the glory of his body in the way that the Hellenistic king’s success is linked to his visage. There is one passage in Paul’s writings which could be read to suggest that Christ’s subjects are transformed through their vision of him.

In 2 Corinthians 3.18, Paul writes that believers, “seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror (τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι), are being transformed into the same image (τὴν αὐτῆς εἰκόνα μεταμορφοῦμεθα) from one degree of glory to another.” In general, Paul associates the Spirit with the transformation of believers (Rom 8.9–17; 1 Cor 12; Gal 5.16–6.10), but here, if the “Lord” is indeed Christ, then it would seem that we are dealing with the transformation of believers through a vision of Christ. Paul’s language at this point reflects his ongoing use of the biblical tradition upon which he has been drawing since verse 7, namely, Exodus 34.29–35, which here is extended to speak of the new covenant. Under the new covenant, and in contrast to the old, the believer is able to see God’s glory. However, the believer does not see God’s glory per se, but God’s glory displayed in Christ (2 Cor 4.6). This comes through Paul’s ministry, at the centre of which was the preaching of the gospel (2 Cor 4.1–3; cf. 2.12–3.6). What is in view at 2 Corinthians 3.18, then, is not a mystical vision of Christ’s majestic glory, but an understanding and acceptance of “[Paul’s] ministry of glory that

similar cultural assumptions (see, e.g., Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 254–55). But the New Testament documents concentrate on Christ’s deeds rather than his physical appearance. The symbolic imagery in Revelation proves to be the exception to this rule.

384. The passages in Acts which speak of this event (9.1–9; 22.6–11; 26.12–18) do not give an indication that Paul saw the resurrected Christ. In his account (2 Cor 12.1–4) of his paradisiacal “visions and revelations of the Lord” (ὁπτοσίας καὶ ἀποκάλυψεις κυρίου), Paul says that he “heard” (ἠκούσας; v. 4) things that should not be expressed.


387. See Hansen, Philippians, 272–77. Reumann (Philippians, 599) argues that Paul has in view the sphere of Christ’s influence—a locative rather than an ontological distinction.

388. It is not at all clear that this is the case. However, given that in the following passage (2 Cor 4.1–6) Paul speaks of “the glory of Christ” (v. 4) and Christ’s mediation of God’s glory (v. 6), I am inclined to side with those, like Lambrecht (“Transformation in 2 Cor 3.18,” Bib 64.2 [1983]: 245), who argue that Christ is in view as “the Lord.”

389. Thrall, Second Corinthians, 290–95.
beings justification” (2 Cor 3.9). We are quite a distance away from the Hellenistic concept of the transformative power affected through a vision of the king.

Although the image of Christ seated—presumably upon a throne—at the right hand of God, the heavenly king, is found throughout early Christian writings (Acts 2.33; 5.31; 7.55; Eph 1.20; Col 3.1; Heb 1.3, 13; 8.1; 10.12; 1 Pet 3.22), with two exceptions, this image is never made explicit in the Pauline writings we are examining. Romans 8.34 notes that Christ is interceding for believers “at the right hand of God” and 2 Corinthians 5.10 sees Christ seated on a “judgment seat” (βημα), which might be considered a throne of judgment. Other visual representations of kingship—the sceptre, royal robes, crown—are entirely absent in Paul’s writings about Christ.

While later Christian texts and art would make much of the beauty of the risen Christ, Paul, in keeping with Jewish kingship traditions, is not concerned with the physical features of Christ. Neither does he describe Christ’s kingship using the visual imagery of ancient kingship. Christ’s kingship is defined primarily in terms of his relationship to his subjects, his royal deeds on their behalf, and his role as God’s royal agent.

Christ, the Wisdom of God

Wisdom was an important characteristic in both the Hellenistic and Jewish constructions of ideal kingship. It was, in particular, the defining feature of Solomon’s kingship in Jewish literature, yet the figure of Solomon plays a very limited role in the New Testament and is not even mentioned by Paul. The Pauline references to wisdom are also limited; so much so that Gordon Fee can write, in the context of the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians, “It is especially doubtful whether ‘wisdom’ is a

390. So Lambrecht, “Transformation”; see also Paul B. Duff, Moses in Corinth: The Apologetic Context of 2 Corinthians 3, NovTSup 159 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 201: “Paul almost certainly means that the glory of the deity can be perceived in Christ’s salvific death and subsequent resurrection.”
394. This aspect of Paul’s writing might derive, in part, from his chosen genre; compare, for example, the royal imagery in apocalypses like Rev, 1 En., 2 Bar., 4 Ezra.
395. Note, in particular, the spirit of God in Isaiah 11.2 that rests upon the king is described as a “spirit of wisdom (σοφιας) and understanding (σημειως) ... the spirit of knowledge (γνωσεως)”; see ch. 4.

