The Theological Significance of Light (אור) in the Old Testament:  
An Applied Cognitive Linguistic Study

by

Joel D. Ruark

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Supervisor: Prof. Louis C. Jonker  
Discipline Group: Old and New Testament

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DECLARATION

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

March 2017
Abstract

Even a casual reading of the Old Testament demonstrates that the ancient Israelite writers clearly conceived of some kind of conceptual relationship between light and YHWH. Theologians disagree concerning its precise nature, however, advocating anything from a simple metaphorical relationship with no metaphysical meaning to a full ontological equivalence of YHWH (primitively, as a sun-god) and the sun. The thesis applies the principles of cognitive semantics to the lexeme אֻר (light) in Biblical Hebrew and develops a working hypothesis of the conceptual relationship between light and YHWH in the ancient Israelite cognitive environment.

After constructing a cognitive model of the lexeme אֻר in Biblical Hebrew, the thesis then tests this model and its derived conclusions against theological writings concerning light in the interpretive history of the Old Testament, with special focus on contributions made in the last fifty years. This comparative investigation seeks to determine how the recent developments of cognitive linguistic theory either confirm or correct previous understandings of the theological significance of light in Old Testament literature. On the basis of testing this cognitive model of light, the thesis proposes a working hypothesis concerning the relationship between light and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world and delineates a set of methodological principles for a future study to develop a more precise and fully articulated theology of light in the Old Testament. The concluding chapter explores the implications of both the cognitive model of light and the academic discipline of cognitive linguistics within Old Testament studies and the broader theological landscape.
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Many women have achieved excellence, but you! – you rise above all of them. [Prov 31:29]

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Finally, let us bless the LORD. Thanks be to God.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>The Book of Common Prayer (Episcopal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDB</td>
<td>The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Biblical Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHS</td>
<td>Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>Common English Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Cognitive Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBI</td>
<td>Dictionary of Biblical Imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH</td>
<td>Deuteronomistic History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDBW</td>
<td>Expository Dictionary of Bible Words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESV</td>
<td>English Standard Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALOT</td>
<td>The Hebrew &amp; Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICM</td>
<td>Idealized Cognitive Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJV</td>
<td>King James Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXX</td>
<td>Septuagint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Masoretic Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIV</td>
<td>New International Version</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKJV</td>
<td>New King James Version</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRSV</td>
<td>New Revised Standard Version</td>
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<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>New Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Old Testament</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

The observant reader of the Old Testament (OT) readily identifies several concepts in the text that carry tremendous theological importance – covenant, justice, righteousness, mercy, love, and the list could go on. The Hebrew lexeme  צֶּדֶק (light) is one such term, in one place being called "one of the Bible's major and most complex symbols" (DBI 1998:509). Remarkably, however, scholars and theologians throughout the centuries have often disagreed concerning its fundamental meaning in the biblical text.¹ Even a casual reading of the OT demonstrates that the ancient Hebrew writers clearly conceived of some kind of conceptual relationship between light and YHWH, but the nature of this relationship is far from clear on the surface of the text. For example, the psalmist writes יְהָוֶה is my light... (Psa 27:1), but what does this phrase actually mean? There are any number of physical phenomena to which the psalmist might have compared YHWH, so what is being expressed by the use of the particular metaphor of light? And when the psalmist attaches the personal pronominal suffix to the noun – my light – does this indicate a light internally possessed by the psalmist, that is, a thing somehow intrinsic to their humanity or personhood? Or does this refer to something external or extrinsic to the author, such as a lamp or some kind of flame to light the way ahead?

One could make similar inquiries concerning Isa 60:19 – And the sun will no longer be your light by day, nor the moon by night; but YHWH will be your everlasting light – but this text raises some deeper theological questions as well. What is the specific nature of both the comparison and contrast between YHWH and the sun/moon? Does the writer conceive of YHWH as an actual source of physical light? Or is this reference to "everlasting light" merely a metaphor for some non-physical reality? If so, what specific abstract concept is being symbolized or emblemized by the metaphor? And beneath all this, how might one answer these

¹. See Chapter 3 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of how modern scholars sometimes come to disparate, even opposite, conclusions concerning both the lexical meaning and theological import of this one Hebrew word.

². Following an ever-widening convention in modern English, in this thesis I will use 3rd person plural pronouns to refer to both singular and plural antecedents in order to avoid gender-biased verbiage and other more awkward phrasing.
questions in some objective and testable manner rather than settling for mere statements of interpretive opinion?

By applying the principles of lexical semantics within the discipline of Cognitive Linguistics to the lexeme אור in the OT, this thesis aims to develop a methodology for defining as precisely as possible the relationship between light and יְהֵわָה in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. After the introductory first chapter, the second chapter of this thesis will construct a "cognitive model" (Lakoff 1987:12-13) of the lexeme אור in the OT. This analysis will include data concerning the complete lexeme אור (both the nominal and verbal forms as well as the derivative noun מָאוֹר, "luminary"), also taking into consideration נָשָׁה (to shine), נור (from which comes נֵר, "lamp," and מְנוֹרָה, "lampstand"), and other collocatively-related lexemes. The process of constructing this model will include applicable semantic data gathered from the usage of these terms, deriving from that data the logically-consistent cognitive processes that govern the use of this lexeme in Biblical Hebrew (BH).

The third chapter will then test this model and its derived conclusions against theological writings concerning light in the interpretive history of the OT, with special focus on contributions made in the last fifty years. This comparative investigation will seek to determine how the recent developments of cognitive linguistic theory either confirm or correct previous understandings of the theological significance of light in OT literature. The fourth chapter will aim to derive, on the basis of testing this cognitive model of light, a set of methodological principles for a future study to articulate fully a proposed hypothesis concerning the relationship between light and יְהֵわָה in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. The concluding chapter will seek to locate the thesis in its broader theological context and explore potential implications for further study.

1.1. Background for the Thesis

In 1973, the first volume of the landmark series Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (TDOT) was published in German and translated into English the following year.

3. The nature of this study is inter-disciplinary; I am seeking to apply a linguistic theory toward a pertinent theological issue via the biblical text. Thus, while the thesis finds its point of departure in the field of linguistics, this study follows a theological trajectory and is rightly classified as a theological rather than a linguistic discourse.
This multi-volume work, which has enjoyed wide popularity as an academic resource, was the collaboration of many scholars who endeavored to take the historical data (etymological, semantic, socio-cultural, geo-political, etc.) relevant to individual lexemes in BH and apply them in some way toward a theological treatment of each respective concept in the OT text. The Norwegian scholar Sverre Aalen, a professor of New Testament (NT) at Oslo Theological Seminary, authored the entry on the lexeme אורים in *TDOT*. Based on my own study, his article exhibits some paradigmatic principles of twentieth-century scholarship concerning the concept of light in the OT. First, in the mind of an ancient Near Eastern person, the phenomenon of daylight existed independently of the phenomenon of sunlight, because scientific knowledge had not yet progressed to the point where the ancient peoples knew that daylight came from the sun (Aalen 1974:150-152). Secondly, although it is metaphorically applied in various ways, the concept of light in ancient Near Eastern literature, including the OT, never represents any sort of metaphysical reality in connection to Deity, with the possible exception of Isa 5:20 (Aalen 1974:160-164). Finally, the various senses of the term אורים were typically understood as categorically distinct based on the specific context of each individual attestation without investigation as to how the various meanings might be cognitively linked. That is, scholars in the twentieth century treated the lexeme on the basis of categorical analysis without providing any kind of conceptual synthesis. This approach is evident in both preeminent lexicons of BH published in the twentieth century, *The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon* (*BDB*) and *The Hebrew & Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament* (*HALOT*), which list lexical meanings according to uses in individual contexts without offering a synthetic overview of any given lexeme as a unified whole. This approach was both appropriate and fruitful for its time – indeed, exegetes today still depend on this kind of categorical analysis – but the discipline of cognitive linguistics has since innovated methodological tools for further synthetic inquiry.

In the last thirty years, two important dissertations have been published that directly pertain to the concept of light in the OT. The first study, by W. David Reece, offers a much more thorough and detailed lexical analysis than Aalen's earlier treatment, but Reece still

only deals with categorical meanings and never explores any potential cognitive links between the various senses of אורים in the OT literature. The second study, by Shawn Zelig Aster, touches upon the current topic in several important ways, although his work focuses not on the Hebrew lexeme אורים but on the parallels in BH to the specific Akkadian term *melammu*. Nevertheless, Aster's research is significant for the current study, particularly his treatment of the phrase יְהוָה כְֹבוֹד (the glory of YHWH) in the OT and its relationship to depictions of the presence of YHWH as physically radiant.

Most importantly, however, an entirely new school of thought in the field of linguistics has emerged since the publication of *TDOT*, i.e. the approach commonly called "Cognitive Linguistics" (CL). When Reece completed his dissertation in 1989, many of the preeminent theories of CL were still being hammered out on the anvil of academic scholarship. But even then Reece was already disputing the aforementioned cornerstones of the twentieth-century approach, partly on the basis of these emerging theories. With the light of Aster's work now shining on the subject at hand, the time has come for a renewed treatment of the lexeme אורים in BH, a treatment that is conceptual and not merely categorical in nature.

1.2. What is Cognitive Linguistics?

As an academic discipline, CL can be defined vaguely as "a modern school of linguistic thought and practice, concerned with investigating the relationship between human language, the mind and socio-physical experience" (Evans 2011:69). There is no single overarching doctrine of the CL approach, but rather a cluster of principles derived from two foundational linguistic commitments titled the Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment. The former is "a dedication to characterizing general principles that apply to all aspects of human language" (Evans, Bergen & Zinken 2007:3), and the latter is "a com-


6. "Cognitive linguistics is best described as a 'movement' or an 'enterprise', precisely because it does not constitute a single closely-articulated theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of core commitments and guiding principles, which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories" (Evans, Bergen & Zinken 2007:3).
mitment to providing a characterization of the general principles for language that accord with what is known about the mind and brain from other disciplines" (Evans, Bergen & Zinken 2007:4).

These two commitments can be summarized as an attempt to generate a comprehensive theory of the mental mechanics of human language (i.e. the "Generalization" component) based on substantive data rather than merely abstract arguments or postulates (i.e. the "Cognitive" component). The melding of these two foundational commitments has led to the development of five principles of the CL approach that, it is argued, existentially govern the phenomenon of human language. These five guiding principles, along with a family of cognitive theories that flow from them, provide the substantive point of departure for this study.

First, the principle of embodied cognition affirms that human conceptual structure is embodied (Evans, Bergen & Zinken 2007:6), or to put it more simply, "our construal of 'reality' is mediated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment" (Evans 2012:3). As humans, we cannot separate our immaterial "self" from our material body. This principle of embodied cognition suggests that human cognitive processes (perception, logic, language, etc.) are dependent on and flow from our nature as embodied beings. The outworking of this theory provides many of the most fundamental touchstones of the CL approach, and its applicability to the current study will become obvious.

Secondly, the principle of encyclopedic semantics states that semantic structure is conceptual structure (Evans, Bergen & Zinken 2007:6). Evans expounds the practical upshot of this principle:

Each individual instance of word use potentially leads to a distinct interpretation. For instance, fast means something quite different in fast car, fast food, a fast girl, and fast lane of the motorway. This follows as any instance of use constitutes a distinct usage-event that may activate a different part of the encyclopedic knowledge potential to which a lexical item facilitates access (Evans 2012:4, emphasis original).

7. The principles of embodied cognition have been substantially developed by scholars in the fields of both linguistics and psychology, especially Ronald Langacker, George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Leo Talmy (see Johnson 1987:1-40, Lakoff & Johnson 1980:1-114, Lakoff 1987:5-57). Lawrence Shapiro is also a cognitive scientist who interacts critically with the conceptualization approach and other competing hypotheses of embodied cognition (Shapiro 2011:70-113).
The principle of encyclopedic semantics posits that the human brain does not formulate the meaning of a term in any specific context by some kind of abstract linguistic algorithm. Rather, the human brain operates *encyclopedically*; that is, via repeated observation and usage the brain learns that certain terms mean different things in various contexts, then stores that information for future recall. Furthermore, any specific occurrence of a term has the potential to activate any part of that "encyclopedic knowledge" stored within the mind. Thus, taking Evans' example above, it is impossible to determine the nuanced meaning of the adjective *fast* until the term is placed into a specific context – *fast car, fast food, a fast girl*, etc. This principle of encyclopedic semantics does not address how the various meanings of a term are generated in the first place – that is a separate issue – it only addresses how semantic information is processed (i.e. stored and accessed) by the human brain.

Thirdly, the Symbolic Thesis states that "the fundamental unit of grammar is a form-meaning pairing, or symbolic unit" (Evans 2011:76, emphasis original). Linguistic forms symbolize actual concepts in the mind; for example, the lexical noun נָר symbolizes the concept of light in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. These linguistic forms occur across a continuum of specificity. They can be as small as a letter (the lexeme *a* in English) or affix (mis-, or -tion), as large as a fully independent grammatical sentence (the ditransitive construction, incorporating both a direct and indirect object, as in *I threw him the ball*), or any where in between (the English expressions *in the doghouse* or *bite the dust*) (Riemer 2010:50-57; Taylor & Littlemore 2014:9-10). Evans (2011:77-78) identifies three important consequences of this thesis: (1) "form cannot be studied independently of meaning;" (2) "there is not a principled distinction between the study of semantics and syntax;" and (3) "symbolic units can be related to each other, both in terms of similarity of form and semantic relatedness."

Fourthly, CL theory states that *meaning is conceptualization*, that is, a semantic whole is more than simply the sum of its parts. Evans explains:

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10. See also Riemer 2010:88-89,129.
Cognitive linguists subscribe to the position that linguistically mediated meaning involves conceptualization — which is to say, higher-order cognitive processing some, or much, of which is non-linguistic in nature. In other words, the thesis that meaning is conceptualization holds that the way in which symbolic units are combined during language understanding gives rise to a unit of meaning which is non-linguistic in nature ... and relies, in part, on non-linguistic processes of integration (Evans 2011:7).

Theorists within the field of CL have proposed different methods by which the human mind accomplishes this integration, but it is generally agreed that some kind of non-linguistic integration is, in fact, necessary (Evans 2011:76-78; Taylor & Littlemore 2014:9-10). Take the Hebrew expression הַבֹּקֶר אָור (light of the morning), as an example. The principle of conceptualized meaning holds that the human mind does not simply add together the meanings of the individual symbolic units – the noun אָור, the prefixed article הַ, and the noun בֹּקֶר (morning) – in order to arrive at the meaning of the expression as a whole.11 Rather, the brain integrates these parts via some non-linguistic process using non-linguistic units of meaning, although CL scholars disagree about how this integrative process actually works. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to understand simply that the meaning of lexicalized expressions such as the light of the morning is comprised of more than the sum of its semantic components.

Fifthly, the Usage-Based Thesis states that "there is no principled distinction between knowledge of language, and use of language ... since knowledge emerges from use. From this perspective, knowledge of language is knowledge of how language is used" (Evans 2011:79). The Usage-Based Thesis is the logical extension of the previous four principles and more directly pertains to the methodology of the current study. If knowledge of language equals knowledge of language usage, then the content of the conceptual world itself is inextricably linked to the linguistic construal of that conceptual world, and vice versa.

One of the consequences of the usage-based thesis is that symbolic units exhibit degrees of ‘entrenchment’ — the degree to which a symbolic unit is established as a cognitive routine in the mind of the language user. If the language system is a function of language use, then it follows that the relative frequency with which particular words or other kinds of symbolic units are encountered by the speaker will affect the nature of the grammar. That is, symbolic units that are more frequently encountered become more entrenched. Accordingly, the most entrenched symbolic units tend to shape the language system in terms of

patterns of use, at the expense of less-frequent and thus less-well-entrenched words or constructions. Hence, the mental grammar, while deriving from language use, also influences language use (Evans 2011:80).

Therefore, in order to discern how the ancient Israelites cognitively thought about the concept of מִשְׁקָר, one must analyze the use of that concept in actual linguistic contexts. According to the Usage-Based Thesis, the observable patterns of frequency and usage reflect varying degrees of mental entrenchment and therefore provide a legitimate means of reconstructing the "cognitive routines" of the ancient Israelites. Assuredly, this reconstructive process must be done carefully and deliberately, and its accuracy depends directly on the analyst having sufficient background information (historical, cultural, geographical, socio-political, etc.) to interpret correctly the symbolic units of the language. This kind of linguistic analysis becomes extremely important when investigating a dead language, where it is no longer possible to access directly any speakers of that language or members of that specific culture. The starting point of this thesis will be to construct, via analysis of the lexical data, a cognitive model of light – that is, the thing(s) symbolized by the use of the lexeme מִשְׁקָר in the OT – within the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

1.3. Presuppositions and Limitations of the Thesis

This thesis does not attempt to prove a specific thesis statement via a strict progression of logical thought. Rather, this study aims to apply a family of presupposed principles (i.e. "Cognitive Linguistics") toward a particular set of data (the lexeme מִשְׁקָר in BH) and then evaluate in some measure the merits of that approach toward a particular issue (the relationship between light and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world) relevant to that data. Empirically speaking, the cognitive model constructed in this thesis is neither verifiable nor falsifiable; such is the nature of philosophical inquiries like this one. However, as Johnson rightly affirms, such models can be tested against the standards of "comprehensiveness, coherence, and explanatory power" (Johnson 1987:xxxvii) and should be judged accordingly.

This thesis presumes that the cosmology of the ancient Israelites, like other ancient Near Eastern cultures, consisted of three realms or 'abodes' – celestial, terrestrial, and subterrrestrial. The celestial realm (Heb. שָׁמַיִם, "Heaven" – literally the heavens) was believed

12. Here, and in the rest of the thesis, I use the term *cosmology* in the narrow sense of what
to exist above the sky and was considered the abode of the divine being(s). The terrestrial realm (Heb. האָרֶץ, "Earth" – literally the earth) consisted of the land, the sea, and the air, and it was considered the abode of living creatures. The sub-terrestrial realm (Heb. שְׁאוֹל, "Sheol") existed below the "ground level" of the earth and was considered the abode of the dead.

Concerning the ancient Near Eastern conception of the heavenly bodies, Walton (2006:170) writes: "Sun, moon, stars, and planets were all considered in the same category and were believed to occupy the same region, the air, since they could be seen beneath the sky" (i.e. the boundary between the celestial realm and the terrestrial realm). Various peoples of the ancient Near East certainly differed in the nuanced details of their respective views of the cosmos, but this study accepts that the general cosmological principles listed above were shared by all ancient Near Eastern cultures, including the ancient Israelites, and that they undergird the worldview depicted by the OT literature.13

For the purposes of this study, the entire corpus of BH will be considered as one single and synchronous data set. The principles of cognitive lexical semantics applied in the thesis cannot be effectively used in an attempt to date certain texts before or after others or to trace specific developments of thought throughout the course of the OT's composition. There are two reasons for this: first, the lexical data analyzed here is too small a sample size on which to base any conclusions concerning broad textual diachrony, nor does the nature of the data itself warrant such conclusions. Secondly, even if it could be demonstrated that a particular attestation of the lexeme was put into writing at a specific point in time, it cannot be proven whether or not that lexical form in its specific context previously existed in oral form (and if so, for what length of time), or if between then and now the written form was edited or updated in accordance with patterns of ongoing linguistic development. In order to be helpful for this study, a diachronic component would require specific temporal knowledge of when a particular attestation first occurred in the text, either in oral or written form, and to what extent the form had been subsequently modified. This knowledge is unavailable. Therefore, this study will leave aside all questions of textual or linguistic diachrony within the OT. However, if by some method a particular diachrony (either textual or linguistic) of Walton calls 'cosmic geography,' that is, "how people envision the shape and structure of the world around them" (Walton 2006:165).

13. See also Cassuto 1978:19-20.
specific attestations within the text could be proven true, than the results of that study could be applied to this one in an attempt to discern patterns in the temporal progression of lexical development, including the relationship of light to \(\text{YHWH}\) in the conceptual world of the ancient Israelites.

Finally, as already mentioned, the relationship between the concepts of daylight and sunlight was a matter of some discussion in twentieth-century scholarship, with some notable scholars arguing that ancient Near Eastern peoples, including the Israelites, conceived of daylight and sunlight as separate physical phenomena (Skinner 1910:20, Aalen 1974:150-152; Sarna 1989:7).\(^\text{14}\) In the dissertation mentioned earlier, the American scholar W. David Reece argued convincingly against this view, positing instead that the Israelites and all other ancient Near Eastern peoples "knew of no celestial light other than that produced by the heavenly bodies" (Reece 1990:21). Reece's argument is too detailed to be reproduced in full here, but it is built on these four cornerstones: (1) "All the cultures of the ancient Near East knew the sun to be the only source of daily light;" (2) "The Hebrew belief that the sun was their only source of daily light is evidenced by eschatological and military texts, which describe utter darkness when the heavenly bodies malfunction;" (3) "Poetically parallel texts from the Bible show the Hebrews recognized no distinction between sunlight and daylight;" (4) "Texts usually cited to show a distinction between daylight and sunlight do not bear that witness" (Reece 1990:21).\(^\text{15}\) Although I will interact with both sides of this debate, the current study accepts the verity of Reece's argument from the outset, and I will argue that the lexical data affirms this view.

1.4. Research Methodology

This thesis aims to accomplish two objectives: 1) to construct a cognitive model of the lexeme \(\text{אור}\) in BH by analyzing its usage in the OT corpus in accordance with the principles of cognitive linguistic theory; then 2) to test and apply that model toward a specific theological issue, that is, the relationship between light and \(\text{YHWH}\) in the ancient Israelite concep-

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\(^\text{15}\) One full chapter of Reece's dissertation is dedicated to expounding this entire argument. See Reece 1990:21-86.
tual world. The foundational commitments and principles of Cognitive Linguistics (introduced above) serve as the point of departure for this study, especially the specific theories of cognitive lexical semantics called prototypical modeling, radial networking, and metaphorical grounding. I will briefly describe these theories here, then develop them further in the course of the study as they are applied in building the conceptual model.

The theory of prototypical modeling affirms that, generally speaking, a word or term in any language has a primary and prototypical semantic meaning (and/or pragmatic function) that is most salient within its semantic-pragmatic range and attested most frequently in common usage (Dirven & Verspoor 2004:31; see also Rosch 1973:328-330, 348-349).16 Certainly any specific term can have more than one meaning, but cognitive semantic theory suggests that additional meanings other than the prototypical sense are less salient in the term's entire semantic range. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of a term's 'semantic field' but rather a 'semantic cloud' of diminishing density, with the prototypical meaning forming a dense mass in the center and less salient meanings thinning out toward the periphery (Taylor 1989:51-69).

Prototype models of categorization have been the source of a major reorientation in the practice of much semantic description. In spite of Rosch’s unwillingness to elevate prototype theory into a full-blown theory of mental representation, many semantic investigators now take it for granted that the meaning of all or most lexical items consists in a prototype structure. As a result, the semanticist’s role is to characterize only the most prototypical aspects of that structure, and a range of meanings outside it is only to be expected. … Many of the insights of prototype research, however, are accounted for in cognitive approaches to semantics, which do set out to develop a comprehensive theory of mental representation (Riemer 2010:237-238, emphasis original; see also Rosch & Mervis 1975:573-605).

The second theory governing the methodology of this thesis, called radial networking, flows from the preceding principle of prototypical modeling. Dirven & Verspoor write the

16. The progressive development of the theoretical concept of cognitive models (based on categories with "fuzzy" boundaries and which exhibit prototypical effects) within the field of linguistics has been expertly documented by George Lakoff in his seminal work, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (published 1987). For the linguistics component of this thesis, I draw heavily on the work of Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Ronald Langacker, Eleanor Rosch, Charles Fillmore, Gilles Fauconnier, John R. Taylor, Nick Riemer and others (see Lakoff 1987:68; Taylor 1989:51-69).
following in their introductory work on CL, which expands the earlier image of the semantic cloud:

The fact that some word senses are more salient and others more peripheral is not the only effect under consideration here. Word senses are also linked to one another in a systematic way through several cognitive processes so that they show an internally structured set of links. . . . The various senses of a word are thus systematically linked together to one another by means of different paths. Together, the relations between these senses form a radial set ... starting from a central (set of) sense(s) and developing into the different directions (Dirven & Verspoor 2004:31,34).

This theory of radial networking suggests that the particulates of any term's semantic cloud do not coalesce together on an ad hoc basis but rather are generated as a result of logically-consistent cognitive processes that develop over time as the term undergoes sustained usage (Lakoff 1987:96,109-110,113,153-154; Johnson 1987:xii). These cognitive processes are reproducible by a reader/hearer given sufficient information about the writer/speaker's situational context. This reproduction of cognitive processes is the primary work both of the broader discipline of cognitive lexical semantics and of this specific study as it relates to the lexeme אָוָּר in BH.

Figure 1 – A Simplified Radial Network of the Noun אָוָּר in Biblical Hebrew

Figure 1 shows an example of a simplified radial network for the noun אָוָּר as it is used in the corpus of OT literature. The cognitive processes that generate the various meanings of the term in specific contexts are shown in parentheses. For the purposes of this thesis, the most important of these cognitive processes is that of metaphorical projection.
(a.k.a. metaphorical grounding – both terms are different ways of referring to the same cognitive phenomenon). This theory states that all human metaphors are grounded in physical experience and that the brain conceptualizes metaphors either by projecting specific concepts or by mapping entire structures from one domain onto another more abstract domain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:77-86,115-119; Lakoff 1987:110,114; Taylor 1989:130-141).

Perhaps the most important thing to stress about grounding is the distinction between an experience and the way we conceptualize it. We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever. All of these experiences may be just as basic as physical experiences. Rather, what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the non-physical in terms of the physical—that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:59).

When the psalmist makes the metaphorical statement *Yhwh is my light*, they are in some way projecting the concept of light within the domain of their own physical experience into some more abstract domain of their conception of the deity they call Yhwh. This is an oversimplified description of this particular metaphor, but it satisfactorily illustrates the point for now. What is important here is the specific notion that all metaphors, no matter how basic or complex, are experientially grounded in the actual physical world as it is perceived by the human brain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:56-60; Lakoff 1987:112-113,154; Taylor 1989:140-141).

These three theories all fall under the general categorical principle of embodied conceptualization in the CL approach – conceptualization being the technical term for what Evans calls "non-linguistic integrative processes" discussed above. Here, I will not discuss thoroughly the fine details of embodied conceptualization. The following quote from Riemer satisfactorily introduces the concept with an application of special relevance to the current study:

Many cognitive semanticists stress the embodied nature of the conceptualizations underlying language. To say that a conceptualization is embodied is to draw attention to its origin in basic physical experience. Johnson (1987) pointed out that much language use reflects patterns in our own bodily experience, particularly our perceptual interactions, movement and manipulations of objects. Particularly basic patterns of repeated experience give rise to the conceptual categories which Johnson called image schemas, such as containment, source-path-goal, force, balance, and others. These ‘operate as organizing structures of our experience and understanding at the level of bodily perception and movement’ [Johnson 1987:20], and thus also underlie the conceptual categories deployed in language. For instance, from an early age we frequently experience containment and boundedness, in-
teracting with containers of different sorts. The most important type of container with which we interact is our own body, which functions as a container into which we put things like food, water and air. We also experience physical containment in our surroundings, interacting with receptacles of many sorts. These repeated patterns of spatial and temporal organization give rise to the image schema of CONTAINMENT, which underlies the linguistic representation of many scenes... (Riemer 2010:241).

Johnson's concept of an image schema in language – especially that of CONTAINMENT – directly applies to the understanding of how humans conceptualize light (especially celestial light) in the physical world and how that conceptualization is represented by linguistic forms. I will further explain and develop these concepts in due course.

Having offered a brief description of the theoretical framework that will guide the thesis along its trajectory, I will now embark upon the task at hand. Chapter 2 will construct a cognitive model of אור in BH via an inductive analysis of all the lexical data. This cognitive model will include a thorough and detailed model of the term's conceptual prototype (i.e. sunlight) and will describe the various ways in which that prototypical model is semantically expanded to produce the various meanings of אוֹר in BH. Chapter 3 will then test that model against other recent and similarly detailed treatments of the concept of light in the the OT in an effort to evaluate the applicability (or not) of the CL method for clarifying this particular theological concept in the OT. On the basis of this discussion, Chapter 4 will apply the cognitive model of אוֹר toward identifying a methodology for defining the relationship between light and Yhwh in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. Finally, Chapter 5 will explore further implications of this linguistic study in the broader theological landscape, both in terms of the specific model presented here and the wider discipline of Cognitive Linguistics.
I have already explained how the Usage-Based Thesis generates the following corollary: that the most prototypical lexical and grammatical forms are used with greater frequency than less prototypical forms and therefore become more firmly entrenched in the mental grammar of the speakers/writers of a language. On the basis of this principle, then, one must carefully analyze the attestations of the lexeme in actual linguistic contexts in order to reconstruct the cognitive routines that produced the various meanings of that particular lexeme. Such is the goal of this chapter. I will start with some etymological notes on the lexeme, then proceed with the inductive analysis.

2.1. Etymological Notes on the Lexeme

The lexeme אָרָא in BH has a verbal correspondent in Ugaritic (‘wr – 'to be light, bright;' Gordon 1965:353) and a nominal correspondent in Akkadian/Assyrian (urru, 'day;' BDB 1906:21, HALOT 1994:24-25). The closely related Hebrew lexeme נַר – unattested in its verbal form in the OT, but common in nominal forms נֵר and ניר (both meaning "lamp"), and מְנוֹרָה (lampstand) – exhibits a similar pattern, corresponding to the Ugaritic lexeme nyr ('to illumine' – see Gordon 1965:443) and also the Akkadian nuru, 'light' (Aalen 1974:148; BDB 1906:632; HALOT 1995:683; Kellermann 1999:14-15). Other lexical synonyms of אָרָא in BH, such as נָר (to brighten) and נֶה (to shine), are also attested in Biblical Aramaic (Aalen 1974:148). This study will not attempt to determine conclusively any philological relationships between all these words, but the orthographic and semantic similarity between the Hebrew noun אָרָא and the Akkadian/Assyrian noun urru (day) should be noted.

2.2. Semantics of the Lexeme

The lexeme אָרָא consists of three terms, comprising a total of 186 attestations in the OT:

1. There is an additional attestation of אָרָא in Isa 53:11 found in the Qumran scrolls and in
– the primitive noun אֹר (‘light’ – including the feminine form אוֹרָה), attested 124x in the OT, totaling 66% of the lexical attestations;
– the denominative verb אוֹר (‘to shine’ or ‘to brighten’), attested 43x in the OT, totaling 23% of the lexical attestations;
– the derivative noun מָאוֹר (luminary), attested 19x in the OT, totaling 10% of the lexical attestations.

Only two OT passages (Gen 1:14-19; Ezek 32:7-8) collocate all three lexical words in the same immediate context. The inductive methodology of this study demands that it begin by analyzing the linguistic forms as they are used in actual linguistic contexts. Therefore, I will start with these two specific texts and then move to the data as a collective whole, looking for discernible patterns from which to begin construction of a cognitive model.

2.2.1. Genesis 1:14-19

This pericope describes Day Four of the Genesis creation saga, where God creates the celestial bodies, i.e. the sun, moon and stars. Interestingly, Gen 1:14–19 does not use the typical Hebrew nouns שֶׁמֶשׁ (sun) and יָרֵחַ (moon), but rather the single designation מָאוֹר (luminary, i.e. "a thing that gives light" – see section 2.2.3c below), a secondary derivative of the primitive noun אֹר in Gen 1:3–5. Both terms belong to the lexeme אֹר. The sun and moon are called הַגָּדֹל הַמָּאוֹר (the greater luminary) and הַקָּטֹן הַמָּאוֹר (the lesser luminary), respectively. The text downplays the celestial luminaries as objects in and of themselves, highlighting instead their function as givers of light to the earth. This physical operation of providing light serves two metaphysical functions – to rule the day and the night, and to separate the light from the darkness (v.18). This literary precision serves an important function within the Genesis creation narrative itself: as objects in and of themselves, the sun does not rule the day, nor the moon the night; rather, the light rules both day and night.

הַלָ֑יְלָה וּבֵ֣ין הַיּ֖וֹם בֵּ֥ין לְהַבְדִּ֕יל הַשָּׁמַ֔יִם יְהִ֤י אֱלֹהִ֗ים וַיֹּ֣אמֶר וְשָׁנִֽים׃

the LXX (Gr. φῶς) but not contained in the MT. It seems very likely that the Qumran/LXX reading is the more accurate rendering of the original text, and several modern translations include it (e.g. NIV, NRSV, CEB). See section 2.5.1e for more discussion about this.
And God said, 'Let there be luminaries in the vault of the heavens, to separate between the day and the night; and let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years; and let them be for luminaries in the vault of the heavens, to shine on the earth.' And it was so. So God made two great luminaries – the greater luminary to rule the day, and the lesser luminary to rule the night – and the stars. And God put them in the vault of the heavens: to shine on the earth; and to rule the day and the night; and to separate between the light and the darkness. And God saw that it was good. And there was evening, and there was morning: Day Four. [Gen 1:14-19]²

This text arranges the derivative noun מָאוֹר and the denominative verb אוֹר in a subject-verb relationship, with the verb in the Hiphil stem. In this context, then, מָאוֹר is an object that performs the action of the Hiphil verb אוֹר. This sentence further implies that the Hiphil infinitive לְהָאִיר includes the substantive noun אוֹר as its object even though it is not written in the text. That is, the reader can supply the substantive noun אוֹר as the direct object of the Hiphil infinitive לְהָאִיר without changing the meaning of the sentence. The text could just as easily read "to shine light on the earth" as "to shine on the earth;" the meaning is the same.

Another specified function of the מְאוֹרֹת is to separate between the אוֹר and the חֹשֶׁך (darkness). The reader cannot readily discern any direct referential relationship between the denominative verb and the primitive noun in this case, so it will be passed over for now. It should be noted, however, that this specified function of separating the light and the darkness should be noted, however, that this specified function of separating the light and the darkness

² All OT quotations are from the BHS, and all translations of biblical texts are my own.
has also been assigned to God earlier in the story (v.4). Although quite oblique, the opening narrative of the OT draws a comparative connection between light and divinity.