320
truly Pauline word at all." Nevertheless, God is wise or characterized by wisdom (Rom 11.33; 16.27; 1 Cor 2.7) and Paul’s desire is for his readers to be wise (Rom 16.19), although Paul knows that human wisdom is not always true wisdom (Rom 1.22; 1 Cor 3.18–20). Christ is never identified as wise, but he is called “the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1.24). This phrase needs to be examined more carefully.

The concentration of wisdom language and the identification of Christ with the wisdom of God is generally recognized as a response by Paul to terms and concepts used by the Corinthians.400 Their desire for, and claim to, wisdom lead Paul to redefine and reconfigure wisdom in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians. Although Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom (1 Cor 1.22), Paul proclaims Christ crucified (Χριστὸν ἐστι δοξήμου) — a crucified king/Messiah (v. 23). This message, Paul recognizes, is unacceptable to both groups since a crucified Messiah is “a stumbling-block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles” (v. 23). However, to those who have been called (τοῖς κλητοῖς), that is, those who believe (v. 21) and who are saved (v. 18), the same message of a crucified Messiah is understood to be the power and wisdom of God (Χριστὸν θεου δόξης και θεοῦ σοφίας; v. 24). These two divine attributes stand in parallel to the desire for signs and wisdom from Jews and Greeks, respectively. God’s power and wisdom, are displayed and effected, paradoxically, in a crucified Messiah.

There is a strong interpretive tradition that understands this passage in terms of a Wisdom Christology in which Paul employs the figure of personified or even hypostasized Wisdom found in Jewish Hellenistic wisdom literature.401 In 1 Corinthians 1.24, however, Paul’s focus is not on Christ’s wisdom or Christ as God’s wisdom, but on God’s wisdom displayed in Christ’s death.402 Paul goes on to link wisdom and soteriology in verse 30 when Christ, “who became for us wisdom from God,” is associated with “righteousness, holiness and redemption.” That God’s wisdom is being contrasted with human wisdom becomes clearer as Paul’s argument progresses. He contrasts the “wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age” (1 Cor 2.6) with God’s wisdom, which is “secret and hidden” (v. 7). Paul is aware of the link between rulers and wisdom, and contrasts this sort of wisdom with that of God. The

399. Dunn, Christology in the Making, 177; Andrew Chester, “Messianism, Mediators and Pauline Christology,” in Messiah and Exaltation: Jewish Messianic and Visionary Traditions and New Testament Christology, WUNT 207 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 388–89. While scholars often narrow down the background of the Corinthian problem(s) to one element, Schnelle suggests that “a variety of partly overlapping religions, cultural and social influences” explain the Corinthians situation, including Hellenistic Jewish wisdom and Graeco-Roman intellectual traditions (Apostle Paul, 197–207, here, 204).
400. Fee, Pauline Christology, 103–4.
latter is only available by God’s revelation through the Spirit (vv. 9–12).

The focus in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians is thus not on Christ as the figure of Wisdom, nor even on Christ as wise, but rather on God’s wisdom manifested in Christ’s death.

What Paul is setting out to do is to recapture “wisdom” from his Corinthians critics by showing that God’s foolishness found in the cross can in fact be recognized as wisdom, but not in terms of God’s attribute of wisdom—and this only by those who have received the Spirit of God.

While Christ is associated with God’s wisdom in this way, he is not explicitly said to be wise. Neither, for that matter, is he characterized in terms of a number of the other virtues associated with Hellenistic kingship. It is not Christ’s unique virtue that makes him fit for kingship, but the fact that he is the one sent by God to fulfil certain tasks as God’s royal agent and vice-regent.

**Missing Royal Elements**

Before concluding, it is necessary to mention three royal elements commonly found in the other literature which might have been expected in the Pauline writings but which don’t play a role in his conceptualization of Jesus’ kingship.

First, a common theme in the kingship texts is concerned with the king’s possessions. Wealth is frequently portrayed as a necessary evil. The writers are clearly aware of the temptations that enormous wealth brought to monarchy and attempted to remove, or at least, diminish these temptations by urging kings to use their wealth for the benefit of their subjects.

The question of the extent of Paul’s knowledge of Jesus’ life apart from his death and resurrection continues to be debated. One of the passages that forms part of this debate has to do with Christ’s poverty. Paul’s appeal to the Corinthians’ generosity in 2 Corinthians 8.9 is based on “the gift of our Lord Jesus Christ” (την χαριν του κυριου ήμων Ιησου Χριστου). “though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich.” But is Paul reflecting on the tradition that Jesus’ ministry was marked by poverty? The parallels between this passage and Philippians 2.6–11 suggest that it is not primarily Jesus’ material deprivation that is in view, but rather, his incarnation and death: “His self-impoverishment in the whole event of incarnation was for the spiritual enrichment of believers.” Paul calls upon the Corinthian believers to imitate the churches of

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404. Fee, Pauline Christology, 107.


406. Most commentators understand του κοπιου as a genitive of source: the gift that comes from Christ (so, e.g., Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 331–32). Barclay (Paul and the Gift, 451–52, 577) considers Christ to be the gift given by God, i.e., reading this as an epechegetical genitive.

407. See, e.g., Matt 8.20; Luke 8.3.

408. Thrall, Second Corinthians, 532–34, here, 534; see also Furnish, II Corinthians, 416–18. Seifrid (2 Corinthians, 330–32) is largely in agreement, although, given the priority he ascribes to Christ in the gift-giving (see n. 406), he argues that Christ is simultaneously rich and poor: “the riches of Christ, hidden in his poverty, are the riches that make the Corinthians rich” (p. 330).
Macedonia (2 Cor 8.1–7), not Christ. Rather, the gift of salvation—their wealth—that comes from Christ describes the reality from within which they are expected to act. It is possible that Paul knew of the paradoxical poverty of Jesus the Messiah, but his exhortation to the Corinthians is based on soteriology, not ethical imitation. 409

Second, it is because of the soteriological role that he plays in God’s economy that Jesus Christ cannot be described as “father,” another term that was employed of the ideal king. 410 While Paul can sometimes portray his own God-given authority (2 Cor 10.12–18) by describing himself as the father of those who come to believe through his preaching (1 Cor 4.14–15; 2 Cor 6.11–13; 11.2; 12.13–17; 1 Thess 2.7, 11), the title “father” is otherwise reserved for God (Rom 1.6; 6.4; 1 Cor 8.6; 15.24; Gal 1.1, 4; Phil 1.2; 2.11; 4.20; 1 Thess 1.1, 3; 3.13; Phlm 3). This divine title has antecedents in both Jewish and Graeco-Roman texts. Furthermore, believers are able to call God “Abba, Father” because of their adoption as children of God through the Spirit of God (Rom 8.14–16; Gal 4.4–6). 411 Finally, because Christ is the Son of God, God is described as “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 15.6; 1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2, 3; 11.31; Gal 1.3). Given this relationship, it would certainly not be possible for Paul to call Christ “father,” but neither is it possible for Paul to use related language to speak of Christ. Rather, Christ is the Son whose work allows others to become children (υἱοί: Gal 3.26; 4.6, 7; τέκνα: Rom 8.16, 17) of God. 412

Finally, the metaphor of “king as shepherd,” so prominent in many of our other texts, is also missing. This is all the more striking given the presence of this metaphor throughout the rest of the early Christian tradition. 413 But the absence of the word should not lead us to declare the absence of the concept. If “shepherd” carries connotations of care, provision, leadership, then the Christ of Paul’s writings fulfills these ideals (see above). It remains somewhat puzzling, however, that Paul does not identify Jesus as “shepherd” of his people.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter, I have examined the language and concepts used to refer to Jesus Christ in the undisputed Pauline epistles. I have moved beyond a study of the titles ascribed to Christ to include a functional and relational analysis. In the former I described the various roles Christ played in obedience to God and on behalf of God’s people. In the latter, the relationships between Christ and God, and Christ and his subjects were investigated. It is not always possible to keep these categories separate.