2.2.2. Ezekiel 32:7-8

The Ezekiel passage provides further clarity concerning the syntactical relationships between the three lexical words:

אֶת־כֹּֽכְבֵיהֶ֑ם
וְהִקְדַּרְתִּ֖י
שָׁמַ֔יִם
וְכִסֵּיתִ֤י
אוֹרֽוֹ׃
לֹא־יָאִ֥יר
וְיָרֵ֖חַ
אֲכַסֶּ֔נּוּ
בֶּעָנָ֣ ן
שֶׁ֚מֶשׁ
עָלֶ֑יךָ
אַקְדִּירֵ֖ם
בַּשָּׁמַ֔יִם
אוֹר֙
כָּל־מְא֤וֹרֵי
יְהוִֽה׃
אֲדֹנָ֥י
נְאֻ֖ם
עַֽל־אַרְצְךָ֔
חֹ֙שֶׁךְ֙
וְנָתַ֤תִּי
[32]
And I will cover the heavens when I extinguish you, and I will darken the stars; I will cover the sun by a cloud, and the moon will not shine its light. All the luminaries of light in the heavens will I darken over you, and I will put darkness over your land,' says the Lord YHWH. [Ezek 32:7-8]

This text explicitly specifies the substantive noun אאור as the direct object of the Hiphil verb אור. The following sentence goes on to explain that God will darken all the luminaries of light in the heavens, with the derived noun כאור in the status constructus taking the substantive noun אאור as its postconstructus. On the basis of the previous sentence in the Hebrew text, I take this particular construct phrase as a subject-object relationship over against an entity-material relationship (van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:197-200); indeed, the Septuagint (LXX) explicitly translates it as such. The phrase all the luminaries of light must refer to the sun, moon and stars, which have already been listed, and the substantive noun אאור has already been established as the object of the verbal action.

4. For a discussion of the morphology and semantics of derivative nouns, i.e. nouns that are derived from verbal forms, see Joüon and Muraoka 1996:255-260. Here the LXX reads πάντα τά φαίνοντα φῶς, i.e. the nominative participle of φαίνω (to shine) + the accusative noun φῶς (light).
5. See Reece 1990:55; also section 2.3.1a for a discussion of why the noun אאור takes the pronominal suffix in v.7 but not in v.8.
In tandem, these two passages provide a tentative template for the syntactical relationship between the three lexical words, which can be expressed by the simple sentence shown in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>VERB</th>
<th>OBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A luminary...</td>
<td>...shines...</td>
<td>...light.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;something that generates light&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;the action of generating light&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;light&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attested 19x in BHS text</th>
<th>Attested 43x in BHS text</th>
<th>Attested 124x in BHS text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10x refers to the tabernacle menorah</td>
<td>35x in Hiphil stem</td>
<td>includes 3x in feminine form (אֹרָה)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7x refers to celestial bodies</td>
<td>6x in Qal stem</td>
<td>includes 1x in Qere but not Ketiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2x refers to face/eyes of a person</td>
<td>2x in Niphal stem</td>
<td>additional 1x in LXX (Isa 53:11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 – The Syntactical Relationship of the Lexical Terms

Two additional observations must be noted at this point: (1) the verbal forms have all appeared in the Hiphil stem; and (2) all three lexical words have referred to celestial light from celestial bodies. This collocative data is insufficient in and of itself to determine conclusively a prototypical referential pattern for the lexeme as a whole. A comprehensive lexical analysis of the three terms together must be completed either to confirm these initial observations or to present a better alternative.

2.2.3. Lexical Analysis

At this point the analyst must make some decisions regarding how to analyze the linguistic data. The context of certain attestations of the lexeme, especially in Hebrew poetry, clearly implies that the lexeme is being applied in some abstract or metaphorical way. Other attestations, such as those already examined, appear more or less straightforward. The physical referent for the term in the phrase from Ezekiel 32, *the moon will not shine its light*, seems readily apparent; whereas the specific referent for the phrase *YHWH is my light* in Psalm 27 is ambiguous but almost certainly metaphorical in some way. That is, it seems clear from the context that the psalmist is not attempting to communicate that YHWH is a light source in a physical sense, like the sun or the moon. The analyst must somehow understand the mechanics of the metaphorical system(s) in the ancient Israelite conceptual world (and/or culture) in order to reconstruct the encyclopedic meaning of the specific lexical attestation.
One cannot proceed simply on the basis of the Usage-Based Thesis at this point, because it is possible that other factors affect the patterns of frequency in the data besides simple patterns of mental entrenchment. A fixed corpus like the OT might exhibit more attestations that refer to a metaphorical projection of a particular concept than to the actual physical referent, but this in and of itself does not mean that the metaphorical projection is a more primitive or prototypical understanding of that particular concept. It simply means that that limited body of linguistic forms contains more of one kind of referent than another. Furthermore, the nature of literary genre plays a key factor here, in that the analyst must be sensitive to how the terms may or may not be used differently in different kinds of literary works. For example, it stands to reason that one would find a higher percentage of attestations of metaphorical projection of the lexeme in poetry than in prose, which is, in fact, the case with this lexeme in the OT.

According to the CL theories of embodied conceptualization, and specifically the concept of metaphorical grounding, ALL attestations of linguistic metaphor (across all languages in all times and all places) have some sort of referential basis in the actual physical world (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:56-60; Reece 1990:120). If the meanings of the metaphorical uses of the lexeme אָוֶּר are in fact "grounded" in the actual physical experience of the writer (or their broader culture), then the analyst must first identify those physical referents to the best of their ability and proceed to construct the cognitive model of the term from them. Therefore, I will begin the lexical analysis by examining the text for those objects/phenomena/events in the physical world that, as subjectively determined by the context of each individual attestation of the lexeme, are symbolized by the objects/phenomena/events in the conceptual world construed by the text. Or, to say it in simpler terms, I will begin the lexical analysis by identifying what "things" (i.e. objects/phenomena/events) in the actual physical world are being referenced by the lexeme אָוֶּר in the text.

At this point an additional caveat must be given, that the analyst cannot replicate physical objects or events from the past; the best one can do is construct in one's own mind the conceptual world construed by the text, using the linguistic symbols provided and interpreting those symbols in accordance with certain presuppositions and available facts. This is necessarily a subjective process. Modern readers must utilize their own experiences and knowledge in order to determine as best they can the relationship between the conceptual
world of the writer and the actual physical world as it existed at the time that any particular linguistic form was used. Gratefully, many of the referential concepts concerning the phenomenon of light are congruous between the ancient world and the modern world. We can safely presume that the ancient Israelites saw the same sun and moon that we see today and that the physical properties of light (and natural sources of light such as fire and lightning) have not changed between ancient times and now (Reece 1990:35). In this study I must subjectively determine which attestations of the lexeme in the OT corpus have a referential basis in the physical world of the writer – there is no other way to accomplish the task – but these subjective judgments are readily evaluated by others because of the universal nature of the subject matter.⁶

The substantive noun אוֹר comprises almost exactly two-thirds of the total attestations of the lexeme אוֹר in the OT, equaling about three times more attestations than the denominative verb and six times more attestations than the derivative noun.⁷ On the basis of the Usage-Based Thesis, the substantive noun should be considered the most prototypical of the three terms in the lexical family, unless the data itself suggests otherwise. This accords with previous scholarly treatment of the lexeme, which has generally considered the nominal form as the most primitive (Aalen 1974:148; BD 1906:21; HALOT 1994:24). I will thus examine each lexical entry according to frequency and, presumably, prototypicality.

2.2.3a. The Primitive Noun אוֹר. Even from the opening paragraphs of the OT, the immediate reference of the substantive noun אוֹר to the physical phenomenon of celestial light is unmistakable (Gen 1:3-5,18). In some cases the noun is specified as the light of all the heavenly bodies together (Ezek 32:8), the light of the sun and moon (Psa 136:7), moon-
light (Isa 13:10, 30:26; Ezek 32:7), or starlight (Psa 148:3; Isa 13:10). However, most often the noun refers specifically to sunlight. This pattern continues throughout the OT, using various permutations of specific wording: as an indefinite noun, for all the people of Israel there was light in their dwellings (Exo 10:23; see also Isa 5:20, 18:4, 45:7, 60:19; Jer 13:16, 31:35, Hos 6:5; Amos 5:18,20; Hab 4:11; Zech 14:6; Psa 139:11; Job 3:9); as part of the construct phrase, the light of the morning (Judg 16:2; 1 Sam 14:36, 25:34-36; 2 Sam 17:22, 23:4; 2 Kin 7:9; Mic 2:1); and as indicative of a particular point of time in the day, the light (Judg 19:26; Isa 59:9; Mic 7:8; Hab 3:4; Zeph 3:5; Job 12:22, 24:14; Neh 8:3). There are 44 attestations of the primitive noun that directly refer to the physical phenomenon of sunlight,\(^8\) equaling more than twice the number of total lexical attestations (including all three terms) for the next most common physical referent of fire.

Two attestations of the primitive noun definitively refer to firelight, i.e. the by-product of the physical phenomenon of fire: Psa 78:14, And you led them by a cloud by day, and all night by the light of fire; and Jer 25:10, And I will abolish from them the sound of exultation and the sound of rejoicing, the voice of the bridegroom and the voice of the bride, the sound of millstones and the light of the lamp. Two other attestations of the noun, in Isa 10:17 and Job 18:6, are contextually connected to the physical phenomenon of fire but do not directly refer to it; these passages will be discussed later in the chapter (see sections 2.4.2c and 2.6).

Other instances where the primitive noun refers to the physical phenomenon of light indicate a variety of other light sources: lightning (Job 36:30,32, 37:3,11,15, 38:24; Hab 3:11); the mysterious creature Leviathan (Job 41:32), although this could possibly represent firelight (Reece 1990:71); even God himself (Job 25:3, Psa 43:3, 104:2; Isa 2:5, 60:19,20; Hab 3:4; Zech 14:8). There are four other attestations (all in the status determinatus) indicating a reference to light as a generic material substance regardless of its specific source (Eccl 2:13, 11:7, 12:2, Isa 42:16; see van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:190).

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Three additional attestations occur within construct phrases referring to the light of a person's eyes or face: Prov 16:15, In the light of the face of the king is life, and his favor is like a cloud of the late rains; and Psa 89:16, Blessed is the people that knows a joyful shout; O Yhwh, in the light of your face they walk; and Psa 38:11, My heart is throbbing, my strength has forsaken me, and yes, even the light of my eyes. Here are shown some of the inherent complexities in analyzing this term. In these cases, the context indicates that these attestations do not refer to actual light radiating from someone's face or eyes, but neither does the meaning of this phrase appear completely abstract. Even if the light of the face is not physical light, I argue that this phrase in speaking about the king does refer to some event or phenomenon that is physically seen with the eyes. The application of this phrase to Yhwh is more problematic in terms of a physical referent, because it can be debated whether the writer here conceived of Yhwh having a physical visage or not (see section 2.5.2b).

2.2.3b. The Denominative Verb אוֹר. The simplest explanation for the derivation of this lexical form is that the primitive noun אוֹר became grammaticalized as a verb.9 Also spelled אוֹר, the denominative verb is attested 43 times in the OT: 35x in the Hiphil stem; 6x in the Qal stem (including 1x in the Qere but not the Ketiv); and 2x in the Niphal stem, although never as a finite verb. The referents for the verb follow the exact same pattern as the substantive noun: celestial light, firelight, personal body parts (face and eyes), etc.

As already mentioned, the Hiphil stem of this verb appears in the first few paragraphs of the OT with an unmistakable reference to celestial light. God places the sun and moon in the vault of the heavens to shine on the earth. Ten attestations of the verb specifically refer to the physical phenomenon of celestial light as a product of one or more of the heavenly bodies. Five of these refer specifically to sunlight (Gen 44:3; 1 Sam 29:10; 2 Sam 2:32; Psa 9.

Hopper & Traugott define grammaticalization as "the change whereby lexical terms and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions. Thus nouns and verbs may change over time into grammatical elements such as case markers, sentence connectives, and auxiliaries" (Hopper & Traugott 2003:book jacket). Examples of this particular grammaticalization path abound. A modern example is the proper noun "Google," which originated as the name of a website and has since become grammaticalized as a verb in common parlance, meaning to search for a particular thing on the internet using a search engine website. See also the comparative discussion of the noun hand at the beginning of section 2.4.

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another two refer specifically to moonlight (Isa 60:19, Ezek 32:7), and two more refer to the light of both the sun and moon together (Gen 1:15,17). The attestation of the Niphal verb in Job 33:30 does not explicitly specify its precise cosmic referent; the phrase *the illumination of life* most likely has sunlight in view, but it could refer to the light of all the celestial bodies together.

Nine attestations of the verb, all in the Hiphil stem, refer in some way to the generation of light via the physical phenomenon of *fire*. Of these nine, five of them refer specifically to the theophanic pillar of fire in the exodus narrative (Exo 13:21, 14:20; Neh 9:12,19; Psa 105:39). Two additional attestations refers to the tabernacle menorah giving light inside the holy place (Exo 25:37; Num 8:2). Two more attestations refer to the general action of burning (Isa 27:11; Mal 1:10), and the same can possibly be said of the reference to the *shining trail* (i.e. a burning wake?) left by the creature Leviathan (Job 41:18). It is worth noting that five of these nine attestations refer to one specific object, the theophanic pillar of fire; one does not see a multiplicity of references to the general phenomenon of fire as with sunlight. Finally, the use of the Hiphil verb in Psa 118:27 may also be a reference to the theophanic pillar of fire, but the context is uncertain; I classify this attestation as a reference to God as a light source (see below).

Seven attestations of the verb refer to *the shining/brightening of the eyes or face* (1 Sam 14:27,29;10 Ezra 9:8; Psa 13:3, 19:8; Prov 29:13; Eccl 8:1) as a physical and observable event. Other attestations of the verb apply to other sources of physical light already mentioned: *lightning* (Psa 77:19; 97:4); the creature Leviathan (Job 41:10); and *God himself* (Psa 76:4, 118:27 – although both of these referents may be metaphorical projections rather than referring to the actual generation of physical light). The paucity of attestations in comparison to the substantive noun does not allow us to overturn any of the previous conclusions in regard to prototypical patterns of reference for the lexeme. All the analyst can say at this point is that the verbal form of the lexeme is used with a greater degree of specialization than the nominal form.

What is most important here is the congruity between the general use of the Hiphil verb in reference to physical objects/phenomena/events and the specific use of the Hiphil verb  in 1 Sam 14:27 occurs only in the *Qere* and not the *Ketiv.*
verb in the collocative passages examined earlier. The Hiphil verb most often refers to the actual physical generation of light by some light source. Thus, the most prototypical action of the verb אוֹר necessitates the accompanying substance אוֹר, both conceptually and in actuality. It is physically impossible for an object to shine without the existence of light as a material substance. In the same way, the use of the lexical verb אוֹר in its prototypical sense implies the noun אוֹר as its direct object, even if it is not actually written in the text. The reverse is not true, however. Someone need not see an object shining in order to observe the phenomenon of physical light. All humanity experiences this reality every morning and evening, when we observe light in the sky even before the sun rises and after the sun sets. The same principle holds true for the linguistic terms as well. The use of the lexical verb אוֹר implies the use of the lexical noun אוֹר; but the use of the noun does not imply the use of the verb. Gen 1:3 reads, And God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light. This verse uses only the substantive noun, and the reader can conceive these sentences without having to supply the cognate verb.

Thus, within the lexeme itself, the substantive noun is a more primitive and prototypical concept than the denominative verb. This accords with the lexical data examined thus far when considered in light of the Usage-Based Thesis; one would expect the more primitive and prototypical concept to occur more frequently in overall language use. The fact that a fixed corpus exhibits the same pattern makes the case very strong indeed. I further conclude that the fundamental relationship between the two lexical concepts in the mental grammar is verb-direct object. The primitive noun refers to light as a physical material substance. The denominative verb in the Hiphil stem refers to the physical generation of light by some object/phenomenon/event. In simplest terms, then, we can say that the Hebrew noun אוֹר means light, and the Hebrew verb אוֹר in the Hiphil stem means to generate light.

11. This accords with the principles of Langacker's cognitive grammar: "Though we can perfectly well conceptualize an object separately from any action involving it, the conception of an interaction inherently presupposes some reference—however vague or schematic—to the entities through which it is manifested. Objects are therefore conceptually autonomous, and interactions conceptually dependent" (Langacker 1991:14). For a full discussion of the cognitive primacy of nouns over verbs, see Langacker 1991:13-49.
2.2.3c. The Derivative Noun מָאוֹר. The noun מָאוֹר is formed from the cognate verb via the common morphological pattern in BH of adding the pre-formative mem to indicate a noun of instrument (Joüon & Muraoka 1996:256-257; Reece 1990:55, 219-220). This term is attested 19x in the OT: 7x in reference to the sun, moon, and/or stars (Gen 1:14-19; Psa 74:16; Ezek 32:7-8); 10x in specific reference to the tabernacle menorah (Exo 25:6, 27:20, 35:8,14(x2),28, 39:37; Lev 24:2, Num 4:9,16); and 1x each in the construct phrases the lamp of the eyes (Prov 15:30) and the lamp of the face (Psa 90:8). One should not think that the greater number of attestations of this noun for firelight precludes the concept of celestial light (i.e. celestial luminaries) as the prototypical sense of the lexeme. The imbalance of attestations is negligible; with only nineteen attestations in the first place, the derivative noun is already quite rare in comparison with the other two lexical forms. Furthermore, even though the number of attestations is greater in reference to firelight, the only actual referent is a single physical object, the tabernacle menorah. Like the verb above, all one can conclude from this imbalance is that the derivative noun מָאוֹר is used with greater specificity than the primitive noun אוֹר.

At every point, a systematic analysis of the lexical data which refer to objects/phenomena/events in the physical world has confirmed the conclusions of the collocative data in Genesis 1 and Ezekiel 32, as shown in Figure 2 above. The three lexical terms are linked in the mental grammar via a subject-verb-object relationship with an inverted cognitive hierarchy. The substantive noun אוֹר, referring to light, is the most primitive. The denominative verb, referring to the action of generating light, comes next in the conceptual chain. The derivative noun, referring to something that generates light, is cognitively dependent on both of the previous two concepts. When the Usage-Based Thesis is applied to all these terms, the sheer percentages of attestations demonstrates (or at least strongly indicates) that the lexeme's prototypical referent in the physical world is celestial light – and most especially the light of the sun, as will be argued shortly.

12. This is in contrast to the classification of מָאוֹר as a nominal participial form (EDBW 2005:598). It is conceivable that the broader phenomenon of the pre-formative mem in BH originated as a grammaticalized Piel participle, but this is entirely speculative. In BH, the word מָאוֹר is certainly a grammatical noun and not a participle.
If this aggregated referential data is placed into a bubble graph (see Figure 3), one can begin to visualize (albeit crudely) the semantic cloud of the lexeme "אור" in BH. The phenomenon of celestial light forms the dense prototypical center: the area of each bubble represents the total number of lexical attestations for the given referent; and the distance of each bubble from the center of the graph is inversely proportional to the ratio between its size and the size of the center bubble. Thus, the more attestations for any specific referent, the more its bubble will "gravitate" toward the center of the cloud.

Having identified celestial light as the prototypical category of light, I will now examine the conceptualization of celestial light in BH. The twentieth-century debate concerning the conceptualization of daylight and sunlight is particularly relevant here. I contend that the sun is the most fundamental "cognitive reference point" (Lakoff 1987:45; see also Rosch 1975:532-547) for the lexeme "אור" in BH, and I will show in this chapter how all the various usages and nuanced meanings of the term can be generated from the physical object of the
sun and its interaction with humans on the earth. *Thus, I argue that the reference to the phenomenon of sunlight in the physical world stands as the densest prototypical core of the semantic cloud of the lexeme אור in BH.* This argument is supported by analysis of three different types of "prototype effects" (Lakoff 1987:58-67) evinced in the lexical data referring to celestial light: 1) asymmetry of semantic usage, i.e. frequency; 2) asymmetry of linguistic forms, i.e. markedness; and 3) asymmetry of lexical association, i.e. collocation.

First, concerning frequency: the Usage-Based Thesis states that the most prototypical meaning of a term is used the most frequently in colloquial usage. Thus, if sunlight is the most prototypical meaning of the lexeme אור, one would expect that meaning to appear most frequently in the text. As stipulated before, this might not be the case with a fixed corpus of relatively small size, as the OT is; but, lacking any other explanation for the data, a particular meaning that appears much more frequently than others is almost certainly the most prototypical one. Accepting Reece's prior argument that the ancient Hebrews (and all other ancient Near Eastern cultures) always understood that daylight comes from the sun, one can categorize precisely the specific referents for the term in relation to the celestial light that comes from celestial bodies:

- there are 50 specific lexical references to sunlight;
- there are 8 specific lexical references to the light of the sun and moon together;
- there are 6 specific lexical references to moonlight.

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13. Lakoff (1987:59) provisionally defines the term *prototype effects* as "asymmetries within categories and gradations away from a best example." See also Evans 2012:3.

14. Attestations of the primitive noun include: Gen 1:3(x2),4(x2),5,18; Exo 10:23; Judg 16:2, 19:26; 1 Sam 14:36, 25:34,36; 2 Sam 17:22, 23:4; 2 Ki 7:9; Isa 5:30, 18:4, Isa 26:19 (as feminine), 30:26(x3), 45:7, 60:19; Jer 31:35; Amos 8:9; Mic 2:1; Hab 3:4,11; Zeph 3:5; Zech 14:6; Psa 37:6, 139:11,12 (as feminine); Job 3:20, 24:14,16, 26:10, 28:11, 33:28,30, 37:21, 38:19; Prov 4:18; Neh 8:3. Attestations of the denominative verb include: Gen 44:3; 1 Sam 29:10; 2 Sam 2:32; Psa 139:12; Prov 4:18.

15. Gen 1:14,15(x2),16(x3),17; Psa 136:7.

• there is 1 specific lexical reference to the light of the moon and stars together;\textsuperscript{17}
• there are 2 specific lexical references to starlight;\textsuperscript{18}
• there are 5 lexical references to celestial light as a general category.\textsuperscript{19}

Figure 4 shows the conceptual relationship of physical referents for the lexeme \textit{אור} in BH, with the area of each individual bubble proportional to the number of lexical attestations for each referent. With the greatest number of attestations, sunlight is the prototypical cognitive reference point, standing at the very center of the semantic cloud. Moonlight and starlight are included with sunlight within the general category of celestial light. Firelight,

\textsuperscript{17} Jer 31:35.
\textsuperscript{18} Isa 13:10; Psa 148:3.
\textsuperscript{19} Jer 4:23; Ezek 32:8(x2); Psa 56:14; Job 33:30.
lightning, the light from the creature Leviathan, and divine light are other categories of light in the physical world; and finally, some lexical attestations refer to light as a general material substance without specifying any particular physical object as a referent.

Second, concerning markedness: this is another prototype effect in cognitive semantics, defined as "an asymmetry in a category, where one member or subcategory is taken to be somehow more basic than the other (or others)" (Lakoff 1987:60-61). Lakoff (1987:60) aptly expresses the cognitive principle at work: "The idea here is that simplicity in cognition is reflected in simplicity of form." This principle is exemplified by the lexical data in reference to celestial light in BH. In attestations where the OT refers to celestial light but sunlight is not included in the specific reference, the noun אוֹר is always specifically defined, either with an identifying pronominal suffix or by the context (Psa 148:3; Isa 13:10, 30:26, 60:19; Jer 31:35; Ezek 32:7). For example, nowhere in BH does a text say, the moon shines light, but rather, the moon shines its light. The same is true for starlight as well as those references where moonlight and starlight are mentioned together. By contrast, attestations that refer to sunlight do not include any linguistic denotation; the noun is used in its naked form. This is a rather small sample of data and inconclusive on its own, but it is significant that the prototype effect of markedness indicates the same result as the prototype effect of frequency. Both types of prototype effects in the attestations of the lexeme אוֹר in BH that refer to celestial light indicate sunlight as the most primitive and prototypical meaning.

Third, concerning collocation: when describing the actual happenings of the sky at the beginning of a day, BH utilizes two specific subject-verb constructions, שַׁחַר עָלָה ("the dawn came up") and השמש זָרַח ("the sun rose"). These constructions are both mutually exclusive in their use in the OT: the verb זָרַח never takes the noun שַׁחַר as its subject; and the verb עָלָה never takes the noun השמש as its subject. If the ancient Israelites considered sunlight and daylight as separate physical phenomena – such that אוֹר (i.e. in this view daylight, not sunlight) is visible during the morning and evening even when the sun is not – then one would expect the term אוֹר to collocate with the verb עָלָה, thus following the trajectory of the noun שַׁחַר rather than השמש. However, the exact opposite is true! The verb זָרַח takes the noun אוֹר as its subject twice in the OT (Isa 58:10; Psa 112:4, either directly or by apposition); but the verb עָלָה never takes the noun אוֹר as its subject in BH. Of course, these patterns of collocation could be a function of mere happenstance (due to the limited scope of a finite corpus) and not
indicative of colloquial usage within the Hebrew language as a whole. Nevertheless, while not absolutely conclusive, this collocative evidence fully accords with a presumed referential link between אֹר and the sun; indeed, it is the simplest explanation of the linguistic data. Conversely, the available evidence does not cohere with the presupposition of daylight (as disambiguated from sunlight) as the prototypical referent for the noun אֹר in the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

Taken separately, none of these three arguments — frequency, markedness, and collocation — empirically prove that sunlight is the most prototypical meaning of אֹר. When considered together, however, they present an overwhelming case. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to provide another equally cogent and coherent explanation of the data. Conceivably, one could attempt to build a cognitive model on the basis of the popular twentieth-century assumption that the ancient Hebrews considered daylight as a separate phenomenon from sunlight, with the specific understanding of daylight as the most prototypical meaning for the lexeme אֹר. That model could then be compared with the one proposed in this thesis, and the merits of both evaluated against the other; but the linguistic data examined up to this point, combined with Reece's discussion of the logical inconsistencies of dissociating daylight from sunlight in the OT, demonstrates already that such a model lacks comparative explanatory power. Given all that follows below, I consider the matter concluded until a better alternative is argued. The sun is the most primitive cognitive reference point for the lexeme אֹר, and the physical phenomenon of sunlight is its most primitive and prototypical referent in BH.

As a final note before constructing the cognitive model, I have identified five key lexemes in BH that stand in close relation with אֹר, either semantically or orthographically. These are:

* נֵר – attested 91x in BH: 44x as the noun נֵר (lamp); 42x as the noun מְנוֹרָה (lampstand); and 5x as the noun נֵר (lamp);

* נֹגַה – attested 26x in BH: 19x as the noun נֹגַה (brightness); 6x as the verb נָגַה (to shine/brighten); and 1x as the noun נְגֹה (probably meaning "the sun");
• *יפע* – attested 10x in BH: 8x as the verb יָפַע (to shine); and 2x as the noun יִפְעָה (brightness, splendor);

• *הלל* – attested 6x in BH: 4x as the verb הָלַל (to shine); 1x as the verb אָהַל (to shine); and 1x as the noun הֵילֵל (morning star);

• *נהר* – attested 4x in BH: 3x as the verb נָהַר (to brighten); and 1x as the noun נְהָרָה (probably meaning "the sun").

There is a high degree of collocative correlation between all these lexemes. Not only have I taken all of them into account in constructing the cognitive model of אור, I will show how the cognitive model offers a comprehensively coherent understanding of all these lexemes.

2.3. The Idealized Cognitive Model of the Lexeme אור

As I have already explained, and will continue to argue in this thesis, the lexeme אור in BH prototypically refers to the physical phenomenon of sunlight, which simultaneously operates in three "experiential domains" (Lakoff 1987:95): the visual domain, the temporal domain, and the spatial domain.20 Technically speaking, these three are subdomains of the broader physical domain (i.e. the physical world), and as such they co-exist and overlap. All

20. Lakoff & Johnson (1980:117) define the concept of an experiential domain: "What constitutes a 'basic domain of experience'? Each such domain is a structured whole within our experience that is conceptualized as what we have called an experiential gestalt. Such gestalts are experientially basic because they characterize structured wholes within recurrent human experiences. They represent coherent organizations of our experiences in terms of natural dimensions (parts, stages, causes, etc.)" [emphasis original]. I argue that the sun's patterns of behavior as observed from the earth serve as the basic experiential gestalt which forms the prototypical sense of the lexeme אור. Langacker writes: "All human conceptualization is presumably grounded in basic domains, but for the most part this grounding is indirect, being mediated by chains of intermediate concepts derived through cognitive abilities...Once characterized relative to a basic domain, a concept creates the potential for an array of higher-order concepts and thus functions as their domain; these later concepts in turn provide the domain for the emergence of still further concepts, and so on indefinitely. In this manner—as well as through the coordination of conceptions to form conceptual complexes that may also serve as domains—vast and intricate hierarchies of conceptual complexity evolve over the long course of our mental experience" (Langacker 1987:149-150).
humanity experiences the phenomena of day and night as temporal intervals (the temporal subdomain) characterized by the accompanying phenomena of light and darkness (the visual subdomain) which appear to move up and down and across the sky (the spatial subdomain). In the same way, these three subdomains also co-exist and overlap in the conceptual world construed by the text, and the lexeme עֹר functions in all three of these domains simultaneously. Any particular attestation of the lexeme עֹר may have one or even two of these subdomains in its primary scope, but all three are operative when the lexeme is used in reference to sunlight as it exists in the physical world. Therefore, the human cognitive understanding of sunlight is not a singular concept but rather a conceptual Gestalt, what Lakoff calls an "idealized cognitive model," or ICM (Lakoff 1987:68-76; see also Langacker 1991:13).

2.3.1. The Primitive Noun

Of the 124 attestations of the substantive noun עֹר in the OT, 80 of them (64%) are referentially grounded in the physical phenomenon of celestial light. Of these, 57 attestations directly refer to objects in the physical world, and 23 attestations refer to celestial light as it is metaphorically projected into some other conceptually abstract domain. Of the 57 attestations with a physical referent: 45 attestations refer specifically to sunlight or to the sun metonymically; 3 attestations refer specifically to moonlight; 2 attestations refer specifically to starlight; and the remaining 7 attestations refer to celestial light, either ambiguously, or as light from one or more of the celestial bodies together, or as a metonym for celestial bodies. Of the 23 attestations with a metaphorical referent, I argue that all of them refer to a metaphorical projection of sunlight specifically. Therefore, of all the various referents for the substantive noun עֹר, the largest group (with 44 attestations) is sunlight as it exists in the physical domain, and the next largest group (with 23 attestations) is sunlight as it is metaphorically projected in various abstract domains.21

As stated previously, the substantive noun עֹר simply means light, referring to light of all kinds and in any form but being defined conceptually by the phenomenon of sunlight in the physical world. I will construct a cognitive model of the lexeme by observing how the nominal concept operates within each of the three domains listed above. As I will discuss lat-

21. See the addendum to this thesis (p.162) for a complete classification of the attestations of עֹר in the OT.
er in this chapter, I contend that the lexical concept of אור is then projected metaphorically into other abstract domains on the basis of the behavior of light in the physical domain (see section 2.5).

2.3.1a. אור in the Visual Subdomain. Most fundamentally, the physical phenomenon of light is something that is seen, and it marks in the physical world a visible state of being, i.e. in the condition of being visible. This stands in contrast to the physical phenomenon of darkness, which is the absence of light and therefore marks in the physical world a not-visible state of being, i.e. in the condition of not being visible. Accordingly, the lexeme אור primarily serves as a visual marker in the conceptual world construed by the OT text, as defined prototypically by the physical phenomenon of sunlight.

Because of the physical nature and properties of light, the visual domain is always in view whenever any language speaks of light as a physical phenomenon. However, the grammatical context can determine a primary domain of scope for any specific attestation of the noun. To offer some basic examples: when paired with the verb רוא (I see the light), the noun has the visual domain in its primary scope. When the noun is paired with the verb קוב (I wait for the light) or the temporal preposition עד (until the light), its primary scope is the temporal domain. When the noun is paired with the verb זרח (the light rises over me), its primary scope is the spatial domain. Sometimes the context concurrently highlights either the visual and temporal domains or the visual and spatial domains, but I do not find even one attestation in the OT where the temporal and spatial domains together are foregrounded before the visual domain.22 I must stress again that all three of these domains co-exist, and none can be referenced in the prototypical sense of אור without also referencing the other two at least to some degree.

Linguistically speaking, not all celestial light is equally represented in the BH corpus. The OT always specifies when the light of the moon or the light of the stars are in view, except in those cases where the context either explicitly or implicitly demands the inclusion of

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22. This is an example of a conceptual asymmetry, called clustering, that evidences a prototype effect. The fact that both the temporal domain and the spatial domain are paired with the visual domain but never with each other demonstrates the primacy of the visual domain when this specific lexeme is used (Lakoff 1987:50-57). This makes sense intuitively, and the linguistic data both affirms and confirms this understanding.
sunlight as a referent for the substantive noun. In the Ezekiel passage already examined, the light of the moon is specified via the use of the pronominal suffix, literally his light (Ezek 32:7). In the next verse, however, the substantive noun is used again as part of the construct phrase, all the luminaries of light. The substantive noun is not specified in the latter case, but the fact that the sun, moon, and stars have all been discussed previously in the text supports the view that this construct phrase includes the sun, as further implied by the use of the qualifier כל (all). The clearest example of the specificity of moonlight and starlight is found in Isa 13:10, but the same principle holds true in other texts as well (Ezek 32:8; Isa 30:26; Psa 148:8).23

> For the stars and their constellations will not show their light; the rising sun will be darkened, and the moon will not shine its light. [Isa 13:10]

Conversely, attestations of the substantive noun that refer to sunlight are typically unspecified in the OT, as in the following examples.

> A man could neither see his brother nor rise up from under him for three days; but for all the children of Israel there was light at their dwellings. [Exo 10:23]

> "And it will happen in that day, says the Lord God, that I will make the sun go [from sight] at noontime, and I will darken the earth in a day of light. [Amos 8:9]

The Amos text above is especially puzzling for a couple reasons, yet because of this it is also instructive. As many translations affirm, I take the construct phrase a day of light to refer specifically to a day in which the sun is visible and not obscured by clouds.24 In collo-

23. The noun נֶמר, used synonymously with אור but in reference to light that is less bright than when the sun is visible, is similarly marked when referring to starlight in Joel 2:10, 3:15.

24. The KJV translates the phrase a day of light as "the clear day," and many modern
quial English, I would say this refers to a day when "the sun is out." The most difficult concept in this passage is the suggested notion of the sun "going" (Heb. בּוֹא) at noontime. This is almost universally translated with some variation of the verbal expression "to go down," implicitly referring to the sunset. Judging from what we know about the sun and moon, however, and assuming that the heavenly bodies have not changed their fundamental properties of operation since the days of ancient Israelites, it seems highly unlikely that this expression of the sun "going" at noontime should be understood as a reference to the action of the sun dropping below the horizon. Although they were not privy to same amount of scientific data that we have today, the ancient Israelites observed the same cyclical patterns of behavior exhibited by the sun, moon and stars. They knew such cycles occur with predictable temporal regularity; they would have understood that the sun does not set at noon. In fact, although the Hebrew term for noontime (צָהֳרַיִם) is a temporal term, its definition refers to the position of the sun in actual physical space as perceived by a person standing on the earth (BDB 1906:843). The very term noon is defined by the phenomenon of the sun being at its highest point in the sky! Thus, it is conceptually problematic to understand the "going" of the sun in Amos 8:9 as a reference to the sunset, especially if a better understanding can be suggested and defended.

Once again, the principles of embodied conceptualization in CL help provide an interpretation of this coming-out/going-in language that is coherent with all the data.

An image schema is an abstract conceptual representation that results from our everyday interactions with the world. ... [One] image schema involves the notion of 'in', which can be extended from a very basic sense (where an object sits in a container) to more abstract, metaphorical senses, where one might find oneself 'in a group', 'in the know' or 'in love'. The same can be of course said for 'out', where a basic sense of not being in a container, extends metaphorically to form expressions such as 'out of the loop', 'outward looking organization' or 'coming out'.

An interesting comparison is between The stars came out and The lights went out. Here we have two uses of out which appear to be contradictory; in the first example, out refers to the stars becoming visible, in the second, out has to do with the lights being extinguished. A clue to the paradox lies in the use of come and go and the implications that these words have for the ways in which the container relation can be conceptualized. Come denotes movement (literal or metaphorical) towards the speaker; go suggests (though does not always entail) movement away from the speaker. Taking an 'external' perspective on a container, its inside is invisible and inaccessible; 'coming out' thus denotes a transition to a translations render it as "broad daylight" (NKJV, NIV, NRSV, ESV, CEB).

25. See KJV, NKJV, RSV, NIV, NRSV, ESV, CEB.
state of visibility and accessibility. ... Conversely, 'going in' denotes a transition to a state of invisibility (The stars went in). Taking an 'internal' perspective, however, 'going out' denotes a transition to a state of invisibility or inaccessibility (Taylor & Littlemore 2014:11-12, emphasis original; see also Rudzka-Ostyn 2003:1-74).

I contend that the reader ought not consider the OT descriptions of the sun and light coming out and going in as "rising" and "setting" above or below the horizon, but rather as moving in and out of the field of vision from the perspective of the sun itself (i.e. the 'external' perspective in the quote above).

This is a complex example of the conceptual metaphor The Visual Field is a Container utilizing the image schema of Containment (referenced in the earlier quote from Riemer in section 1.4).26 English speakers conceive of their visual field as a "container" – we see objects when they enter into it, and we don't see objects when they exit out of it. Furthermore, we can conceive of other objects as having their own field of vision (regardless of whether or not those objects can "see" or not) which is also a "container." When we enter into it, we can see those objects; when we exit out of it, we cannot. When I say, The sun is out, I am expressing the conceptual idea that the sun has, metaphorically speaking, "come out" of the container of its own visual field and is therefore visible to me, who am also outside the same container. Thus, when I say, The sun is out, I mean to say that the sun is visible; in the same way, I argue that BH speaks of the visibility of the sun (and its light) as "coming out" and its non-visibility as "going in." This argument is anachronistic, being derived from linguistic analysis in modern English; but the proposed use of an embodied image schema accords with both the Generalization Commitment and Cognitive Commitment of CL (see section 1.2) and is plausibly applicable to ancient languages as much as modern ones.

The principal argument in favor of this image schema explanation of the coming-out/going-in language for the sun and its light is that this understanding offers a coherent sense of the Amos passage (and others). It would not be surprising to the ancient Israelite for the sun to "go" at noontime, because clouds regularly obscure the sun. But that is not what YHWH intends to say in the speech. Rather, YHWH affirms that he himself will cause the sun to "go in" from the field of vision at noontime of a day of light, that is, a day in which sunshine is visible. Further evidence for this fundamentally visual understanding of the sun and its light

"coming out" is found in the parallel use of the verbs יָצָא and רָאָה in Isa 62:1-2 (below). The action of Israel's righteousness "coming out" corresponds with the action of the nations "seeing" it; as substantiated by cognitive semantics, the verb יָצָא here has the sense of "to appear" in the same way that the dawn "appears" in the morning.

כְּלַפִּ֥יד וִישׁוּעָ֖תָהּ צִדְקָ֔ה כַּנֹּ֙גַהּ֙ עד־יֵצֵ֤א כְּבוֹדֵ֑ךְ וְכָל־מְלָכִ֖ים צִדְקֵ֔ךְ גוֹיִם֙ וְרָא֤וּ יִקֳּבֶֽנּוּ׃

For Zion's sake I shan't be silent, and for Jerusalem's sake I shan't be quiet until her righteousness comes out like the dawn, and her salvation as a torch burns. And nations shall see your righteousness, and all kings your glory; and you shall be called by a new name that the mouth of YHWH will designate. [Isa 62:1-2]

A family of different terms in BH is used to describe various nuances of sunlight as it operates within the visual field (Reese 1990:89-94). As I have already mentioned, light is obviously contrasted to חֹשֶׁךָ (darkness), which characterizes the visual field during the regular interval of night. As I will describe in further detail below, the noun שַׁחַר (dawn) refers to the light seen in the sky prior to the rising of the sun, and נֶשֶׁף (twilight) refers to light seen after the setting of the sun.

2.3.1b. אָור in the Temporal Subdomain. The physical phenomenon of sunlight marks in the physical world the temporal interval called יום (day). This also stands in contrast to darkness, which marks the repeated temporal interval called לַיְלָה (night). In the same way, the lexeme אָור functions as a temporal marker in the conceptual world construed by the text. Other applicable temporal terms include: בֹּקֶר (morning), the general period of transition from night to day; צָהֳרַיִם (noontime), the general period when the sun is at its zenith; and עֶרֶב (evening), the general period of transition from day to night (Reece 1990:89-96; BDB 1906:133-134,787-788,843-844; HALOT 1994:151-152; HALOT 1995:877-878; HALOT 1996:1008). It must be noted that the boundaries of these terms are "fuzzy" and overlapping and not rigidly fixed, another significant feature of cognitive semantics.

The noun אָור serves as a specific temporal marker most frequently in the status constructus taking as its postconstructus the noun בֹּקֶר, yielding the lexicalized expression "the
light of the morning” (attested 8x in the OT – Judg 16:2; 1 Sam 14:36, 25:34,36; 2 Sam 17:22, 23:4; 2 Kin 7:9; Mic 2:1 – see Reece 1990:90-91). I argue that this specific phrase corresponds to the Hebrew noun שחר (dawn), referring to the sunlight seen in the sky before the sun appears on the horizon. The temporal import of this use of the noun אור is seen most clearly in the tragic narrative of the Levite and his concubine in Judges 19.

The specific temporal sequence in view is established in verse 14, when the text describes that the sun has set as the Levite and his concubine reach the Benjamite city of Gibeah. An old man takes them into his home for the night (v.20-21), and the implication is that it is well dark by the time the main drama unfolds. Starting from v.25, the reader must note carefully the temporal markers found in the text:

ומיה אלהת נבלותיה כליהללה עדכמנה
והתהנה בשעת الملكה:

...And they raped her and abused her all night until the morning, and they sent her away at the rising of the dawn. [Judg 19:25b]

Here the temporal period called בוקר follows the temporal period of לילה and commences with the rising of the dawn, not the rising of the sun. The wicked men continue to perpetuate sexual violence against the woman until they begin to see light appear in the eastern sky, at which point they let her go.

ותבא המשה ל�ות המק
ותמקת בתה ידידתה אשירה אוחנה שם עדירינו:

And the woman came as the morning turned, and she fell at the entrance of the man's house, where her master was, until the light.

[Judg 19:26]

The specific "turning" action mentioned here is unspecified, but that detail is not important for the establishment of the temporal frame. The woman makes her way back to the house and falls dead – literally at the door of the house – and remains there until a specific point of time called the light. The temporal sequence of described events, and especially the conspicuous use of the temporal preposition עד (until) before the noun אור, demands that the
specific point of time referenced by the term the light must be after the dawn has appeared and been rising in the sky.27

"And her master rose up in the morning, and he opened the door of the house, and he went out to go on his way—

and behold!—the woman, his concubine, had fallen at the entrance of the house, and her hands were on the threshold. [Judg 19:27]

The specific progression of wayyiqtol verbs here does not preclude the possibility of some temporal overlap between v.26 and v.27. The Levite may have risen up "in the morning" either before or after the specific point in time that the text calls the light. However, it is clear from the context that he does not pick her up and put her on his donkey until after that specific point in time.

Two factors are important here. First, this text offers a general scope for the Hebrew term בוקר as the time of transition from night to day, commencing with the appearance of the dawn in the sky and concluding with the establishment of the temporal period called ים (i.e. when the sun is fully visible over the horizon). Secondly, whatever is referred to as the light cannot be precisely the same as the שחר, because the שחר has already appeared and been rising in the sky. Also, it must occur sometime after the commencement of the temporal period called בוקר, because the woman did not even leave the scene to make her way to the house until the morning had begun.

Considering all this information, I contend that this entire narrative suggests the following: first, that the specific point in time called the light (with the status determinatus func-

27. This is a significant temporal detail in the text that conflicts with the twentieth-century suggestion that the noun אוֹר refers to daylight as a cosmic substance dissociated from the sun in accordance with Aalen's "pre-solar" conceptualization of daylight (Aalen 1974:150). If אוֹר referred to cosmic daylight (visible at the dawn before sunrise) instead of sunlight, then the Hebrew terms אוֹר and שָׁחַר would refer to the same physical phenomenon. Either the temporal progression in the text must become nonsense, or the semantic value of אוֹר in this particular context must be significantly stretched, perhaps more than can be reasonably explained. The concept of sunlight as the prototypical sense of אוֹר fits the available data exactly as would be expected, another indication of its greater explanatory power for the cognitive model over against the meaning of disambiguated daylight.
tioning demonstratively, see van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:190) in Judg 19:26 refers to the appearance of the sun on the horizon. This is not to say that this is true for every attestation of the substantive noun with the prefixed article in BH, because the status determinatus can and does serve other functions as well. Rather, I am affirming that when the otherwise unspecified substantive noun in the status determinatus functions demonstratively in relation to time, the prototypical event in view is the appearance of the sun on the horizon (i.e. the sunrise) and not the appearance of the dawn. When the substantive noun functions in this specific way, it always takes the article with a preposition: either עַד (until the light, Judg 19:26), or מִן (from the light, Neh 8:3), or לְ (at the light, Job 12:22, 24:14; Mic. 7:8; Zeph 3:5), or כְּ (as the light, Hab. 3:4).

Secondly, the narrative suggests that the phrase the light of the morning is a fixed expression specifically referring to the rising light of dawn visible in the sky before the sun physically appears on the horizon. Again, this follows the overall pattern of markedness already observed in the data: that the most prototypical and unmarked sense of the noun אוֹר is sunlight, and BH utilizes more specific terminology when speaking about celestial light in reference to times when the sun is not visible.

Here the temporal use of the cognitive model is made vividly clear. Linguistically, this specific use of the substantive noun אוֹר does not refer to any specific point in time but to the general light of day in contrast to the darkness of night. There are no specifying modifiers added to the noun, not even the article; the substantive simply stands on its own, referring to the light of the sun.
For YHWH has spoken thusly to me: 'I will be quiet and I will look from my dwelling, like a heat dazzling more than light, like a cloud of dew in the heat of harvest.' [Isa 18:4]

Isa 18:4 contains an unusual use of the substantive noun within the temporal domain, being compared with the phenomenon of the heat of the day during the harvest season. The Hebrew text is not extremely clear, and the specific relationship between light and heat is difficult to quantify because of the rarity of the adjective here translated dazzling (Heb. צַח). I take the preposition על in the spatial sense here functioning metaphorically, meaning that the "YHWH heat" will be greater the heat of the shining sun. One cannot make this case too strongly because of the difficulty of the Hebrew terminology, but the context seems to demand the semantic connection of אור to sunlight here. Reece (1990:72) sees this attestation of אור as referring to the sun itself; this could be the case, but the semantic extension is not necessary to make sense of the sentence (see section 2.5.1a). Either meaning of the specific term אור could be correct in this case without changing the meaning of the passage.

2.3.1c. אור in the Spatial Subdomain. The physical phenomenon of light marks in the physical world the spatial area above the ground (i.e. the abode of the living, called הארץ in BH). This stands in contrast to the spatial area below the ground (i.e. the abode of the dead, called שְׁאוֹל in BH), which is marked most notably by the concepts of darkness and death. Thus, the lexeme אור serves as a spatial marker in the conceptual world construed by the text, as understood according to an ancient Near Eastern cosmology.

The Hebrew text describes אור as rising within the spatial domain especially in collocation with the verb זַרַח ('to rise' – see Psa 112:4; Isa 58:10). This same lexeme (the verb as well as the derivative noun מִזְרָח) is the one primarily – and almost exclusively – used to describe the rising of the sun (Kohlenberger III and Swanson 1998:501,931-932). In some contexts the verb עָלָה (to rise) is used to describe the rising of the שַׁחַר ('dawn' – see Judg 19:26), but עָלָה never takes the specific noun אור as its subject. This collocative evidence strongly advocates Reece's arguments that daylight and sunlight are one and the same phenomenon in the conceptual world construed by the Hebrew text. If, as many twentieth-century scholars suggested, the noun אור referred to daylight as a separate phenomenon from sunlight, it
would be extremely strange to find the noun אֹר collocatively associated with the verbal concept describing שֶׁמֶש instead of the verbal concept describing שַׁחַר.

Five attestations of the substantive noun אֹר specifically function as a spatial marker in contrast to the concept of darkness as characteristic of the space below the ground: Job 26:10, 18:18; 28:11; Psa 112:4; and Isa 58:10.

He scribed a circle on the face of the waters, at the boundary of light with darkness. [Job 26:10]

Job 26:10 illustrates the horizon as the meeting place between light, which marks the space above the horizon, and darkness, which marks the space below the horizon (Aalen 1974:156). This helps build the spatial framework necessary for understanding the concept of bringing hidden things to light, that is, to bring things from below the ground to above the ground (Job 28:11). The context of Job 18:18 reinforces this same spatial distinction by describing death as a transition from light to darkness, which I take to refer to the action of physical decomposition. When a living thing dies, the body appears to descend into the ground, from the realm of light to the realm of darkness.

Isa 58:10 offers a classic example of a metaphorical projection of the prototypical image of sunlight (see section 2.5.2a). For now it is sufficient to note that when the pronominal suffix attached to the noun refers to a person, as in this case, the text places that person within the conceptual model in the same position and manner that persons exist in the actual physical world. When the text speaks of "your light" rising in the darkness, the metaphor is not grounded in an abstract sense of inner human light but rather in the light from the sun which rises in the sky within the visual environment of the darkness of night.

Another six attestations of the substantive noun אֹר specifically mark the abode of living things above the ground in contrast to the abode of the dead below the ground: Job 3:20, 33:28-30; Psa 36:9, 49:19, 56:13. This linguistic connection between light and life manifests itself in some different ways in BH. Job 3:20 sets them in parallel within a poetic couplet:
Why is light given to the miserable person, 
and life to the bitter of soul: 
who long for death but it doesn’t come, 
yet they search for it more than hidden treasures; 
who are glad, even rejoicing, 
they exult when they find the grave? [Job 3:20-22]

As in Job 18:18 above, the division of the spatial domain by the horizon is applied to both contrasts of life/death and light/darkness. The references to death and digging make clear that the conceptual connection between light and life in this case is spatial in nature, in literal reference to the physical world. Living things exist above the ground, in the realm of light; dead things go down under the ground to the realm of darkness.

Figure 5 – The Idealized Cognitive Model for the Lexeme אָוֹר

The operation of אָוֹר within these three experiential subdomains can be represented visually, as in Figure 5, which shows the cycle of a 24-hour day as conceptualized by the ancient Hebrews and symbolized by the linguistic terms in BH. In Figures 5, 7, and 8 (see above and below), the visual terms are indicated in blue type, the temporal terms are indicated in red type, and the spatial terms are indicated in green type. This visual representation
depicts the experiential *Gestalt* that defines the prototypical concept of שָׁמָשׁ in BH; throughout this thesis I will refer to this *Gestalt* as the idealized cognitive model (ICM) of שָׁמָשׁ in the OT.

2.3.2. The Denominative Verb

I have demonstrated how the verb שָׁמָשׁ prototypically occurs in the Hiphil stem and, in simplest terms, means *to generate light* – referring to the generation of light from a light source as defined conceptually by the generation of light by the sun in the physical world. In its prototypical sense, the substantive noun שָׁמָשׁ is always the direct object (either explicit or implicit) of the Hiphil verb. The operation of the lexical verb can be illustrated by examining the relationship it expresses between three prototypical physical substantives: (1) the sun, i.e. a light source, which is the subject of the action; (2) light itself, which is the direct object of the action; and (3) the earth, i.e. the lighted object, which is the indirect object of the action. The Hiphil expresses a transitive action, describing the relationship between the subject and the direct object in the mental grammar.

אָרֶץ לַשְׂמָשׁ שָׁמָשׁ. *The sun shines light.*

I argue that the Hiphil form of the lexical verb prototypically functions as a causative, meaning that the substantive noun שָׁמָשׁ (as the direct object of the action of the Hiphil verb) shifts to being the subject (again, either explicit or implicit) of the action expressed by the Qal verb (van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:86). The Qal form indicates an intransitive action (to brighten), describing the relationship between the direct object and the indirect object of the verbal action symbolized by the lexical verb.

שָׁמָשׁ לַאָרֶץ. *Light brightens the earth.*

Thus, the Hiphil verb focuses on the cause of the verbal action, and the Qal verb focuses on its effect. The Niphal stem only occurs twice in the entire OT and never as a finite verb; therefore, it is impossible to conclude any definitive prototypical sense of the Niphal

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28. For ease of reference I have rendered the *qatal* forms of the Hebrew verbs with the English present tense in the two sample sentences. The translation values should not be taken as either universal or prototypical.
stem of this verb. Both attestations must be treated entirely on their own based on the context.

2.3.2a. The Hiphil Form. The Hiphil form of the verb אָרַד indicates transitive action, expressing the relationship between a light source (as the subject of the verb) and light itself. The Hiphil verb אָרַד often takes a specified indirect object, either in the object position or as a prepositional phrase, but always implies the substantive noun אָרַד as its direct object whether specified or not. I have already examined two of the three attestations of the Hiphil verb that pertain directly to the conceptual prototype of sunlight (Gen 1:14-19 and Ezek 32:7-8); the other is Psa 139:12.

At first glance, the use of the verb in Psa 139:12 appears nonsensical because the Hiphil verb takes the noun לַיְלָה (night) as its subject. How is it possible for night to shine, as demanded by the grammatical construction? This is an important example of a case where the ICM provides an explanation for an attestation of the lexeme that appears to be an exception to the rule; this is due to the modifying prepositional phrase כַּיּוֹם (like the day). The psalmist here utilizes a sophisticated metonymic play on words, substituting the words לַיְלָה and יוֹם for darkness and sunlight (or rather the sun, to be exact). The Hiphil verb is used because the temporal period of "day" is marked by the visibly shining sun. This is contrasted to the use of the Qal verb in Gen 44:3, where the subject is the morning rather than the day (see discussion below), which indicates a temporal period not marked by the visibly shining sun but by sunlight during a time when the sun itself is not visible. The use of the different verbal forms in the texts is completely coherent with the ICM presented in Figure 5.

I have mentioned already that the lexeme נגַה functions as a synonym of אָרַד; it also contains a substantive noun (attested 19x in the OT, with one additional attestation in a feminine form) and cognate verb (attested 6x in the OT – 3x in the Hiphil stem and 3x in the Qal stem). Because of the very close semantic relationship between these two lexemes, it is worthwhile to observe the two lexemes side-by-side. This is especially helpful for the use of the Hiphil verb, because all three attestations of the Hiphil form of נגַה have very similar grammatical statements that utilize the Hiphil form of אָרַד.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ezek 32:7</th>
<th>Isa 13:10</th>
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| אֶת־כֹּכְבֵיהֶם וְהִקְדַּרְתִּי שָׁמַיִם בְכַבּוֹתְךָ וְכִסֵּיתִי אָוָם לֹא־יָאִיר וְיָרֵ֖חַ אֲכַסֶּ֔נּוּ בֶּעָנָ֣ ן שֶׁ֚מֶשׁ יָהֵ֖לּוּ לֹ֥א וּכְסִילֵיהֶ֔ם הַשָּׁמַ֙יִם כִּֽי־כוֹכְבֵ֤י אֹרֽוֹ׃ | כְּרִכְבּוֹבָםּ הַשָּׁמַ֙יִם לֹא־יָאִיר אֵ֥לֶּה אֵֽלִים חָשַׁ֥ק וְיָרֵ֖חַ אֲכַסֶּ֔נּוּ בֶּעָנָ֣ ן שֶׁ֚מֶשׁ יָהֵ֖לּוּ לֹ֥א וּכְסִילֵיהֶ֔ם הַשָּׁמַ֙יִם כִּֽי־כוֹכְבֵ֤י אֹרֽוֹ׃ For the stars of heaven and their constella-
| I will cover the heavens when I extinguish you, and I will darken the stars; I will cover the sun by a cloud, and the moon will not shine [אָוָם] its light. | I will cover the heavens when I extinguish you, and I will darken the stars; the sun will be darkened in its appearing, and the moon will not shine [בֶּעָנָ֣ ן] its light. |

**2 Sam 22:29**

כִּֽי־אַתָּ֥ה יַגִּ֨יהַ אֱ֝לֹהַ֗י יְהוָ֥ה נֵרִ֑י תָּאִ֣יר כִּֽי־אַתָּ֥ה יַגִּ֨יהַ אֱ֝לֹהַ֗י יְהוָ֥ה נֵרִ֑י For you are my lamp, O YHWH; and YHWH illuminates [נָגַהּ] my darkness.

**Psa 18:28**

כִּֽי־אַתָּ֥ה יַגִּ֨יהַ אֱ֝לֹהַ֗י יְהוָ֥ה נֵרִ֑י תָּאִ֣יר כִּֽי־אַתָּ֥ה יַגִּ֨יהַ אֱ֝לֹהַ֗י יְהוָ֥ה נֵרִ֑י For you light [אָוָם] my lamp; YHWH my God illuminates [נָגַהּ] my darkness.

**Figure 6 – Verbal Synonyms for אָוָם**

These four passages illustrate the close verbal synonymy between אָוָם and נָגַהּ, especially in Ezek 32:7 and Isa 13:10, where the two verbs directly substitute each other in the same thought, *the moon will not shine its light*. Two other verbal synonyms for אָוָם, the verbs יָפַע (*"to shine" – attested 8x in the OT) and הָלַל (*"to shine" – attested 4x in the OT, including Isa 13:10 above), both appear always in the Hiphil stem and only in poetry. In BH, the physical action of shining is described prototypically (and perhaps universally) using the Hiphil stem.

**2.3.2b. The Qal Form.** The Qal form of the verb אָוָם indicates intransitive action, expressing the relationship between light itself (as the subject) and the lighted object. The six attestations of the Qal verb אָוָם are found in Gen 44:3, 1 Sam 14:27 (*Qere* only), 14:29, 25:3, 31:26, 41:18; a derived form of this same verbal root לָאֶהַל is also found in Job 25:5.

29. The verb יָפַע is attested in Deut 33:2; Psa 50:2, 80:1, 94:1; Job 3:4, 10:3,22, 37:15. The verb הָלַל is attested in Isa 13:10; Job 29:3, 31:26, 41:18; a derived form of this same verbal root לָאֶהַל is also found in Job 25:5.

30. See also Job 22:28 and Isa 9:2, where the substantive noun אָוָם is the subject of the Qal verb נָגַהּ.
29:10, 2 Sam 2:32, Prov 4:18, and Isa 60:1. Having established that the Hiphil stem is the prototypical form of this particular verb, those attestations of the verb that occur in other stems should be scrutinized carefully for further information that can be induced regarding its fundamental meaning.

The morning brightened, and the men were sent away, they and their donkeys. [Gen 44:3]

I consider it significant here that the Qal verb takes the specific temporal term בוקר as its subject rather than the temporal term יום (in opposition to לילה as in Psalm 139, which utilizes the Hiphil form). I have shown from Judges 19 how the term בוקר refers to the general period of transition between night and day, marked by the phenomenon of light visible in the sky before the sun appears on the horizon. In this verse, I argue that the term בוקר is a metonym for the noun אור in the same way that יום is a metonym for שמש in Psa 139:12. By utilizing the technical term בוקר as the subject of the Qal verb, the text indicates here that the men left after the dawn but before the sunrise. The ICM that I propose for the lexical verb provides a fully coherent and consistent explanation for why Psa 139:12 utilizes the Hiphil form whereas Gen 44:3 utilizes the Qal form. This is difficult to explain otherwise, because in both instances the subjects of the verbs are the same kind of temporal noun; one would naturally expect the same kind of verb in both cases.

Two more attestations of the Qal form (1 Sam 29:10 and 2 Sam 2:32) take an impersonal subject and an indirect object specified by the preposition ל with a pronominal suffix. It is possible to understand the Qal form as a stative in these attestations (...it is light for you/them...), but I see no convincing reason to deviate from the intransitive here (...it brightens for you/them...). In either case, the use of the lexical verb again implies the use of the lexical noun. The substantive noun אור can be supplied as the subject of the Qal verb, just as it can be supplied as the direct object of the Hiphil verb without changing the meaning of the sentence. One can express the same concept with the words It is light for you/them or Light is for you/them; and the same is true for the phrases It brightens for you/them and Light brightens for them. Regardless, the fundamental referent of the verb within the conceptual model
remains the same; as in Genesis 44:3, the Qal stem signifies the visibility of sunlight prior to
the visibility of its source, the sun. The use of the Qal verb in Prov 4:18 provides even
greater clarity, since the lexical verb takes the lexical noun as its explicit subject:

וַהֲולֵךְ נֹ֑גַהּ כְּא֣וֹר צַ֭דִּיקִים וְאֹ֣רַח הַיּֽוֹם׃

The way of the righteous is like the light of dawn,
progressively brightening until the day is established. [Prov 4:18]

Here the Qal participle is paired with the Qal participle of קָזָה, indicating a gradual
progression of action similar to the infinitive absolute (BDB 1906:232-233[4d]; van der Mer-
we, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:159-160). The phrase the light of dawn (literally, "the light of
brightness") exhibits the same pattern of markedness as was true of the phrase the light of the
morning: when referring to light of a time other than when the sun is visible, the noun אוֹר always
takes a linguistic modifier that indicates greater specificity. In this case, the combina-
tion of the substantive noun with the term נֹ֑גַהּ connotes the concept of light that is not as
bright as the prototypical sunlight. The contextual referent is clear in this case: the text
refers to the light of the dawn which precedes the sunrise and grows brighter and brighter
until the sun has fully risen and "the day is established."

The lexeme נֹ֑גַהּ follows the same pattern as אוֹר in its verbal form, taking the noun אוֹר
as the object of the Hiphil stem but the subject of the Qal stem (Job 18:5, 22:28; Isa 9:1).
The literary image of the dawn rising over Jerusalem (situated atop Mt. Zion) features promi-
nently in both Isaiah 9 and Isaiah 60 and illustrates the synonymous relationship between
the two lexemes. One could substitute the Qal form of the verb אוֹר in Isa 9:1 for the Qal form of
the verb נֹ֑גַהּ without changing the meaning of the sentence. As with the verb אוֹר, the use of
the Qal form indicates the action of the brightening dawn in contrast to the Hiphil form that
indicates the action of the shining sun.

This fundamental understanding of the Qal verb – as prototypically referring to the
phenomenon of sunlight visible in the sky when the sun itself is not visible – aligns with all

31. Compare with Ezek 32:8, Job 22:28 and Isa 9:2. This is a pattern throughout BH: when
the nouns אוֹר and נֹ֑גַהּ are collocatively paired, the term נֹ֑גַהּ refers to the dimmer light, with
אוֹר referring to sunshine when the sun is visible in the sky.
the other linguistic evidence, both nominal and verbal, supporting the phenomenon of sunlight as the conceptual prototype for the lexeme אור in reference to the actual experience of sunlight in the physical world.

2.3.2c. The Niphal Form. There are only two attestations of the Niphal stem of the verb אור in the entire OT. In Job 33:30, the Niphal infinitive is a verbal adjunct and functions as a passive, to be enlightened. In the mental grammar, the indirect object of the verbal action has become the subject of the action described by the Niphal form. According to the conceptual prototype, the Niphal here should be properly considered as a passive of the Qal, not the Hiphil, because the stipulated object of the passive verb is light itself and not the light source.

The semantic meaning of the Niphal stem in Psa 76:4 is much more difficult to determine from the context. Here the Niphal participle functions as a predicate adjective describing God himself. The passive sense seems unlikely in this case, because God is described as a source of light in the OT and not a recipient of it. I take the Niphal here as describing a reflexive action, meaning that God both generates and receives his own light. It seems likely that this attestation utilizes some kind of metaphorical projection, however, and the context for this specific phrase is very unclear. This attestation is further complicated by a textual issue, because the LXX translates this participle with the Greek φωτίζεις, which would reflect a Hiphil yiqtol verb in the Hebrew text rather than a Niphal participle. In my judgment, this gives further weight to the reflexive sense of the Niphal in this case over against the passive sense. Thus, an argument can be made that the Niphal form functions as both a passive of the Qal stem and a reflexive of the Hiphil stem, but two attestations simply do not provide enough data to conclude a definitive prototypical function of the Niphal form.

The lexical data concerning the Hiphil and Qal verbal forms can be consistently understood within the ICM of אור as visually represented in Figure 7 (below). The Hiphil form of the verb אור as well as other verbs of shining (see Figure 10) refers to the transitive action of a light source shining light, as prototypically defined by the shining sun. This is differentiated from the Qal form of the verb אור (also נָגַה and נָהַר), which refers to the intransitive action of light illuminating an object, as prototypically defined by sunlight which is visible in the sky even when the sun itself is not visible.
2.3.3. The Derivative Noun

As noted earlier, the derivative noun מָאוֹר is attested in the OT only one-sixth as many times as the primitive noun and one-half as many times as the denominative verb; therefore, the derivative noun should be analyzed in accordance with the nominal and verbal data and not vice versa. Seven of the 19 total attestations of מָאוֹר refer to one or more of the celestial luminaries, and most of these passages have been discussed already. In these cases, the derived noun consistently functions as the subject of the action of the Hiphil verb, either as a finite verb or verbal adjunct (Gen 1:14-19; Ezek 32:8). One of these seven attestations is found in Psa 74:16, and while not statistically significant, by functioning as a metonym for the moon it imports some theological freight to the current study. I will discuss this passage in detail later in the chapter as part of the section concerning the metonymic extension of the lexeme (see section 2.5.1d). The main point here is that the use of the derivative noun in the OT neither affects nor contributes substantially to the construction of the conceptual prototype of the overall lexeme. Rather, I argue that the derivative noun מָאוֹר is best understood via the same ICM; the prototypical luminary in BH is the sun (see Figure 8 below).
2.4. Referential Expansion of the Idealized Cognitive Model

One can easily conceive how this ICM could be expanded to refer to other kinds of light and light sources in the physical world. The fundamental concepts of the primitive noun and the denominative verb remain exactly the same; only the light source changes, that is, the conceptual subject of the lexeme. This is very much like the use of English term *hand* which is prototypically a noun (referring to a body part) but includes a matching verb; except in the case of *hand*, the object of the verbal action referentially expands rather than its subject. I can *hand* any number of objects to another person, yet the action of *hand-*ing remains the same, as does the implied subject performing the action, a *hand*. In the case of the lexeme אור the intrinsic verbal action of *generating light* remains the same, which, as I have already explained, always necessitates the more primitive substantive concept *light* as its direct object.

2.4.1. The Moon and Stars

The nearest degree of referential expansion occurs within the category of celestial light, with the inclusion of the other celestial bodies (i.e. the moon and stars) as sources of light. The fact that the other celestial bodies stand in closer semantic proximity to the prototypical center than the other referents listed below is indicated by the applicable collocative data (see section 2.2.3). Although the number of attestations is relatively few, sunlight, moonlight and starlight are collocatively paired with one another in some contexts, whereas none of the three is ever paired with any of the other expanded referents. This data yields the
conclusion that celestial light is a distinct category of light in BH; thus, if sunlight is the prototypical core, celestial light is the densest part of the semantic cloud immediately surrounding that core.

Moving out from the category of celestial light, the most common of the expanded referents of the lexeme is the physical phenomenon of fire. Naturally, the same primitive referents in the mental grammar apply to fire that apply to the sun. Fire is a light source (derived noun מאור as the subject) that generates light (Hiphil verb אוֹר + substantive noun אוֹר as direct object) that is directed toward some other object (i.e. an indirect object). The same can be said for other light sources as well: lightning, the creature Leviathan, even God. These uses of the lexeme do not represent any kind of metaphorical projection of the prototypical referent onto a different and more abstract domain; that is, light does not stand as a symbol for some other abstract concept in these attestations. The fundamental meaning of the lexeme remains exactly the same, but the concept is expanded to include other physical referents besides the sun and other heavenly bodies.

2.4.2. Fire

There are 21 attestations of the lexeme אוֹר that, in the conceptual world of the text, refer to the physical phenomenon of fire in comparison to the 58 attestations that refer directly to the prototypical concept of sunlight. In Isa 27:10 and Mal 1:10 the Hiphil verb refers to the specific action of burning rather than the typical sense of fire shining light on some other object (see section 2.5.1f). Jer 25:10 utilizes the substantive noun in the construct phrase light of the lamp as one of a series of items that God will abolish as part of his divine judgment on the nation. The overwhelming majority of these references to physical fire specifically refer to two objects described in the Pentateuch: the theophanic pillar of fire in the exodus story, and the tabernacle menorah.

2.4.2a. The Theophanic Pillar of Fire. YHWH's appearance as a pillar of cloud and fire is introduced in Exo 13:21.

And YHWH went before them by day in a pillar of cloud to lead them on the way, and by night in a pillar of fire to shine for them as they went day and night. [Exo 13:21]
The text specifies the function of the nightly fire was to give them light (Hiphil verb אֹר, see also Exo 14:20, Psa 105:39) for the overarching purpose of leading their way in both the light of day and the darkness of night (Psa 78:14; Neh 9:12,19). These 6 attestations are difficult to categorize specifically because of the conceptual overlap with the notion of YHWH himself as a light source. I have kept them separate in this study and included them here because the actual referent of the term in these cases includes the physical phenomenon of fire and is not merely disambiguated light which comes directly from God himself (as seems to be the case with the others).

2.4.2b. The Tabernacle Menorah. There are ten attestations of the derived noun מָאוֹר that have the physical phenomenon of fire for their referent, all of which occur in the Pentateuch and specifically refer to the tabernacle menorah. Of these ten, 8 of them are attested as the postconstructus of the noun שֶׁם – literally oil of the luminary or oil for the luminary – designating oil that would be used as fuel for the lamps placed on the lampstand. In these contexts, the derived noun מָאוֹר functions as a synonym of the term מְנוֹרָה (lampstand), apparently to draw attention to its function within the tabernacle, that is, to provide light during the night hours (see Exo 27:21, also compare to Psa 136:7 in reference to the moon). The imagery of the nightly flame utilized in the tabernacle may also symbolize the divine presence as manifested in the theophanic pillar of fire of the Exodus narrative, but there are no explicit linguistic connections.