410. This was also an imperial title; see James R. Harrison, “Paul, Theologian of Electing Grace,” in Paul and His Theology, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 106 and references at p. 106, n. 123.


412. At this point Paul seems to anticipate what is made explicit in Heb 2.10–18.

413. See, e.g., Matt 2.6; Mark 6.34; John 10.1–16; Heb 13.20; 1 Pet 5.4; Rev 7.17.

323
“Saviour,” for example, is simultaneously a title and a function, and it establishes a particular type relationship between the saviour and those who are saved.

Ancient constructions of ideal kingship that were discussed in earlier chapters have served to guide the approach to Pauline Christology followed in this chapter. An attempt was made to discuss Paul’s writings in the context of the various conceptual matrices of ideal kingship observed in these earlier chapters. The results of this comparative project will be synthesized in the next chapter.

A number of parallels between the various constructions of kingship and Paul’s christological language were observed. However, the most striking aspect of Jesus’ kingship is his consistent portrayal as God’s vice-regent and plenipotentiary.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have sought to read Paul’s Christology as part of the “ecology” of first-century political thought. The cultural repertoire provided by popular philosophy contains, among other elements, the topos of ideal kingship, often signalled in philosophical writings with the phrase περὶ βασιλείας. Through establishing the various configurations this topos might take and comparing these with Paul’s writing about Jesus, I have shown that Paul’s Jesus does indeed meet the expectations of ideal kingship expressed in the Hellenistic topos, but that he does so in ways influenced by the Jewish Scriptures.

The Hellenistic Kingship Topos

Isocrates’ To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia stand at the head of the περὶ βασιλείας tradition (Chapter 2). The importance of virtue in defining the king was highlighted by Isocrates’ use of the cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, moderation, courage—to structure his text. Xenophon’s lengthy narrative of Cyrus’ rise to power draws attention to this Persian king’s virtues. Both writers justify monarchical rule on the basis of the king’s superiority which is defined in terms of the virtues.

Almost none of the numerous περὶ βασιλείας treatises composed in the Hellenistic period have survived. Nonetheless, these texts provide the focus for Chapter 3. Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean writings about kings and kingship suggest certain themes that might have found a place in the kingship treatises written by members of these schools. A group of three περὶ βασιλείας texts preserved by Stobaeus and attributed to Pythagorean writers provide further insight into the development of Hellenistic thought about kingship. The motif of the king’s virtue-based superiority provides an element of continuity between these texts and those from the classical period. In the Hellenistic period, this provided a way for intellectuals to address the harsher aspects of monarchical rule. Also of interest in this period is the way in which kingship is used as a metaphor for discussing the life of the sage.

Jewish writings were studied in the fourth and fifth chapters. In the former, the Jewish Scriptures which focused on Israel’s king were discussed. These were limited to Deuteronomy (including other texts from the Deuteronomistic History), Psalms, and Isaiah, since these are the books Paul quotes from most frequently. The king’s relationship to God expressed in obedience to God’s law emerges as an important theme. In Chapter 5, the Letter of Aristeas, Wisdom of Solomon, and Philo’s On the Life of Moses were examined. These Jewish Hellenistic texts provide examples of the use of kingship themes from both the Jewish Scriptures and Hellenistic intellectual traditions.

The penultimate chapter of this dissertation examined Paul’s undisputed letters against the various models of ideal kingship established in the preceding chapters.

Jesus as Paul’s Ideal King

In the study of Paul’s writings, similarities and differences between Paul’s writings and the various constructions of kingship were observed in his portrayal of Jesus and the portraits of ideal kingship observed in Chapters 2–5. The similarities point to Paul’s familiarity with the Hellenistic...
topos of ideal kingship, while the differences can be ascribed to the influence of the Jewish Scriptures and the particular traditions about Jesus familiar to Paul.