2.4.2c. Potential Exceptions to the Cognitive Model

There are two metaphorical uses of firelight in the book of Job that represent possible exceptions to the cognitive model. In Job 18:5 the text uses a Qal form of the verb נָגַה (a lexical synonym of אֹר) where the analyst would expect to find the Hiphil form according to the ICM. I take this metaphorical use of firelight as an example of the WISDOM IS LIGHT conceptual metaphor (see section 2.5.2b) discussed later in the thesis, but I am discussing the verse here because this phrase appears to represent an exception to the cognitive model being
presented. I have asserted that the lexeme נגה functions as a full lexical synonym to אור, yet this attestation seems not to follow the model.

Indeed, the light of the wicked is extinguished, and the flame of his fire does not shine. [Job 18:5]

This attestation could represent a legitimate exception to the model, and it certainly would be if the subject of the Qal verb נגה was simply אִשּׁוֹ (his fire) instead of אִשּׁוֹ שְׁבִיב (the flame of his fire). The term שְׁבִיב is a hapax legomena in BH and is probably related to the same word שְׁבִיב in Biblical Aramaic, which means "flame" (BDB 1906:985,1114). However, it is impossible to determine the precise meaning of this word in BH from a single use. If this word שְׁבִיב refers in some way to the light which comes from fire, then the use of the Qal form accords perfectly with the cognitive model. However, the matter is inconclusive.

When [God's] lamp shined over my head, by his light I walked in darkness. [Job 29:3]

In this verse, the infinitive construct form of the verb הָלַל takes the noun נֵר (lamp) as its subject. However, there is some disagreement whether the verb here occurs in the Hiphil stem or the Qal stem: BDB classifies this as a Qal infinitive (BDB 1906:237), whereas both HALOT and the BHS apparatus consider this a Hiphil infinitive (HALOT 1994:248), as would be expected according to the ICM. It seems better to read this attestation as a Hiphil in accordance with the other three attestations of the verb in BH. There is a similar problem as in the previous example, because this is the only instance of the infinitive form of this verb in the entire OT. There simply is not enough information to draw firm conclusions.

The best judgment the analyst can make of these attestations is to acknowledge them as potential exceptions to the cognitive model and recognize that there is insufficient data to determine conclusively whether they are legitimate exceptions or not. Even if both these attestations do represent genuine exceptions to the cognitive model, it seems highly unlikely that these two instances of verbal synonyms of אור significantly impact the correctness of the
cognitive model, especially since these are metaphorical uses and do not indicate physical referents.

2.4.3. Lightning

The primitive noun and the Hiphil verb are also used in the OT to refer to the physical phenomenon of lightning. Two attestations of the verb, in Psa 77:19 and 97:4, are repetitions of the same phrase, that lightning shines on the world. As before, the sense of the lexical terms remains exactly the same, only with a different light source functioning as the subject of the verbal action.

The sound of your thunder is in the whirlwind, lightnings illuminate the world; the earth trembles and shakes. [Psa 77:19]

His lightnings illuminate the world; the earth sees and trembles. [Psa 97:4]

The references of the primitive noun to lightning are slightly more problematic, especially in Job 36-38, but the general context of storm imagery convincingly suggests that lightning is in view here (Job 36:30,32; 37:3,11,15; 38:25). Lightning could be conceptualized here as light itself (i.e. the physical substance), but it is more likely that the substantive noun אוֹר is being used as a metonym for ברָּק in these attestations (see section 2.5.1c), indicating lightning as the source of light. The introduction of the imagery in Job 36:30-32 provides some helpful clues:

Behold! [God] scatters about him his light; and he covers the roots of the sea. For by them he judges the peoples; he gives food, multiplying it. He covers light over his hands; then he commands it to strike. [Job 36:30-32]
Of unique importance is the identification of light in Job 36-37 as "his light" (referring to God), and the imagery here develops a wider OT theme of lightning as God's weaponry – especially arrows and/or spears, conspicuous as weapons of attack wielded by the hand. The specific image described in Job 36:32 is instructive for the conceptualization of lightning as light generated by God himself (presumably residing in the heavens, Heb. שמים) which then enters the earth (Heb. אָרֶץ) and functions the same as light from any other light source discussed in this thesis. Thus, these attestations of אור ought to be understood as indicating a special class of light that uniquely originates from God himself instead of a celestial body.

Here the analyst encroaches upon a further difficulty, however, because it strains observational credibility to think that the ancient Israelites envisioned lightning as actually having traversed the entire physical distance from Heaven to Earth. Once in Job 37 lightning is referred to by the expression, the light of his cloud, with the personal pronoun referring to God and the postcontractus noun 'cloud' meaning source (van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze 1999:199). I see no reason to think that these are disparate or conflicting images, especially since the narrative places them in the mouth of the same speaker, even within the same speech. Perhaps God is being conceptualized here as bodily resident in the cloud itself; but I consider it more likely that the bodily conception of God (and the attending reference to light covering his hands) here operates metaphorically, depicting some sort of metaphysical reality interacting with physical reality. Lightning comes from the cloud, but at the same time, it also comes from God. In this way, lightning is a unique light source because it is depicted (I argue) as actually sourced in God as opposed to the light from other physical light sources.

The sun and moon stood in their place; for light went your arrows, for brightness the lightning of your spear. [Hab 3:11]

Hab 3:11 presents a complex layering of celestial light imagery; that is, the imagery of lightning as YHWH's weaponry overlays the matrix of terms for the light of the sun and moon. As is common in BH, the parallel pairing of אור and נגה refers to sunlight and moonlight, respectively; in this case, however, YHWH's lightning is given the role of sunlight and moonlight via the use of the ל preposition (see van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze 1999:285). It is significant that the lightning being described in this case is not a typical weather event, as appears to be in the case in Job 36-38, but the perceptible effects of a storm theophany.
The same could also be the case in Psa 77:19 and 97:4, but the context is inconclusive. Nevertheless, the conceptualization of lightning remains the same, whether theophanic or natural; lighting is uniquely conceptualized as light sourced in God himself rather than a specific natural light source.

### 2.4.4. Leviathan

Two attestations of the lexeme – one being the primitive noun, the other the denominate verb – refer to certain by-products of the creature Leviathan. Specifically, his sneezes flash forth light, and he leaves a shining trail in his wake.

כְּעַפְעַפֵּי־שָֽׁחַר׃ וְ֝עֵינָ֗יו א֑וֹר תָּ֣הֶל עֲ‍ֽ֭֭טִישֹׁתָיו

*His sneezes shine light; and his eyes are like the eyelids of the dawn.* [Job 41:10]

אתָרִי יָאִ֣יר נַעֲבְּרֶ֣בֶן תָּ֣הֶלֶת לִשְׁרוֹנָ֔ה׃

*Behind him shines a wake; he reckons the deep as gray-haired.* [Job 41:24]

These references could be a further extension of fire as a light source (see section 2.4.2) if Leviathan is identified as a creature that destroys by its fiery breath and leaves a path a burning destruction behind it, such as an "igneous dragon" in some mythical traditions (Reece 1990:71). There is not enough lexical data to come to any firm conclusions about the specific referent in these cases, only that the text affirms that light is produced in some way by the creature identified in the text as Leviathan.

### 2.4.5. Light as a Generic Material Substance

The three attestations of the primitive noun אוֹר in the book of Ecclesiastes all occur in the *status determinatus*. This is not uncommon – although אוֹר is usually indefinite in BH – but the fact that all three attestations in this book take the prefixed article bears closer examination.

מִן־הַחֹֽשֶׁךְ׃ הָא֖וֹר כִּֽיתְר֥וֹן מִן־הַסִּכְל֑וּת לַֽחָכְמָ֖ה יִתְר֛וֹן שֶׁיֵּ֥שׁ אָ֔נִי וְרָאִ֣יתִי

*And I myself saw that wisdom is better than folly, as light is better than darkness.* [Eccl 2:13]

וכְּחִזֵּ֣ק לוֹחֵ֑ם לְעֵינִ֣ים לָאֲבָדָ֖ת אַיּוֹת׃

*And light is sweet,*
and it is pleasant for the eyes to see the sun. [Eccl 11:7]

Based on the wider context of these attestations as well as the philosophical slant of the book as a whole, I argue that these instances all reflect the generic use of the *status determinatus* (van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:190), referring to light as a general substance without any specific light source in view. Qoheleth grounds their evaluation of wisdom and folly in the universal human experience of the physical phenomena of light and darkness: light is better than darkness; in the same way, wisdom is better than folly. The writer here appeals to an assumed presupposition on the part of the reader, that they consider light better than darkness.

In Eccl 11:7, one can make an argument for the temporal demonstrative use of the *status determinatus* because of the noun occurring in parallel with "the sun," yielding the following translation: *Sunrise is sweet, and it is good for the eyes to see the sun.* This understanding of the specific line of poetry coheres within itself but does not adhere to the understanding of the surrounding context as a whole. Qoheleth is not seeking to make some point about the object of the sun; rather, the writer is appealing back to the earlier philosophical assertion about light and darkness, offering the human emotional response to the sun as evidence for its validity. The writer then builds an additional assertion atop this foundational treatment of light and darkness, advising the reader to enjoy the pleasant days "of light" in one's youth, because as one grows old, the sorrowful days "of darkness" are coming (Eccl 11:9-12:7).

A generic sense of the *status determinatus* in Eccl 12:2 also fits the contextual flow of the argument. The author places the definite noun יָאוֹר in a series describing the phenomenon of old age blindness. Qoheleth is affirming that in one's old age, one loses the ability to see light of any kind, including the sun, moon and stars. The order of the nouns seems puzzling in this regard, because one would expect יָאוֹר to come first in the series (even as I myself did in the above sentence). I surmise that the normal convention of speaking in BH would, in fact, place the noun יָאוֹר first, but that in the present case the poet moved the noun
to the first position for phonaesthetic purposes, to preserve the unbroken rhythm of consecutive "sh" sounds on stressed syllables in the first line of the couplet.

Qoheleth's philosophical treatment of the metaphysical concept of wisdom and its correlation to the physical phenomenon of light (as a generic substance in and of itself) offers a significant window into the *philosophy* of light in the ancient Hebrew conceptual world. The text of Ecclesiastes presupposes the reader will attach certain emotional responses to the physical phenomena of light and darkness and directly appeals to those emotional responses in an attempt to persuade the reader of certain metaphysical assertions concerning wisdom and folly. These philosophical issues will be picked up later in the thesis, both in the discussion of the metaphorical projection of the concept of light in the ancient Hebrew conceptual world and the application of the Hebrew philosophy of light toward a specific *theology* of light.

And I will bring the blind by a way they do not know; in paths they do not know I will guide them; I will turn the darkness before them to light, and the rough places to level ground: these are the things that I do, and I do not forsake them. [Isa 42:16]

Here the phenomenon of blindness is being conceptualized using the generic concepts of darkness and light; that is, a blind person has darkness in front of them, whereas a seeing person has light in front of them. The specific referent for the term *אָוֹר* is not localized to any particular light source, only that YHWH will turn the blind people's darkness into light. The context seems to indicate that this language is not being used to describe literal blindness (v.19-20), but neither is it entirely certain what precisely is meant by "blindness" here. In my opinion, the best understanding of this passage is that idolatry is being conceptualized as blindness/darkness, and the worship of YHWH as sight/light. However, it is clear from the context and the use of the *status determinatus* of both אָוֹר and חֹשֶׁךְ that these are being referred to as generic phenomena; thus, the referent of אָוֹר here is the generic physical substance *light*, as in the Ecclesiastes texts.
2.4.6. Divine Light

The question of YHWH himself as a light source in the OT is a puzzling one for several reasons, but especially because the modern reader cannot always be certain of the specific referent in the physical world. The psalmist exultantly writes in Psa 118:27, *YHWH is God, and he shines for us!* But it is not clear from the text what specifically is being referred to as YHWH. This could be a reference to a physical object as a light source, but if so, the reader is not instructed what that is. If the writer in this instance conceives of YHWH as a sun-god (see section 3.8), then this could be a reference to the sun. Alternatively, the wayyiqtol verb could be understood as a past action – *YHWH is God, and he has shined for us!* – in which case this might very well be a reference to the theophanic pillar of fire from the exodus narrative, but there are no contextual clues in the text to confirm that assumption. One could also make an argument that these lines do not reflect any specific physical referent at all but are simply metaphorical projections to convey some abstract metaphysical reality. Thus, the psalmist might be communicating that YHWH shows them how to live, or directs them on their path, or is favorably disposed toward them, or any other abstract concept for which the phenomenon of light might serve as a physical metaphor. The linguistic data simply does not give any information in this regard. What the reader can glean from these lines is that the writer is speaking of YHWH as a light source who himself generates light, in either some physical or metaphysical sense.

Because of this ambiguity in the linguistic data, I have collated the references to YHWH as a light source into a separate category for further observation. There are 11 specific lexical attestations which refer to YHWH as a source of light – Isa 2:5, 51:4, 60:1,3,19,20; Ezek 43:2; Mic 7:8; Psa 76:5, 104:2, 118:27.

> YHWH is God, and he shines for us;
*bind the festival sacrifice with cords to the horns of the altar:* [Psa 118:27]

> Glorious are you, and majestic
*from the mountains of prey.* [Psa 76:5]
These two passages utilize verbal forms of אור when speaking of YHWH. Psa 118:27 is the most direct assertion of YHWH as a source of light, placing the divine name as the subject of the Hiphil verb. The Niphal form in Psa 76:4 is problematic, both textually and semantically, but there are a few contextual clues that provide some guidance. The LXX translates this verb as from a Hiphil yiqtol, φωτίζεις ("You shine wonderfully from the eternal mountains."). Also, the subsequent pairing of light with the concepts of splendor and majesty in Psa 104:2 suggests that the psalmists in all these texts conceived YHWH as divinely radiant in some way.

לָבָֽשְׁתָּ׃ וְהָדָ֣ר ה֭וֹד מְּאֹ֑ד גָּדַ֣לְתָּ אֱ֭לֹהַי יְהוָ֣ה אֶת־יְה֫וָ֥ה נַפְשִׁ֗י בָּרֲךִ֥י כַּיְרִיעָֽה׃

Bless YHWH, O my soul; YHWH, my God, you are exceedingly great!
You are clothed with majesty and splendor; wrapped with light as a garment: having stretched out the heavens like a tent; ...

In this text, the term light stands in apposition to the pair of nouns majesty and splendor. The psalmist does not praise YHWH for generating light specifically but rather declares that YHWH has clothed himself with majesty, splendor, and light; that is, the chosen verbs denote the action of putting something on oneself, which also presumes the potentiality of the converse action of removing it. We should notice the monarchical overtones here; YHWH wears light like a king wears his royal robe. In other words, the depiction of the divine light in Psa 104 implies that it is something which YHWH is able to put on and remove, much like the Akkadian concept melammu (see section 3.5).

זָרָֽח׃ עָלַ֥יִךְ יְהוָ֖ה וּכְבוֹד אֲוֹרֵ֑ךְ בָ֣א כִּ֣י א֖וֹרִי קוּמִי לְאֻמִּ֑ים לְאֻמִּ֖ים וַעֲרָפֶ֖ל יִזְרַ֙ח וְעָלַ֙יִךְ לְנֹ֥גַה וּמְלָכִ֖ים לְאוֹרֵ֑ךְ גוֹיִ֖ם וְהָלְכ֥ו גוֹיִ֖ם לְנֹ֥גַה וּמְלָכִ֖ים לְאוֹרֵ֑ךְ

Arise, shine, for your light has appeared, and the glory of YHWH has risen over you. For behold! darkness covers the earth, and thick darkness the peoples; but over you YHWH is rising, and his glory over you is being seen. And nations will come to your light, and kings to the brightness of your dawn. [Isa 60:1-3]
Here the concept of divine radiance becomes even further complicated by the mixed images of the glory of יְהֹוָה and the phenomenon of sunlight. The prophet clearly depicts יְהֹוָה himself as the source of light throughout Isaiah 60, but this assertion is layered over the visual terminology which constructs the ICM of sunlight (see Figure 4). One could substitute the word השמש for יְהֹוָה in these verses, and the text would perfectly depict the typical scene of the morning dawn. Yet one cannot say that יְהֹוָה is being depicted as the sun in this case, because the concepts are carefully distinguished from one another at the end of the oracle. Neither can one say that יְהֹוָה is being depicted as either a sun-god or a moon-god, because the text is equivocally clear that יְהֹוָה takes the place of both the sun and the moon as the source of light for the earth within the scene depicted by the text. Obviously, יְהֹוָה has not replaced either the sun or the moon in the actual physical world, since we still see the sun and moon today. A likely explanation could be that the writer here is describing something in their own conceptual world that does not exist in the physical world, such as a vision or a dream or a prediction of a physical event that has not yet occurred. Alternatively, the writer could be accessing some unspecified conceptual relationship between יְהֹוָה and light which provides the philosophical basis for the comparative imagery.

2.5. Semantic Extension of the Idealized Cognitive Model

Thus far in the cognitive model, I have discussed only referential meanings of the lexical terms: the primitive noun as the physical substance light, from various light sources in the physical world; the denominative verb as to shine/to brighten, referring to the generation of physical light by actual light sources in the physical world; and the derivative noun as luminary, referring to an object in the physical world that generates light. These attestations already discussed comprise 61% of the lexeme's total occurrences in BH. There are other meanings of the lexeme that are generated toward the edges of the semantic cloud, meanings that are fewer in frequency than the physical referents yet quite evocative in OT literature, especially in Hebrew poetry.

This section of the chapter will aim to reproduce how all these various meanings of the lexeme can be generated from the more prototypical meanings. Again, as modern readers we cannot empirically verify that the ancient Israelites generated these meanings in exactly this way; we can only propose cognitive processes that best explain the available data (both linguistic and non-linguistic) and evaluate them accordingly. At the same time, the Usage-
Based Thesis in CL affirms that the cognitive routines utilized by the ancient Israelites to generate the linguistic data are "encoded" within that data to some degree or another. This process is somewhat like putting together a jigsaw puzzle without the benefit of the image depicted by the puzzle: the one putting together the pieces cannot empirically verify that the result is the same as the maker of the puzzle intended; yet if all the pieces fit together to make a coherent image, then one may be confident that the puzzle has been correctly put together. Of course, in contrast to a jigsaw puzzle, in the case of linguistic forms the possibility exists that the data can be arranged to produce more than one equally coherent image.

2.5.1. Metonymic Extension of the ICM

In many languages, words commonly undergo semantic change via the cognitive substitution of one concept for another within the same conceptual domain (Panther & Thornburg 2007:240-242). Linguists refer to this conceptual substitution as metonymy, and it is a highly fluid and ubiquitous phenomenon in language.33

In traditional rhetoric, metonymy is the figure of speech based on an interrelation between closely associated terms – cause and effect, possessor and possessed, and a host of possible others. The common element in metonymy is [sic] notion of contiguity: the things related by a metonymy can be understood as contiguous to (neighboring) each other, either conceptually or in the real world (Riemer 2010:249, emphasis original).

The actual mechanics of metonymy vary for different concepts in language, and scholars sometimes disagree concerning what precisely distinguishes metonymy from metaphor. In this thesis, I consistently use the term metonymy to describe conceptual substitutions that occur within the same cognitive domain and the term metaphor to describe conceptual projections that move from one cognitive domain into a different cognitive domain (see section 2.5.2). I argue that in BH, these metonymic substitutions pertaining to the lexeme אֵר occur between various concepts within the ICM. Building on Riemer's description above, the ICM provides the cognitive contiguity by which concepts are metonymically relat-

33. Panther & Thornburg write: "Metonymic links can be used for reasoning or inferencing purposes. Like implicatures, metonymies can become completely conventionalized, that is, end up as senses in a polysemous word....A metonymy may, on the one hand, statically relate different senses of a word, but it may also be productively used in actual communication situations to produce novel meanings....The productive use that speakers make of this metonymy can be considered evidence that it is not a 'dead' metonymy but a cognitively real process" (Panther & Thornburg 2007:248, emphasis original).
ed to one another (see Radden and Kövecses 1999:21). Metonymic extensions of the lexeme אֹר are not common in BH, but there are a variety of examples found in the OT corpus.

2.5.1a. Job 31:26 – אֹר as metonym for שֶׁמֶשׁ (sun)

If I have seen the sun as it shines, and the splendid moon as it travels, ... [Job 31:26]

There are two compelling linguistic features in this verse that lead to the conclusion that this particular attestation of אֹר functions as a metonym for the sun. First, it occurs in parallel apposition with the moon, although this is not conclusive in and of itself. The more compelling case is made from the use of the Hiphil verb הֶלְל, one of the verbal synonyms of אֹר found in BH poetry. It would be highly anomalous in BH to find the specific noun אֹר as the subject of a Hiphil verb referring to the action of shining (see section 2.3.2a). Rather, it seems much more likely that אֹר is being used as a metonym for a light source – which would prototypically take a Hiphil verb – in this case, the sun. The context leaves little doubt that the sun is the specific light source in view here, as Reece convincingly argues (1990:69-72). The specific noun שֶׁמֶש is only found once in the book of Job (Job 8:16); thus, Reece (1990:70) argues that the writer of Job typically prefers to use other words to refer to the sun, for some unknown reason.34

Reece (1990:72) also considers אֹר as a metonym for שֶׁמֶש in Isa 18:4, For thus YHWH said to me: ‘I will be quiet, and I will look from my dwelling like a glowing heat greater than sunlight and a cloud of dew in the heat of harvest.’ However, the unmarked primitive noun prototypically refers specifically to sunlight within the ICM, as translated above, which renders a coherent sense of the passage with no need for any metonymic extension in this case.

2.5.1b. Psa 136:7 – אֹר as metonym for קָאָר (luminary)

In Psa 136:7, the sun and moon are referred to as אֹרֵים (lights). Thus, the lexical noun אֹר here does not refer to the substance light but rather to a luminary (Jenni & Wester-__________________________

34. This same type of elliptical reference is found in Job 3:4, where the noun נְהָר (from נָהָר) also functions as a metonym for the sun.
mann 1997:64). This semantic shift is so subtle that it escapes the immediate attention of the reader, but this attestation of the noun does reflect a metonymic extension.

2.5.1c. Job 36:30, 37:3,7,11 – אוֹר as metonym for בְּרַק (lightning)

These attestations are ambiguous, in that the noun could be referring to the substance of light itself; but the lexical data as a whole supports the idea that lightning is being conceptualized here as "his light," specifically as light that comes from God's hands in like manner as a weapon of attack (see section 2.4.3). Again, this use of metonym is very subtle yet nonetheless present.

2.5.1d. Psalm 74:16 – מָאָוָּר as metonym for יָרֵחַ (moon)

The attestation of מָאָוָּר found in Psa 74:16 functions as a metonym for the moon, in collocation with the noun שֶׁמֶשׁ:

לְךָֽיָ֝מֶ֥ם אַתָּ֥ה לָֽיְלָה֙ אַף־לְךָ֣י֭וֹם לְךָ֣. Yours is the day, yours also the night; You yourself established moon and sun. [Psa 74:16]

The collocated pair of nouns יוֹם and לַיְלָה in the first line of the couplet provides the most compelling case for understanding this particular attestation of the derivative noun as a metonym for the moon; the verse forms a parallel chiasm (Reece 1990:75). It is worth considering the potential reason(s) why the author utilized here the cryptic noun מָאָוָּר instead of the much more straightforward יָרֵחַ. I consider it likely that this is done for theological reasons, drawing on some conceptual relationship between YHWH and light and highlighting the moon's function of providing light during the temporal period of darkness (similar to the tabernacle menorah). Regardless of the reason, I affirm that a metonymic understanding of this attestation is the simplest coherent explanation of the contextual evidence. Reece makes a further argument on the basis of semantic congruity of the Greek φαῦσιν in the LXX both here and in Gen 1:14-15 (Reece 1990:75). This may not be true, however; the term φαῦσιν occurs in a prepositional phrase in Gen 1:14-15, which may indicate a different specific semantic sense of the noun. Even though Reece's argument here is less than conclusive, it is not necessary for making a convincing case concerning the meaning of the noun מָאָוָּר in this specific context.
2.5.1e. **אֹר** as metonymic concept for being alive

Two attestations of the substantive noun, in Psa 36:9 and 49:20, are paired with the verb **רָאָה** (to see) to form a lexicalized expression which serves as a metonym for the concept of being alive.

They will go to the generation of his fathers, until forever they will not see light. [Psa 49:20]

For with you is the fountain of life; by your light we see light. [Psa 36:9]

This latter verse is complex because each attestation of **אֹר** applies the concept of light in a different way. I am presently concerned with the specific phrase, *we see light*. Due to its position within the couplet, this phrase repeats the concept of life. I take this expression in its literal sense, that beings which are alive "see light" as opposed to beings that are dead; and this reality serves as the experiential cognitive basis for the metonymic expression. Similarly, in Psa 49:20 the psalmist describes dead people as those who will never again "see light" (**אֹר** + **רָאָה**).

Certain Qumran manuscripts as well as the LXX contain this same verb-object construction in Isa 53:11, but the specific word **אֹר** does not appear in the MT. This is an issue for further study to verify the best reading, but the fact that the older texts include the full expression lends credence to its authenticity over against the wording of the MT. If one accepts the longer reading, then I argue that the verb-object construction should be understood as a metonymic expression, as in the two passages from Psalms mentioned above and reflected in the NIV translation of Isa 53:11, *After he has suffered, he will see the light of life and be satisfied* (underline added).

2.5.1f. **Isa 27:11; Mal 1:10** – Hiphil **אֹר** as verbal concept of burning

Two attestations of the Hiphil verb **אֹר** describe the action of burning (which produces light) as opposed to the specific action of a light source shining light. In Isa 27:11, the verbal
action being described by the noun has shifted from the action of the fire itself to the action of women setting fire to dry branches.

When its branches dry they will be broken, the women coming and lighting them, for they are not a people of compassion, therefore he who made them will not have compassion on them, and he who formed them will not show them favor. [Isa 27:11]

"Also, who is among you that will shut the doors so my altar does not burn in vain? I have no delight in you," says YHWH of Hosts, "and I will take no offering from your hand." [Mal 1:10]

This latter case is more straightforward than the former, with the Hiphil verb being used quite similarly as in Exo 25:37 of the tabernacle menorah, And he will make its seven lamps, and he will light the lamps, and it will shine on the space in front of it. The subtle difference in the Exodus text is that the action of "lighting" the lamps has already been described and the specific function of shining light is definitively specified, whereas the Malachi text metonymically refers to the simple action of burning.

2.5.2. Metaphorical Projection of the ICM

Johnson (1987:xiv-xv) defines the cognitive device called metaphor as "a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind." He immediately continues:

So conceived, metaphor is not merely a linguistic mode of expression; rather, it is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of. Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding. Understanding via metaphorical projection from the concrete to the abstract makes use of physical experience in two ways. First, our bodily movements and interactions in various physical domains of experience are structured ... and that structure can be projected by metaphor into abstract domains. Second, metaphorical understanding is not merely a matter of arbitrary fanciful projection from anything to anything with no constraints. Concrete bodily experience not only constrains the "input" to the metaphorical projections but also the nature
of the projections themselves, that is, the kinds of mappings that can occur across domains (Johnson 1987:xv).

Johnson's theories regarding the phenomenon of metaphor provide an illuminating insight: not only does the human brain project individual concepts from one domain into another, but the brain also maps entire structures from the physical domain onto other conceptual domains for the purpose of organizing entire systems of abstract thought (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:61-68). This development is significant for the current study as it allows the analyst to develop further the "metaphorical system(s)" involving light within BH rather than making oversimplified one-to-one correspondences (e.g. "truth is light," or "kingship is light") that do not satisfactorily explain the actual linguistic expressions found in the text. Reece's seven-fold classification of light metaphors in the OT perfectly illustrates this minimalistic approach to metaphorical thinking. He writes (1990:116) that "all light-metaphors may be grouped into seven reasonably isolatable categories" – namely, Yahweh metaphors, Kingship metaphors, Life metaphors, Success metaphors, Information metaphors, Guidance metaphors, and Rightness metaphors (Reece 1990:118). In truth, these categories are not nearly as "isolatable" as Reece suggests; rather, their boundaries are fuzzy, if not outright overlapping. Reece admits as much in his analysis when he treats "Guidance metaphors" and "Information metaphors" as one unit. Also, concerning his category of "Success metaphors," he writes:

There are twenty of these metaphors, more than twice the number of other light-metaphors, an important fact when combined with their collective more-than-usual abstractness. Taking them as a group they encompass a much broader set of conditions and include a greater diversity of referents with the rubric of "success," than all the other groups. "Light is success" metaphors are so much more general and so much wider in range that the grounding is reciprocally tenuous (Reece 1990:132).

If his definition of "success metaphors" is so wide and abstract that the specific means of grounding the metaphor is considered "tenuous," then one could argue that the category is not actually a useful one in the first place. Belaboring the point here would not be helpful; it will suffice simply to affirm that Reece's categorical schema of light-metaphors is neither convincing nor clarifying. A more satisfactory approach is needed.

The discipline of CL suggests that, based on empirical psychological data, the human brain does not cognitively separate concepts into rigidly fixed and isolatable categories, but rather organizes conceptual categories according to prototype structures (see Rosch 1973:328-350; Rosch & Mervis 1975:573-605; Lakoff 1987:12-76). This invites the exegete
to probe the contextual clues that accompany the operation of various linguistic metaphors in order to induce systematic cognitive processes that generate metaphorical meaning from embodied experiences (via the projection of concepts or conceptual structure from one domain into another more abstract domain). Thus, rather than identifying a series of simple pairings, it is more fruitful to survey the data looking for principles of thought that create a metaphorical system. Any particular instance of a metaphor might access one or more of the principles within the network. For example, several examples of light-metaphors in BH access the concept of light (in all its experiential domains) and project it onto both the emotional and moral domains simultaneously (see below). This method of understanding the metaphorical system of word operative in BH accounts for the full complexity of the linguistic data and avoids reductionistic, one-to-one correspondences, as Fauconnier and Turner attest:

The study of conceptual mappings, including metaphoric mappings, has produced great insights over the past several decades, not only for the study of language but also for the study of such subjects as scientific discovery, design, mathematical thinking, and computer interfaces. ... This blooming field of research has as one consequence the rethinking of metaphor. We have a richer and deeper understanding of the processes underlying metaphor than we did previously. ... Conceptual products are never the result of a single mapping. What we have come to call "conceptual metaphors," like TIME IS MONEY or TIME IS SPACE, turn out to be mental constructions involving many spaces and many mappings in elaborate integration networks constructed by means of overarching general principles. These integration networks are far richer than the bundles of pairwise bindings considered in recent theories of metaphor (Fauconnier & Turner 2008:53).

My objective in this section is to push beyond the "bundles of pairwise bindings" that Reece articulates in an attempt to identify the "overarching general principles" that govern the operation of the concept word within the total cognitive system of metaphor in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. Because the brain handles multiple mental constructions (the cognitive model of word in the current study is only one example) and integrates them into networks that overlap in various experiential domains simultaneously, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a completely comprehensive treatment of any one specific aspect of the entire metaphorical system. These mental networks act in two important fundamental ways: like a spider's web, where the plucking of one strand reverberates through the whole structure; and like a multi-faceted diamond, where only one face of the entire structure can be closely examined at one time. Therefore, I do not claim that this treatment is complete in the absolute sense. Rather, I am seeking the main structural mappings that can be confidently defended from the linguistic data and then identifying the primary metaphors that operate on
these conceptual maps. It must be admitted that other similar studies of concepts within the whole cognitive system may affect these outcomes as more data comes to light. However, I have tried to identify both the general principles and specific metaphors that have sufficient textual support to stand on their own merits, even if new data might clarify specifics within the whole metaphorical network.

Concerning the textual data itself: even as sunlight was the specific referent attested with the greatest frequency among referents for the lexeme אור in the physical world, the same is true for the metaphorical referents as well.

- 23 attestations specifically refer to sunlight as metaphorically projected into some other domain.35

- 3 attestations refer to firelight as metaphorically projected into another domain (Job 18:5,6; Prov 6:23, 13:9).

- 3 attestations that definitively refer to light as a generic substance are especially rich with metaphorical meaning, as discussed below (Eccl 2:13, 11:7; Isa 42:16).

- Besides the direct references to divine light, 4 additional attestations are inconclusive concerning the specific physical referent being metaphorically projected: Psa 119:130 (probably firelight); Job 12:25 (probably sunlight); Job 38:15 (perhaps sunlight or firelight?); Hos 6:5 (perhaps sunlight or lightning?).

The imbalance of frequency of attestations here further strengthens the beginning assertion that sunlight is the most primitive and prototypical referent for the lexeme as conceptualized via the ICM. If sunlight is the most primitive and prototypical referent for the lexeme אור, then it follows that sunlight would also be the most prototypical referent for the metaphorical use of the concept. Such is the case in BH; if it were not so, then the analyst would need to find the explanation for the divergence and/or re-evaluate the referential prototype in the first place. There is no such need in regard to the analysis of the lexeme אור; all along the way, the data has pointed again and again to the ICM presented in this study as the prototypical referential basis for the lexeme אור in BH.

I propose that the metaphorical use of אָוִ֖ר in BH is conceptualized via two primary projections of the entire ICM from the physical domain (externally pertaining to a person's physical body) into the personal domain (internally pertaining to a person's abstract self), specifically the emotional and the moral aspects of human personal existence. Like the experiential domains listed earlier which co-exist in the physical domain (i.e. visual, temporal, and spatial), so also the metaphorical use of the lexeme demonstrates that these two experiential subdomains within the personal domain (i.e. emotional and moral) do not cognitively operate in isolation from each other. Many of the metaphorical attestations of the lexeme utilize both of these domains simultaneously in order to communicate meaning. As with the referential data discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, the metaphorical data exhibits some paradigmatic examples of these projections which are reflected by the whole data set.

Here the writer sets in apposition three participial phrases that form a "semantic triangle" to express fully the message of the prophetic oracle. In BH, the terms טוב and רע can convey meaning in both a moral and emotional sense, i.e. "good, pleasant" and "evil, unpleasant" (BDB 1906:373-375,947-949; HALOT 1995:370-372; HALOT 1996:1250-1253), and both meanings are at play here as explicated in the second line of the verse. The literary context demands that the prophet is decrying moral corruption here and not merely unpleasant behavior (v.8,18,23); the prophet hammers home this fundamental difference between good and evil in the moral sense by evoking the metaphor of light/darkness. Yet the prophet also includes an emotional component with the further metaphor of sweetness/bitterness. Grammatically, all these conceptual pairings stand in direct parallel apposition; indeed, the synonymous relationships between all the pairs together is what "makes the semantic triangle work," so to speak, with each pair eliciting its specific nuance in the context. Thus, both moral and emotional meanings are rightly ascribed to all these conceptual pairings – good/evil, light/darkness, and sweet/bitter. I consider it significant that the concept of light does not stand on
its own but in opposition to its obverse concept of darkness, a pattern observed again in Isa 59:9.

Therefore justice is far from us, and righteousness does not reach us; we wait for the light – and behold! – darkness: for radiance, yet we walk in despair. [Isa 59:9]

This verse combines the semantic relationships as before; that is, light/darkness function as a unified metaphor in both a moral and emotional sense. But in the present case, light and darkness are not disembodied concepts but are rather defined by the human experience of the daily pattern of sunlight (day) and darkness (night) via the use of the verb קוה (to wait).