A central trait in Jesus’ kingship is his relationship to God. More specifically, his role as God’s vice-regent is on view throughout Paul’s writings. In the classical texts, the king’s piety was only one of many virtues. There is a heightened sense of the divine in the Pythagorean kingship treatises, but even there, the king’s responsibility towards God extends only to imitation. In contrast, Jesus is described as one who rules at God’s right hand on God’s behalf until that point in the future when he returns sovereignty to God. Jesus’ exaltation to God’s right hand results from his resurrection. Both Jesus’ rule and his resurrection are linked to his identification as “Son of God” which, in turn, highlights his relationship to God. Although this language is found in both Jewish and Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman traditions, the relationship between Jesus and God described by Paul echoes most closely that of the Davidic king in the Psalms.¹

Similar to the king of the Deuteronomistic History and Psalms, and in contrast to the Hellenistic kingship ideal, Jesus’ kingship is not spoken of primarily in terms of his virtues which make him the best of men. Rather, his rule derives primarily from his obedience to God. This obedience is seen, above all, in his sacrificial giving of himself for his people. Paradoxically, the virtues of obedience and humility—hardly royal traits (although there are hints here of the Cynic theme of kingship achieved through toil and/or suffering)—establish Jesus as king and lead to his exaltation. Christ’s suffering in obedience to God, rather than suffering per se, remains central in Paul’s thought.

In his role as God’s vice-regent, Jesus fulfills a number of royal functions and exhibits a number of royal traits. However, important elements of kingship such as judgment, clemency, and benefaction are more regularly associated with God, with Jesus frequently described as the one through whom God fulfills these functions. This pattern serves to establish kingship as an important metaphor upon which Paul draws when speaking of God. It is likely that Paul understands Jesus’ kingship as an imitation of God’s divine kingship.

Just as in the Hellenistic ideal, Jesus’ subjects imitate him as he imitates God. The most striking example of this imitation is found in Galatians, where Paul calls upon believers to fulfil the law of Christ by following Christ’s example. Although Deuteronomy 17 suggests that the Israelite king should serve as a model Israelite in following God’s law, Paul’s portrayal of the person of Christ as a paradigm around which the divine law is reconfigured goes beyond what is envisaged in the Jewish Scriptures. The authority of the Hellenistic king, conceptualized as the “living law” (νόμος ἐμψυχος) in the writings of Diotogenes and Archytas, provides a closer parallel.

Jesus acts for the good of his subjects. The king’s φιλανθρωπία, expressed in terms of his saving power exercised on his people’s behalf, his benefaction provided for them, and the goodwill he shows towards them, is of central concern in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman kingship writings. By placing this

¹ Beth Stovell identifies the following as two of the four major themes that define the relation between human and divine kingship in the Jewish Scriptures: (1) the human king is an instrument of God; (2) he “reflects the character of the Divine King” (Mapping Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: John’s Eternal King, Linguistic Biblical Studies 5 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 73–133, here, 73).
idea at the centre of the περὶ βασιλείας topos, the writers of these treatises hoped to influence the king’s behaviour along these lines. While many Greeks were made royal subjects through conquest, divine φιλανθρωπία, effected by Jesus and often portrayed in terms of “love,” is expressed towards those who are at enmity with God and God’s king. Paul’s ambassadorial mission is to announce that God’s enemies are being reconciled to God through Christ. While the language Paul uses derives from the world of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman diplomacy, it has undergone a surprising reconfiguration in light of Jesus’ unusual kingship.

Like all kings, Jesus demands obedience from his people. Both Xenophon and Ecphantus theorize about the king’s influence over his people. They contrast those who rule through violence, fear, and forced obedience, with others who set themselves up as examples to be imitated and who show goodwill towards their subjects that they might obey willingly. The first set of approaches characterizes tyranny, while kingship embraces the second. In Romans, Paul’s phrase “the obedience of faith,” combined with the emphasis on Jesus’ φιλανθρωπία, places Jesus in the latter camp, once the relational aspect of πίστις is recognized.

The “shape” of kingship in Paul’s thought, more often than not, is that God is king while Jesus is his vice-regent or plenipotentiary. This shape is essentially Jewish, derived from the teachings of the Jewish Scriptures about God’s kingship and the derived kingship enjoyed by God’s king. It is this relationship which was subsequently transferred to God’s Messiah, in certain cases. Within this fundamental Jewish structure, Paul incorporates the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship.

Paul’s Paradigm Shift

Both the Jewish and the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman ideal of kingship have undergone a “paradigm shift” in Paul’s portrayal of Jesus as king. In an essay on Paul’s understanding of reconciliation, John Fitzgerald observes:

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Paul as a theologian is his ability to take over an existing conceptual paradigm and transform it. The result is a paradigm shift in which the elements of the old paradigm remain, but they appear in a revolutionary new configuration.²

Paul is not simply borrowing ideas about kingship from a variety of sources, but he has taken the topos of ideal kingship and put it to new use to speak of the kingship of God and Jesus.

We might speculate as to the reason for this paradigm shift. Paul might deliberately employ language and categories which he knows would be understood by his auditors. Max Pholenz, for example, argues that Paul used Stoic concepts and rhetoric for missionary purposes. “Paul’s goal, [Pholenz] maintains, was to find a Hellenistic language with which to draw a Hellenistic audience to a basically non-Hellenistic set of theological beliefs.”³

It is also possible, in the case of Paul’s kingship discourse, that this was the language with which Paul thought about kingship even before his call to apostleship. If, as was postulated in the first

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chapter, Paul was influenced by popular philosophical *topoi*, he would not necessarily have thought he was speaking of either Jewish or Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman kingship, but simply of kingship. Popular philosophy and the Jewish Scriptures provided him with the περὶ βασιλείας *topos* which described the ideal king, and since Jesus was the ideal king (and more)⁴, Paul naturally applied this *topos* to him, with the changes necessary to speak of Jesus accurately.

In some instances, such as the reconciliation language mentioned in Chapter 6, Paul himself adapted the *topos* to speak of Jesus’ unusual kingship. In other cases, over time, a number of the elements of this *topos* became part of the Christian lexicon (δικαιοσύνη, χάρις) and in doing so, took on slightly different meanings from those they originally had in the kingship *topos*. As Teresa Morgan observes in her study of πίστις:

> New communities forming themselves within an existing culture do not typically take language in common use in the world around them and immediately assign to it radical new meanings. New meanings may, and often do, evolve, but evolution takes time. This is all the more likely to be the case where the new community is a missionary one. One does not communicate effectively with potential converts by using language in a way which they will not understand.⁵

By paying attention to the original *topos*, we are able to filter out some of the meanings that have accrued to these words and are thus in a position to hear Paul more clearly.

We should be careful not to claim too much with regard to the philosophical significance of this *topos* in Paul’s writings. Abraham Malherbe has stated that “Paul is at his most philosophical when responding to claims made in philosophical terms by some of his churches.”⁶ Paul’s language about Jesus’ kingship, while drawing on the philosophical *topos*, is not used to answer philosophical questions about the nature of ideal kingship or the best polity. It is not used for philosophical ends. Rather, as God’s king, Jesus is portrayed in the common language of ideal kingship.⁷

**Between Jerusalem and Athens, or In Alexandria?**

The question of the origin of individual elements within Paul’s thought is, for the most part, under-determined. Those who argue that Paul’s thought should be situated primarily within first-century Judaism point to his use of the Jewish Scriptures and his autobiographical comments (Gal 1; Phil 3) to support this position. Others point to allusions to Greek literature as proof that Paul was

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⁴. This study is not arguing that the kingship ideal accounts for the totality of Pauline Christology. While there is much in the New Testament that resonates with royal ideology, and Jewish royal messianism in particular, as Crispin Fletcher-Louis notes, “the real focus is on Jesus’ inclusion within the divine identity in a way that goes far beyond the Israelite [and, I would add, Hellenistic] view of the king” (*Christological Origins: The Emerging Consensus and Beyond*, vol. 1 of Jesus Monotheism [Eugene: Cascade, 2015], 216).


familiar with at least part of this tradition. If scholarship from an earlier generation felt the need to argue that Paul’s thought must be either predominantly Jewish or predominantly Graeco-Roman, the literature surveyed in Chapter 1 demonstrates that this is no longer the case.

In the mid-twentieth century, W. D. Davies could state confidently that, “It has also been shown that Paul was acquainted only in the slightest degree with both Greek literature and philosophy,” but more recent studies suggest this position is untenable. Thus Abraham Malherbe can write,

> There is no longer any doubt that Paul was thoroughly familiar with the teaching, methods of operation, and style of argumentation of the philosophers of the period, all of which he adopted and adapted to his own purposes. This is not to argue that he was a technical philosopher; neither were his philosophical contemporaries. The philosophers with whom Paul should be compared were not metaphysicians who specialized in systematizing abstractions, but, like Paul, were preachers and teachers who saw their main goal to be the reformation of the lives of people they encountered in a variety of contexts, ranging from the imperial court and the salons of the rich to the street corners.