In the same way that the concept of אור is itself cognitively defined by the human embodied experience of the sun (as depicted by the ICM in Figure 4), so also its metaphorical use is governed by the same embodied experience. I am not suggesting here that Isa 59:9 is programmatic for all of BH; this one verse does not in and of itself define how the metaphor is used in BH. This verse is paradigmatic, however, in that it illustrates a pattern that holds true across the entire range of data in the OT. The metaphorical use of light in BH is not the result of utilizing a single concept to stand for another in another domain (or domains), but rather the mapping of an entire cognitive structure from one domain onto another more abstract domain in order to organize, communicate, and utilize concepts in that other domain. I will now show how this is done in regard to light metaphors in BH via the operation of three governing principles.

1) In the ancient Hebrew conceptual world, the ICM of light in the physical domain is projected onto the emotional subdomain of the personal domain. I contend that this metaphorical projection is based on the fundamental human emotional response to light and darkness. Nearly everyone at one point or another experiences fear of darkness. Similarly, anyone who has suffered through a night of terror experiences comfort when daylight reappears in the morning. It makes intuitive sense that the ICM constructed from the experience of light in the physical world would then be mapped onto the emotional domain as a structuring device to conceptualize and communicate positive and negative emotions.
The people walking in darkness have seen a great light; those dwelling in the land of deep darkness, light brightens over them. You have multiplied the nation, you have increased its rejoicing; it rejoices before you like the rejoicing at the harvest, as they rejoice when they divide plunder. [Isa 9:1-2]

For I waited for good, but evil came; I hoped for light, but darkness came. My insides are in turmoil and they will not be still; days of affliction have come to me. [Job 30:26-27]

In both these verses, the writer utilizes the imagery of light and darkness by conceptualizing the person(s) in view as being in the cognitive frame defined by the ICM of אור, either "in light" (Isa 9:1-2) or "in darkness" (Job 30:26-27). This use of imagery should not be understood as a one-to-one correspondence of concepts. The analyst cannot say that "light is pleasantness" or that "darkness is unpleasantness" in a strict sense. Rather, I contend that the entire Gestalt of the ICM is projected from the physical domain into the personal domain in order to organize the emotional aspect of that personal domain. Thus, to be "in light" metaphorically refers to experiencing positive emotions, and to be "in darkness" metaphorically refers to experiencing negative emotions. I have only elucidated two individual passages here, but these are indicative of a wide programmatic pattern in the metaphorical use of light as it is projected onto the emotional subdomain.

The specific kinds of physical light that are projected onto the emotional domain generally include sunlight (Job 3:9, 17:12, 30:26; Psa 139:11; Isa 5:20(x2), 9:2(x2), 30:26, 58:8,10, 59:9; Jer 13:16; Amos 5:18,20; Mic 7:9) and firelight (Job 18:5-6; Prov 13:9). The analyst should further observe that most of these attestations use light metaphorically to discuss human emotional responses specifically in the context of a personal relationship to YHWH, as in Mic 7:9.
I am bearing the indignation of YHWH, because I have sinned toward him, until when he adjudicates my case and accomplishes my judgment; he will bring me to the light, I will see his vindication. [Mic 7:9]

Here the writer conceptualizes their experience of darkness (v.8) as the effect of having sinned against YHWH. The prophet goes on to affirm that YHWH will provide vindication, which they conceptualize as they themselves being brought out "to the light." The status determinatus of אור should be understood in the temporal demonstrative sense, indicating that the conceptual pairing of light and darkness here does not stand in isolation but within the specific cognitive frame of day and night as visualized by the ICM of אור.

2) In the ancient Hebrew conceptual world, the ICM of light in the physical domain is projected onto the moral subdomain of the personal domain. I contend that this metaphorical projection is also based on the fundamental human experience that moral wrongdoing is more often done during the night rather than during the day. As a general principle, honest work is performed during the day, whereas evil works are performed during the night (see Job 24:13-17 below). This is true even in modern cultures, where artificial light is abundant and work is less constrained by the limitations of night. In ancient societies, where there was no artificial light whatsoever, it stands to reason that this principle would have held true to an even greater degree.

They are ones who rebel against light, they are not acquainted with its ways; and they do not remain in its paths. At the light he rises murdering, he kills the poor and needy; and in the night he is as a thief. Also the eye of the adulterer watches evening, saying, "No eye will see me;"

36. "The prevailing idea in the OT ... is that darkness is a hiding-place and a covering for their sins, while light exposes and convicts the wicked of their evil deeds in the daytime" (Aalen 1974:163).
and he disguises his face.

Having dug in the night, they shut themselves in houses by day;
they do not know light.

For the deep darkness is morning for all of them,
because they are acquainted with the terrors of deep darkness. [Job 24:13-17]

Another aspect of this metaphorical projection relates to the physical realities of walking in the day versus in the night. A mountain trail that is easily traversed during the day can become a treacherous and injurious path at night; this is the cultural backdrop for the following prophetic oracle of judgment:

Listen and give ear, do not be proud,
for Yahweh has spoken.

Give to Yahweh your God glory before he brings darkness,
and before your feet stumble on the mountains of twilight;
and you wait for light but he turns it to deep darkness,
and he makes it thick darkness.

But if you will not hear it,
in secret places my soul will weep because of your pride;
I will weep bitterly, and my eyes will stream down tears,
because the flock of Yahweh is taken captive. [Jer 13:15-17]

I submit that the writers in BH utilized their embodied experiences of sunlight in the physical world in order to conceptualize and explain their more abstract conceptions of moral/immoral actions and attitudes. This principle is applied in some different ways, such as to describe the consequences of sin (Mic 7:9) or to describe the faithfulness of Yahweh in response to moral wickedness (Hos 6:5). Precise one-to-one conceptual correspondences do not satisfactorily explain many of these attestations. It is difficult to assert that light "stands for" any one particular concept; rather, it seems that the entire ICM of אוֹר is being projected onto the moral domain as a way or organizing and structuring how moral concepts operate within that domain.
זָרַח
בַּחֹ֣שֶׁךְ
א֖וֹר
שִׂמְחָֽה׃
וּֽלְיִשְׁרֵי־לֵ֥ב
לַצַּדִּ֑יק
זָרֻ֣עַ
א֖וֹר
הַיּֽוֹם׃
עַד־נְכ֥וֹן
וָ֝א֗וֹר
הוֹלֵ֥ךְ
נֹ֑גַהּ
כְ֣א֣וֹר
צַ֭דִּיקִים
וְאֹ֣רַח

[Yhwh] rises in the darkness a light for the upright, 
gracious and merciful and righteous. [Psa 112:4]

Light is sown for the righteous, 
and joy for the upright of heart. [Psa 97:11]

The way of the righteous is like the light of dawn, 
progressively brightening until the day is fully established. [Prov 4:18]

Isaiah 58 describes a scene that incorporates almost all of these dynamics, with
broad descriptions of both moral righteousness and wickedness structured by the metaphorical
projection of light/darkness (v.8,10). As with the emotional domain, this metaphorical
projection also includes references to firelight as well as sunlight (Job 18:5-6 and Prov 13:9).
It should be noted that in all these cases, the light referenced is always extrinsic to the person(s) within the scene. Furthermore, sometimes it is specifically stated that the light is Yhwh himself, but using solar imagery (Isa 60:1,3,19,20), fire imagery (Psa 18:28, 119:105; Job 29:3), or sometimes combining multiple images of light (Hab 3:4,11). Therefore, it is clear that the metaphorical use of light involves complex conceptual layering, as has been seen at several points already in the study.

3) In the ancient Hebrew conceptual world, the spatial domains of Earth and Sheol
are conceptualized as domains marked by light/life and darkness/death. A thorough exam-
ination of the data also shows a third principle governing the metaphorical projection of light
in BH, but this principle should not be classified the same as the previous two. This principle
does not describe the cognitive "mapping" of a structure from one domain onto another more
abstract domain, but rather a conceptualization of space within the physical domain itself (see
section 2.3.1c). I am discussing this principle in depth here because I will argue that the
metaphor Life is Light in BH (see below) is cognitively built upon this spatial conceptualiza-
tion of the physical world in the ancient Israelite cognitive environment. This spatial concep-
tualization is itself a function of the ICM of אור as defined by the operation of the sun as ex-
experienced by humans on the earth and is primarily evidenced in the book of Job within the OT.

[YHWH] uncovers the deeps from darkness,
and he brings the deep darkness to the light. [Job 12:22]

They will thrust him from light into darkness,
They will cause him to flee from the world. [Job 18:18]

Behold, all these things God does
three times with a man,
to turn back his life from the pit,
to be illumined with the light of life. [Job 33:29-30]

In the conceptual world of the Hebrew text, the spatial domain of Earth is primarily characterized by life, i.e. living organisms. This stands in opposition to the spatial domain of Sheol beneath the earth, which is characterized by death. This specific conceptualization is not a metaphorical projection but rather a mere characterization. Thus, when the phrase "the light of life" is used in BH, the term "light" refers to physical light, but the expression highlights the fact that in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, life is a primary characteristic of the domain of light (i.e. Earth). If one was to say that this relationship was a metaphorical projection, one would then need to say that the physical phenomenon of light is being projected onto the more abstract domain of life in order to conceptualize something about life and/or death. The linguistic data does not warrant such a conclusion. Rather, the concept of light is compared with life, and the concept of darkness with death, on the basis of a similar spatial relationship between the two "states of being." Living things exist above the ground, where light shines on them; dead things decompose and descend into the earth (or at least appear to do so) where light does not shine. This spatial characterization further makes intuitive sense because light is an essential ingredient for life, especially plant life, without which there would be no animal life.
2.5.2b. Metaphorical Projection of אָוֹר

I will now discuss instances of more straightforward examples of metaphor in BH, where a vehicle concept is projected from a physical or tangible domain into another more abstract or intangible domain to conceptualize a specific target concept within that domain (Riemer 2010:247-248). I will continue to refer to these external and internal domains as the physical domain (externally pertaining to a person's physical body) and the personal domain (internally pertaining to a person's abstract self), in concordance with the previous section.

1) Wisdom is Light. Before discussing this metaphor in detail, it is worth noting the imbalance of attestations of both the lexeme אָוֹר and the lexeme חָכָם (to be wise, wisdom, etc.) in the OT (see Jenni & Westermann 1997:63). Of the 186 attestations of אָוֹר in BH, 82 of them (44%) are found in the wisdom literature, i.e. Job, Psalms, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes. Of the 318 attestations of the lexeme חָכָם in BH, 196 of them (61.6%) are found in the same four books. The use of both terms is heavily weighted in what has traditionally been called "wisdom literature" compared with other literary genres of the OT.

I have already discussed the prime example of the direct comparison between אָוֹר and חָכָם (wisdom) in the OT literature:

ויָדַעְתִּי אָנִי וְרָאִיתִי שֶֽׁיֵּשׁ אָנִי אֵֽלֵֽהַ בָּאָרֶֽה׃

And I myself saw that wisdom is better than folly, as light is better than darkness. [Eccl 2:13]

This one verse demonstrates both of the preceding principles of the structural mapping of the cognitive model of אָוֹר from the physical domain onto both the emotional domain and the moral domain. While the verse falls short of declaring outright Wisdom is light, it does provide the conceptual basis for the cognitive metaphor Wisdom is Light by drawing the qualitative comparison between the two concepts wisdom/light in contrast to their opposite concepts folly/darkness. Thus, in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, wisdom has the same effect on a person's internal self as light does for a person's external body. Consider the following examples:

וְיִתְרֹֽוְוּן מִנִּ֥הֲלָה יִתְרֹֽוְוְ֑וְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְوְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְוְw
The light of the righteous rejoices, but the lamp of the wicked is extinguished. [Prov 13:9]

Indeed, the light of the wicked is extinguished, and the flame of his fire does not shine. Light darkens in his tent, and his lamp over him is extinguished. [Job 18:5-6]

This metaphorical projection operates slightly differently than before, however. In the earlier cases, the entire ICM of אור (see Figure 4) within the physical domain is mapped onto the emotional domain and the moral domain. Rather than mapping an entire structure onto another domain, in this case the individual vehicle concept light in the physical domain conceptualizes the target concept of wisdom within the personal domain. As Eccl 2:13 suggests, I contend that this specific metaphor utilizes the previous two structural projections of the ICM of light into the emotional and moral domains. As with light, in the ancient Israelite conceptual world wisdom affects a human person both emotionally and morally; that is, the concept wisdom in BH simultaneously conveys both moral rightness and emotional pleasantness. The combination of these comparisons and contrasts strengthens the following assertions: (1) the metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT is cognitively built upon the general metaphorical principles explained above; and (2) light is not a disembodied concept in the ancient Israelite conceptual world but rather a concept that is understood via the experiential operation of its prototype, that is, the daily alternation of sunlight and darkness (Eccl 11:7).

I contend that many of the metaphorical uses that Reece identifies can be more helpfully understood as various dimensions of the over-arching cognitive metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT rather than as isolated categories. The general concept of wisdom in BH includes such

37. This is not to deny that the concept of wisdom in BH might also convey other ideas as well. I only intend to say that the concepts of moral rightness and emotional pleasantness are the specific aspects of wisdom as an abstract concept that can be gleaned from the metaphorical use of the lexeme אור in the OT.
things as information,\textsuperscript{38} success,\textsuperscript{39} guidance,\textsuperscript{40} rightness,\textsuperscript{41} even life.\textsuperscript{42} However, this specific concept of wisdom requires further definition here to determine if this cognitive metaphor of light holds true across the broad spectrum of use of the concept חכם in BH.

2) LIFE IS LIGHT. Here I will argue that in BH a person's life is conceptualized as light, sourced in God and seen in a person's eyes. In the ancient Israelite conceptual world, light is the vehicle concept in the physical domain that conceptualizes the target concept of life in the personal domain. The operation of the metaphor can be expressed in the simple phrase, LIFE IS LIGHT. This sense of personal light is distinguished from the general "light of life" that marks the quantitative value of being alive (and existing above the ground) in opposition to being dead (and existing below the ground), although it is quite possible, even probable, that the conceptual characterization of the spatial domains of Earth and Sheol formed the experiential basis for this particular metaphorical projection in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. This personal light marks the qualitative value of the life of a person, whether that be physically, emotionally, etc. Indeed, the implication is that this personal light, visible in or through the eyes, is no longer visible when the person dies.

My heart is throbbing, my strength has forsaken me, and yes, even the light of my eyes. [Psa 38:11]

And Jonathan said, "My father has troubled the land; See how my eyes have brightened because I tasted a little of this honey!" [1 Sam 14:29]

1 Sam 14:27-29 offers the most detail concerning the application of light to a person's eyes. In this narrative, the Israelite army under King Saul has embarked on a campaign to find and kill the Philistines. In a particularly non-lucid moment, King Saul orders the entire

\textsuperscript{38} Exo 31:3-6; Deut 4:6; Eccl 1:13, 2:26; Dan 1:17-20.
\textsuperscript{39} 1 Kin 10:7,23; 2 Ch4 9:22; Ezek 28:4,5; Prov 24:3, 28:26; Eccl 7:11,12, 9:15, 10:10.
\textsuperscript{40} 2 Chr 1:10-12; Prov 4:11, 5:1, 31:26; Eccl 2:3.
\textsuperscript{41} Psa 37:30, 111:10; Job 28:28; Prov 10:31, 13:10, 23:19; Eccl 7:16.
\textsuperscript{42} Job 12:12, 32:7; Eccl 7:12, 8:1.
army not to eat any food until they have found them (v.24). Jonathan was not present when this order had been given, and later in the day he finds some honey and eats it (v.27). The text reports that "his eyes brightened" after he ate the honey. In the prototypical sense of the verb, the Qal form of the verb suggests that "eyes" are the indirect object of the shining action, meaning that light from some source is shining on the eyes, causing them to be in a brightened condition. This sense seems confirmed in the text itself, because Jonathan asks his friends to observe the fact that his eyes have brightened. Thus, this concept of brightening the eyes is not a purely abstract metaphor but is referencing some actual physical experience.

It seems clear from the context that the "brightening of the eyes" is not the effect of some external light source; Jonathan's eyes did not brighten because the sun is shining brighter than before, or because Jonathan has put a candle near his face. Rather, the brightening of the eyes is the result of some internal change that has taken place within Jonathan's body, as if some light from within Jonathan himself brightens his eyes, producing an observable result. This linguistic phenomenon is readily recognizable even today when we speak of someone's eyes "lighting up." Other applicable attestations of this conceptualization of light include: Isa 60:1; Psa 13:4, 19:8; Prov 15:30, 29:3; and Ezra 9:8.43

43. The use of the Qal stem in Isa 60:1 presents a special challenge because of the imperative form of the lexical verb. All the terminology in the greater context (v.1-4) coheres within the prototypical model as already explained. The imperative of אוֹר appears in series with the imperative of קוּם, the typical verb to describe the action of a person rising up from sleep. I argue that this refers to the conceptualization of light as the life of a person, inviting the addressee to quicken oneself to life as if from sleep. In colloquial usage, one might say that these imperatives function similarly to the modern injunction to "Rise and shine!" The same can be said concerning the attestations of the Qal imperative form of the verb נָהַר (as a verbal synonym of אוֹר) in Isa 60:5 and Psa 34:6.
to brighten our eyes, O God,  
and to give us a little reviving in our slavery. [Ezra 9:8]

These requests for YHWH to "shine" on their eyes provides an illuminating insight into how this complete verbal action operates. In these verses, as in the other attestations that utilize the Hiphil verb in reference to shining eyes, YHWH is the subject of the verbal action! The lexical data offers a complete grammatical model for the light of the eyes: God is the light source who shines; the person's eyes are the indirect object of the verbal action (the object of the Qal verb), i.e. the thing being illuminated by the light; and the life of the person, conceptualized as light, is the direct object of the verbal action (the subject of the Qal verb).

The concept of light is related to a person in BH not only by reference to the "light of the eyes," but also "the light of the face." Rather than the abstract concept of God shining on/through the eyes, in these cases it is the person who shines their own face toward another person(s). Metaphorically speaking, when a person shines their face, the person themselves functions as the subject of the verbal action of shining, and the face is the object, i.e. the thing "being shined." This concept of the shining face in BH utilizes the Hiphil verb and consistently occurs in parallel phrases with the concepts of grace, favor, the "lifting" of the face (i.e. smiling), and so on (Num 6:25; Psa 4:7, 31:17, 67:2, 89:16; Job 29:24; Prov 16:15; Eccl 8:1; Dan 9:17). Thus, in BH: the light of the eyes is intra-personal in scope, reflecting the quality of the life of the person; whereas the light of the face is inter-personal in scope, reflecting the relational attitude or demeanor of the person toward another person(s).

In the light of the face of the king is life,  
and his favor is like the clouds of the late rains. [Prov 16:15]

May YHWH bless you and keep you;  
May YHWH shine his face toward you, and be gracious to you;  
May YHWH lift his countenance toward you, and give you peace. [Num 6:24-26]
save me in your loyal love. [Psa 31:17]

Of the 15 references to the light of the face in the OT, 11 of them describe the face of YHWH (or God). This concept of the light of YHWH's face occurs as merely one aspect of a collection of anthropomorphic ways of speaking about God in the OT.

כִּֽי־יְמִֽינְךָ בְחַרְבָּם לָֽ֥מוֹ לֹא־הָוֹשִׁ֪יעָה וּזְרוֹעָם
יָ֥ רְשׁוּ בָּאָ֗רֶץ לֹ֪א
cִּ֣י פָּנֶ֗יךָ וְא֥וֹר וּזְרוֹעֲךָ
cִּֽי־יְמִֽינְךָ֣ לֹ֪א

For they inherited the land not by their sword,
and their arm did not gain the victory for them,
but your right hand, and your arm, and the light of your face;
because you delighted in them. [Psa 44:4]

In this verse, it seems clear that these anthropomorphic ways of speaking about the actions of God are not meant to be interpreted as referring to physical realities. The reader is not meant to understand that a giant flesh-and-bone arm physically removed the Israelites from one place and took them to another place, or that a giant flesh-and-blood face was above them with its "radiance" physically lighting the way for them. I argue that these anthropomorphic ways of speaking about YHWH are not physical references but metaphorical references. The action of bringing the Israelites out of Egypt is credited to YHWH. It is an act displaying God's divine power on behalf of the nation of Israel; therefore, it is described as an act of God's strong arm and mighty hand. It is also an act displaying God's divine favor toward the nation of Israel; therefore, it is described as an act of God's shining face.

Given this specific reference, one could ask whether this concept of God's shining face is an anthropomorphic way of speaking about the physical action of the theophanic pillar of fire, but this is problematic. The concept of the shining face is never paralleled with the concepts of illumination or guidance in any other attestation; rather, it is almost always paralleled with the concepts of favor and grace. There is insufficient contextual evidence to suggest an interpretive variant in the present case. I take God's shining face here to refer to divine favor, following the same pattern as the other attestations of the concept in the OT.

The only instance in the OT where the concept of the light of the face seems to have a slightly different nuance is Psa 90:8, referring not to the concept of God's favor but rather to the concept of God's notice or attention. This attestation utilizes the derived noun instead of
the substantive noun, yielding the translation "luminary of your face" instead of "light of your face."

You have set our iniquities before you, our secrets in the luminary of your face. [Psa 90:8]

I have included this discussion of the light of the face in BH here because this use of the concept seems to be a secondary development of the cognitive metaphor Life is Light. In the ancient Israelite conceptual world, a person's internal life is conceptualized as light seen in the eyes, a light sourced in God and not in the person themselves. Further, the quality of that internal life is demonstrated by a person's emotions (i.e. it is qualitatively better for a person to be happy than sad), and this reality is also shown in a person's eyes. Therefore, BH conceptualizes both physical nourishment and emotional happiness as the "brightness of the eyes."

One of the physical demonstrations (perhaps the primary one!) of this internal emotional quality specifically in relation to another person is the lifting of the countenance, i.e. smiling, conceptualized as the "shining of the face." In these cases, the subject of the Hiphil verb אוֹר (to shine) is the person themselves with the face as the direct object of the verb. Thus, one cannot rightly say that the phenomenon of the "shining face" is simply an extension of the phenomenon of the "shining eyes." The conceptualization of light in each case is certainly distinct, yet both draw upon the same fundamental cognitive metaphor Life is Light. The "shining eyes" reflect a primary application of the metaphor, whereas the "shining face" reflects a secondary development of that metaphor. A human person is conceptualized as a light source, but only in a derivative sense; the first cause of the Light is Life metaphor is YHWH, who is also conceptualized as a person – a divine person rather than a human person.

2.6. The YHWH Problem

At this point, the analyst can identify at least four different dynamics at play in regard to the correlation of the concept of light to YHWH in the OT. First, sometimes YHWH is described as producing light himself (Psa 76:4, 118:27). Secondly, sometimes light in the physical world is a direct metaphor for YHWH (Psa 27:1, Mic 7:8). Thirdly, this kind of metaphorical conceptualization of YHWH occurs across a broad spectrum of light sources, including
celestial light (Isa 9:2, 58:8,10; Mic 7:9; Job 12:22; Lam 3:2), fire light (Psa 18:28; Job 29:3), lightning (Job 36:30, 37:3), the life of a person (Psa 13:3; Ezra 9:8), etc. Fourthly, sometimes YHWH is depicted as a light source in the physical world either by utilizing terminology associated with some other light source or by appearing directly as that light source in a theophanic sense. This also occurs across the broad spectrum of light sources: the sun (Isaiah 60; Hab 3:11), fire (Neh 9:12,19), and lightning (Job 36:32; Hab 3:4,11). Thus, the concept of light in relationship to YHWH defies strict categorization into any of the identifiable referents and definitions of the lexeme אור examined thus far.

This suggests that a raw analysis of the lexical data has exhausted its resources in regard to answering the question at hand: What is the relationship between אור and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world? The analyst can have good confidence in the cognitive model that has been presented in terms of how the specific term אור operated in the typical cognitive environment for an ancient Israelite, but there are still too many variables toward the edges of the semantic cloud where it comes into contact with the conceptualization of YHWH. How should passages be understood where YHWH appears to be a light source and metaphorical projection also seems to be operational in some way? In isolation, the principles of cognitive semantics applied here cannot answer this question from the lexical data examined in this study; to draw a conclusion, either more information must be gleaned somehow or other methods must be explored to untangle this hermeneutical knot.

Still, the analyst can certainly affirm that the metaphorical relationship between light and YHWH does not stand alone but exists within a complex metaphorical system of thought that bears much closer investigation, especially the complex lexical concept חכם (wisdom). This suggests that the CL methodology has not yet reached its investigative end because the systematic study of other concepts within this metaphorical network could very well provide more information to clarify the inconclusive data concerning אור and YHWH. Additional encyclopedic information concerning the ancient Israelite conceptual world (or the ancient Near East in general) could also help clarify this issue.

2.7. Summary

This chapter has constructed a cognitive model for the lexeme אור in BH via an inductive application of cognitive semantics, drawing its conclusions regarding lexical meaning on
the basis of the term's use in actual linguistic contexts. The analysis of the prototype effects exhibited by the linguistic data, combined with Reece's convincing arguments that daylight and sunlight are one and the same phenomenon in the OT, demonstrates that the most primitive cognitive referent for the lexeme הַאור in BH is the sun, providing the prototypical meanings of all three lexical terms. The primitive noun prototypically refers to sunlight, and the denominative verb prototypically refers to the shining of the sun. The Hiphil form functions as a transitive, describing the visible shining of the sun during the temporal period called "day." The Qal form functions as an intransitive, describing the action of sunlight that illuminates the earth even when the sun itself is not visible during the temporal periods "morning" and "evening." The Niphal form functions as a passive of the Qal and perhaps a reflexive of the Hiphil, but with only two attestations there is insufficient data to demonstrate prototypicality conclusively. Therefore, the sun is the prototypical example of an object that shines light; because the derivative noun is derived from the verbal form, it also prototypically refers to the sun, even though the sun is not the most frequent referent of the derivative noun in BH.

This prototypical understanding of the lexeme in BH, which I have called the Idealized Cognitive Model using Lakoff's proposed term, is then expanded to include light from other light sources in the physical world, such as fire, the creature Leviathan, lightning, and even יְהֹוָה himself. This expansion includes multiple metonymic extensions of the lexeme that refer to various objects conceptually related to light. Furthermore, the ICM of הַאור within the physical domain is then mapped onto the emotional and moral subdomains of the abstract personal domain, as a means of organizing various aspects of personal experience such as happiness, sadness, righteousness, wickedness, etc. This lexical analysis has identified two specific metaphorical projections within the ancient Israelite conceptual world that operate within these two cognitive mappings: the cognitive metaphors WISDOM IS LIGHT and LIFE IS LIGHT. Finally, it has been observed that the lexical analysis itself cannot satisfactorily conclude the specific relationship between the concepts הַאור and יְהֹוָה in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, although enough information has been gathered to propose a reasonable hypothesis (see Chapter 4).
Thus, leaving aside the specific attestations of light in reference to YHWH that remain conceptually ambiguous, the analyst can now generate a semantic cloud of the lexeme גלעד as well as the radial network of the entire cognitive model (see Figure 9 above).

It is also worth drawing some conclusions concerning the important terms that stand in close relationship to the lexeme גלעד in BH as evidenced by the analysis of the linguistic data. First, the orthographically similar lexeme נר exhibits very similar semantic patterns as גלעד, only with specific regard to the phenomenon of firelight. The terms גלעד and נר are sometimes used as synonyms in Hebrew poetry (Psa 119:105; Job 18:6, 29:3; Prov 6:23, 13:9). The lexemes נר and נר לנגה function as direct lexical synonyms of גלעד but with a greater degree of referential specificity. The terms נר and נר לנגה are used similarly but with a definitive difference: the term נר לנגה refers to a dimmer light than גלעד, either sunlight during a time when the sun is not visible or another light such as moonlight or starlight (Isa 9:2, 13:10, 60:3,19;}
Amos 5:20; Hab 3:11; Prov 4:18). The lexical verb אוֹר has two other synonyms, the verbs יָפַע and הָלַל, and they are both attested only in the Hiphil stem and primarily in poetic literature instead of prose. But these four synonyms are attested only rarely in the OT, with a combined total of 46 attestations. Thus, the lexeme אוֹר is the conclusive prototypical lexeme in BH for the general concepts of light as a physical substance, the physical action of shining, and objects that shine (i.e. luminaries) in the physical world. Figure 10 (below) shows these general lexical relationships, which are not absolute "laws" governing every attestation but merely general trends of semantic potential: the terms in bold black type are lexical synonyms; the terms in blue type are poetic synonyms; the terms in green type are referential synonyms; the terms in red type are verbal synonyms.

Figure 10 – A Simplified Conceptual Network of Cognitively-Related Lexemes
CHAPTER 3

TESTING THE COGNITIVE MODEL IN THEOLOGICAL CONVERSATION

Having constructed a cognitive model for the term אור in BH, I will now test the theological significance of this model in conversation with other theologians along the course of interpretive history of the OT. For the sake of concision, I will accomplish this by looking through the lens of especially pertinent publications in approximately the last fifty years.1 The primary aim of this chapter is to provide some measure of evaluation whether the development of cognitive linguistic theory significantly impacts the discipline of theology as it pertains to the treatment of the concept of light in the OT. Toward this end, then, I have identified eight influential publications on the theological significance of light in the OT for inclusion in this study:

• the series of Gray Lectures presented by Jaroslav Pelikan at Duke Divinity School in 1960, revised and published in the book The Light of the World: A Basic Image in Early Christian Thought (1962);

• Aalen's article on אור (TDOT, 1973), referenced earlier in the thesis;

• the dissertation by Carol L. Meyers, entitled The Tabernacle Menorah: A Synthetic Study of a Symbol from the Biblical Cult (Brandeis University, 1974);

• the dissertation by William David Reece, entitled The Concept of Light in the Old Testament: A Semantic Analysis (University of California at Los Angeles, 1989);

• the dissertation by J. Glen Taylor, entitled Yahweh and the Sun: Biblical and Archaeological Evidence for Sun Worship in Ancient Israel (Yale University, 1989; revised and published in 1993);

1. In selecting the theological works with which to interact in this chapter, I have prioritized depth over breadth in order to compare products that are most alike. The cognitive model presented in Chapter 2 contains a very detailed treatment of the concept of light; therefore, it is best compared with similarly detailed discourses on the topic. The reader should note, however, that these works do not represent a comprehensive sampling of the relevant material within the specified parameters.
• the academic book by Mark S. Smith, entitled *The Priestly Vision of Genesis 1* (published in 2010);

• the resultant publication, entitled *Light From Light: Scientists and Theologians in Dialogue*, of the 2009 Istanbul symposium (and its follow-up in Oxford the following year) to "share insights and research on [the theme of light] linked to core issues in both theology and science" (Meyers & O'Collins 2012:1);


I have listed these works in chronological order of publication, but I will treat them thematically in accordance with the textual and linguistic methodology of this thesis. The studies by Carol Meyers and Glen Taylor both seek to synthesize biblical data with archaeological/iconographic evidence rather than treating the textual data itself. Therefore, these will be discussed at the end, because they pertain more directly to the issue of a proper methodology for determining the relationship between YHWH and light in the ancient Israelite conceptual world rather than directly evaluating the theological import of the cognitive model of אֵל in the OT.

The NT text sets the table for the entire discussion with its theological development of the concept of light, primarily within the Johannine literature but also in the Pauline epistles. Jaroslav Pelikan traces the adoption of this theological theme from the biblical text into ecclesial dogma, elegantly encapsulated in the Nicene confession of Jesus Christ as "God from God, Light from Light, True God from True God" (*BCP* 2006:326). As stated previously, Sverre Aalen summarizes well the state of affairs in the twentieth century in terms of the treatment of light in the OT, a status quo that W. David Reece begins to challenge with his convincing arguments concerning the ancient Near Eastern conceptions of sunlight and daylight. Although he does so in an indirect way, Shawn Zelig Aster contributes enormously to the present discussion of the phenomenon of radiance in connection to the broader concept of the "perceptible Presence of YHWH" (Aster 2012:264ff) throughout the OT. Mark Smith builds a significant bridge between the textual and theological facets of this discussion in his treatment of Genesis 1, also breaking from the broader opinion of twentieth-century thought. Finally, the Istanbul symposium serves as an ample launch pad for future theological discus-
3.1. The Theological Significance of Light in the NT

The following discussion will not be a comprehensive treatment of the theological significance of light in the NT; indeed, there is neither need nor space here to delve into the exegetical details of any of the passages included below. I will merely survey, very briefly, the most significant NT passages that provide the basis for the theological meaning of light in Yahwistic religion after the advent of Jesus of Nazareth. My purpose is to demonstrate that the NT authors, both in narrative and didactic texts, begin to weave together these three conceptual strands of God, light, and Jesus using OT writings as the referential grounds for doing so.

3.1.1. Light in the NT Narratives

Three major narratives in the New Testament directly connect the concept of light to the person of Jesus.


Καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄνθρωπος ἦν ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ ὃ ὄνομα Συμεών, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος δίκαιος καὶ εὐλαβής, προσδέχομαι τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, καὶ πνεῦμα ἦν ἁγιου ἐπ’ αὐτὸν· καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ κεχρηστισμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου μὴ ἁρέτην θάνατον πρὶν ἢ ἂν ἑδή τὸν χριστὸν κυρίον. καὶ ἦλθεν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι εἰς τὸ ἱερόν· καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰσαγαγεῖν τὸν γινόμενον παίδιν Ιησοῦν τοὺς γονεῖς τοῦ παιδίου Ἰησοῦν ποιῆσαι αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὸ εἰθισμένον τοῦ νόμου περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδέξατο αὐτὸ εἰς τὰς ἀγκάλας καὶ εὐλόγησεν τὸν θεὸν καὶ εἶπεν· Ἡ ὑπερβάλει τὸν δοῦλόν σου, δέσποτα, κατὰ τὸ ρήμα σου ἐν εἰρήνῃ· ὅτι εἶδον οἱ ὑπάλληλοι μου τὸ σωτηρίον σου ἢ ὑπάλληλος κατὰ πρόσωπον πάντων τῶν λαῶν, φῶς εἰς ἀποκάλυψιν ἑθνῶν καὶ δόξαν λαοῦ σου Ἰσραήλ.

And behold! a man was in Jerusalem whose name was Simeon, and this man was righteous and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel, and the Holy Spirit was on him; and it had been revealed to him by the Holy Spirit that he would not see death before when he would see the Lord's Christ. And he went by the Spirit into the temple: and when the parents brought in the child Jesus to do for him according to the custom of the law concerning him, then he took him in his arms, and blessed God, and said,

'Now you are releasing your servant, Lord, according to your word, to go in peace; for my eyes have seen your salvation, that you have prepared before the face of all peoples, a light for revelation to nations,
and the glory of your people Israel.’