This is not to deny the Jewish elements within Paul’s thought, but it recognizes that he cannot be understood apart from the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman world. We might think of this Paul as belonging to neither Jerusalem nor Athens, but finding a home, rather, in the Jewish Diaspora as exemplified by the Alexandrian Jewish community, for example.

Like Paul, these texts from Jewish Alexandria all display a knowledge of the Hellenistic *topos* of ideal kingship. In the case of Philo, there is a clear Platonic and Stoic influence; the philosophical antecedents to the Letter of Aristeas and Wisdom of Solomon are more difficult to identify, but their presence is unmistakable. Like Paul, these texts also draw deeply from the Jewish Scriptures. There is no indication that any of these authors felt the need to pit the two traditions against one another. Like Paul, the kingship ideals in both Jewish and Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman traditions were brought together in a creative synthesis characteristic of much Hellenistic literature. The conclusion that Paul retained certain Jewish kingship categories and structures of thought does not undermine the fundamental thesis that he was also familiar with the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman tradition of ideal kingship found in the popular philosophy of the first century.

**Extending the Discussion**

This comparison of the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman kingship ideal with Paul’s Christology raises further questions and potential discussions.

This study has demonstrated the utility of *topos*—“an ordered cognitive space”—as a heuristic.

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8. Although see Vadim Wittkowsky, “‘Pagane’ Zitate im Neuen Testament,” *NovT* 51 (2009): 107–26 for the argument that even these citations need to be understood within a Jewish milieu.


device for studying ancient texts through comparison. This approach is different from comparing the manner in which a single theme is developed by different authors, or the comparison of a collection of discrete concepts across various texts. By establishing the topos as the element of comparison, a category from the ancient world is employed. Furthermore, this approach also allows one to compare not only individual elements, but also the relationships that exists between these elements. When one element in the topos is modified, the potential exists for related elements to be modified along with it. Adaptations of this nature are more easily identified when considering the topos as opposed to considering isolated elements. Some topoi common to the Graeco-Roman world and the New Testament, such as friendship and the passions, have already received scholarly attention, while others remain to be investigated using this approach.

The relationship between kingship and priesthood needs to be examined further. The Hasmoneans subsumed kingship within the priesthood (to the consternation of some) and Crispin Fletcher-Louis argues, “there is now plenty of evidence that their predilection for a royal high priesthood was essentially faithful to an older, traditional, Jewish political theology, and one firmly grounded in Scripture.” Does Paul draw on this same “traditional, Jewish political theology ... firmly grounded in Scripture”? We saw that Diotogenes and Philo both included the priesthood as one of the royal duties, and from Augustus onwards, the Roman emperor assumed multiple priesthoods. This suggests that the study of royal high priesthood (or priestly kingship) should not be limited to Jewish sources since it is possible for priesthood to form part of the ideal kingship topos in various traditions.

When Christians needed to theorize kingship in the fourth century in order to speak to and of a Christian emperor, they drew on Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman concepts of ideal kingship. Does this conclusion need to be revisited in the light of this dissertation’s demonstration of Paul’s knowledge of this topos? It is also possible that studying these later texts using a similar methodology as that applied in this dissertation might yield slightly different results to those attained in earlier studies?

Finally, commenting on Cilliers Breytenbach’s conclusions regarding the origin of Paul’s language of “reconciliation,” John Fitzgerald points out that,

[Breytenbach’s] analysis offers yet another proof that one can readily acknowledge Paul’s genuine indebtedness to Hellenistic terms and traditions without undermining the apostle’s theological integrity. It is, after all, what Paul does with derived concepts that is theologically significant, not the sources themselves.

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13. Christological Origins, 220–30, here, 222, original emphasis.
This dissertation has only hinted at the theological implications of Paul’s portrayal of God and Jesus in terms of ideal kingship. There are, no doubt, implications not only for Pauline and New Testament Christology, but also for the Christological debates of the fourth century and beyond.
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354


362


364


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