This poetic oracle, uttered by the prophet Simeon over the Christ-child and traditionally called the Nunc dimittis in the Christian liturgical tradition, is the earliest recorded ascription of the concept of light to Jesus of Nazareth. Traditionally, as in the translation above, the Greek phrase φῶς εἰς ἀποκάλυψιν ἐθνῶν (literally, light for revelation to nations) has been interpreted with a preposition of goal or place (Zerwick & Grosvenor 2007:179; BDAG 2000:290[#1ab]; Wallace 1996:369) and an objective genitive (Wallace 1996:116-119). While not explicitly stated, the final couplet appears to be an explicative allusion to the phrase εἰς φῶς ἐθνῶν (for a light of the nations) found three times in the LXX translation of Isaiah (Heb. גויים לְאוֹר in Isa 42:6 and 49:6, עַמִּים לְאוֹר in 51:4), with the accompanying concept of glory reserved or ascribed to YHWH (Isa 42:8, 49:3; see also the conceptual pairing in Isa 60:1-5,18-20).

3.1.1b. John 9:1-7

Καὶ παράγων εἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τυφλὸν ἐκ γενετῆς. καὶ ἠρώτησαν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ὅτι Ῥαββί, τίς ἤµαρτεν, ὁὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῇ; ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς ὅτι οὔτε οὗτος ἤµαρτεν οὔτε οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἵνα φανερωθῇ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἣμᾶς δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με ἐκ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐστίν· ἐρχεται νῦν ὡς ὅτε οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐργάζεσθαι ὅταν ἐν τῷ κόσµῳ ὢς φῶς ἑτοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι. οὕτω δὲ ἐπιτυσάντης φῶς ἐκ τοῦ κόσµου ἐπηλὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πτύσµατος καὶ ἐπέχρισεν τὸν πηλὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλµοὺς, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὅτι ὑπάγεις ἐνίψαται τῇ κολυβήθρᾳ τοῦ Σιλωάνι, ἓρηνεύοντος ἐπεσταλένος. ἀπῆλθεν ὁ µὴν ἐνιψαμένος καὶ βλέπων.

And passing by he saw a man blind from birth. And his disciples asked him, saying, "Rabbi, who sinned, he or his parents, so that he was born blind?" Jesus answered, "Neither he nor his parents sinned, but that the works of God might be shown in him. It is necessary to do the works of the one who sent me while it is day; night is coming, when no one is able to work. While I am in the world, I am the light of the world." Having said this, he spat on the ground, made mud from the spittle, smeared him on the eyes with the mud, and said to him: "Go, wash in the pool of Siloam" (which being interpreted is 'He who was sent'). So he departed, and he washed, and he went seeing.

The story of the blind man in John 9 opens with the statement of Jesus claiming to be the "light of the world" (v.5). The narrative that follows illustrates this concept via the healing of the blind man, reaching its climax with a dual confession: by Jesus, that he is the "Son
of Man" (v.35-37); and by the blind man, in calling Jesus "Lord" (v.38) and affirming his belief in him. The tension within the story comes in the disputed identity of Jesus, whether he is "from God" (i.e. divine, v.33) or "not from God" (i.e. merely human, v.16). In contrast to the Pharisees, the formerly blind man propounds a historical argument for the divinity of Jesus: only God can heal someone born blind because never before has any human been able to perform such a feat. The story contains no direct quotation of the OT, but the use of the term φῶς in the narrative mimics exactly the use of the term אָוֹר in the prophetic oracle in Isa 42:16 describing the actions of YHWH. Jesus calls himself the "light" and then turns the blind man's darkness "into light.”

3.1.1c. Acts 9:3-8

Now as he was on his way, approaching Damascus, suddenly light from heaven shone around him, and after falling to the earth he heard a voice saying to him: "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?" Then he said, "Who are you, Lord?" Then he replied, "I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting; but rise up and go into the city, and it will be told to you what is necessary for you to do. Now the men traveling with him had been standing speechless, hearing a voice but seeing no one. So Saul rose up from the earth, but having opened his eyes his saw nothing; and leading him by the hand, they brought him into Damascus.

In this story, light from heaven shines on Saul as he and his companions are on the road to Damascus. Saul recognizes the voice that accompanies the light as the voice of YHWH, whom he addresses as "Lord" (v.5). The text does not say specifically whether it is the light, or the voice, or both, that indicate to Saul that it is YHWH who is speaking to him; nor is this detail important. The point here is simply that, in the story, a light from heaven is one of the indicators that identifies the speaker. Of course, the voice proceeds to identify himself not as YHWH but as Jesus. The implication of this text accords with the previous narratives; that is, the simultaneous linking of the concepts of YHWH and light with the person of Jesus of Nazareth, although there is no specific reference or allusion made to any text in the OT in this narrative.
3.1.2. NT Perspectives on Light in Creation Theology

Having surveyed some narrative texts, I will now turn to some didactic passages in the NT that theologically explicate the concept of light in reference to the OT creation narrative of Genesis 1.

3.1.2a. John 1 – Jesus as the "true light"

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν. ὁ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν. ... ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἀνθρώπων ἐρχόµενον εἰς τὸν κόσµον.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This [Word] was in the beginning with God. Everything was made through him, and without him was not one thing made [which was made]. Life was in him, and the life was the light of humankind: and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not comprehended it. ... The true light, who shines on every person, was coming into the world.

The key equation in this passage lies in the parallel nominative phrases τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν (the true light) and ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἀνθρώπων (he who shines on every person), both of which refer to Jesus. Rather than grounding these ascriptions in one of the prophetic songs of Isaiah, as does the Lukan Evangelist, the Johannine Evangelist instead develops the contrasting themes of light and darkness within the creation narrative of Genesis 1 and applies the concept of light to Jesus.

3.1.2b. 1 John 1 – "God is light"

Καὶ ἦστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία ἡ ἀνηχόµεναι ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναγίγνεται ὑµῖν, ὡτι ὃ θεὸς φῶς ἦστιν καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν σοφεία.

And this is the message that we heard from [Jesus Christ] and communicated to you, that God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all.

The Johannine writer states the metaphor directly, God is light, and attributes it to Jesus Christ himself. Although not explicit, the creation event is the assumed backdrop here, given the conceptual accordance between this text and the prologue to the Johannine Gospel narrative as well as the strong contrast drawn between light and darkness. The analyst should not make too much of this specific statement in terms of OT exegesis, but the fact that an NT writer explicitly states God is light should be considered an important piece of anecdotal evi-
dence when considering the theological significance of light in ancient Israelite culture. Its occurrence within Israelite literature means significantly more to the current study than if the statement never occurred.

3.1.2c. 2 Cor 4:3-6 – "From darkness let light shine"

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον, ἐν οἷς ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἐποίησεν τὰ νοήματα τῶν ἀπίστων εἰς τὸ μὴ αὐγάσαι τὸν φωτισμὸν τῆς ἡμέρας τοῦ Χριστοῦ, διὸ ἔστιν ἐκείνων τοῦ θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἐαυτοῦς θεόν ἦσαν ἀλλὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν κυρίον, ἐστὶν δὲ δούλους ἦσαν θεοῦ. ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἐκείνων ἐκορμάζει, διὸ ἐλάμψειν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἡμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ.

Now even if our gospel is veiled, it is veiled to those who are perishing, in whom the god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers so they do not see the light of the glory of the gospel of Christ, who is the image of God. For we do not preach ourselves but Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake. For God, who said "From darkness let light shine," is he who has shone in our hearts the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ.

Here the Pauline writer draws a similar referential connection between Jesus and the creation narrative of Genesis with respect to light. However, rather than drawing the connection to Jesus specifically, the writer grounds this link in a double assertion about the actions of God. The author affirms that in the past God commanded light to shine from darkness, and now (i.e. in respect to the time of writing) God is shining "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ" into the hearts of the people of God.

Again, my only purpose in this section has been to show how the NT authors grounded their Christology in some preconceived cognitive nexus of YHWH and light within the OT writings. The specific nature of this link is beyond the scope of the current study, although a hypothesis will be presented (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the study intends to develop the proper method by which this cognitive relationship can be most precisely articulated and defended. Still, the fact that the NT writers recognized and developed this relationship cannot be denied. This paves the way for future theological discussion in the Church when seeking to articulate the nature of Christ's identity, which eventually builds to the creedal confession of Jesus as "God from God, Light from Light, True God from True God" (BCP 2006:326, emphasis added).
3.2. A Brief Theological History of "Light"

In 1960, Jaroslav Pelikan delivered the Gray Lectures series at Duke University, showing how Athanasius of Alexandria utilized and expounded the Johannine image *God is light* in his theological defense of the Nicene formula. These lectures were further refined and published in 1962 as the book, *The Light of the World: A Basic Image in Early Christian Thought*. Pelikan aptly describes the centrality of the metaphor of light leading up to Athanasius:

Now among the images for Christ that had been handed down by Scripture and tradition for the theologian's reflection, the image of the light and the radiance was assuredly one of the more important. As Athanasius himself put it, "all [the saints] proclaim [Christ] as the radiance"....Because of its prominence in Scripture and in the liturgical tradition, the image of light and radiance might be expected to appear often in the writings of Athanasius. But because of his sensitivity to the problem of biblical imagery, we may safely judge that he would not merely play with the image rhetorically or hold forth dithyrambically on the glories of the uncreated light. On the contrary, he made a precise effort—more precise perhaps than the effort of most of his predecessors or contemporaries—to locate the image "light" within the imagery of the Scriptures about Christ and thus to add its value as a *paradeigma* to all that the Scriptures, through other *paradeigma*, had to say about the relation between Christ and the Father. In short, light was no "mere image" to Athanasius, because for Athanasius there was nothing mere about an image. "God is light," then, is a symbolic statement about God (Pelikan 1962:30-31).

Pelikan draws out two fundamental cornerstones of the statement *God is light* as developed by Athanasius. First, the statement was regarded as an "image" (Gr. εἰκών) and not a direct ontology; that is, Pelikan does not affirm that the metaphor *God is light* communicates an analogical relationship between light and God (as the "uncreated Light") but only a symbolic relationship (see section 3.7 below). Secondly, this image stood within a complex network of other metaphorical images that worked together to communicate meaning. In the case of Athanasius, his immediate concern was to articulate the relationship between Jesus Christ (as God the Son) and God the Father. Pelikan identifies three primary images in scripture that Athanasius highlighted and developed for this purpose: Christ as the Son of God; Christ as the Word of God; and Christ as the radiance of the Father (Pelikan 1962:23-34). Here I will not delve into the theological philosophy of Athanasius. I only wish to point out the fact that Pelikan sees the early Christian theologians recognizing a complex metaphorical system of thought exemplified within the biblical texts; the metaphor *God is light* is but one strand in that web. Thus, according to Pelikan, from very early in Christian theology the same
fundamental principles concerning metaphor articulated in CL theory are already beginning to be applied (see Fauconnier and Turner 2008:53-66), although the terminology is different from modern times.3

Pelikan affirms that there is another side to this coin, however. Yes, the image God is light is not an ontological statement itself, but it does communicate an ontological reality:

At one level of discourse it was accurate to say that the statement "God is light" is symbolic. Yet this did not mean that one already knew, from some source or other apart from God, what light was, and that one then attributed some quality of this light to God. On the contrary, God was uncreated light, the light that illumined every other light, himself the ultimate source of every illumination in his universe (Pelikan 1962:33-34).

Again, Athanasius was interested in this notion of God as light primarily in terms of defending the Trinitarian confession of the Nicene council, and specifically as it related to the person of Jesus of Nazareth. And because Pelikan's chief concern is to articulate how Athanasius understood and developed the concept of Jesus as the "Light of the World," Pelikan doesn't go much deeper than the statement presented above regarding the precise ontological reality that the biblical authors were intending to communicate via the metaphor God is light.4 But I consider what Pelikan does say to be significant. He does not understand God as the first cause of all physical light, as if all light sources in the physical world do not produce light themselves but only refract God's divine light.5 Rather, he affirms that God is the "ultimate source of every illumination," that is, the action accomplished by the physical substance light in the physical universe. Thus, Pelikan interprets the early Christian theo-

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3. This result is to be expected if the CL theory of embodied conceptualization is existentially true concerning the operation of the human brain: that is, that all humans, regardless of culture or language, conceptualize the world on the basis of human bodily existence.

4. Pelikan writes: "This simple and almost homely metaphor for the Christian life took on a new and more profound significance in the context of the theological and Christological use of the image of light in the thought of Athanasius...When Athanasius applied such language to the Christian ethic, therefore, he freighted it with all the theological and metaphysical connotations we have been reviewing in this study...Clearly the image of the church as the body of Christ was a paradeigma to Athanasius. It said something about both Christ and the church that was really so in their very nature. So, too, the image of light and darkness revealed the nature of both the Creator and the creature" (Pelikan 1962:108,110).

5. Pelikan's view here stands in contrast to Achtemeier and others; see Achtemeier 1963:440.
gians – and especially Athanasius – as affirming that the metaphor God is light conceptual-izes the action of God in the world (especially his salvific work) more than the divine nature itself. Pelikan directly points to some ontological reality that he leaves imprecisely defined when discussing the metaphor God is light.

Perhaps the most striking facet of Pelikan's treatment of light in early Christian writings remains essentially an afterthought: when discussing the theological significance of light, almost exclusively the sun is the physical referent used to illustrate the concept (see Pelikan 1962:36,40-51,56-60,68-72,76-92,106):

For if the light was good and if the sun, from which the light proceeded, was nobler yet, then the presence of hope and the knowledge of God in the world pointed beyond itself to its source in God and in his eternal Logos, who was the orderer of it all (Pelikan 1962:40).

Once again, the pervasiveness of references to the sun in comparison with other sources of physical light strengthens the notion that the sun is the most basic cognitive reference point for the concept of light in the OT and therefore serves as the basis for the ICM in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. Furthermore, as suggested in the quote above, one can glean merely from Pelikan's quotations that Athanasius clearly understood that daylight came from the sun and was not a disambiguated thing of itself (see Pelikan 1962:59,80,106). Both these observations lend support to the conclusions of the current study.

Ironically, I will conclude my discussion of Pelikan's book by citing his opening sentences:

"IN THY LIGHT DO WE SEE LIGHT": these words from Psalm 36:9 sound one of the most intriguing themes in the entire history of religion. The New Testament echoes this same theme when it declares that "God is light" (1 John 1:5). Readers of the Bible, both Jewish and Christian, have always recognized that there are parallels between this biblical theme and the worship of light in various pagan religions....Yet it has not been until our own century that the depth and power of this imagery in the history of Near Eastern religion—and therefore the significance for this imagery for the interpretation of Christian faith—have occupied the attention of scholarly research (Pelikan 1962:11-12).

Unfortunately, Pelikan essentially leaves out fourteen centuries of theological discussion in his treatment of the image of light. He identifies James Breasted, Franz Joseph Dölger, and Rudolf Bultmann as twentieth-century scholars who produced influential works which set the backdrop for his own lectures, but he does not critically interact with any of
their specific works. Similarly, Pelikan states that blossoming research concerning both Hellenistic Judaism in the time of Philo and the mystery religions contemporaneous with early Christianity shows that the concepts of sun and light were also important in various Hellenistic religious contexts. It is clear from the endnotes to his book that Pelikan is building on the foundation of these twentieth-century scholars, but he does not show this in the formation of his own arguments; rather, he limits himself to expounding the literature of the early centuries.

Thus, the vast temporal gap between Athanasius and Pelikan still needs to be satisfactorily bridged. Most importantly, what historical developments led to twentieth-century scholars such as Aalen (see below) to conclude against any kind of metaphysical meaning of light in the OT text? And what gave rise to the belief that the ancient Israelites and other cultures did not understand that daylight came from the sun? This second question is especially puzzling. It is possible that these developments were simply the result of rationalist thought that arose post-Enlightenment, but this conclusion should be induced from the literary data itself rather than merely conjectured. There is insufficient space in this thesis to track the entire history of the theological concept of light since biblical times. The scholars from the Istanbul Symposium do this somewhat by presenting different perspectives on light from various eras, but in an ad hoc way (see section 3.7); a systematic presentation of the temporal development of the concept of light in theological literature remains yet to be completed.

3.3. The Concept of אַרְכ in the Twentieth Century

In his article on אַרְכ in TDOT, Aalen (1974:151,160,164) categorizes the lexeme into three major categories of use in the OT: "Natural Light;" the "Figurative Use" of light; and "God and Light in Theophanic Texts." There are several individual points at which the cognitive model of אַרְכ proposed in this thesis either agrees or disagrees with specific assertions

6. Pelikan comes the closest to it in his final pages: "The modern dichotomy between theology and ethics does justice neither to the way Athanasius spoke about faith and life or to the deeper significance of the key images, like that of light, which served both his theology and his ethics. Even though the Scriptural instances of the image may not actually connote all of this each time, Athanasius employed an exegesis in which the rhetorical admonitions of the Scriptures acquired a more profound significance through their association with these images" (Pelikan 1962:109-110).
made by Aalen. This section will not include a comprehensive critical interaction with Aalen's article in every detail; rather, I will limit the following comments to items that significantly impact the issue at hand for the current thesis, i.e. the attempt to derive a methodology by which to determine the relationship between יְהֹוָה and בָּרָא in the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

I have already demonstrated how the linguistic data with respect to בָּרָא in BH does not support the popular twentieth-century claim that sunlight and daylight were separate phenomena in the conceptual world construed by the OT text (Aalen 1974:150-151; Jenni & Westermann 1997:63-64). Aalen makes some concessions to this claim, however:

For a correct understanding of the OT idea of light, the distinction between light and sun is important....Of course, a closer relationship between light and the sun in the OT would be established if it could be shown that 'or should be rendered "sun" or "sunshine" in certain passages....In Job 31:26, the rendering of 'or by "sun" is suggested because it stands in parallelism with the moon. But here again, this is not necessary. We must keep in mind that the light of day is considered to be separate from the light of the sun everywhere in OT thought (Aalen 1974:151-152).

I have shown in this thesis how the proposed cognitive model for the term בָּרָא in BH offers a coherent rendering of בָּרָא as "sun" in Job 31:26 (see section 2.5.1a) and demonstrates the greater coherence of בָּרָא as prototypically referring to sunlight over against a disambiguated daylight. Aalen sees his claim as the presupposed basis for the OT corpus, especially Genesis 1, and appears to base his claim in the fundamental presupposition about the ancient world that "empirical observation apart from cognitive reflection did not lead men to conclude from the first that the light of day originates from the sun" (Aalen 1974:152). This may or may not be true, but it does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether the ancient Israelites actually concluded this.

In contradiction to these things, the linguistic data supports Reece's later claim that the ancient Israelites always understood that daylight came from the sun. This distinction carries substantial exegetical weight in the OT, especially concerning the interpretation of the Genesis 1 creation narrative. If the light of Gen 1:3 is, in fact, a reference to sunlight, either as a direct reference or as a metaphorical projection, this introduces – or rather re-introduces, since biblical commentators have long wrestled with this interpretive problem – the apparent inconsistency of daylight before the sun within the Genesis 1 narrative. Ironically, this would seem to give even more credence to Aalen's assertion that "the narrator is thinking existential-
ly and theologically rather than physically" (Aalen 1974:156). Even if the merging of the concepts of the sunlight and daylight in the OT does not have significant theological implications for the text, it certainly makes a great deal of exegetical difference. This is an especially rich mining field for further study in OT literature and exegesis.

With the exception of the issue concerning the conceptual relationship between sunlight and daylight as the overarching organizing principle, I do not see any significant conflicts between my proposed cognitive model and the specific details of Aalen's treatment of the referential operation of הָנַח within the physical world (see Aalen 1974:153-156). Within the ancient Israelite experience as expressed in the BH texts, I see the same kind of "ordered dualism" that Aalen describes below:

The darkening of the heavenly bodies is an element in the prophetic preaching concerning the future. We also encounter the idea in the OT that darkness itself will come to an end and that God's light alone will shine....The "ordered dualism" of light and darkness, which was given along with the rhythm of day and night and the movement of the heavenly bodies and is a part of the character of the present creation, is abolished by a state in which only day and light rule (Aalen 1974:159-160).

Aalen describes this future temporal period as an eschatological "time of salvation" (Aalen 1974:160), and this merits much further study in regard to the specific relationship between light and YHWH within the cognitive model. It is uncertain if the eschatological application of light in the prophetic texts is based on a prior cognitive link between light and salvation, or if the salvific application of light is based on the eschatology of "the day of the Lord." In other words, did the ancient Israelites cognitively link light with YHWH on the basis of a shared concept of salvation, or did they correlate light with salvation on the basis of a shared link to YHWH? This particular problem illustrates the challenge of discerning the referential meaning of YHWH as a light source in the OT. At this point, the cognitive model as I have constructed it does not answer this question because the complex layering of metaphorical images has not yet been satisfactorily disentangled nor the specific abstract domain(s) identified. I have discussed multiple domains into which the concept of light is metaphorically projected in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, any one of which might be potentially accessed by these eschatological references to God's light. This same criticism applies to Aalen's treatment of YHWH as the "light of Israel."

In some passages, God himself is characterized as the light or lamp of man or of Israel....It would be a mistake to see in such expressions a designation for the metaphysical
nature of God. All that they indicate is the importance God has in man's life to provide him salvation and help. There is no essential difference between Ps. 18:29(28), which says that God "lights my lamp," and 2 Sam 22:29, which states that God himself "lightens my darkness" (Aalen 1974:161).

In relation to the cognitive model, Aalen overstates his case in denying the possibility of metaphysical meanings of light in relation to God. The very nature of the linguistic phenomenon of metaphorical projection of concepts (or whole conceptual structures) onto abstract domains precludes this disavowal. If a human being is capable of conceiving metaphysical concepts in the first place, then CL theory would affirm the possibility of using metaphors in language to express those concepts. The key issue is how an exegete would determine that a metaphysical domain is being referenced in any given context; this question is still unanswered, but I will return to it in the next chapter (see section 4.2).

In the texts studied thus far, light is never a personal attribute of God, but generally speaking is the natural light of the created world or artificial light kindled by man. This rigorous distinction between natural light and the person of God (which is not retained in Judaism) is significant for the OT concept of creation. A theogonic origin of light is excluded here (Aalen 1974:164).

Again, Aalen has overstated his case based on the actual linguistic data. For example, to deny a theogonic origin of light is to preclude a priori a metaphysical referent for numerous attestations of the lexeme אוֹר in BH (Gen 1:3; Psa 36:9; Mic 7:8), which is a possibility; but the burden of proof falls on Aalen to demonstrate it or, at the very least, to present the argument that a metaphysical referent provides a less coherent sense of the text than a physical referent. This is especially true since Mark Smith and other scholars argue for a metaphysical referent of the term אוֹר in various places in the OT. Still, Aalen's objection to a metaphysical referent for the term אוֹר in the OT is worthy of note.

3.4. Challenging the Status Quo

In his dissertation at the University of California at Los Angeles, W. David Reece completed a thorough semantic study of אוֹר in the OT and drew some significant conclusions that challenged the status quo of twentieth-century thought about אוֹר. Reece's work has significantly informed this thesis; in a way, this study has served as both a recapitulation and a revision of what Reece accomplished nearly thirty years ago. Our methodologies have been largely the same, i.e. to analyze the contextual information that can be gleaned concerning the
term ḥôr in the OT and to quantify that information in exploring the semantic potential for the lexeme in BH. The difference between Reece's study and this one lies in the fact that the fundamental principles of cognitive semantics (i.e. the prototype structure of lexical meaning and its linguistic effects, the radial relationships between encyclopedic meanings of a term, the complex cognitive phenomenon called *metaphorical projection*, and so on) are much further defined now than they were when Reece completed his study. Not surprisingly, then, this study has reached many of the same conclusions as Reece but developed those conclusions more fully.

Most significantly, the cognitive model affirms Reece's highly-developed and detailed argument that daylight and sunlight are not disambiguated concepts in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. Reece devoted an entire chapter of his dissertation – nearly 60 pages – to constructing the argument and defending this claim, and, when combined with the cognitive model developed in this thesis, has effectively re-opened the question of the cognitive relationship between daylight and sunlight in the OT that had been considered closed by Aalen and other twentieth-century scholars. Going forward, this debate merits careful and thorough study. From a linguistic point of view, one way to probe this problem would be to develop an alternate cognitive model for the term based on disambiguated "daylight" as the prototypical meaning for the lexeme ḥôr, then evaluate the coherence and cogency of that model compared to the model constructed in this study. I have already explained in this thesis why such a model is less than satisfactory; however, a comprehensive inter-disciplinary study (comparative literature, iconography, archaeology, etc.) could potentially uncover some reasons why a less coherent model of the linguistic data fits the "complete picture" better than a more coherent model, although that result seems highly unlikely.

Reece discusses the prophetic eschatological vision of cosmological light in much the same way as Aalen, but he directly affirms that the eschatological light is conceptualized as being sourced in God himself.

In sum, before creation, God is the Light who creates light. As He creates sun, moon, and stars, He transfers responsibility of cosmic illumination to them. Presently, they are the only source of light. During the future judgment, those heavenly bodies are darkened after which God Himself again becomes the sole source of light (Reece 1990:37).

Reece raises the question of whether the writers of these prophetic visions regarded these prophecies as literal or figurative, and he stridently affirms that the OT exegete must
not dismiss either alternative *a priori* but must weigh the contextual evidence to draw a conclusion (Reece 1990:34-41). This question is important for the construction of cognitive models, including the one in this study; if all metaphorical concepts are, in fact, grounded in physical referents as CL theory affirms, then it matters whether *YHWH* as a light source refers to something physical as distinct from other light sources, or if this terminology is itself the result of some cognitive metaphorical projection. I consider the textual evidence too scant to decide definitively one way or the other, and thus the exegete must wrestle with this ambiguity both when constructing cognitive models and when seeking to induce conceptual relationships construed by linguistic forms in BH.

Although Reece himself never answers the question (because it wasn't necessary for his specific task), he argues some specific points for both sides of the issue (see Reece 1990:36-37). In this discussion, he specifically affirms the existence of a metaphysical domain of reality within the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

With no regard for the necessities of balance physics, a new cosmic order -- devoid of sun, moon and stars -- is logical if the prophets believed that was just what the [Word of the Lord] predicted. By accepting a basis for knowledge other than sensory experiences, they could preach whatever doctrines the new prophetic framework dictated regardless of the wisdom their new "revealed" views contradicted (Reece 1990:36).

Although Aalen does not disavow this notion of a metaphysical domain within the conceptual world construed by the OT text, he strictly denies that any attestation of the term *אור* in BH directly accesses a metaphysical domain (Aalen 1974:164). While the linguistic data of *אור* does not lead to any definitive conclusion of the matter, I consider Aalen's judgment too hasty and concur with Reese that the exegete must admit the potentiality of a metaphysical domain in the thought of the OT writers. If the existence of a metaphysical domain in the ancient Israelite conceptual world allows for a plausibly coherent cognitive relationship between light and *YHWH* within that conceptual world which accounts for all the other linguistic data (whether concerning the lexeme *אור* or otherwise), then the exegete must seriously explore and evaluate the possibility that the lexeme *אור* refers to concepts within that domain either directly or via the cognitive process of metaphorical projection. The theological significance of this point cannot be underestimated, especially if it can be otherwise determined that the concept of *YHWH* exists, either in whole or in part, within such a domain in the ancient Israelite cognitive environment.
Reece offers some speculations on the nature of the relationship between YHWH and light, but he does not develop his thought very far nor defend it very rigorously. Again, this lay outside the purview of his study, which focused specifically on semantic analysis. But as the current study works toward developing a cognitive methodology for articulating the relationship between YHWH and light in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, some of Reece's thoughts are worth considering.

Impelling every expression about created light was the belief that it originated with God. The following primary and secondary references leave no doubt of this dogma. [Gen 1:1-5,14-19; Isa 40:26; Psa 136:1-9; Psa 74:12-17; Isa 45:4-7,12; Jer 31:35-37; Jer 4:23; Psa 104:19-23; Psa 148:1-6] Equally significant is the subsequent communis opinio that all natural phenomena, and especially light, was under the immediate control of God. [Psa 19:1-6; Job 26:10, 38:12-15,19,20,24; Gen 8:22; Isa 45:12] In fact, many are the references that make direct relationship between light and God. So, if not one of his primary attributes, light is at least a by-product of his presence (Reece 1990:58, emphasis original).

When the exegete surveys the verses marshaled to support the first statement above, it is unclear whether Reece, when speaking of the origination of light, intends to refer to the creation of light at the beginning of time, or if he means to say that the OT affirms that all light is always generated by God, even the light of sun and moon, fire and lightning, etc. As I have constructed the cognitive model in this thesis, I am not convinced of Reece's assertion that the OT text envisions that all light originates with God. However, this study affirms Reece's second statement, that the text reflects a belief that YHWH controls the operation of light in the physical world, as earlier proposed by Pelikan.7 YHWH makes the sun rise each morning (Jer 31:35-36); he makes the stars "come out" in the evening (Isa 40:26); he causes the occurrence of each day and night (Isa 45:7). The OT makes other statements of similar ilk (Gen 8:21-22; Josh 10:12-14; 2 Ki 20:8-11; Isa 38:7-8; Psa 104:19-20, 148:5-6). Finally, Reece perfectly illustrates the central problem the current thesis seeks to address when he declares that there is a "direct relationship" between YHWH and light but goes no further to define it! Thus, while this thesis has largely affirmed and extended many of Reece's arguments, more study is required concerning the specific cognitive relationship between the concepts of YHWH and אור in BH.

7. See also Achtemeier 1963:440.
3.5. The "Perceptible Presence of YHWH" in the OT

Shawn Zelig Aster completed his dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania in 2006, which was then edited and published in 2012. He completed a comprehensive comparative study of the typological and historical parallels between the Akkadian concept of *melammu* and texts in the OT that utilize conceptually similar ideas. Of particular importance for this study is his concept of the *perceptible Presence of YHWH* as one of the principal meanings of כְּבוֹד יהוה (kebod YHWH, "the glory of YHWH") in the Pentateuch.

Descriptions of God as radiant and shining are widely found in the Hebrew Bible. This is clearly demonstrated by such passages as Ps. 104:2, describing God as "wearing light like a garment," and Hab. 3:3-4, which describes God's arrival in imagery reminiscent of sunrise, stating "there shall be brightness like light." Additionally, Ezekiel consistently describes the divine majesty (kebod YHWH) as radiant (as in 1:28 and 10:4), and Job 37:22 compares God's arrival, bedecked with terrifying glory, to the appearance of the sun from among the clouds....Although radiance is an important motif in the Hebrew Bible and in medieval Biblical exegesis, no comprehensive investigation of Biblical depictions of divine and human radiance has ever appeared. The present study will examine Biblical depictions of divine and human radiance within an ancient Near Eastern context....The methodology employed here focusses on defining terms based on usage patterns, rather than by etymology, and then on investigating diachronic development in the meaning of terms (Aster 2012:2-3).

Aster cautions against the treatment of similar cross-linguistic lexical terms in ancient Near Eastern literature on the basis of orthographic similarity, because words that look alike in different languages do not necessarily follow the same etymological trajectories. He argues that it is better to compare literary concepts on the basis of semantic similarity. This is how and why Aster chooses the Akkadian term *melammu* as the point of departure for his study – a lexeme that first connoted the concept of metaphysical power (but which can be made visible via various phenomena, including radiant phenomena) and only later acquired the specific meaning of radiance, whether metaphysical or physical (Aster 2012:22-106). Aster completes his study from the presupposition that images and expressions in the biblical literature are far more likely to be borrowed from Akkadian literature than the other way around (Aster 2012:4), so he investigates the biblical depictions of radiant phenomena against the background of other ancient Near Eastern literature. It is worth pointing out here that while Aster is not working from a specific CL perspective, his inductive methodology completes much the same task as does a cognitive linguist, i.e. he determines the meaning of
terms on the basis of contextual clues rather than pre-programmed formulae (Aster 2012:5-12).

Aster rightly makes a careful distinction between typological parallels and historical parallels (see quotation below); and in his study he specifically attempts to identify and evaluate potential historical parallels, that is, evidences of direct literary borrowing from one text to another. He leaves aside detailed discussion of typological parallels.

The term "parallel" is used in Biblical and ancient Near Eastern studies as a sort of catch-all phrase for various types of similarities between phenomena. It is important to distinguish among different types of similarities, because the type of question scholars should ask about such a similarity depends on the nature of the similarity. Thus, the blurring of distinctions between different types of "parallels" leads scholars to neglect the nature of the analysis which should be applied to each type. Treating all parallels as identical phenomena significantly reduces scholars' likelihood of fruitfully and accurately pursuing the implications of a particular parallel. It is therefore important to distinguish between typological and historical parallels. Certain parallels found in texts from different cultures are the result of innate similarities in the human condition in different societies. These similar conditions lead all people to write about themes such as rags-to-riches, escape from evil, comeuppance, and the like. The tendency to see the sun's radiance as a positive symbol also results from a similarity in the physical conditions of human life, which lead all humans to see solar radiance as life-giving. This type of parallel can be labelled typological, since the similarity lies in the type of theme or element. Such parallels do not attest to any unique or specific link between the two culturally distinct texts. When approaching a typological parallel, scholars ought to recognize the cause of the basic similarity between the phenomena, and then investigate the different ways in which the parallel motif is expressed in each text. The differences in expression shed light on the underlying values present in the culture in which each text was produced. For example, there is a universal tendency to see radiance as a symbol of power (Aster 2012:6-7, emphasis original).

Aster utilizes the radiance of the sun as his paradigmatic example of a typological parallel, highlighting the commonality of its application across cultures and languages. Thus, Aster correctly affirms that, when considering the theological significance of light in the OT, the specific details of the metaphorical imagery should be compared and contrasted with the way the same imagery is used in other kinds of literature to determine what is especially unique about the way the metaphor is used in BH. In this regard, Aster's study is not tremendously helpful toward the current study, because it focuses on the historical parallels in BH to the concept of melammu rather than the typological parallels of the concept of radiance. This is a weakness of Aster's study because he doesn't always fully account for the typological influence that might be at work even within historically parallel passages. Nevertheless, I find
Aster's observations regarding the phenomenon of radiance in ancient Near Eastern literature exceedingly helpful.

The most significant of these for the current study is his affirmation of radiance as a universal human symbol of power in the ancient literature. Indeed, Aster sees the solar imagery for God in nearly every instance of use in the OT as communicating specifically the sense of divine "power and reliability" (Aster 2012:124). The fact that Aster observes this phenomenon across the spectrum of cultural literature merits inclusion in any treatment of light in the OT. At the same time, however, the fact that this emphasis on the specific concept of power was not readily apparent in the current study suggests that the concept of power was not as significant for the ancient Israelites in their conceptualization of light as that of other ancient cultures. For example, one does not find in the OT the metaphorical equation of light and power as one does find with the concepts of light and wisdom (see sections 2.4.5 and 2.5.2b).

Aster traces the use of the term *melammu* through roughly two millennia of Akkadian literature, and he finds a significant shift in meaning from the 8th century BCE onward. Throughout the second millennium, *melammu* was described as a covering worn either by a god or a king. In all cases, Aster argues that *melammu* signifies the concept of royal power, either divine or human, and that *melammu* can be made visible in any number of ways, including radiance. Starting from the Sargonid period, however, the meaning of the term *melammu* shifts and refers only to the concept of radiance. Aster points out that much scholarly writing concerning the concept of *melammu* has assumed that its meaning remained constant throughout all eras of Akkadian literature, but Aster argues strongly against such an equivocation. Furthermore, Aster affirms that the later semantic range of *melammu* significantly overlaps with the semantic range of *אור* in the biblical texts, being used in descriptions of fire, monsters and/or mythic animals, human persons, also demons, weapons, walls (i.e. fortifications) and buildings (Aster 2012:59-66).

Aster's study leaves no doubt that the Akkadian concept of *melammu* is a fundamentally different kind of referential concept than the Hebrew concept of *אור*, although their respective semantic clouds increasingly overlap over time. This overlap is due to the semantic development of the Akkadian concept of *melammu* rather than a shift in the Hebrew concept of *אור*. This accords with CL theories of semantic changes. Both are referential terms, but
the primitive referent for the term *melammu* is in an abstract domain, similar to terms like *compassion* or *generosity* or *authority*, whereas הַחַד fundamentally refers to a physical substance rather than an abstract concept. In both cases, the meaning of the term expands via the principle of metaphorical projection, only in opposite directions. The concept of *melammu* originates in the metaphysical domain and acquires more highly developed metaphorical symbology over time; the concept of הַחַד originates in the physical domain and acquires metaphorical meaning in abstract domains.

Another major component of Aster's dissertation that directly relates to the current study concerns his treatment of the phrase יְהוָה כְּבוֹד (*kebod YHWH*, "the glory of God") in the OT. He begins his discussion of the Hebrew concept by conducting a brief survey of recent literature on the subject, including the work of Bernhard Stein.

Stein attempted to formulate a definition of *kebod YHWH* based on the material in the Pentateuch. Focussing on the connection between this phrase and "appearances (of physical or visible phenomena) caused by God," he argued that "the beginning of these revelations is always the cloud as the cloak of YHWH." Stein's second point is not tenable, since there are several cases where *kebod YHWH* is not connected to the cloud at all (as in Lev. 9:23 and Num. 14:22). But his first point is largely valid: all of the passages describing *kebod YHWH* are related to visual phenomena whose appearance is directly caused by God (Aster 2012:259, quoting Stein 1939:64-69).

Aster argues that the Hebrew concept *kebod YHWH* mirrors the development of the concept of *melammu* in the Akkadian literature, in that the later literature exhibits the more specific meaning of radiance in comparison to literature from earlier times. However, he convincingly demonstrates that the two concepts are fundamentally different and strongly affirms that all the parallels between them are typological and not historical (Aster 2012:290). The Hebrew concept of *kebod YHWH* cannot have been borrowed from the Akkadian concept of *melammu*, although the two concepts do have a "shared characteristic" of radiance (Aster 2012:290). He asserts that the term *kebod YHWH* in the Pentateuch only rarely refers to radi-

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8. "[*kebod YHWH*] refers to the Presence and / or the gravitas of YHWH, and does not refer consistently to a particular visual appearance. It is associated with radiance only occasionally, notably in Exod. 24:17 and in Lev. 9:23-24, when God's presence or importance is made visible by means of a radiant phenomenon. In the book of Ezekiel, however, *kebod YHWH* is consistently a radiant phenomenon" (Aster 2012:301). Aster argues that the use of the term *kebod YHWH* is influenced by the later Akkadian concept of *melammu*, but that this relationship falls short of full literary borrowing as he defines it (Aster 2012:314-316).
ance specifically, but rather means either one of two things: "1. the perceptible Presence of YHWH; or to 2. signs and wonders which demonstrate His importance" (Aster 2012:264). Thus, in places where the term kebod YHWH does refer to radiance in the Pentateuch, it is an example of the divine Presence of YHWH made perceptible to humans via radiant phenomena. I will not replicate Aster's textual argumentation here, but it is both compelling and convincing. His assertion that theophanies (i.e. a "physical manifestation of YHWH's presence," p.264) in the OT should be understood as the perceptible Presence of YHWH contains extraordinary explanatory power toward proposing a solution to what I have called "the YHWH problem" in the linguistic data concerning אור in BH (see section 2.5). Perhaps this is not a ground-breaking innovation on Aster's part, but his analysis of the comparative linguistic terms definitively suggests that the specific concept of the perceived presence of the divine being is a focal point of ancient Israelite theology in contrast to other ancient cultures.

The final chapter of Aster's dissertation contains a lengthy discussion of Isaiah 60, drawing similarities between it and Neo-Babylonian royal inscriptions describing various restorations of Babylonian temples. Aster sees the use of light imagery in Isaiah 60 as referring to the radiance of the city itself, achieved by the adorning decoration of precious metals such as gold and silver provided by YHWH.

Radiance is also the result of the transformation, and this is seen in the progression from vv. 17-18 to vv. 19-20. In v. 17, the replacement of the human building materials by divinely provided metals (gold, silver, and iron) is described. Vv. 19-20 describe Jerusalem as basking in the glow of a divine "eternal light," as a result of which Jerusalem no longer needs natural light sources. It therefore seems that the divine "eternal light" is the result of the divinely provided metals, whose shine and glint illuminate the city (Aster 2012:325).

Aster's argument here is problematic, for the primary reason that he appears to assume that the reference to Jerusalem's light in Isaiah 60 means light that inheres in the city itself. If this were the case, then his argument would be quite coherent and comparisons to Neo-Babylonian texts would be legitimate, since those texts Aster quotes leave absolutely no doubt that the radiance of the buildings mentioned comes from the precious metals with which they are adorned. But this assumption is far from assured in Isaiah 60; rather, a close reading of the passage is unequivocal that the "Jerusalem light" is extrinsic to it, not intrinsic.

The prophet writes in v.3 that the nations will be drawn to "your light" (i.e. Jerusalem's light), and the previous two verses leave no doubt that the source of this light is YHWH and not the city itself. The use of the noun אור in BH follows a consistent pattern that
when speaking about persons – and the city of Jerusalem is being personified here – the pronominal suffix attached to the noun always indicates a light that shines on a person and never a light that shines from a person.\textsuperscript{9} Not only this, but the Isaiah 60 text itself suggests this very same sense of the phrase "your light" in the final verses of the chapter, where it is specifically stated that neither the sun nor the moon will be "your light," either by night or by day. This use of divine light in Isaiah 60 follows not only the same linguistic pattern as the rest of the OT, but also the eschatological pattern in the prophetic literature of YHWH himself superseding the celestial lights.

Perhaps one of the most illuminating observations of Aster's study concerning the concept of melammu and its biblical parallels is that the most direct examples of literary borrowing occur in the diachronically later stages of semantic development. For a concept like melammu, which is primitively an abstract term and only later takes a specific referent in the physical world, this might suggest that the conceptual contours of a metaphysical domain within a specific cognitive environment could have been quite different between the respective conceptual worlds of the ancient Israelites and the ancient Babylonians. If so, then it stands to reason that conceptual exploration of BH literature itself is much more fruitful than comparative studies with literature in other ancient languages for the purposes of investigating the metaphysical thought of the ancient Israelites, as is certainly the case with Isaiah 60. This is not to dismiss the necessity of both, nor does Aster's study conclusively prove the priority of intra-biblical study over other kinds of scholarly work. But Aster's conclusions definitely accord with the theories of CL: in order to investigate the conceptual world symbolized by a particular language, one must study the use of the language symbolizing that conceptual world; the two cannot be divorced.

3.6. A Classic Exegetical Case Study

In his book \textit{The Priestly Vision of Genesis 1}, Mark S. Smith provides an inter-textual treatment of the Genesis 1 creation account in the context of both intra-biblical and extra-bib-

\textsuperscript{9} This pattern operates exactly opposite from the pronominal suffix in reference to the moon and stars, which always refers to the light from the object itself. The point here is that the use of pronominal suffixes attached to the noun \textit{אור} always follow consistent patterns of reference. There is no reason to suspend these patterns when reading Isaiah 60.
lical thematically-related texts. For such a painstakingly thorough treatment of a relatively small section of text, especially one so important in the OT as Genesis 1, this work conspicuously lacks exegetical depth. I include it in the study for two reasons: (1) because of the nature of the conclusions that Smith draws regarding the theological significance of light in the Genesis 1 narrative in the broader contexts of Priestly writings and the OT in general; and (2) because Smith directly affirms God as a light source in Genesis 1, even while admitting that the text does not say so outright. The Genesis 1 text serves as an interesting case study to work out some of the implications of the CL method for biblical exegesis.

Smith opens his discussion of the light in Gen 1:3-5 by asking the question, Was the Light on Day One in Gen 1:3 Created? (Smith 2010:71). He proceeds as follows:

At first glance, this question hardly seems worth asking. The answer would seem to be obvious; of course, light was created. After all, this is the first act of creation on the first day in Genesis 1:3: "And God said, 'let light be,' and light was." However, as we are about to see, the issue is more subtle. It involves looking at how this light was understood among ancient and modern commentators as well as in other ancient texts. Our exploration of these authorities will help us to uncover the deep and important meaning that the light held for ancient Israel. As a result, we will also see what it meant in Genesis 1:3 and what was at stake for its author (Smith 2010:71-72).

The primary weakness of Smith's approach is that he immediately jettisons the local context when seeking to determine the meaning of light and its significance within the text. Rather than engaging in the difficult work of searching for contextual clues and allowing them to clarify the semantic values of individual terms, he immediately imports meaning from various biblical texts (Isa 45:6-7; John 1:1-9; Exo 40:1-38; and Psa 104:1-2) in order to arrive at his conclusions. This method directly opposes the CL theory of encyclopedic semantics, which acknowledges that words can mean different things in different contexts and must therefore be considered in their immediate contexts in order to understand the meaning of each individual attestation. In theory, Smith's conclusions may be correct, but from a linguistic perspective they might equally well be incorrect. He could have made more convincing exegetical arguments if he had examined closely the contextual clues in each of these respective contexts and then, on the basis of inductive analysis, explained how the lexical semantics of each individual context informs the others.10

10. John H. Walton provides this kind of linguistic analysis in his book, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate. As one example, Walton surveys
Smith is unequivocal in his conclusion regarding the light specifically referenced in Gen 1:3-5.

As suggested by several biblical texts discussed in this section, the light at the beginning of creation was known in ancient Israel to be an inherent divine light that preceded creation. This, in turn, suggests the possibility of this view for the light in Genesis 1:3. Despite possible objections, the overall weight of the evidence favors this view. The light was a primordial, divine brilliance made perceptible in the created world. The composer of Genesis 1 allowed a number of primordial elements prior to the creation to fit into creation (for example, darkness, watery deeps, and water in verse 2). The light of verse 3 seems also to be one of these uncreated components (Smith 2010:78).

When this conclusion is read in light of Smith's complete argument, the reasoning is circular. Smith offers no exegetical proof that the various other passages (both intra- and extra-biblical) intend to explicate the meaning of the Genesis 1 text. Furthermore, he does not defend his own interpretation of textual similarities over against others that might be equally legitimate, or perhaps even better, explanations for the evidence. There appears to be no specific linguistic basis for his conclusion of light as preexistent other than an argument from silence: "No verb of making appears before the creation of the firmament in verse 7. If the writer wished to express the point that the light was made, he might have been more explicit about this" (Smith 2011:74-75). In contradiction to his statement, Smith has not satisfactorily answered possible objections, nor has he satisfactorily explained precisely how the weight of evidence supports his conclusion. In the end, he has merely asserted his opinion.

I disagree with Smith that the lack of the specific verbs בּרא (to create) or עָשוּה (to do, make) precludes the concept of a bona fide creative act in the use of the wayyiqtol of היה (to be) in Genesis 1:3. Gen 1:11-13 describes the creation of edible vegetation utilizing the following verbal sequence – the jussive of דְּשָׁא (to sprout); the wayyiqtol of היה (to be); the wayyiqtol of יצא (to go/come out) – yet it seems highly unlikely that the reader ought to think that the narrative is presenting vegetation as also preexistent. In my opinion, it seems much more likely that other factors are at play regarding the specific choice of words to describe various creative acts. First, I argue that the use of the wayyiqtol immediately after the jussive of the same verb suggests an action that occurs in response to the words spoken by God. It is the use of the key term בּרא (to create) in the OT to demonstrate various nuances of the verb in BH (Walton 2009:38-46). This plays a significant role in exegeting both Isaiah 45, which specifies darkness as "created" by God, and Genesis 1, which does not.
more likely that the verbal action here connotes the idea of "coming into existence" instead of simply "appearing" (as Smith seems to suggest). If the writer wanted to describe the action of "appearing," they could have used the Niphal form of the verb ראה (to see), as in Gen 1:9 (describing the appearance of the dry land). Thus, I argue that the most coherent contextual sense of the wayyiqtol of היה in Gen 1:3 reflects an actual creative act. Smith admits this as an exegetical possibility and never argues convincingly against it.

Secondly, one can just as easily conclude that the nature of the thing being created affects the writer's choice of verbs to describe particular creative acts in Genesis 1; that is, the nature of the substance light defies its being "made" in the same way as tangibly solid objects (or ones that appear to be such) with definable shape such as the sun, the moon, the stars, and living creatures. The same argument can be made concerning the creation of vegetation, which is depicted in the narrative as coming from inside the ground, then sprouting up and growing, even as we observe it today.

Thirdly, the biblical writer may well have intentionally avoided the specific verbs בּרא and עשׂה in certain instances in order to produce a specific literary result for an unspecified reason. In the MT as we read it today, the verb עשׂה is used exactly 10x in the Genesis 1 narrative (Gen 1:7,11,12,16,25,26,31, 2:2(x2),3), and the verb בּרא is used exactly 6x in the Genesis 1 narrative (Gen 1:1,21,27(x3), 2:3) with a seventh at the beginning of the Genesis 2 narrative (Gen 2:4). It seems unlikely that these numeric patterns are the products of mere happenstance. It is more likely that deliberate care has been taken in the fashioning of the narrative, reflected in the nuance of verbs chosen to describe each of the specific creative acts.

In Gen 1:3, the indefinite primitive noun is used in both the divine speech and the statement immediately following, with no attached preposition or pronominal suffix. The definite noun אוֹר is used for the remainder of the pericope, referring back to the unmarked noun mentioned in v.3 (van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze 1999:190). The temporal progression of wayyiqtol verbs in v.5 to describe the passing of evening and morning suggests: (1) that the light being referred to here is celestial light, i.e. sunlight, as indicated by the unmarked noun; and (2) that the text describes a period of darkness passing between the events of v.3-4 and v.6, because the temporal terms עֶרֶב (evening) and בֹּקֶר (morning) are defined by the visual transition of light to darkness and vice versa. When the Day One text is read via a
CL methodology utilizing the ICM constructed in the current study, the use of the term in Gen 1:3 unquestionably refers to sunlight.

Of course, one can object to this reading on contextual grounds because the narrative does not record the sun being created until later in the story (v.14). Thus, one could argue that this attestation of the lexeme must not refer to sunlight, in spite of what other semantic principles might seem to apply. This is both a fair and legitimate objection; but if this light is not sunlight, then what light is it? Smith's conclusion that the light described in Gen 1:3-5 is sourced from God himself bears closer examination. Even if the light in Gen 1:3 is not pre-existent, that does not preclude the possibility that the light is still sourced in God, but in a theophanic sense rather than as an "inherent divine light" (see above), as Smith proposes.

There is much to be said for this view, considering the observed parallelisms of language between the light of Genesis 1 and the kebod Yhwh in Exodus 40 paired with Aster's concept of the perceptible Presence of Yhwh as one of the definitions of the term kebod Yhwh in the Pentateuch (Aster 2012:264ff). Indeed, Aster's treatment of melammu in ancient Near Eastern literature provides a compelling motif for understanding theophanic phenomena in the OT. Thus the question remains, Is the light described in Gen 1:3 sunlight, or is it theophanic light that mimics the operation of sunlight? Applying the principles of CL definitively suggests the former but does not negate the possibility of the latter.

3.7. Investigating the Metaphysics of Light

In April 2009 a group of physicists and theologians, via the impetus of the Humble Approach Initiative of the John Templeton Foundation, met in Istanbul to present papers concerning the intersection of faith and science in specific consideration of the phenomenon of light in the universe. Those papers were subsequently edited and published in 2012 in the book entitled Light from Light: Scientists and Theologians in Dialogue. This symposium explored the physical and metaphysical aspects of light specifically within the Christian tradition with the full theological freight of the NT, the ecumenical creeds, and its vast subsequent theological tradition. Very little space is dedicated to the treatment of light in the OT, although a few relevant strands can be pulled out from the chapters by O'Collins and Hunsinger and woven into the current study.
Gerald O'Collins in his chapter lists several observations concerning light in the OT, but he leaves it to the reader to reproduce the exegetical methodology used to arrive at his conclusions.

Besides associating light and glory with the divine presence, the Scriptures represent God as the creator of light (Isa. 45:6-7)....By starting the work of creation with the creative command "let there be light," God shows — within the scheme of the Book of Genesis — that light is the most basic, general, and even perfect manifestation of the divine reality and operations....Created by God, light not only symbolizes God but is also an image of divine salvation and deliverance (O'Collins 2012:106-107, emphasis original).

O'Collins clearly diverges from Smith in his hermeneutic of the Genesis creation narrative and repeatedly affirms that the OT consistently conceptualizes light as created light and not uncreated Light. These two concepts figure prominently in the Christian theological tradition, especially as it relates to Christology, and the exegete must consider carefully whether the OT ever expounds a concept of a divine "uncreated Light" or not. In concordance with O'Collins, I have already shown how the Genesis narrative should not be understood as presenting a concept of uncreated Light, but this does not deny the possibility of the concept being expounded elsewhere. Pelikan opens each chapter of his book with a quotation of Psa 36:9, which Athanasius treated as the central theological text concerning light in all of Scripture: "IN THY LIGHT DO WE SEE LIGHT" (Pelikan 1962:11,21,39,55,75,95). O'Collins continues along this line:

The biblical expression "seeing the light" amounts to "being alive." We can unpack the expression "the light of life" as "the light which is life and the source of life" (Eccles. 11:7; Ps. 49:19; Job 3:20). When the divine light shines on human beings, they experience "liveliness" and happiness. That is the sense of "in/by your light we see light" (Ps. 36:9). When the psalmist prays "shows us the light of your face" (Ps. 4:6), he is asking for the grace to see/experience happiness (O'Collins 2012:107).

Frustratingly, O'Collins never defines his term "divine light" here. Is he referring to sunlight? daylight? theophanic light? all created light? uncreated Light? All are possible. His citation of biblical texts (Eccl 11:7, most conspicuously) appears to indicate sunlight, which makes intuitive sense but also reflects an enormous exegetical leap in his conclusions regarding the Genesis creation narrative. How exactly is sunlight the "most basic, general, and even perfect manifestation of the divine reality and operations" (p.106)? This is surely an overstatement of the Genesis text, and perhaps of the entire OT corpus as well. Nevertheless, it is fruitful to note that O'Collins appears to understand (unconsciously, perhaps) the OT concept...
of "light" as sunlight in its theological application, while at the same time denying the strict equivocation of either light or the sun with God himself.

O'Collins also makes the same exegetical error as Aster in his study of Isaiah 60 discussed earlier in the thesis:

Through the gift of God, Jerusalem is a zone of light in the surrounding darkness: "Arise, shine; for your light has come, and the glory of the Lord has risen upon you. Though darkness covers the earth and dark night the nations, on you the Lord shines and over you his glory will appear; nations will journey towards your light and kings to your radiance" (Isa 60:1-3). By twice setting "light" and "glory" in parallelism, this passage implies a functional identity between the glory of God and the light of God (O'Collins 2012:107).

As explained previously, the consistent referent "your light" must be an external light which shines on the city, not from the city. He is correct to see a correlation between the "glory of God" and the "light of God," but his defining term "functional identity" lacks substantive meaning. All of this serves as an illustrative example of how scholars can (and often do) take the concept of light in the OT for granted without carefully considering its meaning within the text itself. At the same time, this example is instructive of the theological and exegetical gap that Aster begins to fill with his comparative study of melammu in Akkadian literature and the comparative application of the concept kebod Yhwh in the OT as the "perceptible Presence of Yhwh" (Aster 2012:264ff).

Hunsinger launches his essay by developing eight theological observations concerning the signature quote from Irenaeus of Lyon: "[God] is most aptly called 'light,' but he is nothing like the light we know (Against Heresies, II.13.3-4)" (Hunsinger 2012:208). He draws the following conclusions based upon his observations:

"If the idea of uncreated Light is unpacked according to these points from Irenaeus, the following results are obtained.

- The one indivisible being of God is wholly a being of light.
- God's transcendence as uncreated Light is something for religion to acknowledge and piety to adore.
- The light in which God dwells is unapproachable and indescribable.
- To affirm God as uncreated Light is no mere creaturely projection.
- God is comprehended truly and properly when comprehended as incomprehensible Light.
- God alone is light in the true and proper sense.
- All creaturely light, despite its metaphysical otherness, finds its supreme source in God.
- Created light is entirely contingent upon uncreated Light."
• Created light is what it is only as a remote, imperfect copy and by inconceivable extension.
• Uncreated light can be known for what it is only because God is love and because in love God wills to be known.
• Proper statements about uncreated Light must take a form that is not only paradoxical but also analogical: "God is light, and yet God is unlike any light that we know (Hunsinger 2012:211-212).

Of course, both Irenaeus and Hunsinger are treating the concept of "uncreated Light" in a wider scriptural and theological context after the advent of Jesus and the composition of the NT. But these observations serve as a fruitful backdrop against which to view the OT conceptualization of light and YHWH. In my view, none of these statements can be exegetically sustained from the OT passages themselves, but certain concepts utilized by these statements are certainly communicated by the language of BH in regard to light. For example, the OT makes no explicit statement of the divine nature as light, but YHWH is unquestionably conceptualized as a light source in some sense (see section 2.4.6). Neither does the OT state that all created light is sourced in God in its immediate sense, yet the OT does affirm that YHWH is the one who created light itself as well as sources of light in the universe. Linguistically speaking, BH treats sunlight as genuinely being sourced in the sun, not sourced in YHWH and channeled through the sun to the earth; this is in agreement with Pelikan but in contradiction to Hunsinger.

The OT nowhere explicates the idea that YHWH is "uncreated Light" as Hunsinger uses the term, but neither does the OT deny the existence of such a metaphysical concept. The OT data itself is inconclusive on this matter. However, it cannot be denied that certain passages could be understood this way: not Gen 1:3, in contradiction to Smith, but certainly some of the direct statements concerning light and YHWH in the psalms, most notably Psa 36:9, as Pelikan argues concerning Athanasian thought. Thus, in my view, Aalen is correct to be skeptical of the explication of metaphysical light within the OT literature, but he draws a conclusion much too soon in denying the possibility of such a concept in BH. The fact that theologians in the past have read OT texts as referring to uncreated Light, paired with the ambiguity of the language itself, prohibits the exegete from drawing such a rigid conclusion. At the same time, the broader hermeneutical witness as well as close exegesis also precludes Smith's affirmation of the explication of metaphysical light in Genesis 1. The use of the lex-
in BH demands that the exegete find a middle ground and articulate a much more nuanced view.

To sum up, Hunsinger sees in the broader discipline of Christian theology an analogical relationship between the physical concept of created light and the metaphysical concept of uncreated Light. This relationship is to be distinguished from both a metaphorical relationship and a symbolic relationship (Meyers & O'Collins 2012:6-7). The broad question here is, To what degree can this analogical relationship be exegetically developed from the use of אור in BH? First, it must be clarified that the relationship expressed in the OT is not that of created light to uncreated Light, but rather created light to YHWH. Thus, a full analogical relationship, as envisaged by Hunsinger, cannot be sustained from the OT text itself in its use of the lexeme אור. Other data is required. Secondly, I have sufficiently begun to define the metaphorical use of the term אור in BH to show that the OT definitively evinces some kind of metaphorical relationship between light and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. This cannot be denied. Thirdly, at the very least, the use of the lexeme אור in BH invites the exegete to speculate concerning a symbolic/emblematic relationship between light and YHWH in the OT, as Pelikan affirms. Of particular importance here is the extensive use of solar imagery used concerning YHWH in BH, especially in the prophetic literature where YHWH and the sun sometimes appear to be juxtaposed.

3.8. Is YHWH a Sun-God?

In his dissertation, *Yahweh and the Sun: Biblical and Archaeological Evidence for Sun Worship in Ancient Israel*, J. Glen Taylor provides a possible explanation for this juxtaposition of YHWH and the sun in biblical literature by proposing that YHWH was conceptual-

11. These terms are defined as follows: "Metaphor, analogy, and symbol, while all truly ascribing properties of reality, need to be distinguished. Metaphor involves an extended use of language, which, while being false in the literal sense, makes a true statement about reality: e.g., 'The Lord is my Shepherd.' While God is not literally a shepherd, there is something about God's caring behavior towards 'me' that justifies this metaphorical statement. Analogy uses a common term to designate realities that are both like and unlike with regard to the same point....When comparing two realities, analogies 'carry over' some core meaning but qualify it....A symbol is something perceptible that represents something else, either naturally (e.g., light symbolizing understanding) or conventionally (e.g., the lotus symbolizing fullness in Hinduism)" (Meyers & O'Collins 2012:6-7).
ized as a sun-god at some early point in ancient Israelite history. He points to Josh 10:12-14 as the primary proof-text for this view.

In my judgment Josh. 10.12-14 provides important testimony to DH's understanding of the relationship between Yahweh and the sun at an early period....As noted earlier, my own opinion is that the Deuteronomistic framing of the poetic fragment must be taken to clearly imply a one-to-one correspondence between Yahweh and [בְּגִיבֹעֹן שֶׁמֶשׁ], 'Shemesh-in-Gibeon'. A number of considerations support this interpretation. First and most importantly, as Holladay has implied in part already, this is how the passage appears to read when taken at face value. This is evident in v. 12 in which Joshua who addresses 'Sun' and 'Moon' is said to have spoken nonetheless to Yahweh and also in vv. 13b-14. In the latter case of vv. 13b-14, equation between Yahweh and the sun is apparent because its assumption is the only means of resolving two difficulties otherwise posed by these verses. First, only on the assumption that Yahweh-in-Gibeon is the sun can one take seriously the claim that it was unusual for 'Yahweh' to listen to the voice of a man (which Yahweh regularly does with Joshua and others in DH). Secondly, only on the assumption that Yahweh was the sun at Gibeon can one account for the way in which Yahweh's listening to the voice of a man is implied by its placement in v. 14b (that is, after the halt of the sun) as a phenomenon equal to or even greater than the sun's miraculous arrest in mid-heaven. In other words, only by equating the sun's halting with Yahweh's hearing the voice of a man can the latter be interpreted as a miracle on a par with the stoppage of the sun in mid-heaven (Taylor 1993:114, 116-117).

An exegetical analysis of Taylor's conclusions here would venture far afield from the scope of this study, but his entire hermeneutical process – presuppositions, methods, and conclusions – needs to be examined carefully. Taylor's discussion of biblical texts lacks exegetical substance, as illustrated in the above quote. Furthermore, he tacitly subverts his interpretation of biblical texts to his interpretation of archaeological data rather than taking each on its own grounds and then comparing and contrasting the two. This represents a significant deficiency in his research methodology when considering the textual data.

All this being said, however, his conclusion must be taken into consideration when seeking to articulate the relationship between light and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. The linguistic data treated in this thesis does not support such a claim; YHWH and the sun are consistently treated as different entities in the passages that I have examined. But in order to either confirm or deny Taylor's conclusions using a CL methodology, one would have to complete an additional cognitive study of the concept YHWH in BH, even as the current thesis has done for the lexeme אור.
3.9. Imagery Exemplified by the Menorah

The dissertation by Carol L. Meyers, entitled *The Tabernacle Menorah: A Synthetic Study of a Symbol from the Biblical Cult*, does not pertain much at all to the current study except in the conceptual overlap of the lexeme אֹור with the specific object of the tabernacle menorah. Meyers connects the menorah to the concept of the tree of life, which is certainly the weakest aspect of her dissertation. She barely devotes a paragraph to expounding this link, and her argumentation does not convince.

It has long been recognized that because of the language employed to describe the menorah and because of its assumed appearance as a thickened stem or shaft from which branches project that the whole shape strongly resembles that of a stylized tree. S.A. Cook pointed this out some time ago, largely on the basis of its representation in later Jewish art. He would have it "laid down as a rule that the candlestick [sic] and sacred tree inevitably tend to merge into one another." Goodenough also suggests this, pointing out that the vision of Zechariah, with trees flanking the menorah, perhaps preserve the original meaning of plan form imbued with sanctity (Meyers 1976:84, quoting Cook 1903:186).

This conceptual link needs to be carefully scrutinized, especially since the lexical data surveyed in this study exhibits no direct cognitive connection whatsoever between light imagery and plant imagery. Based on Meyers' own treatment of the archaeological data, one could make an argument that the "branches" of the menorah are indicative of divine imagery rather than arboreal imagery, which would accord well with the light (probably celestial) imagery of the menorah as a מָאוֹר (luminary). The current thesis cannot settle the matter, but this is a pertinent issue for further investigation of the conceptual relationship between light and יְהוָה in the ancient Israelite cognitive environment as an integrated whole, incorporating both intra- and extra-biblical data.

On the basis of this critical interaction, it is clear that the application of cognitive semantic principles to the lexeme אֹור in BH has certainly contributed to what was already a quite lively theological dialogue concerning the concept of light in the OT. Now we come to

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12. "A third observation concerns our discovery that there exists a convention for expressing the essence of deity which assumes the typical form of six upward-reaching branches, in three pairs, extending from a central element which happens in Mesopotamian iconography to be the body of the god. The total figure thus created is the formal equivalent with respect to arranging of elements of the branches occurring in ritual scenes" (Meyers 1976:106; see also 107,118-122,134,144-146,154-156).
the payoff: the next chapter will begin the move toward a theology of light in the Old Testament.
CHAPTER 4
A COGNITIVE HYPOTHESIS OF A THEOLOGY OF LIGHT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

Having constructed the cognitive model of אֵל in the OT and tested this model against other recent theological writings, the time has now come to draw some disparate threads from the examined data and weave together a result. I will begin by making some observations and then propose a working hypothesis concerning the relationship between אֵל and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

4.1. Observations From the Linguistic Data

The metaphorical system concerning light in BH still needs to be worked out in greater detail. In this study I have done a good amount of preliminary work in this regard, but the specific concept of YHWH still needs to be coherently integrated into the model. Nevertheless, some fruitful observations can be made from the cognitive model as it is currently constructed.

• YHWH is conceptualized as a light source, utilizing imagery across the spectrum of physical referents.

• YHWH is further conceptualized as a divine person and, by extension of the LIFE IS LIGHT metaphor, the source of human life.

I suggest that both of these conceptualizations of YHWH in the OT invite the reader to consider YHWH as a Divine Being who exists in an abstract domain but who dynamically interacts with the physical domain. The fact that YHWH is not conceptualized as any particular light source in the physical world, but still as a light source nonetheless, would seem to indicate that the biblical writers’ conceptualization of YHWH did not correspond to any particular physical object. In contrast to Taylor, then, the reader ought not to conclude from the lexical data that YHWH is a sun-god, or a moon-god, or a storm-god, or even a "light-god," so to speak. Yet the fact that light imagery is used so directly and ubiquitously to conceptualize YHWH demands at least a metaphorical relationship, and perhaps even a symbolic relationship, between אֵל and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, although the linguistic data itself is insufficient to conclude this.
The concept of wisdom also impacts this discussion but needs further methodological clarity. Does the concept of wisdom govern the metaphor of light, or does the metaphor of light govern the concept of wisdom? And how does the conceptualization of YHWH relate to the dynamic of light and wisdom? The current study suggests several plausible answers: (1) the conceptualization of YHWH simultaneously governs both the concept of wisdom and the metaphor of light in BH; (2) the ancient Israelite conceptual world contains some kind of metaphysical domain within which the concept of YHWH is embedded and into which the physical concept of light is metaphorically projected within the OT literature; (3) there is no single conceptual relationship between YHWH and light for the ancient Israelites, but multiple relationships operating either simultaneously or progressively; or (4) there is insufficient data to propose any plausible definition of the relationship between YHWH and light in BH. The current study cannot verify any of these theories; further study is required to articulate the relationship between YHWH and אור in the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

The main question is, How should this be done? The actual linguistic data is sparse, with only 33 attestations of אור directly linking to YHWH.1 This makes it exceedingly difficult to induce a method via the kind of raw analysis that I have done in the current study. It seems to me that the analyst would need to propose a hypothesis that appears to fit the linguistic data and then test that hypothesis against available evidence. However, this method is weak because of its inherent subjectivity. Also, at this point the analyst only has sufficient information to observe the data from one side, so to speak. As things stand now, at the conclusion of the current study, one can see the relationship between YHWH and light only from the point of view of the concept of אור. Just as the current study has defined the conceptualization of אור in BH, so also the conceptualization of YHWH in BH needs to be thoroughly defined.

Thus, a much sounder method would be to leave the current study in its truncated form, recognizing the conceptual overlap of אור and YHWH with the understanding that the larger question of the relationship between these concepts remains unanswered. The analyst should then proceed to construct the cognitive model of the concept of YHWH in BH, including its entire radial network, just as the current study has done for the term אור. The two se-

semantic networks can then be juxtaposed so that the overlapping data can be viewed from the perspective of both constituent concepts.

This method presents some significant challenges, however. First, there are an overwhelming number of attestations of YHWH in BH; the task of constructing its cognitive model would be much more difficult simply due to the amount of data. Secondly, the exact referent of YHWH is much more difficult to determine than for אור. Does YHWH refer to a physical object, or a metaphysical being, or both? Might the specific referent change over time? How do the various terms for "God" in BH (e.g. the words אלהים and אל, etc.) factor into the conceptualization of YHWH? It may very well turn out that constructing a single cognitive model of YHWH is impossible, but there is no way to know unless the task is attempted. Furthermore, according to the Usage-Based Thesis, if multiple cognitive models of YHWH are present within the OT literature, then this fact should be represented within the linguistic data. If there is insufficient data to substantiate multiple cognitive models, then a single model could be used with confidence, even if not absolute certainty. There is no way to know the answers to these questions, or even if they can be answered, without performing the difficult work of examining and analyzing the linguistic data.

4.2. A Proposed Hypothesis

Even after all the preceding caveats, I propose that the comprehensive analysis of the lexeme אור in BH according to the principles of cognitive semantics has uncovered sufficient data to form a cogent hypothesis concerning the relationship between YHWH and light in the ancient Israelite conceptual world:

[**YHWH IS LIGHT**].

This proposed conceptual metaphor accords with all the lexical data, with all the CL principles concerning the phenomenon of metaphor, and with the (presumed) ancient Near Eastern tripartite cosmology of Heaven-Earth-Sheol. To explain the mechanics of this proposed metaphorical projection within the ancient Hebrew conceptual world, the terms and their respective domains need to be defined.

– The current study has consistently treated the noun אור as referring to the substantive material light in the physical domain. From the perspective of an ancient Israelite,
one would say that "אֹר" exists in the realm of הָאָרֶץ, i.e. "Earth," the realm of the living. Although prototypically defined by the physical object of the sun, the term "אֹר" refers to light from any and all light sources within the physical world.

I suggest that the term YHWH in BH refers to a personal Divine Being who exists in the *metaphysical* domain. It seems to me that the ancient Near Eastern tripartite cosmology facilitates the existence of a metaphysical domain within the ancient Israelite conceptual world via the celestial realm called הַשָּׁמַיִם (i.e. "Heaven," the realm of the gods) in BH. In other words, to me it seems both reasonable and probable that the ancient Israelites regarded the realm of "Heaven" as not merely a physical location (above Earth) but also the means by which to conceptualize a metaphysical reality co-existent with physical reality (i.e. objects/events/phenomena that happen within Earth) which interacts with and provides meaning to that physical reality. Walton argues persuasively that this kind of metaphysical thinking pervades ancient Near Eastern literature, including the OT (Walton 2006:85-161).²

Thus, I hypothesize that the ancient Israelites conceptualized light in the physical domain as the vehicle concept for the target concept of YHWH in the metaphysical domain. It is clear from the OT that YHWH is not physical light itself, as seen most evidently from the fact that the creation narrative specifically stipulates that light is a creation and not the Creator. So this statement YHWH IS LIGHT is rightly understood, not as a metonymic conceptualization (i.e. two different names for one thing), but as some kind of metaphorical projection from a less-abstract source domain into a more-abstract target domain. While this proposed cognitive metaphor requires further study to confirm its veracity, there are several good arguments to be made on the basis of the current study.

First, a careful reading of the creation narrative in Genesis 1 suggests a metaphorical relationship between "אֹר" and YHWH. As mentioned in section 2.2.1, the description of the luminaries ascribes to them the very same metaphysical operation that was earlier ascribed to God in the Day One narrative, "to separate between the light and between the darkness" (Gen 1:4,18). The Genesis 1 narrative does not treat the sun and moon as "the sun" and "the

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² "The world thus maintained is a world of meaning, of language, of knowledge, of relations and reflections, an anthropomorphic reading of the universe with a correspondingly cosmomorphic image of human order. The hourly ritual bans cosmic chaos, and with it the chaos in man himself" (Assmann 2003:211).
moon” but as objects that give light; the text is speaking of light here and not the sun or the moon as objects themselves. Furthermore, another function of light is to rule over the day and the night, stated on the occasion of the creation of the sun and moon. Compare this with the words of the psalmist, describing the same creative event:

לָֽךְ יְהוָֽה אָרְבֵּל לָֽךְ לָלֵֽה אֵלָֽה וְעַל שֵׁ֨רְכוֹ בֵּן יְשֵׁמָ֖ם:

Yours is the day, yours also the night;
You yourself established moon and sun. [Psa 74:16]

The proposed metaphysical metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT provides a compelling causal connection between these two lines of poetry; that is, the creation of the sun and moon demonstrates God’s omni-temporal rule over the universe because of the reality that light – as a metaphor for the metaphysical deity YHWH – rules over both day and night. If the metaphysical metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT is operative in the conceptual world construed by the OT text, we can affirm that, in its characterization of light, the Genesis 1 story declares the metaphysical reality that God rules both the day and the night. In other words, there is no time when YHWH is not sitting on the cosmic throne, ruling over the entire physical universe, even the dreadful monsters of the oceans and the terrifying predators that prowl the earth under cover of darkness. The authors of Psalms 74 and 104 seem to apply the same cognitive metaphor as well in their respective treatments of creation theology.

Secondly, the conceptual metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT fits all the lexical data concerning the lexeme אור as defined by the cognitive model constructed in the current study. If the OT writers utilized light as a general substance in the physical domain to conceptualize YHWH in the metaphysical domain, then it follows that this metaphorical projection would occur across all kinds of light in the physical domain and not simply the light of a single source. It further follows that this metaphorical projection would most prototypically occur in reference to sunlight, because sunlight itself is the most prototypical referent for אור in the physical world in BH.

Thirdly, the conceptual metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT accounts for the dual conceptualization of YHWH in BH as both a person and a light source. If the ancient Israelites believed in the existence of a divine person (who is by nature invisible but could make himself visible if he chose in any form he chose), and if they further believed that this divine person existed in
some transcendent realm and not in the physical realm, then they would have had a unique challenge to speak about this divine person. How would they have described to someone else who this divine person is and how this divine person influenced and impacted them? They would not have been able to reference any physical object in order to identify this divine person; they would have needed to find substitutes to stand in his place. They would have needed to use objects within the physical world to metaphorically represent his existence in the metaphysical world. But even this would not be enough, because they further would have needed to express somehow that he was a \textit{person} and not merely an \textit{object}. The use of the term \textit{אור} in BH can be reasonably and coherently interpreted to be expressing these very things, presuming that the previous description of the divine person corresponds to the ancient Israelite conceptualization of YHWH (i.e. a divine person who is invisible by nature and exists in a transcendent realm).

Fourthly, the conceptual metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT in BH coheres with later theological treatment of the concept of light by the NT authors. Most conspicuously, the metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT provides the simplest explanation for the direct statement \textit{God is light} found in the Johannine epistle. It also offers a satisfactory underpinning for the repeated references to light in the life of Jesus made by the NT authors, especially the references identified earlier in this study. Again, I am not attempting to make any specific NT exegetical claims here, but merely offering the cognitive metaphor as a convincing conceptual backdrop for the NT text.

Fifthly, the conceptual metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT accounts for the wider theological use of light in the Christian tradition. Speaking on the basis of the Nicene Creed, one can make a convincing argument that light is the preeminent theological metaphor in the Christian tradition. The Creed confesses Jesus as "God from God, Light from Light, True God from True God" (\textit{BCP} 2006:326); the Creed does not say "Sound from Sound" or "Tree from Tree" or any other physical substance or reality. This begs the question, \textit{Why light? Why not something else?} If one accepts, as Pelikan argues, that the early theologians were formulating their assertions from the writings of the Hellenistic Jewish NT authors, who were in turn formulating their assertions from the writings of the Semitic Israelite OT authors, then it stands to reason that the cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT would be a common thread running throughout, provided that that particular conceptual link could be shown. At the very least, the current study shows evidence of such a link; and the proposed hypothesis provides a plau-
sible, if not convincing, rationale for the choice of light as a theological metaphor in the Creed as opposed to any other physical substance.

Sixthly, the conceptual metaphor \( \text{YHWH IS LIGHT} \) appears to relate cogently the three concepts of \( \text{YHWH} \), light, and wisdom in BH, although further study is required on this issue. If wisdom is conceptualized as light in BH, and if wisdom is conceptualized as being metaphysically sourced in \( \text{YHWH} \), then it would be unsurprising for \( \text{YHWH} \) in the metaphysical domain to be conceptualized as light in the physical domain. The variables are the concepts of \( \text{YHWH} \) and wisdom in BH, and the radial networks of these terms would need to be constructed in order to verify the hypothesis. The only point being made here is that the hypothesis provides a cogent relationship between the three concepts based on a surface-level interpretation of the data.

Finally, the conceptual metaphor \( \text{YHWH IS LIGHT} \) contains an extraordinarily high degree of explanatory power. Simply put, it makes intuitive sense. Since many ancient cultures worshipped the sun, moon, and/or stars – which are sources of light – it is reasonable to think that a particular ancient culture such as the ancient Israelites would regard light in the physical world as somehow sacred and imbued with metaphysical meaning by a divine being. It is reasonable to propose that peoples in ancient times would ask questions about metaphysical realities and seek to articulate answers to those questions in writing, even as many cultures do and have done for millennia, whether by mythical stories, philosophical treatises, or other means. There is no reason to think that the ancient Israelites were an exception to this rule. The metaphysical metaphor \( \text{YHWH IS LIGHT} \) offers a reasonable and intuitive explanation for why the data connecting נאם to \( \text{YHWH} \) is so widely dispersed across the various meanings of light. Other explanations might be equally plausible, but, in my judgment, the hypothesis I have suggested appears to be both the simplest and best.

4.3. Considerations for Further Study

Having expounded the primary working hypothesis concerning the conceptual relationship between נאם and \( \text{YHWH} \) in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, I will now move toward developing a method by which this hypothesis can be tested for validity along five parallel axes: lexical, linguistic, textual, historical, and theological considerations.
4.3.1. Lexical Considerations.

As I've stated already, the broader system of metaphorical projection within the ancient Israelite conceptual world needs further study and explanation. In regard to the concept of light, the two concepts that need further refinement are the lexical concept חכם (wisdom) and the concept of YHWH. Final conclusions regarding the relationships between these three fundamental concepts would be much stronger if complete lexical studies were done for the lexemes חכם and יהוה. The current study has shown some specific examples of the metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT in the wisdom literature of the OT, but a complete radial network of the lexeme חכם must be completed to determine if the metaphor holds true across all the linguistic data for the concept of wisdom in BH. A complete study of חכם might elucidate information that refines the data analyzed in the current study. For example, BH may use multiple metaphors for wisdom besides that of light, and the specific metaphor of light may highlight a particular aspect of a more general concept of wisdom. The current study has concluded only that wisdom is conceptualized as light in the ancient Israelite world, but perhaps more could be said about the abstract concept of wisdom here. In fact, there almost certainly is more to be said about wisdom that has not been uncovered in the current study.

There is much less need to conduct a similar study of the concept of life, because the fundamental referent of human life is not as abstract as the concept of wisdom in this case. In my opinion, the data seems fairly conclusive regarding the specific referents that govern the metaphor LIFE IS LIGHT in BH. As noted earlier, a complete lexical study of the concept of YHWH must also be conducted in order to confirm or possibly correct the hypothesis concerning the cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT in BH.

4.3.2. Linguistic Considerations.

The fundamental question at issue here is, How do patterns of linguistic typology concerning language development affect the validity of the hypothesis? The current study has considered all of BH as one single and synchronous data set, yet this very analysis suggests a diachronic development of the lexeme. Since there is strong linguistic evidence for the primitive and prototypical cognitive model with other meanings being generated from it, one would expect the semantic variations of the term to follow along the same diachronic trajectory. Again, these dynamics are very difficult to prove with a fixed corpus like the OT, but
they need to be investigated at the very least. This difficulty is only exacerbated by the fact that there is no universally accepted textual diachrony of the OT, but there has been some broad consensus for some time regarding general linguistic diachrony of BH. The discipline of CL has uncovered many important insights regarding trends of linguistic change across a wide variety of human languages. These principles should also be investigated and applied to the data as well, even if such a study does not yield any clarifying results.

4.3.3. Textual Considerations.

The ICM of אָרִים is consistently attested across all the OT texts, so the referential model can be utilized with good confidence. However, there is significant variation of the semantic extension of that model in various books, with both the majority of uses and the most varieties of use concentrated in Psalms, Job, and Isaiah. This result is not unexpected given the intrinsic nature of poetic versus prosaic literature, but this trend of use in the OT bears some closer examination, especially in Isaiah. I have argued in this paper that the cognitive metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT is operative in the ancient Israelite conceptual world; if this is an especially predominant conceptualization of wisdom, then it makes sense that writers in BH would utilize the concept more in literature that is specifically classified as wisdom literature. As I've said already, a complete lexical analysis of the term חכם would help clarify this. But what accounts for the metaphor of light being used so frequently in Isaiah compared to other prophetic books in the OT? This is a significant outlier to be investigated and explained.

Finally, it bears looking at this cognitive model in conjunction with a general diachrony of BH texts. This is problematic, of course, because of the inherent contentiousness and thorniness of the issue, but this is not sufficient cause to avoid the discussion altogether. In the current study I have treated the entire BH corpus as one data set and constructed a cognitive model, but this should be taken one step further to see if (or how) this cognitive model shifts or changes over time. Based on linguistic typology, one would expect that earlier texts attest more prototypical uses of the ICM and that other uses are included in later texts, i.e. the lexeme expands its semantic cloud over time. But with such a fixed and limited corpus as the OT, it would be extremely difficult to demonstrate that variations in the data are in fact the result of linguistic development and not other factors such as literary genre, as discussed
above. Nevertheless, both these factors need to be considered when seeking to articulate and defend the relationship between אֹיֵר and YHWH in the ancient Israelite conceptual world.

4.3.4. Historical Considerations.

The fundamental question at issue here is, *How might iconographic and archaeological data affect the validity of the hypothesis?* If the cognitive metaphor holds true within the ancient Israelite conceptual world as a whole, then it must not contradict rational and reasonable interpretations of relevant extra-biblical evidence. Taylor's thesis is of prime importance here, especially concerning the relationship between YHWH and the sun in the OT. This also touches on the issue mentioned earlier in section 4.1 whether the linguistic data supports a single cognitive model of YHWH in BH, or perhaps multiple cognitive models. If Taylor is correct that at some point in Israelite history YHWH was considered a sun-god and only later was conceptualized as a heavenly God, then the conceptual nature of the cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT might in actuality be quite different than what I have proposed above.

A second consideration, perhaps even more important than the first, concerns the historical development and iconographic evidence surrounding the menorah as a religious symbol in Israelite and later Jewish religion. In her dissertation Meyers draws a conceptual link between the tabernacle menorah and the "tree of life" motif in ancient Israelite iconography, whereas the textual evidence for such a link is virtually non-existent. These disparate findings beg to be explained. It seems implausible to think that such an important conceptual bridge between the "tree of life" and the menorah would be entirely absent from such an important religious text as the OT. Can the cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT within the ancient Israelite conceptual world account for the Meyers' proposed conceptual blending of the "tree of life" motif and the menorah as a religious symbol in Yahwistic religion? If not, can this melding be explained some other way, or would this negate the existence of the proposed metaphor in the first place? Perhaps Meyers' dissertation needs to be updated in accordance with the ICM of אֹיֵר in order to answer these questions, or perhaps not – but either way this conceptual tension needs some resolution in order for the proposed cognitive metaphor to survive close scrutiny.
4.3.5. Theological Considerations.

Two different strands of theological development (i.e. Christianity and Judaism) sprang from the composition of the OT and considered it a sacred text. In order to be proven true, the cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT within the ancient Israelite conceptual world must be able to account for both the differences and similarities between these two theological perspectives on the data in BH.

In the current study I have highlighted the continuity of thought between the OT and NT but only briefly shown how the concept light entered into the theological discourse of the Church. The complete theological development of the metaphor throughout the Christian era still needs to be systematically traced, especially from the post-Nicene era until the twentieth century. The recent literature surveyed in this study clearly shows that there is more than enough literary data to accomplish this task; together these books cite more than twenty writers from all periods in the Christian era who have discussed to some degree the concept of light in their theological writings. This survey needs to be done especially with an eye to observe what factors influenced progressive changes or shifts in either the hermeneutical understanding of the relevant biblical texts or the theological application of the concept of light.

As mentioned in the last chapter, the background for the common twentieth-century opinions concerning light in the OT needs to be examined. What accounts for the common arguments of the twentieth century that the ancient Israelites didn't know that daylight came from the sun and the disavowal of any metaphysical conceptualization of light in BH? Neither the early Christian literature (according to Pelikan) nor the textual data (according to Reece, and seconded by the current study) would seem to support these conclusions, yet it seems unlikely that they would be drawn from thin air. Undoubtedly, further investigation is required; at the very least, the vast variation in opinion should be rationally and thoroughly explained in order for a convincing argument to be made.

In addition, this study has not considered at all the post-biblical Jewish appraisal of the OT image of light in the Targumim and later midrashic commentators up to the modern era. This work needs to be done. As stated earlier, the hypothesized cognitive metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT must bear the weight of explanatory power to account for the development of the theological concept of light in both the Jewish and Christian traditions.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS

This thesis has constructed a cognitive model of the lexeme אור in BH in accordance with the principles of CL as an academic discipline. This thesis has further tested this cognitive model against the treatment of the concept of light in the OT in approximately the last fifty years of theological writings. On the basis of this ongoing theological conversation, this thesis has developed a working hypothesis concerning the metaphorical relationship between אורים and יהוה in the ancient Israelite conceptual world as construed by the OT text. In conclusion, I will draw some broad implications of the findings of this study as well as its research methodology for the broader discipline of theology moving ahead into the future.

5.1. Thesis Summary

The introductory chapter of this thesis demonstrated how scholarly opinion concerning the concept of light in the OT has shifted in the last fifty years since the publication of TDOT in addition to the birth of a new approach to linguistic science called Cognitive Linguistics. In light of these developments, a new and comprehensive treatment of the concept of light in BH is required that utilizes the research tools of CL to provide a cognitive model of the lexeme אור and not mere categorical analysis.

The second chapter constructed a cognitive model for the lexeme אור in BH utilizing the fundamental principles of CL, especially those pertaining to cognitive lexical semantics. This thesis concluded that the lexeme אור does not stand as an isolated concept in the ancient Israelite conceptual world but is rather defined by sunlight as it operates in the actual physical world; the lexeme אור uses the sun as its most basic cognitive reference point, as visualized by the ICM depicted in Figure 5 (see section 2.3.1a). This prototypical sense of light is then referentially expanded to include other sources of light in the physical world, including the moon and stars, fire, lightning, the creature Leviathan, God himself, and even as a generic substance disambiguated from any particular light source. The ICM of light in the physical domain is then metaphorically projected into the abstract domain of personal existence, including the emotional and moral subdomains, as a way of organizing and systematizing the emotional and moral aspects of human personal existence. Furthermore, the OT text evinces
two main conceptual metaphors that operate within these metaphorical projections, **Wisdom is Light** and **Life is Light**. The personalization of this metaphor **Life is Light** is illustrated both in the eyes and face of a person, including the conceptualization of 

The third chapter then surveyed the development of theological thought concerning light in the OT over the last fifty years or so of academic scholarship against the backdrop of the NT witness to the relationship between light and God in the OT. Jaroslav Pelikan elucidated the symbolic relationship between light and God illustrated by the works of Athanasius of Alexandria in defense of the Trinitarian formula of the Nicene Creed. Sverre Aalen, along with other prominent twentieth-century commentators, disambiguated the concepts sunlight and daylight in the BH and disavowed any metaphysical referent concerning light in the OT. Less than twenty years later, W. David Reece disagreed with both of these fundamental tenets of twentieth-century thought, persuasively and convincingly demonstrating that all ancient Near eastern cultures always understood that daylight came from the sun. Shawn Zelig Aster contributed fruitfully to the theological understanding of light in the OT by proposing an understanding of theophanic light in the Pentateuch as the "perceptible Presence of YHWH" via a literary comparison of divine radiance with the concept of *melammu* in Akkadian literature. Mark Smith attempted to develop an OT concept of "uncreated Light" in the Genesis 1 narrative also using a comparative literary methodology, but his conclusion does not hold up to close exegetical scrutiny of the Hebrew text itself. Finally, the resultant publication from the Templeton Foundation's symposium on light, bringing together both theologians and physicists, provided a helpful matrix by which to evaluate the nature of the philosophical relationship between the physical and metaphysical in regard to light and YHWH as either metaphorical, symbolic, or analogical. The application of a CL methodology toward the lexical data unequivocally demonstrates a metaphorical relationship but not an analogical one, although it does not deny that an analogical relationship might exist.

The fourth chapter drew together some definite conclusions that can be induced from the lexical data. BH conceives of YHWH as a light source in some sense – either physically or metaphysically, or both – and as a divine person. However, much ground still needs to be explored concerning the operation of the network of theological metaphors at work within BH that describe the conceptualization of YHWH, especially the broad concept of wisdom in ancient Israelite culture and thought. Constructing additional cognitive models of the terms YHWH and wisdom in BH might provide further clarifying information regarding the interplay
of the concepts of light, wisdom, and YHWH within the ancient Israelite conceptual world. Nevertheless, the current study provided enough disparate data to develop a working hypothesis and apologetic for the conceptual metaphor YHWH IS LIGHT, projecting the concept of אור in the physical domain into the metaphysical domain to conceptualize the Divine Being called YHWH in OT literature.

5.2. Implications of the ICM of אור for Theology

In light of the recent theological works surveyed, I see two major implications of the cognitive model developed in this thesis for the discipline of theology: one exegetical, the other philosophical. First, the cognitive model provides a viable means by which to evaluate the degree to which the OT contributes to the metaphysical concept of uncreated Light in theological discourse. The introduction to the book Light from Light, composed by Mary Ann Meyers and Gerald O'Collins, provides a helpful distinction between three options concerning the specific relationship of physical reality to metaphysical reality indicated by the use of the term אור in the OT text. I have already shown that the ICM demonstrates beyond dispute that some kind of metaphorical relationship (as articulated by Meyers & O'Collins) between אור and YHWH is operative within the lexical data.

I have also shown that the OT text falls short of developing a full analogical relationship between light and YHWH, although some texts (particularly from the psalter) could be interpreted that way. The linguistic data neither confirms nor disallows the concept of uncreated Light as a referent of the lexeme אור. The question is, Does the OT data develop a symbolic/emblematic relationship between light and YHWH, as Pelikan affirms? I would answer in the affirmative, but as before, strict semantic analysis cannot conclusively demonstrate it. This question must be settled by applying exegetical and hermeneutical methodologies other than linguistic science. This represents exceedingly fertile ground for future study, particularly in regard to the metaphysical dynamics at play in Genesis 1. As has been true throughout the interpretive history of the OT, each new generation of scholars must continue to wrestle with the hermeneutical challenge of daylight – yes, even sunlight! – on Day One before the creation of the sun and moon on Day Four of the creation saga.

Secondly, it is helpful at this point to bring the somewhat impersonal linguistic analysis completed in this thesis into an actual philosophical conversation in order to demonstrate
how the ancient Israelite worldview still resonates in modern times for theological thought and religious spirituality. In order to do this, I will use a particular case study developed by Michael Brown in his essay in the book *Light from Light*. Brown encapsulates a very broad discussion between philosophy and theology over many, many centuries:

Plato had described how "truth flashes upon the soul, like a flame kindled by a leaping spark." For him it had been a metaphor to explicate the relation of his theory of forms to the sensible world. Augustine, by placing those same forms in the mind of God himself, now ensured that all intellectual understanding required divine aid. That is to say, just as sensible awareness was believed to require the light of sun, so now all intellectual understanding was taken to need divine illumination through participation in awareness of the seminal forms out of which God had created the world. Although Aquinas's revived Aristotelianism weakened this approach, it was really only with Descartes that such ideas were wholly abandoned, with his claim that in effect the capacity to illuminate lay in the objects themselves, in the ability they gave us to form clear and distinct ideas of their nature (Brown 2012:173-174, quoting Plato's *Seventh Letter*, 341C: cf. 344B).

While each of these thinkers approaches metaphysics from their own particular slant, Plato and Descartes are much closer to each other in opposition to Augustine and Aquinas, both of whom require a divine Creator who defines metaphysical reality. The Hebrew sage would not be silent in this discussion, rather siding with the theologians; for the ancient Israelite, wisdom is not some disembodied spark but light sourced in YHWH himself. The psalmist writes, *Send out your light and your truth, let them lead me; let them bring me to the mountain of your holiness and to your dwelling* (Psa 43:3). Such a stance is natural and expected. Brown continues, examining the humanist underpinnings of one Italian art initiative at the turn of the twentieth century as communicated in a painting by one of the collaborating artists.

A group of Italian artists that includes Giacomo Balla, Umberto Boccioni, Carl Carra, and Gino Severini signed in 1910 what they labeled their Futurist Manifesto. It had as its aim the liberation of Italy from the oppressive weight of its past, and the endorsement of everything scientific and modern, in particular machinery, speed, and violence. ... All the group were united in an antireligious stance, with Christianity, perhaps inevitably, seen as part of the past that had to be rejected. It is perhaps in Giacomo Balla's *Street Lamp* [sic] (1909) that this inherently antireligious thrust of the movement is made most obvious. The painting is a celebration of the technical achievements of artificial light, in which [a street lamp's] diffraction into colored rays is treated as an explosion of light from its own sun. Meanwhile, the moon as part of the created order is set in the top right of the painting in such a way as to suggest by way of contrast its purely passive and insignificant character (Brown 2012:174-176).
In Balla's painting, humanly manufactured light has replaced the celestial luminaries, seemingly relegating them into the background, away from the viewer, as if to demonstrate the irrelevance of natural light and, by extension, its Creator. All the while, darkness clings to the edges of the page (see Figure 11 below). Of course, this vision is exactly opposite of the eschatological vision in the OT prophetic literature, in which the divine light supersedes even the sun and eliminates the very phenomenon of night itself. While this contrast is instructive, the Hebrew sage would have still more to say on this matter. Qoheleth, in particular, would affirm that Balla's painting presents a self-defeating philosophical argument. The human production of artificial light does not, in fact, negate the theological significance of light in the universe but rather intensifies it! The ICM of the lexeme אֹר constructed in this thesis demonstrates that it is not the specific source of light which carries metaphysical meaning in BH but rather the phenomenon of light itself. Light is better than darkness, says the Preacher: the construction of the street lamp in the first place merely demonstrates this point, which is proven true when the light – yes, even the manufactured light! – dispels the darkness.

5.3. CL in the Theological Landscape

I will conclude the thesis by gleaning a few principles from the research methodology employed by this study (i.e. Cognitive Linguistics) that can be applied to the philosophical discipline of theology. Many religions of the world have a sacred text, and the three prominent monotheistic faiths Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have all developed theological doctrine (systematized to one degree or another) on the basis of their respective texts. At least practically, and perhaps even existentially, theology and linguistics are inextricably bound together. Therefore, stones dropped in the pool of linguistics invariably ripple over into the field of theology, particularly in the matter of reading, interpreting, and applying sacred texts such as the OT.
5.3.1. **CL and OT Theology**

Perhaps the greatest contribution that CL as an academic discipline can make toward the field of OT theology is to construct, on the basis of the linguistic data, a cognitive model (or models, if appropriate) of YHWH in the OT. The conceptualization of YHWH in the OT is not a new issue, but it is a contested one within biblical scholarship. Can the reader discern a single unified conceptualization of YHWH throughout the entire OT, or are there actually multiple different conceptualizations of YHWH at play? Did this model(s) shift over time, and if so, then how? Scholars can be found on both sides of these questions. While it is unlikely that a CL study either would or could provide authoritative conclusions to these questions,
the addition of such a methodological approach would be a refreshing inclusion into the body of data available on the subject. Building on such a study, then, CL is further poised to investigate and propose a construction of the entire complex network of theological metaphors utilized in BH. I admit that such an endeavor is an enormous task to undertake, perhaps requiring an entire lifetime to complete; yet it must be done, especially if ongoing empirical research studies continue to validate the theories of CL, as has been the case in recent decades (Evans 2011:69,74; Talmy 2000a:1-18). The field of biblical theology cannot afford to leave aside the developments of linguistic research toward its own methodologies and conclusions.

5.3.2. CL and Biblical Hermeneutics

Much ink has been spilled in the field of theology regarding various strategies for interpreting texts, principally biblical texts. These strategies are often classified along a spectrum of source-focused approaches, text-focused approaches, and reception-focused approaches. The development of CL as an academic discipline, and specifically the principle of embodied cognition, offers a helpful way to synthesize these various means of appropriating biblical texts. Texts are linguistic by their very nature; and one can reasonably argue that biblical texts are first and foremost a linguistic phenomenon, even more than a religious, historical, or even a theological phenomenon (although certainly these are all included). And because language is personal (i.e. embodied), CL theory offers a text-focused method of interpreting texts that satisfactorily accounts for the participation of both the writer and the reader in the hermeneutical process.

If knowledge of language equals the knowledge of language use, as postulated by the theories of encyclopedic semantics, the Symbolic Thesis, and the Usage-Based Thesis, then the creator(s) of a text is/are not divorced from that text. This is because the text itself, as a linguistic phenomenon, symbolizes concepts within a specific cognitive environment, either the direct conceptual world in the mind of the writer(s) themselves or a conceptual world created by the writer(s). Existentially, the text and the conceptual world are different "things," but they cannot be separated ontologically any more than the linguistic words spoken by a person can be separated from the person themselves. To separate a text from its creator(s) is to change it, although the merits of doing such a thing to biblical texts can be debated, either for or against.
In the same way that linguistic text symbolizes concepts that exist within a conceptual world, so that linguistic text must also be re-symbolized to construct a conceptual world in the mind of the reader; without this cognitive reality, a text is merely ink on a page (Talmy 2000b:417-420). But if linguistic text was truly nothing more than ink on a page, then it would not communicate any more meaning than a random dot or line. The embodied and personal nature of language, articulated in the theories of CL, demands the participation of both the addresser and the addressee in the utilization of linguistic symbols and construction of cognitive environments. This is ontologically true for any and all kinds of linguistic phenomena, whether written or spoken or otherwise. The veracity of CL theories can be questioned and debated, of course; but if CL theories hold true existentially, then any hermeneutic method must, of necessity, satisfactorily account for the participation of the writer of a text, the text itself, and the reader of that text. CL offers a method by which to accomplish this, although sufficient information may not always be available to solve every hermeneutical problem.

5.3.3. Moving Into the Future

The fourth principle of CL enumerated earlier in the introduction to this thesis, i.e. that meaning is conceptualization, affirms that the human brain lexicalizes meanings of fixed expressions by some sort of non-linguistic integrative process, although researchers disagree about how this process actually works. There is no need to delve into the various theories here, but research is ongoing concerning this issue in the field of linguistics. If any particular theory is eventually demonstrated to be true, this will open up an even larger field of inquiry in cognitive semantics for biblical scholars. Not only would there be a method by which to analyze semantic clouds of particular lexemes (as I have done in the current study), but there would also be a method to investigate semantic clouds of fixed expressions and lexicalized phrases in BH.

Already, the application of a CL research methodology has demonstrated that the article on נָשִּׁיָּה in TDOT needs to be substantially revised, if not rewritten altogether. Most likely, similar kinds of semantic analyses of various terms will also provide substantial correctives across the entire TDOT project. In fact, perhaps TDOT can already be considered an outdated resource, especially since forty years have elapsed since its initial release. I affirm the tremendous benefit of having a theological dictionary of terms in BH, but I would suggest
that the semantic analyses of terms needs to be redone in light of CL principles and the entire series rewritten. The advent of CL as an academic discipline qualitatively affects how linguistic concepts should be analyzed, and the theological literature needs to allow these linguistic conclusions to impact its trajectory, even if that means that influential theological works such as *TDOT* may need to be scrapped and completed all over again using methodologies of cognitive semantics.

In conclusion: after tedious and abstract linguistic analysis such as that which has been completed in this thesis, it is appropriate to ask, *So what? Why does the 'idealized cognitive model' of light in BH personally matter to anyone now?* In point of fact, one does not need to look too far to find modern applications of the very same cognitive model, in witty aphorisms or even in everyday experience. We say to one another, *The sun will come up tomorrow*, and we are comforted both in the saying of the words and in the actual rising of the sun. When we say to a beloved one, *You are my sunshine*, we always intend to communicate something pleasant and good, never something bad or evil. At one point or another, virtually every child is paralyzed by the terrifying darkness of night, for no other reason than the fact that it is dark and not light. If we go a sufficient length of days without actually seeing the sun, we begin to feel depressed in both body and spirit. We are embodied beings, we frail humans on earth; therefore, the light around us means something to us, to our spirit, to our very self. The ancient Israelites contemplated this and strove to communicate that meaning in their sacred writings. I venture to claim that light still means the same to us today, because of our common human bond.

As Love dispels fear;
and Wisdom, folly;
and Hope, despair;
and Life, death:
so thus the True Light dispels darkness. [original]


The Book of Common Prayer, according to the use of The Episcopal Church. 2006. New York: Oxford University Press [abbrev. as BCP].


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*The Holy Bible, English Standard Version.* Copyright © 2001 by Crossway, a publishing
ministry of Good News Publishers [abbrev. as ESV].

*The Holy Bible, King James Version.* Public Domain [abbrev. as KJV].

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# Addendum

## Classification of Attestations of the Lexeme אָרָה in the Old Testament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Referent</th>
<th>Metonymic Referent</th>
<th>Metaphorical Referent</th>
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### Sunlight (continued)

- Mic. 2:1
- Hab 3:4
- Hab 3:11
- Zeph 3:5
- Zech 14:6
- Psa 37:6
- Psa 139:11
- Psa 139:12
- Job 3:20
- Job 24:14
- Job 24:16
- Job 26:10
- Job 28:11
- Job 33:28
- Job 33:30
- Job 37:21
- Job 38:19
- Prov 4:18
- Neh 8:3

### Moonlight

- Isa 13:10 Gen 1:15 Gen 1:14 Psa 74:16 der. noun
- Isa 30:26 Gen 1:17 Gen 1:15 Psa 136:7 noun
- Jer 31:35 Isa 60:19 Gen 1:16
- Ezek 32:7 Ezek 32:7 Gen 1:16 Gen 1:16

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<td>מאור</td>
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**Starlight**

Psa 148:3
Isa 13:10
Jer 31:35

**Celestial Light**

Jer 4:23 Job 33:30 Ezek 32:8 Psa 36:10 noun
Ezek 32:8 Psa 49:20 noun
Psa 56:14 [Isa 53:11] noun

**Fire**

Exo 25:37 Exo 35:8 Prov 6:23 noun Job 29:3 noun
Num 8:2 Exo 35:14 Prov 13:9 noun
Isa 27:11 Exo 35:14
Mal 1:10 Exo 35:28
Psa 105:39 Exo 39:37
Neh 9:12 Lev 24:2
Neh 9:19 Num 4:9
Num 4:16

**Lightning**

Job 36:30 Psa 77:19 Job 36:30 noun
Job 36:32 Psa 97:4 Job 37:3 noun
Job 37:3
Job 37:11
Job 37:15
Job 38:24
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**Leviathan**

Job 41:10  Job 41:24

**Light as a Generic Substance**

Isa 42:16

Eccl 2:13

Eccl 11:7

Eccl 12:2

**"Divine Light"**

Isa 2:5  Ezek 43:2  Isa 10:17  noun  Psa 27:1  noun

Isa 51:4  Psa 76:5  Psa 36:10  noun

Isa 60:1  Psa 118:27  Psa 43:3  noun

Isa 60:3  Job 25:3  noun

Isa 60:19

Isa 60:20

Mic 7:8

Psa 104:2

**Light of the Eyes**

Psa 38:11  [1 Sam 14:27]  Prov 15:30  Isa 60:1  verb

1 Sam 14:29

Psa 13:3

Psa 19:8

Prov 29:13

Ezra 9:8
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**Light of the Face**

- Prov 16:15
- Eccl 8:1
- Psa 90:8
- Job 29:24

**Ambiguous References to Light**

- Isa 42:6
- Hos 6:5 noun
- Hos 6:5 noun
- Isa 49:6
- Psa 119:130 verb
- Zech 14:7
- Job 12:25 noun
- Job 3:16
- Job 38:15 noun